

The
POLITICAL QUARTERLY

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
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
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THE FUTURE OF TOWN AND COUNTRYSIDE

By F. J. OSBORN

A FEW specialists and enthusiasts have been trying for many years to get the public interested in the possibilities of replanning our disgracefully congested cities, bringing light, air, gardens and space into them, and rebuilding them so as to meet the known desires of ordinary people in the way of living space. These basic requirements have to be reconciled with the needs of industry, much of which in this country has to be carried on in fairly large units. Certain technical conditions have also to be met in order to provide public services on a sufficient scale, and to sustain the educational and cultural standards of modern society. The pattern of rebuilding which would meet all the essential needs, while removing the grievous disadvantages of congestion (themselves due to the almost complete absence of social control over physical grouping in the past) is, when the problem is grasped, obvious. We have to thin out the congested parts of our towns. We have to stop the spread of those that are already over-large, for the double reason that long journeys between home and work are a burden, and that towns are more pleasant when a green belt of open country is reasonably accessible from their centres. Starting from the present situation in Great Britain, where over-concentration in a few great urban masses is evident to anyone who can read a map, it is plainly necessary, if we are to bring about a grouping satisfying the requirements, that we shall transfer some proportion of our congested population to smaller centres; either to existing small towns or to newly-created towns. In recent years it has been agreed by all who have studied the subject that this better grouping is not likely to happen by a spontaneous change of fashion or trend. The indications are all the other way. The dynamic of urban growth is supplied by landowners and builders developing land, municipalities extending roads and public services, industrialists and other business firms locating their establishments.

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Socially this trend to aggregation is disadvantageous. Even for the purposes of some of those supplying the dynamic the advantage in many cases are dubious. But the trend is strongly set, and each of the forces, anticipating the acts of the others, confirms it. A reversal of the trend could occur if, for example, industrialists resolutely changed their practice. But it is difficult for any of the constituent forces, acting alone, to give a strong enough lead to counteract the combined effect of the others. A collective reversal of policy would be possible. This points to social or governmental control, and it is now agreed that a measure of such control is required.

The whole subject of the distribution of population in Great Britain was very thoroughly investigated by the Barlow Royal Commission, which sat from 1937 to 1939, and published its Report at the beginning of 1940.¹ Its conclusions were that national action was necessary, that a Central Planning Authority ought to be established, and that the decentralisation or dispersal of congested urban areas should be brought about by improvements in statutory planning and a measure of state control over the location of industry.

The Report, published after the war started, though its conclusions were agreed while the country was still at peace, attracted relatively little popular interest. No doubt this was due partly to the preoccupations of the time; but, for the reasons given above, I think the public would in any case have been slow to appreciate the importance of the matter.

The Blitz of the autumn of 1940 created a genuine popular interest in town planning for the first time. It may be said to have let light into the urban mind in the figurative as well as in the literal sense. Looked at on city maps the destruction was by no means on a vast scale. Though one in five houses were damaged, only a small proportion were destroyed. Relatively few areas were demolished to such an extent that complete reorganisation or replanning was possible. Nevertheless, the effect of these few cases in opening the eyes of city-dwellers was magical. In a good many towns sufficiently extensive areas were demolished to make some replanning possible. Views to a distance were newly seen. Knowing that on the sites of these rubble-heaps, new buildings would

¹ Report of the Royal Commission on Distribution of Industrial Population, February, 1940. Cmd. 6153.

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have to be erected at the end of the war, contemplating their former homes and workplaces in retrospect, the townspeople spontaneously jumped to the possibility of replacement in an altogether more imaginative and pleasant form. It was a kind of after-war activity they could clearly visualise, one that touched them very closely, one that they could argue around and let their constructive imagination play upon, something obviously practicable, not remote either in space or time, a subject for collective discussion and action. Moreover it was a prospect intimately connected with the war, and its realisation depended on the speed of victory and involved continuance of national effort with a more congenial objective. The reconstruction of cities very quickly took a leading place in the popular mind as a war aim.

In high quarters there were at first doubts, natural enough, as to whether this new enthusiasm for post-war planning might impair concentration on the more immediate task. But the sounder view soon prevailed: that the enthusiasm should be welcomed and fostered as an inspirational light through dark and laborious hours. Looking back, it seems remarkable that it was in October, 1940, when air raids were still at their height, that Lord Reith was appointed Minister of Works and Buildings and asked to report on methods and machinery for reconstruction of town and country after the war.

I cannot detail here the advances and withdrawals, the marches and countermarches, of the planning campaign in the succeeding two years. Though movement has been disappointingly slow, there have been gains on balance. The lucky chance that the Barlow Commission had gone exhaustively over the ground, and that its Report was to hand as (in Lord Reith's words) "a considerable volume of authoritative guidance"¹ proved of great importance. The thoughts of the Ministers concerned have from the first revolved around the conclusions of this Report. The changes brought about by the war—especially the air raid damage, the stop to normal building, the evacuations, the strategic dispersal of many factories and offices, and the accelerated tempo of public control—had strengthened the arguments for a policy

¹ House of Lords Debate, 13th November, 1940.

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of decentralisation, and reduced the political difficulties of it. The policy, however, could not be carried out unless some solution were found for the problem of compensation and betterment, which had hampered even the timid local planning of the past. One of Lord Reith's first steps was therefore to accept the recommendation of the Commission for reference of this problem to a body of experts; and on 29th January, 1941, Mr. Justice Uthwatt's Committee was appointed. A month later it was announced that the Government had accepted another recommendation: the principle of a national planning policy and of "some central planning authority."¹ In October, 1941, Lord Justice Scott's Committee was appointed to consider the agricultural repercussions of the proposed policy of industrial decentralisation. Finally, in February, 1942, when it was announced that it had been decided that the Ministry of Works and Buildings should take over the central planning powers of the Ministry of Health and be renamed the Ministry of Works and Planning, Lord Reith stated specifically that the Government would review the main objectives proposed by the Royal Commission, and would study and concert, in the light of the review, the steps that should be taken to reach these objectives. Provisos were added, that in considering the decentralisation policy, the Government would have a care for existing capital equipment and public services, and would not wantonly countenance the break-up of old and valuable industrial concentrations; also that they would avoid the diversion of productive agricultural land to other purposes if less productive land could be used.²

There has been a great deal of public dissatisfaction, expressed in the press and in Parliamentary debates, with the reluctance of the Government to commit itself definitely to a bold policy of town planning, to complete the machinery of a central authority, and to introduce the necessary legislation. Having joined in the pressure for a decision, in the absence of which both the nucleus of the planning staff at headquarters, and the local planning authorities, are marking time and becoming "browned off," I would not wish to say that this dissatisfaction is unjustified. A Government

¹ Lord Reith, House of Lords Debate, 26th February, 1941.

² Lord Reith, House of Lords Debate, 11th February, 1942.

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resolute on attending to this matter, or willing to delegate it (as in the special case of the moment it must be delegated) to a group of Ministers of sufficient authority and capacity, could at least have produced decisions on the major issues, which would have enabled the preparatory work to proceed along a clear line instead of ranging over an undefined field of possible alternatives. But the difficulties and the resistances, active or potential, should be understood. Until it was clear that there was at least one practicable solution of the problem of compensation for land values changed by planning, the Barlow policy could not be carried out; indeed anything like a nationally conceived plan for the country as a whole could not be implemented. The Government could therefore contend, with much reason, that they must await the Uthwatt Report. Another reason that could be, and was, given for delay, less justifiably in my view, was that an influential section of public opinion, strongly represented in Parliament, feared that decentralisation or dispersal of industry and population from the congested cities would be prejudicial to agriculture and the countryside, or at any rate needed to be reassured that it could be effected without injury to those interested. The history of the development of this point of view deserves a few words.

Town planning in this country had two origins: the garden-city movement, resulting from Ebenezer Howard's famous book of 1898,¹ and the movement for public control of the layout of suburban extensions dating from the efforts of Mr. T. C. Horsfall and others soon after that date and receiving its first legal expression in the Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act of 1909. The two movements grew together, and after the last war became almost inextricably mixed up with the great national housing enthusiasm that produced 4½ million houses (1½ millions of them built under the Housing Acts) by 1939. The leading personnel in these three movements, of course, overlapped. Throughout the period there was always a core of advanced planners who held to the idea that town-building should be conceived as a unified process, or a process under a clearly-conceived policy for the country as a whole. The essence of their idea

¹ Garden Cities of To-morrow. 1898. Allen & Unwin.

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was well expressed by the late Sir Raymond Unwin as that of planning towns as defined units on a background of open country, rather than that of reserving park-like spaces in an indefinitely expanded development. This conception, however, did not prevail. There was in fact no generally agreed large-scale "pattern" of development. The policy (if that is the right word) followed in the housing drive was simply that of meeting the local demands wherever, and in whatever measure, they existed. Planning schemes, again, were looked at (both by the local authorities and by the central control) with essentially parochial eyes; there was, for the most part, no serious thought beyond that of tidying-up or regulating in detail whatever amount of building might happen to be occurring in a given place.

The result was the suburban sprawl—the continued expansion of towns already large—exaggerated in some cases into ribbon development, in which builders took advantage of sites provided with access at the public expense; and where planning was weakly administered, a rather indiscriminate spread of odd houses and groups of houses in the rural areas around the cities. In addition to this formless building in the city environs, there was an outbreak of a similar sort of loose development along the coasts to meet the desires of week-enders and people retiring to open surroundings after a working life spent in gloomy towns. All this was bad enough as a pattern of development. What made it intolerable to people of æsthetic sensibility was the shockingly bad architectural taste and the low standard of construction which a very large proportion of these scattered houses exhibited.

All this produced a reaction—an agitation for better architecture and an intense if not numerically strong movement for the "preservation of the countryside." This movement was documented by an attractive and eloquent literature. It quickly penetrated planning thought and advocacy, adding to the two original impulses of better living conditions for the overcrowded town-dwellers, and a tidier extension of suburbs, a new and passionate demand for saving agricultural land and raising the quality of building design.

If the war popularised and strengthened the advocacy of

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the urban decentralisers, as crystallised and given authority by the Barlow Report, it also intensified the propaganda of the countryside preservationists, and placed a powerful new card in their hands—the war-time importance of agriculture. The notable Land Utilisation Survey conducted by Dr. Dudley Stamp in the last few years had revealed a fact that had not previously been at all realised; namely, that of the 30 million acres or so of farm-land in England and Wales, only a very small portion—not more than 2½ million acres—was land of the highest quality, capable of intensive cultivation for market-gardening and similar purposes. Moreover, much land of this especially precious grade had been built over during the housing boom, and a good deal of the 2½ million acres left was on the fringes of great cities, right in the path of prospective development, and in the market as land "ripe for building." This, and the increased consciousness of the value of such land for food-growing when maximum self-sufficiency is vital, gave a great sense of urgency to this reason for national planning. Though the movement for countryside preservation produced its extremists, who unfairly blamed the planners for ungracious suburban development and bad architecture, and even went to the length of advocating the maintenance of the undue compression of the cities in order to economise rural land (a proposal as inhuman as it is politically impracticable), there was no section of the planning movement that did not agree in principle with its main enthusiasm. The differences of accent did, however, bewilder the successive Ministers who were charged by the Government with the task of formulating a national policy, and who endeavoured to ascertain the consensus of opinion among the "experts" and societies who had been giving attention to town and country questions. The appointment of the Scott Committee was primarily a response to the demands of those concerned for agriculture and countryside amenities; and the intention was to ensure that, if the Barlow policy were implemented, it could be done in such a way as not to injure those interests.

What I have said so far summarises the main factors in the planning situation as it existed up to the date of publication of the Reports of the Scott and Uthwatt Committees,

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and the position that the work of those Committees occupied in the long deliberations on policy. I have explained, if I have not in everybody's opinion justified, the Government's hesitation. We now have the Reports. What difference do they make?

The Uthwatt Report is a brilliant piece of work. It contains a complete, closely-reasoned and lucidly-written analysis of the essential problem of the public planning, or control of use, of privately or separately owned parcels of land. Planning in essence is a public limitation, over the head of the owners, of the purposes for and manner in which land may be used. Imposed on what was previously a free market, it necessarily alters values—distributes them on a different pattern among the respective owners of different parcels of land. Where public planning imposes on a piece of land a limitation of use which the free play of supply and demand would not have imposed, clearly the owner of that land is disadvantaged. Whether he should be compensated in such a case depends on a variety of considerations, in which custom, common law and the public sense of fairness all play their parts. This matter is beautifully analysed in the Report; and I do not think there is anything left to be said upon it. Now that the analysis has been made, its conclusions of principle seem obvious. But if they had been fully understood before, no one could have been under the illusion that statutory planning, as developed in the succession of Town Planning Acts from 1909 to 1932, could possibly achieve satisfactory results with the poor apparatus of compensation and betterment with which they were equipped.

The practical bearing of this analysis upon the policy of national planning is this. All advocates of comprehensive planning desire, for a group of reasons, that very considerable areas of land just outside cities shall be excluded from development. This land has building value. It is not a realised value; it is not covered by a covenanted rental; therefore it may be described as an "expectation value" or even as a "speculative value"—for, in fact, by the chance of the market, building may never descend upon it at all. Yet it is (or was in peace-time) an asset which could be sold

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for cash, and in fact the owner may have paid cash for it or held it after cash had been offered to him for it. If he is now told that, by a new or revised planning scheme, the land is scheduled for continued use for agricultural purposes only, the building value, so far as his land is concerned, is cancelled. Actually, however, the building value does not simply disappear. So long as other usable sites exist, the value is simply transferred. The insuperable problem of planning under the pre-war system was just this: that while the disadvantageous effect of the planning restriction was clear and precise, the corresponding advantageous effect on the value of some other piece of land somewhere, while in practice a mathematical certainty, could not possibly be traced. You could see who lost, but not who gained. There are provisions in the Planning Act for collecting 75 per cent of "betterment"—the increased value of land due to planning—but there are hardly any cases in which a claim can be established. On the other hand, almost any restriction of potential use generates at least a moral, if not a legal, claim for compensation. Weak schemes were the inevitable result. Anything like a wholesale reservation of the agricultural land around a city was impracticable without imposing obvious hardship; though it would have been legal, since neither common law nor the Planning Act admit a right to compensation for a limitation of land to its present uses. The latter is a point of some argumentative and political importance, especially after a war which has interrupted development and possibly changed its trend, and has imposed so many personal hardships to no one's advantage at all that personal hardships correlated with positive public advantage seem less outrageous.

The Uthwatt Committee propose to cut this obstinate knot by the state acquisition of the development rights in all land outside built-up areas. Compensation for these rights would be covered by the fixing of one single sum for the building value of the whole of land in the country, assessed on a generous estimate of total probable development, this sum being apportioned rateably among all the owners of such land on the basis of relative market values. Planning of undeveloped land could then proceed with concern for

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the public interest only, in complete freedom from considerations of compensation. Whenever and wherever land was required for development, the state would have power to acquire it compulsorily, and lease it (not sell it) to a local authority or private developer. This audacious scheme is fully worked out in the Report. It seems to me to be practicable. If it is adopted it will solve the compensation-betterment problem so far as unbuilt-upon land is concerned. The cost to the state would not be burdensome provided that the global sum is reasonably assessed in relation to future prospects of development of this class of land.

The parallel problem of compensation for the planning (which really means the replanning) of built-up areas is not so cleanly solved. Having given much thought to this section of the subject myself, and having been baffled in the search for a tidy and logical answer,¹ I feel nearly sure that the Committee's recommendations, taken together, cannot be improved upon as measures practicable for the coming Reconstruction period. They dismiss ownership pooling for reasons that are unanswerable. They reject nationalisation on three grounds: (1) political inacceptability; (2) financial impracticability in the immediate post-war period; and (3) administrative impracticability. Of these the second is the least convincing reason. The first is in my view weightier; though if nationalisation were absolutely essential to the carrying out of the vital policy of urban decentralisation and rural preservation, no political resistances could succeed against the forces that will demand such a policy. The third reason is the strongest; to attempt to construct between now and the end of the war a complete national system of land management and development, replacing all the private initiatives and controls which have hitherto handled these functions, would be an almost superhuman task. On the other hand, the proposal for unification of the reversion, which the Committee mention but upon which they were not able to agree, is attractive. It recognises ultimate national ownership by converting all present freehold interests into state leaseholds at a peppercorn rent, for say eighty or ninety-nine years.

¹ "The Land and Planning." Faber & Faber, 1941.

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After considering all possible alternatives, the Committee recommend a threefold solution of the urban side of their problem: (1) extensive compulsory acquisition of land, in parcels large enough to facilitate redevelopment on new plans, by planning authorities; (2) revision of the methods of assessing compensation on acquisition and for the effects of planning; and (3) a periodic levy on increases in annual site values. It is possible to have misgivings about the soundness in principle of the ownership of land by local authorities, for this reason. National planning, if it is to have any meaning, will seek to control the size and density of individual towns, to reserve wide areas of land for agriculture, and to guide, by methods of restriction here, and encouragement there, the location of industrial and commercial businesses. If all the land were owned by the state, or if in the alternative there were an absolutely complete system by which compensation for reductions of land value in some places were offset by collection of increases of value in other places, such planning would neither encounter resistance on financial grounds nor involve cost to the state. But if the balance of compensation and collection of betterment is imperfect, then there must be a state loss or local resistance in cases where, in the national interest, planning reduces values or holds them down—whether the local owner is a private person or a public authority. (I make the assumption which I think is sound, that local government must continue to carry with it local financial responsibility). The Uthwatt recommendations do not overcome this difficulty, but they reduce its magnitude. The price to be paid on acquisition of land will be limited by the 1939 "ceiling," and by various improvements in the rules of assessment which are fair to the public as well as to the owner. Revised principles are proposed for compensation for planning restrictions, which will, among other things, place a time-limit on an owner's right to benefit by the existing use of land for purposes and in ways which, under a new planning scheme, would not be permitted. A "life" is placed on such "non-conforming" uses; so that, if the authority is prepared to wait a reasonable time, no compensation may be payable for insistence on rebuilding in accord with the

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new standards laid down in a scheme. The proposals made are not in the spirit of arbitrarily scaling down compensation; they maintain the principle of financial justice. Few would hold that there is a private title in perpetuity to a use of land contrary to the public interest as currently interpreted, even though the public has newly awakened to its interest or has changed its mind as to what is its interest. The ethic of the subject is a logical bramble-bush. The Report trims a straggler here and there, but rightly does not attempt to uproot a firmly-established plant.

If we imagine these principles of compensation being applied under the national policy outlined in the first part of this article, it is clear that, in early redevelopment (before the "life" placed on the present or pre-war use of land expires), the reduction of density in congested areas and the introduction into them of open spaces would raise valid claims for compensation, which would be payable by the planning authorities. Though the Uthwatt Committee do not discuss the administration of a compensation fund, it would seem essential, as it is national policy which requires planning along these lines, that some contribution will have to be made by the state, though many local authorities will doubtless find it well worth while to pay something for such improvements to their cities. A vital point arises here. As in the case of suburban or rural land, already described, the values for which compensation is paid are not cancelled, they are transferred elsewhere—to a destination unknown. They may go to another part of the same city. If a city is purposefully decentralised, some part of the values compensated for will go to other towns. The Uthwatt Report dismisses entirely the possibility of tracing the resting-point of these values, and they propose the abandonment of the Planning-Act principle of betterment. They propose instead the collection by the state of a periodic levy on increases of the annual site values of urban land wherever they occur, after deducting from such increases the portion due to the expenditure of the owners. The valuation would be made by the local rating authorities, under the direction of the County Valuation Committees, at the time of the ordinary quinquennial valuation, and on any increase revealed at the

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second and subsequent revaluations a levy of 75 per cent would be collected annually.

The Committee anticipate that the state and the local authority would share the proceeds of the levy. Clearly, however, it should go wholly to the state; the local authorities who will collect the smallest amount of levy are likely to be the ones in whose areas the largest amount of compensation for planning will be payable, and the whole principle of compensation and betterment, as analysed in the Report, shows that the field of its incidence is national, not local. Moreover, not only because a percentage of the assessed increase must, for good reasons, be left to the owners, but for other practical reasons, compensation and the levy will not balance; the public will be "in the red" to some extent, and contributions from the Exchequer will be called for in the early years if reconstruction on bold lines is to be pursued. The levy may not yield a large revenue, but it is indispensable to the whole scheme. If on the one hand nationalisation is politically inexpedient, in the present balance of public opinion a scheme for paying for decreased values without any recovery from increased values, when big changes in both directions are to be caused by state policy, would not stand a better chance. The Uthwatt proposals, taken together, provide a programme for dealing with the land question that may seem, and in fact is, revolutionary, and yet is the minimum that will provide an adequate financial basis for national planning.

The Report of the Scott Committee is a document of a totally different character. It touches on every kind of activity connected with the countryside, and makes a great number of commendable suggestions for improvement. Many of these are in the nature of "prods" to authorities and organisations who are already advancing along the routes suggested and who will no doubt welcome the stimulus. It is useful to have this compendium of rural reform, but impossible in this article to do justice to it. The chapter on the pattern of the countryside is an example of the tendency of geography and economic history to blend; its angle of vision is not mine, but the picture drawn is engaging and revealing and makes a contribution to the

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understanding of the subject. The Report has been criticised for being too much concerned for the pictorial and traditional, and too little with the economic and dynamic, aspects of the countryside. Some who have made this criticism, which is a valid one, would themselves have ignored altogether the considerations which the Report overstates. The rapturous welcome given to it by some of the landscapists and countryside preservationists is accounted for by the lack of attention paid to cultural factors in state documents in the past. No one will ever find an agreed formula for the right balance of tradition and aesthetics against the impulses to change and mechanisation—a problem of society as a whole and not only of rural areas. The trend to organisational bigness, not only in farming, but in business and in governmental units, is not wholly advantageous, and has been accepted, by both main schools of political thought, all too uncritically. Novelty and an enthusiasm for technical progress are not sufficient ingredients for a philosophy of aesthetics in any art or craft; least of all in that of building and the design of human settlements. A manifesto in favour of stability in culture and considerate driving of the chariot of “progress” is not therefore in itself unwelcome. But anyone who challenges the spirit of an age needs great astuteness and tact. The majority of the Scott Committee, in their statement of agricultural policy, gave more openings to the criticisms of their economist minority—Professor Dennison—than they need have done. And by disclosing a prime interest in the pictorial and traditional aspects of the countryside in too many paragraphs dealing with other matters they provoke the charge of being nostalgic and of regretting changes on the whole beneficial.

The terms of reference of the Committee were to consider the conditions which should govern development in country areas consistent with the maintenance of agriculture, and in particular factors affecting the location of industry, having regard to economic operation, part-time and seasonal employment, the well-being of rural communities, and preservation of rural amenities. To a certain extent the Report re-surveys the Barlow territory; less authoritatively, because it had not the advantage of receiving the same wide

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range of evidence on the subject. It accepts industrial decentralisation as, on balance, advantageous to the countryside. If it seems to do so with some reluctance, this is explained, I think, by the deep impression made on those who care for the countryside by the unplanned and ill-considered building development of the inter-war years. On the general question the conclusion agrees with the consensus of opinion among town-planners with economic and sociological knowledge—that industrial decentralisation should not take the form of the location of isolated factories in rural areas, but that factories and industrial estates should be grouped in the existing smaller towns and new towns, and in some of the medium-sized towns where there may be a surplus of workers. The Committee are rightly opposed to the siting of large factories in villages unless such villages have been chosen as nuclei for deliberate extension into small industrial towns. The only types of industry suitable for villages which it is intended should remain villages are the types related to agriculture; but the impression most of us have that such industries and industries of the craft type do not offer a prospect of a substantial amount of rural employment, is not contested by the Report. Where sites for new towns are chosen, the Committee are insistent that the better qualities of agricultural land shall be avoided—a view with which all can agree provided that the principle is not exaggerated to the point of distorting location in respect of economic and sociological considerations.

Much attention is paid in the Report to the extremely important questions of the physical fabric and social facilities of villages and country towns. The recommendations on these matters are all in the right direction, though in some cases they are hardly specific enough to give the authorities a clear mandate as to what to do next, and leave a good deal to be worked out in respect of legislative principles, quantities, priorities, and costs. An example is the case of rural housing. Better rural housing is eloquently advocated, and some elements of good design, apt to be neglected, are stressed. But the rules which should guide a national rural housing policy are not analysed, and insufficient guidance is given as to the extent to which housing should be expected

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to be economically self-supporting. This is admittedly a difficult matter, and in fact no clear principle has ever been evolved in the policy of urban housing either; the Committee are in good company in their vagueness on this point.

A very important and fundamental issue arises in the difference of opinion between the majority of the Committee and its one-man minority. The majority take it as "axiomatic" that a large and prosperous agriculture will be maintained in peace-time, even though this means the continuance of state bounties to agriculture. They find this essential to their whole conception of the future of the countryside. If the rural population is not to decline, not only must the maximum area be kept in cultivation, but it must be ensured that mechanisation and rationalisation will not proceed to the length of a big displacement of farm labour, and that agricultural wages will be sufficiently equated with industrial wages to check the drift of workers to the towns. In some places in the Report it is assumed that state policy will, somehow or other, ensure all these things; while in other places the expectation that economic trends will in themselves be more favourable to British agriculture after the war is entertained. Professor Dennison is thus given the opportunity of an orthodox economist's holiday, which he seizes upon and enjoys to the full. So complete is his mastery in the economic battle, that he is even able to proceed, very dashing and surprisingly, to mopping-up operations in the field of æsthetics and amenities.

Yet I cannot help thinking that the majority were unwary rather than short of munitions in this part of their campaign, and that it might be fought more successfully. Considered in long-term perspective it is surely an economic anomaly, a strange world accident, that food-growing, the oldest and most indispensable of all industries, is, over wide areas, one of the least remunerative both to capital and labour. It is arguable that the world is so near the limits of its agricultural productivity that this discrepancy cannot be long maintained, altogether apart from the world-wide political disposition to correct it. The very process of industrialisation, with its corollary of a rise in the purchasing power and standard of

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living of the masses, should at no distant date produce a demand for food products that will necessitate an increase of the output of world agriculture; and while some of this may be achieved by higher capitalisation and intensified production, it is difficult to believe that it will not involve the productive use everywhere of reasonably good soils. England and Wales are countries, as things go, of high-quality land. Because they are also countries of high industrial production, is it likely that their own agricultural land, close up to their vast urban markets, will for all time be unable to yield a good living to farmers and farm-workers without heavy subsidies from the state? And if there is substance in this question, is it not wise for public policy, in view of all the other considerations, to tide agriculture over a period of difficulty created by a world market condition that cannot be expected to last?

Not being an economist I cannot myself answer these questions. But I feel they are implicit in the assumptions of the Scott majority, and that it was only because they were not asked in accepted economic jargon that they were not taken seriously by Professor Dennison. The latter's brilliant solo effort therefore leaves me in considerable doubt as to whether the majority are not, after all, essentially right, though their lightheartedness on economic and financial questions is not defensible.

This, however, while it is a matter of first-class importance, is rather outside the main scope of this article. Whatever the future of agriculture, whether it is to be so large as to absorb the maximum area of cultivable land in this country or whether it is to be highly mechanised and productive on a contracted area, the same physical pattern of town and country is indicated. The Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports imply and support the same essential pattern: a wider diffusion of urban industry, not scattered but grouped, less of it in the larger cities and more of it in the smaller towns and new towns; a better regional diversification of industry; the reservation of wide areas of rural land from all forms of non-agricultural development; more direct social and economic exchange between the towns and their rural hinterlands; and a national policy which takes more thought

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for and more deliberately provides the facilities for local community life.

All this requires an increased measure of public planning and control. The debate continues as to the machinery and scope of that control, which must be neither weak nor dictatorial. The machinery suggested by the Uthwatt and Scott Reports, and for that matter the Barlow Report, needs further consideration. But there is now a general consensus of opinion as to the town and country pattern at which national policy should aim. To carry it out effectively requires much greater public knowledge and an immense amount of expert consideration and hard work. The interest, the elements of understanding, and much of the will and capacity exist. What we now await is a decision by the Government on the principles to be applied in planning, and the appointment of a strong Minister or group of Ministers and a capable executive, to translate these principles into a working programme.

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By A. CREECH JONES, M.P.

IN the urgencies of the present war, the quickening of public interest in colonial problems is an arresting feature. The British public have shown in the past too little curiosity as to the way colonial affairs are managed. The whole business seems to them a bit off their own main track of interests and experience. But a change is evident. The challenging criticisms in America, the disasters in the Far East and the world-wide influences of movements of revolution, nationalism, freedom and independence, have provoked discussion and anxiety as to the assumptions of British colonial policy.

Few Government Departments are less known to the public than the Colonial Office. Ministers come and go; usually, they disturb no more than the surface of departmental life; the permanent officials remain and things run on very much in the tradition and habit which have grown up over the years. There are, of course, changes in organisation and emphasis; there is some adaptation to new circumstances and events; all of which are carried out cautiously and leisurely. But the permanence and knowledge of the civil servants (originally assistants and advisers to Ministers) assure them a strength and authority which none but forceful Ministers can challenge. In any case, it seldom happens that a Minister takes possession of the Colonial Office and stays long enough to know its problems and to achieve any substantial programme of permanent value. Already, since the last war, sixteen Secretaries of State have made brief sojourns in this office. Joseph Chamberlain made the best record in the period since the Office has existed as a separate department—he stayed eight years. Earl Grey, ninety years ago, stayed six years, and both these statesmen were able to influence colonial policy. Most of the other Ministers, as Colonial Ministers, are forgotten. The Colonial Office is too often made a house of call. It is public indifference which allows a Parliamentary system to tolerate the inconsequence of Ministers when behind the Office is the living

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reality of lands and peoples; vast ignorance, disease and poverty; and the perplexities of race, religion and the varying stages of social development. And it is odd that the peoples of Britain, a great Imperial power, should be bored when colonial problems are discussed, should know so little about the empire territories, and, in the centre of that empire, should have created few buildings of dignity expressing the needs and spirit of the territories they control.

The Colonial Office, like "No. 10," the India Office, Dominions Office and Foreign Office, shares the title "Downing Street." It occupies part of the Scott "Renaissance" building that borders all one side of that street. The Office remains heaped in little more than the space that was assigned it seventy years ago. Indeed, its files, records and messenger staff spill out of the rooms into the corridors. It looks a gloomy, inconvenient place to work in. In the past year or so, a few additional rooms have been put on the roof; a group of flats—with corridors like a maze—have been acquired near Hyde Park for the Social Services staffs, while recently Dover House in Whitehall has been taken over for the economic staff. The staff in 1876 undoubtedly thought their new building imposing after the leaky, rickety house further down the street which the Office had used for the previous fifty years. The new building certainly provided an impressive room for the Secretary of State—a spacious affair calculated to cool the ardour of any suppliant who enters it and to dwarf the importunities of areas far away!

A few facts about the history of the Office should be mentioned. In 1660 a Committee of the Privy Council for the plantations was appointed to administer the Colonies. For nearly two centuries after that, colonial administration was linked with other State interests—Trade, India, Home Affairs and War. In 1854 it operated as a single office. The Dominions Office split from it in 1925, carrying with it the Dominions, Southern Rhodesia and the three Protectorates in South Africa. The Secretaryship of State dates from 1768.

The Office has thus lived through many fluctuations of fortune. It has seen the loss of the thirteen American states; the consolidation of strategic and trading centres over the

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known world; the movement, in big areas of white settlement, to self-government and dominion status; and the division of Africa. It must be added that many of the territories brought under the British flag in the past century were acquired with little official alacrity; areas sometimes came under protection with no obvious enthusiasm, and the expansion of empire went on with little vision of imperial responsibility. The Office has usually been served with competent administrators. Their conception of British policy has, of course, been influenced by the pressure of variable interests uppermost in public life from time to time—humanitarian, mission, manufacturing, commercial, investing, imperialistic.

No more than forty administrative officers were employed in the Colonial Office when the last war came. To-day, without the Dominions Office, it has nearly three times that number on the Secretariat and a total staff of more than 500. Before 1925 there was no permanent internal organisation for dealing with the major colonial subjects which are common to the dependencies—though the first Committee on Education was set up a little earlier than that. In recent years, the structure of the Office has undergone important changes and some of these must be mentioned.

There are three main Office Divisions: Personnel, Geographical and General. Personnel is concerned with the problem of recruitment and training and conditions in the colonial services. The Geographical Division, the dominant section of the Office, is broken into seven departments, each containing a number of dependencies, grouped chiefly on regional lines and concerned with the broad questions of conditions and policy in its area. The General Division, apart from its interest in defence, imperial and international relations, comprises an Economic Department and a Development and Social Services Department. The Economic Department is particularly concerned just now with the difficulties arising from the war situation and the problems of transport, markets and war production. The Development and Social Services Department deals with Labour, Health, Education, Nutrition, Housing, Agriculture and other such matters. These technical sections have grown in

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size and influence in recent years, as increasing stress has been put on the social and economic needs of the colonial peoples. Indeed, they tend to-day to dwarf the geographical departments. They employ the services of experts and are served by advisory committees. The Secretary of State first appointed a Legal Adviser in 1867, but his advisers on Education, Health, Labour, Agriculture, Welfare, Finance, Business, have all been appointed within the last twenty years. In addition, he has the services of experts and experienced men and women on advisory committees concerned with Health, Education, Penal Administration, Labour, Welfare, Nutrition, and Agriculture and Animal Health. These matters are regularly brought into review in terms of the whole colonial empire as well as in respect to the individual dependencies. This arrangement allows for the separate consideration of broad subjects of concern in colonial development and brings the specialised knowledge of the technician into play in regard to them. It helps to the fuller appreciation and application of a consistent and informed policy in the treatment of problems throughout big areas. The geographical departments make it possible for problems to be considered in any colony from the aspect of internal co-ordination. The success of this dual form of consideration depends, of course, on the enterprise and good sense of the geographical departments and of the hierarchy of the Office, on their appreciation of the importance of the respective subjects, their ability to co-ordinate subjects and establish priority, and to understand the complex background of the respective areas. One suspects at times a greater sense of urgency in the functional departments than in the geographical. It is a pity sometimes that the former departments cannot be given their head.

It is important to note in this connection that the Colonial Office has been too much obsessed with the idea that "the man on the spot" knows best and must be implicitly trusted. It seems never to forget the differences in the empire—its variety in culture and race, its extraordinary complexity in social practice, climate, natural and material resources, religion, geography, economic life and so on. The hierarchy needs to be reminded more of the common problems

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throughout the empire. Ministers have made at times the noblest declarations of liberal principles for the guidance of the officers overseas, but the Office holds firmly to the differences and, in many respects rightly, to the separateness and integrity of each dependency. The White Paper issued with the Draft of the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill in 1940 revealed the Secretary of State at pains to affirm that there would be no uniform policy, no attempt to impose a set pattern from Downing Street. "The resources and needs of individual territories," he said, "respond to no common formula and colonial governments know best the needs of their own territories and should enjoy a wide latitude in the initiation and execution of policies." Legislation is therefore framed in the non-self-governing colonies in the narrow conception of what the Governor regards as the local needs; there is no expert examination there or in Downing Street or Westminster of the issues of policy involved. The problems of how to secure the right balance between local policy and initiative on the one hand and metropolitan direction and control on the other is of fundamental importance, but little of the integrity of a dependency would be sacrificed if the Colonial Office showed more energy in directing Governors in respect to action on many important subjects.

How is the Colonial Office recruited for its task? Mainly from the ordinary Home civil service examinations. The Colonial civil services must not be confused with the Colonial Office staff. They are a completely different and separate body. The highest administrative and technical appointments in the colonies are made by the Colonial Office by selection, though the other appointments are made by the local colonial governments. But the recruitment of the Colonial Office is by the home examination, though not absolutely. Each year a small number of men from the colonial service are seconded for work for a period in Downing Street. The technical advisers are special appointments and may come from the colonial services or from outside. A few of the senior officials have also come from the colonial services: occasionally they may be appointed from unusual sources. The present Permanent Under-

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Secretary, Sir George Gater, came from local government ; a former Under-Secretary was provided by the Foreign Office.

Uneasiness has been expressed in some quarters about the way the Colonial Office is staffed. Some critics would like greater interchangeability with the colonial services ; others a unified service of the Office and the colonies ; and others a preponderance of persons born and recruited in the colonies. These matters I need not discuss, as they have recently been examined by the Fabian Colonial Bureau and made the subject of a published report.¹ It is unquestionably desirable that persons recruited to the Colonial Office staff should be required to take a special course in colonial studies—in government, economics and social science. This is not the case to-day. They should spend, as is the present practice, a couple of their early years in the service of a colony. This period might well be longer. And colonials should be encouraged to take the appropriate examinations for the Colonial Office and more of them should be appointed to the technical departments. Several have recently been selected for service in the Welfare Department of the Colonial Office. More of the Colonial Service men should be brought to administer in the Office. In those and other ways a greater sense of actuality and urgency can be brought to the Office. The knowledge that problems are being handled in an understanding atmosphere would probably inspire in the colonial people a greater degree of confidence in the Office. But I am less certain that the creation of a unified service of Downing Street and the colonies would mean that problems would be handled in a more liberal or sympathetic spirit.

On another point, the Colonial Office would gain by the admission to its ranks of more women. There are as yet only three in the responsible grades, whereas their co-operation in such matters as health, housing, education, labour, would be of inestimable value. The social and industrial developments of the future ahead give urgency to this plea.

The Colonial Office is not over-communicative about its activities and policy. If its activities were more on the beaten track of general public interest, it probably would be more informative. It savours too much of a bureaucracy because

¹*Downing Street and the Colonies.* Fabian Society and Allen and Unwin.

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it is too little subject to public criticism. There is, nevertheless, more specialised interest than is usually assumed. A number of societies in London are concerned with the economic, social and cultural development of the colonies, or with research, welfare and political action. There are a few learned and scientific bodies interested in medicine, language and agricultural research. All do important work and contribute their stream of knowledge through their journals, lectures, etc., to making enlightened opinion. Political parties also profess an interest, but Ministers are apt to pretend that colonial matters are mainly outside party controversy. Why this should be, when policy is often a matter of keen interest to many economic interests, it is difficult to see. There is, consequently, little political drive. Colonial questions, however, occupy a good place on the Order Paper of the House of Commons every week. Nevertheless, in existing Parliamentary conditions the volume of informed criticism playing on the Department cannot be large. The limited parliamentary and public interest encourages an aloofness in the Colonial Office from the urgencies and compulsions of popular feeling and ideas. Yet it cannot be said that the Office is altogether insensible to the limited parliamentary criticism there is, or altogether unresponsive to constructive suggestions. It appears to pay some respect to the advice offered it by the expert bodies it has created to assist it. But its machinery and relationships are cumbersome and slow. The bureaucracy appears to lack strength and convictions as to what policy should be secured. It has enlightened, well-disposed men in its ranks, but it is clear that they find the traditions and practices of the Office hard to surmount. The Office is tender in driving a reactionary local administration for reasons already mentioned ; it seems often inept because of its consciousness of the complexities of colonial problems ; it often appears too compromising with important interests which can make their weight felt. So we get a situation described by Lord Harlech a few years ago : "There has never been a British imperial policy in regard to its colonial dependencies—only an immense variety of improvisations and adjustments as events and the somewhat capricious pressure of Parliament may from time to

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time determine". "The one thing constant in British colonial policy has been the determination of the Colonial Office to devolve the maximum powers into the periphery, to diminish the initiative and power of its Secretary of State and to exalt those of the Colonial Government however constituted." The Secretary of State acts still as the final appeal authority in respect to the grievances of individuals in a colony. He is responsible for appointments and the selection of Governors overseas. While strictly speaking, he has no executive authority within a colony, by the terms of the commission of the Governor, the latter is bound to carry out the directions of the Crown communicated to him by the Secretary of State. The Colonial Office is thus vested with ultimate power to enforce decisions. In fact, the constitutions of all our dependencies are such (with the exception of a few colonies in the West Indies) that the Crown can enact any law which the Secretary of State deems fit. Nevertheless, the policy of the Colonial Office is seldom strong and determined.

Events are, however, pulling the department into the main current of popular interest. The assumptions of colonial policy are being challenged outside the Office and questioned within. In Parliament the spokesmen of the colonial hierarchy seem hardly as yet to know that revolutionary processes are disturbing the foundations of policy, that the tempo of change has been accelerated and that the war and other factors are producing situations that brook no delay. Some of the Colonial Office departments are obviously willing to explore, are increasingly concerned about social well-being and economic change, but, somehow, the impression given is that the directors of policy seem scarcely to discern the impact of movements and influences on the colonial people. The Office is pedestrian in manner and unimaginative in conception. The world changes with astonishing rapidity and problems can no longer wait for their solution for more propitious moments after the war. The disintegrating forces need to be dealt with now: hopes that the empire will emerge from the war stronger and better-knit only inhibit thought and action. There should be no room in the bureaucracy at home and overseas for the tired and the reactionaries who are incapable of ques-

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tioning the assumptions on which their administration is based.

I imagine that the majority of the Office would welcome greater publicity about their problems. In some respects, there are achievements of great importance to tell. Why should the public not be told? Healthy criticism and the ventilation of opinion are not possible if we are all kept in ignorance. It is true that a publicity office has been operating for several years with deliberate press contacts and occasional press conferences, that posters are reappearing in the streets and more film and broadcast work is being done. But it is difficult for the public to obtain current and reliable information about affairs from the Colonial Office. It still likes to hide what light there is under a bushel. This year it estimates for its publications no more than £400, one-third of the cost of transferring a Governor from the Bahamas to Uganda, or the passage allowances of the Duke of Windsor when appointed to the Bahamas! The Ministry of Home Security will, at the same time, spend forty times that amount on its publications. But the Colonial Office, responsible for fifty separate administrations, serving a population of 50 million and more (double the populations of the self-governing Dominions), must keep its activities to itself. Parliament clamoured a year or so before the war for an annual survey of Colonial Office activities. A survey was produced in 1937-8 and in 1938-9. The publication stopped. An annual volume on trade and statistics called "The Economic Survey of the British Empire" was produced for a number of years. That no longer appears. The Committee responsible for the administration of the Colonial Development Fund published an annual report on its work, but since the 1940 Act no reports on the progress under the Act have been made. The Royal Commission Report on the West Indies was never published and the report of the Copper Belt Enquiry in 1940 could scarcely be obtained in London. Seldom is the report of a Colonial official issued now, and a number of reports of special investigations undertaken for the Government by specialists remain unpublished. A few annual departmental reports of colonial governments are published, but the general annual reports of colonies are no longer available. Even the annual reports on the mandatory territories are

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unpublished. An occasional White Paper on some important aspect of policy may appear on rare occasions, but the little information that trickles to public notice is usually obtained from non-official sources or by meagre answers to questions and debate in Parliament.

Parliament and the public acquiesce in this obscurity: it fits their normal apathy and ignorance. The public believes our imperial tradition to be liberal and tolerant; it forgets that a responsibility to 50 million people cannot be discharged in ignorance. Confidence is disturbed all too rarely by some dramatic happening in the empire that reveals the inadequacy of imperial administration in the changing conditions of the world. The Colonial Office is almost a silent office. So long as these conditions remain, the Office can only be kept up to the mark with difficulty; in the absence of popular sentiment and informed criticism, the tendency to bureaucracy must remain strong.

Parliament has plainly failed to link the public with the colonial administration for which it is responsible. Machinery for knowing and examining colonial problems does not, in effect, exist at Westminster. Future planning depends on reliable statistics, but in spite of warnings and the strictures of Commissions, vital statistics and elementary census figures nowhere exist. Practically no colonial problem can be accurately measured to-day and it seems to be nobody's business. Colonial ministers have been trusted. The public has inclined to the view that the noble pronouncements on colonial policy would act as important pointers to action. Great authority and responsibility have therefore reposed in the hands of Ministers, which is another way of saying that they have reposed in the hands of the Colonial Office officials. There have been bad periods of timidity and weakness. On the other hand, it may be argued that the existence of the British Commonwealth itself owes something to the good sense of the Colonial Office. And undoubtedly the pre-occupation of the Office with the developing dominions overseas has created a tradition and built up a habit of thought which are not without importance to the future of the non-self-governing or more backward colonies.

The Colonial Office attitude to development overseas has

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been more negative than positive. That has been the reflection of the attitude of Parliament. There have been, unhappily, many colonial episodes which have shocked our sensibilities. We remember them to-day with shame. We have been guilty of infinite neglect and in consequence, even after allowing for the nature of the colonial background and the consequent difficulties to be overcome. Only since the white settlements overseas have achieved their full self-governing status has the conception of trusteeship slowly come to mean some positive and constructive purpose in the colonial empire. And even yet there has been no general systematic survey of colonial policy as a whole. Pronouncements have usually been made on specific issues as they have arisen and then given a wider applicability.

Parliament has endorsed the caution and timidity shown by the bureaucracy. Policies are often a compound of political expediency—ingredients of moods, influences and pressures of interest and convictions of a comparatively small public. The doctrine of *laissez-faire* dominated the minds of Parliament and of all in authority over a period long after it had collapsed in this country. They regarded the colonies either as a nuisance which should be left largely to themselves, or as tributaries to the wealth of Britain. Even the 1929 Colonial Development Act was more concerned for unemployment in Britain than colonial welfare. The police policy of good order fitted in with the desires of British industry—trade expansion, free trade, peace. Communication with the colonies was slow and the Colonial Office relied on its servants scattered far and wide, to make the best of local conditions with as little bother to, and aid from, Britain as possible. It discovered a number of distinguished men who governed with fairness and tolerance, suppressed abuses and violence, and administered justice with impartiality. Some of them showed imagination and enterprise in their conception of colonial growth. But too many of the Governors were far less concerned and successful.

I believe the public would welcome a bold and courageous Colonial Office. The influence of the old ideas, the obsessions which satisfied the "interests" and decried the essence of partnership, which condoned colour conventions, segregation,

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parallel institutions, land alienation and the rest, still linger. We can take little unction to our souls for the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. The colonial situation had long become intolerable, lit by the blazes in West Indies, the Copper Belt and Mauritius. We were frequently met with calls for aid by colonies facing hopeless distress through economic and other disasters. When the war came, trusteeship was little expressed in positive and constructive terms and many dependencies were burdened with debt. Social squalor, mass illiteracy, disease, malnutrition were frequent terms in a great number of reports. The West Indies Commission forced a new approach. Consequently, the war has seen developments in labour policy in most colonial areas; it has brought more economic collaboration with neighbours, an effort at better balanced economies, more food production, the initiation of small industries and other improvements.

The present assumptions of policy remain inadequate or unsound. Will the Colonial Office pronounce in unequivocal terms a new political status for the dependencies, its policy in respect to plural societies and common citizenship, its determination to build up rapidly social standards and material prosperity? It faces a difficult world which will be impatient of sloth and unimaginative routine. It functions in a world in which all have an interest in all. There are no imperial "reserves." Moreover, the conquest of air and ether, the use of electricity and new forms of transport, and the economic and political interlocking and changes, now call for a new technique. There must be less dependence on the impedimenta of the old order—circulars and despatches, minutes and lengthy correspondence, respect for precedents good and bad—all the slow formal procedure that wanders interminably as frustration and desperate needs increase in the areas concerned.

The Colonial Office needs to be organised and equipped for the immense tasks before it. The dead wood should be cut out from the department and procedures simplified. The Office should exert more pressure on colonial governments and insist on action and vigorous administration; it should codify the experience brought to its attention and use it; and it should mobilise research into the basic problems still

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baffling colonial administrators. If public apprehension is to be allayed, the Colonial Office must not wait on the initiative of local governments which are too often obsessed with the difficulties and lack of money and anxiety to make no demands on British funds.

The problems of the war are heavy—defence, strategic and political collaboration and economic organisation are obvious preoccupations of the Colonial Office now. But financial and economic problems in the colonies call for much more specialised attention than so far they have received. The economic department should concern itself more with the internal economies of the respective colonies, their food supplies, new industries, economic planning and programmes of development. A degree of economic co-ordination is being achieved in West Africa by the appointment of a Minister of State charged to resolve some of the problems of the war effort in that area. The work of the Comptroller and his advisers in the West Indies is beginning to become apparent and many comprehensive proposals for social improvement and educational advance are under consideration. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary now presides over a committee recently set up to examine and approve schemes submitted by the Colonial Governments under the 1940 Act. The Secretary of State has also recently called into being the nucleus of a research committee entrusted with the task of putting research on a regular basis and directing it in a proper scheme where the need is greatest. Nor should the Labour Advisory Committee be overlooked: its possibilities are immense in supervising industrial legislation and encouraging labour protective codes and combination in curbing the exploitation of cheap labour. The Office is fortified, as already mentioned, with important technicians and Advisory Committees on the varied problems of colonial interest to which reference has already been made. The Secretary of State is giving important guidance by circulars on matters of nutrition, building material, labour, social services, health, food production and many other matters. His technical advisers visit the colonial areas and one of his senior officials is touring the colonies as his representative, for the discussion of local problems on the spot.

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Meantime, in Parliament, among Conservatives, a demand has become vocal for a Colonial Development Board of big interests with directors, each concerned with some aspect of colonial affairs. There are objections to this in the light of all the existing advisory machinery now operating. Nothing should be done to diminish the authority of the Secretary of State or to embarrass him in discharging his responsibility. His policy is the Government's policy and he answers for it to Parliament. It is important that no other authority should duplicate his office or diminish his powers in respect to the broad policy determined by H.M. Government except in so far as that authority is delegated to a colony as self-government becomes an active principle in the territory concerned. A Standing Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, on the other hand, would supply the link missing between British democracy and the colonial administration. It would subject policy to searching examination, question its assumptions and consequently revitalise Colonial Office work. It need usurp none of the authority of the Secretary of State, but advise him on the important principles of administration and the application of these principles in the varying circumstances of the Empire. It would make its own investigations and submit reports to him, and these would be published. In its work, the Committee should seek the co-operation of representatives from the areas under consideration. They would sit with the Committee when their problems are being dealt with. The Standing Joint Committee would see that the colonial peoples were actively associated and consulted in respect to all developments. It would encourage research and stimulate the administrations throughout the colonial empire by bringing their work and their problems under annual review. The need for such machinery, in view of the limited information and time available in Parliament for the consideration of colonial questions, was broadly recognised before the war began. It is the more necessary to-day, in the altered circumstances of the world. Such a Committee would focus more constructive and informed criticism in Parliament, stimulate its interest and compel a better discharge of our national responsibility to the colonial peoples.

JEWISH PROBLEMS¹

By M. POLANYI

I
TO live as a Jew is a peculiar and sometimes perplexing task. There is no accepted doctrine as to what obligations one Jew owes to another; how far they belong together within one country or across the frontiers. Zionists regard Jews as a nation of Hebrews. Their opponents, pursuing assimilation, insist that Jews must remain a mere religious denomination; that they are just Englishmen, Scotsmen, Frenchmen, Americans, Russians, etc.—as it may be—who happen to be of the Judaic faith. Both views are obviously forced—expressing somewhat crudely a particular programme, rather than facing the facts. Actually, some Jews best known as such to the world were men like Heine, Marx, Disraeli, Einstein, who neither spoke Hebrew nor professed the Jewish faith; and there are a great many people of this kind, commonly called Jews, who do not belong to any visible kind of Jewish community but whose lives, nevertheless, are profoundly affected by the fact of their Jewish descent—just as on the other hand the existence of these Jews is of decisive importance to the whole Jewish community, down even to its most orthodox roots.

The fact that official spokesmen of a community should give two conflicting definitions of its membership—both of them bluntly excluding a great number of the men who are best known to the world as the representatives of that group, does indeed reveal an extraordinary and perplexing situation. Jews cannot expect to play a reasonable part in the world unless they first clarify their views concerning themselves as a group. This is not impossible if only one is prepared to face the facts. I believe that a glance at Jewish history will show that the present internal conflicts and ambiguities between Jews merely reflect the unavoidable difficulties of their historical situation and I am confident that once these difficulties are squarely met they need not confuse us much longer nor weaken our standing and future action.

¹ Address delivered to the Manchester Branch of the Trades Advisory Council of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 24th September, 1942.

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II

The position of Jews to-day is determined in the first instance by the fact that their forefathers 2500 years ago made the momentous innovation of adopting a single God of righteousness as their tribal deity. The fervour of the Bible was the fervour of the Israelites, and much of it continues to live in their descendants to-day. Religious fervour brought the Palestinian history of the Jews to an end when, by colliding head on with the claims of the Roman Empire, it involved the country in complete destruction and caused the Jews to be dispersed through the whole world. Soon after came a second collision when Rome became Christian, and the great rival religion, an offspring itself of Judaic fervour, became dominant over the western world. The new religion, now in power, reduced the adherents of the old one to the position of a hardly tolerated, contemptuously treated sect. But, fortunately for the Jews, the Roman Empire did not outlast this event very long and it was not until the time of the Norman Conquest that Christianity once more succeeded in consolidating its power over Europe. Up to that time the Jews, often in contact with the Arabs, continued to develop their intellectual heritage and remained well at the head of the cultural elite of the West.

The decisive blows against Jewry which were to fix our position until the opening of the 19th century, began to fall thick and fast soon after the forces of the new Christian civilisation deployed their might. Christendom in its medieval glory could tolerate no heretics. The Jews were overpowered, exiled, hunted, and finally their remnants imprisoned within the walls of the Ghetto.

The process went on in different ways in the various parts of Europe, but was practically completed everywhere by the close of the Middle Ages. For the then following 500 years, that is all through the formative period of the Modern Age, the Jews lived in isolation. It was a case of purely religious persecution. The situation was maintained by the pressure of one religion from one side and the unyielding tenacity of another religion from the other side. The Jews accepted at this time in the Shulchan Aruch a newly defined

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ritual code of unsurpassed strictness, regulating every detail of orthodox life. Every action and every thought was ruled by a meticulous discipline and any sign of laxity was watched and checked as a portent of defection. In fact while the physical gates of the Ghetto were guarded from outside, its spiritual and intellectual gates were locked from within.

During the 500 years of isolation in the Ghetto, Jewry produced nothing of general human value. Rabbinic scholarship, maintained with unflinching devotion, was largely wasted in elaborating fruitless talmudist speculations. In the world around us men were embarking on great oceans of new inspirations and were discovering continent after continent of new truth; but we remained sitting in the dark, visited in our seclusion only by occasional waves of crude, fanatical visions of a national Messiah. The brute force of the Christian authorities, helped by the vigilance of the Jews, succeeded in reducing the heritage of Jewry to stagnation and decay.

III

Then came the time when modern civilisation began to spread from England and France to the less advanced countries of the world. Modernisation was a military and economic necessity and it engaged the political and intellectual eagerness of progressive forces everywhere. Enlightened rulers from Peter the Great to Kemal Ataturk started it with a strong hand from above, while national leaders from Kossuth to Sun Yat Sen spread it through the masses below. It created nation-states; merging the population inside their frontier into one mass of equal citizenship under one common law; educating the population to speak the national language and to feel themselves different from people elsewhere; exacting national loyalty unconditionally and to the exclusion of any other allegiance.

Had the Jews at this time been living together on one patch of land, the process of their modernisation would have occurred similarly and a Jewish nation would have been born. Some Peter would have risen to cut off forelocks and beards and some Ataturk to scrap skull caps and kaftans. Perhaps the Yiddish vernacular would have been standardised or Hebrew been revived as our common language. In any

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case, after overcoming the usual resistance of antiquated opinions and claims, the reformers would have established a more or less westernised Jewish national State.

But the Jews were dispersed, living in small settlements surrounded by a vast majority of other kinds of people. Their westernisation could not be achieved by a national renaissance. If they were to become citizens of a modern State at all, this could happen only by disrupting their own internal cohesion: by cutting their internal bonds, all along the frontiers of the new national territories, and allowing each separate section to become absorbed by the country to which it would thus become apportioned.

To this new situation a certain number of Jews did respond. The modern rationalist ideas had penetrated into the Ghetto and weakened the hold of religious customs. The new latitudinarianism showed the way to relax ritual while retaining religion in a more spiritualised form. The outlook of equal citizenship within the national state offered tempting facilities for a broader and more useful life. Many of our ancestors, recognising themselves disgracefully backward, were overwhelmed by the contact with a superior culture. They rebelled against the ties of orthodoxy and entered on the path of assimilation.

Such a process could possibly take place in two ways: either in groups, that is by reform of general Jewish customs on modern lines, or else individually by the action of single persons deciding to give up their Jewish characteristics and to mix with the surrounding national community. The dispersion of the Jews, placing small separate colonies in widely different conditions, hindered a movement of reform in large coherent masses. It increased, on the other hand, the opportunities for contacts which could lead to individual assimilation. Hence the latter process became altogether prevalent and it is mainly the progress of individual assimilation which has determined the position of the Jews to-day.

IV

All through the period of Jewish seclusion there was a trickle of individual Jewish assimilation going on and in the 17th century one of the outcasts from Jewry, a grinder of

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lenses in Amsterdam, Baruch Spinoza, gave a world-wide demonstration of the fruitfulness of the process, by establishing a new great system of rational philosophy. But when about the time of Napoleon Jewish assimilation started in numbers, there occurred a veritable invasion of intellectual life by Jewish newcomers. The list of their great names has often been compiled and is mentioned with pride by many a Jewish writer.

Yet in a sense the event does by no means represent a straightforward Jewish success. The names of Heine, of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of Ricardo, Marx, Disraeli, do prove the presence of genius among Jews. But since all these were baptised Jews, their achievements may also indicate that Jewish talent is most effectively released by baptism. Or at least that Jewish triumphs are bound up with the neglect of distinctive Jewish traditions.

In fact, the process of assimilation has, I believe, demonstrated this beyond a doubt. For over a century there kept pouring forth from the Jewish community a stream of individual Jews possessing more or less talent or genius, undergoing baptism or retaining their religion only in an abstract and often quite superficial form while actually severing their ties to Jewish tradition and Jewish circles. Why did these men abandon their tradition and the community of their kinsfolk? They were the same stock which had so often braved the stake for its religion. Some of them, like Marx, gave examples of great courage in facing exile and poverty for the sake of an idea. These men were not tempted by the easy fruits of apostasy. The reason for their desertion lay not in the lack of moral scruples, but sprang, on the contrary, from a profound urge to embrace the greater causes of mankind. They rebelled against the Jewish tradition which they found narrow and uninspiring; and they were found justified when, by stepping into the current or modern civilisation, they succeeded in making a major contribution to it.

Usually a people is best represented by its most eminent sons. Frederick II and Goethe—are Germany; Peter the Great and Tolstoi—are Russia; Louis XIV, Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, Rousseau—they are France; and they

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represent these nations at their peak. But the more eminent a modern Jew is, the less Jewish he becomes, the less is he usually concerned with Jewry, the less is he attached to Judaism. Our great men do not demonstrate the greatness of our distinctive tradition, but rather reveal—by the success of those who abandoned that tradition—its state of sheer exhaustion.

The broad masses of Jewry were not reached by the movement towards modernisation until well after the process of individual assimilation had got on its way. General reform, like individual assimilation, involved a hard struggle against orthodoxy, and around the middle of last century this struggle led to the splitting of Jewry into two parts: an orthodox community retaining its old elaborate distinctive ritual and a new body of Judaism following a more spiritualised form of the faith. Reform brought parts of the Jewish masses nearer to the position of the assimilated vanguard, but the separation continued essentially as before. It remained true that in general the higher a Jew rose in the world, the more he became removed from Jewry.

V

The various degrees of assimilation, achieved by the various groups of Jews, have led to a second dispersal of Jewry. Jews are now not only spread out over all countries, but also spread out over a wide range of Jewishness in each country. There is a mass of orthodox Jewry, speaking Yiddish, their men with forelocks, their married women with wigs over their shaven skulls. They recall the original mass of medieval degradation and mental narrowness to which most of our ancestors belonged about 150 years back. And there exist various Jewish communities and circles representing all stages between the original Ghetto and the final dilution of the Jewish blood through intermarriage to a point where it loses all recollection of its own sources.

Those at the head of these straggling columns progressing towards complete assimilation are not the leaders of those behind them, but often seem rather to be running away from them. They are not supported, but only hampered by those who follow them. Their tendency is to cut themselves loose

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from the less assimilated Jews, because that facilitates the more intensified contacts which they are establishing with the non-Jewish world. The advance guard of assimilation may therefore be inclined to lose their feeling of solidarity with the less assimilated Jews, who are to them a constant source of embarrassment in the task of assimilation.

Naturally, the Jews left behind sometimes resent their treatment by the more prosperous and distinguished Jews whom they see drawing away from them to gain firmer ground in non-Jewish circles. They feel deserted by the more successful Jews who leave them, the poorer people possessing no exceptional gifts for advancement, to carry the burden of a more rigorous Judaic tradition.

Moreover, the reactions of the outside world to assimilation tend to increase the disruption of the Jewish community. Assimilation was sponsored by the modern idea of equal national citizenship. It flourished during the forward march of the new democratic nationalism in the latter half of the 19th century. But as opposition to democracy gathered force, there arose—first in Germany during the economic crisis of the seventies—a new political form of Jew-baiting which became known by the scholarly name of Anti-Semitism. Those Jews who, by assimilation, had ceased to be subject to religious persecution, were henceforth met by an attack based on racial discrimination. Each different stage of assimilation was faced with its special kind of opposition and each Jew had to fight his separate battle according to his grade on the scale of assimilation. These new diversified troubles increased the estrangement and distrust between the various grades of Jews.

VI

In the last years of the 19th century, there arose among the Jews themselves a vigorous reaction against assimilation. Jewish nationalism, buried for almost a century, rose again with the appearance in 1896 of Theodor Herzl, a Jewish lawyer from Budapest. Another, even more important beginning was started during the last war by a chemist, the Polish Jew, Chaim Weizmann, then living in Manchester.

This movement, which became known as Zionism,

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attempted to collect once more all Jews dispersed by the process of assimilation. It caused some Jews, well distinguished in the non-Jewish world, to reaffirm more closely their community with the poorest and most backward of their fellow-Jews. They proposed to do for these what so many other leaders had done for their people during the period of Modernisation. To weld them into a modern political state and to fill them with a new national consciousness by reviving the long disused language of their ancestors. The task involved in this case the return to the ancient home country : thus raising special problems of great political and moral difficulty with regard to the now indigenous population of that country.

With these special problems I need not deal here. Even had they not arisen, the impression of Zionism on most of the Jews advancing towards assimilation would yet have remained slight, so long as the path of assimilation was generally kept open. But a great change occurred with the advent of Hitler to power in 1933. When Hitler condemned all Jews in Germany—the orthodox, the reformed, the baptised and even those with only a fraction of Jewish blood alike—to the same common destruction, Zionism suddenly appeared in a new prophetic light. The fall of German Jewry was taken to demonstrate the failure of assimilation in the very land of its greatest success and to justify by contrast the national conception of Jewry. When all Jews once more become outcasts, Jewish unity is automatically restored and at the same time the Holy Land may appear as the only true refuge from persecution.

VII

The time, however, has now passed when Hitler's rise was accepted as the verdict of history ; when his successes over European progress, his destruction of the Law, of Religion, of free Science, were accepted as the proofs of decay—if not of ultimate failure—of these great causes of our civilisation. The time is now to fight him. And when victory comes, Hitler's fall must be made a token for all times of the invincible force of progress towards civilised life.

What then—in the light of this true verdict of history—

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can justify a return to Messianic traditions, from which the best of our forefathers 100 and 150 years ago turned away with such energy and contempt ? How can this faith which seemed outworn and even degrading to men who were brought up in it, now inspire their descendants, educated, and often highly distinguished, in the arts of Western culture ?

My answer is—in all reverence to the earnest endeavour of the Zionists—that in reality very little of such inspiration exists. I can see the practical and humane undertaking of settling some Jews in Palestine. There is here an enterprise in colonisation which offers a refuge to some oppressed people and an adventure to some enterprising ones. The colonists are Jews, a race inclined to reflection, the soil on which they settle is that of the Holy Land, unparalleled on this planet for its associations. That soil is bound to move them, as it moved so many mere travellers : “the clime, and the land, and the name of the land, with all its mighty import.” It is bound to move them the more if they speak Hebrew and cultivate other Jewish reminiscences.

So far I will go, with willing admiration for settlers and organisers alike. I can see good reason for supporting their scheme so long as it does not conflict with more important interests. But I cannot accept that this scheme represents a genuine revival of Jewish national feeling among Jews in general. And it seems to me that even in a good number of Zionists, including some of their leaders, no genuine revival of this kind has occurred.

Zionist ideas have been recently reformulated by Professor L. B. Namier in a collection of remarkable essays.¹ He reveals most penetratingly the moral ordeal of assimilation and through page after page that will long remain classic, he lays bare the painful anomalies of our position. “The obvious conclusion of it all”—he writes—“is that a situation which produces such results should not be continued indefinitely.” (P. 132.) And a little later (p. 156) he declares : “we have adhered to our own religion for thousands of years, whatever price we had to pay for it ; our religion is essentially national in character ; and the core of both our religion and our nationalism has always been the return to the land which

¹ L. B. Namier, *Conflicts*, Macmillan & Co., 1942.

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the Lord has given to us and to our fathers from old and even evermore."

These declarations, however, seem to me to reflect a sentiment rather than to define an actual course of action. Most Zionists in England and America show no practical intention of going to Palestine. For all their feelings against assimilation, they take no steps to discontinue the process. In spite of their high emphasis on the Jewish religion with its Messianic traditions, they may be often found not to believe in that religion at all. In fact some of the most eminent Zionists are—as Professor Namier describes for his own case (p. 172)—almost ignorant of Judaism, while the flower of Jewish settlers in Palestine itself, the Chalusim, are practically without any religion at all. Similarly, while Zionists express the desire that we should all speak Hebrew (p. 167)—they continue to speak and write in excellent English.

