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Philosophical

Quarterly

Apr. 1944

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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XX, No. 1]

[April, 1944.

AN ORGAN

OF

430

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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[April, 1944.

The Present Position in Inductive Logic

By

MR. W. LILLIE

In his 'Outline of Philosophy', published in 1927, Mr. Bertrand Russell wrote, "The best examination of induction is contained in Mr. Keynes' 'Treatise on Probability'. There is a valuable doctor's thesis by the late Jean Nicod, "Le problème logique de l'induction", which is very ably reviewed by R. B. Braithwaite in "Mind", October 1925. A man who reads these three will know most of what is known about induction'.¹ Our ordinary elementary teaching of inductive logic has been very little influenced by these three writings containing 'most of what is known about induction', and in the elementary courses in our Indian Universities at any rate, we tend to follow with little questioning and few additions the doctrines of Mill and Jevons. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a background for the teaching of elementary induction in the light of these modern studies. With the mathematics of probability, and with the more profound epistemological implications of the subject, the elementary student, or for that matter the ordinary teacher of general philosophy, like the present writer, can hardly expect to make a thorough acquaintance, but there are aspects of the subject, which might find a place even in an elementary text-book.

I

It is convenient to begin with the conclusion of inductive arguments for it is there that modern logic has made its most definite

1. B. Russell: An Outline of Philosophy, p. 280.

and revolutionary finding. Mill and the earlier logicians seem to have considered that induction should lead to true universal statements as its conclusions; even when they realised that the practical difficulties were so great that it might never be possible to reach such certain conclusions, the true universal statement remained the goal at which all induction aims. On the other hand, modern logicians are all agreed that inductive arguments can only lead to probable conclusions. The term 'probable' has been applied to events in the real world, to propositions and to beliefs. It may be agreed that the probabilities which we study in induction do not belong to events, although the applications of probability in the quantum theory in physics may suggest that those who ascribe probable relations to events are expressing, however inadequately, a true fact about the nature of things. There has been more confusion between the view that probability is logical and objective, so that propositions are probable, altogether apart from our attitude of belief or disbelief towards them, and the view that probability is psychological and subjective, so that the probability of a proposition merely expresses the strength of our belief in it. If, as a logical treatment of the subject would seem to demand, we take the view that propositions are probable, apart from our believing them, it would still be the case that our beliefs, which are themselves propositions, are more or less probable; only their probability would not depend on the strength of our belief. Strictly speaking the term 'probable' refers not to a proposition itself but to a logical relation between two sets of propositions, a relation by which knowledge of one set of propositions, (in this case the data or premises of the induction), while not proving the truth of a second proposition or set of propositions, (in this case the conclusion of the induction), provides some rational ground for believing it. The emphasis in this account, taken from Lord Keynes' *Treatise*, is on the word *rational* and not on the word *belief*.² Lord Keynes goes on to point out that the term 'probable' is applied derivatively to the degree of rational belief in statements asserting this relation, and also to the proposition related to the original propositions by the probability relation;³ it is in this third sense that we speak of the conclusion of an induction as always probable, and never certain. Lord Keynes holds that probability

2. Keynes: *A Treatise on Probability*, p. 6.

3. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

is indefinable,⁴ so we must regard the above account as a description, with a reference to belief that would not be admitted in a strict definition.

Lord Keynes also suggests that certainty is 'a special case of probability, as being, in fact, the *maximum probability*'.⁵ This suggestion seems to be misleading, and likely to increase the confusion, (which it is very difficult to get rid of), between psychological certainty and logical certainty or between psychological probability and logical probability. As a matter of experience we often feel certain about propositions that are not really certain at all; at certain stages of the present war, Hitler may have been certain that Britain was about to be defeated. Similarly a person may hold that a particular proposition is probable, which is not probable at all in the strictly logical sense; many a gambler has been ruined by hazarding a stake when his estimate of the probabilities had no logical justification. If we confine ourselves to psychological attitudes there can be little dispute that certainty is the maximum probability; and, in so far as logical probability is a matter of *belief*, even rational *belief*, it shares this characteristic. There may be other ways, and I shall suggest one in a later section of this paper, in which certainty seems to be the maximum probability, but, in certain respects, some of which are especially important for logic, the two seem to be of a different order altogether. These include the following:—

(1) A logically certain conclusion based on true data is, when reached, independent of its data, and can henceforth be used without reference to these data. A logically probable conclusion continues to be dependent on its data; it is only probable relatively to these data, and only in this form can it be carried on to the next stage of the argument.

(2) It follows from the view of probability as a relation that the same probable conclusion may have at the same time different probabilities in relation to different sets of data; but it is inconceivable that a certain conclusion should be certain and uncertain, except in the psychological sense, at the same time.

(3) Probability is a matter of degree; and a probable conclusion may be more or less probable, although we may agree with

4. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

5. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

Lord Keynes that in most cases the probability cannot be measured. There are no degrees in the case of logical certainty.

(4) In a logically certain inference, the conclusion refers indifferently either to 'all' or 'any' of the members of the class of its subject. If it is certain that 'any A is B', it is also certain that 'all the A's are B's, so that the two forms *all* and *any* differ only verbally. Nicod points out that in cases where it is merely probable that any A is B, it may at the same time be improbable or even impossible that all the A's are B's.⁶ Even after meeting with a single white crow, and so definitely refuting the statement that 'all crows are black', I can still maintain that there is a considerable probability that any crow, such as the next crow I shall see, is black.

(5) Even an infinite probability is not equivalent to certainty. It is infinitely probable that any number taken at random, to quote Nicod's example,⁷ will not be 1324, but it is by no means certain that it will not be so. It is conceivable, although not at all likely under our present conditions of knowledge, that the conclusion of an induction might attain to infinite probability; it would still be in a different category from a certain conclusion.

Those who regard certainty as a special case of probability may point out that the 'law of contradiction', which is the foundation of all certain inference, has been proved by Lord Keynes by the same type of argument as he uses to prove the fundamental theorems of probability.⁸ Mr. H. W. B. Joseph considers that the Law of Contradiction is proved by Lord Keynes only on the stipulation that 'no contradictions shall be admitted into the groups of propositions whose logical relations we are to study how to determine';⁹ in other words, the argument is circular. Even if the proof were accepted, it would not establish the fact that certainty is one case of probability. The same type of argument even dealing with relatively similar data may lead to very different conclusions, different in order or even in kind as well as in degree.

6. Nicod: *Le problème logique de l'induction*, p. 16.

7. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

8. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

9. H. W. B. Joseph: *Mr. Keynes on Probability*. 'Mind'. N.S. Vol. XXXII. p. 423.

The fact that logical probability is so different from logical certainty is important, because the pursuit of an elusive certainty after the fashion of deductive logic has certainly been one of the tendencies that has led inductive logic astray. Mr. Braithwaite quotes with approval a statement by Nicod that if certainty is lacking, the probability remains to be established, and the whole theory of induction must be done over again.¹⁰ That induction can never establish certain universal conclusions after the model of deduction has been demonstrated in a very simple way by Dr. C. D. Broad in an article in 'Mind' October 1918.¹¹ Dr. Broad points out that any attempt to establish a certain universal conclusion from a particular premise, (however large the extension of the subject of that premise might be, short of universality), would break the rule that from a particular premise, only a particular conclusion can be established. A critic might reply that we are now using a different kind of proof altogether from the deductive syllogism; and that is just the position that we accept. We are dealing in induction with a type of proof that leads by the relations of probability to a universal statement that is probable to a certain degree on the basis of particular data, a conclusion very different from the conclusion established as certain by deductive reasoning. The main resemblance between them is that it is generally rational to believe and to act on both.

II

How is the universal probable conclusion reached from the given premises or data? The older text-books sometimes distinguished inductive logic as material logic, which deals with the observed world, from deductive logic as formal logic, which deals with the conditions of valid thinking apart from observed material altogether. Others maintained that inductive logic was also formal in character, as it dealt only with the methods or forms used by scientists in their investigations, and never with the world observed by the scientists. The question is whether induction depends on the real world for the validity of its conclusions in a way that deduction does not. It would be generally agreed that the syllogism, 'All Y

10. *Mind*. N.S. Vol. XXXIV, p. 484.

11. *Mind*. N.S. Vol. XXVII. p. 390.

is Z, All X is Y, therefore All X is Z' is valid in all possible universes, whatever may be denoted by the symbols X, Y and Z. Is this true also of an inductive argument, such as the argument by simple enumeration, that given the premises, 'This x is y': 'This x_1 is y_1 ' 'This x_2 is y_2 ' 'This x_n is y_n ', therefore the proposition 'All x is y' has a certain probability in relation to these data. Such a probability would be very low indeed, if we treated the argument as purely formal, for we then could have no indication whatever as to whether the n cases examined are a fair sample of x generally, or what proportion n bears to the total denotation of x. When modern logicians say that the principles of induction must be the laws of probability,¹² we are apt to think that they are asserting that the principles of induction do not depend on the nature of the real world for their validity, because we feel that the principles of probability are entirely mathematical and formal in the sense that the principles of deduction are formal. This may not be the case; the 'relevance' which Lord Keynes includes among his definitions does not seem to be an entirely formal notion,¹³ but actually all inductive logicians have assumed that we are able to reach our probable conclusions in induction because of some characteristics of the natural world. Lord Keynes and Nicod both point out that abstract numbers must have the same or equivalent characteristics, as we use inductive arguments with equal success about them.¹⁴

The identification of the principles of induction with the laws of probability, however certain, does not by itself take us very far. Lord Keynes has drawn attention to the very definite and restricted conditions under which a principle like his Law of Indifference, (the law of non-sufficient reason of other students of probability), is applicable, and to the fact that other principles, like Berouilli's theorem, (that, in a like series of events, the *a priori* probability of which is p, the proportion to occur is not widely different from p) are perhaps never rigidly applicable at all.¹⁵ In actual experience, the principles of probability have been most successful in their application to the 'urn' or box from which balls of different colours may be drawn, but we have little evidence that the conditions of the real universe resemble the conditions under which balls are

12. e.g. C. D. Broad in *Mind*. N.S. Vol. XXXI, p. 71.

13. Keynes: *Op. cit.* p. 138.

14. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 244; Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

15. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, chs. IV and XXIX.

drawn from an urn, or, to use Lord Keynes' reversion of an expression of Quetelet's, that 'la nature que nous interrogeons, c'est une urne'.¹⁶ Indeed nature appears to be very different from an urn. In spite of the odd resemblance of the proportions as determined by Mendel's law¹⁷ and those determined by the principles of probability, what could we make of an urn in which the balls not only reproduced themselves in unpredictable numbers, but in which a ball sometimes appeared with the characteristics of a Shakespeare or a Napoleon?

There are then some characteristics of the real world, in virtue of which we can so apply the principles of probability as to make inductive inferences. The older logicians labelled these characteristics causality and uniformity, and we shall come back to these later. Modern logicians however are all agreed in giving the first place to another principle,—the Principle of Limited Variety. This is a principle of long standing in inductive logic, for it was certainly suggested by Bacon, and it has the merit of being to some extent comprehensible even to an elementary student of logic. Lord Keynes states this in the form that the qualities of an object are bound together in a limited number of groups, a sub-class of each group, (that of the generator properties) being an infallible symptom of certain other members of it also.¹⁸ Nicod points out that what is necessary for induction is not that the number of groups is limited or finite but that it is less than some number given in advance.¹⁹ One may doubt with Dr. Broad whether the notion of 'generator properties', however much it may be in harmony with the findings of modern science, is really necessary for induction,²⁰ it seems enough to assume that the perceptible qualities of objects tend to occur in bundles. Dr. Broad himself in examining Bacon's philosophy refers to four kinds of limited variety, suggested by Bacon²¹:—(1) that a small group of the qualities of a substance, (Lord Keynes' 'generator properties') determines the others; (2) that the number of different kinds of material substances is comparatively small; (3) that the various differences of quality found in the species of the same genus can

16. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 428.

17. c.f. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 419.

18. Keynes: *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

19. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

20. *Mind*. N.S. XXXI, p. 71 ff.

21. Broad: *Philosophy of Francis Bacon*, pp. 37-39.

be reduced to a single principle, for example, differences in colour to wave length; (4) however incompatible the qualities of different genera may be, there is still a unity among the underlying principles or 'forms', as Bacon called them, of these genera; for example colour and heat are both explained in terms of motion. Modern science would accept all these statements, if they were expressed in more accurate terms, and all of them would serve to some extent as a basis of inductive argument, although Lord Keynes' form, as modified by Dr. Broad and Nicod, seems the most useful. This is the one fundamental assumption of induction; 'the hypothesis that nature is fundamentally finite has a finite antecedent probability'.²²

The other principle commonly accepted as a postulate of induction is that of determinism or causality, although about it there is more difference of opinion. Nicod considers that Lord Keynes does not recognise that elimination presupposes determinism as a postulate.²³ It is true that Lord Keynes does not examine the hypothesis of determinism; in fact, he deliberately avoids the metaphysical difficulties which surround the true meaning of the term 'cause'.²⁴ Yet there is much in his Treatise to suggest that he would be prepared to accept the postulate of determinism in some form; it is difficult to imagine what 'generator properties' could mean without some such assumption. It may be that Lord Keynes uses the wider conception of 'negative analogy' rather than the narrower conception of 'elimination' just because elimination in the ordinary sense of the word does seem to assume determinism of a very definite kind. What Nicod points out rightly is that there is no need to assume, as most logicians have done, that the causal principle is universal, that *every* event in the universe has a cause; all we need to assume is that the event about which we are making a generalisation has in some sense a cause.²⁵ Moreover even in such cases, we need to assume only the probability and not the certainty of determinism. Mr. Braithwaite thinks that it is necessary to any reasonable theory aiming at the justification of the proposition that any generalisation has some *a priori* probability to assume that a 'thorough-going determinism' is certain. To accept this in any full sense would give an inductive argument in theory at least all the certainty of a deductive argument, and to do

22. Mind N.S. XXX, p. 71 ff.

23. Nicod. op. cit., p. 28.

24. Keynes: Op. cit., pp. 263, 275.

25. Nicod: Op. cit., pp. 28-30.

so would contradict all we have said of the difference between the two. The older logicians landed themselves in un-necessary controversy and difficulty by assuming the universality and the necessary certainty of the law of causation. A more modest postulate will suffice.²⁶

With regard to the other commonly accepted postulate of induction, the law of uniformity, Lord Keynes maintains that this law is simply the assertion that mere position in time and space is always irrelevant to generalisation.²⁷ Generalisations which specifically refer to space or time are, of course, exceptions to this rule. It may be doubted whether every-one would make this universal judgment of the irrelevance of position in space or time, and so whether it is an axiom known intuitively. In any case, in dealing with concrete events or things, differences in position of space and time always seems to be accompanied by other differences, some of which *may* be relevant to the generalisation under consideration. The principle of uniformity is not one of the assumptions required for induction, and most logicians will gladly abandon a principle, the careless use of which has had a most baneful influence on human thought by giving a pseudo-scientific support to the Preacher's pessimism, when he said, 'That which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the sun'.²⁸

III

The methods of induction can, it is generally agreed, be reduced to scientific induction or elimination and simple enumeration. Nicod uses more general terms, which might well come into general use as names for the two classes of induction, 'induction by infirmation' and 'induction by confirmation'. The 'infirmation' which is the main subject of Lord Keynes' section on Induction, and of Nicod's section called by this name is not the elimination of the methods of scientific induction, as taught by Mill and Jevons. Nicod indeed points out that Mill based his doctrine of scientific induction on the law of causality obtained by simple enumeration.²⁹ It is however possible to imagine a universe where Mill's methods of scientific induction would give certain universal laws as their

26. Mind. N.S. XXXIV, p. 488.

27. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 226.

28. Ecclesiastes I. 9.

29. Nicod: Op. cit. p. 17.

conclusions; only the methods used would then be deductive or mathematical and not inductive. Let us suppose that at any moment there happens in the universe a finite number of independent events, unrelated to one another; each of these events causes after a short interval of time another event, and the events at this second moment of time are also independent and unrelated; the same effect is always preceded by the same cause; there are no complex causes and no plurality of causes; only after a longer or a shorter time, each series comes back again to one or other of the events with which we started, so that history frequently repeats itself. In these circumstances, the methods of scientific induction would give us a complete knowledge of the universe expressed in certain universal propositions. The older logicians seem consciously or unconsciously to have cherished the hope that a fuller knowledge of the universe would show that, in spite of the appearances to the contrary, the universe is really a universe of this kind; this alone would be what Mr. Braithwaite calls a 'thorough-going determinism'. Unfortunately for this view, the universe which we study seems to modern science very different from the universe which we have imagined. But may it not be the case that certain parts or aspects of the universe show more resemblance to the completely determined universe which we have imagined than others? May it not be the case that in some parts, causes are less complex, there is less plurality of causes, and there are more cases where a single cause produces a single effect? It may be suggested for example that in physics we study facts with more simple causal relations than we do in biology, and that in biology we study facts with more simple causal relations than we do in psychology. Or, in other words, there is more complexity of causes and more plurality of causes and perhaps even more events which cannot be fitted into the deterministic scheme at all among the data of psychology than there are among the data of biology or of physics. It may be argued that, if this is the case, we are away from the deductive certainties of a 'thorough-going determinism' aided by the methods of scientific induction, and back to the probable relations of inductive inference. That is true, but a probability is a relation between a conclusion and certain relevant data, and one of the relevant data in any statement of probability about the real world is the extent to which that part or aspect of the world shows the characteristics of thorough-going determinism. If our suggestion about the sciences is correct, a conclusion in physics has its probability increased, in comparison with a conclusion in biology, in virtue of the fact that one of the data or

propositions on which the conclusion is based is that the part of the universe with which physics deals shows, more of the characteristics of thorough-going determinism than the part with which biology deals. When Nicod maintains that the law that X entails A can never have a probability greater than the probability of A's determinism,³⁰ he bases this statement on the utterly false view that a conclusion in induction can never have a probability greater than that of its most uncertain premise; Nicod is here confusing the nature of inductive and deductive argument. It may be the case however that Nicod is expressing in his statement about determinism the truth that, other factors being equal, the probability of a conclusion will vary to some extent with the amount of determinism among those events, which are referred to in its data.

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There is a parallel argument in the case of the syllogism, and it has been the contention of the last paragraph that in a universe of a certain kind Mill's induction by elimination would be just as deductive as the syllogism. In the syllogism, 'all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, *therefore* Socrates is mortal', let us suppose that we had to substitute for the major premise either of the following, (a) 'In my experience, ninety-nine out of every hundred men are mortal' or (b) 'In my experience, fifty out of every hundred men are mortal'. In both cases the argument would no longer be a syllogism, and the conclusion would not be certain. It would be the case however that a statement about Socrates would have a greater probability with (a) as one of the premises on which it is based than with (b) as one of the premises on which it is based. Incidentally this seems to be the truth on which the frequency theory of probability is based. Both these arguments may be interpreted in such a way as to suggest that certainty is the maximum probability; in the argument by elimination probability increases with the amount of determinism among the data, until it reaches certainty in the case of a 'thorough-going determinism', which would admit of a deductive argument; in the syllogistic argument, the extension of the subject of the major premise becomes greater and greater until in the real syllogism this term is completely distributed, and we have a certain conclusion. It is to be noted that in both cases the degree is not primarily in the probability of the conclusion; in the one case it is in the amount of the determinism

30. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

given as a premise; in the other case it is in the extension of the subject of a premise; and only under certain conditions of the other premises would these increase the probability of the conclusion in an inductive argument.

Both Lord Keynes and Nicod deal mainly with the repetition of instances which Lord Keynes calls *pure induction* and which Nicod calls induction by repetition. Lord Keynes argues that in such repetition of instances, a process of 'infirmation' or elimination goes on by means of what he calls 'negative analogy', and this appears to be the main source of the probability of any conclusion derived from the number of instances. Nicod holds that such invalidation can lead only to a law of 'mediocre probability',³¹ and that it is in 'confirmation' by additional instances that the main source of probability lies. Nicod admits that, even after his own criticism, Lord Keynes' argument by elimination would give some probability to its conclusion, and in his section on confirmation, he accepts with certain criticisms Lord Keynes' proof; Nicod himself seems to exaggerate the extent of the differences between his own view and that of Lord Keynes; both seem substantially valid, provided that we do not expect too much probability in the conclusion.

When we are dealing in this way with a series of instances in order to discover those characteristics which are universally connected, the appropriateness of Lord Keynes' term 'negative analogy' in connection with characteristics present in some instances but absent in others is evident. The clearest statement of Lord Keynes' view known to the present writer is found in a review in 'The Philosophical Review' by Mr. C. I. Lewis.³² If we have a given set of objects, their characteristics may be exhaustively classified into (1) those which are common and connected, (2) those which are common but irrelevant, and (3) those which are present in some but absent in others. The first class are those expressed by $g(\varphi\psi)$. The probability that this holds not only for the cases examined but for all cases is what is in question. This is the same as the proving that, if all cases were examined, the properties under (2) and none under (1) would be disclosed as genuinely irrelevant by being sometimes absent, so that all the properties would be divided into those of class (1) and those of class (3).

