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Philosophical

Quarterly

Jan. 1944

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XIX No. 4]

[January, 1944.

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OF

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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The Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Error

By

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The pragmatist theory of truth and error is advocated with great force by William James, and Drs. F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. It is on the works of these three distinguished men that an authentic account of it should be based. All of them agree in their polemic against extreme intellectualism in philosophy, and insist upon the necessity of taking our personal ends and interests into consideration in any adequate theory of truth and error. There is, however, some difference among them with regard to specific details in the statement of the theory. So we propose to state separately their views on the problem of truth and error.

William James in his *Pragmatism* states the theory as follows:—
“Truth is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality”. But the agreement of ideas with reality does not mean, as it does with the realist or the intellectualist, that our ideas copy reality, or that there is a fixed relation of correspondence between ideas and objects which have a fixed nature and an independent existence of their own. While our ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them, those of their activities or works cannot be said to be copies of them in any sense. In the case of these ideas, therefore, we cannot say that they are true because they copy or correspond to reality. The truth of ideas depends on their verifiability. “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and

verify. False ideas are those that we cannot".¹ Now to verify ideas is to see their practical consequences. If the ideas lead us, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, to other parts of experience with which we feel that they are in agreement, i.e., if their connections with those parts of experience are progressive, harmonious and satisfactory, then the ideas become verified. This function of agreeable leading is what the verification of an idea means. An idea is not true by itself. 'The truth of an idea is not inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its *verification*'. This means that the truth of an idea is constituted by its verifiability, and its verifiability means its ability to guide us prosperously through experience. That is, if by following an idea we can obtain certain experiences which for practical life are useful and valuable, then the idea becomes true; if not, it turns out false. True ideas thus possess a practical value for us and we should have them for their practical value. The practical value of true ideas is primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. The objects are not practically important at all times. An idea whose object is not important for the time being will be practically irrelevant, and had better remain latent. Since, however, any object may some day become important, there is obviously some advantage in having such an idea that shall be true of a merely possible situation. When the situation actually arises, the idea becomes practically relevant, it does its work and our belief in it grows active. Of such an idea it may be said either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience".² True ideas would not be considered true unless they had been useful from the outset in this way. An idea becomes true in so far as it leads to certain experiences which verify it and it is useful in so far as the experiences it leads to fulfil its function in one's actual life. In the case of a man who seeks shelter from rain, the idea of a house in the neighbourhood becomes true when it leads

1. Cf. *Pragmatism*, p. 201.

2. *Loc. cit.*, p. 204.

to the experience of the house and thereby fulfils its function on that occasion. 'That we have a true thought means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of experience and make advantageous connection with them'.

Verification by satisfactory experience which makes an idea true need not always be complete. Sometimes we accept our ideas as true even before they start the process of practical verification. The idea of the clock which I see on the wall is taken as true before I make any use of it or examine its inner working. Similarly, many of our thoughts and beliefs are treated as true when they are found to be consistent with previous truths or when they are not contradicted by anything. But even in such cases we are to say that the process of verification is indirect. It is because such ideas and beliefs are either based on certain actually verified truths or may, like them, lead to certain verifying experiences, that they are allowed to pass for true. The original and prototype of the process of truth-making is the verification of an idea by experiences and their practical consequences. All other processes of recognising truths may be explained as modifications or indirect applications of this original process. So in the end, all true processes must lead to the phase of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere.

The pragmatic account of truth, it will be seen, is an account of truths in the plural. It does not admit anything like the Truth or Absolute Truth which is a static system in which there is no process or development. For James, truths are only processes of leading which possess only one common quality, namely that they pay. 'They pay by guiding us into or towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into sense-percepts which verify them. Truth is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience'.³ Just as health is a name for certain organic processes as easy digestion, circulation, sleep, etc., so truth is a name for verification-processes by which ideas lead us prosperously through experience. In short, 'the true is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right

3. *Loc. cit.* p. 218.

is only the expedient in the way of our behaving'. But expediency is a matter of degree and is subject to change and variety. What is expedient now in one way and relatively to present experiences, may not be so with reference to other ways and further future experiences. Hence what is now considered true may afterwards be considered false. Ptolemaic astronomy was expedient for centuries within the limits of experiences then available. But now in the light of further experiences, we declare it false or relatively true within those borders of experience. Truth thus grows from more to more and in this process the superseded truths contribute their quota to the making of higher and larger truths. We may here of course conceive the idea of a complete truth that will some day be established absolutely. But this truth is by no means the rationalist's absolute truth which is eternally complete and independent of human experiences. Rather, it has, like all other truths, to turn its face to the concrete facts of experience and take all future experiences into account. Like other truths, 'the absolute truth will have to be *made*, made 'as a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verification-experience'.⁴

Dr. Schiller's theory of truth may be briefly stated as follows. The question of truth is primarily a practical one. Success in practical life depends on our ability to predict the course of events in the world in which our lot is cast. We want to 'discover the truth' that we may be able to predict and control the course of things in the world and thereby make our life better and prosperous. But we must distinguish between a prediction which comes true and one which does not. We cannot treat them as of equal value. Nor should we rest content with the formal consistency of predictions and of the deductions from them without considering the question of their application to the real. Predictions which are formally valid but practically inapplicable to reality are only truth-claims, but not truths. Every prediction claims to be true, but it becomes true only when it is attended with success. 'True' thus must be the term for the *positive* value of successful prediction and is opposed to falsity which is the *negative* value of a failure to predict. This is how the sciences distinguish between the true and the false. A logic, therefore,

4. Loc. cit. p. 224.

which is observant of scientific usage must treat 'true' and 'false' as logical values which are analogous to moral and aesthetic values. 'True' and 'false' are the valuations belonging to our cognitive enterprises; 'right' and 'wrong' those applicable to our acts; 'beautiful' and 'ugly' those indicative of aesthetic appreciation. The 'true' is the 'good' of knowing, and the 'false' its bad; the one means success, the other failure in a cognitive understanding.⁵

A cognition is not a passive mental state which reflects a reality outside or external to it. On the other hand, it is the means or mental way of dealing with the objects round about us. The value of a cognition lies not so much in its copying an object, as being the effective means of dealing with it. Hence no judgment or proposition is true or false in itself; its value is always dependent on its use in the context in which it occurs and bears a meaning. So far as the form of a judgment is concerned we may say that there is no distinction between its value-claim and value, or, which is the same thing, between its truth-claim and truth. Every judgment is a confident assertion and so far lays a claim to value and truth. Now if we go by the form alone and do not consider the question of practical use, all judgments alike are true and none is false. Hence, if we are to, as we must, make a distinction between true and false judgments that must be by reference to their use or purpose in a certain context. Having regard to this, we cannot equate what *further*s, with what *defeat*s, a cognitive purpose and ignore the distinction between positive and negative values, or between the 'true' and the 'false'. A judgment as such is a truth-claim; but merely to claim the truth, is not to be the truth. It becomes a recognised truth when it undergoes 'verification', 'validation' or 'confirmation'.⁶

The distinction between truth and truth-claim is not absolute. It is a matter of degree. While a truth-claim is not a *mere* claim without any ground or rational basis, a truth continues to be a truth claim inasmuch as it may be doubted and modified. "A verified truth may always be improved and revised by further verification, and no amount of verification ever renders it *absolutely* true".⁷ Its truth is relative to the evidence that is

5. Cf. Schiller, *Logic for Use*, pp. 95-98, 103.

6. Loc. cit. p. 105.

7. Loc. cit. p. 106.

available in its favour at the time we raise it to the status of 'truth'. Hence all that we can say is that any truth actually enunciated is to be conceived as the *best* (i.e., most valuable) under the circumstances. We cannot treat any truth as absolute, for the process of verification on which it depends can, at least theoretically, go on for ever and progressively enhance its value for us. "Absolute truth will then appear, not as a presupposition which has to be granted before we can begin to know, but as the aim and ideal towards which our knowledge moves".⁸

Dr. John Dewey is most indebted to C. S. Peirce for his logical theory including the conception of truth. It was Peirce who first introduced the word 'pragmatism' into philosophy and gave the outline of a theory which is now known as pragmatism. Hence to understand Dr. Dewey's position we shall do well to recall the views of Peirce on the relevant points. According to Peirce, our beliefs are really rules for action and the significance of a thought for us lies in the mode of conduct that it is fitted to produce. The difference between one thought and another consists in a difference of practice. The thought of an object is just the conception of the conceivable practical effects for us.⁹ The truth of a belief or of an opinion cannot, therefore, mean any fixed relation of its correspondence to a fixed object. In his later writings, Peirce defines truth as follows:—"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented by this opinion is the real".¹⁰ A more significant statement made by him with regard to the nature of truth means that it is 'the concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which scientific belief tends through endless investigation, the concordance being essentially a matter of recognition of the inaccuracy and one-sidedness of the abstract statement'. This means that truth is the ideal which we are to attain by endless scientific investigation, and that a particular statement or proposition is true in so far as it is provisionally established by investigation and is open to correction by further investigation.

8. Loc. cit. pp. 106-7, 115.

9. Cf. Peirce's article on "How to make our Ideas clear", *Popular Science Monthly*, Jan., 1878.

10. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, p. 268.

Dr. Dewey's theory of truth agrees in the main with that of Peirce as explained above. For him knowledge or truth is the outcome of competent and controlled inquiry or investigation. 'Knowledge is related to inquiry as a product to the operations by which it is produced'. That is, knowledge or truth is the product of the operations which are involved in inquiry. Inquiry is a process of investigation which is evoked by a doubtful situation. It begins in doubt and it terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for doubt. And as a process it consists in 'the directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate or doubtful situation into a determinately unified one'. There are two kinds of operations by means of which the transition is effected. First, there is the formation of ideas as to the possible ways of resolving and ending the doubtful situation. There are certain anticipations of a solution or certain working hypotheses which instigate and direct new observations yielding new factual material. Secondly, there are certain activities involving the techniques and organs of observation. These are experimental operations which modify the prior existential situation, render some conditions prominent, and relegate to the background other aspects which were at first conspicuous. In this way new facts are provided with which to test the ideas that represent possible modes of solution. Ideas and judgments or reasoning as such cannot provide new factual material. Hence the transformation of the original situation must be effected by experimental operations under the guidance of ideas. It is only the execution of 'existential operations' directed by an idea that can bring about a transformation of the original uncertain situation into a settled and unified one. When this happens, there is a state of affairs which may be designated by the words *belief* and *knowledge* or *truth*. But these words being misleading, Dewey prefers the words "warranted assertibility" which he substitutes for knowledge or truth. That a proposition is true means, for him, that it is warranted by competent and controlled inquiry. It is better not to use the words *belief* and *knowledge* or *truth* in relation to it. Belief generally means a merely mental or subjective state. But as the outcome of inquiry it is a settled objective state of affairs. So also the word *knowledge* or *truth* is supposed to mean something fixed and eternal and to have this meaning apart from connection with and reference to inquiry. But this is a purely metaphysical preconception which has given rise to much confusion in logical theory. Every special case of knowledge is

constituted as the outcome of some special inquiry. Knowledge as such must, therefore, be said to be the product of competent inquiries. Now inquiry is a *continuing* process in every field with which it is engaged. There is practically no end to the process of inquiry with regard to any subject-matter. Hence it follows that any knowledge or conclusion of an inquiry may be subjected to further inquiry and modified accordingly. No knowledge can be said to be so settled that it cannot be subject to revision in further enquiry. All that we can say is that a certain knowledge is warranted by some special inquiry, that it is warranted assertion, although it may be revised in the light of the results of further enquiry. Hence when knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means "warranted assertibility".

