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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XX, No. 2]

[July, 1944

The Concept of Sthayibhavas in Indian Poetics

(A Psychological Scrutiny)

By

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The classical doctrines of Indian poetics have, most of them, their origins in the work of Bharata, the *Nāṭyashāstra*. Among such doctrines is the famous Rasa Doctrine of poetical appreciation, in connection with which Bharata lays down the following cryptic aphorism :

“ तत्र विभावानुभावव्यभिचारि संयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः । ” (Nāṭyashāstra, VI, 34).

An expositor has explicated it as follows :

“ स्थायिनः विभावानुभाव व्यभिचारिभिः संयोगात् स्थायिनः रसत्वेन निष्पत्तिः । ”

Its purport has thus been rendered : “When the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and the *vyabhichāribhāvas* combine to awaken the *sthāyibhāva*, the awakened *sthāyibhāva* finally develops into *Rasa*.”

Bharata has said again :

“ विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिपरिवृत्तः स्थायीभावो रसनामरुभते (नेन्द्रवत्) । ”

(Nāṭyashāstra, p. 71.)

This means : “The *sthāyibhāva* when acted on (stimulated) by *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhichāribhāvas* obtains the title of *Rasa*.”

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It is obvious that the *sthāyibhāva* is here presumed to be some fact or phenomenon connected with the *mental life* of the *Rasika*, or the appreciator of a work of art.

The passages cited above are the *locus classicus* of Bharata's famous *Rasa* doctrine, which became afterwards the central text for the development of the various theories and explanations in the hands of the Sanskrit *Sāhityakāras* or literary critics. It is obvious that the whole *Rasa* doctrine hinges upon the central concept of *sthāyibhāva*, which is the core of that doctrine. It is this *sthāyibhāva* (whatever its nature), which, when acted on or appealed to by certain factors called the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhi-chāribhāvas*, is said to develop into *Rasa* (poetical appreciation or aesthetic enjoyment) of a work of art. A sound understanding of the *Rasa* doctrine, therefore, depends in the first instance upon a clarification of this central concept of *sthāyibhāva* in that doctrine.

A reference to recognised writers on this subject reveals a remarkable lack of agreement among them about the exact psychological nature of the *sthāyibhāva*. Here are a few representative views :

Dr. S. K. De (*Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*) has used a variety of expressions to render *sthāyibhāva* into English ; "the principal or permanent mood," (p. 27); "more or less permanent mental states," (p. 28); "permanent mood or sentiment," (p. 168, footnote 168); "dominant emotion," (p. 326); "dominant feeling," (p. 343); etc.

Pandit P. P. Sastri (*The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*) uses these phrases : "potential conditions of mind," (p. 18, footnote); "a permanent mental condition," (p. 39, p. 171); etc.

Prof. P. S. Naidu (*The Rasa Doctrine and the Concept of Suggestion in Hindu Aesthetics*, in the *Journal of the Annamalai University*, Vol. X, No. 1 (September, 1940), p. 8) opines : "The *sthāyibhāvas* are the propensities of Western psychology."

Dr. K. N. Watave (*The Psychology of the Rasa Theory*, in the Silver Jubilee Number of the *Annals of the Bhāndārkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XXIII, 1942, p. 670) writes : "The *sthāyibhāva* is the '*Sentiment*'. Our Sanskrit *sthāyibhāva* is neither an instinct, nor an emotion, nor a mood; although it has got an instinctive base and is a *primary emotion* in character."

It is obvious that these scholars have sought to identify the concept of *sthāyibhāva* in Indian poetics with some (corresponding) concept in Western psychology, e.g. *mood*, *mental state* or *condition*, *emotion*, *feeling*, *sentiment*, *primary*, *emotion*, *propensity*, etc. Now, if a concept of some mental fact or phenomenon as described by the Sanskrit literary critics is to be identified with the corresponding concept of some allied fact or phenomenon described by modern psychology, then this can be done in any *decisive* sense only after a direct and close, comparative *scrutiny* of the description of both the concepts given by competent and relevant witnesses, with a view to bringing out whatever *essential similarities* (and differences) there might exist between them. Similarities, then, if substantial, will make for their identity (and differences, if any, will have to be satisfactorily explained). The writers quoted above, apart from the thought-provoking suggestions that they have made, cannot be said to have done *this*, at least in a way that would satisfactorily decide the question about the exact psychological nature of *sthāyibhāva*. It is accordingly proposed, in this paper, to re-examine critically the descriptions of the *sthāyibhāva* in the Sanskrit works on literary criticism, with a view to ascertaining more definitely what fact or phenomenon as described in our modern psychology it approaches most in its essential nature.

II

Dr. K. N. Watave (*Rasa-Vimarsha*, Doctorate Thesis in Marathi, published by New Kitābkhānā, Poona, pp. 136-138) has very usefully brought together the principal representative passages in the various Sanskrit treatises, which are meant to describe, though not to define always and strictly, the nature of the *sthāyibhāva*. On a close scrutiny of these, it appears that they can be classified under five or six main heads, emerging out of that scrutiny, of the dominant characters of the essential nature of the *sthāyibhāva*, as it was envisaged by these writers. Below are given these heads and the passages that would appear to fall under them :

(1) *Innate Inclination or Disposition :*

'जात एव हि जन्तुः इयतीभिः संविद्धिः परीतो भवति ।' or 'न हि एतच्चित्तवृत्तिं वासना शून्यः प्राणो भवति ।' or 'वासनात्मना सर्वजन्तूनां तन्मयत्वेन उक्तत्वात् ।' (अभिनवभारती of अभिनवगुप्त)

सामाजिकानां वासनारूपेण स्थितः स्थायी भावः ।' (काव्यानुशासन of हेमचन्द्र)
 '.....स संस्काररूपेण स्थायितां गतः ।' (सङ्गीतरत्नाकर of शङ्कदेव)
 'वासनारूपतया अतिसूक्ष्मरूपेण अवस्थिताः अविच्छिन्न प्रवाहाः स्थायि-
 भावाः ।' (काव्यप्रकाशटीका of वामनशास्त्री शृङ्गरीकर)

(2) *Prevailing Predominance :*

'यथा नराणां नृपतिः शिष्याणां च यथा गुरुः ।
 एवं हि सर्वं भावानां भावः स्थायी महानिह ॥' (नाट्यशास्त्र of भरत)
 'सकलप्रधानो मनोविकार इति वा स्थायी भावः ।' (रसतरङ्गिणी of भानुदत्त)
 'एकः कार्यः रसः स्थायी रसानां नाटके सदा ।'
 (सङ्गीतरत्नाकर of शङ्कदेव)
 'सुराजैव विराजेत सः स्थायी भाव उच्यते ।' (साहित्यकौमुदी of विद्याभूषण)

(3) *Capacity not to be eclipsed by other factors :*

'विरुद्धैरविरुद्धैर्वा भावैर्विच्छिद्यते न यः ।
स स्थायी..... ॥' (दशरूपक of धनञ्जय)
 'सजातीय विजातीय भावानभिभाव्यो.... ।
 परानभिभाव्यो मनोविकारो वा....स्थायीभावः ।' (रसतरङ्गिणी of भानुदत्त)
 'विरुद्धा अविरुद्धा वा यं तिरोहितुमक्षमाः ।
 आनन्दाङ्कुरकन्दोऽसौ भावः स्थायीति संज्ञितः ॥'
 (साहित्य दर्पण of विश्वनाथ)

'सजातीयविजातीयैरतिरस्कृत मूर्तिमान् ।
 यावद्रसं वर्तमानः स्थायीभावः उदोद्धतः ॥ (रसगङ्गाधर of जगन्नाथ)
 'न तिरोधीयतं स्थायो..... ॥' (साहित्यदर्पणटीका)

(4) *Capacity to attract, subdue or assimilate other factors :*

'अन्ये भावास्तान् (स्थायिनः) गुणतयाश्रयन्ते ।' (नाट्यशास्त्र of भरत)
 'आत्मभावं नयत्यन्यान् स स्थायी लवणाकरः ॥' (दशरूपक of धनञ्जय)

'....तै (अन्यभावैः) रसौ (स्थायी) पुण्यते परम् ॥' (साहित्यदर्पणटीका)
 'अविरुद्धान् विरुद्धांश्च भावान् यो वशतां नयेत् ।
स स्थायीभाव उच्यते ॥' (साहित्यकौमुदी of विद्याभूषण)

(5) *Endurance—Stability—Permeation :*

'चिरं चित्तेऽवतिष्ठन्ते संबन्ध्यन्तेऽनुबन्धिभिः ।
 रसत्वं ये प्रपद्यन्ते प्रसिद्धाः स्थायिनोऽत्रते ॥' (सरस्वती कण्ठाभरण of भोज)
 'सक् सूत्रवृत्त्या भावानामन्येषामनुगामकः ।
स्थायी..... ॥' (साहित्यदर्पणटीका)
 'तत्र आप्रबन्धं स्थिरत्वादमीषां भावानां स्थायित्वम् ।'
 (रसगङ्गाधर of जगन्नाथ)

'....अविच्छिन्नप्रवाहाः स्थायिभावाः (काव्य प्रकाशटीका of शृङ्गरीकर)

(6) *Enjoyability—Delectability :*

'स्थायी एव तथा चर्वणापात्रम् ।' (अभिनवभारती of अभिनवगुप्त)
 'आनन्दाङ्कुरकन्दोऽसौ भावः स्थायीति संज्ञितः ॥'
 (साहित्यदर्पण of विश्वनाथ)

The following appears to be the broad upshot of the passages quoted above: The *sthāyibhāvas* are the innate, predominant or prevailing, uneclipsable, assimilative, enduring and permeating, enjoyable, conative-dispositional factors in human nature. In brief, the *sthāyibhāvas* are the prevailing, innate, conative-dispositional factors in human nature.

III

If this upshot extracted from a scrutiny of the descriptions of the *sthāyibhāvas* in the works of the Sanskrit *Sāhityakāras* is representative and correct (as it is hoped it is), then it directly suggests (and invites) a *prima facie* comparison of the *sthāyibhāvas* with the Instincts or Propensities of western psychology to the students of that science. Below are accordingly given a few representative passages from the works of McDougall and Drever, the well-known British psychologists, who have done so much in

recent times to secure a proper recognition for Instincts or Propensities, as the prime, innate factors or the original basic constituents of human nature :

(1) McDougall defines Instinct as follows :

"We may, then, define instinct as an *inherited* or *innate* psychophysical *disposition*, which determines its possessor to *perceive*, and pay *attention* to, objects of a certain class, to experience an *emotional excitement* of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an *impulse* to such an action." (An Introduction to Social Psychology, 23rd Edition, p. 23.)

(McDougall has also defined Instinct almost in similar terms in his later work, *An Outline of Psychology*, 4th Edition, p. 110. And he has defended the same general position in regard to Instinct in his *The Energies of Men*, 3rd Edition, pp. vi, 26, 64 and 118; but he has used in this book the term propensity instead of instinct to avoid certain controversial difficulties).

(2) McDougall describes the significance of Instinct in human life as follows :

"We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the *prime movers* of all human activity; by the *conative* or *impulsive* force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from some instinct), every train of *thought*, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every *bodily activity* is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the *ends* of all activities and supply the *driving power* by which all *mental activities* are sustained; and all the complex *intellectual apparatus* of the most highly developed mind is but a *means* towards these ends, is but the *instrument* by which these impulses seek their *satisfactions*, while *pleasure* and *pain* do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means." (Op. cit., p. 38.)

(3) McDougall also describes the relations of Instinct and Emotion,—especially how *emotions* inevitably appear in the wake of the operation of the instinctive impulses as the *affective reflection* of them,—as follows :

"Emotion is regarded as a mode of *experience* which *accompanies* the *working* within us of *instinctive impulses*. It is assumed that human nature (our inherited inborn constitution) comprises

instincts; that the operation of each instinct, no matter how brought into play, is accompanied by its own peculiar quality of experience which may be called a *primary emotion*; and that, when *two or more instincts* are simultaneously at work in us, we experience a *confused emotional excitement* [secondary or blended emotion], in which we can detect something of the qualities of the corresponding primary emotions. The human *emotions* are then regarded as *clues* to the *instinctive impulses*, or indications of the motives at work within us." (*An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 127-128.)

(4) A passage from Drever, quoted below, focusses most of the points in the passages quoted from McDougall above :

"When we seek the *motives* for the man's acts, we find that, they reduce themselves on analysis to certain *motives more or less characteristic of human nature in general*.... Moreover, these motives are *innate*.... The human being comes into the world with certain *active tendencies*.... These active tendencies.... may be designated *instincts*.... These instincts are experienced as *impulses*, each accompanied by a *feeling or interest*, evoked by certain *particular objects, situations, or other experiences*, and manifesting themselves in more or less definite kinds of behaviour." (*The Psychology of Everyday Life*, 6th Edition, p. 20.)

The following appears to be the *main upshot* of these passages from McDougall and Drever: Instincts are the *innate prime movers*, the *dominant conative-dispositional* factors in human nature. These are the *enduring motive forces* behind all activities of man—*bodily* and *mental, intellectual, emotional* and *volitional*. They are *stimulated* by some concrete thing, aspect of environment or experience; and out of this their stimulation come into play all the *emotions and feelings* of men. All thought, activity or feeling arises only in connection with and is *subordinate* to one purpose,—the *satisfaction or fulfilment* in some way or sense of these native dispositions of man's nature, which is the grand *ultimate value*, the most delectable, of our human existence, in relation to which alone everything derives its value and enjoyability.

