

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY



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POST-WAR MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

I—THE CIVIL SERVICE

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DURING periods of industrial depression, greater importance is attached to the degree of security which particular professions afford than to the prizes they have to offer. It is because of this that, when unemployment figures outside are high, competition for entry to the Civil Service is exceptionally keen. It might be assumed that the Service is advantaged by being able to select from an excess of potential candidates made available through such circumstances, but, in my view, experience tells against such an assumption. The reasons for this are very relevant to the consideration of recruitment to the Civil Service after the war.

Many young men and women, who entered the lower and middle grades of the service during the period of industrial depression before the war, had no positive desire to become Civil Servants at all. I believe this to have been true also to some, if not to the same extent, with those who entered higher up. They were influenced by parents and teachers to choose a career which would normally be free from the risks of unemployment, in preference to one with greater appeal but less security. This is an understandable motive, but it is not necessarily the motive which provides the Public Service with the best type of recruit. The number of young men and women in the Service in the years preceding the war who had little interest in their profession but who revealed a marked desire to be doing something different was disturbingly high.

When recruitment is recommenced after the war, the functions of the Civil Service Commission might well be

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extended to enable educational work to be done in schools, and among parents and the young people themselves, in order that they may be made aware of the disadvantages as well as the advantages of Civil Service employment. Such work is particularly necessary among those who may be considering entering the Clerical and Executive grades of the Service. One of its purposes would be to show that the price which so often has to be paid for security of tenure is employment on work so much of which is inevitably monotonous and routine. Emphasis should be placed on the extent to which the division of the Civil Service into grades, and the direct recruitment from outside the Service direct to the different grades, restricts the opportunities of promotion of those who enter lower down. Potential entrants should be given helpful information about the sort of work they will have to do, according to the particular grade they may enter, for disillusionments due to ignorance on this subject have been numerous and far-reaching in their effects. The young man who enters the Customs Service in the hope of being able to match his wits against would-be law-breakers, but who finds that his working day is spent in compiling columns of figures about imports, soon loses the inspiration which originally made him choose the Civil Service as a career.

A scheme such as I have outlined might, I think, deter a number of unsuitable people from becoming Civil Servants and would certainly fortify them in their resistance against undue persuasion from teachers and parents. But it would still be necessary to have a more scientific allocation to particular Departments and to particular work than existed before the war. The practice of the Civil Service Commissioners was to send to successful candidates at examinations for the general classes of the Service lists of departments having vacancies, and to invite them to state their preferences. So often the recipients were uninformed about many things relevant to their decision and in many cases the stated choices were shots in the dark. Actually it did not matter very much, because the Commissioners were usually obliged to allocate recruits to where vacancies existed, regardless of individual preferences. I do not wish to over-emphasise the importance of initial allocation to particular departments, but I reject the view sometimes advanced that it matters very little where the new entrant is sent because he will eventually find his level.

Under existing arrangements the Civil Service Commission ceases to have any direct interest in the young Civil Servant

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after it has allocated him to his post. This I consider a serious defect. What so often happens is that the receiving department fits him in wherever staff happens to be wanted without much regard to his qualifications or temperament. If he gets along without revealing any marked signs of being out of place he is left there indefinitely or until official needs require his presence somewhere else. His transfer is then often conducted on the same completely unscientific basis. There is a system of probation, extending from one to two years, during which period the newcomer is supposed to be under special surveillance with a view to determining his suitability for Civil Service employment. More often than not, however, the person of doubtful fitness, instead of being re-allocated to another post or, in bad cases, told that it is in his best interest to find other employment, is conveniently hidden away where his deficiencies are unlikely to come to light or to create any embarrassment for his immediate chiefs. The motive may be a kindly one, but I believe it to be bad. The Civil Service Commissioners should remain responsible for the newcomers for a period after entry, and should receive reports upon their work and suitability. Where necessary, they should be empowered to re-allocate them to other departments, if experience shows the first choice to have been wrong. A more rigid application of the probationary system should be enforced to ensure the retirement from the Civil Service of those who, in their early years, give evidence that they have mischosen their careers, for it is a cruelty and not a kindness to condemn young men and women to a lifetime of unsuitable employment where they will become progressively more unhappy.

TRAINING

The training of Civil Servants is a matter to which a good deal of attention has recently been paid. This is all to the good and is in striking contrast to the indifference which existed towards this subject before the war. At present a Committee appointed by the late Chancellor is investigating the whole subject, including the recommendation of the Select Committee on National Expenditure in favour of the creation of a Staff College.

One cannot help noticing a certain confusion among those who are most enthusiastic about the need for training schemes; few of them seem to agree as to the precise purposes which these schemes should serve. It is scarcely necessary to suggest that until these purposes are clearly defined, the nature of the

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training to be given cannot be usefully settled. One of the causes of confusion is the tremendous range of functions performed by Civil Servants and the wide differences which exist between the work of the different grades. Subjects admirably suited to the needs of trainees in the Administrative Class might be of very limited value to members of the lower grades, only an insignificant number of whom are likely to reach the highest levels. It is necessary, therefore, to deal with the question in stages.

Administrative Grades.—In my view the most important part of the training in the Administrative Class should have to do with people and affairs. The present arrangement, which enables young men and women from the Universities to begin and end their official lives in the Whitehall headquarters of a Ministry, without having any real experience of what might be termed the "front-line" of their Departments, is bad. In Departments such as the Ministry of Labour and the Assistance Board, it should be possible, for example, for new entrants to the Administrative Class to spend some part of their training period in performing the actual work in the Exchanges and the Area Offices and having physical contact with the Departments' clients. They should also take refresher courses from time to time afterwards to enable the Administrative side of the Department to be kept up to date with the "front-line" work. One of the common complaints made by the men and women who have to deal with the public is that the instructions and regulations to which they work, and which emanate from the Administrative sides of their Departments, show a lack of knowledge of the human and practical considerations involved. This gives rise to a feeling of hostility between the Administrative and the Executive Branches of Departments. Much could be done to eradicate this by ensuring closer contacts between those who formulate instructions and those who have to put them into effect.

There are, of course, Departments of the Public Service where arrangements for periodical contact between members of the Administrative Class and the public which the Department serves cannot be so easily arranged. It is also conceivable that the public interest might not be advantaged by too close a relationship of this sort in some areas of the Service. But it is doubtful if there is any Branch of the Public Service where scope does not exist for a greater measure of contact and understanding than exists at the present time. The nature of

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the contacts, the precise purposes they are to serve, and the limitations to be put upon them are all problems which need detailed consideration.

Other Grades.—Training schemes for the middle and the lower grades of the Civil Service are more difficult to devise. No uniform scheme is likely to prove of much value, since the functions performed by the Executive and Clerical grades of one Department may have little or no bearing upon those of another Department. To the extent to which there is a case for vocational training, it should be provided more on a Departmental than a general basis. In the major Departments, the work divides itself under a few main headings, and there should be no difficulty in arranging that, during the first few years of service, the young Civil Servant is given tuition in the main functions which his Department exists to serve and in the machinery existing to perform those functions in the different sub-departments. He could graduate, for example, in one of the large Central Registries through which most of the incoming and outgoing correspondence passes, and, from his experience there he would become familiar with the "lay-out" of the Department. He could, in turn, be passed on to each of the main sections so that, at the end of a few years, he would be familiar in a general way with the organisation, and, as he passed to more important work, he would be assisted by the background of knowledge acquired in the training period. To-day there are in the large Government Departments men and women of mature years whose experience has been limited to one or two sections and who are as unfamiliar as any outsider with what goes on elsewhere in their own Ministries.

Apart from the departmental training to which I have referred, centralised specialist courses could be devised. Audit and accounting work suggest themselves immediately as examples. Those duties have to be performed in almost all departments, but no training facilities are provided by the State. Moreover, as allocations to particular work are carried out at the present time so unscientifically, there is little incentive to Civil Servants to devote their leisure time to equipping themselves in particular subjects as there is no sort of assurance that these particular qualifications will be of any official use. There are other well-defined pieces of work in the Public Service which are carried out according to certain general rules and under certain well-defined systems. It would be of great practical advantage to the Service if, under a Directorate of

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Training, which might be a separate Department of the Service, or allied to the existing Civil Service Commission, provision for vocational training were introduced and opportunities given to Civil Servants to equip themselves with particular qualifications with some assurance that the equipment would not later be wasted by faulty and unscientific allocation.

I have said nothing so far about the idea of a Staff College for the Civil Service, and I don't propose to spend very much time on it. The sponsors of that idea have yet to produce any cogent arguments in its support, or, indeed, any clear exposition of their ideas. I do not believe that a Staff College can offer any advantages which cannot be provided within the Service itself, if the problem of training is dealt with in a scientific fashion and takes full account of the importance of ensuring the maximum of contact, commensurate with the maintenance of essential integrity, between Civil Servants and the community which they serve. The idea of a Staff College, as it emerged in the Report of the Select Committee, had a very unenthusiastic reception in the Civil Service, where it is regarded, particularly among the middle and lower grades, with a good deal of suspicion. In the nature of the case, the number of persons who can be given such advantages as a Staff College can offer must always be a meagre proportion of the total. There is the suspicion that a vested interest will develop in which the selected, those who select them, and those responsible for the administration of the Staff College, will combine to justify choices made. In the result the College will become less of a valuable training ground than a restricted inlet into the higher grades of the Service. The many, on whom the preferment has not fallen, will know at a disturbingly early point in their official careers that an upper limit has been imposed upon them, beyond which they cannot hope to pass, no matter how brilliantly they may acquit themselves in their official work.

PROMOTION

I turn now to the question of promotion, the most vexed of all Civil Service questions. Contrary to commonly held view, competition for promotion in the Civil Service is so keen as to be almost unhealthy, and something needs to be done to minimise the importance which Civil Servants attach to it. The position in the lower and middle grades of the Service—and since these comprise the overwhelming majority of the staffs, consideration of their situation is very appropriate—is a some-

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what complicated one. For promotions from one area to another merit is regarded as the dominant consideration; age and experience are not of themselves assets, and, in certain instances, may be positive disqualifications. I cite, by way of example, promotions from the Clerical to the Executive grades, where the emphasis is on youth and receptivity rather than on seniority and experience. By way of contrast, however, are the promotions from the clerical to the supervisory and controlling grades, in which the important factor is maturity and experience. In their early years of service, among the young men and women who aspire to enter the Executive class, there is a concentration of effort which is, in some respects, disproportionate to the limited possibilities of promotion or indeed to the benefits which may accrue from it. Leisure time is assiduously devoured in taking courses in subjects which may be thought to brighten the prospects of selection, and degrees and diplomas are collected, for the main purpose of being used to dazzle promotion boards. All this takes place during the late teens and the early twenties, and so much of this effort is of the "cramming" kind. In the result, many of the younger generation of Civil Servants have overdrawn on their mental and physical energies during the period when their leisure time could, from the point of view of physical and full mental development, have been more profitably spent. Moreover, as some 50 per cent of the posts in the Executive grades are filled by direct entry from the open examinations, and because the number of aspirants for promotion always greatly exceeds the number of promotees, the proportion of disappointments is bound to be high. Disillusionment at the end of a process of concentrated preparation is a bitter blow made worse because, when these young people pass beyond the age when they are serious candidates for Executive promotion, their remaining hope lies in getting into the supervisory grades. But for such promotions, influenced as they are by seniority and maturity, they must wait a very long time, often as long as from fifteen to twenty years. It is this system which deadens their hopes and causes them to develop a negative attitude towards their profession.

The principle of selecting men and women for promotion to the supervising and controlling posts in the Civil Service rests upon the assumption that long years of being supervised makes supervisors of those who have suffered. The actual formula upon which selection boards work in picking out controlling

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and supervising officers is "seniority combined with merit." The first qualification is acquired by mere endurance; the second by punctuality, good conduct and avoidance of difficulty with supervising officers. The time when these qualifications may receive their reward varies tremendously from Department to Department according to the nature of the work and the amount of supervision required. Very often the first promotion which a Civil Servant achieves is in his late forties or his early fifties. Armed with the qualifications I have mentioned, he proceeds to take control of younger men and women who are passing through the same painful process as that from which he has belatedly emerged.

In the Administrative and Professional areas of the Civil Service, the position is, of course, very different. Promotion comes more rapidly, and the work upon which the less exalted members of these Classes are engaged is more interesting and enables mental vigour to be maintained to a much greater extent. If it were possible to hold out to the lower grades of the Civil Service the same expectations that exist higher up, there would be no very great problem to solve, but the Civil Service, shaped and organised as it is, cannot have prizes of equal value on offer at every stage in the hierarchy.

I have referred to the promotion problem in the Civil Service, not in the sense that there is any difficulty in selecting as many people as are necessary for the more responsible duties, but in the sense of dealing with that vast number for whom prospects of any advancement beyond the first step or two on the ladder are small indeed. I believe the natural difficulties to have been increased by the creation of an unnecessary number of grades. Experience during the war has thrown a new light on this problem. Overtime is being worked on an unprecedented scale, but the actual cash rewards for overtime diminish in value the higher one proceeds until, at the Staff Officer and equivalent levels, no additional payments are made for overtime at all. This has resulted in members of the lower grades, because of their more favourable overtime conditions, earning more money than their official superiors, for working shorter hours. In spite of this the competition to enter the higher ranks, far from diminishing, has, if anything, become more acute, and it is an interesting commentary on the outlook of Civil Servants that so many of them are prepared to suffer a drop in total earnings in return for entry into the higher posts. This experience confirms the view that the Civil Servant is,

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perhaps, more concerned about status and standing than he is about the additional pay which employment in the higher posts normally provides.

A partial solution of the promotion problem would be the elimination of some of the present grading divisions and the abolition of direct recruitment to posts above those in the basic class. I see no reason for the separation into a class of its own of the Executive work of the Civil Service; nor do I believe it necessary that the greater number of posts in the Administrative Class should be filled from persons who have not passed through the ranks but who enter direct from the Universities. It is necessary, of course, that the intake to the Civil Service should be related to our educational system and that the graduate as well as the product of the Secondary School should have the opportunity of a Civil Service career. It would be possible, however, to arrange for the intake to be to a basic class and for different rates of pay to operate on appointment which took account of the age of entry. Posts beyond the level of what is now termed "Administrative Principal," i.e. posts in the highest groups of the Administrative Class, could continue to be filled by the most careful selection from below, and in this specially preserved area would be the Assistant Secretaries, Principal Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and Permanent Secretaries. Below these could be one main Class for the performance of the less important Administrative work and for the Executive and Clerical work of the Service. A lengthy scale of pay would have to be devised to cover this very wide range of functions. It would be necessary to interpose efficiency barriers at certain points in this scale, and progress beyond these points would not be made without a certificate of capacity to perform the higher ranges of work. The severity of the test could become greater as the stages became higher. Failure to pass beyond the next efficiency barrier would be remediable, in those cases where the necessary ability was present, by a greater attention to the particular deficiencies that had been responsible for initial failure. Under such an arrangement it would be possible to relate the quality of the work done more closely to the salary received, and the almost unhealthy attention now paid to status and standing would be very much reduced. The element of chance which now enters into the promotion competition, and which is accentuated because the ratio of higher to lower posts varies as between Departments, would be largely eliminated, and the Civil Servant would not

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be advantaged or disadvantaged by the fortuitous circumstance of where he happens to be employed.

The form of organisation I have propounded cuts right across the present conception and could, indeed, be considered unnecessarily revolutionary if its only purpose were to provide a more ordered system of promotion than we have to-day. But in my view it possesses advantages apart from those related to promotion. Even if this were not the case, however, I would still submit it for careful consideration, for until we do something to decrease the importance which is attached to status, dissatisfaction will continue to run high. I believe that the scheme I have propounded would serve to destroy a good deal of this dissatisfaction, and it would certainly do away with the excessive sub-division of work from which the Service suffers to-day—a sub-division which cannot be justified by reference to the nature of the functions performed or the compartments into which those functions appropriately fit.

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II—RESEARCH, INTELLIGENCE AND ADMINISTRATION

By HAROLD LASKI

I
THE relation of the modern state in Great Britain to research and intelligence is as inadequate as it is complicated. The fact that our society is overwhelmingly based upon the assumptions, first, that private ownership in the means of production gives better results than public ownership, and, second, that implied in the fact of private ownership is the need for secrecy in discovery, has meant that, in the scientific field, the place of government has always been both dubious and haphazard. The fact, further, that ours is so gravely unequal a society response to demand in which is rarely proportionate to need has meant that the use of modern techniques for eliciting information, even upon a confidential plane, has been very slowly adopted, even where its immense possibilities are known. Though the

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requirements of two world wars in a single generation have both elevated the status of the scientist in government employ, and hastened the effort of the administrator to find out, as in the realm of food, for example, what demands he must satisfy; it is difficult to feel that the official world, whether of the politician or of the civil servant, has worked out any effective foundations of a permanent policy either in scientific research or in the gathering and dissemination of information. In both realms the main features of policy have been timidity and niggardliness; and there is little to suggest that the experience of the present war is likely to drive home its lessons.

No brief discussion can pretend to describe the organisation of the complicated machinery of research and intelligence in the British Government; under the first head, that has been done in critical detail by Professor J. D. Bernal¹, and it is in itself significant that no comparable description of the second exists. Until the war, the Stationery Office published, indeed, an invaluable guide to the available statistics, and, from time to time, the reports of Royal Commissions, Departmental Committees, of officials like the Chief Inspector of Factories, or the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, of commercial attachés or consular officials in the Foreign Service, provided important material. A mass of important knowledge, of course, had been accumulated over the years by Departments like the Board of Inland Revenue, the Home Office, and the Board of Agriculture. Most government offices had their intelligence branches, and even their public relations officer. Yet no survey of the whole but must emphasise the general incoherence of the pattern involved. There was little co-ordination; there was no effective machinery for publicity; there was no real attempt to integrate the work, or the needs, of government with those of outside bodies. The scientific enquirer, whether in the natural sciences or in the field of social studies, was everywhere subordinate to the administrator, with the result that the complexion of the government in office had far too great an influence both on the nature and range of the problems investigated. Above all, the total amount of money expended upon research and intelligence work was pitifully small, both directly and indirectly. No one could look at the whole picture and infer from its character that the British Government understood either the implications of modern science or the possibilities inherent in the investigation of social phenomena.

¹ *The Social Function of Science*. (1939.) Esp. chap. 17.

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Above all, the incoherence of its attitude in both realms, its discontinuity, and the absence of any organised method of surveying the problems by which it was confronted present features by which it is difficult not to be disturbed.

II

The answer, no doubt, to the general problem is a willingness to spend more money; but it is only a partial answer. The scale of expenditure is important; but hardly less important are the related issues of who are to decide the objects of expenditure, the status of those who investigate, the methods by which investigation is to be undertaken, and the difference between short-term and long-term expenditure. All of these, it must be emphasised, are matters closely bound-up with the nature of British society. So long as it rejects the idea that we must plan the objectives at which we are to aim; so long, even more, as it identifies the idea of planned objectives with bureaucracy and the denial of freedom; so long as its statesmen and men of affairs regard the scientist, whether in the field of human, or the field of non-human, relations, as an individualist amateur who would be spoilt by professional recognition; we shall lack the knowledge that is appropriate to wise action. It is, in fact, inherent in the unequal society which, despite universal suffrage, Great Britain remains, that neither in the natural nor in the social sciences is research attempted on a scale that is proportionate to our problems. War apart, life is a gracious and pleasant thing for our rulers; unless some problem presses, or some individual minister has an interest in a particular scheme, it is highly unlikely that large-scale expenditure will pass the scrutiny of the lynx-eyed Treasury. The result is the simple one that we not only do not spend the money which might give us the knowledge we require; we even lack the organisation which could spend the money if Parliament were asked to vote it. Only in the single field of defence, and there, for the most part, only in periods of actual crisis, are the national purse-strings loosened. We confront the problems of the twentieth century in a frame of mind which was outmoded at the time when, a century and a half ago, the Smithsonian Institution was founded for "the increase and diffusion of knowledge amongst men".

Let us note, first, how much of the vital enquiry in modern times has been the outcome of private zeal either only partially, or not at all, assisted by the Government. The famous Survey

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of London by Charles Booth, and that of York by Seebohm Rowntree, were the work of private individuals; the first was repeated, half a century later, by the London School of Economics and Political Science, the second, after a generation, again by Mr. Rowntree. Most of the important work on the national income and its distribution has been done by academic persons like Professor A. L. Bowley; books like the once indispensable "Progress of the Nation," by A. R. Porter, has had no government successor. Our criminal statistics are lamentable; there is no adequate census of production; there is no census of housing which, even before 1939, would have enabled an argument on housing programmes to proceed from agreed factual premises. The Home Office knew nothing of penal experiment in the U.S.S.R.; it required violent outbreaks in the West Indies to secure an attempt at serious insight into their social and economic conditions. Almost all our anthropological work was the outcome of private investigation; and, once again, neither the India Office nor the Colonial office had any knowledge of what was being done to destroy illiteracy in the Soviet Union. The serious attempt to train members of the civil service to ask the right questions can hardly be said even to have reached its infant stage. There was no central statistical office as a service institution for government before the war began. And if one moves from the realm of measurable fact—the number of unemployed, for example—upon which taxation depended, into the realm of more impalpable opinion, at best, the Government was largely dependent upon what information it could gather from those elements in the community, for the most part powerful elements, which had taken pains to organise themselves to protect some interest with which they were concerned.

If the position in the natural sciences was better, it was not outstandingly better. No doubt certain Government institutions, like the National Physical Laboratory and the Geological Survey, had immense achievements to their credit. No doubt, also, from time to time, a Minister, like Lord Haldane, showed both interest in, and understanding of, the place of science in the community. But all the major scientific institutions, the Royal Society, the Royal Institution, the university laboratories, the British Association, to take obvious examples, were dependent upon private benefaction for their main opportunities; the Rockefeller Foundation has spent more, since it was created, on scientific research than the British Government.

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And where the knowledge existed, there was no assurance that it would be used. The experience of Sir Ronald Ross with malaria exemplifies the static approach of Whitehall to the use of knowledge which, if applied, would alter decisively the environment with which it deals. Nor must we forget, as Sir F. G. Hopkins has pointed out, that the work generally of the Medical Research Council suffers seriously from the fact that the organisation of the profession sets its effort in an excessively clinical aspect, and fails to give due regard to the scientific background in which it should be set.¹

Nor can one omit the problem of delay in tackling an issue. Had miners' nystagmus or silicosis been the general threat to the population that cholera was a century ago, it is difficult to believe that enquiry would have been so dilatory or remedy so belated. It has taken the Government thirty years and more to revise the cost of living index; though it has been a common theme of every wage enquiry that the index was a pathetic anachronism. Broadly, indeed, both in the social and in the natural sciences, it is not unreasonable to argue that the attitude of the Government to research and intelligence is still built on the assumption that its essential function is a negative one. Bodies like the National Chemical Laboratory are little more than an adjunct of the Board of Trade for the purpose of analysis. Bodies like the Fuel Research Board leave an essential investigation like hydrogenation to I.C.I.

Nor is it easy to speak with enthusiasm of the part played by the Government in industrial research. The associations initiated after the first World War by the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research, some twenty in number, hardly cover half the field of production; they lack adequate funds for large-scale effort, and they are handicapped by the secrecy of process to which most firms cling where they are not inhibited in development by our patent laws. Those institutions which are, like the Forests Products Institute and the Building Research Institute, directly under the Government, have a better record; though one has only to read the Reports of the Advisory Council of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to realise that their work has not yet been genuinely integrated with the policy-making branches of the Government.²

¹ Proc. Roy. Soc. (1934.) Vol. 148, pp. 24-5.

² As for instance the comments, in the Report for 1932-3, of the Advisory Committee on the lamentable results of the disappearance of the Empire Marketing Board.

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But perhaps nothing better illustrates the scope of the problem than the policy of the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research in making grants to students. Our universities every year turn out some 2,000 graduates in the natural sciences, pure and applied. Of these, on the average, some eighty receive grants; and perhaps, again on the average, some thirty of these embark upon a career of research in industry. The grants are limited to £120 per annum, though they may amount to £250 per annum at Oxford and Cambridge. It is difficult not to conclude from such a position either that the universities train a very small proportion of students fit for industrial research, or, alternatively, that the Government and business men have jointly made up their minds that the promotion of science in a positive way by the State is definitely undesirable.

Anyone, in fact, who surveys the whole field will find himself driven to some obvious conclusions:

1. The funds at the disposal of research are utterly inadequate.
2. Neither the salary nor the status of the Government researcher is adequate.
3. The pattern of administrative organisation is awkward, lacking in integration, and defective in comprehensiveness.
4. The relation of research to administration is gravely defective. The control of research is mostly, both in the natural and the social sciences, in the hands of men who have no serious acquaintance with the possibilities of either.
5. There is no properly thought-out policy for long-time research. It is an issue with which the most important civil servants are, outside the Defence departments, rarely acquainted, and it seldom reaches the level of ministerial discussion.
6. There is no properly thought-out attempt to use the universities, or bodies like the Royal Society, to make investigations of an independent character into the problems with which the community is concerned.
7. Every stage in the development of research by Government, whether in the natural or the social sciences, is marked by an excessive, indeed an outrageous, tenderness for existing vested interests.
8. No proper method exists in any Government department for securing awareness of the relevant work achieved by scientists in foreign countries. This unawareness is especially notable in the case of the U.S.S.R.

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9. The sacrifice of the endowment of research to the easy road of direct subsidy to the industry concerned, so notable in the inter-war years in agriculture, exhibits in the Government a preference for the short-term, as against the long-term view, which is bound to have evil results. It is difficult not to associate this preference with the power of vested interests, in agriculture those of the farmers and landowners, to obscure the claims of science with its power to lower costs and to change habits. In this field, the failure, between 1919 and 1939, to apply the discoveries of the science of nutrition is an outstanding example of administrative inadequacy in the utilisation of new knowledge.

10. It is difficult to see evidence of any attempt on the part of Government to set the problems of science in the full and coherent perspective that would give its possibilities their due place in the life of the nation. On the contrary, the evidence is rather of piecemeal thinking. The problems of civil aviation, for example, are rarely related to the issues of aerodrome-sites, economic air-routes, house-design, because the civil servants responsible do not compel attention to the fact that land-ownership, national sovereignty, and tradition in building and architecture, all stand in the way of the potentialities before us. There is no plane of thought in the organisation of the British Government which assures this kind of wholesale consideration of science.

11. It is important to note that little effort is made by Government to make public, even to embark upon, the enquiries which would reveal the waste in modern industry. We have no studies of adequate dimensions on the costs of distribution, especially of advertising, of the maintenance of a great mass of small retail traders. I am using examples only; but it is difficult not to feel that the failure to use "rationalisation" in this realm is largely due to the fact that a middle-class democracy like Great Britain does not desire to offend the farmer and the small trader, who are the two most consistently conservative elements in the community.

12. No one can fail to see, in any examination of the relations between Government and the social and natural sciences in this country how much they are still dominated (1) by the theological inheritance of our society and (2) by the individualist approach which still believes that the scientist's passion for knowledge as an end in itself colours the organisation upon which we depend. An example of the first is the difficulty of getting an adequate endowment from public funds for research

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into the methods of birth-control. While it is, no doubt, true that the pleasure of discovery is a real motive in any investigator of quality, it is certainly by no means either the only, or even the first, of the investigator's motives. And it is highly probable that the emphasis on this individualist approach results in (1) the assumption that scientific discovery will take care of itself; (2) the inadequate provision of the assistance the scientist needs; and (3) inadequate co-ordination of research activities—there can be little doubt that all this in great part reflects, as the great chemist Fritz Haber pointed out, the habit of mind of the English gentleman. Our civil service approaches the relations of Government to the sciences in this mood.¹

13. A further weakness is the age of those who are charged with the direction of these relations. A Minister of the Crown is likely to be in his middle fifties; it is rare for a permanent secretary of a department to be less than fifty; the average age of the advisory councils on science in the departments of State is sixty-three; the result is that the needs of the new generation are being passed upon by the one that is coming to its close. While there is, no doubt, an important truth in the fact that maturity brings a certain experience and judgment, there is a not less important truth in the need, above all in this realm, for a certain audacity and experimentalism which only the outstanding Minister and the quite exceptional civil servant are likely, after middle age has been reached, to possess.

14. A real danger exists in our system in the implications of the relationship between the administrator and industry. The civil servant who hopes, on leaving the department to which he belongs, to become a director of one of the great corporations will be anxious, even if unconsciously, not to offend it. Just as inventions are suppressed because they may mean injury to existing interests, for example, expensive alterations in plant, so it may be recommended that an investigation be not undertaken, or some proposed change be underrated, lest it mean a conflict between the administrator and a big firm. Or the official may desire to safeguard his Minister from the difficulties involved in some proposed innovation or enquiry. I have been told, on good authority, that the placing of orders for the making of tanks in a British Dominion was postponed during the whole of the first year of this war for fear of repercussions in the House of Commons from members, in both parties, concerned to safeguard the interests of the steel

¹ Bernal. *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

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industry after the war. I suggest that no small part of the reason for the backwardness of Indian industrial development will be found in this realm.

15. Another real danger, especially in the realm of social science, comes from the Departmental desire to "let well alone." *Quieta non movere* is an axiom of official wisdom. There grows up in every Ministry a bias in favour of a particular line of policy; and the research favoured is the research which proves that this policy is valid. Between the wars, tank-enthusiasts suffered when their C.I.G.S. at the War Office had been brought up as a cavalry officer. The naval men who believed, in the same period, that an aeroplane could sink a battleship did not find promotion easy. Nothing would induce the Treasury, until the outbreak of war, to recognise the validity, much less the importance, of Lord Keynes's views. "With us," Mr. Nevinston was told in India by an official, "with us a pro-native is a rank outsider." Again, I give examples only; but it is worth adding that, in the choice of temporary civil servants during the war-period, it has been more forgivable to have been known as an enthusiastic supporter of General Franco than to have been marked down even as a critical supporter of Marshal Stalin, before 1939-41. The outcome of this attitude is the important one that conformity and conventionalism are the highway to posts of importance, and the limits of what is in fact practicable, even within the framework of our system, are set far lower than they need to be.

16. A final danger, which must strike the observer, is that there is little opportunity in the British scheme of organisation for the researcher in the natural or the social sciences to show his powers as an administrator, save by accident, and all the vital places are reserved for the administrator. While it is no doubt true that it is sheer waste to allow a man of the ability of Joseph Henry to spend on the organisation of the Smithsonian Institution powers that might have made him a name like that of Clark-Maxwell or Willard Gibbs, it is also true that it is thoroughly unsatisfactory to allow the administrator the final say in the judgment of scientific proposals. To be a scientist is, no doubt, to be a specialist; but the possession of a specialism does not exclude that faculty of commonsense which the administrator is supposed to possess in a degree which the scientist does not share. In fact, this is a matter to be assessed separately in each individual. Lord Rutherford had a

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magnificent fund of commonsense; it is not easy to feel, on the record, that in the years of Mr. Chamberlain's ascendancy, Sir Horace Wilson could have rivalled him in this regard. Not until the judgment of the researcher's plans is set by considerations wider than those which now obtain shall we have attained a satisfactory relationship. And this is true even though it be the case that few men with first-rate gifts for research will wish to devote their main energies to administration.

III

I cannot even attempt here to outline what seem to me the changes that are desirable in the organisation I have been discussing. It must suffice to say that, in my own view, the changes that are required are of a major character. The relation of Government to science in Great Britain still exhibits, at almost every point, the characteristics of a state-power that is essentially and inherently negative in character. Partly, that is because our society is still overwhelmingly geared to the profit-making motive; and its operation necessarily results in the frustration of science. For the greater the degree in which organised knowledge makes us the masters of Nature, the more possible becomes an economics of abundance. Our whole theory of society is predominantly built on an economics of scarcity. The actual function of government is not the maximum possible fulfilment of demand, but the fulfilment of that portion of effective demand to which we are limited by the requirements of a capitalist democracy. Within this ambit, no government could transcend the postulates upon which it was built. Immediately we begin to scrutinise those postulates, it becomes obvious that they are a technique not of fulfilment but of frustration.

We could not, for instance, seriously hope to maintain them and realise Sir John Orr's programme for nutrition. We could not hope to maintain them, either, and achieve, at a high standard, a programme of full employment. It is at least doubtful whether we could rapidly introduce the developments that are becoming possible as a result of the study of fibres in clothing without grave trouble. The same is true of housing, of town-planning, of transportation. The problem of the health of our population exists on one plane when we think of a socialised medical service; but it exists on a very different plane when the services of medicine are a commodity largely bought and sold in terms of a medical profession the members

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of which are concerned with the making of profit. The future of machinery in its effect on the worker is one thing if the instruments of production are privately owned; it is another and a very different future, if machinery comes to be owned by the community, and private profit can cease to be regarded. Above all, the kind of educational system we can contemplate in a system run for the private profit of a few, bears no relation to the kind of educational system we can begin to contemplate if the well-being of the community is the test by which our effort is directed.

It is imperative to be clear that the relation of government to scientific enquiry in all realms of knowledge is given by the postulates of our existing system. Those postulates involve, on a large scale, the frustration, conscious and unconscious, of scientific possibility. Inventions are suppressed because they will not pay. Enquiries are not undertaken because their results would be disturbing. Difficulties are not faced because they are not felt as oppressive by the men and women who command purchasing power. In a society like ours scientific knowledge is necessarily subordinated to an end it cannot define. That end is given by those who rule the society in which we live; and, in a major degree, progress in science is a function which is determined by those rulers.

Not, indeed, wholly determined. The implications of scientific change are beyond the knowledge even of those who possess the power of the state. They can set the problems, ask the questions; they can never know with any certainty what will be done with the answers. It is obviously important that Great Britain, in the next epoch, will have to prove the validity of the postulates upon which its social system is built over against the outcome of the very different postulates upon which the Soviet Union is built. It is obviously important, also, that, in increasing measure, the British scientist is impatient of the constraints laid upon him by the limitations of a democracy that is contained within the envelope of capitalism. It is significant, too, that there is a growing tendency among men of science, in the field of nature as well as in the humanistic studies, to recognise their obligation as citizens; here, without doubt, the impact of Fascism upon the scientist has been to emphasise the fragility of any liberal and progressive outlook that is taken for granted. The scientist is slowly coming to realise, what the worker has always known, that freedom must be taken and can never be conceded.

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The future relations of Government with science and intelligence must take serious account of these considerations. None of them, I must emphasise, means for one moment that the victory of freedom and democracy is secure; not even the defeat of Nazi Germany offers any such security. At best, it creates the conditions in which freedom and democracy are possible. But it still leaves their conquest as a major task for the next age to fulfil. And it leaves it upon the basis of an understanding that retrogression is as possible as advance, that the relations we have so far built between science, intelligence, and the state-power set the two former in a context of which the last is the master. And the state-power is not, and cannot be, a neutral agent. Its authority is in the hands of those who own and operate the instruments of production. If there is to be a change in the purposes to which it is devoted, there must be a change in the relations of production. In the making of that change, it would be foolish to regard the officials of our Government as the enemy; but, equally, it would be foolish to regard them as our friends. Their direction will be determined by the volume of power that freedom and democracy can organise in their service. They will become devoted to their achievement in the degree that they are successful. For every state belongs to the men who have the courage to take possession of its authority.

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By TOM HARRISSON

“**I** DON'T expect many social changes in *practical* form—but I do think the war has already shaken many people, once apathetic because they felt secure and did not know other people's lives, into at least an interest in securing healthier and less degrading conditions for the working people of this country.”

Thus a young married soldier, about “after the war.” He echoes a by now familiar and ever-growing attitude of mixed doubt and hope, apathy and alertness. There has been a considerable and increasing concern, in the columns of the *New Statesman* and elsewhere, to some extent with this attitude (though its importance is still much under-estimated), to a larger extent with the political set-up which will eventually have to

face this reconditioned (or de-conditioned) public. In particular, there is leftish concern at the returned confidence of Conservatism. Because the Right was quiet in 1940 and 1941, dark years when all men's goodwill was needed for survival, many leftward minds seem to have assumed a change of heart to match the tongue. But naturally, when things get "better," when the siren's wail is dim, and unity less vital, hidden faces again pop eagerly out from behind the camouflage nets. Belatedly, the Left are having to recognise that their future fight may be tough. That Social Change which 1941 writers like J. B. Priestley and Ritchie Calder wrote about as if it had already begun, via blitzes and British Restaurants, seems less certain now. The Tories re-emerge with new assurance, while Labour hopes uncertainly. Politics consists in manipulating, if possible successfully, the "natural", "automatic" trends, for group interests, if necessary, into other channels than those they would normally follow. Not only in Britain, but throughout the world, strong forces of self-interest as well as deep tides of human mood and distress, are lining up for a catharsis of civilisation in the years ahead, the years of Theoretical Peace. What objective evidence can we now adduce about the probable emergent political pattern? Data accumulates and certain tentative, limited, answers can be attempted.

This is an impersonal attempt: First, here at home . . . The commonest single belief among politicians seems to be that at the next General Election, whatever Party or Group Winston Churchill heads will win (e.g. *Spectator*, September 3rd; *Tribune*, October 22nd; Nicholas Davenport in *Evening Standard*, November 3rd; Michael Foot in *Evening Standard*, November 23rd). Some Conservatives claim to be eager for a straight poll, like Colonel Arthur Evans, M.P., at the Annual Conference of Conservative Clubs of Wales (August 14th), though Colonel Harold Mitchell, M.P., Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party, at a Birmingham Conservative Conference (July 24th), describes the party truce as "still needed when war ends." Although, by the coal debate of early October, Churchill had allegedly given up hope of a post-war coalition, A. V. Alexander, of the tiny Co-operative Party, still advocates (November 13th), and Sir Stafford Cripps, the able man without a party, also favours some form of non-party co-operation (November 20th, Bristol). In doubtful times, the Conservative Party itself tends to neo-fragmentation and a temporary leftish wing; this time it is the Tory Reform Committee, first prominent in October, and

already effective in jockeying the party towards verbal acceptance of some planning ideas. This group is not, of course, by any means a new *movement*. It is revealing already a strong line in favour of permanent coalition (e.g. Chairman, Viscount Hinchingsbrooke, M.P., speaking at Shrewsbury, November 27th; star Quintin Hogg, M.P., writing in *Evening Standard*, November 24th). Such tendencies imply that thoughtful Tories are far from sure of a solo success post-war.

Meanwhile Labour is increasingly split on Coal, Workmen's Compensation and other issues; so much so that Herbert Morrison has publicly warned the party of its approximation to the pre-war literal split-up (November 13th), a warning that has not spared him Mosley anger. The rank and file of Labour M.P.'s suspect another 1931 trap. Many evidently consider Churchill can carry the post-war election, and that they must work for victory only in a *second* post-war election. It can by no means be said that Labour is in very confident mood. Rather they are showing once more their old "fear of power," rationalised into an exaggerated estimate of differences, and lately symbolised by the "safety-first" trend in the Parliamentary Party elections, which put Emanuel Shinwell off the Administrative Committee. Some months ago I remarked, at a research meeting, that social surveys suggested a probable Labour victory, by a wide margin, at the next election, if Labour played now for success. Next day, a famous Labour journalist rang me up to query this "amazing statement," and another wrote me asking for substantiation of "so extravagant a claim." The basis for my remarks will be examined below; so far I wish only to re-emphasise Labour nervousness, Churchill overshadowing.

Common Wealth show no such nervousness. Having won its first by-election at Eddisbury (September) and polled at recent by-elections 54,000 votes, it announced (*Observer*, October 3rd) the intention of running 120 candidates in the next general election. Sir Richard Acland, M.P., Chairman, declares for an outright attack on "the whole conception of a capitalist community," expresses a readiness to fight with and, if necessary, under the Labour Party, provided they discontinue "an official policy of compromising with capitalism" (Plymouth, August 18th). The temper of his party personnel is confident too! But among M.P.'s of all established parties there is nervousness, nervousness at the uncertain future after an unprecedented parliamentary life of nine years, in which a third of the original members, elected on Baldwinism, serving under three kings

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and three Prime Ministers, have died or been elevated to "higher" appointments. One hundred and seventeen M.P.'s have entered the House without any real election, in effect by party caucus nomination.

This record prolonging of parliamentary life is generally regarded, in the lobbies, as due for decess in the 10th year, so strained is the gulf becoming between initial vote and current, dating result. Equally strained and stale is the electorate itself—stale two ways. First, through the inevitable moratorium on direct politics, and the 1939-43 effect on confusion of current thought. Second, through vast movements of population and the out-of-datedness of the last register. By the next election, *very few people under thirty will have voted at all*. The whole basis of our democracy has thus been shelved, dangerously. The new legislation now passing into operation (second reading October 26th), establishing a temporary register for any election, comes just in time. The bigger problem of long overdue seat redistribution looms ahead (*Times*, October 20th, 1943). Labour feels a full redistribution would spread party gains and losses fairly evenly, while a *partial* one might be greatly to Tory advantage. Of the constituencies cited as examples in the report of the Committee on Electoral Machinery, five in six with deficient electorates are represented by Labour members, four in six with excessive electorates by Conservatives. Only 27,000 N. Southwark electors could vote for or against George Isaacs as their parliamentary representative; 188,000 decided on John Parker for Romford. Labour favours a common qualification for local elections, but many Conservative local authorities seem likely to oppose the change, which is indeed unlikely to favour them, by admitting more poorer, younger, non-householding folk.

So much for the top level. Now for the big, wide bottom. Let us see the available evidence here. First, this question of Churchill. The common editorial and M.P. assumption of his post-war potency finds relatively little support in studies of public, let alone private, opinion. Supremely popular as he is to-day, this is closely associated with the idea of Winston the War Leader, Bulldog of Battle, etc. Ordinary people widely assume that after the war he'll rest on his magnificent laurels. If he doesn't, many say they will withdraw support, believing him no man of peace, of domestic policy, or human detail. This comes up over and over again in diaries, letters, talk. It is harder for people to express such sentiments publicly about

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the chief loyalty figure and security symbol in war-time, but mass-observation had made many studies of Churchill popularity, short-term and long. While he has outstandingly maintained his position as a popular war leader—in October nine people in ten were favourable, a higher figure than in the same months last year—his position as a post-war figure is far from certain in the public mind. At some point in most of our political enquiries it emerges that most people do not expect he will be the primary post-war leader, while many do not expect that he will himself seek to be a post-war leader at all. His age, his already almost complete achievement, his supposed disinterest in home affairs, and his alleged lack of sympathy with working people over domestic issues, all add up in the public mind. In addition, there is to some extent an automatic process of peace which tends to underline the contrast by wanting to be rid of the primary figures from war-time. Thus, in answer to a straight question on whether or not Churchill could or should be post-war prime minister, the majority reject the proposition. More illuminating perhaps are enquiries into who people would like as a post-war premier, although there is always much difficulty in naming an alternative to the present leader. About two persons in ten nominated Churchill, and he has gained position slightly since Cripps declined; in July, 1942, Cripps easily headed even Eden with 29 per cent, whereas by this autumn he had fallen to 14 per cent.

On a broader front, there are a variety of M-O polls on post-war voting intentions. These must be treated with great caution, the main point to bear in mind being that people tend always to give "respectable," *status quo*, opinions to strangers (investigators). B.I.P.O. has also conducted several polls of interest in this connection, and they correspond closely with M-O's less statistical indices. In June and August, 1943, they asked:

"If there was a General Election to-morrow, how would you vote?"

The classifiable results:

Would vote for	Percentage who said they'd vote this way in			
	June, 1943		August, 1943	
Conservative ..	..	23 per cent	..	23 per cent.
Labour ..	..	38 "	..	39 "
Liberal ..	..	9 "	..	9 "
Communist ..	..	3 "	..	3 "
Common Wealth ..	..	2 "	..	1 "

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About one in six were uncertain both times. These polls covered only *civilians*. All M-O evidence suggests that service personnel have been *more* affected by radical trends than civilians and service voting in Australia and New Zealand confirms this (see below). B.I.P.O. finds, as M-O does, most civilian radicals are among the under 29's, few of whom have ever voted; here Common Wealth and Communist Party support is strongest, as also the "undecided" and "non-voters."

Somewhat contrary evidence is supplied by the "*Daily Express* Centre of Public Opinion," an interesting organisation run on no clearly recognised independent scientific lines. These polls seem frequently to support Beaverbrook policy, and therefore the striking feature of the one published on July 24th, 1943, is the relatively slight difference of Conservative over Labour—no preponderance at all if leftist coalition is assumed. The Conservative drop prestige is great compared with the last election.

Would vote for	Percentage who said they'd vote this way
Conservative	37 per cent
Labour	34 "
Liberal	7 "
Communist	4 "
Common Wealth	3 "
Independent.. .. .	5 "
Uncertain, etc.	10 "

M-O has made several detailed studies of this subject, more qualitative and localised, but generally in line with other objective information. In early 1942 studies showed a general belief that some sort of socialism was inevitable, coupled with a very frequent disillusion in the Labour Party and Socialist leaders. The attitude has been watered down into confused doubt about *all* parties over the past sixteen months, but still this sort of remark reflects a common temper:

1. "Socialism is as inevitable as the course of time itself."
 2. "Socialism is inevitable sooner or later in our present stage of civilisation. All over the civilised world. It is the only natural method in which to present problems."
- With this, among the more thoughtful, goes the concomitant: "I believe in the socialist state, but I believe the present leaders are too self-seeking and ignorant to bring about a state of socialism."

In spring, 1942, another study in widely separated areas of

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all types showed most favouring a return to pre-war party politics as soon as possible, the well-off least favouring this, the young most urging it. When verbal comments on parties were analysed, 48 per cent were found to be anti-Conservative, 43 per cent anti-Labour. Conservatives were most criticised for policy, Labour most for personnel and party machinery. To the straight but deliberately broad question, asked of cross sections in three type areas, on who would win the next General Election:

Party expected to win	Percentage expecting this in:		
	London	Midland	Northern
Conservatives ..	12 per cent	14 per cent	17 per cent
Labour	27 "	33 "	26 "
Liberal	2 "	0 "	1 "
Coalition, etc. ..	6 "	3 "	9 "
No opinion, etc. .	57 "	50 "	51 "

(Some people gave alternative answers in the above table).

In late 1942 and again in mid-1943 people were asked if they thought the war had changed their political views at all, with the following striking results:

Attitude shown:	In:	
	1942	1943
No change noted	70 per cent	61 per cent
Change: more to left	12 "	25 "
more to right	6 "	4 "
Vague, etc.	12 "	10 "

Adding up so far, there seems to emerge an incontestable unanimity of evidence towards a much reduced Conservative prestige, plus a big, if not immense, shift to the left, vague and confused though it at once shows itself to be on any subtler, qualitative analysis. The crude figures on this, as indicated above, almost certainly do less than justice, however, to the scale of that trend when presently expressed in terms of *private* opinion at the secret ballot.

We can now examine this available evidence of the ballot box itself . . .

In the first six months of 1943 there were twelve contested by-elections, with total polls:

Official Government Candidates ..	111,842 votes
Other candidates	90,684 "
	(54,412 for Common Wealth)

Thus 45 per cent votes cast were against candidates in all

cases receiving the full support and prestige of Winston Churchill, and lately of *all* the party leaders, in war time when national unity remains a strong card (most people still favour the *electoral* truce), on a stale register, favouring the old and better off, the least radical. This 45 per cent, giving a margin of 20,000 votes in 200,000, provided only one non-government M.P. (Eddisbury), though in two other areas the combined vote for opposition candidates eclipsed the Government one, and in two more the Government majority was under 1,000. Since then we have had three further striking by-election results. At Chippenham, in August, a strong progressive young Government candidate, with all party support, got in by only 195 votes on a poll of 16,425 (in 1935 the Conservative majority was over 5,000); a sample study in the constituency showed a third of the residents disenfranchised. At Peterborough, in October, Lord Suirdale beat a local house-painter (Independent) by 1,086 votes on a 22,866 poll; in 1935 the Conservative majority was 5,304. It is hardly necessary to underline such results. No machine, no big names, no helpful register, no suitable "political atmosphere," wartime electoral difficulties, the current weight of *status quo* leaders, plus the much used argument of wartime disunity, can only *just* stem the success of independent, almost "private," candidates, often of a quality lower than we may expect after the war. Consider the difference with a nation-wide drive, a popular policy, backed by popular national figures, in an atmosphere of sanctioned rivalry. Yet the electorate is not indiscriminate for "anyone different," though almost anyone can get an appreciable number of votes, if not definitely "cranky," as shown in the November Woolwich by-election, where the Independent Labour Party man scored 3,419 to the Government 8,204, but the third Independent got only 958.

The trend seems clear enough so far? But, so far, we have not touched the big area of the new voter. Millions will vote for the first time in the next general election. Here is a less calculable, but possibly decisive, influence on our politics.

The young are especially disturbed by war conscriptions. Women are on the political scene more than at any time since suffragette days. The Welsh are pushing strongly for a more decentralised and independent political life. All the evidence suggests that these groups, and especially the young serving men, are moving more to left (not necessarily the Labour left) than right.

How does this British picture square with trends elsewhere? In eight countries there have been important elections during 1943, providing specific behaviour data. Let us briefly consider these:

(i) *Northern Ireland.*

Labour, hitherto an insignificant force in Ulster politics, suddenly won the "safe Tory" South Belfast seat in 1941, and early this year in a three-cornered fight took West Belfast. This has caused consternation among Unionists, and has helped to remove the cautious Mr. Andrews from Prime Minister. In the Carrick by-election of August, 1943, the new Prime Minister, Sir Basil Brooke, personally intervened, and a big effort was made, which produced only a 40 per cent poll, including a large Labour vote. The move away from long-established Unionist dominance seems unmistakable.

(ii) *Eire.*

The June, 1943, General Election put back de Valera's Fianna Fail with a reduced majority, 66 for and 71 against in the Dail. Compared with the 1938 elections:

	1938	1943
Fianna Fail (de Valera) ..	77 per cent	67 per cent
Faen Gael (Cosgrave) ..	45 "	32 "
Labour ..	9 "	17 "
Farmers ..	1 "	14 "
Independent ..	6 "	8 "

So, though de Valera lost a little, Cosgrave, only organised opposition, lost much more, while Labour, Farmers and Independents all gained. The board trend: decreased satisfaction with accepted parties, stronger feeling and organisation among other groups and opposition.

(iii) *Switzerland.*

The General Election of October, 1943, renewing Parliament for six years, showed no big change in the upper chamber, but important ones in the second chamber, the National Council. The Government Party lost seats; retaining 47; Socialist gained 11 seats, giving them 56.

(iv) *Australia.*

The General Election of August, 1943, showed the biggest leftward swing in Australian history, not only in the House of Representatives, but also in the Senate, for the first time. Every one of the nineteen vacant Senate seats were won by Labour, which will control that body for the next six years. In the House of Representatives, Labour needed to gain two seats

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for a majority on the previous position. Instead they gained a two to one majority on all other parties combined. Curtin himself turned a 641 majority at Freemantle's last election to well over 15,000 this time. Women also enter Parliament for the first time—both in House of Representatives and Senate.

In the subsequent West Australian State elections (November, 1943) Labour remained in power as before, actually gaining, against the pendulum, three seats. One was won by Flying Officer Newton while serving in this country, on a campaign conducted wholly by proxy, which defeated the Deputy Leader of the Opposition.

(v) *New Zealand.*

Mr. Fraser's Labour Government came to power in 1935, returned again in 1938. The General Election of September, 1943, has reduced their majority (they now command 44 instead of 50 seats), but remain securely in power. This was the result expected by experts (*Times* leader, September 25th). *The Times* remarked (September 28th):

"A striking feature of the election has been the large Labour majority in the service votes, which saves Government seats in several constituencies."

The Labour Party lost some seats owing to a party split led by John Lee with his Democratic Soldier Labour Party, demanding more vigorous Government action to control finance. They lost others in several areas through the farmer vote withdrawing into a closer self-interest (as in Eire).

(vi) *South Africa.*

The General Election of October, 1943, put liberalish Smuts back completely secure and on top. At the same time, Nationalists under Mr. Malan gained two seats, to 43, on a third of the total vote. Here again Smuts has long been in power, and the pendulum moves. South Africa cannot, of course, be so closely compared as the other countries, for most of its inhabitants are black, with no vote, and no Labour movement has yet appreciably emerged.

(vii) *Canada.*

In the Ontario elections of August, 1943, both established parties (Conservatives and Liberals) lost heavily to a new, third party, Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, previously without a single seat. Their policy is Socialist, and on it they won thirty-four of ninety constituencies at their first attempt. With two "Socialist-Labour" men, they have only three less seats than the Government ("Progressive Conservatives").

WHO'LL WIN?

For forty years Ontario, with one-quarter of the Canadian population, has been politically Conservative.

Four by-elections in three other States have also lately been won by Independents—two by Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, one by a Communist, and one by the French *Bloc Populaire*.

(viii) *U.S.A.*

Here the evidence is less clear and so far small-scale. Indications in the Government elections of November, 1943, suggest small Labour groupings (e.g. at Bridgeport (Conn.) and Reading (Uni.)). Gallup Polls show Roosevelt still well ahead in popularity, but this may be misleading, for he is the *status quo* figure for and in the last nation-wide election, Gallup predicted only a minute loss for the Democrats, instead of the minor landslide they experienced. The classic test of what people say on political intentions is still, I think, M-O's pre-war Worktown election study, where we found, in a typical contest, nearly half the electorate giving contradictory answers to different canvassers, 28 per cent promising to vote for both, and a contradictory 2 per cent promising to vote against both!

Finally, we have the oblique behaviour indices of Occupied Europe. It is perfectly clear from the scrappy news coming in, that both in Greece and in Yugoslavia there has been a great upsurge of leftish feeling, and active organising action. In China a sort of leftish, radical, tory-cum-socialist synthesis is apparent and rapidly expanding (c.f. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek in *Sunday Dispatch*, 5, xii, 43). In Italy it has become explicit in a united effort of liberal, radical and even communist elements (*Times* leader, November 6th).

SUMMARY.

What, then, does it all arrive at?

Simply this:

(1) Politics has a pendulum which swings, with human nature, towards change, chance and alternative. This has been normally operative in the war years, and where the more left-wing ideas have long dominated, has been more or less disadvantageous to them (N.Z., U.S.A.).

(2) Even so, pendulum moves to the right have been slight—when compared with many pre-war moves.

(3) Swings away from the established "Right" have, on the other hand, been evident in several countries where open General Elections have been held (Australia, Canada, Switzer-

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land, Eire), while smaller-scale indications of anti-Right feeling come from Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

(4) Movements are often confused and even contradictory. Behind them lie a deep and growing disillusion with the efficacy of existing systems, doubt about the whole pattern of promise in our civilised life. For many here, giving Labour another chance is a last hope. An American editor, Dwight Macdonald, has put the general position in a nutshell (*Horizon*, November, 1943):

"Choice between evils rather than between positive programmes, a scepticism about basic values and ultimate ends, a refusal to look too far ahead—this is the mood."

(5) This condition of the human mood is both dangerous and hopeful. From the inner chaos of civilised man after years of uncivilised war, may come a new resolution, expressed when the flags go up, through new or currently minor channels. If this expression is inhibited, ignored or unsuccessful, a new apathy may come upon us. All the seeds are there for ghastly luxuriance of indifference and negativism, leading inexorably downhill. Political vitality, the pendulum of promise, is the lifeblood of healthy, social mass life.

(6) Yet I doubt if this cynicism is so deep-seated in relation at least to the small act of voting, as it seems. There would seem, on the whole, to be enough inertia left to put enough crosses on pages, to elect another Government here in Britain, once more. And on the present form I have no doubt that the present Conservative Party, even if led by Mr. Churchill, will not accomplish enough of itself to govern again, unless the alternatives commit suicide. This is about the first prediction I have ever dared make. It is offered, therefore, diffidently, but definitely. My own *views* don't come into it. And, clearly, there is no political predeterminism. Politics is the art and science of *altering* the future . . .

End Note.—If any Tory wants a shaking, go and see the new Ronnie Waldman film "Guess What," and hear what happens when Baldwin appears, in the Coronation procession.

TOM HARRISON.

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RE-ALIGNMENTS II (MARCH-APRIL, 1939)¹

By L. B. NAMIER

BACK TO DANZIG

EVEN before the Memel affair was settled, Ribbentrop re-opened that of Danzig. Lipski was invited, returned immediately from Warsaw, and on March 21st, at noon, called on Ribbentrop. The tone of Ribbentrop's discourse, according to Lipski's *Final Report*, "departed considerably from that in which matters . . . had been discussed in the past, and was distinctly coercive." Both White Books report the conversation, without serious divergencies.

There were excuses from Ribbentrop that the "headlong course of events" concerning Czechoslovakia had prevented him from keeping foreign representatives in Berlin properly informed, the usual story about the nature of that crisis, and a reference to the settlement of the problem of Carpatho-Russia which, he assumed, must have given "the greatest satisfaction in Poland"; there were complaints about the Polish Press, about the anti-German demonstrations in Warsaw during Ciano's visit (February 24th—25th), about the Polish attitude on the Minorities Committee which had failed to reach agreement, and an assertion, ascribed to Hitler, that a poster in a Danzig café forbidding entry to "Poles and dogs," which had produced demonstrations by Polish students, had been their own work (Lipski vigorously denied it). There was sparring over historic and ethnic rights, and over claims to gratitude; Poland, said Ribbentrop, owed her resurrection in part to Germany's victory over Russia, and her Western frontiers to Germany's bitterest misfortune—defeat in the World War; Lipski talked about the attitude and understanding which, since 1934, at crucial junctures his country had evinced towards Germany, often in trying circumstances. But all these arguments, and others which are hardly worth recounting, were mere debating points, decorative and meaningless. Lipski's chief complaint was about the situation which Germany had created in Slovakia.

I pointed to our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that with us the man in the street would not understand why the Reich

¹ Previous instalments appeared in the issues of January-March, 1942, July-September, 1943, and October-December, 1943.

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had assumed a protectorate over Slovakia, this being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.

Ribbentrop pressed the proposals first made in October, 1938, and repeated with growing urgency in January, 1939.¹ Danzig was to be incorporated in the Reich; an ex-territorial railway and road were to be conceded across the Polish Corridor; and the understanding between Germany and Poland was to be given an explicit anti-Soviet character. After their relations had thus been put on a satisfactory basis, the question of Slovakia, and also a share for Poland in guaranteeing that State, might be considered. The bold and unique initiative of the Führer, who on these terms was prepared to leave the Corridor to Poland, was stressed once more; and a threat was added: there should be no delay—the Führer was puzzled by the Polish attitude in a number of problems—"it was essential that he should not be given the impression that Poland simply refused." Ribbentrop suggested that Beck should come to Berlin; the Führer desired an exchange of views. Lipski should go to Warsaw to report. When asked about the talk with Urbsys, Ribbentrop gave an evasive reply.

Lipski supposed that Ribbentrop meant to secure Polish neutrality "during the Memel crisis"; further, that Ribbentrop's suggestion of a talk with Beck

and his emphasis on its urgency are proof that Germany has resolved to carry out her Eastern programme quickly, and so desires to have Poland's attitude clearly defined.

In these circumstances the conversation acquires very real importance, and must be carefully considered in all its aspects. A report of it was immediately despatched through a secretary of the Embassy, and on March 23rd, Lipski returned to Warsaw for consultation and instructions.

On March 21st, President Lebrun and Bonnet arrived for a three days' visit to London. The proposed Four-Power Declaration was discussed. France accepted the suggestion; Russia, provided both France and Poland did; but no reply had yet come from Warsaw.

Poland's position is admittedly difficult [wrote the Diplomatic Correspondent in *The Times* of the 23rd]. The Polish Government, as is well understood, are reluctant to prejudice even their present uneasy state of truce with Germany except in return for a clear and tangible offer of co-operation from the other Powers. The draft declaration in their view hardly seems to go far enough. . . . Perhaps even Russia's conditional assent was prompted by the

¹ See *Political Quarterly*, January—March, 1942, pp. 17-19 and 29-33.

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conviction that Poland would refuse to join in so vague a declaration.

Countries which are in daily fear of invasion [wrote Vernon Bartlett in the *News Chronicle* on March 22nd] are not much comforted by the suggestion that in the event of another act of aggression, all the signatories of the proposed declaration should consult together. . . .

There is in fact a suspicion in many embassies and legations that all this talk about a strong line is not much more than an attempt to silence criticism by a show of activity on the part of Ministers. . . .

The proposal of a Four-Power Declaration was handed in at the Polish Foreign Office by Ambassador Sir Howard Kennard on March 21st. Beck was laid up at home. The British memorandum, immediately taken to him, was received with mixed feelings. Prompt action of momentous importance was required. His aim, in a dangerously tense European situation, was to preserve Poland's (seeming) freedom of action, and to continue the non-stop acrobatic performance of balancing between Germany and Russia: an understanding with Britain was welcome if it could be used as a steadying makeweight, not if it were to bring him down on one side. Beck had not lost hope of an arrangement with Hitler. He thought in terms of diplomatic moves and counter-moves, and paid insufficient attention to military problems, on which, in Poland's geographical position, discussion would have had to centre, had he seriously envisaged war. Was the question ever pressed by Poland where and how the Western Powers would help her if attacked by Germany? There have been bitter—and on the whole justified—Polish complaints about inactivity in the West in September, 1939, but no allegations of default with regard to agreed military measures.

Discussion of concerted resistance to Germany was bound to raise the problem of Russian-Polish relations. The Chamberlain Government, with their anxieties sharpened by Memel, Rumanian rumours, and rumours fostered by military concentrations on the German-Polish frontier, admitted the need for Russia's co-operation; yet they let themselves be diverted from a policy so novel to them. The Poles argued that to bring in Russia at this stage would provoke Hitler (when close co-operation between the Western Powers and Russia could alone have restrained him), and they greatly over-rated their own military strength, and under-rated that of Russia; and so did the British Government.¹ Moreover the Poles understood

¹ Mr. Arthur Krock thus reports, from American diplomatic sources, a talk between Ambassador Kennedy and Lord Halifax on March 24th, 1939 (see "How War Came :

that faced by a reconstituted Triple Entente, they would become subordinate to Russia—a position which appeared unbearable to them, and was not devoid of danger while they held Ukrainian and White Russian territories. In the *Observer* of March 26th, the Diplomatic Correspondent aptly summed up the situation: Poland means to preserve her neutrality between Germany and Russia, and “no Russian army could be welcomed on Polish territory, for no matter what purpose”; France wishes the Western Powers to restrict their commitments “to German aggression in the West”; Russia argues “that the peace of Europe now depends on Anglo-Russian relations,” and that the two countries should fully commit themselves to military action against German aggression wherever it occurs.

On March 23rd, Beck sent instructions to Raczyński for a reply to the British proposal of a Four-Power Declaration (it was presented in a Note the next day). Seeing the “unavoidable difficulties and complications, and consequent waste of time, involved in multilateral negotiations,” and “the very rapid pace of events,” he inquired whether the British Government would not consider concluding immediately with Poland “a bilateral agreement in the spirit of the proposed declaration”; “such an agreement would not prejudice the fate of further general negotiations,” and as Poland had an alliance with France, and Britain an understanding, it would accord with the policy of both towards France.

