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
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MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.,
ST. MARTIN'S STREET,
LONDON, W.C.2

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SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT

By C. H. WADDINGTON

AT the conference of the Social Division of the British Association, held in London on September 26th-28th, the first session was officially devoted to a consideration of the relations between science and government; but these two social functions are coming to impinge on one another in so many and such various ways that every session, almost every paper emphasised some particular point of view or presented some new data about their interaction. The general trend of the discussion is particularly difficult to summarise because it became clear that different speakers had very different concepts of what is implied both by "science" and by "government." A comparatively few years ago it was usual to consider science as an orderly body of correlations between observed events; and it was tacitly accepted that the things which science had actually observed lay in a few, and for the most part rather specialised, fields. Science consisted of physics, chemistry, zoology, botany and so on—well-known and fairly separate disciplines, each sanctioned by the existence of its own professor. The relevance of such subjects to government was not a pressing problem; it was enough to set up a machinery by which any government department which, for reasons of its own, wished to have the latest information about some species of worm, say, could be put in the way of obtaining it. And, in those far-off days, government was primarily a taxing, policing and regulating function, to whom detailed information about worms, however economically important, was unlikely to be of great interest; the farmer's pests were his own look out.

We have already greatly modified both these concepts of science and government. It has become clear that science is not only a body of data but is also a method which can be profitably applied to the analysis of a great range of happenings which do not fall into the domain of any of the classical disciplines, but which may be of the greatest importance for

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society. And we have been led to allow the government to influence the course of productive enterprise, and even to initiate and carry out such enterprises itself, in a way which would have been quite out of the question not so many years ago. It is more especially these two new and extended concepts of science and government which impinge upon one another; and the way in which their relations are conceived, and the kind of machinery considered adequate to implement them, are very largely dependent on how far one is prepared to go along the line of development which leads from the old ideas to the new.

This general problem is of least importance in those fields in which the demands, made by external circumstances on science or on government, are most specific. No one, except a small minority of pacifists, denies that warfare is an enterprise in which government may have to engage. And under conditions of war, government departments may be faced with the necessity of solving perfectly definite problems of a technical nature. There is no longer any hesitation in admitting that *ad hoc* scientific research is the method of choice for dealing with them. We have already had classical examples of its services in this war; one need only mention the combating of the magnetic mine and the development of methods of radio-location. All the combatant and several of the civil departments have already set up research organisations for handling such matters. Many of these were, of course, in existence before the outbreak of the war and have since been enlarged by taking in men from the universities or industrial laboratories.

It is significant that two of the speakers most closely associated with such work made essentially the same demand for its extension to cover a wider field. Professors Hill and Bernal both emphasised the necessity for more intimate contact between the research worker set to solve some technical problem and the man who will eventually have to put his method into operation. Bernal stated that a satisfactory solution of a technical problem comprises four steps, all of which should be under scientific investigation. Following the basic research, as to the need of which everyone is agreed, there follows a period of development, during which the

SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT

newly-discovered method is adjusted so as to be practicable on a large scale. It used to be said that the lag between the discovery of a method and its adaptation to practice was of the order of fifty years; for some of the more recent industrial developments it has been about five to ten years; a government in wartime cannot be satisfied with a lag of longer than a few months. Such an acceleration of development can only be achieved by a very close collaboration between the government research organisation and productive industry.

Following this development, the new method or apparatus is actually used in the field. Men, that is to say, have to be trained to handle it under the variable and partly unforeseeable circumstances of active service. Bernal claimed that mistakes frequently occur in this period of execution which could be minimised or rapidly put right by scientific research devoted to the mode of operation of the device. The subject usually known as industrial psychology is an example of such operational research in peacetime industry. In one of the fields of government science, namely, the agricultural, the value, indeed the necessity of such work, has already been widely recognised. The County Agricultural Advisers, and the County War Agricultural Executive Committees are intended to help farmers to learn how to carry out measures recommended to them, such as the preparation of silage, and to adapt the general principles of the new methods to particular local circumstances. But this is at present an isolated instance of such an organisation, and the claim made by Hill and Bernal, that such services should be greatly extended, deserves serious consideration.

Finally, Bernal drew attention to the need for a checking service which would ascertain how far the recommended policy was actually bringing about the desired results. Some control of this kind is, of course, automatically provided in industry and agriculture by the final production achieved, but even in those cases, scientific analysis would make it much easier to discover where the limiting factors are located. In many other fields of government action, no such check of results is at present sought at all. The disconcerting, but potentially very valuable, data which may emerge from such investigations have recently been very strikingly demonstrated

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in one instance : the unofficial organisation Mass Observation has published (*Change*, Advertising Service Guild, Bulletin No. 2) the results of a survey of the effectiveness of various campaigns of home propaganda put out by several departments. Such surveys have at any rate a certain degree of objectivity, and although it may be possible to claim that they are still subject to certain types of error, they are undoubtedly a much sounder basis for estimating the effect of a given action than are the intuitive guesses or traditional prejudices on which one is forced to rely in their absence. There is, unfortunately, also no doubt that, partly for this very reason, there is a considerable resistance to their wider use. As an example of the psychological difficulties which they have to overcome, one may mention an example described by Mass Observation in the booklet mentioned above. Some of the early advertisements for the A.T.S. were severely criticised in a *Times* leader for "handling these calls to women like the selling of a patent medicine," while the propaganda of the so-called Empire Crusade was a model of respectability. An objective check showed that the former had made a favourable impression on a large proportion of the people to whom it was addressed, while the latter went almost unnoticed ; but this conclusion would hardly be welcome to the more highly placed government officials whose views are expressed by leader writers in *The Times*. Similarly, a checking service in other departments may be expected to produce results which are by no means always expected or desired by those responsible for the formulation of policies. Scientists have long been used to inhabiting a world in which the final word is left to the test of experience, but such a test is inevitably incompatible with a world ordered in accordance with official status and personal prestige. Any widespread introduction of a machinery for discovering what a policy actually achieves would eventually have profound effects on the whole method of organisation of government departments. Research into operational methods, and a checking of the results actually achieved are both necessary phases of the application of scientific procedure to the solution of a known problem. But they will in nearly all cases raise problems of a different kind ; they will lead to a restatement of the problem

in more precise terms or even reveal quite new problems which had previously not been apparent. In so far as this occurs, science will move from the position of a technical means-to-an-end into the position of one of the functions by which ends are decided ; it will develop from a policy-performer into a policy-maker. The question of how far such a change is desirable, and what provision it is necessary to make for the performance of the policy-making function of science, is the most crucial phase of the relations between science and government at the present time.

There are certain fields in which the paramount influence of science on the formulation of policy are already generally recognised. Mr. Herbert Morrison, from the administrative side, echoed Sir John Orr and the other scientists in pointing out that scientific study of human needs has already led to a formulation of the problem of nutrition which has completely superseded the statement of this matter which would be made by ordinary common sense. Nothing can now merit the name of a food policy which is drawn up on any basis other than the scientific. Moreover, both Mr. Herbert Morrison and Mr. Noel Baker realised that the precision with which human nutritive needs can be formulated by science has consequences of a more profound kind than merely to bring science into the arena of political controversy. Its effect is in some ways the opposite of that ; it goes far to remove the food problem from that arena. Once we can set up objective minimum standards, and measure, with some degree of accuracy how nearly they are or are not attained, the desirable direction of government action becomes no longer a matter which must be decided by the pressure of interests, but follows inescapably from the ascertained facts. It becomes clear that science is in a position to determine a policy which is in accordance with the needs of the community as a whole, and thus has a wider basis than that of any sectional interest or political party (whether it attracts the political support necessary to put it into effect is another matter).

There are, however, rather few fields in which our present scientific knowledge is in so highly developed a condition. Morrison and others drew attention to the desirability of working out similar standards for other human needs ; of

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clothing, housing, industrial health and so on. A beginning has, of course, already been made in attacking several of these problems. The famous report of the Health of Munition Workers Committee issued in 1918, and the subsequent reports of the Industrial Health Research Board, are other examples of the definition by scientific study of a standard whose objectivity is such that it may not easily be gainsaid. But there are very many other spheres of government action in which the lack of objective standards, either of needs or of performance, cries aloud to the scientific mind. Dr. P. Lamartine Yates, in an article in the July number of this journal, mentioned several cases in connection with agricultural policy. "No body of experts," he writes, "had ever been commissioned to sit down and decide in what manner these three methods (of ploughing up grassland, increased use of fertilisers, land improvement and drainage) ought to be combined . . . so the merits of the various alternatives still remain largely unelucidated." In this, as in many other government activities, the problems should be susceptible of an exact scientific formulation which, if it were carried out, would place the responsibility for policy very largely in scientific hands.

It was clear from the British Association meeting that a similar scientific formulation has already been, or is in process of being, made for many questions which, although they are not yet matters of concern to government, are nevertheless very real social problems. One may instance the communications of Sir Harold Hartley on world-power resources, of Professor Eggerton on world reserves of raw materials, Sir John Russell's paper on the reconditioning of Eastern European Agriculture after the war, and the many discussions of new technological advances and their probable influence on the structure of production and industry. It is still, of course, a matter for debate how far such matters come into the province of the central government; the central authority of a socialist or communist state would undoubtedly undertake to regulate them, a *laissez-faire* capitalist state would attempt to leave them alone. But, whatever we may think of the former, the latter alternative is no longer a practical possibility. Some degree of concern with such matters will

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inevitably be forced upon our government under any foreseeable type of development. And in so far as this is true, government will be dealing with matters which can only be handled with any pretence of efficiency by scientific methods; either because they are the repercussions of new scientific and technical advances, or because they are problems which can only be formulated in scientific terms, such as, for instance, the rate of population increase or the conservation of power resources. For this class of problems, then, scientists will not be in the position of experts called in to advise the government how to tackle difficulties which it has already a long tradition of coping with. They will, instead, find themselves calling the attention of the government to the necessity of taking action in spheres which had previously lain outside its purview.

After this short, and perhaps rather abstract, statement of the ways in which scientific data and methods are applicable to the activities of government agencies, it will be well to enquire how far the present machinery is adequate to make full use of them. Before the war, the main governmental scientific bodies (other than the purely military) were primarily concerned with research of a fairly abstract character. The field of research was divided into three major sub-divisions. The medical was dealt with by the Medical Research Council, the industrial by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and the agricultural by a somewhat complex set-up of the Development Commission, Agricultural Research Council and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; and there were a number of other minor research boards attached, for instance, to marketing boards, etc. The "three great pillars of the permanent civil research organisations," as Lord Hankey has called them, have exercised two main functions; they have encouraged fundamental research, not necessarily of immediate obvious practical importance, and they have investigated specific urgent problems as they have arisen in their respective fields. The former of these is a general responsibility of any government with a long-term policy. The latter is the first of the above-mentioned scientific contributions to government. While it would of course be merely complacent to suppose that everything was perfectly

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consists mainly of the president and secretaries of the Royal Society, and the secretaries of the three Research Councils. It has also taken steps to ensure adequate scientific liaison with Canada, by the exchange of missions headed by Sir Lawrence Bragg and Dr. Wilder Penfield, and with the United States, where they are represented by Dr. C. G. Darwin. Again, it is well known that Mr. Churchill has appointed an important physicist, Lord Cherwell, to be his personal scientific adviser.

These direct contacts between the heads of the scientific profession and the most important policy-making agents of government must have extremely important consequences. The machinery has, of course, been set up primarily with reference to war needs and problems. There has not yet been time for the general scientific public to have formed a very definite opinion as to its working even in this comparatively restricted field, but on the face of it there seems every reason for optimism. Moreover, it is apparently intended that the same committees shall be permanent parts of our governmental machine, and if this is so, a step of very great potential importance has been taken towards the realisation of the scientific demand for a greater share in the determination and not only in the carrying out of policy.

The new mechanism is, however, somewhat in danger of being a head without any supporting body. The influence of the scientific leaders, exerted on the highest spheres of government, can only be fruitful if it receives adequate support from three sides; the spokesmen of science must be able to base themselves on an active and efficient body of younger scientists studying the problems of social importance, the administrative staffs of government departments must exhibit a receptive attitude towards suggestions emanating from the scientific advisers, and there must be a sufficiently large part of the general public prepared to exert its political weight towards overcoming the influence of those people whose interests constrain them to oppose the new policies.

Let us consider for a minute the first of these. Up till now we have been considering matters in which the scientist felt that he was justified in demanding that other people should alter their ways to meet his criticisms. But here we

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come to a point at which many scientists are likely to feel that their own house rather badly needs putting in order. The general level of scientific interest and competence with respect to the socially most important matters is, in fact, at a rather low ebb in Britain at the present time. Professor A. V. Hill has drawn particular attention to this, pointing out that not only is there, under the present system, some danger of government scientists losing their imagination in a morass of bureaucratic restrictions, but that, conversely, there is much too rigid a segregation between the official research departments and the general scientific life of the Universities. These faults are much more marked in some fields than in others, and Hill has urged that there is no reason why they should not both be overcome by a policy of personnel-exchange similar to that which actually occurs in a few instances. His idea is that all young scientists should undergo a period of work in a government laboratory devoted to problems of immediate social importance, so that we should build up what would in effect be a reserve of scientific officers ready to cope with an emergency. He would also encourage considerably more interchange between the various branches of the profession, so that more senior men in government departments might take positions, either permanent or temporary, as University teachers. In connection with this suggestion, the reorganisation of the scientific profession introduced by the Popular Front in France shortly before the war provides an example, perhaps worthy of some imitation; by setting up a series of parallel grades in teaching and research positions, it aimed at giving the scientist greater mobility in shifting his interests from one to the other of these fields.

Hill's suggestion of the creation of a scientific reserve would go far to meet some of the problems of providing an adequate scientific staff for emergency use. If all biologists, for example, had done some work in agricultural institutes, it would have been much easier to carry out a radical policy of food production. It might even, though this is less clear, have provided a large enough pool from which we could draw specialist officers to meet sudden enlargements of the normal demand, such as the recent call for radio specialists

to handle radio-location devices. The younger scientists and students, as far as one can judge from ordinary day-to-day contact with them, would welcome such a scheme; and it seems very probable that something of the kind will be introduced in the near future.

Although this would make a considerable difference both to the nature of British science and to its relations with government, it may be doubted whether such a step as Hill has advocated really gets to the heart of the problem. The main defect of our science, as a social instrument, is more a matter of quality than of quantity. The main emphasis of the teaching at the most famous centres, the main research interests of our best men, in fact the whole tone of our scientific tradition, has tended to discount the social functions which science can perform and to extol the pure search of truth for its own sake. This has, of course, been a strength as well as a weakness. It is, in the long run, of the utmost importance that the development of fundamental science should be actively encouraged without consideration for immediate importance. But, granted that that is so, the paramouncy of pure science can and has been exaggerated. The comparative backwardness of university physics education in the science of radio is a case in point; undue concentration on the theoretically more interesting field of atomic physics had led to a neglect of a branch of the subject which was clearly of greater immediate importance for society. In biology the case is even stronger. Our orthodox teaching is based on those aspects of biology which were important to society in the period of exploration, modified by interests arising from the sphere of medicine; the socially crucial aspects concerned with food productions play a very subordinate role, being for the most part banished to the specifically "applied" subject of agriculture. The mere subjection of academically-trained biologists to a year's work in a government agricultural institute will only tickle the hide of their preconceived attitude. What is required is a much more general reconsideration of the whole scientific curriculum, placing a greater, but of course by no means exclusive, emphasis on the socially relevant aspects.

This may be too large an alteration to be practicable in

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the middle of such a war, but some beginning can be made towards it without much more organisational effort than is involved in Hill's scheme; it would be not too difficult to arrange for the use of university students, during the summer vacation, by institutions already employed on government service. In some fields, such as agriculture, there is a seasonal demand for partly-trained scientific assistance which could be met in this way; and the students would thus not only be acquiring a valuable outlook on scientific work, but would be contributing to the war effort while doing so.

It is only by such a radical reorganisation of the science curriculum that we can hope to approach the second of the objectives mentioned above, the inculcation of a more receptive attitude in the administrative staffs of government departments. At the present time the suggestion that scientific workers should have a greater part to play in national affairs is frequently met with the objection that in point of fact they know less about the complexities of the actual situation than men trained in a merely commonsense method of approach. And only too often there is a considerable core of truth in this. The scientists' demand is primarily for an application of their methods; they are in a much less favourable position to demand the utilisation of knowledge actually at their disposal, since they have, owing to their undue concentration on "pure" science, largely neglected to accumulate the data which would be most useful. There are whole sciences, such as applied psychology and sociological surveying, which will require enormously greater attention before scientists will be able decisively to rebut the administrators' criticism.

There are, however, many fields in which such an objection can no longer be upheld; and it is by no means the only impediment in the way of a ready acceptance of scientific assistance. The training of entrants to the civil service has been singularly little influenced by the enormous growth in the importance of science in recent years; and the traditions of the service are in many ways such as to discourage a mental attitude which can easily see the advantages of scientific methods of approach. Possible ways of changing this state of affairs, by altering the basis on which personnel is selected,

SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT

have been discussed in many quarters; one may mention the recent PEP report, among others. It would be out of place to make any suggestions here. But the need for some consideration of the problem has been widely recognised in the scientific world. A recent editorial in *Nature*, which was devoted to the matter, contented itself with a demand for the creation by scientists of a more favourable general public opinion. This is at first sight not a very bold attack, but it is probably in the long run the only sound one. Moreover, it takes within its scope the last of the three requisites listed above, the creation of a general political backing for scientific policies. This is, of course, in many ways the most crucial aspect of the whole problem of science in government. Nobody can be very interested in the mere writing down of a scientific policy, however firmly based on authoritative facts; until it is translated into action, nothing of importance has been achieved. No system of rationing is scientifically satisfactory if some people, in fact, cannot afford to obtain their quota; standards of housing, of shelter-safety, of other amenities which remain unapplied in practice may be scientific contributions to the Government of Cloud Cuckooland but not to that of England.

The attraction of political power to the support of scientific policies is much too large a subject to be discussed in an article primarily concerned with the machinery of government. Here there is only room to point out that there is a certain reciprocal interaction between machinery and power. While the application of science in government is likely to be, to a greater or less extent, frustrated until a more favourable public and civil service opinion has been created, it is also true that the creation of such an opinion can be most rapidly brought about by the scoring of a few definite successes by scientific policies. For this reason the setting up of the Hankey Committee, which gives scientists the possibility of making some contributions of real magnitude to government, is an event of the greatest importance for the whole future development of the political relations of science. The Committee may, with luck and good judgment, be able to bring about a very rapid improvement of the whole situation.

COLOURED BOOKS

COLOURED BOOKS

II—FROM MUNICH TO PRAGUE

(September 29, 1938—March 15, 1939)

By L. B. NAMIER

AFTER MUNICH

"PEACE for our time," "peace with honour," Mr. Neville Chamberlain triumphantly announced on his return from Munich.

"A total and unmitigated defeat," replied Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on October 5th, 1938.

All is over [he said]. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. She has suffered in every respect by her association with the Western democracies and with the League of Nations . . .

. . . the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintained as an independent entity . . . in a period which may be measured by years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in the Nazi régime. . . . At any rate, that story is over and told.

We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves to that. It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi power.

Many people, no doubt, honestly, believe that they are only giving away the interests of Czechoslovakia, whereas I fear we shall find that we have deeply compromised, and perhaps fatally endangered, the safety and even the independence of Great Britain and France.

. . . we have sustained a defeat without a war . . . we have passed an awful milestone in our history, when

the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged. . . . And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning.¹

The suddenness and completeness of the Munich surrender, and the way in which Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier coerced Czechoslovakia into suicide, took Europe by surprise. When Mr. Chamberlain first offered to go to Berchtesgaden, Hitler could hardly believe his luck—"ich bin vom Himmel gefallen"² he said with a chuckle, when recounting the story to a foreign diplomat. Some doomed statesmen had preceded Chamberlain on the sorry pilgrimage to Hitler, and many were to follow, but he went of his own resolve, twice repeated it, and in the end returned apparently glad at heart, nay, exulting; and he was acclaimed by the blind and the half-sincere. The new frontiers of Czechoslovakia were to be drawn by a Commission of the Munich Powers sitting in Berlin under German chairmanship—an "impartial" Commission presided over by an interested party! And it "deliberated" after Czechoslovakia had been disarmed, and the Western Powers had shown that they would not fight! Further, the Polish and Hungarian claims, unless settled "within three months by agreement between the respective Governments," were to be brought before a Four-Power Conference. After all claims against the Czechs had been satisfied, a system of guarantees was to be established for their new frontiers, which, according to Mr. Chamberlain, held out to Czechoslovakia the prospect of "a greater security than she has ever enjoyed in the past." Mr. Churchill replied: ". . . now that the fortress line is turned, what is there to stop the will of the conqueror? Obviously, we are not in a position to give them the slightest help at the present time." Paper guarantees, feelingly accorded to the despoiled, merely add a sickening, humiliating touch, which no one who has been through such transactions can ever forget.

Had Poland stood by Czechoslovakia, the Western Powers might have taken a less discreditable line; had the Western Powers stood firm, public opinion in Poland would

¹ On November 1st, 1938, replying to Mr. Attlee, Mr. Chamberlain asserted that publicly to call the Munich Agreement "a great defeat" was fouling one's own nest.

² "I fell from Heaven!"

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probably have compelled the Government to support them. The Note addressed by Poland to the Western Powers at the time of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, proposing joint action against the Nazis, showed the very uneasy nature of her friendship with Germany. Now the Polish Government were after cheap gains. Sore at not having been invited as equals to Munich, they would not appear as suppliants before the Axis Powers or the Four-Power Conference, but would help themselves to whatever they claimed. The British and French Ambassadors tried to speak to Colonel Beck about Teschen. "The door was shut in their faces. The French Ambassador was not even granted an audience and the British Ambassador was given a most curt reply by a political director. The whole matter is described in the Polish Press as a political indiscretion committed by those two Powers..." Polish troops occupied the Olsa district of Teschen and some scraps of Slovak territory—a sorry performance.

"The process of Czechoslovakia's conversion into a vassal state is unfortunately more or less an accomplished fact," wrote M. Coulondre, the new French Ambassador in Berlin, on December 15th, 1938. "My country is no longer anything more than a province," said my Czech colleague to me yesterday... and, according to him, certain German circles go so far as to declare that henceforth the Czech Army will be called upon to play the same part which the Bavarian had played in the Second Reich." Through Slovakia the Nazis reached Carpatho-Russia, now renamed Carpatho-Ukraine. This was to be the seed-plot of a Great-Ukrainian agitation, to realise Hitler's and Rosenberg's East-European dreams. "Thus, by a curious turn of fate," wrote Coulondre, "Czechoslovakia, established as a bastion against German expansion, serves the Reich to-day as a battering-ram against the gates of the East."

But a Great-Ukrainian agitation was even more dangerous for Poland than for Russia, as in East-Galicia alone the Ukrainian movement had firm root. Poland was therefore anxious that Carpatho-Russia should pass once more under Hungarian rule, which would have put a stop to nationalist Ukrainian agitation in that backward mountain province Poland had long wished for "a common frontier with

Hungary"; this programme was now taken up in all earnest; the Nazis were told that Carpatho-Russia was "a veritable Communist centre" (Communism was about as strong there as in the Hebrides), and that a common Polish-Hungarian frontier would "be of great value as locking out the East"; in Western Europe the "lock" was represented as working the other way, and rumours were circulated about a Polish-Hungarian bloc favoured by Mussolini.

Time was pressing: the Hungarian frontiers were about to be settled, but Hitler and Ribbentrop had withdrawn to Berchtesgaden. On October 17th, François-Poncet, the retiring French Ambassador, saw them there—Hitler in his mountain fastness (described by François-Poncet in a much-quoted despatch that would have earned him a prize in any literary competition). M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, wanted to see someone in authority. Suddenly he received an invitation to Berchtesgaden. Was he to see Hitler? He was merely to lunch there with Ribbentrop at the Grand Hotel; at that luncheon, on Monday, October 24th, there appeared as third a Herr Hewel, whom Lipski had never met before, but who served as Foreign Office liaison with Hitler; while the notorious Danzig "Gauleiter" Forster was nosing about the place.

The Polish White Book, in recording the transactions of that day, gives what is obviously only an extract from Lipski's report, whereas the German Minute, drawn up by Hewel, runs into two large pages and tries to supply atmosphere and vistas; in substance the two accounts agree. Ribbentrop began with a general survey of the international situation (presumably as table talk while the food was consumed). The business started with Lipski on Carpatho-Russia: "Poland wishes for its inclusion in Hungary. . . . Rumours about an intended bloc against Germany are nonsense. . . . Poland counsels moderation to the Hungarian Government with regard to Slovakia and action in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. . . . He, Lipski, hopes that such a solution is not contrary to German interests." Ribbentrop replied that he appreciated the Polish point of view, but had to consider certain difficulties.

Next, Ribbentrop opened up "the great general problem

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which made him invite M. Lipski to Berchtesgaden"; he wished to talk in the strictest confidence—Lipski was to inform no one but Beck about it, and this by word of mouth, "as otherwise the danger of leakage, especially in the Press, is too great." Ribbentrop wished Beck would visit him—"Polish friends had a standing invitation to Germany." He thought the time had come to "crown the work initiated by Marshal Pilsudski and the Fuehrer" by removing all sources of friction. In a similar settlement with Italy, the Fuehrer had renounced the Southern Tyrol. He hinted that Germany might enter in the future into "a clearer deal" with France, "transcending the Fuehrer's declaration concerning the frontier." The first problem between Germany and Poland was Danzig—"Danzig was German, had always been German, and must remain German." He proposed that it should be reincorporated in the Reich; an extra-territorial road and a several-track railway were to be conceded to Germany across the Corridor, and to Poland across the Danzig territory; Poland was to have a free port in Danzig; frontiers and territory were to be mutually guaranteed, the German-Polish treaty was to be extended from ten to twenty-five years, and "a consultation clause" inserted. According to Lipski's report, Ribbentrop further proposed joint action in colonial matters, emigration of Jews from Poland, and "a joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact"—an offer consonant with Nazi policy at that time, but not when the German White Book was published.

In reply, Lipski recalled Hitler's declaration to him on November 5th, 1937, ("*Danzig ist mit Polen verbunden*"), repeated to Beck on January 14th, 1938; and he warned Ribbentrop not to expect an agreement based on a reunion of Danzig with the Reich. Ribbentrop would accept no immediate answer—Lipski had better consider the matter and talk it over with Beck. Lipski replied that he would go to Warsaw. Then he reverted to the question of Carpatho-Russia. "M. Beck had instructed him to say that if Hungary's wish for arbitration by Germany, Italy, and Poland was accepted by the first two, Poland was prepared to join in it" (thus taking a place among the Great Powers).

Ribbentrop answered that risks were involved in arbitration.

Some twenty minutes after they had parted, Ribbentrop sent for Lipski, and offered a favourable settlement of Carpatho-Russia if the German demands regarding Danzig and the Corridor were accepted. Lipski replied that he was merely instructed to place Poland's views about Carpatho-Russia before the German Government, just as they had been placed before the Italian.

The German Minute repeatedly emphasises the cordial character of the conversation, which Ribbentrop conducted with pressing affability. Lipski, who had come to urge, was now forced to fend. Nor was he told whether the proposal emanated from Hitler or whether it was Ribbentrop's (sometimes Hitler's gallopers would out-distance him). But it was fundamental and far-reaching, and was made at a time when no European statesman or diplomat could be sure of his bearings.

When Mr. Chamberlain, stepping from the aeroplane at Heston, waved his "treaty" with Hitler, like a happy autograph hunter—"here is a paper which bears his name"—Europe was astounded. Could Chamberlain's trust, joy, and triumph be genuine? His experience was that of a middle-class business man, and he, with his umbrella, tried to introduce into international politics the atmosphere of the "pleasant Sunday afternoon," consciously dull and sober. He was shrewd, ignorant, and self-opinionated, and had the capacity to deceive himself as much as was required by his deeper instincts and his purpose, and also to deceive those who chose to be deceived. Once more he scored a great and miserable victory over Mr. Churchill. But within him there was an uneasy, unclear compromise, which he preferred not to probe: if he was so happy about Munich, why re-arm? if he was playing for time, why make such poor use of it? No foreigner could ever have understood Mr. Chamberlain. Hitler was puzzled and indignant. After Godesberg and Munich he had assumed British *desintéressement* in people of "far-away" countries "of whom we know nothing"; but when he spoke at Saarbrücken on October 9th, he was less certain. Still, he would go ahead on the Continent. He saw the listlessness of France, and the greed and megalomania.

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mania of the Polish Government. With Daladier, Bonnet, and Beck he hoped to settle Europe. On October 17th, he tried, through François-Poncet, a new approach to France; a week later, Ribbentrop spoke to Lipski. François-Poncet, in his despatch of October 20th, pointed out that Hitler "adhered to his design of breaking up the Franco-British bloc and of securing peace in the West, in order to obtain a free hand in the East." He probably thought himself much nearer to the "New European Order" than he was. Ribbentrop asked of Poland a small surrender and offered a great friendship; the offer was far more formidable than the claim. Had Poland become a second junior partner in the Axis, her dependence would have been complete and final; Italy, accessible on the West, could have changed sides: had Poland entered the German system, the Western Powers would have confined their East-European policy, if any, to Russia. Hitler could then have bid Poland seek in Russian territory "compensations" for the cessions which he would have dictated to her in the West; or, alternatively, could have partitioned her with Russia. In Poland's fatal geographical position, an alliance with either of her great neighbours must result in a measure of dependence: while an independent existence between them, especially if in conflict with both, is a continuous acrobatic performance. Even had Danzig been less vital for Poland, a far-sighted Polish Government would have hesitated to close with Germany's offer. Beck had strong totalitarian leanings, and co-operation with the Axis suited his tastes; he had personal resentment against France, and hostility to Russia was part of Pilsudski's presumed "political testament"; but even he was averse to a close connexion with Germany and had to count with the intense Polish feeling about Danzig. Towards the end of the month Lipski went to Warsaw and, on October 31st, received instructions from Beck, rambling and turgid, long-winded and too clever by half. This, in brief, is their substance as published in the Polish White Book: "The Polish-German Agreement of 1934 has stood the test of the greatest political upheaval in post-war Europe": it is "not of a transient and tactical nature", and the need for it is now greater than ever; progress is

noticeable, in that Hitler's public declarations about Poland "contain increasingly precise and unequivocal formulas." The Polish Government favours "a certain extension in the period and form of the 1934 Declaration." Poland has paramount economic interests in Danzig; Gdynia alone is insufficient; Danzig must remain within the Polish Customs system; Poland never interferes in Danzig's internal politics; "the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bilateral Polish-German Agreement," which would guarantee the Polish economic and the German political interests in Danzig, but "any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich must inevitably lead to a conflict" of a more than local character. Beck is ready to go to Germany for personal talks, but enjoins on Lipski first clearly to explain "the principles to which we adhere."

On October 24th, Ribbentrop had urged Lipski to proceed to Warsaw immediately. Now that Lipski returned with Beck's reply, Ribbentrop did not see him till November 19th. Possibly he was put off by Beck's interview with the Hearst representative in Warsaw, in which Beck denied that negotiations were being conducted for a surrender of Danzig and the creation of a transit-route across the Corridor.¹ The interview of November 19th is reported in both the White Books. The German Minute is by Ribbentrop himself. Both Minutes state that Lipski read out his instructions. Ribbentrop thus reports the first point of Lipski's exposé and of his reply to it:

Foreign Secretary Beck considers that German-Polish relations have on the whole stood the test. The Czechoslovak crisis has shown that the German-Polish Agreement is built on solid foundations. He believes that the straightforward Polish policy has benefited Germany in the acquisition of the Sudetenland and has greatly contributed towards a thorough settlement of that problem in the German sense. During those critical days, the Polish Government paid no attention to blandishments held out to them from a certain quarter.

I replied to M. Lipski that in my opinion also the

¹ The Hearst representative seems to have had exceptionally accurate information, and Ribbentrop complained about that interview to Lipski on November 19th.

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German-Polish Agreement had proved its strong power of resistance. The action of the Fuehrer against Czechoslovakia had enabled Poland to obtain the Olsa territory and a number of other frontier improvements. But I said that I agreed that the attitude of Poland had rendered things easier for Germany.

There is nothing so blatant in Beck's published instructions as Ribbentrop's summary of its first paragraphs; but Lipski, reading his instructions, is not likely to have added to them in this manner, nor Ribbentrop to have gone to the trouble of inventing the story either then or afterwards.

To the part of Lipski's instructions dealing with Danzig Ribbentrop replied that he regretted Beck's attitude; it may be difficult for Beck to justify a surrender of Danzig, but so it is for the Fuehrer to justify a renunciation of the Corridor. When he (Ribbentrop) put forward his suggestions for placing German-Polish relations on a permanent basis, he did not mean "to engage in diplomatic small talk." The Fuehrer takes a very wide view of the German-Polish problem. Ribbentrop did not absolutely reject a bilateral treaty about Danzig, but hardly thought it feasible, and urged the Poles to reconsider the matter. Lipski's Minute of this part of the interview is fuller; Ribbentrop speaks in it with more cordiality and less reserve, but taking all in all the two reports are perfectly compatible. Both mention an enquiry by Ribbentrop about the transit-corridor, and Lipski's reply that he had no instructions on that point, but believed a solution possible. One important point mentioned by Lipski is, however, omitted by Ribbentrop: a discreet hint by Ribbentrop that his suggestions had been his own—he had talked only in a vague manner with Hitler on this subject. Obviously they were to be dropped for the moment.

According to a minute by Beck, Count Moltke called on him on November 22nd, assured him that Ribbentrop continued to attach the highest importance to good Polish-German relations, and had taken due note of Lipski's statement. Moltke said that he had always warned Ribbentrop that Poland would be adamant about Danzig, and was glad that after the conversation with M. Lipski, Ribbentrop "thoroughly realised this."

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It was on that very day that the Polish Ambassador in Paris was officially informed about the negotiations for a Franco-German Declaration.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION

François-Poncet reported from Berlin on October 4th,

1939:

The German Press overflows with friendly phrases at the address of France. It persists in repeating that there is no ground for conflict between France and Germany. It delights in rendering homage to the part played by M. Daladier at Munich. . . . Quoting an expression of Herr Goering, it says "that with a man like M. Daladier it is possible to make politics."

Referring to the declaration exchanged between the Fuehrer and the British Prime Minister after Munich—which is represented here as a Non-Aggression Pact—it hints that there is nothing to prevent a similar arrangement between France and Germany. But France must adopt a realist policy based on the recent events which have upset Europe.

Munich was to be the "starting point for building up a New Europe"—the term "New Order" was not yet current, but was implied in these dissertations, and the "realism" expected from France was *desintéressement* in Eastern Europe.

On October 18th, when taking leave of Hitler, François-Poncet was treated to "fairly indulgent appreciations of the French attitude" and bitter reproaches against England. Hitler suggested a Franco-German agreement confirming their frontier, and containing a consultation clause; not a Non-Aggression pact, to avoid reservations relating to the League of Nations Covenant, and to existing treaties with third parties. With regard to limitation of armaments, Hitler suggested starting with a programme "for humanising war (bombing of open cities, etc.)." François-Poncet assured him that the French Government would give the most sympathetic consideration to his proposals. The negotiations were to be kept secret, except that the French Government was free to sound the British Government, and the German

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to inform the Italian. Poland and Russia were not mentioned.

"I certainly am under no illusion concerning the character of Adolf Hitler," wrote François-Poncet. "I know him to be changeable, disingenuous, contradictory, uncertain." Still he thought that, "at least intermittently," Hitler shared the wish of the majority of Germans to close the weary, age-long conflict with France; and that this was aided by the sympathy aroused in him for Daladier by the Munich meeting, "and also by the idea that our country is now evolving in a direction which will permit it better to understand the Third Reich" (i.e. moving towards the "New Order"). "But it is equally certain that the Fuehrer remains intent on breaking up the Franco-British bloc, and on securing peace in the West in order to have his hands free in the East. Still, he urged a positive approach to Hitler's proposals."

On October 21st, the French Government notified François-Poncet of their favourable attitude, which was immediately communicated to the Germans. "Like you," wrote Bonnet, "I view Herr Hitler's initiative with all the interest which it deserves, and I agree that we should endeavour rapidly to reach concrete results." No discussions about the text of the Declaration are recorded either in the French Yellow Book or in the German White Book. On November 20th, the new French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, called on Ribbentrop who claims to have told him that a Franco-German understanding would be greatly facilitated if "a certain mental ballast was dropped." "It is necessary that the European States should confine themselves to their real interests: France to her great Colonial Realm, England to her Empire, and Germany to her proper sphere of interests, which is South-Eastern Europe." On November 22nd, at Berchtesgaden, Coulondre presented his credentials to Hitler, who played off some of his gramophone records about no territorial problem dividing France and Germany, about the pacifism and comradeship of ex-combatants, etc. On that very day, the text of the Declaration (said to have been drafted by the Germans and accepted by Bonnet) was agreed upon in Paris, and its outlines were officially communicated to the Polish and Russian Ambassadors, with an assurance that French relations with

third parties would be safeguarded.¹ M. Lukasiewicz, "showed himself very favourable to the plan"; the Russian, M. Souritz, made no comment, but on November 23rd asked for the full text, which was refused on the ground that it had not been shown to anyone. The same day Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax came to Paris, and were shown the text; and the fact was disclosed that a Franco-German Declaration, similar to the Anglo-German signed at Munich, had been drawn up and only awaited ratification. On November 24th, Chamberlain publicly blessed it as "marking a new effort in the direction of peace," and Ribbentrop's forthcoming visit to Paris was announced. On the 26th, M. Souritz, asked by Bonnet for his observations, said that he had received no instructions and that, moreover, the text of the Declaration was fixed; Bonnet, disingenuously, replied that Souritz had been informed of its outlines before it was submitted to the Cabinet. The same day, a "friendly agreement" was concluded at Moscow between Russia and Poland to live together henceforth as good neighbours. Nazi intrigues in "Carpatho-Ukraine" were apparently at the root of this *rapprochement*; but the Paris transactions may have prompted its announcement.

On December 6th, Ribbentrop and Bonnet signed the Declaration which, having dwelt on the importance of good Franco-German relations for European appeasement, solemnly recognised the existing frontier between the two countries as "definitive," and concluded with a consultative clause "under reserve of their particular relations to Third Powers." The official communiqué mentioned that "the principal European problems" had been discussed; a statement by Bonnet asserted that the Declaration opened the way for a collaboration aided "by the conviction that no difference exists between the two countries liable to disturb the pacific

¹ Among the diplomatic documents which the Germans allege to have found in Warsaw (*"Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges,"* Auswärtiges Amt, Nr. 3, March, 1940), is a despatch from M. Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador in Paris, dated December 17, 1938, in which he mentions that, when leaving for Warsaw at the end of October, he was told by M. Bonnet that "the Declaration may be signed and published any day"—obviously he knew about it; he writes further that "pro-Russian politicians such as Mandel" were worried whether the Declaration was compatible with the Franco-Polish Alliance and the Franco-Russian Pact. "Finally, he [Mandel] persuaded M. Bonnet to talk to me about it, and probably also to the Russian and Belgian Ambassadors." It is not clear whether this refers to the talk of November 22 or of an earlier date.

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nature of their relations"; another one by Ribbentrop, that it opened the way "for a mutual recognition and respect of their vital national interests" ("*ihrer nationalen Lebensinteressen*")—a hint at a delimitation of spheres of interest.

On December 14th, in a Circular Note sent to the French Ambassadors in London, Berlin, Brussels, Rome, and Barcelona, and to the Minister at Prague, Bonnet gave an account of these talks; Ribbentrop had made light of "unofficial" Italian revendications against France; the fight against Bolshevism was the essence of Axis policy: Germany was not interested in the Mediterranean; a Franco-German *rapprochement* would react favourably on Franco-Italian relations; and why should there not be Four-Power co-operation? Dealing with Spain, Ribbentrop again made a parade of anti-Bolshevism. Incidentally, French policy towards the Soviets "seemed to him a survival of the encircling policy of Versailles"—in reply Bonnet recalled that the restricted character of the Franco-Russian Pact was due to the refusal of Germany and of other Powers to join it. Ribbentrop blamed the attitude of the British Government, and still more of the Press, and complained of the emphasis laid in London on re-armament; Bonnet emphasised "the fundamental and unshakable character of Franco-British solidarity." They talked about Czechoslovakia and the implications of Munich: Ribbentrop was on his return to Berlin to re-examine the question of the international guarantee, of which Germany had accepted the principle. According to Bonnet, these informal talks, "without resulting in precise conclusions capable of being minuted, have thrown interesting light on certain essential points."

Poland is not mentioned in the Circular Note, which therefore was not sent to the French Ambassador at Warsaw (nor, of course, to Moscow). France had not been apprised by Poland of Ribbentrop's recent proposals; but, even so, the omission was remarkable, and underlined the distinction which France was making between Great Britain and the Eastern Allies. Her withdrawal behind a diplomatic "Maginot Line" was encouraging to the Nazis, who were openly treating freedom of action in the East as corollary to their (present) renunciations in the West: Coulondre says

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it in so many words in his despatch of December 15th. They all, including Ribbentrop and Goering, but with the sole exception of Hitler, were talking to him, though in different ways "and always with deliberate imprecision, of the need for German expansion in Eastern Europe." Across Czechoslovakia and Hungary, reduced to vassalage, their eyes seemed fixed on the Ukraine, the *Lebensraum* of Nazi dreams: but Coulondre saw, though without drawing the obvious conclusions, that this would have meant "curbing Roumania, convincing Poland, despoiling Russia"; which was more than could be undertaken at the outset. And the Bulgarian Prime Minister, about the same time, told the French Minister at Sofia that, in his view, it was Poland who was most immediately threatened—he foreshadowed the possibility of a German-Russian understanding, and of a new Partition.

After Hitler had occupied Prague, a dispute was to arise as to what had been said about Czechoslovakia in Paris, on December 6th. Herr von Weizsäcker, Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, claimed that Bonnet had given Ribbentrop "verbal assurances" that it would never again be "the subject of an exchange of views"—"he added that the German Government, could they have thought otherwise, would not have signed the agreement." Bonnet replied with a categorical denial: he had reminded Ribbentrop of the promised guarantee to Czechoslovakia, but failed to obtain from him any assurance as to when Germany would give it. The whole thing probably seemed to the Nazis a mere farce—which it was; they did not duly appreciate the delicate feelings and consciences of the appeasers who, when they threw anyone to the wolves, would plead a higher righteousness and give the victim a beautifully-illuminated safe conduct.¹ But though there is reason to suspect that Bonnet had signified his *desintéressement* in Czechoslovakia, formally his statement seems correct; he claimed at the time to have talked about the question of the guarantee for Czechoslovakia to Ribbentrop; and on December 22nd, on instructions from him, Coulondre raised it with Weizsäcker, whose reply was negative.

¹ Cf. treatment of the Jews at the Palestine Conferences, February-March, 1939.

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"Could not this matter be forgotten," he said to me with a smile. "Seeing Germany's predominance in that region, does not the guarantee of the Reich in fact suffice?" I naturally signified that engagements, once undertaken, could not be forgotten, and returned to the point. But I had the impression that he spoke from a brief.

"It is for Czechoslovakia to claim that guarantee," he concluded. "Anyhow, we are in no hurry to settle this question, and M. Chvalkovsky is not expected in Berlin till after the holidays." In fact, the journey of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister has already twice been postponed.

But what was the position of the Chamberlain and Daladier Governments with regard to that guarantee? Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement reads:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have concluded the above agreement on the understanding that they adhere to the offer in paragraph 6 of the Franco-British proposals of 19th September, 1938, concerning an international guarantee for the new frontiers of the Czechoslovak State against all unprovoked aggression.

After the problem of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, on their part, will similarly give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

In the first paragraph the Franco-British guarantee is an offer; in the second, by implication, an accomplished fact. And on October 4th, Sir Thomas Inskip declared in Parliament that, though technically incomplete, morally the guarantee had to be treated by Britain "as being now in force."

On October 18th, 1938, Hitler speaking to François-Poncet about the Polish and Hungarian territorial claims, said that he was trying to have them settled out of court, for in an international conference the Axis would have to support Poland and Hungary—"because of the political bonds between us"—while the Western Powers would have to stand by Czechoslovakia. "I hope a compromise will be reached. But the affair is dangerous. It shows how

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wrong France and England were to guarantee Czechoslovakia's frontiers even before these had been clearly defined. The most annoying complications may yet result from it."

HITLER ENDORSES THE RIBBENTROP PLAN

When Ribbentrop's proposals had met with a Polish refusal, he subsided—was it to avoid possible disturbance to the French negotiations? But after December 6th, Beck seems to have been willing to resume the ticklish discussions about Danzig—was it to keep pace with the Western appeasers? In the German White Book, Moltke reports an interview with Beck on December 14th (not mentioned in the Polish White Book). Having learnt from Moltke that he was going to Berlin, Beck invited him for a talk, praised the Agreement of 1934, and deplored the present tension in Polish-German relations. "The reason probably was that too much had suddenly changed in the last few weeks. Czechoslovakia had received a new face, and a series of other systems and combinations, which had been of weight in the past, had broken down." He wished to review the situation with Ribbentrop. Passing to concrete problems, he mentioned new difficulties in Danzig, expressed an earnest hope that "undesirable *faits accomplis* would be avoided," referred to the "preliminary discussion" about Danzig which, sooner or later, would have to be resumed—"he obviously alluded to the Berchtesgaden conversation," writes Moltke. Polish public opinion was deeply apprehensive lest Carpatho-Russia was used for an anti-Polish policy, but he disclaimed any wish to exclude Germany from the Danube basin. Lastly, in view of possible developments, he recalled Poland's economic and shipping interests in Memel. Moltke answered that also in Germany there was irritation against Poland, mainly because of minority problems, especially in the Olsa district of Teschen "where the population had gradually come to consider the twenty years of Czechoslovakian rule a Paradise compared to their present condition." Beck replied with assurances customary on such occasions.

When Beck expressed the wish to meet Ribbentrop, he meant at Warsaw, on a return visit to that paid by him to

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Berlin three years earlier. But while Beck was for Christmas on the Riviera, an invitation reached him from Hitler on his way home to call at Berchtesgaden. They met on January 5th; Ribbentrop, Moltke, Lipski, Beck's Chef de Cabinet Count Lubienski, and Herr Schmidt were present. The interview is reported in both the White Books; but the German Minute by Schmidt is almost three times longer than the Polish. It seems fairly credible, except that Hitler's anti-Russian (not merely anti-Bolshevik) effusions noted in the Polish Minute, were obviously excised from the German before publication in September, 1939.

Beck started by again underlining how well German-Polish relations had stood the test of the September crisis; if of late they had not maintained "the high level" of those days, both sides should endeavour to remove existing difficulties. He mentioned Danzig—what, for instance, was to happen should the League of Nations withdraw from Danzig? Further, "in the agitators operating in Carpatho-Russia, Poland recognised old enemies, and she feared lest in time it became such a focus for anti-Polish activities as to compel her to intervene, which might produce further complications." Hence a common frontier with Hungary had been desired.

Hitler replied that he fully adhered to the principles of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. He disclaimed all direct interest in Carpatho-Russia, and insinuated that the responsibility for the settlement lay with Hungary. But to reach finality between Germany and Poland, it was necessary to go beyond "the mainly negative Agreement of 1934." He hoped to settle the problem of Memel with the Lithuanians "who seemed willing to concur in a reasonable solution"; Danzig and the Corridor were felt by Germany to be difficult problems which required a new approach. For Danzig a formula had to be found which "would join it politically to the German Commonwealth, while economically leaving it with Poland." "Danzig was German, would for ever remain German, and sooner or later must return to Germany." Germany required a connexion with East Prussia across the Corridor. If a reasonable solution was found for these two problems, he would guarantee the frontier with Poland as

he had guaranteed that with France. He "underlined once more the psychological difficulties of the problem which only he could solve in this manner." It was not easy for him to guarantee the Corridor to Poland, and by so doing he would incur a great deal of criticism. But as a *Realpolitiker* he wished to see the problem settled and relegated, as had been those of the Southern Tyrol and of Alsace-Lorraine.

Beck replied that Poland, too, stood by her agreement with Germany, and would continue "the independent policy pursued of recent years as against attempts through an Eastern Pact, to connect her closer with Russia." Poland was less concerned about reinforcing her security than France, and had no opinion of the "security systems," absolutely discredited since the September crisis: which made it a turning point in history. He valued, however, the German attitude, now reaffirmed by the Fuehrer. He took note of Hitler's wishes, but, although he persistently disregarded the "coffee-house opposition" (and yet continued in office), he had to mind national opinion, and this rendered the Danzig problem very difficult. Still, he would calmly think over the matter.

The Polish record of Beck's reply is so unusually brief as to suggest uneasiness about it (thirty-eight lines of Hitler against five of Beck); what there is bears out the German account; but it accentuates Beck's attitude towards guarantees: in Hitler's scheme he saw "no equivalent for Poland" (the actual words used were: "*ich sehe keine Gegenleistung*").

The next day Beck met Ribbentrop at Munich. The Polish White Book publishes only a very short extract from Beck's minute of a conversation which lasted one and a half hours.² He asked Ribbentrop to tell Hitler that, for the first time, an interview with Hitler made him feel pessimistic, and that he saw no chance of settling the Danzig problem on the proposed basis. Ribbentrop replied with renewed

¹ Beck touched also on the Polish-Russian Declaration of November 26th, 1938, and described it as defining relations "on the lines of their Non-Aggression Pact." But he denied its pointing against Germany. These remarks of Beck's are not mentioned in either report.

² The Polish White Book had to be compiled mainly from materials in the Embassies, and these apparently were not always supplied by Beck with full information.

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assurances "that Germany was not seeking any violent solution." His minute, which covers more than a page, reports Beck to have started immediately on Danzig: the League of Nations may withdraw—what then? Or events in Danzig may force Poland to act. He was at a loss how to solve the problem; to the entire Polish nation it was "the test of German-Polish relations." Ribbentrop repeated that Germany desired "a final and comprehensive consolidation of their mutual relations on big lines"; rehashed what Hitler had said about Danzig, the Corridor, and Carpatho-Russia; raised minority complaints; and accepted Beck's invitation to Warsaw, without fixing the date.

It seems that Beck, usually brazen and overbearing, had felt constrained in his talk with Hitler; he committed the mistake of speaking of an "equivalent," which implied the possibility of a deal; and afterwards with Ribbentrop tried to correct the impression which his feeble reaction must have produced.

Back at Warsaw, he received the French Ambassador, M. Léon Noël. "*Si l'on en croit M. Beck*," rightly remarks Noël, this was all that had happened: the need of good neighbourly relations was re-asserted; Hitler talked a good deal, but not feverishly, and did not seem about "to set going great events." He expressed satisfaction at war having been avoided; made friendly references to France; inveighed against Russia, "not only against Bolshevism"; no relaxation of anti-Jewish persecutions was to be expected, though negotiations about the Polish Jews were to be reopened; Ribbentrop seemed imperfectly informed of Hitler's intentions; he would visit Warsaw about the end of the month. What a lot Beck had to tell Noël merely to suppress the things which mattered!

On January 25th, 1939, Ribbentrop arrived in Warsaw on a three-days' visit. There are seven documents about it in the Polish White Book, but only one single minute in the German. To M. Mościcki, the President of the Republic, Ribbentrop declared that there were no insuperable difficulties between Germany and Poland; to Marshal Smigly-Rydz he talked about Russia, "asserting that she was growing weaker," but was "quite incalculable in her behaviour."

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Beck reports to have explained to Ribbentrop "the impossibility of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact"; to have "categorically rejected" an extra-territorial route—i.e. German sovereignty over Polish territory—but "transport facilities" could be discussed. With regard to Danzig he claims to have refused any concessions, "for we could not part with our tangible rights in exchange for mere assurances"—which again implies that the concessions could be had at a price. But next he rightly declared that a reunion of Danzig with Germany would give her "economic and therefore political control over Polish national life." Asked by Ribbentrop what impression his talk with Hitler had produced in Poland, "M. Beck said, the worst possible" (in official circles, as nothing about it was allowed to reach the public). The one concrete result named by Beck was a "Gentlemen's Agreement" that, should the League of Nations withdraw from Danzig, a joint declaration was to be published immediately, stating that pending an understanding between Germany and Poland the *status quo* would be maintained. Ribbentrop merely mentions an agreement to negotiate, thought Beck "impressed" by his exposé of the German claims, but worried about Polish public opinion; "none the less willing to consider thoroughly the German suggestions." Asked by Noël, was there anything new about Danzig, Beck replied in the negative, renewing his promise to keep France informed. From some other source Noël learnt about the demand for "a corridor across the Corridor"; of the demand for Danzig he apparently remained ignorant.

THE END OF MUNICH.

After Munich, Czechoslovakia was bound to pass completely into the German orbit, or to suffer disruption and extinction; if the Czechs, besmirched and betrayed, would not turn into Nazi janissaries, the scattered Germans remaining in Bohemia and Moravia, the "Hlinka Guard" in Slovakia, and the "Ukrainians" in Carpatho-Russia, were to complete the work initiated by Henlein and the "Sudetens." But Munich marked the limit of what Great Britain would brook, and to which her "appeasers" themselves would go. Knowing how poorly they had prepared the country for

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war, and therefore most anxious to avoid it, they had accepted at face value Hitler's demand for a union of all territories inhabited by Germans, and had hoped to pin him down to it. The position was geographically impossible and politically untenable, and the ideas of the appeasers were fancifully naive in their wishful misconceptions of German psychology. They expected Hitler to save their faces by preserving at least a certain outward decorum. But he neither understood, nor cared for, their niceties; the manner in which the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia were fixed, his speeches in the autumn of 1938, the intensified anti-Jewish persecutions and the November pogrom, the Nazi activities in Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia, the increasing pressure put on the Czechs, and lastly the delay in implementing the guarantee of their new frontiers promised to them at Munich, brutally tore down the trappings from Mr. Chamberlain's make-believe. Mr. Chamberlain would still defend what he had done and stiffly protest that no defence was required, and he would depict on his Christmas-card the 'plane in which he had flown to Munich; but the atmosphere round him was changing perceptibly. The agonies of Czechoslovakia were the death-rattle of appeasement as the guiding principle of British policy; while the policy of France and of Poland continued to flicker and flutter, with Bonnet and Beck each pursuing a line more tortuous, though more realist, than that of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had ever been.

But whereas, in spite of certain suppressions, the course of the foreign policy of France and of Poland during the year preceding the war can be traced in their printed documents, the material is lacking for a study of British diplomatic activities during that period. The Chamberlain Government refrained from publishing the wires, despatches, and memoranda from which the story of their endeavours and disappointments could be told: to the self-esteem of politicians, a record of drivel, fuddle, and bungling is more painful than one of unprincipled but consistent action.

The policy of the French Government was inspired by deep defeatism, born of disenchantment in victory; by a passionate anxiety to avoid sacrificing any more French lives; and by a fear and hatred of the "Reds" overruling

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national considerations—the Left believes in "class-war," and the Right practises it. In this spirit, effective resistance to totalitarian Germany was impossible, and the road to Vichy had to be traversed, in one manner or another: and yet there was the desire to maintain the appearances of continuing the traditions of France as a dominant European Power.

In Poland the epigons of the Pilsudski régime were influenced by their totalitarian leanings and by traditional hostility against Russia, and, in view of the virtual eclipse of France, they had, more than ever, to seek a *modus vivendi* with Germany. They did not believe in the possibility of Nazi-Soviet co-operation, and they overrated Poland's military strength.

In Great Britain, Mr. Churchill alone, month after month and year after year, exposed the growing dangers of the international situation, pleaded for a consistent and active European policy, and pressed for rearmament on an adequate scale. Labour and Liberals believed in the League of Nations and "collective security," advocated action but opposed rearmament. The so-called National Government combined a worldly-wise scepticism with inaction and unpreparedness, and abhorrence of Nazi atrocities with a sneaking admiration for totalitarian achievements (best seen in the Chamberlain foible for Mussolini). Still, even if during the years preceding the war there was no national policy worthy of the name, there was diplomatic correspondence of which the public has a right to see as much as can be safely printed. Something resembling the French Yellow Book could have been expected even from the Chamberlain Government.

"*Le Livre Jaune Français*" bears the sub-title: "Diplomatic Documents, 1938-39"; and the opening sentence states: "This Yellow Book is a collection of the principal documents which show and explain the action of French diplomacy between September 29th, 1938, the date of the Munich Agreement, and September 3rd, 1939, the day on which France and Great Britain, acting on their assurances of assistance, declared themselves in a state of war with Germany." The book comprises 431 pages of the size of our Blue Book, and 370 documents; of these 124 are communica-

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tions from the French Embassy in Berlin (86 previous to August 23rd, 1939, the beginning of the acute crisis); 106 from the Embassy at Warsaw (57 previous to August 23rd); and more than 40 emanate from the French Foreign Office. Here is material for a study, if not of French foreign policy, at least of the work of French diplomacy.¹

The title of the Blue Book presented to Parliament on September 21st, 1939 (Cmd. 6106) reads: "Documents concerning German-Polish Relations, and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3rd, 1939." Thus Anglo-German relations enter into it only, as it were, incidentally, and British diplomatic transactions with Germany during the eleven months, September 29th, 1938, to August 23rd, 1939, are outside its purview: for that entire period it contains only three communications from the British Embassy in Berlin. If it was necessary to rush the publication of a Blue Book so limited in scope, this did not absolve the Chamberlain Government from following it up with a wider documentary account of its foreign policy, such as other, less democratic, Governments felt it their duty to attempt (a task which would obviously have been invidious for their successors). But all they vouchsafed to the public on the history of appeasement was a book by Sir Neville Henderson, Ambassador to Berlin, 1937-39. He writes in the "Prologue" to his "Failure of a Mission":

It was the stationmaster at Grantham who finally overcame my scruples about the writing of this book. Mr. Gardner was kind enough to invite me into his office, where there was a fire, one cold morning when I was waiting for a train for London, which was late. We spoke of this and that, about the war and its origins, and his final remark to me was that he and people like him knew nothing of the facts of the case. A very sensible remark! But a Minister is not free to quote in Parliament from documents which had not previously been tabled; without permission from the Government, Sir Neville.

¹ Bonnet's foreign policy cannot be fully gauged by his despatches: he would send official communications to Berlin through Coulondre, but different, and more significant, messages through de Brinon. Even his dealings with the Embassy are said to have been peculiar: he would give soft-peddling instructions over the telephone, and then send a stiff and stern despatch—the first calculated to mould action, the written record to screen Bonnet.

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Henderson could not have tried to enlighten the stationmaster at Grantham; and a semi-official apologia should not precede the publication of documentary evidence. And though Sir Neville unfolds his "Greek tragedy" (with a good deal of pseudo-artistic claptrap), the serious student is no wiser for it, and in tracing the collapse of appeasement, has no British diplomatic sources to draw on.

On January 11th to 13th, 1939, Mr. Chamberlain visited Rome, and in talks with Mussolini raised the question of the guarantee promised for Czechoslovakia's new frontiers; and early in February the British and French Embassies in Berlin were instructed to make that guarantee the subject of a *démarche*. Coulondre did so, and in his *note verbale*, dated February 8th, asked for the earliest possible reply: what the British Embassy did, when and how, is nowhere stated. Meantime the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, M. Chvalkovsky, back from Berlin, gave M. de Lacroix, the French Minister at Prague, an account of his talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop which had hinged on the promised guarantee. "What seems to have struck him most was the disproportionate importance attached by them to the Jewish question . . . both declared emphatically that it was impossible to give the German guarantee to a State which does not eliminate the Jews." They regretted "the sentimentality and slowness" which they themselves had shown in dealing with the Jews: described them as Germany's chief enemies "responsible for all the difficulties which we encounter in dealing with Paris, London, and Washington." "We shall give similar advice to Rumania, Hungary, etc. Germany tries to form a bloc of anti-Semitic States, and cannot be friends with any State in which the Jews retain influence, either through their economic activities or by holding high office." Next, they demanded full freedom for the Germans within the Czechoslovak borders to organise on Nazi lines, and to wear their party badges in public; lastly, a considerable reduction of the Czech Army. By February 17th, seven more points were added to these three preliminary conditions, amounting to an entire subordination of Czechoslovakia's foreign and economic policy to that of the Reich.

On February 22nd, Bonnet asked Coulondre about the

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results of his pressing démarche undertaken a fortnight before, and was told that no reply had been received. This was given a week later in a Note which combined circumlocution with veiled threats and sallies. During the six or seven weeks after the "Vienna Award" adjudicating the Hungarian claims, the new Czechoslovakia had been extolled by the Nazi Press as a firmly-established State, which would prove the superiority of Axis creations over the "flimsy structures" of the post-war settlement; now it was described as lacking the stability stipulated as pre-requisite for an Axis guarantee. At the same time, the Western Powers were warned not to interfere: their "more or less serious military guarantees" had in the past encouraged the Czechs "to neglect the imprescriptible revendications of national minorities," and such a guarantee might now "aggravate" the differences between Czechoslovakia and her neighbours. The Note concludes:

The German Government fully realises that ultimately the general evolution of that part of Europe falls primarily within the sphere of the most essential interests of the Reich, historically, still more geographically, and, most of all, from the economic point of view.

It further deems it necessary to await an elucidation of the internal development of Czechoslovakia, and an improvement in her relations with her neighbours, before it assumes a new attitude.

So long as Hitler expected a united, though truncated, Czechoslovakia to serve as Nazi transmitter to Eastern Europe, the Vienna Award was described as "definitive." A change may have occurred in his immediate plans: the "Ukrainian" agitation in Carpatho-Russia tended to create a common interest between Poland, Rumania, and Russia, and also with Hungary which coveted that province. More-over the Czechs, even in their bitter misery and humiliation, did not prove truly docile. According to Sir Nevile Henderson, "the revulsion abroad" to the anti-Jewish pogrom, "and particularly in the U.S.A., where Dr. Beneš had taken refuge . . . encouraged the anti-German section in Czechoslovakia . . . to raise their heads again and to hamper the conciliatory efforts of Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky for

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better relations with Germany." In January, reports Coulondre, Hitler said to a foreign diplomat "that if Czechoslovakia did not toe the line, he would let loose against her a lightning action." On February 5th, a Nazi, in close touch with Hitler, told an official of the French Embassy that "a disintegration" (*Auflösung*) of Czechoslovakia might prove unavoidable, in which case Slovakia would become independent, Carpatho-Russia would go to Hungary, "and the Reich would, in one form or another, assume control of Bohemia and Moravia." The Note of February 28th clearly pointed the same way; the programme was complete; "movements" and "incidents" could now be expected.

Sir Nevile Henderson, who, since the end of October, had been away ill, returned to Berlin about the middle of February. "My compulsory absence was a minor disaster," he writes. He met Hitler at a banquet on March 1st: "he carefully avoided looking me in the face . . . confined his remarks to general subjects, while stressing the point that it was not Britain's business to interfere with Germany in Central Europe. . . . In the light of wisdom after the event, I have no doubt that he was already weighing the various contingencies in regard to Prague, and making his plans for March 15th." This "wisdom" does not, however, prevent Sir Nevile from saying, on another page, that "if the Czechs had been a little more prudent, and if the Stanley-Hudson visit¹ had taken place ten days earlier . . . March might, after all, have gone out like a lamb," and from inveighing against the "folly" and "obstinacy" of the Czechs, their "incredibly shortsighted and domineering" treatment of the Slovaks, etc. Still, he was "once again moderately hopeful and not inclined to see the black side of anything" (except in the actions of the wronged). Presumably his reports encouraged Ministerial optimism in London. On March 10th, Sir Samuel Hoare spoke at the Chelsea Town Hall about the "notable change in public opinion" which had occurred since the beginning of the year—"confidence, almost suffocated in the late autumn by defeatism, has returned,

¹ A visit to Germany by Mr. Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. R. S. Hudson, Secretary D.O.T., had been planned for the middle of March in connexion with trade talks.

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hope has taken the place of fear, moral and physical robustness has overcome hysteria and hesitation." He talked of "the greatest opportunity that has ever been offered to the leaders of the world," and refused to believe that they would not join Mr. Chamberlain in the high endeavour of appeasement upon which he was engaged. Taking the cue, "Punch," on March 15th, published a cartoon in which an awakening John Bull sees the "war-scare" vanish and says, in reply to "pessimists" who had "predicted 'another major crisis,'" for the Ides of March: "Thank goodness, that's over." On March 10th the final crisis started in Czechoslovakia, and on March 15th Hitler entered Prague. It was all over.

In Slovakia the Nazis operated through types now known as quislings, and through the local "Fuehrer," Herr Karmasin, at the head of 120,000 "Volksdeutsche." In November, provincial Governments had been set up in Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia. Now, encouraged from Berlin, the separatists in both were clamouring for virtual "independence" while, to say the least, with the silent cognisance of Berlin, the Czechoslovak Government were preparing to take action against them. On March 10th, Prague removed from office the Slovak Premier, Mgr. Tiso, and M. Durcansky, who escaped to Vienna, and immediately started virulent anti-Czech broadcasts over the Nazi radio. Next, the Slovak ex-Ministers appealed to Hitler; were summoned to Berlin and on March 13th were told by him that he desired "a completely free Slovakia"; the Slovak Diet was summoned for the next morning to Bratislava, while Tiso continued till 3 a.m. his conferences with Ribbentrop and other Nazi leaders. In the afternoon of the 14th, the prescribed "independence" was voted by the Diet. In the morning, Herr von Weizsäcker had received Sir Nevile Henderson (I follow here a despatch of Coulondre's); declared that Tiso's was the only legal Government, that "the Reich desired the maintenance of order, a decent treatment of the German minority, and the final elimination of the 'Benes' spirit,'" but that no decisions had yet been taken. "My colleague," writes Coulondre, "in reporting the conversation to the Foreign Office, concludes that Berlin hesitates what line to adopt . . . but I am not certain that the declarations of the Secretary of State square

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with the facts of this hour."¹ According to a report of the interview cabled by the Berlin Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in London, "Henderson stated that he neither meant to make a *démarche*, nor create impression of his Government meddling in this matter. Predominant German interest in Czechoslovakia acknowledged ('*stehe fest*'). Also British Press had shown greatest restraint. But it would be fatal if impending visit of . . . Stanley . . . coincided with application of force against the Czechs." Then follow Weizsäcker's explanations and assurance that "legitimate German claims would be enforced in a decent manner"; "Henderson concluded by repeating acknowledgment of predominant German interest in Czech territory ('*im tschechischen Raume*')."

Meantime an ominous campaign had started in the German press and broadcasts: the hackneyed stories reappeared of atrocities committed against harmless, helpless Germans—"Blutbad," "Marxist plot at Prague," etc. Another German coup was clearly imminent, but the Czechs in their utterly defenceless condition² could not think of resisting. For

¹ Sir Nevile Henderson thus reports the interview and its sequel in his "Failure of a Mission" (pp. 203-5):

I went to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the Monday morning and adjured the State Secretary to see that nothing was done to violate the Munich Agreement or to upset the Stanley-Hudson visit. I found Weizsäcker completely non-committal, and all that he could assure me was that whatever was done would be done in a "decent" manner . . .

I left the Wilhelmstrasse . . . filled with the gloomiest forebodings. I tried to comfort myself with the State Secretary's assurance about "decency" . . .

The Czech Government was alone in a position to save itself by its action. After my conversation with Weizsäcker, I accordingly saw the Czech Minister, and once again urged him . . . to propose to his own Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky . . . an immediate visit to Berlin. . . . When not only Chvalkovsky, but also President Hacha himself came to Berlin, it was already too late, and the announcement, which

was made on the following day, March 14th . . . Thus, Sir Nevile Henderson, as usual, finds grounds for blaming the Czechs: he saw Weizsäcker on Monday, March 13th; after that he repeated his wholesome advice which, if acted upon immediately, might have saved the situation; it was "too late" when "on the following day, March 14th . . ." But, as appears from the French Yellow Book, Nos. 57 and 63, and the German White Book, No. 258, Sir Nevile's interview with Weizsäcker took place on the 14th, and not on the 13th: the story requires re-writing.

² Coulondre writes in his despatch of March 16th: "Indeed, during the proceedings of the International Commission in Berlin, in October, it soon became obvious that the Germans acted on strategic rather than on ethnic considerations. The frequent interventions of the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht in the negotiations showed that the foremost purpose of the rulers of the Reich was to trace a frontier which would deprive Czechoslovakia of all her natural defences and fortifications and reduce her to complete military impotence. In fact, the frontier which the Prague Government had to accept in October engulfed 850,000 Czechs in the Reich." This was the higher righteousness which Chamberlain and Daladier had secured at Munich, and to which Allied diplomacy pandered at the Berlin Conference.

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some time past the "decent" Weisäcker had carefully avoided all contact with the Czech Minister in Berlin; it was now decided that President Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky should proceed to Berlin and try to reach some settlement; but the enquiry whether such a visit would be welcome seems, in fact, to have crossed a summons from Hitler. They left Prague late in the afternoon and arrived at Berlin at 10 p.m. Miss Hacha, who accompanied her father, was given a bouquet of flowers at the railway station from Ribbentrop, while a box of chocolates from Hitler awaited her at the hotel. Hacha's interview with Hitler started at 1 o'clock in the morning and lasted till 4 a.m. He was told from the very outset that there was no question of negotiating, that he had to accept decisions already formed, and sign a document of surrender which had been prepared beforehand, that Prague would be occupied the next morning (German motorised detachments had in fact already crossed the Czech border and occupied the vital district of Moravska Ostrava and Vitkovice); and that if the least resistance was offered, the most terrible destruction would be wrought in Prague by the *Luftwaffe* (a forecast of Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Belgrade). Hacha fainted, was given injections; pleaded that he could not take decisions of such gravity without the assent of his Government, and was ordered to obtain it over the telephone; and he finished by signing a statement that after "the serious situation" had been examined "with full frankness," the two sides agreed to aim at "safeguarding calm, order, and peace in that part of Central Europe."

The President of the Czechoslovak State has declared that, in order to serve that aim and to achieve a final pacification, he places, with full confidence, the destiny of the Czech people and country into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich. The Fuehrer has accepted that Declaration . . .

In the afternoon of March 15th, Hitler entered Prague and hoisted the Nazi flag from the Hradchin. A chapter closed in the history of Czechoslovakia, and also of Europe. "*La Tchécoslovaquie a vécu*," wrote Coulongre. And Mr. Churchill said at Waltham Abbey on March 14th: "Not until the Nazi shadow has been finally lifted from Europe—as lifted

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I am sure it will eventually be—not until then will Czechoslovakia and ancient Bohemia march once again into freedom."

But what became now of the guarantee, or promise of a guarantee, given to the Czechs at Munich? In the House of Commons, on March 15th, Mr. Chamberlain, having acknowledged that there has been "a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia," went on to say:

. . . His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to come to an agreement with the other Governments represented at Munich on the scope and terms of such a guarantee, but up to the present we have been unable to reach any such agreement. In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee and, accordingly, the condition of affairs . . . which was always regarded by us as being only of a transitory nature has now ceased to exist, and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation.¹

Equally remarkable in that debate was Sir John Simon's account of what had happened to the guarantee: having summed up "the central tragic thing" in a dictum attributed to Herr Goebbels—"the State of Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist"—he put it forward as an "obvious point" that "in that situation it was indeed impossible to suppose that a guarantee to maintain the State of Czechoslovakia could have any meaning at all." In these clever explanations the Munichers reached their nadir.

Two days later, at Birmingham, Mr. Chamberlain delivered a speech which marked the end of appeasement and opened the way for fundamental realignments in European politics.

¹ But this was Lord Halifax's view of the "internal disruption," expressed in the House of Lords on March 20th:

I find it impossible to believe that the sudden decision of certain Slovak leaders to break off from Prague, which was followed so closely by their appeal for protection to the German Reich, was reached independently of outside influence.

