


The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. XII. No. 1

JANUARY-MARCH, 1941



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
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WHAT HAPPENED TO FRANCE¹

By D. W. BROGAN

"MEN are we, and must grieve when even the Shade of that which once was great, is passed away." This emotion, or some variant on it, must have afflicted millions throughout the world, not merely when the full extent of the French military defeat was revealed, but when the aftermath showed so clearly that the military defeat of France was only one aspect of a deeper defeat, of a loss of faith in herself, of a resignation to a passive role. The one-time educator and leader of Europe, the second country of all good Europeans, like eighteenth-century Holland, resigned from the role which she had played so long. *Fluctuat nec mergitur* had been the motto of Paris, but Paris had now sunk. The contrast between the refusal of the French generals to implement the fine words of the French politicians and defend Paris—as she has so often been defended in the past—was symptomatic. In the age of Madrid and Warsaw, Chunking and now London, the most combative of European capitals accepted her invaders passively and, a few days later, the whole of France followed suit. Stunned by this spectacle, what was left of the free world found hasty explanations, hasty excuses, formed baseless hopes and dreamed fruitless dreams. But in the months that have passed since the debacle of June, the outlines of the picture have become clearer, the colours more distinct and more sombre.

There are certain fundamental military considerations to be borne in mind before the long-distance causes of the French disaster are considered. From a purely military point of view there was nothing inherently surprising in the catastrophe. Great military powers have been knocked out as quickly as France was, in ages whose speed of life and movement was far less than ours. Jena, Sadowa, Austerlitz, Waterloo, remind us of a truth too much forgotten by a

¹ *The Last Days of Paris: A Journalist's Diary*, by Alexander Werth. 274 pp. (Hamish Hamilton, 8s.6d.). *What Happened to France*, by Gordon Waterfield. viii. & 152 pp. (Murray, 5s.)

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generation obsessed by the memory of 1914-1918 that war is not a simple set of recipes for victory but a complicated series of recipes whose relevance is like that of the supplies open to a good cook. It is conditioned by the season of the year, by the raw materials available. There are times in the history of tactics, stages in the development of military science, in which the best available technique gives *quick* results. There are times when it can only give slow results. In the last war, initial superiorities in numbers and equipment did not give decisive victory to the side that possessed them in 1914 because the dominant weapon, the machine-gun, was more useful to the defensive than to the offensive. The balance of tactical possibilities was in favour of the defensive, and the chief tactical weapon was one that poor, non-industrial countries could provide in reasonably adequate numbers. The most brilliant initial successes petered out and time was given to reform broken lines and keep armies in being.

The tactical character of modern war has changed to the disadvantage of the democracies. Their strength was *in posse* rather than *in esse*. They could not, in peace time, or even in times of mere "non-belligerence," devote their resources to preparing for war as the dictatorships did. They could not make war at the best time for them. They were tied by the pacific character of their public opinion and their rulers had inadequate resources for educating that public opinion to a sense of realities. And the tank, the dive-bomber, the armoured division, have given modern war the speed and decisiveness it has had at various times in the past. Only one democratic state has, in fact, been given time to develop its latent powers and that time Britain owes to her insular position. Like a witch, a *Panzer-Division* cannot cross running water.

France was a democracy with all the limitations of a democracy for total and rapid war-making. France was the chief military enemy of a state with twice her population and with greater industrial resources for the creation of a modern war machine. It is not in itself surprising that France was beaten by Germany. The problem is how did France come to be at war with so powerful an enemy?

WHAT HAPPENED TO FRANCE

That problem raises another. France, twenty years ago, was one of the leading members of an alliance so overwhelmingly victorious that it could impose its will as it liked on the defeated enemy. It was possible to "solve the German problem" in several ways, and all of them were open to France and her allies and associates, that is to say the choice of means was not limited by any power of resistance in the Germany of 1919.

It is true that France was not the sole judge of her interests. She had in some degree to conciliate her allies and associates. Whether, if left to himself, Clemenceau would have adopted the Foch plan for the permanent occupation of the Rhineland is not certain, but he did not think himself in a position to adopt it. What he got as a substitute was an Anglo-American guarantee, a temporary occupation of the Rhineland and a permanent demilitarisation of both banks, plus a limitation of the German army to a long-time professional force of 100,000 men. This last provision the French soldiers did not take too seriously; they remembered the resurrection of Prussia after Jena too well.

Their point of view was simple and technical. They were not obsessed with the moral problem of the rightness of a war for, far more than the "Anglo-Saxon" peoples, they, like their countrymen, contemplated the possibility of *defeat* and did not think that the righteous cause always triumphed. "Thrice armed is he that hath his quarrel just," no doubt, but, as the American poet added, "and six times armed that gets his punch in fust."

If the nodal points of German rail and road communications on both banks of the Rhine were held, especially if the Rhine bridge-heads were held *permanently* by France, Germany could not concentrate against France except far off in Central Germany. French concentration would take place *in* Germany; the battles would be fought for the possibility of recovering the Rhine bridge-heads. Germany would start a war with immense disadvantages—disadvantages crippling her to a degree that would more than offset her numerical and industrial superiority. Germany would have very small chance of winning a war in such circumstances. Even if air power was called in to redress the geographical balance

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tilted against Germany, it would not be effective. The Rhineland, perhaps Westphalia and Franconia, would be hostages. Shells on Mannheim would retaliate for bombs on Paris or Lille. Such, in brief, was the military argument behind the Foch policy. Its weight was never sufficiently allowed for in Britain and in America. It was quite true that an effective Anglo-American guarantee would have been still more valuable, but that bill was dishonoured as soon as it was convenient.

France was left with a military predominance that was no longer automatic, for the Rhineland was to be evacuated in fifteen years' time and then she had as her security only the imposed inferiority of the Reichswehr and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland. To maintain the military inferiority of Germany meant constant vigilance. Had France held the bridges she could have imposed a serious disadvantage, perhaps a crippling disadvantage even on a Germany that was free from all armaments limitations. Now it was necessary for France to watch German armaments seriously. Moreover, a France in possession of the bridge-heads was a France in a position effectively and quickly to aid any allies she had in eastern and central Europe. A French army starting from Mainz was a safeguard for Warsaw and Prague as well as for Paris and Brussels. For the French did not forget that one result of the war had been greatly to strengthen Germany in Central Europe. With the collapse of the Austrian Empire and of Russia, a Germany free from all limitations on her sovereignty would be in a position that Bismarck never attained. The Little Entente, the Polish Alliance were mere expedients imposed on France by this fact. They would be ineffective expedients if Germany's hands were untied.

The demilitarisation of the Rhineland was a more serious safeguard than the limitations on the numbers and character of the *Reichswehr*. It did not make impossible a prevention of German concentration, but it did, or could, secure that a quickly mobilised French army could seize the Rhine bridges or at any rate take up defensive positions in the Rhineland and ensure that the campaign would begin with battles for the liberation of German territory. The Germans would have to advance to redeem the Palatinate; their

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industrial areas on the left bank, like the Saar, would be easily severed from the Reich even after the discounted return of the Saar to Germany had taken place. Impressed, not to say obsessed, by the memory of invasion, the French were resolved that the next war would begin on German soil; they amended the *Marseillaise*:

“Qu'un sang impur abreuve *leurs sillons*.”

And while Germany would have had a much better chance of winning a war begun when the Rhineland was merely demilitarised, not occupied by France, she would not, so many French people thought, have been ready to wage a war, even a victorious war, if it had to be fought in Germany. France had won such a war, and the devastation of the North, the terrible sacrifices imposed on France by the military-political necessity of redeeming her own soil, had made the fruits of victory taste sourly in many if not most French mouths. And in 1940 many Frenchmen who realised that a victory was still possible and who wished to stick by the English alliance, were appalled by the thought that the new war of liberation would have to be fought with far more of France in German hands than in 1914—perhaps all of it. They reasoned in 1940, as they thought Germans would have reasoned had the positions been reversed; victory, even if attainable, could be too dearly bought.

But how did it come that France, in 1939, having allowed all her advantages to be taken from her, still went to war? For the same reason that she had allowed her advantages to be taken from her, culminating in the fatal error of permitting the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, on the eve of a general election, when all politicians had their eyes elsewhere. There was no centre of authority in the French state to carry out a foreign policy that would intimidate Germany, or really conciliate Germany, or that won over Britain, or wrote off Britain. With the murder of Barthou in 1935, the last independent French Foreign Minister disappeared. And Barthou was murdered because the police of Marseilles was inefficient and the whole tangle of graft and inefficiency in the second French city was incapable of being straightened out by any normal political means!

France needed skilled players; but, more than that, she

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required resolute players. She got neither, or, at any rate, such skilled and resolute players as she did get were not allowed to play their hands. Such a situation was a gift for a brilliant bluffer like Herr Hitler. And France was, in this position for reasons inherent in her political system.

France was a democracy in which all questions of public policy were open to endless discussion—and all the alternative policies had a good deal to be said for them. It was politically profitable to find grounds for disagreement in all fields of politics. Before 1914, though there was a good deal of discussion of foreign policy, its bases were accepted by all parties. The Russian Alliance, the British Entente were to Jaurès grounds for hoping that peace could be secured, to Delcassé and Poincaré necessary instruments in the game of power politics that France was bound to play. But there was, in 1914, no large body of Frenchmen devoted to the policy of another country. The Communists and the various Fascist parties in France provided that in 1939. The failure to form any equivalent of the "Sacred Union" of 1914 in 1939 was significant.

France needed a government that could follow one policy (after having debated what policy should be chosen). She needed a government that adjusted internal policy to the dire necessities of a Europe moving towards a war which could only be avoided if France were strong and resolute—and looked strong and resolute. And such a government was what she was prohibited from having.

The Third Republic was organised to make a concentration of authority in one man or in a group of men impossible. The rules of parliamentary procedure, the division of powers between the two houses, the role of the bureaucracy, all were elaborately designed to dissipate authority, to make the attribution of responsibility difficult, the attribution of glory or of prestige impossible. The enemies and the critics of the regime might talk of a "government with a punch," of the role of the "grands chefs," but its defenders, "Alain" with the greatest ingenuity, M. Jammy Schmidt and the rest with more candour, found excuses for the division of authority among so many persons that the character of authority was lost. A series of compromises, and a tacit

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agreement to push no issue to practical extremes, to take no irrevocable steps of any kind, combined with verbal violence pushed to any extreme, these were the marks of the French political system.

It was, in fact, capable of making only one irrevocable decision—war. Once that decision was taken, many of the rules had to be suspended, but not all. There was a considerable difference between the background of pacifist and "peace without victory" activities in France and Britain in 1914-1918. *The Cambridge Magazine* differed from the *Bonnet Rouge* in more than not being subsidised by Germany; Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Maxton, Mr. Clifford Allen differed markedly from MM. Laval, Bolo and Caillaux. To the latter war, like peace, was a thing to be managed, to be manipulated, to be adjusted. And in 1940 the same spirit was at work. On the eve of the last fatal crisis, M. Malvy and M. Laval were at their old games; M. Bonnet was at his; and the organised treason of 1917 was to the organised treason of 1940 as an acorn to an oak. Abetz and Brinon were greater and more sinister figures than Almeyreda; and the Mata Haris of the new conspiracy both more numerous and more elegant than their notorious exemplar.

But the aversion of the French governing class to authority was illustrated long before 1939-40. The political hero of the last war was the founder of the dominant party. Clemenceau was a Radical; he had been *the* Radical. But the most representative party did not try to take credit for producing the Tiger. The Jacobin tradition was dead, except in words. The real heroes of the party were its martyrs, MM. Caillaux and Malvy. The Left made it one of the first charges on its political budget in 1924 to rehabilitate those victims of authority and each was a hereditary politician and chief of a dynasty as well as of a party.

In the great crisis of 1934, two Radical politicians helped to make even worse a bad situation. One of them, M. Chautemps was incomparably more guilty than the other, M. Daladier. For M. Chautemps (himself a hereditary member of the ruling class) had had an opportunity to prevent the Stavisky scandal becoming a crisis of the regime and leading to that disastrous day of February 6th which

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divided France so bitterly and so profoundly. M. Daladier was faced with making the best of a very bad job, and he made the worst of it by indecision and by foolish dodges. Yet the rehabilitation of these politicians was one of the main objects of the leaders of the *Front Populaire*!

If war was the one decisive act that the French state permitted to itself, there was one category of state activity in which the limits of evasion were narrower than in others. National bankruptcy had to be avoided or camouflaged. And it was part of the tacit bargain between electors and elected that party programmes should be abandoned the moment that they seemed to endanger the savings, the future of the millions of rentiers; it was these millions of small men and women with a stake in the country behind whom the Two Hundred Families successfully took refuge, in 1926, in 1934, in 1938; in each case two years after the election of a Left Chamber. And the Left majority had always to abdicate its authority or to see its unity destroyed. When the crisis was over, the old game was resumed.

The argument could be elaborated, but its strength would not be increased. The political personnel of the Third Republic was not lacking in men of ability, nor was it lacking in men of honour, and in some cases the two qualifications were combined. But it was lacking in men of weight. So in the last crisis, a system designed to prevent any one man, above all a soldier, from taking real power into his hands, collapsed because it could not produce a man or even a small group of men with authority to counter that of Marshal Pétain. The President of the Republic, of the Senate, of the Chamber, were great official figures, but even the most eminent of them, M. Herriot, was nothing when once the parliamentary game was up.

French politics were organised to maximise the emotional satisfaction to be got out of expressing egalitarian sentiments, while keeping to a minimum the changes in the social structure which a real increase in equality would have made necessary. Under a vast blanket of words, projects for a few, not very profound, alterations in social structure were concealed. And the most representative French Left politicians, representing the sentiments of the rural and semi-rural

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districts of the South, which were the strongholds of the Radical-Socialists, and to some extent even of the Socialists, knew what little positive meaning their electors expected them to give to the party programmes and manifestos. That representative meridional elector and orthodox Republican historian, Charles Seignobos, explained the Left victory in the elections of 1932 almost entirely in terms of the anger felt by the *militants* in non-industrial France at the favours lavished on the reactionaries by the Prefects. Courtesies to priests, to notables, that showed the real bias of the Centre ministries of the 1928 legislature. Tardieus might pass social legislation, establish insurance schemes, but these were not the essence of republicanism. That was, in essence, a jealous and suspicious egalitarianism, directed to little points of local business, to the distribution of honours, of minor jobs, of courtesies and privileges, to naming streets after Jaurès and prohibiting religious processions. That is what politics were about in a great part of rural and small-town France. The darkening sky of 1932 was only partially visible to these electors. What had Combes said in 1903? What had Camille Pelletan said in 1907? Nor was this concentration on trifling issues, this obsession with historical internal quarrels, confined to the Radicals or to the rural Socialists. I have heard the son of an eminent Socialist leader stress, with some complacency, the eminently bourgeois character of even the Communist party. Many Communists were very bourgeois and not ex-bourgeois at that! But few Left Frenchmen were ready to allow that there was anything unhealthy in the contrast between the violence, the real radicalism of language of the Left and their lack of any active desire to make that radicalism bear any but verbal or personal fruit.

That verbal violence, imposed by tradition on French politicians, was often taken simply as part of the game. But it was not always so taken. When that eminent corporation lawyer and representative of the *bourgeoisie possédante*, M. Blum, told his political opponents in the Chamber "I hate you," the deputy for Narbonne was merely saying what his constituents expected him to say. But the Prime Minister, trying in a great crisis to form a national government from

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extreme Left to extreme Right, found it awkward that he had denounced his prospective colleagues in these terms and in turn had been delated to the working classes by his Communist allies as their most dangerous, most venal and most implacable enemy. The comedy of French politics had to be played seriously. The agreement between the electors and the elected not to disturb fundamentals must never be openly admitted. A Republican administration paid formal respect to the triumph of democracy and laicity by being, if not rude, at least cold to the recognised representatives of reaction. There might be and, usually, was no substantial difference between the performance of a government based on the Right (and Centre) and one based on the Left (and Centre), but there was a difference between their attitude to certain social phenomena in French provincial life. They might have no very different views of foreign policy, or internal economic policy, but the good Republican was rude to the clergy, while the defenders of the moral order were respectful of the claims of a supernatural body whose fundamental claims often enough they totally rejected. In a later crisis, the *Canard Enchaîné* (which approved of Munich without approving of its sponsors) managed to find a ground of difference with M. Pierre-Etienne Flandin, by dwelling on the fact that he had had his daughter married in church with a great deal of éclat.

It was customary to talk of the French as the most patriotic, not to say nationalist people in Europe. They had been that, and some of the old uniformity of attitude to the outside world remained. French judgments, in all ranks of society, were remarkably French, and French social habits, like the French language, were remarkably uniform. But the old unquestioning patriotism was dead. On the one hand the Left, for nearly a generation, had acted as if patriotism was simply a Right ramp. It often was. Forced out of all other positions, the French conservatives, no longer able to use either throne or altar as rallying cries, fell back on "la patrie en danger." It was sometimes effective and it was sometimes dishonest. But it was not always effective and it was not always dishonest. France was in danger; a danger not invented by the *Comité des Forges*. But the Left, with memories of the

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sweetening of the press by Russian money before 1914, with memories of the role of such patriotic journalists as Raymond Recouly who combined both cash and credit in such nice proportions, was inclined to ignore certain realities.

An eminent American authority on France, Professor Carleton Hayes, noted that the training of French elementary school-teachers gave them very little knowledge of the outside world. But the conclusion he seemed inclined to draw from it, that French education was chauvinist, was misleading. The French *instituteur*, with little knowledge of and little curiosity about the outside world, was predisposed to a naive optimism. He thought of Europe as a continent in which people like himself, *laïc*, socialist, sceptical of the glories of war and of the claims of authority, were increasingly dominant. That the *Haupt Lehrer* of a Bavarian village was not necessarily at all like the *instituteur* of a Burgundian or Provençal village, did not occur to him often enough. He assumed the existence of a political religion of all sensible men, which was an error.

And the error of the *instituteurs* was shared by others. To Socialists of the Paul Faure school, only economic adjustments were needed to tame the Nazi tiger. That Herr Hitler, for better or worse, did not share M. Faure's scale of values was ignored—and is being ignored. That glory, power, victory, violence have great powers of appeal was a neglected truth. From the position that equality before the law was of no importance without economic equality, from the position that war is the greatest of evils, some Frenchmen of the late Left parties have moved on to an enthusiastic acceptance of the equality of all Frenchmen under the Germans, the ending of the paradox of political equality and economic inequality by the abolition of political equality and the apparent justification of the charge so often made against the French Socialists of being a "parti du ventre."

There has been a dangerous tendency in British (and American) comments on French politics to take too seriously the doctrinal claims of the parties, especially the parties of the Left who made more claims of this type than did the parties of the Right. A kind of deceptive shorthand, such

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as that which made of the *Dépêche de Toulouse*, the "*Manchester Guardian* of France," led many people astray. So in the catastrophe there has been a tendency, destructive of clear thought, to see in the Pétain-Laval regime, a "Right" conspiracy and to expect too much from the old Left cadres. The role of a leading Socialist like M. Spinasse has occasioned excessive surprise. How could so prominent a leader of the *Front Populaire* rally so enthusiastically to the new order? But in order to understand the role of M. Spinasse, one would have had to ask a preliminary question. Why did so rural a department as the Corrèze produce a Socialist leader and a prominent Communist deputy? What did Socialism or Communism mean to the peasant proprietors of this department or to other departments? It meant enmity to the old regime whose historical memory was not sweet in the Limousin or the Bourbonnais; it meant suspicion of "*les gens bien*" unless, like the Jouvenels, they showed their loyalty to the Revolution by breaking with the social habits of their class and turning anti-clerical. It did not mean a profound conviction that the economic troubles of the age, the social troubles of the age, were to be solved by any form of socialism. Until it is realised that French Left deputies, even Communist deputies, owed their election in most cases to *petits bourgeois* in the towns and to *kulaks* in the countryside, it is impossible to form clear views about the causes of the present debacle and the prospects of a French revival.

Because French Left politics have consisted in large part in most eloquent denunciations of Fascism, because the triumph of the *Front Populaire* in 1936 was represented as being, and very largely was, the result of a reaction against the alleged danger of a Fascist coup by Colonel de la Rocque, the acceptance by many Left leaders and a good proportion of the rank and file of the Left parties of the Pétain-Laval constitution and, in some cases at least, of the Laval policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany, has been received with incredulous horror by many British Leftists. But as Mr. Werth points out in his brilliant terminal essay, the Communists were the only fundamentally anti-Nazi party, the one group free from any appeasement taint—and they were betrayed by their Russian masters, left bewildered and open

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to German propaganda disguised as their own party line.

France was bitterly divided in 1914, yet she united in face of the enemy. Why did she not unite in 1939? It is not enough to say that a great revolutionary crisis was under way. It was under way in other countries which stood the shock of Nazi invasion better than France did. Social conflict was, or should have been, as intense in Britain where economic conditions had produced a vast body of unemployed practically unknown in France and where the policy of collaboration with Germany had been preached by more eminent politicians than M. Flandin and more persuasive publicists than M. de Chateaubriant. In 1914, the party furthest to the Left was supposed to be pacifist, and its attitude alarmed the government—until the test came when French Socialists, despite the murder of Jaurès, rallied to the "*patrie en danger*." In 1939, the most combative Left party was committed to a policy of "standing up to Hitler" even if it meant war.

On the Right, the situation was less apparently satisfactory, for there *were* important Right elements in France secretly predisposed to admire Herr Hitler and many more openly disposed to admire Signor Mussolini. And Mr. Werth has rightly stressed and admirably illustrated the degree to which the French Right was poisoned by illusions about Italian power and benevolence.

As the event showed, the Left was in as unhealthy a state as the Right, and one of the immediate causes of French defeat and ruin was the behaviour of the Communist party. But here again a problem arises. How did so many of the French workers follow so blindly the orders of a party itself palpably at the orders of a foreign power? Of course in the regions where Communist power was most effective, a great part of the workers were not French. But with all allowances made, the French worker was present in large numbers in Communist ranks. And he followed, reluctantly, the party line, or, if he did not go as far as that, regarded the war passively. He waited for the situation to develop, for Moscow to show its hand.

Two suggestions may be made to explain the acceptance of this disastrous policy and the failure to exploit the war situation as part of a genuine anti-Fascist crusade. The

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Communist party had managed to give to the French workers the impression that it did not harbour or provide careers for men of the Laval type, the men who blackmailed the possessing classes into buying them by their verbal violence. And the Communist party had something definite and impressive to show, not in France but in Russia. This accounted for the hold of the party on its supporters' loyalty.

It was too late in May to undo the mischief done by the treason of September. Mr. Waterfield, in his most interesting book, makes the suggestion that "the people" of Paris should have been armed. But the time for insisting on a war *à outrance* was in September. Then was the time for demanding the firing-post for Brinon and his friends—but at that time the Communists were getting ready to preach peace with Germany! One of France's weaknesses was just this: the existence of a very large party, large enough to frighten some honest people, at the beck and call of a foreign power. The French C.P. was big enough to be a national danger, but not big enough to impose its own solution on France.

Of course there are many other elements in the French defeat and in the French despair of June, 1940. We contributed in some degree to the demoralisation of French public opinion. Our complacency was for many the last straw. But the main lesson of the tragedy so ably described in these two books is political. Only an isolated country can afford to ignore that politics is about power. A powerless state, one that refuses to make any fundamental decisions, is lost. There is a vacuum that will be filled from within or without, by revolution or by invasion.

THE "NEW ORDER" AND THE BALKANS

By FABIA

AFTER the War, when Hitler has been defeated, Britain will have to re-settle a Europe which has been mobilised as one unit by the Nazi war machine; the "New Order" in Europe will obviously be the Nazi slogan for some time to come. Like the earlier Nazi aim of One Reich, One Volk and One Führer, it bears very little relation to the results of Nazi achievement—order is certainly not one of them—but like that earlier slogan, it does carry some conviction, because of the defects of Versailles.

Of course, the conception and its details are still completely vague. Geo-political concepts—*Grossraumwirtschaft*, *Südostraum*—are current among the Nazi journalists, reminiscent of all the big nebulous conceptions under which German professors of economics worked out their "systems." It is not even clear how much of Europe is to be organised, or what the relations of the parts to the whole are to be. Dr. Funk, at any rate, seems to wish to introduce a régime like that of the British Empire in the nineteenth century—subordinate countries on a lower economic level as primary producers, the central power as the industrial and financial dominant partner. For instance, his recent suggestion that the clearing balances, which have accumulated in the Reichsbank in favour of the Danubian countries, are to be used as cover for currency issues—as dollar and sterling balances were used in the past—clearly shows some muddled conception of the Reichsbank as the Bank of England. Of course, there is no real analogy; Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century became a long-term lending centre, holding the Empire, the U.S.A. and Europe by the low rates of interest it could offer, because it had the capital to lend for railway construction and general development. It could therefore promote the expansion of primary production in

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the Dominions by the provision of capital goods, and receive back interest in the form of food supplies. It is true that Britain's African and Indian policy has been to keep the native populations at the level of primary producers and to exploit their labour and raw material resources without adequate capital investment, but that type of exploitation was not the mainspring of Britain's world financial supremacy. So far as British imperialistic expansion did create a "world order" in the free trade era, it was based on long-term investments which led to development of new countries and not on mere exploitation.

The German New Order cannot develop the backward parts of Europe, because Germany has no capital; it is not in fact an order at all but an unstable dynamic, with the German Army as an immense investment on which a return must be raised by invasions—at roughly six-monthly intervals—which bring in a short run return in the form of food, gold reserves and raw materials, but in the long run must cause a falling off in supplies.

So far as territories have actually been incorporated in the Reich, it is quite evident that only severe repression maintains order—to the inhabitants of the Protectorate and of German Poland the restoration of the rule of law in their own territory would be of immensely greater significance than incorporation into any sort of European system. In the other states, however, which have been exposed not to actual Nazi rule but to the brilliant technique of demoralisation, there would appear to have been some important social reactions to Nazism.

In the history of Nazism, the case of Rumania will surely rank as one of the most perfect examples of this technique. To make Rumania safe for Nazism was on the face of it rather difficult. Democratic forces, as represented by Maniu, were in opposition to an unpopular dictatorship—a situation in which it is difficult to discredit democracy. Racism had very little hold: so far as it existed, it took the form of Latinism among the intellectuals, and implied a French, not an Axis, orientation in foreign policy. Nor had Rumania anything to gain from the Axis in the way of territory: she was a definitely "saturated" power. Hence it needed a

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really ingenious political imagination to supply a Balkan variant of Nazism: there was no *single* big minority issue to exploit and no obvious class or race dissensions. It was necessary therefore to build up, from a small indigenous anti-Semitic and anti-communist movement, a special type of Rumanian fascism. Hitler and Stalin know that there are really only two classes in the Balkans, bureaucrats and peasants, and that there are therefore always two potential sources of *coups d'état*, unemployed officials and the landless rural proletariat.

The Iron Guard made its appeal chiefly to the former—the professors, teachers and minor officials, i.e., the unemployed intellectuals, who are always discontented. For this social type, without political roots and principles, agitation against "politicisation" was second nature. Soon after Hitler came to power in 1934, the small clique of the Iron Guard began to extend its programme to include social reforms to attract town workers, and agrarian reforms to attract the peasantry, the whole policy being veiled in a haze of religious mysticism. Point for point, its economic and social policy was simply that of the long-forgotten early Nazis, Feder and Gregor Strasser—nationalisation of large-scale industry and finance capital, moral and social regeneration; and on the agrarian side the division of the big estates (which was rather an anti-climax in Rumanian conditions). The abolition of *Zinsknechtschaft*, a very early Nazi theme, is for obvious reasons always a popular line to take in a peasant country. The element of Christian mysticism was peculiar to Rumania, and is, of course, to be explained as a necessary substitute for racialism, in the anti-Semite policy. Latinism, obviously, could not be substituted for the German race theory: so a vague mystic Christianity had to be introduced instead. The foreign policy of the Guard was, of course, anti-Bolshevist and pro-Axis—yet its leaders, most of them not even fifth-rate politicians, never seem to have realised the incompatibility of these aims with Rumanian independence. Twice, in 1935 and in 1938, it was stamped out by Carol, only to raise its head again with new funds and new men.

In the first year of the War, because British policy did

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succeed to a large extent in holding up oil deliveries, it was obvious that German invasion would be necessary to secure the full rate of oil supply from Rumania, but owing to the importance of the Balkans for German food supplies it was desirable to wait till the maize harvest was over, in the event of trouble. With the Iron Guard ready to take control, it was only necessary to secure the complaisance of Rumania's neighbours by allotting half Transylvania to Hungary, Bessarabia to Russia, and the Dobrudja to Bulgaria, for the country to be ready for military occupation.

Clear though the main development is, however, there are three very obscure points in the story of the occupation. One is the reason why the oil-wells were not fired, and only one explanation of that can be suggested, the obvious one that British capitalistic interests delayed it. The second point which needs explanation is the attitude of the National Peasant Party. Why did Maniu not lead a peasant revolt against the Transylvanian partition? Maniu has great prestige, a great following, and is still the peasants' leader, for the Iron Guard recruited itself from the rural intellectuals, not from the real peasantry. The third obscure point is the attitude of Russia; it is only to be explained by the fact that Stalin wants prolongation of the war more than he wants the Balkans, since obviously the control of the Rumanian oil-wells is a vital factor for Hitler, and implies control of the Black Sea. Had Maniu turned to Russia earlier, would Stalin's policy have been different?

The only explanation of the internal development is that the National Peasant Party has ceased to count as a democratic force, as may be the case after years of Camarilla intrigues, culminating after the fall of France in the rapid demoralisation of a country where morale and morals were never strong points. The development proves, of course, not that opinion is pro-Nazi—opinion does not decide foreign policy in the Balkans—but that nationalist forces are too weak to resist economic penetration, coupled with gangster methods and a new social ideology. It is always typical of the Nazi technique of aggression that it does not strike until the centres of resistance are paralysed.

Can the same thing happen in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria?

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Nazi propaganda in Yugoslavia would not appear so far to have succeeded in its efforts to foster dissension between the Croat Peasant Party and the Serbs. Macek—apart from a small Nazi-financed separatist movement—would appear to be still firm in the saddle and the Croat Peasant Party is still the foundation of Yugoslav unity. But the Nazi propaganda in Croatia is even more ingenious than in Rumania: it utilises as its basis Radic's theory of the peasants as the basis of democracy (i.e., the idea which inspired the early Soviet system, the workshop or village as the unit of government, electing members to local and central administrative bodies), and turns it, by a subtle change of emphasis, into a form of totalitarianism—i.e., the doctrine that all other classes, merchants, officials and industrialists, exploit the peasant, through the money economy and the profit motive. As anti-Semitism is not at all widespread in Yugoslavia, the bugbear responsible for the profit motive has to be found in the Yugoslav National Bank (as the representative of 'Anglo-American capitalist ideology')—and this is of course a highly successful line, since the National Bank, until the recent change to German control, was hated by most business circles, because it had assumed almost dictatorial control over foreign trade, and represented a power within the State beyond the government's control.

It would be absurd to believe that these ideas are as yet a powerful influence. A British defeat of Italy will undoubtedly mean that the whole of Yugoslavia is on Britain's side. But in the meantime Nazi ideas are gaining ground; if Hitler can cause a Croat-Serb breach, it is only too likely that among the official class enough pro-Nazi sympathisers will be found to support a Nazi regime.

In Bulgaria, of course, Nazi economic penetration has gone so far that serious resistance to invasion can be counted out. Very large sections of the peasants are going communist. The Left Wing Agrarian Party always was communist, and Sofia was a centre of intellectual Leftism which, in its scientific ruthlessness, put Bloomsbury to shame, but it is evident that the trend is now much stronger, and is indeed gaining ground in the whole Balkan region among the poor landless peasants who now represent 20-30 per cent of the

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total land population. Soviet propaganda is extremely well adjusted to the aspirations of this group.

It should be emphasised, however, that there is no real pro-Nazi feeling among the peasants. The specific Nazi pro-peasant propaganda, now rather out-of-date, makes little impression on them: they are not kulaks, and it is only the anti-capitalist line of Nazi propaganda which has any real appeal. Even this does not go far to influence their attitude. It does not counteract what they know that Nazism in practice means—the restoration of big estates to German estate owners with Nazi sympathies, in the Sudetenland and in Ruthenia; the peasant expropriations under terror in German occupied Poland, and the deportations from the General Government. If the history of the Nazi impact on Europe is ever studied sociologically, it will appear that the peasants have been more free from illusions than other classes. In Poland it was the magnates, the Sapiehas and Potockis, who favoured Nazism as a protection against Bolshevism; the peasants by contrast were fully conscious, even as early as 1936, of the danger involved. It is significant that Witos in 1939 refused to become the Polish Quisling, and that Rataj, the wisest, most democratic and most skilled parliamentary leader in Eastern Europe, should have recently died under torture by the Gestapo.

But destructive though Nazism has been to all that was progressive in the peasant states, its power has grown simply through the economic factor. Through the Schacht clearing system, Germany in 1936-38 succeeded in getting control of the greater part of Danubian trade. At a time when the Danubian grain importing countries, Czechoslovakia and Austria, had imposed very high tariffs on food imports, and the rest of Western Europe, particularly France, had embarked on a policy of autarky, the access to the German market was valuable for the peasant countries. It was not until the world crisis of 1930 and the collapse of farm prices, that Eastern Europe felt the full effect of the Versailles settlement. The most disastrous result of that settlement was that it divided Europe into two halves—predominantly industrial countries, including the West and Central European countries, with comparatively high standards

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of living and declining populations, and predominantly agricultural countries, with low standards of living and growing populations. The basic result of the peace settlement was that it intensified, instead of lessening, the gap between living standards.

In the West, as a result of the agricultural crisis, tariffs on food imports were raised to prohibitive heights to protect the income level of the peasant populations and farm prices were maintained at the expense of the industrial workers. The grain and meat producers in Eastern Europe were entirely cut off from high-priced urban markets and could not shift the impact of the crisis by any measure of internal taxation, since 60-80 per cent of the total population are peasants. "Peasant protectionism" in Western Europe, where the peasantry has a definitely more bourgeois outlook, has been fatal to peasant interests in the East, where the peasantry is proletarian in spirit. Still more fatal to the situation in the East was the decline of international migration after the last War. Before 1914 it had proceeded on a scale which appreciably relieved the pressure of population in Poland and the Carpathian regions; after the War, this outlet was closed and in consequence the growth of population, though the birth-rate was less, began to threaten the standard of living.

In that situation, it was not surprising that Schacht's economic strategy was a brilliant success. The clearing system, designed first as an *ad hoc* measure of adjusting Germany's trade balance by encouraging imports from the countries with which Germany had an export surplus, quickly became a means of securing Germany's trade domination over the whole area, and the Danubian countries soon found that they accumulated mark clearing balances in their favour, which proved difficult to liquidate.

Up to and even after the outbreak of war, the Balkans struggled in the Nazi grasp, striving to sell to free currency markets instead of piling up clearing credits, but every effort was countered by a new Nazi move. Since the outbreak of war, the German pressure on these countries has increased, as the benefits which they have gained from trade with Germany have declined; since the fall of France, they have

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had no alternative markets. Far the most serious aspect of the present situation is the food shortage, which in Rumania is now very grave. Always on the verge of starvation, the peasant population finds itself with a harvest 20 per cent below normal, increased pressure to deliver to Germany, low prices for grain for export, but soaring retail food prices, and a shortage of industrial raw materials. Probably the peasants' conception of the "New Order" is clearer than that of Dr. Funk.

Has the New Order any long-term economic significance? So far as can be gathered from the actual developments and the pronouncements of Nazi leaders the main lines of the New Order in the Balkans are to be as follows:

- (1) The chief function of the subordinate countries—France, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, as well as the Protectorate, Poland, Hungary and the Balkans, will be to supply Germany with food.
- (2) Industrialisation is to be discouraged in the subordinate states; where important industries exist, as for instance oil and mineral production, they are to be taken over by German capital and managerial staff.
- (3) Comprehensive plans for the reorganisation of agriculture have been forced on all the Danubian countries with their chief features mechanization, by means of machinery purchased on credit in Germany; increase of fodder crops and oil seeds, and other industrial plants; restriction of the area under grain cultivation, but an increase in yields per acre—all of which will improve the position of the peasants and represent sound lines of development.
- (4) A multilateral clearing scheme through Berlin, at present very vague in its conception, to be introduced for all the occupied and subordinate countries.

Obviously the Danubian states will gain some advantage from farm mechanization and technical advice. What Germany cannot offer, of course, is a sufficient outlet for the surplus land population, the really grave problem of Eastern Europe; Nazi policy, in fact, by the re-settlement of Germans, has actually intensified overcrowding on the land. (Certainly the forced deportation of Polish peasants from Western Poland,

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relatively sparsely settled, in order to make room for German settlers, into the General Government which was already very over-populated, must have caused a desperate struggle for existence in Central Poland.) Over the Danubian states as a whole and Poland, including the Eastern regions now in the U.S.S.R., 30-50 per cent of the land population are surplus, in the sense that no amount of farm reorganisation on the Russian or the German model will be able to absorb them in farming. Improved farming methods would in fact increase, not reduce, the excessive supply of labour. The only way of relieving this pressure would be large-scale industrialisation, or large-scale emigration—and neither of these can Germany offer. It is, on the contrary, in Germany's interest to keep the peasants on as low a level as possible, to have cheap labour on the land.

Still, the Nazi claim to have united Europe has some validity. New transport connections between Russia and Germany, such as the Dnieper Bug canal, will open up some of the most remote regions. It is possible that trade connections will develop inside Europe, not so much as under a free-trade system, but at least to a greater extent than they did in 1930-40. Germany obviously can offer the Danubian states *some* place in its trading system, which is, from the economic standpoint, preferable to pure isolation.

As opposed to these schemes, British policy looks, of course, very negative. So far we have no stated war aims, except to restore, in some form or other, freedom to the Czech and Polish peoples. This is the essential line, but, if it means no more than supporting the Czech and Polish National Governments in a back to Versailles sense, it is a miserably barren attack on the European situation. For the basic reason of the failure of the Versailles system was not the minority grievances, but the isolation of the economic spheres of Europe. Eastern Europe's problem was not the inability of different races to co-operate, but the fact that an unproductive, backward and one-sided agricultural system could not support a rapidly growing population, in isolation from the West.

British and French policy after the last war aimed at liberating the oppressed races of the Monarchy from German

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domination, which meant, in fact, backing the nationalities which had been the Allied Fifth Columns to the limit of their national and territorial claims (sometimes on the principle of racial self-determination, sometimes on the principle of economic inter-connections, sometimes on the principle of the simple *fait accompli*, as in the case of Poland and the Ukraine). There was, however, behind the motive of liberating the small nations a strong conservative power politics reason for building up a group of atomistic nation states in the Danube region and in Poland—the formation of an insulating block (the so-called *cordon sanitaire*) between Germany and Russia. If German democracy had been trusted, if Russia's revolution had not been feared, this line could never have been taken. It was, whether from the power politics or the liberal standpoint, a stupid idea: Germany and Russia were not affected, but the peasants of the insulating block—100 million people—were made the victims of a policy as futile as it was inconsequent.

Britain and France, if they really wanted to play the balance of power game, should have safeguarded the economic development of the European hinterland by giving the peasant countries a place in their own economic systems, providing trade openings or opportunities for migration. This of course they never did; migration stopped, tariffs rose, the world agricultural crisis broke over the Danubian States and Poland. Tentative efforts at co-operation to secure preferences by the Agrarian bloc (the only spontaneous Eastern combination) came to nothing, because the Franco-German conflict—well before Hitler, in 1930-33—prevented Western Europe from giving unified preferential treatment to the united Eastern countries. After that failure the Danubian States lapsed back into nationalism: but every national plan came up against the vicious circle of poverty—no industry because no capital—no capital because no savings—no savings because low income and low productivity—low productivity because no industry. Some countries, like Bulgaria, made efforts to adjust production by swinging over to other types of farming—but as the peasants turned over from wheat to tomatoes and strawberries, Great Britain, the chief market, put on tariffs against these imports. Generally

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speaking, by 1936, when the Schacht drive began, these countries had reached a position from which they could not rescue themselves by their own efforts. Far from isolating Germany from Russia, their economic weakness meant that they were bound to become absorbed by one or the other.

After the war, it will be essential for Britain to find some alternative to the National States Cordon Sanitaire idea, if it is to offer anything better than Hitler's New Order. The chief aspects of the European situation to be taken into account after the defeat of Hitlerism will be (1) general poverty in Europe, very acute in the East, (2) a centralised financial organ of control, the Reichsbank, which will control the trading operations of virtually the whole continent, (3) very large grain surpluses available from overseas countries, which must be used to counter starvation, but which must be imported with regard to the peasant interests in the East, (4) the Russian frontier tending westward, possibly taking in Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and even Hungary. All these factors will mean that a reorganisation of Europe on purely nation state lines will be impossible.

To deal with that situation it will not be enough to look back to the war aims of 1918, the encirclement of Germany by a ring of small states. Since so many people are happily trying to play the same part in this war as they did in the last, it is quite natural that conservative circles should take out of the liberal lumber-room the slightly shop-soiled, but after all, not seriously worn, ideas of 1918, nation states and democratic constitutions for anti-German and anti-Russian national entities, to build up an anti-German, anti-Russian bloc. But no one can seriously believe that those ideals will be the liberating force now that they were after the last war, particularly if propagated by those who were responsible for Munich. It is, of course, very difficult to comment on the composition of the Czech Provisional Government, and even more so on that of the Polish, without appearing to wish to discredit the Czech and the Polish cause, but, without intending to give currency to the silly communist line that either of the Provisional Governments is in any sense fascist, it cannot be denied that the main significance of the two

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Governments is that they are purely nationalist and do not represent an ideological opposition to Nazism. Hitler, by carrying nationalism to its furthest extreme, has made Nazism a super-national force, which can only be countered by super-national opposition, to liberate Germans as well as Czechs and Poles. The danger is not that the present committees are fascist, but that to support them without a statement of war aims is to foster the belief—naturally likely to spread the longer the war lasts—that we are fighting a nationalist, imperialist war and to forget Chamberlain's statement that it is Nazism we are fighting. Possibly conservative circles want to forget it, unable to grasp its implications.

Obviously the first war aim must be to restore liberty to the Czechs and Poles, among others. But that does not mean that we need return to the old policy of favouring certain nations at the expense of others, and neglecting the interests of industrial workers and peasant populations by restoring frontiers and tariffs walls. Before the next settlement British policy should not incur obligations to any foreign groups, or embark on any of the wearisome discussions as to ethnographic boundaries and historic claims, before it has attempted to see the continent as a whole and to decide on what principle and within what framework the claims of each group are to be satisfied.

Hitler found it simple to break up the Versailles settlement simply because various outstanding grievances remained, and he has been able to subjugate Eastern Europe by a masterly exploitation of these *points d'appui*, coupled with the acute economic necessity of the whole region. The ease with which it happened should have proved that "most favoured nation" in this sense is a game which is really played out in the Balkans. What, then, would be the right principle of reorganisation?

It is tempting to suggest—and every post-war planner no doubt already has done so—an East European Federation, a Danubian Bloc or a Czech-Polish Understanding, or a Hapsburg Restoration; whatever the title, any Eastern Union will be the old Cordon Sanitaire. This is, economically, about the worst solution possible, since it is in essence still

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the same line of cutting off Eastern Europe from the West. It ignores completely the economic necessities of the whole region and it can never overcome the basic problem of the differentiation of economic levels between East and West which makes the East inevitably a "Colonial area," likely to be exploited by any of the Great Powers in a power politics conflict. Post-war policy must take into account, not the all too articulate needs of the bureaucrat class, but the needs of the largely inarticulate peasants. What the peasantry needs is incorporation in a dynamic system: a system in which (1) labour can migrate to new territories, (2) industry can advance through rapid accumulation of capital and absorb the peasant surplus population of 20-30 million, (3) real wages can rise, causing an expansion of demand for high-quality foodstuffs. No artificial union or Eastern Federation will ever succeed in providing these essentials. It is no remedy for over-population and capital shortage to tie up together a group of countries all more or less equally over-populated and poverty stricken, under the control of feudal landowners or chauvinistic bourgeois bureaucrats.

That incorporation in a dynamic order cannot be achieved unless the peace conference is prepared to throw overboard three cherished institutions of 1918-1940:

(1) The tariff barriers against food imports in Western Europe. The peasants in the East must be given access to the high-priced markets of the West. That means that something of the German plan for inter-European trade must be conserved.

(2) British social imperialism will have to be considerably modified, to relieve the pressure of population, by taking as immigrants into the Dominions both the industrial workers of Western Europe and the peasant farmers of the East. The only way to convince Europe that democracy is a dynamic is to admit greater numbers to assist in the development of democratic countries.

(3) The "cordon sanitaire" idea. Obviously for reasons of administrative convenience, it will be essential to create local governments in Europe, on a racial or territorial basis. But some body must exist—the Federal Government or a Central Economic Council—it is quite irrelevant what it is

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called—to control economic policy : to foster the growth of trade relations between Germany and Russia and the transition zone, to find the capital from the U.S.A. which will be needed to finance food imports, to build up electrical power stations, transport connections and new industries in the East. If Hitler's New Order means the mobilisation of Europe's economic resources for war, the peace settlement must mobilise the economic resources of the world, to deal as a whole with the European economic problem.

THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT:

POST-WAR PROBLEMS

By GEORGE W. KEETON, LL.D.

(Professor of English Law, University of London)

ONE of the branches of English Law to which it will be necessary to devote considerable attention at the end of the war is the Law of Property, and in particular the law of Landlord and Tenant. The development of indiscriminate bombing this summer has already created many very serious problems, some of which were foreseen before the outbreak of war, and for which emergency legislation was passed. Such legislation, however, provides only a temporary solution, and it is already clear that a number of permanent modifications in the law will be necessary. For example, the relieving provisions in favour of mortgagees and tenants are a temporary expedient only, and it has already been noted in the daily Press that whilst the mortgagee may obtain some relief from his liability to pay interest on his loan during the period when his property is unusable, his liability to pay the loan itself remains, although it is apparent that the destruction of the mortgaged property is a calamity alike to mortgagor and mortgagee, and that unless the property is restored by Government aid to its pre-war position, the loss, which was due to circumstances beyond the control of both, should ultimately be shared by both. The problems affecting landlord and tenant are of a special type. As will be shown later, the tenant is relieved of his obligations to the extent that his property has become unusable. Here the root question seems to be whether, at any rate in urban areas, it will be possible for either party to renew the tenancy, when the war is over, on a pre-war footing. As yet there is no indication that the problem has been considered on this basis and the assumption, at any rate as far as landlords are concerned, seems to be that when war

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damage has been repaired the pre-war situation can be revived. Some general consideration of the respective conditions of landlord and tenant will therefore be required.

A general survey of the Law of Property shows that whilst the Courts, and especially Courts of Equity, have over many centuries been ready to protect beneficiaries under trusts and settlements, and mortgagees, relief of tenants has been of slower growth, and has been more limited in extent. In origin, the term of years was not regarded as an interest in the land at all, and it was not until the fifteenth century, when feudalism was already breaking down that the tenant for a term of years obtained the right to be restored to the possession of the land itself, if he was ejected through no fault of his own. Previously, his remedy had been restricted to a personal action against the landlord for breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. The reason for the inferior status of the tenant under a lease was that he was outside the scope of the feudal rules of tenure. Some hint of that inferior status has survived down to the present day. This is most clearly seen in the law governing covenants between landlord and tenant and in the law relating to fixtures.

As is well known, the covenants which govern the relations between landlord and tenant are usually set out expressly in the lease itself, and as will be shown later the general assumption is that the parties are on a footing of complete legal equality, and are therefore free to contract as they please, although manifestly this is often not the case. There are, however, one or two covenants which are implied by law in leases independently of agreement, and it is instructive to notice how limited is the protection conferred by them upon the tenant. For example, where a house was the subject of a lease, there was no implied condition that it was fit for habitation at the beginning of the tenancy, and even to-day an unwary tenant who undertakes in his lease to repair may find himself saddled by this clause with the obligation of putting into sound condition property which he has not allowed to become dilapidated, although his predecessors or even the landlord himself may have done so. It was not until the nineteenth century that even in the lease of a furnished house a condition that it was fit for habitation

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was implied, although immediate habitation was obviously the sole reason for the contract. Even this protection for the tenant of a furnished house has been construed restrictively. In *Sarson v. Roberts* (1895, 2 Q.B. 395) the plaintiff took part of a furnished house for himself, his wife and two children and a servant for a month. A few days after he went into occupation a grandchild of the defendant (the landlord) contracted scarlet fever, but the defendant concealed this from the plaintiff, and one of the plaintiff's children in turn contracted scarlet fever. When he sued the landlord on the implied warranty of fitness for habitation, the Court of Appeal held that he was unable to recover, because the implied warranty is only that the house shall be fit for habitation at the beginning of the tenancy, and there was no obligation on the landlord to see that it remained so, even when as here, the unfitness was directly due to the landlord's sole fault. This is still the law. As far as dwelling houses for the working classes are concerned, the ignorance of such tenants of the absence of an implied warranty of fitness in leases of unfurnished houses had caused so many hardships that the Housing Acts changed the law by providing that where a house is let at a rent not exceeding £40 a year in London and £26 a year elsewhere, there is an implied condition that the house is fit for human habitation at the beginning of the tenancy and will remain so throughout the tenancy. The standard of fitness required is not a very high one and no one but the tenant himself may take advantage of it. Moreover, notice of the defect must be given by the tenant to the landlord before injury ensues. Failure to do this on the part of the plaintiff in *Morgan v. Liverpool Corporation* (1927, 2 K.B. 131) prevented him from recovering anything from the landlord when a window slipped down and injured his hand as a result of a defective window cord. Even the limited protection given by the Housing Act has been whittled down by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal which, it is suggested, is misconceived in law. In *Rousou v. Photi* (1940, 109 L.J.K.B. 693) the plaintiff claimed the protection of the section in respect of unfurnished rooms in London, the annual rent and rates of which amounted to £45 10s. The rates were, of course, substantially more than £5 10s. a year, but because

the tenant paid the two together to the landlord, the Court of Appeal by a strained construction, held that the tenant was not entitled to the protection of the section.

Whilst it is not a question of implied covenant between landlord and tenant, it is important to notice that neither the purchaser nor the lessee of real property may in English law take advantage of one of the most important and far reaching House of Lords decisions which has been given in recent times. In *Donoghue v. Stevenson* (1932, A.C. 562) a person bought a bottle of ginger beer for his fiancée who, on drinking it, was horrified to find that the liquid contained a decomposing snail. As a result, she became seriously ill, and the House of Lords held that she was entitled to recover damages from the manufacturer of the ginger beer, even though there was no contract between them. The ground of the decision was the negligence of the manufacturer who, said the House of Lords, owes a duty to the ultimate consumer of his products, provided that they reach the consumer in such a state that there has been no intervention (or according to some, no possibility of intervention) by a third party. In *Otto v. Bolton & Norris* (1936, 105 L.J.K.B. 62) it was held that this principle, which is of widespread application in the law relating to the duties of manufacturers, has no application to sales or leases of real property. The position is very clearly put by Lord Justice Scrutton in the earlier case of *Bottomley v. Bannister* (1932, I.K.B. 458) where he says: "now it is at present well established English law that, in the absence of express contract, a landlord of an unfurnished house is not liable to his tenant, or a vendor of real estate to his purchaser, for defects in the house or land rendering it dangerous or unfit for occupation, even if he has constructed the defects himself or is aware of their existence." Liberalising principles such as those set out above have not yet been allowed to intrude into the law of landlord and tenant. On the other hand, even apart from express covenants (which are an invariable feature of written leases) the tenant by the ancient and unrepealed Statute of Marlbridge (1267) is under a strict liability as explained in *Yellowly v. Gower* (1855, 24 L.J.EX. 289) to keep the property in repair.

It is with regard to the three questions of fixtures,

compensation for improvements, and protection of the tenant against arbitrary disturbance of the tenancy where the tenant has built up a substantial goodwill that the Common Law has shown itself most markedly reluctant to admit change. By a fixture is meant something which the tenant affixes to the real property for the better enjoyment of his tenancy. The ancient Common Law rule was that these chattels became the landlord's property, but as soon as the growth of commerce and industry created a new and powerful class of industrial and commercial tenants the Common Law reluctantly gave way so far as to permit such tenants to remove from the leased premises fixtures which they had brought for the purposes of their trade. In the nineteenth century this privilege was extended to the tenant of a dwelling house in respect of ornamental and domestic fixtures. The bias of the Common Law is clearly shown, however, by the decision in *Elwes v. Maw* (1802, 3 East 38) in which it was held with regard to agricultural fixtures that although the farmer's sole purpose in putting them there was to assist him in his farming, nevertheless they could not be considered as trade fixtures, and consequently the farmer was unable to remove them. The effects of this on farming are sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless, the farmer had to wait until the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1923 to obtain relief. At the same time, the farmer for the first time obtained a right to claim compensation for such improvements made by him during his tenancy as will raise the rental value of the property, whilst the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1927 gave a similar right to an urban tenant carrying on a trade, business or profession. The same act gave similar urban tenants a right to compensation at the termination of the tenancy for any increase in the rental value of the premises which can be attributed to the goodwill which the tenant has built up on the premises. In order to succeed, the tenant must show that he or his predecessors in title have carried on a trade or business for a period of not less than five years and that the goodwill has become attached to the premises, so that in consequence the rental value of the property has increased. The landlord can, however, avoid payment of compensation by an offer either of a new tenancy or of alternative accommodation.

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An important part of the Landlord and Tenant (War Damage) Act, 1939, would probably not have been necessary, but for the age long bias of the Common Law against the tenant. In the old case of *Paradine v. Jane* (1647, Aleyn 26) Paradine sued Jane for rent due on a lease, Jane pleaded that he had been deprived of his property by the action of an alien prince, Rupert, who was invading the country, but the Court held that this was no excuse; the rent was still due and he must pay it, notwithstanding that events beyond the control of both lessor and lessee had made enjoyment of the subject matter of the contract impossible. The lessee, said the Court, had undertaken to pay the rent and he must repay it. If he had wished to be excused, he should have provided for it in his lease. In the Law of Contract generally, apart from leases, the parties would have been excused further performance on the grounds of impossibility, but old conceptions die hard in the Law of Real Property. How special this exception is against the lessee is shown by the well-known decision in *Taylor v. Caldwell* (1863, 3 B. & S. 826) in which the defendant agreed to put a theatre at the disposal of the plaintiff for four days at a rent. Before the specified date the theatre was burned down, and the Court held that as the existence of the hall was necessary for the performance of the contract, the defendants were excused from liability in respect of its non-performance, and that neither side could sue the other. Mr. Justice Blackburn, in his judgment in that case was careful to point out that "the parties inaccurately call this a 'letting,' and the money to be paid a 'rent,' but the whole agreement is such as to show that the defendants were to retain possession of the hall and gardens; so that there was to be no demise of things and that the contract was merely to give the plaintiff the use of them." The distinguished Judge then rather puzzlingly adds "Nothing, however, in our opinion depends on this." On the contrary it would seem that everything depended on it, for had the contract amounted to a lease, the tenant would have failed to be excused from payment of rent, in accordance with the decision in *Paradine v. Jane*, which Mr. Justice Blackburn obviously did not regard as being in point.

Inasmuch, therefore, as *Paradine v. Jane* was still good law

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three hundred years later on the outbreak of the present war, it was necessary to provide in the Landlord and Tenant (War Damage) Act, 1939, that a tenant should be able to disclaim his lease, if his house became uninhabitable as a result of enemy bombing. The operation of the Act is surrounded by irritating and probably unnecessary technicalities which, as accounts in the daily Press sufficiently show, are causing a good deal of difficulty, as a result of the ignorance of many tenants of its provisions. Where the tenancy is for a short period (for example weekly) the tenant can, of course, give notice immediately, and his obligations will cease with the payment of rent for the period in respect of which notice is given. In other cases where a house has been bombed, the position varies, according as to whether a house is habitable or not. It is on this question that much difficulty is arising, although it should be noticed as an initial point that where a tenant is compelled to evacuate because a time-bomb has rendered the premises dangerous this does not excuse him from liability to pay rent. When a house has been damaged, but is still habitable, the tenant still remains liable for the rent under the lease. If, however, the house has been so severely damaged that it is uninhabitable, the tenant must serve on the landlord a notice disclaiming the lease. If the landlord refuses to accept the tenant's contentions, the question must be settled in court. A very considerable number of such applications are at present awaiting decision. Until the tenant disclaims, however, he remains liable on the lease. The Act of 1939 also provides that the usual obligation of the tenant to repair shall not include liability to make good air-raid damage. Apart from this provision it would appear that, having regard to *Paradine v. Jane*, the tenant's obligation would have extended even as far as this.

It must also be pointed out that where houses are destroyed by air raids, the landlord's position is a serious one, for whilst he loses his rent, his right to compensation is postponed until the end of the war, and the amount of it will depend upon the resources available. Prior to that, he must rely upon his own purse to make his property remunerative again, and he must himself be the judge of the wisdom of this course.

These problems may be regarded as special ones arising

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out of war-time conditions but they have wider implications. A rapidly increasing proportion of the property in inner London is now controlled by a few large property owners. These are of two distinct types, being either the trusts of a few distinguished families, such as the Westminster, Portland and Bedford Estates, or else property companies, organised exclusively for purposes of profit. The family estates trusts have on the whole pursued a conservative policy, seeking to maintain the security of the large numbers of family incomes dependent upon their commercial stability. The property companies, on the other hand, have pursued a more progressive policy, but again with the ultimate interests of shareholders and debenture holders predominantly in view. The plight of some of these companies is already serious, as the following extract from the City page of the *Evening Standard* in November last will show :

"Many London property owning companies are now experiencing financial difficulties as a result of the war. Several have already had to make arrangements with debenture stock holders, and Abbey Lodge to-day announces that its articles of association are to be changed so as to allow for representation of debenture stock holders on the board.

"Connaught Estates is now discussing with the trustees for its two debenture stocks the question of a complete moratorium respecting these stocks. There is a total of £400,000 outstanding on them.

"The company last month was compelled to pass the interest payment. As soon as the talks are completed, a meeting of the 2,500 debenture stock holders will be called to consider a moratorium scheme.

"This development is an indication that the predicament arising out of the war of the numerous big property companies in London is rapidly coming to a head.

"Another big concern—Associated London Properties, which has nearly £1,000,000 debenture stocks outstanding—is already a year in arrears with two Preference issues.

"It is not improbable that most of the big London property companies will have to seek relief in a moratorium on their obligations. The property company movement in London is a development of the past ten years or so, and

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accordingly the undertakings have not so far had time to build up reserves."

The figures quoted above are sufficiently staggering, for they indicate that investment in London properties in the last ten years has reached something of the proportions of the railways boom. For nearly a century the railways have been paying the penalty of reckless over capitalisation, and it would seem that the scramble for London properties has already produced a number of similar problems. When one considers the extending vista of first and later debenture holders, of preference and ordinary shareholders, of head lessees, sub-lessees and sub-sub-lessees, who interpose between the ultimate tenant and the land, all of whom must receive their maintenance for a very limited area of land, it is possible to obtain some idea of the magnitude of the problem with which we shall be faced after the war. All these organised, associated and powerful interests will require to be appeased in their respective ranks, for their own benefit. In addition, there are other interests which demand attention, notably, those of the occupying tenant of the property and of the general public. The handicaps under which an actual occupying tenant labours, however, are so great that he has seemed at times beyond help. The assumption of the law is that landlord and tenant are on a footing of complete equality, and that they are therefore free to contract exactly as they choose. This, however, is manifestly not the case. Freedom of contract has gone, and the prospective tenant is now faced with a standard lease, in exactly the same way that a railway passenger is faced with a standard ticket. He may accept the terms without argument, or he can refuse them. He is, as the law says, quite free to choose. But if his business compels him to travel to work every day, and if that work must be conducted within a certain area, that freedom is obviously non-existent in fact, whatever it may be in theory. The individual is face to face with a powerful monopoly, and his freedom to argue about terms is valueless. Nor is this all. The industrial employee may combine with other industrial employees in an association to improve his status, and such associations now have legal recognition; but a similar organisation of tenants not only enjoys no legal recognition,

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but exposes itself to an action in damages at the suit of the landlord, if it induces tenants to withhold their rent when they have reason to complain of unremedied grievances to their landlord. Such an extraordinary survival of the mediæval attitude towards tenants received the blessing of the Chancery Division so recently as February last in *Camden Nominees, Ltd. v. Forsey* (1940, 109 L.J.Ch. 231). The head note to this interesting and astonishing case reads as follows :

"In a block of flats let to a number of tenants on monthly tenancies under a common form of agreement, the tenants were to pay rent in advance, the owners to provide central heating, constant hot water, a lift, cleaning and lighting of the staircase and passages, portorage and other services. Some tenants complained that the premises were not properly kept as to heating and cleaning, and meetings were held and an association formed. A number of tenants withheld their rents, and others threatened to do so unless the alleged grievances were remedied. In an action against the Chairman and Secretary of the association to restrain them from inducing tenants from committing a breach of their agreement by withholding rent, held, that, assuming that the defendants were acting in the common interest of all the tenants who complained, that was no justification for procuring a breach of contract. The remedy was at law. Nor could the defendants be justified on the ground of performing a public service."

In the course of his judgment in this case, Mr. Justice Simonds offered the following explanation of his decision. "It is," he said, "a dangerous proposition that inequality in wealth or position justifies a course otherwise actionable, and that tenants may, against their landlord, adopt measures of self-help because, in their judgment, the law does not afford them adequate remedy for his default."

This would be an interesting comment even if well founded. It is suggested, however, with respect, that it is misconceived, inasmuch as the tenants in this case quite clearly had a legal remedy, but were too poor and too weak individually to enforce it.

It is obvious, therefore, that if the urban tenant, especially in inner London, is to be left to the mercies of powerful

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property trusts when the war is over, his position will be even more unenviable than it was in 1939. There is, moreover, an important further aspect of the problem which requires consideration. London, and probably other cities, it is agreed, need replanning at the end of the war. In that replanning, the interests of the large property owner will necessarily be in opposition to that of the community as a whole, since replanning will, in the majority of cases, limit his income by restricting his freedom to build as he pleases. Quite clearly, therefore, we shall need comprehensive legislation to control his and allied interests if we are to realise to the full the opportunity for a better urban life with which we have now been presented.

THE BLOCKADE AND THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER

By E. V. FRANCIS

HERE is perhaps no surer sign that the blockade is beginning to tell upon the Nazis than their persistent propaganda of a New Economic Order. The *Blitzkrieg* has failed to give them a quick decision, and although they retain a certain superiority in offensive power, their propaganda suggests that they do not hope to wage a long war without the backing of the resources of the conquered countries.

The risk of losing that superiority is being brought home to them this winter as the blockade threatens for the first time seriously to interfere with the development of German war production. This change in situation is largely due to the measures taken by the British Government after the collapse of France, to fasten the whole of enemy-occupied Europe under the blockade. Until that time, Germany was to a large extent protected against the full rigours of economic warfare by a buffer of neighbouring neutral countries—Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium—who were exempted from the blockade. While trade agreements were made with them to prevent re-exports to Germany, such agreements could not be made anything like as effective as the blockade itself. Consequently, Britain lost during the first eight months of hostilities much of the advantage in economic warfare which command of the sea had given her.

That loss, however, has since been recovered, and the risk of leakages in the blockade has been reduced to a minimum. To begin with, a new and effective method of contraband control has been introduced, the effect of which has been to make it compulsory for ships sailing to European and North African ports to secure navicerts from British Consuls at the ports of shipment, testifying to the proper character of every item of cargo. This has virtually imposed control at the sources of supply instead of, as hitherto, at

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the contraband control ports, and the Navy, relieved of the task of directing and escorting neutral shipping to these ports for inspection, may detain any ship anywhere which does not possess its navicert. The success of this new method of contraband control is seen from the fact that 75 per cent of the world's shipping tonnage is now covered by navicerts. The remaining tonnage still operating is largely in U.S., Japanese and Russian hands, and this is largely concerned with non-European trade. Thus little tonnage is likely to be used for enemy purposes. Steps have been taken, however, to reduce even this risk to a minimum. Accordingly, any neutral owner who fails to give a satisfactory guarantee that his ship or ships are not being put to enemy use, is denied the services of all British-controlled undertakings, and as the main oil and coal bunkering stations along the world's trade routes are in this category, the control cannot fail to be effective.

No blockade can, of course, be completely watertight, but the new system ensures that such leakages as do occur will be of negligible value to the enemy. It is still necessary, of course, to have regard to the trade requirements of the few remaining neutral countries bordering on German, or German-occupied, territory. Nevertheless, the problem of neutrality is far simpler to deal with than before. The most important neutrals concerned are Spain and Portugal. Unlike the Low Countries, these do not possess any large processing industries, and have no special claims, therefore, for raw materials with which to maintain a re-export trade with the rest of the world. Consequently their requirements for domestic consumption can be fairly easily assessed, and the British Government has undoubtedly been guided by its experience of previous leakages into Germany through neutral territory to cut down the permitted imports of these countries to a level which enables them to meet their current consumption requirements and maintain no more than a safety margin of stocks. As regards the other neutrals, the chances in the case of Switzerland, Yugo-Slavia and Bulgaria are that these will be unable to obtain the necessary shipping to secure even their permitted quota of supplies from overseas. It may be assumed, therefore, that such imports as are

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allowed into neutral territory will be of little or no service to the enemy.

The function of the blockade in depriving the enemy of vital supplies makes it the main instrument of economic warfare. But economic warfare is concerned not only with creating shortages to slow down the enemy's war production; it aims, also, at disorganising the machinery of production by direct assaults on factories, transport and stocks. In this sense, air bombing is as much an instrument of economic warfare as the blockade, and has been employed as such with increasing effectiveness during the past six months. Considerable credit is due to the Ministry of Economic Warfare for the skill with which the bombings of German oil plants and war factories have been co-ordinated with the work of the blockade. The knowledge gained from the blockade of the shortages and the strains to which Nazi war production and transport are subject has enabled the authorities to build up a master plan of attack on the most vulnerable points of the enemy's home front. It would appear that our industrial and economic intelligence of Germany is first-rate, and the selected bombing of factories, shipyards, oil refineries and communications, as illustrated by the recent official guide-map on the subject, shows an excellent appreciation of the difficulties with which the Nazis are faced in maintaining their economic war effort.

It would be too much to expect any decisive results from economic warfare of this kind in the immediate future. The Nazi economy is well organised and capable of considerable adaptation to the emergencies of war by reason of the total conscription of labour, resources and productive equipment. Yet a time will come when the shortages of all raw materials begin to affect every aspect of economic life in enemy territory, when there is no longer a reserve of labour and plant for the production of substitutes for imported goods, when civilian consumption cannot be curtailed any further without great political risk, when the lack of petrol cripples road transport and puts an intolerable strain upon the railways, when the Nazi economy will, in short, be stretched to the furthest limits: then only is it likely that economic disorganisation will become sufficiently widespread to impair the working

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of the highly integrated Nazi military machine. Faced with the rapidly diminishing prospect of being able to knock out Britain with their present superior weight of metal, the Nazis have therefore been forced to consider preparations to resist a long-term blockade, and naturally they have turned to the possibility of exploiting the man-power and resources of the conquered countries—of turning, in fact, the entire Continent against Britain. Hence the propaganda of their New Economic Order.

On paper the Nazis appear to have promising material to work upon. Hitler now dominates a population of some 260 million people, representing a working class of the order of 80 to 100 million, with a fair reserve of industrial skilled labour. In the conquered countries of the West, there still remains a considerable industrial potential, notwithstanding the great destruction of property caused by invasion, and in France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark, plant is available for the manufacture of a wide range of war material, including steel, guns, motors, aircraft, textiles, chemicals and ships. Besides which, these countries also have useful supplies of certain raw materials, of which the most notable are Swedish ore, Norwegian manganese, Scandinavian timber and French bauxite. In Eastern Europe, also, the Nazis are in a position to draw upon large sources of foodstuffs, raw materials and petroleum. Potentially these resources have the makings of great industrial developments capable of augmenting materially the productive powers of the Third Reich. But all this is a far cry from the creation of a New Economic Order of the kind announced by the Nazis. Undoubtedly it would serve them well to weld Europe into an economic unit independent of the rest of the world, with its great industries integrated into the German economy and provisioned with foodstuffs and raw materials from conscripted agriculture and primary production throughout the whole area—all in pursuance of orders from Berlin. Needless to say, this scheme is quite unworkable even in the long run, for although Europe could feed herself at the cost of a general decline in the standard of living, her lack of essential raw materials would hamstring her basic industries and processing manufactures and cause a catastrophic slump in employment

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in all the great industrial regions. The development of European industry has been dependent largely on imported raw materials and on the exploitation of its skilled labour for the processing of these materials and their re-export on highly favourable terms of trade to the rest of the world. A new economic order, as advertised by the Nazis, clearly cannot be built up in the face of the blockade, except at the cost of writing off the greater part of Europe's industrial equipment. Far from creating an order of any kind, the Nazis have intensified the chaos in industry and agriculture in all the conquered countries by plundering all available stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials, which it is no longer possible to replace.

Plunder is necessarily a short-term policy and cannot be continued except at the cost of turning the whole of occupied territory into an economic deadweight. The Nazis must, if possible, avoid this. Yet the choice before them is not very great. They cannot on the one hand hope for even a moderately effective mobilisation of the man-power and resources of the conquered countries unless they themselves can replace out of their own reserves the necessary raw materials. Clearly, their reserves are not sufficient for this purpose. Yet on the other hand, they cannot afford to neglect the more obvious opportunities of employing certain important industries in the conquered territories, notably steel and ship-building, in close co-operation with their own war industries. Industries like these are dependent to a large extent on local conditions and are difficult to transplant, so presumably they will be left to function where they stand, and provided with the necessary raw materials. It is no part of the Nazi plan to leave substantial industrial assets in the hands of the conquered, and it is likely that they will continue to disband the remaining industrial equipment which can be of use to them and transfer it to the less vulnerable parts of Eastern Germany to be incorporated bodily into the machinery of production there. Machine tools, rolling stock, and high-precision machinery are the type most likely to serve this purpose. The intention behind these transfers is clearly to collect all the substantial industrial assets of the Continent in the German basket and to minimise

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the risk of sabotage in war production. The question of skilled labour is being solved by virtual conscription, for the workers attached to the transplanted factories and machine shops are beginning to find that the possession of a ration-card is dependent upon their willingness to accept low-paid work in Germany under the supervision of the Gestapo. Industrial production is, in fact, being converted as far as possible, into Nazi monopoly.

The plunder of industrial equipment and raw material stocks has already compromised the possibility of restoring economic life in the conquered countries for a long time to come. The selective exploitation of a few chosen industries will still be possible, though the likelihood is that Germany will have to provide the necessary raw materials out of her own reserves. It will be no less difficult to pursue the alternative course of forcing the occupied countries to become low-cost producers of foodstuffs and primary products for the industrial workers of the Reich. They are themselves even less self-sufficient than the Reich, and there can be no question of the rehabilitation of agriculture unless adequate stocks, equipment and transport are made available.

There is, in fact, no proper basis for a new economic order in view of Europe's serious deficiencies in raw materials and foodstuff. The Nazis, so far from attempting to restore economic conditions in the conquered countries, have created further disorder by plunder. This is not to imply that the Nazis have exhausted their gains. Apart from an almost inexhaustible supply of forced labour, they are able to increase the productive capacity of their war industries in certain directions. In the matter of iron and steel, Germany is now comparatively well off. With Swedish ore supplies assured, and Luxembourg and Lorraine under control, the Nazis have sufficient raw material, including scrap, to work their own and other continental steel works to something like capacity, estimated at about 44,000,000 tons a year. They will not be able to exploit this asset, however, to anything like full advantage. What is required in this war is specialised steel rather than mere volume of basic metal in view of the fact that mobile and high-precision weapons, like the aeroplane and tank, have come to take

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the place occupied by trench mortars and field artillery in the offensive strategy of the last war. It is in the making of specialised steel that certain alloys are required, of which Europe is particularly deficient, notably nickel, tungsten, manganese, chrome and vanadium. The deficiencies are least acute in the case of chrome, but this is mainly found in Greece where the supply situation has been seriously affected by the war with Italy. This shortage of alloys is bound to handicap considerably the use to which the Nazis can put their very large steel-making capacity.

No such handicap, unfortunately, is placed upon their aluminium supplies, for bauxite, the raw material, is found in ample quantities in France. French output of bauxite has been the largest in the world, and the Nazis may be relied upon to maintain it. The danger that the supplies hitherto drawn from Hungary, Italy and Yugo-Slavia might fall short of requirements has thus been avoided. The principal difficulty facing the Nazis is that the conversion of bauxite into aluminium is a costly and complicated process. While Germany has undoubtedly sufficient plant to produce the aluminium for maintaining her programme of warplane production, further plant will probably be needed as the demand for aluminium as a substitute for other metals increases. Only determined air attack upon the aluminium plant in Germany is therefore likely to hinder seriously the exploitation of French bauxite reserves.

Apart from aluminium, however, Europe is deficient in all the important non-ferrous metals, notably copper, tin, lead and zinc. The Nazis have, of course, gained a land contact with Spain and are in a position to exert pressure to secure the release of supplies of copper from the British-owned Rio Tinto mines. These are located in the south of the peninsula, where rail facilities are poor, so that transport creates important difficulties. Besides this, the Spanish Government may be impelled to reserve the greater part of the copper output for sale outside Europe in exchange for much-needed shipments of oil and wheat. It is unlikely, therefore, that Germany will obtain any material contribution to her copper supplies from this source, the shortage of which will seriously affect her electrical equipment industries.

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Similar shortages occur in the case of tin, lead and zinc, which must further interfere with her metal and light-engineering industries.

No less difficult is Germany's position in regard to other important war materials like rubber, wool, cotton, jute and vegetable oils. Europe is normally the principal importer of all these commodities, and in 1936-38 her purchases of rubber accounted for 25 per cent of the world's exports; wool 54 per cent; cotton 47 per cent; jute 55 per cent; soya beans 52 per cent; linseed 54 per cent, and palm kernels 72 per cent. To some extent the deficiency in rubber, cotton and wool can be made good by synthetic production from coal and timber within enemy-occupied territory. There is potentially a field for increased soya bean cultivation in Roumania and Hungary. Nevertheless, the time and resources involved in developments of this kind preclude the production of substitutes on anything like the scale required to meet even the normal consumption of the Reich. The synthetic rubber production is a case in point, for this has been developed for many years by the most lavish investment in plant and research. Yet soon after the war broke out the Nazis could not afford to put tyres on the bicycles which they had contracted to supply to the Balkans.

Most vital of all is Europe's deficiency in oil and petrol. The substantial stocks obtained by the Nazi invasion of Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France have already been used up according to the Minister of Economic Warfare, and the Nazis will be forced increasingly to draw upon their own accumulated reserves. Europe's normal consumption of oil is about 30,000,000 tons a year, of which only the 5,000,000 tons consumed by Spain and Portugal will be allowed from overseas. It is likely, however, that civilian consumption in the remaining countries will be cut to about one-third, say 8,000,000 tons, by drastic rationing, but this makes no allowance, of course, for the needs of the armed forces. If the Nazis could use the entire Roumanian output of 6,000,000 tons per year, their position would be eased materially, as they would then have about 12,000,000 tons a year at their disposal, including 4,000,000 tons from German coal-oil and other plants, which would give them

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a potential margin of 4,000,000 tons for the needs of the armed forces. This is quite inadequate, considering the width of occupied territory now to be covered by the Army. Nevertheless, it would be sufficient to enable Germany, with the aid of existing stocks, to maintain an offensive strategy for a long time ahead. It is most unlikely, however, that Germany will be able to use the whole 6,000,000 tons of Roumanian production on account of transport difficulties. During the past year imports into Germany from Roumania did not probably exceed 1,500,000 tons (and even this is above the peace-time level). There are serious difficulties in the way of transporting the rest of the output. About 1,500,000 tons could at a maximum be carried up the Danube alone under present conditions, though a larger quantity would be possible provided the capacity of the river were increased by the construction of additional wharves, barges, handling equipment, storage tanks, etc. Similarly, the capacity of the railways could be enlarged with the addition of new equipment, notably tank wagons, and standardised operating conditions. But all these things take time, and even when completed the necessary increase in oil transport from Roumania would, to a large extent, be secured only at the expense of other traffic from the Balkans. Assuming that all these difficulties could be resolved, Germany would, at best, have enough petrol to meet only about half of Europe's normal requirements, omitting altogether the needs of her mechanised armies. In the circumstances, the Minister of Economic Warfare has good reason for making Nazi oil refineries No. 1 target of the R.A.F.

The food position does not appear to be so bad as was indicated by earlier predictions. Although Europe is an essential importer of all the principal foodstuffs with the sole exception of potatoes, the quantities involved do not amount to more than a small proportion of total consumption. Imports of wheat, barley, oats and maize, are normally equivalent to about 10 per cent of home production, and there should be sufficient of these to maintain the population on iron rations. The cutting off of animal feeding stuffs from abroad will inevitably cause a continued deterioration in the livestock industry, though the supply of meat will be

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augmented from time to time by the forced slaughtering of cattle. The supply of fats will be reduced by more than half, and this will be felt acutely, though it need not be disastrous, provided that the Nazis look after the production of grain crops. It is the Nazis themselves who are most likely to endanger the food situation by continuing to impound labour in war-prison camps, by commandeering the necessary transport for distribution and by pillaging the reserve stocks. At best the position will be extremely difficult, for countries which have to accustom themselves to living on iron rations cannot afford serious crop failures.

The so-called New Order in Europe thus remains extremely vulnerable to the blockade, and this is in no way altered by the fact that the Nazis appear to be well placed for the production of synthetic and substitute materials from their ample resources of coal and timber. As the war proceeds, an increasing number of industries will be forced to depend on *ersatz* materials, the cumulative effect of which will be to put a severe strain upon the coal-mining industry and the conversion plant, thereby creating fresh bottlenecks at vital parts in the system of war production. The resort to substitutes and synthetics involves costly and roundabout methods of production, creating a vicious spiral of scarcity, for additional labour, transport and equipment is required at every turn, all of which adds to the strain on the enemy's resources.

The most serious bottleneck in all Germany's war economy is railway transport. A great deal of the traffic of the roads has had to be taken on to the railways as a result of the shortage of petrol, as well as a considerable tonnage that was normally forwarded by sea. The restriction of shipments along the Western seaboard of Europe is not likely to be very serious, for skeleton services have been restored along the main railway routes in France, Belgium and Holland, and these are probably sufficient for the transport of the relatively few resources which the Nazis are able to exploit in these countries. No difficulty will be experienced, for example, in getting bauxite from the workings in the French Alps to the German frontier. It is in the transport of vital supplies of oil and foodstuffs from South-Eastern Europe that the loss of seaborne transport will be most

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acutely felt. The normal method of bringing raw materials from the Balkans to the Reich is by long sea voyage via the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the North German ports. Not only is this route the most economical for the transport of commodities in bulk, but it is also the most efficient. On the other hand, the railway system of South-Eastern Europe, apart from a few international services, has never developed beyond the construction of local lines intended to serve local agricultural needs. In fact, most of the lines south of Budapest are single tracks and are of very limited capacity. If Germany is to maintain her supplies from the Balkans, the bulk of the trade hitherto carried by the sea must be pushed on to the rather inadequate network of railway lines converging on the Reich from the South-East. The difficulties are enormous.

To begin with, sea transport is by far the most suitable method for bulk traffic movements. An average ship of 5,000 tons can, for example, carry in its hold as much as can be loaded on to about 400 railway wagons requiring the locomotive power of up to 10 engines. Moreover, the sea provides as many lines of communication as there are ships to sail on it; whereas goods moved by rail have to be confined to expensive steel track, requiring the services of large numbers of signalmen, shunters, station officials and operating experts. An intensification of railway traffic from the Balkans to Germany on a scale sufficient to make good the loss of sea transport would appear to be practically impossible. Not only is the route mileage limited, but the routes themselves are difficult to operate and liable to interruption in winter. Except for N. Yugoslavia and Hungary, most of the supplies from this region must be hauled over the Transylvanian Alps and/or the Balkan mountains.

In peace-time the tonnage moved north-westwards by rail from the Balkans amounts to 1 million tons annually, and it may be possible for Germany to increase this to 4-5,000,000 tons; but only if the railway system of South-Eastern Europe is entirely subordinated to her needs, so that every wagon and locomotive could be so directed as to provide a constant flow of through-traffic to Germany. This could clearly not be achieved without the surrender of the countries concerned, for it would involve the standardisation

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of German operating methods and management throughout, to say nothing of the elimination of non-German traffic. It should be noted in this connection that South-Eastern Europe is also the main source of supply for Italy, but owing to the limitations of traffic facilities, her imports have to travel for the most part along the same routes as those used by Germany. Germany can therefore only increase her imports of oil and raw materials from these countries at the expense of Italy.

Transport is a factor which must also largely determine the extent of German trade with Russia—the only other important source of supply now open. There are, admittedly, good sea communications in the Baltic, but the fact that Leningrad is icebound for part of the year and is also far removed from the main sources of raw materials makes the Baltic an unsatisfactory route from Germany's standpoint. The Black Sea is also available for the shipment of oil, cereals, etc., via the Danube, though the shortage of discharging facilities, and barges, limits severely the usefulness of this route.

The alternative rail routes across Poland, which have now been re-established, are not likely to provide the necessary transport. The Russian railway system is itself subject to great strain as the result mainly of the small mileage of track compared with the great increase in internal traffic in recent years. The difficulties imposed by inadequate equipment and long hauls may be illustrated by reference to the Trans-Siberian Railway, which offers Germany a possibility of evading the blockade by imports via Vladivostock as well as by supplies from Russian sources. Even under most favourable conditions, the maximum number of freight trains which could be run every 24 hours would be not more than twenty, and assuming that these kept up a fair average speed of 12 miles per hour, it would take 36 days for each train to do the round trip of 7,000 miles between Vladivostock and Germany. This would mean keeping 40,000 wagons continually on the move, or the equivalent of about 7 per cent of Russia's total rolling stock. If, on the other hand, Russia maintains neutrality and desires, as she must, to meet the transport requirements of the Ukraine, Don Bas, Urals

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and other industrial centres, it is scarcely likely that room could be found for the transport to Germany of more than 500,000 tons a year along this route. Such a scale of deliveries would be insignificant in relation to Germany's requirements, especially of bulk materials. In this connection the large-scale import of soya beans from Manchuria can incidentally be ruled out. The position is rather different in the case of less bulky commodities like steel alloys, copper and non-ferrous metals. But apart from manganese, Russia produces less of these materials than she requires for her own industries. Political consideration will alone determine whether Russia will cut her own consumption of raw materials to assist Germany, but in any event trade between the two countries cannot fail to be limited by the inadequacy of transport facilities.

Germany's conquests in the west and east of Europe have brought her no nearer to the solution of economic difficulties resulting from the blockade. The shortages of foodstuffs and war materials, though temporarily relieved by plunder, will become more acute as the war proceeds. The combined effect of the blockade and bombing attacks will be to put an increasing strain upon Nazi transport, production and stocks, and so diminish Germany's powers of resistance and attack. It is a mere presumption on the part of Nazi propagandists to suggest that such resources as Europe has can be mobilised in the so-called New Order to beat the blockade. For the most part the conquered countries of the West are far from self-sufficient and their industrial and agricultural capacity can only be exploited to the limited extent that Germany can make good their deficiencies. The position in South-Eastern Europe is rather different. Considerable, though by no means adequate, resources exist there, but if Germany is to squeeze the maximum surplus out of these countries, she can only do so by direct occupation. Whether in the East or the West, Hitler has yet to prove that the New Economic Order will produce substantial benefits with which to reconcile the peoples to the loss of political freedom. This he is not attempting to do: in essence the order is based on methods of economic exploitation which must inevitably release forces beyond the control even of the Reichswehr and the Gestapo.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME. IV

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

IF at the beginning of December the Minister of Information had sent "Cooper's snoopers" to find out how many people definitely knew that Parliament was in session, he would probably have learned that the proportion was very low. The debates had ceased to be front-page news and often were not news at all. The House had been sitting as frequently as in the earlier stages of the war, but it had ceased to act as the focus of public opinion. For this there were several reasons.

First, the development of the war had led people to take their eyes off Parliament. They realised that the conflict would be a long process of attrition in which, at this stage, the civilian population would bear the brunt. The victories of the Royal Air Force in August and September had shown that air power could not render a smashing blow. London, therefore, settled down for a grim winter with its shoulders bunched under its tin hats or took part in that dispersal which has always been the Government's main answer to night bombing. Whatever was said or done in Parliament made little difference: the job was to hold on until the British night bombing and the blockade had their effects on German output and the growing strength of the Royal Air Force enabled air supremacy to be obtained. Parliament was not in the picture at all.

In the second place, the mis-named *Blitz* compelled Parliament to be more secretive about its own actions. The Palace of Westminster was an obvious target, and the gathering together of several hundred members of Parliament was likely to be a temptation which the enemy could not resist. As late as the 5th September, the House gave public notice of its next meeting and indicated the time of its rising. When it met on the 17th September, however, conditions had changed. From that date the usual question about Parliamentary business was answered with the statement that at the next meeting the House would discuss such a subject, and on the next subsequent meeting it would discuss such

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other subject. The time, too, was kept a secret, though certain indications enabled any one familiar with parliamentary procedure to work it out. News of parliamentary proceedings was released as usual, except on the day when Parliament was prorogued. On that day the information was kept back for twenty-four hours, and the King's Speech on the Prorogation was released at the same time as the King's Speech to the new session. The explanation of this exception was, no doubt, that a German who knew anything about parliamentary procedure might assume that, as was the case, the King would open the new session in person. The exception was of no great importance, but the general practice of secrecy compelled the newspapers to refrain from their usual preliminary "write-up." The Sunday newspapers were able to say that, when the House next met, a certain subject would be discussed: but there is a vast difference between an announcement which says that there will be a debate next Tuesday on the Home Guard and an announcement which says that when Parliament next meets there will be a debate on that subject. Moreover, the daily papers were unable to inform their readers that there would be an interesting debate that afternoon, and the result was that the ordinary individual could not have his appetite whetted. Those who have tried to follow parliamentary proceedings from a country where very full reports of debates are available, say Canada, but where no attempt at preliminary publicity is made, must already have been aware that, from a public point of view, the preliminary publicity is extraordinarily valuable. The experience of the past three months has proved this more widely. In this same connection it should be mentioned that the *Official Report* was usually not available until late the following afternoon, because the printing was done in London under a glass roof, and it was unreasonable to ask the printers to carry on while bombs were dropping around in the nightly *Blitz*. Sometimes, apparently, the *Official Report* could not be sent off until the second morning after the debate, and owing to postal delays it would not get into the country until at least two days later. Thus, the report of the debate held on a Tuesday might not be received in the country until the following Saturday or Monday. Admittedly, very few read

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the *Official Report*, but those who do are naturally those most interested in parliamentary proceedings.

Another reason for the decrease in interest was that the House continued to hold all its important debates in secret. Between the beginning of September and the end of November there were twenty-four debates: of these seven were taken in secret session, and these were, no doubt, the most important. The undesirability of this system of government by secret session was mentioned in the preceding article in this series. That it contributed substantially to the decline in public interest cannot be denied. The fact is that, apart from the Prime Minister's surveys of the war situation, which might easily have been given anywhere else, there was extraordinary little of general interest in the public debates. If Parliament is to perform its fundamental task of enabling the people to govern, it must enable the people to take part in its debates.

Finally, there have been no "politics." The debates are no longer an oratorical contest between opposing groups. They consist instead of a formal statement by the Minister concerned, followed by odd remarks by private and often odd members. Very rarely has any speech from the back benches been of sufficient interest to receive much attention in sadly attenuated newspapers. Moreover, Ministers have rarely replied to any discussion. For this there is a good explanation, given by the Prime Minister on several occasions. The introductory ministerial speeches are carefully prepared with the knowledge, as the Prime Minister puts it, that others are listening; the extempore concluding speech is dangerous because the Minister may be led to disclose more of his knowledge than he ought.

The fact that there are reasons for the decline of public interest does not detract from the importance of the consequences. It cannot be said too often that parliamentary government is not government by Parliament but government by the people through Parliament. This is an unrepresentative Parliament, and its personnel has been weakened by the calls of national service. Moreover, members themselves have shown their lack of interest by frequently staying away. Even so, it is the only institution that stands between the people and bureaucracy. The experience of the past three months

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has proved once more that a free democracy demands a free Press as well as a free Parliament. More must be done to enable the Press to pay attention to Parliament. Naturally, the chief remedy is to give them something interesting to print. The secret session habit is therefore the most important defect in our present system. A more rapid circulation of the *Official Report* would help a little; and in this connection it should be pointed out that the annual subscription remains the same although the House of Commons sits on three days a week instead of five, and although one-third of the debates are held in secret. The 1,300 subscribers are not purchasers of luxuries upon whom a hidden purchase tax should be imposed, but public benefactors who should be encouraged. Nevertheless, the *Official Report* is not likely to achieve the circulation of the *Saturday Evening Post*, and it is surely not impossible to provide for the duration of the war a more readable survey, edited by an independent but responsible journalist. Nor is there any reason why the more important speeches should not be broadcast from recordings. Indeed, the B.B.C. has not served Parliament well recently. The summary of the parliamentary debate, tacked on at the end of the latest Royal Air Force communiques, and perhaps after the description by "our observer" of the firing of an anti-aircraft gun, is completely inadequate.

II

Since Parliament has missed the public ear completely during the past three months, and since it is important to discover what the House of Commons has been doing during that period, it may be convenient to set out the dates and the subjects of the discussions:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Subject</i>
Thurs., Sept. 5	Adjournment	... War Situation (P.M. only)
		... Coal Industry
Tues., Sept. 17	Adjournment	... War Situation (P.M. only)
		... Secret Session (Air Attack)
Wed., Sept. 18 ?	Adjournment	... Secret Session (Air Attack)
Thur., Sept. 19 ?	Adjournment	... Secret Session (Air Attack—Transport)
Tues., Oct. 8	Adjournment	... War Situation
Wed., Oct. 9	Adjournment	... A.R.P.

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<i>Date</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Subject</i>
Thur., Oct. 10	Adjournment	... A.R.P.
Tues., Oct. 15	Government Motion	... Purchase Tax
	Adjournment	... War Aims
Wed., Oct. 16	Government Motion	... Vote of Credit
	Adjournment	... Physical Training
Thur., Oct. 17	Private Member's Motion	... National Health
Tues., Oct. 22	Consolidated Fund Bill	... Food Production
Wed., Oct. 23	Government Bill	... Prolongation of Parliament Bill
	Adjournment	... Exit Permit for H. G. Wells
Thur., Oct. 24 ?	Adjournment	... Air Defence
Tues., Nov. 5	Adjournment	... War Situation
Wed., Nov. 6	Supplementary Estimates	... Supplementary Pensions
	? Adjournment	... Secret Session (? Subject)
Thur., Nov. 7	Supplementary Estimates	... British Association for International Understanding
		... Internment Policy
	Adjournment	... Loss of H.M.S. <i>Glorious</i>
Tues., Nov. 12	Supplementary Estimates	... Camps
	? Adjournment	... Chief Whip
		... Secret Session (Apparently, future sittings)
Wed., Nov. 13	Adjournment	... Railway Fares
		... Military Pensions
Tues., Nov. 19	Government Bill	... Workmen's Compensation and Benefit Bill
	Adjournment	... Home Guard
Wed., Nov. 20	Adjournment	... War Effort of India, Burma and Colonies
	(Prorogation)	
Thur., Nov. 21	Address	... General
Tues., Nov. 26	Government Motion	... Business of the House
	Address	... General
Wed., Nov. 27	Address	... Industrial Production
Thur., Nov. 28	Address	... Secret Session (? The Army)

In peacetime, the House rarely meets during August and September. This year the urgency of the situation compelled meetings at intervals throughout the summer. The longest gaps were from August 22 to September 5, from September 5 to September 17, and from September 19 to October 8. There was another gap of a week between October 24 and November 5. Except on November 14, the House has otherwise met regularly on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. Usually, this successor of the old Autumn Session is occupied with clearing up Bills left over from the summer. This year there

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has been very little legislation left over because, though there has been as much legislation as usual during the 1939-40 session, it has rarely been contentious and the long debates in Committee of the whole House have not been necessary. Instead of filling up the time with formal motions, most discussions have been held on the motion for the adjournment. This process has given the House the greatest possible freedom, and it is remarkable that the debates have been sustained as debates. There is nothing in the practice of the House to prevent any member from raising any subject he pleases on the motion for the adjournment. The discussions might therefore consist of odd speeches by odd members who insisted on raising their pet subjects. In fact, however, there has been nothing of the kind. The subjects of debate have been settled through the usual channels, and members have kept to the subjects so decided upon. Once more the House has shown that the success of our parliamentary system depends not on the formal rules but on the desire of members to make the parliamentary system work. If debate is to be effective it must be conducted in some sort of order, and for a member to introduce the subject of deep shelters when the House is debating the Home Guard would be to render the procedure futile. It is also worthy of note that, during a period when many individuals have suffered special burdens through enemy action or thoughtless enthusiasm, members have kept to general questions and have not spent the whole time on raising the personal issues which burden so many legislatures.

The limitation to three days a week has not involved any limitation of the control exercised by the House over the Government. Throughout the session 1939-40 there were no private members' Bills or motions. In peacetime these occupy two of the five parliamentary days in most weeks of the session. Accordingly, Government action has been debated as frequently during that session as in normal times. The motion to take all private members' time and to prevent private members from introducing Bills was again passed in the new session. It is significant, too, that there was no opposition. An amendment was proposed for a different reason. There being now no Opposition, there is no

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organisation for taking up a subject on which a minority feels strongly. It was accordingly suggested that forty members should have the right to ask the House, without debate, to decide whether a motion should be discussed. This is, of course, a modified form of the ordinary urgency adjournment, which has been so rigidly limited by successive Speakers that it is now seldom of use. The Prime Minister objected to the proposal on the ground that it would interfere with the ordinary conduct of business, though Lord Winterton put the more cogent arguments that a subject could always be raised on the ordinary adjournment, and that the urgency adjournment was available for any definite matter of urgent public importance. The amendment was pressed to a division, but it was defeated by 183 votes to 22. The minority was composed of the left wing of the Labour Party, the I.L.P., a couple of independent members, and what may be called the Clement Davies ginger group.

There was only one other division during the period covered by these notes. The motion for the approval of the order for the commencement of the purchase tax was opposed, but was carried by 138 votes to 28, the minority consisting of Labour members. It will be noted that in both cases the number voting was low. It appears, in fact, to represent the number of members usually present during the more important stages of a debate. It is also to be noted that the division on the procedure amendment was taken at 1-20 p.m. after about one-and-a-half hours' debate, while that on the purchase tax was taken at 2-20 p.m. after about two-and-a-half hours' debate. Though the House is careful to keep its time of meeting a secret, the German Intelligence is surely intelligent enough to do the necessary calculation.

III

Since the most important debates must have taken place in secret sessions, it is a little misleading to consider those which the House deigned to have in public. In this connection it should be mentioned that there was never any question about going into secret session. On each occasion somebody "spied strangers," with the consequence that the motion for exclusion had to be put without debate. Nor was any

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question asked on the subject. In other words, the House appears to be unanimous that it should govern in secret, a conclusion which suggests that the debates in secret must be highly successful, or highly flattering to private members, or more probably both.

