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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XIX No. 3]

[October, 1943.

The Indian Philosophical Congress, 1943

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By

PROF. P. N. SRINIVASACHARIAR, M.A.

I am deeply grateful to the members of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for their kindness in asking me to preside over this year's session. It is with great diffidence that I consented to accept this high office held with distinction in the past by eminent philosophers and representatives of Indian thought and culture. This Congress is held at the most critical moment in the history of the world when there is a life and death struggle for the preservation of the personal and social ideals of ethical and spiritual life. It is only in moments of such crises that men begin to think furiously and philosophise on the fundamental problems of life, justify the need for righteous warfare, and seek to establish the supremacy of the spirit. The Song on the Chariot in Kurukshetra, true to the synthetic genius of India, was a call to the philosopher to be not only a spectator but also a man of action participating in the battle of life and working for world welfare. In every world war, which is really a warfare of ideals, the Indian philosopher has always fought in defence of the ancient world heritage of spiritual culture and the re-establishment of its synthetic ideal.

The best way of retaining the soul power of India is to keep alive her synthetic philosophic outlook by removing the barriers of isolation and exclusiveness on the one hand, and the evils of the slavish imitation of alien ideas on the other. Science has destroyed distance only in the physical sense but not in the

philosophic and spiritual sense. It is only philosophy applied to practical life that can really bring men together and make them live a new spiritual joint-family life. Philosophy in India is not divorced from life but has always permeated the popular mind and irradiated everyday life. What is now required is not more philosophy, but more philosophers, who would, as heirs of India's cultural heritage, consecrate their lives to the pursuit of philosophic thinking and set an inspiring example to others in their views and ways of life. Contemporary philosophy in the East as well as in the West is anxious to integrate the different branches of knowledge like science, metaphysics, ethics and religion which have not been on cordial terms for a long time. To a student of synthetic philosophy, it is a fit and fascinating subject to watch the confluence of the various thought currents in modern philosophy. The need for synthesis is different from the manner of synthesis and it is proposed in this brief address to bring out the philosophic implications of this 'meeting of extremes', to use the happy words of a great philosopher, by avoiding technicalities as much as possible. Synthesis is discerning unity amidst diversity and is different from the 'eclecticism of soapy minds'. If the various sections of philosophy come to a common understanding without giving up their essential features, they can present a united front against the common foes of wisdom like ignorance and isolationism, win a spiritual victory and re-establish the kingdom of righteousness, in which the philosopher will play a leading part.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy seeks to integrate all kinds of experience—scientific, moral, aesthetic and religious—and to solve the problem of knowledge synthetically. It enables us to criticise all categories in the light of an all-inclusive truth which transforms our outlook on life, by going beyond the partial and the fragmentary. Though intellectual in its method, it has to consider all questions of abiding human interest in a disinterested way, think them together and arrive at a comprehensive unity. Science and philosophy which have been at arm's length so long owing to mutual distrust, are now anxious to appreciate each other's standpoint, and find out their common features. The dominant interest in contemporary philosophy is the integration of scientific knowledge with the totality of experience. The scientist has the advantage of focussing his attention on a particular section of knowledge, discovering the secrets of nature and arriving at the solidarity

and universality of knowledge in a disinterested way. His problem is, however, self-limited by the specific way in which he puts his questions to nature and approaches the study of reality. He, however, oversteps his bounds when he turns philosopher and mistakes sectional thinking for the spirit of totality. Even mathematics, on whose pattern metaphysics was long modelled owing to its accuracy, gives us only abstract truths and does not aim at concrete unity. The modern philosopher is fully alive to the needs of a realistic approach to reality and constructs his system on the concrete facts of experience and seeks to find out ultimate meaning and value of experience in all its aspects. Science and metaphysics have different subjects of inquiry, though they may adopt the same critical method. The scientist may use the logical method, but is not a logician. Likewise the philosopher may rely on the data of science for his enquiry, but is not a scientist. There can be no universal science just as there can be no scientific philosophy. Physics and biology have separated from philosophy; but epistemology, ethics and religion are still with philosophy. Psychology is on the border land between science and philosophy, and by its unique position in the Congresses of Science and Philosophy it can mediate between the two by reminding the scientist that every observation he makes presupposes the observer, and by telling the philosopher that in his introspection he should not forget the object and that his speculations should touch the earth and have solid foundations. Philosophy is both critical and constructive and it provides a corrective to the evils of sectional thinking and sterile or airy speculation.

EPISTEMOLOGY

What is valuable in current thought is the stress it lays on the ways of knowing truth or on the method of arriving at clear and distinct knowledge. The main contributions made to the Logic and Metaphysics Section of our Congress, especially those dealing with the antagonism between idealism and realism, reflect the modern tendency to seek more the points of convergence than those of divergence. Epistemology with the theory of the *pramanas* is the foundation of philosophy in the East as well as in the West and, as is crisply stated, if a man tries to break logic, logic will break him. The need is now felt for the co-ordination of the truths of rationalism and empiricism, or idealism and realism, from a higher point of view, which will do justice to both and

thus remove the feeling of estrangement. The chief postulate of knowledge is that reality is knowable. It is involved in experience and is neither prior to it nor deduced from it. The old rivalry between idealism and realism arose out of abstracting mind from matter, and regarding each as a thing in itself existing in its own right. The realist says that things alone are real, that experiencing makes no difference to the facts experienced and that the relations are external. The idealist says that a thing is only a mental construction and that there is no reality, but thinking makes it so. While subjective idealism ignores the reality of the external object, realism ignores the synthetic activity of thought. Modern thinkers are inclined to reconcile the differences between the two from various points of view. Neo-realism and traditional idealism affirm the existence of a world that is common to all minds. The principle of relativity recognises the activity of the observer of the space-time continuum, and is said to support idealism in the sense that it makes knowledge an internal relation. The duality of the subject-object relation is the bedrock of logical experience. The relations are not external to the terms related, but are relevant and organic. They are more like the relation between the hand and the fingers than that between the hand and a piece of paper held by it. When the realist says that thoughts subsist logically and are as real as the things that exist, he approaches idealism. The idealist has to recognise the reality of social objects and inter-subjective intercourse and thus fall into line with the realist. The view of certain modern realists who refer to the organic inter-relation of processes and explain objects as unities which are self-identical, is nearly the same as the view of the idealists who affirm the reality of the universal as the life-blood of rational thought. The modern realist tries to know the wood as well as the trees, and the modern idealist, the trees as well as the wood. Both of them agree in thinking that the judgments of fact and value are equally real from a higher standpoint in which reality and value coincide. The scientist as logician often mistakes realism for reality and the philosopher as mentalist mistakes idealism for mere ideas. Even in Indian epistemology there is a tendency to regard Sankara as a realist when he accepts the reality of the external world and Ramanuja as an idealist when he lays stress on internal relations. The relation between mind and matter cannot be dissected though the elements can be distinguished as modes of the All-Self.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

The triumphs of the physical sciences constitute the chief glory of modern science and it is claimed that, in future, metaphysics will be in the hands of those who know physics and that it will be the handmaid of physics. The dominant truth of the physical science is the concept of matter with its principle of uniformity of nature. Matter is energy and a cluster of events; it is not merely what is, but what does, and the materialised energy includes radio-activity. But when science turns into naturalistic philosophy and makes matter the whole of reality, it goes beyond its limits, and philosophy as a criticism of categories is justified in examining the assumption of science and the claims put forward by the materialist, naturalist or realist. The visible and tangible universe has certainly its own stability and objectivity, and is the common theatre of all human activity, and both the neo-realist and the absolutist agree in saying that nature is real and not created by our thinking. Matter may have the quality of extension, but is external to the self and persists in its own being, and it cannot be spiritualised. The materialist is right when he insists on the reality of the physical world, but goes wrong only when he concludes that it is the only and the whole reality, and that life and consciousness emerge from the stuff of space-time as its off-shoots and that therefore it is prior to, and has primacy over them. Materialism often leads to mentalism. Even though matter is now thought of as less material, it can never be considered alive and conscious of itself. Life is spontaneous and self-active and different from radio-activity and physico-chemical changes. The promise and potency of self-consciousness are only in the living and not in the non-living, and the lower has to be explained in terms of the higher. The scientist explains the happenings in nature by the law of causation which is a methodological postulate and is true as far as it goes; but naturalistic metaphysics is one-sided as it ignores the reality of super-sensuous experience and creative evolution. Nature no doubt serves the purpose of life, but is not itself purposive. Matter is neither bare monad nor congealed spirit; it is only the garment of the spirit and not the spirit itself. The critical realist holds the view that the physical objects of science are self-contained existents which are unaffected by the percipient. The objects cognised by me are not created by me or constituted by the act of my cognition; but realism goes too far when, aided by the physical sciences, it leads to materialism and naturalism. The object is not a bare *that* without the *what*; if it

were, it would lead to scepticism. The pan-psychist goes to the other extreme when he denies the reality of inanimate things. Contemporary thought is anxious to avoid these extremes of materialism and mentalism when it insists on the stability of the physical universe known as *acit* in Indian thought, but denies its self-containedness, and thereby escapes from the pitfalls of scepticism and subjectivism.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

Modern psychology, unlike physics and physiology, is an important section in the Science and Philosophy Congresses and has a unique value in synthetic philosophy as, in the treatment of the self, it can bring about an '*entente cordiale*' between naturalism and absolutism on the one hand and ethical religion on the other. Though naturalism and absolutism are opposed to each other in their method and conclusions, they agree in so far as they deny the meaning and value of personality. The naturalist depersonalises the self and treats it as a mere offshoot of matter or as an epiphenomenon. The absolutist thinks that the self suffers from self-contradiction and is a mere appearance or element of the absolute. The humanist and the personalist go to the other extreme in their revolt against naturalism and absolutism. The humanist makes man the measure of all things and the personalist denies the reality of physical objects. It is the prerogative of psychology to mediate between these extremes and establish the nature of the self and its value. Before it does so, its conflicting schools should come to a common understanding. Some psychologists explain mind as a response to stimulus and thus explain it away. Their view borders on materialism. Psychology is explained by them in terms of biology and biology in terms of physics. Others say that consciousness is a new quality that emerges from life. All biocis is said to be psychobiocis. Still others say that the self is only a series of sensations; but a sensation cannot be conscious of itself. Self-consciousness without selfhood is like the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. To explain the mind without the self as its unity is to stultify its meaning. The psychologist as a scientist in his zeal for observing things forgets the observer or the experient, and thinks only of association of ideas, configurations, and complexes. Still others rightly recognise that purpose is the central fact of psychology and that the self is personal and self-directive, and has the factors of knowing, feeling, and willing. The life of reason has no origin in the animal life of man; but it is the essential quality

of the self in its gradual ascent from reflex action to reflective action. The spiritual self is different from the mind-body and has the freedom to achieve the highest ideals of truth, goodness and beauty. The self known as *cit* in Indian thought has its own worth and dignity and its freedom cannot be explained away in terms of the scientific law of causation or the omnipotence of God. Though the self exists by itself, it is not isolated or exclusive. It has its value only in a society of persons and as a mode of the Absolute.

ONTOLOGY

The chief question in contemporary metaphysics as the theory of Being, is whether Reality is one or many, or the one in the many, or whether it is the absolute experience, or Self; and though extremists are ranged in opposite camps in the solution of the problem, a distinct tendency to *rapprochement* is discernible in the leading exponents of the philosophy of today. The absolute idealist affirms the unity of the universe and the principle of totality as its vitalising thought and seeks to discover the one all-inclusive whole which is the ground of existence. He applies the principle of non-contradiction to discover the nature of the whole, finds that finite experiences and even God, self, and nature are self-contradictory and are mere appearances of reality, though there are different degrees of reality; he concludes that the absolute is a single all-inclusive experience which transcends all differences and embraces every discord in a transmuted form. A more moderate form of absolutism accepts the principle of immanence or identity in difference and says that reality is a systematic whole consisting of inter-related parts. Another form of absolutism interprets unity in terms of a totality of wills. The pluralist distrusts the monistic absolute as a colourless abstraction of thought or a static whole that stifles moral and religious experience and swallows up personality. He interprets reality as a pluralistic universe consisting of a multiplicity of monads or selves, each having its own exclusive existence. The personalist as an absolutist tries to compose the differences by accepting idealistically the existence of the absolute as supra-personal, but he denies the reality of external things. A true synthetic philosophy has to explain the reality of the system of nature as well as the society of selves and co-ordinate the realms of logic and metaphysics on the one hand, and ethics and religion on the other. It has to reconcile the claims of pragmatism and

humanism, which reject absolutism, with those of realism which attacks the subjectivistic trend. The contention of the idealist that reality is spiritual has to be accepted, whether he is a monist or a pluralist, or adopts a middle course, and the reality of the physical world has also to be recognised; this is satisfied by regarding the absolute as the All-Self immanent in all beings as their ultimate ground, and ethically transcendent as the home of all the eternal values of life. Absolute experience presupposes an experiencing Self known as Isvara in Indian thought, which is supra-personal in the sense that it is more than personal and is perfect. This view accepts the theory of organic relations and denies only the separate reality of individual things and not the reality of the separate individual things. It meets the demands of monism and pluralism and the claims of logic and ethics.

THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

The problem of change and evolution occupies an important place in modern thought, and in spite of the confusion caused by the principle of indeterminacy used in physics invading all ranges of experience, and in spite of the conflicting views held by extreme naturalists and absolutists, there is a tendency amongst some notable exponents to come to an understanding. The naturalistic view affirms the ultimate reality of matter and explains life, consciousness, and personality as its offshoots or by-products. The evolution of matter is an ascending movement having the promise and potency of spiritual perfection. According to the theory of natural selection the living comes from the non-living and mind evolves from life; life is an adjustment to the environment, and in the struggle for existence the fittest alone survive. Nature is red in tooth and claw and the world is like a huge gladiatorial show. Might alone is right and the supermen produced in the course of evolution reduce others to utter subjection by means of their tyrannic will-power. Some deny the law of progress and say that gradual degeneration and death are the end of human experience. The modern theories of emergence are variations of the theory of evolution and they explain the higher as emerging from the lower. According to one school, the matrix of space-time is the primordial stuff of the universe, from which new qualities like life and mind emerge, and the next higher stage in its growth is the *nisus* towards deity. Another theory goes a step further and accepts God as the *nisus* through whose activity emergents emerge and is therefore less naturalistic. A third theory refers to a realm of eternal objects which require God as

the principle of concretion for achieving actuality, abandoning naturalism altogether. This view is further developed by distinguishing between the absolute which is infinite possibility, and God who is one possibility actualised. It is pointed out by way of criticism that emergents may not emerge but get submerged. Absolutism in its transcendental aspect points to reality which somehow divides itself into finite centres and gradually becomes the world of empirical experience. Another well-known theory insists on the principle of evolution that what is implicit alone becomes explicit and that reality as idea is the gradual dialectic unfolding in a rhythmic way of the One that goes out of Itself and then returns to Itself. In this way naturalism and absolutism agree in destroying the autonomy of ethical religion and explaining away the existence of the self and God as mere emergents or appearances of the Absolute. But a true theory of cosmology has to recognise the reality of nature, self, and God by avoiding the extremes of naturalism and absolutism. This is rendered clear by distinguishing between the process of nature, the moral progress of man and the inner purpose of God which consists in soul-making. The events in nature happen, and form a medium for the progress of man due to his freedom; and God is the ground of the evolutionary process and the transcendent goal of moral life.

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS

Contemporary philosophy is deeply interested in the problem of progress and there are neo-realists and neo-idealists who insist on change as the very core of reality. Whether time is relative and variable, or uniform, it is a succession of events, and reality is endless becoming. Time is not change, but a form of changing things. The intellect dissects the free flow of time and makes sections of it; but when we rise to intuition we feel the throb of life as creative evolution. According to another view, there is emergent evolution and the world of space-time is reaching towards the new quality of the Deity. The Deity comes from the universe and not the universe from the Deity and there is no end to the becoming. Still others prefer the moral attitude to the religious, accept the historic view and say that humanity is ever progressive. Man is never satisfied with what he is, but aspires to be more, and his aspiration is never fully achieved. The humanitarian and the political idealist always think of perfection and not of the perfect. The idealist philosopher himself believes in dynamic

process and not in a block universe, and says that reality is not thought, but thinking. The good is to be won by the race as a whole and it lies only in the future. The pragmatist has the will to believe that the world is perfectible and that it can be made better by man co-operating with God who is also finite. The absolutist is justified when he allies himself with religion in rejecting this philosophy of progressivism on the ground that time and change are in the Absolute, which is timelessly complete, but the Absolute is not in time and change. There can be no universe without an underlying unity and no becoming without being. Infinite becoming or progression is self-contradictory and purposeless. The scientist's view of becoming and the moralist's view of progress are different from the philosopher's view of reality as the goal of life. All change is only in the whole and not of the whole. Likewise it is the living faith of the religious man that the values of temporal life are perishing and futile, and that the free self can enter into divine life by self transcendence and attain eternal security and stability. When man is deified without losing his own spiritual worth, he dies to live and attains immortal bliss. Immortality is not survival in life or eternal duration but is eternal life which is but the fulfilment of the temporal. The supra-personal self has no history though it gives a meaning to it.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

The dominant character of Indian philosophy today as of old is the synthesis of the theoretical and the practical sides of human nature. It is thus both speculative and spiritual and is truly called a *darsana*. It seeks to re-interpret the philosophic heritage of India in terms of the western methods of scientific and philosophic criticism and thus makes its own specific contribution to philosophy as a whole. Of the systems of philosophy, orthodox or heterodox, Vedanta is now the most popular *darsana* and it accepts the essential features of other systems in so far as they do not contradict its own truths; such as the *nyaya* ways of knowing truth, the *sankhya* principles of psychology and evolution, the *yoga* scheme of psychic discipline, the *mimamsaka* theory of duty, and even the moral ideas of Jainism and Buddhism. All the systems are said to have their philosophic completion in the absolute idealism of the Advaita type. In contemporary Indian philosophy, as expounded by many of its leading philosophers, Vedanta is often identified with Advaita, though Advaita itself is

variously interpreted. Of the three chief *pramanas* of Vedanta, namely, *sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*, or revelation, reason and intuition, the first is not very much stressed and it is presupposed in the presentations of Advaita. Vedantins as rationalists rely on reason or *yukti* in the development of their system and fall into different groups. Some insist on the analysis of the three states of consciousness and point to the state of dreamless sleep as the nearest analogical explanation of Advaita. Others refer to the science of the self or *atmavidya* and conclude dialectically that the 'I' is one, infinite, and eternal. The 'I' first poses itself, then opposes itself and finally reposes in itself. Still others speak of the philosophy of truth in which reality reveals itself as truth. The illusionists say that Brahman alone is real and that the world is false like a dream. Another group of Vedantins say that the Absolute is beyond the logical intellect but it is possible to have an integral intuition of Brahman. It is held by some that *mukti* will be complete only when there is *sarva-mukti*. There are Vedantic mystics who affirm the identity of thought and being by referring to a direct intuition of the self-identity of Brahman. The more realistic amongst the Vedantins say that the world of nature, self, and God is self-contradictory, but not illusory, and conclude that the real is not the real for thought, but is realised in the integral intuition of the Absolute. Advaita denies only difference, but does not affirm identity.