A PLAGUE ON ALL YOUR ISMS¹

By BARBARA WOOTTON

A WORD that ends in ism should be a kind of shorthand. Shorthand notes are useful when they can be read back. When they cannot they are useless.

Unhappily the vocabulary of politics and social affairs is littered with ism-words which are quite as useless, and considerably more dangerous, than illegible shorthand. Sometimes the writer or speaker of these words seems to have no clear idea in his own mind of what his particular ism is supposed to stand for: sometimes it is used, consciously or unconsciously, to convey a false picture of reality. In these cases speech (or writing) fails to perform its primary function as a means of communication. It is reduced to a series of laryngeal noises (or inkspots). When that happens, the time has come for a revision of vocabularies, since intelligent and co-operative thinking is impossible, unless there can be communication between the thinkers. Unfortunately, however, such revisions are apt to be bitterly resisted. For the very words that are due to be thrown away are often charged with violent feeling; and we are not willing to make the emotional adjustments necessary to discard them.

In this context we may classify the political isms into three classes: the terms of indiscriminate abuse; the sacred dogmas; and the terms of visionary escape. The word Fascism was, before the war, rapidly establishing itself as an example of the first variety. It was applied to Mussolini's Italy, to Hitler's Germany and, from time to time, by the Left in this country, to Mr. Chamberlain's government. According to the definitions collected by Stuart Chase,² its meaning ranged from "A large Florida rattlesnake in summer" via "the equivalent of the National Recovery Act" to "what Hitler's trying to put over." One might, I suppose, reasonably

¹ The substance of a lecture given to the Fabian Summer School, 1941.
² *The Tyranny of Words*, p. 132.

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denounce Mr. Chamberlain for some of the things for which one denounces Hitler or Mussolini (and particularly for the fact that he himself did not denounce these two as he should have done). But effective political thinking could only be frustrated by the attempt to comprise the policies of all three governments, or their 1938 heads, under a single term. If "Fascist" is merely a synonym for "objectionable," why not use this word instead, and avoid implications as to the grounds, as distinct from the fact, of the objection?

To the Left wing sympathiser, the most obstinately obstructive example of the dogma type of ism is Marxism. To the question: "Are you a Marxist?" there really is only one adequate answer—"What a silly question!" It has been pointed out hundreds of times that Marx made some very illuminating contributions to the interpretation of social phenomena. These may well be comparable to the contributions made in other fields by Darwin, Faraday, or Pasteur. But it is noteworthy that the tendency to erect the discoveries of these various pioneers into a school, an ism, or a dogma is in inverse proportion to their connection with social affairs. I have never heard the word Faradayist. Pasteurist had, I believe, a brief reign, and Darwinist a considerable one. Faraday died in 1867, Pasteur in 1895, Darwin in 1882, and Marx in 1883. But only in the case of Marx, has the ism survived to block further advances in knowledge and understanding, sixty years after the death of the Master. In all the other instances we have assimilated the true and shaken out the false in what these great men left behind them, so that we can get on unhampered with the job of trying to add something of our own: with the result that much has, in fact, been added.

It is, no doubt, legitimate to hold the opinion that Marx was more often, and more importantly, right, and less often and less importantly, wrong, than anybody else who has written about social affairs in the past century—or twenty centuries, if you prefer. If so, let us by all means pay tribute to his genius. By labelling yourself a Marxist you do not, it is true, *necessarily* commit yourself to more than the view that Marx was a wiser man than anybody else whose name you might alternatively adopt. But even so you are laying up difficulties in the event of subsequent knowledge demanding

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a revision (as presumably *some* day it must) of even *this* opinion. For then you will have to disown your label; and that, as experience shows, involves a certain loss of prestige, and so creates a serious temptation to ignore such knowledge when it comes along. The label implies a declared bias in favour of stopping where somebody else stopped. Why on earth should anybody wish to do this? To judge from the look of the world around us, we get along slowly enough, in all conscience, with the business of adding to our *effective* knowledge, that is, with enlarging our ability to control social relations satisfactorily. The last thing that we want is an unnecessary brake.

The visionary-escape type of ism is best illustrated by that most sorely abused of all ism-terms—socialism. Because of its wide influence, and because of its tendency to inhibit thinking just where thinking is most needed and potentially most fruitful, this is now one of the most dangerous of all political abstractions. It is, therefore, about this that I wish particularly to write.

Now socialism to the socialist means something very nice. That much is agreed. What exactly that nice thing is is not so much a matter of agreement. The fact that professing socialists are not even of one mind as to whether the U.S.S.R. is, or is not, a socialist state seems to suggest a fairly fundamental state of confusion. It is moreover a common experience for any socialist speaker who does attempt to give some sort of realistic body to his conception of the socialist society to meet the criticism: "That is not socialism at all." The obvious answer to that criticism is that it is entirely irrelevant. If a plan is a good plan, it does not matter two hoots what you label it. It should be judged on merits, and those who are interested should attempt to find some common and definable criterion of merits, and apply this to the particular proposal under discussion. But it is remarkable how seldom the criticism is dismissed on this ground. The fact that it can be made, and that, when made, it is not thus disposed of is evidence that the term socialism conveys no common meaning to the parties concerned, that it actually obstructs communication between them, and should, therefore, be dropped. Fundamentally this type of argument (e.g.

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the endless discussions as to whether the Soviet Union is or is not a socialist state) are not arguments about socialism at all. They are arguments about the (very important) subject of people's conception of desirable and undesirable ways of dealing with social problems; and they are *frustrated* by the intrusion of the socialist phantom. "Socialism" has here degenerated into a term of general approbation in just the same way as Fascism was at one time emptied of all but abusive significance.

Further, the habit of thinking in terms of two, and only two, sharply contrasted and mutually exclusive "systems," corresponding respectively to the Platonic ideas of socialism and capitalism, and of attempting to judge concrete proposals in terms of these ideas, is disastrously out of touch with reality. From Washington to Moscow, from Stockholm to Ankara, the twentieth-century world exhibits a vast variety of economic and social experiments, customs, institutions, ways of behaving; and the results produced, in terms of the everyday life of ordinary people, are not less varied. It is true that some common elements can be traced in all this confusion. But the attempt to fit everything into one or other of our two systems simply distracts attention away from differences that are significant towards similarities which are often imaginary. The only things that matter are the answers to such questions as: How do people live? Are they free to speak their minds? Do they have enough to eat? What sort of houses do they live in? Do they have fun and gaiety in childhood, adventure and opportunity in youth, ease of mind and body in old age? In these respects there were, before the war, great differences between the Danish peasantry and the slum populations of Chicago, between the sharecroppers of the American South and the miners of the Donetz basin. The system-classification rides roughshod over these differences, or pretends that they do not exist. Such make-believe will not get us anywhere.

Use of mechanical formulæ about system-changing as a means of evading serious thought on real problems is the most deplorable vice of all. How many hundred times have not discussions about minimum wages or family allowances or the League of Nations or a capital levy been swept aside by the retort that it is no use talking about any of this till you

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have changed the system? It happens in Labour Parties, in Co-operative Guilds, in undergraduate societies, among the W.E.A. The retort is, of course, perfectly legitimate provided that the critic is prepared to consider *concretely* what he is proposing to change into what, and what are the best methods of changing it. But how often is this the case? The point at issue here is not, as is often represented, a difference between reformists and revolutionaries. Revolution is quite as capable of being expressed concretely as is any reformist proposal. It is very concrete when it happens! The revolutionary can advocate a general confiscation of all industrial property, or the suspension of suitable persons from lamp posts. These are *intelligible* policies, on the merits of which intelligent opinions can be formed. But a policy of changing one indefinable into another indefinable lies in the realm, not of intelligibility, nor (alas!) of works, but of faith and faith alone.

The change-the-system attitude is, in fact, an example (to borrow another ism-word) of the dangerous variety of utopianism. It is pure fantasy: a method of escape from a situation which is felt to be intolerably difficult. Since one does not solve real problems by running away from them, or by the incantation of magical formulae, the prevalence of this attitude (and among the Left public generally it is prevalent) is extremely dangerous. To say this is not to admit that the label "utopian" is necessarily pejorative. There are in fact two forms of utopianism. The bad form is that just illustrated. But the admirable and useful form is the utopianism of those who advocate policies which appear to the promoters to be in themselves desirable, but are unattainable so long as other people do not share this opinion. J. S. Mill was utopian in this sense when he demanded equality of the sexes in 1869. So are many who advocate a federal political system in Europe after this war. But the fact that other people do not already agree with an opinion is the silliest possible reason for keeping quiet about it. If your view is right, how can others accept it, if they are not to hear of it? If it is wrong, how can you see what is wrong with it, if they never have a chance to tell you? Moreover, particularly in circumstances where public opinion has some influence in shaping events, it is the plain lesson of experience

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that desirable reforms begin as paradoxes and end as common-places. No doubt Mill's essay was ridiculous at the time when he wrote it. That was a reason for writing it. If the charge of utopianism is used to inhibit the expression of opinions that are still at the ridiculous stage, they will all, sensible and silly alike, remain permanently at that stage.

II

In view of the immense prestige of socialism, it is worth while trying to sort out a little more carefully the various strands that are tangled up in contemporary usage of the word: in order to see whether something reasonably precise and coherent can be made of them; and whether, if so, that something is a suitable subject for political campaigning.

I have found that among professing socialists three ideas are associated with the word more frequently than any others. These are (1) social equality; (2) the full utilisation of resources under a system of "production for use and not for profit;" and (3) public ownership or socialisation of industry. Possibly the most widely acceptable definition of socialism is that it is a state of society in which all these objectives have been attained.

If so, the use of a single ism to cover the lot begs a number of questions. For these three aims stand on quite different levels. In particular there is a confusion of ends and means; and it is very dangerous to wrap up your ends and means in one bundle and stamp the lot with the socialist seal. For to do this is to beg the question of whether the means proposed will in fact promote the ends desired. And that implies that, if you should ever come to think that they will not, you will be unable to say so without raising doubts as to the sincerity of your socialist faith.

For example: social equality is desired, when it is desired, for its own sake; or at most as a direct constituent in human happiness and dignity. It is, I think definable with fair precision.¹ At all events it is clear that large differences in wealth, opportunity, or prestige unrelated to function, militate against it. So, if we wish for an equalitarian society, let us get on with the job of tackling these.

¹ I have tried to define it in *End Social Inequality* (New Democratic Order Series).

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The "fullest available use of resources" is also an intelligible end, at least if it is read to mean the abolition of avoidable poverty. But economists have legitimately pointed out that, in view of the great variety covered by the omnibus word "resources," and the fact that these can be used in thousands of different ways, maximum production is an extremely elusive goal to define in theory, or to recognise in practice. Are four vacuum cleaners and six bicycles more or less than six vacuum cleaners and four bicycles? This is not just the hair-splitting of the sequestered academic. It is a real problem that arises in real practice. It puzzles the heads of the Soviet planners in the actual business of plan-making. Every elaborate modern community must have some method of deciding how much of what is to be produced. And the choice of that method calls for hard thinking. Recently, some of that thinking has been undertaken by economists who are also professing socialists.¹ Some of these economists have argued that the most reliable method will, in general, be to work upon the principle of producing the things that show a profit and stopping the production of those that are not, in the strict commercial sense, profitable. This is a highly technical matter and cannot be argued here. These economists may be wrong; but at least they have called attention to a practical problem, and have shown up the void covered by the production-for-use-and-not-for-profit formula. That formula cannot tell you when or where to open a railway or a mine, to build or demolish a house in your socialist society. No doubt, if you spent thousands of pounds on a branch line which only served a village of three hundred people, and these people already had access to another railway a mile or so away, somebody would *use* the new line. But does it follow that you ought therefore to build it?

The third strand in the socialist bundle is unmistakably means rather than end. A nationalised industry is not an element in happiness and dignity in the way that living on terms of fellowship and equality with your neighbours is. Socialisation is desirable, if it is desirable, because it is expected that it will enable people to live better, or to have more

¹ e.g. Dickinson, *The Economics of Socialism*; Hall, *The Economic System in a Socialist State*.

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freedom, not because it is a Good-Thing-in-Itself. Here there are several points to be noted. First, it is plain that socialisation of industry *can* be used to promote ends that are in flat contradiction to the freedom and equalitarian abundance which are also tied up in the same socialist bundle. It can, for instance, be used to promote the domination of a bureaucratic hierarchy; and it certainly seems to be an essential element in totalitarian war-making. So we had better reserve judgment about the socialisation business until we know what we are socialising for. It is not a matter of principle: it is a matter of method or expediency.

Second, it is by no means certain that socialisation is always and in all circumstances the ideal road to equality and abundance. Economic and administrative inventiveness has not been idle in the past half-century, and one might as well keep abreast of it. There are a hundred and one weapons beside formal transfer of ownership to public authorities in the armoury of those who know what they want, and are prepared to be intelligently opportunist about getting it. There is for instance the limitation of profit, the ceiling income, the deliberate adjustment of controlled prices, the free distribution at the taxpayer's expense, the compulsory delivery. Most of these are very modern inventions. It is absurd to dismiss out of hand their possibilities in the creation of a society in which people live well and on terms of equality with one another—merely because they are not traditionally included under the term socialism, which was itself invented before they were. It would be no more absurd to refuse to listen, even experimentally, to a broadcast concert, merely because, traditionally, prior to the invention of radio and gramophone, music could only be enjoyed if the listener was within earshot of the actual performers.

And, third, it is the final absurdity to suppose that, because socialisation is itself a traditional element in socialism, therefore it can, in and by itself, eliminate *all* that is objectionable in capitalist industry. It is true that a worker in a publicly-owned enterprise cannot be embittered by the thought that one result of his day's work is to make a particular rich man richer still. That is important. But that is not everything. That does not mean that when the alarm-clock rouses the

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Soviet factory worker he is never tempted to steal another hour's sleep; or that he never wishes his wage packet was larger or his annual holiday longer. There are some things about going to work for *any* employer, which are the same yesterday, to-day and to-morrow.

In any complex and specialised society there must, in fact, always be conflicts of group interest. One of the most persistent of these is the employer-worker conflict—in one or other of its many forms. The Soviet authorities know that very well; though their uncritical admirers in this country frequently do them ill service by pretending that they do not. In the Soviet Union elaborate machinery is provided for dealing with these conflicts in the form of agreements between enterprises and their employees, regulating the conditions of employment. Whether these agreements are, in fact, freely negotiated or duly observed is not, in this connection, of significance. The fact that they are made at all is an admission that employer and employee cannot be expected to see eye to eye on all points, and that their mutual relations must be adjusted somehow.

In a well-ordered community these conflicts would of course be reduced to a minimum; but the well-ordered state will, equally, be alive to the need to provide smooth-working machinery for settling those that must remain. Certainly such conflicts need not always be the same, still less need they be as exacerbated, as those that disfigure contemporary England or America. But they cannot all be charmed away by the fact that in a socialist state we should all, in some general sense, be working for the community. Working for the community for four hundred roubles is not the *same thing* as doing the same work for the same community for six hundred.

III

The moral of all this is, I think, that we must be as concrete as possible in our ends, and intelligently empirical in our choice of means. Rather than embark upon a full-blooded campaign for "socialism" or the "socialist faith," we should draw up a list of some half-dozen specific objectives that must take front place in any reconstruction programme. Such a list might include (1) the essential personal freedoms that

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have been traditional in this country: these do not need much definition because we have been familiar with them in actual practice; (2) a nutrition standard expressed in terms of the minimum constituents of a physiologically satisfactory diet; (3) a housing standard expressed in terms of space-plus-amenities (e.g. a bathroom for every family); (4) an educational standard in terms of the duration of school life and the provision of so many places in such and such types of post-elementary schools and colleges; (5) a leisure standard expressed as so many hours a week to do what you like with; and (6) a limit on inequality expressed as nobody's income to be more than x times anybody else's.

This is not intended as a considered or final list. The items are chosen merely to illustrate the *degree of concreteness* necessary, and the fact that if specific ends of this kind were in fact achieved, it would not matter at all whether you called the result socialism or not. (If we pitched the standards high enough and wide enough, there would not be much else to bother about for a good while to come!) Whatever the list contains, the point is that it must be concrete; and the next step must be to draft considered plans for getting from here to there.

These plans will certainly necessitate the nationalisation of some industries; the establishment of drastic controls in others; the manipulation of prices so as to provide satisfactory incentives in yet others. The choice of means will demand much knowledge and much unprejudiced thinking. Never mind. All that matters is to find, and to follow, the particular road which will get us to the particular destination in view. Then we can tick off the items on our list one by one as actually accomplished. And then add others, of course.

There is another reason for taking this very earthy view of the task before us. That reason derives from a particular diagnosis of the causes of our present discontents. The essence of that diagnosis is that more is at fault with our heads than with our hearts. This is not a popular view with the Left at present. On the contrary, a remarkable retreat into ethics is already in progress. Victor Gollancz has written a plea for a new political morality: John Strachey has spoken to the undergraduates of Oxford (or was it Cambridge?) of

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the virtue of love : and the Fabian Society is sponsoring a new campaign for socialism with a special stress on the ethical.

But are the implications of all this in keeping with the facts of experience? The fundamental ethical drives of most people, most of the time, seem to me sufficiently admirable to be capable of sustaining a world which would be absolute heaven by comparison with that in which we now live—if *only those drives had a chance to express themselves efficiently*. Kindliness and generosity are notoriously widespread virtues. The number of perverts who derive pleasure from the infliction of serious injury upon their neighbours is still, in ordinary experience, very small. No doubt it can be increased by suitable education, as has been done in Nazi Germany ; but for this purpose a pretty deliberate and rigorous training seems to be necessary.

And *yet* the most amiable people are perpetrating the most revolting cruelties upon one another. That is the essential tragedy of our present plight. And only those who can out-Vansittart Vansittart deny that this is true of many millions now fighting on both sides. Does not this tragedy suggest that what is at fault is not so much a breakdown of morality as a failure to provide the channels through which good moral sentiments can make themselves effective in public affairs? Thousands of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Czechs, Dutch are to-day convinced that it is only by the perpetration of these cruelties, by killing, maiming and blinding their fellow-creatures that they can safeguard the survival of ordinary toleration and kindliness. They never ought to have got into a position in which such a proposition would make sense. They *have* got into it, not because they like it, not because of their own viciousness, not even because of the viciousness of the Germans. They have got into it because of their own and the Germans' failure to think through, and to bring into being, the social institutions which, in our bewilderingly complex world, would enable their decent feelings to find efficient social expression. In a simple orderly community, like a village, it is easy to be friendly to your neighbour if you happen to feel like it. In our complicated anarchic world, whatever you may feel, it is impossible.

It is useless to tell people to be good when they (and you)

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are good already. Those who do so lay themselves open to the suspicion of trying to be good because they have failed to be clever—the more so when the call for goodness comes from those whose political morality has been as irreproachable as that of the leaders of our ethical drive. Indeed it is worse than useless. It is dangerous. For if the channels along which ethical fervour can discharge itself in effectively promoting its own ends are blocked, one or other of two things will happen. Either there will be frustration and disastrous disillusion ; or the emotion will be diverted into courses leading to ends utterly opposed to those which it was intended to realise. The first is what happened here in the reconstruction period after the last war. The second is what made Germany Nazi.

IV

The whole of the above is an attempted application of a more general proposition : that is the proposition that the future of civilisation—perhaps one should rather say the creation of civilisation—depends, not upon a change of heart or upon greater moral fervour, but upon the application to social and political problems of the scientific method which has accomplished such marvels in other fields. That method implies patient and accurate observation of the facts, and choice of means, not for the satisfaction which their use gives to the user, but for the likelihood that they will, in fact, promote the ends in view. It is the attitude which cleans the carburettor, instead of kicking it, when the car will not go. Above all, it is an attitude which is innocent of the loathsome art of propaganda, in every sense except that of the effective publication of verifiable statements.

The faint marks of that attitude are just beginning to make themselves visible in social and political life : but only just. The volume of precise knowledge of social conditions is slowly growing. Mass Observation, for all its crudities and imperfections, has taught us a *little* about the actual facts of our own behaviour. Gallup Surveys have made it a *little* more difficult for every politician to claim that "the whole country is behind" his every dictum.

In this astonishing age we have learnt to fly above the earth and to voyage beneath the deeps of the ocean. Our

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stockings are made from coal and air, our spectacle frames from milk. We make love without conceiving and have our teeth removed without pain. And all this has been accomplished, not by campaigning for isms, but by the unfettered exercise of the human intelligence. A nation-wide campaign under the slogan "Rise above it" never put a single aeroplane into the air. Already the nineteenth century has gone down to history as the age of discovery in the non-human sciences. The opportunity is open to write the history of the century that lies before us as the age of science in human affairs. If that opportunity is lost, there may well be no history at all.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT IN WARTIME

By HAROLD J. LASKI

I
WE have passed through more than two years of a war that has been as searching a scrutiny of our political institutions as any to which they have been subjected since the Napoleonic period. Obviously, it is too early to pronounce with any confidence upon the result; probably not until the peace is well settled shall we begin to have the materials for a detached judgment. What I write here is, therefore, no more than a series of notes upon aspects of their functioning by which I happen myself to have been impressed, together with some attempt to explain the causes of the position as I see it. The conclusions I have formed are necessarily provisional; granted the pace of events, they cannot hope to be more. They may perhaps serve the useful purpose of indicating to others phenomena which need explanation in the light of the possible future they may influence.

II
The outstanding feature of the political landscape is the overwhelming predominance of the Prime Minister. None of his colleagues looms even approachably in the public eye; none of his critics dares even to suggest that he has overstayed his welcome. It is improbable that any Prime Minister has been so fully the master of his forces, least of all in a coalition government, as Mr. Churchill. The position is interesting because, as yet, his months of office have not been associated with any serious German defeat; and they have been marked as in Libya and Crete, by reverses at least comparable with those which led to the fall of the Chamberlain government. It is interesting, further, because his predominance is not accompanied by any such effort to build for him the kind of personal machine which, on the skilful use of the patronage,

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Mr. Lloyd George built for himself in the last war. In most vital aspects of policy, their contours are decisively shaped by his preferences. He controls strategy as Minister of Defence. He defines the supreme principles, as in his speech on Russia of June 22nd, 1941, of foreign policy. The level at which propaganda shall function has clearly depended on his judgment. His well-known prejudices have been the decisive factor in Indian policy; he binds to his chariot wheel these Labour colleagues who are bound by party principles which deny the very premisses he accepts. If there have been social and economic reforms during his Premiership, there has been none for which he would not have been prepared to be responsible as a Liberal Minister under Mr. Asquith before 1914; and none of them has been incompatible with his pivotal position as leader of the Conservative Party. In the light of its well-known declaration, on consenting to take office under Mr. Churchill, that it did so as a "full partner," the secondary rôle of the Labour Party in his administration only reinforces the vigour of his supremacy.

What is the source of this supremacy? It lies, I think, in a number of factors. In part, it is the outcome of the fact, evident ever since the overthrow of Mr. Asquith by Mr. Lloyd George, that crisis government always enhances the position of the Prime Minister. This is true of every occupant of the office since 1916; and the apparent exception of Mr. Baldwin is shown to be no exception by the experience of the abdication. A comparable phenomenon, it may be noted, is also true of the American Presidency in the same period. Crisis government, especially in wartime, seems to require the embodiment of the national effort in a person in whom popular confidence can be maintained. Whether this is related to the sense of security the child feels in paternal protection in a period of anxiety is a problem I cannot answer. What is, I think, certain is that a concentration of interest in one man takes place which puts him, while he retains confidence, on a level where no power can rival his. In policy, in appointments to office, in power to override even the decisions of colleagues, the Prime Minister is no longer, as in the classic theory, *primus inter pares*; he is the master of an organisation in which he has important subordinates, but,

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quite certainly, no equal. There seems to be almost a psychological compulsion in the nation to be able to regard one man as indispensable.

The reality of the safeguards upon the obvious dangers of this position are, I think, beyond question. They are broadly three in number. The Prime Minister must retain his hold upon the House of Commons which is, by nature, an organisation the genius of which is for criticism of the Executive power. He cannot side-track the House; on the vital occasion he must make his case there, and, if he is felt not to have made it, he begins to lose hold of his eminence. He must, moreover, be able so to speak to the nation that it recognises not only its own purposes in his, but, almost more, its own spirit in his spirit. From this angle, the contrast between Mr. Chamberlain's incapacity, and Mr. Churchill's capacity, to evoke this recognition is very striking. The third factor is, I think, the press. There can be little doubt that, alongside the "stereotype" of the Prime Minister that he seeks himself to construct by his policy and actions, there is another which, in the long run, takes shape from the comment made upon this effort by the press. While the two mainly coincide, his position will not easily be assailed; when the two widely diverge the signals are set at danger and since, in a crisis period, the normal limits of party loyalty are more swiftly transcended than at other times, since, further, the loyalty of the colleague to his leader within the party is more easily broken, the influence of public and press opinion on these means that only the continued assurance of success in policy is likely to keep the Prime Minister in office. He is indispensable only while he is able to maintain the conviction by success that he is in fact indispensable.

The safeguards, as I say, are real; some of the consequences of the eminence he occupies deserve note. The Prime Minister's power to elevate unknown men is great; I doubt whether any of the Labour Ministers knew either Mr. Oliver Lyttelton or Lord Leathers before they discovered them as colleagues. His power to terminate careers without fear of reprisal is not less great; Mr. Churchill's relegation of Mr. Duff Cooper, Mr. Cross, and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald to elevated obscurity is pretty clearly the kindly interval which

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precedes political silence. Perhaps in some ways his power over men was most decisively shown in the Moore-Brabazon incident; for there he insisted in retaining in office, in the face of profound public indignation, an unpopular minister who had been guilty of what was, at the least, a grave indiscretion in a vital realm of policy.

To this must be added the problem of getting attention for issues from the Prime Minister. The calls upon his time are hardly more immense than the formidable barrage which protects him from the outside world. Some of his lesser colleagues have not seen him personally, except in the House, since he became Prime Minister; others speak with awed gratitude of a brief interview accorded them. It is, I suspect, far easier for a visiting journalist of eminence from America or the Dominions to penetrate to him. He has little direct contact with his critics. Most of what they have to say he either hears publicly in parliamentary debate, or in the form of written comment. His own environment, in short, is less that of the give-and-take of the normal political period, but rather that of the subordination-acceptance of the crisis atmosphere when direct contradiction is not easily compatible with the eminence he occupies. There is nothing in his environment comparable in significance to Mr. Lloyd George's need to watch the activities of Mr. Asquith and his supporters, on the one hand, or the trade union leaders on the other. Anything corresponding to the first is absent; and the greater urgency of the time means that the attitude of the second is confined to deputations which are satisfied to act on the level of persuasion.

If the Prime Minister were not a man of exceptional energy and acute flashes of imaginative insight, his position would be fraught with great, even dangerous, problems. There is not to-day any civil servant with Morant's power of insisting on attention to great problems; there is not a ministerial colleague whose contingent power to succeed him makes his every word of weight; and there are no personal friends about him whose candour equals their admiration. Mr. Churchill, of course, has the eagle glance. But he does not allow that glance unduly to dwell on those features of the landscape which do not especially attract his interest; and he

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seldom remembers that things are revealed to the humble earthworm which escape the eagle's imperial glance. Were it not that the rest of his position is its dependence upon a public opinion which only success can, in the long run, hold, there would be something in the atmosphere that it would be difficult not to compare with the psychological atmosphere of a Grand Vizier's court.

Part of it, no doubt, is the result of the extraordinary personal hold Mr. Churchill has won alike over his colleagues and the public. The first are dazzled by his immense superiority; their doubts and differences become acquiescence in most major matters almost before they have succeeded in formulating them. The public is won by the knowledge that, despite all errors in policy and administration, the power to hold, and the will to win steadily mount; and by its inner confidence that the deep compassion for suffering which is one of Mr. Churchill's greatest gifts, the real source, indeed, of what sympathy for liberal ideas he has, will always make him eager to assuage it wherever it grips his attention.

Yet it must be added, I think, that the experience since Dunkirk reinforces two conclusions in this realm. It is bad for any government not to have aligned against it an opposition powerful enough to compel it to continuous scrutiny of its own foundations. That was evident in the Chamberlain period. The fact that "appeasement" was never in danger in the division lobbies meant that Mr. Chamberlain did not hear the voice of even so eloquent a Cassandra as Mr. Churchill. It is bad, also, for any cabinet when no colleague can talk to the Prime Minister on a level of equality. The best results of our system are attained when the supremacy of the Premier is, indeed, marked, but not so marked that his voice alone is effectively heard. For that means that men who ought to have the status of collaborators have in fact the position of subordinates. The shaping of policy is not genuine team-work in the creative sense of that word. He initiates and controls; they question and amend. They are like passengers inside a coach to whom the driver gives attention only when the check-string is fiercely pulled. The by-standers know that they are in the coach; but it is to the driver's activities only that they give attention.

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III

One of the dogmas with which this country entered the war was the adequacy of its civil service for any task to which it might be called; and it is the dogma least likely to survive. The administrative division, at any rate, has shown an absence of imagination and audacity, an unwillingness to attempt experiments proportionate to the urgency, which make the future of civil service organisation one of the major problems of the post-war period.

What are the reasons of this inadequacy? The first, I think, is the fact that the predominant temper and outlook of the administrative class represents that of a single section only of opinion; for even those in the service who, like Sir Horace Wilson, have climbed into power from below are promoted as much for their "soundness" as for their capacity. The major assumptions of the important officials are roughly those of the ruling class of Great Britain; and they do not easily incline either to policies or to methods which might lie outside the area in which that class feels confident and comfortable. They perform all the actions within that area with competence, great tact, and a real zest for administrative perfection. They regard all principles outside the area to which they are accustomed as dangerous and impracticable. When, therefore, they come, as with the war, to a crisis period, in which the classic assumptions they make are in hazard, they tend to set the limits of experiment more narrowly and less audaciously than either the times permit or the circumstances demand.

A second reason is connected with this, though its origin is different. Little of the last war had been expected or planned. The result was that new Departments were rapidly created and entrusted to new men. They were mostly young; and their habits had not been hardened into a routine by long years of a traditional discipline. In this war, the main administrative innovations had been planned; and the men chosen to fill the vital places were either middle-aged officials, already eminent, or retired civil servants brought back to give their experience to the common effort. The result was that not only did tradition control the normal problems in their new scale, tradition controlled also the new problems.

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The men in charge were by definition wedded to habits they were largely incapable of questioning. There was none of the flexibility and freshness so striking in the war of 1914-18.

A third reason, I think, lies in the impact of criticism by the House of Commons on the administrative process. The theory of the Civil Service is that it does not make mistakes; it is, of course, like other human institutions, capable of monumental blunders. But one of its main ardours, to which immense energy is devoted, is the concealment of those blunders from the public view, and especially from the view of Parliament. In the game of question-and-answer in the House, it has become an unchallengeable rule that while a Department must not evade the truth in its reply, it can be economical of the truth, and it may be skilful in the provision of the perspective in which it sets the truth. This has the twofold advantage of saving the Minister from difficult situations and preventing attacks on details from ascending into investigations of principle. Anyone who studies the replies of the Service Departments on rearmament in the period from 1936 to 1939, and studies these in the context of Viscount Gort's despatch on the 1940 campaign in France and Belgium will, if in an extreme instance, see the consequences of the system.

Now I cannot myself believe that it is not dangerous for men who assist in the making of vital decisions to spend so large a part of their energies in building this twilight world. It makes them anxious to see as little as possible in its stark clarity. It persuades them to postpone the consideration of anything which may arouse acute controversy; and it tends to make them shrink from those positive innovations which so easily put a bureaucracy on the defensive. More than this. The knowledge that any of its actions may mean that a powerful interest will use the House of Commons as an instrument of attack begets a habit of avoiding the action which may offend the powerful interest. The result on the service seems to me to breed a race of men a large part of whose ability is devoted to building a strong case for letting well alone: the assumption being that what is, is necessarily well. Such a service does not easily adapt its habits to the bitter exigencies of war. Innovation on the grand scale,

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utter frankness, relentless attack upon obstructive interests, rapid adaptation to the wholly unexpected, the ruthless rejection of the men who do not rise to the occasion, these are the qualities for which war calls in officials; and they are pretty exactly the qualities against which the main genius of our civil service has been directed.

To two other elements in the situation it is worth while to direct attention. I have already noted the emphatic supremacy of the Prime Minister in the inter-war years. That has, I think, led to a habit in the civil service of keeping a weather-eye cocked on the Prime Minister as a matter of special importance. More: it has meant that in those realms of policy in which the Prime Minister took a special interest, and in which he had strong views, it was not easy for an important official to have any influence unless he accepted the premisses of the Prime Minister. The fate of Sir Robert Vansittart is the decisive commentary upon this situation. But it had two more subtle effects. The first was a kind of prenatal control on the views of any ambitious official which were likely to make him *mal vu* in 10, Downing Street; and the second was a tendency to promote to the highest places those officials who would not add to the overwhelming burdens which already rest upon the Prime Minister by forcing him to the continuous revaluation of principles he held vital. This has made, in the inter-war years, for the emergence of a type in Whitehall whose primary characteristic is adaptability; and it has meant, also, an anxiety on his part to surround himself with colleagues capable of the same quality. Neither knowledge nor courage have mattered so much as the ability to fit the frame of assumptions within which the Prime Minister proposed to dwell.

The other element is the increasing tendency of the Civil Servant, either before, or after, retirement to accept an important post in the business world. This has led to the emergence of relations hardly possible between 1870 and 1914. The prizes of the business world are great; and an able man who feels either that the highest awards of his own profession are not available to him, or that, at sixty, a dignified leisure on pension is not enough, cannot help feeling attracted by them. Anyone who surveys the record in this field can

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hardly avoid the sense that it opens vistas which, if they prove attractive, have a perceptible influence on policy. Conscious adaptation to these influences is no doubt exceptional; the resounding vigour of the Fisher report on the Air Ministry case is proof of the service's grasp of the principle that integrity is the foundation of official influence. But there remains an important gap between the fruits of conscious ambition and the adjustments of unexplored hopes. We have not discovered how to bridge that gap.

IV

I have dwelt upon two aspects only of the light thrown by the war on the problems of our government. Obviously there is the material in our experience for a full-scale investigation which needs to be as searching as it is wide. I will only add here that, in my judgment, the scale of innovation that is required if our governmental machinery is to be adequate to contemporary problems is as great as at any time since the major reforms which followed upon the Northcote-Trevelyan report. We are trying to run the positive state with institutions largely devised for the negative state. Neither in the amassing of information, nor in its assessment for conclusions; neither in our ways of discovering capacity, nor in the use we make of it when found; neither in our recognition of the need from time to time, but, above all, in a crisis period, to examine first principles, nor in our valuation of the results of examination, have we the technique or the institutions necessary to our situation. Largely, we grope in the dark because we shrink from the blinding effect of light. It is time that we made up our minds to be prepared for the consequences of a new society. For its claims are being formulated; and we can meet them wisely only if we have the institutions adapted to their understanding.

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AFTER THE MERGER

Only with the merger of the two ministries could complete co-ordination of movement of goods from shipment overseas to delivery at its final destination be achieved. The transport of goods to this country and their distribution on arrival consists of a whole series of operations performed by different agencies, but is essentially a continuous process, the speed and success of which depends on a correct adjustment of each separate operation, both of internal and external transport. It was logical that responsibility for the whole process should be concentrated in one government department. The misfortune is that this was realised only after the country had been at war for twenty months. To-day full knowledge about ships' movements and cargoes is in the possession of the same department as that having full information as to the capacity of inland transport, and it becomes possible to integrate the whole process. In this matter of clearing the ports the advantage of single control is seen. The Ministry takes the ports as the central point of contact between the different services, and its Port and Transit Control therefore constitutes one of the main sections of the department. Its task is to secure the proper distribution of ships to ports, the equipment and operation of those ports and the provision of labour. In linking the movement of ships with inland transport there has been a great improvement over the conditions ruling when the Select Committee reported. This link between ships and inland transport is effected through a committee on which representatives of all government departments concerned sit with the Ministry of Transport; it diverts ships to ports in relation to cargoes carried and their destination. It is not however concerned with the transport which carries it away from the port, only with choosing the port. The availability of the services depends upon their efficiency and adequacy. Success or failure of transport co-ordination depends on the most effective use of all available facilities to meet the demands. In wartime, the test is no longer economy of operation but the continuous movement of supplies without the creation of bottlenecks. Up to the merger of the two ministries, transport had partly failed. Since the merger there has been some progress but complete

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success is circumscribed by a pre-war conception of transport divisions, a refusal to cut across them and the preservation of the industry in such a form that it can return to the *status quo* when peace is established. The Ministry seems to regard its task as one of co-operation between the various services rather than the operation of transport as a single industry.

The British transport system built up by private enterprise is regarded as made up of a number of different units. Shipping, coastwise shipping, road transport, railways, canals and local transport systems, all have their separate identity. The merging of the two ministries could only be complete if, at the same time, there were a new conception of transport, a mental merging of these units into one transport system. That has not occurred. The control of transport is regarded as a means of obtaining the maximum amount of co-operation between the various services rather than the operation of those services as one system.

THE RAILWAYS

The railways, road transport and the canals have been treated with separately and differently. Of the three, the railways alone have been taken over, but in such a way that the advantages of public ownership are not fully reaped. The Railway Executive is composed of the general managers of the companies, and its Chairman is the railway controller, Sir Alan Anderson, formerly a director of the L.M.S. and other companies, but largely interested in shipping, who succeeded Sir Ralph Wedgwood in August, 1941. The government has assumed financial responsibility. Under the first railway agreement published in January, 1940 (Cmd. 1668), the companies were entitled to earn up to the standard revenue fixed under the 1921 Act, and charges were to be adjusted to meet increased costs, the Minister of Transport replacing the Railway Rates Tribunal in deciding on such matters. The Government guaranteed the average earnings for 1935 to 1937 (the year to 30th June, 1939, in case of London Transport), a total of about £40 millions. Any earnings above £43½ millions were shared with the government until the railways' share reached standard

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By ERNEST DAVIES

VITAL as is an efficient transport system to the country's war effort, after more than two years of war, Britain's transport services have not yet been welded into a co-ordinated unit. Steps have been taken and much has been achieved, but the conception of all transport as a single industry, with its various services complementary one to the other, is still lacking. The fault lies in too careful handling of transport interests, the tackling of problems piecemeal as they arose, and a refusal to act boldly from the beginning.

If, at the outbreak of war, all transport services had been taken over by the State, and operated by a transport executive representative of all branches, but directly responsible to the Government, problems would have arisen and difficulties have been experienced, but it is unlikely they would have been greater than those resulting from the slow extension of control which circumstances compelled. Over-all control, with the weeding out of non-essentials, would have been preferable to the selective method, with its inefficiency and inadequacy, which results from lack of co-ordination. Had such a bold step been taken, it is inconceivable that the transport system would have been less efficient than now, and highly probable that it would have been more so. More recently, transport administration has been moving at an increased tempo towards co-ordination, thanks to administrative changes made in the spring of 1941—eighteen months late.

The Ministry of Transport was often regarded as a cinderella among government departments. Set up in 1919, the powers and duties of other government departments relating to railways, tramways, canals, roads and road transport, harbours, docks and piers were transferred to it. Under subsequent legislation its powers and responsibilities in relation to highway development and the control of road

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transport were increased. Illogically tacked on to these related functions was the extraneous task of controlling electricity developments, etc. Ministers have come and gone at the Ministry of Transport more frequently than elsewhere, and only during the latter part of Herbert Morrison's period of office was its Minister a member of the Cabinet. Although the Ministry has often served as the trial ground for budding politicians, and as a stepping stone for higher office, a Ministry that nobody particularly loved, with frequently changing Ministers, was not the ideal training centre for efficient administrators. Nor when war came was it particularly well equipped to deal with the added responsibilities thrust upon it. Captain Euan Wallace was then Minister of Transport and he was replaced by Lord Reith (then Sir John) in May, 1940. The latter's tenancy lasted only until October, 1940, and his successor's, Colonel Moore Brabazon, until May, 1941, when the Ministries of Transport and Shipping were merged. During this twenty-month period, there were thus three Ministers of Transport, with an average wartime tenure of office of about seven months apiece. On the merger, Lord Leathers, a business man with shipping interests, became the Minister of War Transport, and Colonel Llewellyn and Sir Arthur Salter, its joint parliamentary secretaries. The latter remained in U.S.A. in connection with the vital tasks assigned to him there, and similar to those carried out so successfully during the war of 1914-18. This left the former to carry on the normal duties of Parliamentary Secretary at home, made the more onerous because of the new Minister's membership of the House of Lords. To the new Ministry were transferred all the previous functions of the two Ministries except those relating to electricity, which were returned to the Board of Trade.

BEFORE THE MERGER

Prior to the merger, the Ministry of Transport retained its pre-war duties, but became more directly responsible for the railways, which under the Defence Regulations the Government took over on September 1st, 1939. Their operation, however, was left to the Railway Executive Committee, which, made up of the general managers of the

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earnings of about £56 millions. After that the government took the lot. In an attempt to meet rises in costs and to implement the agreement, charges were raised twice, the total increase being 16½ per cent over pre-war. The rises were unjustified because they were based on increased costs calculated on a basis weighted in the railways' favour. The railway companies were not required to take into account the benefits arising from increased gross traffics; the proportionately lower overhead which results from spreading fixed charges over the increased volume of traffic was ignored. A serious criticism of the arrangement was that as fares rose with costs the agreement was in direct contradiction to the government's anti-inflation policy. Railway earnings have consequently risen, profits increased, and dividends have been raised.¹ This year net earnings are estimated to exceed the £43½ millions above which, under the original agreement, the government would have shared in railway earnings. A calculation based on the limited information available indicates that if charges had remained unchanged, the greater volume of traffic would by this year have enabled the companies to earn on pre-war charges the 1935-37 average.

Being of an inflationary nature, the original agreement was basically wrong. If the letter of the agreement had been adhered to, further rises in charges might have become necessary and an incensed public would have resented frequent increases in fares. The agreement's failure was implicitly admitted when Sir Kingsley Wood, in introducing this year's budget, stated that subsidies to enable public utility charges to be stabilised—including those of the railways—would be paid by the government. This autumn a new agreement was entered into.² Under it, as from January 1st, 1941, the government makes a fixed annual payment to the railway companies of £43 millions a year. This is some £3 millions more than the average earnings for 1935 to 1937, and, compared with pre-war, more than has been earned since 1929. As the companies are to be responsible for 50 per cent of war damage incurred, in the event of substantial damage their earnings would be less. Changes in the agreement were largely financial but control is now

¹ For a critical analysis of the first railway agreement, see the author's "The State and the Railways" (Fabian Society). ² Cmd. 6314.

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exercised more directly by the state. The Railway Controller is responsible to the Minister and is Chairman of the Executive Committee which continues to operate the railways. Dual control of its members has however ceased for they are now responsible to the Ministry and not to the companies they formerly served. Nevertheless, in the last resort the railway executive, as now constituted, must be primarily concerned with the interests of the railway companies whose past and future employees its members are. They must protect and preserve railway interests and be reluctant to take any step which would destroy their identity or subordinate it to any other form of transport. Theirs is a railway outlook and they cannot be expected to have anything but blind spots for road transport and canals. Above all, they are concerned with the position of the railways when decontrolled a year after the war ends. If railway operation separately from transport as a whole is necessary, the Railway Executive should at least be enlarged to include representatives of the railway unions, and some personnel independent of any railway interests.

The main faults of the present railway agreement are that it destroys the financial incentive and puts nothing in its place, and fails to broaden the basis of control to bring in others besides railway managers whose past ties are strong. Financially it is unjustifiably generous to railway shareholders, assuring them, subject to excessive war damage, an income far greater than that received for many years before the war. Finally, it does nothing to solve the problem of road and rail competition.

ROAD TRANSPORT: CANALS

The war has brought far-reaching changes to the road transport industry, but there has been no government agreement with the industry, no general scheme to unify road and rail transport. Control was exercised through the Regional Transport Commissioners, who continued as the licensing authorities for road transport vehicles. Indirectly control was first extended by the introducing of fuel rationing, which gave arbitrary power to the Commissioners but did not provide them with a transport plan. Only recently has

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main line companies and the Chairman of the London Passenger Transport Board, with Sir Ralph Wedgwood, formerly with the L.N.E.R., as government appointed Chairman, acted as agency for the Ministry. The Ministry of Shipping, set up in October, 1939, was responsible for merchant shipping and the British mercantile marine, for securing maximum use of neutral shipping and co-operating with the allies on shipping affairs.

The Ministry of Shipping's responsibility ended with the docking of ships. The Ministry of Transport then took over. This division of function was a serious fault. From the arrival of ships at home ports to their departure, the Ministry of Transport was responsible for the discharge and loading of cargo and for the clearing of goods from the ports. The convoy system results in periodic concentration at the ports of large numbers of ships and abnormal quantities of goods. Shortage of shipping and its reduced speed in convoys make its quickest possible turn round essential. Enemy bombing renders the rapid removal of cargoes inland vital; bottlenecks in the ports gravely reduce shipping efficiency by preventing its maximum use, and endangering its cargoes. In a few hours the safe conduct of ships through enemy-infested seas on which days or weeks of hazardous vigil has been expended is rendered valueless if ships and goods are subsequently destroyed in the dock or on the quayside. The speedier the passage of goods through the ports and the faster the release of the ship, the less is the risk of loss.

The division of function between the two ministries contributed to unnecessary delays and some serious losses. Among the causes of delay were insufficient equipment at the ports, lack of railway wagons, lack of transport to remove the goods which overflowed the warehouses and held up receipt of goods for export which delayed departure of ships. There were also labour difficulties, the system of casual employment of dock labour being unsuited to wartime conditions.¹ Co-operation in handling shipping at ports was effected through Port Emergency Committees on which Port Authorities, rail, road, labour, employers, traders, the Ministry of Shipping and Overseas Shipping Owners as well

¹ For account of port delays, see tenth report of Select Committee on National Expenditure, 20th March, 1941.

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as all government departments interested in transport were represented. These committees proved somewhat large and unwieldy, and conflicting interests, particularly as between the different ministries, could not always be rapidly resolved.

Another cause for delay in unloading was lack of co-operation between the Ministries in overseas ports. Intelligent operation between the Ministries in overseas ports, loading of cargoes in ships, and as between different ships, makes for maximum use. Although the Ministry of Transport was responsible for unloading and dispersing cargoes inland, it was not represented in overseas ports, and therefore had no voice in the arrangement of the cargoes. Each problem was tackled piecemeal, though the fundamental fault was that the Ministry of Shipping was concerned only with the movement of ships, and the Ministry of Transport with home ports and internal transport. To overcome dock labour difficulties decasualisation was initiated. Under special schemes for the Clyde and Mersey the Ministry employed dock labour on a weekly wage basis. A later scheme to keep up a full, regular, mobile labour force in other ports has since been worked out. A National Dock Labour Corporation has been formed on which employers and workers have three representatives each. Regular employment is guaranteed, the employers paying the dockers while at work and the Corporation between jobs. This scheme is to cover London, Bristol Channel, Firth of Forth, the Humber and the North-East coast.

Work of the Port Emergency Committees has to some extent been superseded by the appointment of Regional Port Directors with greater powers and able to make quick decisions. The problem of inland transport remained, but was relieved somewhat by the organisation of a pool of road transport lorries to be used as a piece of government emergency machinery for evacuating freight from congested ports. Port equipment was improved by the transfer from other ports, and fresh cranes, trucks, etc., were obtained and additional railway wagons of special types constructed. Railway wagon shortage was felt in other directions, notably in the coal industry. The position was vastly improved in May, 1941, when wagon control was centralised. Pooling of wagons had been introduced early in the war.

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mittees. On the former sit representatives of all Ministries using transport and the Service departments, and on the latter the heads of divisions in the Ministry and representatives of the Railway Executive Committee, the Ministries of Supply, Food, Aircraft Production, Works and Building, Department of Mines and the War Office. This Central Committee is responsible for estimating the likely volume of traffic and allocating it among facilities available without regard to pre-war or financial considerations. Here planned transport is slowly taking shape.

The administration of the Ministry is in the hands of the Director-General, who is assisted by three deputy director-generals, two for shipping and one for inland transport. For administrative purposes their functions are divided into groups, viz., servicing of ships and general administration of mercantile marine, use and operation of ships, inland transport and general programmes. Wartime control has imposed upon this structure two controllers drawn from the shipping and railway industries. Both are representatives of "big business." One is Sir Vernon Thomson, principal Shipping Adviser and Controller of Commercial Shipping, and the other Sir Alan Anderson, Railway Control Officer. The former is Chairman and director of a number of shipping lines and has served as Chairman of the Tramp Shipping Subsidy Committee, which before the war was responsible for administering the government subsidy scheme. Shipping interests could not be better represented than by one who has been among the most active and prominent in the shipping industry for many years. It is under his Chairmanship that the Ministry's Shipping Control operates. This control is responsible to the Minister for exercising close supervision over the turn round and operation of ships. It supplements and does not displace the responsibility of the individual directors who are members of it, viz., the directors of the Liner, Ship Coasting, Short Sea Shipping and Sea Transport Divisions.

CONCLUSION

The faults which remain in wartime transport organisation are, in the main, due to the Government's failure to take over

when war started the whole industry in order to operate transport as a unified system under a board directly responsible to the state. Preservation of the identity of the separate transport organisations, the placing of control in leaders of the industry, and the assumption that the *status quo* will be re-established, all stand in the way of the creation of a national transport system, the *sine qua non* of which is permanent control. Temporary wartime control prevents a freedom of operation which can only be obtained when the interests of private enterprise can, when necessary, be subordinated to the national interest. As long as private enterprise expects to run the industry after the war, thought for the future will circumscribe its actions during the war.

Failure to reorganise during war will have grave repercussions when the war ends. For years the problem of road and rail transport has been responsible for uneconomic operation. The two systems, run according to different forms of transport economics, competed with each other and were treated unequally by the state. Co-ordination of road and rail transport is in any case a complex problem and within the framework of pre-war conditions it proved impossible. Only if the two are brought under the same control can they be unified. A return to pre-war conditions would add chaos to a post-war system which in any case will be faced with innumerable problems. Even if the government refuses to go the whole way in moulding a national transport system during the war, plans should be made now to cope with the problems which will arise if the government's plan to decontrol the industry is carried out. But whatever plans are formulated, they will fall short of perfection to the extent they fail to provide for the operation of the country's transport system by a National Transport Board independent of transport interests, but responsible to the community.

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a comprehensive plan for road transport emerged from discussions with the industry. The scheme entails the government going into the road haulage business. As early as January, 1941, the then Minister of Transport, Col. Moore Brabazon, announced that the government would hire vehicles from operators for the carriage of government traffic. Difficulties were encountered and delays ensued and nothing much came of it at this time. In July, 1941, the new Minister of War Transport, appointed a Road Haulage (Operations) Advisory Committee to advise him on the operation and development of the scheme. The principle of the new scheme, introduced on its recommendation, is that the government controls a fleet of 4,100 vehicles hired on the basis of a standing charge plus a mileage allowance, the latter increasing for miles run over a fixed number per week. This last is an incentive to maximum operation. Although the lorries are chartered, as it were, by the state, the owners will have the option of operating them for the government somewhat similarly to the system under which ships' managers operate ships under the government requisition scheme. This large fleet is to be used for government traffic or for other national requirements. From the operational standpoint central control of a large fleet is obvious, and from the financial an advantage is that a yardstick will be created with which to measure the fairness of rates charged for government traffic carried in other than its own vehicles. Lack of uniform rates and general ignorance of road transport economics have enabled the industry to get away with high charges during times of emergency. This scheme sets the model for extension of government control. The next step should involve Government renting all vehicles and, where desirable, employing existing operators to run them on government account. Certainly, until all commercial road vehicles are brought under the control of the Ministry of War Transport, and their operation is governed by war requirements and the most efficient use of transport facilities, the unification of road and rail transport is impossible.

A similar argument applies to the canals, long neglected because of railway control. A survey was made by the late Mr. Frank Pick, and the Ministry has to some extent tried

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to bring the inland waterways back into use. Here lack of equipment and labour are the main problems. Not until September, 1941, was a Central Canal Committee created, to advise and to co-ordinate the Regional committees which organise the use of the canals. Ownership and financial control remain unchanged and there has been no attempt to unify the canal system with the railways and roads.

The wartime operation of shipping is of vital concern to the nation, and to all intents and purposes is conducted by the state through the Ministry in the closest co-operation with the Admiralty. Ships are requisitioned by the government, and mostly run by shipping companies acting as ships' managers for the government. Naturally enough, no detailed knowledge of the working of this system is available for public discussion.

DEPARTMENTAL ORGANISATION

In functioning as the co-ordinating authority for all inland transport and coastwise shipping, the Ministry of War Transport is handicapped by different and limited powers of control over the various forms of transport. Internally it is organised into separate transport divisions, but a number of advisory and co-ordinating committees have been set up which aim at the maximum use of transport facilities, and the greatest measure of co-ordination possible within the present structure. Two main committees advise the Minister on shipping and inland transport respectively, viz., the Shipping Advisory Council appointed in November, 1939, and the Inland Transport War Council, not set up until April, 1941. On the former there sit with the Minister and members of the Ministry representatives of the main shipping companies and the unions. The Inland Transport War Council consists of leaders in the transport industry and the Trade Unions, all serving in a personal capacity. The Central Canal Committee includes the Chairman of the Regional Canal Committees, representatives of the Canal Association and the Canal Carriers, the Ministry of Labour and the Transport and General Workers. Concerned with actual allocation and operation are two interdepartmental committees, the Transport Priority Committee and the Central Transport Com-

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By H. R. G. GREAVES

THE House returned from contact with what remains of organised opinion in the constituencies on September 9th. It immediately began to show concern with the question whether we were collaborating actively enough with Russia or taking sufficient advantage of the immense opportunity offered by Soviet resistance. The Address in reply to the King's speech, to which eight sitting days' debate were devoted, and which closes the period here under review, revealed continuing concern; it took place, however, against the background of our second offensive in Libya, and both for this reason and because in the meanwhile the Moscow Conference had taken place, producing much publicity on British material aid as well as glowing tributes from Lord Beaverbrook to Russia's leadership and spirit of resistance, there was less disposition to doubt the Government's energy and good will. Other subjects which have occupied the time of Parliament include the structure of industry, which has raised the whole issue of the adequacy for war purposes of a policy of preserving the profit-motive principle and postponing fundamental change; the allied topic of man-power; food production; the operation of regulation 18B, and the general issue of liberty of the citizen and of the rights of the M.P.; and finally, the position of Parliament itself in relation to the Prolongation of Parliament Act. A more active interest is now being shown in the general problem of reconstruction. Its international aspect is mentioned in the King's speech on the opening of the seventh session, and the Atlantic Charter, signed during the recess, was debated on the reassembly of Parliament.

On the major problem of how best to co-ordinate our own offensive against the enemy, with the heroic resistance of our Russian ally and with the increasingly active front in Occupied Europe, the House as a whole has shown little disposition to lay down specific lines of strategy. Although one or two members have been bold enough to assert not only the

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desirability, which is obvious, but the possibilities of a western front, criticism has been less strategic than the product of doubt about the genuineness of a certain element in the Government in the desire to accept the Soviet Union, without reservation, as a full ally whose interests in the conduct of the war are precisely the same as our own. The speech of the Minister for Aircraft Production just before Parliament reassembled was calculated to fortify such doubts, and therefore a blunder of the first magnitude. It was clearly uncertainty as to the completeness with which the Government had discarded both the negative and the positive aspects of the Munich policy that dictated criticism, rather than fear of strategic misconceptions. While the possibility of tactical errors was in the mind of some members, this was not the issue of main concern. The Prime Minister failed to rebuke Colonel Moore-Brabazon; instead he took refuge in formalities. The speech was made at a private function—but this was attended by a large gathering; there was no written record—but the gist of his remarks had been confirmed by the Minister in a letter. Speaking of him, Mr. Churchill said, "I am satisfied that at the root of the matter he is with us heart and soul." The Prime Minister evidently thought that the Government's position was sufficiently clear to need no such reaffirmation as would have been constituted by a rebuke; and the House, by failing to take the matter further, suggested that it did not want to magnify an incident, the importance of which lay less in the views of a minor Minister than in the fear that these reflected an attitude current in certain high political, military, and diplomatic circles. That Mr. Churchill, by using his own prestige to shield the Colonel, had failed to allay a very real disquiet on the wider issue, became apparent in later debates. Lord Beaverbrook's activities and pronouncements, and Mr. Eden's forthright declaration in winding up the debate on British aid to Russia, seem, however, now to have produced more assurance than resulted from the Prime Minister's defence. It is a curious commentary upon the Cabinet's relation to a public which definitely suffered, as Mr. Noel Baker said, from "a generous but bitter sense of frustration," and had a "deep instinctive conviction that this is a decisive opportunity which if we miss

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it may not soon recur," that it should have been left to the most effective critic of the Government in the Russian debate to make the best exposé of what we had in fact already done to help our new ally. "For a year," he said, "we held the pass alone . . . we destroyed six thousand or eight thousand German aircraft and killed or captured the flower of their pilots." Our Balkan campaign delayed the attack on Russia by what may yet prove to have been a decisive period. "Our activities in the Far East have held back the crazy militarists of Tokio from breaking Russia's life-line to America. . . . Our campaigns in Iraq, Syria and Persia have prevented the encirclement of Turkey and of the Caucasus, and have kept open other vital routes of supply to Russia." Does this mean that where the object is not willed, propaganda is naturally poor? Mr. Baker doubted whether our General Staff had been able sufficiently to see the total identity of interest between our allies and ourselves, in not thinking of our ally's territories and of their armies and their campaigns as though they were in very truth our own. This normal failure of any General Staff had been responsible, he alleged, for the absence of that little bit more which would have made all the difference between victory and defeat in previous campaigns. He wanted more aircraft sent to Russia, a return to the old policy of bombing German oil, and the seizing of the opportunity afforded by the Russian front for our own fighter squadrons to deal with the Stuka dive bombers, the greatest single danger to the Russian defence. The urgent need for us to be willing to take more risks for Russia, as one of the legitimate hazards of war, was a point made by Mr. Lees Smith in an earlier debate on the war situation, after the Prime Minister had said that "the veriest simpleton can see how great is our interest, to put it no higher, in sustaining Russia by every possible means." There was an apparent difference of emphasis here. It is difficult to imagine Mr. Churchill using so negative a word as "sustaining" when describing a British campaign. Mr. Eden appeared to strike a slightly different note. He claimed a share for the War Cabinet in the natural impatience of the moment. "Russia's resistance," he said, "is not an important side show," and in using those words he put his finger on the heart of the critics' case. It was not help for

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Russia—a phrase which he decried—that they were in fact demanding, but the preparation of a common victory. The demand, made in question time later, for a co-ordination of the Allied Command, at least as great as that in force before the fall of France, underlined this point.

Supervision by the House of the Government's economic policy reveals one interesting consequence of Russia's resistance, of which it would not be rash to prophesy that more will be heard later. This is a fundamental criticism of the structure of industry, and it might be expected that the War Cabinet's apparent intention, seemingly with the agreement of its Labour members, to avoid any controversial interference with the established power of property by the simple process of freezing the *status quo*, is likely itself to cause controversy in the future. In a significant contribution to the debate on the war situation of September 9th, a Conservative member, Mr. Cary, expressed a surprise, which must be widespread, at the efficiency of Russia's socialist production system. "How is it that Russia, said to be a backward and undeveloped country industrially, and assumed to lack the vast engineering resources of the democracies," he asked, "is able to fight, and fight well, on a thousand-mile front, and is able to produce readily and in vast quantities the innumerable articles of war required to maintain great armies in the field, whereas we for five years of time have had so much difficulty in producing the means of war and in some instances have probably come nowhere near the totals of Russian output?" Although he applied the lesson only to the war period, the obvious corollary was of a more general character. "Let us face the blunt truth; is individual gain an acceptable standard of value when the growing need is for universal service? Our great chance to throw Germany on the defensive draws near. Nothing must be allowed to shackle or choke that greater efficiency which we all desire, and without which victory cannot be attained. In my own opinion, disinterested universal service will be required on a scale which is as yet dimly appreciated." The lesson of his remarks seems to be that if the Royal Navy, a nationalised service, had surprised the world, and if the same could be said of nationalised production services in the Soviet Union, then we ought not to be afraid to "organise, scheme

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interests, the Minister of Labour showed himself as making a valiant effort to keep the scales properly weighted in accordance with a general strategic line. Demands were made for this major strategy to be revealed, and there was some disposition to doubt whether it should not be readjusted; as Mr. Lees Smith had pointed out in the debate of September 9th, our alliance with Russia meant that we now had more manpower than Germany. The division of opinion on the respective claims of the army and industry followed no Party lines. For some, and it seemed that Mr. Bevin was among them, the claims of the army were paramount. By others it was asserted that small forces combined with a superiority of material had so far been successful in this war, and that therefore the military Moloch should be more strongly resisted. Such an issue, however, was clearly not one upon which the House could do more than offer opinions. On the detailed applications of whatever the major strategy is, many points were made in a debate, the effectiveness of which was necessarily handicapped by the difficulty of stating in any general way, in public, the issue of machines v. men. A case was made for a quicker training tempo, for reservation by job rather than by age, for better apportionment of specialists in the armed forces, and for moving towards more drastic industrial compulsion of both men and women, a course which the Government was soon to undertake. Some inquiry was also expressed on the rapidity with which the concentration of industry was proceeding.

The question whether the best use is made by the Service Departments of the money placed at their disposal by Parliament was raised in a dramatic way by the resignation of the Air Services Sub-Committee of the Select Committee on National Expenditure. It arose out of the decision, for which the Sub-Committee was not responsible, that its report, which drew attention to a matter of serious waste through what it regarded as inefficiency, should not be presented to the House, but only to the War Cabinet. The Members of the Sub-Committee evidently thought that the plea of secrecy in wartime was being used, as Mr. Ammon said, to cover up the failings and shortcomings of a particular Department. Sir Adam Maitland claimed that "here was a

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case, we believe and still believe, of bad administration, official negligence and wasteful extravagance in money, material and man-power." The Sub-Committee felt so strongly on the subject that they asked unanimously to be relieved by the House of their task. Only after some days did they agree that if a pledge of action was given they would be willing to withdraw their resignations, and this pledge was in fact given by the Prime Minister. By their forthright action these Members of this much-worked Committee gave one of the more obvious examples of the value of parliamentary supervision, even in wartime.

On the food and agricultural aspects of production, the House has shown little disposition to criticise. Satisfactory development was shown in the supply of canteens, and special rations by means of them, to the coal mines, a matter which had been urgently raised in the spring, and a need, the urgency of which had been admitted by Mr. Grenfell. The extension of school meals and an increase in the grant by 10 per cent was announced by the President of the Board of Education on October 21st. The fact that milk production had been maintained in 1941 at practically the same figure as in 1938 was announced by the Minister of Agriculture during the debate on the Address. His report, that the consumption of liquid milk had risen in the same period by over 25 per cent and that rationing was due only to a distribution more in accordance with needs, was clearly satisfactory. Criticism was voiced only at the failure to impose by more authoritative measures the consumption of wholemeal flour, a failure which avoids a possible 20 per cent reduction in the shipping space required. On the agricultural development, under the Ministry, of disused land, Mr. Hudson has also been able to satisfy the House, always highly articulate on agricultural questions, that good progress has been made with drainage and new cultivation. Labour won the victory of the £3 a week minimum wage. The Agricultural (Miscellaneous) Provisions Bill besides ending the slag subsidy, empowers the Ministry to acquire certain requisitioned land on reasonable terms of compensation, and this caused little criticism.

The position of Parliament in wartime has come under renewed consideration. With Parliament entering on its

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seventh year, this is a matter which clearly calls for serious thought, and several questions which ought to have been discussed received no attention during the debate on the Prolongation of Parliament Bill. This debate showed an undue tendency to sink into minor legal difficulties related to the operation of the Septennial Act. By it, the life of Parliament was simply extended, in effect, for one year. No one seriously disputed the case that it is undesirable to have a General Election in wartime, or that it is impracticable to hold an Election on so stale a register. But there was no response to the plea for study now of the problem of redistribution; the undertaking given last year that the electoral system will be studied after the war "when a General Election becomes practicable" was repeated. The right to reconsider the situation was preserved to the House by the decision to renew its life by twelve months only, for this entails the passing of a new Act next year. Similar considerations apply to the local Elections and Register of Electors (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Bill. This also continues for another year the postponement of local elections, but it provides that vacancies in local councils shall be filled by co-option. The attention of the House has not yet been drawn sufficiently to the dangers inherent in the present system under which there can be, in effect, appointment to a seat in the House by the rump of a constituency party organisation which, owing to the political truce, is neither virile nor representative. The headquarters check on this method is not yet effective enough, and the dangerous consequence of the appointment of pensioners or "yes-men" to carry out the extremely vital function of representing opinion and supervising Departments is growing increasingly important. Not only is the House becoming older, but, through the enlargement of the Ministry, the absence of many Members on Service and in semi-official positions, and the presence of all three groups of Party Leaders in the Government itself, the capacity of Parliament is seriously diminished.

The liberty of the Member, as of the private citizen, has been the subject of much keener debate. Many questions aimed at damaging the Home Secretary have been asked on the operation of Regulation 18B. This tendency to criticise

culminated during the debate on the Address, and was strengthened by the dissentient judgment of Lord Atkin in the House of Lords. The Government has shown itself determined to maintain the discretionary authority of the Home Secretary. Mr. Morrison was so completely convinced of the strength of his case that he said he would not be willing to continue in office without the powers originally granted to Sir John Anderson, powers which he claimed had been rendered more in keeping with constitutional principles under the second edition of the Regulation than under the first edition, which he himself had strongly attacked. Mr. Pethick-Lawrence expressed the feeling of the great majority of the House when he said that it was more desirable, since such unusual and obnoxious powers had to be exercised, that they should attach to a person responsible to Parliament than to the Courts.

The rights of Members were reasserted by the House on the issue of the granting of a permit to Mr. McGovern to visit Northern Ireland. The first statement by the Home Office, that a Member should enjoy no greater right than any other citizen to travel throughout the country which it is his task to represent, was in effect withdrawn by Mr. Morrison, who agreed that the case of the Member should be given special consideration.

The withdrawal for other duties of so many of the younger and more energetic Members may also have weakened the forces making for improvement in the personnel of the Government and of certain influential circles among its immediate servants. The Foreign Office continues to provide critics with the strongest case for changes. They still detect appeasement tendencies in our treatment of the countries on the edge of Axis-controlled Europe. Our patent unwillingness to accede to Stalin's request to declare war on Finland and Rumania, our failure when the opportunity existed to attack Rumanian oil, and our general treatment of Fascist propaganda in subject and semi-subject areas are taken to imply continuing mental reservations in the higher direction of this war for freedom and democracy. Mr. Wedgwood has extended the illustrations to include our policy towards Egypt and the Jews, and has alleged unwillingness to recruit and arm more

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and plan with an intensity worthy of our commitments," and disregarding private interests in the battle of production as we disregard them in the call to the colours, and as they are disregarded in the production system of Soviet Russia. In its treatment of the railways, transport and the mines, the Cabinet's attitude, however, is that the fundamental issue should be postponed. Even on the Trades Disputes Act, its policy seems to be the same.

The Parliamentary Secretary's reply to the debate on the new Railways Agreement made it clear that even on such a simple issue as this, where so much criticism was voiced, the Government's policy was scarcely to be distinguished from that of Mr. Chamberlain's administration. One criticism of the agreement to lease the railways for the period of the war, voiced by Mr. Pethick-Lawrence, was that under it the railways will be encouraged in extravagance, "if it is found that this will work out to the advantage of the companies in the years when they regain full control. I cannot think, therefore, that this half-way house provides either an incentive to efficient working or a means of checking extravagance." He alleged that the agreement in fact made the worst of both worlds, and that it divorced administrative control from financial liability. The waste involved in the maintaining of four railway companies as separate entities is not one that we can afford. The criticism of Labour circles was well expressed in the debate. Even assuming the desirability of renting from the shareholders such a vital national service, the critics claim that the payment is unduly favourable to the owners. Not only does it give them an income some 30 per cent higher than that which they enjoyed in 1938, but it even exceeds by £3,000,000 a year their income as assessed from the average of the years they themselves selected. It was claimed by some Conservative defenders of the agreement that since dividends had been low in pre-war years the shareholders were entitled to special consideration, but this "dole" from the community to one privileged section was not defended on that ground by the Government. There was a noticeable absence of Labour members of the Government in defence of the policy, to which presumably they had subscribed. Colonel Llewellyn's defence was able and inclusive. He refused to

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discuss nationalisation, which the Speaker supported him in ruling as out of order in a debate on the adjournment, because—although this was challenged by one Labour member who clearly had the General Powers Act of 1940 in mind—it would require legislation. A complete co-ordination of all four companies, as well as day-to-day control, was secured, the Ministry claimed, through the Railway Executive Committee. On this the General Managers serve, and Colonel Llewellyn assured the House of their willingness to carry out the Minister's requests. On the cost to the taxpayer the claim was that the revenue of the railways would have been greater than the rent paid, as it was during the last war. The great advantage of the agreement was that it removed any need to consider the remunerativeness of any particular service which bigger issues of policy might require to be withdrawn. On the co-ordination of the railways with other forms of transport, Colonel Llewellyn referred to a growth in the carriage of heavy freight on the canals, and to a control over road services, exercised under the Ministry by the Regional Traffic Commissioners through the operation of the petrol ration. It was also made clear that the Government's policy was, so far as possible, to stabilise rates, and that it thought this more feasible under a system where the revenue of one section of the community had ceased to be a consideration.

Production, one of the principal preoccupations of the House in the preceding six months, was not the subject of so much full debate during this period, but still causes keen criticism. When the Chairman of the Committee on National Expenditure asserted that only 75 per cent of the country's productive capacity was being used, he had found himself confronted by active resentment on the part of the Government, expressed by the Prime Minister. It was nevertheless towards the close of this period, and several months after the criticism, that Mr. Bevin endorsed the figure by asking for a general increase of production by 40 per cent, an increase which is almost exactly the same as that which Sir John Wardlaw-Milne had envisaged as possible.

The particular aspect of production to which the House has recently turned its attention is that of the allocation of man-power. In face of the many claims made for special

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fully Colonial, Indian and Burmese Forces. The appeasement brakes on Government policy are also clearly thought to be paralleled by Whitehall and General Staff obstruction to the desire for offensive actions. The criticism in this respect of the Tory Sir Roger Keyes reveals a striking similarity of tone to that of the Labour Mr. Noel Baker. The former endorsed "the Prime Minister's contention of the strength of the negative power which controls the war-making machine in Whitehall," and likened the present obstruction to that which Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill confronted during the last war, and which the then Prime Minister courageously swept away. Similar fears are evidently felt by many other Members about the ability or willingness of the authorities to cope with the problem of reconstruction. It is by no means only Sir Richard Acland who feels that the Government "though adequate perhaps for carrying us through the next twelve months of war is not adequate to deal with post-war tasks of reconstruction, and is not adequate for the problem of seeing us through a prolonged war."