Dr. Dewey does not call his theory 'pragmatism', because the word lends itself to misconception and has been the centre of relatively futile controversy in philosophy. But he admits that his theory is thoroughly "pragmatic" in the proper interpretation of the word, namely 'the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, *provided* these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations'.¹¹

The pragmatist theory of truth and error has been severely criticised and rejected by many on the ground that it reduces the true to the useful and thereby obliterates the distinction between truth and error. It is a matter of common experience that what is true is not always useful and what is false may sometimes be useful for certain purposes. But if to be true is to be useful and not to be useful is to be false, then we have to treat many truths as errors and *vice versa*. According to many critics, the pragmatists are guilty of making such a confusion between truth and error. But this charge seems to be unjustified. It is not only repudiated by some leading pragmatists like James and Dr. Schiller, but it does not also appear to be justified by the exposition of the pragmatist theory given by its chief representatives. The pragmatist requirement for truth is not certainly fulfilled by

11. The account of Dr. Dewey's theory given here is based on his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Cf. Preface, p. IV; chap. I, pp. 7-9; chap. VI, pp. 104-119.

the merely useful or the pleasant. James in his *Pragmatism* repeatedly tells us that truth consists in the verification of an idea by sense-experiences. It is true that he speaks of truth as what *pays* or has the function of a *leading that is worth while*. Sometimes he even speaks of 'the true' as only *the expedient in the way of our thinking*. But all these phrases are explained by him as meaning the same thing, namely, the verification of truth by experiences. It is this verification that makes truth which, therefore, has no being or meaning apart from it. The idea that there may be truth apart from verification is thus repudiated. It is just this view of truth that seems to be advocated by Dr. Schiller, C. S. Peirce and Dr. Dewey. Dr. Schiller points out that no critic has yet been able to quote from a representative pragmatist any passage in which the logical fallacy of simple conversion of the proposition 'all truth is useful' was committed. No pragmatist, therefore, held that since the true is useful, the useful must be true. That truth is not identical with usefulness has been clearly explained by Dr. Schiller in his distinction between truth-claim and truth. Postulates, axioms, methodological assumptions and fictions are truth-claims and have their uses no doubt. Even ~~fictions~~ and lies make a claim to truth and are useful in their own way. But these are only truth-claims, and not truths. Truths are *verified* truth-claims. A truth-claim like a postulate is not true at all until it has received an adequate amount of verification. The necessity of verification in the making of truth is also emphasised by C. S. Peirce and Dr. Dewey. For the one, truth is the cumulative and convergent effect of scientific investigations. For the other, it is just the outcome of competent and controlled inquiry which is essentially experimental in character. 428

In justice to the pragmatists it should be admitted by us that they have not identified truth with usefulness. All that we seem to be justified in saying is that, on the pragmatist theory, truth consists in the verification of an idea by sense-experiences including both cognitive and conative ones. The pragmatists are not satisfied by the agreement between our ideas and their corresponding cognitive experiences. They insist further on the agreement of the ideas with such other experiences as result from our activities in relation to the objects represented by the ideas. Thus the idea of water is verified when we perceive it from a distance and get certain satisfying experiences by touching and drinking it. It is this complex process of verification by cognitive and

conative experiences that makes truth which, therefore, has no meaning apart from such verification. But while verification by different kinds of experiences is a test of truth, it does not seem to us to make or constitute truth. An idea or belief is *known* to be true when we have an experience of the facts or objects that are meant by it. But it will be true if the facts or objects really exist, no matter whether they are known by us or not. That there are such facts or objects, i.e., realities cannot be, and probably has not been, denied by the pragmatist. Like the man of common sense or the realist, he also admits that 'all our truths are beliefs about Reality, and that in any particular belief the reality acts as something independent, as a thing *found*, not *manufactured*'.¹² If this be so, we are to say that our ideas and beliefs are true even before their corresponding independent realities are found or known by us, although we know them as true only when we have experiences of the realities. My prediction of a future event is now true, if and only if the event actually happens afterwards as predicted. The prediction is of course verified or proved to be true when we have experience of the event. Hence we are to say that truth consists in correspondence to fact or reality and is tested by experience, be it cognitive or conative or both. If, however, we say with the pragmatist that truth is *made* or constituted by verification, we do not see how the truth of the verifying experience can be made out. A verifying experience does not usually require verification, although it is generally accepted as true. That I am now writing is an experience which may be taken to verify the truth of my perception of the paper I am writing upon. But the experience of writing is true and also known to be true apart from relation to any other verifying experience. This is so because the experience in question refers to or corresponds with an actual fact and the correspondence is directly known by me. Hence we conclude that truth consists in correspondence with fact and that, whenever necessary, it is tested or verified by experience of facts or of effects of the activities directed towards facts. In the light of these observations we may say that pragmatism gives us one among several methods of testing truth and has thus a rightful place in a comprehensive theory of truth.

12. Cf. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 243.

The Logic of Scientific Verification

By

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It is very often argued by some that the truth of the Freudian theory stands proved by its successful application to the treatment of mental diseases. In a similar way other kinds of persons have argued in the past that astrology is vindicated by its successful predictions, the homeopathic system of treatment by its innumerable cures, and science, in general, by its power of successful prediction and application. The process of reasoning underlying such contention is that the truth of a hypothesis is established by its successful verification. It is the object of this paper to point out briefly a common fallacy involved in such thinking and incidentally, the real value of verification.

The word verification is derived from Latin, 'verus' which means truth. Most probably this leads persons to believe that, if an hypothesis is verified, its truth is established thereby. It is not realized that there are different kinds and degrees of verification, and truth is not established in all cases straightway. Hypothesis may be about a perceptible fact. As for example, by looking at a withering creeper one may suppose that its roots have been cut. This supposition or hypothesis about the cause of the withering can be verified by inspecting the roots and finding them actually cut. In such a case what the hypothesis supposes is itself perceived to be true. The hypothesis can, therefore, be said to be directly verified here (verified in cash, as William James used to say), and its truth is established.

But in most cases hypothesis consists in supposing some imperceptible or unperceived cause, law, collocation or process. The unconscious 'libido' of the Freudian, the '*similia similibus curantur*' law of the Homeopath, the stellar influence of the astrologer, or the law of gravitation formulated by ordinary science, are all hypotheses about the imperceptible. No direct verification establishing their truth by perception is possible here. We can only try to verify them indirectly by observing perceptible consequents

that can be expected to be perceived if they are true. But supposing that such expected effects are observed, can we conclude that the hypotheses are true? Ordinarily one would be apt to think that they are. But such conclusion would be logically precarious, so long as there remains the possibility of a plurality of causes producing effects of the same kind, same at least to perception. If *H* stands for an hypothesis and *C* for its expected perceptible effect, and if on perceiving *C* one concludes that *H* is true, the formal process representing his argument would be: If *H*, then *C*; *C* is; therefore *H* is. It will be at once found that there is the fallacy of affirming the consequent or what modern logic designates as the confusion between a proposition and its complementary.¹

It may be argued, against such criticism, that the doctrine of the plurality of causes is itself unsound and that though different causes (say different kinds of germs of disease) may apparently seem to produce the same kind of effect (say, fever), yet closer observation will disclose that the effect of each possesses some distinctive marks also along with the general ones (say, the fever caused by each kind of germs has a special time, range and nature of rise and fall). Though this reply may be theoretically acceptable, it is not of much practical use in cases like the ones cited above. One cannot, for example, feel sure that the cure of insanity following psycho-analytic or homeopathic treatment, or the happening of a predicted event after a special stellar conjunction is of such a nature that it could be produced only by those antecedents, and not by any of the other conditions accompanying the antecedents, such as changes in food, climate, environment and the like. The doubt, therefore, cannot be so easily removed, and the hypothesis concerned cannot be established to be true.

What further complicates matters is that in most cases the verification of an hypothesis about the imperceptible can be effected only through a long chain of antecedents and consequents. If this hypothesis is true, then a consequent like *C* can be expected, and if *C* happens, it will cause another consequent *D*, and if *D* happens it will generate *E*, but *E* is observed; therefore, the hypothesis is true. Put symbolically such an argument will be as follows. If *H*, then *C*; if *C*, then *D*; if *D* then *E*; now *E* is, therefore, *H* is. To make it more concrete, if the civilized son wishes the father to be

dead, the wish will be tabooed by the censor; if it be tabooed, it will be repressed to the unconscious; if it is repressed, it can be expressed in a symbolic dream like the collapse of the upper storey of the house, and such is really the dream of James; therefore, James wishes his father dead.² It will be realized at once how precarious such a conclusion is. As we proceed backward from each consequent to its antecedent we expose ourselves to the fallacy of affirming the consequent at every step, and the chance of reaching back to the true antecedent diminishes progressively with the increase of the number of links, as will be more clearly seen hereafter.

The purpose of this criticism is not however to underrate the value of the process of verification, but only to remove the exaggerated notion of its demonstrative value. The real value of verification consists in its capacity for generating a greater degree of certainty, making the hypothesis verified only more *probable*. When verification is by direct perception of the very phenomenon supposed by the hypothesis, as in the example of the withering creeper cited above, the probability of the hypothesis being true is *cent per cent.*, provided of course we do not doubt the veracity of normal perception. This is the ideal limit of verification. But in cases of indirect verification the degree of probability must necessarily fall short of complete certainty. Even in a very simple case, if *H* being *c* can be expected, and *c* is observed by the verifying process to be actually there, the probability of *H* being true is only $\frac{1}{2}$ or 50%, if there is the possibility of even one other (independent) way in which *c* may be caused. But in most cases there may be three, four or even more other ways in which *c* may be caused, and the probability thus attained by verification in such cases would be only $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ or even less.

Consider in this way the probability attained by the verification of an hypothesis by a series of indirect steps, as in the example of the dream cited above, the formal argument of which was symbolically represented as: If *H* then *c*, if *c* then *d*, if *d* then *e*; *e* is, therefore *H* is. It will be found possible in such a case to explain each consequent in more than one way. In fact, the last consequent, the dreaming of the collapse of the upper

1. Vide W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, Part III, p. 55.

2. Cf. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for a similar dream (P. 305. of *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*).

storey can be explained, in many more ways. But even if we take the most modest view and can entertain the possibility of explaining each consequent only in *one* other way, the probability of *H* being true will be $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{8}$ only. It will at once appear how poor the probative value of a process of so-called scientific verification may at times be. A scientist not to mention the semi-scientist and pseudo-scientist, can be deceived into a sense of complacency by the long and arduous chain of experiments by which his hypothesis is verified, while in point of fact he has been travelling only farther and farther from complete certainty.

It should be mentioned however that even indirect verification can generate complete certainty, if it is known that the antecedent which we infer from the consequent is the only cause of that consequent. The formal argument then will be, only if *H* then *c*, *c* is, therefore *H* is. No fallacy will arise here, just as no fallacy arises when we simply convert a universal affirmative, the subject and predicate of which are known to be equi-pollent (e.g. All men are rational animals). In terms of the language of inductive logic this amounts to the statement that if all rival hypotheses have been *exhaustively eliminated* one can infer that the hypothesis in question is the only explanation of the consequent. Full certainty will therefore be enjoyed in such a case by the inference from consequent to antecedent. The aim of every science is such exhaustive elimination; but in point of fact, in most respects, even the most firmly held doctrines of science fall far short of this ideal. The possibility of rival theories can never be exhausted. The proof of the truth of a theory based on indirect verification is therefore always open to the danger of the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent.

It may be felt that in all the previous arguments while criticizing the fallacious nature of reasoning from consequent to antecedent, we have assumed the consequent to be the effect, and the antecedent (supposed by the hypothesis) to be the cause. But the relation between the logical antecedent and the logical consequent in a formal reasoning like "if *H*, then *c*," is one of implication, and such a relation may exist either between a cause and its effect, or between an effect and its cause (or a part of the cause), or between two co-effects, or between any two phenomena known otherwise to be related by some necessary relation. Does the fallacy arise in all such cases? We should, therefore, consider also these other cases. Let us call the imperceptible factor, supposed by

the hypothesis, *x*. Now can we infer *x* from the perceived *c*, if *c* is the cause of *x*? We can, if we can feel sure that *c* is the cause of *x* in the sense of being the sole and sufficient condition of the happening of *x*. But such a cause can nowhere be found except in the full sum of positive and negative conditions necessary for generating *x*, and we can never be sure, in any particular case, of the presence of all conditions which combined together bring about *x*, and sure also of the absence there of all conditions the presence of any or some of which will frustrate the happening of *x*. Consequently in any actual case we never eliminate doubt completely when we infer from *c* to *x*. And if *c* is admittedly only a part of the cause of *x*, then the inference will clearly be precarious. If again the relation between *c* and *x* be that of co-effects, such relation, being dependent ultimately on a causal relation, will be liable to the same objections. As for some other kind of necessary relation between *c* and *x*, we cannot think of any, if *c* and *x* represent two *different* spatio-temporal facts. Necessary relations (even if they are admitted, disregarding Schiller's wholesale denial of them) can be conceived only between *a priori* ideas, and not among empirical facts. The most intimate and reliable relation in the region of facts is of the causal type, or some other relation based on it. Therefore we cannot here hope for anything more reliable.

We find then that we cannot have any absolute certainty from any kind of verification, if it is indirect. The maximum probability attained by such verification cannot be more than fifty *per cent*. This calculation, of course, presupposes that the other way in which a consequent, *x*, can be explained is expected to be as frequent as the first. Moreover such calculation presupposes also what J. M. Keynes³ pointed out to be the assumptions behind all scientific procedure, namely the *Principle of Limited Independent Variety*, and the *Principle of Atomic Uniformity*. If however any of these assumptions be not made, the probability cannot be calculated, though there would remain still the vague doubt or feeling that the consequent in question might be otherwise caused or accounted for.