If we now carefully compare the main trend of the descriptions of the '*sthāyibhāva*' in the Sanskrit works on poetics, of which we have given a broad upshot towards the end of Section II of this paper with that of the definitions and descriptions of Instinct in the works of McDougall and Drever, of which also we have extracted

the main upshot towards the end of the last Section, it will be seen, I hope, that the two concepts, the *sthāyibhāva* and Instinct, seem to offer surprising similarities of their essential natures, so that we may almost recognise them as essentially, though broadly, identical concepts in psychological theory. The two, the *sthāyibhāva* and the instinct, are (1) the innate, (2) conative, (3) dispositional factors of the original endowment of the human nature. They are (4) the prime (non-secondary) movers behind all human activities, (5) to which all other activities in human life, intellectual, emotional and volitional, are subordinate and contributory, and (6) which are the ultimate source and basis of all the human emotions and feelings, which are the main stuff and content of our aesthetic life and enjoyment. It is for the readers of this paper to realise this broad identity for themselves. I, for one, feel convinced about it. The 'sthāyibhāvas' of Indian poetics are the 'instincts' or 'propensities' of Western psychology.

Is Madhva a Monist?

By

MR. H. K. VEDAVYASACHAR

Mysore

I

Sri Madhva bases his philosophy of Natural Dualism on the solid rock of the principle of contradiction. Brahman is *Svatantra*, a being not-dependent upon another,¹ and the world consisting of many entities coeval with God is *asvatantra*, for ever a being dependent upon another. Brahman is imperishable in nature. The eternal entities as Lakshmi, Avyakritakasa, the Vedic sounds, the Jivas etc., are *changelessly* eternal. Primordial matter changes, but is imperishable in essence.² The difference between the eternal entities and Brahman is not *Arôpita* or illusory; it is never contradicted or sublatale; on the other hand it is eternal and persisting even in salvation (*Mukti*). The difference is natural (*Svābhāvika*) and absolute (*Ātyantika*) not tainted by mixture of identity.³

This absolute difference between the world and Brahman is posited as a logical reasoning in proof of God's defectlessness. Brahman is defectless because He is absolutely different from the world which alone is defective. The absoluteness of this difference is further emphasised by the fact that the world and Brahman are irreducible one to the other at any stage of experience. This entire *Siddhanta* is summed up in a few stanzas in 3-3-1 *Anuvyakhyana*.⁴

This form of "Natural Dualism" is distinguished from the Cartesian and other discredited forms of Dualism by the admission—as in Ramanuja's system—of similarity between the World and Brahman; such similarity as makes possible close relationship between the two naturally different entities. The assumption that relation between two entities presupposes their identity of substance is condemned; and it is held that even purely different substances can become related.

The famous modern psychologist C. Spearman writes: Relations can be cognized between any characters whatever, simple

or complex, concrete or abstract, that have come to apprehension within any experience. (Page: 64). It is pointed out that the Jiva and Brahman are sometimes figuratively spoken of as one owing to their (Sthanaikya) occupying the same point of space; their (Matyaikya)—identity of interests, or their (Sadrisya) resemblance; in some figurative statements again the jiva is ignored on account of his dependence and inferiority and God is described as if He were the only existent. In some statements the jiva is figuratively described as if he were God himself, to indicate the presence of God in him. But all these figurative expressions (Gounaprayôga) only denote the glory of God and the intimate relationship between Him and the World and do not in the least take away from the absolute difference existing between the ultimate principles, God and the World. Lastly the difference is identical with its locus and exists in pairs. When we say the world and Brahman are different we mean that the world has difference from Brahman as its natural positive quality; and God has in turn difference from the world as His positive natural quality; so that even if the world were to perish it will not become identical with God as one of the two differences still persists. Thus Dvaita-Siddhanta maintains close relation between absolutely different—entities and makes room for an integrally United Kingdom (an organised union and not a unity) of essentially different parts. It rejects monism as leading to the conception of an imperfect Brahman—not supported by the Vedas—in one of three ways: pure monism which rejects the world as illusory involves the conception of a deluded God; pantheism makes God imperfect by identifying God with the defective world; doctrines of identity and difference are illogical and cannot save God from imperfection resulting from the acknowledged identity. The Natural Dualism of (related) paratantra—svatantra escapes from the chaos of an unrelated multiplicity and answers the problems of variety and free-will.

II

A philosophy so explicitly pluralistic is held to be 'a real example of monism' by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar, our learned President of this section. I mention briefly five or six arguments clearly enunciated in his recent book 'The Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedanta' and his article 'Madhva's conception of Svatantra' in the Mysore University Journal Vol. IV part 2—pages 1-36. 1943.

(1) First comes our author's definition of monism as a doctrine of "One in many" (Page 242). I answer that a doctrine of One God immanent in a manifold world cannot be called monism, if it holds that the one and the many are absolutely and naturally different, one irreducible to the other. There must be identity or identity and difference between the two elements, (the one and the Many), postulated if the system can be called monism. The examples of monistic systems in the world, dictionaries, and the usage of the word in authoritative books bear out my remarks. Monism is a doctrine of One Ultimate Being,⁵ not one Supreme Being absolutely distinct from many dependent beings. In Dvaita, the many beings acknowledged are inferior, *not in point of reality*—but in point of knowledge, bliss, and power, etc.

(2) The next argument of Mr. Raghavendrachar is: The World is less real than Brahman; because the world has God—given reality; God is the giver of the reality to the world; So, God is the sole ultimate reality. (pp. 200-201, 13, 10). I beg to submit in reply that God is not conceived in this system as the *Source* of the world's reality in the sense of material cause. God is the *efficient cause* of the world. The world has its own natural reality distinct from God's reality. God is the controller, not the *giver* of this distinct reality which the world has. All statements meaning that God 'gives' reality, etc., or that the world derives God's reality, etc., are purely figurative for *niyamana*, control from within (*Anadivabhavanīyamaka sakti*). The *niyamya*, (the dependent world) is as real as Brahman, the *niyamaka*. Both are *pāramārthika*. Nyayamrita page 95 is clear on this point. The conception of degrees of reality is criticised in Anuvyakhyana. 1-1-1.⁶ The servant is as real as the master. The dependent world has therefore the same degree of reality as the independent God.

(3) The next argument is: God is the *Creator of all*; everything except God is created. God is the one from whom everything emerges. Even eternal things are created by Him. Therefore He is the one cause of the world and its reality. The doctrine of One Cause explained as the source of all the world is monism (pp. 1, 16, 18, 19, etc., of 'Madhva's Conception of Svatantra').

Criticism: This, I beg to state is a very misleading representation of Dvaita. In 2, 3, 15 of his Brahmasutra Bhashya, Sir Madhva states that the jiva is beginningless and eternal like God: The

jiva is held to be an eternal pratibimba (similar but inferior dependent being) of God who is the eternal bimba (indwelling ruler). Brahmāsūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.6 says that at the time of Creation there were many eternal entities besides God. Sri Nyāyasūtra 2.1.6, repeated in detail that God does make use of other eternal entities in Brahmā-creation and so the created world is the product of many causes, one chief efficient and many subordinate causes of which matter is the material cause and others are dependent efficient causes.⁷ God as already stated is not the material source of the reality of the world. Dvaita maintains that the world has anadisiddha svarūpe satia (तत्त्वव्यवस्था अनादिसिद्धा) unoriginated natural reality of its own not given by God, but controlled by God. The doctrine of many distinct causes with one Supreme Cause is Mono-theism not monism.

(4) This brings us to the next argument which consists in a curious idea of God's glory and 'inconceivable' power acintya-sakti. God, says our author, can do everything; He can create the world without any other causes. He can bring into being effects without causes. No cause can be without Him. He gives cause-ness to the causes. The existence of a second cause is a limitation to Him. Therefore He is the only cause and the system is monism (pp. 12, 16 Madhva's Conception of Svatantra).

I reply that we must distinguish between what God *can* do and what He *has done*. God, it is held, cannot do the logically impossible. That is, He cannot bring into being a real son out of an eternally barren woman while keeping the woman barren. A truly perfect God is a wise God, who cannot become identical with matter or sin, etc. Such apparent incapacity is virtue, a real glory.⁸ So God cannot actually create an eternal thing. Granting that God can do anything and everything, the point is what God *has done*. God *can* negate the world and negate the causes beside Him; He *can* produce the world out of nothing; and remain an Advaita—murthi, the sole Reality. But Dvaita says God *has* used the other causes *invariably* and remained the supreme cause, not the sole cause of the world. Nyaya Sūtra: p. 299. concludes this discussion by pointing out that God's glory is not affected by the admission of several dependent causes by the side of God.

(5) This leads us to the author's view of dependence:—Because the world is dependent it cannot be considered as a distinct

principle at all; there are many statements in Dvaita which consider God alone as the sole Tattva, principle. Śūtra: Ekamevadvitīyam; sarvam khalvidam Brahma, Puruṣa eva sarvam also mention God as the only Reality. Only the independent must be considered to be real. Hence the doctrine of a perfect independent principle is monism (p. 28, 27 of the article).

Criticism:—In Dvaita the conception of dependence is the explication of the ideas of (a) God's transcendence and (b) immanence. The explanations of both these ideas in Dvaita is antagonistic to a monistic scheme of thought. The transcendence of God consists in His being the eternal ruler of the world (Isvara) and in possessing infinite auspicious attributes too numerous to be known in full by any Cetana other than God. God is Sākalyēna ajneya, not fully knowable. This conception makes clear the essential difference between the World and Brahman. God's immanence—the conception of God as indwelling ruler—also is never explained as degrading into identity with the world in which He dwells. There are philosophers who think that utter dependence logically pushed, ends in actual identity and that such a theory is tacit or implicit monism. In my book "Sri Madhva's Tattva-vada" and the book of one of my learned teachers 'Is Madhva a monist?'—both in the press—this question is answered in detail. I now beg to state that Sri Madhva has nowhere stated that dependent reality is no reality or that Reality is ultimately one in his system. He has nowhere called his system Advaita, or himself an Advaitin. He has called himself a Bhedavadin. The fact that the world is extremely dependent upon God has given occasion to figurative monistic expressions, not actual identity (as in pantheism) or negation of dependent reality (as in Absolute monism which maintains that the world is illusory). Hence, Ekamevadvitīyam is interpreted by Sri Madhva as 'God is Supreme and not differenced in Himself and without an equal or superior. Sarvam khalvidam is interpreted as "This Brahman is perfect": Puruṣa-evēdam Sarvam means "all this is dependent upon Puruṣa." The intended teaching of all such apparent monistic passages is explained in Nyāyasūtra: page 124.⁹ The passages referred to maintain that Vedic statements apparently teaching that God is the only reality, God is the giver of reality, etc., are all figurative expressions or imaginative ways of thinking the truths that God is one without an equal or superior; and that He is the maintainer of the reality of eternals and the efficient cause of the reality of non-eternals.

(6) The last point to consider is the strange theory of Svārūpa Srishti, the actual creation of eternal things: the author maintains that the jiva 'changes' when he gets a new body or state of antahkarana; the Visishta 'The jiva with body' is created: When the Visishta is created, the Viseshya the jiva is also created. So, as every moment the jiva becomes connected with a new point of time, a new Visistha is produced: a new jiva also is produced. Nothing is uncreated. From Sri downwards everything is affected in some way or other whenever and wherever a change takes place in the world. Thus the creation of a change means the creation of all". God the sole changeless Reality is the only Reality; the system is monism (pages 17-20 of the article).

Criticism: This is a very misleading exposition. Dvaita maintains that the jiva, Vedic sounds, Lakshmi, Avyakritakasa, etc., are *Kutastha nitya—changelessly eternal*. The jiva as well as God; Akasa, etc., become connected with a new point of time every second. They become new Visishtas. Still neither the jiva nor God nor Akasa 'changes'. The Viseshya 'Jiva is not created when the Visishta—the *jiva with body*' is created. On this line of argument, we have to say that God also is 'created' every second. The author uses the word 'creation' in a sense opposed to English usage. He translates the Sanskrit word 'Adhina' into created. But Adhina means dependent.

The learning of our learned author has not succeeded in establishing that the 'jiva', etc., are actually created, that is, that they come into existence out of a state of non-existence, according to Dvaita.¹⁰ His whole position that Dvaita is monism has led him to the use of very ambiguous expressions. It is besides opposed to traditional accounts of Dvaita as found in authoritative English and Sanskrit works. 'The Monism of Dvaita' is a pure heresy.

APPENDIX

- (1) T.S.T. (p. 2) स्वरूपप्रमिति प्रवृत्तिलक्षण सत्तात्रयैविध्ये परानपेक्षं स्वतन्त्रम् ।

परापेक्षं अस्वतन्त्रम् ॥

- (2) N.S. 412. (सर्वं हि द्रव्यरूपेण नित्यं; T.S.T. p. 4.

॥ वेदाः । अत्र वेदा इत्युपलक्षणम् । पञ्चाशद्वर्णानां अव्याकृताकाशस्य च तथा त् ॥ T.S.T. (R) p. 7.

चेतनानां नित्यत्वं अत्यन्ताभावध्वंसयोनित्यत्वम् ।

T.S. श्रीनित्यमुक्ता ॥ T.S.T. (S) p. 14. स्वतन्त्र तत्त्वस्य विष्णोर्नित्यत्वं परतन्त्रत्वेऽपि चेतनानां नित्यत्वं तथा ध्वंसात्यन्ताभावयोनित्यत्वम् ।

T.S.T. (S) कूटस्थतया इत्यस्य निर्विकारतयेत्यर्थो द्रष्टव्यः ।

- (3) A.V. 3. 3. 1. मेदामेदेऽप्यमेदेन दोषाणामपि संभवः ॥

- (4) अशेषगुणपूर्णत्वं सर्वदोष समुज्झतिः ।

विष्णोरन्यच्च तत्तन्त्रमिति सम्यग्विनिर्णयः ॥

स्वतन्त्रत्वं सदा तस्य तस्य मेदश्च सर्वतः ।

अदोषत्वस्य सिध्यर्थं यदमेदे तदन्वयः ॥

तत्तन्त्रत्वं च मुक्तानामपि तद्गुणपूर्तये ।

मुक्तानामपि मेदश्च न हि भिन्नमभिन्नताम् ॥

गच्छद्गृष्टं क्वचित्तस्याप्यभावोनुभवोपगः ।

पूर्वामेदे दोषवत्वमीशस्येत्यतिभिन्नता ॥

नारायणेन मुक्तानामपि सम्यगिति स्थितिः ।

मेदामेदेऽप्यमेदेन दोषाणामपि संभवः ॥

- (5) T.V.T. (p. 2) एके त्वेकमेव तत्त्वमिति मन्यन्ते । तदसत् ।

Chamber's Encyclopedia defines Monism as a philosophical theory that all beings may ultimately be referred to one category. Thus idealism, pantheism, materialism are monisms.