Zionism declares that it is not so much concerned with the fate of individual Jews as with their collective existence: "For the sense of grandeur men derive only from the collectivity—the nation." (P. 133). Yet by their practical programme they clearly show that this is not to be taken literally. Jewish organisations have ceased to complain about the fate of the largest single body of Jews, living in the Soviet Union, although there Zionism is prohibited, the use of the Hebrew language suppressed and Judaism, like other religions, is distinctly discouraged. Leading Zionists express acquiescence and even satisfaction with these conditions; apparently because they consider it more important that the Soviets have abolished Anti-Semitism.¹ The practical concern of Zionists is clearly with the victims of Anti-Semitism whom they desire to rescue from their plight and not with the Jewish collectivity or the Jewish sense of grandeur. And that is as it should be.

For the enormous majority of Jews who propose to go on living in the various countries of Europe and America and who are bringing up a family with that future in mind, the declarations of their eternal faith in a return to Palestine can express no real conviction. And the same must be said

¹ Compare, e.g., Norman Bentwich, *New Statesman*, 25th July, 1942, and *Conflicts*, p. 152, 159.

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of all Zionists who do not actually go to live in Palestine as soon as that is physically possible at whatever cost and sacrifice. A faith is not real unless we are prepared to live by its precepts. And we must live by it ourselves; not make others live by it on our behalf.¹

VIII

No, the Jews are not a nation, nor are they just Englishmen, Scotsmen, Frenchmen, etc., who happen to be of the Judaic religion. They are the descendants of a religious tribe which, having given the Bible to the world, ran into a heavy conflict with the later developments of its own ideas, and was ever since left more or less outside the main flow of humanity. They are still recovering from the last 500 years of utter isolation, which was brought to an end only in the course of the past few generations.

The recovery is being achieved by assimilation. We must realise more clearly the great difficulties of this task and face them with determination. This by itself will dissolve most of their confusing and weakening effects. I name only a few points which have to be recognised. Jews are still backward in various ways, and have yet more to learn from the great nations who built up our modern civilisation. We are newcomers; and hence, while we must never allow the legal recognition of our equal citizenship to suffer the slightest limitation, we must realise that it cannot yet be put into full and general operation. The degree to which any Jew can speak for the nation to which he belongs—and will be recognised by his non-Jewish compatriots to have the right to do so—will vary in the most complex fashion with the person of the Jew and the nature of the occasion. Consequently the proper relationships between the Jews themselves are also difficult to define in general terms. Assimilation necessarily means getting away from one another; but it must not mean the casting off of mutual obligations which decency requires between people of one kinship, especially when faced with common troubles.

¹In *Conflicts*, on p. 155 it is said that after the war a "certain number of Jews from countries where the Jewish problem is not patently acute" will desire to settle in Palestine. These countries contain 10–11 million Jews (p. 150). All evidence indicates that Zionists expect 99 per cent of these to stay where they are.

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On all these problems there is a great deal of hard work to be done. For this work a higher mood of candour is needed than has yet been general in Jewish literature. We must get rid of the self-praise and self-pity with which some minor Jewish publicists have been disgracing their fellows. It would also be better to leave to others the trouncing of Anti-Semitism, especially within the English-speaking world. We may trust a people who inspired these lines:

*We would establish those of kindlier build,
In fair compassion skilled,
Men of deep art in life-development;
Watchers and warders of thy varied lands,
Men surfeited of laying heavy hands
Upon the innocent . . .*

Let us rather guard our own steps, and restrain such gestures of truculence, as when a Zionist leader quotes himself saying that he considers himself to be "first a Jew and only in the second place a human being." Such defiance only frightens our friends while causing delight to our enemies. In fact what is needed most, I think, is a thorough course of Jewish self-criticism, scourging all their weaknesses in the style of the ancient prophets. That would establish the right kind of solidarity among ourselves and provide the right tonic to our self-esteem.

IX

Men born to a lesser status must have the candour and humility to face their condition calmly and with the determination to shoulder the task. The acceptance of our inevitable limitations sets our souls free and establishes our human equality. We may then be able to discover any special opportunities that are implied in the disabilities imposed on us. In the case of Jewry such opportunities will be found to arise from the fact of their cosmopolitan outlook. The world is now heading towards a new Western Commonwealth, comprising Europe and North America, in which men of a cosmopolitan kind will be needed. Twice already the Jews, by their dispersion, have been the carriers of universal thought through Europe. During the first three centuries of our era Christianity spread from one Jewish

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settlement to another. Then, only a generation ago, the Jews helped to spread Socialism from country to country. The Soviet Government found good use for the Jews because in view of their antecedents their loyalty could always be relied upon. The Western Commonwealth of the future—which for generations to come will be in danger of particularist dissensions—should be able to rely in a similar fashion on Jews throughout Europe and America.

It is as well—from this point of view—that the Jews should have as yet become only half assimilated. The other half of the process will be achieved during the consolidation of the Western Commonwealth of the future. In order to form that Commonwealth all people of the West will have to undergo some assimilation towards a more uniform type of man. The cosmopolitan character of the Jews will give them a start in this direction. It will provide in their midst a natural affinity to the spirit of the new commonwealth and qualify them to become its most devoted servants.

In certain ways the future Western world will resemble the Roman Empire about the time of Constantine. Its basis will be the rule of law, equal citizenship and a religion rather similar to early Christianity with its admixture of Greek philosophy. The dispersed settlements of the Jews to-day are the most genuine residue of the old Roman Empire and they will fit quite easily into its modern equivalent. The world is changing in a way which will make it into a better home for the Jews. So it will in any case appear to us, once we discover how we can serve it best in our own particular way.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE

By RAYMOND POSTGATE

IT was only the other day that I heard, in a lecture by Professor L. T. Hogben, that Mussolini had ordered Professor Peano of Turin to cease his work. Professor Peano is—or was, I do not even know if he is alive—a distinguished scientist who had been working upon the problems of international language. The results he had secured were, as far as they had any national interest, rather flattering to Italian prejudices. All the same, Mussolini prohibited them; which at first sight is very curious. I think it can only be explained by the theory that Fascism eventually creates a sort of inverted morality which is more instinctive than reasoned. Originally, no doubt, many Fascists and Nazis retained a human affection for the primitive and less useful virtues—physical courage, or narrow patriotism, for example—but in the course of time they have acquired an automatic hatred of anything that is good, simply because it is good, and not because any immediate advantage may be secured by destroying it.

For the adoption of an international language would be an unmixed good, and one which would not (at least not directly) appear to injure even Fascists. Indeed, it might almost be claimed that it could be made part of a Fascist and Nazi victory. In the event of an Axis win there would be two international languages: German for Europe, Africa and the major portions of Canada, the States and South America; Japanese for Oceania, Asia, Alaska, British Columbia, Oregon, Idaho, Washington, California, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and parts of Mexico and the Central American states. (I take it Panama would be officially bilingual.) English and Spanish would no doubt still be taught in elementary schools; in fact, access to the international languages would probably be made a privilege, available only to those permitted to take higher economic or political posts under the regime. Confining all major transactions to those two languages could well be made an additional support of

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the governing class. I am surprised they have not yet thought of it. There is no reason, though, why we should imitate their improvidence.

The world has been deprived of an international language since the seventeenth century, when Latin was abandoned. (Gauss, who died in 1855, wrote in Latin, and earlier scientists such as Harvey, Newton and Leibniz used Latin as the natural and only means of securing the attention of the audience that they needed.) It has suffered from that loss; but I am not going to detail the advantages of an international language, I am presuming that the reader does not need to be instructed on such an elementary topic; I am going to try to estimate what has been done and what is likely to be the future. I am not, apart from the speculations with which I have just amused myself, going to suppose anything but an Axis defeat and an Allied victory.

The international languages, then, offered for our use are of two general kinds—what I will call *constructed* languages in the first place, and in the second *natural* languages and their derivatives.

CONSTRUCTED LANGUAGES

Let us consider the constructed languages first, as they are those which are best known. Nearly everybody has heard of Esperanto; quite a number of people have heard of Volapük and Ido. Very few people have heard of the large number of languages constructed towards the end of last century and the beginning of this, of which the best is probably Novial, invented by the famous Danish philologue Otto Jespersen. If they have, they probably regard their number as an occasion for laughter, and as proving that the whole project is foolish, since even scientists cannot agree on a language. That is, however, a rustic jeer. These languages were mostly not intended for universal adoption; they were laboratory languages. They were put out for trial and testing, and forgotten when they were proved of no value. Ehrlich required 606 attempts before he perfected his most famous discovery; the philologues are far short of that figure as yet.

Volapük was launched in 1879, Esperanto in 1887, and

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the date of Ido I have not by me ; it was in any case a child—a bastard and angrily repudiated child—of Esperanto. It was invented by a noble Frenchman, de Beaufront, who had been a prominent Esperantist and had been allowed to kiss the Founder (Dr. Zamenhof) on one cheek, and the savagery with which his apostasy was greeted can only be appreciated by those who have read the curious literature of this controversy. The improvements which he demanded in Esperanto were in any case too limited to have great effect ; it is not really worth while considering Ido separately at this date. Esperanto and Volapük remain the only “inter-languages” which have been spoken on a large scale.

Volapük was the invention in 1879 of an Austrian parish priest who eventually became a Bishop, Mgr. Schleyer. It had at one time over a million adherents (my own father, a bigoted reactionary, learnt it), twenty-five papers were published in Volapük, 316 manuals were issued and 283 Volapük societies were in existence at one given date (1889). It is a fascinating subject of study, just as Mayan is, for it has a similar charm—that it is completely extinct and unused to-day. The next-of-kin and heir, Esperanto, has covered its ancestor with undeserved ill-fame ; Volapük is commonly supposed to have been an uncouth, narrow and arbitrary jargon. In fact it is in some ways more enlightened than Esperanto. The Bishop was an obstinate and vehement man, inclined to strike down opposition with his crozier, but initially he tried to make the path easy to all nations. He struck the letter R out of his alphabet to oblige the Chinese, and he outlawed all knots of consonants, such as the Esperantists allow (the Esperanto for “squirrel,” *Sciuron*, begins with the noise “sts-”). Indeed he carried this so far that the derivation of his words became a mystery to all but scholars. “Volapük” is simply “World’s speech,” after the removal of all difficult consonants and the substitution of “a” for “s” for the sake of euphony. His Grace felt that this process would be clear to all fair-minded persons ; and a million others agreed with him, up to the year 1889 when the international Kadem Volapüka (Academy of World-Speech) proposed to allow revision, upon which he cursed it and left for ever with his “aifidiks” or Ever-

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faithfuls. It was not only to the strange appearance of the words which had been boiled away to their bones that the scholars in the Kadem objected ; it was also to the elaborate grammatical system that the Bishop had retained. Genitives, nominatives, accusatives and datives ; past, present and future—terminations for all these had been exhumed from the Latin or German grammars, although both English and Chinese had proved that these were unnecessary obstacles.

For fifty years, up to the outbreak of this war, the scholars of the Kadem (now Academia pro Interlingua, which is a little less barbarous) pursued the line of thought suggested by these two objections. I hope that when peace comes their work will be continued and suddenly completed, for I think that they had come to the very edge of solving the problem.

But while they had been continuing their sedate and scientific enquiry a practical experiment of enormous size was carried out by others. Esperanto was first mooted by Dr. Zamenhof in 1887, and though it is not as popular as it once was, it still has a large number of adherents. Unquestionably, it works. It has answered once and for all the merely silly cynic who alleged that an artificial language could not be used in real life. Some hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions, have used this language in their daily life. I have heard a young couple from the platform assure an audience from their own knowledge that Esperanto could be successfully used “for all the necessary purposes in creating and bringing up a family.”

Nevertheless, Esperanto has not, after fifty years, had the success that its propounders hoped. It has not become the universal language, and of recent years it has actually receded. Twice, once shortly before 1914-18 and again after that war, it seemed to have a fair chance of success ; but it faltered and the ghost of Bishop Schleyer was sourly pleased. It is doubtful whether Esperanto is likely ever to have a revival. It is certain that it would be a misfortune if, in the hopeful period after this war, adherents were for the third time to waste their chance and their labour by learning a language which would die on them after all.

The weaknesses which cause this lack of success are not all mortal, nor all irremediable ; combined, they are both.

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The first weakness is a repetition of the Bishop's error. With a natural impatience the Esperantists forbade change; they have a central body of doctrine called the Fundament, which may not be touched. While this rule remains no improvement is possible. This rigidity was the cause of the exclusion of de Beaufront and the Idists, though the improvements the latter demanded were minor in character and directed largely to the least important flaw in Esperanto—its uncouth appearance and ugly sounds. That is a criticism, and a valid criticism. But it is not so important a criticism as it appears to a French nobleman. The British and American communities will put up with almost any amount of ugliness in return for small advantages in money or convenience, as fifteen minutes' walk about the streets of any large town will show. If it paid them, they would be perfectly willing to pronounce words beginning with *kv*, *sv*, and *st* and other accumulations which de Beaufront alleged damaged his lower jaw.

But it would not necessarily pay them; in one respect it would cost them money. Printers, and even more the humble possessors of typewriters, would view the general adoption of Esperanto with apprehension, for it has six letters that are not on their machines. I am having to write them in by hand as I type this article—*ĉ, ĝ, ĥ, ĵ, ŝ, ŭ*. (I made this complaint once to an ardent Esperantist: he replied imperially, "You should get a new typewriter. And printers should give up using the lino and take to the mono.")

The alphabet could, I suppose, be reformed. But the vocabulary could not. It was composed in the early days of interlingual science and, not unnaturally, proves to be wrongly compounded. It consists of a mixture in varying proportions of the words of all the chief Western languages, including Russian. Offhand, that seems a practical and fair method. There is a large group of scientific and technical words, like *telephone* or *mycology*, which practically write themselves into the vocabulary; for the others, why not take a proportion each from all the major languages? Surely that would at least save squabbles.

It is only when you come to *use* the language that you find this will not do. By endeavouring to make your language

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easy for all you make it easy for none. Take a couple of examples. The commonest of all words is *and*. You may translate this as *et*, if your language has a Romance basis, and then you are immediately understood by French, Portuguese, Spaniards, Rumanians, Italians and so forth. You may use *and* or *und*, if your language has a Teutonic basis, and then you are understood by English, Americans and Germans. But unless you have a basis and adhere to it you are not understood. To pick out the Scandinavian *og* or the Greek *kai* (which is what Esperanto uses) does not make the language easier for Greeks or Danes, because they cannot understand all the rest of it; and it adds confusion for the rest of the world. Or suppose your language has a root *alt*. If the general basis of your language is Romance (Latin), then its meaning is clear to anyone who has studied altitude or been exalted. It means "high." If the basis of your language is Teuton, it means "old." But if it has a mixed basis no one knows which it means. Does *arm*- mean "poor" or "weapon"? *klein*- "little" or "famous"? *frag*- "break" or "question"? These questions, whose answers should jump to the mind, are insoluble without a dictionary when the basis of your language is unsettled.

Moreover, the Esperantists add to the difficulty of their language by actual misuse of words. *Mal*-, for example, is a prefix which they use to indicate "contrary." But to every European and American *mal*- means "wrong." *Malfermi*, *malgranda* convey to them "to shut imperfectly" and "evilly great," not, as they are meant to in Esperanto, "open" and "small." For a malformation is not a lack of form, nor a malpractice a kind of inertia, nor even is maladministration the same as anarchy.

But what will finally kill—or at least wither—Esperanto is its unnecessary difficulty. Dr. Zamenhof sends us all back to school, to learn a lot of foolish rules which have been made up for the occasion and have not even the excuse of antiquity. We may not call our mother *Ma*, *momma*, *mater*, *mère*, *Mutter*, *madre* or any of the words that we naturally would use or recognise, but we must say *patrino*, because Dr. Zamenhof has ruled that all feminine words must end in *ino* and a mother is, in his opinion, a female father. We

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have to learn accusative cases (accusative cases, mark you, in the twentieth century) and to decline adjectives to agree with nouns. The grammar even states that Esperanto verbs have :

- A Present tense
- A Future tense
- A Past tense
- A Conditional mood
- An Imperative mood
- An Infinitive mood
- 3 Active participles
- 3 Passive participles.

It will not do ; the Doctor may brandish his cane as he wills ; the world will not learn all this.

There is, indeed, another type of constructed language which is probably—well, possibly—the universal language of the distant future. It is the “logical language” which was the aim of the 17th century philosophers who first studied this question. That is, a language based upon categories ; such a language need not have any connection at all with any spoken language. For example, there is Ro, published in 1922. In this tongue, *A* indicates a pronoun ; and so *ab* means me, *ac* you, *ad* he and so on. *Ba* indicates a material ; *bac* means hydrogen, *bad* oxygen, *bag* nitrogen, and so forth. In fact, as soon as you consider this type of language at all closely you realise that it need not have any words at all. There is a language of this type called Solresol, concerning which I have no more information than that it uses notes of music and not letters at all. A better example is Timerio, which consists of numbers arranged according to categories of ideas. “1/80/17,” for example, means “I love you” and can be addressed to any girl of any nation with equal success, or lack of success. Absurd though this may seem to the layman, it is nothing of the sort. A similar system is already in use for the classification of books in libraries called the Decimal Classification. I have before me a publication which has on its cover : “614.449:594.754.1 Cimex.” If I knew my way about that code, as I ought to, I could have told without looking any further that this publication was in English, was non-fiction, was a pamphlet, was issued by an official body, dealt with public health, and finally that it

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concerned the bed-bug. A Chinese librarian knowing the code could have put it instantly in its right case, or handed it out to a reader who knew no Chinese in which to ask for it. It is, in fact, a pamphlet emanating from His Majesty's most excellent Privy Council and informing me how to disinfest myself and house of bed-bugs, a present which was as unexpected as it is—up to date—superfluous.

I see no objection that can be brought against this type of international language except that the initial effort—to grasp and memorise the categories once they have been agreed—is too great for all but scientific and technical experts. For another century I think that objection will probably be final.

NATURAL LANGUAGES.

Under natural languages I include distortions and derivatives of natural languages—“Basic English,” neo-Latin, “Teutonish” and so forth. Indeed, the distortions are far more important than the natural languages, for no one but a Frenchman believes French will be the international tongue of the future, or a German that German will, or an Englishman or American that English will . . . and so on to H.E. the Sultan of Perak who believes in Malay as the lingua franca. English, French, Spanish and Latin are the most common favourites in this sort of dispute ; and it is among the most useless debates in the world, for it is as certain as anything well can be that no existing language, as it stands, will be adopted.

But an attempt has recently been made to *adapt* two of these languages to international use. The result (in the first case) is called Basic English ; and it is as important an event in its way as the launching of Esperanto was. Indeed, when first I studied it I was almost convinced (as many others have been) that the problem had been solved and I could put my books away.

Basic English, whose original inspirer was Mr. C. K. Ogden, consists of 850 English words, no more, used in accordance with English idiom and spelt in the English way. A hundred extra words have been listed as those most useful for the reading of verse ; and for special works a sort of Indulgence is issued for a few more necessary words. The

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Basic English translation of the New Testament has 50 of these extra words above the 100; it uses just 1,000 words. Every English-speaker can, of course, understand the tongue at once; and it is, apparently, remarkable with what ease Chinese and Japanese, and others who find little consideration generally for their convenience, can master the language.

The ingenuity and labour that has gone to the construction of this limited vocabulary cause me more admiration than I can express. I turn over the pages of the "Basic" New Testament with an unfading wonder. It *does* work; with this small vocabulary, as limited as a coolie's, it is possible to express almost all of the meaning of all that is contained in that varied book. Almost all; "almost" is the important word. It misses quite a perceptible proportion; and at that the New Testament is a book chosen for its purposes. The Greek of the original is bare, simple and artless; fit for and intended (as it should be) for the reading of coolies and their like. To scholars it is poor and jejune to a degree; it is the gorgeousness of the King James version that conceals this. As a result, Basic English has in it an admirable subject; in many places, indeed, it is possible to argue that the Basic version is more accurate than the Authorised. But even on this chosen ground it has grave faults which appear on a second reading. It is clumsy: "make a request" has to be used, for example, because the word "ask" is not an approved word. It is not so easy for the foreigner as it appears; he has to learn such baffling idioms as "come about" for "happen," in which neither "come" nor "about" have the meaning he has been told. And even in this narrow compass it is forced to be not just clumsy but actually incorrect. Take Mark xv, 34; here it gives us:

And at the ninth hour, Jesus said in a loud voice, "*Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?*" which is, "My God, my God, why are you turned away from me?" And some of those who were near, hearing it, said, "See, he is crying to Elijah." And one of them went quickly, and getting a sponge full of bitter wine put it on a rod. This is, for me, a great deal nearer to the original in spirit than the version I learnt in school. But it contains, as that did not, actual errors. Christ said "Why hast thou *forsaken*

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me?" which is a very different thing in its implication from "are turned away." And vinegar is not "bitter wine."

The more grave obstacles to Basic English are, I think, two. First, that only English speakers, of their national pride, are likely to accept it as an international language. Second, that, oddly enough, it places those same English speakers under a grave disadvantage.

The first objection ought normally to be admitted by any fair-minded English-speaker; but at the moment it is not. There is a solid block of opinion, especially in America, of the kind that served notice on the British and Russians through the mouth of Mr. Henry Luce that the coming century would be "the American century." It holds that the power and wealth of the States, buttressed by the British Empire, will in the future be so great that other languages can in fact be overridden; and all that need be done for human progress is to hasten and facilitate this process. But this is, so far as languages are concerned, an illusion. The coming of peace is likely to find other races less rather than more willing to accept English dominance. Picture, if you can, the set-up after an Allied victory and see whether it will lead to a universal acceptance of a reformed English. The French, who still control a huge empire, will almost certainly be fuller of national linguistic pride than ever before, in an attempt to restore their self-confidence. The Russians will be stronger, more self confident than ever, and I doubt if they will be ecstatic in their admiration of our two countries. The four hundred million Indians, I am afraid, are likely to have turned their choice from English to any other language or none at all.

The second objection, if less obvious, seems to me more vital, because it affects me personally. A Chinaman can write Basic English easily. I can't. I can only reduce my written vocabulary to 850 words by the most violent and continued effort. The labour necessary to translate even this simple essay into that narrow pidgin tongue, for example, would take several days. I could certainly never *speak* it. I am too literate. It is practically impossible (and it is certainly very disagreeable) for you and me to bar from our mind our knowledge of the English language and not even

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by an oversight to use the correct and exact term when a clumsy more-or-less-the-same alternative has been approved. They say that dogs have ears which can hear far more sounds than men; they can be summoned by what appear to us soundless whistles, and high notes which vanish into silence for us are clear to them. Well, if Basic English were adopted we should be dogs among men. A great portion of the noises that we made would be wholly incomprehensible to our audiences. We, not the poor foreigners, would be the most handicapped; we should be barking meaninglessly, and would find ourselves often in the dangerous position of thinking we had been understood when we had not.

That is not to say that Basic English is useless; but that its use is something else than is imagined. It is commendable philosophically (to use an antiquated but correct term) because it is *right*; that is, because it is working along with the stream of history. It is assisting and making easy something that is likely to come and should come—a pidgin language. Nature, so to speak, will provide that pidgin some day. The process is very like the progress of recovery from a disease. Suppose you have, let us say, a foreign body in the bowel. Nature endeavours to remove this in her wasteful way. She speeds up all your physical action, giving you a fever; she tries to wash it away in a liquid flood. But left to herself she may very well kill you before curing you. The doctor intervenes; he gives you a purge, and its sharp and artificial action saves your life and cures you too. So, after years of convulsion and savage wars, the human race might very well evolve a sort of commercial pidgin that would do its job—if in the meantime our frenzies had left it any job to do. This pidgin would probably be a rather debased and ignoble patois. For “I know that my Redeemer liveth” it would probably write “Me savvy Redeemer longa-me livee.” Mr. Ogden is the doctor who speeds things up. He offers instead “I know my Redeemer lives” and that now and not in zoo years’ time. His offer will, I think, be taken by all those who want for their own purposes an easy entry into the English language. It will, I think, be found very useful by Chinese and Africans who want to trade with us, or who propose to go on to study English literature.

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There remains Latin. It is almost inconceivable that anything useful should have come out of that complicated and dead tongue; still odder that it should have been the work of the Kadem that Bishop Schleyer first founded and then damned. But it is so; it became the Academia pro Interlingua; it moved from Munich in 1887 to Paris, thence to St. Petersburg, and thence to New York, and in 1909 settled in Turin and came under the general direction of Professor Peano, whom I mentioned at the beginning of this article. I am inclined to believe that, given certain necessary developments, this body has provided the solution to the problem, suppose we care to take it.

Professor Peano, if the story I heard some years ago is true, originally announced his discovery to the world in a dramatic, eccentric and amusing manner. He addressed a conference upon linguistic problems in what was initially the best Ciceronian Latin. His subject was the possibility of using this venerable tongue as an interlanguage. He pointed out that it had grave disabilities. As for example, the need for adjectives to agree with nouns, the existence of the ablative case, which was unnecessary, the dative case, the accusative, the vocative and for that matter any case at all. Next he condemned the formation of the past and future tenses, and so forth; and each time that he proved a practice to be useless he removed it from his own speech. As he spoke, his language changed; his auditors perceived a simpler tongue appearing before their ears, as a chicken pecks its way through an exceptionally hard eggshell. Before he sat down he was speaking a tongue which they all could immediately understand, but could not name. It might have been a form of Italian or Spanish, or French or Portuguese, or even in places a foreigner’s sing-song attempt at English; but it was not. It was actually an “interlingua,” which was in fact what he called it.

This pleasant method of presenting it in fact does it an injury. It is not a whimsical and ingenious way of reviving an ancient language, delightful to scholars but not of real importance. Professor Peano is a mathematician; and his language was a scientific and strictly practical device. It was based upon two generally admitted truths which had not

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previously been logically applied ; it was—or was in intention—quite dispassionate.

The first principle was that all declensions, variations of termination or other grammatical devices except those dependent on position were harmful and could be dispensed with. That is to say, the huge list of "endings" in every grammar could be wiped out ; "have" and "will" would do for past and future ; "of" for genitive ; the accusative case would be simply indicated by putting the object after the verb ; and so on. Professor Peano even investigated the possibility of dropping the use of "s" to indicate the plural : here zeal outran discretion.

The second principle was that an international vocabulary already exists. It had for long been observed that a considerable number of words were international. More than half the vocabulary of a well-educated man in any Western country was international ; you could compile a dictionary of such terms, and geographers, international politicians, hygrometers, amperes, carcinomas, telegrams, hydrogen atoms, diameters, metronomes and thousands of others would force their way in practically unchanged. Professor Peano, in his *Vocabulario Commune*, which appeared in a second edition in 1915, extended these by including a large number of Latin roots (such as *alt-* for "high"), which although not surviving always in their simple form were immediately recognisable from their derivatives in all Western languages. This common vocabulary covered 638 double column pages and was confined to Latin derivatives ; a further volume was to contain words of other origin. The whole corpus covered almost all, but not quite all, the words needed by a man of considerable culture to express himself fully and accurately. The vast majority were either Latin in origin or Greek—and Greek words fit easily into a Latin framework ever since about the year 200 B.C. There remained a number of words from other languages which no one would wish to challenge, tea, coffee, skunk, gas, and jasmine, for example.

Almost all ; "almost" again is the significant word. Peano had attempted to construct a language which would be intelligible at first sight, intelligibile ad primo visu as he wrote it ; but he was not quite to achieve that miracle. The

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disiecta membra of the language lay about, dispersed and unassembled, like the unassembled parts of a motor car. For the words which were missing were mostly the bolts and pins, the "junction" words which would connect up all those attractive nouns and verbs. Words like *why*, *about*, *among*, *behind*, *yesterday*, *but*, and *on* are the most unchangeably national of all. There is no common form of about half of them ; you cannot do anything at all with these but plunge for an arbitrary form. Peano plunged for the Latin form, on these grounds : that the structure of the language was already mainly Latin and these words were consequently agreeable in appearance and sound in their context (an argument which, as I have observed, he will discover is despised in Britain and America) ; that at any rate a considerable number of educated men in all countries have once had a nodding acquaintance with them in school and may recognise them ; that no national prides will be ruffled ; and that no special dictionaries are needed, as the Latin lexicons rest forlornly already on the shelves of schools and public libraries. The total list of such words which he drew up amounted to 120, a large number of which were as a matter of fact unnecessary and could be cut out. Forty would be my own estimate of these words : a record low total of words to be memorised.

It is clear there are certain things that remain to be done before the problem can be said to be solved. I don't think, for example, that the question of the future tense has been adequately settled, or the use of the infinitive. And, in any case, this will remain an educated man's language, not an unskilled worker's. The highest concentration of existing "common words" to all languages is to be found in scientific subjects ; the lowest among those subjects in which unskilled (especially rural) labourers are interested. *Sheep*, *bog*, *plough* and some less decorous words are examples of these highly unassimilable words. I am afraid it will turn out that it is a literal impossibility to devise a language in which an Iowa farmer, a Hindu peasant and a Russian collective agriculturist can quickly and easily talk about their occupation to each other.

But, meanwhile, as one of the interlinguist manuals begins by saying, *utilitate de lingua internationale es evidente. Id es intelligibile ad me, et intelligibile ad vos*. Or is it not ?

ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE UNION CO-OPERATION

By ERNEST DAVIES

THE recent elections in America, indicating as they do that American opinion has advanced little towards international co-operation, and that the country may revert to isolationism at the end of the war, makes it more important than ever that close contact be established between the organised labour movements of Britain and America. Unfortunately, thus far, attempts to establish machinery for co-operation have failed, both because of the conservatism of a large section of American labour opinion, and because of the disunity in the ranks of American labour. At the annual Convention of the American Federation of Labour, held in October, 1942, any hopes that may have lingered that a united American labour movement would participate in an Anglo-American-Soviet committee were finally shattered when, if press reports are correct, the speeches of the T.U.C. delegates urging it were coldly received. Unfortunately, American labour opinion is no more advanced than American opinion generally, and the movement is not only split but largely non-political. If American trade unionism is to hold the gains made in recent years, and not to experience an anti-labour reaction, such as followed the last war, it must not only put its own house in order, but co-operate internationally.

British and American labour may have a common purpose and identical interest, but differences exist. Such differences are to be found in the attitude of the American employers, whose hatred of the New Deal is second only to their hatred of what the Axis stands for—and that may be is too kind to many an industrialist; in the vast section of the general public which regards trade unions as either rackets or radicalism if not communism; in the anti-union activities engaged in by the industrialists, of which Pinkerton detectives, tear gas, agents provocateurs and violence are, alas, not apocryphal. In the organisation of the American trade union movement itself, the main differences lie in the greater degree

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of craft unionism within an industry, the different attitude of the employer and the different political organisation of the U.S.A. which has led to difference in emphasis on the demands and actions of the American unions. Thus, in view of the employers' penchant for company unions as an anti-labour device and the extent of jurisdictional dispute arising from craft organisation and union rivalry, the closed shop has always been of greater importance to American trade unions than British. Allied to this are the American preference for the "check off," i.e. the deduction of dues, fines and assessments by the employer. Initiation and membership fees are far higher in U.S. than in Britain. The fight for recognition and for labour's juridical rights and the later and slower development of trade unionism in America have led working-class organisations to develop more as militant unions, fighting for existence, recognition and labour's rights, than as mutual aid associations. Finally, and of great importance to future collaboration between the American and British workers, the federal and state constitutions of the United States and the political line-up and election machinery have caused their political development to be vastly different there than here. In America to-day the workers have no national political organisation affiliated to any party, nor for that matter have the unions any common political programme.

Although American labour has made great strides since the advent of Roosevelt, it has advanced politically only to a small extent, and that within the younger C.I.O. The advance has been mainly industrial. Up to the formation of the C.I.O. in 1935, the development of American unionism was confined largely to the organisation of the skilled workers, loosely federated in the American Federation of Labour, founded by Samuel Gompers towards the end of the nineteenth century. In most industries the unskilled were unorganised until the New Deal, when the C.I.O. set out to unionise the great mass-production industries and succeeded so well that the last decade witnessed a trebling of total membership of the American trade unions. The spurt was due to the legalising of collective bargaining by representatives of the workers' own choosing by the Roosevelt administration,

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the virtual banning of company unions, and the awakening of the social and political consciousness of the American worker as encouraged and evidenced by the New Deal.

To regard the important development of American trade unionism of recent years in its correct perspective, it is important to realise that Roosevelt's New Deal was as much an outcome of the innate demand springing from the people of America as it was a policy of the President. It is doubtful whether a Roosevelt at any other time than that following the great depression of the early thirties could have effected those great changes in the attitude of the general public, the judiciary, and even the employer, that have taken place in recent years. Roosevelt deserves all praise for his achievements, as magnificent in social and labour policy on the domestic front as in foreign affairs, but the former did but follow a great upsurge of feeling within America which enabled that country to narrow that wide gap which separated British and American social legislation and labour policy.

It was this opportunity which John L. Lewis seized. President of the United Mine Workers' Union, loyally affiliated to the A.F. of L., of which he was also a Vice-President, Lewis was politically a Republican holding at this time no court with the Communists, and devoting his energies to his union, which, though built up on industrial lines, had suffered loss of members equally with other unions. In the struggles in the mining industry of the twenties, Lewis had remained faithful to Gompers's policy of negotiation and was fighting largely on the defensive, as the principle of national agreements had been undermined and district agreements were the order of the day. The result was a decrease from 400,000 to 150,000 in the membership of the U.M.W. During this period Lewis fought attempts at the democratisation of his union and engaged in red-baiting. With the National Recovery Act, which legalised collective bargaining, came the opportunity to repair the damage. In four months, the U.M.W. trebled in membership, but Lewis, having learned from the mistakes of the past, saw it was insufficient to rebuild the U.M.W. without a strong labour movement to support it; his union could not withstand the full force of any anti-labour drive that might come

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later. He saw that the field for organisation was far larger than the coal industry and realised that steel, so closely allied to coal, and the automobile industry, dependent upon both, must be organised if the full weight of the worker was to be brought against the employers. Further, if advantage was to be taken of the workers' urge to organise and of the opportunity provided by the New Deal for unionising industry, drastic changes in union organisation were necessary. This necessitated revolutionising the policy of the A.F. of L. or breaking with it because Lewis saw that failure to organise the mass industries had hampering effects on unionisation of craft unions. The A.F. of L., abiding by its conservative structure of craft unions, had organised no more than a tenth of the industrial workers of America, and only one-third of all organised workers were organised industrially. Workers in the great mass production and heavy industries were ripe for organisation, in some cases were crying out for it, and when the Government gave it its blessing, flocked of their own accord into the A.F. of L. unions or formed unions of their own and sought affiliation. The urge to organise was greater than ever before in American history.

The A.F. of L. was unprepared for this flood of new members, and, making little attempt to adapt its structure and organisation to the new demand made upon it, tried to direct the new members into existing craft unions or even, where the officials were content with their present lot, to discourage them from action. The struggle which followed was not only craft versus industrial unions, but the traditional defensive A.F. of L. policy of co-operation with industry versus the new offensive and militant strategy. The struggle was between William Green, President of A.F. of L., who followed in the tradition of Gompers, and John L. Lewis, who, after twenty-five years of loyalty to it, broke away. Jealous for its craft unions, the A.F. of L. sanctioned organisation on industrial lines subject to the full protection of the crafts. The result of this policy was that either the unskilled would alone be organised industrially or the industrial unions would encroach on the crafts. The latter occurred, and led to much acrimonious dispute, both verbal

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and physical, at Federation conventions, especially as many of the A.F. of L. craft unions were, in effect, unable to cope with rapid growth, which, in any case, some officials discouraged, preferring a quiet life and the enjoyment of their union's prosperity. In pursuit of its policy, the A.F. of L. would grant federal charters to newly-organised industries and then split the members into their respective crafts and so scatter them over a dozen or more unions.

The formation of the C.I.O. followed, but this break came only after Lewis and his supporters had pressed their policy before the 1935 and 1936 Federation conventions and suffered defeat. The organisation of the C.I.O. was a modern development, pursued by the best union leaders of the time and inspired by no political party, communist or other. Evidence of its success is the organisation of the steel, automobile and other industries on industrial lines and the C.I.O.'s present strength of 5 million members. But, despite this success, labour disunity was bound to react unfavourably on labour's cause. The struggle between the rival federations caused jurisdictional disputes which strengthened anti-labour opinion. Such disunity might, however, have disappeared long ago but for the behaviour of John L. Lewis. In 1936, labour had supported Roosevelt and Lewis had thrown in the full weight of the C.I.O. on his side. During Roosevelt's second term Lewis became estranged from the President, and in 1940, for personal reasons, withdrew his support and gave it to Wendell Willkie. Refusal of the workers to follow his lead resulted in his resignation from the Presidency, and Philip Murray, also of the Mine Workers, succeeded him. Lewis continued in his opposition to the President's foreign policy and aligned himself with the isolationists, and until the German attack on the U.S.S.R. had Communist support. In November, 1942, he instigated a miners' strike which, though resulting in a victory for the miners, harmed the labour cause. It was followed by the introduction of anti-labour legislation, which the attack at Pearl Harbour caused to be shelved. From then on, Lewis's influence within the C.I.O. decreased, and he set out to build up the United Mine Workers' Union, from which Murray was expelled in January last, as an independent force. Into its ranks he took workers

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from a number of industries remote from mining, and this policy was endorsed at the recent miners' convention at Cincinnati, which amended its constitution to permit persons in industries other than coal miners to become members of the organisation. At the same time the miners withdrew from the C.I.O. American labour is now divided between the A.F. of L. and C.I.O., of approximately equal strength, the Railway Brotherhoods, a few independent unions and Lewis's mine-workers.

All labour is united in its support of the war, a non-strike agreement has been entered into, and a War Labour Board established to conciliate disputes. Donald Nelson, chief of the War Production Board, has encouraged labour-management co-operation which has been established on a large scale, and labour is represented on various war committees in Washington. Nevertheless, consultation with trade unions and labour co-operation has not reached the same scale as in this country and public opinion remains far more anti-labour than here. For instance, immediately after America entered the war, there was a concerted attack by the press and anti-labour elements in Congress on the 40-hour week established under the Hours and Wages Act. There was intentional misrepresentation, as the Act did not prevent work in excess of 40 hours a week, but required payment of wages at time-and-a-half for overtime. Average hours per week were in excess of 40, but the general impression created was that the Act was holding up production. So far, Roosevelt has successfully resisted the attack on this Act, but the recent Republican gains in the elections make his position far more difficult. Almost certainly, when the new Congress meets in January, anti-labour legislation will be introduced. President Roosevelt has striven to maintain labour's gains under the New Deal, and has opposed any anti-labour legislation. Where disputes have arisen, he has tried to act impartially, though this has not prevented accusations being made of his partiality to labour. To date he has succeeded, labour's support for the war effort has been held, and it has been assured of the maintenance of its rights or, after cessation of hostilities, immediate restoration of those which are surrendered. The War Labour Board

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has allowed increases in wages up to the level obtaining last spring and devised a union maintenance scheme to settle disputes arising from demands for the closed shop. This maintains the *status quo*, union members must retain membership, but new employees are not compelled to join. The President must pursue a policy which will satisfy the unions, keep disputes at a minimum, and assure labour's full co-operation in the war effort. At the same time, the country must be assured that labour is not specially favoured by a partial administration, and the employer must be satisfied that the unions are prevented from utilising the war situation to entrench themselves more firmly for the anti-union fight they hope to resume when war ends. To retain the confidence of all warring parties is Roosevelt's unenviable task. It necessitates his personal control of labour policy, especially as he, as much as labour, is open to attack for using the war situation to further New Deal policies. Early in 1942 he appointed a joint committee of both organisations, including Green and Murray, to meet with him. This "Labour Cabinet" meets frequently to discuss labour policy and is reported to exert a strong influence.

Roosevelt aims to prevent Lewis obtaining greater power over labour and to prevent a flare-up of the A.F. of L. and C.I.O. feud, for the old rivalry smoulders under cover of an outward show of increased co-operation and amicable relations. In the week following Pearl Harbour, Philip Murray and William Green, wreathed in smiles, drove together to the White House, and they and other leaders of both federations have frequently appeared on the same platform to contribute their quota of oratory to the war effort. In January, 1942, Lewis himself tried to exploit this situation by launching a move for unity; but he did so in league with William Hutcheson, A.F. of L. Vice-President and reactionary, and without consulting Green or Murray. It was quickly realised that the scheme was designed to give Lewis control of the whole American trade union movement, and his guns were quickly spiked by the President.

Although willingness to end the feud has been expressed on both sides, there is a wide gap between each federation's ideas of the possible basis for amalgamation. The A.F. of L.

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favours a single all-inclusive federation, but the C.I.O. fears this would result in a return to the chartered unions with their respective jurisdictions clearly defined and a split-up of the industrial unions among them. A situation would then arise similar to the one which led to the C.I.O.'s formation and breakaway in 1936. The C.I.O. has gone no further than to suggest a joint policy committee with powers over the whole movement. This the A.F. of L. does not favour. The cleavage in principle is too great and the vested interests of the respective unions too deeply rooted to permit a sanguine view to be taken that a united trade union movement will be brought about by war conditions. The A.F. of L. and C.I.O. are likely to retain their individual identities for some time to come, unless Lewis's recent moves cause the latter's disintegration. Lewis stands aside ready to re-enter the fray when the opportunity occurs. If the unions were driven to accept a labour policy which went further in the surrender of their rights than that for which their members were prepared, Lewis would be that much more successful in attracting workers into his independent union. In framing his labour policy, Roosevelt is fully aware of this danger and so must resist anti-labour legislation and fend off the pressure from those who would rush him into formulating a labour policy which would antagonise the unions and so play into the hands of Lewis.

As already stated, an accretion of Lewis's strength threatens to weaken labour and to cause it to emerge from the war in poor condition to meet any attack on its rights when peace returns. Much depends on Lewis's future action. His withdrawal from the C.I.O. changes the relationship of the two federations and reduces the prospects of a merger. As he has more in common with the A.F. of L., sharing their anti-Communist attitude and the Republicanism of some of its leaders, he is quite likely to lead his miners back into the fold. This he will do in his own time and on his own terms. Should he do so, he will once more become one of its leaders; he would be an obstacle in the way of generous terms for co-operation with the C.I.O. and would encourage the A.F. of L. to remain adamant in face of a demand for co-operation from the rank and file.

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In this situation, the outlook for co-operation between British and American labour is not bright. While all sections pay lip-service to Russia's resistance, the A.F. of L. remains anti-communist and there is no prospect of its entering an Anglo-American-Soviet committee. Conceivably, the C.I.O. would be willing to do so, but it is extremely unlikely that the T.U.C., which has previously confined its attention exclusively to the A.F. of L., would cause a rupture with that Federation by linking up with the C.I.O. Lewis's powerful Mine Workers' Union and the Railway Brotherhoods also have to be considered, as to leave them out would be to ignore important sections of American labour. It would seem that the only solution lies in a joint committee with all sections represented, but how that can be achieved or who is to bring it about is the problem. Possibly the President might intervene, as it is believed he was largely responsible for the cancellation of the projected meeting of the abortive Anglo-American committee last September, when it consisted of the T.U.C. and A.F. of L. only. On the advice of the British Embassy at Washington the meeting did not take place. The President has, however, failed to bring the A.F. of L. and C.I.O. together and the personal animosity between Roosevelt and Lewis continues.

Apart from American labour disunity, there are other obstacles to Anglo-American trade union co-operation in the conservatism of the A.F. of L. and its fear that the T.U.C. is moving towards the left, and in the non-political nature of the American trade union movement. For the latter there are several reasons. One is concentration in the past on the fight for the right to organise; another the limiting nature of the American constitution, which has conditioned labour and social legislation; a third, the nature of American politics, particularly the party machine and election machinery; and, finally, the nature of trade union organisation and the American workers' political outlook, which is dissimilar from that of the British worker. The former is less advanced. Both accept the Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt and the post-war declarations of the administration spokesmen, from Vice-President Henry Wallace to the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. Through these declarations, America

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has already established her position as a leader in planning the post-war world. With the idealism that underlies the demand of Henry Wallace for a century of the common man, Milo Perkins's demand for the matching of mass consumption with mass production, and Cordell Hull's desire to reduce tariffs, labour should have no quarrel. With plans for feeding and reconstructing Europe all will be in agreement; but it is important not to confuse the humanitarianism of the one or the sound economic planning of the other with the socialist democracy which is the objective of the British labour movement. American views aired so far stop short, when to go further would entail changes in the present economic system and interfere with the rights of property and private enterprise. The Wallace-Welles school is far preferable to the American imperialism advocated by the American publications, *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune*, whose proprietor, Henry C. Luce, would have America use the war to establish American civilisation operating under the ægis of American big business, but, though preferable, it is no substitute for that for which labour is fighting. For American labour to realise this, co-operation now in the planning of joint action is essential.

After the last war, America experienced a violent reaction, not only against interference in European affairs, but also against radicalism. For a decade, with America ruled by big business, trade unionism had to fight for survival. Depression in the 1930's brought revolt against the machinations of big business, and the New Deal did much to alleviate the evils of American industrialism. But further than this it has not gone. The Franklin D. Roosevelt era in economic and domestic affairs corresponds to the liberalism of an earlier British period. It has seen hostility develop to the abuse of economic power by monopoly, but it has done nothing to shake the foundations of the American belief in individualism as expressed in the freedom of private enterprise. Wall Street, operating through the holding company, came under fire, but not legitimate business, whose success is still so much admired. In this situation, American labour has not advanced in the realm of political ideas. The growth in American unionism has been for industrial and not political

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purposes ; it has advanced because it has embraced the state paternalism of Roosevelt and with that it is well satisfied. Should the Republicans come to power in 1944 this may be endangered, and the aftermath of this war may be as fatal to American labour as was that of the last.

America will play a dominant part at the Peace Conference, and if the Republicans are in power, American labour may find difficulty in making its voice heard. Its chances of obtaining protection of its standards and rights would be greater if it acted in concert with organised labour of the other United Nations. That, unfortunately, the American trade union movement does not yet appear to have realised. In Britain, too, there may be a reactionary government in office, and the need for international co-operation among the trade unions will be of equal importance. It is essential that Anglo-American trade union co-operation be established. The attempt recently made proved abortive, and for this the unhappy handling of the situation by the T.U.C. and the disunity of the American labour movement are equally to blame. Had the T.U.C. been less ambitious and, in the first instance, aimed at an Anglo-American Committee instead of one including the Soviet unions, greater success might have attended Sir Walter Citrine's mission. Had Citrine suggested a joint meeting of representatives of all sections of American unionism, instead of confining his attention to the A.F. of L., representing less than half of the organised workers, agreement might have been reached on the formation of an all-inclusive Anglo-American Committee. This initial rebuff should not be allowed to prevent a new approach along fresh lines, if necessary with the assistance of an outside party, possibly President Roosevelt himself. The fact that the T.U.C. delegates attended this autumn the C.I.O. Convention as well as that of the A.F. of L. is encouraging but whether they were present at the former in their personal capacity or officially has not been revealed. In the interests of the workers of Britain and America, no less than of all the United Nations, it is important that this fresh attempt at co-operation be made.

THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC LIBRARIES

By A. E. THOMPSON

THIS war has brought many people face to face with reality for the first time in their lives. Throughout the country there is a general awakening to contemporary problems ; ordinary men and women are beginning to question what once they accepted, and are groping for answers to the new doubts and uncertainties which are besetting them. Nowhere is this demand for knowledge so manifest as in our public libraries. People are clamouring for books, books on economics, books on science and the arts, books that will point the way to the new utopias which statesmen and intellectuals are discussing. Let any sagacious politician who claims that this country is not interested in " scientific planning " examine the statistics of a municipal library !

The mission of the public librarian in society has often been misunderstood. He has been regarded by many as a bookish person whose aim was to create bibliophiles, to provide a haven where men might escape into the world of books. Yet the librarian's mission is really far wider in its implications. His object is not subservience to literature, but mastery of literature ; he does not wish to lure people into romantic illusion—for no man can see life solely through books—but rather to bring the unenlightened into contact with the minds of others, that through the vision of great authors the ordinary man can be led to reason for himself, to face his social and moral obligations, and to achieve a realistic view of the universe. How far the librarian has fulfilled this mission is very doubtful. For library service—the provision of books for the people—is closely correlated with education. When boys and girls are abandoned at the age of fourteen, knowing nothing of the problems which lie ahead of them—let alone how to solve them—and totally unequipped for citizenship, the problems of the public librarian can be imagined. And it must be remembered that in the past public libraries have been the only link with culture available for thousands of people ; they have been

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still remain. Amongst the objections of members to the bill were (1) that libraries would be too expensive for ratepayers, (2) that they would tend to produce revolutionaries and agitators, and (3) that reading would diminish the working-man's consumption of beer. Colonel Sibthorp, M.P. for Lincoln, had an objection all of his own; he did not like reading, and he could not see why anyone else—least of all the lower classes—should want to do so. He characterised the bill as absurd in every sense of the word, and suggested that the working-classes should be given more work to do instead. We note with regret to-day that the bill was strenuously opposed by those M.P.s who represented the Universities, and who should have been strongest in its support. The bill finally passed the House of Commons, however, although some of its effects were whittled down in committee, and it became law. It was a purely *permissive* Act, allowing—and not compelling—municipalities to provide libraries, and furthermore it restricted expenditure upon libraries to one halfpenny in the pound. This was later increased to a penny in the pound, and finally abolished in 1919.

Since the abolition of the rate restriction, our public libraries have steadily progressed. Every educational improvement has increased the importance of the libraries beyond measure. Without unwarranted optimism, we expect some far-reaching reforms in our educational system after the war even if these reforms are not as drastic as some of us would like. There is a danger that our public library service will be left behind, and unless its defects are remedied it will be unable to meet the cultural needs of post-war Britain. It may be argued that more pressing reforms need undertaking than the reorganisation of libraries; this is probably so, but we must not make the mistake of underestimating the intellectual and cultural—besides the more recreational—needs of the community, as we have so often done in the past. In some of our large cities, public libraries are provided which deserve the highest praise. Yet there are still many backward local authorities very close in spirit to the ideas of Colonel Sibthorp; authorities which regard library provision as a waste of public money; authorities which tolerate

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gloomy, antiquated and overcrowded buildings, and badly stocked shelves. Who has not penetrated into squalid reading-rooms, where tramps consume a meal in a temperature nearly at zero, and overworked attendants scowl at your requests? The state of these libraries in no way reflects upon the enthusiasm of the librarian, who might have struggled for years against overwhelming odds, upon a salary that a bus-driver would spurn, until apathy finally overcame him. Often local conditions have prevented proper facilities, as in the case of public libraries in depressed areas. The neglect of many libraries has been the legacy of an era of misdirected economy, when the most important social services were starved. And town councillors are often keen business men; why should they devote a percentage of their estimates to a public service which shows no financial return? Ratepayers' associations in many localities have done all within their power to stultify the growth of the public library service.

Some attempt has been made to bridge the tremendous differences between local library conditions. Readers living in a backward area are able to secure books from other towns through inter-library arrangements. Thus, if a book required by a reader is not in stock at his library, it can be obtained through this regional system from another library in the same zone. Nevertheless, such schemes cannot fully solve the problems of haphazard municipal administration. How then can we ensure that the citizen of one locality receives the library service that is his due, in the same measure as a more fortunate fellow in a progressive locality? How can we ensure that children of post-war Britain, whether they live in the remotest hamlet or the largest city, will have a free and unrestricted access to the world of books? And how can we ensure that the doctors, engineers, scientists and all the other specialists who will be needed in the future shall receive the best possible service that the specialist librarian can give?

One solution would be to bring our libraries under some measure of government control. In most other branches of local government service there exists a national body, possessing supervisory functions, but in the case of libraries

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no central authority exists. As a result, there is a large amount of overlapping, and an almost complete lack of co-ordination within the public library system. If libraries were to be brought under the control of some government department, the benefits would be wide. State library inspectors would ensure the best possible service, whilst a scale of state subsidies would even out the burden of maintenance. Apathetic authorities could be induced—or, if necessary, compelled—to make better library provision, and the taxation of progressive authorities would be lightened. It has been argued that large cities like Manchester should not be asked to provide regional “British Museums” from the pockets of local ratepayers, whilst backward municipalities escape with very little expense. If we admit that the public library service is necessary to the community as a whole, then the cost of its upkeep should be shared equally by all citizens. A famous American librarian and State Inspector of Libraries, Mr. Asa Wynkoop, has summed-up the question in the following words :

“Every believer in the tax-supported public library believes it is the proper business of the Government to compel the individual, whatever his private disposition and will in the matter, to contribute to its support. Justification for this belief is found in the fact that if the free library is an important factor in the general well-being of the community, then it is for the community *as a community*, and not thereby as an association of individuals, to provide this benefit ; and as its advantages accrue to the social organism as a whole and not merely to individual members, the burden of its support should be borne by the whole community.”

The subject of nationalisation of public libraries has been discussed by librarians many times in recent years. The Library Association has never advanced the idea formally, however. The reticence of members of the Association can be understood ; as public officials, librarians must of necessity be cautious in their public utterances, whilst many librarians are by nature reluctant to focus national attention on their problems. Suggestions from unofficial quarters have, however, been numerous. A clarification of the shortcomings of our public libraries, and valuable suggestions for

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reorganisation, are contained in a report presented in October to the Library Association by its honorary secretary, Mr. L. R. McColvin. This report is not an official document, approved by the Association, but its recommendations are based upon a detailed survey of public libraries throughout the country, and should receive careful attention. Mr. McColvin finds the whole library service is badly organised ; provision in many places is lamentable, whilst staffs are ludicrously underpaid. He quotes the example of one town of between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants, where the reference library consists of two shelves of completely useless books. The chief importance of the McColvin Report lies in its far-reaching proposals for reorganisation. First, independent municipal library authorities should be abolished, and their place taken by large regional units, every unit being responsible for one unified public library service, urban and rural. Every unit would be partially controlled locally, but it should be attached to a central body with wide administrative powers. This central authority could be a department of the Board of Education, or preferably a Ministry of Arts.

These then are the main recommendations of the McColvin Report. The usual arguments of *laissez-faire* propagandists against national control can, of course, be raised ; the elimination of individuality and independence, and the dangers that would arise from Government control of the people's reading. This latter argument is on the service valid enough. But supervision of libraries by the Government could be no more sinister than control by local authorities. The best safeguard against the misuse of a nationalised library service would be an intelligent public and a scrupulous library profession.

Nationalisation of the facilities whereby the people reads would no doubt arouse powerful sectional interests ; but no reforms have been achieved without opposition—the history of the public library movement itself is a striking illustration of that. There are still Colonel Sibthorps both in Parliament and upon county and city councils, successors to those men who, one hundred years ago, flocked into the lobbies to vote against the provision of libraries for the people. But the spirit of progress is a little stronger to-day than it was when

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William Ewart faced a hostile oligarchy with what then seemed revolutionary proposals.

Yet in one thing the opposition was right. Public libraries *have* produced revolutionaries and agitators, but not nearly enough of them. For that is the purpose of libraries—to foster revolution in the minds of the sluggish, and progress in the minds of the agile, to arouse men from mental apathy, and to enable them to discover for themselves the means of human advancement. Intelligent reading is the key to the new social orders which lie within man's reach; when we realise that fact we can understand the vital contribution that a reorganised public library service can make to society. "Let the people read" is not an intellectual cliché; it is a mission, which, if fulfilled, would bring us one step nearer to Utopia.

SOCIAL SERVICE IN RURAL AREAS

By HENRY A. MESS

IN the Scott Report, which has attracted so much attention, considerable emphasis is laid on the need to improve the social life of villages and of the countryside, and tributes are paid to some of the voluntary associations which are at work. But necessarily the subject is dealt with shortly, and the purpose of this article is to describe at greater length, and to assess, the very great amount of voluntary effort which there has been in rural areas during the last twenty-five years.

There is general agreement as to the deterioration of rural life during the second half of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth century. The yeoman class had disappeared; landless labourers were a large part of the population, and for them there were few openings to higher status and better remuneration. Long years of agricultural depression drove the more energetic men to the towns, and right down to the end of the century the exodus was going on. In 1871 the population of the rural areas of this country was 8,671,000; in 1921 it was only 7,851,000. Those who remained were to a considerable extent a remnant population, creamed of some of the most vigorous elements. The position of the landed gentry deteriorated, and deteriorated particularly rapidly with the collapse of prices at the end of the first World War. Often they could only with great difficulty keep up their estates; often they sold out, the Hall going to some rich townsman and the farms being sold to tenants, who were themselves overburdened. The new rich from the towns lacked the country tradition, and often they were lacking in a sense of social responsibility. Rural crafts were decaying; pride in the countryside was at a low ebb. The education given in the schools was said to be more suited to town children than to country children. The facilities for recreation and the opportunities for culture were poor.

Since 1918 there has been a considerable revival of rural life. To some extent it has been economic; agriculture has been helped by a number of subsidies and of preferences;

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a good deal of attention has been given to agricultural education, agricultural research, and agricultural marketing. But more conspicuously there has been a cultural revival. And in that cultural revival a number of agencies have co-operated, some voluntary and some statutory.

The plight of the countryside had been noted and deplored by a good many writers, and a gallant few had put up a losing fight against the forces making for its ruin. In 1917 a recently formed Rural Organisations Council, to which were affiliated sixteen societies, called a couple of conferences. The conferences were concerned mainly with such matters as rural housing after the war, the establishment of small holdings for returned soldiers, and the possibilities of attracting industries to rural areas. But time was also given to considering the needs of rural education and questions of social amenities. The members of the Council realised the need of village halls; but they took a gloomy view of the prospects of getting them, still more of maintaining them. Reference was made to the value of the performance of plays by villagers, and examples were quoted from the Cotswolds and from Grasmere. A paper was read on "Rural Disfigurement and Its Remedies." A good deal was said about the defects of rural education. There was an adumbration of what are now known as Village Colleges. Indeed, many of the schemes which were to be fruitful in the post-war years were adumbrated; quite a number of them existed *in petto*.

These conferences marked a growing interest in the problems of rural life and a growing desire to do something about them. The conferences were held in Oxford, and it was in and around Oxford that action of a new kind was first taken. In 1919 the Oxfordshire Rural Community Council was formed. It was no mere coincidence that its birth was within a few months of that of the National Council of Social Service; the same kind of ideas, and some of the same group of men, were behind both. At the same time the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust was getting into its stride; the Trustees had formulated a policy in which rural enterprises occupied a prominent place. And statutory authorities, both central and local, were becoming more active with regard to rural needs, especially cultural needs.

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As a result of all this there was in the years following the war a great deal of fruitful experiment in which there was elaborate and intricate collaboration between voluntary and statutory bodies of various kinds, more particularly between the National Council of Social Service, the Rural Community Councils, the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, the Development Commission, the Board of Education and the Ministries of Agriculture and of Health, County Councils and Rural District Councils and Parish Councils, and a large number of voluntary societies.

Very important was the development of Rural Community Councils. The Oxfordshire body was so obviously useful that an attempt was soon made to apply its method to other areas. In 1922 the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust made a grant to the National Council of £1,000 a year for three years to enable it to promote the formation of Rural Community Councils in other areas. In 1923 the Kent Rural Community Council was formed. Within the next decade thirty Rural Community Councils were started. Further grants were made by the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust until 1926, when in pursuance of its settled general policy it withdrew its help from that field of effort and turned its attention elsewhere. A few of the Rural Community Councils had become well established, but it was not so in the majority of cases, and a crisis was only averted and further advance was only made possible by the Development Commissioners stepping into the gap left by the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust's withdrawal. The finance of Rural Community Councils has continued to be a great difficulty, and some of them have collapsed, mainly on that account, though financial weakness is obviously a reflection, in part at least, of want of local interest. At the outbreak of the second World War there were 22 Rural Community Councils in existence.

Rural Community Councils are very similar in general structure to the National Council of Social Service and to the Urban Councils of Social Service; they are composed of representatives of the chief voluntary social service organisations within their area together with representatives of the statutory authorities, who may be full members or who may be sent merely as assessors and observers; there will also be

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a few co-opted persons, representing no particular body but valuable for their general interest or for their special knowledge. The aim is also comparable : it is to secure co-operation as fully as possible, to review steadily the social needs and the social provision of the area, and to enhance the welfare of the inhabitants. A Rural Community Council, like an urban Council of Social Service and like the National Council of Social Service, is not primarily an executive body : its business is not so much to carry on social services itself as to see that they are carried on. But in practice a Rural Community Council, like the other bodies named, does usually find itself involved in a certain amount of executive action.

It has been one of the marked differences between the Rural Community Councils and the urban Councils of Social Service that the former have been mainly concerned with the enrichment of normal life, whilst the latter have been much pre-occupied with the relief of distress. Both Rural Community Councils and the urban Councils of Social Service have come into existence to remedy bad conditions : but, whilst the latter may be said to have been concerned with specific diseases and crises of urban life, the former have been concerned not with particular positive evils but rather with the general condition of low vitality.

The area over which a Rural Community Council has operated has usually been an administrative county. There are obvious advantages in a coincidence of area of operations of the chief voluntary body and of the chief statutory body. It has sometimes, however, its inconveniences. In a number of cases the county is too small to be able to afford the machinery of a Rural Community Council, and in particular to raise the salary of a really competent chief officer. (It may be doubted in many of these cases whether the area is not also too small for efficient local government, but a discussion of that is outside our theme.) In such cases there are advantages in taking a larger area of operations, two or perhaps three adjoining counties. No Rural Community Council has yet been constructed for such an area, though there have been examples where a Rural Community Council of one county has rendered some services, chiefly of an

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advisory nature, in an adjoining county which had no Rural Community Council. There are also examples of specialist instructors, especially in respect of handicraft and of drama, operating over more than one area, but they have usually not been the direct servants of the Rural Community Council.

One of the unsettled questions of Rural Community Council policies is their relation to the towns, especially to the larger towns and the industrial towns, within their area. Social work in towns, as we have said, tends to have another emphasis ; it is more concerned with the relief of distress and the meeting of particular crises. In any case it is concerned with populations with different outlook and different interests. Some Rural Community Councils have confined their attention to the strictly rural areas and to rural problems, as distinct from urban problems. Others have taken the towns into consideration. Especially in the years following 1931 there was some attention given to helping the unemployed in the towns ; and there was concern expressed by some supporters of Rural Community Councils lest they should be diverted from their original purpose. Other Rural Community Councils have considered it to be part of their normal work to deal with the towns within their area ; this appears to have been the policy in Nottinghamshire. In Kent there was particularly striking action ; in 1930 the Kent Rural Community Council was converted into a Kent Council of Social Service, covering the whole geographical county, including such typically industrial areas as the Medway towns. The Kent Council of Social Service is a strong body, well staffed ; it has offices in Folkestone, Maidstone and Sidcup : and it seems to be fairly successful in dealing with both urban and rural problems. But opinions differ sharply as to the wisdom of combining rural and urban work in the same organisation.

The Rural Community Council is the co-ordinating body in each county : its responsibility is to see that services are provided ; but the actual provision is, as we have indicated before, made by a number of organisations, often in an intricate collaboration. We shall now consider some of the fields of social work which have been entered.

In the first place, there has been the provision of libraries.

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This has been due in the main to the initiative of the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, whose partners in the enterprise have been the local education authorities. In the second place, there has been the field of formal adult education. Here there has been a good deal of co-operation between the Rural Community Councils, the Workers Educational Association, the local education authorities, and the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust. In the earlier years especially, the officers of the Rural Community Councils did a good deal of pioneering and undertook duties which in later years have usually, but not always, passed to the extra-mural boards of universities. The Carnegie United Kingdom Trust has played a considerable part in this work also, notably by its grant to the Sawston Village College and by its grants to the Workers Educational Association to maintain resident tutors in country districts. The Rural Community Councils have continued to do a good deal of work in connection with informal education; they have, for instance, in a number of counties arranged series of health lectures in collaboration with the Red Cross. In 1935 the National Council of Social Service negotiated with the British Broadcasting Corporation for a special series of talks to villagers, and the Rural Community Councils did their best to stimulate interest in those talks and to see that they were discussed.

With regard to music and drama a great deal has been accomplished. In this sphere also the great Trusts have been very helpful. In most counties there have been formed music and drama committees of the Rural Community Councils. In many counties there have been arranged schools for producers of plays and schools for conductors of choirs and of orchestras. Usually there are yearly festivals at which dramatic societies and choirs compete. The plays chosen and the music rendered are usually of good quality; the performances sometimes reach a very high level. In addition to this evocation of local talent, there has been the arrangement of tours by professionals, notably the Village, Country Town and School concert parties which toured the country between 1920 and 1935. Since 1939 many good concerts have been provided in villages under the auspices of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts. Whilst it is

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probably not yet possible to say that some good music can be heard (other than over the wireless), and some good acting can be seen, in every village, yet it can be said that there are now few parts of the country where good music and good drama are totally inaccessible to the majority of the inhabitants. One could not have said that twenty years ago.

As activities were multiplied in the rural areas, the need for meeting places became more apparent. In 1924 the Development Commissioners placed in the hands of the National Council of Social Service a sum of £5,000 out of which loans could be made for the building of Village Halls. The loans service proved very popular and very successful. The National Council of Social Service placed on record in its annual report for 1933-34 that in respect of 265 loans to villages to build halls there had been no single case in which a village hall committee had failed to keep its promise to re-pay. Grants were also made by the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust towards the cost of new buildings. And after 1927 grants could be obtained also from the National Fitness Council. And also in a few cases grants were made by the Land Settlement Association in areas where it was operating. With this financial help some eight hundred village halls were built between 1918 and 1939. They have been of many kinds, sometimes converted cottages or barns, sometimes adapted houses, sometimes entirely new buildings. In the construction of many of them there was a good deal of voluntary labour given. Most of them are pleasant buildings; quite a number are of considerable æsthetic merit. Of their value to the villages there has never been the slightest doubt. One happy and unforeseen consequence of the building of them has been that it has solved in a number of cases the hitherto baffling problem of getting together a voluntary body representative of the village. In this connection it is interesting to note the definitions of "village" and of "village hall committee" framed for its administrative purposes by the National Council of Social Service:

"A village is understood to be a community in a rural area with a population not exceeding 4,000"; whilst a village hall committee is

"A committee whose membership is . . . adequately

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representative of the village community, or a substantial section thereof, and which is responsible for the management of a Village Hall, Village Community Centre, or other building serving the social, educational or recreational needs of a village community."