The Polish counter-proposal was meant to keep out Russia: so much is visible even in Beck’s cautious and plausible instructions. But *le dessous des cartes*—unvarnished Polish reactions to the British proposal, and Polish feelings about co-operation with Russia—appears in a despatch of March 29th,¹ in which Łukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador in Paris, reports to Beck what,

Extracts from the Hull File,” in the *New York Times Magazine*, July 18th, 1943): Lord Halifax believed that Poland was of more value to the democratic tie-up than Russia because his information showed the Russian air force “to be very weak, old and short-ranged,” the army “poor,” and its industrial background “frightful” . . . The most that could be expected from Russia, assuming that Russia wanted to be of help, would be “some ammunition to Poland in the event of trouble,” and Lord Halifax thought it possible that Rumania might join with Poland in a fight against Germany.

Similarly Raczyński, Polish Ambassador in London, reported in his despatch of March 29th, that Kennedy had told him “that the British Government attach greater importance to collaboration with Poland than with Russia, and anyhow treat that collaboration as the pivot for further possible action” (see “*Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*,” Auswärtiges Amt. No. 3).

¹ *Ibid.* The copy of the despatch photographically reproduced in the collection does not bear Łukasiewicz’s autograph signature. It is explained that this is a carbon copy, but on its front page appear various office marks and initials, among them those of Count Szembek, then Polish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

on the 24th, he had said to his American colleague, Mr. Bullitt. He had started by explaining that he had not seen either the British Memorandum of March 21st, or the Polish reply (an amazing nescience in so important an Embassy, yet perfectly credible under Beck); but that the British move seemed to him “at least three parts calculated for inner consumption.”

It is childish naïve, and also dishonest, to invite a State in Poland’s position to compromise its relations with a neighbour so powerful as Germany, and expose the world to the disaster of war, to suit the home policy of the Chamberlain Government. It would be still more naïve to suppose that the Polish Government will not see through this manœuvre and its consequences.

Further, it is supremely rash to start such action publicly, and give prominence to the participation of Soviet Russia, which disfigures the political physiognomy of the group of States called upon to collaborate, and also the purpose of their action. To seek ostentatiously the collaboration of Russia, in a form and scope answering exclusively the needs of British home policy, creates wrong appearances, and suggests that this is not a mere question of securing States threatened by the new technique of German policy, but also an ideological fight against Hitler, and that the aim is not peace, but revolution in Germany. Whoever knows the old and firmly established principles of Polish policy cannot suppose that the Polish Government could fall in with the frivolously dangerous political moves of Mr. Chamberlain.

As “the experience of the last twenty years has shown that neither England nor France has ever lived up to any of their international obligations,” continued Łukasiewicz, “and have not even been able properly to defend their own interests,” no one will take their proposals seriously unless they are ready to imperil their own relations with Germany.

The British initiative—rash, frivolous in form, and incomplete in substance—places the Polish Government before the alternative of compromising their relations with Germany or of failing in their negotiations with London. In the first case Hitler may feel compelled to apply to us pressure to which we shall be forced to react by war. A European conflict will ensue, and in its first stage French and English indecision will expose us to the impact of Germany’s entire force. Our whole war industry will be endangered, or even lost. This will, at the very outset, create the worst possible conditions for us, and also for France and England. If, on the other hand, negotiations with London fail, this will be for Hitler proof of the insincerity and weakness of English and French policy, and will encourage him to further aggression in Eastern and Central Europe, which, sooner or later, will result in the catastrophe of war. It is therefore childish criminal to throw on Poland the responsibility for peace or war. It should be understood, once and for all, that this responsibility rests foremost on France and England, whose policy, either nonsensical or ridiculously weak, has led to the present situation and events. Should

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especially regarding a return of Danzig to the Reich, would mean war with Poland." Nothing in Lipski's report suggests such language—what was Ribbentrop's purpose in ascribing it to him?

Next [states Ribbentrop] I called attention to the reported Polish troop concentrations, and warned Ambassador Lipski of the possible consequences. The Polish attitude seemed to me a strange reply to my recent offer for a final German-Polish appeasement. If things continued to move in that direction, a serious situation might soon arise. I wished to inform him that, e.g. an infringement of Danzig territory by Polish troops would be treated by Germany as on a par with an infringement of the Reich frontiers.

Ambassador Lipski emphatically denied any Polish military designs against Danzig. The troop movements were of a purely precautionary character.

I then asked him whether the Polish Government would not, when things have calmed down, consider the German proposals anew . . . Ambassador Lipski gave an evasive answer, and referred me again to the memorandum.

I replied . . . that I would report to the Führer. Most of all I was anxious to avoid suggesting to the Führer that Poland simply refused.

Lipski notes that Ribbentrop spoke excitedly about Polish "mobilization measures," and recalled "similar risky steps taken by another State (obviously he was thinking of Czechoslovakia)." He argued that the German demand for extra-territorial lines of communication could not be treated in merely technical terms: the "painful separation of East Prussia from the Reich must find such an accommodation as would secure the desired psychological effect" through a "kind of corridor within the Corridor," "a German-owned link between East Prussia and the Reich." As for Danzig, nothing short of re-incorporation in the Reich would satisfy Germany.

The next day, March 27th, at Ribbentrop's request, Lipski called again. The interview is mentioned in Lipski's *Final Report*, and a minute of it by Schmidt (who was not present) appears in the German White Book. Ribbentrop launched out on the ominous theme of "excesses" against *Volksdeutsche*—but the inculpatory report from the German Passport Office at Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) is not in the German White Book (which includes at least 150 documents about the "sufferings" of the Germans in Poland, often of the most trivial character). Something of its contents can be gathered from a despatch sent by the Wilhelmstrasse to the German Ambassador in Warsaw: there had been demonstrations at Bromberg, inciting speeches, cries against Hitler, demands for Danzig and Königsberg—

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"the Polish police succeeded with difficulty in protecting German property from the violence of the excited crowd" (so they did protect, and did succeed!). Ribbentrop now "called the Polish Ambassador to account," stated that "these new outbreaks had produced a catastrophical impression in Germany," taxed the Polish authorities with connivance, deplored this turn in German-Polish relations, and stressed that the Polish Government would be held "strictly responsible for such events." Lipski offered to enquire into the matter, and remarked that similar demonstrations against Poland had occurred in Germany. Ribbentrop sharply retorted "that so far all provocations had come from the Polish side"; and when Lipski asked "whether a few words of 'appeasement for both nations' could not be found," Ribbentrop repeated his allegation, adding that when "the German press starts answering the Polish attacks—and soon it will hardly be possible to stop them—they will do so thoroughly." In short, a press campaign, such as regularly presaged German territorial demands and armed aggression, was officially signalled: and its connexion with the *impasse* reached the previous day was indicated.

The Herr Reich Foreign Minister concluded that he could no longer understand the Polish Government. The generously planned (*grosszügig*) German proposal had been refused. The proposal submitted yesterday by the Polish Ambassador could not possibly be regarded as a basis for settling the problem. The relations between the two countries were therefore suffering severe deterioration.

Lipski, according to the German minute, promised "to do all he could to master the difficulties."

On March 28th, the German Ambassador, von Moltke, was, in turn, sent for by Beck, who made a formal statement on behalf of the Polish Government. To Ribbentrop's declaration "that Polish aggression against the Free City of Danzig would be regarded by the Reich Government as an aggression against Germany herself," they replied that "any intervention by the German Government aimed at changing the *status quo* in Danzig will be regarded as an aggression against Poland," and that any similar attempt by the Danzig Senate would produce an immediate reaction on the part of Poland. Still, the Polish Government did not intend "committing any act of violence against the Free City," and considered that its fate should be settled by agreement between the Polish and German Governments. So far the Polish and the German minutes of the interview agree in substance. But all that the Polish adds is a skirmish:

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THE AMBASSADOR : "You want to negotiate at the point of the bayonet!"

M. BECK : "That is your own method."

Moltke, on the other hand, reports that he complained of Polish "mobilization measures," of the war-atmosphere engendered by them and heightened by the Press and propaganda, and of the "unheard-of excesses at Bromberg and Liniewo," and that he received rather conciliatory replies—though Beck spoke of the impression which was growing on him of our standing at a turning-point in German-Polish relations."

Thus both Ribbentrop and Beck recorded, with pride and pleasure, smart *dicta* of their own: the Germans started their usual "game of nerves" (which would have failed even had the Poles realised their hopeless military situation); and the Poles meant to show that they could not be intimidated, but would call the "German bluff."

RUMOURS, FEARS, AND THEIR DÉNOUEMENT

The German demands put forward on March 21st and 26th amounted to an ultimatum with its date of expiry unnamed.

... the Polish Government [writes Lipski in his *Final Report*] not wishing to increase the tension, and desirous of leaving the way open for further conversations, preserved silence about the subject of the conversations in March.

It was from Hitler's speech of April 28th that the Polish public first obtained certain knowledge of what had happened—after a month of official secretiveness in Warsaw, and of semi-publicity in Berlin through press leakages and rumours, calculated to arouse anxiety without as yet forcing the issue.¹ When, towards the end of March, German reports, circulated in Warsaw that the Speaker of the Polish Diet, in a meeting of the Government Party, had admitted the existence of Hitler's demands, they were authoritatively denied.² Indeed, the Polish Government went so far in its reticence as to conceal even from France the result of the Ribbentrop-Lipski talks.

On March 27th, the French Consul in Danzig reported to Bonnet having heard from an "authoritative German source that a voluntary retrocession of Danzig to the Reich formed the object of negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw, which are not, however, likely to succeed"; and the next day he obtained confirmation from the office of the Polish High Commissioner. On the 28th, M. de Montbas, Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, reported that negotiations were still being carried on "in the

¹ In the speech at Wilhelmshaven, on April 1st, Hitler did not mention Poland.
² See Warsaw despatch in *The Times* of March 30th, 1939.

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greatest secrecy." On the 30th, M. de Vaux Saint-Cyr (who replaced Montbas) wrote:

Polish circles in Berlin do not hide their opinion that the situation which has arisen over Danzig is very serious, and that the tension between the Reich and Poland may become extremely grave overnight. Most of the Embassy officials and of the Polish colony have already sent away their wives and children, Polish students in Berlin have returned to their country, and, according to some of our agents, the consuls are said to have received orders to burn the secret papers in their archives.

He correctly reported Ribbentrop's demands for Danzig, for extra-territorial lines of communication, and for an "elucidation of Poland's attitude towards the Axis," but erroneously added a frontier rectification in the Oderberg district. Thus the French were left at first to pick up scraps of news, and to guess; and when they obtained more authoritative data, it was "from Polish Embassy circles in Berlin," not by way of official communications from the Polish Government.¹

Concealment vis-à-vis Paris precluded frankness in London. Even when Beck arrived in England early in April, and Halifax asked him about the German demands, he gave evasive and inconclusive answers, although by then the British Press had, from German sources, ascertained Hitler's terms. Possibly Beck hesitated to go on record about these anywhere—he would not admit the failure of his policy and meant to continue negotiations with Hitler, allowing or inducing others to play into his hand but without showing it to them. He may have feared that knowledge of Poland's danger might affect his position with the Western Powers, or frighten them away, or make them urge concessions on him, or cause them to restrict their own commitments concerning Danzig and the Corridor. Such fears (if entertained) were ill-founded; yet his silence, by evoking equally groundless apprehensions in London—that Poland was negotiating with Germany under extreme duress and might capitulate—helped him, in an unexpected manner, to win the first round. During these crucial weeks, in which the re-alignments took shape, Poland became the pivot of British policy, while Russia faded out of the picture.

After the proposals for a multilateral conference or declaration had been allowed to drop, London settled down to await

¹ How poorly the French were informed about German-Polish negotiations is also shown by Noël, French Ambassador at Warsaw, reporting the following as news on April 30th, 1939: "One of my colleagues has learnt from one of M. Beck's closest collaborators that last September, January, and March, the German Government proposed in Warsaw collaboration directed against the U.S.S.R." "September" should read "October 24th."

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Beck's arrival. "The ironic situation was reached yesterday," wrote the *Observer* on March 26th, "that the discussion of the proposal for immediate action is postponed for ten days." "Growing importance is attached to the forthcoming visit of Colonel Beck . . ." wrote the *Manchester Guardian* on March 29th. "The Anglo-Russian discussions have been interrupted not because there is any hitch . . . but because . . . matters of more immediate urgency have to take precedence. Discussions between London, Paris, and Warsaw, are, it is held here, at the moment all-important." And the *Daily Mail*, on the same day :

It is quite clear that at this stage Soviet Russia is not being sought as a partner in the contemplated alliance. Apparently the British Government will be content to obtain complete Anglo-French co-operation as a first step, followed, it is hoped, by a new defensive alliance between Poland and Rumania that they will jointly resist German aggression if either is attacked. If Poland and Rumania agree to this course, there will be a far-reaching Four Power anti-aggression pact which Soviet Russia and others may be invited to join at a later stage.

The next day Vernon Bartlett wrote in the *News Chronicle* that the reluctance of Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia to enlist Russia's help "is undoubtedly an important factor in delaying the development of a system of collective defence"; but he did not believe that the British Government intended leaving her out, "though it may not be pursuing a very tactful course in keeping Russia so assured."

Mr. Chamberlain, when urged in the House to "maintain the closest possible touch and co-operation" with Russia, replied that "the Government are in touch with the Government of the Soviet Union"—the difference between question and answer can hardly have been accidental. And he would, at times, treat the question of including Russia in the peace pact "as though"—to quote Mr. Lloyd George—"it were a matter of placating the Labour Party," rather than one of first-rate military importance. A new scheme was being evolved: Poland and Rumania were to provide the wall against German aggression (and Russia was snugly to shelter behind it). But would the two stand firm and united? This was the besetting concern of British diplomacy in the last week of March. The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* wrote on March 28th: "Yesterday, Count Raczynski . . . called at the Foreign Office with the object, I gather, of denying reports that Poland was in negotiation with Germany on certain of Berlin's alleged demands." Had Poland given in, the other,

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smaller, States of East-Central Europe would have fallen like ninepins. The courage, determination, and also the rashness of the Poles were under-rated in London: there was as little likelihood of their meekly surrendering as of their correctly appraising forces and chances. Clear-headed, determined statesmanship and a lead were required from Great Britain—but a motion tabled in the House of Commons, on March 28th, by 34 Members (31 of them Conservatives, including Churchill, Amery, Duff Cooper, Brendan Bracken, Eden, Law, Macmillan, Wolmer, etc.) and calling for a "National Government on the widest possible basis," passed unheeded.

On March 28th, after Lipski's third talk with Ribbentrop, the semi-official *Deutsche diplomatische Korrespondenz* adopted a menacing attitude towards Poland, and so did some leading provincial papers. Tension was developing rapidly and reports appeared in the British Press of "heavy troop movements on the Polish frontier, notably Silesia," which "raised misgivings about Germany's intentions towards Poland," and even "fears of a German invasion "within the next few hours." On March 29th, a full Cabinet was suddenly summoned, sat for nearly three hours, and met again the next morning. The same day Sir Howard Kennard called on Beck :

During this conversation [states the Polish Minute] the Secretary of the British Embassy in Warsaw, Mr. Hankey, called, bringing Sir Howard an instruction from his Government to ask the Polish Government whether they had any objection to a British Government guarantee to meet any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces. Mr. Chamberlain would propose to make a declaration on the subject in the House of Commons the next day, March 31st.

M. Beck informed Sir Howard that the Polish Government fully accepted the British Government's proposal.

A singular scene! The Ambassador has come to discuss the Polish Note of March 24th, when one of his officials brings him an announcement which marks a revolution in diplomatic history—and indeed, in diplomatic technique. It was the first of the guarantees sent home on approval. Beck made up his mind between two flicks of the ash off his cigarette.

The same night the Cabinet Foreign Policy Sub-Committee sat in London, and again the next morning, March 31st. The leading newspapers carried reliable forecasts of the declaration which the Prime Minister was expected to make: that Britain was determined to go to war, if need be, in resistance to new acts of aggression, and that the guarantee was intended to cover

both Poland and Rumania. It being Friday, the House met at 11, and Greenwood, acting leader of the Opposition, asked a question about the European situation, alluding to "the wild rumours which are floating round." Chamberlain replied that "they are not confirmed by any official information . . . and the Government must not be taken to accept them as true" (not "accepted," they were acted upon). He would make a statement on the adjournment. (Was he still awaiting a reply from Rumania to include her in the guarantee?) At 2.55 p.m. Chamberlain, after reiterating that "there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means," declared that, even before certain consultations with other Governments were concluded,

in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

He was authorised to add that France stood "in the same position in this matter."

Did Britain guarantee the integrity of Poland's Western frontier, or only her independence? and if the frontier, did this include Danzig? The interpretations supplied by various newspapers reflected their own wishes and policy, but aroused anxiety in Warsaw lest the guarantee be used to urge concessions on Poland. On Saturday, Raczyński called at the Foreign Office, which issued a communiqué expressing surprise "that attempts should have been made in London to minimise the Prime Minister's statement," which is "of outstanding importance" and "perfectly clear and categorical." The significant sentence was added: "The Polish Government will wish to keep His Majesty's Government fully informed, although the latter do not seek to influence the Polish Government in the conduct of their relations with the German Government." In Moscow the exclusive attention paid to Poland and Rumania produced coolness—though, according to the *Izvestia*, a policy of collective security could still "count on the full support of the only country which bears no responsibility for Munich"; in Warsaw there was studied silence about relations with Russia; in London an answer from Rumania was awaited—Tilea was about to return, and was expected to bring the desired reply.

On April 3rd, the guarantee to Poland was debated in Parliament. Chamberlain quoted its description in *The Times*: "a cover note issued in advance of the complete insurance

policy." While the Government's action was generally approved, Churchill, Sinclair, and Greenwood emphasised the importance of obtaining Russia's adhesion, and Lloyd George asked what were without her the means for implementing the pledge? "If war occurred to-morrow, you could not send a single battalion to Poland." Nor could France, faced by fortifications far more formidable than in the last war. What then is to happen to the Poles, brave but much inferior to the Germans in numbers, and still more in vital equipment? Russia alone can reach them, and she alone has an air-fleet to match the German.

I cannot understand why before committing ourselves to this tremendous enterprise, we did not secure the adhesion of Russia . . . We have undertaken a frightful gamble . . . If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, it is for us to declare the conditions, and unless they are prepared to accept the only conditions under which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs.

The same day, Halifax, in the House of Lords, explained that certain circumstances had seemed "to suggest the possibility of dangerous developments in the relations between Germany and Poland," and the British Government while not accepting the rumours "as true," in order to "stabilise the situation," had given the advance pledge to Poland. Further:

His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the importance of the attitude of the Soviet Government, and attach value to good relations with them. We are bound, however, to have regard to the fact that the relations of some States with Russia are complicated by particular conditions, though . . . so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, these difficulties do not exist.

How far had Russia been kept in touch with these developments of British policy? Sir John Simon stated in the House of Commons, on April 13th, that the Soviet Ambassador had been told on March 29th "that we had to recognise that it was useless to pursue the idea of a Four-Power Declaration, and . . . was given a provisional outline of the course we were contemplating, which would involve us giving assurances, together with France, to Poland and Rumania." On the crowded day of hasty decisions, March 30th, nothing was said to Maisky; and it was only after the meeting of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, on the morning of March 31st, that Halifax acquainted him with the impending declaration (which was by then a *fait accompli* and common knowledge). A few hours later Chamberlain had no doubt "that the principles upon which we are acting are fully understood and appreciated" by the Soviets.

Beck arrived in London on April 3rd. The visit had been suggested by the British Government as far back as February, and was announced in Parliament before Prague. Its original purpose was to improve Anglo-Polish relations, somewhat strained since October, 1938, and to exchange views on Danzig (Halifax was the League rapporteur about it). Now the visit assumed a different significance. There were conferences and receptions, Beck was courted and fêted, taken to Portsmouth, etc. The unilateral guarantee of March 31st was to be replaced by an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character.

Pending the completion of the permanent agreement [declared the Anglo-Polish communiqué of April 6th], M. Beck gave His Majesty's Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty's Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty's Government to Poland.

Nor was this reciprocity adopted merely to satisfy Poland's self-respect: although a direct German attack against England was not expected, Anglo-French conversations, especially at the time of Lebrun's visit to London, suggest that fears were entertained of possible German action in the West, against Belgium, Holland, or Switzerland. The communiqué concluded

It was understood that the arrangements above mentioned should not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace.

"Colonel Beck," wrote the Diplomatic Correspondent in *The Times* of April 6th, "explained his Government's reluctance to enter into any closer agreements with Soviet Russia, first because they had no wish to antagonize Germany, secondly, because they were chary of having troops carrying the Red Star in Poland. At the same time there seems to have been a hint that Poland would have nothing to say against a move towards closer contacts, were they suggested, between Great Britain and Russia." And further: "From the Polish side it is learned that Rumania was much discussed." Apparently the British Government were still always haunted by the fear of a German invasion of Rumania (though clearly this would have implied joint action with Hungary, hence a partition of Rumania, which would have brought Russia into the picture, and impaired Germany's chances of obtaining what she wanted—Rumanian wheat and oil); and they seem to have still pursued the idea of giving a general character to the Polish-Rumanian alliance, which was only against Russia: but Poland would not endanger

her good relations with Hungary and Italy for the sake of Rumania, nor Rumania her relations with Germany for the sake of Poland. And so the scheme of the Polish-Rumanian wall collapsed. In appearance the outcome of Beck's London conversations was highly satisfactory; in reality, a great deal remained unsaid which called for plain and open speaking.

At Weizsäcker's request Lipski called on him on Thursday, April 6th, in the afternoon. The reports of the talk in the two White Books substantially agree. Lipski said he was as yet uninformed about the London conversations but was acquainted with their basic principles (he had seen Beck en route for London). Poland was signing nothing contrary to the Polish-German Declaration of 1934, she was not joining any bloc, merely concluding a bilateral defensive pact. Weizsäcker replied that he no longer understood Poland's policy—instead of seizing with joy Hitler's magnanimous offer, "which would not be repeated," she had resorted to sabre-rattling; if the Press reports about the London talks were correct, he failed to see how they could be squared with the Agreement of 1934. He thus hinted that the "offer" would be withdrawn, and that an Anglo-Polish pact would destroy the German-Polish Agreement. Otherwise the conversation ran in well-worn grooves. "In short," boasts Weizsäcker, "I gave with unconcern the obvious replies to Lipski's phrases; and then we parted."

Beck left London on April 7th, and passed through Berlin without stopping.¹ The German Press, after the anti-Polish campaign at the end of March (intended perhaps to deter Beck from going to London), had, during the visit, moderated its tone. But now the attack was resumed. The French Chargé d'Affaires reported that Hitler was in a state of constant anger ("le Führer qui ne décolère pas ces derniers temps"). Moltke was in Berlin. Beck, on his return to Warsaw, expressed the wish to see him. He was expected back on the 13th. But on April 24th, M. de Vaux Saint-Cyr wrote from Berlin: "Herr von Moltke still awaits the order to return to his post."

¹ The story reported by de Vaux Saint-Cyr, on April 10th, that Ribbentrop had a personal letter delivered to Beck, when he passed through Berlin, demanding the withdrawal of the Polish troops from the German frontier, lacks all foundation. His account of Lipski's talk with Weizsäcker, sent on April 8th, does not contain the main points, and erroneously makes Lipski say that the forces mobilised by Poland did not exceed two army corps. On April 12th, Ambassador Noël reported from Warsaw that in reply to his enquiries, Beck denied there having been any conversation between Lipski and Ribbentrop of recent days, and added "that a high official of the Wilhelmstrasse, in the course of a non-political conversation, had confined himself to asking M. Lipski the reason for the military measures taken by Poland"! One wonders how much about the Weizsäcker-Lipski conversation was known in London.

THE INTERPRETATION OF POPULATION STATISTICS

By DAVID GLASS

IN view of the growing interest in population questions, it is more urgent than ever that we should be clear as to what current population movements mean. Population is a complex question, and at least some of its aspects are rather technical. It is therefore not surprising to find a certain amount of confusion as to what demographers have said and how far their statements have been borne out.

The charge has sometimes been made that demographers are false prophets and that in particular they are given to pessimism unjustified by the facts. In part this view derives from a consideration of the various estimates of future population which have been published in the last decade, especially those of Dr. Enid Charles. However insistent the authors of such estimates may be as to the assumptions they have chosen and however emphatic that such estimates are to be regarded only as statistical variations on a stated theme, there is always the danger that they will be accepted as horoscopes, only to be denounced as false if the actual populations of the next few years show even a slight deviation from the calculations.

But there are at least two other contributory causes in this misunderstanding. First, there is a failure to realise that estimates may furnish a valuable basis for speculation and for long-term social policy, even if they are not fully borne out in the short run. Secondly, there is a lack of understanding of the basic factors in population movements, so that small and temporary increases in the birth rate are regarded as evidence of a change of trend, without consideration of the quantitative significance of the increases and the reasons why they have taken place.

I can perhaps best illustrate the first point from an American study on which an interim report was published in 1942.¹ The study presented a series of projections of the populations of

¹ Milbank Memorial Fund, *Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference, 1942*, New York, pp. 49-52. The study was undertaken by A. J. Coale on behalf of the Office of Population Research of Princeton University.

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Europe and the U.S.S.R. from 1940 to 1970, the hypotheses in the calculations being a continuance of recent trends in fertility and mortality and the absence of international migration. On these assumptions, excluding the effects of war, the population of Europe (minus the U.S.S.R.) would increase from about 398 millions in 1940 to some 421 millions in 1960 and then fall to about 417 millions by 1970. In the Western States the decline would begin earlier—about 1945 for the U.K. and 1950 for Scandinavia and Western and Central Europe. On the other hand, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would show a continued increase beyond 1970. At the same time the population of the U.S.S.R. (including the Asiatic territories) would increase from about 174 millions in 1940 to 251 millions in 1970. That is, while in 1940 the population of the U.S.S.R. would be equal to about 44 per cent of the rest of Europe, in 1970 it would be about 60 per cent. Similarly, within the rest of Europe the balance of numbers would shift increasingly towards the East and South-East.

These are deductions of very considerable long-term political and economic importance and they are based on certain explicit assumptions. Naturally these assumptions will not hold good in every detail. In fact, war mortality will at least temporarily shift the mortality trends and the fertility trends will also be affected. But the projections illustrate the consequences of certain basic tendencies obtaining at the beginning of this war and which may still obtain, though on somewhat modified levels, after the war. The fact that the year by year actual population figures do not agree with the long-term projections will not invalidate them as bases for discussion and planning.

Similarly, given certain assumptions regarding fertility, mortality, and migration, we can calculate the resultant age composition of the population. In England and Wales in 1935, 24 per cent of the male population was under fifteen years of age, 64.2 per cent between 15 and 59 years, and 11.7 per cent aged 60 and over. If we assume the continuance of the fertility and mortality of that year and that there is no migration, the age composition will change substantially. By the year 2000 the male population would consist of 17.4 per cent aged under 15 years, 61.5 per cent aged 15 to 59, and 21 per cent aged 60 and over. The switch over between young and old in those circumstances would necessitate significant changes in the planning of the social services. The fall in the proportion of the population in the active ages (and the higher average

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age of the active population) would also involve changes in the structure of industry. No student of population believes that fertility and mortality will persist at precisely the 1935 level. Those assumptions are made only to illustrate the results of certain conditions. The point is that unless fertility rises above the replacement level¹ and if there is no significant migration, changes of this nature will take place in the age structure of the population. And every further decline in fertility and mortality will tend to intensify this movement.

The second point in misunderstanding may perhaps best be illustrated from the changes in the birth rates in England and Wales in recent years. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the fact that since 1933 the birth rate in England and Wales has apparently stabilised, and, moreover, has shown a certain upward trend. This has also been associated with an increase in marriage and with a continued though not so consistent fall in death rates. These facts have led to a fairly widespread belief that the trend of the last seventy years has been checked and that the declining population anticipated by the demographers is without reasonable foundation.

In part this view has drawn support from the White Paper on the *Current Trend of Population in Great Britain*.² There has been some misunderstanding of the Registrar-General's table³ showing the ultimate population which would result from an annual supply in Great Britain of 700,000 births (approximately the figure registered in 1937), namely 42.5 millions with the maintenance of the mortality of 1930-1932 and 47.5 millions with a further decline of mortality of the order projected by the White Paper. In accepting these figures as indicating that the decline in fertility is not really serious, there has been a tendency to forget that the continuance of any given annual supply of births means the ultimate raising of the reproduction rate to unity—that, as the Registrar-General pointed out, to maintain 700,000 births per year would involve a rise of about 30 per cent in fertility over the next thirty years. This is because in 1937 the births occurred when there were over 11 million women aged fifteen to forty-five years, whereas in the stationary population envisaged in the White Paper there would only be 8.9 or 9.1 million women in those age groups.

¹ With present or lower mortality, the maintenance of a net reproduction rate of unity would still involve some ageing of the population, since the present age structure is the result of the high fertility and mortality of the past.

² Cmd. 6358, 1942.

³ P. 4. See also R. R. Kuczynski, *The New Population Statistics*, Cambridge, 1942, pp. 18-19.

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To some extent, however, the White Paper itself confuses the issue by saying, of an increase of fertility of the extent involved, that it might seem unlikely at the moment, but "in view of the concern expressed in Parliament and elsewhere, it seems clear that the possibility of a declining population is not viewed with equanimity, so that it is by no means impossible or improbable that the necessary improvements would be secured, with the aid, if required, of measures ensuing from the adoption of a national population policy." But this is to beg the whole question, which is whether, without the adoption of a population policy, such a rise would really be forthcoming. To assume that there will be a positive policy and that it will have the effect of raising fertility to the replacement level is really to go beyond the province of technical estimation and enter the field of wishful thinking.

In considering the significance of present birth rate trends in England and Wales, three questions are relevant. First, how does the present compare with the past? Secondly, what does the present birth rate mean in terms of reproductivity? Thirdly, what are the probable causes of the reversal of the previous trend? And is that reversal likely to persist?

As regards the first question, the table below shows that the estimated birth rate in England and Wales in 1942 was 15.8. This is higher than for any other year from 1932 onwards.

BIRTH RATES (PER 1,000 OF TOTAL POPULATION) FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES.²

	SELECTED COUNTRIES:-							
	1931-5	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942*
England and Wales ..	15.0	14.8	14.9	15.1	14.9	14.6*	14.2*	15.8
Scotland ..	18.2	17.9	17.6	17.7	17.4	17.1*	17.9*	18.1
N. Ireland ..	20.0	20.3	19.8	20.0	19.5	19.6	20.8	22.8
Eire	19.4	19.6	19.2	19.4	19.1	19.1	19.0	22.3
Sweden ..	14.1	14.2	14.4	14.9	15.3	15.0	15.6	17.7
Switzerland	16.4	15.6	15.0	15.2	15.2	15.2	16.9	18.5
Canada ..	21.4	20.0	19.8	20.5	20.3	21.4	22.3	..
Australia ..	16.9	17.1	17.4	17.5	17.7	18.0	18.9	..
New Zealand	18.0	18.1	18.9	19.3	20.2	22.6	24.1	..
South Africa (white) ..	24.1	24.2	24.9	25.0	25.3	25.3	25.2	..

* Provisional rates.

¹ The White Paper inserts a "not" at this point, but presumably that is a misprint.

² *Statistical Year-Book of The League of Nations*, 1941-42, Geneva, 1943, pp. 36-37.

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	1931-5	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942*
United States..	16.9	16.7	17.1	17.6	17.3	17.9	18.9*	..
Germany (1937 territory)	16.6	19.0	18.8	19.6	20.4	20.0	18.6	14.9
Austria ..	14.4	13.1	12.9	14.1	20.9	21.8	..	..
Finland ..	19.5	19.2	20.0	21.0	21.3	17.9	24.2	..
Hungary (Trianon frontiers)	22.4	20.4	20.2	20.1	19.6	19.9*	18.8*	19.8
Italy ..	23.8	22.4	22.9	23.7	23.5	23.4	20.8	20.2
France (excl. Alsace-Lorraine 1939-1941) ..	16.5	15.0	14.7	14.6	14.6	13.3*	13.0*	..
Belgium ..	16.8	15.2	15.3	15.8	15.3	13.4	12.1	12.9
Denmark ..	17.7	17.8	18.0	18.1	17.9	18.3	18.5	20.5
Netherlands	21.2	20.2	19.8	20.5	20.6	20.8	20.3	21.0

* Provisional rates.

But it should be noted that 1942 is the only year since 1932 for which that is the case. In other words, although 1931 and 1932 were the lowest points of the depression, the birth rates for those two years (15.8 and 15.3 respectively) were higher than for any subsequent year except 1942. At the same time 1932 was the tail end of a period of falling birth rates. Even during the last war the lowest birth rate was 17.7 in 1918, some 12 per cent higher than in 1942, although the number of women in the reproductive age groups was higher by at least 800,000 in the latter year than in the former.¹ And it should be remembered that the higher birth rate of 1917 occurred during a war in which far greater numbers of men from this country were overseas than at the present time.

Secondly, the rise in the birth rate still leaves the net reproduction rate well below unity. In 1930-1932 it was about 0.805 and after falling until 1933 it rose slowly again to reach the 1932 level in 1938.² In 1939 it was practically unchanged³ and it then fell again in 1940 and 1941. In 1942 with an upward

¹ See R. M. Titmuss, "The significance of recent birth rate figures," *Eugenics Review*, July, 1943, pp. 36-38. Actually the lowest birth rate was in 1933 (14.4), naturally lagging about a year after that low-point of the depression.

² *The Registrar-General's Statistical Review of England and Wales, 1938. Tables, Part II.* Civil, p. 153.

³ The gross reproduction rate for 1939 was 0.902, slightly higher than for 1938, and mortality was lower. The net rate was thus about 0.82.

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spurt of births the net reproduction rate was probably about 0.87, still 13 per cent short of adequacy. The further increase of births in 1943 may bring the rate to 0.9 or slightly more.¹ There is thus as yet by no means a complete reversal of the former trend.

To interpret this rise in detail requires far more data than we now have available. In particular, we need to know the distribution of first, second, third, and subsequent births for each year since 1938. We also require an analysis of legitimate births by the calendar year of marriage in order to see how far the marriages of recent years have contributed to the increase in births. Failing these statistics, we can nevertheless point to some relevant facts. First, the increase in marriage has not led to a proportionate increase in births. In fact, although between 1937 and 1941 there were over 200,000 marriages more than would have taken place if the 1937 marriage rate had prevailed, the birth-rate over the period 1938-42 shows practically no increase. Any births due to the new marriages must have been counterbalanced by a reduction in the fertility of existing marriages. Moreover, the marriage rate and the actual number of marriages are both falling again, as they must do because we have been using up the reserves of the unmarried. In 1937 there was a probability of about 87 per cent that a woman would be married at least once before she reached her fiftieth birthday, and that percentage must now be very considerably higher. But even with the maintenance of a high probability of marriage, as we deplete the accumulated stocks of unmarried women, we should expect a substantial fall in the numbers of marriages each year until we reach an approximate balance with the numbers of young girls coming up each year into the marriageable age groups.

Further, as the table of comparative birth rates shows, a rise in the birth rate in the last decade has occurred in many countries, in some of which there has been a considerably greater increase than in England and Wales. Apart from special local reasons for the increase in each country, one of the factors common to all is the increase in employment characteristic of preparedness and war economies. A very suggestive study by Kirk² indicates that even in Germany, with a widely developed population policy, much of the rise of the birth rate after 1933

¹ These rates are naturally very rough estimates, since the data necessary for an accurate computation are not yet available. The 1942 rate is slightly higher than that estimated by E. Grebenik in *Review of Economic Studies*, vol. 10, p. 52.

² Dudley Kirk, "The Relation of Employment Levels to Births in Germany," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, April, 1942, pp. 126-138.

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may be attributed to increased employment, and that the same applies to other countries, though the influence of employment on birth rates appears to diminish as employment goes up.

Add to this general factor the special war-time circumstances of the conscription of women who have no young children, the maintenance of large parts of the British, Dominion, and Allied armies here, the special food privileges given to pregnant women and young children, the development of maternal and child welfare services, and the payment of Service allowances on a large scale, and we appear to have a more relevant and specific explanation of the rise in the birth rate since the war than in terms of any permanent change of fertility. By the end of the war, the net reproduction rate may have actually risen to unity. But if these special facts cease to obtain at that point, fertility may fall again to its pre-war level or even lower, and we may return, with but a slight break, to the trend of the last 70 years.

Thus as far as we can now tell, there is no incompatibility between what demographers have said about long-term trends and what has been happening to the birth rate in England and Wales in recent years. Estimates of the future population, even if they are not borne out in the short run, may be valuable as indicating the long-term results of certain explicit assumptions. However, these estimates will naturally be the more useful the nearer the underlying assumptions are to reality.

It is therefore essential that far more information be provided on many aspects of marriage, fertility, mortality and migration. We do not know the present distribution of families with various numbers of children, and thus have relatively little idea of the increase of childlessness since 1911 and of the extent to which there is still a "hard core" of highly fertile families who might act as a stabilising factor. Although we have some indirect evidence, we do not really know whether the gap between the fertility of the different occupational or socio-economic groups has narrowed. We have almost no information on the incidence or effectiveness of contraception, or the significance of involuntary sterility or impaired fecundity in the spread of childless and one-child families. This lack of knowledge seriously impairs the demographer's ability to diagnose and advise. But these facts could be secured and with them he would be better able to analyse the rationale of population movements and to estimate the impact of the various factors on the future course of the population.

UNRRA'S PROSPECTS

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

THIS is how President Roosevelt indicated the extent of the task of relief, rehabilitation and repatriation, when he spoke on November 9th to the representatives of forty-four nations who had just signed the agreement establishing UNRRA¹ :—

"It is hard for us to grasp the magnitude of the needs in occupied countries. The Germans and the Japanese have carried on their campaigns of plunder and destruction with one purpose in mind: that in the lands they occupy there shall be left only a generation of half-men—under-nourished, crushed in body and spirit, without strength or incentive to hope—ready, in fact, to be enslaved and used as beasts of burden by the self-styled 'master races'."

The appalling fact is that the President's phrase was not, it seems, a wild exaggeration: it is substantially true, so far as a great part of Europe is concerned. Indeed, the warning was in one respect too restricted. For besides the "occupied countries" to which he referred, there are the Axis countries. When the screen of censorship, lies, and terrorism is lifted from Germany, we shall surely find some bitter need there too; not all Goering's programme of plunder can have nullified the effect of so long a diet of "guns instead of butter"; no country in modern times has ever suffered such wholesale devastation of its cities. When the German soldiers stream back and find their homes destroyed, and when the millions of prisoners and foreign workers are free to trek to their homes again, UNRRA's defences against hunger and disease will certainly have to be extended into broken Germany.

And then there is China and the invaded East. Here, then, is an attempt—a layman's attempt, necessarily based on inadequate information—to assess the prospects of UNRRA. Does it look as if the outstanding lessons of last time will be recognized? And what are the outstanding dangers ahead?

SOME LESSONS OF LAST TIME.

It is evident that some at least of the mistakes made in 1918-19 will not be repeated this time.

¹ i.e. "United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration."

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Last time, for instance, there was virtually no preparatory work. Apart from the Belgian Relief Programme, there was no provisional estimate of the needs of the liberated or conquered countries. This time, the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements has been working since 1941 on estimates of the needs of eight occupied countries in Europe, and this Report, dated June, 1943, has been accepted by UNRRA as a basis for this part of the work.

Last time, the Inter-Allied machinery for control of supplies and shipping, which had reached a high state of efficiency and cohesion by November, 1918, was unfortunately laid aside then, on Mr. Hoover's insistence, and a new organisation, unpractised in working as a team, and with inadequate powers, was improvised and had then to be superseded. This time, though UNRRA starts work much later than had been hoped, it should be in working order by the end of the winter of 1943-44—i.e. presumably before the main crisis develops.

Last time, by far the greater part of the burden of supplying relief fell on one country, the United States, with some help from Britain and a little from France and elsewhere: the Americans were virtually dictators in this field—benevolent dictators. This time, a real effort has been made to combine the effective control of power at the centre with wide representation: the Council of UNRRA is the policy-making body (at least on paper), and its forty-four member governments have equal voting rights.

Last time, the inter-allied effort was confined to a short-term programme of relief, almost entirely in the shape of food: it ended with the harvest of 1919, and it did not suffice to prevent a worsened food shortage in the winter of 1919-20, and it did nothing to enable the war-shattered countries to import raw materials and restart the wheels of industry and agriculture. Thus, as has been shown in the admirable Report on "The Transition from War to Peace Economy," recently published by the League of Nations, Continental Europe imported in 1919 \$3,600 million dollars worth of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods; but almost the whole of this—\$3,500 millions worth—went to the four Allies and the six neutrals, leaving only \$100 millions worth for all the thirteen other countries put together, including Germany! Much the same happened in 1920. Europe, as a whole, got \$3,600 millions worth again, but only \$600 millions worth went to those thirteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, a great part of the

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Continent was simply left to rot for nearly four years, after which came an orgy of loans at high interest—a burst of greedy gambling which contributed to the crash in 1929. This time, UNRRA has at least recognised in its title and terms of reference the need for something more than a "soup-kitchens" programme: its Preamble declares that its signatories are "determined that, immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy, the populations thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparations and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes, and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services."¹

Note, however, that the provision for resumption of production is confined to "urgently needed . . . production": that word "urgently" was interpolated when the original draft of May, 1943, was revised in September. It was emphasised in the discussions at the UNRRA Conference in November that UNRRA "will not engage in long-range rehabilitation projects." (No doubt, there will again, as in 1918-19, be tremendous pressure from business interests to get rid of controls immediately after the "cease fire." "Back to free trading" will be advocated as a means to economic health, whereas, whilst these customers are still so hungry and helpless, it would really be a means to exploitation.)

THE SHIPPING IMPROVEMENT.

One other fortunate circumstance may be noted. Last time, it was not until the third quarter of 1918 that Allied shipping replacements substantially overtook the losses inflicted by the German submarine campaign; so that this shortage of shipping was a serious bottleneck in relief policy during the early months. And that shortage was aggravated owing to the failure to insist in the original Armistice terms upon the transfer of the German merchant ships to Allied control for use in the relief programme. This time, a similar bottleneck was anticipated so lately as May, 1943, when the Post-War Requirements Committee completed its Report. But since that time, the situation has been radically changed by the decisive defeat of the submarines, 150 of which are known to have been destroyed during the six months from

¹ My italics.—W.A.F.

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May onwards. The American shipbuilding programme has achieved miracles, and the Mediterranean route has been re-opened for Allied ships. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, if there is a serious shipping shortage immediately after the "cease fire," it will not last long. Supply programmes can therefore be framed with much less anxiety about the bottleneck.

Evidently, then, we have good ground to expect that many of the mistakes made in 1918-19 will not be repeated this time. But of course there are many grave causes for anxiety. Before estimating the gravity of these prospective dangers it is necessary to have a general idea of the existing plans and organisation.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMBINED BOARDS.

There exist in Washington eight Combined Boards, all of them Anglo-American. They co-ordinate and control supplies and shipping in the interests of the war effort, and they have hitherto held a key position as regards preparations for relief. Various Allied Governments have from time to time bought stocks for their own countries, since no one else was doing the job; it was recognised that they were primarily responsible for providing for the economic need of their own peoples. But these Governments also recognised that their plans must be co-ordinated "in a spirit of inter-Allied collaboration for the successful achievement of the common aim," so it was agreed that the Combined Boards should be consulted as to whether the purchase proposed would prejudice the war effort. Only a few such purchases have been authorised.

It appears that these Combined Boards will still have a dominant role now, when UNRRA has been set up. For in the first place, countries such as Britain which are in a position to purchase supplies for their own normal requirements—not as relief—can go direct to the Combined Boards. Secondly, countries such as Belgium, which have foreign exchange overseas and could therefore buy supplies for themselves, will in future have to accept the judgment of the Director General of UNRRA as to whether the completion of such purchases would prejudice the interests of other countries; and if the Director's judgment is challenged, such countries will have a right of appeal to the Combined Boards. The fact is that UNRRA will in effect be an agent of the Combined Boards for certain purposes.

The dangers of this dual system are manifest. Writing as

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an outsider, without first-hand knowledge of the actual working of the arrangement, I anticipate that friction and a sense of unfairness may be generated unless an organisation—call it a Supreme Economic Council—is established, representing all the United Nations, and securing an equitable and efficient co-ordination of the policies of UNRRA and of all the eight Combined Boards.

ORGANISATION OF UNRRA.

To complete the picture of the machinery, here is a summary of the organisation of UNRRA. (1) The "policy making body" is the Council, on which each member government has one representative. It is to meet not less than twice a year, and the redraft provides that it shall vote by simple majority "unless otherwise provided by the Agreement or by action of the Council." (2) There is a Central Committee, on which the "Big Four" Powers only are represented—U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.K., and China, with the Director General presiding without a vote. It can make policy decisions of an emergency nature, subject to revision by the Council. Other members are to be invited to participate when action of special interest to the member in question is discussed. (3) There is a Director General, Mr. Lehman, who holds the Executive authority for carrying out relief operations, etc. (4) There is a Supplies Committee of the Council, with a Canadian Chairman; a Committee for Europe, and one for the Far East; and technical Standing Committees may be appointed for nutrition, health, repatriation, agriculture, transport, finance, etc. . . . The revised text of the Agreement gives the Council somewhat greater power than it had under the original draft, and to that extent the revision helps to meet the complaint of certain countries, notably Holland and Belgium, that the whole set-up was undemocratic and that the Big Powers would be left in too dictatorial a position. But this revision did not give any representation to the small recipient countries on the Central Committee, nor is Latin-America represented on that Committee; and so there may still be some feeling of soreness and anxiety, and this may perhaps account for the fact that among the fourteen countries which made reservations when signing the Agreement, ten were Latin-American.

Now consider some of the dangers that may arise.

THE PRIVILEGED POWERS.

One evident danger is that the Combined Boards and

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UNRRA may fail to work in harmony; and if they do so fail, this will probably be due directly or indirectly to some resentment or fear engendered by the privileged position of the United States and Britain on the Combined Boards. If, exploiting that privileged position, the Americans or British were to make disproportionately heavy demands upon the world's short supplies, whilst keeping a heavy hand upon efforts at self-help by countries which are more hard-hit, the bond of common purpose which holds UNRRA together would be strained to breaking point. Countries such as Norway and Holland which have a large merchant marine of their own would naturally want to pull their ships out of the pool as soon as possible, and countries such as France and Belgium which possess gold and foreign exchange abroad would want to break the stranglehold by the Combined Boards upon supplies and to upset UNRRA's scheme of priorities.

The fact is that a vast work of education, not least in America and Britain, will be needed if the world's relief effort is not to be prejudiced by serious grievances and defections. American food consumption (including that of the Forces) is now much higher than it was before the war; Europe's is much lower than it was, and enormously lower than the American standard. As for Britain, a remarkably good general standard has been maintained, thanks to various extraordinary efforts; but even here, in what is now the best fed country in Europe, we may expect strong pressure on the Government, as soon as Hitler falls, to increase our rations regardless of the mortal needs of Allied Countries. (In 1922, during the Russian famine in which three million people died, Mr. Neville Chamberlain opposed a proposal to increase Britain's gift from £100,000 to £500,000 with the argument that "It is not our bounden duty to become a kind of Mrs. Jellyby among nations. Was our first care to be that of people not our own, and were we to act without consideration of the burdens placed upon our own people and our resources to meet distress?" This Jellyby argument is likely to be heard again before very long.)

SHORTAGE OF SUPPLIES.

Another danger is that there may be a shortage of supplies, or of readily available supplies. A layman is in no position, of course, to estimate the seriousness of this danger; and so many factors are uncertain that even the expert must find it impossible to forecast the extent of the shortages with precision. But the

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following indications are, I believe, fairly reliable so far as they go.

Firstly, we know that the Post-War Requirements Committee, in its Report of June, 1943, gave 45,855,000 tons as a provisional estimate of the minimum import requirement, for the first six months after liberation, in eight European countries, viz. Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium (with Luxemburg), Greece, Holland and Norway. This includes 7,332,000 tons of food, 11,150,000 tons coal and coke, 9,462,000 tons base metals and manufactures, 7,272,000 tons wood and cork, and other goods such as fodder, fertilisers, seeds, and medical supplies.

It was assumed that, during the "emergency period," whilst military operations were proceeding and military control was maintained, food imports added to local supplies should suffice to provide a ration per person of 2,000 calories a day: but this minimum, which is much higher than the existing average in nearly all the occupied countries, was recognised as being "applicable only for the shortest possible period during which it may be physically impossible to provide a more adequate standard of nutrition." The average for a "relief period" of six months was put at 2,600 calories (the amount being varied, of course, according to the category of consumer).

These estimates were based on various assumptions that will need modification. For instance, Europe's home production was estimated on the 1942 basis: but the 1943 harvest is worse. On the other hand, the shipping position is better. Nothing was allowed in the emergency scheme for working stocks in shops, factories, etc., or for waste in transit, nor was there allowance for prisoners, refugees or "displaced" persons.

Moreover, these estimates cover only the eight countries named; Russia is omitted, and so are all the enemy countries and all the neutrals. So the eventual total will be far larger than 46 million tons for six months.

So much for the demand: now as to supply. There is a substantial reserve of wheat; and this and other grain stocks could be greatly increased if the use of grain for purposes other than human consumption were cut down. Thus, in the U.S. some 150 million bushels of wheat is now consumed annually in making alcohol, mostly for synthetic rubber. ("Tyres instead of bread" is the revised form of "Guns instead of butter.") And some 5 million tons of grain, it is said, were consumed in the season 1942-43, in the Argentine for fuel. To send coal ships to the Plate is to save food from destruction.

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Sugar is all right, I believe, provided that controls are kept on so that consumption here does not expand. And there will be enough cocoa. But meat is likely to be a problem; there ought to be a reduction of consumption in the fortunate countries if the hard-hit countries are to be relieved in time. One trouble is that they lack cold-storage facilities. Milk will be a major shortage, undoubtedly. I expect the world will soon be regretting that UNRRA was not established earlier, and that action was not taken in good time to equip factories for producing dried milk. Our country, remember, has *increased* its consumption of milk during the war. Thus, there will be a fairly good supply of the energy-producing foods in the world; not necessarily available in convenient places, but at least in existence. But there will be a world shortage of other foods, notably animal proteins; and part of that shortage should presumably be made good by a temporary reduction of consumption in the most favoured countries.

These notes are too slight and inexpert to deserve the reader's attention in detail. But I think they do indicate the need for publication before long of really informed particulars of the world's emergency feeding problem. The problem can only be tackled successfully if hundreds of millions of people have a broad idea of its importance to them, and of what they can contribute. We are all needed for the army of collective defence against hunger and pestilence.

NEED, AND CAPACITY TO PAY.

The principle that relief should not be used as a political weapon has been recognised at the UNRRA Conference, so far as the liberated Allied countries are concerned. So has the principle that relief should be supplied in accordance with *need*, and not simply on the basis of capacity to pay; in the liberated countries relief will be supplied free to those who cannot pay for it. But that principle has now been rejected in Germany's case; the Conference has decided that the enemy countries must pay in full for all UNRRA's operations within their territory, and an amendment qualifying by the words "to the fullest extent practicable" has been defeated, at Russia's instance, by 23 votes to 17, with Britain, America, China and Poland in the minority. Here begins to emerge a great issue. Do the United Nations really mean to use hunger, after the surrender, as an instrument of vengeance against a helpless, defeated people? I do not for a moment think they will want

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to do this, when it comes to the point. Will the United Nations, then, repeat the error of 1919, giving permission for imports of food but insisting on terms of payment which could not be fulfilled, blocking the exports by which imports could be paid for, and destroying credit by leaving a vast indeterminate charge for reparations hanging over Germany's head?

Behind that lies the still greater question—do the United Nations wish to see a Germany that is not Hitler's recovering prosperity—butter without guns? Do they aim at keeping the German people economically caged and crippled for a generation? At Paris, the Allies were divided about that. At Atlantic City they were divided. It will be a black look-out for the world if, before the end of this war, Britain, Russia and America have not reached full agreement on a policy realistically designed for the purpose of harnessing the will of the bulk of the German people behind a cause which is also Europe's.

But this must be added. When one compares the position in 1918-19 as regards nutrition, relief and reconstruction with the position in 1943, as indicated by the Resolutions of the Hot Springs Food Conference and the UNRRA Conference, one realises that an immense advance in understanding has been made. If the United Nations manage fairly to combine democratic representation with firm leadership and efficient control at the centre, they may render an outstanding service both to the healing of the world's fearful scars and to the growth of functional government for certain purposes of the community of nations.

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By AN OBSERVER

IN so far as one may be justified in assuming the existence of any specific war aim on the part of the United Nations, that aim would appear to be the prevention of future wars. Moreover, it begins to be understood that international peace is unlikely to be secured by purely political means ; wars will still occur if no effective steps are taken to remove their underlying social and economic causes. Whatever may be our view about the German "race" and its historical tendencies and characteristics, it is hard to imagine that the present war would have broken out had not something like one-third of the working population of Germany remained unemployed for years on end, with a totally inadequate unemployment benefit on which to maintain themselves and their families.

It may, therefore, be taken as axiomatic that the present war will no more be followed by a stable peace than was the last if mass unemployment and intolerably low levels of real remuneration subsist in industrially important areas.

Further, it will hardly be disputed that reasonably satisfactory social conditions cannot be secured for the world as a whole unless the production and distribution of essential commodities are regulated and co-ordinated by international agreement. No intelligent and well-educated person will believe that the international economic conditions of the nineteen-thirties could have resulted in anything but widespread destitution and frustration.

Probably few people now realize or remember that those who drafted the settlement of 1919 placed on record their belief in these truths, in specific terms, in the various treaties that they drafted and signed. They did so in the Preamble to Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding Parts of the other Treaties of Peace, which embody the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation. This Preamble states that universal peace can only be established upon the basis of social justice ; that social justice will not exist as long as conditions of labour are acutely unsatisfactory for large numbers of people ;

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that the attainment of generally satisfactory conditions of labour is a matter of international concern ; and that an international labour organisation must therefore be set up, having among its attributes not merely the protection of the worker in direct connection with his employment, but also the actual prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage and the regulation of the labour supply.

Responsible spokesmen of the Governments of the United Nations are now going out of their way to stress their recognition of the social and economic aspects of the main objective that the United Nations are pursuing : the establishment of a lasting peace. Article V of the Atlantic Charter lays down the principle of :

The fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.

In rather less specific terms, the general declaration officially issued on the results of the Molotov-Eden-Hull Conference in Moscow records that :

Second only to the importance of shortening the end of the war was the recognition of the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and co-operation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic, and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

The declaration adds that consideration was given in the course of the Conference to—*inter alia*—"economic collaboration and assurance of general peace."

The significance of these statements of policy can only be fully appreciated if it be borne in mind that in no previous international war has any specific social objective been voiced or acknowledged. Not even President Wilson's Fourteen Points contains any mention of social policy. Moreover, the notion of a social objective has profoundly impressed the imagination of the peoples who are doing the actual bleeding, toiling, weeping and sweating. There is a very general desire that the peace settlement should bring with it, not merely security from future war, but also social security from fear and want.

In making their declarations on international social policy, responsible statesmen have not forgotten the practical steps that were taken in 1919 or the institution that was then created and that is still functioning. President Roosevelt, addressing

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the New York-Washington Conference of the International Labour Organisation in November, 1941, said:

In the planning of such international action (i.e., for the implementation of Articles IV and V of the Atlantic Charter) the International Labour Organisation, with its representation of labour and management, its technical knowledge and experience, will be an invaluable instrument for peace. Your Organisation will have an essential part to play in building up a stable international system of social justice for all peoples everywhere.

Mr. Eden told the House of Commons in December, 1942:

The I.L.O. must be strengthened and developed. I should like to see it become the main instrument giving effect to Article V of the Atlantic Charter.

So far, so good. The United Nations seem to be committed to a policy of international economic collaboration for social purposes: a policy, that is to say, which implies a *positive* conception of peace. Still more, spokesmen for the British and United States Governments have designated the institution to be used as the main channel or instrument of such collaboration. There are a number of reasons for approving their choice of the I.L.O. It already exists, and is in working order. Its work, and the work done through it, during the quarter-century of its existence have been effective (within the limits imposed by the unwillingness of the States Members to use the I.L.O. for the achievement of the more ambitious items inscribed in its constitutional programme, such as prevention of unemployment and provision of an adequate living wage). It ensures due representation to the smaller among the United Nations, to most of the neutrals and non-belligerents, and to the organised workers (and employers), and in a considerable degree enjoys their confidence. Moreover, the selection of the I.L.O. as a main agent of economic-social reconstruction appears logical and necessary to those most directly concerned in its work; for the Conference of the International Labour Organisation which met in New York in November, 1941, unanimously adopted a resolution moved by the United States delegation calling for the intimate association of the I.L.O. in the whole task of post-war international economic and social reconstruction, and laying down the lines on which it should collaborate in working out the necessary plans.

If the I.L.O. is to be effectively used for the purposes suggested by President Roosevelt and Mr. Eden, what will be the chief tasks confronting the Organisation after the war?

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Essentially those, it would appear, that already stand allotted to it in the Preamble to its existing Constitution.

In the first place, it will have to continue its task of improving actual conditions of employment, and strengthening the protection of the worker in direct connection with his work. Under this heading it has already achieved much, but much remains to be done, particularly as regards standards of health and safety, holidays, recreation, welfare and amenities, protection of juveniles and vocational training. (In so far as the limitation of hours of work remains a live issue, it is to be hoped that the I.L.O. may be allowed and encouraged to deal with it on its own merits, and not as an indirect means of providing more employment or higher cash earnings.) There is still an immense amount to be done for the improvement of social conditions in colonial territories—that is to say, territories, whether colonies or possessing nominal autonomy, where goods are being produced by primitive and politically backward populations for the international market. Standards of labour inspection must be improved, and sooner or later the I.L.O. will have to possess its own technically qualified inspectorate—a body whose authority will, like that of any good national labour inspectorate, rest rather on its ability to advise and help than on its power to initiate penal proceedings. (For years past members of the Office's staff have in fact been being called upon to advise and assist individual governments in the drafting and enforcement of their labour legislation.) A determined effort will also have to be made to secure the international standardisation of labour statistics.

Secondly, the I.L.O. will have to continue its efforts to secure the generalisation of social insurance on technically sound bases. The authority of the International Labour Office in this sphere has already won wide recognition.¹

So far, the tasks mentioned merely represent the continuation and extension of the I.L.O.'s normal pre-war activities, and would no doubt have been undertaken in any case, without reference to any Atlantic Charter or other such document. But there is a third, far more difficult and important, group of reforms: those which involve effective international co-operation and regulation in the economic and financial fields. The Preamble to the I.L.O.'s Constitution specifies three such reforms: prevention of unemployment, regulation of the labour

¹ Cf. *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, report by Sir William Beveridge (Cmd. 6404), para. 36.

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supply, provision of an adequate living wage; but, as has already been pointed out, it has never been within the Organisation's power to make any effective attempt at their realisation. The Roosevelt and Eden declaration may reasonably be regarded as signifying the willingness in principle of the British and United States Governments to make the I.L.O. a focus of genuine economic collaboration for social purposes.

Fourthly, the 1919 Preamble specifies one essential guarantee of a political nature: "recognition of the principle of freedom of association." It is as true now as it was in 1919 that if this guarantee be lacking, all the other social and economic reforms merely add up to slavery. The working of the I.L.O.'s own constitutional machinery entirely depends on the collaboration of representatives of free associations of employers and workers. The authority and influence of the Organisation have suffered severely in the past because a number of the States Members openly flouted the principle of freedom of association, with the express or tacit support of all the rest. An institution approved and utilised by the victorious United Nations must in future be kept free of all reproach on this head.

How far is the I.L.O. in its present form capable of acting as the instrument for the realisation of these reforms? What changes, if any, must be made in its constitution, its practice and its status? In what follows an attempt will be made to suggest answers to these questions; but before going into details, one comment of a more general character may not be out of place. Those who think of the I.L.O. in terms of the kind of questions with which its activities have hitherto been mainly concerned—questions, that is, directly connected with the protection of the individual worker in his employment, or with social insurance—and those to whom the word "labour" in the title of an institution signifies that the institution in question can logically be concerned only with such questions, are inclined to assume that the Roosevelt-Eden declarations represent a considerable extension of the I.L.O.'s competence, and that its Constitution will have to be redrafted from beginning to end to enable it to cope with its new responsibilities. The I.L.O. is already, under its 1919 Constitution, made responsible for dealing with fundamentally economic issues, and the authors of that Constitution must be presumed to have supposed that they were making adequate provision for the effective execution of this part of the Organisation's work. Consequently, though experience may have revealed weaknesses in the Constitution,

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and certain adaptations may be required to meet changed circumstances, the task of revision should not be undertaken on the assumption that provision has to be made for tackling tasks essentially different from those originally contemplated. And there is surely nothing anomalous in the suggestion that any labour organisation, national or international, should concern itself with issues of such direct concern to the workers as employment and wages.

1.—*Membership*: It is clearly important that the membership of the Organisation should once again embrace all economically important countries. There is some doubt as to the present position and attitude of the Soviet Union. That to the present position and attitude of the Soviet Union. That state's former membership of the League of Nations automatically carried with it membership of the I.L.O., and Moscow did in fact appoint a representative to the Governing Body and sent delegations to a few Sessions of the Conference. But even this degree of participation ceased from 1937. The truth probably is that the kind of work that the Organisation was doing before the war was not of major importance to the U.S.S.R., which had its own methods of dealing with day-to-day labour and social problems and appeared to see no special advantage in international collaboration in that particular field. But if the I.L.O. is to become the official instrument of economic and financial collaboration between the United (and other) Nations for the solution of social problems and the raising of living standards, Moscow's attitude might change. Messrs. Eden, Hull and Molotov agreed in Moscow to the principle of post-war collaboration with a view to the promotion of the "economic and social welfare of their peoples," and there is no reason to suppose that the instrument already designated for this very purpose by the British and United States Governments would be obnoxious to the Soviet Union.