En. R. E. Vol. VIII p. 809. *Monism*:—Taking the term in its widest sense we might apply to every mode of thought which seeks to transcend the distinction between the physical and psychical and to reach an ultimate unity:—Classification—Idealistic monism; materialistic monism. In the 19th century, the term 'Monism' came to be used by the disciples of Hegel as designating their own peculiar mode of thought.

(6) N. S. 1. 4. 6. (p. 198) एवं श्रुति पुराण युक्तिभिः ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वावगमाम्न जगदुत्पादान कारणत्वं किं तु निमित्तत्वमेवेत्युक्तम् । A.V. 2. 2. 2. नित्यं नित्यशक्त्या स्वयेश्वरः । नियामर्यात् नित्यं च । Sri Raghavendraswamin interprets giving of reality thus:—

“तत्सत्तादि प्रदं चेति—आकाशादि सत्ताशक्ति प्रतीति प्रवृत्त्यादि प्रबोधनं कुर्वदित्यर्थः ॥ p. 124. Parimala. N. (p. 95). यादृशं ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वं तादृशं स्यात् जगत्पि । p. 96. त्रिकाल सर्वदेशीय निषेधाप्रतियोगिता सत्तोच्यते । A.V. 1. 1. 1. स त्रैविध्यं च मानेन सिध्यन्ते केनेति पृच्छते ॥

(7) N.S. (p. 299) इदमुक्तं भवति । यदुक्तमीश्वरस्य कारणोपादानादि नियमोऽस्ति न वेति । तत्रास्तीति ब्रूमः । तथाच प्रकृत्यादीनां कारणत्वं युक्तम् । स च नियमो न कुलालादेरिव तान्यपहाय व्यत्यस्य वा करणे शक्त्यभावनिवन्धनः । येन तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं न स्यात् । तेषां च पारतन्त्र्यं न स्यात् । किं नाम स्वेच्छायत्तमेव । ततः स्वातन्त्र्यादिकमपि युक्तम् । न च तानि स्वाधोन सत्ता शक्त्यादिमन्ति । येनैश्वर्यं निर्गलं न स्यात् । किं तु भगवत्येव तदीयं सत्तादिकमायतते । ततस्तत्सा-चिव्यमतिशयेनैश्वर्यस्य द्योतकमेव ॥

(8) A. V. 3. 2. 10. नायुक्तमीशितुः किञ्चिदोशत्वस्याविरोधि यत् ।

यदोशत्वविरोधि स्यात्तदेवायुक्तमज्ञसा ।

(9) N.S. (p. 124). सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदवाक्यान्यसङ्ख्येय कल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्ध विधुरम्... ब्रह्म नारायणाख्यं प्रतिपादयन्ति । कानिचित्सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानायाद्वितीयत्वेन । कानि चिचित्सर्वसत्ताप्रतीति प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तता प्रतिप-त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेनेत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति N. S. Parimala (p. 118). अद्वितीयत्वेनेति । एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यादोनीति भावः । सर्वं खल्विदं पुरुष एवेदं सर्वमित्यादोनीतिभावः ॥

(10) V.T.V. (p. 110). भावदीपः स्वरूपोत्पत्ति भ्रमनिरासायाह ।

In this Sri Raghavendraswamin condemns Svarupa Srishti of the jivas.

N.S. (p. 431). इह आकाशस्य उक्तं जन्म घटादेरिव अभूत्वाभ-वनलक्षणमिति केचिदास्थिताः । तन्निराकरिष्यन् स्वमतं तावदाह ॥ तदेवं आकाशस्य अभूत्वाभवन रूपोत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति सिद्धम् । N.V. न प्रदेशः कथञ्चन । प्रदेशः=अवकाशः । N.V.B. (p. 42). कथञ्चन=स्वरूपेण, विकृतरूपेण वा नोदेतोति संबन्धः । V.T.V.B. (p. 100). “स्वरूपपरिणामरूपोत्पत्त्यपेक्षया (देहोत्पत्तिरमुख्ये-ति) भावः ॥

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. En. R. E.	.. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
2. A. V.	.. Anuvyakhyana.
3. N. S.	.. Nyayasudha.
4. N. V.	.. Nyaya Vivarana.
5. N. V. B.	.. Nyaya Vivarana Bhavabôdha.
6. N.	.. Nyayamrta.
7. T. S.	.. Tattva Saṅkyāna.
8. T. S. T.	.. Tattva Saṅkyana Tika.
9. T. S. T. (R)	.. " " " (Raghavendra Tirthiya).
10. T. S. T. (S)	.. " " " (Sreenivasa Tirthiya).
11. T. V.	.. Tattva-Viveka.
12. T. V. T.	.. Tattva-Viveka Tika.
13. V. T. V.	.. Vishnu-Tattva-Vinirnaya.

Buddhism : The Conception of God

By

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It is very doubtful whether Buddha Himself was willing to let his teachings be used as a foundation of a philosophical system. But every reasonable and intelligent human being has got a philosophy of his own.¹ Mahātmā Buddha also, in this sense, has got a philosophy. Lately Professor Bapat has attempted to distinguish the philosophy of Buddha from Buddhist religion and philosophy. Although Buddha tried to avoid metaphysics, yet the germs of all the four philosophical schools named Sūnyavādi or Mādhyamika, Vijñānavādi or Yogācara, Bāhyānumeyavādi or Sautrāntika and Bāhyapratyakṣavādi or Vaibhaṣika were found by the later interpreters, in his teachings. These are the four chief schools constantly mentioned by Indian critics of Buddhism, out of many other schools under both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna schools. As these schools were not religious schools they did not take up any question regarding the existence of God. This sometimes leads the students of Buddhism to conceive the idea that Buddhism is a religion without God. In fact those who approach Buddhism with a desire to find a personal God are sure to be disappointed. So far as Buddha himself is concerned, he was a practical moralist who found that there is too much Duḥkha or suffering in the universe. He was very much pained to see this. He went in search of the way which will make human beings get rid of pain or suffering and will lead them to something other than suffering or Duḥkha. Throughout his life, he was so busy with this problem and its solution that he did not try to take up other metaphysical questions at all. He was anxious to make human beings get rid of Duḥkha, and when he found the way for the same, he at once began preaching it to every one who came across him. He was so

1. Prof: Bapat's papers on Buddhist Philosophy Presented to the Indian Institute of Philosophy and referred to by Dr. Tawakly in his paper on comparative Philosophy Presented to the Punjab University Philosophy Conference held in 1940 at London.

enthusiastic about it that he was not at all anxious or willing to think over any other problem.

Early in his life he had shown here and there some doubt about the existence of God, but later on he kept quiet on the point. If he had developed some theory on this point he would have surely preached that too. If he positively believed in the non-existence of God, he ought to have taken up the problem of creation and given some solution of it which did not imply the existence of God. But as he left all these questions unanswered, it seems that for him the existence of God was something taken for granted. He was not of course in need of assigning God any place in his ethical or moral theory. In order to find out a way to get rid of Duḥkha, he was not in need of God or any other metaphysical assumptions. Therefore he never touched upon that problem.

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Whenever any one asked Buddha such metaphysical questions his answer was, "Will a man, when he goes to a doctor in order to get his wound cleaned of an arrow ask the doctor to tell him the name or the shape of the person whose bow caused him that wound before allowing the doctor to touch the wound?"²

He constantly allowed his disciples to ask him how to remove suffering but never to ask him metaphysical questions regarding the universe. He had certain knowable subjects for discussion and preaching and certain others he declared as Avyakhya or unknowable subjects on which he would not speak.³

These were his real views. He tried to preach morality without metaphysics. Even his grand morality was based on the one question of Duḥkha. At the same time, we find in Mahāyāna scripture that Buddha himself sometimes talks of deities and the grace of gods.⁴

According to this scripture, Buddha also talked of Brahma and the world of Brahma, professing that he knew the path which leads to it. He also told Vashisthy a Brahman that he had entered that world and had been born within it.⁵

2. M. N. Chulmalunkya Sutta in Buddha Bachan by Mahasthavir Jyāśātīloka Ceylon also.

3. M. N. Chūl Mālunkya Sutta.

4. Maha Parinirvāṇa 1, 31.

5. Tevigga Sutta 1, 43.

In Dhammpada it is stated that if you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made.⁶

On reading this, Max Muller felt inclined to say that even for Buddha, "a something existed which is not made and which therefore is imperishable and eternal."⁷

Man, it seems, has got a natural belief in the existence of a supreme being, whose grace he seeks at every step. Even, if he is strong enough not to seek his grace and depend on him, he believes in a creator of the universe, the Supreme Being. Buddha was so strong a man as to build a whole grand building of karma theory and Dukkha Nirodh upāya, without referring to the ruler of the world; but his followers could not keep up to the same form of his teachings. Even by avoiding the metaphysical problems, they could not build an agreed permanent system successfully. Soon after his death his teaching led his followers to divide themselves into two different schools, Hinayān and Mahāyān.

Mahayanists believed in the idea of the Bodhi Sattva as helping all the fettered beings to liberate themselves. By and by they identified Buddha with the transcendental reality. Buddha was thus believed to be an incarnation of Buddhi-Tattva or the ultimate Reality.

Many previous incarnations of Buddha are also mentioned.⁸ This ultimate Reality is believed to be manifesting itself in the universe as Dharma Kāya or the director of the world.

Buddha is often called the world-Honoured one.⁹ Many other attributes which are usually assigned to God, the Supreme Being, are assigned to Buddha. Buddha is omni-present.¹⁰ One can attain Devatva only by remembering Buddha, on one's death-bed.¹¹ Buddha is always anxious for the welfare of all creatures.¹² Before

6. Dhammpada Brahmana Vaggo, 383.

7. Intro. I.C.P. XLIV quoted by Oldenbury.

8. See Jatakas.

9. A.D.S. 4.

10. Ibid 3. 20.

11. Ibid 3. 31.

12. Ibid 4. 3.

being born, Buddha decides the place, time, parentage and loka of his birth. All that happens in his life is decided in advance.¹³ Buddha is unique. There is no one like him in the universe. He had no Guru or Teacher.¹⁴ Two Buddhas can not be born or exist in the world at one time.¹⁵ Buddhist thinkers of Japan found the first principle of the universe in "Dharmakaya" or "the body of righteousness". This was identified with Buddha himself. The whole universe is a manifestation of Dharmakaya. It is the Divine Ruler of the universe manifesting Himself in the universe.

The doctrines of the Māhayān school clearly show that Buddha was assigned the dignity of an Avatara (incarnation of God).¹⁶ Gods are referred to at many other places. The following passages will make the point quite clear:¹⁷

"That Arhat is here saluted, who has no counter-part, who, as bestowing the supreme happiness, surpasses (Brahman) the creator—who as driving away darkness vanquishes the sun—and as dispelling all burning heat surpasses the beautiful moon".¹⁸

"He shall become a universal monarch, a king of kings and even a ruler among the guardians of the world, an Indra, the ruler of the gods and even of the Yāma heaven".¹⁹ ".....Bodhi Sattvas and the whole world with gods, men, evil spirits and genii, applauded the speech of Bhagavat".²⁰

Thus the later development of Mahayan School of Buddhism showed clearly that there can be no religion or school of morality permanently accepted by the people, without a Supreme Reality.

We conclude that Buddha himself was generally except on one or two occasions, silent on the question of God. Hinayanists tried to follow Buddha in this respect.

13. Ibid 4. 4.

14. Ibid 4. 6.

15. Ibid 4. 6.

16. Adibuddha Vol. I 97 and Adibuddha Vol. 1. 93.

17. Buddhism 283 and n.

Dhamma-Cakka-ppavattana Sutta. 27. Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha V. Kevaddha Sutta XI, Jataka 1. 47, 68 etc. Samgutta-Nikāya XI, Visuddhi Magga III.

18. Buddha Carita of Asvaghosha 1. 1.

19. Ibid 16. 110.

20. L. Sukkhavati Vyūha 20.

Socrates's Conception of Civic Duty and the Basic Principle of Civil Resistance

By

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The use of "Civil Resistance", in preference to other expressions—Civil Disobedience, Non-Co-operation, Pacifism and Satyagraha—as a part of the title of this paper is purposive. The dilemma which Professor A. D. Ritchie presents in his most interesting and thought provoking article on the Subject of "The Ethics of Pacifism", published in "The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy" London (Vol. XV, No. 59, dated July 1940), is not so formidable as the learned Professor thinks it to be, and it is intended to show during the course of this present discussion, that an actual mean position which avoids this dilemma is both conceivable and possible. The difficulty in conceiving this "mean position" is perhaps in a large measure due to a confusion of thought resulting from the confusion in the usage of the aforesaid four expressions. As a preliminary to further discussion, it seems therefore necessary to distinguish clearly these other expressions from Civil Resistance, and in this way, precisely define the exact scope of this short study. Civil Disobedience, Non-Violent Non-Co-operation and Pacifism, all the three, by implication, are associated, at least in the imagination of those who decry these movements, with a passive and negative attitude of mind. Satyagraha, which means insistence upon and persistence in truth, being free from the association of either negation or passivity undoubtedly stands for a particular type of life and necessarily implies a definite set of ideas and sentiments. The personal life of its revered leader and past history of this movement have made this particular mode of living, this special set of ideas with their associated sentiments an integral and inseparable part of this concept. It is unnecessary to describe here the underlying principles of Satyagraha in detail by analysing the writings and utterances of its founder or scrutinizing his own personal life and the lives of his trusted followers, because it is

claimed that Satyagraha stands for some thing different from what has been designated as "Civil Resistance" in this paper, and therefore such a detailed treatment of that movement does not lie within its limited scope. This difference may sufficiently be indicated by pointing out, for the sake of an example, that regular devotion of one's time to hand-spinning or the exclusive use of hand-spun and hand-woven cloth and the allied conditions of encouraging the handicrafts and supporting of village industries, though an integral part of "Satyagraha-idealism" have nothing to do with "Civil Resistance" as such; the other part of our title, "Socrates's Conception of Civic Duty" also requires a few preliminary explanations.

