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THE RIDDLE OF 1941

I. BRITAIN AT BAY

I

THE war has gathered momentum once again with the return of spring, and events have shown in the course of a single crowded month how many-sided is the challenge that the British Empire is called on to defeat. General Wavell's brilliant winter campaign in Libya, the signal successes of the Mediterranean Fleet under Admiral Cunningham and the truly heroic fighting of the Greek Army in Albania had combined to engender early in the year a spirit of widespread optimism which outran the judgment of those who remembered that the Italian forces are not the main or most formidable opponent to be met and mastered by British arms; and there has followed a certain reaction amongst the commentators on events which has tended to belittle the value of the reverses inflicted upon Hitler's chief ally.

That is a profound mistake. The fact that we have been driven back to the eastern edge of Cyrenaica and also out of mainland Greece does not deprive us of the very solid advantages gained by the skill and enterprise of our three Services in the Mediterranean theatre. In the Balkans Hitler has been obliged by the British intervention to deploy and to use up a considerable measure of his strength. We have gained much by the weeks he has had to devote to the Balkan war; and though his sacrifices may not be heavy in proportion to his enormous strength, his eastern programme has unquestionably been delayed—with consequences that may seriously affect the final result. This is a speculative gain, though not to be despised on that account; but in North Africa the advantages are concrete enough. Let anyone consider what the situation there would have been to-day, had the Italian fleet remained

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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capable of convoy work on a large scale between Sicily and the North African coast, had Germany been able to reinforce an unbeaten Italian army planted in strong advance positions on Egyptian soil, had the Italian forces in East Africa still been a menace to General Wavell's rear in Egypt and the Sudan, and had the Red Sea not ceased to be a war zone, barred on that account to American ships. It is not easy to over-rate the advantage that we may derive from the denial of these important facilities to Hitler's designs in the Middle East, and we have therefore every reason to be grateful to the forceful naval and military leadership which reduced the Italian war machine to its present crippled state.

To see the sequence of success and reverse in true perspective is not, however, to under-estimate the magnitude of the challenge that we now have to face. It is clear that Hitler has, like Napoleon, a "plan with branches", and that he can switch from one of these to another or pursue them in combination till one begins to promise the results on which he is bent. First and foremost in these plans is the strangling of Britain by blockade of her sea approaches and destruction of her ports. Second is the attack upon her Mediterranean position and communications with the East, combined with the capture of new sources of food and oil. And third is the invasion of Britain herself by sea and air. Hitler is already well launched upon the first two branches of this strategy, and he is ready to make a direct attack upon this country at very short notice, whenever he may think the moment has come. Our task is therefore to counter him effectively in the Atlantic and in the Middle East without relaxing our readiness to throw back any assault, however wide, upon our own shores.

It is a giant task, but on two conditions we can achieve it. One is the rekindling throughout the nation of that sense of mission and also of hard emergency which lifted us above the welter of events last year. We are giants when that spirit is aroused. The other is a similar awakening in the United States, for there are vital necessities for the defeat of Germany which the British Empire cannot supply in adequate measure alone.

American assistance is expanding rapidly, but there is still no certainty that enough will be available in time. Yet now more than ever, when certain countries of great strategic importance are still to be held or won, the critical factor is time.

The tide will not turn in this war until the democracies are as fully engaged and organised in every activity that affects the issue as the unsleeping and unresting adversary they are sworn to overcome. They should therefore realise that the future depends not merely on the winning of the war but on the cost at which it is won. Every touch of slackness, every needless controversy, every week of procrastination and doubt not only endangers the victory but increases its cost and compromises the broad prosperity we wish to secure. The leaders of the United States have shown by recent statements how clearly they grasp these facts. But essential action is still delayed, and Britain has not yet risen to the height of the emergency at home. Let us then set out broadly the facts, the dangers and the opportunities, which constitute the riddle of 1941.

II

WE have now been waging war by sea for twenty months, and there are no words too generous to express the gratitude we owe to our magnificent sea services. The high lights of their achievement are many. Actions have been fought, by great forces and small, which will live for ever in our naval history; and like a long battle without name, the gruelling duties of protection and supply have been faithfully discharged week by week and month by month, in fair weather sometimes but far more often in foul, by a host of seamen in an immense variety of craft. They have kept our life-lines open with a bravery and steadfastness unsurpassed by the seamen of any time. To their unflinching endurance we owe all the elements of strength—food, oil, raw material and manufactured munitions from oversea—on which victory over Germany will turn. Had they failed us—captains, sailors,

engineers, fishermen and seamen of a hundred different types —our staying-power and our striking-power would both be at an end.

In broad summary, from the strategic point of view, we have indeed to thank the Royal Navy, with its sister sea services, for three main achievements, all vital to the waging of the war. It has, in the first place, so far defeated Hitler's blockade of these islands that their function as our main base and power station has never been seriously weakened by shortage of sea supplies. Practically all our vital processes depend in one way or another upon mastery of the sea, and that the Navy has maintained against an enemy whose bases have now for nearly a year overshadowed all but the north-western approaches to our shores. In the second place, the Navy has enabled us steadily to strengthen and supply our forces in the Near and Middle East. In the third place, with brilliant assistance from the air, it has inflicted shattering losses upon the Italian Fleet and made an end of that much-trumpeted menace to British sea-power. These last two achievements have given an entirely new turn to the European as well as to the African aspect of the war. It is essential to remember this successful assertion of sea-power as the background of all our strategy, the one essential without which all else is vain.

The Battle of the Atlantic is now severely straining our resources in ships and maritime personnel. The air attack upon our ports is also formidable; it will test to the full our powers of organisation and civilian morale. But we are making better head against the attack on commerce than we made in 1917, and there is no indication to suggest any weakening of civilian spirit and staying-power. "It was nothing but Dante's Inferno", wrote a girl in domestic service after two nights of continuous horror from one of our most stricken ports— "devastation and wanton destruction, really heart-breaking, and yet Britons never shall be slaves." She had herself been covered with débris and badly bruised by a close explosion— "but", she remarked, "it's marvellous what one can get used to—even bombs. . . . We will beat them and give them their

own medicine back." And that invincibility marks the spirit of nine-tenths of our people everywhere.

But while we can "take it", as the phrase goes, it would be false optimism to pretend that the struggle will not greatly shorten this country's supplies, reduce the mobility of its forces and therefore curtail its striking-power. That is, if we are left to face it unaided, with such resources in ships and maritime personnel as we now command or can build and train alone. The magnitude of the effort demanded of our sea services in this respect has not yet come home to our own people, much less to the Americans. In 1914–18, against a Germany which had, it is true, a battle-fleet but was not in other ways so well equipped for war against sea-borne trade, we could count upon the French, the Italian and the Japanese fleets in addition to our own. When the United States entered the war in 1917, the sea alliance was overwhelming. Now we stand almost alone, since the naval support derived from Free France, Holland and Poland, though splendid in spirit, is small. Italy is against us. France, under Darlan, is so uncertain that her naval movements have to be watched with sleepless care. Japan is another constant cause of uncertainty and strain. In addition to this enormous difference in the balance of sea-power, Germany menaces this island from bases extending from the Arctic Circle to Spain, and is able to reinforce the naval attack on commerce by large-scale air attack not only on ships but on ports. The R.A.F. is countering the latter with great effect; it will do better with each month that passes. But the air menace to sea-borne trade nevertheless considerably aggravates the Atlantic problem which we have, and mean, to solve.

This is not a question merely of "taking it"; we can grit our teeth to hardship and loss, however grave they be. It is a question even now of strategical mobility; we cannot give assistance to our forces in the Mediterranean or the Middle East on the scale which would be possible with a greater command of ships. And for the future, it is a question of our ability to hit back in ever-growing measure, to seize the initiative for ourselves as Hitler's initiative is foiled, and thus to

carry the offensive victoriously into his territories by land as well as air.

The American people are already giving us yeoman help outside the war zones. But it is in the war zones that the issue is really being fought, and that issue—it is already clear to see—will depend on them as much as on us. If they will the end, they must will the means. It is difficult to see how without American ships and convoys we can develop both the resources and the power of movement necessary to attain the end—to which, after all, the United States is as deeply vowed as Britain. On that aspect of the struggle it is only necessary to quote Lord Lothian's moving words to the American people in his last speech at Baltimore:

> I have endeavoured to give you some idea of our present position and dangers, the problems of 1941 and our hopes for the future. It is for you to decide whether you share our hopes and what support you will give us in realising them. We are, I believe, doing all we can. Since May there is no challenge we have evaded, no challenge we have refused. If you back us you won't be backing a quitter. The issue now depends largely on what you decide to do. Nobody can share that responsibility with you. It is the great strength of democracy that it brings responsibility down squarely on every citizen and every nation. And before the judgment seat of God each must answer for his own actions.

On the ultimate issue of the war at sea there is no more to be said.

III

THE difficulties of sea transport and convoy have had a direct and serious bearing upon our ability to deal with the second branch of Hitler's strategy, his advance towards the East. Had General Wavell commanded larger forces, the Balkan Powers might have been willing to act in defence of their liberties together. The Italian army in Albania would then have been driven into the Adriatic during the winter months, and Germany would have been faced by a strong combination capable of protracted resistance all through the Balkan area. But the help we could offer was small; and so,

as in the old days when they were subjugated by the Turks, the Balkan nations have sacrificed their freedom to their internal rivalries. The Yugoslavs unhappily overthrew their Government too late, and the brave Serbs, with their main armies only half mobilised and disposed, for political rather than military reasons, upon the northern frontiers of the kingdom, were taken in the rear and rapidly submerged. The German attack on them was vilely treacherous, since it was delivered without warning, while negotiations were still in train; but the tragic fact is that Yugoslavia in any case acted too late. Turkey, strong for defence but ill situated and equipped for attack, decided not to intervene.

The absence of effective Serbian resistance in the south was fatal to the Greeks; it would indeed have been better for them had they not counted on the Serbs to hold up the German advance between their Albanian and Thracian fronts. The British imperial force in Greece, small as it inevitably was, most fully justified the decision of His Majesty's Governments in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand to send it to the support of Greece; for though it was unable to prevent the tremendous thrust between the two Greek fronts which passed through southern Serbia undelayed by organised resistance of any effective sort, it fought magnificently and only gave up the struggle at Greece's own request. With the limitations imposed by shortage of adequately equipped ports, as well as of ships, Great Britain could not in any event have maintained an expeditionary force of any size in Greece, and there are some who maintain that the Greeks should in consequence have been told from the outset that Britain was unable to help. That criticism reflects directly upon the competence with which the Government is exercising the higher direction of the war; but it is a natural one and should be weighed with candour, not summarily dismissed.

The first fact to be noted is that Britain had no responsibility for Greece's decision to fight. That came from the heart of her gallant people under a leadership which reflected and expressed in every way their passion for independence and

their valour of heart. Though they are suffering for a courage which has never been surpassed, they will regain their freedom in due course and they will stand immeasurably higher in the years to come than the venal neighbours who sold themselves into vassaldom. The decision and the glory of it are theirs; they were not inspired by pressure or persuasion from their allies. When that resolve was communicated to London, the British Government had to decide whether to aid them as best it could or leave them to fight alone—one of those deep-searching choices in which moral and military considerations diverge. The former course was chosen, and there was no difference between political and military leaders, despite the military risks involved, upon the rightness of the choice.

It was a forward-looking decision, and its wisdom is not to be judged by immediate results. It has not, it is true, prevented the over-running of mainland Greece; and on the southern Mediterranean shore we have suffered a reverse in Cyrenaica which would not have occurred but for the assistance which we sent to our Hellenic allies. These are serious items on the debit side of the balance; but they do not justify an adverse judgment on the long-range wisdom of the course which the Government took. Let anyone reflect how by comparison the world would have looked on us, and how we ourselves would have felt, had we not faced the German and Italian invaders at Greece's side with what forces we could spare and carry to her support. It always looks like special pleading to set moral gain against material loss; but in this instance, judged solely by what will or will not help to win the war, there is decisive reason for the view that our cause is the stronger morally and on balance none the weaker materially for the effort we made on Greece's behalf.

Let it be added that the imperial forces sent to Greece acquitted themselves magnificently in what is for spirited soldiers the hardest of all tasks. All who knew the Australian and New Zealand troops were confident that they would add fresh honours to the Anzac name. What is never so certain until it is tried is the quality of the training given in relation

to the methods of war which have to be met; but the British and imperial forces proved themselves no less equal in training than in courage to German armoured assault; and though very greatly outnumbered, they inflicted much heavier losses in men and material than they themselves sustained. Their showing has been an inspiration and encouragement to all the armed land forces which are still awaiting the test; for they have utterly destroyed the legend that German armoured air and ground attack cannot be met and overcome.

It still remains to hold and counter Hitler's challenge in the Middle East. His aim is unquestionably to drive our sea-power from the Mediterranean by occupying Egypt and depriving the Fleet of its main base at Alexandria. For this purpose he now has the advantage of air bases on Greek territory, and he can switch both air and land forces from one theatre to another with a rapidity which we cannot at present match. Backed by strong air-power with bases upon the Eastern Mediterranean coasts, Hitler's threat to Egypt via Libya and also via Turkey and Syria is unquestionably grave, and it may well be that he will attempt landings with armoured forces in Asia Minor or on the shores of the Black Sea. Though Russia is plainly conscious of the menace implicit in this to herself, we cannot count upon her intervention. She may abandon the Turks, if they are attacked, and she may herself capitulate; no man but Stalin can tell. France is another uncertain factor; we cannot set aside the possibility of having to reckon with the French fleet, since Admiral Darlan is clearly bent on evading Marshal Pétain's scruples and setting the strong anti-German feelings of the great majority of the French people at naught.

Spain also may turn against us, for Hitler in his burning desire to close both ends of the Mediterranean against us has renewed his pressure upon the Spanish Government. Every extension of his communications is in some sense an advantage to us, particularly when they pass near the sea; but the opening of new ports upon the Atlantic to German use would add considerably to our difficulties in the maritime war; the

control of an even shorter sea route for German divisions into North Africa would also manifestly aggravate the menace that we have to counter in that theatre. It is, however, to be noted that a move by Hitler into Spain would be another direct challenge to the vital interests of the United States.

Whatever the United States may do, it is certain that Hitler will press his advance on Egypt and the sources of oil. The summer heat will soon make fighting in the African desert an almost intolerable physical test; but it will be undertaken none the less. And while we must arrest Hitler's *Drang nach Osten* if we are to prevent a great prolongation of the struggle, we have to keep our daylight air superiority over these islands and the narrow seas, and also to be ready at any moment to defeat a massive attack by air- and sea-borne forces upon this country at many different points. One thing is certain—that Hitler cannot reach a decision this year without invading England and destroying her fighting-power. That is his only road to decisive victory, whether he is checked in the East or not, since he cannot secure a decision by local victory there; and he must attempt the task without giving us much more time to expand our strength by land and air, if he is to attempt it with any hope of success. The security of these islands must therefore remain our central preoccupation, whatever else befall. They are the heart of freedom's cause, and they must be held intact against assault and battery, however severe.

Our task in the coming summer is therefore manifest. Hitler may well have an open mind as to the theatre in which he will press his fiercest attack; but he has the means for attacking simultaneously on all three main fronts. If he is checked in the Mediterranean, he will be driven back upon invasion of this country; and if invasion fails or looks unpromising, he will stake all upon his eastward drive. Whatever the issue in those theatres, he will also press to the utmost his attack upon the Atlantic routes. We are therefore called upon to fight for our very life in three main theatres; the issue of the war will not be certain until we have mastered the threat to the Atlantic life-lines, countered Hitler's eastward thrust and held

this country unsubdued by either moral or material assault. If we stand fast against this triple menace, as we shall at all costs, during the summer months, Hitler will have failed decisively to impose his will on us, and the initiative will pass at last into our hands. How then shall we impose our will on him?

II. THE WAY TO WIN

I

THIS is a moral no less than a material war. Moral forces have already played a momentous part in it, but in many ways to our detriment. Germany has sapped the vital strength of her victims before attacking or absorbing them, and she is now exploiting a well-earned reputation for invincibility with very great effect. It is an utter mistake to suppose that we can destroy that legend or the strong self-confidence which it inspires in German breasts by denouncing the moral obliquity of the means by which it has been built up. Moral forces will not tell against it until it is shaken by a manifest and concrete military check. But when that check has been administered for all men to see, when the German tiger is plainly caged and the great resources of the oceanic democracies are known to be piling up against him, when in particular the air-power leagued against him is expanding to a fighting and bombing strength that he cannot equal, then the tide will turn and a moral renascence throughout Europe will help to overwhelm him in all the countries he has enslaved.

The truth is that a succession of brilliant military triumphs, prepared and exploited with consummate political skill, have so far concealed the political weakness of Hitler's long-range schemes. It seems certain that he himself combines real military insight with his political genius. He also has the gift of choosing men; he has found daring and skilful soldiers to wield his military machine, and no truthful estimate of his power should under-rate the soldierly virtue and capacity of the German race. The staff-work of his enterprises, the dash

and daring of his plans, the endurance of his troops are all alike remarkable. He has emulated Napoleon for suddenness and rapidity in the strokes of war, and he has surpassed Napoleon in the process of intimidating and disintegrating his opponents before the blow falls.

He has thus welded Germany into a swift but massive engine of war, and has used that engine to establish in the course of a few months a military dominion as great as Napoleon's. This might remain proof against all counter-attack if the method and purpose of German rule were as praiseworthy as German military skill. The fact, however, is that no pervert more Satanic than Hitler in method and purpose has ever afflicted mankind. The fact also is that Germans are incapable of playing the part of beneficent, tactful and therefore acceptable overlords, for which they are incongruously designed in Hitler's dreams. We believe, in consequence, that, despite the moral ascendancy which Hitler now enjoys, moral forces of a very different order, springing from revulsion in the countries he has overrun, will rise to overwhelm him when the oceanic alliance of free peoples is seen to be mastering him in strength of arm.

If terrorism could ever serve as the means to stable, world-wide power, then indeed Hitler might accomplish his aim. He has drawn from modern science a range of equipment such as no tyrant or conqueror ever controlled before. He can move with awful speed to destroy men's habitations and blast their bodies, whole families at a time; day after day and night by night he can assail their minds and intimidate their souls. No compunction besets him in the exercise of these terrible powers. He has made a system of treachery, a new and utterly shameless technique of lies. He despises cruelty, dishonour and falsehood only when practised on a moderate scale. He uses destruction to terrorise his adversary with no more compassion than a farmer killing pigs, and rapine to reward his own party leaders and troops with less compunction than a huntsman throwing foxes to his hounds. In pursuit of his aims he does not shrink from the wholesale extinction of

young men and women of reproductive age. Never in the history of the human race has one distorted and cunning mind brought so much suffering on such myriads of innocent homes.

> The year 1940 [writes Jules Romains in *La France Libre*] is surely one of the most disastrous which humanity has ever known. . . . Other epochs have looked on warfare and the spirit of conquest unchained. But we must travel far back in human annals to discover a picture like that now before our eyes. For since the end of the Middle Ages conquerors have done harm to civilisation but they have not challenged its very existence. They have attributed their crimes and excesses to necessity, but they have never sought to present them as exemplary actions upon which the conquered peoples should henceforth model their codes. They have not announced to those conquered nations in advance that they would be treated like inferior races—or rather as inferior races were treated some centuries ago—despoiled, transported, confined and even decimated according to the plan or caprice of their overlord. The accidents of military history in Europe have never hitherto threatened the end of her most precious moral and spiritual values, the annulment of all that previous generations have achieved in the growth of mutual respect, fair dealing and goodwill—or, to put it briefly, of humanity amongst men. Whatever the sequel may be, the year 1940 will be known as one of the four or five in which the civilised life evolved by man has stood in greatest jeopardy.

This is a terrible indictment, but it is true. The Swastika flag is flying on the Acropolis of Athens, a baleful sign of the degradation into which civilisation has been plunged.

The effects of this volcanic devastation are for the moment so overpowering that it is well to consider how far Hitler still has to go in order to realise his dreams. It is obvious, for instance, that the establishment of his new order will not be compatible with any form of responsible government in the countries where it is to operate. Their systems of administration will be made to correspond with the Nazi system in Germany under safeguards of the rigid Nazi type. There will be close control of national production and finance, of customs duties, export and import, and every activity of commercial life. The right of meeting and free speech will of necessity be suppressed; education will be straitwaistcoated; the Press will

be gagged; trade unions will cease to exist. All this will not be possible in countries such as Norway, Holland and France without a continuance of military occupation at central points. It will also call for an army of German advisers, supervisors, inspectors and such; and the Gestapo will inevitably keep a stranglehold on all the arteries of national thought and life.

This is a project of government over proud and civilised nations such as no civilised Power has ever yet attempted, much less realised. It would be complex enough in countries without the long tradition of independence that Hitler's victims possess; in modern Europe it is an impracticable enterprise. Hitler is seeking to impose his political and economic régime upon peoples who have for generations, under one system or another, determined these things for themselves. For that the co-operation of the governed is indispensable. He cannot win such acquiescence, except for a passing moment of time. Money and power may tempt a small minority in each of the conquered countries in Europe to compound with his rule, but acceptance of it as a permanency by the great majority is inconceivable.

The instruments which Hitler has to use—that is, the German bureaucracy of the Nazi régime—are, moreover, as fundamentally unsuited as his method of conquest to the scheme of government he has in view. Such trained administrative personnel as he possesses must already be spread extremely thin, and it is not of the type which wins co-operation from the governed, quite the reverse. The German bureaucracy would find the task with which Hitler has charged it difficult enough if it were compact of idealists with a passion for good government as an end in itself. But there is no disinterestedness in the Gestapo, no vestige of idealism, no touch of benevolence. It is cruel, material, self-seeking and rottenly corrupt. It cannot win assent, or anything but hatred, fear and ultimately scorn.

It is no small thing, though it may not seem as yet to have counted for much, that the Nazi method and aim are revolting to all that is upright, decent and self-respecting in the mind

of civilised man. "God", in the great words of the English Bible, "is not mocked"; and Hitler's every thought and action is a mockery of that God-reflecting element in man which lifts him above the beasts. In the history of human abnormality there is nothing to equal his contempt for human life, his indifference to its sanctities, or the degrading nature of the order which he wishes to establish upon earth. Revulsion against such a régime is as sure as sunrise when once the hope of freedom is reborn.

The fundamental weakness of Hitler's infamous technique is indeed that its effects are momentary. It turns the victim's internal troubles against himself; it spreads confusion like a fire and destroys his power to resist. But it does not touch his essential character, if real character there be. Applied to a spirited people, the Hitler technique is thus like a drug which paralyses action and even thought for a period but does not permanently affect the heart or mind. The truth of this diagnosis is already manifest in Bohemia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Occupied France—victims from whom the demoralising effects of the Nazi ether are passing fast. It will be equally apparent in Serbia, Greece and any other manly country which the German army may yet overrun.

Another ingrained weakness springs from what has been defined as the "psychological ineptitude" of the German race. No one has analysed that trait more ruthlessly than Hitler himself; his contempt for the German people's lack of sense and understanding is written broad across the pages of *Mein Kampf* and in every speech that he makes. He understands his Germans thoroughly because he, a revolutionary by temper and an Austrian by birth, has no resemblance whatever to the true German type himself. That heavy-handed people, incapable of the dignity of self-government within its own polity, is equally incapable of making life under its direction tolerable to the rest of the world. The way in which a German with authority of any sort behaves to a German without it is symptomatic of his utter inability to make himself acceptable to other men. No nation in the world really likes foreigners,

particularly when they are throwing their weight about; but the German has an unequalled genius for raising such dislike to the level of active and mutinous hate.

Yet another feature in the German character undermines the pretension of that people to be a *Herrenwolk*. No man is capable of sustained achievement who cannot keep his faith in his leaders and himself when the tide is running against him and his luck is manifestly out. The German is saturated with belief in everything German so long as he is meeting with success. He is then propelled by an almost mystical self-confidence and goes from strength to strength. But he collapses with extraordinary suddenness when he finds that things are not going according to plan and that his tribal god, his Hitler or his Wotan, is confronted by something as strong as, or even stronger than, himself. With Germans the passage from overbearing superiority to cringing humility is remarkably swift. Their morale is brittle, even at its height. They can be monuments of self-sufficiency at one moment, and jellies of self-pity at the next. It is one of the characteristics of the English that they rise superior—or, as some say, remain insensitive—to catastrophic reverses and the most shattering events. Such insensitiveness or steadfastness is not a German trait.

The Nazi régime, moreover, with its demand for blind, unquestioning and universal belief, has probably increased this weakness of the German character. It is a noteworthy fact that British officers and men who have had experience of the German as a fighting man both in the last war and in this do not regard the modern German soldier as equal, man for man, to the German soldier of twenty years ago. For German equipment, tactical enterprise and training, organisation and military leadership, the admiration of our soldiers is greater than in the past; but for German troops it is very definitely less.

All these things are facts as undeniable and as significant as the triumphs which Hitler has won. They make it certain that the German overlordship of Europe will not be of long duration, even if it survive the peace.

II

OUR business, however, is to make certain that it does not survive the peace. The grade is hard, but we can make it, with the help of the United States; for with sea and air power combined we can strike such blows at the Nazi machine of domination that it will lose confidence in itself. In these days, it is true, science has placed such weapons in the hands of unscrupulous Governments that revolt against them is most difficult. But men cannot wield these weapons with effect when once they begin to lose their nerve or cease to believe in themselves. Towards the end of the last war two English soldiers, an officer and a corporal, walked up the bed of a dry canal and captured a German machine-gun position which had a clear range of fire for over a hundred yards. They had no cover of any kind and they ought to have been killed a hundred times before they reached the gun; but their coolness unnerved the gunners, who failed to touch either of them.

The parallel may seem a little far-fetched, but it illustrates in cameo the solid fact that machine-guns lose their power when the gunners behind them lose their nerve. What is individually true of those who hold a single position is equally true collectively of those who hold a province; when once they lose self-confidence, they also lose control. Not that the first effective step in loosening Germany's hold over her victims can be taken by the victims themselves. The Germans' belief in their invincibility must be broken first by men who can meet them with weapons equal or superior to their own. The legend of invincibility serves not only as propaganda to other peoples but as food and drink to themselves; and it must be shattered by military failure and the manifest checkmating of their plans. That is our task, and we must achieve it with the United States. But with that achievement will come the turn of the tide; and if, as is certain, we can then strike continuously home by raids at many points upon the coasts the Germans hold, we shall unleash a terror which they will not be able to

overcome. Ruthlessness is easy for men who are sure that they will remain the masters, whatever befall; it is not at all easy for men who are losing faith in their invincibility and wondering whether their own turn for subjection may not once again be at hand. It is then that Nemesis will strike as surely as in an Aeschylean tragedy.

Though Germany has still an unshaken ascendancy, the process of undermining has indeed already begun, as two successful raids on Norway have shown. These are small beginnings, but they are examples of a method which can be steadily enlarged as our strength matures; and we have the assurance of a great master of war, who tried like Hitler to found a continental system on military power, that the method of raids may be employed against an extended continental enemy with devastating effect. On this subject Napoleon's views carry even more than their usual weight, since he knew what the domination of Europe involved better than any man before him or since—not excepting Hitler, who has not yet had his experience. Caulaincourt records that in the winter of 1812, when he was driving with the Emperor home from Russia across the endless snows, Napoleon spoke constantly of England, dwelling on her curious strength, the mistakes she had made, and the better tactics she might employ. The parallel to our own time is close and illuminating, as a single quotation will prove.

On this journey, writes Caulaincourt, "the Emperor returned continually to the subject of England, which occupied his mind above everything else". She was purely selfish, Napoleon maintained; but "the more he studied her government, the more innately vigorous it seemed to him", and other nations—for a reason he could not understand—seemed to prefer the idea of English supremacy to French. England, ventured Caulaincourt, did not seek universal dominion, like France—but Napoleon waved the explanation away, and turned to the subject of Spain.

According to the Emperor [Caulaincourt goes on] the presence of the English Army was the greatest obstacle to the pacification of

Spain, but he would rather see it in that country than be threatened with it at any moment—in Brittany or Italy, or anywhere, in fact, where the coast was accessible. As it was, he knew where to look for the English; while if they were not occupied there he would be forced to prepare for them, and hold himself ready for defence against them, at every point. And that would use up many more troops, give him much more anxiety, and possibly do him much more damage.

"If 30,000 English landed in Belgium," he said to me, "or in the Pas-de-Calais, and requisitioned supplies from three hundred villages —if they were to go and burn the château of Caulaincourt—they would do us much more harm than by forcing me to maintain an army in Spain. You would make a much worse outcry, my good Master of the Horse! You would complain much more loudly than you do when you say that I aim at universal monarchy! The English are playing into my hands. If the Ministry were in my pay, they could not act in a way more favourable to me. You must take good care not to repeat the ideas I express to you; for if the idea entered their heads to make expeditions against my coasts, now at one point and now at another: to re-embark as soon as forces were collected to fight them, and go at once to threaten some other point—the situation would be insupportable."

This is assuredly an inspiriting moral for application to the present war. If life could have been made insupportable to Napoleon by the tactic of raids a hundred and forty years ago, it can most certainly be made still worse for Hitler with air-power added to sea and land power as the medium of attack. The German armies are more widely spread than Napoleon's, and they will be still further extended before this summer is done. Germany cannot hold down Europe from the Russian frontier to the Pyrenees, fight in Africa and the Middle East, attack or terrorise the Russian bear, and possibly also advance into Spain, without exposing herself at a hundred points to our amphibious power; and she will not sustain repeated raids upon her enormous flanks without finding that her troops are losing morale as fast as her victims are recovering it. Nor will she be able to save herself from air attacks of steadily increasing weight upon the fatherland; for as our offensive power expands, we shall be able not only to send out stronger squadrons but also to advance our aerodromes. Germany's air bases

have been closer to her principal target than ours, ever since the fall of Norway, Holland and France; but we shall wrest that advantage from her as air superiority passes from her hands to ours, and we shall then strike the German forces not only at their foreign stations but through their German homes with such a battery, in front and rear, as no army has ever sustained.

One of the most cruel features of this totalitarian war is the manner in which the sufferings of civil populations have been used to hamper and demoralise the troops in the fighting line. Every one knows how hordes of panic-stricken refugees have been driven on to the roads to be bombed and machine-gunned night and day in their struggle to escape. This process is serious enough in blocking the movement and supply of the armies at the front; but it works still deeper harm by engendering a sense of futility and despair in the fighting man. The conscript's strongest inspiration has always lain in the sense that he is protecting his people and his home. It therefore saps his morale to know that he cannot defend them, however bravely he fights, and that the longer he resists, the longer their calvary will be. This is perhaps the most fiendish of the terrible new guises which totalitarianism has given to war. It undoubtedly played some considerable part in the demoralisation of the French armies, and it is one of the two main causes which put an end to the heroic resistance of the Greeks. As a threat, it has probably done more than any other factor to win uncertain neutrals to the German side and to drive them to surrender without a blow. It is therefore just that this appalling weapon should be one of those which will help in due course to weaken Germany's hold upon her victims and undermine the victorious self-confidence of her troops.

If Napoleon's views be sound—and who can question his military instinct and experience?—it is clear that our opportunities for undermining German power will be as wide and varied as the vast coast-line Germany has to defend. We can shake her people in their base at home; we can harry her garrisons in their posts abroad; we can rouse the subjugated

nations, and finally strike home as we struck at Napoleon. When Napoleon advanced into Russia in 1812, the continent was still at his feet; it rose against him from all quarters in 1814. With air-power we can now strike deeper than was possible at that time, and we can unlimber against Hitler a mass of hatred even greater than that which shattered Napoleon's Empire.

Mr. Churchill, who combines political with military instinct like the great founder of his line, has but recently contrasted Hitler's career with Napoleon's. Here is the passage, spoken in the House of Commons on May 7:

> Some have compared Hitler's conquests with Napoleon's. It may be that Spain and Russia will shortly furnish new chapters to that theme. It must be remembered, however, that Napoleon's armies carried with them the fierce liberating equalitarian winds of the French Revolution, whereas Hitler's Empire has nothing behind it but racial assertion, espionage, pillage, corruption and the Prussian jackboot. Yet Napoleon's Empire, with all its faults, with all its glories, passed away like the snow at Easter till nothing remained but His Majesty's Ship *Bellerophon*, awaiting the suppliant refugee.
>
> So I derive confidence that the will power of the British nation, expressing itself through a stern, steadfast, unyielding House of Commons, will once again perform its liberating functions, humbly exercised, and execute a high purpose amongst men.

To execute that purpose our will power must also produce the means; but with adequate armament to our hands, we have Napoleon's own reflections to point the way.

III

WE have, however, to organise with far more thoroughness than we have yet achieved in order to command the striking-power which we shall need in aircraft, ships and the whole range of modern arms. The vast resources of the United States are being marshalled with increasing resolve; her people are clearly determined that their output shall not be sunk at sea, and they will help to give us mobile strength

with ships and maritime personnel. But the conversion and tuning up of that immense industrial machine will necessarily be slow, and it will not suffice to make head against German production without a national effort on our part much greater than we have yet made. Time is a vital factor; for Hitler also commands immense resources, and his output will not fail for lack of drive. This, to repeat, is a moral no less than a material war, and we shall not rise superior to Germany without a concentration on war necessities as great and unresting as hers.

Part of this depends upon our leaders, but a large part of it depends upon ourselves, because the collective effort we require for victory cannot be made without the single-minded collaboration of men and women in every branch of life throughout the realm. We are not yet "all out" as a nation, and we must be so, to the utmost which every man and woman can daily achieve, if we are to win. The Germans are throwing every ounce of strength they possess into the struggle. We shall not defeat them, nor save our freedom from them, unless we do the same.

The task of our leaders is to adapt our machine of government to the demands of war. It was not only in military organisation and material that Germany was prepared for war. Her machine of government, with its unchallengeable central authority, possessed from the outset an executive capacity and speed which we have failed so far to attain. That is not remarkable. Our peace-time central government is a regulating rather than an executive instrument. It lays down principles in response to public or parliamentary opinion, guides, conciliates, advises and adjusts. Its many departments are profoundly anxious to show consideration for each other, and a long process of inter-departmental consultation almost invariably precedes action of any kind. It is impossible for a system of this kind to achieve the swift executive capacity which is indispensable in war. The country therefore is eager for clearer and firmer direction. For all its love of individual freedom it would rather be given orders than exhortation and advice. Government by inter-departmental committee is a

slow and tentative business, and the whole nation is conscious of the fact.

In peace our system of production and transport was in the main directed by private enterprise. That is now under rigid control, and the system which replaces it requires business and executive capacity of a very high kind. Conflict or lack of co-ordination between the departments responsible for it is fatal to efficiency and terribly wasteful of irreparable time. Administration, on the other hand, depended in peace on a host of local authorities guided by Whitehall; and these have proved for the most part incapable of the foresight, decision and rapid executive action required by war. The Regional Commissioners, of whom there are twelve, were originally intended to take the place of the Central Government in the event of a breakdown of communications. But there has been a tendency to depart from the original intention and to give them powers of intervention in local government. They are still, however, very uncertainly placed between the local authorities and Whitehall, and delegation of authority to them has not yet gone very far. These are grave defects in the organisation of the country for war, and there is much complaint about them. They need correction with a firm and forcible hand.

Mr. Churchill has thrown himself with matchless vigour into the direction of our military effort; he has the instinct and temperament of a fighting man; every speech he makes is elixir to the Empire and to the cause of freedom throughout the world. He has now to address himself to certain needs which are evident. The foremost is to intensify production and raise it to the pitch required by war. One reason why our present production lags behind our need is the combined effect of wages and new taxation on work in the factories. No one grudges high wages; no one criticises taxation, whatever level it may attain; but the two must be regulated, if necessary by a much broader scheme of compulsory thrift, in such a way that they do not lead to absenteeism and work below the maximum which every worker can attain.

Another urgent need is the better use of man and woman power. Women are required in thousands for the Army and Air Force, where they can render splendid service in replacing men; they are also needed in the factories. Registration by classes is now proceeding, and much will depend upon the manner in which it is used. There is some talk of compulsion, and Parliament has given the Minister of Labour, Mr. Bevin, most of the necessary powers. The Services and the factories may obtain what they demand without it; but there will be little patience with delay or fumbling, if voluntary effort fails to produce the very large numbers required. More ships, more speed on docks and railways, more food control and production, and immensely more munitions of war—these are the central necessities which Parliament and the country are determined to obtain. They are impatient of the obvious faults in our present organisation for war, and they will support wholeheartedly any measures of reform and concentration, however arduous, on which Mr. Churchill may decide.

Such measures are essential, not only for production, but also for morale. We still have much to endure, and we have to prove that we are better stayers than the Germans, who have no power to choose. The spirit is in us; but it still needs tempering into the steel which sheers all obstacles and stands all strains. For that we all demand a decisive leadership in home affairs which speaks the truth and conceals from us no part of the sacrifice to which we are called. The future is ours if only we forge ourselves into high-speed steel in time.

The times may be dark—in many ways they are—but we have ridden such weather before. It was obscure and threatening when Pitt died, soon after Trafalgar and Austerlitz, in the dark December of 1805, and ten years were still to pass before final triumph crowned our arms at Waterloo. It was obscure and threatening in the spring of 1918, when Russia had collapsed and the German armies, thrusting at Amiens, were almost on the point of dividing the French and British armies and driving us back upon the sea. Yet we were then within

four months only of the great counter-offensive which forced our enemy to his knees before the end of the year.

The circumstances to-day resemble those of our struggle against Napoleon much more closely than those of the last war, and the future may well conceal as many years of struggle if we do not now stiffen our sinews and summon up our blood. We need, therefore, a united effort such as this country has never made before in order that the initiative may be wrung from Hitler's hands and firmly wielded in our own. Without that effort, resolute and sustained, the thing cannot be done. But at this crisis leadership and national resolve can in sober fact command and mobilise the material power required. The greater part of the world is on our side, and all we need for victory will be added unto us if we deserve it by strength of heart and brain.

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR. VII

I. The Challenge to Sea Power

IN the period covered by the last survey of this series, though clouds had begun to thicken over the Eastern Mediterranean, they could not obscure the success that had been gained. Cyrenaica was captured and with it all but the scattered remnant of the Italian army which had crossed it to threaten the British positions on the Suez Canal. The campaign against the Duke of Aosta's army in Italian East Africa was proceeding steadily, and the small heroic army of Greece was still outmanœuvring and out-fighting the Italian armies in Albania. Now, at the time of writing in early May, the storm has swept across the Balkans, a German and Italian force has advanced to the gates of Egypt, a dissident minority in Irak has seized power and raised the army against Britain and the reverberations of these enemy successes are disturbing a considerable area in the Middle East. Syria and, apparently, the French African Colonies are to be put at the disposal of Germany. Only in Italian East Africa, already reduced to Abyssinia, has the British success proceeded without check. If the last survey could be regarded as the demonstration of sea power, the present unmasks the challenge to it. Latent from the first in the enemy strategy, this has become clearer as the struggle proceeds. Though cast on more grandiose and ambitious lines, it is fundamentally the Napoleonic challenge to British sea-power reborn.

The modern claimants to continental power rarely recognise the meaning or vitality of the oceanic power which Britain represents until they have come into violent conflict with it. Herr Hitler appears to have agreed with the French generals that with their defeat the war was won. Goering's attempt to make good that conclusion, decisively defeated by a small

number of British airmen last summer, was less significant and impressive than the speed with which the situation was realised and preparation made to renew the struggle this year. The opening phase of this fresh attempt to defeat us, violent, skilful and versatile, has been marked by a careful synchronisation that is more real than apparent; and, judged from the superficial standpoint, it has secured remarkable success. This is, of course, the minimum of what Germany wishes to be believed and few would refuse to go as far as that. It is therefore all the more startling that Herr Hitler made two points in his speech of May 4 that heavily discounted the Spring campaign and, indeed, the entire German position. These remarks cannot be ignored in any study of the situation; but it will be wiser to take them with composure since Germany is at present at the peak of her strength and the British Empire is but slowly gathering the elements of a war potential, which, when mobilised thoroughly, must greatly exceed that of her enemy.

Instead of saying, as one might have expected from his characteristic flamboyance, that the end of the war is near, Herr Hitler ignored his earlier promise of victory this year and merely said that Germany would be better equipped next year! A German spokesman, after the speech, even went so far as to state that it is really immaterial when victory comes. This is an amazing change, and it suggests that at length some realisation of the strength of the British Empire is dawning upon Germany. The second point that deserves note is the gross minimisation of the German losses in the Balkan campaign and of the troops engaged by the Forces of the Empire. It is legitimate to draw the conclusion that Herr Hitler is under the necessity of conciliating his people more than anyone had thought. The two statements do not appear to be consistent, since the first paints the struggle as being likely to extend into the next and perhaps other years, while the latter suggests an invincibility that should assure a speedy decision. But at least we are bound to conclude that there are adverse factors in the German situation that discount much of the Nazi boasting.

The present phase of the German spring campaign is

apparently directed to the severance of the sea communications of the British Empire. The attempt to cut Britain off from her overseas supplies and to pen her within the narrow coasts of her island has been in train since the beginning of the war. It has proceeded *pari passu* with the creation of diversions in distant places, which tend to stretch to the breaking-point the amount of naval cover required to protect the extended lines of communications, while the more direct attack applies the apparatus of destruction at home in what has been called the Battle of the Atlantic. This is a threat as direct as it is vital; and if it has not achieved a vital measure of success, the combined process has gone sufficiently far to make the position serious. The reinforcements sent to the Far East, to Singapore and to Hong Kong, divert shipping that might be used to carry from the factories of the United States the arms and munitions upon which Britain depends to overtake the pre-war German armament and the mobilisation of an overrun Continent for the supply of further equipment.

Even more does this apply to the transference of the main German threat to the Near and Middle East. This is, in principle, an attempt to apply to sea communications what the Italian General Douhet suggested should be applied to the nodal points of a country's land communications and what, in fact, Germany did in Poland. Germany intends, with such assistance as the Italian army can give, to cut out of the imperial communications the whole of the Mediterranean sector, including, it now appears, the head of the Persian Gulf. The means by which she proposes to perform this operation is the preponderant force of her land troops and the Luftwaffe. The German Navy cannot even enter the theatre of operations; and, indeed, the main reliance has been placed upon the Luftwaffe from the beginning. It was suggested in the last survey that the aeroplane has not yet shown any sign of its ability to act as an effective check upon sea power. But nevertheless Marshal Goering persists in pinning his faith to it and it has had a greater influence upon naval strategy than, in fact, it deserves.

The dive-bombers which attacked the convoy in the Sicilian Channel on January 10 were intended to do more than make the passage unsafe for British transport: they were to make the crossing from Sicily safe for enemy shipping. To some extent they succeeded in both purposes. The Sicilian Channel lies roughly equidistant from the main naval bases at Gibraltar and Alexandria, and it is clearly difficult to control these waters from bases a thousand miles distant. The German bombers were meant to persuade the British naval commanders to regard the Mediterranean bottle-neck as an untenable area. If they could do that, it was hoped that the channel would be left free for enemy shipping to carry reinforcements to Tripolitania. Ground troops, amply assisted by armoured units, would then be able to re-create the advance upon the Suez Canal and to make the naval base at Alexandria untenable.

In spite of the numerous demonstrations of the comparative inability of the aeroplane to destroy warships, under even the most favourable conditions, there appears to be a lingering suspicion that it constitutes a risk that must be avoided. If actual experience be consulted, it would appear that almost a campaign is necessary completely to destroy a warship that is normally protected. Ships of the line, at least, are so constructed that they can bear, as well as deliver, the heaviest buffets, and the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, lying at Brest, suggest that they well fulfil their purpose. They still lie there, it is true; but after repeated attack by the most destructive bombs directed against them with the utmost precision, it is not yet clear that they have been vitally damaged.

The aeroplane has, then, to be regarded as a recognised and inevitable risk, and there can be little doubt that the Navy would take it in that light were it not that its tasks are so many and its numbers so few. It is under this condition that the enemy was able to ship to Tripolitania strong reinforcements. When the ships crossed the channel it is impossible to say. It would seem most reasonable to conclude that the time selected was the period during which the British Navy was covering the landing of troops in Greece, at the beginning of March; and it

may have been the necessity for distracting the attention from a particularly important convoy that led to the sortie of the Italian Fleet and one of the strangest battles in the history of naval warfare. It was on the morning of Thursday March 27 that air reconnaissance reported a force of Italian warships east of Cape Passero in Sicily, steering in the direction of Crete, some 500 miles towards the east. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, concluding that the Italian cruisers were threatening to interfere with our convoys between Egypt and Greece, at once ordered the Light Force under Vice-Admiral H. D. Pridham-Whippell to proceed to a position south of Crete, to intercept them. Besides his flagship *Orion* he had in his command the cruisers *Ajax*, *Perth* of the Royal Australian Navy, and *Gloucester* and some destroyers; and the Commander-in-Chief in H.M.S. *Warspite*, with the battleships *Valiant* and *Barham*, the aircraft carrier *Formidable* and some destroyers, left Alexandria in the afternoon in the hope of bringing the enemy to battle.

In the morning of the following day, aircraft reconnaissance reported a *Littorio*-class battleship, six cruisers and seven destroyers south-west of Crete, and the Light Forces shortly afterwards made contact and steamed south-eastward in order to draw the enemy towards the battle fleet, some 95 miles away. A little later the Italian cruisers turned to the north-west and the British forces followed until the *Littorio*-class battleship was sighted, when the British cruisers in their turn changed direction in order to draw the enemy forces on to the Battle Fleet. After a torpedo-bomber attack upon the battleship, the Italian warships again turned north-west and a little later another Italian force was discovered towards the west. This force consisted of two *Cavour*-class battleships, three cruisers and four destroyers. The next few hours appear to have been occupied with repeated torpedo-bombing, and the *Littorio*-class battleship, the *Vittorio Veneto*, was damaged and slowed down. At dusk, the Light Force, which had again achieved contact with the enemy, attacked with torpedoes, and a little later the Battle Fleet encountered the enemy at a distance which made his position hopeless. Two *Zara*-class

cruisers received salvoes at 4,000 yards and were at once destroyed. The engagement lasted but a few minutes, though the sound of firing was heard long after; and it seems certain that the Italians were engaging their own vessels in the night.

The results of the battle were the sinking of the heavy cruisers *Zara*, *Pola* and *Fiume* and probably a 6-inch gun cruiser of the *Colleone*-class; the destroyers *Vincenzo Gioberti* and *Maestrale* were sunk and probably the destroyer *Alfieri*. The *Vittorio Veneto* received under-water hits and there were other enemy units badly damaged. Two British naval aircraft were lost; but otherwise the British Fleet sustained neither damage nor casualties. This was the first occasion in the history of naval warfare in which a fleet was brought to action through aircraft slowing down the speed of the ships, the first too in which so much damage was inflicted without loss. A reluctant enemy was brought to battle by novel means, though the battle developed only into the briefest encounter. The Italian official account attributes the sortie to a desire to cut the British communications between Egypt and Greece. In that intention, though the Italian force was the stronger numerically, it signally failed, and with overwhelming loss.


It was less than a week later that the world was startled by the German success at Benghazi; and it seems improbable that the landing of the enemy reinforcement can have been taking place at the time of the Battle of Matapan. The advance was undoubtedly designed to coincide with the opening of the Balkan campaign; but the incident was none the less unpleasant and the British Fleet at once planned to use the Italians' strategy against themselves. The enemy had clearly been making use of the Sicilian Channel; and it was decided that he should receive a lesson. It is still not known whether the convoys merely travelled the 70 miles of open sea between Sicily and Cape Bon, covering the remainder of the distance inside French territorial waters, or whether they risked the much longer journey direct to Tripoli. In either case a certain stretch of open sea had to be covered; and, on the night of Tuesday April 15, a convoy was intercepted and annihilated. The convoy was conveying troops,

motor transport and munitions to Tripoli and consisted of five vessels escorted by three destroyers. One of the ships was evidently carrying munitions, since it blew up with a terrific explosion. The Italian destroyer *Luca Tarigo*, of 1,628 tons, and two smaller destroyers formed the escort, and one of them before it sank apparently torpedoed the British destroyer *Mohawk*, of 1,870 tons, though most of the ship's company was rescued.

The Navy was occupied with other activities during this period. On March 5 the interesting and important little raid on the Lofoten islands was carried out and in April several destroyers were sunk off Massawa. The Navy also co-operated in the victorious advance along the coast of Italian Somaliland, and in the middle of April four enemy supply ships were destroyed in the North Sea. In addition to these and other of the more spectacular expressions of the operation of sea-power, the Navy continued its daily work of convoy across the oceans of the world, to Singapore and to Egypt, as well as about the shores of Britain. The Forces of the Empire were carried to Greece without the loss of a single man and, though the evacuation was not so free from loss, it is nevertheless remarkable that the Luftwaffe failed as clearly at the Grecian ports as it had at Dunkirk. Once more it is desirable to point out that the effective operation of British sea-power tends rather to be obscured than illuminated by the description of the occasions upon which it blazes into overt action. Its true measure cannot be given without some estimate of the volume of risk. All that can be said is that without its continuous operation Britain could neither act nor even continue to exist. It is this that gives point to the steady losses of shipping, and though the April sinkings—omitting those involved in the Balkan operations—show a distinct fall, the steady drain is serious. The incident off the Algerian coast on March 30 was perhaps more informative than was then realised. The French batteries which fired on British light forces about to exercise their right to visit and search French vessels were an irritating reminder that French neutrality was being given a German orientation.

II. Recoil in Libya

ALMOST every incident that occurred in the rest of the period was part of a plan that showed an evident coherence and synchronisation. Benghazi had been entered by the British forces on February 6 and with its occupation General Wavell rounded off the defeat of an army and the conquest of a province. It is necessary to note both facts. General Wavell is undoubtedly a great soldier and as such his objective in the Libyan campaign was the defeat of the enemy army. This accomplished,



the province of Cyrenaica merely awaited occupation. When General Rommel appeared on the scene, his intervention was so spectacular that there was a tendency to suggest that he had exceeded the achievement of General Wavell and that the latter's campaign might as well never have been fought.

General Wavell's victorious campaign had been carried out with the minimum of troops. In no single engagement had he used more than two divisions, or about 30,000 men; and yet at the end he had captured over 140,000 prisoners. When it was decided to send a force to Greece, an armoured brigade was left to hold the frontier of Cyrenaica and the bulk of the troops were withdrawn. It did not seem to the command, accustomed to the lack of enterprise shown by the Italians, that any force of sufficient strength to challenge this small

frontier guard could be concentrated before resources would be available from the liquidation of the campaign in Italian East Africa. This was a miscalculation. Italians are poor models for soldiers. Yet the British forces had early warning that the wide desert belt west of the Cyrenaican frontier was not to act as a complete insulation. On February 26 German mechanised forces were found reconnoitring at El Agheila and were driven back. A few prisoners were apparently taken by the Germans. El Agheila lies about ten miles from the frontier of Cyrenaica, and if the Germans had not earned a most unsavoury reputation for embroidering the facts, their communiqué would have administered a salutary warning. But Benghazi lay some 175 miles to the east, and El Agheila was the westernmost point of the British advance.

There was some nervousness at the time about the meaning of the German incursion into Africa, though the tendency was to conclude that the size of the force was greatly exaggerated. But, about a month later, the British forces evacuated El Agheila and the Germans occupied it. By this time the Forces of the Empire had been some time in Greece and attention was fixed on the storm that was preparing in the Balkans. It was almost unremarked that the Germans had made an advance; and the statement that their force in Tripolitania was gradually increasing passed unnoticed. The naval victory of Matapan tended to distract attention still further from the Cyrenaican frontier, so that it came as an almost overwhelming shock to hear that Benghazi had been evacuated and the Germans had occupied it. In little over a week the Germans were fighting at Sollum; Bardia, also evacuated, was occupied, and a crop of rumours and reports of captures darkened judgment.


It is still far from clear what actually happened on the frontier of Cyrenaica. Apparently the first clash came at Mersa Brega, where the German armoured forces "defeated, dispersed and largely destroyed" the single armoured brigade which guarded the frontier. The German force was not much larger than the British unit, and it seems that the enemy had no intention of going beyond Agedabia, a few miles to the north on the

coastal road to Benghazi. But on reaching Agedabia, they found that the British were in full retreat, and with a bold opportunism they pressed their advance. There was only a division at Benghazi; and on April 3 these troops were falling back upon Tobruk. The Prime Minister has said that there were some "tactical mistakes", due it would seem to overconfidence bred through dealing with the Italians, who (so decisively does strategy affect tactics) had been condemned, ever since their initial defeat at Sidi Barrani, to fight each battle with hardly a chance of success.

The Italians were now having their revenge quite unexpectedly; and it was no doubt the sweeter for that reason. Between Derna and Mechili, apparently, the British troops fought stiff rearguard actions on April 7, and the enemy took about 2,000 prisoners, about half of them being administrative details. The fighting was of a confused nature, for the army had lost its principal leaders. A minor disaster fell upon the Desert Force when it lost the services of four general officers, including the immediate commander and the officer in charge of the armoured units. Lieut.-Gen. Sir Richard O'Connor, who had commanded the advance with such distinction, Lieut.-Gen. P. Neame and Major-Gen. Gambier-Parry were captured in the neighbourhood of Mechili, the two first in making a detour to avoid a road blocked with motor traffic while changing their head-quarters on the night of April 4. Major-General Carton de Wiart, who was joining the Army of the Nile by aeroplane, also ran into a German patrol and was captured. The whole of the Libyan area had again become fluid; and, though it was to set in an entirely new pattern, the transition offered the main advantages to the attack.

The rearguard had admirably carried out its rôle, since, although the enemy were at Sollum and in possession of Bardia by April 12, Tobruk was by that time in a state of defence. It has been attacked heavily on four occasions since, and both German and Italian troops have suffered heavy reverses. Over 3,000 prisoners have been taken and considerable casualties inflicted upon the enemy. All that can be shown for these

losses and the destruction of much valuable material is a slight dent in the outer defences. In spite of the use of tanks, flame-throwers and numerous dive-bombers, so little impression has been made upon General Morshead's troops that the enemy has actually cast up defence works about Tobruk to protect himself against the repeated raids. On April 26 the Egyptian frontier was crossed at several points by enemy columns, and



the advance was pressed to a distance of about six miles. But there it was checked; and the main British concentration lies many miles to the east. In the second week of May the enemy crossed the frontier again in five small columns but he was checked at Sofafi and fell back. A few days later, on May 15, British covering forces occupied Halfaya Pass, Musaid and Sollum. This riposte seemed to have been wholly unexpected and the Germans left many prisoners in our hands.

There are several features that distinguish this operation and suggest the need for new standards in measuring it. On this occasion it seems to be established that the enemy had not the

numerical superiority in the air upon which most of the German advances have been built. There also seems little doubt that bombardment from the sea has affected the advance less than might have been expected; but the most remarkable feature is the continuance of the advance while a strong and aggressive force remains active upon the line of communications. This, at least, suggests that desert operations, even when carried out by armoured units, fall into a new pattern little amenable to ordinary standards, fluid, liable to swift and striking change, involving perils to the advance as grave as they threaten to the defence.

III. Italy in Albania

THE advance across Cyrenaica was intended to detain there troops who might be sent to the Balkans, where the German offensive was about to begin. The Germans were east of Benghazi and approaching Derna when the attack upon Yugoslavia and Greece actually opened. Less obviously, but not less essentially, connected with that offensive was the series of heavy attacks launched by the Italians in the second week of March against the Greek positions in Albania. The Greek army, in the last days of the period covered by the last survey, was still making the small advances by which alone troops holding organised positions in mountain country can be ejected and either captured or compelled to retreat. Tepelene had been under threat since the capture of Klisura. This important tactical position had been entered as long ago as January 10; but, three weeks before that, it had been reported that both it and Tepelene were evacuated by the Italians. In such country success cannot be measured by miles but by tactical advantage, and the advance north of Klisura appeared to promise the fall of Tepelene. There is no doubt that the position was held at the cost of increased casualties; and at the end of February the Italians were seen to be reorganising their front in this area. The Greek army was assisted by the close co-operation of the Royal Air Force under Air Vice-Marshal

D'Albiac as well as by remoter air assistance, and the help thus given was significant.

But during the whole of this period it was known that the



Germans were getting into position on the Bulgarian frontier of Greece, and Italy was given the task of attempting to pin down the Greek troops in Albania so that the concentration against the German threat to Eastern Macedonia and Western

Thrace should be maintained at a minimum. The plan decided upon was to deliver a large-scale attack on a front of some 20 miles in the area of Tepelene. The Greeks were faced with the alternative of abandoning the grip they had secured on this sector or of reinforcing their concentration against it. In the neighbourhood of Tepelene and for 20 miles to the north, there are four roads running towards the south-east; and if the advance could be pressed to a certain point it was hoped the Greeks would be compelled to relax their hold upon the centre of their front. With first-rate troops, the centre of the line might have been pierced and the whole line in Albania rolled up. It has already been shown that an operation of this sort had been carried out by the Greeks in the opposite direction; but if the Italians could hold on to Tepelene from December 20 until the end of March under immediate pressure, as it seemed, from all sides, it was little likely that the Greeks, holding the better positions and with the moral advantage of a series of definite victories, would be compelled to give way.

The battle never seemed to favour the Italians in the event: and after a week it was broken off because of the heavy losses. Seven or eight divisions had been used in the attack, and many of them were among the most famous units in the Italian Army; but the losses inflicted upon them were exemplary. The third Alpini division had twice before been withdrawn because of its heavy casualties. It was this division which had forced its way to within sight of Metsovo at the opening of the Italian campaign. At that point it was cut off in a defile and suffered heavily. In the present vital thrust to the Greek centre it was roughly handled again. The Sardinian division, which history records had fought by our side in the Crimea, lost between 40 and 50 per cent. of its effectives. No division can remain a fighting unit with losses of that order. The 38th division also had to be withdrawn and replaced by the 47th. The 14th regiment of the 24th division lost 50 per cent.; two battalions of the 26th Blackshirt division suffered very heavy loss and the commander of one battalion was taken prisoner. The Italians had, in fact, suffered a serious defeat, though it is probably

true that the Greek commander was compelled to retain in immediate support on this sector more troops than he may have desired. On March 16 the Italians abandoned the attack and devoted themselves to the reorganisation of the front. If, as has been stated, this offensive was carried out under the eye of Mussolini, he cannot have gained much encouragement from the sight of several divisions unable to remain any longer in the line through the severity of their casualties. It was estimated that, in addition to the 3,000 prisoners left in the hands of the Greeks, the Italian army lost about 25,000 other casualties.

On March 17 and 18 local attacks were delivered to clean up pockets in the front; but once more the Italians left prisoners in Greek hands and it was found that their morale was bad. The attacks continued throughout the rest of the month and on no occasion did the Italians secure more than small tactical successes at heavy cost. On March 23 they had even to ask for an armistice to bury their dead.

It is impossible to believe that the German Staff, who were in charge of the operations in the Balkans, did not desire very different results from these attacks, which were pressed, on and off, up to the opening of the offensive against Yugoslavia and Greece. If the Italians had been able to pierce the Greek centre and compel a general retirement, it would have been difficult for any commander to have maintained his dispositions in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace unchanged. As it was, the weight of the offensive was left upon German shoulders—which may not have been entirely unacceptable to Germany in the final analysis.


IV. Twilight in Italian East Africa

THE fighting in Italian East Africa had also a part to play in the German spring campaign. It was the Duke of Aosta's rôle to drag out his resistance as long as possible, in order to detain in his area of the war the excellent ground and air units which would otherwise have been available for service

on the Egyptian front or even in Greece; and brilliantly did he play his part. In the text-books it is pointed out that the successful commander fires his troops with his own resolution; and when the campaigns in Libya and Italian East Africa are compared, it is impossible to ignore the difference between the units on the two sectors. The morale of the Italians in Libya was low and that of the units in Italian East Africa conspicuously high. When every allowance is made for the difference in terrain, which admittedly in the East offered opportunities for resistance that the desert country refused, there can be no doubt that the Duke of Aosta's troops fought with a superior stubbornness. It is true that the Duke asked for terms during April, but when he was given the only terms that corresponded with the hopelessness of his position and he was ordered to reject them, he went on with the struggle as resolutely as ever, in circumstances of increasing and almost indescribable difficulty.

It was this part of the Near Eastern theatre of war that provided continuing encouragement for the British during the period under review. Indeed it cast up instances of operations that must find their place in the history of warfare. The zone of operations was of immense extent. The Italians were centrally situated in an area in which distances of fully a thousand miles could be measured from north to south and from east to west. There were innumerable opportunities for manœuvre and evasion in a territory of such extent, and the Italians made the most of them. Only with mechanised forces of perhaps ten times the strength could General Wavell have expected to run his elusive foe to earth in the time that his growing responsibilities required, and if he had disposed of such forces he could have afforded to look with composure on the dragging out of the resistance and to send the reinforcements so badly needed elsewhere. His strategy was to set in motion as many columns as the communications in the area allowed him to provide, arm and supply. General Cunningham was in command of the columns operating from Kenya on the routes which the Italians had used for their own inva-

sion of Abyssinia. His task was more difficult than that which had confronted Graziani, who could base his forces on the



colony of Italian Somaliland and depend upon the neutrality of British Somaliland, which lies on the flank of the advance through Jijiga and Harrar; General Cunningham had first to conquer Italian Somaliland and then to reconquer British Somaliland, which had been occupied by the Italians in the preceding summer. In the north, General Platt, commanding

the troops operating from the Sudan, was threatening Keren, the most difficult position in the Italian colony of Eritrea. In addition to these two main forces were the Abyssinian patriots who, under the instruction and command of British officers, submitted to discipline with unexpected completeness.

At the beginning of this period, the most southerly column had crossed the frontier of Italian Somaliland and had taken Afmadu and Kismayu. The fortified line of the Juba river lay in its path, with the town of Jumbo at its mouth. There were by this time no Italians in Egypt, the Sudan or in Kenya. The column which faced the Juba consisted not only of South African troops but also of West African and Gold Coast units, and it was a patrol of the last mentioned which showed its fibre by taking a tank at the point of the bayonet. The Kismayu defences, in the forcing of which the Gold Coast regiment had played an important part, were very strong, but the Navy was able to co-operate in the movement against them and in all the operations involving the coastal towns. The attack upon the Juba line began immediately after the capture of Afmadu and Kismayu. For some part of its lower course the river has a double channel, and below Jelib an island in the centre of the river had been strongly fortified. But on the 20th the troops were across the river and two days later both Jumbo at the mouth and Jelib farther inland were occupied. The coast road and the course of the Webbe Shebelli, which here runs roughly parallel with the coast, were opened up and although Margherita, between Jumbo and Jelib, was not captured until the 24th, Brava was entered on the same day. The troops were already half-way from the Juba to Mogadishu, the capital. As the Imperial column had covered the 95 miles from Jelib in less than two days, it seems to be clear that the resistance collapsed at the Juba. Mogadishu was entered on the following day, and General Cunningham was already establishing records that rivalled those of the Army of the Nile. Mogadishu, a poorish port, was the principal base for the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.

The territory farther inland was being cleared up during this

swift advance from the Juba, and the day after the occupation of Mogadishu, Bardera, 180 miles from the mouth of the river, was captured and a way of advance upon Isha Badowa was opened. The importance of this success was that a movement upon Dolo, near the frontier of Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia, and Negelli, on the Strada Reale to Addis Ababa, was initiated. General Cunningham's troops had thus two routes available for their advance upon the capital. From Mogadishu there stretched the main line by which Graziani had marched, through Ferfer, Gorahai, Gabre Darre, Dagga Bur to Jijiga and Harrar. Graziani had advanced astride this road and his march was held to establish a record for speed. It will be seen that General Cunningham's advance was much more remarkable. He had already moved with astonishing speed. When he entered Mogadishu he had covered some 240 miles in two days. As there were nearly 10,000 prisoners to dispose of, there had to be a pause; but at the beginning of March the advance was resumed.

On March 2 Villagio duca Abruzzi was entered. This town lies nearly 60 miles to the north. Four days later the column was in Ferfer, 280 miles from the capital. With this capture the column was inside Abyssinia. On March 9 the troops were at Gabre Darra, nearly 100 miles across the frontier, and three days later they entered Dagga Bur. At this point the column was only about 90 miles from Jijiga. It had advanced in the thirteen days from Mogadishu some 577 miles, nearly 45 miles per day. This is a greater speed of advance than the Germans reached in their march across France. Graziani had crossed the same ground against native troops possessing neither modern arms nor aeroplanes, while he had been equipped with tanks, mechanised artillery and motorised troops, and his three columns made up a total of about 40,000 troops. Yet in his advance he took ten days to cover 80 miles.

Another part of the British plan now made its appearance. Berbera in British Somaliland was occupied on March 15 from the sea, with the close co-operation of the Royal Air Force. If action had not been taken there, the further advance of

General Cunningham would have left an enemy force on its flank. This was not a very profound source of anxiety to General Wavell. He was perfectly able to recognise that such a force would not be in an entirely enviable position, with a strong column cutting across its lines of communications with the main Italian body. But the clearing of British Somaliland offered an advanced source of supply and bases nearer French Somaliland and the railway.

By the time that General Cunningham's column had reached Jijiga the Italians had suffered over 31,000 casualties since the crossing of the Juba river; but they were now being concentrated, against their will, and more difficult country was being approached. From Jijiga the Italians had, before the war, constructed a light motor road to Berbera, by permission of the British authorities. The road joined Harrar and the sea, and ran through Hargeisa ("little Harrar"), which important town was taken from Jijiga on March 20. There being no more even potential opposition on its flank, the column at Jijiga was once more set in motion. Between it and Harrar lay difficult country, and the Marda Pass had been strongly fortified. On March 25, however, it was carried and two days later Harrar was entered.

At this point, the organic connection of the various thrusts from the frontiers began to appear. This day, March 27, was even more remarkable, because on it there first began to mature the battle of Matapan which has already been described. On the same day Gambela was captured. General Platt had, at the start, to face the fact that the Italians were in occupation of Kurmuk and Gallabat and were on the Sudan frontier at many points to the south. Kurmukand Gallabat had, by now, already been reoccupied. Wahmi and Dangila, north and south of Lake Tana respectively, had also been taken. At the beginning of March Burye, some miles south of Dangila, was occupied, and Gambela many miles to the south-west was captured by Belgian and British troops. These various movements raised threats to Addis Ababa from the north-west and the west. But one other event marked March 27: Keren fell to an attack

from the west and the south. Keren is a naturally strong defensive position and the Italians had lavished all their skill upon it. Lying in a spoon-shaped hollow offering its point to the west, it is rimmed by mountains; and although Agordat had been taken on the first day of February and the retreating troops had been followed up with great speed, Keren was soon recognised to present such difficulties that attempts were made to turn the position. A column was landed at Marsa Takli on the Red Sea coast. Another detachment entered Eritrea across the northern apex of the western frontier. These elements joined hands and, with a strong unit of the Free French Forces, moved southward; but the advance was skilfully held off by the Italians and only indirectly influenced the fate of Keren. Another column moved in from the south. The town was subjected to increasing pressure from the first moment that the advancing British established contact with the defence; but the fighting was of the most bitter character. From their mountain positions the Italians, discarding their rifles, hurled bombs and grenades upon the assailants. On March 18 the final attack was made and every step of the advance was resisted. On one day no fewer than seven strong counter-attacks were delivered. But when these were beaten off, the Imperial troops pressed their advance again, and at seven o'clock in the morning of March 27 the fortress fell.

Speculation had been busy as to whether, with the breakdown of the resistance there, the exploitation of the victory would be easy. The event soon put an end to all doubt. On April 1 Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, was occupied, and a week later Massawa on the Red Sea was taken. The troops from Asmara had fallen back towards the south and south-east and the Imperial forces followed them through Adowa on April 5, and continued their advance against growing resistance. Meanwhile General Cunningham's column had occupied Diredawa, Messo on the Addis Ababa railway and on April 6 Addis Ababa itself. Three weeks later they had occupied Dessie, after overcoming the resistance at Cambolci. The northern column from Adowa and the southern from

Dessie started to close the gap between them. The way of escape westwards by Gondar was closed; the advance was pressed through Debra Markos; the column which advanced from Italian Somaliland through Dolo passed through Negelli, joining with another from Yavello. The Duke of Aosta's area of freedom was steadily shrinking. He had lost an impressive number of prisoners. His native troops were deserting. He was deprived of reasonable communications. His supply was dependent upon dumps already arranged in various parts of the country. But he held on until, surrounded at Amba Alagi, he surrendered on May 20. The only remaining centres of Italian resistance were then Gondar and Jimmah. General Cunningham has the distinction of having carried out the greatest march in military history.

V. The Balkan Campaign

IT is well that these encouraging movements were taking place at this time, for across the Mediterranean tragedy seemed undiluted. Admiral Mahan, the great exponent of the influence of sea power, once wrote some words that appear to have a more intimate bearing upon the problems of the present moment than they had when he wrote. He referred to the "word 'defence', already too narrowly understood, (which) has its application at points far away from our own coast". It is the characteristic of most non-militarist peoples to conceive the problem of defence too narrowly, and at the present moment, when one country after another defers its preparation until it is immediately attacked, the danger of this attitude is painfully obvious. When Yugoslavia at length found itself faced with the German attack, its forces were not completely mobilised, the equipment was below the standard required in modern war and, worst of all, there had not been time to change the concentration. This military operation, by which a nation's armies take up their positions to face or initiate attack, is a complex of detailed arrangements which take much time to elaborate and cannot be changed except in a similar time. The Simovitch Government had, therefore, to

await the German attack upon a concentration that had no relation to the actual needs of the existing situation. Yugoslavia has a very long frontier and only on the Greek and Bulgarian boundaries does geography assist the defence. But it would nevertheless have seemed a counsel of prudence to take precautions against a German attack through Bulgaria. But, understanding the problem of defence too narrowly, the previous government allowed things to drift; and when General Simovitch took charge of affairs, with every interest in making common cause with the Allies, or at least in keeping open a way of retreat to a friendly country, he could do nothing but recognise that the safety of his country had been fatally compromised.

Herr Hitler has said that, although the German concentration was much larger, he only used twenty divisions against Yugoslavia and Greece, including six armoured divisions. The statement is probably incorrect, and at best it can only be trusted to give the order of the German numbers. The attack was delivered without warning at 5.45 a.m. on April 6 against the three Greek divisions which were concentrated on the Metaxas line in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace. The Germans struck down the five main avenues of advance into Greece: the Maritsa valley from Svilengrad; towards Komotine; towards Xante; over the Nevrokop plateau towards Drama; and down the Struma valley by the Rupel Pass. Here parachute troops were used, but two-thirds of them (100) were quickly killed and the rest captured. The Allied plan contemplated offering little resistance in the Maritsa valley, and Dedeagach was occupied on April 9. It was recognised that it might be necessary to evacuate Thrace and eastern Macedonia, but it had been thought that there would be time to withdraw the Greek forces, after inflicting the heaviest possible losses on the enemy. The Allied plan contemplated a stand upon the high ground west of the Vardar valley; the evacuation of Salonika was therefore intended and, in fact, prepared.

These plans looked feasible enough; but they took no account of the faulty concentration of the Yugoslav army,

which placed the greatest strength in the north, and left the vulnerable south and east of the country insufficiently protected. As a consequence, the valley of the Strumitsa was quickly threaded by the Germans, who then passed down the Vardar valley on both sides of Lake Doiran. They entered Salonika on the evening of April 8; and the Greek divisions to the east were cut off. This was not, however, the most serious effect of the Yugoslav weakness on the south and east. Skoplje and Veles, the head of the branch line through Bitolj (Monastir), were also occupied on April 8 and the Monastir gap was threatened. Resolute troops will find a way over all difficulties; but not only would the main line of Yugoslav retreat into Greece be cut off, if the Monastir gap was seized by the Germans, but a line of advance for the Germans between General Wilson's force and the main Greek army would be opened. The Forces of the Empire, comprising Australian and New Zealand divisions and various British contingents totalling about 60,000 men, with two Greek divisions—all under the command of General Wilson—held strong natural positions from the sea near Katerini through Veria and Edessa to the Yugoslav frontier. A British armoured force was operating to the east on demolition work. General Wilson's small force was therefore stretched out along a line of some 60 to 70 miles on the east while the main Greek army was confronting the Italians on a front of about the same extent on the west. Between them lay the Yugoslav mountain barrier pierced by the Monastir gap; and there were only Greek mountain guards on this sector of the front.

A small force was concentrated near Amintaion, south of Florina, and the armoured force was withdrawn south of Edessa. On April 9 this force, under General MacKay, engaged the enemy and during this and the following day inflicted heavy losses on him; but it was by that time clear that the much larger German forces could not be held indefinitely and the whole line would have to be abandoned if it were not to be outflanked. On April 11 the Forces of the Empire and the Greek troops began to fall back to a line running



from south-east of Mount Olympus, north-west to Servia, south-west along the Aliakmon river and then north-west along the high ground to the west of the plain of Kozani. The armoured force was placed at Grevena. The Greek divisions held the Kozani plain sector and suffered heavy loss, while the Germans advancing down the Kozani valley were heavily engaged by the Imperial forces and hammered in their turn. But the two Greek divisions had now almost ceased to exist as a fighting force; and, to avoid an imminent threat to their flank and rear, the Imperial forces had to fall back to the Thermopylae line, south of Lamia. They were now deprived of all aid from the Greeks, since the main Greek Army was beyond the Pindus. On the next few days, the Imperial troops fought their way back to the new line against heavy odds. A small Anzac force on the 16th fought off two German divisions in the Peneios gorge and covered the withdrawal of the right flank at the cost of severe casualties. On April 20 the Imperial forces were on the Thermopylae line, with the New Zealand division on the right, and the Australian division holding the pass on the left.

By this time it was clear that the Greek army could fight no longer and the Greek Government thereupon requested that the Forces of the Empire should be withdrawn from Greece. The Greek army of the Epirus had now laid down its arms, and the Germans began to advance south from Yannina through Arta and Agrinion towards the rear of the British position. On April 22 a New Zealand brigade was withdrawn to a position on the pass south of Erythrai where it covered the withdrawal of the forces from the Thermopylae position to the beaches in Attica, Argolis and Peloponnese, where they were embarked. The total casualties suffered by the Forces of the Empire were 11,500, of whom the greater part were cut off and taken prisoner in the last phase of the campaign.

The Yugoslav army had been out of the battle for some time. The operations of modern war depend upon communications, and before the end of the first week all the main nodal points of the Yugoslav communications had been


captured. When the Germans seized Skoplje and the Monastir gap, they put it out of the power of the Yugoslav army to resist as an organised force. On April 17 the German News Agency reported that all the Yugoslav forces which had not been disarmed previously laid down their arms at 9 p.m. Their heroic gesture had saved the honour of the Yugoslavs; but the great possibilities latent in their defiance had been sacrificed by the pusillanimous government of the Regent. The Italian communiqués naturally continued to announce the occupation of one town after another in Dalmatia. Never are Italians so victorious as when fighting has been abandoned.

Herr Hitler threw a strange light upon the campaign by a gross minimizing of the German casualties and of the forces engaged against the Forces of the Empire. Even if he had been content to state the number of divisions actually thrown against the British troops, he would have deliberately misrepresented the cause of their defeat, since it was not that factor which compelled withdrawal, but the destruction of the forces on their flank.

VI. The Next Step

A CONSIDERABLE number of the Greek and Imperial troops were evacuated to Crete, where they were placed under the command of General Freyberg. The importance of maintaining the position there is not easy to exaggerate. Even if it did no more than impose a check upon the extension eastwards of the threat to the British base at Alexandria, it would be amply justified. But it seems impossible that the Germans can reconcile themselves to the continuance of this defiant gesture without retaining troops in Peloponnesus and on the Greek mainland. This must be a matter of serious inconvenience to the German command, and it is certain that they will make a determined attempt to drive the Allied forces out of the island or make it altogether untenable. Some part of the inconvenience of having the German armies stretched out from the Arctic to Attica in police operations cannot be

avoided. But it is clear that while the British force remains in Crete, the Royal Air Force will have a wide range of action of which it would otherwise be deprived. It is also certain that the Greeks, who might otherwise be expected to settle down



under some quisling, will resist every attempt to coerce or assimilate them.

About 80 per cent. of the Forces of the Empire were safely evacuated from Greece either to Crete or to some other part of the Near East. They will be available for the next phase of the struggle. The difficulty is to imagine where it will be

staged. The Germans wish to eradicate British power from the Mediterranean and their next move should logically be some form of threat to the Suez Canal from the north. They have occupied the Aegean islands in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles and about the coast of Asia Minor. It should not be difficult to link up with the Dodecanese and create a series of air bases from which to threaten Turkey and Syria. With French compliance—presumably the price paid for the German "concessions" announced from Vichy on May 14, German aircraft are already using Syrian aerodromes—and being attacked there by the R.A.F.—and they have appeared in Irak. But without command of the intervening sea the Germans will have difficulty in securing an effective occupation of Syria. If Germany required the Yugoslav communications to assure the position in Greece, *a fortiori* she must have the Turkish communications for any operations beyond raiding activity in Syria.