2.—*Regionalism*: The I.L.O. has already experimented fairly successfully with regional devolution, and may be expected to carry its experiments still further. It has held two labour conferences of American States Members, which, though they could hardly draft any decisions strictly comparable to the Draft Conventions and Recommendations of the International Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Conference, did nevertheless provide a useful stimulus to social improvement in the Western Hemisphere, and above all enabled a number of technicians from different countries to get into touch with each other. As one result, there now exists a

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permanent Inter-American Committee to forward Social Security, working under I.L.O. auspices. Useful regional meetings of labour inspectors for Western and Eastern European countries respectively have been held. There has been talk of an Asiatic Labour Conference, of a Middle Eastern Labour Conference, and so forth. It may be expected that after the war there will be various regional conferences on the pattern of the American ones and meetings of various regional technical committees or other bodies. There may also be a tendency to group the existing national branch or correspondents' offices on regional lines, with a kind of central office for each region. Such developments will help to stimulate local interest and multiply personal contacts. Conceivably the work of economic co-ordination which it is proposed to undertake through the I.L.O. may lend itself to an even greater degree of regional devolution, and potentially binding decisions in this sphere may be taken by regional bodies. For instance, is it not conceivable that a Middle Eastern Conference, meeting under the auspices of the I.L.O., might take decisions concerning the future development of the social and economic collaboration that war conditions have forced upon the area?

3.—*The tripartite basis*: The I.L.O.'s Constitution provides that the membership of the Conference and Governing Body shall have a tripartite character: government, employers' and workers' representatives, in the proportion 2 : 1 : 1; and the same principle has been adopted in constituting other bodies and meetings organised by the I.L.O. (except consultative technical bodies). Various questions are being posed as to the maintenance or modification of the tripartite system in the future:

- (a) does the existing system provide adequately for the representation of groups having a direct interest in the solution of social problems, but not normally catered for by existing employers' and workers' organisations—e.g., the management of publicly-owned undertakings, professional workers, handicraftsmen, the managerial staff, the co-operative movement?
- (b) why should not the proportion 1 : 1 : 1 be substituted for 2 : 1 : 1?
- (c) would it not be advisable in certain cases—particularly in constituting bodies representative of specific industries—to copy the pattern of the existing Joint Maritime Commission, which consists solely of representatives of the shipowners and the seamen, with a "neutral" chairman?

The reply to all these, and similar, questions seems to be, that in the course of the quarter of a century during which it

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has been actively at work the I.L.O.'s Constitution has been found again and again to possess enough elasticity to enable it to "move with the times" and to face all sorts of situations which were probably not foreseen in 1919. *In practice* it has proved perfectly feasible to fit a tripartite Soviet delegation into the Conference machinery; to secure representation for state-owned railway undertakings when railway questions were being discussed; to fit representatives of professional workers' and merchant marine officers' organisations (for instance) into the constitutional framework; to set up bodies on which the proportion of government representatives to employers' and workers' representatives diverged in all sorts of ways from the 2 : 1 : 1 formula, and even bodies without any government representatives at all.

4.—*The organs*: The Constitution provides for a general Conference, to meet in regular session at least once a year; a permanent secretariat (the International Labour Office), under a Director; and a Governing Body responsible for the "control" of the Office, the appointment of the Director, and the determination of the agenda of each session of the Conference. In practice, both the Conference and the Governing Body have done a good deal of their work through, or with the help of, committees chosen from among their own members and/or outside experts.

The future composition and functions of the Conference and the Governing Body do not seem to call for any special observations. On the other hand, a few words may be said on the duties of the Office.

It was the appointment of Albert Thomas as first Director of the International Labour Office which ensured that the Office should become something very much more than the modest secretariat that had been planned by the British officials who drafted the first outline of a Constitution for an I.L.O. Not merely did he insist on having a reasonably large and representative staff, with adequate technical and personal qualifications; above all, he imposed his view that the Office must, if it was to make its proper contribution to the efficient working of the whole Organisation, be something quite different from a secretariat. First of all, it could not be impartial—it must believe in and work for the bold reforms specifically recommended in the Constitution. Secondly, it must have an opinion on every question that arose, and must submit to every meeting convened under the auspices of the Organisation a

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document embodying specific proposals, to serve at least as a basis for discussion. (Of course, he was careful to ensure that any proposals put forward or opinions expressed on important issues had the approval of his Governing Body.) Thirdly, the Office must be present where matters within its competence were being discussed and decided internationally, and not wait to be presented with a *fait accompli*. Fourthly, the Director must enjoy something corresponding to Ministerial status, and must be in a position to discuss policy on an equal footing with Government spokesmen of whatever rank. No one who is familiar with the history of international institutions since 1919 can doubt the importance of maintaining Albert Thomas' view of the duties of both Office and Director; and it may be safely prophesied that if after the war other views prevail, the I.L.O. will prove a failure and a disappointment.

5.—*Industrial offices, secretariats, commissions*: In November, 1941, the New York Conference of the I.L.O. adopted a resolution requesting the Director of the Office "to begin immediately the preparation of a definite scheme for the establishment under the ægis of the International Labour Organisation of a World Textile Office, based on the tripartite principle, to be responsible for the international organisation of economic and social measures to secure prosperity and social justice in the textile industry." Similar proposals have been put forward in respect of the transport, mining and metallurgical industries. On the other hand, there has existed within the framework of the I.L.O. almost since the beginning a Joint Maritime Commission whose tasks are of a more modest character, and whose composition is bipartite, not tripartite.

It seems quite possible that a considerable development may take place at the end of the war, if not before, in the direction of setting up central international organs under the ægis of the I.L.O. for the study and regulation of social conditions in various industries. It remains to be seen what form these bodies will take and what powers will be allotted to them. It may be doubted whether joint committees with purely advisory powers, after the model of the Joint Maritime Commission, would in the majority of cases serve a useful purpose; whilst if they had power to take definitive decisions the absence of effective intervention by representatives of the public might leave them free to develop monopolistic features. In any case the idea of subdividing by industries the task of economic collaboration and regulation for social purpose is a most interesting one,

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and may make for much greater efficiency, provided that appropriate steps are taken to co-ordinate the work of the various industrial offices or secretariats; and to place them all under the ægis of a body like the I.L.O. would perhaps offer the best guarantee of such co-ordination.

6.—*Delimitation of the I.L.O.'s technical competence*: When Mr. Eden said he would like to see the I.L.O. strengthened and developed so that it could become the "main instrument" of "fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field" for social purposes, he can scarcely have intended to suggest that all the main responsibilities in the field of international economic collaboration should be handed over to the I.L.O. He can hardly have been contemplating a situation, for instance, in which the International Labour Conference, with its delegations composed of government, employers' and workers' representatives, would meet in regular session with, say, "full employment" on its agenda and would proceed to work out, in the form of a binding Convention, a five-years plan of investment, production, imports and exports for States Members as a whole. On the other hand, it would be futile to restrict the I.L.O.'s competence to the adoption of resolutions declaring that unemployment and starvation wages ought to be abolished, and recommending that this, that or the other conceivable step towards that end be "explored".

It is to be assumed that there will exist in the post-war world various official international bodies competent to organize economic, financial and social collaboration. It is also to be assumed that their activities will be co-ordinated within some general framework. It is not difficult to fit the I.L.O. into such a picture. It will continue to be the body responsible for the formulation of social (labour) policy, in accordance with the principles laid down in its Constitution. It should be easy enough to devise a system of interlocking Executives, technical committees, etc., through which the authorised representatives of the I.L.O. can express the Organisation's views and work effectively for their realisation. The New York Conference of the I.L.O., in 1941, recommended various practical steps with a view to ensuring effective utilisation of the I.L.O. and co-ordination of its activities with those of other bodies:

- (a) representation of the I.L.O. in any Peace or Reconstruction Conference following the war;
- (b) continuous consultation between national reconstruction planning agencies and the I.L.O.;

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- (c) full utilisation of such existing organs of the I.L.O. as the International Public Works Committee, the Permanent Agricultural Committee, the Permanent Committee on Migration for Settlement, and the Joint Maritime Commission.

In accordance with these recommendations, the Chairman of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration recently invited the I.L.O. to be represented by observers at the Atlantic City Conference, so that the Council and Committees might "receive the benefit of the experience and advice which the I.L.O. is able to offer."

7.—*Co-ordination of National Relations with the I.L.O.*: The I.L.O. is already dealing with questions that lie within the competence of various national Ministries or Departments in each country, and this will probably be even more the case in the future. In addition to the Ministry of Labour, its activities will be a matter of direct concern to such other Departments as Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Transport, Agriculture, Public Health, Education and Finance—to say nothing of Reconstruction. Further, its activities are, of course, of very direct interest to the central organisations of Employers and workers, and these organisations tend to assume an increasingly official character. It would therefore seem advisable that there should exist in each capital some kind of an official co-ordinating committee or board for relations with the I.L.O., so that each of the bodies or departments concerned should be maintained constantly aware of the Office's activities and potentialities.

REFLECTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM

By I. DEUTSCHER

NO events in human history have given rise to such violent controversy as have revolutions. The great disputes of the XVII Century turned on the Cromwellian revolution. The French revolution dwarfed all other events of the XVIII Century as a centre of intellectual interest. The great ideological disputes of the XIX Century were in a sense a post-script to the revolution of the preceding age and a prelude to the social convulsions of our own time. The Russian Revolution of 1917 has undoubtedly been the most significant event in our eventful epoch. Like the others, it has found its enthusiastic admirers; and it has aroused boundless hostility. Enthusiasts as well as enemies have vied with each other in wishful thinking and blindness to facts. And, again, the Russian revolution has—like its predecessors—outgrown and outwitted both foe and friend. The historical process has taken its own course—cutting across all the formulae of the politicians and sweeping aside almost all the calculations of the sociologists. The impetus of the drama has grown beyond the powers even of its participants and actors, many of whom have been crushed and destroyed in the process. Only history will tell who will ride the stormy wave of the Russian revolution until the nation's life flows out into the broader and quieter waters of a non-revolutionary epoch.

The controversies around every revolution have sprung from the obvious fact that a revolution destroys the old established interests, ideals, customs and habits and that it undertakes to replace them by a totally new mode of life. This alone would suffice to let loose all the passions and furies of the human mind and heart. But this is merely a commonplace. What keeps the controversy alive and feeds it during many decades is the complexity of the phenomenon, its fantastic many-sidedness which usually escapes the contemporary mind. Political formulae simplify the problems; yet if there is anything that does not lend itself to simplification, it is surely the terrific process by which the whole life of a nation is turned upside down and reduced to a chaos from which it must then painfully

struggle to recover. *Grau ist alle Theorie und ewig grün ist der Lebens Baum.*

Historical perspective is essential for a balanced and unbiased judgment. Until men, with their virtues and their vices, their magnificent deeds and their horrifying crimes have been relegated to history, enthusiasts will persist in their admiration for the virtues—genuine and imaginary—while critics will allow the crimes to overshadow the achievements; and this is not only because of narrow motives and prejudices, but because in the one pattern of revolution the virtues are all but fused with the vices.

II

Every genuine revolution is an orgy of destruction. But no revolution is genuine until it achieves something more, until it shakes a nation for a new upsurge of its creative forces. The era of the English Civil War was full of crime and horror; but some of the roots of the branches and the flowers of English progress are firm in the dirty soil of that era. The guillotine dominated the scene of Jacobin France; its shadow was the more dreadful because it fell on the fresh ruins of the Bastille. Those who fought the French Revolution had their eyes fixed on that monstrosity that grew out of the Cult of Reason. The Cult must have appeared to them as a sanguinary masquerade; and they were certainly right. Yet it was out of the dirt and horror of Jacobin France that French liberalism and French democracy grew. The highest recognition of human rights and liberties was born out of acts in which all human rights and liberties were totally obliterated. The continental sympathisers of the Jacobins outside France—behaved as if they were stricken with blindness. They adhered to the great ideals—Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité—proclaimed in Paris. And—to use a modern idiom—the myth of the French Revolution possessed their minds so thoroughly that they mistook the new French tyranny for the reign of liberty. Beethoven was not repelled by the pandemonium of Robespierre's Terror. Nor was he disillusioned by the cruelties of the Thermidor and the Consulate; it was only the Empire which eventually filled him with disgust. Others of his contemporaries continued to see their liberal dreams embodied in Napoleon's conquests and in Fouché's police-state. The *fata morgana* of the revolution was stronger than the revolution itself.

The judgment of the French historian has—in spite of all that is being said in Vichy-France now—come much nearer to

the attitude of the believer of Jacobinism than to that of its implacable foes. And the cry: "Back to the ideals of the French revolution"—has become the battle-cry in France's present struggle for survival. The guillotine and the Terreur have assumed much smaller proportions in the historical perspective—they have appeared less essential than that permanent contribution to human progress which was made by revolutionary France.

The Pandora box of the Russian revolution is still open. It still releases its monsters and its fears. It would be foolish and dishonest to deny this. No motives of political expediency can be strong or convincing enough to do away with this aspect of the problem. It would be futile to portray Stalin's Russia as the realm of democracy. It would be an unpardonable stupidity to take the "freedom-loving" phraseology of the Kremlin at its face value. The Russian version of the guillotine—the firing squads of the G.P.U.—has not yet disappeared.

The same arts that did gain
A power must it maintain—

This is as true of Russia's Protectorate as of England's.

But Russia is Janus-headed. The other face shows strain, effort, suffering and hope. The revolution has stirred and stimulated a wealth of creative forces hidden underneath the surface of Russian life. It has awakened many dormant energies which could find no outlet under the old régime. This is the fundamental fact without which no understanding of Russia's role in this war is possible. First, there is the record of material achievement—the vast centres of a new industrial civilisation which have sprung up—almost overnight—on the borderlands of the Eurasian continent. The weight of Russia's new industries developed on the Volga, in the Urals, in Siberia, in the taigas of the north and on the plains of the Far East tells already on the battlefields; and it will tell on the scales of the peace. Here is a new factor which is playing and will play an enormous part in shaping the destinies of the world. The war has revealed its existence and its overwhelming strength which grew unnoticed and ignored in the years before the war. Here is a mass of many, many millions of forsaken human beings who have learned to read and write. The whole achievement might perhaps be dismissed as just another accumulation of lifeless matter, as one heap more of iron and steel destined to be scrapped by the contempt of history, had it not been for the

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tremendous upsurge of mental powers and moral energies by which it has been accompanied. Those mental and moral energies may still be—as indeed they are—unconscious of their own purpose. But they cannot be conjured out of existence. Nor can their basic soundness be denied. No collective Frankenstein would be able to raise itself to the heights of heroism and sacrifice to which the Russian people rose among the ruins of Sebastopol, Leningrad and Stalingrad. The ruthless will power of the leaders, the weight of a prodigious military machine, the cleverness of the strategy—all these would not have sufficed to do the job. They can all be found in the armies of the Third Reich—developed to an even higher degree of efficiency and perfection. They were enough to drive forward disciplined human masses intoxicated by unparalleled victories. But they would not have sufficed to sustain and keep together a nation which had drained the cup of defeat almost to the last bitter dregs. The dynamic of post-revolutionary Russia has not been merely material. It must have been anchored in some deep ideals which live in the minds and hearts of the people. Nobody can yet say into what those ideals will ultimately crystallise or towards what purpose they are going to be directed. Russia's dynamic may be used for evil or for good. But hope still lies at the bottom of the Pandora box which has been open since October, 1917.

III

It is a fallacy to treat a revolution *en bloc*. Every revolution goes through a series of metamorphoses. The starting point is left far behind; and the road of history is a tortuous one. The onlooker tends to fix his eyes on the starting point and to overlook the zig-zags that follow; and the revolution itself is entangled in its own illusions and myths. At every twist and turn of the course which carries it away from the starting point, it looks back to its origins and repeats an oath of allegiance to them. At every stage of its evolution, the revolution reasserts its own identity. The illusion is not altogether illusion. The continuity of the revolutionary process is a fact. But continuity itself implies change and the recurrent disruption of continuity.

The starting point of every social revolution so far has been the promise of full and unqualified equality to the oppressed and the disinherited. What followed was a painful and stormy drift away from Utopia. The oppressed and the disinherited storm the Bastilles and the Winter Palaces, and every revolution

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appears to them as the Doomsday in which they are the supreme judge. Their anger and their passion are the battering rams which break the old order. The *sans culottes* of the Parisian suburbs and the Red Guards of Viborg and Krasnaya Presnya performed the same function with the same zeal and the same hopes. On the morrow of their victory, the new régime proved unable to fulfil the promise. The claim to equality is the terrific liability on which the new régime is bound to default. The triumphant revolution is entangled in a tragic net from which it can get loose only by chopping off its own limbs. The more it mutilates itself in the process, the more desperately must it look for props and crutches to support its precarious "balance." It must also look for new stabilising factors in the social environment of the post revolutionary era.

Before Cromwell could firmly base his Protectorate on the merchants of London and on his Major-Generals he had to silence John Lilburne who had persistently voiced the original claims of the revolution. The stage for the Empire of Napoleon was set in the long series of "purges" which started with Hebert, the leader of the most radical wing of Jacobinism, engulfed Danton and Robespierre and finished with Babeuf, the last epigone of the equalitarian spirit of the revolution. The repetition of the process in Russia looks almost like a plagiarism committed by history on its own previous performance. Yet there are new elements in this plagiarism.

The revolutions of the XVII and the XVIII Century drift away from Utopia into the haven of a bourgeois society. It is more difficult to see the port towards which the Russian revolution is sailing through the storms of war. Those social layers which managed to stabilise the life of XVII Century England and XVIII Century France are absent in Russia. The bourgeoisie has been destroyed. The proletariat and the peasantry have been reduced to political silence and harnessed to the planned economy; they are not the ruling or dominant classes of contemporary Russia. The new "élite" is still in the stage of formation; and its outlook has not yet been clearly defined.

The American sociologist Burnham has coined the phrase, the "managerial revolution." He forecast a stage in which modern society can be dominated neither by the capitalist nor by the worker and in which the industrial manager becomes the dominant figure. As a sweeping generalisation, this is too tempting to be true. Managerial society, technocracy and so on

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have gained much more ground in the books of some theoreticians than in real life. Yet if any nation on earth has come near to the pattern of a managerial society, it is Russia. So far the only "stabilising" force which has emerged from the Russian upheaval has been the "class" of administrative and industrial managers. Their role can in many respects be compared to that played by the City merchants of the Cromwellian era. It is they who have, probably not fully consciously, undertaken the task of taming the "unruly elements of the revolution." It is they who have put their stamp on the psychological outlook of the country, on its industrial aspirations and endeavours. It is undoubtedly their "style of life" which has manifested itself in such unique strokes of economic strategy as the leap-frogging of whole industrial complexes and combines, with their machinery and labour, over hundreds and thousands of miles to Russia's east. The imaginative novelty of that "economic strategy" corresponds to the "dynamism" of a young and vigorous social force making its first ambitious appearance in the national arena.

It must not be forgotten that the several hundred thousand technicians and industrial managers who are fighting this war in Russia's mines and factories only received their training some three, five or six years ago. A few figures illustrate the magnitude of the process. Not much more than ten years ago only about twenty thousand engineers were employed in Soviet industry. The programme of industrialisation called for hundreds of thousands of technicians. The "output of industrial officers" became an inseparable part of the successive five-year-plans. The number of engineers in Russia increased about thirty times during the pre-war decade. More than 160,000 young Soviet citizens graduated from technical colleges in the course of the second plan. These figures reflect the leaps and bounds by which a new social group has emerged. The new industrial manager has been given a privileged social status. His slogan is "Away with the *uravnilovka*"¹; his faith, machine worship, and his ideals, absolute obedience of the workers, ruthless discipline in production and one-man-control in factories. The managerial phalanx, itself an offshoot of the revolutionary plebs, has brought to a close the plebeian phase of the revolution.

But the end is not yet. The structure of the Russian Protectorate has itself not taken on any final shape. In a totalitarian state which was arming itself to its teeth the officers' corps

¹ *Uravnilovka*: equalitarian policy of wages.

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reappeared on the stage, rehabilitated and elevated to a peculiar position of social respectability. A rigid military hierarchy was reintroduced at the end of the thirties, and a distinctive *esprit de corps* has taken hold of the commanders of the Red Army. The war has added incalculable momentum to this development. Towards the close of 1942 not less than five hundred officers were promoted to generals in the course of a few weeks. The promotions to the lower ranks of colonels and majors must have been proportionately more numerous. No doubt, promotions on such a scale were dictated by the actual needs of the war. But whatever the immediate reasons, the fact itself could not fail to affect the social outlook. The new officers' corps has evoked the old Imperial military tradition which the revolution was supposed to have renounced "once and for all." The historian will probably describe the set of military reforms which were carried out towards the end of 1942 as a concentrated ideological counter-reform. Not only was the political commissar, the errant shadow of the civil war, banished from the army; not only were the new orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, the national heroes of old monarchist Russia, placed above the orders of Lenin and the Red Banner; in addition, the officers' corps was ordered to sew on epaulettes, the symbols of the old Imperial army, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army; and the Regulations of Peter the Great were recalled to the memory of the Russian soldier as a source of inspiration and as a valid code of behaviour. *Pravda*, the official party paper, honoured the military leaders as the "sovereigns of the people," a description which was as flattering as "anti-constitutional."

The revolution seems to renounce its own origin and its own programme. It seems to abdicate step by step to the new social groups which may be able to stabilise a new social hierarchy. Yet this is only half the truth. The continuity of the revolutionary process is still something more than merely an outward appearance. It is symbolised by Stalin himself, the living link between all the phases of the process. Stalin is the underground leader of the Tsarist days and the member of the Central Committee of October, 1917. He carries with him his somewhat obscure legend of the civil war and the prestige of the only authorised successor to Lenin. He is at the same time the tamer of the "old Bolshevism" of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin. He has paved the way to the new hierarchy of industrial managers and generals. He has bowed to and endorsed the new hierarchy by

assuming, at the age of sixty-two, his first military rank—the rank of Marshal. But he has not only bowed to the new hierarchy, he also keeps it under control. It is he who creates the Marshals and it is he who is potent to hurl them down from the Tarpeian rock of the revolution. In the history of revolutions only the Lord Protector was equal to Stalin in embodying the unity of the revolution throughout all its transient metamorphoses. No French Jacobin career is comparable. Stalin is Robespierre and the First Consul in one person.

The new hierarchy is very strong, but is it equally stable? It may still take much time and many a convulsion before the vortex of changes stops swallowing new and new victims. At this point all the analogies with previous revolutions fall short. The problem may shortly be put thus: Cromwell's England and Napoleon's France could bring the revolutionary process to a standstill because the Merchants of the City and the French bourgeoisie grew and matured as social forces under the pre-revolutionary régimes. They possessed the social tradition and confidence which were needed for the task of stabilisation. The industrial managers and the new marshals of Russia possess no such qualities. Their capacity for "stabilisation" is still an unknown quantity. The Russian revolution has uprooted the old order much more radically than any of its predecessors could possibly do. It has irrevocably barred the way to any restoration, and it has not yet firmly paved the way for any new permanent solution. This has, of course, little to do with the stability of Stalin's personal rule, which may survive a number of new phases, provided Stalin's stupendous adaptability does not fail him. But the issue is much wider than the fortunes of Stalin's personal rule.

This, then, is the vicious circle. The Russian Revolution is still drifting away from its starting point, but the haven at which it could cast anchor is not yet in sight. The task of post-revolutionary stabilisation has become immensely difficult and complicated in the "century of the common man" when so many old social hierarchies lose their balance and the new ones seem to totter as soon as they are set up. Any post-revolutionary hierarchy resembles a throne established on the crater of a volcano. The degree of its stability or instability depends on whether the volcano has already disgorged the whole of its lava content or not. Here, the student of history can only put the question-mark without attempting to formulate any reply.

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THE CHRISTIAN FAILURE. By CHARLES SINGER. (Gollancz. 120 pp. 3s. 6d.)

ONE of the significant happenings of the present time is the renewal of interest in religion and the rediscovery of its importance in the life of society. This awakening to religion is partly conservative and defensive, but it is also growing in strength in progressive circles which have hitherto been inclined to treat religion as at best a private affair, irrelevant to social struggles. It is the discovery by social radicals that religion is an indispensable factor in the creation of a new social form that is most significant, but the first effect of such a discovery is something like despair. For it is combined with a recognition that the existing religious agencies are both incapable of performing their function in the present crisis, and almost completely unaware of the true reason for the powerlessness that they cannot but admit.

This discovery of the social significance of religion is somewhat belated. Karl Marx saw it clearly nearly a century ago when he wrote that the criticism of religion is the beginning of all criticism. But the Marxian criticism led only to negative results. Its conclusion was that now and for the future religion can only play a conservative and counter-revolutionary rôle in social life; and consequently progressive forces must declare war on religion in any and all of its forms. It is the experience of the developments which have followed the Communist revolution, both in Soviet Russia and elsewhere, that is beginning to reveal the mistake in this analysis, or rather, its inadequacy. What is needed now is an inner critique of religion which will lead to positive conclusions and so reveal the transformation in religion which is required if it is to perform its indispensable function in the future.

Dr. Singer's book is an attack, and in parts a bitter attack, upon traditional Christianity. But it is delivered in a fashion which performs a very great service to the cause of religion and of Christianity. The author is a distinguished historian of science, and part of his book is naturally concerned with the conflict between science and religion. His unique knowledge of science enables him to locate the conflict in its proper field as a conflict between two attitudes of mind; and it leads him to realise the inherent limitations of science, and its inherent incapacity to serve as a substitute for religion. His early training in an atmosphere of liberal Judaism, though it has left him critical of the traditional Jewish ritual, enables him to see that the religious issue of to-day, in its most concrete form, is the treatment of the Jew by Christian civilisation. Though not a Christian, and indeed bitterly critical of the Christian Churches, he can write that their complete breakdown "would be a catastrophe beyond measure and to be avoided at almost any cost. It hardly bears contemplation by men of good will, whether they call themselves Christian or not."

This is at least the beginning of the inner critique of Christianity which must precede any effective revival of religious influence upon the future of civilisation. It will not be fully effective until it comes from within the

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Christian Church itself, and is spoken, not in whispers between believers, but openly before the face of the world. Dr. Singer has pointed the way. He refuses to allow Christian apologists to take refuge in distinctions between the historic activities and policies of the Church and the essential content of the Christian gospel. Organised Christianity must answer for the social practice of its organisation through the centuries, and not least for the blindness and cowardice of its official spokesmen during the period between the two world wars. As Dr. Singer rightly insists, "it is impossible to remove from the record the stupid, the obstinate, the wilfully blind, the heartless, the cowardly, the time-serving, the subservient attitude of the Churches and of large sections of Christians during these fateful years." "The human soul may doubtless be free from sin by grace, but history never forgives."

JOHN MACMURRAY.

THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By K. M. PANIKKAR. (George Allen & Unwin. 124 pp. 5s.)

MR. PANIKKAR was the gayest and most erudite Indian at the Pacific Conference in Canada last December. The ideas widely expressed at that Conference for achieving security and orderly social and economic progress in the Asiatic lands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans have influenced the argument of his remarkably stimulating book. It may be objected that much of what he has written is too slickly said and that the difficulties have been too lightly considered. Nevertheless, Mr. Panikkar has courageously tackled a series of problems of great complexity and lucidly and interestingly told us what an Indian of undeniable ability and experience thinks about the reconstruction of that part of the world with which he is most familiar. In his bold sweeps of past and present policies, he grasps the essentials and presents the principles round which future policy might be shaped. His little book is an intelligent contribution to a subject which for most people is obscure.

The theme of the book is the essential place of India in the maintenance of peace and the attainment of progressive societies in S.E. Asia. India occupies a position of the first strategic importance; it is basic for the reconquest of the lands overrun by Japan and its predominance is increasingly noticeable with the breakdown of European imperialism in the East. "The future of S.E. Asia has to be thought out on entirely new lines which would provide for full security and at the same time not repeat the conditions of local helplessness. In fact, the defence of this area must be related to India and the political system now prevalent in S.E. Asia should be so modified as to ensure the participation of the local population in government and the gradual liquidation of the colonial system and its replacement by a political organisation which will in time guarantee the freedom of the peoples of this area."

It is in amplification of these ideas and with the broad argument sustaining them, that the book proceeds. Mr. Panikkar believes that the war has destroyed in Asia that aspect of the colonial system which spelt foreign political and economic dominance, in which raw materials were produced

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for metropolitan industries, and the local or native agriculture was clearly differentiated from plantation economy and mining took the place of industry. In any case, colonial economy with its concern for profit from oil, rubber and tin, and controlled by foreign interests, negatives the development of industry and the means of modern defence. In the modern world Britain herself cannot guarantee the defence of far-away areas administered on such lines. The alternative is a policy based on the freedom of the colonial peoples, on the development of a better balanced and non-colonial economy and on a collective security in which all powers directly concerned share in responsibility.

A free and stable India is the essential prerequisite of the success of this alternative policy. For the resources and economies of India and S.E. Asia are complementary. Their policies should be conceived on co-operative lines. A sound colonial policy in S.E. Asia should permit of the creation, as part of a global system of security and economic wellbeing of a regional council that is representative of the nations and peoples of the area and allow of third party supervision of the metropolitan powers in colonial areas. But if India is the keystone in this policy, what constitution can give her freedom and the essential stability?

Mr. Panikkar's answer will disturb many people. He rejects any federal solution because none can guarantee security or afford the necessary assurances and safeguards to minorities. He argues that the Hindu-Muslim problem is a question of political power and not a religious issue. He wants an independent state of Pakistan created from contiguous areas containing a majority of Muslims, equal in status to Hindustan, the re-integration of India to come "through an organic relationship between two independent states in the relationship between whom there will be no place for constitutional safeguards or majority or minority considerations." This New India would co-operate on matters of defence and foreign policy and on other common interests such as transport, irrigation, currency, etc. The vulnerability and strategic importance of India necessitate in the modern world a close alliance with Britain and association with the family of British nations—an arrangement mutually advantageous. The situation will also demand the rapid and steady development of the industries and resources of India.

Siam, Burma, Indo-China, and the Netherlands East Indies are rapidly surveyed and brought into the general picture in regard to their defence, political growth and economic relations. Indian immigration into S.E. Asia is a poverty problem which India must face and solve herself by her own internal development. Britain will continue to have a part to play as leader in the world community "in which her ideals of government, her ethics of public life, and generally her way of civilisation will dominate."

The common-sense and liberal tone of much which is set out in this vigorous book commend for it a wide reading. Some progressives will challenge it, but workers in the colonial field will be more than interested in how an Indian feels about the assumptions of British colony policy and the changes he sees necessary in our administration of colonial territories.

A. CREECH JONES.

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WEALTH FOR WELFARE. By H. W. FOSTER and E. V. BACON. (Macmillan. 174 pp. 12s. 6d.)

IF some time there has been wide agreement that the major fault in British colonial policy in the past has been the neglect of material development which is essential to political advancement and there is now a welcome shift in emphasis from political to material development in the utterances of thinkers on progress in the colonies.

In 1941 Lord Hailey warned us that "you cannot build up political liberties (in the colonies) on dwarfed bodies or stunted minds" and that has now received official recognition. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Colonel Oliver Stanley), in his last statement in Parliament on colonial policy, said that if self-government in the colonies is to succeed, it will have to have solid social and economic foundations, and that it is no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to confer political advances which are unjustified by circumstances, for there cannot be any real self-government if a colony is financially dependent on the Mother country and he went on to show that the twin pillars supporting colonial self-government are education and economic development.

Where disagreement arises is how colonial development is to be achieved. *Wealth for Welfare*, a study of world reconstruction with special reference to the economic development of backward areas, written by men with first-hand knowledge of several colonies, offers an answer to this question which should commend itself to those who are planning colonial development. This book puts forward a scheme by which Great Britain could develop her colonies, in the first place, in the interests of the local inhabitants, and secondly, in the interests of the world at large. The interests of the two are inter-dependent, and it is only by co-operation between the two that the raising of standards of living will be achieved and markets will be found for the goods manufactured by the highly industrialised countries. In our colonies and in India and Burma the responsibility for initiating development and welfare policy has been left to the Colonial Governments themselves, the Home Government being content to encourage and indicate major lines of policy and to restrain over-ambitious administrators. It has been the rule that no Colonial Government could initiate policy which it could not pay for itself either from current revenue or from loans for the interest on which the Colony was responsible. While the £5,000,000 a year for ten years granted by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, will relieve colonies to which grants are made from financing development entirely from their own resources, it is clear from statements of policy made by successive Secretaries of State on the working of that Act, that the initiative to develop remains with the Colonial Governments and censorship of their schemes with the Colonial Office. The authors of this book would reverse that process and would set up an Imperial Development Authority financed and controlled by the Home Government, competent to visualise the effective development of the whole huge estate, to draw up comprehensive plans, and when these have been approved by both the Home Government and the Colonial Government concerned, to implement them. They suggest that the direction of such a body might be entrusted

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partly to specially selected Government officials and partly to business men who should be required to sever all connection with private business on their appointment, and to refrain from holding directorships of other companies. Presumably they would be mainly business men with a leavening of officials. The art of administration requires a mind amenable to routine. Planning and development of resources demands a different type of mind, capable of comprehending a wider subject matter and of taking risks and grasping opportunities.

The authors point out that at the outset the ideas and the impetus must come from this country by reason of the backwardness of the majority of colonial people, but they emphasise that the colonial peoples themselves should be associated from the start in the task of working out the policies adopted, so that they may feel that they are building their own future. In order to give them this opportunity, they suggest that in each colony in which development work is undertaken, there should be a subsidiary company, financed by and responsible to the Imperial Development Authority at home, but directed by a Board chosen from the people of the colony, with the Governor as ex-officio Chairman. They have selected British Honduras for a detailed study of the methods by which the Imperial Development Authority should operate, and say that the aims of development should be, firstly, to strengthen the internal market and economic structure, to secure a progressively rising standard of living for the existing inhabitants and for immigrants of suitable type; and, secondly, to produce for export selected products with the efficiency necessary to justify competition in the most suitable external markets. They present a detailed scheme of development of that colony to which it would not be possible to do justice by summarising it here.

Other colonial territories on the development of which they have written are Trinidad, Kenya, Burma and the Seychelles Islands. It is to be regretted that they did not include in their suggestions for the development of Trinidad a recommendation to drain the vast area, known as the Caroni Swamp, and to bring it under rice cultivation. It is to be hoped that this may be added in a future edition. Of Kenya, in which one of the authors has resided for many years, and in which it is often said that there is an insufficiency of land for the needs of the native population, they say that there is need firstly for survey, secondly for experiment, and thirdly for swift action. Some millions of wasted capital could have been saved if it had been known and recognised that a large part of the land is too poor and the rainfall too erratic for European farmers to succeed in cultivating it. They recommend survey and close study of 2,000 square miles of land traversed by the Tana river with a view to its development by drainage and controlled irrigation. Of Burma, they say that it is one of the countries of the East where there are still available comparatively large areas of undeveloped land suitable for cultivation, and it seems to be a typical field for an Imperial Development Authority when it has been recovered from the Japanese. In the Seychelles they recommend development of a fishing industry and export of processed fish to India, East Africa and Mauritius. In 1926, Mr. J. Hornell, formerly Director of Fisheries of Madras, surveyed the fishing banks of the Seychelles,

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covering 1,200 square miles, and advised development of a fish industry, but no action has been taken on his report.

While the book presents a scheme primarily for the development of colonial territories, it also contains a chapter on development in the Home Country and in the self-governing Dominions. It suggests setting up a Research Centre to enquire into the economic condition of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. Of the Dominions it writes: "They have eagerly co-operated in the unfruitful work of war, and would probably welcome the opportunity of co-operating in developing the resources of our common heritage," and should be consulted while the scheme of the Imperial Development Authority is being worked out. In India, the book points out that the greatest problem of all, overshadowing all disputes of the politicians about constitutions, is poverty, but the problems of India are so immense that they would require a volume to themselves. India, however, is not excluded from the scope of the Imperial Development Authority. It includes an ingenious scheme for financing colonial development based partly on a Capital Levy, in return for which shares in the Imperial Development Authority would be issued to those who pay the Levy, and partly on loans guaranteed by the State.

This book is a valuable, realistic contribution to solution of the problem of colonial development and well repays study.

C. W. W. GREENIDGE

CONSTRUCTIVE DEMOCRACY. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (Faber. 41 pp. 2s. 6d.)
BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER. By ROBERT A. BRADY. (Columbia University Press, Oxford Press, & Milford. 340 pp. 20s.)

THESE two books, in different ways and from different angles, raise the same fundamental questions about the future of democracy. Professor Macmurray's is extremely short, consisting of two lectures. His thesis is that our democracy, which received its form in the nineteenth century from the liberal tradition, is negative democracy. Beginning in a demand for religious toleration, it became in essence a denial of the omniscience of government. It is negative because it defines and establishes freedom by enacting what the government or state may not do; the two spheres of life which it withdraws from state interference are culture and economics. The liberal doctrine attempted by withdrawing economics from state interference to make government in that sphere negative in order to secure industry, commerce, and finance for private control and enterprise. That was the nineteenth century doctrine of *laissez-faire*, economic freedom and democracy. Actually the capitalist control of industry is the antithesis of democracy; it is oligarchic and the growth of large-scale enterprise and of monopoly capitalism has made the economic system more and more authoritarian and oligarchic. The paradox of liberalism, the defender of political democracy, was that by helping to concentrate economic power in a small oligarchy of monopoly capitalists and financiers it has created an anti-democratic rival to the democratic government within the liberal state, a force which threatens to destroy

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political democracy. In fact, under modern conditions, whatever the theory of *laissez-faire*, negative economic government has proved impossible. Even when *laissez-faire* liberalism was at its zenith, state interference with industry could not be avoided, and everywhere in highly industrialised countries it has increased enormously during the last fifty years. It is clear that the passage from negative to positive government, which is already complete in Russia and the totalitarian states, will take place everywhere. In Professor Macmurray's second lecture he considers the question whether in this transition from negative to positive government political democracy can be preserved, whether, that is to say, we can establish economic democracy. The danger to democracy is acute. What has happened so far is that positive economic government has been largely already established by the economic oligarchy of monopoly capitalists using the power of the state and their control of or "influence over" the government as an instrument of their own economic policies. That is the easiest way to make the transition from negative to full positive government and it was the way taken in the fascist states. It entails the complete destruction of all democracy, both political and cultural. But though this is the easiest way, it is not necessarily the only way. Our problem is to democratise our economic system. Professor Macmurray does not really attempt to explore how this may be done; he merely points out that the solution must depend upon our ability both to maintain the living spirit of democracy throughout every section of the community and to devise the necessary institutional organisation for democratic control of the economic system. In one not unimportant point I cannot follow him. He maintains that "the transition from negative to positive government does away with the effectiveness of our present means of controlling government—the power of the House of Commons to refuse to vote supplies. To maintain democracy under positive government, a new instrument of effective public control has to be devised and established." I do not understand why a government which planned and controlled production and distribution should not be as effectively controlled by the House of Commons as a negative government is to-day. The House would still have to vote supplies. Democratic control of the government ultimately depends upon the fact that it cannot carry on the day to day government of the country constitutionally unless a majority of the House of Commons supports it in the Lobbies, and not merely on the question of supply. I do not see why a transition from negative to positive government should make it more difficult for the House of Commons to throw out a Government in which it had lost confidence by a hostile vote on, say, the Appropriation Bill, than it is to-day or was in Gladstone's time.

Mr. Brady's book is a long, intensive study of one aspect of Professor Macmurray's subject. It is of the greatest interest and value and I know nothing quite like it in this peculiar field of research. It shows, by an analysis of certain parts of the structure of business organisation in the great industrial countries, how the economic oligarchy of the monopoly capitalists use political democracy as an instrument of their own economic policies, and how this process, if allowed to proceed unchecked, ends naturally in the fascist or corporative state and the destruction of all democracy. The

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process consists in a movement to a stage beyond the cartel, which was originally a concentration of economic power for economic purposes, to federations or associations on national lines of all industrial, commercial, and financial concerns, what Mr. Brady calls peak or central associations and the Germans call *Spitzenverbände*. These national associations—the National Federation of German Industry in Germany, the General Confederation of Italian Industry in Italy, the Zaibatsu in Japan, the C.G.P.F. in France, the F.B.I. in Britain, and the National Association of Manufacturers in the U.S.A.—are primarily concerned with politics, with safeguarding the political foundations of monopoly capitalism. They are all dominated by the giant cartels or industrial or financial giants; the history of their development and of their antidemocratic policies has a striking resemblance in every country. Mr. Brady's detailed and sleuth-like analysis of their organisation, methods, and policy is fascinating; no one who wishes to understand the crisis through which the world and democracy are passing can afford to ignore it.

LEONARD WOOLF.

POST-WAR MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT¹

III—GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND EFFICIENCY

By A TEMPORARY CIVIL SERVANT

A

LARGE number of civilians drawn from the business community and from the academic profession have been recruited during the war to the Administrative Grade of the Civil Service. Many of them, including the present writer, have been disturbed by their experiences and feel impelled to make a number of criticisms and suggestions. The criticisms are not offered in a mood of complacent superiority. No profession is without its faults, and I am perfectly certain that Civil Servants brought, temporarily, into the ranks of my own profession (that of University teaching) would suffer the same disillusionment and comment with equal pertinence upon the besetting sins of dons—but I write in the confident belief that the suggestions for the reform of the Universities that Civil Servants could make, and would feel compelled to offer, at the end of three years, would be worth the most serious consideration of well intentioned University reformers. No profession is without fault or can wisely ignore the advice of candid friends.

2.—Some criticism of the Civil Service and of the efficiency of Government Departments has, however, been ill-mannered and intemperate, and it is necessary to begin by repudiating it, and insisting upon preserving some sense of proportion. A great deal of inefficiency and downright confusion was inevitable in the transition from peace to war, in the rapid multiplication of Government Departments, and in the expansion of the Service. Efficiency is normally the fruit of long labour and careful selection and can only be practised by a balanced team. It cannot be created overnight or practised by a rabble. A crowd, hastily assembled, is not an army.

Moreover, the Administrative Grade of the permanent Civil Service is characterised by four outstanding and positive virtues. The general level of intelligence is remarkably high (as a result

¹ Two articles in this series appeared in *The Political Quarterly*, January-March, 1944.

decline during their lifetime in the amount of specialised and technical knowledge thought to be necessary or desirable by their younger colleagues. Certainly most Civil Servants exhibit an ignorance of the natural sciences and social studies related closely to their work that is very surprising to the outsider. It is impossible to justify this divorce of modern knowledge from the formation of policy.¹

In the *fourth* place there is no systematic training provided for the young Assistant Principal on entering his career. In many cases the unfortunate young man spends two, three or four years—the formative years—sitting at his desk, sometimes in the same room as his superior, reading papers and supplying the first drafts of letters and documents for whose final form he bears no responsibility. The excessive formality, meticulousness and “paper-mindedness” of the older Civil Servant is to be traced more to this dreary initiation than to any other single cause.²

In the *fifth* place the work of the Establishment Divisions—the Divisions concerned with staffing organisation—is poor. This is partly due to the tradition of short-sighted “economy” that has prevented the modernisation and proper equipment of Government offices—a point to which I shall return in a moment. But the weakness of the Establishment Division is also due to the poor calibre of the officers who take up work in the Establishment Divisions. It has become traditional in many Departments to send men who are not much good for anything else into this Division—it has become a retiring ground for the mediocre and the “misfits”. It is, therefore, a “blind alley” occupation, and few men passing into it can entertain any hope of reaching the highest offices in the Service. Yet upon the work of this Division depends the efficiency of the whole office—as an office. The essential skeleton of the mechanism is in their

¹ The strangest example of this separation that has come within my personal experience is the ignorance of the rudiments of general economic and monetary theory exhibited by officials in the Treasury. There is considerable knowledge of the problems of the foreign exchange market and of taxation and budgetary economy—but of little else. In no field did the separation between academic study and the formation of policy have more disastrous consequences in the years before the war. Fortunately, since the war began, Lord Keynes and other economists have been in a position to remedy this defect, and, as a consequence, this war has been incomparably better financed than the last.

² In certain Departments a serious attempt has been made to provide an adequate training for the young recruits, and it is becoming increasingly common to send them “out into the field”—to a Colony, or a Post Office, or a Labour Exchange. This is the most important form of training if the administrator is to understand the living reality of the thing administered, and the practice should be generalised and systematised. In addition, however, it is also desirable that the young Civil Servant should learn something of the methods of administration practised by private Corporations and should also be given an opportunity to study the subjects that are of especial relevance to the work of his Department.

hands, and it is not surprising that the machine should be inefficient if its designers are second-rate.

4.—It is, I think, commonly agreed that, in all these listed respects, the position has deteriorated between the two wars. It is interesting to speculate on the reason for the decline. In the minds of most observers it cannot be separated from, and may, indeed, be wholly due to, the similar and greater decline in the calibre of Cabinet Ministers—with the causes of which these Notes are not concerned. But it is in the highest degree probable that more vigorous and imaginative Ministers would have selected, over a period of years, Civil Servants who were men of action and who would have communicated their leadership and “drive” through the hierarchy of the Service. In addition it is said that the increasing influence of the Treasury in the nomination of men for the highest posts has been detrimental to efficiency in two ways; first that it has made the senior Civil Servants, naturally eager for promotion, too sensitive to the opinion, and too eager to secure the good will of the Treasury; and secondly that in recent years a tendency has appeared for the Head of the Treasury to use his influence to select men of flexible mind, who have received a more general training as Private Secretaries to Ministers instead of the older type of Departmental specialists. Whatever the cause of the disease may be—it is essential to find a cure.

5.—What can be done to improve the efficiency of the Service?

No single remedy for these weaknesses exists, and it is, in any case, highly probable that the efficiency of the Government machine cannot be substantially improved unless and until the average ability of Cabinet Ministers (in peace-time) has been considerably increased.¹ They are, after all, the real “Heads of the Department,” and Civil Servants are servants—and must remain so. No school can remain good under a series of bad headmasters, and no Department of State can, in practice, remain administratively “fit” under a succession of vague short-sighted, inactive political Chiefs. Reform, to be completely effective, must extend to the top.

¹ There is a natural and inevitable improvement in the calibre of Ministers in the war. In the first place all the main Parties are represented in the Government, and it is therefore easy to form Ministries of the “best men willing to serve.” In the second place it is possible during war to overcome the Trade Unionism of the professional politician and to bring in able men from outside. In the third place we are a little more ruthless during time of war and do get rid of a large number of men who have proved incompetent—adjusting a little the balance between seniority and ability in favour of ability. As a consequence we secured by the third year of each of these wars a very able team of Ministers, and our remarkable triumphs or organisation are directly traceable to this fact.

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With this problem I am not concerned. Whether we are to have good or bad Ministers we shall always need a Civil Service, and it will continue to make an essential contribution to the complex process of democratic government; and there is, therefore, every reason for improving the efficiency of the persons in it.

The Service could be improved in three ways—by better methods of *recruitment*, by better methods of *training*, by better methods of *promotion*. Any team of men, assembled for any purpose, could be improved by drafting better people into it, or giving them better instruction when they are in it, or perfecting the methods by which the Captain is chosen. In addition there is the special problem of *status*, or tenure of the highest offices, to be considered. I propose to touch upon each of these problems in turn.

6.—*Recruitment*.

There are two ways in which it would be possible, in my view, to improve the methods of selection.

(a) The normal method of entry at the age of twenty-one or two should, needless to say, remain open and competitive—but the kind of tests that are used should be modernised.

The present written examination has served an invaluable purpose. It has kept the Civil Service intelligent. But intelligence is not enough, and the written examination needs to be supplemented (not replaced) by something better than the present “*interview*”. The interview in the Examination for the Administrative Grade, to which nearly a quarter of the total marks has been accorded in recent years, is a poor affair. An oddly selected Committee of persons (including titled ladies) whose claim to deep psychological insight is far from obvious, are asked to sit hour after hour, day after day (for as long as six weeks) “*interviewing*” candidates for periods ranging from ten to fifteen minutes. Such a procedure approximates to a farce. Anyone who has had any experience in interviewing candidates for any post or scholarship will realise that a bored and exhausted Committee, however fair and conscientious, can arrive at nothing but the crudest “hit and miss” judgments after a few minutes conversation with candidates who are strained and anxious.

Plainly this miserable arrangement can be improved upon, and the present interview should be replaced by

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a modern combination of intelligence tests, practical tests and psychiatric examinations such as those used by the more progressive business houses and in the “pre-OCTU” Selection Boards now set up for the Army. Anyone who doubts the value of these more scientific methods of selection should study the procedure and results, as measured by “follow-up” statistics, of these Boards.

I do not suggest that any new kind of test should wholly replace, at any rate for a time, the older written Examination—of whose virtues we are at least sure. But since no one proposes that we should put the clock back thirty years and dispense with the “interview” altogether, we should at least make the “non-written” test as good and as scientific as possible; and when confidence in the justice and validity of the new method of judgment is firmly established the relative importance of the practical and psychiatric tests might be weighed equally with the written papers.

And I feel convinced that the improvement of the interview would do something to adjust the balance between intelligence and vitality more wisely. The present written Examination picks out the intelligent, but a Committee of bored amateurs, talking to an endless stream of candidates for ten minutes a piece, places an undue premium upon pleasant manners, quiet modesty and friendliness, and charges too heavy a discount against “pushfulness”, “bumptiousness” and “toughness”. A better form of “interview” would diminish the prejudice in favour of “charm” and against “vitality”.

(b) I think it is a mistake to suppose that recruitment to the Civil Service should take place exclusively at the age of twenty-two or twenty-three. The Service needs a variety of experience, and there is no reason why it should be deprived completely of the services of men who have proved themselves to be good at administration. Few men can have done that at the age of twenty-two. There is no reason, however, why a small number of posts at a senior level (say one quarter of the posts held by Assistant Secretaries) should not be filled by men in their early thirties drawn from outside the Service by advertisement and open competition.

It would be essential to avoid any suggestion of political “colour” in the making of these appointments. We have

set our faces steadily, and probably wisely, in this country against anything that savours of the "spoils" system. But nothing of the kind is implied by this proposal. The appointments should be made by the reformed Civil Service Commission (whose constitution I shall briefly describe in a later paragraph), they would be advertised and open to all comers (including permanent members of the Service), and impartial methods of selection would be exclusively employed. Hence no suspicion of political influence need arise, while the advantages of such a practice would be considerable. The inflow of men at a later stage in life, and at a higher level, would continually freshen the Service, keep it in touch with the development of administrative technique, maintain its intellectual communication with the larger world, and do a great deal to break down the cloistered separateness of Whitehall—the "place apart".

7.—*Training.*

Once the young man (or young woman) has been selected, he or she needs, like anyone else, a special vocational training. This should be provided in two stages:

(a) The young recruit or *Assistant Principal* should in all cases, and not merely in some, be sent out into the field. He should spend his first year touring various sections of his Department in Whitehall, in the Registry, in the Establishment Division, in a policy Division; but then he should be moved for a substantial period into the sector of human life he is proposing to administer—an Assistant Principal in the Board of Education should spend six months in the schools and offices of a Local Education Authority; an Assistant Principal in the Board of Trade should spend six months or a year in a factory or a commodity market; an Assistant Principal in the Ministry of Transport should work, not only in the Regional Offices of the Ministry, but also upon a railway and in the office of a bus company and a Road Authority. In every branch of administration the individual admitted at the top should begin all over again at the bottom. He must see his Department from outside, work below the harrow as well as above it, widen his experience, and live in a world peopled by men and women, rather than papers and files walking.

It is also most important that very early in his career he should be entrusted with some field, however small, of personal responsibility. The paralysing influence of

constant supervising and complete subordination must be removed. It does not matter how small and unimportant the job may be—if it only consists in organising the messenger Service or providing drawing pins to Local Education Authorities—as long as he finds himself in a position in which he must take decisions and subsequently defend them without relying upon the authority of his superiors, becoming responsible for a little world in which something happens as a result of his labours. There is no other way of avoiding the slow growth of cynicism, the consequence of an unacknowledged sense of futility, that saps the administrative vitality of far too many Civil Servants before they have reached the age of forty.

(b) It is now commonly agreed, I believe, that *at a later age*, after some ten years in the Service, in the early thirties, the Civil Servant should be given the opportunity, and indeed required, to enjoy a further period of vocational study and training. This is the essence of the idea behind the present agitation for a *Civil Service Staff College*.

The opponents of change will no doubt make some obstructive use of this choice of a name by arguing that the requirements of military training are quite different from those of civil "administration"; and that it is impossible to teach "administrators" anything because there is no agreed "science of administration". All this is quite beside the point. It is true that it would be unwise to press the analogy between the new proposals and the existing Military Staff Colleges too far—but the absence of any strict parallelism between them does not weaken the case for two positive provisions in the case of the Civil Service.

In the *first* place nothing but good could come from releasing men for a "sabbatical year" between the ages of thirty and thirty-five to renew their academic studies and to travel. It does all specialists good to escape for a breathing space from the professional prison that closes around all but the best of us as soon as the years of intellectual maturity have been reached. To move in a larger world, to meet men and women with different backgrounds, and to "see how the other half lives" does us all good. Dons have benefited enormously from their short life as Civil Servants, and what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

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I would not wish, myself, to put any exclusive emphasis upon the element of "holiday" in the sabbatical year. It should be a period of serious study and intellectual development, and it should, in my opinion, have a strong vocational flavour. Officials released from the Board of Trade should not spend the whole year in reading modern poetry but should spend some of their time in studying recent theories of foreign trade or industrial organisation at the London School of Economics or observing, in the United States of America, the work of the Federal Trade Commission, or working in the office of a large Corporation. The official from the Colonial Office should attend lectures in anthropology and study, in the field, the campaigns for mass adult education conducted in Russia. In all cases it would be desirable to combine a course of study in the most important relevant fields of scientific research with travel and the investigation of some practical administrative achievement in another country. Intellectual and geographical isolation must both be destroyed.

In the *second* place I believe (though this second idea might not gain such wide support) that no harm could be done by introducing a second general test, at this higher age. Few of us are so good that we can dispense with a periodical stimulus to gather all our forces together and do our best to jump over another hurdle. There is therefore every reason why the studies of the "sabbatical year" should end with some sort of assessment, made by the Civil Service Commissioners and corresponding to the "passing out" examination of a Service Staff College, in which the candidates were awarded classes that would be considered whenever the question of their future promotion was raised. Nor is there any reason why the more modern methods of judging a man, to which I have already referred, should not also be used at this stage in the career of the Civil Servant—or of any profession for that matter.

8.—One problem of training deserves a further word. I have already pointed out that the work of, and the capacity of the men serving in, most *Establishment Divisions* is very poor; and there is every reason why the status of this specialised profession within the Service should be raised and a suitable training provided for it. There may be no agreed "science of administration" in the sense that it would prove of equal

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value to the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office and a Principal in the Ministry of Health—but there can surely be no question that there is an immense amount that can now be taught, and learned, about the business of organising an office efficiently. The existing courses in "Business Administration," including the subjects of recording, planning, accounting, personnel management and the rest, undoubtedly contain a large body of information that is of great relevance to the work of any Establishment Division. It would therefore be desirable in my view, to make it a rule that men and women intending to specialise in this field should spend part of their "sabbatical leave" in Courses and Colleges primarily concerned with the study of these matters.

9.—Promotion.

Selection and promotion within the Service could be improved, in my view, by making two changes.

(a) It is commonly agreed that it is an error to unite the duties of accounting and economy with that of advising on promotion to the highest posts in one Department. As one business man has justly said:

"If we had allowed our Accountants to get the whip-hand—to determine the policy of, and select the Heads for, all our other Departments—we should have been bankrupted long ago."

It is wrong that the *Treasury* should, at one and the same time, discharge the honourable and essential duty of "watchdog" in the interests of the taxpayer, and exert an important influence in choosing Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries for every other Government Department. Acceptability to the Treasury is not the primary virtue in the Head of any Office.

On the other hand, it would be undesirable to leave the selection of Secretaries wholly in the hands of the Minister of the day; and to lose the opportunity of moving men from Department to Department and thus preserving a rough equality of personal efficiency at the various levels of the Service. And the Head of the Treasury is in a better position than anyone else to judge the relative competence of the Senior Civil Servants since he personally sees most of them at work.

The solution of this dilemma is not far to seek—the duty of supervising promotion should be taken from the Treasury and placed in the hands of an enlarged and

reformed Civil Service Commission. The new Commissioners would then be charged with four tasks—recruiting the Service, ensuring the proper training of all Assistant Principals, running the “Staff College” and supervising promotion throughout the Administrative Grade. They would become a “Personnel Department” for the whole apparatus of government.

Promotion to the Headships of Departments would remain in the hands of the Prime Minister (acting in consultation with the Minister of the day), and he (the Prime Minister) would be advised by the Senior Commissioner after the Commissioner had consulted the Head of the Treasury, who would remain, for all other purposes, the Head of the Civil Service. Below this rank senior appointments would be made by the Departmental Minister, advised in his turn by the Commissioners after consultation with the Permanent Head of the Department. By this method it should prove possible to secure the advantages of Treasury control without suffering from the evil consequences of the present arrangement.

(b) No one wishes to introduce any form of, or approximation to, the “spoils system” in this country. One of the reasons for our greater administrative efficiency and deeper political stability is, no doubt, to be found in the fact that our Civil Servants are guaranteed *security of tenure*, that they do not change office with their political chiefs and are, in some measure, independent of them. This arrangement secures continuity in administration and makes it possible for Civil Servants to make regular careers in the Service and offer honest advice, if they are courageous men, to politicians.

But, as in many other walks of life, it is easy to have too much of a good thing, and we have gone on from offering Civil Servants continuity of employment to giving them security *in particular posts*. A man is not only guaranteed a salary and a job. He is also secure in the office he holds unless he is guilty of gross moral fault or negligence. In short, unsuitability for the work he has been called upon to do is no ground for dismissal. This unnecessary extension of a valid principle has two unwelcome consequences. In the *first* place a Minister is not sufficiently master in his own household. He carries the formal responsibility. He is answerable to Parliament for

the conduct of his Department, and it is an unwritten, but unbreakable, convention of the Constitution that he should not lay the blame, in public, upon the Civil Servants to whom he has delegated his powers for any mistake that they may have made in using them. Yet he finds it unduly difficult to remove the most important “servants” who have failed him. If he has no confidence in his Permanent Secretary he must embark upon an elaborate, and usually indirect, intrigue to get rid of him. It is almost impossible, therefore, for a Minister to make sure he is well served, and this is a paradoxical and unnecessary limitation upon his power. In the *second* place too much security is no good to anyone. A Civil Servant can only go up. He can never go down. He has no immediate motive to keep himself administratively fit and creative. This is an unfortunate consequence, and undesirable form of “security”. Can it be safely altered?

In my view it could. I believe that it would be possible to remove the security in particular posts without disturbing the independence of the Civil Servant or introducing the “spoils system”. It should be made possible for a Minister (or a Permanent Secretary) to remove an Official from the position he occupies, on the ground that he is unsuitable for this particular post, without necessarily reflecting on his (or her) capacity for other duties. Such persons would remain at their substantive rank but come back to the care of the Civil Service Commissioners who would seek to place them elsewhere. In this way a new element of flexibility and a desirable incentive to efficiency could be introduced without losing the security of tenure that is essential and the independence of judgment that springs from it. The power of the Minister within his Department would approximate more closely to his formal responsibilities, and the small initial cost to the Treasury would be offset by the increased efficiency of the administrative machine.

II

10.—So far I have concentrated upon the weaknesses of, and the methods by which, the Civil Service might be improved. It may be worth adding a word or two about the work of the Departments. This is a vast subject, and the experience of any one temporary Civil Servant is very limited and makes an insufficient basis for many generalisations. Nevertheless,

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there are certain criticisms that I have found to be very generally made by my fellow "temporaries".

Again it is necessary to stress the great differences between the Departments and the Divisions within them. Some are efficient. Some are not. Some work smoothly. Some are chaotic. But there are certain features of Government administration that force themselves upon the mind of a candid outsider. I shall mention four of them.

11.—In the *first* place there is a marked failure to *define and delegate spheres of responsibility*. It is never easy to find anyone who is finally responsible for anything. Decisions must continually be referred to other people—either upwards to more important officials or outwards to other Departments. Files, containing a single letter or an unimportant trifle, may have to pass through seven or eight hands before a reply can be made. I have frequently attended Committees on which fifty or sixty officials normally sat. This slowness and complexity, together with the temperamental willingness of the Civil Servant to avoid responsibility is what we all mean when we denounce "bureaucracy" and "red tape" and "Civil Service methods".

There are two immediate causes for this phenomenon—a minor and a major cause.

The "minor cause"—of which far too much has been made in the past—is the fact that the Minister and his Department are *responsible to Parliament*. A Member of Parliament may ask any question he pleases about the affairs of any Department of State and the Minister must reply in the House. Or he may write letters that must be answered with care. And the Permanent Head of the Department is responsible to the Public Accounts Committee and may be called upon to justify the smallest item of expenditure before it. For this reason excessively meticulous accounts and paper records must be kept.

There are many ways in which this evil could be mastered. Many Departments could create a better, swifter and more specialised machine for answering enquiries of all kinds. There is also no reason why a more realistic convention should not be adapted by Ministers answering questions in the House. They might frequently say, when it is true: "Yes, a mistake has been made. I am formally responsible for what has happened and I have looked into the matter, and I can assure the House that the appropriate remedy has been applied and the same error will not recur. On the other hand it is impossible that a large organisation should not make many mistakes, and I am

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sure the House will not press the criticism too far or extend it too widely."

Finally, it is time that Parliament recognised that its machinery of supervision is out of date and ill suited to the complexity of modern government. More discretion should be allowed to Departmental Officials and Parliamentary enquiry should be limited to larger questions and the prevention of corruption.

But the major reason for complexity and delay is, however, more fundamental than the existence of responsibility to Parliament. The real impediment to action is the need for "co-ordination" and is a function of size. The larger the Department, the bigger the State, the more persons must be informed and consulted before a policy can develop consistently. Take an example. Suppose a small firm writes to the Ministry of Supply asking for a continuation of its contract to produce shell-caps or for a licence to extend its machine shop. The difficulty of coming to a decision is much greater than might, at first sight, appear. The Director of the Division responsible for making shell-caps must first pass upon the matter. He will want to know the opinion of his local representative about the record and efficiency of the firm. He must consult the Treasury on the cost of the extension and the proportion to be borne by the Treasury—otherwise money may be wasted or different firms may be offered quite different terms. He must consult the Ministry of Labour to discover whether labour is relatively scarce or relatively abundant in the area in which the firm is situated—otherwise there will be complete confusion (as there often has been) in the geographical distribution of work. He must consult the Ministry of Aircraft Production to make sure that they are not going to offer new contracts to this firm—otherwise there will be a disastrous competition between Government Departments. He must consult the lawyers of his own Ministry on the legal terms of the contract. Finally, he must obtain the sanction of his superior, and of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Supply, and perhaps, if he is especially meticulous, he will also have a word with the Ministry of Production, in order to make sure that this particular increment of shell-caps is consistent with the larger "production plans" of which this programme is a part. But all this "co-ordination" takes time and effort, and I have chosen a particularly simple case. Many decisions would require consultations with a dozen, rather than half a dozen, different

persons and Departments before consistence was secured. All this is inevitable.