31. Nicod: Op. cit. p. 78.

32. Philosophical Review. Vol. XXXI, p. 184.

Assuming then that when a connection holds in the first n cases there is some a priori probability of its holding in all, this probability is increased when the examination of new cases reduces the common properties regarded as irrelevant, Mr. Keynes calls this increasing the negative analogy, and finds in it the chief significance of induction'. To take the familiar text-book example, the conclusion 'All men are mortal', might be based on the propositions, 'Fielding died; Scott died; Dickens died; Thackeray died. In this case the characteristics of 'humanity' and 'mortality' would fall under (1); the characteristics of 'mortality' and 'being English' or of 'mortality' and 'being a novelist' or of 'mortality' and 'being male' would, to begin with, fall under (2); as the number of instances increased to include men, who were neither male nor English nor novelists, these would all fall under (3) and by so increasing the negative analogy, according to Lord Keynes, the probability of all men being mortal would be increased.

The question now is whether, if we assume the principle of limited variety, the principles of probability can give to the conclusion of this type of argument by elimination a tendency towards infinite probability with an increase in the number of instances. Nicod considers that at best we can reach only a mediocre probability,³³ but Nicod's argument is based on the view that the probability of a conclusion can never be greater than the probability of the least probable of its premises. This is only true, as Mr. Braithwaite points out,³⁴ in the case where this premise is *necessary* for the conclusion; it is not true in those cases with which we are most concerned in induction where the premise supports the conclusion without being necessary to it. At another point Nicod's argument rests on the distinction between the relatively high probability of an event being determined by an antecedent and the relatively low probability of a character being entailed by one of its concomitants,³⁵ this is a distinction that most people would admit, but, it may be the case that by avoiding the analysis of determinism, and so a distinction between sequence and concomitance, Lord Keynes has escaped from the force of Nicod's criticism. Mr. Braithwaite too draws attention to an error in Nicod's probability arithmetic.³⁶ In spite of these defects in Nicod's

33. Nicod: Op. cit., pp. 30, 71.

34. Mind N.S. XXXIV, p. 485.

35. Nicod: Op. cit., pp. 52, 53.

36. Mind. N.S. XXXIV, p. 486.

argument, one wonders whether a similar argument might not be reconstructed without the assumption of the false view of the probability of a conclusion being limited to the probability of its least certain premise. It is difficult to judge what kind of determinism, if any, is implied in Lord Keynes argument. Mr. Braithwaite says, 'Determinism, of course, comes in the establishment of the *a priori* probability of any law by the Principle of Limited Variety' (my italics), but it may be suggested that it comes in also in other places in an argument by elimination, and that the probability of the conclusion will depend to some extent on the kind of determinism postulated, whether it be the very limited determinism postulated by Nicod, or the 'thorough-going determinism' of Mr. Braithwaite, or the complete determinism that we imagined in an earlier section of this paper. Both Lord Keynes and Nicod wish to avoid being drawn into metaphysics, but it is most desirable that agreement should be reached among logicians as to the kind and degree of determinism which we may assume as a postulate in induction.

In dealing with induction by confirmation there seems general agreement that, given the principle of Limited Variety, as modified by Nicod, and given the principles of probability, it can be demonstrated that the mere increase in the number of instances can give an increase in the probability of the conclusion tending to infinity, under certain conditions. These conditions are (a) that the conclusion or law has some initial probability and (b) that, on the hypothesis that the law is false, the probability that the law should be confirmed in n instances tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.³⁷ As Mr. Braithwaite points out,³⁸ Nicod's main criticism can be avoided here, and we have a statement of the conditions of a valid simple enumeration that can be understood even by the elementary student, however incomprehensible he might find the theorems of probability on which it is based. There is difference of opinion as to whether the accumulation of identical instances adds to the probability of the conclusion in an induction by confirmation. It does not do so in an argument by elimination, but identical instances would seem to have the same usefulness as other instances in an argument by confirmation. In any case, the argument seems merely academic, because in the real world it is

37. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 236.

38. Mind. N.S. XXXIV, p. 490.

unlikely that absolutely identical instances ever occur, and, even, if they do, it is unlikely that we should know that they are identical.

IV

There are two matters relevant to induction which seem to call for a more adequate treatment than they have so far had from the inductive logician,—the place of intuition in induction and corroboration.

Lord Keynes quotes with approval a statement of Leibnitz that in dealing with probability there is need not so much of mathematical subtlety as of a precise statement of all the circumstances.³⁹ To know which circumstances are relevant is largely a matter of direct judgment or intuition. The application of the Principle of Indifference depends necessarily on judgments of relevance, and although 'these judgments may be limited and controlled, perhaps by logical rules and principles which possess a general application',⁴⁰ they are ultimately intuitions or judgments of direct insight. This is no surrender of the validity of inductive arguments, for we use a similar direct insight in judging the validity of a deductive argument. It is this direct judgment which sees those characteristics where there is positive analogy and where there is negative analogy in the argument by elimination. There are other places where intuition enters an inductive argument. The presentation of a set of data may arouse in a subject as his response an 'intuitive induction', which Dr. Broad describes as 'the intuiting of necessary and universal connections between characteristics when conjunctions of these characteristics are presented to the mind's attention'.⁴¹ Here intuition comes into closer connection with induction, for the result of the intuition is not merely a particular statement as in the direct judgment of relevance but a universal (and perhaps even necessary) proposition. Nicod suggests that, besides the probability which a statement has in virtue of its relation to another set of statements, (the view of Russell and Johnson and Keynes), a statement has a 'plausibility' or 'intrinsic probability' by which a proposition recommends itself more or less to the mind without being related to any other of the propositions which

39. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 369.

40. Keynes: Op. cit., p. 53.

41. Broad: Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 105.

happen to be given'.⁴² Such plausibility can obviously be known only by intuition. There are two observations that seem worth making in this connection. (a) The intuition of an expert is itself sufficient to give to a generalisation that *a priori* probability which can be increased by the observation of instances. This appears to be the common scientific practice; the expert sees, perhaps on the ground of already accepted propositions, perhaps by a mere intuition of plausibility, the probability of some new generalisation; the experimenter goes on confirming this by repeated experiments, producing new instances. (b) The place of intuition in logical thought has been obscured by a widespread view that the statement based on intuition has about it a mysterious certainty, so that to doubt it seems a kind of sacrilege. This attitude to intuition undoubtedly comes from the place given to intuition in mystical and religious experience, but the kind of intuition used there is very different from that which we use in inductive arguments, although it too might benefit from a more critical analysis. Dr. A. C. Ewing points out in a recent lecture on 'Reason and Intuition' that we may have 'an intuitive conviction of the truth of a proposition not amounting to certainty'.⁴³ Such an intuition is the beginning of an inductive investigation into the truth of the proposition, not the end. And even the intuition that appears to give us a certain proposition may err; there is nothing infallible about any of our psychical processes, even intuition. All this suggests that we require a much fuller treatment of the conditions in which intuition has a part, and in which it is likely to have some validity.

One of the special features of inductive argument is that, with the help of additional premises, there is the possibility of reaching a conclusion of a higher probability than that of the least certain of the premises. An attempt to use an analogous but by no means identical type of argument in deduction would certainly lead to the fallacy of illicit process. The use of corroborative arguments is one of the most common forms of reasoning in practical life. If a proposition A has a probability *p* on the ground of a certain set of propositions B, a probability *q* on the ground of another set of propositions C, (independent of B), a probability *r* on the ground of another set of propositions D, (independent of B and C), then, provided that B and C and D are independent of one another, the

probability of A becomes very considerable indeed, at any rate far beyond its initial probability with any one of the separate sets of propositions. The classical and later arguments for the existence of God illustrate this type of argument; the probability that God exists based on each of them separately is very low indeed; and, when one argument is largely identical with another as in Descartes' proofs, the probability remains low; but, when the various arguments are more or less independent of one another, then the probability of the conclusion that God exists becomes very considerable. Perhaps a more familiar example at the present day would be the clues in a detective story; separately they give a very low probability to a statement about the identity of the criminal, but, when taken together, they give a conclusion which the not too careful reader will accept as certain. Lord Keynes' theorems on the combination of premises would be applicable here, but he himself admits that his results here are not very valuable, and he refers the reader to Johnson's Cumulative Formula, which, as far as the present writer understands it, and that is not very far, shows that such co-operating data continually strengthen their own mutual probabilities. Here, as elsewhere in the realm of induction, the probability of the conclusion does not depend on the principles of probability, but on the limited variety of that real universe to which the principles are applied. It is because the sets or 'groups' of propositions which can be truly made about the real universe are limited in number that a proposition based on a number of such independent sets has such a high probability. This needs investigation by those skilled in the principles of induction, but the hope of a sound metaphysical basis for our subject seems to lie in the direction of limited variety.

42. Nicod: *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

43. A. C. Ewing: *Reason and Intuition*, p. 31.

44. Keynes: *Op. cit.* p. 149 ff.

Some Problems of the Mandukya-Karika

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I

In the course of his introduction to *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*,¹ Professor Vidushekhara Bhattacharya makes the following salutary remark: 'When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible?'² In spite of this observation of his he rejects the evidence of tradition on many points apparently because he finds contradictions and incongruities. Yet it is worthwhile examining if there are real and insurmountable difficulties in following the Advaita tradition regarding the composition and character of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.

The traditional Advaita view is (i) that the twelve mantras beginning with 'om ity etad akṣaram' constitute the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (ii) that the *Kārikā* consisting of four chapters is the work of Gauḍapāda, an early teacher of Advaita, (iii) that the 29 verses of the first chapter form a commentary on the Upaniṣad, and (iv) that the following three chapters seek to establish the truth of non-duality through such reasoning as may be found in support of Scripture.

Professor Bhattacharya accepts whole-heartedly only one of these propositions, viz., that Gauḍapāda is the author of the *Kārikā*, and calls in question the others. After briefly noticing his partial agreement with tradition, we shall consider the grounds on which he feels constrained to differ therefrom and see if they really warrant disagreement.

1. Published by the University of Calcutta (1943). We shall refer to this book in the foot-notes as *Āgamaśāstra*.

2. Ibid., p. lxxi.

II

As against Walleser who thinks that there was none named Gauḍapāda who is believed to have been the author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, that there existed long before the time of Śaṅkara a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century, and that this school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads in the form of a *śāstra* (a school doctrine) and embodied it in a collection of sayings consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, Professor Bhattacharya believes that tradition is right in ascribing the work to Gauḍapāda, for the reason that a work cannot be the production of the whole people of a land, though, written by a single individual, it may represent the views of the entire country to which he belonged. In this connection he quotes the view of *Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī* (17th century A.D.) that in the country of Kurukṣetra there was a river called Hīrarāvati on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people, the pre-eminent of whom was Gauḍapāda, and that as the Ācārya was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his proper name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.³

Though Professor Bhattacharya grants that Gauḍapāda was the author of the *Kārikā*, he is not prepared to believe that the *Kārikā* is a single work in four chapters. He is of the view that the four prakaraṇas are independent treatises which were put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.⁴ According to him, the attempt of the commentator, whom tradition identified with Śaṅkara, to show the interconnection of the chapters is a miserable failure. Introducing the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara⁵ says that though it is declared in the first chapter that there is no duality, yet as it is merely an expression of *āgama*, the second chapter is written to support it by reasons. Professor Bhattacharya finds fault with this statement, because though the second chapter advances various arguments, the first is not devoid of them. And he asks, "If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Ś [Śaṅkara] to be, then why is it that

3. Ibid., pp. lxiii-lxxi.

4. Ibid., p. lvii.

5. Or whoever the commentator was; the identity is of no consequence for the present discussion.

the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning though he could do so easily?" At the commencement of the third chapter, Śaṅkara says that non-duality can be understood not only by *āgama*, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well, and that consequently to exhibit the reasoning the third chapter is required. The Professor's objection to this is that if Śaṅkara were right, the object of the second and third chapters must be the same, viz., to formulate the arguments for non-duality. But, then, why should there be two chapters at all? Cannot all the arguments be included in one? The fact, according to Prof. Bhattacharya, is that non-duality is mentioned only incidentally in the third chapter, and as such is not discussed. The purpose of the fourth chapter, as stated by Śaṅkara, is the establishment of the system of Advaita through pointing out the contradictions that vitiate the schools that are opposed to it, viz., those of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas. As against this, Prof. Bhattacharya contends that there is no detailed criticism of the Dvaitins' view in this chapter, that there is no allusion to the Vaināśikas, and that the views of the Vaināśikas are accepted and endorsed by Gauḍapāda, who cannot therefore criticise them. As regards each succeeding chapter the Professor wants us to ask these questions: does it presuppose the preceding chapter somehow or other? What do we lose if we take it as an independent work on Advaita Vedānta? Do we find in reading it in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming its connection with the preceding chapter? Professor Bhattacharya's answer to these questions is in the negative; and he regards the four prakaraṇas as independent manuals of Advaita.⁶

Let us gather afresh Śaṅkara's statements about the nature of the work as a whole and about the purpose of each chapter. In his introduction to the first prakaraṇa, Śaṅkara describes the argument of the four-chaptered *Kārikā* thus: "For the purpose of determining (the sense of) Omkāra is (written) the first prakaraṇa which abounds in Scriptural passages (*āgamapradhānam*) and which is the means for knowing the true nature of the self. When the world of duality is resolved, the non-dual is known, as when the serpent, etc., imagined in the rope are resolved the rope which is real is cognised. In order to explain through reason the illu-

ness of (the world of) duality there is the second prakaraṇa. When there occurs the contingency that non-duality too may likewise be illusory, the third prakaraṇa shows through reasoning that non-duality is not so. There are views which are *avāidika* and opposed to non-duality being absolutely real. For the purpose of refuting them on rational grounds, by showing that those views cannot be true as they are mutually contradictory, is commenced the fourth prakaraṇa".⁷ At the beginning of the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara says: "It was said, 'When (Reality) is known, there is no duality' (I, 18), and this is supported on the basis of such *śruti* passages as 'One only, without a second'. That is only Scripture (*āgama-mātram*). It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second prakaraṇa is commenced".⁸ At the beginning of the third prakaraṇa Śaṅkara remarks, "While discussing the nature of Omkāra it was stated 'The self is the cessation of the world, blissful, without a second', and 'When (Reality) is known there is no duality'. That was only as a premise. Of these (i.e. the two propositions 'the self is' and 'the world is not'), the non-existence of the world was explained in the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa by illustrations like dream, magical show, and *fata morgana*, and through reasoning on the ground of *probans* such as 'because it is seen', 'because it is with beginning and end', etc. Is non-duality to be known through Scripture alone or through reasoning also? Asking thus, the teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also. How is that? To show how the Advaita-prakaraṇa is commenced".⁹ Explaining the connection of the fourth prakaraṇa with the preceding ones, Śaṅkara observes, "By way of determining Omkāra non-duality was stated (in the first prakaraṇa) as a premise known from Scripture. The same was established (in the second prakaraṇa) on the ground that the external world of objects is illusory. Again (in the third prakaraṇa), of the non-duality which was ascertained directly from Scripture and through reasoning, it was conclusively stated, 'This is the supreme truth'. At the end (of that prakaraṇa) it was indicated that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, which are opposed to the view of non-duality, the sense of Scripture, are wrong because of their mutual opposition and because

6. *Āgamaśāstra*, pp. xlvii-lvii.

7. Vani Vilas Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, p. 89.

8. Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, 122.

9. Ibid, Vol. 5, 144.

they give rise to passions like attachment and aversion. Non-dualism is praised as the right view on the ground that it does not give rise to passions. Now, the *Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa* is commenced for showing in detail the falsity of those views which are opposed to one another, and for establishing finally through negative reasoning non-dualism".¹⁰

Now let us return to Prof. Bhattacharya's questions. The relation between the first and the second *prakaraṇa*, according to Śaṅkara, is that while the first chapter states as a premise the non-reality of the world of duality, supported by Scripture, the second chapter establishes the illusoriness of the world through reasoning. The first objection raised by Prof. Bhattacharya is that the first chapter is not devoid of arguments. He cites *kārikās* 16-18 to show that arguments are advanced for proving the illusoriness of the world even in the first chapter. But a comparison of the method and the contents of the first chapter with those of the second will clearly reveal that while in the former Scripture is the main source of evidence, in the latter various reasons are given for the illusory nature of the world. This is all that the commentator means when he says '*āgamamātram tat*'. The word '*mātra*' here has the sense of '*prādhānya*', for that is how Ānandagiri interprets it. Śaṅkara himself says in his general introduction at the head of the first chapter: '*prathamam prakaraṇam āgama-pradhānam*'. To the next objection that if the relation between the first and the second chapters was as it is declared by Śaṅkara, why does the author himself not say so at the beginning of the chapter, we need only reply that it is not necessary. What we should consider is whether Śaṅkara has correctly understood the teachings in the two chapters and their connection, if there be any. Let us turn to the contents of the chapters themselves to find an answer. The *āgama-prakarāṇa* begins with a summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.¹¹ *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are described; different theories of creation are mentioned with a view to show that they are unsatisfactory, as the world is in truth the very nature of the *Deva*; in the *Turiya* which is the absolute non-dual reality, there is neither cause nor effect; *Prajña*, the self in sleep, is conditioned by the cause of world-manifestation, viz. nescience;

Viśva and *Taijasa*, the self of the waking state and the self of dream respectively, are conditioned by both cause and effect, i.e., nescience and its product. The *Turiya* is not to be confused with *Prājña*, for while *Prājña* is associated with dreamless sleep, in the *Turiya* there is neither sleep nor dream; as a corollary from this it is said that the universe does not really exist; the non-dual self (*Turiya*), is the sole reality; the world of duality is illusory (*māyāmātra*); then, following the *Upaniṣad*, *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are identified with the three letters of *Om*, *a*, *u* and *m*, and the *Turiya* with the soundless culmination of *Om*; lastly, meditation on *Praṇava* is prescribed, as it leads to the supreme. From this brief outline of the contents of the *Āgama-prakarāṇa* it will be evident that the main subject of study is the teaching of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. No doubt it is declared there that the world is non-real. But that declaration is based on such words of the *śruti*, as '*prapañcopaśamam*' and '*advaitam*'. Thus it is clear that Śaṅkara is not wrong in characterising the first *prakaraṇa* as '*āgama-pradhāna*'. The second chapter, *Vaitathya-prakarāṇa* begins with the statement that the wise declare all the objects seen in dream to be illusory; and then it is argued that the objects perceived in waking also must be illusory because of similarity with those seen in dream. Now, does not this line of reasoning presuppose the discussion of *avasthās* in the previous chapter? Is it not an elaboration through logic of what was premised on the authority of *śruti* in the *Āgama-prakarāṇa*? After showing in detail how there is parity between waking and dreaming, the author of the *Kārikā* proceeds to say that the entire world is a mistaken reading of the non-dual self. As when the rope is seen the snake-illusion is removed, so also when the self is known, the world of plurality disappears. Then follows a catalogue of different views about the self. The truth is, there is nothing other than the self. A few more illustrations are given to prove that the universe is illusory; the final truth is proclaimed as the non-dual reality which knows neither dissolution nor origination, neither bondage nor release; and lastly how the *yati* could know the truth and after knowing how he should live in the world. Here again Śaṅkara seems to be substantially correct in his statement that the purpose of the second chapter is to establish through reason the illusoriness of the world of duality.

As regards the relation between the second and the third chapter, Prof. Bhattacharya's objection, as we have already seen, is that if the object of the third chapter was what Śaṅkara regards

10. Ibid., Vol. 5, 180.

11. The view that the *Upaniṣad* must have been composed later than the *Kārikā* we shall examine below.

it to be, then there should be no need for this chapter at all, as all the arguments for non-duality could be included in one chapter. As a preliminary observation we may point out here that the treatment of the same topic in two successive chapters is not uncommon even in modern books. But that apart, does Śāṅkara say or mean to say that the object of the second and the third chapters is the same? Is it not his view that while the Vaitathya-prakarāṇa establishes through reason the illusoriness of duality, the Advaita-prakarāṇa seeks to show the non-illusoriness of non-duality? The two are related topics, no doubt; but they are not identical. The contention of Prof. Bhattacharya is that non-duality, though mentioned in the third chapter, is not its main topic, but something else. And this will be clear, he says, if one examines the contents with some amount of care. The following is his own account of the contents of the third chapter: "Here at the beginning (III, 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajāti*) and having established it concludes in the end (III, 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśayoga* meant for the realization of the Truth".¹² We have no quarrel with this analysis. But what does it show? How is *ajāti* a topic different from *advaita*? Why is non-origination the truth? Is it not because the truth is non-duality alone? Prof. Bhattacharya admits that Gauḍapāda asserts in this chapter the absence of difference between jīva and Brahman. If this is not *advaita*, what else is it? And what is *asparśayoga* if it is not the path to the realisation of non-duality?