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Indian philosophy is at present overweighted on the side of Advaita and unless the other Vedantic systems are equally well-known and come into their own, the balance will not be restored. This defect is mostly due to the default of the followers of those other systems. The criticism is often made that Indian philosophy favours illusionism and asceticism, is world-negating, and indifferent to the needs of love and social service. Though this charge is unfounded and refuted by our leading philosophers, the critic is fully disarmed only if he is made aware of the ethical and religious foundations of Vedanta in Dvaita and Visishtadvaita. Dvaita insists on the reality of absolute difference between God, the self, and matter, and defines God as the instrumental cause of the universe. The *jiva* is finite and can never become infinite, and the text construed as "Thou art that" really means by reference to the context "Thou art not that." God can be attained only by *bhakti* and, even in *mukti*, there are eternal differences in the experience of God. As good and evil are exclusive, good men alone attain God and there is no hope for

wicked men. Visishtadvaita is a philosophy of religion which does equal justice to the metaphysical needs of synoptic thinking and the religious needs of universal love. The Absolute of philosophy is the God of religion and He is defined as the ground of existence and goal of moral and spiritual life. He is immanent in all beings as the life of their life and light of lights and is at the same time eminent as the pure and perfect. The finite self has its own unique value as a monad, but at the same time it is a mode of the Infinite sustained by its life and dependent on its redemptive love. It is eternal as an entity, but is not external to God. Moral life presupposes the freedom of the self to give up its egoism and attain self-sovereignty. Spiritual life is the realisation of the self as different from the mind-body; and the knowledge that it belongs to God. Religious consciousness is awakened when the purified self sheds its selfish outlook and seeks union with God. The self-consciousness of the self is all-pervading and when the self is freed from the barriers of *avidya* and *karma*, it can intuit the Absolute. To the Visishtadvaitic mystic, God is essentially love, and religion is the life of God in the love of man, in which God seeks man and man seeks God, and the lover and the beloved become one in the bliss of the unitive consciousness. Self-loss is not the loss of personality, but is its enrichment by participation in divine life. The freed self sees God in all beings and all beings in God, and effaces itself in the service of humanity, till all human beings attain the highest ideals of spirituality, like truth, goodness and beauty and become one with God. Thus understood, Visishtadvaita occupies a middle position between the Dvaita ideal of *mukti* as service to God and godly men, and the Advaitic idea of *mukti* as the disappearance of the dual consciousness.

From the synthetic point of view, these three systems afford parallels to the Western theories of pantheism, theism and monism. But they are different from them as they dwell primarily on the relation between the finite self and the Infinite, and not on that between the universe and God. The tolerant spirit of Advaita is said to be brought out by the theory of degrees of truth and reality and the idea that truth is a passage from the lower phase of Dvaita to the intermediate state of Visishtadvaita till the higher stage of Advaita is realised. A more tolerant view is that expressed by a supermystic of India that the three are the three aspects of the supermind. Dvaita gives the delight of seeing difference; Advaita is the realisation of non-difference and Visishtadvaita, of the immanence of God in all beings.

ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Ethics has to defend itself against the inroads of naturalism and absolutism into its domain, by insisting on the moral freedom of the self and its intrinsic and eternal value as a person and not as a thing. The self is not a by-product of matter, nor an emergence from it, nor again is it an appearance of the absolute. Freedom in morals is not mere spontaneity, but involves real choice or decision; and the self has the freedom to grow into godliness or lapse into animal life. The *Gita* contains the essentials of morals according to Hinduism and it does not favour a mood of escapism or fatalism. *Karma* from the scientific point of view refers to causality on the moral plane and *prarabdha karma* has a determining influence on conduct. Though we cannot undo the past, the future is entirely in our hands, and not even a god can enslave a man who has conquered himself. From the ethical point of view, *karma* insists on the freedom of the self or *purusha* to overcome the solicitations of animal inclination and the utilitarian impulse of success or gain. Every man can attain self-sovereignty and self-knowledge, and the true meaning of *karma* is disinterested action or freedom in action and not from action. From the religious point of view, *karma* implies consecrated service to humanity and to God or *Purushottama* who is the inner self of all *purushas* and the real actor and subject of all moral and spiritual life and His inner purpose is to make the *purusha* pure and perfect.

The social philosophy of today reveals the tragic fact that culture and civilisation are on the very verge of collapse owing to the decadence of faith in the moral values of life and the dignity of personality. The evolutionary theory of the survival of the fittest affords a scientific and moral justification for the growth of the evils of cut-throat competition in all walks of life, and dictatorships or the rule of supermen with their will to enslave humanity. The gospel of material progress based on the triumphs of modern science has reduced man to a machine and a mere item in the programme of exploitation. The machine created by man has become a menace to his very being. The idea that the State is an end in itself and is beyond moral laws and that the individual is only a means to an end has undermined the foundations of true democracy and self-rule. The theory of chosen races and religions has increased racial bitterness and religious fanaticism. Religiosity has taken the place of religion and dogmas and rituals masquerade as spiritual faith; and

religion itself is regarded as a morbid obsession. Psycho-analysis has exaggerated the meaning of the sexual instinct as an all-powerful but repressed feeling clamouring for satisfaction, and made training in sexual matters an education in nastiness and licence. Society itself is threatened with extinction by the total war that rages everywhere and some thinkers say that life is now decadent and will soon be destroyed. It is the supreme task of the philosopher to restore the higher ideals of life and reconstruct society on a moral and spiritual basis. The acquisitive instinct is very strong in human nature and it no doubt defiles the mind, clogs the spirit, and makes for division and hatred. But the solution lies not in the abolition of private property but in reconstructing society on the principle that riches may be hated, but not the rich man and that one should get wealth in a righteous way for giving it freely to others. The sex instinct is likewise irrepressible but it should be humanised and spiritualised by insistence on the need for marriage as a social opportunity for developing the virtues of fidelity, reciprocal love, and spiritual at-onement. War is no doubt a monstrous evil, but it is inevitable and even a necessary evil as long as man has the instinct of pugnacity. Man is no doubt now threatened with extinction by the very deadly weapons which he has created with his scientific knowledge. But a few living philosophers with a prophetic vision tell us that such destruction is but a prelude to a fresh construction of society and the founding of the kingdom of righteousness. Disarmament will be possible only when man is disarmed of his brutal instincts and his spiritual side is fully awakened. Behind the gloom of the present, there is visible to them the splendour of a new life of harmony and goodwill among mankind.

RELIGION

The age-long feuds between philosophy and religion, especially in Western thought, are now coming to a close owing to the new synthetic movement in philosophy which seeks their integration in a true philosophy of religion. It has the double task of reconciling religion and philosophy and finding a *via media* between pragmatism and absolutism. Religion, relying on supernatural revelation, makes reason subservient to faith and formulates a theology deduced from such faith. Religion distrusts science and speculative thinking on the ground that they often lead to agnosticism and endless doubts. Philosophy subjects theology to relentless criticism and rejects it as blind faith based on myths,

rituals and irrational feeling. But the mere analytic intellect only dissects feeling and cannot enter into the heart of religion and intuit its truths. The modern philosophy of religion, however, seeks to avoid the evils of dogmatism and fanaticism characteristic of institutional religion on the one hand and agnosticism or free thought on the other by insisting on the authority of personal experience. Both pragmatism and absolutism deny the primacy of religious consciousness and explain away the existence of God. The former makes God a finite being fighting victoriously against evil, with our co-operation, but its will to believe tends to become a make-believe. Some realistic thinkers say that God is not yet born but will soon be born. The absolutist thinks of God as a person suffering from self-contradiction and therefore a mere appearance of the absolute. But the philosophy of religion refutes both these views and says that God is infinite and not finite and that the "absolute" is an all-devouring abyss. It rejects the theistic proofs of God by affirming that the best proof of the existence of God is the experience of God, and it is possible for every one who has the instinct for the infinite or the hunger for God to satisfy it by a soul-sight of God and by enjoying the bliss of communion. While the philosopher seeks unity and defines God as the all-inclusive unity, the religious man seeks union with the same God as the supra-personal. When the seeker after God sheds his self-feeling, he can contact God and enjoy the bliss of unitive consciousness resulting in the illumination of the intellect and the exaltation of the will by philanthropic service. This experience is testified to by the mystics of all great world religions including the Christian, the Sufi and the Hindu.

The philosophy of religion collects and co-ordinates varieties of religious experiences in a systematic way and evaluates them in the light of their immanent idea of perfection. An important feature of the philosophy of to-day is the increasing recognition of the inseparable relation between reality and value. While science is said to study the realm of facts, ethics and aesthetics are said to deal with values, and this distinction has led to a cleavage between the two kinds of studies and resulted in open hostility. But now there is a tendency in philosophy to recognise the interrelation between the two. A true philosophy is as much interested in the apprehension of facts as in the appreciation of values. To be aware of a thing also implies the appraisal of its value. Value judgments are therefore said to have as much ontological significance as judgments of facts. The conative and affective sides

of experience are as important as the cognitive. Values are not variable and subjective, but are intrinsic and objective. The highest values of life are truth, goodness and beauty, and they are personal or spiritual experiences. If values are emptied of such spiritual or personal content they become abstract or meaningless. They are the highest ideals of life, and when they are realised they become ultimate and eternal. The philosophy of religion treats such ultimate values as the attributes of God in whom they are always self-realised. God is not only the ground of existence, but also the home of values. When the self is freed from ignorance, evil and ugliness, it has a soul-sight of God, becomes perfect and participates in divine life. The value and destiny of the individual consist in its ascent to God and attaining the eternal bliss of divine life. The ultimate values are trans-valued in that state and become eternal. Eternal life is the fulfilment of the temporal and according to one Indian philosopher spiritual life is not only an ascent from the stage of matter to the super-mind, but also a descent from the super-mind to matter and that the world is now approaching a stage when this harmony will be effected and there will be a new race of super-spiritual men. From the point of view of a true philosophy of religion, religion is one, though religions vary and it is possible for the world religions to come to an understanding and establish a fraternity of faiths as a first step towards a federation of peoples. India is no doubt the meeting ground of religions. But if the founders of world religions are understood in their mystic or personal aspects, the followers of each religion may then know inductively the best of the other religions and appreciate their common features.

Modern life suffers from racialism in social life, sectional thinking in science, nationalism in politics and fanaticism in religion. What is sorely needed to-day is a new synoptic outlook that will combine the seriousness of the thinker with the social virtues of the man of action, break down the barriers of departmental thinking and exclusiveness, heal all discords and give a new spiritual direction to society.

If ideals rule the world in their own silent way, Indian philosophy is still alert and alive as can be judged from the lives and teachings of our men of genius who have achieved international reputation in the aesthetic, moral, philosophical and mystic aspects. Our poet-philosopher who gathers wisdom from all sources by direct contact with reality freed from the tangle of self-interest and has

a direct vision of the kinship of nature and man speaks to us of the joy of beauty and the truth of love which he intuitively by self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice. The moral genius of India has recognised the reality of moral evil in its individual and social aspects and has shown the way of overcoming it by love and by self-suffering. Evil by contact with good becomes sterile and self-destructive and thus gives rise to the reign of universal love. The modern *yogi* of India insists on a new integration of divine life in which there will be a gradual ascent to supra-mental life as well as a descent into the physical life with a view to spiritualise it. He has a vision of a universal transformation of society as a whole in the future by the descent of divine life on earth and the creation of a new race of super-spiritual men. The religious prophet of India lived and realised the truths of various religions and heralded a new age in which all religions will be harmonised without losing their individuality. The Indian philosophers to-day with their synthetic thinking and synoptic vision have already attempted a new orientation of Indian thought by utilising the best thoughts of the West and interpreting the West to the East and the East to the West and thus bringing about a better understanding between them. India's service to the world is the gift of her spirituality. In the words of one of India's leading philosophers, the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity have a deep spiritual meaning. The freedom of man is the freedom of the self-development of divinity in man. The equality of men implies the recognition of the same Godhead in all human beings, and the ideal of brotherhood is a unity of mind and feeling based upon the inner spirituality of man. Thus the political ideals of the west can be spiritualised. Freedom in the positive sense is to be utilised by the free man in the service of the ideals of world-welfare by his renouncing the egoistic and individualistic outlook. All men are equal in the sense that they have the same divine destiny. This view furnishes the most inspiring motive for intellectual co-operation and inter-religious understanding so necessary for realising the ideal of the federation of the world. Such a consummation can never be achieved unless mankind gives up its present antagonisms based on differences of race, culture and religion. It is up to the Indian philosopher with his age-long tradition for solving world problems to face the present confusion, examine its causes, and point the way out of it.

"Madhva's Absolute"

(Presidential Address to the Indian Philosophy Section)

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I

Madhva lived in the 13th century A.D. He is the last of the originators of Vedānta Systems. Having studied both their merits and defects, he has propounded a system of Vedānta in which he shows that the whole universe with all its aspects is the work of a single principle. As his system forms the last phase of Vedānta thought, it has naturally become exceedingly complex.

At the outset I may say a few words about some important ideas that may help us in understanding Madhva. Throughout his teaching Madhva has a single point of view namely, the point of view of Brahman, the ultimate source of all. He says in V.T.V. "*Sarvotkarṣe deva devasya Viṣṇoḥ mahātātparyam naivacānyatra satyam*"—"The only aim of this Śāstra is the determination of the Ultimate character of Viṣṇu i.e., Brahman. The other things are only incidental." We have any number of such statements in the course of his teaching. Further the words he uses have a definite meaning. If once we miss the meaning of any term we have missed his entire thought. We may take for example the word *adhīna*. Ordinarily this word is taken to mean 'dependent.' It may be the dependence of a servant on his master. But the term is used by Madhva in a technical sense. It is applied to a thing which is created by Brahman. He says in Ai. Bh. 37 "*Tadadhīnatvameva teṣāṃ sṛṣṭyādinā darśayati*."—"Showing that the world in question is created by Brahman the Upaniṣad explains how the world is *adhīna*.' Following him his great commentator Tīkācārya says in T. Pr. 2. 3. 13. "*Kiñcātaḥ tadadhīnatva līngena tatkrtonumīyate*."—"Further for the reasons stated from the fact that the thing in question is *adhīna*, the fact that it is *krta* (produced) is inferred.' So *adhīna* according to Madhva means created or made. Similar is the consideration with regard to all the words he specially uses in the course of his thought.

Madhva is a Vedic thinker not in the sense that he upholds anything that appears to be taught by the Veda, but in the sense that he accepts only the rational as taught by it. He says in the Bhg. T. "*Kevalam vedaśabdena jñānam vaidika ucyate. Vedam vināpi anubhavāt jñānamstu tyaktavaidikaḥ...Tattvam Vedānu-sāreṇa cintayan vaidiko bhavet. Veda ūhām anusaredyasya saḥ tyaktavaidikaḥ*."—One who depends on the Veda in order to obtain knowledge is called a *vaidika*. But one who knows the truth by *anubhava* even without the help of the Veda is *tyakta vaidika*... One who understands the truth according to the Veda is a *vaidika*; but one whose enquiry is followed by the Veda itself is *tyakta vaidika*. And in a previous passage Madhva calls himself "*Vaidikaḥ Tyakta Vedaśca*"—"though a *Vaidika* he is really a *Tyakta Vaidika*."

In the above passages Madhva is bringing out the comprehensive significance of *jijñāsā*, philosophical enquiry started by Bādarāyaṇa in the first of the Brahmasūtras "*Athāto Brahma-jijñāsā*". Madhva arrives at the conclusion that there is ultimately only one source of knowledge and that is philosophy or *jijñāsā*. He respects only that philosophy which is free from every prejudice. He observes that prejudice of some kind or other is at the bottom of wrong philosophies, wrong because they deny the Absolute in some sense or other. He does not tolerate any kind of dualism in his system. To meet this demand he studies carefully the problems of psychology and epistemology. His conclusions are in fact far beyond the reach of the philosophers that preceded him. Even the modern and contemporary philosophy will be much benefitted if Madhva is properly studied and assimilated. He is the only philosopher in India who valued knowledge for its own sake. For him philosophy is the highest kind of *tapas* and the knowledge thus obtained is the threshold of *mukti*. He says in Anu. V. "*Jijñāsothahajñānajat tatprasādāt eva mucyate*."—"One is liberated only by that grace of Viṣṇu which results from the knowledge resulting from pure enquiry." According to him enquiry itself is a case of grace.