Now there are two methods by which this necessary "co-ordination" can be obtained—*either* an Inter-Departmental Committee can be appointed to plan a series of contracts for shell-caps, *or* a man can be given the responsibility to produce shell-caps and charged with the duty of securing proper "co-ordination" with other Government Departments. There can be no doubt, in my view, that the second course is preferable to the first. "Co-ordination" is essential, but so is "drive" and independent action. The only way to complete any complex administrative task, and overcome the inertia of large institutions, is to place the responsibility plainly and firmly upon the shoulders of one man and give him the necessary powers so that he can either succeed or fail. If he fails, or if he cannot fit his plans into the complex pattern of Government policy, then he must go and someone else must tackle the job in his stead. There is no other method by which vigour can be combined with consultation, and action with democracy. The wider recognition and practice of this principle in Whitehall is fundamental to the achievement of higher levels of efficiency. Unfortunately the principle is not yet sufficiently recognised and a great deal of time and energy is wasted on inter-Departmental Committees that have no powers and no full-time officers to carry out their "decisions".

All other points are of secondary importance in comparison with this first matter—this is the heart of the administrative problem.

12.—In the *second* place there is often a marked failure to communicate policy *downwards*. It is almost impossible for the officials in the lower ranks of the hierarchy (Principals and Assistant Secretaries) to discover what is happening, or what decisions have been taken, in the fields for which they are responsible. I have met Assistant Secretaries more than once who remained in complete ignorance of Cabinet conclusions for weeks after they had been arrived at despite the fact that they were of immediate importance for their work. I even came across an Assistant Secretary (an experienced Civil Servant of many years standing) who had not heard that the subject for which he was responsible had been referred, by the Cabinet, to a Ministerial Committee *four months before*; and had never seen the papers submitted to, or the minutes arising from, their frequent meetings since that date. In neither of these cases

did any difficulty arise on grounds of security—there was no special need for secrecy. Such cases are no doubt extreme. They have to be encountered to be believed, but they are symptomatic of the deep obscurity in which the policy of the Government is sometimes shrouded from those who have to implement it, and the absence of proper arrangements to make policy known throughout the Service. This deficiency explains some of the confusion and inconsistency in detail of which we all became aware in dealing with Government Departments. Policy is only intelligible at the top.

It would be easy to remedy these defects by introducing devices that are familiar outside Whitehall. The efficient system would differ from Department to Department. In some—the smaller ones no doubt—the "Departmental Meeting" is the natural solution. The Minister and the Permanent Secretary should meet all the officials above the rank of Principal at least once a week to communicate changes of policy to them and to discuss a Progress Report. If such meetings are needed in the life of academic institutions, in which the amount of administrative action is much less, they are far more essential to the smooth running of a large Government Department. In others it would be desirable to circulate a carefully prepared Progress Report or "House Journal" in which a more formal account of changes in policy and a record of action could be provided. Such a document would, of course, possess no value unless it were taken seriously and made the direct responsibility of a senior official—the Permanent Secretary or the Deputy Secretary—but it would prove invaluable if it were informed and properly edited. Finally, another attempt should be made to produce a readable and interesting "vocational journal" for the whole Administrative Grade of the Service—corresponding to the technical periodicals published for any other professions—doctors, lawyers or economists. Such journals have not proved successful in the past—but it is difficult to believe that a weekly publication, produced under the auspices of the Treasury, containing confidential but not secret information, and including a review of new legislation, Orders in Council and Blue Books of general interest, and a section devoted to the scientific problems of government and administration, would not prove an indispensable piece of reading for the competent Civil Servant.

13.—In the *third* place some of the *staffing arrangements* in Government Departments are most peculiar—they appear

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"top-heavy" to a newcomer. Too little clerical and secretarial aid is provided for administrative officers. This is an extravagant and inconvenient piece of "economy". Men and women, who are paid as much as £1,500 a year to do administrative work, are not given personal secretary-typists. They have to get their own telephone numbers, make their own appointments, provide themselves with typists out of the "typing pools", summon messengers and do all sorts of trivial jobs. A considerable part of their time—paid at the rate of £800-£1,500 a year—is spent on work that could and should be performed by girls glad to earn £150 a year. This means a considerable waste of money, and a loss of administrative efficiency, to the Department as a whole. Two Principals with personal secretaries could do as much work as three Principals without secretaries, and do it better at a smaller cost. No doubt a good deal of "sharing" and "pooling" would be desirable, but the existing "pools" are far too big and do not provide the time-saving services that are required. The distribution of staff between grades should be radically overhauled.

14.—*Finally*, it is necessary to call attention to the very low standards of the *physical arrangements* in Government Offices. These are surprisingly poor and depressing. The interiors of the buildings are old-fashioned, gloomy, dirty, and in some cases almost insanitary. The rooms in which all grades of the Civil Service are condemned to work, below the level of Assistant Secretary, are meanly furnished and arranged with the maximum of inconvenience. They are not modern office buildings—for obvious historical reasons—but they have not been reconstructed behind the existing facades or adequately "improved". The physical environment in which the Civil Servant works is squalid and overcrowded. There is no room for comfort or quiet for thought. There are no proper reading rooms in the Libraries, no Common Rooms or (in peace-time) good Canteens or Restaurants. There is nothing to make anyone feel at home in a Government Office, or glad to get there in the morning, or anything but delighted to leave it at night. These conditions, trivial as they may seem, are not without their importance in preserving vigour and harmony among any team of busy men and women.

In addition to all this, and of more immediate importance, is the correspondingly low level of the *services* provided in the Offices. Perhaps my experiences were unfortunate and not typical, but in the first office to which I went—a new war-time

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Department—the standards were deplorably low. The typists from the "pool" could not type. The "shorthand-writers" could not write shorthand. The girls on the switch-board could not operate a telephone, and the switch-board was so over-loaded that it was often necessary to wait for three or four minutes before one could begin to make a call. There were four of us in one small room, using artificial light most of the day, and the atmosphere was one of chaotic pandemonium. These intolerable inconveniences between them wasted half one's time. And I have reason to believe that in many of the older Departments, even in peace-time, conditions are not markedly better.

The reasons for this congestion and physical inefficiency in Government Offices are not far to seek. They are partly due to the short-sighted parsimony of Parliament and the Treasury. As long as Parliament believes that wise economy in administration is secured by over-working and over-crowding its most important officials there cannot be much improvement in physical standards. The failure is further due to the poor performances of the Establishment Divisions to which I have already referred. Fortunately the methods of improvement are equally obvious. An extensive programme of new building, re-building, and reconstruction within existing buildings, together with an enlargement in the duties, and an improvement in the selection and training of men and women for the Establishment Divisions, would work wonders in a comparatively short space of time. These are the easy changes to bring about.

III

15.—To sum up.

There is no reason to despair. We have worked miracles in organising ourselves for war. This small island, with its forty-five million inhabitants, aided by twenty million white citizens within the borders of the Empire, has armed itself with spectacular speed and has, in three years, produced the most powerful navy, the finest fighter force, the largest bomber fleets, and some of the best armies that the world has ever seen. We are the smallest of the Great Powers, but we are the most completely mobilised and the most productive. This is a triumph of organisation. In the successful completion of this immense task the Civil Service has played a vital and honourable part. We are still the best governed and best administered modern state, and our Civil Service is the best in the world.

But we cannot stay still or rest upon our laurels, however

green. After the war is over we shall have complex administrative problems to resolve. The sphere of Governmental activity will be permanently increased. We must improve (restore some would say) the efficiency of the Civil Service and machinery of the State. By what methods can that be done?

After some experience of academic and business administration, and over three years spent inside more than one Department of State, I offer the following positive suggestions:

First, the *recruitment* to the Civil Service should be improved by introducing modern methods of selection into the preliminary interview; and by taking in a small proportion of older men to higher posts.

Secondly, the *training* of the Assistant Principal should be made systematic, should always include a period of work in the field; and should be followed, between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, by a further period of vocational training in scientific and practical disciplines, and by a further examination.

Thirdly, *promotion* within the Service should be supervised by a reformed and enlarged Civil Service Commission, and Ministers and Permanent Secretaries should be able to remove men and women from the posts they hold without dismissing them from the Service.

Fourthly, more responsibility should be devolved upon individuals and "co-ordination" (consistency in policy) should be secured by requiring these men to make the necessary consultations. Personal responsibility should not be confused and lost in a thicket of inter-Departmental Committees.

Fifthly, better arrangements should be made—including "Office Councils," internal "House journals," and an official Whitehall magazine—to communicate policy downwards and render it more intelligible to the lower levels of the official hierarchy.

Sixthly, the principles of staffing should be overhauled and physical conditions and secretarial services of the Offices should be greatly improved.

All these steps are separately desirable and, taken together, would secure a marked improvement in the efficiency of our system of Departmental Administration.

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IV—PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

By J. P. MAYER

IN a recent book¹ Mr. Ross has provided us with an impressive analysis of the personnel of the House of Commons from 1918 to 1935. The results of this survey are interesting and important.

We learn that the House of Commons throughout the period under examination is characterised by elderliness. The average age of our parliamentarians is eight and a half years higher than that of the electorate and twenty years higher than that of the British population as a whole. Other points are equally noteworthy. The public school men in the House of Commons show a remarkable ascendancy. To have been educated at Eton gives you an 1,800 times better chance to become an M.P. than to have been educated at an elementary school. The Conservative Party is beyond doubt the public school party, the Liberal Party the secondary school party, and the Labour Party the elementary school party. Furthermore, the occupational representation does not correspond to the occupational structure of the British community. Barristers and lawyers, company directors, and trade union officials provide more than half of the membership of the House. The predominance of lawyers in all modern parliaments is, of course, a well-known historical fact. A lawyer's presence in his own office can more easily be dispensed with; consequently he can easily devote his time to parliamentary business, apart from the fact that legal experience in many human affairs makes him an opportune representative of the people. With the progressing bureaucratisation of modern industry and its functional counterpart, the trade unions, company directors and trade union officials have increasingly become convenient representatives.

Mr. Ross gives also some significant details of the aristocratic element in the House of Commons. "It is clear," he writes, "that in the average House of Commons more than two-fifths

¹ *Parliamentary Representation*, by J. F. S. Ross. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1943.)

of the Conservative Party, at the lowest estimate . . . belong to families of hereditary title. . . . Similarly, the average strength of this element in the parliamentary Liberal Party may be estimated nearer one-fourth than one-fifth." Thus the average House of Commons shows an aristocratic element of at least two-sevenths of the total membership. Education, occupation, parentage, and last, but not least, financial means provide considerable advantages for a parliamentary career.

The latter point needs, perhaps, some further illustration. I refer again to Mr. Ross's admirable statistical analysis. The costs of contesting an election are limited by Act of Parliament. Generally, the actual expenditure of candidates does not reach the legal maximum. Still, it is revealing that in the 1935 election, the average amounts of election expenses for contested elections were: for Conservative candidates £780, for Liberal candidates £520, for Labour candidates £360. These figures must be related to Mr. Ian Harvey's famous memorandum—*A plutocratic System: Facts regarding the selection and adoption of Candidates for Parliament in the Conservative interest*. In it Mr. Harvey states that there are (the memorandum was published in 1939) "roughly three categories of candidates . . . Those who are willing to pay all their election expenses (anything between £400 and £1,200) and to subscribe between £500 and £1,000 a year to the local association; . . . those who are willing to pay at least half their election expenses and to subscribe between £250 and £400 a year to the local association; . . . those who are unable to pay anything towards their election expenses and only able to subscribe £100 or less to the local association. . . ." If it is personal wealth or income that facilitates candidature in the Conservative or Liberal Party, it is the financial backing of trade unions or co-operative societies which enables a candidate to stand for Labour. Here, too, Mr. Ross is extremely suggestive. "Taking the (Labour) party's official list of Labour members in the House of Commons in October 1937, we find that exactly half—80 out of 160—were backed by specified trade unions, while nine were backed by the co-operative societies. A majority—roughly four out of seven—of Labour members, therefore, are financially and in other ways dependent to a greater or lesser extent on bodies that are only sections of the Labour Party. . . . Only two of the 160 Labour members on the list are backed neither by trade unions and co-operative societies on the one hand nor

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 236, where the essential points of Mr. Harvey's Memorandum are given.

by divisional Labour parties on the other." A considerable raising of members' salaries is, in the light of these facts, probably one of the most urgent needs of parliamentary reform in England.

Thus far I have only given some of the more striking facts resulting from Mr. Ross's statistical analysis. These facts are indisputable and it is a great merit to have elucidated them. But it is one thing to state facts, and it is another thing to work out a scheme of parliamentary reform. Mr. Ross's proposal for a scheme of a new parliamentary representation in England culminates in the demand for proportional representation, or, to be more exact, for the introduction of the single transferable vote system. Ever since Thomas Hare published his *Treatise on the Election of Representatives* (1859), which was acclaimed by the authority of John Stuart Mill to count "among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government,"¹ the discussion on proportional representation has continued. I do not intend to enter here into the technical details of this mode of parliamentary representation, which has been fully described by the late Mr. S. R. Daniels in his book *The Case for Electoral Reform* (1938). Yet it ought to be made clear that proportional representation has only been successfully tried in countries which, compared with England, France, and U.S.A., must be classified as small states, or, to put it differently, as states which have no mass electorates with 30 millions and more.² Politics cannot, perhaps unfortunately, be reduced to arithmetics or geometry, in spite of Hobbes and Spinoza, and in spite, perhaps, also of our modern planners and statisticians. It seems extremely doubtful whether proportional representation would work when applied to the modern mass state. It is difficult to see how an effective central government could be secured once political atomisation has been allowed.

Proportional representation was conceived by Thomas Hare as a safeguard against party government. Thus he writes in his *Treatise*: "It is not necessary here to discuss the merits of party government, it is enough to say, that in the vast field of modern legislation, in the adaptation of our ancient institutions to a new state of society, and in providing for new emergencies, a multitude of political and social problems come to be solved

¹ Mill, *Representative Government*, Everyman's Edition, p. 263.

² It is well known that proportional representation was applied under the Weimar Republic in Germany. It failed, not only because of the mass structure of German society, but also for the lack of consent without which any electoral system is bound to break down. See my forthcoming book, *Max Weber and German Politics*. (Faber & Faber, 1944.) Cf. also Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?* (Notre Dame, 1941.)

with which party has nothing to do, and into which the introduction of party elements and considerations is not only useless but is absolutely pernicious. It is obvious that the tendency of a system of government founded on numerical majorities alone, is to absorb all differences into one issue—a contest for power.”¹ The theorists of P.R. clearly attempt to introduce into politics the influence of a moral and intellectual *élite* which they think, probably with some justification, political parties tend to eliminate. This becomes evident, if we follow Hare’s further argument: “The extension of knowledge and the progress of civilisation open the door of inquiry, prompt activity of thought, encourage diversities of opinion, and thus lead the way to social improvement; but the benefit of this progress in the composition of a representative assembly is excluded when every variety of opinion and shadow of thought is expurgated—thrown aside as so much lumber, in order that both sides may come unencumbered to the trial of strength which is to determine the single issue—the possession of power. Such a result would be impossible if full play were given to the partialities which arise from *individual character and sympathy*, for these would be in constant rebellion against the tyranny of faction, and would moderate its influence even amongst those who might be subject to it. *Every man, according to the degree in which he is intellectual, and possesses public spirit, would bring his talent and weight to the public aid in the business of concentrating in the representative assembly a selection of the best minds of the nation, and the statesman who shall have proved by experience to be trustworthy.*”² . . .” (My italics.) Here, indeed, we have the *weltanschauung* of P.R. in *nuce*. Hare, like John Stuart Mill, and Acton, belonged to that generation directly or indirectly influenced by the renewed success of Bonapartism in France, which by skilful combination of universal franchise with terrorism had established a democracy which in Alexis de Tocqueville’s words was “not free.”³ The antagonism towards party politics and indeed any form of organised politics is also clearly discernable in Mr. Ross’s book, yet without firmly organised political parties the modern mass electorate cannot be integrated in manageable units. It would seem much more profitable to think about ways and means by which *within* the party machines an adequate representation of the electorate might be achieved. To raise

¹ Cf. Thomas Hare, *The Election of Representatives*, 4th edition. London, 1877. P. 10.

² Cf. *Ibid.*

³ Cf. my book *Political Thought in France. From Sieyès to Sorel*. (London, 1943, pp. 57 seqq.)

members’ salaries to something between £1,500—£2,000 would certainly be *one* important step. M.P.’s and local party organisations—of all parties—would become more independent of the central party offices.

Moreover, there is much too much of a political *laissez-faire* ideology in the P.R. political philosophy. Liberalism is one thing, *laissez-faire* is another. We ought to work out the implications of a new political philosophy which integrates the individual with the needs and necessities of a collectivist age. Any individual is always a member of a group, be it a church, a club, or a trade union. And any group is an element of a larger community, a village, a town, or a state. All these “elements” are inter-related. And even a state does not stand alone. Any purely arithmetical approach towards these highly complex relationships is bound to fail because it isolates artificially where realities are fluid and organic. Political theory must differentiate between political techniques and the living whole of the body politic.

The degree of voluntary consent within a given society is, perhaps, the only safe norm to decide whether we have a “good society.” Consent in this sense means the organic integration of the complex relationships which we have just mentioned. To analyse the means or techniques for achieving this consent is the task of the political scientist, to achieve them in practice is the task of the politician.

Parliamentary representation¹ has never been the only means of achieving this consent which is, of course, never an achieved state within the body politic, but rather a potential dynamic tendency whose direction may not always be progressive. English society has, I believe, proved in this war that its measure of consent² is greater than, e.g., the measure of consent in states like France or the U.S.A. As you do not vote within a happy family, which is, after all, a basic unit of any community, so the electoral system is only a technique of convenient management of a complex society with electorates numbering tens of millions. Traditions, value-patterns, transmitted from generation to generation by experience and education, and institutions of all kinds help to form what a pertinent American observer has termed the civic loyalty of the English. By admitting this, one must not deny perpetual class struggles and power situations or grave and unjustifiable economic

¹ For a suggestive exposition of the significance of representation see C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy*. (Boston, 1941. Pp. 255 seqq.)

² *Ibid.*, pp. 583 seqq.

inequalities which naturally are reflected in politics. We suggest that state-control of the film industry might, perhaps, achieve more with regard to civic responsibility than a parliamentary reform on the lines of P.R.'s political philosophy. Still, parliamentary reform is needed in order to remove certain grave anomalies which have arisen or become more acute since the last Speaker's conference in 1916 and the subsequent parliamentary legislation. The terms of reference for the forthcoming Speaker's conference are not known at the time of writing. Yet it is a foregone conclusion, judging from the White Paper of the *Committee on Electoral Machinery*¹—that a new scheme of registration and a redistribution of constituencies will be put on the agenda. A detailed examination of this White Paper is beyond the scope of this article, but it seems unlikely that a fundamental change of the method of electoral representation will be proposed, and if proposed, accepted.

While reading the proofs of this article, a two days' debate on Electoral Reform has taken place in the House of Commons (February 1st and 2nd, 1944). The Home Secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison, moved "that this House welcomes the proposal of H.M. Government to set up a conference on Electoral Reform and Re-distribution of Seats and to invite Mr. Speaker to preside." The House agreed after a vigorous and interesting debate which would well deserve a detailed analysis. The question of re-distribution will receive prior consideration. It is also certain that, in view of the trend of the debate, Liberal and probably other members of the forthcoming Speaker's Conference will raise the problem of P.R., but I think my thesis that P.R. will be rejected has been confirmed by the declarations of the two major parties.

Plural voting, the business premises vote, and the university graduate vote will certainly also be discussed at the Conference. I have not been concerned with these obvious anomalies of the present electoral system. It is to be hoped that the sixth Parliamentary Act will remove them once and for all. Furthermore, if Parliamentary and Local Government franchises could be merged, the electoral machinery would gain immensely in tidiness. Nor is this all. The Speaker's Conference will also have to consider limits on the expenditure, not only of parliamentary candidates, but also of a member. The legal formulation of provisions for the last-named points will present no small difficulties, but if provisions can be agreed to, the new

¹ Cf. Cmd. 6408.

electoral law would contribute in no small measure to relieving candidates and members of the ties of party bureaucracies. It would help to pave the way of younger men and women into politics, a point which Mr. Anthony Eden strongly emphasised in the debate in the House.

The present electoral system has deep roots in British social history. The inadequacies of the majority system are obvious. Mr. Ross has shown that "the average House of Commons during the twenty-three years from 1918 to 1941 has contained, in round figures, 96 more Conservatives, 30 fewer Liberals, and 62 fewer Labour members . . . than the respective voting strengths."¹ Why is this so? Obviously the majority system favours the stronger party. Mr. Ross sums up the position like this: "in a three-party contest, any party which can secure more than one-third of the grand total of votes can be almost certain of securing a dominating position in the House of Commons and in all probability a clear majority of seats; while any party which is unlucky enough to secure less than one-third of the total votes must expect less—often much less—than its fair representation. Similarly, in a two-party contest the party that secures a bare majority of votes will almost certainly secure a substantial majority of seats: but there is one vital difference between this case and the other. The effect of the "system" in a two-party contest is, in general, to exaggerate in the House the party majority that exists in the country; but in a three-party contest it does much more: it gives to a minority in the country a majority in the House, which is a far more pernicious misrepresentation of "the will of the people." For this reason the merely *exaggerated* majorities given by the "khaki" election of 1900 and the "Chinese slavery" election of 1906 are far less objectionable than the completely *false* majorities of 1918, 1922, 1924, and 1935."²

Again the defender of P.R. concentrates his attention too much on electoral machinery. A redistribution of seats which, as we have seen, is to be expected, may also reduce the number of the single-member constituencies; a considerable rise of members' salaries may lessen the tightness of party bureaucracies; but there are other points which are not less important. I accept Mr. Ross's criticism in principle, though I think the anomalies just mentioned can easily be remedied to some extent. What our critic underestimates are the implications of the British Cabinet System. An "exaggerated" or even "false"

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

² *Ibid.*, p. 98.

majority cannot disregard a strong minority nor a majority of voters against the government. Arithmetically, it is true, the voters are disfranchised; morally, they are all too present—for the government in office. I also do not think that it is a psychologically sound argument to blame the majority vote system for causing political apathy. The recent by-election of Skipton gives a different lesson. Moreover, it was a majority government which, in 1940, had to yield to a parliamentary minority which demanded a new Prime Minister and a new Government.

The method of parliamentary representation is by no means the only method of measuring consent or dissent within a democratic society. The full significance of the inter-relationship between consent and representation does not seem always to be present to our contemporary theorists. Perhaps one should suggest to them to read the late Miss Clarke's admirable book *Medieval Representation and Consent*.¹ Such a study of the origins of parliamentary institutions proves that consent and representation were intimately linked together long before the majority principle established itself. The majority principle established itself only very late in Europe, not because people could not count but because their conceptions of the human being were in many respects more profound and subtle than those of our modern perfectionists.

We read in Thomas Smith's *De Republica Anglorum*, which he wrote between 1552 and 1556, "that at that time the decisions of the House were reached according to the majority principle,"² yet even as late as 1791, as we know from Bentham, out of a hundred motions, ninety-nine were taken without a division. Only in modern times have people become concerned to discover how the Roman '*quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur*' might best be measured by 'numbers'. Consent was the preliminary condition, indeed the source of representation. In the words of

¹ M. V. Clarke, *Medieval Representation and Consent. A study of early Parliaments in England and Ireland, with special reference to the modus tenendi parliamentum*. (Lond, 1936.)

² Cf. J. G. Heinberg, *History of the Majority Principle*, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. xx, 1926. Cf. also Otto von Gierke, *Ueber die Geschichte des Majoritätsprinzips*, in *Essays in legal history*, ed. Paul Vinogradoff. (Oxford, 1913). Gierke's interpretation of the history of the majority principle may be summarised in these sentences: "So ist in der Tat fuer die historisch-organische Betrachtungsweise das Majoritäts-prinzip zwar ein bedeutungsvoller Faktor fuer den Aufbau der Verbaende, aber fuer sich allein zur Gestaltung lebendiger sozialer Koerper nicht befahigt. Sein Geltungsbereich kann nicht rationell, sondern nur geschichtlich begruendet, sein Wert nicht absolut bestimmt, sondern nur nach seiner jeweiligen Wirkungsweise im organischen Leben des Gemeinwesens bestimmt werden." Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 335.

See also Ludwig Riess, *Geschichte des Wahlrechts zum englischen Parlament im Mittelalter* (Leipsig, 1885.)

Cf. also Maitland's writings, J. N. Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, pp. 91 seqq, and H. J. Laski, *The Pluralistic State in The Foundations of Sovereignty*, pp. 232 seqq.

Hooker in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*: ". . . that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living, and to be commanded we do consent, when that Society whereof we are part hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed past is good as long as himself continueth; so the act of a public society of men done five hundred years sithence standeth as theirs who presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortal; we were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still. Laws therefore human, of what kind soever, are available, by consent."¹ Hooker stands in between Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Burke, linking them together through the centuries. Consent, like freedom, is one of those political concepts which have, as it were, an atmospheric character. You know what they mean when the realities they intend to convey have been lost.

In another direction the apologists of P.R. also go wrong, or they do not see the wood for the trees of parliamentary representation. Mr. Ross makes the following point: "That the system (of parliamentary representation) shall secure that the political complexion of the House of Commons corresponds with all reasonable closeness with the state of public opinion."² But what is "public opinion"? And how can a theorist who claims to use a "scientific method"³ employ such a difficult sociological concept like public opinion without any further interpretation? Already Alexis de Tocqueville, who was not a copyist of our modern sociologists, has observed that the press is an institution of representation. Thus we read in the third volume of his *Democracy in America*: "I think that men living in aristocracies may, strictly speaking, do without the liberty of the press: but such is not the case with those who live in democratic countries. To protect their personal independence I trust not to great political assemblies, to parliamentary privileges, or to the assertion of popular sovereignty. All these things may, to a certain extent, be reconciled with personal servitude—but that servitude cannot be complete if the press is free: the press is the chiefest democratic instrument of freedom."⁴ There were periods after 1933 when even the

¹ Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, vol. I, Everman's Edition, p. 194 seq.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ Cf. my book *Prophet of the Mass Age: a Study of Alexis de Tocqueville*. (London and New York, 1939.)

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British parliament—in its majority—succumbed to erring governments while the press, or at least some papers, voiced the demands of freedom. The body politic is a total unity and one should only study parts of it, if one is aware of the whole.

There is, finally, the problem of the two-party system, without which the phenomenon of parliamentary representation cannot be understood. That the British constitution in its present form has been shaped by the two-party system is beyond doubt. The two-party system is “the unwritten law underlying the new parliamentary order of things in England,” as the Master of Trinity writes in his admirable lecture on *The Two-Party System in English Political History*.¹ The fact that the opposition party in the House is an alternative government tempers opposition and the government in power alike. “The party bond,” says Professor Trevelyan in the same lecture, “introduces discipline not only into the counsels of the Cabinet, but on the benches of Parliament itself. It gave to members of the House of Commons a public motive other than mere opposition to the executive. . . .” I know of no satisfactory sociological explanation *why* the two-party system has grown so deeply into the British soil: religious, legal, socio-economic motives will have to be brought together one day in a study which would fulfil what M. Boutmy attempted with inadequate methods more than forty years ago in his *Psychologie politique du peuple anglais*.

Will the two-party system maintain itself in the future? The sociologist is not a prophet, but we may express, if it is permitted, a tentative suggestion. England, indeed the world, will be faced with a clear and unambiguous integration of two great principles: freedom and collectivism. (Soviet Russia can learn from Great Britain as Great Britain must learn from Soviet Russia. Here, again, we see how the “dialectics” of politics cannot artificially be restricted to one sphere: home politics). It seems probable that the struggle for consent in Great Britain will be fought between the Conservative and the Labour Party. The minor parties, like Common Wealth, the Communist Party, and the Liberal Party, will in all probability only have the function of the salt in the earth within the general framework of British politics. That party will lead which integrates the heritage of British traditions and the demands of collectivism most harmoniously.

Only then can the attitude of consent which proved itself

¹ The Romanes Lecture. (Oxford, 1926.)

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during the critical months of 1940 be firmly founded on a work-day basis. Methods of parliamentary representation,¹ though never logically perfect, would appear, then, as convenient rules of transacting the citizens' business in an orderly manner. They cannot mean more. For reason and logic alone do not define man as a political being.

¹ Since reading the proofs of this essay I have read Mr. R. W. G. Mackay's suggestive little book *Coupon or Free? Being a Study in Electoral Reform and Representative Government*. (Secker & Warburg, 1943.) Mr. Mackay is a staunch supporter of P.R., but overestimates the importance of electoral machinery. The analytical details he gives of the University Seats, the Occupation Vote, Uncontested Constituencies, etc., are extremely important and should be borne in mind by all those concerned with the forthcoming Speaker's Conference.

THE EDUCATION BILL

By SHENA D. SIMON

BY the time this article appears the Butler Bill will be well on the way to becoming the Butler Act, and the first stage in the post-war reconstruction of our educational system achieved. It is inevitable that the thoughts of many of us should turn back twenty-five years to the passing, in 1918, of the Fisher Act which was expected to produce a new era for the child of the common man. Before examining the Butler Bill in more detail, it may be useful to compare it with the Fisher Act, and to try to discover whether the reason that the splendid promise of the Fisher Act was not fulfilled in the inter-war period was owing to faults in that Act which are absent from its successor.

The Butler Bill was received by a chorus of praise both from the press and from all those bodies which had spent the last few years in pressing for fundamental reforms in our educational system. Wars inevitably quicken thought in the ordinary citizen, and educational reformers took full advantage of the situation. The Bill was claimed as the most comprehensive educational measure ever produced, or at least since 1870. Little reference was made to the Fisher Act, and those who are ignorant of our educational history might well assume that no Act of any importance had appeared between 1870 and 1943. It is as well to remember, however, that the series of measures which, with the Fisher Act, were consolidated in the Education Act of 1921, achieved certain not unimportant results.

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The aim of that Act was to establish "a national system of public education available for all persons capable of profiting thereby"¹ and with regard to the schemes that local authorities were to submit to the Board, it was stated that "adequate provision shall be made in order to secure that children and young persons shall not be debarred from receiving the benefits of any form of education by which they are capable of benefiting through inability to pay fees."²

The aim was high enough, and the scope wide enough to have resulted in a much greater advance than did, in fact, take place.

Still the school life was lengthened, first by the abolition of all exemptions—including the half-time system in force in textile areas—under fourteen, and, secondly, by preventing children from leaving school until the end of the term in which they became fourteen. The chaos and insecurity of the salary position of teachers was resolved by the national settlement, brought about by the establishment of the Burnham Committee, and by the Teachers' Superannuation Act. The position of partnership between the Board and local authorities was given practical expression by the introduction of the percentage system of grants, under which every authority received at least 50 per cent, and some a considerably higher proportion of their expenditure. Power was given to local education authorities to provide nursery education for children under five, and to raise the school leaving age to fifteen by by-law—which last power was actually exercised by very few authorities. On the other hand, Day Continuation Schools which boys and girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen were to attend for eight hours a week, were only set up in a few areas and, with the shining exception of Rugby, where attendance ends at sixteen, these faded out within three or four years, so far as compulsory attendance was concerned. Some voluntary Day Continuation Schools have continued.

The aim of the Butler Bill is expressed as follows: "The statutory system of public education shall be organised in three progressive stages, to be known as primary education, secondary education, and further education, and it shall be the duty of the local education authority for every area, so far as their powers extend, to contribute towards the moral, mental, and physical development of the community by securing that efficient

education throughout those stages shall be available to meet the needs of the population of their area."¹

The main provisions of the Butler Bill are to raise the age to fifteen in April, 1945, or not later than April, 1947; a later date for raising it to sixteen is left to the Minister to settle. The date for the institution of Young People's Colleges with, like the Fisher Act, compulsory attendance for one day a week, or its equivalent, is also left to the Minister to settle. Increased financial aid is given to the Churches to enable them to play their part in the educational advance; salary scales for the teachers approved by the Minister, are to be made obligatory on local authorities; fees are to be abolished in all schools which are maintained by the L.E.A., but no decision has been announced about direct grant schools. The Board and the L.E.A.'s are to have the power to pay fees for children attending fee-paying schools, i.e. the so-called Public Schools, and L.E.A.'s are to be able to run their own boarding schools. Part III education authority areas are to be brought within the areas of the County Councils, and the Government grant for the country, as a whole, is to be increased from 49.36 per cent of the total expenditure, which it is at present, to 55 per cent by 1948-9.

The Fisher Act had anticipated the main features of the Hadow Report,² and during the intervening twenty-five years this report and the Spens Report indicated the lines upon which the education of children over eleven should develop. The Education Act of 1936 recognized that procedure by by-law was an impossible means of raising the school leaving age, and the war brought home to those responsible for mobilising the technical resources of the country the waste involved in a system under which 80 per cent of our young people left school at fourteen.

The Butler Bill is much more specific in setting out how its aim is to be achieved than was the Fisher Act. Primary—the term elementary has now been legally banished from our educational phraseology—education, is defined as full-time education for junior pupils, i.e. those under twelve years of age. Secondary schools for pupils over this age must be "sufficient in number, character, and equipment to afford for all pupils opportunities for education, offering such variety of instruction and training as may be desirable in view of their different ages, abilities, and aptitudes and of the different periods for which

¹ Education Bill, 1943, Sec. 7.

² Issued in 1926.

¹ Education Act, 1921, Sec. 11.

² Education Act, 1921, Sec. 14 (4).

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they may be expected to remain at school, including practical instruction and training appropriate to their respective needs.”¹

Secondary education for all, has at last been promised, and if words could produce that variety and diversity which, according to those who make speeches on English education, is so much valued by us, the problem would be solved. But we have become sceptical of mere words, remembering the inter-war period when the aim of the Fisher Act was perpetually before us. This time we want to know what will be behind the words.

The claim that the Butler Bill is a much more comprehensive measure than the Fisher Act, and that for the first time it establishes a national system of education should be examined, not in order to detract in any way from its importance, but in order that false hopes may not be raised by its passage into law. How far, in fact, can the failure to achieve more educational progress during the last quarter of a century be attributed to the limitations of the Fisher Act? how far have these limitations been removed by the Butler Bill? and how far were causes outside the scope of legislation responsible?

Mr. Fisher did not tackle either the question of Dual Control or that of the Part III authorities, but Mr. Butler had no choice. Both of these problems became acute when the school life had been lengthened, and the Board had adopted the Hadow proposals for reorganisation, which involved building new senior schools for children over eleven. The problem of the denominational schools was the more urgent, for until the Churches were willing and able to co-operate, progress was slow, especially in the rural areas. The Education Act of 1936 recognised this fact, and empowered local authorities to make grants of amounts varying between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of the cost of new senior schools to be built in connection with raising the age to fifteen.² But the problem of buildings is not confined to senior schools. Many of the existing junior and infant schools are obsolete, if not on the Board's black list, and extensive improvements are necessary to bring them up to the standard now demanded. Before the war, the slum clearance programme brought into prominence the question of new schools for all ages of children if the Churches were to continue to provide denominational schools, and the building of four million houses after this war, and the extensive town planning

¹ Education Bill, 1943, Sec. 8 (1) (b).

² The Act came into operation, but when the time came the raising of the age was postponed owing to the war.

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schemes which are expected will accentuate the problem. There were only two courses open to the Government. Either the dual system must go or it must be helped to continue. Mr. Butler chose the latter course, and made the most generous offer to the denominations that has ever been made. The offer covers not only primary but secondary schools, and under the new definition “secondary” includes all types of schools for children over eleven. Denominational grammar, selective central and senior schools, together with junior and infant schools, can all get full maintenance from the L.E.A. together with a grant of 50 per cent of the cost of alterations, improvements and external repairs from the Board, and still retain the ownership of the building, and the right to appoint all the teachers. If the denominations are not able to raise 50 per cent of the capital costs, and the schools become “controlled,” instead of “aided,” a certain number of “reserved” teachers must be appointed who will give denominational teaching for not more than two periods a week, and the managers must be consulted by the L.E.A. about the appointment of the Head Teacher. The 50 per cent grant can be given also in aid of a completely new building, if it is made necessary by slum clearance or town planning requirements or if the new school is in substitution for one or more existing schools. In fact, the system of the “removal” licence of a public house, by which a brewer gets a licence for a new, modern, public house in the suburbs of a town, if he surrenders several licences of old, out of date, pubs in the slums, is now to be applied to denominational schools.

The arrangements made under the 1936 Act for senior schools are to be reviewed and brought up to date, and they will provide for 70 per cent of the Roman Catholic children between the ages of eleven and fourteen.

Intelligent anticipation suggests that possibly three-fourths of the Church of England schools will become “controlled,” that is, pass over to the L.E.A. under the conditions described above, but in some rural counties the Church may be able to raise enough money to provide the necessary 50 per cent of the capital charges, which will keep the schools in virtually the same position as they are in to-day. The Roman Catholic schools will probably all become “aided”.

The dual system will, therefore, even if it applies to fewer children, be more firmly entrenched than ever before. If costs of building are high, and as the standard demanded is raised,

the denominations may still find it difficult to provide their share of the money. If so, progress will again be held up. There are no powers in the Bill to enable the Minister to "direct" the Churches to give up their schools if, after a time limit, they cannot produce the standard needed. The only course open to him is the clumsy procedure by mandamus.

Mr. Butler, having decided to mend, and not end, the dual system has certainly not been niggardly, for the churches gain more than money. A daily collective Act of Worship, and religious instruction, are to be statutorily imposed on all schools, secondary as well as primary. Although both of these have been practically universal in elementary schools, and the Act of Worship general in secondary schools, this is the first time that Parliament has intervened in matters of the curriculum, but it may not be the last. If this Parliament can impose religious teaching—denominational in some schools, agreed syllabus in others—might not a future Parliament impose a socialist or capitalist teaching of, say, history? The freedom which we have hitherto allowed our teachers—greater than that of any other country in the world—is threatened by this new provision.

If, however, the new dual system works as it is intended to work, the provision of sufficient secondary schools of varied types, and of well built junior and infant schools, should provide the physical structure upon which to base equal educational opportunity for every child in the area. There is no doubt that one of the reasons for the slow progress with reorganisation in the rural areas was the problem of the Church schools.

Once elementary education, which formerly covered the education of the majority of children under fourteen, disappears, and secondary education begins for all children at eleven, or thereabouts, the existence of some local authorities who were only able to deal with elementary education, becomes impossible. A compromise, which provides for divisional executives in county areas, with delegated powers but no power to raise a rate, and allows the larger boroughs and urban districts to make their own schemes for delegation, but also without the right to raise a rate, will have to be tested by experience before an opinion can be given as to its efficacy. It is to be hoped that the larger area over which the cost is to be spread, the advantages of a greater choice of type of secondary education which this can make possible, and the delegation that is contemplated, will keep in being the keen local interest and real progressive spirit which many of the Part III authorities have shown.

How far, by tackling both these thorny problems, has the Butler Bill instituted—as some of its supporters claim—a national system of education for the first time in our history?

If by a national system is meant one under which a comprehensive system of education is provided by the public—even if, as in the U.S.A. private schools are allowed to exist as well—then we are still far from that state of affairs in England. Not only are denominational primary and secondary schools to be kept in existence and new ones built, but the Act contemplates that a part of the provision of grammar school, and special school, places will be made in schools provided by voluntary bodies, and, like the denominational schools, kept alive by public money with little public control. The demand by the Labour Party that fees should be abolished in all schools which receive public aid was refused. Direct Grant schools will continue, and may charge fees on the basis of 100 per cent special places. Although the amount of aid from the Board will have to be considerably increased, their governing bodies are to be left as free as they are at present. Independent schools which charge fees may have those fees paid for a certain number of pupils by the L.E.A. under arrangements to be approved by the Minister; they may also get grants from the L.E.A.

Some grammar schools which have been deficiency aided by the local authority, and would, under the new Bill have had to abolish fees, and some Direct Grant schools, which may not like the thought of having to do the same, or of only charging fees with a means test attached, will have the choice of contracting out of the public system, and again becoming independent schools. If parents, whose children formerly attended grant aided schools with only 25 per cent, or less, of free places for elementary school children, dislike the prospect that all children will in future have to enter on merit, they may prefer to send them to schools which are outside the system, even if a high fee has to be paid. If these schools can get some assistance from L.E.A.'s they may be able to continue as fee paying schools, free from any public control. For the first time the Bill provides for State scholarships, paid for by the Board, for children at the "Public" boarding schools.

Instead, therefore, of providing all kinds of schools within the public system, under full public control, which is what a truly national system involves, the Bill, not only continues arrangements with outside schools, but takes wider powers to bring in more of them. This will further postpone the coming

of the Common School, and will perpetuate social distinctions in our educational system. The country is certainly not ready—if it ever will be—to prohibit all private or independent schools, so that the well-to-do may continue to send their children to “exclusive” schools, and a certain cleavage is inevitable. But the number of those children would be considerably smaller than it is to-day, if all schools in receipt of public aid had to abolish fees and admit children on the same test—a test quite unconnected with the parents’ ability to pay fees.

The checks and balances of the new Bill are interesting. On the one hand concessions are made to the progressives by the raising of the age to fifteen, and by the abolition of fees in maintained secondary schools. On the other hand, the Board has established more firmly schools provided by voluntary bodies, namely the Churches and governing bodies, and has actually extended its aid in this direction. The influence of these bodies can be counted on to keep the ship of education on an even (conservative) keel.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the Butler Bill and the Fisher Act, and the sense in which the former can be said to come nearer to establishing a national system, is the much greater power which it gives to the Minister.

In the first place his duty is no longer to “superintend” matters relating to education in England and Wales, but to “secure the effective execution by local authorities under his control and direction of the national policy for providing a varied and comprehensive educational service in every area.”¹

The idea of an equal partnership between the Board and the L.E.A. has gone. The Board is to be very much the senior partner, and to give orders to its junior partner. This change has been widely acclaimed by education enthusiasts, who blame the L.E.A.’s for many of the faults inherent in the old system, or for the sins of the Board.

There are, of course, authorities that can be described as backward; some owing to a lack of enthusiasm, and from a desire not to spend more than they can possibly help on education, others owing to a genuine lack of means. Reorganisation was held up for financial reasons as well as by difficulties connected with the Church schools. But at no time has a President of the Board come to Parliament and asked for powers to deal with both these hindrances. The power he has possessed

¹ Education Bill, 1943, Sec. 1 (1).

to reduce grants has only been used—or even threatened—on very few occasions. The Fisher Act of 1918 said that, if required by the Board, a local authority must submit a scheme showing how they propose to carry out their duty to provide for the progressive development and comprehensive organisation of education in their area. This provision was repeated in the 1921 Act. Answering a question in Parliament,¹ asking on what occasions since 1921 the Board has exercised its powers under this section and required local authorities to submit schemes, Mr. Butler was disarmingly frank—“After the passing of the 1918 Act,” he said, “local education authorities were asked to submit schemes for the organisation and development of education in their areas. In view of the financial position that arose, my predecessors in office did not feel justified in giving their statutory approval to the schemes submitted which would have made it obligatory upon the authorities to carry them into effect.” No stronger vindication of the local authorities, and condemnation of the Board could be given.

Local authorities remember all too well that the waves of economy that have engulfed education since 1918 have originated from above; the Geddes Axe, the May Report, the 1931 cuts, which last, amongst other things, abolished free secondary education in the areas of a number of authorities, and reduced teachers’ salaries by 10 per cent. The lack of greater progress since 1918 cannot, according to the President himself, be charged against local authorities as a whole, but against the central administration acting as the instrument of Parliament. It is certainly an advantage that, according to the Butler Bill procedure, Parliament has ruled that the L.E.A.’s *must* submit development plans; also that, after certain conditions have been fulfilled, the Minister *must* approve them.

But in spite of Mr. Chuter Ede’s hope that “the development plan is going to look a good many years ahead,”² it will not be possible for the first one to be more than a temporary plan. Until the town planners and the housing committees have settled the whereabouts of the four million houses that are to be built during the twelve years after the war, education authorities cannot decide how many schools are necessary of the various types, or in what areas they are to be built. But the only provision in the Bill for anything beyond the first development plan is in Section 11 (2) which says that “the local education order for every area shall continue to regulate the duties of the

¹ Hansard, February 3rd, 1944.

² Hansard, February 16th, 1944.

local education authority in respect of the matters therein mentioned and shall be amended by the Minister whenever in his opinion the amendment thereof is expedient by reason of any change or proposed change of circumstances." The initiative is therefore with the Minister, and is there anything to prevent the same thing happening to subsequent development plans that happened to "schemes" under the Fisher Act? It may not this time be "financial considerations," it may be shortage of labour or material, prior claims of our export trade, etc., etc., but the result will be the same. The much greater powers given to the Minister under this Bill can be used for obstruction as well as for progress.

One gets the impression that in the future far more questions will be settled by the Minister, and L.E.A.'s figure in the Bill as bodies to be directed rather than consulted, but what really counts in the end is, who pays? When the Board is paying 50 per cent of the L.E.A.'s expenditure, it can act as an equal partner over the whole field of development. Where—and as the individual guarantee of 50 per cent provided by the Fisher Act and abolished in 1931 is not reinstated—the Board is contributing less than half, then it will sink to the position of junior partner. Power to reduce grant has been used so sparingly, that evidently the Board does not put much faith in it. If it wants a "poor" but "willing" authority to provide schools equal to those of a "rich" authority, with no heavier burden on the ratepayer, then it must increase its grant accordingly. If it wants an "unwilling" authority—whether "poor" or "rich"—to provide a fuller service than the L.E.A. thinks necessary, then it will probably find, as various government departments have found during the war, that it will be driven to increase its grant.¹ Although it would undoubtedly have delayed the Bill if the financial basis of the grant had had to be reformed at this stage, the proposed increase of grant from 50 per cent to 55 per cent of the total expenditure over the whole country, but varied above and below from area to area, is far too little to enable the Minister to use to the full the powers of direction given to him by the Bill.² The most he will be able to do, and probably all he should do, is to insist upon a national standard of provision, help to provide the money necessary for this, and then use extra grant to encourage

¹ It is perhaps significant that the present high rate of grant on school meals and the 100 per cent grant on school milk are to continue.

² The new financial regulations were not issued when this article was written. They may give the Minister greater powers than he now possesses.

L.E.A.'s to go beyond the minimum. It is true to say that practically all the advances in education in the past have come from the L.E.A.'s, not from the Board. The Board has encouraged and, when the experiment has proved successful, has disseminated knowledge of it through its Inspectors, and occasional—too occasional—publications, so that other authorities are able to copy, and perhaps improve. Until a revolution takes place in our civil service, and in our government departments, this method will continue. It means a sacrifice of equal educational opportunity, in so far as that term is interpreted as a similar provision in every area, or at least one that costs exactly the same. However superficially attractive, that would mean that no area could go beyond the national minimum until that minimum was raised, and it is difficult to see how it is to be raised if not by the acts of progressive authorities, who are allowed and encouraged to spend more than the minimum. But the real advantage that should come from the increased power of the Minister is that he will now be responsible—at least for the minimum. He will not be able to shelter, even if he wished to do so, behind the backward L.E.A., and education enthusiasts will have to direct their attacks on him. If the Bill results in central responsibility, combined with freedom for the progressive L.E.A.'s, the conditions for advance will be much more favourable than they were in 1921.

It is clear, then, that the Butler Bill is more comprehensive than the Fisher Act, in that it has attempted a settlement of the problems of dual control and of the Part III authorities, and if it has not established a completely national system of education, it has defined the three stages, primary, secondary, and further education, and it has given greater power to the Minister, and thus concentrated responsibility in one man.

But, in a democracy, even a Minister is not omnipotent. He is the servant of Parliament, and Parliament reflects the opinions of the people. The real reason for the failure of the initial promise of the Fisher Act was not dual control, or the existence of Part III authorities, or the backward, or "poor," L.E.A.'s, or lack of sufficient power by the Board, but the fact that the nation did not care sufficiently about education. Parliament—and the country generally—seemed to accept it as quite natural that education should be the first service upon which economies should be made. It is also always easier for a local council to increase the Public Health than the Education Rate.

As in 1918, so to-day, there is a widespread demand for

better educational opportunities, but it is not even now so strong as the demand for the Beveridge Scheme. Until as a nation we care for education, as the Americans, for instance, care for it, and are prepared to pay for it, no amount of Acts of Parliament, or "directions" to local authorities, will alter the situation. The Butler Bill will go the way of the Fisher Act, unless something is done which has never yet been attempted in England, and is not contemplated in this Bill, and that is a revolution in our attitude towards education.

It is not easy to see how this is to be brought about, but we might, perhaps, take hints from our Allies. In the U.S.A., parents are brought into contact with the schools by means of the Parent Teacher Association, which is attached to every school. In the U.S.S.R. a large number of members of the public are brought into close administrative contact with the schools. The Butler Bill may definitely tend in the opposite direction unless certain steps are taken. If the schools make it their business to get the parents into close touch with their work, and make them feel that they have an important part to play in the education of their children, there will be a greater interest in education in an important section of the public.

One great advantage of small areas of administration is the opportunity offered many citizens to take an active part in the work of the authority. In large towns, even members of the education committee rarely visit the schools. Now that larger areas of administration have been adopted, might not the governing bodies, which every secondary school is to have, provide an opportunity for associating with the school citizens from the neighbourhood? Governing bodies need not necessarily consist of distinguished citizens, and when every school for children over eleven has a governing body, they cannot be so exclusive. But they might be of even greater value than the ordinary governing body, if they could link the school with the life of the locality, and make the people feel that the schools are theirs in fact and not only in name. How to make the English people "education conscious" might well be the first problem to be tackled by the new Advisory Council, for until we have solved it, no consistent advance will be possible.

When this article went to press the Committee stage of the House of Commons had only reached Clause 16.

THE RE-EDUCATION OF GERMANY

By KINGSLEY MARTIN

WHEN we say that the Nazi movement is a "revolt against civilisation" we are not talking symbolically or abusively, but precisely and historically. The cultural tradition that Hitler declared the Nazi conquest would supersede for a thousand years is synonymous with Western civilisation. (There are, of course, other civilisations—the Hindu and the Chinese, for instance—but neither until modern times have come much into contact with the West). The Nazi attack was directed against the conception of reason and liberty that emerged in the Athens of Aeschylus and Pericles, which redeemed the Roman rule of law from the arbitrary totalitarianism of earlier empires, and which, rediscovered at the Renaissance, was harmonised with the Judaic conception of a moral Universe, ruled by a God of mercy and justice. The Nazis made no secret of their intention of cutting this tradition; Goebbels, for instance, declared that the task of National Socialism was totally to uproot its political expression, substituting obedience for liberty, racialism for equality, and German domination for international fraternity. Instead of reason, thinking with the blood. And to show that there was to be no compromise with the Christian deity, Himmler began even before the war a systematic attempt to destroy the Church in Germany.

We must not let our liberal habit of scepticism hide from us the truth that the Nazi movement was a resolute attempt to revive those older gods of power and terror, cruelty and magic, worshipped by our pre-Christian ancestors; nor must we forget that it is not so many generations since in the minds of village people every woodland and mountain was still peopled by witches and wizards, dwarves and ogres. The values on which our civilisation is based are comparatively new in the history of mankind; to reduce the younger Gods of Reason and Love once again to the status of struggling outcasts is not necessarily beyond the capacity of able and ruthless men.

If the victory of the principles we profess were securely established in the Democracies, we should now have little to fear from the Fascist and Nazi revolt against civilisation. But

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in the countries which are called democratic there are many who worship Power and Terror, though they have not heard of Odin or Thór, and many who have not read a book about the superiority of the Nordic race who yet believe in a ruling and a subject class. In the democratic countries we have not killed the older gods, though it is the Christian deity whose name has long appeared on our official documents. For that reason we are vulnerable to the Nazi threat and our victory is not won when the power of the Third Reich is destroyed. What we may claim is that we have set ourselves the ideal of reasonable and tolerant conduct in public life and declared our allegiance to the doctrine that the State exists for the happiness of its citizens. When we talk of "re-educating Germany" we can only mean that we intend to so that the principles of democracy, whose triumph we have still to assure here, may also have a chance in Germany when the Nazi revolt is frustrated.

While recalling that Fascism has its active adherents and dangerous satellites outside the Axis countries, we are justified in noticing that in Germany (which alone I am discussing here) the conception of democracy has never succeeded in gaining so firm a hold as it has in Britain. The older gods were nearer to Hitler's call than they would have been to a British Führer. Give full weight to the facts of defeat and humiliation in the last war, to the devastating effect of inflation, unemployment and social breakdown, and still I think that the resistance of the Weimar Republic, which had never rid itself of the Junkers and the militarists and all the paraphernalia of Bismarck's Prussia, was weaker than we had a right to hope. It was in 1928, before the final economic crisis that gave Hitler his chance, that D. H. Lawrence, travelling in Germany, saw, with a strangely prophetic vision, how deep and terrible the revolt of the old gods might be.

Lawrence wrote:*

Something has happened. Something has happened which has not yet eventuated. The old spell of the old world has broken, and the old, bristling, savage spirit has set in. The war did not break the old peace-and-production hope of the world, though it gave it a severe wrench. Yet the old peace-and-production hope still governs, at least the consciousness. Even in Germany it has not quite gone.

But it feels as if, virtually, it were gone. The last two years have done it. The hope in peace-and-production is broken. The old flow, the old adherence is ruptured. And a still older flow has set in. Back, back to the savage polarity of Tartary, and away from the polarity of civilised Christian Europe. This, it seems to me, has

* This letter was published in the *New Statesman and Nation*, October, 13th, 1934.

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already happened. And it is a happening of far more profound import than any actual *event*. It is the father of the next phase of events.

And the feeling never relaxes. As you travel up the Rhine valley, still the same latent sense of danger, of silence, of suspension. Not that the people are actually planning or plotting or preparing. I don't believe it for a minute. But something has happened to the human soul, beyond all help. The human soul recoiling now from unison, and making itself *strong* elsewhere. The ancient spirit of prehistoric Germany coming back, at the end of history.

The same in Heidelberg. Heidelberg full, full, full of people. Students the same, youth with rucksacks the same, boys and maidens in gangs come down from the hills. The same, and not the same. These queer gangs of *Young Socialists*, youths and girls, with their non-materialistic professions, their half-mystic assertions, they strike one as strange. Something primitive, like loose, roving gangs of broken, scattered tribes, so they affect one. . . .

And it all looks as if the years were wheeling swiftly backwards, no more onwards. Like a spring that is broken and whirls swiftly back, so time seems to be whirling with mysterious swiftness to a sort of death. Whirling to the ghost of the old Middle Ages of Germany, then to the Roman days, then to the days of the silent forest and the dangerous, lurking barbarians.

Something about the Germanic races is unalterable. White-skinned, elemental, and dangerous. Our civilisation has come from a fusion of the dark-eyed with the blue. The meeting and mixing and mingling of the two races has been the joy of our ages. And the Celt has been there, alien, but necessary as some chemical reagent to the fusion. So the civilisation of Europe rose up. So these cathedrals and these thoughts.

But now the Celt is the disintegrating agent. And the Latin and southern races are falling out of association with the northern races, the northern Germanic impulse is recoiling towards Tartary, the destructive vortex of Tartary.

It is a fate; nobody now can alter it. It is a fate. The very blood changes. With the last three years, the very constituency of the blood has changed, in European veins. But particularly in Germanic veins.

At the same time, we have brought it about ourselves—by a Ruhr occupation, by an English nullity, and by a German false will. We have done it ourselves. But apparently it was not to be helped.

Quos vult perdere Deus, dementat prius.

Lawrence was particularly sensitive to such influences. He found in himself the primitive and mystical urges which he attributed to Germany. He was, nevertheless, a prophet; Nazi fanaticism in rejecting the religion of reason and humanity reached back to a period older than Mediterranean culture. The Germany of Goethe and Beethoven has made immense contributions to European culture, but Lawrence saw that the triumph of reason and common sense and tolerance was

more superficial in Germany than in the Western democracies. The philosophy and political thinking of Germany has been predominantly authoritarian and mystical; it contrasts badly (in so far as I know it) with the clear thinking French individualism or the practical compromises of the moral philosophy of England and Scotland. One can find in the British classics—it would be an amusing exercise—occasional passages from famous writers who have ridiculed equality and denigrated freedom with as much malice as those bad German philosophers, of whom it is said that “when they die, they go to Oxford.” It was an Englishman, not a German, who talked of the “lesser breeds without the law.” There is more glorification of war than denunciation of its follies in Carlyle; the extravagances of Kipling never reach the heights of sentimental twaddle about the value of battle and bloodshed that you may find in Tennyson and in Ruskin. It would be entertaining to construct a volume of British utterances, approaching in their rejection of civilisation various anthologies of German nationalism recently offered to the British public. It might even be a useful service to remind the British public that the Fascist strain in England is not only to be found in Carlyle’s picture of Cromwell. But it would be misleading to write such a book, for, while we have had our militarists and political mystics and occasional fanatics, they have never dominated British thought. Similarly, one could also counter partisan accounts of German philosophy by a book of wise, generous and freedom-loving sentiment selected from German liberal writers. But that would not alter the verdict. The Liberals have always been a minority element in Germany, weak, even in the first half of the nineteenth century, when there seemed a chance that liberty would win a constitutional triumph, and Germany would become the free federation that the genius of Bismarck was so tragically to frustrate. In short, while the British have often behaved like Philistines and glorified barbarism, commonsense liberalism has been our dominant tradition; in Germany the aggressive and imperialist champions have been in the saddle and the voice of liberty and humanism has remained for the most part a protesting and honourable undercurrent. Mill, Gladstone and Churchill are a better trio than Treitschke, Bismarck and Hitler.

It was largely because of Allied fear of the Left that in the revolution after the last war the keys of power were never wrested from the servants of Bismarck’s Germany. In the

Weimar Republic there was much to admire, much that was brave, democratic and experimental. The intellectuals were, many of them, good Europeans; the working-class movement was international in its outlook; the Communists, polling six million at their peak, were confident of eventual victory. It is important to recall that this hopeful Germany, which was frustrated, disillusioned, doped and strangled, did actually exist, and that there is in Germany, whatever the appearance to-day, a tradition which has contributed very greatly in music, in art, in science and in speculative thought to the main stream of European culture. Since no country, least of all a victorious alliance of nations that do not agree among themselves or within themselves, can “educate” another country of seventy million people, it is to those who are still faithful to these traditions that we must primarily look when we talk of the psychological rebirth of Germany. We cannot dictate what shape this rebirth will take. Culture cannot be planned. All we can do is to provide conditions in which the growth of a freer spirit is possible in Germany. That cannot happen under foreign dictatorship, nor must the necessary supervision of Germany be of a type to deprive the young of hope and self-respect. The re-education of Germany is merely a facet of the general problem of European reconstruction.

II

First we must try, as far as we may, to imagine to what psychological condition Germany will be reduced after the terrific and unprecedented experiences of the last thirty years. Most English Socialists have been too optimistic in expecting a German revolution. That the working-class parties were so strong only a little more than ten years ago, that war was notoriously dreaded in Germany until after the conquest of Poland, and that two millions have entered and some emerged from concentration camps—these facts gave ground for hope of a repetition of the type of revolution that ended the war of 1918. Revolution before the Wehrmacht is destroyed in the field is still possible, but unlikely. In candour we must admit that Himmler and Goebbels have done their work better than we believed. We hoped for no revolution until Germany’s invasion of Russia, but it was a disappointment that vast German armies should be willing to follow the Nazi leaders against their Russian comrades. Only a few, when desperately pressed, surrendered in response to Soviet propaganda and to

the well-conceived appeals of General Seydlitz and the Committee of Free Germans in Russia. Some may have resisted their officers; if so, they are dead. But when all is said, it is clear that ten years of intensive propaganda, the reign of torture and terror, the exile or murder of all Liberal intellectuals and the constant spectacle of Hitler organising easy triumphs at the expense of those who had recently defeated and humiliated their country—all these have combined to make for practical purposes a fighting unity of the German people.

This does not mean that unity will survive defeat, or that there is not resistance to-day. On the contrary, the evidence is that even before the devastation of Allied bombing, the prospect of defeat and the terrible toll of casualties on the Eastern front, the prevailing mood within Germany was a listless apathy and desire that the war should be over. We know that within every factory Himmler's agents have been constantly at work, weeding out those who were brave enough to talk treason. Four hundred public executions and a Security Police a million strong are eloquent testimony of disaffection. There is plenty of other evidence. There is a remarkable stream of literature, recently analysed by Mr. W. W. Schütz, by which courageous writers have managed to keep alive the critical tradition.

Somehow or other the censorship has passed a *Life of Attila* in which even the superficial reader will recognise a thinly-disguised attack on the Führer. Again there is the fairy story which describes the horrors of the concentration camp; an open satire on the huntsman who is so obviously Goering; stories of the fall of the Roman Empire, which so strangely resembles the Third Reich. Crowds have cheered plays and operas as subversive as Beaumarchais' "Figaro" on the eve of the French Revolution. Gerhardt Hauptmann's "Iphigenia in Aulis" owed its great reception in Vienna, recently, to its open attack on the Nazi regime, while Werner Egk's opera "Columbus" tells the story of Columbus journeying to America to escape from tyranny at home.

I choose such examples of the persistence of the critical spirit because they are not well known. The thundering denunciation of Nazi persecution by the Archbishop of Berlin and by the Bishop of Münster, have been widely publicised, and it is an important fact that both the Catholic and Protestant Churches have survived persecution and still possess leaders who may properly be described as good Europeans and upholders of the best in the German tradition. A hero like

Pastor Niemöller is likely to be a German nationalist, and some of those who have resisted Hitler may themselves be dangerously nationalistic as well as anti-Nazi in their outlook. But such men have kept alive in Germany the concept of the *Rechtstat*, the State in which the law is paramount and the constitution based on ethical principle, firmly upheld in the Courts of Justice. I believe that the desire for a society in which moral principle is upheld, and favouritism, corruption, the Black Market, thuggery and arbitrary despotism are banished, is one of the prevailing desires in Germany to-day. The Archbishop of Canterbury spoke recently of the courageous protests against the massacre of the Jews that had been uttered by German churchmen as well as by bishops and pastors in occupied countries. Remember, too, that Karl Barth in Switzerland still exercises a great influence. He is, I suppose, the most powerful evangelical writer of our day, and it is his doctrine that the individual must be both a moral and political being. "Faith," he says, "is not genuine without the decision to stand against tyranny and anarchy." One looks for some such influence in the remarkable story of the students of Munich, whose leaders were executed for spreading defeatist ideas and attempting to undermine the authority of the Nazi Party. All that has appeared about this student revolt suggests that it reached large dimensions, spreading to other universities such as Frankfurt and Königsberg, and that its purpose was largely a moral revolt which was only suppressed by savage executions. It involved the writing and distribution of leaflets, not only among students, but also factory workers.