An opportunity for a discussion on the general war situation occurred on the 5th September, when the Prime Minister made a statement on the developments since the 22nd August, the date of the previous meeting of the House. The statement covered the agreement with the United States for the exchange of destroyers and bases, the mutilation of Rumania, and the progress of aerial warfare. There were plenty of subjects for debate in this statement, but the usual channels had obviously not been blocked, and Mr. Lawson from the Labour benches at once raised the question of the coal industry. If anything justifies the public ignorance of the House of Commons, this quiet and contemptuous change of subject was enough to justify it. Private individuals were being bombed and murdered, and the House decided to debate the supply of coal to the hearths that were no longer there. On the 17th September another opportunity occurred. Mr. Churchill made a short statement about the bombing of London and then, casting his eyes around, spied strangers. Before doing so, he justified his action: "There are some matters connected with our arrangements under air attack which I should prefer to discuss in private. I must remind the House that every word spoken in public session can be telegraphed all over the world; and that there is no reason why we should keep the enemy informed of the details of our arrangements, and thus enable him to inflict the maximum injury upon us. We do not receive similar information from him about his way of life; although, I am sure, our military staffs would be very much inconvenienced thereby. There are several things that I wish to say to the House, and I dare say there are many things that hon. Members would like to say to the Government." Hon. Members, however, have means of saying what they please in private: the people who have not the means of saying anything are the people who are gallantly facing the aerial bombardment. A public debate, with all the necessary reticence, at least gives them the general

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picture in which, for instance, the sufferings of those anonymous districts of London can be placed in their true proportion. It would, moreover, give those people the opportunity of making certain that their own ideas—about retaliation, for instance—are being put. That Hon. Members had many things to say is obvious from the fact that the whole of that week was occupied by secret debates on aerial warfare.

Perhaps it was the suspicion that common people were being treated rather scurvily that induced the authorities to hold the debate of the 8th October in public. The Prime Minister made a very comprehensive survey of the war situation, though he said very little (no doubt rightly) about Dakar. The rest of the debate was not very enlightening, though indeed nobody would expect it to be. It did enable some members, particularly Mr. Hore-Belisha and Mr. Poole, to say some of the things that needed to be said. Mr. Clement Davies made the kind of speech which one now associates with the ginger group, including a very relevant criticism of the organisation of the War Cabinet. Mr. John Morgan put into words a widespread suspicion of the present control of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Gallacher brought the debate to a sudden end by talking about deep shelters, the only subject which the Communist Party can take seriously until M. Stalin shows his hand. As is now customary, there was no reply from the ministerial benches. On the whole it was a good debate, and it is a great pity that the preceding debates were not in public.

The war situation was again debated in public on the 5th November. The Prime Minister was, for him, unusually optimistic, though he drew attention to the gravity of the shipping losses. He kept off the subject of relations with the Soviet Union, on which many members desired enlightenment. Mr. Lees-Smith emphasised the desirability of bombing military objectives in Italy. Sir Archibald Southby made the point that the Prime Minister said nothing which could not be read in the newspapers—a point which presumably induced Mr. Churchill to congratulate himself. The idea that the purpose of these debates is to give information is fundamentally false, and it lies behind the acquiescence of private members in government by secret session. Their curiosity is

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tickled and their sense of importance enhanced by the notion that they will be able to tell their wives something which is not in the newspapers. The purpose of debate is to give not news but views. It was, for instance, time that something was said about the absence of bases in Eire. No facts on this subject were forthcoming, but it was desirable that, on the one hand, the people of the United Kingdom should understand that the inability to use the Eire bases was a grave disadvantage, and on the other hand that Irish people should be induced to examine their consciences. Nor was it a disadvantage that a private member should say that a strong line ought to be taken with Eire, if only to show up the fact that Eire was getting all the advantages of neutrality through British protection and was contributing nothing in return. Mr. Hore-Belisha made an unusually critical speech which appeared to call for reply; but the possible disadvantage of adjournment debates was shown by the subsequent intervention of Mr. Quintin Hogg, who brought in a noisy red herring about a speech made by a member of an information committee in his constituency. There was, however, no answer to the general debate nor any attempt to catch the herring.

The last opportunity for general debate occurred in the new session, on the Address in reply to the King's Speech. The debate on the Address was in process when these notes were written, because the three days originally allocated by the Government proved not to be enough. The critical spirit was again manifest, but its extent cannot be gauged because the most important debate, that of the 28th November, was held in secret. On this occasion no statement was made by the Speaker, so that we are left to guess the subject from a remark made by a private member during the public debate, to the effect that the position of the Army was to be discussed.

The general debates do not enable any conclusion to be drawn as to the efficacy of parliamentary control. The general impression is that of a House generally satisfied with its leadership, but critical of particular actions and above all anxious to speed up the pace of the war. The impression may be faulty because the critics are naturally those most anxious to speak, and it is reasonably clear that neither Mr. Hore-

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Belisha nor Mr. Clement Davies carries much weight, either in the House or among the general public. Private impressions drawn from a narrow range of contacts and from the newspapers are necessarily misleading, but the opinion may be hazarded that the mass of people outside Parliament have been fully convinced that though nothing very cheerful is going to happen for some months the Government has the war well in hand.

It should be added, however, that Parliament has done much more than debate the war effort. A short debate on war aims was not very convincing because so few people are beginning to think of the war as having an end—perhaps an advantage in maintaining civilian morale, but a disadvantage if it prevents the public from thinking in entirely new terms of the post-war problems of the world. The debate which attracted the most attention was hardly a debate, because it consisted almost entirely of an attack by Captain Vyvyan Adams on the Chief Whip. It would have been more effective if chapter and verse had been given. The only point which emerged clearly was that Captain Margesson spent most of his time in the House instead of staying in his room. Captain Adams could not build a case on this fact alone, and he weakened it by blaming the Chief Whip for all the weaknesses and futilities of the National Governments headed by Mr. R. MacDonald, Lord Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain. It is true that the case was very difficult to make. If Captain Margesson was the *eminence grise*, the fact could be ascertained only by inference, and the only kind of factual basis that might have been produced was actual interference by the Whips' Office in the constituencies of members who were not content to be yes-men.

There was also a useful debate on the Home Guard—useful above all because the Home Guard consists of quite a substantial section of the civil population. An earlier debate on air raid precautions was valuable for the same reason. Can members not realise that this is their essential function, to put in public debate the difficulties which confront ordinary individuals in their daily life, and not to act as amateur strategists on the inadequate information that is given in secret sessions? Moreover, the value of question-time has

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not diminished. In particular, Mr. Herbert Morrison has been pushed by constant questioning into looking seriously into the problem of interned aliens. Since this subject has nothing to do with his control of air raid precautions, there is much to be said for the pre-war opinion that the Home Office and the Ministry of Home Security should be separated more clearly than they are at present. Civil defence is really a misnomer, since the greatest task is that of clearing the debris and restoring services. The Regional Commissioners are on the whole a poor lot, and they need much more stimulation from the centre.

IV

It would be unfair to judge the House of Commons on its proceedings in September, October and November. These are traditionally not parliamentary months. Until comparatively recently in its long history, the House did not sit in the autumn at all; and even in time of peace its proceedings in a comparable period would have appeared scrappy and inconclusive. This year the period has been one of waiting, the interregnum between the defeat of the first great attack on these Islands and the development of more powerful counter-attack during the coming year. No important legislation was necessary; the finances of the year had been provided; there were no great political issues; and, in short, there was no particular reason for having Parliament in session except the general principle that parliamentary control must be maintained. Moreover, the published proceedings may give a completely false impression. Since the public sessions were so dull it is inevitable to make the assumption, perhaps false, that the seven secret sessions were not. Nevertheless, the impression cannot be avoided that the House of Commons has lost ground as a democratic instrument during the past three months. It is no consolation that the present writer saw the decline coming and accordingly criticised in the preceding article the system of government by secret session. Parliament cannot be successful unless it is closely attuned to public opinion, and the evidence is incontestable that ordinary people are ignoring it. Even the most obvious trick of showmanship, the restoration of Big Ben to the

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nine o'clock news, was used by the B.B.C. not to remind its listeners that, *Blitz* or no, a democratic Parliament remained, but to prescribe a minute's silent contemplation for maiden ladies in trouble with their souls. However, the House will be successful not by means of showmen's tricks but by acting as the means by which public opinion can be formed and expressed. The newspapers will print parliamentary news if there is any. News is, however, of secondary importance, and in any case there is likely to be much less news in Parliament than elsewhere. The democratic process is a process of constant argument over different opinions. The House of Commons begins the public debate which is carried on by the weekly journals of opinion and the monthly reviews. From them it percolates into the leading articles and thence into the railway carriage, the factory and the office. In spite of that notorious poster which began "If you must talk . . ." people are talking now more than they ever were. The pitch-black railway carriage during the nightly "Alerts" makes it necessary to talk, and the public shelter gives one new neighbours with whom opinions can be exchanged. The reply of the hon. Member for Bumbleton to the hon. Member for North-East Blankshire ought to set the tone for the reply of the Small Bass to the Double Scotch. There is no longer much relation between parliamentary debates and casual conversations because the House of Commons is burying itself in its Maginot Line. Parliament, for ordinary people, is not only not in the news; it is also out of the war.

APPENDIX

(Complete Session, 1939-40)

Address in reply to the King's Speech	..	..	6	days
Government Legislation..	..	..	35	days
Finance	..	..	36½	days
Adjournment Debates in Public	..	..	27	days
Secret Sessions	..	..	10	days
Government Motions	..	..	4	days
Opposition and Private Members' Motions	..	..	6½	days
Total			125	days

REFLECTIONS ON AIR RAIDS

By KINGSLEY MARTIN

WHEN war broke out, the terror of air raids was far greater than it was when the great raids began in September, 1940. Fear, like other emotions, wears out, even when it is anticipatory fear. Fear withstood, as we have seen lately, wears out even more quickly. We have had so long to get used to the idea of raids. Spain, China, Warsaw, Rotterdam, had given a sober actuality to a horror which a few years ago had the quality of nightmare. Then we had had the experience of a period of "nuisance bombing" during which we learnt to adjust our habits to the expectation of death from the air. Adjustment has been surprisingly quick; Tom Harrisson cites as an interesting example that on September 12th, 31 per cent of those who were questioned by Mass Observation reported that they got no sleep at all on a noisy night, while on September 22nd all but 9 per cent were finding it possible to sleep some of the time. According to expectation there should have been a large number of neurotic hospital cases in the early raids. Fear, we know, can be countered either by running away or by fighting back. If both these outlets are denied, the expected result is a large crop of shell-shock or hysteria. The Government had provided elaborately for casualties of this kind; the best psychologists with the experience of shell-shock in the last war stood by waiting in special hospitals. Hardly any cases came. Minor cases of hysteria were easily treated at First Aid posts. An expert analysis of the reasons for this remarkable psychological stability would be valuable. Several factors at once suggest themselves in part explanation. The horror had been long expected and was less terrible in reality than it had been in imagination. Note that few individuals have experienced long-continued bombing of the severity of a large-scale bombardment in the last war. I believe that one of the most important factors is that people are capable of vicarious fighting. That is to say, they identified themselves with the legendary successes of the R.A.F., and later,

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when the night-bombers seemed to be getting through too easily, the A.A. barrage provided a surprising amount of comfort. All observers agree that this awe-inspiring noise had an almost magical effect in steadying the nerves of harassed Londoners. The barrage is a poor defence in itself; it drove the aeroplanes high and so made bombing indiscriminate, but I believe it saved London from panic at a critical moment. When I came back from Spain and gave evidence about the effect of bombing on civilian morale, I reported that people would stand it almost endlessly provided that they were conscious of a defence and could feel a sporting interest in the battle overhead.

During last summer it became a commonplace to say that civilians are in the front line in this war. But the Docks in September were in the front line in an actual, not a metaphorical or symbolical sense. And yet it was long before most of the papers sent special reporters to the scene of action. The bombing of Helsinki or Warsaw or Shanghai were signals for papers like *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* to rush out their star reporters. But it never seemed to occur to the editors of these papers that almost as good a story, and one even more important to the British public, could be found at the end of a journey on the District Railway. The only paper that was immediately on the spot was the *Daily Herald*, which happened to have on its staff Mr. Ritchie Calder, who had intimate knowledge of some of the most badly-hit areas. His first splash story was in the *Daily Herald*, and later, in more detail, in *The New Statesman and Nation* he described how several hundred homeless workers were housed in a school in the most deadly spot in Dockland and left there without shelter until most of them were bombed again and many of them killed three days later. The carelessness of a charabanc driver had something to do with this disaster. But the sting in Mr. Calder's story lay in the exposure of the breakdown of local government in the East End and the lack of preparation for dealing with the biggest of all air raid problems.

When the bombing began, the A.R.P., the W.V.S., the fire-fighters, rescue squads and bomb-disposal units all proved both brave and efficient. But the services which

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were supposed to cope with the living and unwounded were immediately overwhelmed and almost helpless. The authorities had ill-defined and overlapping functions. Secondly, the preparations made by the Ministries of Home Security and Health were based on a conception of the war which was falsified by events. Hundreds of thousands of papier-maché coffins were ready; the hospitals were empty and well-staffed. A scheme was fully prepared for accepting and evacuating at least 20,000 casualties a week. As it turned out, most of the casualties (which were not nearly so numerous as had been expected) could not even be dug out from the mountain of rubble above them. There were comparatively few hospital cases and not much work for First Aid posts. Instead, there were vast numbers of casualties of a different kind for whom no preparation had been made. An East-ender, whose home had been destroyed, is for all practical purposes a casualty. He and his family are usually completely destitute. His place of work has often gone with his home and the fragments of splintered wood that lie amongst the rubble of brick are all that remains of his life's savings. Often he has kept a few pounds in the house; almost always, he has invested in furniture. And note that destruction in the East End is of a different order from that in the West End. Where the houses are substantially built, bombs make ugly gashes; it has been calculated that a bomb will destroy about one house in the West End, and three in a comfortable suburban area. In the East End, one large explosion may render uninhabitable several streets of houses. I recall one spectacle in particular, though it is typical of many. A large block of modern flats stands with its windows blown in, just as you might see it in any part of London. A hundred yards away there is an enormous crater round which there are perhaps two acres of bricks and mortar so completely demolished that you could not have told there had been houses standing there. Running out from this centre of destruction are half a dozen streets in which no house can be considered habitable. Even where the walls are standing, the doors and walls and ceiling are gone. One such explosion is said to have destroyed or rendered uninhabitable as many as four hundred houses. In such areas

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in the weeks immediately following the intense bombing in the East End, there was no gas or electricity and seldom any water. Some dock areas to which the communications were also shattered were as completely isolated as a moorland village in a snowstorm. But the people survived and had, somehow, to be cared for. This part of the problem had not been envisaged.

One of the difficulties was the lack of buildings in the East End which could serve as "emergency rest homes" for any considerable number of people. There were only schools and churches, and a large proportion of East End schools and churches were destroyed. There was almost no arrangements for communal feeding, and the variety of services uncoordinated and run by different authorities, required for a bombed-out person, was surprising. There was no one person able to tell these people where they should go to be fed, to find shelter for the night, to be given a few shillings for immediate necessities, to learn whether their house was considered uninhabitable, whether they had to go on paying rent, or whether, on the contrary, they would themselves receive compensation; to know when and how they could be evacuated, or be given the money for the railway fare—no one who could tell them more than one of these things at the same time. Take, for example, a woman and her daughter whom I found in a ruined street devastated by a large explosion. This woman, after long wandering, went to one of the departments which should deal with her case. She was sent, in all, to five different addresses in her utterly worn-out condition, kept as long as two hours waiting in some cases, finally reaching an address where she was told to come back at nine the next morning. We calculated that this involved a walk of five miles. After telling us this story, she turned to a young woman in a small derelict shop at the corner and said, "Have you seen my cat?" "I've fed twenty this morning," said the girl, "what is yours like?" "Mine is a tabby," said the woman. When we left, half a dozen cats had arrived and a tabby was sorted out. The woman went into a house, of which the structure was still standing, with the tabby. Her chief worry was over. The girl at the shop was worth knowing. She was completely

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cheerful. All the front of her shop was gone, and it seemed to contain nothing except a few bottles of sweets and chocolate and a few packets of cigarettes. She declared her intention of reopening the shop at once, and I bought chocolate for some children near. A young mother told us a similar story of the impossibility of finding what authority would evacuate you, and where to get relief and where to get a meal and so forth. She said naturally, though I know mistakenly, that the authorities "did not care what happened to you."

She was wrong, no doubt. But lack of money often produces results that are hard to differentiate from callousness. Contrast the treatment which victims of raids receive in the West End. People dug out of their shelters are immediately taken off in taxis to hotels, given hot drinks and warm beds in an underground shelter—as they should be. Some of these people, in East London, wandered about for thirteen hours, having lost every possession in the world except what they stood up in, and were directed to a series of addresses which involved as much as eight miles of walking before they were cared for.

I have quoted here from an article which was published in the *New Statesman* on October 5th. Mr. Morrison was appointed Minister of Home Security and Miss Ellen Wilkinson Under-Secretary in the week it appeared. They were confronted with an enormous task. Their problem could be considered under three heads. First, the problem of evacuation and care of the homeless. Second, the problem of improving existing shelter accommodation; people who had to remain in London and who could not remain in their homes had to be provided with a place to sleep that was warm and dry and sanitary. Lord Horder's Report confirmed the fears of those who prophesied serious epidemics. Thirdly, more shelter accommodation had to be provided, and the demand of those who advocated deep shelters had to be granted or refused. Let me take these three problems in order. Many of us who visited the East End at that time wanted to make evacuation of useless mouths compulsory. Ever since the beginning of the war, parents had been persuaded by one means or another to send their children

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to the country and mothers to evacuate with their small children. The first evacuation in September, 1939, had been a failure. The transport and the initial arrangements were good, but the problems of billeting proved almost insuperable. In the quiet, dull winter of 1939-40, the majority of women and children returned to London, and in the course of twelve months many had evacuated and returned two or three times over. There were many reasons. London was less bombed than they expected; occasional bombs fell in reception areas. They found the social problems of billeting with country people intolerably difficult. Both parties to the bargain were disillusioned and irritated. Women hated the parting from their husbands; probably the most common reason for returning to London was the natural fear that the husband could not look after himself and that he would find someone else to do it for him. Anyone who talked to the women lined up in queues for shelters, sometimes in the mornings or early afternoons, discovered a sea of perplexity and indecision on the matter. The children were healthier in the country. It would be safer and better for both mother and child to go. The women would agree with the kindly social worker who questioned them that it was their duty to get the children out of London. They would certainly like to go themselves, but their husbands had to stop behind. Often they would be persuaded and agree to go, and then not turn up at the appointed time and place. They could not make up their minds; and the fact that Mrs. Smith next door had had an unsatisfactory time in the country and had decided not to go away again would be enough to make them alter their minds at the last minute. I found in those days of intensive bombing that a group of the best-informed and most experienced social workers in the East End were agreed that Mr. Morrison could apply compulsion to the problem of evacuation with safety and advantage, provided—and the proviso was absolute—that good communal meals and good shelter were somehow or other established for the working members of the family who had to remain in London. They thought that if the intensive bombardment of the East End continued, the whole area should be taken over and administered by the

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central authority, that a single Welfare Board should be set up to deal with the problems of the homeless; that all who were not working should be evacuated and, in a word, that badly-bombed areas should no longer be treated as places of civilian life but rather as a defence area would be treated in the event of invasion. They were careful to add, however, that there was a vital objection to the phrase "defence area." It is a technical term which envisages martial law and all the rest of it. There was no reason, they said, for a single rifle or bayonet in the East End. Indeed, it would be fatal to introduce military methods. But if the troops would come and bring field-kitchens and help in the work of demolition and rescue, everyone would be glad to see them. After all, the troops would only be the sons of the civilians who were being bombed come back to their ruined homes dressed in uniform and working under discipline.

Mr. Morrison did not accept this suggestion, and as the intense bombing of the East End eased, he has been justified in the decision. The Ministry of Health were able to announce in November that only about 80,000 children remained in London and troops have been allowed gradually to take on the work of rescue and demolition. The care of the homeless is now vastly improved, and many of the suggestions put forward by Sir John Anderson's critics have by now been accepted by Mr. Morrison.

About the second problem—the question of improving existing shelters—I do not want to write at length. The Press has taken it up in great detail since the early weeks in which investigators like Tom Harrison went round sleeping in the shelters, and journalists on many papers started an agitation for decent sanitation, for bunks, for wardens and organisation. Since then there has been much improvement, especially in a few big shelters about which we made most of the fuss. When I first saw the great warehouse in which fourteen thousand people slept at night, it was an astonishing sight—rather like an oriental bazaar with a rough and mixed population, with beds made on stacks of margarine (removed only after I made a row with the Ministry of Food several weeks after the store began to be used as a shelter), with a

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few pails for lavatories which overflowed and crept like a tide up to the blankets. A policeman told me that they found a corpse there one day—"an old man; and when we found him his legs were covered with maggots." This shelter is now comparatively decent, with many less inhabitants, with bunks and water closets. But the shelters as a whole have not seen the improvement that was promised. Miss Wilkinson promised a million bunks by November 19th; there were only 50,000 in all shelters by the end of November. The disparity between promise and achievement was so great that it was unwise of Miss Wilkinson to attack her critics as malicious. She had made improvements and it was, as she said, wrong to deny them. But for many people things had changed for the worse, because bad weather meant walls and ceilings that dripped, day and night, on to the bedding and faces of those who tried to sleep. It meant damp and it meant cold, or, at best, the warmth of unwashed bodies. It meant a growth of the lice population, and it increased the risk of disease. Communal feeding advanced, but slowly in relation to the whole problem, and in Coventry, and especially in Southampton, when the great bombing took place, the emergency organisation of all the services, including food, was, at the outset, deplorably bad. Some of the shelter problems were extremely difficult to solve—technical problems of great complexity. Others, the majority, were not solved because of local authorities with whom the executive duties finally lay were utterly inadequate. Mr. Morrison and Miss Wilkinson, both of whom have worked with the utmost energy and devotion, had to contend with two special difficulties: shortage of materials (part of the general question of organisation of production for war under a capitalist system) and the failure of local authorities.

I want to say something about these local authorities. In the East End they failed utterly, as I have said. They failed because they had not the personnel to do the job. Sometimes they were corrupt; almost always they were inefficient. The antique boroughs—kept in existence, as Lord Balfour admitted, to prevent the L.C.C. from organising London—overlap and are for the most part safe seats for

Labour. Their conquest has been a life's work for many devoted people, not least among them being Mr. Morrison himself. For that reason, as well as others, Mr. Morrison's appointment was really rather a cruel one. None knows so well as Mr. Morrison that to-day, when the political battle is regarded locally as won, the local Labour leaders are often mere pensioners maintaining their positions less because of present merit than because of past services. Labour does not dismiss old servants, especially when the jobs have salaries attached. The Labour M.P.'s for East London are mainly elderly men, without initiative and without much contact with their constituents. There are exceptions, like Jimmy Hall, and a few councillors like Charlie Key and the Mayor of Poplar, who did all that they could. But recognised leaders on the Councils have counted surprisingly little in this crisis. Mr. Morrison, who knows all this better than anyone else alive, must also know that to confer more powers on some of these Councils, to grant them "permissive" authority, is often a mockery. Even when their officers were honest and efficient, the task was far beyond their strength. They are handicapped by a salary structure which overpays a man at the top, pays about one other local official adequately, and then only pays enough to obtain very poor material for the rest of the personnel. I prophesy that Mr. Morrison will even yet have to deal drastically with some of these authorities. It is difficult for him; he is a good democrat, skilled in the art of persuasion, and rightly anxious to work as far as possible through democratically-elected bodies. In some cases he has had to make his own appointments and supervise the work to be done. He has not adequately guarded against the mistake of assuming that because a Minister announces a decision his wishes will be promptly carried out. Mr. Morrison has all the qualifications, the knowledge, the capacity and experience for this post. He should make a magnificent success of it. He must not fail. There are those who hope that he will fail, knowing that, if he does, Labour's authority in this Government will be irrevocably undermined, and that if the Labour members of the Government are discredited, democracy as a whole stands little chance of surviving, even if others are found—which is far from

tain—who, by more ruthless methods, achieve a more obvious surface success.

This failure of local government to stand the strain of the war is of incalculable importance. There are few political leaders in the East End to-day. The real leaders are a number of devoted and disinterested priests, ministers and doctors. The best known of these is Father Groser. He is certainly one of the most remarkable and saintly of men; a priest with the authority that comes from faith and experience; a man of infinite compassion, courage and devotion. In Stepney he speaks with unique authority. He became for a few weeks headline news in the Press for the simple reason that journalists who went East in search of news seldom got beyond Stepney. There, only a few miles from the City, they found Father Groser in one of the most devastated areas in London, working day and night; he seemed the one person certain to get something done and to provide, amid chaos, a centre of calm and efficient hustle. But if the journalists had gone farther East they would have found essentially the same phenomenon everywhere—that the real leaders were a few individual doctors, social workers, heads of clubs and settlements, but most often priests and ministers of character and authority who directed, persuaded, ordered, fed and provided comfort (physical as well as spiritual) where, otherwise, comfort there was none.

I come now to Mr. Morrison's third function—the question of deep shelters.

Two years ago, when some still hoped there might be no war and others were clamouring for deep shelters for the whole population, a leading Communist said that the day would come when the public would take over the Tubes as shelters in spite of official prohibition, and that occasion would be the beginning of the revolution in England. The first part of this prophesy was fulfilled in the first week of September; there is at present no sign that the second part will also come true.

The Communist Party was not alone in prophesying that the public would insist on using the Tubes. There were highly-placed officials who also foresaw that people would

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insist on going underground in big raids, even if the stations were unhealthy and liable to be turned into death-traps by flooding. But successive Home Secretaries had dug their toes in from the beginning in the matter of deep shelters. They had used the Hailey Committee to reinforce their own view. The arguments were numerous and of varying quality. Deep shelters for the whole population were considered impracticable, and every discouragement was put in the way of Finsbury's effort to demonstrate to the contrary. There were numerous technical difficulties. London, in particular, is already honeycombed underground with sewers and water mains, while the East End, where deep shelters would be most needed, is mainly built on drained marsh; water is found not far beneath the surface. Further, the Minister argued, there was grave danger in crowding people together. A direct hit on a communal shelter might kill thousands; if the people were dispersed, it would kill no more than a few. The cost of deep shelters was regarded as prohibitive, and the amount of concrete and steel required would seriously impede the war effort in other directions. Perhaps the most important argument, however, was that in the event of great raids we should have to learn to carry on daily life without security. Ministers feared, or said they feared, that workers engaged in vital production would learn the habit of finding security when it was essential that they should learn to work in danger. The Home Secretaries added that there was not time for any great extension of deep shelters. Either the war would come before we were ready, or the war would not come and they would not be needed.

The night raiding of September, 1940, made most of these arguments look silly. If the job had been tackled two years ago there would now have been a large measure of security, and the necessary expansion of cement and steel production, now wanted for other fields of war activity, would long ago have been accomplished. If the job had been tackled two years ago, the technical difficulties could have been overcome and the cost would have been behind us instead of coming at a time when the burden is already so large. As for the argument about "carrying on under fire," it disappeared, since we had learned to work in day-

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time—raids or no raids. The problem was one of sleep. So powerful was the urge to find a place for sleep which was moderately quiet, as well as safe, that the L.P.T.B. gracefully gave way when London crowds demanded admission to the Undergrounds; and large warehouses, by no means suitably equipped or protected, were opened as shelters. Anderson shelters stood up to blast and shrapnel extraordinarily well, and even the brick surface shelters were stronger than had been expected. But they were clearly of little use to most people in the winter, and they were, in any case, so exposed and so apparently unsafe and so noisy that to place bunks in them was, in many areas, largely a waste of money and trouble. It was obvious that there must be an extension of underground shelter, but also that now there was really not time to do more than turn over a larger number of Tube stations wholly for shelters and to begin the work of scooping out new tube passages which would serve rather for next than for this winter. The demand that City basements, reinforced for day use, should be taken over by the general public at night, and that other underground shelters should be improvised wherever possible, was general and spontaneous. Since the Communists had been among the first to demand deep shelters, they naturally made what capital they could out of the Government's failure to provide them.

When Mr. Morrison was appointed Minister of Home Security, the outcry about the condition of the shelters and the lack of deep shelter was already loud and irresistible. The newspapers after a slow beginning dealt with the problem in a variety of ways. The *Herald* was noticeably constructive; the *Daily Worker* gave the impression of being less interested in the repair of deficiencies than in using the whole shelter scandal as a political stick with which to beat the Government and the upper classes. The *News Chronicle* began to print spectacular news stories about shelters and ran editorial demands for improvement. The Conservative Press in general talked about the heroism and cheerfulness of the common people under difficulties in a way which was rather exasperating than satisfying. On the feature page of one London newspaper Lady Patricia Ward wrote:

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"The East End loved it. They settled themselves down each night, on rugs and cushions and blankets, along the corridors; in the day-time they sat in the tip-up seats and sent their children to play in a disused ice-rink at the back of the stage . . . and wasn't it a lovely, bright place, almost like a palace? So they told each other."

It will be seen that when Mr. Morrison was appointed, the question of deep shelters was already charged with strong political emotions. He himself had advocated a much bolder shelter policy, as leader of the L.C.C., and the Communists were quick to point out the contradictions between his earlier statements and the caution of his policy once he had come to office. In his first speech in the House of Commons as Home Secretary, made two days after his appointment, he attacked the Communist Party (without mentioning it by name) and suggested that many of the complaints that were being made were in the nature of defeatist and Fifth Columnist propaganda. He returned to this theme in a subsequent broadcast. At the same time, he made a survey of the deep shelter possibilities, opened new Tubes for shelters, and announced a policy of digging out headings which would be ready for the winter of 1941. He was better than his word. He knew that the demand for deep shelter came from the instinct of helpless people. Communists sought to use that instinct, like other politicians, for their party purposes. The right reply to the Communist is to remedy grievance, not to attack him as a Fifth Columnist.

I began by remarking on an unexpected capacity to adjust to a horror which, in imagination, had seemed final and intolerable. That Londoners would ever put out thousands of incendiary bombs with their hands during the night, that there would be no panic even when whole areas of a great city were under constant bombardment, that 80 per cent of London's population would sleep in their own homes during great air raids, that thousands would put up with the smell and the crowd in the Undergrounds, that we should learn to sleep through the A.A. barrage and scarcely mention it when bombs dropped close to us—all this would have

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seemed impossible before the war. I realised it very clearly one day in a railway train when, in the course of an hour's journey, everyone in the carriage began to talk, as people do only in war-time. A woman and her child were evacuating after their home had been destroyed. A hospital employee had astonishing stories to tell of the behaviour of patients and residents during air raids. One of the party had been on a Thames patrol boat in the docks on the Saturday afternoon when the German aeroplanes had it all their own way. His view of one of the most surprising fire displays in history had only been interrupted by the fact that his boat was tossed about from one bank to the other as the bombs fell and blazing timber was hurled into the water. An apple-cheeked country boy of 20 belonged to a bomb disposal squad. He told us as a joke that when the pick-axes hit the bomb, as they always did a few times before it was pulled out, "we always give a cheer." Any one of these people could have told a story that would have put them on the front page as heroes in any newspaper in time of peace. No doubt they experienced a variety of violent emotions, but if fear was one of them it did not show. The truth is that, faced with actual danger, the human animal is almost infinitely courageous. It is seldom cowardice that defeats people. Defeatism may come from disillusion, excessive physical misery, and, above all, from lack of direction. That was our difficulty before the war. The charge of cowardice in the disastrous years before the war was nonsense. We dithered, not from fear, but from lack of decision about which way to move. One way seemed to lead to Nazi domination, the other to war; both were catastrophes beyond analysis or calculation. That is why war itself came as a relief to many people—for the moment it gave a sense of direction. That is why the summer of 1940 was also comparatively easy. The danger was so obvious and so close that few could doubt what to do. But a long winter of bombing, disorganisation and black-out brings back the old difficulty. For most people there is too little and not too much to do in this war. The uncertainty of any war aim beyond "survival," the lack of assurance about the future, the lunacy of the whole affair, the monotony of a 16-hour black-

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out ; above all, the immense difference between the conditions of the poor and the rich—these are the factors, not lack of courage, which are dangerous to what is known as "morale." There is only one thing which can make a civilised people face the monstrosity which is modern war. They will face and endure it to the end if they feel that it is "their war." They will not face it to preserve a social order in which they no longer believe. They will not endure it if there is food shortage in some places and in some classes of society and not in others, if some can sleep and have leisure and others cannot sleep and cannot find work. That is why the question of shelters and the question of war aims are in reality two aspects of a single problem.

ENGLAND AND THE ALIENS

By NORMAN BENTWICH

AMONG the historic monuments of London which have been destroyed by the too discriminate bombing, that seems to choose the precious things, are the Dutch Church in Austin Friars in the City and the Elizabethan Hall of the Middle Temple. The two buildings have a special association with the English tradition of giving asylum to refugees from religious and political persecution. The Church was the centre of both the Dutch Huguenots and the Polish refugees who fled to our shores in the 16th and 18th centuries. The Hall contained a screen which was the gift of Huguenot refugees, a token of their gratitude to this country. England has been for centuries the classic land of refuge for exiles from the continental states of Europe ; and for centuries alien immigrants were encouraged. The development of British trade and industry owes a great debt to them.

The first modern legislation¹ which introduced some check to the flow of aliens was an Act passed at the beginning of the 19th century—when the fear of the French Revolution was strong—to empower His Majesty by Order in Council to restrict the ports at which aliens might be landed. But that Act, provoked by war, was not long on the Statute Book, and no further regulation of immigration was enacted till the early years of the 20th century. Then the coming of numbers of aliens from Eastern Europe, mostly Russian Jews who settled in the East End of London and other big towns, excited agitation ; and the Conservative Government of Mr. Arthur Balfour passed the Aliens Act 1905, which gave power to prevent the landing of "undesirable immigrants" and to expel "undesirable aliens." The immigrant was considered "undesirable" if he could not show that he had in his possession, or was in a position to obtain, the means of decently supporting himself and his dependents, or if, owing to any disease or infirmity, he

¹ For the summary of the English legislation the writer is indebted to an excellent book : *Control of Aliens in the British Commonwealth*, by C. F. Fraser. (Hogarth Press, 1940).

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appeared likely to be a charge on the rates or a detriment to the public. There was, however, an express reservation: "In the case of an immigrant who proves that he is seeking admission to this country solely to avoid persecution or punishment on religious grounds . . . leave to land shall not be refused on the ground merely of want of means or the probability of becoming a charge on the rates." The Act provided also for an appeal by the immigrant refused admission to an Immigration Board of persons having magisterial, business or administrative experience.

At the outbreak of the War of 1914, the Act was supplemented by the Aliens Restriction Act which gave powers in time of war or imminent national danger to impose further restrictions. Though designed to meet the exigencies of hostilities, it was extended by an Act passed at the end of the war. The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919, ominously stated in its first section that the powers shall *for a period of one year* be exercisable not only in the circumstances mentioned in the principal Act, but at any time. It extended the power of regulation and laid down fresh restrictions, which prohibited aliens from holding a pilot's certificate, acting as chief officer on ships of the mercantile marine, appointment in the Civil Service, or sitting upon a jury. Enacted in the spirit of the "Hang the Kaiser" election, it included a general provision for deportation of former enemy aliens, that is, German or Austrian subjects, and for refusing admission to any former enemy alien for a period of three years without permission of the Secretary of State. In addition, disabilities were imposed on former enemy aliens, to acquire an interest in land in the Kingdom, in a key industry, or in a company owning a British ship.

The sting of this war and post-war legislation was in the tail-piece, the Aliens Order which was issued under it in 1920. The measure, enacted for one year, proved to be one more example of the adage that nothing is so permanent as the provisional. The Order amplified provisions of the Act of 1905 as regards admission, supervision and deportation of aliens, and the restrictions introduced during the war on the residence of and possession of certain articles by enemy aliens; and departing from constitutional tradition, it

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contained no exception in favour of refugees from persecution. Every alien above the age of sixteen was required to register with the police in the district in which he is resident and to notify any change of residence, both to the place where he lived and the place of fresh sojourn. Moreover, he could not engage in work without special permit. Enemy aliens in time of war were subject to more rigid conditions as regards residence and removal, and were prohibited from having in their possession a motor-car, a camera, a map of a certain size, or any documents depicting a ship, aircraft, etc., used by the Forces of the Crown. An abortive attempt was made in 1927 to amend the legislation by restoring the Immigration Board which had been set up by the Act of 1905, and the exception in favour of refugees from persecution. When war broke out, the restrictions laid down by the Acts of 1914 and 1919 and the Order were in full force and the discretion of the Home Secretary was absolute.

On the other hand, at the outbreak of war England had become a gathering place of exiles from many countries in the struggle of Europe for freedom. Already for a year before the war she had resumed her habit of granting asylum, and nearly 100,000 victims of Nazi persecution from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and a small number of refugees from Italy and Spain, had been admitted. It is a paradox that, having given shelter to this mass of exiles, England has found it necessary to deprive a large part of them of their freedom and intern them as if they were potential enemies.

The total number of aliens in England is estimated at 250,000. They include:

- (a) Alien enemies in the normal sense, *i.e.*, subjects of enemy countries who were voluntarily resident in September, 1939;
- (b) Refugees from persecution in the enemy countries who were admitted before the war;
- (c) War refugees from Allied countries who have fled to England during the war; and
- (d) Aliens from neutral countries in Europe, North and South America and elsewhere. As to this last class the war has not brought any special restriction.

Many of those who were formerly German, Austrian,

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Czech or Polish subjects are now legally stateless. But that character rarely affects, to their benefit, their status during the war. The principle laid down in the Aliens Order 1920, is that where it is uncertain what nationality, if any, is to be ascribed to an alien, he may be treated as a national of the state with which he appears to be most closely connected for the time being. The official mind has been unable to divest itself of the association of national origin and allegiance.

Persons who came from Germany, Austria and Italy, and were German and Italian subjects, or stateless, have been treated as enemy aliens, whether or not they were admitted to England as refugees from persecution. Persons coming from other countries occupied by the Nazis are treated as alien friends.

The striking feature of the alien population at the outbreak of the war was the large number of refugee sojourners. The stream of political and racial exiles had flown from Germany since 1933; but till the end of 1938 only a small rivulet had made its way to England. Out of 200,000 who left, those who remained in this country were not more than 10,000. Many who had come in transit were able to emigrate to Palestine, the United States and other overseas lands. The condition had been strictly enforced that the refugee immigrant must satisfy the officer at the port that he was in a position to maintain himself or would be maintained here by friends. Sir John Hope-Simpson, writing at the end of 1938 his monumental survey on the refugee problem for Chatham House, observed that "the initiative of Great Britain in international work would be greatly strengthened if she could show a braver record as a country of sanctuary." While there had been abundant sympathy with the cause of refugees both in the general and the Jewish public, admission was selective, and the permission to work of those exiles who were admitted was narrowly restricted. In what Sir John called conditions of pandemic economic nationalism, the theory of the lump of labour was generally accepted. It was feared that every refugee who was allowed to engage in work would be taking away employment from a British subject, and so adding to the burden of unemployment.

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Despite proof that aliens who had been allowed to establish business or industry were giving work to a much larger number of British subjects than the total of refugees, that fallacy persisted and still persists.

The problem of the refugees from Germany engaged the interest of the League of Nations since the Assembly in 1933—the last in which Germany took part—appointed a High Commissioner for the refugees, Jewish and other, coming from Germany. That action followed the example of the League in dealing twelve years earlier with the mass of refugees from Soviet Russia. The first High Commissioner was an American, Mr. James McDonald; he was followed in 1936 by an Englishman, General Sir Neill Malcolm, who was succeeded in 1939 by Sir Herbert Emerson. The League office occupied itself particularly with the juridical condition of the refugees, and it contrived to secure the adoption in 1938 of an International Convention which gave the refugees in the signatory countries a minimum of civil status and some prospect—it was not more—of relaxation of the rules restricting employment of aliens and the grant of social aid to aliens. Great Britain ratified, in 1939, that Convention, and a similar instrument concerning the Nansen (Russian and Armenian) refugees; and to that extent modified the law which made no distinction between refugees and other aliens. No steps, however, were taken by the Government to implement the Convention by an Order in Council or other legislative measure; and its application was left, like so much regulation of aliens, to the wisdom and discretion of the Home Secretary.

The inadequacy of the League office to find homes for the refugees, particularly after the Nazi rape of Austria threatened another quarter of a million Jews and "non-Aryans" with extinction, led to a fresh initiative by President Roosevelt for international effort. Another conference was held at Evian in July, 1938, and a permanent Inter-governmental Committee was constituted to assist the settlement overseas of the refugees and to devise a plan of emigration. Lord Winterton was the Chairman, and Sir Herbert Emerson was later appointed as the Director also of this Committee. Sir John Hope-Simpson noted that the machinery was

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created, but what was needed was action. Surveys of territories for settlement were made in British Guiana, Northern Rhodesia, San Domingo and elsewhere. But the execution tarried long, and little had been done when the war broke out. A decisive change in the English attitude to the problem was brought about in the year preceding the war. Following Munich and the assassination of a German diplomat by a young frenzied Jew in Paris, the Nazis indulged in an orgy of destruction against the whole Jewish population in the Reich; and it was made clear that their policy was no longer elimination of Jews from public and economic activities, but extermination. A wave of indignation and sympathy swept the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The doors of asylum in England were again opened. A continuous and increasing exodus of Jews and non-Aryans was admitted for permanent or temporary sojourn. The Movement for the Care of Children took responsibility for 10,000 boys and girls, placed them in homes and hostels in all parts of the country, and enabled them to continue their education in English schools. Thousands of young men and women between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five were brought for training in industry and agricultural occupations, and were likewise distributed in hostels and training centres and private homes. A still larger number of women, married and unmarried, were admitted for domestic service. Thousands more of adult men and women were admitted under guarantee of individuals in this country, some of them having a prospect of emigration to the United States or other lands, within one or two years, and allowed here in transit, others being old persons for whom there was a guarantee of maintenance for their life. Finally, a camp for 3,500 men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five was established at Richborough, Kent, as a place of transit and training for those who had a prospect of emigration overseas, and had to be taken out of Germany to save them from continued incarceration in concentration camps.

The funds required for the maintenance and emigration of the refugees who were without means were contributed entirely by private sources. The central Jewish organisation, which had already raised in England before 1938 £1,500,000,

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raised a further million pounds. Various Christian and undenominational bodies collected substantial if smaller sums for the non-Jewish refugees. The work of the Friends (Quakers) was "a lonely example of effective help for the non-Jewish victims brought to England." The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning collected a large sum for the help of academic exiles without discrimination of creed, and brought home to the Universities both the call to vindicate academic freedom and the opportunity provided by the migration of scholars and scientists. England gained, in this way, the services of nearly 400 eminent men of science and scholarship. There was a less generous admission to work of professional men and women. The trade-union spirit of the doctors and dentists was strong. But a limited number of refugee aliens in those professions were enabled to qualify in England; altogether some 250 medical doctors and 150 dentists who had qualified were allowed to practise. Following the brutal pogroms in Germany, Lord Baldwin broadcast a national appeal for a fund to assist the refugees without distinction of creed, and the amount contributed was over £500,000.

The outbreak of the war checked the inflow of refugees, made conditions more difficult for those who remained here, and threw a much heavier burden on the refugee organisations. Of the 15,000 women who had been admitted for domestic service, a large proportion lost their employment and needed assistance. Men who had obtained permission to work as agents in trade found themselves deprived of their posts. The emigration of many waiting here in transit was held up indefinitely. The Government came to the financial assistance of the voluntary bodies that could no longer sustain the burden. As from the beginning of the war it made a grant of roughly half the expenditure incurred, on condition that they made a further effort to raise the large funds required. The Jewish body, in fact, raised in 1940 a further £350,000; and in the autumn of this year the Government increased its contribution. Its grant for the year ending in March, 1941, amounts altogether to £600,000.

International law has recognised the practice of interning enemy aliens in the belligerent country on the grounds of

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national security. That policy was pursued in England for resident Germans in the last war, after fierce passions were aroused by the unrestricted submarine warfare. The harshness of the treatment of many innocent victims was expounded in moving tales by Galsworthy. In the early months of the present war, the Government sought to carry out a more humane treatment, and discriminated between those German residents who were dangerous and those who were technically aliens but, being refugees from Nazi persecution, were not enemies in spirit and were devoted to the cause of the Allies. It interned the former; and in order to sift the mass of refugees appointed a hundred Alien Tribunals, composed of judges and leaders of the Bar, to examine individually every adult refugee, and decide whether they were to be interned or freed from the restrictions imposed upon alien enemies. Three classes were distinguished:

- (A) Persons to be interned because of doubt as to their reliability;
- (B) Persons left at liberty, but placed under certain restrictions because the Tribunals were not convinced that they had actually suffered persecution;
- (C) Persons certified as "refugees from Nazi oppression," and freed from restrictions other than those applying to friendly aliens.

A few hundred were classed as A; 6,000 as B. The great majority, over 60,000, were in category C. Certain tribunals placed all refugees not recommended for internment in category B, although many should have been in category C. In the light of later events, when public suspicions were excited against all aliens, it appeared that the investigation and marking of some Tribunals was not as reliable as was to be hoped, because insufficient guidance had been given to them, and there was no attempt at securing consistent adoption of certain principles.

Towards the end of 1939 the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps, a branch of the British Army, was opened to the refugees who had been given the C mark. Some 3,000 quickly volunteered. They included many engineers and skilled technicians; and several alien companies were sent to France and did excellent service. The Home Secretary

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in the early months of the war spoke hopefully, too, of the absorption of other refugees in civil employment. In fact, during the six months from November, 1939, to May, 1940, Government Departments were more ready than before to give refugees and other aliens permission for work which was useful for the national effort. At no time, however, was there any general enrolment of the refugees for that effort, though thousands of them were longing for an opportunity of service and hated to eat the bread of idleness.

The invasion, in the spring, of Holland, Belgium and France, the reports of the part which had been played by German residents in those countries as Nazi agents, and, above all, the collapse of France, owing to internal treachery, brought about a fundamental change of feeling and of policy in England towards the "alien enemy." Government practice had drawn a distinction between the refugees from Nazi oppression and alien enemies in the popular sense; but, under the stress of events and the stimulus of a press campaign, many forgot the distinction. The imminent possibility of an invasion of England was a factor in the change of outlook. There were reports (never substantiated) that Germans purporting to be refugees had helped the invader in Holland. Our former Ambassador to Holland, in a broadcast, encouraged that idea; and those who had pro-Nazi sympathies in England were not slow in diverting attention from their own activities by working up feeling against aliens. A panic cry of "intern the lot" was started, and the Home Office, abandoning the principles which it had followed, began a general policy of internment of all males between the ages of sixteen and seventy and of certain women refugees. They started with the arrest of those who had been given the B classification by the Tribunals. Next the men and schoolboys of the C category, who were in "protected areas" were arrested; and, finally, there was a general arrest of all male refugees over 16 years without discrimination. Many arrested were employed in work of national utility; or had been given permits to practice their professions as doctors, dentists, architects, or were scientists and scholars with academic appointments. The great God Pan ruled.

The policy was not carried out methodically; execution

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was left to the local police authorities, and involved great hardship and suffering. The passing attitude may be described by reversing the Latin adage: "Nothing alien do I regard as human." The Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson, admitted later mistakes of individuals, stupidity and muddle. Over 20,000 would-be allies were placed behind barbed wire, and an elaborate military organisation was employed in guarding these friends of freedom. The mental suffering caused was greater than the physical. Deaths occurred amongst the older people who were invalids, and there were suicides of those who could not face the ordeal of what seemed to them a second concentration camp. Prof. George Trevelyan noted that Nazis keep their concentration camps for their enemies; we use them for our friends. A bitter aggravation of the hardship was the transport to the overseas Dominions of some 7,500 "enemy aliens." The transportation was originally intended to cover those whose presence might be a danger in case of invasion. But in the confusion, thousands of refugees, including schoolboys who had been interned, were sent away. A striking case was brought to light by Professor A. V. Hill, following the announcement of the election to fellowships at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the elected was a German refugee, an outstanding scholar of mathematics who would have been valuable for the war effort. When elected he was an interned prisoner in the Dominion of Canada.

After a short period of unreasoning panic, public feeling changed, and some alleviation of the policy was announced by the Government at the end of July. A White Paper provided for consideration of applications for release of persons in certain categories, particularly those who (a) were already engaged in work of national utility; (b) were over the age of 70—a little later reduced to 65—or invalids, and (c) had an immediate possibility of emigration to the U.S.A. or elsewhere. Steps were taken at the same time to make the conditions of those interned in the camps more decent, and the responsibility for internment was transferred from the military to the civil authorities.

Two Advisory Committees were appointed, one to assist the Home Secretary in dealing with applications for the

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enlargement of the categories for release, and the other to assist the Foreign Office in dealing with the well-being of refugees generally. A further White Paper was issued in August enlarging the classes for release, and applying the conditions to Italian refugees from persecution, while another Advisory body was appointed to sift the cases of such Italians. A fresh category included those who, by writing or speech or political activity, had consistently taken a public and prominent part in opposition to the Nazi system, and were actively friendly towards the Allied cause. Soon after the new Home Secretary was appointed, three further categories of eligibility for release were announced for all refugees:

- (1) Persons who have made outstanding contributions to art, science, learning and letters.
- (2) Students who were pursuing their studies, provided that the College authorities certify that it is desirable for them to continue.
- (3) Persons who, since early childhood or for at least 20 years, have lived continuously in Great Britain, have severed their connection with their country of nationality, and are found to be loyal.

A spate of distinguished Committees was set up by the Royal Academy, the Institute of British Architects, the Pen Club, etc., to report upon the applications for release and submit recommendations to the Home Secretary. At the same time, the grounds for release remained narrowly restricted and the practice of release painfully slow, so that the categories were known as "Anderson's fairy tales." What was more serious was that the principle of internment was retained for male German refugees between 16 and 65.

Lord Cecil, broadcasting in November, pointed out forcefully the wrongness of the principle of release by categories of usefulness and infirmity. The only just principle was to release those who were found, by a responsible body, innocent and friends of the cause for which we are fighting. It was as wrong to keep interned the common man, though he was devoted to that cause, as the scientist, artist or manu-

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facturer who had employed 12 English workmen. What was required was a recognition that this was not just a war between England and Germany but a struggle between two principles; and those who were with us in the fight for freedom and justice were our friends, and those who were enemies of those principles were our enemies. The victims of Nazi persecution are essentially in the foreground of the struggle; and, as Lord Cecil pointed out, it is hard to convince the world of our sincerity if we allow helpless and innocent victims to suffer; nor can we afford to be unjust even in war measures. The midsummer aberration—or nightmare—has done us grave harm in America.

A word must be said about aliens in the country who are not enemy aliens. The Czechs who were admitted to England have been treated as friendly, and are not subject to internment, save some who fled from the Sudetenland after the Nazi annexation and, it might have been thought, were above all reliable and loyal. Men of military age have been enlisted in the Czech Legion in England, which includes also soldiers and airmen who escaped to England from France. Till the outbreak of the War the Government assisted, from the Czech Trust Fund, constituted with the four million pounds voted for the assistance of the Czech people in 1938, the emigration overseas of Czech refugees. War refugees who have come to England since September, 1939, from the countries overrun—Poland, Belgium, Holland and France—were also regarded as alien friends. When they arrived they were placed for a short period in a distributing centre to be sifted. But as soon as their reliability was established, provided they were not originally subjects of enemy countries, they were liberated, treated as guests of the state and billeted or maintained in hostels. Most Poles of military age and a small proportion of Belgians, Dutch and French have been enlisted in the Forces.

The Minister of Labour announced in the summer that he was forming an International Labour Force, in which the aliens would be enrolled to help the national effort with civilian service. To assist him he engaged the help of trade union refugees from the European countries. His announcement raised great hopes, which were a little slow in being

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realised. He could not enlist those interned, because that was a matter for the Minister of Home Security; but for his purpose all aliens at liberty were eligible, whether they were from Allied countries or originally subjects of enemy countries, refugees or voluntarily resident. In the intensification of the war effort the plan should become reality and embrace many who are to-day yearning for the opportunity of work. That would not only restore the self-respect of refugees but help to increase production, release soldiers who are engaged on futile supervision, and reduce the grant-in-aid from the Treasury.

Much, indeed, remains to be done in order to give expression to the feeling of the common cause which unites us with these "liberties" of exiles from oppressed Europe. It is a move in the right direction that the British Council have appointed officers in different regions to foster cultural and intellectual activities for aliens, and particularly to bring them in touch with the English war effort. The pockets of refugees, including many thousands who are still interned, may be made the advance guard of an international force of freedom; they afford the best means of approach to masses who, though for the moment under the yoke of serfdom, still cherish the cause of their own country. The friendly stranger in our midst, whatever his national origin, may become the loyal ally and the messenger of good tidings to the friendly peoples suffering under the Nazi yoke. Lastly, if we seize the opportunity, we may make of these alien groups on our soil the nucleus of an international European society.

Since this article was set up, the Home Secretary has announced that all the male refugees interned between eighteen and fifty years, who are medically fit, may volunteer and be enrolled in the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps; and those who are not fit or are too old may be released if they satisfy a tribunal of their loyalty. These measures, if liberally interpreted and if accompanied by the release of the women and boys, will go far to remove the stain of internment and to vindicate our reputation of humanity.

THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

By W. N. EWER

IT is hard to discuss seriously something which the world has decided to regard as a rather poor joke. And it is the misfortune of the Ministry of Information that it has come, that it came in the first months of its existence, to be a byword and a jest.

Even its critics have scarcely been serious critics. They pounced with delight on the grotesque fact that its staff at one moment numbered 999. They rioted with joy at the thought that this staff included traffic experts and museum curators. They hilariously damned its "Home Intelligence Service" as "Cooper's Snoopers."

And, indeed, there has been much of the ridiculous about the Ministry. Tales of the follies of its censorship are innumerable. The spectacle of a Ministry of Information begging that nobody should tell anybody anything—"If you must talk, talk victory"—was rich comedy. Many of the jests at its expense have been unfair. But too many of them have had point.

But let us be serious. For it is a serious matter that a big War Ministry should even be thought ridiculous. What is wrong with the "M. of I."? Is its very existence a mistake? These are quite serious questions.

The first and fundamental error, I think, was in the whole manner of its creation. It was decided, in the months before the war, in the months when war seemed clearly inevitable, that we must have a Ministry of Information. I do not know the inside story: but I strongly suspect that the idea sprang from contemplation of Dr. Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda. That institution had a high prestige. It was regarded with a certain awe, as evil but immensely efficient: a powerful instrument of Nazi policy and therefore a powerful weapon of Nazi war. We must have our anti-Goebbels weapon. We must counter lies by truth, falsehood by fact: in a word, propaganda by information. A Ministry of Information as defence against the enemy's Ministry of Propaganda.

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That conception of its job has been one of the Ministry's fundamental weaknesses. From the beginning there has been a tradition that has crippled initiative, a tradition of countering German activity rather than of acting ourselves. And with this a kind of dogma which laid it down that the antidote to lies is the truth, that German propaganda consists of the dissemination of lies, that therefore it is best checked by disseminating the truth—"information" as against "propaganda"—and leaving the neutral world to judge between truth and falsehood. The root fallacy being that German propaganda is something far more subtle than the mere spreading of falsehoods and has to be countered by more subtle methods than the mere emission from London of statements of fact.

The second initial weakness of the Ministry was consequent on the mode of its formation. It was decided that it would be impolitic to set up a Ministry of Information in peace time, but that it must leap into full activity at the moment that war came. That meant that a big organisation had to be created on paper, its departments planned, its staff appointed, all without any kind of trial or preliminary working. It was as if a motor manufacturer had built a car from blue-prints, without any testing of any of its parts, and had put it straight into service under arduous conditions. The wonder is less that the car ran badly than that it ran at all.

The planning and the organisation were entrusted to the Earl of Perth. It was a strange selection. Lord Perth has many qualities. But he has never been noted for any great interest in or understanding of publicity or propaganda. He is by nature a rather shy and retiring man with an aversion to advertisement. The League of Nations was indeed well publicised—perhaps rather too well publicised. But that was not the work of its first Secretary-General. It was the work of private organisations—League of Nations Unions and the like—carried on without, and almost in spite of, him. As an organiser he had indeed created the League Secretariat. But that rather cumbersome and lethargic organisation was hardly the model for the vigorous, lithe and flexible instrument which was now required. It is no personal criticism of the

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Earl, but a criticism of those who selected him, to say, in the language of the theatre, that he was emphatically miscast.

It is, in the circumstances, no criticism of anybody to say that the staff was largely ill-chosen. For men had to be appointed to posts without it being possible to know by experience whether or not they would be fitted for them. They were drawn from many sources—from Civil Service departments, from the Universities, from the Fighting Services, from the Bar, from the Press, from the business world. Inevitably, when the test came, many of them proved complete failures. It could not be otherwise. On the other hand, let it be noted, in view of certain criticisms, some of them malicious, some merely ignorant, that some of the, at first glance, rather odd appointments have turned out to be among the most successful.

The whole apparatus was designed on paper. The staff was chosen—from directors to typists. Two days before the declaration of war they moved into the University of London building, found their quarters, prepared for action, and waited to learn who was to be their chief. Again it was a strange selection. Lord Macmillan was a distinguished lawyer and a distinguished judge. But it would have been hard to find a man less fitted for this particular task.

Now let us consider the organisation which had been planned in theory, and the manner in which it functioned in practice.

Under the Minister (Lord Macmillan) and the Director-General (Lord Perth) were two main sections. First the Press Bureau and, associated with it, the Censors. Second a whole elaborate system for publicity (other than Press work) at home, in the Dominions, in France and Poland, in the United States, and in other neutral countries.

First, then, of the Press Bureau. This was to be the machinery for providing to the Press of this country and of the world a steady flow of news and information. The concept was typical of its genesis. Everything was to be centralised. Arrangements—admirable arrangements—were made for the comfort and convenience of the Press. Here, under one roof, and with all facilities for their work, they could get all that they required. Here, under one roof, were

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press officers for the Service Departments, for the Foreign Office, for a number of other Government offices. How admirable in theory. But in practice——!

All the mechanical arrangements for the supply of information were provided. There was just one fault. An astonished and aggravated Press found that one thing had been forgotten. There was, roughly speaking, no information available for supply. The Press Bureau was an admirably-equipped shop—with no wares for sale. A dribble of official announcements, and no more. All the normal sources had been stopped. The Press could only get its news from the Ministry. And the Ministry had no news to give, because the Departments were giving it none.

The story of the Press revolt, of the protests made, of the plain and harsh words said to the Minister and to high officials, is old and dead history. The effect has been to break up and destroy the whole plan of a centralised organisation for the supply of news to the Press and for all those other forms of contact between the Press and Government Departments which are really much more important than the dissemination of what journalists call "hard news."

To-day the Press deals (as it dealt in the days before the Ministry was created) directly with the Departments. The Foreign Office has housed its whole News Department in the Ministry building. The Service Departments keep a liaison staff there, while the main body of their press officers are in Whitehall. Economic Warfare "keeps itself to itself" in Berkeley Square. But all that is merely geographical. The original scheme is dead. The News Section of the Ministry is now little more than an apparatus—and a very efficient one—for the swift transmission to the Press of communiques and "hand-outs" from the Departments.

The elaborately-planned system has long since been broken up. Its place to-day is something much looser and vaguer and more flexible. Mr. Duff Cooper, after some initial and inevitable rows, has established a personal relationship with editors and correspondents which neither of his predecessors did. Sir Walter Monckton's relationship with them has been perfect all the time. There is a Press Relations Section whose functions are very vague, which is working rather empirically,

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but which is beginning to be quite helpful in a hundred different ways. The whole of the new system which is growing up is decidedly illogical. If you set it out schematically on paper it is manifestly unworkable. But, though it is far from perfect, it does begin to work.

Now the censors. Censorship of all news sent abroad is compulsory: no wire, no mail story, no telephoned message can go without a censor's *imprimatur*. For the home press, censorship is voluntary. Probably cautious editors, with fear of transgressing the defence regulations always in their minds, submit more than they really need. If the censor has passed a story, they are safe.

From the stormy beginning the censorship has inevitably been a subject of bitter complaint. Stories of its stupidities are legion. Every now and again the American press, generally with full justification, breaks into vehement denunciation. But—let us face the facts—it is a hard job. Rules are laid down. Censors work to rule. And rigid adherence to rigid rule is bound from time to time to produce absurdities. It is often urged that the censors should use their own judgment, should know when it is the occasion to break a rule. But censors are human. They know that, however absurd the result, the man who sticks to the rules is safe, the man who deliberately breaks one may be in for a lot of trouble. And the type of man who has the nerve and the self-confidence to back his own judgment against orders, and to take the risks of doing so, is not, and should not be, wasting those qualities at a censor's desk. The problem is a permanent one, only to be solved by continued complaint and continual revision and readjustment of rules. I think that even the most indignant American correspondent would admit in tranquillity that on the whole, since the first trying months, the organisation does not work too badly. For both sides let it be said that their personal relations are of the most cordial, and that their most devastating quarrels are conducted in a spirit of mutual friendship, and of mutual understanding of each other's difficulties.

So much for the Press side of the Ministry. I pass to the other side, charged with the organisation of publicity (I almost said propaganda) at home and abroad. Its task was

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to arrange for the publication of articles, for the production of films, for the dissemination of information, for the briefing of speakers and lecturers, for the arranging of broadcasts, and so on.

Again, at the beginning, there was elaborate organisation. There was an Empire division, an American division, a Foreign division (this for neutral countries, for the important business of propaganda in enemy countries was carefully dissociated from the Ministry). There was a "Supply division" which was to provide the material for distribution. There was Home Publicity. There was "Home Intelligence" and a whole complex "Regional Organisation" to advise about the state of public opinion. There was a Films Division, a Photographs Division, a Religious Division. And others, I suspect, which I forget.

It was a very thorough piece of paper organisation. But it lacked one thing. Here was all the apparatus for "telling the world" something. But nobody had any clear idea or any clear guidance as to what the world was to be told. The result was chaotic and at times ludicrous. Let one instance suffice. At the time when the Polish armies were reeling under the hammer blows of the German offensive, Empire Publicity was presented with a scholarly article on the "Racial Distribution of Populations in the Polish Corridor" for distribution by mail to the Dominions, in India, and in the Colonies—and so for publication many weeks later.

The need was for a policy. But there was none. There was the machine, but nobody seemed to know what it was supposed to be doing. And before anybody could really find out there came the storm of criticism and the clamour for swift and drastic reform. Much of the criticism was wild, much of it unfair. It sprang from the failure of the news supply in the first month or so, and even that was more the fault of the Service Departments than of the Ministry. About the other side of the Ministry's work the critics knew and cared little. But the attack was made indiscriminately on the Ministry as a whole. The demand was for reorganisation and reduction. It had ill effects. For the high command, instead of directing activities, became obsessed with questions of mechanical organisation.

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I say the high command. But the high command itself was continually changed. Sir John Reith succeeded Lord Macmillan, Mr. Duff Cooper succeeded Sir John Reith. Lord Perth was followed by Sir Kenneth Lee, Sir Kenneth by Mr. Frank Pick, Mr. Pick by Sir Walter Monckton. Every newcomer had new ideas about organisation.

The result was an instability, a continual sense of upheaval or impending upheaval that was in itself fatal to efficiency. Officials high and low were removed—sometimes for good reason, sometimes for none except a sweeping and unthinking call for "economies." Directors came and went. Men were moved from one job which they were just beginning to grasp to another of which they knew nothing. Divisions were broken up or amalgamated or had their names changed. New posts were created, announced to be of the greatest importance, and then after a few weeks were abolished again.

That has gone on now for a year and more. No reform has ever been carried right through, no reformer has ever stayed long enough to put his ideas into effect. The last change was the most startling of all. Mr. Frank Pick, it was announced one day in December, "is completing a far-reaching reorganisation of the Ministry." Ten days later Mr. Pick had left the Ministry himself. Sir Walter Monckton took his place. Reorganisation began all over again.

It is to be hoped that this really is the last. Sir Walter has advantages over his predecessors. He knows the Ministry already. He knows—or should know—the strong and the weak points, the first rate and the third rate men. He has the confidence of his officials and of the Press. The welcome to him as the new "D.G." was unanimous and sincere.

I think that he does himself realise how necessary it is that the heads of the Ministry should concern themselves less with the machinery and more with the work. Its problems seem to have been attacked continually from the wrong angle—from the inside instead of from the outside. The right approach, surely, is to ask first: "What in such and such a field is it that we are trying to do?" Then "What should we do in order to achieve this?" Instead, it is too often

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"Here is this new piece of machinery we have planned. What can we do with it?"

The result has been an enormous wastage of effort. Much work is done, and often thoroughly well done, which achieves no result at all. Material is collected which is never used. Matter is prepared which never gets published. Propaganda is largely a question of salesmanship. The first care must be to study the needs of the various markets, the possibilities of the various markets. The Ministry is far too much inclined to concentrate on production and to leave distribution to take care of itself. From one department I have had a frank estimate that only about 20 per cent of its produce gets to the public for which it is designed—mainly for lack of guidance as to what is required. And this is no isolated case.

Concentration on organisation—and on reorganisation—has resulted in over-organisation. There are too many fingers in every pie. Too many people have to be consulted, too many approvals obtained, before any action can be taken about anything. Important officials have to spend too much time on committees—and then to work far into the night trying to catch up with their own work. All that means delay, waste of energy, and inability to take responsibility. Things which urgently need to be done, which could be done in twenty-four hours, take weeks. The bottle-neck of "Treasury sanction" for almost trivial details of expenditure has been a terrible obstacle to rapid action: though here there has been some improvement in recent months.

It all seems to come back to the same point. That the weaknesses of the Ministry are in very large measure due to the fact that both in its inception and ever since far too much attention has been paid to questions of its own organisation, far too little to the tasks which it exists to perform. The shock of those first weeks has made it a hypochondriac organism, preoccupied with its own internal troubles instead of with its job. Its greatest need is to stop worrying so much about its inside, and to get on with its work.

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THE SUBSISTENCE MINIMUM IN GERMANY

By HERSIN

I
FOR more than two decades the German worker has lived between what one might call the Scylla of unemployment and the Charybdis of lack of essential foods. So far as unemployment is concerned it is true that under the Republic the majority of workers did not experience it personally. But every single employed worker, through his immediate family circle, his relatives, friends or fellow-trades-unionists had been stricken by the plague of unemployment. Thus even the employed worker was exposed, if only indirectly, to the danger of attrition through unemployment, to say nothing of the sword of Damocles that was always hanging over him—the fear of his own dismissal. This fact must be borne in mind in order to appreciate one of the subtle reasons why the brilliantly organised German industrial workers fell a comparatively easy prey to their Nazi opponents in 1933. These victims of Hitler, who allowed their hitherto powerful trades-union organisations to be stamped out almost without opposition, were no longer the proud ranks of the pre-1914 trades-unionists. For one thing they were split into employed and unemployed and for another they were paralysed by the fear of the spread of unemployment. Anyone who, like the writer of these lines, had the opportunity of attending from time to time small “illegal” meetings of skilled printing-trade workers (in Germany as in almost every other country the pick of the trades-unionists) from 1933 to 1935 will never forget the spirit of complete resignation to the inevitable amongst this economically and intellectually advanced section of the workers. Hunger is a bad counsellor and the fear of going hungry is not much better. At that time these thoroughly socialistic and well-organised workers were haunted by a ghost—the phrase “subsistence minimum” and the conception behind it.

This expression had acquired a double meaning. The

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question was not only: “Shall we earn enough to clothe and feed our families?” but also: “Where will Germany get enough fat, butter and milk to assure for us and our children the minimum necessary for subsistence?” For the catch-word “autarchy” had already been invented and immediately after it came Dr. Goebbels’s frivolous pronouncement about not being able to shoot with butter and cannons being therefore more important. In other words it was a race between the *armaments maximum* and the *subsistence minimum* and the workers already had a pretty good idea that the first would win. They believed then that war was much nearer than it actually proved to be. Unlike many foreign diplomats, not one of them had any faith in Hitler’s peace assurances. This was especially true of the older men who remembered clearly the events of 1914 and who, moreover, could still trace in themselves and their children the effects of the deprivations of the war and post-war periods.

Their experiences during the world war, the inflation and the world economic crisis with its ever-increasing unemployment had taught them that in a disturbed and confused Germany there is no such thing as a subsistence minimum for the working classes. Deprivations at the expense of health and even of working capacity had been treacherously described as “sacrifices for the nation.” Knowing all this the Nazis, during the period when they were struggling desperately for the upper hand, saw to it that the workers were, for the time being, better provisioned than the middle classes and the big cities better than the provincial towns, in spite of the artificial decrease in the import of food-stuffs. I remember meeting a friend who had just come up to Berlin from a provincial town in 1935. He could hardly contain his astonishment at the liberal display of hams in the Berlin shops. In his home town a ham in a shop window had already become a curiosity. This was of course partly accounted for by the Nazi policy of giving preference to Berlin as “Germany’s shop window for foreigners.”

On September 30, 1933, Hitler, the arch-liar, said in one of his speeches: “It is of supreme importance to fight the ideology of frugality and the systematic reduction of consumption, I mean the cult of primitiveness as preached by the

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Communists." In the same speech he referred to this latter as a "colossal danger for humanity." Since then he has done everything to add to that danger both for the Germans and for the peoples under their yoke. At about the same time Herr Schacht, then President of the Reichsbank, in a speech delivered at Basel (December 11, 1933) used the following words: "In our day it is impossible to depress the standard of living of a whole nation indefinitely." His lord and master has nevertheless succeeded in achieving the impossible in the short space of time between 1933 and to-day.

These two quotations are taken from a book by J. Rosen recently published. Against them the author sets another with which he himself is in agreement, taken from the *Zeitschrift für Ernährung*: "The standard of living of a nation can be lowered at will, so long as it is done gradually." But he adds a reference to Karl Marx's dictum that the extent of the so-called essential commodities, as well as the method of supplying them, is governed by history and therefore varies according to the cultural level of a given country (*Das Kapital*, Vol. 1, p. 179, Berlin edition, 1932). This brings us to the subject which is admirably and objectively treated in Herr Rosen's book.

II

The author undertook in the year 1933-34 an investigation into the budgets of ninety unemployed households and individuals in Berlin, drawing therefrom conclusions as to their general standard of living. His book is an exhaustive report on this investigation based on statistics conscientiously collected, with an estimate of the results in their relation to the conception of the "subsistence minimum," in so far as this, in the opinion of the author, has any meaning at all.

One's only doubt is whether his conclusions, based on investigations made exclusively in the metropolis of Berlin, can be applied to the whole German economic sphere. The unemployed Berliner is an extreme case—one might almost say a classic one. He has hardly any contact with the cultivated countryside and therefore no access to its resources. A similar

¹ J. Rosen: *Das Existenzminimum in Deutschland*. An enquiry into the lowest standard of living. Published by Verlag Oprecht, Zurich, 1939.

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inquiry in, let us say, Württemberg (Suabia), or any other South German industrial area where the workers, employed or unemployed, are closely in touch with agriculture, would yield very different and much less depressing results. The author draws a picture of a centralised city situated in an industrial region which is still largely decentralised. This sets limits to the applicability of his results without in any way detracting from their intrinsic significance.

The value of this treatise is enhanced by the fact that its foundations were laid in the fateful year 1933, that is at a political, economic and psychological turning-point, when unemployment figures in Germany had reached their peak. One gets a tragic picture of this when one reads the statistics about the decrease in "income" for 1932-33—"income" in this case being, of course, mainly unemployment insurance benefit and public assistance. Income from these sources fell, during those two years, by roughly 25-50 per cent. The highest scale of public assistance was not allowed to exceed, even in the most favourable circumstances, 46 per cent of the last wages earned, including subsidiary earnings; in the least favourable only—19 per cent! This minimum, which is obviously below the subsistence minimum, however one interprets it, concerns the single unemployed. Being young people they naturally succumbed to the national-socialist temptation. They got into Hitler's uniform and could get enough to eat with the money which "big business" had showered on Hitler, the same "big business" which had hitherto let the unemployed starve—a truly Satanic combination of circumstances!

Of particular interest are the figures about household expenditure amongst the unemployed. In the form of percentages expenditure on meat, bread and fats takes first place, namely 19.18, 17.68, 11.06 per cent. Vegetables come fourth with 6.57 per cent. Milk and butter come next with approximately 5.5 per cent each. Potatoes are in about the same proportion. Cigarettes claim as high a percentage as 4.5 per cent, alcohol only 5 per cent. The proportions of fruit, sugar and coffee are in the neighbourhood of 3-4 per cent. The average family spends 11.39 marks a week on food, that is, in money values just short of an English pound. But

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the purchasing power of the English pound was then higher. The expenditure on non-essential commodities, namely for alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, tobacco and cigarettes represents only 5 per cent of the total expenditure. The consumption is of a striking uniformity—60 per cent of the total income was spent on food and drink. Rent took about 30 per cent. The balance had to cover books and papers, physical training, radio, etc.

An illuminating (again tragic) chapter is devoted to a comparison between the years 1927-28, for which official statistics were already available, and the year 1933 in respect of the standard of living. In the intervening period the scale of unemployment benefit had been reduced by 50-60 per cent. Incidentally scientists had found unmistakable signs of undernourishment among working-class families as early as 1927. Naturally the reduction in every kind of public assistance was accompanied by a general reduction in the wages level. The brunt of the economic crisis was borne by the workers, whether employed or unemployed. They were either in a state of actual or more or less latent undernourishment. Nevertheless in the *Deutschen Medizinischen Wochenschrift* (No. 6, Feb. 9, 1934) a doctor declared that those individuals in receipt of public assistance to the value of 0.55 marks per day (purchasing power rather more than sixpence) could buy themselves the necessary calories, provided they spent the money wisely.

III

Herr Rosen comes finally to the conclusion that the subsistence minimum does not exist in actual fact. He may be right. In any case it is superfluous to discuss it. For the subsistence minimum which really exists and which is decisive for the fate of the individual, as also for society, is a psychological conception. Whether a man can exist on a given minimum or not depends ultimately on the spiritual and mental conditions under which he lives. Moreover it means ultimately nothing less than the determination of the interest taken by society, the state and the employer in the life and work of the individual worker. This is the starting-point of Hitler's social policy. He gave the workers their subsistence

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minimum so far as food and clothing are concerned, in order to mould them into suitable tools for his imperialist and re-armament policy. He even supplied them with an entertainment minimum ("Kraft durch Freude"). Only one minimum he denied them: freedom.

When will the German workers win back for themselves the freedom they have lost? Perhaps on the day when Hitler is obliged to deny them—the minimum subsistence minimum through lack of imported food-stuffs. So strange is the logical connection between the material and spiritual things on which man lives.

BOOK REVIEWS

STALIN'S RUSSIA AND THE CRISIS IN SOCIALISM. By MAX EASTMAN.
272 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

MR. EASTMAN went to Russia in 1922 in order to study upon the spot what was then still the Bolshevik experiment, the first great experiment of Marxian socialism applied on classical lines to the government and society of a great country. He knew intimately the "old Bolsheviks," a few of whom died in their beds, while the vast majority were executed by Stalin as traitors to the Soviet Republic. He conceived a great admiration for their work and for many of them personally, particularly Lenin himself, Serebriakov, Muralov, Sosnovsky, Piatakov, Bukharin, and Budu Mdvani. From 1922 to 1924 he lived in Russia as "a friend of the government," and when he returned to America, it was as a defender of the Soviet Government and of the communist system. The defence and his "endorsement" of Lenin's applied Marxism are contained in his book, *Marx and Lenin, the Science of Revolution*. Like everything which Mr. Eastman writes, it was written with distinction, great intelligence, and passionate sincerity.

His present book is in many important respects a recantation. In the existing state of the world and the human mind, that in itself means that few people will read it with an open mind, for the recantation of a defender of communism is an ideal hotbed for all the insane political and social passions and prejudices now devastating the world. Mr. Eastman makes the hotbed unnecessarily hot by his own terrific passion. There is the same sincerity here as in his other writings, but he is so horrified and hurt by what Stalin has done to Lenin's Russia and Lenin's fellow-communists that he puts no restraint of any kind upon his feelings or his language. Even if his moral indignation and condemnation were always completely justified, they are so intense that they defeat their object, for anger will only beget anger and passion passion.

It is probable, therefore, that the book will merely be received with violent anger and abuse by communists and their fellow-travellers and with indiscriminate enthusiasm by the anti-communists. It will be a great pity if this should be its only effect. For it raises a question of the utmost importance for anyone, particularly a socialist, who can still preserve some vestiges of an open mind with regard to politics and economics. For Mr. Eastman raises the question in this book whether the totalitarian tyranny of Stalinism, which he considers to be worse, if possible, than that of Nazism, is not in fact an inevitable result of Lenin's "revolutionary engineering," of complete socialization through "a revolutionary power-machine." He has himself come to believe

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that it is. He points out—what in these days requires to be pointed out again and again and again—that the social objective of both Marx and Lenin was an increase in human freedom, the liberation of individuality, an extension of "initiative, variety, daring, creativeness." They thought that this would come about because socialization would ensure the "dying away" of the power-machine, the withering away of the state and the machinery of coercive government, and that as equality of opportunity was established there would be more and more liberty and individuality.

In Russia, Mr. Eastman argues, the result has been the exact opposite. The process of socialization through a revolutionary power-machine in the hands, not of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but of the dictatorship of a minority party, has created a privileged bureaucracy. The power-machine and power remain in the hands of this privileged class with a dictator at its head, and there is not the slightest sign or chance of their "withering away." Power cannot pass from the hands of Stalin into that of workers or peasants or anyone else, except by a revolution. The "substance of the state" is therefore "a caste or class of bureaucrats who have enslaved the proletariat more effectively than before, appropriating all that can well be taken of the increasing product of their labour, and depriving them of every means of protest, and besides enslaving the proletariat these bureaucrats have perfected the enslavement of 'all society'."

Even if one allows for exaggeration in Mr. Eastman's statements and intemperance in his language, there remains ample substance in his facts to cause an honest socialist acute uneasiness. The uneasiness is a sign that the facts and the dilemma which Mr. Eastman forces upon our attention ought to be faced. There is little or no liberty in Soviet Russia. The government is in the hands of an absolute and irresponsible dictator and an immense army of paid bureaucrats who obey him as implicitly as the army of Nazi bureaucrats obey Hitler or that of fascist bureaucrats obey Mussolini. There can be no opposition to this absolute government, because any opponent is either executed or placed in a concentration camp. Politically there is no freedom of speech or of the press, which is completely controlled by the government. There is not the slightest sign that the workers and peasants have any control over the government; on the contrary, it is clear that the proletariat, like every other class, are subjected to the iron and absolute control of Stalin and the bureaucracy. It is also true that all the worst signs and symptoms of a class system as the structure of society have reappeared in Russia. The names of the classes may have changed, but the economic and political inequality has been re-established. Mr. Eastman gives figures which prove that the difference in workers' wages and the difference in remuneration of the worker and those who control

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the worker are just as great in Soviet Russia as in the most "advanced" capitalist country. The class system is indeed the old class system with new labels stuck over it, for society has fissured again into classes which govern, which control political and economic power, and those which are governed, which are composed of those who possess nothing but their labour, and who therefore have to do what they are told for the wage which is given unto them. The Russian worker, with a wage of 170 roubles a month, has to take his orders from M. Ostrogladov, who earns a salary of 8,600 roubles a month, while the American worker, with a wage of \$24 per week, takes his orders from Mr. Kelley of the Chile Copper Co., who earns a salary of \$50,600 per annum. The names, like the currencies, are no doubt different, but under the names the political and economic realities are the same. It is these realities which, being the same, make both systems a class system in which possession or non-possession of political and economic power determines a man's class and the remuneration which he gets for his labour. And in both cases there looks to be a considerable element of exploitation of the governed by the governing class.

These are the ordinary symptoms of totalitarianism everywhere, whether it be called socialist or national socialist. They result, not in liberty, but rigid tyranny as cruel and repressive as any in the history of human society. Mr. Eastman raises the question whether this crushing out of all freedom, initiative, humanity, and tolerance is not the inevitable result of complete collectivism or nationalization, which must necessarily in a modern society concentrate in the government and governing class overwhelming political and economic power. Sometimes he writes as if he would answer this question with a bleak affirmative. At other times he is less absolute, for he suggests that there were particular blind spots in the theory and practice of Marxian socialism which account for the degeneration of the Soviet system into this tyrannous totalitarianism. Here he points to one blind spot which has had immense importance. Despite the contempt of Marx and of the most orthodox Marxists for the utopian socialists, there is in both an extreme and dangerous element of utopianism. It appears in the conviction and dogma that the evolution from capitalism to the communist millenium is inevitably determined and in the belief that therefore there *must* be the leap forward from a socialist revolution and "dictatorship of the proletariat" inevitably to the free and classless society in which the state and the power machine have withered away. In Marx himself this belief was part of the rubbish which he inherited with the Hegelian dialectic, which enabled him to prove to himself that his ideal was not only attainable, but inevitable; in his orthodox disciples to whom Hegelianism means about as much as Zoroastrianism it is merely a mechanical dogma. But the effect of this dogmatic utopianism has

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been disastrous. For it enables the communist to elevate the revolutionary seizure of power and collectivism, which for Marx were to be the means to freedom, into ends in themselves and to treat freedom itself, tolerance, and humanity as the outmoded trappings of bourgeois democracy. Though his state becomes more and more totalitarian, the bureaucratic tyranny more and more ruthless, and freedom withers more and more away, all is for the best in the communist Paradise, because in the end the state and presumably the Stalins *must* wither away.

These considerations and our experience of the Russian revolution point to conclusions which are not clearly drawn in the rather ineffective last chapter of his book in which Mr. Eastman asks what we are to do now. The conclusion surely is that there is a problem of power here which neither Marx nor his followers have faced adequately, but there is nothing in the Russian experience to make us despair of a solution. It is the old problem of the communal control of power which has cropped up in every form or kind of society during the last 2,500 years. Collectivism in a highly organized modern European state, no doubt, makes the solution peculiarly difficult, for it concentrates such overwhelming power in the hands of the government. The whole of history proves that the only way in which the power of a governing class can be prevented from degenerating into tyranny and dictatorship and in which the freedom and initiative of the individual can be safeguarded is by making the government responsible and removable, by establishing and maintaining a real communal control of the central government. That is the meaning and function of democracy, and it is simply not true, as so many people glibly repeat nowadays, that the methods of such democratic control have proved and always must prove ineffective. The history of political democracy proves that, provided a people is determined to preserve its freedom and initiative, it can do so by the methods and machinery of democracy. Collectivism makes those methods and machinery not less necessary, but ever more essential in both the political and the economic sphere. The lamentable developments in the Soviet Union were made inevitable by the disastrous divorce between communism and democracy which dates from the first days of the revolution, and which in the end has destroyed not merely democracy and freedom but communism itself. The lesson for the socialist who wants to make the Marxian utopia a reality—and there is not the slightest reason for believing that this is impossible—is to pursue the opposite course from that of the Bolsheviks, *i.e.* never to move a step in the direction of socialism and collectivism without at the same time moving a step in the direction of democracy and democratic control.

LEONARD WOOLF.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

CONTROL OF ALIENS IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS. By C. F. FRASER. (304 pp. Hogarth Press. 12s. 6d.)

THE control of aliens in war time has become one of the burning problems of the day. But the control of aliens in peace time is also an important aspect of international relations which, in recent years, has become more prominent because, on the one hand, of the expulsion by totalitarian states of masses of their population, and, on the other hand, of greater restriction on immigration in the New World. Mr. Fraser, who was an immigration officer of the Dominion of Canada, has found an interesting and opportune subject for study. His book is concerned with the individual alien in his relations with the administrative authorities of Great Britain and the other parts of the British Commonwealth. For each part he has made a careful analysis of the legislation, the case law, and the administrative procedure on four major questions:—

- (1) How is the alien treated at the port of entry?
- (2) For what reasons, having been permitted to enter, he may be removed or expelled from the country?
- (3) His status as regards public rights, the franchise, military service, jury service and the professions.
- (4) Naturalisation.

Mr. Fraser has been thorough in his study. He has not been content with gathering and paraphrasing Acts, Statutes and regulations, and examining the decisions of the Courts. He has been at pains to find out by persistent enquiry what is the practice in the government offices. Naturally, the treatment of the questions is fullest for the Dominion of Canada. But what he has to say about the practice in England is not less illuminating, and he has probed beneath the surface. He shows how the previous liberal tradition of admitting aliens to live and work in the country has been seriously impaired since the last war. A grave feature of the English practice is the absolute authority vested in the Home Secretary, and the absence of any publicity regarding his measures of exclusion, expulsion and naturalisation proceedings. In the overseas Dominions those matters are subject to some control by the Courts. But in Great Britain it is difficult for the alien to test by any legal process the discretion of the Home Office. The Home Secretary need not, and usually does not, assign any reason for his decisions. The principle laid down by James Mill—"Whatever are the reasons for conferring power, those also are the grounds for erecting safeguards against their abuse," has been disregarded. There is a significant letter addressed by the Home Secretary in 1924 to a Member of Parliament which runs: "You will like to know that I have asked the immigration officers, while administering the provisions of the Order with tact and fairness, to exercise, at the same time, all possible strictness in every case, and

to remember that, when any doubt arises, the benefits should be given to this country rather than to the alien."

Mr. Fraser examines decisions given by the Courts in the Dominions which have checked the exercise of administrative powers by the executive, e.g. the famous Kisch case in Australia, where the High Court interfered with the action of the immigration officer in requiring an alien, who must prove his literacy in some European language, to submit to a dictation test in the Gaelic tongue. The English practice suggests that a more complete introduction of administrative law with administrative tribunals would here be not a derogation from the principle of the rule of law, but a defence of civil liberties.

The last chapter of the book deals with aliens in time of war. It is a summary of the legal position regarding aliens, worked out carefully as the rest of the study, but inevitably limited because it takes the story only to the end of 1939. It was possible for the author to write at that time: "If a person is an enemy national and, at the same time, an exile and refugee, he may derive some comfort from the knowledge that, within the British Commonwealth, enemy alien though he may be, he is entitled to claim the protection of definite and well-established principles of law, and that he is no longer an outcast wanderer devoid of right and without protection." That statement appeared a travesty of the facts six months later. If a second edition of the book is called for, as we hope it will be, Mr. Fraser will have the opportunity of examining the extraordinary series of police measures in the summer of 1940 which swept away all the defences of personal liberty of enemy aliens, and also of examining the series of remedial Orders and regulations which have gradually corrected the hardships.

The study is completed by an appendix containing the British Aliens Act and subsequent legislation, the Aliens Order of 1920, instructions about applications for Naturalisation under the British Nationality Act of 1914, and the relevant parts of the Immigrants Regulation Act of the Union of South Africa. The book should be studied by all who are concerned with the administration of the law concerning immigration and aliens; for it indicates the need of the application of certain broad principles about these matters in the British Commonwealth.

NORMAN BENTWICH

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

WHAT GERMANY FORGOT. By JAMES T. SHOTWELL. viii. & 152 pp.
(New York: The Macmillan Co. 6s.)

DR. SHOTWELL'S lucid and very readable analysis of some of the consequences to Europe during the last war might, very appropriately, be called "What we have forgotten." Such a title would give the measure of the book, for it is remarkable more for its bringing together of useful and generally accepted facts than for any striking originality of argument or discussion of new material. Dr. Shotwell does not tell us much that we have not known about already, but he does bring together in a very compact and readable form many things we ought to remember and may very well be in danger of forgetting.

His thesis is a simple one. World economy in general and German economy in particular were stricken by the world war to an extent which economists and statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic—though for very different reasons—did not fully appreciate. In America, the false recovery of the boom of the twenties; in Europe the illusions of the "Genevan" period of peace and reconstruction turned people away from the root of their evils, the aftermath of four years' destructive war. And in Germany, this refusal to face the facts amounted to a political and social disease which was, after the advent of Hitler, to rot Europe.

Germany, more than any other state, chose to forget the war. The exhaustion of resources, the overstraining of the whole credit structure, the destruction of the consumer market, and the warping of the industrial system which were directly the fruits of Germany's war-time economy under the Hindenburg plan were attributed in the post-war period not to totalitarian war but to the "servitudes" of the Treaty of Versailles. And by thus refusing the consequences of war, the Germans would not learn that "*Machtpolitik* was no longer *Realpolitik*"; they were therefore never far from the mood of accepting a return to the militarism which had been—though they would not see it so—their undoing, and when Hitler came, offering a return to the old ways and the abolition of the "servitudes" upon which Germany had pinned all the blame for her disasters, "the second President of the Republic, in order to undo some of the consequences of the 'Hindenburg Plan,' felt compelled to sign the emergency decree by which the National Socialist Party was put into power, their programme being to restore the German nation to the condition in which it fought the war from 1915 to 1918." Some of the most telling passages in the whole book describe this war economy of the Hindenburg plan. It is, detail for detail, even to the hope of making good wasting assets by a brutal exploitation of conquered territory, the "new order" of to-day.

Again in the sphere of propaganda, Germany's determination to fix the whole blame on the treaty instead of the war had devastating reper-

cussions both inside and outside the Reich. Inside, the powerful peace movement with its slogan *Nie wieder Krieg* lost its most potent argument when the Germans refused to recognize war as the root of their evils and began to contemplate further war as a means of undoing the treaty which they were determined to have as their scapegoat. Nor was militarism shown up for the disaster it was. The "stab in the back" completed the myth of a triumphant army robbed of its conquests by traitors at home and the vindictive peace of Versailles.

And externally, by exaggerating every clause, by putting the most savage interpretation on every article, by "making out that the treaty contained the most sweeping of indictments against it, Germany was able to rally to the support of its case . . . the majority of liberal opinion of the allied countries. . . . Never was propaganda more successful."

Dr. Shotwell makes his points clearly and persuasively, and only those readers who go to his book expecting new material or new methods of analysis or a new approach to the German problem, are likely to be disappointed. And Dr. Shotwell can argue that he set out to do none of these things. Nevertheless, the book suffers from its rather negative flavour. To criticise any system as keenly as Dr. Shotwell attacks Germany's war economy, the critic must have a positive view on the right ordering of a nation's economy. But on this point, we can only gather—by inference—that Dr. Shotwell accepts "the world of business as it is organised to-day, that of free enterprise and competitive capitalism." But this type of world was at least a contributory cause to the war of 1914 to which Dr. Shotwell rightly attributes the miseries of post-war Germany. Thus the reader is left with the impression that *What Germany Forgot* is admirable as far as it goes, but to be really satisfactory its analysis should be pursued further.

BARBARA WARD.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

NAZIS AND GERMANS. By HAROLD PICTON. Foreword by G. P. GOOCH. (Allen & Unwin. 144pp. 5s.)

FROM VERSAILLES TO DANZIG. By CLAUD GOLDING. (Allen & Unwin. 239pp. 7s. 6d.)

IS there a fair chance of winning the loyal partnership of the bulk of the German people in some kind of community of nations? The future of this civilisation depends largely on the answer to that question: for the only real alternative—the killing of all the Germans—is out of the question. We shall have “lost the peace” unless the settlement soon becomes one which all peoples, including the Germans, would sooner maintain than destroy.

Mr. Picton has a clear answer to the question. Yes, the Germans can be won, though it will be a hard job, especially since the bulk of German youth have been enslaved by seven years of exclusively Nazi education. The Nazi system, “as evil as any the world has seen,” has silenced but not destroyed the best elements in the German nation; and these elements must be recognised as allies, in this war across frontiers, between freedom and total tyranny, between commonwealth and Hitler’s everlasting *Kampf* for tribal supremacy.

Mr. Golding, on the other hand, seems unable to make up his mind about it. Beginning with a sketch of the Armistice, and a withering summary of the peace-making, he concludes that the peace terms were “not harsh enough.” He adds that “the course of events since the Armistice prove without any doubt that military Germany was determined to arise out of its ashes; firstly, for the purposes of revenge, and, secondly, to carry on the plan of world domination.” That may well be true of “military Germany,” the Germans who maintained the militarist and Junker traditions, and who were quickly allowed to become too potent in the Weimar Republic. But Mr. Golding goes much further. “It is not true,” he claims, “that if the Allies had held out the hand of friendship to Germany, the present war could have been prevented. . . . There is little difference between the Germany two thousand years ago and the Germany to-day. That nation’s much-vaunted culture chiefly concerns war.”

Oddly enough, however, Mr. Golding changes his tone on the last pages, declaring that there must be “a just peace,” “no Versailles.” “The Hall of Mirrors has ghastly reflections, too gruesome to revive.” He even admits that “the peoples of the aggressor nations are not unanimously behind their leaders” and will “exact a toll from those who have plunged them into this madness.”

Mr. Picton lived in Germany from the end of 1919 till April, 1939. He started with strong sympathies for the broken Germany, and must be humane, as Quakers are, cultured, and a good mixer. His stories, set down without much art, show convincingly, as Nora Waln’s book

showed, how the decent Germany was silenced, driven underground, by the rising beastliness of Nazi terrorism, and how nearly impossible it became for even the bravest champions of freedom and internationalism to withstand the pressure. Some records of the treatment in concentration camps and prison camps are given, including one from Lichtenberg which ranks with the worst stories of devilry from Oranienburg, Sonnenberg, or Dachau. Horrible to recall how the British Government, knowing of such horrors, kept silence about them for six years in the hope of appeasing the chief torturer.

Mr. Golding’s book consists of short chapters summarising such stories as the peace-making (in which he is unfair to the German case about the Fourteen Points) Reparations (in which he is again unfair to the German case), the rise of Hitler, the Reichstag Fire, the Purge. The Hitler stories will pass muster with those who have not read the story more fully elsewhere; but much of the book is tiresome to read, being written in staccato paragraphs a few lines long.

“A long wait. A brilliant moon rose higher and shortened the shadows of the turrets.”

“At length the clatter of heels . . .”

Mr. Golding is often careless with his facts and wildly careless about spelling German names. His judgment may be estimated from his statement that “there is no reason to suppose that they (the German people) as represented by the new Republican rulers of Germany who negotiated the Peace terms (in 1919) were more honest or sincere in their determination to create a Germany desirous of living in unity with her neighbours than they were under the Hohenzollerns and their Junker satellites.”

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

A HISTORY OF THE GAMBIA. By J. M. GRAY. (508 pp. *Cambridge Press*. 25s.)

PORTRAIT OF A COLONY. By ALAN F. HATTERSLEY. (233 pp. *Cambridge Press*. 8s. 6d.)

A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA. By ERIC A. WALKER. *Second edition*. (xvi and 710 pp. *Longmans*. 16s.)

MR. JUSTICE GRAY'S book is a full-length portrait of the tiny colony of Gambia, the narrow strip of territory on both sides of the Gambia River which has the distinction of having harboured the first British settlement on the West Coast. The first Europeans to discover and enter the river were two Italians, explorers sent by the Portuguese Prince Henry, nearly six hundred years ago, and the relations of Africans with Europeans in this territory began with a fight—African arrows against European cross-bows and cannon. The subsequent history of Gambia, so long and so characteristic of European imperialism in that continent, makes Mr. Justice Gray's volume extremely valuable for any serious student of the subject. There is practically no phase of imperialism, economic and political, which is not illustrated in this history. First come the Portuguese in the 15th century, explorers in search of gold and ivory, followed by traders, settlers, and missionaries. There followed in the 16th century English adventurers, first in search of trade and then of slaves for the West Indies; then Courlanders, Dutch and French. Up to the 19th century there was the usual economic rivalry between the nationals of these states, but the really serious rivals were the British and French. It long remained doubtful whether the Gambia would fall to Britain or France. The matter was only finally settled by the French cession of Albreda in 1857, although even as late as 1888 there was talk of Britain exchanging the Gambia for French territory elsewhere in Africa.