With these preliminary ideas, I hasten to indicate the final position that Madhva takes in his philosophy. As it is already indicated, he traces the whole world from a single principle, Brahman. Svatantra, Hari, Viṣṇu, etc., are the other Vedic names of the same principle. In the process of enquiry Madhva gives greater prominence to *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* signifies not only the self-established nature of the principle but also the fact that it is the

principle of all. It indirectly points out that all that is other than Itself is derived from It. Madhva calls that which is derived *paratantra*.

He respects the Vedic tradition because it teaches the truth of *Svatantra*. He illustrates this idea by a reference to a Vedic passage "*Sarve Vedāḥ yatpadamāmananti*."—'All the Vedas really teach the truth of *Svatantra*.' He accepts *Smṛti* as valid only if it is based on this Vedic truth. In this connection he respects the *Bhāgavata* and the *Gītā* most, because they teach the same truth in an unequivocal language. The *Bhāgavata* employs the methods of agreement and difference and shows how *Svatantra* is the principle of all as "*Dravyam karmaca kālaśca svabhāvo jīva eva ca yadanugrahataḥ santi na santi yadupekṣayā*."—'Substance, motion too, time also, nature, soul, etc., exist only because of His will and if He is indifferent to them they never exist.' The truth "*Aham sarvasya prabhavaḥ*,"—'I am the originator of all,' is the key note of the *Gītā* teaching. In view of these ideas *Bādarāyaṇa* defines Brahman as that which is the principle of all. This is his teaching in the second Sūtra "*Janmādyasya yataḥ*"—'That from which the production etc., of all this take place is Brahman.' This is how the Vedic tradition establishes what is called *Brahma Vāda*. If we understand the significance of this position we would see that it is more correct to say that the cause of all is Brahman than to say that Brahman is the cause of all. In the latter expression that Brahman is the cause of all, there may still be lurking the idea that the state of being the cause of all may be an accidental property of Brahman. This idea is perhaps the origin of non-philosophical theistic and theological ideas. But to recognise fully that the principle of all is Brahman is to fix the attention on the ground of all. So long as this attention is operating, there is philosophy in the real sense of the term. This is in fact the significance of *Brahmajñānāsā* which itself is the teaching of *Bādarāyaṇa*.

Madhva notes that the real significance of this truth consists in seeing that Brahman and Brahman alone is realised to be the whole cause of all that exists. He observes that this significance is lost sight of even by the other Vedānta thinkers who preceded him, in so far as they postulate something or other along with Brahman as the cause of the world. In interpreting him T.C. 770, illustrates this idea taking for example the *Māyā Vāda* of *Śaṅkara* and observes that in essence it is the denial of *Brahma Vāda*, as "*Kāraṇatvam pradhānasya nirasya sthāpitam yadi avidyādeḥ tadā*

konu lābhosti Brahmavādinah?"—'Having denied that *pradhāna* (root matter) is the cause of all, if it is held that *avidyā* is the cause of all, then nothing is contributed to *Brahma Vāda*. It is like giving the sheep to a tiger after snatching it by force from a wolf.' This passage reveals the vigour or spirit of Madhva's *Brahma Vāda*.

II

After the *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.1 "*Yāvadvikāramtu vibhāgo lokavat*", Madhva holds that all that has change (*vikāra*) is limited (*vibhakta*) and all that is limited is a product (*kārya*). He observes that thought does not stop with a product. It is not satisfied unless the product is fully explained. When the *Taittirīya* said "*Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*"—'From which do these things come?', it put a proper question and this question has become the birthplace of all philosophies that followed it. Applying the ideas of change and limitation, Madhva sees that the whole world of experience is a product. In accounting for the cause of it he makes a reference to all degrees of pluralism and dualism. He shows how they are defective philosophies, because they do not see that the different causes they postulate in order to explain the world need inter-action; inter-action implies change and limitation and this means that they are themselves products. He further points out that their chief defect lies finally in their total denial of *Brahmavāda*. Materialism of any kind does not explain the spirit, the *cetana* aspect of the world. Further to hold that something like Brahman or *Īśvara* with something else such as *Prakṛti* or *Karma* is the cause of the world is a case of dualism or pluralism as the case may be and this position does not explain how there is inter-action of these different entities. Accepting *Brahmavāda* of a kind to hold that some aspect of the universe such as *Jīva* is not produced is again to make this aspect partly the ground of the world along with Brahman. This again results in dualism or pluralism. In any case these theories do not lead to the conception of the ultimate ground of all and the question put by the *Upaniṣad* is not answered at all.

Further to hold that the world is illusory is simply to give it names. It is not to solve the problem of finding out the first principle. Even supposing that the world is illusory, the problem of finding out the ground of illusion still persists. For these reasons Madhva holds that the world is a real problem. This is the significance of his conception of the reality of the world.

What does the reality of the world mean? Madhva answers that it consists of *Svarūpa*, *Pramiti* or *Pravṛtti*. *Svarūpa* means essence and it is that which gives individuality to the thing in question. Because of this aspect we understand a thing as being distinguished from the rest of the world. It is the thinghood itself. Without it a thing is inconceivable. *Svabhāva* is another name of the same. *Pramiti* means Knowledge. Following the objective sense of the term, it is taken to stand for *Prameyatva*, the state of being the object of knowledge. The significance of this idea is that a real thing is necessarily *Prameya*, object of correct knowledge and by correct knowledge is meant that which apprehends that object exactly as it is. From this it follows that that which is not the object of correct knowledge is not real. That that knowledge is essentially relative to object and is by nature apprehended by knowledge is the implication of this conception. It may be noted that *Svarūpa* or *Svabhāva* itself is a *Prameya*. For that which is not a *Prameya* is impossible. Similarly *Prameya* is an expression of *Svarūpa*, for it is *Pramiti* or *Prameyatva* that makes an object an object. Thus 'thing' and 'object' are completely the same. *Pravṛtti* means function. It is an activity. Without it a thing is inconceivable. A motionless thing is nothing. We commonly speak of an inactive entity (*jaḍa*). But it has no philosophical justification. When we call a thing inactive, we have in mind a particular kind of activity according to our interest. If we can see, we have to recognise that even to lie is to do something. To lie is a verb and a verb is an expression of activity. With this comprehensive meaning of *Pravṛtti* we may now see that *Svarūpa* and *Prameyatva* are only the expressions of *Pravṛtti*. Further, *Pravṛtti* is *Svarūpa* because, it distinguishes the thing in question from other things. Similarly *Pravṛtti* is impossible unless it is a *Prameya*. Hence *Svarūpa*, *Pramiti* and *Pravṛtti* are only different expressions of the same reality. Yet they are distinguished from the particular standpoints of discussion. Having these ideas in view, Ṭikācārya says in N.S. 431 "*Apūrva Viśeṣopajananehi Viśiṣṭākāropajano avāśyam bhāvi Viśiṣṭākāraśca vastu Svarūpābhinna iti tasyaivāsau Upajano bhavati*"—"If there is a production of a change with regard to a thing, then the changing entity is produced. The *Svarūpa* of this entity is not different from it. Hence the production of a change meaning the production of the entity means the production of the *Svarūpa* itself". This idea may be illustrated. Supposing a thing has a function, we have to admit that the function is produced. Function is the property of the functioning entity. The two may

be mentally distinguished. But in fact, they are identical. And we have to admit that it is the very nature of every case of identity to admit of distinct usages otherwise we cannot think of identity at all. Take for example the expression 'a case of identity'. In this expression every word signifies something with reference to the same case of identity and qualifies it. So whether we think that the change of a thing is produced or the changing entity itself is produced, all the same, we have, in fact, admitted that the whole circumstance is produced. To make a sharp distinction between change and changing entity is unwarranted. Such a distinction makes the so-called changing entity really changeless and to attribute change to it involves self-contradiction. Hence change and changing entity are identical. They are different expressions of the same identity. So to hold that the change of this thing is produced, or, that this thing having this change is produced is practically the same thing. It is only a matter of language. We make use of it according to our training. It may be asked, if the entity itself is produced along with the change, then what about our idea of an enduring entity? The answer is simple. Just as change is attributed to the thing, endurance is also attributed to it. To recognise it as enduring is to attribute a change to it. Hence endurance is as much a fact as change because both are equally given in experience.

So change and changing entity are the same and the production of the one means the production of the other. Further, the changing entity is distinguished from the rest of the Universe. This means that it has the characteristic or *Svarūpa* of its own. *Svarūpa* and the entity may be mentally distinguished from each other, but in fact, they are identical. Hence the production of change means the production of the changing entity and this means the production of *Svarūpa*. Thus change being universal production is universal.

III

The foregoing considerations illustrate that of the three, *Svarūpa*, *Pramiti* and *Pravṛtti*, each implies the others. All these three are the cases of *Sattā*, being. Being as such is not superimposed (*mithyā*). The superimposition of being presupposes the same kind of being, for being cannot be superimposed on non-being. Nor is it sublated by any experience, because the fact of sublation itself posits some kind of being.

Further, to observe that being consists of these three aspects is to recognise that there is nothing else in the world of experience. These three stand for a thing. They are the expressions of change and they have therefore limitations of every sort. They exist at a point of space and at a point of time and limitation is their characteristic. They are therefore produced. The thing that is spatially, temporally and characteristically limited is not self-explanatory. It takes us beyond itself. It points to something that is unlimited as its cause. To hold that something limited is its cause does not solve the problem, as this something itself being limited requires an explanation. Hence ultimately something unlimited must be the cause of all. The force of this observation itself tells us that there could be no opposition between the limited and the unlimited. The two are distinct, because the former is a product and the latter is the cause. But they are not opposed to each other. One does not make the other impossible.

In concluding the discussion of this kind Tikācārya finally, observes in N.S. 335 "*Ataḥ Svatantra evāsau āṅikaraṇīyaḥ. Sa eva ca Īśvaraḥ*"—"Therefore this cause of all must be taken to be Unlimited and It alone is Īśvara". By Svatantra as Unlimited Madhva means *anapekṣa Kartā* and *Kārayitā*. *Anapekṣa* means that which does not need the help of anything else. This word qualifies both *Kartā* and *Kārayitā*. The whole term stands for the idea that Svatantra does not need the help of anything else both in doing something and in making others do something. In this sense Madhva calls Svatantra *Sarvottama*. This word has a technical use. According to Madhva *Uttama* means Cause (*Kāraṇa*). *Sarvottama* means the cause of all. By its very nature this expression signifies Svatantra cause. At times Madhva uses the word *Eka* in order to signify Svatantra. According to him the word *Eka*, does not merely mean number. Rāghavendra Thirtha interprets it in the *Vivṛti* as "*E ekaḥ asahāya eva Kaḥ Kartā Kārayitācāityekaḥ Sarvottamaḥ. . . Anya nirapekṣa Kartṛtvādimata eva Sarvottamatvāditi. Atra eka śabdaḥ Sarvottama parodhyeyāḥ*"—"In the word *eka* there are two parts *E* and *Ka*. *E* means *Eka* and this means that which needs absolutely no assistance. *Kaḥ* means both one who does and one who makes others do. Thus the whole meaning of the word *Eka* is *Sarvottama*; for *Sarvottama* can only be one that does things absolutely without the assistance of other things. So in the present connection it must be understood that the word *Eka* means *Sarvottama*'. With the same

interpretation Madhva accepts the validity of the Upaniṣads, "*Ekamevādviṭīyam Brahma*"—"The cause that requires absolutely no assistance is *Sarvottama*' i.e., the cause of all and that is Brahman'. So *Sarvottama* means *Svatantra* and *Svatantra* means The Uncaused Cause of all.

IV

Having arrived at the conception of *Svatantra* Madhva deduces certain important ideas which need a conscious recognition, if the conception were to have any value.

(1) If we have understood the truth of *Svatantra*, we must not bind it by the considerations which we ordinarily call moral. For our considerations moral or unmoral are so far not referred to *Svatantra*. They are therefore our own creation. And to bind *Svatantra* by these would be unphilosophical. The same is the defect of those positions which insist on defining the ultimate reality in terms of morality. But this should not be taken to mean that *Svatantra* is non-moral. Judging consistently with the foregoing considerations we have to admit that *Svatantra* is moral in the true or higher sense. For that which is consistent with the truth of *Svatantra* alone is moral. That is good which is an expression of *Svatantra* and that is evil which negates *Svatantra*. So Madhva concludes that it is wrong to consider that *Svatantra* creates things according to the *Karma* or *Adṛṣṭa* of the individuals. To give the help of *Karma* to *Svatantra* is to deny *Svatantra*. Not to give this help to It does not mean that Its creative activity is whimsical in an evil sense. If the so-called whimsical illustrates *Svatantra* then it is philosophically justified and it is therefore good (*guṇa*) but not evil (*doṣa*). Madhva says in Br. S. Bh. 2. 1. "*Īśo yato guṇa doṣādi satve*". This passage explains how *Svatantra* is the maker of *guṇa* and *doṣa*. That It is the maker of *guṇa* and *doṣa* naturally means that that which is consistent with It is *guṇa* (moral) and that which is not is *doṣa* (immoral).

(2) Similarly, when once we have arrived at this conception, we must not judge it from the stand-point of our common ideas of laws. These ideas are our own creation and they do not bind *Svatantra*. We know that 7 plus 5 is equal to 12. This is of course, a scientific law. We may argue that because 7 plus 5 is 12, 5 plus 7 is 12 or 12 is equal to 7 plus 5. This is quite logical. But we cannot bind the power of *Svatantra* by these laws, i.e., we are not justified in thinking that even *Svatantra* must adjust itself to these laws. For these laws of Science or

Logic are as much facts of the universe as the other facts are. Though they appear to continue to be the same they are receiving continuous changes in so far as they are made use of in particular manners. They are therefore limited and they are items of the world of products. They therefore presuppose *Svatantra* as their author and they cannot bind their very source.

Further, we observe that the things that are produced have definite causes of their own. But this does not mean that *Svatantra* ceases to be the cause of them or that Its power is limited by them. For producing something is itself an expression of a change and this indicates that they are limited. The same idea can be applied to all those things that are said to be the world causes, such as matter (*Prakṛti*), Space, Time, etc. Though they are said to be causes they are products. They presuppose *Svatantra* as their author. Having all these ideas in view Madhva says in Anu. V. "Sādhānānām Sādhanatvam yadātmādhīna miṣyate, tadā Sādhana sampattiḥ aiśvaryadyotikā bhavet"—"The so-called causes, laws or principles have become causes, laws or principles because of *Svatantra*. For this reason their existence in the world points to the richness of *Svatantra*'s Creatorship. So the so-called causes, laws or principles that belong to the world are strictly speaking, no causes, laws or principles. For this reason Madhva calls them *dvāras*. This term signifies that they are just produced as causes, laws or principles when the particular products are produced. This idea may be illustrated. X is not the cause of Y when Y is not born. Nor is it the cause after Y is born. It is the cause of Y only as Y is being born. This signifies that along with Y the causeness of X is also produced. So production as it is explained now is not confined only to Y. It has a reference to the whole circumstance in question. And, in fact, it has a reference to the whole world, because change in a part means the change in the whole itself. Further, the existence of these *Dvāra* causes illustrates how the world of *Svatantra*'s creation is a system. This points to the all powerfulness (*Aśeṣa Śakti*) of *Svatantra*. The realisation of this aspect is to substantiate the conception of *Svatantra*.

(3) The all powerfulness or *Aśeṣa Śakti* consists in doing anything that *Svatantra* wills, undoing anything that is already done and changing anything into any other thing. Madhva calls this power *Kartum*, *Akartum*, *Anyathā kartum ca sāmāthyā*. To negate any of these powers is to limit the power. It is, in fact, to deny the power itself. If after doing a thing *Svatantra* cannot

undo it, then the thing that is done marks the limit of *Svatantra* and with this limit *Svatantra* ceases to be *Svatantra*. In making use of this conception T.C. 379 "Kṛñcākartum Anyathā Kartum Kartum cāstīśvarasya yat Sāmarthyam Tena tattantram anādyapi ca sādivat. Īśvarohi sarvatra apratihata Śaktitvāt..... Avyākṛtākāśādināpirahitam atītādikālam Kartum Śaknoti. Sankalpābhāvattu tadakarṇam. Tadabhāvaśca Kāryonneyaḥ Naca Saktyabhāvādeva tadupapattiḥ. Svabhāva jīva karmāṇi ityādi tīkodāhṛta Śrutyādivirodhāt. Aiśvarya virodhācca Tathā. cānādiśvarecchādhīnā anādi svabhāvata kathamiśā tantratā-virodhini"—"Further the power of not doing, doing otherwise and doing characterises *Svatantra*. From this follows that all things in the world are the creation of *Svatantra*. Some of the things of the world may seem to admit of no creation: For this reason they may be looked upon as *Anādi*, enduring. But if we understand the truth behind them they are not in essence different from those things that are readily observed to have origination. So, in so far as origination is concerned the so-called *Anādi* is as good as *Sādi*. This is proved by the fact that *Svatantra*'s power is in every sense and in every circumstance unopposed and unmodified. This is the very significance of *Svatantra*! (This passage intends to tell us that to hold that some part of the world is unoriginated is opposed to the *apratihata śakti* of *Īśvara*, *Svatantra*. From the same idea it follows that *Svatantra* can do the things which we consider to be impossible. For example, the things that are now passed existed in Space. This is a fact of experience. There is nothing more impossible than to make them spaceless. It is not possible even to think of this idea. (The past things existed in Space and they are gone now. It is impossible even to revive them. It is still less possible to make them spaceless. Even to think of this possibility is absurd). But *Svatantra*'s power is absolutely unopposed. It can make the past world spaceless. It may be asked why it has not made it spaceless. 'Because it has not willed it' is the only answer. (Any other answer would be to oppose Its *apratihataśakti*). How do you know that it has not willed it? The answer is this—that it has not willed it is inferred from the fact that we are still correct in thinking that the past world existed in space. Because we are correct in thinking that the past world existed in space, can we not infer that even *Svatantra* cannot make the past world spaceless? The answer is that it is impossible. This inference is sublated by many considerations that *Tikācārya* has established including the position as expressed by *Śruti* that *Svabhāva*, *Jīva*, *Karma*, etc., are there

because of His will and they do not exist if He is indifferent to them. It is not merely this. The inference is also opposed to *aśvarya*, *apratihata śakti*, *aśeśaśakti*, *Svātantrya* or all-powerfulness. The fact that something is *Anādi* and it forms the very essence of a thing is the work of the will of *Svatantra* which is in the true sense of the term *Anādi*. How can then the idea of *Anādi Svabhāvatā* be inconsistent with the truth that everything including *Anādi* is the work of *Svatantra*?