Reconstruction is a subject destined for much further debate. Mr. Kenneth Lindsay has claimed that "in spite of what some Members, and apparently the Government think, people do want to pin their hopes on something very much better than we have had in the last twenty years." Abuse of the last war propaganda on the "land fit for heroes to live in" theme appears to have driven the Government to the opposite extreme. Reconstruction, international as well as internal, has to be prepared now. As Mr. Lindsay said, "I do not believe that there will be some period at which we pull down the curtains and say 'We are now in the post-war world. Let's introduce a number of reforms' . . . I hold that the only time to approach the post-war world is now. My criticism, if I have a criticism, so far as I can detect it, of the Government attitude is that they are not prepared to cash in on certain things that are happening now because they think they are controversial." The principal Labour leadership appears to be becoming identified in the War Cabinet with at least some aspects of post-war policy, but without any, as yet, sufficiently clear indication of a wider acceptance of the principle that such post-war world problems cannot be postponed until the war

is over, and can even be used to promote the successful prosecution of the war itself. The "ferment and frustration," to which several Members have referred in one form or another, can only be coped with by meeting the demand for a more progressive spirit and by making it clear, as policy does not yet make it clear, that appeasement and obstruction neither permeate nor even penetrate the administration. On at least two associated matters which have occupied parliamentary attention in the past, there seem to have been developments of some importance that Parliament has dealt with in this period. The Atlantic Charter has diminished the demand for the statement of war aims. Both it and Mr. Attlee's participation in the International Labour Conference have emphasised our alignment ideologically with the United States. The Foreign Office's tardy but eventual resumption of relations with Mexico is also evidence of movement in this direction. Criticism of the Charter, as going too far, has only come from a very minor reactionary element, one representative of which even described it as a step towards the larger lunacy. A second sign of movement, also not unrelated to earlier and strong demands by the House, is the formation of the Political Warfare Executive, a ministerial body consisting of the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Information and the Minister of Economic Warfare. But the secrecy which surrounds the Executive Committee under this general direction has caused some criticism. At least, however, it does express something of the co-ordination, accompanied by power, which has been so strongly urged. Its creation directly after the Government's unsuccessful day in the propaganda debate suggests another example of the value of parliamentary supervision, a value particularly important in any aspect of policy to which the Government tends to attach too little importance.

Another side of the Government's work which arouses fears that it is not imbued with a progressive enough imagination is its treatment of India and Burma, as well as the Colonies. The India and Burma (Postponement of Election) Bill provided the principal opportunity for the expression of criticism in this connection. It was rather ironical, in view of the critics' claim that we were failing to make use of the vast war-potential which lies under the control of Mr. Amery,

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that one of the chief reasons given for the postponement of elections was the need to avoid interfering with the war effort. Both communal dissension and local opposition to the Government were nevertheless, in fact, the governing reason for the passage of this Bill.

Apart from the legislation already mentioned, there has been little of major importance. An Act to provide an insurance fund to cover defalcation by solicitors was a minor non-controversial measure. And another was the Marriage (Members of H.M. Forces) Bill, which removes certain restrictive residential qualifications on the celebration of marriages. Service pay and dependents' allowances have been the subject of frequent questions as well as of a debate on the adjournment.

PALESTINE AND COLONIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By RITA HINDEN

THE problem of developing the backward lands of the empire—our “neglected estates,” as the Colonial Secretary has called them—is stimulating much serious thought and discussion at the present time. Yet, in all this discussion, the experience of the one “colonial” territory which has, in fact, achieved a striking economic success in the nineteen-twenties and thirties, is invariably overlooked. I refer to Palestine.

The economic development of Palestine has been one of the few triumphs of the Versailles world; in many respects the rate of progress has been unequalled; in all respects the approach has been bold and original. Unfortunately, economic prowess has been overshadowed by political conflict, and the world had come to think of Palestine in the years before the war as a battleground of warring nationalisms, a hotbed of murder, rioting and rebellion. And not only has this conflict submerged the profound economic lessons to be learnt from Palestine, so that they have passed almost unnoticed by the outside world; it has also prevented the development within Palestine from reaching full fruition. It has acted as a severe brake on progress, and each step forward has involved a painful and disproportionate effort.

But, if there is a lesson the opening-up of Palestine can teach to other colonies, that lesson must be taught, and the political issues ignored in the teaching. Jewish colonisation in Palestine has achieved its economic success, precisely because it has possessed the two elements which are essential for all colonial development—a free capital supply, and a planned economic policy based on the expansion and supply of the home market. Capital in Palestine has been available on such exceptionally favourable terms, that in spite of the enormous outlay on migration, land purchase and settlement, the country has been able to build up a capital equipment and a system of excellent public services in an incredibly

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short period. At the same time, the main outlines of development have gone according to a rational and coherent plan, which, while not excluding exports, centred in production for home needs. All the resources of science, individual initiative and social organisation were brought to bear for the realisation of this plan. The plan underwent changes with the passage of time. Many ideas had to be modified when the original public control of the colonisation movement was challenged by the successful entry of private enterprise. But beneath these changes, a coherent plan always remained; and there was always an active and energetic organisation to carry it through.

Before describing how Palestine was opened up by the combination of these two factors, one important point must be established. The Jewish settlement in Palestine was *not* based on cheap indigenous labour. It is notorious that the Jewish settlers were unwilling to employ Arab workers; this has, in fact, been one of the causes of political conflict. But from the economic point of view Palestine's lesson cannot be vitiated by a claim that progress was secured by exploiting colonial labour. On the contrary, Palestine's modern economic structure has been built by highly-paid Jewish trade union labour—unquestionably the most expensive labour in the Near and Middle East.

The supply of capital, which financed the basic public services of Jewish Palestine, was given free of all charge. It was subscribed, often in pennies, by donations of sympathisers in all countries; and the public funds thus raised in the years from 1917 to 1939 amounted to close on £20,000,000.¹ With these twenty millions the foundations of the Palestine settlement were laid. The fundamental work of draining and preparing the land for settlement, of building roads, of establishing the first pioneer villages, of building schools and hospitals, was performed by the public funds without, as a rule, demanding any financial return worth speaking of, and without being compelled to show a profit to eager investors at the end of each financial year. The broad heads under which the money has been spent (from 1917 to 1939) are as follows:—¹

¹ Bulletin of the Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. No. 1, 1940. Published in Jerusalem.

	£
Purchase of land and agricultural settlement	7,700,000
Health services and social welfare	2,600,000
Urban settlement, trade and industry	1,600,000
Immigration and training	1,200,000
Education	3,800,000
Public works, labour and housing	1,100,000
National organisation, security and emergency aid.. ..	1,200,000

The effect of these "non-commercial" investments on the economic development of Palestine has been enormous. It is, indeed, impossible to imagine that the development could ever have taken place without the backing of these funds. The schools and hospitals which have maintained the unusually high standard of health and education among the settlers; the sophisticated agricultural technique employed; the water supplies, the transport facilities, not to mention the marketing and credit organisations—none of these could have been provided by private effort, nor could they have afforded to pay high interest rates. And these fundamental public investments paved the way for the bulk of private investment which followed in their wake, and which depended on their achievements for its own capacity to earn profit.

Although the greater part of the trade and industry and almost the whole of the valuable citrus export have been developed by private capital, the existence of large public funds in the hands of a central authority has had a remarkable regulative influence on the country's economic system. The Jewish Agency, in whose hands the funds are concentrated, has pervaded the whole of Palestine's economy. The largest Jewish Bank is its offshoot, and this bank holds the key to the financial structure of the country. Through its investments it has a voice, often a dominating voice, in every branch of activity. There is, in fact, no section of the country's economic life which does not in some measure come under the influence of the public funds.¹ The Jewish Agency represents nothing more closely than a progressive, interventionist Government. It subsidises enterprises of key significance; it grants cheap industrial and agricultural

¹ These remarks all refer to the Jewish economy only. The Arab economic structure if of course affected, but indirectly.

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credits; it runs special departments to deal with special needs—health, education, social welfare, roads, housing, maritime matters; it creates special companies to carry out specific functions—such as public works—which are not performed by private capital. And the effect of all these activities has been strengthened by a close co-operation between the Workers' Federation (in which almost the whole of the labour force is organised) and the public funds. The Workers' Federation has built up a network of co-operative enterprise, covering nearly every branch of agriculture, industry, marketing and transport. This co-operative movement has drawn strength from the public funds, and collaborated with them in many of their activities.

The influence of these £20,000,000 of free, public money, has therefore extended very much further than the size of the sum could possibly suggest. On the basis which it has laid down, a further £80–100 millions of private capital was invested in Palestine in the same twenty-two years. Measuring on the usual colonial standards, this is an enormous sum—in the whole of British colonial Africa from 1870 to 1936 less than £200,000,000 of private capital were invested.¹ But it is highly probable that in any colony other than Palestine, the same results could be achieved with half the money. So many millions have had to be spent on the private purchase of land, so many millions on housing, wages have been three to four times higher among the Jewish labourers of Palestine than among most colonial peoples, so that the cost of all investment has been increased. And vast sums of money have been lost in the artificial booms which followed on sudden spurts of immigration. With all these factors eliminated, other colonies could achieve similar results with a very much smaller outlay.

The one great advantage enjoyed by Palestine's private investment was that most of it was brought from abroad by its owners who settled in the country and retained the full profits from their enterprise in the country with them. Investment of the type on which Africa's mines have been dependent, involving the export of profits abroad, has been very small indeed. In other colonies, on the other hand,

¹ "Capital Investment in Africa." By S. H. Frankel. Table 28. Oxford, 1938.

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investment carried out by settlers, as was common in Palestine, has been very limited. Professor Frankel estimates such investment at only about £30,000,000 for the whole of British Colonial Africa in the 66 years from 1870 to 1936.¹

The planning of Jewish Palestine's economic structure has followed strictly logical lines. It was decided in the first place that the new settlement was to be based on agriculture. But with the small areas of land available, large-scale cereal farming for export was obviously impossible. There was also little to be expected from the small home market, as the settlers could not compete with the cheap Arab produce. Jewish agriculture faced the fact that it had no alternative but to concentrate on self-sufficiency. To this object the settler, in the early 1920's, when colonisation was just beginning, applied himself with vigour. His aim was avowedly to cut himself off from the market, both as a buyer and as a seller, and no sacrifice was too great to achieve this purpose. But to attain such a state of self-sufficiency, and at the same time to maintain the standard of living to which the immigrant was accustomed in Europe, was no easy matter in the hostile physical environment of Palestine. It involved the most far-reaching measures—the introduction of technical methods previously unknown in the country, and even the creation of new social forms. By rallying all the material and moral force within his grasp, both of these measures were achieved. The settlements took on a communal or co-operative form, whereby 40–100 family units would unite in cultivating a stretch of soil on a most meticulously worked-out plan for the division of labour. At the same time, the problem of increasing the yield of the soil and evolving a suitable form of mixed farming was scientifically tackled. Tractors and combines were introduced, to increase the yield per man, and new agricultural methods to increase the yield per acre. Within a short time the yields of wheat and barley had been more than doubled: the breed of cattle and poultry was improved. By 1927 the cows in the Jewish settlements were yielding 2,000 litres of milk a year as against 500–700 litres yielded by the indigenous cows. Newly-introduced White Leghorn hens, aided by incubators and

¹ "Capital Investment in Africa." Ibid.

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mills, and artificial teeth factory—which have taken root in Palestine and even built up a valuable export trade for no special reason except the initiative of their founders.

It must not be imagined from this description that economic development in Palestine has followed a smooth and effortless upward path. The natural poverty of the soil and resources of the country; the hostility of the political forces arrayed against Jewish settlement; the need to purchase every strip of ground and to develop the practice of "self-help" into a fine art—all these have cost the settlers dear. The figures of industrial progress do not reveal the capital lost by individuals, or tell of the minute profits of small workshops; the statistics of increasing agricultural output may mask hard and unremitting toil for very low rewards. The development of Palestine has been achieved only through blood and sweat. The last thing that the country has ever been able to offer—except for the early days of the citrus boom—has been a promise of easy profits.

Yet, comparing the opening-up of Palestine with the stagnation of most British colonies, the success of the Palestine experiment taken as a whole is undeniable. In twenty years Jewish Palestine has settled more than a quarter of a million immigrants; has provided itself with universal education, with completely adequate hospitals and medical services; with a correspondingly high standard of health; with a network of roads out of all comparison better than any in tropical Africa; with a standard of housing almost as good as any in Western Europe; with good water and irrigation facilities; with a good power supply; and even with a port of its own at Tel-Aviv. On this foundation of public utilities, an efficient agricultural and industrial structure has been built, and whatever may be said of the prospects of profit and inherent stability of this structure—it nevertheless is able to pay its workmen a standard Trade Union wage of about 4s. per day.

Palestine is a special case. The capital, the initiative, and the special idealism which the Jews could command for a special cause, cannot be imitated in any other colony. And the Jews have a skill and an education which most colonial people do not possess, and can only acquire in the course of

years. But the lessons are there for the learning. A supply of free capital is essential for building up the basic social services, and the economic life of a colony must be planned on a broad and imaginative basis. In Palestine, £20,000,000 of free capital were invested in public services in 20 years, and the economic life has been so planned and broadened as to contain an intensive mixed-farming section providing the local community with food of a very high quality; an industrial section producing many of the daily household necessities and even a certain volume of industrial exports; and, in addition, a citrus export trade of many millions per year. And, to allay the fears of those who see in internal development a menace to imports from European countries, let it be stressed and stressed again that Palestine has one of the highest levels of import per head of the population in the world. Proportionately, its import trade is not much less than that of the United Kingdom itself.

The economic prowess of Palestine stands, therefore, as a model of what may be achieved by a planned programme of development. It is, in fact, a poor model—no other colony would be so hampered by political hostility and by such a combination of physical and economic handicaps. Also, with all its planning, it has nevertheless been largely dependent on private capital with the inevitable waste and inequity; and it has had to operate within the limiting framework of the disturbed and disrupting world of the nineteen-twenties and thirties. But with all these overwhelming obstacles, the angle of approach was the right one. With this approach, more has been accomplished in this one country in twenty years than in any other colony during the whole period of British colonial trusteeship. The same approach, applied in the more favourable political atmosphere of an African or West Indian colony, is capable of opening up prospects as yet unimagined.

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Palestine is a special case. The capital, the initiative, and the special idealism which the Jews could command for a special cause, cannot be imitated in any other colony. And the Jews have a skill and an education which most colonial people do not possess, and can only acquire in the course of

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years. But the lessons are there for the learning. A supply of free capital is essential for building up the basic social services, and the economic life of a colony must be planned on a broad and imaginative basis. In Palestine, £20,000,000 of free capital were invested in public services in 20 years, and the economic life has been so planned and broadened as to contain an intensive mixed-farming section providing the local community with food of a very high quality; an industrial section producing many of the daily household necessities and even a certain volume of industrial exports; and, in addition, a citrus export trade of many millions per year. And, to allay the fears of those who see in internal development a menace to imports from European countries, let it be stressed and stressed again that Palestine has one of the highest levels of import per head of the population in the world. Proportionately, its import trade is not much less than that of the United Kingdom itself.

The economic prowess of Palestine stands, therefore, as a model of what may be achieved by a planned programme of development. It is, in fact, a poor model—no other colony would be so hampered by political hostility and by such a combination of physical and economic handicaps. Also, with all its planning, it has nevertheless been largely dependent on private capital with the inevitable waste and inequity; and it has had to operate within the limiting framework of the disturbed and disrupting world of the nineteen-twenties and thirties. But with all these overwhelming obstacles, the angle of approach was the right one. With this approach, more has been accomplished in this one country in twenty years than in any other colony during the whole period of British colonial trusteeship. The same approach, applied in the more favourable political atmosphere of an African or West Indian colony, is capable of opening up prospects as yet unimagined.

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other modern apparatus, were laying 150 eggs a year as against 40-50 eggs laid by the local hens. In all these achievements, the public funds played an important part through financial help, research and general encouragement and supervision.

In the 1930's the ideal of the farmer's self-sufficiency was eclipsed by the sudden immense swelling of the urban population of Palestine through increased immigration, which meant a rapid and unexpected expansion of the market for foodstuffs. The Jewish farmer adapted himself to the situation and set out to convert himself into a market gardener, operating on a minimum of land. Vegetables, milk and egg production rose by leaps and bounds; yields per cow and per hen continued to increase, and the quality of both milk and eggs was so high as to oust the competition of the products of cheaper Arab farming. Within a few years the Jewish farmer, on an absolute minimum of land, was successfully supplying a great part of the food of a town population which had more than doubled in five or six hectic years.

A second revolution in agriculture took place in the 1930's with the new prosperity in the citrus trade. This was Palestine's one possibility of a large and profitable export, and as the world demand for oranges and grape-fruit rose, the Jewish settlers planted grove after grove. In 1926, Palestine exported under 3,000,000 cases of citrus fruits; ten years later the export (Jewish and Arab) had grown to 11,000,000 cases. And the Jewish plantations were models of up-to-date technique and efficiency. Some groves were co-operatively owned, many of them were worked with co-operative labour, and almost all the crop was marketed through co-operative marketing associations.

The original plan of the colonising authorities was that the Jewish Settlement in Palestine should be an agricultural settlement, and far less attention has been paid to the rational planning of industry and the improvement of industrial technique than has been paid to agriculture. The absence of a power supply, of raw materials, of a home market, made industrial progress appear an impossible Utopia in the earlier days. Nevertheless, a few enterprising settlers, pinning their hopes either on a possible export trade to neighbouring Syria

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and Egypt, or else on supplying some of the bulkier building materials needed at home and processing the few local raw materials (such as oil and tobacco), commenced manufacture on a small scale. But in the 1930's, with the growth of the population and the home market, these small experiments blossomed out into an imposing industrial structure. As soon as the possibilities of the home market became clear, all resources were mobilised to meet its demand from home produce. Electric power was supplied, partly through harnessing the river Jordan and partly through the erection of power stations with oil as their basic fuel; the capital of the settlers was invested, credit facilities were developed with the aid of the public funds; producers' co-operatives sprang up; the skill of the worker immigrants was utilised to the full. By 1937, £12,000,000 had been invested in Jewish industry in Palestine (mostly private capital), the value of the annual output was over £9,000,000—the personnel employed numbered more than 30,000. To achieve this result, every possible raw material, every trading opportunity, every ounce of initiative, were utilised. Export possibilities overseas were very limited, with world trade shrinking; and the high costs of production in Palestine hampered exports to neighbouring countries. The whole effective home market numbered barely 400,000 souls, and yet this remarkable industrial result was possible.

The industries that developed successfully may be divided into two categories. The first group consists of small workshops, catering for the home market only, and allowing a minimal profit to the entrepreneur—the clothing and textile industries (with more emphasis on knitted than on woven textiles), foodstuffs, furniture, leather and stationery are the main types of commodity produced. The second group covers the large-scale enterprises which are based on certain local advantages—the existence of raw materials, or a monopoly of the home market. In this group fall the exporting chemical industries, potash and bromine from the Dead Sea, oil and soap; and such industries as the manufacture of building materials, flour-milling, and the supply of electricity, which are assured of a certain home market. There is also a third category of industries—such as the spinning

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SOVIET COMMUNISM: a new civilisation. By SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB.
Second edition. (Longmans Green. Iviii and 1257 pp. 2 vols. 21s.)
SOVIET RUSSIA: anatomy of a social history. By E. STRAUSS. (342 pp.
Bodley Head. 12s. 6d.)

THE stock of the second edition of *Soviet Communism*—without the note of interrogation which followed the title in the first edition—was destroyed by enemy action in December, 1940. The present issue consists of the surplus stock of a special edition (not issued to the public) which was published in 1937, to which has been added a new introduction by Beatrice Webb. Mrs. Webb's new introduction is a summary of the main conclusions of this monumental work: in the form of answers to a series of questions which have been put to her since the signing of the German-Soviet Pact in August, 1939. Stalin is not a Dictator: the U.S.S.R. is a political democracy based upon a racial equality more complete than that existing in any other political aggregation in the world: its one-party system is a necessary instrument of democratic education, and the Party and Non-Party alliance which is a feature of the political representation of Soviet citizens is a guarantee of self-expression and free speech for those who are not members of the one and only party: there is a virtual referendum on important questions prior to the enactment of legislation upon them: the democracy is multiform and provides for the representation of man and woman in the threefold capacity of citizen, producer, and consumer: the democratic control of the instruments of production and distribution and exchange has been completed by the principle of the collectivisation of agriculture embodied in associations of self-governing worker-producers, whose economy nevertheless retains a judiciously adjusted element of individual incentive: a comprehensive declaration of the rights and obligations of man and woman includes the right to remunerative work, the right to provision for motherhood, the right to education, and the right to full economic provision in all the vicissitudes of life.

The infantile diseases of Communism are recognised. There is the savage treatment of opponents which is a survival from every great political storm: there is the childish idolisation of the leader which Mrs. Webb believes to be already fading out: and there is the intolerance of dissentient opinion, which perhaps has a religious origin. The sure scent, the unswerving direction, the powerful grasp of this veteran huntress of the truth are still manifest in this latest work.

In this particular chase, there are awkward jumps to be negotiated here and there, but those who have questioned the diagnosis of the Soviet system given by the two great partners in social research have had

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evidence in the last few months of one incontrovertible fact. After a generation of earth-shaking change, tremendous suffering, and bewildering reversal of traditional habit, the peoples of the Soviet Union remain willing to give their lives for the régime. Greater love hath no man than this.

Herr Strauss, who had been in close contact with the Labour movement in Austria before the annexation by Germany, was bitterly disappointed by the course of events in the Soviet Union, and finally disillusioned by the Russo-German pact of August, 1939, which to him meant "an invaluable service rendered, during a highly critical period, to aggressive Fascism, the mortal enemy . . . of the ideals for which the Soviet Union professes to stand." He belongs to the indomitable idealists, who decline to put themselves in the position of the statesman called upon to play a game in which the lives of nations are at stake. Those twenty-two months of intensive preparation meant much: and, whatever the ultimate issue of the struggle may be, Stalin and his peoples have made a heroic fight.

The general thesis of *Soviet Russia* is that the claim to have attained the stage of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is not established by the facts. Socialism means: From each according to his capacity, to each according to his work. Actually, argues Herr Strauss, wages, in the recent period, are "position-earnings" not "achievement-wages" (page 287). Not only are there, as we were all aware, considerable differences in the scale of earnings, with the principle of piece-work firmly established, and premiums for work in excess of the normal standards, but the Stakhanovist worker receives "most or all of the premiums won by his group for surpassing the norm." The italics are mine, and a vagueness in the language employed will be noted. If the meaning be that the leader of this group gets more than his equal share of the total wage earned by its members for the joint achievement of all, the information is new to me. That there is a demand for luxury goods, and that there exists, in this sense, an aristocracy of labour, is obvious to everyone who looks in the shop windows and examines the advertisements in the public press and elsewhere, and the costumes in the theatres and places of public resort.

Along with his denial of the attainment of socialism, Herr Strauss makes many admissions of actual achievement which show that he is not without sympathy for the Soviet régime. That régime has achieved some very remarkable things. One of them, as Herr Strauss tells us, is the creation of a strong machine-building industry: and it has been done without incurring foreign debt and without allowing the growth of great private fortunes of the western type. The course of the present campaign leaves no doubt of the fact that such an industry has been created. The practical administrator, who has an inkling of the gigantic

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effort involved in such a success, will hardly quarrel with the Soviet Government because it has employed incentives such as socialist theory cannot wholly approve. Probably all of us would feel happier if the claims of propagandists were put less extravagantly high: but that is not a good reason for boggling over the due meed of praise for that which has actually been done: and it is something which is very great indeed.

JOHN MAYNARD.

EUROPE AND THE GERMAN QUESTION. By F. W. FOERSTER. (Allen & Unwin. 16s.)

MAKE AND BREAK WITH THE NAZIS. By HERMANN RAUSCHNING. (Secker & Warburg. 8s. 6d.)

ON two points F. W. Foerster and H. Rauschning are of one mind, namely in their passionate renunciation of "The Rebellion of Antichrist" (Foerster) or "The Revolution of Nihilism" (Rauschning), just as they agree that "we are in the midst of the liquidation of the doctrines of Nationalism, Socialism, Rationalism and Liberalism" (Rauschning). Moreover both are adherents and front-line fighters (or are they, without knowing it, in the rearward?) of a conservatism nourished from cultural and religious sources. Foerster would like to see a revival of the political conception of "The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" as a solution of Europe's problems, particularly those of Central and South-East Europe. Rauschning still believes in a solution of the same problems under Prusso-German leadership. There is between them, as it were, a resumption of the Thirty Years War: Catholic League versus Protestant forces. Both writers are militant and indeed bellicose; but Foerster's pugnacity is anointed with the oil of Catholic Christianity, while Rauschning's is seasoned with Attic salt supplied by Hoelderlin. Behind these two books stand the figures of St. Augustine and Martin Luther and they resume their conflict, in accordance with ancient European tradition.

Both authors march under flags with retrograde devices and symbols. Reality will, as I think and hope, leave them both far behind.

According to newspaper reports, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster died a short while ago in Switzerland. A few words in memoriam may not be out of place. He was, by calling and inclination, a professor of pedagogy, the herald of a sound system of education, and was capable of speaking with prophetic power and passion of the problems arising from his work. Bismarck's Germany had already forced him into the ranks of the opposition and had even thrown him into prison as a young scholar. Himself a Prussian by birth, the son of a Berlin scholar and official, he

nevertheless saw in the form and spirit of Bismarck's creation the curse of Europe. It was thus almost as much for political as for religious reasons that he became a Catholic and—*lucius a non lucendo*—a Prussian pacifist.

Both his pacifism and his Catholic faith may be described as "Prussian," because they expressed themselves in the most war-like form imaginable. Nor was Foerster the man to stay comfortably in his study or to be content with theories alone. No, he travelled about, visiting the leading politicians and statesmen of the three Great Powers of Europe, the potential war-and-peace-makers, and, face to face with them, he waged his holy war. It was a war against the Prussian spirit of bombs and cannons, against the spirit of disloyalty to the Church (which Foerster identified with Christianity itself), and finally against a too academic form of pacifism, which refused to face up to its opponent, Germany, according to Foerster's most profound conviction, the sworn enemy of peace. Such a man as Foerster did not lack enemies and persecutors. He was the very first refugee from the new post-war Germany and his life in exile was full of inner restlessness and excitement. This German Pestalozzi had become the Jeremiah of Europe.

His last book is filled to the brim with the consciousness of his mission. To read it is to be oneself stirred and excited. This is particularly true of the German edition (since altered and enlarged), which was published in Switzerland several years ago and was written in a crystal-clear and often intensely moving style. The English edition has preserved most, if not all, of the merits of the original. When I was privileged to read the proofs of the book in Switzerland, I felt it to be the most important work yet written by an émigré of our time. It still holds that rank, whether one is or is not in agreement with its analogies and conclusions. It puts the case against Prusso-Germany and in so doing assembles an immense amount of clearly seen and lucidly formulated material, including a closely reasoned account of the political development from Bismarck to Hitler. The wrath of the disappointed German and Catholic is sublimated in a historical narrative marked by superb width of vision and a fine strategic sense in the intellectual sphere. Chapters such as "How did Prussia conquer the German soul?" or "Germany during the first World War" are masterpieces of political description. A man who has battled his way through to Europeanism accuses his own country and people of continued and systematic disturbances of the peace and, at the same time, accuses their opponents, especially England, of unpardonable weakness and short-sightedness in their handling of the disturbers. Foerster was branded and outlawed in Germany long before Hitler's time. He has always been a voice crying in the wilderness. But the European wilderness was much wilder than Foerster's opponents on both sides of the German frontier believed

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it to be. Now alas! we are eye-witnesses of the truth he preached. For it was precisely this war that, since 1919, Foerster had fought almost single-handed to avoid, a heroic and lonely fight that separated him from most of his compatriots and co-religionists. We should not forget to be grateful to him for this.

His proposals for the re-ordering of Europe show Foerster himself to be strangely forgetful. On one point he is certainly right, namely that in the centre of this little overpopulated continent, this "peninsula of Asia," no centralised passionately expansionist military power can be tolerated and that its place should be taken by a loosely built federation of states. But when he then proceeds to set up the medieval German Empire, as the ideal of a Christian kingdom holding supra-national sway over South-East Europe as far as Asia like a veritable "civitas dei," then he is losing himself in the clouds of history. For that old Empire, with its dualism of the papal and imperial rule, was by no means a blessing for Europe or for Germany. As a temporal power it ended with the Thirty Years War and as a conception with the Prussian ascendancy. Europe will not take this tremendous step backwards. It would be theology rather than politics, eschatology rather than development.

Like the Jews, says Foerster, the Germans have a mission. That is the only sentence in the whole closely packed book that is unworthy of Foerster. For it contains a megalomaniac error. The truth is that *every* nation has a mission, so that neither the Jews nor the Germans have the right to consider themselves as "chosen" in a political sense. Foerster's vision is here blocked by a projecting wall; in other words, by a prejudice, originating not in Christian-democratic but in ecclesiastical-imperialist thinking. When one reads his last chapter, which in the German version was placed first, he seems still further removed from our time and its potentialities. For he builds an arch from the Apocalypse of St. John to Hitler. This arch is too high. Its supporting pillars do not rest on solid earth or in the present. Foerster's Europe is here Utopia.

In the chapters on Hitler and National Socialism Foerster makes liberal use of quotations from the earlier books of Hermann Rauschning. And justifiably, for Rauschning, more than any other author, has thrown light on Hitler's personality and its psychological background. From this point of view his flight from the German National Party into the National Socialist Party was not without value.

In his latest book he attempts to explain this flight in political terms. He fled, so he asserts, from the hopeless old German party politics into that rising young party, which he and his political associates (the "Young Conservatives" of that time) believed to be bound up with the renewal of Germany. That he failed to see that it was a plunge into the abyss and towards the destruction of the German state organisation and the peace

of the world indicates a lack of intuition and logic typical of political thinking and acting in the old nationalistic Germany.

Even now Rauschning would like to throw something of a halo round his old party, the Prussian landowners, who were equally enemies of democracy and friends of re-armament. When he tries to justify their opposition to the Weimar Republic he has much to say about the "deficiencies and failures" of democracy, without once touching upon the real reason for that opposition. It was simply that the Weimar Republic was the first serious attempt to end the predominance of the Prussian landowners and Junkers in Germany and Prussia. Unluckily that attempt failed, but Rauschning's party comrades, whether old or young Conservatives, conquered democracy not for themselves but for Hitler. They, and Rauschning with them, share the responsibility for Hitler's rise to power. "The elderly statesmen" in all parties and all nations of Europe, whom he reproaches so bitterly (and rightly!), were nevertheless several shades better than the National Socialist or Fascist "Youth," whose dawn had been red enough with blood and fire—even if Rauschning had not recognised this, or had not been willing to do so, from their programmes and actions since the early nineteen-twenties.

In particular the German "Young Conservatives"—a group of semi-reactionary individualists rather than a genuine political movement—did more to prepare the way for Hitler than Rauschning is willing to admit even to-day. Their "John the Baptist," Moeller van den Bruck, who, in a fit of political despair committed suicide early in life, was admittedly a dignified and original personality. Later on one or two other good men raised their voices from the same camp. But even the most gifted writer among them, Ernst Juenger, of whom Rauschning boasts that he could pursue a thought to its uttermost consequences, was politically muddle-headed. He compounded a theory of disintegration: "Destroy all that all may be re-built," which was taken over by Hitler. He was, together with a few other political writers grouped round the journal "Die Tat" (Action), possessed by the idea of a counter-revolutionary revolution.

It is this conception, purged of its wilder elements, that haunts Rauschning's book. I must confess that I see nothing in it but reaction in a humanitarian guise and a flight from democracy into a mediævally costumed corporative state. Rauschning's attempt to suggest a centralistic state, with strongly developed self-governing corporations, is almost completely unconvincing. Such a state, like Foerster's empire, is a fantasy.

Rauschning is a Prussian, proclaims himself as such and defends the Prussian spirit. He is fighting in a lost cause. This emerges most clearly in his view that the army will be an instrument of regeneration and restoration after Hitler's fall.

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higher standard than any which previously existed, not merely in England, but elsewhere in Europe and probably in the world. Yet at the same time the reader is made to feel the tragedy of spoiling such an achievement by the failure to associate housing with an effective system of town and country planning.

The authors turn next to the question of housing for the family, on which much of their subsequent argument depends. This part of the discussion, it must be said, is not as comprehensive as one would have liked. Too much is assumed concerning "the average man, his wife, and his children." Too little is observed about the varying needs of the family at different ages and stages of its growth. And nothing at all is said of the important and legitimate claims of the unmarried, the married but childless, the aged, the widows with families, the married women with children who prefer employment outside the home to the business of child-rearing. It is necessary to emphasise the needs of these considerable minorities, because Mr. and Mrs. McAllister tend to overlook them altogether in their enthusiastic advocacy of the separate house and garden for "the average man, his wife, and his children."

It is not until this stage of the book is reached that the authors turn their attention to the specific question of town and country planning. Thus, 131 pages out of a total of 169 are occupied with what may without disparagement be termed preliminary, historical and background material, and only about 40 with town and country planning proper. The preliminary matter is not at all irrelevant; but this is one of the few books of which it can be said that it could with advantage have been longer. Perhaps we may ask for a sequel.

As it is, the McAllisters have room to develop adequately only one main theme: namely, the decentralisation of population and industry through the promotion of garden cities and satellite towns. A very good theme it is, too. It is, indeed, one of the most important ideas in the whole realm of social reform; and one, moreover, which is especially suited to the needs of "the average man, his wife, and his children," to whom much more consideration must be accorded if we are to arrest the declining population trend. But when all is said and done it is only one leading principle out of several which compose the corpus of modern planning science. The others do not get sufficient attention in a book which one expects to cover the whole range of the subject.

In particular, one would like to see Mr. and Mrs. McAllister describe the main steps which require to be taken in order to make our great cities (which after all are likely to be with us for an indefinite time to come, even though we may reduce their size somewhat through decentralising the population) more beautiful, more convenient, well planned and generally more civilised in a physical sense. One would

like to see them face frankly the fact that the great city does offer certain unique advantages to its inhabitants despite its indisputable drawbacks. One would like to see a somewhat less heavily weighted statement of the case against the flat. It is undoubtedly true that "it is the unanimous view of nearly all housing reformers and town planners that the individual family house with its own garden is greatly to be preferred to the flat dwelling, and that such a dwelling is indispensable to a full family life." And yet an ever-increasing number of middle and upper class people, who have the means to live in houses if they wish, nevertheless deliberately choose to reside in flats. Why is this?

The answer would have to be given in sociological terms: that is, in terms of the changes in ways of living which result in a change in the kind of home which is desired. Though, of course, to analyse such a change would not be to justify it.

Incidentally, the flat as it exists in England is an extremely poor example of the tenement dwelling. It lacks the advantages of the house and offers few of the possible attractions of the communal building which one finds in Sweden or U.S.A. In Stockholm, for instance, the blocks of working-class flats have well-equipped crèches and kindergartens attached to them in which tenants can leave their children in charge of a trained child welfare worker all day for play, rest and meals. The mother can thus continue her outside employment if she wishes. Architecturally, also, the flat building in this country is on a very degraded level compared with the domestic house.

Again, it is not the whole truth to say that "only for sheer economic reasons do people live in the very heart of great towns. They live there not by choice but from necessity and, whenever their income reaches the limit which makes it possible to do so, they supplement their urban dwelling by a country cottage." What about the inhabitants of Mayfair and Bloomsbury, the Quartier Saint Germain and Park Avenue, New York? They would smile at such a remark. They live where they do because they like it.

One makes these comments not out of any spirit of carping criticism, not because one disagrees with Mr. and Mrs. McAllister's fundamental conclusions, not because one seeks to prove that they are wrong in advocating decentralisation of population, houses with gardens for family groups, garden cities and self-supporting satellite towns—for on all these they are essentially right—but in order to insist on the need for catholicity of outlook on the part of those who can give leadership and direction to the planning movement. It will be fatal if the public should come to think, rightly or wrongly, that town and country planning means that everyone must live in a small detached house with a garden in a small town. We must remind ourselves all the time that the world is made up of many different kinds of human beings; that

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Who and what is the army? The Prussian general staff, an officer caste nine-tenths loyal to Hitler and a rank and file which has gone through the mill of Hitler's education for more than ten years and is likewise nine-tenths pro-Hitler. (The same Ernst Juenger already mentioned, in his book "Der Arbeiter," extolls the soldier as the German worker par excellence). The German army, which moreover, through this war of conquest, occupation and suppression, is corrupted and compromised from general to private, cannot suddenly after the war become the protector of law and order. This is a (Prussian) dream and a very dangerous one.

Rauschning's book consists partly of autobiography (and apologetics), partly of political prophecy and review, and partly of accusations directed against the past. The autobiographical element is interesting, often holding one's attention like a work of fiction. The personality of the author emerges as something unusually attractive. The political element remains in semi-darkness, which the play with Christian-reformative thoughts does little to illuminate. The accusations are levelled against the masses, the intellectuals, and the middle classes. Regrettably enough they are not extended to the highest sections of German, and particularly Prussian, society, to which the author himself belongs. That betrays an altogether tragic lack of self-knowledge. More than once the Rauschning of this book recalls a tragi-comic figure of German literature: "Peter Schlemihl, the man without a shadow." Has not Rauschning left his shadow in Germany? And is he not searching for it in his exile? Incidentally he says some of the best things on this subject in the chapter entitled "The Alien Corn."

This and other chapters would be even more valuable if Rauschning had wrestled through to an admission of the part played by reactionary "big business" and the big landowners in the preparations for the Nazi domination. Or is he really ignorant of the affair known in Germany as the "Osthilfe-Skandal," when the Prussian landowners "relieved" the state illegally of many millions of marks? When a parliamentary commission was set up to investigate this scandal, the patriotic Junkers sent forth their obedient servant Herr von Papen, and his mission ended with Hitler's nomination to the chancellorship of the Reich. Under the latter's "socialistic" régime the whole of this scandal was hushed up. It was one of the treasonable prices paid by Hitler for his admission to power.

If only Rauschning had remembered that reproaches should begin at home!

HERMANN SINSHEIMER.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING. By GILBERT McALLISTER and ELIZABETH GLEN McALLISTER, with a foreword by RT. HON. ARTHUR GREENWOOD. (Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.)

TOWN and country planning in Britain may almost be described as a movement without a literature. Apart from one or two very early and rudimentary studies by Ebenezer Howard and other pioneers, several textbooks on the law and procedure of planning, the recent report of the Barlow Commission, and a few odd pamphlets, there is little published material on the principles and policies of planning, despite continuous and ardent discussion by a substantial group of capable and public-spirited reformers during the past twenty years. Much of the discussion is to be found in the reports of conferences and the back numbers of specialised periodicals, which no-one reads save during the brief period of their currency.

This alone should serve to secure a welcome for the valuable volume which Mr. and Mrs. McAllister have written. There are, however, other reasons which make the book a most timely contribution. In the first place, the planning of the physical environment of Britain after the war is one of the most important questions of the day; and the present volume bears as a sub-title "The Prelude to Post-War Reconstruction." If there is to be any planning when peace comes, the ground must be prepared now and much hard thinking done in advance. Fortunately, there is at the present time an extraordinary amount of interest in post-war planning and Mr. and Mrs. McAllister's book will serve to focus and direct that interest into coherent channels.

In the second place, the book has solid merits of its own. The authors are well-known as writers and workers in the planning movement. They have a keen historical sense; they bring to their task a humane and enlightened outlook; and they have concentrated a vast amount of factual information into a small space. They never forget for a moment that the essential purpose of planning is to provide fuller and freer lives for the mass of the people.

The book opens with a chapter on the effect of the physical environment on health and social welfare. The next chapter surveys the housing progress of the past hundred years and describes both the housing and slum clearance legislation and the literary, moral and economic forces which led to its enactment. Chapter III deals with housing standards and design; chapter IV with buildings costs. Mr. and Mrs. McAllister then go on to discuss the organisation of the building industry, which on the whole comes out of their investigation surprisingly well. Chapter VI is devoted to "Housing between the Wars." Here a full tribute is paid to the remarkable achievement which produced nearly 4,000,000 new houses between 1918 and 1939. In those twenty-one years approximately a third of the nation was rehoused on a much

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their tastes and habits are of infinite diversity; and that in the process of catering for the average man with his family we must be extremely careful not to clamp down a stereotyped physical environment on large numbers of people to whom it would be a form of tyranny.

In conclusion, it may be said that *Town and Country Planning* is by no means a book intended only for the specialist. It is of wide general interest and can safely be recommended to the general intelligent reader and to everyone who is in any way concerned with public affairs. It is greatly to be hoped that Mr. and Mrs. McAllister will follow up this effort with a further contribution.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLAND. From Augustus II to Pilsudski. Edited by W. F. REDDAWAY, J. H. PENSON, O. HALECKI, R. DYBOSKI. 630 pp. (Cambridge University Press. 30s.)

THIS work, as originally planned by Professor Harold Temperley in the autumn of 1936, was intended to trace the history of Poland from the earliest times until the death of Pilsudski. But owing to the outbreak of war and to the new Partition, this plan could not be realised. The later half of the projected history suffered less than the earlier and now receives separate publication as a study of the decline, servitude, and rebirth of Poland. The formal narrative begins in 1697, as a turning point in Poland's decline, and is preceded by an introductory note summarising the stages by which Poland reached her zenith.

Many of the Polish contributors have been flung into concentration camps, and one, Professor Estreicher, chose to die in Oranienburg, rather than accept the proffered release while his colleagues, the professors of Krakow University, remained in captivity. Those who remain are happy in having produced a coherent whole worthy of its great theme. Particularly illuminating for anyone ignorant of history and familiar with post-war Poland are the first two chapters, on the period 1697-1763, by Professor Wl. Konopczynski, Chapter III on the constitution of Poland, by Professor P. Skwarczynski, and Chapter IV, more analytical and modern in treatment, on Social Life before the Partitions, by Professor W. J. Rose.

For the peace-makers of tomorrow, and the emigrés of to-day, the nineteenth century chapters are an essential study. Six of the chapters, XIV to XIX, represent a triumph of co-operation between Polish, American and British contributors. All who are interested in the modern European revolution should read Professor A. P. Coleman's brilliant chapter on The Great Emigration. No one who has followed the long story of group splits, dissensions between right and left, diplomats and

revolutionaries, politicians at home and politicians in exile, culminating in abortive revolution and hope deferred for ever, will generalise lightly about Poland's future or criticise Polish post-war statesmanship too harshly. It is particularly important to have on record the lack of Polish unity at the outbreak of war. By 1914 the division between civilised Austria, efficient Prussia, and barbarous Russia had divided the Polish national movement almost to the heart, and it is less surprising that the new state found so little constructive political thinking and action available.

Unfortunately the chapters dealing with post-war Poland are weaker, individually and collectively, and fail to cover the essential questions or to link up sufficiently with the past. Mr. Reddaway contributes an admirably impartial account of the Peace Conference and throws new light on Lloyd George's attitude to Polish national claims. The frontier questions are treated by a Polish historian as a far too categorical statement of the Polish case. In the other sections, the first years of the Republic and the life of Pilsudski, too many issues are passed over. The student who wants an analysis of material on ethnographic and economic questions, above all on the peasant problem, will find no guidance. There is only one paragraph on the land reform, and no statistics of minorities, rates of population growth, no maps of ethnographic frontiers or communications, though in these lies the key to Poland's many problems.

The final chapter, by Lord Kennet, on Pilsudski, is also disappointing. For the career of Pilsudski must either be interpreted as an indictment of Poland or of his own autocratic personality; and since the author is an Englishman, he naturally shrinks from either course. In view of the constitution of the present Polish government, which contains the more eminent of Pilsudski's former enemies—for instance, General Sikorski himself and Professor Kot—it would have been wiser to have indicated more strongly the existence of opposition to the Marshal during and after his lifetime—for it was, in fact, the most noticeable feature of Polish life for many years. Pilsudski, in spite of his success in uniting the Polish forces, was a negative influence. A revolutionary in his youth, he deliberately used the socialist movement as a tool in the national struggle. Ardently nationalist, he yet distrusted the democratic parties, who certainly represented Polish opinion more truly than army circles. His achievement was the destruction of democracy, the proscription of the Peasant Parties, the oppression of the Ukrainians: even the much celebrated pact with Hitler was not much of a victory in retrospect. Polish unity was achieved only in a fascist framework, though not in a fascist spirit.

Since the book ends with Pilsudski's death, it offers no evaluation of the long-run tendencies in Polish life, and no basis for speculation

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as to the Poland of the future. Of all the writers, it is only Professor W. J. Rose and Professor Coleman—Canadian and American—who stress the importance of the class issue; naturally enough, since few Poles are able to realise that the post-war social structure of Poland was a museum piece. Even in the eighteenth century, the class divisions between gentry and peasantry was peculiar to Poland, owing to the overwhelming preponderance of the squirearchy in the Polish State before the Partitions; and this preponderance, as the introductory note recognises, was the undoubted cause of Poland's retrogression. Foreign oppression for a century and a half kept the gentry in a state of artificial preservation. The manor houses of Poland, remote in the sandhills and forests, became the repositories of Polish tradition. Since their owners would take no part in trade and could take no part in government or administration, they cultivated the past, a sense of European culture, their home life, and raised the standard of their farming to a high level, preserving a way of life with its own high standards, but with an eighteenth century outlook. In liberated Poland, it was inevitable that the gentry class, in spite of its idealism and devotion to the national cause, should prove incapable of leadership. For the peasantry, in Galicia at least, was by then politically advanced and class-conscious: they had progressed while the gentry had not, and they did not look to the gentry for leadership. But the peasants under Witos were so much imbued with belief in political evolution and in the importance of the form of democracy that they did not utilise their power to the full and eliminate the landowners as a class altogether. Since neither class could govern, power fell into the hands of the Army.

Has the new Emigration decided to face the problem of its heritage? A country split vertically by racial issues and horizontally by a single class issue will never be born again. The present Polish government has turned its back on many of the evils of the Pilsudski regime: it has yet to face the question of the peasantry in Poland.

DOREEN WARRINER

BOOK REVIEWS

REPLANNING BRITAIN, BEING A SUMMARISED REPORT OF THE OXFORD CONFERENCE OF THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ASSOCIATION, SPRING, 1941. Edited by F. E. TOWNDROW, A.R.I.B.A. 173 pp. (Faber & Faber. 7s. 6d.)

INDUSTRY AND TOWN PLANNING. REBUILDING BRITAIN SERIES, No. 6. By ROLAND PUMPHREY. Introduction by THE RT. HON. SIR MONTAGUE BARLOW. 36 pp. (Faber & Faber. 1s.)

REPLANNING BRITAIN is an extremely condensed summary of a Conference held by the Town and Country Planning Association, eighteen months after the present war began. The necessity of including reports of everything that was said has resulted in a good deal of repetition; and pressure on space has reduced illustrations and supporting material to a minimum, so that to read the book through and obtain a clear idea of the issues involved requires the utmost concentration. But as a short guide to the main problems involved in replanning Britain and to the terms in which it is discussed to-day by intelligent and authoritative people, it fulfils its purpose admirably.¹

The aim of the Conference was to discuss the implications of the policy outlined in the major recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population (which are given in an appendix at the end of the book). It was assumed that those who attended were in agreement with the principles accepted by this Commission, which has assisted in establishing, in the words of the Association's secretary, "something like an orthodoxy in planning policy." In spite of this common basis for discussion, however, the Conference was not wholly successful in working out further agreed steps in planning policy. From the reader's point of view, the disagreements resulted in a presentation of alternatives which illuminated the field far more clearly than any unanimously accepted statement could have done.

In the introduction, F. J. Osborn remarks: "The broadening out of the conception of town and country planning, as well as of the public interest in it, was reflected by the fact that technical planners (architects, engineers and surveyors) though well represented, were outnumbered by geographers, sociologists, economists, statisticians, national and municipal statesmen and administrators, industrialists and persons interested in agriculture, housing and various aspects of social welfare." It is probably the first time, in this country, that a serious attempt has been made to work out a programme to cover so many different fields of interest and activity. It is not to be wondered at that no final solution could be arrived at so quickly.

The whole book constitutes a powerful, though tacit, argument in

¹ The speakers included Sir Montague Barlow, H. J. Manzoni, F. J. Osborn, W. A. Robson, Sir George Stapledon, Dudley Stamp, Sir Ernest Simon and others.

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favour of a nationally planned economy. As point after point which must be included in an efficient planning policy is presented, it becomes increasingly clear that there is no logical place at which to stop, until a scheme covering the whole of the national economic, and much of its social life, is arrived at. Once the principle of government control in the interests of the people is accepted in one sphere, it can be extended almost indefinitely. The problems of planning are, in the last analysis, the problems of living together in groups. This need not imply (as speakers at the Conference showed) a rigid stultifying control, but an organised attempt to solve urgent problems on the only scale on which they can satisfactorily be dealt with.

Professor Patrick Abercrombie insisted that planners were concerned to put land to its best use, "without considering financial consequences based upon the fortuities of ownership." Sir Ernest Simon remarked on the enormous advantages enjoyed by the town planners of a city like Moscow, where vested interests carried a minimum of weight. The planner is interested, in short, in human values rather than in cash values. At present, in developing certain areas and preventing urban growth in others, in the interests of the community, the British planner runs up against innumerable economic and administrative problems. Here it is refreshing to read of the unanimity of opinion on the need for revision of the present system of individual ownership of urban lands, though the exact nature of the alternative—pooling of ownerships, state or municipal ownership—was not worked out. A Committee of the Ministry of Works and Buildings, under Mr. Justice Uthwatt, is considering these problems, among others. The interim report made a number of recommendations on the immediate steps to be taken to prepare the way for future reconstruction. All have been adopted by the government, except the one in favour of a single central planning authority. This was persistently advocated by speakers at the Conference; it is to be hoped that such an authority will shortly be set up, to replace what is now merely a co-ordinating committee representing the various ministries among whom the functions of planning are scattered.

A Conference of this nature, held in the middle of a war such as the present one, must command a particular degree of interest. New factors have arisen as a result of the war, which make some form of planning a necessity. We may be grateful that this first attempt to provide a plan is too generous, perhaps even too comprehensive for immediate realisation, even though the details are as yet indistinct; that is preferable to a cramped and meagre scheme, which would only match the cramped and meagre towns which we are so determined to replace.

Industry and Town Planning, by Roland Pumphrey, is the sixth pamphlet in the Rebuilding Britain series, edited by F. J. Osborn. It is an attempt to tackle one aspect of the reconstruction problem, an attempt made in a

spirit of thorough reorganisation. The author believes, nevertheless, that government control must be restricted to the imposition of limiting conditions, and that the main driving force must come from private initiative.

JUDITH STEPHEN.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1938. Vol. I. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. Assisted by V. M. BOULTER. x and 735 pp. (Oxford Press and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 28s.)

II DO not know whether anyone has ever had a nightmare within a nightmare, but if so the experience must be very like that of reading the volumes of this survey as they are published. And to relive the nightmare of the year 1938 within the nightmare of the year 1941 is particularly ghoulish. It is the heyday of Mr. Chamberlain and the policy of appeasement. Early in the book we read:

"In a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 1st November, 1938, Mr. Chamberlain deprecated the suggestion that Herr Funk's activities were concealing some political motive. Geographically, he said, Germany must occupy a dominating position in Central and South-Eastern Europe. There was, however, room for both British and German trade in those countries, and he saw no reason to expect that any fundamental change was likely to take place there."

When Mr. Chamberlain made that speech, he had already been to and returned from Munich, he had seen in the previous eleven months of 1938 Hitler incorporate Austria and destroy Czechoslovakia, he had watched Italy's and Germany's non-intervention in Spain. And at the end of these terrifying, shameful eleven months of European history, he is still deprecating the suggestion that Nazi activities conceal political motives, still seeing "no reason to expect" fundamental changes in Europe.

That is in the main the story which Professor Toynbee and his collaborators have to tell in the latest volume of their survey. As usual it is told in considerable detail with meticulous scholarship and almost superhuman restraint and impartiality. Most people would say that we are too near the events, too intimately their victims, to be able fully to understand and explain the psychological and social causes of that determined and complacent blindness with which the shepherds of the two great European democracies shepherded their sheep to their doom in the year 1938. Presumably when time and oblivion have sufficiently blurred the outline, history and historians will conduct the inquest and record the verdict, and Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Lord Simon, having received the appropriate labels, will be shuffled away

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into an obscure niche in English history near Lord North and George III. When that time comes, this survey will still retain its value as a detailed and accurate record of the events as they appeared to a distinguished contemporary historian.

Appeasement in its relation to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Spain is, as we have said, necessarily the main theme of this volume. But it is by no means the only one. In fact, in mere space it accounts for less than half of the volume and the collaborators which Professor Toynbee has found to write the other sections have performed their tasks with conspicuous success. The most interesting and important is Dr. Mitran's analysis of American opinion and its reactions to the European events of 1938. Mr. Beeley gives a very good account of the lamentable events in Palestine and of the curious and illuminating episode of the Sanjaq of Alexandretta. The course of Japan's war on China and the relations of European states and the U.S.A. to it are dealt with by Mr. G. E. Hubbard. And in the first section of all Mr. Allan G. B. Fisher treats, clearly and intelligently, the world's economic affairs and, in particular, the progress towards autarky which in 1938 was the economic reflection of the political events which Professor Toynbee is concerned with in the following section.

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By LORD WINSTER

"We ought to have somebody up at Whitehall
Who knows something about the sea.
And away with the lubbers who call themselves Lords,
The Lords of the Admiralty."

Old Naval Song.

THE device carried on the Admiralty flag is that of a foul anchor, the symbol of everything that a sailor spends his life in trying to avoid. Many officers who abandon ship and go to serve at the Admiralty also abandon hope very soon after they get there, and say, as Robert Scott said of the South Pole, "Great God! This is an awful place."

The Admiralty comprises the Old Building which fronts on to Whitehall with Admiralty House, the residence of the First Lord, in one corner of the courtyard, and the New Building, seen from the Horse Guards Parade, with a residence for the First Sea Lord where the Archway crosses the Mall. Neither block has any architectural merit.

The First Sea Lord does not occupy his residence on account of expense, and it is used for offices. Admiralty House is rambling and archaic, vast cavernous kitchens and cellars and enormous living rooms only used for official receptions. The First Lord lives in the top two floors, which have been converted into a flat, served by the slowest lift in London. The Old Building was the work of Ripley and dates from 1725. It is, as Horace Walpole remarked, "deservedly veiled" by a stone screen added by Adams in 1760. Nelson's body lay in state here in 1805. In the days of Samuel Pepys, a great Secretary of the Admiralty who died in 1705, the Lord High Admiral worked in Whitehall, but the Navy Office was in Crutched Friars. There is little of artistic value or interest in Admiralty House or the Admiralty. Some of the pictures are, in fact, quite dreadful, and much of the furniture more curious than beautiful. The Board Room contains some interesting carving and the worst picture extant of Nelson. For the transaction of business, the

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layout of the Admiralty is not good. Access between potentates requiring to see each other frequently involves long walks. The accommodation is crowded, which Procrustes should remedy by cutting the overgrown staff to fit the bed, and many clerks work entirely by artificial light in semi-basements. An old-fashioned building goes hand in hand with old-fashioned methods, some of which make one rub one's eyes to see blotting paper and not sand on the desks. By Order in Council (9/2/42), the Board of Admiralty consists of—

FIRST LORD.

FIRST SEA LORD, *ex officio* Chief of the Naval Staff (C.N.S.).

SECOND SEA LORD, Chief of Personnel.

THIRD SEA LORD, Controller.

FOURTH SEA LORD, Chief of Supplies.

FIFTH SEA LORD, Chief of Naval Air Services.

VICE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF (V.C.N.S.).

FOUR ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF THE NAVAL STAFF (A.C.N.S.).

FINANCIAL SECRETARY.

PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY.

CIVIL LORD.

CONTROLLER OF MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIRS. SECRETARY.

The First Lord is responsible to Parliament for all Admiralty business and assigns their work and duties to the several members of the Board. The First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Sea Lords, the V.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. are responsible to the First Lord for the general business connected with the movement and condition of the Fleet and with personnel. The Third Sea Lord is responsible for business relating to Matériel, the Financial Secretary for Finance, while the Parliamentary Secretary and Civil Lord perform such duties as the First Lord assigns to them. The Controller of Shipbuilding and Repairs (a civilian) handles the business connected with building and repair of merchant ships and has duties in connection with production of Matériel. The Secretary is responsible for all official communications of the Board, for the interior economy of the Admiralty Office and for control of and advice on expenditure.

The C.N.S., subject to the general supervision of the First Lord and of the Cabinet, may issue in his own name as C.N.S. orders affecting war operations, for which he is

responsible, as well as for all the movements and dispositions of the Fleet.

The Board does not meet to decide on war operations.

The Prime Minister recently laid down that the nature of the business transacted by the Board determines whether decisions are submitted to the Minister of Defence. It is clear from this that in matters of the highest importance it is the Minister of Defence and not the First Lord who is responsible to Parliament, although by Order in Council this responsibility is laid upon the First Lord. While it is in any case loose and unsatisfactory that the C.N.S. should act in wartime under the "general supervision" of two authorities, viz. the First Lord and the Cabinet, especially as the First Lord is not a member of the Cabinet, it is still more unsatisfactory that in matters on the highest plane of importance he acts under neither but under the supervision of a third authority, the Minister of Defence, who figures neither in the Patent of Admiralty, in the relative Orders in Council, nor in an Act of Parliament. All this raises matters of great significance as regards the higher direction of the naval side of the war. How has this situation been arrived at? Up till 1679 the Crown delegated naval matters to a Lord High Admiral. Thereafter the office of Lord High Admiral was vested by Royal Letters Patent in a Board of Commissioners of the Admiralty, all or any two of whom can discharge the functions of the Lord High Admiral. This was confirmed in 1690 by an Act of Parliament which had a curious origin. The Lords Commissioners wished to court martial Lord Torrington for his conduct at the Battle of Beachy Head. The House of Lords questioned the authority of the Commissioners to try a peer, and the Act resulted. The constitution of the Board as defined by the Patent of Admiralty does not entirely correspond with its working in practice. The Patent does not distinguish between members of the Board as regards status, and nominally they are equal. Many high naval authorities have regarded this corporate responsibility of the Sea Lords, with the First Sea Lord *primus inter pares*, as the proper and most efficient system, but a series of changes have swept it away in practice, although the Patent remains unaltered. An Order in Council of 1869

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emphasised the responsibility of the First Lord, who is a politician, to Parliament for all Admiralty business, and another of August, 1904, made the remainder of the Board responsible to the First Lord for the business which he assigns to them.

A Minute by the First Lord of October, 1904, distributing their business to the Board, gave the First Sea Lord supremacy over the other Sea Lords, whose duties thereafter tended to become increasingly departmental and decreasingly connected with the direction of naval war, in spite of what the Patent enjoined. In 1908, a former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, deplored this tendency as making "each successive politician, absolutely ignorant of the business he has to administer, the mouthpiece of one and the same member of the Board." By the strict terms of the Patent all the Sea Lords would, in this war, be jointly responsible, through the First Lord, for all naval operations. By the terms of the Minute of October, 1904, the First Sea Lord alone would be responsible to the First Lord. But on to these arrangements has now been grafted a Minister of Defence who is, in practice, Lord High Admiral as well as Lord High everything else. The First Sea Lord has become to all intents and purposes the Chief Staff Officer of the Minister of Defence for naval operations, and is assisted by a Vice Chief and four Assistant Chiefs of the Naval Staff. The Sea Lords have no joint executive responsibility and are no longer the professional advisers on naval strategy. The First Lord's position has become somewhat obscure. The point at issue for the purposes of this article is, however, that neither the Patent nor the Orders in Council appear to be strictly in force, and there is an *ad hoc* arrangement which has not been laid before Parliament, but which fits into the much-criticised machinery of the Minister of Defence.

The Minister of Defence has certainly usurped some of the functions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty confided to them by Act of Parliament. The title Minister of Defence has not been confirmed by an Act so that the position is irregular. It has grown out of the announcement on 11th April, 1940, by Mr. Chamberlain, that "the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Winston Churchill) will normally

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preside over the Ministerial Committee on Military Co-ordination." Mr. Chamberlain followed this up on 7th May, 1940, by saying that Mr. Churchill "is authorised by the Cabinet to give guidance and direction to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will prepare plans to carry out the objectives which are given to them by him . . . my right honourable friend will have a special responsibility for the supervision of military operations day by day." Under Mr. Chamberlain the First Lord of the Admiralty was a member of the War Cabinet; under Mr. Churchill he is not. When Mr. Churchill succeeded Mr. Chamberlain, an official announcement was made that the King had approved the appointment of Mr. Churchill as "Prime Minister and Minister of Defence." The Court Circular of 12th May, 1940, shows that he was sworn only as "First Lord of the Treasury," while that of 17th May describes him as "Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury and Minister of Defence." The latter title has therefore been assumed by its holder and not conferred upon him by Parliament. There need be no doubt whatever that as Minister of Defence Mr. Churchill has retained the powers assigned to him by Mr. Chamberlain "to give guidance and direction" to the Chiefs of Staff, to order them to prepare plans for objectives he selects and to "supervise military operations day by day." One effect of all this is that the Admiralty has now no direct representation in the War Cabinet, and major decisions of the Board must be submitted to the Minister of Defence for approval. These arrangements may or may not be sound; under them we have certainly sustained resounding naval reverses.

Up till 1832, Fighting and Supply were kept distinct. The Board of Admiralty directed naval strategy, policy and the promotions and appointments of officers; the Navy Office provided the equipment. The Victualling Board looked after victuals. In 1832 the Board of Admiralty absorbed the Navy Office and Victualling Board, and since then those who should be concerned only with what concerns fighting have become involved in all the tangling details connected with administration and supply. When Lord Haldane was at the War Office he divorced administration from operations.

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Before 1882 there were only about six naval officers at the Admiralty: three Sea Lords, the Hydrographer, the Director of Naval Ordnance and the Naval Secretary to the First Lord. The Civil Servants ran the place. After that date the number of naval officers began to increase and now there are naval officers in abundance at the Admiralty, often appointed with no training or experience or understanding of the business passing through their hands. Their term of appointment is only two years, instead of five as at the War Office, so that when they are beginning to master their work they leave and make way for another tyro to go through his cycle of bewilderment, adolescence, and departure. It is certainly necessary for officers to do plenty of sea time, but in peace many Commanders and Captains put in so little service at sea that evidently Admiralty appointments could be extended. Retired officers might also be semi-permanently employed. Service at the Admiralty tends to rob naval officers of self-confidence and infects them with the disease of passing the baby. Vexed questions are referred to committees which often recommend or condemn something with no resulting action. Papers are circulated to every person or department by any stretch of ingenuity interested. The lowest common multiple of agreement between the resultant spawn of minutes, each written with the main object of avoiding responsibility, is then nicely calculated by a permanent official, also determined to avoid responsibility, and embodied in a submission to the Board. Whatever requires a decision, whatever its degree of importance, must go before a Board member. After the last war a proposal to raise the ration allowance of the Admiralty cat from 6d. to 1s. to meet the increased cost of living was submitted to the Board. All this works out badly in two ways. Members of the Board are occupied with a mass of relatively unimportant matters while highly-placed members of the Naval Staff are robbed of responsibility, and, when questioned on what should be well within their competency, reply "that's on a higher plane." The procedure involves considerable delays and results in timorous compromises, because at every stage avoidance of responsibility is a guiding principle.

To illustrate how business is delayed, the *original paper*

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on some matter will be sent to every department concerned, *in turn*, each of which may keep the paper for as long as it likes. In the process it may get lost. One paper took a year in circulation! The procedure in a commercial firm would be for *copies* of the paper to be sent *simultaneously* to those concerned and a date given for their return, when the opinions would be considered by the directors. The loss of the *Royal Oak* in this war can be traced to this slowness in transaction of Admiralty business. The necessity for closing the gaps in the anti-submarine defences had been pointed out several times during preceding years. The papers passed about and about until perplexity descended like a cloud upon those concerned.

A big engineering firm makes the best choice possible of executive authorities and leaves them to manage the work and be judged by results. The Admiralty system is the reverse. Because nobody is invested with sole responsibility, nobody can be judged by results. There is no reward for economical management, and consequently no influence at work against waste and extravagance. In works management, economy is the outcome of initiative and responsibility which officials of the Royal Dockyards do not enjoy.

No First Lord seems to have the will or the ability or the courage to tackle these defects. They are usually a little carried away by the pomp and circumstance of the position and enjoy playing at being an admiral amongst admirals, forgetting that amongst their duties is that of producing a smooth-working, efficient administrative machine.

Lack of decentralisation is one of the main troubles at the Admiralty and results in officials being burdened with unimportant matters which should not come their way. Trivial routine matters are referred to the Admiralty, involving a mass of papers and telegrams and messages. Admiralty approval must be sought for a ship to land an awning for storage. Neither the local Commander-in-Chief, nor the Admiral Superintendent of the Dockyard, nor any of the dockyard officials, can give the permission. There is considerable overlapping and, indeed, interference between the Admiralty and outside Naval authorities. For instance, the Admiralty Construction departments might well leave the

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later disciplinary sanctions will be invoked. Freedom of expression of thought is regarded as criticism, and criticism is treated as an infraction of discipline. As a consequence junior staff officers often cannot discharge their duties. There are many appointments in which function should be independent of seniority, as it is in the Japanese and German navies, where seniors may not encroach on the responsibilities of their subordinates. It is because this is not so in our Navy that Directors of Divisions of the Staff are capable of doing much that their seniors do, are bereft of responsibility and perform menial routine work. At an important conference one such Director, a Captain, was only spoken to once when he was sent out of the room to fetch a pair of dividers. He evidently had an expressive face, for shortly afterwards he was sent away from the Admiralty. Unless naval officers are trained to think, instead of being told their job is to obey, and encouraged to show initiative, instead of probably being court-martialled if they do, there will never be the right raw material out of which to form a Naval Staff. Labelling as the Naval Staff an agglomeration of officers who have had all originality drilled out of them by a system of slavish respect for seniority does not make a real staff.

What is wrong derives from two main causes: (i) officers are not really trained for their jobs; (ii) they are not allowed to do their jobs. The Director of Operations should direct operations and the C.N.S. should confine himself to questions of policy. As things are, the C.N.S. acts as Director of Operations and nobody decides big questions of policy. The existing system of training and discipline is at fault, and this is not confined to the Admiralty but permeates the whole Service.

There is a Training and Staff Duties Division of the Naval Staff under a Captain, responsible to the C.N.S. for advising only on matters of *principle* involved in training and education. This is absurd. A captain is not likely to tell an admiral that his principles are wrong. In practice the Director of Training and Staff Duties has nothing to do with training except on minor questions of technical and staff training. In any case, how can an officer who is changed every two years

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and is mainly thinking of his next job at sea learn to know all that is involved? Responsibility for training should be transferred to a Directorate under the C.N.S.

One of the most important posts at the Admiralty is that of Third Sea Lord—the Controller. Every penny of the money voted by Parliament for ship construction comes under his supervision. It is he also who supervises and co-ordinates the technical departments involved in this colossal expenditure. Experience has to be gained, and only comes slowly. Admiral von Tirpitz stayed at the corresponding post in Germany for nineteen years, during which he equipped and built the German Navy which we fought. In a period of twenty years, nine different men sat in the Controller's chair at the Admiralty. As a Controller is also an admiral, and as most admirals wish to rise to the top of their profession, and as this involves going to sea, most Controllers say of their job: "Here we have no abiding resting place," for it has nothing to do with commanding a Fleet or the strategy of war. The same man cannot be expected to run a shipbuilding business one day and take a Fleet into action the next. The Controller could, with advantage, be an engineer officer, which would involve no conflict with professional ambitions. Questions of Matériel are very attractive, but for executive officers there is a higher side of the naval profession which is concerned with the science of war, strategy, tactics, and the art of command. The Matériel school of admirals did not make good in the last war, for which, incidentally, they failed to provide much of the necessary Matériel. It is worth while remembering that at the end of that war Beatty commanded the Grand Fleet and Wemyss was First Sea Lord. Neither had ever held any appointment concerned with technical matters.

It is for consideration whether there are not too many divisions of the Staff at the Admiralty. A reduction would effect a great saving of time. The Intelligence Division, which is heavily overstaffed, tends, under a certain type of Director, to become involved in all sorts of matters having nothing whatever to do with naval intelligence, which under such a man becomes the Cinderella of the Division. For some unknown reason this Division is put under a Rear-

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dockyards alone to get on with their job of refitting the ships which would then proceed much quicker. It may seem incredible, but the highly-competent Manager of the Constructional Department at a Royal Dockyard must obtain Admiralty approval for even the smallest repair. The man who has to get the job done has no control over expenditure. So far is this carried that a draughtsman may be sent from the Admiralty to Devonport to prepare drawings and estimates for a wooden partition costing a few pounds.

The last war found out this Admiralty system of administration as too slow-moving when time is everything. Those who are afraid (or untrained) to take decisions and responsibility cannot act swiftly. With such a system Admiral Sir Percy Scott found it "not surprising that when war (1914) did come the Admiralty was in a state of dislocation and confusion. One department was wiring to a squadron of ships to do one thing while another department was giving it contrary orders. There was little organisation and little method."

Ideas for creating a Naval War Staff date back a long time, but from the start encountered stiff opposition—not only from reactionaries, but from such remarkable men as Admiral Sir Percy Scott and Lord Fisher.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson was also in opposition. He never understood what are the functions of a staff and never had any use for the idea. At sea he has always kept everything to do with the administration and training of his Fleet in his own hands, being so intensely secretive that he would not even discuss his plans with his Second-in-Command. So also he behaved at the Admiralty.

Lord Fisher says, "only Sir Arthur Wilson and myself when I was First Sea Lord, knew the Naval plan of war." Sir Arthur succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord in 1910. In 1911, the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, summoned the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider the threatening situation arising out of the Agadir incident. Sir Arthur attended and opened the Joanna Southcott box of naval war plans to which only he and Lord Fisher had had the key. He seems to have had nothing naval to suggest except blockade of the German coast and a wild idea of capturing Heligoland. Lord Haldane, Secretary of State for War

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declined to remain at the War Office unless a Naval Staff was at once created. Sir Arthur Wilson refused to co-operate and left the Admiralty. A more inglorious exit could hardly be imagined.

When at long last a Naval Staff was constituted, it showed signs of confusion of thought. There was a Chief of the War Staff who had no executive authority. Staff and administrative duties were not divorced as they should have been. The First Sea Lord combined responsibility for operations with many other duties. The Second Sea Lord was not a member of the Staff, although responsible for training. In May, 1917, the First Sea Lord became Chief of the Naval Staff, *ex officio*, and the post of Chief of the War Staff was abolished. The changes were not, however, accompanied by any great decentralisation and the C.N.S. continued to be weighed down by routine work and to have insufficient time for thought on matters of strategical policy. In June of 1917 Mr. Lloyd George, displeased with the way things were going at sea, and no doubt prompted by some of the unofficial advisers he was never too proud to consult, suggested an "offensive" section of the Operations Division. The First Sea Lord, Jellicoe, thereupon stated that he had examined every possible offensive action! Fortunately Mr. Lloyd George was a tough customer, not impressed by gold or any other coloured braid, and always likely to get what he wanted one way if he could not get it another. He took more advice and a planning section was set up at the Admiralty which, under a new First Lord, Geddes, who meant business and knew his business, was promoted to the status of a full-blown Division of the Staff. The new Division aroused some hostility and had its vicissitudes. Papers submitted by Plans and requiring decisions received no decisions, nor could discussions on matters of policy be secured, so that planning ahead to meet possibilities or emergencies was a difficult matter. The Director of a Division of the Naval Staff has great difficulty in pressing for a decision because he is junior to the man who has to give it, and in our Navy everything goes by seniority and not by function. If a junior staff officer presses a senior officer hard or queries his views or proposals, he is almost sure to rue his action. Sooner or

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Admiral, while the Directors of other Divisions are given a fictitious and undesirable status. The appointment gives it a fictitious and undesirable status. There is no need for it to be under a naval officer at all. The appointment is one very suitable for a marine officer, for whom there is a dearth of high appointments. Intelligence, the head of the Division of Plans and Operations, might well be merged with those two Divisions. There would then be a concentration upon the type of intelligence really required and extraneous matters would be dropped. There have been several instances of opportunities missed and operations going awry because the necessary information was not forthcoming or Operations and Intelligence were not working hand in glove. It was recently sadly remarked by an earnest seeker after naval knowledge that never in the history of the Naval Intelligence Division was so little known by so many about so much.