All this is public knowledge. The most important body of information about internal Germany, however, is to be found in unpublished sources and cannot be recorded in detail. Much is known now from the evidence of prisoners and from those men and women of varied nationalities who have escaped from Hitler's Europe. One remarkable fact is that to-day the control of the Gestapo has become so weakened that Allied airmen who come down on German soil have been able to escape through the friendly offices of German peasants and workers, who may not have known or cared who they were, but who were willing to help anyone on the run from the police. Bombing, and the vast migrations of population in Europe (the official estimate is that over thirty million people have been moved from their native countries in Europe in one way or another during the war) have so weakened control that a Pole or a Frenchman

may contrive, unauthorised, to move from one end of the Reich to the other. How far this vast mixture and confusion of peoples has broken down national barriers in Europe, how far the Nazis have been able to maintain the division between *Herrenvolk* and other workers, and how far the immense destruction of property, by bombing, has altered the mental attitude of the middle class which is now, economically speaking, effectively reduced to proletarian status, I cannot guess. What we can say is that the terror from the air, combined with traditional fear of Russia, has not yet impaired the morale of the Army, while the same factors are increasingly bringing about the utter demoralisation of the home population. The worse the terror, the easier for German propaganda to convince the soldiers, and probably many of the workers, that only by resisting to the last man has Germany any hope of survival. Allied propaganda, in the absence of any clear agreement about the policy of the United Nations towards Germany after the war, cannot counteract this tendency, and Allied bombing, so terribly successful in destroying German towns, has not, as far as we can tell, as yet had decisive results on the production of vital weapons of war.

From all this we must plan on the assumption that no democratic revolution can take place within Germany until the German Army ceases to fight, and that it will continue fighting in occupied countries until it is overwhelmed, or until its supply of munitions runs out. Young Nazis who have fallen into Allied hands appear, many of them, to be the tough and brutal thugs whom we were led to expect, while the intellectuals amongst the officer class usually remain unrepentantly nationalist, some of them hopeful that Germany may yet snatch victory out of defeat, if not in this war then the next. They rely on what they regard as the inevitable conflict between the interests and outlook of the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies.

Of the Nazis themselves, two things may be said: Some of them are fanatics, with no ideas in their heads except loyalty to the Führer and the Fatherland. In so far as our knowledge goes, such men are beyond the hope of re-education. If they repent of the massacre of the Jews, the horrors of Lidice, and the rape of Poland and Russia, it is rather because Goebbels has taught them that those who have committed such atrocities can hope for no mercy from their captors than from any revulsion against the *Herrenvolk* philosophy. We must expect that some, at least, of these deliberately manufactured barbarians

will form bands of terrorists after defeat, more numerous and more savage than those who, after Versailles, committed a long series of political murders in Germany and acted as the élite of Hitler's storm troopers. One recalls that Lord D'Abernon, first British Ambassador to the Weimar Republic, recommended in a despatch to London that these murder gangs should not be suppressed by the Allies, because, in his view, the danger in Germany was rather from the Left than from the Right. Against this sombre picture we may place the fact that a large number of Nazis are not fanatics but merely young men who follow the Leader, and who prove, on cross-examination, to be within themselves empty, miserable and pathetic. When the dream of conquest is dissipated, and the idol they have worshipped found to have feet of clay, they will be vacant shells, waiting for a new gospel, ready, perhaps, to listen to new teachers. They will not, like their more convinced comrades, desire to bring down the whole temple rather than to suffer defeat. They will want most to return to German villages where they may have been brought up in friendship and kindness; they will want to go back, as the mass of men will everywhere in Europe, to the ordinary life of their fathers, to be bakers and carpenters, to look after the animals, or do a day's work in the shop or factory. The prevailing impression of Germany to-day is that everyone, including the leaders, are utterly tired. When Germany does collapse, the fall will be very complete.

I will add a prophecy. There is in Germany to-day a profound sense of guilt; it is partly guilt that, in the absence of any readiness on the part of the Allies to offer the chance of repentance, leads the German army to such tenacity of resistance. After the war, many of the younger generation will again seek salvation in a life as far as possible divorced from the problems, physical and mental, which will beset their country. I recall the youth movement that impressed D. H. Lawrence; the youths and maidens who turned their backs on urban life and wandered through the woods and valleys of Germany, serenading each other with guitars, repudiating politics and seeking in nature a friendship, a life free from the intolerable complexities of national life. Many of them were without constructive ideas; many of them proved an easy prey to the propaganda of Goebbels. But some did not, and there are those who know Germany well who tell me that some of these bands of youth never gave in to National Socialism, maintained in some form

the basis of their organisation and are likely to have played a part in the student revolt that began in Munich. However that may be, we should recall that sentimental and rather humourless as this phase of post-war Germany often seemed, it was as a movement generous and friendly and not oppressive in outlook. It could have been turned to good account if Germany itself had developed into a country where the generosity and friendliness of young people had been encouraged. One of the few prophecies I would make is that once again we shall see a desire among the young in Germany to "return to nature," to find God outside the churches and to co-operate, if the chance is offered, with young people of other nationalities.

III

It is common ground amongst students of the problem that foreigners cannot "re-educate" Germany. Those who teach Germans must be Germans; if the school books are written at Allied dictation they will be written off as the propaganda of the victors, and teachers selected by an Allied Commission will too easily look like hirelings and quislings. This central problem has perplexed the authors of the one serious pamphlet devoted to this subject. It shows signs of joint authorship and a divided mind. It clearly states that the victors cannot dictate the education of the vanquished, but goes on to consider a proposition that an Allied Board should insist not only on burning "*Mein Kampf*" but also on deciding just what should be taught in every German school. Other discussions of the subject have considered more closely how to solve the dilemma by the technique of "indirect control."

Given Allied occupation, a High Commissioner, International Education Office or some similar body will have for an indefinite period to exercise at least a negative function. Nazi ideas can no longer be taught in the schools, and nationalistic teachers must give way to Germans with a European outlook. What are the tests? To ask the question is to expose the impossibility of direct foreign administration. All that the occupying officials can do, if they have the necessary wisdom, is to discover locally such Germans as seem to come most nearly within the definition of European Germans and to leave them in charge. In the revolutionary ferment, new leaders will be thrown up; an old and trusted Trades Union leader who has never said "Heil Hitler" will be found at the head of the Workers' Council in one factory—there is already evidence that

such leaders are emerging; Catholic workers will have taken over the local government of a district in Bavaria; Communists will be in charge, perhaps, of towns in Saxony. Sooner or later, Germany as a whole, or perhaps only the various States which once made up the Federation of Germany, will have become sufficiently blended to enable a central government, or regional governments, to be formed. The supervising body appointed by the Allies will not be able to do more than see that resolute Nazis are excluded; that as many as possible of the survivors of the hundred thousand teachers who resisted Nazi education and were deprived of their jobs, are again given a chance to teach democratic ideas, and that the books they use are no longer inspired by an aggressive and military outlook. Optimists talk of new text books for all Europe accepted by all the Powers. The international outlook required for such a project is too remote, but I can see a real possibility that text-books might be written which give different points of view about controversial historical questions, and that such books will provide the best places for re-education not only in Germany but in other countries, including Britain. Remember that for ten years in Germany a single doctrine has been imposed in every school by every other device of propaganda. Free discussion has been impossible. As soon as newspapers and books are allowed to appear without Nazi dictatorship there will at once be a vast flood of discussion and universal demand for ideas of every kind. That discussion must be the soil out of which the ideas of the new Germany will grow. We cannot direct it; we cannot even forecast its nature. We can only anticipate that certain social groups will play a prominent part in it. There will be Communists and Socialists of various persuasions; there will be Catholics and there will be Protestants whose organisations have never been destroyed; there will be admirers of the Democratic West, and, perhaps more numerous, those who look to Russia as the new Great Power which has solved the twin problems of federating nationalities and planning its economic system for the public welfare. Germany, and indeed the whole of Europe, which has undergone experiences which we cannot imagine, will find out of its turmoil its own solution. We can help by the negative function of preventing bands of Nazi thugs from terrorising the countryside, and seeing to it that those who have maintained a European outlook have the opportunity of trying to convert their fellow countrymen. We can help positively by putting the radio and the

federalism. In that case Europe will have a hopeful future and Germany will share in its development. There is no other solution for the problem of re-education.

TURKEY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By JOHN PARKER, M.P.

TURKEY has been much sought after as an ally both before and during this war. She turned her position to advantage in speeding up her industrialization. Borrowing from Germany, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. in turn, she found the capital not only for strengthening her armaments but also for railway construction, the development of her mineral resources, the creation of a mercantile marine, the construction of an iron and steel industry, and a rapid expansion of her textile industries.

Since the German attack on Poland in 1939, her government has steered the difficult course of neutrality, seeking to show as great a friendship as possible towards Britain without bringing upon her a Nazi onslaught. Questions have frequently been asked in the course of the war as to whether and when Turkey proposed actually to take up arms against the Axis. In considering this matter, Turkey has always had to think of possible Russian moves, as well as of the immediate danger from Berlin.

Being a people of nearly 18,000,000, Turkey has considerable man-power. Her soldiers are traditionally good fighters, and her present army is undoubtedly well trained. Its equipment was sadly lacking at the beginning of hostilities, and although much strengthened by the allies, it is still felt to be inadequate to meet a Nazi blitzkrieg. Mobilization has lasted since the Nazis reached her frontiers. The necessary continual preparedness for war has been a big drain on Turkey's resources; despite this she is obviously very much more prosperous than her neighbours. Neither Turkish peasant nor army officer sees any reason why he should exchange the advantages of peace for war, unless he is either directly attacked or there seems no danger of the enemy hitting back at him.

Militarily, the west of Turkey is open to attack from

Europe. The small European territory (Thrace) would be quite indefensible given a determined onslaught by well-armed Germans and Bulgars. The Greek islands down to Rhodes provide admirable stepping-stones to the western shore of Anatolia. So long as the Axis had air superiority, there was always the danger that the largely wooden buildings of Istanbul might go up in flames at any moment, and that all attempts, either to evacuate or reinforce Thrace could be foiled. A large invading force, once landed in Asia Minor, would find the terrain easy going until the central steppes and outlying mountains of the Taurus Chain were reached.

The Turks believed in the early stages of the war that the British intended, in the middle of Anatolia, to make their first serious attempt to halt Hitler's advance on Bagdad, Suez and India. They argued that the British forces in the Middle East would move up into Turkey to help them if a Nazi attack developed. They thought that the British intended to meet Hitler in the interior of their country, because there, difficult communications to his rear would make it possible to meet him on fairly equal terms. Before Hitler's attack on Russia, it looked as though he might try to expand in this direction. June 22nd, 1941, relieved Turkey of this threat, but left her still too frightened to take unnecessary risks.

From the date of Hitler's attack on Poland to that on the U.S.S.R., Turkey was filled with fears of an accommodation being reached between the two Great Powers at her expense. In the autumn of 1939 the Turkish Foreign Minister was asked to visit Moscow to be greeted with suggestions of a "protective" Russian occupation of the Straits. This proposal was emphatically turned down by the Turks, who have since feared a revival of the Tsarist ambitions to reach the Mediterranean. These fears have been removed only to a limited extent by the Anglo-Russian guarantee of Turkey's territorial integrity.

Kemal Ataturk laid it down early in the Turkish revolution that the Turkish Republic should only seek to embrace the Turkish homeland. Since then both Kemal and Inonu have frequently restated their country's desire for no aggrandisement. On the Asiatic side, Turkey's frontiers are generously drawn and leave practically none of the Turkish minorities within the old Ottoman Empire outside her boundaries since the incorporation of Hatay in 1939. In fact she already included 1,473,000 Kurds and 145,000 Arabs before this acquisition. It is generally agreed in Turkey that any further expansion into

Syria or Iraq would arouse against Turkey the strong opposition of the Arab world, which it would be unwise to provoke.

On the European side, however, there are large Turkish minorities still surviving amounting to about 1½ million. There are 200,000 Turks in the Rumanian Dobruja, and 150,000 in Macedonian Yugoslavia. Nearer home are the 800,000 Turkish-speaking Moslems of Bulgaria and another 80,000 in Western Thrace which the Bulgarians have now taken over from Greece. There is little doubt that if opportunity offered, the Turkish government would like to extend its frontiers further up into the mountains in this direction, so as to increase the defensibility of Thrace and of Istanbul. The Turkish minorities in the Balkans have been steadily moving back to Turkey both before and since the large scale exchange which followed the Turko-Greek war—772,000 returned between 1923 and 1937; this flow has continued even since the beginning of the present war. Most of the immigrants have come from Bulgaria, but there has also been a considerable number from Rumania and Yugoslavia, especially after agreements were concluded in 1936 and 1938 respectively for a systematic transference of a part of their Turkish minorities. This migration will continue in the post-war years; Turkey is thinly peopled and has room to settle these Turkish-speaking minorities.

In addition, there is a considerable Moslem population in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria speaking Serbo-Croat, Bulgarian or Albanian. In the past, many Moslems speaking these languages have migrated to Turkey where they are in process of being absorbed. In the last twenty years, however, national feeling has begun to bind them to the peoples whose language they use, and it is unlikely that many more of them will go to Turkey. There are also some Turkish-speaking minorities in Cyprus, where they form 18 per cent of the population, and in the Dodecanese. There is a strong feeling in favour of obtaining at least Rhodes at the peace settlement, possibly with an exchange of its Greek population for the Turks of the other Dodecanese islands and of Cyprus. Some disquiet was felt in Turkey at the recent Allied adventures at Leros and Samos, as it was feared that Britain was attempting to jump the claim of Greece to these former Italian islands by occupying them.

It appears unlikely to the leaders of the Turkish Republic that Turkey will be able to obtain any appreciable frontier changes on her western boundaries either in Thrace or so far as the islands are concerned. It is true that Bulgaria is one of

the Axis powers, but she is not at war with the Soviet Union. Pro-Soviet feeling appears to be very strong in Bulgaria, where there is an active underground movement under Communist leadership. When the Axis crash comes, a *coup d'état* or partisan rising seems likely. This would create a government sympathetic to Russia, who has already taken steps to make use of the strong pan-Slav feeling existing among Balkan Slavs. The Turks believe that the U.S.S.R. will extend a protective hand over the new Bulgaria and will not only maintain intact its pre-1939 territory but will also insist upon Bulgaria's retention of the Southern Dobruja. Suggestions have also been made of a Bulgarian corridor to the sea through Western Thrace, where Russia could assist in developing a warm water port open to the Mediterranean. If Greece, who has been one of the most valiant of the Allies in the struggle against the Axis, is thus to lose some of her pre-war territory, recompense will have to be found for her elsewhere by her special protector Great Britain. This might be in part in southern Albania, where there is a considerable Greek population. The Turks argue, however, that Britain will probably strengthen her ally by handing over Cyprus (retaining, however, full rights to use the island for military purposes). In addition, it is very likely that the former Italian islands off Turkey's south-west coast will also go to Greece, particularly as the greater part of their population is Greek speaking. In view of these possibilities, Turkey's leaders see no reason why they should embark upon a war which is unlikely to give them any important territorial advantages, particularly when it might still lead at this stage to considerable damage being done by the enemy throughout the most exposed western districts, which are also the most industrially developed parts of the country. Turkey's hesitations about entering the war are strengthened by two further factors: if Turkey were to advance to the attack against the Axis through Bulgaria, she would almost certainly encounter keen resistance from the Bulgars, who still look upon the Turks as traditional enemies. Russian forces, on the contrary, approaching the Danube from the north would be welcomed into Bulgaria as liberators. Why, therefore, should Turkey undertake a bitter and unpleasant war to achieve what the Russians could do without serious trouble? There is also a strong feeling that Turkey should conserve her resources, military and otherwise, against possible threats to her security which may come when or after the peace is made. It is further argued that Turkey, if

strong and untouched by the war, would be able to exercise a big influence at a time when all her neighbours were suffering from the aftermath of their struggle with the Nazis.

Against the supporters of this cautious school of thought, which has so far been dominant at Ankara, there are many who hold a somewhat different viewpoint. They say that even though Turkey may have little chance of securing any substantial frontier adjustments from the war, she should enter the war on the Allied side at an early date. They believe that Turkish prestige will suffer grievously if she remains a neutral to the end, or only enters the ranks of the Allies when all danger is passed. A continuation of the cautious policy hitherto dominant would lead to a very different result from that which its supporters think likely. A Turkey who had remained neutral overlong would have no friends among the Balkan nations when peace was made, and would have no claims upon British or American friendship and support in the post-war years. If the fears of Russian domination in south-eastern Europe are not to materialise, Turkey must build up military prestige and goodwill before the peace settlement, and must be able to depend on British backing for the maintenance of Turkish territorial integrity in the years to come.

Such are the contrary schools of thought on the question of the war. At the moment the cautious school of thought is still dominant, and it appears unlikely that Turkey will enter the war until Germany's position has been a great deal weakened. When her rulers are agreed that Germany cannot do her any very serious damage, she will join the Allies so as to have the better standing at the peace conference, which the status of a belligerent would give her over that of a neutral.

In view of what has been already said, the Turkish government probably does not expect to secure any substantial territorial advantages at the peace conference. She will be very interested, however, in what happens in the surrounding countries. If opportunity were to offer, Turkey would undoubtedly try to re-form on stronger lines a Balkan *entente* to the West, and some arrangement with her eastern neighbours on the lines of the Pact of Saadabad which she concluded in July, 1937, with Afghanistan, Persia and Iraq. The whole question of a Balkan *entente* is linked up with the future of all the countries between Germany and the U.S.S.R. which stretch from the Baltic to the Aegean. Russia has so far set her face against any regional federation in this area through fears that it might

become a *bloc* against her. The greater part of the area seems likely to have friendly governments closely linked with Russia. Rumania would almost certainly be dominated by her Russian neighbour, despite the importance of the pre-war Western groups which were interested in her oilfields. There has been much discussion of a greater Yugoslavia which would incorporate Bulgaria and Albania. The federal organisation which Marshal Tito has set up in the liberated parts of Yugoslavia provides a basis which could be easily adapted to the needs of such a state. Already both Albanian and Bulgar partisans are fighting under his command. The neighbours of the proposed Greater Yugoslavia are a little frightened of the dominant position which it might have in south-eastern Europe. In the earlier Balkan *entente*, Turkey's size, population and strategic position justified her claims to leadership. The Greater Yugoslavia would have a larger population than that of Turkey, and would be unlikely to accept Turkish leadership. Much will depend upon the Soviet Union's attitude to the proposals for a Greater Yugoslavia. Pan-Slav influence is strong through all the south Slav countries, and Communists have a big influence both in Tito's movement and amongst the underground forces in Bulgaria. Russia might regard a Greater Yugoslavia as an outlying defence bastion which could also be used to give her access to the Adriatic and Aegean. Such a state would always be able to threaten Istanbul and thus prevent Turkey from ever taking any line which might lead to rupture of relations with U.S.S.R. and the possible closing of the Straits. There is little doubt that the prospect of a Greater Yugoslavia, backed by the U.S.S.R., arouses considerable fears in Turkey. In the unfortunate event of a war against the U.S.S.R., Turkey's eastern frontier is strategically a good one. Its high windswept mountains are snowbound for a large part of the year, but, as has already been stated, the western defences of Turkey are very different; an attack on European Turkey by Russia through Bulgaria, backed by the forces of Greater Yugoslavia, would be difficult to resist. It was by this route, as well as directly across the Black Sea that the Russians made their attacks most easily against Constantinople, both in the days of the Byzantine and of the Ottoman Empires. It can be taken for a certainty, therefore, that Turkey will do her best to discourage the creation of a Greater Yugoslavia at the peace settlement.

It is not certain, however, that the U.S.S.R. will favour the union of Bulgaria with the other south Slavs in a Greater

Yugoslavia. In the first place, such a state might be sufficiently large and distant from the Soviet Union to be able to develop considerable independence within a few years of its creation. Moscow will not forget that the Bulgaria which the Tsar set up at the Congress of Berlin soon developed an independence of outlook which was not altogether pleasing to her Russian patron. Secondly, British influence with Tito's movement is strong and is based upon the important assistance given in the way of arms and supplies. Thirdly, Russian influence is undoubtedly much stronger in present-day Bulgaria than in any other South Slav area. The Soviet Union may well, therefore, prefer a separate Bulgaria, dependent directly upon her for protection, and more inclined to do her bidding than a Greater Yugoslavia, which would be less easy to control.

The difference between the attitude adopted by the British Government towards the major guerilla movements of Greece and Yugoslavia may in part be determined by the influence which Britain expects to exercise in these two countries respectively after the war. Obviously she hopes to have as big an influence as possible in Yugoslavia, but she recognises that Yugoslavia is part of the European continent, and can only to a limited extent be influenced by sea power. Greece, on the other hand, is primarily a maritime state, and thus is far more open to political influence by the naval power dominating the Mediterranean. The destruction of the greater part of the French and Italian fleets will have strengthened Britain's naval position in this part of the world for many a year. Should Greece be given Cyprus and the Dodecanese, her maritime character will be still further emphasized and the maintenance of her territorial integrity will depend in a special way upon Britain's support. Churchill's policy towards Greece has aimed, therefore, at getting a government under the King which would be amenable to British influence. The independent character of the E.A.M. movement and its desire to be its own master in Greece has been one of the obstacles to the negotiations. Sooner or later, however, some arrangements between this movement and the British are likely to be made. If the British Foreign Office is wise it will leave internal questions to be settled by the Greeks themselves, and give the new Greece the external backing which she would certainly be only too pleased to receive.

Turkey would be very apprehensive if Greece were to follow the other countries of south-eastern Europe into the

Russian orbit, and is, therefore, watching Greeco-British relations with considerable interest. Since the exchange of population in 1923, Turkish relations with Greece have been good. Once the future of Cyprus and the Dodecanese has been decided, no serious cause of disagreement is likely to remain. The transference of any Turks from these islands, should all or any of them go to Greece, would, however, be desirable, both to complete the earlier exchange and to prevent new minority difficulties arising. The two countries have very much the same political interests; both fear possible aggression from the north and value any support which a Mediterranean power like Britain can give them. Their two territories together form very much the area covered by the Byzantine Empire for so many centuries. A desire to restore the pre-war friendship with Greece may influence the Turks to moderate their claims for insular acquisitions when the peace comes to be made.

To the south-east, Turkey no doubt welcomes the decline which the war has brought in French influence in Syria and Lebanon. On the whole she would prefer to see the Arab states neither too closely dominated by the Western Powers nor united into a strong pan-Arab federation which might want to revise her southern boundary. So far as Persia is concerned, Turkey would welcome a government not too closely dominated by either the Russians or British. Communications direct between the two countries are still too poor for any close collaboration to be practical politics.

The big difference which the war has made to the position of the United States in the Near East has had its repercussions in Turkey. America's navy now far exceeds that of Great Britain in size and has begun to back British naval forces in the Mediterranean. The interest of the oil companies in Saudi-Arabia and the neighbouring states has got the backing of Washington, and it is suggested that American Government funds should be used for the construction of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean. American influence is thus competing in the Arab states with the earlier French and British influence. All three powers are combined, however, in their desire to support Turkish independence in order to prevent too strong a Russian influence filtering down from the north.

American influence was considerable in Turkey before the war. American schools in Turkey, as in Lebanon and Bulgaria, go back to the days of the Ottoman Empire; they have had a big part in educating an important section of the intelligentsia

and governing groups. Robert College at Istanbul has been worked into the Turkish educational system, and the lessons its experience has provided have been of great service to the Republic. In the inter-war years, when filling vacancies where foreigners were necessary, American teachers were often favoured, because it was thought that they had less of an axe to grind than citizens of other Great Powers. Many of the schools originally founded by missionaries to assist the Christian minorities continued to exist after the Christians had either been massacred or expelled. I was surprised in the summer of 1939 to find a school on a fine site in the remote Cappadocian mountains near Kayseri serving a score of villages, run by an American headmaster with the assistance of his wife, two Turkish teachers and an Englishwoman, giving a good secondary education with a technical bias. Among the rocks below could be seen the ruins of the Greek and Armenian churches which had been left unattended since their communicants had departed. Apart from the headmaster's children, not a single Christian attended the school, though a considerable part of the funds came from American religious organizations, assisted, however, by a subsidy from the Turkish government. The Americans concerned believed they were doing a useful service, "turning lean village boys into huskies, with high moral standards, and a capacity to do things"; they felt this was worth while, even though they made no converts to their religion. In carrying out their plans for building a national system of education the Turks made an exception and kept most of the American schools when closing down those of other foreigners.

As the Kemalist regime has taken into government ownership all the major industries, mineral resources and public utilities in Turkey, which had previously been in the possession of foreigners, it does not fear internal interference, following a close link up with the United States and Britain in the realm of foreign politics. The Turks take the view that, being economic masters in their own house, they are free to develop their territories and extensive resources in their own way. The big increase which the war is bringing in American influence in the Arab states and her military and naval power throughout the Mediterranean will almost certainly be followed by an increase in American "cultural" influence in Turkey, especially in the educational field. It is probable, for example, that the coming of peace will see a rapid extension of the archaeological research in Anatolia in which American universities had already begun

to dabble before 1939. This increase in American influence is not likely to cut across the wide interest in British literature and institutions which was growing rapidly in the thirties. For the time being, however, French influence, which was very great with Kemal Ataturk and the founders of the regime, is at a discount. French, however, remains the *lingua franca* of the country, and should any leadership in ideas come out of post-war France, fertile soil for them would be found in Turkey.

Will the peace see the elimination of all German influence in Turkey? This is very unlikely. Turkey made great use of German refugees, both in building her new capital and in providing university lecturers and technicians for her industries. In the immediate pre-war years, trade ties with Germany were close, and certain essential war requirements have been obtained by the Nazis from Turkey since 1939. Once the reaction from the threat of a Nazi invasion and of German world domination has declined, some revival of German influence is likely.

Political and cultural influences in Turkey are not necessarily likely to be in ratio to the economic influence there of the Great Powers. Britain and America, however, must have some strong economic ties with post-war Turkey if their political influence is to have a stable basis. Turkish industrialization has progressed far in recent years. She will want large supplies of capital goods to enable her to improve further her communications and carry out the new five years' industrial plan which it is hoped will follow the war. How is Turkey to find the money for this? In pre-war years the desire to obtain her alliance led all the Great Powers to give her assistance. When the war is over she will no longer be in such a strong bargaining position. Turkey will no doubt welcome a continuance of the active help given to Turko-British trade by the Treasury backed United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Should Great Britain adopt even a modified form of planned economy with bulk purchase of the import of food and raw materials, much might be done. This means, however, that Britain will have to take considerable quantities of Turkish exports if she is to supply a substantial part of the capital goods Turkey will want. Given her need to find markets, Britain will probably have to maintain her close war-time trade connections with Turkey. As the United States is unlikely in the post-war years to have any form of planned economy, it is difficult to see how her trade with Turkey can be developed unless considerable American loans are given to the Turkish government to finance

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industrialization. This seems quite a likely possibility, given the growing American interest in the Middle East. Both Germany and France will be out of the Turkish economic picture for some years after the war, but some revival of trade relations, particularly with Germany, should come as soon as the industrial conditions there settle down. Russia and the neighbouring Balkan and Middle Eastern countries produce too similar products for them to have a big trade with Turkey. At the moment, Turkish opinion favours a widespread development of bilateral treaties in order both to find a market for Turkish exports and secure the necessary goods she wants for development at home.

It will depend upon whether a lead is given by the three great victors as to how far Turkey will back proposals for a new International Authority. In the 1930's Turkey became a strong advocate of the League of Nations and of collective security. Surrounded as she was then, has been during this war, and will be, by the conflicting interests of the Great Powers, she wants greater security than patronage can give her. Turkey would certainly take on any commitments to maintain the Peace which the Great Powers themselves were prepared to undertake. It is also likely that she would be prepared to enter into regional arrangements both in south-eastern Europe and the Middle East within some world scheme of security. She is unlikely, however, to go far with any such scheme if it arouses the violent antagonism of any of the Great Powers such as Russia. Turkey would also be prepared to accept any proposals for regulating international trade which the three victors would themselves be prepared to accept, but she will not give up her support of bilateralism without being certain that advantages would follow such a change of policy.

WAR MATERIALS AND THE PLANNING OF PEACE

PART I

By D. S. ANDERSON, B.Sc., Ph.D., M.I.Mech.E.

THE maintenance of peace is unquestionably the most important of all international problems, and we must not assume that our victory in this war will automatically solve once and for all this great and complex problem. Unless we act differently after this war from what we did after the last, the seeds of the third world war will be sown. After November 11th, 1918, nothing seemed more improbable than a second world war, and yet we can see, on looking back, that right from 1918 we approached it step by step with a terrible inevitability. The same can easily happen again unless we act very differently, and differently does not necessarily mean vindictively. It does mean that our preparations and organisation for the maintenance of peace must be as deliberate and positive as our preparations and organisation for winning a war. We would never expect to win a war without comprehensive long-term planning, thorough preparation, and the concentration of all our energies on achieving victory, but when it comes to the maintenance of peace the position is very different. For long-term planning we tend to substitute short-term expediency, a substitution as fatal to the maintenance of peace as it would be to the achievement of victory in war. Peace will not maintain itself; we cannot rely on peace continuously emerging as a by-product from an international policy compounded of general goodwill and short-term expediency, with commercial prosperity as one of the main objectives. It is greatly to be feared that such has been our reliance in the past.

The problem of the organisation and maintenance of peace, like all international problems, is one of great complexity involving many factors. There is no single grand solution to this problem; a solution can be achieved only through a patient, step by step process; there must be a thorough examination of all factors likely to contribute in any way to a solution, because the successful handling of each separate factor will help to build up a cumulative effect of such magnitude as to

make war progressively more difficult and finally impossible. One of these factors, and one which I think is of very great importance, is the question of access to, and control of, raw materials.

An essential condition of a stable regime of peace would be a spirit of general contentment amongst nations and a feeling that all nations were getting a fair deal as regards access to raw materials. One of the contributory factors to the present war was a feeling that there was not a fair deal as between nations. This feeling was shown by the open classification of the Powers as the "Haves" and the "Have-nots." Considering that there was a world surplus of practically all major commodities, it is very doubtful if this distinction between "Haves" and "Have-nots" was true to any appreciable extent; nevertheless it was a slogan widely and intensively used by the leaders of Germany, Italy, and Japan to rally their peoples behind a fiercely aggressive policy. The importance of free access to raw materials has become generally recognised, and statesmen in all countries have emphasised that in the post-war world no nation should be cut off by artificial barriers from obtaining those materials necessary to give its people the highest possible standard of living.

The question then arises, is this access to raw materials to be free of all restraint or is there to be some form of control? In the case of many materials no special form of control would be needed, but in the case of certain essential war materials it would appear desirable to exercise close supervision and control. This question of the control of essential war materials is an inner problem within the larger problem of general access to raw materials. It is with this small but immensely important inner problem that I am concerned, because I believe that the control of some of these essential war materials could be made a powerful factor in the maintenance of peace.

It is a problem which has received remarkably little attention, a problem indeed which has been positively shirked, probably because any form of control is going to cut right across a long-established principle of international trade, namely, that a producer is free to sell his product without let or hindrance to any buyer who can pay for it and need not concern himself with the use to which it is subsequently put. There is no doubt that under this principle of unrestricted buying and irresponsible selling the British Empire and America contributed substantially to building up the war potential, now being used against us, of Germany and Japan, and until recently also Italy. It is quite

obvious that if we are going to make a serious attempt to abolish war this principle will have to be abandoned; unrestricted buying and irresponsible selling of potentially dangerous materials cannot be permitted.

Most countries exercise an extremely strict control over their citizens in regard to the acquisition, retention, and sale of even simple weapons, but much more dangerous weapons together with essential war materials are traded internationally with reckless abandon. Some measure of control must be exercised over these potentially dangerous commodities if war is to be made impossible, and some measure of control could be exercised without in any way hampering legitimate peace-time trade.

The question may then be put, to what extent could the control of essential war materials be made a really effective factor in the maintenance of peace? The answer, I think, is that under the conditions of modern warfare it could actually be a decisive factor for peace. So far as the ability to wage war is concerned, nations have become less and less self-sufficient as weapons have become more and more complicated, until to-day there is not a single nation in the world, not even the British Empire, the United States or Russia which is self-sufficient for a major war. This means that any nation which could not reckon on being able to import freely in wartime, and nowadays no nation could, would have to build up beforehand, if planning to go to war, large stocks of those essential war materials in which its natural resources were lacking. It ought therefore to be possible by controlling in peace-time the distribution of these essential materials to prevent a nation, however aggressive by nature, from building up stocks, arming itself to the teeth, and so becoming a menace to others.

It is no use laying down limitations in the size of an army, navy, or air force, or limiting the size of any particular weapon or prohibiting any particular weapon unless at the same time the materials for building up armaments are also controlled. After the last war Germany's army and navy were limited by the terms of the peace treaty; we had later the tripartite naval agreement between the United States, Japan, and ourselves limiting the size of navy, tonnage of battleships and calibre of guns. All these agreements were broken by Germany and Japan when it suited them to do so. Limitations relating to weapons of war are likely to be of little use unless they are accompanied by the rationing of essential war materials so as to make impossible any serious departure from the limits laid

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down. It is indeed fortunate that Germany and Japan, the two most dangerous aggressor nations in the modern world, could be effectively curbed by the control of certain war materials, because the natural resources of both are seriously deficient in this respect. I should, perhaps, make it clear at this point that my present examination of the problem is limited to the case of Germany, although Japan could be curbed no less effectively by similar means.

The materials required for the conduct of war are many and varied, and it would be exceedingly difficult to exercise strict control over all of them. Fortunately, however, there are certain materials which can be put in a special category by themselves as essential materials and if these could be strictly controlled it would not be necessary to control the others.

What materials should, then, be put in this category of essential war materials? Very briefly the chief characteristics of modern warfare are explosives, armoured fighting units on land, sea, and in the air, mechanical transport, and air transport. The army no longer marches, it rides or flies, no longer fights as men against men, but as armoured units against armoured units—the units being tanks, armoured vehicles, mobile guns, ships, and planes. These units fight each other with bullets, shells, and bombs, explosive laden, or explosive propelled, or sometimes both. This description of modern warfare is admittedly a rough generalisation; it is true that infantry is still required to take and consolidate positions, but the way is blasted by the bomber, the artillery or mortar barrage, and the tank. The mobility of men, guns, and materials depends upon the internal combustion engine; safety depends upon armour; fire-power depends upon explosives; and fighting capacity depends upon a combination of mobility, armour, and fire-power.

To a certain extent the actual choice of what are to be classed as essential war materials is an arbitrary one. Different persons will be guided by different considerations in making their selection, but three main conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the materials must be imports into Germany or they cannot be controlled; (2) they should not come from adjacent countries, as this would make evasion easier; (3) they should preferably be materials whose consumption is much higher in war than in peace, because, if this were so, any stocks accumulated in peace time would be rapidly exhausted in war time. Taking these conditions into consideration along with the characteristics

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of modern warfare, I would select, as the essential war materials to be subjected to strict control, a comparatively small group, namely, petroleum products, rubber, and the metals needed to make the special alloy steels from which armour plate, projectiles, etc., are manufactured, these metals being nickel, manganese, chromium, tungsten, molybdenum, cobalt, and vanadium; to these materials one might add copper from the non-ferrous metals group. The question of explosives is in a different category to that of other materials, and I will deal with it separately at the end. And now, having made my selection, I would like to give a few facts and figures concerning the materials in support of my choice.

Let us take first the case of petroleum products, in some ways the most important of the lot. The term petroleum products includes petrol, heavy oil, and lubricating oil, and the consumption of this group mounts rapidly in war time. Aircraft, tanks, armoured cars, transport vehicles, submarines, and other naval craft, consume vast quantities of petroleum products, and to this vast consumption in the fighting forces has to be added the smaller but still substantial amount needed for essential civilian work. It must be very difficult to estimate Germany's wartime consumption of petroleum products, but some time ago a special correspondent of *The Times*¹ estimated that the total consumption was about 1,500,000—1,750,000 tons/month during a major offensive and about 1,250,000 tons/month between offensives. If we assume consumption at the top figure, 1,750,000 for three months of the year, and at the bottom figure, 1,250,000 for nine months, the annual consumption is 16,500,000 tons. It is likely that the consumption of petroleum products in a future war would be at least as great and probably greater than in the present war, hence any German government planning a war in the future would have to reckon on an annual consumption of petroleum products of the order of 15,000,000—20,000,000 tons—perhaps even more. This quantity is very much greater than Germany's home production. The German output of natural petroleum products is quite small, only about 1,000,000 tons per annum, but this is supplemented by the output of oil-from-coal hydrogenation plants. In 1940 there were at least twelve such plants in operation with an output of 3,000,000—4,000,000 tons per annum.² Probably by now this output is substantially higher, but even so it is certain that

¹ *The Times*, November 14th, 1942.

² "Bulletin of International News," October 5th, 1940.

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Germany could not meet a war consumption from home production alone unless the number of hydrogenation plants was considerably increased. Now it would be a relatively simple matter to dismantle the existing hydrogenation plants at the end of the war and forbid the erection of any new ones; if this were done it would reduce home production in Germany to the 1,000,000 tons of natural petroleum. It might be noted in passing that chemical engineering plants are all special purpose plants and cannot be changed from one product to another as a motor car factory can be swung over to aeroplane engine production. There would, therefore, be no danger of innocent peace-time plants used for other products being suddenly changed over to hydrogenation. The estimated consumption of petroleum products in Germany and Austria in 1938, the last normal year, was about 7,000,000 tons. Germany would therefore have to be allowed to import about 6,000,000 tons annually or such other figure as would make up the difference between the natural home production and the normal peace-time consumption. Germany might, of course, falsify peace-time consumption and try to build up reserves for a war, but it would be extremely difficult, indeed impossible, under any reasonable system of control to build up adequate reserves. Even a war of one year's duration would require a reserve of 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 tons, and a longer war would require one proportionately larger. No trifling falsification such as might escape detection could build up reserves of this magnitude in any reasonable time, and any attempt to build them up in a short time would surely be detected. Further, the actual storage of quantities of this magnitude could not escape any well organised system of inspection.

It is unlikely that Germany could evade control by importing secretly. The oil-producing area nearest to Germany is, of course, Rumania, where the production is of the order of 7,000,000 tons per annum. Not all of the 7,000,000 tons is available for Germany, since Rumania itself and the Balkan countries absorb a considerable proportion of the Rumanian output. Germany has therefore to import in peace time from other sources, such as the Middle East and America. Since, therefore, Germany's oil imports all come from a distance, a system of rationing and control could be established without serious difficulty, and it is clear that if Germany were limited to peace time requirements she could never seriously contemplate going to war.

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In order to maintain the German industrial system in reasonable balance it might be desirable to leave one or two synthetic oil plants in operation. The output of a single hydrogenation plant is only of the order of 300,000—400,000 tons/annum, hence one or two could safely be left. A final point is that to deal with Germany's oil requirements in this way would not impose any economic hardship on the country, since the natural oil is cheaper than the synthetic product, and the import of oil would make possible exports of corresponding value.

With regard to rubber the position is even simpler. All rubber has to be imported from tropical countries, principally from the Far East. In order to prepare for a major war Germany would therefore have to build up reserves or establish synthetic rubber plants on a large scale. It is estimated¹ that before the war about 20 per cent of Germany's annual rubber consumption of 100,000—125,000 tons was produced synthetically at home. No doubt the proportion is now very much higher. As in the case of oil, it would be necessary to dismantle all but perhaps one or two of these synthetic rubber plants, and in place of this home production make an appropriate allowance of natural rubber sufficient for peace time requirements. Again, as in the case of oil, no economic hardship would be caused since synthetic rubber is much more expensive than the natural product, although superior to natural rubber for certain purposes. It is because of this superiority for certain purposes that it would be desirable to leave one or two small synthetic plants in operation. In the case of rubber, not only would there have to be a control of imports, but some control might have to be exercised inside Germany over reclaimed rubber. Unlike oil, which, when burned, is lost for ever, rubber can be reclaimed and used again. Nevertheless, as in the case of oil, an effective system of rationing and control ought to be quite possible.

The next group of materials which I suggested should be subject to control was the small group of metals used in the manufacture of alloy steels. These metals are nickel, manganese, chromium, tungsten, molybdenum, cobalt, and vanadium. The general effect of adding these metals to ordinary mild steel is to impart to the steel special properties of high tensile strength, toughness, hardness, resistance to shock, and resistance to wear. The metals are used normally in groups of two or three and by varying the grouping and the quantities, the different

¹ Royal Institute of International Affairs. Information Department Papers 15b.

special properties can be obtained. If, for example, a part of a machine were highly stressed, or subject to heavy wear, it would be made of an alloy steel containing perhaps two or three of the four elements—nickel, chromium, manganese and molybdenum. Steels for armour plate and armour-piercing projectiles are entirely dependent on these alloy metals for their properties; without them it would be quite impossible to make either armour plate or armour piercing projectiles; their critical importance in modern warfare is therefore obvious. Tungsten, cobalt and molybdenum are used chiefly for cutting tools of all kinds, that is tools for cutting steel and other metals. In war time the consumption of all these important alloy metals increases substantially. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, the demand for armour plate and projectiles increases enormously at least several hundred, probably several thousand-fold. Secondly the necessity for getting the maximum performance from tanks, aeroplanes, armoured vehicles, and naval craft requires that their weight should be a minimum, this means using small section parts of high tensile alloy steel in place of larger section parts of ordinary mild steel. Thirdly, the wear, tear, and shock to which tanks, armoured vehicles and even transport vehicles are subjected is vastly greater than that experienced by vehicles for ordinary civilian purposes, and to resist this greatly increased wear, tear, and shock, special steels are again required in place of ordinary steels. Fourthly, this greatly increased quantity of special steel has all got to be cut and fashioned by tools in the process of manufacture, and it is obvious that the qualities of hardness, toughness and resistance to wear possessed by the special steels make them much more difficult to work and will cause unusually heavy wear in the cutting tools used on them. It is therefore clear that the war time consumption of these alloy metals will be several times higher than their peace time consumption, and they are all truly essential in modern war. Further, Germany has no substantial native supply of any of these metals; all have to be imported, and from considerable distances; from every point of view, therefore, they are most suitable materials for purposes of control.

A few facts concerning these metals will show how badly off Germany is in regard to home supplies and how badly off even Europe, excluding Russia, is as a whole. Taking the case of nickel first, nearly 90 per cent of the world's nickel comes from Canada, about 6 per cent from New Caledonia, and small quantities of

the order of 1 per cent or less from French Morocco, Norway, Greece, Burma, and the United States. A nickel mine was being opened up in Northern Finland when war broke out, but no information is available regarding ore reserves or the possible output of the mine. Production had not started in 1939. The estimated world production just before the war was about 115,000 tons.¹ There was a small home production of nickel in Germany, amounting to about 600 tons, and also a small production in Italy. Figures for the consumption of nickel in Germany are difficult to obtain and it is not easy to analyse the figures for imports, as these may take the form of metallic nickel or the concentrated matter in which the percentage of nickel varies considerably. One can, however, make an intelligent guess at Germany's requirements on the following basis. The main use of nickel is in alloy steels, 65 per cent is used in ferrous alloys, 25 per cent in non-ferrous alloys, and 10 per cent for electrode position and general chemical purposes.² The German consumption of nickel should, therefore, bear roughly the same relation to the world consumption of nickel, that the German steel production bears to the world steel production. This relation is about 15 per cent, and therefore Germany's nickel requirements would be about 17,000 tons. A home production of 600 tons would be a very small contribution towards this, and one can say that for all practical purposes Germany is wholly dependent on imports.

The position with regard to manganese is that there is no manganese ore in Germany itself, and not much in Europe except in Russia. The major producers are Brazil, Egypt, the Gold Coast, India, South Africa, and Russia; the minor producers are China, Japan, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Morocco, Rumania, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, the United States, the Philippines and Cuba. Excluding the U.S.S.R., the total production of the European countries—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania—is about 250,000—300,000 tons, but this is less than the domestic needs of these countries. Europe as a whole is a large importer of manganese ore, and prior to the war Germany alone imported quantities varying from about 130,000 tons in 1933 to about 500,000 tons in 1937-8.

In regard to chromium this metal is found to a limited extent in Europe; Yugoslavia is the largest European producer of chrome ore with an output of about 60,000 tons and Greece

¹ The Mineral Industry, vol. 48.

² The Mineral Industry, vol. 48.

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produces about 50,000 tons. Turkey, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Russia are the four largest producers; and Cuba, the Philippines, British India and New Caledonia produce on about the same scale as Greece and Yugoslavia. German imports of chrome rose from 48,000 tons in 1933 to 176,000 tons in 1938. Of the 176,000 tons, only about 26,500 came from Yugoslavia and Greece, and the bulk of the remainder came from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Turkey.¹ In addition to chrome ore, Germany imported in 1938 nearly 7,000 tons of ferrochrome from Scandinavia.² So far no adequate substitute has been found for chromium in the manufacture of armour plate and stainless steels.

The next metal on the list is tungsten, used as an alloy metal in steel, particularly for cutting tools, for the making of filaments in electric light bulbs and radio valves, for making a non-ferrous alloy called stellite, a tungsten, chromium, cobalt alloy, and for the manufacture of tungsten carbide. Both stellite and tungsten carbide are used for cutting tools. It is one of the key metals in war, being immensely important and very difficult to replace with an efficient substitute. In alloy steels it can be partially, but only partially, replaced by molybdenum. The principal sources of tungsten ore are China, Burma, the United States, Bolivia, Portugal, and Malaya, with a very small production in some other countries. China is by far the largest producer accounting for about 40 per cent of the world output. Portugal, the only European producer of any magnitude, represents about 7½ per cent of the world output. Germany was importing large quantities of this ore for several years before the war, principally from China and Burma.

Molybdenum has come into greater prominence during the present war as a substitute for tungsten. The United States produces about 90 per cent of the world output, and the next largest producer is Mexico, with about 3½ per cent. The only European country in which molybdenum is found is Norway, and the quantity is very small.

Cobalt is of particular importance in magnet steels, high-speed steel for cutting tools, and in the stellite cutting alloys. The principal producers are the Belgian Congo, Canada and Finland, while Burma, Italy, and Rhodesia are smaller producers. Statistics regarding cobalt are very scarce, but the Italian output is probably about adequate for home consumption. The possibility of Germany obtaining supplies from Finland must,

¹ The Mineral Industry, vol. 48.

² The Mineral Industry, vol. 48.

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of course, be considered, and from that point of view cobalt is not quite so susceptible to control as the other metals.

The last of the alloy metals is vanadium. It is not used in the same quantity as some of the others, but it is, nevertheless, an important metal. The principal sources of vanadium ore are the United States, South-West Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Mexico and Peru. In addition to a considerable increase in the imports of this ore, it was known, from articles and references in the technical press, that Germany was recovering vanadium from iron ores, some of which contain small quantities of the metal.

Copper is one of the most important of the non-ferrous metals. Germany's peace-time consumption was of the order of 200,000 tons and the European production was of the order of 100,000 tons, made up of Germany 30,000, Yugoslavia 40,000, Spain and Portugal 30,000. It is clear that Germany, in common with other European countries, would have to import large quantities from abroad, the chief producers being the United States, Africa, Chile and Canada.

It will be noted that no mention is made of aluminium and magnesium, the reason being that Germany is very well placed with regard to these metals.

Lastly, there is the question of the manufacture of explosives. Explosives are all based on nitric acid, which used to be derived from nitrates found as natural deposits in various parts of the world, particularly Chile. There are no nitrates in Central Europe, but in the last war, Haber, the great German chemist, developed a process for the fixation of nitrogen from the atmosphere and so was able to manufacture nitric acid directly. Prior to this war Germany was increasing her nitrogen fixation plants to a capacity far in excess of the requirements of agriculture and industry. Sir Robert Robinson, Waynflete Professor of Chemistry at Oxford, said recently that he thought the development of military explosives not based on nitric acid was unlikely. If, therefore, the nitrogen fixation plants in Germany in excess of those required for peace-time requirements were dismantled, this would be an additional safeguard of great importance.

It is interesting to investigate by means of such figures as are available in what quantities Germany did import some of these materials prior to the present war. Accurate figures are extremely difficult to obtain, and one must be careful in the deductions made from such figures as are available, but the following figures are taken from reliable statistics, and the

deductions from them are, I think, valid. The special alloy metals to which I have referred are largely used in steel. One would therefore expect to find their consumption varying with the production of steel, particularly as the production of steel is a very good indication of the general level of activity in the engineering and manufacturing industries. In making comparisons I have taken the average figures for the two years 1932-3 and the two years 1937-8 and compared the two averages. In Germany the steel output in 1937-8 was approximately two-and-a-half times that of 1932-3, but the imports of molybdenum and vanadium ores had increased nine times, tungsten ore five times, tungsten metal and scrap (including chromium metal) seven times, chromium ore four times, and manganese ore four times. These figures for the German steel output are taken from the annual publication of the Iron and Steel Federation, and the figures for the imports into Germany are taken from an American publication, *The Engineering and Mining Journal*, December, 1941. An editorial note in that journal says that the validity of the information is unquestioned, because it was gathered from official sources. The note goes on further to say that "Germany began preparations for present hostilities in 1932 when a programme of importation of key metals and minerals was started, and expanded steadily each year until she felt prepared to strike in 1939."

The position in regard to tungsten is particularly interesting. From 1932 onwards Germany took an ever-increasing proportion of the world output of tungsten until in 1938 she was acquiring 40 per cent of world production, a percentage greatly in excess of her normal peace-time needs; her share of the world output based on her steel production would be about 15 per cent. I think it is fairly clear from these figures that in order to prepare for this war Germany had to build up large stocks of these key metals, and that if she had been prevented from doing so by means of a system of rationing and control there could have been no war.

Not only do I think that a system of rationing would be effective, but, what is equally important, I think it would be feasible. One must remember that the treatment of Germany after the war has to be agreed upon, and applied, by nations with such different outlooks as Russia, the United States, China, and ourselves, not to mention the numerous smaller nations. I can imagine many effective measures for the restraint of Germany which might not be feasible, because of the bitter controversy

they would arouse, but the rationing of key materials should be one of the least controversial.

Further, the rationing of key war materials is an alternative to the suggestion frequently made that Germany's heavy industry, because of its war potential, should be totally destroyed. I think this suggestion is wholly impracticable. The destruction of Germany's heavy industry would be a task of exceptional physical difficulty, because it would mean the dismantling and destruction of all heavy engineering undertakings. The effect of this on Germany's economic life and the prosperity of Europe would be appalling. Whether we like it or not, Germany's heavy industry must be left intact to ensure the prosperity of Europe. Again, whether we like it or not, Germany herself must be left as prosperous as possible, and as little resentful as possible, since our ultimate aim is not punishment but the re-education of the people and the redirection of their energies and abilities into channels of peace instead of war. The goal of re-education will be reached much more quickly if we are dealing with a reasonably prosperous country than if we are dealing with a bitter, ruined, resentful people. I believe Germany's heavy industry could safely be left intact to the great benefit of Europe as a whole, provided that the key materials I have indicated were strictly rationed and controlled.*

* Part II of this article will be published in the next issue.

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THE PECKHAM EXPERIMENT. By INNES H. PEARSE and LUCY H. CROCKER.
(Allen & Unwin. 333 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS biologists' Utopia for that is what it is, is an extremely interesting production, which all who are interested in the future of our society ought to read. Like most of the products of people who have strong ideas and driving enthusiasms, it has its faults, and, as they rather strike the reader in the face, I will begin by mentioning them, in order that he may not be put off.

It opens with a catchpenny pair of charts, which show the population divided into a few golden-yellow spots representing those in perfect health and vast black areas of those who are not. This trick of colour is unworthy, and gives a scarifying effect which the text (when we reach it) entirely fails to justify.

Secondly, the authors, in a humourless and rather heavy style, thrust down the reader's throat their views upon the importance of the family as a social unit and of working in harmony with natural processes, to the extent of producing doubtful biological analogies and making some extravagant statements, such as that an ideal mother will not wish for any anæsthetic in childbirth. This reviewer is comforted to observe that of all the mothers who attended the Centre only eight came up to the ideal; still, it is a pity to spoil sound sense with crankiness.

Finally, the description of the Centre in working is highly lyrical, and suggests irresistibly a combination of the off-stage descriptions of Mr. Priestley's dream city with an afternoon of the more earnest Soviet propaganda films. The photographs, no doubt, are truthful enough; but I find, for example, the description of a gymnasium full of independently acting children "with no bumps or crashes" rather difficult to swallow. One feels the need of a little antiseptic comment.

Having made allowances for these criticisms, however, it is possible to turn with whole-hearted appreciation to the ideas behind the book. The first of these is that the proper way to achieve health is to aim positively at health through a health-giving environment, not through clinics, treatment centres, etc., which start with the idea of disease. In this connection the authors draw an important distinction between "disease," the condition in which a person feels ill, and "disorder," in which, without himself being conscious of illness, he has weaknesses which may lead any moment to disease and which can only be discovered by careful and regular testing by skilled persons. It is the "disorderly" who account for the vast black areas in the opening charts.

Secondly, their care for the family, even if overstressed, has led them to see that under modern conditions the family grouping can only be preserved and prevented from going bad if it is gradually and easily integrated into a community in which its developing members can expand their interests and fellowships easily without needing to break away. The

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record of the Centre's success in dealing with two of the most difficult of modern problems, the adolescent and the young married woman, is certainly remarkable, even if one feels that *over the people as a whole* (of which more hereafter) the method might not work quite so smoothly.

Finally, the Centre has made two discoveries, which are the more important in that they seem to have been real discoveries and not preconceived ideas. The first is that, given an environment made for community, formal leadership and formal long-lasting committees are not necessary and do not arise; spontaneous *ad hoc* organisation takes their place. This discovery is a good omen for democracy; and the second one, that in a community of this type the really fruitful instruction in crafts, etc., is that given not by the visiting virtuoso, who tends either to discourage the learners or to turn them into mere spectators, but by members of the community at a slightly higher stage of skill, is of great value for the learning of fraternity. Space does not permit me to describe the way in which these lessons were learned, or the various devices for facilitating family life, the growing-up of children, easy intercourse, etc., which all make very interesting reading; but it is quite clear that the authors have formulated and are trying to work out an ideal of what "community" could mean in modern terms, for which all sociologists owe them deep gratitude.

Whether in fact they have worked it out practically is another question, and one which needs a good deal more research. Two things must be said. First, the Peckham experiment was made possible by the initial gift of a building costing £38,000. This at once sets it apart; and though the authors are very anxious that community health centres should be self-supporting, they are too honest to pretend that their building could have been produced out of family subscriptions—and it hardly seems likely that in the near future we shall be able to produce, for every two thousand families in the kingdom, a building costing £19 per family. Secondly, the clientele of the Peckham scheme is selective. Not only does it exclude the very poor—which does not matter very much, for this type of experimentation could not, any more than the co-operative movement, begin with the bottom dog; but it is clear, from remarks dropped in the course of the book, that a number who had entered dropped out of their own volition. It is not clear, therefore, how far the Centre tended to become a club of the like-minded; and until one knows that, one cannot be sure whether Peckham is a pure Utopia, an experiment really capable of being universalised, or an interesting specimen like a "free school" or a Cambridgeshire Village College. But, meantime, everyone ought to read the book.

MARGARET COLE.

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RUSSIA THROUGH THE CENTURIES. By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P. (Allen & Unwin, 1943. 128pp. and 4 maps and index. 5s. net.)

OUR SOVIET ALLY. Essays edited by MARGARET COLE. (George Routledge & Sons, 1943. 194pp. including index. 7s. 6d.)

M. R. PHILIPS PRICE has a real insight into the great outlines of history, which more than compensates for a lack of its more meticulous accuracies. He has grasped its rhythm and its continuity, and exhibits both to us in a way that arrests attention. Racial tolerance, he points out, is in the Byzantine tradition. It is not suggested, he it noted, that there is a similar tolerance in respect to religious and philosophical thought. Now and always there is only one right, and all else is wrong. It is in respect to race that the all-humanitarianism of the Russian is effective. The Russification policy of Alexander III and Nicolas II was, therefore, a new departure out of the Russian tradition. The Soviet, again, was the old Zemsky Sobor come alive again. Michael Speranski tried to revive it when he proposed the creation of a body composed of organised classes and professions, such as landlords, traders and peasants, each having its special representatives. The citizen must be represented as a landlord, merchant or peasant in the legislature. The workers of St. Petersburg instinctively reverted to this tradition when they formed the Soviet in 1905. The Imperial Duma, in composition a Western Parliament, though hardly a Western Parliament in function, was an attempt at a representation of citizens as such, and was a breach with Russian tradition. Incidentally, it may be added that the Supreme Soviet of 1936 was also a breach with the tradition; but a breach having a solid justification, since the assumption is that the classes have now at length been merged into a nation or nations.

Again, the Messianic phase of proclaiming a world crusade for social revolution was an attempt to translate into political form the Russian passion for the liberation of mankind which has manifested itself periodically in many forms. It is best described, perhaps, as the longing after something unattainable, and which is known to be unattainable, and is well expressed by the Russian word "Toska" (*Russia Through the Centuries*, page 109). It has its roots, perhaps, says Mr. Philips Price, expressed by another Russian word, "Prostor." As Gogol once said: "Is it not in limitless space that limitless thought is born." And was it not the limitless space of the Arabian desert that inspired Mahomet with thoughts to embrace all mankind in a great liberating religion?

But perhaps the most enlightening instance of an ever-recurring instinct is that which suggests an explanation of the to Englishmen all but unintelligible confessions of the self-acknowledged sins of the Communists brought to trial. "One could see it peeping through in Bukharin's remarkable last speech. First of all, the Russian revolutionaries lived a life completely bound up with their party or sect. They knew no other life. If suddenly they were uprooted from the only surrounding they ever knew, they became completely unbalanced and their whole mental equilibrium was upset. . . . If he had accepted the authority of the party as part of his

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life, when suddenly the authority turns on him, he becomes overwhelmed by a sense of sin . . . to become ex-communicated from this Church was something worse than death. For this reason, the boyar victims of Ivan the Terrible cursed themselves and blessed the Tsar while undergoing torture. So the Trotskyists blessed Stalin and cursed Trotsky before going to the firing squad. . . . It had happened before in Russian history." It happened in other parts of Europe during the Middle Ages (pages 121, 122).

The Collection of Essays edited by Margaret Cole for the Fabian Society aims at selecting and putting before readers the vital ways in which Soviet Society—not merely Soviet political society, for there is no hard and fast distinction in the U.S.S.R. between political life and any other sort of life, as Mrs. Cole very luminously explains—differs from our own in its purposes and institutions. Perhaps the most interesting item in her own contribution is her explanation of the function of the Party as the eyes and ears of the leadership. It is their business to know and warn the leaders when a particular piece of policy is proving so unpopular as to result in failure; and she cites the case of an anti-abortion law passed in 1936, which, to all outward seeming, awakened a storm of opposition, but was nevertheless passed without further demonstration of unpopularity. The Soviet Government—through the Party—has its ear very close to the ground, and is able to gauge the intensity with which an opinion is held, as well as the number of those who hold it. This evidently is why the autocrat is not dangerously an autocrat. He knows what he is doing, without counting heads. The people do not tell him, the press is his own instrument; but he has an army of trustworthy informants. Mrs. Cole makes the interesting suggestion that it is one of the functions of the political police, who are now part of the Commissariat of Home Affairs, to help to tell him. It is one of those guesses which are likely to be true. Her contribution is illuminating throughout.

Dr. Barou, writing on Soviet Nationalities, emphasises the effect of the economic levelling up of the backward peoples who were kept in dependence and deprived of the cultural influence of their mother tongues by the previous régime. I. Narodny's account of the framework of the Soviet economic system leaves uncomfortable gaps in his exposition. It is plain, for instance, that Stakhanov, aided by an unstated number of subordinate workers, produced about forty times the normal output of coal—presumably forty times his own individual normal output. The significance of the achievement obviously depends in part on the number of his assistants; and we are not informed how many these were. In order to understand the working of the system, we should also know on what principle the wages of the group were distributed. This is not stated. If, as appears to be the case, Stakhanov himself received the benefit of the excess output, the system is very nearly one of sub-contracting. The nearest approach to an intelligible account of it which I have seen is that given by Mr. Littlepage, in *Search of Soviet Gold*. It has now spread very widely, under different names, in the Soviet Union, and we should all be grateful for a clear description.

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Dr. Barou has given us an excellent account of the Trade Unions which are admirably described as "responsible partners allocating shares in a national product which they have helped to plan." They exercise, of course, a number of other functions: which do not include the protection of the workers against the Employer State: because it is assumed that there is no "enemy partner." A final section deals with the great achievements of the Soviet Government in Education and Culture. Mr. A. Steinberg, who writes on these subjects, has a significant passage on his penultimate page. "There is ample evidence that the day may not be far away when the religious outlook will be granted in the U.S.S.R., fairer conditions of competition with the official Marxist philosophy than at any time since the Revolution." I read this as a forecast, by one who has good grounds for it, of the withdrawal of the restrictions upon religious propaganda which have been in force since 1929 in the R.S.F.S.R.

JOHN MAYNARD.

GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1918-1939. By W. M. JORDAN. (Oxford Press. 235 pp. 15s.)

THIS book, which is published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, cannot be praised too highly; it is in every way admirable. And the lessons to be learnt from it are so important and urgent that every politician, civil servant, or other person who is to have any practical concern with the peace settlement at the end of the present war should be compelled to read it. It is, as its sub-title says, a "study of Anglo-French relations in the making and maintenance of the Versailles settlement." It is in fact an extremely detailed study of the history of the three problems which faced the peace makers in 1918—and will soon face them again—the problems of reparations, security, and disarmament. Dr. Jordan analyses the problems themselves and unravels the history of them through the armistice, the peace-making itself at Versailles, and the period which led from peace to the outbreak of another war. The reasons why the book is so exceptionally good are to be found in the mental equipment which Dr. Jordan has brought to his task. He has studied and completely absorbed all the evidence available. But he avoids the pitfall which destroys most conscientious researchers who, knowing all the myriad facts and their intricate entanglements, lose the power of distinguishing their relevance or importance. Dr. Jordan never gives a fact which is not relevant to his purpose, namely, his analysis of Anglo-French relations and their effect upon the Versailles settlement and on the history of Europe between the two wars. Hence his book, despite the intricacy and technicality of the subjects with which he deals, is a model of lucidity. Finally he possesses two rare qualities which give his work its peculiar value at the moment for those who are to make the settlement at the end of the present war: perfect objectivity and the soundest historical and political judgment.

There is only space here to indicate very briefly the vital lesson of this analysis. There was no single cause of the failure of the peace-makers to

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make a lasting peace in 1919, for of large historical events there are no "single causes." But among the causes one was fundamental. There was no agreement, before they began the peace-making, between the French and British statesmen as to the principles upon which they were to try to build peace and rebuild Europe. And as soon as they began to make the settlement, a fundamental divergence of view between the French and the British manifested itself. The French looked for security to a system of power in which by alliances and other methods Germany should be permanently weak and France permanently strong; the British wanted a system based upon conciliation and agreement, but were unwilling themselves to assume the obligations of collective security without which such a system was completely impossible. It might have been possible to establish peace either by the one or the other system; it was totally impossible to do so by a compromise between two incompatible and contradictory systems. Yet that is what French and British statesmen attempted to do until 1939.

LEONARD WOOLF.