(4) A reflection on the idea that *Svatantra* can even make the past world spaceless indeed points to the truth that Its power is *acintya*, incomprehensible. *Āścarya*, *adbhuta*, etc., indicate the same idea. The recognition of *Svatantra* in this manner requires us to see in every work of Its the same *acintya* or *āścarya* power with its threefold aspect, doing, undoing and doing otherwise.

(5) In the light of the foregoing considerations every state that a thing comes to have is an expression of change and it indicates not only the production of the total circumstance but also the production of the fact that the thing in question is essentially identical with what is called itself at a previous time. For this reason everything becomes *nitya*, beginningless and endless in substance and *anitya*, having a beginning and end with regard to its state. Tīkācārya says in N. S. "*Sarvam dravyarūpeṇa nityam, avasthābhedenā anityam*" The meaning of this passage is already explained. And in understanding this passage we must bear in mind that the substance and state or attribute are, in fact, identical but the nature of this identity is such that it enables us to think and talk of the thing as though it consists of different parts, substance, state etc. It must not be forgotten that even these ideas are the work of *Svatantra*.

(6) *Svatantra* thus signifies that it is the cause of all. It is, in fact, the whole cause of all. If this truth is really appreciated we can never hold that there is anything else as the cause of any entity. Because we make a sharp distinction between *anādi* and *sādi* things, we are led to think that the production of *sādi* is in some sense or other due to the *anādi*. We thus attribute some independent function to *anādi* forgetting at the same time the *apratihataśakti* of *Svatantra*.

But the truth is that the so called *anādi* is *anādi*, because of the incessant creative activity of *Svatantra*. Rāghavendra

Thīrtha says in Parimala 99—"*Sarvakāraṇa vākyānām Brahmakāraṇatve virodhābhāva itivā Sṛṣṭi velāyām na sthitiḥ, 'sthītidaśāyām na sṛṣṭisamhārau samhṛtivelāyām na sṛṣṭyādi virodhāt. Kintu kālabhedenaiva sṛṣṭyāditi Rāmānujādyuktadīśā nabhavati. Sraṣṭṛtvādayo guṇāḥ sadaivasanti Harau iti sraṣṭṛtvādi dharmānām sarvakālīnatvoktyā avirodhamitivārthaḥ*"—'If we hold that all the statements of *Śruti* which describe the causes of the world really have in view only Brahman i.e., *Svatantra*, then there would be no contradiction between the statements. And in this case the statements do not support the different theories of the origin of the world. This is an idea presented by the *Sudhā*. There is another idea presented in the same connection. The thinkers like Rāmānuja hold—'At the time of production there is no maintenance. At the time of maintenance there are no production and destruction, at the time of destruction there are no production etc. For each is incompatible with the others. Hence we have to hold that of the three, production, maintenance and destruction each occurs one after the other.'—Their position is not correct. Hari is always characterised by the producing, maintaining and destroying activities. If we have this idea, namely, 'Hari has always the activities, producing, etc., in mind, we do not see any contradiction in the *Śruti* teaching.'—In the light of these ideas we have to understand that *anādi* or *nitya* stands for an entity which is incessantly produced. The same author says in *Vivṛti* on the *Gītā* that a thing of the world, for example a *Jīva*, is called *Śāśvata*—always enduring, because of *atyaktapāratantrya*, incessant production by Hari.

(7) We have noted in connection with an inert thing (*jaḍa*) even to hold that it lies is to attribute a change to it. If so can we not think that to attribute incessant activity to *Svatantra* is to attribute incessant change to it? Does it not mean that the conception of *Svatantra* is impossible? Madhva answers this as "*Aśeśaśakti yuktaścet Svātantryāt doṣavān katham?*"—'To recognise *aśeśaśakti* (in the manner explained) is to understand the significance of *Svatantra*. If so how can things that negate *svātantrya* be attributed to *Svatantra*?' What is meant is this. No doubt, to attribute anything to the entities of the world is to attribute change to them. But the same is not the case with regard to *Svatantra*. The truth of this statement is clear if we draw our attention to the circumstance in which we were bound to accept *Svatantra* as the cause of all. Thus *Svatantra* necessarily signifies that It is *nirdoṣa*, defectless.

(8) That *Svatantra* is the whole cause of everything in the world implies that it is the only source of all that is found in the thing. Madhva characterises *Svatantra* as "*Sarvabhūtaguṇaih yuktam*"—"That in which all the *guṇas* of all creatures are found". For this reason he calls *Svatantra* *Guṇapūrṇa*.

Guṇapūrṇa is an important conception because it brings out the full significance of Brahman. It does not merely mean the totality of all the *guṇas*; but it also means that each *guṇa* (property) is complete in itself. Being complete it is not essentially different from the other *guṇas*. Each *guṇa* is thus the creator of all. Each is thus by itself *Svatantra* full and complete. Madhva says in An V. "*Sarve Sarvagūṇātmānaḥ sarvakartāra eva*"—"All the *guṇas* are all the other *guṇas* and all are creators of all'. This is the conception of Brahman. This is the teaching of the *Śruti* "*Nehanānāstikiñcana*"—"There is absolutely no difference in Brahman'. This truth is proved by the truth of *Svatantra*. This is why the importance of the conception of *Svatantra* cannot be exaggerated in the teaching of Madhva.

(9) When once we have understood the truth of *Svatantra* and its significance in substantiating *guṇapūrṇatva*, philosophically or spiritually speaking, our first duty consists in interpreting all our experience to fix its limitation with reference to *Svatantra*. Failing in our duty simply means that what has been studied so far has only a verbal importance and we have not appreciated our own study. Our appreciation of the truth of *Svatantra* consists in recognising every aspect of our experience as *Paratantra* i.e., as being produced by *Svatantra*. Without the conscious recognition of the complete *Paratantra* character of the object of our experience, our knowledge becomes untrue. It is apprehending it as it is not. It is therefore a *tāmasa* case of knowledge in the language of the *Gīta*—"Sarvārthān viparitamśca buddhiḥ sā pārtha tāmasi"—So Madhva says in Anu. V. "*Svatantrasyāvirodhena yojayitvākhilāḥ pramāḥ. Siddheśatvena cāyuktamapi hiṣe na yojayet*" 'If *Svatantra* is really understood all items of experience must be interpreted consistently with the truth of *Svatantra*. It is only then there is '*Īśasiddhi*', the realisation of *Īśa* on the part of the individual. If once there is this realisation, that which is not consistent with *Svatantra* must not be attributed to it'.

One important question arises at this point. If *Svatantra* is really all doer and nothing is left to us where is the need for us

to do anything? And in fact, is not the conclusion that *Svatantra* is all doer itself wrong so long as we are able to do something?

The first question is illegitimate, because contrary to our own conclusion that there is no need for us to do anything, as everything is done by *Svatantra*, we are at least assuming for ourselves the need for questioning. The truth that *Svatantra*—is all doer being far from making us inactive makes us fully active, because it is only in our fullest activities that we can better realise the truth of *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* is necessarily *guṇapūrṇa*. Doing (*Kartṛtva*) and making others do (*Kārayitṛtva*) of *Svatantra* are items of *Guṇa* and they are *pūrṇa*, Absolute and complete. This truth is to be realised as the source of *paratantra* world. The nearest *paratantra* in the case of a self is the self itself. This means that the truth of *kartṛtva* and *kārayitṛtva* of *Svatantra* must be realised first in ones own self. Would this be possible in a self which is inactive? The more the self is active, the more it realises the truth of *Svatantra*. Hence the second question negates the very significance of the fact that we are active. Madhva says in M.T.N. "*Pratyakṣametad puruṣasya karma tenānumeyā prerāṇā Keśavasya*"—"That a self is active is actually observed. This proves that the whole circumstance of activity including the self is the work of Keśava'. Madhva interprets *prerāṇā* as *svabhāva* *sattā dātṛtva*—giving rise to very *svabhāva* of the whole circumstance. He notes further that this is the teaching of *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* "*Kurvanneveha karmāṇi jīviṣet*"—"one ought to live fully doing *Karmas*', because "*Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam*"—"All this is because of the indwelling *Īśa*'.

(9) To trace *Svabhāva* or the very essence of everything to *Svatantra*, according to Madhva, is in fact to recognise that there is nothing beyond *Svatantra*. He notes that the validity of *Śruti* consists only in establishing this truth when it says "*Puruṣamevedam sarvam*", "*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*", etc. He interprets the first passage as "*Sarvam puruṣa eveti bhāṇyate bhedavajjagat tadadhīnantu sattādi yato hyasya sadā bhavet*"—"This world of multiplicity is said to be *puruṣa* itself, because the *Sattā* etc, of this is incessantly given by It. He interprets the second passage as "*Sarvam Brahmetyācakṣate tadadhīna sattāpratītitvāt*".—All this is said to be Brahman itself, because the very *svabhāva* and *prameyatva* of all this is given by It.

Madhva has in the whole course of his teaching steadily kept in view the final truth which he is never tired to emphasise.

His is the spirit which sees Brahman and Brahman only in everything which it comes across. He says in Bhg. T. 53, "*Sarvasattā pradātva sarvatattvam Hariṣmṛtaḥ*". "Hari is determined to be all *tattva*, because He is the giver of *sattā* to all." In Bhg. T. 55, he says "*jīvasattā pradātva kathyate tadabhedena*"—"As Keśava is the Giver of *sattā* to *jīva*, He is said to be identical with it". In Tai. Bh. 9, Madhva says "*Sarvam sarvapradātva*" 'It (Brahman) is all, because it is the giver of all.' It may be noted that in this passage Madhva interprets what he means by *sattādāna*. To say that Brahman gives *sattā* to something and to say that It gives the thing to which *sattā* is given mean the same thing. In the words of Raghavendra Tirtha *sattālābha* is *ātmalābha* itself.

It may be noted that in the passages quoted now there is the use of the words *bhanyate*, *ācaksate*, *kathyate*, etc. They must not be taken in the popular sense. They do not mean that the thing in question is only said and it is not real. If they mean only this much, then all the reflection that is responsible for this conclusion would be meaningless. Madhva indicates by these expressions that the idea in question is philosophically justified by those that are competent to do it.

Having established that all is Brahman, Madhva further emphasises the pure transcendent character of Brahman. He says in Bhg. T. 21 "*Sattādi yatsvato Viṣṇoḥ tasmādanyaḥ sa sarvataḥ. Yatsattādiratonyasya nānyatvam bhedinopitu*"—"The *sattā* etc., of *Viṣṇu* are *Svatantra*. Therefore He transcends all. All else has *sattā*, etc., from Him. Hence though it is different from Him it is inseparable from Him.

(10) The truth of *Svatantra* is further carried on to prove various other ideas. In M. Bh. Madhva says "*Prabhavaḥ sarva-bhāvānām satāmiti viniścayaḥ*." This is interpreted as—"The knowledge that Hari alone is the maker of the whole world consisting of spirit and matter occurs only to the good (the good here stands for *devas*, *Brahmā*, etc.). And from this it is concluded that this knowledge does not occur to the evil-minded'. What is meant here is profoundly different from the apparent meaning. What Madhva means is that those that can have this knowledge are good and those that refuse to have this are evil. This is the principle of Madhva's classification of souls as good, indifferent and evil—*Sāttvika*, *miśra* and *tāmasa*.

(11) Madhva notes that the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad says the final word when it says "*Ichāmātram prabhosṛṣṭiḥ*"—"The creative

activity of Brahman which is changeless is mere *icchā*, will'. This implies that creation is nothing but '*līlā*' in the case of Brahman.

Madhva deduces from all this that Brahman, *Svatantra* is one complete Source of both good and evil in the world. He calls evil *dvaita* and it consists in not understanding that *Svatantra* is the ground of all. It is caused by Hari. Therefore it must be removed by him. For this reason Madhva calls Hari, *Svatantra*, *Advaita*. He says "*Tadadvaitam param Brahma tadeva jñātamananyathā, jīvena dvaitamuddiṣṭam mithyā jñānam tadevaca*"—"Brahman which is the source of all is *Advaita*. If any person thinks that Brahman is not the source of all or that It is not the only source of the reality of all, then Brahman is wrongly understood by him. This wrong knowledge of a *jīva* is called *dvaita*. *Dvaita* means *Mithyājñāna*. This *Mithyājñāna* is caused by Brahman and it must therefore be removed by Brahman. "*Anyathā pratyayo dvaitam śamayettam yato Hariḥ, Advaitastenacoddiṣṭaḥ turīya puruṣottamaḥ*"—"Dvaita is wrong knowledge. As the remover of it Hari, the transcendent is called *Advaita*.

In illustrating the *Advaita* character of *Svatantra* Madhva observes certain important truths that no student of his philosophy can ignore. This is the process of his thought. (a) The world is real. It is actual. (b) The reality or the actuality of the world is given by *Svatantra*. (c) Therefore *Svatantra* alone is *paramārtha*, absolute. (d) From this it follows that the world does not exist as *paramārtha* i.e., in the absolute sense. He says in Bhg. T. 106 "*Svatantram paramāsthākyam svatantraikā-arermatiḥ... Pāramārthyena nāstyeva tadanyat tad vaśam yataḥ... anādyanantakāleṣu vidyamānamapi dhruvam, asvātantryāttu nāstyeveत्येवam vācyam jagat sadā*", etc.

(12) From these observations Madhva deduces the final truth of his philosophy. As *Svatantra* is the source of everything, given *Svatantra* the whole world is given. Negate *Svatantra*, the whole world is negated. Therefore Madhva says that *Svatantra* alone is real. But this conclusion is profoundly different from Śankara's final teaching. The truth that *Svatantra* alone is real signifies that everything else which is the work of *Svatantra* is real. It is real because of *Svatantra*. It is *nitya* because of *Svatantra*. Madhva notes "*Yaḥ satyarūpam jagadetadāḍṛk sṛṣṭvātvabhūt satyakarmā mṛhātmā. Athainamāhuḥ satyakarmeti-satyam hyevedam viśvamasausṛjate. Athainamāhuḥ nityakarmeti nityam haivāsaḥ kurute*" Br. S. Bh. 2. 1. 'Hence Madhva's

conception of the reality and the eternity of the world does not oppose his final teaching that *Svatantra* alone is real. In fact, It justifies this conclusion. In reality it is the only way how this conclusion can be justified. This conclusion is Upaniṣadic. "*Satyam jñānāmanantam Brahma*" is the one Upaniṣadic conclusion and "*Ekamevādvītyambrahma*"—is the final justification of this conclusion. The whole Upaniṣadic teaching comes to have its true value when Madhva says in Bhg. T. 138. "*Tadicchāyāḥ satve etat sarvam asti, anyathānāstītyanvaya vyatirekau. Tadeva kevalam satyam iti sarvatra sambadhyate. Svātantryameva satyatvam.*"

From this observation Madhva concludes that the real is one. It is *Paramātman*, *Svatantra*, *guṇapūrṇa* and *Brahman*. He says in Bhg. T. 3 "*Yasmāt paramātmaiva tattvam tasmāttameva paśyanti munayaḥ.*"—'Because *Paramātman* alone is real, the wise see Him only'. In this passage he tells us indeed that true wisdom, true spirituality consists in fixing our attention only on *Svatantra*.

To fix the attention on *Svatantra* is possible only with *Jijñāsā*, philosophical enquiry. The subject of philosophical enquiry consists of three aspects, revealed by the *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa anumāna* and *āgama*. As *Svatantra* is *guṇapūrṇa*, the enquiry that leads to the conception of it can never be final. The determination of an aspect of *Svatantra* which we have now must be the result of previous enquiry and it must form at the same time the basis of later enquiry. The process of enquiry is thus endless. Madhva tells us in T. S. "*Dhyānam niścitatattvasya tasmāt śāstrāvamarśanam varam daśaguṇam tasmāt vyākhyāikasya śatottarā*"—'Meditation occurs to one who has understood the truth. But the study of philosophy (*Viṣṇu śāstra*) is ten times superior to meditation. Further, to teach philosophy even to one student is a hundred times superior to the study of philosophy. The teaching of philosophy must be continued even after the realisation of the highest truth, because the Absolute then is better expressed.' This statement implies how unconditioned is the importance he gives to reason. *Ṭikācārya* explains the spirit of Madhva in N. S. in connection with the conclusion of an important discussion as "*Iti upapatti siddhoyamarthaḥ Tathāpi āgāmā-vaṣṭambhena pratyavatiṣṭamāṇaḥ tathaiva bodhanīyāiti mantrau udāhṛtau*". In this context Madhva has purely philosophically justified a position. And in addition, in support of the same conclusion quotes a śruti text. But *Tikācārya* interprets Madhva's position consistently with his spirit as—"Thus the position in question is *upapattisiddha*, i.e., purely philosophically justified.

Yet one who wants the support of *āgama* must be taught in the same language. For this reason Madhva quotes *Śruti* text in addition'. In the presence of these ideas it is not impossible for us to see that for Madhva the study and teaching of philosophy are the best aspects of the spiritual discipline leading to liberation.

V

This is in brief the whole teaching of Madhva. I may now consider certain misconceptions about his teaching.