There is a Press Section of the Naval Staff with naval officers in charge, who naturally look to the First Sea Lord as their little father. It is upon him that their professional future depends, and they know that they are unlikely to get into trouble if, when in doubt, they reply "No" to a request for information or for the release of news. A First Sea Lord feels proprietorial about the Navy, and, so long as Parliament votes the money for it, sees little reason for the public to take any interest in its doings. The idea that the Navy belongs not to the Admiralty but to the public, who have a perfect right to know about it and to expect good results for their money, has not yet penetrated the Admiralty mind. Press and Public Relations, being in the political sphere, should, of course, be a function of the First Lord's Secretariat, with proper representation afforded to the Naval Staff and acquiescence in their veto when they can prove that not assert, that secrecy is necessary.

A grave deficiency in the composition of the Naval Staff is the non-existence of a properly-constituted Historical Research Division with responsible duties and adequate powers. Such a Division should be charged with bringing to the attention of the C.N.S. (under whom it should work directly) the bearing of the past and current lessons and experiences of war upon what is happening or planned at sea. The public would receive a rude shock if it realised the

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extent to which this is not done, and what terrible consequences flow from the omission. The importance which Germany attaches to such a section of the Staff may be judged from the fact that before the war Admiral Raeder, one of the foremost officers on their active list, served in it and wrote three remarkable volumes on cruiser warfare. On the outbreak of war he became C.-in-C. of the German Navy, and has used his scanty surface units to our great discomfiture—notably in the Norwegian campaign and in the escape of the German ships from Brest, profiting by the failure of our Admiralty to assimilate experience. It is also unfortunate that the Science and Engineering branch of the Navy are not directly represented on the Board. The Admiralty should be a business concern, the business being naval war, and its prime concern the efficiency of the Fleet. The Naval Staff exists to run the business of preparing for war, which comes very seldom, and in between wars the Naval Staff gets immersed in administrative matters and neglects the study of strategy, tactics, and the lessons and experiences of the last war. It is on this account that there should be a clear-cut, but not watertight, division between those concerned with problems dealing with the actual conduct of war and those charged with technical and administrative matters—between those who devise and produce the weapons and those who direct their use.

A few words may be said about the office of First Lord. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon says of the office of First Lord: "the main qualities necessary are that he should be a gentleman," hastening to add, "this, of course, in the ethical interpretation of the word." Few First Lords have the determination or the common sense to cut themselves free of the soul-destroying business of reading endless papers. There is, of course, a type of First Lord whose vanity is flattered by masses of papers on his desk. These are always little men, and their Secretaries have a fund of inherited dodges for playing upon their vanity. A First Sea Lord likes a First Lord who is fond of signing papers, but the job is a bigger one than that. Lord Selborne, who held office in Fisher's day, was in many ways a model First Lord. It has been said of him that "he maintained to the full the supremacy of the First Lord in administration. Constitutionally he was

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responsible for all promotions and appointments to command, and although willing to receive the individual advice of his naval colleagues, he would allow no delegation of duty to them. Many of his successors have been apt to let these powers slip from their grasp, with no advantage to the service." This is profoundly true. Nothing is worse for the Service than a First Lord who is in the hands of the First Sea Lord about promotions and appointments. The Service very soon becomes aware when this is so, as, by the time a man becomes First Sea Lord, his grudges, jealousies, favourites, and animosities are well known, and a watch is kept for his indulging them. The First Lord should be the protector of the officers of the Navy from injustice and unfairness. Lord Jellicoe gave Selborne credit for "our superiority in capital ships at the outbreak of the last war." His obituary notice said that his "regard for the Sea Service was warmly reciprocated by the Navy. No First Lord of his generation can be said to have been more popular."

Lord Fisher approved of Lord Spencer as First Lord because he called a horse after him—Caligula made his horse a Consul—and said of Lord Northbrook: "his decisions were like those of the Medes and Persians. Of all the awful people in the world nothing is so terrible as a vacillator." Of Mr. Churchill, Jellicoe remarked that he "proved himself to be a clever and able First Lord in some directions, but his fatal error was his entire inability to realise his own limitations as a civilian quite ignorant of naval affairs." In his argumentative powers "he surpassed the ablest of lawyers and would make a weak case appear exceedingly strong. (N.B.—The Athenians, an enlightened race, did not make Socrates Prime Minister, but put him to death for this very habit.) Whilst this gift was of great use to the Board when we wanted the naval case well put to the Government, it became a positive danger when the First Lord started to exercise his powers of argument on his colleagues on the Board. Naval officers are not brought up to argue the case and but few of them can make a good show in this direction."

The position of First Lord has inevitably suffered a diminution in status and importance with the advent of a Minister of Defence. The Naval Staff knows well that the

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voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau, while the Navy learns from the Press that it is now the Minister of Defence and not the First Lord who announces naval successes to the House of Commons and makes explanations and takes responsibility for reverses. As has been caustically remarked by a naval officer, "The First Lord is not even allowed to announce his losses."

The post of the Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty is one of the plums of the Civil Service, and carries with it great prestige. The holder can exert considerable influence upon naval affairs. Some remarkable men have held the post and also some complete mediocrities.

Such is the Admiralty—slow-moving, caste-ridden, immensely conservative, in fact often reactionary, averse from change, resistant to new ideas, as distinct from the life of the Navy as the Vatican is from the lives of hard-worked parish priests. No First Lord has ever had the valour of ignorance and sailed boldly in to this administrative Sargasso Sea with a broom at his masthead. Somewhere in the womb of time there must be another Haldane. When he appears the Admiralty will get its "Esher" Committee.

Let us agree, however, that in its long history this old established Admiralty has brought us great victories, founded a remarkable naval tradition, and given this country a high reputation. All this work was founded on the Act of 1690.

Students of the last naval war consider that the status and authority our Admiralty then enjoyed gave us a great advantage over the German Navy where there was divided control. The Naval Staff represented by Von Pohl and the Navy Office represented by Tirpitz were continually at loggerheads, and the resulting friction caused inefficiency. Profiting by their quarrels, the Emperor, who called himself not Minister of Defence but ALL HIGHEST WAR LORD, interfered continually as an amateur strategist with disastrous results. In this war the introduction of a Minister of Defence has undermined the position of the Admiralty, which on its record would no doubt contend that under a competent C.N.S. it is better able to run the naval side of the war than the Minister of Defence and the Joint Planning Committee. It could be.

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By W. E. WILLIAMS

I.—THE INHERITANCE OF ARMY EDUCATION.

IT is sometimes far more hazardous and expensive to adapt or reconstruct a building than to pull the whole thing down and start again from the foundations. If the second course had been chosen when war broke out we might have had by now a more solid and workable system of Army Education than the improvisation with which we seem destined to make do until demobilisation. We might have had it designed by a Grotius instead of contrived by a Heath Robinson. By the end of the last war the Army had equipped itself with many varieties of non-military training in the best patterns of adult education. In the flush of reconstruction fervour H. A. L. Fisher described Army Education as "the greatest invention since gunpowder"; many of the best young officers, sharing Fisher's conviction, decided to make it their life-work and enrolled in the Army Educational Corps. When the post-war years of disillusion so quickly came this Corps of specialists suffered heavy blows. That its numbers had to be reduced, in a shrinking Army, was inevitable. What was neither wise nor inevitable was that its prestige should be deliberately undermined. It was deprived of its role of training men for citizenship and set to the task of peeling the educational potatoes. It reverted in many respects to the old humdrum business of the obsolete Corps of Army Schoolmasters, that body of blue-coated ushers in which Cobbett and James Thomson served their dreary time. Army Education relapsed into a mere curriculum for Army Certificates, 1st, 2nd and 3rd class. Many of the best men left the A.E.C. to employ their skill and ardour elsewhere; others stayed on, rather like the poor relations in a Chekhov play, to suffer as patiently as they could the denial of opportunity, recognition and reward. It says much for the faith and stamina of these men that, after twenty years of frustration, and more than their share of raw dealing, they have been able to put so much resource-

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fulness and intestinal fortitude into the present Army Education projects. It is not their fault that the prestige of education was so low when this war began, so low that they were sometimes received by Commanding Officers as curtly as a harassed suburban housewife would treat the vacuum-cleaner salesman. Educationists in the professional army had come to be considered as one of the lesser castes, a handicap which is still, despite their recent success, far more than a vestigial one, and which, of course, is only too familiar in many other parts of our educational system.

This matter of prestige has nothing to do with the size of the Army. The point is that, however large or small the Army, its educationists should enjoy the same recognition and standing as, let us say, the padres and the doctors. This error of values has been the bane of Army education, and it explains many of the imperfections of the present schemes. It is true that these schemes give the A.E.C. the chance of its lifetime, but the A.E.C. has much to forget and much to live down. From being underrated, moreover, the A.E.C. is now overworked. Where chaplains abound by the hundred, educationists are to be found in their tens; while the padre is at least a captain, the educationist is usually a subaltern or a sergeant. These matters are noteworthy, not from the standpoint of professional rivalries, but, once more, as pointers to the crucial issue of prestige. The Army Educational Corps to-day is the most harassed and undermanned section of the British Army, yet its fate is to operate educational schemes of unparalleled magnitude for citizens in arms. What, then, are the projects which are being administered by this long-suffering Corps?

II.—THE HAINING SCHEME.

Briefly two main systems of education are now operating in the Army: the War-time Education Scheme and the Army Bureau of Current Affairs—whose trade-mark, "A.B.C.A.," has become as familiar as "E.N.S.A." The first owes its existence primarily to the Voluntary Bodies of adult education whose powerful and repeated representations finally led, over a year after the war began, to the project which is briefly outlined in the War Office leaflet, "Education

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in the War-time Army."¹ This scheme was intended to provide, quite apart from military instruction, three varieties of education, all on a voluntary basis, and all (therefore) to be conducted in the men's spare time. The three varieties were to be :

- (a) The humanities.
- (b) The utilities.
- (c) The arts and crafts.

The first category was to cover the familiar curriculum of adult education, e.g. history, geography, international affairs, economics, either in single lectures or in short courses. The second was designed to enable soldiers to begin or to continue some training in the vocations they hoped to take up when the war was over. The third was intended to give men constructive hobby-interests. In considering the shortcomings which this triple scheme has since revealed it must be remembered that, in the shopkeeper's metaphor, this was a bigger "order" than the massed resources of adult education could cope with. The potential customers were many times the number of the entire population of pre-war adult education; the machinery to supply them was not the well-established and well-greased civilian system, but an improvised collaboration between the Army Educational Corps and civilian resources.

III.—THE MACHINERY OF THE SCHEME.

The machinery for operating the Army Education Scheme is complicated. First, there is the trellis-work of the Army Educational Corps, which follows the pattern of the military hierarchy. That is to say, a Command Education Officer at each Command H.Q. and, branching from him, A.E.C. administrative officers at Corps H.Q., Area H.Q., District H.Q., and Divisional H.Q. To many observers this procedure of matching educational organisation to military organisation seems wasteful, and the criss-cross of boundaries between Corps, Area, District, Division, etc., sometimes leads to over-elaboration and duplicated effort. It has been

¹ This was a résumé of the plans devised by a small committee of which the Chairman was General Sir Robt. Haining.

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suggested that a simpler procedure would be to by-pass the military hierarchy, and organise army education on a county basis, but this modification is certainly not in sight yet.

The A.E.C. officers in this hierarchy are, so to speak, the supply officers of Army Education. They go shopping, largely, with the Regional Committees of Adult Education in H.M. Forces. These Committees are the representative bodies of civilian adult education—such as the L.E.A's., the University Extra Mural Departments, the Y.M.C.A., the W.E.A.—and each Committee has a panel of lecturers who are available to give single talks or short courses to the troops.

The immediate agent and spokesman for the "customers" is the Unit Education Officer, a regimental officer deputed by his C.O. (on top of many other duties) to take care of education. It is his business to discover and evoke the educational needs of his Unit, and to meet them either from Unit resources—which are sometimes varied and considerable, sometimes negligible—or from the resources provided by the Regional Committees. This Unit Education Officer is the local lynch-pin. If he is keen, resourceful and not too bogged in other duties, he gets a creditable show going. If he is unwilling, apathetic, overworked, he gets little or nothing done, even though the indefatigable A.E.C. hierarchy is constantly encouraging and aiding him. In the better Units there is an Education Committee, of officers and men, who reinforce the effort of the Unit Education Officer.

It must be admitted that this lynch-pin is a frail and uncertain device. It must equally be conceded that the notion of a full-time Education Officer to every Unit is a Utopian vision which cannot be realised in our man-power situation. There is nothing for it but to make the best of these Unit Education Officers, partly by training them at the Army School of Education or at week-end schools, partly by extending the practice of forming Unit Education Committees. Both these palliatives are being applied; and, moreover, Young Soldiers Battalions (where education is even more vital than elsewhere in the Army) have a full-time A.E.C. officer and several A.E.C. sergeants all to themselves.

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IV.—PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND.

The best facilities for every kind of Adult Education, whether cultural or vocational, are usually concentrated in the larger towns, whereas the biggest camps are usually located on some windy heath remote from inhabited places. Moreover, the very idea of further education in their own spare-time was not one which a majority of soldiers were liable to welcome with open arms. They had neither more nor less interest in it than they had in peace-time. The Workers Educational Association had a peace-time student enrolment of about 50,000 men and women, and that figure has been attained only after forty years of propaganda and powerful official encouragement. It is a figure worth remembering when a soldier tells you he never heard of education during his first year in the Army. He is neither more nor less likely to have heard of it than the average Trade Unionist is likely to have heard of the W.E.A. Such were and are the major difficulties involved in the attempt to gear the civilian system of adult education to the needs of a war-time interest. The Army does not provide the suitable framework for education, and the man in battledress is no more disposed to be voluntarily educated than the man in dungarees.

As the Army Education Scheme developed—and its progress has been unexpectedly good—other defects were observed in this effort to utilise the civilian resources of peace-time. There is not a sufficient supply of the right sort of tutor for the “humanities.” Of the 3,000-odd names on the panels of the civilian Regional Committees not more than ten per cent are really up to the game of rousing the average soldier’s mental interests. If any Gideon cares to take the 3,000 of them down to the water’s edge he will find that not one in ten can lap the right way, the simple way. Many of them are experts of high calibre, but they lack the essential attributes for simplifying and popularising their “subjects” among men to whom the very alphabet of those subjects is alien. In a sense, this state of things is a well-deserved retribution on those bodies of adult education which have been preoccupied all these years with aping the intellectual standard of their university betters and have so

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notoriously neglected the effort to enlighten the commonest of common men. The fact is that the massed bodies of adult education cannot produce enough simple expositors to supply a Division, let alone an Army. In the other two species of Army Education, the “utilities” and the “handicrafts,” the supply of instructors has not been so short, largely because they have been supplied by those Marthas of adult education, the Local Education Authorities, and not the voluntary bodies.

V.—HOME-PRODUCED EDUCATION.

The Haining Committee was realistic enough to declare, in “Education in the War-time Army,” that civilian provision would not meet the Army’s educational needs. It urged that the Army should not rely on imports from civilian suppliers, but should get busy on home-produced facilities. This advice has been adopted on a surprising scale. There are many units which are educationally self-sufficient, and which remain so when they go overseas. Gibraltar and Tobruk have accomplished what many areas have failed to achieve in England. Such provision, inevitably, is patchy. There are battalions which can produce twenty-five instructors—some professional, some amateurs—and battalions which can produce none. And the educational fare of units which rely on their home-produced material often shows a lack of balance due entirely to the fact that they may have six language instructors but no historians. The Army Education Scheme is lopsided; it cannot be else.

VI.—SOME FIGURES.

In the face of these difficulties and improvisations let a few figures speak for the progress of Army Education. This spring the number of lectures given to the troops in this country reaches an average of 12,000 a month, and many of the lectures are followed by some variety of question and discussion. Of organised classes, i.e. series of meetings continuing week after week mainly in the utilities but also to some extent in the humanities, the average per month is well over 8,000. And besides these formal activities there are unnumbered legions of music circles, play readings,

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educational visits to historic places and industrial centres, choral societies, art groups and brains trusts.

VII.—THE CRUCIAL FACTORS.

Much of the criticism of the Army Education Scheme betrays an inability to appreciate two decisive factors :

(a) *The shortage of teachers.*

Even if the full complement of peace-time instructors and tutors were available, it would not be able to take on this vast new audience. But, in any case, that complement is not available, for large numbers of trained educators have gone off to other tasks—tasks, moreover, which, in the various Ministries for example, they often prefer to their old profession. Faced with this problem of “short supply” the Army Education Scheme cannot achieve the wide scope which some people expected from it. The dream of “continuous courses” in a multitude of subjects has proved a pipe-dream. Single lectures must inevitably be the mainstay of Army Education.

(b) *The physical factors.*

The Army can't stay put; the Army must give priority to military training and military exercises; the Army lacks the premises and the apparatus for systematic education. Thus, once more, the hope of continuous and diverse educational facilities proves a mirage. And if these conditions are so decisive while the Army is still on its home-ground, they must be even more so when it begins to play its long-awaited away-matches. Even during the “phoney” war-period that unrealistic expectation was defeated; and for an Army on the move it is abundantly plain that the only kind of education it can get must be what it can carry.

The recognition of these factors led directly to the second Army Education project, viz. the Army Bureau of Current Affairs.

VIII.—THE SECOND PLAN: A.B.C.A.

The biggest educational venture the war has produced is the Army Bureau of Current Affairs. Its conception was due in part to the inevitable limitations of the Army

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Education Scheme. The argument behind A.B.C.A. runs thus :

- (1) The Army must learn educational self-sufficiency and equip itself with a rough-and-ready, portable kind of education.
- (2) The predominant interest disclosed by the Army Education Scheme has proved to be an interest in Current Affairs.
- (3) If these first two propositions are sound, then this minimum educational provision must not be regarded as an optional extra in the soldier's daily life. It must be supplied in training-time or, as the old-fashioned commander prefers to say, in “the King's time.”

On this basis A.B.C.A. was built, and let it be recorded to the credit of the regular soldiers who determine the Army's destiny that they were willing to play with this dynamite. For A.B.C.A. is dynamite. It ordains that, at least once a week, slap in the middle of working-hours, platoons shall sit down and discuss Current Affairs. Once a week a soldier shall not only be entitled to ask, but encouraged, to ask “Why Black Markets Are Allowed,” or “Why America Isn't In Top Gear,” or “Why Women Are Being Called Up.” No one pretends that they always get an answer or that they get the proper answer. The significant point is that they can ask. They can talk. They can unbosom themselves of doubt, ignorance and anger. It is a long way from Balaclava to A.B.C.A.—yet the jump has been made.

IX.—OFFICERS AS GROUP LEADERS.

The leaders of these group-discussions are usually the platoon commanders; that is to say, the younger regimental officers, the amateur soldiers, not the recalled regulars or territorials. Most of them lack any experience of discussion-group leading, but they are fortified in their task in many ways, of which the two chief are :

- (a) The issue of weekly bulletins, each of which provides the “brief” and the talking-points for a discussion on some such topic as “Russia's Resources” or “Economic Warfare.”
- (b) The provision (largely by civilian experts from University Extra-Mural Departments) of week-end courses at which

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officers are taught—with clinical demonstrations—the tricks of the trade of group-leading.

Now it must be conceded that to most subalterns this task is strange and (often) disconcerting. Yet if the troops are to get, at least, a regular iron ration of education in citizenship, A.B.C.A. is the only way. From the standpoint of the professional teacher these A.B.C.A. sessions are often lamentably unskilful. But the fact remains that these A.B.C.A. sessions have already struck a deep root into military life. Not, necessarily or mainly, because soldiers wish to be informed about Current Affairs, but because they want a chance to speak their feelings and opinions. Many a thoughtful subaltern has declared that even when he can't find the answer to a soldier's conundrum he is conscious that, once he has put his case or question, the soldier doesn't feel thwarted. A.B.C.A. gives him a chance to open his mouth.

Through its directives to officers the War Office reiterates the following advice :

- (1) The platoon is the only possible basis for the two-way traffic of discussion. A bigger gathering becomes a public meeting—which few officers are competent to address.
- (2) The officer is a group-leader, not a lecturer. His role is to take the chair, not take the floor.
- (3) No one from outside can determine the "dosage" of controversy for any unit. It depends on the experience and good-sense of the leader no less than on the knowledge and stability of the men. But the object of an A.B.C.A. discussion is to secure balanced controversy on the topic under consideration.

These injunctions are, of course, variously adopted or accepted. In conducting A.B.C.A. there are as many errors of judgment, thumbs-in-the-scales and sheer babooneries as you would expect. There are officers who monopolise the meeting; officers who read aloud bits from the A.B.C.A. bulletins; officers who shy from any clash of opinion; officers who hastily shut down when the temperature rises, instead of persisting until reasonable ventilation has been secured. Yet there are others who make this platoon-discussion the most vital and sincere item in the week's entire time-table. In short, A.B.C.A. provides an exacting

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test of leadership for officers; and the percentage of officers who respond to the test is no less than that of any other role of military leadership.

X.—THE NEED FOR TRAINING COURSES.

The imperative need of the moment is to give the regimental officer a fuller training in discussion-group leadership. The week-end course is something; at least it takes the edge off his ignorance of the job. But officers must be given at least as much time to train themselves for A.B.C.A. as they do for their many other roles of leadership. So far there is not a single full-time A.B.C.A. training-school in the country, although many educational establishments have been commandeered for other military purposes. Meanwhile, valiantly improvising as usual, the universities and the voluntary bodies lend their buildings and their experts for peptonised week-end courses in method for zealous but inexperienced amateurs.

XI.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A.B.C.A.

A.B.C.A. is less than a year old. It is still sketchy, and inadequate; ill-staffed and ill-provided according to Russian, German or American standards. Yet it has laid the foundation for a development for which we may live to thank God when the peace arrives. A.B.C.A. is not only a safety-valve for the citizen-soldier's ignorance, bewilderment or indignation; it is becoming also the one and only place where he can hammer out his notions of the post-war world and where he can learn the rudiments of his obligations as a citizen. These may seem ambitious claims, yet they are already taking shape in many units. For A.B.C.A. represents—sometimes, and according to the vision of the officers—not merely a weekly discussion, but a series of other aids to knowledge. It is developing, for instance, into wall-newspapers, visual aids, reading-circles; and it may yet play a part in transforming the escapism of the B.B.C. Forces Programme into the constructive preparation for battle.

The soldier has taken to A.B.C.A., and the reasons are easy to detect. For many soldiers the keenest privation to

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be endured is the curtailment of civic privileges. This is a citizen Army, not the monastic-professional Army of peacetime; and its members are often men (and women) accustomed to their regular ration of discussion. Others, again, are young soldiers who would normally be cultivating some concern about the world they live in. If that concern gets no encouragement in the Army it will become a withered root—or possibly the poisoned cactus-plant of Fascism. The soldier, then, has the citizen's right to discuss current affairs, and the Army is the only place, for the time being, which can preserve that right for him. Preserve it, moreover—and this is significant—not as an extra, after a tiring day's work, but slap in the middle of his "office-hours," in a way and at a time which may persuade him to take it more seriously than he otherwise would.

There is another aspect of this A.B.C.A. experiment which deserves mention: the effect upon the officer of having to give these weekly talks. For many it is, no doubt, one more bit of drudgery in the dog's life a subaltern leads. But for many others—on the evidence of their own testimony—it is an opportunity for self-education in citizenship. An officer who is taking his A.B.C.A. duties conscientiously is becoming a more systematic student of current affairs than he was before. It is notable, for example, that the circulation within the Army of such valuable aids-to-study as the Oxford pamphlet and The British Survey has increased since A.B.C.A. began; and on a lower but not less significant level is the declaration of many platoon officers that they nowadays read their papers and magazines with an eye for discovering talking-points to their men.

Now that A.B.C.A. is a lusty adolescent, something may be said of the opposing attitudes which threatened its cradle. First, there was the clamorous left-wing declaring that A.B.C.A. didn't go far enough, and bellowing for commissars who would enforce in every unit a ruthless analysis of Munich and the rudiments of a political education. Then there were the middle-of-the-roaders, the garden-city idealists, abetted by some educational sects of the covenanting type, who feared that A.B.C.A. would pump propaganda into the troops. The third side of this triangle of forces was manned

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by Brigadier Blueface and his myrmidons, convinced to the last ditch that the soldier is a good-natured clod who is best left in his ignorance. A.B.C.A. has confounded all three. It turns out to be the typical British compromise; improvised, often incompetent, always capable of adaptation. It is an item in the Army's time-table which can be used to get the barb out of a grievance, the poison out of a rumour, or the bees out of a bonnet. If that seems an elementary and minimum function, let it be borne in mind that hitherto there has been nothing in mass-education which provided even such a modest privilege as that.

A.B.C.A. has proved, moreover, a confidence trick in the best sense. Many hard-bitten lieutenant-colonels feared the worst when A.B.C.A. came in—and often did what they could to sabotage the innovation. Nowadays their testimony often harps on three strings:

- (1) The A.B.C.A. discussion does not appear to undermine the subaltern's authority.
- (2) It often seems to create a new and useful kind of association between the platoon-commander and his men; an off-the-record relaxation of the tension of military life.
- (3) If men are to speak their minds, they had better do it in open divan than in the canteen or the privy. Perplexities and grievances are better spoken out loud than whispered—no matter whether they are soluble or not.

Because A.B.C.A. has dissolved such nightmares of foreboding it is now in a position to tackle themes which would have been untimely six months ago—Town Planning, the Future of the Land, Public Health—and it is reasonable to suppose that when a British Army of Occupation begins to speak its mind about the world it wants to live in, it will find in A.B.C.A. a forum whose rules and methods it understands and respects.

XII.—A.B.C.A. AS A PATTERN.

If war-time conditions can produce even a rude and approximate education in citizenship, then A.B.C.A. is the pattern which might also be attempted in factory and dock-yard as well. The fact deserves to be recorded that nowhere

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else but in the Army (and lately, on a small scale, by the National Fire Service) is an attempt being made to teach men and women the ABC of citizenship. The consequences of that fact may yet prove unexpected and decisive.

XIII.—BOLT-HOLES IN ARMY EDUCATION.

The Army, in many ways, doesn't make sense. In its bolder moods it tackles such a job as A.B.C.A., yet in other ways it takes fright and makes for the nearest educational bolt-hole. One such bolt-hole is Handicrafts. In recent years Handicrafts has found its way into Adult Education—and it thrives, always and everywhere, as readily and dangerously as rabbits in the Antipodes. Ever since some well-meaning and easy-going educationist coined the phrase about those who “think through their finger-tips” Handicraft has become the soft option of educational development. Thus it was palmed off on the frustrated unemployed coal-miners of South Wales and Tyneside; and, beguiled by one kind of cats-cradle after the other, the “Hands Without Work” were kept occupied so that their minds might be kept off their bitter fate.

Handicrafts are a pleasant hobby. They may, with profit, occupy a segment of any good citizen's leisure. But Handicraft Schemes get out of hand faster than anything in the adult education time-table; they become escapist and trivial more quickly than any other “subject” under the sun. And this is truer in the Army than in other places. As a device for occupying a portion of the long day in a Convalescent Depot or on a remote A.A. site, Handicraft has an obvious place. But Handicraft has a fatal attraction for one kind of military mind: it looks nice and bright in the shop-window. What can be easier when a Staff Notability asks the C.O. about education than to say “Step this way, Sir,” and to fling open the door of a room in which, tier upon tier, rise models of aeroplanes, prettily-bound Penguins, blotters, footstools, lamp-shades and what-have-you? In some regions Handicraft is sweeping the board of Army Education. It is the easiest business to organise, it placates the reactionary C.O., it produces visible results and it looks big on the records. In its right place and proportion, Handicraft is a valuable

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and necessary part of the Army's educational programme, but it wants close watching.¹

XIV.—AN IMAGINATIVE VENTURE.

On the other hand, although this diverse Army sometimes falls for soft options, it also tackles unexpected propositions. One such is the Army Study Centre, of which several score now exist.

A little over a year ago the British Institute of Adult Education began to foster an experiment which met with a warm response from the Army. It was evident that a considerable minority of soldiers felt the need of a time and a place where, alone or in very small groups, they could pursue those “serious pleasures” which had meant so much to them in peace-time.

Although most units have some kind of common-room, it is, as a rule, a general-purposes place. Very often it is the mess-room which, in between meals, is utilised for recreation of all kinds. When you go into such a room you may hear the radio putting up its evening barrage of variety or dance-music; you may hear the monotonous plonk of half a dozen dart-boards, or the sounds which accompany the playing, at a dozen different tables, of various games of skill and chance. No one complains of that. The Army is a public life in a public place, and the will of the majority, in terms of noise and games, must prevail. Yet it is equally true that some soldiers want something else as well. And it is almost certainly true that all soldiers, if vaguely and subconsciously, sometimes need more private occasions, occasions for solo-activities, occasions for a little peace and quiet—either to do something or simply to sit and reflect. These were the sentiments and convictions which led to the creation of a few specimen Army Study Centres.

The Army Study Centre, as a rule, is a house (rented by the Army) in which the rooms are each earmarked for some minority cultural purpose—a room with a radiogram for organised listening to good music, a reference library, an art-room, and so on.

¹ A caution here. Not only are there some admirably-devised Handicrafts schemes in Army Education, but there is also a significant volume of facilities for Art and Music in the Army—so much as to need explanation in a separate article from this.

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In one sense the notion is not a novel one. The Y.M.C.A., whose record of imaginative service to the Forces has still not received its due of recognition, has for some time provided many camps with Quiet Rooms. These sanctuaries have a realistic and unassuming purpose—to provide the soldier with an oasis where he can sit and write a letter home, or sit and read without interruption. The historians of to-morrow may, indeed, give as many marks to the Y.M.C.A. as their predecessors gave Florence Nightingale.

The British Institute of Adult Education approached the question from a rather different angle. Its purpose—revealed also in several other contributions it has been able to make to Army Education—was to encourage in the Army the notion of self-help. If such a body as the Y.M.C.A. will provide Quiet Rooms, well and good. But if the Army can be persuaded, as part of its regular provision, to supply such places—better still. That was the purpose which animated this experiment.

The Pilgrim Trust, godfather of so many projects which have made good, donated funds to the experiment. The rules of the game were that if the Army would find the bricks and mortar the British Institute would instal the cultural "plant." First off the mark was Northern Command, where the Command Education Officer, abetted by a broad minded "Q" Officer, seized premises which were in use as a store-room in York. The place was, in fact, an abandoned tavern. The example of York has been improved upon elsewhere. The most impressive Army Study Centre is to be found, appropriately enough, in Scotland. The Glasgow Centre is an imposing old house, comfortably furnished—including settees and saddleback chairs—with open fires. On the walls are famous pictures—originals lent by the Glasgow Art Gallery. And there is a woman resident Director, who has managed to give the place not only the atmosphere of culture, but the flavour of home as well. Glasgow has proved that, once someone has the act of faith to start such a place, support is readily forthcoming—in cash and in kind. In other Scottish Centres, for instance, such bodies as the W.V.S. and the Girl Guides have buckled to and donated furniture, sewn curtains and loose covers and

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even browbeaten their husbands into making bookcases.

XV.—BRICKS AND MORTAR.

The success of this handful of Army Study Centres points us once more to the fundamental weakness of every variety of education in the Army—the lamentable lack not only of time but of suitable premises and equipment. Education, always and everywhere, boils down to bricks and mortar. Find the right place with the right atmosphere and the rest is comparatively easy. It is all very well for gills to swell in the Senior Combination Room about the pathetic amateurism of Army Education. Army Education has to make do with barrack-room standards, while all over the country more suitable premises are allowed to remain in the occupation of evacuated Insurance Companies and the like. There is nothing on earth—except the will—to prevent the Army being equipped with premises where its education might proceed in the best environment. Even in the University towns the right premises are there—except that they are occupied by war-time interlopers who have no right to be there: such as the Oxford College now being used as a lodging-house for Civil Service clerks.

XVI.—BACK TO THE A.E.C.

In the face of every disadvantage—from its lack of premises to its lack of expert personnel—the Army has contrived a versatile range of educational facilities. Some of its schemes have gone awry; others, such as its correspondence Courses, have been deliberately supplied for minority interests. But the Army has had the zeal and the sense to persist in its trial-and-error until, in A.B.C.A., it has devised a rough but effective minimum educational provision for its men and women. A.B.C.A., heaven knows, is a botch in many ways, but it is the beginning of something which, when the war is over, may shape a new pattern in popular education.

The considerable volume and diversity of educational schemes sketched in the preceding pages is administered largely by the Army Educational Corps. Their function is to dovetail civilian resources into the Army's needs; to

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evangelise among wayward and indifferent units; to locate and utilise the Army's own teaching-talent; to organise training facilities for the Army's amateur teachers and group-leaders; to develop the growth of handicrafts, music, art and every kind of informal educational activity; to give concentrated attention to the special needs of Young Soldiers' Battalions, Convalescent Depots and the like. And, in the words of the Orderly-room Sergeant, "the rest of the day's their own." Most of the A.E.C. officers spend their days and nights organising and administering at high pressure. In number they are ludicrously inadequate for the heavy and incessant duties imposed on them. In the same spirit as we permit the crowded class-room in the elementary school, so we countenance a similar imposition on Army Education. We skimp it—and then we blame it because the result of its efforts is often so inadequate. It brings us to the question of priorities. Is the education of the Army as important as the health or the spiritual welfare of the troops? If the answer is yes—and dare it be otherwise—one immediate and practical step should be to put the administration of Army Education into as numerous hands as those which bless the troops on Sunday morning or prod their tonsils on Tuesdays. Call them what you like—but let them be as numerous as the men who control the educational destinies of the soldiers of the Reich and of the U.S.S.R. Their motives and their traditions will do the rest.

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By TOM HARRISSON

AS this war gradually moves towards its fourth year, more and more does it become, on the Home Front, a war of women. At first, women played the more negative role of keeping the home going, and carrying most of the small worries. Now, every available female body is required in a war factory or uniform. Never before in our history has the State had to interfere with the lives of so many people so quickly and so drastically, and particularly never before has it had so much to do direct with women. In normal times, most major decisions of personal conduct are determined largely by a husband or father or fiancé. And without anybody having thought about it very much, instructions, directions, legislation are nearly all based on this assumption and are addressed by men to men. Leadership language for women is limited mostly to small matters, particularly concerned with the spending of the wage packet. And, on the whole, the majority of women have been content with this situation. The vigorous suffragette movement did not steadily grow, but faded quickly away once the vote for women had been won, as if this was some final triumph. In the detailed studies Mass-Observation made before the war in a northern industrial town, "Worktown," we found the great majority of women voted according to the attitude adopted by their menfolk, and not more than one woman in twenty normally made an independent political decision. "My husband sees to all that" is the characteristic female pre-war remark about voting intentions.

This war is changing that situation, is forcing women to notice more closely the wider implications of their environment, beyond the home and the corner shop and the town centre. In one sense this war is a painful process of education in citizenship, and in the inter-relationship of near and distant events—the amount of available cheese, local apathy, and your house being ignited by something dropped from the sky.

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girl among young conscripts in a key factory, detailing her observations in a full-length report, reached the conclusion :

The purpose of this study has been to bring to light something of the human foundations on which any schemes for improving efficiency and increasing output must be based. And the picture of these foundations is not reassuring. We find as its material gangs of bewildered and mainly reluctant girls, suddenly cut off from all their former interests and activities ; suddenly released from almost all the social and material responsibilities which formerly gave their lives order and shape. Life has become for them a formless vista of days and weeks, from which most physical discomforts have been smoothed out, most cares lifted, and most pleasures and interests gone. Few gleams of aim or purpose lighten this vista, for their interest in the war has been blacked-out by this sort of life as surely as their other interests. Instead of feeling "in it" (as newspapers would lead one to suppose working in a factory makes one feel) they feel more out of it, in every way, than they ever have in their lives. The "ivory tower" of the intellectuals is not more secure, more insulated from the struggles of real life, than is working twelve hours a day at an unexacting job in a humanely-run war factory.

This, then, is the background of aimlessness, irresponsibility and boredom against which the organisers of this type of factory have to consider their problems. They have to consider what sort of incentives and what sort of penalties are going to be most effective in these circumstances—not what *would* be the most effective in some ideal circumstances, which in point of fact do not exist. It may be good propaganda to say that conscripted factory girls are burning with zeal to have their smack at Hitler ; but it is certainly not good policy to be taken in by one's own propaganda and to spend time and effort on appealing to emotions which aren't there, simply because one thinks they *ought* to be there. At all times, less educated women tend to be more apathetic about anything outside their own immediate lives, and the

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problem of getting a spirit of "urgency" into people, of which we hear so much to-day, is more difficult with women than with men. In the political studies already referred to, we found that both in municipal and parliamentary elections women tended to use their vote anything up to 10 per cent less than men, and they were far less opinionated or critical on general affairs than men. About the efficiency of war industry, for instance, a subject of much controversy lately, in the study referred to above we found the following distribution of attitude in our seven study areas :

Attitude	Percentage adopting this attitude among			
	Men		Women	
Industry efficient ..	31%	..	53%	
Industry inefficient ..	52%	..	25%	
Don't know	17%	..	22%	

Women regularly tend to think that things outside their immediate experience are all right (acceptance) or to have no opinion (apathy) more than men. On the other hand, women are—largely because of their lesser knowledge of the significance, context and meaning of big events—more easily depressed by any unmistakable sign of BIG things obviously gone wrong.

I would like a large card put up in front of every high official, stating the things that he might remember when thinking in terms of new legislation, new propaganda or anything directed at the general public—things about women as well as men. The senior official has little contact with or knowledge of the mass of working women, who left school at age fourteen, either run a home at £2 to £7 a week, or go out to work themselves, or both. Women would disagree about what should be put on the list ; a mere male, but with the experience of many studies of working women in the past five years, I would put something like this on the card :

REMEMBER, MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,

I.—In general, women take less interest in the day-to-day news of the war than men.

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The Prime Minister has called 1942 the year of the crisis of man-power; it is more strictly the year of the crisis of woman-power. Never have so many women been wanted so badly to do so much by and for the State, instead of by and for themselves or their husbands. Faced with this new situation, the structure of government—deeply rooted in peace-time procedures and personnel—has so far failed fully to adjust itself to the new circumstances. The key positions in Britain are held by men and until now they have not had to worry very much about the female point of view, because they were asking women to do the same sorts of things as men, and they were not treating women as separate entities to be removed from families and homes. Too little attention has been paid to the way in which things are still predominantly decided by men in this country, despite the “emancipation of women.” For instance, during a six months’ study of War Production (October, 1941, to April, 1942), Mass-Observation never encountered a single woman in a key position in any war factory or among any of the Government officials dealing with these factories, in seven large industrial areas. Yet the problems of war industry are increasingly female, and the failure to deal with some of these problems (such as day nurseries, shopping facilities, physical effects of long hours, part-time schemes) is in many small ways hampering the full use of our production potential.¹ From every side we find managements paying the highest tribute to the women in war industry, especially the older women who have come in voluntarily. Some of these have a keenness, a “patriotism” which is seldom noticed among the men. But there are plenty, especially the young conscripts, whose industrial morale is not so good. Moreover, the general attitude of mothers running homes now is, after many months of difficulties and continuous bad news, apathetic and lethargic. After careful study of this subject, and having written a number of memoranda and reports on it for various official and unofficial bodies, I must say that I consider many of the frictions which women

¹ Those who are interested to pursue this matter will find a detailed analysis of what women are doing and trying to do in the production field, in our recently published report, “An Enquiry Into War Production,” Part I, “The People In Production,” by Mass-Observation, sponsored and published by the Advertising Service Guild, 10, Hertford Street, W.1.

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are at present experiencing, necessary as they are, could be relieved with favourable effect if there was more appreciation of the feminine outlook and point of view in high places. To quote from a paper prepared for a group of voluntary organisations back in December, 1940:

“Good female morale would not in itself win the war, but bad morale could seriously impede the war effort and make life for thousands more difficult to bear. It is impossible to generalise on women as a whole; each reacts differently according to temperament and circumstances. Each individual may change her outlook and opinions from day to day. It is possible, however, to say roughly how the majority are feeling, and to assess the main categories of minority feeling in different circumstances.

“The fundamental differences between men and women’s morale lies in the difference between their lives. The man goes out every day, mixes with other people, sees other surroundings. The housewife stays behind. If her men are called up, her children taken away, she is left doing the same round of familiar routine, in the same surroundings. Her leisure occupations are restricted, her opportunities for pleasure reduced. She may be evacuated herself; then she is still left alone, away from familiar things, her habits dislocated even more. The whole balance of her life is upset. The working girl on the other hand suffers restrictions, curtailment of pleasures, her friends called up, routines under new pressures. The result, therefore, of the ordinary war-time life of many women is tiredness, boredom, apathy.

“In war conditions a woman has many other points of tension besides these domestic problems. Anxiety is perhaps the strongest, and most lasting. This comes from various sources, from the war news, expected or actual danger, worry about relatives, the war itself, the loss of life. Day-to-day news during a crisis can induce in some older women a nervous condition that has physical effects as well as mental.”

One of my investigators who went to work as an unskilled

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2.—Women, especially poorer ones, tend towards a very considerable apathy about war appeals and urgencies, or about war matters other than those which directly impinge on their domestic arrangements and economies.

3.—Separate wives, mothers, fiancées, are suffering difficulties, anxieties, tensions, much more severe than those of peace. Indeed, many women may actually be made happier when forced to change their present routine, and give up their effort to carry on a peace-time process, e.g. by having to go into the A.T.S. or munitions.

4.—Women are more used, in many respects, to being ordered about than men—or, at least, to having their minds made up for them.

5.—Working-class women tend to be rather less imaginative, more day to day and practical than men. They therefore find difficulty in visualising hypothetical dangers or necessities or in accepting propositions stated in unemphatic terms.

6.—On the other hand, many women tend to value their individuality, their personal liberty in *small* things, more than the average man—e.g. clothes, appearance, meals. Women are more likely to worry about detail, less about generalities, than men.

7.—Women are generally less opinionated than men (except as indicated in paragraph 2 above).

8.—Offsetting much of the above, and underlying the whole female mood, is a readiness to accept the inevitable and to make the best of complications. There is a sense of endurance and acceptance through up and down, thick and thin, which is less often found among men.

9.—In some ways, therefore, women are steadier, at a rather slacker level, than men in this war.

10.—Consequent upon their tendency to more depression and less war happiness, women are more susceptible to reassurance.

11.—Fewer women are externalising the tensions and experiences of war than men. They tend to have more bottled up inside them, subjectively, emotionally.

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Had those in authority been thinking rather more clearly what they were doing with women, we might have been spared many of the delays and bottle-necks in our war effort which have resulted from the slow mobilisation of our woman-power, still far short of maximum. It would be boring, if entertaining, to go back over the whole story of the way women have been confused by the multiple appeals made to them by Mr. Bevin and other men, alternating with threats of conscription and expectations of compulsion. A brief glimpse into a few days of it will suffice, and is relevant here because this past treatment of our potential female war army teaches some lessons and has also led to much of the present confusion and inertia in this quarter. As long ago as March 20, 1941, the eight women appointed by the Ministry of Labour as the Consultative Committee to the Woman-power Campaigns made headlines, with :

BEVIN EIGHT REVOLT.

They Say He Took Wrong Line In Appealing To Women.

Mr. Bevin had asked for 100,000 volunteers in the first fortnight of March, 1941, 500,000 within a few weeks. The press had initially reported the response as magnificent. The *Evening Standard* of March 10 had a double-banner headline on the front page :

WOMEN RUSH TO ENLIST TO-DAY IN BEVIN'S ARMY.

Three evenings later the same paper had a much less conspicuous item, relegated to page 7, with the heading :

Response To Call For Arms Workers "Disappointing."

The *Evening Standard* item of March 13 gave some of the questions which it was supposed that women contemplating registering voluntarily were asking, and the answers. These also revealed a strange situation, a rather naive approach to the tensions and anxieties of women. For instance, one of the questions—and indeed it was a question some interested women were asking : "What sort of wages will I be

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paid?" To this the Ministry of Labour answer read as follows:

It is impossible to answer this question exactly; a lot depends on whether the firm employing you pays union rates. If it does, the minimum will be 35s.

But as the women were then registering to be allocated to a job which they did not select themselves, how could they know in advance whether they would get union rates? Indeed, this answer was calculated to accentuate uncertainty on a subject where assurance was relevant.

Another question was: "What are the working hours?" and the answer: "They will vary at different factories." On the subject of whether the workers would be sent far from home, they were informed that "it is essential workers should be mobile-minded"; this ambiguous statement was grammatically beyond the understanding of many. And so on.

Thus was the ground prepared in a mass campaign for volunteers! No wonder by March 10 the result was "disappointing." Women are not dolts. However, by March 13 (before the "revolt" of the Consultative Committee), the *Daily Mirror* had worked the campaign up again, back to the old March 10 success, thus:

WIVES AND MOTHERS RUSH FOR WAR WORK.

Labour Exchanges were stormed yesterday by an army of women responding to the Ministry of Labour's appeal for women war workers. . . .

The next day (and nine months before it was true) the *Daily Sketch* seemed to offset this storm of volunteers with main front-page headline:

CONSCRIPTION OF WOMEN TO BEGIN.

The *Evening Standard* said that registration must be done through an employment exchange. But the *Daily Sketch* said (with characteristic attitude to the worker) that registration was to be done through "Unemployment Exchanges." The *News Chronicle* (March 11) said applicants need *not* visit an

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employment exchange, they "can seek advice at Demonstration Centres." The following item in the *News Chronicle* was in itself a reflection of the campaign position, in that it again implied that the appeal for volunteers had been made in a somewhat precipitate manner:

PLANS TO MEET THE WOMEN'S RESPONSE TO WAR WORK CALL.

Plans have been made to meet the response to Mr. Bevin's call for women war workers. It is expected that most of the volunteers will be taught in the factories where they are to work.

Two days later, on March 13, the Advertising Trade paper, *World's Press News*, contained the following announcement which might be calculated to confuse the observer who had by now come to the conclusion that an extensive campaign had already been launched:

BIG LABOUR SCHEME STARTS.

As part of the Government drive to get some hundreds of thousands of recruits into vital munitions industries, the Ministry of Labour, in co-operation with the Ministry of Information, is launching an extensive advertising scheme.

Press, posters, leaflets, broadcasting, films and special local drives will be used.

And again, two days later, the *Daily Express* front-paged (March 15) a sort of late surprise (surprising to anyone trying to follow this business) headlined:

BEVIN TELLS THE WOMEN TO-MORROW.

By this time there was chaos in the public mind. This was accentuated when papers, after the Minister's second speech on the subject within a week, headlined that the 20's and 21's would shortly be conscripted *without exception*. Within a couple of days extensive exceptions were being announced. And by this time influential intelligent women, as well as the young women who are pawns in the game, began to get fed-up. For instance, the *Daily Mail* had a feature article by Ann Temple, headed: *You've Got It Wrong, Mr. Bevin.*

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This chronicle of headlines and items directed at the women of Britain can be continued almost day by day, certainly week by week, from March, 1941, to March, 1942. Appeals and directions, no doubt based on consistent policy within the Government, were not coherently presented to the country. This is characteristic of the treatment of human labour problems. It is particularly characteristic of the male approach to women workers in this country. Such treatment wastes enthusiasm and fritters away impulse, produces lethargy, apathy, and "waiting to be forced" among many women required in war industry. It delays expansions and ready replacements for months, influences the general willingness of women in other directions, and hampers all forms of voluntary recruiting.

It is difficult, against this background, to blame (for anything worse than stupidity) a girl described by a friend thus :

We had yet another example of women's outlook to the war situation to-day. Eve registers on Saturday and asked what she was to register as. After some palaver it was decided that she was to register as "Colour Laboratory Assistant." Someone asked her what she was going to do to help her country. "Damn the country," she replied. "I'll do something for my country when my country does something for me. Let them pay a soldier's wife a decent allowance for a start instead of the skimping little bit they dish out every week."

Underlying this complicated picture of multiple official appeal, one suspects the assumption that women are somehow inferior or childish, a sub-tense of the male, automatically to be treated as a side issue, higgledy-piggledy, *ad hoc*. Indeed, this assumption underlies industry generally, where many jobs can be done by women, but have naturally been held by men, because of the pre-war years of economic insecurity and unemployment, when it was more important for men to have jobs than women, and they could keep up a high standard of pay for the job. Working men naturally feel suspicion and anxiety when women take over more and more jobs of a skilled sort, and prove themselves capable of doing many

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tasks which they never did before. They suspect the employers may try to maintain this state of affairs after the war. For this reason we had the strange spectacle of the House of Commons recently spending its time passing the "Restoration of Pre-War Trade Practices Bill" which ensures the return to the exact individual male *status quo* of pre-war employment. An argument was conducted as to whether the employers should be fined £25 or £100 for failing to reinstate the same man in the same job. This frame of mind, most marked in industry, has produced another important effect from the women's side. Everywhere it is implied, or explicitly stated, that she is only to be there "for the duration." Afterwards she will be put out. Many women accept this and are glad of it, but many are not so happy. Some typical comments from women in munitions factories :

"We shall get pushed out."

"We shall be kicked out."

"We are bound to lose our jobs after the war."

"There won't be jobs for people like us."

"There won't be jobs for women."

"There won't be jobs for people like myself."

"I wonder what'll happen to people like myself who are specially trained for a war-time job?"

"I suppose jobs will be hard to get. What is going to happen to us after the war, I'd like to know."

This feeling was not confined to munitions workers; for instance :

"We'll get pushed out, I suppose." (Manageress of British Restaurant.)

"People like myself will find themselves thrown out, I think—our opportunity came in the war." (Welfare Worker.)

But more important still is the feeling that whatever one is doing is important—a feeling due largely to the confusion of appeals and directions, producing almost a coma! This can be summarised in the following table based on 1,200 people studied in our Production investigation :

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Estimate of Importance of Own Job	Percentage giving this estimate among those engaged in :	
	War Industry	Other Occupations
Very important.. ..	22%	13%
Important	68%	61%
Unimportant	6%	16%
Ambiguous	3%	8%
Don't know	1%	2%

On paper, this attitude does not matter very much, because the Ministry of Labour can now compel women in any direction, after many months of semi-compulsion and pressure which did much to confuse. On paper, compulsion gives you the thing you want which you failed to get from the appeal. But it is a purely quantitative effect. And the need for compulsion applied to women is, in fact, a measure of the failure not so much of the voluntary system or of the women, but of the Government to speak to them clearly and to make them see what they require of them. For voluntary response is undoubtedly more efficient because more quick, more lively, requiring less organisation and less intervention, with less margin for antagonism from the persons going into the jobs. The woman who volunteers on her own account is bound to approach the matter in better heart and mind than the woman forced.

Having had so much trouble in getting women to volunteer, Government departments let out a sort of gasp of relief when they at last took the girl by the ears and started conscription. There is always a tendency, in these circumstances, to feel that in solving the initial problem you have solved the problem. I am a little afraid that this is what has happened in the present case and that some of the results are unsatisfactory. Reluctant or apathetic or bored girls working in factories do *produce*, but it is not enough that they should produce something—they need to produce (in the interests of the war) *everything they possibly can*. The Ministry of Labour have a very difficult problem on hand here, but it is one in which they would undoubtedly be assisted by a fresh outlook towards woman-power. The Select Committee on National Expenditure have recommended in their Forty-seventh Report (published April 9) that a

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permanent panel of consultative women should have a key position in the Ministry of Labour. Something of the sort is clearly required, but that in itself will not do the trick. Right through *at every level* a change from the masculine-conducted outlook is required. The Government showed its masculine tendency very clearly on one recent occasion, when it announced the names of the Committee set up to investigate the Women's Services. They were all male political secretaries of the Government departments directly concerned. This was such a flagrant act of stupidity that the House of Commons reacted violently, and a new Committee was set up under Miss Violet Markham. But this is only an extreme manifestation of a general frame of mind, quite "unintentional" and simply automatic.

The spotlight has moved on to women in industry, having for months been focussed on the Women's Services, especially the A.T.S. Large sums have been spent in appealing to women to join the A.T.S. The response was quite inadequate to meet the need; despite every effort of modern publicity method, compulsion eventually had to be introduced on this side, too. The main line of appeal (there is not space for detail here) was around the idea that women should come forward and take the places of men in the Forces. That has, indeed, been the inference of nearly all special war appeals to women. Women are told that they should help, relieve, follow or support the men. It still remains the man's war in which women *help*.

The most remembered and registering pieces of A.T.S. propaganda in order of frequency were:

The Blonde Bombshell poster.

"I wonder whether they will let me *do my own job* in the A.T.S." (Press advertisement.)

"It's time I got a new hat." (Press advertisement.)

The Blonde Bombshell was far and away the most "successful" piece of A.T.S. propaganda. This poster showed a striking woman's head in an idealised and rather Hollywood fashion. It dealt with one of the biggest conscious and unconscious factors against joining the A.T.S., namely the fear of loss of individuality and of over-uniformity. For every one woman (in a random sample) who criticised the

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poster, fourteen liked it and disagreed with the decision to withdraw it. The poster which replaced this "glamour girl" showed a thoroughly uniformed-looking woman marching against a background of a long line of *soldiers*, supported by the caption: You Are Wanted *Too*! However undesirable the blonde bombshell, the brunette martinet who replaced her emphasised the subsidiariness and mass-uniformity, two things which were already putting women off from joining the A.T.S.

There are differences between men and women, and in getting the best out of women, much depends on the intelligent exploitation of female characteristics and abilities and skills. Women are doing a terrific job of work in this war. Taken by and large it is probably fair to say that they are if anything more patriotic and more unselfish than men. At the same time, their patriotism is less directed, less based on a coherent appreciation of what is going on. They have not had enough information put across in ways that will hold their attention, and *individually* many women are still, to a surprising degree, out of the war. Women are less interested in papers, radio news, and other forms of national propaganda. But they are particularly susceptible to pictorial material. It would be possible to illustrate this with hundreds of examples from studies we have made of the impact of official propaganda since the war. Almost every piece of propaganda studied has impacted less on women than on men, often much less. Pictorial propaganda has been relatively more successful with women, but most of it has been masculine in approach and so it is impossible to know how completely successful this sort of propaganda might be for women. Women are ready and anxious to do their best, but this best depends entirely on what they think they are doing and how *urgent* they feel it is. At present there are no grounds for complacency on this account. A lot of women still don't really appreciate what the war is about. Some 2,500 years ago the Chinese philosopher remarked of women: "They are difficult creatures. Keep them at a distance and they are resentful; treat them kindly and they become familiar." The Cabinet still has plenty to learn from Confucius. Personally, I believe that a great deal could

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quickly be done to increase female feelings of urgency and thus accelerate the already large part that women are playing in this war. But that involves quite a change in the outlook of several of the most important men, a lot more "dilution" not only in industry or the Services, but also among senior Civil Servants and in all the areas of leadership; above all, Mental Dilution. Is it possible to believe, for instance, that there is not a woman in the country who is of sufficient capacity to be a member of the War Cabinet? Is it not likely that a woman in the War Cabinet would, in this third year of total war (with its greater demands on the stamina, self-sacrifice and intelligence of women than ever before) make a useful contribution to the thinking and the planning of both immediate and long-term policy for which the War Cabinet is responsible?

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By ANCEPS

I.—THE PROBLEM.

MISINTERPRETATION of the nature of the impact of science on religion commonly arises from confusion of two very different things. Science, like religion, is extremely difficult to define, but, like religion, it involves a "mood," an attitude of mind, and a method. Science is no more to be identified either with scientific mechanism or with the application of the knowledge won by the scientific method than is religion with either liturgy or ecclesiastical preferment. To ascribe to science the evils of modern warfare, for example, is as absurd as to treat the invention of the cutting edge in the Old Stone Age as the "cause" of murder. The error should hardly need refutation outside the Fifth Form Debating Society. The *causa sine qua non*, the indispensable condition of war, as of murder, is, of course, the evil inclination of man which uses the most effective instrument available. There is nothing so innocent that it may not be turned to an ill use and you cannot have power for good without also having power for evil. Mother's milk itself has been the first nourishment of every murderer.

Moreover, it is absurd to regard scientific research as intrinsically opposed to religious belief, for multitudes of men of science, both before and after the "Bridgewater Treatises," have worked all their lives in the conviction that they were demonstrating "the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God." It is manifest that if God fulfils himself in nature, it must, in a Christian view, be at least worth learning about nature. That "Nature is the Art of God" seemed evident, ages before Sir Thomas Browne said it (1635). And if Saint Augustine and the scholastic centuries turned their faces the other way, the ancients did not. Seneca, Pliny, Galen, to say nothing of Aristotle and Plato, had no more doubts on the point than had Job and Amos before them and Herbert

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of Cherbury and John Locke after them. That nature reveals the mind of God was the very foundation of eighteenth-century Deism and is put with embarrassing frankness by a bad poet, clerical, timid, and lugubrious, but living on the very crest of the deistic wave:—

Nature is *Christian*; preaches to mankind
And bids dead matter aid us in our creed

(Young's *Night Thoughts*, 1742)

And if, in the next century, the accepted poet of the age in one mood saw nature as "red in tooth and claw," he was ever more prone to feel that "nature, so far as in her lies, imitates God." Nor did he find it difficult to contain the first within the second.

Despite all this we cannot ignore the fact that times have changed. Our own age has become a "special case." Man's power over nature is so incomparably greater than it has been in former times that the difference has passed from the region of degree to that of kind. The change may be exemplified by a single illustration. It is calculated that in the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century a greater weight of metal was won from the earth than in all the ages before. This might have been used for improving the human lot. The larger part was actually the immediate instrument of destruction. Shall we charge this evil use against the miner on the coal face? against the metallurgical chemist in his laboratory? against the professor of mathematics, geology or physics? against the engineer improving the internal combustion engine? against the pathologist investigating the biology of gas gangrene and trench feet? against the meteorologist predicting the weather for flying? Surely such charges could mean nothing unless we assume that these men—each living his own life, with his own loves and duties, his own cares and joys—are, on the whole, worse than they would have been if science has not shaped the pattern of their lives. For such a worsening of human nature there is not the shadow of evidence. An ancient flint battle-axe may not have killed as many as a modern bomb, but its intention was the same. So far as we can judge, the springs of conduct have not varied greatly from the Old Stone Age to our own. Human character seems

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more permanent than the everlasting hills and man seems to be much what he was before the last glacial epoch.

Surveying our own situation we observe: (1) that after some sixteen centuries of effective supremacy of Christian religious and ethical teaching, the power of the evil inclination is not manifestly or substantially diminished; (2) that in the last centuries science has drawn men to it with a passion comparable to that roused by religion; and (3) that, like religion, science has produced characteristic patterns of conduct. Some have suggested that a rival to Christianity has thus arisen. In order to follow a little further the implications of this common misconception, some examination must be made of what we mean by science and scientific method.

II.—SCIENTIFIC METHOD.

Science never considers, and cannot consider, the world as a whole. It is quite essential to any science that it proceed by abstracting a part of the universe, to be considered by and for itself. This abstracting—"fragmentation" is, in certain contexts, perhaps a better word—carries with it the secret of the scientific triumph. The first reaction to the word "science" to most minds is either that of the grander achievements of astronomy and cosmology or of the material devices of our immediate modern surroundings. Yet the essentials of the method are more vividly brought out by considering studies that elicit no immediate emotions. Let us therefore take our illustration from neutral ground.

If I decide to be, let us say, an entomologist I must, by that very fact, abandon (in my entomological mood) all thought of animals other than insects and of other sciences (save for their bearing on entomology), to say nothing of all consideration of the great themes of religion, art, philosophy and literature. If I cannot put these things aside while at work in my entomological laboratory, it is certain that my entomology will be ineffective. A science must work by abstraction. If it does not, it is not a science.

Perhaps, in the strictest sense, therefore, there is no such thing as science, but only sciences, each of which has its own field. Insects are the field of entomology, minds of psychology, metals of metallurgy, and so on. Each science

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describes its own little bit of the universe in its own terms. These terms are derived by a comparison of yet smaller bits of the universe with other smaller bits. Such terms have little or no application outside the particular science for which they were devised. The technical terms of the sciences have no universal application or value.

Much misunderstanding, even among scientific men, has arisen from transference of scientific terms from their original field of reference. Consider the mass of fruitless disputation arising from such words as "evolution," "instinct," "element" in various scientific fields; or the employment of such words as "race," "tradition," "heredity" to give a scientific appearance to intellectual twaddle; or, again, the endless confusion between scientific and philosophic usages of such terms as "substance," "theory," "idea." Indeed, a special department of the semantics of the language of the sciences is long overdue. It is a peculiarly difficult subject, for language is a product of complex and changing social conditions and, therefore, cannot be fixed or stabilised.

Without entering into the region of semantics, it suffices here to indicate that you cannot have a science of the whole universe. Specifically it is impossible to reach that end—or perhaps any end—by just adding the sciences together. Even apart from the many difficulties and objections intrinsic to such a process, there are vast regions of experience—those occupied, for example, by literature and philosophy—that are refractory of scientific treatment. In any event, there is no such thing as a universal science as an integrated whole. It is more than doubtful whether there ever can be.

Nevertheless, a science must not be mistaken for a mere fragmentation of knowledge. The necessary minuteness of scientific analysis may give those untrained in the sciences an impression of triviality. The restriction of the field of experience of scientific men is a favourite, legitimate, and praiseworthy theme for humorists. There are certainly many scientific men who spend their lives absorbed in detail. But, of course, science is a great deal more than an exploration of ever minuter details. The objective of scientific analysis is to reach a series of points—a natural frontier—from which the mind can return along its tracks to arrange its findings

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into some pattern. These patterns are scientific theories or generalisations. They frequently involve a reunion of the findings of workers in different departments. Often they become the starting-places for new analytic explorations and bases of yet further generalisations.

The impressiveness of the great scientific generalisations must not, however, deceive us as to their essentially abstractive nature. Each is as much a consideration of an artificially separated fragment of the universe as are the minutest entomological researches. Whether we are discussing the galactic circle or the antenna of a scarab or the "expanding universe" (which is, of course, not the universe at all, but an abstracted part of it),¹ we are dealing with an artificially separated bit of the world. Nor can these scientific generalisations, when added together, be treated as a whole. The universe as a whole is *not* explained by gravitation plus particulate doctrine of matter plus relativity plus evolution plus subconscious mind plus the doctrine of marginal values and so on. Such things cannot all be added together. Some of them are incommensurate with others of them. And, moreover, such of them as can be added together provide thereby not a goal but rather a starting-place for further exploration. The vastness of the territory which has been subjected to the scientific process must not blind us to this essentially partial or temporary character of the conclusions. The sciences can, at best, describe only a part of the universe.

Thus to the question "What does science say about religion?" the strictly true answer is: "Nothing whatever," if by religion is meant something that includes its inner essence. Science can say something of gnats and stars and mountains and, maybe, of the relations of all these things to each other. It may treat of the operations of minds, both individual and collective. It may analyse a religion from without and tell us something of, let us say, the psychology of Buddhism or of the debt of Islam to Byzantine Christianity. It may display the influence of a religion on the conduct not only of a society but even of an individual. But, on the

¹ This point is of such philosophic importance and is so often naively missed that it seems necessary to draw special attention to it. Put in another way, we may say that the word "universe" as here used is a technical term of astronomical and mathematico-physical science.

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one hand, science can neither bring all the parts of the universe into relation with each other nor, on the other, touch all aspects of experience. Thus, specifically, on that essence of religion, Communion with the Divine—without which there can be no religion in the Christian sense—science must remain mute. For this there are reasons beside those already touched upon.

The experimental method, better called the experiential method, is, of its nature, a method of comparison. It is, therefore, not applicable to experience that is unique. To say this is not to seek an impregnable citadel for the final retreat of theology before advancing science. The position is a very elementary and ancient one. It is set forth dozens of times by psalmist and prophet and Hebrew sage. These men knew nothing of the conquests of the experiential method, but they had had plenty of inner experience, which is, of its nature, unique, and which they separated from the outer experience which they shared with their fellows. They distinguished their private worlds from the public world. It is perhaps because they made this distinction so sharply and clearly that they failed to create an effective ecclesia. Perhaps this great prophetic religion must always remain the religion of private worlds. The method of science is inapplicable to private worlds.

III.—EFFECTS OF SCIENCE ON CHARACTER.

The prosecution of the sciences involves, however, not only a method but also a definite mood in which, and in which alone, that method can be effectively applied. Now scientific men are not always in the scientific mood. Like other men they have, for example, their philosophic, their religious and their artistic moods. The irrelevance of science to such moods is very evident to them when they are actually prosecuting their scientific studies. Nevertheless, men of science naturally have views outside the scientific field, though aspiration to express themselves on the major extra-scientific themes is rarer than theologians are wont to imagine. Nevertheless, the desire does become effective, and some scientific men speak outside their own fields with very great force and authority. Their force is their own, but their

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character of great men of science bears comparison with that of any class and, notably for our purpose, with that of any long line of distinguished ecclesiastics. This is no criticism either of ecclesiastics or of religion.

Patterns of conduct produced by devotion to the sciences are different from the religious patterns; yet they are not wholly different. The mood in which scientific men approach their task can never have been derived from religion, even though some of them have thought it was. But it may well be derived from something that bears a strong likeness to religion, something that may enter into religion, something very near to that "holy, subtle, lively, clear and undefiled thing that is more moving than any motion and goes through all things by reason of her pureness." It is pictured in the unforgettable seventh chapter of the Book of Wisdom, itself an echo, on its own peculiar Alexandrian sounding-board, of the authentic Hebrew prophetic voice.

IV.—IMPACT OF THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY ON CHRISTIANITY.

Having glanced at some of the ways in which science moulds character, we turn to certain character-patterns produced by religion. It is, of course, substantially impossible to frame a definition to cover all phases of religion. Here we have only to consider those moods habitually produced in the highly sophisticated atmosphere of our own civilisation. Omitting the private world, we discern three main religious activities answering to inherent human needs. These we may distinguish as liturgical, humanitarian and theological. We are concerned only with the last two. It is true that they cannot be completely separated from each other, but the traditions that they represent are not identical and, moreover, they represent different moods. To adopt the covering term "Christianity" for both is to do justice to the historical importance of neither. Moreover, it conceals the fact that Christianity is not only a religion but also a civilisation—another signal for semantic caution.

Quite justly it has been said that a religion can be understood truly only from *within*. But apart from personal

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religion, there is the effect of religion on the life of society. With equal justice it may be urged that the functioning of religion in the human fellowship can be observed effectively only from *without*, for it is not given to all of us to see ourselves as others see us.

To estimate the influence of a religion on a society is extremely difficult. Many factors, besides religion, determine men's relations to each other. Moreover, the society influences the religion as well as the religion the society. An estimate is therefore likely to be best formed by those who can adopt the perspective of observers. It is only as one of these that this writer can offer any reflexions. He professes neither the Christian religion nor what seems to him to be, next to the Religion of Nationalism, its most formidable immediate rival. This is sometimes, but wrongly, called the "religion of science." At risk of misunderstanding, it is here discussed as the "Religion of Humanity." By this is meant the religion that regards man as both a means and an end in himself. This religion is by no means incompatible with theistic doctrine, but it customarily treats it mainly as irrelevant to conduct.

During the last few centuries the Religion of Humanity has been particularly forward in applying the conclusions of the sciences to the amelioration of the human lot. Its ethical system has thus become naively regarded, even by some of its ablest exponents, as based upon and developed from scientific data. Thereby has arisen the misconception of a "religion of science." The error perhaps began with Voltaire.

Of the great Religion of Humanity—for a great religion it verily is—Communism is a modern sect, product of certain special conditions. But we should observe that the Religion of Humanity has far more ancient roots than Communism, and is antecedent to Christianity itself. Scientific activity is in no way essential to its efflorescence. It has appeared under such names as Stoicism, Humanism, Deism, Utilitarianism, Positivism, Secularism, Communism and many more. A way of thinking and of living that inspired Hippocrates, Pericles, Zeno, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Vives, Herbert of Cherbury, Grotius, Locke, Voltaire, Pope, Benjamin Franklin, Bentham,

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authority must not be mistaken for the authority of science when they are not speaking on their chosen sciences.

Most of those who have written most effectively on the relationship of science to the other regions of experience have, in fact, not themselves participated actively in the scientific process. But even if they have done so, it is to be remembered that when they are discussing universal themes they are not using the scientific method and should therefore not be credited with its prestige. This no more belittles what they have to say outside their sciences than it would magnify their scientific work to say that they were men of saintly character, musical ability or philosophic attainments. Scientific achievement is irrelevant to universal themes and, specifically, irrelevant to the inmost nature of man and the inmost element in religion.

Despite all this it is a fact that the pursuit of science produces certain effects on the mental and spiritual life. Scientific interest changes the content of the mind so fundamentally that ultimately it alters even the way of thinking. Science has done more than give us a new heaven and a new earth. It has given us not merely an altered and revised version of heaven and earth, but a heaven and earth of a kind unknown before. Science has also given us new minds and hearts and memories to enjoy the new heaven and earth. Theologians miss this point at their peril, for science has set such a wall between the generations as has never before been seen. The worlds of Newtonian interrelationship of parts, of Darwinian grading of beast and man, of Freudian extension of the field of mind, and of Einsteinian space-time continuum, for example, may not integrate with each other, but none of them can be discussed in either the language or the mood of the days when theology was queen of the sciences and St. Thomas thought he was interpreting Aristotle's synthesis of the moral and material universe. The very habit of sustained ratiocination on a deductive basis, so cherished by theological and philosophical minds of an earlier generation, has lapsed where it is not discredited. Only those who have submitted to a special discipline can even think the thoughts of those ages of faith.

Theologians complain (or ought to if they don't) that

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they are misunderstood; that they have their own technical vocabulary that demands study; that men will not exhibit the patience to get at their meaning; that a materialist generation forsakes its own mercy. All this and more is true. Religious conservatism has for four centuries sought to dam the rising flood of the "new philosophy." The dam has burst and cannot be rebuilt on its old site.

It is true that men do not understand the old terms in their proper context. But it is also true that, if they did so understand them, they would also understand how much richer and fuller their own modern world is than that of the Middle Ages. There was a time when the material world seemed finite and bounded by a fixed sphere so that all adventure was perforce spiritual. That time is no more. The sciences have directed human interest into new paths, given a new content to minds and found a new way in which they may work.

Moreover, apart from the content of the mind and its manner of working there is also a way in which the scientific discipline directly influences character. It is a fact that the sciences do provide a way of life. For their effective prosecution they demand self-control and self-denial and strict regard for truth. Their pursuit needs courage and unselfishness and sensitiveness to the thoughts of others. Especially they require an extreme sensibility, both natural and acquired, to that wonderful form of beauty which is found in order. Moreover, on the plane of human relations the first needs of the pursuit of the sciences are sober, industrious and modest living, and, above all, loyalty to the great ideal of truth as evinced by evidence, and therefore openness of mind, and outspokenness wherever error is in question. Thus science produces in her votaries very noble and characteristic patterns of conduct and even elements of sanctity. Anyone who denies this cannot be well informed as to the lives of the great devotees of the sciences and of the ways in which they have come to be interpreters of nature. Let him read the personal records of such as Archimedes, Boyle, Darwin, Faraday, Hales, Herschel, Huygens, Lister, Linnæus, Maxwell, Newton, Pasteur, Ray. True, there have been great exponents of science who were not of this lofty type, but the general

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Mill, Comte, Marx, Lenin, has had a series of great prophets.

The Religion of Humanity is ignored in most works on political history because it has never possessed Churches in the material sense. It has no architectural monuments, nor, until of late, has it had many formal followers. It is difficult to trace some parts of its historic course since it constantly makes compromises with any form of religion the ethical system of which is not wholly incompatible with its own ethics. The historian of the human mind, however, can hardly be in any doubt of the continued significance of the Religion of Humanity. For long in the Roman Empire it was, as Stoicism, a formidable rival to Christianity. Episodes in its course have borne such labels as "Humanist revolt," "Renaissance," "French Revolution," "Utilitarian School," "Aufklärung," and "Humanitarian Movement."