Socrates the son of Sophroniscus, whose thoughts are rightly considered as the "loftiest expression of the spiritual life of ancient Greece" was born at the outskirts of Athens in 468 B.C. He lived in that City-Republic for full seventy years till 399 B.C., the year in which his earthly life came to an end. He spent his time in the service of truth, in close communion with men, charged no fees for his teachings and gave free instruction to every one who cared to listen to him. He wrote no books. His wisdom has however come down to us enshrined in the beautiful writings of his two friends—Plato and Xenophon. There has been an apparently endless controversy about the true relationship between the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues and the Historical Socrates. This question however need not detain us for long, because as Doctor Sir Patrick Duncan in his learned article on "Socrates and Plato", published in "The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy" (Vol. XV, No. 60, dated October 1940), rightly points out, the problem, "where Socrates the son of Sophroniscus ends and the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues begins, is an insoluble problem". The following critical exposition of what has been named by us, in this essay "Socrates's Conception of Civic Duty", is based on an analysis of "Socrates's Dialogue with Crito", as reported for us by Plato and translated from Greek into English in 1783 A.D. by Samuel Johnson. In this thought provoking dialogue the illustrious Greek Philosopher is represented as declaring that though fortune frowned upon him, yet he would never part with the principles, he had all along professed. Those principles appeared always the same and he esteemed them equally at all times, so, if Crito's advice was not backed by the strongest reason, he must assure himself that Socrates would never comply, not if all the power of the people should arm itself against him or offer

to frighten him like a child by laying on fresh chains and by threatening to deprive him of the greatest good or oblige him to suffer the cruellest death.

In order to understand the full significance of this bold statement it should be considered with reference to the occasion on which it was made.

Socrates himself strictly adhered to the rituals as ordained by the state and exhorted others to do the same. But his love of wisdom, his 'thinking consideration of things' and above all his constant insistence on "one Great First Cause", began to exercise a strong influence on the thoughts and lives of a good many young Athenians. He met his eager disciples on the public market place, in private houses, in workshops and the gymnasium and his discussions gradually began to turn away their attention from mere religious symbolism, "to the soul of truth which it embodied". This new movement frightened the priests and the Politicians. They joined together and attacked him as an innovator who took pleasure in corrupting the youths of the city. He was tried and condemned by a majority of only six votes in the first instance. Had he responded to the Psychological environments of the city-state, accepted the verdict of the authorities and pleaded for a light sentence, no serious harm would have happened either to his person or to his property. This fact is fully indicated in the dialogue where Crito tells his master and friend plainly that he would be charged by the people for standing a trial that he might have avoided and that they would censure his conduct for making his defence. Not prepared to compromise his principles, Socrates bravely tried to justify himself instead of pleading for mercy, and thus having 'alienated' the sympathies of the councillors, was finally sentenced to death by a majority of eighty votes. The most wonderful and sublime speech delivered by Socrates on the occasion of his trial, which has been reproduced for us by Plato in "Apologia", as Sir Patrick Duncan in his article cited above rightly insists, "is not so much an answer to the specific charges brought against him as a profession of faith, a justification of his life".

Socrates had to wait in prison for thirty days after receiving this judgment of Capital punishment. During this period Crito succeeded in making plans for the escape of his master from the prison and, for this purpose, went to see him at night. He was surprised to find Socrates fast asleep and waited patiently by his

side and did not like to awaken him lest he should deprive him of those happy minutes. He awoke a little before day-break and Crito confessed that since he had become acquainted with him, he had always been delighted with his patience and calm temper and wondered how even in such extraordinary circumstances his looks appeared to be so calm and unconcerned. After a few other casual remarks on both sides Crito disclosed the real purpose of his visit. He informed Socrates that the time for the execution of the sentence had drawn very near and requested him to act on his advice and escape from the prison with his help. An escape from the prison in such circumstances was not taken in the same light by the ordinary citizens of the city-state of those days, in which it is regarded by the citizens of any of our modern states. Crito accordingly insisted that if Socrates died, then besides suffering the irreparable loss of a friend, which Crito would ever bewail, he was also afraid that a number of people who were not well acquainted with either of them, would believe that he cared more for his money than for his friend and that it was out of monetary considerations that he did not help his friend to come out of the prison walls. Socrates pointed out in reply to this appeal that they should not pay any heed to the opinion of the multitude but should only care for those sensible and well informed persons who knew how the case stood. Crito replied that it was not safe for him to ignore the others, because however misguided such persons might be, Socrates's own case had been sufficient to show the outrageous manner in which people could display their passions against those who were once run down by the vulgar opinion. Socrates lightly turned down this argument by pointing out that it was not the physical death in earthly life which mattered so much as the intellectual and rational life of the spirit and that the general public could not exercise any power whatsoever on the deeper life of the soul. Crito, extremely anxious to save the life of his 'guide philosopher and friend', made another fervent appeal which was mainly based on sentimental grounds. To this his philosopher friend calmly replied that Crito's good-will would be very commendable provided it agreed with right reason, but if it did not, then the stronger it was the more blame-worthy it would be, and added that in accordance with his well established life-long habit, he himself would only act in conformity to the true principles of morality and would not change this course for any consideration whatsoever. It was on this memorable occasion, during the very last hours of his life, that Socrates advanced the reasons embodied in the above

noted statement to justify his conduct of courting death in preference to escaping from a prison where he had been awaiting the execution of the sentence of capital punishment so unjustly awarded to him.

Our theme, upto this point has been mainly devoted to the development of Socrates's Conception of ethical value, and his implicit faith in what Kant much later called by the name of "The Categorical Imperative". This was however necessary to serve as a back-ground for the consideration of his views on "Civic Duty", because his views on that subject directly depended, as will be presently seen, on his conception of "Summum Bonum", or supreme good. It is not life, but good life, that one ought to court he declared, adding that good life consisted in nothing except honesty and justice.

But if "good life" consists in "justice" and Socrates knew that he had been very unjustly condemned to death by the Athenians and was fully conscious of the injustice of that sentence, then why should he have submitted to it? To solve this apparent dilemma one must remember the difference between "the laws" and the "administration of Justice". Socrates had not faith in the wisdom of the multitude. He knew that the people invested with state-authority at Athens had often been acting unjustly, as was perfectly clear from his own case. But he believed in the ultimate justice of the "Institutions and the laws of Athens" and considered his "Civic Duty" of never violating any of these laws, even to save his life, to be his supreme duty. According to him no city (and the city of that time stands for the state of today) could subsist when justice had lost its force, when it was perverted, overturned and trampled by private citizens. He accordingly said that if he consented to escape from the prison, he could very well imagine the laws of Athens to stand up against him to enquire from him as to whether he had not willingly submitted himself for a public trial. How could he think of disobeying the laws of Athens and thus destroy the Republic? Was not that Republic and were not those laws the authors of his being? Did not his father marry the lady who gave him birth in accordance with these very laws? Was he not nourished, brought up, and educated in accordance with their dictation? Were not those laws just which obliged his father to take care of him in his infancy and made arrangements for his education in fine arts or for the development of his body with the help of proper exercises? Could he maintain that both he and

his father were not nursed as children and subjects of those laws? And if that was true, could he think of asserting his power against the laws? But since he could not lay claim to any such right either against his father or against his teacher, so as to repay evil for evil, injury for injury, how could he think of obtaining that right against the state and its laws, so that if they endeavoured to put him to death, he would counteract and prevent them, and thus ruin the republic and its laws? Could he, who had ever been a follower of true virtue, consider such an action, just? Was he ignorant that the "city-state" was more worthy of veneration before God and man than his father, his mother and all his other relations put together? Was he not in duty bound to honour that "city-state", to yield to it and to humour it more than an angry father? Was it not his duty either to convert the "republic" to his own way of thinking by arguments or else to obey its injunctions and to suffer without grumbling all that it imposed upon him? If it ordered him to be whipped, or laid in irons, if it sent him to the wars, there to spend his blood, he was to do it without demurring; he could not shake off the yoke or flinch or quit his post; but in army, in prison, and at all other places he was to assist it with his wholesome counsel, because offering violence against the state established by law was an act of greater impiety than the act of offering violence against one's own parents. He had been obliged to the state for his birth, for his maintenance and for his education and it had done him all the good that it was capable of doing. Moreover the republic never failed to make a public proclamation that if its laws and customs did not please a man, he could, after mature and careful consideration, leave it with all his effects and go wherever he pleased. And if any private man could not comply with the customs and the traditions of the city and desired to remove and live elsewhere, not one of the citizens would hinder him or interfere with his departure. But if a citizen continued to live at Athens, after fully considering the way in which justice was administered there and after studying the state policy of that republic, then in effect, he was obliged and in duty bound to obey all commands issued by those who were in lawful authority, and if he did not do so then his disobedience would be considered unjust on threefold account: for not obeying those to whom he owed his birth, for trampling under foot those who educated him and for violating his faith after he had engaged to obey the laws of the state. He was, as if in honour bound, not to violate the treaty of obeying all the orders of the state in return for the advantages

that he had been receiving because of his citizenship of Athens, a treaty that he had not been forced to sign either by force or surprise or without time to think over it: for he had the whole period of seventy years to leave that city and get settled elsewhere, if he did not believe in the justice of the laws of Athens. Although he often praised the laws of a few other Greek city states, yet he got domiciled neither in any one of them nor in any other foreign country. In fact, he had been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, which was an invincible proof that he liked the city and its laws; for nobody could like a city unless he found its laws agreeable at the same time. In conclusion Socrates represented the laws of Athens as standing up as an embodiment and incarnation of Justice itself, appealing to him to submit to their reason and not to put his life, his children or any other thing what-soever, in the balance against justice, so that when he went before the tribunal of God he might be able to clear himself before Him. Socrates said that he should not deceive himself, that if he acted upon the advice of Crito, he would neither better his own case nor that of his party; he would enlarge neither its justice nor its sanctity in this or in the other world. But if he died bravely, his death would be due to injustice, not of the Laws, but of men. If, on the other hand, he were to make his escape by repeating so shamefully the injustice of his enemies, he would, by violating his own faith injure his own person, his friends, his state and its laws, and in that case, after his death, the laws of heaven would not receive him with joy, knowing that he had endured to ruin their sisters, the laws of Athens. Thus silencing Crito Socrates bravely faced death for what he believed to be his civic duty. From this statement of Socrates's conception of Civic-Duty let us now turn to an examination of the basic principles of Civil Resistance.

The epithet Civil is intended to imply that the resistance so qualified is offered by an individual citizen or a group of citizens against the state to which the individual or the group concerned owes full allegiance. Such allegiance must be voluntary and the citizen or the group of citizens offering civil resistance, should, like Socrates, deeply love the state concerned and be unwilling either to change or renounce that allegiance by getting denaturalised and adopting the citizenship of some other state, or else by destroying the state concerned even if such a destruction be within their power,—an allegiance that must be based on a deepseated love and should be entirely free from the fear of the consequences of offering Civil

Resistance. All civil resistance must therefore necessarily be non-violent, though all non-violent resistance is not always civil. It may be noted further that although a civil-resister as such cannot resort to violence in his civil struggle against the state to which he owes his voluntary allegiance, he may or may not be an absolute believer in Pacifism. He may, like Socrates, be prepared to participate in wars if ordered by the state, and there "spend his blood without demurring", or else he may, unlike the Greek Philosopher, have implicit faith in non-violence and like Mahatma Gandhi may insist that even foreign aggression should be resisted non-violently. In the latter case, however, the non-violent resistance offered to an aggressor state will not form part of his activities of civil resistance and should be considered independently and separately, and in accordance with considerations which, strictly speaking, fall outside the scope of our present studies. But a civil resister, it may be objected, cannot remain non-violent in his struggle against the state unless he has a complete and an unwavering faith in the principles and practice of non-violence, irrespective of the occasion or the parties to a dispute. To this objection, it may be replied that it is not the faith in the Principles of non-violence so much as the sense of civic duty and the love of the state of which he happens to be a citizen, that guides his action in remaining perfectly non-violent in his struggle against some of the laws and orders of that state, the laws and orders which he believes to be fundamentally wrong and unjust, though still cherishing his unshaken love for the state responsible for those unjust laws and orders. He does not regard the laws of the state to be perfectly just, he unlike Socrates, does not consider them to be "sisters of the laws of heaven", in fact civil resistance is offered against those very orders and laws which are considered unjust and unreasonable. But then how can a citizen love a state while he considers at least some of its laws to be unjust? And further, if it is argued in reply to this question, that "the love of state" of the civil resister is not grounded in the righteousness of the laws but rather in the love for the fellow citizens, including those who happen to be in authority for the time being, one may further ask, are those fellow citizens "who happen to be in authority for the time being", and who are therefore responsible for unjust laws and unreasonable orders, not themselves unjust? How can the civil resister cherish any real love for them?