(a) His teaching is popularly called *dvaita* and the term *dvaita* is translated as Dualism and then quite unconsciously of course, all the defects of Dualism are superimposed on his system even by the students of Indian Philosophy. Against this the following may be noted.

Madhva has never called his system *Dvaita*. In fact he means by *Dvaita* wrong knowledge, illusion, bondage, evil, the world of multiplicity, etc. Further, he calls Brahman *Advaita* and he says that this term brings out the *absolute* or *Svatantra* character of Brahman. There is of course the use of *dvaita vāda* and *advaita vāda* in certain texts: but these terms have in view only certain interpretations of some *Śruti* texts '*Tattvamasi*', etc.

Even supposing that his system may be called *Dvaita*, dualism is not the correct translation of this *Dvaita*. Dualism is a school of thought which explains the universe by assuming two independent and absolute principles. We have seen how this is far from Madhva. His teaching is in fact, a pure and unadulterated case of Monism, i.e., a philosophy which explains the universe from one single principle which is self-established and all explanatory, i.e., *Svatantra* and this has been already explained.

(b) If Madhva's teaching is Monism, then how is it different from Śaṅkara's *Advaita*?

The answer is simple. Just as Madhva's *Dvaita* is not Dualism Śaṅkara's *Advaita* is not Monism. Śaṅkara does not deduce the world from Brahman, because Brahman, according to him is *Nirguna*. Then how does the world appear may be a question. "The world comes from *Māyā* is his answer. But *Māyā* is *acit* and Brahman is *Cit*. Both are thus opposed to each other. Yet *Māyā* is said to be superimposed on Brahman. Thus Śaṅkara's thought ends in irreconcilable Dualism. But according to Madhva Brahman

and Brahman alone is the cause or ground of the whole world and as the ground of all Brahman is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*".

(c) If Madhva's position is Monism, then how is it possible to apply to his thought certain familiar or well-known definitions of Monism such as 'Monism is the philosophy that holds that there is only one reality' and so on. It is not possible to apply these definitions to Madhva because he holds that the world also is real.

The answer is this. Madhva's position is taken to be Monism having explained first what the term means in this connection. It is not necessary, nor is it possible to apply all possible and probable definitions of the same term. It may however be noted that this does not mean that a responsible definition of Monism cannot be applied to Madhva's thought. We may take for example the definition such as that Monism is the philosophy that holds that there is only one reality. If by reality is meant in this connection *Svatantra*, as Madhva would put it, then this definition can be safely applied to Madhva's thought because he holds that there is only one reality that is *Svatantra* and this we have already noted.

Further, there is no doubt that Madhva holds that the world is real. But we have seen in what sense he holds this position. He accepts this position to explain that *Svatantra* is really the basis of the world. And in fact, Monism does not require the unreality of the world; because if the world is unreal, then there would be no occasion to find out its source and further, to hold that the world is unreal is not to explain the problem about the origin of the appearance of the world.

(d) It may be asked further that if Madhva holds that the world is dependent and Brahman is Independent, then how is his position different from that of Rāmānuja?

The answer is this. Rāmānuja holds that the ground of the world is a *viśiṣṭa* entity consisting of subtle *cit* and subtle *acit* as attributes (*prakāra*) and Brahman as substance (*Prakāri*). But Madhva insists against Rāmānuja's position on the strict oneness of the first principle. If Brahman is said to be that principle, then there is no point in insisting on the *viśiṣṭa* character of the ground. And if Brahman is recognised to be the first principle, then the so-called subtle *cit* and subtle *acit* come down to the plane of the *Kārya* world. It is only with this clear understanding that

Madhva's term *Svatantra* can be applied to Brahman and *paratantra* to the world; and from this it follows that the reality of *Svatantra* is *Svatantra* and that of the world *paratantra* and this justifies the distinction of the two.

(e) It may be asked further that if there is distinction or *bheda* between *svatantra* and *paratantra*, then how can the position be called Monism?

In answer to this we must note the following. If *Svatantra* and *Ratantra* are identical both the conceptions lose all their significance. Each can be itself, because it is distinct from the other. A Monistic philosophy, as it traces everything to a single principle cannot ignore the distinction between the principle and the derived. A reference to Bradley would make the point clear. In his *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 486-487, he says "All is appearance, and no appearance nor any combination of these is the same as reality. This is half truth. We must at once turn to correct it by adding its counterpart. The Absolute is its appearance. That is the other half-truth. If you take appearances and assert barely that the Absolute is one of them or all the position is hopeless. Having first set these down as appearances you now proclaim them as the very opposite; for that which is identified with the Absolute is no appearance but is utter reality," and so on.

We shall now see how exactly the same is the position of Madhva. He says in Br. S. Bh, 2. 3. "*Yatobhedena tasyāyama-bhedenaca gīyate atahścāmsatvamuddiṣṭam bhedaḥbhedaḥ na mukhyataḥ*". As *jīva* is said to be both different from Brahman and identical with It *jīva* is taken to be *aṃśa* of Brahman. Hence it follows that neither *Bheda* nor *Abeda* is the whole truth. Consistently with this Tīkācārya says in N. S. 453. "*Jīva Brahmanoḥ bhedenaca abhedanaca vadantyaḥ śrutayaḥ tatvad vidyante. Yadi jīvaḥ Brahmanogataiva paṭāt atyantabhinnā syāt tadā abhede Śrutayaḥ uparudhyeran. Yadvā Brahmābhinnā syāt tadā bheda Śrutayo bādhyeran. Ato bhedaḥbheda Śrutyan-yathānupapatyā jīvaḥ Brahmano aṃśaḥ angikāryaḥ ityeva sūtrārthaḥ iti*". There are *Śrutis* which teach *bheda* between *jīva* and Brahman and there are other *Śrutis* which teach *Abheda* between the two. In view of both the *Śrutis* *jīva* is taken to be *aṃśa* or appearance of Brahman. If *jīva* is entirely different from Brahman even as a pot is different from a piece of cloth, then the *Śrutis* that teach *abheda* become invalid. And if *jīva* is identical

with Brahman then the *Śrutis* that teach *bheda* become meaningless. Hence with a view to justify the observations contained in both the *Śrutis jīva* must be taken to be an appearance of Brahman.

It may be noted now that just as the *bheda* accepted by Bradley does not affect his absolutism, Madhva's acceptance of *bheda* does not stand in the way of his establishing the highest and the best form of *Monism* in his conception of *Svatantra*. And in fact his acceptance of *bheda* gives a meaning to his Monistic truth. I submit that the popular conception that there is nothing but *bheda* in his teaching needs a correction.

Our determination that Madhva taught pure Monism does not end in saying that a merely theoretical curiosity is enough to understand the truth he taught. With a highly scientific spirit alone he can be understood. What he calls *jijñāsā* is thoroughly scientific estimation of all the facts of our experience which leads us to the correct conception of the Ultimate Reality which he calls *Svatantra*, Brahman. He says in Anu. V. "*Tasmāt śāstreṇa jijñāsyam asmadyam guṇārṇavam vāsudevākhyamadvandvam param Brahmākhillottamam*"—'For the reasons already stated the Absolute which forms the subject of my system namely the one principle of all which is called *Parabrahman*, which is secondless in the sense that there is nothing equal and nothing higher than Itself, which is also called *Vāsudeva* and which is *Guṇapūrṇa* is understood only through pure philosophy.'

ABBREVIATIONS

1. Anu. V.	..	..	Anuvyākhyāna by Madhva.
2. Ai. Bh.	..	..	Aitareya Bhāṣya by Madhva.
3. Br. S. Bh.	..	..	Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya by Madhva.
4. M. Bh.	..	..	Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya by Madhva.
5. M. Bh. T.	..	..	Mahā Bhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya by Madhva.
6. N. S.	..	..	Nyāya Sudhā by Jayatīrtha.
7. T. C.	..	..	Tātparya Candrikā by Vyāsatīrtha.
8. T. Pr.	..	..	Tattva Prakāśikā by Jayatīrtha.
9. Tai. Bh.	..	..	Taittirīya Bhāṣya by Madhva.
10. T. S.	..	..	Tantra Sāra by Madhva.

Freedom and Truth

(Presidential Address to the Logic and Metaphysics Section)

BY

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"Nirvana is not contingent on the truth that the world is eternal or on the truth that the world is not eternal"—*Gautama Buddha*.

"Meditation of the heart is understanding"—*Krishnamurti*.

Philosophers, however open-minded and receptive they may be to new ideas and new ways of thinking, invariably assume that the person who is addressing them should place before them a dialectical scheme, a theory of reality or some aspect of reality, an outlook on life, a system of morals or at least a clearly stated though not necessarily final conclusion regarding some object or some aspect of experience. The mind, they believe, if it thinks purposively, must move to a conclusion and this conclusion must be supported by arguments whose worth it is the business of the philosopher in his professional capacity to determine. Thinking is a process directed towards an object distinct from it concerning which it is the intention of the thinker to reach certain definite conclusions. This is undoubtedly true of scientific thinking and it is assumed that all thinking conforms to this type and since science deals with isolated or loosely related portions of reality there must be a process of thinking which covers the whole of reality, not taken piece-meal but some-how as a single object of thought. Thus metaphysicians arise and with metaphysicians, divergent and eternally warring schools of metaphysics, since metaphysical propositions can neither be formally deduced from self-evident premisses nor confirmed or rejected by an appeal to experience of any kind. However much the metaphysical method may be said to differ from the scientific method it shares with the latter the characteristic that it is directed upon an object whose nature it attempts to reveal in a series of propositions brought together in a coherent system. Metaphysics, as much as science is a form of propositional thinking, by which I mean thinking in which some conclusion is arrived at and put up for general

acceptance. Metaphysical thinking however claims a freedom, a comprehensiveness and a finality which it denies to the sciences, since in some way it sits in judgment on them. Sciences rest on presuppositions which they do not question, with the result that scientific thinking is necessarily restricted and incomplete. The freedom of metaphysics is hampered by no such halting assumptions. It presupposes nothing with the result that it is exalted above all sciences by being described as a science of ultimate reality or Truth with a capital T. And since the light of Metaphysics penetrates to the heart of reality through the enveloping darkness, it not only gives us true and unconditioned knowledge, but also tells us how in the light of this knowledge we should shape our actions and model our lives. Knowledge of Reality alone gives us a comprehensive outlook on life, a pattern of living in which our impulses and desires are systematically ranged in a scale or hierarchy of values. An ethical system is but a corollary of a metaphysical system and though a philosophy of life is possible without a philosophy of Reality it is the latter alone which makes the former coherent and ultimately satisfying.

This is what the metaphysicians in all good faith think about their science. And hence if anyone talks to them about those things which they believe fall within their province he is hailed as a fellow metaphysician and is expected to expound his particular philosophical *credo* or outlook on life. If such a person prefaces his remarks with the statement that he is neither expounding nor groping towards a philosophical *credo*, that any such *credo* is really a hindrance rather than a help to a proper understanding of life his remarks are either swept aside as beneath contempt, or are twisted out of their original significance and endowed with a metaphysical subtlety amounting almost to mysticism, which, without adding in any way to their sense, makes them once again metaphysically respectable. Such I believe was the sad fate that met the words of Gautama Buddha. They were intended to awaken the minds of his listeners to the illusoriness of building systems of permanence in a world of eternal flux, especially a system of speculative truths about a permanent reality transcending all phenomena; but the darkness within was too great for the Light without, which passing through layer after layer of prejudice and preconception, became dim, flickered and finally died. Thus Nirvana, which to the teacher was a living reality and an ecstasy, was turned by his disciples into a sterile and joyless metaphysical concept.

And this perversion to my mind is inevitable so long as the illusion persists that there is an absolute or unconditional Truth or body of truths which the mind discovers by a dialectical process and in which it finally comes to rest—a supreme Truth which shapes our outlook on life and from which issue guiding principles which determine the moral choice we must make in the practical conduct of life. In a conviction, however well reasoned, concerning an unknown reality, in the hypothetical light of which our moral life is oriented, there is neither the depth of true understanding nor the intensity of purposive living. It matters little whether the pattern of living is fixed for us by tradition, religious or social, or woven by our subtle brains out of the materials supplied by the fragments of our experience, for in either case the pattern of living conditions and limits life and turns its movements into well defined grooves where it loses its spontaneity in a series of fixed and mechanical reactions to its environment. But theorising is an inveterate habit of the human mind and the theorising mind has been enabled by long practice to take everything in its stride, including just or even harsh strictures against itself, and with the invention of such terms as Anti-Intellectualism and Anti-nomianism, or to mention a Sanskrit term, *Aparokshanubhuti*, it believes it has effected a happy reconciliation between the claim of revelation transcending reason and its own ineluctable resolve to listen to nothing which does not have the form of reason. It turns into a Truth, albeit of a higher or mystical order, the findings of an experience which transcends the level of consciousness where truth and error are significant concepts. Metaphysics is in the blood stream of man. By training and upbringing he is led to evolve a belief or to accept in good faith the belief of another in some ultimate form of existence. Attempts have been made to ridicule and also to eliminate metaphysics, as by those who call themselves Logical Positivists, but these attempts are symptoms of the same disease, merely instances of unconscious and even bad metaphysics. For so long as the mind's quest for certainty or an ultimate Truth continues, whether it is confined to the limits of sense-experience or ventures beyond it, the mind is in the grip of a metaphysical fever, a deep rooted illusion or Maya, and it can no more theorize its way out of this illusion than can a dreamer shake off his dream by dreaming that he is awake.

There is, however, paradoxically, another school of deep-dyed, metaphysically-minded philosophers, who, far from branding my remarks as heretical, would on the strength of them welcome me

in their fold as an upholder of the true doctrine. These subtle philosophers who must be credited with the remarkable performance of standing on the very ground which they have cut under their feet are the sturdy Vedantins of the Advaita school in whose company I was privileged to move for a number of years and whose remarkable feat I had myself modestly performed in a thesis to the satisfaction of more than one eminent philosopher in this country. I now believe that the Advaita Vedanta is an attempt to reproduce at the level of discursive thought the structure of an integral experience which transcends this form of thought. The reproduction or translation of this experience in terms of abstract concepts is an utter impossibility. But to the metaphysician such translation is both possible and necessary. He argues that though the experience of the real is not the culminating point of a dialectical process, such an experience has to be presented and made intelligible and it can only be metaphysically respectable if its nakedness is covered in a metaphysical garb; and in evolving a well rounded system of ideas he slips into the comfortable illusion that he has made intelligible to himself something that cannot be grasped by the categories of his limited intelligence. He insists that there is an intellectual approach to reality while admitting graciously that it is not the only or even the highest approach. But he cannot see that all approach to an object implies to some extent familiarity with that object while the experience of reality is so unique that there can be no "approach" to it, intellectual or any other. The metaphysical point of view is the light within Maya which is darkness. It is not even a pale reflection of that self-luminous reality beyond the folds of darkness. It is perhaps the subtlest process of Maya that it produces in the limited and conditioned mind a theory of the unconditioned and a conviction of its own essential freedom. Those to whom Maya is a metaphysical idea do not realize that Mayavada is itself a creature of Maya, and more firmly the theory is held the deeper is the hold which Maya has over the person who holds the theory. There is no Mayavada; there is only Maya.

The title of my address is Freedom and Truth, but this freedom or Moksha about which I would now like to talk to you is not an abstract concept to be argued about though philosophers under the stress of Maya have argued about it; it is an ever-present reality, which can only be understood as a living experience. But if freedom is not a concept it is equally not an

achievement of any kind, for all achievement or endeavour to become implies the worship of an ideal which *qua* ideal is after all an empty concept, a conscious or unconscious piece of metaphysics, adherence to which destroys the freedom of the mind. Freedom then is not a condition of the mind or any form of adjustment of the inner life to outward conditions which we can bring about under the guidance of a concept. It is the perception of the illusoriness of attachment to a concept and all that such attachment implies. There can be no conscious or deliberately planned quest for freedom, for to seek freedom is to turn it into a concept and thus to deny it. Freedom is a rich and ever-present experience or a reality to which the mind becomes alive when through an intelligent awareness it spontaneously abandons the quest for Truth, for moral perfection or for any of the so-called lower forms of satisfaction. To a free mind it matters not at all whether a given proposition is proved true or false, however powerfully charged with emotion its acceptance or denial may be to other minds. It is indifferent to arguments that set out to prove and counter-arguments that set out to disprove the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and even the freedom of the will. Not because it can establish the truth or falsity of these concepts independently of argument but because these are concepts and an intelligent detachment from concepts makes their truth or falsehood matters of no concern. Buddha did not encourage metaphysical curiosity among those who gathered round him. And the reason to my mind is not that he was merely indifferent or that like Socrates he was absorbed in the moral rather than the metaphysical problem or even that he professed Agnosticism. Buddha I believe perceived that the pursuit of morality either in theory or practice led the mind not to a genuine and vital experience but merely into a groove, where it ceased to be "a lamp unto itself," while agnosticism was but thinly disguised metaphysics confessing its own partial failure. What Buddha's real intention was will perhaps never be known and will remain the subject of scholarly disputes which need not interest us. My reference to Buddha and the Upanishads was casual and not intended to gain support for my statements from sources universally respected, for one's own experience of life cannot be genuine till one ceases to depend on the experience of another. I have used too the Sanskrit term Maya, but without the associations it carries among philosophical circles. I have used it not as a metaphysical concept but as a name for those illusions and obstructions in the mind which hold it in bondage to changing

circumstances, which create all the conflict and chaos in our unhappy fitful and fevered existence. Maya creates in the mind the subtlest of all illusions that in formulating and preaching a theory of illusion it has in some way outflanked and triumphed over the action of Maya, or at any rate taken a decisive step towards its final emancipation. The dialectical path does not lead to reality, for reality, as has been said, is a pathless land. All paths, all approaches, all activities that are conditioned by an ideal are necessarily incomplete and result at best in a certain heightening of consciousness, as in the case of art, but not in a deep and lasting comprehension of things in which the movement of the mind is not the transient effect of a passing stimulus but is spontaneous and self-contained. The mind's ways of thinking are determined by its past history. With countless million years of the evolutionary process behind it the unawakened mind becomes a natural victim of the evolutionary urge, the *elan vital* or *Nisus* which ever presses upwards towards higher and more complicated forms of existence. The emergence of the human mind, conscious of its limitations, conscious too of values and of the conflict between the ideal and the actual is looked upon both as a result of the evolutionary process and an instrument for determining the next step in the upward march. But the evolutionary process terminates in the mind of man, which is its finest achievement, and is also its last. There is no seed of divinity still germinating in the womb of time, for the evolutionary urge is but an aspect of Maya, and awakened mind, passing beyond its influence, does not press forward to a new adjustment but returns to itself in complete self-recollectedness. The growing complexities of evolution are destroyed. There is a hint of this freedom from the tyranny of progress, and the illusion of achievement, in the creative moments of art, in the aesthetic enjoyment of a sunset splendour, for from a biological point of view, Art, as Roger Fry says, is blasphemy. But even in aesthetic delight the mind's *nisus* is still present though temporarily appeased, for the mind's action is still dependent on a stimulus and is not self-sustained. Besides art is an abstraction and therefore in the last resort it is a means not only of enriching life but also of escaping from it. In a deep comprehension of the futility of both achievement and escape the mind truly loses its *Nisus* and comes into its own.