Now, after sixteen centuries during which Christianity has been supreme, the Religion of Humanity has, as Communism, again become a serious rival to Christianity. In this new phase, it has gained an enormous adventitious prestige from its special eagerness for alliance with that triumphant scientific movement which, for various equally adventitious reasons, Christianity has largely treated as foe. It is worth noting that in Russia under Communism the Religion of Humanity has obtained the same type of state support that Christianity has enjoyed throughout Europe since the fourth century.

During its course the Religion of Humanity, like Christianity, has been subject to perversions. Which has produced the uglier products we need not discuss. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. But the two religions are susceptible of comparison and, regarded from without, this is the only method by which they can be intelligibly considered. All we can know of religions from the outside, apart from their history and doctrinal details, is the sort of human result that they produce. We need not question that there is more in religion than the acts of the men that profess them, or that the Lord seeth not as a man seeth, or that the issues of life are from the heart and that all things are there possible. But nothing of that kind can be discussed on the scientific and comparative level.

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V.—IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON CHRISTIANITY.

In the history of ideas few events have been more misinterpreted than the impact of the experiential method on the theological system of the Middle Ages. That system was still untouched in the sixteenth century. It stalks the twentieth, an uneasy and aloof anachronism, moaning plaintively, and not unjustly, of being misunderstood.

It is essential to hold in mind that the material world of the mediæval thinker (and of theological nomenclature) was limited by an outermost "heaven," the spherical internal surface of the greatest of the spheres around the central earth. (The elementary error that scholastics thought the Earth flat should not be repeated.) Grant a central earth as the place of man's short mortal sojourn. Grant that it is surrounded by an exactly arranged series of spheres of which the dimensions are theoretically knowable. Grant that beyond the outermost sphere is a world of perfection where space and time have no meaning. It is then possible to erect a complete system of thought in which the spiritual and moral world is so incomparably more important than the diagrammatically known material world, that the latter is not worth study. Such was the world of the doctors of the Church from St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas and beyond. That was the system of thought in which developed the technical terminology of modern theology.

At first the men of the experiential method, the "new philosophy," sought a compromise with this system. They had no complete scheme of their own. What justification, then, would there be for any of them—Galileo or Descartes—to break with that part of a system which he was in no way prepared to replace? The compromise they sought is the compromise that men still seek. Galileo put it in a sentence when he said "The bible teaches men how to go to heaven, not how the heavens go."

Why, then, should a shifting of the earth from the exact centre as suggested by Copernicus have introduced an upheaval? The answer is that it did not! The religious mood is always conservative. There was certainly opposition to the view of Copernicus, but for two generations it was not fierce or dangerous. Copernicus died in 1543. It was

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seventy-three years before his book was placed in the Index of Prohibited Books. What had happened in the meantime?

The answer demands some readjustment of the conventional historic view. In the scheme of Copernicus the outer heavens were, as in the orthodox scheme, at a limited distance from the earth. Copernicus offended conservatism, but hardly orthodoxy. The world of Copernicus, being limited, could still be conceived as a "creature" (Greek *ktisis*, *Romans* Ch. 8, verses 19-22 and elsewhere) and thus something separate from the godhead. This view was, however, disturbed before the end of the century. Before Galileo had spoken there was in the air another view, adumbrated in the Middle Ages, that the outermost heaven had no definite inner bounding limits, or rather that it had no separate existence. It was suggested that the stars were scattered in infinite distances of space. Thus the world, being devoid of frontiers or limits, could not be thought of as a creature. This is in effect to say that creator and creature are indistinguishable. The view is most forcibly voiced by Bruno, who was its martyr. To place him among the martyrs of science is to get him out of focus. He was no man of science, nor did he understand the experiential method, nor would he have been interested in it; but, like certain others of his day, he sensed certain philosophic implications if the same treatment as that accorded by Copernicus to the inner spheres were extended to the outmost sphere.

Bruno's view links up with the pantheism that long after his death came to flower with Spinoza. It may be that those who condemned him had more cause to fear than he whom they condemned, as he said at his trial. But when Galileo's *Messenger of the Heavens* in 1610 announced a host of new stars stretching magnitude after magnitude beyond the reach of unaided vision, it was, indeed, something terrifying that had happened. The whole fabric of traditional thought was now at risk, the very scheme that seemed to hold civilisation itself together. There is evidence that from now on Galileo himself was more than a little afraid.

It is otiose at this date to discuss the misunderstandings of stupid men about the movements of the earth. Yet it is the simple fact that, to this day, theology has not settled its

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account on this point of the distinction of creator and creature. It is absurd to call this a conflict between religion and science. It is a conflict that began three and a half centuries or more ago between two philosophies. One of these philosophies has and the other has not come to terms with science. One is the philosophy of the Religion of Humanity, the other has remained, in all essentials, the philosophy of Christianity.

(To be continued)

THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC MORALE

By METROPOLITICUS

ABOUT two years ago, in the grim days after Dunkirk when the Nation was bracing itself for the supreme struggle, the Ministry of Information, that had hitherto been concerned with providing information for the press at home and abroad and for the peoples in foreign countries, realised the need of getting the national war effort interpreted and appreciated at home and by a united nation. It had taken some steps to organise a Home division in which regional officers worked with the regional commissioners of Civil Defence, publicising information about the war, advising the local press, stimulating the holding of meetings, and reporting to the Government about the feelings and grievances of the people. But it had no organisation of the kind in London, nor had it created any popular organisation in the rest of the country. During that summer of 1940 it expanded its domestic activity. It assumed the function of stimulating the collective effort for victory and maintaining the confidence of the people. Its regional officers promoted the wide establishment of Information Committees representing all sections of the people and acting as agents of the Ministry.

It was in London that the most striking development took place. Sir Wyndham Deedes, who was well known as a citizen of vision, accepted the post of regional information officer, and set about the task of forming in all parts of Greater London, with its population of eight million persons, an "informed minority." These men and women would have themselves an understanding of the larger aspects of the war, and would carry this understanding to groups of people with whom they were in touch. The large purpose was to create a single-minded people for the war effort instead of "two nations." A local committee was established in the area of each local authority—and there were 99 separate authorities in the Metropolitan Police district. The committee was linked

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up with the borough, or urban, or rural council; it was composed partly of councillors and the heads of the chief political parties, partly of leading citizens. It was stressed that their value would lie in their individual rather than in their collective work; they would be the link between the Government, central and local, and the public. The members too would gather around them a much larger number of information officers, men and women of leading in streets and blocks of dwellings, societies and clubs, who would be a second link in the human chain of information. In those enthusiastic days one of the information committees described itself as "a local parliament of some 200 men and women, representative of every class and creed, of tried patriotism, and desiring to play an active part in the national effort." The functions of the committee were more concisely defined by Sir Wyndham Deedes as public education, interpretation, stimulation, and communication. Their first business was to give information about the aspects of war, to explain events, and above all to keep alive in the public mind the bigger issues. The second function was to explain to the public the endless stream of regulations and exhortations issued by the Government, and on the other side to interpret to local authorities and the Government the reaction of the public to these measures. Their third task was to encourage constructive thought about the war by meetings, discussions, and the stimulus of the spoken word; and to scotch idle rumours. Their fourth purpose, which played an excessive part in the original scheme—because, when the committees were created, the prospect of invasion seemed very near—was to convey bulletins of news or instruction in case of a break-down of the press and the broadcasting system.

It is interesting that at a crisis of the Napoleonic war, when also invasion seemed near, William Cobbett urged the Government to take similar action. Writing in 1803, "It appears to me," he said, "that the most dangerous point in our dangerous situation, is the want of a proper notion of our enemy amongst the common people, who, at present, are balancing in their own minds whether an invasion and a conquest of the country would, or would not, mend their circumstances. This most deadly doubt must be removed;

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and, to effect this removal, I can see no means at once so effectual and so speedy as an address to the people characterising and describing, with great force but with perfect truth, the principles, the manners, and the conduct of the enemy; briefly recounting some of his most wicked and detestable deeds towards the people of invaded countries, and drawing a picture strongly and truly descriptive of the wretched, the degraded, and infamous state, which, in all those countries has been the just reward of popular cowardice. Nothing would be so easy, nothing so speedy, nothing so efficacious to effect an object which is of an importance too great to be described by me."

The aim of the home division of the Ministry was expressed in an unblest term: "to sustain the public morale." There was a public illusion that morale meant courage, and a widespread dislike equally of the foreign-sounding word and of the idea that the people's courage needed to be sustained. That led a number of newspapers and some local authorities to pour scorn on local information committees. Public morale, of course, had little or nothing to do with the courage of the people. What it meant was the sense of being engaged in a common cause, a firm belief that this was the people's war. It was better defined as the conduct or behaviour of an individual or group, measured by what the person does and how he does it, and not by what he says. That there was need of strengthening the public understanding about the war, and thus obtaining a genuine solidarity of the people, could not be doubted. Mental health no less than physical health was an important munition of war. And a service of "L.R.P."—Lie Raids Precaution—against invasion of the mind by the enemy's propaganda, was not less necessary than the service of "A.R.P." against the invasion of the homes by bombs and incendiaries. Yet a considerable part of the people was disinclined to take kindly to the work of the Ministry. To the national dislike of ideas and of intellectual exercise was added the national resistance to any form of propaganda of which the individual was conscious. The public is not conscious of commercial advertisement, but is very aware of any attempt by the Government to mould opinion. The average man does not want to be taught what he is to think,

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and the enemy's use of propaganda made him suspicious of anything similar in our own country.

Nevertheless, in the summer and autumn of 1940 there was no little enthusiasm amongst the intelligent section of the people for the work of the local information committees. Popular rallies were organised, meetings, large and small, were held where national and local speakers gave surveys of the war; programmes were devised for systematic campaigns in the winter by War Commentaries and lectures on the British Commonwealth and the Empire. In London an educational sheet of the regional office, known as "London's Awake," which started with a circulation of 1,000, rose rapidly, to meet the requests of the Committees, to a circulation of some 20,000. It was a link between the Ministry and the information officers, teachers and the like; and sought to give some appreciation of the national effort, the progress of the war week by week, and the preparation of a new order at the end of the war.

Unwarranted grumblings were heard against some of the activities of the Ministry, as when it tried to obtain systematically a record of public opinion, either about general matters or about some specific subject concerning the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Supply, etc., by the methods of social survey. Part of the popular press conducted a campaign against "Cooper's snoopers"; and the reporting by local information committees of the local feeling about raids or transport was attacked as the introduction of methods of the Gestapo into English life. Part of the press also resented the intrusion of Government publicity; and some of the local authorities resented the suggestion that they could not deal adequately with all that was required for informing the public in the locality. It was clear that the Ministry must have courage and conviction about its task.

Then, in the winter, came the period of sustained nightly air-raids; and the need of strengthening public feeling on the one hand, and of representing immediately to the Government, on the other hand, the cares and grievances of the public was clear beyond all cavil. The local information committees, to a large extent, concentrated their efforts on helping all the other agencies of the Government to cope

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with the immediate and urgent needs, publicising by direct methods, by vehicles carrying loud-speakers and bulletins and posters, the information that the people required. They helped, too, in carrying into shelters some of the activities of lectures and discussions which could no longer be practised in the meeting hall, and in displaying documentary films about the war to a public which could no longer visit cinemas or theatres. The Government was kept alive by reports of committees to the urgency of improving the provision for the homeless, the evacuated and the vast mass of the people that spent the night out of their homes in public or domestic shelters. These specific things were done; and to that extent the public morale was sustained. But the other and not less important, if less definite, part of the work of the Ministry of Information on the home front, the constant education of the people and the effort to stimulate thought and discussion about the national effort, was steadily discouraged. The early eagerness of the local committees could only be maintained if the Ministry gave it every possible encouragement. Instead, there was a veto on any meetings under the auspices of the Ministry unless the local Member of Parliament approved of the speakers. The journals issued by the Regional Information Officers were abolished when the size of newspapers was cut down, in order to prevent some possible outcry against the Government's use of paper for propaganda! And what was less concrete but more damaging, the committees were used primarily as agencies for conducting campaigns on behalf of the various Ministries, for man-power and woman-power, for salvage and fuel-saving, etc., instead of as agents for education and interpretation. That mechanical occupation inevitably palled; and the "informed minority" felt that there was no use for them.

It was said by a wag that the Ministry of Information should adopt as its motto the saying of the French Monarch: "*L'état, c'est M.O.I.*" Never was a saying more inept. It has been the besetting trouble of the Ministry, from the beginning of the war to the present day, that it has no sense of aggrandisement and no confidence in itself. One of the youngest of the Ministries, it has been brow-beaten by the

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older members of the family, turned into a hand-maiden of all manner of work. That has meant on the home front that it is called on to do anything except its proper function: to educate the people about the war and the order after the war. It only required a reactionary back-bencher in Parliament to call in question some activity of a local body, or to protest against something done by a local information committee, for the Ministry to shut down the effort. The organisation at Malet Street in charge of the home division grew, in fact, larger and larger; but the spirit in which it was started, anyhow, in London, was dissipated. Members of the public have often charged the Ministry with being an instrument of frustration. That sense of frustration has been strongest in those who worked within the Ministry. It led to the stream of coming and going of officers which has become a by-word. Ministers, directors-general, heads of departments, passed by in baffling succession. Frank Pick, who had been brought in with the great prestige of an organizer to clear up the admitted confusion, resigned after three months. Sir Kenneth Clarke, who was brought in with the great prestige of a popular interpreter of art to advise on production, resigned. Sir Wyndham Deedes, who brought vision to the work in London, resigned. Mr. Tom Harrison, who had brought to the service of the Ministry his instrument of mass observation, and the whole staff of the Social Survey, resigned. One of the unfortunate results of the lack of confidence in itself is that the Ministry has shown constant timidity in giving the British public information about anything which had an element of a new order. It was months after Russia had become our Ally before it brought out any popular leaflets about the Soviet Union; and it exercised extreme caution with regard to speakers about the Union. Sir Bernard Pares, indeed, addressed audiences in many places; but it was more than one man could do to meet the demands of the country. Yet it was clear that the subject which the mass everywhere most wanted to know about was the Russian people and their effort. When a meeting of the officers of the Local Information Committees of the London area had been arranged, to hear an address from an official of the Ministry itself about

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simply by issuing leaflets, showing war films, giving pep-talks in the factories; what is needed is something more serious, more sustained than that kind of mechanical activity. It needs the vision of the whole; it must expound a policy, a new order, something more definite in its economic, social and political aspects than the Atlantic Charter, although based on the broad principles of a racial order in a Charter, and spread that amongst the people. You cannot have a nation intellectually and spiritually united unless there is a willingness to change the old state of things; and it should be the business of the Ministry to inform opinion in the full sense of the term, that is, not merely to give it facts, but ideas. In this struggle, when all that can be done to meet might with might has been done, the decisive work is to meet spirit with spirit. Without a vision the people perish.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE

By CUSTOS

IN 1919 the architects of the International Labour Organisation hesitated between two designs. An attempt might be made to secure the insertion in the Versailles Treaty of a labour charter providing for the immediate application of a number of labour reforms. The alternative was to obtain the setting up of some special machinery for dealing with labour problems on an international basis. The first was reflected in a number of trade union resolutions from different countries and had the powerful support of the American Samuel Gompers, who had long pressed for a "Magna Charta" of world labour. The more humdrum second design had germinated in a British draft, which had "first begun to take shape and form on a couple of sheets of typescript in No. 2, Whitehall Gardens, in the last days of 1918, as a result of conversations between myself (George Barnes) and Messrs. Butler and Phelan and Sir David Shackleton of the Ministry of Labour."¹

Ultimately the two designs were not so much combined as stuck together. The ILO Constitution, adopted by the Versailles Conference, chiefly concerns the creation of permanent machinery for the preparation, adoption, and application of international labour standards. It concludes with nine "methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should endeavour to apply." The machinery consists of the International Labour Conference and Office, of the method for adopting International Labour Conventions and Recommendations, of the procedure for their national ratification or acceptance, of mutual supervision of their application, and of the means of settling disputes. The methods and principles are headed by the mystic statement that "labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce," speak of the "right of association for all lawful purposes," the payment

¹ G. N. Barnes, *From Workshop to War Cabinet*.

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Russia, at the last moment it was cancelled, on the ground that the Director-General, Sir Walter Monckton, had gone to Russia, and that it would be better to wait for his return before promoting talks about our Allies!

No less surprising has been the treatment by the Ministry of the Atlantic Charter. Here, one would have thought, was a theme safe politically and internationally; and every effort should be made to spread a knowledge of it amongst the people. But no! A beautifully illustrated pamphlet about the Charter was issued for overseas and foreign countries. But after the better part of a year since the Declaration was given, the people of England could not obtain even an unillustrated pamphlet with the text of the Charter. If they wanted a copy of the text, they could buy it from the Stationery Office. Nor were meetings to discuss the Charter favoured. Apparently the Government has decided to do nothing to encourage discussion of the Charter at home, although the twenty-six United Nations prefaced their Declaration of Alliance in January by recalling that they had all endorsed the Charter's programme and principles. Speakers of the Ministry lecture about the Empire, America, France, war-time cookery, the horrors of Nazi rule and Hitler's new order, but they do not talk about *our* new order. There is, in fact, no recognition of the war of ideas or of the social revolution through which we are living. The effort to sustain morale seems to mean for the Ministry the giving either of pep-talks about Forces and our production, or of horrific talks about Nazi rule. Anything like discussion of new ideas or a new society is dangerous. It might lead to some demand for a change of the existing state of things; and that must be discountenanced by a politically neutral Ministry of Information.

The functions which the Ministry of Information aspired at one time to fulfil have been sadly neglected. Yet, during the last year consciousness has been renewed of the need of strengthening the minds of the people as well as their bodies. It is manifesting itself in a fresh and fruitful effort to spread education amongst the soldiers and the Civil Defence workers. The Army bureau of current affairs seeks to bring to the mass of the soldiers, by weekly lecture and by the promotion of debate, a fuller understanding about the war and a lively

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interest in the social and international problems. It is notable that the work is directed by Mr. W. E. Williams, who was at one time engaged in the Ministry of Information, but who, too, left it on account of that feeling of frustration. The similar activity with the Civil Defence bodies is conducted partly by regular education authorities, the London County Council and other county and borough councils, and partly by groups of men within these forces who realise the insistent desire for knowledge and the immense opportunity which is afforded by hours of leisure and waiting. They know also the immense dangers of boredom and of a feeling of futility and being in the dark. Stephen Spender, who is enrolled in the Fire Service, is helping to organize this work of adult education by the men themselves. That education, he wrote, "should assume the proportions of a mass movement, such as took place in Russia and Revolutionary Spain, based on the confidence of multitudes that they must really understand more to take their place in a new and better social order." "There is an essential connection between adult education and moral totalitarian war waged by a democracy." The reason for the defective morale in England, which is apparent to-day in a large section of the people and is one of the causes of the deficiencies of production and the endless invocations to greater effort, is the lack of understanding between the people who direct the war and those who are directed. As he noted, this was especially the case of the industrial workers. Totalitarian war requires total co-operation of the whole consciousness of the whole society at war; and that can be attained only by influence of personality and the spoken word. It is a crude fallacy to think that the press and the broadcast can give the full understanding of the war that is necessary.

It is to be hoped then that the Ministry of Information, in the face of the new crisis this summer, will be not less resolute than in 1940, imbibe fresh courage, and renew the effort which it initiated two years ago and allowed to slacken. The work of education for the army and defence forces has been taken out of its hands, but it has still the field of education and interpretation for the vast mass of the civilian population, the workers in the industries, the women in their homes, the youths in their clubs. It cannot do its work

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"of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life," and grow more precise with reference to the 1919 aim of an eight-hour day and weekly rest.

In so far as the international principles have not been forgotten, their fate has depended on the strength of national forces and on the success or failure in incorporating them in the finished products of the international labour machinery. The products of the machinery are arranged and displayed in the bulky volume which has recently been published by the ILO in Montreal.¹ On them, their quality, their adequacy and the use made of them must depend the judgment on the ILO during its first years, and should depend estimates of its future and perhaps of wider aspects of post-war reconstruction.

The International Labour Code is no more than an attempt to arrange in an orderly and convenient manner the provisions of the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference from 1919 to 1939. It also includes standards of social policy established in less formal ways, together with cases where the ILO has co-operated with the League of Nations in the framing of labour clauses for inclusion in League instruments. Its publication is not only of value to the student of international law and of labour relations, but should serve to practical purpose as a guide to legislators and administrators where new economic developments demand new types of labour protection or organisation.

The principal texts, the Conventions and Recommendations, have been approved by a two-thirds majority in a world parliament of labour policy, in which governments, organised employers, and organised workers are all represented. Their preparation has been careful and expert. They therefore can claim unique prestige as international standards of policy. Between the Conventions and Recommendations there is a fundamental legal difference. Recommendations are exclusively standard defining instruments. Conventions, on the other hand, are designed as obligation creating instruments. They are not binding on states by the fact of their adoption by the Conference, but become so only for the states which

¹ *The International Labour Code*, 1939. International Labour Office, Montreal, 1941. 920pp. Price 15s.

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ratify them. The status of a Convention in relation to a state for which it is not in force is analogous to that of a Recommendation; it embodies a standard which has been approved by the International Labour Conference but in respect of which the state has not accepted any obligation. It follows that the International Labour Code is not primarily a code of international obligations, but a code of internationally approved standards, some of which are capable of becoming binding upon the states by reason of ratification by those states of the relevant Convention.

The extent to which they have become so binding is an important element in testing the value of the Code and of the ILO machinery during the inter-war period, although it is not the sole test, for in many cases standards have been accepted where obligations have been refused. The Code comprises 67 Conventions, of which six were revisions of previous texts, thus making an effective total of 61. By 1st September, 1941, the number of ratifications registered was 882 distributed over 50 states. Given 50 states and 61 Conventions, ratifications might have totalled 3,050. The gap between the ideal and the realisation is considerable, but not so considerable as these figures represent, as some Conventions are of limited geographical interest, as sufficient time has not elapsed to obtain the ratification of the later Conventions, and indeed as some Conventions, like some national laws, are faulty in construction. Great Britain has ratified 31 Conventions; the States Members with the highest number of ratifications are Chile (33) and Belgium (32). It can be claimed that at the outbreak of war there was a far-flung though highly uneven network of international obligations and that the further development of these obligations was being continued unremittingly.

At the outbreak of war, however, there were a number of other international obligations in existence, which, though widely accepted, had become mere pious aspirations. Such might very easily have been the fate of ratified International Labour Conventions, particularly as the obligations they imposed were for each state largely internal, so that any other state was little inclined to act as if its own interests were directly affected by faulty application. Yet, on the whole

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and given time, the ratified Labour Conventions were adequately translated into national law and applied with a very fair degree of equal persistence. A part reason for this was that the machinery devised at Versailles did not cease with the act of ratification. It included a system of sanctions which remained a dead letter, and a system of annual reports, which, gradually evolving into international collaboration in the interpretation and application of labour standards, has in spite of illogicalities greatly reinforced the obligation-fixing character of the Conventions. Any state which ratifies a Convention is required each year to report to the ILO on the measures taken to give effect to the provisions of the Convention, and the reports are scrutinised by a standing committee of the ILO and secondly by the International Labour Conference. Although with the growing national susceptibilities and timidities of the years leading up to 1939 the public debates on these reports became more and more formal, the mere ticking-over of this part of the machinery kept warm the reality of international labour obligations.

As regards the value of the contents of the Conventions, a merit of the present codification is that it permits a much more comprehensive view than was possible to any but the magi when each text had to be searched for by year of adoption instead of by subject. Such a view prompts a first question whether the ILO should not begin all over again. That labour should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce in 1919 phraseology, or freedom from want in 1941 parlance, seems to have meant between 1919 and 1939 a series of exceptions and conditions, or at the most of carefully circumscribed benefits. Minimum wage-fixing machinery shall be created in trades in which wages are not effectively regulated by collective agreement and in which wages are exceptionally low, but each state shall be free to decide to which trades the machinery shall be applied. Children may not be employed in agriculture save outside the laws fixed for school attendance, but no obligation is imposed regarding any form of school attendance. Agricultural workers are to be secured the same rights of association as industrial workers, but the rights of industrial workers are

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not defined. Colonial workers are protected from forced labour, but may be compelled to work for 60 days in the year. The conclusion of colonial contracts of employment is carefully safeguarded, but there is no precise obligation limiting the duration of their contracts. These are, however, only occasional defects, each explicable by some circumstance of the time. If freedom from want is translated into law, organisation, and action, it will still be long before the translation is complete and all communities and all persons enjoy adequate standards of living.

In its positive clauses the code is uneven. Time has been short. Also the competence of the ILO has been too rigidly limited to labour questions to the exclusion of questions of social and economic policy. Except for the Minimum Wage-Fixing Convention and an affirmation of equality of remuneration for men and women, it has not been possible to deal with standards of remuneration. Agricultural workers enjoy no more than the undefined rights of association of industrial workers because the Fascists wrecked an attempt to define those rights. Between 1919 and 1937 spectacular progress was realised in fixing and raising the minimum age for the employment of children, but the constructive treatment of child development is limited to vocational training and apprenticeship. The most complete parts of the Code are those concerned with social insurance, the international seaman's code and standards of colonial labour policy for primitive territories. Some of the more advanced Conventions on these subjects, however, still await their first ratifications.

On the occasion of last October's New York Conference of the International Labour Organisation, *The Times* said that the ILO "is to-day almost the only effective survival of the vast machinery of international co-operation."¹ *The Daily Telegraph* more daringly said it was "the only department of the League of Nations which had a continuously active and successful existence."² The purpose of the Conference was (also in the words of *The Times*) "to set in motion the preparation of the plans for the co-operative work of reconstruction which must be ready for practical application

¹ *The Times*, 8 November, 1941.

² *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 October, 1941.

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as soon as the war is over, and which in the very nature of things cannot be hastily improvised." This is a heavy burden to be imposed on an organisation which the U.S.S.R. has yet rejoined, which is working in a world at war, and which has suffered drastic staff cuts. One question, however, may be asked. Has it in the International Labour Code or in the machinery of which the Code is both the result and the basis the basic material on which to work?

Edward Phelan, Acting Director of the ILO, in his report to the New York Conference,¹ asked for a social mandate. "The formulation of such a social mandate would constitute a general declaration of international social policy and would give the International Labour Organisation a programme to implement, completing it with all the detail necessary. It is not difficult to outline in a certain logical order the main points and principles which such a mandate should cover. They are:

- The elimination of unemployment;
- The establishment of machinery for placing, vocational training, and retraining;
- The improvement of social insurance in all its fields and in particular its extension to all classes of workers;
- The institution of a wage policy aimed at securing a just share of the fruits of progress for the worker;
- A minimum living wage for those too weak to secure it for themselves;
- Measures to promote better nutrition, and to provide adequate housing and facilities for recreation and culture;
- Greater equality of occupational opportunity;
- Improved conditions of work;
- An international public works policy for the development of the world's resources;
- The organisation of migration for employment and settlement under adequate guarantees for all concerned;
- The collaboration of employers and workers in the initiation and application of economic and social measures."

The ILO received its social mandate in general terms from

¹ *The ILO and Reconstruction*. International Labour Office, Montreal, 1941.

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the New York Conference. Since then, the Japanese war, adding so many more lands to be reconstructed, suggests that the first steps between immediate relief and reconstruction will also need wide co-ordination. In the early work decisions capable of rapid application rather than obligation creating instruments will be demanded. The programme of reconstruction, however, raises the issue met at Paris in 1919 whether social obligations should be set down in a permanent and general international text or be left to be worked out through the international labour machinery suitably modified.

A combination rather than a patching together of the two methods is easier now, as the articles of the International Labour Code could replace the broad generalisations which alone were possible in 1919. Nevertheless, it seems that, with two possible and partial exceptions, the same answer must be given, that in view of the deficiencies of world co-operation the emphasis for the ILO must still remain on its machinery. Not one country in the world could undertake to apply all the International Labour Code as it stands, and, once the progress is begun of scaling it down, the final result might well be a set of rules representing the common measure of the lowest national practice.

The two exceptions are the international seamen's code and the standards of colonial labour policy. No industry is more characteristically international than the merchant marine and the existing code is comprehensive, save in respect of wages. As, however, the shipowners and seamen are well organised and have in the ILO Joint Maritime Commission the possibility of developing international self-government in their industry, it should be for this Commission, perhaps enlarged as suggested in New York to include government representation, to decide whether the time has come to make any or all of the present seamen's code universally binding. On the other hand the standards of colonial labour policy precisely regulate only primitive labour problems; in other respects colonial powers are required only to examine in good faith whether other decisions of the International Labour Conference are applicable to colonies; there can be no proper labour representation of the primitive workers subject to forced labour or penal sanctions. Accordingly it is suggested

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that it would be practicable, as it would be statesmanlike, to promulgate for the British and Allied colonies a formal acceptance of this part of the International Labour Code.¹

Thus the substance of the ILO's future work is illustrated by Edward Phelan's summary. The form in which obligation creating instruments can be created might include: a general declaration of the international social mandate confided to the ILO; a precise acceptance by colonial governments of the existing labour standards for colonies; if and only if the organised representatives of the industry so decide, similar action in the case of seamen; and the development of existing and working-out of fresh standards by the normal ILO machinery, adapted as experience suggests.

Such adaptation will necessarily widen the social and economic interests of the ILO, might provide for some international examination of national reasons for refusing to ratify Conventions, and should widen membership of the Conference to include representatives of advanced colonial communities. It will by no means, however, obviate the necessity for a more general and political international organisation, on the strength of which the success of the ILO must ultimately depend. The credit of the ILO can be justified by the International Labour Code. It suggests that features in the ILO system, such as the representation of organised non-government interests and the procedure for the adoption, ratification, and application of Conventions, merit examination for extension to other forms of world co-operation. It does not justify a policy of limiting the permanent machinery of post-war international co-operation to an ILO inflated to include competences it is not qualified to fill.

¹ Four Conventions are involved; the British Government has already ratified two (forced labour and recruiting); it has undertaken to ratify the other two (contracts of employment and penal sanctions).

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

By H. R. G. GREAVES

WHEN reviewing the period which culminated in the formation of the second Churchill Government it could already be said that the Prime Minister's leadership was, however covertly, being called in question. The first few months of the new administration have confirmed this. Criticism has been more open if on fewer subjects. But there is no suggestion of alternative leadership, and the chief significance of the development is that the slight change in the atmosphere of the House which it implies enables Parliament more fully and fearlessly to perform its proper functions. Nor is it inconsistent with the increased self-confidence which followed Mr. Churchill's response to so many demands for a strengthening of his administration that the vocal critics should be few in number, or even that their last effort shows signs of having overreached itself. What is implied is more realism and less emotion in the relations between the House on the one side and the Cabinet—and more especially the Prime Minister—on the other.

It is indeed the Minister of Defence rather than the Prime Minister who is now censured. His close identification with war strategy inevitably means that faith in him falls with the failure and is likely to rise with the success of our arms. So far the one strong demand which he refused to satisfy, the demand for the separation of his two offices, has not died down. On the one hand was the fear that the Prime Minister was participating too much at the expert stage in the fashioning of war strategy, that he was, as Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, or through his representative on that body, advising himself in the War Cabinet, that the other members of the War Cabinet were not in a position to call for yet another review of any decision which had already been thus twice reviewed by the Prime Minister. On the other hand was the view put by the Deputy Prime Minister that it was the inevitable function of the Prime Minister in war-time to have

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strategy as his overriding care, that machinery matters more than men and, whatever machine was devised, with the personalities, the resultant weighting of influence was the same. It is not questioned that the Prime Minister always insisted on the Cabinet's and his own full responsibility for the higher direction of all war operations.

The constitutional consequences of this close identification of the Prime Minister with war strategy appear formidable on the whole. If the burden of decisions is borne mainly on his shoulders, the responsibility of the House for determining whether mistakes are real or apparent becomes greater. Major disaster, such as the fall of Singapore, particularly when accompanied by conditions so difficult to understand, is a clear case in point. The succession of reverses and disappointed hopes which preceded the formation of the new government was still showing its political effect in the subsequent debates on the war situation. What was said during the debate in secret session of April and the two days' debate of May 19th and 20th provides an occasion for several speeches strongly critical of the Prime Minister, especially from Mr. Hore-Belisha, Sir John Ward, Milne, and Commander Bower. Refusal to institute an inquiry into the fall of Singapore was as consistently questioned by Members as it was reaffirmed by the Government. The target for attack provided by such refusal to publish reports already available has produced less and more understanding than might have been expected. But governments pay for the sins of their predecessors. Mr. Churchill may by now have paid the greater part of his bill. Sir Percy Harris, who also disliked what he regarded as excessive secrecy on events in the Far East, nevertheless prophesied praise of the Prime Minister when things were better.

The war debate also afforded an opportunity for testing the new system of relationship between the House and the Prime Minister. Delegation to the Lord Privy Seal of the Leadership of the House has proved no merely nominal change. The plan according to which the Prime Minister was to attend only for the most important pronouncements otherwise leaving the statement of the War Cabinet's position

to Mr. Attlee or Sir Stafford Cripps, has been adhered to. Welcomed by the House at the time when Mr. Churchill was accused of taking too many burdens, as Mr. Maxton reminded it, this plan was now questioned. Mr. Shinwell and others thought indignantly that the Prime Minister was not showing the Commons a proper respect. It was noticeable, however, that the accepted claim of the Prime Minister to decide for himself, on the advice of the Leader of the House and his other counsellors, whether his presence was called for was not denied, although several Members were clearly taken aback at a situation which they had not understood. But it still remains to be seen whether such devotion to other duties, with the fewer appearances even in a debate of such importance, will weaken or strengthen the Prime Minister's position or that of his Government. There is little as yet to suggest any of the weakening which might seem a probable consequence of his absence, not from routine business, but from debates so closely concerned with his own functions and policy. Far from its being indicative of alleged dictatorial tendencies, its net effect, by augmenting the responsibilities of other members of the War Cabinet and identifying them more obviously with policy, is likely to be an enhancing of their significance and the clearer portrayal of the War Cabinet as a strong and united team.

One theme of doubt runs through these debates, as through earlier ones. It was evident during sessions devoted to the estimates and was repeated in discussion of the war situation. Successive failures on land and sea have been attributed officially to defective air support, and the House has insisted on the lesson that the quality of military and naval air co-operation is one of the principal, if not the chief, determining factors of this war. This, and certainly not any desire to diminish the weight of our bombing offensive against the Axis, has been the explanation of criticism directed at the Air Ministry. Whether the effectiveness of the large-scale bombing which has developed since will allay any of these doubts remains to be seen. During these months concern has been constantly voiced at insufficient army and naval control of air forces and the absence or shortage of dive- or torpedo-bombers. In defence it has

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been claimed that the Government was alive to these needs long ago, and implied that the product will soon be seen. The organisation of production is a subject which has taken much of the House's attention. There was a debate in secret on aircraft production on May 6th. Scottish industry was the subject of one of the days allotted to Supply. The main topic has been the implementing of the decision to establish a Ministry of Production. Accounts of the powers and organisation of this ministry and consequent changes, as well as of the setting up of regional organisations, have been supplemented by two full and other more limited debates. Here, once more, the House can claim to have been ahead of the administration. Its response has been one of clear approval of the creation at last of machinery which it has so long demanded. On March 25th it was already underlining the urgency of producing for "six weeks" hence rather than "six months." There were still allegations then and later that production remains far below capacity. On the matter of regional organisation the Minister's acceptance of the Citrine Committee's recommendations was interpreted as a tardy recognition of a need expressed two years ago by the Select Committee on National Expenditure, and since frequently repeated. Criticism of particular aspects, such as the non-use of machinery, the transfer of a Royal Ordnance factory to agents, certain gross anomalies in the granting and operation of some Government contracts, has been strong and repeated. The day devoted to agriculture was a favourable one for the Government. The sad plight of the small retailer was raised on the adjournment and debated at some length without the emergence of clear solutions. The coal situation reached the climax which previous debates should have led the House to expect. Once more recognition on the part of the Government seemed belated. To meet the serious prospective shortage it proposed to call back a further relatively small proportion of miners, and forcibly to diminish consumption by rationing. It published, without binding itself to adopt although it clearly favoured it, the scheme drawn up by Sir William Beveridge on the instruction of the President of the Board of Trade. The debate, held with the Government committed only to the

principle of rationing, revealed some little Labour support for the Beveridge scheme and much Conservative and industrial opposition to it on the ground of its complexity and expensiveness to administer. Although some claimed that voluntary curtailment and increased production would solve the problem, there was widespread agreement that rationing of some kind was necessary. As Sir Stafford Cripps pointed out, however, there was no agreement about a satisfactory alternative scheme. Much was made of the possibilities of improved output through national co-ordination and control. Allegations of slacking were not borne out by the statistics given later, for they revealed that despite an increase in the average age of miners during the last few years there had also been an increase in output per head. One conclusion did emerge from the debate, apart from the opposition of the 1922 Committee: neither on the right nor on the left was the House likely to be satisfied with the merely negative approach of rationing; more constructive measures were called for to increase production and improve the condition of the industry, and so incidentally to sugar the pill of seriously reducing consumption of a raw material in which the country is so rich. The Government retreated somewhat from its first position to prepare its scheme, postponed until after the Whitsun recess. When this was produced it revealed an acceptance in the main of the Labour thesis of direct national control combined with a tentative substitution, in deference to Conservative feeling, of voluntary curtailment of consumption for enforced rationing.

Labour criticism has been heard of the working of the Essential Works Order. Questions on the imprisonment of workers and the non-imprisonment of managements for obstructing the war effort led to a debate on the adjournment. Mr. Bevin claimed that managements had, on occasion, been superseded, that action had been taken against many other managements, and that the workers whom it had been necessary to deal with were an infinitesimal proportion: one in ten thousand had been prosecuted, one in fifty thousand imprisoned.

The Home Office has also suffered some attack. Hostility to Mr. Morrison was again shown over his dismissal of a

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Deputy Regional Commissioner and his treatment of Warren Fisher after the latter's unwarranted intrusion into the case. The question, which it was attempted unsuccessfully to elevate to a matter of principle on the Magna Carta level, evoked little sympathy for the critics and a moderate and convincing reply from the Home Secretary. It is unthinkable that the tenderness for the settled career of a permanent Civil Servant should be applied in war-time to a temporary officer of a semi-military character.

Not the smallest effect of the Lord Privy Seal's mission to India is the unanimity which appears since to have been a characteristic of the House of Commons on the subject of that country. There was no discordant note in the debate which followed his return; nor has there been since. There was striking agreement during the day which was devoted to debating his statement upon his mission. At last, it was evidently felt, the right thing had been done. If the mission had failed in its immediate object, it was nevertheless wholeheartedly welcomed as a considerable achievement marking an important step forward and showing this country taking a progressive initiative which might yet have fruitful results. Indeed, despite its apparent failure there was a remarkable degree of optimism about the future, and general recognition of the value of Sir Stafford Cripps's service. Had he succeeded, there could scarcely have been greater agreement. At least he had succeeded in improving the atmosphere, which, it was contended, would not be improved by suggesting that only acute danger made us willing to make concessions to Indian opinion. In this connection the "brutal frankness" of the Prime Minister's statement of March 11th that "the crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life" was not regarded as helpful. Mr. Amery, summing up, stressed the change. "We no longer think," he said, "in terms of India's progressive advance towards full control of her destiny by stages decided here and under a constitution laid down by this House. We think, instead, in terms of India's inherent right to that freedom under a constitution of her own devising." And Mr. Amery, in contrast to Mr. Churchill's earlier words, was

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careful to claim that this was no "death-bed repentance of an unregenerate imperialism," no "sudden improvisation to meet a critical external situation," but the "inevitable culmination of a steady development." There had been complete unanimity in the Cabinet, and if this confession of the Prime Minister as well as an unwise speech by Lord Halifax during the course of the negotiations seemed a little out of tune with the statements of the Lord Privy Seal and the Secretary of State, they could be regarded as the last cries from an unregenerate past, now decently buried, even though its consequences were still being felt.

Striking proof of the revolution which has taken place in another field, that of economic thought, is given by the fact that a period which covered all the budget debates should have seen practically no discussion of finance. Something was said on the methods of collecting taxes, more especially from weekly wage-earners, and the argument was repeated that the excess profits tax was an encouragement to waste, but the House gave a general welcome to the budget. It accepted with alacrity the considerable increases in the taxation of non-necessaries, recognising these as a means of cutting down the use of resources even more than as a method of raising revenue. This was truly another financial universe from that in which a government could be overthrown because it overspent by a hundred million for the unemployed. Perhaps the most startling remark was Mr. Pethick-Lawrence's reminder of the urgency of preparing now for post-war conditions: "Unless the war goes on well into 1944, the Budget which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has introduced will be the last Budget for a complete year of war. We have therefore to start thinking in time of these very large and important issues."

Post-war planning, indeed, seems to have made little headway. Although, of course, some administrative and inter-allied consultation is afoot there is small sign of its having arrived at useful results. At home the situation appears to be parallel. After two years of cogitation the Minister of Works and Planning Bill proved to be a mere matter of machinery, devised to amalgamate the functions of the Commissioners of Works, the Ministry of Works and

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Buildings, the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland and the planning functions of the Ministry of Health. It was hardly surprising that with so little evidence of foresight and imagination doubts should have been expressed about the wisdom of transferring housing functions from an experienced ministry like the last to a new and untried office. Otherwise the chief doubts were raised by the belief that the powers asked for were not sufficiently far-reaching. The new ministry would still have to await the pleasure of private agencies to develop the schemes which it planned. Emphasis was also laid during the debate on second reading upon the need at the same time to undertake a reform, in the shape of enlargement, of the areas of local government. While the Bill does succeed in some tidying up of the central government organisation, the use to which it is to be put remains, towards the end of the third year of war, a matter for the future to reveal. If Labour has achieved some success in its claims for national direction of one national industry, coal-mining, it has yet to produce effects on this side of national enterprise.

Under the estimates there was a debate also on the post-war planning of hospital administration with the demand for a regional rationalisation of this service. The Minister of Health could indicate surveys, committees, and preliminary discussions, and hold out rather vaguely the hope of later planning after actually recorded progress.

To the field of social service also belongs the debate on the report made upon the working of the Determination of Needs Act. With the Government's claim that "the worst features of the old household means test have gone" the Commons were on the whole disposed to agree, although there were still cogent appeals in favour of a more complete ending of the system, especially from the new Member for Keighley, Mr. Ivor Thomas.

The War Damage (Amendment) Bill fills in some gaps and makes slight changes in the original Act. Its main feature is the spreading of the cover provided for the first five years of contributions, which amount to an estimated total of £200,000,000, until such time as the Exchequer has paid out double that sum. Clause 4, which enables the

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Treasury to avoid disclosure of expenditure, raised some objection, but was defended on security grounds. Another useful change for which there was general support is the clause allowing the diversion of money granted for repairs from the restoration of an undesirable old structure to the erection of a more desirable new one. The main criticism was directed against the recognition of the privileged position of the mortgagee who benefits, as Dr. Russell Thomas urged, from "the ultimate refinement of the doctrine of usury," and whose special type of property is thus accepted anew by the law. The Chancellor reaffirmed the principle that it would be inequitable to compensate for loss of revenue from this one type of cause without compensating those who had lost salaries or profits through the war, and therefore that cover for capital loss only could be granted.

The war-time innovation of the secret session has produced some repercussions, showing the need for a clarification of the duties of the Member of Parliament in the matter of preserving secrecy. Two cases of alleged revelations by Members were raised as matters of privilege. The first, after debate in secret session, was referred to the Committee of Privileges by 137 to 58 votes. But the second was debated in public and can therefore be reported. Several questions were involved. Has it to be established that a Member who gives figures—for example, of shipping losses—could only have obtained them from statements made in a secret debate, and does it follow that if they are inaccurate he cannot be condemned? May a Member give the names of those who spoke in a secret session? May he suggest that a speech made by the Prime Minister in public differs from a speech he delivered in secret? Has it to be shown that he intended to reveal something said in secret? On most of these questions two views are possible. The House was not judging the Member; it had only to decide whether a sufficient case had been made out for submission to the Committee of Privileges. Several members argued that a strong enough case had not been made out, and when the House divided 113 went into the lobby against it. Some Members wanted the Speaker to obtain guidance from the Committee for the future without submitting the case; this,

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the Speaker said, "would not be one of my duties." But the view which was supported by the majority, with 148 votes, was perhaps best expressed by Sir Ian Fraser, who said of the Member concerned: "I do not believe for one moment that he meant to hurt this country. . . . It does not to my mind, matter whether the hon. Member made a speech favourable or contrary to the Government. It does not matter whether what he says is accurate or inaccurate. What does matter is this: he mentioned who spoke in this debate, and for my part I should have thought that that was a secret. . . . Further, a speech alleged to have been made in secret was compared with speeches made in public, and it was suggested that a different impression would have been made on people if the things said in secret had been said in public. That must give some impression to the outside world of what was the nature of the speech made in secret, and to that extent it has divulged some part of the secrecy. I cannot help feeling that I myself and the House want guidance as to what is our duty in these matters."

Other matters dealt with included the Finance Bill and the Pensions (Mercantile Marine) Bill. The latter aimed at giving roughly similar pension rights as the result of enemy action to servants of the merchant marine as to members of the Navy, and it was warmly welcomed by the House, although Mr. Shinwell claimed that compensation was too low in both cases.

Political warfare has come in for some continuing criticism, although it has been possible to devote less time to the subject. In the debate on the war situation Mr. Bartlett criticised the failure to make more of the magnificent propaganda material of Sir Stafford Cripps's visit to India. He also pleaded for a more imaginative use of the Allied Governments in London, "not for grandiose well-advertised meetings which really do not do anything, but for meetings at which their representatives would put down on paper the maximum that they would be prepared to offer in the way of collective security when this war is over, and the minimum that they expect other countries to offer them."

SURVEYS

CONDITIONS OF THE URBAN WORKER, MOSCOW AND LONDON

THE attempt to compare the real urban wage in Moscow with the real urban wage in London recalls the game of croquet played by Alice through the Looking Glass, with a live flamingo for mallet, a live hedgehog for ball, and soldiers in uncomfortable gymnastic attitudes for hoops. Everything was in flux, except the ridges and furrows on the ground, and these were embarrassing to the aim.

In the first place there is a difficulty in selecting for the purposes of comparison an epoch which shall be equally convenient and suitable for each of the two countries. For London it is certainly best to take the pre-slump epoch in the *New Survey of London Life and Labour*, which dealt with three millions of "occupied persons" and their families in the County of London and nine additional Boroughs. That was a moment of comparative prosperity for London, and perhaps equal stability of industrial conditions has never since been reached. But if we were to take the 1928-1929 period for Moscow, we should find ourselves in all the throes of the opening phases of the first Five Year Plan, when industrial workers were making real sacrifices and often living on black bread lightly spread with mustard. The period of elaborate rationing and of supply through closed shops followed, making a hundred different categories with a hundred varying standards of life, while the rouble ceased to have a steady value. When rationing had been abolished and the rouble stabilised, and the disturbing effects of the wretchedly poor harvest of 1936 had been overcome, it became possible to regard conditions as less abnormal. I shall therefore be comparing the London of 1929 with the Moscow of 1937.

A second difficulty is that nothing comparable with the *New Survey*, for scope or precision, exists for Moscow or for any other city in the U.S.S.R., and that statistics—though they undoubtedly exist, for the calculations of the State Planning Commission would be impossible without them—are withheld from the world. There was a reason for withholding them: for the clever spies of the Nazi regime in Germany would have drawn many valuable inferences from the figures, and would probably have learned from them where, and how much, the Soviet Government was doing in preparation for the coming war. But the result, to the investigator, is devastating. Since 1930 there has been no cost of living index, though previously the Central Statistical Office maintained one. About the same time the Soviet Government ceased to send any figures of production to the Agricultural Bureau at Rome. Up to, and including, the year 1935, an admirable annual volume called

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Socialist Construction was accessible: and it conveyed a mass of information about agriculture, industry and trade. From 1936 it has ceased to appear. Scraps of information can still be collected and painfully pieced together: and it is on some such process of statistical scavenging that I have had to rely for the tentative information which I here seek to convey.

A third difficulty is the uncertainty of the value of the monetary unit. The official value stands at a fixed figure. The actual value is at something like one-fifth of the official value. This variation is responsible for some very misleading statements about prices in Russia. Mr. Paul Haensel's account of prices in *The Public Finance of the U.S.S.R.*, published in the *Tax Magazine*, 1938, is vitiated by this error. Mr. Colin Clark calculated the actual value of the rouble in 1934 as varying from 1.63 penny to 3.50 pennies, according as it was expended on industrial goods or on food. A later calculation, by Mr. Jacob Miller, who spent a year in Moscow in 1937-8 as an employee of the State Planning Office, gives 2 pennies for the purchase of clothing, 3-4 for food bought in shops, and 4-5 for canteen meals, which are obviously subsidised and are recognised by Moscow housewives to be cheaper than other food.

A fourth complication is the difference in the economic constitution of the family. In Britain the family normally consists of a breadwinner, a housekeeper and a varying number of dependants who break off and form new families a few years after they reach the wage-earning stage. In other words, the breadwinner's wage contains a concealed or unavowed wage for his housekeeper. The family income in London is arrived at by adding to the principal wage 13 per cent from other sources, mainly the earnings of former dependants. The one wage has to provide permanently for two, and, over a long period, for three, four, or even five persons. In Moscow, on the other hand, the housekeeper is, in a very large number of cases, a direct earner: and the number of dependants actually averages only one and one-fifth per wage-earner. When Mr. Colin Clark tells us that the Moscow wage in 1934 was, on the average, equivalent to an English weekly wage of seventeen shillings and sevenpence, we must modify our inferences by allowing for the different economic constitution of the family. The income of the family—without any extraneous additions, such as unavowed overtime, which is a fairly common device of Moscow managers—may easily be 70 per cent above the wage of the principal wage-earner.

Mr. Colin Clark applies, to the calculated expenditure per worker, the British scale of prices for the same commodities and services. Thus, the Russian expenditure on rent, which he puts at five roubles a month, is represented by the sum of twelve shillings: not because the rouble is supposed to be worth more than two shillings, but because similar accommodation in England would cost that amount. The difference in the two cities in housing, and in the cost of housing, introduces us

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to a fifth complication in our attempted comparison. Moscow housing varies very widely, and in the newest blocks of workmen's dwellings it would bear comparison with the best provision made in other countries. But these are still very few, expenditure on housing having been postponed to expenditure on other matters, notably on defence, which appeared more urgent. In Moscow, there was, when Dr. Robson and others made their inquiry a few years ago, on the average only forty-five square feet of floor space (not including kitchen, passage, bath and staircase) for each individual: and a fraction of the people had only thirty square feet per head, just room for a bed. But it is important to get the right perspective: and it is with India, and with Tsarist Russia, that the comparison should be made. The report of Mr. Whitley's Industrial Commission shows even more shocking conditions in Bombay and other rapidly industrialised cities. In Tsarist Russia (as in Russia of to-day) the standard of accommodation, even for what we should call the upper middle class, was low. Dostoevsky has described in *The Idiot* the apartment of an official family: the father (a retired General), the mother, the grown son, the grown daughter, the schoolboy son: all living in four rooms, two of them small. But this family has a lodger, and it takes in Prince Myshkin as a guest. Even if there was no maid living in (and my experience of Russia convinces me that there was at least one, if not two, who probably slept with the blackbeetles) they averaged, when at the full complement, 1.75 per room, which *London Life and Labour* would classify as "crowding" for a worker's family. Where did they all live and sleep? We must get out of our heads the notion—it is not a Russian notion, and it is not an Indian notion—that living-rooms and sleeping-rooms must be separate, and that each person is entitled to a room. The nightly ritual by which each person assumes a special costume, and deposits himself in a special apparatus known as a bed, is a novelty still incompletely assimilated.

The description in *The Idiot* represents conditions in the sixties. At the same period, in the poorer quarters, a single room was often let out to several families, each of which occupied a corner. A great deal later (in 1908) the textile workers of Moscow slept, three-fifths of them, on bunks in barracks.

The cities of Russia emptied themselves in the early years of the Revolution, when the towns were starving, but they filled again with great rapidity. Rapid industrialisation in the period of the first Plan brought great waves of population to the centres. Much was done: but the majority have hardly yet been rescued from the stage in which migrant labour lay down on the floor of a cellar, or on a piece of cloth stretched between two boards: much as it had formerly lain down in a corner of the field, when the harvest work was heavy. *Town life is still a novelty.*

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all, adults and children alike, remains available for clothes, industrial goods, and amenities of every sort, in each week. The value of the "social wage" in addition to this must be estimated at 38 roubles per week. In order that we may judge what this sum of 10 roubles per week, or 520 roubles a year, will buy, I specify the following prices:

Shoes (authorised price), R.19.50.

Goloshes, R.13.50 to R.15.

Man's suit, R.200 to R.750.

Women's woollen dress, R.78 to R.135.

Man's shirt, R.240.

Thick woollen stockings, R.3.50.

Thick woollen socks, R.1.95.

Cinema, R.1.50—R.4.50.

Newspaper, 10 kopeks.

Hair-cutting, R.1.60.

Shaving, R.1.

Cigarettes (25), R.1—R.4.50.

High boots may cost as much as R.600—750.

Mr. Jacob Miller, basing his calculation on the London price value of commodities and services corresponding to those enjoyed by the Moscow worker, concludes that the expenditure of a Moscow family would amount to a London equivalent of about forty-two shillings per week. In other words, the average Moscow wage (or rather the average Moscow income) is a little above the New Survey's poverty line of 38—41 shillings.

The "social wage" in Moscow is calculated to be worth about 34 per cent of the wage. In Britain it is worth about 16 per cent.

I have not left myself space to complete the comparison by contrasting the security and the social status of the Moscow worker in 1937 and that of his opposite number in London in 1928-9. In these two respects, owing to the ending of unemployment in Russia, and to the high consideration enjoyed by the industrial worker, the advantage was with Moscow. The fear of trouble with the authorities, always so disturbing an influence in the lives of the directing and managing class in Russia, did not affect the peace of mind of the rank and file.

To sum up: the Russian worker produces much less, has a much smaller real wage, and more uniformly poor accommodation, pays one-fourth of the London rent calculated as a percentage on his income, gets holidays with pay (which the British worker is only now beginning to get), makes no direct contribution to social insurance, and gets considerably more in the way of "social wage." His wage and conditions of work are protected, less by Trade Unions than by the absence of unemployment, which makes him a valuable asset. Trade Union protection in London is far from general, but it is supplemented, in

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the trades most liable to exploitation, by Trade Boards which enforce a minimum wage.

For the children of the London worker, the chance of being below the poverty line (that is of having less than the indispensable necessities) was one in eight, not because of inadequate wage but because of unemployment. In old age, the chance of being below the poverty line is one in six; the chance of having bad house accommodation is one in three. The Russian worker enjoys greater security in respect to his children, whose health, schooling and holidays are extremely well looked after.

The Russian worker is freer than the British from anxiety because of the absence of unemployment. He stands higher in the scale of comparative human values, and has no example of disproportionate luxury before him (except in so far as the Stakhanovite or the Soviet bureaucrat begins to set it, and that is very remote indeed from the London scale) to give him a sense of inferiority. He has no cause (other than personal indolence) for restricting output, and has a feeling (which the British worker lacks) that he is working for himself, not for the profit of an employer. His wife works hard, but is economically freer, and is largely emancipated from household drudgery. He lives in an obviously advancing and improving world, which breeds hope.

Who shall say how the balance dips? I believe that, given the material minimum required for subsistence, the moral and mental considerations are the more important. In spite of unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance, security is one desideratum in Great Britain and status is another—for status, for the undistinguished mass, too obviously depends upon property. Here is the missing half of liberty for the British worker.

JOHN MAYNARD.

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Just about the time of Stalin's speech of June, 1931, in which he called, among other things, for improved living conditions for workers, eighty-six per cent of the houses in Moscow were of wood, sometimes covered externally with plaster or concrete; forty per cent of the streets had no sewage system; whole municipal districts without any piped supply of water. Life in large aggregations of this kind is slowly learned. The ten-year plan for Moscow shows that the new art is being studied with energy and purpose, and that is about as far as the U.S.S.R. has got at present. For such accommodation as he gets, the Moscow worker pays four per cent of the wage of the principal worker of the family. That being, as Stalin told the 18th Party Congress in 1938, 66 roubles per week on the average, the rent is R.2.65, ninepence at a liberal estimate. The *New Survey* points to a rent which is out of all keeping with this minute average. It is about 15 per cent of the family income. In other words, the Russian worker pays far less for his accommodation, and gets far less for it. But, of course, he is not conscious how uncomfortable he is, and—if I may be pardoned for a paradox—the good home is not precisely the thing which he most desires, because he hardly pictures the possibility of it. It must not be overlooked that communal amenities are provided on a handsome scale, and that the worker is, at all events, not aware that he is paying for them. There are subjective, as well as objective, elements in poverty.

A sixth complication in the comparison is the difference in the dietary of the two peoples. The Russian worker's living and eating habits are far less expensive than those of his opposite number in London. He gets as many calories and possibly as good a supply of vitamins out of a much cheaper type of food. Sir John Russell had calculated that the Plan for 1937 (and there was an exceptionally bountiful harvest in that year, so there is no reason to suppose that the plan for food was not fulfilled) would have given to each inhabitant of the U.S.S.R., per head, quantities of meat, eggs, milk and milk products, margarine and fish, somewhat less than half of those consumed in Great Britain, about one-third of the amount of sugar, twice the amount of flour, and 160 per cent of the weight of potatoes. These figures illustrate the radical difference in the standards of diet—standards, the relative cost of which is only partially relevant to the respective degrees of well-being.

Meat is certainly, now as always, eaten to a very much smaller extent in Russia than in the United Kingdom. Bread is still largely the staff of life in the former country, and it is primarily to changes in the quality and quantity of bread that we must look to find an improvement in diet. One change which has been steadily in progress for years past, and is perhaps the most convincing evidence of a general rise in the standard of comfort, is the increased consumption of wheat.

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Flour and potatoes largely take the place of meat, eggs, and milk products. Tea is an article of exceptional consumption, and beer plays a smaller part than in the life of the London worker. Fruit is a rarity, and cabbages and cucumbers make up most of the vegetable supply. Canned goods, though now making their appearance in increased quantities, are far less frequently on the table than in Britain. Life generally is simpler and nearer to nature.

At a somewhat earlier date it would have been necessary to take account of yet a seventh complexity in the comparison of Moscow conditions with those of London. London labour is a series of social strata, not a single group, and the most comfortable stratum is hardly to be distinguished from the middle class, with its savings in the Bank and its house in process of purchase through a building society. Since the growth of the Stakhanovite movement, Moscow labour is rapidly tending to a similar differentiation, though the process has not yet gone so far. I have no doubt that the attempt to arrive at an *average* for the workers of all classes is, at bottom, unscientific, and that the proper course would be to take similar categories, such as the transport workers, in the two cities and compare the conditions of these. But for such an undertaking as that, it will be necessary to wait for much closer and detailed examination of urban conditions in Russia and for the free publication of the results.

It remains for me to give such figures as I can, after warning the reader of the danger of trusting them and the conditions which qualify their value. But before I do so, let me add that there are defects in the State and municipal and co-operative shops, and that inconvenient access to retail supplies lowers the real value of the cash wage. A preference for the triumphs of productive work, a dislike for counter-jumping, and, more recently, a wish for a seat at the official desk, seem to be ingrained in the more ambitious and efficient of the Soviet workers. The high and mighty shopman, the cross shopman, the stupid shopman, the empty shelves, are stock jokes with the comic press. The authorities obviously encourage the pillorying of the defects in retail distribution, and great efforts have been made to improve the shops. It may be anathema to Socialist principle, but I am inclined to recommend a commission on sales as the essential remedy. It is the extension of a principle already admitted in Soviet Russia.

A calculation made by me, on the basis of Stalin's statement to the 18th Party Congress in 1938 that the annual average wage of the industrial worker amounted to 66 roubles a week, of the published prices of essential articles in certain newspapers in 1937-8, and of known particulars of income tax, state loan (virtually compulsory), and rent, together with estimates of probable consumption of food, fuel, and light, has led me to the conclusion that approximately 10 roubles per head for

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CONDITIONS OF PEACE. By E. H. CARR. (279 pp. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.)
 THE NEW FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER. (134 pp. Methuen. 6s.)
 VERSAILLES TWENTY YEARS AFTER. By PAUL BIRDSALL. (350 pp. Allen & Unwin. 15s.)

PROFESSOR CARR'S book is a very useful analysis of the problem which statesmen will have to face when they begin once more to "make" peace instead of war. His knowledge and intelligence are so great that, even when he uses them perversely to arrive at wrong-headed conclusions, he makes one think a rare and admirable achievement, for most political writers only make one yawn. He attacks his problem in two parts from two directions. In the first part, he deals with what he calls "fundamental issues." Here he analyses not the immediate and superficial, but the fundamental causes of the war. The war, he maintains, is part of a great social revolution; the revolution is due to a breakdown of the 19th century social system, its democracy, its nationalism, its economics, and its morality. Europe and the world are attempting to readjust themselves to this catastrophe, to create a new Europe and a new world. The war is itself part of the revolution and the creative birth pangs. By understanding the fundamental issues underlying the death of the 19th century and the revolution, we can alone obtain the general principles of policy for peace making. And so in his second part he attempts to give an outline of a policy and programme of peace.

It is one of Professor Carr's merits that his mind is not static; it is definitely on the move and this book shows that it has moved quite a considerable distance even in the last three years since he wrote *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. It is essentially a conservative mind and its orbit is a parabola towards what may at the moment be called "The Left." Like so many conservative minds, when it at last finds room for a new idea, it is inclined to believe that it has made an entirely new discovery and to overlook the fact that it had itself been fighting that very idea, as illogical, immoral, or utopian, for the last twenty years. The social catastrophes of the last one hundred years have been largely due to the fact that conservatives, in whose hands power has preponderantly rested, have always been right, but unfortunately have always been right twenty-five to fifty years too late. Examining the parabola of Professor Carr's thought (which will probably bring him back in old age somewhere near the point from which he started), one is reminded of Shigalov's words to the revolutionary meeting in Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*:

"I must add, besides, that my system is not yet complete. I am

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perplexed by my own data and my conclusion is a direct contradiction of the original idea with which I start. Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrive at unlimited despotism. I will add, however, that there can be no solution of the social problem but mine."

Professor Carr's handling of the "fundamental issues" of democracy, economics, and nationalism provides interesting examples of his methods. For instance, he finds the crisis of democracy in the fact that the liberal political democracy of the 19th century, with its doctrine and practice of *laissez-faire*, "broke down"; it proved itself incapable of supplying the very goods, e.g. equality, which were the object of its existence; losing its appeal, therefore, it became an easy prey for its enemies. And looking towards the future, Professor Carr sees the necessity for a new interpretation of democracy, "a new democracy." "The new democracy," he says, "must achieve a reinterpretation, in predominantly economic terms, of the democratic ideals of 'equality' and 'liberty,' and 'just as liberal democracy won the struggle to make political rights effective over military power, so the new democracy must win the struggle to make political rights effective over economic power.'" No one except an extreme conservative would disagree with these statements. But the strange thing is that Professor Carr seems honestly to believe that they are new! He makes the amazing statement that "prior to 1933, no attempt had been made to reinterpret democracy to meet the conditions of the post-war world; and in democratic countries few people recognised that it could not continue to function exactly as it had functioned before 1914." The truth is, of course, that socialists have been saying for a hundred years exactly what Professor Carr, with the world falling about his ears, is saying to-day and that they were dismissed by Professor Carr and his likes as visionary, utopian, or worse. What did the Communist Manifesto say a hundred years ago, what has even the British Labour Party been saying for the last thirty years except that political democracy is not enough and that full democracy must make political rights effective over economic power? For a hundred years socialists have been vainly attempting to make the governing economic classes see that disaster faced us all unless democracy was reinterpreted in predominantly economic terms; now that disaster has come, they and their Professor Carr's querulously cry: "Behold the truth, but why did no one tell us about this before?" Most of the great social disasters in modern history have been due to conservatism, to the habit of governing classes to reject every truth and deny the need for change when there was still time to avoid the disaster, and, then when the world is falling about their long ears, to accept a truth which is now dead and to make a change which is now merely a formal register of disaster. They sit upon every social safety valve until truth and an explosion blows them off, and they and

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their professors then call this procedure "realism" and "statesmanship."

Professor Carr's dealing with the problem of nationality and self-determination is equally naive. He has made the discovery that the whole framework, economic and military, of society has become in the last one hundred years international, and that therefore "the right of nations to self-determination, like every other right, is self-destructive unless it is placed in a framework of obligations." This is only another way of stating that the 19th century claim to unlimited sovereignty and independence for the national state must give way to a system of "sovereign" national states whose sovereignty is limited by international obligations. He naively remarks that no one realized this and that President Wilson and "simple-minded enthusiasts" thought that self-determination was "the infallible short cut to a political paradise." But it was only Professor Carr's "realists" who were blind to these facts. The people whom he calls utopian and simple-minded enthusiasts have been vainly endeavouring to make the conservatives see them for the last thirty years. I could show him books written in 1916 which already pointed to the danger of "balkanizing" Europe, of giving to nations the right to self-determination except in a framework of obligation. Professor Carr was and is blind to these facts because he had always misunderstood and misinterpreted the years between the wars, and particularly the history of the League of Nations. For what was the League but an attempt to create the "framework of obligation" which alone could prevent the self-destruction of an international system based solely upon the right to self-determination? It was not President Wilson who thought self-determination the short cut to a political paradise, but the conservative statesmen and Professor Carr who maintained that it was utopian to create a framework of obligation for the sovereign, independent state. They thought it less utopian to appease the aggressor, first Japan, then Mussolini, and last but not least Hitler and his Nazis.

The second part of the book with its outline of a policy has the same merits and suffers to some extent from the same defects as the first part. The exposition of an economic policy with its insistence upon planned consumption is particularly good, although or because he is repeating what socialists have been saying for a quarter of a century. He is, too, obviously right in insisting upon the necessity after the war of concentrating upon economic recovery. But here again his passionate determination to see only half the truth leads him into absurdity. His dislike of the League and any proposal for establishing international government induce him to delude himself with the comforting belief that if the statesmen confine themselves to "economic recovery," politics will look after themselves. In order to do this, he dismisses the whole problem of the self-destructiveness of self-determination—which he rightly insisted upon in the first part—by means of the half truth that

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"at the present stage interdependence is a practical, not a constitutional, problem," and of the untruth that sovereignty is "a mythical attribute." Sovereignty is not a mythical attribute unfortunately; it is an attribute, claimed both in theory and in practice by states and governments, political or constitutional, which exactly describes the right to complete self-determination unlimited by any obligation. When the war ends, Europe will still consist of a multiplicity of states, large and small. Is it conceivable that we shall find that all political questions between them have disappeared, all political conflicts of interest subsided, and all nationalist animosities evaporated? But if not, to re-establish those states with no framework of political international obligations of any kind, trusting to economics and the "power" of the Great Powers, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the U.S.A., to keep the peace, would be to commit, in their most exaggerated form, precisely those mistakes which Professor Carr wrongly ascribes to President Wilson.

The two other books, both in subject and method, differ very much from Professor Carr's, but the authors, in the course of their exposition, continually intersect the parabola of the Professor's thought. And whenever they do so, they provide in facts and argument a salutary antidote to his prejudices. Mr. Arnold-Forster has written an admirable study of the meaning, history, and future of the Freedom of the Seas. An expert on the subject both because of his knowledge and his practical experience in the last war, he makes a difficult subject understandable to everyone and what might be thought to be a dull, academic subject exciting, because of its important implications. He shows that the old doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas, though its exact form changed kaleidoscopically, was a hopeless attempt to establish the rights of neutrals to use the seas freely for their commerce in a world which tolerated the anarchy of "private" war between sovereign states. The attempt was a hopeless failure precisely because the international system was anarchical and it is one of the "realist" delusions that you can make anarchy the basis of law. Here at once Mr. Arnold-Forster begins to hand us out antidotes to the delusions of *Conditions of Peace*. And he provides still more when he deals with the future. The Americans and the Atlantic Charter have already made the Freedom of the Seas a live issue of the peace. And he shows that the problem of the freedom of the seas is an integral part of the whole vast problem of peace and war. If the old system is re-established, the old failure to establish the old Freedom of the Seas will be repeated. The only attainable Freedom of the Seas is that which President Wilson conceived in the second of his Fourteen Points, but it can come into existence only as part of a general international system of law, order, and collective security, a system in which the self-determination or sovereignty of states is included in and limited by a framework of international obligations.

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Mr. Birdsall is an American and gives us an excellent account of the making of the Versailles Peace. Almost every page is a lesson to Professor Carr and to all of us which we should do well to learn before we write books or even express an opinion upon the conditions of the next peace. Mr. Birdsall is not without national bias, and perhaps he overdoes the picture of Wilson as the one good and wise man in Sodom. But if the object of a treaty of peace is peace, he gives us good reasons for the conclusion that, compared with the Clemenceaus and Lloyd Georges, big and little, Wilson was almost the only practical and realistic statesman in the Sodom which was called Versailles.

LEONARD WOOLF.

A GERMAN PROTECTORATE. By SHIELA GRANT DUFF. (291 pp. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.)

PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN. By C. A. MACARTNEY. (160 pp. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

MISS GRANT DUFF has aimed at giving a scientific account of the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and has succeeded in the sense that she has produced a report without exaggeration and without emotion. But in her praiseworthy attempt to avoid any appearance of bias she has almost succeeded in eliminating reality altogether: her book is an appeal to reason, an ably compiled report of the kind that might have been submitted to the League by an oppressed minority. The real meaning of Nazi oppression is felt in far more intangible ways than her treatment can analyse; it cannot be conveyed by an account of the different stages in the gradual loss of political rights and constitutional forms. In view of the fact that her information must necessarily be second or third hand at best, the accuracy and care of this compilation are great merits: but it will not succeed in conveying to English readers any sense of what the tragedy of Prague really meant to the Czechs.

No one to-day, however, will dispute her account of what Munich and Prague meant for Europe. Her introductory chapter is an admirably balanced account of the strategic significance of Czechoslovakia as the gateway to Eastern Europe and the key-link of the Franco-Soviet alliance, though her concentration on the Czech aspect of events seems to have produced a certain superficiality in her view of what happened after Munich. She holds, for instance, that in the summer of 1939 the insuperable obstacle to Anglo-Russian agreement lay in the fact that Britain and France "found it impossible to persuade and unpalatable to force any of the barrier states which lay between Germany and Russia to accept those Russian military preparations which would have been necessary for a vigorous war on two fronts." If that was the real obstacle,

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why had it not equal force in the summer of 1938? Surely the explanation of the failure lies much deeper than this explanation would suggest: had the will to conclude an agreement been present on both sides, the opposition of Poland and Rumania need not have been fatal. Munich was the culmination of a long series of betrayals of collective security: it was not, as Miss Grant Duff's treatment suggests, the one and only occasion in which a breach of the treaties and the League covenant was condoned by the democracies; but it did convince Europe in general, and the U.S.S.R. in particular, that the democracies would never fight.

On political issues, Miss Grant Duff is inclined to be too dogmatic. From the fact that the Czech Fascists never came to power under the Nazis, she concludes that "there is no such thing really as international fascism except as a purely temporary stage and as a tactical move in the policy of a Fascist state." This may, of course, be a mere difference of terminology, since it is perfectly true that the doctrinaire National Socialist groups—the Arrow Cross, the Croix de Feu, and the N.S.B. in Holland have been always cast aside in favour of the true collaborationists, the Lavals, Francos, Antonescus and Imredys. But it is these who represent the true Fascist International, and who retain power simply because of the general failure of social democracy to deal with economic problems and with collective security.