The fourth chapter, in the opinion of Śāṅkara, points out the mutual contradictions that are to be found in the systems opposed to Advaita and establishes non-duality by a process of negative reasoning. Where in this chapter is a detailed discussion, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, of the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, assuming that they are wrong because of their mutual contradiction? And secondly where is the allusion to Vaināśikas as opponents, whose views Gauḍapāda accepts by implication throughout the book? Before we make an attempt to answer these questions we may notice in passing the argument that the

Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa must be an independent treatise as it commences with a *maṅgalācarāṇa*. Prof. Bhattacharya himself dismisses this argument as not carrying much weight. In a Bauddha work, the *Pañjika* of Prajñākaramati on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* which consists of nine chapters, there is *maṅgalācarāṇa* in the first and the last chapters, and not in others. But where is *maṅgalācarāṇa* in the first prakarāṇa of the *Kārikā*? It has been answered by the commentators that OM with which the Upaniṣad begins is itself the *maṅgalācarāṇa*. Not only at the beginning of the fourth chapter but also at the end there is *maṅgalācarāṇa* in the form of obeisance. Does it not imply, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, that the prakarāṇa is an independent work and complete in itself? We do not, however, see the implication because there is nothing unintelligible in a book ending with an obeisance. Now about the other questions. The *Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa* just immediately after the *maṅgalācarāṇa* refers to the disputants who uphold the reality of origination and quarrel among themselves. Then there is an elaborate and detailed dialectical criticism of the category of origination, the concept of cause. Is not the notion of cause one of the cardinal doctrines of the pluralists (*dvaitinah*), and in criticising it in detail, is not the author of the *Kārikā* examining the view of those who are opposed to *Advaita*? The next question is about the reference to Vaināśikas. In his notes on *Kārikā*, III, 3, Prof. Bhattacharya says that among the Buddhists the Vaibhāṣikas maintain *satkāryavāda*, and the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold *asatkāryavāda*. The verse in question maintains that the two views regarding the causal relation are mutually contradictory, and in subsequent verses Gauḍapāda provides a critique of the causal category and rejects it finally. Is this not an implicit criticism of the Vaināśika views, at any rate of the three schools of Buddhism mentioned above?¹³ There is one more question raised by Prof. Bhattacharya. A number of *kārikās* from the second and third chapters are repeated in the fourth; the *ajativāda* discussed already in the third chapter is discussed again in the fourth. Why is this repetition? Is it not useless? In reply it need only be pointed out that repetition is not a defect in an *upadeśa-grantha*.

That the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* was considered to be an *upadeśagrantha* will be evident from the colophons in some of the

12. *Āgamaśāstra*, p. lli.

13. We shall examine the question of Bauddha influence later.

manuscripts.¹⁴ The main object of the work is to teach students of Advaita the essentials of non-dualism. And the teacher, Gauḍapāda grades his lessons in an intelligent manner. After setting forth the purport of Scripture in the first chapter, he justifies it through reasoning in the next two chapters. The *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* teaches the illusoriness of the worlds of waking and of dreaming and the absolute reality of the Self, the Turiya. The second chapter is concerned with the former and the third with the latter. Having expounded the philosophy of Advaita through Scripture and reasoning, Gauḍapāda examines in the fourth chapter the views opposed to Advaita, exhibits their contradictions and shows the excellence of his own system. Such a view of the *Kārikā*, we submit, is the most rational one to take, having regard to the nature of the work and the topics dealt with therein.

III

Contrary to the traditional Advaita view which holds the 29 verses of the first chapter to be Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* consisting of the 12 prose passages, Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the verses or *kārikās* must have been already in existence before the prose passages came to be composed. The reasons offered for his view by the Professor are these: (1) After the 6th, 7th 11th and 12th mantras of what is called the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the *kārikās* are introduced in the words 'atraite ślokā bhavanti' (here are these śloka). In other Upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadarāṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* similar expressions are employed to introduce śloka in support of the prose passages that precede them. It follows, therefore, that the prose portions must have come into existence after the verses, and not vice versa.

(2) A comparison of the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding verses bears out this view. If the *kārikās* were really explanations of the prose passages, they should throw light on those portions of the latter which are difficult or obscure and should not omit the most important words of the original. But what are the actual facts? (a) The *kārikās* 1-5 which are supposed to explain the prose passages 3-5 omit altogether the words 'saptāṅgaḥ' and 'ekonavimsatimukhaḥ' the most difficult

ones which require explanation. (b) In the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara*; but in the corresponding *kārikās* the word *viśva* is used. The business of a commentator is to explain the original word and not introduce a word which is not identical or synonymous with it. (c) The terms *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapana-sthāna*, and *suṣuptasthāna* of the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively are not found in the *kārikās*. (d) That the so-called Upaniṣad, instead of being the original, is really a commentary on the verses will be evident from the fact that taking a word or two from the *kārikās* it expands and explains the idea contained therein. For instance the terms *ghanaprajña* (1), and *ānandabhuj* or (3) *ānanda* (4) are explained in prose passage 5. (e) The *kārikā* I, 19 says that *Viśva* is identical with *a* the first letter of *Om* because each of them is the first (*ādi*) in its series and each is pervasive (*āpti*). The corresponding Upaniṣad clearly says that the identity is either because of each being the first or because of each being pervasive (*āpter ādimātvād vā*). This option seems to be a later development. (f) There is divergence as regards two words between *kārikā* I, 21 and Upaniṣad 11. In the former there are the word *māna* 'measure' from *mā* 'to measure' and the word *apīti* 'disappearance' from *api-i*, while in the latter there are *miti* 'measure' from *mi*, and *laya* 'disappearance'. (g) The *kārikās* (I, 10-15) make a distinction between Turiya and the other three, viz. *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*; but no such distinction is found in the Upaniṣad. (h) The Upaniṣad (1) says that Brahman or Ātman has four quarters (*catuspād*); but there is no such mention in the *kārikās*.

(3) Lastly, there is the view of Ācāryas like Madhva that the 29 verses of the Āgamaprakaraṇa form part of the Upaniṣad, and that the verses are older than the prose passages. On these grounds Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the *kārikās* of the first chapter are not a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, that the Upaniṣad is mainly based on the *Kārikās*, and that it must have been composed later 'with a tinge of the language used in the *Brāhmaṇas*'.¹⁵

Let us examine the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya *seriatim*. (1) There is nothing unintelligible in the *Kārikā-kāra* introducing his explanatory verses in the words 'atraite ślokā

14. *Āgamaśāstra*, p. 244.

15. *Āgamaśāstra*, pp. xxxi-xlvii.

bhavanti'. In some manuscripts these are said to be the words of the Vārttika-kāra.¹⁶ The Vārttika-kāra here referred to is Gauḍapāda, for the Kārikā is also known by the name Māṇḍūkya-vārttika.¹⁷

(2) Before answering the next set of questions, it may be useful to ask ourselves as to what sort of a commentary we hold the 29 verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to be. Certainly they are not meant to be a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages.¹⁸ They re-arrange the concepts found in the Upaniṣad in a more logical manner with a view to show that the Turiya is the absolute non-dual reality; and this again is only a foundation for the succeeding three chapters. Those expressions in the Upaniṣad which are not materially useful are passed over, and certain implications which are not expressly stated in the Upaniṣad are explained because they are regarded as important by the author of the Kārikā for the development of his thesis. A case in point is the mention and criticism of the several creationistic theories. Without departing from the spirit of what is declared in the Upaniṣad, the Kārikā-kāra prepares his own *précis* of the passages and makes it the nucleus of his subsequent philosophical construction. Now we may turn to answer the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya against regarding the Upaniṣad as the earlier text. (a) Since the object of the first five verses is to analyse the three manifestations of the self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, and to show that Reality is one in the three states though the contents and types of enjoyment vary, the verses leave out expressions which are not useful for this purpose. Viśva and Taijasa being endowed with seven limbs and nineteen mouths is of no metaphysical consequence subserving the purpose Gauḍapāda has in view. It is points of contrast that are important; for the philosopher wants to show that in spite of apparent differences there is an underlying unity. Hence it is that to the differences in objects of consciousness and modes of enjoyment mentioned in the Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda adds the differences in principal locations and types of satisfaction. The reason we

16. See Anandāśrama edition of the Kārikā with Anandagiri's Tīkā, p. 25; atha vārttikakāroktamvākyaṃ.

17. Rāmakaṣṇa Paṇḍita in his commentary on the Pañcadaśī (II, 29) refers to the Kārikā (III, 39) as Vārttika. Whether the name Vārttika as applied to Gauḍapāda's work is proper or not is not germane to the present discussion.

18. See S. K. Belvalkar: *Vedānta Philosophy*, Part I, p. 193.

have just given will also explain why the author of the Kārikā has nothing to comment on the first two mantras of the Upaniṣad, though at a later stage and in its proper place he refers to Omkāra and its mātras. (b) The terms Viśva and 'Vaiśvānara', whatever be their etymological significance, have come to mean the same in Advaita usage. Probably, Gauḍapāda's intention is to show the identity of the self of the waking state with the all-consciousness which has the manifest universe for its object, the identity, in short, of the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* forms of the self. Hence it is that he describes 'Viśva' as all-pervading (*vibhu*). The suggestion, however, comes from the Śruti itself. The Upaniṣadic passage 6 describes Prājña, the self in sleep, as the Lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, etc. Since it is the same self that persists in and through the changing states, the Kārikā-kāra identifies the apparently individual soul that is awake with the self of the universe. (c) The terms *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapnasthāna* and *suṣuptasthāna*, need not be repeated in the Kārikā, because the verses, as we said, present only a summary of the Upaniṣadic passages for a set purpose which their author has in view. They are not, however, unnoticed, for the fifth verse refers to them together in the words 'in the three states' (*triṣu dhāmasu*). (d) That a prose passage is longer than the corresponding verse or verses can be no argument for its subsequent composition. In the Upaniṣad 5 the state of sleep is explained and the self of that state is described. In fact, we have an independent passage for each of the three. Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. Gauḍapāda adopts a different method. The first four kārikās speak of all the three, and the trio are compared in respect of their objects of consciousness, types of enjoyment, locations and kinds of satisfaction. Viewed in this light, it may be seen that Gauḍapāda has incorporated in his verses all the terms that are necessary from the Upaniṣadic passage 5. (e) The kārikā I. 19 identifies Viśva with *a* because each is the first in its series and each is pervasive. The Upaniṣad calls them identical for either of the two reasons. From this alleged difference between the Kārikā and the Upaniṣad Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the latter must have been composed later. But what is the force of 'or' (*vā*) in the Upaniṣadic text? Is it used in the sense of a disjunction either of ignorance or of exclusion? We do not think that the Upaniṣad means to say that 'Viśva' and *a* are to be identified either only because each is the first or only because each is pervasive. Both are equally valid reasons for identification. And it is this meaning that is expressed by the word 'and' (*ca*)

in the *Kārikā*, 19. (f) We have already said that the verses of the first prakaraṇa do not constitute a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages. And so it does not matter from which root a particular word is formed in the *Kārikā* provided it expresses the same idea. Prof. Bhattacharya himself admits that there is no difference in meaning between *māna* and *miti*, and between *apīti* and *laya*. (g) The *kārikās* 10-15 make a distinction between the Turiya and the other three Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. The Turiya is the changeless lord of all, one without a second; it is unconditioned eternal consciousness; in it there is neither the veiling of the true nor the projection of the untrue. Prof. Bhattacharya holds that there is nothing corresponding to this idea in the Upaniṣad. But what do the two Upaniṣadic passages, 7 and 12, which set forth the nature of the Turiya mean? Do they not declare that the Turiya is trans-phenomenal (*prapañcopaśama*) and thereby distinguish it from the three, Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña? (h) There is no mention in the *Kārikā*, says Prof. Bhattacharya, of the four quarters of Brahman or Ātman declared in the Upaniṣad. This, however, is not the case. The *Kārikā* 24 makes mention of the *pādas* (quarters); and that they are four will be evident from the description of Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña, and Turiya, in the preceding verses.

(3) As for the rival tradition which regards the prose passages and the 29 verses of the first prakaraṇa as constituting the Upaniṣad, it must be noted that it does not lend countenance to Prof. Bhattacharya's view that the prose passages came into being after the *kārikās*. If the entire prakaraṇa is *śruti*, in the sense in which the orthodox schools of Vedānta accept the term, its different parts cannot be dated in sequence. It is not our task here to examine the *rationale* of the tradition which holds the *Kārikās* of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to be part of the Upaniṣad. We are only concerned with pointing out that the Advaita tradition is an old one—at least as old as Śaṅkara—and that it is not either unpalatable or unjustifiable. That the tradition is an ancient one is admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself. Even if the evidence of the commentator on the *Kārikā* is set aside as that of a spurious Śaṅkara, there are unmistakable references in Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya* and Sureśvara's *Naishkarmya-siddhi* from which one may gather that according to these two Advaitins, master and pupil, the verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa are not *śruti*. Śaṅkara quotes the *kārikā* I. 16 in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, II, 1, 9, and

says that it is a statement made by the teacher who knows the tradition of the Vedānta.^{19 20} Sureśvara quotes the *Kārikā* I, 11, in his *Naishkarmya-siddhi*, IV, 41, and says that it is stated by the worshipful Gauḍas. It is no doubt true that some of the verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa which are cited by Advaita teachers are declared as *śruti*s. But this only shows that in their view the verses were composed after the *Māṇḍūkya-śruti*. The term Upaniṣad is rather loosely employed by the old teachers. For instance, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is called 'Upaniṣad'. In some of the manuscripts of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* all the four prakaraṇas are called 'Upaniṣads'. Kamalaśīla, a disciple of Śāntirakṣita (705-763 A.D.) quotes in his *Pañjikā* some verses from the Vaitathya—and Advaita-prakaraṇas and speaks of them as belonging to *Upaniṣat sūtra*.²¹ And so, the verses of the first prakaraṇa, when they are characterised as *śruti* or Upaniṣad, must be considered so in the secondary and not the primary sense.

IV

There is one more problem of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* which we shall discuss here in brief. It is believed that Gauḍapāda, if he himself was not a Bauddha, ought to have been greatly influenced by Bauddha views which he accepted and incorporated in his *Kārikā*. Especially the idealist schools of Buddhism, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika, it is thought, must have appealed to him as sponsoring views very much like his own, and so without any hesitation or scruple he made use of the arguments advanced by these Bauddha schools to prove his thesis of the non-reality of the world and its absolute non-origination. The contents of the fourth chapter are indistinguishable from those of any Mādhyamika work. The terms and phrases employed there are those of Nāgārjuna. Even the title of the chapter, '*Alātaśānti*', is borrowed from Bauddha terminology. Though the first three chapters cite here and there the authority of Scripture, no Upaniṣadic passage is quoted or referred to by Gauḍapāda in the last prakaraṇa.²² Probably the great teacher was so much struck with the close

19 & 20. *atroktaṃ vedānta-saṃpradāya-vidbhir ācāryaiḥ*.

21. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. xxxviii n.

22. *Ibid.*, p. lxxxiii.

parallelism between his Vedānta view and the views of the Bauddhas that after finishing the third chapter he wrote an independent work calling it 'Alātaśānti', advocating therein the Bauddha views and thereby preaching non-hostility to them.

The question of Bauddha influence is a vexed one, and we do not propose to enter into the details here. Certain general considerations will suffice to show that Gauḍapāda's main object in the *Kārikā* is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is true that in accomplishing this object he presses into service some of the arguments of the Bauddha idealists and even their terminology. But that does not prove his Bauddha leanings or agreement with the conclusions of Buddhism. In the first place, it must be remembered that those teachers of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who refer to his *Kārikā*, do not regard him as a Bauddha or as having been influenced by Buddhism. Śāntirakṣita quotes in his *Madhyamakālaṅkārikā* verses from Gauḍapāda's work, while discussing the views of the Aupaniṣadas. Kamalaśīla refers to the *Kārikā* in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upaniṣat śāstra*. That the metaphysical position of the Mādhyamikas is nihilism in the primary sense is urged not only by Advaitins but also by Jaina writers.^{23 24} The Mādhyamikas themselves do not refute the charge of nihilism brought against their view, though they carefully distinguish their philosophical nihilism from 'common or vulgar nihilism'.²⁵ No one denies a certain measure of similarity between Advaita and the idealistic schools of Buddhism, especially in the matter of their negative logic. Śaṅkara the commentator himself says that the *kārikās* IV, 25-27 employ the arguments of the Vijñānavādins for the purpose of refuting the views of those who maintain the reality of external objects.²⁶ The procedure is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute Idealists of the West in their criticism of Realistic doctrines. But it does not follow that either Advaita or Absolutism is identical with Subjectivism. Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the *Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa* where he employs Bauddha terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away from the Upaniṣadic moorings. It is not true to say that there is no

23 & 24. See Prof. M. Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 8.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

26. *Mem. Edn. Vol. 5*, p. 196.

reference to Upaniṣadic passages in the fourth chapter. As Dr. Belvalkar has pointed out, familiar Upaniṣadic expressions are employed in IV, 78, 80, 85, and 92. That these expressions are used by Bauddha writers also can only show that they were borrowed by them from the Upaniṣads. And it is significant that Gauḍapāda should have used such expressions as 'brāhmaṇyam padam', and 'amṛtatva' in the concluding portion of his work, and that he should have stated at the end 'naitad buddhena bhāṣitam' (This was not declared by the Bauddha).²⁷ Thus it will be clear that Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* is essentially a work on Vedānta inspired by the Upaniṣads. The exigencies of his time must have made him employ Bauddha terminology, even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of the west to-day feel the necessity for clothing their thoughts in Christian expressions.

It would appear that Prof. Bhattacharya agrees with this view to a large extent when he says, "It goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion", "And among the Vedāntists Gauḍapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being Advaita 'non-duality'".²⁸ The Professor even grants in one place that "Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist".²⁹ But we do not find our way to agree with him when he says that there are two schools of Vijñānavādins, (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head.³⁰ He himself sets forth the distinction between the two schools in clear terms. The real difference between them, he says, is with regard to the intervention of the Ātman with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.³¹ Even where Gauḍapāda applies the term *citta* to signify reality, he uses it as a synonym for *Brahman*. While to the Vijñānavādin, the Ālayavijñāna is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and continuous like a current (*dhruva*); to the Advaitin Brahman-Ātman is eternal (*nitya*). Therefore it helps in no way philosophically to call

27. Prof. Bhattacharya gives a novel interpretation of this sentence. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. 212.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. cxxvii and cxxviii.

29. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxii.

30. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxii.

31. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxiii.

Advaita a school of Vijñāna-vāda. And tradition is not wrong in regarding Gauḍapāda as a stalwart Vedāntin, the philosophical progenitor of Śaṅkara.

V

In conclusion we repeat that the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* is a single work of Gauḍapāda setting forth the quintessence of Vedānta, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that its first chapter, the Āgama-prakaraṇa, is a verse-summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which is made the nucleus for the rational exposition of the system of Advaita in the subsequent three chapters. We hold no brief for tradition. Yet we cannot help pointing out that the Advaita tradition as regards Gauḍapāda and his *Kārikā* is essentially sound, neither taxing our credulity nor involving us in contradictions.

Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Buddha

By

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Gazing forth, like the sage of Lucretius, from the serene heights of wisdom, over the varied world of life, but radiating forth, unlike that sage rays of kind feeling and love in every direction; calm amid storms, because withdrawn into a trance of dreamless unconsciousness, undisturbed because allowing no external object to gain any hold on sense or emotion or even on thought; owing nothing and wanting nothing; resolute, fearless, firm as a pillar, in utter isolation from all other beings, except by feeling kindly to them all, such is the ideal conquerer of Buddhism.

There are three things that I intend to do in this paper: (1) To try and compare Gautama Buddha with Jesus Christ; (2) To expound Nirvana. Not only the Oxford Dictionary, but also innumerable writers and speakers, more especially Christians, have done a grave disservice to Buddhism by their imperfect understanding and erroneous representation of Nirvana; (3) To seek to explain why Buddhism died in the land of her birth—India.

FIRST THEN THE STUDY IN CONTRASTS :

Gautama and Jesus ! The Buddha and the Christ ! Comparisons of this kind seldom serve any useful purpose; they generally involve too much simplification of human character; and they are at times even odious. But in the present case the comparison has so often been insisted upon that today it is almost impossible to avoid it. To mention only the more familiar instances, the comparison is implicit in Edwin Arnold's "Light of Asia", which purports to be 'the Scripture of the Saviour of the World'; Thoreau himself 'named the Buddha beside Christ' though he was aware that in so doing he was laying himself open to the censure of devout Christians.

The problem, however, needs some clear definition. In fact, it is not one problem: there are two. Firstly, there is the question whether there are any points of similarity between the Buddhist

and the Christian legend. To this question the answer seems to be in the affirmative. The parallels established by Seydel, Vanden Bergh, Van Eysinga, Pischel, A. J. Edmunds, M. Aneski, and others are unmistakeable. Some of them—for instance, the story of Simeon, the Temptation, Peter walking on the sea, and the Miracle of the loaves and fishes, which Garbe regards as obvious examples of borrowing by the writers of the Gospel from the Buddhist legend—are so striking that they cannot be explained purely as cases of accidental coincidence in religious legends. Even if there were no direct contact between India and Palestine in the first century A.D., the possibility of indirect contact through the Persians was very considerable; and there is no reason why Evangelists should not have known the Buddhist legend in some of its Near-Eastern variations. Actually there has been far more diffusion and inter-penetration of legends, both secular and religious, current in different parts of the world, than is admitted by most people who seem to take a proprietary interest even in legends!