Maya I have said is attachment to an idea. The idea need not necessarily be an intellectual image of ultimate reality. It may reflect any part of our universe but if it is held and asserted

by the mind aggressively or in a spirit of partisanship, then the mind hardens and grows cold, it becomes destitute of the charity without which "though we speak with the tongues of angels our words are as sounding brass or tinkling cymbal". A mind frozen with theories cannot feel the warmth of life nor follow its swift movement. The attempt to give an intellectual description of ultimate reality is however in a different case. In the case of an ordinary idea the illusion consists not in the content of the idea but in the manner of holding it; but a concept of the absolute, whether the absolute is pictured as one or many as temporal or eternal, is in itself a frozen concept, for in it the mind necessarily takes shelter, regarding it as a final refuge and is thus once again cut off from the movement of life. It does not illumine the conflicts and the sufferings of life but at best affords to the mind a consolation and a form of vicarious satisfaction in the thought of a reality in which evil and imperfection are somehow absorbed and converted into elements of its own perfection. The metaphysician to my mind is like a man who standing on the bank of a flowing stream scoops out a little water in his hands in order that he might better understand the nature of the flow. Reality likewise ceases to live when imprisoned in a metaphysical system.

There is as I have said no freedom, no awakening from Maya, in the subtleties of *Mayavada*, no light, but only a greater darkness. Nor is there awakening in mystical trances or in states of consciousness induced by religious fervour or by any form of Yogic discipline. There is awakening when the mind begins to question, not intellectually, nor through a process of self-analysis, which can be a form of self-deception, but intelligently, in a moment of complete alertness, the worth of its fevered attachments and its insensate longings. This awakening is an integral awareness of the entire hierarchy of human values ranging from the lowest physical gratification to the highest spiritual exaltation, and of the futility of these processes of evaluation whether they be of material or so-called spiritual values. To understand this requires a tremendous and totally unbiased effort of the mind for it will be the easiest thing for a trained metaphysician at this point to chase off after a metaphysical theory of value. This reaction only betrays a mind dyed with the value consciousness and therefore a mind that is not clear, not intelligently alert. In this integral awareness the mind is not sporting with theories and explanations, nor formulating judgments of value. Both theorizing and evaluating

imply an ideal which is after all a rigid concept in which the mind becomes imprisoned. But there is a fundamental movement of the mind which is both an awareness of and freedom from its prison of concepts. Such a movement of the mind therefore cannot be arrested in a theory of value or in any explanation of life's experiences. The mind, in the process of liberation is a kind of detached though not indifferent, witness or *Sakshi* of its many subtle but vain efforts to find stability, certainty and security in this whirlwind of flux which is our world, to build walls around itself behind which it may shelter from the storm without, thus creating and sustaining an illusory idea of a 'self' seeking fulfilment in or salvation from the not-self which stands in opposition to it. But paradoxically the more tenaciously we cling on to what we consider to be ourselves the more estranged we become from ourselves. "He that loseth himself shall find himself". But this experience of losing oneself is neither negation nor salvation, in the sense of absorption in some higher self. It is not an ascetic denial or the will to control, for self-denial is but attachment to the idea of a hypothetical desireless self in which there is no more reality than in the self of desire; and while absorption in a higher self through the ideal of service implies a certain expansion and elevation of the self, the illusory attachment to the idea of a self still remains. This self is built up as an attempt to counter life with a bundle of *samskaras*, a set of defensive reactions organized into a world and in this the mind takes refuge because it is afraid that it will lose itself unless its identity were preserved in this organized world of *samskaras* which creates the illusory consciousness of a self, ever evolving, ever fulfilling itself and destined to move along with other selves to some far off divine event in which it will finally be perfected. This is once again the biological principle of Nisus converted into metaphysical concept, whose illusoriness is perceived directly in the *Sakshi* consciousness. The self is thus a refuge into which the mind escapes, a cave, to borrow a well-known image, unilluminated by the light without.

The Tabernacle is the self, the incoherent or systematically organized world of values to which we cling, but this deliverance however is the object of no quest for it is always with us, "closer than hands and feet, closer even than breathing"; it is the self-luminous light of our being which shines when the mind meets life fully, without preparation, without a background and ceases to react defensively to its changing manifestations. Freedom is

thus the pure action of mind or awareness not congealed in a set of beliefs. But so deeply is the mind steeped in the mists of its dreams that it will sooner seek consolation and satisfaction in concepts than find ecstasy in a freedom which in its fulness needs neither consolation nor satisfaction. It is like the man who to save himself from injuries clings on all the more firmly to a rope that is dragging him along the ground. But if there is a genuine desire to understand, the mind, in a moment when it is completely alert and completely alone, not attempting to escape, will look within itself and find out what it is that it regards as precious, as sacred and to which it clings as if it were the very rock of salvation; and having found it, it will give it up, not with an effort, but joyously, because its contemplation, its own awakening will be so immeasurably rich that it will have no desire for salvation, there being nothing that it will want to save.

This experience which I may describe as becoming alive to reality is unique; there is no analogy for it in our limited, value-ridden consciousness. Hence the ease with which the mind that is not alert falls into the comfortable illusion that by merely altering the pattern of life or substituting one belief or faith for another it has entered the sanctuary of reality, whereas it is merely caught up in the worship of an abstract formula. There is no external test for determining whether our experience is genuine or merely the limitation of a pattern and the very demand for such a test shows that the mind is not thinking but is trying to create that experience for itself by following a prescribed formula thus turning reality into a concept and an illusion. But though there are no aids or hints to a deep understanding of life, the mind that is truly awake will find in its depths an overflowing and yet serene joy which is not evoked by any circumstance, but which is simply there like the perfume of a flower. This serene perception lifts the mind beyond all partisanship filling it with a deep interest, devoid of curiosity, in all men and all things. And being completely invulnerable to what are regarded as life's most outrageous fortunes it seeks no refuge from them, and having nothing to receive from or lose to another, it does not corrupt its relationships with other minds by a spirit of exploitation, which breeds varying degrees of attachment or fear and prevents the opening of the mind in compassion and love. Finally the mind in true contemplation does not show emotional preference, or harden into a conviction or belief or move towards any conclusion, for its own movement and awareness and love are its own eternity.

You may ask, if the mind's contemplation of and freedom from its illusions is not a dialectical process leading to a conclusion and if the mind so awakened transcends the level even of the truth-seeking consciousness, how is it possible even to speak of this awakening, of this reality beyond the reach of concepts? For to do so is to break out into a judgment or series of judgments open to rational investigation and to hold up as the Truth a particular view about the nature of the real. This is a misunderstanding, but I shall not attempt to argue you out of it, for to me, in a perception based on argument, the mind cannot awake to reality. I can only ask you to make the effort to understand these things deeply and not superficially through the mere intellect. Whether the process of thinking is one that liberates the mind or one that holds it in the bondage of a belief cannot be determined by the form of words in which the mind's experience is narrated. All language is rational, but all thinking is not propositional. My thought would be congealed in a set of propositions if the purpose of my talking to you were to produce a conviction in your minds, to make you accept a point of view, or to sway your minds into the channel of a specific intellectual or emotional response to life. But as I have said the mind that is awakened is completely invulnerable and has no interest in defending itself or any statement it makes about the illusions that corrupt its action and its relationship. It does not ask for a recognition of the genuineness of its experience and is unaffected by an adverse judgment, not because it is secure in its own unshakeable faith, but because its experience is rich and free precisely in this that it perceives, without argument, the futility of seeking security in a faith or belief. Not being the development of an argument, its statements do not invite agreement or in intention provoke disagreement, all possible disagreement and even agreement for that matter being on one side alone, indicating that the disagreeing or agreeing mind is held in the bondage of its own beliefs.

And all this is not asserted as some form of Truth about the mind or reality. A living experience lapses into a truth-claim only when it is preached and converts are sought to it. The free mind has no missionary zeal, while the votary of the religion of Truth is eager to make converts and hardens his heart against those who will not consent to enter the walls of his prison-house. The missionary spirit does not die out through indifference but through fullness of love. In fact the meaning of love that is not mere attachment cannot be understood by the mind that worships a truth, however wide and tolerant, because this truth

conditions his mind and acts as a subtle barrier between himself and his fellow-men. There is no universal brotherhood in the hearts of those who belong to a Society for the bringing into being of universal brotherhood, for to them it will ever remain a pious formula and not become a living experience. Their very allegiance to a cause limits the free movement of their minds and defeats their purpose of bringing all men to the recognition of a common cause. They meet life with a resistance and thus provoke resistance in the minds of others. And when the mind's action is corrupted its love cannot be pure or lasting. In the absence of a spontaneous movement the mind needs to be stimulated into action by the driving force of beliefs and these beliefs are in turn kept alive by complicated ceremonies and mystical symbolism and the lure of spiritual hierarchies. But people who live in the sun have no need to light fires. In the complicated artifice of beliefs and ceremonies love, which rejoices in simplicity, can find no abode.

In Freedom there is only comprehension and no reaction, either positively in attachment or negatively in recoil. Though its action liberates it from the value consciousness it does not lead to a denial of values. To condemn a pattern of life is as unintelligent as to accept it as an ideal, for the mind condemns only when it is evaluating in terms of an ideal to which it becomes attached, so that all condemnation is really self-condemnation. Affirmation and denial are both an evidence of a partisan mind which creates and is in turn sustained by the conflict of opposites, but the *Sakshi* consciousness is beyond all pairs of opposites.

As I said before it is not my intention to bury metaphysics. The search for ultimate truth is to my mind an illusion, but this illusion cannot be dispelled by the merely negative act of refraining from or suppressing metaphysics, which is what condemnation of metaphysics would imply. The illusion is dispelled by an intelligent perception in which the habit of speculation is not checked or curbed but joyously outgrown.

In what way then is it even possible to talk about reality without covering it with the cobwebs of our theories or deriving from its contemplation an ideal pattern which serves as the motive force for moral exhortation? Language however has many functions and a deep comprehension of life is not necessarily a dumb ecstasy. The language of the *Jivan-mukta* is neither metaphysics nor science, neither rhetoric nor poetry. Its primary function is not to impart information or to instruct,

to move or to delight, though I am tempted to add, this does not make the *jivan-mukta* either a mystic or a modernist poet, between whom there does not appear to be very much difference, except that the mystic's utterances can occasionally be understood. The highest function of language is not merely to delight, for even in the deepest satisfactions of art there is merely an appeasement of *nissus* while freedom speaks with a voice in which the urge of *nissus* is absent and therefore its words come as a kind of revelation, a revelation not to be believed in or lived up to but to be heard, contemplated and understood. Their function is not to instruct or to delight but to awaken, not by luring the mind of the listener with a word picture of reality nor by prescribing a moral code or a form of discipline, but by pointing out how the mind needlessly burdens its self with attachments and prejudices and the fear of dissolution, thus creating the illusion of a self resulting in the inanities of self-aggrandisement and the cruelties of exploitation. The *jivan-mukta* speaks in words that carry their usual significance, but his words are in reality a kind of *mantra* that has a power to heal the mind and to make it whole. The awakening comes about by the action of his mind on the mind that is in some way alive to the pain in the heart of things and the poverty of its own experiences, though at what point and in what manner the awakening comes can never be determined. "Come, let us reason together" said the Lord of Israel. But it is not through a process of mere reasoning that the mind begins to feel the weight of its illusions. While reasoning together something is touched off, and some door in the mind is opened through which the light streams in as if a dreamer were suddenly to realize the unsubstantial stuff of his dreams; and from that point the awakening mind puts away the quest for truth and the consolations of philosophy. Paradoxically, the *jivan-mukta's* purpose is achieved when the person he is addressing realizes that there is nothing he can learn or gain from the experience of another. So long as he is merely accepting or rejecting what he hears there is no understanding, but only a mental resistance of prejudice and preconception. Imagine that a dreamer's attention is drawn in some manner to the unsubstantial pageant of his dreams. If he disagrees with you he will prolong the period of his dream, but the unsubstantial pageant will not fade through mere agreement, there will be merely a fresh orientation on the part of the dreamer and a subtle transition to a new pattern of dream imagery. This complicates his dream by adding to it the dream

that he is awake. And so through theories, through religious and social loyalties, through high endeavour and exaltation we dream that we are liberating our minds. In a deep and serene comprehension of all values which is not itself a process of evaluating, the spell of dream is broken and we arise joyous and liberated, even from the dream of liberation.

Freedom then is not a forsaking of the world. The *jivan-mukta* enters into the heart of all things, but his perception and his love remain undefiled by the dust of passion and partisanship. Having no mental treasure to guard or to cherish, his mind is not encircled by a wall of defensive reactions and the action of his mind is not prompted by fear. He meets every human situation fully without the desire for exploitation, and so spontaneously, without the compulsion of any imperative, treats humanity whether in his own person or in that of another always as an end and never as a means. He does not scoff at man's desire to evolve a form of society from which superstition, violence, greed and all forms of economic maladjustments are for ever banished, but as his rich perception transcends the scheme of values these values have for him a totally new and vital significance which is missed by the value-conditioned mind. He brings to human problems a dispassionate earnestness and complete sanity, because his vision comprehends both the distractions of time and the deep purposive movement of eternity. His awareness of all things is *sub specie aeternitatis*, but his eternity is not a static concept. It is an ever active experience of unimpeded contact with life. In him alone political greatness and wisdom can meet for, if I may borrow further from the same passage, so long as the mind continues to remain entangled in its own theories and explanations it will not rest from its evils nor perceive the light of day.

Throughout my talk I have used no argument, no persuasion on behalf of a truth or a cause, no invitation to dialectic, which is the recognized instrument of all philosophy. As trained philosophers then you have a right to brush aside all that I have said as containing nothing but heresy and confusion, but if on the other hand this heresy has had the effect of throwing a single mind into confusion, I would conclude by saying:—Do not reason your way back from this confusion into a state of philosophical complacency, but become alive to it, witness it with the whole mind, for if in this moment of deep confusion and anarchy the mind does not escape into a shelter there will emerge a deep comprehension of life.

Public Opinion

A Psychological Analysis

(Presidential Address to the Psychology Section)

By

PROF. S. N. ROY

I am extremely grateful to the Executive Committee of the Philosophical Congress for the honour they have done me by electing me as President of the Psychology Section. A Sectional President finds it to be a part of his duty to deliver an address on his own subject, but he feels some difficulty in choosing a subject of discourse. As I was wondering as to the topic on which I might speak, I found that at the present day much importance is attached to Public Opinion and thought that a psychological analysis of Public Opinion would be of some interest and value, and hence I have chosen this subject for my address.

In this war-racked world we have been listening to the incessant talks on armaments, land, sea, and air forces, and the supreme efforts for the mass production of huge and formidable war machinery. In the armageddon the contending nations have been making huge sacrifices of men and money, and all sorts of necessities as well as comforts of life for the attainment of victory. Each nation functions as a single organised whole, perfectly united in its aim, ambition and activities. The more the solidarity the better are the chances for victory. That is why each nation adopts well devised methods for acquainting the public with the war purpose and enlisting sympathy of its citizens in the successful prosecution of the war. One of the methods adopted is the effective use of propaganda by which a spirit of confidence is created and maintained in the body politic and attempts are made to drive in a wedge in the public opinion of the enemy country so that war efforts of the enemy may be slackened and confusion, dismay and hostile reaction may ensure to paralyse the enemy and its activities. In my article on the psychology of propaganda, which has been published, I have endeavoured to show that propaganda is the means of

creating make-believes to which individual men and groups react readily because most of us are extremely reluctant to come into close contact with actual reality. We do so because we are so trained from the very start of our life that we get accustomed to see things, not as they are, but from a certain angle of vision. A whole group of images and ideas, social, political and religious, circle round our experiences of the external world and they colour and modify our perceptions of things and events in the environment. The successful propagandist is one who has an intimate knowledge of the pre-conceived notions and prejudices and the cultural background of the society among the members of which he wishes to see his propaganda take root.

Propaganda then is one of the powerful weapons which are put into use in a war. The task of the propagandist can be said to be fulfilled when he is able to influence public opinion in favour of certain views which he wants the people to accept. Thus public opinion is a sort of plastic material which the statesman of a country intends to mould into shapes fashioned and controlled by him in his own interests. If a State is desperately autocratic it may function in complete disregard of the opinion of the public which it governs, but in modern times practically the ruler of every country knows that he will have very little chance of success in any sphere of administration if he ignores the public for whom the administration exists. The Fascist Dictator, no doubt, wields all power in the State and in times of war seems to behave against the wishes of the public, but in reality he is compelled to rally round him the public opinion of the country by threats or by force, and as soon as his power wanes, revolution breaks out.