The conflict between love and logic implied in the questions noted above is in fact only apparent and not real. This may be

fully borne out by a careful study of Mr. Charles S. Pierce's most interesting and instructive book entitled "Chance, Love and Logic" (published by Messers Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd., of London in 1923). In this book on 268 page, Mr. Pierce while insisting on the creative element in true love quotes a passage from a book entitled "Human Nature in its Remaking", (published by the Oxford University Press of London in 1923). This passage clearly distinguishes between, what is called in that book, the "Greek notion of Justice" or what we may call here "the Socratic notion of justice", and the modern conception of justice which instead of taking men "statically as they presented themselves refuses to accept the selves which have defects to be their real selves". Civil Resistance, we may add here, thus constitutes an appeal from "the actual Citizens in authority in the given state, for the time being", to "Those very citizens as they may be". These two allied notions of 'creative justice' and 'creative love' are based on the modern Psychological conception of Dynamic Personality. While mere intellectual discussion, it is suggested here, may fail to convert the opponents because of the present selfishness, present desire of safeguarding vested interest or prestige or due to other deep rooted prejudices, arrogance and pride, civil resistance by transforming the character of the opponents as well as by transforming the character of the civil resister to such an extent as may be needed in his own case, may bring about a final readjustment which may be fully in conformity with the principles of true justice. The physical self of the individual civil resister may perhaps perish in the struggle but such a risk is equally present even in violent resistance. Moreover with the single exception of the system of Lokayatas which insists that all moral conventions and ethical theories have been invented by clever weaklings, no other philosopher would seriously support the view that the preservation of one's earthly existence at all cost is the summum bonum of our life. The most beautiful description of the type of struggle involved in civil resistance is found in the following words of Spinoza re-quoted here from the book entitled "The Power of Non-violence" (page 193) by Richard B. Grigg; (George Poutledge and Sons Ltd., London 1935) :—

"He who strives to conquer hatred with love fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their power".

In this short paper the interest has been kept purposely confined to the case of civil resistance alone. Those who are interested in the consideration of the question of the application of non-violent force in a general way and in circumstances falling beyond the scope of this short study may please refer to the excellent exposition of Mr. Richard B. Grigg cited above, and may examine the arguments put forward by its learned author together with the abundant Psychological and biological data and cross references found in that book. In this book the author points out (Preface P.X.) that "Although the moral beauty of the method is an important and enduring factor in its power, there is not room to discuss it in this book, and, any how, I do not feel competent for that". It was to discuss the moral beauty of the method within the limited scope of civic duty that a modest attempt is made here to prepare the ground for the discussions of the wider issues involved in an absolute belief in and practice of non-violence in all possible circumstances. This wider task must however be left for some future occasion. A few suggestive questions to indicate the inconclusive nature of this discussion would perhaps form the fittest conclusion for this short essay :

1. What is that higher order and what are those better conditions for the attainment of which, within the given state, the civil resister is justified to carry on his struggle ?
2. Is it possible to attain and subsequently to maintain that supposed better order in isolation, without having a simultaneous change in the conditions of other neighbouring states ?
3. If the reply to the second question be in the negative, then one has to answer the further question about the method and technique of bringing the desired change in the neighbouring states, forgetting for the moment that owing to modern scientific developments, discoveries and inventions, almost the entire humanity has become the neighbour of every individual in the wider sense of the term ? These and a host of other similar questions connected with the problem of social organization and human personality would naturally suggest themselves to every one interested in this subject.

The two latest papers by Professor Whitehead entitled "Mathematics and the Good", and "Immortality" respectively, (published in the volume "The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead" in "The Library of living Philosophers", Northwestern University, Evanston and Chicago, U.S.A. 1941. Vol. III) perhaps furnish very suggestive

data for a reply to some of the aforesaid questions. The interesting distinction drawn by the learned philosopher between the "World of Values", and "The Creative World" and his insistence that "the essence of values is their capacity for realization in the world of change", require a special mention in this connection. If one believes with Professor Whithead that "The effective realization of Value in the world of change should find its counterpart in the world of Value", (Paper on Imortality, cited above), then one of the important tasks for the philosopher of tomorrow, would be to find a reconciliation for the two apparently conflicting worlds of to-day.

The Beginning of Philosophical Ethics in Islamic Thought

By

DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

Aligarh

For Muslims the term *philosophy* (falsafa) came into use very soon after their military occupation of Syria, Egypt and Persia, when they recognized and appreciated the prevailing Greek culture. But in Islam philosophy found its first field of development in speculative theology, the obvious aim of which was to state the accepted dogmas of their religion so as "to bring them into agreement with the demands of contemporary knowledge".¹

While the influence of Greek thought in the East must be regarded as an ancient phenomenon, which was particularly evident when Palestine and Arabia were buffer states between the Ptolemies and the Seleucidae, and which had penetrated far into the ancient Persian Empire and on into India, nevertheless, in relation to subsequent Islamic culture, very great importance is attached to the activity of the Christian scholars who first translated outstanding Greek texts into the Syriac language. They had begun this work in 300 A.D. and they carried it on progressively, primarily from the centers of Edessa, Jundai-Sábúr and al-Híra, until approximately 700 A.D. This means that for 270 years before the birth of Muhammad the philosophical and scientific speculations of the Greeks were gradually being translated into the Syriac language. This translation work was going on throughout the 62 years of Muhammad's lifetime and continued for 68 years of early Muslim expansion and imperial organization. This latter period included the 38 years of the first four Caliphs—Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, and 'Ali—and the first 30 years of the 'Umayyad caliphate.

Accordingly, when we are told that Christian scholars and scribes, who worked under Arab patrons, began translating these existing Syriac translations of the Greek philosophers into the Arabic language in the period from 700—900 A.D., we should bear

in mind that this Arab quest of general knowledge from the Greeks was being made at the same time that the traditional sayings of the prophet Muhammad were being compiled. Ibn Ishāq, whose records survive only as they are quoted by Ibn Hishām, died in 768 A.D. Mālik ibn Anas, who compiled the *Muwatta*, "the first real appearance of Ḥadīth in literature", died in 795 A.D.; Ibn Hishām in 833 A.D., Ibn Sa'd in 845 A.D., Ahmad ibn Hanbal in 855 A.D., al-Bukhārī in 870 A.D., and Muslim in 874 A.D. These dates have been cited because the fact that the writing of several of the Greek philosophers were translated from the Syriac into the Arabic language in the very same period that the sayings of Muhammad found their way into written Arabic may be found to be of importance in the study of the later developments in Muslim ethical literature as well as in law and theology. For not only were the above-named traditionists contemporary with the translators of Greek learning, but the early writers of the *adab* literature, the "humanities" or cultural writings, men such as al-Jāhiz (d. 868) and Ibn Qutaiba (d. 889), also belonged to this period. Others who related the saying of Muhammad, but more from the viewpoint of historians than of legists, were Abu Hanifa al-Dinawāri (d. 895), Ibn Wadīh al-Ya'qūbī (d. 897), and al-Tabarī (d. 922). It will occasion no surprise, therefore, if we find sayings of Muhammad and his Companions that have become somewhat "Hellenized", particularly in chapters on 'ilm (scientific knowledge), 'aql (Reason), and akhlāq (Ethics).

The earliest problems that faced Muslim philosophers had to do with the metaphysical foundation for the science of Ethics. As they were likewise theological questions they have most generally been so considered, but the reader will recognize at once their striking importance for the Muslim system of Ethics, which is admittedly on a theistic basis:

1. Is it necessary to postulate divine righteousness, and if so, then how can it be appreciated and stated without imposing limitation of divine greatness?
2. To what extent must man have freedom in order that he may be responsible for his actions?
3. Is the Qur'ān, as the word of Allah, to be considered as eternal in Allah's own being, or does it belong to the class of "things created"?

4. How is the *unity* of Allah to be stated in relation to his attributes?
5. What relations does Allah have with mankind and with the material universe?

Foremost among the Muslim scholars who profited by the new learning from the Greek philosophers were al-Fārābī (950 A.D.) and Ibn Sinā (980 A.D.). With a similar background for their studies, it may be said that these two intellectual giants laid the foundations for the structure of Muslim philosophy. "Al-Fārābī distinguishes between that which has a *possible* and that which has a *necessary* existence (just as Plato and Aristotle distinguished between the changeable and the eternal). If the possible is to exist in reality, a cause is necessary thereto. The world is composite, hence it had a beginning, or was caused. But the series of causes and effects can neither recede *ad infinitum*, nor return like a circle into itself; it must, therefore, depend upon some necessary link, and this link is the first being (*ens primum*). This first being exists necessarily; the supposition of its non-existence involves a contradiction. It is uncaused, and needs for its existence no cause external to itself. It is the cause of all that exists. Its eternity implies its perfection. It is free of all accidents. It is simple and unchangeable. As the absolutely good, it is at once absolute thought, absolute object of thought and absolute thinking being (*intelligentia, intelligibile, intelligens*). It has wisdom, life, insight, might, and will, beauty, excellence, brightness; it enjoys the highest happiness, is the first willing being and the first object of will (desire). In the knowledge of this being al-Fārābī sees the end of philosophy, and he defines the practical duty of men as consisting in rising, so far as human force permits it, into likeness with God".³

In addition to this brief summary, as given by Ueberweg, of al-Fārābī's basic principles, it is essential to point out that it was his firm belief that rules of conduct are taught by Reason. It is Reason that decides, most fittingly, whether a thing is good or evil, for the highest virtue consists in knowledge.⁴

That al-Fārābī derived this conception of Reason from his study of the works of Aristotle is plainly suggested in his definition of the term:⁵ The noun, *al-'aql*, is used with many significations. The first is that which the general public says in regard to man,

that he is intelligent ('áqil). The second is that which the Muta-kallims repeat according to their custom, when they speak of what "Reason" requires and of what "Reason" opposes. The third use of 'adl is that which Aristotle mentions in the *Kitáb al-Burhán* (Organon: the Apodeictic); the fourth is that which he mentions in the sixth book of the *Kitáb al-Akhláb* (Nicomachean Ethics); the fifth is that which he mentions in the *Kitáb al-Nafs* (De Anima); and the sixth is that which he mentions in the *Kitáb má ba'da 'l-tabí'a* (Metaphysics).

The use made by Aristotle of the term "Reason" (nous=ratio='aql) in the Nicomachean Ethics (Bk. vi), to which al-Farábí referred, is clearly shown in his analysis of the intellectual virtues. Reason is the *intellect*, the function of which is to attain truth, by the use of deliberation, intelligence, judgment, and prudence.⁶

The freedom of choice that man has, in distinction from the lower animals, depends upon rational consideration. Thought, or the activity of the intellect, is the true sphere of freedom, "a freedom which is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the last resort it is determined by the rational nature of God".⁷

It is significant that we find that al-Nazzám (d. 845 A.D.) taught "that God could do nothing to a creature, either in this world or in the next, that was not for the creature's good and in accordance with strict justice. It was not only that God would not do it. He had not the power to do anything evil".⁸ Orthodox Islam, however, was not destined to accept this conception of God's necessary moral integrity. This was because it was not thought to be in accord with declarations in the Qur'án,⁹ which teaches rather that the being of Allah is not to be thought of as restricted in power, or limited in His freedom of willing, by any essentially continuous quality, such as justice, love, or truth.

If al-Farábí could have developed al-Nazzam's conception of God's necessary moral integrity, in connection with his own teaching that the rules of conduct are taught by Reason and that men's highest duty lies in rising into likeness with God, he would have pointed out to the Muslim world an ethical system that might well have withstood the tendencies that soon developed towards legalistic subserviency on the one hand and mystical vagueness and antinomianism on the other.

But the wide scope of Greek philosophical writings, with their multifarious distinctions, proved to be overwhelming. Even these two master minds among Muslim thinkers were occupied and baffled by endless analysis and definition.

In illustration of the way in which finely drawn verbal distinctions came to be regarded as the philosopher's stock in trade, examples may be found in Ibn Siná's *Rasá'il fi Hikmat wa Tabí'yát* ("Essays on wisdom and Natural Dispositions"), though with Ibn Siná there is the redeeming feature that he is not verbose. In fact his very brevity and conciseness becomes something of a difficulty for the reader who may wish to ascertain the exact meaning of particular Arabic words which he uses as approximate equivalents for Syriac expressions, which had previously been employed in translation of finely discriminated philosophical terms in Greek, which themselves required interpretation according to Platonic, Aristotelian, or Neo-Platonic points of view. It is not surprising that philosophers became philologists and that surveys of the sciences were the order of the day.

In his short essay on *'ilm al-akhláq* ("Science of the Dispositions"), from the above-mentioned work,¹⁰ Ibn Siná begins by acknowledging that Allah is "the one who enriches the soul (nafs) of the man who is devoted to His virtues (faḍá'il) and the means whereby he may acquire them for himself". This is in accord with al-Ghazali's much later declaration that "the perfection of the worshipper, as well as his happiness, lies in imitating (takhalluq) the qualities (akhláq) of Allah the Most High, and in adorning himself with the meanings of His attributes and His names,—in that measure that may be considered within his right".¹¹ "It is a requisite in human life", Ibn Siná continues to say, that he who would attain perfection must seek for happiness in this world and in the next. It is incumbent upon him, moreover, to perfect his power of discernment by means of many sciences, each of which is explained fully in books that enumerate the sciences. He must perfect his power of action also in accord with the virtues, whose fundamental qualities are purity ('iffat), courage (shajā'at), wisdom (hikmat), and righteousness ('Adálat). Furthermore, he must avoid the vices which are directly opposed to these virtues".

As he proceeds to indicate these opposites, he finds it relatively easy to state that purity is opposed to lustful passion (Shawáníya) and that courage is opposed to anger (ghaḍabiya). But he finds it

more difficult to state inclusively and at the same time explicitly the opposite of wisdom and the opposite of righteousness. Later writers, notably Ibn Miskawaihi and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, give the ordinary and general explanation that wisdom is opposed to folly (jahl), but Ibn Sina says that the vice opposed to wisdom is mere distinction or discrimination (tam'yízíya), which is most interesting, in that it suggests that even this master of distinctions fully appreciated that in true wisdom there is a higher discernment that is actually opposite to the elaborate discrimination of terms. But when he undertakes to give the opposite of righteousness ('Adálat), he must first enumerate the many virtuous qualities that are included in the comprehensive term 'Adálat, such as generosity (sakhá), frugality (qaná'at), nobility (karam), tranquillity (hilm), steadfastness (ṣabr), etc. Each of these then needs to be defined and distinguished from other qualities, some of which are similar and some opposite.