The second question is whether the personalities of Gautama and Jesus, after they have been divested of their obviously legendary and mythological attributes, have anything in common; whether, that is to say, there is any measure of identity between their respective world-views. This is a very complicated question. For it is difficult to obtain any agreement as to which parts of the Buddhist and the Christian stories are historical, and which are not; what pronouncements can be attributed to Gautama and Jesus, and what is to be regarded as the improvisation of later commentators. The question that we should ask ourselves is whether the integral personality which emerges from a critical analysis of the Pali Canon, on the one hand, and from the Synoptic Gospels, on the other, points to any common basis of experience, or resultant attitude.

To this question one can only return a negative answer. Gautama and Jesus were as different from one another as it is possible for any two human beings to be. The difference is not merely, as Canon Streeter has it, 'that the Christ was a carpenter, the Buddha was a prince, they experienced life from different angles. The Buddha was a philosopher; Jesus had the mind of a poet'. That is unduly simplifying the issue. It is by no means certain that Gautama was a prince, though it is true his people were comfortably off. On the other hand, though there is no doubt

as to where Jesus's own heart lay, it remains open to question—in spite of Kautsky—whether he personally had any intimate knowledge of poverty; Dean Inge goes to the opposite extreme suggesting that 'Christ and his apostles belonged to the prosperous peasantry of Galilee, a well-educated and comfortable middle class! And the difference between a poet and a philosopher is, to say the least, rather difficult to define.

A somewhat novel interpretation of the contrast between the personalities of Gautama and Jesus has also been put forward by those who, presumably, subscribe to what Papini calls 'the exhausting mercantile superstition of our day'. With varying degrees of refinement, they enlarge on Mr. Bruce Barton's conception of Christ as 'a precursor of the modern man of business, an apostle of outer action and even as a 'go-getter'. Against this they assess the Buddha as a typical oriental, a passive dreamer of dreams. The querulous Buddhist, of course, could protest that, as far as action goes, his catechism insists on 'strenuousness' and 'effort' with such vehemence that it might serve as an excellent text for the modern men of action, whose exploits are normally limited to meditations on Stock Exchange reports, and who are wise enough to have their work done for them by paid slaves. Further—Since by their deeds shall ye know them!—they might point to the prodigious achievements of their Japanese confreres who, even Mr. Bruce Barton would admit, have been anything but dreamy and passive in recent years. To see the difference between the two men in this light is to miss the significance of what seems most central in their world-views. The range of our knowledge about them is limited, but one thing may confidently be asserted that Gautama was as far from being a lotus-eater as Jesus from the glorified slave-drivers of Big Business and High Finance.

Dr. Reichelt, a German missionary of very wide sympathies, who founded 'The Society of Religious Friends' in China, informs us that in his conversation with 'really religious Buddhists' he was able to extract from them the admission that 'in the story of Calvary the Bodhisattva doctrine has reached its perfection'. This must have been due to some misapprehension on the part of our 'really religious Buddhists! For one thing, the Bodhisattva is nowhere represented as bearing his cross through crowded streets. And the reason why he is not so represented is, partly at least, because Gautama was above all a prudent man, like Confucius, and lived the kind of life which could by no stretch of imagination on the

part of his followers be interpreted as martyrdom. He scrupulously avoided getting into trouble with the temporal powers, who would doubtless have given him 'short shrift' as did Pontius Pilate to the 'Messianic agitator' from Galilee. His concession with regard to the admission of runaway slaves, domestic servants, soldiers, etc., may be mentioned as one example of his desire not to get himself involved in any struggle with Law and Order. Because of this prudence on his part, Buddhism has remained lacking in 'the tremendous fact' which forms the nucleus of the Gospel Passion Play—the fact of a supreme martyrdom. But, on the other hand, for this very reason Buddhists have been spared from having their bowels of compassion moved to the point of excruciation by subtle stabs of remorse. On the whole, Gautama seems to have had more consideration for his votaries: they are not reminded of the man who died and suffered for them every time they visit their shrines; nor do their temples everlastingly echo the silent but agonizing refrain of, 'is it nothing to ye, is it nothing to ye, all ye that pass by?' The idea of dying and suffering for others in the Christian sense is, broadly speaking, alien to practically every form of Buddhism. It was certainly alien to Gautama's teaching; he quite frankly told his Brethren that they must not expect that ultimate self-sacrifice of him: for 'by oneself is evil done, by oneself one suffers. By oneself is evil left undone; by oneself is one purified. Purity and impurity belong to oneself; on one can purify another'. There is no vicarious atonement available to a Buddhist.

To the Buddha the supreme problem was the problem of pain. To Christ, on the other hand, this problem and its solution was bound up with that of moral evil. And to Christ the problem of moral evil was prior to that of pain. In this respect again the outlook of the Buddha is temperamentally more "modern"—a fact to be noted without prejudice to the question whether his view is the more profound.

But the Buddha and the Christ are at one in this that their attitude alike to suffering and to sin is wholly *practical*. Their primary aim is not explanation but *deliverance*.

Concerning the inward experience of Jesus, tradition is dumb. We are only told that, at about the age of 30, as he rose from the waters of Baptism on the banks of Jordan, he saw the vision and heard the heavenly voice "Thou art my beloved Son", which assured him that he was called to be Christ, and this was followed by a period of temptation.

So far as personal experience is conditioned by external circumstance, the Buddha and the Christ would seem to be, each the complement of the other. Jesus lived in daily contact with things which to a prince like Sakyamuni could only be known through the capacity of sympathetic interpretation of the experience of others; he and his had knowledge at first hand of the ills of poverty. On the other hand, of the disillusionment that follows a surfeit of life's good things, which the Buddha felt so keenly, Christ had no first hand experience. Yet the possibility of disillusionment was not outside the range of his sympathy and understanding.

In the book of Job, Jesus would have found discussed an aspect of the problem of evil which lay outside the philosophic and etical purview of the Buddha—the problem, why in this world merit and reward are not more nearly commensurate? Why so often do we see the righteous suffer, while the wicked flourish like a green bay tree? For the Buddha, this problem did not exist; or rather, it was completely solved by the doctrine of Karma, which solves it by the simple method of denying its existence. For according to this doctrine, there is no such thing as innocent suffering, since all suffering in this life is punishment justly earned by misdeeds in a previous incarnation; and similarly all present happiness is the reward of previous though forgotten merit. Of course if this Doctrine is true, the problem is solved. If not, we have an example of the way in which the acceptance of a belief traditional to his countrymen artificially narrowed the range of sympathy and thought of India's greatest prophet.

Jesus takes occasion to deny the theory, upheld by Job's friend, that his world misfortune is proportionate to desert, and he frequently asserts that God will vindicate his faithful servants.

The existence of suffering is the supreme challenge to Theism, but to stress the problem of the suffering of the righteous as such, is tacitly to assume that righteousness is a meritorious achievement of the individual for which he deserves reward. Christ will not tolerate the idea of merit in this sense. Again he was not concerned to administer cosmic consolation to persons who conceived themselves to be righteous; rather he taught, the mere fact that man supposes he had achieved righteousness, means that he had missed the way to it. In his valuation of merit, Christ is more "modern" than the Buddhist. The educationalist and the criminologist of today, knowing something of the influence on character of heredity and environment and of the possibility of psychological

mishap in infancy, hoping to make men better, are often inclined to echo that word of Christ, "Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more". Christ is "modern" too, in that he aims at producing the good life, not by mere repression or suppression of the bad but by enkindling enthusiasm for the good.

Christ speaks of pain much less than does the Buddha, but he knew more about it. And for him there was a graver problem. The history of his people as interpreted by a long line of prophets had concentrated attention again, to an extent unique in human history, on the problem of moral evil, both in the individual and in the social life.

To the Buddha, we have seen the problem of moral evil was incidental to the problem of pain: Immoral action tends to increase the will to live; therefore the overcoming of evil impulses in the soul is a precondition of deliverance from pain. It was impossible for a Jew either to explain suffering by means of Karma or to think of sin as something incidental. Thus to Christ the problem of evil had been posed on a larger scale than to the Buddha; and paradoxically enough, it was a problem made at once more difficult and more hopeful of solution because it had been written 'God saw that it was good'.

There enters into later Buddhism a fresh conception of what sin means. The commission of sin grieves the divine spirits and saviours of the world. To be good is to please them, to be sinful is to pain them. It is wrong to do wrong, because it wrongs divinity!

This is an entirely new conception to the Buddhist, though it is not so remote from the Vedic notion that sin makes divine beings angry. The idea, however, in the Buddhist's mind is rather that the Bodhisattvas are pained, because every sin adding to a sinner's demerit increases the debt assumed by the Divine Power, who redeems all sin by assuming that sinner's demerit. The argument is that the sinner must suffer for his sin unless another assumes the burden; the Bodhisattva assumes it in taking upon himself the vow to assume the sins of the world and so redeem sinners. Being divine and having an infinite store of merit this divine being can easily give the sinner enough merit to counterbalance the demerit incurred by sin, so that his divine suffering is more theoretical than real. But the net result religiously and ethically is that the

human sinner believes that in sinning he causes grief to the divine beings to whom he prays.

The original Buddhist has been called an egoistic hedonist. The term is harsh, but at any rate, his whole concern was with his private salvation which lay in his own hands. To secure that salvation he became moral, serene, kindly disposed. Self-development was really his aim, from a practical point of view. Karma, the working out of the act, was alone responsible for the result of acts, which acts it was in his power to do or avoid. He recognised no supreme divine power interfering with Karma. He could not say with the negligent Brahmin jurist, "malformations result from faults induced by Fate or by Karma or by maternal faults". To him it was the act alone that decided his Fate, the act comprising what is thought, said and done. But to the later Buddhist the matter had eventually become a divine matter and this Buddhist, in the gradual decadence of the primitive belief, invented the most extraordinary excuse for sinning. Originally celibate, the friar now married because "it gave pleasure to another", which in general is what a good friar ought to do. Moreover, sin actually became a virtue because it is a joy to the divinity to forgive sin and a good friar ought to give joy to the divinity. Such aberrations are found in other sects where ethical decadence has gone hand in hand with devotion and mysticism; but in no other case is there so marked a contrast between the early and the later stages of religious evolution. However little religion, in the ordinary sense, inspired the primitive Buddhist, he was yet deeply imbued with ethical belief and was a consistently moral person. But the belief in transfer of merit which was at first heterodox but finally became as general a belief as it was in Brahmanism, paved the way for the idea of redemption through divine mercy and led to the slow undermining of reliance upon our own need of ethical behaviour, so that in a measure religious devotion destroyed the fine ethical sense of the early church. It did not entirely destroy it for the idea that sin pains divine saints and that the only way we can recompense them for their goodness to us is to give them pleasure by being good (and by being good to others) was a very real support of morality, but it loosened ethical moorings and sent the ship of Buddhism abroad on strange waters. Incidentally it brought the Buddhist near to the belief in predestination which crops up in the Rig Veda, "Whom I will, I make powerful", and in the Upanishads, "whom He chooses, by him is He obtained", ending

on the one hand in the belief in Fate, and on the other in the belief in the personal Saviour-God, who grants salvation to the true believer. Hence the prayer to the Buddha or Bodhisattva as to a merciful divinity in whose power lies man's fate.

Contrast with this the Christian conception of the suffering of God: the problem of pain is conceived dynamically as one to be solved in terms not of explanation but of battle and of hope. Such a solution will seem shallow and precarious unless related to a concept which is the most characteristic contribution to the problem made in the New Testament, the doctrine of divine participation in the world's pain.

Let us ask then, what precisely are the implications as to the Divine contact with pain involved in St. Paul's statement that we may see "The light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ". To Greek philosophy, as to Indian, it was axiomatic that divinity is intrinsically incapable of pain and the classical Christian theology inherited this axiom of the "impassibility" of God. But in the Old Testament we find the idea that God enters into the sufferings of his people. "In all their affliction he was afflicted...and he bare them...." The relation of God to the woes of the world is not that of a mere spectator. The New Testament goes further and says that God is love. But that is not love which, in the presence of acute suffering, can stand outside and aloof.

The Philosophical objection to ascribing pain to God, is, I would argue, one more example of the fallacy of intellectual abstraction. If God is life he cannot be immune from feeling. But we miss the emphasis of the New Testament if we push our reaction against the idea of the "impassibility" of God to the point of letting pain overshadow joy. The Life of Christ shows forth the eternal quality of the divine; nevertheless this is done under the conditions of time, and no one moment of the time series can sum up the whole. And if there is one moment more representative than another, that moment, in the New Testament view, is not that of the cry, "My God, My God! Why hast thou forsaken me", but that of the resurrection. The historic starting point of Christianity was not the cross, but the conviction that Christ had risen—a conviction which in no way involves acceptance of belief in the resuscitation of the physical body of the Master. It was the conviction, "Death is swallowed up in victory". Were it possible to form an adjective, capable of expressing this idea, then that adject-

tive rather than the classical "impassible", would be an appropriate one to God.

Death is swallowed up in victory but the victory is at the cost of pain to god. Suffering is not explained; it is shared. And what is shared by God, man may be content to leave unexplained.

It is remarkable that the Buddha's eightfold path, considered as a series of ethical precepts, resembles the Sermon on the Mount more than does any other moral system. Such differences as there are between the moral teaching of the Buddha and the Christ are directly related to, and are logically necessitated by their contrasted views of the nature of ultimate reality.

Why, then, we may ask, do those modern intellectuals who share both the pessimism and the agnosticism of the Buddha deduce from them an ethic of such a very different character? To this question the theoretical answer is clear: they do not share the Buddha's acceptance of the Law of Karma. It is possible for a modern agnostic to eat and drink, in the belief that to-morrow he dies, it is also possible for him to contemplate suicide as a way of escape, should life's evils become too acute. To a believer in Karma death is no escape, it is only a preliminary to a new series of rebirths—perhaps in Hell, for an aeon, perhaps on earth as an animal, as a woman, as a pariah or as a man whose life is more crowded with disappointment and disaster than that from which death seemed a refuge. If death is no escape from human misery, but merely a portal to rebirth, something must be found to break the chain of cause and effect which makes that rebirth necessary. This, to the Buddha, can be done by the eradication of desire, that is of the will-to-live, which is the primal cause of birth and continued rebirth, and it can be done in no other way. To this end a man must realise that his individual self belongs, like other phenomenal objects, to the realm of "Maya", and he must know the individual self to be illusion not merely with the pure intellect, but also with that deeper realisation which can be achieved only by a long discipline of negating every personal desire.

With this same belief in Karma are logically connected the differences between the precepts of the eightfold path and the teaching of Christ. In Buddhist ethics the supreme virtues have always been compassion and self-control, more especially shown in the conquest of anger and lust. But detachment is no less fundamental, for the aim is the eradication of all desire, desire of things

good as well as evil. Hence the Buddhist may not let pity pass the borderline which separates it from love; to love is to readmit desire, it is to jeopardise the tranquility which is the goal for the attainment of which the ethical discipline exists. At the lower stages of the upward climb, the love of wife or child or friend is good, but it must be shunned by him, who would attain Nirvana at this life's end or after only a few more rebirths. The need of detachment explains the inclusion in the Eightfold path of right meditation. Undoubtedly this refers to some variety of the technical discipline known as Yoga, the aim of which is to *disengage* the mind from all consciousness of temporal things and focus it on absolute existence.

Thus the Buddha's acceptance of the belief in Karma explains the difference of his ethics alike from those of Christ and from the epicureanism which is taken for granted by so many moderns. But suppose the Buddha had not believed in Karma? In that case his teaching must have moved nearer either to the teaching of Christ, or to that of Epicurus. In which of these directions would it have moved? That question he himself answered not by word but by deed, at the great temptation, when he renounced Nirvana and chose a life of sacrifice and labour in hope thereby to bring to suffering humanity his message of salvation. For the philosophy of religion it is of the first importance to realise that the barrier which separates the Buddha from Christ is due in the last resort more to the intellectual theories which he inherited than to disagreement in the findings of his own very original moral insight. Where the Buddha was most himself, there he was most like Christ.

Yet in the result the divergence is one that matters; for it has not been without practical consequences, ethical and psychological, that the Buddhist bows before a figure that sits rapt in eternal meditation, the Christian before one that hangs bleeding from a cross.

Nirvana

Before we understand Nirvana, let us for a moment look at *Samma Samadhi*:—"Right Self-concentration"—the eighth and final stage of the eight-fold path, which is sometimes defined as "the bringing to a focus of the mental field". As sometimes stated it is very similar to the *samadhi* of the Hindu Patanjali Yoga,—a trance-like state in which all consciousness of individuality is lost.

But it is also often called "Right ecstasy or rapture" and is described as a state of bliss far different from the utter quiescence just referred to. The "*Psalms of the Brethren*" are full of this wonderful sense of freedom, peace and ecstatic joy. "Free indeed, gloriously free am I". "When the 5 Hindrances have been put away, he looks upon himself as a free man, rid of disease, out of jail and secure. And gladness springs up within him, and joy arises to him, . . . and he is pervaded with a sense of peace, and in that peace his heart is stayed".

"In very bliss we dwell, who hate not those who hate us;
In very bliss we dwell, in health amid the ailing;
In very bliss we dwell, care-free amid the care-worn;
Midst men of worries, we continue calm".

Sometimes, perhaps into these raptures there seems to enter a touch of that most clinging of all sins, self-complacency:

"When the wise man by earnestness hath driven,
Vanity far away: the terraced heights
Of wisdom doth he climb, and, free from care;
Looks down on the vain world, the careworn crowd—
As he who stands upon a mountain top
Can watch serene himself, the toilers in the plains".

But there is also a real depth of spiritual experience such as we look for in vain over large stretches of Indian religion.

Samadhi is said to lead to *Nibbana*, the final goal. But just as there is a double conception of *samadhi* as yogic trance and moral rapture, so there is a double conception of *nibbana* as extinction and as perfected bliss. *Nibbana* means "putting out". But what is it that is put out?—self-conscious existence or the fire of desire? Primarily, certainly, the latter.

"Cool am I now, knowing *Nibbana's* peace", is a constant refrain in the songs of the emancipated.

But was not the ultimate end extinction of personal existence? Buddha apparently refused to answer this question directly. But it was certainly understood by most of his early-thinking followers to be the logical result of his teaching. And with regard to himself, the Pali scriptures show that he held out no hope to his followers of his continuing existence to help and to bless. When,

as he lay dying, he was asked by Ananda what would happen to them after his death, he replied, "The Dhamma will be your teacher". And again, "Therefore Ananda, be ye lamps to yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge, but hold fast as a refuge to the Truth (Dhamma) looking not for refuge to anyone besides".

The path of the Holy Ones, more accurately, worthy ones, Arahatas, in which the saint becomes free from desire for material or immaterial, existence; from pride and self righteousness, and ignorance. He is now free from all sin; he sees and values all things in this life at their true value; evil desires of all kinds being rooted up from his mind, he only experiences right desires for himself, and tender pity and regard and exalted spiritual love for others. "As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son: so, let there be goodwill without measure among all beings. Let goodwill without measure prevail in the whole world, above, below, around, unstinted, unmixed with any feeling of differing of...opposing interests. If a man remain steadfastly in this state of mind all the while he is awake, whether he be standing, walking, sitting or lying down, then is come to pass the saying "Even in this world holiness has been found".

The ten sins, or evil states of mind, thus conquered in the course of the four paths are the ten (Sangyojanas or) Fetters, which are :—

1. Delusion of self; 2. Doubt; 3. Dependence on rites;
4. Sensuality, bodily passions; 5. Hatred, ill-feeling; 6. Love of life on earth; 7. Desire for life in heaven; 8. Pride; 9. Self-righteousness; 10. Ignorance.

When the first five fetters are completely broken, the converted Buddhist has become an Arahata, and has entered the fourth path; when the other five are broken, he has become Asekha, and thus put an end to all delusion and to all sorrow.

— One can speak for hours on the ecstatic praise which is lavished in Buddhist writings on this condition of mind, the Fruit of the fourth Path, the State of an Arahata of a man made perfect according to the Buddhist faith. But all that could be said can be included in one pregnant phrase—THIS IS NIRVANA.

"To him who has finished the Path, and passed beyond sorrow, who has freed himself on all sides, and thrown away every fetter,

there is no more fever of grief. He whose senses have become tranquil; like a horse well broken-in by the driver; who is free from pride and the lust of flesh, and the lust of existence, and the defilement of ignorance—him even the gods envy. Such a one whose conduct is right, remains like the broad earth, unvexed; like the pillar of the city gate, unmoved; like a pellucid lake, unruffled. For such there are no more births. Tranquil is the mind, tranquil the words and deeds of him who is thus tranquilized, and made free by wisdom".

"They who, by steadfast mind have become exempt from evil desire, and well trained in the teachings of Gautama; they having obtained the fruit of the fourth Path, and immersed themselves in that ambrosia, have received without price, and are in the enjoyment of Nirvana. Their old Karma is exhausted, no new karma is being produced; their hearts are free from the longing after future life; the cause of their existence being destroyed, and no new yearnings springing up within them, they, the wise, are extinguished like this lamp". "That mendicant conducts himself well, who has conquered (sin) by means of holiness, from whose eyes the veil of error has been removed, who is well-trained in religion; and, who, free from yearnings, and skilled in the knowledge, has attained unto Nirvana".