The story of the stages by which Britain gradually established sovereignty over this colony is extremely interesting. It begins in Elizabethan times with the grant of monopoly rights to a company of traders. The successor to the Elizabethan company was the Royal African Company, and for one hundred years the history of the British in Gambia is to all intents and purposes the history of this trading company. In the latter part of the 18th century there was the usual period of decay of the chartered company system and the beginning of state responsibility and control, though there was a curious interlude in which the affairs of Gambia were nominally controlled by a Committee of Merchants. The history of real state colonial administration only begins after the Napoleonic Wars and the establishment of Bathurst on St. Mary's Island in place of the earlier settlements. The most important fact which emerges in the 19th century is the persistent refusal of the home government to extend their responsibility from the small enclave

on the coast to the interior, and the unsuccessful attempts of the colonial administrators to shake the anti-imperialist determination of all governments, Tory, Whig, Conservative, and Liberal. It was only when the economic imperialism and scramble for Africa established themselves in the seventies and eighties that the home government changed its policy and full sovereignty and administration were extended to the interior or, as it was called, the Protectorate as distinguished from the old Colony.

Mr. Gray, who is a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Gambia, has done a useful piece of work with immense care and thoroughness. There are one or two things in his book which the serious student will regret. It is a pity that he did not include some detailed account, which his material must have provided him with, of the actual practice of the slave trade in this territory. It is true, as he says, that a great deal has been written about the trade and its organisation, but it is so important for the early history of Africa that its nature and effect in any particular locality are always worth recording. Much the same applies to the economic aspect of the pre-nineteenth century monopolist companies. We wish Mr. Justice Gray had included a detailed account of the profits and losses of the Royal African and other Companies which operated in the Gambia. His researches must have given him the material, and it would have been well worth while to omit some of the minute local details in order to find room for such a study. As it is, it is impossible to form any clear idea of the economic organisation and operations of these companies.

Mr. Hattersley's study of Natal in its earlier days is a much slighter book, but it is well worth reading. It is not a connected political or social history of Natal, but, as its title accurately indicates, it gives a general picture of society in the colony from the forties to the eighties of last century. Much of it is concerned with rather small beer, but this kind of accumulation of small details often illuminates the more serious aspects of colonial history. The detailed account of the early emigration under Bryne's scheme is peculiarly interesting. The historical background to this book will be found fully described in Mr. Walker's book. It was originally published in 1928 and re-issued with additions in 1935. The new edition carries the history down to September, 1939. It is a useful book.

LEONARD WOOLF.

Editorial Note

THE war has necessitated a few alterations in this journal which we should like to explain to our readers. Dr. Robson has entered Government service for the duration of the war, and has therefore had temporarily to resign from the editorship, though he will remain a member of the Editorial Board.

Secondly, the paper situation has made it necessary for us, with other periodicals, to economize in paper. We have, therefore, reduced the size of the issue to 120 pages. On the other hand, by using smaller type for reviews and setting the articles in solid type, we have contrived to give more or less the same amount of matter as in the previous issue, and we hope to be able to continue on this basis in the future.

Thirdly, owing to air-raid damage, the editorial offices at 37, Mecklenburgh Square, have become temporarily out of action. Will all readers, contributors, and others note that all manuscripts, books for review, corrected proofs, etc., should, until further notice, be addressed to Leonard Woolf, Monk's House, Rodmell, near Lewes, Sussex?

Fourthly, we must apologize to subscribers and other readers for the fact that they receive their copies of the journal later in the month than before the war. Postal delays and other difficulties make this inevitable from time to time.

RESURRECTION OF THE LEAGUE

By H. LAUTERPACHT

THE appearance of Lord Cecil's autobiography,¹ in terms, largely, of the history of the League of Nations, marks an event of significance for political thought in the sphere of international relations. The book does not herald or invite a new movement of opinion. But it is likely to lend powerful and authoritative support to a trend well under way. For Lord Cecil's autobiography appears at a period of the war when there has already begun to take place a visible change in the general attitude towards the League of Nations. The future historian will be able to state with substantial accuracy that, when in the second year of the second World War the problem of post-war international reconstruction became a subject of study and discussion, there was no longer a tendency to view the League of Nations as a pathetic and grotesque heap of ruins to which it had been reduced by totalitarian force. The League of Nations was becoming once more what it was in 1919 to enlightened public opinion, namely, an expression of the highest political aspiration of humanity. When founded in 1919, the League was more than the sequel of the experience of the World War and of the period of international anarchy which preceded it—a no mean experience in itself. There was then a willingness—inarticulate in some, but active in most—to accept the basic philosophy of the League in terms which underlay Kant's explanation of a World Federation: The purpose of man is to progress in well-being towards the development of his intellectual and moral capacities; such progress is conditioned by the attainment of perfect internal government; the possibility of such government is, in turn, dependent on the establishment of an international system for securing the peace of the world. Thus conceived, a League of Nations must be regarded as the abiding political ideal of mankind.

¹ *A Great Experiment*. An autobiography by Viscount Cecil [Lord Robert Cecil]. (Jonathan Cape, London, 1941. pp. 390. 16s.)

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It was realised that its future achievements and failures must be viewed from that wider perspective, and that there was a duty not to judge it by reference to any passing period of adversity.

That attitude suffered a set-back in the decade preceding the second World War. The successful assertion of power politics and of defiance of international law and morality lent a touch of plausibility to attempts to revitalise the teachings of Frederick the Great, of Hegel and of Treitschke under the attractive guise of a realist science of international relations. In that science power was once more acclaimed as the primary and enduring factor in the relations of States; human beings organised as sovereign States were once more declared to be outside those moral restraints and incapable of that intelligence benefiting from experience which, within the State, have lifted the individual from barbarism to civilisation; and the schemes of international organisation which, to the glory of the human spirit, have been successively put forward by constructive thinkers of all ages were represented as subtle devices of ingenious nationalism bent on perpetuating the advantages of the national *status quo* at any particular period. That facile perversion of realism was in itself a melancholy reminder of the corrupting power of force. There were many who, while denouncing and condemning violence, were unable to escape the influence of its glamorous successes. However, the attraction of that rationalisation of physical force in the field of social science was naturally shortlived. It did not survive the revolt of civilised society against organised lawlessness. In 1941 there was a growing realisation that the fact and the magnitude and the appraisal, by the remaining neutrals, of the meaning of the war waged by the Allies were a proper measure of the essential reality of the ideals of the League of Nations. That enduring significance of the League of Nations was becoming clear in proportion as it was generally acknowledged that the discussion and study, on the part of those suitably situated, of the problem of the future organisation of the world, was a proper and legitimate pre-occupation in time of war. Statements, which were formerly apt to be brushed aside with impatience, like "if the League did not exist, it

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would be necessary to invent it" or "what else can you put in its place?" acquired a new and affirmative meaning. The League had become once more the anchor sheet of constructive thought in the matter of international organisation. There was a feeling of embarrassment at the thought that during a transient period of retrogression so many should have yielded so readily to the temporary triumphs of force as to embrace or treat seriously a recrudescence of realism which political science and ethics had agreed in regarding as utterly discredited. In the second year of the second World War this kind of realism had become largely a matter of the past. The feeling was growing that, in addition to any possible schemes of regional Federation, the continuance of a strengthened League of Nations as a universal system for the purpose of securing peace by the collective effort of States was an essential part of the ultimate war aim. To that growing consciousness Lord Cecil's book is bound to give a powerful impetus.

There are two special reasons why the personality of the author of this unorthodox biography counts for so much in this connection. The first is that he has never wavered in his adherence to the essential principles of the League. This can be said of very few only—even of those whose devotion to the idea of the League has been beyond cavil. Ardent believers in collective security and leaders of the League of Nations movement were ready, on strategic and other grounds, to justify the attitude of the British and French governments at the time of the invasion of Manchuria. After the annexation of Abyssinia by Italy many supporters of the League emphasised the wisdom of recognising facts as well as the duty of remembering that, after all, Great Britain had been responsible for similar actions in the past. Statesmen, who in 1919 regarded physical sanctions for coercing and penalising the aggressor as of the essence of the League, in 1936 deprecated the idea of compulsion and spoke of the League as being exclusively an organ of conciliation and co-operation. Lord Cecil is one of the few whose course has not been subject to any such vacillations. As the official representative of successive governments at the Assembly and in the Council he was often compelled to give effect to decisions of which

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he did not approve. On such occasions he refrained as a rule from an eloquent justification of a course of action which appeared to him distasteful. On crucial occasions his manner was one of a dignity and a determination which succeeded in rescuing what could be saved from the wreckage of opportunism or obstructive caution. There are many who will not share Lord Cecil's view that the League emerged successfully from the Corfu incident when Italy bombarded and occupied the island as a reprisal against the murder of an Italian general in Greek territory. There are many who believe that that incident was the thin edge of disintegration thrust into the structure of the League. But it is difficult to deny that Lord Cecil's bearing at the Assembly did much to offset the damage. In answer to the contention of the Italian delegates that the matter was one touching the sovereignty of the Italian State and, as such, beyond the jurisdiction of any outside body, Lord Cecil, at a meeting of the Assembly unprecedented in dramatic tension and in the realisation of the significance of the event with which it was confronted, asked the Secretary-General to read out aloud the relevant articles of the Covenant as a clear and solemn answer to the Italian claim.

And yet, although the book tells the story of one who has adhered unflinchingly to the major principles of the Covenant, the reader is far from gathering the impression that that consistency was one of a fanatic or of a doctrinaire. In the cumulative light of post-war history the book is one of a realist statesman in the true meaning of the word. It shows how the maintenance and the collective enforcement of international peace constitute a major national interest—an interest in the long run as tangible as that involved in a direct attack upon national territory.

The second reason of the importance of Lord Cecil's book is the fact that it is based on the experience of one who can truly say of himself *pars maxima fui*. As such it is full of instruction on the vital question of the reasons of the failure of the League in the second decade of its existence. The predominant impression with which the reader is left is that that failure was due to deficiencies of leadership, to its ignorance and its shortsightedness. In fact, there runs

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through the book an accusing note which is not devoid of bitterness. Lord Cecil is of the view that "if the League has failed in some respects, it is because the Governments or some of them actively or passively desired that it should fail" (p. 80). He believes that Mr. Baldwin and other Conservative leaders regarded the League "as a kind of excrescence which must be carefully prevented from having too much influence on our foreign policy" and that "Geneva, to them, was a strange place in which a new-fangled machine existed in order to enable foreigners to influence our international action" (p. 146). His view of most Conservative politicians is that "not only did they reject in their hearts the League of Nations, but they did not propose to take any steps for getting rid of war" (p. 189). He thinks that in 1933 "one of the chief objects of the British Government seemed to be to lessen the prestige and authority of the League" (p. 245). He recalls that at the Assembly of the League following upon the Lytton Report, the British delegate, Sir John Simon, "made a forensic defence of Japan, and, according to the account of some of those present, was formally thanked by M. Matsuoka, the Japanese delegate" (p. 234). And there are other, even more pronounced, passages which hardly substantiate the publisher's view that Lord Cecil "scarcely blames" and that he "rarely criticises." But we still may agree, with affection and respect for one who has beneficently dedicated his life to the greatest of all causes, that "Lord Cecil writes as he has lived, as a gentleman." For there is no trace in his narrative of personal attack or of imputation of motives. It is an accusation of the shortsightedness of the leaders of a world empire who, in the author's view, embraced a parochial realism ignoring the essential interdependence of the world. It is an accusation of leadership which sheltered itself behind the doubtful expediency of the refusal to undertake commitments covering unforeseeable contingencies. The fact is that the security of civilised life consists in framing laws and accepting obligations for future contingencies which cannot be foreseen in all their implications. The possible—in fact, the inevitable—measure of resulting injustice is preferable to the insecurity and precariousness of anarchy. This is a truth which applies

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to States no less than to individuals. The verdict of history will probably support Lord Cecil's view that successive governments were ill advised in their refusal to agree to the extension or definition of their obligations in the matter of collective security. In the end, they were driven to give far-reaching undertakings in circumstances which were politically and otherwise open to question.

There will probably be less agreement with Lord Cecil's strictures on the disarmament policy of British governments. There is warrant for the view that they bore a share of responsibility for the disintegration of the League by their laxity in the fulfilment of existing obligations and by their refusal to support effectively the cause of international security and arbitration. These contributions to international peace could have been made, without stint, consistently with the true interests of Great Britain and of the Empire. However, given the situation created by the refusal to contribute more effectively to the cause of international arbitration and security, it was difficult to expect a more drastic policy of limitation of armaments than that actually followed by the British governments. Very few will agree with Lord Cecil that the Treaty of Versailles, when read in conjunction with the Covenant, imposed upon the Allies the absolute legal duty of limitation of armaments consequent upon German disarmament. Neither was such duty imposed by the Covenant. Disarmament, when unaccompanied by parallel progress in the sphere of security and arbitration, was not a programme which could be urged consistently with national and international security. Politically, it is not easy to acquiesce in the opinion that if the Allies had disarmed, the principal German grievance would have disappeared and with it the main cause of the rise and growth of the Nazi régime.

There will probably be agreement—and there must be agreement unless we abandon ourselves to the view that in the international sphere events are impervious to human will and intelligence—that the collapse of collective security was the consequence of the absence of far-sighted and courageous leadership. It may, of course, be said that the absence of such leadership was due to the fact that there

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was no public opinion sufficiently determined and sufficiently endowed with a sense of historic continuity. But these are not usual qualities of the collective mind. However, it is a mistake to identify this failure of leadership with the shortcomings or defection of one particular party. It is possible that some such error may be the result of the emphasis which Lord Cecil places on the circumstance that the League gained a new and continuing accession of power with the advent of the Labour Government in 1929 and that some of the Conservative leaders exhibited an uninformed and petty dislike of the League and of its ideals. The fact is that it is by no means certain that if a Labour Government had been in power in the course of the Manchurian dispute in 1931 or during the Italo-Abyssinian war in 1935, the British attitude would have been radically different from what it was. It is probable that the roots of the evil go much deeper and that they are intimately connected with the entire problem of the conduct of foreign affairs in democracies in relation to collective security. Democratic governments are composed of statesmen and politicians who, for various reasons, are subject to the overwhelming desire to avoid trouble and to preserve peace even if such peace means a precarious war for the next generation or even for their own on the day after to-morrow. They are inclined to act literally on the words of the prayer: Give us peace in our day, 'O Lord. But the obligations of collective security are in the nature of an insurance which requires the payment of costly premiums. Like other institutions of civilised life, it may demand the sacrifice of immediate interests—including the immediate interest of peace—for the sake of a wider future good. It must be a matter for most serious consideration and for future study how best to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of the foreign policy of democracies, especially in the field of national and collective security, irrespective of ephemeral exigencies of internal politics. When Mr. Baldwin, in his capacity as Prime Minister, revealed that his government refrained from proceeding with the task of rearmament on the ground that a disclosure of its necessity would have seriously endangered the electoral chances of his party, he was drawing attention to a problem of a gravity

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transcending the immediate issue with which he was concerned.

However, the failure of the League of Nations is not attributable to any single cause. In particular, it is impossible to evade the question as to how far this result was due to the absence of a sufficiently large measure of restriction upon the legal freedom of action of the members of the League. It is not altogether clear what is Lord Cecil's final answer to this question. Occasionally he expresses the view that the very existence of clear-cut obligations for the collective enforcement of peace is in itself a powerful factor in the promotion of peace and security. Thus he is "morally certain" that if the Treaty of Mutual Assistance had been in operation "the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the German invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland would never have taken place" (p. 158). He often deplores the unwillingness of Great Britain to undertake definite commitments, and it is obvious that he sees in that disinclination a major factor in the post-war retrogression. At the same time he is emphatic that there is nothing inherently wrong in the existing provisions of the Covenant and that if interpreted loyally and in good faith they would have proved adequate for the purpose for which they were designed. There is no doubt that he would have preferred a more pronounced limitation of the sovereignty of the members of the League. But he explains in various parts of his autobiography that any limitation of sovereignty beyond that actually achieved in the Covenant was impossible in 1919 at the Peace Conference. There was, he says repeatedly, a marked opposition against anything in the nature of a super-State. "Nothing can be more certain than that any attempt to erect a super-State would have failed" (p. 71). There will be many who will be inclined to join issue with Lord Cecil on that question. There is a *media via* between what is popularly regarded as a super-State and the rigid principle of unanimity under the Covenant. There is also abundant evidence in Lord Cecil's own book that it was not inevitable that the League of Nations should have been exclusively the work of the politicians and the diplomats assembled at the Peace Conference. The establishment of the League was to

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a large extent the result of the insistence of wide masses determined to prevent a repetition of the cataclysm of another World War. Lord Cecil admits that the great mass of the peoples was ready to make great sacrifices to secure peace. So real was that pressure from below that any of the delegates determined to represent effectively popular feeling would have been in a strong position.

Undoubtedly, the Covenant of the League is an example of an unparalleled and truly revolutionary limitation of the sovereignty of its members. For no other designation can properly be given to the enactment of the collective right of intervention on the part of the League in disputes between its members, to the most drastic limitation of the right of war, and to the recognition of the principle of coercive sanctions against sovereign States. At the same time it is true that in the Covenant, both as adopted and as interpreted in practice, these limitations did not go far enough and that, apart from other reasons which may well have proved superior to any purely legal obligation, however rigid and far-reaching, the effective reservation of freedom of action was one of the principal causes of the collapse of the collective system set up in the Covenant. In establishing the League, governments fell short of their own professions made during the World War and of the expectations of large sections of their peoples. As an instrument for the legal organisation of peace, the Covenant was defective from the very beginning. Those who framed it were deliberately obscure in the matter of prohibition of war, and by limiting it to "resort to war," as distinguished from resort to force, left the door wide open for abuse and confusion. While introducing the principle of collective enforcement of peace, they limited its obligations to economic action and refrained from providing for the jurisdiction of the League as a whole both to determine the case of aggression and to direct the course of collective action aiming at its suppression. They declined to sanction the principle of obligatory judicial settlement even with regard to disputes which they themselves described as generally suitable for such settlement. Sovereignty, formally enshrined in the rigid principle of unanimity, was made to permeate even the machinery of pacific settlement. The

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result of that combination of far-reaching restrictions with the maintenance of sovereignty was a flexible instrument of great elasticity—an instrument which, because of its elasticity, has often been described by friends of the League as the best instrument that could be devised for the purpose for which it was intended. This would have been so if the circumstances had been favourable. But they were not. In consequence, the elasticity of the Covenant has worked one way only. Its potential strength has been allowed to remain in the background; but members of the League have often appealed to those of its provisions which left them complete freedom of action and which reduced the Covenant to a mere declaration of principle.

While, therefore, any argument based on the use of the term "super-State" is bound to be of limited advantage in the discussion, it is probable that a further surrender of sovereignty within a reformed League of Nations will be recognised to be a necessary condition of its usefulness as an instrument of peace. This applies in particular to the question of the peaceful change of treaties and of customary international law—a matter which is generally regarded as one of the crucial problems of international peace and organisation. There are many who believe that the failure of the post-war system as set up in the Covenant of the League was due to the fact that it did not provide effective means for changing conditions which, in the language of the Covenant, have become dangerous to the peace of the world. It is possible to argue—and Lord Cecil does not altogether seem to disapprove of the argument—that even the existing Article 19 which lays down that the Assembly may recommend the reconsideration of treaties and conditions calling for a change would have been adequate for the purpose of instituting responsible discussion and of mobilising public opinion in support of a change. However, as in the matter of enforcing the law so also with regard to changing it, public opinion, when relied upon as the chief instrumentality, is a deceptive weapon. It is therefore somewhat perturbing to find that in his scheme of an International Authority, printed as an Appendix at the end of the book, Lord Cecil's solution does not differ radically from that adopted in the

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Covenant. He proposes that if the recommendation for a change is agreed upon unanimously, except for the votes of States immediately interested, it should be binding on all State Members, and that if it is adopted by a majority it should bind those who voted in the majority. The proposed departure from the existing Covenant is not, it is true, a negligible one. Qualified unanimity—i.e. one in which the votes of the interested parties are not counted—is substituted for the principle of absolute unanimity. The history of the League has shown that on important occasions it was possible to achieve such qualified unanimity. But there were occasions which admitted of no element of doubt—as in the case of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia—and in which no qualified unanimity could be achieved. The very requirement of qualified unanimity may act as an invitation to obstruction, as an inducement to secure a subservient satellite, or as a means of devitalising the proposed change.

The problem of peaceful change cannot be solved on any other than legislative basis, i.e. by way of decisions of an international organ endowed with effective authority in law and in fact to impose its decrees upon a dissenting minority. Such an authority may, perhaps not inaccurately, invite the charge of constituting a super-State. Whatever name we choose to give to the organ entrusted with such powers, it is the only instrument capable of a true solution of the problem of peaceful change. The question of the size of the majority required for legislative action of this nature must remain a matter of study and discussion. There will be general agreement that no State should be required to give up its legal rights unless in pursuance of a decision of an overwhelming majority of the members of the League. To be real and acceptable, any such addition to the competence of the League must be accompanied by a substantial modification of the present rights of its members in the matter of voting and representation. The rigid principle of abstract equality, in addition to being morally objectionable, is not compatible with the existence of a League entrusted with the solution of this and other crucial problems of international order. Any revision of the Covenant in the matter of equality in representation and in voting power is admittedly

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fraught with difficulties. But it is better to face squarely the immensity of the problem in all its ramifications than to adopt solutions which leave matters substantially as they were before. An ineffective solution is, in its results, almost as reprehensible as the flippancy of the realist who concedes that the question of peaceful change is the central problem of international relations; who admits that its effective solution is impossible short of a limitation of sovereignty implied in the power of an international authority to impose changes by a majority vote; who denies that States will ever consent to any such limitation; and who resigns himself to the conviction that the problem of change in the relations of States is in essence one of power and to the hope that such power may exert its influence by way of peaceful persuasion and a precarious interplay of threats and pressure short of war rather than through its more natural manifestations.

In the matter of the recent schemes of Federation, Lord Cecil is distinctly critical insofar as such schemes are put forward as alternatives to the League of Nations. But he is in favour of Confederations within the framework of the League, established on the basis of geographical propinquity and endowed with organs of their own. There is no reason why such Confederations should not be thought of in terms of the Federal principle proper, subject to the retention of separate international personality by the member States. For it is probable that the progression of mankind towards a politically integrated international society conceived as a true Federation of the World will proceed on two parallel lines: horizontally, as it were, by way of a gradual development of the existing Confederation of States, namely, the League of Nations, in the direction of a Federation through the slow process of progressive limitations of the sovereignty of its members; vertically, as it were, by way of geographically limited Federations in the full sense of the word, established on the basis of affinity of culture, of language, of tradition, and of political ideas. Any such schemes must be regarded as a proper subject of serious and unprejudiced study. They may supplement, with great advantage, the development resulting from the rebirth of a reformed and strengthened

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League of Nations. But the latter must remain the starting point of political thought and action in the field of international reconstruction. Without the unifying and restraining influence of a League of Nations universal in its potential membership, any such limited Federations may well become a source of regional friction and far-flung wars. Without the League of Nations—every consideration of dignity and perspective impels us to retain its very name—we must see ourselves deprived of that beacon of historic continuity, of universality, and of the unity of the human race without which all schemes of international organisation must remain mere constitution mongering.

PLANNING FOR RECONSTRUCTION

By THOMAS SHARP

WHEN it was announced last autumn that a new government department, a Ministry of Works and Buildings, was being formed, with Lord Reith at its head, the announcement was everywhere greeted with a remarkable display of enthusiasm and hope. Here at last seemed to be an answer to the demand which had been widely made for some time previously, and which had been growing steadily in intensity, that preparation and planning should be undertaken now for the "new Britain" which should be developed after the war, a Britain with greatly improved social relationships and opportunities, with healthier and less hideous towns, with its lovely heritage in landscape maintained and developed. It seemed at last that official recognition had been given to the existence of war aims at home, even though war aims abroad were too difficult a matter to be openly defined.

In the months which have elapsed since that announcement, though nothing very much seems to have been done, the hopes have grown rather than diminished. Lord Reith issued a cautious statement shortly after his appointment, a statement which seemed almost to be a warning, since it appeared to suggest that his principal work was the organisation of the building industry for war purposes. Nevertheless for some months the press has been all agog with sketches of plans for the new Britain, and especially for the new London which is to rise phoenix-like from the rubble and ashes of bombardment. Everywhere people talk of the finer world that must be built when the war is finished. There is a spirit of idealism abroad: a determination, or at least a hope, that *this* chance of reconstruction shall not be missed or muddled.

Cynics say that happened before and nothing came of it. The phrase "a home for heroes" has not been spoken for twenty years without a sneer, and no one dare use it now save to try to discredit in advance these new hopes for the

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future—nor should anyone wish to use it, for all that we want is a decent home for ordinary humanity. Certainly the high hopes and easy promises of 1919 bore a bitter fruit. In the international field we are reaping an unpleasant harvest now. And while in the domestic field the rottenness of the crop as a whole may have been exaggerated (for some at least of the seeds sown by the 1917-1919 Ministry of Reconstruction came to belated and patchy fruition in the years between the wars) nevertheless there, too, there has been far more reason for disappointment and regret than for satisfaction.

Many of the reforms advocated by the Ministry of Reconstruction at the end of the last war were killed by the desire to "get back to normal" which followed victory, and by the extravagant panic about economy which followed four years of hitherto undreamed-of expenditure. Those dangers lie in wait for us again, though because war has this time devastated large areas of our own towns the cry "back to normal" will not have so easy an appeal nor be so fatally easy a possibility. But many other reforms died rather than were killed: died from unsatisfactory delivery at birth, or because they were inadequately nourished and supported: poor orphans separated from their relatives, crying feebly and alone without sustenance in the harsh forgetful world into which they had been hopefully but somewhat negligently cast.

Obviously to attempt reconstruction by setting scores of unrelated groups of experts to work separately on separated aspects of closely-related problems is futile. An ordered and properly balanced pattern for a new world can never be produced in that way. At best it will result in so many plans for so many individual reforms, all of them requiring such a complicated mass of machinery to put them into operation, that a large proportion of them will simply get lost, forgotten or cast aside in the resultant confusion. More generally the advocated reforms will be so over-lapping, probably even so mutually contradictory, that confusion will be even worse confounded, and the whole business of reconstruction will be so discredited that people will cry out for a return to the simple chaos of *laissez-faire*. Whichever way it goes the possibility of any reconstruction worthy of the name, and

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worthy of the hope that inspired the demand for it, will have disappeared under a mountain of muddle and memoranda. The brave new world does not lie that way. It is a prime necessity of success in any attempt at methodical national reconstruction that the various reforms to be attempted must be welded into one comprehensive plan—and not only a comprehensive plan but a comprehensible one.

Clearly, of course, there has got to be some sub-division in organisation. No one body sitting as a whole can successfully tackle all the major and minor matters in all the manifold fields of reconstruction—housing, education, finance, milk distribution, policing, agriculture, child welfare, employment and all the rest. The problem is how to arrange such sub-division so that there shall be no dissipation of effort and that the maximum possible amount of co-ordination can be achieved.

The recently-created Ministry of Reconstruction is no doubt intended for that purpose—or was it intended merely as a sop to satisfy the public demand that something should be done about a Better Britain? Certainly the Government and the Civil Service do not yet seem to attach much importance to it. It *could* however be used for that purpose, and Mr. Greenwood, at least, seems to take his mission seriously, for he has spoken about preparing schemes for reform in the educational system, the social services and town planning, and of making plans to deal with poverty, unemployment and other evils of that kind. But if the definition of Mr. Greenwood's status as being "chairman of a group of Ministers in charge of reconstruction" means, as it is likely that it does, that each problem of reconstruction is going to be left to the government department which ordinarily deals with administration on the particular field in which the problem occurs, then that arrangement promises little more success than was achieved by the Ministry of Reconstruction of 1917-1919, which had a similar organisation.

The Civil Service and the ordinary government department are just about the worst agents to undertake any planning for reconstruction. Bound up as they generally are in a tradition of slow-but-sure and ten-paces-aside-to-every-one-forward, myopic from over-much study of administrative

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detail, their plans would almost certainly be of the unimaginative timidly negative kind that would postpone general reconstruction till kingdom come. Further, the existing departments seem to be incapable of collaboration. The danger from these is not that schemes may overlap. The departments are so tender of each other's fields of activity that any comprehensive plan is certain to disappear altogether down the yawning chasms that will separate the little separate departmental plans.

What is required is that the organisation should be sub-divided into the smallest workable number of main groups of allied problems, each group being the responsibility of some newly-constituted Ministry or sub-Ministry, and the whole being subject to co-ordination by the Ministry of Reconstruction. Lord Reith's Ministry of Works and Buildings is an example—the sole one so far—of the kind of specially constituted department that is necessary. It would seem also, from what we have been allowed to understand or to guess at, to be an example of such a department being given far too narrow a field, being in fact limited to but one problem in the biggest and most easily definable of all the groups of allied problems. We are still in the dark as to what Lord Reith's job really is to be. It is known that he is "reporting to the Cabinet on the appropriate methods and machinery for dealing with the issues involved in the reconstruction of town and country." He is also known to be himself a man of courage and initiative, so it may be hoped that he is demanding and will be given the very wide range of powers that will be required for reconstruction if that reconstruction is to be on the scale that is necessary and that is hoped for by the majority of the population. But the field covered by the word "Works" in his title will need to be far more extensive than seems at present to be intended, for the planning and control of "Buildings" is but a single aspect, though an important one, of all that is involved in town and country planning, in its widest and most proper sense.

Any adequate town and country planning must involve the positive planning of *every* use of land—it might in fact more properly be called territorial planning. The so-called

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planning that has been undertaken by local authorities under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932 has been anything but planning in this sense: it has been nothing more than the restrictive control of buildings, and even that in a very feeble and limited way: it has been but an extension of that by-law control of streets and buildings which local authorities have long exercised under statutes such as the Public Health Act of 1875. Its results show that this kind of "planning" is almost entirely uncreative even in the most narrow local fields. It cannot produce good individual towns let alone towns that are properly related to a national pattern of development. It cannot maintain even the purely scenic values of the countryside because under it all land is regarded primarily in relation to possible buildings upon it. It cannot do anything whatever towards the development of the basic values of the countryside as a field of economic activity because agriculture is not regarded as a productive use of land under the Act. Any possible extension of "planning" along these restricted and restrictive lines would be barren from the start.

Although town and country planning has so far meant only the control of buildings, even the principal building activities of the planning authorities themselves have hitherto been conducted under a strict departmental separation from their planning activities. The Ministry of Health's Housing department seems to have been only vaguely aware of the existence of the same Ministry's Town and Country Planning department, and has not only in general ignored it but has quite frequently instigated local authorities to do things directly contrary to their own planning scheme made under the control of that department—all of which is as good an example as need be provided of that unsuitability of the Civil Service for exercising planning functions, which has just been mentioned. But even if these and other inter-departmental difficulties and statutory short-comings were resolved, and every town had its positive and realisable plan for reconstruction prepared, that would still be a very long way from sufficient to assure a proper urban pattern for post-war Britain. The question has got to be settled as to what that pattern should be. If the old methods of town growth are

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to be changed, if the continuous piling up of great cities is to be prevented and the establishment of new towns undertaken, then many other activities than that of mere housing will have to be planned, and the pattern of these will have to be planned by the authority which plans the housing pattern.

The urban pattern cannot be directed unless the industrial pattern is directed, for the two are quite inseparable. Being inseparable they must be subject to one direction. It is difficult to see how even the timid control of industrial location recommended in the majority report of the Barlow Commission could be satisfactorily operated by any independent controlling authority, any "National Industrial Board," so to achieve what the Commission desired, i.e. the improvement of the present urban conditions. Certainly the far more realistic recommendations of the minority report of that Commission would, as the commissioners themselves declare, require the creation of a new government department which would exercise the present planning powers and functions of the Ministry of Health as well as the new powers necessary for directing the location of industry.

But both housing and industry are also interdependent with transport. No new or improved national road system can possibly be planned without reference to the urban pattern. Nor can any improved railway system. Nor a system of civil aviation. Those systems exist solely to serve the needs of the towns and the countryside, and if they are to meet those needs efficiently they must be planned along with the utilities they serve.

The same considerations apply to the planning of power transmission and systems of water supply and so on. All services of this kind control to some extent the siting of new towns and villages and are themselves controlled by the siting of existing towns. They too should be planned along with the utilities that they serve.

In all the above matters the needs of the towns are dominant, though not exclusively so. So are they in the chief of all uses of land, agriculture. If agriculture is organised, as it should be, so as best to serve the needs of the urban population, that probably means that, so far as is consistent

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with national needs, agriculture in the neighbourhood of towns should be directed towards the production of perishable foodstuffs for those towns. This will mean that every town will be surrounded for some definite distance, according to its size, by dairying and market gardening land. But national needs mean that every characteristic district should be farmed on the system best suited to its peculiarities of soil and climate, and it may be that, other things being equal, the sites for new towns will be determined by agricultural considerations. Certainly the prodigal waste of national resources which has gone on in the recent past when some of the best land in the country has been used for building suburbs, without a thought that the earth had any other value than for building, would not be tolerated under any planning scheme worthy of the name. Here again, then, are land uses which must be planned together.

Similar considerations apply to afforestation. It is even more absurd to use productive farmland for forestry than it is to use it for building. And, though it is not so generally admitted, and in fact is not admitted at all by the Forestry Commissioners, even agriculturally unproductive land may in certain cases (as in the Lake District for instance) have scenic and recreational values that far outweigh its forestry values. These values chiefly concern urban populations, and are partly determined by and to some extent may themselves actually determine the urban pattern.

These areas of outstanding scenic and recreational value are potential National and Regional Parks, and the possibility of their full usefulness depends to quite a considerable degree on the transport system. But besides these large-scale and sometimes distant recreational provisions many more facilities for the townsman's enjoyment of the country will be required in the neighbourhood of the towns; a better articulated system of country footpaths, for example; perhaps country allotments and similar provisions of that kind. Here again are requirements that can only be met by a co-ordinated planning of town and country, of housing, agriculture, industry and other matters in proper relationship to each other.

At present the existing and seemingly intended Ministries

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and government departments dealing only with the matters mentioned above (and there are others that would have to be considered) are—the Ministries of Health, Transport and Agriculture, the Central Electricity Board, the Forestry Commissioners, the Barlow Commission's recommended "National Industrial Board" and a National Park Commission (if the recommendation of the governmental National Parks Committee of 1931 were adopted). It is quite certain that a plan for reconstruction produced by all these departments, each dealing with its own aspect of the plan, would be a poor uninspiring affair of shreds and patches. What is required is one specially constituted department to deal with them all, and with all other land using activities. That is what Lord Reith's Ministry should be doing. It does not much matter whether the name of that Ministry remains the same, with the word *Works* covering a multitude of activities other than building, or whether it be changed to Ministry of National Planning (which is what it would in fact be). Nor does it matter very much that its taking over such a wide field would impoverish other Ministries. The Ministry of Health would still have an immense range of activity. The Ministry of Agriculture would still have plenty of work to do in dealing with the actual details of farming. And the Ministry of Transport (if it were thought worth while to retain it) might still be responsible for the actual construction of roads and other matters of that kind. But all that is really beside the point. What is to the point is that all these aspects of reconstruction can only be dealt with in one large plan. It is a short-sighted policy (though one which has not been unknown in the past) to sacrifice the national welfare to ministerial jealousies and departmental vested interests.

How would such a Ministry function and how would such a National Plan be put into operation? Obviously the Minister would need to be assisted by some central Commission of experts in the various fields. This Commission should consist of the heads of the various departments of the Ministry which are charged with particular responsibilities—Building, Agriculture, Transport, Location of Industry and the rest. Working on the survey of national resources which must be the basis of any intelligent attempt at national planning, this

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Commission would prepare a National Plan in broad outline, covering only such matters as must be dealt with on a national scale. One of the principal points of criticism of national planning is that it may result in some great central bureaucracy planning all the details of local development (what shall be done with the village green, and so on) from remote and unapproachable places in Whitehall. Such a state of affairs is extremely undesirable and could not produce good results. Only national requirements should be planned at the centre, and the regional and local details within the national plan should be planned regionally. For this purpose it would be necessary to establish a series of Regional Planning Commissions. Each of these Regional Commissions would again have its Sub-Commissions or departments of experts in the various fields covered by the plan.

If regional government were adopted in the future instead of, or for certain purposes additional to, local government, as has been much advocated of recent years, the question would arise as to how far this regional planning should be undertaken by the regional government authorities. One difficulty about the Regional Planning Commissions is how they would be appointed. Would they be regional departments of the national government, run by a new class of civil servant directly responsible to the Minister of National Planning, or Works and Buildings, or whatever he might be called? Or would they be separate bodies specially constituted by the Minister? Or *ad hoc* or directly elected bodies? Or merely departments of regional government? The latter possibility is undesirable if for no other reason than that the regional planning unit should generally be much larger than a successful regional government unit. Further, the Regional Planning Commission would have to deal with matters which are outside present local government control and which probably would remain outside regional government control—agriculture, forestry, power transmission and so on. Whichever method of constitution is adopted the regional and perhaps even smaller local authorities will have to be designated as agents to carry out many of the works proposed under the regional plans or necessary to the servicing of other works—roads, sewage disposal and so on—though

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certain further works, such as housing, for example, would probably be far better undertaken by specially constituted public utility associations. And undoubtedly special provision must be made that local opinion may be expressed on proposals contained in any nationally or regionally prepared plans, and some impartial authority should be constituted to give a proper hearing to objections which might be raised. It has been suggested that a Standing Committee of the House of Commons might be constituted for that purpose.

Whatever machinery may be adopted for planning the reconstruction of Britain, one of the most powerful ways of ensuring the public control of all uses of land would be by the public ownership of that land. The competing interests of private ownership and the speculation in land values that has gone on in the past have probably been the greatest of all the obstacles to what little planning that has hitherto been attempted. They will certainly give rise to grave difficulties in the future; and the only way of avoiding those difficulties is by getting rid of the conditions that create them.

All this organisation may seem to be ambitious. But then the post-war reconstruction of Britain is an ambitious project. If Lord Reith's new Ministry is to deal only with a few limited kinds of Works and Buildings, leaving other matters of physical planning to other government departments, the reconstruction will almost certainly be a patched and blotched affair. National reconstruction means a national plan: and *post-war* reconstruction means war-time planning for it. If we are to get a Better Britain when the war is over Lord Reith must be given powers to plan all post-war land uses *now*.

THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS

By REGIONALITER

I

AT last we have established regionalism, after much discussion and excessive delay. But the experiment in regional government represented by the Regional Commissioners is utterly different from the kind of institution which was the subject of so much advocacy and controversy during the past three or four decades.

As each year passed, the obsolete and inefficient character of our local government organisation became increasingly obvious. Every extension in the scope of the functions which local authorities were required or permitted to discharge emphasised the hopeless inadequacy of the existing system of areas. Far larger units of administration are needed not only for relatively new services such as town and country planning, housing, electricity supply, road passenger transport, higher and technical education, but also for the older functions such as police, highways, and sewage disposal. The expansion in the area of daily movement of the people for economic, social and political purposes, consequent upon improved methods of transport and communication, necessitates a corresponding extension in the units of local government; for no principle of political organisation is more firmly established than the maxim that the areas of public administration should approximate to the areas of diurnal movement.

Above all, the dichotomy between town and country which is implicit in the rigid separation of county councils and county borough councils became manifestly absurd when vast numbers of persons who work and earn their living in cities were enabled to live in semi-rural or suburban dormitories situated at considerable distances outside their boundaries.

An enlargement of local government areas on the one hand, and an integration of town and country authorities on the other, thus became insistent needs which no amount of obtuseness or resistance to reform on the part of local

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councils or their associations could overcome. The facts were too eloquent to be silenced.

The imperative demand for a radical improvement in the structure of local government nevertheless met with a solid wall of opposition from the local authorities concerned, and a pitiful evasion of the issue on the part of successive Ministers of Health. Year by year the large towns attempted, sometimes successfully and sometimes in vain, to enlarge their boundaries. Such attempts invariably met with bitter opposition from the county councils from whose domain it was proposed to take territory, population and rateable value. Even the most ambitious of such efforts were, in any case, drops in the ocean compared with what was needed. Expansion on a larger scale was achieved in certain places in regard to particular services. Thus, regional town planning committees (sometimes with only advisory powers), land drainage schemes covering an entire catchment area, joint sewage boards and hospital authorities serving large territories, have occasionally revealed a spirit of enterprise and a willingness to recognise plain needs.

In the main, however, local authorities and their Associations have persistently refused to recognise the imperative necessity for change, despite the unanswerable case made out by disinterested experts and students of government. No sacrilegious hand has ever been permitted to revise in a general way the absurd boundaries of the administrative counties since the time when the county councils were first established by Parliament in 1888; and it is apparently the opinion of the County Councils Association that they should continue for all eternity in their present form. The Association of Municipal Corporations, and the organs of the smaller bodies, such as the Urban District Councils Association and the Association of Rural District Councils, are equally parochial in their outlook.

II

An indication of the age of the problem is given by a glance at some of the older Fabian Tracts. The Fabian Society commenced to publish, as far back as 1905, a series of pamphlets under the general title "The New Heptarchy."

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The original Heptarchy was, of course, the seven kingdoms of Angles and Saxons in Britain; and the idea underlying the series was the establishment of a similar number of large provincial authorities to supersede the existing mass of small bodies.

The first tract of the series (No. 125) was entitled *Municipalization by Provinces* by W. Stephen Sanders, L.C.C., who later became the General Secretary of the Society. It is an excellent piece of work, surprisingly modern and far-sighted as a statement of the case for regionalism. "The great towns of Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Newcastle, Nottingham, Leeds, etc.," declared the author, "must be considered as centres, and not as self-contained units for all local government purposes" (p. 5). In regard to such services as transport, electricity and water supply," he continued, "it will be necessary, in endeavouring to devise new authorities and new areas for their administration, to drop the idea that they should remain municipal services in the narrowest sense of the term municipal. They should not become even county, but provincial services. . . . But whether seven or more provincial water boards, and seven or more transit and electricity boards are formed is immaterial, provided the provincial principle is applied to those areas where narrow municipal boundaries are cramping the growth of the collective control of industry" (p. 8). The members of these provincial functional boards were to be elected by the local authorities within their areas.

The provinces of the New Heptarchy were clearly intended to be super-local authorities, although it was thought necessary to constitute them by the method of indirect election. The idea attracted the attention of many prominent men at the time, including Mr. H. G. Wells (who dealt with it in *Anticipations*) and the present Prime Minister. The same general idea was worked out in much fuller, more mature and somewhat diverse practical forms by G. D. H. Cole in his *Future of Local Government* (1921), by C. B. Fawcett in *The Provinces of England*, and by W. A. Robson in *The Development of Local Government* (1931) and *The Government and Misgovernment of London* (1939). Thus from the opening years of the twentieth century until the outbreak of the

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present war the need for regionalising local government was demonstrated continually by disinterested reformers.

Similar conclusions were reached by numerous Royal Commissions and committees set up to investigate general or particular aspects of the matter. Among these may be mentioned the Ullswater Commission on London Government (1923), the Hadow Committee on Local Government Officers (1934), the Report on Greater London Drainage (1935), and the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside (1937). There are many others.

This stream of progressive thought fell on deaf ears so far as local authorities were concerned. The more insistent the case for reform, the more obtuse became the spokesman of the *status quo*. Indifferent to the emerging interests of local government as a whole, they defended with fierce passion the divine right of things as they are. Much breath has been expended on denouncing the vested financial interests of property owners and businessmen. Attention might well be paid to the recalcitrant attitude of councillors and officers who defend with blind partisanship the vested administrative and political interests of established local authorities, for this is a phenomenon of immense importance in obstructing progress. It must not be assumed that their motives are tainted with jobbery or corruption. The strongest incentive has been a mere clinging to office and power, an irrational loyalty to the existing order regardless of its merits, a timid reluctance to embark on new and untried courses.

These forces conspired to defeat all attempts to bring the local government structure into conformity with the needs of our time. A large share of the blame must fall on the apathy and lack of courage of successive Ministers of Health belonging to all political parties. Some part of it is attributable to the ignorance, indifference and apathy of Parliament in matters of local government. The late Neville Chamberlain was supposed to have been conspicuously successful as Minister of Health; yet he made no attempt whatever to regionalise local government. The Local Government Act, 1929, of which he was the principal architect, provided for the review of county districts, but left the county councils

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and county boroughs exactly where they were. Mr. Arthur Greenwood did not even make a speech on the subject when he was Minister of Health in 1929-30; nor did Mr. Wheatley when he held that office in the first Labour Government in 1924.

III

The world of thought was thus far in advance of the world of action in regard to this important matter. Even as late as 1938, regionalism would have appeared to an enquiring neophyte to be, not a dead political issue, but rather one which had never come alive.

Less than a year later, however, a full-blown system of regional administration came into existence as an essential part of the Government's war organisation.

This dramatic innovation is a striking illustration of the manner in which necessary social and political changes force their way in at the back entrance when they are shut out of the front door. It has happened again and again in the history of public administration that institutions which have resisted adaptation all too successfully have suddenly been confronted with an alternative solution which, while avoiding the source of conflict and thus evading opposition, in effect by-passes the old institutions and leaves them stranded. In such circumstances it is true to say that nothing fails like success. The apparently irrelevant solution may deal a mortal blow to the organs which have withstood all attempts at adaptation.

This is what has happened in the present instance. At one stroke there has been installed a fully-fledged system of regional government which, while leaving the local authorities apparently untouched, offers a formidable challenge to their future existence and status.

The Regional Commissions are twelve in number. The following list gives particulars of the areas into which Great Britain is divided for the purpose:

<i>Region</i>	<i>Regional Commissioner</i>
SCOTLAND	Rt. Hon. Tom Johnston, M.P.
NORTHERN	Sir Arthur Lambert, M.C.
Northumberland, Durham and the North Riding of Yorkshire.	

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<i>Region</i>	<i>Regional Commissioner</i>
NORTH-EASTERN The East Riding and West Riding.	Rt. Hon. Lord Harlech
NORTH-WESTERN Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Cheshire, the boroughs of Glossop and Buxton and certain urban districts.	Sir Harry Haig, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.
NORTH MIDLAND Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire, Leicester- shire, Rutland, Northamptonshire, Derby- shire (excluding the boroughs and urban districts contained in the North-Western region).	 Lord Trent
MIDLAND Shropshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire.	The Earl of Dudley, M.C.
EASTERN Norfolk, Suffolk, Bedfordshire, Cam- bridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and the parts of Essex and Hertfordshire outside the Metropolitan Police District.	Sir Will Spens, C.B.E.
SOUTHERN Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Berkshire, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, the part of Surrey outside the Metropolitan Police District, Poole and two urban districts.	Mr. Harold Butler, C.B.
SOUTH-WESTERN Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Somerset, Devonshire, Cornwall, Dorset (excluding Poole and the two urban districts con- tained in the Southern region).	General Sir Hugh Elles, K.C.B.
LONDON The Metropolitan Police District.	Sir Ernest Gowers, K.C.B. (Senior Commissioner) Admiral Sir E. R. Evans Alderman C. Key, M.P. (in charge of shelters) H. Willinck, K.C., M.P. (in charge of rehousing the homeless) Sir Warren Fisher (in charge of demolition and repairs)
WALES	R. Richards, M.P. Col. G. T. Bruce, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

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<i>Region</i>	<i>Regional Commissioner</i>
SOUTH-EASTERN . . .	Rt. Hon. Sir Auckland Geddes, K.C.B.
Sussex and the part of Kent outside the Metropolitan Police District.	

It will be seen that in most cases a region has been constituted out of entire (or almost entire) counties and county boroughs. The chief exception to this is the London region, which takes the quite inadequate Metropolitan Police District (created in 1839) as its area.

Much could be said concerning the merits and demerits of the particular areas which have been given to the Regional Commissions, but this article is concerned with the nature of the institution rather than with the details of territorial jurisdiction. Such a discussion would therefore tend to divert attention from the main question, and is therefore omitted.

IV

The fundamental purpose of the Regional Commission is threefold. First, to act as the eyes, ears and mouth of the central government in the region. Second, to be responsible for seeing that the Government's Civil Defence and A.R.P. measures are carried out in the region. Third, in case of a breakdown in communications, to take the place of the central government in the region.

It will be seen that the first of these functions involves intelligence and liaison; the second involves supervision and inspection; the third, administration and policy-making.

The Government departments concerned with domestic services have appointed Divisional Officers to represent them within each region. These include the Ministry of Food, Ministry of Information, the Post Office, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Ministry of Pensions, Mines Department, Petroleum Department, Ministry of Transport, Office of Works and Buildings, and the Unemployment Assistance Board. These officers continue to receive instructions from their respective departments in the normal way while maintaining close contact with the Regional Commissioner. In the event of a breakdown of communications a Regional Commissioner would assume supreme

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control of his area; the Divisional Officers would look to him instead of to their respective departments; and the Regional Commission would operate as a miniature Central Government within the region.

Pending the arrival—which may never come—of this final stage, in which supreme authority is assumed, the Regional Commissioner is in the meantime able to exert an enormous influence over the conduct of affairs. This is particularly the case in regard to A.R.P. and Civil Defence matters, because in this sphere the Regional Commissioner acts on behalf of the Minister of Home Security, who pays a very high grant to local authorities in aid of their expenditure on these services. The Regional Commissioners have attached to them as personal assistants a number of leading officials of the Ministry of Home Security in charge of various aspects of A.R.P. and Civil Defence work.

Outside this special field the Commissioners are able to exercise a powerful and often decisive influence over other branches of administration. The novelty of the institution, the critical military situation, the prestige of the office and the personal eminence of some of the Commissioners result in their authority often exceeding their powers. This is noticeably so in London, where the municipal structure is especially weak—a mere patchwork quilt—and the Regional Commission especially strong. Except in Wales, the Commissions elsewhere consist of a single member with a deputy. In the Metropolis two Commissioners were originally appointed, but the number was gradually increased to five.

The present Commission for London consists of Sir Ernest Gowers (Senior Commissioner) and Admiral Evans, who are charged with general duties; Alderman Charles Key, M.P., in charge of shelters; Mr. H. Willinck, K.C., M.P., Special Commissioner for rehousing the homeless; and Sir Warren Fisher, Special Commissioner entrusted with demolition and repairs to houses, highways and public utilities. To the extent that these vital tasks have passed into the hands of the Regional Commissioners, the scope and significance of the work of the local authorities has been diminished, and their stature reduced.

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V

The Regional Commissioners were established to fill an aching void in our system of government caused by the absence of a coherent and systematic form of regional organisation. In the war emergency we now confront they are without doubt a necessary and perhaps indispensable addition to the machinery of the State. This should not blind us to the fact that they represent a complete break in our constitutional tradition.

The Commissioners cannot be regarded as politically responsible in any genuine sense of the term. The Minister of Home Security answers for them in the House of Commons, and they can be dismissed by the Government. But the position occupied by men of this calibre filling positions of unique authority cannot be assimilated to that of Civil Servants, and no one can seriously imagine that the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility is applicable to them. Moreover, at the time of the fullest exercise of their powers they will be cut off from all contact with the Cabinet, the Minister of Home Security and Parliament. The fact that two or three of the Commissioners happen to be Members of Parliament is presumably an accident, and such an incidental connection with the legislature cannot be regarded as an adequate safeguard of their accountability.

An attempt is being made to arrange meetings between the Commissioners and the Members of Parliament representing constituencies within their respective Regions. This is better than nothing, but it cannot be regarded as an adequate safeguard of democracy, since the Commissioners are not answerable to the M.P.'s, and their statements cannot even be quoted in the House of Commons.

No less sharp is the contrast afforded between the Regional Commissioners and the system of democratically-elected local authorities. The Commissioners represent, indeed, a clear example of that dangerous trend in our political development which may be described as "Government by Commission." By this is meant some form of appointed board or officer exercising large administrative powers without direct responsibility to an elective body. They are the apotheosis of the movement which can be traced in the establishment of such

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bodies as the B.B.C., the London Passenger Transport Board, the Central Electricity Board and the Coal Commission.

Most important of all is the certainty that, whether they desire it or not, and regardless of their good intentions, the Commissioners must inevitably offer a serious menace to the future of local self-government. Our system of local authorities has many serious defects which are deserving of criticism and censure; but as instruments of democracy they possess merits of supreme value. The democratic process has been largely developed in and through the local council. The town hall and the council chamber is the first and indispensable link in the chain of our democratic institutions, the place in which the civic spirit is evoked and bodied forth in democratic shape. If these centres of local democracy are overshadowed and reduced to insignificance by the powerful new Regional Commissions created by the central government, the ultimate effect will be to weaken and undermine democratic government at the national and Imperial level.

It is difficult to propose an immediate remedy at this stage of events. The war makes it impossible to replace the Regional Commissioners by an elected council; and the local authorities themselves are in a state of suspended animation so far as a vital contact with the citizens is concerned. The method of indirect election is undesirable at the best time of times. To-day it would be hopelessly mistaken.

Hence, all we can do now is to watch the course of events carefully, to analyse the present situation in all its implications, and to make up our minds that as soon as the war is over we will abolish the Regional Commissioners and replace them with directly-elected Regional Councils. Only thus can we preserve and strengthen our system of local democracy on which so much depends.

THE MAN-POWER PROBLEM .

By G. D. H. COLE

MAN-POWER is needed, in this present war, for five main purposes—for the fighting services, for civil defence, for munition-making, for the production of exports, and for the maintenance of supplies for the civil population. Even if there were no shortage of total man-power for all these purposes, the man-power problem would be difficult on account of particular shortages and of difficulties involved in transferring workers from one job to another, or in inducing persons not normally "in gainful employment" to come forward and offer their services in the emergency. Particular shortages are mainly of two kinds—shortages of certain types of highly skilled labour, or of workers for certain exceptionally heavy jobs, and shortages of a local character, especially where there has been a great expansion of the war industries in certain areas.

On the whole, the man-power problem, as it presented itself in 1940, was one of particular "bottle-necks," although it could already be foreseen that the problem of general shortage was bound to present itself before long. In 1941, side by side with an intensification of the earlier difficulties, the problem of general shortage is becoming more important, as more men are called up for service with the armed forces, and as the plans for an increased output of war goods mature with the completion of new factories and extensions and the conversion of existing establishments for intensive use on war work.

The general problem which confronts us can be stated in quite simple terms. It can be assumed that, as we have no man-power to waste, every person capable of work ought to be rendering national service in one of the five fields indicated in my opening sentence. "Maintenance of supplies for the civil population" ought, of course, for this purpose to be interpreted widely enough to cover reasonable provision for the continuance of education, research, and other cultural activities, even where they are not obviously and

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directly essential for the immediate prosecution of the war. "Civil defence" must be considered in relation to part-time as well as whole-time services; and "munition making" must be taken in a wide sense as including all types of supplies destined for war use.

On this understanding, the fundamental problem is that of achieving the best possible distribution of total man-power among these five alternative uses. Each department whose activities use up scarce man-power has to begin by making a draft plan, calling for a certain number of persons for its execution. The plan may be either a direct demand for the services of so many persons, as in the case of the War Office and, on a smaller scale, the other service departments; or it may be a plan of production, accompanied by an estimate, more or less accurate and detailed, of the numbers of workers needed in order that the planned output may be produced. The supply departments and the departments which deal with the industries producing goods for civil consumption have to work mainly with plans of this type, in which the man-power requirements are only estimates derived from more or less adequate data about the real labour costs of production. On the other hand, the railways and other services, as distinct from productive industries, can work more directly in terms of the numbers of workers they need to retain. Agriculture lies somewhere between the two groups, and presents certain quite special difficulties.

Suppose we begin with the army, as the chief man-using representative of the fighting services. Clearly it cannot be expedient to create an army bigger than can be adequately equipped by means of home-produced munitions *plus* imports of similar goods, chiefly from the United States. There can, no doubt, be a difference of opinion about the length of time for which men can usefully be put into training before they can be properly equipped with arms; but the greater the shortage of man-power for other uses, the stronger is the case against allowing the call-up of men to run a day further ahead of the actual supply of weapons than is clearly necessary for effective training. It is a matter of plain commonsense that the army's plans for calling up and the plans of the supply departments for the production and

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import of arms ought to be so related to make the enrolment of men in the armed forces depend, month by month, on the *actual* rate of supplies of arms and other necessary equipment.

This suggests that the key to the right distribution of man-power is in the plan for munitions supply and in its actual rate of progress. Now, the limit to the rate at which munitions can be supplied is set by quite a number of factors. The most important of these are as follows: the available supplies of materials, home-produced or imported, the quantities of finished munitions brought in from abroad, the available quantities of machinery and of the special kinds of skilled labour needed for setting the rest of the labour force to work, and finally the demands for the use of all these factors for other purposes, especially for export of competitive goods and for the maintenance of civilian supplies.

Export demand is, unfortunately, highly competitive with home production of munitions; for many of the goods which can most readily be sold abroad use up much the same scarce materials, scarce machines, and scarce kinds of man-power as munition-making. It may seem, at first sight, as if we ought not now to be exporting any goods of which the production competes directly with the war effort; but the authorities responsible for export policy will counter this argument by urging that it is impossible to pay for indispensable imports without the aid of such exports, and that on balance it pays the nation to sell machinery abroad in order to buy materials. Of course, to the extent to which the United States becomes ready to give maximum supplies of war goods without requiring payment, this contention loses force. But there are other sources of necessary materials besides the United States: nor is it clear that the new American policy extends to the supply without payment of either foodstuffs or raw materials or semi-finished goods.

On the other hand, the arguments of the "export" school need careful scrutiny. It is one thing to export goods in order to get necessary supplies which cannot be secured in any other way: it is quite another to keep up exports for the sake of preserving British markets with a view to the prospects of the export industries in the post-war world.

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We have to maintain exports for the first of these purposes; but exports for the second purpose, and wherever they involve the use of scarce materials, plant or labour that could be applied to war production do involve a net diminution of the war effort, and cannot be afforded in face of the total scarcity of resources of all kinds.

The second demand which puts a limit to the expansion of the war industries is the need for maintaining civilian supplies. This is a very difficult problem. It is easy enough for a statistician of ascetic temperament, sitting in his office, to calculate, in terms of purely physical needs, how much of its normal supplies of goods and services the civil population can afford to do without—though clearly the upshot of any such calculation must depend on the extent to which an equal distribution of the available supplies is postulated. Where most goods are unrationed, and spending power is grossly unequal and not subject to any legal maximum, the total allocation has to be made unnecessarily high in order to ensure a reasonable minimum supply to those who have little to spend. It follows that the scaling down of the man-power required for maintaining the civilian population to the lowest point consistent with a reasonable minimum satisfaction of needs depends on rationing either the goods and services themselves or the right to buy them, and that, in the absence of such rationing on a comprehensive basis, man-power is bound to be wasted in this field.

Another serious waste of man-power arises where, in order to reduce hardship to the owners of businesses, the limited amount of output of civilian goods that can be allowed is shared out by means of some sort of quota among the firms already in the trade. It stands to reason that, if this is done, there will be a large unnecessary employment of managerial, clerical and supervisory labour, and also a strong tendency to keep an unnecessarily large manual labour force in partial employment—a waste which is the more serious because it is likely to affect especially the more skilled types of workers. Each firm must have at least a skeleton managerial staff and a skeleton body of skilled labour; and in the result many more skilled persons will be used up in this way than would be needed if the permitted total output were produced

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in a smaller number of establishments, all working full time.

It is easy to argue that the closing down of establishments not needed for producing the curtailed output would involve great hardship and a serious invasion of "property rights." So it would, unless it were accompanied by measures for pooling returns between the establishments kept open and the establishments closed down, as well as for adapting as many as possible of the closed establishments to alternative war uses. This problem is of the greatest importance at the present stage, when industries not engaged on war production are being asked to produce collective schemes for the release of labour for essential war work. It will be impossible for them to release enough labour to meet the needs of the expanding war trades unless they arrange for a concentration of output in a limited number of establishments, with effective measures for compensation where establishments have to be closed down for the period of the war, and cannot be converted to war use.

There is a real danger that the desire to expand the output of munitions without therewith slowing down the rate of intake into the armed forces may lead to a reduction of permitted output for civilian supplies to a level which, in the absence of effective all-round rationing of consumption, may cause real discontent. It has to be borne in mind that civilian consumption under the existing conditions is swollen not only by the rise in total earnings in busy war trades, but also by the need to replace goods and chattels lost in air-raids and by demands arising out of the migration of households either evacuated from danger zones or compelled to move towards the centres of munitions production. Moreover, the attempt to enforce economy in the use of goods by civilians may easily give rise to serious unrest if it appears that the restrictions on consumption are in fact effective only at the expense of the relatively poor. It is in any case necessary, in order to sustain the spirit of the people, to allow for the maintenance of amusements and amenities on a considerable scale—giving preferences, as far as possible, to those kinds of "luxury" production and service which make the smallest call on the types of labour, machinery and

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material that are most needed in the war trades. Useless restrictions on the consumption of the main body of civilians will be certain to set up undesirable psychological, as well as political, reactions. The civilian population must not be left to manage as best it can on the mere leavings of the armed forces, of munitions production, and of the permitted quantities of exports.

So far, I have been treating of the man-power problem almost exclusively in its quantitative aspect. It is reasonable to begin in this way because, unavoidably, as soon as the problem comes to be one of a total shortage of workers for all purposes, the first approximation to a solution has to be made in quantitative terms. The total intake of men into the armed forces has to be settled in relation to the total relative demands of the war industries and of the industries providing for exports and for civil consumption. But the problem is throughout really one of quality as well as quantity. If it is claimed that the industries producing for civilian needs ought to be allowed to retain so many workers, the question at once arises: What sorts of workers? Clearly these are the branches of production in which, even at the cost of quality in the products, the substitution of less skilled or less "fit" types of labour ought to be pushed furthest, in order to release skilled workers for the war trades and fit men for the armed forces in the largest possible numbers. In the war trades also, dilution and substitution ought to be pushed to considerable lengths; but sacrifices of quality in output cannot be tolerated (as distinct from sacrifices of ordinary peace-time "finish") to anything like the same extent as in the consumers' trades producing for the home market.

This brings me to a review of some more special aspects of the man-power problem. The extent to which less skilled workers can be substituted for workers who possess a higher degree of skill is bound to depend largely on the training facilities that are available, both for adapting for higher types of work workers already in the industries concerned and for fitting fresh workers drawn in from other trades or from no employment at all to carry out efficiently the routine operations of running automatic and semi-automatic machines, filling projectiles, and in general relieving the

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workers already in the industry, who can then be transferred to more difficult jobs.

This problem of training is crucial. It has two main aspects, which it is dangerous to confuse, though the distinction between them is by no means absolute. One kind of training is designed to increase the *skilled* labour force: a second, and much simpler, kind has for its object the mass-production of workers capable of performing the simpler operations with adequate machine-sense or manual dexterity. For the first of these types the trainees have to be sought mainly from among workers already engaged in the trades concerned, but no more than semi-skilled, or from skilled workers in other trades whose skill can be adapted by training to the uses most needed under war conditions. Intermediate between these two types of training is a third—the manufacture of semi-skilled operatives or of workers whose skill is practically limited to the use of a particular kind of machine.

For all these types of training the provision, up to the present time, has been quite inadequate. The training of highly-skilled workers is difficult to speed up: it must be based on selecting from among the semi-skilled those who possess both machine-dexterity and a relatively high standard of intelligence, or on taking from trades which are being cut down—such as printing—highly-skilled men whose skill can be adapted to alternative uses. Selection of the former type often takes the form of “upgrading” in the factory, without any specific training for the higher type of work; but it could in many cases be made much more effective if specific training were provided in the factory or elsewhere. The adaptation of skill gained in quite different industries has mainly to be done in special training establishments, except where a big munitions factory sets aside a special shop for this purpose, and thus brings the training into close relation to the skilled work which the trainee will be called upon to undertake.

The two main types of work for which highly-skilled recruits are urgently needed are tool-room operation and machine setting. The second type involves much less difficulty as, given intelligence and habituation to machine-

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operation in the trainee, training can be carried through fairly quickly. There are large numbers of men who know how to set up the particular machine on which they have been accustomed to work, and can learn quite rapidly to set other machines, at any rate over a wide enough range to make them very useful auxiliaries to the fully skilled setters. Moreover, intelligent men or women who have never set a machine in their lives can be trained fairly soon to set a single type of machine, and thus relieve the pressure on the regular setters. The problem of machine-setting is capable of solution, on two conditions: first, that the selection of men and women for training is carefully made, and secondly that enough machines of the right types are made available in the training shops. This latter condition is difficult to satisfy in face of the shortage of machine-tools; but it is as foolish to refuse machine-tools for training skilled munition workers as it would be to expect the Air Force to turn out pilots without an adequate equipment of training ‘planes.

The difficulty indeed is not so much in the training itself as in getting the machines or the men to train. The demand for as many munitions as possible at the earliest possible moment is apt to lead to fewer being produced in the long run, because it makes both firms and government departments unwilling to release either machines or men at the cost of a fall in immediate output.

There is, moreover, a second difficulty. Before the war, the Ministry of Labour always thought of training courses as meant for workers who had been long unemployed and were living on U.A.B. allowances. The rates paid to trainees were therefore put at only a few shillings a week above the U.A.B. scales. Some increases have been granted in recent months; but training allowances are, in general, still very far below the wages which semi-skilled men can earn by remaining on productive work of an inferior grade of skill. They are also a long way below the customary earnings of the highly skilled workers from other trades whom it is desired to persuade to undertake training for munition work, and in some cases even below the unemployment benefits paid to such men by their Trade Unions. Consequently, there is a shortage of men to train as well as of facilities for

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training them ; and this leads to a stalemate. The authorities will not release machine-tools for training until the men are ready to be trained ; and the men, asked to accept very disadvantageous conditions of training, are additionally deterred by the knowledge that there are not enough machines. Indeed, there has been a marked tendency, on account of this shortage of training machines, for both Government Training Centres and Technical Institutions to turn out fitters and assemblers in numbers quite out of proportion to the output of turners and machine-setters or skilled operators.

Under these conditions the scarcity of machine-setters often puts limits to the numbers of less skilled workers who can be employed, especially on night-shifts. It is of urgent importance to speed up training, both in the factories and in special establishments outside. Given right management, the output of skilled setters can be rapidly increased ; but there are much greater difficulties in the way of adding to the effective supply of skilled tool-room workers, who need prolonged training in addition to special intelligence. Something can be done by splitting up tool-room operations and then using rather less skilled workers for the simpler jobs ; but in the main the solution must lie in reducing the amount of tool-room work to the minimum and in stringent regulation of the number of suitable workers retained in the less essential trades. The only way of reducing the volume of tool-room work is by securing the greatest possible continuity of contracts, so that firms which have constructed the necessary jigs and tools can have the longest possible run without the need for making new designs. In this respect there have been substantial improvements in recent months ; but there was during the earlier stages of the war a great avoidable waste of highly skilled labour, and the problem has not been at all completely dealt with even now.

As for the mass-training of workers—especially women—for the less skilled operations, that has to be done mainly in the factories ; and for some months now the Ministry of Labour has been pressing firms to start training schemes, not only for the workers they need themselves, but also to form a pool for supplying the new factories which are under construction. I do not know how much progress has been

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made with this scheme ; but it is clearly on the right lines as far as it goes. It needs, however, to be supplemented by larger measures than at present exist for training women workers in the areas in which they now live, with a view to shifting them, after they have been trained, to the areas in which there is a large present or prospective shortage of labour.

Indeed, this problem of regional shortages of workers is likely to be the principal difficulty in the way of expanding the output of munitions during the next twelve months. In planning the location of new factories and extensions, and also in moving factories out of areas regarded as particularly exposed to danger, altogether too little attention seems to have been paid to the question of labour supply. This has already given rise to acute difficulties over the billeting of workers who have been moved into congested areas and over transport to and from work where workers have to travel long distances because of the lack of accommodation on the spot. Billeting in particular has been a great mess and has involved serious extortions by landladies and much personal friction ; and travelling arrangements by road or rail have often been quite unnecessarily inconvenient and have reacted adversely on the efficiency of workers who have been compelled to spend most of the twenty-four hours away from home. In addition, amenities in the neighbourhood of the new factories have often been grossly deficient, though of late the Welfare Department of the Ministry of Labour has been struggling with this problem more intensively than at first.

The large number of new and extended factories which are either now beginning production or are scheduled to begin in the very near future threatens to aggravate all these difficulties. It is clear that, if the planned output of munitions is to be secured, the rate of industrial migration into the already congested areas will have to be substantially greater in 1941 than it was in 1940 ; and movement becomes harder both as congestion increases and as it becomes necessary to draw more largely on married women who have home ties and are therefore more reluctant to accept distant jobs involving daily travel as the only alternative to breaking up the home.

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I believe that these difficulties will enforce a policy of wider dispersal of work than has been contemplated in the plans hitherto laid down. Now, in general, dispersal is practicable only if the fullest use is made of existing factory space and if everything possible is done throughout the country to enlist the services of small firms. In the past, these small firms, where they have been employed at all on war work, have been engaged mostly on sub-contracts, or on sub-sub-contracts. What is now needed is a decentralisation of the work of the supply departments, in order to facilitate the formation of local pools of small firms which can co-operate closely, dovetailing their equipment, and each specialising on a narrow range of orders. Pools of this kind already exist, as they did during the last war. But they are on a quite inadequate scale, and there is still much under-employment of the valuable resources in the possession of the large number of small businesses.

This "pool" policy clearly works in with the parallel policy of shutting down establishments which are not needed to produce the restricted supplies of goods for civilian consumption. The economical policy of concentrating the remaining civilian orders on a few firms, and keeping these firms continuously at work, is the complement to the policy of converting the factories of as many as possible of the businesses which are closed down into war factories, with as much adaptation as can be secured of their plant and labour to war uses. Even if this is done to the fullest practicable extent, the migration of labour needed for the new factories will continue to present most formidable difficulties. If it is not done, I doubt if the difficulties can be overcome by any other expedient.

The recent moves in the direction of "industrial compulsion" arise largely out of the need for labour migration on a greatly extended scale. The problem is really two-fold. On the one hand it is necessary to move substantial numbers of skilled men to man the new factories—mainly by thinning out the supply of such men in the older establishments; and on the other it is necessary to send much larger bodies of women to the new Royal Ordnance Factories and similar establishments using a high proportion of fairly unskilled

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female labour. Both these migrations involve, in addition to difficulties of billeting and transport, awkward problems about the allowances to be given to persons working away from home, or compelled to move, and about the irrational differences in wages and earnings between one district and another. These latter difficulties are of special importance in the case of skilled workers. The wages of electricians, for example, differ enormously from place to place; and there are also wide divergences of working conditions which make men reluctant to move, and set up serious friction where they move of their own accord, or are compelled to move by order of the Minister of Labour.

Among the obstacles to the full utilisation of the available man-power of Great Britain this is one of the two which I regard as most serious. The other is the continuance, despite government control, of each privately-owned business as a separate unit, with which the government departments enter into separate contracts. I am convinced that man-power could be much more effectively applied if the Government would take over completely all the important munition-making firms, and would pool their entire resources in each locality under unified local management—at any rate to the extent of grouping all firms engaged in closely related types of work. This would make possible a much more intensive use of the machine equipment. It would mean that jobs could be transferred freely from one factory to another in order to take advantage of machines or labour temporarily available; and it would also make it possible, within each area, for workers to be transferred as easily from one firm's establishment to another's as they can at present from one workshop to another belonging to the same employer.

This solution would indeed help immensely towards solving the other problem—that of labour migration. With unification of establishments under government control ought to go unification of wages and working conditions. I have long been in favour of putting at least all the highly skilled workers in the munitions industries on upstanding salaries similar to those paid to professional employees, and thus not only changing the status of the skilled wage-earners but also cutting out an immense amount of trouble over

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varying wage and overtime conditions in different factories. This sort of "War Socialism" ought to apply, not only to wage-earners but also to all managerial staffs, including working employers, who ought all to be put on fixed salaries for the duration of the war. In my view, shareholders also ought to be put on fixed incomes; and the State, instead of first allowing firms to make big profits and then claiming the surplus back by means of E.P.T. ought, for the war period, to cut out the profit motive altogether, and make the shareholder into a *rentier* instead of a dividend-receiver—a *rentier*, that is, who would have no longer any concern with the amount of profit made by the business, or any, even nominal, control over its affairs.

In urging this, I may seem to be wandering far afield from the question of man-power into the general realm of industrial policy. But the questions cannot finally be treated apart; for success in making full use of the supplies of labour depends in the last result on the skill shown in mobilising plant and equipment for national use, and also on the extent to which the workers can feel assured that compulsions and hardships are not being applied unfairly to them while the owners of capital and the managerial classes are being subjected to no corresponding measures of control. If the Government would take the factories completely into its hands, complaints about "industrial conscription" would largely disappear; for in the war emergency men are ready to bear as servants of the State hardship and discipline which they continue to resent when these things come to them through the capitalist employer as the State's agent—especially when the employer is still free to make his profit, and to run his business with one eye to the resumption of unrestricted profit-making after the war.

THE MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

By DONALD TYERMAN

THE function of the Ministry of Supply is to furnish supplies for the armed and ancillary services of the State. Its task is to obtain the sinews and deliver the goods of war, and in effect it is two Ministries not one: a Ministry of raw materials and a Ministry of manufactured munitions. Because its programmes and achievements are necessarily not made public it is not possible for an outsider to speak with authority about the Ministry. All he can do is to set down some impressions of its policy and practical working. It was set up some months before the war, after the German march into Bohemia and the giving of British guarantees to Poland, Roumania and Greece; and its history since has been a record of trial and error to discover the full width and scope of its tasks. Long before March, 1939, critics had urged that the establishment of a Ministry of Munitions or Supply was a necessary part of rearmament, but the answer of the Government was that to set up a special department to organise the manufacture and delivery of war goods would be a needless interference with the normal processes of industry and labour relations. This was the view of the three Service departments, the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. In spite of the experience of 1914-18, manufacture for war purposes was still regarded as a *separate industry* which could be established and developed inside the industrial system, *side by side* with the great civilian industries. Official thought was in terms of a war industry, and the conception of a nation-wide *war economy* was almost entirely lacking. It was sufficient, in this view, for the departments to order their respective supplies from factories specially set up for the purpose—ordnance factories, naval dockyards and aircraft works—without trespassing upon the resources and normal business of industry at large. It was not admitted, in short, that war-making and the scarcity of resources are synonymous.

It would be unfair to make this criticism of the official

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attitude without qualifications. It is not simply shortsightedness that disposes soldiers, sailors, airmen and civil servants to look exclusively to special-purpose industries to furnish their equipment. There can be no doubt that the quality of the products made in ordnance factories, naval establishments and specially designed aircraft works excels the quality of similar goods produced by less specialised undertakings. Nor would it be reasonable, with recollections of the part played by quality in the daytime air battles of last September or, more recently, in the African successes of General Wavell, to deny the soundness of this point of view. Moreover, the claim that, before the war and in the relatively non-combatant months after September, 1939, there was in fact no scarcity of materials, plant and labour to justify the "annexation" of non-specialised resources from the wider civilian section of industry, was quite correct. What was not realised, however, was, first, that the quantities that could be produced by *the specialised war industries*, working with only the best materials and the best workmanship in the best conditions, were not, and could not, be sufficient when set against the products of Germany's "total" war economy; and, secondly, that the real reason why there was no scarcity of resources in the periods of rearmament and early war was simply because the Government's production programme did not represent a sufficiently large demand for resources to make them scarce.

The outbreak of violent war in the spring of 1940 showed the British forces under-equipped at every point. It was then made brutally apparent that the production of the goods of war by what are undeniably the "best" methods cannot produce enough of them to wage a modern war with success. The superiority of Britain's war industry in quality remained; but the superiority of Germany's *war economy* in quantitative production, despite Allied advantages in access to raw materials, threatened to be decisive.

From its inception until June, 1940, the Ministry of Supply was dominated by this limited view. The first Minister, Mr. Burgin, a Simonite Liberal solicitor, was given no powers in the peace months to supervise Admiralty and Air Ministry contracts; naval and air orders, it was argued, could be adequately filled by their respective departments working

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through their respective special-purpose factories. This was obviously true because the orders were drawn to fit the capacity of those factories. Mr. Burgin was simply given the task of placing orders for the War Office, for ordnance factories and for civil defence—with the extra duty of building up a general reserve of essential materials. A Ministerial committee, with various sub-committees, to bring the Admiralty and the Air Ministry into discussion with the Ministry of Supply in cases where some material, labour or machinery they all needed might be scarce, was set up, largely as a concession to the critics. In effect, the departmentalised and specialised process of war manufacture went on in the same way, and consequently on the same limited scale, as before.

It is true that the Act establishing the Ministry did give Mr. Burgin wider powers *in posse*—to expand the output of munitions and to control the supply and use of raw materials. When war did break out in September a series of Orders brought these powers into effect; and they were extended over the whole field of Government contracts. On the side of raw materials, controls were set up of iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, aluminium, hemp and flax, silk and rayon, jute, wool, hides and leather, timber, paper, fertilisers, molasses and industrial alcohol, with authority to control supplies, to make bulk purchases on behalf of the Government, to fix prices and to allocate supplies among consumers. On the side of manufacture, the Minister now had complete authority to place contracts, to supervise contractors and even, in certain circumstances, to take over and run factories. In practice, however, these powers were only partially employed. The introduction of a nation-wide system of controls and licences slowed down the normal working of civilian business, but there was no corresponding acceleration in the pace of war production. The problem was still regarded as it had been before the war. It was the declared policy of the Ministry of Supply not to use its power to give Government contracts precedence or "priority" in the use of labour, materials, industrial capacity or transport until difficulties actually arose; and it was pointed out that there were no difficulties. It was not understood that, as the war

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effort grew, shortages would inevitably appear; that to intervene then would be too late to avoid dislocation; and that the whole balance of the production of any weapon could, and would, be upset by the development of difficulties in the supply of this or that tool or component. The supply of arms was looked upon as a separate and specialised activity to be organised with the least possible hindrance to industry in general; civilian industry was only irritated and hampered without being curtailed; if unemployment was caused, the workers thrown out of work, remained idle; and war production remained stubbornly at a level which, in view of the enemy's output, was frighteningly low. In France there was the same reluctance to turn over from quality to quantity production. In Britain, there was no shortage of labour, plant or materials, but there was a grave shortage of equipment.

It would be untrue to accuse the Ministry of Supply of inactivity during this period. Its work was directed by the Supply Council, consisting of the Minister and his Parliamentary Secretary, the civil service heads of departments in the Ministry and a number of business men. Orders for fresh equipment were placed in great numbers on behalf of the Service Ministries; many new factories were put into construction; and a survey of the nation's engineering resources was initiated. The control of raw materials, which in almost every instance was given over to associations of traders or to leading firms, was made more complete. But the principle was still to "order and wait." It was believed—and it is hard to imagine that the Ministry's honorary and part-time industrial advisers resisted this belief—that the Ministry's job was simply to state the Services requirements and leave it to the engineering, metal and other industries to do the job in their own way and in their own time. In the case of the raw material controls, consumers had, of course, to come to the controllers for permission to obtain supplies; but, in the majority of cases, permission was not withheld. There was no disposition to cut down civilian supplies, except in so far as imports had gone down, because planned demands of the war effort were still too small to make this necessary.

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Critics pointed out that the two foundations of this policy were both faulty: the conviction that the limits of the practicable size of the war programme were largely set by the capacity of the existing war industry; and the belief, founded in a decade of Tory industrial policy, that control of industry was best exercised by industry's own leaders. It is true that, within the framework of these notions, efforts were made to increase output month by month. There was the establishment of area boards of civil servants and advisory committees of representative employers and workers in each of the defence regions of the country, with the object of ascertaining local supplies of suitable labour and equipment. Orders on an increasing scale for miscellaneous munitions, items of equipment and components were now going out to all sorts of firms, mainly large ones; and the experience of 1914-18 when, ultimately, every workshop capable of any war work had to be mobilised, was remembered. But it was a reluctant process. It was claimed, quite rightly, that civilian firms cannot do war work as well—or as cheaply—as special ordnance and aircraft factories; and, in reply to criticisms that not enough use was being made of small and medium-sized firms, it was replied that most concerns of this kind had neither the workers, the organisation nor the space to instal plant of the most economical size.

Indeed, there were sound reasons of national economy for keeping as far as possible to the specialised munition and aircraft makers. In the ordnance factories, the naval dockyards and the Government-planned aircraft factories, it was possible to know in advance roughly what the cost of manufacture would be. It was possible to work out costs beforehand and to arrange for delivery at a set price. In the case of civilian firms this was not possible. They were new entrants into the munitions business. It was hard to determine how overhead charges should be distributed over that part of their work that was being done on Government order; and it was necessary to arrange for delivery, not at a set price, but at a price to be arranged which would cover their costs plus a settled percentage for profit. There was, and still is, an incentive in this system to extravagance and waste in production and consequently to higher prices. The trouble was

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that "sound" finance and specialised manufacture could not deliver the goods. In March, 1940, Mr. Burgin stated that orders had been placed, since September, 1939, to the value of £500 millions, of which one-third was for materials; but no more than two-fifths of these orders, £200 millions, had actually been delivered. The national cost was being cut far below the possibilities of the cloth. When, also, in March, Sir John Simon introduced a Budget envisaging little or no increase in the rate of total national expenditure during the coming twelve months, and an expenditure on the war alone of no more than £2,000 millions in the year 1940-41—the rate now is approaching *twice* that figure—Mr. Amery's comment that "The Budget has only reflected the general outlook and limitations of His Majesty's Government in the whole field of our war effort" reflected a widespread resentment. War production had become bogged. The Government's programme was neither large enough to make use of more than a moiety of the nation's resources nor purposive enough to produce even the equipment needed for the comparatively limited forces in being. There was in practice little control over contractors and none over sub-contractors. Raw materials were being freely released for non-essential purposes. Not even steel was being rigorously kept back for war contracts.

As late as May, 1940, the question of training labour for war work was being discussed in terms of an eventual maximum of 40,000 trainees a year. It was already plain to every student of the national economy that, if a genuine war effort was to be made, there must be a wholesale *transfer* of labour and plant from civilian manufacture to war manufacture, a transfer involving *millions* rather than thousands of men and women. Before the war, in peacetime, the Government had spent about a fifth of the national income. Now, it was calculated, it might be needful for the Government to spend a half or even two-thirds of the national income, and it was imperative that there should be a corresponding change-over from civilian to war work.

Norway, Flanders, Dunkirk, France, Bordeaux—the events of May and June, 1940, told the whole harsh story. In the formation of Mr. Churchill's new Government, the Ministry

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of Supply had a key position. Mr. Herbert Morrison, London's Labour leader, replaced Mr. Burgin; and the real crux of the problem was recognised by the setting-up of a *Production Council of Ministers* "to balance the supply of material and of plant available, and have knowledge of the strategy of the war, together with the labour supply, so that the whole national effort may move forward in a disciplined and cohesive way." The problem was now seen in the round. It was seen that the programme of production must be derived from the strategic decisions of the Cabinet as a whole; and that the *expansion* of production, now the critical task, was entirely dependent on the provision of labour. The Minister of Labour was given new powers: to call upon any citizen for any services, to register any class of citizen for war work, to enter any factory and inspect the use being made of labour. A Labour Supply Board was set up, composed of Ministry of Labour divisional controllers and the chairmen of the former Ministry of Supply area boards; local labour supply committees of industrialists were appointed. The Minister of Labour, with the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Mines, sat beside the Minister of Supply and the Minister of Aircraft Production (a new appointment) in the Production Council.

A major criticism of the Ministry of Supply had been its "isolation." Up to September, 1939, it had had nothing to do with Air Ministry and Admiralty contracts. After the war started, there had been no effective means of co-ordinating the work of all the economic departments concerned in production, distribution and trade; in practice the Ministry of Supply had been little more than a post office for orders, and *the key task of allocating resources of materials, plant and labour to meet war needs in order of urgency* was simply not done. There was a Ministerial priorities committee, it is true, but the policy was not to use priority powers. "Priority" or precedence—the "order of urgency"—is actually the key to war economy. Resources are inevitably scarce, and the problem is to decide how they shall be used and how they shall not be used. In this war, for a year, the official view was that resources were not scarce, and there was consequently

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no need to enforce priorities. As a result, the only things that were scarce were war goods. In spite of controls, materials, plant and labour were freely used for every variety of unnecessary purpose, while the forces were starved of equipment and deliveries on war contracts were held up. The simple fact that in wartime every factor of production must be rationed, not simply in the sense of being apportioned among all the claimants—which the controls of the Ministry of Supply had been busily doing from the first—but rather in the sense of being withheld from non-essential claimants and reserved exclusively for essential claimants, was ignored. Now, at last, in the Production Council there was the context in which the Ministry of Supply could do its job—an instrument of co-ordination and, rightly used, of purposive diversion, which could lay down what was to be produced to fulfil the Services' programmes, leaving it to the Minister of Supply to "attach" the necessary plant and materials and the Minister of Labour to "attach" the necessary labour. Both Ministers now had ample powers, on paper, to perform these tasks; and in the Priority Committee, its sub-committees and the Central Priorities Department, there was the machinery by which the decisions of the Production Council as to the urgency of the work in hand *could* be made operative over the whole detailed field of Government contracts.

It did not work quite like this. The Production Council—and its chief, Mr. Greenwood, also chairman of the Cabinet's economic policy committee—somewhat misfired; and it was perhaps prophetic of the grudging use to which the Production Council, the new Ministerial powers and the priority machinery were, in fact, to be put that a separate Ministry of Aircraft Production was set up. In theory, when the whole of war production was at last being brought together under a single direction, the new Ministry was a retrograde step. Actually, it was the only way of ensuring that priority in materials, plant and labour would be given to aircraft, the nation's most urgent need; and the personality of the Minister, Lord Beaverbrook, made doubly sure. With the institution of the Production Council, every administrative detail existed to make possible the expansion of output. The Ministry of Supply should thenceforward have been in a position to

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deliver the goods. Mr. Morrison, and his colleague, Mr. Bevin, now had an authoritative lien on the nation's resources of materials, plant and labour. Side by side, a policy was introduced by the Board of Trade of limiting supplies to civilian manufacturers in order to reduce the consumption of materials and—ostensibly—to release labour for war work. The tools for making a war economy—with the notable exception of the necessary financial tools—had been forged. Unfortunately, they were not fully used. Mr. Morrison still did not embark on a campaign to press every available item of industrial capacity into war service. His controllers were still reluctant to withhold materials from non-essential consumers; their main function was still just to *allocate* scarcening supplies—scarcening because of short shipping space—among the various consumers, rather than to *reserve* them strictly for only the most urgent contracts and the most pressing work. Mr. Bevin still shrank from any step towards mobilising labour *en masse* for war work, and did not even encourage workers to enter training centres by offering decent standards of remuneration there. They fell back on exhortation. Mr. Morrison said "Go to it," and Mr. Bevin said "Work like hell." Much, of course, was achieved. The employers and workpeople of the *existing* war factories—indeed, everyone *already* on war work—responded to the limits of their capacity and endurance. Aircraft output was pushed up to meet the September challenge; the Army, which had lost everything at Dunkirk, was re-equipped. But the expansion of the war section of industry, the recruitment of *fresh* labour and the enlistment of *fresh* plant and workshops, still lagged; and there was still no real *system* of priorities in the use of resources. In June, it is true, a list of the munitions most needed was issued to guide the allocation of materials; but there was no method of grading the urgency of individual contracts, of making sure that no pressing war order would be held up for lack of materials. As *The Economist* pointed out in August, it was not enough, for instance, to say that airplanes were more urgently needed than rifles: "Aircraft may be more important than rifles, but the last airplane is not more urgent than the first rifle, and a particular order of steel for rifles may be considerably

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more important than a particular order of steel for aircraft." It was left to the "inspired brigandage" of Lord Beaverbrook to make sure that his aircraft works did not go short.

It would obviously be unjust simply to blame the Ministry of Supply for supply failures. Mr. Morrison may have been timid in the use of his authority, but so, too, was Mr. Bevin; and without new regiments of workpeople, output cannot soar. Nor is there any reason now, in its constitution, why the Ministry of Supply should not deliver the goods; it is delivering goods, in great quantities, as is the Ministry of Aircraft Production also. The gap between British and German quantities and equipment is narrowing. There are flaws at the Ministry of Supply; there is the tendency of the industrial and "trade" interests in the departments and at the controls to fight a rear-guard action against restrictions and interference. There have been errors in price policy. But, in the balance, these are minor matters. The real fault has been elsewhere. In the early stages it was the understandable desire of the Service departments to use only their own special manufacturers. That has persisted—and, even though the bias has proved narrow and shortsighted in the circumstances, it would be a serious thing if it was completely dispelled and quality ceased to be a *sine qua non* in British arms production. But, unfortunately, it has been made the basis for a concept of war economics higher up—in the War Cabinet itself. The elementary truth was overlooked that a system of strict priorities for every factor of production, including plant and labour, is the only way to expand output significantly. Events have shown, however, the need to organise and plan for victory. War economy has been forced upon us. The process of curtailing civilian consumption really radically is in train.

The *dramatis personæ* of the struggle for production have altered. In October, Mr. Morrison was replaced at the Ministry of Supply by Sir Andrew Duncan—of the Iron and Steel Federation. In January, Mr. Greenwood passed on to the contemplation of post-war problems. In place of the Production Council, there is the Production Executive, differing only in its members from its predecessor. Mr. Bevin is chairman. With him are the Minister of Aircraft

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Production, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Supply. The tools are the same as those forged last summer, but they have a new burnish. The problem is simple: first, to see that war production is planned on the largest scale that a count of the nation's entire resources makes likely; secondly, to ensure that every available man, machine and material is free, fitted and forthcoming for war work, and that production is never held up for lack of any of these; and, thirdly and consequently, to root out every activity in the nation's life that can be spared. From last June onwards, the need to give priority to aircraft manufacture was inescapable. Now, when the output of Army equipment as well as airplanes has been pushed ahead, priority is to be given to merchant ships, the mainstay of all war production. This will be the Admiralty's task, within the Production Executive, side by side with the Ministry of Supply, which remains primarily a department for Army munitions and equipment. Also within the Production Executive, Mr. Bevin is assuming the rôle of Minister of Labour *Supply*. He has instituted machinery and put out appeals for more shipbuilding labour. In order at last to make full use for the war effort, in terms of labour, of the curtailment of civilian consumption, it has been laid down that civilian manufacture, curtailed by two-thirds or three-quarters by the limitation of material supplies, must be "concentrated" in a few factories working full time, instead of being "spread over" all the firms on a short-time basis; and the number of workers released for the war effort by the limitation of supplies should be increased nearly tenfold by the autumn. So the notion of a *total war economy* using all available industrial resources, whether specialised or not is gaining ground.

The burden of these decisions is not the burden of the Ministry of Supply. The Cabinet lays down the strategic pattern. The Services cast their claims. The plans of the Production Executive can match these claims with productive resources. The Ministry of Supply can furnish the materials and the machines. The Ministry of Labour can provide the men. The Board of Trade, with the aid of the controllers of the Ministry of Supply, can withhold materials from

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civilian work, and by their parsimony they can set free machines for Sir Andrew Duncan and men for Mr. Bevin. It only remains to discover the vision and the ruthlessness to take the long steps needed to make abundant war supplies out of scarce resources; and the province of the Ministry of Supply is only one vital corner of the field.

21 YEARS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE¹

By MARGERY FRY

“**W**HAT the eye doesn't see the heart doesn't grieve for”—so says the cook as she dumps a panful of spoilt food into the pig-pail. And the same comforting thought covers a vast amount of waste in the larger household of the State, waste not only of goods and money but of human lives as well.

If one were to analyse the benefactions to research made in the last quarter of a century one would find that a large number of endowments have been prompted by an intelligent desire for better methods in industry: saving labour, economising material, and producing an improved result. Other motives may sometimes have entered in, but the fact remains that technological research has received its greatest support from people who had much to hope from the elimination of waste by knowledge. But when it comes to a question of the endowment of enquiry into the technique of government, into the interplay and adjustment of human forces (forces which seem to us to-day almost as wantonly uncontrollable as lightning or pestilence to our forefathers, but which will surely yield in their turn to the overpowering strength of systematic knowledge) we find a completely different state of affairs. Here the spur of large savings to a few people is lacking: holes in the public purse are not for private initiative to mend. Moreover it is with great difficulty that people are persuaded that observation, experiment, and resultant theory can have any advantage over rule of thumb in affairs of State. Even the experiences of foreign countries are not made the subject of detailed study to any great extent. In the matter which forms the subject of this article—the study of the treatment and causes of crime—Great Britain is still, in comparison

¹ Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars. By Dr. Hermann Mannheim. (Allen & Unwin. 18s.)

The Dilemma of Penal Reform. By Dr. Hermann Mannheim. With a preface by A. M. Carr-Saunders. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

Penal Reform in England. Edited by L. Radzinowicz and J. W. Cecil Turner. (English Studies in Criminal Science. 10s. 6d.)

with many other pre-war countries, lamentably ill-provided. Yet it would not be true to say that no advance has been made. Whilst we still await the appearance of a millionaire who hates the sight of wasted lives, or of a Chancellor of the Exchequer (since we have no Minister of Justice) who is stung by a far-sighted sense of ultimate economy to finance work which can only produce fruit in the time of his successors, still the complacent slumbers of the British public have been disturbed. There is now—or was till the war interrupted all attention to constructive measures—a real interest in what may be called preventive criminology, a desire to know facts with a view to controlling forces.

In the period which Dr. Mannheim calls, with a touch of nostalgia "between the Wars," this interest has gathered strength, though it has been mainly confined to certain aspects of the subject.

In the popular view *Prison* reform has perhaps occupied an almost disproportionate share of attention. In this field a healthy interaction of public criticism with a somewhat unusual official readiness for change has in fact produced very considerable advances. Whilst it would be invidious to discriminate between the work of living civil servants I may perhaps be allowed some reminiscence of the influence of the late Sir Maurice Waller, who as Chairman of the Prison Commission for an all-too short time, brought into that service a humanity, an imagination, a sense of the value of the individual life which has made it attractive since to other people of the same stamp. It would be ridiculous to pretend that the improvements of the years of Peace were so complete that the Prison Service on the eve of the war needed no reform. There will always be people who cannot stand the strong poison of power over the lives of others. The elasticity of a new growth in all human relations gives place, as time goes on, to woodenness. Arrangements which, under a man of imagination, make room for life, under another become a tangle of regulations; the jealous fear lest rewards should follow iniquity holds back humanity. The small allowance of liberty possible in prisons will always demand a maximum of watchfulness to keep it from extinction. And now the war, lowering all standards, has made havoc with the reforms

that had been gained. The prison administration, crippled as to staff and voluntary workers alike, cramped by the taking over for other purposes of many prison buildings, perplexed by the charge of interned aliens, can no longer aim at much remedial treatment. Obeying a physiological law it has lost first the functions most recently acquired. The activities of voluntary visitors, classes, concerts and lectures have almost vanished, and, as it was twenty years ago, the dreary hours of solitude begin by "locking up" in cells at 4.30 p.m.

But the fact remains for future hope, that large and brave experiments have been tried, that the good effects of contact with the outside world have been proved, that prisoners have responded to the stimulus not only of "wages" (tiny in amount but precious above all as offering some exercise of choice and the chance of a smoke) but of education and handicrafts, and most important of all, that some Borstal Institutions and one prison camp have been successfully run upon "minimum security" lines, under the influence of officials with an instinct for leadership. The casual visitor misses much which "the toad beneath the harrow knows," but no one who had visited prisons in the early twenties and the late thirties could have doubted the reality of the new spirit in their management. And there are officials still who, under crushing difficulties maintain the desire to help which was the motive force of that spirit.

The Prison Administration, a comparatively small group of officials, with more or less autocratic powers, functioning from London without much co-operation with Local Authorities, is a body which can, if it chooses, insulate itself successfully from currents of thought in the world outside. If on the other hand it allows those currents to act upon it, it is capable, as we have seen, of rapid changes. Other organisations for dealing with delinquency, in particular, those two which have owed much in the past to voluntary effort, have a greater inertia: slower to move their motion once begun may be less easy to deflect.