On one or two issues the author's own judgment seems to have been set aside in favour of a Czech national propagandist standpoint: her comments on the attitude of the Czechs to the Germans, and on the democratic Sudeten Germans, seem to be at variance with the views which she expressed in an earlier pamphlet, and her views on President Hacha also seem to have been overlaid by information not perfectly assimilated.

Mr. Macartney raises the question of why the peace treaty did not establish a structure which would stand by itself in Eastern Europe. This is a real question, because the German hold on this region was already complete before the fighting in Yugoslavia or Greece began. He finds an explanation in the fact that settlement on national lines was inevitably unsatisfactory. When the Monarchy was dissolved, some nationalities were unsatisfied, others over-satisfied, with the result that when German foreign policy became aggressive it could link up all the dissatisfied races, or separatist elements in the satisfied states, against the nationalities which the peace settlement had favoured. This is, of course, a true answer as far as it goes, but it leaves much unexplained. Why, for instance, if nationality is everything, did Rumania become an Axis country? She had gained everything possible in the last settlement, and she could only expect to lose territory through German domination. If the maintenance of national frontiers is really the mainspring of political action, then Rumania ought to have fought. Instead, her foreign policy

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is quite effectively pro-Axis and anti-Russian, and there can be no doubt that Antonescu has some support inside the country, with national and democratic forces against him. There are obviously other motives which determine political allegiance in addition to nationality.

But like Miss Grant Duff, Mr. Macartney does not believe in international fascism, and although he is quite aware that there are different social forces alive inside the national units, he does not evidently regard them as likely to become operative forces in the peace settlement. On the contrary he seems to think that the achievement of independence by Slovakia and Croatia does really offer them some degree of social progress. About Slovakia he says: "It is a fact that the German 'protection' while depriving them of political independence, gave them more opportunity than they had ever enjoyed before to pursue their national-social integration, and established a distinctive Slovak nationalism as a factor of the Danubian situation." Does this mean simply that Slovakia has got rid of its Jews? There is no other social change worth mentioning. It cannot mean that Slovakia can build up its own industries, or balance its own budget. It can only mean that the Nazis have made a point of clothing oppression in national dress. (Miss Grant Duff also points out, in a very interesting passage, how the Nazis have encouraged nationalism on the folk-lore level, as a means of killing the movement for national independence).

But, unlike Miss Grant Duff, Mr. Macartney regards the nationalism of Eastern Europe as taking on a new totalitarian form, not as asserting itself against racial domination. Like Miss Grant Duff, his view of the whole picture is influenced by a special angle; since he is unwilling to admit that Hungary is a fascist country, he must argue that nationalism itself has changed, and has become totalitarian in form and spirit. In a sense, no doubt, this is true, though Mr. Macartney does not draw the obvious conclusions from it.

The fact that nationalism is taking on a more absolute and atomistic form, in part as a direct result of Nazism, in part by reaction against it, will mean that the opposition forces must find some new basis for freedom. Carried to extremes, nationalism is seen to result in the negation of the nineteenth century nationalist ideal. On the need for a synthesis in this region of Europe, Mr. Macartney's views are wise and convincing. But will the synthesis originate in this region itself, and if so, will its unifying principle be Hapsburg, Catholic, Communist or peasant? On this point, Mr. Macartney is vague, but he clearly believes that there are still constructive forces alive in the Danubian region which are capable of producing something new on their own power.

DOREEN WARRINER.

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- THE BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE. By W. E. SIMNETT. (249 pp. *Allen and Unwin*. 8s. 6d.)
- THE COLOUR BAR IN THE COPPER BELT. By JULIUS LEWIN. (20 pp. South African Institute of Race Relations. 6d.)
- LABOUR IN THE COLONIES. By FABIAN COLONIAL BUREAU. (47 pp. *Victor Gollancz Ltd. and Fabian Society*. 1s.)
- AUSTRALIAN NATIVE POLICY. By E. J. B. FOXCROFT. (168 pp. *Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford University Press*. 10s.)
- THE INDIAN STATES AND INDIAN FEDERATION. By SIR GEOFFREY DE MONTMORENCY. (161 pp. *Cambridge University Press*. 3s. 6d.)
- STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF DOMINION STATUS. By GWEN NEUENDORFF. (379 pp. *Allen & Unwin*. 18s.)

THIS bundle of books and pamphlets on dominion and colonial affairs is of a nature to bring home to the duldest imagination the range and complexity of the responsibilities of the Commonwealth. How to redress the results of past error in the treatment of a Stone Age culture in the Australian continent; the claim of white labour in the copper belt of North Rhodesia to a monopoly, not only of skilled, but also of semi-skilled employment; with the dangerous implications for the future of Africa which are involved in this claim; the growth of industrialisation in the colonies, and the need of an economic attack upon poverty there and of the encouragement of trade unions and of the enforcement of enlightened labour legislation; the past and the future of the five hundred odd Indian States outside of British India; the evolution of the Dominions into self-governing nations; all these matters are discussed with understanding and sympathy; and a handbook on *The British Colonial Empire* compendiously describes its history, administration and current problems, and its relations to the British Commonwealth and other Colonial systems. It is a cross section of the whole wide world that is exposed to us.

Mr. W. E. Simnett's handbook includes a diagram, illustrating the organisation of the Colonial office in London, enumerating the bodies which advise the Secretary of State, describing the functions of the Crown Agents for the Colonies and summarising the composition of a typical Colonial Establishment. It contains a useful map and a twenty-page bibliography, from which I note the omission of Dr. Norman Leys. Mr. Simnett is of an optimistic turn of mind. He has given us a picture of East and Central Africa which includes no hint of the existence of a conventional colour bar in the copper belt and on the railways of North Rhodesia, beyond the expression of a hope that "some practicable way will be found for co-operation between the two races" (page 98). Apparently it is not decorous to talk about a colour bar. "The Queen of Spain has no legs."

This omission is supplied in Mr. Julius Lewin's pamphlet on the

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colour bar in the copper belt, which is very appropriately published by the South African Institute of Race Relations at Johannesburg. It is not the Government which is responsible for the restrictions upon the employment of Africans in the semi-skilled work for which there seems to be no doubt that they are qualified. On the contrary the South African Mine Workers' Union—a purely European organisation—has declared, by the mouth of its Secretary, its determination that "Downing Street should not have its own way. The white man's rights must be protected." Mr. Lewin thinks there is no danger that the colour bar will be embodied in legislation; but there may be a gradual growth of a conventional bar based on tradition and European opinion, with the help of European Trade Union rules, apprenticeship agreements, technical regulations (such as those for protective measures in mines) and private understandings with employers. There is an explicit colour bar in the South African Union, contained in the Mines and Works (Amendment) Act of 1926: and, with the extension of South African influence which is reasonably to be anticipated, this dangerous principle—dangerous because of the antagonism of the races which it must inevitably bring about—will spread unless vigorous measures are taken to counteract it.

Mr. Lewin's remedy is that, as future vacancies occur in semi-skilled work, they should be filled by Africans, and that it should be made a condition of the immigration of European workers after a specified date, that they should be replaceable, after due notice, by Africans. Government can also effect something by refusing registration to trade unions which impose a bar, by providing training for Africans, and by giving adequate wages to qualified Africans in its own employ. The nettle is one which needs to be grasped.

The Fabian Research Pamphlet on Labour in the Colonies has all the good qualities of scientific and conscientious inquiry and tolerant balance. Though primarily concerned with wage-earning labour, it does not overlook the case of the small producer on his own land, who—outside of the plantation areas—is the true agricultural worker, not only in the colonies but over by far the greater part of the world. Industrial labour is the Benjamin of reformers, and it is refreshing to find that the "peasant" is not forgotten in the eagerness to deal justly and wisely with the new phenomenon of industry. The Fabian researchers point out that, in the past, small colonial producers have been systematically exploited, either in the interests of the consumer or in those of trading monopolies, and that there is a danger that the present insistence on "free access to raw materials" (which figures in the Atlantic Charter) may concern itself mainly with the consumer. The bulk of the pamphlet deals with Trade Unionism, Government Labour Services, Labour Legislation, abolition of penal sanctions for breach of contract of service, international labour conventions, and the spread of commodity control.

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Mr. Foxcroft demonstrates to us that the "backwardness" of the Australian aborigine is, rather, the uniqueness of a culture appropriate to the conditions of an isolated Australia, which lacked cattle and lacked cereals. No chief existed because chiefdom was an institution unsuited to a nomad people. Actually the aborigine made a very intelligent use of his limited means, but he needed a great deal of land to do it. His early European friends misunderstood these things* and tried to Europeanise him, with clothing and a fixed abode and—what seemed to them—a suitable agricultural employment, which—to him—meant the reversal of all his habits and of everything that the tradition of ages had taught him. The actual agents of extermination were the tribal conflicts brought about by the displacement of some of the tribes to make room for white settlement, murderous reprisals by white settlers for acts of theft, the attractiveness of civilised vices, and the aboriginal susceptibility to European diseases. Going somewhat deeper into the secrets of psychology, Mr. Foxcroft finds that a kind of despair—the extinction of the will-to-live—came upon this people. Frequent changes of policy, and occasional spasms of parsimony in the application of it, did the rest. Racial admixture has improved the prospect of survival. In 1939 there were still surviving fifty-one thousand full-bloods, and half that number of half-castes. But the half-caste is bereft of the traditions of his race and not admitted to equality with the whites.

Mr. Foxcroft's account of remedial measures shows that the case is even now not hopeless. The reserves of South Australia (page 114) offer some prospect of success; so does the industrial experiment in Queensland (pages 119, 120) where 75 per cent of the natives are self-supporting; the pastoral industry in the Northern Territory is "absolutely dependent upon the natives for the labour, domestic and field, necessary to carry it on." The fishermen and sleeper-cutters (page 137) are evidently reliable workers. It is interesting that some promising young men were sent from Western Australia to Rome to study for the priesthood and that the general results are claimed by the missionaries to be good. This method—the selection of the best of the indigenous race to be trained at a civilised centre—is the one followed by the Russians in their dealings with the backward nomad peoples of the north and north-east.

Mr. Foxcroft recommends separate treatment of the detribalised natives and those who continue to have a tribal organisation. For the latter he proposes "isolation in inviolable reserves"; but where these reserves are to be found for a people which does not take to agriculture, does not appear. In one passage (page 133) he suggests that the care of tribal natives be surrendered to a Commonwealth Anthropological Service. The detribalised are to be provided for by the establishment

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of industries. There is a vagueness about these recommendations which is disappointing in so instructive and interesting a book.

Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency's booklet on the Indian States and Indian Federation is a useful corrective for undue simplification of the issues raised by the existence of the Ruling Chiefs side by side with a British India in which democratic institutions are evidently in process of introduction. If the Princes and their hitherto autocratic powers are to be fitted in to an all Indian scheme of union, to which western ideas have contributed a large element of popular control, it is plain that neither autocrats nor democrats can have it all their own way and that something out of the original integral expectation of each is to be surrendered. Such compromises are not generally viewed with favour in India, where each side is in the habit of asking for the whole of the subject matter in dispute. Yet compromise is the inevitable alternative to fighting out the quarrel, unless the question is to be settled by some impartial outside authority or—to use Sir Geoffrey's words—left in the state of coma into which it has now fallen. Out of the many important matters with which this booklet deals, perhaps the most permanently significant is the conversion of the East India Company and its Governors in India, from the policy of confining British interests to trade in British possessions, to a far-reaching inclusion of principalities in the interior of India in schemes of protection, and finally in forms of partnership and union with what was becoming the paramount power. "Without such steps," he writes, "the Union of India, or the Pax Britannica, would never have come about. There might have been Indias, but not an India."

It is this unity which is Britain's greatest gift to India; and the instinct which prompts resistance to schemes of partition is a true one. Whatever be the ultimate solution of the problems which are now dividing Indian opinion, it would be short-sighted to slide into one likely to renew the prospect of future internecine wars such as those which preceded the establishment of British authority. No price is too high to be paid for the preservation of the oneness of the sub-continent. This is another way of saying that the disputants must find a path to agreement, or, if explicit agreement be too much to ask, must acquiesce in a reasonable solution found by the paramount power. To repeat the language of the author, in his summary of the situation, "the question is no longer whether India is to govern herself at the Centre, but by what machinery she can do so."

Miss Neuendorff's studies of Dominion status show a very mature judgment, if as seems likely from Professor Laski's foreword, she has only recently emerged from the pupil status. She shows us, with careful emphasis on all the details of the process, what is, on the whole, a steady progress among the Dominions towards separate nationhood in

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co-operation with the Mother country. That this is not necessarily uniform, even in direction, the history of Newfoundland reminds us. That it might, even now, take a fundamentally different course, seems at least possible. Many of us must, from time to time, have asked ourselves whether the real bond of union in the British Commonwealth of Nations was not the sea-power of Great Britain. If that be so, the present war, by the enlargement of the part played by the United States in the policing of the seas, must obviously bring important changes.

The authoress is herself a South African, and her main subject is the evolution of Canada. She starts therefore with the advantage of freedom from certain illusions apt to obsess the home-born, and can assess at their true value phrases such as those which estimate the relative thickness of blood and water. She can tell us frankly that "in Canada British Governors are not disliked for being constant reminders of their country of origin, as among large sections of the population of South Africa and Ireland, nor suspected of being hostile to Labour as in Australia," and remind us on another page that 50 per cent of the population of Canada is of non-British descent. It is certainly not blood which unites us; and class has a tendency to divide. The history of the idea of Imperial Federation shows how little formal ties commend themselves.

The bibliography is concise but valuable. It is interesting to find included in it Bernard Shaw's *The Applecart*. It looks like a sly reminder by Miss Neuendorff that Kings—and Kings' friends—do, after all, play their part, even in these days of nation-republics. Such lighter thoughts find their way into the gravest treatises, and the reviewer, for one, is glad of it.

JOHN MAYNARD.

NEW TOWNS AFTER THE WAR. By F. J. OSBORN. (*Dent*. 4s. 6d.)

THIS is a most interesting and delightful little book. It was first published in 1918, and the war to which the author then referred was, of course, the war of 1914-1918. Now he has brought out a revised edition, which, with a new preface and a few changes in and additions to the text, is quite relevant to the present conflict.

The purpose of the book is to expound and advocate the idea of the garden city, not merely as a remedy against the evils of the overcrowded, overgrown, overurbanised great town, but as a positive means of attaining a more civilised life. Mr. Osborn writes with the profound and passionate conviction which has made him a great force in the town and country planning movement; but the depth of his feelings has not prevented him from producing a most lively and illuminating tract for the times.

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public funds," and that there is something to be said for the old rotten boroughs because to-day "constituencies are auctioned to men of wealth and rank." He notes with approval that Peel "was unwilling to acknowledge the principle that representation should be based on numbers rather than on brains and influence"—what sublime simplicity in the belief that the owner of a rotten borough and his nominee must have "brains"! Later on in the book Sir Tresham "regrets" the "shortsightedness" of Peel in not being enthusiastic for shorter working hours, but adds that "we must not blame him too severely." He tells us that in 1833 it "was essential" that the Government should rule Ireland "with an iron hand" and he is terribly severe on O'Connell for being a "foul-mouthed demagogue", though when he gives us examples of foul-mouthedness from the demagogue they are mild to that of his critics and opponents. He appears to consider it an outrage for O'Connell to have called Peel "the greatest humbug that ever lived," but when the *Times* wrote of O'Connell

"Scum condensed of Irish bog!

Ruffian—coward—demagogue!

Boundless liar—base detractor!

Nurse of murderers, treason's factor!"

he takes it as merely indicating "the general feeling against O'Connell." The partisanship of this kind of biographical and historical writing may be shown by another small, but interesting, example. Owing to the battle between Peel and Disraeli over the Corn Laws, almost every biographer and historian who is pro-Peel seems to become anti-Disraeli, and vice versa. Sir Tresham, who is markedly pro-Peel, is naively anti-Disraeli. Now there is a curious historical problem connected with the famous scene in the House when Peel accused Disraeli of having asked for office and Disraeli flatly denied it. There is no doubt that Disraeli lied, for in 1841 he had written a letter to Peel in effect asking for office, and it was to that letter that Peel obviously referred. Sir Tresham states categorically that when Disraeli rose and denied Peel's statement, "the fateful letter was at that moment in the Prime Minister's despatch case: he had only to produce it to effect once and for all the total undoing of his ruthless enemy. To his undying credit, he did not do so. It was not in the honourable character of the man to compass by such methods the downfall of his adversary." So the nobility of Peel and the ignobility of Disraeli are enhanced. As a matter of fact there is really no evidence at all for this categorical statement. It may be true, though it is rather difficult to explain why the Prime Minister should in 1846 have been carrying about with him a letter written to him in 1841 if he did not intend to use it for some purpose. There are only two pieces of evidence with regard to the incident, both vague and directly contradictory. The evidence upon which Sir Tresham relies comes from Goldwin Smith's

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Reminiscences. Goldwin Smith, who hated Disraeli personally, says that the Duke of Newcastle told him that he had seen this letter in Peel's despatch case. He does not state exactly when he saw it and even Goldwin Smith does not venture beyond a conjecture that Peel may have had the letter with him in the House when Disraeli made his denial. Goldwin Smith is barely a reliable witness against Disraeli, in any case, but his conjecture becomes in Sir Tresham's book a statement of fact. But there is also evidence, equally unreliable, on the other side. Lord Rosebery tells a story that Peel one night appeared in the bedroom of his secretary, Cardwell, and paced up and down without saying a word, and after a time he suddenly said: "Never destroy a letter; no public man who respects himself should ever destroy a letter." That is all, but Moneyppenny, who was pro-Disraeli and therefore anti-Peel, in his *Life of Disraeli*, assumes that the letter referred to by Peel was the Disraeli letter and accepts this as proof that Peel had tried to find it in order to produce it and had failed, thus doing as a pro-Disraeli historian precisely what Sir Tresham does on the opposite side. Thus is partisan history or biography written. Any impartial person would see at once that there is no real evidence for believing that Peel either had or had not that letter with him in the House on the day in question.

LEONARD WOOLF.

FACTORY INSPECTION IN GREAT BRITAIN. By T. K. DJANG. (255 pp. Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

THIS book deals with an aspect of industrial legislation which has not hitherto been adequately discussed. There is general agreement that in factory inspection Great Britain is first not only in time—the first Factory Inspectors were appointed here in 1833—but also in efficiency. Yet, although numerous books have been written on the provisions of the laws relating to industry, until now nothing has been produced which deals in any detail with the Inspectorate whose work and efficiency has been so great a factor in rendering the law effective.

Dr. Djang has made good this omission. His book, which was written as a thesis for the Ph.D. degree of the University of London, is a most valuable and interesting contribution to the literature on social and industrial legislation.

The book outlines the establishment and history of the Factory Inspectorate from its beginnings to the present day, when the central administration has been transferred from the Home Office to the Ministry of Labour and National Service; describes the circumstances leading to the appointment of Women Inspectors; and shows how the increasing scope and complexity of the Factory Acts made necessary the

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The author hates flats, which, he declares, "remain unpopular with the masses despite the most persistent propaganda by architectural playboys who want larger boxes of plasticine with which to indulge their creative fancy." He loathes the great city which, he asserts, "throughout history has been inimical to life and health." This is not true as an unqualified statement; but one would as soon think of stopping David on his way to fight Goliath in order to tell him that his shoe lace was undone as think of holding up Mr. Osborn on his way to do battle against the great city in order to correct some minor detail in his intellectual armoury. There is a vitality and "go" about his approach to the subject which, though not of the essence of what he has to say, are extremely valuable elements in its forcible presentation.

The two basic principles underlying the garden city are: First, that a town should have a population sufficiently large to permit of efficient industrial organisation, but no larger. The urban area should not exceed the territory required to house this population well, and should be surrounded by a zone of rural and agricultural land. Second, the whole of the land, comprising both the urban and rural zones, should be owned and administered in the interest of the community. (p. 43).

In applying these principles, Mr. Osborn is of the opinion that a town of 30,000 to 50,000 population, covering an urban area of 2,000 acres (a circle of about a mile radius) with an average density of 25 persons to the acre, would provide for most industrial and social purposes, though he would be prepared to vary the limits from 15,000 to 60,000. Such a community, he believes, can provide itself with all the institutions which are necessary for the good life. Those which cannot be supported by so small a community are not mentioned, and we are not told what ought to be done about them.

When Mr. Osborn first became inspired by the garden city idea, as a member of the small group of disciples who gathered round Ebenezer Howard, his intention was to promote an agitation on a national scale to persuade or compel the public authorities to construct a hundred new garden city towns. Howard, however, believing that an ounce of practice was worth a pound of precept, suddenly informed him and his colleagues in 1919 that he was about to purchase a piece of land in Hertfordshire for the purpose of building a second garden city; and that they must forthwith abandon preaching in the wilderness and dedicate themselves to the practical task of demonstrating the soundness of his ideas. Thereafter, in spite of some heartburnings and misgivings, Mr. Osborn devoted his energies to the creation of Welwyn Garden City, in which he played a prominent part.

Mr. Osborn is not sure whether he might not have accomplished more if he had continued to pursue the propagation of the general aim rather than the realisation of it in a particular example. It is certain,

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however, that his book has gained much in interest and common sense by the practical experience which the author acquired in translating his ideas into practice.

The garden city idea has gained ground rapidly in the past few years, both in official and unofficial circles. It is likely to occupy a prominent place in post-war planning policy. If that occurs more will be due to F. J. Osborn for his dynamic efforts during the 24 years which elapsed between the first and second editions of "*New Towns after the War*" than to any other person.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR ROBERT PEEL. By SIR TRESHAM LEVER. (320 pp. *Allen & Unwin*. 12s. 6d.)

THERE is room for a new biography of Peel. Every generation has something to contribute to the interpretation (and misinterpretation) of history and historical persons, and the contribution, if objective and intelligent, throws light both upon the past and the present. Peel and his age are well worth our study. As a man he was interesting and he played an important part in our political history; he should therefore be tempting material to the biographer. As a matter of fact, very few biographers have been attracted, particularly among the moderns. Most of the relevant material has been published in the four volumes of his memoirs, papers, letters, and speeches, and in the biographical literature dealing with his contemporaries. The only full-length modern biography is Miss Ramsay's, published fourteen years ago; it has merits, but cannot possibly be taken as having spoken the final word of our age on Peel. Lord Rosebery's brilliant little sketch remains probably the best thing yet written about him. The only other contribution which deserves mention is a short paper by Professor Laski.

Here therefore is an obvious opening for a biographer, but it cannot be said that Sir Tresham Lever has successfully used his opportunity. It is a naive book, both in small things and large. Sir Tresham's style wobbles between the humdrum and the purple passage ending in three dots, and his grammar is not immaculate, for he will write of "no less than five bills." His naivety in little things is shown by his referring in a purple passage to "the solemn, mournful notes of Handel," Handel, the only composer who was constitutionally unable to make even religious music solemn, let alone mournful! His naivety in more important matters appears continually in his indiscriminate defence of Peel and a jaunty political partisanship. For instance, he defends Peel's opposition to parliamentary Reform, by the argument that the Reform Act did not end bribery, that "to-day with lavish promises men bribe with the

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recruitment of specialist Inspectors—medical, engineering and electrical.

Subsequent chapters deal with the administration of the present Factories Act and describe the work done by the Inspectors in enforcing the various sections concerned with welfare, health, safety, etc. Students of industrial and social subjects and those concerned with industrial welfare should find these chapters particularly useful, for they show vividly how the law can be made effective or ineffective by the co-operation or otherwise of employers and workers. Very interesting accounts are given by Dr. Djang of the difficulties attending the enforcement of adequate ventilation in factories, and also in securing the proper use of safety devices. It is clear that, while the neglectful or careless employer is to blame in very many cases of non-observance of regulations, the worker who is prepared to take risks rather than lose time by adjusting a machine guard, or who has a prejudice against fresh air, is by no means free from responsibility. In his account of the work done in enforcing the hours regulations, he shows how the early Factory Acts, when adequately enforced by the Inspectors, were valuable in providing the child workers with some small amount of education, until the Act of 1870 instituted a compulsory State scheme.

Another chapter in the book is entitled "Self-Inspection in Industry" and deals with the comparatively recent developments in voluntary safety and welfare movements and the increasing insistence on the importance of the "human element." Accounts are given of the "Safety First" movement in industry and the work of such bodies as the Industrial Welfare Society and the Institute of Labour Management. Dr. Djang is perhaps taking a rather over-favourable view when he describes industrial welfare as meaning "goodwill in industry, good relations between employers and employees and comfort for the human element." No doubt industrial welfare has this aim, and at its best achieves it; but, unfortunately, it is by no means always at its best, and at its worst may be productive of anything but good relations.

Some reference is also made to the Inspectors' work in connection with the Workmen's Compensation Acts and the Truck Acts. In the latter case one could wish that the limits of space had allowed Dr. Djang to go into rather more detail. Very little has been written on the "human side" of the Truck Acts since Miss Squire so vividly described the Irish and other prosecutions in "Thirty Years in the Public Service."

The concluding chapters deal with the official life of the Factory Inspectors, with the reasons for the success of the British system, and make suggestions for further improvement. Dr. Djang shows how vastly the field of the Factory Inspectors' work has widened from the mere inspection of workplaces. They have become the expert and trusted advisers of employer and worker, the investigators of industrial problems; they participate in trade conferences and agreements and

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enlighten the general public through lectures, interviews, correspondence, and explanations of the Home Office Industrial Museum.

Finally, Dr. Djang attributes the success of the Factory Inspectorate to the careful selection of personnel, the emphasis on co-operation and publicity, and to the zeal of the inspectors. He suggests that the success of the Department would be even greater if more inspectors were appointed—a suggestion which will meet with general agreement—and if the specialised branches were increased by the inclusion of inspectors in chemistry and industrial psychology. He makes other interesting suggestions, notably that there should be closer co-operation between the British department and the International Labour Office, so that other countries might benefit from Great Britain's experience.

The book is altogether a welcome addition to the books on factory law and a worthy tribute to a group of men and women who have never failed to respond to the increasing demands made upon them, and who to-day are facing with their accustomed devotion and efficiency the still heavier tasks imposed by the needs of war.

R. C. CHAMBERS

INDIA: THE ROAD TO SELF-GOVERNMENT. By JOHN COATMAN. (146 pp. George Allen & Unwin. 5s.)

THIS is a moderate and scholarly summary of Indian Constitutional history by an author who combines the experience of an Indian administrator with that of a professor of British Imperial history. His pages are illuminated by frequent examples drawn from the development of the Dominions. The story has been carried up to 1941, but does not cover the enlargement of the Governor General's Executive Council by the nomination of a non-official Indian majority in the summer of that year. That measure appeared to recognise an important principle; that the British Government is not merely "to guarantee the Pax Britannica, within which Indians of all creeds and races, and of all parts and provinces, may peacefully work out their own destiny" (page 115). It has also a duty of initiation, and of seeking to secure acquiescence, where express agreement presents apparently insuperable difficulties, to an equitable solution of the issues between the parties.

On this point the author seems to speak with two voices. On the one hand, echoing some recent announcements of the British Government, he emphasises that constitutional progress depends henceforth upon Indians themselves (as, in part, no doubt, it must). On the other hand, he recognises that there are important interests in Great Britain which view with suspicion any political changes which might lead to possible discrimination against British trade in India (page 103), and that the British Government is one of the interests concerned in the

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process of the building of the constitution (page 135). The truth surely is—and it is effectively demonstrated by the story told in this book—that every recent step in India's constitutional development has been the result of a struggle of interests, interests both Indian and British, fought out in a series of stubborn rearguard actions by those who have opposed fundamental change. The marvel is that such a struggle should have been comparatively so clean, and comparatively so bloodless, on all sides. But the picture of it as a peaceful, almost a planned growth, is too roseate.

In one sense, no doubt, the process has been inevitable. The demand for the increasing control of Indian affairs in India has been the natural result of association with the West, its literature and its institutions. But the fulfilment of the demand, far from being inevitable without more serious clashes, has been won, not by passive waiting upon events, but by action—action in which the British Government, in default of explicit agreement in India, has often had to lead the way. Such action is still a desideratum.

JOHN MAYNARD.

SPEED THE PLOUGH. By C. S. ORWIN. (*Penguin Special*)

EVEN in time of war a description of British agriculture makes dismal reading and the first three chapters of this book are none the less depressing for being well expressed and informed. The hopeless position and hopeless reaction of the landlords, the "rural idiocy" of tenants and labourers, the general drift, muddle, waste, backwardness and inefficiency are sufficiently well known; but that is no excuse for skipping the first part of the book, for the second and most interesting part is based upon a careful survey of actual tendencies.

This second part is devoted to the exposition of a plan which is designed to set the industry on its feet again, make agriculture a paying concern, and at the same time preserve the amenities of the countryside for the nation. Proceeding from a general survey of the countryside, its topography, communications, public services, equipment, lay out of farms, rural industries, social services, etc., a Ministry of Lands would go on to acquire lands for a National Estate. This estate would be the sole purchaser of land in the country and it would be empowered to acquire land at a rate based on the income tax assessment under schedule A. Gradually it would become the only landowner (except perhaps for some public bodies). The forestry commission would remain separate, but be brought under the Ministry of Lands. Property in towns is not considered in any detail, but it may be said that urban reconstruction will have to be approached on very similar lines.

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Armed with a knowledge of modern agricultural methods, and of the data provided by the previous Survey, the National Estate would be able to enforce a much more rational partition of the land, much better working conditions for men and beasts, more frequent and more thorough rebuilding and repairing, work and workshops for rural industry and perhaps a saner method of distribution. Mr. Orwin has gone into the question of organisation with some care; he is clearly anxious that the threatened "horde of officials from Whitehall" should not become a reality. He believes that land agents would enter the government service readily and be glad to escape from the demands of those who regard the land as little more than a vehicle for the uneconomic amusements of a minority. I hope he is right.

It is an attractive scheme, equitable in that it hits no one very hard, except those who are hoping to get something for nothing, elastic in that it makes due allowances for varying conditions and respects the small holder, convenient in that it can be accelerated or retarded to suit the national temper. Nevertheless in several important matters I think it requires alteration and amendment, and this I think becomes clear when one considers the manner in which the proposal is to be brought into effect.

To which section of the agricultural world are the partisans of the National Estate going to appeal? Admittedly it will ultimately benefit all sections of the community, but a large number of people will certainly call it Bolshevism, and its novelty is bound to be against it, for farmers will look any gift horse in the mouth unless it be very long in the tooth. The landlord's idea of reform is that his own particular form of property should be held sacred and exempt from death duties, the tenant merely wants a tariff such as will enable him to farm in the way that his grandfathers farmed before him, the labourer only wants to see wages kept where they are and prices where they were and is quite likely to believe that a tariff will do this for him. Nevertheless it is to him that we must address ourselves, to him and to the intelligent minority of landlords and tenants who understand the true interests of the country.

Mr. Orwin shows that he appreciates the needs of the situation when he points out that in agriculture capital and not ability is regarded as essential, but he does not develop this idea as far as one could wish. When he comes to an imaginary example of the new model farm, an estate of three thousand acres complete with managers, assistant managers, and clerical staff, it is replanned and reconditioned by the state and then let to a private syndicate which puts up the capital necessary for restocking it. Here we are confronted by two objections. First: we are not told from what class the managers and assistants would be drawn, but under present conditions they would be neither tenant farmers nor labourers, for modern equipment requires modern methods; therefore

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they would be those who can afford a technical education at an agricultural college. Thus the labourers' principal grievance that farming "leads nowhere" would not be removed but rather intensified. The government, which with one hand provides admirable educational facilities, with the other allows farmers to use adolescent labour, thus negating its own policy. A part of any equitable scheme for the land must be technical education for all and a much higher school leaving age with endowments. Secondly: what besides capital does the new tenant bring to the farm? The old-fashioned landlord and tenant have plenty of faults, but they also have their virtues, and the tenants at all events perform a useful function apart from that of providing capital. But as far as one can see, the new model tenant has no agricultural function whatsoever; all he does is to provide some of the capital and take the profits. It is difficult to see why those who work on the land should not be the tenants themselves, borrowing and gradually repaying to the government the money required for stocking the land. Such a proposal needs much more consideration than can be devoted to it here, but I believe that, if it could be developed in harmony with the scheme for a National Estate, it might procure for it that popular backing which it deserves.

Finally, it must be remembered that the countryside exists not only for the provision of food and timber, but for the amusement of the urban population and even for the artist and the sportsman. To a large extent the interests of all or nearly all of these will be served by a more efficient cultivation of the land, but if we may suppose that some kind of international and economic order results from this war, then the needs of agriculture should not always be placed first when a dispute arises.

QUENTIN BELL.

GERMAN DISARMAMENT AND EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION

By MERCATOR

EVEN though the United Nations are locked in a deathly struggle and the decisive battles have yet to be won, it is not altogether premature to look ahead to the problem of European reconstruction. Preparations for victory have been systematically organised by Britain, the United States and Russia on a world scale, involving nearly four-fifths of the human race; and preparations of this kind obviously take a long time fully to mature. But such is the speed with which Allied power is gathering that its impact upon the enemy may well lead at any given point not merely to a long continued retreat by the Axis, but to a sudden convulsion bringing victory overnight and, with it, a whole host of post-war problems.

That any ready-made solution can be found for these problems is out of the question, and it would be wisest for the United States, Britain and Russia not to seek it. The ultimate objective of an international authority, backed by an international police force, as the directing influence in world affairs may well be inescapable. But it will not provide a practical plan of action in the immediate post-war period. It is essentially a long-term project, and not until the nations have settled down to the habits of self-government and peaceful co-operation, will they be in a position to arrive at a true conception of their common interests and be willing to provide the necessary sanctions for its realisation in some form of super-national government. Such a development must largely be determined by the trend of events, and any attempt by the victors to impose a cut-and-dried plan from above is more likely than not to compromise the achievement of the ultimate objective. Fortunately there are no signs that this is likely to be done.

The defeat of Germany will immediately result in a bursting of the strait-jacket into which the Nazis have forced the entire Continent. And when that happens the

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recovery of freedom by the suppressed peoples will be inseparable from the release of revolutionary forces. In the course of the ensuing political upheavals, new governments will be formed and new frontiers drawn. Even so, stability will not be attainable until the economic problems are settled. And this will be a long and difficult process. The problem of employment will become paramount in every country immediately the stimulus of war is withdrawn from industrial production and the repatriation of war prisoners and conscript workers begins to flood the national labour markets from every point of the compass. In such circumstances, there can be little hope for an early return to the free development of economic life, and the peoples must, on grounds of necessity, submit to continued restrictions both as producers and consumers. Until the scarcity of consumable goods is remedied, restraints must be placed upon purchasing power so as to avoid an inflationary rise of prices. The scarcity of consumable goods can only be remedied by the effective transition of the industrial machine from a war to peace basis and by the resumption of imports. Both these will make great calls upon the resources of the nation. A large proportion of the national income in each country will thus have to be withheld from current consumption in order to provide for large-scale investment in new capital goods and for the purchase of materials from abroad. In the meantime restrictions upon the consumers' freedom of purchasing power will be necessary. The principles of war-time control of spending and investment cannot therefore be abolished for a long period ahead. They must be retained and adapted to the necessities of an orderly transition to peace-time production. Until the individual nations have had an opportunity to readjust themselves to this situation, it is unlikely that any composite pattern of a new international economic order will take shape. An important point is, however, that these controls will not be directed towards the development of closed economies on pre-war lines. On the contrary, it will be the interest of every country in Europe and the other war zones to keep itself open to every possibility of outside assistance. Emergency relief for those without food, clothing and shelter will be the first consideration. But relief inevitably

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merges into reconstruction, and each nation will have every incentive to make sure that it will secure its full share of relief, trade and possibly reconstruction finance. The efforts made in any single direction cannot be entirely effective, but taken collectively they will inevitably shape in a new pattern of international economic relations.

The extent to which European economic reconstruction can be assisted and directed by new capital investment from outside will depend upon the United States. And if the United States can work out with Britain and Soviet Russia a common economic policy upon which such reconstruction investment shall be made, then it will be possible to give a cohesion and strength to this new pattern. It is only through the process of adjustment to developments of this kind that the Governments of post-war Europe are likely to arrive at a common economic policy, which is the condition precedent to any new international economic organisation with effective sanctions.

To impose such an organisation from the start would be quite impolitic in the sense that it might cut clean across the social, economic and political movements which the combined forces of the Reichswehr and the Gestapo are having difficulty, even now, in keeping under restraint. These movements have clearly to come to the surface, and when they do they are likely to result in substantial changes in the make-up of Europe. The combined power of the United States, Great Britain and Russia to influence these movements will be immense. For their forces will possess the greatest preponderance of armed might in military history, and their productive machinery, backed by sea supremacy and world resources, will still be immensely strong. But their power may easily be dissipated in the long run if out of war-weariness they should force the international issues by seeking a quick peace settlement (which they could secure on almost any terms) in order to bring their armies back home within the shortest possible time. Yet, on the other hand, the assumption that European disarmament and political good faith can be guaranteed only by the indefinite military occupation of Germany would be equally illusory. Whatever peace settlement is made, it must clearly promote the wider development

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counterparts, who have grappled with these problems in close quarters. Among the most important measures must be the dismantling of all the synthetic producer plants which have no other purpose than to replace strategic raw materials from overseas. This would automatically include all the synthetic petroleum, rubber and fibre plants. But whether this should involve the total destruction of all synthetic plants is another matter, for the definition of strategic and non-strategic is by no means easy to make. There are certain synthetic processes which are not regressive in the sense of producing elaborate substitutes for commonplace materials. In the case of plastics, for example, synthetic production has resulted in the creation of entirely new materials of considerable importance to the consumption goods' industries. The difficulty arises, however, only with the borderline cases. But the nearer the borderline the less important becomes the decision whether or not to dismantle, and this may well be left to the experts.

An alternative to synthetic production is, of course, the accumulation of sufficient stocks of strategic raw materials to cover the duration of a calculated aggression. It would be proper, therefore, to set limits to the amount of such materials which Germany could acquire within any given period. This would have the further advantage of depriving Germany of any inducement which she might otherwise have, apart from general foreign exchange considerations, of concentrating her foreign trade on the particular regions which happen to produce these raw materials.

The synthetic industries are, so to speak, only the bastions of a siege economy. The actual sinews of rearmament are created by the heavy industries—the coal mines, blast furnaces and steel works—and, behind them, the vast range of engineering works and secondary industries generally. Broadly speaking, all these are capable of being put to equally efficient use whether for peace or war production. The coal industry is committed to the production of coal by set processes in all circumstances, and the question of its disarmament does not arise. The same applies to iron mining. The steel industry can be disarmed by the dismantling of certain key installations directly connected with the production of munitions. But

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the capacity of the skilled labourers, buildings, power plants and general equipment to produce steel for all purposes still remains. The same applies to the secondary industries. In fact, all that is required for the disarmament of the Fallersleben tank factory, the Messerschmidt works at Augsburg, or the Munster gun factories is the replacement of one set of machine tools by another, and within three to six months, the self-same works will be turning out Peoples' Cars, mail planes and railway carriages.

The danger of these industries lies clearly not so much in their capacity for production, as such, but rather in their convertibility, and the vital factor in this respect is their possession of the necessary jigs, dies, lathes and other machine tools. The Germans kept this fact well in mind after the last tools. From the earliest days of their preparation for rearmament, the industrialists, in collaboration with the Reichswehr, maintained this industry at a high pitch by promoting the sale of machine tools on long term credit to Soviet Russia until Hitler was ready to take over. This enabled the Nazis to start immediately an extensive retooling of their factories in 1933, an advantage which gave them a technical lead in rearmament of at least two years, in addition to the seven years they gained by merely starting first. It may be added that it was due to the cessation of German supplies of machine tools to Russia after the advent of Hitler that Soviet orders flowed to Britain and enabled her, in turn, to maintain her machine tool industry in a reasonable state of preparedness against the time when the Chamberlain Government introduced the first instalment of rearmament. Without this development in machine tool production Britain's rearmament would have been even more tardy than it was.

It follows, therefore, that the control of Germany's machine tool industry is technically an essential condition of her effective disarmament. It might be said that the total prohibition of machine tool manufacture would be the safest course of all. But it is doubtful if so drastic a step would be justified. Apart from permanent immobilisation of an important body of skilled labour which this would involve consideration has also to be paid to the sense of discrimination (and also unfair competition) which even suitably chastened

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of a new international order in such a way as to allow peoples of Europe the fullest opportunities to work out a common salvation.

In framing the Atlantic Charter, the United States and Great Britain made a most promising approach to the problem, and with Russia's acceptance of it already secured it is certain to have a powerful influence upon the economic and political development of the post-war world. The Charter provides a clear exposition of the principles of international conduct by which every nation should find it possible to realise its social and political salvation in freedom from fear and want, and on it is based the appeal by the United Nations for the support of the conquered in overthrowing the enemy. The potentialities of resistance on the part of the conquered by moral, political and economic weapons are immense under conditions of total warfare, and if the appeal is successful, as seems to be the case, the Charter will be associated as closely with the making of peace as with the winning of victory. The criticism that the Charter is vague and inconclusive in the sense that it omits to provide the means by which these principles are to be implemented is not altogether relevant. For the choice of means must obviously be determined in the last resort by the form of organisation through which the future international society will function. Some guidance in this matter is provided by the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement which deals with adjustment of post-war indebtedness in terms consistent with the progressive development of their common trade relations. Britain is only one of many countries which will finish the war with a large financial indebtedness to the United States, and there can be no question that the offer to the United States to enter into similar mutual aid agreements with other like-minded nations represents an important step in the practical appreciation of the Charter and a not inconspicuous starting point of a common economic policy.

We have dealt so far with the more general problems of post-war reconstruction, to the exclusion of the more specific issues arising out of the defeat of the Axis. Lest this should have created the impression that the United States, Britain and Russia should content themselves with the impartial role

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of benevolent sympathisers with the democratic aspirations of the aggressors and conquered alike, assisting wherever possible with their investments, markets and raw materials under the provisions of the Atlantic Charter (or some new form of Lease-Lend), let us not forget that the disarmament of the Axis powers will call for immediate and drastic intervention in European affairs, quite apart from all question of retribution. Germany is clearly the core of the disarmament problem, and the first object will be to enact and supervise the complete disbandment of the Reichswehr and all paramilitary forces, as well as the dismantling of the arms factories.

Disarmament in the purely military sense is only half the problem. For Germany was able, even under the Weimar Republic, to lay the foundations of a rearmament programme which enabled Hitler to shorten his time-table of aggression by two or three years. The basis of Germany's secret rearmament lay in its economic preparation for war; in the organisation of the heavy industries for rapid conversion to arms production, the development of the machine tool industry in accordance with military specifications, the construction of factories capable of producing bombers, tanks and guns with the same ease as they turned out mail 'planes, peoples' cars and railway carriages. In the end, the only industries which were not mobilised for arms production were those which were employed either to meet civilian consumption or produce export goods, which the Nazis exchanged for imports of strategic raw materials. Rearmament dominated the entire industrial and commercial system of the country, and when the new synthetic industries were finally established for the replacement of overseas supplies of petroleum, rubber, cotton and wool the structure of a siege economy was completed.

Unless there is economic disarmament, military disarmament will be ineffective. The disbandment of the Reichswehr and the dismantling of the arms factories is, however, a relatively simple matter compared with the measures required to prevent a repetition of the complicated industrial changes by which Hitler created a war economy between 1933 and 1939. This is clearly a task for specialists from the Ministry of Economic Warfare and their American and Russian

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Germans would harbour if they were permanently cut off from the exercise of one of the highest forms of industrial technique. The solution of this problem might best be found in the setting up of a permanent Machine Tool Commission as part of the programme of German disarmament, with a technical and administrative staff armed with full powers to investigate processes of manufacture and records. This body might report in the interim period of reconstruction to the occupation authorities and subsequently to whatever international authority that may be set up.

These conditions are no more than the minimum necessary for effective German disarmament. To go much beyond this, however, might well involve the recruitment of a large army of foreign experts to occupy key posts throughout the entire range of German industry, or the application of nearly similar terms of economic disarmament to the countries whose productive resources lie within easy reach of Germany. Neither of these courses would be practical, and the only permanent insurance against the remoter contingencies of rearmament lies in the wider sphere of international relations where effective expression can be given to the lessons of retributive justice, no less than to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The economic disarmament of Germany is, however, not an isolated problem, and the great changes which it must bring about in her heavy industries will directly affect the rest of Europe. The economic system of Europe is set firmly in the framework of its heavy industries, and as these are rigidly based on coal and iron, that framework is unlikely to be materially altered except in the event of major developments in hydro-electric power. The incidence of coal and iron has invariably tended towards the formation of regional economic units, the full development of which has been impeded in the past by cross-cutting of political frontiers, tariff laws and exchange regulations. The Nazis have gone a long way to removing these barriers as part of their plan for the total exploitation of the conquered. In the process they have not only acquired direct or indirect control of Europe's iron and steel industry, but have unified it on truly continental lines. Except where restricted by shortages of

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raw materials, they appear to have co-ordinated with ruthless efficiency a multitude of competitive units within and across the existing political frontiers. Although their control is highly centralised, the management of the industry is organised with varying degrees of decentralisation into a closely articulated series of productive processes throughout the continent. If the future of this industry can be approached in the positive sense of a planned development of productive capacity to meet the needs of a higher standard of continental welfare, and not merely from the negative standpoint of economic disarmament alone, one might well ask whether there be something in this unification of steel production which may stand Europe in good stead after the war.

The present position is that the Nazis have acquired direct or indirect control of Europe's steel industry as a result of a number of expedients, ranging from confiscation to share purchases. In the West, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg have been incorporated bodily into the framework of the Reich, forming a cohesive regional economic unit with the Ruhr. In addition to this, the Nazis have strengthened the peace-time links between the Stahlverein and the Comité des Forges by substantial share purchases in most other French heavy industries. Co-ordinated with this Franco-German group are iron and steel industries of Holland and Belgium which have been largely reconstituted under the auspices of the Stahlverein. In Eastern Europe, the Nazis have incorporated the Polish Silesian and Teschen industries in another regional economic unit based on German Silesia. In between lies another composite industrial region, which is largely directed by the Reichswerke A. G. Hermann Goering. This undertaking, based originally on the exploitation of the low grade Salzgitter ores, has now become the presiding influence in the development of a great Central European industrial unit. Included in this are the Austrian heavy industries, the Czech Skoda works, as well as the various Slovakian iron and steel undertakings, all of which have been modernised, unified and dove-tailed into the German steel industry. The heavy industries which lie outside these three regions are relatively unimportant. The Rumanian iron and steel works are perhaps the most note-

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worthy, and these the Nazis have now brought under the control of a single Nazi holding company, and the new capital put into their development has been to a large extent of German origin.

When the conquered nations of Europe regain their independence, German control of their heavy industries will be broken. And that is as it should be. But it would be well to realise that although the mere splitting up of the European steel industry again into its national component parts, behind separate tariff walls, may be desirable as an act of retribution, it will not in itself solve any of the underlying problems. In this connection it will be convenient to examine the question of who shall own the iron and steel works in the various countries when they are taken back from the Germans. This is a problem which has been complicated by the Germans with characteristic cunning. Although their present control of the steel industries in occupied countries rests in the last resort upon military sanctions, the Nazis have been careful to keep up the fiction of property rights, and have acquired control largely by means of seemingly legitimate purchases of shares through the intermediary of the big companies, notably the Stahlverein and the Reichswerke.¹ Even in Alsace-Lorraine and Poland where the industries have been incorporated into the Reich itself, it is not certain that they have dispensed with the formality of buying out the owners. But elsewhere it certainly appears that they have avoided direct confiscation in favour of operations on the Stock Exchange or private deals with financial groups in the occupied countries. Such transactions have all the appearance of ordinary business, and may well have been disguised to a large extent by the employment of French, Belgian, Dutch and other national agents as nominees. Thus the distinction between German and non-German property rights has become intentionally blurred, and the claims of the original owners to a restitution of their property would in any event be difficult to trace through the complications of Stock Exchange

¹ The Nazis do not, of course, really pay for anything. They take all the national currency they require in each country by the collection of so-called occupation expenses. By using this money for the purchase of shares, etc., they make a pretence at maintaining a certain freedom of exchange within the various countries, all of which greatly helps the Nazi machinery of monetary and financial exploitation.

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dealings. Even if these claims were allowed, it is questionable in many instances if the owners could have sure grounds for sustaining their claims, unless it were declared, for example, that all share transactions on the Paris bourse subsequent to the German occupation were illegal, and that anyone who liquidated his holdings during that period would have a right to recover them. And could this principle be extended to bearer certificates, which are as anonymous and as negotiable as bank notes? Obviously the situation would be impossible, particularly if the shares passed through the hands of a number of nominees before passing into Nazi control.

That the sellers of such shares may have been induced to liquidate their holdings by the threat of inflation, impoverishment or duress, all of which are attributable to Nazi domination, is another matter. But it is by no means certain that this is so in all cases. For there are groups of industrialists in most occupied countries who have been most willing to collaborate with the Nazis, and they have been far from reluctant to enter into share transactions of this kind. In fact, they have sought positive advantages from the establishment of closer economic co-operation with the big German combines in the form of exchange of patents, marketing opportunities in Germany, and fresh capital for investment in synthetic processes of production to make good the loss of raw materials under the British blockade. Would there be any equity, for example, in handing back to the Comité des Forges the shares they had sold to the Germans in return for which they acquired francs, and through the reinvestment of those francs, interests in other industries. If the industrialists are given the right to retain the cash benefits of their collaboration with the Nazis a great injustice will be committed. The restoration of their former property would, moreover, merely open the door to another form of collaboration, so familiar in peace time, of price raising cartels and restricted output by the resumption of private agreements between minorities of powerful producers in each country, each demanding from its respective Government high tariffs and export subsidies in order to improve its bargaining position.

The question of the future ownership of the iron and

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steel industries in occupied countries has an important bearing on the future organisation of European production. If the Nazis and the collaborationists are debarred, then clearly ownership must be vested in the elected Governments of the countries concerned. This will not in itself solve the problem of organisation, for it may well be that during the period of transition from war to peace production, the difficulties of unemployment and imports may lead to renewed attempts at self sufficiency and high tariffs. And in the process, Europe might lose its unity in steel production by the disintegration of the present co-ordinated structure into a number of small and ill-balanced units. This would, in turn, break up the economic entity of large industrial regions in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, to the detriment of the high degree of efficient specialisation which is the basis of international trade.

If Europe is to be saved from the dangers of internecine competition and play a positive role in economic reconstruction, an essential condition is that its steel industry should be maintained in the highest state of efficiency for peace production. The problem is one in which all the European nations have a common interest, and the solution lies in the specialisation and co-ordination of productive resources rather than in a reversion to the self-seeking competition of national groups. There must be some plan for the common utilisation of these resources in accordance with the needs of the continent as a whole. This implies some form of common organisation and control, and it is suggested that the case should be met in the initial period by the formation of a European Steel Commission which would introduce a measure of international control over the industry. This Commission should be representative of the Governments concerned, and there should be no discrimination against a duly elected German Government in this respect. It would be premature to suggest the actual powers which such a Commission should have, for this depends in the last resort upon the operative authority in international affairs in the post-war period. The immediate objective would be to maintain, as far as possible, the unity of the industry in its present regional economic groupings, and to create the

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necessary machinery for the planned development of trade and production along truly European lines.

Although the creation of a super-national authority capable of applying a directing force to world affairs may have to wait upon the future, it is generally accepted that certain measures of international control are immediately required as a minimum condition of collective security. If disarmament is the most important, as seems to be the case, then the international control of continental steel industries cannot rank far behind. It is for the United Nations to give a lead in this direction. The steel industry is a key sector in the European economy, and if this can be kept rationally organised, the development of an international economic policy will be greatly assisted.

Whatever penalties may be coming to Germany for her black record of aggression, it would be wise to avoid those which are likely to throw out of gear the economic machinery of Europe. The international control of the steel industry offers one possibility of maintaining an important part of that machinery in good order, and even if it does involve the acceptance of German representation, it would at least strengthen the possibility of harnessing the productive resources of the German people to the common task of reconstruction.

THE MEANING OF THE FRENCH RESISTANCE

By PAUL VAUCHER

THE French collapse and the sudden disappearance of a great country are so bewildering that attempts are made from all quarters to account for it. The Frenchmen who reached England or America wrote numerous books on the subject. But, together with the all too frequent contributions made by foreign journalists, they do not enable us to form reliable and coherent views. While we are informed at great length of the lamentable intrigues that preceded the armistice, the causes that made them prevail on an unwilling, yet unprepared, people remain obscure. Not enough attention is paid to the relative importance that the political, the social, the moral and the technical factors played in the process. All of them must be considered both separately and in their mutual interaction. Much also depends on the period studied by the observers who are anxious to allocate responsibilities, whether their analysis begins in 1935 or 1931, or whether it goes back to 1919 or even to the years preceding 1914.

Perhaps we do not need to have reached definite conclusions as to the causes which produced the breakdown of 1940, to understand the present conditions of the French people. But again the subject is bristling with all sorts of difficulties.

We are fairly well informed of the steps taken by the authors of the so-called "National Revolution," but we know less of the motives underlying their activities. After due account has been taken of Pétain's age, of his natural inclination towards a profound pessimism, of his peasant's acuteness and his political inexperience, of his professed dedication to France and eagerness for self-sacrifice, yet of his visible appreciation of his own popularity, we are still far from understanding his attitude and policy which also must depend on those of his French and German "collaborators." The incredible endeavours of Maurras to push the whole of

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the modern French History aside, and to restore an old order, are not easily reconciled with the realistic spirit of big businessmen bent on dominating the economic life of the country. What is known of the past record of some of the Vichy ministers would point to the existence of a gang of some sort whose members, such as Baudoin, Pucheu, Barnaud, Benoist-Mechin, Marion, have been backed by financial powers (Banque Worms, Banque de l'Indo-Chine . . .) But they are at the same time engaged in a bitter strife and, as they come to admit the possibility of a German defeat, they are apt to seek by different and contradictory means safeguards against an impending disaster.

Not to mention the activities of secret groups such as the Cagoulauds, or of those who still regard La Rocque as their leader, and whose attitude can only be understood by giving them credit for a great deal of foolishness, the course followed by the rival bands, competing in Paris to attract and also to deceive the rank and file of the working class, with Déat and Doriot probably loathing each other, remains utterly confusing. As regards the many appeals made to the peasantry, a distinction must be made between the Marshal's own views leading to the reforms launched by the Minister of Agriculture, M. Caziot, a technician with a good reputation showing some evidence of hostility to the totalitarian doctrines, and the more recent plans of political agitators, Dorgères, Leroy-Ladurie, now serving under Laval. Last, but not least, M. Laval's personal policy, to which we shall turn later, has not been properly defined.

We are not dealing at any length with these problems, because, however painful they may be, they are, as regards the future, of comparatively small importance. What chiefly matters is the state of public opinion which by now is abundantly clear. There is no doubt whatsoever that, except for an insignificant minority, the French people sees no hope in the future outside of a crushing German defeat. Even of those who still believe in Pétain's wisdom or goodwill, and who remain obedient to his orders, most at least are wholeheartedly opposed to the tendencies of his government. Moreover, they are convinced that its work will not last. The wide differences which, in 1940, separated the Frenchmen

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of the two "zones" are by now much reduced. As German interference in the unoccupied regions becomes more stringent and more conspicuous, their population are gradually acquiring the mentality which from 1940 has been that of the occupied districts.

However, the spirit of resistance does not exclude tendencies towards isolationism. Of course, Frenchmen are not so stupid or so boastful as to believe that their liberation can be obtained by any other means than the prevailing power of the United Nations. Those who thought at first that out of the common exhaustion of the belligerents an opportunity may arise for France to make her reappearance, are no longer regarded as clever diplomats. On the contrary, Frenchmen want to rise in open revolt when the Allied armies land in France; they want to be given arms to join them.

Yet their present mood is one of acute sensitiveness making them very touchy. This seems surprising on the part of men who must have felt the full bitterness of the shameful desertion by their government of their former allies. But while deeply humiliated and admitting that the capitulation was a lamentable mistake, they do not hold themselves responsible for it.

They do not feel that in June, 1940, they took any real part in the fatal deed. The millions of refugees who were lost on the roads, deprived of any means of information, were yet convinced that the war would continue and, for that very reason, were eager to reach the French side of the battlefield. They looked towards Pétain and Weygand as men who would go on fighting to the last. After being told by the Marshal's old and shaken voice that the war was over, they were not given the terms of the armistice and were only able to witness the breakdown of all administrative and military order. When they turn back to those days of nightmare, they remember that they were not in any way consulted, and they look upon themselves more as the victims than as the actors in the collapse.

Of course, they know well enough that their own mistakes contributed much to the more distant causes that produced the military defeat. But they are disinclined to make at present a public confession of their sins. This is partly due

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to the irritating way in which Pétain advised them to pronounce a *mea culpa*, with the Germans joining in his request. But it is also the result of all the information or misinformation that was given to them concerning the part played by the British forces in the days preceding the armistice. Even Mr. Churchill's proposal for a complete Franco-British union, which was described to them as a fantastic proposal not to be taken seriously, has impressed them less than the depressing spectacle of the British troops retreating across their country and putting out to sea. They never shared Vichy's cynical expectation of a speedy British defeat. Even at the time when it seemed unreasonable to entertain any hope that Britain could stop an invasion, most of them felt that, somehow, she would go on fighting, because they could not bear the thought of a lasting German victory. Nevertheless they did, and many still do believe that Britain in 1940 let them down. When told that no other course was open to her, they would ask in turn why the British military effort, during the opening months of the war, was so slow.

Their opinion is, indeed, open to much discussion, but we are only concerned in defining it, as it goes far to explain how Frenchmen have passed from a state of depression and humiliation to their present mood of ardent nationalism. It does not affect in the least the profound admiration they feel for the pluck and courage shown by Britain since the summer of 1940. It does not in any way weaken their resolution to help the British forces by all means available and to greet the armies of the United Nations as liberators. But one has to remember it while endeavouring to foresee the future and to keep it in mind in order properly to understand the present spirit of resistance.

For over a year we have been repeatedly told that resisting France includes some ninety per cent of the inhabitants in the occupied zone and at least seventy per cent of those under Vichy. This, I believe, is true, but it does not mean that all of them, although they regard a German defeat as indispensable, are prepared to go the same length to obtain it. There is a widespread anxiety to take again a direct part in the war, but there exist centres of more active resistance compared to others whose temperature has not risen so high.

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The information available does not allow us to draw a map or a list of the resisting areas. It is therefore more helpful to know that the main centres of resistance are at present to be found in the Labour organisations, in the schools and universities, and in the churches.

Taking first the schools and universities, they surely are of all the French institutions the one which has been the best able to maintain itself since 1940. The many dismissals and the not infrequent arrests of teachers and professors that have taken place have still left the great majority of the educationists in office. These are not likely to have much altered their views, and the number of those who turned collaborationists is, in fact, quite insignificant. All we know about classes, at which the audience is above all eager to learn what the lecturer cannot openly say, makes us careful in estimating the real effect of the changes introduced on paper in the syllabuses, or of the instructions issued at Vichy. Moreover, the instructions sent in March, 1942, to the primary schools do show a genuine anxiety to keep our traditions and national spirit alive. Similarly, the books or periodicals now published do not at all reflect the real activity of our intellectual life. Writers and artists, because they well know that its destruction is one of Germany's essential aims, are silently working harder than ever before.

The maintenance of our educational system is the more important because of what seems to be the present tendencies of the French youth. A general demand for a better physical and moral training in 1940 led Vichy to open youth camps and to support those due to private initiative. But the officials have apparently quite failed to enlist youngsters on their side and to turn them into supporters of fascism. Several attempts made to apply to all camps the same rules met with little success. It appears that patriotism among them is running high and also that many do not want to be given facilities for the building up of their personalities and for increased physical abilities at the cost of a reduced intellectual standard. We have some reasons for hoping that the younger generation will be inclined to approach by serious and sustained efforts the enormous task it will have to face. Yet the *intelligentsia* is mainly fighting a battle for

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the future, and its present influence cannot be compared to that of the working class.

Religion is at present contributing to the strengthening of the spirit of resistance. Many clergymen and some of the leading bishops are much opposed to collaboration. However other members of the high clergy hold more prudent views, and the statements made by successive gatherings of the archbishops and bishops showed that they felt in duty bound to support the Marshal's policy. The Church, indeed, fears being dragged by unwise politicians into steps which the deep-rooted anti-clericalism of the country will inevitably resent. But the conservative experiment made at Vichy at first met with the approval of many churchmen. Of course, the Church regards with growing anger and despises the anti-Christian doctrine of Nazism; it becomes ever more hostile to collaboration. But without minimising the moral and national influence exercised by clergymen, they cannot easily bring themselves to recommend active resistance and open revolt. This, however, calls for one important qualification. The leaders of the Christian trade unions stand on the forefront of resistance and they have made so much impression on the other trade unionists that the two directing bodies of the Labour movement, the General Confederation and the Christian Confederation of Workers, are now merged into one single organisation fighting the Germans and the Vichy men.

We thus come to regard the working class as the backbone of resistance. No other social group can pretend to play a part at all similar, and in its attitude lies the answers to the two questions that are in everybody's mind: what may be France's contribution to the final stage of the war? How far are a social revolution and perhaps a civil war likely to follow the country's liberation?

But before endeavouring to see what are the present conditions of the Labour movement, a few remarks are needed to complete our brief survey. First, the officials engaged in the central and local services do also, in a way, work for resistance. After the many reforms that Vichy is trying to bring into force, there exists a widespread complaint that administration has become more cumbersome and more

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inefficient than ever before. This is partly due to the hasty changes imposed on reluctant officials, but it cannot be properly accounted for without admitting that many officials do their best to oppose the Vichy regime. We do not exactly know the number of dismissed officials who have been replaced by more obedient servants. But the vast majority of permanent officials are obviously still in office, and it appears that most of them strongly disapprove of what they are told to do.

The fact may become of far-reaching importance whenever the present government is nearing its end. Meanwhile, the civil servants are by duty bound not to rise in open revolt. But the fonctionnaires, whose unions were before the war affiliated to the general Confederation of Workers, are no doubt taking an active part in the present secret activities of the Labour movement.

An Englishman may find it hard to understand that Parliament did not provide a rallying ground for opposition and that political parties were apparently swept away. He ought to remember that parliamentary methods before 1940 had much irritated public opinion and that the "parliamentarians" had become very unpopular. Moreover, the House elected in 1936 is regarded as quite out of date. Yet the Vichy government is always afraid that the chairmen of the two Houses might suddenly step forward and publicly enter a protest. Hence the recent decision of Laval to dissolve the *bureaux* of both Houses, which of course has no legal value. Meanwhile the first political party to reappear in a secret form has been the Socialist Party, which we now find supporting the efforts of the workers.

It is, of course, impossible to give any precise description of the present activities of the workers. But it is essential to realise the strength of their growing opposition. Not only can it be appreciated by the continuous spreading of sabotage, but in recent months the voice of the working class has been expressed in several ways. First, the attempt made to introduce a so-called Labour Charter was a conspicuous failure. The workers objected to it on two grounds. On the one side Vichy, while maintaining the existing trade unions, deprived them of all real power by forming mixed social

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committees on which the workers representatives were to serve with those of the employers and the technicians under the strict supervision of a government's delegate. It was corporatism of the worst kind. The Labour movement was submitted to official control and, as the great industrialists under the Vichy regime have been able to occupy all the key positions in the government offices, the workers would in fact have been made dependent on their employers. On the other side, the trade unions, with regional unions and even national federations corresponding to the main branches of industry, were henceforth only to deal with the professional interests of their members, and the Labour Charter did not allow their inter-trade organisations to express the solidarity of the working class. Accordingly, opposition to the Charter was first and foremost expressed by the "Unions Départementales," that is, the inter-trade local organisations which correspond to the Trade Councils. Vichy thus faced the nearly unanimous resistance of the workers' organisations and did not dare to enforce on them the new regime. The "Union Départementales" have not been so far suppressed, and, although the French T.U.C. (General Confederation of Workers) was dissolved in 1940, the trade unionists are obviously still able by secret means to continue the fight.

A striking instance of their attitude and of their power was provided on Labour Day (May 1st, 1942), when public demonstrations in honour of the Republican regime took place in many of the provincial towns of unoccupied France. A statement, issued by leaders who formerly served on the C.G.T. or the Christian Confederation, was addressed to the International Trade Union Federation pledging the French workers to do all in their power to bring their country again into the war, and to act in accordance with the orders of General de Gaulle, whom they regard as the representative of the French people.

It is important here to notice that the Communists are standing aloof, fighting their own battle with undaunted spirit and implacable bitterness. The Germans and the men in Vichy, for obvious reasons, have chosen to consider all acts of resistance as being committed by Communists. But, in fact, resistance is a national undertaking, and in the groups

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supporting it are to be found Frenchmen of all parties and of all classes. The trade unionists' and socialists' committees, which express the opinion of the popular classes, may well exercise a great influence on the later stage of the war.

Does M. Laval's return to power mark the opening of that stage? It is not easy to see precisely what he is after. While his reappearance in Vichy was obviously due to German pressure, he is bound to play some obscure game of his own, and he is probably not contented with the part of a German agent. It seems even hard to believe that he still counts on a complete victory of the Axis. His anxiety to avoid a complete break with the U.S.A. was soon apparent. Under present circumstances his real aim should be to avoid a crushing German defeat.

He is making his contribution to that object by inducing or rather by compelling the French workers to replace in the German factories the German soldiers called to the army. It is a ruthless business, and one cannot for a moment admit that he is at all sincere when boasting that by such means he will obtain the liberation of our prisoners. This is only a tactical move intended to deceive the French workers or to embarrass those who refuse to help the prisoners to come back. Let us face the fact that, by closing factories and creating unemployment, by withholding unemployment relief or even the ration books, he may well be able to prevail on an unwilling but powerless proletariat.

The question therefore arises whether Laval's new policy does not open a new course in the history of collaboration and of resistance. Marshall Pétain and those men in Vichy who took the position of accepting economic collaboration, while opposed to military assistance, may pretend that they are still holding their ground. Yet they are obviously doing much more. At the same time Laval is also endeavouring to enlist those conservative forces which prevailed in Vichy on his side. Although he has been so far using the services of the Parisian agitators, such as Déat and Doriot, always denouncing the reactionary tendencies of the Vichy government, to reconquer power, he may by now be anxious to get rid of his former friends. This he can do by playing the one against the other, but, above all, by persuading the great

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industrialists and business men, who supported and dominated the Vichy government, that he alone can save them.

With German help he is waging war on the working class and he might pretend that he will dispose of all the leaders, capable after the war of creating trouble. On the other side, the main French business undertakings have by now so much fallen under German control that they badly need someone to defend their future position. Laval may hope to be of assistance by getting in touch with the German financial and industrial magnates. They, in turn, are likely to come into the open the moment Hitler's defeat is apparent, in order to save their country and themselves from a complete breakdown. Laval's character inclines him to believe that they will succeed in obtaining from the United Nations some kind of settlement, and he is preparing himself for the opportunity.

Meanwhile Laval's social policy tends to destroy not only the Labour movement but also the small factories or commercial undertakings that are of such importance in France. The Vichy regime already made them dependent on committees entitled to allocate raw materials, which were in fact run by the great business men. The closing of small factories in the days of Darlan was probably due to them. Now Laval seems bent on closing many more as a means to obtain for the German factories the necessary *main d'œuvre*. Perhaps he does not mind seeing all French industries run by a few trusts. Anyhow, the delegates of small employers whom he addressed at a recent meeting were given by him little hope to survive.

It might have far-reaching results. In our description of resisting France we had nothing to say of the middle classes, because no centre of active resistance so far was to be found among them. In unoccupied France some of them, at least, seemed inclined at first towards a moderate amount of collaboration, and their subsequent experiments only led them to a state of bewilderment and of passive despair. Small employers were not prepared to revolt against a regime which they had no means to fight and concentrated on keeping their factories running, with their workers partly employed, putting national problems aside. Moreover, was it not in that way alone that they could help to keep the country

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they are inhuman human beings. That is not true of Adolf Hitler. He once said of himself: "I go with the assurance of a sleepwalker on the way which Providence dictates." That explains a good deal in Hitler. If you watch a sleepwalker, he seems to be depersonalized, dehumanized; he moves and acts like a robot; the only emotion in him of which one seems to be aware is fear and he makes one afraid. In Hitler one recognizes hate and deep down beneath the surface fear. He is a robot of hate and fear and he makes one afraid. It is a horrible, shameful, and at the same time—to me—a pitiful spectacle, this sleepwalker, this robot in a dream—a dream which is the most horrible nightmare that has ever afflicted a human mind.

Mr. Norman Baynes's translation of Hitler's speeches in bulk has made it possible at last for the Englishman who cannot read German to understand the Führer's psychology and how he has established his power over the German people. The speeches are far more illuminating than *Mein Kampf*, provided that you read them in bulk. To wade through their 1,700 pages is a grim task. At first, as with the autobiography, one entirely fails to see how this mean-minded, ignorant, little man has obtained his power and been transformed into a world conqueror. It is fatally easy to underestimate Hitler—and fatally easy to overestimate him, once one has ceased to underestimate him. Of personal character, as we said above, he shows little sign—and what there is of it is mean and nasty. The only emotions manifested are megalomania and hatred; it is true that he again and again speaks of love of Germany, but it is a love without the slightest sign of emotional warmth. Even his hatred—his hatred of the Jews—though fanatical, is cold and mechanical. It is essential to insist upon this fact that his emotions, whether of hate or love, despite their fanatical violence, are cold and mechanical, the emotions of a robot. He is fond of talking of himself as an artist rather than a politician, but it is impossible to see in him any love of beauty or artistic imagination. In the hundreds of thousands of words written and spoken by him there is not one imaginative phrase. His taste is confined to the appreciation of bigness and tawdry German romanticism—it is satisfied

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by colossal buildings, *autobahnen*, and Wagner. He has the megalomaniac's exaggerated self-pity alternating with exaggerated arrogance, but he has never spoken a single word or done a single act of generosity or humanity to other people. His mind is uneducated, empty, and inconceivably narrow. He continually talks of his *Weltanschauung* or attitude towards the world which he has impressed upon the Nazi Party and now upon the German people. It is based upon a superficial smattering of historical knowledge, largely false, and half a dozen crude ideas repeated again and again and again.

That, at first sight, is Adolf Hitler. One has met in one's own life, more than once, stunted and embittered unfortunates of the same kind, persons potentially powerful but whose powers and love of power have been thwarted and perverted, men whom life and the social system have crippled emotionally and intellectually. There seemed, however, to be no reason for assuming that they had thereby acquired the mental outfit necessary for a conqueror of Europe. And there is no reason for believing that it was this outfit which made it possible for Hitler to achieve the conquest. One must delve deeper into his psychology, his mind, and the state of the world in the third decade of the twentieth century after the birth of Christ if one is to understand his impact upon history. As one reads his speeches in these two volumes, one becomes aware of other qualities and powers in the man. They do not alter anything of what was said in the last paragraph, but they add something which explains his rise to power. The first thing of which one becomes aware is a gimlet piercing into one's brain. Certain thoughts and ideas are being driven remorselessly and with incredible power into one's mind. One may think the statements false, the thoughts crude, cruel and mean, the ideas stupid and uncivilized—they are all that—but, unless one is dishonest with oneself, one cannot deny the power with which they are being drilled into one's mind. It is not merely the power of unending reiteration; continual repetition of a few ideas has a powerful effect upon those who are ripe to accept them and is of course an important factor in the propaganda of Hitlerism in Germany, but it has the opposite

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alive? But all the time since the days of the Popular Front a strong undercurrent of hostility towards the great employers was noticeable, and the devastating effects of the German conquest have gradually brought the middle class of the unoccupied zone to share the feelings of the occupied one. Here, on the contrary, chiefly among the small bourgeois of the main towns, indignation, anger and the need for resistance were from the first widely felt. They lacked, of course, any organisation to act by themselves, but it is probable that, for instance, many of the shopkeepers in Paris would soon join any rising that might be started by the workers. Thus the new policy of collaboration launched by Laval may well turn the greater number of the small bourgeois into supporters of active resistance.