We may consider one more point before we conclude. Does not the probability of an hypothesis, say *H*, increase if, not one, but many consequents which can be expected to follow from it,

3. In his *A Treatise on Probability*.

say $f_1, f_2, f_3 \dots f_n$, are all actually observed?⁴ The answer must be in the affirmative. It must be admitted that the probability of an hypothesis goes on increasing with the number of expected consequents observed. For this is really the process by which rival hypotheses are eliminated. Another hypothesis, H_2 , can perhaps explain f_1 and f_2 but not f_3 , nor f_4 . We are entitled to reject H_2 with formal rigour since the denial of a consequent enables us to deny its antecedent. For an example, if the earth were like an ellipsoid, in shape, rather than like a globe, we could quite explain why a ship sailing in the same direction should come back to the starting point, but it could hardly explain why the shadow of the earth seen during a lunar eclipse is *always* observed to be circular and never to be elliptical. Therefore, the rival hypothesis is rejected as being incompatible with this crucial observation. Similarly, the supposition that the earth is like a flat plate cannot explain why a ship sailing away from the observer should gradually disappear, bottom first and top last, though it may explain the circular shadow. But the hypothesis of the earth being a globe explains all of the many expected facts, and, therefore, it is far more probable than these rival suppositions.

But even this relative increase of probability does not amount to absolute certainty. The formal argument behind it is: If H , then $f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots f_n$; but $f_1, f_2, f_3 \dots f_n$ are (all observed), therefore H is. We have here the same precarious conclusion, open to the fallacy of affirming the consequent (and thence the antecedent). The factual or material significance of this situation is that there remains still the possible doubt that there perhaps may be another hypothesis which can explain the whole of $f_1, f_2, f_3, \dots f_n$. Such a doubt is countenanced by the constant progress of science itself, from less satisfactory to more satisfactory hypotheses. The Copernican hypothesis explains all that the Ptolemaic one tried to account for, and also certain other newly observed facts which the earlier theory did not consider. Thus indirect verification always falls short of complete certainty.

To remember this, is to give up the air of cock-sureness and self-sufficiency which often characterize the assertions of many scientific writers of to-day, and it is to retain the Newtonian humility of a genuine scientific mind, which does not shut the door to unseen possibilities and, therefore, to further progress.

4. Vide L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 306.

The Nature of Philosophic Thought in Hegel

By

DR. R. DAS,

Amalner,

Pre-Kantian rationalists conceived of sense-perception as confused thought and so thought and perception did not represent for them two different kinds of knowledge, but the same kind of knowledge, only in different grades of clearness. Kant pointed to the distinction of matter and form in knowledge and supposed that the matter was supplied by intuition and the form by thought. Post-Kantian thinkers tried to overcome this Kantian dualism of matter and form, intuition and thought, and 'deduce' or rationalise the given element in knowledge entirely without leaving a residue. Hegel may be supposed to have carried to its utmost limit this attempt at all-round rationalisation, at the reduction of the sensible given to a moment in the process of rational thought.

Hegel defines Philosophy as "the thinking consideration of things". This definition would appear to be both too narrow and too wide, too narrow, because only the thinkable content would seem to come under philosophy, leaving out the contents of intuition, feeling and volition; and too wide, because every thought, of whatever object, even of our daily life, would be philosophy. This difficulty is removed when we consider that whatever is given in other modes of consciousness can also become an object of our thought and that there is a distinction between every-day thought and philosophic thought. The same content may be felt, perceived and thought, and the task of philosophy is to render in terms of pure thought or concept what is immediately experienced in the form of feeling or perception or whatever other modes of consciousness there may be. The entire realm of all possible objects therefore falls within the scope of philosophy, but only as conceived in their proper philosophic form.

From philosophic thought Hegel distinguishes *nach-denken* or reflexion over any object given in experience. Such reflexion leaves the object partly as given, even while formulating it with the aid of intellectual categories. This happens in judgements of

our daily life as well as in judgements of empirical science, as for instance when we say "This leaf is green". Here the object, although it is thought, does not appear in the pure form of thought; it is still one with sensible material. A content is only then conceived in the form of pure thought when there is nothing in it which has to be accepted merely as given or presupposed. To pure thought the object is no longer given as to *nach-denken* or reflexion, but in the forward movement of thought itself the object is created and constructed. For an analogy to the dialectical generation of objective concepts, we may refer to mathematical thinking which constructs and creates its own objects.

Thought has thus in Hegel a wide and a narrow significance. In the wide sense every act of consciousness, even perception or feeling, is a thought. If it were otherwise, if there were an absolute distinction, for instance, between perception and thought, the perceived content would be incapable of being rendered in terms of thought. In the narrow sense thought is one among other intellectual activities, such as perception, feeling and volition, but at the same time it is the highest of these, in which all others culminate and attain their end and truth.

If we start with the ordinary fact of consciousness, we find that relation to an object is involved in the phenomenon of knowledge. Knowledge distinguishes itself from the object, and with this distinction the object becomes a thing in itself and knowledge something which is there for the object, in relation to which knowledge gets its truth. If however we are to judge of the truth of our knowledge we cannot compare our knowledge with the object *in itself*, but only with the object as it is *for us*. That is, we can only compare our knowledge with our knowledge. Doubt in the truth of our knowledge is not occasioned by any known incongruence between our knowledge and the object in itself, but by some inner ground, some felt inadequacy of our knowledge, some inner contradiction. This contradiction drives knowledge forward through the series of its various successive and more and more adequate formulations. Looked at from the succeeding and higher stage, the preceding and lower stage appears to give only an imperfect, false or merely subjective picture of the object, contrasted with which the knowledge now attained appears to represent the object in its true form. In the last stage of knowledge in which contradiction finally disappears

and the movement of knowledge comes to its end, the object in itself or the absolute coincides with absolute knowledge. For the distinction between the object in itself, and the mere subjective knowledge of it, which is possible and significant only when we look back from a higher standpoint, disappears altogether when we have reached the highest stage.

At the lowest stage of knowledge, there is yet no distinction between knowledge and its object and so there is no distinction between the knowledge of the object and a deceptive appearance of the same. Knowledge and object appear as one. This is the stage of sense-awareness or mere sensation, in which the data of outer and inner perception appear in their simple givenness. In this primitive immediate consciousness, in which error has no meaning, there is coincidence between content and consciousness, the sensed object and the sensing self. However in this immediate givenness of the content there is an inner dialectic or contradiction which does not allow us to remain at this stage. When we carefully consider the matter, we find that the knowledge of the given content consists in a look or a mere 'pointing', which fixes the given object, as a 'this' or a 'here and now'. But the 'this' at the very next moment becomes a 'that' and the 'now' becomes a 'then'. As soon as I go to cognise the content of immediate perception as such, it is no longer a content of immediate perception, and in place of the concrete manifold, which the given appeared to be, I am left with a very abstract and empty concept, the concept of 'this'. Every other and more concrete determination of the given would appear to be false, as it would no longer be knowledge of the given, but would have for its object something else.

We seek a fixed self-identical object in the given, in the passing here and now, which is at the time different from it. This object we call a thing and its multiple appearances its qualities. But this consciousness referring to a thing is no longer the immediate consciousness. In place of the immediately given, we have a 'thing' and in place of givenness or immediate awareness, we have perception. The standing self-identical thing has taken the place of an ever-changing this, and to this thing the passing contents are referred as to a supporting and unifying medium. From the standpoint of perception, the firm, persisting identical thing is the truth or reality, the passing, changing, unfixable and indeterminate content of sense mere unreal appearance. In observing and describing the persistent characters,

we seek to grasp the real thing which persists and remains identical with itself. Observational description is the form which knowledge assumes when the standpoint of perception is developed. We attempt to fix upon the real being of the thing and separate it from what unessentially belongs to it. But observational description fails to attain its end and is itself cancelled. We fail to find anything in the thing that remains identical with itself. The thing conceived as persistent and self-identical turns out to be for our knowledge an empty thing in itself. In fact the self-identical thing is no more than a mere appearance and its supposedly self-identical qualities are found to be themselves changing and dependent on various factors. Just as, earlier, the immediate given content turned out to be a subjective appearance, the qualities of the thing now appear merely as so many reflexes in our subjective consciousness of the thing. It is only for the eye that the thing is white, for the palate sweet, for the touch hard, etc.

The inner contradiction, to which we are thus led by perception, its attempt to discover the true reality in its object, is resolved in the concept of law and energy. There are no self-identical things or qualities. What remains identical with itself is the unchanging law of change. The standing realm of law, in a sense beyond the perceptual world, but nevertheless present in it, is the true reality, the inner essence, and the perceived world its external appearance. The concept of law first brings to us the concept of force or energy residing in things, but it is very soon found out that the persisting thing or, what is the same thing, the relatively permanent sum of qualities corresponding to the thing, is the product of the pure law which is devoid of sensible being. Concepts of law and force are concepts of the understanding and not of perception. They are not seen but are merely understood. Knowledge of reality thus passes from sensible perception to ratiocinative thought which supports itself on experience, formulates its law on the basis of experience and again explains experience by means of the law.

Contradiction reappears at the stage of ratiocinative thought. The attempt to grasp the truth in the concept of the persistent law leads at first to the formulation of a plurality of empirical laws and these are then sought to be reduced to as few a number as possible, and ultimately to one fundamental law. Truth for the

understanding, the essence of things, is contained in one such self-identical law which holds good universally.

As we rise to higher and higher laws, we get more and more abstract concepts, ultimately we are left with nothing but the universal concept of law as such, which expresses itself in all particular laws. But this abstract universal, the mere concept of law as such, corresponds to the empty 'this' and the 'thing in itself' of the earlier stages and we have to oppose to it its concrete filling or content and regard it as its appearance.

At this stage contradiction is resolved when ratiocinative thought passes over into conceptual thought and the understanding gives place to speculative reason. The transition is made possible in this way. Law itself is not thinkable without an other which it relates. Law thus posits a distinction which remains one with itself, an identical relation, in which really the meaning of law consists. Law contains within itself a distinction which is transcended in the unity of the law, a division which thus shows itself to be merely apparent. When the law in its essential nature is thought out to the end, it turns out to be a concrete universal, a true infinite which does not stand outside the finite particulars, but takes them up in its own being, limiting and determining them by one another, and at the same time reconciling their mutual opposition in its higher unity and thus making them contributory to its own rich content. The object of knowledge, truth or reality is no longer the abstract general law, but the infinite in this sense, the self-developing and self-maintaining whole of creative processes. In speculative thought, the universal concept becomes the fully concrete idea, the closed thought-system which comprehends and contains within itself all the richness of all actual objects. At this stage the separation between knowledge and truth or knowledge and object is completely overcome. It is only for knowledge of a lower stage that the object is some being in itself, not wholly taken up and absorbed in knowledge. This complete coincidence of knowledge and object characterises speculative thought as the highest stage of knowledge. Knowledge being completely identified with its object, at this stage it can no longer appear as illusory or subjective from a higher stage. Indeed no higher stage is possible.

I cannot pretend that what I have said in the above summary of Hegel's view is all very clear to me. There is no doubt however

that philosophic thought, as Hegel takes it, is very different from thought as it is ordinarily understood by common sense, science or logic or even by Kant. Thought is ordinarily taken to be quite formal, and dependent for its matter on another source of knowledge, viz. sense. Hegel makes thought self-subsistent and for him the distinction of matter and form is a distinction within thought itself, between a lower and a higher stage. Thought is thus both intuitive and discursive. Its content arises from within itself and is not a gift from any alien source. This represents the main idealistic position according to which the object of knowledge is a function of knowledge itself.

I can well understand that when I think truly, my thought is impersonal and not merely subjective; and if the ultimate reality is self or spirit, any adequate thought or category may be regarded as the self-definition of the spirit. But even so, the position is not without many serious difficulties and it is not my design to discuss them in the present paper. I may however refer to two or three points which appear very perplexing.

(i) If the matter of thought is thought itself at an earlier stage, then how does thought begin at all. It seems that thought has no matter to begin with; and if it can be without matter, why should it not remain so forever?

It may be said that there is no beginning or ending for thought. Thought, being one with reality, is always there. But what kind of thought is it that is one with reality and always there? It must be perfect and highest thought. What then about thought in the lower stages? In the highest thought, can there be any room for the lower stages. It is no use telling me that the thoughts of the lower stages are retained in their truth in the highest stage, because any thought in its truth, or as corrected, would not be thought of a lower stage. These stages then are mere subjective appearances. But reality being thought, which is objective, we can find no basis and no explanation for these subjective appearances.

(ii) What moves thought in its forward movement is supposed to be some inner contradiction. But can there be any contradiction in reality. If not, then there is no ground in reality for the supposed movement of thought. Contradiction is found in false thinking and is a mark of irrationality. If the real is

completely rational, how can there ever arise any contradiction? If thought has a tendency to produce contradictions how can we credit it with the opposite tendency to overcome them? We seem unable to provide for contradiction either in thought or in reality, and so we can discover no possible ground for any movement in pure thought.