The pattern of the relations between voluntary effort and State action repeats itself almost monotonously in English social history. Imaginative private citizens, fired by the

sight of a social need, set to work in a small way to meet it,—Kitty Wilkinson in her own cellar begins the baths and washhouses movement of Liverpool; Robert Raikes in his ragged school opens the door for elementary education in England. The help of benevolent donors is obtained, the movement grows, and growing, develops a tendency to magnify the importance of its own machinery as it is more and more directed by its own paid officials. Gradually the social service provided is seen to be an essential one, the State (from central or local money) gives aid. Then sets in the long struggle to combine increasing dependence on public funds with independence of public control, to receive money without ceding principles—or power. Along the latter part of this familiar curve the organisations for the education of delinquent children, and for Probation work travelled between the wars. If, as seems probable, the support they now receive from private charity dwindles away, both services have reached the stage, when they could easily, and probably with advantage, become entirely governmental.

Both have made considerable progress during the period under review. The Home Office Schools, which have now been renamed “Approved Schools” instead of “Reformatory and Industrial Schools” (how pathetically constant is the attempt to destroy painful associations by a change of name!) are certainly far less prison-like than they were in 1918. It would be impossible now to find a school where a boy was constantly on sentry-duty to prevent the escape of his fellows, though until recently, if not to-day, the punishment for an attempted escape in one school was to pace out again along the corridors the whole distance a boy had gone in his (surely not unnatural) dash for freedom. The younger children are not now expected to contribute to their keep by their work; since the whole cost of maintenance of the voluntary as well as the publicly-owned schools is now borne by public funds there is no longer the obligation to eke out a scanty subscription list by child labour. But it is open to question whether the committees of management of the voluntary schools (72 out of a total of 102 according to the last report, dated 1938, of the Children’s Branch of the Home Office) really contribute enough to justify their autonomy. The

Local Authorities are represented on them, and they have some responsibility for the maintenance of premises, but they are in the main self-constituted bodies spending public money and exercising functions which might with advantage be controlled by the Local Education Authorities. This is not to say that those functions are always inadequately performed, though the Home Office itself seems, from its latest report, to have some qualms about the matter. The truth seems to be that there is too wide a variation in the quality of approved schools of both types. Putting it briefly some are good and some are bad. They need to be subdivided according to locality, and to the age, health and type of child to be educated, with various sorts of training available to suit individual needs; as things are, sex, age, creed, have to be considered in that order, and, with the great shortage of school places in the country to-day it is difficult to go much further in the process of meeting the special needs of these most difficult children. A complete national system, embodying the idea that religious education could be given according to the parents’ wishes but should not determine the choice of school, could give a wider range of possibilities, and in particular could devote some institutions entirely to children whose physical health needs special care. But it is a move in the right direction that the L.E.A.’s have of late years increased their schools, and that the Home Office has done much to modernise the education given throughout the country. A vigorous campaign (like that which has enriched the personnel of the Borstal Institutions) for recruiting young men and women of outstanding character could be undertaken as soon as appointments were made to the service as a whole, and not left in the hands of small local committees.

Recent legislation has increased the possibility of substituting for approved school education the placing of delinquent children who cannot be dealt with in their own homes with foster parents. Amongst the discoveries in the character of our own population which the war has made is that of the reservoirs of maternal goodness which can be drawn on in emergency. When evacuation ends there will be no excuse for neglecting boarding out on the plea that

good foster mothers don't exist. The progress of psychological knowledge since the last war has prepared the ground for a more general understanding of the types of child for whom even the best mass training may be disastrous.

The Probation Service has followed the same trend as the Approved Schools. Accepted by the Act of 1907 as a recognised method of dealing with offenders, Probation was still, in 1918, very largely in the hands of the Church of England Temperance Society and other purely missionary bodies. Once more, private initiative had proved the utility of a method whose essentiality was only gradually recognised by the State.

In 1925 the Criminal Justice Act laid it down that no Petty Sessional Area should be without the whole or part of the services of a Probation Officer. Whilst these officers are still many of them supplied to the Courts by the religious societies which choose and employ them their actual appointment is in the hands of the Justices. The standardisation of conditions of employment, the introduction of a pension scheme, the establishment of training courses by the Home Office have immensely improved the standing and calibre of the Probation Service.

Thus, the period between the wars can show the firm establishment of Probation as one of the main methods of dealing with offenders and a most satisfactory growth in the recognition of its importance¹ and of the qualifications it demands. Public interest in this and cognate questions of the treatment of offenders has been stimulated and perhaps at the same time unduly satisfied, by a series of Departmental Committees and Royal Commissions remarkable in their scope. These enquiries are always an ingenious, but sometimes a valuable, invention. At their worst they wind up an inconvenient question in miles of verbiage, evidence, resolutions, reports, so that, like a noxious intruder in a spider's web, they can be safely ignored for years to come. At their best they make a well-laid foundation for legislation.

The fates of the various enquiries held between 1918 and 1939 vary between these two extremes. That on Capital

¹ In 1938, of Indictable Offenders under 17 years of age, 51 per cent were placed under the supervision of a Probation Officer; of those aged 17 to 21, 45 per cent; of those over 21 15 per cent were thus dealt with.

Punishment may be said to have been a victim of infanticide: by refusing to participate further in the work of a Committee whose majority report was likely to go against them, the members who favoured the retention of the Death Penalty undermined its authority from the beginning. The excellent report on Corporal Punishment has formed the basis of proposed legislation, but so long as the House of Lords, filled with sacred memories of the Eton caning block, has power to insist on sharing *this* privilege with the less fortunate classes, whipping is not likely to be cleared from the Statute book.

The enquiry into the Employment and After Care of Prisoners, has had a good, if limited, effect on prison work and on Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies. Those dealing with prolonged imprisonment on remand, and with imprisonment for non-payment of fines have resulted in very definite improvements in the law. The latter led directly to the Money Payments Act, 1935, which caused a drop of over 5,000 in the number of these imprisonments during the first year of its action. The number shows some tendency to creep up again, though the figures for 1938 were still more than 4,000 below those of 1935. This illustrates the unfortunate tendency of reforms to lose their first effect, and slip back into inefficiency—a natural result of the fact that they are after all imposed upon officials used to, and contented with, the earlier state of things.

This was very marked in the history of the imprisonment of prostitutes after the investigations of a departmental Committee into street offences. The emphasis in its report upon the fact that mere being in the streets for the purpose of solicitation is not illegal unless annoyance is caused thereby, led to a sensational drop in the admissions to prison for this class of offence. One court at least still keeps the numbers down by insisting on independent proof, but for the most part the old routine is again followed, and these cases, with their obvious danger of injustice, are decided on nothing but police evidence that the persons addressed "appeared to be annoyed"; and the figures have risen anew. A historian, basing himself on statistics alone, might well infer a sudden mass conversion of street-walkers to a virtuous

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life, followed by a large scale back-sliding into the paths of sin. Statistics must be the food of any satisfactory criminology but statistics need (and here the metaphor must not be pressed to the word "cooking") interpretation in relation to other facts. And so we return to the need for expert study if human lives, the true wealth of the nation, are not to be wasted.

The period under review, whilst it has not seen any imposing or adequate provision for this study, has at least beheld its beginning. To the London School of Economics belongs the credit of having, since 1935, offered to students lectures by its Reader in Criminology, Dr. Mannheim. This experiment has proved beyond doubt that there exists a demand for organised teaching on the subject. Cambridge has shown some signs of following suit by the establishment of a Committee of the Faculty Board of Law to consider the promotion of Research and Teaching in Criminal Science, under whose auspices a first volume of "English Studies in Criminal Science" has appeared. But London remains the only University giving teaching in penal questions. It further showed an appreciation of the importance of the subject by appointing Dr. Mannheim to a Leon Fellowship, thus enabling him to produce work of lasting importance. In his "Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars" he undertakes just that interpretation of statistics whose importance has been stressed above.

That certain classes of crime have shown a definite increase in the period covered by his investigation is not denied. It is of interest that convictions for the most serious crimes of violence, murder, manslaughter and infanticide (including attempts) have diminished in relation to the population—whilst those for crimes against property and some minor forms of violence have increased. It is terribly easy to omit the words "convictions for" and assume that the figures are an absolute barometer of national law-breaking. It is here that Dr. Mannheim's analysis of the effects of public opinion, of legislation affecting the forms of trial, of police activity, even of the mere methods of crime registration are of great value. At every stage the analysis is supported by figures, and it would be idle to attempt to condense it. A few

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quotations will however serve as warnings against hasty conclusions from crude figures.

"The influence of public opinion, the consequent activities of the Police, etc., may create a statistical picture very different from the real effects of a certain change in the criminal law. An unpopular statute" (as, e.g. the legislation against Betting and Lotteries) "from being insufficiently carried out, may reap purely statistical laurels as an efficient means of checking crime, whilst a popular one, on account of the growing number of convictions, may appear a failure."

When a change in the law simplifies the proceedings against a particular offence, for example, when it is made possible to proceed in the Summary Courts instead of the Higher, an increase in prosecutions and convictions may result. The same thing may happen when the fear of publicity is diminished, as in the withholding of the prosecutor's name in cases of blackmail. Particularly effective is public opinion with regard to children and young people.

"Statistics of Juvenile Delinquency," writes Dr. Mannheim, "can do little more than indicate the varying degree of willingness on the part of the public and the Police to bring this category of delinquents before the Juvenile Courts."

Since a very large part of the total increase of convictions is shown to be due to juvenile delinquency¹ (the age of maximum criminality for males in England is 13), and since the years under consideration have shown great progress not only in the administration of Children's Courts but in the public confidence in them, as concerning themselves primarily with the delinquents' own welfare, we have at once a partial explanation for the apparent "growth of crime."

The years 1931-32 marked a terrifying increase in the number of indictable offences known to the Police, roughly from 160 to 208 thousand. Trade depression must have played its part in this, for slumps and unemployment are naturally very closely related with delinquency, but the greater part of this alarming increase was apparently due to

¹ Thus the figures of male persons per 100,000 of population in each age group found guilty of indictable offences grew from 1929 to 1938 in the following way:

	1929	1938
Offenders under 16 years of age	1,144	2,326
" 16 but under 21 years of age	536	841
" 21 years and over	568	660

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the suppression in Metropolitan Police stations of the register known as the *Suspected Stolen* book, a suppression which obliged the police to enter a case of missing property as a "crime known" unless it could be counted simply as "property lost". Once more the future historian would be sadly at fault without the clue to the figures.

Naturally the economic fluctuations of the peace years have had their clearly traceable effect on the statistics of crime. Dr. Mannheim is able to give curious comparisons with German experiences. In Germany at the period of the inflation, convictions for coining and arson fell in response to the shrinking value of money in relation to goods. In England and Wales the social change which has probably had the greatest influence upon criminality has been the arrival of the motor-car, though unemployment and strikes, alcoholism, gambling, and methods of business administration all come in for their share of responsibility.

In major changes in the criminal law the period was disappointing. The large proposals of Sir Samuel Hoare's Bill were lost in the débâcle before they could pass Parliament. The confused tangle of our law, its lack of any clear distinction between serious and trivial offences (unless we accept the barbarous classifications adopted by the Prison Commission into "finger-printable" and "non-finger-printable") its anomalies, its weaknesses, and its hardships still wait for some new Romilly to tackle. The Courts of Summary Jurisdiction, far more heavily burdened than ever before by the mass of new offences—particularly motor offences—with which they have to deal, are left to struggle on with a barely increased budget for staff and administration, with inadequate service and often poor accommodation, as best they may.

The appointment of women magistrates and Labour magistrates has somewhat widened the choice of possible Justices, but it grows increasingly hard to find people of any but the most advanced age who can give time on ordinary week-days for the work, and complaints of the quality and the class-outlook of many Benches are dismally justifiable. Yet the wider range from which the benches are chosen, and the influence of such societies as the Magistrates' Association *have* added some depth to the Shallows of the Bench, and in

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spite of occasional shortcomings and absurdities it is very doubtful whether a general adoption of stipendiary magistrates would give such good justice as could be obtained by a revised system of lay magistrates, served by well-qualified clerks. But the peace crept on from its birth to its disastrous majority full of promise but scant of performance in this and kindred matters. It is disappointing at this time to think of these things. If little was achieved in comparison with what might have been, yet much spade work had been done, and we seem for the moment to have lost both our gains and our good hopes of better things just ahead.

But social reforms, though they may now be cut down by the bitter winter of our war, are not mere annuals cleared off by the frost. Their roots, deep in the hearts and understandings of the people, may lie dormant for a time, but we count on a new and stronger growth of justice uncankered by class privilege, unblighted by ignorant prejudice, uncramped by over-lying custom in some happier future.

THE B.B.C. IN WARTIME

By ALBERT JOHN

THE British Broadcasting Corporation remains in war as in peace the sole broadcasting authority in this country. As such it has had thrust upon it wartime responsibilities for which its constitution was not designed. Not least of these is the development of a network of news and propaganda services directed over the air to all parts of the world. To compete with the propaganda of the enemy it must present the British case to the world, strive to convince neutrals of the justice of our cause, help the oppressed to believe that our victory will be their liberation, and encourage them to resist the oppressors and overthrow the Nazi and Fascist regimes when the appropriate time arrives. At home the B.B.C. must not only maintain its entertainment and other peacetime services but provide a platform for Government spokesmen, aid Government propaganda campaigns and help maintain morale. These tasks have necessitated Government control and interference alien to the peacetime independence of the B.B.C. which its constitution was designed to protect.

The Charter and Licence under which the B.B.C. operates assured this independence and safeguarded the Corporation from becoming merely an official voice. The B.B.C. continues as in peacetime to provide to some extent a forum for discussion and thereby to represent the wide and varied views of the community, its culture and entertainment—to express, as it were, the British *zeitgeist*.

From its earliest days the B.B.C. has been banned by the Postmaster-General from expressing its own opinion, and it thereby differs from the Press in that it cannot employ the editorial “we.” In the catholic composition of the Board of Governors to whom the Director General is responsible, was an assurance that the policy of the Corporation would be reasonably representative. The varied views the seven Governors held acted as a check on the Corporation being overweighted in any one direction. The powers of the

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Board were never clearly defined and as long as there was a strong personality as Director General in Sir John (now Lord) Reith the Governors were not over much in evidence.

When war came, by an Order in Council, the number of Governors was reduced to two, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who continued to exercise the powers of the Board. The various Advisory Councils which existed in peacetime also ceased to function. The reason given for this reduction was the need for quick decision and speedy action. In the House of Commons Sir Samuel Hoare stated that this reduction “. . . was the suggestion of the Board themselves. There was no difference of opinion about it and it was on their own volition the arrangement was made.”

One of the Governors, the late Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, disputed this in a letter to *The Times* (23rd October, 1939). He wrote :

“The truth is that, without any consultation with the Board of Governors, an order in council was prepared last year eliminating the Governors altogether in the event of war. It was only as a result of an energetic protest from the Governors, made when they were apprised of this arrangement and became aware that certain facts and figures were withheld from their cognizance, that the present arrangement was arrived at between the Board of Governors on the one hand and the Ministry of Information on the other.

“The Governors were naturally anxious to fall in with any plan which could be represented as making for greater efficiency in wartime. The present scheme is therefore one which they willingly accept as a temporary wartime measure, though it would not have occurred to them to suggest it, having regard to the general interests of the listening public, and in view of the recent recommendation of the Ullswater Committee for the enlargement of the Board.”

The Governors apparently reluctantly accepted the compromise in preference to no Board at all.

The result has been the vesting of an undesirable amount of power in two men who, being appointed by the King in Council, are answerable to no one, but on whose rulings on policy the B.B.C. must act. To Sir Allan Powell, unknown to the vast body of listeners, and unproved as representing any large body of opinion, and to Sir Charles Millis, Managing Director of Barings, merchant bankers, is entrusted the

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wartime control of the B.B.C. Not only is this a completely undemocratic arrangement, but it is also a dangerous and unbalanced form of control and in practice vests in the Chairman almost dictatorial powers. The extent to which he utilises his power is not publicly known, but in view of the Director General's previous record, one suspects his hand in certain recent B.B.C. rulings which are inconsistent with the Director General's views. The dismissal of C.O.'s from the staff on registration, even if above the age of reservation, seems hard in the case of members of the Society of Friends, whose sincerity cannot be questioned. The ruling that no one may broadcast who has made publicly known his opposition to the national war effort appears indefensible when applied to conductors of famous choirs, astronomers, dance band leaders and all artistes who have signed the manifesto of the People's Convention.¹

It is unfortunate that this undemocratic control should exist when, as Director General, there is a man noted more for his charm of manner than his strength of personality. Mr. Ogilvie was unfortunate. Replacing Sir John Reith, he was like balm to a fevered body; but a good bedside manner is unsuited to war. Strong direction is needed, and that Mr. Ogilvie is unable to provide. In such circumstances it is easy for the Chairman rather than the Director General to run the Corporation. In this he is aided by the limitation of the over-riding control of the Ministry of Information to news and propaganda.

It was decided before war broke out that the B.B.C. should work under the guidance of the Ministry of Information and on its outbreak certain powers held by the P.M.G. were transferred to the Ministry of Information. These included the right to take over B.B.C. stations in case of emergency, power of veto over programmes and control over the hours of broadcasting. An important result is that the Minister of Information has replaced the P.M.G. as spokesman for the B.B.C. in Parliament on matters which come under his control. The limits of his control have been recently clarified.

¹ Since this article was written, pressure in Press and Parliament has compelled the M. of I. to ask the B.B.C. to modify this ban as far as the People's Convention is concerned. This adds point to the argument that the power of the B.B.C. Chairman is excessive and his policy unrepresentative of public opinion.

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In reply to questions and through rulings made by the Speaker, Government policy has been to confine control to matters of national interest in the conduct of the war, that is to news and propaganda. Any responsibility for the B.B.C. outside this has been consistently denied by the M. of I.

Thus on 11th June, 1940, the Minister of Information said that he did not

"intend to take over the administration of the B.B.C., or to be responsible in any way for its entertainment programme."

On 12th June, 1940, Mr. Duff Cooper said:

"I am satisfied that the willingness and efficiency with which the B.B.C. carry out my directions, whether general or particular, on all matters considered to be in the national interest, give me such control as is necessary over news and propaganda in time of war."

In reply to a question of Mr. G. Strauss on 11th December, 1940, concerning the cancellation of a broadcast of the Glasgow Orpheus Choir under its pacifist conductor, Sir Hugh Robertson, Mr. Cooper said:

"I exercise as little control as possible over the entertainment programmes of the B.B.C. and I really cannot be held responsible."

When Mr. Strauss attempted to raise, on the adjournment on 19th December, this issue of banning pacifists, the Deputy Speaker ruled that he could not do so because the M. of I. was not responsible. He dealt only with matters of national interest and this was a question of whom the B.B.C. employed, which was not the Minister's concern.

Following further efforts of Mr. Strauss to discuss the matter, the Deputy Speaker enlarged upon this principle by saying that the Minister had no responsibility with regard to the ordinary programmes or the people whom the B.B.C. employed or dismissed. Later he said:

"Questions which can be discussed on the Adjournment are only those which come definitely under the responsibility of the Government Department concerned, if there is one: I do not think there is one which is concerned in this matter."

The principle was therefore established that the Minister of Information may only be asked questions on matters for

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which he is responsible, which in the words of the Deputy Speaker are "news and matters of that kind."

The independence of the B.B.C. is thereby maintained and the power of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman as the Board of Governors so much the greater. It means, further, that on matters of policy outside the realm of the M. of I. the actions of the Board of Governors cannot be questioned in Parliament. Broadcasting can be debated when Parliamentary time is found or when the Civil Estimates are presented, but such occasions, rare enough in peacetime, are rarer still in time of war. By accident, two men, little known to the public and lacking in specialised qualification, virtually control the B.B.C. policy to-day except where it touches on the national war effort. That they should do so is as illogical as it is undemocratic. The Government is at pains to preserve the independence of the B.B.C., but it has destroyed the main safeguard against its abuse. So truncated a Board can represent only the views of the stronger of its two members. Either the Chairman and Vice-Chairman are anachronisms and should go or there should be something for them to preside over. The Board should be abolished or, if the Corporation is to retain a measure of independence, increased to its pre-war strength.

The old Board governed a financially self-supporting corporation independent of Treasury control. The present Board is dependent upon the National Exchequer. Before the war the B.B.C. received 90 per cent net revenue collected from the sale of wireless licences. (The Post Office took 9 per cent of the gross as collection charges, etc.). There is now a broadcasting grant: for the current year it is £4,700,000.¹ The cost to the Exchequer is not large, because there are more than nine million licences issued, bringing in a gross revenue in excess of £4,500,000, but the B.B.C. must now submit detailed estimates for its expenditure and it thus becomes subject to Treasury control and all that that involves. To be financially independent of the Treasury is the greatest of all advantages a public corporation can enjoy, and that the B.B.C. has now lost.

¹ For 1940-41. Estimates for 1941-42 just issued are £5,600,000. The licence-holder thus contributes a substantial share to the cost of our overseas propaganda.

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The wartime B.B.C. is a constitutional mongrel. Alongside the peacetime organisation partially preserved for its normal broadcasting activities has been thrust M. of I. control of direct news, propaganda and overseas services, and on top has been imposed Treasury control. The confusion of responsibility and divided loyalty that results does not make for efficiency in a broadcasting service which to-day needs to expand continuously to counteract the gigantic state machine of the enemy. The operation of a network of foreign language transmissions, maintenance of news, propaganda and entertainment services for home, Empire and abroad; the conduct of a monitoring service—the interception and digesting for news and intelligence of the world's broadcasts—these demand unity of control and identity of purpose. For lack of it our propaganda effort is weakened.

It is difficult to reconcile M. of I. control with the independent status of the B.B.C. The Minister has admitted that liaison between the two has been unsatisfactory. In a Parliamentary debate on February 6th, he said:

"... but there has not been that complete liaison which we desired between Government advice and the independent conduct of the B.B.C."

What this liaison was the B.B.C. Handbook for 1941 explains:

"The liaison between the Ministry and the B.B.C. involves close daily collaboration. The regular meetings on policy held by the Minister are attended by B.B.C. representatives and representatives of the Ministry attend similar meetings at the B.B.C."

This proved inadequate and in Parliament on 6th February Mr. Duff Cooper announced the appointment of two full time advisers to the B.B.C. Mr. Kirkpatrick, Neville Henderson's Counsellor in Berlin, was appointed full time adviser on foreign affairs, and Mr. A. P. Ryan, B.B.C. Controller of the Home Division, for home affairs. Both are to be officers of the M. of I. under the control of the Minister, "who should," in Mr. Cooper's words,

"as far as any political issues were concerned, be able to give advice which would be taken by the B.B.C. If there was a difference with the Director General of the B.B.C., it should be referred to the Minister of Information for decision."

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If these advisers act as a medium for government direction, they may save the B.B.C. from the confusion which at present results from the assumption of all Government Departments that they can dictate to the B.B.C. Not only do Ministers and their Parliamentary Secretaries and other Government spokesmen come to the microphone but they shower direction on a harassed B.B.C. staff. Propaganda is a form of warfare which should be run by experts, and yet members of the Service departments, ex-diplomats whose very training teaches them to shun publicity, are among those who from outside direct the content of B.B.C. propaganda. They work through the Ministry of Information, but the foreign departments of the Ministry of Information are, as regards personnel, poor in quality. Mr. Vernon Bartlett, who speaks with considerable experience as a regular broadcaster in the B.B.C. Overseas services, in the February 6th debate, said:

"The officials of the B.B.C. are bombarded with guidances and directives from all Government Departments and they do not feel in a position to reject those guidances . . . there is a considerable art in the presentation of news. The B.B.C. is receiving directives from people in Government Departments who in their whole lives have never written an article, who could not sell an article to a parish magazine."

He urged that the Minister should extend his control over the B.B.C. in order "to defend the B.B.C. from the various guidances of officials in different Government Departments who have no experience whatever in the presentation of news." B.B.C. officials are fearful of offending Government Departments. It would be preferable if those responsible for B.B.C. propaganda were experts of sufficient importance to refuse to accept their directions.

Government Departments are in part to blame for the dullness of the Home news bulletins. The B.B.C., like the Press, is subject to a war censorship, but, unlike the Press, it broadcasts nothing concerning the war effort without referring it to the appropriate department. There is a double check, but owing to the reticence of the Service departments and their reluctance to pass more than the barest of news, bulletins are dull to the point of boredom. The B.B.C. sets itself a high standard of accuracy because, though it does not

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speak with the official voice, its news is regarded as authoritative. This applies even more to overseas news bulletins than to home. The prestige of the B.B.C. slumped badly when its news of British landings in Norway was disproved: its interpretation of events was then far too optimistic. This lesson has been well learnt. Accuracy must not be sacrificed to speed, but the great advantage enjoyed by the B.B.C. is its technical ability to radiate news as soon as received. Instead of receiving encouragement to exploit this advantage, the B.B.C. finds itself tied hand and foot by a Ministry of Information which favours the Press at the B.B.C.'s expense. The Ministry has held up news received in the evening to enable it to be broadcast simultaneously with the appearance of the morning papers. There have been important instances of such a ban resulting in Germany broadcasting the news first.

There has always been a natural jealousy of the B.B.C. on the part of the Press, and before the war no news could be broadcast before the 6 p.m. bulletin. The war killed this agreement, but the Press has successfully resisted any privileges being accorded to the B.B.C. in wartime. The B.B.C. is treated as regards war correspondents and facilities as on a parity with a single newspaper. It cannot build up its own news service, and apart from its news observers, it must construct its bulletins on news agency reports and official handouts.¹ In its monitoring service the Corporation has an advantage over the Press for speedy receipt of news, and this may ultimately prove a useful bargaining counter.

Nor is the Empire any more amenable than the home Press, although less stringent censorship and the need to compete with enemy broadcasts has enabled Overseas news to be fuller and of greater interest than the Home news bulletins. Here the fault lies in insufficient differentiation in selection and presentation of news for different countries. In many foreign language services news bulletins appear to be translations from the English instead of specialised material for the countries to which addressed. This is particularly the case for the smaller countries. Foreign staff is employed,

¹ Critics of B.B.C. reports of Parliamentary debates should remember that the B.B.C. has never been granted access to the Press galleries in Parliament.

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but mainly in the role of translator and announcer. The knowledge and ability of the foreign staff is insufficiently drawn upon in the compiling of the news bulletins. Often they must work under the direction of those who have neither the specialised knowledge of the countries nor of the language involved. This is no doubt largely due to the growth of the overseas services outpacing some of the staff who were competent to cope with the peacetime services but insufficiently experienced in international affairs or politics to deal with war propaganda. Excellent as is much of the material broadcast in the foreign language services, notably in German, French, Czech and Italian, there are many of the B.B.C. staff whose jobs have grown beyond them and others who have been transferred from other departments to jobs to which they are not suited. It is often mainly a question of wrong casting. This applies to the Controller of the Overseas Division, Sir Stephen Tallents, whose qualifications as its Public Relations Controller did not include expert knowledge of international affairs.

In total, B.B.C. overseas services appear large and their growth remarkable. In all, overseas transmissions occupy $54\frac{1}{2}$ hours each day and cover the whole world. But when the time given to individual countries is examined, in a number of cases it is grossly inadequate. Following recent expansion, the Empire, the United States and Latin America are now well cared for, and Germany, France and Italy get about 4, $3\frac{1}{2}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours of programme time daily respectively. But our allies, Turkey and Greece, each have only three fifteen-minute news bulletins daily; Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary two each and Russia nothing at all. Such services are scandalously short. The B.B.C. often constitutes the only means by which exiled governments can address their peoples at home. There is ample evidence that the Czechs, the Dutch and the Norwegians listen regularly to B.B.C. broadcasts, running risks of fines, imprisonment and even death to do so. But the enlarged Norwegian and Dutch services occupy only about an hour a day each, Czech an hour and a quarter, and Polish 45 minutes. Such services call for further development. To win and to hold to the British cause those suffering under

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German occupation is one object of our propaganda. To succeed in this we must keep these people constantly informed of the continuation of the struggle by their governments and prepare them for the part they must play when there is an opportunity to overthrow the Nazi regime. Much more needs to be done immediately to counter Hitler's propaganda drive for his New Order in Europe. But we fail to tell of a new world as the outcome of a British victory. Failure to state our war aims in general terms is as great a handicap to our broadcast propaganda as shortage of transmitters is to its adequacy. There is a lack of imagination, direction and consistency in our broadcast propaganda, as was evidenced by the Vansittart "Black Record" broadcasts, and Government and not B.B.C. policy must be blamed. Changes at the Ministry are as necessary as they are at the B.B.C.

Rapid growth of the Overseas services has had unfortunate repercussions on the internal affairs of the B.B.C. and accounts for some of the failings of the Home service. The Overseas Division has drawn from the latter some of its best men, and it duplicates programme planning and production. Each Division is jealous of its own panel of broadcasters and many of the ablest broadcasters in the Empire and North American transmissions are rarely if ever heard by home listeners. An excellent Radio Newsreel given in the American and Empire programmes is a topical magazine programme slickly presented which would almost certainly attract home listeners also. There is a tendency for broadcasting for Overseas and for Home to develop into separate organisations. There is need for fresh direction from outside to cut through the barriers which divide the one from the other and knit the Corporation into a unified whole. This would almost certainly make for better Home programmes, which to-day in the main show a deterioration on pre-war. In pre-war days the B.B.C. consciously provided programmes ahead of the popular taste. In wartime it seems to shun intellectual stimulus, to limit serious music to short concerts, and, apart from propaganda, to provide mostly lighter fare to entertain the troops and tired workers hour by hour. The B.B.C. defends itself on the grounds that listening conditions of the forces are poor and that with the curtailing of programmes for national

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security the tastes of the majority must be given precedence over those of the minority. But the minority is badly treated to-day.

Individual B.B.C. programmes do not call for much criticism. Much of its drama, features, documentaries and music is excellent; some of its variety is the best available and some the worst. But the theatre organ is always with us. Presentation is often poor, and that renders fare unappetising. In home propaganda the B.B.C. acts as the handmaiden of every Government Department in putting their campaigns across, and there is thus a surfeit of Government spokesmen, many of whom are poor at the microphone. In sum, there has been a failure by default on the part of the wartime B.B.C. Not dissatisfaction but lack of enthusiasm is the general reaction to broadcast programmes. That is where the B.B.C. fails. It has not succeeded in attracting an enthusiastic audience. The huge audience for news bulletins is there to hear the news, and as soon as it has heard enough it switches off. Mr. Churchill will get a colossal audience and so does J. B. Priestley, but these are the only two important radio personalities the war has produced for home listeners. Successful broadcasting attracts as large and enthusiastic an audience for regular commentators and programmes. Where are the Raymond Gram Swings and Dorothy Thompsons of the B.B.C.? It is these people who sway opinion and create morale more effectively than officially conducted campaigns.

But lack of enthusiasm for the B.B.C. is partly because the B.B.C. itself lacks enthusiasm. Fearful of the penetrating Parliamentary question, the Corporation has become ultra cautious. It has developed the faults of the Civil Service, but of a section of it whose spokesman has neither complete power over it nor knowledge of its job. The Minister therefore feels no loyalty towards it and blames rather than defends. What confidence can a staff have in a Minister who apologises to Parliament for his department and a Parliamentary Secretary who disavows its actions? Lacking direction and fearful of attack, the B.B.C. inclines to separate itself into unrelated departments each operating without consultation or collaboration with the others. The tendency is away from

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consideration of broadcasting as a whole towards departmental work. Red tape increases, and with it meetings and memoranda, and the staff loses pride in its work. If the potentialities of broadcasting as propaganda's chief weapon are to be exploited there must be not only drastic changes in the B.B.C.'s set up but also a new propaganda line. That is the Government's responsibility.

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By H. R. G. GREAVES

AGROWING dissatisfaction with the administration of Mr. Chamberlain in the early months of 1940 was brought to a climax by the failure of our operations in Norway. The House of Commons then showed that it could bring down a Government in war-time by the action of a minority. That minority was a substantial and powerful one, it is true, and it was supported by a large volume of opinion outside the House as well as by Members of Parliament who were as yet unwilling to go into the Opposition lobby; but it was nevertheless a minority, that could muster scarcely one-third of the votes of the House.

The period here under review has seen remarkably successful military and naval operations carried out in Africa and the Mediterranean. In one of the now fairly infrequent surveys of the war situation the Prime Minister explained that success was attributable to preparations made in the summer of 1940 at one of the most dangerous moments in the development of the war in Europe. He thus gave evidence which reinforces the contrast. The House has at least this evidence of courage and far-sightedness to suggest that it has done well to repose confidence in his administration, and it has in fact shown no signs of seriously doubting its own wisdom in doing so. Questions and debates alike emphasise this remarkable unity of Parliamentary support. While the main issue of confidence is no longer under discussion, however, Parliament shows no signs of abdicating its associated function of vigilant supervision and the voicing of popular feeling. The most important measure passed during these three months, the War Damage Act, has been radically affected by discussions in the House. These have had their influence not by voting strength but by reasoned argument coming from all sides of the House.

Events in Parliament, last spring and since, thus suggest the same conclusion as to the proper function of Parliament

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in war-time when it contains a truly national Government, and when a more urgent need supervenes upon ordinary party divisions. There is evidence that Parliament is realising this and that Ministers are co-operating with it, in short that both are settling down to a conception of Parliament as a collaborating Council of State. On this ground it has been argued more than once from the floor of the House that issues should not in present circumstances be made a matter of "confidence," there being now no alternative Government. As Mr. Mander put it, in debate on the Disqualification Bill, "it seems to me that as we are all united in our support of a National Government, the proper way to achieve results is not by having Divisions or threatening Divisions, which are not effective, but by putting forward reasoned arguments to the Prime Minister, and if those arguments obtain support from all quarters of the House, the Government should take them into consideration and act in accordance with the wishes of the House. It is in that spirit that I put down an amendment."

The War Damage Act concerns the ordinary citizen more closely than any measure passed for a long time. It also provides the most complete example of this co-operation between the Government and the Commons. Described by the Chancellor as the most complicated measure he had ever been associated with, not excluding the Local Government Act, 1929, it was also said to be the longest Bill since that dealing with the Constitution of India. There was so much criticism of it at the Committee stage that the unusual course was taken of recommitting it as a whole. The Chancellor himself accurately summarised the influence exercised upon its form and substance by the House. "I should doubt if in connection with a measure of this magnitude hon. Members have ever played such a considerable part in shaping and improving a Bill. There are some 150 Government amendments on the Order Paper, the great bulk of them being designed to meet points that were made by the Committee in the course of the debates. Some of these amendments are of a minor character, some are more important, and some affect the scope of the Bill considerably." In fact, changes were suggested and incorporated in nearly every clause of the

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Bill, and there was a genuine feeling that both the Treasury and the Board of Trade had done their best to co-operate constructively with the House. Tribute in this sense was paid by many Members, in particular by Mr. Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Percy Harris. "We have had a remarkable series of debates," said the former, "and have covered an enormous amount of ground in a very short time. We have seen democracy at its best." Sir Percy Harris added that "the Chancellor has justified, in war-time, the working of the democratic machine. The House of Commons has been, for this Bill, a Council of State. We have been encouraged to make our contribution, and the result is a measure for which we all have to share responsibility."

It would be impossible in this short space to summarise in any useful way the terms of such a complicated and exhaustive statute. The Chancellor himself stressed, moreover, the provisional nature of the Act, which he thought would have to be improved upon in the light of experience of its working. But certain of the more substantial changes attributable to parliamentary discussion may be mentioned, and it may be worth pointing out that there thus passed on to the statute-book, as an almost entirely agreed measure, the first legislative attempt to cope with the problem of compensation for bomb damage. This happened eighteen months after war broke out; and yet no one could have anticipated, when preparations for a war situation were being actively made, that such damage would not be one of the first and most urgent problems with which the authorities would have to deal.

Perhaps the change of most general interest is that affecting compensation for damage to furniture and personal belongings. The original proposal had been to give free grants in respect of essential furniture and clothing to a single person with a maximum income of £250 or a married couple with a maximum of £400. The Bill was amended to provide for a scheme whereby free cover and protection is to be given to everyone irrespective of income to a maximum total amount for personal chattels of £200 for a single person, £300 for a married couple, and with certain additions for other members of a household. Beyond that maximum there

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is to be a voluntary insurance scheme with a premium rising from one to two per cent.

While the principle is maintained that grants for damage to premises shall on the whole be made only where reconstruction is in the national interest, the provision that in cases of necessity a grant on account may be made for a house or business premises is not only maintained, but the maximum is raised from £500 to £800. Further, in view of the difficulty of fixing a just date for the estimation of values, March, 1939, being the date settled upon, the War Damage Commission, which is to be the chief executive instrument under the Act, is empowered to recommend a different method of assessment when the time comes for making any substantial body of payments. The whole situation with regard to mortgages was also considerably altered. Finally, important changes were introduced into Clause 1, which deals with the relations between the Commission and the Treasury; these secure first that directions issued by the Treasury on the advice of the Commission shall be of a general character, secondly that they shall not be construed as authorising the Commission to exercise any of its functions in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, and, thirdly, that they shall be laid before Parliament "so as to secure the necessary control which the Committee thought desirable."

The Act thus goes a long way to satisfy the many doubts expressed originally in all parts of the House. In particular it meets the demand that there should be what amounts to a compulsory system of insurance for personal belongings. Instead of attempting to base this upon the collection of a new tax in the form of a special premium, it was decided that the most suitable basis was income as assessed for income-tax purposes, or in other words, that the burden should be borne by the ordinary tax-payer. It was also thus decided that there should be no differentiation between different parts of the country, some of which are less liable to damage than others. It was generally agreed that, broadly speaking, the chattel owners and the taxpayers of the country are one and the same body of persons. If there are still certain aspects of the Act which may call for further consideration by Parliament and the Treasury, they are probably in the main

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concerned with mortgaged property, with the relations between landlord and tenant, and with public utilities.

Other legislation passed during this period includes the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension of Immunities) Bill. This simply extends to members of foreign governments now domiciled in London—that “miniature Europe,” as Mr. Eden has called it—the immunities accorded to their diplomatic representatives. There are two other important measures, however, which call for some comment. The first of these is the Determination of Needs Bill, and the second the House of Commons Disqualifications Bill.

The Determination of Needs Bill was brought forward in order to implement a decision already announced by the Prime Minister in November as having been taken “in response to representations from many quarters.” This of course was a decision taken by agreement in the Cabinet, and it was perhaps natural that great stress should have been laid, in particular by the Conservative members of the Government, upon the Cabinet’s unanimity. The Bill does not completely abolish the means test for unemployment assistance and supplementary pensions, although it professes to replace the household means test by one of “personal need.” But it does exempt the first £5 a week in the case of a married couple from consideration, and 15s. a week for other members of the household. Mr. Bevin claimed that it thus accepted the revolutionary principle that for a household of four persons £6 10s. a week was a minimum standard, which must be reached before any member of it “could be called on to take responsibility for any other citizen even for board and lodging and shelter.”

The Parliamentary Labour Party decided by what its spokesman, Mr. Pethick-Lawrence, described as an overwhelming majority to support the Bill. This decision was taken, although the Bill did not entirely abolish the test, on the ground that it was not only a substantial improvement, as was obvious, but that “it shifts in general and in the main the obligation to look after those who are old or out of work from the family and the household to the community as a whole. The aggregation of the household means, which existed before, is abolished in this Bill, and the household

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means test itself, as a principle, is gone.” To end it as a principle only was not regarded as sufficient by some nineteen members of the Party, however, who voted against the Bill on the second reading, thus disobeying the Party decision.

The House has shown itself disposed on the whole to be satisfied with the Government’s social policy. In the field of war strategy, if it has been critical on the two questions of man-power and shipping turnover, the Government has recently taken drastic action likely to remove the chief grounds of complaint for the moment, and the House has revealed a fuller confidence and less anxiety for secret debates, of which there have been only two. But on two other subjects the House has shown a tendency to be restive and not altogether convinced. The first may be fittingly called “constitutional rights.” It covers such issues debated in this period as the detention of Captain Ramsay, the suppression of the *Daily Worker*, and the growing number of Members who enjoy office under the Crown. If this shows the anxiety of the Commons to preserve in their fullest sense the principles of democracy for which the war is being fought, the second subject upon which the House is uneasy is the closely associated one of propaganda. Are we proclaiming these principles either clearly or well enough to make them the potent arm for victory that they are capable of becoming? There is even sometimes, in connection with the activities of the Foreign Office, a certain tendency to doubt whether these principles are as strongly held and applied as they are professed.

The House of Commons Disqualification Bill came to be known popularly as the MacDonald Bill, because its immediate cause was the desire to allow the Minister of Health to retain his seat in spite of his appointment as High Commissioner to Canada. It is doubtful, however, whether in this case the popular view saw through to the central truth, in thinking that there would have been no need for such a Bill had not Mr. MacDonald wished to retain his seat. The confusions and complexities of the law on the subject are well known. It is clearly illogical that a Member should be free to take an office in existence before 1705 and not one created more recently; yet this appears to be the distinction between the

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appointments of Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir Stafford Cripps on the one hand and of Mr. MacDonald on the other. Equally, it is undesirable that there should be any doubt about the right of a Member to assist a Department of State with services of which he is specially capable; yet such doubt was asserted by the Prime Minister to exist. The special case for such legislation at this time was the Prime Minister's argument that he should be free to make any appointment he wished in war-time, without having any such valuable source of material as the Commons closed to him. As he put it, "I do not hesitate to say that five or ten years' experience as a Member of this House is as fine an all-round education in public affairs as any man can obtain." To the counter-claim that this would mean the disfranchisement of a constituency his reply was that constituents like their representative to achieve eminence, as in fact they undoubtedly do. They would even be glad, he argued, "to make a sacrifice in being inconvenienced if they think it conduces to the national advantage and safety." As for the House itself and the Parliamentary tradition, it would gain, when the war is over, from "having in its ranks large numbers of Members who have played an important part in the great days through which we shall have passed." But the real point of contention was reached when the Prime Minister flourished the White Paper, on which the actual services of Members in and out of the armed forces were listed, and claimed that it was a roll of honour.

It was the size of this "roll of honour" that evidently gave most cause for anxiety. Mr. Lees-Smith spoke of 150 Members "helping outside the Services in the war effort"; Mr. Mander said, "We have now something like 200 or one-third of the Members of this House in one way or another depending on the Government. That is not a satisfactory state of affairs and it ought not to be encouraged. Indeed, the number ought to be decreased. There have been twenty-two new Ministers appointed since the war started, and with them they have carried their Parliamentary private secretaries. Indeed, there seems to have been a scattering of political largesse in the various appointments made, and sometimes it seems as if the appointments had been made

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more for the purpose of satisfying party appetites than to meet the real necessities of the Departments concerned." When to these figures are added the 116 Service Members, the reason for the concern clearly felt in several different quarters of the House becomes still more apparent. The Prime Minister, moreover, had clearly indicated the prospect of yet more appointments of this character being made. Undoubtedly a genuine fear existed not so much of direct corruption as of a loss of independence, and the development of what might be called a "packed House mentality." Objection was taken, too, to the suggestion that the ordinary duties of Members were less important than their appearance on the "roll of honour." "I maintain," said Mr. Oswald Lewis from the Conservative side, "that a Member's most useful work is as a Member of Parliament"; and this view was expressed equally emphatically from Liberal and Labour back benches. Sir Percy Harris thought it even more important in war than in peace.

The House had asserted itself with some effect, and two concessions were announced by Mr. Attlee. The first, at which the Prime Minister himself had hinted, was the acceptance of Mr. Mander's suggestion that the Select Committee appointed to enquire into the whole question of Government appointments should make its recommendations for war-time as well as for after the war. The other was to consider giving full particulars of further appointments and thus to afford an opportunity for debating them.

A certain suspicion of executive encroachment was also evident in the discussion of the report of the Committee of Privileges on the detention without public trial of Captain Ramsay. The most effective criticism centred in the fact that the Committee had accepted without examination the word of the Home Secretary that the detention had not taken place as a result of anything said by the Member within the House, but was due to his activities outside Parliament. It was agreed, however, that for such activities a Member should not be treated differently from any other citizen.

In the case of the suppression of the *Daily Worker* and the *Week*, there was little disposition to argue the merits of either paper. The consistent attempt to damage the war-effort

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was generally admitted. But exception was taken to the method of suppression. Upon this it was claimed on the one hand that the process should have been a judicial one, the editors being given the opportunity to reply in open court. It was contended that the power given to the Home Secretary had been granted when invasion was thought to be imminent, and on the ground that in the circumstances of an invasion there would be no time to wait upon judicial decision. The official reply was that no such undertaking had been given, that judicial process would take two or three months, and that there would be nothing then to prevent a suppressed paper from starting again under a different name. There was clearly, however, some genuine belief that the fear of invasion had been used to facilitate the granting of such extreme executive powers which could then be used in other circumstances than those envisaged by Parliament. On the main issue of the wisdom of suppression there was less disagreement than anxiety about its possible effects on editors of other journals. It was alleged by Sir Richard Acland that "there has been a case already where *prima facie* evidence of a first-rate scandal was submitted to an editor, and he replied: 'It is no use my investigating that because we have been warned.' " It was further pointed out that no such drastic action had been taken during the last war. On the whole, however, here as in the other two cases dealt with above, the House's anxiety at executive powers was directed less against actual abuse than against the possibility of its extension.

"The House of Commons," said Mr. Mander in the debate on the Disqualification Bill, "is really a symbol of what we are fighting for; it is part of our war and peace aims, and I hope we shall not take any steps which will prevent it shining during the war as brightly as it has done all down the centuries." Concern at the absence of any clear definition and publication of peace aims continues to be expressed, and indeed has become more frequent. It cannot be separated from another question, with which Parliament has also shown a growing concern—foreign propaganda. If pressure on Ministers for a declaration of aims continues, it has in fact been encouraged by official statements indicating that such

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a declaration might be expected soon. Some retreat seems, however, to have been made from this decision. It appears that the definition may have been found on examination to be even more difficult than had been at first supposed. The Government's attitude has now ceased to be that such a declaration is unnecessary; rather is it that the right time must be chosen, and that there must be preliminary agreement with other Governments. Upon this there is no disposition in the House to be unreasonable. But there is undoubtedly a certain feeling that the Government may be a little too ready to assume that the excellence of our cause and intentions is as fully appreciated outside the Government itself, and particularly in enemy and occupied countries, as it is within that circle.

"I entirely agree," said Mr. Attlee, "that a knowledge of the cause for which we are fighting is a vital weapon in this war." That the Ministry of Information, and still more the B.B.C. since propaganda to a closed Europe is now 90 per cent a matter of broadcasts, are concerned with a vital aspect of war strategy has been a consistent argument from many quarters in the House. Although tributes have been paid to this side of our war campaign, there is clearly a widespread belief that all is not well with it. The contention has been made that since we cannot hope to put as large an army into the field as the enemy, we should make a fuller use of the principles which are our real strength. That the Nazis themselves are afraid on this score is proved, it is suggested, by the very size of the Goebbels machine. The Germans and the Italians, not to mention the oppressed peoples, ought to know what they can hope for from an Allied victory. But, if such propaganda is to be more effectively carried on, it needs first that better ammunition, in the shape of a counterblast to the vaunted Hitler "new order," should be put into the hands of the Ministry and the B.B.C.

The extent of this feeling may be gauged by the fact that, apart entirely from the many Questions on peace aims and the fact that this subject has been raised on the adjournment, the work and organisation of the B.B.C. have been twice raised on the adjournment, once on the Address, and once

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debated in Committee of Supply. The substance of our broadcast propaganda has been criticised. Especially has the allegation been made of a certain hangover from appeasement days, in regard to Italy, for instance, in the failure to attack Fascism as distinct from Mussolini. The Ministry has admitted that we should address Italy "in the voice of Garibaldi."

Besides the substance of propaganda three general causes for dissatisfaction with the present position have been alleged. It has been argued that there ought to be a more centralised direction. Propaganda ought not to be at the mercy of any Government Department, such as the Foreign Office, which likes to impose a directive. Diplomats and officials often prefer silence and generally have no experience of political journalism; they ought not therefore to be able to interfere. The fact that several of the points of criticism were not replied to itself suggests that, as the Minister admitted, the liaison between his Department and the B.B.C. was incomplete. The appointment of an "Advisor" for the home service and another for the foreign service, now announced, was no doubt an attempt to meet this general defect. Secondly, it is claimed that there is too much secrecy on the research and advisory work being carried out, and that this whole work has been treated rather as an offshoot of an organisation devised for quite different purposes. On the point of secrecy, the Minister's reply is, in effect, that the work of his Department is so closely associated with war strategy that there is a risk of help being given to the enemy. Finally, on conditions of work, both as to building space and as to the quality and quantity of the personnel, strong criticism has been put forward, it being even alleged that the claims of other departments have been allowed unreasonably to stand in the way of urgent needs. Here the Minister has admitted some, at least, of the defects, and claimed that they were in course of remedy. The general conclusion, however, would seem to be inescapable that the organisation of our propaganda effort has been allowed to be something of a Cinderella in relation to the other departments, and to be both later devised and less efficiently co-ordinated than the more obvious "Service" ministries. The accident—from the point of view of war

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strategy—that the B.B.C. was a semi-independent corporation without direct Parliamentary control may have been allowed to place obstacles in the way of the best development and the speediest. If so, this is surely strong further evidence of the importance of the chief function of Parliament in war-time, that of directly supervising departmental activities.

TOWARDS A REGIONAL EMPIRE

By DONALD COWIE

THE British Empire overseas has so far owed its major developments to unsought wars. There is no need to recapitulate the familiar epochs, but the point will be accepted that the great conflicts of the last two hundred years have directly influenced the precocious growth of the British colonies, and latterly Dominions overseas. It is early yet to look for the definite effects of the present struggle. But at least one trend can already be discerned.

This is a tendency on the part of the overseas Empire to re-organise itself in what may be described as strategic groupings, with a political significance that conforms curiously with the latest or regional theory of international development. What philosophers vaguely plan for the ravaged structure of political society in the Old World is already in action here. That the phenomenon is fortuitous, and a typical product of the British capacity for muddling-through, does not detract from its importance.

A legitimate complaint before the war was that no obvious provision had been made for the co-ordination of Imperial defences in event of hostilities. It was urged that the Dominions and Colonies should be organised to march as one man with Britain and France at the given signal. Such an arrangement might not only check each movement of an enemy combination at the beginning; it might even dissuade the aggressors entirely from going to war. But little or nothing was done. The British Government could not presume to act as Imperial dictator. The Dominions found it hard to believe, in their isolation, that war was really possible. Co-ordination was confined to military technicalities.

On the outbreak of war a strategy for the Empire as a whole had to be worked out from scratch. The experience of 1914-1918 was little help. Japan and Russia had been our allies then, and the Mediterranean had been initially clear. There had been no imminent threat to the British arsenal and

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trade routes by air-borne attack; Britannia still ruled all the waves. New methods would be needed in a world of potential enemies everywhere, whose great air-forces and under-water fleets outnumbered the defenders. There was also the realisation, kept very much in the background, that the French military machine, chief of our weapons on land, had a dangerously different temper from the same arm in 1914.

So the British Empire improvised hastily. It is unnecessary to describe all the tactical details. Everyone should know by now how the Dominions and Colonies entered the war, what they contributed at once, and where they began to fight. If the Ministry of Information has often failed, it has been signally successful in its Empire publicity. But wider, strategical trends shaped slowly. They followed the needs of each moment, not taking definite form until a situation had been stabilised by events.

Thus that announcement on August 19, 1940, that a permanent joint board on defence would be set up by the United States and Canada for the northern part of the western hemisphere, was greeted as an accomplished fact with some surprise, if little real appreciation. In the previous war Canada had acted as a useful bridge between Britain and America, but only in matters of business, such as dollar exchange and the placing of orders for munitions. It had been expected that she would perform these services again on a larger scale. This sudden arrangement for strategic consultation involved a concept that had never before entered the minds of many people, and that was slow to enter them now.

Admittedly the arrangement was vague. There would be staff consultations; a co-ordination of American and Canadian plans to resist any German thrust against the New World. Greenland would be mutually watched; perhaps a strategic highway built through British Columbia to connect Alaska with the continental United States. But Canada announced other decisions at this time. Diplomatic representatives would be exchanged with the Latin American republics. Canada would take part in the defence of Newfoundland, Iceland and the West Indies; and on

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August 22 a general agreement was reached between Canada and Newfoundland on defence issues. The admittance of the United States to bases on British territory in the Western hemisphere was already a likelihood, and Canada was conducting liaison here. When statesmen talked about the problematical conditions of a British defeat they openly presumed that the rallying-ground for the broken forces of the Empire would be Canada.

Thus it transpired that under the impact of war, and to meet the necessities of the military moment in the absence of a concrete, previous plan, Canada was becoming the instrument of political evolution along new lines. The British Empire could have been conceived as a collection of cells, each cast off by the British Isles at the centre, but all mutually interdependent, and helpless without each other, all contributing to the common-weal. Now one of those cells, faced with the necessity of self-preservation, was itself hurriedly developing a local connection.

Perhaps it is unwise to pursue the analogy too far as yet. But it must be insisted that the Canadian development was, and is, nothing so simple as a move for amalgamation with the United States. The far-sighted administration of Mr. Roosevelt has certainly harnessed the pan-American tendency to its star, but that tendency, for Canada, has been an occasion for free expansion in unison with her neighbour, rather than a sinking of British identity in an American pool. And it might be noted that such a preservation of identity has been assisted by the very conditions of war, under which the United States as a neutral dare not cohabit openly with the belligerent Canada.

But the Canadian example must not be over-stressed, or a development which has been marked in all parts of the Empire will be dismissed as peculiar to a part and correspondingly without a wide significance. There is next, in geographical order, the case of Australia, New Zealand, and other British territories of the Pacific. Three important trends have emerged here.

The first is the increasing endeavour of Australia and New Zealand, since the Canadian success, to make a similar arrangement for military consultation with the United States.

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Until the unfortunate death of Lord Lothian, there were constant consultations in Washington on this matter. The attention of the British Ambassador was necessary because the use of Singapore and other British bases in the Pacific by the United States was a bargain-counter. But the Southern Dominions had, and have, no desire to bargain. Their single object, after the shocks of 1940 and the example of Canada, is to see the establishment of a mutually-protective and indigenous political system for their area.

Although the matter must be dismissed quickly, it is of far-reaching importance and exceedingly complex. The lead has been taken by Australia. What would happen to the Southern Dominions if Britain were lost and the Navy defeated? What may happen in any case with markets for Australian and New Zealand produce in the Old World increasingly restricted, by military action and a growing tendency on the part of the Old World to provide its own supplies? These unanswered questions have convinced prescient Australians, notably Mr. Menzies the Prime Minister, and Mr. Casey the Minister in Washington, that something must be done now to provide alternative safeguards and economic outlets.

A closer relationship with the United States, and indeed with all the Americas, would go far to resolve the problem. Therefore Australia and New Zealand have been assiduously working for, initially, a consultative pact with the United States similar to that concluded with Canada, and fundamentally, a confederation of all the English-speaking communities around the Pacific basin. Certain foreign communities, such as the Dutch East Indies and the French Pacific islands, would be included. That is the first trend.

Second, there has been the significant tendency of the Australian and New Zealand military effort. Australian units have strengthened Singapore; a New Zealand cruiser steamed across the Pacific to assist in the destruction of the *Graf Spee*; the bulk of the Australian and New Zealand land contingents went in the steps of their fathers to Suez. Their chosen task has been to guard the narrow entry of Europe to their southern, inviolate seas. But both

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Dominions on this occasion have kept a disproportionate number of men at home. This is because of Japan, an always imminent threat to the Antipodean lands themselves. Thus Australia and New Zealand to-day are conscious of their indigenous responsibilities as never before. And that consciousness has been underlined by the third trend.

This is the emergence of India as a chief arsenal and supply depot for the Southern hemisphere. At the end of 1940 a conference was held in Delhi between representatives of all British communities east of Suez and from many parts of Africa. Such a meeting was unique in the history of the Empire. Other conclaves had taken place in Dominions, but none before as between the members of a *region* for purposes of greater regional safety and competence. At this conference Australia and New Zealand were confirmed in their war-time realisation that they would be more comfortable in the future as members of a self-contained group within the British Empire than as increasingly independent national states.

But the Delhi Supply Conference had other than Antipodean significance. The most remarkable feature, perhaps, was that it had been convened by the Government of India itself. Admittedly the elected representatives of the Indian people took no part. But the suzerain power had seen fit to entrust India with the novel task, and, as the negotiations proceeded, it became apparent that India's industrial and financial interests, besides the fighting-races, were more than ready to execute it. The task was, briefly, that India should extend a hand to the Pacific Dominions and Colonies on the one side, and the African territories on the other. She should act as the central depot of supply and exchange in a self-contained economic and military system. The Pacific territories and those of Africa would produce raw materials and certain manufactures; India with her teeming manpower would chiefly produce manufactures from those raw materials, and pass them on to the likely theatre of war in the Middle East. In the event of hostilities with Japan, India would stand behind both Malaya and Australia and New Zealand.

The value of this arrangement should be obvious at once,

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but doubters need only glance at a globe or map. India was *made* to be the keystone of a southern federation. Congress politicians will doubtless retort that "made" is the operative word, to which it can only be replied that any such arrangement is a gift to India whose value will be more and more appreciated in coming years.

Moreover, the arrangement has already borne brave fruit in the success of General Wavell's army against the Italians. India provided some of her best troops for that force, whose fundamental purpose is the defence of India, and she supplied a great part of the equipment and munitions.

So we come to Africa, linked on the one side to this southern confederation, but basically an isolated unit. South Africa is far from Australia, remote from Canada. Has she a part in the emerging scheme of self-contained groups within the Empire? General Smuts replied to that question a few months ago. While visiting the Union forces in East Africa he told the men that they were building "a greater South Africa which will ultimately stand foremost in a United States of Africa." Did he coin a phrase there which will set the pace for future developments in these parts?

There are great difficulties to be overcome, but fundamentally it is a stirring picture. You can regard it if you like as the consummation of Cecil Rhodes' vision, or the ultimate destiny of every good Africander, or the practical politics of Federal Union. The prospect is a confederation of like-minded states in the continent of Africa, led at first by the most highly-developed state, South Africa, but ultimately of equal status. When South Africa sent her troops to Kenya last year she made a practical demonstration of her potential influence. Yet it must be admitted that a serious difficulty has to be overcome here.

This is the attitude of a large section of South African opinion towards the coloured problem. Inheriting the old prejudices of the voortrekkers, and superimposing upon them new and equally unpleasant racial theories imported from modern Europe, the large and influential Africander parties have stated it as their definite policy that Africans must remain "hewers of wood and drawers of water." If there are more potent bogeys than "British Imperialism"

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and "Jewish Capitalism" to these sturdy rebels of reaction, they are British experiments over the northern borders with native enfranchisement, land ownership, indirect rule and the like. Allied with this, the Afrianders clamour for a complete cession by the British Government of the Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland Protectorates to the Union of South Africa, not to mention eventual transference of East African territories on similar terms.

Since the sole object, indeed, the driving-force of arrangements for unified blocks within the Empire would be the greater political well-being and economic efficiency of the inhabitants, it is difficult to see how Afriander prejudices can be reconciled with General Smuts's otherwise admirable dream. Indeed, the only way out might be an essentially defeatist one, namely the division of British Africa into two separate spheres of union.

Colonies in this survey have hitherto been lumped in, according to geographical circumstance, with nearby Dominions. But certain colonies in Africa could conceivably be allotted a prouder destiny, if they have not helped themselves to it already. It is notorious how before the war the East African colonies would invent insuperable obstacles to collaboration with each other. Much was made of different systems of native rule in each, conflicting economic interests, and the like. Yet these colonies since the war have acted almost as one unit. Successive conferences between colonial executives have led to a pooling of resources and man-power; there has been a great, and surprisingly successful huddle-together in the face of a common danger.

These East African colonies could, with Southern and Northern Rhodesia, be amalgamated in a new African Dominion. Territories of West Africa, perhaps French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies, even Mediterranean protectorates from Palestine to Libya, might eventually join the association. If South Africa preferred to remain outside and renounce the power, influence and profit which proper participation would accord her, then it would be her misfortune. The power of attraction would probably be so great, however, that eventually those South Africans responsible for their country's lack of imagination would be

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elbowed out of the way by the more farseeing—as in the present war.

Has the pattern been made clear? It is by no means fanciful. We see Canada creating a distinct sphere of interest for herself and making valuable friends; Australia and New Zealand are intent upon a similar arrangement for the Pacific; India is already cast for the role of economic clearing-house in the Southern hemisphere, with British connections east and west; the South Africans are openly fighting for "a United States of Africa," which conforms theoretically at least with the ideas of the British colonies farther north. The spectacle is of a world-wide association of kindred states deliberately aiming at de-centralization but also at local or regional collaboration.

The long, political words tend to confuse the issue. Perhaps it is clarified best by another look at the circumstances that have fathered the development. Primarily they are strategical circumstances. It was realised after the fall of France, especially, that the United Kingdom was going to find it difficult to maintain all her communications with the overseas Empire. The loss of the French Navy was, perhaps, the worst blow of all, and the entry of Italy into the war soon increased our naval responsibilities still further, while the bellicose attitude of Japan made it necessary to prepare for naval warfare in the Pacific. That worst bogey of Imperial strategists might yet be realised, a state of affairs in which the scattered Dominions and Colonies would be progressively cut off from the mother country, herself so dependent upon them for supplies, and they quite helpless without her ships and market.

Therefore the word went out that each Dominion must prepare to look after herself if necessary. Overseas the advice was received merely as confirmation of what had been feared and thought. Canada knew now that she must come closer to the United States, and prepare to carry on the British torch. Australia and New Zealand realised that they must rally all the forces of goodwill in the Pacific. India prepared to succour those armies in Africa and the Middle East. South Africa sent troops north.

And there the subject peters out. To take it any further

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would involve dangerous speculation at the present time. Moreover, it would be misleading to seek for bold outlines of the future where there are only vague shadows. Perhaps too much has been made already of tendencies that might have no more than a temporary significance.

But the wishful thinker has his opportunity if he likes. The increasing trouble with that old British Empire was its economic organisation. The parts were kept in leading-strings, economically, and the centre was choking herself in the effort to hold those strings together. Most of the Dominions had reached the stage where they could no longer rely upon primary production alone for a sufficient livelihood, but where the encouragement of secondary industries directly conflicted with the interests of their best primary customer. And yet debts continued to shackle them to that customer. Whereas Britain herself had reached the stage where neglect of her own primary industries was reacting dangerously upon the health and strength of her overseas as well as the increasingly vital home markets. The commerce of the Empire was slowing-down, as populations were decreasing, and potentially valuable resources were remaining unexplored.

An organisation of the Empire in regional groups would solve many of those problems. It would also provide a model for the rest of the world in the difficult days of post-war reconstruction. Let us hope that the present tendencies may receive proper encouragement; let us study and guide them, so that their brave promise may not be overwhelmed in the upheavals to come.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN FRANCE (1870-1939). By D. W. BROGAN.
(Hamish Hamilton. 21s.)

PROFESSOR BROGAN has with this brought off an achievement to be proud of: he has written a grand, if not a near-great book. It is not to be expected that he should have the same intimate knowledge of France and insight into the very crevices of French life, that he has of the United States and the American way of life: a man may make one foreign country his own, as Bodley did France, but hardly two foreign countries—that would be extravagant and unconvincing. For that reason he has, wisely, not followed the analytical, descriptive and allusive method of his *American Constitution*, but taken to plain, straightforward, historical narrative. For some that may be a disappointment of expectations, but this is really a stronger and more mature book, for Professor Brogan is really an historian and not a political thinker.

But what an admirable historian he is; his qualities and gifts are peculiarly in place with such a subject. For one thing—it is such a relief in an academic historian—he is a skilled and practised journalist, and knows how to write vividly and interestingly. The history of France in the past seventy years provides plenty of scope for, and even demands, vivid and interesting treatment. Then, again, beneath the caustic comments and the apparent cynicism, Professor Brogan has a real impartiality of mind, a just judgment—or suspense of judgment. He is a disillusioned writer, with no toleration of humbug or moral pretensions: in that he speaks for his generation. And everywhere there are interesting strokes which bespeak his omnivorous reading: the Mayor of Strasbourg who appropriately died after making his protest against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Cézanne in Provence hiding from the police who wanted to take him for the army, Courbet in charge of the destruction of the Vendôme column.

The book might have had for its motto that revealing sentence of Flaubert describing the attitude of a meeting in 1848 towards a distinguished professor who was addressing it: "*Bien qu'on l'aimât tout à l'heure, on le baïssait maintenant, car il représentait l'Autorité.*" How like the French that is! In a way it is the moral of the whole history of the Third Republic and accounts for the weakness in so much of French political behaviour. Professor Brogan makes very just strictures upon the badness of French Parliamentarism. From the very beginning the miserable deputies set themselves to fight for their own hands as against the interests of strong executive government and the long-term interests of France. They wrecked Gambetta's hopes of a great national progressive party after the English model which might have given France

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the stable, yet representative, government it stood so badly in need of. They were always jealous of the country's great men: they turned their back on Thiers, they rejected Gambetta, Jaurès was never once in office, Clemenceau was turned down after rendering superb services to the nation. ("Did I hear a cock crow?" he said to some nauseating type who was assuring him that he hadn't voted against him for the Presidency.) The Presidency itself, which should have been an office of power and significance to the state, was deliberately kept insignificant by the deputies and filled by a succession of nonentities, ending up with the inferior Lebrun, who was at least respectable when many of them had not even been that. Is it any wonder that the political history of the Third Republic has been the unedifying spectacle it has been? The wonder is that with such a political system France should have made the great achievements she has in the past seventy years: her Empire, Indo-China, Morocco, her record in the war of 1914-1918, her local administration, French education and science and culture.

All the same, it has been evident to those who have watched France in the post-war period that there was something profoundly wrong, and of a political and social character. Professor Brogan brings out, and it is right to remember, the terrible blood-drain of the last war upon her vitality: proportionately more than twice that upon this country, and we are in a position now to know what we lost in leadership and vigorous conduct of our affairs in consequence. France made a very wonderful effort towards recovery after 1918, for which she has not received due credit. After all, France is always more worthy of respect than Germany: after 1870 the French did get down to reconstructing the life of the nation upon solid foundations than before; they made their greatest achievements in painting, in music, science and poetry, after defeat. The Germans after 1919 sulked and could think of nothing but their vanished vision of a Europe in which they could hector and bully smaller peoples as they pleased; they never acknowledged even to themselves their responsibility for the war of 1914-1918. The French were much more prepared to cut their coat according to their cloth; they have rather fallen over backward in their readiness to do so in the last few years.

The root trouble all through the history of the Third Republic, and for that matter of the nineteenth century, has been the fissiparousness of French society: an undesirable consequence no doubt of the French Revolution. By the defeat and exclusion from power of the old aristocracy, French politics lost something in grace and public-spirit which English political life kept. By reaction, a defeated and excluded governing class divested from responsibility and uprooted from power, took to courses the criminal levity and folly of which are enough to disgust an attentive reader of this book. •The political idiocy of Henri V,

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the doctrinaire stupidity of de Broglie's Constitution—though he was rather a great and good man, the disgraceful financial support given by such aristocrats as the Duchesse d'Uzès to an adventurer like Boulanger, the wickedness of the French upper-classes in the Dreyfus affair, their determination to defeat the ends of justice, the nefarious role of the Catholic Church in French politics: all these things show that there was nothing to expect from the Right. Was there anything more to be expected from the Left?

The French Left had one great man to offer not only to their country, but to Europe: a man of great idealism and courage, a genial spirit: Jaurès. It is possible that in the end Europe may find greater inspiration in his tradition than in that of the more sombre, uncompromising Lenin. Professor Brogan sees well the greatness of Jaurès and how it was he whom France needed above all after the war. In her relations with Germany, in the struggle of her better impulses against the merely destructive vindictiveness of a Poincaré, "what was missing in that opposition was not brains or courage; it was Jaurès. There was now no one to rise to the heights of the great argument and appeal from the narrow, honest and largely irrelevant logic of the lawyer to the spirit of the community of men, including Germans. It was in the years that followed the Armistice that the loss of the great tribune was most felt. Perhaps it would have needed a German Jaurès, too, to make true peace between the neighbouring nations. But a French Jaurès would have been a beginning."

The French can hardly be held responsible for not producing a German Jaurès; and though they may be held responsible for killing their own, or at least condoning his death, they did at least produce him. In the tragedy of Jaurès lies, in a nutshell, the whole tragedy of contemporary Europe.

It is rather shocking that the French have never even produced a good biography of their great leader. But in Professor Brogan we have somebody with all the gifts and the knowledge to write a really great life of Jaurès. He would put us all under an immense obligation if he would undertake it: the book would have an importance not only for this country and for France, but for the Europe which is shaping itself out of the misery of the ruin of all our hopes.

A. L. ROWSE.

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ADVISORY BODIES: A STUDY OF THEIR USES IN RELATION TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1919-1939. Edited by R. V. VERNON and N. MANSERGH. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 320pp. 18s. net).

THIS book is the result of an enquiry instituted by the Politics Research Committee of Oxford University into bodies appointed to supply government departments with advice from the outside world. The "outside world" for this purpose means persons who are neither Ministers nor Civil Servants.

The subject is one of great interest. Sir Arthur Salter, the Chairman of the Committee, asserts that the proper use of advisory bodies is the right answer of representative democracy to the challenge of the corporative state. One would hesitate to go so far as this although recognising the importance of the institutions which help to bridge the gap between the departments of state and the citizens or their voluntary associations.

It is doubtful, however, whether the scope of the enquiry was conceived in a sufficiently comprehensive manner. The use of outside advisory bodies is less significant than the growing tendency to associate the lay element in the active work of government, whether on the advisory side or in connection with executive functions. An investigation into the place of the layman in the entire administrative process might have yielded a more valuable result.

There are nine principal chapters in the book. The first is devoted to the use of advisory bodies in connection with the reform of the machinery of government. These comprise the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of Government, the Conferences on Devolution and the House of Lords, and the Committee on Ministers' Powers. The remaining chapters are concerned with the use of advisory bodies by the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Board of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour in its industrial relations work, the Unemployment Assistance Board, the Mines Department and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Each of these chapters is written by a different author; and as is inevitably the case with such books, the standard of achievement varies. By far the best chapter is that on the Board of Education, by Mr. John Graves. This is particularly fortunate, since the Board of Education is far ahead of all other Departments in successfully using the services of advisory experts in a systematic manner. The Consultative Committee of the Board has played a dominant part in moulding educational policy in a progressive direction during the past twenty years. "On a general view," Mr. Graves remarks, "the Board's advisory bodies are to be congratulated on the part they have played in reforming the educational system of this country both internally and externally." Their work might have been still more conspicuous if the Board's attitude towards publicity had been a little bolder.

The Ministry of Health, by contrast, has persistently failed to understand the importance of advisory bodies or to work with them in a successful manner. Four Consultative Councils were established in 1919 to deal with Medical and Allied Services, with Local Health Administration, with National Health Insurance, and with General Health questions. None of them performed work of any importance after 1921 or even survived. The Ministry of Health has also allowed the report of the Hadow Committee on Local Government Officers, one of the most constructive documents of our time, to fall into oblivion. When an advisory committee was established in 1934 to assist in administering the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, the Minister damped down its activities by stating that although the function of the committee was to give him advice as occasion may require, he did not consider that this would involve the preparation of annual reports. He stated that the committee's activities would be recorded in the annual reports of the Ministry of Health—a promise which was not carried out in the event.

The Ministry of Health may excuse itself, Mr. Spann observes, by arguing that it has no wish to engage in fundamental reforms. This raises an aspect of the subject which only Mr. Graves deals with in an adequate way. In the chapter on the Treasury, Mr. Brown declares that the May Committee on National Expenditure was "most effective"; that the Geddes Committee (which produced the Geddes Axe) was "of almost equal effectiveness"; and that other bodies were of varying degrees of effectiveness. Mr. Taylor, on the other hand, in his chapter on the Mines Department, condemns the Sankey Commission as "the outstanding case of an unsuccessful committee of this kind"; and in his view the nationalisation of the coal royalties in 1938 cannot be traced to the influence of the Sankey Commission since it did not occur until twenty years later.

Judgments of this kind which are unrelated to any criteria of "effectiveness" are meaningless. Surely mere acceptance by the Government of the day and the translation of recommendations into action cannot be the sole test of "effectiveness." A more important question would be whether an advisory body penetrates to the heart of a problem and deals with it wisely and well. Part of the task of such bodies is to educate the public—witness, for example, the revolutionary change of ideas consequent upon the publication of the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission. Mr. Sidney Webb has somewhere remarked that the time-lag in Britain between changes of opinion and action resulting therefrom is about twenty years.

Mr. Graves does at least put the matter in some perspective by pointing out that the success of an educational reform on a large scale requires the active co-operation of four distinct groups: the Board of Education and the Treasury, the local authorities, teachers and parents.

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Elsewhere he makes some extremely suggestive generalisations concerning the optimum size and character of the personnel of advisory bodies, and the principles they should follow in drafting their reports.

Some of the chapters are stilted descriptions of a somewhat formal character. But even the less interesting essays are worth reading for the sake of occasional sidelights. It is, for example, revealing to be told by Mr. Brown that after 1928 the Treasury omitted to refer important questions of new policy to expert bodies on the ground that it did not consider that any body which was progressively minded enough to give acceptable advice would carry sufficient authority to be useful. It is interesting to be informed that in recent years "it has become almost impossible to regard Bank of England advice to the Treasury as outside advice at all." It is a striking fact that "in deciding upon the most far-reaching economic change since the middle of last century [tariff reform] the Government neither sought nor acted upon the advice of an advisory committee."

It will be seen that this book is a useful contribution to social science, although its merits are mainly on the descriptive side. With the exception of Mr. Graves, Mr. Spann and one or two others, the contributors have not brought sufficient thought to the subject to produce a clear body of conclusions or principles. The book must therefore be regarded to some extent as a quarry from which useful facts can be extracted.

W. A. ROBSON.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. Volume II. The New Empire, 1783-1870. XII and 1068 pp. (Cambridge Press. 50s.)

THE century covered by this volume is an extremely interesting and important period in the development of the British Empire. It starts immediately after the devastating shock of the loss of the North-American colonies and ends just before the violent outburst of imperialism of the second half of the 19th century. Though it is therefore anterior to what is popularly considered the creation of our modern empire, the foundations of everything built in the years 1880 to 1914 had really been laid between 1783 and 1870. This is true of both the Dominion and the Crown Colony and Protectorates systems. The effect of the loss of the American colonies is dominant throughout the period, profoundly influencing the psychology and the shape of the new empire. It can be traced indirectly in the acquisition of Australia, for the British Government went reluctantly to Australia only because it had to find some place to which it could send the convicts previously transported to North America. It can be traced directly in the Durham Report and the psychology of a long line of British Governments which, under its influence, gradually evolved the system of relationship between colony and mother country, eventually defined as Dominion status. It can be traced finally in the imperialistic pessimism which was almost universal in all parties until quite late in the period and which made Colonial Secretaries so reluctant to acquire territory or "accept responsibilities" overseas. Indeed, it is only when the period is intensively studied, as it is in this volume, that one realizes fully how persistent was the impulse of the men and administrations "on the spot"—e.g. in Africa—to extend imperial responsibilities and how persistently it was thwarted by the refusal of the home government to accept them.

The main themes of this volume are the growth of the representative or parliamentary government system in the future Dominions, the growth of what is now the Colonial Empire and the evolution of the Crown Colony type of government, the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery, and the movements of population within the empire. The volume follows the scheme and method established for the series. The scheme is chronological and the method that of the agricultural small holding. There are 23 chapters and nearly 20 different authors. The excessive multiplication of authors and breaking up of subject matter have considerable disadvantages. The book is a work of reference for a historian rather than a history, for the history is blurred by the facts and by the overlapping of so many historians. It is also disturbing that, as was to be expected where there are nearly 20 authors, there is marked difference in the merits of their contributions. Some of the chapters have little or no distinction; a few of them are extremely good, e.g. The Abolition of the Slave Trade, by Professor Coupland, Colonial Self-

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Government, 1838-1852, by Mr. J. R. M. Butler, and *Free Trade and Commercial Expansion, 1853-1870*, by Mr. H. J. Habakkuk.

The whole work suffers from one serious defect. It is written throughout almost entirely from the point of view of the imperialist, while that of his victims is neglected. Thus out of 900 pages the number which deal with the effects of imperial rule or the growth of empire upon the native inhabitants is exiguous. Every other aspect of empire is minutely recorded and investigated except this. This is particularly the case in such a chapter as that on the development of the Crown Colonies by Mr. Guillebaud. There, for instance, we are told a great deal about the immigration to the sugar colonies, including that of indentured labour, but it is almost always from the point of view of the planter. The "real value" of such immigration is considered from his point of view, whether it ensured to him "at least a minimum number of workers on whom he could rely" or "a continuous flow of docile labour." We are told much about the effect upon the British planter of abolition, of the land system, and of preferential duties and their abolition. Constitutional questions are discussed at length both in this and in other chapters. About the conditions of life created for the indentured labourer, the negro, or the Creole we are given very little information. It is significant that statistics are supplied about the value of estates relieved of mortgages in St. Lucia and the value of Peruvian guano imported into Barbados; no statistics are given which would throw light upon the rates of wages paid to indentured or free labour or upon the standard of living of the "docile labour" or of the negro population which was less docile. This statistical one-sidedness is characteristic of the whole volume.

LEONARD WOOLF.

BOOK REVIEWS

BRITISH WORKING CLASS POLITICS, 1832-1914. By G. D. H. COLE. (320 pp. *Routledge*. 7s. 6d.)

THE British working class, for many years the least advanced proletariat in the most advanced capitalism, is a fascinating subject. Mr. Cole's history of its political development has done it justice, but it is hard to review, for it would be pointless to recapitulate and foolish to detract. The book is "a monograph dealing with but a single aspect of the social development of British society during the past hundred years"; nevertheless the background emerges by implication and one is made to realise the extraordinary extent to which our sheltered economy has influenced even the most advanced political parties.

Revolutionary socialism, that is, socialism which aims at a peaceful or forcible reorganization of society as opposed to the amelioration or effortless evolution of the existing system, is the product of capitalism in distress. The distress may be caused by the conflict between the middle class and their predecessors in power, by the hardships caused by industrialization, by imperialist competition, or by the failure of capitalism through its own inward contradictions. England after 1850, like the United States at a later period, was almost undisturbed by these afflictions and had, in consequence, no serious revolutionary movement. The political history of the workers was, and to a large extent still is, the history of the trades unions. It is, up to 1914, a record of successive victories in parliament, gained, partly, through the sectional conflicts of the ruling classes, partly by the direct threat of organized labour's potential strength. But these were not socialist victories. The purpose of the Trades Union leaders and of those who elected them was, not to supplant the employer, but to bargain with him. The policy may appear unheroic, but given the economic realities of the time it was inevitable, and, in that it did better the condition of the worker, correct. It was natural that Marxism, the doctrine of catastrophe, should fail at a time when British capitalism was near its apogee and that as the trades unions gradually came into collision with the employing classes they should look to theorists who derived not from Marx and Engels, but from Gladstone or Chamberlain. Even so the socialist leaven worked slowly and I have no doubt that Mr. Cole is right in saying that "the Labour Party, right up to 1914, was not a Socialist but a Trade Union and social reform party, looking to the Liberals, under pressure, to carry into effect instalments of its demands." When, immediately after the last war Labour did at last challenge the Liberals, it was to a Fabian that it looked for its first full length declaration of policy. But by then the catastrophic period had begun and the violence and tempo of events demanded, not Fabian, but Scipian measures. In the next great conflict between the Unions and the employers the Unions were defeated.

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The impact of capitalist crisis has produced a revival of Marxism in that class from which the Fabians were recruited. Unfortunately the English Marxists have become completely estranged from organised labour. They have for the most part worked in or for a party which, despite its energy, courage, and enthusiasm, is regarded with indifference and hostility by the masses. In this way the Trades Unions, robbed of their natural allies among the intelligentsia, remain a headless body, while the communists are become a bodiless head. It will be a major disaster in an era of disasters if that *élan* which drove so many of the younger intellectuals towards scientific socialism is killed by the centrifugal zigzags of the third international, and Mr. Cole's suggestion of a non-policy educative propaganda organization is therefore very much to be welcomed. Until the rank and file of the labour movement can be familiarised with the nature and problems of socialist politics the best of programmes will remain sterile. It is enormously to the interest of the Trades Unions that this education should be attempted, for, when the development of capitalist crisis (a development greatly accelerated by war) reaches a certain point, it is lack of political education that leads to disaster; the leaders, accustomed to thinking in terms of collaboration with capital, are flung to the Right (as in England in 1931), while the unemployed, the badly employed, and the politically inexperienced section of the masses go to the wilder and woolier sections of the Left, or, what is far worse, to the pseudo-Left of the fascists. Only the steadying influence of theoretical education can give the necessary force to keep the leaders and the rank and file united.

In his last paragraph Mr. Cole says that his purpose in writing this history of the earlier phases of the political Labour movement: "has been to bring out clearly the need for a positive effort to re-create the legion of inspired and untiring propagandists for Socialism whose work made the Labour Party possible." It is to be hoped that he will succeed as well in this effort as he has in his purely historical capacity.

QUENTIN BELL.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE UKRAINE. By W. E. D. ALLEN. (xvi, and 404 pp. Cambridge University Press. 21s.)

TO write a good book on the Ukrainian question is perhaps impossible, but it is none the less unfortunate that the Cambridge University Press, presumably because they regarded a disinterested standpoint as the chief qualification for handling the subject, should have selected, as the author of what is evidently intended to be a standard work, a writer whose acquaintance with the Ukrainian question is based on second-hand information. Mr. Allen has produced a competent compilation from extensive sources, and in so far as the work does provide an account of the sequence of historical events which is otherwise lacking it has some value for the student of history. But in the sections dealing with recent events the writer's lack of any conception of historical development, or any theory of social evolution, is a very serious defect. His unscientific and shallow hostility towards the governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland and U.S.S.R., might be intelligible and excusable if it resulted from a burning conviction of the justice of the Ukrainian nationalist cause, but this conviction is lacking, and the central issue, the real significance of Ukrainian nationalism, is quite obscure.

It is admittedly extremely difficult to form any opinion as to the real significance of Ukrainian nationalism to-day. Nineteenth-century continental nationalism still shows a remarkable semblance of life long after the conditions which made it a liberating force have passed away: it is now a respectable instrument of British foreign policy, and it is still the only framework within which a certain group of eminent experts on international affairs can and will think. But few of those whose thinking is to-day so deeply conditioned by nineteenth-century categories are able to realise how their class significance has changed—from being a literary and academic ideology of freedom in the nineteenth century nationalism to-day has degenerated into a vested interest of the bureaucracies. Hence the ease of Hitler's recent conquests.

Yet Ukrainian nationalism is peculiar in that it has not become a vested interest, and its advocates have been martyrs, in Russia possibly in spite of themselves. But what is its real inspiration? All the national movements of the mid-nineteenth century (the Czech and Irish are obvious comparisons) had certain features in common with the Ukrainian, deriving from their academic origin: the extraordinary emphasis on language as a political factor, the wish dream of a mythical Golden Age in the remote past when the oppressed race was a Great Power, and the idealisation of primitive forms of economic life, in which the peasants are regarded as culture bearers.

All these features emerge from Mr. Allen's description of the nineteenth-century movement, and one is left to conclude that these

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ideals are still characteristic of present-day Ukrainian nationalism. If they are, it is very difficult to believe that this kind of nationalism is in any sense a real force. The great early period of peasant revolt seems to have left no mark, and peasant interests do not apparently influence the Ukrainian attitude to the Polish domination, though one would expect the land question to be all important. Mr. Allen makes no attempt to elucidate the nature of the real motive power, and so cannot throw any light on the problem of how far the outbreak of Ukrainian nationalism in the winter of 1938-39 was purely induced by Nazi propaganda, and how far the accusations in the Soviet trials in 1930-31 were based on fact.

Without some assessment of social forces it is difficult to accept the writer's judgments as well founded even when they appear to be correct. It is surprising, in view of his rather peevish hostility to the Soviet government, to find that he is against separatism: "the destiny of all these peoples must be a Russian destiny, in the sense that the fluvial network of the Great Eurasian Plain is one geographical and economic whole, out of which it is impracticable, and would be unreal, to carve separate and politically independent national units." On this aspect of European equilibrium (in spite of a tendency to shift his standpoint) Mr. Allen has done valuable service in pointing out how far back the French policy of the *cordon sanitaire* goes in history and how damaging it has been to the races of the European hinterland.

In the concluding chapter on the development of economic life inside the Soviet Union, the treatment lapses into a guide-book standard, comparable to the Soviet Union's own method of describing economic progress. It is unfortunate that a theme of so much interest should be treated by a writer without economic training.

DOREEN WARRINER.

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BOOK REVIEWS

DEMOCRACY'S LAST BATTLE. By FRANCIS WILLIAMS. 296 pp. (Faber. 8s. 6d.)

THIS is a most timely book and should be studied closely by the many people who are concerned about our war aims. Mr. Williams holds that this is a war for democracy and that therefore our major war and peace aim is democracy. It is a war, too, for civilisation, for, though the two are not coincident, no society can be civilised to-day which has not within it a good deal of the yeast of democracy. Beginning from such considerations, Mr. Williams is brought up sharply, as many other writers and thinkers have been, by the fact that the last war was also a war for democracy, that it ended in a victory for democracy, which in 1920 seemed to be firmly established throughout the world, and that here it is again in 1941 fighting desperately for life. In the first part of his book he faces this paradox of history, and analyses the triple challenge to democracy which has been flung down by the Communism of Soviet Russia, the Fascism of Mussolini's Italy, and the National-Socialism of Hitler's Germany. It is a very good analysis of these three authoritarian systems and of the nature of their challenge. Mr. Williams does not deny that each contains within it a dynamic and revolutionary element, but he shows that there is nothing in their origin or evolution to support the claim that they represent "the characteristic doctrine of our time" or that "they must inevitably replace outworn democratic traditions." The origin of the establishment of communism in power over the vast area of Russia was a desire for peace among the millions of Russian peasants. It was not a reaction against the failure of democracy. Communism subsequently evolved into the dictatorship of a minority party and later into the dictatorship of a single man. Italian Fascism originated in the desire of a small minority for war. It was not a characteristic doctrine of its age, for it had no doctrine at all. It established itself in power by an efficient strategy of political violence. It never had the support of the majority of the Italian people. There is nothing in its history or achievements to show that it is anything but inferior to a democratic system. Communism as an international system has been a complete failure, foreign imitators of the Soviet Government having proved futile and ineffective except as disintegrating factors in national life; Italian Fascism, on the other hand, has had "powerful imitators in several of the unstable and undemocratic states of Central Europe." But it has nowhere established itself among the mass of the people in a democratic country.

National-Socialism differs from both Communism and Fascism in being a popular movement. It is based upon a racial mass mythology and is therefore more stable and dangerous than the Russian or Italian authoritarian systems. Its real power, however, does not come from

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any ability to offer a constructive alternative to democracy. Its appeal is to unreason, to fear and to hatred, and it established itself on the post-war misery and poverty of the German people and the failure of democracy to implement its own principles and create a society which offered both liberty and security. Here is the lesson, Mr. Williams argues, which democracy must learn if it is going to win this war and the peace. It must establish a dynamic democratic society offering liberty and security both within the nation and internationally. But if we are to do this internationally, we must first see that our own society is really dynamically democratic.

In the second part of his book Mr. Williams dissects the social anatomy of Britain. Here again his analysis is vigorous and able. He shows how the existing economic system and the retention of the vestigial framework of the old political system and social traditions have created a bastard democracy, lethargic but complacent. He traces the disastrous and undemocratic effects of this upon various regions of national life—economic, educational, and imperial. But he is not content with mere analysis. He offers at the end of his book a concrete programme of reforms which must be begun at once during the war and carried on into the peace. The details of his proposals should be studied in his own pages. They are mainly based upon recognition of the fact that it is only by reform of the economic system that it is possible to restore its dynamic power to democracy. The stultification of democracy, and the consequent challenge to it from authoritarianism and the inevitable breakdown of civilisation, are directly due to our allowing the whole of society to be enslaved to the economic system of private property and profit. This makes the values of economic self-interest the determining factors in society, but those values are contradictory of the values of democracy. If the challenge of the three totalitarianisms is to be met and finally defeated, we must restore the social values of democracy and see that in every part of our society they are dominant over the values of the profit maker, the stock market, and the speculator.

PROLEGOMENA TO PEACE AIMS

By BARBARA WARD

I
TO have "peace aims" at all implies a certain conception of post-war society and one of the hopeful signs of our contemporary crisis is the measure of agreement that exists on the future organization of Europe. The first task of the Allies' "new order" is to solve the fundamental problem of modern industrial society—that of securing sufficient centralization and planning to achieve economic stability and security while avoiding a control of individual existence so rigid that it destroys freedom, stultifies initiative and produces a cumbrous and oppressive system of bureaucracy. Under one aspect, the war is being fought upon this very issue. The Nazi world order has made its decision—freedom, personal and national, is subordinated to the purposes of Leviathan. Whatever else the Allied nations are fighting for, they are not engaged in war simply to produce their own version of the German system—even though it would doubtless be a more tolerable thing.

We are not concerned here primarily with internal reconstruction but Pitt's maxim—"England by her exertions—Europe by her example"—still holds good. Many of the problems which have to be solved on a European or a world scale are only extensions in space and complexity of problems already existing in the internal polity of a nation. It is difficult to see how Britain can effectively solve the problem of planning and freedom in Europe if no attempt has been made to solve the same problem at home. Freedom is not the difficulty. Government in Great Britain, in the Dominions, in the political systems of many of Britain's Allies and in the United States is directed towards the individual citizen and the ancient oriental heresy of the God-state has been held at bay. The rights of man expressed in a law which is held to transcend locality and century and guaranteed by a judicial system independent of government—possibly the greatest achievement of Western civilization—have vanished from

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Eurasia, from Calais to Vladivostock. It is something to engage in war to restore those rights. But the other element of the problem—security and stability?

We have to remember that one of the most persistent and by no means the least persuasive lines of Nazi propaganda to the peoples of Europe is the promise of stability in a unified economy and the denunciation of Britain as—politically and economically—an element of disruption. Anglo-Saxon imperialism, international finance capital, the trade cycle, hot money and the rest figure as prominently in programmes from Zeesen as from Moscow. Although the whole Nazi system is based on the tremendous folly of rearmament, so long as the German Army can expand the area of plunder, a hope of employment and stability (though at a very low level) is given to the masses of Europe. It is not enough to offer them freedom in exchange. They may not be prepared to take the risk. The only effective propaganda and ultimately the only effective post-war settlement must offer not only the rights of man in the traditional sense but an extended version which covers at the very least the right to eat and the right to work. Only then can we turn to Europe and say "The Dictators offered you bread and security and work. We offer you all this—and freedom too."

The lessons of the war in Britain may produce a new conception of social security—an economic minimum, for example, guaranteed as of right to each citizen and designed among other things to rehabilitate the family. The lessons of wartime industry may restore a right criterion to the nation's economic life—production for use or, to use a more traditional phrase, production for the greatest good of the greatest number. (It is surely sounder to concentrate on the end of the system and subordinate the means to it. There is no especial virtue in nationalization or in private enterprise. There is room in a sound economy for both since the question is which system, in any given industry, produces the best social and economic result). We might feel happier over these prospects of evolution if, to give only one example, the controls of raw materials in this war—in contradistinction to the last—had not been vested in businessmen vitally interested in those raw materials. One of the most obvious ways in

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which the notion of production for use could come to be generally accepted would be by the maintenance of the wartime principle of control (though for a totally opposite purpose, expansion not restriction) in time of peace. Yet if the controllers, for all their public spirit, are men deeply imbued with belief in restrictive monopoly (on the whole the average business man's creed in the twenties and thirties) then control will mean not the direction of the nation's resources to the most profitable use but government backing for a new industrial feudalism.

II

These problems of internal economic policy have obvious bearing in the post-war order. It is possible to think of international control of Europe's public utilities, raw materials and key industries. But is control, say, of the chemical industry, to be vested without modification in I.C.I. or *I. G. Farben*? The trend of policy to-day suggests that this is the most likely outcome. The restoration of free trade unionism would not necessarily counteract this tendency towards monopoly on a European scale. The workers in a particular industry can stand to gain from monopoly by getting "a larger share of a smaller cake." Control to secure the expansion of European output and a steady raising of Europe's standard of living can only come from forces outside the existing economic system, unless there are industrial leaders still in obscurity with considerably more enlightenment than we can reasonably expect from our past experience.

This conclusion is a reminder of a fundamental fact which is in danger of being forgotten. Post-war reconstruction in Europe is a *political* task. It is true that at the Treaty of Versailles, economics were left to look after themselves and the treaty makers concentrated on the political framework. From this premise is deduced the belief that if, in the next peace, the victors concentrate on economics, then the political order will shuffle itself into position. This is a misreading both of Versailles and of the aftermath of Versailles. The failure of Versailles was not only that it did not solve the economic problem of Europe but that it failed to solve the

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political problem as well. The political problem in crudest terms is a problem of power. If a genuine society is to be built up, there must be a centre of sovereignty (even if it is only implicit). So long as France was strong enough to exercise sovereignty through the League of Nations—with some uncertain backing from Britain—there was a European order which, in a primitive but recognisable manner, worked. The eclipse of France meant the eclipse of the order based on France and its replacement by an infinitely worse order based on Germany. And this change was political. To give only one example, so long as the French system persisted, the Balkan countries traded not only with Germany but with the rest of Europe, the British Empire and the United States. It was only when Germany's political strength became overwhelming that the Balkan states fell "inevitably" into the German *Lebensraum*.

After this war, this question of political sovereignty or power will be the key to all the rest. The centres of political power to-day are virtually co-extensive with the centres of industrial power. Modern war is fought in the factories. Where man-power and machine-power are insufficient—as in France and Italy—states which are historically and culturally Great Powers, cease to be so for the purposes of the political ordering of Europe. In Europe to-day and to-morrow there are only two centres of political power, Germany and Britain, and, as we have learnt during these first two years of war, although Britain's industrial power together with that of her Empire can stave off defeat, it is uncertain whether, without American industrial aid, a European victory can be attained.

The Germans are ready to provide a unified system for Europe. It is a unity of oppression and exploitation, but it is not only slavish self interest that leads a Laval to say that Hitler, in integrating Europe, is "imbued with the march of history" (whatever that may mean). Changes in industrial technique are making for a degree of centralization, and the consequences of these changes expressed in total war are leading peoples to prefer stability at a low level to the chance of raising their standards at a risk. We reach, then, the first problem of peace aims even before the first indeterminate

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formulation of what those peace aims will be. Are the victors, representing an Anglo-American combination of military and industrial power, prepared to accept political responsibility for the settlement they create? Long before the settlement itself is worked out, there must be some readiness among the English-speaking peoples to accept the political responsibility victory implies, and it must be squarely admitted that it is by no means certain that they will do so.

America's traditional distaste for the quarrels of an aged and effete Europe is as old as the United States, and the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly expresses the extent of commitment which is generally popular in the United States. Hitler has modified the implications of this policy. It is improbable that he has altered the policy itself. A great majority of the American people look on the war purely from the point of view of American defence, and if they were utterly convinced that the Americas could be defended without the assistance of the British Empire, then it is almost certain that no amount of sympathy for democratic causes or for humanity in general would have brought the United States to the brink of intervention. A thousand good reasons could have been found for regarding the struggle as a "phoney war."