This whole method of close definition is distinctly Aristotelian and it had a necessary task to perform. For once the Muslims were able to have access to Greek scientific literature the need was felt for a systematic analysis of their whole field of general knowledge. In the works of Aristotle the Muslim thinkers appreciated especially his precision of concepts, but they saw also, as Professor Horten has indicated,¹¹ that Aristotle "did not succeed in giving a comprehensive view of the whole universe under some monistic concept. The universe is not traced to a single origin. Matter is eternal and opposed to God in a dualistic system". It is obvious that for Muslim thought this was wholly unsatisfactory. True wisdom, as well as the teaching of the Qur'án, demanded some philosophical explanation that would relate the universe, and mankind within it, to the sovereign power of Allah.

"It is here", Professor Horten observes, "that Muslim philosophy begins, following the Neo-Platonic model. The great notion of contingency brings into a unity the total of the actual. It is the light that explains the individual problems and allows them to be examined under the widest points of view. In the things of the world *being* and *existence* are quite different. The two are not internally and necessarily connected. Existence must thus be imparted to things by a self-existent Being and must be permanently maintained in them. The universe is a stream of being which, emanating from an inexhaustible source, extends to all that is not

God. This idea, which runs through the whole of Muslim philosophy down to modern times, is again and again formulated anew and developed".

THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

Notes

1. M. Horten, "Encyclopaedia of Islam", art. "Falsafa".
2. D. B. MacDonald, "Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory", p. 78.
3. Ueberweg, "A History of Philosophy", vol. i, p. 412.
4. T. J. de Boer, "The History of Philosophy in Islam" p. 121.
5. Al-Fārābī, "Maqálat fī ma'ānī al-'aql", text in Dietireci's "al-Fārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen", Leiden, 1890.
6. Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics", Bk. vi, English trans. by F. H. Peters.
7. T. J. de Boer, op. cit., p. 122.
8. D. B. MacDonald, op. cit. pp. 140-141.
9. Qur'án.
10. Ibn Siná, "Rasá'il fī Hikmat wa Tabi'qát", Bombay A. H. 1318, pp. 98-101.
11. Al-Ghazáli, "al-maqṣad al-asná fī sharh 'asmá' Allah al-husná", ("The Highest Aim in Explanation of the Excellent Names of Allah"), p. 22.
12. M. Horten, op. cit., ii, 48.

What is Sin

By

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Sangrur

The Problem of sin has baffled the minds of men from the early beginnings of civilization. No great philosophy of the world worth the name failed to tackle this problem. Whether with the ancient Indian sages or with the great Greek thinkers or with the Chinese sages, this problem remained in focus of their attention. Even the present-day social philosopher has not failed to acknowledge its importance. And yet it is one of those ultimate problems of philosophy, which have remained to this day a matter of controversy. Before we consider the modern forms in which this problem presents itself, it would, I think, be worth our while to know what some ancient great philosophies of the world have to say about it. For, it is only after we have surveyed some ground, howsoever hurried it may be, that we are able to form a rationalistic view of the whole matter.

The Hindu View.

I shall confine my account to the Upanishads, for it is in them that Indian Philosophy reached its highest pinnacle. Though our problem is ethical, yet we shall have to take into account the Metaphysics of the Upanishads, since it is the view of Reality they take, which provides a basis for their ethics. Now, the idea set forth by the Upanishads is the becoming one with the Absolute. Reality is one, and the aim of all our moral progress consists in our identification with the One. "May I enter thee, such as Thou art, O Lord: may Thou, O Lord, enter me.... May I become well cleansed, O Lord". And again "Thou art my resting place". Throughout the process of the world we witness this infinitisation of the finite. The difference between man and all else is that while all seek the infinite, man alone has an idea of the end. The absolute is the deliberate goal of the finite self. That this goal is the most desirable ideal is brought out in many ways. For instance it has been called a state "far above hunger

and thirst, above sorrow and confusion, above old age and death". Just as the sun, the eye of the Universe, remains unaffected by the sorrow and misery of this world, so also the Atman though dwelling in all creatures dwells untouched by the sufferings of this world. It is a misfortune to live in the world of plurality and be subject to disease and suffering; and a return from the plurality into the One is the proper aim of man. It gives satisfaction to his whole being.

Whatever ethics we have in the Upanishads is subsidiary to this goal. And whatever action helps us towards this goal is deemed virtuous and what keeps us away from it is termed sinful. Morality is valuable only as leading to it. And the one who has reached this goal is said to have attained salvation or Moksha. Moksha literally means release, "release from the bondage to the sensuous and the individual, the narrow and the finite". This idea for which the moral nature cries in man can be attained only if the finite self transcends its narrow individuality and identifies itself with the whole.

It has been urged sometimes by the critics of the Upanishads that there is no scope for ethical endeavour, since man is divine in nature. This error results from a confusion of thought. God is in man, but He is not in man in such an obvious fashion that he can possess Him without effort or struggle. As Radha Krishnan puts it, "God is present as a potentia or a possibility.... The God in man is a task as well as a fact, a problem as well as a possession". And a little further "His divinity is not an actuality, but a part of God aspiring to be the whole. As he is, he is dust and deity, God and brute crossed. It is the task of the moral life to eliminate the non-divine element, not by destroying it, but by suffusing it with the divine spirit". Thus the problem of morality has a significance for man, whose life is a struggle between the finite and the infinite, the demoniac and the divine element.

As we said sometime ago, those actions which keep us bound to our finite existence, actions which serve as obstacles in our march towards the goal are sinful. We may now consider here what actions or general modes of behaviour are impediments in our way as accepted by all the various thinkers of the period.

By far the greatest obstacle in our moral life is the urge of the senses and instincts. The lusts and passions of the animal self

are to be kept in check, for they restrict the vital energies to the lower plane. The Katha Upanishad calls the self as the Lord who sits in the chariot called the Body. Buddhi or intelligence serves as the charioteer, mind is the reins, the senses are the horses and the objects are the roads. Now one whose senses run riot like the vicious horses of a charioteer is never able to reach the immortal state, but enters into the round of birth. The one whose senses are kept in control like the good horses of a charioteer is able to reach a state from which there is no return. Thus the drive of desire has to be checked; "when desire seizes the helm the soul suffers shipwreck". Man is endowed with reason, which reminds us of something higher than mere nature, something which gives meaning and purpose to our life. If in spite of the indications of our rational nature, we make pleasure the end of our pursuits, our life is one of moral evil and of sin, unworthy of man. (Kant expresses the same idea in his Critique of Pure Reason, when he says "Man is not in the least elevated above mere animalism by the possession of reason, if his reason is only employed in the same fashion as that in which animals use their instincts"). Rational life will be consistent and marked by unity. "In it every course of action, before it is adopted is brought before the bar of reason and its capacity to serve the highest end is tested, and if found suitable adopted by the individual". A life led by the senses, on the other hand, will be a series of disconnected and scattered episodes without any end or purpose underlying them.

Another obstacle in our moral life is egoism or selfishness. An egoistic life is inconsistent with a rational life. Reason tells us that the individual is a part of the whole and has no interests apart from the interests of the whole. His deliverance will come only if he gives up the idea of his separate sensuous existence. In committing a selfish deed the soul imposes fetters on itself, which can only be removed by the reassertion of the life universal. Thus he is a bad man, who does the opposite. We must not conceive of ourselves as exclusive unity,—each an "ego sharply marked off from whatever lies outside the physical body and the mental history". From this egoism springs all that is morally bad. Moral life is a life of intense love for humanity, a life which seeks the infinite through the finite and not a mere selfish adventure for small ends.

And this brings us to yet another obstacle in our way, the obstacle of attachment to whatever is finite. Finite objects do not give us the satisfaction, for which our soul hungers. There is no satiety in things finite. The anguish of man consists in his separation from God, and nothing short of union with God can satisfy his soul's hunger. There are men who wish to realise the ideal of an absolutely worthy existence in the love of another being. So long as that other being is human, bound in space and time, the ideal can never be attained. "It is self-deception", says Radha Krishnan, "to seek the fullness of love and beauty in another human being, man or woman. The perfect realisation can only be in the eternal". It is this emphasis on the unstable character of finite things, which led people to detach themselves from the world and seek deliverance in retirement. Many there were who renounced their all, their wives and children, their homes and their goods and sought the salvation of their souls in poverty and purity of life.

The Upanishads, however, do not ask us to renounce all desire, but only selfish endeavours. Desire as such is not condemned, but only the animal desire, lust, the impulsive craving of the brute man. It all depends on the object. As Radha Krishnan puts it "If a man's desire is the flesh, he becomes an adulterer; if things of beauty, an artist, if God, a saint". The essence of renunciation consists in the spirit of disinterestedness which it produces, for we can only enjoy the world, if we are not burdened by the bane of worldly possessions. "Our enjoyment of the world is in direct proportion to our poverty".

The post-vedic period underwent a change in Indian thought. The insane asceticism into which the earlier renunciation had degenerated was condemned. Asceticism came to be considered as undesirable as worldly life. In fact it was realised that a fanatical asceticism, such as burning of bodies, was indicative of a form of selfishness rather than true renunciation, for it embodied the view that one's soul is more precious than all the worlds' souls put together. "The righteous man is not he who leaves the world and retires to a cloister, but he who lives in the world and loves the objects of the world, not for their own sake, but for the sake of the infinite they contain, the universal they conceal". Thus the objects of the world come to be regarded not as lures to sin, but as pathways to divine bliss. And Sankara points out that wealth is evil to the unregenerate, but not to the man of wisdom. The

body is the servant of the soul and not its prison. This interpretation of the spirit of the Upanishads is the most authentic, since it is given by their greatest commentator Sankara. "A philosophy of resignation, an ascetic code of ethics, and a temper of languid world weariness are an insult to the Creator of the Universe, a sin against ourselves and the world which has a claim for us", writes Radha Krishnan.

The Upanishads do not only emphasise the spirit of true religion, but also give us a code of duties, for without them the moral ideal would remain an uncertain guide. Restraint, liberality and mercy, right dealing, non-injury to life and truthfulness are laid down as right forms of conduct.

The fact that the Upanishads lay stress on knowledge as the means to salvation has led many critics to contend that the Upanishads in their enthusiasm for knowledge relegate the will to a subordinate place. This criticism results from a misinterpretation of the term "jnana" in the Upanishads. Knowledge is not mere cognition or intellectual ability. It is the soul-sense. It consists in the spiritual perception of the absolute. It was in this sense that Socrates seems to have used this word when he said "knowledge is virtue". For knowledge in the sense of the realization of the highest necessarily implies a virtuous and a pure life. Ramanuja interprets knowledge to be Dhyana, meditation or Upasana, worship. This kind of knowledge was only possible, after the disciple had undergone a long course of moral and spiritual discipline.

Just as the ideal of the intellect cannot be realised so long as we remain at the intellectual level, but can be found when we transcend that level and rise to intuition, even so the ideal of morality cannot be attained so long as we remain at the moral level. It can be reached only when we rise to religion. At the moral level, the two sides of our nature, the finite and the infinite are in conflict. At the religious level the exclusiveness of our individuality and the sense of our separateness are destroyed. The possibility of this religious realisation is the pre-supposition of all morality. Thus religion is the postulate of morality, and its inspiration. "Without religion morality becomes an eternal striving, a perpetual progress, an endless aspiration towards something we do not have".

As the intuitional level goes beyond the categories of the intellect, even so does the religious level pass beyond the distinctions of good and evil. He who has reached the highest can commit

no sin, for he is above all laws. Thus for a saint or a mystic the question of morality has no significance, for in his case it is not the individual who acts. His will has become identified with God's will. He has joined the whole and thus become the whole. The distinction between God and the individual no longer remains. The mystic is absolutely free and can choose with perfect impunity, but his freedom is not the madness of license. He is a law unto himself. Laws and regulations are necessary for those, who do not naturally conform to the dictates of conscience, but for one who has risen above the selfish ego, morality becomes the natural condition of his being. There is no possibility of evil-doing in him. As Kant puts it "No imperatives hold for the Divine will or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because volition is already of itself necessarily in union with the law". Thus the mystics or the saints go on doing their daily work, diffusing virtue as the star diffuses light and the flower perfume, without even being aware of it. The Upanishads declare that every man has in him the potentiality of rising to his full divine stature, and can realise it, if he strives for it.

The Ancient Greek View.

It was that remarkable band of early Greek teachers known as the sophists, who concerned themselves for the first time in a systematic and scientific manner with the problem of Ethics. Their aim was mainly, however, practical. It was the aim to train the young men of Athens to be efficient citizens. To instruct them in the duties of citizenship they found it necessary to inquire into the basis of social morality. It was really Socrates, in a sense the greatest of the Sophists, who studied the ethical problems in a dispassionate way. He may be distinguished from the other Sophists by the fact that he was not a professional teacher, but claimed only to be a student of moral science. When acclaimed by the oracle to be the wisest man of Greece, he replied that he was as ignorant as the others, only he knew that he was ignorant, whereas the others did not, and in this lay his superiority. This not only goes to show his modesty, but also his keen earnestness about the problem and the difficulty of which he was quite aware.

He was fully convinced of one thing, and that was the unsatisfactoriness of the current views of the moral life of his time. More than anyone else he realized that true morality must be founded on a scientific basis. "Virtue", he said "is knowledge".

He believed that knowingly one would not pursue the evil, for that would be to his own disadvantage. And if he did so, it only showed that he had no knowledge of the end. On the contrary, if any one did the right act by accident, it was not in the full sense of the term morality at all. Thus with Socrates sin was synonymous with ignorance; for whatever was not of knowledge was of sin.