I think I need not dilate upon the importance of public opinion in a modern State. Any country that involves itself in war without the consent of its citizens cannot hope to succeed in the long run because public opinion, if it is against war, will act not only as an obstacle but as a formidable force which saps the energy and undermines the order of any organisation for the prosecution of the war. In Political science the value of public opinion has been fully recognised especially in a popular government and attempts have been made to define its nature, growth and functions. I shall take liberty to speak for a while on the political significance of public opinion. Two questions have to be mooted before anything can be said as to the nature of public

opinion. What is opinion and when can it be said to be public? It has been said that a conviction formed in accordance with a system of beliefs present in the mind is called opinion. An opinion then differs from mere desire or wish because it involves a judgment of facts from a certain standpoint. An opinion becomes public when it is held by a community of people who have at least that amount of education which enables them to understand the common interests which form the foundation of that opinion. A subject in which a particular individual is interested and not a whole community, can hardly be the ground for the formation of a public opinion. The personal views of Mahatma Gandhi about his relationship to the Creator of the world cannot form the subject matter of a public opinion for they are his own and do not affect the interests of others. But his principle of non-violence as a political creed evokes a public opinion for it can be accepted only by those who realise that their interests will be fulfilled by an adherence to that principle, and it will be rejected by those who consider that principle detrimental to their interests.

It is generally believed that public opinion means the opinion of the majority of the people of a country, but this idea is wrong because an opinion held by a minority is a public opinion as much as that which is held by a majority. If 55 p.c. of the Muslims support the scheme of Pakistan and 45 p.c. be opposed to it, the view of the minority cannot be ignored on the ground that it does not reflect public opinion. A minority opinion has as much a claim upon public administration as the majority has, but it will be the duty of the majority to convert the minority to its own opinion either by force or by persuasion. If it is done by force the administration becomes tyrannical, and therefore an administration to have the sanction of public opinion must be able to convert the minority to the opinion of the majority by persuasion.

From what we have said it appears that a public opinion need not necessarily be the opinion of the majority. Does it then indicate that public opinion is the sum total of the views of a community with regard to a subject of common interest? There can be no such summation of views because the views are generally conflicting in nature and there can hardly be what is called perfect unanimity. So long as there is cleavage of race, religion or politics differences in public opinion must exist,

and therefore we cannot imagine the existence of a perfectly unanimous opinion in the presence of racial or other differences.* What is important for the formation of public opinion is that the members of a community must be able to realise the common ends or aims of administration and the means adopted for their realization. The more the consciousness of a common end to be achieved the greater will be the strength of the public opinion, and this fact accounts for growing or progressive public opinion.

It must be observed further that there can be one public opinion with respect to one section of a community and another with regard to another section. For example, among the Hindus there is one opinion on the matters of temple entry with regard to caste Hindus and quite another with regard to the untouchables. Again, there can be division of public opinion with regard to different objectives or methods to be adopted for the attainment of such objectives. For example, the Indian opinion seems to be undivided with regard to the attainment of political independence, but so far as the methods to be adopted for reaching that goal are concerned the Indian opinion is divided. The Congressites hold one opinion, the Muslim Leaguers quite another. Such differences in public opinion must remain so long as racial or cultural differences exist in the body politic.

It may be held that differences in public opinion are not so much due to cultural differences as to the selfish interests of the different groups within a country or nation. But why is it that the different groups cannot have the same interests? Are the differences inherent in the cultural differences of the people in a country or do they spring from the mutual rivalry of the groups for prominence or power in the State or Society? The first alternative seems to be more justifiable than the second, because the people of a country have become divided into groups on account of their variance in cultural equipment and outlook. But it is just here where we must not lose sight of one very important factor which contributes to the growth of clash of interests. We may have the same social interests but in spite of that we may be divided when we are made to believe that our interests are not the same. Such make-believes are created by the leaders of our country. A leader is one who by reason of his social supremacy and authority is in an advantageous position

*Cf *Public Opinion and Popular Government* by Lowell.

to secure a large following. He is able to create the belief in his followers that they must accept his views if they aspire to social prosperity and security. But his views will be accepted by those who find that the views are in consonance with the beliefs already present in their minds. Thus, although it is true that most of us are ready to act at the suggestion of a leader, it is equally true that suggestion initiates action in us only so far as the suggested ideas are in conformity to the traditions in which we have been born and bred up. Hence, the success of a leader depends upon his ability to control and guide the cultural influences which form the background of the mental equipment of group of persons whom he wishes to lead. Now, an able leader can make his followers believe that they must form a group by themselves and oppose themselves to others who belong to a different group. In other words he may foment opposition and clash between two groups by the help of make-believes. The cultural differences need not necessarily lead to opposition and clash but the leader takes advantage of such differences and causes enmity and rivalry between two parties. The followers of a leader become as much attached to him as the children to their father, and the prestige and power of the leader imply their own prestige and power, with the result that they begin to assert themselves against any other leader simply for the sake of prominence in the public eye. The leader's opinion assumes the status of public opinion so far as the followers identify themselves with the leader who is a living embodiment of the cultural forces to which the individuals have become adapted. The leader of the rival group may in reality be a friend and not a foe but he is imagined to be the probable invader of the continent of interests so dearly cherished by the members of the group. This seems to be the psychological situation which accounts for the formation of social groups and the rivalry between them.

From what we have said it appears that public opinion is to a large extent formed out of images which do not represent reality as such but a pseudo-environment. This seems to be the main contention of Walter Lippmann* who in his work on *Public Opinion* points out that at the social level man's adjustment to environment takes place through the medium of fictions. By fiction of course is not meant a lie; it is a representation of the

environment made by man himself. "This representation extends all the way from complex hallucination to the scientist's perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model." He says that public opinion is like a play suggested to actors by their own experience, in which the plot is transacted in the real lives of actors. The pictures inside the heads of the human actors of their needs and purposes are the public opinion. Mr. Lippmann's analysis of public opinion is an important contribution to the psychology of public opinion, and it seems to me that his view is in accord with what the psycho-analysts say about our maladjustment to the environment. In most cases of mental derangement the individual adopts certain means of adjustment to the environment when there is failure to meet the real situation in the right way. But Lippmann suggests that the real situation is never revealed to any body except so far as it is known through immediate perception, and any judgment upon a situation involves a host of images, sentiments and emotions already present in the mind.

We move in a world which is partly our own creation, and the pictures of this world which we carry with us enable us to secure a position of safety in the society. Our habitual adjustments to this world form a number of patterns to which the instinctive equipment of our nature is accommodated. These patterns are the stereotypes and different races or societies have different stereotypes which are handed down from parent to child. They serve as defence mechanisms, that is, behind them we seek a position of safety in the society in which we live. If these stereotypes are disturbed we become upset and that is why any abrupt or wholesale social or political change causes resentment or revolt.

We may then conclude that public opinion is not the result of clear judgment but is largely the outcome of pre-conceived notions and persistent emotional moods or temperaments. At the same time we cannot overlook the fact that public opinion is not the same thing as public sentiment. Public opinion may be said to be the rational phase of public sentiment. Public sentiment is aroused by a reference to the tradition or custom of the people of a country, and underlies our estimate of fashion, propriety and decorum. But the real test of public opinion is sought through elections or referendums or plebiscites. We meet with the expression of public opinion in the press and on the platform. But it must be admitted that public opinion is considerably influenced by public sentiment.

*Cf *Public Opinion* by W. Lippmann.

It should be further noted that public opinion does not reveal the existence of a group mind or collective unconscious. It is the response of a group of persons to a social situation. In a psychological approach to the question of public opinion one must remember that reciprocal relationship of individuals in a group is the basis of our estimate of any group activity. The behaviour of the individual in the group is determined partly by instinctive urges and partly by acquired habits and customs. When a situation arises which affects the interest of the individuals of a group, the group as a whole reacts to the situation under the influence of physical and cultural forces. Thus, public opinion which is no doubt an articulate expression of the behaviour of a group towards a social situation is largely determined by cultural and innate dispositions of the individual members of the group. We may therefore use a simple formula to represent public opinion. If 'R' stands for public opinion which, as we have said, is a reaction to a social situation, 'S' stands for the stimulating situation, and 'O' stands for the physical and cultural influences of the group which reacts, then $R=f(O,S)$ i.e. public opinion is a resultant of physical and cultural influences so far as they act in a particular social situation. It is a mathematical function of these two variables namely O and S. The reaction that takes place is either positive or negative, i.e., it is either one of approach or of withdrawal. If the stimulating situation is in accord with the physical and cultural influences at work it produces a response of approach or acceptance; if it is opposed to those influences it brings about a response of withdrawal or non-acceptance. If we take for our example the proposals of Sir Stafford Cripps and the reaction of the Indian opinion towards them, we may explain the whole behaviour by this formula. The Cripps' proposals offer the stimulating situation 'S', and the present political atmosphere, the prevailing notions about the present day administration of the country and the ideologies of the future constitution of India, the dominant cultural influences, social habits, customs or traditions—all these are represented by the 'O' factors. Now so far as the proposals were opposed to the 'O' factors, the resulting reaction was one of withdrawal or rejection. It is true that some Indians were ready to accept the proposals, and their reaction to the proposals was therefore positive. To explain why such differences in public opinion arise I have already referred to differences in racial or cultural elements. But here I draw attention to two laws of reaction namely the law of selection and the law of advantage. When a group of persons select one form of

reaction among others, the self-preservative motives play an important role. A complex reaction is determined by protective impulses which have an advantage over other impulses. The Indian public opinion, so far as it was opposed to the Cripps' proposals, was largely influenced by self-preservative motives, that is, those Indians whose sense of security was not satisfied by the proposals, rejected them. The origin of the sense of security is no doubt ultimately traceable to the dependence of the child upon the parent, and it may be said that Cripps' proposals were not so much reassuring as to call up a sympathetic response on the part of Indians.

We have already said that public opinion is not an individual reaction but the reaction of an entire group. The group functions through its leaders. Thus the leader of a group or community is not to be judged as an isolated individual but as a function of the group to which he belongs. The leader no doubt develops a personality which marks him out from the rest of his group, but so far as he voices the public opinion he is not to be considered as an individual but as a whole within a whole. His activities are determined to a large extent by the group ideas or group behaviour and therefore he represents the group as a whole. When one leader of a community is opposed by another leader of the same community, we must look for the cause of this opposition not so much in the conflict of personal motives as in the opposition of one set of group ideas to another set of group ideas.

It should be noted that public opinion evolves in the midst of interaction and development of personalities. Each personality may be regarded as a field property, that is, as a characteristic manifestation of the social organization. Just as in an electric field there are potential differences between one point and another, so in the social organization of individuals there are differences in the development of personality. Now an individual who has attained a high degree of personality comes forward to lead other persons who cluster round him. His voice prevails and is accepted as the public opinion of the group to which he belongs.

The leader by virtue of his social position and authority is able to control the activities of his followers. His opinion is accepted by every individual member of his group not because it is the result of deliberate judgment but because of the fact that in accepting his opinion each member finds a satisfaction accruing from the gratification of his sense of security. The members of

the group unconsciously identify themselves with the leader and accept his opinion as their own. But this state of affairs continues so long as the leader holds his power and prestige in the society. No sooner does he fail to fulfil his promises or carry out his own intentions than his followers begin to grow sceptic about his social position and invariably quit his group to form a separate organization by selecting another leader. This utter dependence upon the leader proves beyond all doubt the mental need for security which every follower feels and seeks to satisfy through his allegiance to the leader. So long as the leader is powerful he forces obedience of the followers to his will and in all their activities they feel bound to abide by the opinion of the leader. Thus the leader's opinion, which comes to assume the status of public opinion, acts as a social force which governs social relations of the individual members of a group. At this stage even if some individual members wish to break away from the group they fail to do so until they can select and depend upon another leader who can guide their activities.

Thus, it seems to be true that the relationship of the followers to the leader compares favourably with that of children to a powerful father. It is a matter of common knowledge that the leader is regarded as the father by his followers and it is only when the leader loses his power that the followers behave like a band of hostile children who rebel against their father. In Nazi Germany Hitler has assumed the position of a powerful father and all those who are his avowed followers have been behaving like timid children. They cannot override his orders or do anything contrary to his wishes partly out of fear and partly because they are unable to set up a hostile organization under a different leader. Hence Hitler's opinion and for the matter of that the opinion of the Nazi party is regarded as the public opinion of the National Socialists of Germany. But this does not mean that there are no differences of opinion and the actions that may be attributed to Hitler's policy are approved by all Germans. Hitler's opinion will prevail so long as the power he wields in the country remains intact, but as soon as his position suffers deterioration, a hostile party will raise its head and wrest powers from his hands.


It is no wonder that many individuals will have many opinions, but the many unite their voices so far as the group interest prevails. Each group holds together the individuals by virtue of the dominant wish that seeks fulfilment. In a social environment there may be many such groups, each being dominated by the

prevailing wish of its individuals. Thus, in respect of any question of public interest the individuals of a country may fall into different groups and in this way differences in public opinion will arise.

The same social situation then can evoke different responses from the groups which lie separated from one another, by reason of their different interests and beliefs.* Each group may be regarded as a separate unit which functions either in unison or at variance with other groups. If there is concord among the groups then the individuals can present a united front to any question of public utility or public administration. On the other hand if the groups fail to unite, each will try to adjust itself to the environment in its own way, and the result will be a hopeless division of public opinion so much so that utter chaos may prevail at a particular moment. But the general tendency noticeable in the groups is that they seek to co-operate with each other in the face of a common threat to their safety. Thus the groups must be regarded as so many functional units in a total situation. Each unit is liable to change at any time independent of the other groups, and therefore a public opinion which emerges as a result of the groups functioning in harmony with one another can never be taken as something immutable or permanent, but constant changes are taking place within it quite imperceptibly, and a time may arrive when there will be whole-sale change of the public opinion.

Differences in public opinion then are indicative of the vitality of the body politic and need not be considered as obstacles in the way of public utility. We are told that responsible government cannot be handed over to the Indians so long as they are not able to sink their differences and unite themselves for the purpose of public administration. But the differences in public opinion are not unfavourable to the growth of the political life of India. The differences psychologically understood are only phases in the progressive advance of public opinion. They are the natural outcome of the efforts of an enormous body of diverse people for the successful adjustment to the changing social situation. It is no doubt true that the differences in public opinion are not antagonistic to the union of the different sections of the Indian people for the achievement of a federal form of Government. We need not

* Cf. The Psychology of Society by M. Ginsberg.



make too much of the differences or regard them as plague spots in the life of the body politic. This does not imply that no union is desirable or is capable of being realised. There are differences even where there is apparent unity, for example, the differences in opinion among the different groups within the Congress fold.

What is needed is propaganda for the development of a unity among the people of India. Propaganda, as we have already said, is the means of making people accept a certain standpoint and see things from a particular angle of vision. Its chief use in the development of public opinion in India is to make people act before thought. If the individuals are left to think for themselves they will be buried in the depths of their traditional beliefs and prejudices, but if they are goaded on to do or think things which they would not immediately do or think if left to themselves they will unite. Here "end justifies the means" as Mr. Lambert suggests.*

We have recently seen the effect of propaganda concerning the food situation in Bengal and other parts of India. A word of caution is needed here. There is a current belief that whatever is a subject of propaganda is false. Nothing can be more erroneous than this view. False things are no doubt circulated through propaganda, but this does not mean that we cannot make use of propaganda in respect of a real situation. Scarcity of food and consequent famine are real facts but ordinarily these facts remained in the background or were utterly neglected. But to call attention to the serious situation prevailing in the country much effort had to be made to induce people all over the world to resort to quick action for the saving of the Indian people from utter destruction. In this direction propaganda has played its part. A belief has been created in the minds of men living in India and outside that the situation has become so distressing on account of the indifference or cold neglect of the persons responsible for the protection of the people of India. Thus, a strong public opinion has been formed against the governmental machinery, and people all over the world have joined hands to relieve the distress of the suffering population of Bengal and other parts of India.

Public opinion because it is public depends for its formation and functioning upon the instruments through which it is made public namely the press, the platform and the radio. Once generated

*Cf *Propaganda* by R. S. Lambert.

public opinion acts as a force of social control.* It guides the State in its activities of public administration. It functions as a general will although a general will cannot be said to be an existing fact. It is a general will in the sense of a will of the individuals for the common good.

We have already pointed out the importance of the voice of the leaders in the formation of public opinion. Dr. Rivers† has called attention to the distinction between a group with a leader and a leaderless group. He holds that in a leaderless group sympathy, mimesis and intuition are the three component factors of suggestion which guides the activities of the group, but in a group with a leader suggestion and faith in the leader work together. The followers have not only sympathy but also reverence for the leader, they show not only an intuitive appreciation of the views of the leader, but have an intellectual faith in him, and lastly they not only imitate his actions but voluntarily obey him. But Dr. Rivers has not given due consideration to the unconscious motive forces which play their part in the formation of public opinion. To these motive forces we have frequently referred in our present analysis of public opinion.

*Cf *Social Control* by Ross.

†*Psychology and Politics* by Rivers.

Muslim Philosophy—Its Scope and Meaning

(Presidential Address to the Section of Islamic Philosophy)

By

MR. M. UMAR-UD-DIN

A few years ago the Indian Philosophical Congress instituted the Section of Muslim Philosophy to stimulate its study and research. The Indian Universities are according recognition to the subject, though it must be said, rather tardily. At the initial stages of the study of the subject in which it is in the Indian Universities, I would like to make certain observations on its scope and meaning, which will necessarily be of a desultory nature in the short time at my disposal.