WHY I AM A JEW. By EDMOND FLEG. Translated by VICTOR GOLLANCZ. (Gollancz. 64 pp. 2s. 6d.)

TOWARDS HISTORIC JUDAISM. By E. BERKOVITS. (East and West Library. 144 pp. 5s.)

THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME, 1917-1942. Edited by PAUL GOODMAN. (Dent. 296 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILISATION. By CECIL ROTH. New Edition. (East and West Library. 369 pp. 5s. 6d.)

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE. By CECIL ROTH. Revised Edition. (East and West Library. 448 pp. 5s. 6d.)

ANY one who reads these five books, all of which are intelligent and sincere, will get, if he is himself intelligent and sincere, some understanding of the Jewish problem, both historical and contemporary. If he begins with Mr. Roth's *Short History*, he will find an excellent account of the historical background. All human history is a horrible story of savagery, cruelty, suffering, and stupidity; no people on earth have a longer or more horrible history than the Jews, with their records of 3,500 years. Mr. Roth's interpretation of the Biblical period is conservative, but extremely interesting. But the 300 pages in which he writes the history of the diaspora from 425 A.D. to 1935 A.D. will be found generally to be most useful and illuminating. It is based upon wide and deep knowledge, and his claim that his book differs from most of the works which have preceded it by being a social history as well as a record of the facts of persecution and suffering is justified. The great range of his knowledge is also shown in his other book. This is mainly a record of what individual Jews have contributed since the diaspora to learning, letters, art, science, philosophy, etc. The record is very remarkable, and many of Mr. Roth's facts are little known. For instance,

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a good many readers will probably be surprised to learn how much Jews contributed to navigational science and instruments which made possible the great voyages of discovery of the 15th and 16th centuries. The book would, however, have been improved by rather more discrimination, e.g. by the omission of the lists of rather undistinguished names of Jews who have made some worthy but not very distinguished contributions to modern "civilisation."

The background which Mr. Roth's books supply is essential to an understanding of and judgment upon the other books and the contemporary problem with which they deal. To deal adequately with them and with it would require a very long article or even a very long book rather than a short review. Here it is only possible to indicate briefly their scope. The book edited by Mr. Goodman is concerned with the Zionist solution of the Jewish problem. It commemorates the issue of the Balfour Declaration twenty-five years ago; in it twenty-one different authors deal with various aspects of the Declaration and its results. The multiplicity of authors entails a good deal of repetition, but the book gives one a very clear view of the orthodox Zionist case and of the real achievements of Zionism in Palestine. It also unfortunately shows the failure of Zionists to consider, with the impartiality which is essential in the circumstance, the position of those who see not a solution but an aggravation of the problem in Zionism and the reasons which have led them to that opinion.

The books of M. Fleg and Mr. Berkovits take one to the heart of the problem; both are remarkable for the depth of their sincerity and emotion, and both are therefore moving books. M. Fleg was a French Jew in process of assimilation. The Dreyfus case was the first shock to him in that process, and as a result of the shock, he has gradually retraced his footsteps and become once more a Jew, with a fervent belief in the message of Judaism. Mr. Berkovits has the same faith, and on it he bases his argument for a drastic revival of historic Judaism. His book is profoundly interesting. But neither he nor M. Fleg face one important question. Their own faith is deeply sincere, and that is why their books are moving. But is what they believe in true? The foundations of their belief are personal, a somewhat vague mysticism. There is no reason to believe that these foundations are true or that they will or can be widely accepted. Yet Mr. Berkovits's solution depends upon their truth and the probability of their being accepted.

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WAR-TIME PATTERN OF SAVING AND SPENDING. By CHARLES MADGE (National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Occasional Papers IV. *Cambridge University Press*, 1943. Pp. viii + 139. 6s.)

THIS book presents the results of an inquiry into family spending and saving of wage-earners and small salary-earners by an interviewing team headed by the author. Although the inquiry was conducted in various industrial towns of Great Britain from 1940 to 1942, the book deals mainly with the results of the budget and interview¹ inquiry carried out in Leeds in the period February-August, 1942. The reason for this is that the interviewers, having profited by experience, improved the method of interviewing and this enabled them to achieve much more reliable results in Leeds than in any of the preceding inquiries. Indeed, both the collection of data and their analysis (in the latter the author was assisted by Erwin Rothbarth) seem to have been carried out very carefully and have yielded a wealth of fairly reliable information on the pattern of family saving and spending.

We shall not attempt to give here an abstract of the results of the inquiry. Anybody who is interested in the subject should read the book. We shall deal only with one point which is probably the most interesting result of the inquiry and is of high economic and political significance.

The inquiry has shown that war-time working class savings are highly concentrated. In the Leeds sample, 10 per cent of all families were doing more than 50 per cent of the total National Saving (i.e. of the saving in Savings Bank Deposits and National Savings Certificates). These heavy savers "are mainly those who, after satisfying their requirement in food, fuel and clothing, have more than £2 10s. of their net income left to dispose of. The total net income needed to produce this amount of excess income will vary with the composition of the family. The average family . . . spends £2 19s. 1d. on food, fuel and clothes, and needs another £1 0s. 1cd. to pay for rent, taxes and travel . . . This means that heavy saving will, on average, tend to begin with a gross family income of £6 10s. However, not all heavy savers have so much as £2 10s. excess income. Neither are all those who have £2 10s. excess income heavy savers. Another variant is present: that of the individual or family propensity to save" (p. 69). A special small scale inquiry has been carried out in Glasgow to investigate the distinguishing characteristics of high and low savers. The following important characteristics were to be found much more frequently among high than among low savers: home training in saving, secondary schooling, special interests or hobbies, support of right wing parties, keen interest in religion (p. 99). (This does not mean that all these characteristics were predominant among high savers; for instance, only 22 per cent of them had secondary schooling and only 17 per cent were supporters of right wing parties).

There are two important consequences of the concentration of working class savings. On the purely economic plane it will reduce the pressure on

¹ The budget inquiry was based on regular family budget records. The interview inquiry was applied where people refused to keep budgets; it attempted to obtain data on income, spending and saving in the preceding short period by interviews.

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the market of consumption goods in the first post-war years, because the heavy savers are not likely to part with a large part of their savings. Further, which is of some political importance, a group of small working-class capitalists will emerge from the war, but this group will be relatively narrow. For the savings of the mass of low savers are small and are likely to vanish almost completely in the post-war spending period.

M. KALECKI.

ARMIES AND THE ART OF REVOLUTION. By K. C. CHORLEY. (Faber. 274 pp. 12s. 6d.)

SOCIALISTS of every political shade, all at least who are at all capable of looking the political facts of life in the face, should read this book with attention. For it deals, not only with the technique of violent social revolution, but with problems which must surely confront any progressive government. For those Britons who believe that armed force can play no part in the domestic politics of our country and that the British always behave nicely, there is an illuminating and pertinent account of the Curragh Mutiny and of the Irish Civil War of 1916-18, which latter, we may add in passing, would by itself make this a major contribution to the study of revolution.

In every state the army is potentially a praetorian guard; it is also, potentially, an instrument of social revolution. In normal times and stable social conditions the army remains the obedient and politically neutral instrument of the civil power; its oath is sufficient to bind it thereto and it exists only for the defeat of foreign enemies and subject races, but in certain moments of acute crisis the military realities which underly all government are made manifest and the civil power is subordinated to the military.

The behaviour of armed forces at such moments is the subject of this study; nothing could be more interesting or more urgent, and it is in the highest degree fortunate that we have in Mrs. Chorley an authoress who can approach the matter with the requisite scholarship and detachment and produce a book which is, to use two debilitated adjectives, dispassionate and objective.

The main fact which emerges is: that the dangers which a government must incur when attempting to bring about changes disagreeable to the commissioned officers of its armed forces are even more terrific than those of an autocracy which, having armed the people, faces disaffection in the ranks; indeed, they are greater, for the officers tend to be much more class-conscious than the men, a certain proportion of whom can nearly always be trusted to follow their leaders, having been trained to a blind sequacity. A general mutiny of the private soldiers would seem to occur only in the disintegration of military defeat or as a result of agrarian revolution.

The capitalist state, naturally, draws its officers from the governing classes, and in particular from the land-owning and aristocratic circles, for

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whom soldiering provides, or used to provide, a gentlemanly career. The "Junker," the "militaire" and the "regular army officer" are political as well as professional types. When, as has happened again and again in recent years, the bourgeoisie stops playing at democracy because the game has gone against it, the officers, putting class interests before their oath to the civil power, "take over the government" in the interests of reaction, or, as happened in Germany and Italy, allow an illegal body to take office under their protection. In either case the problem for the officers is comparatively simple: provided they can command the allegiance of their troops, they have only to maintain the *status quo*. For the social revolutionary, whether he comes to power by legal or illegal means, the problem is exceedingly complex and dangerous, for he must re-create an army which will be at once efficient and loyal to the revolution; it will be found that an efficient army implies efficient officers, and that officers cannot be made and trained in a day. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* The old tag applies here with considerable force. To some extent the very processes of war solve the problem, for a nation in arms has much less to fear from its army than has a nation with a small professional force such as the old Reichswehr. Further suggestions for the safeguarding of the state in time of peace will be found in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth chapters of this book.

Most of the great revolutions of modern times are here discussed and used to illustrate the argument; nevertheless, there are some odd omissions and one in particular which is serious in that it may be held to invalidate a conclusion. The abortive Kapp Putsch against the Weimar Republic should surely have been mentioned in connection with the weapon of the general strike. An account of the Hungarian Revolution of 1919 would have been welcome, and General Boulanger's conspiracy might have provided some useful material. It is also surprising that nothing is said concerning what one may call the auxiliary revolution, of which the Arab revolt is the classic example, but which has also been seen in Italy and elsewhere. It is true that in a rising of this kind the revolutionaries are no more than the advance guard of the regular forces, and that it may perhaps be said to fall a little outside the scheme of this book; nevertheless, this kind of insurrection is likely to become increasingly common and may indeed herald the invasion of the European continent, while the isolated domestic civil war will probably become a rarity.

It is to be hoped that in the next edition the proofs will be more carefully read and certain obvious slips, such as that on page 29 regarding the Paris Commune, will be corrected. A book of this importance deserves more care.

Q. BELL.

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EUROPE RISES. By DOROTHY WOODMAN. (Gollancz. 154 pp. 4s. 6d.)

MISS DOROTHY WOODMAN'S book gives a telling picture of the European revolt against Nazi occupation and oppression. Though it is journalistically conceived rather than historically documented, there is no lack of trustworthy reports, whether taken from underground, neutral, or Nazi newspapers, or from eye-witnesses' accounts. The French have been left out from the list of the suffering and resisting nations because "the peculiar and complicated case of France requires a book to itself."

Since most of the features of underground war and sabotage are bound to repeat themselves over and over again in the various countries, Miss Woodman would perhaps have done better to choose a vertical arrangement of her rich material under the headings of the recurrent methods of suppression and resistance, so that even France could have been included if only sketchily. After all, what is a suffering, resisting, and rising Europe without France—yesterday, to-day, or to-morrow?

As it is, the horizontal lay-out of the book produces something of an anticlimax until, in the last chapters, the peculiarly complex character of Yugoslav and Greek resistance intensifies and varies its colour. Moreover, the story of the relations between the exiled governments in London or elsewhere and the respective resistant nations could have been much more subtle and revealing without giving information to the enemy.

The great actual value of the book, written, as it is, with political temperament and human understanding, lies in the confrontation of the reader with a kind of war, man against man, which, in spite of the absence of the deadliest mechanical weapons, is much more deadly to humanity than the war between army and army. Army combatants are anonymous. But the war in an occupied town, village, or hamlet rages between the soldier Schmidt, the official Meier, and the Gestapo agent Mueller, on the one hand, and the individual peasant, worker, teacher, etc., on the other. It is a combat face to face, conducted without truce or truaney. It cannot but engrave itself indelibly on the faces and minds of the combatants on both sides, and one wonders what kind of written and well-paragraphed peace will abolish its far-reaching consequences. Thus there emerges from this little book the problem of the post-war world in its most terrifying aspect. Death, disease, and dismemberment stalk through its pages like apocalyptic, yet, as it were, everyday, figures. Not only all nations seem to be at war with one another, but also all individuals in those countries haunted by the Nazi terror. With such a war, underground and overground, up to the sky and down to the sea, and, as though this were not enough, with war in street and house and room—how shall the "Vox Humana" make itself heard again?

In this context, one misses with special misgiving one source of consolation, namely, the slightest indication of German soldiers or officials secretly participating in, or at least sympathizing with, the heroic combat of the oppressed in the occupied countries, whether they be "Rassegenossen" (racial comrades) or not. Once only one reads of German soldiers deserting

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from Norway into Sweden. But deserters are not supporters and only step-brethren of the oppressed. It is indeed the most lamentable hiatus in the sequence of facts of which this book forms a doubtless unbiased record that, among the tens and hundreds of thousand instruments of Nazi imperialism, there were and are no instances worth mentioning of individuals who have discovered, or rather recovered, their souls by responding to the maltreatment of their fellow-men. Is it due to the deterrent omnipresence of the Gestapo hangmen or to the complete absence of individual compassion and courage? In either case, it is a depressing omen.

To conclude with a better one, I would say that, in the inspiring galaxy of brave resisters to Nazi oppression, there is one group whose deeds and words appeal to me particularly, that is, the Norwegian schoolmasters and their pupils, through their actions and pronouncements. "Germanity," if there is such a thing, has fled to them. From the North comes the light—but in quite a different sense from that triumphantly prophesied by the Nazis.

HERMANN SINSHEIMER.

THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE. Report of the Delegation on Economic Depressions. Part I. League of Nations. (Allen and Unwin. 118 pp. 4s. 6d.)

THE DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATION IN EUROPE. By EUGENE M. KULISCHER. (International Labour Office & King. 170 pp. 4s.)

THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. Department of Commerce, U.S.A. (H.M. Stationery Office. 216 pp. 2s. 6d.)

THESE three publications stand out as among the most important official documents produced since the beginning of the war. They are all intimately connected with the major post-war political and economic problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the scientific analysis and interpretation of the relevant facts they reach a high standard. This by itself would make them worthy of close study, but they gain an additional importance because they show in what direction official opinion with regard to the solution of these major problems is moving. The authors of these reports speak with authority and with the caution necessary in those who speak officially or governmentally. It is satisfactory to observe that this kind of opinion has travelled much further towards the revolutionary realism than it had at a similar stage of the war of 1914. The delusion that we can return to the world of 1939 without disaster receives no encouragement at all in these reports.

The report on the Transition from War to Peace is the result of an instruction of the League Assembly in 1937 to its Economic and Financial Organization to report on the measures which might be employed "for preventing or mitigating economic depressions." The work of the Delegation, subsequently appointed, was interrupted by the war, but it was wisely decided that the Delegation, reconstituted under its Chairman, Sir Frederick Phillips, should continue its work and devote its attention to the problems of the economic transition from war to peace. Part I of

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the report, now published, deals with the immediate problems of the transition period, Part II will deal with the longer-term problem, though the Delegation recognises that the two periods and problems cannot be kept completely distinct. Lack of space prevents us from examining the Delegation's Conclusions; we can only draw attention to one or two points of particular importance. The aim of policy in the transition period should be, they hold, to lay the foundations of an economic system in which there is economic stability, an absence of depressions and unemployment. It is noticeable that they assume the establishment of effective machinery for collective security, for without this no economic stability will be possible. The second point to be noticed is that, though the Delegation maintains a neutral position between the two ideologies of state control and private enterprise, it is remarkable how often they are forced by facts to conclude that a large measure not only of State national economic control but also of international control will be necessary if we are not to return to the pre-war economic chaos. It is to be hoped that both statesmen and the ordinary man and woman who are the victims of their own and their statesmen's ignorance will read this document.

It is remarkable and significant that *The United States in the World Order*, a United States Government Report, should be published here by our Stationery Office. It analyses the economic policy of the United States in the inter-war years and traces the contribution which that policy made to the international chaos of the period. The analysis is admirable, and it is possible to learn certain lessons from it for the post-war period. Some of those lessons are indicated clearly and tactfully in the Summary and Recommendations with which the Report begins.

The I.L.O. Report on the displacement of population is a statement of facts, but of facts upon which the tremendous problem of resettlement and rehabilitation must turn. Mr. Kulischer must have done an immense amount of research, and he sets out the facts, so far as they can be ascertained, clearly and objectively. The facts themselves are horrifying, for, as the Report shows, there is reason to believe that more than thirty million people on the Continent of Europe "have been transplanted or torn from their homes since the beginning of the war."

LEONARD WOOLF.

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V—DELEGATED LEGISLATION

By D. W. LOGAN

SINCE the beginning of the 1942-43 Session of Parliament, there has been a revival of the old controversy about the delegation of legislative powers which had been allowed to remain dormant during the more difficult days of the war. With a few notable exceptions, such as the week-end speeches of Mr. Herbert Morrison and some leading articles in *The Times*, comment has generally been hostile, particularly inside the House of Commons where there has sprung up an unofficial committee of Members who have made it their business to voice their opposition to the practice at question time and on the motion for the adjournment. The attitude widely adopted was summed up by one of the leaders of the movement in a recent letter to the *Sunday Times*:

"The British public is intimately concerned in seeing that the welter of war-time regulations [is] not allowed to remain in force for one minute longer than is absolutely necessary. It is equally interested in seeing that there is no new flood of regulations resulting from peace-time legislation."

Few people will be optimistic enough to imagine that the system of governmental control which has been built up for the war effort and which depends largely for its effectiveness on delegated legislative powers, will disappear overnight with the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, there is much to be said for the view that the winning of the peace may be as hard a struggle as the winning of the war and will demand the same degree of compromise and co-operation on all sides. Major measures of reconstruction, of which the Education Bill is the precursor, will be numerous. A Social Security Board is predicted which will carry out the proposals of the Beveridge Report in so far as they are accepted by the Government, and there will be need for action on the Barlow, Scott, and Uthwatt Reports, as well as on housing, water supplies, and a national health service, to mention only some of the matters already

¹ Previous articles in this series appeared in the issues of January-March and April-June, 1944.

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under discussion. The legislation involved will be complex and controversial, and if any inference is to be drawn from the Education Bill, which took nineteen days to pass through the House of Commons, Parliament is in for some late nights. With these factors in view it is worth while considering how far the hostility towards delegating legislative powers, as evidenced by the quotation above, will be conducive towards placing these reconstruction measures on the statute book in time with efficient machinery for carrying out the avowed purposes of Parliament. As one Member said in a recent debate, "It will be no answer to the returning soldier, who is looking for a job and trying to find a house, that there has been no Parliamentary time."

In fact it seems to be the proper moment for taking stock and for reviewing the entire approach to the subject of delegated legislative powers. I do not, therefore, propose to deal with more detailed aspects such as the question of safeguards, not because I think them unimportant, but because they can be settled more satisfactorily when major issues have been clarified. I am therefore putting forward three general principles which I hope are stated with such moderation that they will be accepted as axioms.

The first is that consideration of the subject should be much more dispassionate than it has been over the last fifteen years. Constitutional problems of an intricate character are not solved by discussion in an atmosphere of recrimination. In this connection, there are two rules adherence to which would do much to take the heat out of the controversy. The first rule is that no one should be allowed to use the words "bureaucracy" or "bureaucrat" in what purports to be a serious discussion of the subject of delegated legislative powers. However much these may have been terms of art in the past, they have degenerated into terms of abuse. The point is put very clearly by Mr. R. B. McCallum in his pamphlet *How Britain is Governed* when he says that we call civil servants bureaucrats if we happen to dislike what they are doing at the moment. In addition to eliminating a certain amount of prejudice from the discussion, observance of this rule would have the further advantage that it would force many of the critics to define more accurately and coherently exactly what it is against which they are tilting. Much as I would like to include the phrases "Whitehall" and "red tape" in this complete ban, I realise that they have some legitimate uses and so I content myself with suggesting that

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anyone who employs them in a derogatory sense should be viewed with grave suspicion.

The second suggested rule is that no one should be permitted to refer with approval to the views of Lord Hewart, as expressed in *The New Despotism*, without having sworn an affidavit that he has read with understanding *The Report on Ministers' Powers*. Lest this should appear somewhat dictatorial, let me hasten to add that I am merely trying to put into practice a maxim of natural justice which Lord Hewart himself was never tired of stressing—*audi alteram partem*.

There is a close relation between *The New Despotism* and *The Report on Ministers' Powers* which is sometimes forgotten. Extracts from *The New Despotism* appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* before the book itself was on sale and the then Lord Chancellor anticipated its publication and any demand for an investigation by appointing the Donoughmore Committee. I regard the Committee's Report as a refutation of the main thesis of Lord Hewart who, by the way, declined to give evidence before the Committee. The crucial paragraph is on page 7 of the Report and must be set out in full. The Committee said:

"We regard . . . the whole of the Lord Chief Justice's book as a warning against possible dangers of great gravity towards which he discerns an existing tendency to drift. We are very much alive both to the presence of such dangers and to their gravity if not checked, and have considered them throughout our enquiry. But, as appears from our considered view in the next two sections of our Report, we see nothing to justify any lowering of the country's high opinion of its Civil Service or any reflection on its sense of justice, or any ground for a belief that our constitutional machinery is developing in directions which are fundamentally wrong. Our Report draws attention to certain parts of that machinery which are capable of improvement, and certain aspects of its working where specific safeguards are needed. At the same time we deliberately say that there is no ground for public fear, if the right precautions are taken. None the less, the public should be grateful for outspoken criticism, even if exaggerated; and we think that the critics whose warnings—and it may be attacks—led up to our investigations performed a useful service."

Sentences one and two of the quotation can be termed in boxing language the feint with the right. The lead with the

left—and the punch—follows, while the last sentence softens the blow previously administered. It is difficult to see how anyone could deny that the Committee was referring to *The New Despotism* when it used the words "outspoken criticism, even if exaggerated," and that it had Lord Hewart in mind when it spoke of "critics whose warnings—and it may be attacks—led up to our investigations."

The real trouble with *The New Despotism* is that it has enough resemblance to the truth to be plausible and is written in such an entertaining style that it is easy to read. An acute American observer once called Lord Hewart "the greatest master of the half-truth" and *The New Despotism* is a lasting testimonial to the accuracy of that judgment. If one really wishes to get to the facts, one must lay aside the exhilarating diatribe of Lord Hewart and turn to the sober realities of *The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments* in which Professor John Willis sets out accurately the uses made by government departments of the powers the delegation of which was so strongly attacked by Lord Hewart. Only thus can the problem be viewed in its proper perspective. In so far as *The New Despotism* had value, it was as an irritant and it performed this function well enough to bring the Donoughmore Committee and its *Report on Ministers' Powers* into being. Beyond that, its bias and its prejudice afford little help in reaching a workable solution of a vital and complicated constitutional problem.

Though Parliament has been delegating legislative powers for over five hundred years, it was not until the last century that the practice assumed substantial proportions. Dicey called attention in his *Law and Opinion in England* to what he called "The Growth of Collectivism," and events since 1905 have served only to emphasise the strength of the tendency. There are many arguments against this extension of state control, but I do not propose to discuss them because there seems to be no practical chance of the tendency being checked. The Donoughmore Committee summed the position up very frankly:

"But, in truth, whether good or bad, the development of the practice is inevitable. It is a natural reflection, in the sphere of constitutional law, of changes in our ideas of government which have resulted from changes in political, social and economic ideas. . . . The truth is that if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be unable to pass the kind and

quantity of legislation which modern public opinion requires."

While some critics admit openly that they do not like the type of legislation which can be put into operation only by the delegation of legislative powers, not every one can afford to be so honest. No political party, for example, would get very far at a general election if it said that it opposed the Beveridge Plan because it could be implemented only by extensive delegation of legislative powers. This I think explains the bitterness with which such delegation is often attacked. Because it is not politically feasible to attack the principle of such legislation, its opponents attempt to achieve the same end by concentrating their attack on the machinery by which the principle is to be put into effect. The *Recent Report of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants* deals with this matter in rather picturesque language:

"In peace-time the Civil Service is a target of frequent criticism: in war-time criticism is very greatly increased . . . The urge to 'shoot the man at the piano' often arises not so much from the demerits of his performance as from dislike of the tune."

Delegated legislative powers must owe their existence to an Act of Parliament and the proper time to challenge their creation is when the empowering Bill is before Parliament. Once the principle of the legislation has been accepted and the extent of the delegation determined, it is a breach of constitutional etiquette for those who have been defeated to carry on guerrilla warfare by attacking the subordinate legislation in which the details of the proposals which Parliament has accepted are worked out. Moreover, there should be no place for the barren, sterile approach that such subordinate legislation must be repressed as much as possible and, where it is allowed, it must be restrictively construed because it interferes with existing rights. This point of view is unfortunately prevalent and it has even been seriously suggested in the correspondence columns of both *The Times* and *The Sunday Times* this year that a Committee of both Houses of Parliament should be set up to examine all subordinate legislation "to strike out or amend all such clauses as should, in their opinion, run counter to existing public or private rights, or lead to public mischief." There seems to be no conception in the minds of those who hold this view that in the exercise of delegated legislative powers the executive is trying to give effect to a policy which

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has been accepted by Parliament, or that the main criterion by which such legislation should be judged is not whether it interferes with existing rights, but whether it tends towards the realisation of the purposes at which Parliament is aiming.

I think that the corresponding position in the United States might be considered with profit. There the matter is complicated because the Federal Constitution impliedly recognises the doctrine of the separation of powers, with the result that formally it is *ultra vires* for Congress to delegate legislative power at all. The impracticability of adhering to this rule has long been recognised, and the Supreme Court has devised a formula under which it is permissible for Congress to frame a general policy, leaving it to the executive to promulgate rules and regulations for putting that policy into effect. Even though the policy of Congress is often stated in very wide terms, there have been few recent cases in which delegation of rule-making powers has been held unconstitutional, with the exception of two decisions in 1935 in the hey-day of anti-New Deal feeling. It is remarkable that the controversy in the United States so far as administrative law is concerned centres largely in the judicial and quasi-judicial functions of administrative bodies and not in the delegation of legislative or rule-making powers. I do not know how far this relative absence of criticism is due to a wiser exercise of these rule-making powers, or how far it results from a realisation that if these powers are constitutional they must tend towards putting a declared policy of Congress into operation. But I am certain that the existence of the formula helps to produce a realistic attitude towards delegated rule-making powers, namely, that they come, not to destroy democratic rights, but to fulfil democratic purposes. The adoption of this general approach to the subject is the second principle which I advocate.

There are other factors which it would be unwise to ignore. It has always struck me as curious that criticism of the exercise of delegated legislative powers, both inside the House and out, comes mainly from two bodies, business men and lawyers. The bankruptcy courts are a constant reminder that business men can make serious mistakes in matters which are nearest to their own interests, and yet no one seems to use this as an argument for abolishing private enterprise. The whole judicial system with its hierarchy of appellate tribunals can be based only on the assumption that judges may make mistakes, or, to put it more charitably, that there may well be differences of opinion

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on the correct interpretation of the law. But if a civil servant makes a mistake in the exercise of delegated legislative powers, he comes off even worse than a dog to whom the Law allows at least one bite, for the critics immediately start to chant in unison that his error shows how indefensible is the whole system.

The position is further aggravated by the fact that attacks on delegated legislative powers receive their widest publicity in the supercharged atmosphere of question time and the adjournment in the House of Commons. The function of these two periods in the Parliamentary timetable is to enable Members to air their grievances against the Government; and it is not surprising, therefore, that the emphasis is all on the alleged errors or mistakes of judgment in the exercise of delegated legislative powers.

There is at present no method for investigating and seeing whether the machinery as a whole works well and what proportion the publicised errors bear to the number of cases handled successfully. The independent investigator finds the Official Secrets Acts a perpetual bar to his activity and the civil servant is by convention both mute and anonymous. Though there is good reason for this anonymity, it has the bad effect that the public get the impression that behind the facade of political heads of departments there is a body of rather inscrutable men who move in a mysterious way their wonders to perform. There has been much discussion lately on the proper functions of the Public Relations Officer who has blossomed forth during the present war. It is clear that the executive has felt the need for making the public more aware of what goes on inside the various government departments and it may be that this tendency will spread into the more technical field of the exercise of delegated legislative powers. But whatever is done in this direction it will still be necessary for a much clearer and detailed picture to be obtained of how these delegated powers are in fact exercised before any rational decision as to their future can be reached. This is the third of my principles.

At the risk of being considered "an idiot who praises with enthusiastic tone every century but this and every country but his own," I suggest that attention to recent developments in the United States would be helpful. In February, 1939 President Roosevelt asked the Federal Attorney-General to appoint a Committee to investigate the need for procedural reform in the field of administrative law, and to make a thorough and comprehensive study of existing practices and procedures.

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As soon as the Committee got to work, it came to the conclusion that "criticism and recommendation—both the Committee's own and those of others—arose from and must be tested by knowledge of the practices and procedures of each of the agencies" under review. Unlike a number of English counterparts, the Committee was not content to ask the agencies for their version of how they operated and to rely on interested members of the public supplementing this information.

"The Committee assigned to a staff of lawyer-investigators the task of studying the procedure of these agencies. The staff interviewed agency officials, attorneys who practice before these agencies, and members of the public affected by them. Staff members attended proceedings, read the records of cases, and examined administrative files to see how the proceedings are conducted. Upon the completion of these studies, the staff prepared for the Committee a description of each agency's procedures. As each study was made available to the appropriate agency for its consideration, the full Committee met for discussion of the study with agency officers."

In addition, many public hearings were held. Though the resulting document¹ deals mainly with administrative adjudication, there is a valuable chapter on *Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making*, with some useful comments on Congressional review of regulations. The Committee describes the attitude with which it approached its task in the following words:

"The Committee has not concerned itself . . . with the wisdom or efficacy of the legislation which is administered by the Federal agencies; nor with the wisdom or propriety of the regulations promulgated by the agencies; nor with the correctness of their decisions in individual cases. . . . The Committee is concerned with the procedures and the procedural practices of the administrative agencies. . . . Its task has been to make a thorough and comprehensive study of them to detect existing deficiencies and to point the way towards improvement."

Curiously enough, the month before President Roosevelt wrote to the Federal Attorney-General, Governor Lehman of New York in his Annual Message to the State Legislature had touched on the same theme, principally in connection with administrative adjudication. He said:

"We cannot, in modern government, attempt to destroy

¹Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941).

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administrative technique. Modification of procedure, if needed, should be undertaken only after careful study of each administrative process on an individual basis."

He accordingly appointed Mr. Robert M. Benjamin as Commissioner to investigate existing New York procedure and Mr. Benjamin approached the problem in substantially the same manner as the Federal Committee. His Report,¹ too, contains an interesting chapter on *Quasi-Legislative Procedure*.

I suggest that the only sound method of approaching the question of delegated legislation in this country and the prerequisite for reaching any satisfactory solution of the existing controversy is for a Commission on the lines of the two American precedents, with a staff of its own, to investigate the way the system works at present—to what extent there is consultation with interested bodies, how much advance publicity is given, in how many cases the jurisdiction of the courts is excluded, how long it takes to get a regulation over the various administrative hurdles, and so on. I believe that while some government departments might show up rather badly in such an inquiry, the public would in general be surprised at the amount of care taken in the framing of these regulations and the number of self-imposed checks which the administration provides. I realise that there are difficulties in the way of opening the files and archives of departments to outside investigators, but this did not prove fatal in the United States, where some of the agencies investigated are just as much integral parts of the executive as the Industrial Supplies Department of the Board of Trade is in this country. Moreover, there is a precedent, for what it is worth, in that some departments to-day have on their staff academic historians engaged in writing their war-time history, and if that history is to be of any value, then the writers must have access to all relevant papers.

This article was written before the Debate in the House of Commons on 17th May in which the Home Secretary announced the intention of the Government to institute a Committee of the House, with Sir Cecil Carr as its legal adviser, to scrutinise all regulations which need an affirmative resolution of the House or laying before the House. Perhaps the most significant fact is that the Committee will not draw the attention of the House to any specific regulation until it has had the benefit of an oral or written explanation from the department concerned.

¹Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York (1942).

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Apart from this provision, which does tend in the direction of more information on how the executive works, it is doubtful whether the Committee will do much except to quiet the apprehensions of persons inside the House and out who still regard delegation of legislative powers as a fundamental violation of the Constitution. There is evidence for this rather pessimistic view in that a somewhat similar Committee has existed in the House of Lords since 1925, though with a more restricted jurisdiction, which has not made any startling contributions to the subject. It is important, however, that the proposed Committee should keep within the bounds set for it. As Mr. Morrison said:

"It will be important that the Committee should recognise one or two things. One is that it will be dealing with legislation which the executive is authorised to make pursuant to an Act of Parliament. There would clearly be an impossible situation if the merits of an Act of Parliament were to be re-debated in the Select Committee, because it would then become an instrument in the party game and perhaps of obstruction against the executive. . . . The time for aguing about a Bill is when the Bill is before Parliament. Once a Bill is passed and becomes an Act, the Government of the day have to work it. . . . The function of the scrutinising Committee is therefore to protect the authority of Parliament and not the interests of a particular party or group."

Such an investigation as I have suggested would of necessity be a lengthy business. The Federal Report mentioned took two years to complete, and the New York Report of Mr. Benjamin three years. There are obvious arguments against investigating at this time the use of emergency powers, though there could be no objection to investigating how delegated legislative powers were actually exercised in the years before the war. It may be, therefore, that investigation of this nature is a long-term policy. But the other two principles I have suggested could be adopted at once. I have already drawn attention to the unfavourable background of criticism in which delegated legislation is invariably considered, with attention being concentrated on alleged errors and no notice being taken of what is actually achieved. The danger is that this may lead to an entirely unwarranted discrediting of the executive. Mr. Gladstone once said that "the British Constitution presumes, more boldly than any other, the good faith of those who work

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it." It would be a tragedy if belief in the good faith of any of the branches of the Constitution were inadvertently destroyed. I look forward to the day when any consideration of delegated legislation, in Parliament, in the Courts or in the Press, starts from the impartial point of view expressed by Mr. Justice Murphy in a recent case before the Supreme Court of the United States when he said:

"I do not question the objectives of the proposed regulations, and it is not my desire . . . to weaken the authority of governmental agencies to deal efficiently with matters committed to their jurisdiction by Congress."

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VI—REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION

By PHILIP ASTERLEY JONES

THREE tendencies have been noticeable for some years past in the field of central and local administration.

First, there has been a move to transfer to a central department certain functions which have lain hitherto within the sphere of local authorities. Probably the most significant example is the gradual break up of the Poor Law. For centuries the Relief of the Poor was almost the sole *ratio vivendi* of local government until Public Health supplanted it. In recent years, however, the Assistance Board has taken over the relief of the able-bodied poor, while later the supplementary pensions payable by the Ministry of Pensions have removed from local authorities much of the responsibility for the aged poor. The implementation of the Beveridge Report will result in the almost total disappearance of the Poor Law, even if it has not before then been brought within the purview of the Assistance Board. Again, shortly before the present war, the Ministry of Transport was made responsible for the trunk roads of the country, thereby relieving local authorities of a burden which had for many years been regarded as unfairly placed on their shoulders. The National Fire Service, which

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has absorbed the fire brigades previously maintained by local authorities, was hastened owing to the conditions of war, but many of the factors which brought it about were present, though not in such great strength, in peace. It is significant, too, that under the new Education Bill the Board of Education will be charged with the duty of securing the effective execution by local education authorities of the national education policy instead of with the mere "superintendence of matters relating to education in England and Wales."

The second tendency has been that of certain departments of the Central Government to decentralise their powers and responsibilities. It is important when considering this matter to differentiate between those departments which are concerned with matters of high national and international or imperial importance, those whose function is to supervise other bodies such as local authorities or public utilities, and those whose activities bring them into direct contact with the public and which are, in fact, carrying on a business with the public as the customers.

The pioneer in decentralisation was the Post Office. It is now over ten years since the Bridgeman Committee recommended, among other things, the devolution of many of the responsibilities of the Headquarters of the Post Office to Regional Directors. For some reason (probably the presence of a very active Postmaster-General) the proposals of this Committee, unlike those of most others, were put into practice in a remarkably short space of time. In 1935 a start was made in two regions as an experiment and the results were so successful that the scheme was extended to cover the whole country. Regional Directors are given a free hand within the broad lines of policy laid down by Headquarters: they co-ordinate at their level administrative, technical and financial functions.

Similarly, prior to and during 1936 the Ministry of Labour carried out a scheme of decentralisation on a considerable scale. According to the Report of the Ministry of Labour for 1936¹ the following departments had local organisations of their own in that year: Industrial Relations Department, Trade Boards Branch, Services and Establishments Department (which controls the employment exchanges) and Finance Department. Adjudication work was divided between the Chief Insurance Officer at headquarters, the divisional Insurance Officers at divisional offices and the local Insurance Officers at

¹ Cmd. 5431, pp. 94-96.

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the exchanges. It is noteworthy, however, that even within one Ministry it was found convenient to divide the country in a different way for each department—the Industrial Relations Department into three divisions, the Trade Boards Branch into eight, the exchange service into nine.

The Factory Department of the Home Office (now transferred to the Ministry of Labour) has from its inception been decentralised. In 1833, for the purpose of factory inspection, the United Kingdom was divided into four divisions within which the inspectors possessed very great powers. They reported to the Home Secretary only twice a year and themselves met in London twice a year to discuss common policy. It appears that since that time central control has tightened while the necessity for specialised inspectors in small technical branches prevents full decentralisation. In spite of this the Superintending Inspector in each of the twelve divisions into which the country is now divided has considerable powers in his or her own hands.¹

The Unemployment Assistance Board (now the Assistance Board) was from the outset organised for decentralisation. The country was divided into seven regions which were further subdivided into twenty-seven districts. While the primary responsibility for control and co-ordination lies with the District Officers, the Regional Officers exercise general oversight and control. They must ensure that the work proceeds with due regard to the expressed views of the Board on matters of principle and policy and that any practical difficulties or doubts which come to light in the implementation of the Board's policy are effectively brought to the notice of the Board.²

The third tendency is that of services for which local authorities are responsible to demand larger areas of operation than many of the existing local government boundaries allow. It is instructive to cite a number of these services, for, if it can be shown that a majority of them in number and importance are ill-suited by their existing areas, a case will have been made out for the alteration of those areas.

One of these functions, which is likely to assume a vast importance in the future, is that of Town and Country Planning. It is significant that in each of the three reports published during the past four years which have dealt with the subject there appears a reference to the organisation of planning on a regional

¹ T. K. Djang. *Factory Inspection in Great Britain*. (Allen & Unwin.) Chapters II, III and IV.

² Report of U.A.B. for year ended 31st December, 1938.

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basis. The Barlow Report¹ devotes a whole chapter to its consideration, while the Scott² and Uthwatt³ Reports both consider the question, though not in great detail. The Barlow Commission concluded that, by the adoption of a regional system, the solution of several of the problems connected with the location of industry would be materially facilitated. Town and Country Planning on the scale which is necessary today cannot easily be carried out within existing areas, nor does the expedient of the Joint Committee appear to meet the situation. It is agreed that if such planning is to be effective and useful it must be applied with reference to larger areas than those comprised within existing boundaries.

Again, the White Paper entitled *A National Health Service*⁴ proposes the establishment of joint authorities over practically the whole of the country. These joint authorities will comprise a number of local authorities and will have two main functions. First, they will be concerned to ensure the provision of or to provide a complete hospital and consultant service of all kinds for their areas: all the existing powers and duties of the present local authorities in regard to hospital services—including tuberculosis, infectious diseases and mental health will pass to the joint authorities, together with the existing hospitals and other institutions concerned. This decision was based on the following factors:

- (a) The organising area for a hospital service needs to cover a population and financial resources sufficient for an adequate service to be secured on an efficient and economical basis.
- (b) The area needs to be normally of a kind where town and country requirements can be regarded as blended parts of a single problem and catered for accordingly.
- (c) The area needs to be so defined as to allow of most of the varied hospital and specialist services being organised within its boundaries (leaving for inter area arrangement only a few specialised services).

The White Paper concludes that in the majority of the areas of existing authorities none of the three conditions would be met. The second function of the joint authorities is to examine the needs of their areas from the point of view of the health service as a whole and to produce, in consultation with local authorities and others concerned, a plan for a health service covering all

¹ Cmd. 6153, Chapter XV. ² Cmd 6378, p. 83. ³ Cmd. 6386, p. 45.
⁴ Cmd. 6502, pp. 15-19.

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branches. The detailed administration of the various branches, with the exception of hospitals and allied services, is to be left to the local authorities themselves.

The nationalisation of fire brigades has already been noted: though nationalised they have been organised in regions. It is clear that a service of this kind, which represents insurance in a concrete form, should be organised regionally, not only during the peculiar conditions of war but also in normal conditions. It was still possible before the war for fires to burn merrily while neighbouring brigades were unable to help: even in cases where mutual aid agreements had been reached, the ensuing financial adjustments were amusing if not irritating. The essence of the fire problem is that there are long periods of inactivity interdispersed with short bursts of large-scale activity: a single fire brigade covering one area is uneconomic and inefficient.

New and improved methods of sewage disposal have rendered obsolete the familiar sewage farms which are or were such a familiar sight and smell in the neighbourhood of those towns which are not fortunate enough to be able to discharge their waste products into the sea or tidal river—the latter, incidentally, not always being an entirely satisfactory method. These improvements, however, can only be economically used over a wide area: the normal borough or urban district is too small.

Long after criminals of all kinds have adopted a regional or national organisation, we continue to confine our Police to county or borough boundaries. The limited war-time amalgamation of small forces, like that of fire brigades, has called forth streams of denunciation which have been stemmed only by solemn undertakings that the *status quo ante* will be restored almost before the ink is dry upon the Armistice. The pigeon-holes are full of recommendations for the abolition of the smallest forces, to say nothing of those of moderate size: on this subject more than on any other, it seems, local patriotism and pride blind men and women to the changed needs of the present day. It is a constant marvel that Sir Robert Peel was able to fix the boundaries of the Metropolitan Police District so widely over a hundred years ago. It has been said that the British will take a radical step only when seriously alarmed: if this is so, a few efficient highwaymen would be worth their weight in gold.

The new Education Bill, like the old, makes provision for

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the combination of the areas of two or more county or county borough councils where considerations of economy and efficiency make it desirable. In such cases a joint education board, consisting of representatives of the councils concerned, will be established as the local education authority for the areas.

To date, this urge towards larger areas of administration has found practical expression only in the establishment of *ad hoc* joint boards. The conception of a general purpose authority, covering an area larger than that of an existing county or county borough, was put forward as a solution to the problem of local government on the Tyneside. The Majority Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area¹ recommended the establishment of a regional authority covering the County of Northumberland, four county boroughs, two non-county boroughs, five urban districts and portions of three more urban districts. The services which it was proposed should be administered by the regional authority were Public Health (Medical and Allied Services) including Mental Hospitals and Mental Deficiency, Education, Public Assistance, Police, Fire Brigade and Highways (except unclassified roads in urban areas). The remaining services were to be administered by the smaller local authorities within the region.

For various reasons, this particular solution in this particular case was not entirely satisfactory, but it is a useful example of the expression of this trend which has just been illustrated.

It was in this situation that the war began in 1939: certain Local Government powers were being transferred to the Central Government—Central Government Departments were tentatively considering delegating some of their powers and duties—the areas of Local Government were becoming inadequate for the functions which they had to fulfil. On to this stage marched those Cromwellian figures, the Regional Commissioners.

The fundamental reason for the appointment of Regional Commissioners was the fact that the Government decided to place the responsibility for the organisation of Civil Defence on the local authorities. Civil Defence is unlike any other activity of local authorities in that it has an operational or military flavour. It is a well-known fact that one Headquarters can direct a large number of subordinate bodies when all are static and carrying out normal routine functions. The situation

¹ Cmd. 5402.

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is very different when they are engaged in battle: it is generally accepted that no commander can effectively control more than three or, at the most, four subordinate formations in the field. For the purpose of Civil Defence, local authorities became semi-military formations: they required, in active operation, reinforcements, support and equipment like any military formation. It would be quite impossible for the Ministry of Home Security and Ministry of Health to deal with each individually. So an intermediate commander had to be introduced for this purpose if for no other. There was, however, a secondary reason. It was appreciated at the beginning of the war that large-scale bombing would result in disruption of communications and the temporary isolation of large areas of the country from London. Later, there was added the serious threat of invasion which, if it had materialised, would undoubtedly have caused parts of the country to be cut off. In these circumstances it was clearly necessary to appoint someone who would take over the functions and authority of the Government in such isolated areas. The obvious choice was the Regional Commissioner. It was also necessary, in order that the essential business of government should be carried on, for the various government departments to appoint officers to act for them in case of emergency. Thus the Regional Commissioners have gathered round them a miniature Whitehall and they have two distinct functions. Their primary function is to co-ordinate and direct Civil Defence and all connected matters within their regions while their emergency function is to assume in case of need all the powers of the central government and to act through the representatives of the various departments attached to their headquarters. Even when there is no emergency they have a general but ill-defined responsibility for co-ordinating the policy of the Government in their regions. The 1939-41 Summary Report of the Ministry of Health¹ describes the system admirably:

“To facilitate the administration of its Civil Defence services the Ministry, like other Departments with similar responsibilities, introduced at the outbreak of war a measure of decentralisation by the creation of a Regional Organisation. This was based on the Civil Defence regions and linked with the offices of the Regional Commissioners. Each of the Ministry's Regional Headquarters is in effect a miniature Ministry of Health, complete

¹ Cmd. 6340, p. 19.

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with medical and technical staff, under the control of a Senior Regional Officer, to whom substantial responsibility for both peace and war-time activities has been entrusted. Close liaison has throughout existed with the Regional Commissioners to whom . . . the Minister has delegated executive responsibility for certain important Civil Defence services. In addition, the Senior Regional Officer has instructions to keep the Commissioners informed of the general activities of the Department within the region. Should communications with Whitehall break down, the Commissioner would assume a general responsibility for all the Ministry's services in the region."

It is only necessary to add that in an emergency the Commissioners would exercise powers over all the functions of local authorities and not only over those connected with Civil Defence, besides being in control of the regional machine of the central government.

It is in one way unfortunate that regional organisation has had to be established in its present form as a result of the war: it has become associated in the minds of the public and of local authorities with the war and thus tends to obscure the important truth that peace-time conditions called for some form of regional organisation and that the need for it was only accentuated by the war which merely places emphasis on certain aspects of it. On the other hand, experience during the war will have served a useful purpose if it demonstrates which features of regionalism are desirable and which encounter opposition. Before proceeding to examine the basic factors which favour regionalism in peace conditions, it will be useful to mention some of the advantages and disadvantages which have been disclosed in war.

In the first place, the larger authorities are inclined to resent the interposition of the Commissioners and Regional Officers of Ministries between themselves and Whitehall. On the other hand, the smaller authorities usually welcome the greater accessibility of the Regional Officers. The reason is obvious. A large county borough will want to brush aside subordinates and to go straight to the man who matters, while the smaller authorities whose business is not of such magnitude are content with the attention of a man who is not so exalted. Another source of annoyance is the tendency for Commissioners to draw into their hands certain functions which local authorities regard as properly theirs: the reason for this being the some-

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what vague charter which has been given to the Commissioners and which enables them to give to it a narrow or broad interpretation as may be convenient.

Secondly, the Commissioners are autocrats: in war this is not inexcusable, but in peace most democrats would instinctively view with some disfavour a system of administrative supervision or *tutelle administrative* exercised by an appointed official of the central government vested with ill-defined powers and responsibilities. The democratic method in local government has on the whole proved itself fit: it may be increasingly difficult to work in the future, but so far as the actual administration of services is concerned, it is believed that opinion is in favour of the continuance of the present system. On the other hand, it must be remembered that local authorities are by no means masters in their own houses. In this country administrative supervision is usually exercised by several departments and by the Ministry of Health in particular. It is doubtful whether there is any difference in principle between the national or regional exercise of the powers of supervision over local authorities, but it is important to recall the distinction which has been made between the supervisory and executive powers of government departments. The man who exercises supervisory powers must either be perfectly impartial and recognised as such, in which case he must have the Law to guide him, or he must be politically responsible. We have changed in fifty years from judicial supervision to administrative supervision: the latter is inevitably bound up with responsibility to Parliament of the Minister who exercises it. If, then, this supervision is exercised on a regional level it will surely diminish to some extent the responsibility of the Minister. For this reason it is argued that administrative supervision should not be exercised except by a Minister or other official directly responsible to an elected body.

On the other hand, there is likely in the future to be a large number of government departments operating on a regional basis: it is at least arguable that they ought to be regionalised at the regional level by an official of the central government. It follows from this that again it is arguable that the same official who co-ordinates the regional administration of the central government should also exercise supervision over and co-ordinate the local authorities operating within the same region. Some form of co-ordination at the regional level is clearly necessary, but it is considered that the method of

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providing it by means of a permanent appointed official, albeit ultimately responsible through a Minister to Parliament, is not in accordance with the spirit and structure of British government and would not command the support of the country. One of the essentials of a healthy and vital democracy is the identification of the citizens with and their participation in the business of government. Present conditions dictate that a large part of governmental activity shall be carried on by permanent officials only remotely controlled by an elected body: at the same time it must be remembered that "good government is not an acceptable substitute for self-government and that the only form of self-government worthy of the name is government through ministers responsible to an elected legislature."¹

It is convenient at this stage to consider what are the factors which militate in favour of decentralisation in a government department and of the enlargement of areas or combination by local authorities. Many of the same arguments apply in the case of commercial organisations.

The prime fault of centralisation is that it begets rigidity and from this fault others follow. In all organisations of any size or complexity, problems and situations arise which cannot always be dealt with purely as a matter of routine. Again, local conditions may call for a modification in certain circumstances of the normal routine. There are two methods of dealing with such matters. Either each as it arises can be referred to the authority empowered to give a decision, or, alternatively, the rules and regulations governing the organisation can be so comprehensive and strictly drafted as to cover every contingency. The former alternative produces one answer which infuriates the public: "I am sorry, but I cannot give a decision on this; I must refer it to higher authority," while the latter produces another answer which also infuriates the public: "I am sorry, but there are the regulations and I have to keep to them." Admittedly, there must in a large organisation be consistency in dealing with the public: the problem is to decide to what level it is safe to delegate responsibility, while at the same time being able to ensure that a reasonable consistency is maintained.

Thus, on the one hand, central control, if exercised by means of sheaves of detailed regulations, breeds an exasperating rigidity, whereas, if it is exercised by means of reference of all difficult problems to one central authority, it breeds intolerable

¹ Report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (1934), Vol. I, Part I, p. 5.

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delay. Again, either method precludes the training of subordinate officials in the exercise of responsibility and discretion: they live their lives as rubber stamps, afraid and unable to exercise any initiative of their own. A high degree of centralisation, by the concentration of responsibility at the top, inevitably results in a lack of contact with the public. The Civil Service or any other organisation exists to serve the public and its members can only fully carry out their function if they are kept in touch with the public for whose good they exist and draw their pay. By spreading responsibility, officials at all levels are enabled to see more closely how their administration affects the consumer.

It is therefore evident that those departments referred to at the beginning of this article whose activities bring them into direct contact with the public should decentralise responsibility so far as possible in order to achieve flexibility, speed, initiative and knowledge of the needs and reactions of the public. It is not thought desirable, however, that those departments whose function consists of the exercise of administrative supervision should decentralise their responsibilities, at all events where the larger local authorities are concerned. It is not possible to discuss in the present article the methods whereby decentralisation may become effective: it is only necessary to emphasise that it must be complete, it must embrace all related functions, responsibility as well as power, it must be free from constant interference from the centre and, most important of all, it must be entrusted to carefully selected and trained officials who are capable of carrying it out.

Assuming that the present measure of decentralisation in government departments will be maintained and increased in the future, it is now necessary to consider possible solutions to the problem of providing certain services of local authorities with new and larger areas of administration. There are two main methods whereby this may be done, though there are several variations of each.

One alternative is that proposed in the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area, and discussed very fully in Dr. Robson's book *The Development of Local Government*. Briefly, the proposal is that as many boroughs and urban districts as possible should be raised to the status of county boroughs: that is to say, subject to the provisions below, all towns of any size should run their own affairs and not, as happens in non-county boroughs

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and urban districts, be subject to the jurisdiction of both borough or district and county council. Such parts of the country as are not included in county boroughs should be directly under the control of county councils, acting in suitable cases through the medium of district councils which would be subordinate to the county council and not independent as now. Under this scheme the whole of the country would be divided up into counties and county boroughs, each possessing full jurisdiction within its own area. These counties and county boroughs would then, where necessary or convenient, form *ad hoc* joint boards for running services which require a bigger area of activity than that of any one local authority. The areas covered by the different boards would not necessarily be co-terminous, and, indeed, it is urged as one of the merits of the scheme that each individual service would be able to plan its work by reference to the most convenient area for its own purposes. It is pointed out that the most convenient area for administering, for example, education, does not necessarily coincide with those which are the most convenient for town and country planning or fire brigades. The boards would be appointed by, and their members formed from, the members of the constituent authorities.

There is clearly much to be said for such a scheme, not the least potent argument being that, as it would involve little or no fundamental change in the basic set-up of local government, it is far more likely to secure agreement than one which reduces the ancient status of existing authorities to the advantage of a new creation.

There are, however, several objections to the proposal to some of which reference must be made. First, it would tend to complicate the machinery of government. During the coming years Government is likely to enter more and more into the lives of ordinary men and women. It is therefore essential that its structure should be simple and easily understood even at the expense of administrative perfection in individual cases. The public, for whom after all Government exists, is likely to become exasperated by the existence of a bewildering number of authorities each exercising functions over a different area. During the past sixty years we have succeeded in almost eliminating the *ad hoc* authority, the last one to fall into the lap of the general purposes authorities being the Guardians Committees in 1930. It therefore seems to be something of a retrograde movement to begin creating *ad hoc* authorities again, even

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though they may be federal rather than independent in character and even though they may be co-ordinated at the county or county borough level.

Secondly, such a system would inevitably result in a loss of status by the counties and county boroughs without a corresponding increase falling to any one other authority. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a county or county borough council would meet, not to hear or pass reports from its own committees, but from the various joint boards of which it was a member. The proceedings would not be attended with great interest as there would be nothing to be done. It would be quite unworkable for proposals to be referred back to the constituent authorities: the delay would be intolerable. There would also be a tendency for the members of joint boards to regard themselves as delegates of their own authority, charged to protect its interests rather than as administrators of a service covering a wide area.

Thirdly, counties and county boroughs would have little control over the bulk of their finances. One of the elementary principles of government is that administrative responsibility must be accompanied by financial responsibility. The only practicable method of financing joint boards would be for them to issue precepts on their constituent authorities. If the scheme were working fully, it is reasonable to assume that many of the major services of most authorities would be in the hands of joint boards. Thus the joint boards would not be directly answerable to the ratepayers for the money they spent and this again would lead to a weakening of the counties and county boroughs and thus of local government as a whole.

Fourthly, the existing divergence between town and country would tend to become wider. Admittedly, representatives of the county boroughs consisting of the big towns and of the counties consisting of the rural areas and small towns would meet on the joint boards on equal terms, but their underlying loyalties to their appointing authorities would undoubtedly in many cases prevent them from seeing problems as a whole. For purposes of town and country planning it is essential that such divergences of views should not arise and that town and country should be treated as interdependent as recommended in the Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports.

Fifthly, a system of joint boards would give little or no scope for effective co-operation with central government departments organised on a regional basis.

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Sixthly, it will be only wise in the future to pay some heed to considerations of civil defence: for this purpose a number of overlapping authorities is most unsuitable.

Enough has been said to show that these are serious, but by no means overwhelming objections to the systems of joint boards: it is now necessary to examine the other proposal, that to set up general purpose regional authorities to supersede county and, to some extent, county borough councils.

Its merits correspond to the demerits of the other. Such a system would be simple and easy to understand: regional authorities would become the focus for all governmental activity within the region. They would be general purpose authorities fitted to undertake new functions as they became necessary. They would possess a status and influence which could not be approached by any *ad hoc* joint board, they would be masters in their own house and would have both administrative and financial responsibility. They would combine within their boundaries town and country and would constitute an area in which a balanced distribution and diversification of all phases of industrial, commercial and social life. They would provide areas over which many services could be more economically administered than at present and would provide a ready means of collaboration with the Central Government. They would provide ready-made agencies capable of shouldering the burdens of civil defence should such a burden unfortunately be placed upon them.

Their size would naturally depend upon varying circumstances in different parts of the country. There seems no reason to pick on an arbitrary figure of population or acreage: rather the homogeneity and general administrative convenience of a region should be the prime considerations. It is important, too, not to offend local susceptibilities in the selection of a regional capital. Often there is an obvious choice, but sometimes it may be necessary to compromise by selecting, for instance, Harrogate instead of Leeds or Sheffield. It is generally considered that the existing Civil Defence regions are in some areas too large. The important fact is that regions must not be parcelled out in latitudes and longitudes: most of them will fall naturally into place. It is important that, once the boundaries of a region have been fixed, as many public services as possible should conform to them, even, as mentioned above, at the expense of administrative convenience in individual cases.

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This ought to apply to departments of the central government as well as to those under the direct control of the regional authority. It is not necessary, of course, for regionalism to be introduced over the whole country at once. There are parts where, for one reason or another, the need for larger areas is not so great. In fact it would probably be better from every point of view to introduce it, as was done by the Post Office, in two regions initially as an experiment, and then, with the knowledge gained, to extend it as and when desirable.

The services administered by the regional authorities would be Town and Country Planning, Hospitals, Police, Fire Brigades, Sewage Disposal, certain Highways, Water, Electricity, Education, Public Health to some extent, the welfare of the Blind, what is left of Public Assistance and any other powers of County Councils, which would cease to exist. Those powers of County Boroughs which correspond to County Council powers would also be transferred. All other local government powers, together with the local administration of many of those listed above, would be left to the Borough and District Councils.

It is not easy to choose between the two possibilities: it is made more difficult because the proposal for *ad hoc* joint boards has the great merit that it is probably far more capable of realisation than the other in that it involves no fundamental departure from preconceived notions. On the other hand it can be urged that the proposal for general purpose regional authorities does not involve the abolition of the boroughs, but only of the county councils, which for some reason have never gained a place in the affections of the British Public. It is considered that, on a just appraisal of all the factors and repercussions discussed above, the advantage lies definitely with the general purpose regional authority. However, in view of the Government's recent refusal to investigate the matter and of the extreme unlikelihood of the associations of local authorities reaching any practicable solution to the problem, the outlook does not appear very favourable for regionalism.

In conclusion, it will be convenient to examine one or two of what may be described as the by-products of a regional system.

First, it is doubtful whether, without some substantial changes, enough suitable men would be available to stand for election to the regional authority. This presupposes that the authority will consist of a regional council, democratically elected: the profound question of whether regional authorities

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are going to be in fact regional authorities or to be merely regional agents of the central government is for discussion elsewhere. It is assumed for present purposes that the principle of election will continue. Under present conditions, membership of a County Council almost invariably involves attendance at meetings during the daytime, travel over a considerable distance and considerable out-of-pocket expenses in the form of stationery, postages and other things. These factors would operate even more strongly in the case of regional authorities and would confine their membership to the wealthy or retired with a few party agents or trade union officials thrown in. One remedy which has been suggested is that the elected members should be paid a salary of £300 or £400 per annum. The chief objection to this is that it would definitely encourage people who wished merely to add to their income without having to work very hard to earn it. It ought to be possible to leave such people to the judgment of the electorate, but, unfortunately, it does not always work out that way, and the presence of such members would inevitably diminish the prestige of the regional council. It is suggested, therefore, that one way of overcoming the difficulty would be to pay all expenses for travelling by the most expeditious means, whether by rail, road or air, to allow members free postage for all correspondence connected with their office, to provide stationery free, to impose a general obligation on all employers to release their employees, without loss of pay, for their duties and to allow employers to make a claim for compensation for the loss of their employees' time and services. It should be possible for master men to make claims which would be considered on their merits. In each case compensation should be subject to a well-defined upper limit. In this way membership of regional councils would be opened to all men and women, whatever their financial circumstances.

Secondly, the establishment of regional authorities would open the door to the reform of local government finance. For many years it has been agreed that the rating system is unsatisfactory: the reason why it has lasted so long is the absence of any agreed alternative. Not only is the present system inequitable in its application, but is unable to produce the necessary money without undue hardship. The only alternative at present is the assumption by the central government of the entire responsibility for supplying funds to all local authorities: this would quickly result in the local authorities becoming mere agencies of Whitehall. Other sources of income would be

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practicable for a regional authority operating over a large area and in particular a local income tax in some form could be introduced and thus make the regional authority financially as well as administratively responsible.

Thirdly, the attractions of a career in the regional government service would increase with the added prestige which the size and influence of regional authorities would bring. The larger questions of exchange of staffs between central and local government cannot be discussed here, neither can the many other proposals which have recently been made for improving conditions of work in the local government service. There is no doubt, however, that the creation of regional authorities would give increased scope to able men and women.

Fourthly, it is possible that a change such as is proposed might make a contribution towards achieving a more balanced administrative machine, diminishing the preponderant importance of London and improving the quality and status of such provincial cities and towns as were chosen as the regional capitals. Many provincial cities and towns would no doubt deny the need for such improvement, but there is a well-grounded belief that it exists. It is suggested that no large city is complete, whatever its commercial and cultural achievements, unless there is some responsibility for government over an area wider than its own confines. The anxiety of towns to become or remain County Towns or Assize Towns cannot be explained entirely by the increased custom which such a status brings to the local shopkeepers and hotel proprietors.

Fifthly, as pointed out above, it would be possible to achieve a real collaboration between central and local government. It is doubtful whether, in peace time, any advantage would be gained by co-ordinating government departments at the regional level. Indeed, opinion tends towards the view that a peace-time equivalent of the Regional Commissioner would result in the slowing up and complication of administration. On the other hand there are many cases where the activities of a regional council would closely affect one or more government departments, and it would undoubtedly be of the greatest value if the regional authority had power to call in and consult the regional officers of ministries together rather than singly. It is obvious that there must be close collaboration between the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and regional authorities: but other ministries, notably the Post Office and Ministry of Transport, would also be concerned in much of

the business of a regional authority and it would be convenient, to say the least, if ministries were organised so far as possible to cover the same areas as the regional authorities. A distinction was drawn at the beginning of this article between departments whose chief function is supervision and those whose chief function is execution. It has been found during the war that while smaller local authorities do not object to, and in fact rather welcome, being supervised from a regional level, the larger are inclined to resent the interposition of a regional officer between them and the very senior civil servants in Whitehall with whom they normally deal. There is a very strong case to be made for keeping centralised *tutelle administrative* so far as it applies to regional authorities. It is a matter for argument whether *tutelle administrative* over the smaller authorities should be exercised by the regional authority, by the Ministry in Whitehall or by the regional officer of the Ministry. It is thought that most of the smaller local authorities would prefer the last, which, apart from anything else, has the merit of keeping in the hands of a Minister responsible to Parliament the administrative supervision of all local authorities in the country.