Another field of effort has been in the sphere of rural crafts and industries, many of which were in danger of extinction. The initiative with regard to this came from the Development Commissioners, to whom was due the creation in 1921 of a Rural Industries Intelligence Bureau, created under trust deed by the Minister of Agriculture, its maintenance being assured by grants from the Treasury, and its operations being controlled by a committee representing the Government departments concerned and others with special qualifications. The Rural Industries Bureau has supplied organisers and teachers, sometimes directly controlled by itself and sometimes attached to the staff of a Rural Community Council, and it has also attempted to make easier the marketing of the products of rural craftsmen. Attempts have been made to improve the techniques and the economic positions of blacksmiths, wheelwrights, carpenters, and other rural craftsmen. In the case of blacksmiths, they have been induced in many instances to provide themselves with oxy-acetylene welding equipment, which has enabled them to undertake a greater range of work. They have also been encouraged to undertake work of an artistic nature, such as making of park gates. Thus during the year 1932 the blacksmiths of East Sussex were able to sell £1,500 worth of iron work. Questions of apprenticeship have been discussed, and attempts have been made to get them to combine for the protection of their interests. Arrangements have been made in many counties for exhibitions of handicrafts, and a Rural Community Council stall has been a regular feature at most county agricultural shows, whilst the Rural Industries Bureau has usually had a stall at the Royal Agricultural Shows. Rural Community Councils have aided in such matters as negotiating freight charges with the railway companies. It has all been very uphill work. Some of the village crafts seem to have no future; probably there is no future for the village wheelwright. Probably there is

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no future for the village saddler, but there is still a place for the saddler in the small country town. The village carpenter is hard put to it. The village blacksmith has better prospects, but only if he brings his technique up to date and if he combines with his fellows to see that he is paid reasonably for his services.

In 1927 the Ministry of Agriculture asked the National Council of Social Service to help in the formation of Young Farmers Clubs, and to administer a grant which the Treasury would make on the recommendation of the Development Commissioners. These Young Farmers Clubs were to consist of boys and girls, children either of farmers or of farm labourers, who would be encouraged to undertake the care of animals, and who would meet to compare notes and to listen to talks from experts on that and other rural topics, the object being to kindle early an intelligent interest in rural occupations. The Young Farmers Clubs have been founded in many counties and have been very popular.

Another form of effort by the National Council of Social Service and by the Rural Community Councils has been that of trying to make the Parish Councils more effective. The parish is the oldest local government area in existence in this country, and the parish council is a local authority whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity. The statutory powers of Parish Councils enable them to deal with such matters as scavenging, cleansing of ponds and ditches, maintenance of footpaths, provision of allotments, provision of recreation grounds; whilst in regard to matters in which it has no direct powers, it can also direct the attention of rural district council or of county council to them. Unfortunately the powers of Parish Councils are not used as much as they might be; there is a bad tradition of incompetence and pettiness to live down, and jokes about the champions and the opponents of the village pump still reflect a common opinion that the matters with which they have power to deal are too trivial to attract the attention of able and sensible men. There is no reason why it should be so; the functions which a Parish Council can execute are important in the life of the community. The National Council of Social Service and the Rural Community Councils have done their best to

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combat this attitude. They have called conferences of parish councillors, which have been very well attended; they have issued leaflets on the powers and duties of Parish Councils, they have maintained a Parish Council Advisory Service. Their efforts have met with some success, but in this as in other directions the work has been very uphill. It is too early to say whether these efforts to instil new life into the Parish Councils will be successful or not. It is in any case a remarkable example of a voluntary organisation devoting itself to the stimulation and education of statutory authorities.

In 1926 the National Council of Social Service gave its hearty support to the efforts which were being made to promote a society which should do something to check the devastation of the countryside which was proceeding at an appalling rate. The result of these efforts was the foundation of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, which grew rapidly in strength and influence. It was very much helped by a Carnegie United Kingdom Trust grant of £10,000 spread over five years. The Council for the Preservation of Rural England has worked very much through county committees, which are usually affiliated to the Rural Community Councils where these exist. In some counties the Rural Community Council has appointed a sub-committee of itself to do the work of a County branch of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England; in other counties it has helped to form and to float off such a branch. Which is the better course depends on circumstances: if there is enough enthusiasm and a sufficiency of resources in personnel and money to allow the formation of a strong separate body that is doubtless the better policy, but it is not always practicable. In any case there is usually a co-ordination of effort. In some counties the Women's Institutes have played a considerable part.

It is very difficult to estimate the total effect of all the voluntary organisations upon the life of the English countryside in recent years. It has certainly been great. It has also been very uneven; it is possible to find parts of England very little touched by the whole complex of voluntary associations. The Women's Institutes have probably been more pervasive than any other type of organisation. But the

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drift of population from the land still continues, as the Scott Report has been careful to remind us, and there is still a large amount of unmet need. Whether there is or there is not to be a well marked and lasting revival of rural life will be determined in the main by the operation of big political and economic forces rather than by the presence or absence, goodness or badness, of voluntary social effort. But that is not to say that the voluntary social effort is of small importance; and since the issue with regard to the future of English rural society is in doubt, it may be of vital importance. In any case it is contributing heavily to the quality of social life in this country. It can scarcely be denied that life for tens of thousands of countrymen and countrywomen is less dull, less starved of healthy interests, more alive and more hopeful than was the case twenty-five or thirty years ago.

THE INDIAN PROSPECT¹

By SIR JOHN MAYNARD, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

MR. NAGENDRA NATH GANGULEE is an economist who was formerly a Professor in the University of Calcutta. He is well known for his practical interest in economic problems affecting India, and is an ex-member of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, of which the Marquess of Linlithgow, the present Viceroy and Governor General, was the Chairman, and of the Imperial Research Council at New Delhi. He is an ardent Nationalist and a supporter of the demands made by the Indian National Congress in rejecting the proposals of the Cripps Declaration.

Mr. T. A. Raman is an Indian journalist who was formerly the London correspondent of *The Hindu* newspaper, but became convinced by his experiences in France that Indian political differences were of an importance secondary to the War. This conviction led to the termination of his connection with *The Hindu* and is relevant to his views as expressed in the present booklet. He is a friendly critic of the Government.

Mr. Gangulee is cold and reticent on the subject of the two years' working of the provinces under the control of Congress majorities. Mr. Raman speaks warmly of the degree of success attained, of the co-operation of Civil Servants with Ministers, and of the general abstention of the Governors from using their powers of veto and restoration. He makes it plain that the Governors assumed control only because the Ministries refused to continue, and that it is open to the latter to take up office again, as indeed has happened in Assam (August 25th, 1942).

But he does not conceal his conviction that the British declaration of August 8th, 1940, with its repetition of the promise of a species of Round Table Conference after the War, its indefinite reference to the "due fulfilment of Britain's obligations in the country" as the condition of

¹ *Constituent Assembly for India*. By N. Gangulee. (304 pp. Allen & Unwin. 16s.)
The World To-day. India. By T. A. Raman. (122 pp. Milford and Oxford University Press. 3s. 6d.)

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support to agreed Indian proposals, and its recognition of the rights of powerful minorities to exercise what looks like a veto, did not adequately convey to Indian critics the actual intentions of His Majesty's Government, and that the great majority were irritated by its reiteration in successive speeches.

Mr. Gangulee provides us with a valuable collection of historical documents relevant to constitutional changes in the British Empire up to the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and to the formation of Constituent Assemblies in various countries, and reproduces the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen. Mr. Raman has a fascinating chapter entitled "On Cows and Caste and Other Things," which brings up-to-date the changing picture of Indian social life: and he illustrates his booklet with a number of well-chosen photographs.

Both writers supplement their work with accounts of the Cripps Mission, which necessarily forms the point of departure for any consideration of the Indian political situation to-day. The draft was slightly modified before Sir Stafford left India, and in my account of it I shall speak of it in its final form: which provided for Indian Members in the War Cabinet and the Pacific Council, with equal powers in all matters relating to the defence of India, and for an Indian member for Defence on the Executive Council of the Governor-General, in addition to the Commander-in-Chief. There has been much controversy over the division of the "defence" subjects, of which by far the most important have been left to the Commander-in-Chief, and the absence of outspoken recognition of immediate independence such as would serve to rally the people of India to a war of defence, has been the central criticism of the Congress Party on the Cripps Declaration.

The Congress Party declared its willingness to put aside for the time being the proposals for the election of a Constituent Assembly at the end of the War, and for the exercise of a provincial option of non-accession to an Indian Union, and to concentrate for the present on their claim to "present freedom and full responsibility" in the matter of defence. The letter with which the President of the

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Congress accompanied the Resolution of the Working Committee issued on April 11th, 1942, made it plain that the demand was for a "truly National Government." But the formation of such a Government postulated the decision of certain questions raised by the Muslim League, questions vitally affecting the post-war future of India, and raising highly controversial issues. These are the questions (1) of the representation of Muslims in the Provisional Government which the Congress proposes to establish during the War, (2) of the right of the Muslims to set up Pakistan (the land of the pure) in certain portions of India, north-west and north-east, where the population is predominantly Muslim.

On the former point the Muslim League (whose co-religionists constitute about 23 per cent of the Indian population) demands a representation of 50 per cent. The argument with which this claim is supported runs somewhat as follows. There are two nations in India. Each must control one-half of the Government. But the same contention is not applicable to other and smaller minorities, such as the Scheduled Castes (Depressed Classes) or the Sikhs, who must presumably find their share of representation in the remaining 50 per cent to be allotted to Hindus. The Congress Party, and with still greater emphasis the Hindu Mahasabha (which represents the older-fashioned and more strictly orthodox Hindus) deny that there are two separate nations, and would certainly repudiate the suggestion that 50 per cent is the appropriate percentage.

As to the actual position of the Mohammedans in India, it is true that some of them are the descendants of races, which invaded and—in part—conquered India. But very many of them are demonstrably converts or the descendants of converts. Except in the extreme north-west and centre west—the Frontier Province, the Northern Punjab, Baluchistan and Sind, where the Muslim predominance is considerable, particularly in the rural population—they are inextricably intermixed with Hindus and Sikhs, and all three are economically complementary to one another. Often the trader and the moneylender are Hindus when the cultivators are Muslims. But many of the best cultivators are Sikhs. It is an error to suppose that the Muslims have the monopoly

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of the fighting spirit. Sikhs, Jats, Mahrattas, Gurkhas, all have it in a high degree. I am not familiar with the distribution of the religions in Bengal, but I believe that only in Eastern Bengal do Muslims substantially predominate. There is thus, as a fact, little or no territorial "Pakistan," but only Muslims living together with the adherents of other religions in a greater or less proportion.

In the Province of the Punjab, as at present constituted for administrative purposes (it includes a considerable area which is not properly speaking "Punjab," "land of the five rivers," at all), the Muslim population is about 55 per cent of the whole. The proportion in Bengal is about the same. These are the two areas, beside Sind, the Frontier Province, and Baluchistan, which are claimed for "Pakistan." The expression "Pakistan"—"land of the pure"—is a recent invention.

I have seen cases of the closest friendship between individual Hindus and Muslims: and Hindus and Muslims have in the near past lived alongside of one another and worshipped together at the same shrines without thought of hostility. There has been practically no inter-marriage between them. But also there has been practically no inter-marriage between different castes of Hindus, except where hypergamy—the marriage of the woman into a higher caste than her own—is practised. The rivalry is a comparatively modern phenomenon, which patriotic Indians attribute to the machinations of the British, seeking to rule by division. It is commonly stated that the introduction of communal representation in the Minto Councils was the beginning of communal friction: but my memory goes back nearly two decades earlier than that, when riots between Muslims and Hindus in a Punjab town, where they had come into collision at the polling booths over the election of common candidates, led to the establishment of communal constituencies in order to keep the two sections effectively apart. The truth I believe to be this: that the growth of sophistication led to the recognition of a separate entity and separate interests, which had previously been ignored. The simpler the people, the less the communal feeling: and the less, naturally, also, the recognition of the intricacies of their own

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religious faith. For a long time communal hostility was confined to British India : but it spread later to some of the Indian States. As political consciousness was awakened, and pressure began to be applied to obtain political concessions, I have no doubt that some sections of British opinion were not sorry to find that divisions existed, and made the most of the argument which they furnished for a *non possumus* attitude.

As to the stimulation of inter-communal jealousies, it is necessary to remember that some persons whose political significance would be trifling if they were merged in a common nationality with the rest, may become public figures of importance as the leaders of particularist sections. Differences of religion have supplied a label to Indian parties, and have served to demarcate in unmistakable colours the rival camps, and to lend fervour and fanaticism to the quarrel, but the subject matter of the dispute will often be found in economic claims or in the distribution of patronage. So much has already been done by Government to recognise the religious difference that no practical politician to-day would be justified in ignoring it, but the greatest caution should be exercised before further encouragement be given to separatist claims.

It seems unfortunately to be true that some Congress politicians have, during the two years' period of Congress-controlled ministries in some of the provinces, attempted, by the use of patronage, or by threats of withholding it, to bring pressure to bear upon communal opponents : and that a book has been prepared (I have not seen a copy) giving a list of specific cases in which power has thus been abused. This is the way to put weapons into the hands of separatists, and the Chairman of the All-India Muslim League recognised the opening which it gave to him when he proclaimed his "Day of Deliverance" from the incubus of Congress-controlled ministries, on the resignation of the latter. If Mr. Gandhi would make use of his immense influence to persuade his followers of the unwisdom of this kind of Congress encroachment, he would help in the elimination of the strongest arguments for refusing to recognise the existence of Indian unity, and also provide against the risk

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of destructive disputes after the achievement of Indian independence : and the move would be a fitting complement to the work already done by him in raising the depressed classes to a better social status.

The Cripps Declaration proposed to deal with the communal difference by providing for a provincial option of non-accession to the Indian Union, which is contemplated as the outcome of the post-war Constituent Assembly. The plan was that—the Constitution having been framed by an Assembly chosen by the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures, sitting with representatives of the Indian States chosen in similar proportions—each British Indian Province should be invited to decide by vote in its Legislative Assembly whether it would join the Indian Union. If the majority for accession should be less than 60 per cent, the minority was to have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. On the assumption that there is solidarity among Muslims in desiring non-accession (for their attitude would, in some degree depend upon the character of the Constitution which the Constituent Assembly had drafted), there would be every likelihood that the Provinces claimed for *Pakistan* would not accede to the Union, despite the very large minorities of Hindus in the Punjab and Bengal. The British Government was to pledge itself, under the draft declaration, to accept the new Constitution, and to give to non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, a separate constitution (or constitutions), giving a status similar to that of the Indian Union.

Not content with the apparent security of the prospect of "Pakistan" under these proposals, the Chairman of the All-India Muslim League, and the League itself by its Resolution of April 11th, 1942, have declared that it will be unfair to Muslims to be expected to enter the proposed constitution-making body without a preliminary guarantee of separation ; and have claimed that the proposed plebiscite be exercised by Muslims only. That is to say, that on the question of the non-accession of such provinces as the Punjab and Bengal, Hindus and Sikhs should be excluded from the voting, though they obviously have a strong interest in the result.

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There is one point in the Resolution of the All-India Muslim League which shows a more conciliatory attitude. It points out that the existing Provinces have been formed from time to time for administrative convenience and on no logical basis : and implies that provincial boundaries should be changed for the purposes of the vote on non-accession. This would mean that both the Punjab and Bengal should be divided in such a manner as to separate the predominantly Muslim from the predominately Hindu and Sikh portions of both provinces.

But such a rearrangement would still leave serious objections to the Pakistan proposal. The strategic unity of India would be broken on the north-west by a breach in its mountain rampart : and the traditional conception of oneness in the sub-continent, which, though never completely realised till the establishment of British control, has long been cherished as an aspiration, would be disappointed. So comparatively trifling a breach of continuity as the partition of Bengal during the administration of Lord Curzon was bitterly resented and had untoward political consequences. The results of the division of Ireland into the six north-eastern counties and Eire are always present to us. On the great scale, the struggle of the United States of America over the secession of the Southern States reminds us how powerful may be the political forces set in motion by an invasion of territorial unity. There is, of course, a strong motive—the avoidance of future wars caused by the vicinity of separate states.

Mr. Rajagopalachari, a Madras Brahmin and ex-member of Congress, who has broken with traditional caste rules by allowing the marriage of his daughter to Mr. Gandhi's son, has vigorously pressed certain proposals of his own for the removal of the deadlock between the Muslim League and the Congress Party. He proposes to abstain from prejudging, during the continuance of the War, the scheme of "Pakistan," which he probably suspects to be a serious stumbling-block in the way of agreement, but is, it appears, personally favourable to a plebiscite on the subject : provided that it be a plebiscite of the whole adult population of the dissenting province. His plan is that a National Government be set up during the War, with an equal number of Hindu and

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Mohammedan ministers, and a smaller number of ministers to be nominated by them to represent other interests (presumably such as the Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs) : and that this National Government be made responsible to the Central Legislature after fresh elections have been held—involving, of course, changes in the provisional Ministry, if it lacks support in the new Legislature.

There are obvious possibilities in this scheme ; but Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, has not unnaturally objected that, at present, Mr. Rajagopalachari speaks only for himself. The originator of it has therefore asked the Government to allow him to visit Mr. Gandhi, now interned, and apparently not allowed to receive political visitors. The Government has, unfortunately, as it appears to me, declined to allow the visit, on the ground that the Congress Party has given no sign of a change of heart. A good proposal might, however, be the occasion of a change of heart, though I cannot pretend to be hopeful of the scheme.

I am not hopeful, because of the circumstances in which the deadlock has arisen, and because of a characteristic of Indian political leaders, which I attribute to their long lack of experience in the art of governing, and to their subconscious assumption that there is an outside authority which in the last resort will decide their differences. They have no notion of compromise, because they do not perceive that—unless the British Government is to decide the question for them—the choice in the long run lies between compromise and the fighting out of the quarrel in the literal sense of the words. Everyone cannot have the whole of what he asks for, unless he is prepared to put the issue to the ordeal of battle. I say it with regret, but I think that they will not come to an agreement, and that the British Government will ultimately have to choose between leaving things as they are and offering its own solution which each party will take or leave, as it may be advised. Mr. Jinnah seemed to recognise the inevitability of something like this, when he said on November 9th, 1942 :

"The British . . . should get on without the Congress Party and mobilise those who were ready to be mobilised."

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But Mr. Jinnah was doubtless mistaken in his assumption that any party will get the whole of what it asks for, because another holds temporarily aloof. What is to be looked for, if the attempts at bringing about agreement should fail, is *progressive acquiescence* in a reasonable solution, to be brought into force in successive portions as each party becomes willing to adopt it.

In the meanwhile every possibility of agreement should be explored, and Mr. Rajagopalachari ought to be allowed to see Mr. Gandhi—the only person who has sufficient influence to carry Hindu opinion with him. If this plan succeeds, questions relating to the representation of the States in the future Constituent Assembly and to the non-accession of particular provinces would be put aside till after the War: by which time actual experience of a combined National Government might alter the outlook.

The British Government thinks it gets on very well without the political parties: and it is true that the contribution of India to the War is already considerable. But few will deny that it might be greater: and it is plain that popular co-operation, or non-co-operation, has its value. The Congress and the Muslim League are both very well organised, and their leaders have eloquent tongues.

I do not think that the help of Mr. Gandhi in a violent war is to be expected. He is genuinely convinced of the truth of his own gospel of non-violence: but, as on former occasions, he may be willing to stand aside. There will still remain other difficulties, of course. But the unwillingness of Congress and Muslim League leaders to defend India is not one of them. What has affected the Indian attitude at an earlier stage—it is useless to shut our eyes to a humiliating fact—has been the doubt, bred by failures in Malaya and Burma, of the power of Britain to defend. We must never forget the immemorial Indian conception of the position of the ruler. The ruler by right is the ruler who has the power to defeat his enemies and protect his people. When the power goes, the right goes too. Some of the speakers in the recent political controversies have as good as said it. With the turning of the tide of battle, this particular difficulty is no longer to be encountered.

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Mr. Gandhi's unwillingness to embark his people in co-operation in a "violent" war must have contributed to the breakdown of the negotiations. The author of *India*, in the *World To-day* series, offers another explanation also. The Congress Working Committee was dominated by two personalities known to be realists in their outlook, Sardar Patel and Mr. Rajendra Prasad. The calculations of this group run somewhat as follows: All that a war-time settlement would give would be substantial power for the two or three years that the War may last: but, as a set-off against that advantage, the Congress has to assume all the perils of power during an invasion and be responsible for unpopular things, from food control to scorched earth: things which may break up the Party and undermine its hold when the time comes for constitution-making. They may also have to yield a good deal more to the Muslims in return for their co-operation. Further, assumption of office at this stage may not materially improve the country's war effort—neither war production nor recruitment can be improved substantially. These things depend on the equipment and industrial capacity of the country. Therefore, on the whole, it is wisest to abstain from the acceptance of responsibility.

Mr. Raman was in close touch with Mr. Rajendra Prasad, and he may be right in his diagnosis of the causes of breakdown. If so, the outlook for an immediate settlement is less than ever promising, unless an improvement in the prospect of the war should alter the calculation.

It only remains for me to mention certain palliatives: the application of which might alleviate Indian suspicions of British good faith, if the British Government can bring itself to believe that the effort is worth the trouble. Indian suspicions are always present, and they are not diminished by incidents such as the recent speech, in which the Prime Minister declared in so emphatic a way the intention to "hold our own." The possible palliatives are these:

- (1) The complete Indianisation of the Executive Council of the Governor-General (with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief).

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- (2) The Indianisation of the Governor's advisers in those provinces in which Congress-controlled Ministries have resigned, and new Ministries have not accepted office.

Diminished suspicion means a better atmosphere and an improved chance of a reasonable settlement. But the palliatives themselves will not effect a solution, since the difference between the two great communities bars the way.

CO-ORDINATION OF WAR AIMS

By RUDOLF SCHLESINGER

ANTAGONISTIC conceptions of war aims—real or imaginary—are among the major difficulties in coalitions. They complicate those differences in military outlook and interests, which are unavoidable, especially in a coalition of "land-animals and sea-animals." Much harm has been done to the cause of good understanding between the Allies by the editors of those periodicals which, sometimes in one and the same issue, combine articles on the alleged impracticability of the "second front" with others, for example, on the alleged desire of the Baltic peoples for protection against the U.S.S.R. Whilst it is impossible to discuss the military issues without inside information, co-ordination of the political war aims and peace aims is among the most legitimate tasks of the publicist. Some people, it is true, fear that public discussion of such subjects may endanger inter-Allied relations. But to adopt such an attitude would be to let public opinion, especially in this country, rest where it stands after a quarter of a century of Anglo-Russian estrangement, and to leave some extreme nationalists, artificially preserved, as the only "legitimate" informants on the alleged needs of the Central and Eastern European countries. It is not difficult to see whither such an attitude would lead: during the War, to mutual suspicions, and to a corresponding weakening of inter-Allied co-operation; at the Peace Conference, to an eventual clash between the Allies. There could be only two possible outcomes of such a clash: either public opinion in this country would be forced to accept a settlement which they would have been taught to regard as unjust—or the Russians, after a war in which they have made the greatest sacrifices in human life and material welfare, would feel betrayed by their Allies, so that the strongest continental power would decline to defend the peace settlement against inevitable future threats. In comparison with such dangers any possible consequences of frank discussion at the present stage seem quite negligible. Indeed frank discussion is a

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necessary condition for clearing the way towards future co-operation, even though it may cause bewilderment to people still rooted in traditional prejudices.

Those who, in this country, are antagonistic to the war aims of the U.S.S.R. seem to be dominated by a conception which the Soviet itself has dropped long ago, namely that permanent peaceful co-existence of the U.S.S.R. with her capitalist surroundings is inherently impossible. Of course, as long as either of the two powers dreamed of the practicability and desirability of enforcing her own way of life on the other one, no agreement beyond very short-term compromises was possible. But one ought to assume that, at least after the experience of the present War, reasonable people have learned that both the English and the Soviet systems, however they may evolve in the future, are most unsuitable objects for export to each other. The conviction of the essentially national character of the Soviet regime (a conviction which, moreover, is fully compatible with an expectation of a trend towards socialism in the evolution of other countries), forms, in any case, an essential tenet of Stalinist Russia. The corresponding recognition of the strictly national *raison d'être* of the British system seems to be accepted even in such documents as the last report of the Conservative Sub-Committee on Youth Education. It is, of course, an essential condition of future collaboration that anyone who pleases should be allowed to contend, with Lady Astor in a speech of October 23, that "the British way of thinking is the best one," just as other people must be allowed to say the same about the Russian or Chinese way of thinking. To look, as Lady Astor did in that speech, for Russian and Chinese participation in an international order established by the Anglo-Saxon nations, on condition that Russians and Chinese "would accept the British way of thinking," means to misunderstand the essential condition for any tolerably stable peace-order—namely that it should contain nothing beyond what *all* participants really and freely can agree upon.

This holds true as regards the material as well as the spiritual foundations of collaboration. The case against Nazi-fascist barbarism can be made from various starting-

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points. It is a strong case precisely because it is not bound to any one set of metaphysical or philosophical assumptions, none of which could command the support of a majority of mankind. No international difficulties are likely to arise from statements such, for example, those of the Archbishop of Canterbury, who tries in the interest of the common struggle to draw the international and social consequences of the specific world-outlook which he stands for. The difficulties arise from statements by people who appear to be interested in a political rather than in a spiritual conception of Christianity, and who speak to a public by which "Christianity" is likely to be understood as, essentially, the negation of all that the men of Stalingrad are dying for. When the *Polish* National Council, in its March session, was concerned with a resolution demanding "including *Lithuania* into the sphere of Christian civilisation," this, evidently, implied an interpretation of "Christianity" against which the Soviet could make a very strong case, merely from the point of view of defending its social system.

In the directly political field the policy of the Grand Alliance must necessarily be a realistic one. Political realism means, for some people, pursuing utopian and reactionary war aims, based upon the assumption that, as a guarantee for the stability of the coming order, dismembering Germany, or destroying her industries, could provide an adequate substitute for the Soviet support which these people do not desire (and which certainly would not be available for this kind of utopia). But this is not realism. Within the framework of any policy likely to be agreed upon with the Soviet, political realism does not mean denying to a future democratic Germany the chance of playing a new rôle in European politics unlike that played by imperialist Germany in this century. But it does mean taking precautions against any possible future threat. These precautions must be based upon two essential lessons of the present war, first, that only two European great powers have proved able to withstand the Nazi onslaught, and, second, that no small nation—small if measured by the standards of the modern war—is able to play any but a subsidiary rôle in the military defence of the new settlement. Such a realistic approach would spare the

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new order a great many unnecessary complications. In particular, it would spare the Polish nation disastrous difficulties, which would be unavoidable if she were burdened with a task she could not even attempt to solve without a strongly oppressive internal regime. Some advocates of the ci-devant Polish regime consider it as an expression of hostility towards the Polish nation, if war-aims are criticised that can be advocated only under the tacit assumption that Eastern Europe ought to be organised without the Soviet.¹ In my opinion, insofar as harm can be done to the future of the Polish nation by public discussion, her worst enemies are those who advocate, for example, inclusion of the bulk of the Soviet Ukraine into a federation intended as an independent bloc between Russia and Germany.² The only likely result of such proposals are doubts on the Soviet side whether complete indifference towards the internal regime of her neighbours is compatible with Russian security.

After the present experiences it seems evident that the U.S.S.R. is destined to bear the main burdens of an eventual future as well as of the present defence. Therefore she, as well as all other European nations, has an evident interest in avoiding any unnecessary complications of the future order. Least of all can the U.S.S.R. be expected to agree that other people's delusions about a possible defence without her support should be satisfied at her expense. Inclusion of, ethnographically, distinctly Ukrainian or White-Russian territories into Poland, or the establishment of Baltic federations, are bound to be considered by the Russians not only as unfit instruments of defence against future German aggression, but also as a proof that it is not defence against Germany that the advocates of such plans have in mind.

As regards the drawing of the future frontiers—with a few minor exceptions where obvious local needs ought to be kept in mind—no better leading principle can be envisaged than ethnographical delimitation, with the local majority

¹ This attitude, which forms the basic assumption of most Right Wing conceptions on War Aims, has been transferred even to the economic field by a letter of Mr. Spencer Curtis Brown, published in *The Spectator* of October 23. This letter also exhibits a remarkable lack of knowledge of what British statesmen found evident even in 1920.

² Thus in an article of a leading Polish politician, in *Contemporary Review*, October, 1942, the estuaries of the Dnieper have been demanded.

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entitled freely to decide upon their future regime. The reason for advocating this principle is not that I, or my readers, deem it just (though we are likely to do so), but that it is the only one upon which those powers on whose collaboration the future security of Europe depends can agree on equal terms. The most complicated national issues in Central and Eastern Europe are those where the national antagonisms coincide with social ones, and experience of Sudeten-German or Hungarian questions have sufficiently proved that social sympathies are the strongest element in determining the attitude of public opinion abroad, on either side, towards the national issues. This is bound to hold true, in an even higher degree, where the internal social regime is directly involved, as for example in deciding Soviet-Polish boundary questions or the internal regime of post-Hitlerite Germany or Austria. It is quite evident that no decision in such issues can avoid conflicting with what some people, within the Allied camp, regard as essential conditions of human civilisation and progress, and no one can expect people, in either camp, to subordinate their views upon the foundations of civilisation to the majority-principle. But no decision could be worse than one exposing the whole Continent to the horrors of a Third World War, which would be unavoidable if the character of the settlement is not such that both the British and the Russians can defend it. A settlement acceptable to both great powers can be found only on condition that no *a priori* validity is claimed for the specific ideals of either side. There may be a strong case for intervention against the survival of fascist regimes in any country on the ground, and only on the ground, that fascist ideology is intrinsically and admittedly bound up with territorial expansion and with oppression of national minorities. But, in an order based upon Anglo-Soviet co-operation there can be no place for considering "food and occupation-troops" as a legitimate provision against what some people may call anarchy, but what the Russians may deem the shortest way to social progress. Polish Catholics have, within such an order, just the same claims, as French, Yugoslav, and even German Communists, namely a claim for support in their struggle against fascist

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oppression, and a claim for participation in forming the future outlook, in accordance with their share in the common struggle. But none of them has any claim for a monopoly of political power unless they prove able to win, for such a claim, the support of the majority of their people. Nor can any useful contribution to future planning be made unless the student starts from the question whether and under what conditions the peoples concerned really demand some federation or other suggested panacea. Once Anglo-Soviet co-operation is accepted as the essential foundation of future security, there is no need for artificial substitutes, in the shape of so-called "federation" imposed upon the peoples concerned by some benevolent "planners." The only legitimate function of regional federation within a system in which security is guaranteed by the collaboration of the two main powers is co-operation of smaller nationalities to further economic and cultural progress in such a direction as they freely agree upon. From this point of view there is no reason to discriminate against federations with admittedly socialist aims in favour of others that may prefer to develop on capitalist lines. National self-determination does not necessarily imply the preservation of full state-sovereignty, but clearly involves the right of each nation freely to decide in favour of what kind of social order it is ready to renounce parts of its autonomy.

It is indeed difficult, for most people, to take such an attitude, and to work for a settlement parts of which are bound to contradict what they have learned to regard as just. But among the advantages of a coalition-war is the need to take, on all sides, a broader view of human civilisation and progress, and to understand that no stable peace-order is possible unless various ways of life are accepted as of equal value. The alternative to such a view is a settlement that some people may deem just, but that the other half of the world will deem oppression. Any conception of some kind of new Roman Empire is merely a programme for the Third World War. The coming settlement will be stable if the peoples by whose joint efforts it will have been achieved deem it to be the least oppressive among all conceivable alternatives.

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VESTED INTERESTS OR COMMON POOL? By NICHOLAS E. H. DAVENPORT.
(183 pp. *Gollancz*. 8s. 6d.)

AN ESSAY ON MARXIAN ECONOMICS. By JOAN ROBINSON. (122 pp.
Macmillan. 7s. 6d.)

IN this fourth year of war, as we look back on the gradual mobilisation of our economic resources which has been proceeding ever since the war began, we realise that nothing has really been changed in any fundamental sense since Mr. Chamberlain and his advisers laid the ground-plan well before 1939. There has been, of course, a continually increasing disturbance of the normal processes of production and distribution, a great increase of state control over both capital and labour, and a great stiffening up of taxation which has affected the relative net incomes of the rich and the poor as well as the total income available for spending on consumers' supplies. But all these changes have been brought about without changing the framework. The productive establishments remain in the same hands as before the war: the workman still works for a private employer, even if he is producing under orders for the State: wages are still settled mainly by collective bargaining, with arbitration made compulsory in case of deadlock instead of remaining voluntary as it was before the war. We are, moreover, still working on the assumption that when a business fails to make a profit and is unable to carry on, that is the owner's misfortune, for which the State can accept no responsibility. Thus, in summary, the structure of capitalism remains as before; the general relations between capital and labour remain as before; and there is no compensation for the "economically bombed," except by way of private pooling arrangements between firms.

Mr. Nicholas Davenport is one among many who are utterly dissatisfied with this state of affairs. His view is that, under conditions of total war, the State, just as it takes over in effect the nation's manpower for national service, ought to take over the national productive capital and to make itself responsible for the wartime distribution of the national income. He would, therefore, not only insist on a national wage-policy (including family allowances and a national minimum as well as the scaling-down of excessive earnings), but also put all the owners of capital on fixed incomes for the duration, bring managerial incomes as well as wages under control, and provide, out of the pool of trading receipts which would accrue to the State, compensation for the "economically bombed."

To me, and I am sure to a great many other persons in all walks of life, this seems to be good horse-sense, and I am grateful to Mr. Davenport

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for writing it down so trenchantly, though he is of course by no means the only person who has done this. I wish, however, he had not vitiated his pleading by an excessive anti-trade-union animus, and by exaggerating the extent to which the Trade Unions have followed a selfish policy. To do this no doubt gilds for many of his readers the pill of his no less vehement onslaught on monopoly capitalism, and gives to his whole argument an air of splendid impartiality. But have the Trade Unions in fact behaved so villainously as he makes out? If they had, one would have expected wages to have risen, in view of the very great scarcity of labour, a great deal faster than they have risen in fact. I agree with Mr. Davenport in thinking that the State, in face of the joint opposition of the employers and the Trade Unions, ought to have enforced a national wage-policy (and therewith a national policy of control over *all* types of income) at an early stage in the war. I said this at the time, and I have not stopped saying it. But that is a very different thing from accusing the Trade Unions of having done their best to exploit the position left open by the Government's failure; and that, in my opinion, they have not done. Again, I agree with Mr. Davenport that the danger exists of a partnership between Monopoly Capitalism and certain big Trade Unions to exploit the rest of the public, and that we need to be on our guard against this danger. But that is a very different thing from saying that this partnership is actually in being.

All this is a pity; for, if it will encourage quite a lot of people to take kindly to Mr. Davenport's conclusions, it is calculated to antagonise even more, and to prevent what he has to say from being seriously considered by those who are best in a position to react to it in a practical way. It would, for example, probably cause Mr. Bevin or any decent working-class leader to shut his mind and fling the book away as merely another essay in petulance by a disgruntled member of the intelligentsia—which is in truth what Mr. Davenport is. The more is the pity; for most of the book consists of precisely the things that most need to be got well into the heads of the leaders of the Labour Party as well as of other groups which put victory first. For example, Mr. Davenport is thoroughly right in urging that the State, in taking over all ownership for the duration (at all events all large-scale ownership) is under no need either to take over all management or, where it does take over management, to instal any sort of bureaucratic management. His own proposal for public management is for a State Commissioner aided by a Board of Four representing "capital, labour, consumer-taxpayer, and Government," with the proviso that the Commissioner must not be a person with a vested interest in the industry he controls.

Mr. Davenport also talks good sense about the industries and services the State does need to manage and those it does not, about the better distribution and control of war contracts, about the need for complete

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taking-over of the banks, and about many other urgent matters. He deals also with post-war questions, and re-states a familiar plan for a transition to a new economic system by way of the taxation of inheritance—pretty much along lines advocated by Mr. Hugh Dalton many years ago. He has a plan, which in principle I have long favoured, for converting debentures into claims on profits and not on assets irrespective of profits; and he is ready with a scheme for extinguishing the National Debt. Finally, the opening part of his book brings out very well the unfortunate results of the economic structure with which we entered the war—its dominance by monopolistic, instead of expansive, vested interests, and its recalcitrance to change-over to the conceptions appropriate to expansion, however pressing the need.

Mrs. Robinson's *Essay on Marxian Economics* is a very different sort of book—so different that it may seem strange to bring it under the cover of the same review. Mrs. Robinson is an economist writing for economists rather than for the general public. But her emphasis on the fact that Marx, despite all that has been written by economists about the explodedness of his doctrine, was on a great many points much nearer the truth about capitalism than his critics, has a very direct bearing on Mr. Davenport's thesis. Mrs. Robinson has indeed no use for the Marxian theory of value, or indeed for any other theory of *value*, in a strict sense. What she does is to point out the many respects in which Marx's account of the actual working of capitalism is very much more realistic than the account given by the orthodox economists, classical or relatively modern, and incorporated in the traditional orthodox structure of economic theory. Her weakness, in presenting this case, is a tendency to think of orthodox, and indeed of nearly all non-Marxian, economics, in terms of the Cambridge School—so that she often writes as if there were no one to be taken account of except Marx, Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes. It follows upon this that her book, instead of being a real evaluation of Marxian economics, peters out into a discussion of the points of similarity and difference between Marx and Keynes, to the advantage sometimes of the one and sometimes of the other. Mrs. Robinson is also singularly silent about all Marx's writings except *Capital* (save for one or two references to his letters) and to all post-Marxian writing as well as to all modern continental economics.

But these defects do not rob her book of its essential value, which lies in showing how near the Marxian analysis comes at many points to the modern conception which, unlike the orthodox theories, starts from the acceptance of the view that unemployment is not merely frictional, and from the rejection of the dogma that every act of production provides a market for what is produced. This is the point at which Mrs. Robinson's theoretical exposition links up with Mr. Davenport's exposure of the restrictive workings of the monopoly system; and what they

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have in common comes out most clearly of all in their closing sections, in which they are both focussing attention on "full employment" as the crucial problem of economic theory and practice alike. It is entirely out of the question to attempt here any summary of Mrs. Robinson's argument, which is itself severely compressed. Her emphasis is on the truth that Marx was never content with the "static analysis" beloved of the orthodox, but studied capitalism throughout as a dynamic system. The change in capitalist dynamics since the coming of the age of monopoly is the underlying theme of both books. Mr. Davenport studies it practically, and Mrs. Robinson theoretically. The conclusion to be drawn from both methods of approach is that the system can no longer work at all without perpetual prodding by the State, and that even this prodding can only make it work inefficiently, because the basic structure is wrong in relation to twentieth-century technical developments and because a new phase of economic evolution calls for an essentially different structure.

G. D. H. COLE.

NATIVE LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA. By SHEILA T. VAN DER HORST.
(340 pp. *Milford & Oxford Press*. 18s.)

WITH the horror of German racial practice before us, one approaches the lesser horrors of racial discrimination in South Africa with a blunted conscience. Whatever one may think of South African law, it *is* law, it *is* obeyed, and there is freedom—at least among the Europeans—to fight for its alteration. And the personal atrocities and barbarities which are now commonplace in Europe do not fit into the South African scheme of things at all. But on any civilised standards the tale which Miss van der Horst tells of the treatment of native labour in South Africa is a sorry one indeed. The author recites her facts scientifically, almost coldly. She has done a most painstaking piece of research and must be congratulated on presenting her picture in so scholarly and objective a fashion. One cannot easily *feel* objective as one reads this book and realises that the events described are taking place within the British Empire, in a Dominion of which General Smuts—fêted and honoured in Britain—is Prime Minister.

The book begins with the first days of European settlement in the Cape, and the early attempts at complete racial separation thought essential for the defence of the small white colony. Gradually it became necessary to allow trading and to enable the natives to work for the Europeans. When the diamond and gold mines were discovered, native labour was in keen demand, and contacts between the races increased rapidly and were officially encouraged. This soon began to generate unfavourable reactions among European employees, who feared the

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natives' growing skill, and also the growing competition of the unskilled natives with the unskilled "poor whites." As a result, the twentieth century has seen an increasing mass of discriminatory legislation in South Africa, designed to keep the Africans only to unskilled work, to depress their wages, to segregate them in urban locations and rural reserves, to restrict their freedom of movement, to burden them with every conceivable handicap in the battle of life. European desires have been conflicting—on the one hand, they have wanted a docile, fairly efficient native labour force; on the other hand, they have feared to make conditions too attractive or to offer any real opportunities for the increase of skill. Legislation has therefore been contradictory, and often short-sighted. The final result from the economic point of view has undoubtedly been to reduce the wealth of South Africa as a whole, and completely to distort the normal workings of economic forces. A small highly-paid force of skilled European workers has been built up, relying for the great mass of unskilled work on very badly-paid unskilled, uninterested, and largely migratory, native labour. The Africans have little pride in their work for Europeans, and their pride and interest in their own agriculture has also been undermined through their recurrent absences on wage-employment elsewhere. From the human point of view, the result has, of course, been deplorable. A population of nearly five millions has had almost every door to economic freedom and betterment bolted and barred in its face. The privileges of the relatively few European workers in South Africa have been bought at a heavy cost in human welfare and economic prosperity.

Dr. van der Horst is well aware of the ultimate unhappy effects of this policy. She ends her book with these sentences: "In the economic environment of the twentieth century a caste system can be maintained only by the exercise of force. It is a highly unstable condition, promising racial and social strife. It is damaging to the national income. It is based on a short view of European advantage, preferring the convenience of the present generation of the European population to the prospects for prosperity and peace of their descendants." This final judgment is all the more damning in view of the dispassionate tone of the earlier chapters. If South African students of this calibre can reach such conclusions, are there hopes that official policy may change? During the last year there has been the dawning of such a hope. It has in part been the result of the war, in part the result of economic developments. The war has encouraged many manufacturing industries in South Africa, and the need for a labour force to man these industries is meaning that some of the restrictions on native labour must be removed. Also, the dangers of a potentially hostile native population were apprehended at the time when South Africa was in fear of direct attack from Japan.

In these last months there have been a number of significant moves

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in native policy. For the first time, the legality of native Trade Unions has been recognised. The Report of an official Commission on Industry and Agriculture was published a few months ago, and has been hailed as one of the most significant documents which have appeared in South Africa for a generation. It faces the fact that there will be a steep decline in gold-mining in about ten years' time, and that a new basis will therefore have to be found for South Africa's economy. It deplores the unfair share of the national income received by the native population, the resulting social degeneration and the limitation of the local market. It recommends a great improvement in unskilled workers' wages and social services, and that skilled wages should be frozen until this has been effected. These proposals go to the very heart of the problem of race and labour stratification in South Africa, and have caused a great stir. A further significant move was the important speech of Field-Marshal Smuts in Cape Town last January, when he spoke of the failure of the policy of segregation, and the need for a new racial pattern. The excellent work of such organisation as the Institute of Race Relations in South Africa, and the response this work is evoking, are also indicative of the new conception of race collaboration which is being born in the Union to-day. These are all only symptoms, and the end of the war may well bring reaction with it. There is a long battle still to be fought. Miss van der Horst has helped the fighters by arming them with the facts and figures which are the first part of their ammunition.

RITA HINDEN.

STUDIES IN NATIONAL INCOME. Edited by A. L. BOWLEY. *National Institute of Economic and Social Research*. (247 pp. Cambridge University Press. 15s.)

THIS volume contains a number of studies, by various authors, of special points connected with the measurement of national income. It opens with an elaborate description, by Dr. Elsas, of the definitions of national income which have been used by economists and statisticians. The definitions are neatly laid out like specimens in a museum of natural history, but the collection scarcely repays the trouble of making it. No definition of the national income has any interest apart from the purpose to which it is put. An absolute figure for the total national income of a country has, in itself, no significance whatever; it is useful only for making comparisons. The share in the total going to particular groups within the community, or derived from the output of particular industries, may be discussed; the income of one country may be compared to that of another, in order to assess the relative welfare of their inhabitants, or the relative strength of their war-potentials; the national incomes of the same country at

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different dates may be compared in order to study the effects of changes in the level of activity or of changes in the technique of production. Each kind of comparison raises its own set of problems and the relevant definition of income is not the same for each. Moreover, estimates have to be pieced together in each case from the data that happen to be available, and the definitions must be framed so as to squeeze as much as possible out of the data. If, for instance, the household services of married women are excluded from national income by a particular investigation, it may be because they are irrelevant to that inquiry, or merely because it is not possible to estimate them from the available information. There is no point in trying to decide whether they should be included or not by a show of hands amongst all the statisticians who have discussed national incomes.

The next section, by Professor Bowley, concerns estimates of wages in this country for the period 1924-1938, and makes some corrections and additions to his former estimates. It includes an extremely interesting formula relating the wage-bill to profits. The last section, also by Professor Bowley, sets out a new method of estimating changes in real output. Formerly the procedure has been to calculate the money value of output and then to correct it by index-numbers of prices, in order to reduce it to real terms. Professor Bowley tackles the problem directly by estimating changes in the quantity of the product of various groups, and weighting them by their relative importance at particular dates. The estimates thus obtained correspond fairly well with those produced by the old method.

Other sections deal with other particular constituents of national income, notably salaries, which are estimated by Miss Marley and Mr. Campion. The book as a whole is a valuable quarry in which all future investigators of national income will find it profitable to dig.

JOAN ROBINSON.

DIARY OF A DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT. By GEORGE BILAINKIN. (272 pp. Allen & Unwin. 16s.)

MR. BILAINKIN in 1940 was diplomatic correspondent of Allied Newspapers. He knew all the diplomatists in London and was on terms of intimacy with many of them. On January 1, 1940, he began to keep "an objective, frank diary" and he kept it up throughout that critical year. He now publishes it reduced to about a third of its original length. It contains a record of his doings, meetings, and meals, of his conversations with diplomatists and others, and his own reflections upon persons and events. There is a curious naivety in diplomatists beneath the crust of elaborate superficial sophistication, and the same incongruous and rather

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absurd mixture infects almost everyone who has much to do with them. Mr. Bilainkin has not escaped the infection. His ingenuous inability to distinguish between the trivial and the important might lead the uninstructed or careless reader to dismiss his book as uninteresting and to miss its significance. Read as a contemporary document it is of considerable interest, for it reveals what was going on in the minds of London diplomatists and journalists during that strange period which covered the end of the phoney war, the fall of France, and the Battle of Britain. The thing which strikes one most forcibly in Mr. Bilainkin's record is the astonishing ignorance and lack of political judgment in men whose business it is to be political experts and to have all the inside information. On April 26, 1940, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy believed that "peace is likely in July, because neither side could win and this was being realised in both quarters." Mr. Bilainkin and Mr. George Levy had already in the previous March pitched on July as the possible date for the end of war or beginning of a truce, for, as Mr. Levy presciently expressed it: "I really don't see how it can all go on." In August the American Ambassador was convinced that it would all be over by Christmas. In February, Mr. Bilainkin and the Bulgarian Minister discussed "the probability of Allied aeroplanes destroying Soviet oil bases in the Baku region." In March the French were urging us "to fight Moscow." In July the Hungarian Minister thought that Spain would declare war on us unless we handed over Gibraltar to her, and that the best thing for us to do was to join up with Hitler to fight Russia. It should in fairness be added that occasionally someone—usually the French Embassy spokesman, M. de Charbonnière—is right.

It will be seen from these gleanings the kind of light which this book throws upon the psychology of 1940. Perhaps the most interesting thing in it is its illumination of Anglo-Soviet relations during the period. Mr. Bilainkin had several interviews with M. Maisky and he reports some fairly frank conversations. They are well worth reading. LEONARD WOOLF

SOCIAL STRUCTURE. By HENRY A. MESS. (130 pp. *Allen & Unwin*. 6s.)

NO doubt it is unfair to judge a book by its jacket. But to one reader, at least, an initially unfavourable impression was given by the following extract from the "blurb": "How far is human nature plastic? Have men and women different kinds of minds? Has warfare been a universal feature of human societies? These are among the searching questions which are asked." This seemed to me to indicate an excessively unscientific approach, even to a book designed for the non-technical public. But, after having read the book, I realised that it was simply an attempt to interest a headline-conscious

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audience in a modest and unpretentious little introduction to the study of sociology, with no very pressing claims to current attention.

The title of the book is the best summary of its contents. The subject matter is the structure of society, regarded as a static phenomenon. The method of approach is essentially that of the descriptive catalogue or table of contents. Thus we learn that social groups may be of three kinds—the *a*-group, the *b*-group and the *c*-group: groups may also be classified according to duration of lasting, size, extension, function, mode of origin. Earlier on, we are given a list of possible ways of behaviour—from action in accordance with custom down to deliberate choice, and from this is derived a list of institutions similarly classified.

Without attempting to deny the importance of classification in obtaining an adequate framework for analysis and comparison, I would suggest that the wholesale adoption of this method of exposition is not likely to appeal to the imagination of the average beginner in the subject, still less to the intelligent layman who takes up the book to find out how sociology can help him in finding an answer to the innumerable social problems with which he is beset. In any case, the usefulness of such classifications seems to be dependent on a clear understanding of the purposes for which they have been adopted. Too often, they appeared to be merely a set of five-finger exercises in an inadequately worked out analytic method.

This is the more unfortunate as the subjects with which the book deals are really of extreme fascination. The appeal of a particular method of approach may be to some extent a matter of temperament, but the evolving biological conception of society is a far more stimulating one, and its adoption is more fruitful in trying to arrive at a clearer understanding of our modern difficulties. The author apparently sees culture as an interlocking mechanism, paralleled by a society of interacting groups: I see it as an ecology whose area is inhabited by a society of living beings, arranged in interdependent and constantly changing groups. (He does not assist in dispelling the curiously common confusion between "culture" and "society," which hampers many newcomers to these terms. A culture is the way of life of a society: a society is the group of people living by a common culture.)

The author omits to stress the way in which the social institutions of a given culture are moulded to a more or less harmonious pattern in accordance with the dynamic forces underlying it—the point which Ruth Benedict makes in her book *Patterns of Culture* (the book which I should recommend as a starting point for the student of society). And he says little of the corresponding modifications in the character structure of the individuals who live by it. A very interesting point could have been made, for instance, of the way in which an institution such as marriage, which occurs almost everywhere in human societies, is

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conditioned in accordance with the prevailing forces at work, so that in one the economic characteristics receive the predominant attention, in another the sexual, in another the child-rearing, and so on. And this could have been followed by an illustration of the ways in which psychological attitudes are varied correspondingly.

It is only fair to draw attention to the undoubted merits of the book. Without any pretence at originality, it sums up, in a very small compass, the present position of the non-dogmatic sociologist on certain topics of interest. Answering the first of the questions quoted above, we are told that, while there are probably certain innate tendencies present in all human beings, "we are not yet in a position in which we can, with any confidence, argue deductively as to human behaviour." This disposes of a lot of nonsense about the inevitability of such cultural phenomena as economic competition and warfare. Answering the second question, the author says that "to deduce from non-performance in the past is risky. . . . What is certain is that there are real and inevitable differences between the sexes which are bound to affect their relations and their roles in society, but that these differences have been exaggerated immensely and unnecessarily by social convention and by social tradition." All this provides a sound commonsense background against which to start the investigation of the features of a specific society. But the whole book would have gained immensely from the adoption of a more dynamic approach, and the introduction of a larger amount of comparative material and factual illustration at the expense of some of the lists. The author states in the preface that he intends later to write about the processes of social change. This might well be a more important volume than the present one which, while it may give the reader some idea of the scope of the subject, is not likely to strike his imagination or to fire his enthusiasm.

JUDITH STEPHEN.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

By R. H. TAWNEY

THE recent appointment by the President of the Board of Education of a Committee on Public Schools is something of a landmark in educational history. The majority of those schools, as is explained below, are already in receipt of grant-aid from the State, and comply with the obligations which that position imposes. But the popular conception of a public school has been derived from the characteristics of select specimens of the genus. As a consequence, the leading representatives of the public school system—to use the conventional, though question-begging, phrase—and the preparatory schools serving them, have been commonly regarded as forming a closed world. Their influence and prestige made it probable that interference with them would encounter tenacious opposition. The minute fraction of the rising generation which attends such schools, and the urgency of other educational requirements, caused reformers for long to doubt whether it was worth while to interfere.

The public schools exercise on English life, including English educational policy, an influence out of proportion to the number of pupils educated in them. The disposition to ignore them was never, therefore, justified. It was as short-sighted as would have been, in the fifties of last century, an apathy which left the older Universities un-reformed, on the ground that the undergraduates in both together numbered under four thousand. To-day the financial independence of the better known among the schools concerned, which made possible, if it did not excuse, that attitude of indifference, is no longer so secure as it appeared in the past. The fall in the birth-rate has hit some of them hard.¹ The improvement, both in quality and quantity, of public secondary education has exposed them to keener competition. War taxation has cut into family resources, which might, in other circumstances, have been spent on education. Some parents, perhaps many parents, who would formerly have

¹ For figures, see *Education and the Birth-Rate, A Social Dilemma*, by Grace G. Leybourne and Kenneth White, pp. 335-336, where two alternative estimates are given of the probable decline in the future population of residential public schools.

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contrived, if with difficulty, to send their boys to boarding-schools, no longer feel justified in incurring the heavy costs involved; while others, who look beyond the circumstances of the moment to the post-war situation, feel doubts whether the day when education in an expensive boarding-school was regarded as socially indispensable may not have passed for good. As a consequence, the governing bodies of some public schools are faced already, and those of some others may be faced in the near future, by a problem of declining numbers. It is natural that educational institutions, which believe that they are doing work of public value, should seek, in an unforeseen emergency, the assistance of the State. It is proper that the State, whatever the final verdict on their request, should give it serious consideration.

The particular occasion which dragged the public schools into the limelight was, therefore, a financial one. That aspect of the subject is, clearly, important, but it is only one aspect. It would be a misfortune if the discussion of the future of such schools were conducted merely or mainly on the financial plane. It is not only that grants of public money can hardly be unconditional, and that the conditions which must accompany them can be settled only after a decision as to the educational services required of their recipients. It is that, quite apart from the immediate embarrassments which have caused the question to be raised, a thorough investigation into the rôle of the public schools, of the relations which should exist between them and other parts of the educational system, and of the changes, if any, required to ensure that they make their full contribution to the educational life of the nation, is long overdue. Now that practical considerations have forced the issue to the front, an examination of the position and functions of different types of public school, in the absence of which an intelligent verdict on the desirability of assisting those not receiving State aid can hardly be given, ought not to be further postponed. The terms of reference of the Committee, which require it "to consider means whereby the association between the public schools . . . and the general educational system of the country could be developed and extended," are a recognition of that fact. Policies, however, cannot usefully be discussed, except in the light of the facts to which they are to be applied. What is a "public" school? What was the number of such schools in existence on the eve of

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the War? What, in respect of mere externals—school population, boarding and day; fees; grant-aid or the absence of it—were their salient characteristics?

I.—THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM.

No legal definition of a public school appears to exist. The Public Schools Commission of 1861-64 dealt only with nine schools, but recognised that beyond them lay a mixed multitude of institutions, many of which were anxious to enjoy the same status and title, and a considerable number of which have since made good that claim. The feature emphasised as characteristic of a public school in the Report issued in 1932 by the Departmental Committee on Independent Schools is their conduct "by Governing Bodies under Trusts or other Articles of Association which limit or prevent profit." In practice, the test by which it is decided whether a particular school is or is not a "public" school is an empirical one. It depends on the answer to the question whether such a school is a member, or not, of the Head Masters' Conference. That body, which was founded in 1869, has, in addition to its other functions, supplied a criterion by which the authentic public schools can be distinguished from the mere pretenders to the title. The schools in the United Kingdom belonging to it have increased by between three- and four-fold since its establishment, from 50 in 1871 to 113 on the eve of the last war, and to 187 in 1938. The figures given below are those for 1938. They relate to public schools for boys in England only, and do not include those in Wales and Scotland. The following table¹ attempts to set out the facts, so far as it has been possible to

¹ I am indebted for the figures contained in this table, as well as for other assistance, to Mr. V. Ogilvie, of the New Education Fellowship. The principal materials used in compiling it are the list of secondary schools recognised as efficient by the Board in 1938, *The Public Schools Year-Book*, 1939; Truman and Knightley's *Schools*, 1939; and Burrows, *Schools of England*, 1939. The Board's list omits eleven schools in England represented at the Head Masters' Conference, presumably on the ground that they did not accept inspection by the Board. These schools have been included in the table. The table omits two schools of an exceptional kind, viz., Dartmouth Royal Naval College and Worcester College for the Blind. The total number of pupils over 11 in the 150 schools included in the Board's list for 1938-39 is 64,388. For the remaining eleven schools represented in the table the only published information available appears to be that given in the work of Truman and Knightley. The figures contained in it are given in round numbers, and include in some half a dozen cases boys under eleven. They total 3,900. The President of the Board stated on June 25, 1942, in answer to a question in the House, that there were 26,500 boys in the independent schools, and 64,700 in the grant-aided schools, affected by the inquiry. The Committee on Public Schools is concerned with schools which are members of the Head Masters' Conference and of the Governing Bodies' Association. Only schools which are members of the former are included in the table here given.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN ENGLAND, 1938

	No. of Schools Boarding & Day				No. of Pupils, Boarding and Day			No. of Schools receiving grant			Special Places		Age of Admission			
	No. of schools	Schools admitting boarders only	Schools admitting boarders and day-pupils	Schools admitting day-pupils only	Total No. of pupils	No. of boarders	No. of day-pupils	Schools not receiving grant	Schools receiving grant		Schools required to offer special places	No. of pupils whose fees are wholly or partly remitted as a result of the award of special places	Schools admitting pupils at 11	Schools having a junior school	Schools not admitting pupils at 11 nor having a junior sch ¹	Uncertain
									(1) Direct from Board	(2) Through L.E.A.'s						
I. Schools charging fees of £150 and over	37	18	19	—	15,191	14,114	1,077	34	—	—	—	—	1	10	22	4
II. Schools charging fees £100-£149...	53	4	49	—	17,049	9,924	7,125	27	15 ¹	1	15	1,165	5	30	13	5
III. Schools charging fees below £100.	70	—	37	33	35,216	2,694	32,522	4	36	29	65	10,970	51	17	—	2
IV. Schools charging no fees	1	1	—	—	832	832	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	161	23	105	33	68,288	27,564	40,724	66	51 ¹	30	14	12,135	58	57	35	11

¹ Including one school receiving grant on a lower scale, and not required to offer special places, though, in fact, it contained 21, out of 360, pupils whose fees had been wholly or partially remitted.

² The figures in this column do not include scholarships or remissions of fees other than those resulting from the grant of special places.

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ascertain them, with regard to the 161 English public schools then in existence, in the matter of number of pupils, boarding and day; fees¹; grant-aid; special and free places; and age² of admission.

It will be seen that the popular view that all or most public schools belong to one type, and that that type is represented by Eton, Harrow or Winchester, is an illusion. In reality, those schools do not form a single category, but, in certain important respects, differ somewhat widely from each other. Some receive only boarders, some only day-pupils, some both day-pupils and boarders. Some depend, to a greater or less extent, on public money; others are financed entirely from fees, or from fees *plus* endowments. Some admit pupils between eleven and twelve, others not before thirteen. Some draw a considerable proportion of their pupils from public elementary schools; others are almost completely divorced from the national system of education. The most striking fact, however, is one which would have been expected. It is that these varying characteristics are not distributed at random between different public schools, but that certain of them are normally found in combination with others, and that their presence or absence is closely related to the level of fees charged, which, in turn, is a rough index of the economic position of the families from which pupils are predominantly drawn.

The majority of schools in Group III, with boarding fees under £100, differ little, if at all, from those grant-aided secondary schools—the great majority—which do not aspire to be regarded as public schools. None of them take boarders only; over nine-tenths of their pupils are day-boys; 65 out of the 70 schools concerned are in receipt of grant, and offer special places; nine-tenths of those pupils attending public schools whose fees are wholly or partially remitted as a result of the award of special places are found in this group of schools. In all these respects the schools in Group I, which charge boarding fees of £150 and over, differ sharply from those in Group III. None of them admit

¹ The fees given in the table are boarding fees. The average boarding and day fees were as follows:

	Average boarding-fee of schools taking boarders	Average day-fee of schools taking day-boys
I.	£169-£170	£63-£64
II.	£121-£122	£37-£38
III.	£82-£83	£21-£22

² The figures relating to the age of admission are unreliable, and almost certainly contain more or less serious errors.

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day-pupils only; eighteen admit only boarders; and, while nineteen admit boarders and day-pupils, the latter form less than one-tenth of the total population of the schools in the group. None of these schools receives grant,¹ or is required to offer special places. Group II is the most miscellaneous of the three. Some of the schools contained in it are hardly, if at all, distinguishable from those in Group III, and others are similar in type to those in Group I. The most significant feature of Group II is, perhaps, that, while over 40 per cent of the pupils covered by it are day-pupils, less than one-third of the schools in it receive grant or are required to admit special place pupils.

In the light of these facts, the public schools which call first for consideration can be roughly sorted out. They are those in Group I, together with something over one-half of the schools in Group II. They form, it will be observed, less than half the total number of public schools in England; but their example has had an influence on the social outlook and educational methods of schools outside their own ranks. If the present article devotes more space to the residential schools than to the day-schools, the reason is not that the former are more important than the latter, or that the defects criticised below are found only in them. It is that they present the more difficult problem.

II.—THE LEGACY OF THE LAST CENTURY.

If the nature of that problem is to be understood, it must be seen in perspective. It may be observed in the first place, that the view sometimes heard that "the public school system" is hallowed by antiquity is a piece of mythology. Of the 161 schools included in the table given above, 59 came into existence² in the nineteenth century or later, and 41 of these, including some of the best-known, after 1849; while, of the 102 established before 1800, none, of course, were founded as public schools in the modern sense of that expression, and the majority have undergone drastic reconstructions. Particular institutions can point to links with the past of somewhat the kind as exist between the city companies of to-day and mediaeval craft-gilds. These pedigrees, dignified or picturesque, are not without their educational value; but a long boarding-school tradition does not often

¹ Three of these schools are approved for purposes of superannuation.

² The dates of the foundation of schools are taken from *The Public Schools Year-Book* for 1938.

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form part of them.¹ In reality, the assumption still prevalent among well-to-do parents in England—an assumption not countenanced² by the most eminent of the founders of modern public school education—that residence for four or five years at a boarding school should form, as a matter of course, a stage in the life of all boys above a certain income level, together with the existence of a group of schools which specialise in catering for that demand, are, on anything like their present scale, a thing of yesterday. Individual specimens both of the attitude and of the institution are to be encountered much earlier; but "the public school system," in so far as these are its characteristics, has no long history behind it. It represents, in its present form, not an ancient educational tradition, but innovations which matured between 1830 and 1890.³

The reasons which made these two generations the golden age of the public boarding-school are not difficult to state. The moral authority and practical example of pioneers, such as Arnold and Thring, were of great importance; but conditions peculiar to their day fixed the direction of their efforts, and it is no reflection on their originality to say that, even more than most successful reformers, they worked with the grain. Apart from the influence of individuals, the

¹ "In every case, except those of Merchant Taylors and St. Paul's, and perhaps Shrewsbury, the bulk of each school, as now existing, is an accretion upon the original foundation, and consists of boarders received by masters or other persons at their own expense and risk."—Report of Commission on Public Schools and Colleges, 1864, Vol. I, p. 8, and Vol. III, pp. 302-3.

² A. P. Stanley, *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold* (Minerva Library ed.), pp. 72-3.

³ The proportion of day-boys to boarders in the sixties seems to modern eyes surprisingly high. The figures below are taken partly from the Report of the Commission on Public Schools, partly from that of the Schools' Inquiry Commission, 1868, Vol. I, App. VI, pp. 150 and 322. Some of them appear to be merely estimates. The discrepancy between the total of 2,673 given below for the nine public schools and that of 2,696 given in the Report is due to uncertainty as to the Eton figures.

	Boarders	%	Day-Boys	%	Total
Nine Public Schools (end of 1861)...	1,952	73.0	721	26.9	2,673
572 Endowed Schools (1868)...	9,279	25.1	27,553	74.8	36,832
Proprietary Schools (1867) ...	15,831	30.7	35,674	69.2	51,505

The nine great public schools included in 1861 two schools, St. Paul's and Merchant Taylors, which were entirely day-schools. It will be noticed that day-boys then formed 26.9 per cent of the boys in the nine schools, as compared with 7 per cent in the thirty-seven most expensive schools in 1938, and that they accounted in 1867 for over two-thirds of the aggregate population of all schools together. Between 1840 and 1867 several boarding-schools (e.g., Marlborough, Wellington, Malvern, Rossall, Cheltenham, Clifton, Lancing, Radley) were founded, and several local grammar schools were reconstructed so as to make them available for a non-local clientele. It is probable that, if figures for 1840 were available, they would show a substantially higher proportion of day-boys. In the present century, the proportion of day-boys attending public schools has again increased, owing to the increase in the number of day-schools belonging to the Head Masters' Conference.