It may be admitted that the existence of trouble in Irak is serious. This country occupies a strategic position of immense importance. Not only does it include a great stretch of the Haifa pipe-line but it also covers the approaches to the Iranian oil-fields. This alone would give it an outstanding importance. But beyond this altogether is the fact that it abuts upon Turkey, Syria and Transjordania on the west and upon Iran on the east. If there is any strip of territory in which a mischief-maker could stir up the maximum trouble with a minimum expenditure of pains it is Irak, which guards the outer gates of India and the rear defences of Syria and Palestine. It is almost beyond belief that the present threat will not be removed within the immediate future. What is disturbing is that there should exist in this important centre the soil in which such a challenge can arise.

It may be that this is the seedling that will develop into the threat upon the right flank to the British position in Egypt. It is reassuring that General Wavell has now about half a million troops at his disposal in this area. If he can be provided with the appropriate amount of material, the chances of

a German disturbance in that area should not be as favourable as they seem to the warm German imagination.

There is one point that may be made as suggesting the conditions under which the next step will be taken. It is significant that the influence of air power strategically and in close co-operation with the ground forces has not proved as decisive as it promised to be last summer. General Rommel advanced against a British air superiority, which has not been able to prevent his concentrating fresh troops and supplies. On the other hand, the German superiority in Greece, particularly in the last phase, was not able to prevent the withdrawal of a great percentage of our troops with but little loss. The night bombing operations in Great Britain have shown developments that may prove most significant. The rise in the destruction of German raiders has been steady since December, and it is now showing an acceleration that cannot be ignored. If by means of night fighters and anti-aircraft fire (which for the first five nights of May destroyed 20 per cent. of the machines brought down) this increase can be maintained, without any corresponding increase in the number of Royal Air Force bombers destroyed, the war may take a new turn. The fact that, up to the end of March, 34,284 civilians had been killed and 46,119 wounded suggests the human side of this grave problem. If desires were deeds this would receive its sufficient solution in the provision of an overwhelmingly supreme Air Force which would speedily apply the brake to the German war machine.

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

II. PLANNING FOR REBUILDING

I. The Urgency of Planning

HERE and there voices are raised objecting to the movement for "Planning Now". The war, it is said, should absorb every energy. The cry should be: "The war, the whole war, and nothing but the war." This is not the moment, they say, when amiable idealists should distract attention with schemes for a new heaven and a new earth. Unless there is victory we shall have nothing that will be worth planning. Victory first—planning after!

At first blush this may sound right. A moment's consideration shows it to be clearly wrong. It is easy to foresee what the home situation will be when the war ends, when the welcome hour strikes and the church bells are pealing, not for invasion but for peace. Then straightway millions of people will be demobilised from the forces, millions more released from munitions. An immense problem of employment will present itself. At the same time there will be a widespread and active demand for building. Destroyed areas will have to be reconstructed. Bombed-out families, often scattered, will be eager to obtain new homes and to unite again. At least two years' arrears of normal building, probably more, will have to be made good. And the demand will be heard everywhere—Now, after this terrible ordeal, is the moment to make this Britain of ours truly worthy of the sacrifices of her people; now is the moment for a sustained effort to get rid of its meannesses and disfigurements; to start on better lines; to raise our country to be a fit home of a great nation, fit to be the centre of a mighty Commonwealth and focus of the moral leadership of the world.

But if in these present days we were to listen to the voices that would deter us from making preparations in advance; and if, when the war is over, it were found that the legislation, which is obviously needed, had not been passed, that local authorities had not been able to frame any schemes, that no one knew what to do next—there would then be an outburst of indignation and impatience. The popular press, members of Parliament fresh from their constituencies, perhaps great demonstrations of unemployed workers, would clamour for action. "Here are all these men on the dole waiting for work; here are public authorities and private enterprises eager to employ them on building that is urgently required; here are owners of sites anxious to rebuild on their own property; here are the materials ready and capital available; and it is all held up because, while the war was on, no one had the intelligence to foresee that this situation would arise or the energy to make preparations to meet it." In such circumstances the nation would not wait—it could not afford to wait—while Departments hurried to prepare Bills, Parliament hurried to pass them, new authorities were being set up, new schemes framed, negotiations carried on, designs prepared. At such a moment those who stood in the way would be brushed aside. "Planning", "amenities", "Better Britain" would become words of derision. Under the pressing compulsion of practical need we should again see rows of houses run up wherever it could be done most quickly and cheaply—that is, all along the main roads. More of the beauty of the countryside would be trampled under. The opportunity to redeem destruction by the creation of finer towns would be missed. Posterity would bitterly blame our generation for an unpardonable failure to seize a great occasion, as we blame the Londoners of Wren's day, but with even better reason.

Nor is it true to say that energies need be diverted from the prosecution of the war. Not everyone is privileged to take a direct part in it. There are many experienced men who are over age or not physically fit, or, for one reason or another, unable to find a war-job which can employ their capacities.

Parliament itself, with hardly any legislation of the normal type, is under-worked; members of both the Commons and the Lords would welcome these new duties. Further, there is now a spirit abroad in the nation which makes this the propitious hour. All classes and interests are drawn together. Political controversy is in abeyance. Property owners are probably more ready now to welcome social progress for its own sake, and to help it forward, than at any previous time. Provided they are given just treatment, they will not obstruct great schemes for the redemption of our towns and the preservation of our countryside merely for the sake of the owner's right "to do what he will with his own", but will rather join in actively promoting them. This national cohesion, however, may not last. When the pressure of the common danger is over and joint action is no longer the rule, the spirit of controversy may revive; in a period of political conflict and confusion the chance may be lost. Just as, in time of peace, a Government has its "War-book" ready prepared, so that, whenever the hour may strike, everything is organised for instant action, so in time of war a Government should have ready a "Peace-book". In it the measures for Planning and Reconstruction must hold a chief place.

These arguments are conclusive. And they are recognised to be so. Throughout the country, among local authorities and voluntary organisations, the movement for "Planning Now" is active. Debates in both Houses of Parliament have shown a keen interest and an almost complete unanimity. The Government have taken action. The Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction, under the chairmanship of Mr. Arthur Greenwood, is charged to survey the whole broad field—standards of living, security of employment, the future of education, public health—every aspect. The Ministry of Works and Buildings, with Lord Reith as Minister, has to deal, within that wide framework, with the special problems of the physical reconstruction of town and country. Both are now busy exploring their respective fields, enlisting advisers, gathering outside opinions, framing proposals.

II. The Present Position

TO a great extent the ground has already been prepared. The nation has not been blind to the evils which this century has inherited from the nineteenth and has itself in a measure increased. Since 1909 Parliament has enacted five statutes in the attempt to cope with the disadvantages of unregulated building. Voluntary organisations have been active; a number of associations, councils, trusts, institutes, led by keen and capable men, have been busy at work for many years, preparing the public mind, influencing the legislature, promoting useful schemes. A Departmental Committee on National Parks, under the chairmanship of Lord Addison, was appointed long ago and made a series of practical proposals. In 1938 a Joint Committee, appointed by three of the bodies concerned, surveyed the question of preserving the amenities of the coast-line and securing public access, and presented useful recommendations. Since then there has been the Barlow Commission (the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population), whose important proposals have aroused widespread attention.

Still the evils continue, and not only continue but increase. Half the country, it is true, is covered by Planning Schemes in course of preparation, but only a fiftieth by schemes that have become operative. And the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Acts have been restrictive rather than constructive; they give power to prevent what is wrong rather than to encourage what is right; the spirit that animates them has been one of control rather than of stimulus. In 1935 an Act was passed for the prevention of Ribbon Development; the result has been to make the ribbons a little broader but no shorter. Nothing has been done for the establishment of National Parks. The fact remains that, as Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis says, "We have sold our birthright for a mess of cottages!"

At the present time, moved by such considerations as we have stated, and eager to seize the opportunity now presented, all the existing authorities and organisations, and some new

ones specially formed, are busily engaged in formulating concrete proposals and pressing them forward. They are coming to close quarters with a whole series of difficult problems.

The most difficult of all, perhaps, is that relating to the future distribution of the population. To what extent should the growth of the great towns be restricted? How far will the distribution be affected by the future course of our foreign trade; and who can foresee what that course will be? Must strategic considerations come in, and if so, should they be the dominant factor?

Next comes the question whether we should concentrate on the creation of new towns or on the redemption of the old ones. To make a fresh start with a number of new garden cities and satellite towns is an attractive proposition, and it may be hoped that some action will be taken along these lines. But we must not forget the claims of existing towns now suffering decline. Is revival to be made impossible for them, is all the social capital of schools, hospitals, municipal services to be wasted by the deliberate diversion elsewhere of such rising industries as there may be? Nor can we ignore the difficulty of synchronising in a new town the starting of industries and the immigration of labour. As anxious periods in the history of Letchworth and Welwyn have shown, the industrialist is inclined to wait until labour is there, while the workman waits until industries are established. Everywhere the employer looks for a pool of competent labour, and the worker for a pool of employment for himself and the members of his family.

Half our population lives in rather more than a hundred large towns, and they are likely long to remain there. Inevitably, therefore, the re-modelling and redemption of the existing towns must be the greater part of our problem. And if the older towns be made better to live in, we may provide an alternative to "the policy of sprawl", and thereby help to save the countryside.

This being the situation, a discussion—a controversy even—has arisen between the advocates of blocks of flats and the champions of separate houses. On the one hand, it is urged

that concentration of population is much more economical; provides greater social opportunities of all kinds; saves the fatigue of daily travelling to and fro. The evils of congestion, slums, lack of fresh air and open spaces, can be cured, it is said, by re-planning. On the other hand, the argument is advanced that these vast urban conglomerations are a bad feature in modern civilisation, a divorce from nature and unwholesome physically and morally. As for the burden of daily travelling, that is merely a question of organising swift and easy transport. Most important of all—a wise nation should make the interests of the family its chief care. Households crowded into little flats, story above story in huge blocks; children brought up without "room-to-live"; families wandering from one neighbourhood to another as wage-earners' work requires, without attachments, without roots anywhere—these will not furnish the material for a strong race and a great nation. As Gissing wrote in *The Rycroft Papers*, "There can be no home without the sense of permanence, and without home there is no civilisation—as England will discover when the greater part of her population have become flat-inhabiting nomads."

How, then, are we to decide this conflict? But is it for us, after all, to attempt to decide it? Surely it is not the function of public opinion, Parliament, local authorities, planning societies to say to the people, either, "You shall live in blocks of flats near your work", or, "You shall live in semi-detached family houses with gardens on the edge of the cities or away from them". Let the people decide for themselves. Some do not have to consider the interests of children, because they have none. Some do not want gardens, because they lack the physique or the disposition to cultivate them. While some are harassed by daily journeys, others do not mind, and prefer their homes to be well away from their work. Let demand express itself, and let supply, as it always should, follow upon demand. Just as we say that it is of the essence of freedom that the State should exist for the sake of the citizen and not the citizen for the sake of the State, so also we may hold that it is essential to a real freedom that man's material environment should be shaped to

meet his desires, and not man himself be moulded and compressed to fit an imposed environment. It should be the business, therefore, of the authorities concerned to meet the demand that springs from the people, whether for flats near by or houses farther away. It should be their duty to see that each should be the best of its kind that is practicable; and that the conditions in the centres, and the transport facilities, should both be so perfected that the choice between the two should be fair and free.

III. The Steps to be Taken

As to the steps to be taken now, expert opinion appears to be crystallising in favour of certain definite measures.

1. There is unanimity that, where direction from the centre is required, it should be given by a single central planning authority. The division of control between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Works and Buildings and the Ministry of Transport is a cause of overlapping, confusion and delay, and is recognised on all hands to be quite intolerable. Lord Reith announced on behalf of the Government, in the House of Lords debate on February 26, "that the principle of planning will be accepted as national policy and that some central planning authority will be required". There can be little doubt that this authority must be a new Department of State, absorbing the Ministry of Works and Buildings and taking over part of the functions of the Ministries of Health and Transport. The Ministry of Health would have ample work left, particularly since a large expansion of the health services is probable after the war. The Ministry of Transport is already having its functions consolidated, prior to amalgamation with the Ministry of Shipping. The new Ministry would of course be in close and constant communication with the Board of Trade on matters relating to the location of industry, and with the Ministry of Agriculture where the interests of agriculture are concerned.

2. There is general agreement, also, that the structure of our system of local government is in many respects out of date.

The old boundaries do not fit modern conditions. The areas are for the most part too small for present-day services—transport, gas and electricity, sewerage, education also and public health. Particularly is this so with regard to planning; and more than ever if control over the location of industry is to be included. There is indeed a strong case for a complete revision of local government boundaries. All over the country, round the fringe of the large towns, new suburbs and scattered districts have grown up to enjoy the advantages of close proximity to the town while escaping the cost of maintaining them, through being outside its rating area. Satellite towns are one thing, but parasite towns are another; and there is no reason why these unfair exemptions should be perpetuated.

But such a review of boundaries would no doubt give rise to many controversies and involve a delay which the present urgency cannot allow. No doubt we shall be obliged to accept for the time being the areas that we have, and make shift with joint boards or committees constituted from existing authorities. In some form, however, the creation of a network of regional planning authorities is generally recognised to be essential. They would be larger than the municipalities but smaller than the great Civil Defence Regions. They would need to be endowed with extensive powers, for theirs would be the actual work of framing and executing the plans for reconstruction and development.

3. As intermediates between them and the Central Government Department there is room, and there is need, for another element. Experience shows that for each one of the hundreds of local authorities throughout the country to be under the direct control of Whitehall has been a source almost always of delay and not seldom of friction. It has been one of the main causes of the slow progress of Town and Country Planning. The tendency now is to press for devolution. The Civil Defence Regions may be found to offer a suitable pattern, though perhaps with some modification of boundaries here and there. Branch offices of the Ministry, established in those eleven divisions of England and Wales, and staffed so as to

be able to take responsibility for decisions on all but major questions, would obviate delay and effect a closer contact. There the democratic element in our local government system, the elected county and municipal councils, would find a meeting-place with the representatives of the Central Government, bringing the national viewpoint.

4. With respect to powers and duties, it has long been realised by all engaged in this work that control over the use of land is the essence of the whole matter. Where, as is usually the case, land is parcelled out into a multitude of ownerships, the difficulties in the way of good planning schemes are most formidable. Parliament has made efforts to overcome those obstacles. Elaborate measures have been enacted of control, compensation and betterment; but it must be confessed that they have not been very successful. If any expert were now asked to say what was the one thing above all others which has hindered proper planning and has left us with the state of things that we have, he would almost certainly answer that it has been the question of land control. In Germany, as is well known, there has been much greater progress in this field. The reason has been the large proportion of the sites of towns owned by the municipalities; together with the Lex Adickes, dating back to the beginning of this century, for the compulsory pooling of small properties. Opinion in this country is now tending to favour the grant to the planning authorities of very large powers of land purchase, sufficient for carrying out the most comprehensive schemes.

5. For the prevention of ribbon development it is not enough to adopt a merely negative attitude of prohibitions and restrictions. The direct financial advantage of ribboning is considerable. Constructing new roads, and laying pipes and cables for the public services, is a great part of the expense of developing a new estate. To make use of existing main roads and facilities obviates this. On the other hand, ribboning brings great social disadvantages. The building of houses in a long strip instead of in a compact area makes community life more difficult. It raises the costs of public services and so tends to

increase rates. It hampers road traffic by necessitating speed limits, but nevertheless increases accidents. In addition, there is the disfigurement of the countryside. It is therefore to the public interest to prevent ribboning, while it is to the immediate private interest of the speculative builder to get round the restrictions and to persist in it. The remedy is to supplement the negative policy by a positive one—to make alternative sites more easily available; and for local authorities to be more ready to provide roads and drainage and other public services at the general charge, and to declare in advance the areas where this would be done.

6. The conditions of these times have brought home to our people, more forcibly than for generations past, the importance of agriculture in the national life. The preservation of good land for food production, and the protection of the open country for its value to physical and moral health, are recognised on all hands nowadays to be a prime object of policy. To ensure that the representatives of agriculture, and of rural life in general, shall have a proper place on the planning authorities, and that those interests shall be fully safeguarded, is among the agreed aims of the present movement.

7. Among other points on which a consensus of opinion is being reached is the need for a National Planning Fund, to be administered by the Central Authority. Some of the purposes in view are of general even more than local concern—particularly National Parks and the preservation of the amenities of the coasts; while the localities directly affected are, from the nature of the case, among those with the lowest rateable values, and least able to afford any expenditure that may be involved. There is an unanswerable case for national financing. Further, some provision should be made for loans to cover, where necessary, the initial costs of new garden cities and satellite towns, new suburbs and industrial estates; and it would often be better that this should be done by a national authority than left to the chances of private finance.

Lastly, a word must be said on the composition of the local authorities. Enlarged duties of high importance will be imposed

upon them, and already doubts are expressed here and there as to their competence. While they are free from corruption, undue personal influence on behalf of particular interests is sometimes suspected. This is not a reason for lessening the functions of local authorities and strengthening bureaucracy. But it is a reason for appealing to a larger number of men and women of character, energy and ability to come forward and accept the burdens of this indispensable form of public service. We may hope that if, so far from being cut down, the duties and powers of our local councils are now expanded, that very fact will constitute a challenge which will not be without response. The country will not fail to rise to the height of a great occasion, and new recruits to the ranks of local government will add to its efficiency and prestige.

IV. A Central Task of Democracy

LOOKING back over the domestic history of Great Britain in modern times, we see one great movement arising after another and carrying the nation forward. There were the political struggles for constitutional reform, and the establishment, stage by stage, of a full democracy. There were the industrial struggles for the emancipation of labour and the humanising of conditions of employment. There was the development of a universal system of education, of a vast public health service, of provision by pension or by insurance against many of the ills of life. Each of those movements has still some distance to go before its purpose is fully achieved; but they are all long established and well on the way to their goal. Now in these days we see emerging yet another great undertaking, worthy to rank with any of these—the movement for a drastic reform in the physical environment of the people. It is safe to prophesy that when the war is over it will come into the very forefront of our public life. The problems it will raise will occupy our thoughts; the action to be taken will tax our energies. This may well prove to be the central task of the coming years. To make ready beforehand is the duty of to-day.

YUGOSLAVIA—THE TRAGEDY OF HONOUR

I

BY the *coup d'état* of March 27, and by the gallant resistance of their armies, the Yugoslav people have shown that they still hold fast to the ancient Serbian faith, "a nation may survive defeat but never dishonour". This conception of honour as the soul of the nation, as the force which binds together the component parts of the State, has grown out of the years of suffering that form the greater part of Serbian history. It is the lesson of Kossovo redeemed at Kumanovo, of the retreat across Albania which led to the victory of the Salonika armies—the lesson that no defeat is final but the one you accept. The readiness of the whole people of Yugoslavia to sacrifice their all for the sake of honour is unparalleled in history. It is for us to ensure that in the final victory they will have no cause to regret their decision.

There is still too little information about the course of events to permit an objective analysis of the recent fighting or of the situation since organised resistance ceased. This must wait until the smoke of battle has been dispelled and the conquerors have finally formulated their plans for the disruption of the South Slav State. All that can now be done is to record in outline the development of events which led to the *coup d'état* of March 27. What has happened since has been but the predestined denouement of a classical tragedy.

The central figure in Yugoslav politics during the last five years was the Prince Regent, who was an absolute ruler to a much greater extent than has been generally realised. Dr. Stoyadinovitch once said of him that he was "neither a Serb nor a soldier"—perhaps the most accurate explanation of his failure to understand his people and to gain their affection.

He had not taken part, as had most of his contemporaries, in the retreat across Albania or in the victories that followed the break-through at Monastir, and in the first years of the post-war period, years of struggle when the foundations of the new South Slav State had been laid, he had preferred to spend his time at Oxford and with his English friends. These facts, combined with his artistic tastes and his thinly veiled contempt for things Serbian, led his subjects to think of him as a foreigner. Indeed, both in appearance and in character, he resembled more the Russian aristocrats from whom his mother was descended than the soldierly and democratic princes of the Karageorge line. He lacked altogether "the common touch", and would never, as King Alexander had so often done, drive out into the country and talk to the peasants in their homes. Even the most distinguished of his subjects were seldom able to penetrate the seclusion of the White Palace outside Belgrade, or the castle of Brdo in Slovenia, where he lived surrounded by the books and pictures he loved.

In the conduct of affairs Prince Paul showed himself impatient of advice, and he would never tolerate the direct speech and frank criticism of the political leaders, many of whom had been his predecessor's closest collaborators; instead, he chose as his Ministers men who had no position in the country and on whose loyalty and subservience he could rely. Those who knew him best believed that there were three constant factors in his policy: a deep distrust, shared by the majority of his subjects, of King Boris of Bulgaria; an extreme fear of Communism, aggravated by the Russophil sympathies of his subjects; and an almost mystical belief that it was his duty to transmit the nation and the dynasty intact to the young King Peter. By "intact" he meant something purely materialistic; he lacked the ardent faith of the leaders of the *coup d'état* that Yugoslavia could survive defeat better than dishonour.

It was generally believed in Belgrade that Prince Paul's policy was elaborated in the closest contact with the British Government, and indeed it is only fair to admit that, in the

earlier years of the Regency, British influence played a share in setting the Prince on the road to "appeasement". Whereas King Alexander had moved in the orbit of French foreign policy, Prince Paul, with his love of England and his many British friends, naturally came very largely under the British impress and especially under the influence of some of the leading protagonists of the policy of appeasing the Nazis. He did not share the deep South Slav hatred of the Germans; but even if he had, it is difficult to see what other policy he could have pursued, so long as Great Britain and France declined to resist the new German imperialism. Dr. Stoyadinovitch once remarked that "the construction of the Maginot Line proves beyond doubt that the policy of our former Allies is exclusively defensive; if we cannot rely on their help it is useless to imagine that the Little Entente alone can contain 80 millions of Germans". Moreover, this was before the seizure of Austria, which gave Slovenia a common frontier with Germany; it was before the Munich Agreement, which spelt the death of the Little Entente; and it was before the Italian occupation of Albania, which all but completed the encirclement of Yugoslavia. In the face of such a situation braver men than the Prince Regent might well have decided to cut their losses. In these years, too, Dr. Schacht, encountering no resistance from the Allies, slowly reduced Yugoslavia to almost complete economic dependence on the Reich. Trade delegations and commercial experts visited the country in increasing numbers, accompanied by the now familiar entourage of "tourists", "journalists", attachés extraordinary, and other propagandists and fifth columnists. It says a great deal for the Yugoslavs that in spite of the minimum counter-attention received from London and Paris they never succumbed to the cajoleries of the Germans.

II

IN August 1939, when it became clear that war would not long be delayed, Prince Paul, largely as the result of pressure from the General Staff, concluded an agreement with the

Croat Peasant Party under which Dr. Matchek and some of his colleagues agreed to enter the Government. With a few insignificant changes, this Government remained in office until the *coup d'état* of March 27. Its composition is of some interest. The Croat members of the Government, unlike their Serbian colleagues, were in no sense dependent on the favour of the Palace, but relied on the backing of their party, which was, until the catastrophe, the strongest political organization in the Balkans. There appears, however, to have been a tacit agreement between Dr. Matchek and Prince Paul, whereby the former abstained from interfering in the conduct of foreign policy in return for receiving a free hand in the administration of Croatia. This is the most probable explanation of the recent readiness of the Croats first to support Prince Paul in his decision to adhere to the Tripartite Agreement, and then to back General Simovitch in his policy of resistance to the Axis. The principal members of the Serbian half of the Government of 1939 were M. Tsvetkovitch, the Prime Minister, and M. Tsintsar Markovitch, the Foreign Minister. M. Tsvetkovitch, formerly Mayor of Nish, displayed a certain political agility, but was in fact little more than the Prince's Secretary. M. Tsintsar Markovitch, who had been Minister to Berlin, had been wished on the Government by the Wilhelmstrasse. (It is perhaps interesting to recall that his father had been assassinated by the Black Hand in 1903 for pursuing a policy too favourable to the Central Powers.) With two notable exceptions, the remaining members of the Government were neither interesting in themselves nor representative of public opinion. The exceptions were M. Budisaljevitch, representing Dr. Vilder's Independent Democratic Party, and M. Tchubrilovitch, representing Dr. Milan Gavrilovitch, leader of the Serbian Peasant Party. These two parties were, in the outcome, to provide the rallying-point for anti-German elements and to bring down the régime.

The position in September 1939 may therefore be summarised as follows. The Prince and most of the Serbian members of the Government, while anything but Germanophil, were

not prepared to resist German pressure by force; the Croat Ministers had decided not to interfere in foreign policy; the Peasant and Independent Democratic Parties supported the Government over the agreement with the Croats and hoped to keep the régime straight in matters of foreign policy. The Opposition parties, which represented the great majority of Serbian opinion, called for open support of the Allies; in this they were supported by the Church and the Army. They also had the concealed backing of the Secret Societies, which were still a potent force in Serbian politics; but the Societies did not then consider that the situation justified their open interference in politics.

The catastrophic success of the German attack on Poland and the conduct by the Allies of what the Americans have so aptly named "the phoney war" detracted still further from that loyalty to the Allies which, a tradition since Salonika days, had already been seriously strained by the policy of appeasement. There was never a moment when pro-German feeling made itself felt, but a certain suspicion of Allied intentions was at times perceptible, as well as a widely voiced opinion that the war was no concern of the Balkans. This attitude was largely the result of Russian propaganda; it should not be forgotten in considering the evolution of Yugoslav public opinion that Russian influence was probably the most powerful determining factor. The word from Moscow was distributed by large and well-organised Marxist parties, but pro-Russian feeling was by no means based on Communism alone or even mainly. Rather was it the old Pan-Slav sentiment and the memories of Russian friendship in the past, memories which led the peasants to speak always of "Mother Russia" and the Montenegrins to boast that "we and the Russians have a population of 180,000,000".

III

DEFEATISM and apathy alike were swept aside by the news of the capitulation of France. Even the members of the French Mission were amazed at the violence of the

popular reaction. In the streets of Belgrade grown men could be seen weeping like children, while the political leaders seemed ashamed that they had not taken the field to help their old ally in her hour of need. The destruction of the French army meant that there was no longer any force in Europe which could defend Yugoslavia from German attack, and no one even among the defeatists harboured any illusions about the Nazis' intentions. The result was a sharp division of opinion; a minority—small but including certain members of the Government—regarded a German victory as inevitable and wished to come to terms with the Reich while there was still time. The Prince himself seems to have tried to bow before German pressure while maintaining good relations with England, hoping to have the best of both worlds. But the great majority of the people, and especially of the Serbs, while not particularly optimistic about the outcome of the war, preferred to die fighting rather than endure a second foreign domination. That was the path of honour and, in the event of an Allied victory, also the path of advantage. The will to resist was by now encouraged by the Russian propaganda machine, which, through the newly established Russian Legation and the Communist Party, spread the belief that the U.S.S.R. would never tolerate a German hegemony of the Balkans.

After the collapse of France, Prince Paul seems to have been convinced that, though Britain might yet win the larger war, the German victory in Europe was complete. Instructions were issued to the press to accord favourable treatment to news emanating from Axis sources, the Masonic lodges were closed, anti-Semitic legislation was discussed, while prominent members of the Government went so far as to proclaim Yugoslavia's solidarity with Germany. The growing anxiety of the Opposition leaders was further increased by the resignation of M. B. Markovitch, the Minister of Education, as a protest against what he considered excessive concessions to Germany, and by the appointment of the late Dr. Koroshetz, fresh from a visit to Marshal Goering, as his successor.

The Opposition leaders, MM. Grol, Yeftitch, Trifunovitch, Nintchitch and others, were unswerving in their loyalty to Great Britain and their hatred of Germany, and they could claim with justice to be the representatives of the Serbian people. In the moment of national danger the time had come for them to lay aside their ancient feuds and work together to save the honour and independence of Yugoslavia. By August 1940, negotiations had begun for the formation of a "national front" of Opposition parties. This movement was supported by the patriotic societies and the still formidable Black Hand, which provided a liaison with the military leaders. Extremists were already advocating a *coup d'état*, but more moderate counsels prevailed under the influence, it is said, of M. Milan Gavrilovitch, the Minister in Moscow. M. Gavrilovitch, who appears to have been the statesman behind the eventual *coup*—his resignation was to be the signal for action—realised the dangers of a revolution in so heterogeneous a country as Yugoslavia, and at first believed that it might still be possible to influence Prince Paul to adopt a firmer policy.

As the winter wore on the National Front developed and extended its activities, while the patriotic societies created an organisation under the guidance of former Komitadji leaders to counter the Nazi fifth column. The spirit of resistance was encouraged by the course of events in Rumania and Bulgaria on the one hand, and in Greece and Cyrenaica on the other. The result was that when the Germans presented their demand for the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Agreement, all at least of Serbia was organised for resistance.

At first the "National Front" tried, through the Peasant Party leaders, to persuade the Prince Regent to put himself at the head of the national resistance. Mass demonstrations were held in Belgrade to show the Palace what the feelings of the people were. M. Tchubrilovitch and M. Budisaljevitch resigned from the Government and called on all their adherents holding state positions to follow suit. This was the moment when Prince Paul might have declared himself against all

further concessions to Germany. He would have had the overwhelming support of the country, the Army and the Church. He must have known it; but he lacked the courage which a great decision demands.

When the Ministers left for Vienna to sign the Axis Pact, the Opposition leaders, who now included MM. Budisaljevitch and Tchubrilovitch and the military leaders, determined to overthrow the Government. There was no doubt about the attitude of the nation, and the Government played straight into the hands of the conspirators. Prince Paul, alarmed by the demonstrations and worn out by the crisis, left suddenly for his estate in Slovenia; the Croat leaders were assembled in Zagreb; the Serbian Ministers, left to themselves, were without authority and incapable of offering any resistance.

IV

THE *coup d'état* brought to an end a universally unpopular policy. No blood was shed and not a hand was raised in defence of the Axis Pact or of the Regency. The new Government was indeed "an administration of all the talents", and could claim with justice to be representative of every element in the life of the nation. General Simovitch was worthy of the traditions of the Serbian Army. Dr. Matchek brought the Croatian Peasant Party to the support of the Government, and until the country was broken by the sheer weight of German arms there were grounds for hoping that his presence in the Government was a symbol of new unity between the Serbs and Croats. M. Slobodan Yovanovitch, the second Vice-Premier, was the outstanding leader of Yugoslav thought. Dr. Nintchitch, the Foreign Minister, had been, with Dr. Benes and M. Titulescu, one of the triumvirate who for so long determined the policy of the Little Entente. M. Tchubrilovitch was there to represent the Serbian Peasant Party and with him were M. Yeftitch, the former Premier and Foreign Minister, who had with difficulty been restrained from declaring war on Italy and Hungary after the murder of

his king at Marseilles. Other members of the Government included Dr. Misha Trifunovitch, the President of the powerful Radical Party, Dr. Milan Grol, the President of the Democratic Party, and M. Kulovetz, the Slovene representative, later killed in the bombardment of Belgrade. M. Kulenovitch, the Moslem leader, was the only member of the Government who later went over to the enemy. Perhaps the most outstanding figure in the new administration, however, was M. Milan Gavrilovitch, President of the Serb Peasant Party, and Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, who was generally regarded as having been the brains behind the *coup*. At the head of the Government was the young King Peter, the direct descendant of Karageorge, who first freed Belgrade from the Ottoman rule, and beside him were the Orthodox Patriarch, the Army leaders and the powerful Secret Societies.

The *coup d'état* had been a complete success, but, as M. Nintchitch has since made plain, General Simovitch and his friends were well aware that the step they had taken meant war with Germany, and their inevitable destruction. With the heavily armed divisions of the German Army massed on a 2,000-mile front, stretching from Fiume to Petritch, the Yugoslav people were not faced with any alternative of victory or defeat, but with the choice between voluntarily accepted slavery and death and destruction in battle. General Simovitch did not hesitate in his choice; what is perhaps more remarkable is that the common people of Yugoslavia, understanding the inevitable implications of his decision to resist, gave him their full support.

There is a legend that on the eve of the battle of Kossovo, King Lazar of Serbia was offered the choice between a "heavenly crown" at the price of death, and the maintenance of his "earthly kingdom" at the price of submission. The Yugoslav people were true to the tradition of King Lazar. They knew the fight was hopeless, but they fought it. They knew that Yugoslavia would live again if they were ready to die for her.

INDIA IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

THE quarterly contributions from its Indian correspondent have acquainted readers of THE ROUND TABLE with the main features of the existing political problem. It is not the purpose of this article to deal with these immediate questions —they are discussed once more on later pages of this issue*— but to look beyond the present deadlock and consider what India's position is likely to be in the world that emerges from the war.

I

IT is difficult at this moment for the imagination even to attempt to pierce the misty abyss that separates us from the end of the struggle. Will victory be complete and overwhelming on the physical plane, as it was in 1918, and as we trust to make it again? More important still, will it be, what the victory of 1918 was not, conclusive on the moral plane, or will the vanquished of 194- remain morally unconquered and unconverted, only waiting for a chance to challenge the issue once more? Will the conflagration, having extended over the whole world, burn itself out and leave at least the peace of general exhaustion? Or will potential centres of disturbance and aggression remain outside the present conflict, only to generate a new cycle of wars in areas now relatively quiescent? Will the Western world succeed not only in achieving for itself some lasting system of co-operation and security but also in adjusting its relations with the East? Will the unsolved problems of Asia make that continent the vaster battle-ground of the future? Or can the East make a new and original contribution to the material welfare and moral peace of the world?

If no direct answer can be given to these questions, it is still

* See pp. 543–54.

worth while considering some of the underlying tendencies, intellectual and material, which have been shaping human destiny in the last generation, which have joined with specific causes and local circumstances in bringing about the present war, and which will dominate the post-war world whatever its immediate outcome. We are fighting to-day for freedom against tyranny, for the right of the individual to his own soul, for the right of the small nation to live its life alongside of the larger one. We are fighting for the whole heritage of our Western Christian civilisation—or, for that matter, of every civilisation, Moslem, Hindu or Buddhist, that is based on moral and spiritual values—against a strange blend of primitive tribal paganism and crude materialism. That is the true essence of the struggle as it has developed. But it is far from being the whole explanation. Behind the moral issues which rightly dominate our minds and hearts to-day lies a complex of universal causes which have operated to give this war its peculiar character in every sphere and which will continue to operate on the world after it is over.

The last great convulsion in the West before the rise of Prussianism affords an obvious analogy. The French Revolution sprang from the rationalist, individualist, philosophical system of ideas which, all over Europe, dominated the thought of the eighteenth century. The extravagances and crimes which marked its course; the reinforcement of aggressive French militarism by the genuine fanaticism of the revolutionary creed and by the immense liberation of national energy resulting from the breaking down of the *ancien régime*; the concentration of power undreamt of before in the hands of a supremely able and unscrupulous military adventurer—all these were more or less transient phenomena. Revolutionary Napoleonic France was beaten, and it was well for our historic civilisation that it was. But after its defeat the intellectual and moral forces that created it worked on, in constant interaction with the material forces set in motion by the Industrial Revolution, they dominated the nineteenth century, the century of political and economic emancipation from old restrictions, the century

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of economic internationalism, of unfettered capitalism, of rationalist democracy.

While that century was working out in the political field the philosophy of its predecessor, its own philosophical ideas were undergoing profound changes. Hegel and Darwin between them undermined the intellectual foundation on which the whole fabric of the nineteenth century was built up. The rational individual has ceased to figure as the starting-point and end of all things. As a product of historic and economic evolution he is rational only within the limits set by habits, instincts and prejudices, individual and collective. His individuality is conditioned by the structure of the society of which he is a member and which is itself, in varying degrees, an organism and not a mere arithmetical aggregation of individuals. From this philosophic revolution of the nineteenth century has sprung the political and economic revolution which in the twentieth has swept over the world. In Russia, in Italy, in Germany, it has taken fantastically exaggerated and perverted forms. But in varying degree it has affected most European countries and much of the outer world as well. And it will inevitably continue to do so. We are fighting to prevent the exaggeration and perversion of the new intellectual outlook from destroying not only the continuity of our civilisation, or those essential rights of individual freedom won by the last century, but the foundation of all the moral laws upon which human society, national and international, must rest. Our victory will save these essentials. It will not restore the nineteenth century.

The trend everywhere towards the closer organisation of the political unit has been immensely accentuated by war. It may be followed by a brief reaction against excessive war restrictions. But, in the main, it will be carried on both by habit and by sheer necessity, and will involve an ever closer correlation of economic with political factors. In an age when defence is dominated by the aeroplane and the tank no nation can be secure that has not developed a highly organised and diversified machine industry. Conversely no nation can be secure

that is not assured of effective access in time of war to a sufficient supply of essential foodstuffs and raw materials. In a world of unfettered international rivalry security is quite as much an economic as a political question: the two aspects, indeed, are inseparable. And, apart from considerations of defence, the demand for social reform and for stability of employment in communities where the working man has become conscious of his political power will strengthen the objection to every form of "unfair" competition, as well as maintain national expenditure on a scale which industry can scarcely bear under nineteenth-century conditions of an unrestricted fight for markets. In an international society still based on self-centred nationalism schemes of economic disarmament, whether in respect of tariffs or of hours and conditions of labour, are no more likely to succeed on a world-wide scale than the military disarmament projects of the Geneva era.

Thus, both politically and economically, the trend of our time is not only towards the closer organisation of the unit but also towards larger units of organisation. Even the most powerful States and those best equipped with human and natural resources are no longer able to achieve security alone. One of the most striking discoveries of this war has been that neither the British democracies nor the United States are safe without each others' help. Still less can the weaker nations hope to preserve a wholly independent sovereignty. A small country, whose vital centres of industry and population are within short range of an overwhelming foreign air force, cannot be independent in any real sense of the word. A poor country, like Yugoslavia, may muster a million or more brave soldiers, but, if it cannot afford the requisite tanks and aeroplanes, it will be no match for a richer and more highly industrialised opponent. Nor can small, poor countries keep their economic footing in the markets of the world against greater and richer countries pursuing a State-controlled and subsidised policy of competitive selling or pre-emptive buying regardless of price. For these problems there can be only one sort of solution.

They can only be overcome by the methods, long familiar to industry, of amalgamation, combination or co-ordination. Whether by the military or economic compulsion of dominant Powers or by freely coming together for mutual co-operation, nations will inevitably tend to be brought together in permanent political and economic association. The cohesive element in such empires or partnerships may be geographic or historic, defensive or economic, based on racial sentiment or on identity of political outlook and ideals.

The course of the present war has violently imposed on almost the whole of continental Europe, west of Russia, the initial framework of the first of these two kinds of unity—the empire of force. Bitter as is the resentment of the conquered nations against German methods, it would be a mistake to underrate the attraction which Hitler's "New Order" would have for them if it could be regarded as the only alternative to a reversion to pre-war conditions. The restoration of a freedom that is no freedom will make very little appeal. Only the prospect of the other kind of unity, the partnership of freedom —the hope of security without subjection to a military despotism, of an international society based on the equality of all its members and protecting the freedom of them all by its collective strength—will enlist the passionate enthusiasm of the European nations on our side.

II

WHAT will be the position of India in this post-war world? At first glance she might seem to enjoy a unique security. Her incomparable natural defences, it is true, are not what they were once. The mountains of the North-West frontier are only in a degree more difficult for armoured or air-borne troops to cross than the mountains of the Balkans. The Indian Ocean is no safer than the Atlantic. But encircled by the Himalayas and the sea is a country as large as all Europe west of Russia, with a population of 400 millions and great natural resources, including coal and iron. In military terms,

however, this vast human and material power is only potential. Modern war demands not only highly developed engineering industries on a scale commensurate with man-power but an immense surplus of total wealth and productive capacity over and above what is required to maintain a reasonable standard of existence for the mass of the population. The vast majority of India's millions live terribly near the margin of subsistence. She has infinitely less surplus available for defence, in peace or in the strain of war, than Britain with only a tenth of her population. Her effort in the present war, splendid as it is, is much more on the scale of Canada and Australia than on that of this country. That is not the result of British government in India or of insufficient Indian response to the call of the common cause, but of fundamental economic conditions. Only a long process of industrial development accompanied by a very substantial rise of the standard of living of the agricultural population—a process requiring generations to complete—can create a surplus sufficient to provide a navy, an air force and a mechanised army on a scale at all comparable with India's needs.

Those needs in themselves may well be very much greater in the future, even in the near future, than in the past. When India for the first time attained political unity under the British Crown, she possessed almost an insular security. The British navy covered her seaward defence with no appreciable extra cost or effort. Nor did she run a serious risk on land. The Afghans were too poorly equipped to be a formidable danger. The menace from Russia was remote. But are these conditions assured for her even by a victorious outcome to the present war? Is it not at least possible that the future theatre of international tension may shift from Europe eastwards and that developments in Russia, China or Japan may prove dangerous for those within their reach by land, sea or air? Can India face that prospect unaided or relying upon casual political combinations?

On the purely economic plane, moreover, India still has a long way to go before she can be in any sense self-dependent

and at the same time raise her general standard of well-being. She has made a remarkable advance in the development of her industries in recent years, but it is only a beginning. The growth must be far greater if she is to provide a livelihood for a population which has increased by 50 millions in the last decade. For that she will need, on the one hand, to import raw materials, machinery and many other manufactured goods and, on the other hand, to export the surplus of her own primary and secondary production. She will need markets in a world governed by the competition of the economically powerful. Here is a second problem not easy for her to solve unless she can be assured of regular co-operation. Like all or almost all other countries, she will only be able to assure her economic safety and welfare in the framework of some permanent group association.

That being so, what association is there that can meet her needs better than the one with which the course of history has already linked her and within which she has only to complete the last short stage of evolution from dependence to equal partnership? Would either the Japanese New Order or the Russian Soviet System afford to her, in anything like an equal measure, both security from external aggression and at the same time internal independence? Would either of them harmonise better with the political ideals which in the course of a long association have become India's ideals as well as our own? Each member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in the words of the historic Declaration of 1926, "is now the master of its destiny". Can India obtain so genuine a power of national self-determination anywhere else? Is there any other company in which she would be so free and yet so safe?

III

THAT raises another question. Is India a nation? Can she be a nation? Are Indians prepared to agree to be a nation? Or rather, the word nation being so ambiguous, can India be a single political unit for the purposes of defence, external

relations and basic economic policy? Can Indians agree upon some single central government for India controlling her fighting services, her tariffs, her dealings with the outside world? In many respects, as has often been pointed out, India is much more comparable to a continent like Europe than to any one of the European nations in the diversity of her many languages, of her cultures, of her political institutions. A third of her area and nearly a quarter of her population belongs to autonomous Indian States, mostly governed on old-fashioned autocratic lines and stubbornly jealous of any surrender of their powers particularly to radical Indian politicians. Mr. Jinnah, the autocratic leader of the Moslem League, declares, with an increasing measure of support from the Moslem masses, that Islam and Hinduism are not only profoundly differing cultures but separate nations which can never be joined under a single political government. Are we, then, to accept the conclusion that the unity of India which we have created is merely the artificial product of pressure from without, incapable of surviving once that pressure is removed?

The answer to these questions lies largely in the domain of geography. India has no such natural internal frontiers as those which in Western and Southern Europe have fostered the growth of separate nations with a distinctive national life and thought. The Indian States correspond to no natural divisions. They represent, in the main, little more than the crystallisation, at moments convenient to the practical, illogical British mind, of the state of affairs left when the chaos resulting from the breakdown of the Mogul Empire gradually gave place to the extension of British power, direct or indirect, over all India. Their territories sprawl everywhere across India's natural lines of communication; and, while that is of minor importance so long as the general control of Indian affairs is in British hands, the elimination of that control, leaving the States and the Provinces of British India to fight out their relations over tariffs, railways, defence or foreign policy as entirely separate and uncoordinated political entities, would lead to indescribable confusion if not actually to war.

The deepest division between the inhabitants of India, that between Islam and Hinduism, has similarly no boundary to express it. Nowhere, indeed, except in the extreme north-west is there an exclusively Moslem population. The North-West in a wider sense, including the Punjab and Sind with the North-West Frontier Province, has an almost two-thirds Moslem majority. In Bengal and Assam the majority is under 55 per cent. Elsewhere in British India Islam is a minority nowhere exceeding 20 per cent. In the States the one great Moslem dynasty, that of Hyderabad, rules over a population nearly 90 per cent. Hindu, while the only major State with a Moslem majority, Kashmir, is ruled by a Hindu dynasty. In the Punjab the Sikhs, though only 20 per cent. of the total population, are not likely to forget that less than a century ago they were the military rulers of that great province or that there are martial Sikh States outside it. Conversely, in the United Provinces the correspondingly small Moslem minority still has the traditions of the age when their province was the centre of a Moslem Empire which for centuries ruled all Northern India; if India were once to be broken up between Moslem and Hindu, they would clamour for a political reunion with their Moslem neighbours, east and west, in order to restore that Empire. The execution of Mr. Jinnah's "Pakistan" policy, in fact, is calculated to reproduce in India the same sort of conditions as those which followed the breakdown of the Mogul Empire, to revive the internal strife and lawlessness and devastation from which the Indian peoples were rescued by the expansion of British rule. Nor would it only be a question of internal peace. An India thus broken up would be incapable of defence against the outside world. A Moslem North-Western State could not defend itself unaided even against the Afghans, and, with the recent record of the Balkan States in mind, can anyone be sure that other Indian States, Moslem or Hindu, would aid it?

Disunion would likewise wreck the prospects of that industrial development on which, almost literally, the future life of India depends. The layout of the transport system, the

local distribution of raw materials, the present low purchasing power of the population as a whole—these and many other factors in the economic situation would make it impossible for India to advance, or indeed to escape a decline, in her scale of production and her standards of living if she were to be divided into two or more rival "nations", born of a political and communal antagonism that would inevitably extend itself into the economic field. The fact is that geography and history have made India a unit for the fundamental purposes of external and internal peace and economic development. As the Czech patriot, Palacky, said of the Austrian Empire, "If it did not exist it would be necessary to create it." It was that need for unity, and not any deliberate purpose or plan of conquest, which caused three small British trading settlements to grow into the Empire of India as it is to-day It is that need which somehow or other must be met by India for herself unless she is to remain indefinitely under British tutelage or once again be plunged into anarchy and eventual renewed subjection to some stronger foreign Power.

It does not follow, of course, that India requires the degree of unity which the centralised bureaucracy of the British Raj has given her in the past, or even that close federation on British Parliamentary lines embodied in the now derelict Part Two of the Act of 1935. As Mr. Amery has more than once suggested, His Majesty's Government are prepared to endorse a much looser federal constitution and to envisage the possibility of its being framed in accordance with American rather than with the British precedent, so that the Executive might be subject, not to the Legislature, but more directly to the component units, whether Provinces or States. A United States of India, with the residual powers vested in the units and with a statutory Cabinet representing the units, might well suit Indian conditions better than the Federation planned in 1935. It would promise a substantial measure of protection to the Moslems, since they are in a majority in four of the present eleven Provinces and, if provincial boundaries were rearranged, they could, no doubt, secure a corresponding

adjustment of their representation at the Centre. To such a new scheme, too, the Princes might be much less reluctant to adhere than they have plainly been with regard to the old one.

It should not prove too difficult a task to contrive the form of Indian unity provided that the supreme and urgent need for it is recognised. The fact must be grasped and faced that India must be united in order to be safe or prosperous. That is the first step out of the tangle in which Indian politics are caught to-day. The next step is to realise that the safety and welfare of India, even if united, cannot be secured in this troubled world unless she is a member of a wider society, working together for common purposes in the light of common ideals.

It has already been argued in the foregoing pages that that last need can best be met by India being "freely associated" in equal partnership with the British democracies in the Commonwealth. It need only be said in conclusion that the advantages of such an arrangement are not by any means one-sided. This article has been mainly concerned with its benefits to India. Another could be written to assess its benefits to all her fellow partners. But little more is wanted than the dramatic facts of the war to establish the cardinal importance of India's place in the Commonwealth. She keeps unbroken the chain that links the Southern Dominions with Britain by sea and air. In East Africa, in Libya, in Irak, in Malaya, her soldiers, nearer their home base than any of their comrades, are holding lines and filling gaps which the British and the Anzacs are not numerous enough to hold and fill. The Delhi Conference marked her out not only as a powerful partaker in the economic war-effort of the whole Commonwealth but also as the natural centre for its co-ordination throughout its vast eastern and southern field. The British democracies will not forget this brotherhood in arms, and they will earnestly desire it to continue for the common task of making and maintaining peace in the post-war world.

THE BUDGET

AT all times war budgets are difficult to construct and still more difficult to criticise intelligently. They must be built on shifting sand. The Chancellor has to pay the piper but he cannot call the tune. Wars have to be won, and they are won not by planning alone but by planning amended by frequent improvisation. No Government which has decided that this or that is necessary to win victory or to stave off defeat is likely even to reflect that to do something else would be cheaper. We shall be right then to assume that any estimates of war expenditure in a budget period will require constant adjustment if they are not to lose touch with the reality.

In this war, for the first time in our history, the whole nation is under fire. It follows that the sources from which war expenditure is to be met are little less speculative than the expenditure itself. The primary source must be the income of the nation, and it is no longer in the sole power of the nation to determine what that income shall be. In that, too, the enemy has a voice, through his bombers and his submarines. We cannot know what materials we shall have to work on or what factories or houses will be left to us. Thus, at the best, all that a Chancellor can do is to indicate that if he is able, as he hopes, to spend £X on the war in the next twelve months he will rely on finding £Y of it by taxation and something like £$X-Y$ by borrowing.

The layman, who has to comment on this proposal, does so under the obvious disadvantage of not knowing even as much as the Chancellor knows. At the present time, for example, he can have only a hazy notion of our complicated financial relations with the United States and of the financial effect of the Lease and Lend Act no notion at all. When he has explained what the Chancellor has given him the means of explaining, he can do little more than point to this feature as

wise or courageous or to that as weak and political or to the chance that a certain assumption may be falsified and the apple-cart upset.

For the first time the budget which the Chancellor opened on April 7 was supported by a White Paper containing, in a novel form, statistics of government receipts and expenditure for the first year and a half of the war and also estimates of the national income and expenditure in 1938 and 1940. It is all to the good that a branch of research which has hitherto been left to the private enquiries of statisticians should have received official blessing. At a time of flux, when great changes are taking place in the national income and in its composition, competent statistical estimates of what those changes mean are invaluable. A glance at the Chancellor's speech will show that, although cast into the customary mould of a budget year, his figures are founded on the calculations of the White Paper, and those are not related to budget years.

The central figure in the Chancellor's exposition is the figure of government expenditure requiring domestic finance, the amount, that is, which has to be met out of tax revenue and domestic loans after payments made out of overseas sources (gold, dollars, securities) have been excluded.

This figure for the first year of the war was £2,055 millions and for the first half of the second year (September 1940 to February 1941) was £1,595 millions or at an annual rate of £3,190 millions. For the budget year 1941–42 the Chancellor estimates that, if there is no further increase in the level of domestic costs, it will be £3,700 millions. This growth of expenditure indicates, though with rising costs it cannot exactly measure, the intensification of the war effort of Great Britain already realised and still anticipated.

Vast though these sums are, they are not the true total of government expenditure, for they exclude all payments made out of overseas sources. For the first year of the war those payments were £542 millions, for the next half-year £479 millions, and it would appear from the Chancellor's statement that he estimates them to be £507 millions in the present

financial year. The term "overseas sources" has not been analysed in final detail. But when the full story of the operations of the Foreign Exchange Control can be revealed, it will show the invaluable part played in the financing of this war by the Dominions and Colonies in the sterling area, by Canada and by allied governments.

To return to the expenditure requiring domestic finance, we have to ask how it has been met in the first year and a half of the war and how it is proposed that it should be met in this year. Of the £2,055 millions, £1,148 millions was provided by taxation. In the next six months tax revenue yielded £837 millions towards the total of £1,595 millions. The balance—£907 millions and £758 millions for the two periods—was made up of extra-budgetary receipts of public departments, savings of local authorities and institutions, undistributed profits of companies, unspent balances of depreciation and obsolescence accounts and net current personal savings. For the current year, the Chancellor was able to forecast a tax revenue from existing taxes of £1,636 millions and receipts from the sources just enumerated (but excluding for the moment any further increase in personal savings) of £1,522 millions. This left him with £542 millions to find either from new or increased taxation or from additional saving. He decided that £250 millions must be raised by taxation and that it was reasonable to expect £200 to £300 millions from additional savings. It remains to examine the methods proposed for raising this further revenue and the validity of the estimate of possible further savings.

For the whole £250 millions of new revenue the Chancellor relies on the income tax. By raising the standard rate to 10*s.* in the £ he expects to obtain an increase of £125 millions in a full year and of £96 millions in the current year. By reducing certain family and earned income allowances he will raise £54 millions this year and £125 millions in a full year. The latter expedient will bring in 2,000,000 new income-tax payers, and as an earnest of his intention that the reduction of allowances should be temporary, the Chancellor proposes at the end of the

war to credit each taxpayer, subject to a maximum of £65 per annum per person, in the Post Office Savings Bank with the amount which he has paid through this reduction.

The decision to rely on the income tax alone for the additional tax revenue required has been generally welcomed. Income tax, graduated as it is in this country, is incomparably the fairest of all taxes in its incidence. The machinery of collection is familiar and has been perfected. The possible alternative choice of fancy taxes is limited, none of them can be universal, all of them would entail new administrative problems. We are on more debatable ground when we come to the post-war credits or compulsory savings or "the acceptance of the Keynes scheme"—as the reduction of allowances has been variously described. The Chancellor argued that the certainty that something would be accumulating for them in the Savings Bank would encourage many workers to add to it by voluntary saving. That may be so. But it might be argued with equal force that if the individual can without hardship find the cash now required there is no justification for treating it differently from any other tax receipts. It is also open to question whether it is wise, when the voluntary savings organisation is being asked to raise an additional £200 to £300 millions, to give the impression that the State, by the simple device of post-war credits, will do a man's saving for him. Nothing could be more unfortunate than that the present innovation should come to be regarded as capable of being expanded quite simply, if voluntary saving fails, into the full Keynes scheme. It cannot be so expanded without encountering the principal practical difficulty of that scheme, namely, that it would involve something like a universal means test.

Before we examine the financial prospect opened by the budget it is necessary to deal briefly with the Chancellor's proposals for mitigating the Excess Profits Tax. That tax, inevitable when government contracts are the principal source of industrial activity, was raised to 100 per cent. in the early days of the Churchill Government, through a laudable desire to set against the efforts and sacrifices, which they were demanding

from labour and everyone else, the achievement of "taking the profit out of war". At the rate of 100 per cent. the tax did much more than that. It left no incentive to efficiency, it operated with greater harshness against those businesses which were showing the most enterprise and public spirit in undertaking war production, it put an abnormal strain on the liquid resources of its victims and in other ways threatened to leave them worse equipped than was reasonable for competitive industry after the war. The Government could not ignore these objections. Its courage was unequal to the simple course of confessing that it had been wrong and that the working man would in the end suffer most from its mistake. There are some things which not even the national government of an intelligent democracy likes to face, and one of them is to retract on highly technical grounds a simple and plausible phrase which has earned it much credit with the masses. No one need be surprised that the Chancellor preferred to keep the full rate and legislate by improvements in detail. He has done something to ameliorate the position of businesses, such as mining companies, which are exploiting wasting assets; he has endeavoured, by another application of post-war credits, to reduce the obstacles to post-war recovery; and by allowing borrowed money to rank as capital he has helped to remove the discrimination against those firms which have exerted themselves to help in war production. There we must leave it.

The question which most of us are likely to ask about this or any other war budget is whether it offers a reasonable prospect of bridging the gap between expenditure and revenue and a tolerable degree of protection against serious inflation. The answer would appear to be that the budget cannot be properly criticised as inadequate. It has many salutary features. Apart from a high level of taxation, the Chancellor proposes also to continue and extend the stabilisation of the prices of necessaries and thus, so far as he can, to stabilise wages. In his aim of raising a further £200 to £300 millions a year from current savings, he is relying on the results of the government policy of limiting the production of non-essential consumers' goods.

For while it is true that government expenditure at the rate of £3,700 millions will add something like £500 millions to the national pay-roll, we have to set against this an unknown but clearly substantial reduction in that pay-roll through the diversion of labour and earning capacity from other work to war work. If savings are to expand at the desired rate, it can only be through the gradual exhaustion of stocks of non-essential commodities and the deliberate failure to replace them.

When all factors are taken into account, it would seem clear that the solution of our financial problem in this war will depend on much the same qualities and achievements as its other problems. The overriding need, from a military as from a financial point of view, is for an intensification of our effort. We have to produce more war material in a given time. We have to overcome with the least possible loss of time the consequences of bombing, whether of ships or of houses or of industrial plant. If we can in fact spend during the present year, at the current level of prices, the £3,700 millions for which the Chancellor is budgeting, it will only be by eliminating non-essentials and by attaining a higher level of war production. We shall then by the same effort have made the calculations of the budget realisable.

AMERICA'S GATHERING STRENGTH

I

BY mid-April the United States was ready for a considerable forward step toward convoying supply ships to the British Isles. Before this article reaches England, many of the steps will certainly have been taken. Unhappily, nearly anything written today that is up-to-the-minute and alert is likely to be antedated by rushing events. However, a correspondent must take that chance and, instead of sticking simply to general reflections, must make his report as factual as possible.

Within the last fortnight several steps have been taken involving substantial American contributions to the Battle of the Atlantic. Many more are due to follow in steady sequence. But these words are written at a very black moment in the Balkan and Egyptian campaigns. One writes with bated breath, hoping that the outcome in the Mediterranean will not reveal the Atlantic actions to have been too late. Yet after all, the Atlantic Battle is bound to be the decisive one, and here the United States can make its largest contributions.

The present pattern of American policy reveals what is to come. On the one hand, American shipyards, both naval and mercantile, are working at capacity and having their capacity enlarged. On the other hand, several steps to relieve the pressure on Britain's own fleet have been taken: Greenland is to be taken under United States protection, which probably means that this country will take over responsibility for patrolling a ship lane from our ports to Iceland; the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have been opened to American shipping under the Neutrality Law, which means that if British forces retain

footholds in the Mediterranean they can be supplied, with the help of America, through the back door; Axis ships in American ports have been seized and, by many other devices, every bit of spare shipping in all parts of the world is scheduled to be gathered up.

Of these steps, action in the North Atlantic is the most significant. The present plan is, broadly, for the United States to enforce its "neutrality belt" out to the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere, which fall, by our definition, just at the western edge of Iceland.* It is unlikely that actual convoys will be formed and guided along this shipping lane. Rather, by means of air and surface patrol—but notably by long-range seaplanes based in Newfoundland and Greenland—these seas are to be swept as clean as may be. The ancient doctrines of Freedom of the Seas will be asserted for these waters, and Germany will be warned that any action west of Iceland will be at the risk of embroilment with the United States. American naval craft will seek to enforce the watch kept by the seaplane patrol. That, at least, is the plan most widely favored in Washington as this article is written. There are many modifications which may be written into it before it is put into effect. Britain would still have to shoulder convoy duties from Iceland to British ports, but this task—although it covers by far the more difficult waters—is less than the job of bringing ships safely across the whole Atlantic.

In addition to this shipping patrol plan, the United States will surely continue to transfer certain naval units to Britain, following the Coast Guard cutters sent a few days ago, which are approximately as useful as the new British corvettes. The Greenland project will also facilitate the flying to Britain of smaller American planes, which cannot make the passage nonstop from Newfoundland. A re-fueling pause at Greenland will permit the carrying of more emergency cargo on larger planes.

* Remarks made by President Roosevelt at his Press Conference on April 29 made it clear that the eastward limit of the "neutrality patrol" will be extended, if necessary, into the "combat zone" around the British Isles. EDITOR.

Opening of the Red Sea, if Britain's hold in the Mediterranean is retained, offers large possibilities of aid. Fast American freighters can undertake the long run around the Cape of Good Hope and hence relieve British shipping. From New York to Suez it is 12,750 miles—not greatly different from the distance from London to Suez around the Cape. The route offers relatively few dangers, certainly less than the passage from British ports. And it would be further possible to get up the Persian Gulf and serve Britain's oil-fields with supplies from the United States if the German drive made additional gains.

Already, according to Washington reports, American planes are being sent by sea to the Gold Coast and thence flown by long or short hops over friendly territory to Egypt. It is a 4,000-mile ocean run from New York, and planes can thus be delivered to the Middle East from America in a relatively short time. Such routes will be useful even if Greece and Jugoslavia fall, as long as Britain retains a toehold in Egypt, or thereafter at points farther East. Establishment of an active German base at Dakar would menace these routes, but such a step would certainly arouse the United States as nothing tangible has yet done, and might be actively resisted. It would at least be countered by an American base on the easternmost bulge of Brazil.

These collateral ways of moving war supplies across the oceans are matched by the American shipbuilding program. The vast Hog Island scheme of assembly of the last war has not been duplicated; but American authorities believe their plans are already well advanced for building more ships, and more quickly, than were put together the last time. On this very day, the keel of a ship was laid at Richmond, Virginia, about 90 days after the first workman moved on to a mud flat to begin building the ways. The present American shipbuilding effort was described by Admiral Emory S. Land, chairman of the Maritime Commission, as "more than twice as great as any ever before attempted in the history of this or any other country". And this includes those days of "prodigy of effort" referred to by Mr. Churchill.

By 1942 it is confidently expected that American shipping will be slipping down the ways at the rate of 4,000,000 tons a year. Shipyard workers must be recruited from our pre-war total of about 100,000 to 650,000. This staggering expansion would seem almost impossible, were it not for the surprising number of World War workers who are descending on the seaboard from the hinterlands, proffering their old skills. Today there are about 43 shipyards with 85 ways engaged in building merchant ships, while 8 Navy yards with 18 ways are working on the two-ocean navy. Present plans call for 59 new ways in the merchant yards and 18 new ways in the Navy yards. In addition, 7 new yards with 56 new ways are planned for the 412-ship emergency program, which has already begun and of which the Richmond keel was a starter.

To meet the shipping problem, it will be necessary to combine the shipbuilding program with the plans for keeping sea lanes open. American and British yards together would not this year come near to equalling German sinkings. But convoy plans, to cut down these sinkings, are the next step expected in Washington and should be able to alter the North Atlantic picture. President Roosevelt has just told the nation that "our ultimate defense will be rendered futile" if American aid does not reach Britain. And if it be asked why Americans have delayed taking up this task so long, it can only be answered that naval action involves a possible and almost probable physical clash with the Germans. Such a clash might not actually mean war. But actual fighting between American and German units could scarcely be called by any other name, however long a declaration were avoided. And Americans are not yet certain they will have to become belligerents. They still are clinging, though with ever lessening conviction, to the hope that they can help Britain win without actual American fighting. You cannot take a democracy into war unless the people are convinced that they must fight. This fact may prove, of course, to be democracy's own undoing. But it still governs American action.

However, when our actual naval plans are announced, it

may well be found that our preparations have gone far ahead of our talk. There is some evidence for thinking that work in Greenland is actually under way, and the Newfoundland air and naval bases are certainly far advanced. Thus the means for undertaking a North Atlantic naval patrol are at hand and can be put into operation fairly quickly. Or so it would seem: the facts are yet to be known.

II

PERHAPS the best contribution an American correspondent can make today—there is no use talking further about the whys of public opinion—is to summarise the cold facts and figures of American military and naval strength. As long as Britain holds out, and in the progress toward that end, these facts and figures may well be the decisive elements in world history. Every American humbly realises how much depends on the rampart of Britain. There is no thought that our contribution "will win the war". But we are gratified that our re-armament progress during the past year has been so considerable, and we are glad to present this progress report of the weight the United States can bring to bear.

THE AMERICAN NAVY. This first line of defense is 100 per cent. prepared for war. In size and fire power it is now the most powerful in the world, though it must be divided between Atlantic and Pacific, and the two-ocean fleet will not be finished before 1946. As to ships, the Navy has 324 vessels of 1,288,000 tons supported by 1,754 auxiliary craft, from mosquito boats to tankers. This is the fleet on hand. On order, to be completed in the next five years, is an entirely new navy. That may be the long-range guarantee of democracy. Unless substantial parts of the British fleet are obtained by enemies, the American fleet now in process of creation would be able to confront any probable resistance in its own waters, largely interpreted. If the very worst fate befell the British Navy, the American fleet would be inadequate. Short of that, it can accomplish its needed tasks.

In early April the battleship *North Carolina*, most powerful craft in commission in any navy, was placed in service and a second new battleship will be added before the year is out. The year's output will include upward of 25 destroyers, and corresponding cruisers and auxiliary craft.

Our naval air force is large and highly trained. It consists of 3,250 planes and 3,700 pilots. One year ago there were 1,765 planes and 2,900 pilots. Before the end of the present year, naval planes will rise to 6,300 and pilot totals will increase correspondingly. But within a few weeks, according to expectations outlined above, many of these planes will be used on Atlantic patrol duties. The American Navy's fighter is rated to be the fastest and most powerful in the world, and the biggest and longest-range bombers belong to the Navy. Both these types are likely to see action over the North Atlantic soon. Coordination of our aircraft and surface fleets has long been developed, and the tests may soon come along the shipping lanes.

The most powerful accession in strength of the American Navy during the past momentous year—during which our actual striking power has been increased drastically—is in outlying bases. For this we have British statecraft to thank. It would have been possible, if mishaps struck at the British fleet, for some foreign foe to gain a foothold in the many islands off our coast. This grave disadvantage has been turned into a powerful asset by the exchange of destroyers for base leases with Britain. Now the Navy is provided with bases extending from Newfoundland to Bermuda and to Trinidad—all striking points in the direction of possible attack. The new base now being established in Greenland, with Canadian forces in control of Iceland, is of the highest importance as an advance post. These stepping-stones may ultimately prove to be the most precious links between democracy in the Old World and the New.

Naval personnel is very high-grade, and has expanded from 177,370 officers and men a year ago to 292,755 today. Every man is a volunteer, selected after the most rigid physical re-

quirements, and recruiting continues apace. It is particularly noteworthy that expansion is easiest and most rapid—with the pick of our young men volunteering—in the naval air arm. That is the vanguard of our aid to Britain.

THE AMERICAN ARMY. While the Navy a year ago was fairly well prepared, the Army was gravely laggard. Its progress has been very great—and is only just beginning. In May 1940—when Hitler shocked us, along with the rest of the world, into action—the Army was composed of 227,000 regulars, with a largely untrained National Guard of 235,000 officers and men. Today, the Regular Army has 487,000 officers and men. There are 286,600 National Guardsmen, who have already had six months of field training. Conscription has brought into training 374,000 men, and 38,000 Reserve Officers are in service. This army of 1,185,600 is well on its way to physical preparation. It has learned to use its weapons. It has not yet had large-scale joint operations, which will be necessary before its training is complete.

The strength of this army will be more apparent as its present and prospective equipment is studied. In the air, the Navy had first call for planes after Britain, for it seemed likely to come into action sooner. Production of all aircraft, which a year ago was at the rate of 700 a month, had risen in March to 1,216 planes and before the end of 1941 is certain to go over 1,800 planes—a high percentage of them bombers. The Army Air Corps now has some 4,000 planes, compared with 2,794 a year ago. It has 6,180 officer-pilots and expects to have 10,000 by June.

It is important to recognise that American industrial production of armaments is just about to come into full swing. The "tooling-up" process is virtually complete. By midsummer, in nearly every line, we shall be in mass production. That means a pyramiding of results on top of the effects hitherto achieved. Such results, of course, will not be then available in shipbuilding. Nor will the effects in aircraft production be so sensational as they will be in some other types of production. But the net result will be that American products

will stack up on the piers in even heavier volume than hitherto, rendering convoying or ship-lane patrol even more essential than it is now, and ultimately getting a far greater supply of war materials to Britain than has been available hitherto.

Some of the effects, already achieved or about to come into heavy production, may be noted in the following lines:

Tanks. A year ago the Army had 10 light and 18 medium-weight modern tanks. Today 6 light tanks are being produced daily and by midsummer 15 will be produced daily, while within an even shorter time 5 medium tanks for each 8-hour shift will be produced. These tanks are the products of Chrysler, the well-known motor-car manufacturer, and of our two greatest locomotive manufacturers—Baldwin Locomotive Works and the American Locomotive Company. The great productive facilities of these companies are cited as an illustration of the power behind the tank program. Moreover, the tanks are not excelled in the world for fire power, armor, and speed. They are not of the giant type, but are heavily protected and fire a 75-mm. gun.

Combat cars. In February 13,000 of these "cavalry" vehicles were built, and our total output of this sort of vehicle for American or British or allied use can be geared quickly to any possible need.

Garand rifles. This standard army weapon, an advanced automatic product in fire power and accuracy, is being made at the growing rate of 3,500 a week.

Machine-guns. An ample supply of old weapons is on hand, production of new ones is running ahead of schedule and six new plants for making machine-guns are about to come into production.

Anti-aircraft. Still a bottleneck. It will be many months before the United States is adequately supplied with either anti-aircraft or other new types of field artillery.

Powder. Here a critical bottleneck has been broken. Production is now running 900 per cent. above 1939, and new plants are coming into operation to assure an ample supply.

Production of all this material is already proceeding at a far faster rate than during the last World War and is picking up speed. The present war effort, as Secretary of War Stimson has just said, already dwarfs the 1917 output. Moreover, the Army training program is far more difficult. In 1917 troops had only to be hardened physically and briefly in domestic cantonments for placing in the trenches alongside seasoned troops.

Now, not only divisions but fully trained corps and armies must be drilled in the coordinated effort of mechanised warfare. Weapons are not, as in 1917, procurable from allies but must all be made here. Training on an extensive coordinated scale must take place here. Despite these obstacles, Secretary Stimson is able to report that physical equipment for training millions of men and equipping them, not simply for the present but in successive military generations up to at least five years, are well under way. When the Armistice was signed in 1918, eighteen months after the declaration of war by the United States, construction work here had not been finished. Today, six months after appropriations were passed last September, 147 new army housing projects are either fully completed or on the verge. They include 42 veritable cities, ranging in population from 10,000 to over 60,000.

III

SUCH efforts are, of course, familiar to Britain in its own program. But the point is that the United States is building forces—and is far enough advanced so that the process could not be stopped by untoward events—which ought ultimately to be able to redress the balance of the world no matter what happens in the Battles of the Balkans, Mediterranean, Britain, or Atlantic.

The situation since the grave moments of August 1940 has reversed itself fundamentally. The American military power has actually come into being, and the fleet—already strong—is headed toward invincible strength. No matter what happens to Britain—and Americans have faith that the worst will not happen—the United States, by virtue of understandings with the British, Dutch, Australian and Canadian Governments ought to be able to insure the defense of much of the world. It ought to be able to turn the world back to freedom, with the aid of the overseas elements of the British nations, even if the battle should be lost temporarily in Europe. But, whatever happens in the Mediterranean, the American power now in

being ought to be able to prevent the defeat of Britain in the home island by assisting in keeping open the channels of communications. Even if fighting Britain were forced back to that island, the American power now in existence should be able to prevent the Nazis from completing their European triumph.

It is fully realised here that the crucial struggle will come in Britain and across the Atlantic lanes. That is why American opinion moves steadily toward preventing the tools of democracy's defense from paving the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. President Roosevelt, whose sense of timing has up to this moment been impeccable, deliberately refrained from opening the shipping question before mid-April. Then, as has been chronicled, he began to move steadily with the seizures of Axis and Danish ships here, the expansion of our building program, the opening of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the transfer of Coast Guard cutters, the first arrival of British ships here for overhaul and the occupation of Greenland. That was the time-table up to the moment of putting this article into the air mail in mid-April. And again it should be emphasised that under the Lease-Lend Law many activities were going on secretly, which probably meant that preparations for naval duty in the North Atlantic must be far advanced. The President must have had his reasons for not moving more swiftly or sweepingly. He had first his own public opinion. Secondly, he had to consider what could be done practically. Thirdly, he wanted the help to be most advantageous and not to embark on commitments which ought to be altered. Fourthly, it had to be perfectly clear that American naval aid was imperative to save Britain's communications. All these conditions were coming to a head as this article was written and the foregoing steps were taken.

Doubtless it is a pity that America could not have acted more quickly. But American physical preparations could scarcely have been quicker and more effective than they have been since last June. The fever of war participation would not necessarily have aided our preparatory effort. There are, natur-

ally, many shortcomings and disappointments, but the evidence indicates that they are far less than in 1917–18. Just as in London or any other war-time capital, things could have been improved. Democracy has plenty of shortcomings, as we have all painfully witnessed, but in Britain and America it has not shown the dry-rot which doomed Fascism in Italy. It shows, surely, part of the fabled efficiency of Germany—one has some confidence that in certain branches, such as automotive or aircraft, American mass production is working better than German—but this democratic war effort is based on the democratic freedom of the individual. The glorious resurgence of Britain which thrills every American—even those who made a profession of twisting the lion's tail—has not been without its counterpart here. Here one feels a vast industrial nation pulsating with the successful effort to make the tools for saving democracy. One sees the minority of isolationists decline into discredit, though not into silence. One sees a unification of mind and heart since the crucial vote on the Lease-Lend Bill. One sees a speedy settlement of serious strike threats—threats inevitable in our stage of labor-organisation immaturity—when once public opinion spoke its mind.

The American war effort has not yet been purged in the fiery furnace. It is still feverish, filled with self-serving and greed, devoid of the powerful elements of sacrifice. But it is by now plain that the vast capacity for team-work of the American nation is definitely in the harness. We all know, even those who protest, that there can be no turning back.

United States of America,
April 1941.

IRELAND AND THE WAR

I. Terrorism

THE bombs dropped by the *Luftwaffe* on Dublin and five other places in the eastern counties of Eire during the nights of January 1, 2, and 3, as a New Year's greeting, not only destroyed life and property but also had serious political repercussions. It was, of course, futile to suggest that these consecutive and systematic attacks, on a neutral State where there is no "blackout", were accidental, as the lights of Dublin in particular can unfortunately be seen from a great distance at night. The Irish Government were therefore forced to take action and announced on January 3 that their representative in Berlin had been instructed to make an energetic protest to the German Government and to claim reparation. On the following day they emphatically contradicted a statement made by an American radio station that they had expelled the German Minister from Dublin. No one in Ireland would credit such a statement anyhow. So far as is known, the German Government has since expressed no regret and made no reparation for this wanton and malicious onslaught. This type of attack on a neutral State is, of course, part of the now familiar Axis technique for terrorising small nations and testing their reactions to violations of their neutrality. It is in fact only a means to an end, namely, the creation of panic and fear. It is common knowledge that German war-planes have, since the occupation of France, constantly flown over Irish territory on their way to attack British shipping in the Atlantic without any serious interference or protest. During the last few months ample evidence of this has been afforded by the officially admitted facts. On February 5 a German bomber crashed on a mountain near Dunbeacon, Bantry, County Cork, five of the crew of six being killed. On March 3

another German bomber made a forced landing near Carnsore Point, County Wexford, one of its crew being found dead from a bullet wound, the remainder being interned. On March 13 a stranger, who stated that he had landed during the night from a German plane, was arrested by the police near Taghmon, County Wexford. On April 1 a third German bomber crashed in County Waterford, its crew also being interned. British airmen have naturally followed their enemies. During the last few months three British fighters have come down in the sea at various points around the Irish coast and their pilots have also been interned. Two British bombers have also crashed near the Northern border, their crews being killed. On a few occasions also Irish anti-aircraft defences are stated to have opened fire on what were described as "unidentified military aircraft".

But the German attack on Eire has not been confined to the air. Several Irish-owned ships, and ships trading with Ireland, have been sunk or attacked, some of them in Irish territorial waters. Mr. De Valera stated in the Dail on February 20 that, since the commencement of the war, out of eight Irish ships which were attacked by German planes—two of them twice—four were sunk, twenty lives being lost and seven men injured. In addition to these four ships, three vessels were, he said, sunk as the result of striking mines and the cause of the loss of two others was not definitely known. The total loss of Irish vessels was nine. In six of the seven attacks made from the air on Irish ships the attacking aircraft were identified as German and there is not much doubt about the identity of the seventh. Mr. De Valera made it clear that his Government had protested against these attacks and lodged claims for compensation, but he indicated at the same time that the only effective remedy was to follow the example of other neutrals, by which he presumably meant America, and avoid sending ships to the blockade area, a course which he admitted, so far as Eire was concerned, was not practicable. On a subsequent occasion he admitted that another Irish ship had been sunk and three more attacked by German aircraft and stated that his Government

were reconsidering the question of providing Irish ships with defensive armament.