What then is NIRVANA, which means simply going out, extinction; it being quite clear, from what has gone before, that this cannot be the extinction of a soul? It is the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart, which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence. That extinction is to be brought about by, and runs parallel with, the growth of the opposite condition of mind and heart; it is complete when that opposite condition is reached.

Nirvana is therefore the same thing as a sinless, calm state of mind; and if translated at all, may best, perhaps, be rendered 'holiness'—holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom.

To attempt translations of such pregnant terms is however always dangerous, as the new word, part of a new language which is the outcome of a different tone of thought, while it may denote the same or nearly the same idea, usually calls up together with it very different ones. This is the case here; our word holiness would

often suggest the ideas of love to, and awe in, the felt presence of a personal creator—ideas inconsistent with Buddhist holiness. On the other hand, Nirvana implies the ideas of intellectual energy, and of the cessation of individual existence; of which the former is not essential to, and the latter is quite unconnected with, our idea of holiness. Holiness and Nirvana, in other words, may represent states of mind not greatly different; but these are due to different causes, and end in different results, and in using the words it is impossible to confine one's thoughts to the thing expressed, so as not also to think of its origin and its effect.

It is better, therefore, to retain the word Nirvana as the name of the Buddhist "*Summum bonum*", which is a blissful holy state, a moral condition; a modification of personal character; and we should allow the word to remind us, as it did the early Buddhists, both of the Path which leads to the extinction of sin, and also of the break in the transfer of Karma, which the extinction of sin will bring about. That this must be the effect of Nirvana is plain; for that state of mind which in Nirvana is extinct (upadana, Klesa, trisha) is precisely that which will, according to the great mystery of Buddhism, lead at death to the formation of a new individual, to whom the Karma of the dissolved or dead one will be transferred. That new individual would consist of certain bodily and mental qualities or tendencies enumerated in the five Skandhas or aggregates. A comprehensive name of all the five is Upadi, a word derived (in allusion to the name of their cause, upadana) from upada, to grasp, either with the hand or the mind. Now, when a Buddhist has become an Arahant, when he has reached Nirvana the for that state of mind which in Nirvana is extinct (upadana, klesa, but he is still alive; the upadi, the Skandhas, his body with all its powers that is to say, the fruit of his former sin remains. These, however, are impermanent, they will soon pass away; there will then be nothing left to bring about the rise of a new set of Skandhas, of a new individual; and the Arahant will be no longer alive or existent in any sense, at all; he will have reached Parinibbana, complete extinction, or Nir-upadi-sesa-Nibbana dhatu, extinction so complete that the upadi, the five Skandhas, survive no longer—that is, in one word, Death.

The life of man, to use a constantly recurring Buddhist simile or parable is like the flame of an Indian lamp, a metal or earthenware saucer in which a cotton wick is laid in oil. One life is derived from another, as one flame is lit at another; it is not the

same flame, but without the other it would not have been. As a flame cannot exist without oil, so life, individual existence, depends on the cleaving to low and earthly things, the sin of the heart. If there is no oil in the lamp, it will go out, though not until the oil which the wick has drawn up, is exhausted; and then no new flame can be lighted there. And so the parts and powers of the sinless man will be dissolved, and no new being will be born to sorrow. The wise will pass away, will go out like the flame of a lamp, and then Karma will be individualized, no longer.

Stars, long ago extinct, may be still visible to us by the light they emitted before they ceased to burn; but the rapidly vanishing effect of a no longer active cause will soon cease to strike upon our senses, and where the light was, there will be darkness. So the living, moving body of the perfect man is visible still, though its cause has ceased to act; but it will soon decay, and die, and pass away; and as no new body will be formed, where life was, there will be nothing.

Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, is then a result of Nirvana, but it is not Nirvana. The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not on death but on a virtuous life here and now, that the Pitakas lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to Nirvana, as the fruit of the fourth Path of Arahantship.

Thus, of the Dhamma-pada, Professor Max Muller, who was the first to point out the fact, says, "If we look in the Dhamma-pada at every passage where Nirvana is mentioned, there is not one which would require that its meaning should be annihilation, while most, if not all, would become perfectly unintelligible if we assigned to the word Nirvana" that signification.

The same thing may be said of such other parts of the Pitakas as are accessible to us in published texts. Thus the commentator on the Jatakas quotes some verses from the Buddhavansa or History of the Buddhas, which is one of the books of the Second Pitaka. In those verses we have, (inter alia), an argument based on the logical assumption that if a positive exists its negative must also exist; if there is heat, there must be cold; and so on. In one of these pairs we find existence opposed, not to Nirvana, but to non-existence; whilst, in another, the three fires (of lust, hatred, and delusion) are opposed to Nirvana. It follows, I think, that to the mind of the composer of the Buddhavansa, Nirvana meant not the extinction, the negation of being, but the extinction, the absence,

of the three fires of the passion. From the most important passages, from the Ceylon fifth century commentators, and from other later books, both Sanskrit and Pali, it would seem that the word was used in its original sense only, even as late as the time of Buddhagosa; after that time we occasionally (but very seldom, and only when context makes the modification clear) find Nirvana used where we should expect anupadisesanibbana or parinibbana,—just as the word “bow” is actually used for “rainbow”, where the word heaven, or some such expression, is in the context; and it is conceivable that the word ‘phrase’ might come to be used for ‘paraphrase’. In these cases the general sense of the context has the same force as the qualifying prefix, or prefixed word, would otherwise have had; and so far from this usage being a proof that Nirvana, without the qualifying prefix, meant the same as Parinirvana, it is very striking that such a use of the word should not occur in books even much earlier than those in which it is actually found.

So little is known of the books on the Northern Buddhist canon, that it is difficult to discover their doctrine on any controverted point; but so far as it is possible to judge, they confirm that use of the word Nirvana which we find in the Pitakas. In the Lalita Vistara the word occurs in a few passages, in none of which the sense of annihilation is necessary, and in all of which I take Nirvana to mean the same as the Pali, Nibbana. The Tibetan rendering of the word is a long phrase, meaning, according to Burnouf, ‘the state of him who is delivered from sorrow’, or, ‘the state in which one finds oneself when one is so delivered’ (affranchi). This is confirmed by Mr. Beal’s comprehensive and valuable work on Chinese Buddhism, where the Chinese version of the Sanskrit Parinirvana Sutra has the following passages—“Nirvana is just so. In the midst of sorrow there is no Nirvana, and in Nirvana there is no sorrow”. “I” (Gautama) “devote myself wholly to moral culture, so as to arrive at the highest condition of moral rest (the highest Nirvana)”.

And so again, in the verse quoted from the Pratimoksha.

‘The Heart, scrupulously avoiding all idle dissipation,
Diligently applying itself to the Holy Law of Buddha,
Letting go all lust, and consequent disappointment,
Fixed and unchangeable, enters on Nirvana’.


If we can trust these translations through the Chinese,—and I think we may, as far as our purpose requires,—the early Sanskrit

texts of the Northern Buddhists, like the Pali texts of the Pitakas, look upon Nirvana as a Moral condition, to be reached here, in this world, and in this life.

Dr. Ven Vajirana Thero says, “It is this final emancipation and eternal Peace, unruffled by the illusion of phenomenal existence that *matters* to us Buddhists, and it is our Nibbana. The very word, Nibbana, is sacred to us, it is our last aspiration at the end of all our good action. Nibbana is not to be discussed, committing it to our dead words, but to be realised for oneself by oneself. Words are but imperfect manifestations of the thoughts of mundane minds, and Nibbana cannot be touched by them”.

3. Thirdly, why did India reject Buddhism? The Buddhist doctrines are Godless, and Buddha preached Ethology and not Theology or the science of religion. He was an Atheist; and in no original Buddhist scriptures has he shown himself God-fearing or God-loving. Just as a shapeless body or a colourless flower is incomprehensible, so the paradoxical Godless-ism of Buddha is unnatural, and failed to satisfy the hunger and thirst of the God seeking souls of the Aryans. Morality divorced from piety is a lifeless carcase. Morality, it is true, makes man, but it is piety that feeds and clothes the inner selves. Dry morality cannot quench the spiritual thirst of man. Man needs God, and a religion of humanism, however noble, can never long prevail. So in India Buddhism was ultimately wiped out by the New Hinduism of the great personal gods, Vishnu and Siva, while the Buddhism which conquered China and Japan was not the religion preached by Gautama but the Mahayana faith in which Buddha himself was deified, and was viewed in such scriptures as the Awakening of faith and the Lotus of the Good Law, as becoming repeatedly incarnate to save the world, through Grace.

b. The second cause was the Buddha’s non-belief in Vedic or any other revelation, which literally means taking off the veil or cover, from the unknown or undiscovered Law of God. Laws are modes of action, and modes of action reveal the nature and character of the actor. So that every law, physical or moral, which is discovered by truth seekers and proclaimed to the world is a direct and trust-worthy revelation of God himself. There is not a nation or a race that does not believe in some kind of Revelation. Dr. Salzer M.D., a very learned man, says concerning Revelation that it is the process by which man may and often does attain to the privilege of grasping and revealing truth far beyond the



ken of human reason. Buddha has left us quite a new revelation of his own. According to Buddha, revelation that comes to man from extraneous sources, however high and exalted, is not the highest attainable by man. And yet Buddha's inspiration of revelation was from the Vedas, the most sacred and the greatest repositories of knowledge. The pure and unadulterated teachings of the Vedas are to be found in the teachings of Sakya Muni. The teachings of the Upanishads in their condensed form may be read also in the Sutras of Buddhism.

Buddha repudiated the Vedas. But in the four great religious congresses that were held between 500 B.C. and 143 B.C. the necessity of Revealed Books and Records was established.

All the Buddhist works, though full of beautiful moral gems, were chiefly borrowed from the Vedas and Upanishads which the Buddha claimed to have undermined. Eminent Orientalists having compared the Upanishads with the Ethics of Buddhism have come to the conclusion that there is hardly any difference between the two. Prof. Barth one of the most cautious of Orientalists goes further and says that the Sutras of Buddha and Upanishads are "identical in thought".

(c) The third cause was the prominence given by Buddha to the doctrine of Bhikkhuism or Mendicancy. Reformation of Society was not Buddha's mission. Sever all social connections and live an ascetic life was his object. As social inclinations are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and interest of every individual to cherish and improve them to the benefit of mankind. Society is the work of men. There is nothing in society which is not also in man. But Buddha was otherwise convinced. He did not know that poverty never regenerated a nation. Poverty is the nurse of grief, sorrows and anxieties. His followers at best retraced their steps and divided themselves into 38 different sects or societies.

(d) The fourth cause was the revival of Vedantism by the world famed Sri. Sankarachariyar, who being a profound scholar in Sanskrit, conversant with the esoteric teachings of the Vedas and Philosophies boldly checked the further progress of Buddha's Materialism in Aryavarta. He defeated in public discussion the principal disciples or Missionaries of Buddha.

The Buddhists began to lose their hold and became demoralised with the touch of Orthodox Hindus. They commenced to worship

the tooth and the bone of Buddha. In Buddhagaya they still worship Hindu Gods and Goddesses. The same sort of thing took place elsewhere too. The great Gautama Buddha, who started his mission with the banner of Agnosticism was at last cunningly incorporated by the Brahmin Priests with their Avathars and proclaimed Sakiya Muni as the 9th Incarnation of God!

(e) The last blow that the Buddhists received was from their brother Jainism proclaimed by Mahavira of Anathaputtra between the 7th and the 10th centuries. The Buddhists wisely conciliated their Hindu neighbours and professed their belief in 136 hells.

(f) I mention as a last reason the fact that Buddhism was expelled from India by violence. Although this is believed by many to be the main reason for the death of Buddhism I deliberately put it last because I find that the reason is not as strong as it is made out to be. The last Buddhist Missionaries Punna Mitra and Prognatta died in the years 381 and 457 A.D. The Buddhism of those days was banished from India and had a refuge in China in A.D. 516. Kumarila Bhatta, a great Sanskrit scholar, subsequently took a prominent part in the expulsion of Buddhists from S. India in the 7th century A.D. His mission of Buddhistic destruction was successfully made over to the celebrated Sri. Sankarachariya in the beginning of the 8th century A.D. King Sudhanna with the support of Kumarila, proclaimed a general crusade and massacre against Buddhists and urged upon his subjects that all Buddhists young and old, should be killed from the South to the North, and whoever would give them shelter should meet the same fate. This massacre went on till the 13th century A.D. Buddhism suffered at the hands of Mohammedan persecutors too. Both Buddhism and Hinduism were exposed to the attacks of the same Mohammedan invaders. Buddhism succumbed with massacre of the monks; Hinduism survived because it had struck root in the family system of the country and its extermination was tantamount to the extermination of the whole population.

An Examination of Ramanuja's Criticism of Ego-Less-Consciousness

By

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According to Rāmānuja, self-consciousness is an essential and inseparable feature of consciousness. Self is a conscious subject which never loses its selfhood,¹ or, 'Ahampratyaya'. The 'Ahampratyaya' is present even in deep sleep, though in a dim degree.² This theory of the eternal presence of the self-consciousness comes in conflict with Śankara's theory of the eternal presence, not of a consciousness of self-hood, which is an illusory superimposition, but of a self-less, and distinctionless presence of consciousness and Rāmānuja offers the following criticism of it.

Rāmānuja's criticism against ego-less consciousness is, that egoity is not something illusorily superimposed on the self, for if that were so, there would be such a consciousness as 'I am consciousness', and not as we have in our daily life, 'I am conscious'.³ This should clearly prove that self is a subject of consciousness. The one and unitary consciousness cannot be divided into two parts of 'I-ness and 'consciousness', the one being held illusory and the other as the only reality. But this criticism of Rāmānuja is true, but irrelevant. If there is an empirical consciousness, it invariably involves the duality of subject and object and the upholders of the distinctionless consciousness never deny this phenomenal aspect of consciousness, which must necessarily be in the form of 'I am conscious', and cannot possibly be in the form of 'I am consciousness' which would be meaningless. It is admitted on all hands that empirical knowledge revels in the distinction of the knower,

the known, and knowledge. What is affirmed is that this distinction is not final and ultimate.⁴ On the other hand, if by consciousness is meant the pure duality-less consciousness it could not possibly be in the form of 'I am consciousness', for the 'I-ness' is as unnecessary to it, as 'thisness'. It can be only in one form and that is subject-less objectless consciousness. The witnessing self which is 'Saksi', 'Kevala', and 'Nirguna' cannot be identified with the 'jiva' which is actually undergoing the modifications of experience.⁵ But Rāmānuja could never see the need of just such a consciousness. To him, consciousness or the self could never be without egoity. He asks, 'Do you mean to say that knowledge appears to itself? The Self is not mere knowledge but the subject of it'. And the general principle is that whatever appears to itself appears as an 'I', and therefore even granting that consciousness appears to itself, it will appear in the form of 'I'. Hence 'what constitutes the inward self is not pure consciousness but the 'I'.⁶

Rāmānuja's second criticism of 'Śankara's distinction of self and egoity is an attack upon the notion that the unconscious 'Antahkaraṇa' can come to possess the character of a knower. Śankara held that since egoity or the character of a knower involves action, and consequently change, it could not belong to the unchanging consciousness. Action and change must be the property of limited consciousness and hence the qualities of 'Kartṛ', an agent, and 'Jñātr' must belong to the ego or the 'jiva', the lower principle of consciousness.⁷ But to Rāmānuja it is manifestly absurd that the non-intelligent 'Ahankāra' or the 'Antahkaraṇa' could become a knower.⁸ The agency of knowledge cannot belong to the unconscious Ahankāra. Nor can Śankara's theory of egoity as a reflection of the Pure Self be tenable. 'How, we ask, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place?' Does consciousness become a reflection of 'Ahankāra' or does Ahankāra become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible since the quality of being a knower would not be

5. Pañcadaśī. X. 11-ff. Nṛtyaśālāsthito dīpah prabhūm sabhyāmsca nartakīm, dīpayed aviśeṣena tadābhāve' pi dīpyate.

6. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 35. 'Ahamartha eva pratyagātmā na jñapti mātṛam'.

7. S.B. 2. 3. 40.

8. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. 'Na jñātrtvam ahamkārasya' na kadācidapi jñāsyāhamkārasya jñātrtva sambhavaḥ'.

1. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 29. 'Ahampratyaya siddho hi asmadarthah.

2. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 35. 'Susuptavapi naham bhāva vigamah'.

3. R.B. 1. 7. 1. p. 31. 'Anubhūtiraham iti pratīyet na anubhāvāmi aham iti pratītiḥ'.

allowed to consciousness and so is the latter, for the non-intelligent can never become a knower.⁹

The Advaita reply to the above is that the unconscious Ahankāra manifests the consciousness even as the hand manifests the light of the sun. But Rāmānuja retorts that the non-intelligent Ahankāra should manifest the self-luminous self has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the sun.¹⁰ The relation of manifestation cannot at all hold good between two contradictory natures of consciousness and 'Ahankāra'. The Advaita illustration of the hand and the sunbeam is untrue, for 'in reality the sunbeam is not manifested by the hand at all'.¹¹

Moreover, the concept of a knower does not involve a concept of change. Rāmānuja denies the fundamental tenet of Śankara that to be a knower is to be changing and hence different from the unchanging consciousness. The ego as a subject of knowledge is not necessarily an active and changing principle. 'Nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing'.¹²

According to Rāmānuja, the Ātman is eternal, and its natural quality of consciousness too is eternal, but yet it is subject to contraction and expansion, which are due to the accidents of the 'Karma' of the person in the cycles of existence and are not the natural property of the self. The quality of an agent is not, however, essential to the self, but originated by 'Karma', the self is essentially unchanging'.¹³ It is difficult to see here any difference at all between the position of Śankara and his critic Rāmānuja, when both virtually believe in the eternity of the self as well as of consciousness, but attribute change and action either to the unconscious 'Ahankāra' or to the mere 'accidents of Karma'. In fact 'Rāmānuja's two above quoted remarks, (1) 'Nor can it be maintained that to be knower is to be essentially changing', and

9. R.R. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. 'Kimahankāra Chāyāpattir samvidah uta samvicchāyāpattir-ahankārasya'.

10. Śāntāgāro ivādityam ahankāro yadātmakah, svayamjyotiṣam atmānam vyanakti na yukti mat. Quoted by R.N. in 1. 1. 1.

11. p. 32.

12. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. 'na ca jñātrtvam vikryātmakam, jñātrtvam hi jñāna guṇāśrayatvam jñānam cāsyā nityasya svābhāvika dharmatvena nityam'.

13. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 32. (a) 'Svayamaparicchinnameva jñānam saṅkoca vikāśārham ityupapādayiṣyāmah'. (b) 'Tacca na svābhāvikam api tu karmakṛtam ity avikriyasvarūpa evātmā'.

(2) 'It is subject to contraction and expansion due to accident of Karma, and the quality of an agent is not essential to the self, but is originated by 'Karma', are identical, which are meant by him to be different. If the self is admitted to be 'essentially unchanging', it matters little whether the character of change and egoity (knowership) is 'due to the Antahkaraṇa' or 'to the accidents of Karma'. The relevance of the argument consists in the recognition of two orders of consciousness, one of the status of the unchanging and egoless, and the other of egoity and action, which Rāmānuja too is virtually forced to admit.

Rāmānuja next criticises Śankara's notion of a 'Sākṣī-consciousness', a form in which the egoless consciousness is supposed to exist in deep sleep. To Rāmānuja 'Sākṣī' and 'ego' are identical concepts. He asks 'What is the meaning of a 'Sākṣin'? By a 'Sākṣin' is meant some one 'who knows about something by personal observation', and one who does not know an object cannot be called a Sākṣin'.¹⁴ Mere consciousness cannot be regarded as 'Sākṣin'. Now though to be a Sākṣin is not to be devoid of knowledge yet there seems to be clear difference between the two concepts of an indifferent and unaffected witness, and the actual participator and the affected 'Bhoktā or the Jīva'. There is at least as much difference between a 'Sākṣī' and a Jīva as between an umpire and a player in a game of football.

The Sākṣī knows, but is not an actual and active participator, and hence is not affected by the vicissitude of the game. The concept of a Sākṣī-consciousness is necessitated by the need of a self-same consciousness in the midst of its changing modes 'vṛttis' which are the actual and active agents.¹⁵ The active modes of consciousness and the quickly successive phases of ego-hood cannot themselves explain the conscious phenomenon, without the assumption of a Sākṣī-consciousness behind them.

Rāmānuja is right in emphasising the concrete aspects of consciousness, but he unjustifiably overlooks the unempirical background of his empirical superstructure, as most onlookers in a game notice only the winning and the losing player, and not the unaffected umpire.

14. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 36. 'Sakṣitvam ca sākṣāt jñātrtvam eva, na hi ajānataḥ sākṣitvam, jñātā eva sākṣī na jñāna mātram'.

15. Pañcadaśī 10. 9-19.

Besides, if there is no difference between a 'Sākṣi' and a 'Jīva' and if a 'Sākṣi' must always have an 'other' to look on, then this permanent state of the duality of the knower and the known would make omniscience 'Sarvajñatā' or the state of all-knowledge impossible. The imperfect knower 'jīva' must at sometime so completely know everything that there is no 'other' left outside and then he is called not a 'jīva' but a 'Sākṣi'.