(iii) Lastly, can we really understand the self-developing and self-maintaining whole of a creative process? If it develops how does it remain identical with itself; and if it is in process how is it a whole which must be completed thing? All these difficulties may be supposed to be due to our sticking to the standpoint of the understanding. But do we resolve these difficulties or merely confirm them, by referring them to the standpoint of the understanding? If the standpoint is real, the difficulties also stand there. If the standpoint is not valid, how is it even allowed within reality which is wholly rational?*

*In the preparation of this paper, the writer has been specially indebted to von Aster's *Geschichte der Neueren Erkenntnis-theorie*.

What is Living and What is Dead in Hegel's Philosophy of History

By

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The critical investigations of Kant had sedulously shown that a finite mind is necessarily subject to limitations which are immanent in its very nature. The speculative spirit of Hegel believed in all seriousness to have broken through the confines of human intelligence by a movement of thought which sustains itself on its own contradictions. No doubt he must be given credit for having successfully asserted the rights of thought. Thought is not confined to the fetters of an analytic and discursive understanding but is the life of the real itself. Hegel knew that feelings have no philosophical worth unless they refer to something beyond themselves. But the dialectical movement has worked with a terrible nemesis on Hegel's own system. It has once again brought home a truth which is all but ignored that in every great system of thought there is something living and abiding and something that is exposed to the changing fortunes of time. This is tantamount to saying that though truth qua truth has supra-temporal validity, it is often mixed up with elements of momentary import. All the pragmatic prejudices of our century notwithstanding, who can gainsay that truth is life? The life, as we empirically experience it, is itself not the pure life but is given to destruction. Death is always lurking in it. But life in its ideal significance is perennial and undying. Though fully believing then in the eternal character of Truth and in the absolute values subsisting over and above the relativity of history and change, we can still with justification try to disengage the living from the dead in any system of speculation.

What is then living and what is dead in Hegel's Philosophy of History? No justice can be done to the stupendous work of Hegel save in relation to the work of his Great predecessor Immanuel Kant. An adequate appreciation of history was not given to this Philosopher of *apriori* thought. He was a philosopher of stereo-

typed categories and had hardly any sense for the flux of life. The antinomy of duty and love which was later resolved by Schiller in the conception of a beautiful character remained always unreconciled in his thought. The formal element of his ethics could not by its nature do justice to world-history whose portals are ever closed to those who cannot reckon with super-individual values and universal forces. It was in Herder that philosophical consciousness fully awakened to its own historical mission. But only in Hegel was it possible for it to do away with all the bias of a naturalistic outlook. History was to Hegel, in the words of R. Eucken, a logic and a dialectic on a cosmic scale. He rightly saw that the philosophy of history cannot bind itself to the category of change. A great panorama of nations and states passes by. Nations leave and quit their hegemony, centres of culture shift and change and the vicissitudes of national fortune greet our eye at every step. They awaken melancholy. "Who could stand in the ruins of Carthage, Palmyra, Persepolis, Rome without being led to contemplation on the evanescence of empires and men, without dis-interested melancholy on the fall of the brilliance and culture of human life". Hegel was further justified in his historical teleology. It was not after all in vain that the nations told their story for a while and passed away; they had to subserve some purpose. What was wrong in Hegel's contention was the pre-supposition that a general evolution following in time necessarily realises values which were lacking in the preceding culture. Thus from this stand-point the civilizations of India and China, Peru and Egypt are simply passing moments for the Greek world: the spirit rests immature. It could only reach its maturity in that consciousness of freedom which was characteristic of the Germanic World. Even the Greek, Hegel thought, could not elevate himself above the beautiful, the unity of the natural and the ideal; he could not attain truth, the ideal in its ideality. Hegel, thanks to his philosophical and national prejudices, could not see that civilizations and cultures, irrespective of their place in the temporal series, have realised super-temporal value in their own way. They have a cultural style of their own and their civilization has also something unique and irreplaceable in character. Every culture had a grandeur and glory of its own, a scale of values which it alone could realise. Moreover to think that it was in Greece alone that man became fully conscious of himself is to ignore those mystical and speculative traditions of the East where the consciousness of oneself ultimately merges in the consciousness

of one's own divine essence. Even Socrates who called upon man to know himself did not go much beyond psychological absorption. Borrowing the language of Hegel, we can say that even in Greece the spirit could not become in and for itself, could not move further than psychological realization.

But Hegel has not ignored the psychological laws that obtain in effecting the ruin of a civilization. A nation achieves greatness by its own incentive and initiative, by hard struggle and toil. But slowly nations lose the impetus and the urge, and the habit of life sets in. Habit, the memory and routine of life is pernicious, rather fatal in the long run. Once habits are completely formed no trace of the initiative remains, the springs of life and vitality dry out. The spirit of a nation dies and on its ruins another flourishes. Look at Nature. "The tree grows and blossoms forth in leaves, flowers, bears fruits and begins always anew. The one year old plant does not outlive its fruits. The tree survives the fruits for decades but it dies however. The renewal of life in Nature is only the repetition of one and the same; it is the monotonous history with the same cycle. Under the Sun happens nothing new but with the Sun of the spirit it is different". The principle of spirit is development and progress. It does not lose but gain in the never-ending process of lives and deaths. Every death is a stepping stone to a life more exuberant.

Notwithstanding the rationalistic attitude of Hegel which expresses itself in every page, he is not blind to the working of irrational forces in the world-history. Reason and passions are the warp and woof of the world-history. Even passions, the so-called irrational forces of psychic life are not so negligible as they might look,—they are the active forces which bring into realization the universal. Apart from their subjectivity, passions can also become the driving forces of deeds having a universal character. Taken in this sense nothing great has been brought about in the world without the working of passions. The harmony of universal ends with the particular interests of passions is the hall-mark of the state reaching the flower of its life.

Nor has the great truth escaped Hegel, that history is led by super-individual values. The Reason working in and through history exploits the nations for its own ends. It is the trick (List) of the Reason that it lets the nations bleed and die in its own interest. The spirit is in itself what it is, it unfolds itself in time and comes to the consciousness of its own essence. The

dialectic of history shows itself in the transition of the imperfect to the perfect, i.e., of an imperfect which has already the perfect in it as a tendency and urge. The opposition of the perfect against itself constitutes the dynamic of spiritual life. But here the same error mars the philosophy of Hegel, namely, that a culture following in time is a transition from the imperfect to the perfect. It is difficult to see in history any such progress, rather history shows infinite varieties of values imbedded and realised in cultures with a mission of their own and with unique and irreplaceable worth. They reflect the Divine from their own standpoint and their standpoint is the last word in history. Though Hegel assigns to the universal all the significance in history he could not totally ignore the working of the individual. The idea has to reveal itself in existential and substantial forms; the universal can incorporate itself in the world-history within the category of process. Recently the late Max Scheler and N. Hartmann have made much of the fact that the higher categories of values are wanting in power and need that energy from lower spheres of value and being to make themselves felt in life and history. The universal ends must embody themselves in historical individuals. Unlike Kant's conception of genius as an inborn talent which works as nature and is essential both for the appreciation and creation of art, the Hegelian heroes are the demoniac personalities who have the right on their side. But it is just in keeping with the spirit of Hegel's thought to consider the individual divorced from the particular interests of its empirical life and subservient to the aims and interests of the concrete universal.

It is painful to note that in modern times just this metaphysical character which makes for the greatness of Hegel has been neglected. Nicolai Hartmann who hails Hegel as the discoverer of objective spirit tries to purge his thought of its association with historical finality. The fate of the nations knows no transcendental guidance but is given to chance, the play of unknown factors. Over and above individual consciousness no other consciousness is known to Hartmann. Hence the objective spirit, the spirit without consciousness, the spirit in itself, is not an aggregate of individuals but something above them. The autonomy of the objective spirit, is all that Hartmann is prepared to accept as the abiding essence of Hegel's thought. Our differences with Hegel and Hartmann are equally profound. The great error of Hegel lies in the fact that he thinks that history is moving

for the realisation of a definite purpose, the idea of freedom and all the movement of history is unintelligible without it. The error of Hartmann lies in the fact that no consciousness beyond the individual and the finite is recognised by him. We are given to the conviction that the spirit as such can only be a subject and can never be an object, that the so-called objective spirit belongs to a totally different ontological status, that historical teleology, though the indispensable pre-supposition of the philosophy of history is only a limiting concept and cannot be rationally worked out to its last consequence. History is not moving towards one far off divine event, towards a predetermined goal, but rather the historical process is revealing itself in a multi-dimensional world of values. The 'in-itself' of history, the ultimate understanding of the motives playing in the processes of the world-history is not given to us. Faced with the mighty movements of history we can only stand with a religious sense of awe. To awaken to a sense of rationality in history and freely acknowledge the irrational in it, is the point of view which associates us with Hegel and leads us beyond him.

Is Bergson a Monist?

By

REV. E. GATHIER, S. J.

Since the publication of "The Creative Evolution" in 1907, Bergson has been enlisted by many philosophers among the tenants of a Pantheistic evolution, "Dynamical Monism", or as Jankelevitch puts it, "Bergsonism appears to us like a monism of substance and a dualism of tendencies".¹

We must admit that texts could be quoted which might seem to bear this interpretation. Such is for instance the celebrated passage about the idea of the genesis of matter. "I simply express a probable similitude when I speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display, provided however that I do not present this centre as a thing but as a continuity of shooting out; God, thus defined, has nothing already made. He is unceasing life, action, freedom".² And again: "The Absolute thus revealed is very near us, and in a certain measure in us. It is of psychological, and not of mathematical or logical essence. It lives with us. Like us, but in certain aspects infinitely more concentrated and more gathered up in itself, it endures."³

And as regards creation he affirms "Everything is obscure in the idea of creation, if we think of things which are created and a thing which creates. Things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions".⁴

We understand easily how Sir Radhakrishnan has been able to characterize the main tendency of Bergson's philosophy as "Monistic". "For there is a universal principle, spiritual in nature, in which all existence is gathered, an initial psychical movement

1. Jankelevitch "le Bergsonisme" p. 244

2. Creative Evolution (English Translation by Arthur Mitchell), 1911, p. 262.

3. C. E. 315.

4. C. E. 261.

which is responsible for the whole of evolution. Creative evolution may be literally compared to the spreading of different branches of a single root. The 'elan vital' goes on spreading out new branches... Matter, life, consciousness are such branches".⁵

But with his usual acuteness, Sir Radhakrishnan has shown the difficulties of Bergson's position, interpreted from a monistic point of view. "If to save his monism Bergson makes matter unreal, he cannot account for the evolution of the world. If to account for the drama of the universe he makes matter an independent existence, then his monism is affected. If dualism, God is opposed to matter like life to darkness. He is a suffering deity. God is the author of life and matter. Bergson's logic requires him to make it an impersonal principle from which both matter and life spring"⁶... "The God of Bergson is not only immanent in nature, but completely identical with it".⁷

But is the Monistic interpretation the only explanation? The difficulties to which it gives rise make us suspect that it is not the real key to the understanding of Bergson's theory.

This impression is reinforced when we see Bergson himself affirming, "The present essay does not aim at resolving at once the greatest problems. It simply desires to define the method, and to permit a glimpse of some essential points of the possibility of its application". If so, we are perhaps asking too much of Creative Evolution, which is a Cosmology, when we look to it for a solution of the essential problems of Theodicy. All the same we may gather already some affirmations about God: "He is freedom, unceasing life. Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed to the descending movement of matter".⁸ So life is the result of an impulsion; then it must be distinct from it, as an effect from its cause.

Bergson thought it necessary to answer the charges levelled against him, in two letters which have generally not been translated fully into English. In the first one he affirmed: "I speak

5. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 150.

6. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 212, 213.

7. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 215.

8. *Creative Evolution—Introduction*, p. 105.

of God as the source from which spring by turn, and by an effect of His freedom the currents or 'the elans' of which each one will become a world. God remains distinct, and it is not of himself that it can be said that "oftener he turns short, or he is at the mercy of materiality, which he has been obliged to give to himself". The argumentation by which I establish the impossibility of the Idea of Nothing, is not at all directed against the existence of a cause transcending the world... I have explained on pages 299, 301, and 323 that it is directed against the Spinozist concept of being. It ends in affirming that something has ever existed. About the nature of this something it brings, it is true, no positive conclusion, but it has never said in any way that what has always existed is the world itself. The rest of the book says the contrary".⁹

And in a second letter he said: "I have nothing to add for the time being, because the philosophical method, as I understand it, is absolutely moulded on experience (interior and exterior), and does not allow me to go further than the empirical conclusion upon which it is founded... the considerations of Creative Evolution present creation as a fact. From all this we derive the Idea of a God creator, free and generating at once matter and life, whose creative effort is continued in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human personalities. From all that, springs consequently *the refutation of Monism and Pantheism in general*".¹⁰ We see a similar affirmation in Louis Levine's interview in N.Y. February 22, 1941 (quoted by Sir S. Radhakrishnan) "the source of life is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it personal?—Probably. Of course, personal in a different way, without all the accidental traits which, in our minds, form parts of personality, and which are bound up by the existence of a body. But personal in a larger sense of the term, a spiritual unity expressing itself in the creative process of evolution". Except for the word 'probably' such a statement could be accepted by theists. They have never dreamt of limitation as the essence of the divine person. A free centre of activity and love is what is essential in a person.