More alarming, however, than the damage to life and property resulting from these acts of war against the Irish State have been the reactions of its Government. These have been manifested in several ways, but principally in a tightening of the censorship both internally and externally. On January 28 they made a special order under the Emergency Powers Act declaring it a serious offence for any person, whether a newspaper correspondent or not, to send out of Eire by any means an uncensored message intended for publication and relating to any event arising out of or connected with the war, internal public order or the supply of commodities. This order, which is apparently devised to prevent any independent and informed criticism of events in Eire, has incidentally made it impossible for this review to obtain its usual quarterly articles from Eire, since under such conditions they would lose most of their value. Hence this contribution from Northern Ireland, where the free expression of opinion on Irish affairs is still fortunately possible.

More light was thrown on the Dublin Government's reaction to Nazi threats by the operations of the censorship itself. On March 6 Mr. Oscar Traynor, the Minister for Defence, admitted in the Dail that the Censor had deleted from an Associated Press message a portion of a statement which had appeared in the *Osservatore Romano*, the official Vatican newspaper, refuting the suggestion that the Pope had pro-Nazi sympathies, and also a portion of an Irish Catholic Bishop's Lenten Pastoral. To understand the serious import of this step one must remember that the pronouncements of His Holiness the Pope, as well as those of a Catholic Bishop, naturally carry great weight in Eire and nothing but serious pressure would be likely to cause the Government to suppress them. In fact Dr. Morrisroe, the Bishop of Achonry, whose pastoral was so censored, after pointing out the suffering of the Poles and the treatment of the Catholic Church in Germany, had asked the very pertinent question whether Catholics could view with

easy minds the possibility of a victory which would give brute force the power to control Europe and decide the fate of small nations. Such an attitude of indifference to the future was, he said, treason to their faith. Unfortunately the rest of the Irish Catholic Bishops have given the people no moral leadership in this vital matter and have contented themselves with admonishing the faithful to pray for peace without qualification and without making it clear that a Nazi peace would be for Christians a peace of death. Cardinal MacRory, the Archbishop of Armagh, indeed, went so far as to state that the war was the fruit of an unjust and indefensible distribution of raw materials and to complain because Catholics in Northern Ireland had to "risk their lives by seeking work in Britain". It would be well, however, for their lordships to realise that the censoring of a Catholic Bishop's pastoral in Ireland for fear of displeasing the Nazi Government may well be the writing on the wall for both Eire and the Church. The recent broadcast of the Vatican to France, which was also severely censored in Dublin, depicting the present plight of the Catholic Church in Germany, its children deprived of any effective religious instruction, its priests disrespected, its press practically wiped out, and the threat of a national religion looming over all religious life, might well give them cause for anxious thought. The whole question of the censorship was subsequently raised in both the Dail and Senate. Senator Frank MacDermot, an independent member who is both candid and courageous, brought forward a motion in the Senate on January 29 by which he sought in effect liberty for the press to discuss neutrality and to express opinion on Government policy. In the course of his speech he said there was nothing more arbitrary and secret than the censorship as administered in Eire. Every editor in the country was reduced to a state of blasphemous irritation when it was discussed. He then gave various instances such as the childish obliteration of the Royal Arms from a photo of a public meeting in College Green, the suppression of Cardinal Hinsley's broadcasts, and even the censoring of a Minister, Mr. McEntee, who in an unguarded moment truthfully said that at the end

of the war Eire might find herself without any friends. On the other hand, he gave instances where articles, statements and posters offensive to Great Britain had been permitted. National security, he said, was not identical with neutrality, nor was moral neutrality necessary. In obtaining national unity, which was to a large degree superficial, they had cut themselves off from the entire Irish world elsewhere. He believed that there was a real danger facing the country, the possibility almost amounting to a probability of an invasion in the course of a few months. The country was, he claimed, being kept in the dark about the situation and the moral issues at stake. Mr. Frank Aiken, the Minister responsible for the censorship, replying in the debate, claimed that not only was the censorship "magnificent" but that the Government would not permit any newspaper to criticise its working. In the end only four members could be found to support Mr. MacDermot's motion. On April 3 Mr. James Dillon, T.D., the deputy leader of the Fine Gael party, who has himself had experience lately of the Censor's methods, brought forward a motion in the Dail to the effect that the censorship was being used to restrict legitimate free speech and prevent the natural expression of public opinion. He said he did not suggest that the executive was pro-German or pro-British, but that Mr. Aiken, the Minister responsible, had allowed himself to drift into the position of a Czar. He referred to the censorship of the Vatican newspaper already mentioned and said that, whilst an English book on the persecution of Catholics in Poland was forbidden, the Italian Minister in Dublin was allowed to distribute propaganda through the post. The newspapers were told they must not criticise Mr. De Valera's broadcast to America on St. Patrick's Day. Whilst they recognized, he said, that liberties must be abridged in this hour of crisis, they demanded that the watch over their liberty should be shared by all. Mr. De Valera in reply said that if they were to maintain their neutrality one of the first things they had to do was to see that people or newspapers who might hold strong views should not be allowed to lead this country into the conflict. The censorship was, he

said, imposed to maintain internal peace, and, as far as possible, to keep them at peace with other nations. He had faithfully carried out the policy of neutrality decided on by the people and was not, he claimed, biased by enmity or hatred against any belligerent. He admitted that in safeguarding the national interest there was a danger that the Censor might go farther than was absolutely necessary, but it was better to err on the safe side. Mr. Dillon's motion was defeated by 55 votes to 32, the Labour party not voting.

On several occasions recently there have been signs that the Irish Fifth Column, called the I.R.A., is far from extinct. Prosecutions before the Special Military Court have revealed various subversive activities, some of them among members of the civil service. During one of these prosecutions it was disclosed that a clerk in the Department of Defence, who received a sentence of fourteen years' penal servitude for his activities, was actually thought to be the Adjutant-General of the I.R.A. Another civil servant was involved in a daring plan to rob some of the principal banks in Dublin, which fortunately miscarried. In other recent proceedings before the Military Court it was proved that documents had been discovered containing information concerning military movements, police escorts of Ministers, the location of food-supplies and the like. All this indicates the existence of an active conspiracy against the Irish State. The suspected persons who are interned at the Curragh Camp contributed their quota to these attempts at disturbance by burning their huts because their butter ration was reduced to the army standard. In the subsequent mêlée one of the rioters was mortally wounded. The others were duly convicted and sentenced to severe terms of imprisonment by the Military Court.

II. Neutrality

MR. CHURCHILL'S reference last November to the strategic importance of the Irish ports and Mr. De Valera's subsequent reply started a controversy concerning the attitude

of Eire to the war which is only likely to be terminated by the march of events. It is, therefore, desirable to recapitulate the essential facts concerning this vital matter. Under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 three ports, Cork Harbour, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly, remained under British military control and were subsequently used as naval bases. By the agreement made between the British and Irish Governments in April 1938 the British forces were withdrawn from these ports and the forts in each place were taken over by the Irish army. At this time Mr. De Valera stated that his Government would not permit Eire territory to be used as a base for an attack on Great Britain. Whether the agreement of 1938 was wise or not is now beside the point. The fact remains that Mr. De Valera's Government, having declared its neutrality, cannot now surrender or lease these ports to Great Britain. All this must no doubt seem puzzling and absurd to British people who are bearing the full brunt of an attack by a cruel and evil foe on their homes, persons and liberties and who have probably never realised the full implications of these events. It is equally irritating for them to read of British airmen being interned after landing in Eire, a country which is still ostensibly a member of the British Commonwealth. On the other hand, they must remember that the British Government has never contested the right of Eire to remain neutral and that the attitude of Mr. De Valera's Government is in reality only an extension of the centrifugal policy adopted by their predecessors.

Northern Ireland, however, remains an Irish bastion protecting the vital north-about Atlantic approach to Great Britain and providing also an essential bridgehead through which a German invasion of Ireland could be quickly met and repelled. Its political leaders have expressed their willingness to discuss the unity of Ireland on the basis of a common resistance to German aggression, but this Mr. De Valera is unwilling to do. As recently as last July he stated that his Government was resolved "to maintain and defend the country's neutrality in all circumstances. Not even the abolition of partition would, failing German attack, induce us to enter the war." They have in fact decided that neutrality is more precious to them than national unity, even though they may eventually lose both and more besides. Their previous separatist policy, which ignored the coming storm, makes it impossible for them to do otherwise. It is this failure to recognise that the political freedom and unity of Ireland can only continue to exist within the larger strategic unity of the British Isles, a failure for which all English statesmen except Gladstone are equally responsible, which has left Ireland in its present tragic plight. In recent interviews with the American press Mr. De Valera has pointed out that the Irish people are entitled to freedom as well as unity and claimed that they should not be asked to sacrifice one right to secure the other. He also categorically stated that there has been no complaint by the British Government concerning unneutral behaviour on the part of his Government. In short, being well aware that Great Britain cannot permit a German invasion of Ireland, his Government will do nothing to provoke or encourage such an attack, although apparently quite willing, if needs be, to invoke British aid to repel it should it take place. It must candidly be admitted that in this attitude they are not peculiar, for this ostrich-like policy is unfortunately common to all neutral States and one can only hope that history will not repeat itself in other respects in Eire. That veteran Irish critic, Mr. Bernard Shaw, no doubt expressed the views of many people when he pointed out recently that local patriotism with all its heroic legends was as dead as a doornail and that the Irish ports did not belong to Ireland, but to Europe, to the world, and to civilisation. England, he added quite truly, had held her hand very hard and no other country in the world would have accepted the situation. He claimed that if the British Government had to take the ports they would have the United States behind them and that if Germany invaded Ireland England would be compelled to fight her there.

Mr. De Valera has no doubt been reminded of these and other obvious truths during his recent heart-to-heart talks

with Mr. Wendell Willkie, Colonel Donovan, and Mr. Menzies the Australian Prime Minister. It was noticeable that amongst those asked to meet Colonel Donovan, a stalwart Irish American Catholic who commanded the famous 69th Irish regiment in the last war, was Cardinal MacRory. If the Cardinal was invited to expound the wrongs of the Northern Catholics the Colonel, fresh from his survey of Nazi Europe, may well have pointed out that the Cardinal should visit Poland in order to understand what persecution was really like. Mr. Menzies did not hesitate to tell the Dublin pressmen that the Irish in Australia were one hundred per cent. belligerent. It is to be feared that none of these distinguished visitors made any impression on their host who still apparently believes, to quote President Roosevelt's telling phrase, that one can escape danger by getting into bed and pulling the clothes over one's head. Speaking in the Dail on March 13, he said that Eire was in danger from both belligerents, a danger that would increase as the crisis of the war became more acute and that existed because the country was in such a position that one side or the other might try to seize their territory in order to gain a military advantage. The official attitude in Dublin apparently is that whichever side invades Irish territory first will become the enemy, but this presupposes that the issue will not be confused as it has been elsewhere. The German wireless, for instance, has already suggested that Britain plans to invade Eire from Ulster and has threatened that "in such an event Berlin is determined to react in the same manner as in the case of Norway and Belgium". The sinister implications of this untrue statement are obvious. There are, however, many people in Eire who have no illusions as to who is the enemy.

Mr. Hugh Law, formerly a member of John Redmond's party at Westminster and later a member of the Dail, in a recent interesting article in the *Daily Telegraph*, quotes a well-known Southern Irish lawyer as stating that "If England wins we shall be eternally dishonoured; if Germany eternally enslaved". But it would be foolish and dangerous to imagine that such views are at all common in Eire. The great majority of the people

are ill informed on international affairs and cannot believe they are really threatened or in peril. Others, better informed, feel that the present situation is due to the weakness and stupidity of British politicians who so lamentably failed to grasp the German nettle firmly when there was yet time and who now want to involve everyone else in their struggle for survival. No one, as Mr. Law points out, tells them "of the evil thing Britain fights—the exploitation of conquered nations, the cold cruelty, the contempt for all spiritual values". They believe that the word "neutrality" still protects small countries, and nothing but bitter experience is likely to bring about the fruition of the hope recently expressed by Mr. Churchill that they will realise it is as much in their interests as Britain's that their ports and air-fields should be available for the British naval and air forces. Nor have they yet seriously considered the answer to President Roosevelt's pregnant question, "If the Nazis win could Ireland hold out, would Irish freedom be permitted as an amazing exception in a world not free?"

III. Blockade

SO long, then, as Irish public opinion refuses to abandon the position of neutrality, Mr. De Valera's Government is clearly entitled to maintain its present attitude which undoubtedly reflects the wishes of the great majority. If it leads to unfortunate results for the people of Eire they must only abide by the consequences. All this is implicit in the principles for which we are fighting. But if the Irish in Eire wish to be independent and neutral, as they undoubtedly do, they cannot at the same time accept all the benefits of dependence and claim those of neutrality as well, which is what their political leaders are in effect trying to do. Since the beginning of the war Eire has in fact suffered no serious inconvenience whatever; now at last her people are beginning painfully to discover that neutrality cannot save them from some inconvenience and deprivation. The loss of shipping and the impossibility of chartering or protecting neutral ships, even if available, has led

to serious shortages in such essential imports as wheat, petrol and tea. To meet these deficiencies the extraction of flour has been increased to 95 per cent., and even so may have to be diluted with other grain crops, before the harvest is available; petrol is practically restricted to commercial, professional and military use; and tea, that most important of all beverages in Ireland, is rationed on the basis of half an ounce a week for each person. Mr. Lemass, the Minister for Supplies, has suggested that the reduction of the tea allowance to Eire by the British Tea Control is not justified by events, as the British ration has not been similarly reduced. This is a good example of the claim to enjoy both neutrality and full supplies. Deliveries of household coal have also been reduced to one-quarter of a ton each month, butter is being rationed by retailers, and the amount of tobacco available has been cut down by one-fifth.

To make matters worse, the cattle export trade has been paralysed by the most serious outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease which the country has probably ever known. Starting here in Northern Ireland it spread quickly to the Midlands and from there to Dublin. It has already involved the destruction of many thousand beasts and has become a serious epidemic the end of which is not yet in sight. How far its mysterious and rapid extension may have been due to malicious activities is an interesting question to which no definite answer is yet possible. As a result, the value of live animals exported from Eire in February dropped by over £750,000. In an attempt to stop the spread of the disease, fairs, agricultural shows, race meetings and similar events have been suspended throughout the country and all export of live stock to Great Britain prohibited. Faced with these serious problems, the Irish Government have taken preventive action. Mr. De Valera in his St. Patrick's Day broadcast to America stated that both belligerents were blockading Eire but, to reassure his American listeners, renewed his pledge that his Government would not permit Irish territory to be used for an attack on Britain. In a subsequent speech in the Dail he sought, in characteristic

fashion, to explain this statement by saying that he meant to convey that the belligerent Powers in blockading one another were indirectly blockading Eire. Mr. Erskine Childers, the secretary of the leading association of Irish manufacturers and himself a member of the Government party, has, however, recently stated that there was no evidence that Great Britain was seeking unduly to restrict the supply of raw materials to Irish industry.

The Irish Government has recently sent Mr. Frank Aiken, one of its Defence Ministers, to the United States to secure a supply of wheat and arms, but the success of his mission is hardly likely to have been furthered by his statement on landing in New York that Eire did not require to avail herself of the Lease and Lend Act because she could pay for what she wanted.* In order to increase the supply of essential foodstuffs the Irish Government has made an order that one-fifth of all arable land must be tilled during 1941, as compared with one-eighth in 1940. Several farmers who disobeyed the order have had their lands taken over by the Minister for Agriculture under his penal powers. At the same time the guaranteed price of wheat has been increased from 37*s.* 6*d.* to 40*s.* per quarter. The inadequate supply of artificial fertilisers is, however, understood to be causing serious difficulties. Speaking at Limerick on March 30 Mr. De Valera said that if something went wrong with the harvest this year the country might be faced with famine. Where 5 acres were tilled last year 8, he said, must be tilled this year; where 1 ton of turf was cut in 1940, 2 must be cut in 1941. To increase the supply of turf the Government has given the county councils wide powers to undertake schemes of turf cutting and saving. A new company has also been formed, under government control, to endeavour to purchase ships for the purpose of bringing wheat from America. In spite of these precautions it is quite clear, how-

* It was announced in Washington on May 19 that two ships are to be placed at the disposal of the Irish Government, and that a quantity of food will be provided by the American Red Cross, but that no export of arms to Eire would be permitted.—EDITOR.

ever, that the supply of essential raw materials and commodities to Eire must depend eventually on the result of the battle of the Atlantic which rages like a maelstrom around her shores.

Mr. Lemass, the Minister for Supplies, has recently warned the people that the country is about to face an economic crisis of the first magnitude in which the maintenance of industries and the standard of living will be accomplished only with the greatest difficulty, if at all. He even suggested that the Government would not allow personal or party considerations to prevent the formation of a coalition government, which he did not, however, think desirable. An attempt of another kind to solve some of these difficulties has been launched under the title of the Guild of Goodwill by Mr. W. E. Wylie, K.C., a retired High Court judge. Mr. Wylie, who hails from County Antrim and is Chairman of the Royal Dublin Society, first expounded his views in a long and rather rambling letter to the *Irish Times* under the title "A Dream of Ireland in the Coming Times". Subsequently, as a condition of proceeding further with the project, he asked for and obtained several thousand promises of support. The purpose of the Guild is not to interfere with government policy or projects but to create a body of public opinion prepared to help the unemployed and to form a number of non-profit companies to relieve distress and unemployment. How far such organisations might interfere with existing charitable and business enterprises is not clear. The only practical result apparent is a proposal to establish cheap popular restaurants in Dublin. Irish Labour organisations are definitely hostile to what they believe to be an attempt to save the rich from taxation for relief, and the Catholic Church is hardly likely to smile on a non-sectarian movement which is strongly reminiscent of the Oxford Group.

IV. Ulster

THE sudden death of Lord Craigavon, on November 24, has left a gap in the Irish political scene which it will be difficult to fill. He had held the office of Prime Minister here

continuously since 1921, a longer period than any other European statesman. During that time he had become the recognised spokesman of Ulster. Unlike his predecessor, Lord Carson, who was a typical Dublin barrister, Lord Craigavon was an Ulsterman born and bred, and proud of it too. He possessed the admirable Ulster qualities of honesty, bluntness and determination in high degree, and in spite of his reputation as a political die-hard he was really a kindly man. It was, indeed, characteristic of him that in his last speech in the Northern Parliament on October 29 he admitted that he did not think Ireland had ever been better governed North and South than during the past eighteen years, and he went out of his way to congratulate the Dublin Government on their success and to wish them well. But he had no doubts as to where Ulster's duty and interests lay and did not hesitate to proclaim his belief. His successor, Mr. John Miller Andrews, a flax-spinner and landowner from County Down, has been Northern Minister for Finance since 1937, shares his predecessor's views, and has also succeeded Lord Craigavon in the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Council, which is the only important political force in Northern Ireland. The fact that an independent Unionist candidate has been returned for Lord Craigavon's seat in North Down, where no election had taken place since 1929, only indicates that we are not prepared to give the Government a blank cheque. Our chief difficulty at the moment is that we do not seem to have got our full share of war work, so there is a considerable surplus of labour and the unemployment figures are high. This is, of course, partly due to the absence of conscription. Recent plans to ameliorate the position of the linen industry are expected to improve matters. We have also at last experienced the full brunt of the German attack. On April 7 and 15 and May 4 Belfast and its neighbourhood had their first air-raids. The serious damage and casualties sustained have proved our people to be ready and unafraid, proud also to take their part in the good fight. We appreciate also with gratitude the goodness of the Irish Red Cross in helping the many thousands of our evacuated women and

children who went to Dublin. Irish hearts recognise no boundary to their kindness and compassion.

Mr. De Valera, speaking in the west of Ireland a few days after the second attack on Belfast, expressed amidst applause the sincere sympathy of his Government and people with their fellow countrymen in Northern Ireland. But the action of the Eire fire brigades and A.R.P. service in spontaneously rushing to the help of burning Belfast has done more than all the stale rhetoric of the politicians to extinguish those spiritual fires, fed on suspicion and misunderstanding, which have for so long tragically separated the people of North and South.

Northern Ireland,
April 1941.

THE STALEMATE IN INDIA

I. Mr. Gandhi's Leadership

THE political stalemate in India persists. The failure to find agreement is regretted in all political camps, but open controversy is less pronounced and a mood of weariness and frustration now permeates nearly all political comment. World happenings are overshadowing domestic affairs, and all sensible folk in India are impatient with those party policies which pay little regard to the facts of Indian political conditions or the significance of world events. Men of moderation continue to work quietly for agreement between rival political leaders. Such men can only influence, they cannot determine, Indian political policy; but they reflect the real spirit of the country in their desire to end the controversy at a time when international developments are apparently entering a critical phase. It still remains true that Indians of all political persuasions desire to see Nazism defeated, and no party manœuvring in the country can be described as designed to assist the enemy, whatever its indirect effects may be.

Mr. Gandhi would probably repudiate the suggestion that his policy of sending Congress men to jail has sent into exile those of the party who were anxious to find a solution. Such, however, is the case. While it is true that, like him, the imprisoned Congress men demand independence as the basis of their co-operation in the Indian war effort, it is also true that they disagree with him in his belief that Nazism can be defeated by non-violence. The fault lies not with Mr. Gandhi but with his followers, who have permitted Mr. Gandhi to over-rule their consciences. Men who implied that they were willing to fight Nazism by means of armed force (granted, of course, that their demand for independence had been met) showed little regard for sincerity of purpose when they

abandoned their view and went to jail for freedom of speech to oppose the Indian war effort. It is fairly obvious that the majority of Congress men do not agree with Mr. Gandhi's present policy; some of them frankly admit that no solution is possible under Mr. Gandhi's leadership; but they continue to accept his leadership against their own judgment, presumably on the basis that it is better to be led by Mr. Gandhi wherever he may take them than to be led by someone else who would have to find an outlet from the present stalemate by means of compromise and an acceptance of political realities in India.

The vital factor in the present political and constitutional predicament is that the Government of India Act, 1935, transferred so much to Indian hands that what remains to be transferred is virtually restricted to subjects which it is well-nigh impossible to transfer in time of war. Defence is among them. But the fact that everything cannot be transferred immediately is no reason for assuming, as the Congress party does, that nothing was being transferred under the British Government's proposal to expand the Viceroy's Executive Council. The proposal to include popular representatives in the Council implied that the British authorities recognised that the war had opened a new chapter in Indo-British relations, and that some specific step had to be taken, in the absence of a Central Federal Government, to bring Indian opinion into closer association with the administration. Indeed, it might even be asserted that the proposal to expand the Council represented the opening in practical form of that transitional period, of gradual relinquishment of control to Indian hands, which all constitutional experts in recent years have predicted must inevitably come. It may not be possible in war-time to transfer defence, external affairs, and those other subjects which must at some time become matters for an agreed arrangement between the two countries; but it is clear that popular representatives on the Viceroy's Council would be making a beginning in influencing British policy in these fields. It is inconceivable that popular opinion would have

no influence on Council deliberations, whatever may be the constitutional restrictions which at present circumscribe the Council. But the opportunity to do so has not so far been seized either by the Congress party or the Moslem League.

It would, indeed, appear that the effort to advance constitutional reform which underlies the British offer has only resulted in retarding it, as opposing political parties are more concerned to foster their own solutions for the main constitutional problem than to work together to assist the Indian war effort and, indirectly, to find accommodation for their conflicting views by collaborative effort. Broadly, the British offer implied that controversy should be set aside for the duration of the war and that party leaders should combine in the work of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion; actually, the offer has resulted in the Congress party persisting in its demand for the immediate grant of complete independence, and in the Moslem League opposing any such solution. Under Mr. Gandhi's leadership the Congress party goes even farther. It will only bring non-violence to the prosecution of the war. So long as Congress men are prepared to accept this leadership little value can accrue from associating them with the Viceroy's Council; nor is it easy to see how the British authorities can meet the Congress demand for independence, which is opposed by important elements in the country who are only too willing to assist the war effort to the full.

Mr. Gandhi's policy is simple enough, however unreal it may be in a world at war. He is putting into effect the non-violent philosophy he has evolved during the past twenty years. But it becomes a complex thing when he associates his policy with the political demands of the Congress party. In a recent letter to the *Times of India* Mr. Gandhi wrote that there can be no settlement with the Congress party during the war, for the simple reason that the Congress cannot commit itself to give active war help in men and money. Any alternative would mean a reversal of his non-violent policy. Only a handful of Congress men believe that Nazism can be defeated by non-violence; the evidence of what has happened in half a

dozen neutral countries is before their eyes. When the party, under the guidance of Mr. Rajagopalachariar, adopted a resolution at Poona indicating that non-violence could not be applied to external aggression, Mr. Gandhi disagreed. He now says that that resolution has lapsed, presumably because the British Government is unable, for patent reasons, to grant the complete independence which the Poona resolution also sought. This suggests that even if the British Government did meet the Congress demand for independence in full Mr. Gandhi would still insist on applying his non-violent doctrine to the war. Commenting on this the *Times of India* remarked: "This point should be noted by those who maintain that the Congress would help Britain's war effort if its conditions were fulfilled." The paper added:

"We can only reiterate that the independent, non-violent India envisaged by Mr. Gandhi, stripped of its power to protect itself by arms against foreign aggression, would prove disastrous to the Indian people. It would forge on them fetters of abject slavery from which they could never free themselves."

Mr. Gandhi's policy has placed Congress adherents in a quandary. All the party leaders of consequence are in jail, having fulfilled Mr. Gandhi's orders to offer *satyagraha* (passive resistance) in favour of free speech to oppose the war effort. This martyrdom they assumed half-heartedly. Most of these leaders had admitted that Nazism can only be defeated by armed force, and the suggestion is now thrown out, even in Nationalist newspapers, that the party under Mr. Gandhi's leadership is being transformed from a political organization into a pacifist society. Mr. Gandhi's view that even a full-fledged Indian National Government will apply only non-violence to the war has perturbed many of his followers, particularly those who are anxious to secure a settlement that will enable the party to re-establish its ministries in the Provinces and to assume a share of responsibility at the Centre. To such Congress men Mr. Gandhi has lost sight of the main mission of the party—to secure independence at the earliest possible date. They feel that they are no longer being asked

to struggle for political freedom but merely to express Mr. Gandhi's particular creed of non-violence. This attitude has been reflected in the Lahore Nationalist newspaper, the *Tribune*, which says:

"The fullest measure of success in the fight would bring to the country, not independence, but only freedom to carry on anti-war propaganda and preach non-violence, a freedom which a National Government itself, should one be established in India tomorrow, would not hesitate to curtail effectively if it found it incompatible with the successful prosecution of a war in which it might be engaged in the best interests of the country."

The criticism has been made that in the interests of the British and Indian war efforts the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, has not done enough in exploring the possibilities of a settlement; this is unjust criticism, as it is clear from Mr. Gandhi's declared policy that even a settlement in the constitutional field does not imply Congress support in the war effort, so long as Mr. Gandhi retains the party leadership. Lesser Congress leaders maintain that if independence is granted Mr. Gandhi's non-violent theories will be abandoned by those who will assume responsibility for ruling the country. But there is little evidence at present that these leaders are prepared to oppose Mr. Gandhi's policy; on the contrary many of them have gone to jail in pursuit of it. It is true that the majority of them do not have full faith in non-violence as a weapon against aggression; but they have placed themselves in Mr. Gandhi's hands in the belief that whatever policy he pursues will lead them to independence, overlooking the fact that non-violence means more to Mr. Gandhi than independence does. Actually, in insisting upon independence as the only solution for the Indian constitutional tangle, the Congress party has played into Mr. Gandhi's hands. Realising the difficulty of bestowing independence upon a divided India, Mr. Gandhi has reverted to his old policy of applying non-violence to solving all difficulties; in applying it in this case he has complicated Congress policy, for under his leadership the party is now pledged to secure independence in war-time in a manner that prevents the

party from assisting the war effort. To make changes in the Central Government in these circumstances would only add to the confusion which exists.

II. The Moslem Attitude

THE ideal of complete independence which the Congress party seeks continues to be opposed by the Moslem League. Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the League, who has been re-elected its president until 1942, has repeatedly declared that the Congress demand is primarily a threat to Moslem India. He regards the demand as aimed at coercing the British to concede constitutional reforms to a Hindu majority, under which the Moslems are unwilling to live. Moreover, the League also opposes the *satyagraha* movement, on the ground that it also seeks to coerce the British into meeting the Congress demand. The League Council, in a resolution passed at Delhi, asserted that if the British Government responds to the Congress demand it will be agreeing to a policy adversely affecting Moslem interests. Mr. Jinnah made it clear at the Delhi meeting that the League will agree to no constitution based on the principle of majority rule; it opposes the idea of a constituent assembly to devise such a constitution, and it opposes a National Government based on popular representation. The League once more reaffirmed its adherence to the scheme of Pakistan, which seeks to establish Moslem zones in eastern and north-western India, in which areas the Moslem majorities could work out their political salvation independent of Hindu control.

Two facts now stand out in the controversy. Non-violence towards Nazism is not endorsed in the country, not even by the majority of Congress men; nor will the Moslem League agree to complete independence of the kind sought by the Congress party. So long as the Congress party takes its stand upon these principles there will be no constitutional solution. Non-violence towards the war is not a solution that can be acceptable to the British authorities, quite apart from the

constitutional issue; nor will the Moslem League accept complete independence if it means the transference of power to a general electorate in India. The British sought the collaboration of party leaders to assist the war effort, not to hinder it; and it is not enough for influential Congress spokesmen to imply that if their demand for independence is met Mr. Gandhi's non-violent theories will be abandoned and that the communal problem will automatically solve itself. Mr. Gandhi has said that even under a Congress government non-violence will be applied to war; and the Moslems, as well as the British, do not agree with that policy. The Moslem community, as represented in the Moslem League, will insist upon the division of India into separate Hindu and Moslem states, unless it can be enticed by negotiation into collaboration with the Congress party to secure an agreed constitutional solution.

Pending such collaboration the League stands firmly behind the Pakistan project, which has come to stay, if only as a bargaining counter. The Moslems prefer to shelter within innumerable Ulsters throughout India rather than accept a Central administration which derives its authority from majority rule. Congress policy has given new life to the old idea that Moslem India should be distinct from Hindu India. Congress commentators would like to place the blame for this development on the British authorities; but the blame lies in India. Recently, in London, Mr. Amery made a plea for policies in India that would be governed by the ideal of "India first"; it was obviously a plea for political unity. This was interpreted in Moslem League circles as implying that Moslems should abandon their Pakistan scheme in favour of something representing the political and economic unity of the country. This they have declared they are not prepared to do, although it is possible that moderate Moslem opinion may modify this attitude when the time for constitution-making actually comes. The Congress press would like the British authorities to condemn the Pakistan project, on the ground that it makes for disunity. But the British Government has clearly indicated that the future constitution is to be devised

primarily by Indians, apart from some special subjects which will mean negotiations between the two countries, and such a stipulation cannot reasonably carry with it a proviso that a large section of Indian opinion should be debarred from presenting its own views about the new constitution. Indeed, it is now obvious that the Moslem League will bring forward the Pakistan scheme as an integral feature of its constitutional proposals. However much Congress leaders may resent this they cannot now prevent it, even with the argument that no minority should have the right to veto constitutional advance which the majority favours. Hindu–Moslem relations form the principal stumbling-block to any advance, and it is now clear that the Moslems will agree to no constitution unless they are satisfied that their cultural, political and economic interests are fully protected within its terms.

III. The Moderate Leaven

HAPPILY, the political extremism which characterises the policies of the two main parties is not endorsed by the majority of politically minded people in the country. There is a strong and growing body of moderate opinion which is becoming increasingly impatient with the official policies of both the Congress party and the Moslem League. Such thinkers emphasize the need for winning the war, which they regard as essential if India is to attain freedom at all. In the main they agree neither with the leaders of Congress nor with the League, although they are prepared to use their good offices to secure the collaboration of these organisations in the formation of a reconstructed Central Government. Some, indeed, would prefer to see the British Government reconstructing the central administration by co-operating with such political talent in the country as is willing to co-operate. But most of them would prefer to see both Congress and the League represented in the Viceroy's Executive Council for the purpose of prosecuting the war to a successful end.

Several public men of moderate political views have lately

been working strenuously to secure some measure of agreement among the parties such as will enable them to take office at the centre. The most serious attempt in this direction has been undertaken by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the constitutional lawyer of Liberal interests, who issued a statement on December 13 in which he recommended Indian political leaders to take steps to find some common agreement that would enable them to discuss with the Viceroy the measures which could be taken to associate Indians with the prosecution of the war. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru suggested that Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah should meet and discuss problems in an open and large-hearted manner, with a fixed determination to come to some form of settlement. He urged that they should associate the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, and the Scheduled Castes with the discussions, with a view to securing even wider unity. They should then see the Viceroy and press on him the need for reconstructing his government so as to give it in substance the character of a National Government, in which the number of non-official Indians would be predominantly large. He also recommended that an Indian Defence Minister should be appointed, and that an attempt should be made to re-establish normal constitutional government in the Provinces, either by reviving the old ministries or by creating coalition governments. He regarded it as necessary that the public should know whether the Viceroy's reconstructed Council will work on the basis of collective responsibility, even although that responsibility for the time being will be to the Crown.

Nationalist commentators were critical of the suggestion that the reconstructed Viceroy's Council should be responsible to the Crown, holding that the essence of the Congress case was that responsibility should be to the elected elements of the Central Legislature. But in the main Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's proposals were regarded as a serious effort to encourage a more rational approach to the whole controversy than had hitherto been possible, owing to the political extremism of the two main parties. Further developments then took place behind the scenes, and it is understood that approaches were made

both to Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah, with what success is not known at the time of writing. A few days after the publication of the Sapru statement the Viceroy made a speech in Calcutta, which was regarded as another invitation to party leaders to collaborate in finding some means that would enable their parties to be associated with the Central Government and with a War Advisory Council, in which the Princes would also participate. Lord Linlithgow asserted that all the constructive proposals hitherto made had emanated from the British side, a statement which the *Statesman* described as a "heavy indictment which should make Indian leaders reflect".

The active intervention of moderate elements is generally regarded as one of the most hopeful features of the situation, as their proposals tend to remove controversy from the problem. The leaders of most of the established political parties are prone to think that they have solved the problem simply by stating their party cases. No attempt has so far been made among these leaders to meet and find agreement, not necessarily an agreement that solves all the problems which India has to face, but sufficient agreement to enable its own leaders to set about the task of solving them. For this purpose various proposals have been outlined, the most practical one being a suggestion that a group of British and Indian experts should be formed to analyse the problem in all its aspects. It is clear, however, that the work of such a group will be fruitless unless it is carried out in association with representatives of the main parties, whose agreement will be necessary for the success of any scheme that may emerge from such a study circle.

IV. The War Effort

THE prominence given to the political controversy has tended to obscure the importance of the Indian contribution to the war, which has been immense and is constantly increasing. Land, sea, and air forces are being expanded; ordnance factories and civil industry are working to capacity on war orders; the establishment of a factory to manufacture

aeroplanes is no longer only a remote possibility; and the effects of the Eastern Group Conference are already making themselves felt in increased production and in the co-ordination of supplies within those countries of the Eastern hemisphere which participated in the conference. The proposal to establish an Eastern Group Supply Council, the principal recommendation made by the conference, has been implemented by the participating governments, and Sir Archibald Carter has been appointed as its chairman by the British Government. He has established his office in Delhi and awaits the arrival of delegates from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa who, in association with Indian delegates, will continue the work of marshalling the resources of the Eastern parts of the Commonwealth behind the common effort.

The appointment of Sir Claude Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief in India has been popularly welcomed. Direct from an important command in England and primed with experience of total war, his selection has been interpreted as implying that the British Government places great importance on its choice for the Indian command. With thirty-seven years' experience of India behind him, Sir Claude Auchinleck has a wide knowledge of India's military and defensive problems, and even in the political field his appointment is not without significance. Comparatively young for the office, he is expected to give a distinct fillip to Indianisation and already in a broadcast talk has emphasised the need for the Indian people to regard their army as part of themselves. That army is growing ever larger, with more recruits flocking to the colours than the authorities appear to require at once. Already Indian soldiers have given a good account of themselves in North Africa, taking a prominent part in the attack on and around Sidi Barrani, when the spearhead of Graziani's invading forces was broken and dispersed by Indian and British troops working in the closest collaboration. Elsewhere, these men are upholding the traditions of the Indian Army and have won praise from Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, and from General Wavell.

The Indian Princes continue to support the war effort with men and money. During the first sixteen months of war they have been contributing cash at the rate of £90,000 a month. Troops from Indian States are serving with His Majesty's Forces outside their States, either in India or overseas, and States are co-operating in supplying recruits for the expanded air forces and technicians for the developing munitions factories. States possessing industrial facilities are placing them at the disposal of the authorities, and the Princes are associated with British India on Provincial Advisory Supply Committees in Bengal, Madras, the Punjab, the United Provinces, and Sind. As in British India, the States are establishing Civic Guards, to assist the police in war duties, and creating A.R.P. organizations, in which the public are now serving in large numbers. When the final tale is told it will be found that the combined war effort of the two Indias will rank among the important contributions from the Commonwealth countries.

India,
March, 1941.

GREAT BRITAIN

I. Towards National Civil Defence

"IT is just in those very places . . ., where the ordeal of the men, women and children has been most severe, that I have found their morale most high and splendid . . . . Indeed, I feel encompassed by an exaltation of spirit in the people which seems to lift mankind and its problems above the level of material facts—into that joyous serenity we think belongs to a better world than this." In his broadcast on April 27, Mr. Churchill paid tribute with these words to the spirit shown by the people of Great Britain towards the resumption of heavy air-raids which have been their lot in Hitler's spring offensive. The scale of the attacks is illustrated by the big rise in the casualty list. In March the number of civilians killed was 4,259 compared with only 789 in February and 1,502 in January; of the total, some 1,100 were killed in the Clydeside raids of March 14 and 15. The April casualties, however, were higher still; in that month 6,065 civilians were killed and 6,926 injured, the highest total of deaths recorded since last October.

Unfortunately, the "exaltation of spirit" in the people of the bombed towns has still not been matched by the service it deserves from those responsible for their well-being. There is not, it is true, the confusion that characterised the arrangements for feeding, re-housing and rehabilitating London's homeless in September and October last year; the lesson that civil defence means far more than air-raid precautions has been learned. But outside London, where civil defence welfare is gradually being satisfactorily organised, local authorities have had great difficulty in translating the lesson into action, because they are too small, both administratively and financially, to grapple with all the problems involved. The regional organi-

sation for co-ordinating the civil defence arrangements of all the local authorities comprised within the region is there, but so far it has only been used for co-ordination. In London the local authorities are becoming more and more the agents of the regional and central administration, but in the provinces they still have too frequently to bear a responsibility for which they are unfitted. Not that it is always the local government that is to blame. Frequent requests were made by the Plymouth authorities to the Ministry of Health that Plymouth should be declared an evacuation area, but this was not granted until the town had suffered five heavy raids in nine days—a delay which can only be explained by the fact that the neighbouring reception areas are congested with evacuees from other towns.

The same defect in the present system of local government is apparent in the fire-fighting arrangements. Within its limitations, the fire prevention scheme which was inaugurated in the New Year has proved fairly successful. It has at least aroused the public to the danger of empty premises and unattended incendiary bombs, and far fewer fires have been allowed through carelessness and ignorance than was the case before the City of London's lesson. But the fact remains that the enemy still finds it profitable to start a raid with large numbers of incendiary bombs, and sufficient numbers of fires have been caused to place a great strain on the fire-fighting services. It is true that, in this case, there is central direction, and local barriers have broken down to the extent that there is complete willingness on the part of fire brigades of different towns and different counties to give mutual help; but because in peacetime each brigade is organised on a local basis, this willingness is often unavailing owing to practical obstacles such as differences in equipment. It was announced on May 13 that the Government is to take over full responsibility for fire-fighting and will organise it as a national service. This is a very large step forward—taken by no means too soon.

Other signs are also not lacking of a slow progress towards a more comprehensive system of civil defence. For instance, a serious weakness, which the first winter of air-raids has shown

up, is the shortage, in some areas, of recruits in the civil defence services, a shortage which has become more apparent with the growing claims on man-power of the armed forces and industry. To fill the gaps in local A.R.P. establishments, the Government first extended the voluntary principle by allowing men of the older age-groups to volunteer for civil defence when registering for military service. But since this did not produce enough recruits—even though the pay of a full-time A.R.P. worker, £3. 10*s.* a week with a subsistence allowance of 24*s.* 6*d.* if away from home, compares favourably with a soldier's pay—a new National Service Act was passed before Easter. Under it, men called up can be compelled to enter civil defence service, and conscientious objectors, who are granted exemption from military service only on condition they undertake specified civil work, can be directed to perform civil defence work. These civil defence conscripts, like those for the armed forces, will be in the service of the Crown, and they will be transferred to any part of the country in need of help.

Another sign of a growing national and regional system is provided by some of the first-aid work done in the raided towns. The Ministry of Food sends food and mobile kitchens, and the Ministry of Works and Buildings has squads of building workers in the different regions on whom local authorities can draw for help in rehousing the homeless when local resources in labour, tools and materials are insufficient. Moreover, the War Damage Act, which attempts to distribute among the whole community of property owners the financial burden of the loss suffered by individuals from bombing, has come into force. Before the Bill became law, its chief drawbacks (which were pointed out in THE ROUND TABLE for March 1941),* had been largely removed. The inequitable distinction between the treatment of those property owners whose houses are damaged (who are to have them restored) and those whose houses are destroyed beyond repair (who were, in the original Bill, merely to receive their pre-war

* Page 328.

value) has been dealt with by allowing the War Damage Commission to recommend an increase in value payments to the latter to cover any rise in building costs after the passing of the Act. The scheme for the insurance of private chattels has also been improved. It has not been made compulsory; but the high rate of premium originally suggested, which would have made it impossible for many households to take out a policy, has been replaced by a sliding scale, and every person suffering loss is to be compensated by free grants of up to £200 for a householder, with an extra £100 for a wife, £25 for each child, and £50 for a lodger or hotel guest. These grants replace the original scheme of immediate free grants for essential furniture and clothing to persons of limited incomes, but unless there is hardship, payment will in most cases—in all cases arising from the insurance of chattels above the limit of the free grants—be deferred until after the war.

To the people of Great Britain the spring offensive has been more menacing on sea than in the air, and the scale of shipping losses, together with the growing demands on shipping of American war supplies has given an added urgency to debates and discussions on food policy. The short-sightedness of preserving comfortable living in the first year of war is now revealed, and the Ministry of Food has incurred censure for forbearing to extend rationing in times of plenty, which would have enabled it to build up stocks against the present difficulties. Thus, the new rationing which has taken place since the New Year might have been less severe—though it is still by no means stringent—if there had been earlier prudence. The meat ration has been cut by successive stages and is now at 1s. a head per week; moreover it includes pork and edible offals, the purchase of which was formerly unrestricted. A global ration allows only 8 ounces per head of "sweet spread"—jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle—a month; cheese has been rationed to the extent of 1 ounce per head per week—with the allowance of an extra ration to underground mine workers and agricultural labourers; milk sales have been temporarily reduced by one-seventh in order to free more milk for cheese-

making—though mothers and children receiving milk under the national milk scheme will be unaffected. There is also unofficial rationing of other foods, such as eggs and biscuits. Moreover, catering establishments have been further restricted; no person can have a combination of fish, eggs, cheese and meat at the same meal, and no sugar allowance for sweetening hot beverages is to be allowed to cafés and restaurants after June 2.

Shortage of shipping has reduced, not only direct food imports, but also imports of feeding-stuffs and fertilisers for the production of food at home. Farmers have, therefore, been severely rationed for feeding-stuffs for live stock, and as dairy herds must be given priority for what supplies of feed there are, farmers, pig-keepers and poultry owners are being forced to make heavy reductions in their numbers of fatstock, pigs and poultry.

II. Economic Mobilisation

IT has long been recognised that not a small part of the shipping problem is due to congestion at the ports. Early in the New Year regional port directors were appointed, whose duty is to effect a more rapid clearance through ports and to speed up the turn-round of ships. Later, a scheme for abolishing casual labour was introduced in Merseyside and Clydeside. From the time it was put into force, dockers became the direct employees of the Ministry of Transport; they are guaranteed a minimum weekly wage for a minimum number of hours of work a week, and in return must take any work considered necessary for the clearance of ports that is offered them.

The congestion at the docks has also been in some part due to duality of control; bringing the ships to port and clearing them were the functions of two different departments—the Ministry of Shipping and the Ministry of Transport. In an attempt to unify the two tasks, these Ministries were amalgamated in May under one Minister, Mr. F. J. Leathers, a newcomer to politics, but a business man with long experience of transport needs and methods.

The dock labour scheme was a voluntary one with a sanction in the background. Steps, however, have been taken towards the industrial conscription that was foreshadowed by Mr. Bevin in the New Year. By the Essential Work Order, employers in certain industries are prohibited from dismissing workers, and workers from giving notice, except with the consent of the Ministry of Labour. And the first general non-military registrations have been carried out. On April 5, men aged 41–44, the age-group immediately above those liable to be called up for military service, were required to register, and the registration has also taken place of all women aged 20–21, with certain exempted classes, such as those doing direct war work. It does not appear, however, that the Ministry of Labour proposes yet to go much farther than registration—especially where the women are concerned. It has been more or less officially admitted that women who are in work will be allowed to remain where they are, no matter how unimportant for the war effort the work may be. Those who are unoccupied will be asked to join one of the women's branches of the armed forces, or the nursing service, the land army or to enter a factory—in accordance with the individual tastes, qualifications and social environment of the woman concerned. Mr. Bevin has proceeded from voluntary appeals to registration and guidance, but he has not yet grasped the nettle of equal compulsion for all.

Far more important, however, than industrial registration as a means of finding man-power for the munitions factories is the policy of industrial concentration announced early in March. The Limitation of Supplies Orders, which restricted in a very wide range of consumer goods industries the amount that could be supplied by manufacturer to retailer, had only succeeded in freeing relatively small numbers of factory workers. So thoroughly had the public conscience been awakened in the 'twenties and 'thirties to the scourge of unemployment that there has been a real psychological hindrance to wholesale closures and dismissals, because there has been no confidence that the labour dismissed would immediately be

reabsorbed. In spite of the big cuts in their turnover, most firms have struggled to keep going, with their plant and labour working part-time, rather than close down altogether.

Industrial concentration was therefore the obvious corollary to the limitation of supplies. Its object is to obtain the most efficient production of the restricted supply of civilian goods by concentrating it in a few factories working full-time rather than in many factories working part-time. Each industry subject to the Limitation of Supplies Orders and the rationing of raw materials is to come under the concentration scheme. Where possible, the nucleus plants, that is, those chosen to carry on production, must be situated in areas where there is no great demand for labour for munition industries; and they will be guaranteed their supplies of raw materials. The remaining plants in the concentrated industry will close down; their employees will be transferred to munitions work and their buildings and equipment, if suitable, will be similarly utilised. They will, however, have a right to a share of the profit earned by the nucleus firms, although the method of distributing the profits among the different firms will depend in each industry on the method of concentration adopted. In some cases, the nucleus firms will act merely as production agents for the closed-down firms, which will preserve their own distributive organisations. This method is the one most in the interests of the consumer in that it preserves the identity of the closed-down firms and thus helps to ensure the restoration of competition and variety in the consumer goods industry after the war. It is also, fortunately, the method most favoured by the Board of Trade. The greatest danger to the consumer's interests would come from a concentration that was effected by a permanent merger, for it would encourage the growth of monopolies, which has been the most unsatisfactory feature of British industry in recent years.

Although the Board of Trade is giving "very close directions" on the lines along which concentration should proceed, the practical arrangements are being left to the industries themselves with the assistance of the Industrial and Export

Council—the Export Council renamed. But the Government will not hesitate to impose the necessary reorganisation if industries are unwilling or unable to reorganise themselves, and varying dates in May have been fixed by which time voluntary schemes of concentration must be completed if compulsory reorganisation is to be avoided. No estimate has been given of the numbers of factory-trained workers that will be released by industrial concentration, but it is certainly the most ambitious and effective method of mobilising man-power for industry that has been adopted since the war began.

III. Politics and National Unity

THE satisfaction with which the Government's more comprehensive and realistic economic policy has been greeted both in and outside Parliament is shown by the absence of debates on labour and supply since the New Year, and also by the general welcome given to the budget, which is discussed in another article. So far as the economic front is concerned, parliamentary criticism has mainly centred on food production and distribution. There have, however, been other topics which have given rise to friction between the Government and the House of Commons. This was apparent, for instance, in the debates on the Determination of Needs Bill. The abolition of the household means test for unemployment assistance had for long been in the forefront of the Labour Party's programme and the application of the means test to supplementary old age pensions had been bitterly resisted when the new Pensions Bill was brought in by Mr. Chamberlain's Government early in 1940. The Determination of Needs Act is, therefore, the firstfruits for the Labour Party of its willingness to join the Government. By it the old household means test is replaced by a test of personal needs; generally speaking, only the resources of the applicant for assistance, of his wife and of his dependants are aggregated in determining needs, instead of the old rule of aggregating the resources of every member of the household, although certain standard contributions by

non-dependent members are assumed in some cases. The Act is, in fact, a compromise which goes more than half-way towards the Labour Party's object, but because it does not establish a simple personal needs test or abolish tests of any sort, it was strongly resented by a small group of Labour members, who complained that their leaders had let them down, and Mr. Bevin had to face accusations of betrayal when the Bill was debated.

A more general dissatisfaction was shown over the House of Commons Disqualification (Temporary Provisions) Bill. The immediate cause of the Bill was the appointment of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald to be High Commissioner in Canada. His new post is an office of profit under the Crown, and ever since the days of Queen Anne acceptance of such an office disqualifies its holder from membership of the House of Commons. In the course of the centuries, the whole position has become very ambiguous; some offices—ambassadorships, for instance—have been generally considered exempt from the rule, and although the disqualification is appointment to an "office of profit", the simple test of remuneration does not apply. The question, therefore, might need clearing up in any case, quite apart from Mr. MacDonald's appointment, and, in fact, a Select Committee is to enquire into the whole position of offices of profit both in war and in peace.

The new Bill, however, is only a war-time measure which has to be renewed annually. Under it, members who are given a Government appointment during the war may keep their seats, provided that it is in the public interest for the prosecution of the war, and a certificate to that effect must be obtained from the First Lord of the Treasury and laid before the House. Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of uneasiness among members of Parliament when the Bill was debated, and if Mr. Churchill had not made its passing a question of confidence in the Government, a division might have revealed a sizeable opposition.

The two main objections to the Bill were, first, that it might weaken the power of Parliament to criticise the Executive and,

secondly, that it disfranchises constituencies whose members, like Mr. MacDonald, are given appointments abroad. Obviously, the more serious objection is the first, for criticism in these days of government by regulation is the most useful function that Parliament can perform. The Act of Queen Anne's reign was passed because of the temptation on the part of the Crown to pack the House of Commons with placemen, and the increase in the number of Ministries since the war has already extended the numerical influence of the Government in the House. It cannot, however, be seriously contended that the Government would abuse its powers to such an extent, and though Parliament cannot reject the Prime Minister's certificates, it can use all its powers of protestation if they are too numerous. Actually, only three have so far been granted—for Mr. MacDonald, for Mr. R. H. Cross, who has been appointed High Commissioner in Australia, and for Sir Ian Fraser, who has been reappointed a Governor of the B.B.C.

The argument of disfranchisement is somewhat meaningless, for the present Parliament is already thoroughly unrepresentative. Nearly four years old when the war started, it has already exceeded its normal maximum span of years; there is a party truce at by-elections; and seats have had to be found for several Ministers who have been drawn from outside Parliament and have no ambitions for a political career. It would clearly be undesirable and impracticable to hold a general election in war-time. But the great age of the present House of Commons makes it very desirable that a general election should be held as soon after the war as practicable. There is, however, some difference of opinion, about how soon this will be. Mr. Churchill has spoken of the advantages of preserving national unity, by which is interpreted the party truce, for the period of planned reconstruction which, he says, is to extend for three years after the war. The Labour and Liberal leaders have given their blessing to this vaguely defined aspiration, and it is fairly widely believed that the present Government will remain in office and that there will be no general election until the three years have elapsed. But there may be serious objections to

such a course if indeed this interpretation of the Government's attitude is correct. While a repetition of the khaki election of 1918 should, of course, be avoided, the spectacle of a, perhaps, ten-year-old Parliament legislating for national reconstruction in the name of national unity would not be very edifying.

IV. Calls for a Stronger Government

CRITICISM of the Government has not been confined to purely domestic concerns. The evacuation of Greece and the setback in North Africa were followed by a demand for a debate on the conduct of the war. But the background of the debate which took place on May 6 and 7 of this year was very different from that of the debate which took place exactly a year previously on the failure of the Norwegian campaign. Last year, the debate was the culmination of a growing exasperation with Mr. Chamberlain's Government which had been fermenting long before the war began. The Government was national only in name, and though the Labour Party would not have been able to form an administration by itself, there was an alternative Prime Minister under whom they were willing to serve. This time, there is not the slightest sign of a lack of confidence in Mr. Churchill's conduct of the war; his position in Parliament and the country remains unassailable; and the decision to send troops to Greece was never really questioned. The debate, in fact, was mainly an occasion for explanatory statements from the Government benches, and unspecific demands from other parts of the House for a yet stronger war effort, a more thorough industrial mobilisation, and, not a new, but a stronger, Government.

It is this last demand that touches Mr. Churchill's weakest spot. He and the War Cabinet are virtually synonymous terms, with the result that, in spite of the elaborate system of committees and executives, he is really managing director of every side of the war effort. Most of his colleagues in the War Cabinet were chosen, not for their abilities, but for their party allegiance, and although the reasons for the choice may have been good ones a year ago, they have now become obsolete.

The few Government changes which were made early in May, were, however, not decisive. Lord Beaverbrook relinquished the office of Minister of Aircraft Production to become Minister of State. Last summer, in speeding up the production of aeroplanes—then Britain's most urgent need—he did wonders, but his genius for hustling is said to be accompanied by certain defects, of which an incapacity for co-operation is the most manifest. In his new capacity he is to be Deputy Chairman of that part of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet which deals with Supply matters. Mr. Attlee is Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee (Operations) and Mr. Churchill is, of course, Chairman of both. He has been succeeded at the Ministry of Aircraft Production by Lt.-Col. J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon, Minister of Transport until the amalgamation of his Department with the Ministry of Shipping. Mr. Ronald Cross, previously Minister of Shipping has been appointed High Commissioner in Australia, an appointment which, following those of Mr. MacDonald to Canada and Lord Harlech to South Africa, emphasises the new importance acquired by these offices during the war.

Those who call for a stronger Government have suggested that Mr. Churchill should not confine himself to this island in his search for stronger men, and the presence of Mr. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, who during the Near Eastern crisis was a powerful reinforcement to the War Cabinet, has again revived the idea of an Imperial War Cabinet. To some an Imperial War Cabinet is essentially a Cabinet in which all the Dominions are represented—preferably by their Prime Ministers. The general view, however, is that this would merely perpetuate the weakness of the present British War Cabinet by making representation more important than suitability for the job. Mr. Churchill might with advantage turn to the Empire for strong men for his Cabinet, and he might well find them among the party leaders, but either would be an unnecessary restriction on his choice.

Great Britain,
May 1941.

CANADA

I. The St. Lawrence Waterway Agreement

ON March 19 plenipotentiaries of Canada and the United States signed in Ottawa an agreement providing for works on the international section of the St. Lawrence River which would allow for greatly increased production of hydro-electric power and navigation by ocean-going vessels. The agreement is not in the form of a treaty—although legal authorities in both countries hold that it will have the validity of a treaty—but requires to be ratified by the legislatures of both countries. The objects of this procedure are to avoid the necessity of a two-thirds majority in the American Senate and to protect the rights of American states. It will be submitted first to Congress, and, only after passing that body, to the Canadian Parliament. The order is a recognition that the initiative has come, and continues to come, from the United States. A treaty with terms similar to the present agreement was rejected by the American Senate in 1934;* but the present project owes its origin to the support of the American Government, and especially of the President, and it can probably be taken for granted that its final acceptance or rejection will be decided in Washington.

For a generation proposals substantially the same as the present ones have been made on grounds of general advantage to the normal interests of Canada and the United States. Now, however, the St. Lawrence development is urged as an immediate necessity as part of the defence measures. In December last the President made public a statement in which he argued that war-time industries urgently required the additional power that could be developed on the river, and that the pressing demand for ships could be effectively met only by

* See The Round Table, No. 95, June 1934, p. 548.

making possible their construction at ports on the Great Lakes. In a message to the Prime Minister of Canada on March 10 Mr. Roosevelt again affirmed his conviction that the project was essential to the general scheme of defence. "The Government of the United States", he stated in a passage which was greeted with applause when it was read in the House of Commons, "is engaged in a great defence programme. It is determined to supply such aid in material to Great Britain, the members of the Commonwealth and their allies as may be necessary to enable them to bring the war to a successful termination." The proposition is that the industrialized areas in the east of the United States and Canada should be able to acquire more electric power as the needs of the war bring steadily increased production. The deepening of the river would allow for the passage to the ocean of merchantmen and naval vessels built at lake-ports in addition to those constructed at the already over-taxed shipyards on the ocean. A further advantage, it is said, would be that the inland ports would be removed by hundreds of miles from enemy attacks.

To make possible these sweeping changes it is proposed that a great dam be built on the international section of the St. Lawrence, that is on the final stretches of the river below Lake Ontario. Here power-houses would also be constructed; and these, together with subsidiary ones at more western points, would finally yield power estimated at 1½ million horse-power. The dam would at the same time flood out the rapids on the river above it, creating a navigation-depth of 27 feet. The cost of the whole work, including compensation for flooded land, is estimated at more than $350 millions, the larger part of which would be paid by the United States, in view of the fact that the Dominion has already rebuilt the Welland Canal between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. It is supposed that power and navigation works on the international rapids section could be rushed to completion in something under three years; and that the subsidiary deepening of canals and channels above and below that section would

be undertaken later—the whole to be finished by the end of 1948 at an estimated total cost of $500 millions. There would then be an inland seaway from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the end of Lake Superior, a distance of some two thousand miles.

The scheme conjures up a vision that can hardly fail to strike the imagination. It is barely six years since it was condemned by an American Senator as opening the way for British warships to sail into the heart of the United States. So revolutionary have been the changes since that day that the necessity for the policy of assisting Britain is now the plan's strongest recommendation. More distant international relationships would be submerged, just as Chrysler's Farm, scene of one of the battles of the War of 1812, would disappear under the dammed waters of the river. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, long venerated as the symbol of peace on the continent, has already been modified, and would virtually be laid aside as modern men-of-war steamed past the ancient fortifications once built as protection against invasion across the lakes and the river. The harnessed St. Lawrence would not only be carrying great ships through half a continent, but at the same time be turning the wheels of factories in two countries—the very factories, perhaps, in which the parts of freighters were being made, and the munitions to be carried in those ships to the battle-front. In time of peace the St. Lawrence–Great Lakes system would continue to perform its dual function as a seaway and a source of power.

Such is the vision. How is its translation into reality seen in the countries whose Governments have affixed their signatures to the agreement? As late as March 5, after negotiations and investigations were well advanced, Mr. Mackenzie King, in a note to the American Minister in Ottawa, asked that the latter's Government review the whole question from the point of view of its actual necessity in time of war, pointing out that "the growing intensity of the war operations and the apprehension that still more serious perils will have to be faced in the very near future necessitate the most careful examination of any proposed expenditure from the point of view of public

need and in the light of war requirements". The reply, a sentence from which has already been quoted, was a categorical affirmative, and apparently is accepted as a final answer by the Canadian Government. To some Canadians, however, there are still doubts about the wisdom of accepting such a large commitment at the present time. It is felt that great construction works would cause a diversion of money, labour and materials which can ill be spared, and which might, perhaps, be better employed in more immediate tasks. The degree to which additional power will be required is a matter of dispute, especially in view of the works already under way to the north of Lake Superior, where water that now flows into Hudson Bay is to be turned south into the lake, operating generators on the way. In general, criticism is levelled not against the seaway plan as such, but against its immediate construction. No results can accrue for years, and it is questioned whether they would, in fact, materialize in time to affect the present war. If the project is looked at on its general merits, quite other deductions might be drawn, for the improvement and increased use of the St. Lawrence has been a dream of Canadians for nearly two centuries. At present Canadians are reluctant to express strong views, both because of their traditional belief in the Great River, and because they wish to put no obstacle in the path of Anglo-Canadian-American co-operation in the war.

The initiative, therefore, remains with the American Government and Congress. Observers of the political scene incline to the opinion that the agreement will pass, and there never has been any doubt of the unqualified approval of the President. There is, however, opposition, both in Congress and outside it, which has already been expressed with vigour. To some extent the arguments are similar to those used in Canada: that construction would take so long as to produce no results which could affect the war, and would at the same time detract from the concentration on immediate work for which every ounce of energy is needed. It has also been said by some critics that the necessary increase in the supply of

power could be obtained more cheaply and as effectively by generating from steam instead of from water. Other critics have suggested that the St. Lawrence plan is simply disguised as a war measure in order to make more acceptable a programme which Mr. Roosevelt has long advocated and has in the past failed to put into effect. Further objections are raised on purely peace-time grounds: that it would damage the seaports of the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, the canals of New York State, and the railways of a large area. It is held that the waterway would probably not be used by ocean-going vessels, and if it were that these would take away business from American lake-boats and railways. The river, it is pointed out, is frozen for five months of the year; and for the remaining months the expense of deepening would be high out of all proportion to the advantages gained.

Such are some of the principal objections which, combined with the resistance of interested groups and areas, were in the years of peace sufficient to defeat the passage of a treaty. It remains to be seen whether the changed atmosphere of war time will sweep away those objections as the St. Lawrence would overwhelm the rapids in its path.

II. French Canada and the War

THE widespread support granted to Canada's war effort by her three million citizens of French speech and blood might seem to an outsider one of the minor wonders of the war. On September 10, 1939, Canada for the first time in her history declared war in her own name, and those who recalled Quebec's bitter opposition to conscription for overseas service in 1917–18, the extensive evasion of the military service law and the draft riots in the city of Quebec, were very apprehensive that passive resistance on an even greater scale would mark the present conflict. The vigorous fight for a declaration of Canadian neutrality in case of a European war that had been waged by influential French Canadians in the previous decade by no means served to alleviate these anxieties. Many

earnest and patriotic men felt that war would inevitably split Canadian opinion into two bitterly opposed camps, that Canada's war effort would be paralysed as a result, and her unity seriously threatened. Fortunately for Canada the saving element in this threatening situation was the determination of the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, and his Government that the unity of the country should never again be endangered by forcing conscription for overseas service on unwilling French Canadians. The Government's purpose was manifest from the beginning of the debates preceding the declaration of war. Mr. Ernest Lapointe, the outstanding French-Canadian leader and Federal Minister of Justice, assured his compatriots that the presence of all French Canadians in the Cabinet was entirely conditional upon the Prime Minister's promise never to introduce conscription for overseas service. Although a handful of French-Canadian members argued against participation, it was clear that Quebec opinion as a whole saw in the Government's promise a guarantee of moderate participation and felt that, under the circumstances of Nazi aggression, Canada, in honour, could not help coming to the aid of Britain and her allies.

In spite of Quebec's general acceptance of Canadian participation, the average French-Canadian sentiment was far more one of loyal submission to the inevitable than enthusiastic endorsement of a popular policy. French-Canadian feelings were often contradictory. In Quebec isolationism has remained a deep-seated passion. Sincerely loyal to his King and to the wider Canadian Dominion, the French-Canadian's primary attachment is to the narrower *pays de Québec* where he was born. He feels no call of the blood to rush to Britain's defence or to the defence of France, from which he has been politically separated for more than a century and a half and from whose anti-clerical and free-thinking modern life a wide gulf divides him. The unhappy conflict between French and English Canadians in 1914–18 over the proper measure of participation convinced many in Quebec that a policy of abstention from all wars not directly affecting

Canada was the only means of preserving their cherished institutions, religion and way of life. Divisions in Quebec opinion were marked in the early days of the present war, when many thousands of high-spirited and adventure-loving French Canadians flocked to enlist for overseas service, while anti-participation meetings in Montreal were largely attended and petitions protesting against Canadian involvement received many thousands of signatures. The French-Canadian press reflected the uncertainty and anxiety of the people. Newspapers with Liberal affiliations urged French Canadians to trust their representatives in the Cabinet as the best guarantee against conscription. On the other hand, papers of the Conservative opposition and those of the more extreme French-Canadian nationalist faction urged that Canada should be used primarily as a source of war supplies rather than of man power.

Less than two months after the outbreak of war the attitude of French Canada to the policy of participation was put to the test by a provincial election unexpectedly called by Mr. Duplessis, the Prime Minister of Quebec.* Already in control of the provincial legislature by a great majority, Mr. Duplessis, himself an ultra-nationalist and somewhat of a demagogue, called upon French Canadians to ratify his refusal to support the Dominion's war effort. The threat to national unity in Mr. Duplessis's stand was obvious. Mr. Lapointe and his lieutenants at Ottawa took up the challenge by announcing they would consider a victory for Mr. Duplessis as a vote of no-confidence in themselves and their support of Canadian participation, which would involve their immediate resignation. The courageous attitude of Mr. Lapointe and the other French-Canadian leaders at Ottawa and the speeches they made throughout the province had a great effect, and on October 25, 1939, the Duplessis Government sustained an overwhelming defeat, retaining only 16 out of 85 seats. A chorus of rejoicing at Quebec's clear repudiation of Mr. Duplessis's anti-war policy swept English-speaking Canada, where it was felt that French Canada had struck a great blow

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 117, December 1939, p. 185.

for national unity. Responsible French-Canadian leaders were almost alarmed lest their compatriots of English speech should exaggerate the verdict of October 25 as being a mandate for "all out" participation, which it was actually not. Cardinal Villeneuve, Archbishop of Quebec, emphasized that the election result was a vote for national unity rather than for an "imperialistic" policy. The new Prime Minister of the province, Mr. Adelard Godbout, an able and statesmanlike leader, who, unlike his predecessor, maintains the friendliest relations with the Federal Government and enjoys its confidence, also played his part in allaying any French-Canadian anxieties. Mr. Godbout's later proposal for an increased study of English in Quebec schools reflected his desire for more tolerance and understanding between the two races, and although the measure was condemned in extreme nationalist circles, it pleased friends of national unity.

The winter of 1939–40 passed comparatively quietly for Quebec. Moderate participation in the war was reasonably popular. French Canada evidenced its satisfaction with the policy of Ottawa by returning 64 government supporters out of a possible 65 in the Quebec delegation to the Federal Parliament in the Dominion election of March 1940. The invasion of Norway, the drive through the Low Countries, the retreat to the Dunkirk beaches, and finally the collapse of France, swept all ideas of safe isolation into the discard. For the first time in their history all Canadians, French as well as English, realized emotionally as well as rationally that actual invasion of Canada was well within the realm of possibility. The result was a great wave of support for measures of national defence. The Ogdensburg agreements of August 1940,* which assured the Dominion a full measure of aid from its great neighbour, aroused a great deal of satisfaction throughout the country. North American solidarity was seen to be the necessity of the moment and wiped out old prejudices.

At this moment of crisis in Canadian history the French

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 122, March 1941, p. 347.

Canadians made good their boast that Quebec would never be found wanting if it were a question of defending Canadian soil rather than seeking adventure in some foreign field. The Government's proposal of a short period of compulsory training for home defence was accepted wholeheartedly in Quebec. Former proponents of Canadian neutrality raised a feeble protest, but less than a half-dozen French-Canadian members voted against the Bill in Parliament. The anti-conscription riots and the monster petitions against conscription so common in 1917 were unheard of in 1940. When Mayor Houde of Montreal, an extreme nationalist, openly urged his compatriots to resist national registration, he was universally condemned and his subsequent internment was received with comparative indifference in Quebec. Vastly more significant was the general approval for Cardinal Villeneuve's appeal to French Canadians to comply loyally with the conscription law. There was no hint of resistance throughout Quebec, and it was widely remarked that no trainees entered their period of service more cheerfully than the French Canadians.

The fall of France was a profound shock to Quebec. Until disaster struck the old mother country French Canadians did not realize how much France meant to them, in spite of the obvious differences. Mr. Mackenzie King, with his extraordinary sense of timing, chose that lonely, bitter moment to tell Quebec that "the tragic fate of France leaves to French Canada the duty of upholding the tradition of French culture and civilization and the French passion for liberty in the world". That spiritual accolade helped the French Canadians over a very bad moment in their national experience and was certainly instrumental in increasing their attachment to the Government of the Dominion and the cause of national unity. It is too early to tell, however, whether the fall of France will actually bring an increase of French-Canadian influence in Dominion affairs in spite of Mr. Mackenzie King's high estimate of Quebec's future rôle, and such flattering appeals for support as have come from General de Gaulle,

who told French Canada that "France knows the large part you play and your importance within the British Empire". French-Canadian leaders, too, have attempted to initiate a period of greater importance for their nationality. Mr. Lapointe himself, in a broadcast appeal to the French nation, spoke of French-Canadian confidence that the heart of France was still loyal to the British alliance and urged Frenchmen never to fight their fellow democrats, no matter what the provocation.

Torn in many ways by the French disaster, the majority of French Canadians have been impelled by it to co-operate more fully with the cause of Britain. A not uninfluential minority of ultra-conservative and ultra-clerical French Canadians has shown considerable sympathy for the authoritarian régime of Marshal Pétain and especially for his efforts to re-establish close relations between Church and State in France, but this attitude has not been in conflict with the official attitude of the Dominion Government, which continues to recognise Marshal Pétain's representative at Ottawa as the accredited French Minister, in spite of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France. The Free French régime of General de Gaulle has also had representatives in Quebec but, though cordially received, they have exercised less influence than the Pétainists. But as the Vichy régime has become more subservient to Nazi demands, enthusiasm for it has noticeably declined in Quebec, though respect for the old Marshal remains constant.

One of the most significant developments in French Canada's reaction to the present war has been the growing support of the nation's war effort by the Catholic hierarchy in Quebec. It has been the established policy of the Church ever since the conquest in 1759 to maintain correct and loyal relations with the governing authorities of the State. Even during the bitter anti-conscription controversy of 1917 the Church, though strongly opposed to the measure as an infringement of French Canada's fundamental rights, succeeded in maintaining a respectful attitude towards constituted

authority in accordance with its own high tradition. Once the conscription Bill became the law of the land, the Church allowed no compromise and the faithful were enjoined to obey it. In the present war the Church happily has been able to lend sincere support to the Dominion's war policy. The Quebec hierarchy was not slow to realize the extreme importance of the Government's guarantee against conscription for overseas service. Cardinal Villeneuve, undoubtedly the most highly respected citizen of Quebec and an intelligent and astute churchman, has played his moderating rôle with consummate skill, by avoiding too close association with either the extreme nationalists or the ultra-loyalists. He has stood faithfully by the Government and in return the Government has done its best to safeguard Quebec susceptibilities. Mr. Mackenzie King, for his part, was wise enough to disregard the demands expressed in certain Anglo-Canadian circles that the exigencies of "all out" participation demanded conscription for service anywhere, because he realized that only by limiting conscription to home defence could his Government count on Quebec's wholehearted support of the war programme.

Quebec's collaboration with the national war effort was dramatically illustrated by the joint decision of the Quebec Government and the Catholic hierarchy to appoint February 9, 1941, as a day when high masses for the victory of Canada, Britain and their allies should be said in all the 1,500 parishes of Catholic Quebec. On that day the Cardinal himself celebrated mass before a vast assembly in the Cathedral of Nôtre Dame in Montreal. With all the dignity of his high office His Eminence admonished the faithful to pray not only for a victory of arms but of ideas, for victory over social disorder and over the unbounded ambition of those who waged war against Christianity and God Himself. The Cardinal urged his hearers to make heavy sacrifices for the common cause, to emulate the valour and steadfastness of England and the courage of the King and Queen who had so nobly shared the trials of their people. While the Cardinal spoke as the ecclesi-

astical leader of his people, Mr. Lapointe as the undoubted political spokesman of French Canada led the many thousands in prayers for victory. This great ceremony, repeated on a smaller scale throughout the length and breadth of the province, was a striking demonstration of French Canada's desire to associate itself with the common war effort. Such a manifestation of national solidarity would have been unthinkable in the last war.

But, in spite of the vastly improved relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians, it would be a great mistake to imagine that Quebec will ever think or act in exactly the same way on Canadian foreign relations and foreign policy as English-speaking Canada. Actually, the wisdom of the leaders of both races has created a larger measure of national unity now than in any other crisis involving Canadian participation in an overseas war. It is also true that the majority of French Canadians now believe that Nazi aggression and authoritarian dictatorship are evil things that Canada as a freedom-loving democracy must resist. But that is a far cry from being partisans of "all out" participation or of a policy which might send French-Canadian soldiers to fight all over the world. No French Canadian to-day would endorse such a policy, for he remains at heart an isolationist whose ideal of life is to be left at peace in the Province of Quebec. Modern communications and especially the radio have brought the French Canadian nearer to world events and world thought, but the life outside Quebec still retains remoteness for him.

It is therefore not surprising that a certain amount of discontent with the Government's conduct of the war is still to be found in Quebec. The great mass of the people and the large daily newspapers of Montreal and Quebec which are either non-partisan or Liberal organs, naturally favourable to Government policies, do not reflect these sentiments. But in excellently written and edited ultra-nationalist papers such as the old organ of Henri Bourassa, the Montreal *Devoir*, one encounters a steady barrage of criticism of the war effort and

constant hints that in due time the Government will repudiate its promise to limit compulsory service to home defence. It is difficult to assess the extent of the discontent expressed in the nationalist press and occasionally met with in private conversation with French Canadians. Considering the open, sincere approval of the war effort by such influential leaders as Mr. Lapointe, Mr. Godbout, and Cardinal Villeneuve, the importance of any disaffection may safely be doubted. But some opposition to the war does persist in Quebec, probably especially in the rural districts, and should not entirely be ignored, for it comes from the underlying fear, which has never quite subsided, that support for the war will lead at last to conscription for overseas service.

Without doubt if Canada were ever invaded, every French Canadian would rise in her defence. Furthermore, an increasing number of responsible French Canadians are ready to volunteer even for service overseas if their freely elected Government should decide that to be in the best interests of Canada. But, if ever that Government or some succeeding Canadian Government should decide to conscript men for service outside Canada, whether it were in the defence of England or for the reconquest of the European continent from the Nazis, French Canadians would be as united in their opposition and resistance to what they would consider coercion as they were a quarter of a century ago. Mutual tolerance between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians has to-day reached a higher level than ever before, but it would be a mistake to expect too much of this new relationship, especially from the French Canadians whose aspirations and affections remain rooted in Canada. The whole creation of the Canadian Confederation was based on compromise between English and French Canada. It is felt by the majority of French Canadians that the spirit of that compromise was violated in the last war when Quebec was forced to co-operate against her will in an overseas war. To-day, partly because French Canadians themselves realize how much is at stake for the world and for human liberty everywhere in the defeat of Nazi

dictatorship, but even more because the Anglo-Canadian majority has respected their rights and their susceptibilities, Quebec has freely and cheerfully co-operated with the national war policy of Canada. In so doing French Canada has taken a great step forward in the achievement of Canadian unity.

Canada,
April 1941.

AUSTRALIA

I. The Situation in the Far East

At the opening of the New Year, popular attention in Australia remained focused on the achievements of the Australian and Imperial troops in North Africa. Comforting predictions of the imminent collapse of Italy and her withdrawal from the war abounded. It was natural perhaps that, in the circumstances, the Far Eastern situation should appear less threatening, since it was argued that with Italy's example before her and in the light of the continuing firmness of the United States, Japan might surely be expected to revise any plans she might have made for active intervention in the war. The appointment at long last of Mr. Kawai, a former Foreign Office spokesman, as first Japanese Minister to Australia was regarded as a favourable, if minor, omen supporting a more optimistic outlook. There had been some foreboding about Japan's failure even to name her Minister as the months went by since Sir John Latham had sailed for Tokyo.

In the circumstances, comparatively little attention had been attracted by Japan's offer to mediate in the dispute between Thailand and Indo-China or by the economic negotiations between the Netherlands Indies and Japan which had been resumed in Batavia. From about the middle of January, however, a quickening of interest in Far Eastern matters began, stimulated by a series of Ministerial pronouncements both in Australia and Japan. Mr. Spender, the Minister for the Army, returning from his visit to Australian troops in Egypt, stated, in a speech at Singapore, that Australia had no quarrel with Japan. Though newspaper comment on this speech was in general not adverse, there were many who saw in it the implied inconsistency that, while claiming to be fighting against aggression, we apparently distinguish between aggression by

Germany and Italy in Europe and that of Japan in China. Immediately following Mr. Spender, Sir Frederick Stewart, the Minister for External Affairs, in an official statement described our relations with Japan as cordial. This evoked a considerable volume of criticism in Australia and, with Mr. Spender's utterance, led to questions being asked in the House of Commons about the identity of British and Australian policy towards Japan.