The change would go far to help France in the days that will follow her liberation to avoid a violent social revolution and to minimise the danger of a civil war. It might also throw some light on the social democracy that France is likely to establish. We can expect extensive nationalisation, including most of the larger concerns, and safeguarding our political institutions against the dangerous influence of financial powers, coupled with the maintenance of those forms of independent economic life that have been of so much value to the country in the past.

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By LEONARD WOOLF

IF you write about Hitler's psychology, you can write only of his political psychology. That is in itself a remarkable and significant fact. There are now in existence a large number of books, some of them by his intimate associates, which record his private conversation at great length. He has himself written an, in many ways irreticent, autobiography, also at great length. Mr. Norman Baynes has just produced two large and invaluable volumes containing a translation of representative passages from his public speeches between 1922 and 1939.¹ There is scarcely one sentence in this vast mass of material which would indicate that Hitler's thoughts, emotions or desires have ever been concerned with anything but two objects, himself and politics. He is a fanatical egoist and a fanatical politician, and there his interests end. So far as the world knows, he has had no private life since he stepped into public life about 1922, and his autobiography and conversation seem to show that he had no private life even before that. His personality is about as impersonal as a human personality can be, for it seems to be a kind of mental sac containing megalomania, hatred, and a limited number of political ideas. This impersonality—or depersonalization—of Hitler is a sinister and almost a terrifying phenomenon and has probably played an important part in giving him his uncanny power over the German people. It is also a unique phenomenon in history, for hitherto even the most fanatical politicians, like Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bismarck, and Gladstone, have had private personalities and lived private lives, and you could see this even in their public speeches. Whatever they said and did was suffused with emotions recognizable as human and akin to our own; however much one may dislike them or condemn them, one can understand their conscious and unconscious motives and passions; they may be inhuman, but

¹ *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April, 1922—August, 1939.* An English Translation of Representative Passages arranged under Subjects and edited by Norman H. Baynes. Two vols. 1,980 pp. Oxford Press and Institute of International Relations. 50s.

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effect upon persons fundamentally opposed to the ideas and incapable of accepting them; it bores them to such an extent that after a time they are incapable of attending to what is being said. But it is impossible not to attend to the voice of Hitler; it has the rasping power as well as the monotony of an electric road drill outside one's window.

What is the source of that power? First, it is based upon sheer power of argumentation. It is easy for an Englishman, who does not read these speeches with great attention, to overlook the remarkable intellectual force, the steel fibre, in the argument. He will overlook it because to him what Hitler is actually saying is just nonsense, nasty nonsense. But it is only nonsense because the premises of Hitler's arguments are false, the premises of the nightmare of a mad sleepwalker. We see that they are false because we happen to be more or less awake, whereas, it must be remembered, hundreds of thousands of Germans between 1918 and 1930 lived in Hitler's nightmare world. And if you accept his premises, then you have to admit that the power of his argument is terrific. Everything which he says is intensely clear and he drives it into one's mind with the force of the electric drill. He spares you nothing. The logic is steely, pitiless, inexorable, unanswerable like the logic of the insane. The common view that the insane are illogical is, of course, a delusion. Very often a person who is insane and has insane beliefs seems to acquire from the insanity of his premises a terrifying power of arguing logically from them. It is quite useless to attempt to argue with him, for in fact he will almost always defeat you; he will batter you into exhaustion with his unanswerable arguments and, unless you happen to have a will and mind of steel yourself, the steel of his insane logic will gradually eat into your brain and reduce you to a mental state not very different from his. One of the most remarkable features of this insane logic is its supple ingenuity; any and every fact is twisted, with incredible ingenuity, so that it supports the fundamental delusion. Hitler may or may not be clinically insane, but no one who has ever attempted to argue with an insane person will fail to notice the resemblance which his method and power of argumentation bear to the logic of insan-

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I shall return to this point later. Here it is important to remark that there is another very remarkable quality in these speeches besides their ruthless, inexorable argument from false premises. Anyone who doubts Hitler's intellectual powers should read carefully two speeches in these volumes: first, that which he delivered to German industrialists in Düsseldorf at the Industrie-Klub on January 27th, 1932, and second, that delivered to the Reichstag on April 28th, 1939, when he announced the demands which he had made on Poland, rejected President Roosevelt's plea for a peaceful settlement, and in fact warned the German people and the world that, if his demands on Poland were not complied with, there would be war. Both speeches are of great length and consist, as usual, of an almost unending series of arguments. They are admirable examples of Hitler's use of the electric drill of logic. But if you read him with close attention, you will gradually realize that there is a brain behind the drill, using it with enormous persistence, immense astuteness, absolute ruthlessness upon the minds of his hearers for his own ends. One of the most remarkable qualities of Hitler's brain is its astuteness, or perhaps the right word is cunning. The quality of his mind, intellect or thought is coarse and tenth-rate, but is almost inconceivably, uncannily cunning, and the directive of his speeches—and actions—is this colossal cunning, which perhaps amounts to genius. The themes in his speeches are few and always the same: the stab in the back, the Versailles "Diktat," the Jewish-Bolshevik criminals, the evils of democracy, the resurrection of Germany through National-Socialism, his own mission as the unknown soldier to save Germany and the *Herrenvolk* and mould them into the bulwark against the Jews and Bolshevism. But his incredible cunning enables him to weave and interweave these themes again and again into the pattern of an argument which is exactly calculated to appeal to his audience of the moment and to convince them that they ought to do exactly what he wants and intends that they should do.

The speech of January 27th, 1932, to the industrialists is a tremendous performance, provided always that you remember the audience which was listening to it, for that is what

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Hitler, the orator, never for a fraction of one second forgets. There is no wonder that it won the support of the great German capitalists for Hitler and the Nazi Party and so prepared the way for January, 1933. The actual theme, the main argumentative structure, of the speech is, as always with Hitler, absolutely simple, trite, and false. His object is to make the controllers of Germany's heavy industries believe that: (1) the population of Germany under its present government is 50 per cent Bolshevik and 50 per cent nationalist, 50 per cent in favour of private property and 50 per cent against it; (2) Germany and the whole of Europe is menaced by Russian Bolshevism and Marxism; (3) a divided nation cannot provide a strong state capable of standing up to Bolshevism and Marxism; (4) Democracy encourages the division in the nation and is therefore incapable of dealing with the situation; (5) a powerful national state can alone ensure economic prosperity—"for it was not German business which conquered the world and then came the development of German power, but in our case, too, it was the power-State (*Machtstaat*) which created for the business world the conditions for its subsequent prosperity. (*Very true!*)"; and therefore (6) the National-Socialist Party and Hitler must be supported by the industrialists because they will provide a new *Weltanschauung* which will produce a strong *Machtstaat*, a state undivided by parties, nationally minded, based upon authority, a bulwark against Bolshevism and Socialism, and so creating the only possible "general conditions" for business prosperity. The framework of the argument is, as I said, simple, but in its very simplicity is already admirably adapted to seduce an audience of German Neville Chamberlains. But it is in the working out and working up of the argument that Hitler's extraordinary cunning becomes evident. It is not a speech which any Englishman would make or that English business men would listen to. It is intensely German in its abstract, general, pseudo-philosophical-historical arguments, but every fact, every insinuation, every reference, every argument, every omission (it is the only long speech by Hitler in which the Jews are not mentioned) is used to appeal to the prejudices and self-interest of the audience. And behind is the ruthless,

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insane force and persistence of Hitler's will, drilling the argument into the listener's brain. So the "case" is built up, fundamentally a silly, false and crazy case, but so craftily contrived that in the end to every listener in the room it appears to be monumental, cast-iron, completely convincing. No wonder that the speech which at first was listened to in silence gradually becomes punctuated with "applause" and "loud applause" and "Very true," and ends with "loud and tumultuous applause."

I have not space here to analyse the speech to the Reichstag in 1939, but it is even more illuminating and characteristic than that of 1932. The English or American reader may easily fail to recognize its power, its horrible cleverness. We know the lies, the distortions, the nightmare delusions upon which the enormous structure of Germanic argumentation is based, and we are inclined to dismiss it with: "Only Germans would be taken in by such stuff!" But Hitler was not addressing us; he was addressing Germans and the German Reichstag, packed with his Nazi *Herrenvolk*. He was not thinking of us and he did not care what we thought of him or his arguments. But he was thinking very hard about his *Herrenvolk*, and he was faced with a vital and ticklish task. The mass of his *Herrenvolk* did not want war; the mere thought of it stirred unpleasant memories and made them afraid. And here was the President of the United States, recalling the fatal days of July, 1914, and appealing directly to the Führer not to plunge his people and Europe again in the horrors of war. Hitler sets himself two tasks: first, to prepare the German people for the possibility of a European war over Poland and to convince them that, if it does come, he and Germany will be guiltless, for he has done everything to prevent war, and that it will have been deliberately contrived by the English, the French, the Poles, the Jews, the Bolsheviks, and the democrats, owing to their hatred of Germany; and second, to discredit President Roosevelt. If then you remember his object, the audience to whom he was speaking, and what the inside of a German's brain was like in the summer of 1939, if you will forget for the moment that you are an Englishman or an American, you will see that this again is a very remarkable performance,

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that Hitler is here using speech with immense cunning as an instrument of power. There is not a single sentence which is not directed with the greatest skill and the nicest precision to rouse passions, obscure inconvenient truths, and induce the belief in untruths in such a way as will ensure Hitler's two main objects. The enormous, elaborate Teutonic, heavy-humoured argument with President Roosevelt at the end of it is, from this point of view, terrific. Point after point is made against the President, argument is piled upon argument, and every word is exactly calculated to appeal to and mislead and distract the attention of the German from facts and realities until in the end once more the cast-iron, incontrovertible and insane case for every kind of shameful bestiality, for injustice, and lies, and cruelty, for murder, mass-misery and war has been built up impregnable, no longer merely in the mind of the wretched Adolf Hitler, but in the minds of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Europeans and in the history of Europe. This speech is, perhaps, the greatest example in history of that art which Aristophanes called the art of making the wrong appear the right.

A careful study of the psychology and methods of Hitler, as an orator, in these two speeches—and indeed in all his speeches—throws great light upon his psychology as a man of action, the methods of his long-term policy, and the reasons why he was able to gain power over the German people and enslave three-quarters of Europe. For his mind, like that of an insane man or of a sleepwalker, seems to move automatically along a deep-worn groove and the pattern of his action repeats itself—like that of his speeches—again and again, though always adapted by slight variations in detail to achieve, through superhuman persistence and patience and the most devilish cunning, the particular object of Adolf Hitler. The beliefs with which Adolf Hitler started on his career in 1918 are the premises of these speeches. They are, for the most part, false, crazy and uncivilized. His objects were crude and simple—power for himself and for "Germany" (later identified with himself) and revenge upon the people whom he hated because he considered that they had harmed and thwarted him (confused with or sublimated in revenge upon those whom he considered to have harmed

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and thwarted Germany). To achieve these objects the first thing which he had to do was to get his beliefs and objects accepted by a large number of Germans and, to some extent, by certain key persons and classes in other countries. In order to understand Hitler and contemporary history, it is essential to be clear upon one point, namely that in a civilized and sane society it would have been totally impossible for Hitler to achieve this. Hitlerism is so cruel, mentally diseased and uncivilized that any civilized man would turn away from it with horror and disgust. But largely as a result of the war, Europe in 1918 was not, or was no longer, civilized. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say, adapting Cavour's epigram about Italy, that by the end of the nineteenth century we had got in Europe a civilization, but not yet civilized men, and that was what made the war of 1914 and thus Hitler possible. It was only because there were these ignorant and uncivilized people in Germany that Hitler, in the initial stages of his career, had any chance of fastening upon Germany his doctrines of hatred, cruelty and slavery. And Lord Vansittart and his followers always ignore the fact that they were not found by him only in Germany. The barbarism of Europe is shown less by the fact that the ruined bourgeoisie and unemployed workers of Germany listened to Hitler than by the fact that the well-to-do and governing classes in such countries as France and Britain, the Neville Chamberlains and the Lavals, were without any sense of responsibility as members of a European civilized community, were in fact themselves uncivilized, for they were prepared to connive at Hitler's cruelties and barbarities, provided that he did their own dirty work by "crushing Bolshevism," or did not interfere with their "interests," or even merely left them "in peace"—which they called "peace with honour."

But the fact that there was a pool of barbarism in Germany, France and Britain where Hitler could go fishing does not, of itself, explain his success. Without it he could not possibly have succeeded; but it was the passive, not the active, condition of his succeeding. I have no space to deal with this question adequately, and can only point out one or two of his most important characteristics as a man of action. As in his speeches, so in his actions and policy the qualities

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which gave him strength were a persistence like that of an electric drill united with extraordinary cunning. This becomes clear if one examines the series of speeches as a whole. For instance, the persistent theme of practically all the speeches between 1922 and his accession to power in 1933 is hatred. The electric drill is turned upon the brain of the German people and hatred is drilled into their brain—hatred of the Versailles Powers, of the Communists, of the Social-Democrats, of democrats and democracy, of financiers, but above all of the Jews who are represented as being in fact all these people at the same time. To do this implied instinctive cunning of a very high order and incredible pertinacity. For it was probably only by universalizing this hatred throughout Germany that Hitler could have obtained any wide acceptance of the nightmare world which he calls the Nazi *Weltschauung*. It must be remembered that to some extent vast numbers of Germans, owing to the defeat and the economic ruin of the slump, already had one foot in Hitler's nightmare world of personal frustration and hatred. The main feature in his cunning is his instinct, his genius, for appealing to the basest of human passions—fear, hatred, cruelty and cupidity—and, where he finds any generous, humane or noble passion, to confound it with or pervert it to the base. If you read the whole series of speeches between 1922 and 1933 attentively and with an unbiased mind, and remember the economic and social conditions in Germany in the first six years after the war, you will realize how it was possible by means of this devilish ingenuity to convert through hatred and an insane logic comparatively decent Germans—like so many of us, semi-civilized—into Nazis. And it was because so many Germans were at the moment, owing to war, economics, and fear, only half-sane that the insane logic of Hitler has, as I pointed out above, a peculiar power over them.

After 1933 the theme of hatred is played down, though it is always just below the surface, because it is Hitler's most powerful personal emotion and his whole mind is perpetually suffused with it. But he is so cunning that after 1933 he only brings it to the surface when he wants to achieve a particular end, such as the discrediting of a person, a class, or a nation.

It is now only a weapon in reserve. But the virtuosity of his cunning increased with power. Nowhere is it more remarkable or more horrible than in his foreign policy. The whole of Mr. Baynes's second volume is filled with his speeches on foreign policy. I have no space to analyze his methods. All that one can say is that they are remarkable for the restraint with which he avoids any indication of an attack upon a victim until the exact moment decided upon by him, the persistence with which he weaves the web of destruction about each of his victims in turn, the violence of hatred with which he suddenly strikes his prey down, and the cunning with which, as he murders one nation, he soothes the fears and lulls the suspicions of his next victim. And the frigid cruelty with which he tortures individuals, Jews or Czechs or Communists or Poles, and with which he humiliates and mutilates states or nations, when once he has them in his power, reminds one of sadistic and mentally disordered murderers, like Jack the Ripper, who must also have been persons of great determination and cunning.

COLONIES IN A CHANGING WORLD

By JULIAN S. HUXLEY

THE world is changing under our eyes. To the accompaniment of much blood-letting, burning of crops, destruction of buildings, hunger, disease and torture (but also much bravery, devotion, ingenuity, efficiency, and hard thinking), the institutions and ideas of a historical epoch are on their way into the discard. Unlimited national sovereignty, *laissez faire* liberalism, unrestricted capitalist enterprise, neutrality, the police state, free trade, are swirling irrevocably down the cosmic drain.

In such a confusion of change, the colonies are bound to be involved. The world's conscience is beginning to grow a little uneasy over the fact of one country "possessing" another as a colony, just as it grew uneasy a century or so ago over the fact of one human being possessing another as a slave. The inter-war disputation between the "have" and the "have-not" powers is wearing a bit thin. It is beginning to dawn on us that the real "have-nots" are the colonial peoples themselves.

The mercantilist view of colonies as milch-cows to be exploited for the benefit of the metropolitan power, when looked at firmly in the light of post-depression economics, is seen to be as short-sighted as it was selfish; not merely to provide a moral basis for their dependent empires, but to increase general prosperity, the standard of living of the native colonial peoples (nearly an eighth of the world's population) must imperatively be raised. The principle of trusteeship sounded rather noble when applied to mandates in 1919; but now, even if it were to be adopted for all colonies, it would look inadequate. The only possible substitute for imperialism is seen to be the development—political and social as well as economic—of the areas now classed as colonies. What is more, the development must be undertaken internationally. The separate possession of colonies was an inevitable consequence or extension of the

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game of power politics as played by independent sovereign states; whatever international framework is superposed upon nationalism after this war, it must concern itself with the colonies as well as with the advanced nations on which the colonies depend.

Colonies in the broad sense of the word may enjoy the status of Crown colonies, protectorates, condominiums, mandated territories of various categories, and so forth. But they all share one essential feature—they are politically dependent territories, administered from the capital of a colonial power. They have their own governors and legislative councils; but there is almost invariably an "official majority" on the Council, consisting of local Civil Servants and administrators; and there is normally little representation of the native population on the Council, and that little is in most cases indirect, often through a white missionary (as well as via the Commissioner for Native Affairs).

Colonies may be best classified by political type. In the first place, there are the relatively advanced colonies which are clearly destined in the near future to follow countries like Iraq and to emerge from political dependence into the condition of partial or complete self-government. Syria, Palestine and the Philippines are obvious examples, while Ceylon (like non-colonies such as India and Burma) is a clear candidate for a fairly speedy attainment of Dominion status. Ethiopia, after its brief interlude as an Italian colony, has now been restored to independence, but (as with other somewhat backward territories) its independence will be qualified for some time to come by a certain amount of advice and help and tutelage from the white man.

Northern Africa constitutes a special area. Already before the war, Algeria and Northern Libya were for most purposes integral parts of France and Italy respectively: Algeria, in fact, was virtually a French *département*. In any case, the whole of the North African littoral, with its hinterland back to the Sahara, is historically a part of the Mediterranean economy and culture, and may be expected to become linked with increasing closeness to the general European system.

Among the remainder, a number have been retained as colonies wholly or mainly for strategic reasons. Gibraltar,

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Malta and Hawaii are the most obvious cases, while Aden, Guam, Hong Kong, and the illicitly fortified Japanese mandates in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, are other examples. Cyprus, British Malaya, Dakar and many other territories are of value as much for strategic as for other reasons. The strategic importance of the West Indies and Newfoundland for the Western hemisphere has been acknowledged in the arrangements made for leasing bases to the United States, and the Anglo-American occupation of Iceland has *de facto* converted that island into a strategic colony of the United Nations, the Malta of the North Atlantic.

The future of strategic colonies will depend primarily upon the arrangements made after the war for guaranteeing international security. The most likely guess seems to be that they will develop, through a stage of pooled strategic strong-points shared by some or all of the United Nations, into truly international bases at the disposal of whatever Security League comes into existence.

Even when the advanced and the strategic colonies are eliminated, the bulk of colonial territories remain to be considered—the whole of tropical Africa including Madagascar, the West Indies, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, New Guinea, Greenland, and various islands in the Pacific. They all share one characteristic—cultural, social and economic backwardness; and the colonial problem is primarily the problem of abolishing this backwardness. Most colonial territories would not have become colonies if they had not been so backward.

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In Britain during the war, in spite of all the urgencies of the military situation, there has been a great revival of interest in the colonial question. Different groups naturally arrive at different solutions; but the general direction of progressive opinion is remarkably uniform. First, it presupposes a necessary minimum of international organization, to guarantee security from military aggression, and to promote economic stability. Secondly, it rejects the pooling of colonies under an international body. Instead, it envisages the adherence of all colonial powers to a colonial charter, the raising of administrative and labour standards by a series

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of international conventions, and the general supervision of colonial administration by an international Colonial Commission. Thirdly, and most important, it regards the development of the tropical colonies as one of the major economic priorities before the world.

The question is how to raise their mode of existence at optimum speed towards a new level. I have deliberately used the phrase *optimum* in place of *maximum* speed. In the case of advanced societies, it suffices to prescribe the desirable direction of movement; for tropical areas, it is also necessary to discover the optimum rate of change. When the advance to be made is not merely from one level of civilization to the next, but from a pre-mechanical, alphabetic, primitive tribal society, operating in untamed natural surroundings, to a technological and highly educated civilization which has largely controlled and even created its own physical environment, it is extremely easy to move too fast: change, like food, must be provided in assimilable doses. Equally, it is easy for change in one field to get quite out of step with other sets of changes, so distorting and disturbing the whole process. Thus in some areas concentration on economic exploitation has resulted in enormous labour migrations which have not only drained the native reserves of the menfolk needed for subsistence agriculture and a balanced life, but at the other end have brought into being a dingy, discontented and atomized black proletariat, which, on any standard of ultimate human values, represents a regression from traditional tribal existence.

Let me begin with the political aspect. The favourite solution of idealist constitution-mongers has been the immediate pooling of all colonies under the administration of an international authority. This, however, is in reality not only impracticable but undesirable. No international authority which we can contemplate as possible in the near future could be adequate to undertake the full executive responsibility demanded of an administration, and the existing colonial powers would rightly refuse to hand over their responsibilities to such an organization. Furthermore, colonial administration is a difficult business, demanding a

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must be as comprehensively international as possible. It is no good blinking the fact that some colonial areas are by no means well administered, either in the sense of efficiency or in that of promoting the welfare of their inhabitants. The world's conscience will not long continue to tolerate any such gross inequality of standards. What is more, inefficient administration and insufficient development interfere with world prosperity. And inequality of treatment will, sooner rather than later, create a sense of political grievance. Malays, Negroes, Melanesians—all the colonial peoples are rapidly and inevitably reaching a level at which they are capable of a simple but heady brand of political thinking. In the so-called Dark Continent, for instance, fifty years ago the negro millions still lived their tribal lives as ignorant of the word *Africa* and its implications as were the vast majority of Indians a century ago of the implications of the word *India*. To-day, however, there is a rapidly growing minority who think of themselves first and foremost as Africans; and the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, together with the fact that the white men have fought two wars among themselves in the last twenty-five years, is now in the background of the native mind from the Sudan to the Cape, from Tanganyika to French West Africa. Africans can see just as far beyond their noses as other people: and inequality of treatment in neighbouring areas, perhaps more than any other type of injustice, is likely to produce a resentful and dangerous type of Africanism, in place of the healthy African patriotism and ambition which it should be the business of the colonial powers to encourage and to guide.

What system then should we aim at setting up? In the first place it is desirable that the new conceptions of colonial status should be internationally expressed and publicly proclaimed. This would probably be best accomplished by the promulgation of a Colonial Charter, which would be for the colonial peoples what Magna Carta was to medieval England or the Declaration of Independence to the infant United States. Such a Charter should be jointly proclaimed by as many as possible of the United Nations; it would be difficult for any of the Colonial Powers to stand outside for long. It should be neither detailed nor lengthy, but need

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affirm only a few general principles. First, colonial dependencies are not possessions but are held in trust or guardianship. Second, the primary aim of the guardianship is to help the colonial peoples as rapidly as possible towards self-government. Thirdly, its other major aim is the development of the colonial territories, first and foremost for the benefit of their own inhabitants, but also for that of the rest of the world. Fourthly, the guardianship is to be exercised jointly by all the nations adhering to the Charter, but its administrative responsibilities are to be delegated to powers with colonial experience. Fifthly, colonial status implies no inherent or permanent inequality: no such inequality exists, and equal status and equal opportunity for all peoples and races is the goal to be realized as quickly as possible. Sixthly, all posts in the colonial services, up to the highest, shall be open to the local inhabitants, subject only to selection for efficiency; and the educational system of the colonies shall have as one of its prime functions the training of men of local race for such posts. Seventhly and finally, all nations adhering to the Charter shall have equality of economic opportunity in the colonies, and also equality of all other types of opportunity, subject only to the need for maintaining efficiency of administration, and to the primacy of the claims of the native inhabitants.

The best method of implementing the Charter will probably be by a series of international conventions. The organization for handling such conventions lies ready to hand, in the shape of the International Labour Office (though in some cases other types of international instrument, such as the Congo Basin Treaty, may be preferable). The I.L.O. already has a colonial section, which would merely require strengthening. If it be asked what the conventions would cover, we can answer: forced labour, labour conditions, social security, and welfare in general, and opportunities for employment and education. The great advantage of the method is that it is a progressive one, which can contribute to a steady raising of standards in relation to changing world conditions. Its effectiveness would be increased if means were found to associate local organizations, such as agricultural co-operatives, say, or bodies concerned with social

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homogeneous staff with its own traditions and accumulated experience. The handing over of administration to a mixed international staff unsupported by strong central machinery would in many cases cause a retrogression in the handling of native problems, and this might well have quite serious effects in some areas. There is also the significant fact that articulate native opinion, backed by such bodies as the Aborigines Protection Society, is almost entirely hostile to internationalization: they feel that this might readily become a more dangerous and impersonal means of exploitation of blacks or browns by white than the existing system. Further, some of the more developed tropical colonies, such as the Gold Coast and the West Indies, have in fact developed a strong loyalty to their metropolitan country and would strongly resent any change in allegiance.

No, the detailed business of administration must for the immediate future remain in the hands of strong and highly developed nations. What is more, transfer of colonies from one power to another is to be avoided wherever possible. It makes for instability, and it treats the colonies as pawns in the political game.

Another widely mooted suggestion has been the universal adoption of a strengthened Mandate principle. After the last war, the ex-German colonies were transferred to other Powers, not as outright possessions, but as Mandates from the League of Nations. The system involved the formal acceptance of the principle of trusteeship. The Mandatory Power was to administer the mandated territory in the interests of the native inhabitants until such time as they were capable of self-government, just as a trustee administers a ward's estate until he comes of age. Largely under the influence of Lord Lugard, this simple idea of trusteeship was gradually replaced by what he called the Dual Mandate. Under this concept the trustee preserves a dual responsibility—towards the native inhabitants, to encourage their progress towards greater prosperity and self-government, and towards the rest of the world, to make the resources of the area generally available.

The Mandatory Powers had to give an annual account of their stewardship to the Mandates Commission of the League,

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a body which included representatives of non-colonial as well as of colonial powers.

The mandate system did produce certain valuable results. It has on occasion prevented undesirable action. The French, for instance, made one or two attempts to extend to their mandates their strongly protectionist imperial system, with the trade of the colonies tied to that of the metropolitan country, but this has always been successfully resisted by the Mandates Commission. The standard of administration demanded in a mandated territory has inevitably had repercussions on the colonies of the same power. It has always aided public opinion, both at Geneva and perhaps even more in the home parliaments, in keeping governments up to the mark.

The suggestion has therefore been made that all colonies should be given the status of Mandates, and that at the same time the Mandates Commission should be strengthened both in its research and secretarial staff and in its powers.

There are, however, a number of objections to this course. In many quarters, not only in ex-enemy countries, the Mandate system as introduced in 1919 was regarded as little more than a pious veneer for annexation. Then the term has become, rightly or wrongly, associated with the idea of transfer of territories from one power to another, which would be bitterly resisted by various colonial powers as well as being undesirable in itself. Again, in certain quarters, including the educated natives of various colonies, it has acquired a connotation of inferior status. And finally the principle of trusteeship itself is regarded as inadequate to modern conditions. Lord Hailey, the author of the great *African Survey*, has said in a recent address that the idea of trusteeship is too legalistic and negative, too much a survival from the *laissez-faire* epoch. Government to-day must be positive, must take the initiative in an active policy of development and welfare. The trustee, in fact, must be replaced by the educator and the guardian, and the concept of trusteeship be supplemented by that of partnership.

For these and other reasons, it seems best, while perhaps retaining the mandatory principle for the existing mandated areas, to include it within a wholly new system. This system

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Commission on any matters concerning general principles or demanding political action.

I have left to the last the most urgent problem—the raising of standards of life in the backward tropical colonies. Though this is primarily an economic and social problem, it has its political aspects. It concerns the political future of the colonies themselves, since political aspirations towards self-government must be built on the foundations of prosperity and education. And it concerns the political future of the advanced nations, since in the joint development by them of backward areas is to be found the only possible substitute for imperialism in the tightly-knit unit world of after the war.

Let us first try to picture more in detail some of the hard facts which are included in the phrase “tropical backwardness.” It is not easy, for the life of most colonial peoples is lived on a different level of history from ours, and is measurable by quite other standards. The tropics are in large part just emerging from primitive tribal existence; at the best, they are still mainly in the barbaric phase of culture—pre-scientific, pre-technological. They are almost entirely lacking in the apparatus of modern civilization. The task of development is immense—nothing less than the capital equipment of the tropics for civilized living. But if we can carry it through, we shall have benefited ourselves as well as the native peoples of the colonies. While they are in their present backward state, they cannot provide good markets for the manufactures of advanced countries; they cannot make any adequate contribution to the industrial and cultural life of the world; and even as a source of cheap labour they will be inefficient and unreliable so long as they remain unhealthy and uneducated. We need a complete reversal of the mercantilist policy.

Let us take a look at the extent of the job which this policy implies. In the first place, the idea of the tropics as a luxuriant region, effortlessly producing abundance and riches, is a fable. Almost the only tropical regions which are prosperous are some of those endowed with mineral wealth. Soil erosion, absence of necessary mineral salts, pests and parasites, are common. The tropics are to a large extent

still physically untamed and unequipped. Railways, motor roads, ports, bridges, warehouse and storage facilities, processing plants, marketing services, dams and reservoirs, power plants, forestry, agricultural and veterinary services—in most areas these are in their infancy and must be provided on a generous scale before the colonies can take their proper place in world economy, where they can act as a stimulus rather than a drag. In addition, encouragement must be given to light and secondary industries, for only so can a reasonably balanced economy grow up in colonial areas.

But human resources are just as important as material resources. By and large the inhabitants of tropical colonies are miserably equipped with health, energy, education and technical skill. The noble savage, the magnificent human animal endowed with the health of which civilization has robbed us degenerate whites—that is another myth. The tropical peoples as a whole are unhealthy peoples. In the tropics, vital statistics are very dubious, but we know enough to say that death- and disease-rates are of a different order of magnitude from those which applied science has made possible in the Western world. To take but a few examples: African infant mortality ranges from 1 in 4 to 1 in 2; probably every adult negro is infested with one or more kinds of worms, usually including hookworm, and often with malaria as well; in some areas up to 90 per cent of the population suffers from venereal disease; gross malnutrition as well as vitamin deficiency is frequent. The white man in the tropics curses the native for his laziness. But if the native were once rid of parasitic and infectious disease and given an adequate diet, he would not merely be more energetic: his entire personality would be transformed.

Improved health would provide the physiological basis for a new advance: education is needed to provide the mental basis. The tropics are as backward in education as in health. Over most of Africa, not 10 per cent of the children ever go to any school; and not 10 per cent of the schools are anything but the most primitive sub-elementary bush-schools, confining themselves to hymn-singing, the catechism, and the rudiments of the three R's. When the so-called primitive is given his chance, he can learn as well

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as anyone else. He can acquire mechanical skill, as exemplified in the workshops of the Belgian Congo; intellectual skill, as is to be seen in the Gold Coast; military proficiency, as has been demonstrated in Ethiopia during this war by the black troops from Nigeria and East Africa. For the realization of the people's latent abilities, home background and some general culture are needed as well as schools. But, given two or three generations of good education and of outlets for those who have been educated, the tropics would be as radically transformed in mind and capabilities as they would be in body and energies by proper health and diet. Tropical backwardness, economic, political, physical, and mental, is not an inescapable and permanent fact of nature; it is a temporary phenomenon which can be remedied if we are willing to make the necessary effort.

What measures should be taken to lift the tropical countries and their inhabitants out of this slough of backwardness? It is clear that the task is too large, too complex, and too long-term to be left wholly or even mainly to the free play of private initiative.

The British Government has, during the war, passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This has not only increased five-fold the amounts available from central funds for colonial development, but has made social and educational improvements eligible for grants as well as purely commercial projects.

This is an important step, but it is not enough. Aid for colonial development must be on a much grander scale, and it must be in large measure international. The first prerequisite is an exhaustive survey of resources and needs, backed by adequate pure research. Anthropology, water-power, mineral and forest resources, soils, erosion, agricultural products, transport and marketing needs, home economics, health, population trends, the prospects of export and home industries—all need to be surveyed in a much more comprehensive way than has yet been done. Lord Hailey's *African Survey* has itself stressed the need for the expansion and co-ordination of research.

Next comes the financing of development. This can be done in various ways. Colonial profits and revenues will

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only go a short distance. Loans and grants-in-aid, both from the separate colonial powers and from the international Colonial Commission, will be of importance. And private finance, largely guided into desirable channels through some international investment board, can still play a major role. Already the British and American authorities are considering ways and means for setting up international finance agencies, among whose functions would be the promotion of development in backward areas.

For the actual job of carrying out development, special agencies and methods will be needed. Existing colonial governments can continue doing much valuable work. Then we may envisage the setting up of more organizations of the type of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation in the Sudan, where co-operatives of native producers are organized with the aid both of private finance and Government aid. We shall require a careful organization of marketing agencies for all products which are regulated by international schemes of commodity control. And we shall certainly need special long-term planning and development agencies of rather new type.

One valuable suggestion, which will apply to those numerous tropical regions where all-round development is needed for a longish period before commercial profit can be expected, is to set up agencies rather of the type of the T.V.A., but adapted to regions of greater backwardness, and under some international control. Their function would be social as much as economic, and would involve the transformation of every aspect of life—a task which obviously requires long-term planning as well as large-scale capital investment. We may call such bodies Regional Development Agencies.

For other regions where a profitable external market is already, or will shortly be, available, a different type of body is needed, which we may christen the International Public Concern. Their shareholders should be given a minimum rate of return on their investment by international guarantee. In return for this a maximum rate should also be laid down; all profits in excess of this must be returned to the area, and a certain proportion must be set aside for social, educational

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welfare, with the detailed application of the conventions to particular areas.

Secondly, even if executive responsibility is left in the hands of powers with colonial experience, their administration can be to some extent internationalized. A small proportion of technical posts should immediately be thrown open to qualified men of any nationality, and the proportion should be gradually but steadily increased. The actual selection should be left in the hands of the power concerned, for otherwise it could not well continue to assume executive responsibility. As time went on and the system proved workable, it could be extended to administrative posts as well. Meanwhile an increasing number of increasingly important posts would become filled by inhabitants of the colonies themselves.

Thus there would be parallel progress towards international government and towards self-government; and even if in some cases international government takes the lead, its share in actual administration will all the time be growing quantitatively less and that of self-government quantitatively more.

International supervision and regulation will also be needed at the outset, both to ensure proper standards and also to give some degree of responsibility to the other powers and some outlet for their natural desire to participate in colonial affairs.

This could be provided in the form of a colonial section of whatever international political organization comes into being after the war: let us call it the Colonial Commission. We need not try now to define the detailed constitution and organizational machinery of any such body. What we ought to define are its broad functions: once we are clear about these, the machinery for their realization can be brought into being.

One major function should be planning. A second is advice. And the third is financial help. The experience of large-scale development organizations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in the U.S.A., shows that a set-up of this kind, although without executive authority (the T.V.A. has executive authority only in connection with its dams and

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power plants, not in matters of health, agricultural improvement, education, recreation, and so forth), can be extremely efficient in supervising and guiding development along right lines.

There are various prerequisites. The whole programme depends on securing the co-operation of all executive organizations concerned. The central authority must be prepared to act as a general catalyst and as an organizer of joint action whenever several separate organizations are concerned in a project. In the long run, it depends also on popular understanding and backing: for this, participation by local bodies and communities and by the agencies of education and of public opinion is needed. Then the planning must be based on ample research and survey: the advice must be based on detailed field knowledge: and there must be an ample supply of men of first-class calibre to go where the problems are.

Thus all we need say at the moment about the Colonial Commission is that it should have attached to it a strong international staff of research workers and advisers, and should have allocated to it a considerable share of the central fund which must be at the disposal of any future League or other international organization that is destined to endure.

The separate colonial powers will no doubt have their own funds for colonial development and their own staff of experts and travelling advisers, such as Britain, for instance, is already building up. There should be no more difficulty in combining these with the resources of the Colonial Commission in a common programme than there has been difficulty in pooling the resources of, say, the Land-Grant Colleges, the State Universities, the forestry and agricultural services of the Department of Agriculture, and the Young Farmers' Clubs with those of the T.V.A. in securing a sane agricultural development in the Tennessee Valley area.

There remains the function of reviewing progress and of detecting any failure of the colonial powers to live up to their executive responsibilities. It would seem best that detailed review, including any inspection which might prove necessary, should be kept in the hands of the International Labour Office, which would then report to the Colonial

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and health improvement (somewhat as with the Miners' Welfare Fund in Britain). This compulsory ploughing-back of any excess profits is essential if the development of the area is to proceed at a reasonable rate: at present there is an undue and illegitimate drain of wealth from the backward to the advanced nations. Finally, as such concerns are bound to exert a dominant influence on all aspects of native life, it is essential that they should operate under welfare and conservation regulations approved by the Colonial Commission. Existing private concerns (some of which, like the United Africa Company, are huge and powerful bodies) must clearly be subjected to similar regulation, social as well as financial.

There are many other aspects of colonial development which it would be interesting to discuss, but space forbids. I would, however, like to mention two. First, it is very important that there should be a well-thought-out population policy for backward areas. As health measures bear fruit, we may expect a formidable spurt of population growth in areas such as tropical Africa; and population pressure is one of the main causes of economic backwardness in countries like India. Thus the provision of birth-control facilities should be a recognized part of the colonial health programme.

Finally, we must do our utmost to secure a continuity of cultural growth, even for the most backward peoples of the world. At present, in most areas the old tribal society and its values and ideals are being rapidly destroyed, and nothing solid is being put in its place. The detribalized native too often gets the worst of both worlds, acquiring a rather unpleasant veneer of imitation white civilization grafted on to roots of tribal ignorance and superstition.

Is it not possible to graft the better aspects of modern technology and education on to a healthy stock of native tradition and skill? There have been some interesting experiments in this direction, notably at Achimota College in the Gold Coast. Already the experiment has demonstrated the immense access of self-respect and vitality which accrues to the African when he finds he can produce by his own efforts something which is of high standard and useful to the community. The new policy of the Indian Bureau in

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the U.S.A. is bearing similar fruit. Only by such means can one encourage the native peoples to take pride in their own traditions and achievements, and enable them to make a distinctive contribution to world culture.

* * * * *

I can sum up the pith of the colonial problem in a brief final paragraph. This war is a symptom of a major historical transformation which will pursue its inexorable course whether we like it or not—a transformation towards a world that will be more socialized, more planned, more internationally organized than the nineteenth-century world that is fading out. But if we cannot prevent that transformation taking place, we can help to guide it. We can see that it is achieved either in a totalitarian, Hitlerian, way, or in a democratic, co-operative way. In the former case the new world order will be based on inequality and on domination by force, in the latter on equality and on mutual help. In regard to colonies, nationalist imperialism could not help but being tainted with inequality, exploitation, and forcible domination. The alternative is to treat the colonial peoples as human beings like ourselves, to be guided, helped and developed towards future political and cultural equality; the responsibility for this rests not on the few colonial powers, but jointly on all the advanced nations. Once this alternative is chosen, all else is a mere matter of machinery and will follow in due course.

INDUSTRY AND THE STATE

By JOAN ROBINSON

WE are told on all sides that we are living in a period of economic revolution. "We are at the end of an age. No matter how the war ends, there can be no return to the old ways of living."¹ "Quite clearly we are on the threshold of a new world, and the theories and practices of the past cannot be taken for granted in the future."² But one very influential element in society—the managers of the great industrial companies—are looking forward to a world which seems very little changed. This is clear from the "prestige advertisements" which so liberally adorn the pages of every newspaper. They imply unquestioning faith in the dominance of private enterprise in post-war Britain, and suggest that the firms for which they speak are even now jockeying for position to ensure a good start as soon as victory is won.

The point of view implicit in the advertisements is clearly expressed, with a minimum of lip-service to fashionable idealism, in the Report on Reconstruction published by the Federation of British Industries, "What is the main object served by industry in this country? Put briefly, it is to maintain a population of 46 million people in these islands, and to provide them with the maximum means of employment and with subsistence at as high a degree as the community can achieve."³ So says the report, but the substance of the argument and the recommendations show that this is not the main object of industry. Industry is identified with the industrialists, and it is an end in itself. It exists to provide them with profits, power and prestige. The employment and subsistence of the population is a mere incidental by-product. The only difference that can be detected in the new world envisaged by the authors of this report is that it will have given up even pretending to be competitive.

¹ Fabian Society Tract No. 256. *A Word on the Future to British Socialists.* (Fabian Society. 6d.) P. 1.

² Report by the Federation of British Industries. *Reconstruction.* (Macmillan. 6d.) Par: 3.

³ Par: 8.

"In our opinion, the future organisation of industry should be decided by the industrialists, always subject to the over-riding principle that it must be in the national interest. . . . The objective should be to ensure that each industry, or where necessary, section of an industry, should possess a Trade Association with clearly defined functions to suit its needs, and so organised as to be capable of their efficient performance."¹ Among the functions of the Trade Associations are interchange of information between the firms in each industry, standardisation, "joint publicity," centralisation of research, "centralisation and control of sales" and "the control of sources of supply of necessary materials."² In short, each industry is to be organised into a monopolistic group.

The over-riding national interest is not embodied in any controlling mechanism in the scheme, and the phrase seems to have been introduced purely as a matter of form. There is no suggestion of any limitation upon prices or of any need to allocate resources between the industries. It is recognised that geographical location of industry and the use of war-time plants are serious problems,³ but all such questions must be solved "by agreement with and through, or in collaboration with, industry itself."⁴ Most important of all "the Government should forthwith adopt a policy with regard to taxation and contract prices which would enable adequate reserves to be built up"⁵ so that firms shall find themselves at the end of the war with finance at their command, and thus be able to pursue an investment policy untrammelled by outside restrictions. The importance of research is emphasised, but research must be fully controlled by the industrial groups. There is no suggestion that either the consumer or the worker has any interest in the direction which research takes or in the use to which its discoveries are put. The industrialists demand absolute independence and give in return no guarantee that their activities shall be conducted in the public interest.

In the philosophy of *laissez faire* the activities of industry were reconciled with the public interest by the mechanism of competition. Competition, we were taught, ensured

¹ *Ibid.* Par: 62. ² Par: 59. ³ Par: 43. ⁴ Par: 48. ⁵ Par: 46.

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inconsistency. This argument is well enough in the mouths of the champions of competition, but the stifling of enterprise, for instance on the part of "new firms who do not wish to co-operate" is one of the objectives of the very scheme which it is proposing.

In conjunction with this report it is interesting to read the reflections of Mr. Courtauld.¹ His tone is as different as can be from the brutal dogmatism of the F.B.I. He is urbane, open-minded, able to see his caste-fellows with a certain detachment, but, when all is said, his proposals amount to little more than gilding on the pill. He recognises the necessity for some measure of State control over the great monopolies, which might take the form of appointing representatives to the boards of directors. He would welcome nationalisation of transport. He advocates family allowances as a remedy for extreme poverty. He distinguishes between the genuinely productive activities of industry and the mere manipulations of finance, and he is prepared to offer finance and commerce as a sacrifice, provided that the rights of industry are respected. In short, his policy is the traditional English expedient of buying off the opposition by making concessions. "Unless the men in possession are prepared to adapt themselves and compromise there is no alternative to a complete socialist revolution."²

The F.B.I. report has nothing to say on the subject of relations with labour, which is the business of the British Employers' Confederation. Mr. Courtauld's proposal is to associate the Trade Unions with the industrialists by means of profit-sharing schemes. This would add greatly to the strength of the monopolised industries, by lining up behind each its own employees, and would drive the last nail into the coffin of the "consumers' sovereignty" which competition used to be supposed to secure. There are plentiful signs at the present time that the trade-union movement is prepared to fall in with this policy, in one form or another, and the existence of industrial magnates as enlightened and well-meaning as Mr. Courtauld will no doubt do much to ease the process.

What vision of the future have the socialists to set against

¹ *Government and Industry*. (Macmillan. 6d.) ² *Ibid.* p. 7.

this mildly benevolent version of the Corporative State? A recent Fabian pamphlet¹ outlines a policy for a transition to socialism from which it is startling to learn that several of the proposals of the industrialists appear to be identical with theirs. The Fabians are concerned with solving the problem of poverty on a world-wide scale, and set in the fore-front of their programme the industrialisation of China and the colonial peoples, fostered by lease-lend aid from Great Britain and the U.S.A. The F.B.I. make precisely the same suggestion,² though their concern is not with poverty but with developing markets for British exports. At home the Fabians demand national control of power, transport and finance, leaving the rest of industry initially to private enterprise. Mr. Courtauld is prepared to concede as much.

How can we account for this remarkable convergence of opinion? On the surface it appears that the industrialists, contemplating the tangles into which *laissez faire* capitalism ravel itself, are turning to its critics to learn of possible remedies, and are willing to adopt some parts of the programmes of reformers to save themselves from the contradictions of their own position. But we cannot conclude from this that they have become, in the Fabian phrase, "socialist in spirit," and that a revolution by consent is just round the corner.

The Fabian argument seems to betray a certain blindness to the dangers of the actual situation. "Given these four essential controls" they write, that is, over land, finance, foreign trade and fuel and transport, "the State will be in a position, through the appropriate economic organs, to direct British industry and agriculture towards plenty instead of scarcity, and to ensure that they take their appropriate place in a system designed to promote the welfare of all peoples."³ True enough—the State would have the power. But who is the State? In whose interests will its power be exercised? Unless there is a real change in the balance of forces within society, mere nationalisation of this and that can produce only superficial changes. If industries are controlled by Trade Associations, and the trade-union

¹ *A Word on the Future to British Socialists* (Fabian Society, 6d.) ² Par: 39. ³ P. 10.

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movement fragmented into industrial groups, the State monopoly of, for instance, transport would be primarily concerned with keeping a balance between the pressure of rival industrial interests, and the keynote of its policy would inevitably be "fairness" between them, rather than the subordination of all sectional interests to a "clearly conceived economic plan." It is because the Fabians have too simple a faith that "the State" represents "the people," while Mr. Courtauld (unconsciously, for his intentions are of the best) feels quite confident that the State is in his pocket, that they can find so much agreement on immediate policy. For socialists, the agreement should be a warning, not a sign that their battle is already half won.

Here and now, behind the smoke-screen of reconstruction committees and B.B.C. broadcasts on social security, there can be no doubt that the industrial monopolies are becoming more and more strongly entrenched, and, as things are shaping at present, the F.B.I. scheme, tempered perhaps by some of Mr. Courtauld's benignity, gives an all too plausible picture of the prospect before us.

"GREY EMINENCE" AND POLITICAL MORALITY

By THE HON. FRANK PAKENHAM

VERY little, and that little far from systematic, has been written about political morality. Sapient but non-committal allusions scattered up and down the pages of the great historians; a few hints in Machiavelli; some unfinished path-breaking by F. S. Oliver; otherwise nothing. That is, if we mean by political morality what it is proposed to mean by it here—the moral code that governs or should govern the conduct of professional politicians in their public activities.

It is true that the subject of political morality, using the term in another sense, has filled many libraries. The merits and demerits of rival political ideologies and programmes have naturally been productive of age-long controversy. And into these discussions the language of moral applause and moral censure has been lavishly if loosely imparted, and applied not only to the doctrines but to those who support or oppose them.

Is this use of words ever justified? Can Fascists or Socialists or Pacifists or Democrats ever be fairly described as virtuous or vicious by reason simply of the political belief that they hold? Seldom, it is submitted, except perhaps as may be the case with Nazi Germany where a whole nation's moral standards have been temporarily debased by a combination of external circumstances and internal conspiracy. Be that as it may, morality (or immorality) of that kind, morality of mass-belief, morality which on the part of the vast majority must be regarded as disinterested—such morality is sharply distinguishable from the morality it is intended to discuss—the morality whose conflicts and dilemmas are those of the individuals actively engaged in politics.

We are concerned, then, with those whom the public recognizes as politicians, whether they be Cabinet Ministers,

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Prospective Parliamentary Candidates or part-time City Councillors, and with them only in their political capacity. Contrariwise, we exclude the private dilemmas of the polling-booth, where the ordinary citizen labours, say, to reconcile his hatred of plunging England into war and his reluctance to betray Abyssinia or Czechoslovakia. In these latter cases, the citizen is framing a moral judgment concerning a programme to which his own life and career are not or may not be directly related. But our concern in their reflections is with the moral code which we have a right to insist should be applied to politics by those inextricably mixed up in the business.

Is it necessarily a dirty business? A casual acceptance of the moral of Mr. Huxley's *Grey Eminence* might lead us to answer yes; for Mr. Huxley ends by insisting that there is no place for a man of virtue in the Mecca of all politicians—at the centre of government. If a good man insists on embarking on a life of active beneficence, he must function "at the margin" and strive to influence his fellow-men in the manner of St. Vincent de Paul or the Quakers. But Mr. Huxley's actual narrative establishes only (if it establishes so much) that a particular priest, Father Joseph, forsook a higher vocation as a mystic for a lower one as a Court diplomatist. It throws little light on the wider investigation of the special devices and techniques on which the politician must rely if he is to succeed in seizing, holding and using power so as to leave the world a better place than he found it. We are thrust back on our own observation.

The well-intentioned and reasonably ambitious young politician does well to recognize that much of his success will depend, quite apart from external aids such as money, connections, etc., on morally neutral qualities such as strong health, practical acumen, confidence in himself and the wisdom of his ideas, and that indefinable "urge to be first" which lies at the root of so much competitive supremacy. But this is no cause for surprise. Without those qualities, no man, however virtuous or intellectually elevated, will get to the top in any branch of practical life.

What will disturb our young idealist more, if we suppose him anxious to lead a Christian life, is the discovery that

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success in politics will in large measure depend on his skill in doing three things—none of them forbidden by Christian teaching, but none of them imaginatively easy to square with life lived by our Lord as it has come down to us. By word of mouth or written document, he has directly or indirectly (1) to persuade vast numbers of his fellow-men of the superiority not only of his views but of his own personality for their purposes; (2) to collaborate with vast numbers of his fellow-men to the point of ardently espousing and publicly recommending doctrines with which he is frequently in imperfect sympathy and to which on occasion he may be strongly antagonistic; (3) to coerce vast numbers of his fellow-men, whether by Governmental orders to fellow-citizens or diplomatic pressure on foreigners, into acquiescence in courses resented and disapproved by them.

The first two of these tasks involves suppression and distortion of one's viewpoint and personality to ensure popularity and harmony in a manner altogether incompatible with the integrity on which the artist or student prides himself. The third task involves the reduction of many hostile wills to conformity with one's own. The atmosphere, in this case, is one of actual or potential war with every latitude accorded to duplicity, ruthlessness and violence.

No other profession calls for the exercise of all three characteristic talents of the politician, or indeed of any one of them to a remotely comparable extent. The lawyer, journalist or salesman indulges in advocacy, but the wares he sells are divorced from self-advertisement. Whereas at an election Bloggs may be ultimately dedicated to Social Justice, but his immediate duty is to secure votes for Bloggs. Again, the necessity of suspending one's own view in order publicly to espouse a standpoint supposedly, but not in fact one's own, is unique to politics. As regards the coercion of one's fellow-men, the soldier or policeman affords a parallel, but as a derivative not an initiating factor, as the agent in fact of the politician himself.

This last point is worth remembering as a general feature of distinction as between the politician and other "professionals." Lawyers, journalists, soldiers, officials bear comparatively little moral responsibility for their professional

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Huxley's commentary that it is difficult to form a balanced verdict on Mr. Huxley's central contention concerning the inevitable corruption of all politicians "at the centre." Thus absorption in worldly cares and anxiety concerning one's future success which Mr. Huxley denounces are unlikely to leave immune those who retire to organize philanthropic movements "at the margin" in the manner Mr. Huxley approves.

If, setting aside the familiar pacifist demonstration, we select one proposition more than another to crystallize Mr. Huxley's meaning, it is this: "The large-scale activities of unregenerate men and women are almost wholly creaturely; therefore they almost wholly exclude God." From which it would follow that the politician, whose opportunities of beneficial achievement depend absolutely on his success in commending himself to an unregenerate public, is inevitably corrupted just in so far as he succeeds in adapting his ideas and personality to that public's requirements.

To argue this way is to identify the art of leadership with a flair for subservience to the led. Recent history of contrasted leaders suggests that the distinction should be kept sharp and clear. Nevertheless, the element of truth in Mr. Huxley's picture, coupled with what was said earlier about the threefold peculiarity of the politician's task, forces the concession to Mr. Huxley that the temptations of the politician are exceptional and may never be wholly overcome. A conclusion, however, precisely the opposite of his, seems to follow.

Even at his most pessimistic he seems to recognize the vital responsibility placed on the shoulders of politicians for providing the essential background against which mystics or theocentrics may influence the world for good. Mystics apart, the noblest elements in humanity should ponder long before they reject this challenge of a political career, where the stakes are so high and the temptations unparalleled. Mr. Huxley looks always to the individual soul and trembles lest the world corrupt it. But the world, too, has its claims. He never reaches the point of denying that somehow it must be governed. The lesson of *Grey Eminence* for many readers will be exactly the opposite of that intended. We

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want better men in politics than we have ever had—better men with their eyes wider open and their tongues more candid to describe their practices.

This is not the place for propounding in proper detail the actual conventions required to harmonise the three-pronged technique imposed on the politician by the nature of his craft with the unchangeable truths of Christian ethics. The time, however, is fully ripe for such a statement. In its absence, many honourable men will hold back from indulging effectively in a political expertise they feel to be sordid; many dishonourable men will slip past them and make hay with abandoned cynicism amid the general uncertainty as to what is and what is not legitimate; the public will continue to oscillate between pathetic, because impossible, romanticisms, and grim subsequent disillusionments, cumulative and subversive of all imposing institutions and all nobly-pitched ideals.

Certainly for all who in contrast to Mr. Huxley believe that it makes all the difference in the world whether or not we draw our rulers from among our wisest and best, the time is fully ripe for a codification of the long-suppressed truths of political morality.

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conduct, provided that they keep a few simple rules, just because they take their orders from elsewhere; they are really servants, not masters.

The freedom and therefore the responsibility of business-men is greater, but they do not begin to compare with those enjoyed by politicians, who, constituting as they do the Government, give untrammelled orders from the highest level to the rest of the community. From this lofty eminence they have seemed to demand treatment as free agents, responsible human beings. Writers have always taken them at their word and judged them by quite different standards from those applied to employees or officials. But, faced with situations of which the academic world has no direct experience, politicians have seen little chance of making headway so long as they clung to the moral conventions intoned in study or lecture-room. One would have expected them to have formulated, and in the course of centuries codified, some system of their own, some set of conventions peculiar to their own profession.

But this is precisely what they have failed to do. Politicians have usually paraded themselves before the public as practitioners of a higher code of behaviour than that of the ordinary men and women they are aspiring to represent and lead. A politician, for instance, who frankly admitted in public (what few business-men would hesitate to avow) that he had his own interest to consider in addition to that of the State, would be dismissed as an embarrassing cynic. At credulous and emotional moments the public will swallow the politician's pretensions at their face value, but their attitude towards him remains uneasily ambivalent. The combination of exaggerated claims to virtue with a practice that on occasion appears more tricky, cynical and ruthless than that of ordinary professional or commercial relationships, brings in its train sharp bursts of disillusionment and revulsion of feeling towards the governing elements in all parties. The cry goes up: "They are all as bad as one another." The part played by despair of this kind in undermining and threatening democracy in recent years is neglected by critics of the ideological or economic schools.

For failing to identify and expound these necessary

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conventions of "high-level" political conduct, a share of blame rests on politicians themselves in all ages and in all countries. Almost without exception they have judged it indiscreet and unsympathetic to widen the gulf between themselves and their fellow-men by asserting the peculiarities of their code. It was universally regarded as an inexcusable *bêtise* when Mr. Baldwin let the cat out of the bag in explaining why he had found it politically impossible to disclose his knowledge of German rearmament.

But the real culprits in recent years have been the official biographers, who never concede for one moment that their heroes deviated in their political morals from the gentlemanly standards of private life. When the statesman estimated was genuinely high-minded, as were Gladstone, Salisbury and Grey, it is particularly deplorable that the opportunity should have been missed to illustrate the adaptation found necessary to bring private into line with public ethics. Nor is the matter improved by pouncing with gusto on every disingenuity on the part of an opposing statesman as though he were thereby branded with undying infamy. Whether in praise or blame, a faulty criterion is applied.

It is not sufficient to reflect that an action permissible on behalf of one's country may become a crime when selfishly performed. Even the most saintly of public men can seldom afford to disregard selfish considerations in making a public decision of moment. His effectiveness in championing the just cause at any moment must eternally be measured against the potentialities of his whole career, which may be jeopardized or betrayed if, for example, he proposes conscription six months too early or opposes it six months too late. The fact that here again neither the public man nor his best-informed biographers are willing to stress the complications that arise from this perfectly honourable conflict of duties, has perpetuated a false and hurtful distinction between selfish and altruistic action, which in its crude form cannot be sustained.

The discussion in *Grey Eminence* does not of itself bring us far towards the heart of these problems, but it stimulates and braces us for further exertions. So many threads of varied implication are tangled together in Mr.

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By ANCEPS

(Concluded from Vol. XIII, No. 3)

VI.—THE HISTORICAL RECORD.

HISTORY is a determinant of everything that lives. History is an irreversible process and is, indeed, the mark of life itself. Chemical and physical processes can be reversed indefinitely; lives, like history, cannot. Being is Becoming. Moreover, such is the history of the race—"biological evolution" as we call it—that we carry our history in our very bowels. Both spiritually and biologically the dead live in each one of us.

The resemblance between our mental and our biological life is more than mere analogy. We need to remember—how we sometimes long to forget—that we are the products of the entirety of our experiences, the bad no less than the good, the pleasant no more than the unpleasant. Moreover social institutions, and specifically religions, are the products of comparable historical processes. Religions, like living organisms, like ourselves, have their rudiments and their vestiges; their dependent, degenerate and parasitic phases; their static and developmental periods; their rapid metamorphoses; their cataclysmic declines. They, too, carry their history with them. Alike of men and of the lives of men, as of religions,

"Our deeds still travel with us from afar,

And what we have been makes us what we are."

Therefore while it would be foolish to judge a religion by its worst and feeblest exponents, it must and should be judged by its historic, its official, representatives. We must not accept the common evasion that such men had not the root of the matter in them. The acts of the Spanish Inquisition; the massacre of the Albigenses; the record of Luther with reference to the Peasants' Revolt and royal divorce; the merciless temper of Calvin; the evil lives and

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designed cruelty of many of the Popes; these are, for comparative and scientific purposes, as essential parts of the history of Christianity as are the lives of the saints. All these events, in sober fact, have had their share in shaping current Christianity.

Some may say that from these acts, these records, these attitudes, these lives, the spirit of Christ had wholly departed. Let it be so. Yet to claim that they are not representative of the historic process known as Christianity is to attempt to falsify the record. Torquemada, Luther, Calvin, Innocent III, Alexander VI were official exponents of Christianity. They were, indeed, the very embodiments of its history. They were typical products of the history of Christianity just as they shaped the history of Christianity. The Christian apologist must answer for them no whit less than the exponent of the Religion of Humanity must answer for, let us say, the persecution of religion in Russia.

Can there be a quantitative measure of inhumanity? If so, we should need to rank the standard of cruelty attained by Christendom high among the achievements of the great religions and the great civilisations. The Christian achievement in cruelty has certainly not been lower than anything of the sort attained by the religion of Humanity. The man who can read history and say that Christianity has produced no abominations, no horrors, no perversions of the human spirit, must have been reading with specially constructed spectacles. Yet how many there are who habitually wear these odd distorters of vision. Europe had been Christian for a full nine hundred years after the vision of the Cross had come to Constantine, when every soul in Béziers was butchered in Christ's own name. "Kill all; the Lord will know His own." This, and all the wickedness that led to it and flowed from it, was approved by one of the greatest of God's vicars. Each of the centuries as it went by was lit by its own cruel fires and religious wars. How grand if we could wipe out these records as from a slate. We cannot.

Theologians will doubtless be loth to believe that these things have anything to do with the shape of the religious war in which we now find ourselves, but the theologians will be wrong. If Christianity means anything at all it

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means that history is all of a piece and that a pattern can be traced in the human drama throughout the ages. Nor is it theologians alone who refuse to withdraw the veil that has been cast over their eyes and are blind to that which they do not wish to see. Yet, to some of those who are not theologically minded, it is not at all difficult to discern how a modern religion of hate, cruelty and pride has developed out of the religion expounded by the men who have been named above. The loathsome and satanic religion of National Socialism seems to have come as a surprise to Christians. It has not come as altogether a surprise to some of the observers of historic and current Christianity from without.

In the physical world there is a law of the indestructibility of energy, but there is also a rule of passage from a higher to a lower potential. The pebble dropped into the smooth surface of the pool spreads waves which weaken as they widen. The ripples ultimately disappear from vision, but their effects are still present and always will be. In the spiritual world there is a like law, but the passage from the higher to the lower potential is not always the rule. That which has been, has been. Naught can be recalled, for history is irreversible. Yet the effects of thoughts and deeds do not always weaken as they widen. For there have been grand spiritual events—as there have been evil events—that have held unimpaired for ages their power to move men to like thoughts and deeds. A thousand ancient phrases still touch the heart as on the day they were spoken. For we are in a strange world that, like a waterfall, is at once ever-changing and changeless. Men differ from each other infinitely, none is quite like his fellow and no life repeats another, yet a single pattern runs through them all.

Theologians, while emphasising what they regard as the eternal and the absolute elements in Christianity, often gloss the equally unalterable character of the history of Christianity. Thus, for example, they concentrate on the Incarnation, but commonly have no word to say as to the blood and tears that Christians have caused to flow in Christ's own name; yes, and would cause to flow yet again, had some of them their way. Theologians often, too, ignore the self-

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evident fact that whatever the spiritual basis of religion, theology itself is a man-made thing. A theological system is as much the product of human ingenuity as is a motor-car. It is ingenious Christian men who have invented, cultivated, exercised and perfected the highly complex apparatus of Christian theology. The ferocity with which Christianity has been championed and the endless suffering and bereavement that it has caused remain inescapable charges on Christians. Surely the theologian should consider the historical effects and implications of his own doctrines as an integral whole, even if and when he claims that they have been perverted.

Forgetfulness of these things prevents Christians from recognising fully the part that the Churches themselves have played in producing the present situation. To an observer, it would seem that if the leaders of the Churches have perfectly clear consciences in this matter, there must be something wrong with the construction of those consciences. Though it is a calamity to mankind of the first order, it is not altogether incomprehensible to the outsider that the Church should now be failing in her main stronghold, the West.

If the fact be doubted, brief reflexion will, perhaps, confirm it. The claim can hardly be made that the spirit of Christ has attained such hold on men's minds that it has of late years been influencing the major actions of their great societies. Historically the ethics of the West are substantially those implanted by Christianity. The field in which we should expect to find them specially operative is just that association of men most characteristic of our region and our age. This is the Nation-State. Is their operation there either an edifying or a hope-inspiring spectacle?

VII.—THE NEMESIS OF STATE RELIGION.

For some sixteen hundred years the Church has assiduously cultivated the aid of the State. It has always claimed to guide the State. For all that long period Christianity has been, as it still is, in effect, the compulsory religion in Western countries. During all those centuries education has been almost entirely in the hands of professional exponents of Christianity. With them it still largely rests. There is, at this moment, an active and organised movement to intensify

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this compulsory or, as it has now become, semi-compulsory religious element in our State schools. Should it succeed, what can be hoped from it? For a full thousand years the Church has possessed an endowed representative in each of the tens of thousands of parishes throughout Europe. She has controlled all schools and all seats of learning and maintained a representative in almost all institutions. Thus states have become specifically Christian and have been designated as such. Moreover, the Church herself has always distinguished between states that are Christian and those that are not. If, therefore, Christian states still fail to act on principles distinguishable as Christian, then Christianity must be held to have failed in its major field. It has been an extremely long experiment—long even on the grand historic scale. It has been an unsuccessful experiment.

It is sometimes disingenuously replied that the State itself is not the field in which to seek the characteristic social contribution of the Church, which is the emphasis on the individual. This is certainly true in the limited but highly important sense that Christianity has succeeded in making a consideration of the dignity and worth of the individual a part of the ordinary thought of many ordinary men. But the challenge cannot be thus evaded. Historically the states have been habitually guided by men who called themselves Christian. Historically the Churches have always claimed to guide the State. There was a long epoch when they really succeeded in doing so, though only a crazed mediævalist will suggest that then was the Golden Age. The true measure of the influence of Christianity on the body politic is surely the way in which the community of Christian states—and, above all, the specifically Christian corporations of those states—respond to acts which ignore, or views which repudiate, the dignity and worth of the individual. Regard the matter, for a moment, from that standpoint.

We pass over the record of the Churches in relation to torture and cruelty; we set aside compulsory conversion, along with the wars of religion; we will forget the horrors of inquisitions and their variants, and the subtler but yet more deadly evil of clerical censorship in all its forms; we will be silent as to the witch-mania; we need not discuss

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the long and systematic defamatory propaganda of the Churches against Islam and against Judaism, compared to which Goebbels shows as a mere prentice hand; let us forget all the futilities of the Crusades and the endless and fruitless misery that they brought upon mankind; we need say nothing either of the long monopoly of higher education by the Churches, or of the Churches in their subservient mood as buttresses of ruling powers or classes. Others may treat of these; we turn rather to the situation as it is.

Memories are short. Will anyone suggest that everywhere men who call themselves Christian have been, for the last ten years, aflame with the outrages inflicted on the most sacred human rights? Will anyone say that the leaders of the Churches, or that Christian men who occupy high positions in politics, were in general, or even often, early to see and to proclaim that acts of injustice were foul offences against the Christian conscience? Will anyone make this claim, for example, for the major ecclesiastical and lay leaders of the great Churches from 1933 onward, men whose names must be in the minds of any reader? No one will do so, for the opposite is most certainly the case. The conception of the nature of the crisis came late to leading Christians. It was accepted very reluctantly by them. Those outside the Christian fold, and notably exponents of the Religion of Humanity, long anticipated them.

Memories are short. What was the proportion of Christian leaders who, professing their religion to be Catholic or Œcumenical or Universal or Orthodox, exclaimed at the first hearing that the claim of a race to override the rights and dignity of man as man could by no means be Christian or compatible with Christianity? The true answer is that there were hardly any Christian leaders who assumed that attitude until the nature of the crisis had long been obvious to intelligent non-Christian observers. The profession of Christianity seems to have added no penetration to scrutiny, but rather to have dimmed the spiritual vision. Not until it became quite evident that the Churches themselves were threatened were their leaders able to see through what did not seem to others a particularly dense fog.

Memories are short. The plain and discreditable fact,

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which the historian will record, is that from 1933 and for four years and more, all the major Churches sought to come to terms with the abominable heresies of National Socialism and Fascism. In so far as the Churches spoke at all it was, at least until 1937, evasively and with the manifest desire to avoid committal. Memories are astonishingly short, but it is the business of the historian to retain a long and intact memory.

Memories are short, but with the documents of these years before him the historian will not omit to record, as significant events in the history of Christianity, many incidents which some would fain forget. There is the papal concordat with Hitler. There are the many early equivocal pronouncements of high Anglican dignitaries, and there is the expertly oracular amphibology that has consistently emanated from the Vatican. There is the pitiful breakdown of Protestantism in Germany. There are the many unholy alliances in many countries of Christianity and Fascism between 1933 and 1938, and the ill-concealed sympathy of many if not most Churches with totalitarian methods. There is the inhuman indifference of the Central European Churches in the face of organised anti-semitism. There is the stupid blindness of the Churches to the manifest fact that the formal basis of National Socialism is not only a denial of Christianity but a deadly enemy to it. Not least, there is the degrading silence of the long procession of presumably Christian British Foreign Secretaries, confronted with the denial of the human foundations of that international law which is, perhaps, one of the greatest products of Christianity. Even the present Foreign Secretary has assured us, and, to avoid any misunderstanding, has assured us yet again, that Foreign Secretaries are *not* their brothers' keepers.

Regarded as an event in the long course of ecclesiastical history, the striking feature of the terrible episode through which we are living is negative. Nothing that has happened in it is as significant as what has not happened. There has been no general Christian upsurge of indignation. Its salient spiritual characteristic has been the failure of the Churches to produce seers or martyrs or even great leaders. Christian reaction to the situation has been very, very slow. Think of

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the hundreds of millions of people in Europe who call themselves Christian and then of the minute number of them who have made any voluntary sacrifice for their Christian faith. Outside Holland and Norway they form the merest handful. Even fewer are those who have shown, by deliberately facing personal danger, any care for Christian ethics. The theologians it is true have manfully wielded their pens overtime, but Christian men who by their lives and with their lives have shown eagerness or even willingness to bear practical witness to their faith have been conspicuously few. Compare the number of this tiny band to the hosts of young men who have sacrificed themselves gladly for the idolatrous Religions of Nationality. Hardly one of the very few Christian protesters has occupied a prominent ecclesiastical position. If the blood of the martyrs be indeed the seed of the Church, then we must have lean spiritual years ahead. The name Niemöller is constantly "in the news," but the reader should be reminded that in the Lutheran Church alone and in the limits of the old Reich there were some thirty thousand pastors.

But if saints and martyrs, and even steadfast and consistent Christians, have been few, even fewer have been the Christian leaders who, early in this world-crisis, showed any insight whatever as to its essentially spiritual origin. We now have it dinned into our ears that Christianity is in danger from these new religions of National Socialism and Fascism. Of course it is. So it was from the first. But when did Christian leaders discover this extremely unpleasant truth? The answer is that it took hardly any of them less than four years to reach this elementary conclusion. Yet the fundamental incompatibility of Christianity with the Religion of Nationality—"the new paganism" as it came to be called—was abundantly evident from the very first to many outside the Christian fold, of whom this writer was one. The twenty-five point programme of the Nazi Party was published in 1920, not 1942.

The Religion of Humanity has had a better record than Christianity during these apocalyptic years. Moreover, looking back on the last three centuries of history, the Religion of Humanity can be seen increasingly as the effective

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working faith of the great "humanitarian" movement so characteristic of the age. This rise of the Religion of Humanity, largely indistinguishable as a separate faith, has concealed an insidious, an ancient and a deep-seated process in the course of which Christian faith has receded as a motive.

To ascribe this recession to "science" is a shallow misunderstanding. Nearer the truth are they who associate the recession with the rise of "humanism" and that stirring of the spirit known as the Renaissance. A number of later and comparable movements, which have tended to edge Christianity out of its central field, may intelligibly be considered as episodes in the history of the Religion of Humanity. Moreover Christianity has shown an indisposition or an incapacity to adapt itself to the philosophic needs of the time, dating from an outstanding and unsettled account with the "new philosophy" reaching as far back as the sixteenth century. But this last is a mere symptom of a much deeper lesion, for far more important than events external to Christianity has been an insidious process the seeds of which were sown much earlier.

VIII.—THE CHRISTIAN FALLACY.