In his second letter Bergson affirmed that "to say more on that subject of God, one should touch problems of another kind, moral problems. I am not sure to publish anything on that subject, I

9. C. E. 284.

10. *Etudes* 1912, p. 515.

shall do it only if I reach results which seem to me as 'demonstrable' or monstrable as those of my other works".¹¹

Even after these clear affirmations, which do not leave any doubt about the intimate conviction of the author, all shadows have not disappeared. What is the distinction between God and the vital elan? Is it a distinction of nature, or only the one between the source from which the river springs and the river?

"The two sources of Morality and Religion" will give us a more adequate answer. We have not to see there a re-statement of the position taken in *Creative Evolution*. He himself has said it. "No doubt we are here going beyond the conclusions we reached in *Creative Evolution*. We wanted to keep as close as possible to facts. We stated nothing that could not be confirmed by the tests of biology. In fact the conclusions we have just set out, complete naturally though not necessarily those of our former work".¹² In what does this progress consist? In affirming the existence of a God creator, who is love.

The method by which he comes to that conclusion will be taken from the experience of the Mystics. "Mysticism ought to furnish the means to treat experimentally the problem of the existence and of the nature of God". For Bergson there is no means to start the inquiry in any other way, "because an object is real in so far as it can be given in an existence real or possible".¹³ On account of this anti-intellectualism the reasoning which reaches the God of the philosophers does not reach the real God of whom the rest of mankind is thinking".

"The mystical experience comes to correct all the conceptual mistakes of the philosophers. In our eyes, the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently a partial coincidence, with the creative effort of which life is the manifestation. This effort is of God, that is if not God himself".¹⁴ There we find again a distinction between the creative effort, the cause—and the manifestation, the effect: life. "The great mystic is to be conceived as an individual who is capable of transcending the

11. *Etudes* 1912 p. 515.

12. *C.E.* p. 219.

13. *C.E.* Pp. 206, 216.

14. *M.R.* p. 210.

limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, and continues and extends the divine action. To the objection that the experiences of the great mystics are individual and personal, he replies, that "it is by no means certain that a scientific experiment, or more generally an observation recorded by science can always be repeated and verified".¹⁵

There is also the fact "that mystics generally agree among themselves. This is striking in the case of Christian mystics. To reach the ultimate union with God they go through a series of states. These may vary from mystic to mystic, but there is a strong resemblance between them".¹⁶ Then "probabilities may accumulate and the sum total be practically equivalent to certainty".¹⁷

"However the mystical experience alone could not convince altogether the philosopher, if he had not another way to come to know that man can enter into contact with the principle of life".¹⁸ But this proof has been given: there is the possibility of intuition. We must not be astonished if we first reach probabilities.¹⁹ "Probabilities may accumulate, and the sum-total be practically equivalent to certainty. We have alluded elsewhere to those lines of facts, each one but indicating the direction of truth, because it does not go far enough; truth itself will be reached if two of them can be prolonged to the point where they intersect".²⁰ That God exists is a fact which is reached in the mystical experience.

But what is the nature of God? Is he a neutral principle from which the world necessarily flows?—No, "God is love, is a person". Such is the gist of Bergson's affirmation. "The mystic does not care about the attributes that reason thinks it discovers in God. He affirms one thing, which contains everything: God is love and the object of love. What he does state clearly is that divine love is not a thing of God, it is God Himself".²¹ But love supposes intelligence, supposes that the one who loves is a person; Bergson affirms the truth. "It is upon this point that the philosopher must

15. *M.R.* p. 211.

16. *M.R.* p. 188.

17. *M.R.* p. 212.

18. *M.R.* p. 212.

19. *M.R.* p. 216.

20. *M.R.* p. 212.

21. *M.R.* p. 216.

fasten who holds God to be a person, and yet wishes to avoid anything like a gross assimilation to man".

God and Creation.—Creation, and consequently distinction of God and creatures is affirmed. "Granted the existence of a creative energy which is love, and which desires to produce for itself beings worthy to be loved, it might indeed sow space with worlds, whose materiality, as the opposite of divine spirituality, would simply express the distinction between being created and creating, and the indivisible emotion from which they sprang.

Beings have been called into existence who were destined to love and to be loved, since creative energy is to be defined as love. Distinct from God who is this energy itself, they could only spring into being in a universe.....²²

No Real Identification with God.—The English edition speaks of the ultimate identification with God, in which mystics go through a series of states. One might question the rendering of the words: "La defication definitive". They present another possible meaning, that of union through grace, where creatures and God keep their own personalities.²³

But since "grace" has not to enter the frame of Bergson's experience, we are obliged to consult other texts which will make clear the thought of the author, and where the distinction of the mystic even in the act of the mystical union is affirmed.

"There comes a boundless joy...God is there, and the soul is in God."²⁴

To be in God is a distinct state from being God. The distinction is clearer when we read that "though the soul becomes, in thought and feelings, absorbed in God, something of it remains outside. This something is the will."²⁵ Since in this text the mystic has not yet reached the final consummation, let us turn to a text which speaks of it. And in the supreme state "the mystic soul yearns to become God's instrument. Now it is God who is acting through the soul and in the soul. The union is total, therefore final".

22. M.R. p. 220.

23. M.R. p. 211 (Eng. Ed.) p. 263 (Fr. Edit.).

24. M.R. p. 196.

25. M.R. p. 197.

"Yet effort remains indispensable, endurance and perseverance likewise...But they come of themselves, they develop of their own accord, in a soul acting and acted upon, whose liberty coincides with the divine activity. They represent a vast expenditure of energy, but this energy, is supplied as it is required, for the superabundance of vitality which it demands flows from a spring which is the very source of life...Nothing remains to distinguish such a man, the mystic, from the men about him. He alone realizes the change which has raised him to the rank of *adjutores Dei*, patients in respect to God, agents in respect to men".²⁶

"How could he be aught but humble, when there has been manifested to him, in mute colloquy, alone with Him who is Alone, through an emotion in which his whole soul seemed to melt away, what we may call the divine humility?"²⁷ For the love which consumes him is no longer simply the love of a man for God, it is the love of God for all men. Through God, in the strength of God, he loves all mankind with a divine love".²⁸ This final stage corresponds to the first. All along we find that if there has been moral union, intimate penetration of the will and intelligence of man by the action of God, there has never been an identification of nature. Both of them have kept their ontological reality, the iron has been penetrated by the fire, the light has passed through the crystal, one has not been dissolved into the other. "The soul would be content to feel itself pervaded, though retaining ITS OWN PERSONALITY, by being immensely mightier than itself, just as iron is pervaded by the fire which makes it glow".

The similitude taken from the instrument also shows this distinction; the instrument is distinct from the person using it, although it receives from him an impulse which makes it co-operate in producing effects which are beyond its ken, if left to itself. The chisel which cuts the marble under the hand of a Michael Angelo and helped to the creation of the Moses, received an impulse which made it so to say intelligent, and elevated it to the plan of intellectual realization. Entitatively it remained distinct in the making of the master-piece; each one (sculptor and tool) had its

26. M.R. Pp. 198-199.

27. M.R. p. 199.

28. M.R. p. 181.

own activity; the sculptor, the principal cause, the instrument; the chisel, both co-operated in a work, but the principal cause sustained its superiority and distinction even when it moved the instrument.

We do not insist on the fact that for Bergson Christian Mystics are the complete realization of Mysticism. His method of taking them independently from the theological context would not lead us to any certain conclusion about the distinction of the mystic and God. But one may question the legitimacy of this dichotomy which considers the affirmations of the mystics without any reference to their intellectual back-ground—this intellectual and dogmatic back-ground has prepared and sustained the mystical experience. If, as we ought, we take into consideration the context of the lives of the Christian mystics we shall see that the most authentic representatives, a St. John of the Cross, a St. Teresa of Avila had their whole life impregnated, with the ideas of creating, of absolute ontological separation between creature and Creator.

Other flaws can be pointed out in Bergson's reasoning. Some expressions like "partial coincidence", if the stress is put on coincidence, divine humanity, "machine to make gods", seem at first sight startling; but the texts in which Bergson has exposed ex-professo his theory allows us to affirm that he was not the dupe of his own words. He knew too well the difference between the idea and its expression: namely even when he likens creation to a literary composition or to the creation of a symphony. There, as often in Bergson, the images are notations, suggestions which have to lead his reader to the intuition of truth. They remind one of Plato's Myths, which were used to make people suspect what clear concepts could not clearly convey. We may regret, without exaggerating it, the anti-intellectualism of Bergson; but we have to take it into account when reading his text. One proof more can be given. Rev. Fr. P. Gorce O. P. in the Review 'Sophia', Rome 1935 gave what he thought represented the chief tenets of Bergson. They were as follows: God is not a phantom of the human mind, but an all powerful creator. Each human creature is free and capable of morality.


Bergson replied on the 16th August, 1935. "You have put in bold relief with great force the significance of my works....As to the question between realism and idealism, if it is necessary

to choose between those two 'isms', I shall not hesitate a single moment; it is to realism, and to the most radical realism, that I attach the totality of my views. I have never been able to consider knowledge as a construction".

And he adds: "My approbation of your study is complete". And this study had placed as one of the cardinal points, creation.

In these few pages we have let Bergson speak for himself, because it seems to us that the texts quoted show that little doubt can be entertained about the thought of this great philosopher, who has summed up his ideas about God in "God is love", and so a person.

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Intellect and Intuition

By

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The concepts of intellect and intuition have been discussed threadbare in past philosophical and religious literature. But in the fog and mist of controversy their true import is not as yet realized. Whether one assigns the post of honour to intellect or to intuition as the final arbiter of truth appears to depend on temperamental differences. Those who are highly emotional, of the artistic and the religious way of life, swear by intuition, while those who are imbued with the cognitive spirit of cold logic are unwilling to give even a patient hearing to things beyond logic. Further, the question of *method* in philosophy has engaged the attention of Philosophers of all ages. Curiosity, the basis of our intellectual framework is regarded as the parent of all philosophy in Europe, while in ancient India Philosophy took its birth in the attempt of man to escape from the perils of life by a realisation of the ultimate reality which is described as intuitive experience. Descartes and Locke, Kant and Hegel, and the contemporary philosophers of the West have been predominantly intellectual. It is only Bergson in France that opened the eyes of Western thinkers to the limitations of the method of reason and pointed to the need for supplementing reason by intuition. In this essay it is proposed to throw some light on the concepts of intellect and intuition and estimate their value in leading us to the heart of Reality.

The necessity of correct definition of concepts is easily brought home to us; but correct definition is by no means easy. Words are proverbially ambiguous. They more often conceal thought than reveal it. The same words are used but different thoughts are meant and further investigation reveals them to refer to totally different experiences. No wonder that philosophical thinking is in chaos. The fate of the problem of intellect and intuition is no better. There are a good many definitions of intellect as of intuition and more views as to their relationship. We are lost in the maze of definitions and views. One would like to step aside

and try to be clear of the maze by attempting to understand the concepts in the light of one's own thinking and experience.

The term intellect is described as a "Faculty of knowing and reasoning".¹ But this is vague and highly misleading. It suggests the old faculty psychology. The term 'Knowing' is so comprehensive that it includes the process of perception and intuition. The method of intellect is the method of 'reasoning'. But what exactly do we mean by reasoning is just the problem. When Hegel describes Philosophy as a 'thinking consideration of things' he means by it a cognitive process, a process of analysis of human experience. Science no less than philosophy employs the method of reason (or intellect), for the determination of truth. The cognitive process involved in the method of science is the same as that of philosophy. But the point of view and the goal to be reached are entirely different. Science analyses aspects of experience and the boundaries are marked by the scientist himself. But philosophy analyses *experience as a whole*. It is an intellectual attempt at *grasping* the nature of the *Real*. The method of intellect both in science and philosophy is marked by the spirit of disinterestedness, persistent inquiry, and involves observation, experiment, investigation and argument. The intellectual process is a process of analysis and synthesis.

The term intuition is equally vague. It is regarded as a name for the ignorance of the causes at work. It is regarded as a mysterious faculty which takes some gifted persons to the highest flights of mysticism. It is generally set in opposition to intellect. It is none of these. The term intuition implies immediacy or direct awareness. But sensuous perception also gives us immediate knowledge. Intuition gives us knowledge which is non-sensuous (or not purely sensuous) and immediate. The knowledge derived by intuition is not confined to any one aspect of the human personality. It is not mere perceptual knowledge nor is it merely a set of concepts formulated by the intellect. It is the knowledge gained by the entire personality. It is of the nature of an insight or Darsana. The entire self or Atman must be in tune with the universe. The knowledge gained by intuition gives the possessor a feeling of absolute certainty because of its immediacy.