Though seldom publicly expressed, apprehension was felt lest such views should be interpreted in the United States as indicating that Australian policy did not conform to that of America, whereby Britain, Greece and China are associated equally as victims of aggression whom America is pledged to assist. It must be confessed that Australians have shown little inclination to face this issue of principle, or even to recognise the vital strategical part played by China as the fly-paper on which the Japanese army has been firmly stuck, and to which it is directly in Australia's interest to make it adhere more closely yet.

There were thus some apparent inconsistencies in the Australian attitude; but in spite of them there was no inclination to accept Mr. Matsuoka's statement that there were no outstanding problems between Australia and Japan, or his expression of hope that together they would contribute towards the peaceful development of the Pacific area. A few days later came the first public address of Sir John Latham since the presentation of his credentials in Tokyo, which won unanimous approval. In this Sir John said "Australia is completely and unreservedly with Britain in this war, and is developing all her resources in men and materials to assist Britain's cause". He stressed the "fundamentally European character of Australian civilisation" and suggested that the Japanese should "get their geography books right" and appreciate that Australia is not part of Asia.

From the beginning of February the feeling of tension rose rapidly. Following the meeting of the Advisory War Council on January 29, a joint statement was issued by the Acting

Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition warning the country that the war was entering a more critical phase which might directly affect Australia. At the Melbourne meeting of the Council a week later, consideration of the agenda that had been arranged was deferred, in order that the heads of the three services might attend to discuss the urgent need for revision of Australian defence plans in the light of developments of the war in general and its possible extension to the Pacific. Then on February 12, at a Sydney meeting of the Council came the most disturbing note of all. Once more the agenda was abandoned and a statement was issued by the Council that the service chiefs had been summoned from Melbourne to attend a further meeting on the following day. Again the Council warned the country that affairs had taken a new and graver turn and implied that Australian security was more directly and gravely involved than ever before.

No indication was given by the Advisory War Council or the Cabinet of any specific developments which had determined their statements, nor did London or Washington throw any light on the happenings involved. The following day the Acting Prime Minister exhorted the people to remain calm, which they showed every intention of doing, and deprecated the dissemination of baseless rumours, including one that Australian troopships which had left Sydney, presumably for Singapore, had been sunk. Private members of the Government parties were left in the dark about the basis of the Government's warnings, but a meeting of Labour members in Sydney was addressed by the Labour members of the War Council. Federal Cabinet members also conferred with the New South Wales Government, and the following day Colonel Bruxner, Deputy Premier of New South Wales and Leader of the Country party, was appointed Commonwealth Controller of Transport for New South Wales with wide power to seize and employ vehicles in an emergency.

In the absence of any specific information from the Government about the nature of the crisis, there were many who, within a few days, attributed the official statements in part

to a desire to check industrial unrest, which—particularly as reflected in the ban upon overtime—was seriously hindering the carrying out of essential war contracts in the heavy industries. This widespread scepticism was checked somewhat by the decision to hold the Second Division (Home Service Troops) in camp for an additional three weeks beyond the completion of their normal training period, and by many other steps taken to strengthen the military position. A few days later it was announced that the period of compulsory military training for home defence would be extended for all branches of the service from seventy to ninety days, and that all trainees would be required to serve for two such periods, or six months in all, in the year, instead of as at present for ten weeks. This would ensure that there were always 125,000 troops in camp available out of 250,000. A further repercussion has been a revived interest in Air Raid Precautions and the appointment by the New South Wales Government of a Minister responsible for National Emergency Services. Though at the time of writing tension has been somewhat relaxed, the Far East, with Australian troops at Singapore, has assumed and appears likely to retain that place in public interest which for strategical reasons it should for some time past have occupied.

The immediate strategical problems which Australia may at any moment be forced to face are related to the possibility of Japanese armed intervention in Indo-China, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. One fact, amidst a great deal of conjecture, is clear. Whatever the likelihood of the war being brought closer to our shores, Australia will unhesitatingly support Britain in whatever steps she may consider necessary to protect her interests in the Pacific, and this even should there be doubt about the measures which America may decide to take. There is a clear appreciation of the significance of Japanese naval and military concentrations in Hainan and of the presence of considerable Japanese air and military forces on the mainland in Tonking and in the vicinity of Saigon. The possibility of a Japanese occupation of Indo-China and Thailand, coupled

with Japanese command of the South China Sea, would obviously constitute a great threat to the whole of British interests in the Far East. Australia, needless to say, is fully alive to the danger of interruption of her principal source of oil from Balik-Papan in such an event.

In the absence of American naval support, Australia, designated by the Eastern Group Conference at Delhi as the main source of supply for the Far East, would face extremely serious difficulties in fulfilling her functions. Though not herself likely to be threatened in the immediate future by enemy landings in force, her seaborne commerce would be subject to attack by enemy ships and her vital coastal areas to hit-and-run raids at least. The provision of adequate escorts for convoys of troops or supplies to the Far East in the face of these threats at home might be impossible; while Japan, with the seas almost completely closed to her peace-time commerce, would have a considerable part of her great mercantile fleet available for transport purposes in the South Pacific.

The Far Eastern supply problem for Britain and Australia, apart from the maintenance of communications, also presents some very real difficulties. As mentioned above, the principal responsibility for this rests on Australia, since, in the opinion of the Eastern Group Conference, she has made far greater progress in the development of her armaments industry than any other country represented at Delhi. Australian production now covers a wide range of supplies of all sorts, such as armoured cars, bren-gun carriers, other mechanised transport, field guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, bombs, shells, small arms ammunition, various types of aeroplanes, and light naval craft such as "Tribal" class destroyers and corvettes. In addition, Australia is filling large orders of war equipment for India and the Far East. Though Australia's achievements in this field have far exceeded the most sanguine expectations at the beginning of the war, there are still deficiencies. Some of the most important of these should be made good in the very near future; and against them may be set the fact that the degree of mechanisation of the army and equip-

ment of the air force in Japan is far from comparable with that of Germany. The crux of the problem for Australia, as for Britain, is Japanese naval supremacy in these waters; and the balance here can only be redressed, so far as can be seen at the moment, by the United States.

In the foregoing brief discussion, the strategical problems confronting Australia in the event of America remaining non-belligerent have been considered, since this possibility cannot be ignored were Japan to confine her immediate activities to Indo-China and Thailand. Indeed, it is one of the incomprehensibles of the war that Japan did not move into these countries in force last October. At that time there was every probability of such action calling forth at most economic sanctions by America, while Britain also at that time was less favourably placed than to-day to resist her advance. On the other hand, Australians who have followed the rapidly changing trends in American opinion in respect to the Far East, as shown by the *Fortune* and Gallup polls, and by the passage of the Lease and Lend Act, are convinced that American intervention, if not certain, is now so probable, should Britain, Australia or the Dutch East Indies be involved in hostilities in the Pacific, that Japanese action will certainly be conditioned by that probability.

In the event of Japan being prepared to face war with the United States, she will do so on the assumption that the American fleet would not be able, for geographical reasons, either to bring Japan to battle at sea or to prevent her from first securing such raw material resources in the East Indies as would enable her to survive the cessation of American supplies. The Japanese are fully aware that American strategy in the past has been based primarily on the defence of American shores behind the triangle of Alaska, Pearl Harbour and the Panama Canal, and that defence of the Philippines has been considered impracticable by many authorities.

In spite of their confident anticipation of American intervention in the Pacific, Australians realise that, in the event of

hostilities with Japan, at best they may expect serious interference with coastal and overseas trade, the extent of which can be judged from their experience of the considerable damage which a few converted German merchantmen have been able to inflict round these shores. These and whatever other dangers may arise will be gladly faced by the whole people, their only effect on morale being to stimulate a growing unity of purpose and a determination that Australia shall play an even greater part in this, its special sphere of interest, than it has so far.

II. The Unions and Overtime

THE New Year was heralded by a wave of industrial unrest which began in New South Wales and spread in some degree to other States. The ostensible cause of this was the sudden realisation by the better-paid wage-earners of the greatly increased contribution demanded of them by the taxation provisions of the budget. The heavy overtime earnings of workers in war industries had, for the first time, made many of them subject to substantial taxation. That this was so was brought home to them abruptly by the deduction from their weekly wage cheque, as from January 1, of as much as 5*s*. in the pound on that portion of their income represented by overtime payments. Such deductions were to run in the first instance for six months, the amount collected being credited against the heavy income-tax assessments later to be issued.

An agitation was started for the exemption of overtime earnings from taxation. Within a few days many of the more important unions concerned in munitions and shipbuilding decided to work no overtime unless this demand was met. Concurrently, a number of strikes occurred in many plants engaged on essential war work. While there was little support for the unions' demand by either Federal or State Labour parties, it was felt that there were legitimate grounds for complaint by some workers who, on account of the serious housing shortage in some localities, had to spend two or more

hours travelling to and from work. On the other hand, there are good grounds for believing that there was no general support from the workers for the plea put forward by certain union spokesmen that overtime should be abolished by replacing the longer shifts by three of eight hours. It was also argued that the men were working overtime not for preference but as a contribution to the war effort, and that it was consequently inequitable to take away a substantial part of the remuneration for this.

Whatever the merits of the case, it was unfortunate that the Government failed to make it clear that the deductions being made applied to prospective assessments based on earnings for the year 1939–40 in respect to which many workers were not taxable or were taxable on a much lower rate than at present. In such cases exemption from deductions might be claimed and a refund made.

The Government firmly resisted the unions' demands, maintaining that they could not differentiate between sections of the community, nor could they elaborate a system which would take into account the time expended to earn income when assessing this for taxation.

In addition to the call for unity and for the cessation of industrial unrest by the Advisory War Council, with which all members strongly associated themselves, the Labour Premier of Queensland, Mr. Forgan Smith, at the annual conference of the Australian Workers' Union issued a stirring call to labour to forget its grievances and appreciate that on its efforts depended the safeguarding of everything it held dear.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which Communist agitators played a part in the wave of industrial unrest which reached its peak in January, or how much was due to the feeling that, since, in spite of the considerable increase in the companies (war-time profits) tax, employers might still make increased profits from the war, the worker too was justified in getting what he could.

Whatever its cause, a steady improvement was noticeable in February and by the end of the month the ban on overtime

had either been tacitly ignored or formally rescinded by the unions. In addition, Mr. Kellock, the President of the New South Wales Northern Miners' Federation, one of the most turbulent unions in Australia, has given a guarantee that, throughout the war, his union will produce all the coal required to maintain the war effort at its peak.

III. The Development of National Unity

A DEVELOPMENT which has been generally welcomed is the decision to end the split in the political Labour front in New South Wales. Hitherto there have been two rival parties in the Federal sphere, the official Labour party with Mr. Curtin as leader, and the non-Communist Labour party with six members in the Federal House of Representatives under the leadership of the vigorous Mr. Beasley. It was felt that the decision to unite was a reflection of the appreciation by Labour of the urgency of the war situation and that it might prove a prelude to national unity in the Federal Government. In the past there has been a tendency for either party to feel that participation in a National Government might after the war be held against it, to the advantage of the rival labour groups which abstained.

The demand for a National Government has in recent months diminished, though flaring up again following the grave statements of the War Council in February. Subsequent events may at any time lead to the sudden realisation of this long deferred hope. In general, however, it may be said that the Advisory War Council has functioned more satisfactorily than was anticipated. In times of crisis it has spoken with commendable force and unanimity and there is a growing tendency for a similar association of all parliamentary interests to be extended in other directions. Thus, the Government has invited two of the leading members of the Federal Labour party, Dr. H. V. Evatt and Mr. Chiffley, to assist the Minister of Labour and National Service in planning for reconstruction, and has appointed a committee of five parliamentarians con-

sisting of two members from the Government and three from the Labour side of the House, to investigate the problem of the supply and utilisation of man power.

In addition to the international situation, the Acting Prime Minister, Mr. Fadden, has been given credit for the more harmonious political atmosphere. Though lacking Mr. Menzies's brilliance, he has established a reputation for frankness and honesty, while he has the ability to win the liking and support of his political opponents. In a little over a month of office he has had to face many severe tests. First the overtime ban in respect of the taxation provisions of the budget of which he himself, as Federal Treasurer, was the author. Then he appeared likely to have to bear the full weight of the opposition to National Security Regulation 42 A, which was gazetted just before Mr. Menzies left for Egypt and England. Under this regulation sweeping powers are granted to the Federal Attorney-General, including that of ordering the detention for the duration of the war and six months afterwards, without trial, enquiry or appeal, of anyone suspected of subversive activities—the definition of which is cast so wide that it might be interpreted to include criticism of the Government's financial policy. Mr. Fadden wisely decided to appoint Dr. H. V. Evatt, a constitutional authority and the newly acquired white hope of political Labour, to investigate and advise on such amendments to the regulation as would remove its more objectionable features. The appointment of Sir Bertram Stevens, the former Premier of New South Wales, as permanent Australian member of the Eastern Group Supply Council at Delhi also evoked violent criticism from the Labour members of the Advisory War Council and the unions, but in this, as in respect to Regulation 42 A, Mr. Fadden received entirely fortuitous relief when the urgency of the international situation diverted the attention of the Council and the public to other matters.

Australia,
March 1941.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. The Industrial War Effort

LITTLE has been told to Great Britain and the other countries of the British Commonwealth of the industrial war effort of South Africa. But the story loses none of its value by the delay in its narration, for it is only now that the magnitude of the effort can be seen in true perspective.

Proportionate to her population and resources, South Africa's Home Front drive is as significant as that of any of the combatants. If the politically disaffected section of the population, which looks with disfavour on the war, except as an opportunity for individual profit, is eliminated from the calculation, South Africa's war effort is, *per capita*, probably the most remarkable of all. For its achievements—which from the first have been conditioned by the necessity of maintaining the general civilian and economic structure of the country, and, with that, the existing political balance—have been brought about by sound development of the pre-war industrial framework and by concentration of effort, with few exceptions, on new production within the resources and capacity of the country. Thus we face the intensified Home Front tasks of the next eighteen months with at least a reasonable assurance of maintaining secure foundations for the difficult period of post-war adjustment and reconstruction.

A year ago the war still seemed remote from South Africa. The tempo of normal life had been so little accelerated by events in Europe up to March 1940 that the main preoccupations of a large section of our engineering industry were long-range developments in gold-mining and manufacturing industry, and the problem of power supply to a potentially large new mining field in the Free State. It is true that recruiting for the Union Defence Force was in full swing and prompt

measures had been taken to repair the dreadful state of well-contrived military unpreparedness which the nation had inherited from the Hertzog-Pirow régime. But the formidable task of arming and equipping the Force still reposed on the comfortable belief that before the day of action dawned ample arms and equipment would be forthcoming from Great Britain and other overseas sources in fulfilment of orders placed. There was little realisation that a vast effort in national self-sufficiency would soon become a vital urgency. Then, with tragic suddenness, every prospect of early aid from other countries disappeared. Week by week the flood-tides of military disaster poured through Norway, Holland, Belgium and, finally, through Flanders to the Channel Ports; with the abdication of France as a first-class Power the last of our comfortable illusions of leisured Home Front preparations were swept away. The day the Italian jackal pounced on Hitler's biggest 'kill' the war came dramatically to Africa and for the first time its realities, in terms of mass production of munitions, clothing and equipment from our own resources, became the measure of our national liberties.

The emergency called for swift decisions. Fortunately for South Africa, the authority for those decisions and the organisation for initiating action no less swift had already been created. One of the first acts of General Smuts on assuming office as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief in 1939 had been to embark on the bold experiment of creating a special civilian Directorate, independent of military jurisdiction, to acquire technical military stores and material in the shortest possible time and to train rapidly and efficiently a large number of technical workers for war services. On the advice of the independent Committee of Inquiry which recommended this course, he placed this Directorate "under the control of the most capable business manager obtainable" and made him directly responsible to himself as Minister of Defence. The choice of Dr. H. J. van der Bijl as Director-General of War Supplies was inevitable. His position as head of the Iron & Steel Corporation and the Electricity Supply Commission

already gave him command of the great steel and electric power resources upon which the country's industrial war effort must largely depend. But an even greater asset which he brought to this formidable and unfamiliar task was his intimate knowledge, as the chief creative pioneer of industrial development in South Africa, of the extensive, though widely scattered, secondary industrial resources of the country—resources which, during the past nineteen years, had shaped themselves much as he had foreseen and planned in the difficult days when, as Scientific and Technical Adviser to a purely advisory Board of Trade and Industries dominated by doctrinaire anti-Protection ideas, he had battled for a balanced policy of industrial encouragement.

Armed with wide ministerial powers under the Emergency Regulations to organise industry and to co-ordinate the activities of Government Departments, engineering societies, labour unions and manufacturers in order to expedite the production and acquisition of war supplies of all types, the Director-General had lost no time in rallying to the service of the nation many scores of leaders in mining, engineering, industry, commerce, labour, and the great railway workshops. Through panels of experts and consultants, advisory committees and an executive labour committee, on which the four principal trade unions were permanently represented, the framework of a great production organisation had rapidly been constructed. And at the call of urgent necessity the machine came to life and swept into action. Iscor (the Iron and Steel Corporation) turned at once to the production of the special steels required for many types of armament manufacture, and in a remarkably short time all the metallurgical difficulties involved were overcome. The State's Small Arms Ammunition factory—the one lone provision for armament which the late Government had made—leapt into increased production. The country was combed for machine tools. Skilled labour resources were surveyed. A scheme for training thousands of youths and men in welding, forging and the use of hand tools and machine tools was launched in all the main centres of population. The steel

tube industry switched over immediately to shell forging and finishing. Foundries and moulders' shops swung into bomb production. The textile and boot industries were organised almost overnight for mass production. And the engineering shops of the mines and railways were geared up to the tempo of war output. Soon all the available resources of the country were co-ordinated in a drive which has truly, as Dr. Van der Bijl remarked in a recent survey of achievements, "written industrial history at breakneck speed during the past eleven months".

These resources were by no means all that South Africa required for the unprecedented tasks she was obliged to undertake, but they furnished sound foundations. Some of them have already been incidentally indicated. First is the steel industry, which has as the source of its most essential raw material a mountain of haematite ore rivalling in purity the famous Swedish deposits, and which in a few short years has firmly established itself as the core of South African industrialism. To the unfamiliar job of producing armament steels for guns, mortars, bombs, shells, armour plate, girder bridges and fabricated steel for Bellman hangars, Iscor applied brains trained in the best works in the Old and New Worlds. Their achievements are already an epic of resourcefulness. Among them is the feat of planning, designing, building and bringing into operation a large heat-treatment plant for gun barrels within nine weeks of the day draughtsmen first put pencil to the drawings. Next comes the great explosives industry—already in pre-war days constituting the largest single explosives unit in the world—and the extensive network of engineering shops which, side by side with explosives production, had grown up round the Rand to serve the needs of the gold-mining industry. Thirdly there are the workshops of the State's great transportation services and the availability of cheap and abundant electric power in every industrial area. And, lastly, there is a structure of secondary industries—boots, textiles, food canning, structural engineering, motor-car assembly, and body building—which in less than twenty years since the last war

had increased the gross value of secondary industrial output to approximately £188,000,000 annually, or not far short of double the value of our gold-mining output at the present enhanced value of gold.

These resources lent themselves readily enough to the vast expansion called for by the new war effort. But the industrial structure which they constituted as a whole presented formidable weaknesses to the directive minds which now had to weld it into a great war-production organisation. None of its constituent parts could be geared down from its normal activities to give preference to more urgent work, since none could be classified as even relatively unnecessary to the war effort. Gold, for example, remained one of the vital sinews of war; responsive to the policy needs of Great Britain, the gold-mining industry had extended its gold production within the previous twelve months, and this extended production had to be maintained. This, in turn, together with military transport requirements, involved the railway system in ever increasing tonnages, with consequent ever increasing utilisation of skilled labour for the maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock. A third insistent demand for skilled labour arose from the urgent need for rapidly mechanising the army. So the problem inexorably resolved itself into the task of superimposing upon the normal peace-time engineering activities of the country, first, an increasingly large mass-production munitions programme *as a part-time job*; secondly, the maintenance of a large mechanised army and air force; thirdly, increasing railway expansion; and, fourthly, the maintenance of the existing industrial and economic machine. And, as if this were not enough to tax natural ingenuity to the utmost, the complexities of the situation were added to by the peculiar and limited nature of our engineering resources. Our machine shops, whether railway shops or mine shops or commercial engineering shops, were almost entirely repair shops. Only a few had developed repetition machining operations, and these were tied up with the production of such articles as rock drill spares and similar items required by the gold-mines, which, under war conditions, had

to be produced locally in larger numbers than previously. We had no bicycle manufacturers; no motor-car industry apart from large-scale assembly of imported parts and limited body fabrication; no mass production of household appliances. Such privately owned machine shops as the country possessed were usually small concerns, with only a few tools. And even while it was true that some items of munitions, such as shells and bombs, required only simple lathe operations, the vast difference between making a small limited number of any article and making a steady number of the same article day after day and week after week had still to be appreciated.

Such, then, was the general background when South Africa plunged into her first war production programme. And it is against this background that the achievements of the past eleven months must be measured.

This, unfortunately, is neither the time nor the place for a detailed particularisation of these achievements to date. But a swift generalisation of some of their most outstanding features will give an adequate standard of measurement.

Oddly enough—since we have no motor-engineering industry—it is in the field of mechanised transport and the provision of armoured reconnaissance and fighting vehicles that the most spectacular strides have been made. Here the start was not even from scratch; it was from minus anything remotely approximating to the facilities of high mobility required by this war of swift movement: for the Pirow policy had shackled the pre-war Defence Force to an ingenious transport contrivance known as the "bush-cart" and to such leisured rate of progress as would almost seem designed to ensure that even in twelve months' trekking it should not march anywhere beyond the borders of the Union. The transformation has been almost magical. Through the sea lanes kept open by the British Navy an almost ceaseless stream of chassis has poured into the Union from North America since the order for mechanisation was first given; another flow of sheet steel from Iscor has merged with it in welding, body-building and assembly works in various parts of the country; and, from this confluence, not

in thousands only but already in tens of thousands, transport vehicles of sixty-five types—troop carriers, supply wagons, mobile workshops, trailers, water carriers, mobile filtration plants, ambulances and the like—have poured out to the Army in the field to make possible the astoundingly rapid sweep from Kenya through Italian Somaliland to the heart of Abyssinia.

The spearhead of this mechanised thrust has been the South African Armoured Car. A year ago this armoured car existed only as lines on a draftsman's board, over which experts pondered anxiously, conscious of mechanical and technical limitations that restricted the production of a more formidable fighting vehicle. To-day its output totals many hundreds; its success is attested by many swift victories in the field, achieved with negligible casualties on three fronts, and by increasing demands for it from other countries. Improvements in armament, protection and mobility have already been incorporated in later models, and present production plans can be stated in units of thousands, not hundreds. From South African-made bullet-proof tyres to bullet-proof turrets it is armoured and equipped by South Africans.

Not less impressive, though as yet not so spectacular in results, is the story of gun and shell production in the Union. In both, embarrassing difficulties as regards machine tools and plant existed from the first, and still exist, though some have been surmounted. For example, estimates for the delivery of shell-forging plants from overseas varied from a year to eighteen months. The urgency of the need was so great that South African engineers were forced to tackle the job themselves. It involved the designing and making of castings of a size never before attempted or even contemplated in the country. In six months the plant was complete and in operation, at a production rate (many thousands a week) ahead of the machining facilities; and additional plants are now under construction. The machining problem in turn called for new ingenuity. It is being met, pending the delivery of automatic shell-finishing plants, by the manufacture in South Africa of hundreds of single-purpose lathes, of which substantial quantities

have already been delivered. As the months have sped past shell production—not merely for the South African forces but for the forces of the Middle East—has come into the picture as one of the major munition activities of the country, tying up with our rapidly expanding explosives industry, and the target is a global figure of millions of shells of several calibres.

Gun production, too, has conquered many early doubts and disabilities. Metallurgical experts in other countries looked askance at the use of South African basic steel, rather than acid steel, for gun barrel manufacture. They have been confounded by the completely successful "proofing", under severe tests, of Iscor gun barrels. We were told again and again, too, that it was common practice in countries with limitless engineering resources and vast experience in ordnance manufacture to allow two years of preparation and planning for gun production before production actually commenced. It was well known that in the last war fully a year passed before the United States produced her first 75 millimetre field-guns and that during the present war it had taken the same highly industrialised country twenty months to get into mass production of a new type of light automatic rifle. But guns for South Africa could not be got for love or money eleven months ago and yet guns *had* to be got. So here, too, the War Supplies organisation plunged resolutely into the most lengthy, difficult and arduous of all munition tasks. Standardising on the one highly mobile piece of artillery within the range of our capabilities, the 3·7 Howitzer, Union technicians got down in earnest to planning; they mobilised, for the tooling of intricate components, the scattered precision engineering resources of the country, some of them 1,000 miles apart; they created a central Ordnance factory (Cofac) for finishing and assembly; and within nine months of the start of final planning the first battery of guns, triumphantly "proofed", was handed over to the Army. Regular deliveries have taken place since that date.

Mass production of infantry mortars of an improved type, with a proportionate output of mortar bombs; of grenades; and of aerial bombs, from the heaviest to the smallest, are

other achievements of the past eleven months. Aerial bomb manufacture is particularly suited to the resources of the country and present production plans visualise that the Union will shortly become one of the great arsenals of Democracy for the intensified air warfare of the future.

All this tells but half the story. On the "Q" supplies side, as distinct from the Technical production side, South Africa's war effort is no less significant. An army well over 100,000 strong, clothed, shod and equipped from head to foot from home factories within eight months of a start from scratch, bears testimony to the resourcefulness of the country's young textile and boot industries. But behind that accomplishment lies much that is little known—rapid organisation and co-ordination of industry for mass production; systematic allocation of orders; long-range policies in the acquisition of vast supplies of cloth and other raw material; conservation of domestic supplies; ruthless elimination of "shoddy"; and rigid price control. Production is so well developed to-day that output capacity far exceeds the needs of the country's own forces and is extended to meet the requirements of other fronts. Army boots of a type far superior to the service boot of the last war are already going at the rate of 100,000 pairs a month to one European front and during the next six months an additional 750,000 pairs will go to meet requirements of the Eastern Group Provisioning Office at Delhi. Large external orders for the excellent South African army blanket, already exceeding a quarter of a million, are also being supplied.

On the Army Foodstuffs side War Supplies development has also been highly satisfactory. It is South Africa's pride that her army is the best-fed army in the world to-day. The days of bully beef, "plum and apple", and "hard tack" biscuits are past. Dieticians have collaborated with Army chefs and factory experts in the production of a balanced diet. Powdered milk, proteins, mineral salts as well as starch compound a modern army biscuit that is a Tommy's delight rather than a Tommy's penance. The canning industry, co-ordinated as never before, has also accomplished a notable feat in providing

variety. Canned fish, canned crayfish, canned meat and vegetable rations, canned sausages, canned orange concentrate, and canned fruit—all these provide wholesome changes from bully beef. And, beyond meeting current military requirements, a wise long-range policy of building up reserve stocks for export has been initiated by the instruction of the Director-General of War Supplies to the industry to can up to maximum capacity during the short but prolific fruit and vegetable seasons.

This rapid survey shows that in a short spell of eleven months South Africa has long since passed the stage of producing Technical and "Q" supplies for the needs of her own forces and is already a substantial contributor to the war effort of the Empire as a whole. In some respects indeed she will be a vitally important contributor in the near future. The narrative has not unduly emphasised persistent difficulties—the chief of which are the shortages in machine tools and skilled labour. The war effort began with an already inadequate reservoir of artisans, and the development outlined has naturally intensified the problem. This difficulty was long foreseen and anticipatory proposals made to meet it. But the collective political mind can seldom move ahead of the necessity that calls imperatively for action, and in this instance action had to await the presentation of an unanswerable case for labour control. This final step toward co-ordination of all the resources of the nation in the war effort has, however, now been taken; a Controller of Industrial Man Power has been appointed with very wide emergency powers; the engineering industry has been proclaimed a controlled industry; and, with the assistance of a Labour Control Board on which the trade unions most concerned and the employers have equal representation and status, problems of dilution and maximum utilisation of all available skilled labour resources are at last being dealt with.

The lessons of war are seldom well learnt. In each new war the military mind wearisomely repeats here and there some of the historic mistakes of past wars. But the lesson South Africa is being forced to learn of her resourcefulness in many un-

familiar tasks under the spur of this unprecedented industrial war effort will certainly not be lost, for it is already shaping the structure of a great industrial nation. Anticipation is a hazardous task in the midst of toppling régimes and systems. But the shadowy outlines of three sound national developments can already be glimpsed by those who look ahead. A machine-tool industry is one logical evolution from the ingenuity and the necessity the supply crisis has revealed. A locomotive building industry to supply the transportation services of the Union and half this continent is another development the practicability of which experience clearly attests. The third, perhaps not so imminent, is the establishment of an infant shipbuilding industry for vessels for the Union's coastal trade.

II. The Parliamentary Session

DURING the present session of Parliament, now more than half-way to its end, thought about the war has overshadowed proceedings far more than in the corresponding session last year. Our troops have penetrated far into Abyssinia, maintaining a speed of advance which has exceeded all expectations of the General Staff. Small trickles of casualty lists begin to appear in the local press—very small, fortunately, in comparison with the results achieved. South African troops make up a large part of the southern circle which is closing in on the Italians in Abyssinia. They were among those who were in at the death at Mogadishu. South African aeroplanes have been operating in support of the British troops advancing from the Sudan; and in the same section of the front the Cape Coloured Corps have been performing feats of endurance and efficiency in transport driving which have elicited the warmest possible praise from the British Commander on the spot.

However reluctant members of the Opposition may be to admit that the war is any concern of South Africa's, these achievements of our men in the North cannot fail to extort from them reluctant admiration. The paradox has actually emerged that, as the Italian line is pushed farther away from

our borders in the North, so the actual presence of the war has made itself more and more felt in our own country. This impression has been enhanced by a lightning dash which General Smuts made, during the course of the session, to the North. Leaving Pretoria on a Sunday morning, he descended at Nairobi and there conferred with the Commander of the South African troops in the Field. His next stop was at Khartoum, where he talked with the British Commander of the troops operating in that area. He then flew to Cairo, met Mr. Anthony Eden, Sir Archibald Wavell, Sir John Dill, Air Marshal Longmore and other high British officers engaged in operations in Northern Africa and the Middle East. He spent more than two days in Cairo, discussing the most important questions of strategy. Then he took to his plane again and arrived back in Pretoria on the Sunday afternoon following his departure. He had flown 11,000 miles, and had spent more than four of the eight days of his absence in conferences on the ground. By Monday afternoon he was back in Cape Town in his seat in Parliament, bronzed by the Northern sun and looking as though he had had a week of complete rest and holiday. So remarkable a feat, at his age, which verges on 71, could not fail to impress on the least sympathetic member of the House of Assembly both the wonderful vigour of the Prime Minister and the fact that the war is far less remote from our frontiers than they like to persuade themselves and their followers that it is.

Parliament itself has done quite a considerable amount of useful legislative work already this session. The House of Assembly has passed through all their stages such routine legislation as a Merchandise Marks Bill, a Motor Transportation Bill, a Marketing Amendment Bill, a Forests Bill and a Land Survey Amendment Bill, with the good result that the Senate this session is being provided with far more work, before the customary end-of-the-session rush, than is usual in our Parliament. Mr. Hofmeyr's budget is discussed elsewhere. The House has put through a Factories Bill and faces a Workmen's Compensation Bill, for both of which Mr. Madeley, Minister

of Labour, is responsible. The guillotine procedure, which was explained in an earlier issue of THE ROUND TABLE,* has been revived both to get the Factories Bill through the House in reasonable time and to make it possible, earlier in the session, to provide the Government with the funds necessary for carrying on the war. The Workmen's Compensation Bill has not yet appeared in draft form. Both Bills lend themselves to considerable opposition; and it is a truism that neither Bill is acceptable to every member on the Government side of the House. The Factories Bill goes farther than some members who are interested in industry like and not so far as others, who are chiefly concerned with labour interests, would desire. The Workmen's Compensation Bill, forecasts of which show clearly that it is intended to make the insurance of workpeople a government monopoly, has aroused furious hostility among the private insurance companies which have hitherto undertaken the work of administering the State scheme of compensation. But it is obviously one of the conditions of the co-operation of the Labour party in supporting the Government in its war policy that that party must be allowed to put through Parliament some of the social legislation which is on its programme. Both Bills, accordingly, are being accepted loyally by the members of the party which supports General Smuts; and it is probably true to say that when they become law the fears which some of General Smuts's supporters entertain about them will be found to have been exaggerated.

The combination which supports the Government has proved once again to be solid and reliable. The only slight rift which has occurred was when the Government brought in the guillotine procedure for the remaining stages of the Factories Bill. That meant that only five hours were to be allowed for the discussion of the Bill in Committee, with the result that one of the later clauses, containing what could be interpreted as a form of Colour Bar, was hardly likely to be reached in Committee. This was too much for two of the members representing the Native Voters. (There are three of these, but

* No. 119, June 1940, p. 699.

Mr. Hemming has been ill and away from the House of Assembly all through the session.) They voted against the Government in the division on the guillotine procedure—the first time that any of the members of the combination supporting the Government have actually voted with the Opposition since the war began.

The main attack on the Government during the session was a vote of No Confidence proposed by Dr. Malan, the Leader of the Opposition, early in February. The motion was introduced by Dr. Malan in one of his longest and most portentous speeches. The Government accepted the challenge and each speech from the Opposition benches was replied to by a member on the Government side, General Smuts himself leading off for the Government in an immediate reply to Dr. Malan. The merits of the debate are hardly worth a pause for comment. Opposition accusations against the Government were much the same as those advanced by General Hertzog when he moved a similar motion last year. The debate dragged on for two days and then the Government put on pressure, declaring that the House must sit until it reached a vote. This entailed sitting all through a Thursday night and well into Friday afternoon. At last the flood of eloquence was exhausted and Dr. Malan, rising to reply, proceeded to take well over an hour—an exercise of his rights as mover of the motion which hardly left a jaded House with a favourable impression of his wisdom and tact as a Parliamentarian. The vote left the Opposition in a minority of 17, the Government thus scoring the majority which, when absentees on account of illness were taken into account, was the largest it could expect.

During this debate there came into clear view the rift between the Nationalists and the new Afrikaner party, recently formed out of those members of the Hertzogite section of the Opposition who have remained faithful to General Hertzog's principles of racial co-operation. In the actual division the members of the Afrikaner party, who number nine, did not vote for the Government because their view on the war issue is unaltered and they still think that General Smuts and those

who followed him were wrong when they voted against neutrality in September 1939. On every other issue the members of the Afrikaner party are far more in agreement with General Smuts than with Dr. Malan. They are furious against the Nationalist leadership because they believe that General Hertzog and Mr. Havenga were driven out of Parliament by deliberate intrigue. In the No Confidence debate Mr. Quinlan, a Johannesburg member who followed General Hertzog in September 1939 and is now perhaps the ablest parliamentary member of the Afrikaner party, denounced those Hertzogites who have remained under the leadership of Dr. Malan and told them that their position in the Nationalist Opposition party was much that of a buck which has been swallowed by a python. They were, he said, "just as powerless as a buck in the stomach of a snake to do any harm to that snake. The only effect they will have on that party will be the same effect as the buck can have on the snake—a little bit of indigestion." Mr. Quinlan then pursued his point by subjecting the policy of Dr. Malan and the Nationalist party to a searching inquisition. He said that the tragedy of General Hertzog's expulsion from the Opposition was that it was due to his refusal to sacrifice the rights of the English-speaking portion of the population. Those who stood behind Dr. Malan believed in the right of the Afrikaans-speaking section to dominate all other sections in South Africa. Mr. Quinlan quoted with approval a dictum of General Smuts, who had said in his reply to Dr. Malan that, "Unity on the basis of race is impossible—it is alone possible on the basis of principle." That, proclaimed Mr. Quinlan, was "the basis of the policy" of the Afrikaner party. It is a clear enough line of distinction and, but for the war issue, might bring the whole Afrikaner party back under the leadership of General Smuts. But that possibility is for the years ahead.

Optimism among the members of the Afrikaner party about their future gains in the country seems, to unprejudiced critics, hardly justified at the moment. The party held a conference in Bloemfontein during the first half of the session at

which they elected General Hertzog to honorary leadership of the party and Mr. Havenga, in spite of his protests and entreaties, as deputy leader. General Hertzog has since accepted the honorary leadership. It seems doubtful whether the action of the party in insisting that Mr. Havenga should become deputy leader was wise. Mr. Havenga himself went to great lengths in trying to persuade the Congress not to elect him as deputy leader. In effect, with General Hertzog definitely out of political life, the election of Mr. Havenga as deputy makes him *de facto* leader of the new party. It can only be depressing for enthusiastic supporters of the party to be under the leadership of a man who shows no enthusiasm for the post and says quite definitely that he would rather not have it, and refuses to come into the open as leader. Since the Congress there have been elections for the vacancies caused by the resignations of General Hertzog and Mr. Havenga from Parliament. The United party, led by General Smuts, did not put up a candidate at either election, leaving the Afrikaner party to do its best against the Nationalist candidates. In both constituencies the Afrikaner party was heavily defeated—more heavily than its enthusiasts had expected. In both constituencies the Government supporters were asked to vote for the Afrikaner party and apparently did so. If they did, the number of General Hertzog's supporters who survive in the Free State must be considerably less, at least at the moment, than even his most hostile detractors have believed. Still, the stand on behalf of the English-speaking and other sections of the population which the Afrikaner party has taken is sound. Those who think that the inherent justice and wisdom of this basic principle may raise it in the future to renewed political importance are entitled to send their minds back to 1915, when General Hertzog himself came back from a general election as the leader of a small faction in the House of Assembly. Nine years later he was Prime Minister.

Such well-wishers for the Afrikaner party are encouraged, too, by their belief—for which there is considerable evidence—that the Nationalists themselves are torn by divisions which

will have an increasing effect as time goes on. The Ossewa Brandwag, an organisation whose origin and composition were discussed in the last issue,* has not abated its claims to be a controlling force over the Nationalist Members of Parliament. The Government has issued a decree forbidding public servants to belong to the Ossewa Brandwag; and its Commandant-General, Dr. van Rensburg, has instructed his followers to bow to this government order. But inside the Opposition itself and particularly among its front-benchers in Parliament there are signs of rivalry and disagreement. It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of these signs and doubtless many enthusiastic supporters of the Government are not proof against that temptation. But one deep-seated cause of difference is evident. On one side of Dr. Malan, the leader, are Mr. Pirow and those who agree with him in proclaiming the doom of democracy and the democratic form of government. Mr. Pirow has produced, at great length, a pamphlet setting forth the principles of his "New Order" which can hardly be acquitted of being modelled almost entirely on the Nazi system. On the other side of Dr. Malan is Mr. Strydom, the young and vigorous leader of the Transvaal Nationalists, who has recently gone out of his way to proclaim his faith in democracy and parliamentary government and has thus thrown down a challenge to Mr. Pirow and those who agree with him. Between the two Dr. Malan stands in the position of one who has a foot on either side of the pivot of a see-saw. His skill in parliamentary leadership is shown by his comparative success, so far, in maintaining his equilibrium. Possibly he may be able to go on performing the feat indefinitely. Time will show.

III. The Budget

DEFENCE expenditure for 1940–41 was placed at £14 millions in Mr. Hofmeyr's first war budget. In the supplementary budget in August the estimate was pushed up

* The Round Table, No. 122, March 1941, p. 374.

to £46 millions. Even that proved quite insufficient, and a further appropriation of £14 millions had to be made. Only a rough estimate of £6 millions per month is now given for defence expenditure in 1941–42. That is about 36 times the normal peace-time expenditure on defence, and a larger sum than had ever been required to cover the total expenditure of the Union in times of peace. If defence expenditure conforms to the estimates, South Africa will spend nearly £131 millions during 1941–42, of which £73·6 millions will be from revenue and £57·3 millions from loan funds. If a greater expenditure on defence is called for, the Union will spend it.

The original estimates of revenue for 1940–41, together with the estimated yield of the new taxation imposed last September, would have fallen short of the revised estimates of expenditure by over £6½ millions. The latest estimates for the budget year 1940–41 have now, however, been revised to show a surplus of £88,000. Revenue estimates are up by £3½ millions (which means an increase of nearly £17½ millions, or 40 per cent., in the yield of taxation in a single year). Cuts in non-war expenditure have been pushed up to £1·7 millions and the surplus brought forward from 1939–40 has proved to be as much as £1·4 millions. The estimated expenditure from revenue in 1941–42 is about £9½ millions higher than for 1940–41, and nearly £8½ millions more than the revenue which would accrue on the same basis of taxation as in the year just coming to an end. The bulk of this shortfall is to be made good by the imposition of over £6 millions additional direct taxation. The rest is to be made up by additional customs and excise duties on petrol, beer and cigarettes and a sales tax of 1*d.* per lb. weight on new motor-cars.

Mr. Hofmeyr does not intend to interfere with the formula worked out for assessing the liabilities of gold mining. The normal income tax on gold-mining companies remains unchanged; so does the principle of the "special contribution", but it is to be increased from 11 per cent. of their taxable income to 16 per cent. and bring in a further £2·2 millions. The normal rate of tax on other companies has been increased

by 6*d.* in the £; but other far-reaching changes in the basis of company taxation are also being introduced. In the first place, private companies are to be deprived of their company status for taxation purposes, and the income of such companies is to be apportioned amongst the individual shareholders, who will pay income tax and super-tax according to the size of their incomes from all sources. According to the Minister of Finance, some £700,000 was lost to the Treasury in 1940–41 through the previously taxed dividends of private companies having been exempted in calculating the taxable income of super-tax payers. This is a surprisingly large amount, but as it is capable of exact calculation by the Treasury officials there can be no reason to doubt it. On the basis of this year's increased rates of tax a further £850,000 is expected from this source. A graduated tax on undistributed profits is also aimed at tax evasion; it will disappear completely when 80 per cent. of the profits earned are distributed to the shareholders to figure in their super-tax assessments. As a rough-and-ready counterbalance to these proposals for screwing more super-tax out of resident shareholders in South African companies, a special tax of 1*s.* in the £ is to be imposed on dividends paid to non-resident shareholders. Excess profits duty is continued on the same lines as before, but the rate is increased to 13*s.* 4*d.* in the £, with provision for special treatment for new undertakings.

Continuing to work on the assumption that war emergencies, with their heavier tax burdens, provide a challenge to create a more equitable tax system, Mr. Hofmeyr has completely remodelled the basis of normal income tax on individuals. Previously income tax had been levied at mildly progressive rates, with an additional element of progression due to the gradual disappearance, as the total income increased, of the primary abatement of £400 of tax-free income. This naturally worked unevenly, the rate of taxation mounting more steeply as the primary abatement was being reduced than after it had completely disappeared. Mr. Hofmeyr has now altered the whole system of allowances which, instead of being

deducted from income before tax is calculated, are to be deducted from the assessed taxation. There is to be a primary abatement of £22, and rebates of £5 per child, £1. 10*s*. per dependant, and up to £2 in respect of insurance premiums. The standard rate has been slightly increased to a minimum of 1*s*. 3*d*. in the £ (1*s*. 6*d*. for bachelors); the speed of progression has been doubled and the maximum rate of normal tax raised to 3*s*. in the £. Similar changes have been made in super-tax, which has been raised to a maximum of 7*s*. 6*d*. in the £. These changes between them are estimated to add nearly £900,000 to the State's revenues. An interesting and sensible innovation is the creation of tax redemption certificates for sale through all Post Offices. They give facilities for providing in advance for income-tax obligations. They will command a small rate of interest.

At the time of the supplementary budget last August the allocation of expenditure between the Revenue and Loan Accounts went almost unregarded. The apprehension of ruthless tax increases with which this budget was anticipated has resulted in more parliamentary attention being paid to it this time. The fact that, of an estimated defence expenditure of £72 millions, less than £29 millions is from revenue and over £43 millions on loan account, has been greeted with relief by that great majority which still maintains the comfortable belief that the burden of waging war can be placed on "posterity".

Last year nearly £45 millions was borrowed. Of this something over £36 millions was the proceeds of loan flotations during the year (as against loan repayments of £8,350,000). Of the £36 millions, £14 millions (including £4 millions from the sale of Savings Certificates) was subscribed by the Public Debts Commissioners and £22 millions directly by the public. The floating debt increased by about £17 millions. This year a net £49 millions is to be borrowed. These are large amounts: and if they are to represent the genuine application of individual and corporate savings to meet the Government's requirements, they should have the same effect in reducing civilian consumption as if they had been raised by taxation.

It cannot be said that there are many signs of such a reduction. The satisfactory total of £4 millions has been devoted to the purchase of Savings Certificates, it is true; but commercial opinion inclines to regard the Christmas 1940 season as having created a record for spending. Though the public has subscribed £22 millions to war loans, there is no sign of its having to go without the means of making other purchases to the same amount. In fact the Minister of Finance pointed out in his budget speech that bank deposits had risen by over £24 millions during 1940, while the amount of bank notes in circulation increased by £3·6 millions. Incidentally, it is not without significance that the banks' investments in Union securities (including over £10½ million subscribed to the new loans) totalled £14 millions, none of which represents any withdrawal of purchasing power from the hands of their customers. Unfortunately there is no more thankless task than inculcating habits of thrift when the monetary situation encourages extravagance.

South Africa had a successful trade year in 1940–41. Both import and export values increased markedly, and the favourable balance of payments is estimated at something over £20 millions, due largely to increased gold production. This suggests that a considerable part of the Union's war effort may be met through a more effective organisation of production, and not merely through the exercise of self-denial. But without self-denial other efforts will be dissipated. The Government's utilisation of the foreign balances earned by its citizens seems to be a main factor in creating danger of inflationary extravagance. Under the Emergency Finance Regulations the Treasury may acquire all foreign exchange in return for payment in Union currency. But the foreign balances cannot be spent both outside the country by the Government and inside the country by their former owner. Unless an equivalent amount is withdrawn from the taxpayers' pockets, the release of internal purchasing power to the seller of foreign exchange is inflationary in tendency. It seems doubtful if this has been sufficiently appreciated.

SOUTH AFRICA

There are obvious political reasons against placing too immediate and too visible a burden upon the South African taxpayer. Yet if the Minister of Finance had thought it possible to enforce taxation on a scale that would have necessitated the reduction of private expenditure unessential to the war effort the taxpayers might have surprised him with their willing response.

South Africa,
April 1941.

NEW ZEALAND

I. Political Developments

THE alterations in the Labour Cabinet referred to last quarter* came into effect on January 21. Following the retirement, owing to ill-health, of Mr. Lee Martin (Minister of Agriculture) and of Dr. D. G. McMillan (to devote his attention to his medical practice), the Labour caucus recommended the appointment of three new Ministers, Messrs. J. G. Barclay, A. H. Nordmeyer and P. K. Paikea. They were duly sworn in, Mr. Barclay as Minister of Agriculture and of Marketing, Mr. Nordmeyer as Minister of Health and in charge of mental hospitals, friendly societies and the National Provident Fund, and Mr. Paikea as member of the Executive Council representing the Native Race.

Advantage was taken of the new appointments to re-allocate some of the ministerial duties. Mr. Nash, who will be Acting Prime Minister when Mr. Fraser visits Great Britain, relinquishes the Ministry of Marketing; but he is still heavily burdened with Finance, Customs, Stamp Duties, Land and Income Tax and smaller departments, besides being a member of the War Cabinet of five. Mr. D. G. Sullivan has transferred the portfolio of Railways to Mr. R. Semple who, as Minister of Transport, Marine and National Service, will operate some of the communications in the construction of which, as Minister of Public Works, he has achieved remarkable success. Mr. Sullivan retains control of the rapidly growing department of Supply and Munitions (with Industries and Commerce and Scientific and Industrial Research). Mr. Armstrong, lately Minister of Public Health, takes over Public Works, Roads, Housing and State Advances. The Prime Minister (Mr. Peter Fraser) relinquishes Broadcasting, thus confining himself to

* See The Round Table, No. 122, March 1941, p. 384.

his duties as Prime Minister and head of the War Cabinet. Mr. Fraser made it clear that the surrender of Marketing by Mr. Nash does not imply any lack of confidence in him. That portfolio is a very exacting task for any administrator, but as the general principles of State marketing have now been laid down, the administration should move smoothly in other hands.

Mr. Paikea is the first appointment by the Labour Government of a Minister representing the Native Race. This appointment is not the same as the Ministry of Native Affairs, at present held by Mr. F. Langstone. The present Minister is a pakeha (white man), and this is the usual practice, though the convention was broken when Sir James Carroll, who was a half-caste, became Minister in 1899 and Sir Apirana Ngata in 1928.

The suggestion that no general election should be held this year places the Labour Government in an awkward position, since its bitter opposition to postponement of an election by the previous Government in 1934 is still fresh in the memory of both Parliament and the country. There seems to be a growing feeling that it is inadvisable to divert attention from the war to a general election, which must inevitably engender strong political feeling. Suggestions that the triennial local-body elections in May should be cancelled or postponed have not been acted upon and these elections will take place as usual. The Prime Minister made a statement in Parliament on March 14 which suggested that he personally was not averse to postponing the general election, but he explained later that he did not intend to indicate that such a course was likely.

Wrapped up with this question to some extent is that of all-party co-operation for war purposes. Tentative approaches on the subject of a coalition have been made during the last few months, but with no result except to indicate an obvious mistrust on the part of Labour outside Parliament. Mr. S. G. Holland, who was elected leader of the National party after Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Coates entered the War Cabinet, has just made the tour of the Dominion which usually precedes the

last session of each Parliament. Speaking at Wanganui, he said that if the National party was successful at the elections "we shall invite other parties to take a full share of the responsibility of government with us, not merely some phases of the war effort". He complained that while his party offered co-operation the Government did not see its way to call a halt in its socialistic programme. Mr. Fraser, he believed, was in earnest in desiring co-operation, "but it is equally true that his colleagues in the Cabinet are at the same time going for their lives socialising New Zealand as fast as they possibly can". Mr. Holland suggested at Blenheim on February 19 that members elected to Parliament at the end of this year should hold office for the duration of the war, and that the National party and the Labour party should agree to form a national Government regardless of which had a majority. He undertook that if his party had a majority it would immediately invite other parties to form a non-party Government which should assume the entire task of government.

The suggestion of a coalition without a general election is not so simple as it was in 1915. Then the policies of Massey and Ward showed little fundamental difference, and the parties were so closely balanced that neither could carry on without the goodwill of the other, so that coalition did neither an injustice. To-day the Labour party, with a firm majority of 53 to 25, can reasonably claim that it has a mandate to carry on in peace or war until the normal date of dissolution, say November. Moreover, the Labour party in the country, though it is whole-heartedly behind the war, is also whole-heartedly behind its own social policy and is unlikely to allow its Government to merge itself in a coalition so long as its capacity to govern justifies the confidence of the public. There is, in fact, no acceptable basis for coalition without a general election, and Mr. Holland's proposal appears as the only really constructive alternative before the country—an election and then, if the result indicates it, a coalition.

The sincerity of the National party's desire for unity is testified by a striking declaration by Mr. W. W. Mulholland,

president of the New Zealand Farmers' Union which has been a consistently conservative force. Calling for unity in politics, he declared that

> If Hitler won it would not matter in the least to what political school of thought one might belong. The people would all be in a concentration camp. It was necessary to save British ideals, and the saving of those ideals was of more importance to us than the saving of some party shibboleths.

On February 19 the *Evening Post* announced the absorption by the National party of three other anti-Labour organisations: the People's Movement, formed some time ago "to defend the people's rights and liberties against unjustifiable state dictation"; the New Liberal party and the sponsors of the proposed Soldiers' party (an organisation distinct from the Returned Soldiers' Association). These bodies in the aggregate had a small membership, and Mr. Fraser's comment on the incident was merely that it "introduced a few hyphens into the Opposition party".

Viscount Galway on February 3 terminated his tenure of the post of Governor-General and left New Zealand for England. On the 21st his successor, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, arrived at Auckland. At his assumption of office on the 22nd, he had a warm reception from a demonstrably air-minded people. On March 12 he opened his first session of Parliament, which adjourned on March 27 until the normal time of meeting at the end of June. It can, of course, be convened earlier if necessary.

The passing of the Lease and Lend Bill in the United States, coinciding with the visit to New Zealand of a United States naval squadron, evoked a warm demonstration of friendly gratitude towards the American people. This was expressed on March 16 by a remarkable public meeting held in the Wellington Town Hall under the auspices of the British-American Co-operation Movement, at which the Prime Minister was requested to forward to the President an expression of deep and sincere gratitude for American assistance to Britain and all democracies.

On February 19 Mr. Fraser announced that it had been decided to appoint a New Zealand Minister to the United States.

II. New Zealand's War Effort

THE reality of the war has been brought definitely closer to New Zealand by events which occurred in the Pacific at the end of 1940. On December 8 and 27 enemy ships shelled Nauru, a mandated island on the equator from which we receive large supplies of phosphates, and on December 31 the Prime Minister announced that a ship from Australia had rescued about 500 survivors from sunk British ships who had been landed by a German commerce-raider on December 21 on the island of Emirau, north of Australia. It was disclosed that three hostile ships working in company had sunk seven British, Allied and neutral vessels (including two belonging to New Zealand) in waters adjacent to Australia and New Zealand and our outlying islands, the Chathams (latitude 44 deg. south). Public opinion in New Zealand was exercised by suggestions that enemy agents in the Dominion were disclosing the movements of overseas ships, and so enabling hostile raiders to intercept them. The Government set up a commission of enquiry under a judge of the Supreme Court to sift these suggestions. Its report, published on April 1, fully explained the circumstances surrounding the sinkings, and declared, first that it was not established that there had been any leakages of information from New Zealand, and secondly that it was impossible to be sure that no such leakages had taken place. Public uneasiness has been allayed both by this enquiry and by the report of the Aliens Commission which, after investigating the cases of 2,300 aliens, considered it advisable to intern only 80.

Until this sinking of ships and the intensification of the Japanese crisis, it had not been easy to evoke a willing response to official warnings of danger, but there has since been a marked enthusiasm in recruiting for the Home Guard and

a considerable reduction in the lighting of cities which are visible from the sea.

New Zealand's war effort compares favourably with what was done in 1914–18. The Prime Minister said at Auckland on March 5 that although in the circumstances prevailing to-day New Zealand would have to maintain a strong force for home defence we would be sending more men overseas this time than last. There are 25 per cent. more men of military age, and "we are getting a higher percentage of fit men than we did from the ballots in the last war". Mr. Fraser said that 74 New Zealand airmen had already received decorations and nearly 23,000 applications had been received for the Air Force. An Air Cadet Force on the lines of the British A.T.C. is being organised to train youths between 16½ and 18 years of age.

Early in January the Minister of Finance announced a special issue of Government stock for supporting the war effort and paving the way for rehabilitation after the war. Amongst the works envisaged are railway construction, development of hydro-electric power, afforestation, housing, roads and public buildings. The loan is issued in two classes: one at 3 per cent. interest at par, repayable in 1945; and the other 3½ per cent at £97. 5*s*., repayable in 1956–59. No limit to the amount required is stated and there is no closing date. The compulsory loan, without interest, which was announced a few months ago, has already realised £9,120,000. During the first eighteen months of the war New Zealand has expended £40 millions; and in the current year the expenditure will be £17½ millions in New Zealand and £20 millions overseas. Of this the Government expects to raise £14,750,000 by taxation. It costs £700 to equip each man for overseas service and £7. 5*s*. a week for maintenance overseas.

The Minister of Finance has announced that for the nine months ended December 31 the Dominion's revenue was £21,930,000 (compared with £22,309,000 for the corresponding period of the previous year). The expenditure for the same period was £23,660,000 (as compared with £26,240,000). The reduction in expenditure is only apparent, since last year's

figures included nearly £4,000,000 of war expenditure, an item which this year is provided for in a separate war expenses account. For the calendar year 1940 the exports reached a record in value (£73,741,133) and the excess of exports over imports was £24,713,464.

III. Doctors and Social Security

THE most stubborn fight of the Labour Government's reform programme has raged about the social security measures. The various pension schemes were extended early in the Labour term of office and, before going to the country in 1938, the Government brought in a scheme of medical benefits based on the assumption that the whole nation would participate and that the benefits would thus stand on the same footing as state education and defence. All would pay for them and all would be eligible to benefit. From the political point of view it would seem that the Government was fully within its rights in pushing to completion a considered policy which the country had twice emphatically approved. It did not, however, enjoy the full co-operation of the medical profession, which differs on a fundamental point. Many of the arguments used are very similar to those which Mr. Lloyd George had to combat in inaugurating National Health Insurance in 1911–13. There are differences between the two measures, however, which are significant, and it is on one of these that the New Zealand division of the British Medical Association bases its resistance.

Dr. J. P. S. Jamieson, who, at the beginning of the controversy, was president of the Association in New Zealand and chairman of its National Health Insurance Committee, has outlined the Association's standpoint in the negotiations in a recent pamphlet. In 1927 the New Zealand representative at the League of Nations signed the draft convention undertaking to introduce a system of national health insurance into the New Zealand Parliament. Enquiry was initiated in 1929 by

the Hospital Boards Association, which, after some discussion with the British Medical Association, issued a tentative scheme. In 1935 a departmental committee presented a report to Parliament, and in that year also the Medical Association set up its National Health Insurance Committee. Noteworthy British authorities (including Dr. G. M. McCleary, Sir Kaye le Fleming and Sir Henry Brackenbury) visited New Zealand to study the problem, and eventually the committee came to the conclusion that—

> Further advances on the lines of the health insurance systems adopted by other countries would not be suitable in New Zealand and would not make for those advances in medical science which were most desirable.

The three political parties which contested the general election in 1935, however, were all pledged to some form of national health insurance. Accordingly, when Labour gained office the Association offered its services to the Minister of Health (Mr. Peter Fraser), with whom it afterwards conferred cordially enough for several years.* In 1936 the Government set up an investigation committee before which the Association advocated better attention to preventive medicine, better co-ordination of hospitals and "complete service for those whose circumstances precluded them from being able to obtain medical attention for themselves, and a contributory system of insurance for all others". In short, those who could should provide the family doctor's services for themselves. At this stage the Association learned that the Government proposed "a universal free medical service for everyone based primarily on free general practitioner service". Such a system, the Association believed, "would yield a poor service to the people and introduce a wholly unnecessary and undesirable degree of control of the public and the profession". Sir Henry Brackenbury, who had a wide experience of the old English "club" system and was an advocate of national health insurance,

* For the Social Security proposals see THE ROUND TABLE, No. 112, Sept. 1938, pp. 856–63; No. 114, March 1939, p. 326; No. 116, Sept. 1939, pp. 881–4.

concurred entirely with the Association in opposing the free universal scheme.

In a series of interviews with the Minister the Association contended for gradual evolutionary change and a steady improvement in the health of the people. This, Dr. Jamieson says, "health insurance has never shown itself capable of effecting, being but an indemnity for sickness. Modern methods of mass-production and the moving work-platform are not suitable for medical work." Early in 1938 the Association came to the conclusion that "the universal system arose from political considerations" and that "complete socialisation and complete financial control of the profession was what was sought". In that year a Select Parliamentary Committee was set up, consisting of six Government members of the House, four Opposition and one Independent, to investigate national superannuation and health. When the Bill came before Parliament embodying universal general practitioner service the Association declared itself fundamentally opposed to it. It told the Minister of Finance (Mr. Nash) that an assurance of professional liberty was beyond his power to give, since interference was inherent in the nature of the system proposed. "We were so convinced", says Dr. Jamieson, "that it was contrary to the interests of the country that we could not do otherwise than oppose it to the utmost of our power." That was the position when the election took place in 1938. The completion of the Government's social security plan was a major issue, which the electorate reaffirmed emphatically. The votes recorded for the Government advanced from 46·1 per cent. in 1935 to 56·1 per cent. in 1938. Within a few months the first important instalment of the plan (mental hospital treatment) was brought into operation (April 1, 1939), and three months later the hospital benefit. As regards this the Medical Association "abandoned with much reluctance the great tradition (of honorary service) associated with the famous voluntary hospitals of Britain", and agreed that honorary medical staffs should continue in an unpaid capacity until general practitioners accepted social security payment.

The Association objected to the proposed contracts for maternity benefits, but eventually a form was agreed upon which the Government accepted and brought into operation.

On the question of a general practitioner service, however, an impasse appeared to have been reached. The issue was not exactly analogous to that which arose in Great Britain in 1911–13. There a large section of the public was omitted from the scheme, and consequently a considerable portion of the medical profession could exercise their choice and practise independently of State regulation. In New Zealand the plan is universal, so that only a few specialists or fashionable practitioners would have any option except to become State servants. The Association contends that there is no urgent need for a free general practitioner service. Several approaches have been made to the Association in the hope of finding a solution. In December 1940 the Act was amended, and the Government has now issued a form of contract to which the individual can obtain the signature of his doctor if the doctor agrees to render service on those conditions. The Association protested that by doing this the Government merely divested itself of the duty of providing a general practitioner service. "It was in the position of a broker who had sold to the public (and taken the money) something which he did not possess, had made no arrangements to obtain and was unable to deliver. . . . The broker has confessed his inability to fulfil his contract and says to his clientele: 'If you can get this for yourselves I will pay.'"

The Association's attitude is thus stated by Dr. Jamieson:

> It will never profit the people to lay the burden of their individual sickness upon the State to a greater extent than is necessary. The creed of the profession is that no individual should be at any disadvantage . . . by reason of his financial position or social standing. We wish the treatment of the charlady to be as efficient as that of the highest lady of the land. The purpose of the Government's scheme is to subordinate medicine and all that pertains thereto to the all-controlling state. . . . Though we are at war with the country which has pursued this aim to the greatest extent the process continues in our midst. As one party succeeds another in power it is seen, rarely if ever, that the party coming into office lays aside any of the powers

> taken by its predecessor, however much, in opposition, they may have protested against their assumption. Consequently the Association places no trust in the future if it yields anything now.

On February 26 the new Minister of Health (Mr. Nordmeyer) announced the inauguration of medical service as from March 1, and appealed to the public to register without delay. The capitation fee of 15*s*. a year is to be paid out of the fund to every doctor who agrees to contract into the scheme in respect of every person (including children) on his panel. Patients have their choice of doctors, and the doctor's signature of the patient's card constitutes a contract. The doctor will, of course, be paid irrespective of whether the patient is well or ill. The payment of doctors, the Minister said, was "not merely adequate but generous. It is impossible to assess the value of the services which doctors render to the community in terms of cash, but it is quite certain that under this scheme the medical profession as a whole will not suffer any financial loss." The Association is not disposed to dispute that point, but its opposition, based on other grounds entirely, seems to be insurmountable. "The profession is determined", writes Dr. Jamieson, "that its tradition of service to the people as individuals and human beings, not as pathological entities, will be preserved in this country. It will not submit to a condition of State helotry."

Thus the position stands at the moment of writing. The Minister of Health proclaims himself confident that sufficient practitioners will accept contracts to ensure the success of the plan. For the Medical Association Dr. Alexander Wilson (the present President) says: "We are not going on strike, but we do say we are not going to become a party to the scheme. . . . We cannot accept proposals which would be injurious to the public health or deleterious to the standard of medical practice in New Zealand. We will have nothing to do with the Government's scheme." A week or two later he added: "We know that the fate of the Government's scheme is sealed."

The controversy carries one forcibly back to the epic struggle between Mr. Lloyd George and the British Medical

Association in 1911–13, when by an overwhelming majority the Association declined to accept service under the National Health Insurance Act, only to be compelled at the last moment to reverse its decision and to release its members from their bond. Our Labour Government to-day is no doubt hoping that it will be found, as it was in England a quarter of a century ago, that the rank and file of the Medical Association are not nearly so antagonistic to the Government as its executive and that a sufficient number will be willing to take service to enable the scheme to operate. As to this, there are certain special conditions prevailing. Out of about 1,000 practitioners in the Dominion fully 200 are already doing war service, and the Director of Medical Services has just announced that he will require possibly 110 more. On the other hand, there has been in recent years a certain influx of alien practitioners into New Zealand as refugees from Nazism. The Government has been appealed to more than once to safeguard the interests of the New Zealand profession against the competition of these practitioners, who are now available to fill gaps left by New Zealand doctors on active service. A one-day strike of miners at Dobson, which was staged "as a protest against the attitude of the B.M.A.", was rightly described by the *Evening Post* as "an unwarranted attempt at coercion, foolish and untimely", but it does show how closely Labour is touched by the threatened defeat of its treasured social scheme. It will be only too ready to identify the resistance of the Medical Association with purely political efforts to sabotage Labour social policy. The press on the whole has never been anything but critical of the Government's scheme, and there is a general disposition to welcome the impasse as a broad hint to the Government to desist from its policy, at any rate until the end of the war, when the doctors on service will again be available.

New Zealand,
April 1941.

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New Zealand,
April 1941.

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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THE NEW PHASE

ON June 22, 1812, in his proclamation to the Grand Army, Napoleon wrote these words: "*La Russie est entraînée par la fatalité, ses destins doivent s'accomplir. . . . La paix que nous conclurons portera avec elle sa garantie et mettra un terme à la funeste influence que la Russie a exercée depuis cinquante ans sur les affaires de l'Europe.*" Two days later he crossed the Niemen and an army of a million men began that march into the unknown which ended only when the Grand Army was engulfed and France herself submerged. The soldiers of France set out with high hopes, confident of a rapid and brilliant campaign before a dictated peace. In imagination they were blazing a trail to Constantinople and the East. "What would you like me to bring you back from India?" said a French officer to a Polish lady. Another wrote from Moscow that "the Grand Army will not see France again until it is laden with the jewels of Golconda and the fabrics of Kashmir". But the army encountered only torrid heat and torrential rain, roads thick with dust or choked with mud, the acrid smoke of burning towns and homesteads, the scorched and desolate earth. Their spirits sank as the murmurings of revolt began to be heard amongst the free peoples whom they had held in subjection and left behind them.

It was on June 22 one hundred and twenty-nine years later that Hitler launched his attack on Russia. He struck with every circumstance of perfidy and duplicity at a nation with which only two years before he had concluded a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. He claimed, as with every new onslaught against the rights of his neighbours to live in peace, that he was acting in self-defence as the champion of European civilisation. Like Napoleon he counted on a speedy and glittering end to his campaign, and so far it has eluded him as it eluded Napoleon. He has learnt the truth proudly

proclaimed in 1812 by the Emperor Alexander that "the Russians are not a people who shrink in the face of danger". His soldiers, like the Grand Army, have met heat and dust, mud and flames, the same scorched and desolate earth. His generals have been driven to complain with the same petulance as Napoleon that the Russians will not fight according to the rules of war as their enemies conceive them. They do not cower before the *Blitzkrieg*.

But the parallel goes deeper than this. To Hitler, as to Napoleon, the Russian campaign is a move, reluctant but inescapable, in the struggle against the same implacable enemy, England. Caught in the toils of sea power, though with the continent at his feet, each of these conquerors has felt the need of breaking Russia or bending her to his will. When all the arts of cajolery failed, as they failed in the years after Tilsit, to make of Russia an instrument to lift the blockade, Hitler was driven, like his forerunner, to stake his fortunes on a campaign that would open the path to the gorgeous East and its riches and remove for ever the menace of Russian arms from the flank of the conquered territories of Europe. To the Germans of to-day that menace has been a political and not merely a military nightmare. The German army has not forgotten that Bolshevism was its own creation, and the memory of the astonishing consequences of the safe-conduct given to Lenin has haunted the soldiers as it has haunted the party. To both the Soviet has appeared as a disruptive force, no less powerful and no less cunning than the Nazi régime itself.

Dread of communism and apprehension over the rising power of the Soviet Union has, indeed, touched many minds in every corner of the globe. It may well have been one of the secondary calculations of the Fuehrer when he decided to march against Russia that he would range behind him all those who feared or hated communism, wherever they might be found. He may have believed that as another Saint Louis he would have the blessing of the Church and the support of the Catholic neutrals, and that in the United States and even in

the British Commonwealth doubts would creep in and divided faith constrict the war effort. If indeed he was buoyed by such hopes, they have betrayed him. For that, the world is much indebted to the immediate decision of the British Government to treat Russia as an ally, and to the logic and humanity of the broadcast in which the Prime Minister announced that decision within a few hours of the invasion. As Madame de Staël noted in St. Petersburg in 1812, "*il n'y a plus que deux espèces d'hommes en Europe, ceux qui servent la tyrannie et ceux qui savent la haïr*". When Hitler is the enemy of mankind, all those in any nation who are prepared to fight Hitler are our friends and will find us fighting at their side. That was the unanswerable logic of Mr. Churchill's speech. But logic alone will rarely defeat prejudice, and it was by a moving description of the transition from peace to war, from life to death, decreed by one man for millions of his unoffending fellow creatures, that the Prime Minister lifted the argument from the wrangle of contending philosophies to the plane of a common humanity.

From whatever angle we regard it, the attack on Russia has opened a new chapter in the story of the war. For the first time since the collapse of France, Germany is opposed by a first-class military power. For the first time in twelve months the main energies of the Nazi war-machine have been diverted from the British Commonwealth to be expended elsewhere. By these events war has been brought to the brink of the Pacific. The strength of Russia is seated in Asia no less than in Europe, and her preoccupations have opened a tempting yet dangerous prospect to the covetous opportunism of Japan, her neighbour and only rival in the Far East. The peace of the Pacific and the course of the war in the West alike depend on the fate of the German adventure. That fate is still wrapped in mystery. Through the vast region of lake and forest, river and plain, which stretches from the Arctic to the Black Sea, millions of men with their tens of thousands of machines are locked in a confused struggle of which no clear picture has yet been conveyed to an expectant world.

Even if the life of Soviet Russia had not for a generation been turned back upon itself and shrouded by a veil of secrecy and suspicion, the very scale and nature of the operations would preclude close or accurate description at this time. But some things at least are plain.

The first is that Russia has held together. The revolt against Communism, the fall of Stalin, the crumbling of the Soviet Union into separate and warring States—all this came within the sober expectation not only of the Nazi leaders but of many of those who in other countries have set themselves up as Russian experts. They forgot what Madame de Staël in a few weeks discovered for herself, that "*ce peuple possède des réserves de vertu nationale à étonner le monde*". Millions of Russians are fighting not for communism but for that inalienable right which Nazi Germany would deny to other nations, the right to live their own lives on the soil that has reared them. The desire for freedom in that sense is a profound and eternal motive in the story of the human race, and the German people will be hated and despised by nations perhaps less gifted than themselves until they learn to recognise and tolerate it.

In a cause which has found them united the Russians have fought not only with stubborn determination but with skill and enterprise. They have shown that they possess abundant mechanised equipment and that they know how to use it. Their Air Force, which the *Luftwaffe* claimed to have eliminated in the first two days of the campaign, is after two months still in being and still active. Their armies have suffered heavy losses and have yielded up a vast territory, but they have not been destroyed nor have they disintegrated. Their civilian population has stood up to indiscriminate bombing with admirable discipline and energy. At a high price in men and material the German army has thrust forward on the main front for some hundreds of miles, but the boasting and the excuses, the lies and the inconsistencies of its announcements to Germany and the world are the best evidence how far its achievement falls below its hopes.

Beyond these general impressions we enter the realm of idle speculation. Too little is known of Russia's reserves of trained troops or of her stocks of war materials or of her productive capacity, or even of the extent to which war factories have been duplicated beyond the probable reach of an invader. It is likely that the loss of Leningrad, Moscow and the Eastern Ukraine would drastically curtail the Russian power of fighting a mechanised war. But whether the driving force of the German army can so triumph over the problems of lengthening communications and of the limits of mechanical strength in vehicles and physical strength in human beings as to reach and hold those centres before the winter—that only time will tell.

Nowhere are the augurs more closely watching the portents than in Tokyo. The Japanese have for long been skilful, indeed slavish, copyists of Western life. They have shown no acute perception of the difference between what was good in it and what was evil. They have been dazzled by the resplendent façade of Nazi Germany and the phenomenal success of the German arms. It is more than probable that the acrobatics of German diplomacy in recent months have left them puzzled and a little resentful, and it is certain that they have no wish to risk their own necks in order to save Hitler's. But having neither scruples nor any conception of international morality, they will not be deterred from aggression at any time and in any place if they judge that it can be practised for the benefit of Japan without bringing them into conflict with the police. In this spirit they have established themselves with energy in Indo-China, in advance positions from which they can threaten and, if the time seems ripe, attack Thailand or Burma, the Dutch East Indies or Singapore. Vulnerable economically in a long war, they are unlikely to face the combined strength of the United States and the British Commonwealth unless those two adversaries should appear to be fighting a forlorn hope elsewhere. But there ought to be no illusions as to the consequences in the Japanese sphere of a Russian collapse in Europe. Once the resources of

Germany were set free for an attack on Britain and for the occupation of the Peninsula and North Africa, Japan might well decide that the time had come for a further move to the south or for an attack on Vladivostok or both. Without such overmastering temptations, even a cautious gambler may misjudge the cards, and until the war with Germany is won peace in the Pacific will be at the mercy of a miscalculation.

It was, perhaps, inevitable that the entry of Russia into the war and the gallant and determined resistance of her people should have been received with a sense of relief, almost of relaxation, in the British Commonwealth and even more in the United States. When air bombardment dwindles to a negligible formality, and the unknown perils of invasion recede into the haze of the future, the optimist comes into his own again. We are at all times a sanguine people, and it would be difficult to prove that the tendency to a renewed cheerfulness has led to any perceptible weakening of our war effort. But no one who pauses for a moment's sober reflection on this new phase in the struggle can fail to hear a challenge to ourselves and to the people of the United States to enlarge and intensify the programmes and the exertions to which we are already committed. The challenge is insistent whatever may be the course of the campaign in the East, and whatever the outcome of the historic meeting in the Atlantic to which the President invited the Prime Minister. From their discussions, the first result to be announced was a joint declaration of common principles animating the national policies of Britain and the United States for the reconstruction of a peaceful world. The true measure of its importance will be the depth to which its eight points sink into the consciousness of men and women in all countries, as the war goes on. They are peace aims, just, generous and far-reaching.

But peace is not yet. If Germany can defeat Russia or so weaken her as to be able to extricate the greater part of the German forces for a renewed assault in the West, we shall have to face at no long interval redoubled violence at home and the probable extension of the war to the other side of

the globe. Men will have died in their hundreds of thousands to give us a brief respite before we meet new and incalculable dangers. But if the German thrusts are stemmed and the Russian campaign is protracted, an urgent and imperative duty will be laid on Britain and the United States to furnish war supplies of every kind to Russia, whilst equipping ourselves to take our full part in the counter-offensive on both fronts which Russian valour and endurance will then have made possible. Russia will have brought us immense reserves of man-power and the will to use them, and man-power cries out for equipment, unlimited and unstinted.

It is with feelings of disappointment, almost of frustration, that the British people and their friends in the world have come to realise the narrow bounds set at this moment to our power of giving effective military help to Russia. By day and night, in all weathers, the R.A.F. have maintained attacks in increasing weight on enemy shipping and on targets in Germany and the occupied territories. They have inflicted heavy losses and caused great damage, and they have helped to spread doubt and dismay amongst the civilian population. But this offensive, powerful and successful in itself, has not deflected the German command from its objectives in Russia, and has fallen far short of the assault with all arms which the German adventure invited. The urgent task of Governments and peoples, here and in the United States, is by organisation and sustained effort to hasten the day when our equipment in ships and planes, guns and tanks will be equal to any opportunity, or any danger, that the military situation may present. Until that day dawns, victory can only be a dream.

WAR PRODUCTION

THE dominant lesson of the war is that the quantity and quality of the equipment which the combatants can throw into the scales at the right time and place will go as far to determine the issue of the struggle with Germany as the military virtues of the rank and file or the skill of the commanders. The Battle of Britain, it is true, was won by smaller numbers, but neither the individual prowess nor the operational training of the Royal Air Force could have prevailed if they had not been displayed in better aircraft than those of the enemy. German arms, with that exception, have gone from one triumph to another by the overwhelming concentration of equipment of high quality, either on land or in the air or both, against opponents who had much less of it. The check which they appear to have met in Russia would have been inconceivable if the scale of Russian armaments had been much inferior to their own. That check, and the surprise and disquiet which it has caused in Germany, have stimulated optimism in the Allied world and have distracted attention from the industrial background of Russian resistance. Men argue that the end of the Russian campaign is not in sight, that the long-term effect of the blockade is indisputable, that the seeds of disintegration of the Nazi power have been sown in every country which they are holding down and not least in Germany. But no wise man will feel that victory is certain until Britain and her friends have raised their industrial effort to a level from which the flow of equipment will swamp that of Germany. No wise man will any longer underrate the magnitude of what is implied by that requirement.