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decisive factors were four. They were the Industrial Revolution, with its flood of new wealth; the deficiencies, both in number and quality, of existing day-schools; the modernisation of communications; and the careers opened by the expansion of the empire, the reform of the civil service and the growth of the professions. The first greatly increased the effective demand for higher secondary education. The second and third put a premium on boarding-schools and made recourse to them practicable. The fourth ensured that the aptitudes cultivated by them would find little difficulty, when school-days were over, in securing suitable employment.

The rising middle class, if often uneducated itself, was not unaware of the advantages of education; nor was it lacking in ambition. It looked to the schools to provide, in addition to a moral and intellectual discipline, a common platform enabling its sons to associate on equal terms with those of families who, if increasingly outdistanced in income, still diffused a faint aroma of social superiority. At first, it looked in vain. The old local foundations were often in ruins. The local secondary schools of today were not yet even a dream. The condition of not a few private schools was such that the choice, parents were told by one with some title to speak, "lies between public schools and an education whose character may be strictly . . . domestic."¹ If they rejected the last course, what alternative had they but to send their sons to schools at a distance from their homes? Yet how, in the days when Arnold himself travelled to his new post at Rugby by stage-coach, and despatched his belongings by the Grand Junction Canal, could the first alternative be generally adopted?

The answer came, not from the educationalist, but from the engineer. It is not an accident that the boarding-school boom followed closely on a railway boom, that three times as many public schools were founded in the thirty years between 1841 and 1870 as in the whole century before 1841, and that enterprising grammar schools made haste to fall in with the fashion, sometimes placating their consciences for the diversion of their services from day-boys to boarders by supporting cheap day-schools for the sons of local residents. A form of education which improved communications made possible was made increasingly attractive by the requirements

¹ A. P. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

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of a state beginning tardily to grapple with the problems of an empire and an urban civilisation. The establishment in 1854 of open competition as the condition of entry to the Indian Civil Service, the application of the same principle to the Home Civil Service between 1855 and 1870, and the gradual assumption by governments of functions demanding an enlarged administrative *personnel*, combined with the growth of law, medicine and business to create a market in which, before the days of municipal and county secondary schools, the products of the public schools for long met few competitors. Parents with means were quick to grasp the advantages of the new dispensation. It could be said by a headmaster in the early seventies not only that "the ordinary English gentleman would think that he lost caste" if he did not send his boy to a public school, but that "there is a strong feeling growing up among the merchant class in favour of the public schools, and [that] hundreds go to a school now who, thirty years ago, would not have thought of doing so."¹ Every stage of education casts its influence back, for good or evil, on that preceding it. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first preparatory school of the modern type should have been founded, apparently, on the suggestion of Arnold. The increase in the number of such schools from something under a score in the sixties to approximately four hundred² in 1900 supplied the public boarding-schools with a clientèle of the social type which they desired, educated under conditions not dissimilar from their own. It is a commonplace that England possesses, not one educational system, but two—a public and a private one. At the close of the century, the former was still in an early stage of its history; the latter was not far from complete.

The "public school system" of today, therefore, in so far as it is represented by the great boarding-schools, is not among the more venerable of the historic treasures of the English people. It grew to maturity between the first and third Reform Acts, as the child of a particular age and a specific environment. Like the reorganisation of local government and the changes which followed the first Royal

¹ G. P. Parkin, *Edward Thring, Life, Diary and Letters*, II., pp. 195-196.

² J. Dover Wilson, *The Schools of England*, chapter on "The Preparatory School," by Alan Rannic, p. 65. According to Leybourne and White, *op. cit.*, p. 190, "During 1936-37 there were in England and Wales 272 boys' preparatory schools recognised by the Board, with 17,785 pupils, of whom 11,493 were boarders, while 6,292 attended daily. Here, day-boys on the average paid no less than £35 7s. each year in fees, while boarders paid as much as £148 10s."

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Commission on Oxford and Cambridge, it was one phase of the great movement of middle-class reconstruction which began in 1832, reached its climax in the eighties, and then, its impetus spent, settled down to make the most of the kingdom it had won, leaving, as was inevitable, new tasks to be essayed by novel methods and in a spirit not its own. No student of English life in the latter half of the last century will question the magnitude of the improvements in the education of the propertied and professional classes which were then gathering way. No fair-minded critic, whatever his own sympathies, will depreciate the beneficial effects which those improvements produced, not only on those who directly experienced them, but on the nation as a whole. The most enlightened of reformers, however, must work with the materials to his hand; and the public boarding-schools, whether reconstituted or newly founded, took, for good and for evil, the stamp of their day. The better among them owed much, and added much, to the practical energy, the admirable moral seriousness, the respect for the hard grind of the intellect, without fancies or frills, of Victorian England. All of them, including the best, were impoverished by the feebleness of the social spirit of the same England. All of them were the victims of its precipitous class divisions, its dreary cult of gentility, its inability to conceive of education as the symbol and cement of a spiritual unity transcending differences of birth and wealth.

Two features of the period, in particular, condemned those schools to a position which they could hardly, at the time—even had they wished it—have avoided, but which later were to prove both mischievous to the nation and humiliating to them. Since no public system of education existed, in which they could take their place, they came to form, as they rose in number and influence, a separate order of their own. They developed, not as partners in a community of educational effort, welcoming the obligations which such partnership imposes and zealous to bring their contributions to the common stock, but as the apostles of an exaggerated individualism, which, at first, perhaps, was inevitable, but which survived into an age when it was no longer a necessity forced upon them by the backwardness of public education, but a cherished idiosyncrasy. Isolated from what were to be the main streams of the nation's educational life, and flattered by the eminent, they were under strong inducements to become the egoists

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of the educational world, whose pride in the uniqueness of their excellences was stronger than their eagerness to share them. It cannot be said that they have been notably successful in resisting that temptation. Since, in the second place, there was no question in their seminal period of state grants to secondary education, the public boarding-schools were compelled, unless blessed with endowments, to finance themselves from fees; and their wares, being expensive, had to be sold in a market in which price was a secondary consideration. Here again, at first, they had no alternative; and, here again, till recently, they do not seem to have sought one. Towards the end of the decade of rapid educational development which followed the Act of 1902, it was suggested by a headmaster—now a well-known national figure—that the public schools should accept state-aid and public supervision, in order both to improve the quality of their education and to reduce its cost.¹ It may be doubted whether the Government of the day would have smiled on that proposal; but, while the number of day-schools on the grant-list has steadily increased, and included in 1938 some sixty-five public schools, the public boarding-schools, as far as known to the writer, took at the time no step in that direction. Their social character was already fixed, and history was too strong for them. They had grown up as the servants, not of the nation, but of one small stratum within it. Their pupils, their staffs, their governing bodies, were drawn from a single class. The conversion of a luxury trade for the well-to-do into one supplying a less select clientèle is never an easy undertaking. Either the schools concerned did not make the effort, or it proved beyond their power.²

III.—THE CASE FOR REFORM.

"The public schools," observed in 1909 Dr. Norwood and Mr. Hope, "generally produce a race of well-bodied, well-mannered, well-meaning boys, keen at games, devoted to their schools, ignorant of life, contemptuous of all outside

¹ Cyril Norwood and Arthur H. Hope, *The Higher Education of Boys in England*, especially pp. 186-196 and Part III, chap. V, "The Reform of the Public Schools," by H. Lionel Rogers.

² It is possible that, in more recent times, the fault has been that of the State, rather than of the schools. According to Sir Frank Fletcher (*The Journal of Education*, Sept., 1941), "On more than one occasion representatives of these schools [*sc.* the leading public schools] have approached the State authorities with suggestions and offers of co-operation, and inquiries as to the possibility of opening wider our doors to boys of all classes—or rather of all degrees of parental wealth or poverty. The question for us has long been not whether this is desirable, but how it can be done."

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the pale of their own caste, uninterested in work, neither desiring or revering knowledge. . . . A sound economy of finance would certainly result in a considerable reduction in the cost of a public school training, to the advantage both of the often sorely-taxed parent and of the public schools themselves, since they would gain in usefulness what they lost in exclusiveness."¹ There is reason to believe that the intellectual standards of all or most public schools have improved out of recognition in the last thirty years. Good judges, for example the Master of Balliol,² have paid tribute to the high quality of their educational work. It is probable that, were the authors of *Higher Education in England* writing today, their strictures on the mental stagnation of public school boys would be omitted or much modified.

That point should be emphasised, especially by a critic, both on grounds of justice and because it is obviously important that reform, whatever shape it may assume, should not impair educational values, but should preserve them and extend their influence. It cannot be said with equal confidence, however, that the social idiosyncracies of the schools in question have followed the contempt for knowledge into the limbo of the past. On the prevalence of the "caste" spirit, views, doubtless, will differ, though it is significant that observers from the Dominions and the United States—not to mention Scandinavia and France—are not slow to detect its presence and to lift their eyebrows at it. "Exclusiveness," of which that spirit is the natural product, is a matter, not of opinion, but of fact. The select character of the more expensive boarding-schools, which in the eyes of their feebler-minded clients is not the least among their assets, is maintained by a scale of fees which, though qualified by scholarships and concessions to parents, automatically restricts their use to the relatively well-to-do. They are the schools for the sons of parents—before 1939 perhaps 3 per cent³ of the population—who can afford to pay £125 to £250 and upwards a year for the education of one child. They are, in fact, public schools from which the children of the great majority of the public are rigorously excluded. In such circumstances, the

¹ Norwood and Hope, *op. cit.*, pp. 187 and 189.

² *Picture Post*, 4.1.41. "Their [*sc.* the public schools'] faults are the result of the class division, but the all-round education they give is of very high quality."

³ "In 1935 only 4 per cent of personal incomes in the U.K. exceeded £500 per annum, while incomes above £1,000 represented . . . 1.55 per cent of the population." (Leybourne and White, *op. cit.* p. 204.)

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charge that they are class institutions cannot seriously be contested.

Educational policy is always social policy. In the England of the later nineteenth century, when the public school system was in the making, it could plausibly be argued that the recruitment of educational institutions on the basis of wealth, if in itself unedifying, was not out of tune with the temper of the day. In their subservience to money and social position, and the tranquil, unsophisticated class-consciousness which that subservience bred, the public boarding-schools, it might be said, did not rise above the standards of their generation, but neither did they fall below them. Their virtues were genuine and their own; their vices were of a piece with those of the society about them. Whether convincing, or not, in the past, that defence is clearly out of date. Since the public school system assumed its present shape, England has become a political democracy. The public boarding-schools continue to serve the same tiny class as in the days when Lord Balfour was at Eton and Lord Baldwin at Harrow. A national system of education has not only been created in the interval, but has revealed un-anticipated possibilities of growth, and is now on the eve of the fourth chapter in its history. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, as far as the contact with it of the great majority of the public boarding-schools goes, it might as well not exist.¹ Institutions so immune to the stresses and demands of a changing environment may enjoy some of the advantages of an old régime, but they suffer also from its weaknesses. It is not primarily a question of the attitude of headmasters, or even of governing bodies; for representative figures among the former have expressed themselves strongly, if with reservations, in favour of reform, and the latter, however opaque their prejudices, could not prevent it, once it had become the national policy. It is a question of the reluctance

¹ The body best qualified to express an opinion on that point is the Association of Education Committees. Its verdict (*Education*, Dec. 25, 1942, p. 585) is as follows: "It is a common characteristic of both boarding and day [public] schools that they have no present association with the general educational system, and that they profess to make, and do in fact make, educational provision for a small section of the community. Internally their organisation and the character of their community life reflect the exclusiveness which necessarily flows from these qualities. Their external relationships are similarly affected in that they have no organic, and little informal, relationship with the general educational provision of the locality in which they are found. They tend to associate, naturally enough, having regard to their circumstances, with the section of the community for which they cater and also with those who are highly placed in church and state, the professions, and the business world, to whose ranks they contribute largely and altogether disproportionately."

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of a small, but influential, class to acquiesce in interference with institutions which it has come to regard as peculiarly its own; of its fears of the keener competition for posts of profit and distinction which will result from a diminution of educational inequalities; of a temper which values the more exclusive public schools, not only as organs of culture, but as instruments of power; of public indifference; of the refusal of Governments, for each and all of these reasons, to take a thorny subject up. As a consequence, the public boarding-schools have been permitted to live in isolation from the educational needs of the mass of the population and from the system which serves them. What are the results of that policy?

(1) Its first result is obvious. The rising generation is submitted in youth to a somewhat rigid system of educational segregation, which is also a system of social segregation. Whether Disraeli's famous epigram is still applicable or not to the adult population, it certainly remains true of the young, though, thanks to the development of public education, it is less true than in the recent past. Given the existing economic order, sharp class divisions exist independently of educational organisation and policy. It is unreasonable, therefore, to speak of the public boarding-schools as creating them. But education ought to be a solvent of such divisions. It is difficult to deny that the tendency of those schools is to deepen and perpetuate them. "The very existence of the public schools, as they now are," writes Mr. Simpson, himself formerly a master at one of them, "helps to keep the different social classes ignorant of one another, and aggravates misunderstanding to an extent which public school men commonly do not realise."¹ Is it possible convincingly to challenge that criticism?

There is something to be said for preserving some schools only loosely connected with the national educational system, on the ground that their existence is favourable to initiative, experiment, and diversity of educational type. There is nothing whatever to be said for preserving schools whose distinctive characteristic is that they are recruited almost exclusively from the children of parents with larger incomes than their neighbours. That infliction on the young of the remorseless rigours of the economic calculus is mischievous for two reasons. It is unfair to them, and it is injurious to

¹ J. H. Simpson, *The Future of the Public Schools*.

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society. Children learn from each other more than the most skilful of masters can teach them. Easy, natural and un-self-conscious contacts between young people of varying traditions and different social backgrounds are not the least valuable part of their education. They are not only a stimulating influence in youth, but the best preparation for an attitude which makes the most of life in later years. An educational system which discourages them is, to that extent, not a good system, but a bad one. The one-class school is not favourable to them. Not only is an obvious injustice done when children are excluded by financial barriers from the schools in question, but the pupils admitted to them are themselves injured. They are taught, not in words or of set purpose, but by the mere facts of their environment, that they are members, in virtue of the family bank-account, of a privileged group, whose function it will be, on however humble a scale, to direct and command, and to which leadership, influence, and the other prizes of life properly belong. The capacity of youth to protect itself against the imbecilities of its elders is not the least among the graces bestowed on it by Heaven; but that does not excuse us for going out of our way gratuitously to inflict our fatuities upon it. If some of the victims continue throughout life, as unhappily they do, to see the world through class spectacles, a policy which insists on their wearing them at school must bear part of the responsibility.

Nor, of course, is it only individuals who suffer from our erection of educational snobbery into a national institution. The nation, as a whole, pays a heavy price for it. The complicated business of democratic government demands, with the world as it is, a high capacity for co-operation; and co-operation, in its turn, depends on mutual understanding. A common educational background fosters such understanding. An organisation of education which treats different sections of the population as though they belonged to different species is an impediment to it. It is precisely such a treatment which is our present practice. Its effects on public life are heightened, of course, by other factors, but they remain only too visible.

The higher ranges of the British Civil Service have many virtues. What too frequently they lack is not intelligence, or expert knowledge, or public spirit, or devotion to duty. It is personal experience of the conditions of life and habits of thought of those for whose requirements in the matter of

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health, housing, education and economic well-being, they are engaged in providing. That deficiency is serious. Yet how, as long as the schools attended by a somewhat high proportion of the individuals concerned are one-class schools which no common child can enter, can they be blamed for suffering from it? There is no reason to suppose that the *personnel* of the British diplomatic service does not possess the same virtues in abundance. If, nevertheless, some of its members surprise friendly foreign observers by their inability to mix on easy terms with any but small cliques, the reason is partly the same. It is commonly not, as their exasperated critics are apt to complain, that they are swollen with British arrogance, but that they have been immolated in youth on the altar of good form. They have breathed at school the close atmosphere of a social sect, whose conventions they have learned to regard as the right thing. Too often they continue to mistake the provincialisms of a class for the interests and manners of civilised mankind. The co-existence of a public and a private educational system is not without influence on Parliament itself. It causes the economic lines between parties to coincide in large measure with educational lines. Such a coincidence is on all grounds unfortunate. It means that education, which should be the great uniter, becomes itself a ground of division, and that not a few members, even when they themselves have no interest at stake, approach questions of importance to the mass of their fellow-countrymen in a spirit, if not of hostility, of insolent indifference, which would hardly be possible had they and their opponents rubbed shoulders at school up to sixteen or eighteen. That spirit is apt to be seen at its worst when education itself is under discussion. Members who have served on Local Education Authorities can usually be relied on, irrespective of party, to show sense and good feeling; they have seen the children and succumbed to them. Too many of the remainder—to judge by their behaviour—find it difficult to believe that the children of common persons are human in quite the same sense as their own. They have rarely themselves been educated in schools which are directly affected by parliamentary decisions on educational policy, nor do they often send their sons to them. They can hardly be expected—apart, of course, from bright exceptions—to regard the improvement of those schools as the urgent issue which it is. On any sane view, the preparation of

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the young for life is among the greatest of common interests. When the economic divisions of the adult world are allowed to reproduce themselves in the educational system, it is difficult for that truism to win general recognition. Thus the evil legacy perpetuates itself.

(2) The resources of character and capacity at the disposal of the nation, if larger than is often supposed, are not unlimited. The course of wisdom for it, therefore, is to make certain of turning to the best account as much of both as it commands. It is to encourage an easy movement of ability to the types of education best calculated to cultivate it, and an easy movement, again, from educational institutions to the posts which such ability is qualified to fill. *La carrière ouverte aux talents*—promotion by merit—is neither the sole object of educational policy nor, in the view of the writer, the most important one; but it is clearly an object which should be given its due weight. The immense tasks which confront the nation during the coming generation enhance its significance.

Success in attaining that end depends on the general educational and social policy of a country, not on any particular group of schools. But all schools should co-operate, according to their opportunities, in facilitating its attainment, and none should thwart or ignore it. The existence of schools recruited primarily by an income test obstructs it in two ways. It results, in the first place, in the misdirection of ability. The children of parents of small means, whatever their natural aptitudes for the types of education which the public boarding-schools provide, are prevented by their cost from obtaining access to them. The children of the well-to-do are not infrequently sent to such schools on account of the social prestige which they confer, even when they would benefit more by an education of a different sort. Educational mal-adjustments of the kind are unjust to individuals and injurious to the nation. They prevent it from making the best use of the talents at its disposal.

The second effect of a system of selection for higher education in which, not merely the personal qualities of the young, but the financial means of their parents, play a determining part, is equally serious. It is unduly to narrow the area from which recruits for positions of responsibility are drawn in later life. It is sometimes said that the peculiar function of the public boarding-schools is to “educate for leadership,” and that the social life which they offer specially

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fits them for that task. But, before that claim can be conceded, two considerations must be weighed. In the first place, there is no such thing as leadership in the abstract. The qualities needed by a leader depend on the social environment in which he works, on the nature of the problems that he is called upon to solve, and not least—if his métier is government—on the political psychology of those who are to be led. All three have changed profoundly, both at home and abroad, in the last half-century, nor is there any probability that that process will be arrested. Even if it be admitted that the characteristics alleged to be fostered by education at a public boarding-school were an asset in the past, what grounds are there for supposing that they are those which the world requires most to-day, or that, if they are, a secondary day-school is incapable of cultivating them? In order, in the second place, that an institution may be successful in training leaders, it is not enough that it should provide an education well suited for that purpose; it is necessary also that it should cast its net wide. The way to pick a strong team of athletes is not to exclude from it everyone with less than £10 a week, but to consider all candidates for inclusion, irrespective of their economic circumstances, and then to choose them on their merits. The way to encourage able leadership is, in principle, the same. If a school begins by ruling out as ineligible all potential leaders who cannot satisfy an exacting income test, the individuals on whom it lavishes its skill will not be those best qualified to lead, but only—a very different thing—those best qualified among the small minority who alone can comply with that initial requirement. Of course, if it is content merely to count among its old boys men who, for one reason or another, have reached positions of prominence, then money and social influence have hitherto been good horses to back. But that version of the venerable pastime of spotting the winner can hardly be intended, when the public boarding-schools are praised as the nurseries of the nation's leaders.

In reality, education for leadership, especially in a democracy, is not a simple matter. It is a question, not only of intensive cultivation, but of a wide range of selection; not only of the education of pupils actually admitted to schools, but of the principles determining the admission of some and the exclusion of others. It is likely to be a success when the right kind of education is easily accessible to those

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best qualified to profit by it. When such education is surrounded by high financial hedges, the education itself may still be good, but, as an aid to the production of able leadership, it is likely to be a failure. Considered from that point of view, the limitations of the English educational system appear somewhat serious. No adequate statistical evidence¹ exists showing the schools from which persons eminent in different walks of life are drawn; nor in the nature of things, can such evidence be up-to-date. Such scraps of information, however, as are available suggest that Great Britain draws on the capacity of all its citizens to a less degree than do, for example, the United States and the Dominions, and that leadership in politics, administration and finance is recruited—less exclusively, indeed than in the past, but still predominantly—not from the population as a whole but from the small circle of families—perhaps 3 per cent of the nation—who can afford to pay for an expensive education. In the words of the *Economist*,² “the public schools turn out, perhaps, 10,000 boys a year; from this tiny fraction we select the great majority of those who are to be given an easy road to the top. The selection is clearly not one of merit.” Here, again, the primary responsibility is less that of the schools concerned than of a public which is at once indulgent to educational privilege and parsimonious in providing for the adequate development of secondary education. The consequences of its attitude are, however, somewhat serious. A nation which permits the continuance of the state of things described by the *Economist* is grappling with its problems with one hand tied behind its back.

(3) If an educational system is to mobilise its full power, it is not sufficient that each of the institutions composing it should make the most of its own virtues without regard to the remainder. It is necessary that all of them should play their varying rôles as conscious partners in a common effort. The pedantries of over-organisation are, of course, to be avoided; but so also is a selfish or capricious individualism. There should be a general recognition that, while a good school is a community with distinctive characteristics, every school has responsibilities, not merely to its immediate clientèle, but to the nation as a whole; and such a relation

¹ Statistics of the schools attended by 691 persons eminent in different walks of life will be found in the writer's *Equality*, App. I. They show that 524 (75.8 per cent) were educated at a public school, and 330 (47.7 per cent) at one or other of fourteen principal public schools.

² The *Economist*, Nov. 23, 1940.

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should exist between all schools and the State as to ensure that those responsibilities are not ignored. It is not a question of mechanical systematisation, but of co-operation within a framework which finds room for wide diversities of educational type, but ensures that such diversities contribute to the common end of an educated nation.

If, judged by that standard, the public boarding-schools of to-day leave something to be desired, it is history, rather than any wilful perversity, which must be regarded as the culprit. Most of them were firmly established at a time when public education was still in its infancy. But a position of isolation, which was inevitable in the past, is unnecessary to-day, and, being needless, has become mischievous. Unfortunately, it still continues. The schools in question touch the public educational system at its apex, through their connection with the Universities; but, being fed by expensive preparatory schools, they are rarely in touch with its lower ranges. Receiving, in most cases, no grants, they are not subject to the secondary regulations of the Board, and their contacts with it are at present confined to the voluntary acceptance of inspection by its officials. Between them and the Local Education Authorities, with their six million children and quarter of a million or so teachers, direct contacts hardly exist. The team-spirit, which leads individuals to play for their side rather than for themselves, is commonly counted among the public school virtues. It cannot be said that those schools themselves are a shining example of it. Like the Cyclops, "each governs his own children, nor do they trouble about their neighbours."

That state of things is not confined to the public boarding-schools. It is a particular case of the general problem arising from the existence of a multitude of private schools, with which no public authority has power to interfere. Its disadvantages are somewhat serious. If the nation is to make the most effective use of its educational resources, it must be in a position to bring them all under review, and to act on the conclusions which a comprehensive survey suggests. As long as one small group of important schools, and many thousand schools of inferior standing, are completely or predominantly outside the purview of the Board and the Local Education Authorities, such action is impossible. It is conceivable that the number of boarding-schools is excessive, and that some of them would be of greater service

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if converted into day-schools. No public authority has power to reduce it, or even to prevent the foundation of additional schools of the same type. It is clearly desirable that the arrangements as to the admission of pupils to different types of secondary schools should be sufficiently similar not to impose needless obstacles on the entry of boys suited for this type or that. The fact that one group of schools is private, and another public, makes a reasonable measure of co-operation needlessly difficult of attainment. Other things being equal, diversity of social and educational experience in teaching staffs, and the easy movement of teachers between schools of different types, are an asset. Both tend to be discouraged by the same sharp cleavage. Sympathy is naturally evoked by the claim of schools for freedom to develop each its own special *ethos* and educational methods. Matters of school government and finance, however, including, where they exist, endowments and the management of boarding-houses, stand in a different category. It is not satisfactory that governing bodies should be as heavily weighted as some are at present with decorative notabilities, to the exclusion or under-representation of public education authorities; or that fees and other costs, which are stated by a headmaster¹ to have risen greatly in the course of the last generation, should be subject to no form of public control; or that no public authority should be responsible for seeing that the domestic economy of public boarding-schools—an aspect of school life which is not, after all, the speciality of teachers—is conducted on modern lines, and with reasonable regard to economy and efficiency. It is probable that, as far as matters of this kind are concerned, not only the public, but the schools themselves, have everything to gain from the pressure of a central authority which can pool the experience of a number of different institutions, and correct individual aberrations or laxities by reference to a range of knowledge which no single one of them can command.

IV.—SUGGESTIONS FOR A POLICY.

The criticisms made above contain nothing novel. Nearly all of them have been from time to time advanced since, at least, the assumption by the State, in the opening decade of the present century, of the responsibility for creating an

¹ "The Future of the Public Schools," by W. F. Bushell, in *The Journal of Education*, November, 1940.

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efficient system of secondary education. Nor does it appear that the spokesmen of the public boarding-schools themselves are unanimous in rejecting them. Leading headmasters,¹ while emphasising that such schools have an important contribution to make, and that a large measure of freedom is the condition of their making it, have deplored their inaccessibility to boys of small means; have insisted that costs and fees can and should be reduced; and have urged that they "should come to occupy a recognised place within the State system."² A reasonable conclusion from recent discussions of the question would appear to be that the existence of a group of schools reserved for the sons of the well-to-do, and divorced almost completely from the public educational system, whatever its justification in the past, is commonly recognised to be no longer defensible. If that view be accepted, to what policy should it lead?

The tradition of English educational policy is one of reluctant innovation. It handles particular issues piece-meal, when they can no longer be ignored, but has rarely been disposed to consider them in relation to the larger problems of which they form part. The feature of the public boarding-schools which arouses most criticism is their social exclusiveness. It is natural, therefore, that the first proposal to be advanced should be one for mitigating it. The suggestion which hitherto has received most attention is that some version of the special place system, under which, since 1907, secondary schools aided by the State have been required to take a certain percentage of pupils from elementary schools, should be applied to the public boarding-schools. Several headmasters have recently advanced the same proposal, and the governing bodies of some schools have approached neighbouring Local Education Authorities with an offer to act on it. It is likely, it may be suspected, to figure prominently among the subjects considered by the recently-appointed Committee on Public Schools.

The free place—since 1933 the special place—system has a distinguished history. In its present form, it is out of date, since we can now do better; but it has done more, nevertheless, than any other agency to build a bridge from the elementary schools to secondary education. Nine-tenths of the cheaper public schools, the great majority of whose

¹ Articles and letters by public school headmasters will be found in the *Journal of Education* for November and December, 1940, and January, 1941.

² *Journal of Education*, November, 1940, letters by C. Russell Scott and W. F. Bushell.

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pupils are day-boys, are required to provide special places. How many boarding-schools are in present circumstances needed is a question for consideration; but, on the assumption that some such schools continue to exist, an analagous requirement in the case of those schools, which, with few exceptions, provide at present no special places, may properly be one element in any programme of reform. It is, however, only one element. To see in it a substitute for other equally essential measures would be as unreasonable as it would have been, in the early years of the present century, to regard article 20 of the then secondary school code as rendering superfluous its remaining provisions. Two points, in particular, require to be considered. The first, and most important, is the educational value of the special place system to the boys affected by it. The second relates to the liabilities which it involves for the authorities administering it.

The object of the special place system has been to make secondary education accessible to pupils in the elementary schools whose parents cannot afford the full fees. Its success has been partly due to the fact that it has combined the provision of educational opportunities with the minimum disturbance of the children's normal life. Not only do the holders of special places continue to live at home, but the schools which they enter, though often greatly superior in staffing, equipment and amenities to those which they leave, are largely, and often predominantly, attended by pupils of much the same social background as themselves. Difficulties sometimes arise; but, on the whole, the children concerned enter an environment not too different from their own, play their part in creating the social atmosphere of the school, mix on equal terms with young people some of whom they already know, and normally suffer neither from the sense of inferiority nor the tendency to exaggerated self-assertion, which are apt to be the fate of the boy whose surroundings impress on him that he is a rare exception. It would be rash to suggest that such conditions cannot exist in the case of boys transferred from elementary or grant-aided secondary schools to the more expensive boarding-schools, as the latter today are; but it can hardly be denied that they must be much more difficult of establishment. They are not likely to exist unless the proportion which such boys form of the total in-take is, not a mere trickle, but sufficiently large to enable them to exercise a decisive influence on the character of the schools;

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unless it is made evident by the treatment of all places as special places that the schools are recruited on the basis of promise, not wealth; unless their living conditions are simplified and cheapened; and unless the composition of their governing bodies is radically changed.

Such reforms are, in any case, desirable; and the fact that they are necessary in order to make a special place policy a success is no argument against it. But clearly they imply a much more drastic interference with the residential public schools than is involved in the mere requirement that they shall admit a certain proportion of pupils from elementary or secondary schools. The truth is that this aspect of the subject has been gratuitously bedevilled by a fog of unconscious cant. It is sometimes implied that the public schools will be "democratised," if, while remaining predominantly academies for young gentlemen, they consent to confer on a few deserving proletarians the inestimable boon of admission to them. To that well-meant, but ill-thought-out, suggestion more than one answer will be given; it is to be feared that the least impolite will be, "Thank you for nothing." The logic of democracy involves, not the stabilisation of the educational privileges now enjoyed by wealth through their nicely-rationed extension to a few more participants, but their complete abolition. What the nation requires is, not more gentlemen, but more men with sufficient sense not to care whether they and their neighbours are gentlemen or not. If the public schools can help to produce them, the more widely their education is shared the better. If they cannot, they had better keep it to themselves, and leave the civic virtues to less fastidious institutions. The fundamental question, in short, is different from that which is usually posed. It is not how to select sons of common persons who are "capable of profiting" by attendance at a public boarding-school. It is how to modify the atmosphere, outlook, and manner of life of the more expensive boarding-schools in such a way as to make it beneficial for ordinary boys to attend them.

The administrative aspects of a special place policy require also to be considered. The problem of the age of admission is one, though not the most important, of them. Grant-aided secondary schools admit the majority of entrants between eleven and twelve; public boarding-schools between thirteen and fourteen. Various expedients have been suggested for

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bridging the gap. Public schools could establish preparatory or junior departments, as some already have, in which case they would receive boys from schools in the public educational system at the end of the primary stage; or they could admit boys from secondary schools between thirteen and fourteen; or they could make the normal age of admission eleven *plus*, and reserve certain places for boys entering later from preparatory schools. It is possible, though not certain, that, given co-operation between the public boarding-schools and the Local Education Authorities—a condition not yet realised—this difficulty could be overcome. But what would be the effect on the secondary schools of the diversion or withdrawal of their ablest pupils, and of the relegation of those schools to the position of a second-best?

The problems arising on the side of finance will not be negligible. The average boarding-fee of the cheapest group of public schools was, in 1938, £82-£83; that of the more expensive £121-£122, that of the thirty-seven aristocrats of the system £169-£170, while the fees charged by particular schools in the last group ran up to £250 or more. The average cost of a free place in a grant-aided secondary school was, on the eve of the war, in the region of £28 16s.¹ The difference is somewhat formidable. It means that the average expenditure required to educate one boy at one of the least expensive boarding-schools would educate between two and three boys at a day-school, and that between five and six boys could be educated at a day-school for one boy educated at a boarding-school in the most expensive group. That consideration is not, of course, decisive; but the disparity of costs, even if reduced by the abolition of tuition fees, must be taken into account in planning the development of secondary education. It raises certain further issues. If the whole cost of special places at boarding-schools is to fall on the schools themselves, public authorities are not directly affected by it; but, in that case, since few schools have large endowments, the number of special places admitted is likely to be small. If, on the other hand, the costs of special places at such schools are to be defrayed in the same way as are the costs of those at grant-aided secondary schools, by Local Education Authorities and the Board, it will be necessary for these bodies to satisfy themselves that the costs of a school place are not needlessly inflated, as some head

¹ The figure is for the year 1936-37.

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masters have alleged that they are.¹ "The public schools," remarks one them, desire that their education "should be available to as large a number of boys as possible. If this is to be done, the nation will have to spend money; but it should not be asked to spend more money than necessary."² That view is likely to command general assent. What precisely it involves is a matter for consideration; but it points to, at any rate, the public control of costs at boarding-schools, and to the adequate representation of public authorities on their governing bodies. Here, again, therefore, the extension of the special place system to those schools will necessarily lead to certain further changes. It ought not, in short, to be introduced as an isolated measure, but only as part of a more general scheme of reform.

"There seems to be general agreement," wrote, two years ago, Mr. Salter Davies, "that the public schools should open their doors to a certain number of free place scholars from the elementary schools. This would be a useful beginning, but it provides no real solution. It would be a fatal mistake to rest content with first-aid treatment when a major operation is needed. . . . The public schools must become public in fact, and not merely in name."³ The recent report of the Association of Education Committees, which rejects a special place policy as futile in the absence of "the full acceptance by the independent schools of those principles of equality of educational opportunity which the Association believe to be fundamental," says, in effect, the same. What is the nature of "the major operation" required? What must be done if the public schools are to become "public in fact"? The proposals made below suggest some tentative answers to those questions.

I.—Independent Schools: general provisions.

It is essential that all independent schools, whether private schools or public schools, should be brought under public supervision. They should be required, as recommended by the Association of Directors and Secretaries for Education,⁴ to hold a licence from the Board of Education, to be

¹ *Journal of Education*, November, 1940, "The Public Schools and the Nation," by Hugh Elder, and "The Future of the Public Schools," by W. F. Bushell.

² *Ibid.* Hugh Elder, *loc. cit.*

³ *Journal of Education*, November, 1940, leading article.

⁴ *Education: a Plan for the Future*, pp. 14-15. The Report on educational reconstruction prepared for the Association of Education Committees also recommends "the licensing and effective supervision on behalf of the State of all private schools."

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granted, in the case of local schools, after consultation with the Local Education Authority. The condition of granting such a licence would be that the schools were open to inspection, and that they complied with such requirements as the Board may lay down.

The effect of this proposal would be (1) that some 10,000¹ private schools, with perhaps 350,000 to 400,000 pupils, of which little is at present known, would be brought under the review of the Board and the Local Education Authorities. Some of them, possibly many of them, would be refused a licence, and would cease to exist. Some of them would continue, but on conditions approved by the Board and the Local Education Authorities; (2) that public schools, whether day-schools or boarding-schools, not at present in receipt of grants, would be required to be licensed, to comply with the Board's requirements, and to be inspected. Such schools numbered sixty-six in 1938. The majority of them are predominantly boarding-schools, thirty-four with fees of £150 and over, and twenty-seven with fees of £100-£149.

II.—Public Day-Schools.

The majority of public schools which are predominantly day-schools are already in receipt of grant, and must comply with the Board's Secondary Regulations. Their future depends, therefore, on the general policy of the country with regard to secondary education. Fees at secondary schools should, of course, be abolished, and all pupils should be admitted on the basis of the same test. Governing bodies should be required to include a majority of representative governors, appointed partly by Local Education Authorities, partly by the Board. When these reforms have been carried out, they will automatically apply to the day public schools receiving grant, in the same way as to other grant-aided schools. The only point which calls for special notice arises from the fact that the majority of the former are now "direct grant" schools. That position represents a concession accorded them in the past, when a public system of secondary education was in its infancy. There may be special circumstances in which it is still justified; but, now that experience has shown that Local Education Authorities can be responsible for secondary schools without impairing

¹ Report of Departmental Committee on Independent Schools (1932), p. 21.

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their liberty, interfering with their teachers, inflicting party politics upon them, or otherwise injuring their *moral*, the case for that exceptional status has lost much of its validity. No additions, therefore, should be made to the list of schools receiving direct grant, and proposals from Local Education Authorities to become responsible for schools now on the list should receive favourable consideration from the Board.

III.—Public Boarding-Schools.

(1) There is nothing novel in the provision of State-aid for public day-schools. The only question which arises in their case—namely, that of the conditions on which aid is to be given—is one common to all schools on the grant-list. The public schools which cater predominantly for boarders are in a different position. A few of these also receive grant, but the great majority do not. The latter include all the more expensive schools, with fees of £150 and upwards.

The suggestion now made that the State should aid these schools is sometimes discussed in general terms, as though it involved financial assistance to all public boarding-schools desiring it and willing to comply with certain minimum requirements. Such a policy of indiscriminate assistance would be an error. In the first place, even if it is agreed that some boarding-schools ought to have a place within the national system of education, it is necessary to decide the number of such schools which, under present conditions, is required. In the second place, public boarding-schools, like other schools, vary widely in quality, and there is no reason to think that all of them are equally worth preserving. In the third place, the residential education which is the distinctive feature of the boarding-school need not necessarily aim at the same objects, or cover the same span of life, as are usual at present, and it is important to define the particular purposes to be served by the boarding-schools which it is decided to maintain. The first essential, therefore, is an investigation to determine (a) how many boarding-schools it is expedient to maintain in existence, (b) what schools are to be included in that number, (c) what special functions such schools are to perform. Until the results of such an inquiry are available, no offer of financial assistance to boarding-schools not already in receipt of it should be made.

(2) If it is desired to make the public schools accessible to boys of small means, the most effective and economical

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method of doing so is obvious. It is to increase the number of day-boys. Two steps, it is suggested, ought to be taken. The first is to convert—sometimes to re-convert—into day-schools those boarding-schools which are situated in areas sufficiently populous to ensure them an adequate local clientèle. The second is to require those boarding-schools which, owing to the absence of that condition, must continue to cater predominantly for boarders to admit as large a proportion of day-boys as local circumstances allow.

The scale on which the first policy can be applied must obviously depend partly on the decision reached as to the number of residential schools required. Subject to that qualification, there is a strong presumption in favour of it. Not only, when practicable, is it the simplest method of establishing equality of access to public schools, but it is desirable for its own sake, and meets a demand which appears to be growing. Since about 1930, the tide which for long ran in favour of boarding-schools seems to have turned, and to have flowed for a time in the opposite direction. The population¹ of public boarding-schools diminished; that of public day-schools increased. That spontaneous movement may mean that the present supply of residential schools is excessive; but it is, in any case, to be warmly welcomed. Higher secondary education ought not to be concentrated in a few great centres, but to be widely diffused. Nothing would do more to heighten the intellectual vitality of English life, and to stimulate a healthy pride in local educational achievements, than the existence, not only in a few great cities, but in all considerable towns, of more day-schools resembling the best of those now in existence. There is no reason, of course, why some boarders should not be admitted to such schools; but the object of the step proposed would be to substitute day-schools, with a minority of boarders, for boarding-schools, with a minority of day-boys. The second policy—the admission to schools which are predominantly residential of a greatly increased number of day-boys—has been strongly urged by eminent head masters.² It is to be supported on condition—and only on condition—that the day-boys are sufficiently numerous not to be damned with a tepid toleration, but to enter fully into the life of the school, and to play an equal part with the boarders in determining its character.

¹ For facts see Leybourne and White, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-11.

² E.g. by Sir Frank Fletcher, in the *Journal of Education*, September, 1940.

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If these reforms are to be carried through on an adequate scale and in a reasonable period, it must not be left to individual schools to initiate them, or not, as they think fit. They must become part of the educational policy of the nation. The Board should make a survey of existing residential schools, to ascertain the practicability of acting on these proposals in particular cases. It should then determine (a) which of these schools can with advantage be converted into day-schools, (b) what proportion of day-boys boarding-schools not so converted shall be required to admit. The schools in the first category would be subject to the secondary regulations of the Board. The schools in the second should be treated in the manner suggested in the following section.

(3) The policy suggested above would substantially increase the number of day-schools. There would still remain, however, a small group of schools some of which possibly could and should admit a larger number of day-boys, but which, being situated in sparsely-populated areas, would continue to be predominantly boarding-schools. It is these schools, some of them highly expensive and exclusive, which occur to the minds of most hearers when the public schools are mentioned.

The distinctive peculiarity of these schools is their residential character. It is a curious feature of the recent discussion of the public schools that the question of the special educational rôle of residence, as distinct from day attendance, has received little detailed examination. The defenders of boarding-schools appear to take it for granted that, if it is good for a boy to go to a boarding-school at all, it is necessarily good for him to remain there, as commonly to-day, for four to five years. The critics of the boarding-schools similarly seem to assume that, if they disapprove of that arrangement, they are thereby committed to denying that residence away from home can play under any conditions whatever a useful part in secondary education. Neither attitude is reasonable. Some boarding-schools of the existing type will probably continue to be required for boys in special circumstances, for example for the sons of parents living abroad; but the conditions which in the past set a premium on the boarding-school have largely disappeared. It is quite possible to believe, therefore, that boarding-schools have a valuable contribution to make, but to hold, with the Association of Education

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Committees, that they would make it most effectively if, instead of providing four or five years' residential education for a small minority of boys, they provided it for a shorter period and for a larger number. The most useful future before some such schools may consist, for example, in supplying facilities for an advanced secondary education after sixteen for boys who have attended the secondary day-schools of a given area; that of others in offering a secondary education closely related to the life and work of rural society; that of a third group, in serving, as Mr. J. H. Simpson¹ has proposed, as centres to which secondary schools can send groups of boys for six to twelve months of residential education. What is needed, in short, is to cease to take for granted the routine inherited from the nineteenth century, and to consider the distinctive functions of the boarding-school in the light of the novel conditions of to-day.

Such possibilities ought to receive more consideration than has hitherto been given them. They would mean, if translated into practice, that the residential school of the future, instead of providing the whole secondary education of a small minority of well-to-do boys, would meet the needs of one stage in the education of a larger number, and ultimately, perhaps, if the new departures proved a success, of the great majority. Like most educational reforms, proposals of the kind will continue, no doubt, to be dismissed as moon-shine, until they come to be acted on, when the schools planned in accordance with them will be described as institutions peculiarly characteristic of the British genius, each blessed with a distinctive tradition of immemorial antiquity, and all offering unique opportunities for the training of character and education for leadership. In the meantime, it is necessary, in view of the suggestion that the public boarding-schools should receive financial aid from the State, to consider what other changes in their position are required. The following measures would be a step in the right direction:

(a) All non-local boarding-schools should be brought under public supervision, in the manner suggested in I above.

(b) The governing bodies of such schools should be constituted in a manner to be laid down by the Board, and should include a majority of governors consisting of

¹ See his pamphlet, *The Future of the Public Schools*.

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representatives of Local Education Authorities nominated by national organisations, such as the Association of Education Committees and the County Councils Association, together with representatives of other social and educational interests appointed by the Board.

(c) The financial arrangements of such schools, including tuition fees, unless abolished, boarding-house charges, the administration of endowments (if any) and similar matters should be under the supervision of the Board. Some headmasters have expressed the view that the costs of boarding-schools are sometimes at present unnecessarily high. It should be the duty of the Board to examine living costs, and, where practicable, to reduce them. The idea to be aimed at is the maximum simplification of living conditions which is compatible with health and efficiency.

(d) Were those changes effected, the criticisms made above on a special place policy, though valid as long as that policy stands by itself, would lose part of their force. But the mere infiltration into public boarding-schools of a small minority of pupils from elementary and secondary schools would still remain of little value. Such boys should enter in substantial numbers, or not enter at all. All places should be special places. Selection for admission should be made by committees representing, in addition to the boarding-schools concerned, the Local Education Authorities and the public teaching profession.

V.—Conclusion.

Such proposals will, of course, be denounced as revealing a totalitarian contempt for educational freedom. If educational freedom requires that a small group of relatively well-to-do families shall be entitled, in virtue of their incomes, to monopolise the use of one group of educational institutions, and that the authorities controlling them shall be under no obligation to consider, in planning their arrangements, the needs of the majority who are differently circumstanced, the criticism is justified. The writer does not share that view. He regards the prevalent practice of recruiting the more expensive public schools from a single class, not only as an injustice to the young people excluded, but as injurious to the pupils educated in those schools, as well as to society. Even were he, however, of a different opinion on that point, he would still desire to see the social exclusiveness of those

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schools completely ended, and the schools themselves made part of the public educational system.

Educational freedom, like other kinds of freedom, does not consist in the right of every individual to use such economic advantages as he may happen to possess in order to secure special privileges for himself and his children, or in the unfettered discretion of those who control educational resources to employ them, if they think fit, to gratify that natural, but anti-social, egotism. It is a reality in so far as, and only in so far as, education is organised in a manner to enable all, whatever their economic circumstances, to make the most of the powers with which they are endowed. No single group of institutions can make more than a small contribution to that end. It is none the less its duty, and should be its pride, to contribute to it what it can. To serve educational needs, without regard to the vulgar irrelevancies of class and income, is part of the teacher's honour. Schools claiming to represent the best that English secondary education has to show should be the first to offer an example of that spirit.

THE BEVERIDGE REPORT: AN EVALUATION

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

THE Beveridge Report was received, both in this country and in the United States, with an extraordinary amount of acclamation. It is rightly regarded as a unique contribution to economic and social reform. There are, however, very few people who understand why, for once, H.M. Stationery Office has been able to publish a document which embodies nearly all the improvements which the vast mass of the people desire and most serious students of the subject advocate, instead of another of the dreary, timid, conservative reports to which we have for so long become accustomed. This aspect of the matter is of far-reaching importance and warrants attention.

The Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services is in substance the work of Sir William Beveridge, who brought to the task a remarkable array of qualifications. He has done original economic research work of high quality and was for many years, as Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science, in close touch with the social sciences and the wide range of social investigations conducted by universities in recent decades. He has had a wide experience of public administration, including especially unemployment insurance, labour placement and man-power problems. His mind is vital, quick, constructive. He represents no vested interest.

We may compare these qualities with the type of Departmental Committee and Royal Commission which is nowadays so frequently entrusted with the task of enquiring into difficult or controversial matters. The chairman is apt to be an aged High Court judge ignorant of the subject or a superannuated politician—often an ex-Minister who has been elevated to the peerage. Such a chairman tends to regard a mere investigation as a matter of minor importance compared with an important lawsuit or a debate in the House.

The other members of a typical Departmental Committee or Royal Commission usually represent sectional interests, with a smattering of independent persons. Thus, if precedents had been followed, there would have been in this instance a collection of representatives of the approved societies, of the Industrial

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Assurance Companies, of the Employers' Liability Insurance Companies, of the Trade Unions, of the Federation of British Industries, of the British Medical Association, of the Treasury, with, of course, a woman—for are we not all feminists?—and a university professor.

From such a *galère* there could emerge little that is constructive or whole-hearted, little except mere compromise, little that would not be evasive and undisturbing to the divine right of things as they are. The Report, often accompanied by a Minority Report, Reservations and Notes, tends to be a demonstration of the gentle art of dodging the issue, an essay in equivocation.

We have for so long become accustomed to these degraded forms of public enquiry that Parliament has forgotten what great tasks were achieved by Royal Commissions in their heyday during the nineteenth century; and the public has almost become hardened to the sense of frustration which occurs when a great opportunity for plain speaking and the formulation of ambitious aims is thrown away.

It is important, therefore, that we should appreciate the Beveridge Report, not only for its own sake, but also on account of the lesson in method which it presents. Similar treatment is required and could be obtained for several other subjects of equal significance for post-war reform. A Report on Education, by Professor Tawney, for example, or one on the Medical Services, by Professor John Ryle, might yield results of similar magnitude.

So much by way of prolegomena. Let us turn now to the Report itself.

At the outset, three guiding principles are laid down. The first is that while past experience should be fully used in building for the future, freedom of action should not be hampered by consideration for sectional interests which have grown up in the course of that experience.

This principle the Report follows with admirable integrity. At no point where vested interests conflict with the common good does Sir William Beveridge hesitate or weaken. An outstanding example of courage and conviction in this respect is his recommendation to abolish the Approved Societies which are associated with the Industrial Life Offices run for profit, while allowing the true Friendly Societies and Trade Unions to continue to act as agents for the State in respect of their members. Another example is his proposal to abolish

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private insurance for employer's liability. Another instance—and this is the most far-reaching illustration of all—is the proposal to convert Industrial Assurance from a commercial operation to a public service.

The second principle is that the organisation of social insurance should not be regarded as an end sufficient unto itself, but as one plank of a comprehensive programme of social progress. The provision of income in time of need is an attack upon want; but it does not alleviate the associated evils of disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. These must be eliminated by parallel remedies. The Beveridge Report not only enlarges the public outlook on social security, but also attempts to expand the mental horizon of the nation on a wide range of social and economic problems.

The third principle is that social security must be achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual. The State must establish a national minimum, but it should leave the individual free to make provision above the minimum by means of voluntary action, and should take care not to stifle initiative in this direction.

The recommendations in the Report are stated in the form of twenty-three principal changes from the present position. It is not altogether easy for the uninitiated to grasp their full import in this form, and the significance of the Beveridge scheme can be better understood and evaluated by a somewhat different method of approach.

Let us first ask what degree of integration it achieves in respect of the existing patchwork quilt of insurance schemes and services.

The answer is that the Beveridge Report unifies almost completely, not only the existing arrangements, but also the new benefits which it contemplates. Health insurance, unemployment insurance, contributory and non-contributory old age pensions, workmen's compensation, widows' and orphans' pensions, provision for the blind, public assistance, unemployment assistance, supplementary pensions—all these are thrown into the foundry to be recast in the new social insurance mould. The only exception consists of war pensions, which now comprise payments made in respect of death and disablement resulting from service with the Armed Forces and their auxiliary services during the present or last wars; payments for war injury sustained by members of the Merchant Marine, fishing fleets and light vessel services; war service payments for

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injuries suffered by members of the Civil Defence Services; and payments for war injuries sustained by the civil population. All these war pensions are administered to-day by the Ministry of Pensions. The Report makes no proposals regarding the incidence, amount or qualifications for these pensions; and although the author is aware of the advantages of unified administration, he does not advocate merging the Ministry of Pensions with the new Ministry of Social Security. Sir William Beveridge merely states that the matter requires further examination.

Integration involves, among other things, the merging of contributions in a single weekly payment by which each insured person will be able to obtain all the benefits to which he or she is entitled. It means the abolition of the fantastic system of workmen's compensation which now exists and the inclusion of benefit for industrial accident or disease as part of social insurance. It means the assimilation of benefit and pension rates for unemployment, disability (with certain exceptions to be mentioned later) and, ultimately, retirement in old age. It brings into line the condition as to waiting time for unemployment and disability, whether arising from industrial accident or disease or from other causes. It assimilates also the condition regulating the number of contributions for unemployment and disability benefit, except where disability is caused by industrial accident or disease, in which case no contributions are required. It amalgamates the special schemes which at present exist, in the sphere of unemployment insurance, for agriculture, banking, finance and insurance, with the general scheme applicable to workers in other industries.

Let us, in the next place, consider the scope of the scheme as regards persons on the one hand and contingencies on the other.

The Report envisages a system which covers the entire population, although not everyone in the same way. One of its novel features is the classification of the nation into six categories consisting of (1) employees, (2) persons gainfully occupied in other ways, such as employers, traders and professional workers, (3) housewives, by which is meant married women of working age, (4) other persons of working age not following an occupation for gain, (5) children and juveniles below working age, (6) old persons who are above working age and have retired. The exclusion of the well-to-do which has hitherto left outside the scope of social insurance those

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earning more than £420 a year in non-manual occupations is abolished; and so, too, are the enclaves which have contained such excepted occupations as the Civil Service, the local government service, the police forces, railway workers, the nursing profession, and so forth. The rentier, the professional man paid by fees, the working housewife who receives no money wage—these and many other categories will be included in social insurance for the first time.

To consolidate the entire nation into a community of insured persons is a step in the direction of social equality. It removes the invidious distinction between those with "cards" and those without; between those who are entitled to benefit and those who are too grand to be endowed with such plebian rights. It will be refreshing to hear of the directors of a large company tell the general manager, after a stormy board meeting, that he can take his cards! Only by universal participation in benefit and burden are the social services likely to be raised to the highest standard of excellence, and the spirit of democracy be made to bridge the gulfs which separate the classes, not of Beveridge but of Marx.

In order to appreciate the significance of the ubiquitous scope of the scheme it is necessary to survey the benefits which it embodies. There are three distinct aspects of the benefit proposals: namely, the contingencies to be covered, the scale of payments and the standard of service to be given in kind. I propose to consider the Report in terms of these three aspects in turn.

The contingencies which are at present recognised, though in a quite inadequate manner, comprise unemployment, old age, sickness or disability, widowhood, orphanhood, blindness, maternity, and death from industrial accident or disease.

The new contingencies which are recognised for grant or benefit are (a) marriage, (b) loss of earnings by a married woman in a gainful occupation for some time before and after confinement, (c) child-rearing, (d) loss of livelihood by a person not dependent on paid employment, (e) death, (f) incapacity of a wife for household duties, (g) loss by a wife of her husband's support through separation or desertion.

The manner in which these contingencies are to be met is as follows:

(a) The expenses of marriage will be assisted by a marriage grant varying with the woman's contribution record up to a maximum of £10.

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(b) Maternity benefit will be paid to wives who suffer loss of earnings through childbirth for a period of thirteen weeks at the rate of 36s. a week. All married women will receive a maternity grant of £4. This sum is surprisingly low and quite inadequate to meet even half the capital outlay which ought to be expended by a mother in respect of a new baby. This is especially true in the case of the first or second child in a family.

(c) The burden of parenthood will be assisted by allowances for children up to the age of sixteen if in full-time education. The first child is to be ineligible for an allowance when the parent is earning, but will rank for grant at other times. The children's allowance will be on the average 8s. a week, but will be adjusted so as to vary with the age of the child.

There is something to be said for omitting the first child from benefit. It effects a great financial economy, and in most cases the parents are able, when the father is at work, to maintain one child at a standard of life not below the poverty line. There is something to be said, too, for graduating the scale according to age, since the cost of rearing children undoubtedly rises as they grow older. But there is much more to be said for increasing the allowance for each additional child in the family, since it is the total size of the family which determines the total weight of the burden on the household income. Under the Beveridge scheme the average weekly allowance per child increases very slightly from 4s. for each of two children to 5s. 4d. for each of three children, 6s. for each of four children, 6s. 5d. for each of five children, and 6s. 8d. for each of six children. This does not give nearly sufficient weight to the fact that the future of the British people depends essentially on a sufficient proportion of parents being willing and able to rear families of at least three or four children. While no intelligent person imagines that the economic factor is of decisive importance in a matter which affects people's lives so fundamentally as the size of the family, it might well be used so as to exert its greatest possible influence in the direction of encouraging larger families. The Beveridge Report is well-intentioned on the question of children's allowances, but its recommendations fall short of the highest wisdom.

(d) There is at present no provision whatever—apart from public assistance—for persons in business on their own account, for farmers, professional men, artists, musicians, teachers and other independent workers who for some reason lose their

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livelihood. Those who have relied on a source of maintenance which has failed, whether as rentiers in receipt of unearned income, or as women maintained by relatives for whom they have kept house in return for a home, are in a similar plight. Under the Beveridge scheme such persons would be given a training benefit to enable them to undergo a course of instruction intended to fit them for entry into a gainful occupation and thus find their way to independence.

(e) In the great majority of families death imposes an intolerable financial strain in the form of heavy funeral expenses which are far beyond the capacity of the slender weekly earnings of the household. Apprehension of this burden, and the desire to avoid the horror of a pauper's grave, has led the British people to indulge in an orgy of small insurance policies on which they at present spend the fabulous sum of £73 millions a year. The Report proposes the inclusion of a funeral benefit of £20 for an adult (with smaller payments for children) in the scheme of compulsory insurance, accompanied by the conversion of the entire industrial assurance business into a public service under an Industrial Assurance Board.¹

This is one of the boldest recommendations made by Sir William Beveridge. The Industrial Assurance Companies include some of the largest, wealthiest and most powerful commercial corporations in the country. They exercise a vast financial influence on banking and investment; they own huge interests in all manner of enterprises, from film production to the ownership of land and buildings; they are politically powerful, not only through Parliament and the Press, but to a still greater extent through their network of agents who call weekly at millions of homes throughout the country to collect premiums. If the Beveridge Report succeeds in transforming this menacing instrument of private power to a public service there will indeed be occasion to rejoice.

(f) Married women occupied in keeping house for their husbands and families will not be eligible for unemployment or disability benefit. But in order to enable them to take the necessary hospital or other treatment in case of sickness, they will be provided with household help.

(g) The functional needs of the housewife are also recognised in case of desertion by, or separation from, her husband. In either of these events she will receive a temporary separation benefit, followed by guardian benefit if she is responsible for

¹ Voluntary assurance for larger sums would still be permitted and existing policies would continue.

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dependent children or, if without incumbents, a training benefit to enable her to enter a gainful occupation.

So much for the new contingencies which the Report recognises. No less important are the extensions in the scales of benefit which it is proposed should be made in respect of contingencies already covered inadequately in cash or in kind. These can best be appreciated by a short review of the effect of the Beveridge plan on the present schemes.

Unemployment benefit will undergo two big changes. The rates of benefit will be raised from 20s. a week for an adult man (18s. for a woman contributor, 10s. dependent's allowance and 4s. for each of the first two children and 3s. thereafter) to 24s. for a single man or woman, 40s. for a married couple where the wife is not gainfully occupied, 16s. a week dependent's allowance and 8s. for each child. Thus, a married couple with two children receive to-day, if the wife is not earning, 38s. Under the Beveridge scheme they will be entitled to 56s. a week.¹

The second change is that benefit will continue as long as unemployment lasts, subject to the applicant remaining available for work, and, after a specified time, attending a work or training centre. The old fear of exhausting his benefit rights at the end of an arbitrary period fixed without regard to his needs or their cause, will no longer haunt the unemployed worker. The meaningless transfer from unemployment insurance to unemployment assistance will disappear in the case of every individual who is willing to co-operate with the State for the purpose of industrial rehabilitation.

The weakest of all our social insurance schemes is National Health Insurance, and this service properly receives the most drastic remodelling. The ludicrously low rates of benefit which at present deter people from going to their doctors for fear they should be put "on the panel" and prevented from earning their wages will be replaced by payments at the same rates as those for unemployment. The anomalous distinction between sickness and disablement benefit, which at present leads to a reduced payment for illness or incapacity lasting more than 26 weeks, will disappear. Provision for wives, children and other dependents will be included in disability benefit, instead of being entirely ignored in the event of sickness as is now the case. Above all, a comprehensive medical service, comprising every type of specialist treatment and every kind of hospital service, will be available without charge to everyone.

¹ Assuming 8s. a week on the average for each child.

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Compare this with the miserable service of low-paid ill-equipped panel doctors and cheap medicines which is all that National Health Insurance offers to the insured contributor to-day. There is no hospital service or specialist treatment; no attempt to provide medical attention for the wives, children or other dependent members of the family; and only a trifling amount of dental or ophthalmic treatment for the more fortunate members of some of the approved societies. The Beveridge proposals would indeed transform the situation; but they merely reflect the revolutionary changes of thought which have been taking place, since the war, in the medical profession and the public health movement generally.

On the income maintenance side the principal defect of the Report is its failure to make any provision for rent. Without a special allowance for this fundamental item in the household budget no scheme can hope to afford a reasonable degree of security for the home. The variations in its incidence are so great between different parts of the country and between different families that no general scale of benefit can cover the liability. The Report admits that the proposal made by the Fabian Society to vary the benefit in individual cases so as to allow for the actual rent "cannot be dismissed as impracticable or as clearly wrong in principle," and also that "the administrative difficulties of adjusting benefit for rent cannot be regarded as insoluble"; but its author rejects the proposal on the ground that the principle that a flat rate of contribution should lead to a flat rate of benefit has a strong popular appeal and is much easier to defend than any departure from it. Sir William Beveridge supports his decision with the hope that the irregularities of rent for similar types of accommodation will be eliminated by a determined effort to deal with urban congestion and the shortage of housing. It is, however, scarcely possible that the disparities of rent between, say, a Norfolk village and a crowded city will be ironed out by means of a housing drive within any foreseeable distance of time.

Workmen's compensation, unlike the rent problem, is dealt with on bold and comprehensive lines.

The present system is not one which partakes of the nature of social insurance at all. It merely confers on the workman or his dependents the right of recovering from the employer compensation in respect of injuries "arising out of and in the course of the employment." These private rights to private funds are enforced by private law process in the Courts; and

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they are defeated, delayed and obstructed by the many and varied resources of wealthy employers and their insurance companies, aided by the legal and medical professions. The vast mass of case law which has grown up has become an impenetrable jungle through which it becomes increasingly difficult to find a way. The whole antiquated structure of workmen's compensation should long ago have been consigned to the rubbish heap.

The Beveridge Report deals with workmen's compensation with extreme perspicacity and astuteness. The separate system of workmen's compensation will be abolished and disability or death arising from industrial accident or disease will be included in the social insurance scheme. Injured workmen will be treated medically through the general medical service. Medical and industrial rehabilitation, hitherto ignored, will receive the attention which it requires and deserves.

Claims by injured workers will be dealt with by the ordinary machinery of social security administration. They will be adjudicated administratively with an appeal to a special tribunal. Workers will receive for the first 13 weeks of incapacity arising from industrial accident or disease ordinary disability benefit at the standard rate for unemployment or sickness of any kind. Thereafter, if the incapacity continues, they will receive an industrial pension related to their previous earnings. This will amount to two-thirds of their pre-accident wages for total incapacity, subject to a maximum of £3 a week and a minimum equal to standard disability benefit. Partial incapacity will be compensated on a proportionate basis. In case of death from accident or disease due to the employment, a lump sum industrial grant will be paid to the dependents.

A third of the cost of benefits, pensions and grants for industrial accidents or disease will be paid for by means of the ordinary weekly contribution made by workers and employers in all industries; the remaining two-thirds will be met by a levy on the relatively few groups of specially dangerous industries. Each of these groups will be required to set up a statutory association charged with the task of collecting from individual employers their respective shares of the special levy. These associations will also perform various functions designed to promote safety in the industry, the rehabilitation and re-employment of injured workers and so forth.

By these means industrial disease and accident cases causing disability for less than 13 weeks—which constitute 90 per cent

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of the whole—will be dealt with on the same footing as disability cases resulting from other causes. The remaining 10 per cent will receive more generous financial treatment in recognition of the special hazards inherent in the dangerous occupations. The economic burden of industrial accident and disease will thus be spread in part over the entire body of employers and employees, and in larger part be imposed on the specially hazardous industries which will contribute to the levy.

The workmen's compensation proposals in the Beveridge Report are extremely ingenious. They secure in effect all that can reasonably be asked for in the way of reform. The ignoble wrangle over claims between workmen or their dependents and employers or their insurance companies will be replaced by a system of disinterested public administration. The long drawn-out Court proceedings will be abolished in favour of an administrative decision by the Ministry of Social Security with an appeal to an administrative tribunal. The commercial insurance of employers' liability risks will disappear. The inadequate weekly payments will be replaced by standard benefit for short-run disability and industrial pensions for long-term accident or disease at much more generous levels. Lump-sum settlements will be restricted to cases where it is in the employee's interest to receive such a payment. Accident prevention measures will be deliberately fostered in the dangerous industries through statutory organisation. Medical and industrial rehabilitation of injured workers will receive proper recognition.

The treatment of the aged is the most important question of all in the Britain of to-day and to-morrow, because the age composition of the population is such as to make this item of increasing absolute and relative weight in the scheme of social security. Confronted with the certainty of a rapidly ageing population we must recognise that increased expenditure on old persons means that the diminishing number of persons of working age must bear a disproportionately heavy burden of maintaining those who have ceased to be productive; and that the more we do for the old the less we can do for the young.

The present muddled system provides contributory pensions for insured men from the age of 65 (and for the old wives of such men) and for insured women from the age of 60. It also provides non-contributory old-age pensions from the age of 70 subject to a means test. Supplementary old-age pensions are also payable and based on need. None of these pensions

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requires the retirement from work by the recipient, though the means test for the non-contributory and supplementary old-age pensions will normally disqualify a person earning full-time wages from a right to pension.

The Beveridge plan embodies a system of retirement pensions. That is to say, such pensions will be given only to persons who have retired from work and will be reduced by part of any earnings made after retirement. The normal age for retirement will be 65 years for men and 60 for women, but in order to induce those who have reached these ages to remain at work for as long as possible, the rates of payment will be increased for each year for which retirement is postponed. The basic rates of retirement pensions will eventually be the same as those for unemployment and disability benefit, but these rates will only gradually be brought into operation over a period of 20 years.

The retirement pensions will start in 1945 at 20s. for a married couple and 14s. for a single man or woman, and will ultimately stand at 40s. and 24s. respectively. The reward for postponing a claim to pension will be at the rate of 2s. a week for a married couple and 1s. a week for a single individual for each year of postponement. The cost of these pensions in the Social Security Budget is estimated to be £126 millions out of a total of £697 millions in 1945, rising to £300 millions out of a total of £858 millions in 1965.