Hitler's methods of war have, however, convinced an increasing number of Americans that continental defence is not enough. They must be sure of the oceans as well and, as it happens, the outposts of oceanic defence nearly all lie within the British Empire. The British Isles, Gibraltar, West and South Africa on the Atlantic front, New Zealand, Sydney, Singapore on the Pacific form two magnificent arcs of defensive outposts. And, until hasty ship building has made good the deficiencies of the United States naval defence, the British navy is the only guarantee that the Axis will not secure control in one or other of America's oceans.

So far there is an obvious coincidence of American and British interests. The United States is interested in the preservation of the British Empire as a pre-condition of its own security; but how much does it understand by "preservation"? It is obvious to Londoners as German bombers drone overhead that Britain's frontiers are not the

Channel, possibly not even the Rhine. Can this be explained to the Americans? It has taken the jolt of Hitlerism to convince them that if the British Empire did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it. It is not certain that the jolt has been sufficient to overcome the old prejudice against European entanglements, even though a European settlement is a condition of the effective survival of the British Isles.

It would be easier to feel confidence in a further evolution of American opinion if the British people themselves were more fully aware of the implications of victory. The isolationism which would leave Europe to its own devices is still with us, and is there not a touch of inverted isolationism in the various panacea solutions of world order? Clearly if it were possible to set up a self-functioning League or Confederation or Grand Alliance, it would entail far less mental and physical effort for Britain. But the lesson of the years between the wars is surely that there is no self-functioning solution. A solution depends upon the resolution which is put behind it. The first years, nay, the first decades of peace must be as arduous, even if less uncomfortable, than the years of war. Anything approaching a hunger for "normalcy" on the morrow of victory will frustrate the hopes for which the war was fought. It will be hard enough to persuade the Americans to participate in a European settlement. It will be impossible if the British themselves are unconvinced.

III

There can then be no intelligent discussion of peace aims which does not take as a pre-condition the determination of the British people to play an active and creative role in the post-war period and to persuade the Americans by every means in their power that it is no use including the British Isles in an American defence system unless the United States will also include Europe as a protective *glacis*.

Equally there can be no discussion if it is based on anything short of total victory. At the moment, appeasement is dead—even though Hitler himself were to drop from a Messerschmitt; but the struggle is not over and another winter of bombing and defensive war may be ahead. If the prospects of a successful re-invasion of Europe still seem

infinitely remote and the offer of a compromise peace is repeated, may there not be an impatient reaction in this country unless the full implications of a compromise are steadily considered beforehand? It is clear that Hitler has this possibility of a weakening British desire for total victory constantly in his mind. There is hardly a speech of his into which the likelihood of a peace offer cannot be read, the substance of which would be, naturally, a division of "spoils" on the present basis, the English-speaking peoples keeping the seas, Hitler the continents.

Even if Hitler cannot play the card of stalemate, he may still hope to use the trump of Bolshevism. It can be put to this country that unless the Nazi framework is preserved, then Germany will fall into "Communist anarchy." Such an argument, besides implying a fanciful and unconvincing distinction between the evils of Nazism and Communism, is based on a number of false premises. For example, a revolution cannot be prepared from within unless there exists some underground organization and every observer is convinced that no such organization exists in the Gestapo-controlled Reich. Again, it assumes that a people which has endured a Nazi revolution will be in the mood for a revolution of virtually the same type with slightly different slogans. The people of Germany will be primarily in an apathy of war weariness; even if there were a faint movement of Communist sympathy, the Nazis themselves would be the first to take advantage of it. From within, then, there is little to fear save the inevitable social and economic collapse that follows total war. And from without? The picture of a neutral Russia biding its time to strike at a war-shattered West no doubt haunts a few minds. But an Allied army which is not only fiercely exercised in modern war but is powerful enough to beat the Nazi war-machine has little to fear from the Russian forces. The picture of Britain and Germany at death-grips also assumes what is by no means certain—that there will be no element of psychological collapse in the German defeat.

On whatever grounds—endless war, fear of Bolshevism—Hitler makes the next offer of peace, it must be rejected. Compromise is defeat. It can mean nothing but an uneasy

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truce during the course of which the Nazis would further consolidate their hold on the economic resources and military potential of a then-hopeless Europe and the English-speaking peoples would sink into an apathetic decadence from which it would be impossible to stir them again. If the shot that sank the *Hood* has not rung the passing bell of isolationism, then the English are past teaching.

IV

Let us assume then that the Allied victory is a total victory and that Britain and the United States are prepared to accept a measure, possibly a large measure, of political responsibility for the settlement. Under such conditions—they are, of course, the most favourable conditions that can be assumed—what should be the shape of the future peace? The shape is not difficult to define. It is one in which the necessary degree of planning for economic security and progress is combined with the preservation of Europe's diverse political and social traditions. It is the filling in of this general framework which offers formidable difficulties, of which the greatest is the sovereign national state. So long as the conception of sovereignty is not effectively modified, economic policies and economic boundaries will inevitably follow national frontiers. Are the peoples of Europe prepared for the necessary modification of sovereignty? The nation-state is undoubtedly the basic political form of Western European society, and it is a valuable and fruitful form, for it has given that society diversity and richness. Can it now achieve the highest of all forms, that of diversity in unity?

Among the fundamental attributes of sovereignty have been military power and economic policy; indeed, a national army and a national tariff have seemed in recent decades to be the condition of independent statehood. In the "new order" it is in just these two spheres that the most revolutionary changes have come about. The subordination of the resources of Europe to the German war economy has done away entirely with national economic policies. Whether the nations like it or not, they are now living in a unified economic system, and one of the elements of strength in this new economy is the extent to which the Germans are able to cut

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across political frontiers in their creation of economic regions—to give only two examples, the Belgium—Luxemburg—Lorraine—Ruhr industrial unit and the Polish, German and Czech Silesian unit. The purpose of the "new order," the mobilisation and exploitation of Europe to turn the wheels of Hitler's war chariot is detestable. Many of its means—zoning, currency control, planning boards—may have lessons for the Allies.

Along with economic independence has gone the hope of military independence. One of the most obvious lessons of this war is that small countries, even if they are heavily industrialized, and even large countries if they are under-industrialized, cannot defend themselves. Given modern armaments and the industrial potential they demand, there is no choice now between collective defence and domination. In the Allied armies, each with its separate entity yet operating under British command, we have a shadow of things to come.

Thus there are changes already at work in Europe which—if they are intelligently considered—can modify men's conceptions of the sovereign nation state. Yet once again it is clear that any search for "normalcy," any parrot-like raising of old hates and old territorial grievances will stultify the Allies' approach to the problem. Hence the absolute necessity of bringing the Allied statesmen in this country into full contact with official British thought so that there will be no confusion of claims between the victors. As the nations which have fought with Britain already include a majority of the states if not of the populations of Europe, and as their restoration depends absolutely upon Britain's determination to restore them, it should be possible to lay down in advance conditions of restoration which will hold good almost throughout the Continent.

Such a procedure does not apply to the defeated, and by far the greatest problem is to fit a defeated Germany into any agreed framework. Germany is, in fact, the problem of Europe—a nation at once the most powerful and the most lawless, the richest and the most predatory, the most skilled and the most irresponsible, the largest and the most racially conscious. What hope is there of reconciliation if defeat alone—whether the settlement be just or not—is enough to

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embitter the people with lasting resentment? How can a European control of raw materials be made to function when most of the vital raw materials lie within Germany? How can the political and military rights of a nation state, eighty million strong, be modified to the benefit of its smaller neighbours? Is there any answer to such questions? Or do we admit that either we must exterminate the Germans—which we shall never do—or abandon the problem as insoluble?

V

Now taking the two original assumptions, of total victory and of a full Anglo-American participation in the settlement, there are two phases to the problem of Germany and of Europe. The preliminary phase during which the framework of the settlement will be built may last decades. It is very important that there should be no spectacular marking of the transition from war to peace, such as is given by a Peace Conference. It is both meaningless and pernicious: meaningless because no full settlement can be drafted by a few men in a few months, pernicious because it creates a *status quo* instead of outlining conditions under which the European community can work and evolve, because it plays on the feeling of "normalcy" and encourages a relaxation of effort, finally because it creates a centre of division and resentment in easily exploitable form and may enable the defeated once again to shift the blame for all the evil results of war from the war on to the peace—leaving the idea that war is still profitable. Peace Conferences concluded in a set period belong to the days before total war. Just as formal declarations of war have gone, so should official declarations of peace. Europe was at war long before September 3rd, 1939. Europe may well be at war long after an official armistice. Peace is created by the gradual re-emergence of a community of men and of nations who will live and work together. It does not spring, formed, from the exhausted brains of two, four, six, eight (or however many) statesmen seated in a stuffy Ministry in some feverishly excited conference town.

In this first phase, the chief characteristic of Europe will be intense political and economic dislocation. The continent

will be short of food and vital raw materials, its industrial system will be to a very great extent perverted from its purpose of production for consumption, there will be vast bodies of unemployed. At the same time, wherever the Nazis are withdrawing, there may well be guerrilla warfare and local anarchy. In this period, the Allies will have to undertake two tasks which directly affect the main modifications necessary in the concept of sovereignty. They will have to occupy Europe with a force sufficient to keep order—a far less onerous task than in the days before the tank and the bomber. At the same time, they will have to feed and restock Europe out of the reserves which during the war they will have been accumulating outside Europe.

The key institutions of Europe for some time after the war would thus be a Military Mission and Economic Mission deriving their powers from the political authority of the victors. To these Missions or Commissions would fall the task of associating an ever widening circle of people in Europe with their work and from the start they would, on the analogy of the Allied armies to-day, be entirely representative. The ultimate political sanction would, of course, lie with the English-speaking world.

Must we assume that the operations of these Commissions in Germany would breed lasting resentment? Quite the contrary. While we do well to discount a moral collapse in Germany as a factor in victory, there can be no doubt that once victory is achieved, there will be a psychological reaction in the Reich unparalleled in history. These are people who have lived on hysteria for eight years and are ending this period in battle, murder and sudden death. These are people from whom every institution, organization, association or even club has been taken and are therefore without political growing points. Moreover these are people who are temperamentally given to an extraordinary duality, like a counter that falls to the ground, one side red, one black. When black is uppermost, there is no hint or trace of the red and *vice versa*. So under the Nazis there is no hint of the attitude of opposition to discipline, centralization and *Gleichschaltung*, which is also German. Defeat will reverse the counter, provided the Allies make no fatuous attempt to bolster up

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the Nazi regime and the process of disintegration is allowed to run its course.

Moreover the protection a military commission can give to the Germans against enraged Poles and Czechs will not be slight and its work will clearly be very closely bound up with the distribution of food and the creation of work. The experience of the Rhineland proves conclusively that the army of occupation in Germany should be British only and is a happy augury of how quietly and decently the work can be done.

VI

A state which really merits the name of peace will have been restored only when the Commissions have either become permanent bodies or have transferred their functions to other organizations. The Economic Commission might develop with widened representation into a European planning board, while subsidiary commissions controlled key industries and public utilities. If such vital services as Europe's electricity supply were under international control—for example, a European grid system—a large amount of decentralization on a regional basis would be possible without any danger to the political order. Similarly, the Military Commission could be transformed into the General Staff of a European defence force, policing key strategic points and composed of different national army corps on the analogy of the county regiments.

These are possibilities; but their securing will still depend upon the political initiative of Britain and the United States. This international structure will be maintained only if there is effective power behind it and in the economic sphere British and American capital and in the military sphere British and American armaments (there should, obviously, be complete standardization of military equipment) would underpin the claims of the non-German peoples to a controlling voice in the political and economic decisions of a continent in which they are a majority. The question of how this new political relationship should be expressed is not vitally important. The affairs of Europe like those of Britain and America must get "mixed up together." This is not a question of constitution building but of common interests, common action

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and the growth of common sentiment. The Statute of Westminster is almost certainly a happier model than the American Constitution with its elaborate checks and balances, its distortion of the role of the minority, and its premium on friction and inaction.

There still remains the long term problem of Germany. Much will depend upon the stability achieved during the intermediate period of occupation (an occupation whose "shame" will be mitigated by being shared with the rest of Europe). We have no reason to believe that if a German is given an alternative to despair and servitude that he will not take it. The Nazi Party was at its weakest between 1924 and 1929 when the Weimar Republic enjoyed a measure of prosperity. After the coming of the world depression, the frustration of the young intelligentsia coupled with mass unemployment were decisive factors in the revolutionary situation. Whatever may be said of Germany, Germans have rights and it should be the aim of the Economic Commission to ensure that German prosperity returned at the same pace as that of Europe. The interest to Germany of securing an expanding European market and in particular of working for the industrial development of South-Eastern Europe could surely be made obvious enough to secure the co-operation of German producers and attractive enough to replace the dynamism of the *Lebensraum*.

Politically, however, the difficulty still remains of a potentially divided Europe with Germany, for all her prosperity, choosing to regard British and American co-operation as an invasion of her vital spheres of interest. It would be folly after five wars to disregard the possibility. If Germany does not "go straight," what then? Obviously, a more highly organized Europe would offer greater deterrents to violent action. Provided the Anglo-American basis of co-operation had remained sound, international control of the basic raw materials and public utilities of Europe would not make war easy. At the same time, a more co-ordinated defence system would avoid follies such as the attempt at co-operation *without staff talks* between Norway, Holland and Belgium and the Allied armies made in the spring of 1940.

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If, however, in a system in which Germany occupies all the land peopled by Germans willing to live in Germany, and in which the fullest economic development is assured to the German people, the Germans still denounce their neighbours because of "encirclement," meaning by it that Germany cannot annex other men's land and exploit the resources of Europe for its own benefit instead of for that of all, then police action alone is possible. The only dispute is whether Britain has the strength and determination to extend her political guarantee (on which the defence system must turn) to the lands east of Germany.

If any conclusion more than another emerges from these notes, it is the primacy of the political or power problem. There will be no unity and order in Europe without an effective centre of power and unless the order is to be the "new order," then that centre can only be Britain and the United States, with their prestige, their influence, their material resources, their industrial systems, their war factories, their oceanic communications with the whole world. But are they prepared to play such a part? The Germans at least desire to conquer the world. Have the British any particular desire to spend themselves in giving it peace? One day the war will change from a grim struggle for existence to the greatest challenge and the greatest adventure that has ever fallen to a people's lot, yet for the time being leaders and people alike seem readier with their fortitude for the death-struggle than with their courage for the new day.

Behind all the complexities of economics and defence, there lies a perfectly simple issue, an issue of the will. If the English-speaking peoples at the end of the struggle are prepared to take no broader view of their own security than that of a more or less explicit isolationism, then the war will have been fought in vain. If, on the contrary, they match the Nazis' will to world power with a will no less vital for world order, then the peoples of the world, and Europe among them, may yet know "a new birth of freedom." The issue of the war is no less than this.

THE MINISTRIES OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

By P. LAMARTINE YATES

BY genealogical descent the Ministry of Food is the child of the Food Defence Plans Department of the Board of Trade, a Department set up at the end of 1936 to prepare for the eventuality of war, to develop a food storage policy, to prepare a shadow distribution scheme and to outline plans for rationing. Had the parent carried out these tasks with courageous determination Britain might have entered the war with a well-stocked larder and well-organised food control. Looking back, it is clear that a large accumulation of food stocks before the war would have enormously strengthened our security and would have freed shipping for other urgent duties. But the chance was missed. It is true that the Food Defence Plans Department, supported by professional economists and other contributors to the correspondence columns of the *Times*, played some part in persuading the Government to buy certain quantities of wheat, sugar, whale oil and corned beef, but it seemed unable to prevent this being partly offset by private traders running down their own stocks. Undoubtedly the Treasury put a brake on food purchase proposals, but precisely here the Food Defence Plans Department showed its weakness. It had no Minister, no one of sufficient status and influence to fight the Treasury and to insist that large food stores were essential to national defence.

In the field of distribution the Department had a better record. It worked out, in conjunction with the trades, a shadow scheme based on decentralisation, so that if, for instance, London were blitzed, the supplies of other areas should not be jeopardised. No one can blame the Department for not foreseeing that blitz would be delayed for a year, and that when it came the west coast ports would be bombed even more severely than the east. Considered in retrospect, it might have been wise policy to augment port-handling

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facilities by, for example, installing more large cranes at certain Welsh ports ; but in those days when so much port equipment stood idle it would have been difficult to press such demands. Even the ill-conceived plan for removing Billingsgate to Oxford would have been less harshly judged if the war had opened with devastating raids on London.

In its preparations for rationing the Department knew from 1916 experience that any effective scheme must be based on some form of National Register, yet it apparently never urged, it certainly never persuaded, the Government to compile a Register before war broke out. Except in this instance most of the shortcomings of Food Defence Plans Department can be ascribed to lack of status and lack of executive power. Nobody championed its cause, no one fought for its requirements ; consequently it made only half-hearted preparations for an only half-believed-in eventuality.

All these impotencies disappeared overnight, of course, when the Department was transformed into the Ministry of Food. But before taking that story up to the present day it is necessary to discuss the wartime activities of the Ministry of Agriculture on which our food supply so increasingly depends.

The Ministry of Agriculture's war objective is to secure a maximum output of food and feeding stuffs from the soil of this country, a task which can be accomplished in three principal ways : by ploughing up grass, by increased use and more scientific application of fertilisers and by land improvement schemes of various kinds, including drainage, reclamation, and so forth. The foundations of this policy had in part been laid before the war. A ploughing-up subsidy had been available though it did not significantly affect the extent of the arable area. Under the Land Fertility Scheme subsidies could be obtained for lime and basic slag, the two fertilisers most needed for improving second-class pasture and for grassland newly ploughed. Land drainage, too, was being encouraged under a revised schedule of grants. But no body of experts had ever been commissioned to sit down and decide in what manner these three methods ought to be combined ; there was no co-ordinated policy ready in September, 1939.

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Since the autumn cultivations were just about to commence, the Ministry quickly launched its two million acres ploughing-up programme and hoped for the best, though actually the mere turning of grass into arable probably contributes less to increasing output than either of the other two methods.¹ One might have hoped that the Ministry would ask the Agricultural Research Council or some other competent body to outline a programme for the 1940-41 campaign, it might have consulted its own Economics Division ; but nothing was done, so the merits of the various alternatives still remain largely unelucidated. Some still quote Sir Thomas Middleton's twenty-year-old figures suggesting that arable land produces four times as much "starch equivalent" per acre as meadow grass ; others have asserted that in 1940, in spite of the ploughing of two million additional acres, food production increased by less than 1 per cent.

Whatever the truth about ploughing up, there can be little excuse for the delay in fertiliser and drainage policy. Obviously, for a limited supply of fertilisers to have its maximum effect it must be consciously allocated to the counties and the crops which will yield the biggest responses, yet only now is a plan being evolved along these lines—for the crops of the 1942 harvest ! Similarly with drainage. During 1940 comparatively few schemes were begun, and though at the beginning of 1941 a system of loans was introduced to cover the balance of the cost of grant-aided schemes, most of these still have to be initiated through a medley of overlapping authorities. Again, the results will not begin to show until the 1942 harvest or later ; again the first eighteen months of war were lost.

For these various activities of its Production Campaign the Ministry of Agriculture, unlike other Government Departments, has made few important additions to its headquarters staff. Instead, it has endeavoured to delegate as much administrative work as possible to the County War Agricultural Executive Committees which were created at the very beginning of the war out of the old County Agricultural Committees and which took over the whole of the

¹ This would, of course, cease to be true if livestock were drastically slaughtered and grass were no longer wanted as fodder.

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staffs of the Agricultural Education Departments of the County Councils. These bodies have the advantage of consisting for the most part of working farmers, intimately acquainted with local conditions, who act in collaboration with the organisers and advisors from the County Councils and the Agricultural Colleges. Thus not only is "Whitehall farming" largely avoided but the scientific advisor has been invited in by farmers to an extent never thought possible in peace-time. It is generally agreed that these Committees, apart from a few exceptions, have pursued their tasks with enthusiasm and efficiency. They have enlisted, together with the district committees working under them, the voluntary services of close on 6,000 men and women in England and Wales alone, and they are effecting a notable improvement in farming practice. The farm-to-farm surveys undertaken last summer, the enforcement of good cultivation standards, the making available of agricultural machinery collectively owned by the Committee, these things are rapidly changing the face of Britain's countryside. It can be argued that many Committees have erred on the side of leniency, being unwilling to displace bad farmers and undertake direct farming on their own account, but others have ordered quite a number of evictions—practice varies greatly from one county to another. (Against the Committees' decision to evict there seems, rather disgracefully, to be no appeal.) It can be argued even more forcefully that Committees have one and all been hampered by the lack of certainty and clarity in the general lines of agricultural policy laid down for them from above. But of this, more presently.

An important supplement to commercial food production has been the Dig For Victory allotments campaign; indeed, except for a mention in the instructions to War Committees and the guaranteed prices for onions and carrots, this is the only way in which any specific encouragement is given to vegetable growing. The aim has been to add 750,000 wartime allotments to the 900,000 existing in 1938. Provision in the first war-year proceeded somewhat slowly so that extra inducements had to be devised: greater security of tenure, value of occasional sales of produce not to be deducted from Unemployment Assistance Board allowances, £2 per acre

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subsidy to local authorities using other (dearer) land for allotments, arrangements with the Royal Horticultural Society to provide lectures and demonstrations. Meanwhile, however, the Customs and Excise have been less encouraging. Not only were two men in Scotland fined for growing tobacco on their allotments, but the Excise authorities have stated that anyone growing sugar beet without a license, and proceeding to extract the sugar, is liable to penalties. Yet surely to grow anything which saves shipping ought in these times to be a meritorious act.

Space does not permit any full account of the Ministry's labour and credit policies. Suffice to say that a Women's Land Army 10,000 strong has been created, registers of available casual workers have been compiled, and although last summer there was no great demand for additional labour, this year the position may be more acute (even though the number of tractors has been increased from 50,000 in 1938 to 90,000 in 1941). Last year the minimum wage was raised to 48s. per week to stem the drift from the land, this year a wage of 60s. is under discussion and the call-up of de-reserved workers has been postponed until after the harvest. To provide credit the Ministry has established an Agricultural Requisites Assistance Scheme mainly designed to help farmers who find difficulty in borrowing from the banks or other sources. But the scheme has not been widely utilised, partly because the banks, who now have liaison officers on the County War Committees, are lending more freely and partly perhaps because of a lack of publicity.

We must now consider how the broad lines of food policy are formulated: who decides what the nation shall eat? In the early months of the war no single body considered and was responsible for the fundamental issues of policy. The Ministry of Food admittedly had a distinguished scientific adviser, but for months he was left to study the prevention of gas contamination in foodstuffs. Not till the early part of 1940 was he first consulted on the nutritional aspects of the food supply. Not till the summer of 1940 was a Scientific Food Committee set up to advise the Cabinet Food Policy Committee, and only then did the latter come to assume effectively the rôle it now has of final arbiter in matters of

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food policy as a whole. It is the Food Policy Committee which decides the order of priority of foodstuffs from a nutritional standpoint and determines, after hearing what can be imported, what ought to be produced at home, leaving the Ministry of Food in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture to formulate appropriate price and rationing policies for securing the desired results.

At the end of last summer the Food Policy Committee laid down a programme for British farming in 1940-41 which included the maintenance of the milk supply at least at pre-war levels and a great increase in potatoes, carrots and green vegetables. But it was already rather late. On the one hand, the chance of stocking up with specially nourishing foods, such as cheese, had been lost, so that when in 1941 sinkings became exceptionally heavy, milk actually had to be withdrawn for cheese-making and liquid consumption curtailed. On the other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture had already arranged with the National Farmers' Union a scale of prices incompatible with this nutritional policy. Such favourable prices had been fixed for beef-cattle, barley and pigs that it has proved difficult to fix attractive enough prices for milk and potatoes. We have had the unedifying and costly spectacle of the Ministries of Food and Agriculture competing with each other, a subsidy to one commodity necessitating a further and larger subsidy to another. Clearly what is wanted is a Department with the strength and courage to decide the issue between the nutrition experts and the "beef-and-beer" men, and to fix frankly unremunerative prices for those products which in wartime have to be discouraged.

As regards livestock the Ministry of Food no doubt hoped to make up for an ill-conceived price schedule by introducing the feeding-stuffs rationing scheme, and this has certainly expedited the reduction in pig and poultry numbers. But the scheme has two grave defects. Firstly, it is impossible to ensure that the fodder rations go to the classes of livestock for which they are intended, since the great majority of British farms are mixed enterprises with dairy cows, bullocks, pigs, poultry and often sheep as well. The farmer will give the feed to whichever class of animal looks like paying best. Secondly, feeding-stuffs rationing will not by itself ensure a

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rational slaughter policy. Farmers dislike parting with their beasts. If supplies of fodder are halved, they prefer to keep all their animals on half rations rather than slaughter half or nearly half and keep the remainder on full or nearly full rations, though the latter method produces far more milk and meat per unit of fodder. These are reasons why price policy remains so vitally important. Unless a government inspector is detailed to every farm, it is only by suitable pricing that farmers can be induced to prefer cows to bullocks and only by announcing a steadily *descending* scale of prices that they can be prevented from holding on to their animals too long. At present the rewards and penalties are not nearly differentiated enough, and food production has not been decisively diverted into the required channels.

On the more strictly nutritional side there has likewise been a lack of clearly defined policy. For months the question of whole wheat bread was discussed, yet its production is still optional. If the standard flour extraction ratio were fixed at 85 instead of the present 72, we could save many hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping space per annum. (It can be argued that white flour stores better than wholemeal, but it is no argument to say, as is repeated so often, that the wheat offals are needed as pig feed; Britain cannot afford to import any pig feed under present circumstances, even in the form of outer husks of wheat grains.) Again, why if vitamin-rich foods such as milk and vegetables are going to be scarce, has no one ordered the large-scale production of synthetic vitamins for general distribution? There is in the Ministry of Food one section which has tried to talk in the language of nutrition, namely the Food Education Department. At first it always had the ill luck to recommend foods which were just becoming extremely scarce—herrings, vegetables, cheese and milk; but now its attractive leaflets, recipes and posters are better co-ordinated with available food supplies.

We may now turn from policy in general to the particular functions of the Ministry of Food which are to ensure an adequate supply and equitable distribution of essential foodstuffs at a reasonable price. The main work of the Ministry is done in its Supply Department comprising several commodity Divisions as well as Divisions for Price Policy,

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Economics, Transport, Freights and Storage. There is a Division dealing with retail trade and rationing, while another supervises the Divisional and Local Food Control Organisations. Already the Ministry's staff almost equals in numbers that of the Ministry of Food in the last war though, as then, the great bulk of the employees are in the regional and local organisations. As in the last war public criticism has fastened on the Commodity Controllers, leading men from the world of big business, who have been put in control of the commodities their firms handled in peace time. Despite an assertion of the Select Committee on National Expenditure to the contrary, it would seem that this practice was followed in more instances in 1940 than in 1918:¹ in fact, recent administrative changes (May, 1941) have immensely strengthened the Controllers' power. Appointments of this kind are probably inevitable. These men bring with them from their trades an intimate knowledge which civil servants could not possibly acquire, they enable the Ministry to buy wisely and skilfully, they inject, moreover, a modicum of business tempo and efficiency from which Government Departments can greatly profit. On the other hand, occasions arise where such men are at one and the same time Ministry officials and trade representatives negotiating with the Ministry the profit margins to be allowed in that trade; again, in questions concerning the concentration of industries or the popularisation of new gadgets, like home canning machines, such men may find it difficult to advise impartially. The only real public safeguard against abuses is that these men should increasingly feel a loyalty to the public interest which transcends their loyalty to their firms, and that has undoubtedly been happening. Anyone who wishes to see monopoly capitalism transformed into socialism must welcome this as a desirable and essential step in the process.

The Ministry deals with foodstuffs either by purchase or control. The most essential commodities it purchases itself. Thus it is the sole importer of many, and the principal importer of most, of the foods still obtained from abroad. It also buys all home-produced meat, sugar, and creamery butter. Other

¹ Fourth Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure p. 28 and Appendix III.

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commodities are not bought but merely controlled by price-fixing and/or licensing of traders. A few articles, mainly luxury goods, still remain uncontrolled.

As regards imports the Ministry has an Overseas Purchase Board which meets several times a week, and, on the basis of the tonnage which the Ministry of Shipping can allocate, considers the requirements put up by the various Commodity Divisions and decides, subject to Treasury sanction, what shall be bought. During the first year of war the policy was to buy as much as possible in all parts of the world, though some of the purchases, e.g. Australian wheat, ultimately could not be lifted. Political considerations often had to play some part in these purchases: West African cocoa crops were bought, mainly to succour the native producers, certain joint Anglo-French contracts were taken over and honoured last summer after the French collapse, other commodities were pre-empted at the request of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. But in the second war-year these considerations have played a smaller part. A far more modest import programme was planned, and even that has been only partially fulfilled. It is easy to make superficial and uninformed criticisms of the Ministry's import policy. If port wine or other luxury goods are still imported from the Peninsula it is because ships bound for the Mediterranean would otherwise have to return in ballast. A more cogent criticism is to ask why during the precious early months of the war, before shipping became so scarce, the Ministry did not concentrate on building up large stocks of essentials, such as cheese, so making up for the omissions of Food Defence Plans Department; instead it gaily imported luxury fruits from America and new potatoes from Teneriffe.

In the field of distribution it is the aim of the Ministry "to interfere as little as possible with the normal channels of trade. This involves a large amount of consultation with trade interests, both with regard to the method to be adopted and, more particularly, the margins to be allowed at each stage, importer, wholesaler, retailer, etc."¹ The imports and home-produced foodstuffs which it buys the Ministry hands over to wholesale traders (licensed) who pass it on in the usual

¹ Fourth Report of Select Committee on National Expenditure, p. 19.

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way to retailers, these being for most goods registered with and tied to individual wholesale merchants. The Ministry has encouraged the association of all the wholesalers of a particular article into a group or combine under Ministry control or with Ministry representation. Much of the valuable time of the Ministry's higher officials, especially in the early months, was taken up in "long and protracted negotiations" or in plainer English in higgling and haggling to fix distributors' margins. In cases where the functions of traders were unavoidably curtailed, e.g. the grain trade, the Ministry established the principle of "fair reward for services rendered" instead of allowing pre-war margins to persist, but in the case of retailers there has been a tendency to allow higher margins as compensation for reduced turnover. Distributors have been encouraged to adopt cheaper forms of "pack": baked beans, canned soups, fish and meat pastes, galantine rolls, packed cheese and Worcester sauce, were, strangely enough, the first commodities to be dealt with. As for the concentration of firms now being undertaken by the Board of Trade the Ministry of Food is responsible for dealing with the food trades, but so far has taken action only in respect of certain wholesale branches. Retail concentration is more difficult. Not only has dispersal to be considered, but the competing claims of chain stores, co-ops, and small shopkeepers present a thorny problem for any would-be rationaliser; that is no doubt one reason why Lord Woolton shelved the Perry Report which planned reducing milk distribution costs to 8d. per gallon by permitting only the Co-op and one private distributor to operate in each area.

The only commodity which the Ministry itself handles through all stages of distribution down to the retailer, is meat, and courage was certainly shown in cutting down the number of slaughterhouses from 17,000 to just over 800, an action which, despite a few local mistakes, has immensely improved meat marketing. Nevertheless, the wholesale distribution of meat costs the Ministry some £28 million a year and retailing costs another £60 million,¹ which suggests that important economies remain to be effected.

The allocation of unrationed foodstuffs between different

¹ These figures relate to Spring, 1940; they are probably higher now.

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parts of the country has caused and still causes much public dissatisfaction. At first the Ministry merely informed wholesalers of changes in the location of population, and left it to them to adjust supplies. But when supplies are short, a wholesaler who has customers in, say, London and Oxford will be loath to cut his London retailer more than his Oxford client, especially if the London one was previously, and after the war is likely again, to be the larger customer of the two. More recently the Ministry has attempted to form Boards of manufacturers and wholesalers and has tried to persuade them to ensure more appropriate allocations. But much room remains for improvement. Here is another instance of Lord Woolton's distaste of intervention resulting in the public being badly served.

This leads us on to consider the Ministry's performance in the sphere of consumer rationing. It is best to begin with the bright side. Without doubt a generous tribute is due to the Ministry for the efficacy of the rationing schemes actually in force. Where goods have been rationed on cards they have, generally speaking, been well rationed. The rations have almost always been available to purchasers, except sometimes in the case of meat and when severe dislocation has temporarily been caused by bombing. This is in itself a notable achievement, seeing how little Lord Woolton has interfered with the normal channels of distribution. True, there has been grumbling by retailers at the extra clerical work, even since the simplification of procedure at the beginning of this year, but far less grumbling than among German retailers, though the German rationing system is frequently held up to us as a model of smooth efficiency.

What is questioned in this country is not so much the technique of rationing as the policy determining it. Rationing has from the beginning been regarded as a *pis aller*; indeed, for some months in propaganda to Germany we stupidly boasted of "not needing to ration." This attitude was fostered by certain groups of traders and advertisers who used the national press to carry on a violent anti-rationing campaign. According to a statement by Mr. A. V. Alexander, which was never officially denied, the Cabinet yielded to pressure and vetoed rationing, though the Ministry of Food

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was prepared to introduce a scheme within a month of the outbreak of war. Later the Cabinet policy became the policy of the Ministry; but events proved too stern, and the Ministry was forced to yield, though only inch by inch and clumsily. It was surely clumsy to announce each new rationing order just sufficient days before it came into operation so that the rich and leisured could queue at the shops and lay in a hoard of supplies. At times, too, the Ministry had to eat its own words: cheese was a "quite unsuitable article" for rationing, but four weeks later it was on the card. Moreover, the present rations are lower than they need have been if rationing had been started earlier. An instance of this is the animal feeding-stuffs scheme, only introduced last February after fodder stocks had been seriously depleted to maintain bullocks, pigs and poultry which the nation could ill afford; in consequence, the remaining supplies of concentrates were not even adequate to maintain milk production.

From the ordinary working people of this country come constant demands for an extension of rationing to far more of the commodities in short supply, and, at the moment of writing, the Minister has foreshadowed a substantial extension both by individual commodities and by the system of grouping, which latter is no doubt administratively less cumbersome than the points system. Still, however, the problem of the needs of heavy workers, so fastidiously cared for in Germany, has not been squarely faced by Lord Woolton, and while this may be partly ascribed to Trade Union opposition, it is probably due even more to the Minister's fear that better rations for heavy workers would involve cutting the "normal consumer's" ration of meat and fats below the present level. Still in hotels, restaurants, canteens and feeding centres rationed foods can be eaten "off the card"; the economies of communal feeding are great, but the psychological effect of discriminating between those who have to eat at home and those who eat out is bad. Still the Ministry has not dealt boldly with commodities which may be only occasionally available; for example, of certain oranges arriving last April a large proportion was disposed of privately by the merchants and never reached the shops at all. A second shipload, it is true, was in part allocated to hospitals, but what an

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opportunity was lost of distributing the remainder to children and mothers through the machinery of the milk-in-schools scheme and the National Milk Scheme.

But if rationing has been half-hearted, so also has price policy. Here again let us begin with the credit items. Apart from a lapse at the beginning of the war when Mr. Morrison helped to raise the cost of living by buying up food stocks and re-selling them at a profit, the Ministry's central objective has been to keep down the prices of essential foodstuffs. That is why bread, bacon, milk, meat and cheese are being subsidised to the extent of more than 100 million pounds per annum, of which perhaps the least laudable is the bacon subsidy—a present to those who can afford their ration, i.e. the middle and upper classes. Stabilising the cost of living is an objective so important as to be worth considerable financial sacrifice, but the Ministry makes the task unnecessarily expensive by continuing to offer farmers attractive prices for unwanted foodstuffs and thereby being forced to offer still higher prices for the milk and potatoes which it wants.

Another activity has been simplifying the price structure in distribution by reducing the number of brands and qualities. Although entirely praiseworthy from the point of view of cutting down unnecessary processes and packings, this has meant, as George Darling emphasises in his stimulating little book *The Politics of Food*,¹ the elimination of the cheapest brands which the poor relied on so largely: instances are butter, tea, bacon and margarine.

A much less successful experiment has been the fixing of maximum prices, hoping thereby to discipline the trade in any scarce commodity which the Minister is unwilling to ration. Price control never proves successful unless supplies are controlled too. For example, early in 1940 the prices of oats for milling and feeding were fixed, but not of seed oats. Immediately all oats in merchants' hands became "seed oats" and prices soared to fantastic heights. Alternatively, fixed price goods simply disappear from the shops, as onions did. More recently the prices of new potatoes were fixed and they likewise disappeared. The same will probably happen in the

¹ George Darling: *The Politics of Food*. (Routledge. 5s. net).

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case of soft fruits. Eggs, on the other hand, though scarce in the shops can be had from farms. Every day cars and bicycles bring crowds of people to queue up outside the poultry farms round London, so that the supplies are bought up without ever passing through the normal channels of distribution. Here what is needed is control of supplies by means of a little compulsion on the poultry-keeper. It could easily be ordered that every person keeping more than, say, 20 birds must deliver up 60 (or 100) eggs per laying hen per annum or else get no feeding-stuffs coupons. This would be a task for the executive officers of the War Agricultural Committees to supervise, just as the supervision of price control is in charge of local Price Investigation Committees.

A few words should be said here about the local organisation under the Ministry of Food. It has created Divisional Food Offices in areas corresponding in the main with those of the Regional Commissioners. Below these are Food Control Committees set up by local authorities and the Price Investigation Committees, unfortunately not created till September, 1940, which have power to inspect shopkeepers' books and report on infringements of regulations. In practice the Food Control Committees have little power. They are composed largely of councillors elected three or four years ago, and in any case most of the work of dealing with retailers' troubles is undertaken by the Committee's Food Executive Officer who is an official of the Ministry of Food. Much more live bodies are the Local Advisory Committees set up in connection with Food Preservation, Food Education and Communal Feeding, for on these are representatives of all the active organisations of the locality. In general the utmost possible decentralisation of food stocks and food administration has been the Ministry's aim, a continuation of the policy originally outlined by the Food Defence Plan's Department. This policy has been fully justified by the experience of severe air raids, for inadequate as the emergency feeding arrangements may often have been, they would be far worse but for the dispersal of local supplies and local initiative.

The question finally arises: would it be in the national interest to effect a merger of the Ministries of Food and

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Agriculture? Certain advantages are immediately obvious. In the first place a combined Ministry could have a unified policy and a unified administration. Policy could be securely based on the nutritional needs of the people, imports and home production being more consciously planned to serve that end. Administrative tasks need not be so duplicated as at present when every scheme put up by the Ministry of Food in relation to home production has to go to the Ministry of Agriculture to have each comma and decimal point checked and criticised before it can be launched. Secondly, a combined Ministry would be in a much stronger position *vis à vis* interested parties. At present one Ministry more or less openly represents the farmers, and the other has a soft spot for the traders, so that the representation of the public interest as a whole may sometimes go by default. Thirdly, a combined Ministry would be a far more appropriate permanent Department for looking after the nation's food supply when the war is over. Against amalgamation it may be argued that such a Ministry would be too large and unwieldy, giving rise to difficult administrative problems merely on account of its size. Moreover, in practice, the Production Department—the present Ministry of Agriculture—would continue doing its own separate specialised work within the new Ministry. Perhaps the final issue rests on the problem of leadership. If a man could be found strong enough to drive the two teams on a tight rein, the nation's food policy might be wisely conceived and adequately executed. But where is the man?

COLOURED BOOKS

I—PRE-MUNICH

By L. B. NAMIER

WHY do people talk and argue, clothe hollow nouns with threadbare adjectives, and repeat for a hundredth time the same story, raucous like a damaged plate on a barrel-organ? Why do they go to the trouble of trying to appear relevant when, to explain themselves, they might just as well employ something like a Thibetan praying mill? Two years ago, I sat through meetings of an official conference and listened to a Minister who talked by the hour because he was uneasy in his conscience; and he went on talking till resentment against those who made him feel uneasy got the better of his *malaise*. While he was holding forth, I often wondered why he did not read out to us "Alice in Wonderland" or Bradshaw; either would have made a nice long speech, would have been restful, and for relevancy would have equalled some of his own performances. In the beginning is the need or emotion: to these are gathered words; if burred like the sounds of an animal or of an infant, or jumbled like objects in an ultra-modern painting, they might transfix a receptive understanding. But in speeches and argument men feel constrained to adopt the modes or appearances of articulate thought.

Why do people listen or profess to listen, believe or wish to believe? The effect of words is but loosely correlated to their visible contents. When they strike home, there is faith: the response of human nature, not of human understanding. Moreover, the weight of argument greatly depends on him who uses it: that of the strong has "force" and carries "conviction"; of the weak, if unanswerable, is called a quibble and is apt to cause irritation. Why do people waste so much time and energy on elaborate, and often tedious, presentations of their case? Because somewhere even the worst retain the desire of seeming to do right; and somehow even the world-wise retain the belief that a

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proper presentation of their righteous cause will help them to victory. In the eighteenth century, before going to war, a monarch possessed of a sense of decency would produce a title, however spurious, to the territory he claimed; and now belligerents publish collections of documents about the origin of the war they wage.

There is our Blue Book, the French Yellow Book, the German White Book, the Polish Book in white and red (the Czechs have published none: they are weak, they were wronged, and a statement of their case would have produced irritation. But, however great the sale has been of the various coloured books, not many people have read them, not even the pages of Sir Neville Henderson's "Final Report" (or his "Failure of a Mission" would hardly have been a publishing success). For who wants to read documents? And what are they to prove? Is evidence needed to show that Hitler is a gangster who breaks his word whenever it suits him? that the British Government winked and blinked, and hoped against hope for appeasement? that French foreign policy, though clear-sighted, was singularly timid and ineffective? that Polish calculations were too clever by half? The main facts and the big outlines of recent history are known and hardly require re-stating, and none of these collections of documents, barring the French (which is rendered brilliant by M. Coulondre's despatches), makes good or easy reading. You must dig into them before you obtain enlightenment or amusement; first each must be read separately, then with its "partner," and finally all of them together. This is a laborious proceeding; but by the time you have them all round you talking past each other—a Bedlam—you begin to understand what they say, and, which is even more important, what each prefers to leave unsaid and unexplained.

On the Allied side errors are masked which played into the hands of Hitler; what is masked on the German side is criminal war-guilt. To defeat Germany's crimes, we have to recognise our past errors.

THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK

The Germans published a preliminary collection of documents in September, 1939, and followed it up in

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December by a volume¹ of 488 large pages, equivalent to about 650 in our own Blue Books. Herr von Ribbentrop contributes a preface of two pages; whoever knows German should make a point of reading him. Empty of thought, trite in expression, he booms, flatters Hitler, inveighs against England, and thinks that to assert is to convince: the insolence of parrots in power.

The German people led by Adolf Hitler turns its eyes to the future, not to the past [writes Ribbentrop]. But the struggle which has been forced on us, and which we have to fight through to the end for the sake of Germany's future, demands that we should remain ever conscious of how it arose and where its origins are to be sought for. Still, this has long been obvious to anyone who wants to see, and has often enough been exposed in public by German authoritative quarters, foremost in the speeches of our Führer. But as the mendacious propaganda of our enemies strenuously exerts itself to hide the truth and to mislead world-opinion concerning the origin of the war and their own aims, it is important by means of authentic official documents to produce once more unanswerable evidence that England, exclusively and alone, bears the guilt for the war and willed it in order to annihilate Germany.

The documents "show the magnanimous and infinitely patient statesmanlike endeavours of the Führer to place German-Polish relations on a permanent basis which would do justice to the interests of both sides," and the "short-sighted obtuseness" of the Poles who were "lured on by a British Government intent on unchaining its long-planned war against Germany." Oh, English hosts and friends of Ribbentrop, who listened to his discourses, mark how well he has observed you! He wishes it were possible to start with 1919, so as thoroughly to expose British policy and show how it countered every German attempt at effecting a revision of the Versailles Treaty by negotiation. Has Herr von Ribbentrop read the documents in his own White Book? The very first is taken from Mr. Lloyd George's Memorandum of March 25th, 1919, urging that the peace terms, though

¹ Auswärtiges Amt. 1939, Nr. 2, "Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges."

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stern or even ruthless, should be "so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain." No. 11 is from a debate in the House of Lords, on June 15th, 1932, in which several speakers laid stress upon the rights of the German minority in Poland; and Lord Hailsham, on behalf of the Government, expressed gratitude for any suggestions which would help to bring about a more satisfactory fulfilment of the obligations under the Minority Treaties; No. 255 is an extract from Mr Chamberlain's speech of November 1st, 1938, defending the "Treaty revision" which he had helped to effect at Munich, etc. But the White Book is meant primarily to satisfy the Germans—and is there anything which a Minister, in any country, cannot put across a willing audience? especially if he does not mind being exposed as a liar to a different public about which he need not care.

On Ribbentrop's preface follows a "Survey" of 27 pages, presumably by an official—a more competent piece of misrepresentation. It instructs the reader what to find in the documents. These are grouped into four chapters: the first, on German-Polish relations during the years 1919-1939; the second: "England works for War"; hence the fourth: "Poland the Tool of England's Will to War"; while the third chapter, "Germany's Endeavours to secure Friendly Relations with her Neighbours" is an interlude intended to please, now fit to amuse: it includes e.g. the promise made to Belgium on October 13th, 1937, to respect her neutrality, and the Non-Aggression Pact with Denmark, of May 31st, 1939.

This is the history of German-Polish relations since 1919 as propounded in the German documents. The cession of German provinces in the East was the worst injustice of the Versailles "Diktat," and created an untenable position. The Poles were out to uproot and destroy the German "Volksgruppe," and neither the German-Polish Agreement of January 26th, 1934, nor the Declaration on Minorities of November 5th, 1937, had any effect on their behaviour (the White Book expatiates on the alleged sufferings of the German minority in Poland which, in respect of space, form its main theme). The Führer could not remain indifferent,

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and therefore, between October, 1938, and April, 1939, urged the Poles to accept a new and permanent basis for German-Polish relations: if Danzig (which was anyhow under a Nazi Administration) was reincorporated in the Reich, and an extra-territorial road and railway was conceded across the "Corridor," he would renounce all further claims on Poland. The untenable position, the intolerable sufferings, the incorrigible Polish ways were to continue with his full and irrevocable consent in exchange for concessions which would not have improved the lot of a single member of the German "*Volksgruppe*" in Poland. A finer "non-sequitur" has seldom been put forward in international politics.

With a good many people talk is a quasi-physiological secretion; and the discharges of the German mind are pathological.

THE POLISH WHITE BOOK

This title appears on the bi-coloured cover of the "Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939." Its German part comprises 145 pages of the same length as those of our Blue Books.

The argument in the "Introduction" (6½ pages) is this: The Weimar Republic aimed at isolating Poland; Rapallo and Locarno were steps in that direction. Hitler, to begin with, tried "to continue this policy . . . as the first stage in German expansion": he signed the Four-Power Pact and renewed the German-Soviet Agreement of 1926. But, like other Governments, Poland wished for appeasement.

(Now the tune changes). National-Socialism denoted the rise of "new ideas and new men"; although its conceptions were "no artificial growth," but an epitome of "German thought and politics," they were "so utterly foreign to the rest of Europe" that there appeared a possibility of a new foreign policy and of a German-Polish rapprochement; especially as the leading Nazis—Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and Hess—were not Prussians (and therefore less concerned with the late Prussian-Polish provinces). Hitler asserted "that the Third Reich was interested only in the fate of Germans and of territories inhabited by a German majority," and hostility to Russian Communism was his "cardinal tenet."

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During the five years following on the Declaration of January 26th, 1934, Poland scrupulously refrained from any share in "the anti-German crusades of M. Litvinov." She respected the German character of Danzig whose population enjoyed "the same possibilities of fostering their national spirit" as that of Germany. In Poland "the German minority . . . enjoyed a position such as hardly any other national minority possessed in Europe"; but, controlled from the Reich, it engaged in subversive activities, provoking reactions among the Poles which the Government had to check. "Despite everything, war broke out between Poland and Germany . . . Why?"

(The tune changes back). True, there were certain immediate reasons: "*Lebensraum*" replaced as programme that of the union of the "*Volksgenossen*"; gigantic armaments lead to war or bankruptcy; autarky militates against comity; the Nazi régime stood in need of successes—but "it would be a mistake" to explain the war only by "the Hitler régime"; it has a "historical and psychological background." "German mentality . . . is attracted by force . . . not repelled by brutality . . ." The Germans by preference give themselves up to leaders who are conquerors. The views of Tacitus and Mirabeau are quoted; "Germany's ancient history" is left aside, but the medieval Teutonic Knights and their "eastward expansion," eighteenth-century Prussia, and the Reich of Bismarck and Wilhelm II are discussed. Prussia's bid for hegemony must start with Eastern Europe, and as Poland refused actively to collaborate with Hitler, he had "to crush Polish resistance by force."

Each part of the Polish apologia, though euphemistic, is true, or almost true; but the whole lacks rhyme or reason. With such knowledge of German history and nature, and so much understanding of their logic, seeing Hitler as heir and exponent of a policy which he at first deliberately continued, how could the Poles expect him to work a lasting change in German-Polish relations? Moreover, was "*Lebensraum*" in Eastern Europe a new theory with Hitler? Is there not a whole chapter on it in "*Mein Kampf*"? Are not hints by Nazi leaders recorded in the Polish White Book, in 1935, which show that their East-European dreams were

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merely in abeyance? A truer picture of Polish policy is required—"warts and all."

In 1918 Poland re-arose in a void, acquiring, even so, less than her due from Germany, but much more than her due from Russia (still, Germany for geographical reasons and because of her intense nationalism, felt her losses more acutely than Russia). The Poles were safe only so long as Germany and Russia were outcasts and weak. After a century of non-existence, Poland was intensely jealous of her "sovereignty" and of any "encroachment" upon it; she claimed to be a Great Power, and as such would not play the part of satellite to France. But (to use Mr. Toynbee's brilliant expression), hers was merely "brevet rank as a Great Power," and, since 1925, she had to manoeuvre not to appear "in a position of manifest inferiority to either of her traditionally and essentially grander, but temporarily and accidentally humbler, neighbours." The Poles loathed the Minority Treaties and League control, "an indignity" not imposed on any Great Power, not even on Germany; similarly, League interference in Danzig; in short, the League. Again, Locarno was intensely resented: it drew a distinction between Germany's Western and her Eastern frontiers, and it brought her into the League with a permanent seat on the Council, which was refused to Poland (the reproach of Locarno is tactfully levelled by the Polish White Book only at the Weimar Republic). In March-June, 1933, followed the Four-Power Pact, one of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's (invariably futile) incursions into international politics. After it had been emptied of substance, it no longer worried the Little Entente; but for Poland it was an "offensive advertisement" that she was not a Great Power. Meantime Russia, frightened by Nazi bluster, was drawing closer to France and to the League, which Germany left in the autumn of 1933; Russia, in turn, was about to be rehabilitated and acknowledged as a Great Power.

The Polish-German rapprochement was facilitated by Nazi Germany being "so utterly foreign to the rest of Europe"—this sentence in the Polish White Book, puzzling at first, acquires significance: Germany had lost caste; now Poland could expect to deal with her on easier terms. This is the

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background to the German-Polish Declaration of January, 1934; and now the documents in the two White Books must tell the further story.

THE TWO TOGETHER

(May, 1933—October, 1938)

For this period there are 42 documents in the Polish White Book and more than 100 in the German (of these roughly half are consular reports about the "sufferings" of the German minority). But even of the diplomatic documents in the two collections, few deal with the same moves or events. For months on end the two corresponding White Books conduct monologues: the German book, taking minority grievances for its main theme, is vocal in the autumn of 1934, when Poland repudiated League control over minority treaties, and in 1937, when the Geneva Agreement on Upper Silesia of May 15th, 1922, was about to expire; the Polish dwells on Germany's disclaimers of all idea of territorial revindications and on her assurances of friendship, which were specially frequent and emphatic in the first half of 1935 (before the Stresa Front broke over Abyssinia), and between February and October, 1938 (while Austria and Czechoslovakia were on the rack). Four official documents and one of Hitler's speeches are given in both White Books, but while each reports a good many interviews during these four-and-a-half years, only three interviews appear in both; which is a pity, as opposite accounts of the same talk are illuminating and entertaining.

On May 2nd, 1933, M. Wysocki, Polish Minister in Berlin, on instructions from Warsaw, called Hitler's attention to the excitement which Nazi agitation at, and concerning, Danzig was causing in Poland, emphasised the importance which Poland attached to her access to the sea, and the need to allay apprehensions by a declaration from Hitler announcing that the Reich meant to respect Poland's rights and interests in Danzig. In reply Hitler, speaking "without a break," ran over the recitals common to him at that time: he meant to respect treaties; he was a pacifist having experienced war and its horrors; even victory had its disappointments; he was a nationalist and respected other peoples' nationality;

Poland had a right to exist, and so had Germany; there was danger from Russia; etc. (Were Hitler's gramophone items labelled *a, b, c, d*, etc., any statement of his could be reported in a brief formula, such as *cdmbf* or *adjkbr*; while the frequency, incidence, variations, and permutations of these marks would yield useful charts for Hitlerology). Wysocki gives a full report of Hitler's remarks (and an even fuller of his own—a very common and natural failing). Neurath, who was present at the interview and drew up the German minute, having given the barest summary of the Polish representations, makes Hitler start with an emphatic denial of any specific Polish right to Danzig¹ and delivers a discourse of which there is no trace in the much longer Polish account: "the blindness of statesmen, their absurdity and ill-will, has drawn a frontier between Germany and Poland which well-nigh excludes quiet contiguity between them so long as it endures"—the Poles themselves ought to have refused a Corridor across German territory and sought to reach the sea on the other side of East Prussia. Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, on May 17th, 1933, bears out Wysocki's account and echoes, in an attenuated manner, that of Neurath: "A reasonable approach to European problems could then [in 1919] have furnished a solution in the East which would have fully met both Poland's intelligible claims and Germany's natural rights."² Hitler was probably more explicit with Wysocki; but had these remarks been as crucial and emphatic as Neurath makes them appear, Wysocki's omission would indeed be odd. In the next talk, on July 13th, 1933, Wysocki reports Hitler saying that "the authors of the Treaty of Versailles had created the so-called Corridor in order to set an enduring abyss between Germany and Poland."

On October 14th, 1933, Germany announced her withdrawal from the League. On November 15th, M. Lipski, who had replaced Wysocki at Berlin, delivered to Hitler, after

¹ "dass er zunächst ein besonderes Recht Polens auf Danzig zurückweisen müsse" Wysocki thus reports apparently the same statement: "Germany . . . will not recognise that Poland had any rights in Danzig which would exceed the bounds of existing treaties." Neurath's version decodes this disingenuous and superfluous protest.

² A similar hint is contained in Hitler's speech at the Sport-Palast, on October 24th, 1933, but again without any indication of what that solution should have been. The translation of the speech of May 17th in the Polish White Book is poor (though not wrong), and a new translation of the passage has therefore been attempted above.

a visit to Warsaw, the following message from Pilsudski: "Poland's security rested on bilateral relations with other States, reinforced by their common membership of the League. Germany's withdrawal was causing nervousness—could Hitler think of a method of compensating Poland for that reinsurance? In replying, Hitler "spoke rapidly and poured out a flood of ideas"—Lipski reports them at length, though there was nothing new in them. The Saar was the one territorial problem which Hitler named as calling for a solution: but this was provided for in the Treaties. The Versailles Treaty had not established German-Polish relations on an ideal basis, and "was calculated to render them difficult." Still, he emphatically declared that he would not try to change it by force. The German minute of the interview, in length only one-fourth of the Polish, again suppresses most of the Polish statement, and while it reproduces Hitler's pacific declarations, makes him say that the position created at Versailles was "unbearable for Germany and bound to pain every German." The agreed communiqué about this interview declared that the two Governments intended to proceed "by way of direct negotiation" and "to renounce all application of force in their mutual relations."

The Polish White Book supplies no further information about the preliminaries of the German-Polish Agreement: its aim is to show how the Germans, after having zealously sought and enthusiastically endorsed the Agreement, subsequently tore it up, not how the Poles had come to sign it. It is therefore in the German White Book that this part of the story has to be traced.

On November 24th, Moltke, German Minister at Warsaw, was instructed to submit to Pilsudski the draft of a German-Polish Declaration which, while no less binding than any Pact, was to dispense with "traditional conceptions and somewhat worn-out formulations."

For your information [wrote Neurath] I wish to point out that the text of our draft in no way implies a recognition of the present German frontiers in the East, but says on the contrary that this Declaration is to provide a basis for solving all problems, therefore also the territorial problems.

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For the German Ambassador's personal information—this is delicious. The least hint of this kind to the Poles would have closed the discussion.

On November 28th, Moltke saw Pilsudski, who "in his own drastic language" approved of the suggested "new formulation," but warned against mentioning in it "the Locarno Agreement, which in Poland had a bad name." Though he wished "to place German-Polish relations on a good neighbourly basis," he stressed with great frankness the fact that a thousand years of hostility between Poles and Germans would render such improvement difficult. Moltke (with less frankness) denied this being so in Germany, and referred to the effective steps taken with regard to the German Press. "Pilsudski replied by expressing his unmeasured contempt for the Press, with which he would have no dealings . . ."

On January 9th a draft was submitted by the Poles excluding from the scope of the Declaration all questions "which fall under the exclusive competence of States"; and on the 20th, Lipski explained that this was to prevent any meddling with the affairs of the other country: for instance, during the preceding year, some people in Poland had wanted to protest "against the treatment of Jews in Germany. The Government, of course, refused." Finally it was agreed to exclude from the Declaration "questions which under international law are to be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of one of the two States." And here is the comment made in a German Foreign Office minute:

This formula has the advantage . . . that it no longer excludes minority questions from diplomatic discussions between Germany and Poland. For minority problems undoubtedly cannot in international law be deemed exclusively the internal concern of one State.

The German-Polish Declaration, signed in Berlin on January 26th, 1934, announced that the two Governments would "settle directly" any problems which might arise between them, and would in no case resort to force; it invoked the Kellogg Pact, but not the League Covenant or Locarno. Hitler and Pilsudski, both deeply contemptuous of pacifism, now employed its language: each period has

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its forms, and each form has its twaddle. The Declaration, devoid of contents and basis, was a demonstration and a manoeuvre. Poland, while specifically reserving "international obligations undertaken . . . towards a third party" (foremost the Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921), declared that henceforth she would deal with Germany "directly"; Hitler, having left the comity of nations formed under the ægis of the Western Powers, achieved the first signal success in his endeavours through "bilateral dealings" to isolate potential opponents and future victims. But the Declaration claimed to supply "an essential pre-condition for the general peace of Europe," and to contribute to the "well-being" of the contracting States, and "of the other peoples of Europe as well." "Where international Conferences and Pacts had failed," said Beck to Moltke on January 27th, "a bold policy evincing the will of leaders¹ makes itself strongly felt, especially when it takes account of the existing wish for peace"; the event had made an impression on Polish public opinion which exceeded his own expectations, and it had a good reception abroad. (Indeed, it was acclaimed by a world exuding appeasement.)

The "Introduction" to the Polish White Book says that Hitler, as an Austrian, and Goering as a Bavarian, could be expected "to rise above the Prussian hostile attitude to Poland," and that the Third Reich claimed to be interested only "in the fate of Germans and of territories inhabited by a German majority." In other words, the Poles (rightly) expected Hitler to start with Austria and Czechoslovakia, and not with Poland: which suited their book. Nor must they be condemned offhand for this piece of "Real-politik": for years a strenuous German propaganda had placed the Corridor and Danzig in the foreground of its attacks against the Treaty of Versailles, and so successful had been its specious arguments², most of all in this country, that had Hitler

¹ " . . . eine mutige und von Führerwillen zeugende Politik" (Moltke to the German F.O., January 27th, 1934).

² Conviction through the visual sense can be produced without mental effort, and that the Corridor separated East Prussia from the Reich was patent. But it would tax the imagination to think of East Prussia as an island and to see that even if all connection between Königsberg and Stettin had to be by sea, this would not be a tragedy; while to gauge the full gravity of Poland's position if deprived of access to the sea, requires some hard and informed thinking.

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started his extra-German operations by demanding a frontier-revision in that quarter, the reaction to such a demand would probably have been very different then from what it was in 1939. On the other hand, unanimity seemed to prevail about the need of maintaining Austria's "independence," and no one in Western Europe had as yet discovered the "Sudetens" as a name, a problem, or a "righteousness." Had the conflict between Hitler and the "Stresa Powers" broken out over Vienna, both sides would have been fully convinced of Poland's right to the Versailles frontiers, and the storm might have passed without ravaging Poland; the Poles therefore meant to play for time. There is a Jewish story of a poor fellow who, not knowing which way to turn for a living, promised a whimsical nobleman that in five years he would teach that man's favourite dog to talk; asked how he could give such a foolish undertaking, the Jew replied: "In five years either the master or the dog may die." This was the sense and justification of Poland's policy towards Hitler; where the Poles went wrong was in gilding and garnishing that policy till they came to believe that their statesmanship was both subtle and bold, and that one can act like a jackal and look a lion.

The Polish White Book contains not a single further document for 1934, the time when Barthou and Litvinov, after having initialled on May 18th an East-European Pact of Mutual Assistance, were trying to gain Poland's adhesion to it; and the Introduction to the Polish White Book tactfully refers to Litvinov only, and to Poland's refusal to participate in his "anti-German" activities. In the German White Book the two main sub-chapters for 1934 bear the headings: "German-Polish Appeasement fails to improve the Position of the German *Volksgruppe* (November, 1933-August, 1934)" and "Poland rejects further Minority Control of the League of Nations (September-November, 1934)."

On September 13th, 1934, before Russia was admitted to the League and assigned a permanent seat on the Council, Colonel Beck declared at Geneva that, pending the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of minorities, Poland refused to submit to further League of Nations supervision. When, the same day, the Polish

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Minister informed the German Foreign Office that Poland could no longer suffer such "declassament," he was told that the Minority Treaties were a counterpiece to the territorial sacrifices imposed on Germany at Versailles. This, however, was merely a first reaction or retort: at that time France was drawing closer to Russia and Italy, and it was therefore imperative for Germany to keep Poland out of a European coalition. On November 14th, Moltke was instructed to tell Beck that Germany attached no special importance to the co-operation of the League which she had "long recognised to be of no value," to remind him of the German-Polish Declaration which envisaged "direct negotiations," and to say that Germany sympathised with Poland's resentment of international control: still, that she could not disinterest herself in the fate of her "*Volksgenossen*." But, while dropping some hints about their grievances, Moltke was to declare that "the German Government did not think in any way of using its interposition on behalf of the German minority in Poland as a means for unrolling frontier problems."

Moltke saw Beck on November 19th, and started by declaring that his demarche aimed at rendering German-Polish relations even more intimate ("*eine Vertiefung deutsch-polnischer Beziehungen*"). Beck, after profusely complimenting Hitler, replied that Poland's move had been provoked by "the incredible treatment" recently accorded to her by the League—"people sit there who are no use except to create difficulties for themselves and for others, and who have no understanding for realities." The rights of the German minority will be perfectly safe without the League, and subordinate officials will be duly instructed. Beck rounded off his discourse by suitable remarks on the harmful influence of the Jews in the Polish Press. Moltke, in closing his despatch, expresses the conviction that "the Poles had full understanding" for the interest shown by the German Government for the German minority in Poland. By excluding the League, the Poles were letting in the Germans.

In April, 1935, the Stresa Conference met, and on May 2nd, the Franco-Russian Pact was concluded. The Nazis were

redoubling their attentions towards the Poles: Goebbels had visited Warsaw in June, 1934, Goering in January, 1935; he went there again in May to attend Pilsudski's funeral, followed by Ribbentrop in October. Not a single diplomatic document in the German White Book deals with these visits. It is now the Polish White Book which speaks.

On January 22nd, 1935, after the annual New Year banquet to foreign diplomats, Hitler engaged Lipski in cordial conversation: he declared that "the theory of Polish-German hereditary enmity was very unsound"; in the past there had been periods of co-operation against a common danger from the East; soon they might have to defend themselves against Russia. "In his opinion, the policy of former German Governments, and in particular of the Reichswehr, which had aimed at uniting with Russia against Poland, was the greatest of political mistakes"; he had told General Schleicher that possible territorial gains at the expense of Poland would not outweigh the increased danger from Bolshevism.

Goering further developed this theme during his first visit to Warsaw, spicing it with gross flattery: "theoretically one could imagine a new partition of Poland by means of a German-Russian collaboration," but practically this would be impossible "partly because of the strength and dynamic power of Poland, partly because . . . a common German-Russian frontier . . . would be highly dangerous to Germany"; when in January, 1933, Schleicher advised Hitler to seek an understanding with France and Russia which would eliminate Poland, Hitler did not reply, but afterwards said to Goering: "*Und ich werde das Gegenteil machen.*"¹ In further talks Goering hinted at "an anti-Russian alliance and a joint attack on Russia"; and he brought up the topic even with Pilsudski, though he had been warned by Lipski "to observe some reserve." "The Marshal in reply *tat gestutzt*,² as Herr Goering later put it . . ."

On April 25th, Lipski spent several hours with Goering at his hunting lodge at Schorfheide; Goering told Lipski that

¹ "And I will do the opposite."

² The Polish White Book translates these words in a footnote as meaning "stiffened." This is hardly correct. It means much rather "made a show of being puzzled," or even "staggered."

Hitler had "asked him to pay special attention to Polish-German relations, independently of official channels" (Goering, the sportsman, was always detailed "to pay special attention" to nations and statesmen accessible to such approach); Hitler's Polish policy "was not governed by any consideration of a tactical nature but sprang from a very deep perception of this problem." "In Goering's reasoning," writes Lipski, "there was, as usual, a strong anti-Russian bias, whether in regard to the Soviets or to any other possible Russian regime." For the Nearly-Fifth Column among West-European visitors, the Nazi leaders had anti-Red ravings; but as the Poles, if anything, preferred the Bolsheviks to a non-Bolshevik Russia (for the Bolsheviks, like the Nazis, were "so utterly foreign to the rest of Europe"), in talking to the Poles the Nazis made a show of indiscriminate hostility to Russia.

On May 21st, 1935, Hitler declared in the Reichstag that Germany "will blindly observe" the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland. The next day he delivered to Lipski a eulogy on Pilsudski (who had died on May 12th), and produced an improved version of the Schleicher story, even suggesting that Schleicher's policy had not been "disinterested," and saying that his help "to build up the Soviet military power was ample justification for the end that befell him"; Hitler went on to declare

that a *rapprochement* with Poland was more advantageous to Germany than uneasy relations with Russia. Russia is Asia, he said. Germany was faced with the problem of finding areas for economic expansion or space for its population. Poland had not and could not provide either. There was criticism of his attitude in regard to the question of the "Corridor," against which he maintained that in face of the greater problems the "Corridor" was of no importance whatever.

Possibly "an idea, premature to-day," will be feasible some fifteen years hence: "the building of a special railway line and of a motor road for transit" through the Corridor. The Polish Ambassador,¹ in reporting the conversation, refrains from all comment on this significant hint.

¹ The German Minister in Warsaw and the Polish Minister in Berlin had been advanced to the rank of Ambassadors in October, 1934.

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In July, 1935, Beck visited Berlin. An official communiqué about his talk with Hitler stated that it had been "conducted in an atmosphere of frankness" (gentlemen over-bubbling with "sincerity" like talks to be "full, frank, and friendly"). "The conversations revealed a far-reaching agreement of views. . . . Both governments . . . will devote all their energies to the cause of peace in Europe."

On December 18th, 1935, Hitler again discoursed to Lipski on the impossibility of any *rapprochement* with Russia: European solidarity for him ended at the Polish-Soviet frontier; pacts were not possible with States which did not recognise "the same ethical principles in international policy."

Of all these talks there is no trace in the German White Book; and indeed, its 488 large pages, covering more than six years of the Nazi régime, do not contain a single remark unfavourable or disrespectful to Russia or the Bolsheviks.

On March 7th, 1936, Hitler announced the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. This was one of the crucial moments of modern history. France lost the last military safeguards which she had secured in 1919, and which were solemnly confirmed to her at Locarno; and a barrier was placed between her and Eastern Europe. At that juncture M. Flandin was French Foreign Minister, while Great Britain was ruled by the MacDonald-Baldwin coalition of "sham Conservatives, sham Liberals, and sham Labour." The Western Powers condoned Hitler's coup; and never has a most fatal decision received more general approval.

Not one document bearing on the remilitarisation of the Rhineland appears in the German White Book, while the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book start their full story only after Munich. Even the Polish White Book is silent about the crisis of 1936, though the Poles, whatever their mistakes had been during the preceding two years, did not fail to gauge the significance of the event. The distance between them and France was growing.

The speech in which Hitler announced the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was profuse in pacifist reassurances—he invariably offered opportunities to those intent on self-deception. Among other things, he explained that

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National Socialist foreign policy . . . finds it painful that the outlet to the sea of a people of 35 millions is situated on territory formerly belonging to the Reich, but . . . recognises that it is impossible and therefore unreasonable to deny a State of such a size as this any outlet to the sea at all . . . —again a hint that Poland, the land of the Vistula, ought to have been given access to the sea not at the mouth of her own river.

The introduction to the Polish White Book says:

In Danzig, as to which Chancellor Hitler repeatedly gave explicit and solemn assurances, the Polish Government respected the German character of the majority of the population. The National-Socialist Senate was never troubled by Polish interference in the internal affairs of the Free City. The Polish Government confined their activities in Danzig to the maintenance of the Polish rights established in international treaties. So far as the internal political life of the Free City was concerned, it was an independent State. In this sphere the Senate had unlimited freedom of action, and the German population had the same possibilities of fostering their national spirit as the population of Germany.

Or, in plainer language: the Nazis promised to forego the re-incorporation of Danzig in the Reich and to respect the interests of Poland and the rights and status of the Poles in the Free City; in exchange the Nazis were allowed by fraud, violence, and intimidation to make themselves masters of Danzig, to rule it in their fashion through a "Gauleiter" receiving orders from Berlin, and to flout the League High Commissioner if ever he tried to protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of non-Nazi Germans.

At the meeting of the League Council on July 4th, 1936, Herr Greiser, President of the Danzig Senate, delivered a most provocative speech. [It was then that, in the Council Room, he cocked a snook and put out his tongue at some journalists.] "So marked were the breaches of the [Danzig] Constitution" that the question was considered "whether the High Commissioner should not be withdrawn and the post abolished."¹

¹ Report of M. Carl Burckhardt, High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig: Geneva, March 19th, 1940. Official No. C 42, M. 38, page 2.

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While in conflict with the League, Hitler courted the Poles. On August 12th, 1936, he spoke to the Polish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Count Szembek, of "the Danzig question" as "negligible" in comparison with the grave problems which bid them harmonise German and Polish policy; in 1933, he had ordered his men in Danzig "that they should at all costs come to an understanding with Poland"; and he

reiterated his statement that Polish rights in Danzig could not be violated in any case. To this I remarked [writes Szembek] that we were interested to know what the future of Polish-Danzig relations would be, and what guarantees we would have of the maintenance of our rights in the Free City in the event of an overthrow of the present statute and of the League of Nations in Danzig. The Chancellor replied that there was no question of that. In all his policy he was governed by the principle of signing nothing and promising nothing, if he had any doubt whether he could realise it in practice. From the moment, however, when he assumed some obligation or concluded a certain friendship, there was no power on earth which could make him break his pledged word.

The Poles were obviously prepared to bargain away the international status of Danzig, but the Germans apparently thought it cheaper and more convenient to Nazify the Free City with the connivance of the Poles, without an open change in its status.

On August 14th, Ribbentrop received Szembek, repeated the assurance "that nobody wanted to violate the status of the Free City or the position of the League in Danzig" and then enlarged on the grave problems at which Hitler had hinted.

Both Poland and Germany were faced with a serious danger arising from the fact that the Soviets had not renounced the conception of world revolution. Moscow could not renounce this conception, and Stalin was bound to carry on a corresponding policy, otherwise there would be a break-down of the whole Bolshevik system, which aimed at levelling down and destroying all the

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achievements of Western civilisation and culture. Chancellor Hitler could not make any compromise in relation to Russia, because the slightest deviation from his own present policy must open the way for the reign of Bolshevism in Germany. Herr von Ribbentrop considered that Poland was menaced by the danger of Bolshevism equally with Germany, and that the only way of counteracting this danger was the prevention of the catastrophe by crushing at their roots even the smallest signs of Communism.

During the next few months incidents in Danzig were frequent, opposition to the policy of co-operation with Germany became intensified in Poland, and the tone of the Press in both countries became acid. On November 18th, 1936, Moltke, having returned from Berlin, had an interview with Beck, reported in both White Books. In Moltke's Minute, or the part which has been published, he claimed to have expostulated sharply with Beck about the attitude of the Polish Press, the treatment of the German minority, and about Danzig.

Referring to the increasingly obvious tendency of Poland to obtain new rights in Danzig, I declared, in accordance with the instructions received from the Führer and Chancellor, that such procedure would unavoidably produce sharp reactions, and therefore acute disturbances in German-Polish relations.

But the Führer, Moltke went on to say, wished to continue the understanding with Poland. "M. Beck replied that he gratefully welcomed this extremely valuable declaration."

In Beck's Minute of the conversation, reassurances from Hitler are reported at length, and so are his complaints about Mr. Lester, the League High Commissioner at Danzig, while those about the Polish Press can only be inferred.

I . . . thanked the Ambassador for his declaration which I regarded as a desirable basis for quiet and objective study of the problem which caused the greatest difficulties, i.e. that of Danzig. I had undertaken the perhaps thankless mission of investigating the Danzig question on the basis of the League Mandate. I thought, however, that the Polish Government, which was not

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influenced by doctrines and had no desire to create difficulties, could find a solution. A cardinal condition was the goodwill of the Senate, which would have to contribute their share to the success of this mission.

In the further conversation, Beck "detected a certain nervousness on the part of the Ambassador lest Poland should desire to exploit the situation to extend her rights considerably at the Senate's expense, which would lead to new difficulties," and claims to have replied that, as the Danzig Senate had by its actions disturbed "the equilibrium of the *status quo*," "Polish interests demanded new guarantees."

Judging from the conversation as a whole, I had reason to believe that pressure would certainly be brought to bear on Danzig from the German side, provided we did not place them in a too difficult position by putting forward demands either compromising the activities of the Nazi Senate or extending, not the practical, but the theoretical Treaty Rights of Poland.

In short, Beck admits to have spoken with contempt about the existing "basis of the League Mandate"—to him principles were "doctrines"; and if this basis was not destroyed at that time, it was obviously because the Nazis did not as yet intend to take overt action. Beck was playing a singularly weak, double-faced game: according to Burckhardt the new League Commissioner at Danzig, "it was largely in deference to the Polish Government's views that it was decided in January, 1937, to maintain the post of High Commissioner in Danzig, but at the same time "he was warned by the Poles not to hamper the internal administration of the Free City of Danzig." When, early in March, 1937, Burckhardt visited the President of the Polish Republic, M. Moscicki declared to him that the Nazi régime in Germany had "normalised relations between Danzig and Poland."¹ All important questions between them, M. Beck pointed out to Burckhardt on another occasion, were "settled in Warsaw and Berlin," and he advised Burckhardt to make personal contact with the German Government. At the New Year reception, on January 11th, 1937, Hitler expressed to Lipski "the conviction that Danzig affairs would be settled

¹ Report of M. Carl Burckhardt, page 3.

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satisfactorily, and . . . that the growth of National Socialism in Danzig would be a guarantee of peace and good relations with Poland."

The German-Polish Agreement of May 15th, 1922, regulating economic and minority problems in Upper Silesia during a transition period, was to expire on July 15th, 1937, and in January Neurath urged on Beck an early consideration of the position which would arise. The Germans wanted an agreement which, under cover of minority rights, would have enabled them to consolidate the German "*Volksgruppe*" in Poland, the Poles wished only to discuss "concrete" cases. On March 16th, in Beck's absence, Szembek told Moltke that the Polish Government were averse to a bilateral minority treaty, that German minority rights in Poland were anyhow secure, while the Polish minority in German Upper Silesia was too poorly organised to profit by such an agreement. On April 19th, Beck added that the Polish Government viewed international commitments on minorities as an infringement of sovereignty apt to lead to interference in internal affairs, that the Poles were jealous of their sovereignty, and, having suffered from League control, were loath to accept anything which might look like its continuation. Moltke's distinction between a one-sided obligation under international control, and the free resolve of two Governments to settle a problem which disturbed their relations, failed to impress the Poles.

The next step was a formal démarche by Moltke on June 1st, 1937, and a memorandum which expressed "disappointment, nay, serious apprehensions" because of Poland's refusal, and argued that concrete cases raised outside the framework of a treaty would savour even more of interference in internal affairs, that Germany's acquiescence in Poland's repudiation of League control did not affect the legal position with regard to German minority rights in Poland, and that Germany could not disinterest herself in that German minority; it enumerated grievances, and suggested that, if Poland persisted in refusing a bilateral Minority Treaty, declarations dealing with the protection of the two respective minorities should simultaneously be published by the two Governments. In reply, Beck assured

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Moltke that "the wishes of the Führer were always certain to receive specially serious consideration" in Warsaw; and on June 6th, in a further talk, declared that, wishing to meet a *démarche* ordered by Hitler, the Polish Government were ready to consider the proposal of parallel declarations, though they declined a treaty. "Beck's renewed, though less categorical refusal of negotiations by experts" reported Moltke, "suggests that no intrinsically important declaration is contemplated. It seems therefore advisable to open the negotiations with a draft of our own."

This, sent from Berlin, was submitted on June 24th to Beck, who, "with regard to its concrete terms" merely "pointed to the difficulties which might arise over the Jewish minority"—for fending off the German proposals, the Jews in Germany had their use, but this apparently was all the attention that their position received in the negotiations. On August 26th, Beck accepted what seems substantially to have been the German draft of the Declarations. A further delay of over two months was caused by certain Polish measures in Upper Silesia, considered by the Germans contrary to the forthcoming Declarations which were already throwing their shadow ahead. They were published on November 5th, 1937, and added little to the stale theme of ineffective minority regulations.

On the day the Declarations were published, Hitler talked to representatives of the Polish minority about the "*Volksgruppen*"; President Moscicki told representatives of the German minority that they would continue to receive favourable treatment if they showed loyalty to the Polish State; Neurath presented the Polish Ambassador with an *aide-mémoire* on what was expected from the Declarations, further suggesting "periodical conferences between representatives of the two States"—something of a condominium in minority questions; Beck, in a circular to "all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad," explained that the two Declarations were "sovereign acts in the sphere of home affairs," based on "the principle of reciprocity," and that they emphasised "absolute loyalty on the part of Minorities as a condition of enjoying the protection which is the exclusive attribute of sovereignty"; Lipski was received by Hitler and "in the

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course of the conversation it was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig question"—a phrase in the official communiqué which appeared so important to Beck that he announced it beforehand in his diplomatic circular.

In the German White Book the story of the Minority Declarations of November 5th, 1937, fills twenty-two large pages, equal to almost thirty of the Polish White Book. In the Polish White Book there is nothing about their origin, merely their text, Beck's circular, the communiqué on Lipski's interview with Hitler, and Hitler's address to the Polish minority, together about three pages. On the other hand, the Polish White Book reproduces pronouncements by Nazi leaders in which they decanted on the inestimable value of a strong Poland for Germany, and affirmed their fixed hostility to Russia. But not a single talk which Goering, detailed "to pay special attention to Polish-German relations," had with the Poles, is reported in the German White Book.

In February, 1937, Goering was once more in Poland. In a talk with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, he declared that Germany had no desire to deprive Poland of any of her territory.

Germany was completely reconciled to her present territorial status. Germany would not attack Poland and had no intention of seizing the Polish "Corridor." "We do not want the 'Corridor'. I say that sincerely and categorically; we do not need the 'Corridor'." He could not give proof of this; it was a question whether his word was believed or not.

Next followed once more the story about Schleicher, the Reichswehr, and the Bolsheviks. But the advent of the Nazis had changed this for good and all.

Germany would never return to a pro-Russian policy. For it should always be remembered that there was one great danger coming through Russia from the East, and menacing both Germany and Poland alike. This danger existed not only in the form of a Bolshevik and Communised Russia, but of Russia generally, in any form, be it Monarchist or Liberal.

The policy of the two nations must be harmonised, misunderstandings must be removed, "cultural contacts must

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be made and strengthened." And at the end of this candied harangue, he once more dropped a hint which the Polish Minute reproduces, but avoids probing :

When mutual relations were completely regularised, then it might be possible to consider facilitating German transit to East Prussia.

On November 4th, in a talk with Szembek in Berlin, on the eve of the signing of the Minority Treaty, Goering repeated his declarations that Germany regarded Poland's "territorial integrity as inviolable," and that the Third Reich would never collaborate with Russia, whatever may be her internal régime. In the talk which Lipski had with Hitler after the Treaty had been signed, Hitler asserted once more that no change would be attempted with regard to the status of Danzig, that he would always keep his word—"a surprise step was out of the question"—"*Danzig ist mit Polen verbunden.*"

By 1938 Nazi Germany had successfully traversed the danger zone ; Hitler had re-armed, and had re-militarised the Rhineland ; Germany was no longer "vulnerable." To frighten statesmen who had shown greater aptitude for fear than for action, he now even exaggerated the degree of his preparedness. By exploiting their weakness and blunders he succeeded in disorganising the post-war diplomatic system of Europe. In 1938, he passed from preparation to aggression. In February, Schuschnigg was summoned to Berchtesgaden ; on March 12th Austria was invaded. By the end of May, Hitler's relations with Czecho-Slovakia reached their first crisis. On September 29th, the Munich surrender crowned the achievements of his first year of expansion and conquest. These were developments of paramount significance for Poland. Her rulers did not oppose Hitler but followed in the wake of the man-eating tiger. When he invaded Austria, they put the screw on Lithuania ; when he started to partition Czecho-Slovakia, they helped themselves to two pounds of flesh in Teschen, to territory with as many non-Poles as there were Poles in it. But what discussions passed between the Germans and the Poles during the period from January to September, 1938 ? Both White Books are significantly

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reticent : to those supremely important nine months, the German devotes eleven out of a total of 459 pages, and even then deals merely with local detail—minority questions—not with problems of European policy ; the Polish devotes to that period four out of a total of 152 pages, reproducing extracts from three speeches of Hitler, and from conversations with him, with Goering, and with Ribbentrop, all on old themes, not a word about what was happening. This reticence finds its counterpart in the French Yellow Book and the British Blue Book, which open properly only after the two, let us call them, "major operations" of 1938 had been performed. During the nine pregnant months of 1938, all the "Coloured Books" suffer from vapours and faintness, and from a most remarkable mental blackout.

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By H. R. G. GREAVES

A MORE strenuous testing-time for the Government was to be foreseen. While the previous three months saw the great achievements of General Wavell's forces against the Italians, during this period it was with a story of successful German invasions that the Government had to face the House. Enemy propaganda was quick to see the parallel between Norway and Greece, and it confidently predicted the same fate for Mr. Churchill's Government as that which overtook his predecessor almost exactly a year before. This parallel, no doubt, was a main reason why Mr. Churchill took the unusual step of tabling a motion of confidence to provide the general opportunity for criticism to be ventilated and to discover, both from debate and the vote which followed it, how his Government stood with the House and the country. His decision was certainly vindicated: attack showed itself to be flashy but unsubstantial; criticism, much of which was undoubtedly necessary, the force of some of which was admitted by the Government itself, was clearly founded on a spirit of confidence; and the vote gave a useful demonstration to the world, that could scarcely have been provided by any other means, of a national unity behind Mr. Churchill, fundamentally in contrast with the situation twelve months earlier. The Government emerged strengthened from the debate. Its testing-time, however, was not by any means restricted to the effects of military events in Cyrenaica, Yugoslavia, Greece and the Greek islands. This period has included the budget with the general survey of all departments, and it has also seen Parliament dealing with a considerable volume of legislation. In both connections it can be said that the Commons continue their confidence in the Government, but that they have justified themselves by a supervision that has produced both legislative and administrative improvements.

The demonstration which greeted the Prime Minister's speech winding up the debate on the Confidence motion was

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the last to take place in the historic Chamber. On the night of May 10th it was destroyed. The House met as usual on the next sitting day, which was Tuesday, May 13th, but in "another place." The Speaker announced a message from the Lords that "the House of Peers shares to the full the grief and indignation aroused by the ruin of the place of meeting so long and intimately associated with the liberties of Britain and the spread of free institutions under the Crown."

Debate on the Budget showed that the general reaction was wholly favourable. Indeed, in spite of or because of the unprecedentedly heavy burdens imposed, the feeling was that at last sufficiently thorough methods were being applied to cut down private expenditure on non-essentials, and that the dangers of inflation were being squarely faced and guarded against. Some doubt was expressed on two points in particular, the "inflation gap" and the possibility of maintaining or increasing savings with such a high level of taxation, but the Chancellor managed to persuade the House that he had adequately considered the grounds for such doubts, and he clearly thought that they were not unduly serious. Mr. Lees-Smith pointed out that the Chancellor had made inflation the central problem of his Budget, and said that "it would not be criticised on the ground of timidity as other Budgets have been in the past. As far as the actual figures of expenditure are concerned, the higher they are the more the nation will welcome them, because they mean equipment for carrying on the war." There was welcome both for the decision to find revenue by direct and not indirect taxation and for the elasticity of mind shown in the acceptance of a part of the Keynes proposal for enforced saving. In connection with the excess profits tax the Chancellor took credit to the Government for having effectively stopped profiteering. The need for looking ahead to the problems of reconstruction was shown to be very present in the minds of many Members, the case for the Chancellor's reduction of the 100 per cent excess profits tax being based upon the necessity that industry should be prepared to meet post-war requirements of re-equipment. The House was agreed on the merits of the Budget as a whole; it was natural, therefore, that debate should turn to a large extent to such questions as the

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need for a capital levy to avoid too heavy an interest burden being placed on production when the war is over. There was also some demand for a more direct control of banking, for less consideration of the interests of big property when so many other interests have simply to be disregarded. Requisitioning of lives may well justify a greater willingness to requisition goods. Complete fairness as between one citizen and another is not always an aim that can be achieved. Some plea was made also for the taxation of unearned increment. Agricultural land, it was claimed, had appreciated by as much as 20 per cent in the last six months, and although there was some feeling that an industry which had gone through difficult periods now deserved its relative prosperity as a counterbalance for the past, the case was made that it would both be just and not too difficult of administrative application to gain for the benefit of the community at least some of this unearned increment. There was thus no appreciable complaint that the Budget imposed too heavy burdens; the stress remained upon the desirability of further and more equal sacrifices. The Chancellor was justified on the whole in feeling pleased with the reception accorded to his proposals.

Production, however, is the field in which the House has shown the greatest anxiety to be informed of the Government's efforts. It is here that there is still most disposition to doubt that enough energy and imagination is being revealed. The debate on the work of the Ministry of Supply was held in secret session—one of the four secret sessions of the period under review. Nothing therefore can be said on that aspect of the problem, beyond the fact that the House will no doubt show in the course of later debates by indirect methods how far the Government was then able to satisfy it that everything possible is being done. The American Lease and Lend measure has undoubtedly had a stimulating and heartening effect in connection with this problem of supply and with the budgetary necessities for dealing with it, and the House has shown a constant endeavour to guard against any slackening of effort due to the placing of too much reliance on the help of the United States.

Parliament's attention has been directed to three further aspects of the general problem of production—industrial

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man-power, the concentration of industry and distribution, and food output. The concern expressed by the House certainly corresponds to a widespread feeling in the country, and the measures taken by the Government can not unfairly be represented as having been fostered by past Parliamentary pressure.

The opportunity for Mr. Bevin to explain his measures for dealing with the problem of industrial man-power was provided by the claim of two Birmingham Members. They urged "an effective and courageous use" of powers to ensure that all "who are not engaged in the armed forces or in duties essential to the life of the nation shall, in such manner as the Government may direct, use their industrial energies in the total war effort." Their complaint was that not sufficient use had been made of the complete authority taken by the Government to conscript labour. They gave expression to a feeling current among manufacturers for many months about absenteeism and the movement of labour from one concern to another under the promise of higher reward. Mr. Bevin's answer was a full and energetic one. "If you overdo the ordering business you get a reaction and disaster; that is not the way to get output." He pointed to the difficulties which have ensued from the industrial policy of closing down shipyards and factories in the past, and to the prior necessity of reopening them before labour can be employed. He stressed the inefficiencies of management and the turning off of men due to it which had taken place in some areas, including that from which these particular Members came. Of the steel industry in their area he said that "the industry was chaotic. Therefore when I am told to get the proper use of labour I have to get the proper conditions under which labour can be used. The men cannot do it if all the other factors are not there." His demand was, in fact, for improved management, and the net effect of his arguments was to leave some doubt as to whether more control over management also should not be undertaken by the Government, even though this particular function might not be within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. Nor was Mr. Bevin slow to point the moral: "Is it not strange that in the majority

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of industries which had highly developed Joint Industrial Councils, the modern industries in which these things had been introduced prior to the war, the industries which had all kinds of relationships with the trade union movement arising out of the Whitley Committees, there should have been the least trouble since the war began, both internally and in everything else?" But this was a moral mainly for peace-time, and it related more to the past than the future.

Mr. Bevin's plans for the future had already been indicated by the Essential Work Order and other regulations, including the registration of women. In addition, there was the plan to end the blight of casual dock labour, and to organise and ensure the supply of labour to the specially urgent work of shipbuilding. The House was assured that not only should the right of the worker on essential work to move from that work be removed, but also that "if the State says to a man that he must not move from one employment to another, surely the right of the employer to discharge him must be taken away."

As was clear from the debate on industrial man-power, there were certain aspects of this problem which fell beyond the purview of the Ministry of Labour; for the most part these belonged to the function of the Board of Trade. Not the least important of these was the extent to which short-time was being worked in different factories throughout the country. Mr. Lyttelton's plans for securing the concentration of industrial production were an attempt to remedy this side of the general problem. The reasons for them hardly needed elaboration. The necessarily restricted allocation of raw materials, a matter for the Ministry of Supply, coupled with the quota restriction on sales under the Limitation of Supplies Order, a responsibility of the Board of Trade, was intended to perform the essential task of directing some of the national force of production away from peace-time and into war-time channels. The time had now come to aim more directly at concentrating production to economise labour, materials, plant and factory-space and to release these for war purposes. There was, in fact, a large body of opinion in the House and outside which thought that the time had come long before, but Mr. Lyttelton's claim was that this might perhaps be

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cancelled by the views of others, like Sir Herbert Williams, that the steps were taken too soon. Timing was at any rate an essential part of the problem, and only now were we beginning to feel the demands of our new factories. Geographical distribution and the numbers to be released were other complications. The Board of Trade's solution was to invite firms to get together under a threat of enforced amalgamation if they failed to do so. It was, as the Parliamentary Secretary said in winding up the debate, a plan in which industry itself was left to fill in the blanks, being supplied by the Board with only a broad outline, the central theme of which was the nucleus firm. This nucleus firm was to act and produce for the closed-down firm as a temporary war-time measure, the idea being that the *status quo ante* should be restored when the war is over. It was upon this idea of unscrambling the omelette as a possible or desirable end that the most effective criticism centred. The economies and advantages of such concentration from the point of view of the consumer who would get products at less cost, and of the small man who would thus avoid bankruptcy, were so stressed by the spokesmen of the Board of Trade that it was natural the reply should be made: "such economy is desirable in peace-time too." The official claim was, however, that economy came only through curtailment and would disappear when factories were working full time again. Associated with this criticism was the complaint of Mr. Shinwell which, he said, was "not against the principle, but is based on the neglect to embody in the scheme effective State direction, and the absence of essential safeguards for the protection of the small trader and manufacturer, the worker and the consumer." The alternative scheme advocated by Mr. Horabin was the formation of operating holding companies in which all the firms should participate under a chairman appointed by the Government. The advantages of such a bold scheme, while obvious to a Socialist, were not acceptable to the Board of Trade, which has clearly preferred the minimum of interference despite all the difficulties of persuading competitive firms to work together when they have to look forward to a future in which they will again compete with one another, and must in the meanwhile be

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careful to safeguard their position—for instance, by refusing to reveal industrial secrets—for the period of renewed competition. Many on both sides of the House must have continued to entertain some doubt as to whether such a compromise policy could really be made to work even during a time of stress, or whether it really did, as was claimed for it by the Parliamentary Secretary, “preserve a basis for a rapid and healthy return to peace-time conditions.” At least Captain Waterhouse put the policy at its best in describing it as “designed to reconcile traditional British industrial policy with the stringent requirements of a war-time economy, to retain as far as possible private enterprise and private initiative in a self-regulated system.”

The distributive trades were also thought to show an important gap in the proposals. Mr. Horabin spoke of hundreds of thousands of small shopkeepers being pushed out of business, and said that the Government “are allowing them to die with the coldest savagery, which has only been equalled in the worst periods of *laissez faire*.” He said that these people were beginning to believe that there was no hope for them even in victory. About this different, although connected, problem the Government could only say for the moment that the whole future of the retail trade was under consideration. On May 13th Mr. Lyttelton told the House that after consultation with the Ministers of Labour and Food he had decided to set up a representative committee to advise him and report, this being given wide terms of reference.

On the whole, the Government did not come badly out of the debate on food production. There was much comparison with the last war, when several important aspects of the problem were less difficult, but this comparison was somewhat irrelevant and inconclusive. Within the limits set by shipping and man-power, as well as the loss of agricultural land during the last twenty years, the Government was able to show satisfactory energy and achievement.

Parliament can claim to have succeeded in leading and expressing the public mind on production, the budget and the war situation. It certainly failed fairly to represent public opinion in England, if not in Wales, on the question

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of Sunday opening of theatres, and in that debate hardly appeared at its best. But its fulfilment of its function of supervision has shown it still disposed to criticise two important aspects of Government policy and administration—the Foreign Office and propaganda, and in this respect it certainly corresponds to informed public opinion.

The House has revealed in questions and in debate a certain uneasiness about the foreign side of our war-time administration. During the debate on the confidence motion on the war situation the feeling was shown to be widespread that the Intelligence and Secret Service were markedly inferior to their counterpart of the last war. It was suggested that they had failed to prepare the Government—or that the Government had not taken enough notice of their reports—for developments in Iraq and Libya. The suspicions of this kind which existed a year ago, when it was a question of knowing the German intentions in Scandinavia, had clearly survived, if they had not even been strengthened, during a period which had also seen the failure at Dakar. The fear was also evident that new battlefields, such as Tangier, Morocco, Syria, might show new gaps in the Government's information service. It is true that the Prime Minister managed to dispel some doubts by revealing the smallness of the German forces used in Libya and mentioning military mistakes committed there, as well as by his suggestion that we had forestalled the Axis in Iraq, a suggestion difficult to reconcile with the news we broadcast after Rashid Ali's coup which led the public to believe that his pro-Axis government was going to be friendly to us after all.

Suspicion of a continuing appeasement policy has been constantly voiced. Questions have shown a critical attitude among several Members in different parts of the House on the Loan Agreement with Spain. That country's official and strong declarations of friendship with the Axis and hostility to England leave no doubt where it stands; it is naturally believed, therefore, that money lent, and goods allowed to pass through the blockade, eventually reach our enemies. So great is the scarcity in Spain that this may not be so, but the policy followed in the past by our Ambassador when there was no such excuse for it encourages these doubts

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about the wisdom of the present policy. The Prime Minister has thought it necessary to defend his ex-colleague, and by implication the policy, by saying that "many people thought in July of last year that Spain would enter the war against us, and it is very largely due to the brilliant discharge of his duties in Spain that our relations with that country have tended to improve and not to deteriorate at this critical time." Doubts about the policy with regard to Spain extend to the Tangier zone, where acts of an intention clearly hostile and dangerous to us have had to be defended as legal by Mr. Butler. The truth is that we are now faced with the consequences of our past failure to support a friendly Spanish democracy—a failure condemned at the time by several members of the present Government; and now, whatever policy we pursue is fraught with danger.