It is a commonplace that in rearmament Germany took a long lead, but only in recent months has the immense scale of German production been brought home to us. The facts are that the Germans were preparing the instruments of war

during years in which Western Europe was thinking and planning only peace, and that the extent and completeness of their work have been consistently underestimated. They have acquired in two years vast additions to their resources in plant, material and labour, and they have been enabled to disperse their production over a wide area much of which is inaccessible for the time being to the R.A.F. They have overcome formidable difficulties, and while there is reason to believe that Germany's production problems are becoming more numerous and more intractable, no one has yet encountered the German fighting man without finding him equipped with every offensive weapon and every device for his protection that forethought and ingenuity could provide. When that can be said of our own forces, and of those of our Allies, our war production may be adequate—but not till then.

The industrial effort of Britain has been powerfully reinforced by the Dominions and the United States. The growing production of war material in the Dominions is from every point of view an invaluable contribution to the Allied cause. It is immune from interference by bombing. It reduces the demands on shipping. It relieves the financial burden borne by the people of these islands. But in the vast industrial output which the war necessitates Dominion production can never be more than a fraction. Direct comparisons of output are difficult, but it is known that to the end of the financial year 1941–42 the total war expenditure of the United Kingdom was estimated at £7,300 millions, and that of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India together at £1,230 millions. These figures are evidence only of the predominant rôle which the old and highly organised manufacturing community of Great Britain must play in an industrial war.

Immense as are the potentialities of the magnificent assistance which the United States has undertaken to give, it cannot excuse, nor could it necessarily retrieve, any slackening from the maximum effort required of British industry here and now. American production has its own problems, some of them more acute than ours. There is no well-established

modus vivendi between employers and workers such as a century of trade union development and a generation of rapid social progress have brought about in Britain. Instead of that, the immediate background is the bitterness engendered by the New Deal policies, the conflict of rival labour organisations, the unsolved problem of what the relations between organised labour and the great industries are to be. Labour disputes have held up production and will no doubt recur, and the Fifth Column will do nothing to discourage them. Then again the central control of American war production is only beginning to take shape. Nothing that has been said in criticism of the Ministry of Supply or the Production Executive or the Army Mechanisation Department can equal in pungent severity what innumerable distinguished Americans are saying about Washington or their own Army Ordnance Department. When every allowance is made for political prejudice against the President, we shall do well to remind ourselves that the American system of government is designed, like our own, for peace and not for war, and that the process of adaptation was begun in the United States at least two years later than here. Nor ought we to forget that the production in America for Britain of equipment not merely of high quality, for that can be relied on, but of the highest fighting efficiency involves constant and intimate collaboration between the service experts and the engineers of the two countries. To see for himself how improvements in this sphere could be effected may reasonably have been one of the purposes justifying Lord Beaverbrook's visit to America. For it is we and our Allies who have the up-to-the-minute fighting experience, and who must convey it via Washington to the designers and production managers of Los Angeles or Detroit. It is characteristic of engineers that, although they are practitioners in a universal science, they should be as sensitive to criticism as the artist. When this is remembered, it is perhaps astonishing how many problems co-operation has already solved. But many remain; and even when the interchange of experts and flying visits "between one sermon and the next" have been much extended,

as it is to be hoped they will be, it is in the nature of things that the British and American services will always find it easier to meet their design requirements in the factories of their own countries than in those of the other.

Considerations such as these have no doubt had their share, with our reverses in Greece and Crete, in arousing public opinion, in and out of Parliament, to ask whether our supply arrangements are yet adequate. It is widely recognised that our own industrial effort is now, and indeed must always be, of fundamental importance. No one pretends that it has reached its peak, and few are satisfied that the curve is as steep, after two years of war and four years of rearmament, as it might be expected to be. The layman knows no more of quantity production than a Cabinet Minister, and he is driven to judge by results, where they are apparent to him. It is such things as the reports of the fighting in Crete and his own equipment in the Home Guard that lie at the root of his doubts and criticisms. The recent debate on the subject in the House of Commons, extended to a third day in order to enable the Prime Minister to answer an attack which his colleagues had allowed to go largely by default, may be said to have met the popular demand for criticism without removing the popular misgivings. It is unfortunate that the present House is not particularly representative of productive industry, less so indeed than of law or agriculture or trade union experience. Much of the criticism was ineffective through misdirection or exaggeration, and the Prime Minister's brilliant debating speech, in spite of an admirable and timely vindication of the working man, was certainly not an entirely convincing reply to the case which the critics had tried, and failed, to make.

It was characteristic of the unreality of the debate that the most judicial speech made in it should have been inspired by the obscure belief that "our people are not working up to more than 75 per cent. of our possible efficiency". If that means that four man-hours are required to produce what could be produced in three, it is palpably untrue. If it means

that when we have reached the peak production for which plans have been made, output will have risen by a third, the statement might well be true without being a legitimate reason for criticism. If it means that we are not yet as near the peak as we should be, someone should have reminded the House that percentages of efficiency are dangerous ground in war, for all programmes are subject to dislocation at short notice to meet the changing military situation. The magnetic mine was a bolt from the blue. It was defeated by rapid and brilliant technical improvisation. But it would be absurd to suggest that the decision to provide ships with degaussing equipment has been carried through without repercussions in other fields of production. Dispersion in the aircraft industry—a measure for which Lord Beaverbrook will perhaps be remembered when some of his other activities have been forgotten—has reduced efficiency on a short view, but on a long view may well prove to have been indispensable to its maintenance.

In considering whether our industrial effort is adequate to our needs, there are three main factors to be examined. The first concerns labour, the second management and the third staff work at the centre. Has labour been made available in sufficient strength for war industries, have the workers done a fair day's work, has time been lost by frequent trade disputes? Has the management of industry been on the whole competent, has it as a whole put the national interest before selfish or sectional ends, has it shown itself capable of responding to the elastic and growing requirements of supply? Finally, what of the central control? Have its plans been drawn on a scale commensurate with the need, has their execution been impeded by conflicting jurisdictions, does the organisation in and below the War Cabinet function smoothly and without loss of time?

It is obvious that an immense expansion of the engineering and allied industries for a temporary purpose is only possible if the dilution of labour is freely practised, if skilled labour is confined to the tasks for which it is essential, and if men and

women with skill in other trades or in none can be introduced by the million, trained in the rudiments of their new work and quickly assimilated. There are sound reasons for believing that this process has been carried through with little opposition from any vested interest and with a large measure of success. Industry itself has done most of the training, and done it intelligently. The Essential Work Order has prevented the disorderly scramble for skilled men from which, if newspaper advertisements can be believed, not even the legendary efficiency of the Germans has succeeded in protecting their own industries. Most engineering employers would probably agree that they have been able, and are still able, to obtain all the labour which they are in a position to train and use. In spite of the unfavourable and in many cases ill-chosen situation of the new ordnance factories under direct Government management, it would not appear that the delays which have occurred in bringing them into production have been due to any extent to a failure on the part of Mr. Bevin to provide the labour. The broad general answer, therefore, to the question whether labour has been made available in sufficient strength for war industries would seem to be that it has up to the present.

Nor can it fairly be suggested that output over the whole field has fallen, as a result of slackness or indifference or absenteeism by the workers, much below what it would have been right to expect. Trade disputes, as the Prime Minister has pointed out, have lost us 2 million working days in the first two years of this war as against 12 million in the last two years of the last. The great body of workers, men and women, have worked well and consistently in conditions to which the last war could show no parallel. They have been sustained against discomfort and the risk of death, many of them without a roof over their heads, by the conviction that this war is their war and that Hitler is their enemy. There has been absenteeism, though much less than the sensationalist would have us believe, and there is no doubt that one of its causes has been the attempt to work excessive hours. Experience

has shown that in present conditions the optimum result in output is obtained from a week of something nearer 55 than 60 hours. It may well be found that the gradual general approximation to that standard will reduce avoidable loss of time and promote that sustained industrial effort which is needed to see us through.

If one-half were true of what the Minister of Labour, in his more fractious moments, has said about the management of industry, he would deserve impeachment for his failure to exercise his almost tyrannical powers and put a stop to the abuse. Industry is a wide term, and it is used to-day to cover the whole range from the concern with 100,000 employees to the converted garage with half a dozen. There is clearly no common standard of management throughout that range, either as regards efficiency of production, quality and maintenance of plant or treatment of employees. But if we consider established engineering firms with a normal pay-roll of 1,000 or more, the general impression must be that of a remarkable achievement in adaptation and expansion. Many of these firms have doubled and even trebled the number of their workpeople and have carried through, with very little addition to their administrative staff, the organisation of the manufacture of apparatus and equipment, often of great delicacy and quite alien to their usual activity. No one who is familiar with the problems set by the quantity production of a predictor or a four-engine bomber or even a modern tank will believe for a moment that what has already been accomplished would have been feasible without a high standard of productive efficiency and of works management in the widest sense. This work has not been done under compulsion, for extensive as its powers are the Government has not forced anyone to make anything. Nor has it been done for hope of reward, since E.P.T. at 100 per cent. is the sure guarantee of a negative return in excessive depreciation, neglected development and depletion of cash. Doubtless firms could be found which have been enabled by the demand for their normal products to stand aside and to avoid expansion and excess profits. If

such there are, the Government has ample powers to bring them into the general co-operative effort. Doubtless, too, some firms are more efficient than others. Not all the constructors of aircraft have the same right to be proud of their achievements, and not all delays in tank production can fairly be ascribed to changes in design. But when every allowance is made for the weaker brethren, the general level of performance, in the conditions which the course of the war and the staff work of the Government have imposed, has been remarkably high.

It is sometimes forgotten that the Government itself is the largest employer, with several hundred thousand men and women working in the ordnance factories which have come or are coming into production. The country is committed to this policy of direct labour, and no sweeping change is now possible. But it is well not to overlook the consequences. The Government, unlike the great industrial concerns, has no sufficient established organisation on which to draw for the management and staffing of these factories. It has to go out into the highways and byways and hire what it can find there. There are surer ways of obtaining efficient management than by a combination of the civil servant and the foundling. The civil servant is not trained to provide for the welfare of his staff—that concerns the Office of Works—and it is not surprising that complaints have been heard from many of these new factories in remote districts of inadequate arrangements for canteens or transport or housing. Until these things are put right—and the Prime Minister has told the House that they will be put right—maximum production in the ordnance factories will be unattainable and the many other war activities which are carried on in all great works will fail to flourish there.

It remains to consider the part played by the centre. It would be idle to pretend that we are not still suffering from the refusal of pre-war Governments—aided and abetted by a great majority of their supporters—to take a big enough view of the scale on which equipment of all kinds was required, or

of the central machinery necessary to enable it to be provided. Programmes have had to be expanded and expanded again, and machinery has had constantly to be improvised and adapted. The penalty of lack of foresight may be a delay of months or even years in the conditions of modern quantity production. A decision to increase, say, the bomber output even by 20 per cent. involves consequential decisions affecting the makers of steel, aluminium, instruments, wiring, undercarriages and a thousand other components. It is not surprising that the very timidity of our past approach has, when corrected, often led to confusion, to some things falling out of step, to the growth of bottle-necks. On the side of organisation it has led repeatedly to the Government having to choose between the comparative advantages of further adaptation and compromise, and a clean sweep—and a clean sweep is rarely possible in the middle of a war.

In the matter of programmes there are two solid grounds for confidence. The Admiralty, in the first place, may be relied on to know what they want and to get it. They are helped not only by the fact that many of their needs are not competitive with those of other departments, but by the command of contract and inspection departments of long experience and sensible methods. The aircraft programme, again, proceeds directly from the admirable groundwork laid down during the three years before 1940 by the responsible officers of the Royal Air Force and their civilian coadjutors. We owe it to them more than to anyone else that the Prime Minister can report that "our spring and summer fashions in aircraft are this year further ahead of contemporary German production than they were last year". With the manufacturing facilities now available a still further increase in production may reasonably be expected, now that the department concerned has time for a little quiet organisation within its own walls.

It is upon the equipment of the Army that most doubts have centred. This is not unnatural, since the Army was the last in the field and its task in the war is neces-

sarily much less clearly apparent to the public mind than in 1939. Moreover it is the Army which has been found repeatedly to be less well equipped than its opponent, and which can be seen with its equipment in every corner of the land. Yet it must be presumed that the Defence Committee of the War Cabinet has clearly envisaged the rôle which the Army may be called on to play, in offence as well as in the defence of Britain, and that this has been taken into account in the War Supply Budget which the Prime Minister has said was approved in March last. To provide that material is the task of the Ministry of Supply. That ill-fated department has in a short life had four heads, and it has now come under the control of a dynamic personality who does not believe in organisation. The result must be awaited. It is safe to assume, if only because of the momentum already acquired, that there will be tanks, whatever hen-roosts have to be robbed on the way.

In a higher sphere than the merely departmental, critics in and out of Parliament have called for a Ministry of Production. They have had it in mind that an excessive responsibility at present rests on the Prime Minister, who does not readily delegate executive work: that the Production Executive under Mr. Bevin takes no executive action and is at best a conciliation board: and that the logical end of the present arrangements is to make a single Minister responsible for supply to all three services. The Prime Minister has rejected the proposal on the perhaps inconsistent grounds that there was no need for the new Minister because the Production Executive was doing his work already, that the individual was not in sight (who could control Lord Beaverbrook?) and that if he were he could not relieve the Prime Minister. The decision will clearly be accepted for the present. But it is right to point out that the proposal for a new Ministry seems more logical than opportune to many of those who are dissatisfied with the present arrangements. When so much is working well a major disturbance in departmental organisation can cost too high a price. This does not mean that no changes are needed.

There are two major reforms which have been too long delayed. On the administrative side the Prime Minister's lifelong and passionate interest in the details of executive work has raised to the Ministerial plane a mass of detail which is better handled not by Ministers but by officials. Most of the problems with which Ministers have attempted to deal in the Production Executive would be brought to a decision in a fraction of the time and with less friction if they were left to the responsible heads of the departments concerned—not all of whom, we hasten to add, are civil servants. In the proper sphere of Ministerial function, the real need of the moment, in production as in every other branch of the war effort, is not for supermen or superministries but for a small War Cabinet, in which the best men amongst the Epigonoi of our time would be free of departmental responsibilities and able to devote themselves to the major tasks of planning and of policy.

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR. VIII

I. The Development of the Continental Strategy

THE period covered by the present survey appeared to challenge all our earlier experiences. In scope and quality the war transcended every standard, and both in pace and in intensity set up new records. The novelty of the operations marked not so much a fresh turn of the conflict as an exaggeration of the old historic clash between the Oceanic and the Continental strategies. With Hitler's attack upon Russia the Continental strategy worked to a climax. The reality of sea power was recognised. Its tendency to permeate and control land as well as sea operations was at length fully apprehended, and Hitler, like Napoleon before him, decided to make the attempt to establish a Continental system and leave to Britain the onus of destroying it.

With certain areas of Russia in his control he concluded that his system would be self-contained, with an abundance of cereals, minerals, and the fats and oils without which modern civilisation cannot be maintained upon its present plane. The areas which promised to provide him with these necessities would also place him in a position to threaten vital centres of the British Empire, so that, in possession of a sufficiently large and rich unit, he could resist the pressure of sea power and both challenge and threaten attack. At Crete he appeared to show air power triumphant over a powerful navy; and yet he, at all events, could not be ignorant that the campaigns in Iraq, in Libya and in Syria were dominated by sea power. Against it he failed to make headway significantly either by submarine or surface attack; and the one encounter in which his newest battleship sank the battle-cruiser *Hood* ended in a sudden and overwhelming concentration that destroyed it.

II. Iraq

THE true meaning of Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* did not immediately disclose itself, though the British Government refused to acknowledge the administration and maintained a watchful attitude. When strong forces were landed at Basra on April 19 their suspicions were made to appear almost an indelicacy, so warm was the local welcome and so correct the administration's attitude. But when reinforcements arrived about ten days later, Iraqi mechanised troops were concentrated around the aerodrome and training school of the Royal Air Force at Habbaniya, some 60 miles west of Baghdad. On May 2 they opened fire on the cantonment, and it was evident that the usurper intended to put his fortunes to the test of fighting. He had received promises from the enemy and rather rashly, in the circumstances, looked for their support. Throughout that and the following days the aerodrome was under intermittent fire, and the Iraqi extended the scope of their operations to Rutba, on the pipe-line to Haifa, where they attacked and overcame an unarmed construction party. The British bombers then went into action. The Moascar Rashid aerodrome, south-east of Baghdad, was attacked, and in a few days the bulk of the Iraqi air force was put out of action and the guns at Habbaniya reduced to almost complete inactivity. The way was now clear for the assault on the plateau above Habbaniya. This was taken, and the Iraqi withdrew to Ramadi, up the Euphrates, and Felujah, nearer the capital.

The British operations now began to take shape. An armoured column of the Royal Air Force swept across the western desert, occupied Rutba and the surrounding district on May 11 and began to move north-east on the capital. Preparations were made for the attack upon Felujah, and by May 19 the settlement was in our hands. It fell to a land and air attack and, in spite of repeated counter-attacks, was securely held. An armoured column moved up the Euphrates, and by May 29 had reached Ur and Luqait, to the south-east. The


position of the insurgents now began to look serious. On the day before the capture of Ur the advance had been resumed from Felujah, and Khan Nuqta, half-way between Felujah and Baghdad, was occupied. An armoured unit pushed its way to a point some 5 miles north-west of the capital, and only the floods held up the main advance from Khan Nuqta. But Rashid Ali had now recognised the inevitable, and on the last day of the month he fled to Iran. An armistice was asked for, and on the following day the British troops entered Baghdad. On June 3 air-borne troops and land forces entered Mosul and the unhappy insurrection was at an end.

There was no attempt by the Germans to help Rashid Ali out of his difficulty until May 15, when about thirty aircraft landed in Iraq with agitators and other "specialists". They had enjoyed the hospitality of the Syrian aerodromes as staging posts, and this treachery led to the repeated bombing of the airfields at Rayak, Palmyra and Damascus. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the punitive expedition could have been pushed to success but for the continual assistance of the Royal Air Force against the enemy there and the insurgents in Iraq. The success of the operations, however, was to bear fruit later on, when it was found necessary to take up the challenge of the Vichy Government. At the time it was completely overshadowed by the withdrawal from Crete.

III. The Invasion of Crete

WHEN Greece was evacuated the Greek Government, with several divisions of Greek troops and a number of Imperial divisions, withdrew to the island of Crete; and it required no unusual prescience to predict a German attack. Its position gave it an importance that no one could ignore. At its easternmost point it lies no more than 110 miles from Asia Minor, and the intervening space is dotted with the thirteen islands of the Dodecanese and the Cyclades group. It is separated from the south of Greece by only 60 miles. From Libya it lies less than 200 miles. Its possession by the enemy

would give him the chance to create a second bottle-neck in the Mediterranean, and the means to draw closer in the threat to the naval squadron based upon Alexandria. On the other hand, its retention by Britain involved a constant threat to the enemy occupation of Greece. From its aerodromes Greece and even Italy would be within easy reach, and the control of the eastern Mediterranean would still ride with comparative



security in our hands. The Germans could not ignore this defiant stronghold, and, even if their line of action had not been clearly suggested by the strategic position, it was made obvious by the concentration of the *Luftwaffe* in southern Greece. This was no secret, and the Royal Air Force had made repeated attempts to bomb and destroy the numerous aerodromes. On May 16 the enemy retaliated by an air attack upon Maleme and Heraclion, but without inflicting any significant damage or causing casualties. It was a gesture and a reconnaissance; but it was apparently taken quite coolly by the British command who, according to Mr. Churchill, had determined to defend the island "to the death".

Crete is a mountainous island and only two notable plains intervene between the crumpled hills. The central plain is shut off from the south coast by a range of mountains; the smaller lies about Canea. It has few good roads and not many natural harbours. One of these, however, at Suda Bay, is sheltered by the rocky peninsula of Akrotiri, south of which it seems to penetrate like the intrusion of a bent forefinger. The principal towns are all on the northern coast, Canea in the west,

Retimo nearer the centre, and Heraclion (or Candia) farther to the east. The first is the seat of government, the last the old capital. All three, for a time, held the world's attention, for round them raged a struggle that was at once the most novel and the most bitter that the war had cast up. The island was garrisoned by British (including a large body of marines), Australian, New Zealand and Greek troops under the command of a famous fighting soldier, General Freyberg.

The Germans, being determined to capture the island, had to face a far from simple problem. They designed to take it by means of air-borne troops assisted by a sea expedition. Without the latter, occupation, at least, could not be stably assured. An air-borne invasion could not land an unlimited number of troops nor could it assure the heavier sort of equipment. The British troops had little heavy equipment themselves, and it soon became evident that they lacked the more vital protection upon which the retention of the island turned. The attack began with an intense air bombardment which reached its highest pitch on Monday, May 19, and in the early hours of the following day the air invasion began. Under cover of repeated dive-bombing attacks parachutists landed. Their rôle was the same as in Holland, to seize positions and, when established, signal for the troop-carriers and gliders to follow.

The first objective appears to have been the Akrotiri peninsula, the capture of which would have given possession of the Suda Bay harbour and thereby have paved the way for reinforcement from the sea. But the three main towns were also attacked, and particularly Canea near which lies the Maleme aerodrome. Throughout the day the Germans continued to land troops. The military hospital between Canea and the Akrotiri peninsula was captured and promptly retaken. The enemy penetrated to the outskirts of Canea, were surrounded and disposed of. Even more bitter fighting went on at Retimo and Heraclion. The conditions under which the defenders had to fight were the worst that can face any troops.

The dive-bombing attacks could be tolerated by taking cover, but the machine-gunning from the enemy fighters could not be evaded. The troops lacked the protection of their own fighters, since the overwhelming strength of the *Luftwaffe* attack upon the few aerodromes confronted them with the alternative of withdrawal or annihilation. Even with the most perfect aerodrome protection it is improbable that they would have been able to withstand so heavy an attack; and it is clear that such protection did not exist.

So the second day of the attack dawned with the Germans precariously holding a few positions. Many more had paid the last penalty and numbers of enemy machines had been destroyed; but there was no cessation in the attack. That night, after hours of bitter but unsuccessful fighting, the Germans held the Maleme aerodrome, though it was still under our guns; and the town of Heraclion was in their hands though the adjacent aerodrome was held. It was presumably the capture of Heraclion that led to the launching of an expedition from the sea, but it met with disaster. Numerous caïques and small merchantmen, hiding under cover of the distant fringe of islands, put out in their challenge to the Navy, only to find that their task was impossible. Maleme aerodrome was held against a heavy counter-attack on the third day, and this, in the end, turned the scale. Throughout that and subsequent days reinforcements were landed and, at length, the invaders were able to extend their hold towards the east against the most bitter hand-to-hand fighting. Odd parties which had landed in other places were rounded up, but gradually the Germans secured a firm grip upon Heraclion and Retimo, and pushed their way from Maleme eastward. The New Zealand troops fought with almost incredible stubbornness to hold Canea, but were gradually ejected.

In spite of the assistance of the long-range fighters the battle was clearly being lost. Canea fell into German hands after sixty hours of continuous attack. After a struggle of ten days, the Germans had linked up their positions in the north, and grave decisions had to be taken. The losses on both sides had

been very heavy. The Germans were almost at the limit of their endurance, but the British troops were suffering from a deeper fatigue, and the withdrawal began. It was an unpalatable operation, and some of the criticism that followed was distinguished by irritation and petulance rather than wisdom. It is absurd to suggest that only positions that can certainly be held should be defended. If that canon had been followed by General Wavell the splendid campaigns in Libya and Italian East Africa would never have been fought. He had barely a chance of holding Egypt for a month, if the two Italian armies had shown a trace of the will to win. Britain was still in a state of gross inferiority in men and material as compared with the enemy. That condition governed all the operations of the period; and to a less extent it governs them still.

It may be held that the campaign was strategically unsound; and, clearly, there is a case to be made for that contention. British losses came to a total of 15,000 men, killed, wounded and missing, and the German dead are estimated to exceed that number. Three cruisers, an anti-aircraft cruiser and six destroyers were also lost. Against this must be set the destruction of 180 bomber and fighter aircraft and at least 250 troop-carriers. The total number of men taken off came to 17,000. It does not make an encouraging balance-sheet. But there is evidence that the battle in Crete was the cause of the inability of the Germans to reinforce the revolt in Iraq. If the redemption of that important strategic area is to be set against the losses in Crete, it seems difficult to resist the conclusion that the attempt was, on balance, a profitable undertaking. Iraq could not be allowed to fall into enemy control without imperilling our whole position in the Middle East.

The lessons to be drawn from the Crete episode will provide material for endless controversy. General Franco seems to think that it established the supremacy of air over sea power. But narrow waters which forbid manœuvre are not the proper element for naval vessels. Every instrument has its limits of application and, for surface craft, narrow waters represent too

grave a handicap. It is supposed to establish the efficiency of the dive-bomber, but it seems more certain that the machine-gunning of the fighter aeroplanes was the real enemy. It is held to establish the impossibility of defending aerodromes against air attack; but it is wiser to leave that question in suspense, since the defence was not convincingly attempted in Crete. It is imagined, lastly, that it establishes the invincibility of the air-borne invasion. This is the weakest of all propositions founded upon the struggle in Crete. The air-borne invasion succeeded in Norway, and to a lesser extent in Holland, by surprise. But in neither case was it met by strong challenge from fighter planes; and there is no reason to think that it would have succeeded in Crete or will succeed anywhere else if an efficient force of fighter planes is at hand. Crete was at all events an unhappy episode.

IV. The Destruction of the *Bismarck*

ALL the major events of this period, it will be noticed, overlapped. It was during the tragic defence of Crete that an event occurred which convincingly demonstrated the effect of sea power. Germany's attempt to break the sea cordon that was slowly crushing her relied upon the operation not only of her aircraft and submarines but also of her surface vessels. Up to this moment she had not achieved any success comparable with that of a number of her commerce-raiders in the last war, but her two new battleships were designed to give effect to her wishes. *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were immobilised in harbour from the attentions of the Royal Air Force, and *Bismarck* was sent off from Bergen in company with the 10,000-ton cruiser *Prinz Eugen* to take their place. A number of supply ships had been mobilised for their assistance, and the plan must have seemed feasible to the German naval staff. *Bismarck* was rated a 35,000-ton battleship (some who saw her believe that the Germans under-declared her true size) carrying eight 15-inch guns and a secondary armament of twelve 5·9-inch guns. Her speed was about 30 knots, and


she embodied a number of novel features in her design that were supposed to render her unsinkable. She was most elaborately compartmented and, in spite of her speed, heavily armoured.

Air reconnaissance located the battleship and cruiser in the Norwegian port of Bergen, and when Coastal Command aircraft discovered they had sailed dispositions were made to intercept and bring them to battle. They were sighted on the evening of May 23 by the cruisers *Norfolk* and *Suffolk* in Denmark Strait, which separates Iceland from Greenland, steaming south-west at high speed. They were then within six miles, but the visibility was poor and variable, and it was not long before snow and sleet reduced it to a single mile. The cruisers however continued to shadow the enemy, and early the next morning the great battle-cruiser *Hood* and the new battleship *Prince of Wales* achieved contact and opened fire at long range. It was during this brief encounter that *Hood* received at a range of 23,000 yards a hit which penetrated her magazine. She at once blew up and became a total loss. The battle-cruiser *Hood*, for a time the largest warship in the world, was of 42,000 tons, and her armament consisted of eight 15-inch and twelve 5·5-inch guns. Though a battle-cruiser, she had the armour of a battleship, with a speed of 31 knots. The loss of *Hood* was a tremendous blow, and it was cold comfort to reflect that at such a range no shot could have found its way to the weak point of the construction of the ships of the period without fortune as well as good shooting on the enemy's side. The Germans were entitled to make the most of their success.

Prince of Wales was also slightly damaged, but *Bismarck* did not escape entirely. At one time she was seen to be on fire, and when the British battleship with *Norfolk* and *Suffolk* resumed the chase she was leaving a wake of oil and steaming at a lower speed. During that evening *Prince of Wales* twice made contact with *Bismarck*, but the Germans turned away to the west and then swung round to the south. Meanwhile naval aircraft from *Victorious* had secured a hit upon *Bismarck*

with a torpedo. Shortly afterwards, however, the low visibility enabled the German ships to escape from their shadowers. *Prinz Eugen* was not seen again until she was discovered a fortnight later in Brest harbour.

It was about three o'clock in the morning of Sunday, May 25, that the ships were lost. They were then about eleven hours' steaming from the south-west of Greenland, and the



By courtesy of "The Times"

seas were scoured for them. Admiral Sir John Tovey in *King George V* was hurrying with the main body of the Home Fleet at high speed towards the south-west. Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville in *Renown* was speeding north-west from his Gibraltar station. *Rodney* and *Ramillies*, employed on convoy duty in the North Atlantic, hastened to the area where the ships were expected to make their reappearance. Coastal Command aeroplanes from the home bases and Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft from the opposite side of the Atlantic carried out widening sweeps over the ocean; but it was not until over thirty hours later that *Bismarck* was again seen. About

10.30 in the morning of Monday, May 26, a Catalina aircraft of the Coastal Command located the battleship about 550 miles west of Land's End. It was compelled to keep its distance and in half an hour lost contact. But less than an hour later she was once more picked up, this time by naval aircraft of the notorious *Ark Royal*. *Bismarck* was then steering eastward and no doubt her commander, Admiral Lutjens, was congratulating himself on nearing safety at Brest. Even if he should be attacked before reaching port he felt assured of relief by the *Luftwaffe*.

Events, however, did not fall out that way. *King George V* and *Rodney* were approaching but were not yet close enough to engage, and Sir James Somerville sent the cruiser *Sheffield* ahead to take up the shadowing. Naval aircraft from *Ark Royal* attempted to torpedo the battleship during the afternoon and then about 6 in the evening. On the second occasion they secured two hits, one amidships and the other on the starboard quarter. They seem to have been damaging hits, for the battleship was seen to make two complete circles and her speed fell. In the small hours of Tuesday, May 27, the destroyers *Zulu*, *Cossack* and *Maori* made a torpedo attack, and the last two secured hits which put the steering gear out of action, lowered the speed still further and set the forecastle on fire. The ship was seen to stop completely while repairs were hastily made to get her under way again. She lay at that moment scarcely 400 miles from Brest after being pursued for over 1750 miles; and her commander must have been torn between hope and fear. She was capable of heavy and accurate fire but could only make eight knots.

Admiral Tovey had intended to engage her before dawn; but the visibility was so poor and so variable that it was not until 9 o'clock in the morning that *King George V* and *Rodney*, supported by *Norfolk*, opened fire with their main armament and in a short time completely destroyed her as a fighting ship. She still lay defenceless on the waters, her armament in ruins, but her complicated system of compartments kept her defiantly afloat with her flag flying. *Dorsetshire* was ordered to

sink her with torpedoes and shortly after 11 o'clock she turned over and went down, after a very gallant but hopeless fight. The conclusion appeared to be certain from the beginning, but the chase did not follow its expected course. No-one could have foreseen the sinking of *Hood* and the loss of contact for a day and a half. What the episode demonstrated was, perhaps, already known beyond need of proof to all who understood the meaning of sea power. Its technical lessons were valuable. Once more the torpedoes of the naval aircraft had been used with telling effect, and this must now be taken as a part of established naval tactics. But more important was the swift mobilisation of overwhelming naval strength against the challenge of a powerful battleship; and, when the air invasion of Crete was taken by so many as disturbing the conditions that govern the English Channel, this was an extremely pointed reminder of one respect in which the enemy stood very little chance. The loss of *Hood* was serious. But it fell upon the stronger navy, and the relative strength of the two fleets, after the destruction of *Bismarck*, was even more in our favour than before.

The *Luftwaffe* appeared in due course when all was over, but they could not redress the balance by their intervention. The destroyer *Mashona* was hit and later sank; and thus the episode finished. While the chase lasted it held the world's attention, and if the Germans made full use of their hit on *Hood* they were compelled to change their tune when their newest and most powerful battleship followed to the bottom of the sea.

V. The African Scene

THE astonishing German advance through Libya was not exploited, but the position left in its wake was one of considerable interest. The reoccupation of Libya was not sufficient for the enemy, and towards the end of May he appeared to think he might once again catch the defence napping. On May 26 strong enemy forces advanced with tanks across a front

of about forty miles in three columns, and during the day and following night they were held up. So stubborn was the fighting by a force not quite a quarter as strong as that of the enemy that, though he penetrated to Halfaya Pass and compelled the desert outposts to withdraw, he was stopped there. He contrived to maintain his hold in spite of a resolute attack which was delivered on June 15 and the two subsequent days. There was little doubt that this brisk attack was, like the Germans', an exploratory venture. It was carried out by a strong force of tanks and infantry, and what was at stake was the possibility that it would develop so strong a threat from the east that the enemy would be compelled to throw in his forces as far west as Tobruk. In that case there was just a chance that the force in Tobruk might break out and, taking the enemy in the rear, assist in rounding up his whole eastern force.

The event did not fulfil these hopes. At first all went well. The advance swept past Capuzzo, but after that success large enemy forces were thrown in and a very heavy battle developed. Reinforcements as far to the west as Tobruk were brought up and the enemy attempted to envelop the head of the advanced units. Under such conditions the British troops slowly withdrew, bringing back with them several hundred prisoners. The enemy had been compelled to disclose his strength and had suffered heavy loss in tanks and guns destroyed, as well as in human casualties. The operation had justified itself, even if it failed to yield all that better luck might have granted.

Tobruk continued to make the existence of the enemy in its vicinity burdensome. The perimeter had been penetrated, and several small operations were conducted to recover the lost positions and pinch out the salient. But beyond this was the determination to develop that unceasing tactical offensive which tends so much to undermine the confidence of troops condemned to passive defence. Small patrols entered the enemy positions repeatedly, inflicted casualties, destroyed material and returned with prisoners. To such a pitch were the enemy reduced at the end of July that, at the slightest


appearance of British activity, they put down heavy barrages at intervals throughout the night. Farther east, on the frontier, they were busily fortifying their positions in order that we should be unable to resort to the offensive except at prohibitive cost.

In the colony of Italian East Africa the campaign wound to its close. With the surrender of the Duke of Aosta organised resistance on any scale was no longer possible. The small concentrations which remained in the Jimma and Gondar areas were tied to their supply dump. Their power of movement and manœuvre was further restricted by the various Allied columns which gradually pressed in from all directions. After the fall of the capital, part of General Wetherall's 11th African division turned south towards Jimma. General Godwin Austen's 12th African division had turned west after forcing the Juba river, and fought up from Negelli. There were patriot detachments on the west and Belgians towards the north. Under the combined pressure of these columns, in spite of the rains which so gravely checked the pace of advance, there were further surrenders; and, at the end of the period, the one force still at liberty was that in the Gondar area.

A word has already been said about the campaign which brought this vast new area under the Crown. Our forces had to cover immense distances, undergo almost indescribable hardships and take risks that on cool reflection seem perilous. They never fought except at a grave numerical and material disadvantage. The 5th Indian division, with the assistance before Keren of the 4th Indian division, were always outnumbered. Even at Keren they outfought double their number. General Cunningham, who marched across Italian Somaliland through Abyssinia up to Amba Alagi and destroyed an army of 170,000 (of whom 96,000 were infantry) with 400 guns, never had more than 20,000 infantry and at most 68 guns. On the whole the casualties incurred in this striking campaign were not large. The 5th Indian division had about 2,000 killed and wounded at and about Keren; but that represented four-fifths of the casualties of the whole campaign.

VI. The Campaign in Syria

THE events in Iraq had shown that the position in Syria could not be left as it was. The defection of France had left upon the southern flank of Turkey, our ally, a large terri-



tory with at least ten aerodromes and numerous landing-grounds. The Germans had already been permitted to use them as stages in their journey to Iraq, and the possibilities of the air-borne invasion had not been overlooked. It was accordingly decided to occupy the country. The campaign did not in

advance look so serious as the event proved. It was thought that others of the troops then in Syria would follow the example of some of their leaders, and there were hopes that tribes, such as the Jebel Druze, who had always resented the French yoke would assist the advance.

The strategy of the campaign was determined by the nature of the country. The mountainous coastal part left, fringing the sea, a route as old as any in the world. It was the highway between Egypt and Syria. The ancient caravan route broke off from this old road within the borders of Palestine to make its way westward to Damascus through Kuneitra. There was also the Pilgrims' road from Mecca which runs through Der'a to Damascus. A coastal advance was indicated and, as the road threaded the country to Latakia whence it turned inland to Antioch and Aleppo, it would if pursued threaten the isolation of the occupying force. The advance upon Damascus was not so simple; but it could be approached directly from the south and by the caravan route from the south-west. There was a subsidiary way of advance through Metulla to Merj 'iyun, and tracks led thence northward to the Beirut–Damascus road and towards the coast. Across the way of advance runs the river Litani, one of the two great rivers of the country.

In the east lies the great Syrian desert. But this was not perfect insulation, since it is crossed by the pipe-line to Tripoli and the river Euphrates; and along the extreme north runs the Mosul railway. Each of these roads would provide a way of approach for columns from Iraq, and the defence would find the line of retreat threatened by every mile of the advance. It can now be seen how essential was the loyalty of the Iraqi Government. If the Germans had been allowed to secure control of Iraq, not only would it have been impossible to launch these columns across the desert country: it would have been perilous even to have ventured upon the Syrian campaign at all.

British, Imperial and Allied troops crossed the frontier in the early hours of Sunday, June 8. They were assisted by the Royal Air Force and by naval co-operation from the sea. The two main motorised and armoured columns made rapid head-

way. Der'a on the Pilgrims' route, Merj 'iyun in the centre and Tyre on the coast were occupied in the afternoon. At first there was little resistance, but this changed as the advance continued. In spite of it, however, the coastal column crossed the Litani river and, on the right, reached Kuneitra, Sheik Miscine on the Pilgrims' road and Ezra on the railway to Damascus. The Litani was not crossed without a struggle. Small bodies of Scottish and Australian troops were landed from the sea and met with stiff opposition, but with the co-operation of warships the Australians succeeded in capturing the bridgehead. The Free French Forces on the right pressed ahead but ran into stubborn resistance near Kiswe, about 12 miles south of Damascus. Up to this point the resistance had been extremely patchy, but now it began to settle down. The coastal road was barred by blocks and demolitions, and at one place, covering the line of advance, the Foreign Legion was found to be holding a spur honeycombed with caves.


Merj 'iyun had been entered on the opening day of the advance but it was not completely occupied until three days later, and then it became the most bitter object of contention over the whole front. At this time the coastal column was within 5 or 6 miles of Sidon. Indeed the Australians had already penetrated the outskirts at one point but were compelled to give ground by a sharp counter-attack. On June 15 it was in their hands. Jezzine, on the Merj 'iyun road to Sidon, was also reached after heavy fighting, but on the east the resistance was more effective. The troops were moving up the Kuneitra road towards Sa'sa, and the Free French were attempting to get round Kiswe. It was about this time that the effect of a skilful counter-offensive was felt. Small mobile columns attacked the Allied communications, recapturing Ezra and Kuneitra and even Merj 'iyun. In Kuneitra they were allowed to stay only a few hours after the small British force, having used all its ammunition, had surrendered; but the recapture of Merj 'iyun presented graver difficulties and only the unbounded skill and endurance of the Australians succeeded in retaking it. That was some days ahead.

The envelopment of Damascus was now proceeding steadily from the west and General Wilson, the Allied commander, broadcast an appeal to General Dentz to withdraw from the city in order that it might be saved the horrors of bombardment. The city was attacked all day on Thursday, June 19, the Free French moving up the Pilgrims' road and the Indian troops up the Kuneitra road towards Mezze. Merj 'iyun was now almost completely surrounded, though the French Colonial infantry and Foreign Legion who occupied it held grimly on. The defence was attempting to hold up the advance on the flanks, towards Beirut and Damascus, by maintaining its grip on the centre. But progress continued to be made towards Damascus. On Friday the Mezze airport was seized, and the city's hours were numbered. On Saturday, Vichy announced that it was evacuated, and on the following day, exactly a fortnight after the beginning of the campaign, it was entered by the Free French Forces. Part of the staff who left the city the preceding day were captured by the Australians.

Damascus had been untenable against heavy assault for some days. Indeed, it is true that from the first the Command had been reluctant to adopt *Blitzkrieg* tactics against the defenders of Syria, and that policy is already justifying itself. But at the time it seemed as if the advance was dragging, and meanwhile the guns had started thundering on the Russian front. It is probable that, in the end, Damascus was evacuated less because of the immediate threat and out of consideration for the inhabitants than out of respect for the development of General Wavell's strategy. The day before the evacuation the Vichy radio was announcing that a strong motorised force was advancing across the desert towards Palmyra. This was one of the best airfields in Syria, and strongly defended. But it was not the loss of the airfield that moved the Syrian Command; it was the threat to the main line of retreat. The main railway line runs through Homs, Hama and Aleppo. The line of retreat even from Beirut also passes through these three towns. Further, if the column advancing upon Palmyra were allowed to reach Homs, it could move

down the line to Tripolis and cut off the whole of the southern area of Syria.

The day after Damascus was entered by the Allies the column moving along the pipe-line from Iraq reached Palmyra, and though the position was held for ten days the advance did not pause there. Three days after it was taken the British



troops were at Furqlus, about 24 miles from Homs. But by this time, July 7, the position of the defence had deteriorated still further through the appearance of other columns across the eastern frontier. One of these followed the line of the Euphrates in the direction of Aleppo. It was at Deir es Zor on July 2 and a week later at Raqqa. This town lies only 110 miles from Aleppo and 140 from Hama. A third column had begun to move up the Mosul railway across the north-east corner of Syria. By July 9 it had reached Kameshlie, about 240 miles north-east of Aleppo. These columns continued to advance, and they kept contact. As a result of this, on the day that the most northerly column reached Kameshlie, the desert had been

swept free of hostile troops up to Selemiya, barely 20 miles south-east of Hama and 30 miles due north of Furqlus. The Imperial forces were, therefore, within 30 miles of the main lateral communications of the country on a broad front, and whatever the firmness of the resistance elsewhere the foundation upon which it rested was crumbling.

Meanwhile, on the western sector, the Allied advance had made headway. Merj 'iyun fell on June 24 after four days of bitter fighting. Two days later the troops were at Nebek, 45 miles north-east of Damascus, nearly half-way to Homs. They were pressing up the coast, though against a stubborn resistance. General Dentz recognised the logical conclusion of the Allied operations and, seizing upon the less humiliating of the two alternatives open to him, asked for terms. His request appears to have travelled round the world, and while he was waiting for a reply the Allied columns continued to advance from all directions. The strong defences south of Beirut were crossed. Damur was entered on July 9. The Australians were steadily closing in upon Beirut. The negotiations were hastened; at length the parties met and terms were arranged. The convention terminating hostilities, which while safeguarding Allied interests granted favourable terms to the Vichy representatives, was signed in the Sidney Smith barracks at Acre. The position was not without its irony. The barracks had been called after the British admiral who compelled Napoleon to raise the siege of Acre, and in this place which had witnessed the defeat of one of France's most famous sons General Dentz was compelled to abandon the position that had been designed by the Germans as a stepping-stone to the same prize.

The campaign was coloured so deeply with politics, and overshadowed at the end so completely by the great struggle on the eastern frontiers of Germany, that it failed to win the praise which its skill deserved. In it there co-operated the strategic insight of General Wavell and the tactical skill of General Wilson. Before it was over, but not before the end was in sight, General Wavell had become Commander-in-Chief

in India, and Iraq was added to his parish. With this change and other readjustments in administration the outline of a feasible scheme for the defence of the Near and Middle East began to take shape.

VII. The Campaign in Russia

IT was on the day which saw the Allies taking over the ancient city of Damascus that there began on the eastern frontiers of Germany a campaign which in scope and quality gripped the world's imagination. There were many reasons for this widespread interest. The German army was recognised as an immensely powerful force, thoroughly trained, lavishly equipped and possessed of a technique that had everywhere proved successful. The most sanguine of the opponents of Hitler did not fail to pay tribute to its formidable strength. The Russian army was very little known. Its showing in Finland had been misinterpreted, and its development since that time was depreciated. It was at least clear from the outset that the numbers engaged on the eastern front must be enormously greater than those involved in earlier battles of the war; the extent of the battlefront similarly dwarfed that of every other theatre and, indeed, of other wars. Russia was known to have developed armoured units even before Germany was allowed to build tanks. Her troops were elaborately equipped on the modern scale. Here, it seemed to the discerning, Germany was at last confronted by an enemy with a technical equipment of the same order as her own and with a human reservoir immensely greater. What lay in doubt remains undisclosed at the date this survey terminates. Germany, by attacking without giving Russia the chance of even considering her demands, must fight the battle out; Russia could not do otherwise and remain a Great Power. In such a conflict it is not material or technique that decides. It is the strength of a country's institutions.

The opposing forces can only be broadly suggested. Germany with 250 mobilised divisions put into the field about 160

of them, including most of her heavy armoured divisions and at least half a dozen light armoured units. The bulk of the *Luftwaffe*, perhaps as many as six of the seven air fleets, was also used on the eastern front. If the 20 divisions of the Roumanian army, 6 of the Finnish and 4 of the Hungarian, Slovak, Italian and Spanish contingents are added the total force comes to about 190 divisions. The Russians were, by German admission, caught in the act of deployment, and the slow mobilisation could not promise to be complete before the end of four weeks. The initial strength was, therefore, scarcely three-quarters as great as that of the German army. In the Far East some 35 divisions had to be left as a separate force, and the western armies were disposed across the 1,800 miles of the front. In tanks the Russians probably used about the same number as the Germans, some of them heavier and built to a more ingenious design. The Russian Air Force was not gravely inferior numerically, though its average speeds appear to have been lower.

The strategic position had been improved by gains of the war. The new Russian territories acted as a sort of *glacis* before the main defensive area of old Russia. But only on the Finnish sector did the changes strengthen the position for both offensive and defensive strategy. The frontier line of Lithuania made a rough right angle with the eastern boundary of East Prussia. For offensive purposes this offered the advantage of a converging attack upon the heart of a sensitive German area; but for the defensive it gave Germany the chance of striking out in divergent directions, to the north and to the east, with the prospect of completely disorganising the armies holding this sector. The Russian dispositions facilitated this operation. Almost half of the troops were concentrated below the Pripet Marshes. On the sector which was selected for the main thrust, the White Russian front covering Smolensk and Moscow, there appear to have been actually fewer divisions than were allocated to the Bessarabian front, and very few more than were ranged across the zone covering the Murmansk railway and Leningrad.

Germany made the most of her chances and struck violently

towards the north. During the first week there was heavy fighting about the Lithuanian centres, Shavli and Kaunas (Kovno), but the armoured units went ahead, crossed the Dvina, a strong line which in the last war had been held for a considerable time and was expected to hold once more, and by July 3 had reached Tartu (Dorpat). They also struck heavily through Grodno (June 23) towards Wolkowysk, through Lomza towards Bialystok and through Brest-Litovsk towards Baranovice. As a result of this fighting part of the Russian forces was cut off in the Bialystok area, and the heads of the attacking columns were directed towards the historic line of advance upon Moscow. On the third day of the offensive the tanks passed south of Vilna, and the Russians began to talk of the "Minsk area". Below the Pripet Marshes an advance was made on the first day of the attack which captured Stojanow and attempted to reach Brody. The intention here was to cut the Lwow railway and help in surrounding the Russian forces which lay about Przemysl, nearly 130 miles to the west. In the south, attempts to cross the Pruth were drastically handled and, in short, it may be said that not until the end of the fifth week of the campaign was it even claimed that Bessarabia was clear of the Russians. The repeated reports of "pursuits of the beaten enemy across the Dniester" stultified themselves.

From this summary a roughly accurate picture can be discerned. The main thrust was clearly in the north centre towards Smolensk and Moscow. The Russians evidently reacted after the initial surprise and began to fight the Germans boldly and stubbornly, as might have been expected, but also skilfully. The Polish campaign was not being repeated here. The Command had profited by the association with the Germans to study the form of attack which might be expected of them, and in dealing with it adopted the tactics which had been evolved in Germany. For the first time the *Panzer* attack was being intelligently challenged. The tank advance was taken calmly. If they could not be ignored, it was at least necessary to regard their penetration with equanimity and, while attempting to canalise and check them, above all to

prevent the infantry from following. As a result of these tactics there began to develop a series of battles ranging over considerable areas. As late as the end of the fifth week of the campaign the Germans were announcing, at the same time, fighting "west and south-west" of Vyazma (92 miles east of Smolensk) and at Mohilev, on the Dnieper, 190 miles to the south-west. Such battles, taking place at such distances, were largely out of control of the High Command, which was unable to state with any accuracy where the "front" lay at any given moment. The very idea of a "front" in the old sense had to be discarded. The Russian defence in depth reduced even organised positions to the rôle of pivots of manœuvre, and a new type of warfare, zonal but mobile, had displaced the old. It was this novel character of the warfare as much as anything that led to the reticence of the Russian communiqués and expressed itself in premature rejoicing, on equally vague lines, in the German reports.

At the end of a fortnight the Germans had clearly made impressive progress, except on the Finnish front, where they had been unable to maintain a footing across the frontier. Though the Dvina had been forced by an armoured force the river was not wholly in German hands, but Dvinsk had fallen (July 4) and the advance had been pressed to Ostrov. The spearhead pointed to Leningrad. They had reached Polotsk and Lepel, where they maintained a threat to the main lateral line of communications connecting Leningrad with the south; but it was at Lepel they had an armoured division destroyed. They had reached the Beresina at Borisov and Bobruisk, where they were held for many days. South of the Pripet Marshes they had penetrated to Novgorod Volinsk, after a period of bitter struggle at Luck; and they were to be detained over a fortnight at this town on the Slucz. The Pruth had been crossed at last, and to the north the pocket about and east of Przemysl was steadily being evacuated under frontal and flank pressure. The capture of Minsk had been announced after nine days' fighting, which represents a pace of about twenty miles per day from the most easterly point of the German frontier. It was slightly



better than the best pace made in France, but less than half that made by General Cunningham's column in Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia, and the latter faced a numerically superior enemy armed on European lines.

The thrust then began to die down. In the middle of the third week the impetus had been lost and, although the Germans had suffered heavy casualties, the Russians were able to announce that they had "established a fairly stable line along the whole 1,500 miles front". The fighting had been most bitter, and losses in men and material had been severe on both sides, but it could not be maintained that the Germans had secured any advantage commensurate with the cost. It seems certain that although they had hoped for more decisive results they did not expect to defeat Russia by a *Blitzkrieg*.

While they were delivering strong local attacks on the bridge-heads of the Beresina and Velikaya they carefully mounted their second thrust. The first shots were fired in the afternoon of Thursday, July 10, on the southern frontier of Finland. Marshal Mannerheim, with a number of German and Finnish divisions, made an attempt to advance north of Lake Ladoga and cross the Karelian peninsula. The battle continued during the whole of the next day, and on Saturday the Germans tried to land troops behind the positions in Latvia, but the expedition was destroyed or dispersed. It had been hoped that the advance upon Leningrad could be resumed on both sides of Lake Peipus, but with this failure all that was possible was to reach Pskov and extend the thrust eastwards to Porkov. After a week of heavy fighting with mechanised and motorised units the advance was pinned to that front, and although the Germans had stated that "Leningrad is immediately threatened" it was no nearer capture than when the new thrust had been launched.

It was in the centre that the most striking success was achieved. From Polotsk the fighting welled over to Nevel, on the main railway communications, and was to revolve about these points for some time. Vitebsk the Germans claimed to have been in their hands from the preceding day,


Friday, July 11; and fierce fighting continued there. The "route to Moscow is open", they announced in the same report, and this statement, though very far from the truth, concealed a success of some importance. Between Vitebsk and Orsha there is a gap where the Dvina, turning sharply north-east, runs roughly parallel with the Dnieper, nearly fifty miles to the south. Much of the fighting had revolved about bridge-heads and river-lines; but here were none, and a *Panzer* unit which pushed through seems to have been followed by infantry who swiftly turned south and forced the crossing of the river Dnieper. This move appears to have taken the Russians completely by surprise, and the Germans were able to turn the defensive position on the river as far south as Mohilev. They had penetrated the suburbs of this historic town a few days before, but had been ejected. Meanwhile the armoured unit sped ahead, and on Wednesday, July 16, it reached Smolensk. In the sixteen days since the entry into Minsk the Germans had covered almost exactly 200 miles. The pace which in the first thrust had been over 20 had now sunk to 12½ miles per day, a fall of about 40 per cent. What then happened at Smolensk we do not yet know. Apparently German advanced units entered it, as they entered Kiev the same day, as they had entered Warsaw during the Polish campaign, only to be ejected.

The fighting had continued at Novgorod Volinsk with varying intensity; but an armoured unit had pressed ahead and penetrated into Kiev. The Russians were "thrown across the Dniester" on July 12, declared the German communiqué; a week later they announced that they had "forced the passage" of the river. It was on this sector of the front that the gravest threat to the Russian forces which had so far developed began to disclose itself in the seventh week of the offensive. A new German army was thrust across the middle Dniester striking towards the north-east, as a new threat to encircle Kiev from the direction of Korosten and Byelaya Tserkov began to make headway. As a consequence, part of the Russian forces —the Germans claimed the bulk of two armies and part of a

third—were cut off, and the enemy then turned towards the south-east. Marshal von Rundstedt, who was in charge of this sector of the front, confronted Marshal Budenny with a bitter dilemma. He had either to withdraw his troops across the Dnieper and in so doing uncover Odessa, Nikolaiev and a stretch of the Black Sea coast, or risk having his extreme left wing isolated. That position was still unresolved in the middle of August. The possibility of a counter-attack that would relieve the situation depended upon the communications, and the direct lines from Kiev had already been cut. It seemed that this might be made the area of the main German thrust, and that the objective was the capture of the Ukraine and, later, the Caucasian region.

In the north the Russians announced fighting about Petrozavodsk. This suggested that the German-Finnish attack had made a considerable advance. But it seemed evident that the town had not been reached. Its capture would involve the cutting of the line to Murmansk, and the White Sea canal through which lies the only line of escape of the smaller ships of the Russian Baltic fleet. To the south of Leningrad the advance made some further headway, mainly in the directions of Staraya Russa and Kholm, south of Lake Ilmen.

In the Smolensk sector the wedge is both broad and deep. If Mohilev and Nevel mark its southern and northern limits the Germans have broadened their thrust very significantly, since the two places are nearly 160 miles apart. It is not certain that the whole of the area is clear of Russian troops, though the Russians announced on August 14 that they had evacuated Smolensk itself several days previously. What is established is the slower pace, shallower penetration and shorter duration of the second thrust. That was to be expected, but it is none the less deserving of record. Some recent German statements have suggested that the Command was about to pay more attention to the battles which are continuing miles behind the extreme limit of penetration. This is a counsel of prudence, but it should involve delay, and that should favour the Russians. The extent of country over which their resources



are spread, while it gives practical immunity from enemy air attack, at the same time involves delay in concentration. It remains clear that the Russians have fought with a confidence and versatile skill that reflect more accurately than the German tactics the present method of warfare. It is still developing; and the Germans appear to have studied the offensive better than the defensive patterns. It is the characteristic of this evolutionary phase that both forms coexist together and demand their appropriate direction. How the campaign will progress will be determined by factors beyond the scope of a strategic survey. It is the clash of two civilisations.

It is convenient to mention here the sharp emergence and development of the British strategic offensive. The massive air attack, though it began before the Russian campaign opened, reached its highest intensity during these weeks. For some time it was delivered, almost without cessation, throughout the day. The damage to internal communications drove the enemy to use sea transport, which offered further opportunities to the destructive work of the Royal Air Force. Bases in Germany, ports in Germany, Holland and France, factories in the Ruhr and the northern industrial area of France, and aerodromes in occupied territory were persistently visited. *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* felt the weight of the highest-level and heaviest bombing. The daylight raids showed that, within operative range in occupied territory, the Royal Air Force could challenge the *Luftwaffe* on its own ground and emerge triumphant, a significant postscript to the Battle of Britain. On the other hand the Anti-Aircraft Command has equally advanced; a British A.A. division in the south-east of England by the second week in August had shot down its two hundredth aeroplane, and by that date about three times that number had been destroyed over Britain by ground fire. The military and even more the moral effects of the vigorous offensive grew evident and, in default of decisive results on the Russian front, added their powerful contribution to the weakening of Germany. It may be that, in the long run, this will prove to have been the most significant development of the period.

VIII. Sea Operations

THE battle of the Atlantic has recently taken a more favourable turn; and the meeting of Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt in a warship at sea was symbolic of the contributory causes and their mighty effect. With the United States in occupation of Iceland a considerable part of the essential sea-lanes must now be better policed, with less burden upon the British Navy. The pursuit and destruction of *Bismarck* show that it has not lost its power of preparing and successfully fighting battles. The convoying of troops and necessities through the waters which wash the enemy's coast demonstrates another side of its work. The heroic defence of Malta, compelled to live so long on such precarious terms, reflects the impotence of the enemy upon the sea which he claims as his own. Another challenge looms ahead. With the occupation of bases in Indo-China Japan has isolated more markedly Shanghai and Hong Kong, and pushed her threats to Singapore a stage farther. It is this base which holds the keys of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. It cannot be ignored that grave developments may challenge our position in that area.

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

III. THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION

I

THE last seventy years have been the greatest educational age of the world. There was more acute and fundamental thought on education in the fourth century B.C., but in practical achievement our time has no rival. A century ago, education in England (apart from its universities and public schools) was little more advanced than it is to-day in a backward African colony. Though printing had been discovered some 500 years earlier, half the inhabitants of England could neither read nor write; to-day illiteracy exists but shocks us. Here are some figures by which our progress may be measured. In 1833 the Government granted £20,000 for the building of schools; to-day we spend about £100,000,000 on education. In 1830 there were two universities in England and Wales; in 1880 there were four; to-day there are twelve. In 1904 there were 575 grant-aided secondary schools, with 94,698 pupils; in 1939 there were 1,398 with 470,003 pupils. Before the last war the older universities were largely a preserve of the "upper classes"; in 1939, of 798 open scholarships and exhibitions awarded at Oxford and Cambridge 437 were won by pupils at grant-aided schools, and 65 per cent. of the 437 had been educated at elementary schools. We have created a national system of elementary, secondary and university education. It is a colossal achievement.

Why did the world wait so long for it? Our advance is the result of three chief forces. There was the Christian conscience roused from its eighteenth-century lethargy by Wesley and others, working in the Churches, and creating the British and Foreign School Society and the National Society. Then there was the rising movement of democracy, conscious that it was

impotent without knowledge and demanding access to it so that men could enrich their lives and develop their powers, while even doubters and opponents saw that an uneducated nation was a blind and dangerous giant. The worldly wisdom of Lowe's saying "Educate your masters" was shown in our day by the Russian Revolution. The third force was science, not in the narrow meaning to which we unfortunately restrict it but in the Latin sense of the word. The spirit of knowledge was moving over the face of the world and changing it. The great discoveries are made, the great principles worked out, by the few; but the many must co-operate if they are to be effectively applied. In its early phases society was like an Homeric army—a few well-armed heroes, and a mass of undistinguished followers. To-day everyone counts. In a world whose life is increasingly based on knowledge the uneducated man is useless or dangerous; he is no less incompetent as a soldier or citizen than as an engineer. The need to train the intelligence of all, in order to live in a civilisation where as much intelligence as possible is needed, sufficiently explains the recent development of education and why it must continue to go forward.

The great landmarks in development have been the Forster Act of 1870 establishing compulsory elementary education (some 2,200 years after Plato had urged it); the Balfour Act of 1902 establishing a national system of secondary education; the Fisher Act of 1918 which forecast the future by its provision for day continuation schools; the creation of eight universities in England and Wales between 1880 and 1926. We have now a massive and well-designed educational structure, which has been further improved since 1920, largely as a result of the work of the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education, perhaps the most successful of all advisory bodies. Since 1920 it has produced seven Reports, storehouses of experience and information, which owing to the Stationery Office's lack of enterprise are less well known to the general public than they should be. Two of these, the "Hadow Report" on the education of the adolescent (in fact

it deals with children *under* 15) and the "Spens Report" on secondary education, are particularly important. The former proposed a reorganisation of elementary education—the primary stage ending at 11+, and a post-primary course being provided to the age of 15. The Spens Report dealt with secondary education to the age of 16+, with the relation of grammar and modern schools, and with the curriculum of the former, and proposed the creation of higher technical schools on an equality with the grammar school, but providing a more "realistic" education for boys of a less academic type.

These proposals indicate the lines of further development. Other problems remain:—classes of excessive size; better school buildings (but good education depends on the teacher rather than the schoolhouse); the pernicious influence of examinations on education. But there is one problem, rarely noted but more important and difficult than any of these. The newer universities have done a great work in the country, but they have grave shortcomings which two recent books have emphasised.* They teach rather than educate.

II

WHATEVER weaknesses may remain in our system, we have done a great work in education and it might seem that we have every reason to be pleased with ourselves. Yet if we could hear our children talking of British education before the present war, we might find them saying: "How complacent and shortsighted that age was! Eighty-two per cent. of its children left school to enter full-time employment at the age of fourteen. A fraction of these—less than ten per cent.—continued some sort of education through evening classes. The vast majority, when their day's work was finished, found serious study beyond their physical strength or preferred to employ their brief leisure in easier ways. The

* *Blind Guides*, by D. M. Paton, and *The Universities in Transformation*, by A. Löwe.

admirable provisions for part-time education in the Fisher Act were optional and therefore inoperative, except in one enlightened town, Rugby. A few good employers provided it. But in 1939 apparently people thought that more than seventy per cent. of the citizens of a democracy needed no education after the age of fourteen."

It is the more serious, because that seventy per cent. have to pronounce, as voters, on complicated political and social issues, and have some responsibility and power in determining the future of this country and its empire, and in making the history of the world. Further, their outlook, their tastes, their desires, make the quality of our society. Democracy is a noble conception, and a splendid opportunity, but also a great danger. Call the masses into power, and you must pay attention to their tastes and wishes. If these are worthy, you will have a great civilisation—if they are unworthy, an ignoble one. It was said of the greatest empire of the past, that the sovereign people "has thrown its cares to the winds and only desires anxiously two things, free food and the games of the Circus".* We find *Panem et Circenses* to hand and popular in our own day; the latter may be translated as "the dogs" and the films. Democracy in this country has been an advance towards a juster and better society; but it has a less encouraging side. The newspapers of to-day with the biggest circulation are on a lower level than any published fifty years ago, nor will the future think much of our civilisation as revealed in its popular advertisements and amusements. A democracy can be "a social order in which a degenerate mass has no other care than to enjoy the ignoble pleasures of vulgar men". It should be a society in which each citizen is an aristocrat in his character, ideals and tastes, and has some conception of what is first-rate in life and some desire for it. Our task is to create such a democracy. Can it be done? It cannot be done if education stops at fourteen for the vast majority, or if we fail to give them the right kind of education. What should we give them and how?

* Juvenal x. 78 f.

That is the unsolved educational problem of to-day. In any scheme of future national education we shall have to provide, as at present, for two great classes—the few and the many. The composition of the first class will not be the same as now, for it should be recruited from the whole nation, without distinction of birth or wealth, and composed of those whom the community chooses to be its leaders, because of their fitness to lead. It will include politicians, higher civil and municipal servants, ministers, teachers, journalists, doctors, scientists, technologists, leading business men and the like. They will continue to be educated roughly on our present lines, receiving a full secondary education, followed for the most part by study at a university or similar institution. It will be easier to provide their education than to choose them, and their choice is not only one of the most difficult problems for society but one of the gravest dangers to education.

We are aiming at a society based, not on equality, which is impossible, nor on democracy, which is too vague a word, but on the Platonic idea of justice. The just State, says Plato, is one which allots to every man the place and the work "for which his nature is best fitted"; and that definition has a practical corollary, sometimes forgotten by persons more aware of the State's duty than of their own. "The virtue of a State depends on the presence in every child and woman, every slave and freeman, every ruler and subject, of this principle—that each should do the work which belongs to them."* But how shall we allot his or her place to each member of our forty-odd millions?

It is far easier to live in a society wholly or partly dominated by a caste system than in Plato's ideal republic. Under a caste system birth or condition allots men their places; they accept what appears a law of nature and neither desire advancement nor struggle for it. That on the whole was the condition of England in the nineteenth century and earlier. It had a modified caste system which gave opportunity to move from one grade of life into another, but it did not attempt to achieve

* *Republic* 433.

Platonic justice. An American once asked the writer, "Do you think that the American or the English working man is the happier?" I said that I supposed that the American was probably happier because he is better off. "No", he said, "your working men are happier. They accept their lot in life; an American wants to change his lot." Now we are moving from a society where men as a whole have been born to a certain condition of life and normally have accepted it, to a society based as we hope on justice, where everyone will find the place to which his character and abilities entitle him. Well and good. But how easily such a society may become acutely competitive! Everyone must find his right place. Everyone will desire to find it, and, unless human nature changes, will wish his place to be as high as possible. What possibilities of intense competition that suggests! And how will he find his place? How, but by examination? And if so, education becomes a savage competitive system. It ceases to be education and becomes a road to a career. Shakespeare is read, not because he is Shakespeare, but because he is an examination subject in a syllabus, and the child who reads him sees behind the figures of Cordelia or Juliet or Hamlet or Lear the possibility of an examination question which may admit him to the university and determine the course of his life. Examinations are harmless when the examinee is indifferent to their result. As soon as they matter, they begin to distort the attitude both of pupil and of teacher. Already they work like a slow poison in schools and universities; the more depends on them, the stronger the poison will become. For disinterestedness is the essence of all good education, and liberal education is impossible without it.

Apart from problems like these, the education of the few is not more difficult than all education is; a system for it has already been worked out. But we have devised no system for the higher education of the many; here everything remains to be done. In the past two remedies have been proposed, either raising the school age or making part-time education compulsory to eighteen on the lines of the Fisher Act. These remedies

are not necessarily alternative, and recent speeches of the President of the Board of Education* indicate the intention of combining them. The school age will be raised first to fifteen and later to sixteen, and part-time education will at the same time be made compulsory. The mere raising of the school age would leave us almost as far as at present from being an educated nation, and too much is commonly expected from it. Its advantages are that it keeps children in touch with education and under regular discipline instead of throwing them on the world at fourteen. Further, it is the essence of the Hadow Report scheme that strictly primary education should cease at 11+, and be followed by a four-year post-primary course. Unless the school age is raised to fifteen, this course will be incomplete.

But no one can suppose that anybody can be educated by the age of fifteen or even sixteen. At those ages education has no more reached its goal, than a traveller from London has reached Oxford when he arrives at Slough. Further, it is questionable whether all children wish to remain at school till sixteen or will profit by doing so. The late Chief Inspector of Education for the London County Council, who must have as wide a practical experience as anyone, writes:

> Enlighten teaching as you will, there will be children who at fourteen yearn to escape from the best of schools.... Besides the stupid... there are those who, intellectually capable, get tired and bored with school conditions. They desire change; they wish to get into another discipline, half-comprehended, but sought because it is another.†

These children, kept at school, benefit neither the school nor themselves. There are many such already in public and other schools. But if it is impracticable for most people to continue education after, at latest, sixteen, if education is anyhow wholly incomplete at that age, and if many cannot carry it even so far with profit to themselves, must we not cease to hope for an educated nation?

* The speeches referred to were delivered by Mr. Herwald Ramsbotham, now Lord Soulbury, who has been lately succeeded as President of the Board of Education by Mr. R. A. Butler. There is no reason to expect Mr. Butler's attitude to be less enlightened than his predecessor's.

† *Education for the People*, by F. H. Spencer, p. 76 f.

III

THE way out lies through a principle hitherto unregarded in education. Applied, it will open the road for a great advance; if we neglect it, our voyage will be bound, as at present, in shallows if not in miseries. The great weakness, the great difficulty of education is that we receive it at an age when we have no clear or compelling sense of its meaning or purpose. Education is intended to be used, all of it, in life. It disciplines and trains the brain to be a good tool; it teaches languages for practical use and for access to the knowledge and wisdom contained in them, and science, in order that we may understand something of the universe and control it by our knowledge; it shows us great examples of human conduct, ideals, achievement, so that we may know what is first-rate in the numberless provinces of life. And so on. But how likely is a child or an adolescent or even an undergraduate to see the real meaning and importance of education, when he has seen nothing of life? Hence, in school and even university, education easily becomes a game, an intellectual exercise, an elegant accomplishment, a means to a certificate or scholarship or career, the conscientious performance of a task ill understood, the routine of a treadmill. The real appreciation of its meaning comes when people have lived in the world and there both learnt its importance and seen the realities with which it deals. It is the person who has seen something of life who values education and gets from it far more than a schoolboy or an undergraduate, who knows nothing of the world outside his family and his school.

There are many witnesses to the truth of this. A medical student's keenness is doubled when he begins to walk the wards and see disease at first hand. A pupil is much more interesting to teach if he comes to the university not direct from school but with some knowledge of the world. All of us say in later life, "I wish I could have my education over again." A recent experiment teaches the same lesson. Oxford and Cambridge now admit as senior students persons of mature

age who have either had no secondary education or not enough to pass the ordinary entrance examination, but who are held to be intellectually qualified for university study. Between 1925 and 1934 twenty-nine of these students came to Oxford, from occupations such as miner, cotton-weaver, ironmonger's assistant, railway clerk, blacksmith. It seems an experiment fated to fail. But of the fourteen who read for the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics, four obtained first classes and seven second classes. In every way except one they were handicapped in competition with the ordinary undergraduate. They came presumably from homes with little cultural background. They had had no secondary education (though all or most of them had been regular students in W.E.A. Tutorial Classes). They had spent their lives in manual or clerical work. But they had one advantage. They had lived in the world and, having seen the raw material of philosophy, politics and economics, were fitted to understand their theory.

To what practical conclusions do these facts point? They point to the value of part-time education in which the adolescent divides his time between study and practical work, following a trade or occupation for some five-sixths of his working week and going to school for the remaining sixth. Education is bound to gain by this contact with actual life. It ceases to be mere school, mere education, a thing apart, and is seen to be closely related to our occupation and to the everyday world. Further, they point to adult education, which gives men and women, engaged in the ordinary business of life, opportunity to think about it systematically—like someone sailing in unfamiliar waters, who reaches land and looks out over the sea, notes landmarks and rocks and currents, and rests for a while. He will understand his sight of the sea better, because he has already struggled to navigate it, and when he re-embarks his voyage will be easier, safer and more interesting for his survey of its conditions.

Such a survey was made possible for many people in this country by the Extension Movement, whose founders shook

off the fettering notion that education could be complete at eighteen or twenty-one, and saw that adults needed it as much as the young, could understand it far better, and were almost wholly unprovided with it. That movement in due course had a child. The Workers' Educational Association, which in the last forty years has given a higher education to the working-class intelligentsia, had to face great difficulties. Its students had mostly received no secondary education; they attended its lectures in their spare time after a hard day's work. Yet it has firmly established itself throughout the British Isles and spread beyond them, and is one of the great successes in the history of education. It has only touched a limited class, but it points to a line of educational advance. The time has come for us to apply its lesson to other sections of the community.

This has already been done elsewhere in Europe. Those who look for the nearest thing to an educated democracy will find it among the Scandinavian peoples, and a visitor to their countryside is certain to stumble across one of the power-houses which have produced it. There are 57 in Denmark (with a population of three and a half millions), 59 in Sweden, 53 in Finland and 32 in Norway. They are called People's High Schools, and are residential colleges attended by the working-class population, who have left school at fourteen and who, after the age of eighteen, come to study there for periods of three to five months—the chief subjects of study being literature and history. In Denmark about a third of the population attend these colleges, voluntarily and paying at least half of the cost.

Education, like politics, tends to be too deductive, too *a priori*: in the future it may with advantage become more inductive and clinical, based on a study of the patients. If so, we shall study closely its great successes—they are rare—and for our immediate problem none is better worth study than the Danish People's High School. The Danes have solved the problem of giving their ordinary people the opportunity of a liberal adult education, and the ordinary people have

taken it. It may not be possible to reproduce their colleges exactly in this country; educational systems like plants have their own climate. But without effective and widespread adult education we cannot have an educated nation. We have made a beginning. There are residential Adult Education Colleges like Coleg Harlech, Newbattle, Fircroft and Avoncroft: there are the interesting village colleges of Cambridgeshire: some other Local Education Authorities have done valuable work in adult education: there are the Adult School Movement and Educational Settlements and Clubs: there are possibilities in the Women's Institutes and the Youth Movement: above all, Army Education may lead to a demand for adult education in peace-time. Each L.E.A. or, if education is in the future organised on a wider regional basis, each region might well have a House of Education or Adult Education College, which could be used for educational and other conferences, schools of study and longer residential courses. Many great houses, admirably suited for such purposes, will be vacant after the war and very cheap to buy. It is better to dedicate them to education than to slow decay. Such houses too might be given to the National Trust for these uses.

Adult education is necessary for all, not merely for those who have left school at 14 or 15. Its function is not to fill up gaps in an imperfect education, but to keep the human mind growing and alive, so that the passing years instead of deadening its fire may bring it richer fuel. The few need it as much as the many. We have a curious superstition that a man is educated if he has been through school and college—as though he had no further need of systematic study. Educate men as highly as you can, and they will still need to withdraw at times from the press and specialism of their occupation, to think methodically not only about it but about life. Otherwise they will ossify, probably in their professions, certainly in their mind and outlook. We have recognised the need of "refresher courses" for teachers and doctors; their immense value has been shown not merely in bringing knowledge up to date but in stimulating interest and intellectual life. All

human beings—not merely teachers and doctors—need "refresher courses"; and they should be provided, because adults need to study as well as undergraduates and are far better equipped to do it. When that day comes, fewer men will suffer from hardening of the arteries of the mind—a common disease, and the cause of chronic intellectual and spiritual ill-health.

To sum up, our future education will roughly follow two lines. The training of the few will be much as at present. For the rest, full-time schooling to 15 if not 16, and part-time education to 18; later, and for all, opportunities of adult education, so that people in after life will have an opportunity of systematic study, and will not, as at present, have no chance to think at an age when they have far more to think about than they can have at school or university.

IV

IF this is our general framework of education, what picture will it frame? Roughly, education, like ancient Gaul, has three divisions. For everyone it has three main elements, corresponding to the three main needs of human life. All men need to make a living—not a bare one, but the best that conditions allow. All men have to live in a society. All men need a scale of values, a sense of what is first-rate, in life as a whole and, so far as is possible, in its many provinces. For all these education must provide, and it must therefore include a vocational element, a social or, as the Greeks would have called it, a political element, and a spiritual element. Men must learn to earn a living, to be good members of a society, to understand the meaning of the phrase "the good life"; and education must help them to achieve these three ends. It must do this not for a limited class but for every citizen, though it will do it in different ways for different people.

The new society, then, like every society, will need three main kinds of education—vocational, social, spiritual. It must provide for its material existence and for the running of its

machine, and the education dealing with this may be called vocational. It will need its technologists and skilled workers to feed it, clothe it and supply the necessities, comforts and even luxuries of life; its doctors, scientists, economists, teachers, administrators. So it will have every variety of technical education, and in its places of higher study it must provide not only for Medicine, Science and Applied Science, but for such subjects as Economics, Psychology, Sociology, Public and Colonial and Business Administration. The list can be completed by studying the Calendar of the London School of Economics. That, of course, is not to say that everyone will study all, or even any, of those subjects. But in addition to training the numerous and various specialists which it requires, a society should give its educated members at least, not indeed specialist knowledge, but some perception of the general conditions and possibilities of modern civilisation, and a sense of the importance and uses of the techniques and specialisms essential to it.

Then our society—again like every society—will need social or political education: and by that is meant some training in the art of governing, and still more that of being governed. It is a rare art, commoner in this country perhaps than in any other, but not perfected here, and needing to be learnt by every generation; a harmony of clashing forces—independence and respect for authority, individualism and team-work, self-assertion and self-discipline and self-sacrifice, initiative and subordination. It is learnt, as Aristotle thought all virtues were learnt, by practising it. Social virtue is learnt by social life. So its infant school is the family, where the members, living together, learn how to live together. The smaller the family, the worse the school. But families exist in all countries. Where have the British had the teaching, which makes them not experts in the art but perhaps more expert than most peoples? They have learnt no doubt much, painfully and with many failures, in a thousand years of history. They must have learnt something when Roman Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans managed to be loyal Englishmen in the days of

Queen Elizabeth: more in the bitter struggles between 1640 and 1660: most of all perhaps in the admirable school of parliamentary government, where men learn to fight without becoming enemies, to lose without resentment and to win without pushing victory too far, and where the verdict of a majority is accepted but the rights of the minority are not forgotten. These are among the schools where the English have had a general social education. But there are several institutions which give it in a specific form, institutions whose members learn the habit of citizenship by being citizens. The Scout Movement is one of them. Another great school of citizenship in England is the trade union where several millions of Englishmen learn to subordinate private wishes and opinions to a common policy, and a mass of individuals becomes a disciplined army. A strike may be inconvenient or even unjustifiable, but men who will throw up their work and livelihood for a common cause, possibly against their desire or even their judgment, have learnt one at least of the lessons of social education—how to act as a community.