The criterion to be applied to these proposals must be formulated in functional terms. It is obviously desirable that old persons who are past work shall be maintained on a reasonable minimum standard of life, having regard to the resources of the nation. The proposed rates are a considerable improvement on existing scales.

The next point to be considered is the principle of making the pension conditional on retirement. This idea has been advocated by the Labour Party for some years, but it is not embodied in the existing system of contributory old-age pensions. It assumes that old persons who work can maintain themselves by their earnings and makes no allowance for the diminished efficiency, and consequent reduced earning power, of aged workers.

Sir William Beveridge is, however, by no means anxious that the retirement stipulation should encourage or hasten the cessation of work. "On the contrary," he writes, "the conditions governing pension should be such as to encourage

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every person who can go on working after reaching pensionable age to go on working and to postpone retirement and the claiming of pension. The large and growing proportion of the total population who will be above the pensionable ages^{*} of 65 for men and 60 for women makes it essential to raise the average age of retirement, if possible, and in any case to avoid doing anything which may bring about earlier retirement than at present."¹ With this object in view he introduces the principle of increasing the pension in proportion to the length of time for which it is deferred.

The merits of the device can only be tested by experience. Everyone who views the matter dispassionately must agree that having regard to the inescapable trends in the age composition of the population it is in the social interest that people shall continue at work as long as their health and welfare permit; and it is indisputable that these factors vary between different individuals. Whether the Beveridge proposals will achieve the end which its author has in view cannot be predicted, for we are dealing here with human incentives in an unknown field. But it would seem unlikely. On their face they appear to be less attractive as means to the same end than the alternative suggestion put forward by the Fabian Society. The Fabian plan provides for a double-deck scheme: a small pension for everyone on attaining the required age, followed by higher rates of pension on retirement.

It will be seen that the Fabian plan offers all old persons who continue to work a handicap allowance intended to compensate them for a postulated reduction in earning power. This, it was thought, would enable them to accept less strenuous or responsible work better suited to their powers. The Beveridge scheme, conversely, permits part-time employment by old persons who have retired from their usual occupations, on condition that a substantial proportion (from one-half to two-thirds) of any earnings in excess of £3 a month is forfeited from the pension.

While one does not wish to dogmatise on what is, after all, no more than a difference of opinion as to the best method of attaining an agreed objective, there are two aspects of the Beveridge plan which may well defeat the end in view. In the first place, old persons are not likely to be susceptible to *future* benefits. At 60 or 65 it is only human for a man or woman to want to receive something here and now by way

¹ Report, par. 245.

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of pension, for the future prospect of life has become disturbingly uncertain. Hence the deferred pension at a higher rate may prove to be a not very tempting carrot. Second, the idea of forfeiting a part of the pension in respect of earnings has a negative and discouraging savour, although some condition of this kind is bound to accompany a system of pensions payable only on retirement.

The machinery of administration contained in the Report is obvious and inevitable. A Ministry of Social Security is recommended which will take over all the functions in regard to social insurance at present exercised by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, the Ministry of Health, the Customs and Excise, Home Office, Assistance Board, and the local authorities. The only doubtful points in this connection are the proposal to take over—"probably"—the employment service of the Ministry of Labour; and the somewhat curious indecision as to whether war pensions should remain the responsibility of a separate Ministry of War Pensions. It would seem clear that the placement work of the Ministry of Labour should certainly continue where it is at present; while the case for including war pensions in the Ministry of Social Security would appear to be no less clear.

These, however, are small defects in a great scheme. The Beveridge Report, broadly speaking, is worthy of its theme. It is a State document in the grand manner, clear in conception, acute in analysis, bold in solution, comprehensive in outlook, humane in spirit, distinguished in style.

AN AGE OF TRANSITION

By HAROLD J. LASKI

IT was a happy thought which led Professor von Hayek to reprint the articles contributed to the *Examiner* by John Stuart Mill in the first months of 1831.¹ There are signs that, under pressure of our own immense crisis, we are beginning to feel a more real sympathy with those early Victorians who, like Mill himself, like Bulwer Lytton, whose *England and the English* is one of the forgotten masterpieces of that age, like Matthew Arnold, and the greatest of the public health specialists of the time, Sir John Simon, confronted a situation which was full of revolutionary possibilities with an honesty and directness it is difficult to overpraise. Mill himself, at the time when he wrote these articles, was still in his early twenties. He was the clearest intelligence among the younger group of thinkers who had drawn their original inspiration from Bentham's great work. He was profoundly acquainted with the main currents of European thought. He had seen a good deal of the Saint-Simonians in Paris, and, if he was not formally a disciple, at least he regarded them, in his own phrase, as *à la tête de la civilisation*. Through the Austins, he was aware of some of the chief currents of German thought, though it is clear from a letter of his to Bain in 1867, that he had no knowledge of the Hegelian movement, particularly not of its leftward developments which were to produce something like a social revolution in the ways of European thought in the next ten or fifteen years. He knew, broadly speaking, that the old aristocratic Europe against which the ideas of 1789 were a magistral protest was, after twenty years of war and another twenty of reaction, going out not, in Mr. T. S. Eliot's phrase, with a bang, but with a whimper. But though the inspiration he had received from the reading of Wordsworth's poetry had enabled him to recover from the spiritual depression by which, in the two years after 1828, he had been almost overwhelmed, he had not a clear view of the new pattern of social institutions by which the rule of the aristocracy was to be replaced.

The result is shown clearly in these interesting articles. Mill is acutely aware that he is living in an age of transition. He puts his finger unerringly on its central characteristic: the breakdown of the traditional values of civilisation. "In an age of transition," he writes, "the divisions among the instructed

¹ *The Spirit of the Age*. By John Stuart Mill. Chicago. The University Press.

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nullify their authority, and the uninstructed lose their faith in them." He realises that what he calls the "higher classes" have become a public danger. They have power, without any sense of the need to justify its possession. "What really enervates," he comments, "is the secure and unquestioned possession, without any exertion, of all those things to gain which mankind in general are wont to exert themselves." He comments with vigour on the degeneracy of the Crown and the aristocracy in comparison with the quality of their forbears; set, he exclaims, country gentlemen like Sir John Eliot, Hampden, Colepepper and Wentworth against Knatchbull, Bankes, Gooch and Lethbridge. Compare the Sugdens and the Copleys, among the lawyers, with the Seldens, the Pymms and the Cokes. An epoch, he thinks, has come in which civilisation has become a threat to privilege, and the ruling powers, that they may retain their seat, must . . . deliberately endeavour to barbarise mankind." We have reached a situation in which what is done by voluntary effort is, defence apart, better done than when it is undertaken by the agency of government. Only by divesting the aristocracy of a monopoly of power for which its unfitness is evident can England emerge safely from its crisis. For by no other means can "the most virtuous and best instructed of the nation" acquire "that ascendancy over the opinions and feelings of the rest" which enables the business of the State to be carried on with success. Only that transfer of power makes possible a future in which there is hope.

Mill wrote on the eve of the passage of the Reform Bill; and for almost twenty years he watched the process whereby the English aristocracy was compelled to share the power it had so largely monopolised in politics since 1688 with the commercial and industrial middle class. The revolution he feared in England did not develop, though its shadow harassed the early Victorian age, and compelled its rulers, in the phrase of Charles Trevelyan, the brother-in-law of Macaulay, "to put our house in order." When one seeks to penetrate into the mystery of why there was no English revolution in the nineteenth century, why Chartism ended in a cul-de-sac, why the promise of that early socialist movement in which Thompson and Hodgskin, Bray and Bronterre O'Brien renewed so remarkably the radical insights of their Leveller predecessors of the Civil Wars, ended in a body of leaders who found spiritual sustenance in Gladstone and Bright, the answer, no doubt, is a

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complicated one. But its roots will be discovered in the immense economic development of this country in the fifty years after the repeal of the Corn Laws, a period in which its exports dominated the markets of the world. Until the eighties, it had nothing to fear from German competition; until 1918, it still stood to the United States in the position of a creditor; on the scale of its Victorian operations, neither France nor Italy, neither Japan nor Russia, could be regarded as a rival.

Its expansion was immense; its sense of security was proportionate to its expansion. That is why the Victorian age is a period in which there is at once continuous, if sporadic, social reform, and a profound toleration of all extreme ideas. The Victorians listened to the warnings of their prophets in a mixed mood of interest and amusement; only an occasional shock, like the failure of Overend, Gurney, or the Dockers' Strike of 1889, disturbed their serene confidence in the significance of the trade returns. Carlyle's warnings were attributed to indigestion; what stuck in their minds was his ever more intense conviction that the masses needed a master. Matthew Arnold performed his shrill sonata upon the theme of "barbarians, philistines, populace"; it was difficult to take seriously a defence of equality from a school inspector who despised the Americans and enjoyed nothing so much as a week-end at the Rothschilds. There were the warnings of Ruskin and William Morris; but an art critic and a poet were likely to be regarded merely as examples of that English passion for eccentricity which built Strawberry Hill in one period and, in the age when despair was the professional duty of the romantic, took Byron on his fatal voyage to Greece.

The truth is that in the period when the Victorians should have been discussing those social problems which they did not seriously tackle until the years after 1906, the debate by which they were mostly absorbed centred in the truths of the Christian religion and the claims of the Anglican Church. It was, from almost any angle, an amazing debate. It was amazing, theologically, because it is at least doubtful if any of the main protagonists, Anglican or Nonconformist or Roman Catholic, either knew what questions ought to be asked, or by what canons of testimony the answers given should be judged; and it was amazing, ecclesiastically, because so few of the protagonists were willing to admit forthrightly that what was really bound up with the establishment and endowment of the Church of England was hardly at all the future of religion,

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but, almost entirely, the social-political compromise reached between 1832 and 1846 of which the peculiar status of the Anglican Church was a vital, if indirect, symbol.

Except, in fact, for a few eccentrics, like Arnold and William Morris, and a few special occasions, like the Sheffield outrages, Victorian England did not really discuss the central issues of domestic politics until the Taff Vale case in 1899; or, if they did, as in the controversy over popular education, there was little idea in the minds of any influential persons that the masses should be consulted about their outcome. There was representative government in England; except as a weapon in the drama of party-struggle, no one thought who exercised responsible political duties that representative government ought to mean popular government. In its essence, the system was still an oligarchical one, even though property made as well as property inherited was a slowly legitimated path to membership of the Cabinet. That is shown not only by the attitude of Queen Victoria to the proposal to make Bright a Privy Councillor in 1859, and by her reluctance, in the eighties, to admit Chamberlain and Dilke to the Cabinet. Even more is it shown by the reluctance of the Liberal Party, twenty years after MacDonald and Burt had been returned by their fellow-miners to the House of Commons, to find winnable seats for candidates of working-class origin. It was, indeed, that reluctance, rather than any essential difference of outlook, which made Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1906 the colleague of Keir Hardie rather than the colleague of Asquith.¹ Marx and Engels had long ago seen the completeness with which the English labour leaders had become permeated with the spirit of the bourgeoisie;² it was only the leaders of the rival parties who failed to observe the completeness with which they had triumphed.

The Taff Vale case may be taken very fairly as the date from which the erosion of the Victorian compromise begins. Thenceforward, the nation is increasingly occupied with those fundamental questions which its rulers thought had been finally answered a half-century before. After the Boer War, there is no moment in which the empire is not a problem as well as an asset. Thenceforward, also, the issues of international relations are set in the shadow of deepening crisis. The emergence of the Labour Party as a separate political entity, by making the "condition of England question" a matter of permanent

¹ Stewart, *Life of Keir Hardie*.

² *Letters of Marx and Engels*. (1934.) P. 419f.

debate, also made the Conservative and Liberal parties increasingly aware of what they had in common, aware of this, still more significantly even when, as from 1909 to 1911, they were insisting on the gravity of the differences by which they were divided. And the war of 1914 made the awareness of that common interest a decisive event in the political history of Britain. It was the evidence of the fact which, as Engels had always predicted, would bring to the birth a real Labour movement in Britain—the end of British predominance in the world market. The war, on the one hand, and the Russian Revolution on the other, combined not only to bring the Liberal epoch, and, with it, the Liberal Party, effectively to a close. It combined, also, to put capitalist democracy on the defensive, all over the world. It raised the issue, which most Englishmen had imagined to be no longer an open issue, of the claim of the proletariat to its place in the sun. Just as the middle class had compelled the feudal aristocracy to offer it a share in the disposition of the state-power, so, after 1918, the proletariat posed to the middle class the problem of its rights. And it did so with the Russian Revolution, acting as its predecessor in France had acted, to define for the masses the essential mood of the post-war generation.

It is this which makes our period, like that of Mill when he wrote these articles, an age of transition. With him, as with us, a system of traditional values has broken down. With us, as with him, when the ruling class was challenged, what he called its "secure and unquestioning succession" of authority made it as unwilling as its predecessor to share the substance of power with men and women who had hitherto been its instruments rather than its partners. It had yielded political democracy in the nineteenth century as the price for its retention of economic sovereignty. What it discovered was that political democracy, in the long run, finds that it cannot affirm its own essence unless it becomes also the bearer of economic sovereignty. So challenged, where political democracy was weak, as in Germany and Italy, privilege moved to its overthrow; and it was then driven to make war lest civil disruption be the price paid by the masses for a counter-revolution which deprived them of hope. For what had become obvious, in the inter-war years, was the fact that, on its historic postulates, capitalist society could not, within the framework of the national state, recover that power to expand which had saved it in and after 1848. It had largely replaced competition by monopoly;

and the growth of its productive capacity had driven it into an imperialism which had made the whole world the *latifundia* of some eight or ten powers. For the economic slavery which Germany and its like-minded partners brought to their subjects they had therefore no new compensation to offer save insofar as victory in war would give them the right themselves to possess these *latifundia* and, thereby, to divide its loot among their peoples. The second world-war was thus not merely a continuation of the first. It was also a struggle between privilege which had overthrown democracy and so embraced counter-revolution as its postulate of action, and the capitalist democracies, together with the Soviet Union, which sought at least to stay that redivision of the world without which the counter-revolutionaries of Germany, Italy, and Japan had no hope of survival.

At least to stay a counter-revolutionary redivision of the world; how much beyond that end it was the object of the United Nations to go, it is far from easy to say. If we analyse the spirit of their endeavour, not in terms of the propaganda to which they resort, but upon the basis of the actual policy they pursue, it is difficult not to believe that, as when Mill wrote in 1831, "the divisions among the instructed nullify their authority, and the uninstructed lose faith in them." For now, as then, outside the Soviet Union, those in possession of power seem to lack any sense of the need to justify its possession. If this war were to end to-morrow, none of the changes would have been effected which make possible that economics of expansion we require if we are to fulfil the purposes of democracy by common consent. There is, on the contrary, an eager desire, on the part of the forces of privilege, to postpone all questions of social change until after the war. There is a deep sense, among the masses, that, with victory, there will come, for a second time, the disillusion which bedevilled the inter-war years. Our leadership has a superb faith in the greatness of our past, but it builds no foundations upon which the post-war generation can erect a great future. Mr. Churchill has confronted shattering defeats with an unbreakable faith that our people is unbeatable which has gone far to making possible the defeat of the counter-revolution in the field. But he has steadfastly refused to answer the questions, for whom it is to be beaten and for what. We shall, so far as we can see, enter the epoch of peace without agreement about the postulates of the new civilisation we are called upon to construct.

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No one who examines our present situation can fail to recall its resemblance to the post-Napoleonic years. Then, as now, after long and bitter struggle, a weary people, which had made immense sacrifices for victory, entered upon a peace in which, for nearly twenty years, its hopes were disappointed, its ambitions unfulfilled. Privileged interests, which had sheltered beneath the ramparts of freedom, crept out again to take possession of their authority. Measures which seemed obvious both in their urgency and their desirability to the men who, like Bentham, on the radical side, and Southey on the Tory, had an insight into the future that was being shaped, were denied because the masters of the state-power confronted the unknown without either the courage to share its perspective or the generosity to safeguard the claims of the poor and the humble. The thousands who came back from the victory over Napoleon found that the statesmen who told them that they were soldiers in a war of liberation meant by freedom nothing more than the preservation of that traditional order from whose benefits they were excluded and in whose hopes they were not permitted to formulate a claim. The world was freed from the nightmare of a Napoleonic despotism. But it was for the cotton lords of Lancashire and the landlords of the ancient régime that the crowning mercy of Waterloo had been won.

That is why the literature of the post-Napoleonic period strikes so deep a note of bitterness and despair. Byron and Shelley, Cobbett and Leigh Hunt, Bentham and Hazlitt, all wrote in their various ways the prelude to Mill's essay. From 1815 until 1850 the shadow of civil conflict broods over the whole English scene; even the high spirits of Dickens fade into gloom when he writes of the condition of that common people whose energy and endurance had made the defeat of Napoleon possible. If recovery came a generation later, do not let us forget that its basis was a technological supremacy that is not now open to the epoch in which our lives are set. And when recovery did come, it came not as a principle of justice equally shared, but as a body of hurried concessions wrested from privilege as the price of its continuing authority. When we congratulate ourselves upon the skill or good fortune which enabled us to escape revolution in 1848, we ought to look at such a survey as Charles Booth made of London in the eighties to realise what the English poor paid that the civilisation of their masters might astound the world.

It is a not dissimilar situation that we confront to-day. The

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difference is the all-important one that we have no longer the differential advantages, economic and technological, which we then possessed. We enter a post-war world with a people to which is denied the resources of America and the resources, so rich with hope, of the Soviet Union. We shall enter it a fatigued people, part of a Europe that is ravaged by ugly wounds and riven by deep hates. To what will it be, an age of transition?

It is the tragic answer of our time that we do not know, mainly because our rulers fear to ask, much less to answer, the questions upon which our future depends. They dare not say forthrightly that they propose to maintain the general outline of the old order; that is associated with sufferings too deep for it to be accepted as a tolerable aim. Yet they fear to offer pledges of a world built upon the Four Freedoms lest it be found that the cost of attaining them involve the abrogation of traditional privilege. In the result, they shuffle and evade the problems by which they are confronted, hoping that by some miracle whose secret they cannot fathom they will slip through victory into peace. What they forget is the vital fact that the cause of this war is precisely what Mill termed their "secure and unquestioned possession, without any exertion, of all those things to gain which mankind in general are wont to exert themselves." No possession, when this war ends, will be either secure or unquestioned unless it is associated with a great and general increase in economic well-being; and there is no prospect before us, within the framework of the productive relations of capitalist democracy, of the attainment of any such increase. So that in its absence, the foundations of our social order will remain threatened foundations until a day when its uneasy equilibrium is upset by the angry realisation that men no longer hold the great ends of life in common. When that day comes, we shall learn in the tragedy of conflict what we might discover in the experiment of reason.

When Mill wrote his essay, over a century ago, there was some excuse for the refusal of privilege to renovate the foundations of society. The population was largely illiterate; the power of effective public administration was small; the belief was still general that, in another world, men at least of virtue find compensation for the inequities of this life; and the study of social organisation was in its infancy. The world, moreover, was committed by the theoreticians of its conquering class to an economics of scarcity which seemed to lend

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the authority of science to the defensive philosophy of the successful and the well-born.

None of those excuses is valid to-day. Still less are they valid in a society in which, as in our own, one of the major political parties exists to prove that they are indefensible. A Mill who, in our own day, examined the social philosophy of Mr. Churchill might well conclude that though it was, in its essentials, a massive anachronism, the policies in which it resulted were, however lamentable, at least the logical outcome of the principles he held. For the leaders of the Labour Party he neither would nor could attempt any such apology. On the contrary, he would be bound to say that at a moment when the mind of the nation was ready for great changes, they concurred, without repining, in their denial. He would insist that when the time was supremely favourable to wholesale experiment, they accepted minor innovations which they represented to the masses as significant achievements. He would argue that when it was urgent for them to prove by creative activity the right of democratic institutions to an eager confidence, they co-operated with the party of privilege to demonstrate their incapacity. He would speak, I am certain, with a warm enthusiasm of the common people of Britain, the heroism of their endurance, the courage of their self-sacrifice, their refusal to bow their heads before the tempest of tyranny. He would say of those leaders, I feel sure, what he said of the men who ruled Britain in his own day, that "they have gradually contrived, in a manner, to exclude from their minds the very idea of their living and breathing fellow-citizens, as the subjects of moral obligation in their capacity as rulers." I think he would add that no men so gravely betray the movement they profess to serve as those who insist that its principles are urgent while they are engaged in an elaborate effort to prevent their application. It is unforgivable in statesmen who know the need for revolutionary change so to act that, in Mill's phrase, the "business of the day is done so as to prejudice the work of the morrow." In the long run, as he predicted, "worldly power must pass from the hands of the stationary part of mankind into those of the progressive part." To that end, as he observed, a moral and social revolution is necessary. It is unforgivable that the very men who should be leading that revolution are devoting their main energies to preventing its accomplishment.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

By H. R. G. GREAVES

IF Parliament is not well ahead of events it is unlikely to influence them. Accordingly the transfer of the main preoccupation of the House of Commons from war to peace issues, which offers the most striking contrast between its activities at the beginning and at the close of the past six months, is to be welcomed. Not such a question as the central direction of the war, but rather the economic and social foundations of the peace, seems from now likely to determine the divisions in the House. In these circumstances party is reasserting itself. Coalition government, if this account be true, is already beginning to enter the difficult transition stage from war to peace, where the overriding need for unity to save ourselves from defeat is increasingly replaced by conflict about the meaning of victory and the use to which victory is to be put. Survival of coalition government depends on its ability to secure wide support, and support from the different elements composing it; it is not merely a matter of majorities. It depends also on the absence of an alternative government. Both requirements were met by the Churchill Government during the fifth, sixth and seventh sessions of this Parliament. It has now become uncertain whether they will be met in the eighth session.

That, despite official suggestions of the need for continuing coalition government after the war, the division in the House is already taking party lines is shewn by analysis of the minority voting on the two types of issue. The first is illustrated by the no confidence motion on the central direction of the war. Here the minority itself was a coalition, stretching from Admiral Keyes and Sir John Wardlaw-Milne to Mr. Bevan, or from Mr. Hore-Belisha to Mr. Maxton. It contained only 27 including the Tellers, while the majority was composed of nearly all the Conservative, Liberal and Labour members, not to mention the entire Communist party. But the country was then at grips with resounding defeat and the whole Middle East was in peril. Since that vote of July 2nd the change of Parliament's preoccupations has occurred, ushered in by a King's Speech half of which was devoted to reconstruction policy. The two minority votes against the Government of February, 1943, present a picture in complete contrast with July, 1942.

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The vote against the Catering Bill was a Conservative vote; the vote against the Government on the Beveridge Report was non-Conservative and no Labour member outside the Government voted for it. Of the minority of 118 in the first only one appears also among the minority of 121 in the second vote; thus within ten days 238 members enjoyed the experience of carrying their criticism into the lobby, while in the second case many who criticised abstained from voting or voted with the majority. The minority of July is to be found, with four exceptions, distributed among the minorities of February. It thus emerges that in the interval between those dates both the supporters and the critics of Mr. Churchill's direction of the war have tended to divide on the lines of Conservative versus Progressive or non-Conservative, and that this has affected about half the House. If it be contended that the second vote in February, and the Labour Party's decision on that occasion to vote against the Government, were influenced by the challenge of the Sir Douglas Hacking group of Conservatives on February 9th, the answer is that they were none the less party alignments. If it be also argued that neither minority had really in mind an alternative government, it remains true that both would like to see serious changes in the personnel, and perhaps also in the party composition, of the Government, although this still does not imply the existence of an alternative government on anything like the lines of pre-war definitions.

While analysis of the division lists suggests these conclusions, and is no doubt the surest foundation for any conclusions at all, a study of the course of debate in February produces another impression which is of no less importance. On the Catering Wages Bill, and still more on the social security proposals, there was a distinct cleavage of opinion within the Conservative party. In the former case agreement with the Labour and Liberal supporters of Mr. Bevin's proposals was crystallised by the Government's "unanimous" lead, to which Mr. Bevin was careful to point. In the latter, while no Conservative joined Labour, Liberals and Independents in the lobby, several voiced similar criticism. Nor is that inference to be drawn any less strongly from the debate on economic policy of February 2nd and 3rd, which is referred to below. This does not mean an imminent disintegration of the Conservative party, any more than the Labour cleavage between Ministers and others on February 18th suggests its disappearance as a political entity. It does mean that the Government can for the present rely, if

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it retains its present composition, on some considerable Conservative support for progressive measures. It means a continuing possibility of coalition for an energetic, imaginative and forward-looking government. The implication is that the Government cannot afford to hand over the right claimed for it by Sir Stafford Cripps, and implicit in the Prime Minister's speech in the debate on the Address, itself to define what is sufficiently "uncontroversial" to warrant passage through the House as a Government measure. In short, party resurgence having begun—with the considerable Conservative revolt on the Catering Bill—if the coalition is to survive at all it can do so only from its own impetus and not by deferring to such revolt. Yet the difficulty of avoiding such abdication is great: it is enhanced by the unreal party composition of the House, unreal because it does not reflect either the division of the electorate, whether in 1935 or 1943, or the present party make-up of the War Cabinet, which indeed more nearly corresponds to the electoral division. An inflated majority party is a help to party government; it is a hindrance to coalition. The implication may well be that the holding of "real" by-elections is a needed corrective.

The background to the changed emphasis in the interests of Parliament can be seen in the four statements on the war situation. The first of these, made when the Axis was outside Cairo and Alexandria and the Russians retreating, could report a successful Malta convoy and the Dieppe reconnaissance. If it shared with the last a stress on the primacy of the submarine front and the claim that shipbuilding now exceeds sinkings, it was otherwise in contrast. Mr. Churchill then, on February 11th, reported to the House upon the Casablanca conference, with the Eighth Army beyond Tripoli and the Anglo-American forces outside Tunis, and in an atmosphere of victory largely the creation of the astonishing Russian advances. Everywhere, as Mr. Attlee could already say on January 19th, the initiative was in the hands of the United Nations for the first time in over three years. To say that the House was thus reacting more to Soviet than to British achievement would be only partially true. In his review of November 11th the Prime Minister said that "of the nineteen convoys we have sent to Russia, every one has been an important fleet operation, because the enemy's main fleet was close at hand," and there was no disposition to cavil at this description or to doubt the naval and industrial achievement it represented. Mr. Churchill, both by

his visit to Moscow and by his tribute, in the course of a frank account of Russian disappointment and final agreement, to Russia's suffering and her military contribution, managed to express the unanimous feeling of the House: "My heart has bled for Russia. I have felt what almost everyone in this House must have felt, that intense desire that we should be suffering with her and that we should take some of the weight off her." These things, together with success in Africa, the evidence of our drawing Axis force away from the eastern front, the clear indication that a blow will soon be struck in Europe, and the Prime Minister's frank words "There is a German army in France as large, apart from the Home Guard, as ours in Great Britain," have combined to reduce in the House the doubt of political integrity and military energy which underlay "second front" proddings, and which at one time threatened the unity of the Government's support for its direction of the war.

If in the realm of strategy and war-production the House has become less critical, profound concern has been shewn over one aspect of the conduct of the war. This is the political aspect of the occupation of North Africa. A tendency to put the responsibility on the shoulders of the Americans was hardly in accordance with the claims made by the Foreign Office, through Mr. Law, that the Political Warfare Executive had here "really had the first chance it has ever had of developing and seeing through to the end a campaign in political warfare. . . . In the whole field there has been the fullest co-operation between ourselves and the United States. . . . This campaign constituted an outstanding achievement." Mr. Eden pleaded later that the appearance of Darlan could not have been foreseen and therefore its consequences were not prepared for. But it is hard to understand why one Vichy administrator the more within a Vichy administration should alter the foundations of Allied policy, and the implication is that it did not. The Foreign Office responsibility, however much shared with the State Department, was nevertheless partly its own, and it gives little evidence of efficient intelligence work, or of that inner comprehension of democratic principle which lives, it so often seems, more naturally in the heart of the ordinary citizen than in the working of the diplomat's mind. Mr. Granville asked if "our foreign policy is heading towards something which commits us to a new balance of power policy in Europe and the installation of puppet governments on the Continent after military victory." He spoke of people being "deeply disturbed

and suspicious" about "this apparent change in our foreign policy" and in the conception of the world for which we are fighting. "There is a feeling that democracy and the House of Commons have lost control and the check on policy, and that dangerous seeds of Fascism are growing." The fear that we had here taken, as an American correspondent had said, the first step towards losing the peace was certainly felt in the House. In answer to the plea that agreement with Darlan prevented the waste of lives, Mr. Cocks remarked: "if you really want to save bloodshed you can make peace with Hitler or the German General Staff now." The Casablanca declaration on unconditional surrender is not enough to allay such suspicions. Nor is the welcome assurance by Mr. Eden that there are no secret agreements and nothing to tie the hands of the country when it enters the Peace Conference.

Fear and suspicion will continue to be justified as long as the Government fails to remove them by drawing a clearer picture of the international system to which it will work. Neither a general declaration of aims like the Atlantic Charter, nor the negative approach of "no commitments to anyone beforehand" will suffice. All official statements so far are consonant with a world hegemony of the great powers in an international political structure exactly like that which led to war in 1914 and 1939, save only that the defeated countries will be for longer and more completely disarmed. What the critics in Parliament are really demanding is not reiterated assertions that aggression must be prevented, but evidence that plans are being worked out by the United Nations in concert here and now while the best opportunity exists, not a negative waiting policy by the Foreign Office but a constructively international one, not the condemnation of "aggressor nations" but the preparing of that democratic world system which will prevent fascism and military dictatorship as causes of aggression, not the aim to outlaw war but the principles of economic and financial policy, the agreements, and the mechanisms necessary to organise prosperity. "Let us begin now," said Mr. James Griffiths in the debate on the Address, "in our discussions with the United Nations to formulate precise plans for the creation of machinery." We need "a wider and bigger conception than anything to be found in the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech," said Mr. Bevan. The Foreign Office attitude, as expressed by Mr. Law, did not provide this. It was a curious amalgam of scepticism and faith.

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It revealed the Foreign Secretary as "chary of producing elaborate and complicated and beautiful blue-prints," doubtful of the value of "building a shining palace which is founded only on the sands of hopes which have never yet been fulfilled," sceptical about the League of Nations which was "at once too ambitious and too unpractical." To what, then, are our hopes to be fastened? "First of all we have the conception of the United Nations," replies Mr. Law. This conception, he seemed to think, was both "more concrete and more practical," but he entirely failed to shew any way in which, for the post-war period, the conception had yet produced any concrete or practical organisation. That presumably would be a blue-print. And instead of blue-prints, "we must *hope* that this development of United Nations' action, among the great powers and among the smaller powers alike," admittedly considerable for the limited and immediate purposes of the war itself, "will be continued after the war." While no one would dispute Mr. Law's claim that a very real and active collaboration exists at present between most, if not all, of the United Nations, and this was not disputed in the House, the argument that it should be used now to lay the foundations of a world structure for peace is not met by anything put forward in the Foreign Office case. It is not met by a policy of hopes instead of a policy of discussing plans. Nor is it met by the argument that Mr. Eden "prefers . . . an empirical policy to a purely academic policy," itself a somewhat academic argument.

As Mr. Greenwood argued later, in the debate on reconstruction, the possibilities of domestic economic development will depend on the framework created by our foreign policy. "Internal conditions in all countries will be largely determined by the general world lay-out." The amendment to the Address moved by Mr. Pethick-Lawrence, welcoming the general endorsement of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, took a similar line with its emphasis on the urgent necessity for "reaching practical conclusions, in co-operation with the United Nations, to fulfil these undertakings." Thus it may be said that Parliament, in turning its attention from war to peace issues, has wisely stressed the fact that we are "involved in mankind," and that unless we recognise this here and now in the planning of a more satisfactory international organisation than has ever been known before, all our other efforts are vain. "All talk of reconstruction is a mockery," as Sir William Jowitt said, "if the world is to remain hereafter under the

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constant fear of aggression." But to recognise the importance of a problem is not the same as to achieve its solution. Mr. Eden's speech in reply to this later debate was a little more promising. At least he recognised that it is easier to get agreement during, than it may be after, the war. And he gave as "our message to Europe" the promise that we should be willing to help to re-establish ruined economies and to contribute force for the maintenance of peace. The absence of such force, as well as of adequate representativeness, he regarded as the chief weakness of the League of Nations. The international technical services must be maintained. "The I.L.O. must be strengthened and developed." The Foreign Secretary was able to convince the House that he was aware of the great opportunity. "We have to make our co-operation in peace as true and as effective as it now is in these war years." He could convince, if convincing were necessary, that the task was of vital importance. But he did not prove that it was being undertaken while the conditions for its achievement were most hopeful.

Substantial agreement exists in Parliament not only upon the urgency of undertaking international economic planning here and now, but even upon several guiding principles. The debates of November 11th to December 2nd shew a striking similarity of approach to that revealed in the debate of February on Lord Winterton's motion on economic policy. The members who spoke on these separate occasions were different; yet the arguments were similar, had become stronger, and were voiced by speakers from all parties. Sir Kingsley Wood's speech consisted of a string of economic platitudes conveyed with a complacency which suggested that they were pearls of wisdom. The House seemed pleased to think that the subject matter of economics had penetrated so far. Yet the Chancellor produced not even a sketch of possible action, nor any reply to the questions of application that were in the minds of members. The long vista of lessons in elementary economics suggested by his belief that this was "only one of many debates we shall have" held out a continuing prospect of amiable inconclusiveness, and in the second day's debate little satisfaction was expressed. Mr. Shinwell "detected common agreement on the objective we desire to reach. But that is not our problem. The problem is to devise the machinery, the method and the manner of approach." He claimed that "economic organisation on federal lines already exists in Europe. To a large extent it has been established by the Nazis." And he wanted to know

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with what we were to replace it, whether merely with that "return to the policy of free enterprise" and unregulated competition which appeared to be an assumption of the Chancellor's speech. Sir Percy Harris said that Sir Kingsley "stated the problems, but he did not indicate what were his proposed remedies." "I want to press that these questions be faced," said Sir George Schuster, "in the heat of our common emergency when we may be able to forge together the framework of a policy in a way which will not be possible when we cool down to our domestic problems of peace." Sir Edward Cadogan felt that Mr. Shinwell had extracted more from Sir Kingsley's speech than he had. "I confess that at the end of it I felt just as ignorant as I did when it began. I had hoped that the Chancellor would, at least, have had some interesting announcement to make on what was the Government's policy. . . . I am insisting that the plan upon which all other plans depend should have precedence." Mr. Dalton stated, in replying to the debate, that the Wheat Agreement, which he described and rightly praised, "is a forerunner, and it is the intention of the Government in due course to enter into other agreements on the same lines." This was more promising. And he also reminded the House of the Chancellor's emphasis on the need for continuing many of the controls after the war, as well as telling it of consultations now being undertaken with particular industries on their reconstruction problems. Clearly there was present in Parliament's approach to these questions a certain optimism. There was little disposition to believe that a country which had shewn itself able to achieve so much for war should be defeated by the problems of peace-time economic organisation, and there was a definite sense of demand that the lead possessed by the Government at the moment should be used now, and with more vision and energy, for preparing the future.

The House of Commons has spent much of its time discussing the country's internal economic future. In the debate on the Beveridge Report the Chancellor's negative approach was even less successful in satisfying the House than in the economic policy debate. Here Sir John Wardlaw-Milne's view that the Government had badly mishandled the debate was at least part of the truth. That it could do so proved an astonishing degree of misunderstanding of the temper of the country. There was a general feeling, even among many who voted for it, that it had lost a great opportunity. It was not so much that the

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Government had accepted three-quarters, and not the whole, of the Report that lay at the root of the criticism; rather was it the impression of a narrow, unimaginative Treasury attitude to it which Sir John Anderson and, still more, Sir Kingsley Wood managed to convey. By the time the latter had finished speaking every promise seemed to have receded into a remote future, where the interests of the super-tax payer with Sir Kingsley as his willing agent would become an obstacle to satisfying the needs of the common man. This occasion indeed bore much resemblance to the earlier ones, being in some measure their culmination.

The implications of the vote on the Catering Wages Bill have already been dealt with. Here was a modest Bill empowering the Minister to make regulations, setting up a body to adjudicate or advise, with the object of bringing order and decent conditions into a service employing more than half a million people. It was put forward as necessary not only in war-time, when people had to be directed into this service, but as a measure to establish reasonable conditions for people to return to after the war is over. Indeed it was less on the merits of the case than on the ground that it was controversial that the opponents argued, and both Mr. Bevin and Mr. McCorquodale effectively shewed that its provisions were in line with much other legislation, some of it passed under a Conservative Government. The latter claimed, therefore, that it was not "controversial"; he also repeated the claim that the Government has the right to determine what is and what is not "controversial," made by Sir Stafford Cripps. He clearly thought that the opposition in fact came from a sectional interest against the common good, and that factional demands were not equivalent to "controversy."

The House gave what the Parliamentary Secretary, Mr. H. Strauss, described as a friendly but unenthusiastic reception to the Ministry of Town and Country Planning Bill. This was yet another "machinery Bill" where all depends on the motive power behind the machinery. Mr. Greenwood criticised on the ground that such planning as is necessary "travels far beyond the range of any single department." But the chief point is that the effectiveness of any ministry, new or old, and whatever it be called, depends "on major Government decisions as to policy" which, despite the Scott and Uthwatt reports, have not yet been taken. While awaiting these the House gave a qualified and tentative approval.

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In the category of economic and social policy Parliament has not yet had the promised scheme of educational reform to debate, but it has spent time on coal and wages, man-power (in secret session) and colonial development. To the argument that wages should be stabilised because to allow them to increase is unfair to the men in the Services and produces inflationary tendencies, Mr. Bevin answered that the main concern of the men in the forces is with the conditions to which they are coming back. He claimed that the trade unions have been careful in their demands, and that the soldiers, as members of trade unions, are glad to see an improvement. He also argued that the increase of 44 per cent in productivity per man-hour, which has taken place since the war, explains and justifies some rise. In the earlier two days' debate on the coal industry Major Lloyd George could shew that the decline had stopped, and that "mechanisation, reorganisation and concentration are some of the most important preoccupations of the Controllers," although several members pointed to the narrow margin of surplus over essential needs for which the Minister was planning. Looking back there were many accusations of lack of foresight; looking forward the Government itself pointed out that if the situation was now likely to be all right this year, it will not be so "beyond this winter."

In the day devoted during the debate on the Address to the subject of colonial development the Government was able to shew a not unsatisfactory policy. It claimed no "unwillingness to proceed rapidly with our task" and admitted the undesirability of the recent frequent changes in the occupancy of the Colonial Office. Mr. Macmillan was opposed, as is every department, to the setting up of a continuing Parliamentary committee, preferring the specialised departmental advisory committees on education, labour, medical services, and agriculture "on which many Members of Parliament, I am glad to say, are willing to serve us," apparently overlooking the fact that these fulfil an entirely different function from that of crystallising the supervision of the House of Commons. He claimed credit for the Colonial Office in its implementing of the West Indian Report through the appointment of a Controller, now out there with "a body of experts to undertake a constant review of the needs of the West Indies," a machinery which he described as a projection of the Colonial Office into the area and as capable of extension.

Two reports of Select Committees have been debated by

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the House. That on the civil service by the Committee on National Expenditure, a valuable document to which many tributes were paid, was accepted by Parliament as a recommendation for the consideration of the Government. Sir Kingsley Wood's remarks on the report were on the whole critical of its recommendations and revealed no anxiety to undertake reforms, although he agreed that the time had come to "start an investigation into the general question of the training of civil servants." The Government accepted the report as "a sincere and valuable contribution to the improvement of the efficiency of our great Civil Service."

The report of the Public Accounts Committee produced a more limited, if more acrimonious, discussion, but it raised an important issue about the method of granting contracts by a department, and it showed the value of the vigilance exercised by the Committee on behalf of the House in defence of proper economy in the expenditure of public monies.

Parliament has dealt with several matters concerning itself. It lost through death Mr. Speaker Fitzroy after long service, the Deputy-Speaker, Sir Dennis Herbert, having just retired to the Lords. Colonel Clifton Brown, the previous Deputy-Chairman, was elected the new Speaker, and Major Milner, Chairman. General Smuts addressed both Houses. The Father of the House, Mr. Lloyd George, was congratulated on his eightieth birthday. The House of Commons Disqualification Act, permitting the combination of membership of the House with the holding of offices certified as of urgent national importance by the Prime Minister, has been renewed for another year. A third Prolongation of Parliament Bill has become law; in this case there was a lengthy debate after which Sir Richard Acland and Mr. W. Brown divided the House, which disagreed with them by 215 votes to 9. The arguments in favour of continuance were the same—the inconvenience, risk, waste and difficulty of holding a general election in war-time on a stale register, with so many in the forces away from the possibility of voting. But one or two new considerations arose. Sir Richard Acland claimed, not without force, that by-elections reveal changes in the views of the electorate since 1935. He argued that it was possible to hold a general election by stages, renewing the House by sections, and that ration-books or identity-cards could be used to replace the register. It may be because the Government knows that it might in fact, in certain circumstances, have to resort to some such method that it failed to answer this argument;

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the Attorney-General asserted instead that the real case for the Bill is that the people do not want an election, and that they are satisfied with their present representatives. The Committee which has been set up by the Home Secretary to consider the machinery of registration and redistribution had not yet reported, and Sir Donald Somervell was unwilling to commit the Government to providing the House with an opportunity for debating the report when it was completed. Nor would he resolve the conflict between the views of those who feared that another "khaki" election would follow the war and of those who were more afraid that peace terms might be negotiated without due consultation of the electorate. A rather different case was urged against the provision, which it was now necessary to put in the Bill for the first time, enabling the Northern Ireland House of Commons to extend its life. Mr. Morrison argued that it was not possible to deny to the latter a right taken by the Imperial Parliament. But his case was clearly weakened by the nature of the North Ireland administration, the absence of coalition there, and the evidence—since fortified in the West Belfast by-election—that there have been serious changes in Irish electoral opinion.

The Local Elections (Temporary Provisions) Bill, a similar renewal measure, was attacked on yet other grounds. Here it was alleged that Parliament was dealing differently with local authorities and with itself. The effect of filling vacancies by co-option is both to make the local council a closed corporation and to kill interest in local affairs, it was argued, and at the same time the inconveniences of holding a general election do not apply to local government elections. The Government's answer was that to follow the same practice as for election to the House of Commons would mean a constant stream of local elections, and that the principle of co-option was a customary and successful one for local affairs. On the whole, its decision seemed to be a regrettable necessity.

Many other matters have been debated by Parliament in the period under review: India, followed by severe criticism of the Prime Minister's view on the unrepresentativeness of Congress; service pay, on which further increases were announced as final; army pensions, which led to a promise by the Government to establish independent tribunals; the police forces amalgamation order; women's compensation, which appears to have led to the adoption of the principle of equality.

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Anglo-Soviet co-operation in the coming Peace

By MAX BELOFF

THE Anglo-Soviet treaty, signed in London on May 26th, 1942, was made public on June 11th at a time when general attention was fixed on military developments in Russia and North Africa. What people wished to know then was how far M. Molotov's London visit had contributed to the further co-ordination of the strategy and war-efforts of the United Nations. The immediate answer to that question appeared to be a disappointing one, and the consequent debate over the "second front" issue was not conducive to a full appreciation of the momentous implications of the treaty itself. Rarely indeed can the British people have accepted so calmly and with so little discussion a political step of such far-reaching importance. It seemed to most people little more than a logical conclusion to a sequence of events which had begun when, on the evening of Sunday, June 22, 1941, Mr. Churchill broadcast Britain's determination to "give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people."

Mr. Churchill's declaration was made formal and reciprocal in the promise of mutual assistance and the pledge not to make a separate peace which together formed the substance of the Anglo-Soviet agreement signed in Moscow on July 13th, 1941, by M. Molotov and Sir Stafford Cripps. This agreement provided an adequate basis for war against the common enemy. The Alliance of May, 1942, however, does much more. It goes right outside the framework of the present conflict and marks for both countries a radical departure in foreign policy—a departure whose full consequences for Europe and the world are indeed incalculable.

Great Britain's foreign policy has been marked historically by a consistent and comprehensible reluctance to undertake definite long-run commitments to other powers. Exceptions there have always been—the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, Britain's role as a guarantor of Belgian neutrality or of the Locarno Treaty—and occasionally some particular combination of circumstances has led to an apparent abandonment of the principle itself, as for instance in the case of the

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Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. But the tendency towards freedom of action has almost invariably reasserted itself in the end.

In the case of the Soviet Union (though not of "Russia") the novelty of the departure is even more conspicuous. The theory that the "two worlds" (capitalist and socialist) could not co-exist was indeed specifically abandoned at an early date.¹ But the Soviet attitude to external affairs remained deeply coloured by the conviction that there was an absolute difference in kind between the Soviet Union and all other states, and that sooner or later the capitalist world was bound to stage a grand onslaught upon the proletarian fatherland. "Peaceful co-existence" was a transitory stage, and the primary business of Soviet diplomacy was to prolong this stage in order to permit the building up of Soviet strength at home. In pursuit of this objective, political and economic considerations might lead to better relations being enjoyed with some capitalist states rather than with others; but such arrangements were envisaged as temporary, entered into for immediate mutual convenience, and as never having the exclusive and binding force of a full alliance. Into this category fell all the "non-aggression" pacts entered into by the Soviet Union between 1925 and 1933.

The mutual assistance pacts concluded with France and Czecho-Slovakia in May, 1935, did, of course, imply a definite discrimination between one group of capitalist states and another. In the first place, however, both treaties were explicitly linked with the wording and machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations (to which the Soviet Union had been admitted in the previous September). In the second place, the protocol to the French pact placed on record the fact that the negotiations which had led to it had originally contemplated a wider system of security for North-Eastern Europe and that a more general agreement of this kind was still considered desirable. In spite of the frequent use of such phrases as "aggressive states" and "peaceable states," Soviet spokesmen could still claim for their country a measure of aloofness from the rivalries and alignments of the other Great Powers. This fundamentally aloof and self-centred attitude enabled the Soviet Union to swallow without obvious embarrassment the apparent *volte-*

¹ The possibility of the peaceful co-existence of the two worlds was specifically stressed by the Soviet delegation at the World Economic Conference of May, 1927. See K. W. Davis, *The Soviets at Geneva*, Chap. VII.

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face of the non-aggression pact with Germany in August, 1939.

The Anglo-Soviet treaty stands in marked contrast to any instrument to which the Soviet Union had previously been a party. If either party in the post-war period becomes "involved in hostilities with Germany" or with any of the "States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe," the other party will at once "give all the military and other support and assistance in his power." (Article 4.) Furthermore this article is to remain in force until such time as both parties agree that it has been superseded by the adoption in unison with other states of more general proposals "for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression." Should such proposals not be adopted, the treaty will remain in effect for twenty years at least, after which it becomes subject to notice by either side. (Articles 3, 4 and 8.)

The two innovations of first-rate importance can be defined as follows: first, the alliance is for the period given, an absolutely unconditional and direct commitment, unrelated (save in the provision for its termination) to any international machinery; second, the parties explicitly recognize that the alliance is designed to meet a specified danger, namely "a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace" by Germany or her associates. Further to emphasise this point we may quote Article 3 (2):

"Pending the adoption of such proposals [the proposals for common action already referred to], they will after the termination of hostilities take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in her acts of aggression in Europe."

A good deal of rather confused debate has taken place as to the precise meaning attached to this article by the Soviet Government. It is sometimes overlooked that the Soviet Government is committed, as a minimum, to the unilateral disarmament of "nations which threaten or may threaten aggression" by clause 8 of the Atlantic Charter, a document referred to in the preamble to the treaty, and one to which the Soviet Government had already given its adhesion by the Declaration of Washington of January 1st, 1942. Far too much has probably been made of the frequent use by the Russians of the phrase "Hitlerite Germany."

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Whatever their real opinions, it is clearly out of question for the official spokesmen of the Soviet Union not to pay lip-service to the Marxist-Leninist creed involved in the admission that there exists the theoretical possibility of "another" (proletarian) Germany. Furthermore, any study of Russian propaganda since the outbreak of the war reveals a truly enviable suppleness and catholicity. The Russians are ready to make use of any internal strains which have developed or which may develop inside the enemy's ranks, whether or not they can be analysed on strictly "class" lines.

If it were true that Russia looked to the creation of a Communist or near-Communist Germany as the best guarantee of her future security, the outlook would be black indeed. A Soviet Union which included a Germanic component would inevitably become a new vehicle for German exploitation of the Slavs (to say nothing of the non-Slav peoples of the Soviet Union). The ultimate object of this German exploitation would be the preparation of yet another assault on the Western world. Since, however, it is well known that, in the 1920's, leaders of the German Army were toying with the idea of giving Germany a communist façade as the possible price of a Soviet alliance, it may be presumed that the Russian leaders appreciate the dangers of such a course.

Additional grounds for doubt as to Russia's intentions with regard to Germany were provided by certain phrases of Stalin's speech of November 6th, 1942, in which he declared that it was as impossible to destroy Germany as to destroy Russia, and as impossible to destroy the German army as to destroy the Russian army. Russia's actual war-aims were summed up in three phrases: "the destruction of the Hitlerite state and the men who inspire it"; "to destroy the Hitlerite army and wipe out its leaders"; "to destroy the 'new order' in Europe and to punish its builders." What is meant then by the "Hitlerite state and army"? To answer this we have available the interpretative article by Yudin, published in *Pravda* and broadcast over the Soviet wireless on November 22nd. There we find the Hitlerite state characterized as an instrument for the plunder and enslavement of all other nations for the benefit of German imperialism, "the most rapacious and gangster-like imperialism in the world." There is no question here of making peace with the German army or any of its leaders. "Hitler's army

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is the basis of the gangster-like, despotic Hitlerite state. It is on the army that Hitler relies in his home policy and in the realisation of his foreign policy. All that is worst in the Fascist party, in the Fascist officials, the police and the Gestapo is expressed in an even more barbarous form in the army."

Therefore the task ahead is visualised as a comprehensive one:

"The entire combination of establishments, organisations and institutions created by Hitler—the government, the ministries, and the courts, including the whole enormous machinery of officialdom, the police, the prisons, the army, the Fascist party—all this constitutes the Hitlerite state which can and must be destroyed."

Yudin's phraseology is clearly influenced by Lenin's *State and Revolution*. But in the altered circumstances of 1942, with a foreign enemy government in question, the implications need not be similar. What the Russians wish to destroy is not the coercive apparatus of a capitalist economy, still less the economy itself which is not mentioned, but rather the entire machine which has prepared and drilled the German people for war and launched its armies against the peaceful homes of the Soviet Union. The issue of reprisals is not shirked:

"All the criminals of Hitler's clique will be severely punished for their crimes. Hitler's gangsters will be sternly faced with their responsibilities. Retaliation for his crimes awaits each one of them. . . . The executioners should know that they will not escape responsibility for their crimes and that they will not dodge the avenging hand of tortured peoples."

It is to be regretted therefore that the Soviet Union and its allies have so far been unable to co-ordinate their proposals for dealing with war-criminals. The Soviet press campaign (in October, 1942) for the immediate trial of Hess, while no doubt connected with other and deeper causes of inter-allied friction, would not have been possible had a common procedure been agreed upon. The personal eminence of the individuals composing the Soviet War Crimes Commission, set up on November 3rd, and the inclusion among them of a prominent ecclesiastic, show how important an aspect of its external relations the Soviet Government considers this to be.

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"After the Hitlerite régime has been destroyed," writes Yudin, "the German people will be saved from running completely wild and turning into beasts." But no positive proposals for a future régime in Germany are made. This question is still reserved, we may assume, for discussion with Russia's allies. But this does not mean that the question will be kept open for ever.

Neither in the case of Germany, nor in any other issue of post-war policy will the Russians consent to accept ready-made solutions hall-marked "London" or "Washington." The confidence necessary, if the alliance is to achieve its purpose, depends upon Russia sharing in the settlement of every important question, including questions of procedure. They have shown very clearly in relation to the unfortunate North African episode that they at any rate understand that vital questions of post-war policy may easily be settled in advance, under the head of pure "strategy." By Article 5 of the treaty, Britain and Russia "having regard to the interests of the security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of peace and security in Europe." The Russians would certainly take it as evidence of bad faith were this wording to be interpreted to mean that such collaboration must be postponed until after hostilities have ceased. By then, indeed, the promised security might be unattainable. Finally, it should be made clear that such issues as arise between the two countries will be treated on their merits and that no subject will be barred because of the real or presumed susceptibilities of the U.S.A.

From many points of view, our association with Soviet Russia cannot be as intimate as that which binds us to the United States. As Mr. Gladstone long ago observed, "you sympathise most with those nations, as a rule, with which you have the closest connexion in language, blood, and religion." To these ties with the Americans we may add those of a common way of life and of similar democratic institutions and of gratitude for the help tendered in our darkest hour. But the political aspects of the European settlement are not and cannot be of the same interest to the U.S.A. as they are to Russia and ourselves. In European affairs the Russian alliance must be the foundation of our policy, a policy directed towards securing all the nations of the continent against renewed aggression, so that their national develop-

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ment can proceed unhampered. On this issue above all, the views of Russia must have special weight, and, although there is some evidence that the Russians still think the contrary, it is from us, rather than from the Americans, that they can expect the firmer support.

Before leaving the problem of security one must deal with the familiar argument that Germany and Russia are "natural" partners and are bound to come together. It would admittedly be a mistake to overlook the enormous role which Germany played in the "westernisation" of Russia both before and after the Revolution. There are, however, at least three factors which should militate decisively against any "return to Rapallo." For one thing, the differences in the technical levels of the two countries are rapidly diminishing with important psychological as well as material consequences. The Russians (in the narrow sense) regard themselves to-day more than ever as the bearers of western civilisation to the Asiatic peoples linked with them. They are teachers now rather than pupils. More important still is the often overlooked fact that the period when Germans played the greatest part in Russia was that prior to the Bismarckian unification of Germany and its conversion into a mighty engine of conquest. Since that time, it is Russia's fear of an aggressive Germany which has been the dominating feature of the scene, and the periods of relatively good relations have intervened either when Germany has been weak (as in the 1920's) or when she has seemed so strong as to be unchallengeable (as in 1939-41). Finally, there is the deep and perhaps unbridgeable gulf between the two peoples, which has been created by the deliberate cruelty and obscene savagery of the occupying forces. Recent visitors from abroad, in particular that gifted observer, Mr. Alexander Werth, confirm the impression which one gets from even a casual reading of the Soviet press. They all stress the hatred and the contempt which the Russians feel for their torturers. These butchers of helpless non-combatants, these desecrators of the shrines of the nation's literary and artistic heritage of which the new Russia is so proud, these brutal clowns will never again be able to pose in Russia (or anywhere else in Eastern Europe) as missionaries of European culture. "It is not the Nazis," remarks another able British correspondent, "who have planted this disastrous crop which will one day be reaped by men and women hungering

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for revenge; it is the Germans, the German army and the German corps of officers."¹

In view of all this, it can be asserted fairly safely that a Russo-German combination with all its evil portents is highly improbable except as the result of the actions of the western democracies themselves. If the Rapallo situation is re-created, if the Russians are treated as "outsiders," if, even worse, we attempt to strengthen a defeated Germany in the name of European "stability," then the Soviet Union will be driven into the only policy available to it. If Britain starts bidding against Russia for the friendship of Germany, it will be discovered that Russia can outbid her every time. That surely is the supreme lesson of the nineteen-thirties.

After this war, both Britain and the Soviet Union will be faced with mighty tasks of reconstruction in what are in effect two great world empires. On the economic side, Article 6 of the Treaty pledges them to render to each other all possible assistance; it is to be hoped that the practical elements of this are being explored. In spite of much loose talk about "each having much to learn from the other," it is likely that politically and socially their paths will continue to follow the different directions dictated by their respective ideologies.² This need be no barrier to their collaboration in peace any more than in war—a fact emphasised by both Stalin and Mr. Eden in recent speeches.³ While a restored France will still have a vital role as a bridge between Britain and Europe, the Anglo-Soviet alliance must be, at any rate for a time, the main element of stability on the continent. "That the peace of Europe should rest on Britain as its western pivot and on Russia as its eastern pivot would . . . be little more than the recognition of an historical fact which comes spontaneously to light in times of extreme historical emergency."⁴ With this judgment most realistic students of international affairs would agree.

¹ Philip Jordan, *Russia's Glory*, p. 137.

² This is not to deny in the least that the study by each of the other's aims and methods may be intellectually fruitful, provided always that such study is scientifically and conscientiously pursued. See for instance Professor W. K. Hancock's discussion of their contrasting formulae for dealing with "backward peoples" and multi-national problems, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, I, pp. 497-507. But most writers on topics into which the Soviet Union enters fall far below Professor Hancock's standard. The Russians, of course, have a still greater leeway to make up.

³ Stalin's speech of November 6th, 1942, was referred to and quoted by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons on 2nd December.

⁴ Harold Butler, *The Lost Peace*, p. 208. The same point was made by Mr. Eden in the speech just cited.

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But what chance is there of applying realistic standards in a sober way to a problem like that of Anglo-Soviet relations? The heroism of Russia's armies, the proved skill and tenacity of her leaders and people have aroused enormous admiration for their country throughout Britain. Anyone, for instance, who is in touch with the "current affairs" side of education in the Forces knows that there is a bigger demand for lectures on Soviet Russia than on any other topic. Popular enthusiasm of this kind cannot, however, as experience shows, be relied upon to give to a foreign policy that persistent and informed support which is needed for its complete success. Anglo-Russia relations still have to liquidate a heavy and unfortunate legacy from the past.

The conclusion of the first Anglo-Russian entente in 1907 was hampered by the effect of nearly a century of rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Asia. Furthermore, "a large left wing of this government's own supporters hated the Anglo-Russian entente upon what from a diplomatist's standpoint were not grounds of foreign policy at all. So did the whole of the Labour Party."¹ An even more complicated political and ideological set-up confronted Mr. Eden when he tried to form a new entente in 1935. The most novel factor was the existence of a section of opinion which was actively pro-Russian, again on grounds which had nothing to do with foreign policy. It is often assumed that the Soviet relationship with Communist parties abroad can be discounted because after 1928 the Comintern became "in fact a mere propaganda arm of Russian state policy," without immediate revolutionary potentialities.² It is difficult to see how any state can in fact include without serious friction a group of citizens whose main allegiance lies elsewhere. "It is just as unreasonable to expect the formal surrender of the international pretensions of communism," writes one distinguished British authority on Russia, "as to ask his Holiness the Pope to give up the œcumenical claims of the Vatican."³ This may well be true, but it is also to the point that Elizabethan England found it very difficult to tolerate Roman Catholics at a time when the Papacy was

¹ R. C. K. Ensor, *England, 1870-1914*, p. 404.

² See "Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the Future," by the P.E.P. International Group, *Agenda*, April, 1942. Although this article over-simplifies some of the problems involved, it is a very important contribution to the subject and deserves careful attention.

³ Sir John Maynard, *The Russian Peasant and Other Studies*, pp. 407-8.

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regarded as a propaganda weapon of the Habsburgs.¹ There is indeed nothing so disturbing to the political life of a country as the existence of a "favourite" nation. On the most unfortunate of its consequences we may quote George Washington:

"It gives to ambitious, corrupted or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favourite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption or infatuation."

The Soviet Government could do nothing more conducive to a real improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations than to disown the professional Russophiles and to rely for the strengthening of the alliance on the political good sense of the mass of the British people.

As well as professional Russophiles there are, of course, professional Russophobes; and these latter are far more dangerous. They belong to more powerful social groups and they possess subtler and more influential methods of influencing opinion. The Society for Cultural Relations and similar bodies can hardly hope to compete with the Imperial Policy Group for instance, with its "inside information," subtly designed to flatter the vanity and appeal to the prejudices of the politically backward elements among the upper and upper-middle classes. Recent developments inside Russia rather suggest that the "religious persecution" theme in anti-Soviet propaganda may soon be deprived of some of its force.

As far as much of official Britain was concerned, the Russian revolution merely served to add ideological fuel to the not yet dormant flames of imperial rivalry. In Lord Curzon the two themes received a simultaneous incarnation and his dead hand was still heavy in 1935. "Intervention" then was a much fresher memory in Russia than the Crimean War or the Congress of Berlin had been in 1907. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that on the British side not all governmental and foreign office circles were as ready for

¹ Although it is not really relevant perhaps, one might point out that communism itself seems to have gained very little from the "Avignon captivity" of the Comintern. For an excellent study of the actual political results of the Comintern's policy in the inter-war period, see Professor D. W. Brogan's *Is Innocence Enough?*

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the new entente as Mr. Eden himself. The diplomatic corps did not distinguish itself in its pursuit of the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. Our ludicrous underestimates of Russia's powers of resistance in 1941 would have been impossible had our earlier representatives in Moscow regarded the collecting of reliable information about the country as a vital part of their official duties. The United States, less intimately concerned and on very cool terms officially, was clearly better served by the naïve but tireless inquisitiveness of Ambassador Davies. What is necessary is that we should show a continuous, unforced but genuine interest in Russia as a country, failing which any sudden display of interest in a particular Soviet activity is bound to excite the worst suspicions.

It is not possible to discuss here the other reasons which prevented a real Anglo-Soviet understanding being reached between 1935 and 1941. We may be thankful at least that we had as Prime Minister in 1941-2 a man who was on record as having urged agreement between the two countries in 1938-9 and as having done his best to prevent a total breach in 1939-40. The realisation of this in Moscow must have gone some way to disarm Soviet suspicions of the genuineness of our proffered aid.¹

Our past actions (and omissions) with regard to the Soviet Union have left a legacy of suspicion which will be hard to eradicate in any case and which new clashes can all too easily reinforce. A full and equal partnership in the burdens and direction of the war is the essential foundation for a new era of mutual confidence. In view of this past history, the political initiative must come from this side. As in the war, so in the planning of the peace to come, the Russians can and must be treated as equal partners, nor would the Russians be wise if they were to neglect this primary object in order to achieve some accretion of strength for their partisans in a particular area. On all specific problems of joint concern agreement can be reached—in the Middle and Far East as well as in Europe. An attempt to settle the main questions giving rise to friction was made by Salisbury in 1898. It failed.² After the conclusion of the

¹ For a Soviet view of Mr. Churchill's services, there is the review by Alexander Troyanovsky, former ambassador in Tokyo and Washington, of the latest volume of the Prime Minister's published speeches under the title "Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat" in the August issue of the monthly journal *Oktjabr*.

² H. W. V. Temperley and L. Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy*, pp. 499-501.

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Entente not one of these questions proved insoluble. The precedent is a useful one. Given the determination to co-operate, the diplomatists will always find a way; let them play with formulæ (as in summer, 1939) and the result will be a breakdown. The basis of British policy to-day is the same as it was in 1907 when Eyre Crowe wrote his memorandum: first, sea-power; and second, as a corollary, "a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations."¹ Russia is a land-power whose centre of gravity is moving inwards away from her periphery. Granted an assured security she has neither the need nor the wish to deprive nations of their independence. Both countries are explicitly committed not to impose particular forms of government on other lands.² This commitment must be observed by both in the spirit and in the letter. Great Britain and the Soviet Union have the best of all foundations for an alliance, common interests. They have an unambiguous treaty to bind them. It is time that their collaboration became an everyday fact of current politics.

¹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, III, p. 403.

² See, for example, the Soviet statement on the future of Albania, December 18th, 1942.

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LETTERS ON INDIA. By MULK RAJ ANAND. (159 pp. Routledge. 6s.)
WHAT DOES GANDHI WANT? By T. A. RAMAN. (117 pp. Oxford Press and Milford. 3s. 6d.)

MR. MULK RAJ ANAND, the novelist of the Indian underdog, has given us, in *Letters on India*, addressed to a typical British worker, a statement of the case of the Indian National Congress in the existing political deadlock. As I understand him, he asks the British Democracy to see to it that British power shall be at once withdrawn from India—from the India of the Princes as well as from what is known as British India, without any attempt to determine to what particular persons or groups that power shall be transferred, and without any recognition of the separate rights of particular communities. The old framework is to disappear before any new framework is created. As the old goes, the Indian people, represented by the Indian National Congress, is to "establish a democratic régime, reorganise the land system on the basis of the demands of the peasantry, and ameliorate the terrible lot of the working class."

A modest programme, he says, and a clear and simple enough idea for everybody to understand (p. 148).

It certainly has the merit of simplicity.

Beside its desirability on general grounds, he looks upon it as a means to the cure of India's poverty, which is to be attained by industrial planning such as is attainable only under socialism (pp. 75, 76). It is apparent, therefore, that he is convinced that a free India would establish a régime of socialism, thus avoiding "all the horrors of the characteristically British brand of haphazard, slow, individualistic, competitive capitalism, already evident in Indian industry."

Here seems to lie the weak point in Mr. Mulk Raj Anand's argument. He is a student of Marx and he is certainly aware of the obstacles which a peasant economy presents to the acceptance of a socialistic system. Factory industry is still very backward in India, and, if it be true that an organised industrial working class must lead, the material for the realisation of his expectations does not appear to exist at present. The Congress itself is understood to be deeply divided on questions involving the future of private property, and to be dependent for its funds largely upon the section which looks askance upon suggestions of expropriation. On the negative, or destructive, side, the author's theme is admirably clear and simple: but his constructive expectations admit of question.

My own forecast of the future of India under Indian rule is that it will be governed by a more strongly authoritative government than at present; and that—the nationalistic impulse once satisfied and appeased—conservative influences will be powerful.

Mr. Mulk Raj Anand is interesting when he points out that the introduction of modern transportation gave India an economic unity and laid

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the basis of a new social unity. It broke down the caste system and the narrow parochialism of old days, and created a class system, with a strong commercial middle class and the beginnings of an industrial working class.