This suspicion of continuing appeasement tendencies, however, is by no means confined to our relations with Spain. There has been some accusation of our using "kid-glove" methods for attacking Italy, and disappointment at our having failed to bomb more key-points in the Italian fatherland. Although there may be an answer to that in terms of strategy, the Prime Minister himself has suggested by the nature of his broadcast to Italians that the onslaught is rather on Mussolini than on Fascism. Of our attitude to Vichy too, until the close of the period here under review, it might be wondered whether we were being as firm as we could be. The strong approval shown to Mr. Eden's statement on May 22nd that "we shall no longer feel bound to draw any distinction between occupied and unoccupied territories in the execution of our military plans" gave final proof of the feelings of the House. That his declaration meant what it said was shown by the bombing only a few days later, not only of aerodromes in Syria used by Nazi planes, but of an Italian munitions ship which took refuge in the Tunisian harbour of Sfax, and soon afterwards by the invasion of Syria.


The failure to resume diplomatic relations with Mexico owing to the oil dispute has also been criticised, impatience being shown at disagreement of this nature being permitted to stand in the way of friendship with one of the key countries of Latin America. Nor is the House entirely satisfied that

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Anglo-Russian relations need stay in the impasse which they appear to have reached.

Closely allied with the foreign question is the whole issue of propaganda. About this "fourth arm" at least as much doubt continues to find expression; it is interesting to find that doubt is by no means confined to such circles as those represented by Mr. Noel Baker and Mr. Vernon Bartlett, but has also been voiced by active service Members. This attitude has been shown in debates on adjournment, on supply, and by questions. Criticism of the B.B.C. has led to the reconstitution of the Board of Governors, which had been closed down since the outbreak of war. Foreign propaganda—in particular our broadcasts to Germany and the holding up of news for America—has come under discussion; there have been suggestions of indifference or incompetence. It has been urged that this work ought to be directly under the Minister of Information. To meet the acknowledged difficulties of that Minister in obtaining sufficient recognition on the part of the service and home departments of the importance of giving the news at the right time, in the right way, and to the right extent, it has been claimed again that he ought to enjoy greater authority, and that there should be someone in the War Cabinet responsible for this important part of our war strategy. Our propaganda has been unfavourably compared with the services performed under the direction of Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Northcliffe during the last war. Staffing in particular, and accommodation also, have been criticised. The belief in the importance of this work was well put by Mr. Duff-Cooper himself: "as the war approaches a critical stage, and as the prospects of victory draw nearer, so the importance of this weapon will become ever greater, and will hasten the collapse of the enemy which our Army, Navy and Air Force will prepare." He admitted the possible justice of the case made nearly a year ago by Mr. Baker who had advocated "an entire reorganisation of the system of foreign broadcasting, that it should be taken away from the B.B.C. and placed completely under Government control, separated materially and mentally from the authorities who had hitherto controlled it, and housed in a separate building. Looking back," the Minister said, "I am quite prepared now

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to say that that might have been the right thing to try ; but it is difficult to reform your army on a new basis in the middle of a battle." His defence was the maintenance of continuity and a general improvement still in progress.

The Hess affair, and treatment of other items of news, such as the invasions of Cyrenaica and Jugoslavia, has also led to criticism of the efficiency of our information service. Certainly more will be heard of this problem which, whether or not it be on the way to solution, has clearly not yet been solved. The same may be said of the associated issue of our intelligence services, the co-ordination of which and the better linking with policy and with news is a question that as yet has only been raised.

The House has carried out in secret session its supervision of the Ministries of Shipping and Economic Warfare, but it has revealed in open debate a disposition to doubt whether we have woken up to the full necessities of shipbuilding and whether Mr. Dalton is not sometimes too optimistic in estimating the effects of his department's work. Both questions, however, are so much governed by what the Admiralty can do that the public is necessarily left in considerable ignorance. A department which has been more extensively criticised is the Home Office. Apart from the eternal vigilance so well shown by Miss Rathbone on behalf of internees, and actively expressed by several members during the debate on the Isle of Man (Detention) Bill (a technical measure due solely to the fact that the Isle of Man is not legally part of the United Kingdom), there was some criticism of the Home Secretary for having failed to produce his scheme for converting the fire services into a national organisation under his control. The House of Commons, at least, could not be accused of delay for it passed the necessary measure as a matter of urgency through all stages in a single day, May 20th. The Ministry of Works and Buildings was interestingly described by Mr. Hicks on March 19th.

The Empire has been the subject of more than one debate. The Colonial Office has had to answer for conditions in the North Rhodesian copperbelt, when concern was expressed at the lowness of wages ; and the India Office has had,

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unfortunately, to come to the House for a renewal for another twelve months of the Proclamation suspending Parliamentary government. Mr. Amery was careful to point out that whatever unrest there may be in India was not the consequence, even though it clearly was the cause, of this suspension. He also stressed the fact that it did not apply to four out of the eleven provinces, which include one-third of the total population, and "which are still enjoying the advantages of democratic self-government" after four years. Here "ministers and legislators," he said, "have continued to gain experience and are making their effective contribution, not only to the welfare of their constituents within the wide sphere of their direct authority, but to India's general war effort. I think we ought not to underestimate the significance of this remarkable advance in self-government over so large a field. Nor can we afford to ignore the importance of the voice which these Provinces, through their Governments, are bound to exercise in any deliberations affecting the future constitution of India." The Government's "deep regret" at the attitude of the Congress which had rendered parliamentary government impossible for the other two-thirds of India was shown to be shared on all sides of the House with regard to the situation as a whole. Indeed, a debate which will no doubt be read by many Indians proved, at least, that there is no absence of good will in any section of the House. There was a disposition to feel that, regrettable though the situation was, little more could be done at present from our side to improve it. Suggestion was made, however, that were the Secretary of State himself to go to India, or other steps to be taken to bring home more forcibly the unity of that good will, something further might be achieved, not only in bringing about agreement but in usefully and more effectively adding the great force represented by Indians' detestation of Nazism to our own. Concern has been frequently expressed at the number of political prisoners and there have been questions about the conditions under which they are confined.

The House has carried through a large volume of legislation. The National Service Bill placed civil defence services on a footing with the armed forces in respect of conscription.

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Amendments to exempt M.P.'s and conscientious objectors were refused. The Liabilities (War-Time Adjustment) Bill is an extension of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act. Its main feature is the setting up of liabilities adjustment officers to facilitate agreement, in place of litigation or bankruptcy, as a solution of the problems of financial obligations made unreasonable by the war. If agreement is reached on such adjustment the officer's finding is given legal validity; if this fails, the Court can still enforce reasonable terms under the earlier Act. In principle the adjustment officer is empowered to reduce or postpone rent, for example, in relation to a house to safeguard the home and family, and in relation to business premises to safeguard the continued existence of the business. The main criticism was the familiar one, that some such measure should have been introduced long ago.

Two other Bills gave rise to more disagreement. The Public and Other Schools (War Conditions) Bill was chiefly remarkable for the argument it produced that the Government had failed to use the present opportunity to review the whole position of these public schools. It was buttressing them with special favours in permitting them to convert trust monies left, perhaps, for the foundation of a scholarship to perpetuate their own existence. As the terms of the Bill were confined to the legalising of such conversion of monies, debate upon it on the lines desired by several Members proved difficult. There was some conflict between Mr. Bevan and the Speaker, and many speeches were prefaced by complaint of the consequences of the restrictive ruling. The general effect did seem to suggest that the Board of Education will have to take a bolder line in coping with the question of the place of such schools in the national scheme of education.

The Allied Powers (Maritime Courts) Bill appeared a fairly innocent measure to empower Allied Governments now in this country to enforce their own law on seamen of their own nationality. It gave rise, however, to some heat, the chief objection being a retrospective clause foreign, it was claimed, to the normal principles of our legislation. Having opposed amendment and divided both the Committee and the Labour Party on this clause, the Government eventually gave way.

REFLECTIONS ON LORD BALDWIN

By A. L. ROWSE

"There is one other thing. The greatest crime to our own people is to be afraid to tell the truth." (*Mr. Baldwin, Debate on Armaments, House of Commons, July, 1934.*)

"My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. . . . Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was re-arming and that we must re-arm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain." (*Mr. Baldwin, Debate on Defence of the Country, House of Commons, November, 1936.*)

"The responsibility of Ministers for the public safety is absolute and requires no mandate." (*Mr. Winston Churchill, House of Commons, November, 1936.*)

"We never worry. Worry works internally and affects the nervous system." (*Lord Baldwin, The Falconer Lectures, Toronto, April, 1939.*)

FOR fifteen years, at a most critical juncture in our history, from the fall of Mr. Lloyd George in 1922 to Neville Chamberlain's assumption of the Premiership in 1937, Mr. Baldwin was the most powerful man in British politics. It has not been given to many of our modern statesmen to enjoy such a long, and almost unbroken, run of power. In fact, it would be out of the question for anybody who was not the leader of the Conservative Party, who had not behind him all the forces of which only the Conservative Party can dispose, the City of London, the banks, industry, the land—or, at any rate, the landlords, the farmers and the bulk of their obedient tenants and labourers—most of the newspapers, the Church—that other organ of propaganda, the aristocracy, the middle classes, upper and lower, the infinite and incalculable influences of respectability and social snobbery—in short, all the holders and supporters of power. Nobody who represented the other side, or—though he might be a man of genius—was outside that camp, had the slightest chance. But it happens that in Mr. Baldwin the English middle classes had a man after their own heart. No man of genius could have disputed

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his ascendancy with them. There was, in fact, such a man whom they could have called upon to lead the nation through those difficult and dangerous years: the great man whose unbreakable spirit and resolution inspires us in the trials of this war which need never have come upon us if the country had but heeded his warnings. But the Conservative Party would have none of his leadership.

In 1922 it chose a quite unknown man, the "cabin-boy" instead of the "captain"—as Lord Birkenhead commented contemptuously but not inaptly—and held him in power and esteem throughout the whole of this period 1922 to 1937, in the course of which we lost all that we had won at a cost of four years of war in 1914-1918 and at the sacrifice of over a million British dead. Nor was that all: it landed us, after years of unchallenged power, in another war in far more dangerous circumstances, when all has to be fought over again, only twenty years after emerging from the first with complete and absolute victory. In incalculably worsened circumstances: last time, after eight years of Liberal government, the ablest we have had in modern times, when the war came we had France and Russia on our side, and Japan and Italy and the United States, to say nothing of smaller peoples. This time, after twenty years of Conservative rule, twenty of the most disgraceful years in our history, we are fighting for our lives, and virtually alone.

It is of the first importance to bring home whose responsibility it is to the right quarters, if we are to learn the lesson of the past for the benefit of the future. As Mr. Churchill has said: "We are not in a position to say: 'The past is the past.' We cannot say: 'The past is the past,' without surrendering the future." Political leaders cannot abnegate responsibility for what happens to the country under their leadership; again, as Mr. Churchill has said: "The responsibility of Ministers for the public safety is absolute and requires no mandate."

In Mr. Baldwin the Conservative Party and the occult influences, which through its agency rule the country, had a man after their own heart. Coming from the Western Midlands—that stupidest and most sluggish region of the country politically—not a far cry from Birmingham, that

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fons et origo malorum of British politics in the past three-quarters of a century, here was no Welsh genius whose energy and vision might run counter to the interests of property, however indispensable they had found his services in 1914-1919. Here was no Churchill with an historian's inconvenient understanding of the basic necessities of British policy in Europe and the world beyond. They wanted to forget; they wanted to make money; they wanted to return to the so comfortable world (for them) which they had inhabited before 1914. So they chose "a person of the utmost insignificance," as Lord Curzon bitterly lamented. It is the nation that has had cause to lament it since. But from their point of view Mr. Baldwin had two great advantages: an industrialist himself, he could be depended upon to see things in terms which would suit the interests of "industry." He did: witness the General Strike and his rôle as saviour of the nation in 1926. (There would have been more point if he had acted as the saviour of the nation from the greater dangers of 1933 onwards; but that would not have suited the purposes of "industry" so well. The whole logic of the attitude of "industry" to Nazi Germany pointed to a deal with it; and it must not be forgotten that at the moment Hitler was invading Czecho-Slovakia, representatives of the F.B.I. were in Düsseldorf negotiating an understanding with their German confrères.) But a second, and hardly less important, consideration: Mr. Baldwin talked the language of the people; his was a plain, straightforward, bluff, honest, truthful personality such as the people could understand. These were democratic days. Mr. Baldwin's expressed sympathies were all in favour of democracy. Was he not himself a strong supporter of the extension of the franchise, especially to women?—in itself a great proof of democratic sympathies, while at the same time not at all a bad move for the interests of the Conservative Party, since women are much more conservative than men.

So they gave him their confidence as few party-leaders have been given it—not clever men like Balfour or Disraeli before him, certainly not to great men like Gladstone or Peel or Canning or Pitt. For Mr. Baldwin was an inferior man,

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and that appealed to the great mass of inferior people who are the electorate and love that sort of thing. They felt safe with him—when they did not feel safe with Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Churchill. Do they feel so safe to-day, I wonder? They were very happy and content to go on, year after year, with him, in spite of the warnings they were given. As a political candidate with a responsibility to the people in my own part of the country, the county of Cornwall, I warned them again and again of the fatal indolence and irresponsibility of this man who was Prime Minister of Great Britain. They preferred not to listen; they are paying for it now. But who am I to complain when not all the eloquence, the experience, the hereditary position, the great name of a Churchill had the slightest effect (and there were others: the best elements in the nation) on a lulled and fascinated and befuddled people? For years this man held office and power and respect and consideration. All that suffered was the long-range interests and the security of Great Britain and the Empire. It is impossible for him now to avoid responsibility. His career and personality, above all his technique of managing the electorate and his appeal, are phenomena of the first importance to be studied for all who wish to understand the true character of British democracy and its workings in the past twenty years and who desire to avoid the mistakes, the fundamental fraud running through the whole system as it has been operated, and for which we are paying so heavily now.

This is not the place to review his whole disastrous record, but simply to concentrate on the evidence which his speeches afford us on those few cardinal points which are most relevant to the crucial question of leadership in a democracy. It is because of the failure there that we have to go through the ordeal that we are now going through. *It need never have happened.* It need never have happened had this man done his plain and simple duty by the people who were in his care—who trusted him as they trusted no one (more fools they!), whose trust he at every moment and in every speech solicited, flattered, conjured—and ended by betraying more completely than we have ever known in our history.

What did Mr. Baldwin really think about democracy,

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about the people who were such fools as to go on supporting him? What was his attitude on the crucial questions of responsibility and leadership?

Mr. Arthur Bryant in his official tribute to Mr. Baldwin "written in all humility as a tribute to a great Englishman at the hour of his retirement") tells us that "more than any public man of his generation, Mr. Baldwin has believed in democracy because he has believed in the common man. Like Cromwell and Lincoln, he learnt to know and love him" . . . etc. It is certainly the common man who is now suffering from the ardour of that belief in him, from the too close and stifling embrace of that love for him. Better the withering contempt of a Swift or a Strafford, a Voltaire or a Shaw for the qualities of the common man—provided only there were some glimmer of a sense of responsibility for him, some care for his simplicity and credulity, some respect for his faith and loyalty which treated him as he deserves to be treated for his hard, laborious days, warning him faithfully of his dangers, thinking ahead for him, telling him the truth about things, guiding him, protecting him, leading him; not using your wits, your cunning to lull him into a sense of false security, telling him that all is well so long as he trusts you, then letting him down, failing him at the moment of greatest danger. Better a thousand times an honest contempt for the people, and a respect for their defencelessness, than this kind of Conservative humbug!

"The impression which like most of my countrymen I had formed of him by hearsay—of a sincere, honest, but not very strong man—vanished in a moment," says Mr. Bryant. He was certainly not honest, nor in the end even sincere, if this is what the confused syntax of that sentence is intended to imply. But apparently not: "Honesty and sincerity were written all over his face, but there was more. . . . Strength above all other qualities is his chief attribute. I never met any man who carried so much of it in his bearing: it communicates itself to others." (Notably in the National Government, I suppose?) "Like the Bishop of Worcester, remembering all that might have happened in our land but for his life of love and service, one thanks God for him." So much for Mr. Bryant!

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In all his speeches Mr. Baldwin always made great play with the idea of himself as a democrat, flattering the British people with constant appeals to their weakest side—their distrust of intelligence (so different from the great days of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries when the foundations of the British Empire were laid, and so different, alas, in consequences then and to-day!); constantly playing up to their silliest side, their love of moralising, their love of seeing themselves as neither clever nor logical, as other people are supposed to be, but honest and good; pandering to the gallery with his insistent depreciation of intelligence—as if this great country achieved its name and fame in the world by ignorance and foolery; in the end posturing before the people, a caricature of himself, the old Harrovian who has talked pulp to the people until his mind has come to consist of the pulp in which he dealt so long and so successfully. The contrast it is to read yards and yards of these sickening, nauseating speeches in Hansard with their diseased egoism—their chief concern always being not the issue in hand, not the pros and cons of policy, but how he is appearing to the people—speeches intellectually intervebrate, without shape or style—and, on the other hand, the speeches of Mr. Churchill, always addressed to the matter in hand, devoting “fundamental brain-work” to the issues of policy upon which depends the well-being and safety of the nation, and at the same time admirably constructed, full of wit and humour, and inspired by a profound sense of responsibility and an historian’s sense of the needs of policy. Yet the Parliaments of 1931 and 1935, and the people outside, listened to the former and would not hear the latter, until events made them hear, and with a vengeance.

For Mr. Baldwin told them, in every speech, always that *he* was the democrat. In the very speech in which he had to defend himself in the House of Commons for the trickery of the attempted Hoare-Laval deal with Mussolini only a few months after winning an overwhelming majority on the plea of pursuing a League of Nations policy, Mr. Baldwin said: “I shall always trust the instincts of our democratic people.” This is the very speech in which he was forced to stand in the white sheet of a penitent for having misled them for

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months on this issue, as he had been misleading them for years on other and even more dangerous issues. What is the clue to his behaviour? It is to be found in a speech in the House in 1934: “Mr. Keynes told me ten years ago that it is quite impossible to make the English people think, and that I was wasting my time, but I did make a great effort then.” Apparently he had desisted ever since. Now ten years takes us back to the election of 1924, when the Conservative Party, by its skilful and unscrupulous exploitation of the Red Letter scare, obtained a large majority for the next five years: which they used to return to the Gold Standard in the interests of the City, thereby throttling British exports, their remedy for this being to reduce wages and so force the General Strike—which they were able to represent as a danger to the nation and easily defeat, institute a deflationary policy under the ægis of Montagu Norman which set in train the world economic depression, while such time as they could spare from these activities they spent in neglecting the fundamental problems of European order.

But—and this is the point—the year before, Mr. Baldwin, who as an industrialist was, of course, a protectionist, had gone to the country for a mandate for tariffs and been defeated. After that, never again. He had learnt his lesson. Mr. Bryant lets the cat out of the bag. “He imagined he could show the creature [i.e. the electorate] its mistake by reasoning with it. . . . He did not know them as well as he supposed.” Never again after that. The whole art of politics became for him the art of taking the people in, telling them what they wanted to hear, waiting to see which way they were moving, and then—the leader of the greatest party in the State, Prime Minister of Great Britain, responsible for the lives and security of forty-five million people—following safely, belatedly, cautiously after. “Safety First” was the motto under which he fought his elections and conducted his manoeuvres: meaning safety for himself and for the Conservative Party. It must be admitted that he was very successful at that game; its ultimate consequences for the country are to be seen in our wrecked and ruined towns, in the City, in Westminster, in Birmingham, Coventry, Sheffield, Liverpool, Southampton, Portsmouth, Plymouth—all of which

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supported him and his disastrous party through thick and thin¹—and now must pay for it.

Henceforward for the rest of his career, the country was to be governed by what can only be described as the consistent application of the confidence trick. He had found it worked so well; he was such a past-master of the art, with his appearance and technique. It reminds one of the distinguished public servant, a friend of mine, who once came upon Mr. Baldwin alone in a room at some country house practising various angles at which to hold his pipe, before a mirror. His line at the time of the General Strike was really the confidence trick practised upon the country—only people had not come to recognise it then. "We must resist this unconstitutional threat to the nation, and once that is defeated you can trust me to see that justice is done to the miners." Justice never was done to the miners. The most ambitious and æsthetically complete example (Mr. Baldwin was an artist) of the confidence trick was the panic election of 1931. The old and worn-out hacks of the Labour Party were taken in, MacDonald, Snowden, the celebrated Jimmy Thomas: people are taken in chiefly because they want to be taken in, witness Hitler's technique with the propertied classes of Europe from 1933 on. Mr. Baldwin was very self-effacing; he was ready to surrender the first place in the National Government to the vainest of his dupes. It was very cunning; he did not have to take responsibility openly—until the fact that MacDonald was gaga became too evident. Meanwhile, ensconced in the background, the unchallenged leader of the Conservative Party, the reins of power were safely in his hands and theirs. It was very clever: it was not a Conservative Government that ran the country through all those years from 1931 on, until it ran the country on the rocks. Oh, dear me, no!—it was a National Government. To-day the name of National Government stinks in the nostrils of all decent people, so that a government of national safety, that really represents the nation, got together in the moment of greatest danger to save the country from the consequences of those hideous, disgraceful years from 1931, will not even take up the name from the gutter.

¹ I except Bristol from this stricture.

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The confidence trick was played again and again, not only over great issues of policy, but over lesser matters, not only in the General Elections, 1935 as well as 1931, but over the Hoare-Laval swindle, most dangerously of all over the question of German re-armament with all its related and subordinate issues, the solemn pledges of air-parity with Germany given by Mr. Baldwin to Parliament and the country, the holding up of a promised Ministry of Defence for nine months and then the appointment of an Inskip as Minister—a typical piece of wool-pulling across the eyes of the public; the giving of mistaken figures as to German air-strength in the House of Commons so as to throw doubt on Mr. Churchill's estimates, when the latter turned out to be more than justified in his warnings, the reiterated assurance that everything was all right, you can trust the Government.

Old Baldwin's in his heaven:

All's well with the world—

when everything was far from well, and Mr. Churchill was at length driven to describe the confidence trick in so many words. In the summer of 1936 when Mussolini had carried through the conquest of Abyssinia and was forming the Axis with Hitler to carry forward their joint aggression in Spain, Mr. Churchill said: "We are told 'Trust the National Government. Have confidence in the Prime Minister (Mr. Baldwin), with the Lord President of the Council (Mr. MacDonald) at his side. Do not worry. Do not get alarmed. A great deal is being done. No one could do more.' And the influence of the Conservative Party machine is being used through a thousand channels to spread this soporific upon Parliament and the nation. But, I am bound to ask, has not confidence been shaken by various things that have happened, and are still happening?"

That summer and autumn, while Hitler and Mussolini were now in a position to put into execution their far-seeing campaign of aggression against the British Empire, beginning with Spain, it became clear that all hope of air-parity with Germany had now vanished and that there was no likelihood of our catching them up in re-armament. Mr. Churchill initiated a debate on the state of the country's defences. He

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recalled Mr. Baldwin's specific pledge given as long ago as 1934, three years before :

"Any Government of this country—a National Government more than any—and this Government, will see to it that in air strength and air power this country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores."

Mr. Churchill underlined the fact that responsibility was never "more directly assumed in a more personal manner." Yet the solemn pledge was never fulfilled in general outline, any more than the particular steps necessary to implement it were carried out. Sir Samuel Hoare, then First Lord of the Admiralty, was put up to answer : "I am authorised to say that the position is satisfactory. . . . We are always reviewing the position." Mr. Churchill commented : "Everything, he assured us, is entirely fluid. I am sure that is true. Anyone can see what the position is. The Government simply cannot make up their minds, or they cannot get the Prime Minister to make up his mind. . . . So we go on preparing more months and years—precious, perhaps vital to the greatness of Britain—for the locusts to eat. They will say to me : 'A Minister of Supply is not necessary, for all is going well.' I deny it. 'The position is satisfactory,' It is not true. 'All is proceeding according to plan.' We know what that means." Mr. Churchill went on to give evidences that no attempt had been made to carry out the pledge or equip the Army properly : searchlight companies without searchlights, the Army lacking "almost every weapon which is required for the latest form of modern war. Where are the anti-tank guns, where are the short-distance wireless sets, where are the field anti-aircraft guns against low-flying armoured aeroplanes ?" In the air we had already fallen more than a third behind Germany—three years after a solemn pledge to keep parity. He called upon the Prime Minister to account for his responsibility before the nation.

In reply Mr. Baldwin made one of the most ignominious confessions that have ever fallen from the lips of a British Minister. He admitted that "from 1933 I and my friends were all very worried about what was happening in Europe. . . . But I would remind the House that not once, but on many

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occasions . . . when I have been speaking and advocating as far as I am able the democratic principle, I have stated that a democracy is always two years behind the dictator. I believe that to be true. It has been true in this case." He went on to excuse himself on the score of the Fulham by-election in 1933, when the National Government lost one of the 550 seats it won by the dirty panic of 1931. "My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. . . . Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was re-arming and that we must re-arm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment ? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain. . . . Frankly, I could conceive that we should at that time, by advocating certain courses, have been a great deal less successful."

So that was the explanation : the trickery of a party manager where there should have been the sense of responsibility of a Prime Minister of Great Britain, if not of a leader of the Conservative Party, for the safety of the nation. This barely-concealed distrust of the people who were following him was the deepest slander upon them, as was seen from the way they rallied in the worst circumstances of defeat and the fall of France last year to the sincere and candid leadership of a Churchill.

In fact, nothing could be meaner than the attempt to shuffle off the responsibility from the shoulders where it properly lay—upon the country, upon the electorate, upon the League of Nations Union, upon Lord Cecil and Professor Murray, upon the Labour Party—anybody rather than that party and its leader which had enjoyed the fullest power throughout that decade from 1931. They now say : "We were all to blame." It is very generous of them : another variety of the confidence trick. Mr. Churchill has himself disposed of these excuses once and for all : "What is this argument that it was necessary to wait for the General Election before Ministers could do their duty and place their country in a state of security ? . . . It has been said that before the General Election there was no mandate to do it, but there is no mandate so imperative on Ministers of the Crown as

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that they should guard the safety of the country. Throughout the last Parliament there was never a moment when the Prime Minister could not have asked both Houses of Parliament to support him in any measures necessary to maintain the security of the country. Nothing relieves Ministers from that prime duty. It is the first object for which Governments are called into being." Even earlier, Mr. Churchill had scotched any such excuse: "I have been told that the reason for the Government not having acted before was that public opinion was not ripe for re-armament. I hope that we shall never accept such a reason as that. The Government have been in control of overwhelming majorities in both Houses of Parliament. There is no vote they could not have proposed for the national defence which would not have been accepted. . . . As for the people, nothing that has ever happened in this country could lead Ministers of the Crown to suppose that when a serious case of public danger is put to them they will not respond to any request."

On one of his tours of a blitzed town recently, greeted by the cheers of people who had been bombed out of house and home, who had lost everything, Mr. Churchill praised their spirit and said: "I can never deserve it." But he had already deserved their trust, not only for his own magnificent courage and determination, but for the years in which he fought against that majority which nothing could shake, for the safety and security of the nation. During all these years Mr. Baldwin held power in fuller measure and with a larger majority than it has ever been given to a political leader in this country. On the fundamental test of the responsibility of leaders to the country whose destinies they guide, he is tried and found wanting. His whole career throws a searching light upon the crucial question for the future, that of leadership in a democracy. His often-protested belief in democracy is seen to be largely humbug; his trust in the people, in the literal sense hypocrisy, even if he himself was not aware that he was playing a part; his career of "love and service" to consist mainly of keeping the country safe for the Conservative Party. On rule by the confidence trick, that most penetrating of political observers, Low, is at one with Mr. Churchill. It is true that rule by confidence trick prevails even more in

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totalitarian states where there is no criticism. But it is even more dangerous for a democracy, which depends for its very existence upon a genuine and unfalsified political life, and where this kind of rule does not even achieve power.

Mr. Baldwin, now elevated to the peerage as Lord Baldwin, lives still in possession of his honours, if not of honour, and presumably of a pension for his services. But what can this man think in the still watches of the night, when he contemplates the ordeal his country is going through as the result of the years, the locust years, in which he held power?

THE MANY GERMANYS

By HERSIN

I—THIS GERMANY

BEFORE Bismarck threw the Second Empire together, with violent and therefore unsteady hand, there were almost as many Germanys as there were thinking, or rather dreaming, Germans. Throughout the Middle Ages and during the centuries that followed, the German Empire was more of a dream than an idea, more of an idea than a clearly-defined reality. And so it remained until the year 1871. From that point until 1918 Germans were just about equally divided into those who were content, and had more or less ceased to dream, and those who had begun to dream of a Germany freer than the Empire of Bismarck's making. Their hour seemed to have struck in the year 1918. But the Weimar Republic was a failure and so the dreaming of another Germany began again.

Into these no longer innocent dreams stepped the sleep-walker Adolf Hitler. He roused in the dreamers all those hopes, desires and lusts which had been going about Germany for the last thousand years, and he promised to fulfil them. He is the most daring gambler who has ever sat down at the political gaming-tables of Europe, and he began to play with all the sinister dreams and visions and inclinations of the German people. He cheated his honourable, but alas! diffident, opponents out of the game. He had false cards enough up his sleeve.

Of these, the most false, and the most important to the gambler, was called "*Gleichschaltung*" (conformity). With this he destroyed what was left of true German-ness in Germany, namely the variety and differentiation of the German "clans" and of their spiritual resources, the fruitful rivalry between one German conception and another, the receptivity of Germany, as the land of the Centre, to European ideas from East and West and its readiness and ability to work them out. Hitler's outstanding crime was the deliberate destruction of German individualism, which had in it something essentially European. In so doing he outstripped Italian Fascism and

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very nearly caught up with the Bolshevism of Stalin. Certainly he succeeded in transforming as by magic—black magic indeed!—the most many-coloured nation of the Western hemisphere into one uniform grey mass.

How he accomplished this is significant enough and of sufficient consequence to merit a short description. It was by using the pincer technique, familiar through so many recent war manœuvres. With the two arms of the pincers he gripped and held the body of the German people.

First he made "civilian" Germany totalitarian. After two years—the process was complete by the spring of 1936—he had destroyed all types of civilian power, all organisations and groupings of civilians that opposed National Socialism or displayed only a half-hearted enthusiasm for it.

The only surviving organisation of the kind is the Catholic Church—but she survives in chains. True, the Protestant "Confessional" Church also represents a community held together from within and presenting a united front towards the outside world, that is, against National Socialism. But she consciously limits her influence to parochial matters and, in the strictest sense, to the religious life of her adherents. Even so her leaders are persecuted and imprisoned.

Thus it is true to say that the boundaries of National Socialism coincide with the boundaries of the Germany of to-day. The domestic policy of the Nazis has been to surround themselves with a desert belt of impotence. In creating it they have spared nothing, from the trades unions and the former political parties to the Rotary and Welcome Clubs. Organisations devoted to the arts and sciences, to social intercourse and hobbies, Bridge Clubs, circles interested in the occult and in anthroposophy—all without exception have been brought under Nazi control. You may not tell fortunes, you may not give acrobatic performances in public unless you are a Nazi. It is a unity and absoluteness of power hitherto unknown in the history of Germany and of Europe.

This being so, it is inevitable that the outside world should see and judge the German people as National Socialists. The last shreds of individualism have been torn from the nation of individualists. The strength of the "Third Empire," in the enslaved Germany of to-day, rests on the discrediting and

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spurning of all individualistic yearnings and tendencies. The German spirit is confined to barracks.

The other arm of Hitler's pincers is called war-preparations. It is difficult to decide (and of no practical importance) whether the war for which the Nazis have rapidly and consistently prepared since 1933 was—and is—an end in itself or whether it is only the means to an end, namely the consolidation of the Nazi power inside Germany. It has always been clear that the day would come when Hitler would have to choose between war and his own downfall. The influence of capitalistic enterprises, dependent on export for their existence, was still too powerful. Only by harnessing them to the state by means of war-preparations could they be subjected to it and to Hitlerism.

Of still greater importance is the fact that universal conscription brought every young German under National Socialist influence and discipline. Thus did Hitler's pincers get their final grip on the German nation. Those who had managed to escape being ground small by the "Movement" found themselves caught in the machinery of the new German militarism. The ever-increasing "*Gleichschaltung*" of the Army, which preceded conscription, is one of the most cunning achievements of National Socialism. The Prussian-German officer caste, hitherto so proud of its tradition, bowed to the supreme command of a "corporal" and opened its once exclusive ranks—at one time in Germany it was easier to become a professor or a "*Geheimrat*" than a lieutenant!—to the protégés of a "Socialist" party.

Thus arose the one united Germany, which the world in peace-time failed to recognise clearly and has had perforce to discover in this war. It is important to understand what the character of this Germany is, and perhaps even more important to understand what it is not. We have already seen how German individualism was crushed and ground. It used to represent what might be called German ethics, custom and piety. With it they disappeared. They fell into the abyss, because nothing and no one was there to uphold them. Unless this is grasped it is impossible to understand the proclamation and acclamation of that most despicable of all principles ever set up by a state: namely, justice (and with it

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of course, morality) is that which is profitable to the state (and therefore, of course, to the Party which alone represents the state). The public conscience is a thing of the past in Germany. Or has anyone heard of a single judge or a single teacher who resigned rather than administer or teach this new principle of right and justice? (Those who might have so acted had already been deprived of office because their views were not the "right" ones.) On the contrary, for instance, there is to-day in the University of Berlin a chair of Political Pedagogy (Ethics). Its occupant, Alfred Baeumler, is the editor of the most popular German edition of Nietzsche's works. The only possible comment is supplied by the title of one of Nietzsche's best-known books: "*Jenseits von Gut und Boese*" (Beyond Good and Evil).

At this point we are confronted with one of the most ill-omened phenomena in the public life of Germany. The country has hardly ever had a genuine code of public morals emanating from the state and therefore from the nation. The limits of German individualism mark also the limits of German moral sensitiveness. The German nation has never been nation enough to exercise moral compulsion on the individual. The whole has never been morally superior to the parts. The opposite has been nearer the truth. Moral compulsions began with individuals who attempted to influence the state and the nation. Thieves are no commoner in Germany than in other countries, but the various German classes and groups have always been peculiarly irresponsible and unscrupulous in their behaviour towards the state and towards their fellow-citizens. This applies equally to the unprincipled claims to overlordship made by the Prussian Junkers as to the long and tender cherishing of the class-war theory by the Social Democrats. The ironic lines of the poet: "*Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein, So hau' ich dir den Schaedel ein*" (And wilt thou not my brother be, I'll break thy dirty neck for thee) has always been taken quite seriously.

The Weimar Republic was to set aside this unmoral and violent tradition in favour of more civilised principles and methods. At last there was to be in Germany a central authority which would recognise the equal rights, the freedom and the interdependence of all. The constitution (drawn up

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incidentally by the democratic Jewish scholar and politician, Preuss) was a good one. But it remained little more than a scrap of paper. It was never translated into reality.

History will ascribe to the Republic the virtue of having protected the German people—beaten, starved, deceived down to the very day of the Armistice—from civil war and Bolshevism. It may be that, in its anxiety to keep the peace or to restore it as quickly as possible, it failed to fulfil its promises and obligations to the workers, peasants, and soldiers. All the greater should have been the gratitude of the middle classes, the nobility and the big industrialists. Instead of this the greater part of the bourgeoisie, as soon as it felt safe enough politically, turned its back on the Republic and played political opposition as in a badly-staged play. Industry and big business exploited the inflation of 1919-23 in their own interests and to the detriment of all other classes of the community. Meanwhile the circles who “counted,” including the nobility, looked about for saviours who should deliver them from the Republic. One of these, with their financial and “moral” backing, was duly anointed.

This demoralised and demoralising behaviour towards the Republic was indicative of the low level to which the nation as such had sunk. The moral disintegration and the flouting of obligations in the “Third Empire” are only the completion of a process which had been going on throughout the period 1919 to 1933. These “fourteen years,” made notorious by Hitler’s references to them in his public speeches, marked a growing apathy and exhaustion in German national life. The nation had proved too weak, too unfit morally, to turn the freedom and equality, that it already had on paper, into the stuff of everyday life. These years brought with them the débâcle of a capitalist and utilitarian society, which, with every year and every election, had moved further and further away from the ideal of a national community.

The rising unemployment was not, as is often wrongly asserted, the cause of the internal decline, but merely its most obvious effect. It was the scourge with which those who wished to hasten and exploit the decline whipped its victims and theirs into the same condition of moral instability as that which prevailed in their own relations to the Republic.

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Hitler put the finishing touches on all that. The result was “his” Germany—a country officially deprived of moral standards, in which every excess and every injustice justified itself, if it served to increase power. The golden freedom of the Republic had remained unminted. German individualism had proved incapable of guarding and using it. Hitler’s grey, monotonous mass was moulded. On its ghost-like countenance were painted the features of life—with highly-coloured flags and badges, with strident placards and slogans, with drums and trumpets. A many-cogged machine was constructed, which, by the manipulation of a few handles, could be converted into a war-machine. The more completely any possibility of moral opposition is excluded, the more smoothly it runs. Every crime demanded by the necessities of war, and far in excess of anything permitted until now, is promptly accomplished. It may be the machine-gunning of women and children in Spain and England, it may be the desolation of defenceless cities like Rotterdam and Belgrade or the invasion of neutral countries inhabited by kindred peoples. A nation that has allowed itself to be robbed of its rights, mishandled and enslaved, has no respect for the freedom and integrity of other nations and men. It treats them in the same way that it has itself been treated. It even finds satisfaction in spreading the spiritual and intellectual anarchy from which it suffers over the whole surface of the earth.

This is Hitler’s Germany. This is the Germany of to-day. Whether it is the “eternal” Germany, and must be the Germany of to-morrow, that is the question.

II—“BLACK RECORD.”

Sir Robert Vansittart has searched German history, from the time of Cæsar and Tacitus, for evidence of Germany’s tendency towards war, conquest and robbery. But one cannot judge even an individual by his sins alone, or a criminal by his earlier offences. How much less a whole nation that settled down in the middle of a small continent, that is, in the midst of dangers and temptations. Let us pass over the potential “Black Records” of other nations, for instance the French or, to go further afield, the Turks. For

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the nations are not only the lords and masters of their history but also its victims, the victims of the conditions under which they live.

In any case Sir Robert is wrong in branding Charlemagne as a German blacksheep. For one thing that great emperor was more of a Frenchman than a German. For another the majority of his wars helped to establish Christianity in Europe, a service which should surely be counted to his credit. He was, so to speak, the "Caliph" of the Christian world. He had a Christian-European mission to fulfil and it is not by chance that the Nazis have denounced him as un-German.

Sir Robert's reference to the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa is equally unfortunate. It will suffice to mention that that savage medieval warrior was cast in precisely the same mould as his contemporaries on the English throne, Henry II and Richard Cœur-de-Lion. Moreover his most unyielding German opponent, the rebel Guelf duke, Henry the Lion, was secretly supported by his father-in-law Henry II of England.

If we are to delve so deep into history—I mean so deep in *time*—why should Sir Robert pay such slight attention to the greatest mass slaughter, the most successful invasions and conquests in Germanic history—the Migration of Nations. At that time the Germans defeated the moribund Roman Empire and set up new kingdoms on its soil. What is left of them now? Nothing but a few buildings, nothing but a few ruins, not even a literary document except Bishop Ulfila's translation of the Bible into Gothic. Not only have the kingdoms themselves disappeared but also the tribes and their descendants. This is the clue to the German tragedy: ever conquering, ever destroying, ever building anew—and all in vain. The greatest adventure of the Germans, the flooding of Southern Europe and the North Coast of Africa, ends in nothingness, in a dead loss. The—to them—foreign soil, foreign climate, foreign civilisation, wipe them out and turn their supposed victory into an eternal defeat. In the German national epic the "*Nibelungenlied*" (Sir Robert rightly draws attention to its intrigues and low-down treacheries) there is a last echo of the tragedy of the Migration, though the material was first collected and given literary form in the later Middle

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Ages. At the court of King Etzel everything that is left of German-ness dies. Never once have the Germans, in spite of all their conquests, been able to keep and hold anything beyond their own borders. That is the tragedy of their overweening self-confidence—to-day, as yesterday and for ever!

Their lust for expansion and their imperialistic ambitions have always been their ruin. The Roman Empire, even at the height of its power, failed to bring them under its control. They remained, until they destroyed it, outside the Roman world order and unaffected by the Roman discipline which was not merely military. For a thousand years and more they constantly displayed a lawlessness which swelled up and overflowed all geographical and moral boundaries. The last display is now being witnessed by a stricken world.

Since Sir Robert, in an attack of historiomania, goes back to the original sins of the Germans, it is relevant to ask here whether these outbreaks of war-like barbarism were due to innate or inculcated characteristics of the Germans, or whether they are not rather traceable to a tragic inability to put their own house in order, so that they feel tempted or impelled to escape from their domestic confusion into the outside world. The only German stock which, admittedly in co-operation with Latin stocks, has been able to evolve a constitution capable of growing and ripening with the centuries—I mean the German Swiss—belongs unquestionably to the most peaceable nations of the world. In the Middle Ages, and even later, the Swiss mercenary was the most sought-after and the most highly-paid of all. But no sooner had this small nation achieved an internal balance of power than it renounced (as a condition and consequence of this same hard-won political freedom) its militaristic vices and transformed them into a virtue—the virtue of militancy in the service of freedom and peace. Why should the Swabians, the Franks and the Bavarians be so different from their near relations, the Swiss?

Different in fact are the Prussians! They are probably the most mixed stock in Europe—the greater part of the original inhabitants were wiped out in the "Christianisation" of the 12th and 13th centuries. They are a nation of soldiers,

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educated as such in the 17th and 18th centuries by the upstart robber dynasty of the Hohenzollerns. The Prussians substituted for the political and war-like day-dreams of the Germans the much more dangerous exact science of politics and war, of peaceful penetration and military conquest. In so doing they enslaved and conquered the rest of Germany.

From the *Great* Elector and Frederick the *Great* to the two alas! *great* world wars of our time, there is a straight and clear line of development. The "greatness" of the Kings, as of the wars, was "made in Prussia." The Prussians are an extremely, a fatally thorough people. Yet German culture has flourished almost entirely outside Prussia. Its home is, roughly speaking, the triangle of which Hamburg forms the apex and Vienna and Basel (or Strassburg) the base. Viewed from this cultural triangle Prussia is a German colony. Here there flourished, in the imperialistic forcing-house, the Prussian-German sergeant-major (*Feldwebel*), a demoniac yet mediocre figure, and the Prussian-general-staff type of brain. Hitler, the outsider and the heretic from the land of culture, Austria, who has fallen from Christianity to heathendom, from the civilisation of the Danube to Prussianism, represents a mixture of both ingredients, as fascinating to the Prusso-Germans as it is revolting to the rest of the world, a mixture of the mediocre and the intellectual. The mediocre has learnt to command and the intellectual to obey. Here is the genesis of that characteristic Prussian perversity which, in the Germany of to-day, is celebrating its triumphs and its excesses.

III—CONCERNING THE GERMAN SPIRIT.

It was the great general Moltke, if I am not mistaken, (incidentally a Dane in the service of Prussia), who said: "The battle of Koenigsgratz was won by the Prussian schoolmaster." The dictum, which might well have been Bismarck's, is typical of the militaristic attitude of Germany, under the influence of the Prussian hegemony, towards education and culture. German minds had succumbed to this influence during the second half of the 19th century, when the new Germany, with Prussia as its centre, took shape.

Until only a very short time before the picture had been

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quite different. One has only to think of Goethe's complete detachment at the time of the Napoleonic wars, and of the visit paid by this greatest of all German poets to the conqueror in Erfurt. Or, to give another example: when Napoleon on the morning of the battle of Jena, in which Prussia was defeated, rode through the university town of Jena, the great philosopher Hegel had just put the finishing touches to his chief book: "The Phenomenology of Spirit" and now stood at his window to see the great Corsican go by. "I have seen the *Weltgeist* (World Spirit) ride past," he wrote enthusiastically. Let us consider one more significant fact, even if it is only loosely connected with the history of German philosophy. The father of the German philosopher Schopenhauer was a well-to-do merchant in Danzig. When, after the Napoleonic wars, this city fell into Prussian hands, he moved to the free Hanse town of Hamburg, saying that he was a free citizen and could not remain in a city that belonged to Prussia. All this happened at a time when Germany was already in danger of "going Prussian," and it suggests the remarkably detached attitude of leading men and circles towards the patriotic "*Schwung*" just then beginning.

The nation of poets and thinkers had not yet lost the habit of dreaming and thinking independently of the politics of the day. The first Prussian, and therefore political, poet of the 19th century was Heinrich von Kleist. Torn between Potsdam and Parnassus, a genius in a vacuum, he took his own life while still a young man! The first Prussian, and therefore political, philosopher was Fichte. The teaching of Kant, which was independent of Prussia-Germany and outside it, was no longer to give rise to laws for all mankind, but, according to Fichte, it was to issue instructions for Prussian citizens and soldiers. Thus German philosophy was subjected to a certain degree of Teutonicisation. It became ambiguous. Hegel's exaggerated dialectic provided both Karl Marx and the German "Tories" with material. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, neither of whom could breathe in the contemporary Prussian atmosphere, became the *frondeurs* and critics of German thinking.

The ideals and conceptions of Nietzsche, that least understood and most misrepresented of the German philosophers,

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did not express harmony with the prevailing Prussian spirit but rather the spirit of opposition to it. Whether the Germany of that time was symbolised in the "mailed fist" of Bismarck or in Wagner's theatrical megalomania, mattered little to Nietzsche, the "good European," as he liked to call himself. His spirit—with its touch of Polish—was too sensitive for the new Prussianised Germany. Only as a madman could he be induced to return to Germany, only when he could no longer defend himself could he be exploited by the Teutons among his fellow-Germans.

Socrates and Plato learnt from their experience with the Sophists that pre-occupation with philosophy can make men vain. Ironically enough one is reminded of this in reading George Santayana's "Egotism in German Philosophy." It is a fact that German vanity has sought and found sustenance in German philosophy. ("Hence the egotist can the more easily mistake his passions for duties, and his cupidities for ideals.") The Germans have, in the latest stage of their imperialistic career, allowed their well-disciplined intelligence to be influenced by philosophical slogans. This, if not this alone, has made the German spirit amenable to the most extravagant and unlawful demands. Philosophy in itself is the opposite to a seducer. But as so often happens, the seduced is, in this case, too, more guilty than the seducer.

In the Germany of to-day there is no living poet or thinker of distinction who has fallen from grace by supporting the National Socialists, with the one exception of the senile Gerhart Hauptmann. It is the day of the third-rate in Germany. The second-rate are guilty of remaining silent or of allowing themselves to be carried along by the stream. Hitler's mediocre mind has discovered for them, as for the majority of the German people, the poison which they cannot resist, the revival of the dream of world domination. This narcotic has its origins in the primeval chaos as in the underworld of the German spirit. Since the Migration it has produced over and over again that patriotic-imperialist delirium which is regularly followed by increasingly horrible hang-overs. From the Migration and the time of Charlemagne onwards, German history has been a series of debauches and returns to sobriety in which the greatest exponents of the

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German spirit have taken no part. German politics have never been more than a poaching on the preserves of German philosophy and poetry. Now these have been completely hounded down, together with German individualism. Anything of them that survives must be sought beyond the borders of Germany.

IV—THE MANY GERMANYS.

German history shows no unbroken line of development. Even the centre of its political life has continually shifted. Under Charlemagne it was on the Rhine and further to the West and South. Then it moved still further south until at last the great medieval Emperor Frederick II actually held his court in Sicily. Only for a time was the geographical centre of Germany (Saxony and Thuringia) also its political centre. Ultimately Vienna became the residence of an imperial Power whose declining authority was filched from it by the Prussian kings.

These geographical changes were accompanied by changes in the character of the German rule. The successive dynasties were as varied as the German stocks from which they came. Between the Swabians, Bavarians and Franconians on the one hand and the Saxons and Prussians on the other, there is at least as much difference as between, let us say, the Prussians and the English or the Franconians and the French. Germany, the German Empire, the German people, were decentralised and attained only under the pressure and domination of Prussia a unity which, as we see to-day, was at best a doubtful experiment.

It was only under the Second Empire that the Prussian attitude became representative of the whole of Germany, and was unfortunately recognised by the latter as such. Thus began the Prussianisation of Germany, which was from the beginning a falsification and became increasingly so as the standardisation of the German people kept pace with it. This standardisation was the source of all evils, the cause of the weakening of German-ness within Germany, despite all efforts to appear powerful. The Prince Consort, who knew his Germans and Prussians, gave as his advice: "Germanise Prussia!" But to-day, when the whole of Germany has been

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Prussianised, and moreover in the extravagant form of Hitlerism, it is necessary that the whole of Germany should be Germanised. And that can only come from the South or from the West. Prussia was born and brought up a military state—a political “*mixtum compositum*,” the product of conquest, treaty-breaking and robbery. Such a state could only be represented by one body: the Army, the instrument of war!

Munich is often accused of being the birthplace of Hitlerism. So it is. But what was the post-war Munich like? The native population, by ancient tradition detached and tolerant, had been completely unbalanced by the grotesque experiment of the Soviet Republic in the spring of 1919. Afterwards the town was flooded with Prussian officers and other reactionaries, such as General Ludendorff. These anti-Republican conspirators, in their public and private meetings, paved the way for National Socialism in Munich. Munich was always a foreigners' city whose tradition it was to serve them. Now she serves the Nazis.

Neither Munich nor Berlin was in itself responsible for the rise of the Nazi movement. Berlin has long ceased to be a Prussian city. It is the creation equally of Slavs and Jews as of Prussians and Germans. It was before 1933 a cosmopolis with a colonial streak, energetic alike in work as in the pursuit of pleasure. In both cities Hitler's power is a plant in foreign soil. Its home is in the German provinces and its natural adherents are the German middle classes. From the provinces and the middle classes Hitler has advanced to the conquest of the upper and lower sections of the German people and has made out of the many Germanys that one Germany on to which he could unload the responsibility for this war.

After this war, the most difficult war of all, will come a peace, the most difficult peace of all. It will be peculiarly hard for this one, standardised and drilled, Germany, which since 1933 has committed one sin after another, against the individuals within her border as against the nations without. If at the end “*Finis Germaniae*” is not to be written, then there must be a revival of the many Germanys and a rejection of the Prussian predominance and guardianship—a revival

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without the Prussian sergeant-major and the Prussian general-staff mentality.

What then of the several generations which have been harried and ruined by National Socialist education? That is one of the unanswerable riddles of the coming peace, about which it is impossible to think without deep misgiving. When Napoleon had been defeated, he was superseded by the blackest reaction. Many fear, or have feared, that after Hitler's fall Germany and the adjacent territories will succumb to Bolshevism. That is a mistake, since National Socialism is nothing else than Bolshevism in its Prussian-German form. Nothing can save Europe but democracy. What form it will take in Germany is as impossible to foresee as it is impossible to measure the abyss from which Germany must raise herself in order to reach the level of a worthy and dignified constitution and government.

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POLITICAL LIBERTY; A History of the Conception in the Middle Ages and Modern Times. By A. J. CARLYLE. viii & 220 pp. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.)

A STUDY of the European tradition with regard to political liberty from the Middle Ages to the present time would be of great value to-day, for whatever may be the true meaning of the terrible convulsions which Europe is suffering, they certainly have something to do with this theory and practice of political liberty. Dr. Carlyle's book makes some contribution to such a study, but it is a pity that it is so limited. He traces in chronological order the doctrines of thinkers and writers, mainly jurists, publicists, and philosophers, from Gratian in the 12th century to Rousseau in the 18th. He then adds one chapter dealing with the question who, in the view of these thinkers, were to be regarded as full members of the political community and therefore as entitled to political liberty, and another chapter of six pages on the relation between economic and political freedom. The words "modern times" in his subtitle must therefore be taken to mean the 18th century, for his book does not deal with either the tradition or the practice of the 19th and 20th centuries. This in itself is an unfortunate limitation, for *prima facie* the conception of liberty has suffered some important modifications since Rousseau and Jefferson.

The most valuable part of the book, nearly a half of its total bulk, is that in which he deals with seventeenth century thinkers, particularly some of the continental writers whose works are only known to scholars. He shows that, during the period in which it is customary to say that liberty was eclipsed and absolutism and authoritarianism dominant over the greater part of Europe, the traditions of political liberty and of free institutions persisted even in those countries where the eclipse seemed most complete.

Here Dr. Carlyle's occupation with the mediæval tradition is relevant, but it is a pity that in the rest of the book he did not disentangle himself from the Middle Ages. He is continually trying to show that this mediæval tradition is reproduced in the thought and doctrines of subsequent thinkers, and once having satisfied himself that he has proved this he passes on to the next torch-bearer. The result is that he leaves the reader with the impression that the doctrine and practice of political liberty has hardly changed since Gratian's day. It is not true, however, that political liberty, either in conception or in practice, was the same in the days of Rousseau or Burke as in those of Althusius, and the main thing which a history like this should tell us is what the differences were. Dr. Carlyle irons out the creases to such an extent that the product is

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sometimes almost ludicrous. One example will show what we mean. The attitude of Burke towards political liberty is profoundly interesting and historically important. But you cannot understand it unless you consider his attitude to two revolutions, the American and the French. Dr. Carlyle ignores what he wrote about the Revolution of 1789 and concentrates his entire attention upon the speeches dealing with America. And so when two chapters on he comes to deal with Thomas Paine, the innocent reader might well draw the conclusion that Burke and Paine agreed with one another on the conception of political liberty and both of them with Althusius. But the not so innocent reader with some impatience wants Dr. Carlyle to explain why the Burke of the French Revolution differs so much from the Burke of the American Revolution and disagreed so violently with the author of *The Rights of Man*.

HISTORY AS THE STORY OF LIBERTY. By BENEDETTO CROCE. 324 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

I SHOULD find it easier to write of Croce's book if I had the least idea what it was all about. Paragraph after paragraph, firmly gripped, shrinks to a platitude, and in the sequence of platitudes I can discern no nexus and no relevance to the title of the book. I can indeed see that much is to be taken as a *critique* of bad Italian writers, whom I have not read, but whose demerits I can divine more clearly from my own experience of their class than from Croce's exposition of their fallacies—the authors, for example, of nationalist or racial histories, or of romanticised biographies. But whenever Croce lifts himself to what—chiefly from the terminology—I guess to be his notion of philosophy, I am reminded of the cowman in *Cold Comfort Farm*, whose idealism seems to be of exactly the same type. There were, it will be remembered, three cows: Feckless, Pointless and Aimless. One of Feckless's legs fell off, and she had to walk on three. The cowman's attention being directed to this *contretemps*, he replied: "And how can I, who do understand the deep heart of the dumb creatures, be minding about their legs?" How, with all these abstract nouns to roll around, can Croce be minding about their sense?

"The following simple and fundamental truth can never be sufficiently insisted on: many minds lost in the shadows of naturalism and positivism find it hard to grasp: that 'cause' (though it may seem superfluous, we must here insist that we mean the concept and not the word 'cause' which belongs to ordinary conversation), the concept of cause must and should remain outside history because it was born in the realm of natural science and its place is there. No one has yet succeeded in practice in relating a fragment of history by matching certain causes with this effect."

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If this means that a purely deterministic attitude to history, making no allowance for individual impulses, breaks down, it is a platitude. If it means anything else, it is nonsense.

"Men with a gift for history have always been labourers in various fields, inclined to meditate upon situations which have arisen in order to overcome them and to assist others to overcome them by new activity: politicians who have written political history, *artistic spirits who have tried by means of their intelligence to distil from the history of art an enjoyment of works of art*, men of great moral and civil fervour who have severely scrutinised the history of human civilisation."

Always, it will be observed. Then am I to conclude that Gibbon had no "gift for history" or that he was a man "of great civil and moral fervour?" I could sustain this latter judgment, in the sense that Gibbon had a most exalted sense of the virtues and privileges of civilisation. But that, I am sure, is not what Croce means. And the sentence I have italicised is as good an example as I have lately encountered of pseudo-philosophic phrase-making. It is the sort of thing we used to write in an essay timed to last ten minutes, when we only had ideas for five.

"Historical culture has for its object the keeping alive of the consciousness which human society has of its own past, that is, of its present, that is, of itself; and to furnish it with what is always required in the choice of the paths it has to follow, and to keep in readiness for it whatever may be useful in this way, in the future."

No one rates historical culture more highly than I do, but these declamatory pretensions will do nothing to recommend it, because they are obviously grounded on an error too gross to be called a misconception. Conceivably, if we knew all that had ever happened, we might understand all that is happening, and, for anything I know, all that ever will. But the patch called history is so tiny in relation to the unrecorded stretch, and the illumination of that patch so imperfect, that it is idle to speak of the "consciousness which human society has of its own past"—even if we assume that human society can in any real sense be said to have a consciousness. And how, that being so, can these fragments of knowledge, most of them capriciously recorded and accidentally preserved, furnish guidance in the choice of a future path? I should base my defence on the much plainer ground that some people are interested in the past, and that, in this as in every other sphere of knowledge, a right and well-informed way of thinking is salutary, a wrong may be poisonous, to the whole intellectual constitution of a man or a country. There, at any rate, is something on which we can all agree.

Then suppose we apply it to a topic which, as again we shall all

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agree, it really is of consequence to be clear about—the conception of economic liberty. It gives Croce no difficulty.

"Liberty will always be formal and legal, and therewith spiritual and moral: material or economic liberty is a meaningless phrase. Whatever could it mean? Freedom from material things? Certainly not."

Nothing, of course, is easier—or more common among those whom Croce calls the Eternal Vulgar—than to score a point by attributing a ridiculous sense to the other man's words and then demonstrating their absurdity. And if material liberty can be taken to mean freedom from material things, I see no reason why spiritual liberty should not be defined as freedom from spiritual things. But in all these matters, with some definition we must begin, and, because liberty is a more general term than economic, logic requires that it should be first defined. And liberty being also, as a matter of historic fact, very largely an aristocratic conception, it is to the earliest formularies of aristocracy that we must first turn.

The real and tonic virtue of Aristotle is that to whatever height of abstraction he may rise, we know that his feet are always on the ground, and that in his political speculations he is thinking all the time of what people really do, and what they really think and feel about it. Now in his doctrine the most completely free man is the aristocrat living in an aristocracy, ruling and ruled by turns: and the fundamental liberty which he posits, and which alone makes such a government possible, is *σχολάζειν καὶ μὴδὲν ἀσχήμειν*, to have leisure and never to do anything which is felt to be degrading.

We may define liberty, then, as the condition of those who live like that, who enjoy living like that, and are under no apprehension of ever being forced to live otherwise. What they do with their leisure, whether their notions of the degrading are sound or perverted, and how they protect their way of life against disturbance or dissolution, are, of course, very important considerations, but they do not enter into the definition. Apply this conception to the world of economic ordinances. Is there any necessary, any logical, incompatibility? I confess I see none. And if there is none, then economic liberty, so far from being a meaningless phrase, becomes a directive idea of the greatest value, seeing that it points to the creation of such an economic order as involves in itself the progressive elevation of the individual regarded as an intelligence; a progressive improvement—which obviously only the community can effect—in the conditions under which he works and lives; and whatever measures are necessary for protecting these advances as they are made. That may seem a great deal to get out of four words of Aristotle. But you can get it. What is more, you can verify your deduction by observation: you can employ it as a guide to action.

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Whereas, the kind of idealism which Croce—and not Croce alone—professes, is so inflated with verbal alembications of the primitive theme, the mooring-lines which ought to hold all philosophy to the ground are so thin, that the balloon takes charge of itself, and goes soaring away in its aimless and mischievous career, until it becomes a public duty for someone to send a bullet through it. I suppose, for example, that Professor Tawney (page 221) is one of those who have “defiled historic truth with causalism, determinism and psychology” and have defaced their study of the relation between Calvinism and Capitalism “by lapses into psychological occasionalism and contingentism.” Professor Tawney, I have no doubt, will ask for a translation of the indictment before he pleads to it. And the translation will show that it means nothing at all. It is only the bumping of the balloon along the ground.

I remember once reading the Syllabus of Pio Nono, with much admiration for its sound sense, and only discovering at the end that the propositions which had impressed me so favourably were all under anathema. I have had the same experience again.

“An integral and complete vision, unbiased, without any favouritism for any aspect in favour of the others, that (it may be urged) is what is wanted to raise the historian to the level of the scientist who studies all the works of nature in their entire conjointness and common manifestation.”

Really, I said, there are some grains of corn at the bottom of this windbag: and my mind launched out on its favourite run—how the grand Ionian conception of *ἱστορία*, as the record of an entire culture, its growth, its characterising particulars, its contacts and intersections, was constricted by Thucydides to politics and war: how Voltaire and Robertson, one in a brilliant foray, the other in majestic deployment, broke through the enclosing circle: how Ranke devised new weapons and new tactics for the advance (it is a bad sign when a man, professing to write on history, speaks contemptuously of Ranke: he is, and always must be, the Head of the Profession), and how, and by whom, it was revealed to me that the subject of history is not events or forces or causes or people, but “the common thought of common things.” But, not a bit of it.

“Such an ideal drawn from the natural sciences and imposed upon historiography could never bear any fruit except the repertory or the manual.”

Enough? I think so. But what is it, I wondered; what is it that makes the simple English soul, with its prodigious wealth of native philosophy and experience on which to draw, the inevitable victim of every foreign declaimer, with an advertised name, who can hire a lecture-room or find a translator?

G. M. YOUNG.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SOCIAL POLICY OF NAZI GERMANY. By C. W. GUILLEBAUD. (Cambridge Press. 3s. 6d. net.)

IT has been truly said that human beings can be divided into those who know their bias and those who do not. Mr. Guillebaud belongs to the latter class. He believes himself to be an objective student of Nazi Germany, but in this respect he is merely the victim of his own delusions. Almost every page of his little book is tendentious, without, apparently, the author being aware of it. The general effect of the book is to give a highly favourable account of the aims and achievements of the Hitler regime in the sphere of industrial relations and social policy.

This general effect is not, however, produced by the crude method of describing the advantages and omitting the disadvantages. It is produced by the far more subtle method of giving great prominence and weight to the achievements of present-day Germany, while relegating the darker aspects to brief remarks and understatements which sound often like mere asides. The defects of Nazi policy are treated in a way which makes them appear as though they were incidental rather than fundamental.

It is worth while examining the objectivity for which Mr. Guillebaud claims to have striven so hard. In the flyleaf is a quotation by Mr. John de Courcy which states that “The outlook as regards [German] public opinion in April, 1939, from the Nazi point of view, was rather good. Reports from the big and fairly representative cities showed a general contentment among the working classes.” Without any enquiry into the correctness of this statement, Mr. Guillebaud remarks, on page 49, that “the most important cause of that general contentment of which Mr. de Courcy has spoken, is due to the abolition of unemployment.” In his concluding chapter the author explains *for the first time* that his book “consists largely of reprints of the generally well-informed monthly *Memoranda of Information* circulated by the so-called Imperial Policy Group, of which Mr. Kenneth de Courcy is the editor.” Opinions differ widely concerning the objectivity of the Imperial Policy Group; but Mr. Guillebaud does not give the reader an opportunity of forming an opinion. He merely refers to the Group as an impeccable source of information.

In an earlier chapter the author describes the Social Honour Courts, which most informed persons regard as a mere piece of legislative window dressing. After mentioning that very few cases have been brought before the Courts, Mr. Guillebaud continues: “On the other hand, officials in the office of the Labour Trustee in Hamburg (the principal Nazi official in charge of industrial relations) declared that the existence of the Court was of genuine value, and that a large number of cases was dealt with by the Trustees by way of warning and admonition, which never came before the Court.” Is it objective to accept and

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record such statements made by notoriously interested officials without further investigation? If so, the social sciences have indeed sunk to a low level since the days when the Webbs did their work.

Mr. Guillebaud's ideas of working class rights are based on some remarkable conceptions. The abolition of the German trade unions is lightly glossed over and the unions are described on page 20 as being "completely reorganised and unified in an entirely different form, the Labour Front." This statement is about as accurate as to say that the Social Democratic Party had been "reorganised and unified" in an entirely different form, the Nazi Party. "In principle," he writes in a later passage, "membership of the Labour Front is voluntary, but in practice virtually the whole of German workers, and nearly all German employers, are members." No word is vouchsafed as to the methods which have produced this remarkable mass adhesion to a movement which, whatever its other characteristics, is a powerful instrument of taxation, and which publishes no accounts. "The Labour Front," continues the author, "seeks to maintain industrial peace and to conciliate differences. . . . It is in a position to bring, and does in fact bring, great pressure to bear on employers to concede what it considers to be the just claims of the workers."

No attempt is made to analyse what "it" is and whom "it" represents, except to the extent of saying that "its" officials are appointed by the Party; and that "its" structure and personnel results in a bias which, "it is said," (we are not told by whom) tends to be more pro-worker than pro-employer.

The implication is that the rights and conditions of the workers are well cared for by the Labour Front, and that they have lost little, if anything, by the suppression of the trade unions. On page 125, Mr. Guillebaud takes exception to a statement that the German workers accepted a servile status before the War, on the ground that similar measures have been introduced in Britain since the War, and that there is no essential difference between "near war" and actual war. He relegates to a footnote the qualification that the great power of the trade unions in England constitutes a real difference in practice (though presumably not in principle) between German and British conditions. There is not a word about the safeguard to working class interests provided by the political Labour movement in Britain.

A further example of Mr. Guillebaud's authoritarian outlook is to be found on page 50, where he explains that one source of "that general contentment" to which reference has been made is the German worker's knowledge that the continuity of his employment is in no danger of being interrupted by either a strike or a lock-out. It follows, does it not, that the suppression—not by law, but by force and intimidation—of the right to strike, is no great hardship for the workers? Mr.

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Guillebaud's own view is that since a short stoppage of work is welcome to the workers as a means of providing change and rest, the introduction of holidays with pay in Germany, since 1933, may be regarded as a corollary of the abolition of the right to strike!

At no point does Mr. Guillebaud recognise that the harnessing of the whole industrial system of Germany to the military machine is not a momentary aberration but an essential feature of the regime. In reference to the enslavement of the workers in 1938-9 he writes: "It may, however, reasonably be observed that from the Munich crisis onward, Germany felt herself to be on the brink of war." Why was it "reasonable" for Germany to feel herself menaced by war when Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier had gone to unprecedented lengths in accepting a complete diplomatic defeat, and had destroyed Czecho-Slovakia for the one purpose of avoiding war? The only answer can be that Hitler and his colleagues were determined on war. Yet of this the author makes no mention, except to say (in an earlier passage) that "given Hitler's foreign policy, the external reactions to it were clearly such as to call for abnormal measures in many fields, including that of labour policy."

The author nowhere exposes himself to the charge that he omits all mention of those aspects of Nazi policy which are subject to widespread condemnation in this country. He always criticises such matters, but usually in a perfunctory fashion; and the criticism is itself usually qualified. Thus his condemnation of the Gestapo and the abolition of freedom of thought and of speech in Germany is weakened by a reminder that not everyone who condemns the Nazis on these counts remembers that they apply equally to Soviet Russia.

The persecution of Jewish Germans, which is dealt with in a paragraph of ten lines in a book of 134 pages, is given summary treatment which is typical, and not in accord with the importance paid to the matter by the Nazis themselves, who have made it a cornerstone of their policy in the spheres of population, propaganda, economics and culture. Mr. Guillebaud dismisses the treatment of Jews with the statement that "their standard of living has been deliberately depressed until, for the greater number, life in Germany has become an intolerable burden."

The one subject that the author deals with in an unequivocal manner is the long hours of work and their effect on the German employees. "It was a very tired, overstrained working population," he admits, "in all except the consumption-goods industries, which entered the war in September, 1939."

An occasional flash in the pan cannot, however, save the book from being a most misleading compilation. In its lack of insight and misplaced emphasis, no less than in its outlook and temper, it harks back to the pre-Munich period of appeasement.

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WHAT ARE WE WAITING FOR? by FRANCIS WILLIAMS;
 FREEDOM IS OUR WEAPON, by TOM WINTRINGHAM;
 MAKE FRUITFUL THE LAND, by SIR GEORGE STAPLEDON;
 TO HELL WITH CULTURE, by HERBERT READ;
 START PLANNING BRITAIN NOW, by RITCHIE CALDER;
 DEMOCRATISE THE EMPIRE, by W. M. MACMILLAN;
 WHO IS TO PAY FOR THE WAR? by DOUGLAS JAY;
 PARLIAMENT MUST BE REFORMED, by IVOR JENNINGS;
 THE DEMOCRATIC ORDER, by KEGAN PAUL. 1s. each.

MR. FRANCIS WILLIAMS, who edits and introduces this series of pamphlets, begins with an essay which makes very unpleasant reading, but which should not for that reason be left unread. He shows, with arguments to which I can see no convincing reply, that this war cannot be won by means of a purely military victory, and, by less cogent arguments, that, even were such a victory to be achieved, as things now stand, we should probably suffer from a peace in which the vindictive folly of Versailles would be magnified.

If we are to win the war and the peace we must accept a political and economic reorganisation such as will provide the technical and moral strength necessary for the destruction of Hitler's "New Order" and its replacement by a positive substitute. How this is to be achieved, in its military aspects, to produce the proposed results is not indicated here, but is, to some extent, found in six of the seven remaining pamphlets.

Mr. Wintringham is concerned naturally and rightly with the business of winning the war, and within that sphere his attention is devoted to the army. The first effect of reading *Freedom is our Weapon* is to intensify the gloom produced by *What are we Waiting for?* Take, for instance, the following passage—the writer is speaking of that fatal and hopeless passion for "martial symmetry" which is the curse of old-fashioned armies:

... the roofs of our pill-boxes and the sides of other concrete structures are carefully smoothed off, all to a uniform height. Then they are painted. No matter how good the painting may be, they show up because of their regularity, because their upper surfaces are straight lines, and because these surfaces are carefully smoothed. Often they are covered with artificial camouflage. But under this paint and camouflage remains the same material: white concrete. As soon as a shell or bomb or even a bullet cuts into the concrete, a white flake or chip shows, which can be seen far away. Coloured concrete could be provided for a ridiculously small extra cost, but probably if it was used the Treasury would disallow this extra cost. And even if they used coloured concrete, our army authorities

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would be likely to insist on a single specified shade, and refuse to accept a concrete so blotched and speckled that it had natural camouflage qualities.

This is the kind of brass-hatted and bureaucratic bumbledom that loses wars. It is the purely technical kind of old-fashioned stupidity of which the Nazis have managed to rid themselves. But there is another form of stupidity which we can liquidate but which the Nazis cannot; it consists in refusing to avail oneself of the services of those with whom one is in political disagreement. So far we have determinedly refused to profit by this potential advantage.

Officers are chosen "because their parents have an income considerably higher than that normal throughout the country"; class consciousness is cultivated; practical experience in fighting Germans and Italians in Spain is a disqualification; there is a better chance of promotion for the ex-fascist than for the ex-communist. The blame for this absurd state of things lies to some extent with the communist party in this country. They have given the blimps, and perhaps some over-timid or supersensitive trades union leaders, a fine pretext for wrecking and obstruction. That does not alter the fact that technical and political conservatism has done far more to impede the national war effort than the *Daily Worker*.

Something is being done, but not nearly enough, that is the opinion of Mr. Wintringham and most of the authors in this series. But if the reorganisation of the army can be achieved on sane lines there still remains the question, how is the reorganised army to be used. The author foresees a strategy involving the use of a light infantry, trained to move by sea or air, to operate with guerillas in mountainous country or in cities. To this I would suggest should be added a fifth column to distract, impede and occupy the enemy. In Poland and Czechoslovakia such auxiliary bodies are emerging; but we know little about them; examples of how such warfare can be carried on may be seen in the recent histories of Ireland and China. From the Irish example, which is more pertinent to the war in Europe, we may learn how a very small guerilla organisation can, by a scientific policy of political assassination and sabotage of administrative machinery, make the maintenance of government impossible. As the preliminary to an attack from outside, such a strategy might produce decisive results. Ultimately, perhaps, we may win simply because we can, and the Nazis cannot, afford to arm the people.

In Sir George Stapledon's pamphlet the essential unity of war and peace policy is more apparent, but, like Mr. Wintringham's, his policy is of the utmost urgency. He also is concerned with the rectification of the errors and confusion of the past, and his extremely authoritative statistics concerning the state of the land—which may be summarised

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in the statement that 16½ million acres of our land are in a neglected condition (i.e. 43 per cent of the land surface of England and Wales)—form an interesting comment on the activities of that party which claims to represent agriculture and has had a majority in the House of Commons for the last twenty years. Perhaps, if farmers showed a little more originality in their voting, rather more might be done for them. More cheerful and more immediately to the point is the statement that every single acre of this enormous area is capable of radical improvement. The method of improvement is not very fully explained in this pamphlet. Essentially the proposed technique is based upon the treatment of grass as a crop. If all land is to be made fertile and put into good heart, all land must be ploughed. The applications of this theory will be found in "The Plough-up Policy and Ley Farming" by the same author. The requirements of a scientific agricultural policy are far-reaching. They involve, among other things, a national reorganisation of water supply, the building and taking over of cottages and farmhouses, a reconstruction of farm buildings and farm roads, and a rational remodelling of the lay-out of estates. Obviously such a policy requires drastic interference and spending by the government; as the writer points out, there is bound to be much opposition, but the needs of war give some hope that these things which are in fact desirable, whether for peace or war, may be done.

Mr. Ritchie Calder presents a similar picture of muddle, but most of his suggestions are necessarily of a post-war character; the need for a drastic cleaning up of the administrative archaisms and muddle of our municipal government are, however, of immediate and vital urgency. Mr. W. M. Macmillan's views on imperial development are also partially for post-war application, though their adoption in principle here and now would undoubtedly help in the winning of the war. Particularly attractive is his suggestion of Colonial Members of Parliament; as a transitional stage in democratic self-government the idea seems excellent. So also are Mr. Ivor Jennings' proposals for a reasonable limitation of the present wholly unreasonable powers of the House of Lords. Parliament and the electoral system as they now stand are fairly well suited to a party system in which both parties are representative of a monied interest, but in conflicts between the rich and the poor they exaggerate the naturally undemocratic conditions which exist. Anyone who has fought an election campaign in a rural area will know how heavily the possession of cars, telephones, leisure and money tip the scales against labour. But I think that the suggestion of giving a state election fund to the candidates of parties that held twenty seats in the previous parliament would be denounced, and rightly denounced, by the representatives of the smaller parties as monstrously unfair. The solution lies rather in giving state aid for a certain number of nominations.

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Who is to Pay for the War? is well worth reading, and would be more so if it could have been written since the Budget. To the layman the whole business of lending seems slightly unreal; the most important thing seems to be to reduce civil consumption to the minimum compatible with carrying on the war, and afterwards to expand it to the maximum. The idea that any section of the community should be given a lien on the national resources by lending money when others are giving their lives (without return or profit) is monstrous. Mr. Jay seems to hold the same view.

These are mere notes and scattered criticisms. If the authors of these pamphlets received the space that they deserve, the review would be much too long for publication. Of the whole series so far published, it may be said that it provides a reasonable basis for action, on the assumption that democracy must, if it is to survive, be a developing force, an instrument for winning the war as well as a war aim.

An exception must be made in the case of Mr. Herbert Read. It is true that Mr. Read is concerned with democracy, but the basis of his argument is one that involves very different assumptions than those made by the economists and technicians. The thesis of *To Hell with Culture* is that æsthetic values are "part of the structure of the universe," impersonal and capable of scientific measurement, and that beauty may be defined as fitness for function. Hence, in capitalist society, where production is for profit and not for use, culture represents only a spurious veneer on the face of universal ugliness. In socialist society, where production will be for use only, universal beauty will result and the need for culture will vanish. In *that* society the artist will be merely the super-efficient labourer, elected by his fellow labourers (themselves artists) for his special skill. The house-painters will elect their own Rembrandt. The trouble with this argument (which I have perhaps rather unfairly condensed, for Mr. Read says some very sensible things, by the way) is that its first premise is demonstrably untrue. Let me restate that assertion in the author's own words: "When we say, for example, that two colours 'clash,' we are not expressing a personal opinion: there is a definite scientific reason for the disagreeable impression they create." No doubt there is; but that does not make the opinion any the less personal. One of the very few æsthetic assertions which can be verified by experiment is that tastes differ; anyone who has ever tried to sell wallpapers will bear me out. Functionally perfect objects will not always arouse æsthetic admiration; the house-painters may reject Rembrandt and plump for Hitler. It is socially important to remember that tastes differ, and it is also important to notice that they change. It will be found that tastes can be classed into two main divisions: cultured tastes which change very slowly if at all, uncultured tastes which change with great rapidity. For a large number of social

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purposes the former are much more valuable than the latter. Culture seems to preserve certain values which may almost be regarded as permanent. You can't fool all the people all the time about Shakespeare, Raphael, and Mozart. Such variations as do occur in cultured taste may, I think, be ascribed either to æsthetic labour-value which produces admiration for the highly-finished and industrially-perfect artifact (Functionalism), and, in another phase, for lavish and highly-ornamented work (conspicuous consumption); or to a purely class value, such as is manifested in the use of, or allusion to, a generally incomprehensible culture, indicative of an expensive and industrially useless education or way of life, and, more recently, the cultivation of æsthetic ideas which are unfamiliar or shocking to the lower classes. It is curious to note that in surrealism the upper classes have found an æsthetic which is at once shocking in content and workmanlike in form. These variables in the determination of cultured taste are both aspects of what Veblen calls the pecuniary canons of taste. They would appear to be part of the class development itself. In a classless society they might disappear. But to condemn capitalist culture because of its aberrations is to throw out the baby with the bathwater, a definitely uneconomic proceeding.

When it comes to a programme for action, Mr. Read shows that he has his head in the right place.

"Let us build cities that are not too big, but spacious, with traffic flowing freely through their leafy avenues, with children playing safely in their green and flowery parks, with people living happily in their bright, efficient houses. Let us place our factories and workshops where natural conditions of supply make their location most convenient—the necessary electric power can be laid on anywhere. Let us balance agriculture and industry, town and country—let us do all these sensible and elementary things and then let us talk about culture."

How sensibly and vigorously Mr. Read writes, and how enthusiastically one agrees with him when he begins to contradict himself!

QUENTIN BELL.

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MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD. By MAHADEV SAHAI. 191 pp. (*Allen and Unwin*. 3s. 6d.)

HERE was a period in which the Muslims stood aloof from the British in India, and declined participation in the new system of education: while the Hindus availed themselves eagerly of the colleges and schools and used them as instruments of material advancement. Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan, the founder of the famous College of Aligarh, with its motto:

"We are like the compass is: one point fixed on the sacred law, while the other describes the circle of the seven continents," changed the bias of his co-religionists to one of co-operation: at the same time the growth of political aspirations was leading the English-educated class, predominantly Hindu, into an attitude of criticism, more and more outspoken.

This book, written by a Hindu who is the secretary of Mr. Gandhi, and the editor of his weekly paper, *Harijan*, gives an account of the life of an Indian Muslim, who has returned to the earlier tradition as an opponent of the British connection. Maulana Abul Kalam (known by the additional name of *Azad*, the Free), the son of an Arabian mother and an Indian father, was partly educated in the Al Azhar University of Cairo, in order that he might not have to accept the British-Indian system of education. His father was a fugitive from Delhi on the recapture of that city by the British in 1857. There was thus an element of non-co-operation in his origins: and his culture is the culture of an older Islam, in which Arabic and Persian learning plays the greater part. He has many foreign Asiatic friends, including the leaders of the Young Turk party, who made the revolution of 1908. He has taught himself English, and Byron, the lover of liberty, is his favourite poet; but, when he made his translation of the Koran, he chose for his medium the Urdu language. He reads the Upanishads and the Vedas and the Nyaya Vaisheshika philosophy, in their English dress. Not in close personal contact with his fellow human-beings, a man of the study rather than of the market-place, he is a blend of many influences: the ideal republicanism of primitive Islam, the religious patriotism which made men impassioned champions of the Caliphs at Constantinople in the closing days of the Caliphate, the revolutionary nationalism of nineteenth-century Europe, the non-violent non-co-operation of the Gandhian Gospel, with its mediaeval Hindu and modern Tolstoyan antecedents, and the political ambitions of twentieth-century India. A photograph of him, at the beginning of the book, shows the dour expression, the determined jaw, the steady, unblenching gaze, that befit the descendant of the man who refused divine honours to the Mogul Emperor Jahangir, when other theologians were more accommodating in their principles.

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He has spent his public life in the patient effort to reconcile the Hindu and Muhammedan communities, and to unite the two in the aim of Indian national independence. In a declaration of his political faith made before a judicial Court, he said: "If to-day there was to be established in India an Islamic Government, but if the system of that Government was based upon personal monarchy or upon bureaucratic oligarchy, then to protest against the existence of such a Government would still be my primary duty as a Mussalman."

We get another glimpse of his fundamental convictions, when we read his pronouncement that

"Swaraj (self-rule) has no meaning till it annihilates the yawning gulf between the Haves and the Have-Nots."

Clearly he desires a social as well as a political revolution in India. As the Muslim President of the Indian Congress, elected to that office in 1940, he is a standing embodiment of the unity of Muslims and Hindus in their aspirations for India.

These aspirations, with their preliminary postulate that Hindu-Muslim differences are a creation of British policy, form the background, indeed virtually the content, of this biography. Mr. Desai has examined honestly the records of the past, and has made out a *prima facie* case which deserves an answer. It is clear, anyhow, that the British rulers, or some of them, hard pressed by demands for which they sought a better reply than the argument of the sword, were not sorry to discover supporters of British rule willing to utter the faith which was in them, and welcomed this accession of moral strength. But the practical problem as it stands to-day was stated by the Maulana, when he said that the solution of the communal problem was impossible, unless and until the British Government had withdrawn and left the two communities free to resolve the quarrel between themselves. Will they talk it out peacefully, when there is no third voice to arbitrate between them? And will the outside world leave them, undisturbed, to their quiet conversation?

It would seem that the solution must be carried a step further than the Maulana carries it. Must the British fleet remain to keep the ring against external ambitions, while India consolidates her liberty, and settles her internal differences, including the one between the Haves and the Have-Nots? The Maulana would probably answer No: and, in this answer, he would have the support of some, but not, the reviewer thinks, of the majority of Indians. The lesson of recent years, still more of recent months, is: not separation, but unity: and the Indian patriot should surely seek to maintain the unity of the Commonwealth, but to combine it with equality of status for India: which, as the reviewer believes, is the true and unanimous aspiration. JOHN MAYNARD

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THE EASTERN MARCHLANDS OF EUROPE. By H. G. WANKLYN. xxiv & 356 pp. (George Philip. 12s. 6d.)

THE DANUBIAN CASE. By LEO GESTETNER. (Allen & Unwin. 1s. 6d.)

ESTONIA. By J. HAMPDEN JACKSON. 248 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.)

THESE three books raise one of the most urgent and complex problems of our time: the future of the numerous small national units that lie in eastern and south-eastern Europe between the two Great Powers of Germany and Russia. For the moment, the problem is settled: the Soviet Union has absorbed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the border districts of Finland, the White Russian and Ukrainian territories of Poland, and the racially confused Bessarabian flank of Rumania; and Germany effectively dominates, though she has not in every case annexed, the remainder of Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the lands of the Southern Slavs—except for those Adriatic slices which she has seen fit to throw as a sop to her ignoble and entirely undeserving ally in Rome. But no one who has any knowledge of the history of these countries and their enduring characteristics, both in the nature of the inhabitants and the nature of their economic geography, can imagine that this solution will be final, particularly in the case of the Danubian Balkans. The violation of national instincts and the principles of free development are so great in the German *Lebensraum*, that a reaction is bound to be preparing and will disclose itself the moment the hold of Reichswehr and Gestapo weaken.

And yet the problem is one of the most formidable in the world, has already baffled several generations of statesmen, and will yield to no ready-made plan. Here are some of the questions involved. How shall the fact that the centre of gravity of Polish colonisation is in the basin of the Vistula, a fact which strongly reinforces the otherwise inconclusive Polish claim to an outlet to the sea, be balanced against the sharp division of German-colonised territory which a Polish corridor entails? The rancour caused by this division was one of the chief weapons in Hitler's hands. How shall a Baltic people like the Estonians, with a racial separateness and a strong organic unity that entitles them to independence, maintain that independence in view of the fact that their seaboard has advantages of the utmost strategic importance to their vastly greater Russian neighbour? How shall the naturally complementary economic roles of highly industrialised Germany and the primary producing and mainly peasant Danubian countries, be accommodated with the desire of those countries to fortify their independence and assure their economic progress? Owing to their technical "over-population," the course open to them in pursuit of these ideals seems to be either more intensive farming or increasing and specialised industrialisation; but both run counter to Germany's economic needs.

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How shall Rumanians, Hungarians, Bulgars and Yugoslavs form strong states that will guarantee their national identity, when no ethnic frontier—even granted that a certain exchange of population in transitional areas takes place—is strategically defensible? And finally, how is Vienna to play its historically and geographically determined role as the centre of cultural and economic exchange between north and south, east and west in this part of Europe, now that the Hapsburg Empire has collapsed and cannot (in spite of a great deal of wish-dreaming in certain circles) be re-established as before? As part of strongly centralised Greater Germany Vienna is condemned to decay, and as crowded capital of a small state made from the mainly mountainous and thinly populated German-speaking lands of Austria, it has already been a total failure.

Miss Wanklyn's book, in spite of its curious exclusion of Rumania and Bulgaria, is a very useful compendium of essential information, historical and geographical, for anyone who attempts to find an answer to these questions, and though it does not offer any solution to the main problem, it at least indicates those solutions which will not work. There are in addition a very large number of excellent maps, which would be valuable enough without the text, illustrating, as they do, the geophysical, racial, and economic features of the region in considerable detail and at various stages in history. Miss Wanklyn has obviously been at great pains to be thorough, and it is all the more disappointing, therefore, to find no adequate consideration in the book of the Danube itself, a factor that has played, and still plays, such an enormously important part in shaping Central European destinies; nor is the history of international trade and administration on the river even mentioned. Mr. Gestetner's little pamphlet is an altogether more superficial work, clumsily written and marred by many questionable generalisations both in its central analysis of the problem and its ideal blue-print for a workable future. It is, however, valuable in its insistence on the disastrous effects of the struggle for autarky in each of the Danubian states; it is impossible not to remember those ghastly years before the war, when each move towards autarky in one state made further autarky in the surrounding states inevitable, though everyone knew that the process was really a multiple suicide pact. Mr. Hampden Jackson's study of Estonia is pleasantly readable and written with an agreeable but not too obtrusive bias in favour of the tough little people who have had to endure such incredible hardships from Germans and Russians throughout their history; it fills a gap which has existed too long in English literature on the Baltic lands. And it is a reminder that in the north, as in the south of eastern Europe, the problem behind all other problems remains the same: the still unsatisfied land-hunger of the peasant masses.

JOHN LEHMANN.

BOOK REVIEWS

MARXISM: IS IT A SCIENCE? By MAX EASTMAN. (343 pp. *Allen and Unwin*. 8s. 6d.)

WAR AND PEACE IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. By T. A. TARACOUZIO. (x and 354 pp. *Macmillan*. \$4.00.)

MR. EASTMAN'S new book is a brilliant sequel to his *Stalin's Russia*, reviewed by us in a recent issue. It is an analysis and criticism of Marxist theory rather than of its application in practice by the Soviet Government, though applied Marxism is necessarily not ignored, and the part which deals with the revolutionary or social engineering of Lenin are particularly interesting. Mr. Eastman is such a clear and intelligent thinker that even when you think him wrong or wrongheaded, he makes you see the really important point in the problem which he discusses and over which you disagree with him. That is why this book, like its predecessor, deserves to be read by any one who is concerned to understand the theory and practice of Marxian socialism; it clears the mental system like an intellectual purgative. Mr. Eastman's object is to distinguish the scientific from the unscientific element in Marx's teaching. As an analyst and interpreter of the actual facts, of the nature and structure of 19th century capitalism and the causes which produced it, Marx wrote as a scientist. There is therefore a hard and vastly important kernel of scientific truth in Marxian socialism which has withstood and will withstand the Hegelian delusions of Marx himself, the fury of capitalists, and the folly of socialists. But Mr. Eastman maintains—and gives shrewd reasons for the opinion—that as a prophet Marx was hopelessly unscientific, and by the hocuspocus of Hegelian dialectic and of dialectic materialism himself provided the Marxian religion and the paraphernalia for turning it into a Church. The Hegelian and religious elements in Marx's doctrine have been seized on by his disciples, and the True Believer now has as fantastic an edifice of economic dogma to fight for and persecute for as any of the more ancient and theological religious fanatics.

What ordinary, sane people can get themselves to believe in this way is shown by Mr. Taracouzio's analysis of the Soviet Government's diplomacy in relation to war and peace. The object of the book is to analyze the Soviet international policy in the light of Marxian theory. It is a laborious, detailed, and documented work and it gives a valuable account of Soviet foreign policy from the earliest times to the present day. The book would have been easier to read and just as useful if Mr. Taracouzio had been rather shorter winded. Incidentally, however, whenever he solemnly discusses what kind of war according to Marxian dogma each war waged between 1919 and 1939 was, he illustrates the moral of Mr. Eastman's book, for, if one did not know already that the human mind is, like Habbakuk, capable of anything, one would imagine that belief in such unmitigated nonsense was impossible.

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THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By W. IVOR JENNINGS. xvi. & 232 pp.
(Cambridge Press. 8s. 6d.)

THIS is a model book of its kind and could hardly be better. It is written for the "ordinary person" by an expert, to explain to him the nature and working of the British Constitution and the contemporary problems of society and government which they involve. Dr. Jennings has a rare combination of qualities which make him peculiarly fitted for such a task, as readers of his articles in these pages on the week to week work of parliament in war time have learnt. He is a leading authority upon constitutional law, but, unlike so many people who possess profound expert and academic knowledge, he understands and is intensely interested in the working of the machine in everyday and contemporary life. He sees instinctively the relevant fact and the important point. He has a clear mind and a clear style and so he can put his expert knowledge at the service of the ordinary man. He can even write amusingly about the British Constitution without writing cheaply. Lastly he combines a lively, critical scepticism with soundness and sobriety of judgment.

The book is a straightforward account of the Constitution, dealing in order with the relations to government of people, the political parties, the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Crown, the Civil Service, and the Cabinet. One of the chief reasons why it should prove valuable to the ordinary reader is that Dr. Jennings sees a constitution not as "a framework of laws, but a tissue of dynamic relations." In his analysis, therefore, he always gives us the framework of laws in clear and simple language, but is continually trying also to discover and explain those "intangible relationships which," as he says, "are more easily felt than analysed," but upon which the process of government ultimately depends. He is particularly successful in unravelling these intangible relationships and explaining their effects in two instances: the relation of public opinion to the Government and the influence of the monarchy.

Believers in democracy, who have felt the need of stout hearts and firm faith beneath the blows and broadcasts of dictators in recent years, should derive some encouragement from reading this book. Dr. Jennings's view is, in the main, the classical view of the Constitution and of our democracy. He maintains that the Constitution, as it actually works, means government by opinion and that we have government by the people, "not merely because the people exercises a choice freely and secretly at short intervals, but also because it follows from that fact that the whole machinery of government—the House of Lords in part excepted—is keyed to public opinion." Civil liberty, he maintains, is the consequence of political liberty, and to us democracy "means that the people must be free, the free choose the rulers, and the rulers govern according to the wishes of the people." The evidence for this view is

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given in his book, in the detailed analysis of the Constitution and of how it actually works.

LEONARD WOOLF

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By ERNEST BARKER.
(viii and 167 pp. Cambridge Press. 3s. 6d.)

THIS little book has considerable merits. It is written with clearness and economy. The first chapter on the conception of empire in different ages and the historical accretions which overlaid it to-day is excellent. So are the two chapters which follow and which deal with the development of the British Empire in its "modern-maritime" phase and with the political ideas informing it. The treatment of the growth of the Dominions, of Dominion Status and its problems, is for the most part unexceptionable. Finally it may be said that the whole book is an elegant picture of the British Empire—an Academy portrait—seen through the eyes of a Liberal imperialist; idealism has guided the brush to smooth out any wrinkles or creases, blemishes or irregularities.

There is the rub; these pages are redolent of the Liberal imperialism of Grey, Asquith, and Haldane, and it is arguable that the idealism of that type of imperialism, by painting the map, not red, but rosy, by a certain agility in the forgetting of facts and in preserving "liberal principles" in perorations, had a good deal to do with the destruction of British liberalism. "We are to be sure a miracle every way," says Fanny Price in *Mansfield Park*, "but our powers of recollecting and of forgetting, do seem peculiarly past finding out." The powers of the Liberal imperialist and Dr. Barker to forget are certainly "peculiarly past finding out." The unmitigated rosininess of the map and picture are largely due to it. It is in dealing with India and the colonial empire that Dr. Barker's power of forgetting is so effective. If the book is intended as propaganda for foreigners and natives of the Empire, it is effective, but if it is intended as a serious study of how far "ideals" are imperially translated into practice, there are big holes in the picture. For instance, at the end of the book we are told categorically that one half of the "dual trust" has been "faithfully obeyed," namely the half which is concerned with "the advancement of the well-being and the liberty of native populations." No impartial and informed person will deny that much has been done within the Empire to advance the well-being and liberty of native populations, and Dr. Barker is right to say so and give examples. But he has no right to omit the creases and the wrinkles in this picture. Nothing is said in this book of the colour bar, industrial, political, educational, and social, which dominates the whole of South Africa, the two Rhodesias, and Kenya. Nothing is said of the obvious fact

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that there is a serious danger of this rigid colour bar system spreading over the whole of British Africa after the war. Nothing is said of the uncontrovertible fact that this colour bar system is deliberately intended to prevent, and does prevent, "the advancement of the well-being and the liberty of the native populations."

Another instance of the rosiness of Dr. Barker's spectacles may be given. It is concerned this time with India. India, Mr. Barker says, already has much of "the actual substance" of Dominion status, even if she has not its form. The reasons which he gives for this rather startling statement are as follows: "India has been included with the Dominions by the Imperial Conference in the claim for an adequate voice in foreign policy." Analyze the meaning of this oracular sentence and you find it means that India has been included in a claim to say something about foreign policy. The Dominions are, however, not "included in a claim"; they have the power actually to determine their own foreign policy, even to the extent of maintaining the foreign policy of neutrality when the British Government is at war. That is the substance of Dominion status so far as foreign policy is concerned. India has no such power at all, and India, in the sense of Indians, has no control of any sort or kind either over foreign policy or the voice of the Indian Government with regard to foreign policy. In this respect India has not got the substance, it has not got even the shadow of the shadow, of Dominion status. The second reason which Dr. Barker gives for his statement is that "like the Dominions, and along with them, India signed the Treaty of Versailles: like the Dominions, and along with them, she became an original member of the League of Nations." But it is only by "the power of forgetting" that any one could make this astonishing statement. India did not sign the Treaty of Versailles or become a member of the League "like the Dominions." The substance of Dominion status consists entirely in the fact that Australia and Canada decided upon their course of action in these matters without reference to the British people, parliament, and Government, and solely with reference to the will of the Australian and Canadian peoples and Governments. The decision of India, on the other hand, was simply a decision of the British Government. In this case it would be an exaggeration to say that India had the shadow of the shadow of Dominion status.

LEONARD WOOLF.

PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT RUSSIA

By TOM HARRISSON

OPINION-FORMING INFLUENCES.

TO the student of public opinion one of the most striking features of recent years has been the wide extent of public confidence in Russia, throughout numerous political and military crises, and during times when experts and leaders of opinion have often been pessimistic or hostile. Indeed, the steadiness of public opinion on Russia has been exceptionally marked, and constitutes in itself something of a tribute to the unemotional attitude of that majority in the population who left school when (or before) they were fourteen, and are not readily swayed when once they have made up their minds.