It was, however, his illustrious disciple Plato, who dwelt at length on the problem. Plato put forward a metaphysical view of the universe on which he tried to base his ethical philosophy. He interpreted virtue and vice, goodness and evil in terms of his celebrated theory of Ideas or Forms. Reality, he maintained, consisted of Forms, Types or Ideas. The word 'idea' may be somewhat misleading to the layman. As Plato understood it, it did not mean something which goes on in our heads, but rather a real something, in fact the most real of all things. Idea was not meant to signify what modern Psychology calls concept—the product of abstract thinking—but rather a spiritual entity. The existent world was a shadow or at best a realization through imperfect medium of the world of Ideas. 'Ideal' perhaps comes nearer to the Platonic meaning.

One may glean an exposition of his theory of Ideas in almost all the Dialogues of Plato, but it is primarily in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the *Parmenides*, that he takes pains to expound his theory. He makes a sharp distinction between the objects of sense and the objects of thought. The objects of sense perception may be said to "become" rather than to "be." For example, he says, when we perceive two things as being equal, they never are really and absolutely equal. A more minute observation enables us to see inequalities in them. Thus objects actually perceived are never absolutely equal, but indefinitely approach the idea of Equality. They are tending towards equality, becoming equal rather than are equal. This applies to every quality perceived by the senses. When several objects are judged to be white, none of them is absolutely white, for there are shades and grades of whiteness. Thus equality and whiteness as presented by the senses are relative, but there is that quality of equality or whiteness, which all the appearances represent in a more or less inadequate way. It is that common characteristic, the absolute Idea of Equality or whiteness, which is the true object of knowledge. This Idea is eternal unchanging and identical. It is the true and the abiding reality.

But though Forms or Universals are the true objects of knowledge in terms of which we apprehend the objects of our Sensory experience, how do we get to know these Forms? If nothing that we see is absolutely equal or absolutely white, how do we come to have knowledge of equality or whiteness at all? Obviously it must have come through some independent means, through which we possess a knowledge of these Universal Forms. And, this knowledge must be prior in time and in logic to the knowledge of sensory experience. Plato accounts for such knowledge through the Doctrine of Reminiscence. If the soul possesses such direct knowledge of Forms independently of sensory experience, it can only be, because the soul has had a previous existence. When unencumbered by flesh, it has had a direct vision of the eternal Reality. Thus Socrates and Plato believed in pre-existence; and reminiscence means that knowledge of Forms is the revival of an earlier and purer experience. Socrates constantly speaks of the body as a hinderance in the way of the knowledge of absolute Truth or the knowledge of Forms. True knowledge could only come, if we could rid ourselves of the body. Hence his own absorption in certain trances which he regarded as moments of exaltation in which he came in direct and absolute contact with Reality.

It was, in particular, in the *Meno* that Plato propounded his views on virtue and sin. The dialogue begins with a discussion on the nature of virtue between Meno and Socrates in the characteristic dialectical style. Meno asks Socrates whether virtue is acquired or natural in man. Socrates replies that he is unable to answer that question, for he does not know what virtue is. This surprises Meno, who says that it is common knowledge as to what virtue consists in. Man's virtues come in in such things as the ability to manage the affairs of the state, in serving the public, and in defending one's country against an enemy. A woman's virtue, on the other hand, consists in the ability to manage well the affairs of her family, to look after the house and the children and so on. And similarly in every action and in every kind of business some peculiar virtue belongs to each person, and the same holds true about sin. Socrates retorts by saying that he was in quest of one virtue, but that he had been given a whole swarm of virtues. He had not been told about the nature of virtue at all, only the various virtuous acts had been enumerated. He asks Meno to tell him in what all these virtuous acts have in common, for that must be

virtue. And further, Socrates brings his adversary to realize that all virtuous acts contain such characteristics as courage, temperance, wisdom, magnanimity and many more of the kind. This, however, brings them face to face with the same difficulty; for while in search of one, they had found many virtues. Many more attempts are made to discover what the essence of all virtuous deeds is, but all these attempts meet the same fate. Ultimately Meno comes to acknowledge his ignorance and pleads to Socrates to initiate him into the secrets of virtue. Socrates then tells him that it is the priests and the poets, who have a real knowledge of virtue, for these men are spiritual, and have a direct contact with divine things. These people tell us that the soul of man is immortal, that it may change its garb, called the body, but it never dies, and for this reason we ought to live throughout our lives with all sanctity. It is our past life of purity, which we faintly recollect in our present life, that is called learning or knowledge. Thus all inquiry and learning is reminiscence. No new knowledge of which we have had no experience in our past pure life, is at all possible. He distinguishes between knowledge and "right opinion". Knowledge is that in which the end is in view and is, therefore, a sure and stable guide, but right opinion is without the end in sight. It therefore does not abide. It is valuable so long as it remains with us, but there is nothing to bind or fasten it to us.

Among the followers of Socrates there arose two distinct ethical schools, known as the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. Both these Schools had been influenced in different ways by the character of Socrates. The cynics were struck with his independence and freedom of want, and this they made their ideal. The cyrenaics, on the other hand, had been impressed by his tact and skill in making the most of his surroundings. The cynics were consequently led to asceticism with whom pursuit of pleasure became the chief sin, while the Cyrenaics were led to Hedonism with whom virtue consisted in the pursuit of pleasure.

The Modern Presentation of the Problem.

The present age is noteworthy for its scepticism. There is no code of duties or even general moral philosophy to which we are attached. This has made it all the more difficult to distinguish between virtue and sin. In any case its relative character was never more apparent than today. One man's virtue is another man's sin. A variety of divergent currents flow in different direc-

tions thereby giving different explanations of the existence of evil and sin in the world. This is in consequence of the lack of any religious belief, which is typical of the post-war period. According to Professor Joad, the generation which has grown to maturity since the last war is suffering from spiritual starvation, suffering from a "repressed will to believe", as he puts it. As is natural, man reflects in troubled times on the problem of evil. Such reflection was characteristic of the last Great War. The emphasis then, however, was on God. War was seen as God's punishment for human sin. Today we note a singular shift of emphasis. It is not God, but man who is responsible for the present ills of the world. It is man, who has failed to control his life and use his opportunities. Thus the problem of sin has shifted from a religious or a metaphysical background to an economic or a psychological one. Let us take each of them in turn.

Socialism is increasingly becoming the craze of the day. It teaches us that bad conditions are the cause of human wretchedness and of human wickedness. Poverty, as Shaw insists, is the supreme sin, supreme, because it is the source of all others. "Now what does Let Him Be poor mean? It means let him be weak. Let him be ignorant. Let him become a nucleus of disease. Let him be a standing exhibition and example of ugliness and dirt. Let him have rickety children. Let him be cheap and drag his fellows down to his own price by selling himself to do their work. Let his habitations turn our cities into poisonous congeries of slums. Let his daughters infect our youngmen with the diseases of the streets, and his sons revenge him by turning the nations manhood into Scrofula, cowardice cruelty, hypocrisy, political imbecility and all the other fruits of oppression and mal-nutrition". And Shaw goes on to conclude that since poverty is the root of all evil, money is the source of every virtue.

In more recent times, however, it is psychology which has captured the imagination of the people, and in particular, psycho-analysis. In one book after another, the psycho-analysts have exposed to us the hidden springs that work our natures. The sources of the springs, it seems, lie outside our control. Previously we could rely on self-control, depending on the faculty called the Conscience. Human beings being fallible, Conscience permitted them a certain amount of indulgence. It gave the passions a certain amount of rope. When the permitted indulgence was over, the end of the rope reached, conscience would rap on the counter. "Time's up, gentlemen, no drinking after 10-30" she would say.

If they did not heed to the advice, they had a bad time from conscience, suffering remorse.

But now it is all different. Now it appears that the part of us we can control, the part over which conscience rules, is not the part that matters. Even conscience itself is only a sublimation of a feeling of guilt. If then, we are not in the last resort responsible for the actions to which our passions incline us, what becomes of the notion of moral evil? Obviously, it goes by the board. You cannot blame people for the contents of the unconscious, if only because they do not know what the contents are. No more can you blame them for the influence of these contents on consciousness, or for the distorted and perverted or sublimated versions of them which appear at the conscious level.

Now the contents of the unconscious depend very largely on one's early training. The first two years of one's life are the most important according to Adler determining the unconscious Life Goal, which is later to prescribe the motives and direct the course of all our subconscious activities. According to Freud they fill our body-souls with all those desires, which later get us into trouble with society if expressed, and with ourselves if we suppressed them. For this suppression leads to disastrous results to our personality. Just as a fresh-flowing stream, dammed at its source overflows itself and creates a marsh, even so our suppression results in the formation of "complexes". It is these suppressions, perversions and frustrations, from which originates all moral evil.

Now these two views—in spite of all the service they have done to mankind—have certainly indulged in exaggeration. They are revolts against some of the current evils of our social system, but like most revolts they go to extremes. They have undoubtedly exposed some of the weak links of our social structure but it is preposterous to read all the evils of the present-day world in terms of either the one or the other of these theories. Man has from times immemorial indulged in acts of sheer beastliness, acts for which no adequate explanation can be given and long before the class-war had assumed the present proportions. Nor can we accept the psychologists' view as a complete explanation. If defective early education is the cause of all moral evil then our generation should have been far more virtuous than its predecessors, since it has received training in accordance with considerably improved and advanced educational theories. And yet it is we who behave like fiends, glorying in violence and indulging in wholesale murder of innocent people without remorse.

Perhaps we can study the problem only in an abstract way in terms of the motive and the consequence of the act. Is the consequence more important in our judgment of the act or the motive? In ethical terminology the problem may be formulated thus: Which is the object of moral judgment, the intention or the motive? The utilitarians, notably Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick are responsible for the view that the consequence is the important factor in our judgment of the act. If the act results in the general welfare of the people, the act is good, irrespective of the motive underlying the act. Thus if two men act in precisely the same way, one out of fear and the other out of compassion, their actions are equally good. They may not be equally good men, but that, says Mill, is irrelevant to the question. A good man may do a bad action, and a bad man may do a good action. The question simply is this—are their actions good or bad?

Here Mill seems to be labouring under a confusion. He seems to interpret motive in terms of feeling whereas the proper ethical significance of motive is the end or the goal, which induces us to act in a particular way. If motive is to be understood in this latter sense, then it is on the motive that the moral judgment is passed. Mill's error seems to lie in the fact that he thinks the moral judgment is to be passed on things done, whereas the moral judgment is properly passed not on these, but on the person doing. If it were not so, we should pass moral judgments on such physical phenomena as storms, floods, earthquakes and so on. The object of moral judgment is voluntary action. Whatever is not willed has no moral quality. The other school, which lays emphasis on the motive is supported by the intuitionist writers, of whom Martineau may be taken as a fair representative. If the motive which induced one to act in a particular way is good, then the act is good, no matter whether the result is beneficial to society or not. On the other hand, if the motive is bad, the act which accrues from it is also bad, even if apparently it does good to someone.

Martineau draws out an elaborate list of motives of conduct and arranges them according to merit. He places reverence at the top and censoriousness, vindictiveness and suspiciousness at the bottom. Between them lie a great variety of passions. This scheme is open to two criticisms. In the first place, it implies that the human mind is not an organic unity, but an aggregate of distinct faculties. This psychological division is false and is against the current conceptions of psychology. Secondly, Martineau confuses

the different senses of the term "motive". Motive is not to be interpreted as a state of feeling but rather as an end or aim. Thus if a list of motives had to be given, it should have taken the form of a classification of ends to be attained.

The Conclusion.

From a general survey of all the various views we have covered one thing is evident. It is evident that sin is not an absolute concept. It is something relative and subjective. It is relative, even as morality itself is, to the time in which the individual lives. Sin as we understand it is not what the same as the ancient Hindus or the ancient Greeks understood by it. It is relative to the environment. It is relative to the metaphysical theory of Reality accepted by us. It is relative to the extent of knowledge attained. Sometimes a new discovery of science will alter our judgment of right or wrong in a particular case. For instance in primitive times wanton killing of insects did not arouse any moral censure. In the humanitarian age that followed, it came to be considered sinful. But later still, in our own time, the discovery that house-flies carry disease has changed the act into a moral one. Sin, thus, is a relative term. The only universal element, in terms of which we can understand it, is the motive underlying an act. If in doing anything we mean well, our act is virtuous, otherwise it is sinful. Kant calls it the "goodwill". A goodwill is more than a mere good intention in as much as it involves a determined effort to produce a good result. But we cannot take into account the actual result achieved, for in the production of the result many other forces are at work. "Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own". Sometimes with the best efforts we achieve quite the contrary of what we aim. This change in the result may be due to the interference of Divine Agency, and we may say with Shakespeare "There is a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will". Or, it may be due to the interference of some non-intelligent forces of Nature. It remains, nevertheless, true that we cannot consider the actual results achieved when morally judging an act. Goodwill is all that matters. As Kant put it "it is the only jewel that shines by its own light". We cannot give it a content, for to give it a content would mean introducing a changing and a variable factor. There is no act, which in itself is virtuous or sinful, it is the motive which endows it with a moral quality. "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so".

Bergson's Ethical Outlook

By

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Bergson's "Creative Evolution" secured for him a permanent place in the metaphysical firmament. His "Two sources of Morality and Religion" does the same for him in the moral sphere. It is the purpose of this paper to examine Bergson's Ethical Outlook with a view to showing how fundamental and revolutionary are his contributions to moral problems.

Bergson's moral philosophy follows from his metaphysical presuppositions. In this he represents a revival of the metaphysical ethics introduced by Kant in a new setting of intuitionism. His anti-intellectualism forces him to seek the source of morality not in reason but in intuition. The *elan* is conceived as manifesting itself in moral geniuses after breaking through matter or by triumphing over it. These geniuses are the mystics. They are like a new music springing into the world. The love of God emanates from them. They are impelled to bring about a regeneration of all nature. They feel an urge to transform the whole humanity into a new species, creative, loving and free, or to lead it back into pure *elan*.