Ego-less consciousness and deep sleep :

A study of deep sleep provides a fruitful background for a theory of the true nature of consciousness as a distinctionless eternal presence. Such an eternal consciousness as exists in deep sleep or in the fourth state 'Turiya' is consciousness, but not self-consciousness, because there are no objects in the dreamless sleep, in opposition to which there may arise the ego-consciousness 'Ahampratyaya'. Self-consciousness is the consciousness of the self as mediated through the consciousness of objects, as is the case in the waking and the dream state. But since this mediation is not possible where there are no objects, there is consequently no self-consciousness in dreamless sleep in place of which there is only a distinctionless or a 'nirviṣaya' 'cinmātra' presence. And conversely, where there is a mediation through the presence of objects, as in waking and dream states, there is also the presence of the differentiated consciousness in the form of the 'Jīva' which revels in the distinctions of the 'Aham' and 'Idam'. But there is then, no manifestation of the 'nirāśraya' and the nirviṣaya 'jñapti mātra cit prakāśa', which also is nevertheless present as the basic substrate.

Rāmānuja says that the 'I' consciousness is not very clear in deep sleep for lack of external objects.¹⁶ He, therefore, accepts the main principle that the consciousness is due to the mediation of external objects, and that ego-consciousness is the one extreme of the polarity of consciousness of which the object-consciousness is the other extreme. So that where there is no possibility of the mediation there is no self-consciousness. The question, therefore,

is whether in deep sleep there is unmediated consciousness or a mediated consciousness.

Rāmānuja accepts that there are no objects in deep sleep, and hence no possibility of any mediation. The only alternative left therefore is either to deny the presence of consciousness and thus to affirm a break in the continuity of consciousness or to admit the existence of an eternal consciousness, unmediated by external objects. Ego-consciousness must exist only in polarity with object consciousness. It must go in the absence of its objects. Rāmānuja cannot retain the one without retaining the other also. He destroys the object-consciousness but wants to retain the ego-consciousness. In deep sleep, either there is self-less consciousness, or there is a lapse of consciousness. Since the latter alternative is not acceptable, the former alone is in keeping with the doctrine of the polarity of subject-object consciousness. This self-less consciousness is not either a psychological self, or a particular consciousness, but a consciousness presupposed by all empirical and particular fluctuations of consciousness, which itself cannot be apprehended as an object.

16. R.B. 1. 1. 1. p. 36. 'tamogunābhībhavāt parāgarthānubhavābhāvācchāmarthasya vivikta-sphuta pratibhāsābhāve apyaprabodhād. aham-ityekā kārena ātmanah sphuranāt suṣuptāvapi nāham bhāva vigamaḥ'.

The Jaina View of Causation

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In this short paper I propose to deal with the theory of Causation in Jainism. This ancient religion has a distinctive metaphysics that is based on pluralistic realism; this basis may be traced even in the Jaina view of Causation.

The view is remarkable for the reason that it seeks to bring about a compromise amongst the various extreme doctrines of Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Buddhism, Vedānta, etc. The Naiyāyikas assert that the effect is an origination and is non-existent prior to its production,—view known as Ārambhavāda and Asatkāryavāda; Sāṃkhya holds that all effects are pre-existent in their causes—a view that is known as Satkāryavāda. The Jaina view is that an effect is neither an origination absolutely nor is it pre-existent absolutely; the effect is pre-existent in its cause from the point of substance (Dravya), but it is an origination from the point of modification (Paryāya). If the effect is taken to be absolutely pre-existent then what is there for the cause to produce? The cause thus causes nothing; again if the effect is absolutely non-existent like the sky-lotus then it could never be brought about. There cannot also be any definite restriction about the material conditions necessary for the production of an effect, for anything may come out of anything. We shall thus have to give up the use of accessories regularly needed for the production of a desired effect. The author of Aṣṭasāhasrī sums up the whole contention thus:—If the effect is absolutely non-existent like the sky-lotus or son of a barren woman, then it cannot be produced, again if the effect is absolutely existent like the ether, then there is nothing that could be produced; no one will be foolish enough to bring together various conditions in order to produce the effect which is already there on hand. Thus all practical activities will come to an end. It is therefore urged by the Jains that effectuation is possible of that only which is relatively existent; the material conditions are changed into the effect, this effect was pre-existent in the form of a substance though not present in the form of

modification, thus e.g. an effect like a pot is pre-existent in its cause viz. clay in the form of clay-substance, but not in the form of pot-modification, it is only after the clay substance has undergone the modification that the effect, pot comes to be, so far as this modification is concerned it is an origination, but so far as the substance is concerned, the effect is pre-existent, thus a compromise between the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya views is reached.

The Jaina view again is opposed to the one-sided views of the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and the followers of Sāṃkhya. The Buddhists maintain that every entity is momentary; the Naiyāyikas and the followers of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta claim that certain entities are permanent. Now the Jains tell us that neither the momentary nor the permanent entity can be a cause. On both the views known as Kṣāṇikavāda and Nityekāntavāda causation is impossible. The Jains argue as follows: It is admitted on all hands that causation is established by means of co-presence and co-absence, now this is impossible to find when entities are momentary or permanent absolutely. If the entities are momentary then the cause moment cannot be viewed to be present along with the effect moment and so no agreement can be observed, and similarly the absence of the cause cannot be viewed along with the absence of the effect, for the cause is present when the effect is absent and the effect is present when the cause is absent. All that we gather under the doctrine of momentariness is that the absence of one leads to the presence of the other which is what we do not have in the case of co-presence or co-absence. If the cause moment is completely destroyed before the effect moment appears, then one might naturally ask, what remains of the cause that could be causally connected with the effect? Further under this view there cannot be any distinction between the material and accessory conditions, for since the cause moment is completely destroyed before the effect emerges, the non-existence of the material cause preceding the effect is the same as the non-existence of the accessory cause preceding the effect; there is nothing to distinguish between one non-existence and another. Hence no rule can be laid down that the effect emerges from the non-existence of the material causes and not from the non-existence of the accessory conditions.

On the other hand if an entity is taken to be permanent, then it will not be possible to determine by co-absence the relation between cause and effect for *ex hypothesi* the entity cannot be

absent. Again in an absolutely permanent entity there cannot be any change and consequently no causation, for change is the very essence of causation. Unless a substance is modified there is no effectuation. Threads cannot become a piece of cloth so long as they are not modified that way. It is the substance and its modification that are the objects of cognition by means of co-presence or co-absence. When threads are present the piece of cloth is present and when they are not present the piece is also not present. The thread substance leaves off its former form that was different from the piece of cloth, and retaining its threadness is modified into the form of a piece of cloth that was not present before. The form of the piece of cloth is different from the preceding form of threads, but threadness has not altogether disappeared.

The relation of causation may then be said to depend upon the contiguity of substance and its modification. The author of *Aṣṭasāhasrī* says "Therefore that which does not retain its preceding form like that which does not shed its preceding form—in other words, the momentary and eternal entities—cannot be causes". In the former case there is no enduring substance that may retain its preceding form and be called a cause. In the latter case there is no shedding of the preceding form and taking up of a succeeding change and therefore there is no effectuation. Under the Jaina view, however, there is an enduring substance that is supposed to undergo modifications, and so effectuation is possible.

Another remarkable feature of the Jaina view is that causation is taken to be some kind of an energy or efficiency. Thus the Jaina view like that of *Mīmāṃsā* may be said to be very near the scientific dynamical conception of causation. The *Naiyāyikas* deny the existence of such an efficiency. They suggest that for the production of an effect all that is needed is the collocation of material and instrumental conditions. They find no use for efficiency. They say that a piece of cloth is made when the last thread is interwoven with the rest; for without the conjunction of the last thread the effect will not take place; by co-presence and co-absence we can infer that the only causes needed to produce a piece of cloth are the material and instrumental ones. When the collocation of all the conditions take place the effect is produced, when it does not take place there is no effect, hence the admission of efficiency is superfluous. Without the conjunction of the last thread the other existent threads do not produce the effect—a piece of cloth. Therefore this conjunction alone may be taken to be their efficiency in producing the effect. If it is asked "How can an object be the

efficiency of another?", then it will be replied that this is equally applicable if the efficiency is supposed not to belong to another object, for no cause can be an efficiency of its own. Again the *Naiyāyikas* ask "Is this efficiency eternal or non-eternal. If it is eternal then effects will take place at all times, and further the effect will be found without the help of the accessories, so such accessory causes will become superfluous. If the efficiency is non-eternal, then whence is it produced? If it is said that it is produced by the efficient cause, then the question arises as to how this efficient cause comes to have this efficiency; if the efficiency is produced by a preceding one, then there will be infinite regression. If the efficiency is produced by a non-efficient cause then why should not an effect as well be produced by a non-efficient cause?" The *Naiyayika* further asks "Is efficiency different or non-different from the efficient cause. If it is non-different, then we have either the efficient cause alone or efficiency alone. If it is different, then owing to the absence of aid it cannot be said that this efficiency belongs to the efficient cause. If however it is said that one aids the other, then does (A) efficiency help the cause, or (B) the cause help the efficiency? (A) In the former case does the aid of the efficient cause by the efficiency reside in (i) a different object or (ii) not? (i) If it resides in a different object then owing to the pre-supposition of another aid to designate the first aid we shall have to assume another efficiency, there will therefore be infinite regression. (ii) If the aid does not reside in a different object then the self-same object will be cause. (B) Where the efficient cause helps the efficiency it may be asked whether the cause does so being possessed of another efficiency or being devoid of it? In the former case is this efficiency different from the original efficiency or non-different from it? In both cases we shall have the defects that have been previously pointed out. If the cause aids efficiency being devoid of it, then the pre-supposition of efficiency is set at nought for as the aid is produced without efficiency, an effect as well may be so produced. Further is the efficiency one or many? If it is one, then many effects cannot be simultaneously produced, if many then the cause that has these different powers will have to have many powers to retain them and so there will be infinite regression. Again if the nature of the cause be supposed to produce an effect then it should be needed to produce the efficiency in the cause also and so an efficiency will be needed to produce another efficiency; this leads us to regression again".

The Jains refute all this as follows: Is the absence of efficiency determined due to lack of knowledge or due to the fact that efficiency is suprasensible? The former is not sound, for efficiency is known by means of inference which results from the incapacity of other causes to produce the effect. Without the knowledge of such an efficiency it is impossible for one to take up a definite collocation of materials to produce the desired effect. Again it may be asked if there is no efficiency how is it that even though all the circumstances calculated to bring about the effect are present the effect does not take place? Fire e.g. in the presence of a counteracting gem or charm does not cause blister. It may be asked here whether the counteracting agencies suppress directly the form of fire or of the accessories? The former will not do for the fire is directly observed in an unsuppressed form; neither the second will do for the accessory in the form of the contact of the finger with the fire is also noticed. The only conclusion we can then draw is that the gem counteracts the efficiency of the fire and so no blister is caused. If efficiency were not counteracted, why is it that the same fire causes blister in some man but not in another who wears the gem or repeats the charm? It cannot be said that since efficiency cannot be sensed it does not exist for then we shall have to throw overboard our belief in the existence of merits and demerits and God. If we can infer any peculiarity in causes by means of a peculiarity in the effect then similarly efficiency can be inferred.

As to whether the efficiency is eternal or non-eternal, the Jains assert that since substance is eternal its efficiency is eternal, but because modifications are non-eternal their efficiencies are non-eternal. Because of the eternality of the efficiency of substance it cannot be said that causation will take place always, for the Jains maintain that a substance alone cannot produce an effect. It is the substance that has undergone a modification that will produce an effect; modification is due to the aid of accessory causes, and so a substance cannot produce effects eternally for the requisite modification takes place at certain moments only in the presence of suitable accessories.

To the question "Does efficiency belong to the efficient or non-efficient entity?" they reply as follows:—Efficiency belongs to the efficient; if it is urged that this leads to infinite regression then it is suggested that such a regression is not a flaw for like the interaction between the seed and sprout the flow is eternal. The present

efficiency is manifested by a potent entity possessed of a prior efficiency and this latter by an entity possessed of a more prior efficiency and so on.

Again to question whether the efficiency is different or non-different from the potent entity is improper. For surely there is some difference between them. One difference lies in the fact that while the entity is perceived the efficiency is not perceived. It is rather conceived, for without it an effect cannot be explained. It is also non-different from the potent entity for it is impossible to find the efficiency existing separately from the entity. There is no contradiction in saying that efficiency is both different and non-different from the potent entity, for an entity possessed of identity-indifference falls under a different head altogether.

If it is asked whether the efficiency is one or many the Jains say that an object is possessed of many powers because they produce multifarious effects. Or rather it may be said that the multifarious effects of the same cause indicate that it is possessed of such different effects as light, burning of the wick, evaporation of oil etc. If it is said that the different effects are due not to different powers but to the difference in the accessories, then it will be urged that an object like an orange is not possessed of diverse qualities such as taste, smell, colour, etc., for these qualities are known by means of different accessories such as the palate, nose, eyes, etc. On this view an orange will have to be taken to be formless.

We now turn to an important application of the Jain view of causation, viz. to divine creation. Following the special view of causation, that the Jains hold, they refute the view that the world is created by God. Their arguments are as follows:—

Either the substance out of which the world is made existed from the very beginning or it did not so exist. In the first case the existent substance should limit the activity of God and so He would cease to be All-powerful; in the latter case, what material cause did God resort to in making the substance? If it is said that God alone is the material cause as some of the Vedāntins hold, then it may be said that since the properties of the material cause are to be found in the effect, the Universe should be expected to have such properties of God as Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. If it is said that God is the instrumental cause, as a potter is of a pot as

the Naiyayikas hold, then it is here implied that God should be an Agent, since all actions presuppose an agent, but it is unnecessary to take God to be an Agent for two reasons, (a) agency implies some kind of a body through which work is done and so God will become an embodied being. If it is suggested that God does not need a body but creates by His mere Will then it may be asked, "What is His Motive in creating the world?" If God created the world without any motive then the world being a product of caprice we should fail to find law and order in the world. If the motive is pity then we should expect no evil and pain in the world. If God created the world by his mere existence then it may be asked, "Is bare existence the cause?" If it is so then the bare existence of a goldsmith should lead to the production of a gold ring, for the bare existence of one is the same as that of another. (b) Again experience shows to us that it is not necessary to presuppose an agent always wherever there is activity; there are many effects such as rainfall that are produced without any agent. If it is said that the agency is the activity itself then it is clear that the reason adduced is doubtful for the opponents cannot show any defect in the supposition that any action may precede even without any agent. If it is said that this is opposed to the well-known logical dictum that there is no effect without a cause—there it may be said that this does not mean that God must be the cause and that something else may not be the cause of the universe. Some one may suggest that the perfect adjustment and design that are found in the world indicate that its creator must be an All-Wise and All-Powerful and Infinite Intelligent Being, inasmuch as an inert body cannot work according to plan and further no finite spirit has the power to create such a vast Universe. All this may be refuted by showing that the world is far from being perfect and properly planned. If God had created it then the wicked should never have prospered, there should have been no wastage and no calamities, gold should have possessed fragrance and sandal trees should have bloomed. As an Omnipotent and Omniscient being He should have foreknown and forestalled these imperfections and calamities. If the calamities are supposed to be due to merits and demerits then it should be admitted that these influence God in creating the universe and so He ceases to be All-powerful. Again this notion of plan or design is an anthropomorphic conception. If on the analogy of human experience God is regarded as intelligent then why should He not be regarded as imperfect since men are so. Further it may be said that since causal relation is established

by means of co-presence and co-absence it is impossible to determine that God is the cause of the Universe for God is Omnipresent and therefore it cannot be shown that where He is absent His effect viz. the universe is also absent. Moreover if the Universe is an effect we should like to know what "Effect" means. Does it mean the changeful? If so, then since God is creating by His different acts He is also changeful and therefore an effect and not a cause. If effect means a contingent event then it should be denied that the Universe is an effect for the world has always been. If effect means coming into being of that which was not before then also the Universe is not an effect for it always has been.

For these reasons that are the ramifications of the principle of Causation, Jains disprove that the world is created by God.

Is Maya-Vada Defensible?

SRI AUROBINDO'S ALTERNATIVE

By

DR. INDRA SEN

The history of Indian philosophical thought witnessed in Sri Aurobindo's "The Life Divine", published a few years ago, a true creation—a creation thoroughly Indian in inspiration but fully abreast of total modern knowledge and in direct lineal descent or advance of the country's past achievements. Historians of Indian thought have to regretfully observe a failure in philosophical creation from about the time of Shankara and Ramanuja. The contribution of the Navya-Nyaya school to primarily logical doctrine in the eighteenth century is all that can be mentioned to break the dull monotony of centuries since then. Sri Aurobindo obviously becomes a close successor to Shankara, the intervening centuries dropping out for want of any important fresh philosophical content. However, one has to consider Sri Aurobindo's writing in English by the side of Shankara's writing in the traditional medium of Sanskrit. The Jain philosophers, who originally wrote in Prakrit, soon felt the necessity of rendering their works into Sanskrit for they were not considered learned enough. Since then the cultural conditions of the country and the world, as a whole, have vastly changed so that today we recognise the form of medium to be a matter of the author's convenience and that the one thing that really matters is the substance of thought and experience on its own merits, however clothed and embodied.

Sri Aurobindo's thought has naturally to get progressively more and more into our philosophical discussions and therefore Professor G. R. Malkani's article 'A Justification of Maya-Vada,' 'written after reading Sri Aurobindo's criticism of Maya-Vada in 'The Life Divine' and by way of an answer to it' is definitely a contribution to the philosophical thinking of the country. This article was published in January, 1943 issue of the Philosophical Quarterly and appeared to the present writer as initiating a discussion, in which he felt persuaded to participate. The same issue

also contained another article by the same author on 'Sri Aurobindo's Theory of Creation.' But that is not considered here. Professor Malkani's reactions and my reactions to Sri Aurobindo's philosophy are, I believe, just the opposite and we, therefore, make natural combatants. May be the particularities of our points of view make some contribution to a relative fullness of the whole—the subject of Maya-Vada under discussion.

I shall first state the position of the learned Professor as far as possible in his own words. The quotations are from his article and also the book entitled 'Ajnana, Theory of Ignorance,' where, jointly with two other authors, he has more comprehensively propounded his view of Ignorance, as 'the fundamental postulate of every philosophical system and its special position in Advaita Vedanta.'

"It is sometimes supposed," says the author in opening his exposition of the subject in the book, "that in philosophy we should attempt an ultimate explanation of things, or seek an answer to the 'why' and the 'wherefore' of things with which experience makes us acquainted. Now so far as this involves an investigation of empirical facts, the empirical sciences may be relied upon to give the best answer that is possible under the circumstances. But in so far as what is wanted is a non-empirical principle of explanation of that which is experienced, the demand involves the tacit assumption that our experience as such is not adequate to reality: it involves, in other words, the non-reality of empirical fact-hood. We have then not to explain anything; that which we would like to have explained is not what it is; it is not real".

Thus the aim of philosophy itself makes an utter division of the empirical from the non-empirical and renders the urge for ultimate explanation of things invalid.

"The system of Advaita Vedanta", continues the learned exponent, "is a system of extreme Monism or non-dualism. It, therefore, makes a special use of this concept of avidya.² The only reality is the Absolute, the one eternal intelligent substance. Besides it, nothing else exists. The world of the manifold that we

1. 'Ajnana' (in future to be referred as A.) p. 3.