1. The Concise Oxford Dictionary.

It is clear that intellect and intuition are the two processes of grasping the nature of reality. What exactly is the role of each in the knowing process? In this connection no body can afford to neglect the views of Henri Bergson. Bergson, in his work "An introduction to Metaphysics" expresses an absolute contrast between intellect and intuition. He points out that "Philosophers in spite of apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the *relative*; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the *absolute*".² Intellect is purely analytical in character, takes only the snapshots of the reality. It cuts the concrete reality—change—into bits of matter and the knowledge given by intellect is not real knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is only useful; but not true. It is only intuition that can give us a knowledge of the absolute—the '*elan vital*'. "By intuition is meant," says Bergson, "the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."

This opposition between intellect and intuition is thoroughly unjustifiable. If the knowledge given by intellect is false and unreal the entire field of scientific knowledge becomes mere moonshine. But scientific facts have at least as much reality as the facts of ethical life or aesthetic enjoyment. An intuition which lacks an intellectual foundation is utterly empty and contentless even as a spiritual universe without a *terra firma* is an unreal abstraction. Bergson under-estimates the importance of intellect in the knowing process. He is wrong in thinking that the intuitive processes are absent in scientific knowledge. Many of the greatest inventions of science are due to the intuitions of scientists who have equipped themselves for their calling by a strenuous process of intellectual discipline. The mind of man can never be compartmentalised into the intellectual and the intuitive. Though the predominant tendency of Bergson is to oppose intellect to intuition,

2. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1.

he himself recognizes the kinship between the two in another connection. "If it (Metaphysics) is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is science and not simply an exercise it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, concepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences".³

The Bergsonian emphasis on intuition as the only method of reaching philosophic truth finds its analogue in the Vedantic doctrine of intuition as expounded by Sankara. According to Sankara "Intuition is the final result of the inquiry into Brahman". *Sāksātkāra* is a process of knowing distinct from perception or inference. Sankara dissociates himself from the view that intellect is opposed to intuition. He believes that the Yogin, "whose mind is restrained by the practice of yoga sees the self, the highest which is wholly spirit and essentially light by means of the purified inner organ",⁴ while intuition is a mode of knowing distinct from intellect there is no opposition between the two. As Sir S. Radhakrishnan observes, "For Sankara, it is a fulfilment of it. Intuitive experience is the crown of intellectual knowledge *Anubhavāvasānam Brahmaññānam, anubhavārūḍha eva ca Vidyā-phalam*. Intuition is not a substitute for rational knowledge but a supplement to it. It is rational thought matured to inspiration". While one can agree whole-heartedly with Sankara that self-discipline, study, and reflection are the necessary stages in the development of knowledge by intuition, it is not easy to accept his view when he describes the nature of such knowledge. According to him intuition is not so much a means of knowing as the ultimate result itself. Intuition is the crown of all intellectual activity. It is the end and not the starting point. Intuition is the experience of the supreme Brahman or the Absolute. It is that state of supreme bliss in which the Atman and Brahman cease to be different. In the revelatory experience of intuition the Brahman stamps its authentic mark of truth on the experiences of the Atman. Such an experience is ineffable and non-communicable. The intuitive experience is the silent witness to its own truth or reality. One is in the midst of mysticism which cannot be proved and, as the mystics assert, which needs no proof. Brought to such

3. Ibid, p. 17.

4. Quoted by Sir S. Radhakrishnan. Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore Session, 1932, p. xi.

a pass philosophical thinking signs its own death warrant. As J.L. Stocks rightly observes: "An intuition which claims sacrosanctity and declines the test of reason is, as Locke and Mill both protested, a moral and social offence, a mere misnomer for blind prejudice and crass superstition".⁵

Philosophy can be saved from dogmatic theology and mystic silence by viewing intellect and intuition as processes of knowing. Both are mental processes leading to certain results. The knowledge gained by intuition may be true or false even as the knowledge gained by intellect may be true or false. There can be no intuition, however sublime, which can free itself from logical criticism. Every intuition must be tested by logic as well as by life. Sankara appears to be wrong in thinking that intuition is only the last stage or the final result. The process of intuition is with us all the time of our knowing life. As Spearman says "any lived experience tends to evoke immediately a knowing of its characters, and experienter",⁶ and the process of knowing is intellectual as well as intuitive. H. H. Price in his careful analysis of the process of perception points out that the perceptual act has a 'pseudo-intuitive' character. Further he points out that for him 'genuine intuition' is the result of active thinking. We may analyse an act of simple apprehension of a 'rose', for instance. The object is presented in sensation and the mind perceives the whole of the 'rose' and not any particular part of it. This 'totalistic' or synoptic vision may be described as intuition. What the mind has grasped as one unit is analysed and dissected. This process of analysis is inevitably accompanied by a process of synthesis. The knowledge that emerges is certainly more concrete and more real than the knowledge at the stage of simple apprehension or the first intuition of the rose. Such an analysis should not lead us to the conclusion that intellect and intuition exhibit temporal succession in the knowing process. Both may be present simultaneously in any act of knowing. There is no reasoning process, which is entirely devoid of the intuitive element, nor can there be an intuition which is absolutely irrational. What is intuited may be reasoned about, and any process of reasoning may yield an intuition. Intuition is pervasive of all intellectual processes. It

5. Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore Session, 1932, p. 11.

6. Reason and Intuition, and other Essays, p. 10. Cf. Perception, by H. H. Price.

may be possible to have the Absolute or Brahman reflected in the unity of a self or Atman by a single act of intuition when the mind is intellectually alive and equipped with a complete store of facts. Even such an intuition must pass through the Fire of Philosophical criticism. It is true that philosophical activity which is at the stage of mere discursive understanding is engaged in a process of severe analysis. But such fractional thinking is futile if it does not pass into an integral experience, an experience which becomes the basis for further thinking, and in this fashion the quest of reality moves forward till the attempt is crowned with success. In the words of Sir S. Radhakrishnan "Intuitive insight, whatever be the line, is a whole-view where the mind in its totality strains forward to know the truth. The realisation of this undivided unitary life from which intellect and emotion, imagination and interest arise is the essence of the spiritual life".⁷

7. An Idealist view of Life, p. 211.

Aristotle's Theory of Causation

By

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Generally speaking, Aristotle was more empirical and realistic than Plato, that is to say, he had more respect for the world of sense, but he was not blind to other aspects of reality, and actually shared some of Plato's fundamental views. Aristotle agreed with Socrates and Plato about the importance of general ideas or concepts for knowledge. But he declined to accept a world of Platonic "Ideas" more or less aloof from the world of sense. He regarded ideas as necessary in order to explain or to understand the world of experience, and he endeavoured to reconcile ideas with percepts, universals with particulars, as jointly constituting the world of reality and of knowledge. His attempt was based on the notions of "matter" and "form", which had hitherto been divorced from each other, but which he joined in a new harmony. Whereas the early Ionians had stressed "matter" only, while the Pythagoreans and Plato stressed "form" only, Aristotle maintained that they belong to one another, that "form" is immanent in "matter", the universal is immanent in the particular—they may be distinguished, but not separated from one another. Plato's "Idealism" was largely the outcome of his pre-occupation with pure geometry and its ideal figures. Aristotle's interests were mainly biological, and his study of the phenomena of growth and development gave no encouragement to the conception of immutable "Ideas." In fact by his use of the conceptions "form" and "matter", Aristotle attempted to reconcile the opposite views of those who, like the Eleatics, treated changes as illusion and identified the real with the immutable, and those who, like Heraclitus and his followers, identified the real with the "flux" of change or process. Aristotle tried to do justice to both. He recognised in all ordinary things both matter and form, or a comparatively raw stuff and some finishing touch which made it a comparatively finished product. The nature of the distinction varies in different cases. In the case of a statue the marble is the matter, the shape imposed on it by the sculptor is the form. In the case of a plant or an animal or

a man, the bodily structure is the matter, while a certain function or combination of functions (nutrition, sensibility or reason, respectively) constitutes the form. In the case of human character certain impulses and instincts constitute the matter, while the way in which they are organised, drilled or "licked into shape" constitutes the form. Moreover nothing is without some form. Even the most elementary kinds of matter recognised in his time (fire, air, water, earth) were regarded by Aristotle as different forms of primary matter resulting from different combinations of ultimate qualities (dry, moist, hot, cold).

Intimately connected with Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form is his doctrine of the four kinds of cause. If we are to understand certain objects fully, then there are four things we must ascertain, namely, (a) their material cause, that is the matter or stuff of which they consist, (b) the formal cause, that is the form or law of their constitution or composition, (c) the efficient cause, that is the agency through which the matter took on that form, and (d) the final cause or the purpose which they serve. Aristotle explained that not all these kinds of causes are to be found or sought in all things; some things are sufficiently explained by reference to the material and efficient causes alone.

Aristotle reduced these four principles to two viz. Matter and Form. He showed that formal cause, efficient cause and final cause all meet in the single conception of Form. In the first place the formal cause and the final cause are the same, for the formal cause is the essence, the concept, the idea of the thing. Now the final cause or the end is simply the realization of the idea of the thing in actuality. What the thing aims at is the definite expression of its form. It thus aims at its form. Its end, final cause, is thus the same as its formal cause. Secondly, the efficient cause is the same as the final cause, for the efficient cause is the cause of becoming. The final cause is the end of the becoming, it is what it becomes. And in Aristotle's opinion, what causes the becoming is just that it aims at the end. The striving of all things is towards the end, and exists because of the end. The end is thus itself the cause of becoming or motion. That is to say, the final cause is the real efficient cause. The end or final cause of the acorn is the oak. And it is the oak which is the cause of the acorn's growth, which consists essentially in a movement by which the acorn is drawn towards its end, the oak. We see this even more clearly in the case of human productions. The efficient cause of the statue is the sculptor. It is he that moves the marble,

but what moves the sculptor and causes him to act upon the marble is the idea of the completed statue in his mind. The idea of the end present in the sculptor's mind is a motive. This is possible only in the case of human productions. In Nature there is no mind in which the end is conscious of itself, but nevertheless Nature moves towards the end and the end is the cause of the movement. Thus of the four kinds of causes which Aristotle enunciates viz., the material, formal, efficient and final causes, the last three melt into a single notion which Aristotle calls the "form" of the thing. And this leaves only the material cause unreduced to another. So we are left with the single antithesis of matter and form.

Matter and form are the fundamental categories of Aristotle's philosophy by means of which he seeks to explain the entire universe. Matter and form are inseparable. The distinction between matter and form is relative. But this relativity has its limits. Material objects cannot have less form than the so-called four elements. Nor can the forms of ordinary things exceed certain levels. A block of granite may assume the form of an image of some kind, but it cannot develop into a plant; an acorn may eventually assume the form of an oak-tree but not an animal. Such considerations induced Aristotle to assume the fixity of species, though this did not prevent him from comparing the rich variety of things and noting what a wonderful ascending series, or "scale of nature" they constituted. The conception of such a "scale of nature", beginning with the limiting case of formless matter and ascending through richer and richer forms to the highest forms of life, led him to the conception of an upper limit or apex, a being so perfect that he cannot be regarded as matter for further development, and so could be conceived as form only. This being is God whom (and whom only) Aristotle conceived in the manner of an immutable Platonic "Idea". God, according to Aristotle, is not the Creator, for matter and the forms are eternal, there being no break in the embodiment of the forms in matter. Yet, in some way, all things feel drawn towards God. He is the object of the world's desire, and by His mere presence lures objects to higher stages of development. He is the "unmoved mover" of the universe, and "it is love (for Him) that makes the world go round".

The Conception of an Idea—and an Ideal World

By

PROF. J. K. SARKAR

Introduction.—The idea stands for, means some physical object. The material enters into the mind in the form of ideas. When the mind wakes up to the meaning of sensations, it knows the object. The mind comes to an *awakening* in the case of understanding the physical world. The mental life contains a long succession of ideas uninterrupted by any sense experience. The starting-point of the series of ideas is always sensory experience. But the train of ideas, once started, can go on for a long time without the help of perceptions or sensory experiences. This shows that every idea has a tendency to release itself from physical existence. The idea in relation to the world wants to stand out of all relation to it. It tends to pass to a new world, e.g., the world of generalisation. This new world of independent ideas is purely mental in nature, bearing no counterpart whatever in the physical world. It is the mental world, the realm of independence or autonomy.

The demand and aspiration of the mind is to pass beyond physical existence and to gain more and more in its latent autonomy. Its deeper nature comes to a greater and greater awakening the more it rises to the level of pure inwardness and independence. The idea seems to find its own real nature and live in a world of its own, as soon as it becomes pure and free from its physical roots.