The mystics are the reformers of morality and religion. They effect change through a kind of inner force. But it is not a constraint or a drive. It is in the nature of an appeal. Those who ever come in contact with these privileged personalities or even those who simply follow their lives and teachings realize the nature of the appeal. They feel attracted. The appeal embodies that super-intellectual emotion with which the mystic was fired to serve humanity. Such an emotion is not a mere surface stirring. It means the upheaval of the human personality to its very depths, the stirring of the soul itself. It is a glow which is pregnant with new ideas and hence constitutes the source of new morality. It is a fresh emotion which by taking some preexisting 'notes as harmonies' produces 'the fresh notes of a new instrument'.

Humanity responds to the call of these moral geniuses because such a call *awakens* feelings by sympathetic vibration. Feelings are never introduced into us. They lie dormant in us. Moral preachers give out the stimulus, humanity responds to it. Bergson remarks: "Life holds for them unsuspected tones of feeling like those of a new symphony and they draw us after them so that we may express it in action".

The mystic morality naturally knows no bounds for it extends to the whole humanity. It is the morality of the open soul. It presupposes an open society whose membership includes all humanity. It is found in its full-fledged form, according to Bergson, in Christian mysticism. It is complete *only* in Christ and those who imitated him.

Opposed to the open morality of the mystics is yet another type of morality originating from man's social relationships. These are the obligations imposed by society on its members by virtue of their position or status in society. The obligations exert a kind of pressure or force. And since the obligations cohere together they impart even to a trivial obligation the force of the whole block of obligations. We feel the pressure of the force on our failure to observe a rule of society. Bergson calls it 'the totality of obligations'. It is, in his own words, 'the quintessence of innumerable specific habits of obedience to the countless particular requirements of social life'. 'It is a virtual instinct'. Obligation, for Bergson, is a state akin to inclination. Says he, 'Obligation is in no sense a unique fact, incommensurate with others, looming large like a mysterious apparition'. He charges the intellectualist like Kant for confusing the sense of obligation with "the violent effort we now and then exert on ourselves to break down a possible obstacle to obligation".

It is difficult to agree with the suggestion of Bergson. For God (and here we agree with Kant) duty will be inclination, for to Him there is no sense of duty. But for human beings there is a great difference between the two. Experience tells us that often duty runs contrary to our inclinations. For so long as man is a finite being his will falls short of the Perfectly Holy Will. Obligation cannot altogether be likened to inclination.


But that obligation wields the pressure of 'the totality of obligation' is indisputable. The obligations appear in the form of

the categorical imperative. The command must be obeyed. But while Kant suggests an *a priori* rational source to it, Bergson suggests an *a posteriori* instinctive basis. For example the ant must work for the ant-hill. She is impelled by an instinctive urge. But the nature of the command is the same in both the cases: 'You must because you must'. Thus, says Bergson, 'conceive obligation as weighing on the will like habit each obligation dragging after it the accumulated mass of others, and utilizing thus for the pressure it is exerting the weight of the whole: here you have the totality of obligation for a simple elementary moral conscience'.

Bergson's analysis of conscience is thus both new and unique. It is quite different from the one which the theological and even the intentional ethics postulates. Conscience cannot be reduced to mere 'habit of obedience' for, it is something like a faculty or an inner sense which enables us to distinguish right from wrong. It cannot be reduced to mere 'totality of obligation', and here perhaps the opponents of Bergson are justified in their criticism. This is the nature of the second type of morality that Bergson postulates. It is limited to the members of its own group. It is a closed morality as it issues from 'closed souls'. Hence it presupposes a closed society. This is the morality of 'My Station and its Duties' which Bradley discusses in his 'Ethical Studies'.

It would be wrong to conclude from the preceding discussion that the two types of moralities exist apart. The two amalgamate into a unitary whole. In this process of fusion the closed morality passes something of its compulsive force to the morality of the mystic which in its turn 'diffuses over the first something of its perfume'. The closed morality encloses each time something of the spirit of the open morality and the people are made to conform to this by the social pressure.

The pressure carries with it the appealing power of the open morality. The two forces may be likened to mechanism and teleology. One pushes from behind, the other attracts from the front. They account for the conservative and dynamic forces in morality and religion. This dualism however, should not be mistaken for a final one. The two moralities represent the freshets and the stagnant water of the enclosing banks from the same river of life ('Elan Vital'). It is for this reason that Bergson holds all morality to be in essence, in a very broad sense of the term, *biological*. It is an *ethical monism*. It is directly related to his 'monistic



spiritualism", for the material and the vital aspects of creation like the two moralities are the manifestations of the same Cosmic 'Elan.

The explanation of evil is a baffling problem to all monistic systems of ethics, Bergson's system not excepted. Bergson reduces all evil to suffering which, according to him, is not willed by God. But 'it is no solution', as one of his reviewers remarks, 'to reduce all evil to suffering and to say that suffering may not have been willed, and in any case is one feature of an indivisible movement of which eliminating one element would mean suppressing all others, and for the rest to abuse the intellectualist for asking improper questions'. It would have been in conformity with his metaphysical views if he had defined it as the swerving away of life from its course of evolution or its retrograde movement towards matter.

Whatever be the limitations of Bergson's treatment of ethical questions, his analysis of morality is both pertinent and valuable. The distinction between the two types of moralities and their twofold source is both new and unique. His analysis has laid down the standard of his ethics as 'progressive'. The current morality is always progressing towards the dynamic as if in a chain, reaching not as Fichte would suppose to the infinite, but developing towards the realization of its Ideal. The ideal is the establishment of a contact with the creative force of which life is a manifestation. Such a contact is possible only through an imitation of the mystic in whom the 'elan succeeds in triumphing over matter. Such a triumph means infinite joy for it lies at the terminus of an infinite progress.

Crisis and Delinquency

A Psychological Analysis

By

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It is well-known that any durable and major order of social unrest steers the normal propensities of the juvenile mind in the direction of criminal behaviour. The phenomenon is explained by the disturbances that are bound to occur in the even tenor of youthful life on account of the measures that must be taken under the exigencies of modern warfare. Evacuation from a threatened city, the break up of a family upon its members taking up different types of war-work, relaxation of parental control, the conditions of life in black-out and in improvised shelters, all conspire to loosen the moorings of habits and customs that fasten the growing personality to the stable order of social relations.

Yet it must be conceded that the conditions of social unrest merely stress the criminal patterns of conduct and suppress those that are socially approved. The seeds of criminality lie latent in the personality and germinate when in a favourable social soil. This is illustrated by the sharp rise in the figure of thefts and burglaries by the young people during the first world war and the immediate decline of the number upon the declaration of peace. The following table illustrates the point:

CHART No. 1

Number of Adolescents indicted of Theft and Burglary in England:

1913.	1917.	1919
14,325.	24,407.	13,999.

A similar phenomenon is being observed under the conditions of the present war. Mr. S. K. Ruck, a former Assistant Director of the Borstal Association, says: "One child out of 80 throughout the country (England) between the ages of 10-14 is found guilty of indictable offence". The influence of the war-conditions will be

manifest from the following figures collected from the courts of Birmingham¹:

CHART No. 2

	1939.	1940-41.
Simple delinquency.	1985	2680
More serious cases.	1266	1672

The fact that such increase coincides with the social changes contingent upon the war need not lead to the conclusion that these are the necessary effects of war. The roots of these delinquencies lie in a specific *Anlage*, familial and personal. The emergence of the criminal behaviour pattern under the social stress is a fact of the same order as an increase in the frequency of physical diseases and mental disorders under unfavourable conditions. In both of these cases, the environment but serves to activate the disposition which is already in existence.

An analysis of the disposition or the *Anlage* of certain types of delinquency, especially theft and burglary, is likely to be of two-fold interest. It will reveal the mechanism through which the normal attitudes and impulses acquire a criminal taint. It will also enable the state in the very beginning of any social unrest to segregate the individuals who may possess the taint. Society would in this manner be saved from the inroads of crime.

It is possible to define the profile of the personalities that are prone to larceny and burglary. The study of a large number of Borstal cases has served to bring out the common features that are associated with the growth of a criminal behaviour-pattern.

The usual age at which the criminal tendencies begin to become better 'structured' and defined is the period of adolescence. The Borstal cases that are surveyed here belong to the age-group from 17-20. But the growth began much earlier.

The tension of adolescent crisis is accentuated by the familial conditions. The analysis of the cases reveals the fact that there is always some type of maladjustment among the members of the family. Mental diseases in the form of epilepsy, 'fits', schizophrenia, manic-depressive insanity and other orders of neuropathic conditions are frequent. One of the members of the family of the youthful burglar is often found to be an inmate of a mental hospital. Intemperance of the father or the mother is sometimes a complication in addition to these. Bad temper and drunkenness are very

frequently the disturbing conditions. In several of the instances, the youth, being of illegitimate birth, is denied the common social status and amenities. These constitute the immediate social milieu in which young thieves grow up.

A probable neuropathic disposition in which anomalies arise in the life of emotion, is thus accentuated by the conditions of the family milieu. A greater emphasis is placed in this way upon the subjective life comprising mainly of the affective states. This would usually be expected to lead to the inhibition of the behaviour-patterns that secure adaptation. A chronic condition of (i) indolence would thus emerge. Even when the youth is given a piece of work his performance would be (ii) unsteady. He would usually make an indifferent worker. The stress on the subjective life, again, would render the *ego-feeling* more vivid. The various ego-impulses of which self-assertion, sex and subjection are important would begin to play a dramatic rôle. The youth would in turn be impertinent, amorous and entirely at the disposal of a stronger personality. The process of adaptation to the environment of work would, thus, be uneven. At the same time, a pre-occupation with the subjective life of emotions would render the world outside less significant. The youth would be expected to develop a diminished sense of fact. He would grow up into a chronic liar.

The same conditions would explain the unsteadiness of attention and the frequent changes in moods that characterise the would-be thief. These oscillate with the alterations of the inner emotional states which must wax and wane from their very nature. The stress on emotions again would render the sense of the ego more vivid and, therefore, functionally more important. Narcissism and vanity which so often characterise the youthful delinquent would grow upon the personality.

The quality and the course of emotions would determine the general disposition of the personality. If the emotions are of the 'explosive' type, such as anger or deep remorse that find expression in sudden and intensive physical and organic changes, a manic state would gradually mature. And with it will come its opposite the depressive state that arises when the vehemence of emotions and the physical changes leave the mental personality in a depressive condition so that some kind of a balance of energy might be restored. On the other hand the vivid emotions may inhibit the movements. The personality slowly withdraws into its inner core of sentiments, relishing them and even gloating over them. There

is a break between the mind and the world of facts. A schizoid temperament settles upon the personality.

The consummation of the subjective states into cycloid and schizoid temperaments has certain other consequences. The pre-occupation of the growing boy with his inner states precipitates, in some cases, an intense selfishness and egoism. It also compels him to seek loneliness in other cases. In both of these instances the checks that the companionship of fellow men exercise over the impulses that ever tend to run off at a tangent, diminish to a minimum. Thus the emotions that are the common associates of the impulses have their full sway. The ideas and beliefs follow the lead of emotions rather than of facts.

This situation accounts for the entire lack of veracity that the youthful thief so often displays. For, the beliefs out of contact with facts naturally become lies. And when these lies become more bizarre they develop into delusions and even hallucinations.

At the same time the ego-feelings that are often exaggerated in all of these cases make the mental personality excessively sensitive. Remorse and reprimand alike evoke explosive responses. The suicidal tendencies that are stimulated by self-pity and remorse so often for this reason make their appearance in the early life of the youthful delinquent may be explained in this way. The homicidal tendencies may in a like manner be viewed as the reaction of the sensitive ego against reprimand, rebuke and all orders of humiliation. The various personality-processes of the individual build up in this manner a well-organised syndrome.

The following chart prepared on the basis of data of a number of case studies by East and Hubert will represent the profile of personality of the youthful delinquent who commits thefts:

CHART No. 3.

I. Age	14-16.
II. Home Conditions:	(i) Psychopathic <i>Anlage</i> in parents, grand-parents or collaterals—esp. Schizophrenia and Manic-depressive states.
	(ii) Tensions: Loose morals of at least one of the parents. Drunkenness. Parents living separately.
III. Personal Habit of the Delinquent.	Indolence, Insubordination. Lying. Unsteady at jobs.


IV. Mental Estimates.	Intelligence —	Mediocre to good.
	Mental type —	Schizoid or cycloid.
	Attention —	Unsteady.
	Mood —	Changing.
	Personal attitude —	Vain.
	Unusual traits —	Delusions, hallucination, suicidal and homicidal tendencies.

It is possible with a picture of this type to isolate the adolescent personalities at the beginning of any social crisis. The reason why all of these personalities reach out towards a criminal consummation is not far to seek. Weak as the influence of society and the physical environment may be, they tie down the impulses to a life of fairly fixed routine. A rapid social change frees the youthful person from whatever restrictions he has been subjected to. The feeling of protest that the anomalies of family life breed now comes to the forefront. This expresses itself by breaking the social laws, especially those of property. As a matter of fact, the first step in the career of theft is usually taken with the property of parents. A relative immunity from punishment in the first instance and a process of substitution in which all propertied persons are placed in the position of parents finally launch the youth in the regular career of crime.

At the very beginning of any social unrest, all youth of uncertain mental personality should be enlisted in a scheme of productive work which has a social use and which would keep the youth tied to a life of routine. The socially eccentric propensities would in this way be checked at the very outset. Reward and punishment, creation of new loyalties round the plan of work and opportunities for new friendship that prevent the self from lapsing into its subjective seclusion, all serve to restore a normal balance that contribute to the security of the individual and the society alike.

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