But the greatest instrument of social education in England affects a different and much smaller though very important class. It is the so-called public school, which should rather be called the residential school. Whatever its weaknesses, it has by its very nature one great virtue. It is an incomparable school of social education, of citizenship, where boys learn citizenship by being citizens. That is what a public school boy is—a citizen. He has two countries—his school, a community of perhaps 600 boys, and his house, a community of some 50 boys. He is a member, a citizen of both these communities, and in each of them has his place and privileges and duties. He lives inside them for eight months of the year. Their problems, their interests, their happenings are before his mind on every day of these eight months. Never in later life will he be so intensely a member of a community, never again will he live so completely in and for a community, as he does in these school years. Living

thus as a citizen he imbibes instinctively the fundamental principles of good citizenship. To feel yourself part of a community which you have a share and a responsibility in making, whose successes are somehow your successes and whose failures cast their shadow on you—to be able to obey and to live and co-operate with other members of the community—this is the essence of citizenship, and this the boy at a good residential school learns unconsciously every day of his life, not by being taught it, but by practising it. Schools and trade unions may be narrowed to serve the interests or represent the views of a class. But this is not inherent in their nature, nor do these incidental weaknesses alter the fact that they create a spirit which may serve wider uses.

We shall not lose trade unions after the war, and, having in a fit of absence of mind created as great a training-ground of citizenship as the residential school, we should indeed be foolish if we threw it away. But in the new world it must undergo a change, which need not diminish its virtues but will justify its name, and must become a real public school. It must be absorbed, as in the last 20 years the older universities have been absorbed, into the scheme of national education, so that, like the Oxford and Cambridge of to-day, it may be open to anyone fitted to profit by its virtues. It must come under the ultimate control of the Board of Education—though this need not and should not mean that the Board or Local Education Authorities should directly manage it. It should receive grants of public money when needed. It should be open to every class in the community, and the only right to entrance should be merit—merit assessed (as in the case of Rhodes Scholars) on the basis not merely of intellectual ability but of character and personality. The education consequently must be free, but, as in hospitals, parents who can afford to pay should do so on the basis of their means. We shall then have public schools democratic in the best sense of the word—giving equal opportunity yet recognising merit—and we shall have provided training in citizenship for a minority which if small is most important.

But we shall not have provided it for the masses of the nation, nor for those boys who either cannot gain admission to the public school or whose parents prefer the day school. Where will they learn the virtues of the citizen by living as citizens? The growth of school camps will help; the Youth Movement has great possibilities. Still more will be done if some form of conscription or of national service persists after the war. It may take the shape of compulsory labour camps, which all members of the community must attend. They could give to the nation the training in community life which the public school now gives to a few. They would make every Englishman "work at least once with his hands and thus contribute towards the building up of his people. Above all, we want those who are in sedentary occupations to experience what manual labour is, so that they may feel understanding and sympathy for those of their countrymen whose lives are spent in the fields, the factory or the workshop. We want to abolish for ever that attitude of superiority which unfortunately so many of our intellectuals adopt towards the manual workers, and we wish them to realise that they too will be worth all the more if they know themselves to possess a capacity for physical work. But the ultimate aim behind labour service is to promote mutual understanding between the different classes, and thus to strengthen the spirit of national solidarity among the whole people." These are Hitler's words. But the fact that Hitler spoke them does not lessen their wisdom.

V

THERE remains the most important, most difficult and perhaps most neglected branch of education, which for want of a better word may be called spiritual. The efficiency of a community will depend on its technical and vocational education, its cohesion and duration largely on its social or political education. But the quality of its civilisation depends on something else. It depends on its standards, its sense of values, its idea of what is first-rate and what is not. The

vocational and the social aspects of education are essential, but the most fatal to omit is the spiritual aspect. Fatal, because its absence may be so long unperceived, and, as with an insidious disease, a State may suffer from it and be unconscious of its condition till the complaint has gone too far to cure. And this spiritual element is precisely what we tend to ignore. Yet nothing is more needed at the moment. The body of our civilisation risks destruction by war, and we are too distressed by that to notice that its soul is already more than half drowned in the turbid river of modern life.

During the last war the salvation of the world was assigned to science. Now we are disillusioned. Science like medicine is an integral part of civilised life. It is difficult for human beings to maintain health without doctors, but medicine is not health. It is difficult for a civilisation to be sound without science, but science is not civilisation, and few people can suppose that salvation is its business. To-day we tend to assign that rôle to psychology, economics, and sociology. These branches of knowledge are indispensable to our civilisation. We have not enough of them. We need more. But, though adjuncts and auxiliaries, they too are not saviours of society, and if we fix our hopes on them the year 1960 will find us so much further down the hill and looking for some other force to help us to recover our lost ground. Our knowledge of the sciences, natural or social, fixes the limits of the course within which the yachts on which humanity is embarked must sail, but does not indicate the goal of their voyage, still less supply wind to fill their sails.

The forces that move the world need to be informed and disciplined by the intellect, but they are not in themselves intellectual. Is there any great event in history which does not bear out that truth? Economic or social conditions may prepare the way; the moving force is a vision. The ardour that created modern Germany and modern Russia came from a vision, even if it was one seen through bloodshot eyes. An eternal trait of men is the need for vision and the readiness to follow it; and, as Russia and Germany show, if men are not

given the right vision they will follow wandering fires. One tragedy of our world is that Hitler had a vision and his opponents had not. The weakness of England and of America is that (with plenty of science and a quantum at least of economics and sociology) they have seen no vision. Indistinct and blurred figures stir them in their uneasy sleep, but have not yet taken clear form. That has been a grave weakness in this war; it will be a much graver one, when we face the problems of peace.

And where shall we get our values and vision? There is no precise answer to this question. The wind bloweth where it listeth and we cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it bloweth. But a general answer is given in a phrase from a modern philosopher. Two sentences contain perhaps all that needs to be known about moral—we might say spiritual—education. The first, from Aristotle, has been already quoted, "We learn virtues by practising them". That saying takes us far on our road: but it needs to be combined with a phrase of Professor Whitehead's, "Moral education is impossible without the habitual vision of greatness". Few profounder things have been said about education; it applies in the highest degree to moral education, but in a lesser extent to all. You cannot get far in any branch of study unless the greatest models in it are before your eyes. That is true of science, of literature, of architecture and art. It applies equally to life. Unless education implants in men the right standards, values, ideals, it does no more than put into their hands tools without giving them an idea for what purpose they should be used. But is there anything more common? Look at the world; it answers that question. No doubt human beings can have great visions and live as if they had never seen them, compensating for unworthy conduct by splendid dreams. Whitehead's precept needs to be reinforced by Aristotle's. Men must have the chance of seeing the vision of greatness, and of practising the virtues. Yet it remains true that where there is no vision the people perish. It is a truth not always remembered by those who train the young.

Where shall we find a "vision of greatness"? Each human activity from architecture to agriculture, from chemistry to banking, has its own models of excellence. So has life. There is no doubt where our ancestors found their visions of greatness in life. The nation as a whole found it in the Bible—in its great beliefs and great ideas, greatly described. That platitude need not be laboured. But an educated minority found it in the Greek and Latin classics, particularly in Greek. Classical education in the nineteenth century was described by Carlyle, who never had it, as a mill where gerunds were ground. Yet it formed the minds of Englishmen as different as Shelley, Mill, Gladstone, Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, Robert Bridges, and of the long succession of liberal thinkers who created the great tradition of nineteenth-century English liberalism and whose successors in this century have been inspired from the same source. Of most of them is true what Lord Milner said of himself. "My own education was almost entirely classical. . . . To the priceless privilege of having sat even for a few years at the feet of those august masters I owe whatever mental equipment—I might almost add whatever moral inspiration—I carried into the battle of life. . . . I would fain believe that I imbibed too much of their spirit to be ever wholly estranged from their sane and stately conception of what is best and worthiest in human life." There are of course many other places where the visions of which Professor Whitehead speaks can be seen. History is full of them, though they need to be disentangled from the confused web of its tapestry and they rarely appear in text-books. Any great literature is full. But the quality of English life would be impoverished to the edge of starvation and changed beyond recognition, if these two influences, the Bible and Greek thought, ceased to flow into it.

Whatever the sources of our vision of greatness it is essential that we should not give it a second place in our system, nor suppose that it belongs to a general education which ends with the School Certificate or at latest with the Higher Certificate, and, when these Meccas of education have been

reached, at the university or earlier, feel that we have done enough and can safely say good-bye to spiritual education, forget all about it and settle down to the serious business of economics or sociology. If we do this we shall learn the truth of some prophetic words in the *Charmides* of Plato. "It is not", he says, "the life of knowledge, not even if it includes all the sciences, that creates happiness and well-being, but a single branch of knowledge—the science of good and evil. If you exclude this from the other branches, medicine will be equally able to give us health, and shoemaking shoes and weaving clothes. Seamanship will still save life at sea and strategy win battles. But without the knowledge of good and evil, the use and excellence of these sciences will be found to have failed us."

Plato speaks the language of his own civilisation and talks of medicine, weaving, shoemaking and seamanship. To-day he would say that science, economics and sociology will provide us with the frame of our society and satisfy its material needs, but that "unless we have the knowledge of good and evil, their use and excellence will be found to have failed us". It has been already "found to have failed us". Let us learn our lesson.

ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE WAR

THE outbreak of hostilities in Iraq on May 1 took the British public by surprise. Since the beginning of the war, the relatively little news from the Middle East which appeared in the British press had for the most part encouraged a complacent belief that the Arabs were "playing up", apart from a few irreconcilables like the Mufti of Jerusalem. Even during the month of April the press and the B.B.C. continued to stress the "loyalty" of the insurgent government of Iraq to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. No wonder then that the news of the bombardment of Habbaniya Camp came as a disagreeable shock, all the more intense because the aggressor was regarded as a small and weak nation which owed its independence and its political progress to British goodwill and assistance. No wonder too that the revolt was generally believed, and not entirely without reason, to be the work of a small group of ambitious men who had been captured or bought by German agents.

In reality, the Iraqi rising was the extreme symptom of a widespread *malaise* amongst the Arab peoples. It is certain that its leaders were counting not only on German support but also on sympathetic action in the other Arab countries, and were profoundly disappointed by the meagre response of Arab volunteers and the negative attitude of other Arab governments. Even in Iraq itself, although the full extent of its reactions has yet to be revealed, the movement roused none of the enthusiasm that marked the rising of 1920.

The Iraqi episode thus throws a strong light upon the political tensions within the Arab world, and upon the problems with which Great Britain and her Allies are confronted, first of all in Iraq and Syria, but ultimately in all the Arab countries, including Egypt. These problems are not

peculiar to the Arab world, indeed, but have been thrown into sharp relief in the Middle East in consequence of the exceptionally rapid development and emotional strain to which the Arab peoples have been subjected since the close of the last war.

For three hundred years the Arab countries of Asia had been shielded from the harsher realities of world politics by the protective shell of the Ottoman Empire. Friction between the governors and the governed was eased by their common religious faith, and was often entirely absent. Only the desert-dwellers, fiercely intolerant of control by any outer force, were in constant armed opposition. In the early years of the present century some small groups, drawn from the educated official and middle classes and fired by the historic traditions of the Arab race, began to agitate for the restoration of Arab liberties. Most of them were not hostile to the Ottoman Empire in itself, but claimed only an equal place with the Turks. The futile efforts of the Young Turks to dragoon them had already begun to widen the breach when the war of 1914 broke out. The rising of the Sherif of Mecca in the name of the Arab nation and the success of the Sherifian army against the Turks consummated it. Throughout Syria and Iraq Arab Nationalism spread like a flame.

At the close of the war the Arab Nationalists, flushed with victory, were in a highly excited frame of mind. With the letters written by Sir Henry MacMahon to the Sherif of Mecca and with the subsequent proclamations of the British and French Governments to the Arabs of Syria and Iraq as their charters of liberation, they expected the immediate establishment of an independent Arab State covering the whole or greater part of Western Asia. The disillusionment which awaited them was correspondingly bitter. To the installation of France in Lebanon and of Great Britain in Iraq and Palestine they reacted first with accusations of treachery and then by a hopeless resort to violence. Its results were only to rivet the chains upon Syria as well, and to dissipate the last hopes of an immediate union of the Arabs.

Though the intervening twenty years have seen many changes in the Middle East, the fundamental elements in the situation have not altered. Besides her direct control of Palestine and parts of Arabia, Great Britain still retains a dominant influence in Egypt, Arabia and Iraq; France, at the date of the Iraqi rising, still administered Syria and Lebanon; and Arab Nationalism is still seething with unsatisfied aspirations. But the mutual relations of the parties have inevitably been affected by the march of events, and it is more important to appreciate the outcome of this process than to trace the history of these years in detail.

The changes have been least in respect of Franco-Arab relations. From the outset the French Mandate over Syria was regarded with extreme hostility by the Syrian Moslems, and their hostility has only been deepened by its administration. They had three main grievances. The first was that, instead of striving to attenuate the confessional and regional rivalries that hindered Syrian unity, the French authorities gave the impression of exploiting them in order to strengthen their own control. The traditional French "rights" in Syria were based on their protection of the Christians of Lebanon, and one of the first acts of the French administration was to strengthen the Lebanese bastion in a military sense (although thereby reducing their Maronite supporters to a minority) by annexing to it the coastal areas to the north and south, including the ports of Tripolis and Sidon, and the fertile central valley between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges. Moreover, the new "Greater Lebanon" was erected into a separate State, with a President and Government of its own. Even in what remained of Syria, the forces of division were strengthened by setting up separate administrations for the Jebel Druze in the south-east, the Alawite territory on the coast north of Greater Lebanon together with its mountainous hinterland, the Sanjaq of Alexandretta to the north of that again, and the Jazira, the Mesopotamian plain east of the Euphrates.

The second Syrian grievance was that, while Iraq was progressing rapidly towards self-government, Syria remained

under what was in essentials a colonial administration, with a multitude of French officials in control of every department of public life. Economically, it was geared to the French machine, and its economic resources were handed over to French exploitation.

In 1936 a change of government in France gave hopes of a change of attitude. Negotiations for a treaty to replace the Mandate were opened, and two treaties, one with Syria, the other with Lebanon, were actually signed. In anticipation of a settlement, the Syrian Nationalists had gone the length of conceding the boundaries of Greater Lebanon. But the politicians of Paris, after handing over Alexandretta and Antioch to Turkey as a sop to Turkish apprehensions of the treaty, declined to ratify it, and reimposed colonial government. This was the third and bitterest of the Syrian grievances.

The Arab attitude towards Great Britain has been much more complex. There was less animosity to begin with than towards France, though the conflicts in Iraq and Egypt, and the shadow of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, strengthened a suspicion—which had never entirely died down—of British imperialist designs. As Great Britain showed in increasing measure a readiness to come to terms with Iraq and Egypt, some of this suspicion was dissipated, and in later years the powerful influence of King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud contributed to friendlier relations. But to offset this there was a growing uneasiness about the Jewish National Home, which was capitalised by the Mufti of Jerusalem and surged into downright hostility during the years of mass Jewish immigration (1931–5) and the Palestine rising (1936–8). In August 1938 even Ibn Sa'ud authorised the publication of a strongly worded declaration on the subject of the Zionist policy of the British Government. That autumn saw the climax of Nationalist fury, and had Great Britain gone to war in September 1938 a disastrous situation might rapidly have developed in the Middle East. But the subsequent Palestine Conference in London and Parliament's acceptance of the White Paper on Palestine turned its edge. Confidence was not

yet restored, but once more the relations between Great Britain and the Arabs were sweetened by the revival of hope.

A further complication which must not be left out of sight was the survival throughout the whole of this period of the old Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant, not in its substance but in its effects. To the end, French officials in Syria were convinced that behind their difficulties lay the hand of the British Secret Service, and in fact British readiness to make concessions in the areas under British control naturally added fuel to the fire of Syrian discontent and aroused French resentment. Official relations became smoother in later years, but the underlying suspicion remained that Great Britain was secretly determined to oust France from Syria. On the other side, it was a cause of some irritation that French insistence on maintaining the isolation of Syria from its neighbours stood in the way of creating that more organic system in Western Asia which most British observers considered to be the natural and ultimately irresistible development.

The Arab Nationalist movement itself had not stood still in the meantime. The disappointment of its hopes after the war only drove it deeper into the consciousness of the Arab peoples. From the rather vague general aspiration for a united Arab Empire which constituted its programme down to 1920, it began to organise its forces along a number of lines. In its first stage, after the breach with Turkey, it was loosely bound up with Moslem reactions to European penetration and control, although not so strongly as to prevent Arab Christians from taking a prominent part in it. The Iraqi rising in 1920 and the Syrian rising in 1925 were Moslem even more than nationalist movements. The Islamic motive continues to supply a more or less active driving force in all its subsequent developments, but more especially on what may be called its international side. As the strongest ties between the Arab peoples are those derived from Islam, the religious element has predominated in the various Congresses which have been held from time to time to co-ordinate the

policy of the Arab peoples towards their common problems and to focus the pan-Arab movement upon particular objectives. It is only in this sense that one can speak of an Arab Nationalism extending over the whole area from Morocco to Iraq.

Alongside this wider pan-Arabism there has grown up a more intense local nationalism in each of the Arab countries. This local nationalism, however, does not feel itself in any way opposed to pan-Arab aspirations and ideals. It is sustained by the conviction that in strengthening and developing the powers of the local unit to the utmost, it is contributing to the strength and power which will eventually be wielded by the greater Arab State of the future. It derives inspiration not only from the progress of its own unit, but also from the common hopes and fears. And in the present it serves as a means by which the disconnected, and often discordant, social units of which every Arab country has hitherto been composed may be welded into a unity of feeling and of action.

But it is fatally easy for such a regional nationalism to move insensibly towards a more self-centred ideal. Signs of this change of spirit may be discerned in almost every Arab country, more especially where there is an active and clamorous youth movement. The young men of the present generation have grown up in the tense atmosphere of the post-war years. From their first recollections those whom they revered as patriots in their country have been engaged in a struggle against either Britain or France. Their education has been punctuated by demonstrations, strikes and even riots in the sacred name of patriotism. They have observed with scorn what they regard as the futilities of their elder statesmen, the shufflings in and out of office, the pursuit of private interests, the acceptance of soothing formulas. They are contemptuous of the devotional and pacific aspects of their religion; Islam for them is a fighting creed, that bids them think shame so long as the foreigners are not driven out of Moslem lands by the sword. They are fascinated by the apparent ease with which in Italy and Germany small but active minorities

have seized control, and imposed their will at home and abroad.

In those Arab lands where the military power is monopolised by the foreigner, the youth movements seem to be at best groups of mistaken idealists who in pursuit of shadows do not realise whither they are being led, at worst the noisy tools of self-important agitators. But when an Arab state possesses an army of its own, it is fatally easy for young men whose minds are filled by such ideas to believe that their country, having freed itself from the yoke of the usurping "coloniser", is called upon to assume the leadership in a mission to free its still enslaved kinsmen.

It has been in some respects a misfortune for the Arab countries that, on being stripped of the protection of the Ottoman Empire, they were not at once faced with the gigantic and complex problems of the modern world, but have been cushioned by Great Britain and France, even while they were rebelling against this tutelage. A few elder and more experienced statesmen, foremost amongst them King Faisal and King Ibn Sa'ud, grasped the realities of the situation, and to them is mainly due the steady advance of their countries in the interval between the two wars. The majority of their countrymen, however, have continued to live in the illusions derived from the Arab movement during and after the war of 1914–18. Even in Egypt, which has followed an independent though sometimes parallel course, and where longer experience has bred a greater sense of responsibility, the influence of this mentality and of these raw ideas can still be seen in more than one feature of political life.

But it was in Iraq that they found the most favourable conditions for their spread. The illness and death of King Faisal in 1933 seemed to release the brake that prudence and a sense of realities had striven to impose on the headstrong impulses of the Iraqis. In the person of his son Ghazi, youth took over the helm. Just before the new reign opened, a massacre of disarmed Assyrians was hailed by a delirious nation. Within three years it was followed by an open military dictatorship, during

which the country's wisest leaders were either killed or exiled. The dictator soon made himself generally hated, and constitutional government was outwardly restored. But the army had tasted power and clung to it, backed up by youth, whose imaginations and desires were kept at fever-heat by the Palestine rising and the grievances of Syria. Fortunately, as it turned out, there was a slight relaxation of the tension in the spring of 1939, following on the restoration of peace in Palestine and the death of King Ghazi, which momentarily allowed the more responsible statesmen to exercise a firmer control.

For a time they succeeded in keeping Iraq on a straight course. At the outbreak of the war diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off, and the loyalty of Iraq to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was unconditionally reaffirmed. Within a few months, however, the atmosphere began to change. The flight of the Mufti of Jerusalem and his followers from Lebanon to Baghdad in October 1939 heightened pan-Arab emotion and weakened the ability of the moderate elements to restrain the hotheads. Rashid Ali al-Gailani, the catspaw of the military faction, forced his way into office at the end of March 1940. Friction with Great Britain steadily increased; already in June the Cabinet refused to sever diplomatic relations with Italy, and soon afterwards it began to undermine the position of the Regent. In such circumstances, German and Italian propaganda and encouragement had an almost free hand. But although secret contacts were opened up with the enemies of Great Britain, the movement remained essentially a pan-Arab movement centred on Iraq. For months before the actual revolt, the highest Iraqi military authorities were openly broadcasting to the Iraqi people that their army and air force had the glorious mission of renewing the heroic days of the Arab Conquests and the Crusades, and of liberating Syria and Palestine from the servitude imposed on them by Europe and the Jews.

There can be little doubt that the statement of these objectives in themselves roused a sympathetic echo in the hearts of all Arab Nationalists in every country. But since the outbreak of

the war they clashed, in the minds of all but a small minority, with other considerations which overweighed them for the time being. From motives of conviction on the part of some, of policy or fear on the part of others, the free Arab countries had thrown their weight on the side of the Allies. In Palestine and Syria themselves, the Arab population left no doubt of their preference for their present rulers over possible supplanters, and their hopes of a removal of their grievances were encouraged in the former case by the gradual application of the White Paper policy.

To overcome this half-heartedness, as they saw it, the extremists engaged in a violent propaganda campaign against England and the "hypocrites, place-seekers and mercenaries" who supported her cause, chiefly through the Arabic broadcasts from Germany and Italy. It had little success, to all appearances; but there were many in Syria and Iraq at least who lent an ear to the story, diligently propagated by the pan-Arab centre in Baghdad, that a secret "conspiracy" existed between Britain, Turkey and the Jews to divide up the Arab countries between them. Above all, the wrongs suffered by the Arabs of Palestine and Syria supplied a never-ending and far from ineffective theme.

The Iraqi revolt was thus a desperate gamble, concerted, no doubt, with Germany, but primarily inspired by exaggerated confidence in the strength of the Iraqi army and in the results of anti-British propaganda in the other Arab countries. It failed because the rebels miscalculated on both points. A handful of British troops disposed of the first. Yet their success could not have been so complete or so rapid had the other been correct. Though there were a few in Syria and Egypt who responded to the call to arms, not only the vast majority in these and the other Arab countries but even a majority in Iraq itself remained passive. The Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia made no secret of their disapproval. And to this failure two factors certainly contributed. One was the certainty that its success meant the extension of the war to the Middle East, with German bases in Iraq and probably in

Syria as well. The other was a suspicion that the rising was an Iraqi bid for supremacy in the Middle East under the cloak of pan-Arabism.

Nevertheless, it gave birth to a painful conflict of emotions among all Arab Nationalists. Sooner or later Great Britain would have to reckon with its effects—and, if she were wise, with its causes also. On May 29, as the Iraqi rising drew to its inglorious close, the Foreign Secretary in a speech subsequently issued as a White Paper made a well-timed reference to Iraq and the Arab world. No measures of retaliation would be inflicted upon Iraq; the British Government sought nothing more than the loyal observance of the Treaty. As for the Arab world, in reaching out towards a greater degree of cultural, economic and political unity, it could count on the support of His Majesty's Government "to any scheme that commands general approval".

It is a measure of the real sentiments of the Arabs that they have taken these assurances, if not quite at their face value, as offering a foundation for renewed co-operation, whereas a similar German and Italian proclamation at the end of last year met with no more than tepid acknowledgment even in extremist Iraqi circles. But with one accord they have called for deeds not words. The restraint shown in Iraq has already had its effect. Their eyes are now fixed on Syria. What happens there will determine for them whether the word of Great Britain, even more than that of France, can be trusted.

On June 8 General Catroux, in the name of General de Gaulle, proclaimed Syria "free and independent". On the same day, in statements issued in London and by the British Ambassador in Egypt, His Majesty's Government formally associated itself with this promise. With the definitive occupation of the country, the task is laid on the Free French and the British Government to honour their undertakings. Not even the Syrians will expect everything to be settled to their satisfaction at once, but too long a delay will certainly bring about a strong reaction.

Enough has been said to make it clear that it will be no easy

task to effect a final settlement in Syria. The problems both of internal structure and of international relations which it raises are of peculiar difficulty. One can only hope that they will be faced by all parties with the goodwill without which they must prove insoluble. Mr. Churchill, in formally recognising the primacy of French interests in Syria over those of other European countries, has gone far to remove any lingering suspicions of British motives amongst the French. On the other side the British Government is committed to a solution which will facilitate the association of Syria with the other Arab countries. Sooner or later the question of Palestine will be raised in this connection. If this too can be taken in hand and brought to a successful conclusion, the peaceful development of Arab Asia and the restoration of harmonious relations with Great Britain and France should be assured for many years to come.

THE OUTLOOK FOR ETHIOPIA

I. Historic Ethiopia

THE return of the Emperor Haile Selassie to his capital after five years of exile was greeted with unmixed satisfaction throughout the Allied world. This was partly because it was felt to be a portent, holding out the hope of deliverance to the other exiled governments who have put their faith in British arms. But it was also due to a genuine interest in Ethiopia itself. This unique country has established a firm hold upon the sympathies of a wide body of public opinion. In Great Britain its cause has become identified in the public mind with the events at Geneva in 1935 and 1936. The popular reaction to the Hoare–Laval proposals revealed how strongly the current of sympathy with Ethiopia was running at that time, and there must be few who do not feel relieved at the thought that what was lost through the failure of the sanctions policy and our subsequent recognition of the Italian conquest has now been retrieved—and our honour with it. In South Africa the disappearance of the menace of a militarised Italian African empire has removed a danger looming from the north. Throughout the rest of Africa and amongst the negro population of the United States and the West Indies it is the bond of race which is predominant in men's thoughts. The restoration of the one ancient independent African State has been felt to add a cubit to the stature of every African, and the maintenance of that independence has become indissolubly linked with the sense of African self-respect. This feeling may have insufficient warrant in the facts—for, as will be made clear, the ruling people in Ethiopia are more closely allied to the Arabs to their north-east than to the negroes to their south; nevertheless, it exists already as a widespread force and is certain to grow more powerful with the development of the

political consciousness amongst Africans in and beyond Africa. Thus the future of the Ethiopian experiment—for experiment the new policy announced last February assuredly is—will be watched with sympathetic but vigilant eyes by negroes and non-negroes throughout the English-speaking world. Its success will have an important bearing upon the future African policy of the Colonial Powers. Its failure or abandonment would evoke more than disappointment—bitterness and a revival of the cynicism of 1936, undermining the confidence which is the basis of British colonial rule and rendering co-operation with Africans more difficult in every British African territory.

The nucleus of the Ethiopian Empire consists of the mountain mass lying between the Sudan in the west and the Danakil Desert in the east; its southern boundary runs south of Addis Ababa and its northern extends to the neighbourhood of Keren, where the highlands begin to slope downwards to the Red Sea. This is the region inhabited for some 2,000 years by the Amhara, a people whose original Hamitic stock had been modified already in prehistoric times by invading Arab tribes. In language and in their early culture they were akin to the peoples of Arabia and the Levant, and every Ethiopian believes that the present dynasty owes its origin to the union between Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. In the fourth century A.D., while pre-Saxon Britain was still under Roman rule, the Ethiopians were converted to Christianity. Their link with organised Christendom has been through the Egyptian Coptic Church, which has always supplied them with their Abuna or Archbishop. In the early Middle Ages Ethiopia, with a culture compounded of Jewish and Christian elements, attained a standard of civilisation well above that of Saxon and Norman England. Moreover she was at times a considerable military power, dominating the whole eastern horn of Africa, controlling the Red Sea and extending her dominion over southern Arabia. Then came the events which caused a break in Ethiopian history and brought about the unique situation in which the Empire finds itself to-day. The rise of the Moslem

power in Arabia and North Africa drove a wedge between Ethiopia and the rest of Christendom. The Ethiopians barricaded themselves in their mountain fastness and, though encircled and often overrun, succeeded in keeping the Moslem at bay. But centuries of religious warfare not only retarded the material and social development of the country but left the people distrustful of foreign influences and fanatically loyal to their traditional institutions, religious cult and customary way of life. When the Portuguese, having made their way round the Cape, re-established Ethiopia's contact with Europe the people rejected Roman Catholicism as resolutely as they had previously rejected Islam. Thus when Africa was opened up to European exploration in the second half of the nineteenth century travellers found a country which, in the ordinary sense of these words, was neither savage nor civilised—a Near Eastern society whose development had been arrested by enforced isolation, but lacking neither in physical or mental vigour nor in the capacity to assimilate, as well as to resist, external influences.

But the Amhara constitute only about one-third of the present limits of the Ethiopian Empire and about the same proportion of its population. During the course of the last 400 years, and increasingly in the last century, Ethiopian rule has been extended over three groups of neighbouring peoples.

The first of these are the Galla, a Hamitic people who penetrated into Ethiopia from the south from about the sixteenth century. They succeeded in establishing themselves in part of the highlands, and to-day occupy a zone stretching from the Somali desert almost to the Sudan and including most of the south and south-east of the country. In total numbers the Galla probably exceed the Amhara; but they do not form a united block. The northern section, who have been in close contact with the Amhara for 400 years, have been largely Christianised and thus subjected to a process of assimilation, whilst the remainder, in the south and south-east, are divided between Islam and primitive paganism.

Another group of peoples under Ethiopian rule consists of

various Hamitic and negroid tribes in the west and south-west of the country, adjoining the Sudan. Some of these are racially akin to the Amhara and might have become integrated with them, had the Galla invasion of the sixteenth century not driven a wedge between them and their northern kinsfolk. As it is, they have remained isolated and, for the most part, pagan, not very different in their social development from the neighbouring negroid peoples.

A third group consists of the hardy nomad tribes in the Danakil and Ogaden areas—the former to the north-east, towards the Eritrean border, the latter in the south-east, towards British and Italian Somaliland. These tribes are Moslems and have been well able to defend themselves in their own country. Both on this account and for climatic reasons the Ethiopian hold over them has never been firmly established.

How had these widespread and variegated territories been governed?

In answering this question we must think away the whole apparatus of government as we understand it, dependent as it is upon swift means of communication and modern administrative technique with a skilled personnel to keep it running, and transport ourselves into twelfth-century conditions. The country was divided into a number of provinces, rule over which was in the Emperor's gift. The chosen nominees were generally either members of his own family (thus Harar was a sort of family fief) or of one of the influential Amhara clans. There was no regularly organised military force or central military establishment. Order was maintained by each governor within his own area by means of armed bands maintained by him, which in practice meant that they were quartered upon the inhabitants, who were made responsible for their subsistence and compelled to tasks of forced labour. Since it was the custom for governors and their local representatives to maintain large retinues the number of soldiers in the country was always very considerable, as every traveller testified.

This system, which penalised the more prosperous districts,

retarded the development of the country. Naturally its pressure was felt most severely in the non-Amharic areas, particularly those most remote from the capital. In some districts in the south-west, conquered in the time of Menelik, there is evidence of widespread depopulation of what were once flourishing tracts. So far as the Galla were concerned, conditions seem to have varied greatly from province to province. In Jimma and Wallega, for instance, they had secured a considerable degree of autonomy under their own local chiefs. Galla were also selected for high office at the court, and in the mixed districts associated and intermarried freely with the leading Amhara families.

The lack of adequate means of central control made the task of the Emperor a very delicate one. He was dependent upon the loyalty of his provincial nominees, and thus was naturally driven to play off one against the other. But this was not sufficient to prevent uprisings, so that Ethiopian history in the nineteenth century is largely a record of civil war. The danger to the central power was increased from 1880 onwards by the development of European imperialism. The Italians, in particular, realised the advantage to be gained by taking sides in Ethiopian internecine disputes, and it was in this way that Menelik overcame his rivals and seized the throne in 1888—only to turn against his patrons later. The use of the same tactics by Mussolini in 1935 will still be fresh in the reader's mind.

With a political system so loosely compacted it is natural to ask how the country has maintained its unity at all. The answer is twofold. There is, first and foremost, the national tradition, of which every Amhara and a considerable proportion of the Galla feel themselves to be the embodiment. No one can come in contact with the Amhara without being struck by their pride in their nation—a pride showing itself sometimes in senseless arrogance and naïve ignorance, but always in a self-respect which is the product of centuries of independence. For a non-mechanised people to be endowed with such a superiority complex may expose it to grave danger; but at

least it constitutes a surer basis for the building of a modern society than the servility resulting from centuries of subjection.

The second great unifying influence in Ethiopia has been the Christian Church. Seen through Western eyes, it may seem to embody a debased form of the Christian tradition. Its priesthood is, generally speaking, uneducated and not immune from the temptation to misuse its spiritual authority by playing upon the fears of the people. Nevertheless, when all allowance has been made for the prevalence of ignorance and superstition, it does represent a genuine link with the Christian West—and one which is capable of being strengthened by the development of regular contacts with the Western Churches. The authority of the Ethiopian Church over the people, both high and low, is very great. It has made and unmade Emperors and its excommunication is a dreaded weapon. Its monasteries have been the repositories of the learning of the country, which recalls the disputations of Byzantine theologians in its concentration on subtle points of Christian doctrine. Moreover, with all its defects, the priesthood has familiarised the people with the notion of public education. Every church has its school attached to it and, however rudimentary the instruction, it at least provides possibilities for the time when the training of the clergy has itself been carried a stage farther.

Moreover, it is to the credit of the Church that the Ethiopians, however simple and prone to superstition, are apt to reveal a spiritual quality too often denied to the more sophisticated. The references to religion which were so marked a feature of Haile Selassie's utterances during the period of trial were not the product of a well-worn convention but of genuine piety; and in this the Emperor reflected the attitude of his people as a whole. There is a classic simplicity about Ethiopian Christianity which differentiates it both from the more artificial systems of the West and from the atmosphere of the mission-field to the south. On the evening of the day when Ethiopia was admitted into the League of Nations one of the delegates was asked whether he believed that that institution would ensure peace in the world. "'This is my second visit to Europe",

came the instant reply, "and I have seen that Europeans care very much for power and wealth. So long as men care for power and wealth there can be no peace." The enquirer, who had expected a conventional reply, retired abashed before this Solon come to Geneva.

II. The Recent Period

HAILE SELASSIE became Regent of Ethiopia in 1916, at the age of twenty-five, and Emperor in 1928. He realised from the first that, if the country was to retain its historic independence, it was urgently necessary to bring it more into line with Western conditions. He had to move cautiously, owing to the fear of opposition from the provincial governors and from the Church, which suspected all foreign influences. But in the twenty years of his rule prior to the Italian occupation he had achieved results which, compared with the record of his predecessors and in view of the difficulties of the home and foreign situation, must be regarded as highly creditable.

The reforms which lay nearest his heart were in the sphere of health and education. The two, of course, were interrelated; for Ethiopian medicine, though, like Chinese, it handed down a knowledge of herbal remedies, has been quite out of touch with modern knowledge and, in spite of their apparent robustness, the Amhara have become a prey to the diseases which never fail to accompany the opening up of a backward country. It was chiefly for the sake of their educational and medical activities that the Emperor braved the opposition of the Church by encouraging foreign missions. Several of these established hospitals; the Seventh Day Adventists, for instance, maintained a maternity hospital, and a Swedish mission hospital run on European lines began the training of nurses destined to work in the provinces. The Swedes also established a school in Addis Ababa which became very popular amongst the forward group of the younger generation; it avoided colliding with the Church by giving no religious education. After his first visit to Europe in 1924 the Emperor embarked on the policy of him-

self founding schools of a modern type. Between 1925 and 1930 primary schools were opened in all the provincial towns. The Tafari Makonnen School at Addis Ababa, founded in 1925, grew to number 250 boys, of whom 100 were boarders; its staff consisted of French, English, Italians and Ethiopians. It drew clever boys from the provinces, and had by 1935 founded a nucleus of a young Abyssinian party in which the Emperor hoped to find collaborators for his future reforms. A number of these young men were sent to Europe to pursue their studies, chiefly in medicine or law; the majority went to France or Belgium, Sweden being ruled out owing to the language difficulty. French was the most popular European language, though in one district, owing to the popularity of a particular consul, English had acquired a vogue.

But the central difficulty which confronted the Emperor in this programme of betterment was that of changing the old-fashioned administrative system in the face of the opposition of the local governors and in the absence of an adequate armed force to ensure the execution of his orders. He was forced to move by slow degrees, since it was only in the Harar area that he could take action freely. This led him to adopt the experimental method. He selected the province of Chercher, appointed as governor Dr. Martin, who had personal knowledge of British methods in India, paid him and his officials fixed salaries and ordered them to remit all the taxes to the Imperial Treasury. The result was a great success and was being extended to a second province, that of Jigiga, when the experiment was interrupted by the Italian occupation.

To aid him at the centre the Emperor invited a number of foreign advisers from Sweden, Belgium, the United States and Great Britain. But in practice their work was only effective within the restricted range of external affairs and matters arising out of contacts with resident foreigners; in the whole field of internal affairs, where they were exposed to the dead weight of conservative opposition, it was impossible to make substantial progress without throwing the country into a turmoil which would have played into the hands of the Italians. Thus, in spite

of his good intentions, the Emperor took no decisive step towards internal reform until the storm had actually broken. Then he suddenly resolved to inaugurate a new system in the area adjoining the Sudan, and Colonel Sandford, a former consul at Addis Ababa with administrative experience in the Sudan, who had been residing in Ethiopia since his retirement from the British army and was well versed in the ways of the country, was invited to take charge of the province of Maji and entrusted with executive powers for what was, inevitably, a short-lived if promising régime.

Thus the period which closed abruptly with the Italian occupation was marked by hopeful beginnings in a number of different fields rather than by any general improvement in the organisation of the country.

The original purpose of Mussolini appears to have been to turn the highlands of Ethiopia into an area of large-scale settlement for Italians, the native inhabitants being gradually reduced to the position of the Red Indians in North America. However this may have been, it was abandoned when the Duke of Aosta succeeded Marshal Graziani, and a "sympathetic and attractive" policy was substituted in its place. But this did not enable the Italians to establish their control over the country. By 1940 not more than 1,000 settlers had been sent out from Italy, and Italian rule was, broadly speaking, still confined to the towns. Thus, so far as the social structure of the country as a whole is concerned, the Italian occupation has been little more than an episode, and the Emperor is free to begin where he left off in 1935.

Nevertheless, the five years of Italian occupation have introduced changes which must have far-reaching consequences. The communications of the country have been transformed. Thanks to the skill of the Italian engineers it is now endowed with a network of first-class motor-roads, with revolutionary effects upon the possibilities of central government. The towns have been modernised and equipped with power stations, water supplies, public buildings and other improvements. The rudimentary social services established in the previous fifteen

years have been improved and extended. Numbers of Ethiopians have come into contact, if only in subordinate positions, with modern methods of administration. Above all, there is the lasting psychological impression of the Italian conquest—the shattering effect of mechanised warfare and poison gas upon a people who had hitherto deemed themselves self-sufficient and invincible, and the discovery that if they are to retain what they value in their national freedom they cannot afford to keep all foreigners and foreign ideas at bay, but must learn to distinguish friends from foes and helpful from harmful ideas and influences. It is in this atmosphere that the Ethiopian experiment is being inaugurated.

III. The Outlook for the New Policy

THE statement of policy announced by Mr. Eden on February 5 of this year* puts the British Government under a double obligation, first to the Ethiopian people and secondly to the world as a whole. We are pledged to the Ethiopians to restore the independence of their State under the Emperor Haile Selassie and to provide him with the assistance and guidance, both in political and economic matters, for which he has asked. And we are pledged to the world as a whole to abstain from territorial ambitions in Ethiopia and to make any assistance and guidance "the subject of international arrangement at the conclusion of peace". For the time being, however, during a period which, whether short or long, is bound

*"His Majesty's Government would welcome the reappearance of an independent Ethiopian State, and recognises the claim of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the throne. The Emperor has intimated to His Majesty's Government that he will need outside assistance and guidance. His Majesty's Government agree with this view, and consider that any such assistance and guidance in economic and political matters should be the subject of international arrangement at the conclusion of peace. They affirm that they have themselves no territorial ambitions in Abyssinia.

"In the meanwhile the conduct of military operations by Imperial forces in parts of Abyssinia will require temporary measures of military guidance and control. These will be carried out in consultation with the Emperor, and will be brought to an end as soon as the situation permits."

to be decisive for future developments, the guidance of Ethiopia is a purely British responsibility and it is British advisers who are engaged in discharging it.

Let us consider the problems which have to be faced. The first and most urgent is the organisation of an effective military force for the restoration and maintenance of internal order. One of the earliest pronouncements of the Emperor on his return was that he intended to establish a national army. The nucleus for this exists in the patriot bands who joined with the British regular forces in expelling the Italians. Now is the moment for welding them into a permanent and disciplined force available to enforce the commands of the central government. When this has been achieved a great step will have been taken towards modernising the government of the country, for a recalcitrant provincial governor will no longer be in a position to defy the Emperor. The "King's Peace" will have been imposed on the unruly barons.

The next task will be to change the system of administration throughout the provinces, carrying farther the experiment already made before the war. Here everything will depend on the choice of the right men as governors, a matter in which the Emperor's hands are not entirely free, as he cannot simply set aside the older generation of "Rases", especially those that have remained faithful to him throughout the years of trial. The problem is to some extent eased by the thinning of the ranks of the older chiefs, but against this must be set the irreparable loss of most of the younger men who had been educated for leadership. The greater part of them perished in the indiscriminate massacre at Addis Ababa which followed the attempt on Marshal Graziani's life.

But there is another difficulty of an even more insistent kind which confronts the Emperor and his advisers—that of finance. Under the old Ethiopian system the provincial officials, the armed forces and the Church lived upon the proceeds of what could be raised locally. No accounts were naturally kept in the provinces nor, in spite of the efforts of the American financial adviser, at the centre either. Even the amount of the customs

revenue remitted annually to the capital was unknown. There was indeed a Bank of Ethiopia, but it dealt only with private transactions. There is therefore no means of estimating the annual revenue of the country before the war. In any case, it has now to face greatly increased needs. These fall under two main heads—the provision of regular salaries for officials and soldiers, and the maintenance of the public works and services introduced by the Italians. Some of the more grandiose of these may perhaps be dispensed with, but most of them, particularly the roads and the aerodromes, are too valuable for the security and economic development of the country to be allowed to fall into disrepair. Yet the upkeep of the roads alone, in face of the conditions to which Ethiopian mountainsides are exposed in the rainy season, will entail a very considerable standing charge. It would not take many years' neglect of essential communications to set the country back into a state stultifying every effort at social and administrative reform.

It is quite impossible that, even when order has been thoroughly restored and the export trade in coffee and hides, interrupted during the Italian occupation, set going again, the country should meet these needs out of its own resources. It will take quite a number of years for Ethiopia to grow into its new clothes, and during that time the deficit must be covered from outside. How to arrange for an annual subsidy of this kind without, on the one hand, offending against financial canons and, on the other, impairing the authority of the Emperor by the method of control adopted is a problem that must be left to the tact of the new financial adviser. It must not be forgotten that the Italians had drawn up a programme of public works entailing an expenditure of £133,000,000 over a period of six years, and paid an annual subsidy of at least £10,000,000 in addition. It will not be easy to strike a balance between this and the traditional public expenditure of the country.

Then there are certain specific problems which will require particular attention. The chief of these is slavery, which has

been prominently before the public mind owing to our long and honourable anti-slavery tradition. But it is not always realised that in a country such as Ethiopia, where slavery is an established part of the social system, as it was in Ancient Greece, it is the slave-trade, rather than slavery within the household, which is the principal abuse. The Emperor, to his credit be it said, had set himself before 1935 both against the slave-trade, which has been carried on through Italian ports, and against domestic slavery—though with indifferent success. In the former sphere he was impeded by his lack of control over the provinces, and in the latter by the opposition of conservative influences. The former obstacle ought now to be removed once and for all. As for the latter, the Emperor's decree of 1924, which was supplemented by a further measure in 1931, made elaborate provisions both for dealing with abuses and for bringing the system gradually to an end, and it should now be possible to enforce it more effectively than before the war.

Then there is the question of an outlet to the sea. This is bound up with the disposal of the ex-Italian territories, which raises issues beyond the scope of this article. So far as Ethiopia herself is concerned, the restoration of her colonies to Italy would reproduce the threatening situation of yesterday, whilst the handing over of one or more ports like Massowa or Mogadischu would burden the government of the country with new and complicated problems, which might end by affecting its independence. It would therefore seem preferable that the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts should be under some régime which would both inspire confidence in Ethiopia and provide the needed facilities for through traffic. Occasion might be taken, in this connection, to unite the highland area of Eritrea with the rest of the Amhara country and to dis-annex the desert districts, which have only been a source of weakness. The problem of the disorder along the Kenya and Sudan frontiers, which has been the cause of so much trouble in the past, should find its solution in the reform of provincial administration.

There remains the question most important of all—the choice of the men who are to direct the unique experiment of guiding this ancient African Empire along the path of modern progress. They should not be numerous, if only because the number of those who know and understand the Ethiopians is necessarily very limited. The important thing is that the few who are chosen should have the right qualities. In the peculiar circumstances of the country a close relationship of confidence between the Emperor and his Chief Adviser is all-important. There is room here in this new field of independent Africa for a counsellor who, half-way between a Cromer and a Livingstone, would combine the patience and efficiency of the far-sighted administrator with the wisdom and sympathy of the friend of backward peoples, and would thus carry the Ethiopians across the present difficult stage of their long history from twelfth-century to twentieth-century conditions. If such a man were found, Britain—and indeed the world—could trust him to choose his own associates.

AMERICA—A PROBLEM IN TIMING

I

AMERICA'S place and policy in this war-torn world, as of midsummer 1941, can best be summarized in the following points:

Item. The United States is giving just about as much aid, and possibly more, to the nations fighting for freedom as if it were itself a belligerent. Its aid is far ahead of what it was in 1917, far exceeds the American contribution for many months after our entry into that war.

Item. By actions such as the "occupation" of Iceland (does action taken at the invitation of the Icelandic Government constitute "occupation"?) the United States gives a quantity and quality of aid to Britain "short of war" which is explicable only in these unorthodox undeclared-war days. A sea-lane open to Iceland, a "neutrality" patrol based on that island, afford substantial assistance to the maintenance of the British lifeline. Meantime, American materials go in a steadily increasing flow to the British bastion, most notably in the air-ferrying of planes.

Item. American production of these materials and fighting tools for its own and British forces continues steadily to increase, although with some slack spots and disappointments and—now that the rate of mass production is becoming higher—with a slower rate of increase. In some essentials, such as destroyers and heavier aircraft, tanks, armor plate, etc., the rate of increase still continues and peaks will not be reached for another year or more, but these peaks are very high.

Item. The United States's own armed forces are being formed into effective and large units, with a year of conscription almost at an end. If laws are amended to extend the period of service, these striking forces will have sufficient

time to be built into armies and air forces comparable only to Germany's and Britain's.*

Item. Public opinion meantime, like the man who ought to go to the dentist, puts off the hour of actual entry into the war, though with a feeling that it is becoming more and more inevitable. There is no sign that the decision approaches. We *act* like belligerents in this undeclared war, and so long as such action seems adequate, we defer outright belligerency. Only when continually strengthening actions "short of war" no longer seem sufficient to save Britain, or when Hitler actually attacks some American outpost or interest far more flagrantly than he has yet done, does our policy appear likely to become outright war.

II

THERE are at least three serious defects in the present state of affairs. The first is that the United States is not completely "committed". It is a fact that the Lend and Lease Law and the numerous categorical statements of President Roosevelt that this nation is enlisted to help make sure the defeat of Hitlerism are moral commitments. It is equally certain that Hitlerism rampant in Europe threatens the free existence of the United States, and that most Americans realize the fact. But it is also true that the United States Congress has not declared war on Germany. Until that definitive act is taken, nobody can be quite sure in what direction and with what inhibitions our policy may evolve. Many Americans, and doubtless many Britishers too, would feel much better if this nation were positively committed by Congress to an all-out war for the suppression of Hitler. Until such a commitment comes, our policy has a fatal defect. The defect may be turned into an actual asset in practice. Our intervention later may come after due preparation and with the effect of a *Blitz* so much the better for a long period of preparation. But the fact that we are not at war is still a defect; it marks an unfinished chapter, and many of us are uneasy and impatient at the possibly necessary suspense.

* A Bill to authorise extension of the period of service of draftees (conscripts), National Guardsmen and reservists by a further 18 months passed the House of Representatives on August 13 by one vote, having passed the Senate by 44 votes to 28. The President signed the necessary order on August 22. Forces of public opinion affecting the progress of this legislation are discussed on pp. 731–3.—EDITOR.

The second defect in present policy is in morale, in the uncertainty which it produces in public opinion. None of us know just exactly where we are going. There is a strong faction propagandizing daily against "shooting war". It feeds on present uncertainties and confusion. Because we have not taken a final decision, the national morale is poor. Until that moment of decision comes, the debate and disunity will inevitably continue. Once the die is cast, we shall see a real closing of the ranks, with many who now oppose participation in the war joining loyally and enthusiastically in the war effort. The present situation is a vicious circle. Until the public shakes off its apathy and recognizes that this war is "our" war, the decision to participate will not be taken; until the decision is taken, the apathy will not cease to be. President Roosevelt is now* a tight-rope walker, alternating between a forthright statement of policy or striking act and a cautious word or deed of recession, such as his recent expressed "hope" that the United States would not be drawn into the war.

The third major fault in present policy is that so long as the nation remains out of war, the war effort will not be "all-out". The *tempo* of American industry, now harnessed in the fight for freedom, is very high, but it is not as high as it could be. The nation has not yet really begun to make sacrifices, except possibly in the colossal debt that is being run up. Business is still very much as usual, while much of the nation is uneasily enjoying a great armaments boom. It will require a war decision to make the all-out effort really possible. We are now in a state of Presidentially declared emergency, but that has not been nearly enough to awaken

* It will be appreciated that this article describes the situation in the United States immediately before the President's meeting with Mr. Churchill.—EDITOR.

the American people and mobilize their resources in the totalitarian manner which will be necessary to help win the war. In Britain the people were united by danger, and their final realisation that everything must be sacrificed to the war effort came only after dire events had taken place. These events, or their counterpart, have not yet come home to the people of the United States. Until they do, this nation will have many resemblances to Britain before the fall of France.

As against these faults, there are certain advantages. Prime among them is the fact that the United States has time to remake its industry, build an army, expand its air force and prepare its navy for action while still technically at peace. We are not committed to strike before we are ready to strike. We do not have to be carried along with borrowed equipment and facilities, as was necessary in 1917. And while actual participation in the war would probably promote national unity, it would also produce at this distance a feverishness and possibly a panic which would not altogether conduce to efficient preparation. It may be that public opinion would insist on retaining for Western Hemisphere defense certain supplies or weapons that are now going to Britain.

Another advantage is that no pretext is given Japan, should it dare to do so, to seize any American outposts in Asia before our mounting defenses are able adequately to protect them. The United States is also able to go ahead with certain *faits accomplis*, such as the holding of Iceland, in stages which suit our technical preparations. If, by entering the war, we felt obligated to undertake great operations, the task would be very difficult indeed. The present inadequacy of our forces would be revealed, and public opinion in the United States and Britain would perhaps be disheartened.

As things stand, the gallant British people have something to look forward to—the steady stiffening of American policy. If, as would otherwise have been the case, our commitments ran far ahead of our capacities, perhaps Britain would have said: "There, you see—America is in the war and still it doesn't help much." American participation may come along

at just the time Britain will relish it most. And it will come along at a time when we will be far better able than now to match word with deed. If, when the hour of decision comes, the United States is able to strike with devastating force, the effect on German morale will be far greater than if our power came to be felt only slowly and protractedly.

III

OF the bases of American policy, and the support given them by the American people, there can be no doubt. The major tenet, as enunciated by the President and accepted by the people, is the defeat of Hitlerism in the world. Tacitly most Americans realize this probably means eventual entry into the war. But they are not anxious to enter.

Responsible officials, even including President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox, still publicly express the hope that the United States will be able to avoid "shooting war". But their hope is strictly pious. The only real prospect they see of keeping out of the actual fighting is for the war to cease before very long. Nobody counts on that, or expects it. They know that from the Lend and Lease Law onward the United States has bound itself to give safe delivery of all-out aid to Britain and its allies. With such an obligation, and barring unexpected denouements in the war, the eventual need of American participation seems certain to arise.

There were those who hoped until fairly recently that it might be possible to help Britain win the war without American fighting. Many tried to take Winston Churchill at his word and believe that if we give Britain the tools, Britain alone can finish the job. But they doubt if the Prime Minister would use precisely the same language to-day. In July, British informants in Cairo are said to have told American newspaper correspondents there that an American expeditionary force would be necessary. Such talk sounded very grim and unwelcome in the United States. It implied that Britain might have to fight its way step by step across blood-soaked Western

Europe, not to mention Africa, the Near East and the Mediterranean. It raised grisly transportation difficulties, the picture of another citizen army in Flanders fields or, perhaps, at Dunkirk. It did not arouse Americans, but gave the isolationists the strongest arguments they have had for a year or more. It permitted them to say that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had been deceiving them all along.

The outcome of the Russian campaign will, of course, vitally affect American thinking and the need for actual participation. Most Americans believe that if Germany completes its conquest of the Ukraine and the Caucasus—or crushes the Russian armies preparatory thereto—in a few weeks or even months, then the way will be open to a long war. Under such circumstances, American participation would be surely inevitable. If the Soviet forces were still able to hold out and maintain a front on the Urals, or if—a miracle scarcely hoped for by Americans—they were able to hold the Nazi columns to a stalemate at some point short of trans-Caucasian oil, then Americans believe Hitler might be defeated without an A.E.F. or even short of direct participation of the United States.

While the Russian war introduced these elements of uncertainty, it did not in the least make Hitlerism any more desirable in American eyes. A good many Americans felt that the battle of the two totalitarian giants was indeed a happy circumstance; they would like nothing better than a battle to the death between them. But few reckoned on that. Rather, they took satisfaction in the fact that every German soldier and bit of material expended on Russia could not be used against Britain (or the United States), but they also realized that even partial German victory would prolong the war and increase the chances of American fighting.

The great and instant wisdom of Prime Minister Churchill, supported by President Roosevelt, in welcoming the new Russian ally did much to silence any who might have hailed Hitler's anti-Communist crusade. The new Communist allies are somewhat embarrassing domestically, for the anti-totali-

tarian *bloc* had been very clean-cut, but at any rate fewer strikes in defense industries are now anticipated. The graceless and oft-repeated shifts and reverses of the Communists have almost completely destroyed their prestige with Liberals and former fellow-travellers, so that now the confusions of the United Front days have virtually ceased to exist.

From August 1939 until the Russian war broke out, the American Communists had been in the forefront of the peace and isolation movement. They had somewhat embarrassed the honest isolationists, but their net effect was to confuse the public and hamper the Administration. On the one hand they deluded some simple souls with their arguments of "books, not bullets", and on the other hand they stirred up a good deal of strike trouble. Their influence was felt in varying degrees in all parts of the American continent. Removal of this deterrent will help.

Conversely, the pro-Nazis who were that way before 1939 because they were so anti-Communist have come back into their own again. The fraction led by Father Coughlin, which used to be very prominent before the Berlin–Moscow pact, has emerged from the shade into which that alliance had flung it. The chief utility of this so-called "Christian Front" in the United States lies in its effort to capitalize upon the twenty years of anti-Communist activity of the Roman Catholic Church. Father Coughlin was able to take this aspect of church policy and create a political faction. It tallied with his vigorous anti-Semitic policy. When Berlin took Moscow into partnership, Father Coughlin's appeal to Catholics was cut down to its Irish and pro-German elements. Now, however, the Coughlinite movement has come out of obscurity and is preaching its anti-Communist crusade (which again means pro-Nazi) with old-time vigour. Happily, the wise and broad attitude taken by the Pope in refusing to join Hitler in an anti-Communist movement has had an extremely good effect here. A number of leading American Catholic clergymen have strongly supported the Churchill–Roosevelt line, carrying the Pope's position a step farther. Potentially, American Catholics

constitute a great and powerful part of the isolationist minority. They include large numbers of Irish, Germans and Italians. Some of their clergy have been aggressively isolationist. The stage was set for a damaging gain in strength, had Hitler's anti-Communist stunt worked. Happily, Vatican statecraft, the boldness of other American Catholic clergy, and the common sense of the rank and file of American Catholics prevented big gains in isolationist forces.

IV

IT must frankly be recognized that the United States is not prepared for immediate entry into war, either physically or psychologically. Physically, despite the excellence of our navy, the intensified and enlarged training of the army, and the swift growth of industrial production, the nation cannot be in full fighting trim for many months yet. It is possible to tackle such important but seriatim jobs as the Atlantic patrol, the protection of Iceland, the containment of Japan, and all the wide range of material and financial aid to Britain. These steps will inevitably continue, becoming more and more effective. It is desirable not to undertake greater jobs until the United States can carry them out with such force that resistance is hardly possible, and there it may be a question of American timing against German timing. With the Russian adventure, the United States would seem to have gained time. On the other hand, it is equally desirable that the United States should not get involved at this stage in operations—which may, to a degree, be side-shows—that would slow up our aid to Britain itself in its island fortress. The major part of our industrial output, notably in aircraft, must still go to Britain for the R.A.F.'s magnificent onslaughts on Germany. We must not hoard aircraft or scatter them too thickly in the outposts when they can be used to strike at the heart. Our aviators must be used generously in the Atlantic ferry service. Many of our skilled technicians must be spared for building operations in Northern Ireland and Britain, as is the case to-day.

The priority list of American action must be skilfully drawn, with first things put first. But the more men and equipment are made available to Britain, the less the United States would be able to bear a big and active part should it enter the war forthwith.

Thus, indeed, it is a problem of timing. Our aid must not be "too little" nor "too late". But it must also be late enough to be overwhelming, and it must be applied at the right spots. The conclusion which follows must be a matter of opinion and judgment at the present stage, but to a lay observer it seems reasonable to assert that had the United States entered the war any sooner its aid to Britain would have been less. The assets of war *tempo* would have been counterbalanced by the debits of anxiety for our own safety. There seems, therefore, to be a strong case for Roosevelt policies of caution to date, insofar as they are related to our physical preparation.

In the field of psychological preparation, we are even less ready. Congress, the essential indicator of the public mind, is not yet worked up to war or even to an all-out defense effort. It is true that many of the squabbles and isolationist flurries are on the surface. The nation, by and large, gives Administration foreign policies its overwhelming moral support. But the nation is not yet certain that it will have to go to war. If a war resolution based on present facts were suddenly introduced in Congress, it would certainly be delayed for a considerable period and it probably would be defeated. There is also delay and doubt about many of the forward steps which the President has to refer to Congress. As this article is written, Congress is beginning to debate the proposals to extend the statutory year of service for draftees and reservists and to remove the restrictions which limit their use to the Western Hemisphere only. The outcome is by no means certain. Likeliest probability at the moment is that the period of service may be extended, but that service abroad will be limited to specific outposts and not broadened to cover another American Expeditionary Force in Europe.

The reasons for lifting both restrictions are very compelling. The draftees and reservists have been mixed in with the regular army, as was wise and necessary, and to send them back home to-day would be to break up the army at a moment of obvious national danger. Moreover, in order to perform tasks recognized as vital even by isolationists—such as the holding of Iceland—it is necessary to use these mixed army units at places outside the generally recognized limits of the Western Hemisphere. That Congress should hesitate at all in taking such obviously urgent action seems hard to understand. The explanation will help to clarify the complexities of American public opinion to-day. It is simply that people are suspicious of being coaxed down the road to war by steps which they suspect may be premeditated, and after explicit promises to the contrary. Even to those Americans who regard participation in the war ultimately as inevitable, this gradual process seems disingenuous and even disconcerting. Last year President Roosevelt and his leaders promised explicitly that draftees and reservists would be called up for one year only. But even more categorically the President and his party pledged, in the words of the Democratic Party Platform, "We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside the Americas except in case of attack." Congress is now asked to go back on the general understanding of the meaning of this pledge.

It is, of course, undeniable that action in Iceland and elsewhere in consonance with a long-range plan is definitely in the national interest. So would be the extension of army service and scope. Yet, say many mid-road Americans, what pledges can we count on? Wouldn't it be better, they ask, if we knew where we were going? Those who insist that President Roosevelt has been acting disingenuously all along —and the isolationist leaders make the most lurid charges— find their arguments strengthened. Moreover, above all else the rank and file of Americans are alarmed at the prospect of an American Expeditionary Force engaged in only partly

prepared and extremely difficult operations on any of the ominous battlefronts from Narvik to Dakar, from Flanders to the Caucasus. A war of naval and air action would be one thing. A citizen army in its millions facing Hitler's *Panzer* divisions on a precariously held shore is quite another. And the proposals to lift limits on overseas uses of the army, while extending its period of service, strike American public opinion precisely where it is most tender.

More fundamentally, it is still true that Americans are not adequately awake to the menace of Hitlerism. Despite the basic support they give national policies—which include a commitment to defeat Hitlerism in the world—the people are far too apathetic and complacent. They are ready to be led. They are ready to be told what must be done. But if there is any leading into war, it will be the President who will lead Congress and the people, not the people who will lead the President. To date, it has seemed as if Mr. Roosevelt were waiting for the people to make up their mind that the time for entry into the war had come. And, as has been pointed out earlier, the longer he waits the more the obstructionists of national unity do their work. The President obviously does not want to go down in history as the man who manoeuvered and planned the American people into a great war. He wishes, rather, to be the man who sought and contrived for two years and more to defeat Hitlerism "short of war", and then only in response to public realization that war was inescapable was willing to lead the nation into conflict.

But many Americans are convinced—and Wendell Willkie expressed this view in so many words the other day as he left the White House after lunching with the President—that national opinion will demand a more positive leadership. In a word, the American people will not go to the dentist voluntarily. Their elected leaders—and this means the President—must speak to them authoritatively and say: "The time has come." In many polls and tests of opinion, the nation has said that it would go to war only if that is unavoidably necessary to bring about the defeat of Hitlerism. Not private

citizens or the collective nation, but the President and his informed officials, can determine when the moment of unavoidable necessity has come.

There are two ways in which public opinion might be solidified. One is by constant Presidential pressure through "fireside" radio chats and a steady succession of aggressive measures submitted to Congress and followed through with party organization and aid from like-minded Republicans. Under such a program, the President would have to refrain from the typical qualifying afterthoughts with which he has followed nearly every forward step to date. These postscripts have evidently been for the purpose of soothing those Americans who were alarmed at his vigorous advances. Actually, in the opinion of many, they have played into the hands of the isolationists and increased the general confusion. The most friendly explanation of these pullings-back is that the President did not want us to drift into the war before we were adequately prepared. But if we are to go ahead, the time has certainly come for unmitigated Presidential leadership through a program which the public will understand, and which will arouse them to the need for more direct action. This method would seem to be the more straightforward and certain way of preparing the American nation for eventualities.

The other method is for the President to await an international incident which would arouse the people, and then for him to take advantage of the crisis with a program of action. This seems to be the course now being pursued. But it leaves the initiative with Hitler, and there is a large question whether any sufficiently startling incident will be forthcoming, or whether, in the present case-hardened state of public thinking everywhere, it would suffice to arouse America. Those who pin their faith to incidents are still thinking in 1917 terms.

However, policies are now being followed which may well lead to major incidents. And the reaction of the public thereto will be crucial. Stationing of forces in Iceland is a flat challenge to Hitler, for it is within his combat zone. Already, American ships have dropped depth bombs as a "warning" to German submarines. The protection of the line of communication from the American mainland to Iceland, and the naval and air patrols radiating therefrom, will be provocative of incident. American opinion, including many isolationists, approved the action in Iceland. If other bases are occupied, still further incidents will be tantalizingly bidden. Thus Hitler may be forced into action which in turn would precipitate an American decision.

A combination of these two methods—a program of Presidential leadership looking toward war participation, and steps to force Hitler into actions which would arouse Americans—may well be the actual plan. Both will almost certainly be needed. The exact evolution of American thinking and policy is, of course, impossible to forecast. It depends greatly on events abroad. Yet we are on a path from which there can be no real turning. In the words of the isolationist *Saturday Evening Post*, we are like the diver who has left the spring-board but has not yet struck the water. What kind of a dive we make remains to be seen. And this diving-board analogy is definitely too optimistic. Despite the sense of inevitability which fills most Americans, it would be a mistake to assume that our actual entry into the war is a complete certainty. It is a strange and uncertain time, and things are getting no clearer. Nothing, literally nothing, can be taken for granted.

Yet an American commitment in general terms has been given, American action is going forward, and there is every reason to assume that we will continue to act as becomes necessary. What is uncertain is the manner and time in which we will implement our commitment. The situation is altogether hopeful, but it cannot be diagrammed. With the basic moral unity of the American people, there should be no real doubt of the eventual outcome. But they will not get into "shooting war" until they are convinced it is unavoidable. That is the long and short of the whole matter. And the problem is to

see that this decision doesn't come too late. That is the problem our leadership must solve.

V

A FINAL word of cold statistics, a progress report, may be the best way to end what is otherwise an effort to outline the impalpable. One year ago our intensive defense program began. At that time, in a special message to Congress, the President asked for $5,000,000,000 to equip an army of 1,200,000 men, to speed an air force of 40,000 planes, to hasten the building of a two-ocean navy. The record of achievement in the twelvemonth follows:

The Army. In active service, as July 1941 began, were over 1,441,000 officers and men. About 600,000 of these had been brought into the Army under the draft. The total force was much larger than had been anticipated a year ago. Garrisons in the Philippines, the Canal Zone, and other outlying possessions had been doubled.

The Air Force. The total number of planes in the Army and Navy combined was reported between 8,500 and 10,500. The goal of 40,000 is still far away, but aircraft production steadily rises. In July 1940 the nation produced only 547 planes. In June 1941, despite a major strike, production was 1,476 planes. As in earlier months, an unannounced number—probably at least half—were earmarked for Britain.

The Navy. The two-ocean program is reported to be well ahead of schedule, with new combat vessels being steadily commissioned ahead of time and Atlantic forces substantially augmented by vessels from the great Pacific Fleet. The "fleet in being" is at full fighting strength, and, as for productive capacity, it was just announced that by 1943 the destroyer-building capacity would be at the rate of 100 yearly.

These are general indications of the mobilization of American power. Compared with the 1917 effort, present progress is heartening. There have been setbacks and disappointments. But we are working within the democratic framework. We travel with the free consent of a free people. There will be

no attrition of our war effort, but a constant gaining of strength. It is more than regrettable, it may come close to an historical tragedy, that the American people have not recognized earlier and more fully that this is *their* war. But it would have been a more grievous tragedy if our President had sought a war declaration from Congress before the nation was ready. The mistakes of Wilson's latter years are not being made to-day. We travel more slowly than many of us would like. But we will travel far, and with Britain holding its brave bastion we shall help to bring freedom back to all men.

United States of America,
July 1941.

DIVIDED IRELAND

I. Two Budgets

THE difference between the two Irish Governments, both in general and as regards the war, was clearly shown in their respective Budgets. Here in Northern Ireland, where the major portion of our taxation is imposed and fixed in London, Budget Day causes little excitement or apprehension. Three weeks before Mr. Milne Barbour, the Minister of Finance, introduced his Budget at Stormount on April 29, we already knew that we should have to pay income tax at 10*s.* and to meet the various other new taxes imposed to meet the rising cost of war. It was also obvious that our contribution to imperial expenditure, which is in essence the excess of revenue over expenditure, and so rises or falls according to the rate of taxation, would be materially increased. In fact it has practically doubled, rising from £6,000,000 to £11,750,000. Mr. Barbour estimated expenditure for the coming year at £19,066,000 and revenue at £27,596,000, the surplus of over £8,000,000, which constitutes our imperial contribution, being increased by a rebate of some £3,000,000 from the British Exchequer in respect of excess war expenditure. The few changes proposed in the taxation under the direct control of the Northern Parliament were principally in the form of very minor reliefs. The strength of our financial position is proved by the fact that this year income tax and surtax in Northern Ireland are estimated to produce £10,742,000, national defence contribution £2,000,000 and purchase tax £1,190,000. The tax revenue which the Northern Parliament itself controls is expected to yield £1,761,000. Under such conditions there was little necessity for Mr. Barbour to remind his audience, as he did, that luxuries would tend to disappear and that we must spend less and save more. The attacks of the

Luftwaffe on Belfast had already brought home to most of us the magnitude of our peril and the necessity for sacrifice.

The story which Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly, the Eire Minister for Finance, told the Dail on May 7 was neither so satisfactory nor so simple as Mr. Barbour's. The financial year had closed with a deficit of £1,755,000 instead of the modest surplus of £4,000 which he anticipated, and that in spite of the fact that the tax revenue on the whole exceeded the estimated yield. This unsatisfactory result is, of course, due to the spate of supplementary estimates, mainly for defence. Neutrality, as Mr. O'Kelly pointed out, may not be heroic but it is certainly expensive. Expenditure on the army alone has increased since 1937 by over £5,000,000. Indeed the task of one of the few surviving neutral countries within the zone of hostilities grows progressively more difficult. His embarrassments are twofold—a decline in revenue and a rise in expenditure. Moreover his estimates may be completely upset by unexpected events. Mr. O'Kelly frankly stated that he was proceeding on the assumption that Eire would remain neutral, that some supplies would continue to reach its shores and that no major economic catastrophe would occur.

Estimating expenditure at £39,448,000 and revenue, at the existing rate of taxation, at £31,683,000, he faced a prospective deficit of £7,765,000. His original proposal, afterwards modified, was that approximately half this gap should be bridged by additional taxation and half by borrowing. The proposed taxation covered a wide field and was fairly distributed over the entire community. Income tax was increased by a shilling to 7*s.* 6*d.*, and also estate duty on estates over £10,000. The duty on petrol was raised by 5*d.* a gallon, and that on tobacco by 5*s.* 6*d.* a pound. Additional taxes were imposed on matches, betting transactions and cider. Postal and telephone charges were also increased. As originally introduced the Budget proposed to extend the Corporation Profits Tax to all companies with an annual profit of £1,000, to raise the rate by 2½ per cent. and to impose an excess profits tax, all these charges to operate as from September 1939. But this proposal, which would

undoubtedly have crippled if not ruined many of the new Irish manufacturers, raised such a storm of protest from the commercial community that its retrospective effect was cancelled and the exemption margin was raised to £2,500. Even so it will probably be difficult for some of the new companies to make ends meet. Another proposal to impose a tax of one-third of a penny on each copy of all Irish newspapers, and to increase the existing tax on imported newspapers from two-thirds of a penny to one penny per copy, was so severely criticised that it was dropped completely. Had it in fact been enforced it would probably have killed two of the leading daily newspapers. A more welcome feature of the Budget was the proposal to increase unemployment insurance payments and to allow recipients of this assistance, as well as widows, orphans and old age pensioners, a small supplementary grant in kind of milk, butter and bread. Altogether Mr. O'Kelly's proposals suffered drastic criticism and amendment. As a result he will have to find at least £600,000 more by borrowing.

At the same time as the introduction of the Budget the Government issued an Emergency Powers Order forbidding any increases of dividends or directors' fees in limited companies, or of wages in public utility and statutory occupations and essential or protected industries. This order covers practically the whole field of industrial employment and, whilst it is both courageous and necessary in order to secure equality of sacrifice, it may occasion injustice if it is not accompanied by a strict control of retail prices. Naturally enough it has not been welcomed by the Labour Party, already incensed by the introduction of a Bill to regulate trade unions. This measure, which is designed to rationalise the trade union movement and to eliminate the many small unions whose rivalries have led to much unnecessary friction, provides that bodies of employers or employees carrying on negotiations for fixing wages or conditions of employment must in future be licensed by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. Licences will be granted only to authorised trade unions or

to foreign unions (*i.e.*, the British trade unions which have strong branches in Eire) registered under the law of their own country. Substantial money deposits of at least £2,000 will be required as evidence of bona fides. A tribunal will be set up to decide which unions or associations shall be recognised as representing employers or employees in any particular type of business, and no other union or association will be permitted to organise in that class. The trade union leaders object to the Bill because it denies the worker's right to join any union he likes, by requiring deposits applies a means test to the whole trade union movement, makes it impossible for the underpaid sweated workers to form a union, and places the survival of each union at the mercy of a government tribunal. In short, they see no reason why the workers should be deprived of freedom of choice and association on the ground of what they consider a questionable increase in efficiency. These serious differences reveal the rapidly increasing rift between the Eire Government and the trade unions.

II. Conscription Revived

THE relations between the two parts of our divided country, which had improved as a result of the practical sympathy and help extended by Dublin to Belfast during the recent air raids on Northern Ireland, were once more aggravated by the revival of the proposal to impose conscription in Northern Ireland. It will be recalled that on the introduction of conscription in Great Britain during 1939 Northern Ireland was exempted from its scope on representations made by Mr. De Valera to Mr. Chamberlain. There the matter has since remained, and no one with real knowledge of the situation desired to see it revived. Astonishment was therefore shown in many quarters when Mr. Churchill announced in the House of Commons on May 20 that the question of conscription for Northern Ireland had for some time past engaged the attention of the British Government, and that he hoped

to be able to make a statement at an early date. The reactions in all parts of Ireland were immediate. Cardinal MacRory, the Archbishop of Armagh, on behalf of the Catholic Hierarchy repeated the protest made by them in 1939, to the effect that conscription would be disastrous and unjust and would rouse the Northern Catholics to resistance. Mr. Denis Ireland, the writer, who is President of the recently formed Ulster Union Club, an anti-partition organisation of Ulster Protestants, stated that if the suggestion arose from the British need for more man-power, then the proposal to defend Britain by sowing discord in Ireland seemed absolutely fantastic. On May 24 it was announced that Mr. Andrews, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, had flown to London to see Mr. Churchill, and on the same day Mr. De Valera held conferences in Dublin with the leaders of the Opposition parties to consider the position. At Belfast a meeting of Nationalists decided to resist conscription by "the most effective means consonant with the law of God". On May 26 the Dail met specially to hear a statement from Mr. De Valera in which, with the support of the entire House, he spoke grave words of warning against the proposal. In the past he has often said and done many foolish things which have embittered Irish and Anglo-Irish relations, but on this occasion he uttered something that is profoundly true when he stated that no greater violence can be done to liberty and human rights than to force an individual to fight in the forces of another country to which he objected to belong.

That, whether one likes it or not, is the position of the majority of the Nationalist population in Northern Ireland. They are unfortunately separated by religion, race and history from the community in which they live. Some day these discords may be modified or ended by wise statesmanship and the passage of time, but at this moment unity in Ireland can only be achieved on the basis of "an agreement to differ", an agreement which does not hamper the common will. Mr. De Valera pointed out that no matter what political or economic changes may take place in the world, the people living

on these two islands were destined for all time to dwell as neighbours upon the earth. They were certain at all times to have more interests in common than they could have with other nations. Surely, he pleaded, it must be the aim of statesmen on both sides to make the relations between the people of the two islands those of friendly neighbours, and it was quite clear that such a relationship could only be built on the basis of mutual freedom. Emphasising Eire's right to be neutral, he claimed that it had all the time been a friendly neutrality, and that his Government had done everything in its power to preserve the peace-time co-operation with Great Britain. Should the British Government go ahead with the proposal to enforce conscription in Northern Ireland, he claimed that the work which had been accomplished with the utmost patience, perseverance and good will over a long period of years would be undone, and the people of the two islands would be thrown back again into the old unhappy relations. That, he said quite truly, was not wanted by the people of either country. Mr. Cosgrave, the leader of the principal Opposition party, Fine Gael, whose speech was equally reserved and sensible, appealed for more personal contact between the British and Eire Governments to see whether it was possible to clear up and solve any difficulties that exist between the two countries. He added that at this time it was vital that no question of misunderstanding should be allowed to revive an old enmity which everyone in the Dail fervently hoped had been ended for ever.