There are some difficulties that do not allow 'the idea in relation to the physical world' to pass to the idea-in-itself. The idea-in-relation is rooted in an order which is empirical. The idea-in-itself is something more than or above the empirical series. The constant reference of the idea to its physical basis is a great obstacle to a universal completion of itself. The material relations of the idea may throw some light on it but cannot give a clue to the idea in its totality and purity. The idea perceives the material world, understands and interprets it, divides and

recombines it, but *also passes beyond it*. In the movement of an idea to a new and independent world there lies the deep urgency of the mind to pass beyond physical existence. So, one may conceive of the world of ideal existence by the side of the world of physical objects. Or, one may think of psychical reality alongside of the physical reality or a second world beyond the first or physical world.

The problem is: Does the idea lead us away from or towards reality, as it leaves the physical world behind?

The march of the idea in its intellectual or interpreting enterprise casts some light on the problem.

1. The idea develops into a principle or law. As such it is the interpreter of the world. It carries us from the individual object of perceptual judgment into the realm of the general notions of conceptual judgment. It goes beyond particulars to universals. It develops into factual-judgments and value-judgments. The principles give us norms and criteria for the classification and appraisal or evaluation of all things physical or mental. Some meaning is made out of the things and some value is given to them only in the light of some principles or laws that have unfolded by means of concepts and ideas. It is in describing and appraising (i.e. understanding) the world that the reality of the idea lies.

General concepts or ideas, principles or laws are generally called universals, and the special objects of the particular judgments are called particulars. Particulars may be taken as the copies or appearances of which the universals are the originals or the reality. Here, also, the ideas which are 'the wholes or totalities of individual particular concepts' pass the barriers of physical existence.

The principles or laws are transcendental in character. According to Eddington the genuine laws which control the physical world are of a transcendental character.¹ The principles which ideas have brought into the human mind or experience contain something more which is totally different from anything of the physical world. The world of principles or laws acquires a new quality (or reality) and also attains autonomy. The autonomy of the idea in the form of the principles increases with the increase

of its break from its physical world. In understanding the world the idea (or the mind) passes beyond it and at the same time creates a new world. It is not only the interpreter of the physical world but also the creator of a new world of principles or laws. In describing and evaluating physical existence the idea causes the emergence of a new reality with a change of character.

2. The idea transforms the impressions made by the objects upon the senses and the object gains the meaning. The object becomes the meaning itself. As such it is removed from bare physical existence to a level other than the physical one. The object as meaning is quite different from the object of the physical world. It is transformed into an ideal fact. It is resolved into the subject or drawn in by the mind to form a meaning. In fact, the object, if it is found to remain outside the mind, cannot become a meaning. It must lose its 'thing-hood' before it can have a meaning. "To know the object is to identify, to overcome its otherness." To detach the object as the ideal fact from the mind is to miss its true nature and existence.

The impression coming from the object is transformed into particular limited concepts and these concepts are again merged into an idea. By means of mental manipulation of abstraction and generalisation the object is transformed into an idea and acquires meanings. The idea is independent and transcendent. In the transformation of physical existence into the mental existence there is a real break with the physical order. The idea forms a new and unique world. In understanding the physical object (or world) the mind creates a second or unseen kind of world. It is this ideational world, i.e., the world of concepts and ideas that must come in order that a knowledge of any physical object becomes possible. To interpret is to create. The second world of ideas is a reality as it is the only thing that can interpret the first world. It is a new and unique world by itself as it has no counterpart in the physical world.

3. As the idea marches on it creates more. The idea creates the ideal objects, viz., perfect triangles, perfect angles, etc. It solves empirical problems and passes beyond the empirical series. This is also true in other departments of knowledge viz. Logic, Ethics, etc. The creation of such pure Mathematical conceptions point out that the idea yearns towards its ideal form. This is but the creation of a world as an Idea, showing the real break of the idea with physical existence and entry into a new realm of experience. The

1. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, Pp. 244-246.

world of ideal objects created by the idea possesses a reality or existence of its own, though not the reality or existence belonging to the physical world. In brief, the idea has an existence of its own and the physical grounds are not sufficient to explain the reality of the idea.

4. The idea proceeds further in its ideal creation and attempts to complete itself in its ideals of life. However, the creation of a perfect second world is the ultimate end of the idea.

The reality of the second or ideal world:—

(a) The mind is an activity not only as a type of reaction but also as a type of creativity. The object, in order to be known, must be in a cognitive relation to the ideas created by it. In fact, the mind is already working in the ideal world even when, at lower levels, it is creating particular concepts and ideas. It is working in the ideal world when, at higher levels, it is creating ideal objects like perfect figures. It is also going further into the ideal world when it is creating values and ideals. It cannot stop short of passing into the ideal world. But at every phase of its development from sense-perceptions to the formation of ideals the idea (or the ideal world) is gaining in transcendence and autonomy and becoming a larger and larger 'critical novelty' with a change of character. The idea finds its roots in the physical objects but at the same time transmutes and transcends them and thereby interprets them. They are moulded and explained by what is beyond them. So, the reality of the idea or the ideal world implies the reality of the empirical world. It is only when it is cut off from the ideal world that the empirical world is wrongly understood or not understood at all.

(b) The mind shows the tendency to create greater universes or wholes. Each whole is a mental universe assuming a new quality. For instance, in the passage from the object to the idea or from the idea to laws and ideals a new form of the mental universe or a new order of dimensions or reality emerges.

The emergence of newer and larger universes in the mind bears a resemblance to the emergence of newer and larger wholes in the physical world. The creative imagination of the mind bears all the marks of critical evolution of the physical world. "The works of Nature bear all the ear-marks of creative imagination." The workings of one are akin to the workings of the other. The

mind, uses the same sort of power or expedient to evolve reality as the physical Nature uses. On the whole, there is an affinity between the structure of the world and the mind. And what is created by Nature is true for her, and the criterion of truth is within her creator. Similarly what is created by our mind is true for it, and the standard of truth lies within it. A straight line created by the mind is true for it, though it is not in nature.² The mind understands, it, because it constructs or creates it. So the ideal world is true, and we can understand it by constructing it.

(c) From the above it follows that the ideal world is a reality by itself. It is not a faint adumbration or reflexion of the physical world and so it is not a pseudo-reality. From its very start it is removed from physical existence. It is really independent and transcendent. When the idea turns to itself it finds a world of its own. It extends more and more in the direction of any particular object that is found outside us. The idea stretches itself to the universe and has no fixed terminus of it. The journey of the idea towards the universe (or tending to be more and more universal) makes us aware of its universal reality. It tends to pass beyond the physical world and lives more and more in 'the total universe.'

Perhaps in this sense Plato regards the idea or the ideal world as having its ground in the supersensuous world. William James speaks of the religious view-point of the universe in this way: "The so-called order of nature which constitutes the world's experience, is only one portion of the total universe, and..... there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we know nothing positive, but in relation to which the true significance of our present life and mind consists. A man's religious faith means.....his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of the natural order may be found explained. In the more developed religions the natural world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world".³

In fact, the idea possesses the reality of its own. It is a reality which exists in the universe, though it does not exist as a

2. Cf. Gentile, *Theory of Mind as pure Act*, p. 15.

3. *The Will To Believe*, p. 51.

physical object. And in a sense the ideal world precedes the empirical world, for the mind cannot understand the latter without creating the former. To know is to create. The knowledge of the first world presupposes the creation of the second world. Thus the ideal world is the logical prius of the physical world and not the temporal consequent of the latter. So the idea is prior to the object but not in any temporal sense. On the whole, the knowledge of the one world involves the knowledge of the other. There is an inner relationship between the two worlds, each being involved in the other. So if one is real, the other is real. So if one exists the other exists too. If the physical world is real because it exists the ideal world is real as it exists too. But what really exists can be determined by the mind or the idea that can think it and at the same time goes beyond. Further the knowledge of the physical world is not a fruitless affair. The mind can overcome and transcend it by passing through it in obedience to its immanent nature. The knowledge of the empirical series gives us a clue to the reality of the ideal world. It enables to catch a glimpse of the total universe of psychical and physical reality (Bhuma) of which the physical is only one portion. In fine, the idea gives us the glimmerings of something more or what is beyond the physical order.

Subjectivism in Kant

By

SREENIVASA SAHU

According to Kemp Smith,¹ there is a conflict between subjectivism and phenomenalism in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. When the former tendency is in the ascendent, the phenomena are considered by Kant as purely subjective in character. When on the other hand, Kant's thought is dominated by the latter tendency, the phenomena gain an independent existence. As against Kemp Smith, whose opinion derives support from Adamson and a number of other Kantian critics, both British and Continental, it is contended by Paton² that there is no such conflict in the *Critique* and that "Kant's doctrine is a whole and humanly speaking a consistent whole." We find ourselves in agreement with Kemp Smith, and venture to think that Paton's description of the *Critique* as a "consistent whole" is far from correct. The very fact that Kant found it necessary repeatedly to warn his readers against confusing his philosophy with subjective idealism, shows that he was not entirely unaware of the subjective trends in his thought. Subjectivism is where the inexorable logic of his teaching leads, although he makes phenomenalism his aim. No wonder therefore that Jacobi in his perplexity remarked that "without realism it is impossible to enter Kant, and with it, it is impossible to stay with him."

If Kant's purpose was to expound a type of phenomenalism, was he able to achieve it without being involved in inconsistency? The answer must be in the negative. Starting with a metaphysical dualism that was common to almost all philosophers of his day, he had succumbed to its consequences in spite of all the subtlety he could summon to his succour. When the *Critique of Pure Reason* was first published, it was reviewed by Feder and Garve. Both of them accused Kant of out-Berkeleying Berkeley. That is why in the second edition of the *Critique* Kant introduced

1. *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 83.

2. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, Vol. 1, p. 18.

a new section entitled *The Refutation of Idealism*, which unfortunately added nothing new to his previous arguments. The very fact that post-Kantian philosophy became ego-centric in the hands of Fichte and Schopenhauer, and that philosophers like Schelling, Hegel and Herbart felt the need of modifying the master's teaching, shows that there is a weak spot somewhere in Kant. Paton³ says that Kant is now understood much better than he was in his own day. But as a matter of fact, even among the critics of our own time the general opinion is that Kant's philosophy reduces itself to subjectivism. "Kant," says Caird,⁴ "emphasised the relativity of objects to the unity of the self, but he still maintained the reservation that the objects so related are not in any ultimate sense real apart from the subjectivity to which they are related." In regard to Kant's attempts to escape from Berkeleian idealism, the same critic observes that "he was unable to achieve this end except by an argument which if carried to all its consequences, would have been fatal to the distinction of phenomena from the things-in-themselves and would thus have transformed the most fundamental concept of his *Critique*." Paton⁵ does not however, attach much value to Caird's criticism. He accuses him of interpreting "Kant in terms of Hegel." But what about Adamson, Ward and other modern critics of Kant? According to Adamson⁶ "though Kant never definitely accepts subjective idealism,..... yet it is hardly possible to distinguish his view from that of the subjective idealist..... The whole still appears, as in the corresponding view of Berkeley, to be a mode in which the subject is somehow affected." Whilst Ward⁷ very modestly calls Kant's philosophy "anthropomorphic," Joseph⁸ is of the opinion that if we understand the real nature of Kant's phenomena, the difference between Kant and Berkeley whittles down. Their similarity, says Joseph, consists in "their accounts of what the reality of things consists in and again of their distinctions between reality and illusion within experience." Prichard⁹ also takes a similar view,

3. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 464.

4. *Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge* (Proceedings of the British Academy, 1903-04, p. 96).

5. Op. cit., Pp. 17 & 65.

6. *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, p. 233.

7. *A Study of Kant*, p. 87.

8. *A Comparison of Kant's Idealism with that of Berkeley* (Proceedings of the British Academy, 1929, p. 217).

9. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 13.

though Paton¹⁰ accuses him of confusing between exegesis and criticism. No wonder that Kant was driven to subjective idealism much against his own will, for philosophers like Ferrier and Green who took their stand upon Kantian grounds were driven to the same ego-centric predicament; and, to put it in the words of Caird,¹¹ "it is apt to be the case with those who go back to Kant and take their start from him."