It is believed that the above conclusions are sound only if based on two assumptions: first, that regional and local government in this country should continue to be based on the elective system and, secondly, that regional and local authorities should in fact as well as in name continue to be authorities rather than agencies of the central government. On the choice which is made between these two sets of alternatives will depend the course which administration takes in this country during the next century.

CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

LET us assume, for purposes of this article, that the main question which should now be asked about the future of civil air transport is this: how should it be organised so as to maintain its efficiency as a service for all who need it, and so as to minimise the dangers of the anti-social use of air power?

In considering that question, we can start from some unchallengeable facts. Firstly, the earth is only 24,000 miles round. Secondly, the air is the only medium for transport which allows of conveyance from door to door, or at least from airfield to airfield, over land and sea alike, and (within limits) over mountains. Thirdly, the aeroplane's distinctive character is its great speed and long range. Fourthly, air transport is relatively costly at present, and is almost sure to remain so as far as the transport of bulk cargo is concerned. Fifthly, for various reasons the development of civil air transport between the wars was extremely disappointing, especially in Europe: having achieved the power to fly, mankind did not make adequate use of this new resource for the transport of passengers or even for transport of mails. Moreover, national competition for control of air routes was becoming a serious danger to international goodwill.

Now let us take some samples of current opinion about the future of civil air transport. On the one hand, take the Labour Party's recent pamphlet, "Wings for Peace,"; Mr. Michael Young's recent book, "Civil Aviation"; and the Canberra Agreement of January, 1944, between the Australian and New Zealand Governments. On the other hand, take the opinions of Lord Londonderry, Lord St. Davids, Lord Rennell, Lord of Essendon (for the shipping companies), Lord Kennet (for the railway companies), Lord Rothermere, the Duke of Sutherland, Lord Denham, Lord Trenchard, Lord Winster, and especially Lord Beaverbrook, in the House of Lords debates on "Civil Air Transport" on May 10th and 11th, 1944.

The Labour Party pamphlet, Young's book, and the Canberra Agreement all deal with the question posed at the beginning of this article: they all conclude that there should be a World Air Authority with wide powers, including the ownership

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and operation of a service of World Airways for the main trunk air routes round the world. The Canberra Agreement¹ adds that, "in the event of failure to obtain a satisfactory international agreement to establish and govern the use of international air trunk routes, the two Governments" (Australia and New Zealand) "will support a system of air trunk routes controlled and operated by Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations under Government ownership." The two governments "supported the right of each country to conduct all air transport services within its own national jurisdiction, including its own contiguous territories, subject only to agreed international requirements regarding safety facilities, landing and transit rights for international services, and exchange of mails."

All this was part of the Canberra Agreement of January, 1944. The Labour Party, in "Wings for Peace," welcomed "with enthusiasm" the lead thus given by these two Labour Governments. Its own proposals are in two parts. The full programme includes creation of a World Air Authority, which should own and operate World Airways, i.e., the main trunk air lines, with the requisite airports and ground organisation. This Authority should provide certain services generally required, and exercise certain controls over all civil aviation, including such over-all control of the regulation of private flying as will safeguard the general interest. It is desirable, in this Party's view, that the Authority should own all civil aircraft stations for regular air transport, but should depute wide powers to subordinate regional organisations, such as "European Airways." Special importance is attached to the organisation of air transport in Europe as a unified system, with appropriate local administrations, but all subject to the general control of a European air commission responsible to the World Air Authority.

The pamphlet affirms that this full programme is perfectly practicable technically, but recognises that it will encounter strong opposition. "Powerful interests in this country and

¹The Agreement says, in part:—

"17. The two governments agree that the regulation of all air transport services should be subject to the terms of a convention which will supersede the conventions relating to the regulation of aerial navigation" (i.e., the Paris Convention of 1919, revised in 1927. Besides this there is the Havana Convention of 1928).

"18. The two governments declare that the air services using the international air trunk routes should be operated by an international air transport authority.

19. The two governments support the principles that: (a) full control of the international air trunk routes and the ownership of all aircraft and ancillary equipment should be vested in the international air transport authority."

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elsewhere are now busy fortifying their capitalist positions with the arguments of militant nationalism and the traditions of unfettered private enterprise. We must therefore candidly face the prospect that the programme may not be realised *in full* at this stage. We should deeply regret this. The Labour Party will in any case continue to work for it without abating its aims." So the pamphlet goes on to outline an interim policy—one which would "represent such substantial progress as to be worth striving for even if the full aim cannot be achieved yet." This includes the creation of the World Air Authority, with wide functions, including the provision of various services and controls. As regards the main trunk air lines, it says that a unified World Airways, owned and operated by the Authority, should be regarded as an indispensable part of the interim programme; and that it would be better for the world that there should be no unified World Airways system unless the Authority "is in a position to exercise effective control . . . so as to protect the interests of communities which command no great resources in aviation. . . . It would be most dangerous to let this power fall into the hands of a monopolist cartel (such as an American-British combine), free to exploit it arbitrarily for the profit of a few."

If the World Airways project cannot yet be achieved, there should at least be Regional Air Unions, co-ordinated by the World Air Authority: and in any case "the full internationalisation of air transport in Europe" is regarded as "a major part of this immediate programme." If World Airways is ruled out, "then it will be necessary to fall back upon a system of British Commonwealth Airways," which should, as proposed at Canberra, be owned by governments of the Commonwealth. In so far as air transport here remains in national hands, Britain's air transport should be wholly nationalised (unlike the present hybrid system which includes the B.O.A.C.). Finally, the charge of civil air transport should be entrusted to an Air Department of the Ministry of Transport, not left with the Air Ministry after the war.

The proposals we have been summarising differ in some details, but they are all alike in this fundamental respect: they all take into account the long range of the aeroplane and the potential dangers of aviation as a factor in power politics. So all these proposals are directed to answering just that question which was posed at the beginning of this article—a question which affects the whole world.

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Now turn to the two copies of Hansard, reporting the Lords' Debates of May 10th and 11th on "Civil Air Transport." Lord Londonderry opened the debate with some questions to Lord Beaverbrook, and to clear the ground he began by dismissing all consideration of the subject as a world problem, requiring an internationalist solution. After a withering reference to the Labour Party's pamphlet, he said: "The question of internationalism or nationalism is a very highly controversial one, and I should not consider myself entitled to enter upon a discussion of that subject now. Many thousands," he added, despite this disclaimer, "and even millions of people have lost their lives fighting for their nationalities and nationalism (*sic*), and it seems to me a strong order at this moment to embark on a system which cuts across many of the sentiments of people all over the world." He hoped that "that highly controversial question of nationalism or internationalism will be left in the background for some time to come."

Next, look at the important speech by Lord Beaverbrook, who is chairman of the Civil Air Transport Committee of the War Cabinet. He said it was hoped that an international conference on this subject will be held this year, and referred to his discussions with the Dominion Governments, and lately with the American Government, in preparation for this conference. The Canberra proposals for an international authority owning and operating world airways were cheerfully disposed of with these words: "But just as we made concessions to American feeling, so Australia and New Zealand have made it clear to us, in their agreement of January 21st last that they will be prepared to make concessions to opinion here. So you see the helpful situation we are building up." The Canadian Government had tabled a Draft Convention providing for "an international regulatory authority with powers of enforcement. Its provisions include the allocation of frequencies of air services and national quotas for international air traffic." But this project also has been thrown over, though in this case reluctantly; it has been dropped, Lord Beaverbrook explained, as a concession to the Americans, who hold that the proposed authority should "start on a non-executive basis with *no power or means of enforcing its regulations*, at least during an interim period." The U.S. and Britain, Lord Beaverbrook added, are in agreement on the general principles that an international transport organisation should "evolve standards, seek to eliminate uneconomic competition, work out for each nation

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an equitable participation in world air transport, and maintain broad equilibrium between air transport capacity and traffic on offer."

Lord Beaverbrook mentioned that the discussions with the Dominions six months ago (i.e., before the Canberra Agreement) included "plans for an All-Red route." And he announced that he had managed to reach an agreement on the principle of "cabotage" within the British Empire. This means that it was agreed that Britain will be entitled to reserve to British air operators all air traffic within British territory, including traffic between the United Kingdom and all the British Crown Colonies. (It was not stated whether this discriminatory system would likewise apply to mandated territory). "Of course, the Dominions and India will set up a similar system," and Britain concedes the same right of reservation to all other Colonial Powers. "If I had thought," Lord Beaverbrook added triumphantly, "we could have got that matter settled on those terms six months ago, I should have considered it was worth any labour that I might be asked to undertake. I am sure that is the view of those in the aircraft industry. The settlement is an immense advance and it is of great benefit to Britain."

Just consider that achievement dispassionately. At this stage in the evolution of the Colonial system, is it really appropriate to describe as "an immense advance" an agreement which is to extend and approve the exclusive, discriminatory privileges of colony-holding Powers? In a matter of this kind, affecting the welfare of many millions of peoples in colonial lands, should "the view of those in the aircraft industry" of Britain be regarded as so decisive a factor? At this stage in the evolution of flying, when for the first time it will be practicable to plan quick transport services to all the outlying places of the earth, but when the costs of flying are still comparatively high, is it a sound economic proposition to disregard geography and force the pattern of new air services into arbitrary correspondence with the pattern of colonial flags? Look at the map of Britain's scattered colonial empire; and France's; and Holland's. To confine the air services of each of these groups to the air lines of its imperial country would be about as sensible, from an economic standpoint, as operating a railway service exclusively by and for people who happen to have red hair!

Among the other speakers was Lord Essendon, who spoke

especially about the interests of the shipping line to South America in which he is concerned. His line wants to run an air service to South America and wants B.O.A.C., with its Government subsidy, to be out of the running, since this traffic is expected to be one of the most profitable bits of the aviation business. So he argued that it would be most unfortunate for British prestige if a British air service to South America were not inaugurated soon, but that it would be most unfair if a Government-owned line (B.O.A.C.) were presently to "take away the cream of the traffic." (Again, you see, nationalism and private profit as the dominant motives, and the question of efficient lay-out of air transport for the world's use lost sight of.)

One, only one, of all the speakers considered the provision of air transport primarily from the broad standpoint of the consumers, the peoples of the world, rather than from the sectional standpoint of a British company director. "The air," said Lord St. Davids, "has no frontiers, and any attempts to create such frontiers must end in disaster. . . . Airports ought to be the same as seaports. . . ." He advocated an "internationally controlled" company analogous to the Suez Canal Company, the shareholders being "either governments or similar organisations," and the directors being "representatives of such governments and similar organisations." Whether this "internationally controlled" company would be subject to general guidance by a world authority was not made clear.

In this condensed account of a debate lasting two days I have necessarily omitted much. I have not even mentioned the efforts of various speakers to undermine the position of the B.O.A.C.—efforts which Lord Beaverbrook had to meet with uneasy, evasive replies, though he probably shares the attackers' dislike of such a departure from the principles of private enterprise. But I have dealt with other aspects of the debate at some length because few see the House of Lords Hansard; because the war-time Press reports are very brief; and because the debate showed, I think, that from the standpoint of those who favour an international solution, the situation is now very serious.

The fact is that the pattern of British policy about civil air transport is being fixed now. The industrious beavers are building their dams *now*. The Labour Party has published a pamphlet arguing with a wealth of evidence that we cannot afford to go back to the anarchy of the inter-war years, and that the control of air transport is certainly one of the keys of power

which must be in the hands of an international authority, for the benefit of the whole community of nations. But what are the leaders of the Labour Party doing about it now? What are they saying? The man who has the chief responsibility and opportunity for choosing the pattern of British air transport policy is a man so steeped in traditions of nationalism and of private profit-making that he cannot bring an unprejudiced mind to bear on the question at the head of this article.

I repeat: How should civil air transport be organised so as to maximise its efficiency as a service for all who need it, and so as to minimise the dangers of anti-social use of its power? Do you not agree that that is, roughly, the question that should be under consideration? But the speakers in that Lords' debate never touched on it, with one exception. This debate was entitled "Civil Air Transport" on the cover of Hansard; but it was actually concerned with something much narrower than that, namely, the conditions in which British air transport could most surely augment Britain's political power and most surely secure profits for British air operators. That is not the major issue.

As matters stand, the British delegation will go into the coming Air Conference with a restrictive nationalistic programme worked out beforehand—a programme confined within such limits as an imperialist like Lord Beaverbrook and a capitalist *entrepreneur* like Mr. Juan Trippe (of Pan-American Airways) find acceptable. If so, we shall miss a great opportunity. It is of cardinal importance, of course, for us to work with the United States as far as possible in "fraternal association." And very many of the trump cards will be in American hands, we all know, especially at the outset. But there are other countries, other interests, besides the American. There are many—very many—who will look to England for a progressive lead in this matter—for a move away from the international anarchy which made such a mess of civil flying between the wars. But that lead will not be given unless, very soon, there is a resolute stand in the country and in the Cabinet against such policies as Lord Beaverbrook is now shaping. If such a programme as was indicated in the Lords' debate is tabled at the coming Conference, and is adopted, the service which air transport could render to mankind will be blindly wasted, and the dangers inherent in the nationalist's and capitalist's scramble for power and profit in the air will be needlessly maintained and aggravated.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE

By JOHN DUGDALE, M.P.

THIS article is more in the nature of a report of what I noticed when I was recently out in America than an expression of my own desires. Any Englishman who has been in America a few months before a presidential election realises to the full the acute susceptibilities of the American people at any suggestion of interference in their internal affairs. One has noticed, however, that American writers do, from time to time, refer to the British political scene.

Having made this general observation for the benefit of any Americans who may read this article I am bound to say that it is impossible to keep one's own views entirely out of it, and there is no doubt that any gentleman wishing to discover a preference between one candidate and another might not find it impossible to do so.

It is nine years since we last had a general election in this country. America, however, has not given up the luxury of elections during war-time, and whatever the state of the war the presidential election is bound to come in the late autumn. But long before that important decisions bearing directly on the result of the election will have been taken by the two big political parties. In fact, they are being taken now. The complicated evolutions of candidate choosing are now in full swing—full swing that is so far as the Republicans are concerned. The Democrats fortunately or unfortunately for them have no problem at all in this respect. Either they put up Roosevelt for a fourth term or, to put it bluntly, they “go down the drain.”

So great has Roosevelt's prestige become during his twelve years of power that no Democrat has been able to build up a reputation enabling him to take over the leadership of the Party, if Roosevelt should decide not to stand. At one time it was thought that Vice-President Wallace might fill this position. It is a curious fact, however, that with a few notable exceptions, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Vice-Presidents have very rarely become Presidents. Apart from this Wallace, to his eternal credit, has come out firmly and strongly against the big business corporations and is to-day looked upon as one of the champions of Labour—a position which makes it

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almost certain that the Democratic Party would pass him over, if the question of a new leader arose. Apart from Wallace there is no outstanding figure at present.

All this is, of course, the result of the Democrats' long term of office under one outstanding leader. It is an obvious fact, to which any country can bear testimony, that political parties however revolutionary they may be tend after a certain time to lose their impetus. They are then defeated by the more conservative Parties, prepare a new programme, gather fresh impetus and emerge ready to fight a new election. The Democratic Party could never at any time be called revolutionary. It contains, in fact, a curious mixture of views. It has certainly a strong liberal tendency, which is expressed to-day by Roosevelt himself, but on the other hand much of its strength comes from what is known as the “Solid South,” which is by no means liberal. It is, in fact, an odd assortment of liberalism and ex-slave-owning feudalism and the two tend naturally to pull one against the other at times.

The leading representative of the South is the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The recent months have seen a re-shuffle in the State Department. Sumner Wells, who has represented the more advanced wing of the Democratic Party, has retired from office and been replaced by Stettinius, who represents big business, and it has been said that the change was made at the instance of Cordell Hull himself.

There is no doubt, however, that the Roosevelt administration has effected far-reaching reforms. Many years ago I went to stay with Roosevelt when he was Governor of the State of New York. I told him that I had never really been able to discover what the fundamental difference was between the Republicans and the Democrats. “What, in fact,” I said to him, “does the Democratic Party stand for?” He replied that it stood for roughly the same policy as the Liberal government of 1906-1914. This was just two years before the Democrats won their sensational victory and Roosevelt became President. By and large his administration seems to have carried out just such a programme as he described to me. This programme, including a system of social insurance and old age pensions, and the establishment of the right of collective bargaining together with many other less important advances, has given America some of those things which we in Britain had secured many years ago, and which the people of New Zealand secured even earlier.

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In one respect the New Deal has, in fact, gone further than either the Siddons government of New Zealand or the Liberal government of Britain ever went, and that is in the direction of public works.

The establishment of the T.V.A.—covering an area of 42,000 square miles (or four-fifths of the total area of England and Wales) with a population of $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions—only three months after Roosevelt took office was one of the most remarkable achievements of recent times. Quite apart from its great value as a method of flood control and land reclamation (150 square miles of water-logged land have been reclaimed), it has established a yardstick for measuring costs of publicly and privately generated electricity throughout the United States.

It has, indeed, had very practical results. In 1933 the average rate for electricity in the United States was $5\frac{1}{2}$ cents. By 1939 it had dropped to 4 cents, as compared with the T.V.A.'s rate of 3 cents. The whole T.V.A. scheme has, in fact, been a remarkable experiment in public enterprise, one of the most interesting features being that negroes are paid exactly the same rates as whites and are employed in proportion to the negro population in the T.V.A. district, which is 12 per cent.

Roosevelt has, however, publicly stated that the New Deal has been completed, and his programme for the election if he should stand seems to be one of "win the war," rather than one envisaging an advance into new fields of social development. At the present moment the alternatives in the field of social development seem to lie, therefore, between holding or losing the gains made by the New Deal.

This is the period of the Primaries. As readers know, the members of each political Party are entitled to vote for delegates to attend the Party Convention, where the presidential candidate is chosen. During the course of the past month or two Primaries, as they are called, have been taking place in each of the States, and they throw considerable light on the election itself. Even in the case of the Democrats, where Roosevelt seems to be the only possible candidate, there may be two men standing at the Primaries—one pledged to Roosevelt and the other demanding a free hand to vote as he thinks best at the Convention, and if the free hand delegate should be returned this would naturally be a great blow to Roosevelt's prestige.

Primaries for the Republican Party are, however, far more interesting. Delegates may be pledged to support any of the candidates for the presidency or they may be chosen simply for

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their own personal judgment and be given a free hand at the Convention. Such is, indeed, the case in California where the entire Republican delegation is going to the Convention pledged to no candidate. While delegates may be pledged to give their first choice to a certain candidate, this does not, of course, mean that if he is hopelessly defeated in the first ballot and there seems no chance of his being elected, they must continue indefinitely to vote for him.

An enormous amount of juggling does, in fact, take place at every Party Convention before one candidate secures a clear majority over all the others, and, if there are two outstanding candidates with about an equal number of supporters, there is always a chance that after many hours of deadlock they may both be thrown over in favour of a third quite insignificant man.

During the past six months there have been five fairly serious aspirants for the Republican nomination. Let us take first Lieutenant-Commander Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota. At thirty-seven years old Stassen is the youngest of all the candidates. He is now working on the staff of Admiral Halsey in the South Pacific and is not taking any part in the campaign for the presidential nomination. All he has said is that while he is not a candidate for Republican nomination he would not refuse it if it were offered him. Since Willkie retired from the scene Stassen's chances have increased considerably.

Born on a small farm in the west he went to school at eleven and worked his own way through the university and the law school, acting in the meanwhile as shop assistant, baker's helper, book-keeper, and even sleeping car porter on the railways. Then he went in for the law and became a "gang buster" in St. Paul's, Minnesota. This led him to the Republican nomination for the Governorship of Minnesota, where he had an overwhelming majority over the two-party machine men who opposed him. Finally in May of last year he gave up the Governorship to go into the Navy.

Stassen's strength lies in his efficiency. When he became Governor he said he was going to make a clean sweep of all graft and that he would cut out the dead wood from the State's departments. Many people have promised to do this sort of thing and when they got in have forgotten their promises. Not so Stassen. Before he had been there many months he had sacked six thousand State employees who, he said, had no real work to perform and who were only there as a reward for

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past services. He followed this up by reducing the number of State departments from some 60 or 70 down to 12, and made every department in the State operate at 10 per cent below its appropriation. Within a year Stassen had converted Minnesota's debt into a substantial credit balance.

In his foreign policy Stassen supports United States co-operation with some form of world government organisation. This is a very remarkable thing to do in a place like Minnesota which has always been strongly isolationist. It seems that in his foreign as in his home policy Stassen does not wait for public opinion to lead him, but has the courage to lead it. While he is quite plainly both efficient and go-ahead, he does not appear to have shown any signs of moving towards the Left in internal politics and should he be elected he will get his main support from those who believe in the continuance of private enterprise.

Next comes Bricker, Governor of Ohio. At one time Bricker was thought to be violently anti-British, but he appears to have modified his attitude somewhat during recent months. Although he would not like to be called an isolationist (at the moment the term is almost one of abuse) he is probably the nearest approach to one among the presidential candidates. Representing as he does a typical Middle West state and seeking to obtain the votes of the Middle West farmers, who are not known for their international outlook, Bricker plays a lot on the "no interference from Britain" theme, and any statement by an Englishman in favour of President Roosevelt is a heaven-sent opportunity to him.

We need not consider General MacArthur, as he has now decided definitely not to stand. And now we come to Willkie. The mystery of Willkie's sudden decision to withdraw from the presidential campaign can only be solved if we examine both Willkie's own character and the organisation of the Republican Party Machine. I had the opportunity of talking to Willkie when I was over in America recently and this talk confirmed all that I had previously heard of him.

Willkie is a curious mixture of an astute lawyer and a naive child. This can be a very useful combination for a presidential candidate. The childlike part of his character has great charm and has undoubtedly a tremendous popular appeal. As one man once said to me, "Willkie makes you want to do things to help him." His great enthusiasm—whatever the cause—is infectious, and he has a gift of putting his ideas into words which the ordinary man can understand. Indeed his famous

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book, "One World"—rather unkindly called "Gullible's Travels"—has sold over a million and a half copies.

It is obvious that a man of this character would not make a big appeal to any Party Machine. He does not fit into the mechanics of politics, being liable suddenly to go off at a tangent. His nomination as Republican candidate at the last election came, indeed, as a surprise to many people, and it is generally thought that it was made by popular acclaim and in spite of the Political Machine. There can be no doubt that this machine has been anxious for some time to get rid of Willkie.

Willkie, indeed, launched his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination in a most unusual manner by hurling a challenge at his own Party. In an interview with the magazine *Look* he stated that he would accept the candidacy of the Republican Party "if it intends to drive heart and soul for liberal objects." These, according to him, included first the protection of minorities and equal rights for all, irrespective of race, creed, or colour, and second what he called a "rebirth of enterprise." Here he made an astonishing statement for a Republican. "We must distinguish," he said, "between enterprise and private ownership. A corporation may be privately owned and still be the worst enemy of free enterprise. The liberal Republicans must prevent the further misuse of the word 'enterprise' by those who wish merely to preserve their idle capital and vested powers." After a great many other remarks highly provocative to a Party of big business Willkie finally attacked isolationism, which, he said, "would lead directly to another war."

At the time when he made this appeal people said that it was a very clever move to get the support of large numbers of non-political voters, who were tired of Roosevelt, but who would not vote for a dyed-in-the-wool conservative Republican policy. It seemed, however, that Willkie really meant what he said and that, not having found an adequate response to his appeal, he has decided to withdraw.

His campaign has been a spectacular one. Unlike Dewey who could afford to stay quietly at Government House in Albany, Willkie knew that his strong point was his personal magnetism and he must, therefore, take every opportunity of "getting himself across" to the American people. With this object in view he started on a whirlwind tour of the whole country just before the Primaries were due to begin. So far there was still a hope that things might go all right for him.

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And then he did an extraordinary thing which can only be explained by the volatile and impulsive nature of the man. The Primaries in the State of Wisconsin were due to take place shortly. Willkie announced that if he did not secure the nomination to the Republican candidacy in this one particular Primary he would withdraw from the whole fight. In fact, he came very low down on the list, securing scarcely any votes. He kept his word and without more ado said that he would withdraw from the Republican candidacy.

What does the Wisconsin Primaries' result mean? The State of Wisconsin is a curious mixture. For many years it returned Senator La Follette of the American Farmer-Labour Party. It might therefore be thought to be a very advanced State, but, in fact, it is not. Its population is composed mainly of farmers who, living, as they do, well over a thousand miles away from the Atlantic, could easily be persuaded that Willkie was proposing to launch out into dangerous adventures which would get America entangled in European politics. Add to this the fact that one of the candidates—who may well have secured many of the votes which would have otherwise gone to Willkie—was a comparatively local man, Lieutenant-Commander Stassen, former Governor of the next door province of Minnesota. Wisconsin may, therefore, not be a true test of Willkie's chances and it is possible that his decision to abandon the candidature was the culmination of a long standing quarrel with his Party Machine.

In spite, however, of his withdrawal from the actual candidature Willkie can still exercise a very considerable influence on the course of the presidential election. I do not myself think that he will stand as an independent candidate, but if he chose to come out with a clear-cut policy and give his support to whichever of the Republican candidates comes nearest to it, he might swing a large number of votes at the Republican Convention. It is difficult, however, to believe that any of the candidates now left in the race will meet with his approval. I have already mentioned Stassen and Bricker, neither of whom are noted for their liberal and international policy. Let us now examine the last and most powerful of all the candidates—Governor Dewey.

Dewey is Governor of the State of New York, a position which has in the past often led to the White House. Roosevelt himself was, of course, Governor of New York immediately before he became President. Dewey represents the Party

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Machine *par excellence*. His strength depends not on charm, but efficiency, and here, of course, he has a very strong card, for with all Roosevelt's great qualities nobody has called him a first-class administrator, and it is easy enough to pick holes in the administration of the New Deal.

Dewey is, however, not an isolationist in the sense in which Bricker is. Bricker represents a Middle Western State, albeit only on the fringe of the Middle West, and makes his appeal to the isolationist sentiment of the people, who live far from the Atlantic seaboard. Dewey, however, gets his strength from the State of New York, a State of 13,479,142 inhabitants, which quite obviously is very well aware indeed of what the Atlantic seaboard means. I was surprised when I saw him to find that he had, in fact, been over to England some seventeen or eighteen years ago. His views on foreign policy, however, struck me as purely escapist. He said that he disapproved strongly of such events as the Teheran Conference where three or four amateurs sat round a table and decided the future of the United Nations. Foreign policy, he said, should be left to the experts. When I pressed him for a rather more detailed explanation as to what he meant by this and how there could be any democratic control of foreign affairs if this view were taken up, he became rather confused.

Dewey still stuck to his point that the President should have no say whatever in foreign affairs, but admitted that the Secretary of State, as the "foreign expert," should. He appeared, however, to think that the latter would agree with any proposition put up by his officials, so that the conclusion seemed to me to be that foreign affairs would be run entirely by the officials of the State Department. As his main planks are (1) a personal attack on Roosevelt, and (2) a plea for efficient administration, it is perhaps not unnatural that he should have taken this line with regard to foreign policy.

The election campaign has been enlivened and complicated by the dispute about the voting rights of men on active service. Here the eternal question of States Rights intruded itself. The question was whether arrangements for soldiers to vote should be made by the Federal Government or by each State. The Republicans in the main supported the view that the States should do the work. Certain States, they said, had disqualified various classes of men from voting and they, and they alone, were therefore entitled to issue voting papers to soldiers. The Democrats, who in general supported the Federal Govern-

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ment, said that if it were left to the States some of the more backward States, either through inefficiency or even deliberately, might hold up the whole process, so that many soldiers would, in fact, be deprived of a vote. Another point, and one which went indeed far beyond that of States Rights, was the argument that soldiers should not be asked to vote at all for a presidential candidate, in view of the fact that the President of the day was himself Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and that they would be asked to vote for or against their own Commander-in-Chief. Some people may have really meant this, but I have a shrewd suspicion that the main reason for this particular argument was that they were afraid that Roosevelt was, in fact, very popular among American troops, and that he would get the overwhelming majority of their votes.

What attitude is Labour adopting in the elections? There is, of course, no strong Labour Party with any hope of putting up a candidate. For years Norman Thomas has stood as socialist candidate for the presidency, but he has never got more than a small fraction of the votes accorded to either of the other two candidates. In this election, however, one of the two big trade union groups—the C.I.O.—has formed a political action committee and at a conference in New York, which I attended during January, it was decided to draw up a programme of full employment and support whichever of the presidential candidates appeared most likely to carry it out. There now seems little doubt that, in fact, as everyone supposed, Roosevelt will get Labour support. Labour cannot forget that it was Roosevelt who gave them the New Deal with all that it meant in social insurance and, above all, in the rights of collective bargaining. In spite of Dewey's statement that "America never goes back" Labour has an uneasy feeling that if the Republicans were to return there might be a step or two back and some at least of the rights which Roosevelt has given them might disappear.

I talked with Dewey and Willkie on this question and their answers illustrated very clearly the attitude of the two men. Willkie said that he thought that he would get a large proportion of support from the members of the C.I.O. Dewey, on the other hand, knew that Labour as an organisation was against him, but maintained that this did not matter, as it could not carry its men with it and indeed, he said, had not done so when he stood for the governorship of the State of New York.

Here, however, he may be wrong since the new organisation

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set up by the C.I.O. Political Action Committee will undoubtedly be far more effective in encouraging Labour in America to take direct political action than anything that has gone before. Unfortunately it is starting rather late in the day and with the appalling handicap of the split between itself and the A.F. of L., which appears to be more reactionary every day. The C.I.O. has been remarkably successful in organising the negro workers and it may be that their vote will play a bigger part than usual in the election, since they are becoming more politically conscious than they used to be. It was indeed a remarkable sight to see negro speakers on the platform at the C.I.O. conference, and still more remarkable to see negro delegates talking with white delegates during the intervals.

There is in fact, no doubt that the future of Labour in America lies with the C.I.O., but it is a very distant future. It will be a long time before Labour has a candidate of its own who can meet the other two candidates on equal terms and with a good chance of success. When that time comes the American political scene will be something very different from what it is to-day.

THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION

By O. KAHN-FREUND

THE present moment is unpropitious for a detached appreciation of the Weimar Constitution, which was passed a quarter of a century ago. We are always inclined to look with a critical eye upon the achievements of the generation of our fathers, and it is often left to the grandchildren to assess in an objective spirit the legacy of a past age. Our own experience tempts us to condemn outright the whole period between the wars and thus to miss the benefit of the lessons it may yield for the future—both in a positive and in a negative way. This is as true of the League of Nations as it is of the German Constitution which was adopted by the National Assembly at Weimar on August 11th, 1919. But in view of the events which lie ahead, this anniversary should make us pause to examine anew the constitutional edifice which a defeated nation erected on the ruins of the past as an outer framework for a new and democratic political life. In the cold light of the chastening experience of this quarter

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of a century we can discern how much the mentality of the victors resembled that of the vanquished—how much the Constitution of the German Republic had in common with the Covenant of the League of Nations. Not only the preamble, but the substance of both documents, was inspired by an almost fetishistic belief in the efficacy of constitutional arrangements. The Weimar Constitution proclaimed the will of the German people: "to renovate and strengthen its Reich in freedom and justice, to serve internal and external peace, and to advance social progress," words strongly reminiscent of those references to the "promotion of international co-operation," to the "maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations," etc., which introduced the Covenant. A passionate longing for "law" swept the world of 1919, a pathetic faith in the effectiveness of institutions and formulated codes. We have become very impatient of words in these twenty-five years, and we have learnt to our cost that high-sounding phrases as well as premature legal fixations can be very dangerous traps where the enunciation of magic formulæ fails to silence the clash of real interests. The building of institutional bridges does not bring about a reconciliation of the hostile forces on either side of the chasm.

The hostile forces inside Germany which had faced each other ever since the country had risen to the status of a major power and since its industrialisation had given rise to a class conflict of unparalleled acerbity remained, after 1919, what they had been before. The second part of the Constitution proclaimed a "*déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*," the grand style and high intention of which may have served as an inspiration to some of those young people who had to be supplied with a printed copy of the document upon leaving school (Art. 148, para. 3). But upon closer scrutiny they could hardly fail to perceive that some of the beautifully-worded Articles were nothing but sententious platitudes, binding no one, least of all the legislator, and soon to be characterised by the Courts as "merely programmatic announcements" without any legal value. Some of the provisions dealing with "economic life," for example, bear the imprint of unreality: "The organisation of economic life must correspond to the principles of justice with the object of safeguarding a dignified existence for all. In these limits the economic freedom of the individual is to be secured." (Art. 151, para. 1). "Property imposes an obligation. Its use must also be a service for the common good."

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(Art. 153, para. 3). Phrases of this kind were the price which the middle class parties of the coalition paid for the solid concessions of the constitutional guarantees of property (Art. 153, para. 1) and inheritance (Art. 154) which they were able to secure. And the political and economic power of the landowners of eastern Germany was not much impaired by the promise that the State would "supervise the distribution and utilisation of the land in such a way as to prevent abuse and to approach the aim of securing to each German a healthy home, and to all German families, especially those with many children, room for dwelling and economic effort corresponding to their needs." (Art. 155). Whatever real achievements the Weimar Republic has to its credit in the field of land reform and of housing—and some of these achievements, especially in urban housing legislation and administration, were very real indeed—might have been attained without such deceptive proclamations.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany paid lip service to the principles of socialism, but it was desperately serious in all matters of trade union rights and of social reform. The Article of the Constitution which guaranteed "freedom of organisation for the preservation and improvement of the conditions of employment and economic effort to everyone and to all occupations" (Art. 159) was fortified by a clause which translated this generality into positive law: "All agreements and measures which attempt to restrict or to hinder this freedom are illegal." Under the pressure of strike action the working class secured the constitutional recognition of their unions as organs of collective bargaining and as powers "called upon to co-operate in the whole economic development of the productive forces." (Art. 165). These provisions were destined to play a decisive role in the history of the German Republic and to form the basis of its noteworthy system of labour law, but the economic clauses remained a dead letter.

These are more than historical reminiscences. The complete failure of the constitution-makers of 1919 to come to grips with the economic problems of Germany is notorious, but, upon re-reading the document itself, we learn how easy it is to shroud a failure of this sort under the thin veil of well-phrased "Articles." "*Mit Worten lässt sich trefflich streiten*." Will those owners of industrial and agricultural "dukedom" who have twice helped to set in motion the forces that plunged the world into war try again to prevent their elimination by offering pseudo-socialist phrases as a concession to those determined

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to bring about the economic transformation of Germany? Is it presumptuous to suggest that this experience might serve as a lesson for other countries as well?

And will the struggle between the American Presidential system and the Anglo-French Parliamentary system once again, as in 1919, be allowed to serve as a smoke-screen for the desperate fight put up by reactionary and militarist interests for their continued existence behind the broad shoulders of a "strong President"? The compromise which the First, the organisational, Part of the Constitution managed to bring about between the seemingly incompatible ideas of the American and Franco-British Constitutions was indeed ingenious. As in the United States, the presidential power was independent of Parliament. The President, like the Reichstag, was to be elected by the people on the basis of a democratic franchise, and, like the American President, he had a suspensive veto against laws passed by Parliament, while, in a conflict between the two powers, the ultimate decision was to be taken by referendum. On the other hand, the Cabinet, including the Chancellor who "determined the directives of policy", was dependent both on the President, who had the power of appointing and dismissing it, and on the Reichstag, whose confidence it required. At first sight this might look like a system of checks and balances in which presidential and parliamentary powers were fairly evenly matched. In fact, however, the power of the President was far superior. Not only was the effectiveness of parliamentary action hampered by the disastrous results of an over-elaborate system of proportional representation which all too often permitted the formation of majorities only for negative purposes, i.e., to prevent legislation or to bring about the fall of the Government. What was decisive—and, being wise after the event, we cannot help wondering that it was not obvious to everyone in 1919—was that the President combined in his person the right of the British Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament with the function of the United States President of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and with the crucial power of declaring a state of siege, of suspending some of the vital constitutional guarantees, and of issuing emergency decrees. In a society torn by class conflicts of an unprecedented intensity there was little prospect for the smooth working of parliamentary institutions. Everything pointed, even as early as 1919, to the development of a situation in which the power that wielded the "*ultima ratio reipublicæ*," the resort to the force

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of arms, had to become the real sovereign. In a sense which it is not easy to grasp for an Englishman, the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt was right when he said that the power to declare a state of siege was the final test of sovereignty.

In 1919 the answer which any German republican would have given to a line of reasoning such as this was simple: since the President was elected by the people, he was himself a force of democracy. The connection between Bonapartism and the plebiscite in a democratic constitution is not always sufficiently remembered on the Continent. Moreover, the first President, Friedrich Ebert, who had been elected by the National Assembly, was outwardly a "socialist," and his contacts with the militarist reaction were then known only to his intimates. But when, in 1925, Hindenburg became the second President, and the first to be elected by the people—though only by a relative majority—it seemed as if the conservative forces had been right from their own point of view in insisting upon the strengthening of the presidential power as a *locum tenens* for a monarch. That the event of 1925 was destined to inaugurate something infinitely more disastrous than a mere restoration, and that upon his second election in 1932, Hindenburg would obtain the votes of the Left as the "lesser evil" compared with Hitler, even the boldest prophet would have hesitated to predict.

The discrepancy between the reality of power and the formally well-thought-out constitutional compromise embodied in the Weimar document leaps to the eye. In 1944 it is so evident that it hardly needs further emphasis. But in 1919 it was not so obvious. Then men and women inside and outside Germany were only too inclined to confound what was a momentary shifting of political power towards the Left and the temporary disappearance of the forces of reaction with a permanent change in the structure of the body politic—a situation which was to find a near parallel in France in 1936. The lesson for the future need not be elaborated: the premature attempt to formulate in terms of a constitutional compromise the relationship of powers the strength of which cannot be gauged must lead to a disaster—a truism which the lawyer is often apt to forget, the constitutional no less than the international lawyer. To-day, the Weimar Constitution has become a stern warning against "blue-prints."

Nowhere was the clash between words and facts more apparent than in the field of the relationship between Church and State. The future of education, the power over the rising

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generation, was one of the most hotly-contested problems within the Weimar coalition. It led to the famous "school-compromise," embodied in Art. 146, a compromise which established the principle of State Education, and of a common education of all children, but gave the Churches—and the Catholic Church in particular—the reality of the denominational school. The Centre (Catholic) Party had managed with great skill to use its political influence so as to secure to the Church continued domination of the State schools in the Catholic parts of the country, while generously conceding that—as a matter of law—this was to be an exception.

That a democratic constitution does not deserve its name unless it provides for the participation of the people in local administration, was axiomatic to Hugo Preuss, the author of the first draft of the document, and a great champion of self-government. In retrospect, the premature abandonment of its power by the Central Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates in December, 1918, and the hasty election of a National Assembly a month afterwards, appear as major tragedies. These decisions involved the capitulation of the working class to the political and economic "powers that be," and they destroyed those vestiges of spontaneity in the building up of local bodies of administration which had been one of the most hopeful features of the events of 1918. In a country without a strong tradition of voluntary effort it was a mistake to superimpose a democratic constitutional structure upon an unreformed bureaucratic system of administration. It was an attempt equivalent to the building of a house from the roof. Preuss's abortive proposal to substitute smaller units of administration for the Prussian State was a necessary corollary of democracy, not only because "federalism" had to be unreal where one of the members of the Federation comprised more than half of the population, but also—and chiefly—because the centralisation of the administrative processes in Berlin deprived the population of a large part of the country of any awareness that "democracy" was more than the exercise of a voting right. If decentralisation of administration is rightly thought to be a necessary ingredient of a real democracy in a country like Britain, this is a thousand times true for Germany, where spontaneous political action cannot be taken for granted. This decentralisation is inseparably bound up with that political "re-education" of which we now hear so much, and it is a more vital factor in the building up of a new Germany than the precise definition of the distribution

of jurisdictions between the central and the peripheral bodies. For that distribution itself, and, within certain limits, for the participation of the units of local self-government in the conduct of affairs at the centre, some of the detailed provisions of the Weimar Constitution may serve as pattern for the future. Some, but not all. Few will deny that any future body representing the local units at the centre should be recruited by election from local representative bodies, and not, like the *Reichsrat* of the Constitution of 1919, by appointment of delegates acting under instructions given by local "governments."

Lassalle's famous warning that "Herr von Borsig is part of the Constitution" stands at the beginning of the history of the German labour movement. It was and is the tragedy of the German working class that, ever since it first awoke to political consciousness, it had to fight that battle for formal democracy which, in other countries, was carried to a victorious conclusion by the representatives of a liberal middle class. "Herr von Borsig," i.e., the economic substratum of democracy, has remained outside the reach of working class action, because the Left had to concentrate its strength upon the achievement and, later, the preservation of a democratic franchise and of responsible parliamentary government. The working class had to fill the gap left by the middle class parties when they deserted the cause of liberalism, allured by the fatal fascination of Bismarck's *Realpolitik*. Despite all disillusion, and despite all its shortcomings, the Weimar Constitution became, after 1919, the rallying centre for many of the most promising forces of the Left. These men and women had not forgotten Lassalle's warning, but they felt it their duty to uphold "the Constitution" at any price—even at the price of suppressing their own burning desire to meet the rising danger with adequate defensive weapons. The pathetic craving for "legality" and "constitutionalism" which paralysed the German Left and finally led to its downfall stands condemned in the eyes of the historian. But, in passing sentence, he may accord to the masses which were defeated by Hitler in 1933 the saving grace of the "noble effort." That the effort failed was, as we can see to-day in the clear light of subsequent history, due to the structural defects of the building erected in 1919.

Whatever may be the status and structure of a future Germany, the peace of Europe and of the world may partly depend on the willingness of our generation to learn the lesson taught by the events of twenty-five years ago.

WAR MATERIALS AND THE PLANNING OF PEACE¹

PART II

By ALFRED PLUMMER, B.A., B.Litt., M.Sc.(Econ.), LL.D.

METHODS AND MACHINERY OF CONTROL

TWO years before the outbreak of the second world war, there appeared a little book² in which a critical examination was made of the complaints of Germany, Italy and Japan that they were unfairly deprived of access to raw materials. There were, it appeared, no obstacles to the purchase, by any willing buyer, of raw materials in world markets in time of peace. On the contrary, with the exception of tin, the abundance and cheapness of raw materials during the decade 1927-37 was without precedent in modern history.³ What, then, did Germany, Italy and Japan *really* want? The answer then given—but apparently not accepted or believed by the British government or people—was that the three Powers were planning aggressive war on a very large scale, and for this purpose *political* control of the sources of various war materials was highly important, if not essential. Indeed, the Japanese and Italians had already opened the contest in China and Abyssinia. Germany was strengthening her position as far as she could by bloodless warfare—threats, blackmail, bullying, and the creation of internal chaos in other states—before finally launching her armies upon those who refused to be cowed into submission. In this preliminary sparring for position, the importance attached by the aggressors to overseas sources of raw materials is significant and serves to direct our attention to a relatively simple but potentially

¹ Part I of this article was published in *The Political Quarterly*, April-June, 1944.

² A. Plummer, *Raw Materials or War Materials?* (Gollancz, 1937.)

³ J. A. Hobson reached the same conclusion in his book, *Property and Improperly*, published in the same year. "Aggressive policies of forcible expansion are (he says) still explained by their spokesmen in terms of economic necessity. . . . It is a matter of surprise that these arguments for expansion should still be accepted not merely by the ignorant multitude but by educated persons, even statesmen who have access to the economic facts of recent colonial history. The dramatisation of the conflict between the "haves" and the "have-nots" among nations has been made the basis of appeal to international justice and humanity. . . . Yet it is certain that a reliable fact-finding Commission would dismiss the whole of this economic propaganda as illusory. . . . With few exceptions the raw materials and foodstuffs which populous or ill-provided countries cannot themselves produce are produced in superabundance by foreigners and are on sale to anyone who has the wherewithal to buy." (Pp. 112 *et seq.*)

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powerful means of preventing future wars. Power over raw materials, hitherto one of the principal causes of international friction, could be converted into a great obstacle to aggressive attacks: a modern version of the old prophecy (so far conspicuously unfulfilled) that swords shall be beaten into ploughshares. The materials of warfare could become the means of maintaining peace.

In our first section the essential materials to be included in this scheme have been described and discussed. Let us now proceed, firstly, to examine the possibility of setting up the necessary control machinery on an international scale, and secondly, to attempt to assess the chances of operating it successfully, so as to achieve the main object. I propose to approach the matter by asking whether there are any good reasons for thinking that such a scheme might be practicable? Are there any favourable and encouraging circumstances and conditions?

Fortunately there are. In the first place, the total number of raw materials to be controlled is not large: no more than nine, if we exclude copper and nitrates. This, of course, raises the hope that the task may be accomplished with a quite moderate amount of international organisation. This hope is strengthened by the fact that the sources of the selected raw materials are not very widely scattered over the face of the earth. On the contrary, some of them (for example, nickel, vanadium, molybdenum, cobalt, and natural rubber) are found or produced in remarkably few separate places or regions. This is all to the good. Past experience in the formation of various international cartels to control raw materials, such as rubber or tin, shows clearly that the fewer the sources of supply and the smaller the number of parties to the negotiations, the greater the likelihood of a successful outcome. Over 91 per cent of natural rubber is produced in Malaya, the East Indies, Siam and Indo-China—a fact that has been brought home to us recently with some force. Nickel comes largely from Canada, and only in very much smaller quantities from five or six other parts of the world. The sources of supply of vanadium, cobalt and molybdenum are even fewer. Those of tungsten, chrome, manganese, copper and petroleum products, on the other hand, are rather more numerous, but not so numerous as to frustrate the formation, before the war, of several international combines.

Five of the materials mentioned above (*viz.*, petroleum products, natural rubber, nickel, nitrate and copper) have been

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controlled and regulated in recent times on an international scale. Thus, in the petroleum industry, the Royal Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Persian-Burma groups of companies were acting in close collaboration throughout the greater part of the world, and among the largest shareholders we find the British, French and Australian governments. On the great Standard Oil Trust I wrote the following paragraph in a book published about nine years ago: "The number of companies controlled (all over the world) is over five hundred, and the total capital involved is estimated at approximately £1,000 millions. In association with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company . . . and the Royal Dutch Shell combine the Standard Oil Trust has now entered into relations with the various German companies and groups . . . which are trying to develop certain German patents for the extraction of oil from coal." The great slump of 1930-31 helped to bring about an international agreement in the petroleum industry in which British, American, Dutch and Roumanian combines, producing between them 80 per cent of the world output, undertook to regulate exports.

Turning to copper, one finds that an international combine, formed in 1926 under the lead of the great American copper corporations, wielded great power until the onset of the slump. In 1935 another international combine was formed in the copper industry. This time companies operating in Africa and Chile took the lead and made agreements with producers in the U.S.A., Canada, Peru and Mexico. The agreements covered, in all, about three-quarters of the world output of copper.

The position regarding nickel is remarkably simple. Ninety-four per cent of the output is produced within the British Empire (chiefly in Canada) and most of this, together with the bulk of the United States' output and some newly-developed deposits in Finland, is owned and controlled by the International Nickel Company of Canada, either directly or through its subsidiaries. The only other source of any importance is French New Caledonia, while Norway and Greece are minor sources—all, it will be noticed, within the ranks of the United Nations at the present time.

In the natural rubber industry, between 1922 and the outbreak of war, two important experiments in international control were made. The first was the famous "Stevenson" scheme, which lasted from 1922 to 1928, but eventually failed because its price and production policies were unsound, and it included only producers in the British possessions of Malaya

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and Ceylon. The second scheme, embodied in the International Agreement to Regulate the Production and Export of Rubber, dated 7th May, 1934, was much more comprehensive, for it covered not only British, but nearly all non-British sources of supply and it was made between the *governments* of France, Great Britain, India, Holland and Siam, who gave a solemn undertaking to enforce the terms of the Agreement within their territories. The second control scheme was thus solidly based and was controlled by a body called the International Rubber Regulation Committee, composed of fourteen members. Malaya had 4 representatives; Netherlands East Indies, 3; Ceylon, 2; India (with Burma), 1; French Indo-China, 1; N. Borneo, 1; Sarawak, 1; and Siam, 1. Records were kept of all stocks and exports of rubber from these territories, and various other regulations were made and enforced under this Agreement.

After examining these and many other international cartels, one may fairly say that even before the war the control of raw materials by international *public* bodies was becoming more and more desirable, on purely economic grounds. The case for such action is immensely strengthened if it can also be made to contribute substantially to the prevention of war.

Clearly, international regulation of output and export of the raw materials in our list is quite feasible from an organisational point of view, and we already possess some basic knowledge and experience. But, it is equally clear that the quantities (or "quotas") to be allocated to each state at any time must depend not only upon the requirements of its industries for civil purposes but also upon the quantity of armaments it is producing. Therefore, the control of essential raw materials which are also essential *war* materials cannot be severed from the international control of armaments. Whether this thorny, perennial problem will be satisfactorily solved after the present war nobody can say; but if, at the end of the war, the United Nations enter into an Armaments Convention binding on all of them, and if they are also fully determined to control certain essential war materials, they could, by virtue of that control render it very difficult for other states to build up armed forces large enough to make aggressive war appear an attractive gamble.

It will be noticed that these proposals do not have to await the negotiation of complete disarmament, or even substantial reductions in armaments, before they can be carried into

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effect. All that is essential is that the quantity of certain raw materials to be used by any state for armament manufacture shall be openly stated and agreed upon in advance, so that the aggregate quotas of each state can be calculated by the International Control.

Let us, then, assume that this particular portion of the post-war armaments problem will be solved, and that a raw materials control scheme is to be instituted. What should be the essentials of such a scheme? These, in broad outline, appear to be as follows:

1.—The Governments of the United Nations, acting through a Supreme Council, would have to become parties to a treaty affirming their intention to act together to control and distribute certain raw materials with strict justice for peaceful uses, and setting up

(a) a Permanent International Commission to exercise supreme supervision over the whole scheme, and

(b) a Permanent International Organisation, divided into nine or ten sections, one for each of the listed raw materials.

2.—By the same treaty or a supplementary series of separate treaties, nine or ten international control boards could be created, each forming part of the Permanent International Organisation, and being responsible for the proper control and regulation of the particular raw material within its charge. The boards could consist of representatives from the various producing countries, and representation might be made roughly proportional to size of average annual output. This, however, should not be carried so far as to make the boards very large and unwieldy. It might be possible to allocate only one representative among several small producers.

3.—It would be necessary to bring into the scheme certain states not included among the United Nations. These fall into two classes: hostile belligerents (i.e. "Axis Nations"); and non-belligerents. The "Axis Nations," Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Siam, could be brought into the scheme under the terms of peace. The non-belligerents, consisting for present purposes of Turkey, Portugal and Argentina, would very probably come voluntarily into the scheme, for they are all small nations with much to gain from the preservation of peace.

4.—On the Permanent International Commission and

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the various control Boards a majority vote should be sufficient: unanimity should certainly not be required. Voting power on each of the control Boards might very well be made proportional to the average annual output of the various States represented.

5.—No State should be permitted to resign.

6.—An appropriate number of International Inspecting Delegates should be appointed and sent to reside in each producing and consuming country or group of adjacent countries.

7.—All unsettled disputes or complaints would be referred to a special section of the Permanent Court of International Justice. If the evidence showed serious or suspicious abuse and contravention, the Permanent Court of International Justice should have power to order provisional economic sanctions, viz., immediate suspension of deliveries of all supplies of controlled raw materials to the delinquent or suspected power; and simultaneously to refer the matter to the Supreme Council of the United Nations. The latter must be so constructed as to be able to take swift and effective action against a recalcitrant State, for such a State may be a potential aggressor. This evidently calls for an International Police Force, maintained in great strength, based upon a limited number of strategic centres throughout the world, and ready at all times to obey the orders of the Supreme Council.

In the majority of cases—perhaps in all cases—the immediate and *complete* imposition of provisional economic sanctions would probably be quite sufficient to bring from the recalcitrant state either satisfactory explanations, or an apology and assurances of present and future compliance with the provisions of the original Treaty.

The present owners of the listed raw materials need not be bought out. Existing companies and their staffs could remain, but would work under the general supervision (mainly as to output and exports) of the International Control very much as they have done in the recent past under the international cartels in the rubber, tin and other industries. Users would place orders through the usual business channels for their requirements for non-warlike purposes and they would be supplied at reasonable world prices. Any abnormal increases in the quantities demanded would be investigated and would have to be justified by proof of *legitimate* need.

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At this point, lest we fall into the error of presenting an over-optimistic picture, we must deal with certain dangers and difficulties which appear to lie in the path.

In the first place, it is hardly to be expected that the powerful persons and corporations who own and control the raw materials in our list will willingly relinquish control to a superior, international authority. Doubtless they will not regard with equanimity the prospect of being able to sell their products for peaceful purposes *only*. "Business is business," and if the Japanese government is eager to buy large and increasing quantities of basic war materials for use against the U.S.A. when the time is ripe; and if the Government of the United States is prepared to buy even larger quantities of the same materials in order to prepare to ward off the attack when it comes, who shall dare to hinder or prevent the development of such a highly profitable situation? It is by no means fantastic to contemplate a situation in which private enterprise, powerfully organised and thoroughly alarmed, working with the agents of states not genuinely peaceable, might try to wreck the plan by every available means. Bold, drastic counter-measures may be required; action without precedent may have to be taken in order to over-ride certain private interests. But what does this weigh when thrown into the balance against the *public* benefits of security from aggression and the horrors of frequent wars?

If the scheme is to have any chance of lasting success it must be patently fair to all parties, both in its original design and in its subsequent operation. But it should not be indulgent. So long as raw materials are made available at reasonable prices for all legitimate peaceful purposes, no state can fairly complain that its nationals are being persecuted and their trade destroyed by "lack of access to raw materials." Once the United Nations are convinced of the essential justice of the scheme, they must tolerate no contravention, no attempts at sabotage or obstruction, from any person, corporation or state.

Such action for the public good can spring only from a close association of nations pursuing common purposes. It would be unwise, however, not to face the danger that, as time passes, the United Nations may not remain united. The construction and working of any international control scheme demands unity of purpose and willing, broad-minded co-operation. In the case we are considering, each state would have to be prepared not only to do its part in bringing into the

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scheme the producers and consumers under its jurisdiction, and keeping them in; but also to permit and facilitate within its territories continual inspection and supervision by the representatives of the International Commission.

The geographical distribution of the sources of our chosen group of raw materials is, on the whole, very favourable to our scheme at the present time. But human affairs, especially in modern times, are essentially dynamic, and we cannot be certain that no changes in the existing situation will occur. New sources of supply of one or more of these raw materials may be discovered in other parts of the world; or close substitutes may be found or produced synthetically. Clearly, the operation of the plan would at once put a premium upon such discoveries, and attempts would undoubtedly be made by every ingenious, potential aggressor anxious to evade the control and sabotage the scheme.

Therefore, as a safeguard, it would be necessary to set up, as part of the machinery of control, a Technical and Research Section to collect information, to study it carefully and give early warning of all such moves. The International Commission would probably find it necessary to extend its control over all new sources and substitutes, in order to preserve the power and effectiveness of the original scheme.

Another rather difficult task with which the Commission would have to cope would be the control of supplies re-transferred from the ostensible user to an actual user. For example, if the normal trade of a certain state began to decline, surplus essential raw materials, no longer required for civil purposes, might be quickly diverted to the production of armaments and munitions of war. In other words, an attempt might be made to conceal the fact that a gap had appeared between legitimate past and present raw material requirements. Of course, in special circumstances, such as the accidental destruction of large supplies of controlled raw materials, such transfers might be quite legitimate and desirable, and could be effected by the issue of special licences from the International Commission. But means of checking illegitimate, surreptitious transfers of controlled materials from civil to military uses would have to be devised.

In conclusion, we cannot emphasise too strongly the great significance of the psychological and political factors. The necessary international control machinery could soon be set up and no insuperable organisational difficulties are likely to arise.

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But we shall need more than international machinery. We shall need faith in the objects of the scheme, and the will and wisdom to work it. We shall need in peace, as in war, honest, alert, and far-sighted political leadership. We shall need the support of public opinion. We shall need to arouse the interest of men and women everywhere—in field and factory, in the workshop and in the home. The masses of the people everywhere ought to support the scheme wholeheartedly, for it promises not only fair play to all, but a strong safeguard against the sort of international foul play which has brought down upon millions of ordinary decent folk the present cataclysm of destruction and death. The wonders of organisation achieved in war can certainly be repeated after the war, given the will to create a permanent peace by every available means. Once inaugurated and provided with honest administration, the control of essential war materials would become, in less than a generation, an accepted and established instrument of international order, justice and good government.

THE FABIAN SOCIETY

By MARGARET COLE

I
THE Fabian Society, whose diamond jubilee was celebrated this January, has some claim to be a unique specimen in the political world. It is, since the dissolution of the Social-Democratic Federation, the oldest Socialist society in this country; it is the oldest Socialist society in the world; and almost certainly the oldest Socialist society in the world; and it is certainly in membership the smallest Society which has ever exercised so much political influence over so long a period. The membership and the activity of the Society have fluctuated from time to time; but, fluctuations notwithstanding, it has remained the Fabian Society, and the odd name which it chose for itself in 1884 has retained its significance throughout the sixty years which have followed.

The Society was born with no flourish of trumpets; it sidled into existence in the most unobtrusive way. In October of 1883 Edward Pease and Frank Podmore—who had met by chance while looking for a ghost in a house at Hampstead—were present at the first meeting of Thomas Davidson's Fellowship of the New Life, "whose ultimate aims shall be the reconstruction of Society in accordance with the highest moral principles," its first object being "the cultivation of a perfect character in each and all." This organisation (whose secretary for a time was Ramsay MacDonald) maintained a quiet existence for a time; but in the meantime, in January, 1884, by a vote of nine members to two, it budded off a new body which called itself the Fabian Society, in allusion to the methods of the Roman general: "For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently . . . but when the right moment comes you must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be vain and fruitless."

The new Society, the names of whose original members are preserved in manuscript at the present Fabian offices, started operations with an Executive Committee of three members, a secretary (Pease) whose flat was its official address, and a capital of thirteen shillings and ninepence, contributed by the members present at the first meeting. It did not mention Socialism until it was ten weeks old; and only in its third Tract, published in June, did it publicly announce that it "had

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in view the advancement of Socialism in England." It issued no annual reports until 1889, and had no journal until *Fabian News* appeared in 1891. In 1889—the year of *Fabian Essays*—it had only 130-140 members, although these had for some years included the great quartette, Shaw, Webb, Olivier, and Graham Wallas, as well as Hubert Bland, the treasurer, and Pease, its secretary and guardian watch-dog for over thirty years, and it had already issued the second most famous of all Fabian publications, *Facts for Socialists*.

II

From 1889, however, there came a twofold change which put the Society into the middle of the political map. First was the publication of the *Essays*. These were delivered originally as a series of unadvertised lectures in the winter of 1888-9; they were subsequently co-operatively revised by the lecturers, edited by Bernard Shaw, and issued by the venturesome Society at its own expense in December, 1889. The instant success—a success prolonged for many years—of this attempt to provide a body of doctrine for an English Socialist movement needs no recapitulation here. Even to-day, with the exception of the contribution of Annie Besant (of whom more hereafter), the *Essays* date remarkably little. Their thought is the thought of Bentham, Mill, Ricardo, and all the tradition of English radicalism, pursued to its logical end in a Socialist community. What they do lack, as Webb pointed out in later years, is any sense of the means to the end, of the institutions of English life through which the change must come. The Essayists might have learnt this lesson from Marx, if they had not been temperamentally averse from reading him; as it was, they had to learn the second half of the Fabian contribution to social science from the other member of the great partnership—Beatrice Potter—who even at the moment of the publication of the *Essays* was feeling her way, in spite of Alfred Marshall's discouragement of her efforts, to a study of the Co-operative Movement and later of the Trade Unions.

Fabian Essays made an instant sensation. It was followed up by a lightning campaign of lectures on Socialism in the provinces, conducted largely by that brilliant propagandist Annie Besant, who in her reaction from Bradlaugh's secularist individualism made a rocket-like flight through the Fabian Society until before 1890 was over she had come to earth again and buried herself in the Theosophical Society. Whatever

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Annie Besant was, she was certainly not a typical Fabian; nor in the main were her converts; they were working-class people who were crying out for a simple Socialist creed.

While the influence lasted, it swelled the Fabian Society into a body of over three thousand members, five-sixths of them in the provinces; but with the disappearance of Mrs. Besant and the foundation of the I.L.P. (in which the Fabian Society played its part) the provincial membership joined Keir Hardie's new organisation, and the Fabian Society returned to its business of quietly building up its central membership, which by the time of the Boer War had reached nearly nine hundred. The most tangible results on the organisation were the starting of *Fabian News* and the daring decision to pay the secretary a pound a week.

The characteristics of this decade, which was possibly the most formative and the most influential in the Society's history, deserve rather closer study. What first emerges is the enormous amount of actual work done by the members of the Society as well as by its leaders. "Two Fabian committee meetings a week" writes Bernard Shaw to Ellen Terry in 1897—what would the present Fabian Executive make of that? But beside this we have to set such facts as the 3,400 lectures given during 1892 by 117 members, the regularly-attended fortnightly meetings of members, and the searching way in which each Fabian Tract, even when written by those best known in the Society, was perused and criticised by the others.

Many have read Webb's observation that "the work of the Fabian Society is the sum of the work of individual Fabians"; but not so many realise how much this work was in itself a co-operation, extending even to the revision by the leaders of one another's books. To quote Shaw again: "the Webbs' great new treatise on Democracy,"¹ which I have to help in revising"; and it was quite in keeping with the tradition that during the 1919 railway strike both Shaw and Webb should turn up with manifestoes to be issued under the signature of J. H. Thomas, though neither of their styles could have remained for a moment unrecognised.

It was this sense of continued and active partnership which partly accounted for the rather engaging parish-magazine quality of *Fabian News*—"Frank Podmore," says an early issue, "has married Miss E. O. Bramwell, and *vice versa*"—a characteristic which it maintained with little change until the present paper

¹ *Industrial Democracy*, their second big book.

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shortage reduced it to a cold compressed news-sheet about as sympathetic as a page of *Bradshaw*;¹ the same cause also certainly helped to account for the remarkable effectiveness of Fabian propaganda. During the period under review, to take only a few examples, the Fabian Society (a) won the new London County Council for the Progressives by means of a barrage of facts and questions for candidates; (b) in the famous article "To Your Tents, O Israel," declared, seven years before the foundation of the Labour Representation Committee, the two capitalist parties were broken reeds and that the Trade Unions would have to provide their own members of Parliament; (c) succeeded, through the agency of a barely-known member of the Society, in forcing upon a startled Liberal Party the Newcastle Programme of 1891;² and (d) a year or two after the end of the period, was practically responsible for the better parts of the Balfour Education Act of 1902. It was on this occasion that the Education Office, taking a step without precedent (and, so far as I know, without recurrence) for a Government Office, asked for proofs of the Fabian Tract on Education to distribute in advance to its officials.