2. Philosophical Quarterly (to be referred to henceforth as Ph. Q.)

appear to know is a mere appearance; it is non-existent in the real. This apparent existence of the world is due to avidya. There are thus only two important concepts in this system,—the concept of Brahman and the concept of avidya".³

Brahman is the ultimate reality. It is the one existence, without a second. But, for the trenchant logic of Advaitist Monism "the One cannot be One, if it is not pure, simple and undifferentiated.....The real one which constitutes the nature of Ultimate Reality must be without any internal or external differences. This alone can satisfy thought. But if that is so, the "many" of our common experience have to be reconciled to it. This is done in Advaitism through the concept of maya".⁴

But how do we know of such a Brahman, a oneness, pure, simple, and distinctionless within and without? Realisation or intuition is the ultimate answer. However, Professor Malkani's insistence that a truth of intuition should be corroborated by reason so that it may have value for philosophy is quite right. For him the intuition of Nirguna Brahman is an equally valid reality for reason. If ultimate reality is one, a unity, then such a unity has to be a self-identical existence. "The real problem for thought", declares the author, "is not a pure unity without any differences.....The real problem is a unity comprehensive of differences.....A real unity cannot tolerate differences....An ontological unity must be pure and simple".⁵ "Indeed", continues our professor, "we can think of reality as discrete. But this would involve a self-contradiction. Discreteness cannot be realised without unity. The many must be held together and related before they can be many. Thus the many imply the one. But the reverse is not true. The one does not imply anything beyond itself. If it did, it would contradict itself".⁶ The author at the same time admits, "No amount of juggling with thought can succeed in eliminating all dualism".⁷

Thus thought establishes the character of Brahman as much as the direct intuitive knowledge. The question now is, what about

3. A., p. 4.

4. Ph. Q., p. 226.

5. Ph. Q., p. 225.

6. Ph. Q., Pp. 225 & 226.

7. Ibid, p. 225.

the world? The answer for the Advaitist is simple. The one and the many being mutually exclusive, if the one is the true reality as shown above, then the many is unreal. But yet the world is there. Shankara himself had argued against the Vijnana-Vadins, more or less, in the words: To deny the existence of a pot, cloth or pillar while it is being perceived, is like denying flavour of the food while it is being eaten: it is a falsification of immediate experience by sheer force. Now here is the crux of Maya-Vada. The world is not and yet it is. The contradiction is sought to be resolved through the concept of illusion or ignorance, maya or avidya. Ramanuja, the classical critic of Shankara, had through his objections evoked further elucidations from Shankara's commentators. But our author would reject any compromising modifications of this concept and stands firmly by the pure Shankarite meanings of the term. "The category of the illusory", affirms he, "must be recognised as distinct from the imaginary.... The illusory is not consciously imagined, but consciously perceived. It is a case of conception confused with perception. What we really conceive we believe that we perceive or intuit....Or we really intuit Brahman alone, and yet through error we believe that we intuit the world".⁸

But how does the illusion of the world arise? Through ignorance. But "by this we mean", explains our author, "two things, which go to make up an illusion,—ignorance or absence of knowledge of the reality and positive mis-apprehension in place i.e., *avarana* and *vikshepa*".⁹ Further, maya or avidya is not the cause of the illusion. It is 'just a descriptive name for the primal illusion of the world in place of Brahman'.¹⁰ Maya is neither real nor unreal. While we do not know Brahman, the illusory appears as real. When we know the whole, the mayic world is cancelled. In fact that cancellation itself is cancelled". The world, therefore, never was, never is and never will be.

This is our author's fundamental ontological position. To further strengthen it he declares that "the distinction which we make of the different planes of reality, thus justifying to a certain

8. Ph. Q., p. 241.

9. Ibid, p. 229.

10. Ibid, p. 229.

extent the reality of error and our efforts to get rid of it, has no metaphysical significance".¹¹

This is virtually the orthodox Advaitist position. But in Professor Malkani the true Shankarite view finds a convinced representative. His own sentences given above abundantly show it. They carry for that reason certain freshness in them. Such a position by the power of its sincerity and honesty will naturally inspire respect and consideration. There are surely a few more amongst the philosophical writers of the country, who are perhaps equally convinced and confirmed in this extreme Maya-Vada. For the most part, however, one notices wide divergences in the interpretations, on the whole tending to minimise and reject the illusionist hypothesis of Shankara. Pandit Kokileshwar Shastri's view comes first to our mind. He is a great authority among the recent interpreters of Shankara. He argues with full command of the Bhashya to show that the world far from being an illusion is, in fact, the expression of Brahman. His own statements are clear and forceful. "Everywhere Shankara has declared Brahman to be—" अभिन्ननिमित्तोपदान कारणम् "; that is to say, Brahman is to be regarded in both its aspects; i.e., Brahman's transcendence and immanence are inseparable (अभिन्न) aspects. Brahman is revealed in the world in the diversities of nama-rupa (नाम-रूप) but yet it is present behind its manifestations in its own inexhaustible (पूर्ण) nature. In the 1.4.25-27 (वेदान्तसूत्र भाष्य), Brahman is described as evolving from its own nature the changes or the emergent effects, itself being their prior cause, present behind each change:—

पूर्वसिद्धोपि हि सन् आत्मा, विशेषेण विकारात्मना

परिणामयामास आत्मानम् ॥¹²

Another passage would be equally startling. "It is wrong to suppose the universal, the being, the Sat, as totally excluding all determinations; for it had its own differentiations implicitly present in it. Because it contained the जगत् (the world) in it, it has become possible for the जगत् to come out of it".¹³

11. A., p. 69.

12. Advaita Philosophy, K. Shastri, p. 5.

13. Ibid, p. 23.

Regarding the unreality of the world the author emphatically observes, "The falsity only comes in, if you regard the nature स्वरूप of the underlying cause actually lost in these effects emerging from it;—if the स्वरूप is resolved into and thus absolutely identified with these changes—as if it has become something other than itself,—as if the underlying Brahman is actually converted into the aggregate of the empirical changes, and thus become अनेकारम्भकः— . Shankara has, everywhere in his Bhashya, called the world unreal or false in this sense alone.¹⁴

These are the principles of Advaitism which Kokileshwar Shastri presents as 'the real teaching of Shankara'.

Sir Radhakrishnan opines that 'the world of experience becomes transfigured in the intuition of the Brahman. The world is not so much negated as reinterpreted'.¹⁵ Further he argues, "If the world of experience were illusory and unrelated to Brahman, love, wisdom and asceticism could not prepare us for higher life".¹⁶ On the point of identity and difference, the logical foundation of Advaitism, Sir Radhakrishnan maintains that "the real accepts the phenomenal. Appearance belongs to reality. This is the truth suggested by the hypothesis of *ananyatva* or non-difference, advocated by the Advaita".¹⁷ In the conclusion of the chapter he complains that to attribute the view of cosmic illusion to Shankara "is hardly fair to Shankara". Chatterjee and Datta maintain that 'though the world is, in a certain sense illusion according to him (Shankara), it is not a groundless illusion, but is a well-grounded phenomenon (phenomena bene fundata). They assert that this view "should be called not nihilism but phenomenalism".¹⁸

Dr. S. K. Das, another writer on Vedanta affirms that "Creation proceeds out of the abundance of the joy of the Creator" and that this view Shankara propounds following in the footsteps of the oft-quoted Sruti text: "Verily from Ananda, do all these creatures originate, it is as *ananda*—begotten that they live and move and have their being (in ananda) and it is unto ananda that they

14. Advaita Philosophy, p. 171.

15. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 583.

16. Ibid. p. 583.

17. Ibid, p. 585.

18. Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 424.

re-enter and disappear".¹⁹ "The creative evolution is (thus) envisaged in Advaita Vedanta". Such opinions can be further multiplied, but it is hardly necessary.

These divergent opinions are of an incidental interest here. We are principally concerned with Professor Malkani and his article 'A Justification of Maya-Vada', which is offered as a reply to Sri Aurobindo's criticism of the doctrine. But let us first recall a few lines from his introductory sentences, where he affirms certain general truths regarding canons of criticism and philosophical thinking in general. Here are those admirable sentences: "A full appreciation of the system as a whole is a pre-requisite of any criticism of a particular aspect of that system. We must only criticise from within the system. It is the system which we must judge as a whole, and only in a secondary sense a particular concept in it".²⁰ We also heartily accept that a philosophical system to be acceptable must satisfy the following conditions: "(1) It must be grounded in and justified by our experience, so that there is nothing in it which transcends our experience. After all we can only interpret this experience and not speculate about things that fall outside our experience. (2) There must be no internal incoherence or instability. (3) There must be no problem left within it unsolved".²¹ We also accept, with a little variation though, that a truth of intuition to become philosophically valid must make itself intelligible to reason.

For the rest I can only present my differences. And the first thing about the article as a whole that I might observe is that it is more a justification of Maya-Vada, as the title also says, than a reply to Sri Aurobindo. The Professor expounds maya-vada as an independent theme for more than two-thirds the length of the article and then in the remaining portion almost in the fashion of applying the conclusions of Maya-Vada, previously established, disposes of Sri Aurobindo's points. The most grievous thing, however, is that there is no attempt, the need does not seem to have been felt, of taking the full context of Sri Aurobindo's system in judging its relation to Maya-Vada. Sri Aurobindo's criticism of Maya-vada develops in the course of and as a means perhaps for

19. Study of Vedanta, Pp. 306 & 307.

20. Ph. Q., p. 221.

21. Ibid, p. 222.

the exposition of his own system. Professor Malkani is obviously not prepared to grant to Sri Aurobindo the benefit of the admirable principles of criticism he states in the first paragraph of his article.

Let us now address ourselves to the real task—the examination of Maya-Vada as stated above. Advaita Vedanta has been expounded and criticised any number of times in the past and there will ever be a justification for future discussions of the same, so long as it interests the human mind and offers some satisfaction to it, even though there may be nothing particularly new to add to the discussion.

Now what is it really that Advaitism interprets or explains? Regarding the aim of philosophy Professor Malkani's position appears to be anomalous. In an earlier quotation from 'Ajnana' he affirms that 'a non-empirical principle of explanation of that which is experienced..... involves the tacit assumption that our experience as such is not adequate to reality; it involves, in other words, the non-reality of empirical fact-hood'. This statement presents to me many difficulties. If philosophy is not to seek the 'why' and 'wherefore' of things of our experience, what else can it really do? And how does it at all happen that our search for a non-empirical explanation implies the inadequacy of experience reality and the non-fact-hood of experience? Is it not a possibility that the inadequacy of experience for reality may be only a partial inadequacy? This last possibility is supported by science as much as philosophical reason. 'Nature makes no leaps' is a principle ever getting stronger through the additional evidence of new scientific researches. For philosophy the principle of continuity is a necessary corollary from the relatedness of total existence. For a monistic philosophy the principle is the very breath of its life. And yet Advaitism, for all its pride of being the best monistic philosophy, revels in contradictions and seeks unsuccessfully to reconcile extreme oppositions.

In his article, there is the other kind of statement, where the Professor rightly affirms that a system to be acceptable 'must be grounded in and justified by our experience, so that there is nothing in it which really transcends our experience. After all we can only interpret this experience....', etc., etc. This is a perfectly intelligible position. Methodologically we can only start with our present experience and seek to discover the consistent meaning that it might be possessing. Progressively, however, this sphere

of experience must be widened horizontally as well as vertically and meanings retested and reshaped. Such to my mind is the evolving business of philosophy.

But the Advaitist will grant no continuity of relation between the present experience and Ultimate Reality. On the other hand, he affirms a diametrical opposition. The unity can brook no discreteness. Kant had done a similar thing. Knowledge was of the phenomena, the things-in-themselves were unknowable. However, the things-in-themselves were the cause of the sense-data, which were elaborated into phenomena through the operation of the categories of the understanding. A ground for the 'givenness' of phenomena was thus provided for. Advaitism completely divides Brahman from the world and sets the two in complete opposition. The sense of objectivity of the world must be as illusory as the world.

But we cannot afford to forget the fate of the relative separation Kant had effected between the phenomena and the things-in-themselves. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel alike affirmed a continuity between the two and Hegel, in particular, developed the idea to its full logical consequence. The things-in-themselves could not be allowed to hang in the air suspended by some weak thread. The whole reality became with him truly one. Bradley presents the essential message of Hegel in the words: "Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real".²² That must necessarily be the position of a true monism, a monism which is an all-inclusive view of reality.

The ultimate reality of Advaitism is essentially the result of a ruthless exclusion. Every determination being a limitation, the reality to be absolute must be featureless. It is *nirguna Brahman*. It is, in fact, altogether *Anirdeshya*. And yet it is described as intelligent and blissful.

The world, which is the realm of limitations, is a sheer illusory superimposition on Brahman. It is simply non-existent. The illusion itself is illusory.

22. Appearance and Reality, p. 552.

It is a most baffling position. One cannot help challenging the Advaitist to show cause, why his philosophical reasoning regarding the illusoriness of the world, being a part of the illusory experience, should not be taken as illusory. Is not the position of the Advaitist like that of the absolute sceptic self-destructive?

At the last instance the whole matter is really the logical problem as to the character of identity and unity. For the Advaitic logic 'A is A' is the only legitimate judgment ultimately. 'A is B' would involve a discreteness and difference and it is, therefore, not possible. But the Advaitist does not seem to recognise that the logical principles having grown out of and possessing validity for the relations amongst objects within experience may not hold good when experience as a whole is involved. Kant's antinomies keep constantly reminding us that the categories applicable to phenomena had no validity in respect of the totality of phenomena. If they are applied there the result is that the affirmations and negations can be equally well proved. The exact point here is that the principle of contradiction when applied to the whole sum of reality must needs undergo a reinterpretation. The contradictories must actually become complementaries in the whole. There seems to be a certain amount of psychological necessity that we should make of an opposition or a difference an absolute difference. But in fact contradictories themselves involve a common background, the reference to the subject of discourse. Red and not-red are contradictories, but they are both colours. Brahman and the world are contradictories, the one real the other unreal; we must here needs have a third category real-unreal to justify their contradiction. After all the illusion, Sri Aurobindo rightly insists, in some sense is. The adjective *anirvachniya* applied to Maya probably hides some such difficulty.

Sri Aurobindo elaborates in the exposition of his system a distinct discipline of logic called by him 'the logic of the Infinite'. "If we insist on applying a finite logic to the Infinite", affirms he, "the Omnipresent Reality will escape us and we shall grasp instead an abstract shadow, ... our way of knowing must be appropriate to that which is to be known; ..."²³ Exactly comparable is Hegel's position. The dialectic process works through contradiction. Thesis needs an antithesis and then they must both be tran-

23. The Life Divine, Vol. II (1) p. 43.

scended and reconciled in synthesis. The Absolute Idea, the ultimate Reality, thus turns all contradictions of experience into complementary truths. "The consummation of the infinite end", says Hegel, "consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion we live under". But the illusion is not subjective, rather real and instrumental to the realisation of the good. For Hegel proceeds, "In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion by setting an antithesis to confront; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise".²⁴ "Error, or other being, then superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element in the truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result".²⁵ "The Absolute Idea, as the final and absolute reconciliation of all differences has within it all previous categories, the whole logic".²⁶

We cannot help observing that Advaitism is dominated by an abstract notion of the principle of contradiction, and it is then no wonder that for a concrete spiritual conception of the All-existent, it should have to content itself with a featureless, abstract universal of an *Anirdeshya* Brahman overshadowed by an *Anirvachniya* Maya.

The happiest thing about modern metaphysical thought is the agreement regarding the initial stand of philosophy. Our experience is the first reality, which it is the business of philosophy to interpret. Science does the same, but under the limitations of its postulates. Philosophy seeks ultimate meanings of experience. This experience, further, must be taken as a whole in all its varied aspects. Valuation is an aspect of experience more recently appreciated in its proper significance. A pressing problem for metaphysics today, therefore, is the nature of the relation between the values or the ideals and existence. Advaitism cannot even permit such a question. All human effort and seeking, even that of knowledge, is illusory. Thus from this more or less agreed

24. Wallace, *Logic*, p. 212, quoted from Stace's 'Philosophy of Hegel'.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

26. *Philosophy of Hegel*, by Stace, p. 293.

standpoint of modern metaphysics, Advaitism is not only unsatisfactory but altogether unintelligible.

As a corollary of the above general stand of modern metaphysics it is further agreed that virtually no part of experience can be simply dismissed as illusory. In Greek thought the Eleatics had declared motion and plurality as illusory, and Heraclitus the abiding reality. But soon it came to be recognised that philosophy must not thus dismiss any aspect of experience, its proper responsibility rather was to explain, not explain away. This standpoint is today accepted as a general position of philosophy, but Maya-Vada does not mind acting outrageously to it. I wish here to ask whether illusion in the sense of un-reality, as taken by Maya-Vada is at all a valid concept. The various analogies used by the Advaitist philosophers to show the relation of the world to Brahman involve confusion between certain facts of experience. They all involve, at the last instance, an error of relation or misrelation between facts. The son of a barren woman, for example, contemplates two facts in a wrong relation. Such experiences rather confirm than refute, that existence must be a concrete relational whole, error being just a distortion of the relation from a particular point of view. Illusion, therefore, cannot signify non-reality, but only partial reality.

A further point must also be considered here. Advaitism is pre-eminently a monism. Now to the present writer it is a necessary implication of the very concept of monism that it must be an all-inclusive view of the All-existent. That it must posit an Absolute of existence which, however, must be a concrete Absolute—having room for every possible determination and to which such determinations are welcome enrichments—rather than an abstract universal to which each determination is a taint of limitation. Spinoza's metaphysics is perhaps the best parallel from western philosophy to our Advaitism. His logic too worked trenchantly. The substance, so he named the ultimate Reality, must be one, and therefore infinite. Beyond that it can possess no determinations, because each determination would be a limitation to its infinitude. So far it is perfectly Advaitic, but he also affirms that the substance possesses an infinite number of attributes. Professor Malkani's monism delights in consistently sticking to the austere conception of *just oneness*. There is no *other* within it or without. But if other objections are brushed aside as rising out of wrong premises or as involving faulty reasoning, at least

this must be permitted that this monism of just oneness must be able to show itself as a possible concept. This, I believe, it is not able to achieve since the ultimate Reality is also 'essentially intelligent and blissful'. And besides it there is the Maya, whatever its reality or unreality.

Situated as Professor Malkani is by his philosophical persuasion, it could hardly be expected that any considerations, which are unadvaitic in character, however well they may be founded in experience, should at all carry much weight with him. Naturally Sri Aurobindo's objections to Maya-Vada, proceeding as they do, from a premise of thought and experience very different from Prof. Malkani's, carry no conviction to him. Whereas to the learned professor the barest oneness alone can be real, to Sri Aurobindo ultimate Reality is an omnipresent Reality of the All-existent. It is then clear that Sri Aurobindo should complain that 'If Brahman is the only reality, why speak of maya at all?' And if you do, he says, 'there will always be some form of ultimate dualism'. Prof. Malkani's examination of the objection is a consistent application and reaffirmation of his Advaitist position. I must repeat my complaint that the learned professor tears out Sri Aurobindo's objections from the context of his system and therefore that part of his essay, which evidently is the chief purpose of the article is not convincing. The Professor's reply to the objection is that 'the fact we have to hold it (maya) in thought as a concept explanatory of our present experience does not of itself entail a dualism',²⁷ since it is ultimately not real. Further 'that it stands fully revealed to thought in its true nature when it is described as *anirvachaniya*'.²⁸ But does not the epithet *anirvachaniya* involve an admission of ignorance regarding the true nature of maya, the descriptive term that it is?

The second objection is to the effect that 'the world cannot be all an illusion', since 'it has real objectivity for us in any conceivable sense of the term'. The professor's reply clearly shows how at bottom two different premises are in conflict. He says, "There is no distinction, so far as appearance is concerned, between a real object and an illusory object. In fact, this is a ground

27. Ph. Q., p. 238.

28. Ibid., p. 239.

why the whole world must be regarded as illusory". Objectivity of experience is a point against illusoriness for one, and that is just the ground of it to the other. There can hardly be a meeting-ground between the two standpoints.

The third objection and the answer conduct themselves in a similar fashion. The objection proceeds on the fact of experience of other selves and their seeking for knowledge and liberation. The professor's reply is "There is no place for any of these realities in advaitism". Rightly so. Once again the contrast of the initial standpoints is fully-revealed.

The fourth objection examined resembles the first. It asserts that "if the world is an illusion, then the illusion in some sense is". And therefore the Brahman cannot be the only reality. We will have to face a dualism. Prof. Malkani's reply can be anticipated. When the knowledge of Reality arises, the illusory lapses altogether and therefore in the reality there can be no dualism.

The objections and the answers, here barely indicated, almost demonstratively show how two fundamentally different philosophical standpoints are at work. Either of them has a more or less consistent system of ideas of its own, and therefore a reconciliation or a relative appraisal becomes very difficult. William James had wanted to find a way out of philosophical disputes and the result was his pragmatic method. But it hardly served its purpose. Shall we say that a comparison and relative appraisal of philosophical systems is not possible? I would not subscribe to that position. I have developed my thesis elsewhere, but it may be helpful to us to present it here briefly.

Now the thesis exactly is that where purely intellectual systems are concerned, as is generally the case in modern European philosophy, the fact of personal predilection, as a fact of temperament, is the first thing to determine in seeking to appraise philosophical thought-constructions. And where there are world-views, which on the part of their authors seem to pre-suppose a spiritual discipline and the possibility of a supra-intellectual intuition or realisation, then such intuition or realisation is the first thing to characterise. It is obvious that these factors of temperament and intuition cannot be reduced to a logical language. But surely we cannot afford to ignore them either.

By a wide consideration of philosophers and philosophies it may be possible to find out their mutual relations in the way of

being supplementary or complementary or related in any other way of opposition. The story of the six blind men who went to see an elephant comes to me as illustrative of the situation. Surely the quarrel amongst them, if they were left to themselves in the exclusive possession of their particular points of view, would be endless. It was only the realisation of the particular circumstances of each man's point of view that could create the possibility of discovering the supplementary character of them all. Of course in the story the seeing man, who knows the elephant as a whole comes in to show to each blind man his partiality. Surely we do not have a 'seeing' man amongst us to give us an idea of the whole elephant of reality. But even if there were one we could not easily accept him as a superior 'seeing' man. However, we do realise more or less the partialities of our points of view and could we appreciate more fully the particular circumstances of each philosopher's way of looking at reality, we would more correctly understand and appraise his philosophy by itself and in relation to other philosophies.

Similarly in the case of Indian thinkers the specific spiritual realisations when considered together would perhaps show amongst them some relation and harmony. Sri Aurobindo, in fact, affirms such a thing. He states that spiritual realisations are of varying levels and degrees. From each successively higher status the lower positions become reconciled and understandable. Now, from this point of view a possibility is immediately thrown out for discovering a true principle of reconciliation amongst the apparently conflicting world views taken as pure thought-constructions.