He is less than just when he says that the British Government from the beginning neglected public works, letting even the roads, reservoirs and canals constructed by previous rulers fall into decay. The irrigation system, in particular, is a very great achievement and its extension outside of the river valleys into the higher lands between them is exclusively the work of British engineers.

Mr. Mulk Raj Anand is an artist and a patriot: and he makes full use of the ammunition in the nationalist armoury against Great Britain. Part of the indictment, of course, is justified; and part not. The smoke of the struggle must have time to settle or disperse before nationalist controversialists will see Indian history clearly.

The interest of Mr. T. A. Raman's selections from Mahatma Gandhi's speeches and writings during the war is in the facts which it reveals or confirms. Non-violence, it seems (see page 53), is compatible with preventing the Japanese from taking possession of India: but this is to be achieved by a particular technique—that of non-co-operation. Whatever may have been from time to time the varying interpretation of the utterances here cited, it is now made perfectly plain that the Mahatma is the convinced exponent of non-violence as here explained, and that the Indian National Congress will therefore take no "violent" part in the war, so long as it continues under his guidance. As to the attitude of Congress itself, apart from the acceptance of this guidance, we have the Mahatma's own clear statement of the facts (p. 29), "Unfortunately we have many groups outside Congress who believe neither in non-violence nor in civil disobedience. In Congress itself there are all shades of opinion about the efficacy of non-violence. Congressmen who believe in the application of non-violence for the defence of India can be counted on one's finger-tips." In other words, if Gandhi should for any reason again withdraw from the leadership, the attitude of the Congress towards the active prosecution of the war would depend entirely on the satisfaction of its political demands: and no "non-violent" conviction stands in the way.

Gandhi tells us that "*unlike Russia, Indian masses have no national instinct. India is not fighting. Her conquerors are. Supposing that her conquerors are worsted and the Japanese come, the inarticulate masses will not even notice a change for the time being, or even for a long time. The intelligentsia are divided on the issue of the war. Indian soldiers are not a national army, but professionals who will as soon fight under the Japanese as any other, if they are paid for fighting. In these circumstances, the policy of the scorched earth would be indefensible.*" These are truths which few of us have assimilated. In effect, they repeat an Indian proverb of respectable antiquity—"the peasant belongs to no man."

Other conclusions of interest emerge from these extracts. The principle of non-violence (*ahimsa*, wrongly spelt on page 14) covers all human relations (p. 31). Mr. Gandhi looks for "an ideal anarchy" of the Tolstoyan

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type. "That State is best governed, which is governed the least" (p. 31). This is the complete reversal of the socialist outlook, which demands organisation. The principle of the spinning wheel is extended to the use of mechanical methods of transport. "Nor do I contemplate without uneasiness the prospect of Indian soldiers, trained after the modern manner, taking the motor spirit to their homes. Speed is not the end of life. Man sees more and lives more truly by walking to his duty" (p. 17).

We have not the full text of the article in *Harijan* which asserted that Mahomedans and Hindus were preparing silently and secretly to fight the issue out (p. 54), so we do not know whether "fight" is used in the rhetorical or the literal sense. But it is made clear (p. 82) that the Indian Government which is to be formed, on the withdrawal of British authority, for which the Congress has asked, is not to be a Congress Government: "nor will it be Hindu, Mahasabha nor Muslim League Government. It will be all-India Government. It will be a Government not backed by any military power, *unless the so-called military classes seize the opportunity and overawe the populace and declare themselves the Government.*"

So the possibility of armed struggle is envisaged in the event of British withdrawal. But perhaps it is fair to say that the Mahatma does not always make the same forecast of actual events: though he is completely consistent in his preaching of non-violence.

JOHN MAYNARD.

THE JEWISH STRUGGLE. By JEREMIAH BEN-JACOB. (232 pp. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

LET MY PEOPLE GO. By VICTOR GOLLANCZ. (Gollancz. 3d.)

THE writer of this book is an ardent Jewish nationalist of Palestine, and he writes with engaging conviction. He has a simple faith in the destiny of his people to rebuild their state in the Land of Israel, and also in the partnership between the Jews and the English-speaking peoples who are united by a community of faith and interest. He has a simple faith also that the Jews have a great contribution to make to our civilisation. "To-day they sense the coming of a tremendous climax; humanity may soon enter the golden age of history, and the Jews may soon find a home at the end of a tragic journey and a place of refuge from the divine unrest." Many others have written of the Zionist hope; what is particular in this study of Jewish history is a revival of the messianic vision and a vigour derived from contact with the soil. For the author there are no doubts and no inhibitions. The framework of the book is a short sketch of Jewish history through the ages, leading up to the crisis of to-day; an account of the Jewish contact with the world conquerors and the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, which is entitled "On the Stage of World History"; and, finally, the conclusion, "Building a State," which describes the development of the Jewish National Home since the last war, and ends with a passionate plea for the transfer of a large part of the surviving Jewish population from Central Europe to Palestine and a transfer of the Arabs of Palestine to Iraq.

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Mr. Ben-Jacob recognises that his solution is bold, and before the war would have been regarded as a utopian fantasy. But he believes that in revolutionary times revolutionary measures are necessary, and that the world is willing to examine the roots of problems and to consider radical solutions. For him Judaism is "religion, nationalism, internationalism, law and moral combined in one comprehensive system." It can flourish only in the National Home, and the Jews can only make their contribution to the international order if they are again living a national life.

While he is critical of many of the actions of the British Administration in Palestine, he recognises the kinship between the Jews and the English-speaking world which has given a refuge to one-third of the Jewish people. The leaders of the British Commonwealth and the United States, Churchill, Smuts and Roosevelt, are outstanding friends of the Jews. They will surely realise the justice of the Jewish demand to be masters in their own home, and to bring to that home those who survive the orgy of destruction in Europe. He does, indeed, recognise also the part which the Soviet Union has played between the wars in giving equal opportunity and self-respect to its three million Jews; and he believes that the antipathy which has hitherto existed between the Communist state and Zionism will be modified by the experience of the war and the mutual influences of the United Nations. While the Bolsheviks have laid the foundation of a super-national state, with partial recognition of national rights, the Jews have laid the foundation of a national society with a partial recognition of a socialist economy; and so there should be sympathy between the New Judaea and Soviet Russia. The effort of the Jews to discard their national heritage and to assimilate and be merged completely in the life of their environment, save for slender religious differences, was an illusion. The Jew, he remarks, is not good at divining the storm, and his foresight is limited. "He sees the clouds, but his ingrained optimism lulls him into a false sense of security." The bulk of the Jews in the anti-Semitic zones of Europe are "on the verge of divorce on the grounds of incompatibility."

For the policy of transfers of population as a basis of peace and stability he invokes the testimony of Dr. Benes, and the achievement of the exchange of peoples between Greece and Turkey in 1922. Large areas in the Arab Middle East are wasted and neglected because of the lack of inhabitants. That is particularly true of Iraq which, in the days of the Roman Empire, was amongst the most fertile regions of the world, and, in spite of development in the period between the two wars, has to-day only ten persons to the square mile. The British Government has pointed out that to foster agricultural development the country needs an increase of population and schemes of irrigation. The corollary is to transplant the Arabs of Palestine.

It will be seen that Mr. Ben-Jacob has a disarming simplicity of approach. But he makes some shrewd observations about the Jewish people. While they have been distinguished in their long-term planning for the individual, they have been unaware of the need for long-range planning for the people. And while many were busy building up capitalist enterprises, other Jews realised that capitalism was so full of contradictions and so unjust that its

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destruction was necessary and inevitable. The early socialist Jews grasped the truth that world peace and social justice are the cardinal issues of modern times, but failed to realise that internationalism and socialism must operate within the national framework.

Though it is obvious that English is an acquired language, Mr. Ben-Jacob not seldom coins, perhaps for that very reason, happy and original expressions. At the same time he produces not a few infelicitous expressions: "costly Arab riots," "moralism," "the house of cards being up against time"; and he has a way of employing the double epithet so as to produce an effect of bathos. "Zionism is a venture which is noble and worth-while," and "the Labour movement in Palestine has made a decisive and considerable contribution to the development of the country." He would have done well to let an English friend revise his proofs. But these occasional curiosities of expression scarcely impair the force of his appeal and the directness and clearness of his study of the Jewish problem. The book is fortunate, too, in its moment of appearance. Now, if ever, the consciousness of the world is stirred about the treatment of the Jews, and must look for some solution.

It is interesting to compare with the passionate plea of a Palestinian for the Jewish state in Palestine the passionate plea of an English Socialist Jew for action now by the United Nations to rescue his people from massacre by Hitler. Victor Gollancz has marshalled the practical proposals for mitigating Hitler's threatened extermination of his first victims; and while he writes in the name of common humanity and not as a Jewish nationalist, he recognises the special place of Palestine as an asylum. "The doors of Palestine must be opened, and the policy of treating Jewish refugees to Palestine as illegal immigrants who may not be admitted must be reversed." The most moving part of his pamphlet is his personal vindication. "Before I am either an Englishman or a Jew, I am a man with the rights and dignity of a man." What is common to the two pleas is the burning demand for justice; one writer sees it in the restoration of the Jewish nation, the other in the constant assertion of humanity without distinction of creed and race.

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SCIENCE AND ETHICS. By C. H. WADDINGTON and others. (144 pp. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

THIS book is of unusual interest. To the ordinary politician its bearing upon politics would seem remote, but it should be read by all who are both philosophically and politically minded and who sometimes question the meaning and validity of ethical judgments about politics and society. Books of multiple authorship are not often successful, but this one is an exception, perhaps because its form is exceptional. It is really a discussion, and the discussion gives it a unity. It originated in an essay on science and politics by Dr. Waddington, which forms the first chapter. The essay was originally published in *Nature*. The editors invited the comments of various authorities; these are printed in the second chapter with a reply by Dr. Waddington. The commentators include the Bishop of Birmingham, the Dean of St. Paul's and six professors. The discussion and debate continues with other authorities and fills four more chapters. They include a long and very interesting discussion of psychological considerations from the psychoanalytical point of view by Dr. Karin Stephen, Mrs. Melanie Klein and Miss Miriam Rothschild, an exchange of letters on philosophical implications between Dr. Waddington and Professor Dingle, and an exposition of the Marxist view by Professor Bernal. In the last chapter are some last words by the Bishop, the Dean, and Professor Chauncey D. Leake, and a summing-up by Dr. Waddington.

Dr. Waddington's original essay was an attempt to find a scientific basis for ethical propositions, for judgments about the qualities "goodness" and "badness." His method is to investigate the processes which lead to the formation of the concept "good." He is of opinion that psychoanalysis has thrown valuable light upon the origin of the concept in the unconscious motives and impulses of the child. He argues that the ethical system thus formed is in fact an adaptation of the child to his environment, and that therefore an ethical system is a mechanism which makes it possible for man to live in society and provides the motive for attempts at further evolutionary advance. The direction of evolution is therefore the criterion of the validity of the ethical system, and the characteristics of the system can be deduced from the nature of the evolutionary changes produced by it. Thus we obtain a scientific basis for ethics.

The debate which follows is extremely interesting, although it meanders in so many directions that the reader may feel rather more confused at the end than at the beginning. Dr. Waddington has, perhaps deliberately, excluded the school which derives from G. E. Moore. In some ways this is a pity, for it leaves those who might be his most formidable critics unrepresented in the discussion.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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ADMINISTRATION OF LABOUR. An Essay on Problems of Social Economy. By FRANTIŠEK KLANG, VLADIMIR OUTRATA, ALEXANDER KUNOŠI. (99pp. Allen & Unwin. 3s. 6d.)

TO an appreciable extent contemporary social thought can be understood as a reaction to the twin phenomena of mass unemployment and middle class insecurity. We are haunted by the spectre of a *laissez faire* economy which has proved a failure, and at the same time obsessed by the nightmare of a conspiracy between the monopolistic entrepreneur and the representative of organised labour. Neither the "free" contract of employment nor the interplay of collective forces—employers and trade unions—has proved to be a sufficient guarantee against social insecurity, and we easily turn to the civil service as the only "*pouvoir neutre*" which can give to each according to his needs and take from each according to his ability.

The authors of the little book under review modestly introduce themselves as "three Czechoslovak students of public affairs" and their book as an "essay on administration." What they have produced is far more: it is a kind of Civil Service utopia or the picture of the perfect social security world state.

In the social system envisaged by the authors a world super-state, built upon a foundation of national and local self-governing bodies, organizes and directs production, consumption, and the "standard of life" which includes such things as education, leisure and "family matters." The ultimate aim is social security, which means not only the protection of dependent labour and the grant of social services, but also the guarantee of "rentable" prices to the owner-worker in exchange for a drastic control of his production. The tripartite relationship between the state, the employer, and the employee is regarded as deceptive and injurious. It is replaced by a system of universal compulsory labour for the state.

All administrative agencies have "all round competency" because the present principle of legal departmental jurisdiction is considered to be a drag on administrative efficiency and as leading to gaps and "negative conflicts." The suppression of exploitation on the one side and shirking on the other (whether on the part of private citizens or of civil servants) becomes "the measure of interpreting all laws, statutes, acts, and institutions." The "post-application control" of the legality of administrative acts through administrative appeals and procedure in the Courts disappears. The guarantees of justice are found not in abstract categories of legality but in the pooled wisdom of laymen and experts who participate in the processes of administration. All legislative, judicial and executive organs of the state are to be composed of lay delegates and scientific experts, apart from the civil servants in the executive branches. The ultimate democratic foundation of the system is provided by a universal *actio popularis*, i.e. by the power given to each citizen to prosecute anyone, whether state servant or not, for a breach of duty, and particularly for exploitation and shirking.

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The vision of an ideal system of administration, of a society in which the political element has been successfully amputated from the body politic, offers an almost irresistible temptation to the human mind. It is based on the assumption that social conflicts can be understood as shortcomings in the technique of social organisation. Let the expert govern the state, let him organize production, distribution, consumption, education, etc., and all frictions will automatically disappear in due course. It is true, you will, as the authors frankly do, have to postulate the homogeneity of the citizens, you will have to restrict the sphere of individual liberty to the utmost limit, you will have to replace work under the "free" contract of employment by compulsory labour for the state—but what does that matter, as long as you obtain that most precious gift, that Holy Grail of our time—social security?

The authors of this book are not social or political reactionaries. On the contrary, the elimination of unjustified privilege is one of the cornerstones of their political thinking. The hollowness of an ideal of "freedom" which deliberately neglects the facts of social inequality has impressed their minds as it has impressed most of us—but the worthlessness of a freedom to choose one's own place in society, which must remain a dead letter for the large majority of the people, induces them to sacrifice the very principle of liberty upon the altar of "freedom from want." They are not unmindful of the dangers inherent in a government by the civil service, they see with admirable clarity that democratic institutions can only survive in a system which allows to the citizen active participation in the administration of the small circle which is within the range of his vision, but one looks in vain for any institutional guarantees for the rights of dissentient minorities. The "popular action" is indeed a poor substitute for parliamentary institutions. Nor is there any clear indication as to who is to select the civil servants who will be endowed with these tremendous powers, and what principles of selection will be applied. There is a curious lack of insight into the specific problems of the civil service in this civil service utopia.

This is an age in which words are rapidly losing in value. The very conception of democracy is in danger of becoming small coinage—used by everybody and thought of but little. Are not the processes of democratic institutions becoming more and more remote from the public consciousness? And is not, on the other hand, the craving for social security through state institutions alone apt to have an adverse effect on spontaneous political action? The common citizen's deep distrust in his own power to change anything, the fatalistic belief in the omnipotent expert was, on the Continent, part of the political atmosphere which favoured the growth of Fascism. Those of us who share the authors' belief in social security and their abhorrence of a hypocritical conception of freedom which does not include the ideal of equality must resist all attempts to introduce a new serfdom which would destroy the positive achievements of three centuries of democratic growth. The suggestions advanced by the authors are extreme, but

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their tendency is symptomatic and must be watched. We do want to strain every nerve to obtain social security, but we are neither compelled nor are we willing to purchase it at the price of freedom.

O. KAHN-FREUND.

THE RUSSIAN PEASANT AND OTHER STUDIES. By SIR JOHN MAYNARD. (512 pp. Gollancz. 15s.)

SOVIET PLANNING AND LABOUR IN PEACE AND WAR. Four Studies. By MAURICE DOBB. (126 pp. Routledge. 4s.)

SIR JOHN MAYNARD has written one of the best books yet published on Soviet Russia. In fact its merits are so many and so great that this is probably an understatement. In the first place it is based upon a profound knowledge of Russian history, literature, and institutions, both before and after the revolution. Sir John Maynard is not afraid of generalisations, but only of generalisations which are not founded upon facts quoted and analysed. He gives the facts—mountains of them—with the greatest scrupulousness, and he always gives his authority so that the reader himself can judge of their reliability. This in itself is a high distinction, as any one will know who has read many books upon modern Russia and the Soviet system. The book is not a mere catalogue of facts. The author's object is to interpret Russia and its revolution to English readers; he has a meditative mind, a historical imagination, judgment disciplined by culture, and the ability to write English. His book is therefore not merely useful: it is fascinating to read. Finally he has the rare merit of impartiality. Neither the communist nor the partisan or party man on the opposite side of the ideological barricade will like his book, but that only shows his success in pursuing the truth objectively. The communist certainly has no real grounds for complaint. Sir John's account of the achievements of the Soviet Government during the last twenty-five years is extremely sympathetic and intelligent, and he goes out of his way not to offend the hypersensitiveness of the faithful by criticism.

The title of the book hardly indicates its scope. It is true that the Russian peasant plays a dominant part in it, but that is only because the peasant plays a dominant part in Russian economy. Actually we have here a fairly complete picture of the whole soviet system and its effects upon Russian society, not only upon the peasant, the land, and agriculture, but upon industry and the town worker, upon the trade union, the budget, finance, and planning, upon education, culture, and religion, and upon the various nationalities who are federated in the U.S.S.R. Sir John always considers the facts in the setting of Russian history, and in this way he is often able to make intelligible events and kaleidoscopic changes in policy which otherwise would seem inexplicable. And the general result of this outlook upon contemporary history can best be indicated by quoting some of his own words on the last page of his volume, in which he says that he continues

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"to cherish a private conviction of my own that the Russian is not a philosopher at all, but rather one who uses all the philosophies to justify a moral passion for the regeneration of mankind and the fulfilment of the messianic mission of Moscow . . . This is why there is no real danger of this people becoming obsessed with dogma, despite the rigidity of their quasi-philosophers. *When they find that a rule does not fit life, they give the preference to life . . .* Their gift for breaking rules will save them from being pedantic. For the same reason Planning will not hurt them: for they will change the Plan whenever it has gone amiss. This is what has been called 'the broad Slavonic nature.' But it is not race that has made it. The illimitable spaces of Europasia . . . have created the tolerance and the all-humanitarianism in a melting-pot of peoples. There was room for all."

Mr. Dobb has also produced an interesting and useful little book covering a particular section of Soviet activity. The first two studies give a clear account of the way in which the Soviet economy is planned and the part which finance, the budget, money, taxes, and loans play in the system. The third chapter deals with work and wages, and the last with the effect of the war upon the economic system. The book is full of facts. Mr. Dobb is less impartial than Sir John Maynard, or perhaps it would be fairer to say that he is much more uncritical. We doubt whether British communists really serve their cause by adopting an almost entirely uncritical attitude towards the Soviet system and achievements. Those achievements are so remarkable that the system can stand upon its merits and successes, its defects and its failures, and the English reader is likely to be more convinced and impressed by Sir John's method, which is to give unfavourable as well as favourable facts, e.g. with regard to labour productivity.

LEONARD WOOLF.

DOWNING STREET AND THE COLONIES. (100 pp. *Allen & Unwin and the Fabian Society.* 2s.)

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF AFRICANS IN THE UNION. (38 pp. *The South African Institute of Race Relations.* 1s.)

THE world these days is highly critical of the British Empire. Since in quieter times socialists were as critical of it as any foreigner, it was natural for the Government to put its Labour members up to defend it. The controversy has so far been unprofitably vague, except for some Americans like Wendell Willkie, to whom Phillipine experience has taught realism. Socialist apologists take the line of admitting that various things badly needed putting right, without saying what they were, and of asserting that measures, also unspecified, have been taken that have put them right. Jack, in short, is in office. What every patriot must hope is that the whole problem of Dependencies, to give those countries their right name, whether French, Dutch, Portuguese or British, is to be

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thrashed out at the peace conference, just as slavery was after the last series of world wars.

These two pamphlets deal exclusively with one phase of that problem. One of them describes, with strictly factual impartiality, what South Africa has done since the Union to combine two inexorable demands. The European minority, on the one hand, is practically solid in its determination to prevent the growth of a unitary society. Black and White must be kept apart, socially above all and therefore politically and industrially also. And the two million whites must be masters. The other seven millions, on the other hand, of African and mixed descent, must be allowed as much of what they want as does not endanger European domination, in order both to give vent to popular feeling and to satisfy the consciences of the dominant caste as well as of the outside world. The results are correspondingly illogical and in part absurd, but yet curiously attractive. No one who has lived in any British African Dependency could read this pamphlet without recognising that white South Africa has honestly tried to find, in "segregation" and "parallel development," the solution to the problem that in British Africa proper has up to now been evaded. This political cowardice has left British Rhodesia and Kenya, in some important respects, behind the predominantly Boer Union. The problem is old, and in essence if not in appearance, simple. What is to happen to a much less civilised majority in a country where the much more civilised minority, a tiny one in most modern instances, has complete economic power and either the predominant or complete political authority? This pamphlet gives a full and accurate account of the machinery devised by the minority in South Africa for majority and minority to use in their mutual relations.

Our second pamphlet deals with part of that same problem as seen in the many and diverse countries of our Colonial Empire. The area it covers is therefore far larger. But it is also smaller. In South Africa the political machinery is all on the spot. Our Colonial Office, on the other hand, is a kind of power station that serves far distant and separated places. The authors of this second pamphlet are concerned solely with the plant at the power station, both as it is and as it might and should be. Therein lies another difference. The strange contraptions in the first pamphlet are obvious devices to fit a real situation. The machine in Downing Street, by contrast, with or without the suggested improvements, is meant to serve equally well all the multifarious congeries of countries governed from Downing Street. Our authors do refer to the differences of need between countries like the West Indies, that are on the brink of self-government, and the "primitive culture" countries in Africa. But they are given a secondary place. Neither the needs nor the wishes of the governed are the chief source of the changes in the machinery of government the authors advocate. They argue, for example, that when the natives of some "Colony" are given salaried posts they ought to be given salaries the same as those of the Europeans displaced. The reasons given are cogent. But facts of life invisible from Whitehall destroy their validity. Most families in the Colonial Empire have incomes of from £3 to £10 a year. To raise up in

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that Empire a class of men with such origins, and to invite them in effect to share the Olympian detachment of existing administrators and technicians with salaries averaging £1,000, would be a major injustice as well as an absurdity. In general it is assumed in the pamphlet that the more you pay a man the better the service he does, a strange doctrine for socialists to hold. In all other respects the proposals it contains are sober and sensible, are made by men who know how the machine works and see how it might work better. What one wonders is what else the authors would have written if they had believed self-government were everywhere just round the corner. To answer that corruption, nepotism and inefficiency would result is to plead guilty, is to admit that Downing Street, whatever it meant to do, has not taught people to be citizens. A single concrete example will make clear the crux of the matter. Some forty years ago Lancashire manufacturers sought escape from the hold over them of American growers of cotton. They raised a fund to create other sources of supply in the Empire. Uganda was one country where climate and soil were suitable to the crop. Acting, no doubt, under orders, the Government of that country compelled its subjects to plant cotton. Denied at the time, that fact was admitted when people had found that growing and selling cotton was by far the easiest way of finding the hut-tax money. But events proved less pleasing to the others concerned in the venture. Its promoters found that Japanese buyers took all the cotton and could say nothing about it for fear of having their motive of self interest exposed, while Ottawa had not yet corrupted the Colonial Office. The local Government found native "chiefs" charging rack rents for the plots on which their tenants grew cotton. Complaints arose about the profits of the ginners, to whom the Government had, probably rightly, given monopoly rights, and about many other things too. Most of these painful surprises were somehow coped with. But there is one shock still to come. The soil of Uganda is annually impoverished, not merely by the millions of pounds worth of cotton that used to go to Japan, but also by the thousands of tons of cotton seed, rich in oil, from which our manufacturers make soap, explosives and much else. Even if fertilisers were available, the loss of potash and phosphorus would be irreplaceable. The point is, not that the authorities say nothing about this annually mounting disastrous loss, but why they dare not. Only an educated citizenry could in modern days be persuaded, either to grow something new but profitable, or to give up growing it to prevent their grandchildren from inheriting a barren estate. So what is wanted is not reforms in the machinery in Downing Street that deals with things measured in pounds, weight or sterling, but a new kind of machine. The truth may well prove to be, not as we hear on all sides, that more efficient "development" is wanted, but that Africa's natural resources are even now being dissipated too extensively and too fast.

NORMAN LEYS.

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MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT FRANCE

By PAUL VAUCHER

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IT is not my object, nor would it be at this stage of much use, to analyse the terms in which the French Committee of National Liberation has been recognised, but the many articles discussing the present situation of France have obviously not succeeded in clearing the misunderstandings to which past events have given birth. We are well aware of the present importance of the French problem. We all feel the need for grasping its various aspects in order to ensure that the United Nations make a successful political landing on the European continent.

The circumstances under which a French Committee was formed in North Africa created the impression that the restoration of France was delayed and indeed endangered by the conflicting claims of two rival leaders. Friends of France, who were puzzled and shocked to find Frenchmen, before and during the first stages of the war, unable to act in common, might well draw the conclusion that the divisions which were responsible for the French collapse have not yet been bridged. At the same time Frenchmen must refrain from expressing opinions that might tend to weaken the necessary union of the Anglo-Saxon world.

Fortunately most observers do not fail to realise that the obstacles on the way leading to French unity were much more serious than the opposed interests of individuals might ever be. They were prepared to see Frenchmen supporting two different political programmes. But they had to admit that such programmes had not been so far clearly enunciated.

All Frenchmen were obviously pursuing a single aim. They endeavoured to free their country and to make France take an active part in the final stage of the war. On such foundations a clear cut policy was defined by those who maintained that France had never ceased to be at war, who repudiated the armistice and the puppet government responsible for its conclusion, who saw, in the forthcoming battles, the continuation of the fight waged by Frenchmen inside and outside France since 1940.

How far were those who did not share these views able to

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form and to define another policy? Attempts were made to bring forward two different ones which, however, never materialised. It was, on the one hand, the old Petainism conceived as an attentist attitude which, after the Allied landings in North Africa, was given an opportunity to reject collaboration. But the surprising episodes of a Darlan government, and of a royalist conspiracy, prevented the shaping of such a policy until the time when its foundations were shaken by Giraud's decision to condemn the acts of the Vichy government. Simultaneously another policy made its appearance, a so-called imperial policy, tending to build up a new France outside Europe, governed by an Imperial Council and undertaking, with the help of a colonial army, to liberate Metropolitan France. But any effort made on such lines speedily broke down. The members of the newly formed Imperial Council, because they had been devoted collaborationists, were one by one compelled to give way. Finally, the ideas and the policy supported by the Fighting French remained alone in the field.

It is important to understand the reason which gave the Fighting French a sort of monopoly, not indeed as regards the personnel in charge of governmental offices, but as regards the drafting and the promoting of a policy. Other policies were indeed stillborn because they did not allow France to take a direct part in the work of liberation. Either by separating the Empire from the Mother Country or by relying on the help of past collaborationists more than on the leaders of active resistance, they both seemed to foresee that France would be granted freedom from outside. No more fatal mistake could be made.

Anyone who wants to tackle the French problems has first to study and to understand the character and the meaning of the French resistance. We must not be contented with asserting that a definite and, indeed, an overwhelming percentage of the French population is to be counted on the side of resistance. We must estimate the weight and the scope of the resisting movement.

Although its history has remained so far to a large extent a secret one, impartial witnesses cannot fail to see that the resistance, which, from the first, was a national movement in its aims and spirit, has gradually become national also by the composing forces which have been brought to work together. Those who had the courage to enter on secret activities, which could, at any time, mean death and torture to them, were bound

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to be no more than a minority of heroes. But what truly matters is that such a minority never ceased to grow, attracting larger numbers of Frenchmen belonging to more varied social milieux. At the same time the whole country was gradually moving from a state of passive resistance to that of active complicity. The social structure of France favoured such an evolution, as a democracy of "petites gens" found itself united against the "réactionnaires" who were controlling the Vichy government. Thus French resistance has become a national undertaking with the only aim of defeating the enemy by the combined efforts of Resisting France and of Fighting France.

But the events occurring in North Africa might well have produced disastrous results. The failure to achieve unity in Africa might have engendered in France a state of irritation and despair of which Communism alone could have taken advantage. Alternatively there was a danger that the French citizens would again adopt party lines with left and right, once more, reappearing under two rival leaders.

However, those who, in foreign countries, were foreseeing such a course, did not accurately understand the present mentality of the French people. It has ceased to take any interest in its old political battles and it strongly feels the need for co-operating in the building up of a new France.

The discovery made in recent months that some of the French political parties were still alive does by no means contradict what has just been said. It is clear that the only objective of these parties is to counteract the action of the enemy and of its accomplices. Nevertheless their reappearance served as a pretext for comments which are, in my view, profoundly misleading. They were inspired at the same time by a persistent belief in the survival of the old political world and by a profound mistrust of what Fighting France might contemplate doing. These are hopes and fears that a man living in France would no doubt fail to understand. But they promptly led to a denunciation of a so-called "single party" which Fighting France tended to organise.

Let us therefore inquire how far Fighting France was becoming a "single party." To all appearance it was bringing together the Frenchmen outside France whose only aim was to remain in the war. It was a group formed by voluntary members, the only one in existence, so that those who remained aloof found themselves isolated individuals in exile. Following the liberation of North Africa and the subsequent formation of a new French

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Committee we are told that the maintenance of such a group or movement is no longer justified. It should either be dissolved or become one among various political parties. But we have to face the fact that there is at present no room for the activities of several political parties just as we have seen only one single policy taking form in Africa. On the contrary, it would seem advisable to preserve a coalition of parties, a union of citizens supporting the principles which have inspired the Fighting French.

The present Committee of Liberation must rely on the support of such a union in the same way as the National Committee of Fighting France was supported by those citizens who had remained in the war. Does such a union constitute a "single party" similar to those which in the totalitarian countries prepared the way for dictatorships?

A coalition of parties, or, to be more accurate, a coalition of men belonging to different parties does not necessarily constitute a "single party" even when circumstances do not make it possible for other political parties to pursue independent activities. Such a coalition may prove to be a "force unificatrice" without being a "parti unique" as well. What is really important is, of course, the object of such a coalition. In the present case the word "liberation" expresses that object just as the word "Fighting" did express that of Fighting France. In order to attain it, citizens form a national coalition which is not necessarily imbued with the anti-democratic spirit of a single party. Its members have come together not to bring any candidate into power but to beat the enemy, and Englishmen eager to understand what such a coalition truly means should think of a united opposition rather than of a single party.

But our definition leads us to some interesting conclusions. First, such a coalition is not expected to outlive its object and, victory once achieved, the reason for maintaining it disappears. However, it would be absurd to think of the present effort made outside France as having spent its force the moment Frenchmen are able to land on their soil. Liberation will not yet be achieved and they will still have, in common with the groups of "resistance," to free their country, not only from the enemy, but also from its accomplices. The existence of such accomplices creates a situation unknown in the preceding war. Even during the present phase of the war Frenchmen living in France must already be given means to fight with their brothers in the Empire, and what is done in North Africa

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cannot be isolated from the work pursued in the Mother Country. Last, but not least, if the Frenchmen fighting in the Empire were prevented from co-operating with their fellow men in France, if they were denied the right to take part in the liberation of their country, a situation would have been created which it is indeed hard to describe. The strength of communism in France would obviously be enormously increased. In the Empire the present coalition of parties becoming meaningless might, in such case, take a different turn.

Next to the problem raised by the eventual reappearance of political parties or the formation of a single party, that concerned with the rebuilding of administrative services can also be easily misunderstood. It is of course necessary to ensure again as quickly as possible the smooth running of public services. One is glad to find that even the national disaster of 1940 has not uprooted those services, which had been kept working all through the many political crises that occurred in the life of modern France. It is all to the good that so many permanent officials, although they disapproved of the orders imposed upon them, and were even doing their best to elude them, find it nevertheless their duty to remain in office. France later on will badly need their help.

At the same time those officials who were Vichy's appointees, and deliberately worked for the sake of "collaboration," must of course be dismissed without delay. The experiment made in North Africa has already proved the importance and the urgency of a process of "epuration." But it would not be appropriate to restore the public administration that existed under the Third Republic. Frenchmen are well aware of its shortcomings, which, in the years preceding 1940, had gradually brought several public services to a standstill. They are not likely to forget that, owing to the cumulative effect of deficient parliamentary methods and of fascist propaganda, many high officials no longer felt bound to serve the republican regime. The administrative or rather bureaucratic problem which France must solve is only one aspect of the larger social problem raised by the decline of the French élites. Our administration therefore needs not only "epuration" but rejuvenation as well.

Under normal conditions a government, supervised and stimulated by the elected representatives of the people, would be held responsible for that work. Under present conditions, however, it must be undertaken in a different way. The French Committee is holding, in fact, the position of a government.

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Will it be enabled to prepare the necessary administrative reforms?

Let us face that question and visualise in advance what is going to happen when the Allied armies land on the territory of France. In order to maintain public order, and to ensure the safety of the advancing forces, they will no doubt get in touch with the local authorities. But, as such authorities are at present controlled by Vichy agents, the Allied command, in so far as it avoids taking direct charge of administrative duties, will apparently confirm and impose on an unwilling population the power of officials whom the country despises and repudiates. This practically applies to all the prefects and to the mayors of all the large towns. Military requirements allowing no delay will dictate steps that a population, in a mood of ardent nationalism, eager to obtain justice and freedom, will bitterly resent.

Let us try by all means to prevent such a disaster. It might well occur if the Allied governments do not undertake a political preparation of future military operations in common with the only available French authorities, namely those who are outside France, working for her liberation, and those who, inside France, are supporting her resistance. The efforts made by both to work together should indeed be welcomed by the Allied forces.

Moreover, as in any case the administrative problem which we are considering is bristling with difficulties, it seems that the Allied governments might make things much more easy if it was known in advance that they are not going to restore the Vichy government or to prevent its collapse. Any step they might later on feel compelled to take in order to meet the immediate needs of their armies would have lost most of its harmful effect.

Meanwhile the French Committee in Algiers is preparing the administrative reforms, the changes in personnel which have been described, while, under its supervision, the great public services (*les grands corps de l'Etat*) are coming again to life. Thus is it making an essential contribution to our national reconstruction, which, however, would be meaningless if such work was to remain out of touch with the Mother Country.

We have already seen that the whole work of reconstruction should be, as soon as possible, sponsored and promoted by elected representatives of the people. France needs the dynamic force which a body entitled to act in her name alone possess. For that reason also she needs, under present circumstances,

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the support of the men who have been assembled under the Cross of Lorraine since 1940. But the formation in Algiers of a Consultative Council is to be welcomed. Although regular elections are at present out of question, means should be found by which its members could claim to express the will of the French people.

However, it would hardly be worth while forming such a Council if it was prevented from preparing in advance the political liberation of France. The question raises a large number of difficult problems, and no serious contribution is made to their solution by simply stating that the French electors will, at some future stage, be left free to decide their own future. Liberty is not a negative condition which automatically appears after the departure of the invaders. Liberty will have to conquer France, and the lines of her future advance must be carefully explored. Frenchmen should be enabled to undertake that essential work.

There is no doubt, however, that the long delays to which the reconstruction of a French government has been submitted, and the restrictions which still hamper its action, are mostly due to a widespread fear that the French Committee might ultimately prepare the way for a dictatorship. We must not fail to see and, if necessary, to face such a possible danger.

France indeed does not want a dictator. Accordingly we are told that many groups of resisting Frenchmen are not backing any individual leader. We know that those exercising the largest influence have repeatedly and expressly accepted the leadership of de Gaulle. Yet it is said that the fight for resistance is also conducted by numerous small groups acting separately and thinking of nothing else but their fight. In a way the assertion sounds true, because one feels that the guerrilla war is bound to remain the work of a large number of independent "movements." But what strikes me as quite unreal, and psychologically untrue, is that men passing through such a dreadful ordeal, seeing their country scattered into pieces, should not think of her as "une et indivisible" and in so doing, should not expect someone to come and save her. In addition to the services which a committee of able patriots may render, they obviously need to believe that a striking personality is striving to liberate them.

Again we are told that de Gaulle stands as a symbol, and we want to know what that really means. It often implies that de Gaulle should be no more than a symbol. Even if one

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grants that no other name could replace that of de Gaulle, the word "symbol" does not accurately define the position which he now occupies in France. Not only did he stand alone in June, 1940, but for three years he told Frenchmen what was in their minds. His denunciation of the armistice and of collaboration, his demand for justice, his efforts to bring France back to the war and to ensure her participation in the making of peace, also his insistence that France's sovereignty should be maintained, his constant endeavour to keep in touch with the French people and only to act in its name, have no doubt made most Frenchmen eager that his policy should be carried through.

On the contrary, Frenchmen, when told that they should wait for their liberation before France can again exist, do feel that they are asked to abdicate. The most friendly trustees will not succeed in persuading them that they should wait until the day when they will again be able to take charge of themselves. Indeed, they will later on dispose of their own future and see to it that no dictator is imposed upon them. But it is not the best method, in dealing with French problems, either to concentrate on future dangers or, what comes to much the same thing, to approach them with minds still living in yesterday's world. To safeguard the future or to prepare a reappearance of days past is not what Frenchmen need in the fateful hours of the present time.

COLOURED BOOKS:

RE-ALIGNMENTS¹

By L. B. NAMIER

THE AFTERMATH

THE occupation of Prague was the logical result of the Munich surrender: in March, 1939, the first-fruits of September, 1938, were garnered. "This is only a beginning," declared the notorious Streicher on the night of March 15th, addressing the officers of the Nuremberg-Fürth garrison. "Far greater events will follow. The democracies may throw their weight about: in the end they will succumb."

¹ Previous instalments of *Coloured Books* were published in *The Political Quarterly* of July-September, 1941, and January-March, 1942.

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On the 16th Hitler issued a decree establishing "the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" which was "to exercise its sovereign rights in consonance with the political, military, and economic interests (*Belangen*) of the Reich"¹; in other words, was to have no sovereign rights. The "Protector" residing at Prague, and working with the Gestapo, the S.S., the German armed forces, the "*Volksdeutsche*," etc., was henceforth master of the Czech provinces; and Baron von Neurath was chosen for the post.

Slovakia had proclaimed her "independence" on March 14th, and Hungary and Poland hastened to recognise it; they hoped to gain a footing in the country, and to keep out the Germans. But the same day on which the Czech "Protectorate" was established, Mgr. Tiso "begged" the Führer to take Slovakia under his care, and a week later a formal German-Slovak Agreement was concluded; Germany guaranteed the "independence" and territorial integrity of Slovakia, and acquired the right to maintain military establishments in a specified zone in which "the German armed forces shall exercise rights of military jurisdiction"; Slovakia's army and foreign policy were placed under German direction.

The "Ukrainians" of Carpatho-Russia similarly proclaimed their "independence," and asked for German protection. But to them no answer was vouchsafed—theirs was to be a "Republic for a Day."² It was hinted to Count Csaky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, during his visit to Berlin (January 16th-18th), that, should Czechoslovakia be broken up, Germany would not oppose Hungary seizing Carpatho-Russia. On the 14th, the Magyars, having in an ultimatum to Prague demanded the withdrawal of the Czech garrisons, invaded the province, and occupied it after a few fights with the Ukrainian bands, which had previously distinguished themselves in bullying and ill-treating helpless pro-Russians, Jews, and Czechs.

The Nazis had been "merely awaiting a favourable opportunity to finish the work begun at Munich, and to deal the *coup de grâce* to a State which, mortally wounded, was struggling with inextricable internal difficulties," wrote M. Coulondre from Berlin on March 16th. And again on the 19th:

Though a direct challenge to world opinion in perfidy, cynicism, and brutality, the stroke whereby the Third Reich has wiped Czechoslovakia off the map of Europe cannot

¹ In Halifax's speech of March 20th, the German word "*Belangen*" was wrongly translated as "importance."

² See the book by Michael Winch bearing that title.

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be considered a break with the general line pursued by German policy since last autumn, or even as a deviation from it. . . . The Germans understood—or pretended to understand—that at Munich France and Great Britain had wished above all to prevent a recourse to force, but that for the rest they were resigned to Germany's will prevailing in regions where neither Paris nor London could effectively intervene.

The Munich Agreement, completed by the Anglo-German and the Franco-German Declarations, meant in the eyes of Germany her right to organise Central and South-Eastern Europe as she wished, with the tacit approval, or at least the connivance, of the Western Powers. For months past, this view was flaunted daily by the great, officially inspired, German newspapers, as was repeatedly shown in despatches from this Embassy. I myself more than once noticed this state of mind in Herr von Ribbentrop and Herr von Weizsäcker, both of whom expressed a certain surprise whenever I stated that France, as a European Great Power, expects to be consulted in all that pertains to Europe, and that on this point there must be no mistake or misunderstanding. Yet the misunderstanding did exist. Members of the German Government did not fail to stress on all occasions that Central Europe was a region where, as the Führer himself said in his speech of January 30th, "the Western Powers had nothing to seek."

But had Paris held the same language as Coulondre? "M. Bonnet," wrote M. Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador, on December 17th, 1938,¹ "is a weak man, incapable of strongly espousing any cause, and he tends to adapt himself in turn to any person he talks to." France is, since Munich, "like a defeated army, unable to disengage itself from the pursuing enemy. . . . She is too feeble to break with her international engagements, and too feeble firmly to stand by them. Chaotic and resigned, she yields beforehand a defeatist assent to anything that may happen in Eastern and Central Europe." "Signs abound that should . . . France be called upon to discharge the obligations arising from her alliance with us, attempts will be made to wriggle out of them rather than to perform them"; it would almost seem as if she was "not far off from consciously

¹ Lukasiewicz's despatches here quoted were published by the Germans in March, 1940, "*Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*," Auswärtiges Amt, No. 3. They are stated to have been found in Warsaw.

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playing a double-faced game towards us." "French policy treats the British alliance alone as an asset, but her alliance with us and her pact with Soviet Russia as liabilities which are reluctantly avowed." What then could be the French attitude towards the helpless remnant of Czechoslovakia? "From what M. Bonnet has told me," wrote Lukasiewicz, "Herr von Ribbentrop obtained an assurance that France will not oppose Germany's economic expansion in the Danube basin; and he must further have gained the impression that neither will political expansion in that direction meet with firm action on the part of France."

Had Sir Neville Henderson warned Hitler that Britain was not indifferent to the further fate of Czechoslovakia, and expected him to abide by the settlement which he himself had decreed at Munich? No case-book has been published of "applied appeasement." But Henderson mentions Hitler telling him, at the banquet of March 1st, 1939, "that it was not Britain's business to interfere in Central Europe," and adds: "I had heard it all before"—he does not register having ever dissented from such significant and courteous pronouncements. Indeed, Henderson's *Failure of a Mission* lends credibility to the German Minute of his interview with Weizsäcker on March 14th: in this he appears solely concerned with good relations being preserved between Great Britain and Germany.¹

Did Chamberlain or Halifax ever utter a warning? There can be no certainty on this point while the British Government withholds publication of the relevant documents. But on February 1st, Chamberlain hastened to welcome Hitler's Reichstag speech of January 30th, with its brutal, menacing remark that the Western Powers "had nothing to seek" in Central Europe—"I very definitely got the impression," said Chamberlain, "that it was not the speech of a man who was prepared to throw Europe into another crisis." Nor is there any trace of a rejoinder to the sinister German Note of February 28th.² The makers of the Munich Agreement preferred not to probe prematurely into differences in interpretation for fear of seeing their make-believe founder: ambiguity is the soul of appeasement.

Even after the Germans had entered Prague, Chamberlain's first inclination was to avoid blaming Hitler. The end of Czechoslovakia "may or may not have been inevitable," he

¹ Cf. "Coloured Books," Pt. II, "*The Political Quarterly*," vol. xiii, No. 1, pp. 40-41.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 38.

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said in Parliament on March 15th,¹ "and I have so often heard charges of breach of faith bandied about, which did not seem to me to be founded upon sufficient premises, that I do not wish to associate myself to-day with any charges of that character." But he could not maintain this position: in the Press, in Parliament, in the Cabinet itself, indignation was rising; public opinion was moved. The German Ambassador in London, Herr von Dirksen, cabled on March 17th that since the preceding day "a stiffening has occurred in official and Parliamentary circles." "Chamberlain's moderation is strongly attacked within his own party, and his position seems to have suffered in the last few days. Differences of opinion between Chamberlain and Halifax, occasionally noticeable in the past, are becoming more patent, Halifax recommending a sharper attitude." And the next day he reported: "The adherents of the sharper course, especially Lord Halifax, who is entirely under the influence of the Foreign Office, have prevailed in the Cabinet." Naturally not even a publication of documents will reveal the attitude of the Foreign Office—this cannot be fully established till the files, with the notes on their "jackets," are open to inspection. But most people acquainted with the Foreign Office will endorse the compliment which Dirksen has unwittingly paid them: it is borne out by the fact that Chamberlain preferred to employ certain non-diplomatic members of the Civil Service in some of his disastrous diplomatic transactions. As for Lord Halifax, those who have seen him at work know that at times his conscience will revolt against opportunism and injustice.

On March 15th, the text of President Hacha's surrender was officially communicated to the Western Powers by the Germans, with a notification of the entry of German troops "to restore order in the Czech territory." When Dirksen presented it, Halifax, according to the German report,² "expressed regret that the events of the last few days should have produced fresh unrest and concussions, and interrupted the incipient process of general appeasement." There was renewed uncertainty concerning German intentions. "For the time being it was impossible to proceed with the visit of the President of the

¹ Sir Archibald Southby, one of Chamberlain's staunchest adherents, improved on this in the same debate: Czechoslovakia "collapsed, as it was bound to collapse; and it collapsed from within."

² There is no reason to accept it as full and reliable, seeing that many German reports can be proved to be misleading, but as so far the British Minute of the interview has not been published, the necessary means for correcting Dirksen's report are lacking.

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Board of Trade, Stanley, to Berlin, and to complete the general economic settlement, from which so much had been hoped." Dirksen replied with a discourse which blamed "the Versailles Powers" for having created "the impossible State-compound of Czechoslovakia," indicted the Czechs, etc.; and declared that "anyhow there was no connection between those events and the German-British trade relations."

In Berlin Goering "professed the utmost indignation" that the Stanley-Hudson visit "should be cancelled for such a trifle!"¹

CHAMBERLAIN BEGINS TO REACT

On March 17th, Chamberlain addressed a meeting at Birmingham. He had intended to talk on subjects of home policy, but "the tremendous events which have been taking place this week in Europe have thrown everything else into the background. . . . Public opinion in the world has received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered to it, even by the present régime in Germany." He tried to make amends for his speech of the 15th: information then was "only partial; much of it was unofficial." There had been no time "to digest it, much less to form a considered opinion upon it." (Henderson's, so far unpublished, despatches may indeed have been "partial"—but in Paris the official information available was sufficient: see Yellow Book, Nos. 56-70; and, if the fault was Henderson's, how could time have enabled the Government to "digest" what was lacking?) That day he had had to confine himself to "a very restrained and cautious exposition. . . . And, perhaps naturally, that somewhat cool and objective statement gave rise to a misapprehension. . . . that. . . . my colleagues and I did not feel strongly on the subject. I hope to correct that mistake to-night."

But first Chamberlain devoted about one-fourth of his speech to protesting (too much) about Munich; and he remarked in the middle: "Really I have no need to defend my visits to Germany last autumn. . . ." He appealed to faltering Munichers: "The facts as they are to-day cannot change the facts as they were last September. If I was right then, I am still right now." And as if to renew the bond, he expressed his "grateful thanks" to all those who had then written to him "from all over the world to express their gratitude and their appreciation" of what he had done. He went on to assert that no one could "possibly have saved Czechoslovakia from invasion and destruction" and

¹ See Henderson, "Failure of a Mission," p. 213.

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that even after a victorious war, "never could we have reconstructed Czechoslovakia as she was framed by the Treaty of Versailles" (a passage duly selected for reproduction in the German White Book). He recounted how at Godesberg "Herr Hitler . . . speaking with great earnestness . . . repeated . . . that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe, and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than German." Chamberlain had therefore considered himself justified in hoping for appeasement "once this Czechoslovakian question was settled"—now, without consulting the fellow-signatories, Hitler has "taken the law into his own hands. Before even the Czech President was received, and confronted with demands which he had no power to resist, the German troops were on the move . . ." And here a new note was sounded: "Who can fail to feel his heart go out in sympathy to the proud and brave people who have so suddenly been subjected to this invasion, whose liberties are curtailed, whose national independence has gone? . . . What has become of the assurance 'We do not want Czechs in the Reich'?"¹ (And what, one might add, has become of that Munich guarantee from which Czechoslovakia, after having been reduced to a condition in which she "had no power to resist" new German demands, was to have derived "a greater security than she has ever enjoyed in the past"? It was forgotten even by the new Chamberlain, enlightened and indignant). A little further there is another passage in the speech which has been picked out for reproduction in the German White Book: the methods were objectionable in the unpleasant surprises which Germany had previously sprung upon the world—Rhineland, *Anschluss*, Sudetenland—but in each case, according to Chamberlain,

whether on account of racial affinity or of just claims too long resisted—there was something to be said for the necessity of a change in the existing situation.

But the events which have taken place this week in complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German Government itself seem to fall into a different category, and they must cause us all to be asking ourselves: "Is this the end of the old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new?"

England will now turn to her partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations and to France; and, no doubt, "others, too,

¹ When, two days earlier, Dr. Dalton spoke of the "brutal invasion of that once free and happy model democracy in Central Europe," some Hon. Members, unnamed in *Hansard*, shouted "Oh!"—the Munichers' last (public) kicks at Czechoslovakia.

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knowing that we are not disinterested in what goes on in South-Eastern Europe, will wish to have our counsel and advice."

This passage suited the Germans: it morally justified Hitler's previous *coups*; and next, it showed Britain preparing to resist Germany—which, to the German mind, is inherently wicked. But in the middle of a passage of 340 words reproduced in the German White Book, there were these thirteen conveying an unpleasant truth: "in complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German Government itself"; and so, to avoid staining the White Book, they were replaced by a few dots.

Late, very late in the day, Chamberlain announced that "we are not disinterested in what goes on" in countries even more distant than that of which, half a year earlier, we knew "nothing." Still, while he declared that Britain would resist to the utmost an attempt at world domination, should such a challenge be made, he was "not prepared to engage this country by new unspecified commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be foreseen." Even this restriction was soon to be dropped in a headlong plunge; to quote Mr. Churchill: the Government "turned round over the week-end."

On March 17th, Henderson informed Weizsäcker that he had been summoned home "to report." The same day, both Henderson and Coulondre were instructed to protest against the measures notified in the German communication of March 15th. Coulondre called at the Wilhelmstrasse in the morning of March 18th, and, in the absence of Ribbentrop, saw Weizsäcker. The French Note declared the German action "a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit" of the Munich Agreement; pointed to the circumstances in which the Czechs had given their consent; and stated that the French Government were unable to recognise "the legality of the new situation created in Czechoslovakia by the action of the Reich." Before receiving the Note, Weizsäcker asked to be informed of its contents, and then refused to entertain a French protest concerning Czechoslovakia; he begged Bonnet would reconsider the matter. Coulondre persisted; invoked diplomatic usage and the right of France to make known her attitude; especially as a solemn act, signed by the two Governments, was in question. Weizsäcker now alleged that in December Bonnet had told Ribbentrop that Czechoslovakia would never again form "the object of an exchange of view."¹ Coulondre denied there being anything in the Declaration of December 6th, "however widely

¹ Cf. "Coloured Books," Pt. II, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. xiii, No. 1, pp. 27-8.

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interpreted, recognising an eventual suppression of Czechoslovakia"; and recalled its "consultation clause." Weizsäcker argued Czech consent; Coulondre spoke of *duresse*. Finally, Weizsäcker "declared that he took the Note as if it had been sent to him through the post, but he feared that the French Government would regret this démarche." Bonnet, in a despatch of March 19th, hotly denied having declared to Ribbentrop his further *desintéressement* in Czechoslovakia: Herr von Weizsäcker had not been at their conversation; only M. Leger and Count Welczek had been present.

The British Note, judging by the accounts given in Parliament, bore a very similar character; it was delivered on March 18th, at midday, and Henderson left Berlin the same night; Coulondre, the next day. Russia, too, lodged a sharp protest, and the United States declared that they would maintain the diplomatic status of the Czech representatives. The Germans immediately replied to the Western Powers, in a public statement, that "the Reich Government is not in a position to accept such protests as they are devoid of any political, legal, and moral basis."

Germans would feel it derogatory to their "sense of honour" if they ever missed giving a retort: there must be one, however far-fetched and irrelevant. On March 18th, Dirksen duly journeyed to the Foreign Office, to inform Halifax that he, too, had been summoned home "to report," and he lodged a protest: against "the vulgar abuse of the Führer." For once the Press was merely mentioned; the show-piece of the complaint was a speech delivered by Mr. Duff Cooper "without the Speaker intervening, or a member of the Government repudiating it." Dirksen's own report unconsciously conveys how bored Halifax was in having to listen and to reply to the German's zealous and learned arguments; finally he said that he would report to the Prime Minister. "I replied," writes Dirksen, "that I, too, would report to my Government the gist of our conversation."

"The recall of the German Ambassadors in London and Paris to report in Berlin" is "not a mere formality," but expresses mistrust of the British attitude, wrote on March 20th the *Deutsche diplomatische Korrespondenz*, which was understood to reflect closely the views of Ribbentrop. Veiled threats now appeared in the Berlin Press that the Naval Agreement with Great Britain would be denounced.

Chamberlain had intended to spend March 18th—his seventieth

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birthday—in Birmingham. But on Friday, the 17th, M. Tilea, Rumanian Minister in London, informed Halifax that apprehensions were caused in Bucharest by the threatening attitude of Herr Wohlthat, the head of the German economic mission, which was negotiating there a new trade agreement. He also saw the Secretary for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty: it was apparently feared that the Germans might continue their advance to the East, and invade Rumania. Tilea's alarms seem to have been unfounded. The German *chargé d'affaires* in London reports, on March 19th, "from a reliable source", that Tilea had acted on his own initiative, "that he was "most sharply reprimanded" by his Foreign Minister, M. Gafencu, "and, at the end of a lengthy and stormy telephone conversation, was directed to issue a denial." Tilea may have acted without instructions from Gafencu; but King Carol is supposed occasionally to have taken a hand in foreign affairs. Be that as it may, in the tense and anxious atmosphere of those days, the Rumanian scare helped to stir the late appeasers into action—"even if there is no menace to Rumania," said Halifax on March 20th, or if it "has not to-day developed," there is ground for "the gravest misgivings." A Cabinet was summoned for Saturday, the 18th, and sat two and a half hours. Before it, Halifax had asked the French and Russian Ambassadors to call on him, and inquired from M. Maisky what the Soviet Government would do if Rumania were subjected to an unprovoked attack. Russia replied the next day by proposing a conference to be immediately convened at Bucharest, at which the Powers most directly concerned—Great Britain, France, Russia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey—would consider the question of German aggression: the Soviets were obviously prepared to co-operate provided they were satisfied that the Western Powers meant business. The Russian suggestion was, however, declined by the British Government as "premature"; it was apparently feared that the procedure might prove too slow, and that such a conference, unless properly prepared, might end in failure.

On March 21st, a British Memorandum (published in the Polish White Book) proposed as a first step against a possible German policy of domination,

that the French, Soviet, and Polish Governments should join with His Majesty's Government in signing and publishing a formal declaration, the terms of which they suggest be on the lines of the following:

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"We, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, hereby declare that inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are matters of common interest and concern, and since European peace and security may be affected by any action which constitutes a threat to the political independence of any European State, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint resistance to any such action."

This Declaration "should be followed by an examination by the signatories of any specific situation which requires it, with a view to determining the nature of any action which might be taken." Other Governments were not to be approached "before the four Powers are agreed on the declaration." But the fact of such a proposal having been made was published immediately, probably as a warning to Germany.

In Berlin it was received with a show of indifference and scepticism. Small nations associating themselves with it would "commit an act of suicide"; a system of collective security could not be revived. The Germans were on velvet. On March 16th, the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* wrote:

We reckon calmly with an ideological offensive ensuing from the latest developments . . . The liquidation of Czechoslovakia signifies a perfectly clear increase in power for the Great-German Reich . . . In the Skoda Works one of the greatest arms plants in the world has come under German control . . . Germany has now taken a mighty step forward which puts into cloudy uncertainty the day, hoped for by London and Paris, when armaments parity or superiority could be attained.

And Coulondre reported on the 19th:

An official of the Ministry of Propaganda seems to have summed up accurately the state of mind of the Nazi leaders in a remark made to one of our compatriots: "We have before us so many open doors, so many possibilities, that we no longer know which way to turn, or what direction to take."

From Warsaw, Noël wrote on the 16th:

Is the action which Germany has taken in Central Europe the prelude for further operations in the West or in the East?

In Warsaw, the second hypothesis is looked upon as likely.

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Germany's dissatisfaction with Poland is manifest . . .

Herr von Moltke does not conceal from his colleagues his ill-humour which does not spare M. Beck . . .

While the German intrigue in Slovakia was developing, Lipski, for three days, March 11th-13th, asked in vain for an interview with either Ribbentrop or Weizsäcker.¹ On the 13th at night, he met by chance General von Keitel at a reception given by the Minister Herr Kerrl, and told Keitel that, "despite German activities so immediately affecting Poland," he had been unable "to make contact with the German Government." Keitel promised to intervene with Ribbentrop—but without result. On March 14th, German troops seized Vitkovitse and Moravska Ostrava in the eastern corner of Moravia, moving rapidly towards the Carpathian passes which lead into Slovakia—Goering subsequently, in a talk with Henderson, excused that "advance occupation" as having been "effected solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first opportunity."² On the 15th, Ribbentrop went with Hitler to Prague—and the Polish Ambassador was still kept waiting, out of touch with the German Foreign Office. On the 16th, Lipski saw Goering, as acting Head of the State, and lodged a protest; Goering, who had only just returned, interrupting his holiday in Italy, professed a touching innocence. On Saturday, the 19th, Lipski left for Warsaw, in this case truly "to report."

In Poland, the German advance into Slovakia, and the negotiations for a German protectorate over the country, were causing profound dismay. While the Polish Government realised that Munich had converted the Czech provinces into a German dependency, and acquiesced in the change, they regarded Slovakia as within their own sphere of influence, possibly to be shared by the Magyars. Moreover, Beck still thought, in terms of 1934, of parity in a working partnership between Poland and Germany; he used to boast: "Things that concern us cannot be decided without us." The Munich Conference, from which Poland was excluded, had deeply hurt his self-esteem, and he had vented his resentment in rudeness to the British and French Ambassadors,³ and in forcible action

¹ On March 11th, even Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, was unable, as he told Lipski, to get at Ribbentrop or Weizsäcker, and, to cover himself, wired to that effect to Mussolini.

² Henderson to Halifax, May 28th, 1939. This despatch, which deals with Henderson's visit to Karinhall on the 27th, is one of his three despatches, prior to August 23rd, 1939, published in the Blue Book.

³ Cf. *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. xiii, No. 1, page 16.

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against stricken Czechoslovakia. But what was happening now was a direct threat to Poland, and produced consternation in the Polish General Staff and the Army: by entering Slovakia, the Germans outflanked Poland from the south, and turned whatever defensive line she might still have hoped to hold in the west, after having, insanely, delivered the Czech bastion to the Germans. And all this was done without a word to the Polish "treaty partner," and without the Polish Ambassador receiving even the barest minimum of the attention to which his diplomatic position and rank entitled him.

MEMEL

But a minor German larceny was to be perpetrated before Poland was ushered into her seat as object of Hitler's anger and of his surgical fancies. At Munich he had assured Chamberlain that he did not mean to interfere in Memel. But in March, Memel reappeared in the German Press as a black spot of anti-German "cruelties." The Lithuanian Foreign Minister, M. Urbsys, returning from Rome to Kaunas, arrived in Berlin on March 19th, and the next day, accompanied by the Lithuanian Minister, M. Skirpa, called on Ribbentrop; only Urbsys was admitted. Here is the account of the interview given by Sir Samuel Hoare in Parliament on March 22nd:

As regards Memel, I understand that the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was recently in Berlin, received while there the demand from the German Government for the immediate cession of Memelland to the Reich, coupled with the threat that in the event of any resistance or any application for support elsewhere, the matter would no longer be dealt with diplomatically, but in a military sense. This demand amounted to an ultimatum and the Lithuanian Government were required to take a decision on it within approximately four days, but they were assured that if it were accepted, no further demands would be made of them. I also understand that this demand has now been accepted.

The next day the *Völkischer Beobachter*, with German veracity and charm, described this account as a "downright lie." What had happened was even worse: Urbsys was bidden to cede Memel forthwith; and when he pleaded incompetence to do so, Ribbentrop told him (as he had told Hacha) to obtain the consent of his Government over the telephone. Urbsys refused; and, as a concession, was given the ultimatum reported by Hoare.

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Warned not to apply "for support elsewhere," the same afternoon he communicated the facts to Great Britain, France, and Poland (but not to Russia) through their military attachés in Berlin, avoiding the normal diplomatic channels: he added that the attitude of the Lithuanian Government would depend on what aid they could expect. He left Berlin on March 20th; returned in a German plane on the 22nd; was ceremoniously received at the airport (like Hacha at the railway station), and was invited to proceed, as "*Reichsgast*," to the Adlon: he declined, and went to the Lithuanian Legation. At 6 p.m., a meeting with the Germans, headed by Weizsäcker, opened at the Foreign Office, in a room adjoining Ribbentrop's. The Germans were elaborately courteous, but refused to admit any changes in their text of the "Agreement"; when Urbsys tried to argue he was asked to speak to Ribbentrop in the next room. The "Agreement," signed at 1 a.m. (with ceremony, spotlights, and clicking of cinema cameras), was designed to secure "friendly relations between the two countries"; it starts with the declaration that "the Memel territory, severed from the Reich by the Treaty of Versailles, is this day reunited with the German Reich," promises Lithuania a free zone in Memel, and ends with an undertaking by both parties "not to use force in their mutual relations, nor encourage its use against either by a third party." Henceforth the Germans overflowed with "generosity" towards Lithuania, hoping to find in her, because of Vilna, an ally against Poland: another Slovakia on her northern flank.

Even before the "Agreement" was signed, Hitler, at the head of the German navy, sailed for Memel; it is said that on the trip he was violently sea-sick, and that this hardened his determination to obtain from the Poles an overland connection with East Prussia. "The news of the entry of German troops into Memel, and of the Chancellor's demonstrative voyage . . . along our coast," writes Lipski in his *Final Report* of October 10th, 1939, "was as great a surprise to Polish public opinion as the German entry into Slovakia had been." They felt outflanked and outwitted.

(To be concluded.)

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT¹

By M. KALECKI

I

A SOLID majority of economists is now of the opinion that, even in a capitalist system, full employment may be secured by a Government spending programme, provided there is in existence adequate plant to employ all existing labour power, and provided adequate supplies of necessary foreign raw materials may be obtained in exchange for exports.

If the Government undertakes public investment (e.g. builds schools, hospitals, and highways) or subsidises mass consumption (by family allowances, reduction of indirect taxation, or subsidies to keep down the prices of necessities), if, moreover, this expenditure is financed by borrowing and not by taxation (which could affect adversely private investment and consumption), the effective demand for goods and services may be increased up to a point where full employment is achieved. Such Government expenditure increases employment, be it noted, not only directly but indirectly as well, since the higher incomes caused by it result in a secondary increase in demand for consumption and investment goods.

2.—It may be asked where the public will get the money to lend to the Government if they do not curtail their investment and consumption. To understand this process it is best, I think, to imagine for a moment that the Government pays its suppliers in Government securities. The suppliers will, in general, not retain these securities but put them into circulation while buying other goods and services, and so on until finally these securities will reach persons or firms which retain them as interest-yielding assets. In any period of time the total increase in Government securities in the possession (transitory or final) of persons and firms will be equal to the goods and services sold to the Government. Thus what the economy lends to the Government are goods and services whose production is “financed” by Government securities. In reality the Government pays for the services not in securities but in cash, but it simultaneously issues securities and so drains the cash

¹ This article corresponds roughly to a lecture given to the Marshall Society in Cambridge in the Spring of 1942.

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off; and this is equivalent to the imaginary process described above.

What happens, however, if the public is unwilling to absorb all the increase in Government securities? It will offer them finally to banks to get cash (notes or deposits) in exchange. If the banks accept these offers, the rate of interest will be maintained. If not, the prices of securities will fall, which means a rise in the rate of interest, and this will encourage the public to hold more securities in relation to deposits. It follows that the rate of interest depends on banking policy, in particular on that of the Central Bank. If this policy aims at maintaining the rate of interest at a certain level that may be easily achieved, however large the amount of Government borrowing. Such was and is the position in the present war. In spite of astronomical budget deficits, the rate of interest has shown no rise since the beginning of 1940.