For years there has been extensive (unorganised) anti-Russian propaganda in this country. The Zinoviev Letter was only one blitz in a continuous series of psychological offensives. As recently as this March, I saw three anti-Communist and anti-Russian films ("He Stayed for Breakfast," "Debutante of 1940," "Comrade X"), on the same afternoon in the same street in Glasgow; (these conveniently corresponded with the adjacent Dumbarton by-election, in which a Communist candidate was standing). All had top-ranking stars, and were good fun—especially the scenes of life in Russia, welters of inefficiency, petty tyranny, doctrinaire idiocy. I mention this as one example of the extent of indirect anti-Russian propaganda, which was continuous in the most widely-bought sections of newspaper, film, music-hall, mass literature (2d. bloods, women's mags., boys' stories, and strip cartoons often had Russian figures either as bomb-throwing villains or as international village idiots). For those who earned their living by entertaining or instructing the masses, the Russian gradually became a symbol of muddle and misdirected energy, coloured sometimes with a humorous side to his character, and with a vicious side to his character rather more often—the Russian Purges being the most frequently used theme on the latter side.

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REAL PUBLIC OPINION, 1939.

Politicians who frequently draw deductions about public opinion from the press, film and radio, or historians who later derive their picture of opinion in the period from its published effluvia, would naturally conclude that all this represented a great deal of contempt or distrust of Russia. Careful studies made among the mass of ordinary people show that this was not the true position. They have preserved a respect, if not regard, for Russia, and have shown considerable scepticism as regards the news and views about Russia which have generally been available. Of course, most people do not own cinemas, newspapers, or other large bits of property, and they have very little of the *violent* fear or hatred of the Communist which naturally inspires those of wealth and property.

For instance, in March, 1939, after Munich, when it was becoming clear that we had no intention of seriously linking up with Russia in collective security, the British Institute of Public Opinion asked a national cross-section throughout Britain whether or not they would like to see more friendly relations between Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Results were :

84 per cent wanted more friendly relations with Russia
7 per cent did not
9 per cent had no definite opinion.

In the following month (April, 1939), B.I.P.O. asked a more specific question—whether or not people would like to see an actual military alliance with Russia. To this proposition :

87 per cent replied yes, they'd like a military alliance
7 per cent replied no, they would not
6 per cent offered no opinion.

At about the same time, Mass-Observation was making a special survey of electoral opinions and political reactions in the Westminster by-election. In this constituency, which returns Conservatives regularly, exactly the same figure, 87 per cent, wanted an active military alliance with Russia. This is of particular interest, because Westminster is the British centre of Roman Catholic influence, and much of Catholic leadership has been particularly anti-Russian. Just

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as we find the average man being relatively unaffected in his attitude to Russia by general anti-Russian propaganda, so we find the Catholic rank and file not nearly as much affected as their leaders might have hoped by the numerous anti-Russian references in Catholic publications and utterances. There is no exact statistical material on the effect of this in Britain, but a useful survey has been undertaken by Dr. Gallup in America. During July, 1941, he made a national enquiry as to which side people wanted to win in the German-Russian war. In the U.S. as a whole, 4 per cent wanted Germany to win, 72 per cent wanted Russia to win, 17 per cent said it made no difference, and 7 per cent were undecided or offered no opinion. When the sample was sub-divided according to religious associations, a *slight* pro-German bias was found among Catholics. But still the vast majority of Catholics—more than ten to one—wanted Russia to win. The figures :

PERCENTAGE WANTING			
		Germany to Win	Russia to Win
Catholic	6 per cent	65 per cent	
Protestant	3 " "	74 " "	

It is safe to say that among British Catholics, the majority were not moved to any strong anti-Russian feeling, although the Catholics are now the most effective and opinion-influencing of Britain's religious groups, the only big sect whose influence and membership is growing, not declining.

This is, in outline, the pre-war background. Wherever Russia is mentioned in the hundreds of thousands of verbatim conversations on our pre-war files, it is usually with dislike among the upper classes, with disagreement among middle-classes, with sympathy among the artisan classes, and with mild sympathy or apathy among the working-classes. Some of the main reasons for continued pre-war sympathy with Russia were :

- (1) The feeling that we needed an ally, especially to the east of Germany.
- (2) A feeling that Russia was extremely strong and militarily powerful.
- (3) The idea, often vague and rather mystical, that Russia was a sort of Colossus, and also a sort of mystery,

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an enigma. Less educated people are frequently fascinated by mysteries, and this attitude generally tends to be sympathetic in a vague but deep-seated way. And vast size alone inspires some admiration.

- (4) The belief that Russia, however muddled and narrow it might still be, had made great material advances and greatly improved the conditions of its people.
- (5) The feeling, again obscure and often incoherent, that Russia was a working man's country, a country of ordinary folk who could not be *bated*.
- (6) The considerable and effective use of Russian photographs of their air force, mechanised army, industrial plants, etc. These were often reproduced in anti-Russian papers—the popular press has no consistent co-ordinating line, you can get them to publish practically anything that is interesting in itself.
- (7) Also, the period (in the early thirties) of magnificent Russian films. These did not reach the whole population, but had a lasting effect on many at the middle class and artisan level who saw them through societies, adult education units, etc.

INFLUENCE OF RUSSO-GERMAN PACT, AND POLAND.

So, by August, 1939, there was a strong and persistent feeling in this country, often sentimental and seldom political, that we should be allied with Russia more closely. And there was considerable dissatisfaction with the Government for not undertaking such an alliance—regardless of whether or not the Russians themselves wanted it!

It was in this mental atmosphere that the Russo-German pact was announced in Britain at the end of August, 1939. Looking back over the fieldwork material collected in these critical days, one cannot fail to be impressed by the way in which people were reluctant to think the worst of Russia, by the frequency with which people say that Russia is only biding her time, that she can never be a real friend to Germany, that we could have had her as an ally if we'd wanted, that she is only signing a pact with Germany to prevent Hitler signing a pact with Chamberlain against her, and so on. One is impressed, too, by the extent to which

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people did not accept the common propaganda of the period, frequently supported by influential political leaders—the argument that this just proves communism and fascism are both dictatorships, “the same thing under different names.” To quote from the summary of a report made at that time:

People refuse to believe that Germany and Russia are going to be friends, but at the same time there is a feeling that Russia had no business to conclude the pact with Germany. It is held that the pact has put us in a “pretty tight spot.” All the same, it is hoped that Russia will have to fight Germany soon, and it is also said that the Russians do not trust the Germans any more in spite of the pact.

Overheards of that date repeatedly reflect the feeling:

“You never know with Russia; she's a dark horse.”

I still believe she'll come in on our side.”

During this and the following months, Russian goodwill was strained at many points, but always protected by the familiar process of wishful-thinking. People, having long thought Russia should by rights be our ally, were unwilling or unable to face up to the possibility of her being our enemy. The implications were too unpleasant. Even at the height of the Finnish war, people kept on justifying Russia, not because they were politically partisan, but because they *wished* to think that everything Russia was doing was in the long run against Germany. Thus *after the Finnish war* was over, when the Minister for War and others had suggested that we should fight against Russia, and when nearly every major channel for “moulding public opinion” had vigorously denounced Russia as an aggressive power like Germany, nevertheless *a large majority were still in favour of our having more friendly and intimate relations with Russia*. About five people held this view for every one who thought we should *not* now attempt to draw closer to Russia. And the Russian advance into Poland naturally had less effect than Finland.

A summary of material collected after the end of the Polish war, and during the following months, will give an adequate picture of the position then (October, 1939):

“People are beginning to be hopeful that the war will be over soon—and that Russia will break her pact

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with Germany. Reasons for this latter hope are that Russia is a country with ideals and cannot really be allied with the Nazis for long. Russia has her 'tongue in her cheek,' and she does not really like Germany. On the whole, people believe that Russian sympathies are on our side. Many people mention at this stage that they would like to see an agreement concluded between England and Russia. It is also remarked that we ought to have concluded an agreement with Russia two years ago, and that it is to a great extent our fault that an agreement was not concluded. It is rather angrily noted that Russia wants to keep out of the war at any price because she is too frightened to fight. There is really much uncertainty as to what Russia is going to do. But it is believed that she is *not* going to fight us. The growing trouble in Finland is attributed to Hitler. But Stalin is also blamed.

"On the other hand, people seem grateful to Stalin for occupying half of Poland and so preventing the Germans from gaining complete mastery there. But some people feel that Russia should have kept out altogether, seeing that they claimed to have no aggressive intentions. There is also a smaller group who feel that Russia and Germany now have to be classed together, and that eventually we shall have to fight them both, or that Russia will stay neutral unless Germany looks like losing, when she will help Germany.

"People often say that we must give up our 'snootiness' when dealing with Russia and treat her like we would any other country."

ATTACK ON FINLAND.

Russia next attacked Finland. Public opinion now moved against the Russians, who had done a "dirty trick" or been "unsporting." At the same time, many critics in buses and shops and pubs qualified their unfavourable comment by saying that, though it was unfair or unpleasant, Russia was doing this to protect herself strategically, or with some long-term end in view. Many people wanted to wait and see *why* the Russians attacked Finland, being unable fully

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to understand the business. As a report of that period remarked: "There is a note of disappointment that Russia has done something that no one would have expected of her." Throughout the bloody campaign that followed, sympathy was on the side of the Finns, but there was still astonishingly little violent anti-Russianism, the feeling being rather one of pity for the Finns—and a big question mark in people's minds as to why Russia should have attacked her. All the time, the feeling that Russia was basically sensible, kindly, and ordinary, persisted, along with the feeling that there was something mysterious, enigmatical, deeply wise about Stalin.

Probably the anti-Russian effect of the campaign would have been greater had it not been for the press handling of Finnish news. The pre-war press, newsreel and radio bias was now further developed, with this golden opportunity for unrestricted vilification. By the beginning of 1940 people were beginning to become extremely critical of the way the press was handling war news. This dissatisfaction did not reach its peak until the Norwegian campaign, but the decline in confidence in our war news became very pronounced during the Finnish campaign. The long-standing bias against Russia among those controlling news channels, which was much stronger than the bias felt by the average citizen—and therefore easily noticed by the citizen—expressed itself in war reports almost invariably one hundred per cent favourable to Finland even on questions of unfavourable fact. Here are three typical expressions of this dissatisfaction, from people's diaries written at the time:

- (1) "News we get via B.B.C. and Press is positively laughable. Former's opinion is smug and definitely biased, and presented in a dull manner. For example—*not once* have they broadcast any news whatsoever of Russian success—whatever our opinions about the Russian invasion, a great army like the Russians must surely have had *some* minor successes, at *some time* or *somewhere*. And if one believed what was broadcast, the Reds must be commanded by a brace of lunatics."
- (2) "There is so much sameness in the news of patrols, reconnoitring parties, reconnaissance flights, and

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Russian losses that a feeling of insecurity is the main result. The Finns never seem to lose a man, a tank, a gun or a 'plane. The onesidedness of the losses makes me feel that I am not hearing all the truth."

- (3) "I have a feeling that the reporters are just playing with us, that they invent more than half of the tripe that is put over in most of the papers. It has been especially noticeable regarding the Finnish successes which are obviously biased and exaggerated."

Bias towards representing everything favourable to the Finns and unfavourable to the Russians *became obvious to those of the most limited intelligence*. The pre-war scepticism about British treatment of Russian news was rekindled. And this had the effect of making people think that there must be more in the campaign than met the eye, and that they were being misled as to the real issues involved.

BESSARABIA AND BEWILDERMENT.

Russia came next into the news by taking Bessarabia. This further added to doubts about Russia, but still produced remarkably little active anger against her. Partly because people wanted hopeful signs, and partly because there was still fundamental (if wobbling) confidence in Russia's intentions, on the whole people went on feeling that Russia must be doing the sensible thing, even if it seemed unpleasant or germanic. And, from Bessarabia onwards, innumerable conversations and comments show people twisting any little event into proving that Stalin and Hitler were *beginning to fall out*. From June, 1940, until June, 1941, any piece of news which could be seen as a split between Germany and Russia was readily so interpreted by the general public, though many did not really believe in such a split developing finally for several years; it was a hope, an encouraging optimistic focus. This was presently accentuated by headlines announcing that Russia was sending 'planes to aid the Greeks, when Italy attacked through Albania (October, 1940). But Russia denied this; and in the following month Molotov's visit to Berlin puzzled people again, caused more anxiety.

In November, Mass-Observation conducted a specially-detailed survey into people's general feelings about Russia.

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Most blamed the British government for failing to ally itself with the U.S.S.R.; the Government was often accused of having "nothing but abuse" for Russia, when we needed a friend. A great deal of doubt about Russia's intentions prevailed, typically expressed thus:

"Well, it's a dark horse."

"I don't know quite. They're so cunning, the Russians. You never know what they're up to."

"I think it's all a blind. Just a cover for something else she's up to."

"I don't know what to make of it. It looks as though they want us to win, but they also want to keep in with Hitler."

"I don't know how she's going to turn."

Among these attitudes were included pure mystification; the idea that Russia was "up to something" besides her more obvious policies; and the idea that Russia's sympathies were really with us, but she was in a difficult position.

The continuation of Lord Halifax in the post of Foreign Secretary was much criticised and he was often accused (in ordinary conversation) of being responsible for our bad relations with Russia. When Eden replaced him at the end of the year there was much hope of developments in the alliance direction:

"Well, as regards Russia, I think Mr. Eden will nurse them along—he'll talk to Maisky in good plain English."

"That is a case of touch and go. If anyone can do it, Eden is the man. He saw Maisky to-day; they seem to get on together."

Nothing happened. People gradually took less notice of Russia in the first six months of the new year, though all the time mixing occasional hope that she and Germany would fight, with occasional anxiety lest she draw closer to Germany. No split developed. At the same time, all forms of optimism and wishful-thinking were markedly in decline, consequent upon Greece and Crete setbacks. Confidence in Russia was slowly declining; belief that Russia would eventually become our ally was at its lowest ebb by mid-June. When June reports of the German army massing on the Russian frontier

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began to come through, most people remained sceptical. Few now expected war to break out immediately on that front. All the time, people had been thinking in terms of *Russia attacking Germany* when the split came, not of Germany attacking Russia. For every one person who expected Germany to fight Russia at all at that time, three thought it was bluff or that they would compromise. When news of the attack came over the radio on the morning of Sunday, June 22nd, 1941, the immediate reaction was amazement, coupled with bewilderment. This was the final surprise in a long sequence of surprises about the mysterious U.S.S.R.

RUSSIA VERSUS GERMANY.

Most people were glad of the attack; they thought it was bound to help us in one or several ways. One person in seven was sorry, largely because they disliked any extension of the war, but also because the very fact of the Germans attacking was taken as a mark of German strength, and if Germany were to overrun Russia we should be left alone in Europe.

All the dormant or dying confidence in Russia now came rushing back. At first somewhat timidly; but, even so, ordinary people were much less timid than the military experts and columnists. Right from the start of the Russian war, most people felt that Russia was unbeatable, even if they could not beat the Germans. Only a quarter of a large London sample (June 27th—August 4th) expected the Russian war to last *less* than a year. During the first week, under one person in fourteen expected Germany to get the best of it. And even in the periods of the worst news there has always been a considerable majority who think that Russia will get the best of it in the end—30 per cent is the highest figure for those expecting Germany's eventual success. The day-to-day fluctuation of optimism and pessimism, always weighted on the side of optimism, is reflected in the numbers thinking things were going badly in Russia in snap surveys undertaken by standard method in five London boroughs twice a week. (These figures are subject to the usual sampling errors. Ordinary questions show variation of not more than 4 per cent from week to week ;

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the range up and down is exceptional in this case and reflects a real tendency) :

Date.	Percentage thinking things going badly on this day.	Main News.
June 27	5 per cent	German advance—not sensational.
July 1	8 " "	Germans still advancing gradually.
" 4	32 " "	Advance continues; Leningrad and Moscow reported threatened.
" 8	8 " "	Advance held.
" 11	11 " "	Slight German advance.
" 15	3 " "	Advance at standstill; <i>counter-attacks</i> reported.
" 19	10 " "	Some further German advance; Smolensk claimed.
" 25	7 " "	Advance again slowed up.
" 29	5 " "	Offensive reported breaking.
Aug. 1	2 " "	Russian <i>counter-attacks</i> reported successful.
" 8	3 " "	Beginning of new German offensive.
" 11	10 " "	Advance into Ukraine.
" 14	20 " "	Ukraine advance continues; Smolensk taken.
" 18	36 " "	Odessa isolated; Nikolaiev blown up.
" 21	39 " "	German successes as far as Dnieper; dam reported destroyed.
" 25	21 " "	Advance slowed; <i>counter-attack</i> near Gomel.
" 28	10 " "	Advance still slowed up and Odessa intact.

The figure for those thinking we were not doing enough to help Russia fluctuated along with estimates of her success or peril, sometimes reaching as high as four persons in ten considering we were not doing enough to help her.

In this up and down of hope and expectation, always a majority relied on Russia's strength and strategy to break the long chain of Axis conquests: Austria, Abyssinia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete. It must always be remembered that wherever any army has stood up to the Germans on land, the Germans have always pushed them back and put them out. Naturally enough, an exaggerated idea of German military ability had grown up in the public mind—incidentally along with it a great deal of contempt for and dissatisfaction with our own military command and strategy (the Navy and Air Force are admired and respected). Yet, from the start, despite all the pre-war propaganda and despite the alleged implications of

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Finland, the great majority of people expected Russia at least to hold out against Germany, if not to defeat her.

Now, as winter comes, the continued resistance of Russia is exercising a powerful influence on the whole of British morale. It has greatly increased calm, confidence, and cheerfulness. This cheerfulness has tended to develop into complacency among considerable sections of the community. It has once more produced hopes of the war being over soon, or in 1942, or without any further direct assault on ourselves; the effect of this is often disadvantageous to the intensity of our industrial and other efforts. But the most significant effect of all is the propaganda boomerang effect. All the mocking films and sarcastic editorials and spiteful books have bounced with a mighty bounce. Events have proved that Russia, whatever her faults, is distinctly not an idiotic, inefficient, disunited state. The reaction is liable to swing people to the other extreme, so that many now may rate Russian efficiency and ability too high. There is now, of course, much admiration for Russia. And never again will it be possible to represent fascism as equalling communism. On the contrary, Russia is gradually shaping in the public mind as the principal enemy of fascism and the potential saviour of a more kindly civilisation.

There is, however, still a strong suspicion that the anti-Russian bias in high places continues, despite Churchill's powerful and forthright statements. A clear majority are in favour of allowing the *Daily Worker* to renew publication (though there is not much strong feeling on the subject either way). And during the July dispute over the broadcasting of the Internationale, nine people thought it should be played along with the other anthems for every one who thought it should not.

The principal foci of public admiration for Russia are:

- (1) The fight they are putting up.
- (2) The "scorched earth" policy and all its implications of utter determination.
- (3) Their technical proficiency, especially in anti-aircraft defences, which, according to press reports, would appear to be ahead of our own.

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- (4) Their news communiques, and their personal, human touches.
- (5) The way in which everyone seems to be identified actively with the war there—Russian communiques and broadcasts have cleverly built up this idea.
- (6) The lack of complacency or bombast in Russian utterances, Stalin's speech, etc.
- (7) Russia seems to have new ideas and to use them—effective guerilla warfare, radio voice barracking Germany, parachutists and tanks from planes, sabotage in enemy-occupied territory.

EFFECT ON COMMUNIST SUPPORT.

What has the effect of all this been on communist prestige inside this country? Our evidence suggests that so far the effect has been slight. There has been no sensational increase in Communist Party membership, though there has been an increase. Ordinary people put British communism in a watertight compartment away from communism in Russia, which is Russian, and "different." There are as yet no signs of any marked swing over to communism even in the most likely field—the industrial field. Of course, the communists are unable fully to exploit the advantage of Russia's success in terms of internal political activity, because they must now support the war and do nothing to upset our war effort.

The general British attitude to communism is still much the same as it was before Germany attacked Russia. Some people feel violently against it, mainly better-off people. Most people tend to ignore it or regard it as unimportant in this country. And most people are ready to grant it the toleration they will grant to most minority groups—the right to exist and to speak out, within reason. If a communist candidate stood in a by-election at the moment, he or she would probably not do much better than communist candidates have done so far since the war, *i.e.*:

- (a) SILVERTOWN BY-ELECTION (February, 1940). Pollitt, the leading Communist figure, forfeited his deposit, thus:

Hollins (Labour)	...	...	...	...	14,343	votes
Pollitt (Communist)	...	...	...	...	966	"
Moran (British Union)	...	...	...	...	151	"

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(b) BOY BY-ELECTION (June, 1940). The No. 1 Communist speaker, Isabel Brown, forfeited her deposit:

Key (Labour)	11,594 votes
Brown (Communist)	506 "

In both this and the previous by-election about a third of the electorate polled.

(c) DUMBARTONSHIRE BY-ELECTION (February, 1941). This constituency includes part of the strongest Communist area in the country, the Vale of Leven on Clydeside. Here the young Communist candidate did not forfeit his deposit, though easily defeated:

McKinley (Labour)	21,900 votes
McEwen (Communist)	3,800 "

But continued Russian resistance will almost inevitably increase potential sympathy for a more radical socialism, especially when communists are able fully to exploit all the possible arguments after the war is won. The whole trend of public feeling since 1939 has been towards socialism, though (owing to the political truce) this has not yet been reflected at all in representative government.

HOW TO MAKE THE PEACE

By LEONARD WOOLF

THE importance of the eight points in the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration consists, not so much in their actual terms, as in their evidence that the foundations are being laid for an agreement upon peace aims between ourselves and the United States. It is essential, as this article will attempt to show, that this agreement should be greatly extended in certain directions and that the U.S.S.R. should be brought into it.

In the last issue of *The Political Quarterly* Miss Barbara Ward contributed an article, *Prolegomena to Peace Aims*, in which she discussed the broad outline of the international order which may be defined as the British "peace aim" and some of the steps necessary to its attainment. In the present issue Dr. Keeton discusses a particular aspect of the same subject, the part which Anglo-American co-operation could and should play in the settlement. We shall explore some of the same ground in this article with a somewhat different object. Our object is to examine in detail and from the most severely "practical" point of view the actual process of making the peace; we propose to ask the question: Assuming that we know what our peace aims are, what is the procedure or method in making the peace which is most likely to ensure that we succeed in our aims?

This question is of immense importance. In between *Mein Kampf* at one end and Mr. Lloyd George at the other you may find an almost infinite series of different judgments about the Versailles Peace, but there are very few people competent to hold an opinion who do not agree that the procedure adopted by the Allied statesmen in 1918 for passing from war to peace had a profound effect upon the settlement itself and upon the events of the next twenty years. And most of those people would also agree that the procedure was fundamentally wrong and was the first step in the process of thwarting the Allies' peace aims—to make the world safe for peace and democracy. Indeed, if one listens to speeches and discussions about what we are to do at the end of this

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war, one finds that nearly every one, whether competent or not competent to form an opinion, seems to be quite convinced of one thing, namely, that we mustn't on any account this time adopt the Versailles system of making peace. On the other hand, one notices considerable difference of opinion and confusion as to the procedure which this time should be adopted for passing from war to peace.

If this disagreement and confusion continues until the moment when the fighting stops, a very dangerous situation may arise. The procedure of armistice making and peace making will be more or less extemporized, and the principle of the extemporization will be mainly to do the exact opposite of what they did in 1918 and 1919. That is already the trend of public opinion; already people assume that, if only we do the exact opposite of what was done in Paris, all will be well. There are no grounds for assuming anything of the sort. The right way to learn from experience is not to turn the past upside down.

Let us examine, as examples, two views, widely held and often expressed now, for they will at once reveal the dangers and difficulties and lead us straight to the heart of the whole problem. Those who hold the first view maintain that the greatest mistake of the peace-makers in 1919 was to attempt to pass direct from war to peace, to establish the permanent peace settlement and international "peace system" in a comprehensive treaty as soon as possible after the cease-fire. Therefore, they argue, we must this time do the exact opposite. It will take years, five or even ten years, perhaps, before we can really establish peace and any kind of stable international system in Europe. All that we should do at first is to stop the war and prevent it breaking out again. Therefore, the right procedure is to impose terms upon the enemy in an armistice, occupy his territory, and proceed with the piecemeal settlement or resettlement of Europe; the less we think of a peace treaty, a peace conference, or an ultimate comprehensive peace system, the better. This view was put strongly by Miss Ward who urged that it was very important to get rid of any idea of a peace conference or of an official or spectacular marking of the transition from war to peace. "The preliminary phase," she wrote, "during which the

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framework of the settlement will be built may last decades."

The second view is not unconnected with the first. I heard it expressed baldly by one of our political leaders at a Party Conference the other day. The great mistake made in 1918, he said, was that the Allied statesmen thought about the peace settlement only in political terms and neglected economics. If, instead of thinking of self-determination, frontiers, and the League of Nations, they had settled down to the economic reconstruction of Europe and let politics take care of themselves, we should probably never have had the Nazis or another war in Europe. This time we must learn the lesson; we must concentrate upon the economic rehabilitation of the several countries, and as the economic reconstruction proceeds, we shall learn what international political framework is desirable and possible.

In both these views there is an important element of truth, but the corollary which is assumed to follow from it is a dangerous fallacy. It is true that one of the greatest mistakes made in 1918 was that we all thought in terms of a direct transition from war to peace. We imagined wrongly that after the devastating dislocation of a modern world war it was possible to erect immediately the permanent political and economic structure of national and international society, that states and peoples which for four years had regulated their relations by blood and iron, the bomb and the high-explosive shell, would immediately accept the obligations of a new and complex international system, the law, co-operation, and peace through collective security of the League. We must learn from that experience. The settlement of the war is a very different thing from the settlement of the peace, and as long as the psychology of war persists, there is little chance of being able to build a stable peace system which must depend upon law and co-operation. That means that between the end of the war and the beginning of peace there must be a transition period, a bastard or twilight interval, half war and half peace. During it our main concern must be to settle the war and to lay the foundations for a return to economic prosperity and political stability, and until those foundations are laid, it will not be possible to begin the permanent settle-

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ment or the integration of states in a new international order.

But we shall head straight for disaster, if we imagine that in order successfully to carry out such a programme, all we have to do is to turn the procedure of 1919 upside down, to make an armistice, settle the war and Germany piece-meal and on a hand to mouth, day to day basis, while we let the "permanent settlement" and the "international system" go hang and settle themselves. For from the first moment of the armistice this transition period and what happens in it are going to decide what the ultimate and permanent settlement of Europe and its international relations are going to be, and if we do not have a fairly clear idea in our minds of the kind of peace settlement which we want and think attainable, we cannot control the transition from war to peace. The seeds of war or of peace will begin to be sown the moment the fighting stops, and we shall not cheat the future and find the tremendous problem of building a prosperous and peaceful Europe solved for us by shutting our eyes to that ultimate problem.

The idea that, if we reverse the procedure of 1918 with regard to economics and politics, all will be well is equally dangerous. It is true that the statesmen who settled the 1914 war made a disastrous mistake by concentrating upon the political settlement and leaving economics more or less to settle themselves. It is also true that if they had immediately applied themselves to the task of economic reconstruction in Europe and had succeeded in establishing economic security for its various states and peoples, the conditions which made the pestilential growth of fascism and Nazism possible would never have been created and the world might have been spared the crowning horror of the present war. But it is a complete delusion to believe that they could have created those conditions by turning their procedure upside down, by concentrating upon economics and letting the political settlement look after itself, and if we act on that delusion this time, we shall do no better with our economics than they did with their politics.

The reason why this is so is to be found in the simple fact that in the modern world you cannot separate economics from politics. The economic determination of politics is a

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fact, but another fact, no less stubborn and important, is the political determination of economics. The proof and moral of this statement will appear in all that follows. Here it will suffice to point out that the economic structure of Europe in the years 1925 to 1939 was mainly determined by non-economic motives and policies, and therefore by the political structure. The autarkic economic policy of the fascist states was inevitably forced upon them by their internal and external policies of nationalism and war, and the revolution in our own economic system was in turn dictated to us by the necessity to plan for war and the resistance to fascist aggression. The symbolic choice between guns and butter which dominated the years before the war was a political, not an economic, choice.¹ The choice will confront us again as soon as the guns of this war stop firing and we begin once more to eat the butter of peace. It will not be possible to build political stability on economic chaos and insecurity, but it is equally impossible to obtain economic stability and prosperity if the political structure of Europe remains a chaos of independent sovereign states whose frontiers determine the rigid lines of their economic relations, and the fear, the hope, or the threat of war determine the equally rigid lines of their economic policies. There is therefore not the slightest ground for believing that the victorious Governments, if they set themselves seriously to the business of economic rehabilitation in Europe during the transition period, can safely let politics look after themselves. Political passions will be no less violent and embittered at the end of this war than they were at the end of the last, and if they are allowed, undirected and uncontrolled, to build the new Europe and its international relations, they will produce much the same witches' caldron of hatred, fear, and war. To think that in such a situation you can carry out "economic reconstruction" or provide "economic security," as if we

¹ The reader is recommended to study the detailed analysis of the economic breakdown of the interwar years in an extremely illuminating book, *The Reconstruction of World Trade*, by J. B. Condliffe. As an economist, a Professor of Economics, Mr. Condliffe would naturally be concerned, and is concerned, with the economic causes of the breakdown of international economic relations, but the whole of his book proves the soundness of his judgment that "the breakdown is not a result of technical defects in the economic mechanism, or of natural economic and geographical limitations, but of human decisions. It is essentially a political, rather than an economic and technical, problem that must be solved."

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lived in some political vacuum, is to ignore all the lessons of history.

There is another reason—the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war as a belligerent—which will make a purely empirical procedure of peace making peculiarly dangerous, but it will be more convenient to deal with this point later on. Now let us retrace our steps and see whether, bearing in mind what has been said above, it is possible to lay down in advance a more appropriate procedure. Since the method of making the settlement must, as we have seen, in part determine the nature of the settlement, it is essential that we should have a clear, if general, idea of our peace aims before we decide upon what steps we propose to take in order to attain them. If one examines the public pronouncements of Mr. Churchill, which have behind them a very considerable measure of popular support, and the Churchill-Roosevelt eight points, it is possible to say that we are fighting the war in order to attain the following objects :

1. To destroy the Nazi regime and the Nazi system of government ;
2. To prevent another war ;
3. To establish the right of all peoples to national existence and freedom, i.e. political and economic security for peoples ;
4. To establish or protect the democratic rights of man, i.e. political and economic security for individuals.

It is agreed that the procedure of peace making must consist of an armistice, which will determine our conditions for ending the war, a transition period from war to peace, and the definitive peace settlement. To attain our four objects in the chaotic situation at the end of the fighting would admittedly be impossible, and it may take years to build up the international system envisaged in our second, third, and fourth objects. But it is necessary to repeat that nothing must be included in the armistice or done in the transition period which might prevent or obstruct the development of such a system, and therefore the transition period must in itself be a conscious building up of that system.

It follows that the armistice should be as negative as possible. Its object is to put an end to the fighting and to

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make any resumption of it by the Germans in the immediate future impossible. The position of Germany in the permanent international system and under the final settlement will depend upon developments within Germany during the transition period. The psychology of victors at the moment of victory is inappropriate for settling the ultimate destiny of the vanquished. The best armistice terms, not only for ourselves, but in the long run for the Germans, would be the unconditional surrender of the German government, occupation and complete disarmament of Germany, inter-allied administration of German territory, with no undertaking as to the period of occupation or date of evacuation.¹

Though it is desirable that the armistice should be negative and its terms unconditional surrender, this does not mean that it might not be politic for the Allies, at the moment of victory, to make a clear declaration to the Germans, not of their terms, but of their intentions. Here at once is an example of the need consciously to begin the building of the ultimate international system from the moment when the fighting ends. With this end in view, it might well be desirable for the Allies to declare to the German people that their intention was to establish an international peace system in Europe based upon political and economic security for both peoples and individuals and that they would welcome the Germans as equal members of the new order when it became clear that they themselves would act as a loyal and peaceful part of it. It might also be considered whether at the time of the armistice and after the actual surrender it would not be wise for the Allies to declare their intention, at some future time and before their evacuation of Germany, to allow the Germans to elect a Constituent Assembly which would decide upon the future form of government. But this is part of a larger question which will be considered below.

We come now to the heart of the problem, the appropriate

¹ The nature of the armistice terms must, of course, depend upon the military position of the combatants. The above terms are suggested on the hypothesis that the Allies will be in a position to dictate their terms, but the position might be such that they were not prepared to prolong the war in order to get completely unconditional surrender. But this does not affect the view given above which is based upon the judgment that the results both for Europe and Germany would probably have been better if the Allies had insisted in 1918 upon unconditional surrender from Prince Max of Baden, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff.

procedure of peace making during the transition period. The right way to approach the problem is to consider first the chief dangers which will threaten us and our objects as defined above. I should classify them as follows :

(1) The threat of economic chaos. Most people agree about this. A large area of Europe will at the end of the war be threatened with or suffering from famine. The whole economic system of Europe, indeed of the world, will be geared to war production and its population will be either in the fighting services or engaged in industries producing munitions of war. The problem of feeding Europe and of changing over from a war economy to a peace economy without a repetition of the economic disasters of the inter-war years will be stupendous. The problem is summed up in the blessed words which are already on the lips of many, "economic reconstruction." There can be no dispute that this "reconstruction" must be undertaken as soon as the war ends, and that, if it is not controlled far more consciously and effectively than after the last war, there will be no transition to peace at all. Most people would agree that, if it is to be controlled efficiently, the procedure must be international control through an International Economic Commission with very extensive powers. If the task is to be undertaken with any chance of success, the United States, the British Empire, and the U.S.S.R. will have to play the leading parts in the international organization and will have to be prepared to accept far-reaching responsibilities. But there will be small chance of success if decision on methods and means is left until the last moment of war, and it is therefore essential that, despite the obvious difficulties, an attempt should be made in advance by the three principal Powers to work out and agree upon the principles of this economic reconstruction. To do that will require some agreement between them in broad outline upon the permanent international economic system which they desire to establish, for the ultimate shape of national and international economies will be determined by the way in which governments deal with "reconstruction" during the first years of the transition period. And if some measure of agreement between them will be necessary or the economic system, that will force them to come to some

agreement upon the immediate and the ultimate political system, both national and international. Effective international control of economic reconstruction is not compatible with the claims to state sovereignty and independence as we knew them during the period 1918 to 1939, so that here the economic question immediately involves one of the most crucial of all political questions. Moreover, as we pointed out above, internationally the shape of economic things will be largely influenced by the international shape of political things. If the political reconstruction of Europe issues once more in the creation or recreation of a number of independent, sovereign states, each a law to itself, and with no international system or organization for regulating their relations pacifically, then, once Europe has been fed and has "settled down" again, it will have settled down again to a system dominated by the fear and threat of war. So that we again come back to the unavoidable fact that, if the Allies are to deal successfully with the economic structure of Europe, there will have to be some agreement between them on the ultimate political settlement and structure, for without political security and stability there will be no economic security for any one. This brings us at once to the political dangers and difficulties.

(2) The threat of political chaos. There is far less agreement or appreciation of danger here than with regard to economics. But the political situation in Europe at the end of the war will be as chaotic as the economic. The danger will come from our Allies whose territory is now included in the Nazi empire or New Order. The danger is double-faced, for with the collapse of Germany a dozen European states will be forced suddenly to settle the future both of their internal political structure and their international relations. The greatest political revolution in European history will be taking place simultaneously with the greatest economic revolution. Unless that political revolution is consciously controlled and directed by our "peace aims," the whole settlement will be jeopardized by internal struggles for political power by the staking out of international claims fatal to future peace, and by the automatic recreation of that system of international anarchy which, as soon as one great war is settled, makes another inevitable.

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There is no possibility of avoiding these dangers and disaster unless there is some prior agreement between the three principal Allies as to the procedure to be adopted for political reconstruction and, I would add, as to the broad outline of the ultimate international system of national rights and obligations. And it is necessary here to say some plain words on a delicate subject. The entry of the U.S.S.R. as a belligerent may contribute more to the successful making of peace even than to the winning of the war. A situation in which the war had ended in the defeat of Hitler and had left Stalin outside it, a *tertium gaudens* and Hitler's second, would have introduced peculiar difficulties into the reconstruction of Europe. With the U.S.S.R. our ally, those difficulties need not arise, and if Russia, the British Empire, and America work together for peace as well as for war, there is nothing which they cannot accomplish. But there are factors in the political and economic systems and in the social ideology of these three partners in war which, as soon as the war is over, might easily prevent their co-operating in peaceful reconstruction, and they almost certainly will do so unless the danger is frankly faced and provided for in advance. In order to provide against the danger, it is necessary to envisage the condition of the countries at present occupied by Germany when the Nazis are finally beaten.

A considerable number of these countries are represented in Great Britain by Governments, recognized by us and in some cases by the U.S.S.R.; they have armies, fleets, or air contingents fighting side by side with our forces. In the last stages of the breakdown of the German military machine and of the Nazi power, it is practically certain that there will be revolutionary risings and outbreaks against Germany in many of the occupied territories. When the war ends, therefore, some of these countries may have two governments, a revolutionary government in the territory itself and another government in London. If the U.S.S.R. invades from the east and we from the west, some of them may have Russian and some of them British armies in occupation. For some time after the fighting ends there will be a period of great political instability, exacerbated by the passions of war and the Nazi occupation. That is not a very favourable environ-

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ment for undertaking the greatest political revolution in European history simultaneously with the greatest economic revolution.

There is, in fact, great danger that the war against Germany will be followed by civil wars breaking out in a large number of the liberated territories. That would be the beginning of a war of ideologies, not only within the territories, but between the allies, a confused struggle in which communist, democratic, or semi-fascist governments and parties would try to obtain support or recognition in the U.S.S.R., Britain, or the U.S.A. There are quite a number of people, otherwise sane and humane, whose judgment is so clouded by ideological passions that they view with equanimity or even approval the prospect of civil war, although many of them regard international war with horror. But surely we have had enough bloodshed and violence in Europe since 1914 to satisfy the most realistic and modern social reformer. The crude methods of the eighteenth century physician who prescribed bleeding for most diseases of the individual have made way for less sanguinary, but more effective, treatment, and there is good reason for believing that the political and economic disorders of society are not cured, but aggravated, by unlimited blood and pain. The time has come when one of our primary needs is to stop the bloodshed, misery, and persecution which have been devastating Europe for a quarter of a century.

At any rate, those who contemplate with equanimity a number of civil wars as part of the process of European reconstruction must be ignorant of history and of human nature. Such wars will make any economic reconstruction and recovery impossible. Apart from the condition of the countries subjected to them, they will immediately introduce paralyzing discord into the relations between the three principal Allies upon whose co-operation economic reconstruction immediately after the war must depend. There are large numbers of not uninfluential people in the British Empire and more in the United States who ideologically and economically are bitter opponents of the Soviet Union. There are even larger numbers of people, particularly in Britain, who are, and still have the right to be, democrats: all their sympathy is with the Soviet Union as a socialist state, but they

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view with distrust and dislike its authoritarianism. If a period of ideological civil wars is allowed to break out in Europe immediately after the armistice, a period in which there is a confused struggle for setting up communist or democratic, capitalist or socialist governments, a very dangerous weapon will be put into the hands of the irreconcilable opponents of Russia, while the cleavage between the communists and democratic socialists will be accentuated. In such circumstances all possibility of co-operation between the United States, the U.S.S.R., and ourselves will rapidly vanish.

It follows from these considerations that, if chaos is to be avoided, some agreement—a kind of self-denying ordinance—is necessary between the principal Allies with regard to the procedure in political reconstruction. The second and third points in the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration show that there is a beginning of such agreement between Britain and America, but it does not go far enough to meet the real dangers. Those points merely declare agreement in a desire that territorial changes should be in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned, that sovereign rights and self-government should be restored, and that peoples should choose the form of government under which they wish to live. We suggest that the agreement should be extended to cover the following points and that every effort should be made to get the U.S.S.R. to form one of the parties to it :

(1) The three Allies will recognize the Governments of territories evacuated by Germany as only provisional and the frontiers of such territories shall be recognized as provisional pending a final settlement ;

(2) The three Allies will only give full recognition to the Governments of such territories when (a) the people have had an opportunity, preferably through a Constituent Assembly, to “choose the form of government under which they will to live,” (b) the frontiers or territorial changes have been settled according to the wishes of the peoples concerned or, in case of dispute, by international conciliation or arbitration, (c) a settlement has been made and agreed to with regard to the states’ position in and economic and political obligations and rights under the permanent peace system ;

(3) Where there is danger or existence of civil war or

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disorders, likely to prove an obstacle to peace or economic reconstruction, the three Allies will arrange for a joint occupation and administration of the territory pending arrangements which will ensure that the people can choose the government under which they will to live in an orderly and peaceful manner.

There are many other important points with regard to the method of passing through the transition period to the permanent peace settlement, but space requires that this article should be brought to an end. It is, however, worth pointing out that the procedure suggested above for states which have been subjected to Germany during the war might also be adapted to the treatment of the aggressor states, Germany and Italy. As regards the final peace settlement, I am concerned in this article, not with the terms of peace, but with the right procedure for making peace, if we want it to be just and durable. It is, however, necessary to insist once more upon the interdependence of the process of making peace and the nature of the peace which is made. The Churchill-Roosevelt declaration shows that essentially our aim is to create after the war an integrated Europe of free peoples and disarmed states in which every state has economic *lebensraum* and every individual economic security. The following are some of the fundamental problems which we shall have to solve if we are to achieve that aim : (1) How to limit the sovereignty and independence of individual states if the economic and political integration is to be accomplished ; (2) How to ensure the freedom of states at the same time as we limit their economic and political sovereignty ; (3) How to construct the “wider and permanent system of general security,” which the eighth point of the Churchill-Roosevelt declaration envisages, an international system of law, order, co-operation, disarmament, and collective security without which political integration and peace in Europe will not be possible ; (4) How to bring the aggressor states, after disarmament, into such a permanent system as loyal and free members of it. If the procedure of peace making during the transition period is steadily directed to the solution of these four problems, there is some hope that we may avoid a repetition of the bitter experiences of 1919.

BEGGAR MY NEIGHBOUR

By DONALD TYERMAN

IN July the British Government put out a White Paper¹ calling upon "employers and trade unions, with all the help the Government can give them, to do their best to prevent the costs of production from rising, from whatever cause." A few days later, in the United States, President Roosevelt sent a Message to Congress asking for "elastic" powers to restrain prices and appealing to labour for co-operation. In neither country has any intention been expressed of introducing compulsory powers to hold down wages. "Since the outbreak of war (the White Paper stated) the existing joint voluntary machinery for wage negotiations has operated successfully. Increases in wages have been reasonable; . . . the freedom of opportunity to make claims and to have them discussed has enabled industrial peace to be maintained." In the United States, where industrial peace has by no means been maintained—though wages have only been a relatively minor cause of the disputes—the Administration maintains the New Deal view that the establishment of better conditions for the workers is an imperative part of social policy.

The unspoken wish, however, both in Britain and in the United States, is to arrest increases in wages. Higher wages mean higher costs. Higher costs mean higher prices. Higher prices mean higher wages again. This is the familiar vicious spiral, and the concern of the British and American Governments in their July pronouncements is to ward off the inflationary dangers which are inherent in war economy, inherent because goods are scarce and money to buy them with is plentiful. In the White Paper, the issue is stated with unusual clarity. "Our shipping difficulties and the diversion of man-power, machinery and factory space to the production of war materials have already reduced the supply of goods for civilian consumption. The existence of stocks allowed some easement, but only for a time, and it is clear that not only must luxuries be cut out, but also there must be a

¹ Price Stabilisation and Industrial Policy. Cmd 6294.

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reduction in the consumption of goods which in peace-time had almost come to be regarded as necessities." The conclusion is inescapable— "This curtailment is inevitable, whatever money wages, salaries or profits are paid out." There is no choice. "Increases in wages or other incomes would not make more goods available. Such increases would not raise the general standard of living. They would merely tend to send up prices and to denude the shops, making it difficult to secure a fair distribution of the limited supply of goods. Those with the least amount of money or least able to spend time in shopping and standing in queues would suffer most." In general, increases in incomes would be ineffective and unfair.

The argument cannot be challenged. It has been a commonplace to every student of war economics and every historian of society in war-time. In practice, however, there are important footnotes to establish. It would be absurd to "fix" wages (or salaries) in such a way as to bar promotion and up-grading; and there are many individuals and groups whose pay must increase precisely with the cost of living to prevent them from falling into actual destitution. There is a minimum standard of living below which no man, woman or child can be allowed to fall even in war-time; and any war-time scheme for wages must at least be supple enough to ensure this National Minimum. The very large numbers in the population who stand on the edge of destitution include the bulk of the nation's children. It is plain enough, in theory, that the adjustment of pay to the size of the family is an essential part of the National Minimum; and, in practice, it is the level at which the Minimum should be set that is the chief stumbling block to an agreed wages policy in war-time. In peace-time, the main characteristic of society is its inequalities; and it is not, of course, the conscious or accepted purpose of war to bring about a levelling revolution, however desirable the change may seem to be. Differences in remuneration and the standard of living will remain, between group and group and individual and individual; and it is hard for any trade unionist to accept the conclusion that his pay, or the pay of his grade, should be frozen, while so many fellow citizens still earn so much more than he does.

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It is the practice, in fact, for trade unions with effective bargaining power to maintain that the minimum level is the pre-war level; that is, that wages should rise *pari passu* with the cost of living—regardless of the fact that, if they do, neither wages nor the cost of living will ever stop rising.

There is a good deal of confusion in these questions. It is obvious that the problem is one of distribution—the distribution of a stock of civilian necessities which is small and dwindling in size because of other war-time demands upon the nation's resources and because of war-time losses. Increases in wages or in salaries will not increase the stock. At the most, they will increase the share of that stock which can be bought by a particular individual or group of individuals, which means that someone else's must be correspondingly decreased. That someone else, in the case of an increase in wages, will not be a receiver of salaries or profits but another wage-earner; it will be someone whose power to bid for the scarce supply of goods is less than the wage-earner whose wages have been increased. What solution there may be of the disparity between the wage-earner and the salary-earner lies, not in levelling-up wages, but in levelling-down salaries; and it should not be forgotten that there is no clear-cut class distinction, either in remuneration or in status, between wage-earners and salary-earners. There is no frontier where one "nation" ceases and the other starts, but a tangled borderland with a host of minority problems behind each frontier. There are workers who are poor and workers who are well-off, just as there are salary-earners who are rich and salary-earners who are poor; and there is almost as much work for the leveller within each group as there is between the groups.

Actually, the continued demand for increases in wages, salaries and other incomes does little or nothing towards levelling. It is simply a struggle to maintain the unequal *status quo* in which success goes to the trade unions, the professional associations, the business men or the industrialists, who have most strength in bargaining. Indeed, it makes inequality more unequal. In peace-time, it is possible, in a time of increasing trade and expanding production, for all sections of the community to go forward at the same time.

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Inequalities will remain, but they will exist at a higher level of consumption all round. In war-time, this is not possible, because it is only the production of war goods that can be expanded. Peter is robbed to pay Paul, and both Paul and Peter may be trade unionists. In real terms, the attempt to maintain the standard of living, no matter by what section of the community it may be made, is a labour of Sisyphus. The pay packet or the salary cheque may be swollen; but the menu and the wardrobe will shrink—except in the case of those few who are so successful in their demands for more pay or more salary that they are actually able to divert sufficient supplies from their neighbours to keep up their peace-time station. And these successful robbers can only be very few in number for the simple reason that the goods just are not there; the food and clothing just are not available, for any considerable number of people to keep up their consumption to its peace-time level.

It has been calculated, by Mr. R. W. B. Clarke in *The Economic Effort of War* (Allen & Unwin, 1939) and by Mr. Geoffrey Crowther in *Ways and Means of War* (Oxford University Press, 1940), that at the height of this war the actual total physical consumption of the civilian population, as it was in 1937 or 1938, will have to be curtailed by something like two-fifths; and, when aggregate consumption is cut by this amount, it is obviously not possible for many individuals or groups to maintain their former consumption without imposing a drastic reduction on other members of the community that is neither socially nor politically conceivable. It is certainly not possible for the so-called working classes, who account for something like two-thirds of total consumption because of their great numbers, to maintain their consumption. Mr. Clarke's estimate of the curtailment of 1937 consumption required in total war was 38 per cent—a 27 per cent reduction on expenditure on necessities (food, housing, clothing, fuel, light, water, tobacco and household expenses) and a 70 per cent reduction on the rest of personal expenditure (travel, drink and luxuries). In April this year, the Government issued a White Paper¹ giving an estimate

¹An Analysis of the Sources of War Finance and an Estimate of National Income and Expenditure in 1938 and 1940. Cmd 6261.

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of national income and expenditure in 1938 and 1940, and the estimate of personal expenditure was as follows:

	1938 (£ millions)	1940
Food, Drink and Tobacco	1,648	1,973
Rent, Rates, Fuel and Light, Household Goods and Domestic Service	959	991
Clothing and Laundry	469	512
Private Motor Vehicles	118	50
Other Travel	169	164
Other Goods and Services ..	634	613
Total Personal Expenditure (at market prices)	3,997	4,303

Between 1938 and 1940, of course, prices rose. At 1938 prices, the White Paper's estimate probably means that total personal consumption fell between these two dates by over a fifth, possibly by as much as a quarter—but certainly by much less than 38 per cent or two-fifths. The classification differs from Mr. Clarke's, and comparison of items is almost impossible. But it can be hazarded that, according to the White Paper's computation, the consumption of "necessities" fell between 1938 and 1940 by 16 per cent, against Mr. Clarke's projected 27 per cent between 1937 and the peak of the war, and the rest of consumption by 40 per cent, against Mr. Clarke's projected 70 per cent. The distance still to travel, if calculations like Mr. Clarke's are to be given weight, as these must be, is plain; and it will not help in the further process of curtailment if, in 1941-42, what the July White Paper refers to as spendable incomes amounting to £500 millions in excess of the value of available goods at existing prices are to bid unchecked for these limited supplies.

It is important, however, to understand the reasons for this game of Beggar-My-Neighbour which is being played. It springs, as I have said, from the fact of social inequality—from the reluctance of millions of relatively poor men and women to see their modest pittance reduced while other men and women still live in luxury, however much their state may be diminished, and from the much less defensible, though no less understandable, reluctance of the luxurious livers to lose

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their stately footing. It springs from the realisation that, while no considerable part of the community can keep up its consumption and standard of living when the total stocks of goods available for civilian use is limited and lessening, it is possible by an adjustment of claims to make the sacrifices of poor men as small as possible by making those of rich men as large as possible. In short, it springs from the determination, on the one side, to eliminate luxurious living—and, on the other, to defend it.

Actually, however, this Beggar-My-Neighbour is ineffective. All that results from this catch-as-catch-can competition is all-round loss, inefficiency and exacerbation. However understandable it may be, the attempt to distribute a quart from the contents of a pint pot is labour lost. There might perhaps be the justification of rough-and-ready justice for it if it was the poor who did, in fact, gain most and lose least from it. But in fact the poor lose most. Here again, the July White Paper speaks simply and to the point. "The beginning of the 'vicious spiral' of inflation is found in increased prices; these force a demand for increased wages which is generally followed by a further increase in prices and so on, indefinitely. It has always been found impossible to check inflation when it has gone beyond a certain stage. Consequently it is of the first importance to check it at the beginning. By creating insecurity and confusion it would impede our productive effort, give great opportunities to the profiteer and impose hardship on those who were not lucky enough to secure a share in the general advance in money incomes. People in receipt of old age pensions, insurance benefits or small fixed incomes would be able to buy less of the necessities of life. At the same time the money costs of running the war would rise and the Government, unable to raise new taxes sufficiently quickly, would have to issue fresh money, which would further inflame the disease."

This is not simply a question of abstract theory. It is true that the fact that, in 1941-42, people have incomes amounting (after the deduction of taxation and saving at existing levels) to "£500 millions in excess of the current value of the goods available for purchase" has not yet led to any runaway inflation in prices. It is true that, in 1940-41,

an excess of spendable money in the hands of the public of, say, £300-400 millions did not cause inflation "beyond a certain stage"—largely because supplies were not yet sufficiently scarce or distribution sufficiently difficult for people to rush and scramble to make purchases. The fundamental situation of shortage was cushioned by stocks and reserves, which have now been exhausted; and, in the absence of many peace-time pursuits, the "propensity to spend," that is, the rate or habit of spending, did not rise in proportion with the increase in spendable money.¹ People had more money, but on the whole they spent it less freely, so that although there were fewer goods to buy, the competition to buy them did not in fact cause any uncontrollable rise in prices. But it is nevertheless also true that the rise in prices was considerable, and it was not exclusively due to war-time increases in costs. There was at least a tinge of inflation, and the steady increases that were permitted in wages, transport charges and fuel costs enhanced the perils of the situation. The phrase has been coined—"latent inflation."²; and this latent inflation has shown itself increasingly this year, when the cushion of stocks has been removed, in scrambles for unrationed goods. There has been an amazing run on tobacco. Black markets, profiteering, evasion of the law and queuing are all symptoms, and they are all on the increase. The almost universal unscrupulousness of the motoring public, individual and commercial, in obtaining extra supplies of petrol and using them illegitimately is another index of the spendable money that is burning holes in pockets. "Insecurity and confusion . . . great opportunities to the profiteer . . . hardship . . ."—all the signs cited by the White Paper are already present—in some degree at any rate.

In theory, the twofold solution is obvious. First, it is necessary to prevent people from having too much money to spend—by "severe additional direct taxes . . . which should have the effect of restricting the expenditure of those most able to bear the burden," by securing a maximum savings effort and by checking the general rise in money

¹ *The Economist*, June 21st, page 817, "Bank Credit and Inflation."

² See articles by Mr. Kalecki in the *Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics*, *passim*.

incomes. Secondly, it is necessary to prevent people from bidding against each other for necessary goods, by means of rationing and price control—which are mutual inseparables. In practice, the solution has not worked. Even with taxation at its present level—and E.P.T. actually encourages extravagant expenditure—the remaining spendable incomes of rich people have a high bidding power in the shops and in the markets; and if need be these people can always frustrate restraints on their spending power by drawing upon their capital. At the other end of the scale, there is no wages tax; income tax only touches the peaks of working-class income; and, in the matter of rising money wages, it is not the "freedom of opportunity" to make wage claims that has "enabled industrial peace to be maintained," but rather the freedom with which those claims have almost unanimously been granted. In spite of the very notable achievements of the Savings Movement, the rate of saving is far from the rate which would mop up all the excess of spendable incomes over and above the value of available goods at current prices. And, in the physical field of actual buying and selling, the scope of rationing and price control is still insufficient to prevent scrambles for goods, rushes, runs, queues and faulty and unfair distribution.

Within the intense national effort, Beggar-My-Neighbour is still the *motif*. It is increased by the very conditions of war-time. If the wage-earner is engaged in vital war work, working long hours and making marked progress in output, his claim for higher rewards is not unreasonable, to say the least. One of the strongest arguments against any "freezing" or "pegging" of wages is the fact that the differences which exist in peace-time between the remuneration of one job and another—differences which tend to be perpetuated by trade union action—very often do not correspond with the relative worth of the jobs in the war effort. By war-time values, most heavy workers, for instance, are probably underpaid; and if this sort of outmoded differential remains, the war effort will actually be impeded, because workers will be reluctant to move into jobs where they are pressingly wanted. Again, shopkeepers and merchants, conducting their businesses with limited supplies and reduced turnover—as a result of

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necessary Government measures or as the inevitable consequence of war conditions—are naturally disposed, since there is no programme of compensation to cover their overheads and other fixed obligations, to make every penny they can out of the business that remains to them. The scramble for money and the scramble for goods are part and parcel of the unformed war economy.

The fact is that, if a solution is to be found, two elements in the problem have got to be separated. There is, first, the desire of every section of the community not to lose its place in the schedule of money claims on the national income; trade unionists, for instance, justify their policy of pressing at every possible point for higher wages in the separate industries by arguing that the share of wages in the national income must not be reduced. And there is, secondly, the hard, inescapable fact that the goods are not available, and cannot be available in war-time, for the extra money to buy; consumption must go down, whatever the wages and salaries and incomes and profits of the community may be. The trouble so far has been that these two aspects of the problem have been confused. In their understandable eagerness to maintain the share of wages in the national income—actually, according to the White Paper put out by the Government in April, the share of wages increased by appreciably more between 1938 and 1940 than the share of either profits and interest or salaries—trade unionists have greatly increased the difficulty of the physical task of distributing the existing scarce supply of goods fairly and evenly. And by their similar determination not to allow the war to be used as a pretext to introduce a “socialist redistribution” of wealth, the receivers of profits and interests and salaries have also been obstructive.

The task, then, is to separate the question of financial claims in the future from the present physical job of distributing civilian goods without inflation, scrambles and unfairness; and the sad and ironical truth is that Mr. Keynes showed how this could be done, as long as eighteen months ago, and was howled down for his pains. His solution was simple enough. It was simply to *sterilise* for the duration the extra earnings made during the war. His “deferred

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pay” would settle the question of financial claims after the war, but it would not compete, as part of a dangerous excess of purchasing power, in the competition for the scarce war-time supply of goods now. By *blocking* spendable incomes in this way—and it is the principle rather than the precise details that matter most in this argument—the Government would have prevented the present perilous confusion and the political acrimony which is increasing now that the real shortage of goods is becoming more evident. But, although the Government did turn down the plan, it was other opposition, from surprising quarters, that torpedoed it. At this later stage in the war, it is an astounding thing to remember that it was the agencies which stood to gain most towards their own specific objectives, the trade unions and the National Savings Movement, who hounded Mr. Keynes most mercilessly. In each case the opposition was disingenuous in the extreme. The trade unions’ objection was that, under the scheme, rich men would still be rich after the war, and they apparently regarded the fact that workpeople, and especially the poorer workpeople, would be protected by it, against the confusion of war-time scarcity and inflation, as of secondary importance. The National Savings Movement attacked the scheme bitterly because it threatened to do their work for them—and more efficiently, because it would have ensured that people *would not spend*.

It is not necessary to be for or against Mr. Keynes’s plan. It is enough to recognise the fact that the state of affairs which Mr. Keynes sought to secure by his plan is the only state of affairs in war-time which can be (a) fair and (b) efficient. Deferred pay or postponed spending was only part of the plan. Rationing, price control and family allowances—all intended to ensure that the restricted war-time supply of goods would be distributed in such a way as to furnish every man, woman and child with a guaranteed basic ration—rounded it off. Whatever financial arrangements are made, whatever political shibboleths are jealously guarded, whatever desirable social aspirations may be set on record, it is the duty of the Government, with the aid of the nation’s voluntarily-chosen leaders in every sphere of national life, to see that there is enough to go round; that it does in

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fact go round; and that no irrelevant competition for monetary rewards upsets the distribution of this basic ration, by causing the nation to scramble for money and goods like Westminster schoolboys for pieces of pancake. There are only two infrangible conditions: the stock of civilian goods to go round must be limited—in fact, it is limited—by the demands of war production; and there must be a minimum below which no individual and no family can fall. For a year, as civilian supplies have been increasingly restricted, as stocks have run out, as the shipping situation has grown tighter, as the war effort has expanded and as rationing has spread through food to clothing, the realities of the position have become plainer. It is even likely that discussion about the size of the National Minimum is academic, that actually it can now only be got by dividing the number of men, women and children in the community into the total stock of goods available—minimum, average and maximum all at the same figure. And it is obviously urgent to see that no excess of spendable incomes undoes its distribution.

THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF TROPICAL AFRICA

By SIR ALAN PIM

THE problem of the economic future of Tropical Africa cannot be considered by itself but as a small part of the general problem of world reconstruction, and especially of the form to be taken by the new Europe. With this it is impossible to deal in a short article, but two factors which, from the colonial point of view, seem to be of outstanding importance, are first that all colonising nations will have to work together to a greater extent than ever before because colonial problems have ceased to be merely local, or even national, problems; second—and this concerns the British Empire and France in particular—we shall have to adjust our ideas and actions to our new position as a debtor instead of a creditor nation with all that the change may imply. We had a small foretaste of this after the last war, and we have seen the shifts to which debtor nations were then driven and which we may have great difficulty in avoiding. In the sphere of colonial development, as in all other economic questions, much will depend on the policy adopted by the United States, the one remaining great creditor nation. What form this will take is a matter for the future, though its general character is partly foreshadowed in the fourth part of the joint declaration by President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister.

So far as we are concerned one danger seems to be that in our new position of weakness, and more especially when we are trying to grapple with the tremendous problems of post-war unemployment, we may be tempted to take up again something analogous to the proposals of the Empire Resources Development Committee which for some years during and after the last war enlisted a good deal of support and was the subject of debate in Parliament. The main idea of some of its advocates was that the resources of the Colonies, and specially of West Africa and British Guiana, should be taken over and developed through corporations of practical

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business men who would pay an adequate share of the profits into the British Treasury towards the liquidation of the war debt. The local inhabitants were not forgotten; "it would be a splendid means of facilitating their civilization, as their labour would be harnessed to the chariot of progress and productiveness." Such crude proposals are not likely to be repeated, but there are other ways of imposing an unfair burden on colonies as a means of relieving unemployment at home. Making our dependencies bankrupt would be a poor return for their loyal support in this war.

One very important assumption must be made, it would seem, in framing any scheme of future development, and Lord Moyne has made it in his recent statement, while our status as a debtor nation will make it more imperative. It is that both trade and capital investment are likely to be controlled and regulated by Governments much more than we have been accustomed to before the war. The tendency in that direction has indeed been marked since the economic depression of the early thirties, and it seems unlikely that the relaxation of the systems of control which have been organised during this war will follow the precedent of twenty years ago. Whether on a world-wide or on a regional scale some co-ordinating authority will be necessary.

Exchange control, commodity control schemes, and quota systems, seem also to have come to stay for the present, though the character of the schemes may have to be modified so as to ensure a fair deal to the consumer as well as to the producer. Copra is a good illustration of the ruin which the absence of control in a disorganized world can bring to large bodies of small producers. Within this general framework, nevertheless, there is room for wide differences of policy as regards methods of advance.

What, however, is implied by colonial development? In its widest sense it includes not only economic advance but everything which helps to develop the capacities of the native peoples, health, education, social organization, the relation of the State to the land, as well as science in its many branches. The working of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 illustrates how closely connected all of these are. The scope of that Act is limited to schemes of a capital nature "likely

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to aid and develop agriculture and industry in the Colonies and thereby promote commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom." Nevertheless of the assistance given under the Act up to March 31st, 1939, totalling £7,909,000, £1,077,000 was given for public health, as compared with £2,610,000 for internal transport and communications, £474,000 for harbours, £249,000 for surveys, £841,000 for water supplies and water power, £371,000 for land drainage and reclamation, and £592,000 for scientific research. Under the new Colonial Development and Welfare Act the proportions of the expenditure under the various heads is likely to be considerably changed, both because of its wider scope, and even more by the removal of the limitation to schemes of a capital nature related to material development. This limitation barred all applications for assistance towards meeting long term recurrent expenditure. The hoary principle that colonies must be able to pay for themselves has been modified and the weaker territories can be dealt with on the basis of their needs, not merely on the basis of their financial capacity to meet recurring expenditure. Incidentally the new Act also makes it possible to get over another difficulty in the working of the old Act, the incompetence of the staffs of some of the weaker colonies, which in some cases has resulted in substantial waste of money. From a practical point of view these are important considerations in evolving schemes for the future.

The rest of this article will concentrate on Africa, as it is in that continent that lie our greatest colonial responsibilities.

It may perhaps be said that most colonial territories in Africa have now passed the initial stages of development. They have created the bony structure of an administrative organization and a preliminary framework of communications. Their external trade has been developed, though it is still limited to a very small number of products, so that their economies are intensely susceptible to the vagaries of the world markets. Their internal and regional trade is still very small and they have made little advance in accumulating local capital or in developing secondary industries, local consumption industries, and native crafts. Taking British Africa south of the Sahara and the Union of South Africa a recent study

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by Dr. Leubuscher has shown that the total recorded inter-African trade (imports plus exports) in 1929 was only valued at £14,338,000, or 5.3 per cent of the total trade, while in 1938 this had actually fallen to £14,112,000, or 4.8 per cent of an increased total trade. Of the latter total £6,101,000 represented the trade of the Union of South Africa. In addition to the recorded trade there must of course have been a good deal of unrecorded trade over the long land frontiers. Except Nyasaland the only countries showing increases in 1938 are those which have developed mining industries. The inland trade in foodstuffs is considerable, more especially in West Africa where Northern Nigeria, for instance, exchanges its animal products and other foodstuffs for the Kola nuts, palm oil, and fruit of Southern Nigeria, but there are no statistics for this trade and it is mostly purely local. In many areas the difficulty is to find something to sell, though a large number of itinerant traders make a living from hawking salt, or fresh or smoked fish. Up to the nineties of last century there was a considerable trade in smoked sea fish from the West African coast, but this trade has been driven out by Norwegian stock-fish. This decrease in inter-African trade is partly due to the establishment of new local markets in connection with the mining centres and to the home growing of products formerly imported, such as Kola nuts in Nigeria.

Secondary industries are little developed and the old native crafts are for the most part on the decline, though the textile industry in West Africa is still considerable, and new activities, such as those of brickmakers and builders, have sprung up as the result of the change towards a European manner of life. A general feature is that the native craftsman must still combine his craft with some other occupation in order to make a living.

Under colonial conditions, however, the day of small things should not be despised, and much can be done to increase internal trade, an important factor in raising the standard of living, by encouraging production suited to local requirements, and by developing local markets, transport, and communications. The planning of communications on regional instead of on purely local lines would extend the

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area of benefit. Whether measures of this kind should be supplemented by protective duties has been a disputed question. European consumption industries in Kenya depend on high duties, as do the sugar of Uganda, the rice of Tanganyika, the ghee in all three territories and in Nyasaland, as well as the industries of the Union of South Africa. Protective duties have thus helped to create small industries in tropical Africa, but the price is the usual one of increased cost to consumers and a loss to the customs revenue. It seems unlikely that native crafts can be revived in this way. European industrial enterprise—apart from small consumption industries—is practically confined to industries ancillary to mining.

Whether large scale manufacturing industries should be set up—a cotton industry more especially—has been the subject of some discussion, particularly by French writers, but the main purpose of their proposals has not been that of giving the economic life of colonies a more diversified character but of utilising the services of labour even cheaper than that of the eastern nations for the purpose of establishing an export industry. Markets are the main determining factor in establishing industries, and African purchasing power is a weak foundation for a large scale industry. Special circumstances may however create such a market. The Dutch had not much success in establishing local industries in Netherlands India until Chinese ingenuity took advantage of the scarcity of supplies during the war of 1914-18, and the newly created Belgian textile industry in the Congo is profiting from the present abnormal conditions. A natural development from the position of today would appear to be the establishment of industries applying preparatory processes to raw products, but here again—as for example in the case of ground nuts—the absence of a local market for the by-products and the extra cost of special receptacles for transport may be limiting factors.

Progress on these lines of small advances in many directions determined by local circumstances would rest on a sound basis, and should lead to greater stability, but its success would be partly dependent on the increased resources derived from the export industries. The fact remains that

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hitherto African economic progress—and the same would apply to other colonial areas—has mainly depended on the introduction of European capital, and the direction in which it has been applied has been determined by European needs. From West Africa Europe required vegetable products, either natural or cultivated, and in recent times minerals, from South and Central Africa chiefly minerals. Where white settlement has developed on any considerable scale—apart from mining centres and the Union of South Africa—it has depended on the production of export crops, even the cotton of Uganda is all for export. The alignment of railways has been determined either by the presence of minerals, the only stable foundation in Africa for railway finances, or by export considerations. Administrative policies and railway rates have been determined by the necessity of encouraging exports for the purpose of paying for the necessary imports and of meeting the interest on Government loans. This has included the encouragement, amounting in some cases to compulsion, of special export crops. The total capital from abroad invested in British African territories up to 1936 has been estimated by Professor Frankel at £329 millions, of which the public listed capital represents £163 millions, private listed capital £139 millions, and non-listed capital brought in by traders and settlers £26 millions. The corresponding figures for French Africa are £43 millions public listed capital, £24 millions private listed capital, and £3 millions non-listed; for the Belgian Congo they are £36 millions public listed, £101 millions private listed, and £7 millions non-listed. All of the public listed capital and part of the private listed represent fixed obligations, and the Belgian private listed capital includes large sums guaranteed by Government. Mining, and in West Africa commerce, have been the only large investments which have been able to obtain equity capital. If economic progress is to continue, and it is the necessary foundation for social progress, not only will these obligations have to be met but a great deal more capital will be required, much of it for purposes which will yield either no direct return or a very small or long deferred return. The problem for solution is, how, under the probable post-war conditions, is this additional large capital to be

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obtained? Also is the application to be controlled, and, if so, what are to be the criteria determining its application? How again is the best use to be made of the other two great factors of production, land and labour, so as to yield the maximum results? These problems in Africa differ in character from those in the other major colonial areas. Malaya seems unlikely to have financial difficulties, more especially as the bulk of its obligations are of the equity type. The West Indies indeed have as great, or greater, financial difficulties, but their task is not so much to erect a new economy as to repair a broken down economy of an approximately European type.

Many proposals have been put forward for the application of capital to African development on the grand scale. In Italy, France, and Central Europe, there has been some support for grandiose schemes such as those of Kalergi and of Michaelis for international action to develop Africa as "the complement of Europe;" the only great tropical area in which Europe could count on maintaining its pre-eminence in view of the tendency for the world to divide itself into separate economic regions, a tendency stimulated by the opening of the Panama canal. These schemes were based frankly on European interests, and some of them rested on the very doubtful basis of large scale European settlement, made possible by the modern scientific mastery over climatic obstacles. How the nations concerned, most of them without any capital resources, were to make their contributions was not clear, though Hofherr, for instance, had an ingenious scheme for contributions in machinery and man power to be paid for in the raw materials produced. The necessary financial organization was to be provided through the League of Nations and the Bank of International Settlements. In recent times the schemes for Federal Union have included proposals for a federal organization to deal with all colonial questions, though this part of the scheme seems to have receded into the background as the practical difficulties came to be better realized.

Other proposals again, such as those associated with Dr. Schacht, advocated the formation of national or international Chartered Companies for the development of special

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regions or special products. Some of them—notably those of Dr. Schacht—were intended primarily for the purpose of giving Germany or other excluded nations a place in the African sun without infringing national sovereignty, but others had a much wider scope and aimed at development in the general world interests, possibly through organizations of a non-profit making and semi-public character. These schemes have their attractions, specially those of the non-profit making type, but they are open to various objections. In the first place companies of this kind, independent of the local administrations but controlling the economic life of the countries concerned, though without the responsibilities of administration, would tend to become too powerful, and, as the countries made progress towards self-government, the probabilities of friction would increase. On the financial side again the Chartered Companies of the past have always suffered from chronic difficulties in raising the necessary resources. Such success as they have had—the Royal Niger Company being perhaps the only exception—has been largely due to a mixture of patriotic impulses and vague hopes of spectacular gains, neither of which could be appealed to under the new conditions. They could not hope for equity capital on any considerable scale. So far as colonial native opinion can be gauged, though this is necessarily largely inarticulate, it views all such proposals with much suspicion. To them the word international is not one of good omen but rather suggests exploitation.

If American participation is desired, and this would seem essential, it would be on their own terms, probably not of an entirely altruistic character. International loans again raise similar difficult problems, as is shown by the history of the League of Nations loans. If they are guaranteed by the participating nations the rate of interest tends to be determined by the conditions of the weaker guarantors, and without such guarantees the position is so speculative as to involve even higher rates. Much of the necessary expenditure is of a character bringing in little or no return, and, apart from repudiation, weaker colonies are likely to be burdened with obligations which they cannot meet.

With limited capital resources it becomes even more

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important that the direction in which it is applied should be subject to some form of control so as to avoid the waste and misuse which has characterised so much of the investments of the past. If possible this control should be international in character; it would certainly have to be on a wider basis than a purely national one if the planning of the future is to take advantage of the modern command over nature.

Railway, roads, and communications generally, would have to be organised on lines not determined by political boundaries. The same considerations would apply to one of the probabilities of the future, the control and better use of the immense resources represented by the great rivers, either for irrigation or for the development of power. In Africa, at any rate, mineral developments have been the foundation of economic progress in many territories, but here we get the difficult questions whether these activities should be carried on by the Governments concerned as are the coal mines of Nigeria, by companies more or less under Government control, as in the Belgian Congo and in the Netherland Indies, or by private enterprise large or small. If they are to be in the hands of private enterprise, should they be entrusted to great concerns with a practical monopoly, as, for example, in Northern Rhodesia, or are they to be reserved for the small man as has been attempted in Southern Rhodesia and to some extent in Tanganyika and Kenya? Can native operators be given a share as the French have attempted to do in some of their territories? In all cases the issue arises how the mining interests can be made to give a fair share of the profits to the local administrations, and it has to be remembered that the British Government takes a large share of the profits of all companies with their headquarters in Great Britain. In this matter the Union of South Africa has provided an illustration which deserves close study though the conditions are of a somewhat special type, as few mining enterprises can show such a record of steady advance, and such a promise of continuing prosperity so long as gold is a basis of exchange. The Union, too, has shown how the resources derived from a wasting asset can be applied to developing assets more permanent than the

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mines themselves. Large scale enterprises have great advantages, both because of the amount of capital required for economic operation on modern lines and of the resulting possibility of following far-sighted policies of development, and, even more important, of securing good conditions for the labour employed. On the other hand there are many small propositions worth the attention of the small man, but not of the great company. This applies more particularly to giving some scope for native activities, but in general the operations of the small man tend to be temporary in character and he is gradually driven out by larger organizations; this has happened in the tin mines of Malaya, and is happening at various places in Africa. The living conditions of the small miner, and still more of his labourers, are also generally on a very low standard. Is it possible by some form of co-operative action to combine the advantages of both systems?

On the agricultural side again is there to be a definite policy of encouraging or discouraging different types of agriculture? Is European settlement to be extended, is plantation agriculture to be developed, or is native peasant agriculture to be the general accepted policy? To a considerable extent these questions settle themselves, as any extensive European settlement is governed by climatic considerations, and large scale plantations tend to be limited either to products requiring a large capital like sisal, or to those involving difficult technical operations. I am certainly not among those who consider that European settlement has brought no good to the countries concerned, or that settlers have not often filled the place which Livingstone anticipated for them, but among its disadvantages are the heavy cost involved—Dr. Salvadori estimated the cost of European agricultural settlement in Kenya at £29 millions—and the uncertainty as to its permanence. From the economic point of view it has only been maintained by measures of assistance both direct and indirect, though this indeed applies to commercial agriculture everywhere, but in any case it has depended as much on the attractions of the way of life as on the prospect of financial profit.

Plantation agriculture is, however, a separate issue.

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Native peasant cultivation has given spectacular results in West Africa and in Uganda, but it is open to discussion whether under modern conditions it may not need to be supplemented in the case of some products by organizing larger units able to employ skilled management and to work on scientific lines and with the aid of modern mechanism. This does not by any means exclude native plantations on co-operative lines. The oil palm industry in West Africa, for example, must always remain predominantly a form of peasant agriculture, but it is seriously threatened by the competition of the plantations of the East Indies owing to the difficulties in persuading the peasant producers to improve the strains of their trees and to combine in organising better methods of oil extraction. On the other hand, the native rubber industry of the East Indies shows the success of the peasant producer in competing with the large scale plantation when he is intelligent enough to accept the necessary control and has sufficient other resources to carry him over times of depression. Both systems seem to have their place and they can be complementary to each other. The cotton plantations of the Sudan are a good illustration of the combination of plantation methods with peasant agriculture.

In considering the prospects of native agriculture modern developments emphasize the necessity of examining the question of how far the existing systems of land tenure and land management are favourable to the most economic uses of the land or indeed to the maintenance of its fertility. Communal tenure in its many forms has substantial advantages, and it is not incompatible with stability of occupancy, though this is difficult to secure without a system of cadastral survey and of registration such as exists nowhere in Africa. This need is the more urgent as valuable economic products increase, such as cocoa, more especially when they occupy the ground for a long period. Even where no such special crops exist the more progressive native farmers are beginning to resent the limitations which communal ownership imposes on their activities; fencing, for example, may be prohibited because it interferes with general rights of grazing. The whole subject of land rights and land demarcation requires investigation in the interests of economic and social advance.

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The absence of demarcation of holdings is indeed sometimes useful. Even in India with its elaborate land records organization I have known cases where villages have resisted any clarification of their records, because they were so complicated that if a creditor got a decree for possession against one of the coparcenary body it was quite impossible for him to prove what land he was entitled to. Similarly in Zanzibar the old method of indicating the boundaries of their plantations was so indefinite that when Government had to take over the management of indebted estates in many cases the neighbours could trespass on bits of the debtor's estate without any possibility of checking them.

It is even more urgent to deal with a problem requiring large expenditure of an unremunerative character, and which is eminently one for international collaboration, namely the preservation of the land from the destruction caused by erosion due both to the application of half understood Western agricultural methods and to native customs relating to cattle.

In the interests however of economic advance, as well as of social advance, the most fundamental of all questions is how the capacities of the native peoples can be so developed as to enable them to take advantage of the opportunities offered by scientific advance and the immense extension of economic opportunities. As the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India said, the key to all progress lies in the mind of the cultivator himself, but to use that key he must have free scope for his activities. Among the characteristic features of African development have hitherto been the use of Africans as great masses of undifferentiated labour and the canalisation of economic energies in certain directions, possibly resulting in the diversion of capital from activities of greater general advantage. One of the reasons why large scale mining has been a success in Africa is that the conditions of the work facilitated the control of these large masses of raw labour. If progress is to continue, it must be recognized that these days of undifferentiated labour have gone.

Far-seeing employers such as those on the Rand, in the Belgian Congo and in Northern Rhodesia have already recognized the necessity of a close study of the physical

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needs, not only of their labourers but of the villages from which they come. It is equally necessary that both the actual labourers, and with them much wider circles of the population, should receive such an education and training as will stimulate the capacities which experience has shown to be latent in many of them, and that scope should be provided for the exercise of those capacities. The greater industries, and mining more especially, can provide wide opportunities, but their magnitude, requiring the employment of much organized white labour, also involves a serious danger to native advance in some British territories, namely the extension of the colour bar. The realization of this aim of mass education would involve heavy expenditure with little or no direct return, and it is difficult to imagine its being pursued with the necessary consistence except under the stimulus of an aroused national or international conscience.

The last point which may be briefly touched on is the place of the native in the commercial organization of Africa and whether that is such as to assist the local accumulation of capital and so to raise the local standard of living. The part played by natives in the internal trade, particularly that in foodstuffs, has already been mentioned. When however it is a question of trading on a larger scale and of keeping shops the African is at once up against great difficulties. In East Africa Indians have been engaged for centuries in the coastal trade, and when the interior was opened up by European enterprise they took advantage of the new opportunities to obtain a practical monopoly of the native retail trade. In many parts of West Africa Syrians occupy a similar position. They were encouraged to come in to fill a vacant place in the economic structure, and both communities fulfil valuable functions. As a result of their presence, however, strong vested interests have been created with which it is very difficult for the local African inhabitants to compete when with the expansion of their capacities and ambitions they want to extend their trading activities to new spheres. Their greatest handicap is the difficulty in obtaining even a very modest capital. A half-way house has been found in some cases by working as agents for Indians or Syrians, but this does not take them far. Attempts on co-operative

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lines, which seem to provide the best solution of the problem, have often broken down as the result of African weakness in realising the meaning of financial responsibility.

In the higher stages of the economic organization Africans have only an insignificant share in the export and import trade, though in West Africa they have been indispensable as petty middlemen ever since the day of the slave trade. In East Africa, apart from the products of European plantations, exports and imports are largely in Indian hands. In West Africa with its much larger trade in native products, the tendency has been for many years in the direction of an increasing monopoly both of the export and import trade by a small number of powerful European organizations. The independent native trader has neither the resources nor the experience necessary for competing in the very fluctuating world market for primary products, and many have been obliged to close down during the recurring periods of economic depression. Another factor has been their lack of the additional strength provided by the control of both exports and imports in the same hands. In East Africa in the case of coffee of native production a solution of the difficulties has been attempted on co-operative lines by the formation of the Kilimanjaro Coffee Growers' Association, and the Zanzibar Clove Growers' Association is a nominally co-operative organization, though it also lacks the essential features of the orthodox co-operative society. In West Africa co-operative societies play some part in the main export industries, and the recent Cocoa Commission recommended the establishment of a great co-operative organization among the cocoa producers of the Gold Coast. The consideration of these proposals has been interrupted by the war, and for the time being the British Government has taken over the purchase and control of the main export products. The working of this system of government control should provide experience which may be of great value in deciding on the policy to be followed after the war. The character of that policy will be a small part of the great world problem of organizing the production and distribution of tropical raw materials so as to serve the interests both of the colonial territories and of all the nations which require their products.

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By G. D. H. COLE

SINCE the Local Government Act of 1888 English local government has been based mainly on two kinds of authority—the County Borough and the Administrative County. Within the County Borough there are no lesser administrative authorities, and the extension of borough boundaries involves the disappearance of the bodies which previously existed within the areas absorbed. On the other hand, within the Administrative Counties there are numerous lesser bodies—municipal boroughs often of long standing, urban and rural districts, and, within the rural districts, parishes with Parish Councils or Parish Meetings of their own. Since the disappearance successively of the School Boards and the Boards of Guardians the functions of local government have been concentrated in the hands of general, as distinct from *ad hoc* authorities; and there has been a steady tendency in the counties to increase the powers of the County Councils as against the lesser authorities within their areas. There has also been of late much detailed rectification of boundaries, and a steady process of abolishing small urban districts and regrouping rural districts in certain parts of the country. Many new non-county boroughs have been created, and in a number of cases the boundaries of existing boroughs have been extended, where local or county opposition has not been too strong to be overcome. But apart from the abolition of the *ad hoc* authorities, there has been no major change in the structure of English local government for more than half a century.

Over this period there have been enormous changes both in the functions of local government and in the distribution of population—above all, in the size of towns and the growth of what geographers call “conurbations.” First came a very rapid growth of “municipal enterprise” in the public utility services, then a great expansion of public education after 1902, then a considerable amplification of public health

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services and the beginnings of state-recognized town-planning, then the great spurt in municipal house-building after 1918, and finally the development of the public assistance and hospital services after the absorption of the Guardians in 1929. Side by side with this extension of local government functions, of which I have mentioned only the most outstanding examples, went necessarily a great increase in national grants in aid of local funds. Rates rose too, though everyone admitted that they were a most inequitable form of taxation—made even more inequitable by the “derating” provisions of the Act of 1929.

Functions increased and multiplied; and with this process went a great increase in the size, and on the whole the efficiency, of the local civil service. But structural changes lagged behind changes of function. Functions accumulated because more and more jobs had to be done: structural reform was avoided because Governments, of any party, saw in it much more prospect of trouble than of party profit. Local antagonisms were fierce: national interest was small. The problems of local government structure were most safely ignored by party leaders who were not much interested in local affairs. The existing system worked, after a fashion: best let it alone. If Manchester and Salford could not agree that they formed parts of a single city, why compel them to join hands?

Moreover, the municipal reformers had no common policy. There were Regionalists, with many different notions of what a “Region” ought to be, and of what Regionalism implied. There were some persons who advocated further and further extensions of county borough boundaries, and others who demanded that the County should be given at least some authority over the County Borough. Some persons insisted on the vital importance of local government as a “school of democracy”; whereas others maintained that the necessity of large units of service and administration had rendered local government obsolete. In practice, there was a tendency, side by side with the conferment of new powers on the major local authorities, to take other powers out of their hands. The Unemployment Assistance Board was organized as a national body, meant to take over almost

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entirely the administration of relief to the able-bodied. The Central Electricity Board at least pointed the way towards a reorganization of electricity supply on a basis wider than that of local government; and a similar tendency appeared in the powers conferred on Transport Commissioners and in a number of other fields.

Simultaneously, with the development of town-planning legislation, local authorities were being induced to combine into federal groups for the formulation of town and country plans. But in this grouping there is no principle of any sort to be discerned. Town planning bodies are of all shapes and sizes, from committees of a single local authority, or of a couple of neighbours, to committees embracing a large number of authorities holding sway over wide areas. Some of these bodies have “executive” powers, of a kind; but many are merely advisory, and depend for their success entirely on the endorsement of their recommendations by the separate authorities represented upon them. No approach has been made to any concerted system of regional planning; and many of the joint bodies which exist on paper have little or nothing to their credit in the way of practical achievement. Joint Committees based on indirect election are proverbially ineffective; but, given the existing structure of English local government, there seems to be no possibility of transcending the limitations of this type of federation.

Yet almost everybody admits that for the satisfactory planning of development in town and country alike there is need for an authority wide enough to include both urban and rural areas, and to break down the existing barriers between the County Boroughs and the Administrative Counties. Indeed, the decision of 1888, which cut off the major cities, as they then were, absolutely from the counties in which they were geographically situated, is now seen to have been a mistake. Elective county government was then new, and municipal self-government old and familiar, and no doubt it seemed the easiest course to give the larger towns full powers of self-government apart from the new County Councils, which were to take over the ancient administrative functions of the justices of the peace. But the practical effect of this arrangement was to leave the

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administrative counties as merely residual areas, and to set up a perpetual conflict between them and the growing cities, which naturally desired to acquire administrative powers over the suburban areas, as more and more dormitory districts were built outside their municipal boundaries. The county authorities naturally fought against municipal encroachments which threatened to deprive them of their richest rateable areas; the dwellers in the suburbs of great towns resisted inclusion within the municipal areas for fear of higher rates; and often the position was further complicated when an old town possessing its own ancient charter found itself engulfed, economically and socially, by the growth of a greater neighbour, but was unwilling to surrender its traditional independence, where this meant mere absorption. Salford would not willingly be swallowed by Manchester, or Gateshead by Newcastle-on-Tyne, or Birkenhead by Liverpool, or Newcastle-under-Lyme by Stoke-on-Trent. Nor would Richmond or Croydon willingly pass under the authority of an enlarged London County Council.

In all the controversies over extension of municipal boundaries, there were two issues which were perpetually getting mixed up. It was undeniable that certain services needed large areas for effective administration, and that the great "conurbations" were suffering from want of any authority empowered to exercise general control over their development. But there was strong resistance to projects of unification, partly for financial reasons and partly for reasons of civic sentiment. In the suburban areas, which had no strong civic sentiments of their own, the opposition to the extension of borough boundaries was mainly financial. The suburbanites, often relatively well-to-do, liked enjoying the benefit of the neighbouring city's services and amenities without having to contribute to their cost; and the county authorities, for reasons given already, often abetted their desire to remain outside the boundaries of the great town by which they lived. In the older towns which found themselves brought inescapably within the orbits of their greater neighbours, the financial motive to resistance was often less important; but its place was supplied by the reluctance of mayor and corporation to be superseded and abolished, and by a feeling

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among the citizens that they did not want their ancient borough to lose its traditional rights and powers, and to become a mere electoral district within the enlarged jurisdiction of its greater neighbour. The citizens of, say, Bradford or Gateshead or Hove or Bootle wanted to have still some sort of elected authority of their own, and some local independence. They did not want to be merely voters for a West Riding, or a Tyneside, or a Greater Brighton, or a Merseyside local authority. They had, even apart from financial motives, a civic sentiment which attached itself to the smaller place in which they lived, rather than to the larger "conurbation" of which that place had come to form a part.

This attitude is entirely intelligible, and even laudible. From the standpoint of the administrator, thinking in terms of efficiency and economy of service, it is obviously absurd that Manchester and Salford, Newcastle and Gateshead, or Brighton and Hove, should be administered as entirely separate towns, and that there should be no wider authority responsible for their closely common concerns. But from the standpoint of the citizen interested in local "politics" it is entirely unsatisfactory to have no body which is expected to concern itself with the affairs of his immediate neighbourhood—no body concerned with Salford, or for that matter with Ardwick or Gorton, as distinct from the Manchester "conurbation" as a whole. Nor is there, when you come to think of it, any inconsistency in these two claims. Some, but not all, local government services need to be administered over wide areas: some, on the other hand, need small areas, and among these are services which should be rapidly extended as the communal element in our way of living becomes more important. Why not, then, equip the great "conurbations" with bodies representing all their citizens, and charge these bodies with the duties which need large areas for effective administration, and at the same time why not preserve, or create, smaller authorities to control, over lesser areas, the services which do not need large scale operation and are in fact best managed by persons in close touch with a limited number of constituents?

This, after all, is what happens in London—L.C.C.

London, I mean. A Londoner is both a citizen of London and a citizen of Chelsea, or Poplar, or wherever he happens to live. There are Metropolitan Borough Councils carrying on the work of administration side by side with the London County Council. Similarly, inside the Administrative Counties there is a division of powers and duties between County Councils, non-county Borough Councils, Urban District Councils, Rural District Councils—to say nothing of Parish Councils and Parish Meetings. Only in the County Boroughs is there no lesser authority and no division of powers; and that is one reason why the extension of their boundaries is often so hotly opposed.

What I am suggesting is that for each of the great "conurbations" there shall be set up a new "City" Council, not to supersede the existing Councils, but to act in conjunction with them, as a co-ordinating authority and as direct administrator of those services which are best unified over the whole area. Or rather, I am suggesting more than this—that in certain cases it may also be desirable to re-create within what are now single huge towns lesser local authorities holding a limited sway over more manageable areas.

Let me take an example—Manchester. Opinions will differ about the total area which ought to be included within the Greater Manchester "conurbation." For purposes of illustration, I shall assume that it ought to run, westward, as far as Irlam and Worsley; northwards only as far as the present borough boundary; eastward, to include Ashton-under-Lyne, Hyde and Stalybridge; and southward, to include Stockport and its neighbours, and also Altrincham and probably Knutsford. That is to say, I am leaving outside the wider boundaries such big towns as Bolton, Bury, Rochdale and Oldham, and their several suburbs and satellites. Within the area thus defined are three County Boroughs—Manchester, Salford and Stockport—11 non-county boroughs, 18 urban districts, and 4 rural districts, with a total population of roughly a million and three-quarters. Under the plan which I am advancing, this entire area would be administered by a single Provincial, or "City," Council; but within this larger administration there would be, say, twenty "boroughs," each with its own Council, partly for the

detailed administration of services generally controlled by the larger authority, and partly for the conduct of services more conveniently merged on a smaller scale. Some of these "boroughs" would be identical in area with existing boroughs or urban districts now outside the Manchester boundaries; others would consist of several existing areas outside these boundaries; and yet others would be new authorities, perhaps conterminous with the existing parliamentary constituencies of Manchester. Obviously, it would be inappropriate here to attempt to delineate the exact areas; but what I have said makes the principle plain enough.

Under this plan, Greater Manchester would become an independent "Province," with full powers of self-government in its regional and provincial affairs. But it would clearly be necessary to provide links between it and the rest of Lancashire and Cheshire—especially with such neighbouring "conurbations" as I have excluded—Greater Bolton, Greater Oldham, and so on. Broadly, what I envisage is that Lancashire and Cheshire should be broken up for purposes of local government into a number of "Regions," which would between them include the whole of the two counties. Two of these "Regions," based respectively on Manchester and on Liverpool, would be populous enough to require the status of independent "Provinces." The others—numbering about twenty, and each based upon a considerable town, would come within the orbit of a Provincial Council representing all Lancashire and Cheshire outside the Merseyside and Greater Manchester "Provinces." Each of these twenty or so "Regions" would have its own Regional Council; and within each "Region" there would continue to be lesser authorities for boroughs and districts. The County Boroughs would lose their independence of the surrounding county area; but each County Borough, and some non-county boroughs, would become the centre of a "Region," with a population of anything from about 70,000 to over 200,000. Alternatively, there might continue to be separate County Councils for Lancashire and for Cheshire instead of a single "Provincial" Council for the whole area of the two counties lying outside Merseyside and Greater Manchester.

There would remain the problem of co-ordination between

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the Merseyside and Great Manchester "Provinces" and the rest of the two counties, organized either as a third "Province" or as two separate counties. This would involve the creation of a Federal Council including representatives of the whole area, and possessing certain overriding powers of planning and development for the North West as a whole. The proposed structure may sound complicated; but it is in fact a good deal less complicated than that which now exists.

At this point, I am sure to be greeted with the objection that federal bodies, based on indirect election, are both undemocratic and notoriously ineffectual. My answer is that I do not propose indirect election to any of the bodies suggested. I hold that the inhabitants of each place should directly elect their representatives to serve on all the bodies concerned. Let us take the case of a citizen of Blackburn, or any other Lancashire town. He would be asked at one and the same time to choose his representatives to serve on (a) the Blackburn Borough Council; (b) the Greater Blackburn Regional Council; and (c) the Lancashire County Council, or, alternatively, the united Provincial Council of Lancashire and Cheshire (exclusive of Merseyside and Greater Manchester). The Federal Council for the North West as a whole would consist of the members of the Greater Manchester, Merseyside, and Lancashire and Cheshire "Provincial" authorities meeting in joint session. Thus, the election would be direct at every stage.

Moreover, in order to improve co-ordination between the greater and the lesser authorities, I suggest that every elected person should be *ex officio* a member of the body next down in the hierarchy. Thus, the representative of Blackburn on the Lancashire (or Lancashire and Cheshire) Council would be *ex officio* a member of the Greater Blackburn Regional Council. The representative of Darwen on the latter body would be *ex officio* a member of the Darwen Borough Council. I also hold that the Member of Parliament for any area should be *ex officio* a member of the Regional Council of that area; for I regard it as highly important to establish closer contacts between the personnel of national and of local government.

I have taken my example from Lancashire, which is an

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exceptionally urbanised part of the country. The plan would work out rather differently in counties in which towns are further apart and the rural population forms a larger part of the whole. But the principle would be much the same. I should propose to group the smaller authorities in these counties into "Regions," each based on a considerable market town. Thus, in Devonshire and Cornwall, taken together to form a South-Western "Province," there might be from fifteen to twenty "Regions," co-ordinated either under a single Provincial Council or under two County Councils linked together into a Federal Council. In this area, no "conurbation" is large enough to require the status of an independent "Province"; and accordingly the entire area would come under the authority of the single Provincial Council or of the two County Councils, if they preferred to maintain their separate existence.

I think that only a very few "conurbations" need to be given independent "provincial" status. My own view is that, in addition to Greater London, the only "conurbations" in England for which such a status is necessary are Merseyside, Greater Manchester, Greater Birmingham, Tyneside, and two areas in Yorkshire, centred respectively upon Sheffield and upon Leeds. Elsewhere, I would give the big towns no higher status than that of "Regions," and would bring them within the jurisdiction, in matters of major policy, of the counties or "Provinces" within which they are geographically situated.

The idea underlying this plan is that the complete cutting off of the County Boroughs from the Administrative Counties under the Act of 1888 has been proved to be a mistake. It is undesirable either that urban and rural government should develop apart, or that the major cities should be sharply cut off from the areas in which suburban or satellite development is bound to occur. It is equally undesirable that each expanding town should be allowed to chop off more and more of the surrounding area, so as to leave the Administrative County a mere residue. The plan of reorganization here proposed is meant to meet these difficulties, by putting most of the County Boroughs back into the Counties from which they have escaped, but at the same time expanding them into

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"Regions" with large powers of autonomous administration.