Such is the situation as seen by one outside both Christianity and the Religion of Humanity. In this, one of the greatest contests of all time, Christianity is losing ground. It seems probable that this recession will continue until some great internal change of revolutionary proportions becomes manifest within the Church of Christ. The nature of that upheaval cannot here be hazarded, but it must be of internal origin and no external events can save the Church. The trouble has arisen within; nor, to those outside, do the essential seeds of decay in the Christian system seem wholly obscure. They lie in an ever present, a very ancient, and a highly orthodox confusion, on which we have already touched, between the power of faith and the power of the Church. Ultimately it is a confusion between spiritual and temporal things. The error was incorporated in the Christian system under the Emperors Constantine and Theodosius sixteen hundred years ago. It seems ineradicable from the modern conception of the Christian fellowship and, short of

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an internal revolution, from the Christian way of thinking itself.

What would have happened had Christianity not allied itself with the state in A.D. 380? What would have happened had Christianity not been imposed on Europe during the subsequent centuries? It is probable that the lives of men in those and later ages and, perhaps by consequence, in our own, would have been baser, darker, more brutish than they were and are. The alliance with the State, like all human devices, was susceptible alike of good and evil usage. In any event it created its own type of vice which so grew by what it fed on as to alter not only the habits of Christian life but even of Christian standards and modes of thought. The Churches seem now to have lost the power to stand alone. They cry out for a Christian society, a Christian education, a Christian state, a Christian life, as though it were not precisely their function to provide these things instead of asking for them to be provided from without. If the state does not bear itself in a Christian manner, that is the Churches' failure; nor can it be remedied either by calling the state Christian or by forcing Christian teaching upon the citizens. In the end these things can come only from within. It is evidently very difficult for the Christian to escape in his thinking from all the implications of age-old secular support. These errors are so much part of the unalterable history of Christianity that they have become wellnigh integrated into Christianity itself. The ancient fallacy is being repeated daily in high places.

The point of view makes so much difference to the appearance of the scene surveyed. Thus to those within the Church Innocent III seems one of its great architects, to those without a monster of cruelty. What Christians call the "moral decay" of our time appears to those outside Christianity as a disease within the Christian body itself. To them it appears to be closely related to the Christian failure in its major field, the nation-state. It is noteworthy that Christians, even at this date, should suggest treatment of this disease by State-subsidised or, at least, State-enforced Christian teaching. It is like advising a man to raise himself by pulling on his bootlaces! That remedy has been well

PUTTING BRITAIN ACROSS

The subject-matter of our propaganda

By HISTORICUS

WALTER BAGEHOT once remarked on "the danger of the English eventually failing through not understanding the greatness of the institutions which they have created." The danger is a real one. Modesty and understatement are among our national characteristics, and consequently we tend to deprecate our own achievements. It is all too easy to find Englishmen, even Englishmen who have been living in the south-east of England throughout the war, who will casually remark how terrible it is that we have not yet succeeded in this war in beating the Germans, and have to be forcibly reminded that they themselves were the actual witnesses in the summer of 1940 of a decisive defeat inflicted on the Germans by the courage and skill of British fighting men, making the best possible use of the materials provided by British inventive genius and superlative British craftsmanship, and, in respect of the work of Controllers and Operations Rooms, first-class British organizational efficiency.

Since Englishmen themselves are thus so apt to fail to understand the greatness of their own achievements, it is not surprising that an even greater degree of misunderstanding prevails amongst foreign peoples, and that the Axis legend of us as a decadent people to such a great extent holds the field. Clearly, systematic propaganda is needed to counteract this legend, but clearly also before undertaking such a propaganda campaign we ourselves need to have in our minds a clear picture of what kind of a people we in fact are. This article is an attempt to provide one such possible picture. To what extent, if it is accepted as correct, this picture should be adapted for presentation in different countries and by what methods it should be "put across" is a task on the one hand for those with specialized knowledge of particular foreign countries, and on the other for those with specialized knowledge of propaganda technique.

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It has been said that an institution is only the lengthened shadow of a man, and it is conversely true that the best way of studying the character of a people is through the history of its institutions. National character is real but hard to analyse in abstract terms.

The distinguishing feature of the history of the British people has been its excellent management of its internal political affairs. The last occasion on which Englishmen fought each other on their own soil was at the Battle of Sedgemoor in 1685. Mr. Chesterton once wrote that the greatest event in English nineteenth-century history was the revolution which did not take place. France, it may be recalled, experienced five revolutions during that period—in 1815, 1830, 1848, 1851 and 1870. In Russia there were revolutions in 1905 and in 1917. In the United States in the mid-nineteenth century there was a great civil war. All over Europe in 1848 there were revolutions. Here there was only the Chartist demonstration on Kennington Common, which ended as a complete fiasco. We have the oldest system of parliamentary government, that is to say of government by discussion, in the world, and this system has surmounted extremely severe tests, for example, the Great Reform Act crisis of 1832, the Ulster crisis of 1912-14, the General Strike of 1926, the financial crisis of 1931, and indeed the present war itself. For Mr. Churchill is not a dictator and Parliament is still actively functioning. It was Parliament which secured the setting-up of a Ministry of Production; it was Parliament which displaced the Chamberlain Government.

The first result of this age-old habit of settling our differences peacefully is that our national unity, particularly in moments of danger, is very real. Dr. Goebbels himself has paid us a tribute in this respect, for in *Das Reich* of February 6th of this year he wrote:

"We have to face the specific disadvantage that our national unity is but young and therefore more exposed to tests and trials than may be the case elsewhere. The peoples that went through the process of national unification two or three centuries ago are better off now. For them national instinct is so much a matter

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of course that it needs no discussion. Their action is naturally political, for their character is political. Without much political argument they carry out what measures the situation appears to demand."

In politics we maintain our national unity in three particular ways. First, our parties of the Right gradually take over the ideas of our parties of the Left, and great reforms are therefore carried out almost as often by Conservative as by Radical Governments. One can cite in this connection Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, the second great Reform Act of 1867, the social legislation of Disraeli's second ministry; and much legislation of a specifically socialist character, for example the setting-up of the Central Electricity Board and the nationalisation of mining royalties carried out by recent Conservative governments. Second, parties of the Right in this country, once defeated, do not subsequently attempt to unscramble the eggs; for example, Disraeli's ministry of 1874 did not attempt to reintroduce the Corn Laws and modern Conservative governments have not attempted to go back on the Parliament Act of 1911. The London Transport Bill, which was Mr. Morrison's great achievement in the second Labour Government, was finally carried into law, with only a few changes, by a succeeding Conservative Parliament. The last serious attempt at regression was made by James II in the seventeenth century with results that are well known.¹ Even George III did not attempt to revive the habit of royal attendance at Cabinet meetings. Third, and most important, we settle our differences, however serious, by compromise.² Possibly it is not true that the explanation of this is that Englishmen are by nature illogical; it may rather be that they are moved by the higher logic of realising that no difference, however acute, justifies the fundamental fabric of national unity being endangered. Our failure to adopt logical solutions of difficult problems has very great disadvantages. It very often means that so far as those

¹ A possible exception is the Trade Disputes Act of 1927.
² Cf. John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* (World's Classics Edition, page 250): "It is the character of the British people that to induce them to approve of any change, it is necessary that they should look upon it as a middle course; they think every proposal extreme and violent unless they hear of some other proposal going still further, upon which their antipathy to extreme views may discharge itself."

particular problems are concerned we get the worst of both worlds, but we regard this as a price worth paying in order to preserve our national unity. Fuel policy provides a good recent example of this process of compromise at work.

A second result of this long-standing tradition of the peaceful settlement of our disputes is that gentleness and a genuine hatred of militarism have become firmly-established features of our national character. Two recent witnesses alike bear testimony to this truth. In *The Lion and the Unicorn* (page 17) Mr. George Orwell writes that: "The gentleness of the English civilisation is perhaps its most remarkable characteristic." In *What Have We To Defend?* (page 45) Mr. E. F. M. Durbin writes: "We have always been the pioneers in Europe of the slowly growing arts of gentleness. . . . First to abandon torture, first to emancipate the slaves, first to mitigate the severity of the criminal laws. . . ."

In evidence of our genuine hatred of militarism we may note the fact that in Britain policemen do not carry revolvers, army officers lose no opportunity of changing into mufti, and that the goose-step and heel-clicking are objects of ridicule, if not contempt. Before the war, throughout the whole British Empire, there must have been fewer soldiers than in many a small European country. Even in periods of mass unemployment it was difficult to fill the ranks of our tiny standing army. No politician could rise to power in this country by promises of glory or military conquests. English literature, like other literature, is full of battle poems, but it is worth remarking that those which have won popularity for themselves are always the stories of disasters and retreats. There is, for example, no popular poem about Trafalgar or Waterloo, but there is a popular poem about Sir John Moore's rearguard action at Corunna. The most stirring battle poem in English is about a brigade of cavalry which charged in a completely wrong direction and was in consequence wiped out. This poem we learn in our schools, but the corresponding poem about the successful charge of the heavy brigade is much less well known. The place names of the last war which have really engraved themselves on the popular memory are Mons, Ypres, Gallipoli and Passchendaele. The names of the great battles which finally broke the German

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tried out in the past. Even without a scientific training Christian philosophers, if not Christian statesmen, might be expected to know the probable result. The laces may perhaps break, but the breaker is not likely to be moved, except in a sudden backward direction. That the suggestion of yet more compulsory Christianity should be made at all, seems to indicate a senile destitution of ideas within the Churches, an atheromatous incapacity for adaptation to what must certainly be a rapidly changing world.

The situation is at once poignant and terrifying to one who feels, as does this writer, that religion is essential if men are to live together in communities of civilised dimensions. Regarded from without, and as a means of shaping society, the features of Christianity have been its ethical scheme, its capacity for adapting itself to different and changing circumstances, and its equal appeal to peasant and philosopher. No system that is now on the horizon can take its place. The religion of Humanity cannot provide sanctions for simpler minds and perhaps functions at its best in a near-despotism. The various religions of Nationality are steps backward towards barbarism. The major universal religions other than Christianity can hardly become naturalised in a civilisation shaped by sixteen centuries of Christianity. A development of the prophetic religion, stressing the personality of Jesus and by-passing theology by accepting the unbridgable Hebraic gulf between creator and created, would need for its propagation a greater religious teacher than this position has yet produced. Is only Christianity left? At least in the world as we see it, this is the case.

The maintenance of European civilisation seems, therefore, to this writer to depend on such a change within the Christian body as can be accomplished only by an internal revolutionary movement of the magnitude and completeness of that which must soon overtake our social system. But of such a revolutionary change of heart there is little sign. Religion is, of its nature, conservative. Moreover, the Churches have, for centuries, largely devoted themselves to conditioning Christian society against exactly that upheaval. For the most part the Churches are girding their loins to resist precisely such a spiritual revolution as is manifestly the

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only remedy. There are even purblind efforts to reconstitute a hopelessly discredited Christian totalitarianism. These are doubtless doomed to failure, but without a complete change within the Churches themselves the breakdown of the Churches may well become complete. That would be a catastrophe beyond measure and to be avoided at almost any cost. It hardly bears contemplation by men of goodwill, whether they call themselves Christian or not. Such men can but hope for a more inspired leading than the Churches have seen for centuries.

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army are quite unknown to the general public. Similarly in this war it is Dunkirk which has caught the popular imagination and it seems to be almost forgotten that this whole affair was, as Mr. Churchill said at the time, "a major military disaster." So great has been our hatred of standing armies, begotten by our one brief experience of military rule under Cromwell, that when later it was found absolutely necessary to raise permanent regiments and provide special powers for securing their discipline (previously, for example, the soldier who disobeyed orders could only be proceeded against in the civil courts) the Mutiny Act which was passed by Parliament in 1689 was made subject to annual renewal. This system by which the legal existence of our Army (and later our Air Force) was precariously maintained on an annual basis, was thereafter continued right up to the outbreak of the present war.

It is true that our attitude to the Royal Navy has been very different, but this difference of attitude is based on sound sense. The Navy employs comparatively few people and it is an external weapon which cannot affect home politics directly. History teems with the records of military dictatorships; its pages have yet to yield the story of a naval dictatorship.

All this, of course, is only too apt to foster the legend of our so-called decadence, but our deeply-rooted internal peace in fact only means that we fight all the more fiercely when we see all that we have built up with such pains over so many centuries, and cherish so dearly, menaced from abroad.

When in this way we survey the whole of our history it seems clear that a disposition in favour of peacefulness and therefore of orderliness and legality is a fundamental feature of our national character. It is often said that our sense of fair-play derives from our devotion to games played according to rules accepted by both sides. It seems more likely that this readiness to play according to the rules rather than win by breaking them derives from this fundamental feature of our character. Because of this disposition in favour of peacefulness and orderliness we built up earlier than any other European nation a system of the rule of law, which, by the eighteenth century, had become the wonder

of the civilised world, and with this system of the rule of law went many strong guarantees of personal liberty. In this case also our pre-war system is still maintained.¹ The Home Secretary has just lifted the ban on *The Daily Worker* and under six hundred persons are detained under Regulation 18B.

To any such account of the legal position in this country in respect of personal liberty there should be added the all-important fact that the English are a highly individualist people to whom therefore a belief in personal liberty is something very fundamental.²

The contribution of the British people to civilisation has thus on the whole been on the side of order and liberty rather than on the side of equality. Bagehot spoke of England "as the type of deferential countries," and even in these democratic times the Englishman still loves a Lord. Whilst it is easy at any public meeting in England to arouse strong feelings in favour of fair-play, of freedom, of justice, and of mercy, it is difficult to arouse strong feeling in favour of, for example, equality of educational opportunity. But although our social structure is marred by many unpardonable, though superficial, class distinctions and many real and gross inequalities, our national unity is just as real in social and economic as in political matters. Here again the foreigner is apt to be misled by the hierarchical character of our society into thinking that we are a nation divided against itself. The reason why our society is none the less a unity is to be found partly in the continuing power of the religious tradition in this country which causes appeals to class hatred to fall on deaf ears, but partly also in the actual facts as to our social structure which must now be examined.

¹ See Professor Laski's summing-up of the war-time position of our civil liberties in *Democracy or Vested Interest?* (pages 44-46).

² Cf. George Santayana's *Soliloquies in England* (page 30): "If we try to say what governs [the English] is convention, we should have to ask ourselves how it comes about that England is the paradise of individuality, eccentricity, heresy, anomalies, hobbies and humours. Nowhere do we come oftener upon those two social abortions—the affected and the disaffected. Where else would a man inform you, with a sort of proud challenge, that he lived on nuts, or was in correspondence through a medium with Sir Joshua Reynolds, or had been disgustingly housed when last in prison? Where else would a young woman, in dress and manners the close copy of a man, tell you that her parents were odious, and that she desired a husband but no children or children without a husband?"

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Britain is an almost fabulously wealthy country. The figures published in the White Paper which accompanied the last Budget showed that whereas in 1938 the net national income was £4,595 million it had actually increased by 36 per cent to £6,338 million in 1941. It is usually estimated that there are 12,500,000 households in this country. This figure divided into the latter figure given above shows, therefore, an average annual income per household of £506.

The White Paper, moreover, showed that 67 per cent of the national income now goes to wage and salary earners, while 33 per cent goes to the recipients of rents, profits and interest, and that during this same period, 1938-41, whereas the share in the national income of the latter group increased by 22 per cent, the share of the former group increased by 48 per cent. The tendency, in fact, is for the proportion of the national income received by wage and salary earners to increase.

This tendency is powerfully assisted by our social services on which in the immediately pre-war years £360 million were being spent annually; an increase of 20 per cent even on the amount so spent in 1929.

The distribution of property in this country, however, is much more grossly unequal than the distribution of incomes:

"One per cent of the population own 60 per cent of the saleable assets of the nation. It is still almost true to say, and it is only a short time since it was quite true to say, that 10 per cent of the people owned 90 per cent of the property and 90 per cent of the people owned 10 per cent of the property."¹

This grossly unequal distribution of property is, however, in process of being remedied by two means in particular, by death duties and by the growth of small savings.

Most property is inherited property and the most usual and weighty argument for such inheritance is that the existence of large individual fortunes is necessary to ensure the amount of saving required to provide for economic progress. So heavily, however, have direct taxes, and particularly death duties, fallen on the rich, defined as those paying super-tax, that they have in fact chosen to struggle

¹ E. F. M. Durbin, *What Have We To Defend?* (page 14).

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to maintain their standard of living at the expense of their savings. Mr. Colin Clark in his study of "The National Income" has calculated that in the fifteen years before 1935 the rich as a class saved nothing at all. Certain rich people added to their wealth by the purchase of securities, but this saving by one set of persons was offset, and probably more than offset, by the sale of securities, largely to pay death duties, by another set of persons.

As to the growth in small savings, figures published in March of this year show that there are over 15 million people holding accounts with the Post Office Savings Bank and that the total amount of money standing to their credit is £855,650,000. In other words, roughly one person out of every three in this country now has an account of about £60 with the Post Office Savings Bank, or, putting it another way, in relation to the total adult population of about 31 million every other adult in Great Britain has money deposited with this Bank. All this, of course, is quite apart from the similarly immense holdings of small investors in other similar institutions, such as building societies, retail co-operative societies, friendly and industrial and provident societies, and also national savings certificates, more than 600 million of which have been issued since the beginning of the war alone.

But the growth of this small savings movement during the war has only been an expansion and acceleration of something which was going on before the war. Between 1890 and 1935 the number of depositors in the Post Office Savings Bank rose from about seven million to about twelve million and the funds standing to their credit from £112 million to £587 million—an increase of 500 per cent in 45 years, quite clearly also an increase out of all proportion to the growth of the population. Similarly the funds of provident societies in the same period rose from £36 million to £300 million—an increase of 900 per cent.

There is also evidence to show that the rate of growth of small savings was itself continuously accelerating. The figures which go farthest back in this connection are those relating to the Post Office and they show that whereas between 1846 and 1860 the rate of increase was 38 per cent

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it was 65 per cent in the period between 1921 and 1935.

It was said above that in the immediately pre-war period the rich as a class had ceased to make any contribution to the nation's savings. During the same period, however, small investors as a class were providing nearly one-third of our total national savings (£100 million a year out of a total of £300 million a year). It is obvious that this was bringing about a radical transformation of the distribution of property in this country in an equalitarian direction.

Karl Marx, basing his prophecies on his studies of economic and social conditions in this country, prophesied that the future course of social development would lead to a small minority of immensely wealthy monopolistic capitalists finding itself confronted by a large majority of poverty-stricken proletarians with nothing to lose but their chains. Few prophecies have been more completely falsified by the actual course of events. For one thing, partly owing to the development (which Marx did not foresee) of the limited liability company and the consequent separation of the functions of ownership and management, there has been a great increase in the size and importance of the middle class in this country and particularly of its managerial and professional sections. For another thing, the working class itself, as the result of the general rise in the standard of living, the growth of small savings, public social services, and last but not least its own efforts, particularly the Consumers' Co-operative movement which originated in this country and has now spread all over the world, has itself assumed many middle-class characteristics. The point can be put not only in figures, but in a way visually apparent to all of us:

"In 1910 every human being in these islands could be placed in an instant by his clothes, manners and accent. That is no longer the case. So far as outward appearance goes, the clothes of the rich and poor, especially in the case of women, differ far less than they did thirty or even fifteen years ago . . . the modern council house with its bathroom and electric light is smaller than the stockbroker's villa, but it is recognisably the same kind of house, which the farm labourer's is

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not. A person who has grown up in a council housing estate is likely to be—indeed visibly is—middle class in outlook. . . ."¹

In economics as in politics the special characteristic of Britain is the combination of stability with progress.

For the reason implied in the facts and figures given above, whilst, of course, there are in this country sharp and profound conflicts of interest between capital and labour, the class struggle is not waged with anything approaching the bitterness and frequent physical violence with which it has been waged on the Continent. We have never had a Marxist Socialist movement in this country, and, as has already been pointed out, class divisions are constantly transcended at moments of crisis by conceptions of the national interest. To-day both the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress are taking their full share in the war-time government of the country, while in the industrial field, in marked contrast with the last war, a deep and voluntary peace generally prevails. In July, 1940, in this country not a single rich or aristocratic quisling raised his ugly head. Our ruling classes are not afraid of and do not hate our working classes, and the British worker thinks personally in terms of his own individual betterment, and politically in terms of still further increasing the pace at which the working class is being transformed into a middle class. Neither his personal nor his political feelings lead him to desire the "expropriation" of his present social superiors. Freedom in Britain not only has, but still is, broadening down from precedent to precedent, and not so slowly; and every day sees a step forward to greater social equality.

Such, briefly, seem to one Englishman at any rate to be the basic characteristics of the society into which he has been privileged to be born a member. But why should it be thought that such a sketch of the basic characteristics of English society should be of any interest to those who pay attention to our propaganda abroad? Our foreign propaganda already does much to depict the power and the bravery of the British people, but other peoples, for example the Germans, are obviously also powerful and brave. There

¹ Orwell, *The Lion and the Unicorn* (page 52).

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is a good deal of evidence that foreigners listening to our broadcasts and hearing some, but not nearly enough, and not nearly systematic enough, information about the British home front feel that some vital element is missing in the picture which is being put before them. If, coming back to our Bagehot quotation, we do feel that we have created great institutions, let us not be ashamed to trumpet that fact abroad. The more we do so the greater will be the confidence of foreign peoples, not only in our ability to win the war, but also in our ability to make good use of the peace.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

By H. R. G. GREAVES

IN the three months from June to August the House of Commons sat on twenty-nine days. Thirteen of these were the remaining days allotted to Supply; in the course of them the activities of twelve departments of state were reviewed. The Finance Bill was passed through its final stages. The Consolidated Fund (No. 3) Bill was dealt with on two days. So was the Appropriation Bill, which gave the opportunity for continuing the general survey of administration, undertaken on Supply days, in the shape of a further debate on colonial affairs and of a review of one major activity of yet another department, the Ministry of Supply. The Royal Ordnance factories, the subject of the eleventh report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure, provided the matter for this debate. Several public, and some private, Bills were also passed. The Official Report for the period covers 4,581 columns, and this excludes two secret sessions. Apart, however, from all this more or less routine business of question, supervision, and legislation, the House spent two full days and spoke no less than 335 columns of Hansard on the more dramatic subject of a vote of censure. This, the first occasion of such an action during Mr. Churchill's premiership, was the political high-light of the period.

On June 2nd an optimistic Prime Minister came to an optimistic House with a statement on the course of operations in Libya. "We have every reason to be satisfied, and more than satisfied," he said, "with the course which the battle has so far taken." Although he merely spoke of following the further development of the battle "with earnest attention" and made no promises, the sense of satisfaction of the moment was enhanced when he went on to report the "mammoth" raid on Cologne, promising Germany "an ordeal the like of which has never been experienced by any country in continuity, severity or magnitude." But it was in a contrasting atmosphere of unfulfilled expectation and promise that the House rose in August for the recess. Mr. Churchill had

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cited the praise by General Auchinleck of General Ritchie in June. Now the latter had been removed and the former was being replaced, the Germans were at El Alamein, and the superiority of force in the Middle East of which the Prime Minister had spoken appeared to be, at least in some vital respects, a qualitative inferiority. Mr. Churchill was on his way to Cairo and Moscow to confer on the ways of coping with a worsening situation. If this act of statesmanship, together with the success of the Dieppe raid, were later to do something to relieve disappointed hopes, nevertheless the real or apparent shortcomings of armaments and of generalship in Libya had dealt an undoubted blow at public confidence in the central direction of the war, to which the censure motion gave expression. The debate on this took place, as it happened, at the worst moment in the course of the campaign, before the Axis forces had yet been stopped. Disillusionment was therefore at its keenest, and the successive speeches, quite as much of those who voted for as of those who voted against the Government, breathe intense disquiet. No one doubted the final outcome, but deep and genuine concern about recent and present direction of the war ran right through the debate.

The three principal themes of a discussion which revealed considerable disagreement both as to criticism and remedy among its sponsors, were the quality of weapons, of generalship, and of strategical conception at the centre. They were thus fittingly summed up in a motion of no confidence in the central direction of the war, although the mover and seconder seemed to dispute whether this meant primarily Mr. Churchill or his service advisers. On the subject of weapons it had clearly been a shock to discover that after so much attention to the problem of quantity, now that that was in course of solution the still more threatening doubt of quality should raise its head. Despite some confusion on technicalities and some exaggeration among the critics, deficiency in tank and gun capacity was both admitted and explained by the Government. Denuded of arms after Dunkirk with invasion threatening, we had to concentrate on quantity even at the cost of defects. But that period was now passing. The Prime Minister insisted, however, on the

assertion of a relatively good equipment having been available in the Middle East, although it was admitted that some adaptations of the Nazi use of their known A.A. guns to anti-tank employment were not revealed until the course of the battle—that is to say, had not been foreseen. This in itself implied some stricture on our generalship or central direction. If Mr. Churchill stressed the importance of maintaining full governmental backing for the commanders in the field, there still emerged from this final defence by the Prime Minister the clear implication that generalship had been weaker on our side than on the enemy's. Speaking of the battle of June 27th, a fortnight after the fatal June 13th, he revealed that "for the first time, I am glad to say our whole Army . . . was engaged all together at one time." Of the Bir Hakeim episode he had said: "Here, no doubt, was a turning-point in the battle. Whether anything more could have been done we cannot tell. Certainly very large numbers of troops remained on fronts which were not engaged."

That there is lack of vision at the top and of understanding of the use and weapons of modern war was the gravamen of the most powerful attack. There is no lack of courage in the army "at any point, at the top or at the bottom," said Mr. Aneurin Bevan. Nor is there in the people: their mood is one of anger, not dismay. But there is failure to appoint the right men—Rommel in the British army would be a sergeant, just as is Michael Dunbar. There is failure of training, and of co-ordination of arms. No confidence exists on the part of the army in the War Office or the gentleman "picked out of a respectable obscurity" to become its head. "The Prime Minister has great qualities," said Mr. Bevan, "but obviously picking men is not one of them." Perhaps, indeed, there was more agreement between him and the Prime Minister than either realised or would have been willing to admit. At least the Secretary for War, was not one of the Government spokesmen in a debate which centred on military operations. And the two most directly concerned army leaders were replaced. The picture that Mr. Bevan painted was of a Prime Minister fighting rearguard actions all the time against the House, and then a year or two years later capitulating and carrying out what he had previously

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refused. What was true of the story of production would be proved true of army organisation also. "If the House of Commons has not the guts to make the Government change it, events will. It is events which are criticising the Government. All that we are doing is giving them a voice."

While the old plea of Mr. Churchill's critics for a separation of the functions of Minister of Defence and of Prime Minister has lost in strength, and there is a wider recognition of the inevitability of that combination, there was still the same demand that there should be a greater willingness to delegate. Nor would it seem that such a claim was out of harmony with other developments demanded in the debate—for a stronger and more inspiring leadership of the military, with Mr. Bevan; for a more progressive and open-minded element among the naval staff, with Admiral Keyes; or for a greater willingness to think in terms of combined operations on the part of the Air Ministry, a case made by several.

From the outset it was clear, however, that the motion as a vote of censure was still-born. Critics who although sponsoring such a motion confess that they do not want to overthrow the Government, and see no alternative to it, themselves throw doubt on the wisdom of bringing forward a motion in such terms. Their closing speaker, Mr. Hore-Belisha, even admitted that he did not want to "add political upheaval to military disaster" which would be the "logical conclusion" of such a motion. The critic who says in effect that he hopes a few, but not too many, will vote with him is not in a responsible, if indeed in an entirely honest, rôle. The motion of no confidence was lost by 25 to 475.

A point of army discipline raised on the adjournment might perhaps be taken as a footnote to some of the remarks on army organisation referred to. This was the claim that in a specific case of theft of petrol, while a corporal was reduced to the ranks and given three months imprisonment, an officer in the same unit had his sentence of dismissal reduced to reprimand. The Secretary of State rightly claimed that the original sentence in the case of the officer was more severe, but inadvertently lent some colour to the implication of discrimination (which he strongly denied) by defending the reduction of sentence without admitting that Army Regula-

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tions prescribed the more severe penalty in the case of an officer precisely because theft in an officer is a more serious offence.

Another army matter was the announcement, after so many refusals, of the decision to establish a Palestine Regiment consisting of separate Jewish and Arab infantry battalions for general service in the Middle East, and the expansion of the Jewish rural police. The Government, Sir James Grigg asserted, "are doing their utmost to enable Palestinian Jews to defend their country".

Parliament has passed three Bills touching on army affairs. The National Service (Foreign Countries) Bill provides for the calling up of British subjects resident in foreign countries. It is to be applied by Order in Council in the first instance to Egypt and subsequently to other countries. It was important, Mr. Bevin said, to impress our Allies that we were making the fullest use of our man- and woman-power. A Ministry of Labour official would be sent out to the British Embassy in Cairo to apply the measure. "Very much as they were in this country, people are not so much refusing to do things as they are in need of direction as to what to do." Of course, in countries with which there were no agreements for enforcing such an Act of the British Parliament, obedience to it would have to be voluntary. There was some demand from the House that penalties should be applied where such voluntary compliance was not forthcoming, such as the forfeiture of property held here or of British nationality. The Attorney-General replied that this was not practicable: it would mean trying a man in his absence; it would apply penalties not imposed on a citizen resident in this country; instead, therefore, such offenders would be proceeded against only if at any time they returned to territory where the British writ runs.

The Allied Powers (War Service) Bill places the nationals of Allied countries in the same position as British nationals. They are liable to be called up by the British forces if they have not joined their own country's armed forces or have not been reserved by their own Governments. Here again the measure was to be applied by an Order in Council which, it was indicated, would be issued by agreement with the

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Allied Power concerned. The Bill was passed after assurances had been given on one or two minor points, such, for instance, as the position of an Allied national who had joined his own country's forces under some form of duress, or in the belief that he was legally bound to do so, and who there suffered some racial or other discrimination which made him wish to join the British forces.

The United States of America (Visiting Forces) Bill was in some ways a more controversial measure, and some objection was not unreasonably taken to the decision to rush it through all stages in one day. "What this Bill does is to oust the British courts of justice from jurisdiction in cases of criminal offences" alleged against members of the American forces. The penalties imposed by American military law, Mr. Morrison went on to explain, would be at least as heavy as in British law. "The American authorities have assured us," he said, "that they will be prompt in taking proceedings, and will do their best to see to it that the proceedings are heard as near as possible to the place of the alleged crime." But the chief causes of uneasiness in the House were the imposing of American military law, about which it knew nothing beyond the Home Secretary's assurance that the principles were not dissimilar to British criminal law and that the penalties were at least as severe, and the fact that it was thus replacing British law without fuller consideration.

Parliament spent a day on another aspect of the nation's war strategy—the propaganda carried on in its name. A rather pedestrian account of our activities read by Mr. Thurtle was followed by a debate which showed a continuance of all the past lines of criticism of this service, almost entirely unaffected by recent changes in its organisation. The unjustified secrecy in which it shrouds itself is as strongly complained of as ever. Why should a public service for which the House of Commons is responsible force members to obtain evidence at second hand of what is being said in the name of England to the enemy, the neutral, or our friends in occupied Europe? The scripts of broadcasts are filed secretly only a mile or two from the library of the House. Such secrecy makes a farce of public responsibility. It is

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naturally attributed to a fear of criticism; and such fear generally means that there is good cause for criticism. It is not surprising, therefore, that allegations should be made in the House that undue friendliness is shown in our broadcasts to reactionary régimes, an allegation made by Mr. Pickthorn, member for Cambridge University, with special reference to Hungary. The method of divided control of this service is still as strongly attacked as ever. "When more than one Minister is in control," said Mr. Thomas, "no one in fact can be in control, and the permanent officials are found to be the persons really running the machine." And this view was expressed from elsewhere in the House. Such bureaucracy, more marked here than in any other service where the proper public controls operate, produces, it was claimed, a combination of timidity and officiousness. Of this Mr. Bartlett gave several examples. From much intimate acquaintance with the B.B.C. he spoke of "intolerable interference with the expression of opinion and sometimes even with the issue of news." Much of the unwise treatment of the last battle in Libya, which greatly increased the political significance of the disaster there and undoubtedly embarrassed if it did not even weaken the Government, might be attributed to such deficiencies in the nation's propaganda services both for at home and abroad. The House of Commons has repeatedly made these criticisms throughout the whole period of the war. That, largely as a consequence of them, there has been some improvement, as well as considerable reorganisations, was now admitted, but most of the basic charges remain. They continue to provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of informed parliamentary supervision of this service which is both a public one and an increasingly important section of war strategy. Tribute was paid to Mr. Bracken as the most successful of the many Ministers of Information, even while these charges were levied. But the member who quoted an American reaction to the type of Englishman who is sent abroad as the representative of "democratic England" probably put his finger on one essential foundation of the complaint from which these services suffer. "I asked an American friend what he thought of one of our representatives there who had been well spoken of to me by English friends,"

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said Mr. Driberg, "‘Yes’, said this American, ‘he freezes you with his charm’."

The House devoted as much time as ever to the problems of production. The two days' debate on the joint votes of the Ministries of Production, Supply and Aircraft Production followed naturally on the war strategy discussions of the censure debate. In turn it was followed by a day in secret session on shipping. Mr. Lyttelton, who opened the debate on the first day, was able to report considerable developments on the side of organisation, regional, central and in combination with America. These were welcomed by the House, particularly the policy of giving greater authority to regional officials which had been demanded for so long, and the formation of the Industrial Division at the Ministry with the purpose of co-ordination and of inventive planning on behalf of all departments concerned. Sir Andrew Duncan, at the close of the debate on the second day, and Colonel Llewellyn, on the first day, did much to satisfy doubts expressed in the House on the adequacy of liaison between the operational user and the maker of equipment. There were many tributes to our achievements in production in what appeared something of a reaction from the excessive criticism of the censure debate. Little was added to the revelations of this debate on the subject of our difficulties with tank development or our types of gun production. Doubts about the excellence of the new fighter-planes were answered with the statement that they were as good at all heights and better at some than the most recent German models. Criticism was still heard on the continued existence of idle machinery, of transport difficulties, and of too long hours. On the last point a policy of reduction where hours were excessive was announced a few days later in the Ministry of Labour debate.

The kindred subject of the Royal Ordnance factories, with the eleventh report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure before the House, was debated on August 5th. There was much praise for the forty-two factories which employ 300,000 people and produce two-thirds of the nation's guns and explosives. Even Mr. Kirkwood, who said he had "no desire to join this mutual admiration society in paying tribute to the Ministry of Supply," added that these factories

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"have revolutionised production. We are beyond the wildest dream, not of lawyers but of engineers who have made munitions, who have had charge of munition workers and who made records in the last war." He attributed this to some extent to the fact that "on several occasions we have succeeded in having the management displaced" where this was at fault. There was much recognition also of the value of the work of the Select Committee which had visited sixteen of the forty-two factories. There was some complaint too, that the Press only publicised adverse comment in the reports of the Committee and so gave an entirely wrong impression to the public of the work of the national factories. It was pointed out that while the Committee was in a position to look at the work and administration in a more complete and objective way than the Minister could usually do, even hearing evidence not always available to him, this was the first occasion on which a report had been fully discussed by the House. The implication is clear that the House has yet to plan a more regular and satisfactory method of taking advantage of the supervisory work done on its behalf by its Committee. It is to be hoped that the usefulness of this day's debate may promote at some time the necessary changes in the procedure of the House.

Debates on the Board of Trade, Agriculture and Food showed a satisfactory continuance of policies accepted in the past. They were marked more by praise and suggestion than by criticism. This was true of industrial concentration which, it was reported, had been met with more approval and less friction than anticipated. The extension of utility goods was welcomed, although there was some criticism of the tendency to announce them too long before they were ready. Mr. Dalton claimed that while there was less need for present concern with export trade owing mainly to the operation of lease-lend facilities, he was studying closely the ways in which "we may start a new export drive immediately conditions permit it." If there appeared something more of a pre-war competitive spirit in this than of a propensity for planned international reconstruction, the House does not seem to have remarked upon it. The greater part of the debate, however, was taken up with the affairs of the retail

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trade discussed in relation to the recommendations of the third report of the Retail Trade Committee, which envisaged a voluntary concentration by means of a co-operatively levied insurance fund. An inconclusive debate on this report, which was still under consideration by the Government, showed some division of opinion between those who thought there was too much tendency to accept the bigger units of distribution, and of production, as necessarily more efficient than the smaller, and, on the other hand, those who recognised an inescapable tendency towards concentration and integration and who wished only to ensure that it should be carried out under the control of conscious planning. Nor, significantly enough, was this division a party one.

The poor attendance for the debate on food and agriculture was itself evidence that the House found little to criticise in the work of those two departments. The fact that we are now producing nearly two-thirds of our food supply is a sufficient justification for the further easy day which Parliament gave the Government.

The compromise which formed the basis of the new coal policy announced by the Government also seemed to have achieved the aim of a wide agreement. Although Mr. Bevan prophesied that "it will not produce a single additional ounce of coal," and generally condemned the scheme as "economic fascism in all its elements . . . a State-operated private industry," there was considerable Labour support for it in the vote, which showed 329 for and 8 against. Evidence was forthcoming in speeches also that it was gaining some at least of the good will on the part of the miners which was necessary in order to promote the fullest production. This was scarcely surprising when Sir Stafford Cripps asserted that "the primary and fundamental objective which we have in view is that there should be an absolute control over all mining operations by the Government." To those who objected, as did Mr. Bevan, to the financial aspects of the scheme the Greene award of increased wages, estimated to cost 2s. 6d. a ton, was something of a reply. It was implemented by an Order approved by the House on July 30th, and introduced by Mr. T. Smith, Parliamentary Secretary to the new Ministry of Fuel and Power.

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Mr. Bevin's account of his stewardship in a debate on factory administration was also greeted by a favourable House. If only to make fullest use of a labour supply increasingly scarce owing to services requirements "we felt as a Government," he said, "that one of the first things we had to do was to assume greater responsibility for the welfare of the worker." The application of this policy was met with approval, if with complaint about details and some suggestions for improvement of such things as ventilation, housing, transport, and hours. There was a need, it was claimed, for a larger number of factory inspectors.

Finance as such received some attention. A further vote carried the money granted by Parliament since the war began beyond the ten thousand million level. There was a short debate on the principle, objected to by some members, of paying interest on monies borrowed, instead of requisitioning them. And it was suggested that there was not enough full debate on the financial position.

Pensions, in their many various aspects, received attention—Armed Forces pensions on the adjournment, and Widows and Old Age pensions by way of a motion, to which the House agreed, favouring their early reconsideration by the Government. The latter was followed by an increase of 2s. 6d. a week. There was also a debate on family allowances, the case for which was admitted by the Chancellor to be "very powerful." He undertook that the Government would consider the resolution (recommending them for consideration) in the light of the Beveridge Committee report, of the further conclusions of Labour, and of the financial position. The Pensions (Mercantile Marine) Bill also passed its final stage, the acceptance of the Lords' amendments.

Some social services were dealt with, and their administration approved, under the votes for education, health and Scotland. "One of the longest debates on Scottish supply" took place mainly on the subject of health in Scotland. Many speakers stressed the relatively more acute housing shortage there. The Minister revealed the unhappy evidence of increased tuberculosis and infant mortality. On the other hand, the revelation was also made of improved weight of children, ascribed to their parents' being in full employment.

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While the Foreign Office figured in the debates only in connection with propaganda and the strongly welcomed announcement of the treaty with the Soviet Union, colonial affairs received much more attention than usual. A day in June and another in August were devoted to a general survey. Three conclusions may be drawn from this. There is a strong disposition to criticise past failures and present omissions and a determination among what appears to be a growing body of opinion to prove more imaginative and progressive in the future, particularly when post-war reconstruction in regained colonies becomes possible. Corresponding to this there is a less complacent effort, on the part of the defenders of our administration of the colonies, to balance against the evidence of past neglect claims about the adequacy of newly planned welfare and development work—admittedly praiseworthy, so far as it goes, though this may be. Finally there is a somewhat paradoxical conclusion from a considerably greater attention than normal on the part of the House to this aspect of its responsibilities: it is that the House shows insufficient knowledge and devotes too little time to this part of its work; the case for closer, more continuous, and more organised attention, perhaps through the establishment of a permanent select committee, would probably now meet with wider recognition.

Home affairs provided the material for two debates, neither of which was outstanding. One was on civil defence; the other consisted in a renewed beating of the dead horse of Regulation 18B and a poorer repetition of past discussions, aimed rather unsuccessfully at proving the dictatorial tendencies of Mr. Morrison. The House also considered the report of its Committee of Privileges and accepted the novel procedure of a secret report issued in numbered copies to be returned and destroyed. The report exonerated Mr. McGovern, the member concerned, but cleared up doubts about what it is permissible to say in reference to proceedings in secret session. It may not be said that the secret debate produced a good or bad impression, although it is permissible that, without such express reference to secret proceedings, a member should indirectly show that he has been favourably or unfavourably impressed.

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BROADCASTING FOR DEMOCRACY. By OTTO FRIEDMANN. *Introduction by THE MASTER OF BALLIOL.* (Allen & Unwin. 2s. 6d.)

WARFARE BY WORDS. By IVOR THOMAS. (Penguin special.)

IN the last war much was learned about the technique of economic control. The State went into business on an immense scale and methods were worked out by which the distribution of the world's raw materials could be nationally and internationally planned and rationed. Much of this advance was lost when the Controls were scrapped after the war in the interests of Big Business. But the knowledge acquired was valuable, since, war or peace, there is now no escape from the necessity of large-scale economic planning. During this war the same type of experience is being applied to propaganda, the conscious direction of the mental life of the population. Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany had already gone deep into this form of Totalitarianism before the war; in Britain, the supreme home of individualism, resistance to the State intervention in matters of the mind is still powerful. But the necessities of propaganda in war, especially of propaganda to enemy and neutral countries, in which Britain did pioneering work in the last war, imposes on our Services experimentation in techniques which the Germans had fully acquired before 1939. The field is one which excites every inquiring mind; those who start research into it find themselves forced to make judgments about the political and philosophic issues of the war, about the relation of mental to physical activity, about the technical possibilities of wireless and about a hundred other fascinating problems which, in fact, include the whole nature and destiny of man. Books on this or that aspect of the problem of political warfare appear almost every month. If few of them take us very far or very deep, it is because the real experience of the practice of propaganda is proceeding all the while under the pledge of secrecy. By listening in to the radio in a dozen different languages, by studying the use made of political warfare, particularly by the Germans when they wish to prepare a doomed country for invasion, the amateur student of psychology may learn something; he may have more to say of a general kind about the legitimate objects and the dangerous developments of political warfare. But he knows, and so does the informed reader, that the most interesting knowledge is not used for publication. After the war we may expect books on propaganda comparable with the classical descriptions of shipping, food and trade controls written after the last war by men like Sir Arthur Salter, Sir William Beveridge, and E. H. M. Lloyd.

The two books chosen here are both examples of sensible exposition by people who have taken trouble to understand the main issues and to

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present them simply. Neither go at all far; neither produce anything very new on the subject or add information that is not already in print. Mr. Ivor Thomas was at one time close to the centre of British political warfare and he writes with knowledge. But his book suffers like that of Mr. Friedmann from the fact that he fails to give a factual account, except in the most general terms, of what is actually being done in British propaganda to-day. Most of the generalisations are unsatisfying in consequence. A study of British propaganda, to be really valuable to-day, should include, as the result of elaborate monitoring, a survey and comparison of broadcasting to a large number of different countries; the listening potentialities and technical problems involved would have to be taken into account and the desirability and chances of success for different types of propaganda to countries so differently situated as Germany, Italy, Hungary and Spain. Both these books avoid the frivolity of many Parliamentary questions which inferentially attack British political warfare on the basis of particular broadcasts which may give an entirely false picture of the general scope and plan of a long series of radio appeals. If, for instance, a British broadcast to Germany includes some compliments to the excellence and high traditions of the German navy, this does not show, as some foolish people imagine, the sinister influence of pro-Germans or of German refugees in the Department of Political Warfare; it merely proves that our propaganda department has realised the rather obvious truth (which Mr. Churchill very clearly understood early in the war) that one way to get German sailors to listen to your broadcasts and to divide Germany and create a sense of shame about the present aggressive and sadistic policy of the German government is to remind the German Services of the standards and values which they respected in the past. Nothing can usefully be said about British propaganda except on the basis of a fairly extensive inquiry into its purposes and its conclusions.

Mr. Ivor Thomas lays it down that political warfare, like other forms of attack, should be concentrated especially on the weakest spot in the enemy front. He urges, therefore, particular attention to Italian morale. I wish Mr. Thomas had followed up this point more closely. The British wave-lengths are already crowded; does he mean that more hours should be devoted to Italian broadcasting and less to Germany? If not, in what way can the attack be intensified? I read with surprise his suggestion that a dozen people are all that is required to maintain the broadcast service to Germany; the remark seems to ignore all the possibilities of a form of warfare whose importance he otherwise recognises. A single feature programme such as our wireless carries several times a week may occupy most of the time of half a dozen people and the whole organisation required if broadcasting is to be based on the sound principles he lays down certainly would require ten times the

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staff he thinks sufficient. Apart from this strange aberration, Mr. Thomas has written a sensible but uninspired book. He gives a good illustration of the sinister development of broadcast propaganda when he refers to the deliberate spreading of whispering campaigns—probably more effective than any direct attack—and he quotes a classic example of unco-ordinated strategy given by Lord Wedgwood, who showed that at one and the same time Czechs were being encouraged to guerrilla war and sabotage by the Soviet wireless, and urged by the B.B.C. to avoid action until Britain gave them the signal to strike.

Mr. Friedmann, a Czech now in the Forces, has made a careful study of British propaganda and discloses its main weakness. He has more that is constructively valuable to say than Mr. Thomas. Britain, according to tradition, tries to build up a listening public by a steady stream of news as reliable as that of Dr. Goebbels is false. This is a sound notion. But Mr. Friedmann, who gives some good rules for democratic propaganda, sees that the truth does not prevail merely because it is the truth. A positive propaganda, an active faith is the only counter to the ingenious promises and doctrines of the German machine. Without a positive alternative to the Nazi New Order, democracy vainly denounces its cruelties and inconsistencies. The Master of Balliol writes in his Introduction that the fundamental assumption of democratic propaganda is that it can be checked by other sources. That is both its limiting condition and its strength. "It has long been clear that if we try to imitate Nazi methods we shall do it badly, and, like people in fairy stories, sell our souls and be paid in gold that turns to leaves." That is sound doctrine, but sound only if the truth is organised and propagated with the energy and zeal of falsehood. The truth must be a positive *Weltanschauung*, as attractive as the false promises it counters. As the world now goes, the Devil advocates hell as if it were heaven, and his opponents talk of heaven like Anglican parsons who have long ceased to believe at all in a future life.

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- INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC. By KATE L. MITCHELL. 12. 6d.
I.P.R. Inquiry Series. (94 pp. *Institute of Pacific Relations*. (32 pp.)
CHINA. By P. M. ROXBY. Oxford Pamphlet on World Affairs. (32 pp.)
Oxford University Press. 4d.)
JAPAN AND THE MODERN WORLD. By SIR JOHN PRATT. (32 pp. *Oxford University Press*. 4d.)
JAPAN. A WORLD PROBLEM. By H. J. TIMPERLEY. (150 pp. *John Day New York*. \$1.75.)

MISS KATE MITCHELL presents us with the data which is needed to begin a study of the part the Pacific is destined to play in post-war reconstruction. The future of the Pacific, she points out, "depends not only upon the defeat of the Fascist Powers, but also upon the far-sightedness of the great Western Powers now fighting Fascist aggression, and upon whether the industrialisation which has taken place is sufficiently strongly rooted to withstand the renewal of foreign economic competition and political pressure."

First of all, how far has British policy laid such foundations? In her survey of British Malaya, Miss Mitchell shows that this territory has practically no secondary industries of any size. Its economy is highly specialised, developed with foreign capital and largely by foreign labour (the rubber plantations are worked mainly by Tamils from Madras, and the tin mines by Chinese) and dependent on the world market for tin and rubber. In every field of economic activity, British capital predominates—it represents over 70 per cent of the total business investment. Further, Malaya is "Britain's dollar arsenal"; in recent years, the United States has imported roughly half the world's production and two-thirds of its rubber, most of these imports coming from Malaya. The large export surpluses which accumulated as a result "have appreciably mitigated the normal adverse trade balance of a sterling bloc in relation to the United States." The case of Burma is similar in certain respects. She has a largely monocultural economy, 70 per cent of the total area is devoted to rice-growing. The first World War gave a great impetus to industrial materials, oil, rubber, wolfram, lead and tin, and between 1914 and 1940 capital investments tripled. At least 90 per cent of it is British or British-controlled. Practically all modern industries have been developed, partly because of such difficulties as the absence of sufficient coal and iron and skilled labour, but mainly because it has not suited British interests "to encourage the transformation of the colony from a purely raw material producing area to a self-sufficient economic unit."

In a chapter on India, Miss Mitchell gives us a valuable and optimistic analysis of the industrial backwardness which characterises the "brightest jewel" of the Empire. Potentially, India is one of

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world's greatest industrial areas; her resources are either undeveloped or used for the factories of Great Britain and other industrialised countries. A sudden development during the last war followed by a boom period produced large dividends for British capital—an average of 120 per cent by the leading cotton mills in Bombay and 140 per cent of 120 per cent by the leading jute mills. Later, when the boom was over, these capital investments quickly dropped and this factor, plus a protective tariff system for cotton piece goods, and for iron and steel in the interests of the British producer, combined to slow down post-war industrialisation. The mechanised nature of the second World War, and the fact that Japan is now a formidable threat, made it imperative that India should become the industrial arsenal for the forces East of Suez and this has been the programme of the Eastern Supply Council in Delhi. Yet it was not until Japan invaded Malaya and Burma that the British authorities in India withdrew their opposition to the expansion of India's heavy industries. The political problems of Indian independence have overshadowed those of a quickened industrialisation under British as well as American auspices.

Miss Mitchell points out the contrast between the speed of industrialisation in India and Australia. The first World War greatly accelerated it in both countries. But the increase in the range and volume of Australian manufactures was such that the British Trade Commissioner declared in 1936 that "the greatest competitor of the United Kingdom in the Australian market is the Commonwealth itself." Since that time tension in Europe and Japan's aggression in the Pacific led to a further increase in Australia's industrialisation. She tried to be self-supporting, especially in war industries, and most of her resources to-day are concentrated on war production. The end of the war will find Australia a considerable industrial producer. New Zealand, on the other hand, remains predominantly pastoral and even small-scale manufactures have only played a minor role in her war-time economy.

The same type of retarded industrial development can be seen in French Indo-China, where French economic policy was strongly opposed to any form of industrialisation, and ruled out the development of any local industries which might compete with French manufactures. In the case of Netherlands India, the Dutch Government in recent years has encouraged small-scale industries and the revival of native handicrafts on a large scale. The war extended this encouragement to modern mechanised industries, "the immediate purpose of which was to strengthen the country's defences, but which would also serve in the long run to give Netherlands India great self-sufficiency in manufactured goods." Lastly, the Philippines. Here, the economy, as it developed under American control, was dependent on access to the American market and on a restriction of production, since sugar, the chief product,

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was produced in competition with American production. The Independence Bill, which comes into effect in 1946, was welcomed by the Cuban and Hawaiian sugar planters and will necessitate changes in the Philippines, including a development in manganese, chromium and hemp, but an independent economy and any very considerable industrialisation would seem doubtful.

To this study of the Western Pacific, Miss Mitchell adds a more detailed analysis of the more widely known developments in Japan (including Formosa, Korea and Manchukuo) and in China. Assuming the victory of the Allied nations, she suggests that at the end of her long struggle with Japan, China will need extensive material aid. On her unity and strength will depend its terms as well as her ability to develop an independent economic structure and the use of her industrial resources for the benefit of the Chinese people.

Professor Roxby, in an Oxford pamphlet entitled *China*, describes the main geographic divisions of the country. He, too, emphasises the need of unity as "essential to China's successful emergence from this titanic struggle with Japanese militarism." When victory has been won he suggests that the urgent need for agrarian reform is the real crux of the internal situation in China. He suggests that the hope of rebuilding the industrial structure on sounder lines lies in the development of the Chinese Industrial Co-operative Movement, which is "much more in keeping with the Chinese genius and traditional aptitudes than the exotic mass-production factory system which, 'under Western economic influence, had developed in the lower Yangtze Valley.'"

In the meantime, Japan has made wide inroads into China as well as throughout the wide area stretching from Burma to the Solomons and from the borders of Siberia down to New Guinea. Sir John Pratt, in an Oxford pamphlet, *Japan and the Modern World*, describes British policy in the Far East during the period of Japan's expansion. He regrets the ungentlemanliness of Japanese behaviour, but explains some of it by Germany's wicked influence. He deplores the inability of Japan to keep up the friendly relations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but says that "it was Great Britain's friendly assistance to China that made good relations with Japan impossible."

Mr. H. J. Timperley, in *Japan. A World Problem*, takes a more far-sighted view of Japanese policy, and stresses the deep-rooted psychological forces which have spurred on the Japanese in their vision of world-domination. But he avoids the Vansittart trap of attributing all wickedness to all Japanese and constructively suggests that wise statesmanship will facilitate Japan's co-operation with other nations in the Pacific where the "propinquity and the character of her manufactures will still leave her with a considerable advantage in East Asia over her competitors." Mr. Timperley introduces the psychological problem of

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name; and Marx had a consuming desire for justice, besides a belief in certain other "values," such as the supremacy of reason, intellectual sincerity, hatred of suffering, the value of individual life, as any reader of his works or intelligent observer of his career can see.

How much more is there to be said about the connection between Marx's ideas and Darwin's? Whatever more there may be said on the subject, M. Barzun is not the man to say it. There is nothing more difficult and tricky than the genealogy of ideas. Only a philosopher should attempt it, and philosophers usually fight shy of it—when in modern universities it becomes the unhappy hunting ground of the half-educated pursuer of a research degree. M. Barzun says of his trio: "Through their efforts, feeling, beauty and moral values were shown to be illusions for which the world of fact gave no warrant." This is a disqualifying vulgarisation of the work of three great men: Darwin certainly believed in truth, Marx in justice, and even Wagner, it may be supposed, in beauty. But perhaps M. Barzun hardly considers his subjects as great men: he tells us that "of the many books which Darwin, Marx and Wagner have left us not one is a masterpiece;" and ends up, rather disarmingly, "But that it is easily possible to be more original than Darwin, Marx, or Wagner should be clear from a reading of these pages."

If we allow the utility of a comparison of Darwin and Marx, though it is exiguous, how does Wagner fit into the scheme? Was he a materialist? He is evidently regarded as such by M. Barzun. I should have thought there was no more deplorable example of a heavy and pretentious idealism in the perverse German manner in the whole history of art: the totalitarian doctrine of the "Kunstwerk" as opposed to the normal "work of art," the exploitation of the gamut of artistic resources, stage, theatre, music, literature, in the interest of the German myth. No artist was ever more of an ideologue, a doctrinaire than Wagner, with all the resources of a superb showman, organiser and propagandist at the service of his ideal. It is enough to make an honest materialist shudder: both Darwin and Marx would be shocked to be linked with such vulgarity, would blush at such blatant sensuality: they were both chaste and prudish in the Victorian manner, and the whole world knows what Act II of *Tristan und Isolde* describes with such rhythmical accuracy.

M. Barzun is at least right about this. But nothing can excuse—not exile, not Columbia University—such sentences as: "Thunderation, so to speak, is at work"; "His [Marx's] Communifesto, if we give back most of it to its inspirer, Victor Considérant, seems slight"; "Through geology, timeless room opened backward behind us and made possible the lucky survivals insuring progress. History was a sieve that worked. Man was the residue . . . Environment, as in Darwin, was made up of

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things. In both, man responded like a machine, and out of this same physical necessity—compared to which everything else was ideological rubbish—a perfected society was produced. History was a sieve that worked. The proletarian utopia was the residue."

This is Columbia at its worst.

A. L. ROWSE.

STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT. By G. P. GOOCH. (373 pp. Longmans. 12s. 6d.)

CONFLICTS: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. By L. B. NAMIER. (223 pp. Macmillan. 8s. 6d.)

BOOTH these books, by distinguished historians, are studies in contemporary history, and originated as articles in journals or as lectures. They raise in the mind of the reader some interesting questions with regard to this kind of historico-political writing. If the two authors could be put into scales which weighed the volume of their historical learning, there would be little to choose between them and the weight would be found to be stupendous. There is nothing which Dr. Gooch does not know about the diplomacy of the last 150 years, while there are few things in the past, from the politicians of the eighteenth century to the history of Carpatho-Russia, with which Professor Namier is not more intimate than most people are with the geography of their own houses. There their resemblance ends, for the way in which their minds work, the way in which they use their knowledge, and therefore the way in which they look at "contemporary history," are completely different.

Dr. Gooch specializes in diplomatic history. His book consists of papers on Franco-German relations between 1871 and 1914, British Foreign Policy in its relation to the wars of 1914 and 1939, the diplomatic background of the war of 1914, two German diplomatists, and then at the end four papers of a more general character. His mind is that of a cataloguer, his outlook that of the beetle—or postage-stamp collector. Any relevant fact is transfixed with a pin or pasted into its appropriate place. "Relevant to what?" the tired reader may begin to ask after a few hundred pages, and the only answer is "relevant to Franco-German relations, 1871-1914," or "the diplomatic background of the first world war." This catalogic method—the method of the ancient chroniclers—has, of course, its uses. In his book, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*, in which he summarises the result of reading a colossal mass of books and documents, Dr. Gooch has put every student of contemporary history under a great debt to him. His industry, scholarship and objectivity in the pursuit and pinning down of facts are admirable. He is the ideal writer of historical text-books.

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But the method and outlook are inappropriate in a large book of 370 pages containing ten essays or studies in—for the most part—contemporary history. In the first place, where, as here, the subjects overlap, the facts overlap, and therefore often Dr. Gooch has to record the same facts in almost the same words both with regard to the Diplomatic Background of 1914 and British Diplomacy before 1914. We do not want to be told twice in 20 pages that Campbell-Bannerman wrote in 1906: "I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations." In the second place a "study" should be something more than a catalogue of facts strung upon a thin thread of platitudes. But that is not an unfair description of Dr. Gooch's "study" of Political Biography or of Politics and Morals. If you look in a dictionary, you will find quite near the word catalogue another word, "catalysis"; the use of facts by a writer of historical studies should be not cataloguic, but catalytic. In chemistry catalysis means the "effect produced by a substance that without undergoing change itself aids a chemical change in other bodies"; so facts in the hands of the historian should be used so that, without undergoing change themselves, they aid a change in our vision of the past and the present.

That is what Professor Namier does with his facts. He has historical imagination as well as historical knowledge. His interest is not in pinning dead facts into a text-book; he tries to keep them alive and give them wings. In his first two essays he covers much of the ground which Dr. Gooch plods over in some of his studies, but the reader should get more understanding of contemporary events from Professor Namier's 33 pages than from 333 pages of Dr. Gooch. That is because Professor Namier thinks deeply and imaginatively about his facts and he therefore makes the reader think. This is true whether he is writing about diplomatic history or Germany or the resemblance between 1812 and 1941 or the Jewish problem or the party system. You will not always agree with him; he may sometimes seem to you perverse or wrong-headed in his own opinions about facts; but he is continually making you re-examine your own opinions through the catalysis of his facts, and every now and then he will suggest to you a new and profound generalisation, such as the following:

"One would expect people to remember the past and to imagine the future. But, in fact, when discoursing or writing about history, they imagine it in terms of their own experience, and when trying to gauge the future they cite supposed analogies from the past, till, by a double process of repetition, they imagine the past and remember the future."

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A COMBINE OF AGGRESSION: MASSES, ELITE, AND DICTATORSHIP IN GERMANY. By KARL OTTEN. (356 pp. *Allen & Unwin*. 15s.)

MR. OTTEN'S book somehow suggests to me a solo dance round a calf of clay! The calf develops into a monster, a dragon of huge proportions, a shadowy and terrifying ogre, while the dancer loses himself in a whirl of arguments and similes, metaphors and symbols. But that German calf is still a calf of clay, even when, as a mature monster, it appears to be made of steel and iron. For, in spite of a brilliant display of intellect, Mr. Otten fails to make his subject "live."

If it were permissible to apply the term to psychology and sociology, I should describe this book as "surrealist". For it relies, in its interpretation of the ups-and-downs of German life, less on everyday facts and circumstances than on symbolism fetched from the most distant horizons and the deepest depths. Perhaps the fact that Mr. Otten is an accomplished German novelist may account for this. His aim is to outline the German psychology, but he stops short of depicting the typical soldier and general, workman and petit bourgeois, civil servant and general manager, boy scout and party official. Inevitably so unscientific a technique results in everyone and everything being exaggerated, magnified and, if in a negative sense, glorified. Not only the breath of life but the blood-circulation of logic are lacking. Maybe the author will go on to write a novel of Hitler's Germany, for which, at any rate, he has made impressive preparations in his present book. But his sketch, however comprehensive, is unacceptable as an explanation of the German problem of to-day.

The author, being more of an artist than a scientist, is even sensitive to and influenced by Nazi slogans and argumentation. He uses, and uses repeatedly, a number of terms ascribing to the Germans: dread of life, yearning for death, murder-impulse or lack in the individual of need for personal happiness. Even in the German "wilderness" I have never met such peculiarities, and neither has anyone else. They are nothing but pseudo-heroic slogans palmed off on a muddle-headed generation by the intellectual gang round a lunatic dictator. Though, to their eternal shame, many Germans have believed in such "tripe," it cannot be used to explain any of the crimes committed or tolerated in Nazi Germany.

Mr. Otten is even adopting something like the blood-and-soil theory when he writes:

"The dread of life in the German and, in conjunction therewith, his scepticism as an attitude of life, are the outcome of the denaturalisation of German man, of his transformation from a being bound up with nature into a mis-being bound up with the machine; they are an outcome, too, of the unavoidable loss of his original moral in the course of this process."

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that here was a carefully prepared loophole for evasion? On November 19th, 1941, Mr. Amery was telling the Manchester Luncheon Club some of the obligations were, but still carefully protecting himself. "I am not, of course, giving an exhaustive list." On March 30th, 1942, in the draft declaration for discussion with Indian leaders by Sir Stafford Cripps, the vagueness as regards the acceptance of a constitution to be framed by Indians was—very wisely—eliminated and all such matters were relegated to a treaty to be negotiated between H.M.'s Government and the constitution-making body. Why should it be necessary to fight a rear-guard action at each successive step of concession?

The answer, I think, is plain, and it does not justify any accusation of hypocrisy. Each step is the result of a struggle of interests and sentiments in Britain herself, as well as between Britain and India. A powerful section of political Britain does not desire concession and fights against it. Both our eyes and our ears must be sealed if we are unaware of this fact. No decision is clear cut, or based upon a continuous policy. If it were otherwise this would not be a democratic country.

The Indian leaders see the zigzags of compromise and incomplete concession, and give them an interpretation which justifies suspicion and impatience. At the present moment they are suffering from an ecstasy of unreasonableness. But the inevitable lesson is that, in the long run, a democracy cannot govern a foreign people.

As to the proposed adjustment between Hindus and Mohammedans by means of provincial option for exclusion from an all-India union, its necessity—if there be a necessity—is profoundly to be deplored. Both the Punjab and Bengal have, indeed, Mahommedan majorities; but they are both very narrow. Separation—if that miserable consummation should be effected—opens for India a vista of future wars. It would be better—I say it deliberately and with a full consciousness of the tremendous issues involved—it would be better to fight out the quarrel now.

JOHN MAYNARD.

BOOK REVIEWS

ECONOMIC PEACE AIMS. By OSWALD DUTCH. 278 pp. (Arnold. 12s. 6d.)

THERE are two ways of making the world a better place. One is that of the visionaries and extremists who cheerfully demand utopia in our time; the other is the more pedestrian method of those who only ask what they think there is a reasonable chance of getting. Neither is the exclusively "right" technique. The circumstances of history favour now one now the other. In Russia in November, 1917, the moment was with the revolutionaries; but when no revolutionary situation exists, a policy of demanding revolution may do more harm than good—for instance, the Communist parties of Europe during 1920-40.

It is anybody's guess how many countries may develop a revolutionary situation at the end of this war. In places where one materialises those now preaching utopia will be justified; everywhere else they will be a menace—actually we shall achieve less than without them. Consider, for example, these demands for a large federation of all democratic peoples. The visionaries might push such a scheme through, but the wording of the federal constitution would inevitably be so vague that in practice it would mean nothing. In consequence (a) international institutions would get a bad name again, and (b) we should not even get collaboration between nations in the few essentials such as armaments and raw materials. Although I might favour the visionary-extremists if I lived in Central Europe, it is pedestrian proposals that will prove most useful in Britain and the U.S.A. now.

Mr. Dutch is a visionary but of the reactionary breed. He has a grandiose scheme for a single Federation of the British Empire, Europe and the U.S.A.; he would abolish all tariffs within three months of the armistice, or at most twelve; he would establish complete freedom of migration. All this, he says, "can be taken for granted," it will be "an exceedingly simple matter to arrange," it can be accomplished "without any difficulty." May one ask Mr. Dutch whether he has consulted any responsible European statesman on the subject of tariffs? Does he seriously believe any of them would agree to his scheme or dare contemplate the violent dislocations it would occasion? He asserts that "the course of the present war has shown only too plainly the folly and abortiveness of the policy (of self-sufficiency)." In actual fact the continental nations have drawn just the opposite deduction. The more food they grow the less they suffer through the British blockade. It is in Greece and Belgium, the least self-sufficient countries of Europe, where distress is now greatest.

Surely what we most need to do is to distinguish between the *laissez-faire* and the comparative cost elements in free trade. Encourage nations to plan their foreign commerce and then gradually lead them to reduction of tariffs and to exchanging goods wherever economic advantage is manifest.

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And still more wrongly:

"... we observe a deterioration of the blood of the German nation which, in the wilderness of the great cities, intermix in a haphazard manner, and which, consequently, are exposed to a rapidly increasing decline of their spiritual faculties."

For reasons of space I cannot follow Mr. Otten's somewhat confused speculations, now psycho-analytical, now idealistic, which lead him into the clouds or down into the mud and muddle. But I must mention one or two instances. Mr. Otten bestows on the average German youth a father—that is, an Oedipus—complex, with Hitler playing the part of the mother, though a false one. Elsewhere he contends that the Germans "have no relation to music, lacking, as they are, in the creative capacity for experience and in the child-like disposition which such relations presuppose." He even goes to the length of saying that "atheism and negation of all revealed faith arose in the Prussian aristocracy and among its kings in particular." This is nothing less than a falsification of history. Finally, Mr. Otten calls the founder of Prussia as a Great Power, namely The Great Elector, Frederick the Great and his father, "the three cripples"—which would be of no importance if he did not proceed to draw psychological conclusions from it. Fortunately, or unfortunately, cripples they most certainly were not!

Let us now follow the author on the plane of reason. He is right in his demand that the liquidation of the "Prussian General Staffs of army and industry" should be proclaimed as the war aim of the Allies. And he shows insight into the German character when he states:

"The Germans alone of all nations want others to achieve for them the task of self-liberation."

It would of course be more logical to say that the Germans are incapable of self-liberation and are therefore dependent on their enemies of to-day for liberation from their military class, nobility, capitalists and bureaucrats. This has been the core of the German problem, since the failure of the reformative activities of Freiherr vom Stein more than a century ago. The Germans are offenders against civilisation and humanity through their political backwardness and cowardice in public life, which have become second nature to them during the course of this century. If, after this war, they are left to themselves, they will allow their old oppressors to resume authority, as happened after the Revolution of 1918. This in its turn would lead to a third world war. As a German politician put it sarcastically after the last war: the Germans, incapable of putting their own house in order, should ask England to make their country a British crown colony.

Joking apart, we can only hope that Germany, liberated from Hitlerism, will be both compelled and willing sincerely to seek the

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friendship of the western democracies. Precisely for this reason books such as Mr. Otten's are a hindrance rather than a help. By digging in the German mind for apocalyptic elements which Hitlerism itself has done so much to conjure up, such writers do nothing to clarify either the German or the European atmosphere. The facts of the last ten years stand out only too clearly. The need is for realistic interpreters. Surrealism and symbolism in politics are nothing but a nuisance—and a characteristically German one.

HERMANN SINSHEIMER.

INDIA, 1939-1942. A Summary of events up to and including the Cripps Mission, prepared by AGATHA HARRISON and GERALD BAILEY. (30 pp. *National Peace Council*. 6d.)

INDIA AND FREEDOM. By THE RT. HON. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Burma. (122 pp. *Oxford University Press*. 3s. 6d.)

PEACE AIMS PAMPHLET No. 14 is a useful statement of events up to and including the Cripps mission. Since the resolutions of various Indian groups and parties on the Cripps mission were recorded, the Indian political situation has undergone very great changes. The termination of British authority in India has been demanded without any immediate substitute. The intention of interfering with British military operations for the defence of the country has been repudiated: at the same time a non-violent campaign of civil disobedience has been threatened. The Government has interned the Congress leaders: and there have been widespread disturbances, taking violent forms. The ordinary sources of non-official information have been closed. The Indian majority in the Governor-General's Executive Council has been greatly increased.

Mr. Amery's book is a record of speeches made in Parliament and elsewhere between June, 1940, and April 28th, 1942, with appendices reproducing the statement issued with the authority of H.M.'s Government on August 8th, 1940, and the draft declaration for discussion with Indian leaders as published on March 30th, 1942. If sweet reasonableness would solve political deadlocks, Mr. Amery's speeches should have achieved that result. But the situation must be looked at as an historical continuum, with all the suspicions and prejudices which it has begotten and nourished in decades of controversy and struggle. On August 8th, 1940, the British Government was still assuring the Indian leaders that it desired to see a constitutional scheme framed by Indians, "subject to the due fulfilment of the obligations which Great Britain's long connexion with India has imposed on her—" and leaving it quite uncertain what those obligations were. Was it not natural to suspect

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
In the matter of migration, has Mr. Dutch consulted the British Dominions? It may well be that after the events of the coming months Australia will alter her attitude to immigration, but even then she will not agree to uncontrolled movements of population. She will want to regulate the numbers and to discriminate in the nationality of migrants; she will not readily accept East Europeans. Other Dominions will have other stipulations. Mr. Dutch comforts them with the strange announcement that "when the frontiers of all States are opened, at least as many workers will want to leave as enter a country." Does he really think as many Americans will try to settle in Poland as vice versa? Again the constructive line is surely to look not at the supply but at the demand side for migrants and to devise international conventions which meet the wishes of receiving countries, even if for a time the demand is on a very modest scale.

But Mr. Dutch is equally naive in believing that everything will be all right as long as the world is made safe for capitalists. Here are samples of his views: "a world economic plan gives capitalism a very good and perhaps final chance of saving its good features" . . . "the interests of the ruling classes must not be violated" . . . "to the capitalists his money and possessions are in principle what physical strength is to the worker. He must be freed from the fear of living . . . must be guaranteed not only the substance of his wealth but also the usufruct" . . . "If workers refuse to go where public works are, some influence would have to be brought to bear, e.g., in the withdrawal of the dollar. It is not necessary to compel men to work. If any man can let himself live an idle life he can continue to do so. If he has means he can quietly consume them . . . but a man without means will be forced for material reasons to set to work."

His reading of history is equally peculiar. He holds the following truths to be self-evident: "Before 1914 fear of living did not exist. There was purpose in study, in saving, in founding a family . . . that constituted the good old times came to a sudden end on August 4th . . . "The world crisis of 1931 began in Central Europe and spread from there" (no mention of Wall Street). "The demands of Slovaks and Ruthenians for autonomy led to the disruption of Czechoslovakia" (no mention of Sudetenland or Munich). . . . "Of the 2,000 million people in the world at least 99 per cent regard Britain and the U.S.A. as their only guarantors of freedom and justice against the rule of force." (I wonder why?)

In the current library of peace aims writings there is still room for detailed, practical studies of particular world problems, setting forth concrete if modest proposals for progress. Mr. Dutch's contribution is neither practical, modest, nor progressive.

Printed in Great Britain by the Withy Grove Press Ltd., Manchester 4, for The Political Quarterly Publishing Co., Ltd.



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