Arabian Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy and Muslim Philosophy are the terms used interchangeably. But since our subject is not limited to the contributions made by the Arabs, the term Arabian Philosophy is too narrow for our purpose. It has been cultivated by the peoples of various races and religions. The term Islamic Philosophy will likewise limit its scope, meaning thereby the interpretation of the fundamental principles of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran. It will, therefore, exclude many important aspects of Muslim thought like Metaphysics, etc. Hence Muslim Philosophy seems to be the most preferable of the three terms, because it includes all the Philosophical system cultivated by the Muslims, and, by extension, the contributions made by non-Muslims to the development of these systems.

When Islam extended beyond Arabia, Muslims came in contact with various peoples and their cultures. The contact raised many religious, political and social problems which led the Muslims to study the literatures of these peoples. The study was prosecuted with zeal under the injunction of the Holy Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet (may peace be upon him!). The Holy Quran says, "To whom wisdom is given has been given a great good." The Tradition of the Prophet says, "Seek knowledge even if it be in China." What the Muslims produced after the assimila-

tion of different philosophies is a unique contribution with distinctive characteristics of its own, having its foundations in the Holy Quran. The Muslim philosophers, e.g., assimilated the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, in the light of the divine knowledge of the Quran, synthesizing these ideas into metaphysical theories, at once original and coherent. Muslim thought represents a stage in the development of human thought—philosophical as well as scientific. "The Arab has impressed his intellectual stamp upon Europe," Draper says, "and not in too remote a future will Christendom concede this truth. He has left unfading traces of his finger on the sky, which every one can see, who reads the names of the stars on any ordinary celestial globe."

In the course of its development Muslim thought came to express itself in the various systems of Dialectics, Philosophy and Mysticism. I shall make a very brief mention of these systems.

(1) *Dialectics*:—Dialecticians are those who express their contentions in logical forms. They differed amongst themselves as to the source of knowledge. Some considered it to be reason, while others revelation. The former may be called the Rationalistic and the latter the Orthodox or Scholastic Dialecticians:

(a) *Rationalistic Dialecticians*:—There never has been a set of Philosophers who exalted human understanding to such an extent as the Rational School of Dialectics. In their Metaphysics, Ethics, etc., they are thorough-going rationalists. The knowledge of good and bad, the real and the 'not-real' can only be attained through reason. No human action, in their opinion, has any value unless it is governed by rational motives. They regarded man as the creator of his own actions and the maker of his own destiny.

In Metaphysics their reasoning led them to a concept of God as wholly devoid of personality. They are Monotheists and their attempt to purify God from anthropomorphic elements, has shorn Him of all qualities which they thought man had bestowed on Him. No attributes can be assigned to Him other than negative qualities. Like Hegel, they identified in God the subject and the object, the knower and the known. God, they held, acts according to a plan, and is not a free creative force, as the Theologians believed. In short, their God is a sort of vague unity without any personality. Their God is eternal law bound by rational motives and aims.

These Dialecticians started as theologians but ended as metaphysicians. They discussed such problems as the nature of Thing. They defined Thing as a concept that can be known and can stand as a subject to a predicate. Even before the quality of existence is added to thing, it has both essence and accident. When the quality of existence is added to the essence, it becomes an actuality, while without this quality it remains only in a state of non-existence.

(b) *Orthodox or Scholastic Dialecticians*:—Many schools of Scholastic Dialecticians rose simultaneously in different countries as Ibn-Hazm's school in Spain, at-Tahawi's school in Egypt, Maturidi's school in Samarqand and Ashari's school in Iraq. Ashari's school surpassed all other schools. This school had for its exponents such original thinkers as Baqillani, Ghazzali, etc.

This school believes that revelation is the only source of knowledge. Secular knowledge may be gained through reason, but it is incompetent to know the really real. This school is a protest against the view that the mysteries of the Universe can be solved by human thought. They regarded God as an absolute power and a free creative agent directing the course of the Universe. He is not circumscribed by any aim or plan as this would limit His power. The solution they offered with regard to the freedom of the will and the thing in itself bears so close a resemblance to Leibnitz's theory of the 'pre-established harmony' and Kantian conception of existence that they may be regarded as their forerunners in the development of human thought. The earlier thinkers regarded existence as one of the qualities of existing things. The things were there. When the quality of existence was added to other qualities it became existent. Asharites refuted it arguing that existence was the self of the entity and not a quality added to it.

In their daring and thorough metaphysical schemes we find, in the words of MacDonald, that "Lucretian atoms raining down through the empty void, self-developing monads of Leibnitz, 'pre-established harmony' and all, the Kantian things-in-themselves are lame and impotent in their consistency beside the parallel Asharite doctrines. The object of the Asharites was that of Kant, to fix the relation of knowledge to the thing-in-itself. But in reaching that thing-in-itself they were much more thorough than Kant. Only two of Aristotelian categories survived their attack, substance

and quality. The others, quantity, place, time, and the rest were only relationships (*Itibars*) existing subjectively in the mind of the knower, and not things. Relationships had no real existence . . . all the categories had gone except substance and quality". (MacDonald, *Theology*, pp. 200 f).

Now qualities are of two kinds, negative and positive. There is always a change in the qualities but the qualities cannot exist without substance. Therefore substance also changes. The remaining two categories, viz., substance and quality, also vanish. Thus their reasoning led them to Atomism. Their Atomism, however, is not only of space, but of time also, and like the modern physicist they introduced the conception of 'Leap'.

Ghazzali in his book, 'Deliverer from Error' anticipated Descartes in the Method of Doubt and passed through all the stages of doubt, discarding all authority and disbelieving even his senses. But Ghazzali went further than Descartes and seriously questioned the validity of thought as an instrument of knowledge. He finds certainty only in the 'will to believe', inspired by Divine Will. It is 'Volo ergo sum' with Ghazzali, whereas with Descartes it is 'Cogito ergo sum'. About his another book 'Revival of Sciences', in which Ghazzali has discussed at length the fundamental principles of his ethical and philosophical doctrines, a European writer observes: "This work, probably owing to its originality, was never translated into Latin during the Middle Ages, and remained a closed book to all but Arabian Scholars. It bears so remarkable a resemblance to the Discourse on Method of Descartes that had any translation of it existed in the days of Descartes, every one would have cried out against the plagiarism."

Ghazzali wrote another book to prove the incompetency of analytical reason, called 'Refutation of the Philosophers', in which, while discussing the law of causation, "he" in the words of MacDonald, "cuts the bond of causality with the sharp edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause and effect but simply that one thing follows another." Summing up the views of Ghazzali on causation Renan says, "Hume never said more than that."

In the same book Ghazzali has demonstrated, like Kant, that theoretical reason cannot solve the fundamental problems of religion and philosophy, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, or the eternity of the universe.

(2) *Philosophers*:—There was a group of Muslim thinkers who had great faith in Plato and Aristotle's infallibility. Aristotle in their eye was the greatest teacher ever born. This group of Muslim philosophers may be divided into several schools, Peripatetics, Ishraqi philosophers and Natural philosophers.

(a) *Peripatetics*:—They are called Peripatetics after Aristotle. They believed in the capacity of human reason to solve the mysteries of the Universe. The main representatives of this school are Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Miskawaih, Ibn-Sina, Ibn-Rushd, etc. This school believed that Aristotle possessed the most perfect intellect. They regarded philosophy as a manifestation of Truth. They summed up their position as philosophers and Muslims in a syllogism: "Philosophy is truth; Quran is truth, but truth is one; therefore Philosophy and Quran must agree."

Greek Philosophy reached the Muslim thinkers not in its original form but full of inconsistencies and transformed out of shape. Neo-Platonists, who were mostly Christians, were responsible for shaping Greek philosophy in the light of Christianity. They represented Greek philosophers as great saints and mystics, and Greek philosophy as the truth compatible with the Christian doctrine. Rationalism of the Greeks was changed into Intuitionism. It took the Muslim thinkers a long time to free Greek philosophy, as it had reached them, of the accretions and inconsistencies that had crept into it. Besides, on the basis of Greek philosophy, Muslim thinkers made great advances. Farabi, known among the Musalmans as the Second Teacher, improved upon the system of Aristotle. With Aristotle Logic is merely a method to arrive at the truth, but with Farabi it is a method as well as the truth itself: it is a part of metaphysics. Unlike Aristotle, Farabi is a thoroughgoing Idealist, and Aristotle's theory of the eternity of matter had no place in Farabi's Metaphysics. Matter, according to him, is the adumbration of the mind which is the fashioning force in the Universe.

In his Ethics Farabi follows Plato; but he regards a philosopher as insufficient to guide the destinies of humanity, unless he is also a man of character, namely, a prophet.

Ibn Sina, who claims to be a humble follower of Aristotle, in his system embraces problems which had not been envisaged by Aristotle. He took Aristotle's fragmentary psychology and infused into it a dynamic principle. The void between man and God is filled with a hierarchy of spiritual agencies. Ibn-Sina

believed in the eternity of the Universe like Aristotle but differed from him in regarding it as the creation of God. Aristotle's theory assumed that cause always precedes the effect. Ibn-Sina argued that it is not necessary for cause to precede its effect in time. Cause and effect may be simultaneous e.g., in the case of the movement of a key as it opens or fastens a lock. Love, according to Ibn-Sina, is an appreciation of beauty. It is the Universal force that exists in every thing from mineral world to the animal kingdom, impelling everything to become more and more perfect or beautiful. In the vegetable kingdom it manifests itself in assimilation, growth and production. It becomes somewhat conscious and unified in the animal kingdom, while in man it becomes fully conscious and can develop to an unlimited degree. In short, it is a spiritual principle which is striving to realize itself in various degrees of perfection through different strata of existence.

Most of the Muslim Philosophers advocated the theory of evolution of mind and matter. But the dynamic force of evolution was ascribed to mind, matter being only a by-product. It is from the primal mind that the world has evolved. The best representatives of this theory are Ibn-Miskawaih, Rumi and Ibn-Khaldun. Ibn-Miskawaih explains the evolution of matter as follows:—

"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the borderland of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., Coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life is the development of power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and

humanity begins." (*The Development of Metaphysics in Persia—Iqbal*—pp. 33-34).

In their cosmology, Muslim Philosophers did not content themselves with presenting merely an intellectual conception of the Universe, but they also endeavoured to present a conception in which the whole being of man,—his moral, religious and æsthetic self, could find expression.

(b) *Ishraqi Philosophy (Philosophy of Illumination)*:—This school affiliates itself to Plato and the Platonists. They disregarded analytical reason as an instrument of truth. Observation, contemplation, intuition and ecstasy are the means through which this school tries to reach the truth. The greatest representative of this school is Shahabuddin Suhrawardy Maqtul, who has expounded his philosophy in a book called *Hikmatul-Ishraq* (Philosophy of Illumination). He conceives reality as light—all else being darkness or non-existence. Light creates darkness or non-light. All that is not light is the product of light, which is the fountain-head of all existence. Another representative is Ibn-Tufail of Spain who, though generally regarded as Peripatetic is an Ishraqi. Just as Suhrawardy's Philosophy is Iranian in content but Platonic in form, so Ibn-Tufail's philosophy is Aristotelian in content but Platonic in form. Ibn-Tufail has explained his philosophy in an allegory, '*Hayy Ibn-Yaqzan*', in which he imagines a man on an island where there are no human beings. Hayy through his own observation, introspection, contemplation and ecstasy attains to the highest form of knowledge.

(c) *Natural Philosophy*—Natural philosophy does not form part of modern philosophy, but the ancients regarded it as a part of philosophy. They confine themselves to the study of the natural phenomena. They believed that the knowledge gained through the senses can lead man to universal truth. The sciences which they cultivated were Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geography, History, Medicine, Ethnology, etc. I shall mention a few of the chief representatives who left their impress on their successors.

Abu-Bakr Mohammad Zakarya Razi, (d. 932) cultivated almost all the natural sciences but his fame rests on medicine, ranking according to some, above Ibn-Sina as a physician. He based his investigations on experience, individual as well as

collective, which he believed has a greater value than logical deductions.

Geber or Jabir, the chemist, was the first scholar who employed the scientific method. He founded a Chemical School in the West; and just as Aristotle was regarded as the founder of Logic, Jabir was regarded as the founder of Chemistry.

Ibn-ul-Haitham (Alhazen) (d. 1038), a great scientist and mathematician, an acute thinker, is famous for his book on Optics, in which he discusses vision in a scientific way. Knowledge according to him is based on sense perception elaborated by understanding.

Another great scientist, perhaps the greatest of them all, was Al-Biruni, at once a mathematician, historian, astronomer and physicist. In his book '*Qanun Masudi*' he comes so near the modern astronomical researches that it must be said 'that modern methods are as old as genius.'

A great philosophical writer on almost every topic connected with human society was Ibn-Khaldun. He is the founder of the science or philosophy of History. In his famous Prolegomena to his Universal History he discusses such problems as the rise and fall of nations, inter-relation of the various grades of society, production of food, labour, etc.

(4) *Mysticism*:—The Sufis regard real knowledge as immediate and personal which is only gained by intuition in a state of ecstasy. In an ecstasy a Sufi sees realities and experiences the presence of God.

The Sufis regard human soul to be of divine origin, temporarily lodged in the human body, but restless to return to God—God being the only reality which they conceive as Will, Beauty or Light. On the basis of these conceptions they have built their Metaphysical systems. Sufiism in its development passed through ascetic, theosophic and pantheistic stages. Strictly speaking Muslim Sufis have never been pantheists, since they could never dissolve the personality of God. Similarities, though of a superficial nature, between Sufiism, Buddhism, Vedantism, Christianity, and Neo-Platonism have given rise to numerous theories regarding its origin.

"A Superficial resemblance exists" says O'Leary "between the Buddhist Nirvana and the *fana* or the re-absorption of the soul in

the divine spirit of Sufiism. But the Buddhist doctrine represents the soul as losing its individuality in the passionless placidity of absolute quiescence, whilst the Sufi doctrine, though also teaching a loss of individuality, regards ever-lasting life as consisting in the ecstatic contemplation of the Divine Beauty." (O'Leary, *Arabic Thought*, p. 91).

(5) *Muslim Thought and Europe*:—Muslim culture penetrated Europe through Spain and Southern Italy and Sicily. Muslims in Spain had reached a very high degree of culture when Europe was steeped in ignorance. Scholars from all over Europe flocked to Spanish Universities to study Arab sciences and philosophy. The second great factor in the spread of Muslim philosophy were the Jews, who translated works from Arabic into Hebrew, and being a mercantile community, carried philosophical knowledge wherever they went in Europe. They made a particular study of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the greatest Muslim Philosopher of Spain, who was regarded by them as the greatest commentator of Aristotle.

After the re-conquest of Toledo by the Christians Raymond Archbishop of Toledo (1131—1250 A.D.) founded a College for the translation of Arabic scientific and philosophical works into Latin, and in a short time works of Ibn Rushd and other Muslim philosophers became available in Latin translations.

When Fredrick II of Sicily was crowned Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1215 A.D., he, being a great admirer of Arab culture and Muslim sciences, established a college of translation at Palermo. He himself could read Arabic Philosophical works in the original. In 1224 he founded the University of Naples which became a centre for the spread of Arab sciences and philosophy into Europe. By the middle of the 14th century nearly all the important works of Ibn Rushd and other Muslim philosophers had been translated into Latin. "By the close of the 13th century Arab Science and Philosophy had been transmitted to Europe and Spain's work as an intermediary was done. The intellectual avenue leading from the portals of Toledo through the Pyrenees wound its way through Provence and the Alpine passes into Lorraine, Germany and Central Europe, as well as across the Channel into England." (Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 589).

Throughout the 13th century Muslim Philosophy dominated in the Paris University.


Through Franciscan Friars Muslim philosophy reached England. As early as 1109 A.D. we find that a Latin translation of a book of Ibn Rushd was prescribed in Cambridge. Roger Bacon, the father of modern inductive method, studied at Toledo and could read and speak Arabic, and came directly under the influence of Muslim thought.

Many European universities were noted for their cultivation of Muslim sciences, e.g., Padua and Bologna. It is from these centres that Averroism spread to North-East Italy. The professors of these universities under the influence of Muslim philosophy were regarded as free-thinkers. The influence of the Muslim philosophy was the precursor of the Renaissance. Muslim thought was the direct parent of the Philo-Pagan element in the Renaissance." (O'Leary, *Arabic Thought*, p. 294), "It made a deeper impression on Christian and Jewish thought . . . , and attained its final evolution in North-East Italy, where, as an anti-ecclesiastical, it prepared the way for the Renaissance." (O'Leary, p. 295). European culture in fact has been nursed and brought up on Muslim thought. Many a thinker like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Dante, Spinoza, etc., were influenced by it.

In the words of Iqbal, "The Political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of Deductive Science, and were fairly on the way to the building of Inductive knowledge. It was practically at this moment that Europe took up the task of research and discovery. Intellectual activity in the world of Islam particularly ceased from this time, and Europe began to reap the fruit of the labours of Muslim thinkers. The Humanist Movement in Europe was due to a large extent to the force set free by Muslim thought. It is not at all an exaggeration to say that the fruits of Modern European Humanism in the shape of Modern Science and Philosophy are in many ways only a further development of Muslim Culture. (Extract from the letter of Dr. Iqbal to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan, dated 4th June, 1925).

I would conclude this hurried survey of the various schools of Muslim Philosophy with a brief reference to some of the chief characteristics which made the Muslim Philosophers worthy of their place with the greatest thinkers of the world. Muslim philosophers not only studied, commented upon and enlarged Greek philosophy but also discovered inconsistencies and weak

spots in it and endeavoured to remove them. They investigated regions which the Greeks had left unexplored, by introducing as problems demanding serious enquiry such topics as phenomenon of dreams, miracles, future life, immortality of the soul, Divine attributes, Divine unity, etc. They enriched the human self by proving that it was not only an intellectual self but also a moral and a spiritual self. In short, they made philosophy the instrument not only of solving the problems which confronted man in his everyday life but also of solving the riddle of the universe.



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