After this expression of opinion, there was little surprise when Mr. Churchill announced in the House of Commons on May 27 that the British Government had come to the conclusion that at the present time it would be more trouble than it was worth to enforce such a measure. Although one may regret that the reason for dropping the proposal was based on expediency rather than principle one cannot doubt the wisdom of the course adopted. That such a project was ever seriously considered under present conditions makes one wonder whether the British Cabinet has any competent

adviser on Irish affairs. Whilst Mr. Andrews, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, hastened to say that the decision of the British Government would be loyally accepted here, it seems unlikely that his Government were responsible for originating the proposal, whatever their personal views, as to do so would only have been looking for trouble. Mr. De Valera on his part, without accepting the implications in Mr. Churchill's announcement, thanked God that the wise decision had been taken. Perhaps it is now better to leave it at that.

Apart from this unfortunate incident, Anglo-Irish relations have not deteriorated during the period under review. No notice of termination has been given by either Government in respect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1938, and so the Agreement will continue for the time being although, in fact, present conditions have nullified many of its provisions. Mr. Churchill in his broadcast talk on April 27 referred again to the denial of the Irish bases to British forces, but Mr. Duff Cooper, then British Minister of Information, speaking in London on May 6, pointed out that the fact that the British Government respected the independence and neutrality of Eire whilst they were fighting for their lives was an example and proof to the world of the true independence of the Dominions. It showed, he claimed, that Great Britain kept her word, and that the Statute of Westminster was not a scrap of paper which could be torn up but a bond which they had entered into and by which they should abide. This statement, which clarified the position of the British Government, was evidently appreciated in Eire, where passive dependence on Great Britain is not fortified by the flame of allegiance, and which is now, in Mr. Churchill's pregnant words, a "quasi-Dominion".

III. War's Alarms

HOW far Eire may expect Nazi Germany to respect her neutrality has, however, again been made abundantly clear. During the early hours of May 31, five days after

Mr. De Valera had emphasised in the Dail his Government's attitude of "friendly neutrality" towards Great Britain, the *Luftwaffe* once more dropped bombs on Dublin. Whether this fresh attack was a veiled reply to that speech or the carelessness of a German pilot one can only surmise. As a result some 34 people were killed and 88 were injured. Considerable damage was also done to property. The attack was made in spite of the fact that flares were sent up to indicate to the planes that they were over a neutral country. At some stage during the proceedings anti-aircraft guns were apparently in action, but without result. The first bomb, which fell on soft ground in Portland Row near the centre of the city, only caused damage to property; the second, which fell at North Strand not far from Amiens Street Station, the terminus of the Great Northern Railway, demolished 20 houses and wrecked 55 more. It was here that the major portion of the casualties occurred. Nearly all the victims belonged to the poorer classes and although fire-fighting, ambulance and A.R.P. services were quickly on the scene, tragic sights were witnessed. A third bomb, which dropped not far from the President's house in the Phœnix Park, wrecked the pumping station of the Zoo but caused no loss of life.

Investigation having shown that the bombs dropped were of German origin, the Irish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin was directed to protest in the strongest terms to the German Government against this violation of Irish territory and to claim compensation and reparation for the loss of life, the injuries suffered and the damage to property. He was further directed to ask for definite assurances that the strictest instructions would be given to prevent the flight of German aircraft over Irish territory and territorial waters. Evidence of the value of this protest was afforded on June 10, when a German bomber crashed in flames near Churchtown, County Wexford, all its five occupants being killed. On the same day a British fighter made a forced landing not far away at Kilmacthomas, County Waterford, the pilot being interned. A British aircraft

also crashed in County Dublin on May 22, the crew being interned. On June 19 it was announced that the German Government had denied responsibility for the Dublin bombing, but admitted liability and were prepared to pay compensation. They also stated that they had issued the necessary instructions to prevent the possibility of the occurrence of such incidents.

On June 13 the Great Western Railway cross-channel steamer St. Patrick was dive-bombed and sunk by German aircraft whilst approaching the Welsh coast on her usual voyage from Rosslare to Fishguard. As a result 23 persons, many of them Irish, lost their lives. Other ships trading with Ireland, both North and South, have also been attacked and some of them sunk. Mr. De Valera has on several occasions recently reminded his people of the peril which these events indicate, but he still refuses to admit that attack is only likely from one direction. Mr. F. Aiken, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, has at last returned from America, where he went to secure wheat and munitions. In neither respect does he seem to have been very successful. Whilst the American Government sold him two ships and gave him some foodstuffs, all requests for a supply of arms were refused. President Roosevelt in fact stated on June 27 that armament aid for Eire would follow assurances that the Irish would defend themselves against German attack, but no such assurance had been received. Mr. De Valera's reply to this blunt statement is, no doubt, contained in his oft-repeated utterance, made again at Ennis on June 29 and in the Dail on July 8, that the people of Eire are neutral and pledged to defend themselves against attack, no matter from what quarter it comes. Should the German forces secure control of the seas or skies surrounding this country, that pledge will soon have to be redeemed or abandoned.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, the British Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, has recently made a tour of Northern Ireland. Speaking at a luncheon in Belfast on July 7 he said that Ulster made no secret of the fact that it

was part of the British Empire, and paid a tribute to its fighting traditions. It was not altogether accidental that General Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Brooke, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, were Ulstermen. He added that he was satisfied from what he had seen that, if Ulster was invaded, the men of the Home Guard and Special Constabulary would fight like demons. Mr. Andrews, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, in his reply said that Northern Ireland did not want to be placed in a privileged position and only demanded equality throughout the Empire.

IV. Supplies

THE problem of supplies remains, and is likely to remain, the most serious question confronting the Government of Eire. The executive acts, as well as the speeches, of the Ministers concerned show that they are well aware of this fact. The popular delusion, so long fostered by their policy and declarations, that Eire could maintain an entirely self-sufficient existence has been conclusively shattered by the march of events. The sudden diminution in the supply of wheat, petrol, coal, tea, coffee, cocoa and many important and essential raw materials of industry has caused widespread inconvenience. Although part of this deficiency can be made good from substitutes of domestic origin, the dependence of Eire on imports has become clear. As far as food is concerned there should, however, be no dangerous shortage. The petrol situation has recently improved, and private motorists are now receiving a small ration which permits a very limited use of their cars. Mr. Sean Lemass, the Minister for Supplies, made it clear recently that this shortage of supplies was not the result of any external pressure. "The difficulties", he said, "are an inevitable outcome of the war and will end only when the war ends."

He also drew attention to what he described as the dangerous fallacy that Eire's present difficulties could be avoided by some manipulation of the currency or the wider utilisation

of bank credits. In fact, whilst Eire's large reserve of sterling assets has no doubt limited the capacity to command imports from other countries, which in any event are virtually unobtainable owing to lack of shipping, it has maintained a position of strength in the only available market, and has suffered far less depreciation than if it had been invested elsewhere. Speaking in the Dail on June 17, Mr. Lemass said that the shipping position was one of extreme difficulty. As there were almost no neutral ocean-going vessels available for purchase or charter, the measures taken to acquire ships by the newly formed Irish Shipping Company had been only partially successful. The five ships that had been obtained would be required to bring to Eire cargoes of wheat, and space for general cargoes would only be available to a very small extent and in very special circumstances. They were, he said, already facing a severe shortage in foodstuffs for human consumption, animal feeding stuffs, artificial manures, coal and most of the raw materials for industry. To meet this, rationing of consumption would have to be applied and extended as circumstances required.

The general position of essential commodities in Eire, as outlined by the Minister, seems to be as follows. There is sufficient wheat available, owing to the present 95 per cent. extraction, to meet all requirements until the harvest. There is no prospect of increasing the tea ration, now reduced to ¼ oz. per week. Supplies of sugar are sufficient and no scarcity is anticipated, as the beet-sugar factories can meet all demands. No more cocoa will be available when the existing stocks are exhausted. The supplies of coal are most uncertain and unsuitable; a situation may easily arise when coal for domestic purposes may not be available. Supplies of kerosene must be conserved drastically to provide enough for harvesting needs. Fuel oil is only available for industrial purposes, and petrol supplies are less than 50 per cent. of normal consumption. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining raw materials there is likely to be a serious shortage of candles. Supplies of timber are very limited and large-scale building activities will shortly

become impossible. On the other hand there is no likelihood of any shortage in such essential foodstuffs as bacon, milk, butter and fresh meat.

Speaking at Waterford on June 27, Mr. Lemass said that the difficulties which faced them were truly appalling. These included the curtailment and eventual stoppage of industrial production and of a number of commercial activities, involving loss of employment for thousands of workers, and with it social difficulties of such magnitude that they might be beyond their power to cope with; a shortage of many essential foodstuffs hitherto imported, which might develop into their complete disappearance; fuel difficulties which might cause widespread hardship and necessitate the serious curtailment of many public services; and finally, as a result of all this, grave problems of public administration and finance. Mr. Lemass went on to point out that outside the Dail party politics were dead or, at least, dormant; the problems he had referred to were not problems of party and did not arise out of internal politics, but from causes originating outside their territory and completely outside their control. The backwash of the conflict might yet swamp them. He appealed to employers to avoid reducing employment and to the trade unions to be reasonable in their demands. Although they were of necessity fighting a losing battle their aim should, he said, be to minimise losses, and so to control the situation that a subsequent advance would be possible.

The Dublin Government has set up a committee of scientists and experts to report on possible substitutes for essential imports. This committee has already done valuable work and has saved several industries from closing down. It has advised, however, that there is no effective substitute for petroleum products. To meet the fuel problem a campaign for increased production of turf has been begun, and Mr. Hugo Flinn, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance, has been specially appointed to co-ordinate and control the work. Mr. De Valera has asked for a production of three million tons of turf this season, but informed opinion thinks

it will be very difficult to save and transport that quantity in time for winter use. Unfortunately turf cutting and saving is a very primitive occupation and everything depends on the private owners of bogs, who are mostly small farmers and labourers experienced in this work. They have been asked to double their output, and the certainty of a market for their product may secure the desired result. But although the county councils and workers from the cities are also engaged in an attempt to increase the supply, and the 30,000 men already at work are stated to have cut some 700,000 tons of turf, there are no grounds for optimism in respect of next winter's fuel supply in Eire.

To conserve coal supplies the railway services have been severely curtailed and Sunday services suspended entirely. This step has become necessary so that the transport of the wheat and beet crops may be possible after the harvest, for on these the supply of sugar and bread depends. Eire's wheat requirements ought, for the most part, to be met by the harvest, and it is hoped to import a sufficient supply to cover the deficiency. The first cargo of wheat purchased in America has already reached an Irish port. But the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease has had disastrous effects on Eire's export trade; for instance, the value of live animals exported in March fell by £1,200,000 as compared with the previous year. As imports are also seriously reduced, the net result is not so grave as it might otherwise have been. The disease itself seems to be now under control, and cattle exports have fortunately been resumed. Over £200,000 has been paid in compensation to the owners of slaughtered animals.

Here in Northern Ireland we also have our own troubles, although they are of a different kind. Various problems have naturally arisen out of the air raids. Steps are being taken to improve the A.R.P. and fire-fighting services. Inefficient fire-watching was undoubtedly responsible for much loss of property in Belfast, too many premises, both industrial and private, being left unguarded at the crucial moment. In addition, some of the recent British regulations have received a

cold welcome. Clothes rationing, for instance, was condemned vigorously by the Belfast Chamber of Trade on the ground that the scheme was both inequitable and unworkable. Plans are, however, in hand to erect seven new flax factories, which will help to alleviate unemployment and stimulate the linen export trade. The Government have also decided to set up a drainage commission to carry out a complete arterial drainage survey of Ulster, with a view to increasing the area of cultivated land. Above all, we have fortunately so far no serious anxieties as regards food or fuel.

Northern Ireland,
July 1941.

THE WAR AND INDIAN POLITICS

I. The Spreading Menace

THE continuing spread of the war in an easterly direction has imbued the Indian political controversy with an air of unreality. Recent military operations in Iraq, although on the limited scale necessary to deal with an adventurer who got short shrift, found Indians glancing at the map and seeing for themselves that Iraq is neighbour to a country which, in turn, is neighbour to their own. It is recognised that the Nazi menace is creeping towards regions which are regarded as vital to the defence of India, and it is realised that in these days of swift mobile warfare no country that borders on a zone of Axis influence is safe from attack or infiltration. It is noted that the fall of Greece, particularly of Crete, and the German attempt to support the Iraqi quislings, have brought the threat of war from the Mediterranean seaboard to the northern shores of the Persian Gulf. It is also observed that Russia has been endeavouring to secure a diplomatic foothold in Iraq, and that her historic interest in Iran may presently assume a new and more specific form, in view of the Nazi threat to those Moslem countries which stretch from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.

Indian commentators believe that strategically the British position in the Middle East is strong, and they regard it as having been strengthened by the entry of Imperial forces into Syria. Indian opinion clearly favours the policy that the enemy should be attacked wherever he may be found. This view is also shared by the Government of India, whose prompt and effective action in Iraq offered a pointer to the later occupation of Syria. The authorities were well aware of Rashid Ali's allegiance to Nazism, even before the Indian troops entered Iraq in fulfilment of treaty obligations; and the downfall of

the short-lived quisling régime removed a direct military threat, not only to India, but also to the other units of the British Commonwealth in the eastern hemisphere. British lines of communication now extend from the Indian ports of the Arabian Sea to Mosul, on the borders of Syria, where they are linked with a British defence zone which straddles the Suez Canal and stretches westward to Tobruk in Libya. Egypt has long been regarded as an outer bastion of Indian defence, as Burma and Malaya have been regarded as the defence outposts in the East. All three places are heavily manned to-day, with Indian troops assuming a significant share in their defence. Indeed, the prowess and valorous conduct of Indian troops in North Africa, particularly in contributing to the downfall of overwhelmingly superior Italian forces, have been among the outstanding features of the battle for the Middle East.

Developments in Iraq and Syria suggest that India is likely to play an even more important rôle than hitherto in the events now holding the world stage. Those Indian soldiers who went to Egypt and Malaya in the early days of the war moved in fulfilment of plans for the general defence of the Commonwealth; but the Indian forces in Iraq and Syria may be said to be defending something much nearer home, although they too contribute to the wider scheme of Imperial defence. The conduct of military operations based on Iraq is primarily an Indian responsibility, and India is now more directly concerned in the war than at any earlier stage since September 1939. Preparations for this eventuality were well advanced long before the Iraqi episode was enacted, and General Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India, was able to move with a swiftness which completely disconcerted the Iraqi rebels. In General Auchinleck the country possesses a Commander-in-Chief who has caught the imagination of the people. He has had about 38 years' experience of soldiering in India, and, what is more important, he has personal knowledge of modern totalitarian warfare. He commanded the Allied forces at Narvik, and he was largely responsible for creating the defences of south-western England after the fall

of France. General Auchinleck has associated Indian public opinion with military policy in a manner wholly new to Indian experience; and he has done much in his short time as Commander-in-Chief to lessen the distrust which has long existed between politically minded Indians and the Defence Department.* His policy has greatly improved political relations.

India's preparedness for the new phase of the war derives in no small measure from the deep interest the Viceroy has shown in the progress and likely progress of the war since it began. Lord Linlithgow has long been a shrewd student of military affairs, and domestic political preoccupations have not diverted his attention from his primary task of prosecuting the war. Through his initiative the Eastern Group Supply Council is now a well-established organisation. Its members represent Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and, while the full scope of the Council's activities is not likely to be made known until the war is over, it is already clear that it has done significant work in marshalling war supplies, particularly for those British territories in the East. The country's own war industries are being developed and intensified, and a growing list of military items is now being produced in India; these are supplemented by supplies from British and American sources. The army has been greatly enlarged and is constantly growing; its quality has been proved on many North African battlefields, where the Indian soldier has shown himself to be amongst the most seasoned and experienced of Imperial troops.

II. Political Proposals

THE seriousness of the war situation had a direct bearing on the decision of a group of moderate men to convene a conference for the purpose of making a new approach to the

* This tribute to General Auchinleck's reputation in India was written just before the announcement of the interchange of General Wavell's and General Auchinleck's commands. The Defence Consultative Committee of the Central Legislature, which General Auchinleck planned, was actually inaugurated by General Wavell.—Editor.

constitutional controversy. The conference met in Bombay in March. It reflected the dissatisfaction of moderate men with the policies of the established political parties; and it sought to impress upon His Majesty's Government that new efforts should be made to end the political stalemate, not merely to appease Indian political opinion, but also to enable the country to inject new life into the Indian war effort. Its participants included some of the most prominent men in the political life of the country, notably Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the distinguished Liberal and constitutional lawyer, whose association with the conference gave its proceedings and conclusions a prominence it would not otherwise have enjoyed. For it was recognised that, while those who sponsored the conference were in themselves men of prominence and distinction, they commanded no popular following in the country in the sense that they represented any organised political party. This did not, however, detract from the importance of the Bombay gathering. Its findings obtained a support which cut across all normal party affiliations, securing a general endorsement throughout the country which reflected the common Indian desire to bring an end to controversy. As Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru remarked at the conference, it was with a view to helping in the successful prosecution of the war that they had assembled to take stock of the situation, and to make suggestions as to how that end might be achieved.

The conference emphasised the need for the complete reconstruction of the Viceroy's Executive Council. It claimed that the existing Council was neither adequate nor sufficiently representative to organise and direct India's war effort at this time of grave peril. It held that the country's defences should be placed on a firm basis, and that its resources should be used to the fullest advantage, not only for defending India's domestic frontiers but for helping the British people to the greatest extent possible, consistently with the best interests of India. The conclusion was reached that the Executive Council should consist entirely of non-official Indians, drawn from important elements in the public life of the country. All port-

folios, including the vital ones of Defence and Finance, should be transferred to Indians, although it was admitted that the position of the Commander-in-Chief as the executive head of the defence forces should not be in any way prejudiced. The conference would be content during the period of the war that the reconstructed Centre should remain responsible to the Crown, but should deal with all important matters of policy on the basis of joint and collective responsibility. The reconstructed government should be treated as being on the same footing with the Dominions in regard to all international and inter-Imperial affairs. It was also felt that Indian doubts and misgivings regarding British intentions should be removed by a clear British declaration that India will enjoy the same measure of freedom as Great Britain and the Dominions within a specified time after the end of the war.

The Bombay proposals were generally regarded as an attempt to effect a compromise between the proposals made last year by the British Government and those included in what are known as the Poona proposals of the Congress Party. The British proposals had offered to expand the Viceroy's Executive Council to include representatives of political parties, and to establish a War Advisory Council to associate the Indian States with British India. The Poona proposals asked for the establishment of an Executive Council that would command the confidence of elected elements in the Central Legislature. The Bombay proposals differed from the British proposals in urging the complete Indianisation of the Council, and they differed from the Poona proposals in accepting responsibility to the Crown, instead of responsibility to the Legislature, which is a logical consequence of the Congress demand that the Council should command the confidence of elected elements. Both the Bombay and Poona proposals were complicated by the fact that they impinged on the main constitutional controversy, for they made demands which are difficult to meet in the absence of some form of political agreement between the main parties, who have conflicting ideas regarding the main constitutional settlement. The British

offer sought to secure an interim settlement, pending the reconciling of views between conflicting groups, so that Indian opinion might be more closely associated with the war effort without prejudice to final constitution-making.

III. Political Reactions

THE first and obvious criticism of the Bombay proposals implied that without the co-operation of the Congress Party and the Moslem League it would be difficult to secure a reconstructed government that could claim to represent the people. Indeed, this criticism was made at the conference itself, where one prominent spokesman maintained that the conference should first endeavour to create a new centre party if it hoped to assume responsibility in the administration of the country. The principal proponents of the Bombay conference had themselves recognised the validity of this criticism, and several of them made direct appeals to the leaders of the two main parties to settle their differences; it was known later that Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru had himself approached both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, in the hope of bringing them together, but without success. In view of this criticism it became clear that an underlying intention of the Bombay conference was to secure some advance on the existing position, which had remained static owing to the difficulty of securing collaboration between the Congress Party and the Moslem League. It was held that such advance was possible, and that to obtain it the question of a reconstructed government should not be dependent on the policy of individual party leaders. Supporters of the Bombay proposals contended that if the Moslem League and the Congress Party could not reach agreement the Viceroy's Executive Council should be reconstructed from among those political groups and individuals who were willing to co-operate. It was also felt that no new central party could hope to secure popular support until its representatives had some authority to speak from seats of office.

In the main, the Indian press welcomed the Bombay proposals, chiefly on the ground that they offered a new opportunity for a re-examination of the whole problem. Several prominent Congress newspapers supported them, while disagreeing with the principle of responsibility to the Crown. The *Hindu* of Madras believed that if the British Government accepted the Bombay proposals they would not find the Congress Party unresponsive, but the British would have to give up the policy of insisting on prior agreement between the Congress Party and the Moslem League. The *Tribune* of Lahore held that if the organisers of the conference were in earnest about ending the deadlock they should address themselves principally to the task of creating machinery for bringing the parties together. On the other hand, it was generally admitted in the press that an all-Indian executive was an advance on the existing one, and there was a widespread belief that some settlement was possible along the lines suggested at Bombay. Emphasis was laid on the need for the authorities to give due weight to the value of moderate opinion in spite of its lack of political organisation. Discussing this, the *Leader* of Allahabad asserted that the acceptance of the Bombay proposals would so change the political atmosphere that those elements of public life not associated with the extremists would stand a real chance of getting a hearing from their countrymen and being returned to the Legislatures.

In due course Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was invited to meet the Viceroy, and after the meeting he said that the implications of the Bombay proposals had been thoroughly explored and that the Viceroy's reception of his views had been most friendly and sympathetic. But the considered British attitude to the proposals was not made known until Mr. L. S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, dealt with them in the House of Commons on April 22, when he sought to extend for another year the proclamation under which the Governors of the Provinces can assume the powers of the Provincial Legislatures. Mr. Amery described it as unfortunately evident that the promoters of the Bombay conference had not been

able to secure beforehand for their scheme any kind of agreement, if not between the Congress Party and the Moslem League, at any rate between the League and other representatives of the Hindu majority. He held that if the reconstructed Council was to be composed, not of leaders who between them could secure some measure of political backing, but of men individually eminent but politically unsupported, it would be very difficult to persuade Parliament to confer Dominion or quasi-Dominion powers on a body so constituted; nor would such a body, between its responsibility to the Crown on one side and in face of an unfriendly Legislature on the other, be likely for long to maintain its precarious position. His appeal to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was, therefore, not to cease his efforts in finding a solution, but to concentrate first and foremost on bringing contending elements in India together.

IV. Unresolved Difficulties

INDIAN political circles were disappointed that the Bombay proposals elicited no immediate new response from the British side. A sense of frustration permeated political comment, although the Nationalist press drew some encouragement from the views expressed in the Commons debate by Parliamentarians who knew India at first hand. It was felt that even in Great Britain there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction about the political situation in India, and a leading article in the *Times* suggesting that new men among Indian politicians should be given a chance obtained much prominence. But Nationalist commentators held that no solution was likely unless the British authorities were prepared to regard the Congress Party as the only body promulgating proposals capable of securing a settlement, a view that was not endorsed by Mr. Jinnah, President of the Moslem League. He maintained that the Bombay proposals merely echoed Congress policy, and it is clear that Mr. Jinnah regards all proposals for a settlement from the particular angle of their

effects upon the League objective of separate and sovereign Moslem States.

In this connection the Moslem League has made the establishment of Pakistan a fundamental basis of League policy. At a meeting in Madras the League declared its constitutional goal to be the creation of fully independent Moslem States in the north-western and eastern zones of India. Mr. Jinnah said that these States will not be associated with any all-India government, but will be autonomous and sovereign, exercising full control over defence, foreign affairs, customs, currency, exchange, and communications. This marks an advance on the position previously adopted by the League. Prior to the Madras meeting the League favoured the establishment of separate Moslem and Hindu States, but it accepted the principle of collaboration between the units through some form of central government. This no longer holds. Under Mr. Jinnah's leadership separatism is being carried to extremes, although it cannot be said with conviction that his followers, including many important Moslems, agree with his policy. Indeed, there is something curious about Mr. Jinnah's ability to maintain the homogeneity of the Moslem League in view of the opinions held by many of its outstanding personalities, who obviously disagree with him in his ideas for a constitutional solution. Nevertheless, he continues to possess the confidence of the League, and appears to have full powers to act on its behalf.

The truth is that it is the conflict between the Congress Party and the Moslem League which still lies at the root of the whole controversy. Critics of the Bombay proposals were right when they said that the first task of mediators is to bring the Congress and the League together. The makers of the Bombay proposals recognised this, but spokesmen on their behalf maintain that no agreement can be obtained between Congress and League leaders, and that their proposals were designed to secure an interim settlement, with Congress-League collaboration if possible but without it if necessary. But the Moslem opponents of the Bombay proposals believe

that the scheme advanced by the moderates raises unresolved issues of the constitutional future. In this regard they find themselves in agreement with Mr. Amery, who contended that the Bombay proposals amounted to the supersession of the existing government by a government of an entirely different type. Mr. Jinnah has made it clear that the Moslem League is prepared to collaborate in a government under the existing constitution, granted that the party obtains a substantial measure of power, amounting virtually to equal treatment between the two main communities. Such a demand is inconsistent with Congress faith in democracy, although the Congress leaders have long declared that under the democratic system the Moslem League will obtain its just and justified rights.

The discussion about the Bombay proposals tended to disclose the specific attitudes of the principal parties to the whole constitutional question. The Moslem League opposed the proposals on the ground that they were indirectly based on the principle of majority rule, which the League rejects as a solution. The Congress Party acquiesced in the proposals, although it never officially endorsed them, believing that in action responsibility to the Crown would by convention become responsibility to the Legislature. The Hindu Mahasabha, although also officially uncommitted, appeared to give general favour to the proposals, but might be expected to insist upon special representation for Hindus in any Indianised Executive Council which did not include the Congress Party. The majority of Liberals were strongly in favour of the proposals, although some prominent Liberals had little faith in their power to bring about a settlement. Representatives of other groups attended the meeting at which the proposals were adopted, and may be assumed to have taken an academic interest in them. The real significance of the Bombay meeting lay in the fact that distinguished Indians met to offer their ideas for a solution in the hope that their efforts might contribute to the political pacification of the country.

V. The Next Stage

IT is now generally felt that some further action is likely to be taken by the British authorities.* It is fairly clear that the British Government, preoccupied with the war, is hardly in a position to spare its important political leaders for work involving all the multitudinous considerations that must inevitably arise from a full-fledged investigation of the constitutional question. But it is generally felt that some action should be taken to associate Indian opinion more closely with the prosecution of the war, and talk commonly favours the incorporation of prominent non-party Indians in the Viceroy's Executive Council. It is doubtful if the British authorities can meet the demand for a Council consisting of non-official Indians entirely, in view of the tasks which the war has imposed upon the specialised talent which the Viceroy's Council contains, and more particularly in the absence of agreement between parties.

The suggestion is made that the Viceroy should expand his Council to include such party representatives as are prepared to co-operate, a proposal originally contained in the British offer of August 1940, but one which was not implemented at the time. Even this suggestion, however, is likely to raise questions of communal representation as between Hindus and

* Circumstances of war necessitated the writing and dispatch of this article from India by the end of June. Events have fulfilled the suggestions outlined in the paragraphs that follow. On July 22 the Viceroy announced the enlargement of his Executive Council by the creation of five new portfolios, and the appointment of distinguished Indians to all of them. The immediate result is to transform the European majority of four seats to three on the Council into an Indian majority of eight to four. He also announced, as a means of associating Indian non-official opinion as fully as possible with the prosecution of the war, the establishment of an advisory National Defence Council of about 30 members (all Indians except two), comprising representatives of the Indian States as well as of the Provinces and of other elements in the national life of British India; serving on it are the Prime Ministers of Bengal, the Punjab, Assam and Sind, and representatives of the other Provinces, as well as of the different communities, of commerce, industry and labour, and of women's interests.—Editor.

Moslems. It would therefore appear that the only interim solution possible is for the Viceroy to invite representative Indians to share in the work of his Council, although such a solution will admittedly do nothing to bring about that final constitutional settlement so genuinely desired. Any other suggestion inevitably impinges on the main constitutional issue, which, it is generally agreed, cannot be determined until the war is over. The solution proposed by the British Government for the duration of the war implied the expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and the creation of a War Advisory Council consisting of representatives from British India and the Indian States. There are public men in British India who are prepared for patriotic reasons to collaborate in both Councils, and the Princes have publicly declared their willingness to be associated with a War Advisory Council.

The whole difficulty at present arises from the inability or the unwillingness of party leaders to segregate the interim solution from the long-term solution. The Congress demand for independence and an Executive Council commanding the confidence of the Central Legislature goes far beyond the confines of the existing constitution. The Moslem League is solely concerned in safeguarding its constitutional future, and no interim solution which violates its policy will meantime secure its support. Even the Bombay proposals, in urging what is virtually the immediate establishment of Dominion Status, raise constitutional questions difficult of settlement during the war. Thus a solution which precludes long-term constitutional issues from immediate consideration can only be found on the lines indicated by the British offer of 1940, which might, however, be so liberalised that it will appeal to patriotic Indians to come forward to serve their country at this time of international crisis.

India,
June 1941.

GREAT BRITAIN

I. More Government Changes

IN the last issue of The Round Table this article described as indecisive the few Government changes that were made early in May. At the end of June and in July other changes followed which, although more numerous, were also not final, in that they did not indisputably strengthen the Government or include the appointment of anyone to relieve Mr. Churchill of his responsibilities on the economic front. When Lord Beaverbrook left the Ministry of Aircraft Production in May to become Minister of State and deputy chairman of the Supply Committee of the Cabinet, it was thought that he would eventually assume this function, even though his position and duties were not clearly defined. Considerable surprise was therefore felt when at the end of June he returned to departmental responsibilities as Minister of Supply. The reason for his return was, however, soon apparent. All the Near Eastern campaigns had emphasized once again the success which the Germans achieve by their strong air force and their mechanised divisions. Just as in May 1940 the popular imagination seized, rightly, upon the need for more aeroplanes, with the result that Lord Beaverbrook's appeals to workers in aircraft factories met with a willing response, so now, after the defeats in North Africa, Greece and Crete, it has seized upon the need for tanks. Lord Beaverbrook's appointment as Minister of Supply was, therefore, generally accepted as a means of speeding up the production of tanks in the same way as he speeded up the production of aircraft last summer; indeed, before he left for America, this interpretation had been tacitly admitted by the Government.

Sir Andrew Duncan, whom Lord Beaverbrook replaced, returned to the post of President of the Board of Trade which he

had held from the beginning of 1940 until last September. Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, an able and energetic Minister, under whose Presidency the Board of Trade had undertaken such important and formidable tasks as the concentration of industry and clothes rationing, was sent to Cairo as a member of the War Cabinet and Minister of State. Here he is responsible for all the non-military and non-diplomatic conduct of the Near Eastern War. The commanders of the three Services will retain their direct contacts with their Ministries in London, and no change is contemplated in the functions of the British Ambassador in Cairo. Mr. Lyttelton's principal tasks will be, in Mr. Churchill's words, "to facilitate the conduct of operations by the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East by relieving them . . . of a number of extraneous responsibilities . . . and, secondly, to settle promptly matters within the policy of His Majesty's Government but which involve several home departments or local authorities. . . . The Minister of State will make reference home whenever necessary on important issues of policy; but it is to be hoped that the presence of a War Cabinet Minister with wide discretionary powers will smooth, hasten and concert action in the Middle East between the various authorities in that area."

It is possible that Mr. Lyttelton's unprecedented appointment was linked up with the exchange of commands by General Wavell and General Auchinleck with which it coincided. It was certainly a shock to public opinion when it was announced that General Wavell, the one British general of the war who had captured popular imagination here, was to go to India. No official reason for this transfer was given. The explanation of fatigue was suggested by some people; Mr. Menzies said that a "fresh mind" was needed in the Middle East. Others, especially after it was revealed that Iraq would be included in his new command, suggested that he was sent to prepare the defences of India and the Middle East proper against a possible German drive in that direction as a result of the Russian campaign. In some lectures given a few years ago, which were recently published, General Wavell emphasized that a Commander-in-Chief

should have complete authority, in his command, on all matters incidental to military operations, such as propaganda and supply. One can only guess whether Mr. Lyttelton's appointment is a measure of the War Cabinet's disagreement with General Wavell's thesis.

A few weeks after these changes in high places, another Cabinet shuffle took place. In the interval an important but unsatisfactory debate had taken place on the Ministry of Information and the conduct of propaganda. Unlike the early debates of the war on the same topic, in this one Parliamentary sympathy, which reflected the feelings of the press, was quite clearly on the side of the Ministry. For some time it has been felt that the Ministry is being asked to do an impossible task. It has all the responsibility for issuing news, but none of the power—which is reserved for the Service Departments. The latter have all along, in debatable cases, cast their votes for suppression rather than issue—the suppression of shipping losses is a recent flagrant example—but it is the Ministry of Information which has had to receive the kicks. Moreover, when the Service Ministries do decide to release news, they may follow it up by stupidly optimistic commentaries issued by their own news departments. The Air Ministry is frequently guilty of this offence. It elaborates announcements of air raids on Germany in an extraordinary fashion, describing one of them as an air "invasion" of Germany and another as "wrecking" hundreds of miles of German communications. The British public, which by experience knows quite well the extent of damage that can be inflicted by raids, is slightly contemptuous of such announcements. But they have a danger in that they tend to destroy confidence, both at home and abroad, in the objectivity of British news, hitherto its greatest asset.

What the critics demanded, therefore, was a better co-ordination in the issue of news, with responsibility both for this and for the conduct of propaganda abroad in the hands of one man—preferably a member of the War Cabinet. What the Government gave in reply, after some weeks of cogitation and discussion during which it was reported that the chief officials

of the Ministry had threatened to resign, were a few minor changes in the existing system. Apart from matters involving high policy, power to release news is to rest with special representatives of the Service Departments who will reside in the Ministry of Information. Questions of high policy will be referred immediately to the Service Minister concerned, or to a specially appointed delegate; and the Cabinet undertakes to issue no unnecessary vetoes. The House of Commons was naturally indignant at this attempt to head off its complaints by a few trivial concessions which left the basic situation completely unaltered. Little surprise was felt when Mr. Duff Cooper left the Ministry as a result of the July changes to take up the position of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Hankey vacating that office to become Paymaster-General. Mr. Duff Cooper is visiting the Far East in his new capacity, to examine the present arrangements for consultation and co-ordination between the various authorities, military, political and administrative, in those regions.

The new Minister of Information is Mr. Brendan Bracken. This is his first Government appointment. He has not even served his apprenticeship in a junior post, and at first sight it seems a rash as well as unusual move to appoint a man with no administrative experience to a department which has defeated three Ministers and four Director-Generals. But Mr. Bracken, who has been connected with the newspaper business, has also for many years been closely associated with Mr. Churchill, who appointed him his Parliamentary Private Secretary when he became Prime Minister. Thus it is assumed that Mr. Bracken's new task means that Mr. Churchill is showing more interest in the fortunes of the Ministry. It does not necessarily mean that any change in its status and powers is contemplated for the present, but it is very possible that, if Mr. Bracken finds with the critics that the present system is unworkable, more attention will be given to the complaints than they have received hitherto.

The only other Departmental change on this occasion was at the Board of Education, where Mr. Ramsbotham, who has

taken over the chairmanship of the Assistance Board from Lord Rushcliffe, was succeeded by Mr. R. A. Butler, formerly Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. The Board of Education has too often in recent years been used to house Ministers in transit from one important post to another, or those displaced in a shuffle whom the Prime Minister does not wish to drop altogether. Very rarely has it been considered as an important Ministry in itself, not even when war and evacuation threw the whole educational system out of gear. It is understood however that Mr. Butler, who has been generally regarded as meriting promotion, has gone to the Board of Education because his keen interests are in that sphere, and not at all because it is a convenient office in which to obtain ministerial experience.

The other Government changes were in junior posts. Mr. Butler's place at the Foreign Office was taken by Mr. Richard Law, son of Mr. Bonar Law; he himself was succeeded as Financial Secretary at the War Office by Mr. Churchill's son-in-law, Captain Duncan Sandys, whose chief claim to fame so far is his quarrel in 1938 with Mr. Hore-Belisha, then Secretary of State for War, over the application of the Official Secrets Act to members of Parliament. Sir Hugh Seely, nephew of Lord Mottistone, was appointed an additional Under-Secretary for Air and raised to the peerage as Lord Sherwood; and Mr. Ernest Thurtle, a Labour back-bencher, displaced as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Information Mr. Harold Nicolson, who was instead appointed a Governor of the B.B.C.

II. The Economic Front

MR. CHURCHILL'S decision not to appoint a Minister or Controller of Production was taken in the face of a considerable body of opinion, both in and out of Parliament, to the contrary. When suggestions for a similar appointment had been made in the early days of the war, they did not receive general support; at that time the country was so clearly on only a partial war footing that an Economic Controller might have been superfluous. But in the last

eighteen months the industrial effort has got well under way, and the symptoms of the change-over from civilian to war production are apparent in a labour shortage, demands for higher wages, reports of absenteeism, bottle-necks, competition between the departments and so on.

Unfortunately, when these symptoms and their causes were described by members of all parties in a two-day debate in the House of Commons early in July, Mr. Churchill, in a manner rare indeed for him, showed resentment. In spite of the importance of the debate, no member of the War Cabinet had spoken for the Government, which was represented by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply and the Minister of Aircraft Production, with the result that members felt that their criticisms were not to be given due attention. A few days later, however, the Prime Minister announced that a further day's debate would take place, not because the War Cabinet had realised that its treatment of Parliament had been discourteous, but on account of the unfortunate impression which, he said, the reports of the debate had aroused in the Dominions and the United States.

This attitude of Mr. Churchill's was unusual for a man who has always appeared to hold the Parliamentary tradition in such respect and affection, and surprise was deepened when, in reply to a question whether he intended to make a statement or to initiate a debate, he said he proposed to initiate a debate and "it will then be open to any member to take up the quarrel if he wishes". For a great Parliamentarian to call Parliamentary criticism quarrelling—even in a momentary fit of impatience—not unnaturally aroused astonishment and resentment among members. When eventually he rose to answer the critics, after an interval of three weeks, during which the departments had been told to give the fullest consideration to the points raised, he rejected the suggestion of a Minister of Production—or a similar appointment—for almost the same reasons as Mr. Chamberlain had rejected it in February 1940. Such a man would be a superman, a Napoleon, whose position would rival that of the premiership—if, indeed, such a man could be found.

If he were not such a person, he would be redundant, merely an obstacle between the chiefs of the Supply Departments and himself. Yet, when announcing that this debate would be held, Mr. Churchill had used a revealing phrase—"It was not possible for me, because of the many other things I have to do, to be present in the House except during the closing speeches of that debate"—and it was to relieve him, not to rival him, that the appointment in question had been suggested.

To the more detailed criticisms Mr. Churchill gave an impressive answer of increased and increasing production—the Ministry of Supply output in the last three months had been one-third greater than in the three months of the Dunkirk period, and the total output of warlike stores in the seventh quarter of this war equalled production in the fourteenth and culminating quarter of the last war. He dealt with the effect of Sir John Wardlaw-Milne's statement that the war effort is still only at 75 per cent. of full efficiency in some detail, pointing out that, wrenched from its context, it would deeply disturb public opinion in Australia to be told that Great Britain is only making a three-quarter effort to equip Australian troops, and also that it would be meat and drink to the isolationists in the United States. Finally, he urged that undue pessimism, no less than complacency, should be avoided, but that "our own vital and commanding responsibilities remain undiminished; and we shall discharge them only by continuing to pour out in the common cause the utmost endeavours of our strength and virtue and, if need be, to proffer the last drop of our heart's blood".

By his speech Mr. Churchill dispelled most of the previous resentment, even if not all the criticisms and fears. As one member said, if a speech of that calibre had been made in the original debate, the cry of stinking fish, to which the Prime Minister referred, would not have gone round the world. Nevertheless, although the very real achievements of Mr. Churchill's Government are not called in question—as, indeed, they never have been by responsible critics—the feeling remains that more is needed and more can still be done.

One of the words that in recent months has cropped up over and over again in any discussion of the economic front is absenteeism. In its examination of this and kindred problems in the aircraft industry the Select Committee on National Expenditure, whose objective reports on virtually every aspect of the war effort have been the basis of most constructive criticism almost since the war began, found that thousands of man-hours are lost every week from this cause. In some cases there was slackness on the part of workers, but in the majority of cases they were quite simply tired. A seven-day week had been in operation for more than a year, and Sunday work is paid for at high overtime rates. Very naturally, therefore, workers who are tired take a day off during the week and make up their earnings on Sunday. The remedy is as obvious as the cause. The labour force in each war industry—the aircraft industry is not the only one where absenteeism is found—must be big enough to ensure that a seven-day week and a 24-hour day can still be maintained, although each individual worker works a normal week only. Moreover, transport facilities to and from work must be improved, and hostels, canteens and other welfare arrangements perfected.

Thus the remedy is in the Government's own hands and particularly in those of Mr. Bevin, who both in and out of Parliament has declared that he is nauseated by the charges of absenteeism. But the transfer of labour to war industries must not be allowed by him to lag. Registration of men and women for war work is proceeding, and about half the women that have registered have been or will be interviewed by Ministry of Labour officials, who tell them whether their present occupations are considered essential or not. Some have been warned that if they do not enter nationally important work, such as the women's branches of the Services, within a certain time, they will be required to work in a munitions factory. Also, the concentration of civilian industry has so far released about 110,000 workers for war work. But though they are released, the Ministry of Labour is still slow

to transfer them, when necessary, away from their homes to war industries; and, so far as the interviewing of women is concerned, the official interpretation of essential work is so wide that too many feel themselves relieved of the necessity of volunteering for real war work.

Complaints are not only directed at absenteeism, whether culpable or not. It is contended on the part of the workers that they are frequently forced to be idle owing to the inefficiency of managements. Here again, though doubtless there is some inefficiency just as there is some slackness on the part of labour, a wrong diagnosis is drawn from the symptom. Labour is idle in some factories and overworked in others because of unevenness in the flow of materials. Shipping losses and transport delays are bound to cause dislocation in the organisation of output, yet employers are naturally disinclined to turn away men for whom they have no immediate work but who would be difficult to replace if there should be a chance of increased production. Managements, no less than labour, are dependent upon the Government's policy.

An example of what results from defective planning at the centre is provided by the coal shortage. Of all the raw materials needed for Britain's war effort, coal is the only one which can be, or should be, supplied in abundant quantities from domestic production. But after the fall of France, whose requirements were to have been met by British production, many pits were closed, with the result that the miners sought remunerative work elsewhere—chiefly in munition factories. It is officially stated that 75,000 men have left the industry in the past year. The Secretary for Mines announced on May 28 that the output of coal, in a country which before the war exported millions of tons, was no longer sufficient to meet prospective internal needs. At that late stage, when there was a danger not only of public services being held up and supplies to domestic consumers being drastically curtailed, but of war factories being forced to slow down, the Essential Work Order, which forbids employers to dismiss workers, and workers to leave, except with the consent of the Ministry of

Labour, was applied to the coal mining industry. All exminers have been required to register, and a guaranteed weekly wage, with a bonus of 1*s*. per shift conditional upon regular attendance, has been granted. But it is very doubtful whether the situation has been tackled soon enough to build up stocks to an adequate level before winter brings increased consumption, air raids and transport difficulties.

Unfortunately, moreover, this inducement to the miners to return to the pits is being partly met by an increase in the industrial price of coal. This is directly contrary to Sir Kingsley Wood's promise in his Budget speech that key prices would be stabilised by subsidy in order to help in keeping wages stable. Nor has the Government been able to fulfil its promise by producing a comprehensive plan to control wages and prices. In July a White Paper on Price Stabilisation and Industrial Policy was issued, stating the dangers of inflation in the clearest terms and exhorting workers and employers in their own interests to help in maintaining prices and wages at a reasonable level. But it did not go beyond exhortation, and the Trades Union Congress immediately gave notice of its attitude on wage policy by declaring that "any attempt to control movements for increases of wages is impracticable and undesirable".

It is quite true that something has been done to restrict spending by the extension of rationing. There has been no new food rationing—with the exception of eggs—since the restrictions described in the last number of THE ROUND TABLE, but in June clothes rationing came into force. No person is allowed to spend more than 66 coupons on clothes in the year ending May 31 next. Each rationed garment—some, such as protective clothing for workpeople, are exempt—has been allotted a certain number of coupons, with no account being taken of price; the same number of coupons is required for a 2-guinea coat as for one costing 20 guineas. In view of the demands on laundering and repairing services which the scheme will entail, a new Goods and Services (Price Control) Act was passed, giving the Board of Trade power to fix maximum

prices for all such services as well as for clothing, including second-hand clothing, itself. But the principle that rationing one section of consumption goods only leads to a scramble for those that are unrationed, and that controlling one set of prices causes a run on goods that are uncontrolled, has not yet been officially grasped—or at least it is being officially ignored.

The Battle of the Atlantic is not yet so decisively won as to warrant anything but a stringent rationing policy. From 310,000 gross tons in January this year, total shipping losses (British, Allied and neutral) rose to 516,000 tons in March and 589,000 in April, before falling to 498,000 tons in May and to 329,000 in June. The April and May figures include losses during the evacuations from Greece and Crete. In the summer the shipping position in the Atlantic has shown a definite improvement but, in spite of the drop in June, total losses in the year from July 1940 to June 1941 were almost 5 million gross tons, which is twice as much as the present estimated annual replacement capacity of merchant vessels by British and American yards and about 1½ million tons more than the output of the two countries forecast for 1942. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when the Admiralty announced that on grounds of keeping the enemy in ignorance the June figures would be the last regular statement, almost everyone jumped to the conclusion that the real object was to conceal the results of bad months and only to give out the figures when they were favourable.

III. The Home Front

BRAKES on full production at the present time are particularly regrettable, because the lull in air raids during June and July should have enabled the industrial war machine to go all out. On the home front, the opportunity provided by the lull has been taken to examine the weak spots of civil defence, and certain remedies have been applied. During the winter and spring raids the most obvious weakness was the lack of co-ordination in fire-fighting arrangements, owing chiefly to the fact that each fire brigade was a local autonomous unit,

locally staffed and locally paid. In May an enabling Bill was passed, centralising the fire services under the control of the Minister of Home Security, and decentralising their administration on a regional basis. The 1,400 separate fire brigades are, together with the Auxiliary Fire Service, being grouped into 40 or 50 large brigades. Local authorities will now only bear 75 per cent. of the peace-time cost of their fire service; the remainder, together with the whole of the cost of the A.F.S., which was formerly shared between central and local authorities, is being borne by the State. Fire-watching has also been tightened up. In August, by extending the Civil Defence Duties (Compulsory Enrolment) Order to all places where the Fire Prevention (Business Premises) Order is in force—that is, all industrial districts and most large towns—the Minister has made fire-watching either at home or at work, for a maximum of 48 hours a month, compulsory on all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 living in these districts. Moreover, provision is being made for proper training of the Fire Guard, as fire-watching parties are henceforward to be called.

Other weaknesses disclosed by the winter and spring raids have prompted suggestions for a Ministry of Civil Defence, to take over all the civil defence functions at present shared among several departments. The supporters of this proposal have on their side the authority of the Select Committee on National Expenditure, which in its report on the A.R.P. services recommended further consideration of the possibility, and in any case greater delegation of authority to the Regional Commissioners. Hitherto the Regional Commissioner has been, generally speaking, only responsible directly for Ministry of Home Security matters; the Ministry of Health and other departments have their own regional staffs. The functions of the Regional Commissioner have, it is true, nominally included the co-ordination of the activities of all departments concerned with civil defence, and the Ministry of Health has delegated to him the responsibility for administering shelter welfare, first-aid posts and ambulance services; but the regional officers

of these other Ministries remain actually responsible to their own overlords.

In a debate on the administration of civil defence the Government rejected the proposal for a single Ministry, and also the further recommendation that the administrative unit should be the region rather than the local authority. Nevertheless, regionalism has been gaining ground. The Regional Commissioners are now to have two Deputy Commissioners, one primarily concerned with reorganisation and reconstruction after a raid, and the other with the new fire services—including the fire prevention arrangements made by householders, occupiers of business premises and owners of factories. Experience alone can show whether the civil defence machinery has even now been adequately strengthened; nevertheless, a resumption of heavy raiding will not find central, regional and local authorities so unevenly prepared as they were in September 1939.

Of purely civil measures in the last three months, the most important has been the extension of compulsory health and pensions insurance and workmen's compensation to persons with incomes up to £420 a year, instead of the present £250 and £350 respectively. This Bill is only an interim one; it does not really rectify the existing anomalies in sickness insurance, chief of which is the absence of any dependants' allowances. In the meantime, the Government has established a committee under Sir William Beveridge to enquire into the whole of Britain's social services, which will include a review of the measures necessary to complete a basic minimum of social security. Family allowances are obviously such a measure, and recommendations to the Government to introduce them have considerable support. But though the Government has not finally rejected the proposal, the trade unions are still opposed to it, for the old reason that their bargaining power on wages might thereby be adversely affected.

Also in the non-war sphere comes the Government's statement on colonial policy.* Little had been done in the year

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 119, June 1940, p. 652.

since the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed because it was not felt that the sort of schemes envisaged would be practicable in war-time. Only in the West Indies, where conditions were admitted to be least satisfactory, was some progress made. In July, however, Lord Moyne announced that colonial development would go forward as far as possible. The colonies are asked to submit schemes for development and welfare which, provided they do not involve imported materials and staff, will be financed out of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. Education, soil erosion, the switch-over of native agriculture from purely export crops to mixed farming, the provision of hospitals and other medical services, all of these are now within the scope of the Fund, and all are urgent problems. If schemes for solving them are actually put into effect, Great Britain will have the satisfaction of knowing that even in the middle of a great war the welfare of the dependent peoples was not forgotten.

Great Britain,
August 1941.

CANADA

I. War-time Administration

THE distinguishing mark of Canadian endeavour in this war, as compared with that other twenty-five years ago, is of course the enormously increased stress upon economic activity, together with the far greater complexity of the demands made upon the Dominion's civilian organisation. The relatively simple supplies which Canada contributed in the last war, such as foodstuffs, other raw materials and certain of the less elaborate forms of munitions, have been replaced in the present struggle by a multitude of divergent, intricate, and highly specialised products which Canada was at the outset ill-equipped to manufacture. The industry of the Dominion, therefore, has had to be geared up to meet this unprecedented and far-reaching demand, while in order to make this effective the whole Canadian economy has at the same time been adjusted and realigned to meet the altered conditions. The leadership in bringing about these comprehensive changes has necessarily been furnished by the Dominion Government, and the oversight of these new functions has inevitably involved an enormous expansion in the administrative machinery at Ottawa.

The Cabinet itself has met the increased demands made upon it without serious embarrassment. Two new portfolios, Munitions and Supply and National War Services, have been created, and the Department of National Defence has been enlarged into three main divisions, army, navy and air, each with a Minister at its head. Politically, the adaptability of the Cabinet has not been so evident. There has been a persistent demand in some quarters that the purely Liberal Ministry should be recast so as to include representatives from all political parties, and the Prime Minister has made occasional tentative advances in this direction. But the Parliamentary weakness of the other parties, their lack of outstanding men of

genuine administrative capacity, the constant Liberal civil war between the Prime Ministers of Canada and of Ontario, the absence of any overmastering enthusiasm for Mr. Mackenzie King as a national leader—these have combined to discourage any cabinet reconstruction on a large scale. There is, moreover, a general feeling throughout the Dominion that while the Cabinet may lack brilliance it does contain men of real ability, and that no other grouping is likely to add materially to what has been and continues to be a very substantial achievement.

The Canadian Cabinet has, moreover, shown a fair amount of administrative adaptability. It was quick to recognise that almost a score of members is in war-time too ponderous a body to discharge its functions adequately, and it therefore entrusted the general oversight of the war to a smaller group. This so-called War Committee is composed of ten Ministers, and while many of its decisions (particularly those of a formal nature) must be approved by the whole Cabinet, the presence of all the leading Ministers on the Committee makes such approval little more than routine. This body bears no likeness to Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet of 1916–19; it is much larger, and the great bulk of its members have departmental duties to perform. Mr. Mackenzie King, like Mr. Churchill, believes in retaining intact the close association between planning and practical administration, and thus the conception of a select cabinet of contemplation has never gained much headway at Ottawa. The Canadian War Committee has, however, followed Mr. Lloyd George's example in appointing a Secretary, who arranges agenda, keeps minutes, informs Ministers of decisions taken, and generally systematises the business and accelerates its despatch. The Cabinet as a whole, although committed to the same idea by Order in Council, has not yet availed itself of this more businesslike procedure, a significant sign, no doubt, of the extent to which the War Committee has displaced its parent. One notable advance in the transaction of Cabinet business has, however, been made by the practice of consigning routine Orders in Council to a group of Ministers for pre-

liminary consideration. Inasmuch as the great bulk of the Orders come under this category, they can be subsequently approved *en bloc* (unless a Minister chooses to raise a question) without consuming the time of the entire Cabinet.

Another labour-saving experiment was the creation, under the War Committee, of ten Cabinet sub-committees dealing with various topics such as internal security, wheat, fuel and power, legislation, public information, &c. While a few of these, such as the wheat sub-committee, have been moderately useful, the majority have tended to withdraw more and more into the background. Some have had little to do from the beginning. The one on public information had its work later taken over by the new Department of National War Services; others have had their functions absorbed by various boards or other agencies better adapted for the purpose. A much more successful device has been the establishment of a body of leading civil servants, known as the Advisory Committee on Economic Policy, which works in close co-operation with and under the direction of the War Committee of the Cabinet. The Advisory Committee acts primarily as a clearing house and an investigating body. It collects information and makes proposals; and while it does little of an administrative nature itself, it endeavours to produce ideas and formulate plans for other bodies to carry out. The genuine need for this kind of work, and the imagination and knowledge which the members have been able to contribute, have resulted in making the Committee one of the most useful and creative bodies in the Dominion Government.

The greatest expansion of government activity, outside the armed forces themselves, has occurred in Munitions and Supply, the department especially charged with war production. The growth here has been prodigious, for the Department, once launched upon its building programme, has not only steadily expanded what might be called its legitimate field, but has also by force of circumstances been compelled to branch out or to compel other departments to branch out into almost every sphere of economic activity. The necessity of

making financial arrangements with Great Britain, of arranging purchases from the United States, and of protecting Canadian exchange generally, has led for example to the establishment of the Foreign Exchange Control Board which, working in intimate co-operation with the Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance, supervises all monetary transactions with other countries. The expansion of production has also made unparalleled demands on the labour market, leading in turn to the establishment of training schools for the provision of skilled workmen, to special restrictions regarding strikes and lock-outs, and to the institution of such bodies as the National Labour Supply Council and the Labour Co-ordination Committee, which are primarily designed to improve the relations between labour and capital and to apportion the supply of labour more effectively on a national scale. The growing scarcity of essential raw materials and necessities of life has resulted in many of these being placed under special controls applying regulations which are constantly tending to become more and more restrictive. In short, the work of the Department of Munitions and Supply has been so broad and so far-reaching that virtually every person and every economic activity in Canada have been affected in some way by its action.

One unusual device employed by that Department to do a part of its work calls for special mention, namely, the so-called government corporation. This kind of organisation was used in mammoth shape in the United States during the last war, and is being even more extensively applied in that country at the present time. The government corporation is simply a quasi-departmental agency cast in corporation form. The stock of the company is held by the Dominion Government, and the latter appoints the president and board of directors, who are held responsible to the Minister of Munitions and Supply. The Government audits the books, and the operations of the company are subject to Treasury control. The president and directors are, however, virtual masters in their own house, and are expected to use their powers with almost complete freedom; indeed, one great purpose of the scheme is to enable the

officers to operate without the usual trammels of departmental regulations and procedure.

There are at present no less than eleven of these corporations in Canada. They may make war equipment of a very special kind, or buy and maintain large stocks of rubber for the national needs, or supervise the construction of airplanes, or deal with the housing of war factory workers, or be concerned, as several are, with matters so secret that virtually nothing about them has yet been made public. It is difficult at this stage to judge of the success of the corporations, for the Government has kept most of their operations obscured in mystery; but the creation in recent months of two new ones would certainly indicate that the Department still has confidence in them. On the surface at least (and few people have been allowed to see more) they seem to possess little merit save, perhaps, as temporary expedients. The secrecy which accompanies much of their activity is assuredly no virtue, and indeed it becomes a danger when it is combined with an almost complete absence of ministerial control. The freedom given to each management may permit the industrialist to be somewhat happier in his work, but similar results are obtainable under adequate departmental devolution which could make allowances for emergency conditions. The speedy parcelling out of awkward problems which the corporation has rendered possible gave, it is true, temporary relief to the Minister of Munitions and Supply; but the loud complaints about one of the corporations, Federal Aircraft Limited, illustrate the futility of trying to escape problems permanently by burying them. It is evident that an alert, well-managed corporation will probably give most satisfactory results, but there seems to be little assurance that the lethargic or inefficient one will be brought to task by the Minister with anything like the same promptness that obtains under more orthodox organisation.

One of the earliest agencies to be set up at Ottawa was the War-time Prices and Trade Board, created on September 3, 1939. It is supposed "to provide safeguards under war conditions against any undue enhancement in the prices of food,

fuel and other necessaries of life, and to ensure an adequate supply and equitable distribution of such commodities". Its five members are all senior civil servants whose departmental activity has been in fields somewhat related to the work of the Board, and they are assisted by a secretary and an economic adviser who are university economists with experience in government administration. The powers of the Board are comprehensive: it may investigate and demand any information from the manufacturers or dealers concerned; it may itself buy or sell any of the necessaries of life or it may decide the amount of such commodities which any person may hold; it may fix prices and control imports and exports—the more sweeping of these powers requiring the approval of the Governor in Council.

The Board exercises much of its control through Administrators who have been appointed to supervise special fields. These are now six in number—wool, sugar, hides and leather, coal, rents and oils (animal, fish and vegetable). The Administrators are not experts in regard to their respective commodities, but each has the assistance of a Technical Adviser to furnish special information. This emphasis on non-technical administration has been a deliberate policy of the Board, which has tried to obtain thereby—not without success—an unbiased judgment, a freedom from trade particularism and favouritism, and a fresh approach to administrative problems. The Administrators work under the general direction of the Board and are responsible to it, the Board being in turn responsible to the Minister of Labour.

The Board and the Administrators have done valuable work in ensuring adequate supplies and in regulating the prices of the essential commodities under their jurisdiction. An early wool scarcity, for example, was overcome by a number of emergency regulations, and the price is now kept at a reasonable level by arranging for adequate quantities and co-ordinating all purchases through the Wool Administrator, who also allocates certain special kinds of wool, which are comparatively scarce, among the different manufacturers. The Sugar Ad-

ministrator, by taking prompt measures at the outbreak of the war, was able to overcome a buying panic; he is now the sole importer of sugar into Canada. The Coal Administrator, by a system of licensing for all producers, importers and distributors, combined with regular reports from dealers, keeps a constant watch on supplies, and has exercised a further salutary effect on prices by helping to bring about wage agreements in some of the mines and maintaining competitive conditions among the retailers.

Generally speaking the Board has endeavoured, in most instances with gratifying results, to control prices indirectly through organising supply, rather than to maintain supply by means of price manipulation. The latter policy, however, has occasionally been used if circumstances suggested its advisability; for example, a shortage of cod-liver oil was overcome by deliberately allowing the price paid for cod livers to soar in order to induce the fishermen to conserve the supply. A further function of the Board has been the investigation of complaints regarding such abuses as hoarding and unfair prices, and these enquiries, together with the actual and threatened use of its great powers, have doubtless had a wholesome influence in eliminating many undesirable practices.

The War-time Prices and Trade Board was called into being as a guardian of the consumers' interests. It does not, however, by any means monopolise the field, for various other bodies, such as the Bacon Board, the Dairy Products Board, the Apple Board, the Canned Lobster Control and the Wheat Board (to say nothing of the British Ministry of Food and certain provincial authorities) also have a substantial share in influencing prices and in marketing and regulating supplies.

A somewhat different though allied purpose—that of securing vital war materials for the Government in its capacity as a producer—has been entrusted to another group, the members of the War-time Industries Control Board. Eight comprehensive services and commodities have each been placed under officials known as Controllers—timber, steel, machine tools and machinery, power and electrical equipment, metals

other than iron and steel, oil, ship construction and repairs, and motor vehicles. These Controllers, who are responsible to the Minister of Munitions and Supply, are expected to assist the Department (in the words of the Minister himself):

> to examine into, organise, mobilise and conserve the resources of Canada contributory to munitions of war, and the sources of their supply; to explore, estimate and provide for the fulfilment of the needs, present and prospective, of the Government and community in respect thereto; and to take steps to mobilise, conserve and co-ordinate all economic and industrial facilities in respect of munitions of war and supplies and defence projects.

To this end each Controller has been given very extensive powers within his field: he may investigate premises and records; he may buy, sell, and store the commodities under his jurisdiction; he may take possession of the means of production, storage and transport of those commodities; he may fix prices and issue licences for doing business. The Controllers together compose the War-time Industries Control Board; but the work of the members in their collective capacity has been slight and has been completely overshadowed by the separate activities of its members.

The Controllers present an interesting contrast in at least two respects to the Administrators who operate under the War-time Prices and Trade Board. The Administrators do not themselves compose the supervisory Board but carry out the general policies which it determines, although there can be no doubt but that they do to a material degree aid in the formulation of those policies. The War-time Industries Control Board, on the other hand, is simply the Controllers sitting together as a body, and its function is primarily co-ordination rather than direction. The second difference lies in the background of the men themselves. The Administrators, as previously stated, have no technical training for their work, but the Controllers have in many instances been chosen from the particular industry which they are supposed to direct. The advantage of the latter policy is obviously the intimate and specialised knowledge which the Controller can bring to his task; but this

benefit may well be more than offset by other factors. The possible conflict between the interests of the Government and those of the particular trade, the narrowness of view which usually accompanies a lifetime devoted to one occupation, the danger of jealousy and favouritism as between different companies within the industry which is being made subject to the control—these are fundamental difficulties implicit in a situation which places a person, trained in a special field, in what is virtually complete charge of that field.

The war-time administration at Ottawa presents two other interesting features worthy of comment: the use which has been made of business men, and the part played by the upper group of civil servants. The phenomenal expansion of many branches, particularly in the Department of Munitions and Supply, has naturally led to an enormous demand for men which the peace-time organisation was quite unable to satisfy. In many instances the obvious and, indeed, the only place to obtain the necessary personnel was the business world, and a large number of "dollar-a-year" men and others were brought to the capital and given positions of varying importance. The results have been on the whole satisfactory; but they have not been without their instructive and even amusing side, for many of those who took part in this invasion confidently expected to transform government administration by the sweeping introduction of superior business methods. These latter hopes and the certainty which accompanied them have gradually been dissipated, although a number of Canadian newspapers still write in glowing terms of what a "business administration" could do in certain circumstances. In Ottawa, however, the "captain of industry" is learning that the catch-as-catch-can methods of private enterprise are not entirely applicable to a government service. He has begun to appreciate, albeit dimly, that something can be said in favour of red tape and formal procedures; he is reaching the point where he will admit reluctantly that the circuitous approach may on occasion prove in a democracy to be the most direct. At the same time there can be no doubt that the impact of the business hustlers has had

its beneficial effect in arousing and stimulating the deliberate and more phlegmatic temperament of the permanent staff.

The strain of war-time administration has also revealed in most gratifying fashion the excellent quality of the Canadian civil servants, particularly of those in the upper classifications. The last war made comparatively modest demands on the permanent officials, and it is safe to assert that had the latter been asked to assume the tremendous burdens carried by the present staff they would have been quite unable to bear the load. Reform in the service was not generally established until 1918, and the country is only recently beginning to reap the benefit of the steady infiltration of ability which has been taking place for over twenty years. There is now in Ottawa a pool of live-minded, adaptable, well-trained officials who can be called upon for any emergency work and can be relied upon to do a thoroughly competent job. When the administrative history of the Canadian war effort is finally reviewed, the people of the Dominion will appreciate, as few have yet appreciated, the great debt they owe to the integrity and intelligence of the permanent civil service.

II. Economic Effects of War

THE outbreak of war found the economic position of Canada much improved over that of the worst point of the depression but still far from "full employment"—however defined. The general level of economic activity was lower than in the peak recovery year of 1937, but the national income* was the highest since pre-depression years. Unemployment in 1939, according to the official figures, stood at 332,000, or 12 per cent. of the working force; this contrasts with 245,000 (or 9 per cent.) in 1937. In the opinion of some, the official figures are far too low and do not indicate

* The Bank of Nova Scotia estimates the national income thus:

1935	$3,464,000,000	1939	$4,376,000,000
1936	$3,759,000,000	1940	$4,950,000,000
1937	$4,162,000,000	1941	$5,350,000,000
1938	$4,132,000,000		

the true situation. In the first place, they do not allow for the drift of wage-earners back to agriculture; some unemployed workers became subsistence farmers, fully employed but at a very low return. Secondly, the calculations based on the total working force do not allow for the new would-be workers who had reached the age for entering industry but for whom there was no place. In many cases these youths simply stayed at home as dependants, or on the farm where they could be employed but at virtually no return. For these and other reasons, it is argued that the unemployed working force in Canada must have been at least 700,000 at the outbreak of war.

The amount of idle industrial capacity is even more difficult to assess, but there was definite unemployment of this character in 1939, although it varied greatly from field to field. Shipyards were practically idle at the beginning of the war, the iron and steel industry was not more than half employed, and there was also idle capacity in the construction industry, the automotive industry and elsewhere. On the other hand, power sources were fairly well utilised, while the mining field was exceedingly active. Agriculture had improved, particularly in the cattle and dairy sections, but the grain-growing areas were still depressed. In Saskatchewan, drought and low wheat prices contributed to a situation which was decidedly bad.

The almost full recovery in exports which had occurred by 1937 did not have the anticipated stimulating effects on Canadian economy. This was mainly because there had been a substantial shift in the composition of these exports, particularly from agricultural to mining products. The value of agricultural produce exported was less than half of the 1928 level, while that of mining and similar enterprises had increased in about the same proportion. Thus, while the volume of exports recovered, it did not correct the maladjustment in the wheat-growing areas, and it failed to bring a proportionate revival of imports, particularly of capital goods. This was how it came about that Canada entered the war with many of her economic resources and men unemployed, and with an

acute problem of agricultural relief in the wheat-growing districts.

It was not until late in 1939 and early in 1940 that the extent of the economic demands to be made upon Canada began to emerge, and there was little difficulty in the first nine months of the war about meeting these calls. Certain military goods and machines were of course scarce, but most requirements were for foods and raw materials. After the Norwegian campaign, the change in the British Government and the fall of France, the situation was transformed. Not only did the nature of the demand for Canadian products alter, but a very great expansion was planned for Canadian industry.

Although some of the slack in manufacturing capacity was utilised for producing a variety of commodities and supplies for military purposes, Canadian industrial equipment with some exceptions was not of a character which in general could be turned to account for armaments and explosives. Accordingly the programme envisaged in the spring of 1940 required that new plants should be constructed and new machinery obtained and installed. The plants could mostly be planned to use domestic resources, but the equipment had to be obtained elsewhere, in the main from the United States.

From almost the beginning of this expansion, it was the policy of the Government to own all new plant and equipment of a specifically war-time character. Some of the latter was leased to private manufacturers and used on their premises, but accounting systems were devised to keep it segregated. In the few cases where private enterprise purchased the equipment, special arrangements were made for the amortisation of it and for dealing with problems of corporate taxation. The Government has in fact directly financed at least nine-tenths of the war-time expansion of plant and equipment. Some was for the Canadian Government, some for the British Government, and a good part on joint account. Most of the new plants arranged for under this programme are just now beginning to come into production, and it will probably be the end of the year before any sizable volume of output will

accrue. They cover such a range as aircraft, machine-guns, explosives, artillery, bombs, mines and tanks, all products which were practically never manufactured in Canada before.

One of the main problems which faced the Government was that of a labour policy under war conditions. In 1939 there were about 2,400,000 persons in employment other than agriculture; between that time and the spring of 1941 the figure increased by over 350,000. During the first twenty months of the war the Canadian index of employment in all industries rose by nearly 18 per cent., though this of course shows great variation when broken down into the component groups. Increases in wages and earnings have been much more general in war industries than elsewhere. There was little evidence in the early months of the war of a consistent labour policy, but by the beginning of 1941 the Dominion Government had adopted a programme of training labour for war industries. Quite naturally the first bottle-necks in labour supply showed up in those industries which require skilled and semi-skilled workmen. The shortage of skilled labour is due, of course, partly to reduced training during the depression, partly to the increase in the demand from war industries, and partly to the need for skilled tradesmen in the army.

The general policy recently formulated by the Government is that of freezing wages at the highest level which existed between 1926 and December 1940. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of greater earnings, because the Government has included a plan of flat-rate bonuses based on increases in the cost of living. For example, for each one per cent. increase in the cost of living index a flat bonus of 25 cents per week may be added to the wage. The lower wage groups gain relatively, because in their case the flat-rate addition means a greater proportionate increase. The object of the policy is, of course, to avoid a spiral inflation through wages, but it may be queried if it will be successful unless the enforcement machinery is particularly effective.

Although there have been a number of industrial disputes,

strikes have not been widespread. This is doubtless due in part to the reluctance of labour to resort to drastic action under war conditions, but in the main to the use of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. Under ordinary conditions, this Act applies only in certain industries when the employers and employees ask for an *ad hoc* Board of Conciliation. The report of the Board was not enforceable, but carried considerable weight. The Government has extended the use of the Act so that now a strike is illegal in any industry engaged in the production of war supplies of any kind until a Board of Conciliation has made a report; and, generally, labour has found the procedure very satisfactory. Recently the Department of Labour has announced the appointment of a standing conciliation body which will endeavour to iron out disputes even before a formal board is set up.

The necessary goods and services for the Canadian armed forces and war effort must come from five main sources: additional production, reduced personal consumption, reduced investment in new capital, depletion of existing capital and foreign borrowings. Up to the present, foreign borrowings have been *nil* because there is in effect no place to borrow. This does not mean that outside sources of supply are not important. The United States has been a tremendous factor in the Canadian industrial expansion, for the reason that Canadian industry is technologically an offshoot of American, and the demand for additional equipment is passed on to the American economy. Consequently, when added industrial expansion was required in Canada, most of the machine tools, machines and equipment were obtained in the United States.

The depletion of existing capital is a slow source of goods and services, and has not yet contributed much to the Canadian war effort. It is capable of doing something. Reduced investment in new capital goods has happened in some places, and there have been few, if any, corporate securities offered for public sale. But at the same time private investment has been going on in some directions, and it is doubtful if any net benefit has come from this source as yet. However, early in

1941 all commercial and industrial expansion was made subject to government licence, and there will be a greater effort to see that no capital is put to non-essential uses.

So far the main source of new production has been from idle resources. Shipbuilding facilities are fully engaged; the steel industry is fully employed and expanding its capacity. The army, navy and air force have enlisted about 300,000 men. Now that the Dominion's economy is approaching somewhere near full employment, further war expansion can no longer be met in that manner with its beneficent effects. Over a period of time, reduction in consumption should be the main source of fresh power. Little has come from here as yet. Consumption has increased since the war started and still appears to be doing so. Retail sales generally are still expanding and are well above last year's figures, though automobile sales showed a recession for May. Reduction in consumption over a much wider field is essential before long.

The broad implications of the economic impact of the war can be judged from the scope and nature of the Government's fiscal and financial measures. Before the war it was estimated that government—federal, provincial and municipal—spent 25 to 30 per cent. of the whole national income. This included expenditures, heavy at times, for urban and agricultural relief. In the first two years of the war it is estimated that government will have spent at least 40 per cent. of the national income. Actual war expenditure is probably greater than the apparent difference in the two periods because of the reduction in certain classes of non-war expenditures. The Canadian National Railways deficit, unemployment relief and agricultural relief, as well as lessened provincial and municipal expenditures, account for most of this, although the increase in wheat expenditure reduces the net gain.

The federal budget presented in February 1941 for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1942, provided for a maximum war expenditure (including the Empire Air Training Plan) of $1,450,000,000 and a non-war expenditure of $470,000,000 —a total of $1,920,000,000. If the provincial and municipal

expenditure of (say) $550,000,000 is added, then all governments will spend nearly $2,500,000,000, which is probably between 45 and 50 per cent. of the national income. This, however, is not the whole picture, for the Canadian Government must in addition provide large credits for British purchases in Canada, though some portion of these will of course be covered by imports and some by the repatriation of Canadian securities. Although it is clearly the intended policy of the Government to relate the increased war taxation to the increase in the national income, and discussion of the matter has taken place on this basis, it is sometimes forgotten that the national income is an aggregate and that aggregates hide much that is relevant. It may be questioned if the increases in the national income have increased taxable capacity to a proportionate extent.

Since the outbreak of war, taxes have been raised on tobacco, malt, carbonic acid (for soft drinks), cosmetics, sugar, automobiles and similar commodities, and a war exchange tax of 10 per cent. has been placed on imports. The personal income tax has been raised three times, so that it is now quite severe on the intermediate incomes ($2,000–$10,000). In addition, a national defence tax of 5 per cent. has been imposed on single people with incomes between $660 and $1,200, and of 7 per cent. on incomes over $1,200; on married persons with incomes over $1,200 the tax is 5 per cent. The corporate income tax was increased to 18 per cent., and an excess profits tax imposed so that 75 per cent. of profits over the base (prewar) years is taken. As a flat minimum of 22 per cent., excess or no excess, is enforced, the corporation income tax really operates at 40 per cent., with the excess tax in addition to that. The Dominion has also invaded the succession duty field with a moderate levy superimposed on the existing provincial duties. New taxes have been placed on amusements, and a duty of 3 cents per gallon on gasoline, both previously provincial fields.

It is quite clear that while some business incomes will be larger, corporate incomes generally, after taxation, will not;

the reports of the larger companies now coming out indicate this. The personal income tax has been most sharply raised on the middle class, whose incomes have not increased. Some of the taxation on this group will be met out of capital rather than by reduced consumption, and one of its purposes thus defeated. Agricultural income is practically untouched in the war taxation. Gasoline, sugar and a few minor duties may affect it, but the bulk of the extra taxation is on urban income. It is true that agricultural incomes are relatively low and have not increased much; even so, the relative position of the agriculturist is better than before the war. The bulk of the increase in the national income has gone to re-employed and newly-employed persons whose taxable capacity will not be high. In breaking down the estimated increase in the national income for 1940 the Minister of Finance divided it as follows:

Wages and salaries	$348,000,000
Investment income	$26,000,000
Individual enterprise—agricultural .	$3,000,000
„ „ other . .	$22,000,000
Military pay and allowances . .	$158,000,000

There is therefore a certain speciousness in the discussions on taxation and the national income. Under the cover of aggregates a redistribution of income is going on, a redistribution with considerable social significance.

There have been some price rises, due in part to taxes and the exchange position, but on the whole they have been moderate. The index number of wholesale prices, which stood at 73 and 78 in August and September 1939, was slightly over 90 by mid-1941. The cost of living index shows similar moderate change; rentals have of course been pegged in many cities and towns. The main reason for this price stability is that the increase in incomes has so far been met with a larger flow of goods, but now that full employment is close at hand that may not continue, and in fact there are disquieting signs already. A great deal depends upon the American situation, for even with exchange and other restrictions the effect of American prices on Canada is still important.

Thus, to sum up, in the first two years of war unemployment has virtually disappeared, old and new factories are in active production, new armament plants are being established and there is a general air of "busyness" that seems closely akin to the boom days. On the other hand, taxation has increased to an extent never before seen by North Americans, some few products (especially aluminium ware) have vanished while others are growing scarce, and the community is becoming dimly aware that the "cost of living" is rising. Canada has begun the establishment of administrative machinery—still quantitatively and in some cases qualitatively inadequate for the ultimate job—which will make for the transfer from a peace to a war economy with all its controls. But while more can yet be obtained out of idle resources, the bulk of further production must come from restriction in other kinds of production and the transfer of those resources to war purposes.

This is how it comes about that the full significance of the war in its economic sense is still to be realised by the country. The extent to which it can meet the problems of cutting consumption, diverting resources, maintaining prices and avoiding inflation depends upon its administrative techniques. The programme of the Canadian Government is probably more ambitious than most Canadians yet see, and will require all the ability and ingenuity available if it is to be carried out with reasonable success.

Canada,
July 1941.

AUSTRALIA

I. Greece and After

HOPES were disappointed in Australia as elsewhere by the failure of the Greek campaign, for, though the superiority of the German army in numbers and equipment is now generally appreciated, the nature of the ground made it not unreasonable to expect that the advance could be rendered slow and excessively costly. With a little luck it even seemed possible that British forces might retain a foothold indefinitely in the southern extremity of the peninsula, thus developing a new Balkan Peninsular War.