3.—It may be objected that Government expenditure financed by borrowing will cause inflation. To this may be replied that the effective demand created by the Government acts like any other increase in demand. If labour, plant and foreign raw materials are in ample supply, the increase in demand is met by an increase in production. But if the point of full employment of resources is reached and effective demand continues to increase, prices will rise so as to equilibrate the demand for and the supply of goods and services. (In the state of overemployment of resources such as we witness at present in the war economy, an inflationary rise in prices has been avoided only to the extent to which effective demand for consumption goods has been curtailed by rationing and direct taxation.) It follows that if the Government intervention aims at achieving full employment but stops short of increasing effective demand over the full employment mark, there is no need to be afraid of inflation.¹

¹ Another problem of a more technical nature is that of the National Debt. If full employment is maintained by Government spending financed by borrowing, the National Debt will continuously increase. This need not, however, involve any disturbances in output and employment, if interest on the Debt is financed by an annual capital tax. The current income after payment of capital tax of some capitalists will be lower and of some higher than if the National Debt had not increased, but their aggregate income will remain unaltered and their aggregate consumption will not be likely to change significantly. Further, the inducement to invest in fixed capital is not affected by a capital tax because it is paid on any type of wealth. Whether an amount is held in cash or Government securities or invested in building a factory, the same capital tax is paid on it and thus the comparative advantage is unchanged. And if investment is financed by loans it is clearly not affected by a capital tax because it does not mean an increase in wealth of the investing entrepreneur. Thus neither capitalists' consumption nor investment is affected by the rise in the National Debt if interest on it is financed by an annual capital tax.

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II

1.—The above is a very crude and incomplete statement of the economic doctrine of full employment. But, I think, it is sufficient to acquaint the reader with the essence of the doctrine and so enable him to follow the subsequent discussion of the *political* problems involved in the achievement of full employment.

It should be first stated that although most economists are now agreed that full employment may be achieved by Government spending, this was by no means the case even in the recent past. Among the opposers of this doctrine there were (and still are) prominent so called "economic experts" closely connected with banking and industry. This suggests that there is a political background in the opposition to the full employment doctrine even though the arguments advanced are economic. That is not to say that people who advance them do not believe in their economics, poor though these are. But obstinate ignorance is usually a manifestation of underlying political motives.

There are, however, even more direct indications that a first class political issue is at stake here. In the great depression in the thirties, big business opposed consistently experiments for increasing employment by Government spending in all countries, except Nazi Germany. This was to be clearly seen in the U.S.A. (opposition to the New Deal), in France (Blum experiment) and also in Germany before Hitler. The attitude is not easy to explain. Clearly higher output and employment benefits not only workers, but *entrepreneurs* as well, because their profits rise. And the policy of full employment outlined above does not encroach upon profits because it does not involve any additional taxation. The *entrepreneurs* in the slump are longing for a boom; why do not they accept gladly the "synthetic" boom which the Government is able to offer them? It is this difficult and fascinating question with which we intend to deal in this article.

The reasons for the opposition of the "industrial leaders" to full employment achieved by Government spending may be subdivided into three categories: (i) the dislike of Government interference in the problem of employment as such; (ii) the dislike of the direction of Government spending (public investment and subsidising consumption); (iii) dislike of the social and political changes resulting from the *maintenance* of full employment. We shall examine each of these three categories of objections to the Government expansion policy in detail.

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2.—We shall deal first with the reluctance of the "captains of industry" to accept Government intervention in the matter of employment. Every widening of State activity is looked upon by "business" with suspicion, but the creation of employment by Government spending has a special aspect which makes the opposition particularly intense. Under a *laissez-faire* system the level of employment depends to a great extent on the so-called state of confidence. If this deteriorates, private investment declines, which results in a fall of output and employment (both directly and through the secondary effect of the fall in incomes upon consumption and investment). This gives to the capitalists a powerful indirect control over Government policy: everything which may shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause an economic crisis. But once the Government learns the trick of increasing employment by its own purchases, this powerful controlling device loses its effectiveness. Hence budget deficits necessary to carry out Government intervention must be regarded as perilous. The social function of the doctrine of "sound finance" is to make the level of employment dependent on the "state of confidence."

3.—The dislike of the business leaders of a Government spending policy grows even more acute when they come to consider the objects on which the money would be spent: public investment and subsidising mass consumption.

The economic principles of Government intervention require that public investment should be confined to objects which do not compete with the equipment of private business (e.g. hospitals, schools, highways, etc.). Otherwise the profitability of private investment might be impaired and the positive effect of public investment upon employment offset by the negative effect of the decline in private investment. This conception suits the business men very well. But the scope of public investment of this type is rather narrow, and there is a danger that the Government, in pursuing this policy, may eventually be tempted to nationalise transport or public utilities so as to gain a new sphere in which to carry out investment.¹

One might therefore expect business leaders and their experts to be more in favour of subsidising mass consumption (by means

¹ It should be noticed here that investment in a nationalised industry can contribute to the solution of the problem of unemployment only if it is undertaken on principles different from those of private enterprise. The Government must be satisfied with a lower net rate of return than private enterprise, or it must deliberately time its investment so as to mitigate slumps.

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of family allowances, subsidies to keep down the prices of necessities, etc.) than of public investment; for by subsidising consumption the Government would not be embarking on any sort of "enterprise." In practice, however, this is not the case. Indeed, subsidising mass consumption is much more violently opposed by these "experts" than public investment. For here a "moral" principle of the highest importance is at stake. The fundamentals of capitalist ethics require that "You shall earn your bread in sweat"—unless you happen to have private means.

4.—We have considered the political reasons for the opposition against the policy of creating employment by Government spending. But even if this opposition were overcome—as it may well be under the pressure of the masses—the *maintenance* of full employment would cause social and political changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business leaders. Indeed, under a regime of permanent full employment, "the sack" would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined and the self assurance and class consciousness of the working class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in conditions of work would create political tension. It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under *laissez-faire*; and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus affects adversely only the *rentier* interests. But "discipline in the factories" and "political stability" are more appreciated by the business leaders than profits. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part of the "normal" capitalist system.

III

1.—One of the important functions of fascism, as typified by the Nazi system, was to remove the capitalist objections to full employment.

The dislike of Government spending policy as such is overcome under fascism by the fact that the State machinery is under the direct control of a partnership of big business with fascist upstarts. The necessity for the myth of "sound finance," which served to prevent the Government from offsetting a confidence crisis by spending, is removed. In a democracy one

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does not know what the next Government will be like. Under Fascism there is no next Government.

The dislike of Government spending, whether on public investment or consumption, is overcome by concentrating Government expenditure on armaments. Finally, "discipline in the factories" and "political stability" under full employment are maintained by the "new order," which ranges from the suppression of the trade unions to the concentration camp. Political pressure replaces the economic pressure of unemployment.

2.—The fact that armaments are the backbone of the policy of fascist full employment has a profound influence upon its economic character. Large-scale armaments are inseparable from the expansion of the armed forces and the preparation of plans for a war of conquest. They also induce competitive rearmament of other countries. This causes the main aim of the spending to shift gradually from full employment to securing the maximum effect of rearmament. As a result employment becomes "overfull"; not only is unemployment abolished but an acute scarcity of labour prevails. Bottlenecks arise in every sphere and these must be dealt with by creation of a number of controls. Such an economy has many features of a "planned economy," and is sometimes compared, rather ignorantly, with socialism. However, this type of "planning" is bound to appear whenever an economy puts itself a certain high target of production in a particular sphere, when it becomes a "target economy" of which the "armament economy" is a special case. An "armament economy" involves in particular the curtailment of consumption as compared with what it could have been under full employment.

The fascist system starts from the overcoming of unemployment, develops into an "armament economy" of scarcity, and ends inevitably in war.

IV

1.—What will be the practical outcome of the opposition to "full employment by Government spending" in a capitalist democracy? We shall try to answer this question on the basis of the analysis of the reasons for this opposition given in section II. We argued that we may expect the opposition of the "leaders of industry" on three planes: (i) the opposition on principle against Government spending based on a budget deficit; (ii) the opposition against this spending being

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directed either towards public investment—which may foreshadow the intrusion of the state into the new spheres of economic activity—or towards subsidising mass consumption; (iii) the opposition against *maintaining* full employment and not merely preventing deep and prolonged slumps.

Now, it must be recognised that the stage in which the “business leaders” could afford to be opposed to *any* kind of Government interventions to alleviate a slump is rather a matter of the past. Three factors have contributed to this: (a) very full employment during the present war; (b) the development of the economic doctrine of full employment; (c) partly as a result of these two factors the slogan “Unemployment never again” is now deeply rooted in the consciousness of the masses. This position is reflected in the recent pronouncements of the “captains of industry” and their experts. The necessity that “something must be done in the slump” is agreed to; but the fight continues, firstly, as to “*what* should be done in the slump” (i.e. what should be the direction of Government intervention), and secondly, that “it should be done *only* in the slump” (i.e. merely to alleviate slumps rather than to secure permanent full employment).

2.—In the current discussions of these problems there emerges time and again the conception of counteracting the slump by stimulating *private* investment. This may be done by lowering the rate of interest, by the reduction of income tax, or by subsidising private investment directly in this or another form. That such a scheme should be attractive to “business” is not surprising. The *entrepreneur* remains the medium through which the intervention is conducted. If he does not feel confidence in the political situation he will not be bribed into investment. And the intervention does not involve the Government either in “playing with” (public) investment or “wasting money” on subsidising consumption.

It may be shown, however, that the stimulation of private investment does not provide an adequate method for preventing mass unemployment. There are two alternatives to be considered here. (a) The rate of interest or income tax (or both) is reduced sharply in the slump and increased in the boom. In this case both the period and the amplitude of the business cycle will be reduced, but employment not only in the slump but even in the boom may be far from full, i.e. the average unemployment may be considerable, although its fluctuations will be less marked. (b) The rate of interest or income tax is

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reduced in a slump but *not* increased in the subsequent boom. In this case the boom will last longer but it must end in a new slump: one reduction in the rate of interest or income tax does not, of course, eliminate the forces which cause cyclical fluctuations in a capitalist economy. In the new slump it will be necessary to reduce the rate of interest or income tax again and so on. Thus in not too remote a time the rate of interest would have to be negative and income tax would have to be replaced by an income subsidy. The same would arise if it were attempted to *maintain* full employment by stimulating private investment: the rate of interest and income tax would have to be reduced continuously.¹

In addition to this fundamental weakness of combating unemployment by stimulating private investment, there is a practical difficulty. The reaction of the *entrepreneurs* to the measures described is uncertain. If the down-swing is sharp they may take a very pessimistic view of the future, and the reduction of the rate of interest or income tax may then for a long time have little or no effect upon investment, and thus upon the level of output and employment.

3.—Even those who advocate stimulating private investment to counteract the slump frequently do not rely on it exclusively but envisage that it should be associated with public investment. It looks at present as if “business leaders” and their experts (at least part of them) would tend to accept as a *pis aller* public investment financed by borrowing as a means of alleviating slumps. They seem, however, still to be consistently opposed to creating employment by subsidising consumption and to *maintaining* full employment.

This state of affairs is perhaps symptomatic of the future economic regime of capitalist democracies. In the slump, either under the pressure of the masses, or even without it, public investment financed by borrowing will be undertaken to prevent large scale unemployment. But if attempts are made to apply this method in order to maintain the high level of employment reached in the subsequent boom a strong opposition of “business leaders” is likely to be encountered. As has already been argued, lasting full employment is not at all to their liking. The workers would “get out of hand” and the “captains of industry” would be anxious to “teach them a lesson.” Moreover, the price increase in the up-swing is to the disadvantage of small and big *rentiers* and makes them “boom tired.”

¹ A rigorous demonstration of this is given in my article to be published in *Oxford Economic Papers*.

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In this situation a powerful block is likely to be formed between big business and the *rentier* interests, and they would probably find more than one economist to declare that the situation was manifestly unsound. The pressure of all these forces, and in particular of big business—as a rule influential in Government departments—would most probably induce the Government to return to the orthodox policy of cutting down the budget deficit. A slump would follow in which Government spending policy would come again into its own.

This pattern of a “political business cycle” is not entirely conjectural; something very much like that happened in the U.S.A. in 1937-1938. The breakdown of the boom in the second half of 1937 was actually due to the drastic reduction of the budget deficit. On the other hand, in the acute slump that followed the Government promptly reverted to a spending policy.

The regime of the “political business cycle” would be an artificial restoration of the position as it existed in nineteenth century capitalism. Full employment would be reached only at the top of the boom, but slumps would be relatively mild and short lived.

V

1.—Should a progressive be satisfied with a regime of the “political business cycle” as described in the preceding section? I think he should oppose it on two grounds: (i) that it does not assure lasting full employment; (ii) that Government intervention is tied down to public investment and does not embrace subsidising consumption. What the masses now ask for is not the mitigation of slumps but their total abolition. Nor should the resulting fuller utilisation of resources be applied to unwanted public investment merely in order to provide work. The Government spending programme should be devoted to public investment only to the extent to which such investment is *actually needed*. The rest of Government spending necessary to maintain full employment should be used to subsidise consumption (through family allowances, old age pensions, reduction in indirect taxation, subsidising of prices of necessities). The opposers of such Government spending say that the Government will then have nothing to show for their money. The reply is that the counterpart of this spending will be the higher standard of living of the masses. Is not this the purpose of all economic activity?

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2.—“Full employment capitalism” will have, of course, to develop new social and political institutions which will reflect the increased power of the working class. If capitalism can adjust itself to full employment a fundamental reform will have been incorporated in it. If not, it will show itself an outmoded system which must be scrapped.

But perhaps the fight for full employment may lead to fascism? Perhaps capitalism will adjust itself to full employment in *this* way? This seems extremely unlikely. Fascism sprang up in Germany against a background of tremendous unemployment and maintained itself in power through securing full employment while capitalist democracy failed to do so. The fight of the progressive forces for full employment is at the same time a way of *preventing* the recurrence of fascism.

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By MARIAN E. A. BOWLEY

I.—*The Magnitude of the Post-War Housing Problem*

THE magnitude of the post-war housing problem depends on the way in which that problem is defined. In this the housing question does not differ from other social questions such as those of education, or nutrition, or social security. If sufficiently low standards are accepted, or state and community responsibility rejected, almost any social problem, including housing, can be defined out of existence. Choice of a definition of the post-war housing problem has therefore as much bearing on questions of policy as elaborate statistics.

It will be convenient to approach these questions by discussing a definition in terms of a post-war shortage of houses which seems to be gaining tacit acceptance. A general shortage of houses is bound to emerge after the war for three reasons. The number of families wanting separate houses has increased since the beginning of the war, but there has been an almost complete cessation of building. The blitz has destroyed or damaged houses, thereby reducing the available supply below pre-war levels. Finally, the war has meant that the slum clearance and decrowding programmes of local authorities have

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been put into cold storage. Thus the numbers of families falling below the minimum official standard of housing will be greater than if there had been no war, owing to the failure to improve the supply of houses of an adequate quality. The housing problem defined in terms of shortage may be regarded as meaning the problem of restoring the *status quo ante* with respect to the pre-war relation between numbers of families and numbers of houses, including projected improvements in the quality of the houses.

The magnitude of the housing problem so defined can be calculated approximately. It is estimated that if there had been no war the number of families needing separate houses in England and Wales would have increased by 425 thousand in the five years from 1940 to 1944.¹ This number of houses will be needed if the war ends in 1944, on the assumption that any postponement of marriages, or setting up of families, during the war will be made good as quickly as possible. It is impossible to make any allowance for the effect of war casualties or immigration at present; these may cancel out or the net effect may be small. Official reticence on the subject of the destruction of houses by the blitz makes it more difficult to estimate the requirements for replacement. We have been told, however, that about one in five houses, that is just over two million, have been damaged or destroyed, including all those slightly damaged. This crumb of information helps and we can adopt a hypothesis which anyone who knows better can alter. It seems unlikely from general observation by anyone walking about the streets that more than a quarter of the houses damaged have been actually destroyed, or damaged beyond repair. On this hypothesis, and assuming heavy raiding is not resumed, 500,000 houses would be needed for war replacement. There is still the third item, and here we are on safer ground. The outstanding local authority programmes for slum clearance together with the houses needed for abolishing overcrowding, as it existed before the war, amounted probably to about 400 thousand in 1939. As some of the slum houses have been destroyed by the Blitz, some part of this total has already been included in the replacement item; it might be reasonable to scale the addition on this count down to 350 thousand. The grand total of requirements thus comes out at about 1,275 thousand, or say not less than 1½ million and not more than 1¾ million. It will be convenient to take 1½ million as the base for other calculations.

¹ See "Housing Before the War and After," by Dr. Elzea, p. 55.

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Although this total appears formidable, it is only equivalent to 3½ years' building at the average rate maintained between 1935 and 1939. If allowance is made for the continued growth in the number of families after the war and a considerable margin allowed for the arrears of repairs of all kinds, it can be hazarded that five or six years' building at this pre-war average rate would restore the *status quo ante* and provide for the outstanding local authority programme.

II.—Problems of Organisation.

So much for the crude arithmetic of the post-war housing problem. Whether the results exaggerate or belittle the size of the problem, decisions must be reached on matters of policy. Is a planned attempt to be made to restore the *status quo ante* completely by building approximately as many houses of each type in each place as would have existed but for the war, plus appropriate additions for those needed for increases in the numbers of families? Alternatively, is it to be left to the combined efforts of private enterprise and individual local authorities to decide in what way to restore the pre-war relations between numbers of families and numbers of houses in each area. These are the main alternatives unless the definition of the problem in terms of the *status quo ante* is abandoned. It is possible, of course, to regard the whole problem from a different angle. The housing situation at the end of the war could be considered dispassionately and independently of what might have happened if there had been no war. Housing policy could be deliberately orientated to make the best use of such building capacity as is available for housing in relation to the seriousness of actual weaknesses in the supply of houses.

It seems probable that people in general and the local authorities also are thinking in terms of restoring the *status quo* in the first and most rigid sense, by schemes for replacement of destroyed houses and completion of pre-war programmes. The difficulties involved are worth careful consideration, for the collapse of such schemes might lead to worse confusion and delay than building without a set plan. Muddling through might be preferable.

The first difficulty arises from the effect of the war in piling up housing arrears in individual areas. The uncompleted slum clearance programmes affect, in the main, a few big towns. London, Leeds, Liverpool and Manchester had still a balance of 35 thousand houses to complete on their original programme

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in 1939, while other authorities had already nearly finished their original programme and some had already started on additional programmes. The need for additional houses for the abatement of overcrowding was most acute in London, Durham and Northumberland; according to the Overcrowding Survey of 1936 these areas accounted for 40 per cent of the total of overcrowded families and little headway had been made with the really big programmes before the war.¹ To some extent the evacuation of families from some of the towns has eased the situation, but if they return in force as soon as peace is declared the local authorities will be faced with completing as quickly as possible their programmes already overdue.

The uneven incidence of the blitz has almost certainly resulted in a further net accumulation of building needs in areas like London, Liverpool and Tyneside, which already had large programmes outstanding. In other districts heavy raids have created serious housing shortages in addition to the temporary difficulties caused by inflows of war workers. The strain on the capacity of the building industry will be increased in the blitzed places by the need to repair public buildings, factories and offices. On the other hand, there are a great many towns which have had no raids or only small ones. In these the effect of the war on the housing situation may be negligible, provided that families which have come to them on account of the war go back to their home towns. On the other hand, if these families can be prevented from going home it may well relieve the general housing situation. For though housing conditions may be unsatisfactory in war-swollen towns, where this is the only serious problem it may be easier to provide additional houses for the immigrants in these than to rehouse them in their home towns. This is not the end of the problem. The normal additional numbers of families will need houses. At present it is impossible to forecast in what places the normal additions will be important, but they will naturally tend to be largest in the biggest and most congested towns. If the pre-war trend of population from the north to the midlands and south is resumed after the war, it is obvious that the congestion of building requirements in the London area and the Midlands will be still further aggravated. It is difficult to see how even the most efficient system of priorities for building materials and labour can solve the problems of inadequate building resources due to the lopsided geographical distribution of demand that

¹ In 1935, for example, at least 24,000, probably more, houses were needed in the L.C.C. area to abolish overcrowding. (Ministry of Health—Annual Report, 1938-9.)

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must be expected as the result of attempts to restore the *status quo ante*.

The second major difficulty, though it arises initially from the types of houses which would be required, will almost certainly be enhanced by the first. The slum clearance and decrowding programmes of local authorities depend entirely on the provision of working-class houses to let at low rents. The blitz has taken heavy toll of working-class houses of all sorts. On the probably over-optimistic assumption that the damage has been spread evenly over houses of all types, at least two-thirds of the houses rebuilt should be working-class houses to let; that is possibly 330 thousand would be needed at rents within the reach of families of all sorts of sizes and incomes. A further addition must be made for additions to the numbers of working-class families. The grand total may be put at about two-thirds of all houses needed, that is approximately 900 thousand, allowing for continued peace-time increases on the number of families. This total is greater than the total built by local authorities in the ten years before the outbreak of war!

Thus if the problem of providing sufficient building resources where they are needed is eventually solved, there will remain the problem of organising, within a few years, the actual provision of houses of the types required. Before the war it was considered that the larger local authorities would be fully occupied for several years with the completion of their slum clearance and decrowding programmes. In 1938-9, when the efforts of these authorities reached their maximum, the number of houses completed by all the local authorities was only 102 thousand; and this figure was greater than in any previous year since 1919 with the exception of 1926-7. Even if post-war requirements were relatively uniformly spread over the country it seems certain that local authorities would be unable to satisfy them in a reasonably short period. The lopsided distribution destroys any grounds for optimism; it means that some quite capable authorities will have an easy time, while others will be overwhelmed.¹

It may be suggested that private enterprise may be able to make a substantial contribution. After all, the majority—72 per cent—of the four million houses built between the wars were

¹ Another aspect of the problem, perhaps, ought to be mentioned. The larger urban local authorities have in the past been hampered continually by the difficulty of obtaining suitable and accessible building sites. The threatening concentration of housing requirements in some of the largest and most built-up local authority areas will tend to cause further delay because of this difficulty. Even if the recommendations of the Uthwatt Report are carried out, this obstacle is unlikely to disappear in the big towns.

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built by private enterprise. In London, Middlesex, Kent and Essex alone over 70,000 houses were produced in one year in this way. Unfortunately the problem is not just one of building houses, it is that of building houses to let, a process which means investment either by private individuals or through state organisations. In 1937-8 private people invested in 42 thousand new working-class houses to let; this was the maximum for any one year. There is little reason to suppose that there will be any greater enthusiasm for venturing into this field in the far more uncertain conditions of the post-war period.

If planned attempts to restore the *status quo ante* in detail seem likely to fail, the case for the alternative of leaving local authorities to do what they like is perhaps strengthened. It may be better to bow to the inevitable. Complete freedom for local authorities and private enterprise would, however, be inconsistent with a rational system of priorities for building resources. The way would be opened to scramble for resources and uncontrolled increases in building costs similar to those experienced after the last war. This would result in houses being provided primarily for those who could pay most. Private enterprise would undoubtedly build houses for sale; local authorities would tend to let houses on the basis of ability of tenants to pay rather than on the urgency of need for houses. It is only if the results of housing policy between 1919 and 1930 are considered to be satisfactory, that the possibility of such a situation, aggravated by the probable peculiar geographical distribution of demand after this war, can be regarded with equanimity.

It can, of course, be argued that as long as the amount of building resources allocated to housing are so limited that only a few tens of thousands of houses can be built a year, no policy will make much difference. But sooner or later resources can and must be made available. Though the destruction of buildings during this war has introduced a source of demand for building resources which did not exist after the last war, it must be remembered that not only has the building industry not been destroyed since 1939 but its capacity at that date was greater than in 1914 by at least 50 per cent.¹ Restoration of the industry to its 1939 level will make possible a much greater absolute output of buildings than the parallel restoration after the Great War. Even without any sort of practical plan for increasing capacity, the average annual output of houses in the

¹ Measured by changes in the numbers of bricklayers. This probably underestimates the increase in capacity as it makes no allowance for changes in technique.

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first four years after the armistice was 60 thousand. It should be possible to do better than that after this war.

There is no real excuse for procrastination over plans. The difficulties of attempting to base them on some sort of restoration of the *status quo ante* are so formidable, however, that the possibility of approaching the post-war housing situation from an entirely different angle must be considered. It will be convenient to proceed by stages: to decide what were the worst weaknesses in the system of supplying houses before the war, to assess the effects of the war in increasing or diminishing the importance of those weaknesses, and finally, to examine some of the possibilities of using such resources as are available to relieve the worst deficiencies in the supply of houses resulting from these developments.

The most obvious deficiency in the pre-war system was in the provision of working-class houses to let. In between the two wars four million houses were built, but only 1½ million of these were houses to let of normal working-class type—that is of four or five rooms with rateable values under £14 (£20 in the Metropolitan Police District). The supply of typically working-class houses increased by only a third, compared to increases of two-thirds for other houses. The increase in the former was mainly dependent on the energies of local authorities. As private enterprise was far more active than local authorities, the system was in practice strongly biased in favour of those who could afford to buy their own houses. There is no reasonable doubt that only the best-off working-class families could do this. For instance, according to sample inquiries, about 18 per cent of the urban insured families had embarked on owner-occupation by 1938, compared to 65 per cent among professional and semi-professional families.¹ It is ludicrous to suppose that the difference can be explained without taking into account the smaller financial resources of the insured group.

The pre-war system could only work satisfactorily if extensive house-purchase by those who could afford it left sufficient suitable houses vacant for the rest of the population. The fact that there were in 1939 approximately the same number of houses as families does not show that this was the case. The abandoned houses might or might not be of the right kind or in the right place. They were old-fashioned and less convenient than new houses. The system had the inevitable

¹ Ministry of Labour Cost of Living Inquiry 1937-8 (published in Ministry of Labour Gazette, December 1940) and "Expenditure of 1,360 British Middle Class Households in 1938-9." (Paper by P. Massey read before the Royal Statistical Society, June 16th, 1942.)

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disadvantages of making the supply of houses for the majority of the population dependent *not on their requirements* but on the willingness of other people to buy new houses.

The system had other disadvantages of a less obvious kind. It tended to hamper the mobility of the population and to increase the size of towns already too big. Apart from the local authority estates on the outskirts of the old towns, the supply of houses to let was concentrated either in derelict areas or inside the towns. Those families who could not afford to buy houses were tied to the existing towns and only able to shift from one to the other. As the bulk of working-class families were thus inevitably static, other families were obliged to live in a periphery of suburbs round the old industrial and commercial core in order to earn their daily bread. The system had no geographical elasticity.

The war has affected this situation in two quite different ways. The additional shortage of working-class houses has made a situation already barely tolerable quite intolerable. In view of the bias of the provision of houses before the war in favour of houses for sale, there is *a priori* good reason for attempting to use any new houses that can be built to counteract it. Moreover, since the requirements of families who could afford to buy had been so much more adequately satisfied before the war, the effects of the cessation of building and destruction of houses must be proportionately less serious than in the case of working-class houses. There is thus a very strong case for a higher priority of building resources for working-class houses after the war than that which would be required under any serious attempt to restore the *status quo ante*. It will be observed that the post-war problem is not made any simpler by this conclusion.

The second effect of the war is more encouraging. The destruction of houses, factories and other buildings by the blitz provides an opportunity for modifying the results of the excessive locational rigidity of the pre-war system. It is possible to replace some of the old buildings by new ones in new areas. For once there is a chance of unscrambling some eggs. This in itself would ease the concentration of building requirements in particular places, relieving the burden both on local authorities and on local building resources. The process could be carried further and applied to part of the slum clearance and decrowding programmes and to the supply of houses for the additional families in the population.

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If advantage is to be taken of this opportunity, a policy of controlled location of industry is essential.

Although the Report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population is already several years old, there is no sign that we are within sight of a decision. An immense number of questions depend on this. If some form of control of location of industry is adopted, then the questions of how far existing towns are to be allowed to return to their pre-war size or to increase must be settled, and how many new or expanded towns are to be allowed. The rebuilding, slum clearance and decrowding programmes as well as general house-building programmes are all dependent on this factor. Machinery for co-ordinating these programmes on a national or regional basis must be set up; the extent of interference with the existing powers and duties of local authorities determined. Organisations for carrying out the construction and government of new towns will have to be planned and created. All these are questions requiring much thought and public as well as technical discussion.

On the other hand, if it is decided not to control the location of industry, then the question of whether serious attempts to remedy the bias in the housing system should be made must be discussed from another angle. They will not form part of a general policy of location and must be treated as a housing question pure and simple. The question of how far the state is going to take responsibility for working-class houses must be decided as well as the practical possibility of evolving an organisation capable of carrying it out. It will be convenient to say a little about this latter question first. The basic difficulty apart from finance will occur, as we have seen, in those areas in which housing needs will be beyond the organising capacity of local authorities, or where there are acute difficulties in finding suitable sites. The recommendations of the Uthwatt Committee may alleviate the problem of sites. The creation of a new type of authority less tender of the vested interests of ratepayers in land and buildings might also help. Housing departments responsible in the first instance to the elected representatives of ratepayers are apt to be hampered by the necessity of considering the feelings of their employers. Essentially, however, the hard economic core of the problem is to discover a system of state building able to make use of all the resources open to private builders small and large. It is a problem of organisation which requires urgent and careful study.

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III.—*Is the Provision of Houses to be a Social Service?*

Definition of the post-war housing problem in terms of the *status quo ante* presupposes acceptance of the thesis that the state must assume responsibility for housing in periods of crisis or acute shortage. This is entirely consistent with the attitude towards state intervention in the house market before this war. Although immediately after the Great War the responsibility for the provision of working-class houses was imposed by the Housing and Town Planning, etc., Act on the local authorities (and this was confirmed in later Acts), in practice responsibility was narrowly interpreted in terms of alleviating the shortage in the cheapest possible way. In 1933 a new interpretation of state responsibility was given. Government policy was stated to be to prevent people living below certain minimum standards of housing. In the first instance this was defined in terms of slums, but in 1935 was extended to include overcrowding. The provision of houses for all families not actually living in slums, or not overcrowded, was stated to be the function of private enterprise.¹ The state retained responsibility only for the control of the rents of pre-1914 houses and for the definition of the minimum standards that new houses, if built, must satisfy. Thus, apart from crisis conditions, state responsibility has only been accepted in practice for preventing people falling below a minimum standard, much lower than that to which new houses must conform.

A housing policy directed towards remedying defects in the housing system involves a new conception of state responsibility: a responsibility for providing modern houses for those who need them on terms which they can afford. If a system of controlled location of industry is finally chosen, this conception will necessarily be accepted either explicitly or implicitly. If location is left uncontrolled, housing policy for the post-war period must either accept or reject this responsibility. This is one of the most fundamental of the unsettled questions of housing policy.

IV.—*Problems of Finance*

If the old conception of state responsibility is retained, novel financial issues will not arise. If the new one is adopted, however, questions arise as to the terms on which houses are to be let. For instance, are large numbers of similar houses to be let at rents adjusted to the capacity of individual tenants to

¹ Report of Inter-departmental Committee on Housing, 1933 (Cmd. 4397).

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pay, by subsidies? If these adjustments are to be made on a reasonably flexible basis, some form of means test would be retained as a permanent part of the housing system just when the trend in other spheres is generally in favour of its abolition. An entirely different system might be developed by borrowing the idea of the production of utility goods. A standard utility type of house might be provided at a uniform rent in each area fixed at a level well within the reach of, say, ordinary families of unskilled labourers with children. The difference between the economic rent and this utility rent would be bridged by a subsidy. Only families in exceptional circumstances would receive rebates. The rent which would satisfy these conditions would depend partly on the extent to which the Beveridge system of social security and family allowances was adopted. The level of rates, and possible modifications in the rating system if controlled location of industry is adopted, would also affect it. Elasticity and some freedom of choice could be secured by provision of better, or more elaborate, houses at rents increased proportionately to their additional cost for those who cared to pay more. It would be part of the function of the housing authority to judge the market in this respect. After all, if the state in practice has a monopoly of new houses to let, the inherent tendencies of all monopolies to ignore the wishes of consumers and avoid risks must be overcome.

It is impossible in an article of this length to deal thoroughly with questions of the cost of various housing policies. The experience of the past twenty years provides some general guide, however. The average net subsidised rent of 866,277 local authority houses was, in 1936, 7s. 6d. a week. The annual cost of the subsidies was not more than £16 million, although these houses included all those built in the period of exceptionally high building costs after the last war, and the majority were built when local authorities were borrowing at 5 per cent or more. In the more favourable circumstances following the great depression of the early thirties, it would have been possible to build a million ordinary 3-bedroomed houses to let at an average net rent of 6s. a week with a subsidy of £6 million a year. This is not a large amount, and suggests that a much extended housing programme before the war would not have imposed an undue financial burden on the country. These rents, however, do not include rates, and by the time rates, varying from, say, 2s. to 4s. and more a week, had been added, the houses would have been out of reach of large numbers of families. Increases of subsidy

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would have been needed to offset the rates, that is to offset the cost of local government and services paid for out of the rates; in other words, an indirect subsidy to local social services would have been needed. It is extremely doubtful whether it is rational to include such subsidies in the cost of housing rather than to debit them to other social services. The distinction ought, at any rate, to be kept in mind in assessing the merits of different housing policies in the future, in order to prevent excessive weight being attached to their apparent cost.

Conclusion—Questions of Policy to be answered.

It has been the purpose of this article to indicate some of the most important questions of housing policy which must be answered before plans for dealing with the post-war housing situation can be made, and to outline some of the considerations involved. These questions are so fundamental that officials are not in a position to answer them on their own responsibility. They must be debated in the streets and in Parliament. The most vital to decide immediately are—

First, what definition of the housing problem is to be accepted and what degree of state responsibility for the provision of working-class houses? In other words, is housing going to be treated as a genuine social service after the war or is a return to be made to the old pre-war system?

Second, is the location of industry to be controlled after the war and house building treated as part of the general social and economic problem of planning the geographical distribution of the population?

Until decisions on these two problems are reached, all the other questions of organisation and finance cannot be settled. Postponement of serious debate and Government reticence have already begun to give the impression that the Government is hiding behind a belief that building resources will be so scarce after the war that no policy will make any difference. In view of the vast number of dependent subsidiary questions to be settled and the amount of work required to evolve a workable method of carrying out any policy, the procrastination is becoming dangerous.

THE CURRENCY PLANS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

By T. BALOGH

INTERNATIONAL Trade is essential for the maintenance of the British standard of life." How often are these impeccable words followed by the statement "Britain cannot afford an improvement in wages or in social services because such improvement would destroy exports?"

The prevalence of such misconceptions alone would necessitate a re-examination of the "theory" of international economic relations which was so strangely different from the "practice" actually followed. The British, the United States and the Canadian experts have now spoken and put forward their views on the international arrangements which are to be the basis for a general co-operative effort to abolish want. Remembering the failures of the 'twenties and 'thirties, it behoves us to scrutinise with some care the proposals which are to give effect to the lofty phrases of the Dunkirk period and of the Atlantic Charter.

All successful post-war planning of international economic relations must start from the lesson of the past decades. It is quite apparent, from a study of the inter-war period, that surpluses and deficiencies in the balance of international payments, indeed the volume of international trade itself, were not so much determined by changes in basic structural factors (e.g. in taste, technique, discoveries) as by slumps and booms in national economics large enough to influence total world demand. Protectionism, except when undertaken for aggressive military reasons, was, in the main, the consequence of acute crises which threatened the existence of important sections of the population.

If a slump starts in any country *all* other countries will be immediately affected. With home demand sagging, its industries will increase their sales pressure abroad (after a time probably aided by a fall in wages). The demand of the country for foreign products will slump. Thus, even if the balances of payments of all countries had been in equilibrium before the slump occurred, they will be thrown out of gear by the slump. The depressed country will acquire a surplus in their balance of trade. Other countries will experience a deficiency.

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If the "deficit" country takes counter measures against the worsening of its balance of trade this will—for the same reasons—further aggravate the crisis. A grave danger arises of each country trying to remedy the diminution of internal demand by cutting imports and stimulating exports, i.e. by "beggar-my-neighbour" policies of cumulative protection or of (competitive) depreciation.

Equally disturbing would be the refusal of a country (if large enough) to prevent an inflationary spiral. It would then (if the Gold Standard or some such mechanism did not impose limits to its expansion or if its currency did not depreciate) export its inflation to other countries trying to maintain stability at full employment. It would then be able to impose on these countries a fall in their real income, as it would bid against home consumers for their supplies (and by bidding for its own exports reduce the imports of those countries).

These considerations suggest that a full solution of the problem of re-establishing an international monetary system without perpetuating international business cycles and thus eliminating the most important cause of protectionism can come only through a prior agreement on home policy. If each of the countries pledges itself to maintain stable and full employment there would be no *general* reason for protection. Real wages would then adversely be affected by any restrictionist policy, and the fatal, because irresistible, alliance between Trade Unions and Employers' Associations would be considerably weakened. Without such agreement the same influences and factors which drove the world towards economic (as contrasted with the deliberate Nazi military) self-sufficiency will inevitably re-assert themselves. But they will come upon us piecemeal as the occasion forces defensive measures on each nation. It will, therefore, be impossible to evolve a new system which combines international intercourse and stability.

Such agreement, in spite of its patent advantages to all, is at least improbable because of the considerable differences in the social and economic background of the main world powers. The question arises, therefore, whether a more limited scheme could not be elaborated which would secure that countries should be able to continue this policy of full employment irrespective of the depression abroad (and the consequent worsening of their balance of payments). Such scheme must, furthermore secure that the original depression in the surplus countries should not be aggravated by measures taken by the

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deficit countries in pursuit of their full employment policy so as to avoid cumulative retaliation. There will, of course, be cases in which the deficiency in the balance of payments of a country would persist even if all other countries were fully employed because it arose out of its own misfortunes (crop failures, etc.) or its own policies (inefficiency coupled with high wages, etc.). In these cases any help given to the "deficit" country must be conditional upon her undertaking measures of readjustment. But in those cases where the deficiency of a country's balance of payments is solely due to depression abroad, in a sane world that country *must not* be forced to undertake any readjustment, for in doing so it would deepen the world depression.¹ Apart from this, no international agreement or scheme, if it is to be satisfactory, must render a long term planning of the production and exchange of commodities between regionally and imperially linked countries impossible. Nor must it prevent the undertaking of long term development and industrialisation of poor countries. And it should interfere as little as possible with *national* policies and the character of economic systems.

Theoretically the problem of maintaining full employment in any single country or a group of countries can be solved in two ways. (a) Either a scheme must be evolved which enables a member country to offset a fall in effective demand due to the emergence of a depression abroad. This implies that measures must be taken to offset internally the depressing effect of the consequent worsening of their balance of payments. But such internal reflationary measures, if not accompanied by increased protection, must necessarily lead to a continued accumulation of adverse balances, until the emergence of a sufficiently large favourable balance in the depressed countries restarts an expansion there, and thus cures the original depression. (b) Secondly, schemes can be elaborated by which the

¹ This approach is radically different from that taken by most—especially American—critics of the currency plans. Both the British and the Canadian proposals emphasise the fact that the surplus of any country is ultimately decided by that country unilaterally. Yet the main point of attack was directed against the possible "unlimited" obligations which the British plan imposes on the creditor. It must be admitted (cf. above) that a deliberate inflationist policy of a country or a refusal by a country to adjust her internal affairs in order to balance her international payments, can impose burdens on other countries (i.e. diminish her real income or generate inflation). But, except in the immediate post-war period and failing a radical re-shaping of the U.S. economic system, this is not the problem the world will in all probability be faced with in the longer run. It seems that these critics in their insistence on necessity of "discipline" and "self-imposed limitations" in international economic relations are already oblivious of the lessons of the 1930's. Restrictive economic policies are no doubt inimical to maximum real income. But they will always be preferred to general bankruptcy and mass unemployment. The same authors oppose internal measures to stabilise employment. In the absence of positive policies negative and exclusive measures are the only means of counteracting a deflationary spiral.

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eventual balancing of international accounts is brought about more directly, irrespective of the fact that some countries may be unsuccessful in preserving full employment.

This can be done either by a multilateral arrangement, by which "additional exports" from the deficit countries are ensured automatically; or by a penalisation of such surplus countries which acquired international credits only because they lost their internal balance and use foreign trade policies as a means of home employment policy; or, finally, by making arrangements by which countries which are able and willing to pursue a full employment policy, are enabled to maintain their policy by direct agreements among themselves, regulating their foreign trade and payments, and securing equilibrium with countries who are unable, or politically unwilling, to do so, by a quantitative regulation of their imports and exports.

THE CURRENCY PROPOSALS AND THE FUTURE.¹

How far are these requirements met by the British and U.S. proposals?²

A word of caution and explanation is necessary here. The United States (and to some extent Canada) have in the last decades been not merely surplus countries but (apart from a short period in 1933) also the recipients of vast capital imports. Britain has been liquidating her foreign investments since 1930, and will emerge from this war almost a net debtor nation, quite apart from the fact that her *current* balance of trade will need substantial readjustment. Most European countries will be pauperised and in dire need of foreign help. This vast difference in economic background necessarily imprints itself on economic thinking, which is subject to influences emanating from contemporary problems. One must, therefore, expect differences in *national* approach, differences which cut across and modify *political* differences *within* countries. Progressive U.S. economists such as Professor Viner condemn exchange control as a reactionary measure, thinking of the Nazi New Order, because, given the U.S. position, the problem of the foreign balance does not influence, much less determine, *internal* social policies in the U.S. They are utterly uncomprehending when a

¹ The Canadian is a well-meant attempt to arrive at a compromise between the two plans. It need not, therefore, be discussed separately.

² Space does not permit a detailed review of the provisions of the different currency plans. Readers not already familiar with their provisions are referred to the *Economist*, May 1st, 1943, p. 556, and April 10th, 1943, p. 452. *The Bulletin of International News*, November 15th, 1943. *The Banker*, May and June, 1943, as well as to the Supplement to the *Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics*, "The New Plans for International Trade."

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European economist points out that exchange control is—barring international agreements on the lines suggested—the *conditio sine qua non* of progressive internal policies. They do not see that by their attitude they help the very reactionaries in Europe whom they oppose at home. They misjudge their true friends in Europe and weaken their influence.

The U.S. scheme can hardly be said to show awareness of our problem. Indeed, it must be considered an attempt to restore the oldest-fashioned gold standard by methods which are closely similar to the procedure adopted in the 1920's with disastrous results, but with far less generous means than were then put at the disposal of the pauperised countries of Europe. In all fairness to the U.S. experts, it must be stated that they chose a difficult and arid way of presenting their proposals. They elaborated a draft of the Statutes of a United and Associated Nations Stabilisation Fund.

The scheme envisages the establishment of a fund of \$5,000 millions, of which half is to be paid in immediately. Any further payments or the enlargement of the means of the Fund are made dependent upon the consent of the future credit countries. All member countries have to pay part of their contribution ("normally" 12.5 per cent, which can be decreased to a minimum of 5 per cent) in gold. The rest is contributed in their home currencies or Government securities. Each of the member states has the right to purchase foreign exchange up to the limit of 100 per cent of its quota in the first year of the operation of the Fund, an additional 50 per cent in the second and third years. Once the limits are reached, further amounts can only be obtained with the consent of 4-5ths of the votes which are distributed proportionately to quotas held, i.e. in practice subject to the veto of U.S. When the Fund becomes exhausted both creditors *and* debtors must pay additional contributions, again partly in gold. To him who hath . . . But even this rather meagre credit-facility is limited by the availability in the Fund of "scarce" currencies, i.e. the currencies of the creditor nations (quite apart from the fact that 15 per cent of these is apparently considered as an irreducible minimum).¹ Should the U.S. be the only important creditor country, the total credit extended by this means would be \$625 millions.

The authors of the proposals evidently envisage a system in which the monetary policies of all participating countries are

¹ The *net* addition to the means of the prospective debtors is less than 100 (200) per cent of their quota as they have to contribute some gold to the Fund.

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identical. *If* there is a crisis in any one large country (i.e. in practice, in the U.S.), all other countries must follow suit.¹ They presumably arrived at the figure of \$5,000 millions by taking an arbitrary period before the war (when no international lending existed to "distort" the balances of trade, a greater part of Europe, under the leadership of Nazi Germany, practised war economic autarky, and no one else attempted to maintain a pacific full employment policy) and adding up the negative balances of trade. Not daring to separate the immediate post-war and the longer run problems, they provide a system of *rationing* the scarcest currencies among the prospective claimants. They freeze the present mal-distribution of gold and other liquid international assets, by obliging all countries to sell to the Fund such reserves acquired *after* they joined the scheme!² While the document inveighs against exchange control (except if instituted against capital export, and even in that case preferably by way of discouraging the acceptance of foreign deposits), this inevitably entails strictest control of all foreign payments and discrimination against U.S. exports. Indeed, though the phrasing of the documents permits of several interpretations, the working of the scheme is difficult to imagine without such control: for the proposal restricts the sale of foreign exchange to debtors to that for the purpose of *current* transactions, to cover the deficit in the trade with *specific* countries (III 3a). The insufficiency of means is therefore evident: the U.K. alone when returning to gold in 1925 was granted a stabilisation credit of some \$500 millions.³

Even more revealing than the quantitative aspects of the plan are the numerous points (II. 4, III. 1, III. 3 c and f, III. 9 L, III. 12, III. 13, III. 1), which regulate the dealings of the Fund in the home currency and the Government securities of the member country, contributed as part of the quota. The average European economist is here confronted with a puzzle:

¹ A change in exchange rates is made dependent on 4-5th majority of votes, i.e. ruled out, as depreciation would certainly aggravate a depression in the "surplus" countries.

The Fund is to prepare a report on the causes of the surplus to the creditor countries. But the latter need not accede to the proposals of the Fund as to how to diminish the surplus. As we have seen, *any* measure except the increase in home demand will aggravate the depression in the surplus countries, and is therefore hardly likely to be accepted. A reflation policy at home, however, will not be inaugurated because of international reports when the distress at home was unsuccessful to enforce it.

² This would seem to rule out the maintenance of the "sterling" block while U.S. dependencies, not having separate currencies, could still "bank" with the Federal Reserve System. Shades of "non-discrimination"!

³ The Canadian proposals seek to remedy these drawbacks by increasing the size of the Fund to \$8,000 millions, with an additional 50 per cent call on surplus countries whose currencies become scarce, and permitting a 5 (10) per cent devaluation.

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for what purpose, he is bound to ask, are these extremely complicated stipulations on the lending, selling, etc., of the *home* currency of a member country? Surely if a Government needs home currency it has merely to go to the Central Bank and get it. The plan is evidently based on the "theory" of the "independence" of Central Banks and currency managements from "politics," i.e. the dependence of the Governments on the "confidence" and "help" of their financial community. *If* currency management (and the volume of credit) is rigidly fixed to gold, then all these rigmaroles which look so odd to anybody in war-time Britain are perfectly comprehensible and important. For these stipulations enable Governments to undertake exchange equalisation while sterilising the internal effects.

The British plan is written in the most persuasive tones of one of the few living masters of the English tongue. The reader is warned in advance that currency arrangements, however flexible, cannot give a full answer to the ultimate task of post-war economic policy. They can only eliminate some specific *monetary* causes of crises. The plan is aimed at giving an expansionary bias to the world economic system. It attempts to do so by creating a new, internationally acceptable medium of exchange and distributing it among the different member states proportionately to their needs: the first of the methods discussed above.¹ This legerdemain is accomplished by giving each country the right to pay any deficiencies in her current balance of payments by a draft on an international banking institution (called the Clearing Union, really a true Bank of International Settlements), up to a certain amount, i.e. one-quarter (half) of its so-called quota.² The equivalent of this deficiency is then credited to the countries which achieved a surplus. This creation of new monetary "reserves" and their distribution according to need substantially reduces the present

¹ Lord Keynes seems to have desired to combine the creation of international liquidity with an automatic method by which depression in any one country, or rather its effect on the balances of payments of other countries are neutralised by forgiving surpluses, appreciating the currency, etc. (II. 9 a-d). This *automatic* adjustment enforced on surplus countries limiting the cumulative exhaustion down of the newly-created liquidity which is so essential to the smooth working of the scheme in the longer run appear merely as optional recommendations to surplus countries in the proposals as published. Presumably other British experts did not believe this to be acceptable by the prospective (depressed) creditors, whose business activity they would further lower (III. 7-9, IV. 17). A compromise solution compromising the solution was put forth.

² The quota is equivalent to three-quarters of the average foreign trade in 1936-8. This principle favoured Britain unduly, though it is logical. The U.S. plan bases the borrowing power of members on the contributions paid into the Fund, i.e. its *lending* power, its gold reserves, etc. It thus strengthens the strong. Borrowing power and contributions must be separated from one another and from voting power.

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mal-distribution of international liquid assets. The share of the U.S., which now holds 70 per cent, is reduced to 50 per cent. Thus the danger that countries will be forced to bilateral arrangements and autarky by reason of their illiquidity is also reduced.

The British plan is founded on the principle of reflatting the "surplus" countries by their surpluses. If the quotas, i.e. surpluses, were sufficiently large for this purpose, and if "deficit" countries therefore only had to undertake deflationary or more specific¹ readjustments (de-valuation of over 5 per cent being dependent on the consent of a majority of countries) in respect of such deficiencies as would persist even if *all* countries were fully employed, an "expansionist bias" would indeed be imparted to the world economic system. As published, the scheme suffers from a double disadvantage: it is under certain circumstances not sufficiently "expansionist," under others far too "expansionist." Let us take these in turn.

The creation of the bancor reserve in the words of the proposal is a "once-for-all endowment." Should any one country exhaust the new limits set, indeed anything more than a quarter of the new reserves, and if the corresponding surplus is not sufficient to start a boom in the creditor country, the deflationary bias in the world system would reassert itself.

The creation of more than \$20,000 millions of imaginary gold reserves will not alter the basic weaknesses of the present uncontrolled economic system. In 1919 it might have been enough, as indeed it is the logical development of the resolutions of the Brussels and Genoa conferences on "economising" gold. But the position of comparative equipoise between the various national units of the world economic system has been drastically changed by the two wars and technical progress. In the nineteenth century the level of national output in the leading political powers was not of a markedly different order of magnitude. Now the potential net investment capacity (or its equivalent voluntary savings) of the United States at full employment will, after the first restocking boom, at a minimum of some \$16,000 million—scarcely be less than one-half, and might be as high as two-thirds of the investment capacity of the world, excluding the U.S.S.R. Yet it does not seem probable that the foreign trade will be more than a small fraction of the total national income of the U.S. The emergence of a favourable trade balance

¹ I.e. tariffs or other measures falling into the sphere of commercial policy as would decrease imports or increase exports.

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can therefore hardly alter total investment sufficiently to counteract a violent downward swing originating internally.¹

It is legitimate to assume that the instability of the economic system of the United States will not be moderated to a significantly greater degree by Government intervention than in the 1930's. The ease with which demobilisation can be managed under *laissez-faire* if an inflationary boom develops is likely to blind once more the American party machines to the basic problems. It seems more than likely that the restrictions and controls necessary to secure stability at full employment will seem politically unacceptable to the American public. Given the checks and balances of the American constitution, reforms will not be introduced in time to avoid violent economic fluctuations. We might, therefore, easily be faced with a situation in which the U.S. may have export surpluses of the order of magnitude of \$4,000 millions for some years without inducing a boom in that country. Such surpluses would exert a deflationary pressure even under the British plan after the end of the first year, if other countries tried to maintain full employment without measures to increase self-sufficiency. The White and the Canadian schemes would break down—in this sense—after a few months of acute depression in U.S. From a longer run point of view, even the British scheme does not guarantee the possibility of maintaining full employment. We shall then witness the spread of depression and of those "malpractices" which are now condemned by the same people who oppose the "Keynes" scheme.

In the period immediately after the war (and in such subsequent periods in which there should be a tendency in any large or a number of smaller countries, to over employment) the Keynes scheme enables the export of inflation from one country to another. The inflating country then imposes upon other, fully employed, countries a burden; it competes away supplies and thus diminishes their real income. Admittedly in the long run this problem is not of as great an importance as under-employment. But given the instability of certain national units, it is grave enough to demand an answer.

SUGGESTION FOR A FLEXIBLE SOLUTION.

We might conclude this review by some positive suggestions: If the British proposals could be amended in two respects, they would provide a solution of the problem of allowing the main-

¹ Though the reverse, an inflationary excess, might well involve a general world inflation. Cf. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion*, pp. 233-7.

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tenance of full employment in single countries when others are unwilling or unable to pursue appropriate policies without at the same time lending themselves to inflationary abuse and without leading to autarkic policies.

(a) The solution of the monetary problem of the relief and reconstruction period must be separated from the longer run problem. This is, in any case, bound to happen, as foreign trade will then still be closely controlled in all countries, if only to check inflationary excesses. The movement of goods in that period should be closely planned by the appropriate Inter-Allied Boards with which the U.S.S.R. should be associated.

A Clearing Union should be brought into being, but the quotas of each nation should *not, in this period*, be fixed on the basis of a rigid formula based on irrelevant criteria such as suggested in *all* the plans, but on the one hand the priority needs of the countries and the availability of supplies on the other. Most supplies will have to be made available on a "relief" basis. All others should be paid for by the new clearing scheme.

(b) Once the world economic system shows signs of reintegration, and the immediate post-war shortages are eliminated, the Clearing Union can proceed to "normalise" quotas for each country on the basis of a more rigid formula based on *post-war* foreign trade and national income figures. These quotas should, however, be regarded merely as a *fond-de-roulement*, an intermediary credit frame and *not* as the main mechanism of maintaining full employment without internationally having to resort to a restriction of foreign trade.

That function must be taken over (as is now gradually becoming apparent also as far as internal policy is concerned) from a purely *banking* institution by an International *Investment* Board.¹ Whenever full employment flags in any one country this Board should grant development loans to countries needing long term capital investment with the proviso that the loans must be spent (with due safeguards preventing exploitation)² in the "mature" countries which have developed a deficit in their balances of payments *solely* because of the depression. In this way full employment can be stabilised internationally by diverting real resources towards those countries most needing them, real resources which, without this intervention would become unemployed. The International Board will, therefore, in the first instance, only utilise resources which would otherwise not be utilised. It should be noted that in view of the

¹ This plan has been elaborated by Messrs. Schumacher & Kalecki (*ibid.* p. 30).

² Cf. my article *ibid.* pp. 34-37.

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terrible discrepancy in the standard of life between different countries, this method does not suffice. But any *further* international lending will necessitate *restriction* in the immediate consumption of the *rich* countries. It must be undertaken (with or without the intermediary of the Investment Board) by a conscious policy of these countries.

Deficiencies and surpluses in the balances of payments, which do not, in the first instance, arise out of depressions, must be dealt with by more direct readjustment of the countries concerned. The International Agencies can facilitate these readjustments by helping to maintain world demand, but an attempt to deal with them by any "clearing" procedure would lead to general inflation.

The advantages—both to prospective surplus and deficiency countries—of such a scheme, which would guarantee the maintenance of full employment internationally without interfering with the national policies and prejudices of the member countries, are so obvious that the adherence of all United Nations should be assured. It is most improbable, however, that all countries would in fact adhere to a system which, at least superficially, infringes their sovereign rights. We must, therefore, face the alternatives of introducing the scheme among countries which would follow a British lead, or of abandoning such a scheme altogether and joining some international monetary arrangement which—as even the British proposals—does not safeguard the possibility of maintaining full employment at home irrespective of foreign economic policies. It would be regrettable if the Government decided for the latter alternative. The loss caused by economic fluctuations—amounting in the inter-war years to some 10–20 per cent of the country's national income—is far bigger than any gain which could be reaped from such "fully international" system as would be re-created. A regional block, consisting of the British Commonwealth and Western Europe with its Empires, is, even without protective devices, self-sufficient enough to need little or no foreign trade. The greater the regional block, moreover, the less easy it is for any outside countries to remain in isolation or to take retaliatory action against it. At any rate, if the Government should accept a formula less satisfactory than that outlined by Messrs. Schumacher & Kalecki then they must insist on an escape clause which would permit the cancellation of all engagement should unemployment rise above a limit of, say, 10–15 per cent in certain major countries.

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Whatever monetary arrangements are arrived at, the freedom of concluding reciprocal long term purchase agreements must be maintained. This implies—if a complete monopoly of foreign trading is not to be introduced in this country—the freedom of concluding, at least with respect to our main imports and exports, reciprocal purchase agreements at special conditions and prices.¹ It also implies the liberty of regulating both exports and imports quantitatively by the block.

The insistence on the embargo on the export of capital is welcome. It is a *conditio sine qua non* of a full employment policy. But it is rather rash to assume that it is not merely a necessary but also a sufficient condition of success in securing stable and full employment.²

There is a grave danger that the national interests of Britain, whose position as a world power depends on her ability to maintain full employment and far-reaching controls over her economic system, will be sacrificed to vested interests, bent on maintaining the pre-war system. They will plead the necessity of entering into arrangements with the United States, even though these will prevent this country from taking the lead in establishing in Western Europe a progressive economic block powerful enough to be an equal—and therefore friendly—partner of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., while at the same

¹ Lord Keynes's insistence (House of Lords, Col. 528/9, 1943) that the abstinence from such regulated clearing arrangements is favourable to Britain seems curious. The arithmetic of our foreign trade—some £400-£500 million of exports as against almost £1,000 million imports—hardly suggest this thesis. Cf. in this connection Sir R. Street's proposal of segregating "staple" exports and imports in commercial agreements from "general" trade.

² Opinions still differ as to the minimum of agreement that would safeguard full employment and stability. The British Government—or rather the draftsmen of the White Paper—seem to imply that provided the framework of commercial policy is established by common consent (White Paper, Preface 2) the production, distribution and price of primary products is regulated (*ibid.* (3)), the problem of international aid to "backward" countries is settled (*ibid.* (4)), this can be achieved by monetary measures alone. Of these the regulation of interest rates (backed by appropriate control of capital exports) looms largest in their minds. Cf. White Paper, VII-32-36, and more emphatically Lord Keynes, House of Lords, Col. 533. But the use of Government loan expenditure seems to be envisaged (*ibid.* II-6, (9) (a)). Disequilibria of transient nature are to be eliminated by a slight (5 per cent) depreciation of the currency (*ibid.* (8) (a)). Disturbances of a permanent nature are to be dealt with by further depreciation of an agreed amount or "appropriate" "internal measures" of an unspecified nature of which exchange control affecting foreign trade and involving "blocking" arrangements are specifically excluded. Lord Keynes (*ibid.* Col. 538). It is tentatively acknowledged that the maintenance of full employment is a *conditio sine qua non* of the success of any international arrangement. But it is implicitly hoped that a system by which some latitude is given to countries to pursue their expansive policy will be sufficient to attain this object.

The experience of the two wars as well as the intermediate period does not seem to warrant this optimism. It points to the conclusion that a far closer quantitative control of the economic system is necessary than is at present admitted by those who tolerate controls over production, prices, etc., in war-time as a disagreeable *pis-aller* and refuse to admit that they are necessary in order to enable the combination of stability and economic progress. Cf. my article, *Revolution in Economics*. "This Changing World," Routledge,

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time promoting maximum progress and prosperity internally. The vested interests (especially in agriculture) will at the same time successfully insist on protection without positive planning. Britain might easily find herself committed to such multilateralism such as will prevent all planning for full employment and efficiency. The decrease in the standard of life of the masses will be the price to pay.

The enemies of reform in this country will use to the utmost the argument that a progressive solution of our economic problems would instantly and irrevocably embroil Britain with the United States. At the same time the enemies of reform in the United States will be willing to succour a moribund British monopoly capitalism sufficiently to enable her to vegetate, yet weak enough to render her dependent on U.S. help. Thus the solution of Britain's basic problems would be postponed—at the cost of aggravating them. It is most unfortunate that closer contact is not maintained between progressives here and U.S. In the end a chaotic autarky will be the consequence, far narrower than any sensible person would wish, enforced by sheer monetary pressure. It will then be too late to reverse events and organise a progressive economic block between the opposing camps of collectivism and monopoly capitalism.

No change in this dismal trend can be expected until the preparatory work for international post-war arrangements, both political and economic, is subject to free discussion in each of these countries. If there had been such discussion before the British currency proposals were published, the subsequent international negotiations would have been conducted in an atmosphere far more favourable to the British case than they in fact were. There will always be a tendency in Government proposals to anticipate (especially international) criticism and put them forward in an attenuated form in the hope of inducing a similar attitude. These hopes are usually disappointed. But the fact that concessions were made to the opposing point of view renders the position of negotiators impossible. They cannot ask for more than what they proposed (however insufficient that was), but they might be forced to further concessions. The present method of secrecy favours reaction. Progress is, moreover, further menaced by the fact that its enemies can be found in every country. And in all countries they seem to be triumphantly on the ascendant.

(Since this paper was written much has happened to confirm the estimate of the prospects to justify the scepticism expressed

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about the tactical handling of the British case. Even the White scheme has been sharply attacked by the United States banking community who seem to have successfully repressed all memories of 1929-33. Mr. Eric Johnston's visit should have disenchanted many in this country who thought that somehow or other constructive collaboration with the United States is a practical possibility. His insistence on freedom of capital movements and a renewed exploitation by Anglo-U.S. private enterprise of capital hungry parts of the world should have opened eyes however firmly closed to the realities of the position. Finally, the new edition of the "White" scheme dealt a blow to wishful thinkers. This document was obviously drawn up in deference of the die-hard "hard-money" school. On two points it represents a small concession to sanity: in the first three years after the war exchange rates can be changed by 5 per cent without the consent of the Fund (it is not clear whether this concession is to operate more than once) and a simple majority may permit more substantial depreciation; after three years three-quarters majority is required for such readjustments (instead of four-fifths) which *formally* abolishes the veto-power of the U.S., because no country can exercise more than one-fifth of the votes (in fact it does not change this objectionable feature of the U.S. plan because the U.S.'s Central and South American satellites exercise so large a vote as to render the U.S. paramount). The fund is to be brought up to \$8,000 millions. Not less than 50 per cent of the "quotas" is, according to this version, to be paid in gold. South America and France, being the main exceptions, would be forced to apply for large loans to the U.S. merely to qualify for membership. As these "gold-loans" would have to be negotiated *bilaterally*, the U.S. (if not Wall Street) could impose such further conditions as it may see fit.

Had some concessions been made, the British Government might have felt some hesitation in refusing to accede to a palpably insufficient scheme. The "stubbornness" and "incompetence" of the die-hards (in the words of President Roosevelt) gives a chance to the British Government to escape the predicament which they themselves created and give a lead to a really progressive organisation of a smaller but not small regional area willing to follow that lead. Appeasing the wicked has not paid politically, far less will it pay economically. Popular feeling in the dominions is ready for a closer co-operation with the Mother Country than ever before. This sad episode might yet turn out as the beginning of better things to come.)

BEFORE AND AFTER BEVERIDGE

By BARBARA WOOTTON

WHAT has happened to the Beveridge Report? It is a pity that the Government does not take the public more into its confidence. Much that was said in the February debates could be read in two ways. The Report, said the optimists, had been "welcomed," much of it "accepted in principle," some proposals even earmarked for early legislation. "We have heard those phrases before," said the pessimists. As time goes on, official silence inevitably feeds the suspicion that it was the pessimists who were nearer the mark. To be sure, any realistic person is ready to accept the fact that so comprehensive an overhaul of an antiquated social engine must take time. To explore all the relevant avenues will be quite an expedition; and some nasty surprises may be found lurking under some of the stones to be upturned. None of this, however, justifies secrecy: a progress report is long overdue.

For the Beveridge Report is either dead or alive. If it is dead, the consequences for British politics of the putrefaction that will follow may well be altogether beyond what has yet been imagined. This is much more than an apt, if ugly, metaphor. The fundamentals of the present social situation are everywhere the same, both in domestic and in international affairs. Immense and practical opportunities for social progress after the war are within our grasp, if we will but shout loudly and fiercely enough for them. It is not knowledge that is lacking: it is conviction and will that lag behind knowledge. The public is aware of having been swindled before: it is absolutely determined not to be swindled again. The one certain safeguard against being swindled (it would seem) is persistent incredulity. To admit the possibility of reform is to admit also the possibility of disappointment. So we will dismiss every constructive programme in advance. "Nothing will come of it." "They won't have it." But in conditions in which every step forward depends upon a push from behind, to hold such beliefs is actually to make them come true. This is the really dangerous vicious circle of our time—far more to be feared than any cumulative rise of wages and prices.

The fate of Beveridge is critical in all this, because the Beveridge Report both touches the individual closely, and says

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what it means, not in large generalities, but in concrete detail. And it has stood up remarkably well to the considered criticism and comment of the nine months that have now gone by since its publication. If it does die, the death will not be due to natural causes, or to its own constitutional weakness or inherent deformity.

The objection most quickly and generally raised to the Report as a whole—that we can't afford it—is not easy to sustain in precise quantitative terms. This is shown with much ability in recent publications by both Dr. H. W. Singer¹ and Mr. R. W. B. Clarke.² Attacking the issue from different ends (Dr. Singer is concerned with the *extra* cost of the Beveridge plan over that of the existing services, Mr. Clarke with the *total* cost of Beveridge), both arrive at estimates which agree remarkably well. The long and the short of it is that unified social services on the Beveridge model will imply (when the peak is reached after the proposed twenty years' transitional period) a redistribution of about 10 per cent of the national income towards the support of those who have, for the time being, no income of their own. This assumes that the national income itself continues to expand at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per head per annum as in the years between the wars. But even on the dismal assumption that that income remains stationary from now till 1965, the cost of the Beveridge services will demand only about 12 per cent of the total.

Any discussion of what we can afford is bound to reflect the astonishing revolution which has taken place in reputable economic thought since the publication, a few years ago, of Lord Keynes' *General Theory of Employment* turned heresy into orthodoxy. This revolution goes right to the bottom of what is meant by "affording" anything. In the old days the parallel between the individual and the state was simple and unchallenged. The upright, the responsible, the prudent, lived within their incomes; while the unbalanced budget was the sign of the spendthrift, the waster, and the bankrupt—upon whom judgment would presently descend. Now, however, we have to work with two alternative sets of assumptions leading to mutually contradictory conclusions. In the first case we assume full employment. On that basis the old doctrine holds, and incidentally the precepts of economists make sense in terms of individual experience. We must cut our coats according to

¹ *Can We Afford Beveridge?* By H. W. Singer. (Gollancz and Fabian Society. 6d.)