Paton, Ewing, Cushmann and others assign to Kant's phenomena the status of a *tertium quid*. Though constructed by the mind, the phenomena are not states of the mind. If according to Kant, the mind constructs the phenomena out of suitable material given by reality, it must be admitted that he is not a subjective idealist. But do we have any evidence of such a view in Kant? The fundamental tenet of his philosophy is that we can never know the real. As a concession perhaps, he says that the things-in-themselves "influence" our senses. But the word "influence" has no intelligible meaning in his system. In the absence of a real that is given, so much stress has to be laid on construction, so much upon the synthesis of the mind, that the distinction of the phenomena from the mind becomes nothing but a distinction without difference. Why should the "influences" of the things-in-themselves, which result in intuitions, fit into the moulds prescribed by our understanding? This question put to himself by Kant in a letter to Herz, less than two years after his Inaugural Dissertation, is adequately answered neither by Kant himself nor by his defenders. No doubt Kuno Fischer's famous saying that "the mind does not create but constructs 'nature,'" has cleared a vast amount of misinterpretation of Kant. But the question remains, "construct out of what?" The difficulty is not peculiar to Kant alone, but to all representationists, and is found in later thinkers like Clifford, Karl Pearson and others. In the sequel we shall see how this same representationism is responsible for another conflict in Kant namely, between problematic idealism and subjective idealism.

There may be objection to our calling Kant a representationist. It is true that Kant being an empirical realist maintains

10. Op. cit., p. 105.

11. Op. cit., p. 17.

that the objects of experience are directly presented to us. But the question arises, what are these objects? They are as already stated what the mind constructs from the "influences" of the things-in-themselves. This description of the nature of objects is intelligible only if we understand the word "influence," (einfluss) in its literal sense of something flowing into the mind. But the unknowability of the things-in-themselves stands in the way of our interpreting the word in its literal sense. If the things-in-themselves are unknowable, how is it possible for them to "flow into" the mind? And if it is not possible for us to have a direct knowledge of the things-in-themselves, does it not follow that the objects of our direct knowledge can only be mental representations of the things-in-themselves?

Kant's central problem as formulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? The problem corresponds to that of mediate inference, namely how the conclusion is novel and at the same time necessary. The *Aesthetic* in which Kant discusses how the propositions of pure mathematics and geometry can be synthetic and at the same time a priori, is one of the most flagrantly subjective parts of the *Critique*. Paton¹² justifies the subjectivism by saying that Kant while writing the *Aesthetic* did not want to introduce what he was going to prove in the *Analytic*. But unfortunately, the *Analytic* is no more phenomenalistic in character than the *Aesthetic*.

Now, how are pure mathematics and geometry possible? They are possible only if Time and Space are a priori. The characteristics of apriority are necessity and universality. But they are never given to us from outside; and this is what perplexed Hume and made him a sceptic. Kant attacked the problem with his transcendental method, and it is to his credit that he found the answer in the apriority of Space and Time. But is the apriority of Space and Time temporal or logical? Over this question there is difference of opinion among Kant's commentators. The weight of evidence is, however, in favour of the latter alternative. From the logical priority of Space and Time it does not necessarily follow that they are subjective in character. But Kant asserts the subjectivity of Space and Time repeatedly in the *Aesthetic*. If

they are subjective, the question arises, Are they of the nature of an illusion? Kant answers the question by drawing a distinction between appearance and illusion. "When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and time as they affect our senses, that is as they appear, I do not mean to say that these objects are mere illusion. . . . For in appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them are always regarded as something actually given." But are not the objects of illusion also regarded as something actually given as long as the illusion lasts? To meet this objection Kant puts forward his other test of truth, which has come to be known as the coherence test. But this too does not give us any guarantee of reality existing outside us. It only converts a small-scale illusion into an illusion on an organized scale. Indeed, Kant himself says that the coherence is due to *Bewusstseins Ueberhaupt* the common nature of our consciousness or understanding.

The problem in the *Analytic* is different. In Kant's own words, "a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought have objective validity (Kant attributes receptivity to the sensibility and spontaneity to the understanding. But have they not both a common root? Do they not both act together?) The same problem is more clearly formulated in his letter to Herz. It is an extremely difficult problem, specially so, to one in the position of Kant who starts with a dualism that keeps the self and the not self in two air-tight compartments, and who yet tries to escape subjectivism. It is this difficulty that taxed Kant's ingenuity to its utmost limits. Nevertheless, he failed to defend himself against the charge of subjectivism, because his explanation of the "object" was nothing more than a "reification," to borrow an expression from MacDougall, of the subjective state. "It is easily seen," says Kant, "that this object must be thought only as something in general, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it." Thus nothing is knowable about the transcendental object except that it is necessary, because without it there can be no representation. But is there any need of positing the transcendental object after it has been said that the objects of knowledge are constructed with the "influences" of the things-in-themselves, which come in the form of intuitions? The only justification lies in Kant's dualistic predilection. "Noumena or things-in-themselves,"

12. Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 52.

to put it in the words of Windelband,¹³ "are therefore thinkable in the negative sense as objects of non-sensuous perception, of which to be sure, our knowledge can predicate nothing—they are thinkable as limiting conceptions of experience." But even such negative attitude involves positive knowledge however partial. As a matter of fact, Bergson¹⁴ contends that a negation has more content than an affirmation, because it is an affirmation plus a negation. Even idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet argue that a negation involves at least the suggestion of an affirmation. The thing-in-itself may not be known to us in all its aspects. And perhaps some of its characteristics that are perceived by us now may disappear when we have a more adequate perception of it, or when we perceive it under different circumstances. A coin, for instance, appears oval when looked at from a distance, and round when looked at from above. When it appears round, does it mean that my experience of it as oval from a distance was all wrong? Roundness and ovalness are among the different aspects under which the object is presented to the subject. A complete severance of the object from the subject, of the not-self from the self, has therefore hardly any justification.

Further, as we have already pointed out, Kant's dualistic metaphysic involves him in a conflict between problematic idealism and dogmatic idealism. The problematic idealism of Kant is hinted at by a number of critics. As Adamson¹⁵ observes, "the general notion of the thing-in-itself sums up in its own way the reflexion as knowledge which is common to Kant and the Cartesian School; that it is subjective and therefore indicative of something not itself." "Might not," asks Ewing,¹⁶ "reality consist entirely of human minds? Any casual argument for the existence of anything else is out of the question; since even if we think things-in-themselves in terms of the categories, we certainly cannot according to Kant prove anything beyond the realm of experience by means of the categories". Prichard,¹⁷ though not so plainly, expresses the same opinion. "If," says he, "as the theory supposes the cause of sensation is outside or beyond the mind, it cannot be known."

13. *History of Philosophy*, p. 547.

14. *Creative Evolution*, p. 304.

15. *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

Kant, in trying to escape subjectivism and to posit the phenomenon as something which is dependent on the mind and yet which is not a state of the mind, had to go beyond his own critical principles. In the *Dialectic* Kant says that when we have a sensation, all the conditions that are responsible for it are not given with it. To discover all the conditions is an impossible task for the pure reason. Hence when we posit the transcendental object as being responsible for the sensation, we are assuming more than we are warranted to. We can at most say that the transcendental object is possible. But according to Kant, the possible and the actual coincide in their denotation. That being so, all that I posit to be possible, as not self-contradictory, will become actual. If the existence of men in Mars is posited as a possible fact, it becomes an actual fact (and through a similar transition it becomes an apodeictic certainty) which is absurd. If however the possibility of the thing-in-itself is denied, Kant's theory of knowledge becomes indistinguishable from subjective idealism.

There is a similar difficulty in connection with the doctrine of the affinity of the manifold as expounded in the first edition of the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*. Affinity is not a contingent but a necessary fact, in the sense that it is a "principle to which all phenomena must necessarily conform because otherwise, they could not be experienced by us at all and would not therefore be phenomena". In which case, however, the affinity will be, as Ewing¹⁸ says, "contingent in a more ultimate sense," and Kant's deduction of the affinity of the manifold from that of our experience must remain problematic.

Kant felt that his argument in the first edition failed to demonstrate that the categories constitute the unity which is necessary to knowledge. In the second edition this defect was rectified to some extent. Still Kant's argument remains obscure. This is due to his laxity in the use of the term "object." Sometimes it is identified with the noumenon, sometimes with the transcendental object, sometimes with the determined object, and so on. According to Prichard¹⁹ there is a vicious circle in the argument of the *Transcendental Deduction*. "First, the possibility of self-consciousness is deduced from the possibility of experience

18. *Op. cit.*, Pp. 110-111.

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

and then the possibility of knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness." We, however, venture to think that there is no circle here. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that there is here a confusion of psychological and epistemological accounts. The first part of the argument, namely, the deduction of the possibility of self-consciousness from the possibility of knowledge is epistemological in character. It starts with our experience of knowledge as a fact, and by means of the transcendental method, deduces that this involves self-consciousness, because unless "I think" accompanies and holds together all our perceptions, experience will not be possible. The second part of the argument, namely the deduction of the possibility of experience from the possibility of self-consciousness is psychological, for what is said here is that knowledge is possible because there is the "I think", the transcendental unity of the subject which accompanies all perceptions, giving all of them the self-same stamp. All perceptions are taken up in self-consciousness and synthesised according to the categories of the understanding. This part thus shows the genesis and development of knowledge. Of the two parts, evidently the first is more in harmony with and more essential to the critical philosophy. But the argument reduces itself to subjectivism by throwing its weight on the side of self-consciousness.

Thus here is in Kant a tangle of threads, and we must pick the proper one carefully. The general rules of the unity of apperception are the categories. "All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone the manifold can come together in one consciousness." Kant could say this with confidence because the object is after all constructed by the understanding with the help of the categories. On Kant's own grounds, we do not know why the rose is red and not blue, though our perception of it as possessing some colour may be explained as due to the category of attribute which is one of the ways in which the mind works. Further, the pure categories are not applicable to objects without being schematised by Time; and Time, as we saw in the *Aesthetic*, is subjective.

What then is error due to? An answer is found in Kant's *Introduction to Logic*.²⁰ "The origin of all error must be sought

20. Abbott's trans., p. 44.


solely in the unobserved influence of the sensibility on the understanding, or to speak more exactly on the judgment." Although it is not clear how the sensibility, which is passive can influence the understanding, nevertheless Kant's intention is plain. Truth and error are both in the mind. We have truth, when the understanding is enabled to function without any unobserved influence of the sensibility; and error, when the sensibility introduces something clandestinely into the understanding. In spite of all this explanation of truth and error, Kant sincerely believed that he is not a subjectivist!

Kant's argument in the *Refutation of Idealism* is as follows:—
 "I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determinations of time presuppose something permanent in perception. But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For, all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with in me are representations; and as representations, they themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change and so my existence in time wherein they change may be determined. Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me." I perceive certain changes in time, within as well outside me. But the perception of change presupposes something permanent with reference to which the change is perceived. This permanent cannot be in me, because I have only representations, which themselves change. Hence these representations presuppose a thing outside me, a thing which is permanent and with reference to which they change. Against this argument of Kant we may urge several objections. First, as some commentators have rightly asked, why should not the permanent be the self? We have already pointed out how the "I think" accompanies all representations, and thereby gives them a unity. It is something more than representations. Kant could not however persuade himself openly to admit that the permanent was the self, because such a proceeding would brand him as an out and out subjectivist. So he simply evaded the question by declaring in general terms that "all grounds of determination of my existence which are met with in me are representations." Secondly, by creating an unbridgeable gulf between the self and the not-self, Kant forfeited his prerogative of looking beyond the self for the permanent. Thirdly,

the *thing* that Kant refers to is, as he himself says, *regarded* as the object of the self. In other words, the distinction of the *permanent* (or the object) and the mere representation in the self (or the subject) is one within experience. That within experience there is the distinction of subject and object is not denied by Berkeley or any other mentalist. As long as the self is functioning as a subject, there are objects for its experience. It is only when Berkeley and others come to the question concerning the nature of the objects that they designate them as mental. If Kant, as he calls himself, is an empirical realist, so too are all philosophers. Experience is always of something distinct from the thinking self no matter whether it is introspective or extra-spective. It is however to be noted that empirical realism cannot be sustained without presentationism, which is the only means of bridging the gulf between the knower and the known.

Presentationism is deriving considerable support from idealists as well as from realists of our own day. Even dualists like MacDougall now believe in interactionism. The antiquated theories of parallelism and occasionalism should now be cast into the lumber-room; and the problem of knowledge and reality attacked with more effective instruments. Our knowledge is knowledge of the real, however partial and distorted it might be. And when the real is known in its fullness, this partial knowledge is not sublated but sublimated. We know the real; but "not only has the real object many qualities, probably which are unperceived; the object as perceived has qualities which it does not possess when it is not being perceived".²¹ In contemporary philosophy helped by the sciences, this type of explanation of the relation of knowledge to reality is bringing idealism and realism closer together.

We should not blame Kant for not having achieved more than what he did. In spite of his towering genius, he was like every other individual, a child of his age; and the defect from which his philosophy suffers is attributable to the dualism so rampant in his time among empiricists and rationalists alike. The transition from Locke to Berkeley finds its parallel in the development of Kant's own doctrine. Knowledge is like a spring that stretches from the knower to the known. It is hooked on both sides. Once it is unhooked on the side of the known, it remains stretched no more, but falls back into the knower. It results in mentalism.



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6-6-1945