But what, it will be asked, is to be the distribution of powers between the proposed "Provinces," "Regions," and lesser authorities included within their boundaries? The answer cannot, for the most part, be found in terms of whole spheres of public administration. Neither health, nor housing, nor town-planning, nor education can become, *in toto*, a "provincial," or a "regional," or a "local" service. In each of these spheres there will need to be both a distribution of powers and functions, and a distinction between powers of direct administration on the one hand and powers of supervision and co-ordination on the other. In education, for example, the University is clearly a "Provincial" concern; whereas elementary education is rather a case for "Regional" administration subject to "Provincial" co-ordination and supervision, with the "management" of individual schools left to the smaller authorities within the "Region." Secondary education is probably a case for a similar mixture of "Provincial" and "Regional" control; whereas adult education appears to be a case for the exercise of concurrent powers by all types of authority, under some degree of "Provincial" co-ordination. Similarly, "planning" is evidently a case for the drawing up of a general "plan" by the "Province" (or "Federation" in such cases as that of the North West), the execution of the "plan" being rather a "Regional" function, and the actual building of houses a case for "Regional" action with power to delegate authority in certain instances to the smaller bodies within the "Region."

I realize that this is but a sketchy account of the proposed distribution of powers and functions. But no more is practicable within the limits of a necessarily brief essay. Rather than elaborate this point further, I shall devote some of my remaining space to discussing the other objection that is certain to be advanced against this or any other ambitious plan of local government reorganization. How are the proposed new authorities to be financed?

No one likes the existing system of local government finance. The sole merit of the rating system is that it is traditional, and does serve as a means of preserving local financial responsibility, without which real local government

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is impossible. It is plain that, whether we reform our local government institutions or leave them as they are, the proportion of local expenditure found out of national grants in aid should, and is bound to, increase. There is no way of raising equitably by local taxation more than a limited proportion of the cost of public services which ought, in the interests of democracy, to be locally, or at least regionally, administered. There is no practicable substitute for local rates, though reforms can be made in the rating system—including a reversal of the reactionary "derating" provisions of the Act of 1929. The idea of a local income tax is attractive; but it is certainly not workable over any area smaller than a "Province," if even so. Public ownership of land, vested in the "Provincial" authorities, might help to provide them with a valuable source of revenue, but would not meet the problem of financing the "Regional" or smaller local units.

Thus, even if it were possible for the "Provinces" to finance their operations by means of local ownership, local income tax, and revenue from public services, the rates would have to remain as the source of income for the "Regional" and lesser authorities. It would, however, be fully possible to reduce their burden by providing a larger proportion of local expenditure out of national or "Provincial" grants in aid, partly under a formula based on "neediness," and partly under a "percentage" system designed to encourage local initiative and diverse experiment.

This retention of local rates may be regarded as unsatisfactory; but is there really any alternative? Rates would be much less objectionable if they were low, but still high enough to ensure the requisite measure of local responsibility. What is intolerable is not so much the rating system in itself as the attempt to use it as a means of financing a rapidly expanding range of services, and especially of services which require the highest expenditure in areas which have the smallest capacity to pay.

One way of relieving the pressure on local finances is by increasing the proportion of the cost of local services provided by way of grants in aid. But there is another. The insistence on the need for preserving local freedom and initiative does

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not by any means involve a belief that all services which are now under the control of the local authorities ought to remain under local administration. There are not a few services which plainly need to be administered either nationally or, under national co-ordination, over areas which can hardly coincide with the areas of either "Regional," or even "Provincial," government. The electricity supply services are one obvious example; and the regional control of transport is another. Public Assistance in the form of cash payments is probably yet another service which, not for the able-bodied alone, would be better transferred to a national authority—an enlarged Assistance Board. There is nothing in the proposals made in this essay at all inconsistent with the transference of any particular service entirely to national administration—or to a devolved administration acting under national authority, and entirely apart from the proposed system of local government.

This brings me to the question of war-time "Regionalism," which I have so far left severely alone. I hold that the "Defence Regions" set up under the Ministry of Home Security have, and can have, nothing whatever to do with any "Regionalism" conceived in terms of local government reform. "Regional" devolution of national government is one thing, and "Regional" co-ordination of local government quite another. It may, or may not, be desirable for certain central departments to maintain after the war "regional" offices with delegated powers. What is certain is that the "regions" suitable for such devolution cannot coincide with the "Regions" appropriate for the exercise of the powers and functions of local government. Central departments cannot delegate effective authority to more than a very small number of separate centres—if only for the reason that they cannot provide more than a very few senior officials capable of exercising wide powers of discretion. On the other hand, the attempt to co-ordinate local government over areas as wide as those suited to delegation from the centre would inevitably break down, because the "Regions" so constituted would be too big and diverse to represent any real community of democratic sentiment. For the effective expression of local democracy, the units of local government

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must be kept smaller than the units into which central administration can be broken up.

Accordingly, even if after the war some measure of devolution from the centre is retained, each centre of devolution will have to deal with more than one centre of "Provincial" government, and, *a fortiori*, with many local government "Regions," in the sense in which the word has been used in this essay. It is a terminological misfortune that the word "Region" is at present used to signify vastly different things. In relation to town-planning it means, usually though not always, something broadly similar to the local government "Region" consisting of a group of neighbouring towns and townlets with their rural hinterland; whereas the "Defence Regions" are of a totally different kind, much wider than the "Provinces" into which I have proposed that the local government "Regions" should be grouped. In considering the future of local government, the only sensible course is to put the "Defence Regions" right out of our minds.

The general idea underlying the proposals made in this essay is, I hope, sufficiently plain. I have set out to reconcile the need for large areas for the administration of certain services and the co-ordination of others with the need, in the interests of democracy, to maintain units of local government small enough to express the sense of neighbourhood and to enable the representative to keep up close contacts with those whom he is supposed to represent. If, as I think both likely and desirable, there comes about after the war a great increase in the communal element in our ways of living—if communal feeding in civic restaurants, communal education and recreation in civic centres, communal action in many spheres of activity now left to voluntary enterprise, come to be the common practice of our democracy, then we may look for a great increase in the number and importance of the functions of local government which will call for autonomous administration over quite small areas, in order to give full opportunity for the democratic spirit of neighbourhood to find expression. It is in the belief that this will come about that I have laid stress on the need for preserving and developing the smaller units of local govern-

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ment, even while we are making provision for the administration of *some* local government services over much larger areas. Any scheme of local government reform which ignores either of these needs is fatally lop-sided; but I believe there is no reason why both needs should not be met within the framework of a democratic system based throughout on direct election, and in such a way as to provide much stronger links than at present exist both between local authorities of different sizes and between the organs of local and national government.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

By H. R. G. GREAVES

PARLIAMENT has not allowed valour and endurance in the Soviet Union to deflect it from the main task. The alertness of some Members, indeed, and their anxiety to expose and correct failures in planning, or to demand bolder measures, may even occasionally have presented a disproportioned picture of the country's war effort. The Prime Minister has shown a tendency to claim this to be the case, and some fear that the Government is beginning to resent criticism has been expressed. On the whole, however, the wide-ranging debate of the last three months has given surprisingly little to encourage the enemy. If the German concentration camp together with the inner councils of the Nazi party and the German army were to publish their discussions a not unhopeful contrast might be drawn, and increasing evidence of a weakened German morale underlines the advantage of relatively free and open supervision even when sometimes this produces what some allege to be damaging statements.

If the House has remained vigilant to ensure the more efficient prosecution of the war, it has not yet shown a noticeably full appreciation of major changes in war strategy required as a consequence of the development of an eastern front. Opening the debate on the defence of Crete on June 10th, Mr. Lees-Smith said that "this country is at the moment fighting a great delaying action, which began with the fall of France and will continue right into next year until the superiority of material is on our side." That situation has completely altered. We have an ally capable, with our help, of much more than delaying action. The immediate consequences, it is true, belong to the realm of higher strategy which is not easily transported to the floor of the Commons, but there are few aspects of Parliament's task which are not in some measure affected by it. Production, man-power, foreign policy, war aims, and propaganda—or political warfare as this is now, more happily, beginning to be called—have provided the principal themes of debate;

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none should be unaffected by the new conditions which the Russian alliance creates.

Although the Soviet Union's resistance is the chief event of the period here under review, coming indeed early in it, little debate has been caused by this development. That in itself is something of a major victory for the Government, which was well prepared and acted without delay, producing an immediate authoritative statement of policy and an early alliance in formal terms. It thus succeeded in largely nullifying the effects hoped for by Hitler's propaganda machine and in presenting possible dissentients at home with a *fait accompli*. The result was the mildest of Parliamentary murmurs which lasted scarcely longer than a day. There was a less assuring moment when Mr. Thurtle, as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Information, had to make the best of a bad case owing to the failure of his Ministry to deal as forthrightly with the gnat of the Russian national anthem as the Prime Minister had dealt with the camel of the Russian alliance. But anyone who relied on the Parliamentary debates for his history of the period would find in them little about the resistance of the Soviet Union. It would begin with the conclusion of the campaign in Iraq, the opening of the advance into Syria, and an important backward look at the British failure in Crete. It would end with an advance by the British Empire and the Soviet Union to their first meeting-place in Iran. He might begin to notice a change to a more hopeful tone, but he would scarcely be aware that the very immunity of the spot where the debates were taking place from a new destruction like that of a few weeks before, not to mention the subject-matter of those debates, was related to a new and immense battle far away.

The German victory in Crete gave the Government the worst moment of its career. Our defeat there after six months of preparations, and after hopeful official pronouncements, was clearly attributable to mistakes, for the gravity of which the public was not prepared. Criticism in Parliament reflected public concern. Inadequacies in material, in aerodrome defence and in fighter planes were indisputable, whether or not they were excusable. But once again it was rather the suggestion of deficiency in the Command, including

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military and air co-ordination, that caused anxiety: had it not been outwitted by the employment of methods which it had failed to foresee? Yet these same methods—crash landing, for example, in Poland and Norway—had already been used and, it was thought, should have been anticipated. Moreover, the Prime Minister himself had said, when the attack began: "We intend to defend to the death and without thought of retirement the valuable and highly offensive outposts of Crete and Tobruk." It was such facts as these which appeared damaging. Here on what seemed favourable ground our troops had once more met the Germans and had to withdraw, and a real state of public uneasiness was the result. The Prime Minister's answer was to assert that "no one who bears any responsibility for the decision to defend Crete was ignorant" of these difficulties as they emerged, and to claim that this particular battle could not be divorced from the general campaign. Often in practice, as here, the choice was not between good and bad but between two difficult and dangerous alternatives. Undoubtedly, however, the revelation of continuing shortages of material was to influence later debates, especially those dealing with production. Whether the lessons of Crete had been learnt and were being applied in home defence—especially in military and air co-ordination—was the subject also of much subsequent questioning.

In the three days devoted to debating production, the House undoubtedly acted as an efficient spearhead of public opinion. Clear conclusions as to what emerged from the debates, however, are not easy to draw, because much of the criticism necessarily relied on the citing of specific examples of mismanagement, absenteeism, or administrative error, and in the equally necessary absence of figures it is impossible to judge how far general conclusions can fairly be drawn from particular instances. But the Government cannot claim to have come unscathed out of the debate. It appeared at first to underestimate the depth of public concern which called for a considered answer from a member of the War Cabinet. The tone of the speech made by the new Minister of Aircraft Production, Colonel Moore-Brabazon, was unsuited to the importance attached by the House to

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the subject, and it completely failed to satisfy. This miscalculation of the nature of the mood of the House and the country obliged the Government to devote an additional day to the debate. The Prime Minister claimed as the reason for this necessity the fact that criticisms made by Members with inside knowledge of the course of production had been quoted abroad, particularly in Australia and the United States, and had raised doubts about the energy with which we were pursuing this side of the task of organising victory. He was thinking especially of the assertion made by Sir John Wardlaw-Milne that we were still working to only 75 per cent of our capacity, and he admitted that such allegations were taken from their context and used by hostile propaganda to create an unfair picture for which the author could not be entirely blamed. But the main reason for the third day of debate was clearly that previous statements by the Government in the House had failed to satisfy Parliament that production was being as energetically planned and ensured as the country had the right to expect, for, as Mr. Shinwell pointed out, admissions made by the Prime Minister during the debate on "the Cretan episode" had been quite as likely to produce damaging effects abroad as anything said by critics during the later discussions. The Prime Minister had then confessed that, "large and expanding as is our present production, every single gun is in action at some necessary point or other, and all future production for many months ahead is eagerly competed for by rival claimants with, very often, massive cases behind each one of them."

Three principal lines of criticism emerged from the debate: waste of labour-hours and material through lack of co-ordination, an inadequate system of priorities, and insufficient ministerial drive. They concentrated into a single demand for a Minister of Munition Supply acting parallel with, and on the same plane as, the Prime Minister, as Minister for Defence. Several examples were given of enforced idleness, the disposition being to blame neither the men nor the managers, but the central direction. Although Members evidently thought that their examples were typical, and claimed that they could multiply them indefinitely, the Government's answer was in many ways convincing. Some

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"bottlenecks" were inevitable in such a rapid expansion when there were raw material scarcities, need for large-scale adaptation of labour, the development of entirely new factories outside vulnerable town areas, and the obligation to change types of war material, sometimes at short notice, in order to make use of the most recent experience.

The second criticism on a lack of sufficiently clear organisation of priorities was met by the Prime Minister's description of a newly-developed system by which to a clear system of priorities there was added "the allocation of the capacity of private engineering firms either to single departments or, in other cases, to two or more departments in stated proportions. Probably half the factories concerned, and certainly more than three-quarters of the men employed are working now, at this time, for one single department." But it was in regard to the third claim, the need for a single Minister of Production, shown by alleged deficiencies in leadership and capacity for quick decisions, that there was bound to be most controversy. Mr. Churchill affirmed the Government's determination to abide "in general and in principle" by the system of administration which he had outlined on January 22nd last. Change merely for the sake of change should be eschewed, however agreeable to the human mind and however much it might tend to give satisfaction, sometimes short-lived. The foundation of our scheme of production must, of course, Mr. Churchill said, "be a single, co-ordinated plan for the programme of the three Services, based upon our strategic needs. In my capacity as Minister of Defence . . . I prepared for the War Cabinet during the first three months of this year a revised general scheme, bringing together the whole of our munition production and import programme and prescribing the highest reasonable target at which we ought to aim. For this purpose I was furnished with the forward programmes of the various fighting Departments, very much in the same way as the Service estimates are brought before the Cabinet and the Treasury in the autumn in time of peace. I discussed the programmes orally and in writing with the Ministers and Service chiefs of those Departments. The programmes were also examined by my own statistical Department under

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Professor Lindemann, now Lord Cherwell, and through the machinery of the office of the Minister of Defence. . . . The strategic aspect of production is also continually considered by the chiefs of Staff Committee which meets every day to advise upon or direct the conduct of the war." While this statement of the Prime Minister again showed the link between productivity and war strategy, and also showed the policy for subordinating the organisation of production to strategic needs, the tendency of the House was to underline the subordination of strategy to actual production. As Mr. Shinwell said, "our strategy is largely, if not wholly, determined by our capacity to produce and deliver munitions." He thus brought the discussion back to the central question of whether the existing organisation was of a kind to ensure maximum output. It was suggested that the mere fact that a new Minister of Supply, Lord Beaverbrook, had just been appointed, was sufficient to suggest that all was not well.

Two further themes stand out from the debate. Both suggest the need for a Minister of War Cabinet rank to take the responsibility for co-ordination and willing to adopt more ruthless methods when confronted by departmental, managerial, or labour difficulties. Such ruthlessness had indeed been foreshadowed by the famous declaration of the Lord Privy Seal when the Government took complete powers in May, 1940, a declaration which Mr. Shinwell claimed "is now a standing joke all over the country." The first theme arose out of what might be taken as an admission by the Prime Minister, in his statement on Crete, of constant competition between the Service Departments; this demanded a single authority for taking decisions. The second theme related to a more complete gearing of private industry, with its profit-making incentive and its need for considering its own position after the war, to the immediate needs of maximum output. Here in particular a difference of conception was revealed between the House and the Government with its policy of interfering as little as possible with the broad lines of the peace-time structure of industrial ownership and control. It is worth noticing, too, that criticism did not come only from the Left, but from Conservative Members who pointed out the conflict between

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the national interest and the obligation of industrial managements to consider how the interest of their shareholders would be affected after the war by any action which they might take during the war.

The debate on the coal supply situation at the end of the last three months shows that Parliament had good reason for the concern which it showed in the debate at the beginning of the period and which it has continued to express meanwhile. Since the issue depends on the relatively straightforward problem of the best use of man-power, the debates have served to underline deficiencies on this side of production-planning. Although the Mines Department planned as early as the end of last winter for a large increase in production in view of the difficulties experienced at that time, its appeals for more effort to secure a 10 per cent increase in output seem to have been based on some miscalculation. Increases were achieved in many places, but the view of the industry that the return of men to the pits was necessary on a considerable scale has been vindicated. The Government had to take somewhat tardy measures to bring back some of the 100,000 miners who had either been called up or had been attracted out of the industry by better conditions in the R.A.F. or in munitions. Economies and the working of extra shifts having failed to secure the necessary increase in production, the Minister of Labour registered ex-miners. This produced a figure of 97,000; 50,000 were needed; 24,000 volunteered to return; 5,500 were reported to the House on August 5th as "either at the coal face or on the way." A grave admission was made by the Secretary for Mines. Mr. Grenfell said that "a sufficient quantity of certain valuable foodstuffs has not been available, and must have led to some diminution of energy and staying-power." He reported plans being made by the Miners' Welfare Commission for canteen accommodation at the pits.

On the whole, the debates did not present a reassuring picture to the House, and they did once again reveal doubt whether the administrative machine had been suitably geared to meet the increased strains of war-time economy. The question raised was whether the Minister of Mines was in a strong enough position to confront the competing demands

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of other Ministers. His plans for stocking coal during the summer months were not achieved, and a tardy increase in production was bound to put a strain on the services of the Ministry of War Transport which it was unlikely to be able to meet. "I think we are all agreed," said Sir Douglas Thomson from that Ministry, "that our stocks are low, that our production is inadequate, and that we shall suffer great embarrassment during the coming winter unless we make a great effort." In other words, the measures which could be taken by the Department of Mines, including appeals to the industry which were largely met, a guaranteed wage-minimum applied for the first time to the country as a whole, the restriction of exports, the arrangement for transport, the application of the Essential Work Order, the increasing of shifts and certain economies, did not suffice to solve the problem created by the larger issue of man-power with which the Department alone was not competent to deal. And the confidence in adequate supplies expressed officially on June 11th could no longer be expressed in August.

Nor is it comforting to find that the two subjects upon which the House concentrated its main criticisms during the previous months remained the same this summer. Political warfare again vied with production for what was called "the worst day the Government have had." There could be no quarrel with the dramatic staging for the declaration of peace aims. The evident consternation caused by it in the circles of enemy propaganda was itself a vindication of the constant demand expressed by the House for something of this nature, a demand which statements made by Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax had only gone a limited way towards satisfying. But the much-heralded speech made by the Lord President in the postponed debate on propaganda failed entirely to convince Parliament that the great opportunities of political warfare were being seized with a sufficiently virile and imaginative grasp. Again and again throughout the last three months this discontent has been voiced. Moreover there is a striking similarity in the character of the charges brought in the two cases of production and propaganda. It was only in the relatively minor matter of the failure to take quick decisions, where the views of a service department

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and of the Ministry of Information were in conflict over the release of news, that the Government was able to show any progressive change. The fundamental criticism—of divided responsibility and lack of drive—remained unanswered. Here, too, there is the demand for a more authoritative and powerful control at the War Cabinet level. In this case there is the added allegation, however, that the Government is not sufficiently aware of the strategic importance of this aspect of the war campaign. Doubts about the efficiency of the present mechanism are only strengthened by constant changes in the holders of office, and one Member after another has stressed at different times what Mr. Lees-Smith called, in the debate on the war situation of August 6th, "the great danger that the part which political warfare can play may be underestimated." Nor is there the excuse of scarce materials in the case of propaganda, for ideas need no shipping-space, or of scarce machine-tools, for the buildings and the men are there, and all that is necessary is to give to the political warfare service the priority rights accorded to older ministries like the Foreign Office or to other experts in war production. The tangible effects may be more difficult to assess; they are not less important.

"This divided policy which is to continue," said Mr. Noel-Baker, "is more to be regretted because propaganda to France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and elsewhere ought to constitute nine-tenths of the Minister's real work. It is there that he can shorten the war—and may I remind him that if he shortens it by one day it will save £10,000,000. I do not think the Minister will disagree when I say that of all the means he has of reaching the people inside Europe, broadcasting is by far the best. There have been failures of almost every kind but, above all, there has been the failure of the people in charge to grasp the possibilities open to them." But once again it was to organisation at the top and not to the officials lower down the scale that the criticism related. Sir Ian Fraser, as a member of the Board of the B.B.C., made this clear: "The view of the B.B.C. and of all organs of propaganda—although I have no right to speak for them, I believe I am echoing what they feel—is that right at the top, in the War Cabinet itself, there is not sufficient

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regard for this fourth or fifth arm. I have come here to say what I know of the delays and difficulties that the B.B.C. has had to meet during the last eighteen months in trying to increase the technical means at its disposal for tackling the enemy's mind, for influencing him through his mind in order that we may win the war."

The interwoven themes of lack of drive, insufficient authority, and divided control provided the gravamen of the charge against what, it was insisted, ought to be a Ministry of Broadcasting. The scarcity of medium-wave transmitter capacity was underlined. How much more effective could be our word in the Mediterranean area had we directed as much attention as the Nazis to this arm, and made use of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Palestine for broadcasting purposes. Sir John Anderson made it clear that the Ministry of Information was bound to take the directives of the Foreign Office and, therefore, that broadcasting policy was inevitably subordinate to diplomacy. His view was evidently that this merely meant a natural division of functions: in foreign policy the Foreign Secretary was supreme, in propaganda the Minister of Information. But no one attempted to defend a system which implied that the voice of London to the peoples of the world should express only the sentiments which our diplomats thought would be agreeable to the governments to which they were accredited. No one went so far as to claim that in the world of to-day the Foreign Office should be subordinated to political warfare. But the inequality of authority between the Ministry and the Foreign Office, or between the new and the old conception of carrying our policy overseas, was thrown into relief by the most obvious fact of the debate. The Government put up as its chief spokesman a member of the War Cabinet who clearly had not given sufficient thought to the gravity of the problem and who was even not wholly familiar with his brief. Did he not commit the diplomatic blunder, even from the point of view of the Foreign Office itself, of describing the activities of the British Council, which officially are purely cultural, as a part of our propaganda, a mistake on which fortunately he was quickly corrected. Summing up after an able defence, Mr. Duff Cooper did not succeed in suggesting any great

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enthusiasm for the system as it is or any prospect of development in the direction desired by so many quarters of the House. "I am sufficiently satisfied with this arrangement," he said, "that I am prepared to work as hard as I possibly can to make it a success." On the whole, however, the weight of the argument seemed to rest with the critics, whose view was well summed up by Mr. Noel-Baker: "I believe that the three main mistakes in our broadcasts have been too much appeasement, too little democracy, and no clear, constructive message of hope and reconstruction, no living picture, for the other peoples of the new and better world which we are resolved to make when the war is over." Service Members criticised the failure to give our soldiers more of the help which broadcasting can give when undertaking such a campaign as that of Syria, help which might well save many lives. It was argued that not sufficient use had been made of such a magnificent opportunity as that afforded by the Allied Conference at St. James's or by the Hess episode. Too little democracy in attacking Fascism, insufficient technical preparation, and too much appeasement—of Pétain and Franco, for example—were, however, the principal theme. Not the Foreign Secretary or the Minister of Information, but an obsolete system of divided responsibility with the consequent timorous indecision of ill-directed and subordinate officials was to blame. Mr. Baker, in fact, put his finger on the point of the charge so widely made when he confessed that he did not know whom he was attacking, "but it must be somebody's job—whoever they are, those people have failed. They have played with the lives and health of their subordinates. They have never understood and never will understand their job. They have not the energy and capacity or the imagination required, and as long as they are there we shall never really use this weapon of ideas."

The serious allegation made by a service Member that if the enemy attempted invasion he would be able to drown the service of the B.B.C. belonged more to the debate on civil defence to which the House devoted a day. The Hess affair was also debated on the adjournment. The condition of internees has been raised more than once. Police action—

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in the case of Lady Lucas—was criticised. Food Production and Distribution, to which another day was devoted, found the Government with, on the whole, a favourable House. A secret session was devoted to the subject of home defence, in addition to the open session which was mainly concerned with the question of co-ordination.

Legislation has again covered a wide field. The Finance Act has been completed. There have been further developments in the War Damage law, the Landlord and Tenant (War Damage) (Amendment) Bill making adjustments under short and ground tenancies. The Colonial War Risks Insurance Bill is a measure enabling the Government to guarantee commodity insurances in dependencies whose financial resources are insufficient, local insurance companies acting as agents for the Colonial Governments. A more important measure is the Pharmacy and Medicines Bill aimed at controlling "quack" remedies by enforcing specification of contents. The Goods and Services (Price Control) Bill gives further powers to control prices, prevent profiteering—particularly at intermediate stages through which a commodity may pass on its way to the ultimate retailer—and to secure necessities at a low price. In the course of the debate the President of the Board of Trade gave a most interesting illustration, coming from such an official and Conservative source, of the evils of the capitalist entrepreneur system with its multiplication of unjustifiable profits by middlemen.

The social services saw some progress, although there were different views as to how real that progress was. The National Health Insurance, Contributory Pensions and Workmen's Compensation Bill raised benefits by three shillings a week, for the first time giving an equal increase to men and women. It also brought an additional half million persons—those earning between £250 and £420—within the insurance system. For this reason alone it must be regarded as an important measure. There was some disagreement as to whether the rise in benefits did any more than compensate for the higher price-level, but the measure was both officially described and accepted by the House as a stop-gap while the departmental committee examined the system as a whole and made comprehensive recommendations.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION

By PROFESSOR GEORGE W. KEETON, M.A., LL.D.

TWO years ago, Mr. Clarence Streit produced a book, *Union Now*, which dominated the field of political thought directed towards the abolition of war. In it, he advocated the permanent association, in a federal union, of fifteen democracies. The fifteen were: the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, France, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The fifteen did not unite, and the second World War broke out. Great Britain and France found themselves facing a much bigger job than they expected, and in July, 1940, when France was being overwhelmed, Mr. Churchill offered a federal union to France, which would have made the soil of France our own soil, and would have bound us to fight for it, as we would fight for Kent or Yorkshire. The rulers of France rejected that magnificent offer by an insignificant majority, and condemned their people to the way of humiliation, leading to slavery in the literal sense, which they have since trodden. History records no more ignoble failure than that of the Vichy clique in July last, and one day the French people will exact a heavy penalty of these bunglers. Let us be quite clear what the position is. The British people sympathise deeply with the humiliations which the French have suffered during the past year, and they are confident that before this war is over they will find the French fighting once more by their side. But it is doubtful whether any considerable number of people in this country to-day hope for Anglo-French Union. Not only is France to-day not the France of the Third Republic; but the swing of events is compelling us to take increasingly wider views of international organisation; and Anglo-French Union alone quite clearly does not solve any of the problems of world-order. Unless those problems are solved, this war will have been fought in vain.

Let us see what has happened to the other democracies since Streit wrote. The other non-British democracies in Europe were: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland,

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Belgium, and Switzerland. The four Scandinavian democracies (probably the most successful practical democracies of modern Europe¹) had certain informal understandings for the promotion of their common interests. In December, 1939, the Soviet attacked Finland, and the Finns put up a gallant, but futile, resistance. Not only did the other three not go to the assistance of Finland, but Norway and Sweden, tenaciously clinging to a precarious and illusory neutrality, refused to grant permission for an Anglo-French expeditionary force to go to Finland's assistance. Finland was therefore overwhelmed, and was compelled to cede territory to Russia. In their mood of disillusion, Finland turned to Germany, and to-day there are well-equipped German troops in Finland, which is co-operating in Germany's attack on Russia. To-day, democracy in Finland is now largely a memory.

The turn of Norway and Denmark came a few months later. In March, 1940, Denmark was overwhelmed in the space of a few hours. Since then, although the Danish constitution has been nominally preserved, the Nazis have been undermining it, preparing for a permanent incorporation of Denmark in the Third Reich. The fiasco of our campaign in Norway may have been due to a profound under-estimation of our adversary; but it was accentuated by the fatal determination of Norway to preserve her neutrality at all costs, when it was manifest that Germany would pounce as soon as the moment was favourable. Formal neutrality entirely failed to avert this, but it prevented any concerted defence measures being achieved in advance.

Holland and Belgium survived another two months, until Hitler had brought the Norwegian campaign to a successful conclusion. Once again, both nations clung to an entirely illusory neutrality, and once again their armies, when attacked, fought to defend their own countries, instead of as units in a federal force. They were therefore overwhelmed separately. To-day we miss those well-trained Dutch and Belgian armies.

Once again, neutrality has led heroic small nations to temporary extinction.

There remain Sweden and Switzerland. Both are surrounded by hostile formations, incomparably stronger than

¹ See Sir E. Simon's *The Smaller Democracies*.

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they, and both are trying to preserve the last shreds of their independence. Both, at the moment, are too encircled for British help to be even theoretically possible. In the next few months we shall have to concentrate, as never before, upon our own survival.

For practical purposes, therefore, we are left with the nations of the British Commonwealth and with the United States. Even one of these—Eire—remains neutral, although it is notorious that Hitler will invade Ireland the moment it suits him, and that at that moment Eire will ask for and receive British help. In the space of exactly two years since the publication of Streit's *Union Now*, therefore, the fifteen democracies by pursuing isolationist policies have been reduced from fifteen to seven, and in face of these profound political changes, Streit has just published another book, entitled *Union with Britain Now*, in which he pleads for a federal union between the United States and the British Dominions with very great urgency. Streit's proposals are specific, and they are likely to cause as great an impression in the U.S.A. as his first book did. He has already made so much headway that the Nazis have recently become extremely concerned about it, as the Survey of the German press, published in *The Times* of May 6th, showed.

One thing which it is important to bear in mind is what Streit excludes. He has been severely criticised in the U.S.A. for leaving out Latin-America, especially at a time when American continental defence measures are multiplying. The omissions are quite deliberate, however. Streit does not consider most of the Latin-American States to be democracies at all, and if they are examined closely, in spite of nominally democratic and federal constitutions, it will be found that they are not. Streit is as aware as anyone else of the importance of Latin-America to the U.S.A., but he postulates community of outlook and "adulthood" in his federating units, and he does not find that in Latin-America. Full federation is one thing; joint defence schemes are another. In the case of the British Dominions and the U.S.A., federation would imply resuming the development interrupted by the American War of Independence. We have common ideals and similar standards of living.

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Opponents of large-scale political changes will dismiss these proposals as visionary. They will also remind you that during the war there was a complete scheme of Imperial Federation, but the Dominions refused to have it. They will argue, therefore, that the Dominions will refuse to have it again. Such criticisms completely miss the point, however. The Dominions will study the proposals carefully to find how they affect them. Their decisions are likely to be influenced by three main factors: (1) That in the period since the War they have been virtually independent, but that has brought them no security at all—not even through collaboration with the League of Nations; (2) the United States would be included in this scheme—she was not in the last; (3) the Empire is facing to-day a threat from both East and West—from Germany and Japan. The demonstration that such a double threat is possible must necessarily make all units of the Empire think in terms of closer association.

There is also the type of mind which prefers to think of federations in terms of contiguous geographical units, e.g., Europe, and would cheerfully tie us to a federated Europe, which the Dominions and the U.S.A. would obviously not join. Such disruption, alike of the Commonwealth and of the English-speaking peoples, deserves censure for its levity. It is the great merit of Streit's proposals that he has appreciated how, under modern conditions, seas unite, and do not divide. Let us look at the matter quite impartially. The U.S.A., Canada, ourselves, Australia and New Zealand all have common interests in the Pacific. Canada, the U.S.A. and ourselves have common interests in Latin-America, and South Africa is obviously in a key-position as far as the defence of the South Atlantic is concerned. It is our position, placed next door to a continent which seems determined to tear itself to pieces, which is the chief complicating factor; and the problem of what we are to do with the continent when the war is over is still an unsolved one. There will still be 80,000,000 Germans; and the myth of France as a first-class military power, able and willing to check them, is now finally exploded. These facts may be hard for some to swallow, but they are there, nevertheless. Let us look at the matter from another point of view. The population of Canada is

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10,000,000; that of Australia eight millions. There are two millions of whites in South Africa, and one and a half millions in New Zealand. Apart from immigration, the populations of all these Dominions have virtually ceased to expand, largely as a result of the maintenance of extremely high standards of living. Yet the population of these islands has also largely ceased to expand, chiefly for the same reason. What populations could these Dominions accommodate if properly developed? Estimates vary very widely, but conservative estimates are:

Canada	60-70 millions
Australia	50 millions
New Zealand	7-10 millions
South Africa	30 millions

(making about 130 millions for the Dominions, ourselves and the U.S.A.—a tremendous stabilising factor in world affairs.)

Now it is perfectly clear that unless we take a new view of our population question, we are not going to solve this problem. It is imperative that we should take such a view over a long period of years: but even then we shall need the assistance of the U.S.A. to carry it through. This seems to be one of the main long-term reasons for federating, or for permanent closer co-operation.

There is another vitally important factor. Prior to this war, the Dominions were mainly producers of primary products, chiefly foodstuffs, wheat, fruit, wool, etc. This had been the deliberate policy of the City of London, which furnished the money, and wished to keep the Dominions as suppliers of raw materials, and as markets for manufactured goods, but it had already caused some restlessness in the Dominions, which (especially Canada) had turned to the U.S.A. for capital for industrial undertakings. Under stress of war-conditions, we have been compelled to reverse this process. Canada and Australia now manufacture vast and increasing quantities of munitions—even up to warships of considerable size. When the war is over, these plants will turn over to peaceful enterprises. Two consequences follow: (1) There will be a demand for labour, as there was in the U.S.A. last century; (2) if we are not careful, we shall have the problem of facing competition with our own Dominions

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in the export trade. We ought to face both problems now and ensure that the bulk of that labour is Anglo-American, and that a common authority controls our export policy.

One other point. If Japan attacks us in the Far East, we shall have to rely on the help of the U.S.A. That we shall get it is evidenced by the recent visit of American cruisers to Australia and New Zealand, and by the joint arrangements which undoubtedly exist for the defence of Singapore. This implies that the task of policing the seas of the world, which was achieved in the 19th century by the British Navy alone, can now only be achieved by the Anglo-American Navies in co-operation. This fact has not been lost on the Dominions, and without weakening the Empire tie in any way—as the present war has abundantly shown—they are also drawing closer to the U.S.A. in their defence arrangements. This is most obviously true of Canada, which is fully co-operating with the U.S.A. for continental defence, but it is also true of Australia and New Zealand. When developments extend to the South Atlantic, South Africa will also be drawn in.

Now let us look at the question from the standpoint of the United States. What would she gain from such a scheme? The answer is best put in the form of another question, what is she gaining to-day? It is probably not putting the matter too high (for responsible Americans have so put it) to say that the continued national existence of the United States depends upon the British Commonwealth continuing the struggle against Hitler. The United States is in no condition to-day to contend with a Hitler-controlled Europe and Africa in the Atlantic and a Japan-controlled Far East in the Pacific. The first point of attack would be South America, and there is no reason to suppose that a double threat to the United States in that continent to-day could be resisted successfully until she has had time to prepare.

Without Europe, Africa, the Far East and South America, the American system would crumble, as President Roosevelt has clearly pointed out to all hesitating Americans. For that reason the British Commonwealth and the United States are indissolubly linked for war purposes. This is a straight-forward struggle between the peoples of British stock, with their standards of decent living, and a cult which leads directly

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back to barbarism. It is a fight to a finish in a sense in which the last war never was; but this is not a struggle conducted by conflicting coalitions, but by peoples possessing different standards of civilisation. When we win, our standards will prevail over the greater part of the earth's surface, and Anglo-American prestige will be higher than it has ever been before. We must not destroy that prestige a second time; and this time we must rely upon ourselves, not upon others. In fact, most of the others, and especially the nations which have been overrun by Hitler in the present war, will be relying on us.

It ought to be appreciated at once that when this war is over the British Commonwealth cannot alone maintain armies of occupation in Germany for the length of time which will be required to bring about a genuine change of heart amongst the German people. Similarly, we cannot in the political sphere seek to remain the dominating military power in Europe west of the Russian frontier. Yet it is also equally clear that we cannot rely upon others as we did after 1918; nor can we go to the prodigious lengths which are necessary to win this war, and then abandon our position in some vaguely well-meaning scheme of federation with Germany and France, which will only thinly disguise ancient animosities. It is impossible to transform national conflicts which have existed for centuries by a few scraps of paper. On the other hand, it is idle for us to seek to be indifferent to what happens on the Continent; and the past two years have shown that it is equally idle for the British Dominions and the United States to seek to isolate themselves from Europe. At bottom, the interests of Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States in this matter are identical. We do not seek to intervene upon the Continent unless our interests are adversely affected, and when we do intervene, we want to be in a position to act decisively. In the sphere of foreign affairs and defence, therefore, the Dominions, ourselves and the United States ought to be prepared to perpetuate war-time arrangements, and to continue to act as a unit externally. If Great Britain is merely one of several federated units, with a world-wide defence scheme, her position *vis-à-vis* Europe is very different from her position if she has to frame her own policy in European affairs. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that

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in any future European War we shall have to regard these islands as the outpost, and to provide for the manufacture of the greater part of our munitions of war in the United States and the Dominions. For that reason, the policy of industrialising Canada and Australia ought to be continued after the war.

The chief problem of international relations when the war is over will be the relation of an Anglo-American bloc towards Europe on the one hand and towards Eastern Asia on the other. There are two others of importance, although not comparable in magnitude with these. One is the question of India, but the progress which has already been made towards the creation of a united and self-governing India warrants the assumption that in the long run the Indian question can be solved on such terms that India's control of her own future is assured in free association with an Anglo-American bloc, to which in outlook she is already closely allied. The other problem is the relation of Anglo-American bloc towards Russia; but that is a question which cannot be briefly discussed, and the solution of which will be influenced to a considerable degree by the evolution of Russia's foreign policy during the present war. It is a problem which is complicated by ideological differences, which are not easily overcome. The fate of China, and of Japan's efforts to establish a "Co-prosperity sphere" embracing some 600 millions of Asiatics, obviously depends upon the issue of the war with Germany. Once Hitler is defeated, the weakness of the Japanese position is so obvious that it can no longer be maintained.

We are left, therefore, with the relations of the Anglo-American bloc towards Europe, and here two important facts must be remembered. The first is that Western Europe is the largest, the most populous and the most centrally placed of the world's fertile areas¹. The other major human regions are North America, India and China, and in each of these a co-operative solution of local rivalries has either been achieved, or is being achieved. Against this, in Europe local divisions and animosities survive, and make further wars inevitable so

¹ See, on this, *Geographical Factors in World Unity*, by Professor C. B. Fawcett, *The New Commonwealth Quarterly*, October 1940, pp. 95-101.

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long as they persist. In the future, therefore, it will be necessary to separate cultural differences from the possession of political power, and this can only be achieved if an Anglo-American bloc is prepared to ensure the necessary conditions in which an experiment in European development can be undertaken.

The second important fact is that Germany is already undertaking the solidification of Europe on the basis of the supremacy of a Master-Race, and the memory of this will persist when Hitlerism has been destroyed, exactly as the effects of the French Revolution and Napoleon's domination of Germany survived to simplify the achievement of German unity after 1815.

Bearing these two factors in mind, and remembering also that our Allies in the present war will require security from further German aggression when the war is over, the outlines of an Anglo-American policy towards the Continent may perhaps be traced. Some limitation of national irresponsibility in the post-war world is generally recognised to be inevitable, and so also is decisive Anglo-American superiority over possible combinations of aggressors at sea and in the air. Association of allied states with the Anglo-American bloc should therefore be welcomed, on terms which make it possible for continental air and naval bases to be used by Anglo-American naval and air-forces in case of emergency, in return for a common currency, common availability of raw materials, close economic collaboration and possibly a common nationality. In any event colonists from allied countries should be welcomed within Anglo-American territories. There is evidence that some of the Allies, e.g., Holland and Norway, are already thinking on these lines.

If such a policy is adopted as far as Allies are concerned, what attitude should be adopted towards Germany? A repetition of the Peace of Versailles will produce a further irruption of the German people. So will any attempt to partition Germany, especially by such patent and transparent fictions as a revival of a Hapsburg "Holy Roman Empire." Any attempt to keep Germany in permanent subjection, either by military occupation or by economic pressure, will fail as soon as the mood of revenge has passed. On the other

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hand, constructive thought with regard to Germany is admittedly at this stage difficult, but it is suggested that the existence of an Anglo-American bloc, with associated or federated states in Europe, will be sufficient to prevent a breach of the peace by Germany for a sufficient period for a world system based upon Anglo-American association to take shape. If, during that period, Germany is preserved from economic chaos, and if further, it is made plain that Germany's entry into this system is desired, but not enforced, then an atmosphere of confidence may be created.

To sum up, permanent Anglo-American association would not only give the peoples of predominantly British stock greater security than they have hitherto enjoyed, and it would not only permanently associate peoples with similar outlooks upon domestic and international affairs, but it would also give them sufficient naval and air strength to preserve their territories from external attack, it would provide the resources and man-power for the necessary development of territories within their boundaries which are sparsely settled, and it would offer an example of association on the world-scale towards which other states would progressively gravitate. It should also be pointed out that unless some permanent Anglo-American association is achieved during this war, there are going to be some very awkward political and legal problems in some parts of the British Empire—for example, in Newfoundland—after the war.

There are those who are still hoping for a millennium in Europe when this war is over, and that hatreds whose roots lie buried deep in the past will somehow be dissolved. They hoped for this last time, and they will certainly hope for it in the next war; and their hopes are an important element in human progress. It is essential, however, to deal with people as they are, not with people as we should wish them to be, and after this war the peoples whom Hitler is seeking to crush will be in a vengeful mood. It is not in this atmosphere that a United States of Europe will be born, although it is virtually certain that some of the enslaved nations will draw closer together for mutual protection, and that they will seek the support of this country more consistently than they have done in the past. Faced, therefore, with the

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problem of Europe, we must take our stand. We must either fetter ourselves with increased European commitments, or we must consciously re-orientate our thought about our relations with the Dominions and the United States. We must accustom ourselves to regard Great Britain, not as the hub of the Commonwealth, but as the original home of the British peoples, now spread over vast areas, and also as one element in a world system, the potentialities of which are practically unlimited, and which is so placed strategically that it can never be destroyed.

Maps are deceptive things, and it is to be regretted that the use of globes is not more common. If one takes a globe, and studies the positions of Great Britain, the United States and the Dominions, one sees that it was no accident that the British peoples spread to these lands in the nineteenth century. It is our common task in the twentieth to see that they stay there, increase and prosper, and if the present war awakens us to this fact, it will have done immeasurable good.

SURVEYS

ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: A STUDY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COURTS AND MILITARY SERVICE HARDSHIP COMMITTEES.

UNLIKE many foreign countries, Great Britain does not possess a formal system of Labour Courts or of Administrative Courts. But the Courts of Referees, originally set up to deal with Unemployment Insurance claims, have gradually acquired a series of new and important functions directly related to the War. They constitute the English model of a Labour Judiciary in regard to one aspect of their work, and an administrative tribunal in regard to other aspects. Their work is so little known and so successful that it deserves attention.

The National Insurance Act, 1911, introduced by Mr. Lloyd George, made provision for Courts of Referees to be set up, consisting of one or more members chosen to represent employers, with an equal number of members chosen to represent workmen, and a chairman appointed by the Board of Trade. Parliament also provided that panels of persons chosen to represent employers and workpeople respectively should be constituted by the Board of Trade for each district and such trades or groups of trades as might be determined; and the members of the Courts of Referees other than the chairman should be selected from these panels.

After thirty years' experience, the structure of the Courts remains unchanged, save that the Ministry of Labour and National Service has replaced the Board of Trade as the responsible department. In practice, each Court consists of three members: one to represent the insured workers, one to represent employers, and an independent chairman to represent the State or the general public. Each of these three parties has both a financial and a social interest in the just and efficient administration of the Unemployment Insurance scheme. The Courts sit at the Employment Exchanges, the frequency of the sessions depending on the volume of work requiring to be performed.

The chairman is frequently a member of the legal profession, but he is required to be qualified to deal in a knowledgeable way with social and industrial questions. He receives a fee for each sitting, while the other members of the Court are unpaid, though they may claim compensation for loss of earnings caused by attendance at the Court. Most of the male workers' representatives on the Courts consist of trade union officials; this is not equally true of the women's representatives. Wherever possible, women members sit when women's cases are under consideration, and *vice versa*, apart from the chairman, who may be either a man or a woman.

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At the outbreak of war, the Courts were dealing with an enormous number of cases, involving a wide range of industrial and social factors. The following were among the commonest types of question to be determined.

The question of whether a claimant fulfils the statutory condition of being "capable of and available for work." The question of capability refers to the claimant's physique and health. The question of availability is of wider import. It may include questions of the hours or days for which the claimant is willing to work; the distance from home he is willing to travel; the type of employment he is willing to accept. A person is not available if he is only willing to take employment for which he is not properly qualified or on conditions which no employer would be likely to accept.

A claimant who voluntarily leaves his employment without just cause is liable to be disqualified from receiving benefit for a period not exceeding six weeks. The question of what is just cause may involve a consideration of wages, hours, conditions of work, the suitability of the employment, the behaviour of the employer or of other employees, and the domestic responsibilities of the claimant.

Disqualification will also arise where a worker is dismissed for misconduct. This again is a matter which is not susceptible of simple definition, but may touch on many aspects of industrial or commercial life. Breach of the factory rules, dishonesty, insubordination, insolence, persistent unpunctuality, negligent work, disregard of the employer's interests, misbehaviour towards a fellow-employee, refusal to obey an order—any of these may constitute misconduct in certain circumstances.

Another type of disqualification occurs where the claimant has without good cause refused or failed to apply for, or to accept an offer of, a suitable situation which has been notified to him by an Employment Exchange or other recognized agency, or by or on behalf of an employer; or where a claimant is proved to have neglected to avail himself of a reasonable opportunity of suitable employment. The word "suitable" is crucial and gives rise to thorny problems touching many aspects of industrial and domestic life.

An entirely different class of case concerns claims for dependant's benefit. The Unemployment Insurance scheme provides for dependant's benefit to be paid to wives, mistresses, parents, housekeepers, sisters, brothers, children and other relatives, subject to specified conditions being satisfied. The commonest is that the claimant must be wholly or

¹ The last year for which figures are available is 1938, when approximately 500,000 cases were dealt with. Of these, 462,204 were referred for decision in the first instance to the Courts of Referees, and 37,823 were referred by way of appeal from disallowances imposed by the Insurance Officers. Of the former, 111,860 claims were allowed and 350,344 disallowed; of the latter, 8,587 were allowed and 29,236 disallowed. *Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1938. Appendix XXIII H.M.S.O.*

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mainly maintaining the dependant. This requirement gives rise to many complicated enquiries into family income, income per head, and the respective contributions to the family fund made by each member of the household, before the Court can be satisfied that dependency exists.

The Anomalies Regulations presented the Courts of Referees with some extremely elaborate problems. These Regulations were designed to impose special and more onerous conditions on married women, seasonal workers, and certain other categories of insured contributors. Under the Regulations a married woman must satisfy the Court that she is normally employed in insurable employment; that she will normally seek to obtain her livelihood by means of insurable employment; and that "having regard to all the circumstances of her case, and particularly to her industrial experience and the industrial circumstances of the district in which she resides, either (a) she can reasonably expect to obtain insurable employment; or (b) her expectation of obtaining insurable employment is not less than it would otherwise be by reason of the fact that she is married."

The number and complexity of the factors to be taken into account in determining such cases are self-evident. Still more difficult are the cases falling under the trade dispute disqualification, which disbars from the receipt of benefit workpeople who have lost their employment by reason of a stoppage of work due to a trade dispute at the premises where they were employed. The disqualification is itself subject to various exceptions which exclude, for example, a workman who proves that he is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the trade dispute which caused the stoppage of work.

These and similar questions impose on the Courts of Referees the task of finding a large number of facts and exercising a far-reaching discretion in giving decisions on the facts so found. The jurisdiction of the tribunal does not cover the exceptional and bizarre eccentricities of human conduct, which occupy so much of the time of the Civil and criminal Law Courts, but embraces rather the frequent occurrences which constitute a typical cross-section of the everyday lives of millions of wage-earners. Indeed, the extraordinary interest afforded by the work of the Courts of Referees lies in the fact that they are dealing with common-place matters affecting the lives of ordinary men and women.

This work is carried on in an atmosphere of informality and simplicity. It is, however, in no sense slapdash. On the contrary, great care is taken to provide the members of the Court with typewritten statements containing the relevant information relating to the question to be determined. This includes not only numerous facts concerning the claimant, but also written statements made, for example, by an employer as to why the employment terminated, with the employee's reply thereto.

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The claimant is summoned to attend the sitting of the Court, and if he desires he may be represented by his trade union official or by a friend—but not by a solicitor or barrister. The members of the Court question the claimant and any witnesses he may bring, and also the employer if he is present—which he rarely is. The witnesses then retire to enable the Court to discuss the case in private.

Above the Courts of Referees is the Umpire, a superior tribunal whose decisions are final. A right of appeal to the Umpire lies in the following cases: (1) at the instance of the Insurance Officer, (2) at the instance of a trade union of which the claimant was a member when last employed, (3) at the instance of the claimant in any case in which the decision of the Court of Referees is not unanimous or in any other case with the leave of the chairman.

In practice, only a very small fraction of the enormous number of cases which are decided by the Courts of Referees go to appeal, and the work of the Courts therefore enjoys a high degree of finality.¹ Nevertheless, even that small fraction was sufficiently large, prior to the outbreak of war, to engage the full-time attention of the Umpire and four Deputy-Umpires.

The Umpire's decisions form a series of precedents which are binding on the Courts of Referees and also on the Insurance Officers. A selection of the more important decisions are printed periodically, and these form a code of jurisprudence affecting Unemployment Insurance.

On the outbreak of war, a substantial modification of the system was at once introduced. All cases were decided in the first instance by the Insurance Officer, and the claimant could appeal from his decision to the Court of Referees. This change was intended to reduce, and did in fact reduce to an enormous extent, the number of cases coming before the Courts. The Umpire's office, which was formerly centralized in London, was regionalized throughout the country.

The curtailment of business caused by the transformation of the Courts of Referees from being courts of first instance to being appellate tribunals, was more than offset by entrusting to them new duties of an entirely different character.

In May, 1939, compulsory military training was introduced in this country for the first time during a period of peace by the Military Training Act. Under this Act men between the ages of twenty and twenty-one were liable to be registered for military training, and to be called up for training within one year from the date of registration. Provision was made for the postponement or ante-dating of liability to be called up, to a date subsequent or prior to the normal age limits; and applications for such treatment, if made on grounds of hardship

¹ In 1938 the Umpire gave 5,000 decisions. This was 1 per cent of the cases coming before the Courts of Referees. *Ministry of Labour Annual Report*.

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and rejected by the Minister of Labour, were referred to Military Training (Hardship) Committees. These Committees consisted of the Chairman of a Court of Referees under the Unemployment Insurance Acts sitting with two other persons selected by the Minister from a panel. The Umpire or Deputy-Umpire, sitting with two assessors, was made the final appellate body.

The National Service Act, passed on the outbreak of War, is a much more drastic law. It authorizes the Government to call up every male British subject between eighteen and forty-one years of age for service in the armed forces of the Crown. The Act provides an opportunity for seeking postponement—but not for ante-dating—similar to that afforded by the Training Act, but it is only open to men who prove that “exceptional hardship” (as distinct from simple “hardship” under the Training Act) would ensue if they were called up in the ordinary course. The same machinery of adjudication is used, namely, the Unemployment Insurance Courts acting under the name of Military Service (Hardship) Committees. The application is made in the first instance to the Minister, who may grant it. If he does not grant it, he must refer the matter to the Committee for decision.

The arrangements for postponement of calling up should not be confused with the machinery for dealing with conscientious objectors, which is quite distinct. The local tribunal for hearing persons claiming to be conscientious objectors consists of a County Court Judge sitting as chairman with two other members appointed by the Minister of Labour and National Service. The “other members” are selected for their impartiality, and half their number is appointed after consultation with workers’ organizations.

The Military Hardship Committees were set afloat on an entirely uncharted sea, without compass or map to guide them on their journey. The legislation gives no indication as to the meaning of either hardship or exceptional hardship. But Parliament enacted that the Minister of Labour and National Service should have power to make regulations as to the principles to be applied by the Committees, and the circumstances to which regard is and is not to be had, in determining applications for the grant or renewal of postponement certificates, and as to the period for which a postponement certificate may be granted or renewed. This power the Minister exercised shortly after the Act was passed.¹

The Regulations distinguish three kinds of hardship: that arising from domestic circumstances; that arising from business responsibilities and interests; and that arising from “individual circumstances and other cases.”

As regards the first category, the Regulations state that regard should

¹ The National Service (Armed Forces) (Postponement Certificates) Regulations, 1939. S.R. & O., 1939, No. 1,541.

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be had to the circumstances in which members of the same household as the applicant or dependent persons living elsewhere than in that household will be placed in the event of postponement being refused rather than to the applicant’s individual circumstances. A certificate should be granted only if, owing to the existence of specific circumstances, the refusal of it would be likely to cause hardship to the dependents or members of the household “over and above that which the calling up of men for service in due course might normally be expected to cause.”

The Regulations require that an application based on business responsibilities and interests should be granted only if the circumstances are such that the business or occupation cannot be carried on in the applicant’s absence unless and until alternative arrangements have been made for its continuance, and the necessary arrangements either for carrying on the business or for its disposal cannot immediately be made.

In respect of the third category of case, which consists of the residue, the Regulations require the Hardship Committee to grant postponement only if they are satisfied that, if it were refused, hardship would be caused to the applicant over and above that which the calling up of men for military service in due course might normally be expected to cause.

The maximum period for which a postponement certificate can be issued is six months from the date of application; but this can be renewed indefinitely by the Hardship Committee, except in the case of applications based on business responsibilities and interests, where the total period for which a man can be postponed is twelve months.

The Minister’s Regulations are necessarily abstract and general. They are not of great assistance in determining actual cases because they leave so many questions unanswered. The Umpire’s decisions laying down principles of a more definite character have proved of substantial help in at least two important types of cases.

The first relates to students undergoing courses of instruction at universities, technical schools or colleges, or studying for professional or vocational qualifications by other means. The question whether such men should be postponed was obviously of the utmost importance for their future careers. The Umpire has laid it down that the test to be applied is as follows:¹

- (1) The applicant must be studying in order to become qualified to follow some occupation which he intends to adopt as a means of livelihood, or for the purpose of obtaining a degree, diploma or other similar qualification which has important value to him in his future career.
- (2) The passing of the examination for which he was studying at the date of registration under the National Service (Armed

¹ Decision No. 1,529/40. (N.S.). Code 2. Pamphlet 6/40.

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Forces) Act is essential to, or is generally recognized as appropriate to, such qualification.

- (3) That the examination is due to commence within nine months of the date of registration and he has a genuine intention of sitting for it.
- (4) That he has been pursuing a course of whole-time or part-time study for the degree, diploma, etc., for a calendar or academic year preceding the date of registration.

The decision has, in practice, been liberally interpreted so as to include students taking university degrees in other than the purely vocational subjects or professional faculties. The position of apprentices has been assimilated to that of other students.

The second class of case where the Umpire's decisions have been particularly helpful consists of those in which a man seeks postponement on the ground that his wife is pregnant. Here again the Umpire has introduced the time element as a factor which may guide the Committee, though not in any hard-and-fast or mechanical manner. The Umpire has said, in effect, that there must be some "specific circumstance" connected with the pregnancy to produce exceptional hardship. While it is impossible to visualize all the "specific circumstances" which might exist, such a circumstance may arise from the state of health of the expectant mother; or from the arrangements which are contemplated for the confinement; or from the length of time which will elapse before the birth of the child. If the birth of the child is expected in not more than three months from the date of application, this may be a "specific circumstance" causing exceptional hardship because "in the last three months of pregnancy a woman's nervous condition is more likely to be upset, so the separation from her husband would cause her greater hardship than in the preceding six months."¹

There are innumerable other kinds of cases. There are, for example, applications based on the economic dependency of wives, children, parents and other relatives; and in deciding these the Military Hardship Committees must estimate the financial resources which will be available from Service dependent's allowances, from the Assistance Board and other sources, when the applicant's contributions from present earnings are withdrawn. There are cases where crippled or sick relatives are physically dependent on the personal services of the man who is liable to be called up. There are cases where near relatives are dangerously ill, or where the applicant or his family has recently suffered a bereavement and it would add unduly to their distress if he were called up without delay.

The most difficult class of case is, usually, that which concerns hardship alleged to arise from "business interests and responsibilities."

¹ Decision 32/40 (N.S.). Code 2. Pamphlet No. 1/40.

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The owners of one-man businesses nearly always ask for time in which to train a substitute or sell their business or dispose of the stock or liquidate their debts. There appear to be thousands of small hairdressing saloons, boot-repair shops, and so forth, which are run entirely by one man, who falls within this category.

Then there are the family business, in which perhaps the most vigorous and active member is liable for military service, and wants time in which to train a relative to take his place. There are small shops whose owner cannot afford to employ a manager or even an assistant, but endeavours at the last moment to train an employee or his wife to run the business.

The businesses in respect of which applications are made are by no means always small ones. Sometimes quite large firms are involved; but the proprietors or managers of substantial concerns usually come within the specified age-groups in the list of Reserved Occupations.

The difficulty of dealing justly with applications of this type has for several reasons immensely increased since the beginning of the War. First, because as the age of call-up has increased, the recruits comprise middle-aged men occupying much more responsible positions than the youths of twenty and upwards in the earlier groups. Second, the labour shortage has become increasingly stringent, so that it is exceedingly difficult or even impossible to engage substitutes, whether experienced or untrained, in many lines of trade. An instance of this is the liquor trade, in which there is an extreme shortage of barmen and cellarmen for public-houses. Many licences are held jointly by husband and wife; and in certain districts it is impracticable for a woman to run a public-house without male help. Yet if a way cannot be found to carry on in the husband's absence, the licence and the inventory must be surrendered at a heavy loss to the holders.

The business of provision merchants and butchers, to take another example, has become much more difficult to conduct in consequence of the complicated food regulations and rationing requirements, which involve a great deal of worrying clerical work which is sometimes beyond the competence of someone who would be quite able to take over the practical side of running a shop. Third, with each reduction in the regular personnel of a business, it becomes increasingly difficult to spare the next man.

Nevertheless, the extent to which these and other difficulties can be overcome depends in large measure on the attitude of the man himself. Some applicants lean back on their problems, maximize their difficulties and make only slight or ineffective efforts to overcome them. When these cases come up for grant or renewal of postponement certificates, the main task of the Committee is to distinguish between genuine difficulties and exaggerated excuses which have been magnified by the

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applicant because he is, consciously or unconsciously, reluctant to overcome them.

Where the applicant is not eager to serve in the armed forces, it is sometimes difficult to discover the true facts of the case. For instance, a large number of sons declare that they are the owners of businesses which in fact belong to their fathers, who employ them for a wage. The father is frequently alleged to have become incapable of taking an active part in the management of the business owing to ill-health; and a medical certificate is submitted showing him to be suffering from "chronic bronchitis" or heart trouble. The fact that a person is suffering from such an ailment is little guide to their effective working capacity for running a small business.

The work of the Military Hardship Committees, like that of the Unemployment Insurance Courts, is conducted in an atmosphere of informality and with little technicality. The applicant can be represented by a friend if he so desires; but lawyers are not permitted to appear in their professional capacity. He can bring witnesses or written statements to corroborate his evidence. There is no representative of the military authorities or any other adverse interest present to oppose the application.

Strictly speaking, the Committees are constituted to perform only judicial functions. Their task is to ascertain if exceptional hardship exists; and, if so, to grant a certificate of postponement. But anyone with an understanding of the organic nature of administrative tribunals will appreciate the complete inadequacy of such a conception.

The Military Hardship Committees have somehow to contrive to strike a reasonable balance between the needs of the State for the war and the personal claims of the individual, as reflected in each particular case. They cannot attach conditions to the grant of a certificate of postponement; but they can (and do) state the reasons for their decision, which may indicate on a subsequent occasion what the applicant undertook to do if he was given time in which to do it. They can (and do) try to assist applicants by suggesting methods by which domestic and business problems may be solved.

Above all, it is essential for a Military Hardship Committee to recognize that its attitude towards an applicant may have an important influence on his attitude towards the war. The three members of the Committee who face the potential recruit in the bare board-room of an Employment Exchange may well represent to him, at that moment and later in his memory, the State, the Government and the War, all rolled into one in a more or less confused way. The actual decision which is given may sometimes be less important psychologically than the manner in which he is handled by the Committee. No matter how slender the grounds of his application may prove to be, he must be made to feel that he is receiving careful and courteous consideration—in short, a

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square deal. Any impression he may get that his personal interests are being dealt with in a perfunctory manner, or ridden over roughshod, may produce lasting resentment with disastrous consequences to his future usefulness as a soldier. The Military Service (Hardship) Committee must bear in mind that the Army does not need mere men, but willing soldiers. The busy Committee member who is anxious to get away by 4 p.m. at all costs must be firmly resisted and reminded of this aspect of the Committee's work.

The National Service Act, 1941, imposes a liability on men who are already liable for service in the armed forces, to be called up for Civil Defence purposes. The Military Hardship Committees will deal with applications from men called up under this Act for the Civil Defence services.

A new and important extension of the jurisdiction of the Committees has been conferred under Defence Regulations 26A and 27B and the various Orders which have recently been issued under their authority.

The Fire Prevention (Business Premises) Order, 1941,¹ requires the occupier of every business premises to which it has been applied to make proper and adequate arrangements for securing that fires occurring at the premises as the result of hostile attack will be immediately detected and combated. The occupier is to notify in writing the arrangements to the proper authority, who may approve, modify or disapprove the proposals. It is the duty of the occupier to carry out the arrangements as approved by the appropriate authority.

When the scheme is approved, all male persons between eighteen and sixty years of age have an obligation to take turns of duty at the premises and perform such fire-prevention duties as are allotted to them in accordance with the arrangements, for a maximum period not exceeding forty-eight hours a month. Certain conditions are laid down concerning the conditions under which fire-watching is to take place; and the Order provides for the exemption of Home Guards, persons engaged on vital work for exceptionally long hours, and other specified categories of men.

The Civil Defence Duties (Compulsory Enrolment) Order, 1941,² provides for the compulsory enrolment of men for fire-prevention duties in areas where the Minister of Home Security is satisfied that the number of volunteers is insufficient to enable the local authority to discharge its relative functions under the Defence Regulations, and has in consequence applied the Order thereto. In this case, of course, the duties of fire prevention are not necessarily confined to a particular building or street.

Under both the Orders every man is given the right to apply for exemption from all or any of the duties on the ground that he is medically unfit to perform them or that it would be an exceptional hardship for

¹ S.R. & O., 1941, No. 69. ² S.R. & O., 1941, No. 70.

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him to be required to perform them. The Civil Defence Duties (Exemption Tribunals) Order, 1941,¹ makes the Military Service (Hardship) Committee for the district the tribunal which is to hear and determine such applications. Its decision is final and there is no appeal.

Most of the applications which have so far been made to the Hardship Committees are based on grounds of medical unfitness. The applicants usually support their cases with medical certificates from their own doctors, where the unfitness is alleged to arise from health rather than from some obvious physical disability. But in order to enable the Committee to have independent medical testimony, a report can be obtained from a doctor specially attached to the Employment Exchange for the purpose. It is by no means an easy task to estimate the degree of health and physique required to carry out fire-prevention duties, especially in places where most of the fit men under thirty-five years of age have been called to the forces.

The Hardship Committee is entitled to grant exemption from all or any of the duties imposed on an applicant. Thus he can be given total exemption, or granted release from night duties; or duties involving climbing on a roof; or week-end duties. The exemption may be granted for an unlimited period or for a specified time of, say, a month or six months.

In view of the essential need for fire-watching and fighting on a great scale to combat incendiary attack on the great cities, it would be hard to over-estimate the importance of these new powers which have been conferred on the Military Service (Hardship) Committees. Fire-prevention squads are indispensable; but they must consist of men capable of doing the work with reasonable efficiency and without undue sacrifice of their private interests. If exemption is granted too lightly or without careful scrutiny, there may be engendered a sense of unfairness and resentment in those who are not exempt. If it is not granted to those suffering from poor health, men who are just able to carry on their work as useful citizens may be made into useless crocks who are a burden on the community. Hence the tribunal must seek to steer a safe midway course between a too indulgent attitude on the one hand and an undue severity on the other. It must perform its task with a sense of the social and national issues involved as well as the individual aspects of each case.

It emerges clearly from the history of the Courts of Referees that they have gained and held the confidence and esteem of Parliament, the Central Government, organized labour, and employers. Had it been otherwise, they would not have retained for nearly thirty years their original functions relating to unemployment insurance (subject only to the wartime modifications explained above), much less had their

¹ S.R. & O., 1941, No. 163.

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jurisdiction expanded by the acquisition of important powers concerning military service and fire-fighting duties. Opposition or serious criticism from any powerful section of opinion would have effectively prevented such a development.

Several Committees and Commissions which have enquired into the subject have given the Courts their approval, either explicitly or by implication.

The Blanesbrough Committee on Unemployment Insurance, set up in 1927, declared that "From all we have learned during our enquiry we believe that Courts of Referees inspire general confidence."¹ The significance of this remark was enhanced by the fact that the chairman of the Committee was a Law Lord, who would scarcely be expected to be prejudiced in favour of such new-fangled institutions as the Courts of Referees, representing as they do a sharp break from the tradition of the ordinary courts.

The Morris Committee was appointed in 1929 to consider "the constitution and procedure of statutory authorities performing the functions of Insurance Officers and Courts of Referees under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, and the nature of the evidence to be required as to the fulfilment of the conditions or the absence of the disqualifications for the receipt of unemployment benefit under the Acts." The real object of the Committee was to enquire into the operation of the then existing statutory condition which required claimants to prove that they were "genuinely seeking work but unable to obtain suitable employment." This condition had given rise to much hardship and resentment on the part of the unemployed; and criticism naturally tended to fall on the administrative organs which carried out the legal provisions.

The Report of the Morris Committee² recommended the abolition of the statutory condition and the substitution of an entirely different test of good faith, a reform which was accepted shortly afterwards. So far as the Courts of Referees were concerned, the Committee recommended a number of minor improvements in procedure, and emphasized that chairmen should possess a knowledge of industrial and working-class conditions in addition to having sufficient legal training. The Report made no substantial criticism of the tribunals concerned; and, indeed, strengthened their position by proposing that their determinations should henceforth be a decision and not a recommendation.

In 1930 the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, presided over by Judge Holman Gregory, K.C.,³ observed of the machinery for adjudication of claims to benefit: "Generally, we find that the machinery is working satisfactorily, and that the Courts perform their duties with

¹ *Report of the Unemployment Insurance Committee*, 1927, page 46.

² Cmd. 3415/1929. ³ Final Report. Cmd. 4185/1932. Page 258.

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a full sense of their responsibility." The Commission had no major alteration to suggest in the general framework of adjudication, but recommended certain changes in detail. The Minority Report agreed with the Majority recommendations, but emphasized the need to define more clearly the functions of the Umpire, so as to distinguish the duty of laying down general rules to guide the Courts of Referees from that of acting as an appeal tribunal on individual cases. They wished the Umpire to have power to issue codified rules interpreting the law on general principles, without waiting for a particular case to arise; while the function of acting as a final appeal tribunal should, they thought, be devolved upon Divisional Umpires sitting in seven great regions.

The organs which have been described in these pages are a highly characteristic piece of English Governmental machinery. They form a typical instance of the institutions through which administrative justice is carried out in Britain. Their work is unpretentious and unspectacular, but it is making a substantial contribution to social peace. The introduction of the lay element in the process of adjudication provides a valuable experience in civic responsibility.

REGIONALITER.

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THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE. By EMMELINE W. COHEN.
(George Allen & Unwin. 221 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE way in which certain subjects are more or less ignored, while others in the same department of knowledge give rise to a plethora of books, is one of the curiosities both of science and of literature. There must be at least a hundred volumes on the constitutional history, law and parliamentary government of Great Britain. Yet until five years ago there was not a single work on the Cabinet. An almost equal neglect has been shown towards the Civil Service. Although it is one of the essential pillars of the British system of government, its literary treatment is confined to a couple of volumes of essays by various writers, and a slender study by Dr. Finer. There has been no attempt to trace its historical growth or to produce a full-length treatise on its present structure and functions.

The first of these omissions has now fortunately been repaired by Miss Cohen, in the short and competent study in which she describes the growth of the Service from 1780 to 1939.

This was the formative period, for it began with the decline of the old police state of the 18th century, in which the administrative work of government was largely divided between the high officers of State, "emanations of the Crown," occupying the principal political positions, and the public officers who go far back into our history and who still exist in various guises. The author shows not only how these public officers were appointed, paid and controlled, but also what was the organisation of the public departments at the end of the 18th century. She gives a list of fifty-three public offices, which included such oddities as the Lottery Office, the Hawkers and Pedlars (Scotland) Office, the Registrar of Colonial Slaves Office, and no less than three offices concerned with Chelsea Hospital. The number of persons employed is also given, and this shows that, with the exception of the Customs and Excise, which had together more than 12,500 employees, the scale of employment was very small compared with modern standards.

Among these fifty-three public offices the only departments of any importance which we should recognise to-day are the Treasury, Home Office, Foreign Office, Colonies, Admiralty, War Office, Stationery Office, the Mint, the Post Office and the offices concerned with revenue. The vast series of functions relating to the physical, mental and moral welfare of the people, the regulation of industry, the provision of public services and so forth, which are a commonplace of our own age, did not form part of the business of government until the arrival of the modern industrial and commercial state in the 19th century produced problems

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which could not be dealt with in any other way save through a vastly extended system of public administration.

It was the change in the emphasis and direction of public administration, and the gradual creation of departments to deal with such matters as the poor law, public health, education, highways, public utilities, local government, unemployment, labour, which caused the Civil Service to emerge with the distinctive features which we now associate with it. Miss Cohen shows the part played by the early reformers (between 1780 and 1840) in securing the elementary virtue of probity. She traces the gradual discrediting of patronage and the slow recognition of professional efficiency as a basis of appointment and promotion. She emphasises the important influence of Indian administration in improving the Home Civil Service.

The author gives due place to the impact on the Civil Service of such events as the Crimean War and the inefficiency which it disclosed; the imposition of the superannuation system as a fundamental element in constructing a career service; the establishment of the Civil Service Commission; the introduction of the Treasury grades; the principle of recruitment by open competitive examination; and the welding together of all the employees of the State into a single, coherent, unified Civil Service. She describes the various Royal Commissions and Committees whose reports were of such moment in bringing about these developments, which occupied most of the 19th century.

Miss Cohen is thoroughly acquainted with the original sources of most of these Parliamentary Papers from which the material is obtained. She writes lucidly, succinctly and with a good sense of the historical background. The first and second parts of the book, which carry the story to the end of the 19th century, form a valuable contribution to political and administrative history.

Part III is devoted to the 20th century and is less satisfactory. This is partly due to the fact that the author deals in a less adequate and comprehensive manner with the present century than with the last; but in part also to the fact that as she approaches the decades immediately preceding the present one, we expect more of her. We are in the twilight zone which separates history from our own experience, and we are no longer satisfied with a critical narrative. We begin to feel the need for a discussion of the problems which confront us, and for a formulation of remedies for the defects which we observe.

The author deals in this Part with women in the Service, the position of scientists and technicians, the rise of the independent public service boards staffed with officers who do not belong to the Civil Service, and so forth. But although she touches on these matters, she seldom gets to grips with the main problems of the day.

How vital those problems are, the war has shown. There is virtual

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agreement among all competent observers—and especially those who have had an opportunity to become acquainted with the administrative machine from inside—that the Civil Service has failed to rise to the level of achievement demanded by the national emergency. It is emerging from the searching test of war with a diminished stature, and the main reason for this is that the men who have risen to the topmost positions in the Service are, with one or two exceptions, not equal to their tasks. Some of the younger men up to the rank of assistant secretary are eager, capable, energetic, and positive in their outlook. Those who occupy the uppermost rungs in the ladder, and in particular the permanent secretaries, are definitely inferior to those in comparable positions in the war of 1914-18.

The principal cause of this deterioration in calibre is the power which was conferred in 1921 on the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury—the Head of the Civil Service—to advise the Prime Minister on the appointment of the principal officials in all departments. This means that promotion to a principal post depends less on the good work a man does in his department, less on his zeal, energy and creativeness in administering health, education, agriculture, or whatever it may be, than on the degree to which he can become *persona grata* at the Treasury. It is impossible to over-estimate the long-term results of this pernicious policy which was allowed to creep into our administrative arrangements in 1921.

THE ROOTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1783-1933. By ROHAN D'O. BUTLER. (310 pp. *Faber and Faber*. 12s. 6d.)

THUS SPAKE GERMANY. Edited by W. W. COOLE and M. F. POTTER. With an introduction by LORD VANSITTART. (xxviii and 438 pp.) (*Longmans*. 10s. 6d.)

GERMAN VERSUS HUN. By CARL BRINITZER and BERTHE GROSSBARD. With a foreword by DUFF COOPER. (270 pp. *Allen & Unwin*. 10s. 6d.)

WHAT TO DO WITH GERMANY. By COLONEL T. H. MINSHALL. (240 pp. *Allen & Unwin*. 10s. 6d.)

HAVING read these four books, the intelligent reader ought to be able to understand the Germans and know what to do with Germany, but we very much doubt whether in fact he will. Yet they are extremely interesting books, full of facts and knowledge, and compiled or written by people who have an extensive knowledge of their subject. The first is a formidable work of original thought and erudition. It is a study of German thought and its relation to German policy and action from 1783 to 1933. Its method is chronological and its object to trace the origin of Nazi practice and theory in the history of Germany and of German thought. In the early chapters of

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his book Colonel Minshall attempts something of the same task more superficially. In the latter part of the book he deals with the question of the right treatment of Germany after the war if we are to prevent her becoming the cause of a third world war. He considers the solution to be found in the weakening of Prussia and Prussian influence within Germany and he proposes to do this through a federation.

The two other books are different in form, though their object and intention are much the same. They are anthologies of German thought in which German writers, thinkers, and orators are allowed or made to explain the meaning of Germanism, the essential ideals and characteristics of the German people. They have been compiled with great ability and to those who have a limited knowledge of German history and literature will provide an invaluable storehouse of quotation and mental ammunition. Whether many people will be able to use them intelligently or wisely is doubtful. For the controversies which have already raged between Lord Vansittart and his critics, and between those who agree and disagree with the thesis which has guided the writers of these books, show how difficult it is at any time, but particularly in war, to form any kind of reasonable or impartial opinion upon the complicated and difficult questions involved in the dispute.

Fundamentally the dispute is about a fact and can be stated fairly simply. The Nazis have a savage and cruel view of life; they believe the Germans to be a superior race, a *Herrenvolk* or Chosen People whose mission it is to create by force a world empire and subject to themselves the lesser breeds of men. They want and have wanted war, for without war the accomplishment of their object is not possible. And in order to accomplish that object they are prepared and even eager to destroy everything which is usually meant by western civilization: freedom and tolerance, the standards of humanity and fraternity, law and justice, religion, morality, truth itself. So far Lord Vansittart and his critics are in agreement; the point in which they disagree is the measure and manner in which the German people or nation accept the standards and objects of the Nazis and share their guilt. Though Lord Vansittart and the authors of these books do occasionally make some qualifying statements, in effect they maintain that the Germans are identified with the Nazis in doctrine and practice, that they accept and always have accepted this barbarous social and racial dogma of the German *Herrenvolk*. The selection of the two anthologists and much of Mr. Butler's argument are directed to this end, to prove that all Germans are tarred with the same brush, Thomas Mann and Bernhardi, Stresemann and Hitler, and that Nazism with its warlord-Fuehrer, its Moloch totalitarian state, its ruling élite, its militaristic nationalism, its demand for *Lebensraum*, and its antisemitism is only an emphatic extension of the German tradition. To this the critics and opponents reply that the Germans are not

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essentially different from the other peoples of Europe; that you could prove by quotation that Frenchmen and Englishmen have also held these barbarous views; that the selection of the anthologists is tendentious and that you could prove by quotation that Germans have opposed this "German tradition"; that our opponents in war are always unadulterated scoundrels and that Burke was right in his objection to the indictment of whole nations or people.

The truth in this controversy is not nearly as clear or cut-and-dried as it appears to the controversialists; it is to be found probably, as so often, about midway between the two extremes. It is impossible in a review to make any real attempt to uncover it, but one or two points may be noted. Mr. Butler's is an extremely interesting and learned book, and he guards himself, for instance, on page 278, by admitting that there have been Germans who challenged the German tradition. But he is biased and therefore unconsciously gives a bias to his facts. A small example will show how this happens. Nietzsche was one of the most violent critics of Germans and Germanism, and was opposed to racialism and the "race-swindle," as he called it. Mr. Butler admits this, but this is how he words his admission: "Nietzsche was properly speaking no racialist," and he goes on: "But if Nietzsche was not actually a racialist he wrote a good deal that was highly acceptable to those who were." Here the words "properly speaking" and "not actually" do the trick; the impression ultimately conveyed to the unwary or ignorant reader is that Nietzsche was actually, like all Germans, a racialist. This kind of bias is much more powerful and effective in the anthologies. The selection, particularly in *Thus Spake Germany*, has been done with great skill; but the skill increases the bias and overemphasis of the selection. By omitting all views or qualification of views, which are contrary to the thesis of the anthologists, a one-sided picture of German thought is given.

But though the picture is one-sided, there are facts here which the controversialists on the other side ignore and a case which they do not attempt to meet. You could probably find in British and French writers some quotations which would prove that they held views similar to these Germans. But they would be a measly and third-rate company. There is no European nation which could provide an anthology of such size, is no European nation which could provide an anthology of such size, savagery, and stupidity, no European nation in which this savage stupidity is endorsed, as it is in Germany, not by obscure fanatics, but by the great writers, thinkers, and statesmen. The fact itself is distorted in these books and its significance and explanation are not adequately given in them—even in Mr. Butler's—but the fact itself cannot be abolished by ignoring or denying it.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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A POSSIBLE TECHNIQUE OF DISARMAMENT CONTROL. By MRS. LAURA PUFFER MORGAN. 96pp. (Geneva Research Centre.) Vol. xi, No. 7. 40 cents. 1.75 Swiss francs.

TO talk of disarmament may seem academic just now. But if a peaceful order is soon to be achieved after this war—if there is ever to be security against aggression, and a revival of prosperity—the arms race must be stopped. As President Roosevelt has emphasised, one of the essential freedoms, freedom from fear, is unattainable without general disarmament.

The Geneva Research Centre, which has courageously gone on publishing during the war such valuable studies as Mr. Engels's book on League Reform, does well to publish this study by Mrs. Morgan, an American lady who has long been one of the most steadfast and informed of unofficial students of disarmament. The book covers a field which is still, comparatively speaking, little explored: to a surprising extent the material is still fresh.

Four methods of disarmament have been considered. Firstly, *quantitative* limitation by ratios, such as was applied to certain navies in the Washington Treaty, 1922, and the London Treaty, 1930. The method achieved considerable success so long as political conditions were favourable: but it broke down eventually, when questions of prestige and power, in Japan, France, and Italy became acute. Secondly, *qualitative* limitation, prohibiting certain types of armament altogether. This method was used in the disarmament clauses of Versailles, and the London Treaty of 1936. It has obvious advantages when coupled with quantitative limitation; but, as was found at the Disarmament Conference, it is liable to provoke endless dispute as to which weapons should be classed as "aggression" or "defensive." Thirdly, *budgetary* limitation. This, with proper publicity and supervision, is a valuable auxiliary. Agreement about it at the Disarmament Conference was prevented by the misguided opposition of the United States. Fourthly, *limitation of the acquisition of new armaments*, whether by manufacture or by importation. It is this last method that Mrs. Morgan examines.

Is it practicable, she asks, to apply to the arms trade such methods of limitation as have been applied with notable success to the trade in narcotics? After reviewing the methods of drug control, and the differences and similarities between the two problems, she concludes that the method applied to drugs may, with minor changes, be "equally fruitful" when applied to armaments. If at first no quantitative or qualitative reduction of armaments can be agreed upon, then such limitation of programmes, with international supervision, would be a useful first step in the right direction.

Certainly, the differences between the drug traffic and the arms trade are great, perhaps greater than Mrs. Morgan indicates. But, as the book

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usefully recalls, much progress towards general agreement on this first step was, in fact, made during the last, little-known stages of the Disarmament Conferences.

The record is of more than academic interest, for the problems then dealt with will have to be confronted again. In November, 1932, Sr. Madariaga drew attention to the analogy between the control of narcotics and the control of arms. In May, 1933, the French Government submitted to the Disarmament Conference a proposal that the Conference should fix quotas for the amount of new arms that might be acquired annually by each state: and this plan, almost unchanged, was then annexed to the British Draft Convention. A year later, when hopes of a general Disarmament Convention were almost dead, the United States submitted fresh proposals, based on the principles that manufacture as well as trade in arms must be limited, and that the Governments must accept national responsibilities for all manufacture of arms, whether by the State or by private firms. The system of *national* control was copied from the Drug Convention, 1931. The system of *international* control likewise followed the drug precedents, but went much further: it stipulated that orders for armaments must be reported in advance to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, and that the Commission should exercise supervision, including permanent and automatic inspection on the spot. (These provisions about disclosure of orders, and about instructional supervision, were of course specially repugnant to the powerful vested interests concerned.)

By November, 1934, German rearmament was gathering momentum: Japan, though nominally co-operating, was in effect as irresponsible as an outlaw: and hopes of a general Disarmament Treaty were regarded as dead. So the United States amended their plan, making it a self-contained agreement which could be concluded separately and incorporated afterwards in a general convention.

In April, 1935, this amended plan was discussed at Geneva. Unanimous agreement was reached upon some important points: the majority accepted substantially the whole of the American case: but on the crucial question of the amount of supervision necessary, Lord Stanhope, for the British Government, led a reactionary minority—Italy, Japan and Poland—in opposition. His case was that "permanent and automatic supervision, with local inspection," could only be justified as part of a system of limitation of armaments.

These discussions did stimulate some national action for control of the arms trade, by isolated Governments: and in England an attempt was made, in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Arms Trade (October, 1936), to induce the Government to withdraw its opposition to the American plan. This plan, said the Commission, afforded "a basis on which an agreement for the international regulation and control

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of the trade in arms might be reached." The Labour and Liberal Parties supported this view: but the Government would not budge. And so the last chance of salvaging the last scrap of agreement out of the great wreck was lost.

Some day, another chance—let us hope, a much better chance—will return. After the post-war transition, it should become possible, on the basis of equality of rights and as part of a collective security system, to reach agreement on quantitative and qualitative limitation, on budgetary limitation, and on international supervision. And before that day, Mrs. Morgan's questions will call for answer. Would it not be worth while, as a first step, to make a convention regulating the arms trade and manufacture, and providing for publicity and international supervision? Would not this serve to "develop the technique of arms control which could be put to use when limitation becomes possible"? Moreover, might not this control become useful "as an instrument which could be used in the application of embargoes or any other co-operative action for the enforcement of peace." Or will it be found that, by the time when conditions make possible the conclusion of a general agreement on the lines of the American Draft, a much more substantial progress in disarmament will have become practicable?

The book is a useful job, well done.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

SOLVING LABOUR PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIA. By ORWELL DE R. FOENANDER. (168pp. Melbourne University Press, in association with Oxford University Press. 15s.)

THE publication of this book is one more rebuke to the war-lords. Even as the cannibals drive in this way and that, even as Australia with a population of seven millions sends its own young men to west and north for the sacrifice, a scholar in isolated Melbourne produces the definitive work on the industrial relations of his young country. Then it is offered calmly for sale by an English publisher, representative of an old university, who finds his workplace each morning an oasis among bombed buildings. There must, indeed, be hope for mankind here; and it certainly is a fine corrective to those of short-sighted, pessimistic vision.

The book has been described as a work on Australian industrial relations. But it is more—and less—than that. At the beginning of this century, with the remarkable example of little, neighbouring New Zealand as an immediate inspiration, and the writings of English socialists and French syndicalists as theoretical guide, Australia resolved, in effect, to apply the rule of law to her labour problems. Laissez-faire was completely abandoned here, and Australia sought to replace the

operation of "natural laws" as between master and man by the rule of definite codes. Thus an industry, such as that of sheep-farming or coal-mining, was (to be briefly explanatory) given a document drawn up by lawyers in consultation with representatives of employers, men and government, upon which was set out rates of wages to be paid and hours to be worked, together with provisions for revising these when necessary. Finally a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was established, with a regular panel of judges and advocates, whose function would be to interpret the codes, or awards, and to adjudicate upon claims for revision.

Something very like this system has been familiarised in Britain by the compulsory regimes of the last and the present wars; and certain of its features were adopted by Roosevelt for his New Deal programme. But it is only in Australia—and New Zealand—that such a system has become, not only a regular, but also a popular part of the life of the people. Arbitration law is as important in Australia to-day as common law, if it is not regarded by many Australians as more important, the common law being like a scaffolding round a building long since able to stand erect by itself, the arbitration or industrial law being the framework of a still unfinished structure of life.

Perhaps it might be said that by the development of this "new thing" in our lifetime, little Australia and New Zealand have given more to mankind than all the Germanic peoples during the period. Recognising that master and man are not opposed forces but complementary ones, whose happiness and efficiency depend upon the smoothness of that co-operation, the Australians and New Zealanders have laboured to eliminate the main causes of friction between the two by this reasonable, legal method. In New Zealand the system has worked particularly well, witness a steady decrease in the number of serious strikes, combined with an increase in welfare and a growth of industry. That its progress has been less satisfactory in Australia has been the product, perhaps, of the more violent temperament in that country both of employers and of workers. Possibly, too, the Australians have become, by nature and climate, more of a litigious people. Some of the Arbitration and Conciliation Court cases cited by Mr. Foenander in his book would have bewildered even Molière. They argue as learnedly and as lengthily "down-under" about, say, the time necessary for a waitress to deliver half-a-dozen cups of tea in a restaurant, as ever lawyers argued about Dickensian wards in Chancery. Meanwhile an exasperated body of workers will cut the knot by ignoring the admonitions of union officials and going on strike. It may be a lesson of Mr. Foenander's book—which is a careful analysis of the leading cases and problems in Australian industrial law—that we cannot hope for a new world if we leave it, alone, to the lawyers.

But the very fact that these things can be in Australia—that problems

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once considered insoluble products of an irrevocable class war can be treated familiarly in special courts just like crimes, divorces, debts and bankruptcies—is a notable fact for mankind, and should be specially considered just now in this country, where unheard-of opportunities for social reform may be at hand. So people with serious views on this matter are advised to have a look at Mr. Foenander's book. They will not find it light reading. It is, as has been said, primarily a case-book and investigation of weaknesses in the system. But they will certainly find therein the blueprints for their own, desired reforms. Professor D. B. Copland, Australia's leading economist, remarks in his introduction to the volume that "the Commonwealth Arbitration Court is to be regarded as one of the main agencies of economic control in Australia." We in Britain, floundering along while our very existence depends upon the efficient operation of the economic system, should surely be interested in anything that is capable of promoting that.

DONALD COWIE.

THE WAY TO JUSTICE. By HEBER L. HART, K.C., LL.D. 146 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 5s.)

THERE is one side of the problem of post-war reconstruction concerning which there exists the most disturbing complacency. That is the problem of law reform, at all times a topic upon which it is difficult to work up any general interest. A good deal of social change must ultimately be expressed in terms of legal regulation, and the last war produced important changes in our legal system which, however, did not go far enough. Already planners of a post-war England are finding themselves enmeshed in a web of private rights and legally-protected interests which, unless controlled, will hold up all important changes, which may be generally desired. An analysis of the legal implications of large-scale reconstruction is urgently required, but no one as yet seems to be doing much about it.

Quite distinct from this problem is that of the reform of our legal system itself. As Mr. Hart, in this modest, but important, collection of essays, points out, the ordinary person imagines that because our judges are excellent, the legal system they administer is also beyond criticism. In fact, it abounds with archaisms and unnecessary complexities; to such an extent, indeed, that the lawyer who knows how efficient an instrument of social justice it could become, despairs of seeing it ever reduced to order. Many of the defects are due to historical causes, but they have been retained long after the reason for them has disappeared. For example, alone among the nations of Europe, Great Britain has a legal system in which all the superior courts (with the exception of the Vice-Chancellor's Court in the County Palatine) are concentrated in London. Every other modern state has district High Courts. The

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reason for this was the desire to centralise justice in Norman and Plantagenet days, and so to retain a firm control over all parts of the Kingdom. This reason ceased to be valid centuries ago, but the system survives, and was confirmed by the Judicature Acts, 1873-5. Again and again the serious defects of this system have been demonstrated to Royal Commissions, but without result. Mr. Hart deplores this over centralisation, and so do many others, who know the inconvenience, delay, and expense for which it is responsible. In this case, the legal profession itself is the principal obstacle to change. London solicitors value their London agencies for litigation, whilst the Bar solves the difficult problem of being in two places at the same time by means of a circuit system which involves unnecessary expense and waste of time—for all of which the client pays in the long run.

Mr. Hart has also a number of weighty criticisms of our law of evidence, which has been framed for the purpose of preventing barristers from unduly influencing lay juries, or for the purpose of giving the accused in criminal cases a run for his money in an age when punishments were barbarous, and generally deplored. The rule protecting an accused from answering questions tending to incriminate him, except within a narrow range of cases, for example, derives from this period.

Many of these defects could be removed, Mr. Hart contends, if a Ministry of Justice were created, for there can be no doubt that professional conservatism to-day unduly obstructs necessary reforms. Moreover, the fact that the head of our legal service is in the House of Lords, and is also the Speaker of that House, as well as the head of the judiciary, necessarily has the effect of stifling criticism of generally-known defects in the law. Mr. Hart has a large body of opinion behind him, when he declares that the achievement of a simpler body of law, and a simpler and less costly legal administration than we possess at present, is urgently required, and is entirely practicable. A further topic in this stimulating little volume which arrests attention is his plea for a better system of legal education for the Bar. In the Middle Ages, the Inns of Court were the centres of Common Law learning. On their educational side they have long ceased to be that, and their system of education is archaic. Comparisons with foreign systems of professional education are humiliating to a degree.

Mr. Hart does not cover the entire field of legal reform. For example, the destruction of records by enemy bombing is making our pre-historic system of private conveyancing even more perilous an enterprise than it was before. Compulsory registration of title, therefore, cannot be very far away. There is, however, embodied in Mr. Hart's book, a programme for law reform, much of it long overdue, which our first Minister of Justice would be well advised to tackle.

G. W. KEETON.

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THE ANNUAL REGISTER. A REVIEW OF PUBLIC EVENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR THE YEAR 1940. Edited by M. EPSTEIN. (xiv and 478 pp. Longmans. 35s.)

THIS book of reference has the remarkable distinction of being 182 years old and of having been published yearly since 1758. It has never recorded a more eventful year than 1940. The editor has done his difficult work well and, on the whole, with that impartiality which is required in a volume of this nature. Part I is divided into three sections, dealing with English, Imperial, and Foreign history. The first section gives in four chapters a record of the events of the war and the political reaction in Britain to those events. The first two chapters cover the end of the Finnish war, the invasion of Norway and the fall of the Chamberlain Government, the invasion of Holland and Belgium and the collapse of France. The air battle of Britain is recorded in the third and the war in the Mediterranean in the fourth chapter. Imperial history is dealt with in five chapters, devoted respectively to Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Australasia, and India and Burma. It is a pity that space is not found here for a chapter on the colonial territories; they have played a considerable part in the war and the war has had a considerable effect upon their problems and development. It is true that occasionally reference is made to them in the first section devoted to British history, e.g. the West India Royal Commission, but this is hardly adequate in a volume which later finds space for nearly half a page for reviews of unimportant books or for obituary notices of not very distinguished people. It is a symptom of the lamentable lack of interest in the vast territories and large populations for which we are politically responsible. The omission is the more noticeable when one examines the excellent section devoted to foreign countries and finds that space is found for recording the history of the Lebanon, Morocco, and Uruguay during 1940. And when on the first page of Part II which begins with a chronicle of events one finds that one event is the damage by fire of the north wing and front of Lord Tankerville's country seat in Northumberland, one feels that the Annual Register's judgment as to the relative importance of events is sometimes very peculiar. Altogether the second part of the book, which attempts to summarize the chief events of the year in literature, science and art, finance and commerce, and law, and which gives a selection of a few public documents and the obituaries of a considerable number of people, is not as satisfactory as the first part.

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MODERN INDIA AND THE WEST. A study of the interaction of their civilisations. Edited by L. S. S. O'MALLEY, C.I.E. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (36s. Pages viii and 834. Oxford University Press.)

THIS is the work of seventeen writers with a foreword by Lord Meston. If the fifty-one pages devoted to literature and drama be left out of account, only forty-three out of seven hundred and sixty pages are the work of Indians. Among the nine representatives of Western scholarship who have contributed thirteen of the sixteen chapters there is not one non-British name and apparently no American. If this is a consequence of the rules of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, it is an unfortunate one. Patriotism is not enough. There is no lack of candour in the book: but it must be added that the outspoken opponent of British influences in India is conspicuously absent. As a result we have rather the liberal and scholarly gazetteer than a representation, in the round, of the interactions of the two civilisations which destiny has so strangely brought together. If an Indian could have hinted to us what India might have been without the British, or a Frenchman, or a Portuguese, what the triumph of another branch of the European family might have meant, we should have been even more indebted to the late Mr. L. S. S. O'Malley than this book leaves us. One chapter only deals with the influence of India upon the West. We do not find in it any estimate of the negative effects upon Britain's own history if there had been no Indian empire under British tutelage.

But it is ungracious to dwell upon omissions when so much is given to us. The reader of this book will find in it a storehouse of knowledge on politics, law, education, the press, mechanism and transport, economics, the religions, the social systems, the primitive tribes, and the literatures of six of the Indian languages. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics in the University of Oxford, writes on Hinduism and the West and reminds us that it is no small achievement to help a great religion to purify itself. Mr. Yusuf Ali, a scholar in the lore of both East and West, contributes a gem of an essay on Muslim culture and religious thought. Scientific developments and the share of Indians in them are not forgotten in Mr. O'Malley's general survey. A chapter is devoted to the Progress of Women by Mrs. H. Gray. An inevitable background is sketched with light and rapid touches in the clash of cultures, and the yet unfinished story of the nationalist revolution, which surely traces its beginnings to a wind from the West.


It is not easy to distinguish between changes which have been brought about by the impact of the West and those which have come from developments such as the improvement of communications and the growth of industrialisation to East and West alike, but sooner to

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one group of countries than to another. A good deal of what we now regard as specifically Western is a novelty in the West as well as in the East. But there are certain seminal ideas which are almost certainly Western importations; and they are those which gather round the conception of the brotherhood of man and the sisterhood of woman. These ideas are in one respect narrower than those of India: because they set a barrier between Man and the rest of creation, which is foreign to Hinduism, but they have issued in a fertilising stream of practical aims and aspirations from which Indian humanity is likely to benefit.

The West brought to India a solvent, not perhaps one comparable in its intellectual force with the solvent which Greek thought brought to the Hellenistic world: but yet a powerful agent of gradual change. The greatest thing which India gave to the West was beyond a doubt the thought of the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita. Perhaps the greatest thing which contact with the West has given to India has been the power of looking at herself. The vision shows a Janus face: on one side hostile to Western civilisation, and on one side eagerly welcoming it.

JOHN MAYNARD.



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