² *Social Security*. Edited for the Fabian Society by W. A. Robson. (Allen & Unwin. 15s.)

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our cloth, draw up lists of priorities, sometimes even forego expenditure on objects which are in themselves inherently praiseworthy. Waste not, want not is, in this case, a sound social, as well as personal, rule. If, however, full employment is not achieved, then everything is turned upside down. Waste becomes a social duty because it makes work; and the more the Chancellor spends, the more he gets, for spending creates employment, and employment creates income and income creates income tax. What, we may well ask, in these conditions is the meaning of "can't afford it"? The substantial arguments of both Dr. Singer and Mr. Clarke are, naturally, based on the first assumption (otherwise there is no case for them to answer); but Dr. Singer finds space to hint at the second alternative. It makes you think.

It is worth remark in passing that the co-existence of these two opposite assumptions (which may be known as commonsense and crazy economics respectively), and the arguments derived from them, account for much both of the obscurity of academic economics and of the confusion of popular thought on the subject. Popular discussion habitually slips without notice from the one set of premises to the other. Thus, one policy is applauded because it makes work (e.g. resistance to labour-saving technical improvements); while another (e.g. excessive handling of goods en route from producer to consumer) is simultaneously condemned as wasteful. In the old days the economist always answered in terms of the commonsense economics of scarcity, upholding improvements and denouncing waste. (The fact that his comforting sense did not always seem to work out very well in practice was not, incidentally, very good for his reputation). Now his job is first to explain the difference between the two assumptions; next to distinguish which is valid in any given case; and finally to make the public (and the Chancellor) understand both that you cannot argue from the two simultaneously and that at a given moment in practice (that is, at the onset of a general depression of trade) you not only may, but must, switch from one to the other, and reverse the whole argument. No wonder that in all this confusion we are inclined to give thanks for the simple, sensible economics of war in which economy always redounds to the common good, and waste is a social offence. No wonder that the re-education of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer is going to be a formidable task. And yet the fact remains that you *cannot* make any sense of "Can we afford it?"

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(whatever "it" may be) unless you can see your way through this muddle.

The Fabian volume covers much more than this question of what we can afford. Part I of the book provides a background to Beveridge which is most helpful to those who wish to assess the changes proposed by the Report against the standards not of Utopia, but of the present and past. Sir William was not called upon to construct an ideal system of social insurance in a vacuum. He was asked to report on the unification of services that already exist. In their survey the Fabian Social Security Committee have set a number of authors, mostly with practical experience as well as academic knowledge, each to describe in a chapter of his own, the various social services as they stand to-day. Dr. Robson has contributed, as Editor, an Introduction which shows the story behind the present situation.

It is easy (and proper) to make fun of the resulting picture, with its mass of inconsistencies and anomalies. It is even easier to be embittered by these, if you personally run up against regulations which are so complicated that you cannot make head or tail of them, and only notice that your neighbour inexplicably qualifies for the benefit of which you are equally inexplicably deprived. Nevertheless, as Dr. Robson shows, the present century has a pretty considerable record to its credit. These social semi-security laws, of whose confusion we complain with such readiness and reason, are after all achievements not to be despised in comparison with the desert years before they were invented. And they are practically all the creations of the present century. None of them, in fact, is older than Anthony Eden. At the turn of the century, the unemployed, the aged, the widowed, the sick, and anybody else who could not earn (and had no private income) had the choice only of living on friends and relations and charitable societies, or becoming a pauper under a Poor Law which was deliberately designed to warn off the self-respecting. All the familiar modern phraseology ("they gave me my cards"—"I went to sign on"—"the doctor put me on the panel") had still to be invented. Judged by the normal rate of social change, this has been fairly good going.

There has been some consistency in the line of development too, although (as so often in this country) a coherent plan has emerged from events more than it can be said to have shaped them. The present muddle all goes back to the break-up of the old Poor Law, with its rule of treating all alike, and all equally badly. That system had to be broken up; and, thanks,

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on the one hand to the late Mrs. Sidney Webb and her colleagues on the Minority side of the Royal Commission of 1909, and on the other hand to the timely importation of social insurance into this country by Mr. Lloyd George—broken up it was.

Social insurance was particularly convenient because it solved one dilemma which greatly worried the thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. How, if you abolished the deterrent Poor Law, which assumed that everybody was equally undeserving, would it still be possible to distinguish between the "deserving" and the "undeserving" poor, and to prevent the latter from growing fat at the public expense? Compulsory contributory insurance, just because it was compulsory and contributory, offered a way round this deserving and undeserving business. The title to insurance benefits is established by the insured persons having previously paid for these benefits: the moral character of the beneficiaries thus becomes irrelevant, since they are not asking favours but claiming rights. Moreover, since everybody (within the insured classes) is compelled by law to contribute on the same basis as everybody else, the shiftless cannot run into difficulties, or incur disapproval, through having neglected to provide for themselves. We are all, so to speak, made "deserving" by Act of Parliament.

Further, it was hoped by insurance to provide *separately* and *appropriately* for each of the various misfortunes to which industrial man is subject. A sick man and one who is out of work are alike, in that both must have an income on which to live while they cannot earn; but in other respects their needs are different. It could be argued that if a separate social insurance, with its own set of rules and its own finance, was established for every contingency, then each of these insurance systems could be tied up with whatever other services (and supervised by whatever Ministry) might be appropriate to its particular field. Accordingly the panel doctor was worked into the National Health Insurance system, and the administration of Unemployment Insurance was founded upon the Employment Exchanges.

So from 1911 onwards we embarked upon a period of increasing specialisation in the social services. The *sound* idea behind this trend was that of carving up, or, rather, carving away the old Poor Law. Fragmentation, however, did not prove to be the last word in political wisdom. Variety and specialisation eventually swelled into departmentalism and sectionalisation; and the standards even of the most progressive

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service have lagged behind modern conceptions of social responsibility for unavoidable individual misfortune. No one can read Part I of the Fabian volume and doubt that the time has come for tidying up. The very phrase "social security" is itself new to our language; and its appearance is a sign that the public has begun to think comprehensively about the problem, rather than the problems, of poverty.

This change may take us a long way. Sir William himself, with his projected new enquiry into full employment, evidently intends to travel further along this road. His new slim volume¹ must not, however, be taken as a map of this journey. In this book he has collected a number of articles and addresses published at various dates in the past eighteen months. Several of these are concerned with the Beveridge Report, and include expositions for particular audiences, answers to critics, and discussion of special points, such as the eugenic effects of family allowances. Others reflect the author's views on questions of policy and administration that have since, for better or for worse, been settled.

"Pillars of Security" is itself the title of one of the papers which discusses the "assumption of full employment," the "assumption of victory," the "people's war for the people's peace," and the "need for the United Nations to remain united." Some of these pillars, the war and the victory, for instance, are evidently built to sustain relatively temporary structures. The fact that we are fighting with one set of nations against another set of nations necessarily implies both opportunities and frustrations. There are certain things that we shall be able to do that would not have been possible, had the assortment of allies and enemies been differently distributed. Conversely, other things will be beyond our power which would have been feasible with a different grouping. But these conditions will not determine the pattern of history for ever. The United Nations must now stick together because it is they, and not some other collection of peoples, who have in fact been brought together. In this sense their unity is, so to speak, an accident of the times; but the permanent element in any design for security for which these international pillars stand, is the plain truth that if security is to mean anything solidly comforting to the individual, it cannot be founded upon British soil alone. The prospect of being blown to bits is an even greater menace to security than the possible loss of one's job.

¹ *Social Security*. By Sir William Beveridge. (Allen & Unwin. 6s.)

SOME NOTES ON THE TRANSFER OF POPULATIONS

Here we part company with the Beveridge Report. The great strength of that Report is that it is so magnificently insular. The rest of the world can go to hell, if it likes, and we can still have our Beveridge plan if we wish. If, however, Sir William intends to be the architect of a comprehensive security he will eventually have to take the world for his province. It will be interesting, in due course, to learn how far he thinks that his next pillar—full employment—can be built of home-produced materials.

SOME NOTES ON THE TRANSFER OF POPULATIONS

By ALLAN G. B. FISHER AND D. MITRANY

I.—THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS.

THE suggestion has been heard lately that the best way to rid European politics of the problem of national minorities is to do away with the several minorities themselves, by moving them back to their mother countries. This idea is given strongest support in relation to the eviction of German minorities, who, it is argued, will always be potential centres of fifth-column activity, but it is also extended to other minorities, in relation to whom the idea is sometimes regarded as subsidiary and complementary to frontier rectifications. It is taken for granted by those who favour the idea that if at the end of the war any territory is acquired by one country from another, the territory ceded should be cleared of those inhabitants who would otherwise become a national minority. Leaving aside all humanitarian considerations, and the implications of the Atlantic Charter, the idea of solving minorities problems by the wholesale transfer of populations after the war involves three practical issues of a general nature:

- (i) The immediate problem of ways and means of carrying out the transfer;
- (ii) The longer problem of absorbing the transferred populations;
- (iii) The question whether, if by a great effort these two problems could be solved, that would at the same time dispose of the problem of minorities.

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The Turko-Greek and Bulgaro-Greek exchanges of population which took place at the end of the last war are frequently quoted as useful precedents in this connection. Actually the conditions under which these transfers took place were so abnormal that even where at first sight they appear to suggest "lessons" favourable to the idea of population transfer as a method suitable for more general application to minority problems, closer examination shows that the lessons on the whole point much more definitely in the opposite direction.

It is true that the great majority of the individuals transferred had no choice in the matter at all. The Turco-Greek arrangement was described by Venizelos as "a convention for the departure of the Turks from Greece because the Greeks had been driven out of Turkey," and the number of refugees who had already come to Greece considerably exceeded the number of persons formally covered by the transfer agreements. Nevertheless, the principle of transfer was genuinely accepted by both the Turkish and the Greek (though not by the Bulgarian) Governments, and without any reservations they strenuously endeavoured to make the transfers a success. It cannot seriously be expected that in any important number of the cases in relation to which population transfer is envisaged as a "solution" at the close of the present war, this condition would be satisfied.

Though the number of Greeks settled in Greece greatly exceeded the number of Turks who left Greece, transfers were nevertheless based as far as possible on a genuine "exchange," both of persons and of property, which while it still left a most formidable problem of absorption and re-settlement reduced this problem to a minimum. The repercussions of the economic dislocation and of the social disturbance caused by these movements were still being felt when the present war broke out, and according to Sir John Hope Simpson (formerly vice-president of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission) "involved an appalling amount of misery and hardship," as well as a very substantial cost to Western Europe. Nevertheless, though one should not exaggerate the ease with which countries and populations whose economic organisation and standards of living are comparatively simple can adjust themselves to such violent shocks, the complications, great as they were in this instance, are likely to be enormously greater if similar shocks are imposed upon much more elaborate and highly organised economies such as that of Germany, and imposed moreover at

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a time when in any event the risks of dislocation and economic and social collapse will for other reasons be grave.

Against the claim, moreover, that this economic and social dislocation was not too high a price to pay for permanent Turco-Greek friendship, it may reasonably be urged that a similar prescription (requiring indeed a smaller dose of population change) was a complete failure in the Bulgaro-Greek case. Even in the apparently favourable Turco-Greek case, population transfer was incidental and perhaps not necessary to new policies initiated on either side by statesmen of unusual foresight and wisdom. The settlement of the Turco-Greek question was moreover accompanied in Turkey by a change of ideas which made the old Ottoman Empire appear as something out-of-date and even slightly disreputable, so that nostalgic longings for the past were from the outset discouraged in a way which cannot safely be assumed in any of the European countries likely to be affected by the transfers of population now contemplated.

It is difficult to form any precise estimate of the volume of transfer which is now in the minds of those who favour this method. The number in any given case would obviously depend upon the criteria adopted for determining the fact of minority nationality. Neither language, family name, religion nor any other single criterion is satisfactory. Minority groups are not, in fact, so clearly distinguished from the rest of the population that there are not large numbers of borderline cases about whose classification legitimate doubts might arise, and any decision in regard to whom would therefore almost inevitably be arbitrary.

Apart from this practical difficulty which must arise in any case, current proposals, even in their more moderate forms, differ radically in nearly every respect from the cases referred to above. There is no serious pretence that transfers would be the result of voluntary agreement. In certain relatively unimportant cases this might be hoped for, but the main objective in mind is obviously to concentrate inside Germany as large a proportion as possible of the Germans still living after the war in other countries, and these, it seems, are to be transported to Germany irrespective of either their wishes or of the wishes of the German people or government. Justification for this decision will apparently be sought in the fact that Hitler has already organised and carried through similar population transfers for his own purposes, though there is no evidence that they were welcomed by the German people as a whole,

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and a good deal of evidence to suggest that the Germans transferred by Hitler were often reluctant to move. It will be difficult to persuade the German people, at a time when they are being urged to abjure Hitler and all his works, that this justification is anything more than a pretext to cloak a plain act of violence.

There is also no serious pretence that the transfers now contemplated will to any considerable extent involve any genuine "exchange" of population. While there might be some genuine exchanges as between Hungarians and Roumanians, the number of non-German people living on German territory is negligible, and their transfer, like that of Roumanians from Bessarabia, and the other areas in relation to which large-scale population movements appear to be under discussion, must in the nature of things be almost entirely a one-sided movement.

The numbers to be transferred have not been accurately estimated, but on some of the hypotheses which have been discussed the transfers of Germans required to satisfy Poland alone would be as many as five million and possibly more. If to this total is added the Sudeten Germans and the German minorities in other parts of Europe, and also the other minorities to be moved, a figure is reached which, in relation to the population which is to absorb the transferees, at first sight seems comparable with the number of Greek refugees actually absorbed after the last war in the Greek economy. Bearing in mind, however, the points made above in estimating the significance of this episode, as well as the fact that the pre-transfer density of Greek population was low, and that the peace treaties did not reduce but increased the territory of Greece, so that considerable areas of land were available for settlement, a comparison with the volume of immigration into the United States at the peak period seems more to the point. From such a comparison the conclusion appears to emerge with irresistible force that transfers on the scale now contemplated for Germans are quite impracticable. The maximum figures for migration into the United States were recorded in 1907, 1,285,348, and in 1914, 1,218,480. (The population of the United States in 1910 was nearly 97 millions.) It may be safely assumed that practically all these immigrants were eager to enter the United States, and the circumstances of the United States were in general the most favourable possible for their absorption. Even in these favourable conditions, however, and leaving aside the growth of the sentiments which later checked the migrant flow, it is probable

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that the rate of influx during these years was unduly rapid. It was certainly not maintained except near the peak period of the trade cycle.

II.—ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES.

The post-war period will, by general agreement, present us with many difficult problems of reconstruction. Apart from actual destruction caused by the war, there will be extensive exhaustion of resources and dislocation of economic and social life. There will be a great shortage of materials and of capital goods. There will be very great difficulties of transport. There will be the difficult problem of redistributing labour and reabsorbing it. Several million prisoners and refugees will have to be repatriated, and for a variety of reasons large numbers of people in Europe will be anxious to move to other territories more attractive to them. These movements should be encouraged, but they will tax to the utmost the available means of transport and the machinery of administration, and it will in any event be difficult to provide adequate means of livelihood for all concerned in them. To superimpose upon these difficulties a wholesale compulsory transfer of minorities and of populations from ceded territories, involving the movement of perhaps some ten million people (apart from prisoners and refugees), would create a task which would evidently be beyond the capacity of even the normal resources of the regions concerned, and which would aggravate dislocation and disorganisation to the point of jeopardising all plans for ordered reconstruction. Dislocation would be all the more serious because in peace-time these peoples could not be moved in the rough-and-ready fashion which is tolerated in war, and the operation would have to be carried through fairly quickly. For if it were extended over years, the continuous arrival of these *déracinés*, the need and the burden of providing for them, would keep alive among them, and in the countries of reception a feeling of resentment which would destroy also the psychological conditions necessary for reconstruction.

The United Nations have recognised and declared that peace must be built up upon social contentment, as expressed in an improved standard of living all round. The countries which will be the recipients of the transferred populations will have little chance of trying to live up to that ideal. They will obviously be the defeated countries—which means Germany above all—who will in any case have lost substantial parts of their resources,

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and who will have less opportunity of replenishing them from elsewhere. They are countries of emigration rather than of immigration, and such a sudden influx of population, under such conditions, could not be absorbed into anything like a normal economic and social system. The problems would be doubly aggravated if, as the proposals for transfer often imply, those countries were to be deprived at the same time of considerable portions of their territories, with the resources contained therein. It is one thing, e.g., to hand over Bessarabia to Russia, it is quite another thing if at the same time the 1,600,000 Roumanians of the province are forced upon the 13,000,000 people of Roumania. Even with her present population Roumania has the utmost difficulty in making adequate provision for its growth, whether by way of industrialisation or otherwise. To add to these difficulties by such a sudden further population increase would be to prolong indefinitely the dislocations from which the country is now suffering, and make it impossible to prepare it for the place in the structure of the European economy which is essential if anything resembling political or social stability is to be established in Eastern Europe. The difficulties for Germany in similar circumstances and the disastrous effects upon any hopes which may be cherished for the establishment of a stable order in Europe as a whole would be equally great, however much they might differ in detail from the difficulties that would be experienced by Roumania.

Some attention should also be paid to the probable effects of the proposed transfers upon the territories from which population is to be removed. The desirability of freer migration from some of these areas, especially those in connection with which there have been fears of overpopulation, must be admitted and indeed emphasised. Nor is the fact that certain individuals play an important part in the economic life of the country in which they live an adequate reason for refusing to facilitate their departure from it, if they strongly wish to leave for political or social reasons. But it is very improbable that the ejection of a whole national minority would give results at all like those which would follow if emigration in general was made easier. Members of national minorities frequently contribute such a large proportion of the skill and experience necessary to the efficient working of particular industries, that to remove them suddenly would throw these industries into confusion and perhaps permanently cripple them. (This is

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largely true of the Germans in Czechoslovakia and to a slight extent in Poland.) Nothing of this sort is likely to happen as a result of the purely voluntary decision of individuals to emigrate. It is conceivable that in the long run more or less satisfactory adjustment to these large-scale losses of skilled labour might be possible, but the effects of the short-run disturbances created by them would be all the more serious as they would be felt just at the time when dislocations of many other kinds were also having their maximum effect. Any countries willing to assist in alleviating the post-war difficulties of continental Europe may well feel that their effort and goodwill would be frustrated by any such wilful intensification of the many difficulties of reconstruction.

III.—POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

The wholesale transfer of populations is being advocated as a means of burying once and for all the question of minorities, and so the use of it for "revisionist" claims. For example, it is said that Hungary would not have been so restless within the Trianon frontiers if it had not been for the Magyar minority left in Transylvania. The existence of that minority, or rather the way in which it was treated, no doubt contributed to that restlessness. But an even larger source of it was the presence within Hungary of those who had fled or had been expelled from the lost provinces; they found in the reduced country no adequate occupation except agitation for the "revision" of the frontiers. Unless the populations which it is proposed to transfer can be absorbed fairly quickly and satisfactorily, they will everywhere, as in the case of Hungary, constitute a standing source of national grievance and agitation.

Moreover, this drastic surgical remedy is likely to be applied to a malady the character of which is already changing. In the latter part of the nineteenth century and until the first World War the idea of national grouping was fostered by the struggle of the nationalities against political imperialism; and the 1919 settlements sought to meet that current by giving primacy to the principle of national self-government. But that current of sentiment is by way of being superseded. In every state—whether old states like France and Spain, or young states like Roumania—the nations are now divided by social ideologies. And on that basis each section has been working to link up with like-minded sections elsewhere, cutting across national frontiers. Already before the outbreak of the war there was a tendency

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among certain authoritarian States to intervene on behalf of ideological minorities elsewhere, even if they did not always go as far in this as they did in Spain. Having seen, therefore, periods in which States were interested in religious minorities and then in national minorities, history is perhaps witnessing a period in which ideological minorities are becoming the centre of interest. What would happen if after causing so much pain and trouble to set up "pure" national states, Europe should be faced with new ideological alignments? Will the new friction engendered thereby be eliminated by a fresh and equally wholesale retransfer of populations so as to create "pure" fascist or communist or liberal States? The idea of transfer clearly makes sense as a basic solution of the problem of minorities only if we accept the Nazi conception of "racialism".

And, further, it is clearly not enough merely to create such "pure" states. Like race, they must also be kept pure. Therefore, whatever the criterion of purity for the time being, if it is to achieve the ends for which it is advocated the policy of transfer must have as its corollary a *continuous* policy of segregation. Migration or any free movement of people would have to be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new unwanted and irritating minorities. The habitual natural adjustments of population, to fit economic conditions, would thereby be checked; and the "New World" would be inaugurated by the suppression of an old freedom. The two considerations mentioned in this and in the preceding paragraph make it clear that, apart from everything else, even the most thorough transfer of populations would not and could not dispose of minority problems for all time. Nor is the reply convincing that in future migration would still be permitted on condition that immigrants submitted themselves to what is believed to be the American method of assimilation, and resigned all linguistic and educational privileges. For in fact the United States does not *impose* assimilation or make it an explicit condition for immigration, as it is apparently proposed should be the future rule in Europe.

There is one final consideration which goes beyond the immediate field of the problem, but which is not the less vital for that, especially because of the stirrings which the war is causing in Asia and in Africa. The peoples of the Far East and of the Middle East, and in a lesser degree so far those of Africa, have been quick to adopt the political dogmas and habits evolved in Europe. Once the idea of national "purity" is

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started on its way as a fundamental principle of political organisation, it is only too likely to spread to those parts of the world in which small European communities have enjoyed a privileged position. Their presence and interests have always been used to justify intervention on their behalf by the home states. Therefore the "solution" adopted in Europe for ending the trouble with minorities would very soon come to be used for "transferring" European minorities from the Middle East and the Far East, from Africa and perhaps from Latin America, back to their home countries. The more real racial difference would in these cases only give added strength to the idea proclaimed and practised by us.

These difficulties and risks might conceivably be faced if the resulting benefits for international peace were to be in any way proportionate. But no matter how irritating minorities problems might be, are they ever more than a symptom, an additional irritant in an unhealthy state of things? Pressure on minorities is apt to become virulent when the people among whom they live are passing through difficult economic times. Again, a "minorities" issue has frequently served as a pretext or tool for the ambitions of one state or another, but the absence of the minority would not have stilled those ambitions. The Nazis asserted that they had no interest in other national groups and indeed left them alone nationally, only to subjugate them economically and politically. To apply such a drastic and unsettling remedy as the wholesale transfer of populations merely to a symptom would be as futile as it would be costly and cruel. If, for instance, regional unions were to develop after the war, one of their main ends would be to open up channels of economic and social life within the region they would cover; there would be little sense if the new unions were to begin life with an arrangement which belonged to an utterly different outlook and trend, and burdened it from the outset with a relationship which economically and socially and psychologically would seriously hamper the relations of the group. The removal of the minorities issue, even if it could be achieved, would do very little by itself to stop international friction and conflict; whereas if the deeper causes of international friction were removed, the problem of minorities would soon subside into oblivion.

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By MICHAEL POLANYI

I
DURING the ten years which have passed since I came to England and during which I have watched, and tried to understand, the methods of its civic life, I have come to some conclusions about the reasons for the steady decline of public morality on the Continent, and the rather different course of development in this country. I believe that the principal difference in recent times between English and Continental politics—and what I shall say of England is, I think, largely true of America also—is connected with the fact that in England social progress was not on the whole associated with enlightenment and anti-clericalism, but was, on the contrary, very often prompted by religious sentiment. It is this, I believe, which has prevented the two Continental anti-moralist theories—that the whole meaning of politics lies in the destruction of one group (class, race or nation) by another and that the “exceptional individual” is exempt from all fixed moral rules—from ever gaining firm ground in this country. It is true that both these theories made some headway in England during the inter-war period, but I believe that they are about to be expelled again in the course of the moral revival which followed on Dunkirk.

To indicate the origin of this difference I must go back at least to the 17th century. While on the Continent the religious wars were brought to a close in 1648 by the peace of Westphalia which forced each national territory under the rule of one single religious confession, England developed during the same period the very different, and in fact quite opposite, principle of Religious Tolerance. Thus the age which culminated in France in the dragonades and the eventual ejection of the Protestants by the Repeal of the Edict of Nantes (1685), in England came to a conclusion in the Bill of Rights and the religious and party truce of 1688.

It is true that tolerance was eventually achieved on the Continent as the outcome of growing indifference to religion. But the English doctrine of tolerance was established in the 17th century by a kind of people who would abandon their homes for the wilderness overseas rather than agree that the

¹ A Hungarian translation of the text is published in the Hungarian Anthology of the Sylvan Press. It is printed here by permission of the Sylvan Press.

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communion table in the village church should be moved to the eastern window. Tolerance in England was a religious doctrine, a doctrine for the protection of the joint religious interests of all Protestant sects. It was established as a safeguard against the Government, against Catholicism, and against Atheism. It was the Charter of the seekers of religious truth, a constitution of religious self-government in the spirit of which, up to this day, religious Englishmen continue—most incomprehensibly to Continentals—constantly to readjust their religious practices in a never-ending keen rivalry between divergent religious inspirations. Tolerance, being originally a rule of religious enquiry, excluded Catholics, because the Catholic Church denied freedom to such an enquiry, and it excluded also atheists because they refused to accept the starting point, the heuristic principle, underlying the enquiry.

In religious tolerance can also be found the main origins of modern British democracy; “. . . insistence,” writes Tawney, in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, “on the right of every church to organize itself, and on the freedom of the Churches from the interference from the State, was to leave, alike in the Old World and in the New, an imperishable legacy of civil and religious liberty.” “. . . it is probable,” he says, “that democracy owes more to Nonconformity than to any other single movement.”

Half a century after the Settlement in England and the Repeal of the Edict of Nantes in France, the two countries can be seen definitely embarked on divergent courses. It is the time when Voltaire, a refugee to this country from French feudal oppression, brought back to France the news of a people enjoying unparalleled liberty; when Montesquieu followed Voltaire as a visitor in search of the secret of British civic institutions. Soon France, soon the educated all over the Continent were alight with the message which these two men carried from this country to the Continent. But as it was transmitted to countries dominated by a single religion, it inevitably originated movements that were anti-clerical and anti-religious. Thus the course of political progress on the Continent became firmly associated with antagonism to religion, assuming, as it were vicariously, a doctrinaire quality, which was embodied eventually in a materialist conception of public life placing a fanatical emphasis on violence.¹

¹ The antagonism between progress and religion has led throughout most of the Continent to a permanent alliance between clericalism and political reaction, which has blackened the record of the Churches and profoundly impaired their spiritual influence.

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Meanwhile in 18th century England intellectual progress occurred on exactly opposite lines. A new devout and popular religious movement was started by John Wesley, while political philosophy, dominated by Blackstone and Burke, was engaged in firmly consolidating—and sometimes even glorifying in almost grotesque fashion—the traditional political institutions of the country.

Thus the rise of the middle classes and the growth of the proletariat in the 19th century occurred in England and on the Continent under very different auspices. On the Continent the French Revolution had struck its blow for progress and against religion and the Congress of Vienna its counter-blow against progress with the help of religion—and the two had jointly made all hope of social improvement for ever hostile to Church and dogma. In England, on the contrary—as Elie Halévy first pointed out—every new extension of democracy was bound to enfranchise an increasing number of middle and working class people who were far more devout and far more puritanical than the hitherto ruling aristocracy.

Consequently none of the reforms which completely transformed England in the 100 years following Napoleon's fall was definitely anti-clerical; indeed many of the most important, such as the abolition of slavery, the various Factory Acts, prison reform, the lunacy laws, were started from religious motives and were often unsupported and not rarely opposed by men representing a more secular outlook.¹ None of the political movements of the time was far removed from the struggle between the rival Christian denominations; and in particular most campaigns against established privilege found an ally in Nonconformity eternally struggling against Anglican supremacy.

Tawney has observed that 17th century Puritanism—not the “Tudor secession from Rome,” achieved at the time of Calvin—was the true English reformation; while Morley (1874) expressed this view even more precisely when he wrote: “It was hardly until the reformed doctrine became associated with analogous ideas and corresponding precepts of government, that people felt at home with it, and became really interested in it.” It may be added that this caused them to be ineffective in opposing the theories of political violence and personal immorality when they came from the Left, and what is even worse—to ignore or even condone their manifestations when they came from the Right.

¹ The abolition of the Slave Trade was advanced and finally brought to acceptance in 1807 by Wilberforce and Charles James Fox in the midst of the Napoleonic wars, while, according to H. A. L. Fisher's “History of Europe,” “every sailor from Nelson downwards declared that its abolition would be the ruin of the British Navy.” Again the Factory Acts were fiercely opposed by many representatives of the *laissez faire* principles of Political Economy on the grounds that they would destroy trade.

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appear now that the English Reformation did not come to an end even then. Wesley continued the religious re-awakening in the 18th century; and the 19th century may be regarded as engaged in expanding further what Morley called “the analogous ideas and corresponding precepts of government” related to the reformed doctrine. The description seems certainly applicable to the social and political progress achieved under the leadership of generation after generation of religious humanitarians and reformers from Wilberforce and Shaftesbury to Abraham Lincoln and Gladstone—including even Lloyd George and Franklin D. Roosevelt. And the religious component of social progress becomes manifest once more in the most recent Socialist movements in England, in the resolutions of the Malvern Church Conference, the growth of the Common Wealth party, and the rising influence of Archbishop Temple.

A political milieu dominated by ideas of this order offered no opening to Marxism. Nothing could be more repugnant, to the Nonconformist conscience than the idea that social progress is determined by ineluctable economic forces. This view is hostile to the whole conception of individual responsibility on which the Protestant faith rests. And even more opposed to Christian ethics is the Marxist teaching of unrestricted class war as well as that parallel doctrine of unlimited violence for national purposes.

Even when the religious foundations were expressly rejected, the political ideas of the time did not venture far away from them. This is why the political philosophies of Bentham, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer appear so strange to the Continental. Their Utilitarian principles of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” impress him as curiously superficial and question-begging. The reason is that the English thinkers did not feel called upon to seek out and uphold the ultimate foundations of social life. To them the individual conscience on which Protestantism ultimately relies, was a sufficient guarantee that men would “pursue happiness” in a spirit of fairness and self-restraint. They never thought that people might deny the very existence of morality and truth and might assert that the only sensible aim in politics is the achievement of absolute mastery of one group over all the others. Fundamentally they relied on the validity of Christian principles.

Accordingly we see Benthamite humanitarianism co-operating frequently throughout the 19th century with the religious humanitarians and the Gladstonian liberals. The only major

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clash between the religious and the irreligious people occurred over the Darwinian theory. But generally speaking there was a free give-and-take between the religious and the godless—in striking contrast to their mutual incompatibility on the Continent.

The release, at the opening of the 19th century, of the new religious forces pent up among the middle and lower classes during the period of the Wesleyan movement, started also a pervasive movement of moral reform, which spread through society upwards and downwards from the expanding middle classes. And here—even while the Continent was busy copying the democratic institutions which seemed so peculiar to England in the 18th century—there was developing a new Anglo-Continental contrast in matters of personal conduct. This time the Continentals felt that the superiority was only in part on the English side. The English remained a pattern of the civic virtues, at least to the upper and middle classes of Europe. Their sense of personal responsibility, manifested in their respect for the law and in their large-scale voluntary activities, in their readiness to stake their personal reputation and even their livelihood and safety for their opinions, and again in their vigilance over their public liberties, and in their willingness sometimes even to suffer imprisonment in protest against infringements of a right—all these commanded admiration. So also did their rigid sense of personal obligation, which gave a guarantee of fair dealing in business. No less admired was the dignity blended with a surprising informality with which British public discussions were conducted and the proverbial skill in discovering common ground between opposing factions and integrating the positive points of both to a fruitful compromise. The Continent copied English manners of dress and social intercourse; and visitors to this country often went back as “anglo-maniacs,” enchanted for life by the ways of English people, their dignity, their kindness and stoic humour.

But the stern repression of all self-indulgence, the severity of Victorian morality in sexual matters, the prudishness of English conventions were regarded as quaint and tiresome additions. More than that: the limitations imposed on literature by puritanical conventions were felt to be reducing the import and depth of Victorian fiction. At the opening of the 19th century England had produced Lord Byron, whose life and poetry had acted throughout the Continent as a signal for a revolution in moral ideas. But while Stendhal and Balzac;

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Puskin, Lermontov and Dostoevsky; Flaubert, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Nietzsche, Stirner, Gide and Proust were populating the Continental imagination with the figures of morally unrestrained individuals in the tradition of the *Manfred* and the *Cain* of Lord Byron, the pages of Victorian literature were closed to such themes. There is no scope for such figures in Victorian fiction, because no need is felt to discover the ultimate possibilities of human immorality. The problems arising from a rejection—at least in principle—of all moral restrictions on the exceptional individual: from the ethical situation in which (as Smardjakov puts it in the *Brothers Karamazov*) “everything is permitted”—these problems did not exist, and therefore called for no answer in Victorian England. The task of the “evangelical discovery of man's estate,” as Maritain has called it in connection with André Gide¹, the task which a St. Augustin pursued in his “Confessions”—but which could also be used as an excuse by a Rasputin—was rejected as unnecessarily dangerous and gratuitously sordid.

Thus the English, by the end of the 19th century, had established a national civilisation of their own, with a unity of views extending over all fields of life, self-supporting and characteristically restricted in its outlook. Protestantism, which had shaped and inspired their democratic institutions, and had firmly established their standards of decency both in social and individual relations, had gradually become secularised into their specific national code of behaviour. This secular Protestantism gave them what Wordsworth had prayed for: “manners, virtue, freedom, power”—and the knowledge of such gifts made the men and women of England happy to be English. It was the time of England's Splendid Isolation.

The power of England during this period was such that she could freely bear herself as a nation in accordance with her moral principles—repeatedly intervening in Europe and Asia in accordance with a foreign policy guided by these principles. Her conception of the international order was based on the same principles; she looked forward to a world in which each people would be granted its national independence and would establish democratic institutions within its borders. Just as the independence of the individual conscience was relied on as a solution of communal life, so national freedom and independence was relied on to represent an ultimate solution in the field of foreign affairs.

¹ “André Gide et Notre Temps,” published by Nouvelle Revue Française (1935).

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Then came the rise of Germany to power and the end of British preponderance. It was also the end of Britain's capacity to stand aloof from the Continent of Europe. The first reaction was Joseph Chamberlain's Imperialism and the Boer War; but in the grant of self-government to the Transvaal in 1906 and the Orange River Colony in 1907 this Imperialism—as General Smuts has recently testified—was buried again. After which there quickly followed the Triple Entente and the first World War.

II

All civilisations are based on faith in a particular tradition and are therefore essentially unstable formations. The first World War appears to have profoundly impaired the continuity of the Anglo-American tradition. It swept away Victorian morals, introduced the Freudian aversion to repressions, spread contempt of conventional manners and obligations and greatly reduced the observance of religious practices. A new literature of sensualism arose, outstripping sometimes in its penetrating frankness all Continental forerunners in this field. (For example, in his "Brave New World" Aldous Huxley discovered an entirely new and important formulation of the problem of absolute sensualism.)

More directly affecting public affairs was the deep horror of war which had suddenly struck the English. To avoid war became the principal aim of public policy. But as war remained possible so long as national independent states continued to exist, it followed that the national principle itself was at fault—that nationhood itself was evil. A deep pessimism (as reflected, for example, in C. E. Montague's "Disenchantment" and in Noel Coward's "Cavalcade") ensued from this conclusion which struck at the very core of the living moral traditions in this country.

The desire to escape from the mortal dangers of nationhood gave rise to a great wave of belief in the League of Nations. But it was a disembodied faith unsupported by any instinctive allegiance, unguided by any profound inspiration.

Meanwhile the march of the Russian Revolution had its effect on the parties of the Left. Marxist ideas, rejected so long by the English Socialists, began to gain influence over them. This led to a second denial of nationhood—this time from the Left. They declared national defence to be a mere manifestation of capitalist competition, and aimed at peace by World Socialism.

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Class-war was becoming gradually accepted as the sole path to progress. And as on the Continent of Europe there unfolded the spectacle of Soviet Russia opposed by Fascist and near-Fascist dictatorships, many conservative politicians took up the class-war challenge and began to look at the world from this point of view. The national body of Britain—weakened already by the withdrawal of loyalty in favour of the League—was thus rapidly falling into two opposite camps of divergent foreign sympathies.

In these circumstances a policy of isolationism, of the abandonment of all aims beyond the defence of her own territory, seemed to be ruling British statesmen, the only, however hopeless and dishonourable, course that was left to England to pursue. But even purely defensive military action was opposed by a pacifist movement, with such figures as George Lansbury and for a time Sir Stafford Cripps among its adherents; while at the same time it was side-tracked by a popular press which was playing up to the comfort-loving terrified masses—reassuring them that there was no reason for war and no danger of war. And everywhere civic indifference, the view that to the common people it matters not who governs the country (since the people will get their minimum of food, shelter, and fun, and will have to toil for it anyway), was spreading as an undertone to pacifism and isolationism.

Thus a great nation, in the fullness of power and fresh from victory, suddenly abandoned its moral purpose as a nation and fell into a rapid process of disintegration. England looked on inactive, while Germany—whom she could have struck down at a blow any time between 1933 and 1936—built up the means of encompassing her complete extinction.

III

More suddenly even than its former decline, came the restoration of the national will in England after Dunkirk. Those who lived through the period of revival in this country may feel that the change occurred as a necessary consequence of the events across the Channel. In this they are surely mistaken. It occurred precisely at the moment when and among circumstances in which masses of people in France and other places all over the world, arrived at the conviction that moral ideals in public life had just been proved to be utterly futile. The recovery of national faith in England may have appeared—and did appear—in the eyes of the British people as an obvious

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reaction to the events facing them, but there was actually no logical connection pointing in that direction.

In what way then did the change occur? Did the speeches of Churchill which roused England elucidate the issues which had previously paralysed the national will? Did Churchill call for a new appreciation of British tradition, of British institutions or possessions? No, he refused even to define any war aims and promised nothing but suffering. But while his call disregarded all these questions it also succeeded in sweeping them aside. He talked in a language in which the issues of the inter-war period had no expression. He spoke of honour and duty; of the hope of Englishmen to give a good account of themselves; of the evil that was facing them and of their privilege of facing it alone. He came to the microphone after the first bombing of London and scarcely referred to that event: his only care was invasion, the danger to the country, not that to its citizens. The carefully balanced sentences, the stoically controlled inflections of emotion, upheld the majesty of a moral tradition even without making any explicit reference to it.

These were the terms in which the "Churchillian renaissance"—as Evelyn Waugh has called it—arose in England. The flow of that inspiration has been rushing on ever since and pouring its waters widely over the planet. We do not know to what shores it will ultimately carry us; but we do take note that in the darkest hour of our civilisation it was nationalism that proved the source from which men's moral ideals were in fact restored.

When England invoked her own past, she recalled the Dominions, she recalled America and the whole of Europe to their common moral traditions. It would seem that in every part of the world—and here I definitely include also Russia—the process of moral re-integration has been achieved—or is being achieved—on national lines. National feeling seems to be the only sentiment to-day in which that responsible devotion to a community can be rooted, that bond of mutual confidence assured, which are needed if reason and equity are to gain acceptance as the guides of human affairs. National traditions appear as the most ample and most reliable embodiments of the principles of morality—at least so far as the guidance of popular behaviour is concerned. Germany's national tradition of political immorality appears now as an exception; as an aberration; as a break-through of the modern doctrine of group immorality in a national guise. It is an evil to be extirpated; not a valid

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argument against the 19th century conception of nationhood—of the nation as a source of honour and as an integral element of international order.

That conception of the nation now regains its validity. But to the realisation of its ideal—and to whatever further aims which may lie in that direction—there is yet an immensely long way to go. The kind of people in Europe—and overseas—who believe that nothing is real but power and the possession of things that can satisfy bodily appetites, probably still form the majority among the educated classes. Their mentality is tenacious. It has the intellectual advantage of a simple and positive system. Emotionally it is clearly focussed on the interests of one group and the hatred of its foe. Those who are accustomed to interpret their experience in the terms of such harsh conceptions and to entrust their political aspirations to their guidance, will not easily regain confidence in the diffuse intangible medium of moral forces.

The fateful interplay between the English and the Continent will continue—and will decide whether the movement, which I described as the English attempt to carry on the great Reformation into the modern scientific age, can be successfully maintained and extended to the countries which previously went the way of an anti-religious materialism—or whether on the contrary the English themselves will finally have to surrender to Continental ideas. The disintegrating effect of these ideas brought England near to national extinction in June, 1940—and should they eventually prevail, England's extinction would seem inevitable. England cannot win in a struggle in which the total mastery of the world would fall to the most bellicose and most unscrupulous group that can be constituted; should the principles of unrestricted violence be generally accepted, the English could not survive.

To help in saving the world from domination by such principles is therefore England's task, as it is England's vital necessity. People on the Continent who want to live as human beings must recognise the moral principles for which England stands and must revive the kindred elements of their own tradition. Nothing will grow from moral unbelief. The bolder our plans for the future, the deeper must they be rooted in the original ideas of our civilisation.

BOOK REVIEWS

NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD REPORT: A POST-WAR PLAN AND PROGRAMME FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (*His Majesty's Stationery Office.*)

THE PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT transmitted to Congress on March 10th, 1943, two reports of the National Resources Planning Board. One was a lengthy document issued by the U.S. Government Printing Office under the title *Security, Work and Relief Policies*. The second, originally titled *National Resources Development Report for 1943; Part I, Post-War Plan and Programme*, was happily selected for reprinting in Britain by H.M. Stationery Office. Behind these reports there stood a history of memorable accomplishment in the field of sociological and economic research, study and publication. Exhaustive investigations over a period of almost nine years of the natural resources of the United States by the National Resources Planning Board had resulted in monographs indispensable to the serious student of the American scene. From a three-year study of the problems of economic security by its committee on long-range relief and work policies there came the Board's *Security, Work, and Relief Policies*. At the close of 1940, the N.R.P.B., at the direction of the President, began to devote the bulk of its labours to the post-war period. It undertook to gather, analyse and correlate, as instructed by Mr. Roosevelt, the "plans and programmes under consideration in many federal, state and private organisations for post-war full employment, security, and building America." Congress recognised the public services of the Board by failing to provide funds necessary for the N.R.P.B. to continue its work.

Post-War Plan and Programme is not an "American Beveridge plan," as it was popularly dubbed even before it was officially released, even though it deals with the key problem of social security.

The purpose of the N.R.P.B. Report differs from that of the Beveridge Report, and its scope is much broader. The first deals with a host of subjects, including health, education, urban, agricultural and forest conservation, the development of energy resources, post-war plant demobilisation, industrial concentration, and public works programmes. The Beveridge Report contains a sharply defined, actuarially elaborated social insurance proposal susceptible of immediate translation into a Parliamentary measure. In post-war plan and programme the N.R.P.B. sets forth not a blueprint but a series of related policies which it holds to be socially desirable—and, therefore, essential—in the light of stated fundamental assumptions and aims.

All the Board's recommendations for the transitional post-war period and beyond are designed to make possible the development of a society within which "democracy, dynamic economy and peace" are, for the first time, combined. While avoiding precise definition of the term, the Board does state that its measure of "democracy" is found in "the fullest possible development of the human personality, in relation to the common good, in a framework of freedoms and rights, of justice, liberty, equality, and the consent of the governed." By implication the Board is fundamentally in agreement with Professor Laski's observation that the argument for

"democracy is built upon the assumption that in its absence men become the tools of others, without available proof that the common good is inherently involved in this relationship." The Board's conception of an "expanding economy" calls for "the fullest possible development of the productive potential of all of our resources, material and human, with full employment, continuity of income, equal access to minimum security and living standards." Narrow nationalism is absent from the Board's approach. It is always aware of the world society of which the United States is a part, and it views the attainment of "peace" through an "effective jural order of the world outlawing violence and imperialism, old or new fashioned, in international relations; and permitting and energising the fullest development of resources and rights everywhere."

"Democracy, dynamic economy and peace" constitute the symbols of the Board's vision of future America. This vision is both amplified and concretised in N.R.P.B.'s nine-point "New Bill of Rights":

- 1.—The right to work, usefully and creatively, through the productive years;
- 2.—The right to fair pay, adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift and other socially valuable service;
- 3.—The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care;
- 4.—The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment and accident;
- 5.—The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from compulsory labour, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority and unregulated monopolies;
- 6.—The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent, free from the spyings of secret political police;
- 7.—The right to equality before the law, with equal access to justice in fact;
- 8.—The right to education, for work, for citizenship and for personal growth and happiness; and
- 9.—The right to rest, recreation and adventure, the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in an advancing civilisation.

These new rights, asserts the Board, can be realised if the Government is committed to the fulfilment of stated national policies. The Board urges that the Government promote and maintain "a high level of national production and consumption"; underwrite "full employment for all employables" and jobs for everyone released from the Services and war industry at the termination of the war; and guarantee for all "equal access to security, education, health and nutrition and wholesome housing conditions."

Although the N.R.P.B. charts the directions by which significant aspects of American life would be modified and transformed, and persuasively argues the need for these changes, its recommendations and proposals must not be viewed as revolutionary. They have their roots deep in American history. Their kinship with the demands of progressive democratic movements from the last quarter of the nineteenth century on is particularly

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close. The idea of positive state intervention in social and economic areas found expression in the Granger and Populist movements of the nineteenth century. It found wider application in early twentieth century progressivism, the farmer-labour political stirrings after the first World War and the New Deal. All of these movements sought in varying degrees to humanise democracy and to democratise traditional liberalism. Even the most far-reaching of the Board's proposals do not contemplate more than this. While its policies have been irresponsibly attacked as "subversive" and designed to replace capitalism with "socialism," the truth is that they are committed to sustain and expand democratic institutions, promote free enterprise and maintain a healthy capitalist economy. The most radical innovation suggested by the Board—and it is certainly not wholly new to the United States—is the employment of mixed corporations with joint private and governmental participation in certain areas of the post-war economy. Such mixed corporations are recommended where they would serve public interest better than private corporations and for those fields in which government war investment has been particularly heavy. The Board places the employment of the mixed corporation within the wider context of governmental policies for the promotion of "free enterprise." Within the limits of a review of this length, the full scope of N.R.P.B. Report cannot be adequately presented and evaluated. Post-war plan and programme offer a statement of the problems of transition from war to peace and of the policies by which these problems can be solved to produce maximum social benefit. Implicitly and explicitly it also reveals the problems, weakness and instabilities which beset pre-war America. Finally, it provides a vision of a more genuinely democratic and socially healthier United States—a vision which many Americans believe is worth fighting for.

HENRY DAVID (Queens College, New York).

THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY. Report by a Chatham House Group. Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Oxford Press. 92 pp. 2s. 6d.)

EDUCATION AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Report of a Joint Commission of the London International Assembly and Council for Education in World Citizenship. (54 pp. 1s.)

NEED GERMANY SURVIVE? By JULIUS BRAUNTHAL. (Gollancz. 256 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MR. BRAUNTHAL, the Jewish-Austrian Social Democrat, fiercely pleading for Germany and her future as an independent and vital state, provides something of a moving spectacle. One cannot but admire the spirit which has dictated this very readable book of a particularly well-read author, though he is often inclined to overstate his case, being rather an enthusiastic apologist than a careful historian.

Naturally his plea is for a socialist Germany. But he makes his task easier than in fact it is by being too uncritical in his attitude towards the socialist Germany of 1919 and the following years. He overestimates the spiritual value of the 1918 upheaval and its revolutionary impetus. For instance, the Munich revolt was far more casual in its beginnings than he

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indicates. Similarly, he attaches too much importance to the expulsion of the many German princes, of whom it would be truer to say that they abandoned their thrones than that they were "swept away" by the revolutionary impetuosity of the masses. It was rather a monarchical débâcle than a popular victory.

In accordance with this very optimistic view of socialist history, Mr. Braunthal is inclined to see the future development exclusively as the outcome of a fight between the "vested interests" of the industrialists and the bankers, the Junkers and the generals on the one hand and the "working classes" on the other. He completely overlooks the rôle of the German middle classes. It was essentially they who, led by their idols from the upper classes, annihilated the 1918 revolution and the Weimar Republic. Later on they became, before the disappointed and embittered unemployed, the backers of Hitler. It is a typically socialist mistake and omission to treat them as a negligible quantity. Some of them, it is true, afterwards became Hitler's victims, but the bulk were among those who felt that they had profited, spiritually and materially, by the Nazi régime. How to catch the imagination of these bourgeois will be one of the most difficult problems of the future Germany, on which Mr. Braunthal would have done well to dilate. The worker can return to his former socialist and Trade-Union slogans. The upper classes will submerge and hide in the middle classes and try hard to mobilise them secretly against socialism. This is as great a danger as the splitting up of the socialists to which the author rightly gives his full attention.

Moreover, even if one has every possible confidence in a re-awakened sound instinct of the German working masses, where are their leaders to come from? They were missing in 1914 as well as in 1919, not to mention the years 1929-1933. This is the most embarrassing gap. The last world war did not bring forth a single outstanding working-class leader in Germany apart from the tragic Karl Liebknecht. And even he was hardly more than a disciple, not to say a creature, of the admirable Rosa Luxemburg, herself a pre-war figure.

In conclusion, much as I like Mr. Braunthal's presentation of the case for a "surviving" Germany, it should be emphasised that she cannot live on optimism alone, especially not on a kind that seems to me characteristic of what remains of the German Social Democratic party, and for this reason particularly dangerous.

The Chatham House report on "The Problem of Germany" is attractive and valuable precisely because it is based on a reasoned scepticism with regard not only to Germany but to the post-war world as a whole. As a refugee let me say that it testifies strikingly to the soundness of the political tradition of this country that, in the midst of an atrocious war, a governmental or at least semi-governmental institute is prepared and allowed to issue a report permeated with, and founded on, an exemplary objectivity and justice. It is indeed the feeling for the complexity and fallibility of all methods of dealing with Germany which distinguishes this report. To be sure, it does not make easy reading because it is written in a diction as cool as its arguments. But it does much towards clearing the ground on which

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practical policies can be established. Although it does not go far in its study of the German mentality yet it hints at a number of problems which are not only German but also English and inter-Allied. There is no need to discuss the details of its arguments. As a whole the report succeeds in giving an accurate survey of the principal questions to be solved. It is a very dignified first advance into the battle against both wishful and hateful thinking and acting.

If it is permissible at all to pronounce on the general tendency of the report, one can say that it advocates a judicious mixture of a policy of sanctions and of collaboration. At any rate, the authors are conscious of the difference of men and regions within Germany and without, and are therefore prevented from making any oversimplifications and from indulging in popular catchwords and slogans whether of the Right or Left. One may reasonably look forward to the further output of this group of upright and independent researchers.

By comparison, the field ploughed over by the pamphlet on "Education and the United Nations" is already well staked-out. Indeed, it is a garden rather than a field, or a favourite flower-bed, being cultivated by the many gardeners keen on education and re-education. Education has become something like a hobby in our time. Many are enthusiastic, but few competent.

This report, coming from an undoubtedly competent commission under the chairmanship of Professor Gilbert Murray, gives space to all educational programmes and proposals which have emerged during the last few years. It is a galaxy of constructive ideas on the education of mankind, collected and summarised in these fifty-odd pages, a systematic survey lacking, alas! in any distinctive spirit. One need not repeat all those conventional features of "World-wide Education," for which there is a dearth not of pupils but of educators.

Valuable in this report is a survey of the destruction by the Nazis of the educational institutions in the occupied countries. It is moving and depressing to learn of the measureless cultural desolation, without bombs and guns; the report of which is almost dramatically concentrated in a few pages. Centuries-old universities, libraries, museums and other institutions of scholarship and science have been brought to nought. They are, no less truly than human lives, irreplaceable casualties of this war. A large part of the European Continent, apart from Germany itself, seems to be de-Europeanised. An educational and cultural wilderness is left in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and who shall say where else. It is rightly pointed out in the report that the restoration of these ruins is amongst the supreme duties of the victors.

The other points made by the Joint Commission do not go beyond what can be read in the many books, pamphlets, and articles which have appeared during these years of speculating and planning. Above all, the expert authors suggest the founding of an International Organisation for Education and, so far as Germany is concerned, the appointment of a High Commissioner for Education. There is little behind those suggestions.

HERMANN SINSHEIMER.

THE ARMISTICE OF 1918. By SIR FREDERICK MAURICE. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Oxford University Press. 83 pp. and appendices. 7s. 6d.)

THIS short book is a timely summary of the Armistice-making of 1918, and draws some lessons from the mistakes made in that difficult task. Most of those mistakes arose through lack of preparedness. So late as September, 1918, the General Staff in London still maintained, despite Haig's contrary view, that the decisive period of the war could not come before July, 1919: so late as October the Allies had never seriously considered Wilson's Fourteen Points, or worked out an alternative programme of war aims; from July 4th till October 31st the Supreme War Council never even met! No wonder the Allies made a hash of the opportunity when it suddenly came. Thus, on September 27th Bulgaria sued for armistice to the British; on September 30th the French Commander, rightly anxious to follow up a military advantage promptly, dictated terms without awaiting Allied agreement; and then the British and French quarrelled over the action to be taken. Turkey sued for armistice, but before any action could be taken, weeks were spent in Franco-British disputes about whether a British or French admiral should command the force going to Constantinople. Finally, when this was settled, the British admiral, leaving out the French altogether, made a totally inadequate armistice with the Turks. Clemenceau was furious, and later, "when we were on the verge of war with Turkey, France left us in the lurch because French big business" (which supported Clemenceau) "hoped to gain more by conciliating the Turks than it could by supporting us." Another disastrous mess was made of the armistice with Hungary. As for Germany, the delay of over a month between the request for an armistice and the conclusion may have been no bad thing for the Allies, but even so, as the book shows, serious mistakes in the Armistice resulted from lack of preparation.

Among the lessons drawn by Sir Frederick, the main one is that the Allies should try to agree beforehand on war aims, and should prepare armistice terms in advance, to suit, so far as possible, the various contingencies. The terms should cover a longish period before a definite peace can be concluded: for an armistice in total war is equivalent to surrender, not merely to suspension of hostilities, especially in such a case as Nazi Germany's. The Allies must retain adequate power to enforce their terms, and must keep their armistice policy in accord with their demobilisation policy. Forced unilateral disarmament will only last, he says, so long as "the penalties of evasion are obvious"; so, in suggesting that the Allies should aim at depriving the enemy of all military and civil aircraft, he proposes that disarmament should be controlled by an Allied air force until "more permanent arrangements for the prevention of aggression can be established." That means, presumably, "a system of general security," within which disarmament and security would be based on equality of rights.

Sir Frederick says that it was "neither necessary nor wise to maintain the blockade" after Germany had been rendered militarily helpless. This point of principle is just: but it is fair to observe that, whilst the machinery

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of blockade was kept in being, a large amount of food was allowed to go into Germany after March 26th, 1919, and that the threat of resumption of the full blockade was a potent factor in inducing the Germans to accept so severe a peace treaty. They almost rejected it.

There are several slips or misprints, surprising in such a book. General Gröner is referred to as Grönet, and Chatalja appears as Chatalza; the date of Ludendorff's momentous action in sending Major von dem Bussche to Berlin, to insist on an armistice, is given as October 1st, but should surely be September 29th: the Major's name is spelt von dem Busche: and the gravity of his message is inadequately conveyed. The summary might well have brought out more clearly how hysterically the High Command demanded the immediate conclusion of an armistice at that juncture: they even prevented Prince Max from commenting on the Fourteen Points, lest this should imperil the indispensable armistice, which Ludendorff wanted—so as to save the army for another fight!

It was a good idea to publish a study of this subject now. But the treatment is too slight for the theme, and the book is not up to the standard one expects in Cheetham House publications.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

PLAN FOR BRITAIN, Essays prepared for the Fabian Society, by G. D. H. COLE, ANEURIN BEVAN, M.P., JIM GRIFFITHS, M.P., L. F. EASTERBROOK, SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, HAROLD J. LASKI. (127pp. Routledge. 6s.)

WHAT are we trying to achieve through planning? Two things in particular, I suggest—the maximum utilisation of our resources, and the equitable distribution of goods and services.

Negatively, we are concerned immediately to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of the last post-war period, and, on a longer view, to settle the economic quarrel. As Mr. Bevan puts it: "Unless poverty uses democracy to control property, then property, in fear of poverty, will destroy democracy." Positively, we want to make use of modern social thinking and research to create a fuller and richer way of living for the people of this country. Within this general framework there are many possible varieties of plan. I have tried to select from these essays the points which seem to me most interesting, rather than those only with which I agree.

Sir William Beveridge divides the task into, first, the preparation of a list of resources and of needs, then the construction of a design showing how best to balance the two, and, after this, the execution of the plan, backed by the whole power of the State, so far as it is necessary. The planners need not be the same people as those who carry out the plan. He offers as a possible method the blue-printing of a five-year plan or its equivalent by the State, and the execution of this plan by private enterprise under suitable controls, of credit, raw materials, and so forth. He is primarily concerned with employment, and I think the scheme might prove effective—it is essentially similar to our present wartime mode of operation; but it does nothing to secure equitable distribution, or to settle the conflict between capital and labour. For this reason I prefer Mr. Bevan's plan,

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under which the Representative Assembly would be responsible for policy decisions, advised by a Planning Commission; the Supreme Economic Council (separated entirely from Treasury control, but checked by an Auditing Commission) would be responsible for seeing that the plan was carried out. It would control the key industries directly, others only indirectly. The representative assembly would retain full hold on the instruments of social control and of education, thus preventing the rise of an economic oligarchy, challenging democratic government. As for distribution, some products and services (e.g. transport, medical attention) would be freely distributed, others price-controlled with a view to securing consumption at a socially desirable level, others sold under competitive conditions. This would enable society to give weight to its own values rather than those of finance, and would provide the firm control of the economic system which alone is likely to be effective in preventing the ascendancy of individual and sectional over public interests.

As a third suggestion, we have the present system of industrial control, as exemplified by the Ministry of Fuel and Power. This appears to me unsatisfactory, despite Mr. Griffiths' endorsement: the machinery of the Civil Service is not adapted for the purpose, and this is so distinct a form of state activity that it requires its own organisation.

Two features of wartime control are favourably commented upon. First, the Joint Production Committees, which are obviously desirable in the interests of industrial democracy; secondly, the County War Agricultural Committees, the retention of which forms an important part of Mr. Easterbrook's plan for the land. Properly handled and run, these could form a valuable instrument of democratic leadership.

So far, I have said nothing of Mr. Cole's plan for living, or of Mr. Laski's essay on choosing the planners. Mr. Cole argues that present-day bureaucracy and apathy towards public and local affairs are traceable to the hopelessly out-of-date, narrowly circumscribed methods through which we are still trying to exercise social control. He advocates an overhaul of the whole organisation, political and economic, to establish democratic units of self-government, based on personally significant units, such as the street or factory. The driving force behind such a system must depend on the conviction that each individual has a function in society with responsibilities towards it similar to those which we now admit readily only towards such groups as our family, or in some cases class, or Trade Union. His essay is particularly valuable because it makes clear the interdependence between a healthy social life and economic welfare in a sound democratic society.

The following points of Mr. Laski's seem to me important. The House of Lords, as at present constituted, is an undemocratic body, hostile towards popular needs, and ripe for abolition. Members of Parliament should be selected with more attention to competence, less to family, financial or Trade Union status (by means of various tests of fitness, to which they would be subjected); once elected, they should be given greater facilities for acquiring the necessary knowledge of social affairs. The Civil Service should be brought into closer contact with the outside world, by external appointments, and by interchange with local government personnel.

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My advice to the reader of this book is: first (like John Stuart Mill) write down a summary of your knowledge and opinions on the subject; next read it; then read it again; and finally, attempt to review it. That is, the book is intended for students rather than for experts; it is in many respects scrappy and incomplete; and to get the best out of it, a reader must be prepared to do some thinking on his own account.

JUDITH STEPHEN

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1938. Vols. 1 and 2. 318 and 365 pp. Edited by MONICA CURTIS. (Oxford Press, Milford, and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 35s. and 25s.)

ONE'S first feeling on opening these volumes and looking at the contents is that one is separated from 1938 and its events, not by five years, but by a life-time. The documents are a tragic record. The second volume is the more important of the two and has a unity of its own, for the editor has confined it to the relations between the German Reich and its neighbours. It covers, therefore, the first two out of Hitler's three great acts of aggression which led directly to the war of 1939. The first section deals with general declarations with regard to German foreign policy; it contains extracts from four speeches by Hitler, two by Goebbels, two by Ribbentrop, and one each by Hess, Bürckel, and Schacht. The second section covers the annexation of Austria and the third the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. It is a pity that the volume could not end with what is actually the penultimate document in it, the speech by the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in the House of Commons on November 1st, 1938, a speech characteristic in its narrow and obstinate incompetence, which ends with the words: "I think I have said enough about Czechoslovakia."

The contents of the first volume are heterogeneous. The first section of the first Part is devoted to the United Kingdom and contains declarations on foreign policy, including the letters and speeches dealing with the resignations of Mr. Eden and Viscount Cranbourne in February. Anglo-Italian relations and the futile agreement of April 16th occupy nearly 50 pages, and here again Neville Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons on the agreement repays re-reading. Finally a sub-section is devoted to the Anglo-Irish agreements of April 25th. Part II deals with the Far East and Part III with America. In Part IV there are sections devoted to the Van Zeeland Report, the Evian Committee on Refugees, and naval armaments.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of "The Political Quarterly"

SIR,

I must not discuss in detail Mr. Graves's *apologia* for the Public Schools. But, in commenting on my article, he has involved himself in some mares-nests. Perhaps you will allow me to attempt to extricate him from them.

1.—"Tawney quotes . . . from a book published in 1909 of which Sir Cyril Norwood was joint-author . . . it would surely have been fairer to quote from *The English Tradition of Education* (1929)."

I quoted Norwood and Hope's *The Higher Education of Boys in England* as evidence for the conditions of the period at which it was written. I emphasised that such was my purpose by giving its date, by stating that in one important respect "public schools have improved out of recognition in the last thirty years," and by suggesting that, were the same authors writing to-day, their strictures on that aspect of Public School life would probably be "omitted or much qualified." Since when was it improper to cite a contemporary authority for the facts of his own day? Mr. Graves must, I fear, have read my article with something less than the care to be expected in a critic. His suggestion that no one can usefully express an opinion on the schools concerned, unless he himself has been connected with one of them, requires no answer. There are few other institutions, from the Cabinet downwards, on behalf of which such a claim would be made, or, if made, admitted.

2.—"He forgets, of course, that what with scholarships, bursaries and special reduction of fees, a number of parents pay considerably less than £125 per annum even in the most expensive schools."

I referred to the existence of "scholarships and concessions to parents," but stated that, in spite of them, the scale of fees at "the more expensive boarding schools . . . restricts their use to the relatively well-to-do," and mentioned £125 to £250 and upwards as the fees required, though obviously the figures are lower in the case of the minority holding scholarships or other grants. Since Mr. Graves does not deny that the schools in question are so restricted, his criticism appears to mean no more than that they are not wholly, but only predominantly, schools for the sons of parents who can afford to pay high fees. I observe that, in spite of his anticipations of a future in which the public boarding-schools will "embrace the entire working-class," he offers no indication of the number of wage-earners' children who at present attend them. As approximately three-quarters of the occupied population consists of wage-earners, the omission is somewhat serious. Obviously, the small minority which can afford to send its sons to the more expensive boarding-schools contains representatives of a variety of occupational groups. The admission, however, to those schools of the sons of "dentists, bank-managers, and the more successful shop-keepers"—a departure which strikes Mr. Graves as an impressive novelty—does not render less mischievous the exclusion from them of the children of the class—or, if he prefers, the classes—forming the great majority of the nation.

3.—"In comparing the cost of residential and day schools, Tawney forgets that even day-boys have to eat and sleep." The recondite truth proclaimed by Mr. Graves had not escaped me. On the contrary, I gave

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figures showing the average boarding and day fees of different groups of schools, and pointed out that, if L.E.A.'s maintained special places at boarding-schools, they would require to provide for them on the higher scale of costs which boarding involves. Mr. Graves has again been careless.

4.—“Professor Tawney sees no advantages peculiar to the residential school.”

I neither see nor stated any fatuity of the kind. Obviously, boarding-schools, like day-schools, possess advantages as well as disadvantages; and I suggested in a passage which Mr. Graves—forgetting his own criticisms on it—temporarily overlooks, that it is desirable that a period of residential education should be enjoyed by a much larger number of boys than at present. The question is how best to use all schools in the general interest. Mr. Graves's catalogue of boarding-school blessings does not, I am afraid, throw much light on that problem.

It would be unfair to judge the case for the residential public schools by Mr. Graves' letter, and I must apologise for breaking a butterfly on the wheel. The real issue is simple. It is whether the existence of a group of schools reserved mainly for the children of the relatively well-to-do and in large measure isolated from the public system of education is, as things are to-day, in the best interests of the nation. I have given my reasons for thinking that it is not, and have made certain tentative suggestions—suggestions which, doubtless, could be greatly improved—for making the public schools, in the words which I quoted from Mr. Salter Davies, “public in fact and not merely in name.” I should welcome a statement either showing that reform is unnecessary or advancing, if the need for reform is admitted, proposals for effecting it more adequate than my own.

I am, etc.,

R. H. TAWNEY.