Sri Aurobindo, Prof. Malkani evidently feels, has been unduly harsh upon Shankara. But to the present writer Sri Aurobindo's philosophy has been illuminating not only in that it presents a satisfying view of life and existence by itself, but also in that it reconciles and offers convincing relative justifications for other important philosophical systems. Regarding Shankara, for example, here are a few illuminating sentences. "In the philosophy of Shankara one feels the presence of a conflict, an opposition which this powerful intellect has stated with full force and masterfully arranged rather than solved with any finality,—the conflict of an intuition intensely aware of an absolute transcendent and inmost Reality and a strong reason regarding the world with a keen and vigorous rational intelligence. . . . The reason has to affirm the reality of the phenomenal existence, . . . but it is not

itself that Reality and, when we pass beyond the phenomenon to the Real, it still exists but is no longer valid to our consciousness; it is therefore unreal".²⁹ At another place we read an interesting comparison between the positions of Buddha and Shankara. "The Buddha applied", thus goes the passage, "his penetrating rational intellect supported by an intuitive vision to the world as our mind and sense see it and discovered the principle of its construction and the way of release from all constructions, but he refused to go farther. Shankara took the farther step and regarded the Supra-rational Truth, which the Buddha kept behind the veil as realisable by cancellation of the constructions of consciousness, but beyond the scope of reason's discovery. Shankara, standing between the world and the eternal Reality, saw that the mystery of the world must be ultimately supra-rational, not conceivable or expressible *anirvachaniya*; but he maintained the world as seen by the reason and sense as valid and had therefore to posit an unreal reality, because he did not take one step still farther".³⁰ That next step, Sri Aurobindo emphatically affirms, involves a vision of the integral Reality, the Nirguna Brahman and the world perceived in the unity of a self-evolving and self-revealing Absolute. This integral unity of total existence is the essence of his intuition.

However, in his *Life Divine* he works out a systematic view of life and existence, presenting it for the most part to reason in its own familiar language and, at times, in forms which reason can appreciate by a little self-exceeding, which is entirely possible to it at the human level. Reason is the term applied ordinarily to the functions of knowing exercised in drawing inferences regarding *finite external* objects. This constitutes our traditional finite logic. But where we deal with reality as a whole the categories of finite reasoning cannot be expected to serve. 'A logic of the Infinite' thus takes its birth. "Intellect is" he affirms, "an indirect action of a knowledge which constructs itself with difficulty out of the unknown from signs and indications and gathered data".³¹ It posits an external world of finite objects, the relations of which it seeks to determine. Psychologically and evolutionally considered, reason develops out of perception. Perception gives us a knowledge of immediately given external fact. Reason is a

29. *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 253 ff.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

31. *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 53.

tremendous advance upon perception. It enables man to look before and after and far out into the distant. But its method is that of construction through piecing together of the perceptual data. "To correct the errors of the sense-mind by the use of reason is one of the most valuable powers developed by man and the chief cause of his superiority among terrestrial beings".³² In another context Sri Aurobindo observes: "When we have passed beyond knowings, then we shall have knowledge. Reason was the helper; Reason is the bar".³³ Reason becomes the bar because of its limitations and of the possibilities opened to man of a fuller knowledge. Reason primarily gives us a knowledge of external things in the manifold relations of their appearances. It collects data and generalises confidently and draws inferences from those generalisations in accordance with syllogistic rules equally well. But it exceeds the grasp of reason to know a thing directly in its integral unity, in its essential being from within, otherwise than by constructing its nature from a knowledge of its empirical qualities. Such knowledge is conceivable and would be superior to the patched-up knowledge we have ordinarily to be content with. Such knowledge, Sri Aurobindo calls 'Knowledge by Identity' in contrast to the other one called 'Separative Knowledge'. Intuition is today much talked about in the West as well and there seems to be a general appreciation of the limitations of the intellectual type of knowing. But we yet do not know how this superior organ of knowledge is to be cultivated and made an increasingly available instrument of knowledge to man. However, this is not the case with Sri Aurobindo. His philosophy entails and is accompanied by a system of yoga offering to enable the seeker after knowledge to progressively rise from intellectual notions of reality to an immediate knowledge by identity i.e., realisations of experience.

If we are not to remain limited to intellectual apprehension of things, then we will have to recognise that the precisions and sharp divisions of logical thinking possess a treacherous character. We must then on reason's own persuasion recognise the need for broadening the base of logical thinking so that it may be able to recognise an intuitive truth where necessary and possible.

32. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 93.

33. *Thoughts and Glimpses*, p. 3.

In connection with the Absolute, in particular, the limitations of logical thinking have to be recognised. The Absolute is really indeterminable because of its absoluteness and infinity. But we are able to seize certain truths of its *being*. "In themselves", says Sri Aurobindo, "they are seized directly, not by intellectual understanding but by a spiritual intuition, a spiritual experience in the very substance of our consciousness; they can also be caught at in conception by a large and plastic idea and can be expressed in some sort by a plastic speech which does not insist too much on rigid definition or limit the wideness and subtlety of the idea".³⁴ "In order to express this experience or this idea with any nearness", continues Sri Aurobindo, "a language has to be created which is at once intuitively metaphysical and revealingly poetic, admitting significant living images as the vehicle of a close, suggestive and vivid indication".³⁵ The Kantian expression of "*The Critique of Pure Reason*" has set the standards of philosophical language for our modern philosophy. But while it possesses its own efficiency, as an instrument for larger truths it is inadequate. This he himself demonstrated through the results of his antinomies. We have surely to learn to appreciate this more comprehensive and plastic medium of philosophical truths. Sri Aurobindo's language of *The Life Divine*, in particular, to my mind, demands of the reader a little fresh adjustment. If he approaches it with the critique of Pure Reason in the back of his mind he might exclaim, "This after all is not philosophical thinking". And yet those, who, intent on seeing the truth of life and existence the book seeks to present, manage to drop other prepossessions, justifiable or otherwise regarding the form of questions posed and the style of expression employed, soon discover in the *Life Divine* a new value in philosophical thinking.

This larger logic is the logic of the Infinite. We should like to characterise it a little further. It is obvious that the logic, which works through limitation and division should create difficulties for itself, when it seeks to deal with an Illimitable Existence. "It is irrational", says Sri Aurobindo, "to suppose that a finite consciousness and reason can be a measure of the Infinite".³⁶ Further, for example, 'A law founded upon an observation of what is divided

34. *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 42.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

in Space and Time cannot be confidently applied to the being and action of the indivisible; not only it cannot be applied to this spaceless and timeless Infinite, but it cannot be applied even to a Time Infinite or a Space Infinite".³⁷ One would here think of the Eleatic Zeno. His arguments against motion baffled philosophers for centuries, because if motion develops out of divisible points of rest then it could not be possible. The nature of fundamental assumption itself ruled out the possibility of motion.

The Infinite evidently must have a mathematics of its own. The Infinite oneness is obviously different from the finite unity. The latter is sole in limitation, but the former "can contain the hundred and the thousand and the million and billion and trillion". Addition and subtraction too cannot possess the ordinary meanings for the Absolute. The Upanishad clearly says "This is the complete and that is the complete. Subtract the complete from the complete, the complete is the remainder". The process of multiplication and division must also acquire a new orientation. "The one becomes Many, but all these Many are that which was already and is always itself and in becoming the Many remains the one".

But how shall we state the positive character of this logic of the Infinite? The basic fact of the integral unity of the omnipresent Reality is the chief governing principle. The logic of the Infinite must needs exceed the conceptions of traditional logic because it "does not base itself on the data of the limited phenomenon, but embraces the Reality and sees the truth of all phenomena in the truth of the Reality; it does not see them as separate beings, movements, names, forms, things; for they cannot be, since they could be that only if they were phenomena in the void, things without a common basis or essence, fundamentally unconnected, connected only by co-existence and pragmatic relation".³⁸ The principle of contradiction, ultimate to traditional logic, cannot but here acquire an instrumental role. The fact of Unity itself of the Ultimate Reality demands that the contradictions of ordinary experience must be reconciled there. This reason, which proceeds in full consciousness of the necessary original unity of things and seeks to discover relations amongst them in the light of that unity, is Sri Aurobindo's 'spiritual and supramental reason'. It is

37. Ibid., p. 51.

38. Ibid., 6. 67.

his 'logic of the Infinite'. I think it has an evident similarity with Hegel's synthetic reason.

We have preferred to take the way of epistemology for presenting the essential philosophical position of Sri Aurobindo as an alternative to Maya-Vada, discussed earlier. This acquaints the reader with his instrumentation of philosophical knowledge, and he now perhaps already knows what to expect further.

For Sri Aurobindo, the philosophical seeking essentially takes its birth in the fact of 'the human aspiration'. Wonder, doubt, and the experience of pain and suffering may become the varying psychological circumstances serving to awaken the aspiration, which 'manifests itself in the divination of Godhead, the impulse towards perfection, the search after pure truth and unmixed Bliss, the sense of a secret immortality'.³⁹ This seeking of man survives and reasserts itself after the longest periods of scepticism. It was the earliest seeking of the awakened thoughts of man. It appears to be his final seeking too. "The earliest formula of wisdom", says Sri Aurobindo, "promises to be its last—God, Light, Freedom, Immortality".⁴⁰

These words as an approach to the problem of philosophy will strike the readers as already fraught with assumptions regarding solutions. They will instead desire that the approach should be that of a dispassionate enquiry into the meanings of experience. Sri Aurobindo would probably say in explanation of his procedure that it should not be always necessary for us to start from the beginning and seek to discover things fairly well established already. A general seeking of knowledge for practical ends or special theoretical interests is a different matter. The philosophical seeking, which is as old as self-consciousness in man, has clearly grasped 'God, Light, Freedom and Immortality' as its very last values. These he therefore has no hesitation in affirming straightway, the true meanings of which the following exposition undertakes to explain. But these concepts too are thoroughly examined at their proper places. This procedure of exposition obviously recalls the Indian traditional manner of starting with the affirmation of what is to be proved.

39. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 1.

40. Ibid., p. 2.

However there is one assumption lying at the root of Sri Aurobindo's position, which too would be accepted by most thinkers as a primary self-evident proposition. That is that 'all problems of existence are essentially problems of harmony'.⁴¹ This already marks him out as an exponent of a monistic philosophy and that not of the Advaitic abstract sort, but a concrete one. There is for him 'a supreme Reality eternal, absolute and infinite. Because it is absolute and infinite, it is in its essence indeterminable. It is indefinable and inconceivable by finite and defining Mind; it is ineffable by a mind-created speech; it is describable neither by our negations, *neti, neti*,—for we cannot limit it by saying it is not this, it is not that,—nor by our affirmations, for we cannot fix it by saying it is this, it is that, *iti, iti*'.⁴² This is the Supreme Brahman of Sri Aurobindo. This ultimate reality is indeterminable. "But if the supreme Absolute", we must allow the argument to develop, "is indeed a pure indeterminable, then no creation, no manifestation, no universe is possible. And yet the universe exists. What is it that creates this contradiction, is able to effect the impossible, bring this insoluble riddle of self-division into existence"?⁴³ The answer is: "A power of some kind it must be, and since the Absolute is the sole reality, the one origin of all things, this Power must proceed from it, must have some relation with it, a connection, a dependence".⁴⁴ It is, indeed, surest contradiction for Maya-Vada how the indeterminate Brahman should become the determined world. But a true monism cannot bisect existence and create an eternal opposition between Brahman and Maya. It is an evident necessity of monistic thought that all reality must be an integral unity. There can be no ultimate opposition within or without it. Therefore the world can only be conceived as an expression of the Absolute. And Sri Aurobindo argues that "It is perfectly understandable that the Absolute is and must be indeterminable in the sense that it cannot be limited by any determination or any sum of possible determinations, but not in the sense that it is incapable of self-determination".⁴⁵ Surely self-determination cannot be denied to Brahman, and the world being not outside the total reality, the

41. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

42. *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 41.

43. *Ibid.* Vol. II (1), p. 26.

44. *Ibid.*, Vol. II (1), p. 26.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

world can only be conceived as the result of Brahman's self-determination. Creation is an illegitimate concept for Advaitism. The world or maya at the last instance is an inexplicable mystery. When it is so, you hardly ask for an explanation of the origin of the mystery. The Advaitist, therefore, ordinarily refuses to admit the problem. It does not exist for him, he would say. For us "Creation would be a self-manifestation; it would be an ordered deploying of the infinite possibilities of the Infinite".⁴⁶

The above argument is principally deductive, the various points having been developed out of the idea of a monistic reality. Sri Aurobindo confirms it also by a complementary procedure, which is generally of an inductive character. We experience in nature three distinct stages of evolution, Matter, Life and Mind. Further, each stage passes imperceptibly into the next higher or lower one, showing that while Life and Mind are distinct emergent qualities they still form a continuity with inanimate matter. The whole nature is then one continuous evolving process with distinct stages, each succeeding one showing a higher organisation. So far it is all as empirical science conceives it.

Sri Aurobindo subjects these facts of common experience to serious reflection. And he observes "the animal is a living laboratory in which Nature has, it is said, worked out man. Man himself may well be a thinking and living laboratory in whom and with whose conscious co-operation she wills to work out the superman".⁴⁷ Elsewhere he shows with much evidence that man does already possess, more as indications of course, of the trend of future evolution than as a reality of achievement, certain supra-intellectual or intuitional functions of cognition. Now surely the evolutionary process does not stop with man. The stage of the superman as the next step of evolution is, therefore, not an illegitimate inference. But the superman is for him no magnified man. He will be qualitatively a new emergent, as life and mind have been in the past. It appears to be the unique merit of Sri Aurobindo to mark out and characterise the distinct levels of being. A philosophy of Monism consistently worked out is in itself a great achievement; but to fill out the monistic system with the necessary levels of being, Matter, Life, Mind and more

46. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

47. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 5.

particularly the still higher ones, without impairment to the general scheme of monism, is a far more difficult task. Sri Aurobindo recognises seven such levels of being. But of all these stages it is that of the superman or supermind that has engaged him most and which he has elaborated in greatest detail. He is therefore very aptly described as the philosopher of the supermind. It will not be possible for us here to characterise these different levels of being.

Consciousness, which seems to be gradually coming more and more to the fore, has to be supposed as involved in Matter. "For", argues Sri Aurobindo, "there seems to be no reason why life should evolve out of material elements or mind out of living form, unless we accept the Vedantic solution that life is already involved in Matter and Mind in Life, because in essence Matter is a form of veiled Life, Life a form of veiled Consciousness".⁴⁸ And the mental consciousness may itself be only 'a veil of higher states beyond mind'. Incidentally, thus the human aspiration for perfection becomes simply a part and echo of the 'imperative impulse by which Nature is seeking to evolve beyond Mind', as she previously evolved life and mind.

The scientific theory of evolution explains the process through the mechanical influences described by Darwin as the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Firstly this theory concerns itself with organic evolution only. It does not contemplate cosmic evolution as a whole. And then modern Biology is already affirming a purposive evolution. Hans Driesch's experiments in this connection are well-known. The mechanical principles in a certain sense continue to be valid, but as subordinate instruments. The purposive evolution at the last instance, philosophically considered, will posit a universal consciousness, the existence of purpose being unintelligible without consciousness. Now Sri Aurobindo's position is similar, though more fully elaborated. A previous involution is, therefore, necessary to an evolution. The Supreme Consciousness of the Integral Reality became, as it were, unconscious in Matter, from where it is gradually re-emerging in progressively higher degrees of consciousness in Life, Mind and Supramental cognitions. Here certain very important questions arise. Firstly the Absolute descending to Matter and then re-

48. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 4.

ascending to its own status looks like a repetitive process. In other words, if what is involved, later comes to manifestation in evolution then there can be no room for creation. Evolution becomes mechanical unfoldment. And then, the most difficult point of all, why should the Absolute descend into unconsciousness? This last one is exactly the question of the origin of Ignorance to which Prof. Malkani demands an answer.

We shall consider these points one by one. First of all, the question whether the idea of previous involution is at all consistent with an evolution, which is creatively progressive. The whole thing really depends upon a true understanding of the meaning of 'potentiality'. Potentiality as preformation, a miniature tree in the seed, is repugnant to creation. But equally unacceptable, in fact unthinkable, is the opposite idea of a creation out of nothing. Creation as a legitimate conception can only mean the emergence of new quality in a material, which must be possessing possibilities for it. Indefinite possibilities of creation in cosmic evolution do therefore point to an infinite consciousness lying down in it hidden as the ground of these possibilities. In this connection it will be interesting to read a few sentences from Pringle-Pattison. "If we are in earnest", says he, "with the doctrine that the universe is one, we have to read back the nature of the latest consequent into the remotest antecedent".⁴⁹ "In other words", he further says, "every evolutionary process must be read in the light of its latest term".⁵⁰ And finally "the philosophical meaning of potentiality is in short simply the insight that, in the interpretation of the process, it is the process as a whole that has to be considered, if we wish to know the nature of the reality revealed in it".⁵¹

Thus the 'remotest antecedent' and the 'latest term' and 'the process as a whole' are mutually implied.

The potentiality or previous involution is, therefore, not only compatible with but necessary to creation. And in evolution while steadily there is a re-ascension to Absolute self-consciousness, it is not a mere return journey ending in the reattainment of the starting position. For our Integral Monism the world is the expres-

49. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 107.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

sion of the Absolute. It is the creative activity of the Supreme Brahman. The world is an eternal creative process, progressively realising new values. And through all this creation the Absolute is renewing itself each moment. There can evidently be no return to the same position. And yet the Absolute is eternally the same. Here the logic of the Infinite alone can help. It is the traditional logic which lands Prof. Malkani into confusion.

Now, how about the origin of Ignorance? How is a descent into the unconscious of Matter compatible with the Absolute Consciousness of the Supreme Brahman? This is of all philosophical problems the most difficult. It is the same as the problem of evil. The question is, if the Reality is Absolute and eternally perfect, then why this pain, suffering, incapacity, disease and death? It is obvious that they are the incidents of finite existence. The question then becomes, why this finitisation of the Infinite? An answer to the 'why' may not be possible, but we can seek to understand the meanings of the phenomenal delimitation of the Absolute in finite individuals, in the form of material atoms, particular life-units and human minds. An absolutist philosophy ordinarily explains it on the basis of a difference of point of view; evil is the result of the finite point of view, while existence is eternally perfect and harmonious. Sri Aurobindo's philosophy being monistic may be taken ultimately to imply a similar position. But it is in the more or less actual demonstration of the position that the real merit of Sri Aurobindo seems to exist. Sri Aurobindo's reasoning regarding the nature and character of the Absolute, given above, cannot easily be questioned. We said there that the capacity of self-determination cannot be denied to the Absolute. As such the various forms of evil can only be conceived as incidents in the progressive realisation of the Good and not a denial of the eternal Goodness and Perfection of the Absolute. In fact they must be taken as means to greater Goodness and Perfection. Thus Ignorance must be a means to knowledge, death to Life and incapacity to power.

But the real difficulty for man is that in his own experience ignorance, incapacity and death are so vivid that he cannot but take them as denials of their desirable opposites. That constitutes the psychological handicap of the problem. Even when the most cogent reason have been advanced, the average man can and will always demur. 'But my present pain is so very real to me'. A psychological help must, therefore, accompany the logical reasons.

And it is just here that Sri Aurobindo goes beyond the purely intellectual Monists. By his method of yoga a change in the form of inner experience itself is made possible, so that what appeared to an individual so far denial of life begins to be concretely felt as just a change in the circumstances of life. Pleasure and pain are conventions of the senses or sense-life, since it is possible for man to develop a form of experience, which responds to all kinds of stimuli with an unvarying Ananda. He says, "It is within our competence to accustom the superficial being to return instead of the mechanical reactions of pleasure, pain and indifference that free reply of inalienable delight which is the constant experience of the true and vast Bliss-self within us".⁵² "Our mind moves and quivers on the surface", runs another passage, "and has not learnt to concentrate itself and live in the depths". That is the real cause of our experience of dualities, of the contrast of pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, and truth and error. The deeper self within us being in direct contact with the deeper self of things in a unified and continuous experience, the individual is aware of a uniform and single quality of Ananda, spontaneous Goodness and sure knowledge. This experience alone can give the true perspective to evil. It is a perfectly valid experience and entirely possible in short snatches at least, provided the individual has learnt to take the right poise in his inner experience. The recognition of this experience as valid philosophical data would, to my mind, be the greatest contribution to the most troublesome of all our problems—the problem of evil.

Evil is surely not an illusion. It is real, but at a particular plane of consciousness, the superficial mental consciousness. But even there it is not an absolute negation of Goodness, it cannot be that, because the deeper self within us sharing the higher truth is a perfect safeguard against it. I will not hesitate to admit that without appreciating the validity of experience to which pleasure and pain become phenomenal, it is not possible to offer a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil.

From the point of view of the deeper experience it easily becomes a helpful means to the realisation of the Good. From that higher experience the lower and superficial becomes intelligible as ultimately contributing to the birth of the deeper poise of life.

52. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 159.