Furthermore, the Fabians were rapidly creating confidence in themselves as persons to whom it was safe to go for information and assistance and who, moreover, might safely be entrusted with the spending of large sums. They ran tuition by correspondence course—until the foundation of Ruskin College; they bought and circulated travelling book-boxes in the days before Carnegie and University Tutorial Classes had made books easy of access; in the midst of their production of Tracts, of which 103 were published between 1889 and 1901, they issued, in *What to Read on Social and Economic Subjects*, one of the first catalogues *raisonnés* of social studies. In 1885 a Mr. Millar of Edinburgh presented them with £1,000 to run a huge conference on Industrial Remuneration, and, more important, in 1894 the Hutchinson Trust, a legacy from an old Fabian, gave them nearly ten times as much, which the Executive Committee with great foresight decided not to put into current expenditure but to employ partly on financing provincial lectures on Socialism and partly on founding the body which is now the London School of Economics and Political Science.

¹ It is, perhaps, worth noticing that, in the days when to avow oneself a Socialist needed some considerable courage, the Fabian Society habitually issued a printed list of its membership, and only discontinued the practice because of the assistance it gave to advertising touts.

² The full story of the adoption of the Newcastle Programme, interesting as it is, is too long to tell here.

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In 1896, the Fabian Society was asked to take part, with the Trades Union Congress, in a Conference of International Socialist Workers. The *Report of Fabian Policy* which the Society submitted with its resolutions for that Conference¹ is so illuminating on the nature and the methods of the Society that it is worth quotation.

1.—*The Mission of the Fabians.*

The object of the Fabian Society is to persuade the English people to make their political constitution thoroughly democratic and so to socialise their industries as to make the livelihood of the people entirely independent of private Capitalism.

The Fabian Society endeavours to pursue its Socialist and Democratic objects with complete singleness of aim. For example:

It has no distinctive opinions on the Marriage Question, Religion, Art, abstract Economics (!), historic Evolution, Currency, or any other subject than its own special business of practical Democracy and Socialism.

It brings all the pressure and persuasion in its power to bear on existing forces, caring nothing by what name any party calls itself, or what principles, Socialist or other, it professes, but having regard solely to the tendency of its actions, supporting those which make for Socialism and Democracy, and opposing those which are reactionary.

It does not propose that the practical steps towards Social-Democracy should be carried out by itself, or by any other specially organised society or party.

It does not ask the English people to join the Fabian Society.²

3.—*Fabian Toleration.*

The Fabian Society, far from holding aloof from other bodies, urges its members to lose no opportunity of joining them and permeating them with Fabian ideas as far as possible. Almost all organisations and movements contain elements making for Socialism, no matter how remote the sympathies and intentions of their founders may be from those of the Socialists. On the other hand, unintentionally

¹ Written by Shaw and published as Tract No. 70. Well worth reading in full.

² This was very true. Up till 1912, at any rate, entry to the Fabian Society, while not as difficult as entry to the Russian Communist Party, was not easy. The present Leader of the Labour Party has told how, on penetrating in 1909 to a basement in Clement's Inn, he and a friend were greeted by the General Secretary as though they had been a couple of blackbeetles and forced to give adequate reasons for their presence. Fabian practice, in this respect, has softened with the years.

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reactionary proposals are constantly being brought forward in Socialist bodies. Fabians are therefore encouraged to join all other organisations, Socialist or non-Socialist, in which Fabian work can be done.

6.—*Fabian Compromise.*

The Fabian Society, having learnt from experience that Socialists cannot have their own way in everything any more than other people, recognises that in a Democratic Community Compromise is a necessary condition of political progress.

(Other sections deal in the same style with Fabian views on democracy, individualism, freedom of thought, the Press, the middle class, etc.)

14.—*Finally.*

The Fabian Society does not put Socialism forward as a panacea for the ills of human society, but only for those produced by defective organisation of industry and by a radically bad distribution of wealth.

It did not, however, refuse collaboration for limited objectives with Societies whose views of their Socialist function were rather different from its own. Examples are: a not very happy association under the chairmanship of William Morris with the Hammersmith Socialist Society (all that was left of Morris's Socialist League) and the S.D.F.; the long-continued partnership with the I.L.P. and the Trade Unions, which turned eventually into the Labour Party; and a joint committee on Socialist propaganda with the I.L.P., formed a few years before the last war and broken up when the I.L.P. adopted its anti-war line.

III

The Boer War brought about the first really sharp dispute in the Fabian Society. A number of influential members were strongly pro-Boer and desired the Society to align itself with the anti-war campaign. The leaders, including Webb and Shaw, were inclined to say "a plague on both your houses" and to point out that neither Dutch farmers nor gold-diggers of doubtful origin cared a button for the rights or the conditions of the natives.¹ After some hot debate, the members of the Society were asked whether they thought the Society ought to produce a statement on the war, and by a fairly narrow majority decided that it ought not. Between twenty and thirty members, including Henry Massingham and Ramsay MacDonald, resigned

¹ See Shaw, *Fabianism and the Empire*, for a statement of their point of view.

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as a result; but the Society generally proceeded steadily on its way, busy with the Education Bill, but not taking much notice either of the progress of the Labour Representation Committee or of politics in general, and neither gaining nor losing much in membership until after the 1906 election.

The results of that election seem to have taken the Society by surprise, as they certainly did the Webbs. As a result of the great radical break-through and the seething social discontent of the years between 1906 and the outbreak of war, the membership began to rise again rapidly. Another rocket, this time bearing the name H. G. Wells, flew into the Society with a brilliant paper entitled *This Misery of Boots* and flew out again in a fury almost before there had been time for all the changes he wished to make even to be discussed. Old provincial societies revived and new ones were founded; young men and women from the Universities flocked to join; forty-eight Tracts were issued in seven years; Executive elections were hotly contested, one polling 78 per cent of the membership; by 1913 there were thirty-nine provincial and eleven university societies, six London groups and a membership of 2,800 with possibly another 800-1,000 who were members of provincial societies only.

But to the historian this revival has a febrile quality which is absent from the earlier movement. It was not peculiar to the Fabian Society; in all parts of the "progressive" world there was apparent the same half-articulate but bitter discontent described so well in George Dangerfield's *Strange Death of Liberal England*, which fulminated now against the Liberals, now against the embryo Labour Party, now against the opponents of women's suffrage, now against the Trade Unions, now against the family, the stage censorship, the marriage laws, or what you will, and now against the collectivist philosophy of the Fabian leaders. The world of Victoria was in fact breaking up, and no one knew quite what was coming.

What is noticeable in the Fabian Society records is the extent to which the new recruits, from Wells onwards, appeared to dislike and to distrust the Society's policy and its practice. They all wanted it to be or to do something different; the only difficulty was that they could not agree what. All sorts of proposals appear and disappear—that the Society should become an immensely large propagandist body, and that it should confine itself to doing research; that it should disaffiliate from the Labour Party, and that it should expel from membership

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all who belonged to either of the older parties. Under such circumstances, it was fairly easy for the Executive, aided by the natural conservatism of the older members, to defeat the successive waves of reform and revolt; but when the Old Gang, as Pease called it, triumphed over the last, of these, the "Right Moment" group led by Clifford Allen and G. D. H. Cole, their victory was won at the price of losing for the Society the driving force of the new generation.

Beatrice Webb, who did not join the Executive Committee until 1912, and was not so deeply imbued with the collectivist tradition, saw to some extent what was happening. After the great campaign for the break-up of the Poor Law, in which, of course, many of the new recruits took part, had finally proved a failure and broken itself against Lloyd George's Insurance Bill, she made a great effort to come to terms with the rebels, particularly the Guild Socialist and Syndicalist rebels.¹ She tried to woo the university young men, and by initiating special inquiries, such as the inquiry into the Control of Industry, which was the beginning of the Fabian Research Department, she endeavoured to find the young men work on which they might spread themselves. But the rebels were unaccommodating; they would have nothing whatever to do with collectivism; they manned the Fabian Research Department—but they took it out of the control of the Executive and finally away from the Society altogether.² The split, accentuated by the blank hostility of the Webbs to the Russian Revolution in its early days, was not effectively healed until more than twenty years had passed.

IV

The War, then, found the Fabian Society with a great part of its new membership lost again, either to the Forces or to the growing and independent Research Department. Nor did it do much during the War to revive its prestige, other than initiating the very fruitful procedure of hiring skilled research workers to do a particular job. Leonard Woolf's two important books, *Empire and Commerce in Africa* and *International Government*, as well as studies of the rural problem in England, of

¹ She had previously announced, at a public dinner, that she did not intend to be reckoned as one of the Old Gang, but would in future lead the Fabian Nursery—though she was fifty-one at the time.

² Eventually they in their turn lost control of the Labour Research Department (as it became) to a Communist group; but the Fabian tradition of accurate and trustworthy service proved so strong that even when anti-Communist feeling was at its height, the Labour Research Department's Trade Union affiliates largely stood by it in defiance of all menacing circulars from headquarters.

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State and private insurance, and of the British Commonwealth of Nations were produced in this way. But the two principal developments of British Labour in wartime—the War Emergency Workers' National Committee and the reconstitution of the Labour Party, on its present basis and with a defined Socialist programme—were the work of Webb himself, not of the Fabian Society.

Consequently, the Labour revival after the war affected the Fabian Society hardly at all; those who might have joined it turned rather to the I.L.P., or the new Divisional Labour Parties, particularly the Westminster Labour Party. It continued to publish a lessening trickle of Tracts, and to circulate boxes of books which got steadily more and more out of date; its name meant something in the counsels of the Labour Party, and a good deal more to foreign Socialists; but it retired into a quiet backwater, supported financially by a regular Summer School—which the General Secretary seldom attended—the regular Autumn Lectures, filled to overflowing by the many who wanted to listen to Bernard Shaw, and a gradually diminishing number of faithful adherents; by 1939 the effective membership had fallen to less than a thousand;—i.e. paying—membership had fallen to less than a thousand; and it is an ironic comment that the last Tract issued before the new revival was entitled *Our Ageing Population*. Various new groups formed during the twenties and thirties failed to offset the growing inertia, the only exception being a Local Government Bureau, which under W. A. Robson maintained a lively existence until it was snuffed out in the 1932 slump. In the later years, the files of *Fabian News* and the Annual Reports show clear signs of somnolence, the phrasing, and even some of the figures, remaining unchanged from year to year, as though they had been kept in standing type.

Meantime, in 1931, the parlous state of the Labour Party after the election had set some of its leaders, notably Clement Attlee and Stafford Cripps, searching for more up-to-date lines of political thinking and research. They made contact with G. D. H. Cole, who had for some time been organising¹ a group of Socialists, including a number of young men recently down from Oxford. The result of these discussions was the foundation, with the approving support of the Webbs, Arthur Henderson, and Hugh Dalton, of the New Fabian Research Bureau which, devoting its main attention to research and leaving political propaganda to others, gradually built up a

¹ Through the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, whose separate existence came to an end in 1932.

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distinguished and hard-working membership, which by 1939 had reached over 800. By that time, it was clear that the existence of two bodies sharing the same name was unnecessary and confusing. Heroic efforts by Emil Davies, the treasurer, having succeeded in clearing off the clinging debt of the Fabian Society, the way was now clear for an amalgamation, which was completed by June, 1939. Beatrice Webb, now in her eighty-second year, emphasised the continuity by becoming President of the reformed Society. G. D. H. Cole became its Chairman, and John Parker, who is now on the Front Bench of the Parliamentary Labour Party, its general secretary.

V

The sequel, the raising of the membership to something between five and six thousand, the revival of fifty or sixty provincial societies, and the steady stream of tracts, pamphlets, and books which have poured out, is a matter of current politics rather than of history. The war, which has been a hindrance by restricting paper supplies and carrying off or overworking the best workers, has yet helped in that it has stimulated the public demand for Socialist thinking while the political truce has been hamstringing the local Labour Parties. One change, however, from the early days of the Society must be noted. Political research, and political education, is still the main business of the Society. But political research has become much more skilled and much more all-embracing since the days when the Fabian Society could observe that "it had no opinions on the currency"; at the same time, the type of worker upon whom the Society can draw has become much more fully occupied, at least in his active years.¹ It would be impossible, to-day, to hold Executive meetings twice a week, or, notwithstanding all the voluntary contributions of members, to answer inquiries, to provide material for Parliamentary speeches and questions and for books and pamphlets, by conscripting the E.C. or even leading members of the Society. Nor are there available now, as there were before 1914, young men and women who can afford to work voluntarily for a political organisation while they look round and take their pick of a career; competition is too keen. A paid research staff is therefore essential—and expensive even if underpaid. It is all part of the complication of modern society, and of our painfully

¹ Some historian or some economist might one day evaluate the "social dividend" which has accrued to this country as a result of the unearned income of £1,000 a year which Richard Potter left to his eighth daughter.

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slow (and still incomplete) realisation of the fact that social, less than scientific, research needs proper apparatus. Fabian Society of to-day is a body which costs a good deal to run; but it could no more carry out the job which the Fabian Society of 1896 set itself on the resources of that date than a modern politician could become Prime Minister at twenty-five.

VI

It only remains to add a brief summing-up. Since 1896 the Fabian Society has almost entirely changed its person and to a very large extent its methods of working. It still endeavours, as it said in 1896, to employ incontrovertible facts and figures to show the British public that Socialism is the only thing that will cure the economic evils from which they suffer, and that if they want Socialism they can have it; to this end it still endeavours to make sure that its facts and conclusions stand up to any criticism which may be brought to bear; this has been recognised, not always conveniently, by a number of requests which continually turn up that the Fabian Society should take up, investigate and pronounce on this or that question. Its impartiality, granted its Socialist principles, has been generally recognised.

But it has also recognised its limitations, and has realised the undesirability of meddling in matters which were not its proper concern and in which it had no special competence. Though it has issued Manifestoes and statements from time to time, it has never fallen into the delusion common to many organisations, particularly the smallest, that passing a resolution on war, peace, reconstruction or other large subjects is doing something. This attitude may upon occasion have caused the Society to take too narrow or too insular an attitude—Shaw, in an article in the current *Fabian Quarterly*, points out how difficult he found it to induce his colleagues in the first decade of the twentieth century to believe that events on the Continent of Europe concerned them in any way; but it certainly made for stability and effectiveness in its own chosen task. The extreme conservatism, possibly, is the "self-denying ordinance" embodied in the present Rules, which prevents the Society, as a Society, from passing any resolution of a political character; though Committees of the Society may, and do, freely express their views upon the subjects with which they are concerned.

The refusal of the Society's membership to make a pronouncement on the Boer War may be an instance of this;

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also an instance of its extreme reluctance to force an issue which might result in a split. The Society has always set its face firmly against anything like heresy-hunting in its ranks, nor has it ever formulated a faith that was rigidly binding on its members. The Fabian Basis—first formulated in 1887 and finally abolished in 1939—was never a full confession of faith, but more a statement of the main points upon which Fabians were agreed. Outside the Basis, every Fabian might hold what views he liked and do what he chose to advance them.

Furthermore—and this is very important—the Fabian Society was never solipsist; it never developed—and I trust it never will—the kind of institutional loyalty that behaves like a dog-in-the-manger to any other institution. It never felt that England could only be saved by the Fabian Society, or even that any particular job was the Fabian Society's private property. Where it felt others could do the work better, it retired from the scene, as when it gave up its early branches to the I.L.P., or its correspondence courses to Ruskin College, or economic education to the London School of Economics. It filled in gaps—sometimes very important gaps—but it never sought to acquire a vested interest in the work which it was doing.

Finally, it was as British as they make 'em. In the early days its membership was almost entirely British; a name like that of Sergius Stepniak stands out like a beacon in the regular monthly list of enrolments.¹ Since 1918, and still more since 1933, that is no longer true; nevertheless, the general character remains British, and this perhaps makes it more possible for foreign comrades of varying types and nationality to feel that the Fabian International Bureau is a place where they will be welcomed and their problems discussed without their having to undergo an examination of a Gestapo type. At any rate, as Louis de Brouckère, himself a life-long friend of the Society, said at the Jubilee Reunion in January: "You in England do not realise how much the Fabian name has meant to the Socialists of Europe." We who have taken over from the founders trust that it will never mean less.

¹ Though, of course, distinguished foreign Socialists, such as Anatole France, were always eagerly entertained.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ROAD TO SERFDOM. By F. A. HAYEK. (Routledge. viii + 184 pp. 10s. 6d.)

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME. By HAROLD J. LASKI.

(Allen & Unwin. 367 pp. 15s.)

FAITH, REASON AND CIVILISATION. By HAROLD J. LASKI. (Collins. vi + 203 pp. 6s.)

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK'S new book, which has received a good deal of publicity, raises the whole question of the unsolved dilemma between planning and freedom, though it does not attempt to deal with the real problems of to-day. His thesis is neither new nor complex. The world took the wrong turning by mistake. The present trend toward monopoly was not inevitable. The socialist argument for conscious planning and for nationalising the means of production fails on economic grounds. Unemployment is necessarily associated with change. The elimination of insecurity would involve retrogression. Nor could there be much economic progress by planning. The plea of progressives that extremes of inequality nullifies personal freedom, is—in his view—a confusion of freedom with "power" [sic]. Economic freedom, as a pre-requisite of any other freedom, is a freedom of choice and initiative. Thus the system of private property is the most important guarantee of all freedom even to those who do not own property. Competition is no respecter of persons and enables an absence of arbitrary power. The rule of law enables impartiality; without it agreement would be necessary on everything, and as it is not forthcoming it would have to be enforced. Planning, once introduced, spreads; the worst get on top, they establish a tyrannical control over the smallest details of private life. It leads to compulsion in every respect, including the choice of occupation and consumption. If the state ceases merely to "hold the ring," it must become a Leviathan which imposes upon its members its views on all moral questions. The only solution compatible with personal freedom is to get back to Liberalism, which must not be interpreted as mere *laissez-faire* but a "national framework for competition." The Gladstonian English tradition which "we in this country" ought to uphold, is being undermined by sinister German doctrines of totalitarianism. International peace can be maintained only by a federal system. This must in its functions be equally restricted to upholding international law. This involves the restriction of the powers of the constituent states and thus lets the individual "free" in international relations.

Let us first turn to some points of economics involved in this argument which so sweepingly condemns all progressives in this country, whether Tory or Labour, of Nazi propensities. As a professional who claims to convict amateurs and cranks (page 5) of dishonesty and ignorance (page 73), we are entitled to expect that his case is most strongly buttressed on these points, which are, moreover, the sole points where empirical verification is possible.

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(1) He wishes to establish the fact that "the tendency towards monopoly and planning is not the result of any specific facts beyond our control, but the product of opinions fostered and propagated for half a century until they have come to dominate all our policy" (page 32). How does he set about it? "The most comprehensive study of facts undertaken in recent times is that of the 'American Temporary National Economic Committee on the Concentration of Economic Power. The final report of this Committee (which certainly cannot be accused of an undue Liberal bias) arrives at the conclusion that the view, according to which the greater efficiency of large-scale production is the cause of the disappearance of competition,' finds scant support in any evidence that is now at hand (page 33).

Thus first of all and *implicitly* the sociological, power factor is eliminated from among the factors responsible for the tendency towards concentration of economic power. Yet in America, as elsewhere, this has been the most potent driving force. The passage further suggests that the "New Deal" agency responsible for the report, as such, has a partiality towards either socialism or monopoly co-operation and has, after exhaustive enquiries, changed its mind. In actual fact—

- (a) a large proportion of New Dealers have always been fanatical *laissez-faire* Trust Busters (e.g., the Department of Justice under Mr. Arnold)¹;
- (b) since the end of the N.R.A. they have become dominant in the American administration;
- (c) the Federal Trade Commission has always been the stronghold of extreme *laissez-faire* opinion;
- (d) it has been shown by Mr. J. M. Blair in the "Review of Economic Statistics" (the relation between the size and efficiency of business, 1942, pages 125-135) that the statistical methods of the enquiry were faulty and that "it arrives at conclusions different from those indicated by the facts."

(2) For some time Professor von Hayek and Professor von Mises have sponsored the doctrine eagerly echoed in Anglo-Saxon countries that a planned economy cannot establish a rational system of production control and organisation. Barone has indicated first (and before von Mises expressed his doubt) the solution of this problem. Lately it has been exploded not merely by Professor Lange but also by one of the most distinguished fellow liberals of Professor von Hayek, Professor Schumpeter. In order, therefore, to establish the thesis that economic progress could not be speeded up by conscious planning and the full use of economic resources, he can no longer fall back on this particular fallacy. How does he set about it? The reader may take it that whoever talks about potential plenty is either dishonest or does not know what he is talking about" (page 73).

"To justify these strong words," he quotes certain conclusions from a book by Mr. Colin Clark, "a man of undoubted progressive views and a

¹ Cf. e.g., his introduction to J. Birkin and C. A. Welsh, *Germany's Master Plan* and the book itself.

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strictly scientific outlook suggesting that the elimination of *preventable unemployment* would not end poverty." Now Mr. Colin Clark's speculations in the field of economic statistical predictions have been recently subjected to somewhat searching criticism and his conclusions did not emerge intact from this analysis. Mr. Clark, moreover, based his analysis on the trends of the past and extrapolated without regard to the consequences on progress of changes in policy or economic structure. He did not take into account the possibility of ending monopolistic inefficiency or of using such expansion as could be derived by achieving full employment and obtaining further redistribution of the productive effort by reducing the inequality in the distribution of income, to undertake a consciously planned investment programme. Such a programme, especially in poorer countries where unemployment is largely "disguised" in an overpopulation in agriculture could explosively increase production, thus speeding up progress at a more than compound rate of acceleration.¹ This may not end poverty in areas where the birth-rate is high and the mortality rate can be expected to fall with an increased standard of life. But it seems the only way in which the present terrible conditions in Central Europe can be ended within measurable time and in which any improvement can be brought about in Asia, Africa and certain parts of America.

(3) His main positive economic thesis for which no detailed proof is offered is that personal freedom can be attained by impersonal competition under the impersonal rule of law. He would have to establish not merely that people wish to compete, but also that competition would lead to optimum distribution of productive factors. He would also have to establish that competition in the absence of monopolistic restraints promotes freedom. Even on the sheer economic plane, Professor von Hayek not only does not succeed in doing so, but does not even make the attempt.

He refuses to take cognizance of the conclusions of modern economic analysis and investigations. Laws prohibiting collusion between producers will by no means result in the restoration of perfect, or even aggressive competition. Tacit understandings to restrict price competition are not the result of the increase in the size of the unit; it is practised even by the smallest economic units, e.g., in the retail trade. The fear of retaliation will be sufficient to check him. Why should an *entrepreneur* consciously lower his profits. Most people (except professors, judges—and, at any rate, in Britain—Civil Servants and the decreasing numbers of rentiers) are producers first and foremost and not consumers. They are interested in protecting their earning power. Anything which threatens their existence as producers is vital to them, whereas protective practices which will

¹ It is also interesting to recall that Mr. Clark included Nazi rearmament as a *datum* to calculate economic progress, yet did not see that the terrific expansion achieved in Germany has nothing to do with the recovery of other countries based on consumption. Equally characteristic of the way in which Professor von Hayek proves his case is his quotation (page 77) of Mr. Max Eastman (who cannot on the whole be taken as an unbiased observer) to establish the fact that the difference between the highest and lowest salaries paid in Russia is of the same order of magnitude as in the United States. But would suggest that there is no more equality in Russia than in the United States. But he forgets that unearned incomes and capital gains are the most important sources of inequality in America.

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reduce their real consuming power by a small fraction are unlikely to arouse their hostility sufficiently to counteract the power and impulse of the interests threatened with extinction.

Therefore, the elimination of the wastage of imperfect competition and oligopoly would require positive price control by the state on the basis of a careful scrutiny of all costs involved. Yet even that would not be sufficient to provide optimum distribution of productive resources and their optimum scale of application. The risk of working for an uncertain and unknown market often does not justify sufficiently large-scale production. The cost, moreover, of "enlightening" the consumer further limits the opportunity of a full use of methods of mass production in a modern economic system organised at the risk of individual *entrepreneurs*. State guarantee of orders would thus be the only possibility of providing that rationality of perfect markets which Professor Hayek wrongly hopes to achieve by a more negative regulation.

The sociological implications of his statements are also misleading. In theory, the compulsion involved in the necessary "shifts" to "implement the wishes of consumers" might be called impersonal. In practice, no one who has spent his life in academic spheres, which on the whole are organised in a democratic way, can fail to know that the relations between employers and employees are not only very far from being impersonal, but also very far from lacking elements of compulsion. It may not be surprising that Company Directors feel the restraint of bureaucracy under the Defence Regulations very irksome and wish to have their "fun" back again. They cannot have intimate cognizance of the life of the greater majority. What is perhaps less permissible is that they should generalise their experience and pretend that the overwhelming majority of the people in their most important relations *qua* producers and income earners are not under compulsion and discipline based on destitution. The necessity of having unemployed (and unemployment involving discomfort, if not abject suffering at that) arises out of the fact that discipline and monetary equilibrium must be enforced even in the automatic system of impersonal markets and it is destitution, or the threat of destitution, which enforces it.

A closer analysis of the three basic economic arguments of his book show that dismal morals do not nowadays necessarily mean good economics. We may then turn to the more sociological and philosophical aspects of the book.

(a) He wishes to destroy the claim that what has come to be known under the expression of economic freedom is not an essential condition of full freedom "in which the attainment of political freedom was but a first step" (page 19). How does he set about it? He asserts that "freedom in this sense is of course merely another name for power or wealth." He then shows that in the U.S.S.R. political freedom in the western European sense does not exist, and then identifies Nazism and Fascism with Bolshevism. Yet on page 96 he writes: "The utter hopelessness of the position of those who, in a society which has thus grown rigid, are left outside the range of sheltered occupations, and the magnitude of the gulf

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which separates them from the fortunate possessors of jobs for whom protection against competition has made it unnecessary to budge ever so little to make room for those without, can only be appreciated by those who have experienced it."¹

In another place (page 78) it is even clearer that he has implicitly adopted the progressive definition: "It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves." While this passage does not acknowledge the existing close organisation of employers, it is clear that freedom in this context means the capacity to earn a living and to maintain oneself in spite, e.g., of one's opinions, i.e., freedom in the *positive economic* sense which he previously rejected. It is not easy to reconcile it with his attack on trade unions and a demand for industrial democracy like work councils and industrial self-discipline. Nor is it explained why, in a country with a long tradition of parliamentary control, a system of independent review tribunals could not be established to guard against excesses of the executive in discharging its functions in the economic sphere.

Equally misleading is his unsupported contention that planning involves a complete control over man-power similar to that in wartime. It can easily be demonstrated² that in peacetime, when the time element loses its supreme importance and sufficient reserves are available in the form of shorter working hours, such control is unnecessary. Nor is there any reason why such direction of labour as is required should not as now take the form of differential wages. It is the maintenance of full employment and the assurance of a greater social justice which is required to restore a greater flexibility in the economic system. They are required if discipline is to be maintained, through self-discipline without the fear of destitution.

(b) Professor von Hayek asserts that once planning is introduced it must be all-pervasive and restrict all individual (political) freedom. If we assume that control must be all-pervasive and that there can be no agreement on basic aims, then obviously planning means dictatorship.³ There is nothing contradictory in the rule of law and planning. The managers and government officials, who are controlled by and are responsible to the electorate, can be made to follow general rules. In his chapter on the rule of law, following Mr. Lippman, who may be excused for such logical errors, he forgets that in a "liberal" system assent to certain fundamental features of the system is also required in order to make it work. If, e.g., private property was not accepted by the majority, it could only be maintained by

¹ This quotation does not refer to that majority of the population who, in the absence of property, are exposed to the fear of loss of livelihood, but apparently trade union restriction to free entry into occupations. He does not refer to the intellectual proletariat which in periods of retrogression, as in Germany, become possessed with a pathological fear of the future and a desire for change at any price, but to differences between workmen who try to protect themselves against major fluctuations by stabilising wages and thus reduce the instability of the national income. If there were no business cycles there would be a faint glimmer of truth in his assertions. Here again we see a confusion of assumptions.

² Cf. *Economics of Full Employment*, essays prepared by the Institute of Statistics.

³ The problem is how to make this responsibility and supervision effective; i.e., not a theoretical but the practical problem of organisation and selection of personnel.

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tyranny. In fact, the rule of law and democracy thus presuppose self-imposed limitation on what may be called opposition to the government, or rather the principles on which the government is established. Where, as in Spain, such assent is not forthcoming, or where, as in other countries, opposition or potential opposition takes the form of a threat of a violent overthrow of the government, there the reaction of the government itself is equally violent.

Professor von Hayek constantly refers, without any shadow of proof or even argument, to the capacity (page 78), the perfect foresight, willingness and ability of individuals to plan their lives for themselves (pages 56-7). Such general statements were, perhaps, permissible in the last century, when social science had no realistic studies at its disposal to demonstrate their adequacy. Who is that individual? Instead of arguing on a high level of airy abstraction, Professor von Hayek would have to controvert Professor Tawney's¹ demonstration how restricted an application these concepts have in actual life, and how bureaucratic control and inability to withstand the unrestricted whims of authority (except in as far as limited by trade union restrictions and rigidities) are the rule for the overwhelming part of the population.²

The reason for the failure of this book to deal with the most urgent problem of to-day, the establishment of an effective check on government controls, controlling the controllers, is not far to seek. He is still vitiated by his complete failure to grasp modern economic dynamics associated with the name of his great adversary and to check his assertions and assumptions by vigorous realistic analysis. There is hardly a single old economic fallacy, due mainly to the simultaneous assumption of full employment and unemployment, in analysing economic fluctuations, which Professor von Hayek does not serve up once more.³ The barrel-load of red herrings which he now offers on the political and sociological terrain will provide a gargantuan feast for those reactionaries whose "freedom-loving" policies brought Britain to Dunkirk and Singapore. On the next occasion, if their influence once more prevail, there may be no Stalingrad to retrieve the issue. For the few who remember the disastrous role of the deflationists in Germany there is something incongruous in Professor Hayek's endeavour, in the name of Liberalism, to transplant Vansittartism into science (especially chapters 12 and 14) and to proceed to convict his adversaries of a taint of Hitlerism. His book will be used to confound people further about "freedom." His advice on monopolies, ill-conceived as it is, will be conveniently forgotten, but in the violent controversy in which he will no doubt play a role, sensible measures of reform may be frustrated. The technique of controlling controllers, the most important task facing democracy, cannot be worked out in that atmosphere. If, then, the next

¹ *Equality*. (London, 1938).

² The history of man-power policy during the war shows, moreover, how impotent trade unions were, even when backed by the State, to institute tolerable working conditions. No one who has read social surveys such as those sponsored by the Carnegie and Pilgrim Trusts can accept the sweeping *obiter dicta* of Professor von Hayek.

³ Page 29 on competition, pages 66-9 on planning, pages 89-91 on anti-cyclical policy, page 96 on unemployment, pages 154-5 on inflation.

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crisis gives a violent answer to all these problems, Professor von Hayek will indeed have played an eminent part in establishing serfdom. Yet though he claims to represent the language of Shakespeare, the morals of Milton, the philosophy of Gladstone (or is it not really Herbert Spencer?), Professor von Hayek's true intellectual home is far from English tradition.¹ May one not hope that in this country a workable compromise will be established? Is it not truer to say that the Archbishop of Canterbury represents the spirit of this country more truly than the aprioristic unreality, the foginess of unsupported generalisations which rule out living compromise because it does not fit into a deductive—one is almost tempted to say *weltanschaulich*—system. Is Dr. Lindsay not expressing what is the best in the heritage of Nonconformism when he says that "we must break with the false and negative concept of freedom." So long as we cling to it, we shall be caught inescapably in the dilemma that we have to choose both in thought and in politics between complete *laissez-faire* and totalitarianism" (*Religion, Science and Society*). Is Professor Hayek's way not really as teutonic as the darkest corner of the Teutoburg forest?

Professor Laski's two books represent a complete if unpremeditated answer to Professor von Hayek's book. It is an acute political scientist's reaction to the trends of to-day, inspired by a generosity of spirit and a solicitude for human decencies. He does not wish to force the world back towards a past state of imaginary perfection which never existed; he wishes to take us into a to-morrow which is to combine political freedom, hitherto only experienced in the western plutocratic democracies, with that sense of economic security, of greater equality and of ever increasing social achievement, that have rightly or wrongly come to be associated with the Soviet Union. His analysis of the growth of the centrifugal forces within and between nations is convincing. The world became enmeshed in the contradiction between the potentialities opened up by technical progress and the inherent inability of orthodox *laissez-faire* to make use of it. The attempt in the 1920's to evade the issue by monetary palliatives broke down in 1929. Perhaps at that moment, without the second overwhelming disruption of the continuous economic evolution in western Europe and the United States, the technical possibility still existed to remedy the contents solely by the abandonment of the tenets of sound finance. Whether sociologically such qualified abdication of the ruling classes was possible is a question which is difficult to answer. The virulence of the orthodox doctrines, especially in the United States, seems to suggest that it was impossible, even without the intervention of what Lord Keynes once aptly termed bedlamite economics. The acceptance of permanent budgetary deficits may ensure profits; but it robs the controllers of the banking and industrial system of their ultimate veto in social and political affairs which in a *laissez-faire* system is vested in them by grace of the importance of their confidence in determining business activity.

The second World War and its immense effect on the balance of world

¹ May one not mention that apart from the eminent Victorians he quotes, Ruskin, Owen, Shaftesbury and Dickens were also English?

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power has made mere monetary tinkering of no avail. As Professor Laski puts it, "we confront the need not for a law here or a law there, but for a vital change in the whole spirit of government. Either that must come with the co-operation of those who now rule or the objective facts will compel a violent change in the principles of the society which they govern" (page 38). Efforts to stem the tide cannot be successful, but it could be canalised into channels and it could be prevented from sweeping away those aspects of western life—government by discussion and consent, political and personal freedom for the individual—which are the essence of civilisation. In analysing the achievements of, and the price paid for, the Russian revolution, Professor Laski, especially in his second volume, shows the immense energy which can be released by breaking down the restraints in social as well as economic matters, which have been forced on the system by the fact that restriction pays better than full effort and that equilibrium and discipline depend on the fear of destitution in the shape of unemployment or bankruptcy. The same applies to international relations. Nothing is more certain than that economic nationalism is promoted by unemployment. The slender hold of the ruling class, uncertain of itself, leads to fear, and fear to policies which in the long run are as inimical to themselves as to the community as a whole. It is, perhaps, the picture of the inter-relationships between the internal problems of the democracies and their international policies which is the most striking contribution of Professor Laski's study.

It is doubtful whether the rise of Fascism can be attributed to economics alone, or even mainly. Professor Laski's emphasis on the importance of national frustration, of the general fear of the future, of the failure of the progressive parties to act with energy and determination, provides an extremely valuable correction of the cruder Marxist explanations which have made so much mischief. But even Professor Laski underestimates the revolutionary dynamism of Nazism. Big business was an accomplice to Hitler, but it has never assumed the role of a dominant partner. The standard of life of the German workers did not fall as compared with the depression level until after the outbreak of the war. It rose steadily in the first years of the Nazi era. It may be argued that the *entrepreneurs* "permitted" full employment because they trusted the power of the ruthlessly terroristic state organisation to prevent full employment from increasing the power and dynamism of the working classes. But even that description would not tell the full story. The *entrepreneurs* were far from being thrown away in Nazi Germany. They were increasingly in the grip of the party which permeated and captured the army. In the absence of any constructive and self-contained programme, the party itself was driven by the demonism of its own which resolved its internal contradictions by the creation of external enemies. The most terrifying aspect of the Nazi dictatorship is that it could acquire a revolutionary energy, however pathological its aims, however perverse its denial of reason, by the mere fact that it provided a social aim. It made men feel that they were wanted. And however despicable the purpose they were wanted for, this led many to accept the leadership

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which they earlier rightly despised and loathed. The recognition of the importance of recreating faith and its combination with reason is an outstanding element in Professor Laski's book.

But it is perhaps the last two chapters of his reflections and the middle part of his essay that are most important. He realises the threat of reaction in the western world which might separate the United States and Britain from the Eurasian Continent and lead to renewed conflict. His hope is that this may yet be avoided through the emergence of a juster social system in the west. At the same time he is more than uncertain whether the heads of the present coalition in this country are willing or able to give the necessary lead. The Labour Party in particular are far too steeped in the spirit of collective bargaining and seems to be led irresistibly towards a corporate state of the most inefficient character. A moderate system of public planning and control to maintain full employment in a free society cannot be achieved by their present methods. The required reforms, unfortunately, are possible only when, as in 1940, people realise that national unity is necessary for national survival. Some hope can be derived from the fact that for this country survival as a first class power depends on the same conditions as the rise of a progressive world order in which peace can be assured. This may reduce the resistance against reform. Unfortunately, it is not certain whether the sequence of events will be swift and dramatic enough to provide the required shock.

It is a pity that Professor Laski did not devote more space to a detailed analysis of the conditions in which personal political freedom and government by discussion can be combined with planning. Apart from intriguing glances, e.g., page 336, he does not work them out in detail. A more positive statement is urgently required. For the ordinary reader, moreover, he might sum up his arguments and conclusions in concise form at each stage.

The first clashes on actual post-war plans have already occurred and in the day to day diplomacy the conditions of the future position are being shaped. It is certainly not yet too late for Britain to preserve her freedom of action, but the period of unfettered choice will not last long.

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THE JOURNEY TO WORK. By K. LIEPMANN. (Kegan Paul, 199 pp. 15s.)

WAR is as much a period of instruction as destruction. It accelerates social and industrial development and reveals the importance of many aspects of our daily life and labour to which little significance has been previously attached. Though, for instance, some discussions of the sociology of town-planning have appreciated the influence of the journey to and from the workplace upon the efficiency and welfare of both the community and the individual worker, Dr. Liepmann frequently comments upon the absence of essential data which she required in the preparation of this admirable study. She has, in the circumstances, wisely preferred to explore and to suggest rather than attempt a definitive analysis. We now possess, therefore, an excellent introduction to further research on the cost and value to society of the mobility which modern transport facilities confer, and of the relation between the daily journey and the other social problems like health, housing and community life, which determine the working and domestic conditions of people.

Apart from its academic merit, Dr. Liepmann's investigation is particularly opportune at a moment when our attention has begun to turn to the character of post-war industrial and social organisation. It is easy to draw up the case against the journey: it is often long and only too frequently overcrowded; the cost in relation to wages is high, especially in the case of women and juvenile workers. With the development of dormitory suburbs and clearly-defined industrial or commercial districts, it is sometimes necessary for workers to pass right across the urban area, as some travel daily from Becontree to the factories on the west of London. But, in addition to the calculable factors of time and money, there is the considerable effect of strain and ill-health which may result in a loss of productive efficiency which Mr. Bevin has put as high as ten per cent. Concentration on useful work during the journey is usually impossible; time must be passed in trivial ways, thus fostering the mechanical mentality which is already a danger in an industrial society. But it is equally certain that without mobility, that industrial economy would be unworkable. It is not merely that there are serious disadvantages if the worker is tied to a particular factory or district, producing areas like South Wales, where pools of unemployment persisted almost up to the war because of the difficulties of transference, but also the development of new undertakings is hampered if there is no flexible supply of labour. The journey, moreover, is a means of keeping the family together and offering alternative employment to blind-alley occupations.

Faced with this complex problem, in which the personal inconvenience to the worker must be balanced against the advantages which both he and the community derive from his ability to travel considerable distances to work, Dr. Liepmann makes several suggestions for the alleviation of unnecessary strain, which need not wait for larger decisions about urban structure to be made before any improvement can be effected. The five-day week, even if it entailed longer working hours, would be the most

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important single step. She considers that time-keeping rules at the average workplace are too strict, forcing workers to waste extra time to ensure prompt arrival. Rest pauses during the day and better canteen meals would do much to offset physical and nervous strain. Finally, after careful examination of the whole policy of workmen's fares and transport, Dr. Liepmann proposes a complete overhaul of times and charges; this would be even more necessary if working hours are to be staggered.

These, clearly, are reforms which can be achieved by negotiation between employers and the workers organisations, together with the transport companies. But the larger issues that emerge from Dr. Liepmann's thesis are in the field of physical and civic planning. Much of the present unsatisfactory position is due to the chaotic building of nearly five million houses between 1918 and 1939. After this war, there is at least the hope that preliminary debate will have secured some measure of control over urban development. But this, if it is tackled purely from the physical side, will not, of itself, solve the social and civic problems involved. We have not yet, for example, settled the issue of sub-centralisation or decentralisation. Dr. Liepmann, one gathers from her book, supports the Abercrombie school rather than the adherents of the garden city, for the latter solution, although compensating for longer journeys with more congenial surroundings, tends rather to increase than to diminish the complexity of the problem. The purpose of planning is two-fold: to create a closer integration between the worker as a producer and as a citizen; and, at the same time, to develop a conception of welfare which neither over-emphasises the claims of his society upon the individual nor exalts him as its sole concern. The first purpose is threatened by the growing severance of home and workplace: far from two distinct but complementary centres of communal activity developing, each suffers through divorce from the other. The average worker, with a journey of at least half an hour at each end of a working day of from ten to twelve hours lives in two worlds; in neither will he develop that sense of local patriotism or communal interest which is essential for a healthy democracy. Certainly a partial solution of this question lies in a reduction of the travelling distance, but it calls equally for energetic treatment by the development of the workplace as a social and cultural centre and by a reorganisation of the social machinery of dormitories, some of which still lack a suitable system of local administration. It is along the same lines that the problems raised by the growing depersonalisation of the individual worker must be tackled.

Naturally, war has aggravated the whole question. Not only will the housing shortage compel workers to live where they can find accommodation, but the great population movements which have now to be reversed, the uncertainty of workers and employers about their economic prospects, and the shifting location of industry must be taken into account. In such circumstances, a *laissez-faire* attitude would produce chaos. But if direction is necessary, the material that Dr. Liepmann has collected should provide the basis for a policy of compromise between the demands of society and the interests of the individual.

NORMAN MACKENZIE.

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HOW IT CAN BE DONE. By SIR RICHARD ACLAND. With a preface by J. B. Priestley. (Macdonald. 240 pp. 5s.)

THE NEW AGE. By EDWARD HULTON. (Allen & Unwin. 212 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THESE two books make interesting reading, if only as straws in the winds of social beliefs and aspirations. They have a good many things in common, and one of them is a certain naivety which adds to their interest for anyone concerned to watch and study the currents of social and political thought. Mr. Hulton is rather more naive than Sir Richard Acland; he does not always reach the same conclusions and, when he does reach them, they are not often so clear-cut and dogmatic. But perhaps the important thing is not the exact nature of the conclusions which they have arrived at and the political and social measures which they want us to take after the war so much as their general attitude toward contemporary society and the broad outlines of the "new age" which they anticipate or hope for. Both reflect the profound and widespread dissatisfaction with the society which we knew before the war. Anyone who can remember the years 1914-1918 and the innumerable books similar to these two which poured out of the printing presses as the war dragged towards its conclusion will be struck by the difference between the prophets of the new age and the new commonwealth then and now. The revolt against the results of our social and economic order is infinitely deeper and wider than it was in 1918. The assumption that there is something fundamentally wrong in that order and in the civilization secreted by it is implicit in the thought both of Mr. Hulton and Sir Richard, and both are convinced, therefore, of the necessity of some change which is fundamental. The Mr. Hultons and Sir Richards of 1918 did not think like that; in those years, if you said what they are saying to-day, you were dismissed or outlawed as a visionary, a dweller in utopia, or a dangerous "Red." The conservative is continually making the discovery that the only thing which can save the state is what the conservative of the previous generation rejected as utopia or bloody revolution—and usually when it is just too late to save the state. The road to war, bloody revolution, and other social disasters is paved with Acts of Parliament passed and "policies" adopted twenty-five years too late.

The publishers inform us that this is Mr. Hulton's first book. It has the signs of immaturity which are common among literary débutants, but it is on the whole a creditable performance. What his thesis really amounts to is that the age of democracy which has perished in the holocaust of two great wars failed by not being democratic, and that what the new age wants is democracy and more democracy. Characteristically he begins with the spiritual rather than the material environment, for he holds that "there can be no real progress, and no Good Life, without an earnest search for spiritual knowledge." The first item to be considered in his programme is therefore education. About it he has many sensible things to say, but he shows here a weakness which vitiates a good deal of his political thinking, a tendency to believe over-optimistically that you can have the best of both worlds. "All children," he says, for instance, "might be given the

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same education up to the age of thirteen; then would come classification." And again: "The natural *élite* should be educated in special *corps d'élite*, which should be boarding schools. These boarding schools should be at Eton, Harrow and Winchester. . . . Entry would be by merit alone, and not merely through money or family. For this purpose, the leading Public Schools would have to be purchased by the Government." And again: "I consider it would be a mistake to give the Government a monopoly in education (or perhaps in any sphere). Privately-run schools should be permitted, and might, in suitable cases, be subsidised." The intention in these three quotations is admirable, but the crux of the practical problem is not really faced, and anyone who has studied the history of education in Britain and the subtlety and suppleness of the ruling classes will think it extremely probable that in Mr. Hulton's best of both worlds of public and private education the *corps d'élite* at Eton and Harrow will miraculously contrive to be much the same *corps d'élite* as in the world which has been made safe for "money and family" by education. Mr. Hulton leaves economics to the end; and here again, though in 1918 he would have been accounted a revolutionary, he underestimates the difficulty of getting the best of the two worlds of socialism and private enterprise.

Sir Richard Acland is more sophisticated and his book is more significant because it is the programme of the leader of a political party which has already won some sensational elections. Sir Richard has the same kind of spiritual background as Mr. Hulton, but economics takes the prima donna's place in his book and programme. It deserves the closest study by everyone, and particularly by leaders of the Labour Party and the Trade Unions. They should begin by studying "The Principles of the Present Age" and "The Principles of the New Age" which are given on page 153. Sir Richard proposes to apply the principles of the new age by drastic socialization, a system of complete public ownership and public control. His criticism of the Labour Party and the planners, as he calls them, is directed against the fallacy that you can get the new age by Public Control of Private Enterprise. Some of his criticism seems to us unanswerable; he goes to the root of the problem when he says: "They (the Planners) propose that the representatives of the community should control the monopolists in the interests of the community. They never seem to ask themselves what will happen if the representatives of the big monopolies decide that they would prefer to control the community in the interests of the monopolies."

LEONARD WOOLF.

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THE MIRROR OF THE PAST. Lest it Reflect the Future. By K. ZILLIACUS. (Gollancz. 286pp. 7s. 6d.)

MAKE THIS THE LAST WAR. By MICHAEL STRAIGHT. (Allen and Unwin. 272pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE aim of this book by Mr. Zilliacus (the unwearied "Vigilantes") is to show from the history of the foreign policy of the Great Powers, especially Britain, from about 1900 to 1930, how fatal is international anarchy; to show how nothing short of world government for certain purposes by a supra-national authority can meet the world's need; to show "the almost unbelievable blindness, tenacity, cruelty and unscrupulousness with which the governing classes cling to their privileges and powers at any cost to their suffering peoples and to the wider interests of peace and civilisation"; and, therefore, to show the need for a conquest of power by those who "are in earnest about peace and social justice"—meaning "the revolutionary Left."

The main method is to take a few books by bourgeois writers such as Lowes Dickinson, Lloyd George, Colonel House and Bruce Lockhart, and to string together with comments quotations from these "unimpeachable sources." The quotations are mostly selected to expose scandalous episodes and class-war motives in "the world of power-politics and Imperialism"; in accusing Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George and the rest of acting as liars and puppets, the author emphasises that he is concerned to indict a system rather than individuals. Thus the book is a compendium of spicy bits, an armoury of class-war ammunition for the boys. It is also a reminder and a disclosure of a system which should be intolerable to any civilised person, and an impressive new challenge to democracy to "conquer the realms of foreign and colonial policy and defence." It is important and salutary as a corrective and a stimulus. But the cocksure assumption implicit in the title should put the reader on his guard. "Vigilantes" is one of those forces of nature which we should use and be thankful for, but he is as incapable of presenting an objective "mirror of the past" as was, say, E. D. Morel.

For the events leading up to the first world war the source mainly used is Lowes Dickinson's "The International Anarchy." It was a good idea to popularise that great book now, for a large proportion of readers of "Vigilantes" book will never get or read it. Few can have studied Dickinson's analysis without having their outlook altered for life; and "Vigilantes" extracts, though necessarily less impressive from sheer weight of testimony, should amply suffice to fire any democratically-minded reader with horror and anger at what was done by the masters of foreign policy in all the Great Powers, without the knowledge of their peoples, in pursuit of their deadly game of "Menaces."

Here, for instance, is the story of the Franco-British deal about Morocco which lay behind Lloyd George's threat of war against Germany at the time of the Agadir incident in 1911. Here is an exposure of the hypocrisy about our defence of Belgium in the event—the long-expected event—of German violation of Belgian neutrality. (Much more could be said in

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support of "Vigilantes" case. The subject might well be the theme of a tragic ironic film.) Here, too, are the sentences, familiar in the early days of the Union of Democratic Control, by which Asquith and Grey deceived Parliament (though not the German Government) about Britain's commitments to France and Russia.

"Vigilantes" says with justified candour that "if Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey had been witnesses in a Court, giving testimony under oath, they would both have been liable to prosecution for perjury for replying as they did to these questions." But, as he adds, in conditions of international anarchy "the standard of truthfulness was no higher in German diplomacy than in ours"; "nor was it more wrong for the Asquith-Grey Government to play power-politics in defence of Imperialism than for any other Great Power to do the same."

"We declared war on Germany," "Vigilantes" asserts, "because if she won her war against France and Russia she would become master of all Europe, and strong enough to help herself to British colonies." Each side was defending its Imperialist interests by preventing the Balance of Power from being tipped in favour of its opponents. These Imperialist interests were in the last analysis the private interests of finance and monopoly capital."

That passage is characteristic of "Vigilantes" slick over-simplifications. Equipped with his Marxist master-key, he finds no difficulty in unmasking and labelling the always disastrous motives of "the ruling class"; he leads the hunt up to some passion-charged formula such as "plutocracy," "vested interests," or "power politics," and stops there, relying on the familiar word to set the pack yelping without more ado. The historian will object that, in this first section, the author has been too content to rely on a single source, Dickinson's book, published in 1926, and makes practically no use of later material. And when Colonel Blimp finds "Vigilantes" referring to Joseph Chamberlain as Prime Minister in 1898, he will have too good an excuse for exclaiming that this is no mere slip of the pen but a sign that this damned feller has scant knowledge of English history beyond what he has picked up in the course of collecting his bagful of scandalous morsels.

But when every due allowance for over-simplification and for unfairness and distortion has been made, what an appalling story this is. Mr. Michael Foot is right in saying in his brilliant introduction that in so far as it is a story already told, it needs retelling now for this generation. Before 1914, there is the irrefutable record of how Grey, tied up in the war system, authorised secret military planning with the French and naval planning with the Russians, and then, with Asquith, lied to Parliament and kept his Cabinet colleagues in the dark about these fateful moves. Again, after 1914, there is the record of the Secret Treaties, which Grey helped to make not only as a means of buying allies by promises of other people's territory but also as a means of assuring Allied support for British claims in the Middle East. Three courses were open, theoretically at least, to the Lloyd George Government. They might disclose and repudiate these dirty

deals; or they might disclose and try to maintain them; or they might keep silent about them, lying if necessary to conceal their existence, and hoping perhaps that something would presently turn up to allow of some wriggling out of the most indefensible terms (such as the proposed annexation by Italy of the whole of Istria and much of Dalmatia, which the Foreign Office itself recognised to be "unfortunately . . . a very distinct violation of the principle of nationalities" and liable to produce "the worst results, namely irredentism and lack of stability and peace." (See Lloyd George's "Truth about his Peace Treaties," p. 37.) The Bolsheviks chose the first course, the Lloyd George Government chose the last. So again the deceptive suppression of essential truths became "necessary."

"Vigilantes" recalls how at the beginning of 1918, in order to secure the assent of the restive Trades Unions to the recruiting of 250,000 men hitherto exempted, Mr. Lloyd George found it necessary "to place before them with complete frankness the purpose with which we were prosecuting the war." He therefore made the famous speech of January 5th, 1918, explaining that "our one object in the war was to defend the violated public law of Europe, to vindicate treaty obligations and to secure the restoration of Belgium." Not a word about the commitments of the Secret Treaties which contradicted these professions. The Labour Party was completely, naively, reassured. Two days later Wilson made the Fourteen Points speech; and on January 18th Lloyd George again addressed Trade Union leaders, declaring that our sole purpose was to "realise those great aims which had been put forward alike by the Trade Unionists, the Government and President Wilson as the objects for which we were committed to fight." In reality, the Lloyd George Government did not accept some important features of the Wilson programme, and did not mean to abandon the Secret Treaties which conflicted in essentials with the peace programme to which the Trade Unions subscribed. ("Mesopotamia and Palestine," Mr. Lloyd George added, "should not be handed back to Turkish tyranny." It would not have sounded so good if he had gone on to disclose that, by the Secret Treaty with France and Russia, Britain had staked out a claim to annex Palestine and Southern Mesopotamia, including Bagdad, herself). "Vigilantes" can justly claim that the Labour movement was bamboozled.

After the German Armistice, the Allies, terrified of Bolshevism, went on attacking Russia. They called this "intervention". Vigilantes retells the story of Mr. Bullitt, the American, coming back from Moscow with peace proposals; how (according to Bullitt's account) he breakfasted with Lloyd George, who found the proposals important but "spoke of British public opinion as a fatal obstacle to the action which he personally would desire to take." A fortnight later Lloyd George was telling Parliament that "we have had no approaches at all." Fear of Socialism, and afterwards horror of the Bolshevik revolution, are identified, of course, as constant and dominating motives. An amusing quotation comes from Grey's heart-broken remarks to the Austrian Ambassador when the World War

was just beginning: "the war," he said, "was the greatest step towards Socialism that could possibly have been made. . . . We should have Labour Governments in every country after this." How potent the fear and loathing of Bolshevism was may be inferred from one of the most shocking specimens in the collection—one which concerns that Mr. Churchill who long afterwards, on the night of June 22nd, 1941, showed such prompt and resolute leadership in pledging British support to invaded Russia. In 1919 Churchill, as Secretary of State for War, was the protagonist and planner of "intervention" against Lenin's Russia, although Mr. Balfour at the Foreign Office had previously advised the Cabinet that restoration of the Czarism through a successful intervention would be dangerous to British interests. Then how came it, "Vigilantes" asks, that despite this Foreign Office opinion, Mr. Churchill could "succeed in getting virtually a free hand after the Armistice and £100,000,000 for a private war" of the intervention? "Chiefly," he answers, "because the Right Wing of the Conservative Party were whole-heartedly for class-war as their nearest and dearest interest, whereas the Lloyd George-Balfour wing were half-hearted and confused. . . ." And then, before the reader has finished saying to himself—"Vigilantes" is laying it on too thickly and crudely again," the author produces this statement, "The Secretary of State for War, in May or June, 1919, cabled to General Knox in Siberia instructing him to tell Admiral Kolchak" (who was leading a White invasion of Russia) "that the Prime Minister, who is all-powerful, is a convinced democrat, and particularly devoted to advanced views on the land question, and suggesting, consequently, that Admiral Kolchak should issue 'a broad and stirring appeal,' promising the land to the peasants and a Constituent Assembly, in order to strengthen his" (Mr. Churchill's) "hand in urging the Prime Minister and Cabinet to recognise Admiral Kolchak's Government." That passage is not just an embroidery by K.Z.: it is the record in Hansard of Mr. Bonar Law's reply, on behalf of the Prime Minister, to questions in Parliament.

The author holds that the League of Nations Covenant ought to have gone much further than it did in restricting national sovereignty; and he attributes this partly to blind reaction on the Right, but largely to the blindness of Liberals, who regarded the economic and social foundations of capitalist society as immutable, viewed the Russian revolution with fear and incomprehension, and were therefore constrained to come to terms with "Conservatism and plutocracy" on a basis of "a very low minimum of obligations in the Covenant."

Mr. Zilliacus refers in his preface to a second volume, already three-quarters written. It will be interesting to see whether he applies to the foreign policy of Stalin just such standards as he has applied in his present book to British policy.

Read this book. It is of real importance as an indictment of the international anarchy, as a compendium of some of the evidence in support of the demand for democratic control of foreign and imperial policy as an indication of the need for a measure of world government, and as

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an analysis from a Marxist standpoint of the motives of those who will continue to oppose such changes. But do not mistake it for a "mirror."

Mr. Straight's book is a powerful plea, by a young Leftist American intellectual, for fighting the war of ideas as well as the war of arms. It contains definite, solid material, as well as inspiration, for the imaginative planning of the democratic revolution. It contains many assertions that the critical reader will question or reject, such as the statement that there is "no other solution" for all Europe but federation, that "all disputes" between the United Nations must be "referred to one judiciary body for arbitration," that each of the United Nations should undertake to aid any other member that is "threatened by rebellion," etc.

But it is a brave and generous book, with solid stuff in it, though sometimes tiresomely rhetorical in style, and still of value though written in 1942.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

COMMODITY CONTROL. By P. LAMARTINE YATES. (Cape. 248 pp. 15s.)
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGREEMENTS. (International Labour Office. 221 pp. 8s.)

IN the twenty years preceding the outbreak of the present war the price of wheat varied from 60s. to 22s. per quarter, of sugar from 25s. to 5s. per cwt., of coffee from 25 to 5 cents per lb., of cotton from 36 to 6 cents per lb., of rubber from 2s. 2d. to 3d. per lb., of tin from £300 to £130 per ton, and of copper from 30 to 6 cents per lb. It needs little imagination to conjure up the picture of mass misery and destitution caused to millions by these wild fluctuations; while statisticians juggle with quotas and governments with subsidies, the real cost of these maladjustments is borne ultimately by the workers in the industries. How exasperatingly complex are these commodity problems, exasperating because in every case it is "too much" and not "too little" which is the cause of all the trouble.

I should like to see *Commodity Control*, a joint work by a group of Fabians, studied in the upper forms of every Secondary School for two reasons: firstly, that young persons might at least start with a clear, unbiased picture of the commodity situation; and secondly, that they might appreciate the profound influence international politics have had in creating again and again non-economic developments which, once established, became vested interests and sources of further trouble. Eight important primary commodities are dealt with in detail—wheat, sugar, coffee, cotton, rubber, tin, copper, and mineral oil; here are all the relevant statistics (wisely limited so as not to confuse), methods of production, attempts at control, effects of the war, and an estimate of the future. The whole story is told with clarity, humanity, and interest, and at the end are two chapters on Lessons and Remedies.

Wheat, a subject in which the author is an expert, illustrates nearly all the complexities of a commodity problem. The great exporting countries have chronic surpluses, but European countries such as Germany, France,

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and Italy, natural importers, have for years kept down their imports by subsidies, import taxes, and quotas, all with the object of being self-sufficient in time of war. Obviously, therefore, an essential condition for a satisfactory solution of this, as of all commodity problems, is political security. The author makes clear one very important point frequently overlooked, namely, that despite the poverty and under-nourishment in vast regions of the world, the potential expansion of wheat consumption is quite limited. In modern communities the variety of foods available is such that wheat consumption per head is actually declining, and this trend has now appeared in so many countries that, since 1930, the *world* consumption per head has decreased; further, in many of the backward regions rice is the preferred cereal, and a higher standard of living would therefore mean more rice and not more wheat.

To the complications of international politics and vested interests there has been added in recent years a new factor, namely, technical research which may increase yields without any change in acreage or labour. This factor is well exemplified in the case of sugar, where a Dutch East Indies research station produced a new cane (POJ 2878) with a sugar content so much higher than anything previously obtained that production costs dropped to £7 10s. per ton, just about half the cost of beet sugar in Europe. Coffee possibly represents overproduction at its worst, since in the last twelve years Brazil has had to burn approximately one-third of her total production, an amount sufficient to keep Britain supplied for 300 years!

In contrast with the food products, whose market is capable of little expansion, there is probably still scope for a considerable increase in the consumption of raw materials such as cotton and rubber. It is hardly possible to eat two meals in place of one, but in the case of clothing and domestic articles these can be possessed in greater variety and renewed more frequently as the standard of living rises. The problem here includes, therefore, the stimulation of demand as well as the control of production. There are excellent summaries of the pre-war attempts at control of both cotton and rubber, the American experiments with cotton control being particularly interesting.

The two chapters on the Metals are perhaps less interesting than the others, but they are useful as examples of cases in which the chief variable is consumption rather than production. The chapter on Mineral Oil gives a survey of one of the most critical materials both in war and peace. One has only to compare the standard of automobile-owning in the U.S.A. (Fig. 20) with that in other countries to realise the enormous expansion which awaits the world oil industry, an expansion potentially greater than that of any other commodity, and yet of all commodities none is such a rapidly wasting asset.

The final chapters on Lessons and Remedies summarise the problem of commodity control in general and suggest the broad lines along which solutions may be sought. Obviously the perfect solution in any particular case does not exist and the simple solution is equally illusory. Reasonably effective control with stability of price will inevitably require fairly

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
complicated international machinery, with economic planning on a national and international scale; only in this way can the most effective use be made of the world's resources; it is incredible that anyone should think otherwise, and yet one of the loudest post-war cries in some places will be "off with the controls."

The data in the book are clearly presented except that the vertical scale of some of the graphs is a little puzzling; it is apparently meant to be logarithmic, but a plain linear scale would have been much better for the average reader.

The I.L.O. is not primarily concerned with the study of commodity regulations, but is keenly interested in the social effects and consequences of intergovernmental commodity control schemes. This volume on Intergovernmental Agreements gives the texts of existing commodity control agreements and is introduced by a preliminary discussion of some of the guiding principles and social issues involved. Commodity control of major importance cannot be considered in isolation and the ultimate objective must be a general international commodity control organisation which would attempt to minimise short-period fluctuations and promote long-term equilibrium between supply and demand. To some extent the way has been opened up towards this objective by the huge bulk purchase and distribution schemes now operated by this country and America, but these will require considerable modification if they are to be adapted to peace-time requirements.

The accessory functions which a commodity control organisation can perform are discussed, e.g. stimulation of research financed by a levy, planning to conserve resources, investigation of storage technique and facilities, grading and control of quality, and even control of labour conditions. In connection with the last item, Appendix B is interesting; this is the standard social clause, requiring fair wages and conditions, embodied in contracts for imported strategic materials concluded on behalf of the Government of the United States. The legal status of control authorities operating in different countries is discussed. At present it is highly indeterminate and the enforcement of agreements presents many difficulties; the suggestion is made that some form of international commercial court will be required. This emphasises once again how very badly we need an extension of the body of international law, with appropriate courts of justice, and means whereby the decisions of the courts can be enforced.

D. S. ANDERSON.



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