These quickly proved to be vain illusions, and the war suddenly became a vividly personal affair to many people in Australia to whom Norway and Dunkirk had been remote events, of great consequence, it is true, but difficult to visualise at this distance. As the army began to fall back from the northern frontier a growing sense of anxiety was evident, tempered with pride in the performance of the Australian troops. Although details were lacking, it soon became clear that our forces were steadily being pushed back, and the decision to evacuate came as no surprise.

News was scanty for some days, and the public remained in a state of suspense while waiting to hear how many had escaped. When it became clear that Germany had proved much too strong, curiosity was aroused to know what the odds of men and material had been in Greece. Stories that came through of the holocausts inflicted upon the Germans in the passes and the success of our forces in maintaining contact and frustrating the efforts of the enemy to cut them to pieces convinced Australia that the fighting quality of her men left nothing to be desired. This naturally led to the seeking of other reasons for the defeat, and to queries whether the

planning of the expedition, the forces put into Greece and the strength of equipment had been adequate to give any reasonable hope of success at the outset.

At this time, one or two newspapers in Sydney began to hold a premature post mortem. In their editorials and in the presentation of their news they suggested that the Greek campaign had been a fiasco, that the Australian forces had been used as the result of a British decision and without proper consultation with the Australian authorities, and that military considerations and the possible consequences for the troops engaged had been subordinated by the British Government to political motives. These suggestions, coming at a time when definite news was scarce, had a perceptible effect in heightening the anxiety of the public. More thoughtful persons resented such comment, which they considered to be ill-judged and irresponsible. At the least, it was obviously premature and was based on incomplete information.

Naturally, as the facts of the campaign emerged, there was much discussion over the wisdom, from the military point of view, of having engaged the enemy in Greece with the forces available. Some felt that men and equipment should have been held back for the defence of Palestine and Egypt, while others contended that this was merely wisdom after the event, that the decision had been the right one at the time, and that, in any case, the enemy had been made to pay dearly for his victory. Whatever opinion might be held on strategic grounds, however, it was generally agreed that honour compelled us to do all we could in aiding Greece.

There was, therefore, a feeling of strong resentment when it was learned that the comments of a small section of the Australian press had been cabled abroad and been seized upon for Axis propaganda. The acting Prime Minister, Mr. Fadden, spoke of the "insidious and harmful statements emanating from a section of the Sydney press", and said that the Government possessed evidence that "a wholly wrong and most unfortunate impression had been conveyed overseas". The indignation of the public was voiced by the

Melbourne *Herald*, which demanded that Mr. Fadden should be specific in naming the offending papers.

There could be no more serious charge (said the *Herald*) than that statements have wilfully or carelessly been cabled out of Australia misrepresenting facts and public opinion in a manner damaging to the Empire's cause. . . . The message apparently contained passages which entirely misrepresented the discussions that had arisen.

Mr. Fadden's sharp reprimand and the fact that such comment as the above met with general approval caused the offending papers to drop their criticism, which would have been insignificant except for the lamentable impression created abroad. Political leaders took pains to deny explicitly any suggestion that Australia was not whole-heartedly and entirely behind Great Britain. The acting Prime Minister stated that the Australian people were proud to be associated with British and Greek troops in the Balkan sector of war. Even if this particular operation did not achieve the success desired, it could not be emphasised too strongly that Australia was fighting the war as one of an Empire team. The Opposition leader, Mr. Curtin, also said that "Australia and the workers of Australia are united in their determination to give their all in the war that has been forced upon us".

Trades union leaders as well as political Labour men have been emphatic in their support of the British cause.

The organised trades unions of Australia (declared Mr. R. A. King, Vice-President of the Australian Council of Trades Unions and Secretary of the Labour Council of New South Wales, in a broadcast) stand shoulder to shoulder with the workers of Britain in defiance of the Fascist terror and in their determination to prevent it from blotting freedom out of our civilisation. In the first place, the trades union membership shares with the rest of the community an honest and simple loyalty. It is a loyalty to traditions and the democratic freedom of Australia as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. We know no other loyalty. And we want no other.

There can be no doubt of the determination of the general public to hasten war preparations as a means of playing the

fullest possible part in the war in the Middle East, Malaya or wherever it might be necessary. The Greek disaster acted as a spur, and the public attitude at the time of the evacuation was well summed up by Mr. Menzies, who was in the United States.

I would say (he declared) that all that happened in reference to the Greek campaign was that people were asking questions about it, and they only wanted to get facts. That a man want facts is no indication of dissension.

There has, however, been some evidence of a desire for a closer liaison between the Governments of Australia and Great Britain on questions of war strategy. Many Australians, who do not for one moment question the principle of a centralised command with full power to dispose of Dominion forces, still feel that Australia should have a more adequate voice when the decisions are being made. So far, no one has put forward any generally accepted proposal as to how this might be achieved. The suggestion that Mr. Menzies might remain in London evoked no very great enthusiasm. It was felt, on the one hand, that he could ill be spared from the control of affairs at home and, on the other hand, he is regarded in Labour circles as being too compliant to suggestions or requests from Britain.

Renewed demands for a national government followed the evacuation, for an increasing number of persons felt that there was no time to devote to party matters and that more drive was needed in munitions production. Most of the daily papers pressed the matter in their editorials, and at the end of April Mr. Fadden officially renewed the Government's offer to Labour of an all-party administration. He emphasised that his only purpose was that of finding the best possible way of governing Australia in the war.

It is my belief (he declared), and I know it is the belief of the Prime Minister, that this purpose can best be served by all parties coming together with a complete unity of purpose in the prosecution of the war. No party is asked to sink its political identity, but all

parties are earnestly asked to subordinate immediate political considerations to the gigantic task we have ahead of us.

This offer was not accepted. The comment of Mr. Makin, a member of the War Council and Secretary of the Federal Labour Caucus, indicated the attitude of the Labour party.

Nothing would so hopelessly divide Labour and this nation (he said) as the adoption of such a project. It is Labour's criticism and suggestions that have helped to stimulate national effort. To incorporate the present Labour leaders in a National Government would be likely to deprive them of the right to speak for a unified industrial and political movement.

Undoubtedly the War Council has performed valuable services, particularly in the smoothing of industrial difficulties, and in such questions as dilution of labour and the speeding up of the arbitration and conciliation system to make the more frequent adjustments necessary in war-time. But it is neither fish nor flesh. Some matters are discussed in the Council and then referred to the Cabinet for the final decision, but sometimes the Cabinet may desire to make substantial amendments and will refer the subject back to the Council. Thus each body may go over the ground several times before all is settled. On the important question of the Greek campaign, however, it was subsequently revealed that the Government had taken the decision to send Australian troops from North Africa to Greece without consulting the War Council, which was informed of the decision afterwards. Mr. Fadden maintained that the matter was essentially one for the Cabinet, as it was one of "high policy". Since the entire executive power still resides with the Cabinet on all matters, it is difficult for anyone to say what should or should not be referred to the War Council. The Council at present consists of the Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, representing the Government, and the Leader of the Opposition, the Deputy Leader and three prominent Labour members, Mr. Makin, Mr. Beasley and Dr. Evatt, representing the Opposition.

II. State Elections

ELECTIONS have been held recently in three States. In Queensland and South Australia the *status quo* was preserved; the Labour administration of Mr. Forgan Smith was returned in Queensland for its fourth successive term, all Ministers being elected with big majorities. The Playford Government received strong support in South Australia, and won 21 seats in a House of 39. Labour won 11 seats as against 9 in the old Parliament, and only 7 Independents were returned. Independents previously had held 12 seats, which gave them the balance of power.

A sweeping victory over the United Australia Party–United Country Party Government of New South Wales has been won by Labour. The Government had held office since 1932, and the public, though not greatly interested in the State election, was in a mood to respond to Labour's promise of a more vigorous administration. Between the platforms of Mr. Mair, the defeated Premier, and Mr. McKell, the leader of the official Labour party, there was not a great deal of difference. Each outlined a long list of public works and social services; each promised the utmost support to the Commonwealth Government in the war. Mr. Mair emphasised, however, that his proposals for works were tentative and would be carried out only so far as was found possible without interfering with war activities. His election slogan, "Beat Germany First", was resented by Mr. McKell for its implication that Labour did not take the war sufficiently seriously.

We know truly (he declared) that the fight against Fascism is our fight. The first attack Hitler made was not on the wealthy, but on the trades unionists, on free speech and on the right to worship. They are the very things that are fundamental to Labour.

He accused Mr. Mair's Government of delays and lack of drive and promised a more energetic prosecution of war preparations, including such matters as air raid precautions and shipbuilding, and more effective support for the

Commonwealth. Mr. McKell's party gained 54 seats, the United Australia Party 15, United Country Party 12, and Independents 9. A feature of the election was the complete failure of the extreme radical wing of New South Wales Labour, which contested a number of seats but failed to win one. This party's platform included immediate recall of Australian troops and naval units "in view of the increasing gravity of the situation in the Pacific". Other proposals were the repeal of Commonwealth national security regulations and repudiation of bond interest.

III. Munition Delays

ALL recent developments have increased the importance attached by the Australian public to war production, and Opposition criticism has been directed at the slowness of the Federal Government in fully utilising all available resources for war. Dr. Evatt and Mr. Beasley, Labour members of the War Council, issued a joint statement expressing their grave concern, not only over the admitted shortcomings in the munitions programme, but more particularly at the attitude of "hush-hush with which the munitions administration is attempting to silence helpful criticism". They attacked "incompetence" in the supply of raw materials and in the use of all plants for war work, and inefficient use of man-power. Valuable plants and skill, they said, were still being absorbed in luxury industries.

Supporters of the Government, although they did not deny that a great deal remained to be done in organising munitions production, retorted that Dr. Evatt and Mr. Beasley would be rendering better service by joining the Cabinet and assuming executive power to remedy the things of which they complained, than by their present rôle of critics. Many plants have been offered to the munitions authorities which have not been suitable or capable of turning out work of the necessary precision for modern armament, calling as it does not only for the appropriate machines and the right degree

of skill, but for an intense effort which must be continually fostered and encouraged. It is probable that these plants offered are quite useless for munitions work, but that many of them could be put to some secondary useful purpose. The organisation so to use them does not yet exist, because the urgent task of munitions production has been up to the present engaging the authorities to the exclusion of secondary matters.

There have been disappointments in the munitions programme. Measured by peace-time standards, the industrial achievement has been worthy of all praise for the manner in which new and unfamiliar processes have been established and brought into full operation in record time, and for the high rate of production, often three or four times the designed capacity, given by some of the plants. In a recent statement Mr. Fadden said that the Commonwealth Ordnance Factory, which is at present the main source of supply for guns, had made a record by producing 3·7-inch anti-aircraft guns ten months after blue prints and manufacturing data had been received from England. The output from one shop was three times as great as originally planned and would be further increased. Since June 1940, the output of cordite from the original Government Explosives Factory had been doubled and that of T.N.T. trebled, and a new group of factories had been established in South Australia. Further important additions to explosives and chemical capacity were being made in other States. The Commonwealth Ammunition Factory was producing every type of cartridge case from two-pounder to 4-inch; new plant at the factory was mainly of Australian manufacture. A large increase in output of small arms and ammunition had also been secured. He added that since the war Australia had virtually established a machine-tool and precision-tool industry, and orders had been placed for nearly 5,000 first-quality machines of an almost inconceivable variety. One firm had completed a 2,000-ton forging press slightly more than four months after it had begun the design.

Without detracting from these achievements, it is nevertheless becoming evident that earlier official estimates of

munitions production have not been realised. Treasury statements of expenditure for the first eleven months of the financial year 1940–41 (ending June 30) showed a war expenditure from all funds of £137 millions, compared with the budget estimate of £186 millions made last November. Many important new munitions projects are approaching completion, but it is doubtful whether they have yet reached the stage of pouring out war materials in a steady stream. Shortage of machine tools to equip new workshops is the most grave obstacle to more rapid progress, and sections of the productive scheme which are ready for operation must perforce wait until other sections are prepared. New projects, such as merchant shipbuilding and the making of tanks, cannot be set in train as fast as could be desired because of these still unsatisfied needs of the partially completed factories. Some hold the opinion that Australia is attempting too many things at present, and diffusing energies and resources which should be concentrated on a few weapons of major importance. From the point of view of production there is truth in this observation, but with the present danger threatening this quarter of the globe, and Australia's responsibility for supplying her own forces and those of the other Dominions east of Suez, it is arguable that she can attempt no less. The machine-tool problem is chiefly a matter of time—a commodity of which, unfortunately, we can spare little—and there is scope for a better use of man-power. The production of war materials, as distinct from the equipping of factories, involves a great deal of simple repetition work, which can be performed by men and women after a short apprenticeship. The services of skilled men can be used more economically, and can be eked out by further dilution with less skilled labour.

IV. War Finance

THE financing of the war has continued satisfactorily, and has not yet reached the difficult stage which might have had to be faced if war expenditure had kept pace with the

estimates. The rate of spending is rising, none the less, and a good deal of lag is likely to be overtaken in the last months of the financial year. Even so, the total for the year may fall short of the budget estimate of £186 millions by £20 millions or £30 millions. Mr. Fadden said recently that he expected war expenditure within Australia to reach £13 millions a month by June and to amount to about £180 millions for 1941–42, compared with £143 millions provided (but not spent) for domestic war expenditure from the current budget. The substantially heavier taxes provided last November appear to have been borne fairly easily; certainly they have not led to any perceptible diminution of industrial and business activity. The loan programme, too, has been successful. The appeal to the loan market was made a little later than usual, and £35 millions was sought—the largest Commonwealth loan since 1918. Of this, £27 millions was for war purposes and £8 millions for State and Commonwealth works, many of which are significant for defence. Small subscribers were few at first, but as a result of more intensive publicity a good response followed and thousands of subscriptions were received in the last days. The final total of subscriptions was 56,000, and the loan closed with £35,750,000.

It is becoming increasingly plain that further drastic curtailments must be made in spending, public or private, which competes with war activities. On top of the competition for skilled labour, there is a danger of an absolute shortage of man-power and, in addition, more and more important materials and machines are being withdrawn entirely from civilian use. An agreement between Commonwealth and State Governments on taxing and spending has become urgently necessary, for State expenditure has been rising instead of diminishing. In the aggregate, State budgets for 1940–41 amounted to £137 millions, compared with £133 millions for 1939–40. Taxation in some States is at a level which precludes much further increase in Commonwealth direct taxation, while in other States the taxpayer is escaping unduly lightly.

This reflects the attitude of the general public to a large extent, for, although there is no doubt of the eagerness of Australians of all classes to work harder than ever before on war production, there is not yet a widespread realisation of the need for, and the inevitability of, reduced civilian consumption. A large section—probably the majority—of the public believes that the wage-earner is entitled to be guaranteed his standard of living in exchange for his more intense effort, and no statesman has yet bluntly proclaimed the paradox that Australian standards of living are even now being undermined in order to preserve future Australian standards. Public opinion develops swiftly in these matters, and many restrictions are being accepted as a matter of course which aroused bitter opposition last year.

The wages question contains the seeds of difficulties, for it is going through an evolution rather like the British experience in the last war. Not long after the present war broke out, a special increase of 6*s*. a week was granted to engineers and others engaged on war work as a compensation for the very arduous and exacting labour they were being called upon to perform. One after another, various other unions demanded the same increase, until finally it reached the stage of a formal application to the Arbitration Court for a general rise of 6*s*. in the basic wage, which has, because of cost-of-living adjustments, already advanced from 80*s*. to 86*s*. since June of last year.

The Commonwealth Government has attempted to anticipate such demands by launching an Australian system of child endowment. The Arbitration Court drew attention some months ago to the need for an endowment scheme.

> On our accepted standards of living (said the President of the Court) I regard the present basic wage as adequate for a family unit of three, but think it offers only a meagre existence for a family unit of four. A more logical system would be to grade the basic wage according to family responsibilities.

The Commonwealth Government accordingly brought in a plan, to operate at the beginning of the financial year, for a

weekly payment of 5*s*. a week for every dependent child under the age of sixteen years, after the first child in each family, regardless of income. The annual cost of the scheme to the Commonwealth will be about £13 millions. A new tax of 2½ per cent. on payrolls, to be paid by employers, is expected to bring in £9 millions, and £2 millions will come from withdrawing the present income-tax deductions for each child after the first; the remaining £2 millions will be a charge upon consolidated revenue. There are obvious advantages in launching such a plan in a period when employment is at a maximum, although by itself it will do nothing to assist the war problem of curtailing consumption. It may well prove to be a useful safeguard to the most necessary kinds of civilian consumption when the pressure upon civilian supplies becomes heavier. Members of the Government, however, have lately issued repeated warnings of much more drastic steps to control consumption and, so long as such steps are well conceived and just, the public can be persuaded to accept them. A wider campaign of education and propaganda must form an essential part of the persuasion process.

Mr. Menzies on his return from England by way of the United States created a deep impression by his description of the ordeal of the British people. "This war is producing a new order of chivalry, and its knights are to be found in the side-streets and back lanes of Great Britain", he said in his first public speech. He appealed for a greater productive effort on the part of all Australians.

> I have come back to Australia (he said) convinced that we must build up to the limit of our resources, if necessary to the exclusion of civil needs, armoured fighting vehicles, anti-tank guns, artillery of all kinds, Bren gun carriers, and all those things that make the difference between an heroic army and a victorious army.

Australia had done well, and in many ways had almost worked miracles in the last two years, but that did not mean that the people should now fold their arms. All must keep moving and driving until it lay in their power to say that they were doing as much and suffering as much in this war as were the

beleaguered people of the mother country. The next six months were likely to be crucial. Australia and Britain were looking more and more to the United States, and he did not believe that they would look there in vain, but in the next six months American help could not be decisive in the Mediterranean. He declared that "at this solemn, fateful hour in our history, it is for us to make Parliament an instrument of war, not an instrument of dissension".

In spite of the new note of urgency in Mr. Menzies' utterance, the Parliamentary situation became no easier after his return. Mr. Curtin formally declined the offer of a national government, and Government policy continued to pick its way gingerly across the knife-edge of an evenly divided House. Labour members are still patently afraid of losing party support by making an overt response to Mr. Menzies' appeal. Some critics of the Prime Minister regret that he should have made any direct reference to party matters at all, even though it was to deplore their obtrusion into war preparations. These persons contend that a direct and fervent declaration to the people of Australia combining a blunt statement of the danger threatening them with an outline of the measures necessary to meet that danger, coming from a leader with the prestige enjoyed by Mr. Menzies after his close contact with the great statesmen of the war, might have aroused a response in which the party manœuvres would be swept away.

Australia,
June 1941.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. The Union and the Prime Minister

THE good fortune of South Africa in having Field-Marshal Smuts as Prime Minister and guide in international and Commonwealth affairs is more and more impressed on public opinion in the Union as the war drags on. The King's mark of high distinction in making our Prime Minister a Field-Marshal has been hugely appreciated, even the attempts of political opponents to make capital out of this "foreign" promotion to the highest military rank having fallen significantly flat. As the range of the war has widened, there has been a constantly growing popular tendency in our country to trust the judgment and insight of the Prime Minister. Knowledge that he is in hourly communication with Downing Street has prevented any tendency to be disturbed by such war misfortunes as the defeat in Greece and Crete. Even the first impact of the German success in driving British troops out of Cyrenaica had little reaction of alarm in South Africa. For one thing, the Prime Minister, on his return from his flying visit to the Northern African front before Easter, had warned his followers in Parliament that the Germans had succeeded in landing *Panzer* divisions in Tripoli and that the results might be temporarily disquieting. The Opposition in Parliament lost no time in suggesting that South African troops might be sent out of Africa, for instance to reinforce the British troops in Greece. The Prime Minister at once took up the challenge, giving the assurance that Parliament would be consulted before a man was sent out of Africa, and saying frankly that as soon as the Abyssinian terrain was cleared up our men would go to take the place of British troops in Libya and Egypt. There was immediate recognition of the wisdom of this.

When our men were the first to enter Addis Ababa and it became known that, as the Prime Minister had already foreseen, our airmen were fighting against the Germans in the north of the continent, there was unbounded satisfaction among all supporters of the Government's war policy. The feeling that that policy could not be in better hands than in those of Field-Marshal Smuts is not by any means limited to those who are openly for Britain against Hitler, little as the concealed approvers let their satisfaction appear. For this reason, there is not much support in the Union for the suggestion that there should be an Imperial War Cabinet or even an Imperial War Conference in London, of which our Prime Minister would be an indispensable member. The *Cape Times* expressed the great bulk of responsible views here when it disapproved of this notion, pointing out the great improvement since the last war in communication facilities, and clinching the argument by insisting, as almost everyone worth counting believes, that the presence of the Prime Minister in our country is invaluable and cannot be spared. No South African substitute for him in an Imperial War Cabinet is visible. Widespread agreement of opinion exists, especially now that Germany has flung herself upon Russia and the immediate course of the war is wrapped in such obscurity, that Field-Marshal Smuts's place is in the Union, whence he can be in momentary touch with the British Cabinet and at the same time keep his sensitive and firm hand upon the reins of South African military affairs.

II. Dr. Malan's Politics

FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS'S presence in South Africa is all the more necessary because, as the war months pass, the Parliamentary Opposition drifts farther and farther towards admitted dependence on a German victory, and tells its followers with steadily increasing frankness that this will be the prelude to the coming of a Republic in the Union, cut completely away from the British Commonwealth. Dr. Malan,

the titular leader of the Opposition, has been in the habit of suggesting in his numerous public speeches, ever since the war began, that a German victory is inevitable. When France fell a year ago, his certainty that Britain's speedy collapse was inevitable was not dissembled; but it is only recently that he has gone so far as to say, as he did say the other day in the Transvaal, that a victorious Germany would "want a Government in South Africa which would be friendly disposed towards her" and that the Nationalist Opposition could "provide a Government which has already shown that it has no hostility towards Germany". This, as the *Cape Times* has commented, is about as near to high treason as it is possible to go; but suggestions in loyally enthusiastic circles that Dr. Malan should be required to pay the normal penalty for such speeches leave the Prime Minister and the Government unresponsive. Wisely, no doubt; for the fact is that Dr. Malan would not use the language of the treason border-land unless he was driven to these verbal excesses by his own conviction that only in this way can he hold his place as Opposition leader.

Those who do not live in South Africa will believe with difficulty that, in this Dominion of the British Commonwealth, Opposition leadership is dependent for its personal continuance on open championship of the German cause. But it is so at the moment. Anti-British feeling, long slumbering among the less enlightened Boer elements, has been whipped into foam by leaders who reckon that the strength of Germany is irresistible. Their predecessors in that opinion used the same tactics in the last war, though much less flagrantly, and found that they paid politically, even after Germany was beaten and they themselves were proved false war-prophets. Large elements in this "back-veld" Boer population have been sinking in the economic and social scale ever since—mainly because they have never been instructed in the iron law of self-help and have been nurtured in the belief that a white skin is the only necessary equipment in the struggle for survival. Now they are being told that the democratic system,

"perverted" by British importations, is the root of their decaying lot. The remedy, they are taught by the politicians, is a Republic purified of these British elements. When Germany wins, Hitler will give them their Republic, in which only the "true Afrikaner"—they themselves—will have the power; in which the Jews will be prevented from "preying" upon them; in which they will have a prior right to all government jobs; in which the poverty of the Boer rank and file will be charmed away; in which they will be "really free" because the country will no longer be tied to Britain. That is the lure. Outsiders who do not know South Africa may think such a lure impotent. In our conditions it is not impotent; it is unquestionably potent. The whole strength of the Opposition is built upon the response to it of men and women who are remote from knowledge of the world, nursed in resentment against Britain and only too ready to listen to politicians telling them that a German victory will mean "freedom" from British "bonds" and their own supremacy over all other population elements in a Hitler-conferred and blessed Republic.

Among the various parts of this lure, dislike of and resentment against Britain are the most remunerative politically to those who exploit them. If proof of this was ever necessary it is supplied by a statement hurriedly issued by Dr. Malan, before the echoes of Mr. Churchill's announcement of British support for a Russia attacked by Germany have died away. Ever since the German pact with Russia, Dr. Malan and his Nationalists have kept their mouths shut about it. But now that Russia is the victim of German aggression and Britain declares that Russia must be reckoned among those who are resisting the Nazi menace, Dr. Malan has hastened to announce to his party that Mr. Churchill has "his arm round Stalin's neck" and "with Field-Marshal Smuts at his coat-tails" has "decreed with a curse the total destruction of Germany". To Dr. Malan this means that "if they achieve their aim, the floodgates of Bolshevism will necessarily be opened; Bolshevism will overrun not only Germany but the whole of Europe as well as

the exhausted, heavily taxed and impoverished Britain". Bolshevism, Dr. Malan continues, "has for a long time had its eye on South Africa", seeking "above all the support of non-European elements". Bolshevism, he believes, "is the devastator of the foundations of civilisation and of everything which is regarded as holy by Christian nations". Yet, so long as Bolshevism was allied to Germany, Dr. Malan had no word of condemnation for it, regarding Germany, he now reveals, as "the iron wall" against the malefactors of the Kremlin. The conclusion to which this balderdash points is irresistible. Anyone who fights against Britain is *ipso facto* immune from criticism by Dr. Malan, whatever his opinion of any ally of Germany may be. But the moment Hitler breaks his pact with any of his allies and forces it on to the side of Britain, the torrent of Dr. Malan's invective is instantly loosed against it.

III. A "New Order"

AND behind this violent *volte-face* of Dr. Malan's lies nothing more creditable than a struggle for the Nationalist leadership. On one side in this struggle are Mr. Pirow, ex-Minister of Defence in the Hertzog-Smuts Government before the war broke out, and Dr. Van Rensburg, Commandant General of the Ossewa Brandwag (Ox-wagon Sentinel), the organisation which was described in a previous number of The Round Table.* On the other side are Mr. Strydom, the most forcible Nationalist figure in the Transvaal, Mr. Swart, leader of the Nationalists in the Free State, and Mr. Sauer, Mr. Eric Louw and other young Nationalists in the Cape Province. Mr. Strydom and his friends are for a democratic form of Government, on the Kruger model. Mr. Pirow and Dr. Van Rensburg advocate a "new order" for South Africa, deriving straight from the Nazi organisation. Essentially, there is not much difference between the two systems. Both would have an autocratic Fuehrer or President. Both would allow only one political party. Both would deny the vote to anyone

* No. 122, March 1941, p. 374.

opposed to the Government. Both would cut all connection with the British Commonwealth. Both would give preference in every possible way to the "true Afrikaner", that is to say the anti-British element in our population, relegating all other elements to a position of inferiority, if not actually of subjection. But in the turbulent background of that similarity is the fight for the leadership in this pseudo-democratic Republic or this New Order, whichever of the two rival systems may win the day, assuming the highly improbable contingency that either is able to establish itself in our country. It is a personal fight and, while it rages behind the scenes, the titular leader of all the rivals for future power, Dr. Malan, clings to the rapidly diminishing remnant of his authority and calculates the degree to which it is necessary for him to sway to one side or the other.

It would be useless to pursue the contest into all its ramifications. The point of importance is which of the rival groups is top dog for the moment; and the test of that is the attitude of Dr. Malan. During last session it seemed for a time as though Mr. Strydom and his section would emerge victorious. Not even the most retrograde part of the Boer people would like Nazi domination here, and even the most unintelligent must doubt whether a victorious Hitler would allow his Nationalist accomplices in our midst to institute a Republic really independent of Germany. Mr. Strydom, therefore, with his penchant for a remodelled democratic system, seemed to have a natural advantage over Mr. Pirow. But the Ossewa Brandwag has a strong appeal among rank-and-file Nationalists. While Mr. Strydom, Mr. Swart and the rest of that Nationalist group were attending to their Parliamentary duties, Mr. Pirow was ranging the country constituencies, paying court to the Ossewa Brandwag leaders great and small and consolidating the strength of that organisation behind himself. The result of these tactics emerged at the Union congress of the four Provincial Nationalist parties at Bloemfontein in the first week of June. There Mr. Pirow made a brief appearance; Dr. Van Rensburg did not even deign to appear. A clause in a new statement of Nationalist party principles—these

Nationalists are always drawing up new statements of their articles of political faith—which mentioned a "democratic government" was altered so as to read "resolute national government". The Strydomites tried to minimise the meaning of this amendment. Mr. Pirow has since rubbed it in mercilessly.*

Meanwhile the Afrikaner party, the party of the remnant of General Hertzog's followers, had also held a congress, at which Mr. Havenga, its leader—General Hertzog, who is in retirement, is still honorary leader of the party—made a brave speech, denouncing all plans for amended forms of government which would recognise one element in the population as dominant over the rest. But the Afrikaner party has all the look, at the moment at least, of a decaying force; and General Hertzog himself has gone some way to deal it a death-blow by issuing, from his retirement, a statement about a ridiculous rumour which attributed to the Prime Minister the intention of "ceding" some unnamed South African port to the United States as a naval base. General Hertzog denounced this supposed plan with wholly unnecessary vigour, adding a reference to the "objectionable purpose for which the war was declared by Britain and France and is still being carried on by Great Britain". If General Hertzog wants to accelerate the political decadence of the party which he still nominally leads, he could not have done it more effectively than through this stupid sentence.

IV. Government Strength

WITH its political opponents thus eagerly engaged in the subterranean slitting of each other's throats, the Government is perceptibly increasing its strength among reasonably minded South Africans. Its combination in Parliament easily

* In a speech at Pretoria on August 13 Dr. Malan condemned Mr. Pirow's campaign for the New Order, and demonstrated his disapproval of the activities of Dr. Van Rensburg, asking whether he intended to transform the Ossewa Brandwag into an Opposition political party.—Editor.

maintained its position during last session, which ended during the first week of May. It was a very busy session, with the Government successfully passing a large number of Bills, not only those needed under war conditions, but others, too, of abiding value for the new South Africa which is to emerge after the war. It is remarkable indeed that in present circumstances the Government has been able to find time for a considerable volume of valuable "peace-time" legislation. In the country constituencies there are signs that the steady decline of the Opposition into mere imitators of and would-be collaborators with Nazi Germany is driving many Afrikaans-speaking people, whose political camp has been hitherto that of the Nationalists, into silent but nevertheless potentially effective support of the Prime Minister; and these signs are too numerous and widespread to warrant their being interpreted as merely the customary fruits of optimism among pro-Government circles in the country areas.

South Africa is fortunate in enjoying prosperity unique among the nations at war. Industrial effort for war purposes continues on an astonishing scale, both in volume and in technical accomplishment. One of the most promising features of this industrial progress is the proof which the Afrikaans-speaking people of the lower-paid grades are giving of their power of self-adaptation to industrial processes. Few would have anticipated this capacity, to which Mr. Hofmeyr, Minister of Finance, has paid enthusiastic tribute. Money is abundant, too abundant from some points of view, for there has been a flood of "hot money" from other less secure countries, which has been an embarrassment to the banks and the investment market. Money requirements for the war are being met without difficulty, and so far the weight of taxation caused by the war is very light in comparison with other lands. There has been no restriction up to now on imports or on luxury consumption, a condition of affairs which has seemed hardly legitimate to many earnest minds. Mr. Stuttaford, Minister of Commerce, has recently issued a warning against overspending, and has intimated that cate-

gories of imports are being drawn up so that graded restrictions may be imposed on those categories which cannot be classed as wholly or semi-necessary. South Africans in fact may regard themselves as perhaps the most fortunate people in the world, thanks to the wisdom of General Smuts, when the war broke out, in insisting that we should take our proper part as a Dominion of the Crown. But for his successful firmness then, the miseries of neutrality would have landed our country by now in a very different plight.

South Africa,
July 1941.

NEW ZEALAND

I. The War Effort

DURING recent months New Zealand's interest in the operations of war has been given a new personal intensity. From the first there have been many hundreds of New Zealanders in the R.A.F. and the Navy, while specialist units co-operated in the British victories in Egypt and Libya against the Italians; but the main body of the Expeditionary Force played no prominent part, for it was divided between England and Egypt. The two sections were united, however, in time to face the German onslaught in Greece and later in Crete, and against the heartening news that its sons had fought with a valour worthy of the highest traditions of our race there had to be set the ultimate failure to defeat an overwhelming invasion, together with the certainty of heavy casualties. Exact figures are still not available, but on June 11 the acting Prime Minister told Parliament that roughly 5,783 casualties had been suffered among the 16,530 New Zealanders who served in Greece and Crete. This figure includes 4,342 missing, most of whom it is said are probably prisoners of war. Perhaps total casualties will not prove much higher than if the Expeditionary Force had been continually engaged in less strenuous warfare; yet losses on this scale were a heavy blow for a country of this size, and will leave no part of the community scatheless.

We cannot as yet expect to know in full detail exactly what happened and why it happened. Parliament was sitting while this article was being written, and presumably debated the facts fully in secret session. Meanwhile there has been virtually no public criticism of the policy involved, and it is generally accepted that all things possible were done both by our men and by those who strove to bring them back to safety. In particular, the whole country would echo the appreciation

expressed by the Prime Minister (Mr. Fraser) of the heroic part played by the Royal Navy. He was actually in Egypt during the Battle of Crete, on his way to London on the invitation of the British Government, and has been in close touch with the leaders of the Expeditionary Force and with British Headquarters in Cairo.

The disasters of Greece and Crete have sharpened the determination that the country shall pull its full weight in the war, and have revived the argument that party politics are obsolete and a national government essential. This last suggestion has been repeatedly urged on behalf of the Opposition, but has been viewed with considerable suspicion within the Labour party by those who maintained that a coalition must mean the abandonment of basic policies emphatically endorsed by the people in 1938. However, Mr. Fraser, while rejecting offers of immediate coalition, has not ruled out the possibility that circumstances of national crisis might arise to make a national government necessary. The whole subject was presumably discussed last Easter by the annual conferences of the Federation of Labour and of the Labour party, but no information has been made public as to what decision, if any, was reached.

There the matter rests for the time being, but it remains of considerable importance in view of the fact that in the ordinary way a general election is due towards the end of this year. So far there have only been small signs of an approaching election campaign, though the "party truce" proclaimed by the Prime Minister on his departure for Europe in May has not worked altogether smoothly. Matters have also been complicated by the municipal elections held on May 10, which resulted in a sharp defeat for Labour throughout the country. The Opposition naturally claims this as a sign of general reaction against the Labour party in all spheres; Labour publicly acknowledges that its defeat presents a challenge that must be met. However, too much importance should not be attached to these local-body elections as a portent for the national elections. For example, voting was probably influenced by an incident of a type which one hopes is unlikely to recur. During the closing

stages of the campaign it was alleged that some trade union officials, who objected to an attack on trade union secretaries by an anti-Labour candidate for the Harbour Board at Wellington, obtained an interview with him and indulged in personal threats and insults. At the time this incident—since disavowed by Government spokesmen—was naturally seized upon by anti-Labour candidates and the press, and undoubtedly caused a painful impression. However, it was noteworthy that the defeat of Labour candidates was due rather to a fall in the Labour vote than to any increase in the votes of its opponents. It is by no means certain that those who stayed at home on polling-day would be similarly apathetic in national elections.

Meanwhile the country's war effort, which in proportion to population and resources compares favourably with that of most belligerents, is being further speeded up. Even before the fighting in Greece the public had been told that the drain on man-power was likely to be greater than in the last war, when over 100,000 trained men were sent overseas. The War Cabinet claims to have in hand a comprehensive scheme for the best use of man-power during the next four years. New Zealand is the only Dominion to enforce conscription, and men are being steadily drawn into the armed forces for service both at home and abroad. The youths of 18, for example, have just been called up for Territorial training, and the first ballot among married men for overseas service is expected before the end of this year. Again, the equipment of Territorials is being steadily improved, and local production of munitions has developed fast. No one denies that New Zealand's industrial resources are very limited, especially as regards the supply of some basic raw materials, and no one claims that everything possible is yet being done. Nevertheless many of the country's factories and workshops have been adapted to produce a considerable range and an increasing quantity of light munitions. This production is part of a general scheme to make the most of Empire resources. The economic conference held in Delhi last year was followed by the organisation of an Eastern Supply Group, the member-countries of which (including New

Zealand) have sent representatives to the council of a central organisation, and have been visited by a British technical mission. These experts reported to the British Government on New Zealand's capacity in the field of munitions and recommended a programme of work; and on May 30 the leader of the mission, Sir Alexander Roger, said on his departure for England that he was very satisfied.

II. External Relations

RELATIVELY little is known to the public of the detailed work of this Eastern Supply organisation, but it seems clear that the course of the war has built up an increasingly important community of interest among Pacific countries. In February and March an Australian ministerial mission was in this country, investigating means by which the two Dominions could co-operate in dealing with their common problems, particularly the marketing of primary products and the supply of munitions. It was announced on April 4 that, as a result of discussions with the visitors, there was to be set up "a permanent consultative committee to deal with problems of common interest between New Zealand and Australia". It is to consist of the two Ministers of Supply, together with other Ministers as required from time to time. No further news is available of this committee's workings, but it was officially stated in June that the Governments of the two Dominions were considering accrediting High Commissioners to each other. Meanwhile Mr. Semple, Minister of National Service, has visited Australia in connection with munitions supply, and in May New Zealand was visited by members of the Dutch Government. The most significant of New Zealand's recent contacts have been those with the United States. The New Zealand Minister to Washington has not yet been appointed, but in May two Ministers were despatched to America on temporary mission, Mr. F. Langstone (Minister of Lands) to discuss trade matters, and Mr. J. G. Coates (member of the War Cabinet and former Prime Minister) the supply of essential

munitions. Mr. Langstone will also make preliminary arrangements for the opening of the New Zealand Legation, and the present twofold mission may be seen as a vigorous attempt to build up still more close and fruitful relations between this country and North America.

There can be little doubt that the course of events has thrown leadership on to the shoulders of the United States, and New Zealand, like the rest of the Commonwealth, rejoices that American strength seems increasingly available in defence of the democratic way of life. Yet the Lease and Lend Act, which may well prove the salvation of the British peoples in the Pacific as well as in other regions, may create a very serious problem for this country. Under that Act America supplies Britain with foodstuffs as well as with munitions, thus enabling her to economise in badly needed shipping by cutting down her imports from distant sources. No one questions the desire of Britain to support her Dominions as loyally in the economic field as they have rallied to her support in the fields of diplomacy and military action. Yet were Britain to draw largely on American supplies of goods previously taken from them, to that extent their economic structure must be disrupted; and in these circumstances New Zealand would probably suffer more than any other Dominion, for she has not derived from the war situation those benefits falling to her more industrialised colleagues in the Commonwealth. Further, though there is a definite demand in various Pacific countries for her products, and though this demand might possibly be increased by diligent pursuit, she controls no shipping by which her goods could be delivered to prospective customers. The possibility has long been discussed that British ships should be progressively withdrawn from the Pacific area in favour of American shipping, which can here operate without restriction by the Neutrality Act. There is much to be said for such a reorganisation, especially if one may regard Anglo-American co-operation as a permanent basis for the new world order. Nevertheless, the disappearance of British ships from the run between New Zealand and America would emphasise the

extent to which this country must depend in the future on her Pacific neighbours.

The formidable problems of the near future in the Pacific are no doubt being faced by our Government, though not yet fully grasped by public opinion; granted goodwill, there is no reason to suppose them insoluble. For example, sound economic basis could be found for at least a modest increase in trade with the United States herself, as well as with other countries, if only by the replacement in their markets of goods sent to Britain, or through co-operation in forwarding Australian and New Zealand goods towards Europe. Again, relatively small as they are, these southern Dominions could contribute significantly in the political and strategic sense to the common cause to which we are all pledged. Moreover, there is evidence of solid goodwill on both sides of the Pacific. Small signs observable locally have been the visit of American warships early this year, and the provision that American citizens may be exempted from the war-time regulations controlling aliens.

III. Export Trade

NEW Zealand's life-line, her export trade, has already been grievously threatened, and a few months ago the situation seemed full of menace. In March, for example, it was expected that our exports of meat, which in 1939–40 reached the remarkably high figure of 351,000 tons, would be cut for the present season to 180,000; and at the same time there were broad hints that butter, another major export, would be seriously resticted before long. These threats to our economy have not yet fully materialised. The 1940–41 contract for meat is for 248,000 tons—a very considerable improvement—and it is expected that butter exports for the year ending July 31 will total roughly 130,000 tons, which is in line with pre-war averages. Moreover, on June 26 the Governments of Britain, New Zealand and Australia announced an important co-operative agreement for handling surplus produce. Its threefold aim is to ensure that a maximum amount of food

reaches Britain: to minimise the dislocation caused to the Dominions by war-time restrictions: and to build up adequate but not excessive reserve stores of foodstuffs which can be rushed to Europe at the close of the war for the rescue of impoverished peoples. It is agreed that New Zealand will do her utmost to make the best use of available shipping (for example, by the processing of meat and other products), and she will endeavour to find alternative markets for produce which Britain cannot take at present. The reserve quantities to be stored will be decided by agreement, and will be controlled by two considerations—probable demands during and after the war, and the importance of the industries concerned to New Zealand—while the financial burden involved will be shared equally by the two Governments.

In a sense this agreement still leaves New Zealand very vulnerable. Though Britain will buy the whole wool-clip and almost certainly take all the cheese and dried milk we can produce there is no guarantee as to the quantities of butter and meat that will be taken, which means that the future of two-thirds of our export trade remains uncertain. Moreover, though the promise that Britain will carry a half-share in the financial burden of building up reserve stores of food is a very valuable one, it will leave to New Zealand a heavy financial load for so small a country. However, as the Government rightly insists, this agreement must not be viewed as a "business bargain made in terms of commercial advantage on either side". The promise that every effort will be exerted to take a maximum quantity of food from us—contract or no contract—can now be seen in the light not only of Britain's own needs, but of the last year's achievements. In spite of serious shipping losses, so much produce was actually lifted that at the end of July there will be only 17,500 tons of butter in store (compared with 14,000 a year before) and 6,500 tons of cheese (compared with 7,400 tons). Meat remains a problem—we enter the new season with 110,000 tons in store—but we have every reason to hope that as the details of the new agreement are worked out the British Government will act with a real

understanding of our problems and with a determination to co-operate in finding a mutually beneficial solution.

Though the agreement between Britain, Australia and New Zealand was published only a few days before the dispatch of this article, the main elements of the problem have, of course, been common knowledge for some time, and much preparatory work has been done. The Government has approached a challenging situation with three general principles clear: that we should produce those things which Britain asks for, that so far as possible standards of life should be maintained and any serious loss spread over the whole community, and that our productive efficiency should be kept up so that progress can be resumed when the world returns to "normal". It is another matter, however, to reduce these general principles to a concrete form which can be taken by farmers and government departments as a practical working basis. For one thing, though all would agree in insisting that everything possible must be done to follow the desires of the British Government, there are practical difficulties even here. For example, a considerable amount of dried milk is already produced, and any large increase would depend on delicate and expensive machinery, much of which must be imported, and which could not be in full production for many months. Again, there has already been a big change-over from butter to cheese, and production for the present season will be a record. Further change will depend on the overcoming of quite considerable technical difficulties and may cause serious loss of productive efficiency. Such problems are being studied, and much can certainly be done by the co-operation of farmers with government leadership, both in adapting existing industries and in organising new ones. Thus the production of linen flax has been developed (on Britain's request) during the past season. Nevertheless, even the recent agreement does not entirely remove the possibility that Britain's requirements from us may change drastically in the future as they have, on short notice, in the past—a possibility which is one of the major obstacles to detailed and specific planning.

In these circumstances the Minister of Agriculture's "primary production programme for 1941–42", which was announced on May 27, made a gallant attempt to explain to the country as a whole and to the farmers in particular what would be required during the coming season. It was prefaced by the significant remark that "instead of last season's aim of increased production the aim was rather a readjustment of production", and gave a fairly definite indication of what was considered desirable. The Minister went systematically through the list of New Zealand's main agricultural products, pointing out where increases or decreases were indicated by present circumstances, and where it seemed desirable that existing practices should be modified in view of such impending problems as shortage in the supply of artificial fertilisers. In the case of some crops at least, the Minister promised concrete and detailed action through government departments or ordinary trade channels which would help individual farmers to finance "projects that were in line with the production programme", and to arrange definite contracts for the sale of increased crops.

In this programme generally, there are two features calling for special mention, apart from the general caution with which projects are framed—a caution made inevitable by uncertainty in the export position. In the first place there is no threat of disciplinary action against those who might reject official advice, and no suggestion of radical change in agricultural organisation as a whole. For the present at least the State has protected farmers from the normal economic consequence of closing markets, namely, falling prices which might stimulate them to switch over to alternative crops, and has not yet provided an alternative artificial compulsion. In the second place, it is clear that no possible readjustment along the lines at present announced by the Government or contemplated by the farmers can avoid an urgent problem of surplus goods, more especially meat and butter. Cool storage capacity has been greatly increased, which will give a breathing-space but no ultimate solution. There is not much hope for expand-

ing the home market, which already consumes a very large amount of meat and butter per head of the population. Prospects in various relatively small overseas markets would be considerable if means could be found of conveying our foodstuffs without refrigeration. The meat-canning industry is developing fast, and research workers have accumulated a good deal of evidence on the possibility of sending pure butter-fat and other concentrated products. However, it remains to be seen how fully such technical possibilities can be exploited in practice, especially since they must involve loss of productive efficiency in highly developed industries, and could scarcely lead to sales at prices approaching those to which everyone has become accustomed.

IV. Stabilisation

WAR-TIME economics have demonstrated even more clearly than the 1938 financial crisis that there are strict limits to New Zealand's power to shape her own domestic economic policy. There has been framed within these limits a policy which is clear in intention, if not in concrete detail, and also is in harmony with the strong humanitarian tradition of her social experiments. Its genesis has already been noted in The Round Table,* and the basic problem outlined —that the people's purchasing power remained high while the supply of goods on which it could be spent was falling away. This problem has become intensified in recent months. In 1940, we are told, the quantity of consumer's goods imported was roughly half the corresponding figure in 1938, and a further fall seems inevitable. On March 28 Sir Harry Batterbee, United Kingdom High Commissioner, emphatically confirmed something that Mr. Nash (Minister of Finance) has been saying almost from the outbreak of the war: that we can help the British war effort by reducing our imports to absolute necessities. Further, apart from Britain's unwillingness to supply, the problem of finance has taken an increas-

* See No. 121, Dec. 1940, p. 188; No. 122, March 1941, p. 388.

ingly threatening form. Heavy debt payments are still falling due, including repayments of capital promised before the outbreak of war. Our troops at home and abroad are in constant need of equipment which must be obtained from overseas, and the prices of imports are rising continuously at the very time when our export trade is threatened with drastic restrictions.

On these grounds it was reasonable to expect a sharp and continued fall in imports, creating a shortage in consumer's goods beyond the power of local industry to remedy. True, its production increased fast. But it must satisfy the new demands of our armed forces and even in some instances of the British Government, and further expansion was checked by the facts that much productive man-power had been taken by the army and that its own equipment and much of its raw material had to be imported. In these circumstances the Government was naturally confirmed in its view that to avoid inflation the surplus purchasing power must be taxed away, or withdrawn by indirect means such as the cutting down of public works and the raising of loan money, in the form both of voluntary subscriptions and of a compulsory war loan.

This policy was enforced with energy. Taxation brought in a large revenue (roughly £3,000,000 above the estimates), and the consolidated fund for the year ending March 31 showed a handsome surplus. What was even more significant, advances by the Reserve Bank to the State fell from a maximum of £25,140,000 in October 1940 to £13,500,000 in June 1941, which was almost exactly the figure of August 1939. Apart from war expenditure incurred abroad and met by loans from the British Government, New Zealand returned to purely orthodox finance. It paid its way by taxation and loan money raised from the public, and actually repaid public debt both in London and in Wellington. This financial situation was reflected in the general economic position. Prices in some cases advanced, but this was mainly through the continued rise in the cost of imported goods, and Ministers could quote official figures showing that the cost of necessities had increased far less than in other parts of the Commonwealth.

The Government's war-time financial policy thus achieved its primary objective of monetary stability, and on April 26 the Minister of Finance could claim that "the confidence of financial circles overseas in the Dominion's financial soundness and stability has been completely restored, and our credit in London is as high to-day as it has ever been", quoting as authority an article in the London *Times*. He was also able to carry through a conversion scheme affecting over £21 millions of internal public debt. However, the Government's policy met with considerable local criticism, both from those who complained that heavy taxation was cutting the root of industrial enterprise (a complaint echoed by the Democratic Labour party), and from those who denounced the taxes on wages and lower incomes. Further, stabilisation is after all a defensive policy, essentially designed (in the Prime Minister's phrase) to keep "economic standards intact or recoverable". However soundly backed by rational arguments, it was naturally distasteful to a Labour movement built upon hope of continual progress.

Particular interest therefore attaches to discussions during the annual Easter conferences of the Federation of Labour and of the Labour party. To the suggestion that stabilisation meant penalisation of the workers, Government spokesmen made an energetic reply. True, taxation fell on every section of the community, including the workers; but, said the Minister of Finance, workers found most of their taxes returned to them in the form of social services, and of such benefits as the 5 per cent. increase in award wages in August 1940. Though workers were being urged not to press at present for further increases, all other sections of the people were asked for similar sacrifices. Farmers have been receiving stabilised prices, in spite of their repeated protests that costs have risen against them. Business and professional men, claimed the Government, were being brought into line by a complicated series of taxes; and though the utmost efforts could not prevent a rise in prices, this simply expressed the fact that all classes had to make a real personal sacrifice.

In addition to such arguments there was significant agreement at the conferences that in the last resort standards of life depend on goods, not on money; that the people of New Zealand need never be short of the necessities of life; and that it was the Government's function to insist on a fair distribution. This amounted to a clear endorsement of the basic views expressed by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Finance. Even if there were no ships to take away the produce which crowded the stores, said the former on a previous occasion, there was no reason why one section of the community should bear the entire loss, or why anyone in this country should go short of food, clothing or shelter. Come what might, "the people could be insulated from want in the midst of plenty".

V. The Home Front

SUCH, in broad outline, was the conception endorsed by the Labour party last Easter. Its details were to some extent filled in by the advice given to the conference by the national executives of the Federation of Labour and the Labour party:

> After a thorough and complete examination of the economic position of the Dominion occasioned by the war, and in particular the shortage of shipping, the reduction of imports, the loss of overseas markets, the loss of productive man-power, and the fact that the reduction of consumption goods must produce harmful reactions on the workers' living standard unless steps are taken to meet the position, the executives recommend that the Government be urged to provide for stabilisation of present prices of essential services and commodities, together with the present rates of wages and salaries. This policy will entail:
>
> The maintenance of access to essential foodstuffs, to clothing, to light and heat and shelter, for all.
>
> The maximum availability of goods while stabilising prices of essentials.
>
> The fixation of prices for essential commodities.
>
> The rationing of essential commodities where shortage develops.
>
> The ordinary law of supply and demand to determine prices of non-essential and luxury goods.
>
> That where landing costs of overseas essential commodities or raw materials advance, prices on local market be maintained by the payment of subsidy.
>
> The categories of essential commodities to be stabilised to include essential foodstuffs, essential standard articles of clothing and household necessities, rent, public services, fuel and light.

Behind these proposals there lie many months of discussion, in which the most important incident was the so-called Stabilisation Conference which met in September last year.* Some suggestions as to procedure were also conveyed to the Labour party conference by the Minister of Finance, though he did not in fact go far beyond the conference's resolution. The basic idea was plainly to maintain real wages and protect basic living-standards by having publicly announced and fixed prices for those commodities and services which make the ordinary man's current expenditure. Such a policy might involve certain important departures from recent principles of action, including perhaps the abandonment of the attempt to hold down all prices. However, it would be a natural development from the past in view of an increasingly critical situation; and the guess may be hazarded that the speed with which it will be translated into concrete detail will depend upon the clarity with which the public realises the gravity of the issues.

So far, in spite of outspoken warnings by public men, it can scarcely be said that public opinion has fully adapted itself to the increased *tempo* of the war or to the economic problems outlined in this article. There are, however, definite signs of some such awakening. In some quarters this has, from the beginning of the war, been expressed as criticism of the Government. The 40-hour week has been denounced, a national government demanded (with the suggestion that Labour's affection for party politics is a major obstacle), and the cry raised that a sufficiently firm line is not taken with aliens and conscientious objectors. In view of this tendency, therefore, there was some special interest in a conference held in Welling-

* See The Round Table, No. 122, March 1941, p. 388.

ton on June 18, when the Minister of Labour (Mr. Webb) met the representatives of a wide range of employers' and business men's organisations. He vigorously denounced recent trends in public criticism, and said that plain facts did not support the charges so freely made. The 40-hour week, for example, he claimed was a bogey: any number of hours could be worked provided overtime was paid, and through the Industrial Emergency Council even this provision could be altered if this were shown to be necessary to the war effort. In no other part of the British Commonwealth, said the Minister, had hours been extended in this way without overtime rates of pay, and this was typical of New Zealand's eagerness to meet the war position. It was therefore surely deplorable that a stream of criticism by individuals and organizations should be allowed to destroy the goodwill necessary to whole-hearted co-operation in critical times. There had been sinners on both sides, he suggested, including perhaps himself upon occasion; but now he appealed for an extension into public discussions of that more generous spirit of non-party co-operation and willingness to look facts in the face which had been clearly shown in the work of such bodies as the Industrial Emergency Council.

This appeal drew a significant response. Delegate after delegate endorsed what the Minister had said, and hastened to repudiate, on behalf of his organisation, the criticisms of which he had complained, while compliments were freely handed to the workers' delegates on the Industrial Emergency Council, who "faced every issue fairly and squarely in free and friendly discussion". In short, there was a wide measure of agreement among all present as to those things which were most important in New Zealand to-day. Reports of the conference made cold comfort for whole-hearted socialisers, but they were encouraging reading for a wide section of the public, who would agree that violence in public controversy, of which no political group has been innocent, is becoming increasingly out of place.

New Zealand,
June 1941.

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION

I

THE future of the world depends on the close co-operation, not only during the war but after it, of the British Empire and the United States of America. Essentially what now binds these two great commonwealths together is that their way of life, their traditions, their freedom, their influence, their power of movement throughout the world, even their trade, are deeply threatened by the aggressive and alien civilisation represented by the Nazis and by Japan, who jointly are making a bid for world power. It is this urgent threat to them which is forcing them together. But though both commonwealths are menaced, the circumstances of each are very different.

The United Kingdom is the heart of the British Empire. If she were completely defeated, Canada, it is true, would be safe under the lee of the United States. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa would no doubt also look for support from that country. The two former might secure it, since the United States could hardly, even at the risk of war, leave these white communities to the tender mercies of Japan. The case of South Africa, with the Germans in possession of Simonstown and whatever other bases they wanted for sea and air command, would be different. As for the rest of the Empire, it would fall to pieces and be seized by the strongest Powers. Therefore all depends on the maintenance of the strength of the United Kingdom. But, as everyone knows though many often forget, the United Kingdom is really one quite small though thickly populated island lying alongside the mass of continental Europe. Its population is only 46 millions as against 375 millions of the population of Europe outside Russia. While the Dominions might carve out each for itself another future, defeat for the British themselves is final, victory a matter of life and death. It is not simply that they are fighting for the

free way of life which has been theirs for so many centuries; it is that defeat would mean complete slavery. If no other means were sufficient, they could be at once starved unless they were obedient to every word of command from their European masters. Their history would cease, their navy and air force disappear, their empire would disintegrate. They would become merely a little island off the coast of the mainland, almost an insignificant appendage to a totalitarian Europe. They must therefore fight to the death. They can never compromise. To compromise with a victorious Germany in control of the whole of Europe would prove itself in a short while to be the same as complete defeat.

It may be said that the United Kingdom can in no case separate itself from Europe, that geography fixes its fate. How can England, now four minutes by air from the coast of Europe, maintain in the face of a world as it will be even fifty, a hundred years hence, a complete independence? Europe, it can be argued—true it may be only after very many years of struggle and disorder—is destined, merely by the inevitable consequences of modern science, to be united or to see its civilisation disappear. From such a Europe, how could the United Kingdom completely separate itself? A united Europe with an air power far beyond anything that the United Kingdom could ever command could overwhelm this small island without difficulty. However much we wished to be separate, and even with powerful allies across the seas, should we not live on sufferance? Must the United Kingdom not be content to forget her ancient glory, her dominion over all the oceans, and to play such a modest part in a unified Europe as her size and population justify?

Europe, it is true, is not united, and may not be for long generations, if ever. Whether indeed civilisation and freedom on that continent are best to be maintained by forcing nations so disparate into a single mould is far from certain, and at any rate lies with the unknown future. Yet, whatever that future, the dilemma which has for centuries faced the British people confronts them now more acutely. By geography they almost

belong to Europe, but by their oceanic history they have been led away from Europe to be concerned with the whole world. What are to be their relations—and the relations (for instance) of the United States through or with them—to Europe after this war? How, in brief, is the German problem to be ultimately settled?

But however the dilemma may be resolved, the British have now no choice. They must resist to the death conquest by Hitler and their own enslavement in Hitler's Europe. They must fight to maintain their own individuality and their empire. They must fight to preserve liberty in Europe and they must hope, after victory, to be the bridgehead between the free nations of Europe and the free nations of the outer world. England therefore battles both for her ancient institutions and also for her very life.

What about the United States? To the American people the issue seems much less clear, and the interest of the United States in the struggle different from that of England. The United States is a vast continental Power, far away from Europe, far away from the chief centres of Asia. It is no wonder that, whatever the President or whatever the strategists may say, a Middle Westerner should regard his country as impregnable and believe that if it arms sufficiently (as it can and will arm) no power on earth can hurt it or him. Moreover, the United States has not a homogeneous population like that of a European state. It is a vast, loosely united conglomeration of races, by no means yet fully absorbed, and many of them hating the idea of entanglement once more in the affairs of the world. The conviction that the United States is greatly, indeed profoundly, concerned in the outcome of the struggle spreads slowly, the more slowly because of the unparalleled opportunities afforded by the American Constitution for political obstruction. Yet the truth is that there is hardly any limit to the consequences to the United States of a complete victory of Germany and Japan over the rest of the world.

Those two countries would by this victory fall heirs not only to the dependent British Empire, but to the French,

Dutch and Belgian Empires also. They would hold practically every strong naval and air base outside the continents of North and South America. They would occupy Gibraltar, Suez, Simonstown, Bombay, Singapore, the Falkland Islands and other strategic world positions. By this very fact they would limit the influence of the United States Navy almost entirely to home waters, since, against strong offensive and defensive air protection at these bases, conquest by a fleet based on distant ports would be virtually impossible. Thus the power of the United States Navy far from its own shores, at any rate beyond the shores of South America, might be small. Indeed, even the fate of the more distant parts of South America might well hang in the balance. It must always be borne in mind that, while through the influence of a common name the Argentine and Brazil as parts of the American hemisphere are regarded by the American people as " neighbours " of the United States, in fact New York is farther away from both than it is from Liverpool, indeed even from continental Europe.

But it is not only the strategic position of the United States which would be profoundly affected by a German-Japanese victory. Many good judges believe that the victory of Nazism throughout the world would lead very quickly to the development of totalitarianism in the United States. If free institutions were to disappear everywhere else, it is doubtful to what extent they could endure in the United States, with a population so much less united than those of the ancient states of Europe. It is not by a deep unity of feeling—such, for instance, as the English have—that the political fabric of the United States is held together. It is held together by what may be called the American idea of life, and by what has hitherto been a very widespread respect for the American Constitution and for constitutional law. But if it were clear that Hitler's complete victory had been due to the uncertainties and procrastinations arising out of the weaknesses of democratic government, and particularly out of very glaring weaknesses resulting from the peculiar form of the American Constitution—if it were

clear that an immense effort had still to be made against Germany and Japan by the American people, now alone and unaided, then very many patriotic Americans might prefer to save their country by a form of government stronger for action, rather than let the Administration continue to be thwarted from any effective course by the existing disunity between executive and legislative power, and by the endlessly obstructive tactics of a few politicians representing a very small section of the population. If such a critical moment were to arrive in American history, no one can foresee the outcome.

Not only therefore do all the generous instincts of Americans urge them to help those who are facing Hitler, but both externally and internally there are, in fact, the strongest reasons why the United States should devote every ounce of its power to the struggle. Hitherto very many Americans have been guided first by their belief that "aid to Britain" and "aid to the democracies" would be all the contribution which they would be called upon to make, and secondly by the profound and widespread distaste of what is strangely enough called a "shooting war". If it were true that public opinion as a whole was persuaded that they should be in the war, in other words, that their vital interests were concerned in the outcome, then it cannot be said that the country's attitude has been heroic. But the truth is that public opinion has been confused, hesitant, divided, not clearly led, almost pathological, and in these circumstances has sought for excuses for inaction rather than action. A nation more violent by character than the British has appeared soft and pacific; soldiers certain when trained and in battle to prove themselves man for man a match for any, others have shown a poor morale, believing that they are to be kept training for years but are never to fight. The whole American scene has in fact been confused in the extreme, reflecting the many and conflicting elements in the nation itself. But the time of confusion seems to be passing, and the time of action to be near. If so, the United States will have to put forth, and undoubtedly will

put forth, far greater efforts than now, involving sacrifices on the part of the civilian population of which the people have as yet no conception.

The character of the aid which they have been giving to the democracies, and particularly to the British Empire, is in itself a sign of the inconsistency of the country's attitude. If the American people are not themselves deeply interested in the struggle, then they have given "aid to Britain" on a scale more lavish and generous than any people in history have ever given in war to any belligerent. If, as their Government constantly reiterates, their own vital interests are concerned, then they have not done nearly enough, not for us but for themselves. This is no reason why the British people should not know and be grateful for the noble assistance which the United States has given and is giving them. Without this aid from the American people we could not possibly continue to fight the war on the scale on which we are now fighting it. They give us indispensable help in providing food of the value of (say) £150,000,000 per annum, indispensable help in having handed over for our use 2,000,000 tons of their merchant shipping out of a total of 7,000,000 tons, thus deranging their trade in many parts of the world, indispensable help in repairing a very large number of our naval vessels and merchant ships, help which will prove indispensable before long in spending billions of dollars on armaments. The results of revising the Neutrality Act are unmeasurable.

Nevertheless, to beat Hitler more is required. The all-important decision which the British and American Governments must be persuaded to reach is to plan *now* to outbuild and far outbuild possible German armaments, so that in a year or eighteen months' time our weight of armament will be much greater than theirs. That at least is a condition of victory. Another condition is that the men must be found to use them. But is it to be over-optimistic to believe that from the British Empire, from Russia, from the United States, from the conquered countries of Europe, all of these burning to avenge their conquest, men and means can be

found to use arms if they are there? Once the United States and the British Empire were both in a position to exert their whole strength, with the effect of the hatred for Hitlerism felt by almost the whole world becoming more and more apparent in its results, it would be surprising if German morale were not to weaken and the tide of war were not to turn.

Meanwhile there is little or nothing that can be done from this side to hasten the final American decision. That is a matter for the American people themselves. No one expects, or should expect, an outright declaration of war. In any case, while the moral value of the United States being in the war would be immense and in the end overwhelming, the actual fighting value—outside the naval sphere—of their participation must remain limited for a long time, since relatively they are at least as unprepared as we were at the beginning of the war. The British Empire must therefore continue to rely on itself to the utmost possible extent. It still remains true that it is on its resistance and its power of striking back that everything depends.

II

WITHOUT the help of the United States in the form in which it is now being given, the British Empire would not be able to win a complete victory: With the full co-operation in war of the United States, Hitler will be beaten. It will be after the victory that the difficult problem of successful co-operation in peace between the British Empire and the United States will arise. It must be solved, since the future welfare of the world will depend upon it. But it will require the fullest measure of wisdom, forbearance, and foresight from both the British and the American democracies.

It is necessary again to stress the very different characteristics of these two great commonwealths. On the one hand there will be a great nation, inhabiting a vast continent, which has been impelled by motives of self-interest to take part with extreme reluctance in a tremendous struggle, but whose

strongest traditions are against entangling alliances and whose people will undoubtedly hope that with the return of peace they will be able to leave the rest of the world once more to its own devices. On the other hand will be a small island, lying alongside Europe, and depending for its continued existence as a free nation upon the fate of Europe and, particularly, on the future treatment of Germany. This small island is the centre of a group of self-governing nations and also of a great empire, with possessions and responsibilities in every part of the world. The British nation has generations of experience in co-operating with other free peoples in far distant parts of the world, and in governing dependent countries not able to stand by themselves. The American nation has practically no such experience at all, and has neither the institutions nor the political outlook to fit it very well for either task. It will, too, in the coming years be faced with internal problems which are likely to absorb very fully its energies.

Moreover, the difficulties of the past will add something to the difficulties of the present. Justly or unjustly, the British have a hard row to hoe in the United States. The history of American foreign policy is in the main a struggle with the British, and suspicion is more easily aroused against them than against any other nation. The two wars which are remembered are the Revolutionary War when the American nation was founded on the defeat of the British, and the Civil War in which the British Government and most of the British people took up an attitude antagonistic to the side that fought successfully to preserve the nation's union. Past history has forced Americans to fight more—and for good or ill to live closer—with the British than with any other nation, while at the same time ignorance within each country of the other has led to mutual misunderstanding. There will be special circumstances and causes of misunderstanding at the end of this war, which will require very careful treatment. While therefore the closest co-operation will be essential, it is of the highest importance that no false step shall be taken, and no

machinery devised in haste which will not bear the strains that must fall upon it.

Co-operation with the United Kingdom means co-operation with all of the British Empire and part responsibility for the future stability of Europe, a responsibility which the American people have hitherto regarded as entirely outside the bounds of reason for them to accept. Yet it is certain that if disaster is not to overtake the world again, the United States must, however reluctantly, now take its full share of this responsibility. It is equally certain that participation in these tasks is not best to be secured by "Union Now", "Federal Union" or any other plan of creating a federation to unite under one Government the United States and the self-governing countries of the British Empire. Those who know the United States are aware that any such project would at present be entirely impracticable. No organic federal union has been found possible between the nations of the British Empire. There is still less reason to believe that it would be practicable in the case of the British Empire and the United States. No one aware of the current of American public opinion and the character of the United States Congress would suppose, for instance, that the sweeping amendments of the United States Constitution which would be required could be secured. Let us do everything to foster the closest collaboration with the United States by the same means which have been found successful between the British nations. But in this sphere, above all, more haste means less speed. We must try by joint efforts to solve the pressing problems which immediately arise, rather than start by such a stupendous experiment. A cordial and well-founded co-operation between these two great commonwealths would undoubtedly serve as a magnet to the freedom-loving nations of Europe now enslaved. Their adherence would form a strong base, from which ultimately freedom might be once more restored to the rest of that continent. But some kind of limited federation between (say) the United Kingdom and Holland and some other Western European nations would be far more

practicable than federation between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The greatest of after-war problems will be, first, to establish conditions by which peace can be maintained and, secondly, though this is in reality an integral part of the answer to the first, to provide employment and security for the populations of the United States and Europe. The former requires the complete supremacy of Anglo-American military forces, and particularly naval and air forces; the latter requires the maintenance at all costs of the stability of exchanges, currencies and prices in the main trading countries of the world.

The first object should be easy to attain, though less easy to maintain. But military supremacy is only the first step towards the principal aim, which must be some approach towards a solution of the European and particularly the German problem. In the vast flux of world affairs who can say what aspect the German question will wear at the end of the war? To take one example, the future relationship of the German and Russian peoples is, notwithstanding their present desperate struggle, quite obscure. Is Russia to remain a bitter and powerful enemy of Germany, and thus force her towards the West? Or, with the disappearance of Hitler, might the German and Russian peoples unite in a common friendliness, with unforeseen consequences to their neighbours? Nothing is impossible. Two things seem certain if the war is won by the democracies: first, that Germany must be strictly controlled for an indefinite period by them, and, secondly, that a policy of repression alone cannot be permanently successful, and that a return of Germany to Western civilisation must be built on the support of strong elements in Germany herself.

It is at this point that the political merges in the economic question. Whether Europe and indeed other countries are to have a chance gradually to enter calmer waters, or whether the post-war world is to stagger into still deeper revolution and chaos, depends more than anything else on the provision of work and security for their populations. If there are to be vast hordes of unemployed, widespread revolutionary move-

ments must certainly follow. The essential condition for avoiding great unemployment is, as already stated, the maintenance of the stability of each country's exchange, currency and price level. Only thus can there be built a firm framework within which the production and exchange of wealth internally and internationally can take place. With such stability and with confidence in peace, recovery should be rapid; without it, nothing but disaster can be expected. All reconstruction plans which do not start from this foundation are without value.

But it is just here that British and American ideas will be difficult to reconcile. The United States will be the great creditor nation of the world, anxious to sell its products freely to every country and insisting, as Mr. Hull does now, that the principle of "no discrimination" shall rule in all international trade. Particularly the American people will feel that, having lent us billions of dollars, they are entitled to expect the most favourable terms of trade from us, and that we should readily absorb large quantities of American exports. We, on the other hand, shall be faced with the ineluctable necessity of making both ends of our balance of payments meet. To suppose that the stability of sterling can be maintained without exceptional measures and without strict exchange control is to be guilty of the rashest folly. No British Government could afford to take the enormous risks involved. So difficult will it be for us, with our very greatly reduced resources, to buy from abroad what is necessary for any reasonable standard of life, that we shall be driven to give preference to purchases from those countries which will buy from us. Such a policy, it is feared, will at present meet with great opposition in the United States. Nothing therefore is more important than that the British and American Governments shall set themselves to achieve some sort of mutual understanding and to work out some plan upon this matter, fraught as it is with the possibility of all sorts of mischief.

Much would be gained if it were generally accepted that the whole world's economic welfare will depend, not only on there

not being countries which cannot pay their way or buy more than they sell, but also on there not being countries that sell more than they buy: in other words, that it is equally blameworthy for a nation to have a surplus on its balance of payments as it is to have a deficiency. Just as armament security for one nation must necessarily involve insecurity for another, so in international trade one nation's surplus must necessarily imply another nation's deficit, and, in the nature of the case, the other nation must be a weaker nation. Thus the surplus of a strong creditor nation places on the weak debtors the whole burden of adjustment, either through currency depreciation or through a deflation, which must bring about not an increase but an actual diminution of international trade, setting up a vicious spiral of even greater reduction, as was so disastrous in 1931 and after. The first duty, therefore, of the stronger nations is to buy sufficiently the products of other and economically weaker ones, so that neither the former have a surplus nor the latter a deficit.

If once this problem is clearly understood it should not be too difficult, with goodwill on the part of both the British Parliament and the United States Congress, for the countries chiefly interested to devise international remedies which, while they may go against some accepted ideas, must, since they will bring about an increase and not force a diminution of international trade, be for the benefit of all parties. If the two commonwealths unite in maintaining both peace and economic stability, and understand the necessary measures which are essential to those ends, there will be good hope of a better world. If on the other hand they allow misunderstandings, particularly in the economic sphere, to destroy their unity and obstruct progress, the greatest optimist must regard the future with alarm.

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR. IX

I. The Climax of the Continental Strategy

THE Russian campaign has developed so extraordinary a character that there is a tendency to regard it as a thing in itself, an event without a context. The extent of the battle-front, the long continuance of most intense fighting, the weight of the attack, the persistence of stubborn resistance on the part of Russia despite the apparent inequality that exists between her and the German armies, and the steady shrinkage in the manœuvring room before Moscow, which has come to be regarded as the symbol of the Russia of to-day, make up a complex of emotional stimuli that almost inevitably betrays the reason. Under its impact it has become fatally easy to depreciate all but the Russian effort, and to ignore all operations beyond her battle-front.

This is entirely to misconceive the campaign, and the misconception finds no adherents in responsible German circles. It may be approved for the sake of propaganda, but the technical view is very different. A reasonably fair statement is given by a naval writer in *Das Reich*. In this article the writer, after pointing out that the operations on the eastern front are "revealing themselves as a struggle against England", goes on to maintain that the destruction of British sea power is the only success that will bring victory. The defeat of Russia is merely an antecedent condition, necessary indeed for victory, but only indispensable as enabling Germany to meet the main enemy, Britain. This article, it is important to note, was published in September, when the Russian campaign had been under way for nearly three months, when the outlook seemed encouraging and the nature of the possible gains had been fully explored. It might be imagined that such a standpoint, natural to a naval officer, is not necessarily endorsed by soldiers. This however cannot be maintained, since the most

distinguished of German present-day strategists, von Rundstedt, says:

> Land power is useless if not coupled with the command of the sea. But sea power alone can strangle a continental Power in the long run.

This is not a mere *obiter dictum* thrown out lightly under a momentary impulse. It forms part of a study of the trend of the last war; published in his lectures to the Staff College, it represents his mature opinion.

The operation of sea power has not declined in importance through the campaign on the eastern front. It has had to assume a new rôle and fresh responsibilities. The northern flank of the naval control has henceforth to include the waters of the White Sea and Archangel, to check the shipping traffic of the enemy to the north of Finland and to assure protection to a much greater volume of sea-borne commodities to the Persian Gulf. With the creation of the eastern front, on the other hand, the theory upon which the Allied strategy rests is at length seen in full flower. The investment of the enemy is finally complete. The navy holds the line from the Mediterranean to Archangel, whence the Russian front continues it to Transcaucasia; there the Imperial front carries it to the boundaries of Libya, where at the time of writing battle rages.

It is the operation of sea power that makes possible the maintenance of a front so far from the main base. If it should be weakened, overseas operations would be to that extent limited, and even the maintenance of active resistance in Russia would be prejudiced. Its offensive side may fail to secure adequate recognition, but it is clear that in making the enemy's communications with North Africa precarious and the sea-borne traffic of the North Sea perilous it is damaging his power as effectively as by a land attack. The supplies and war material are no less destroyed when they are sunk, the troops killed as effectively by torpedoes and bombs as by shot and shell.

The period under review has seen an extension of this offensive side and the development of the skilful co-operation

of ships and aircraft in exploiting it. It has seen further a notable fall in the Allied shipping losses. This campaign which has come to be called the Battle of the Atlantic is merely, to quote again the article in *Das Reich*, "the projection of the struggle against the British motherland and the British bases overseas—the greatest and most decisive battle of the war". It is sea power that has from the first been the foundation of the Allied strength. It made British intervention on the Continent possible. Without it there could have been no campaigns in Libya or Italian East Africa. Every moment and every movement of every day is dependent upon its active functioning; to ignore its paramount rôle is to do an injustice, no less grave because it is unconscious, to the sleepless vigilance and readiness to give battle that assures it. The King's ships may founder without evoking more than a transient thought, yet the brave men who go with them fall with the same nobility and in the same cause as their brothers who fight on land. It is a considerable battle that sees in a morning the death of 1,300 men; but the crew of the battle-cruiser *Hood* reached that number and their passing was almost unnoticed. The war is one, and the operation of British sea power is an essential and very powerful part of the British contribution to the enemy's defeat. The loss of *Ark Royal* and *Cossack* suggests the hazard its maintenance entails, and the sinking of 14 enemy troop and supply ships with four escorting destroyers in the Mediterranean is but the dramatic expression of its achievement.

II. The Russian Campaign

THOUGH it increasingly tends to evade recognition, it is necessary to recognise that this is the background against which the moving drama of the Russian struggle is being fought. In the middle of August, the Germans were engaged in exploiting the success Marshal von Rundstedt had won through his opportunist adapting of the operation which had been designed to effect the capture of Kiev. The armoured

force which penetrated to the suburbs of the city and had been driven back towards the south-west moved to the rear of the Russian armies that were manning the centre of the southern front. Marshal Budenny's right flank was firmly holding below the Pripet Marshes, well to the west of Kiev. His left was on the lower Dniester. But in the neighbourhood of Uman a considerable force was under heavy attack from the west, at the same time that von Kleist's armoured group was closing in from the east. This force was surrounded; the "battle of annihilation", the battle of Uman, was announced as concluded on August 10, and von Rundstedt applied himself to the congenial task of extracting the full advantage of the disorganisation in Budenny's group consequent on the loss of several divisions and the weakening of others. But his opportunity was not without its handicaps. The breach in the Russian centre was incomplete, and the disorder was reflected in the communications of his own armies. While intensive efforts were being made to clear up the situation for a renewed attack upon Kiev, the scene of major operations was transferred to the northern front.

The German and Russian armies were operating upon entirely different strategies. With the possession of the strategic initiative and the ascendancy of the tactical offensive the German armies could strike where they would over a front of about 1,000 miles with the practical certainty of securing an initial penetration. The formidable momentum of an advance was pointed out by Foch to the British commander-in-chief at a critical moment in the first battle of Ypres; but that aspect of a successful attack is exaggerated by the German practice of putting their full force into the initial blow. An adaptation of the principle of the economy of forces, this might be as disconcerting in case of failure as it is devastating in success. Throughout the campaign in Russia the German Staff fought on these lines and, success once achieved, it was exploited until the resistance and the difficulties of supply brought the advance to a stop. The Russian strategy was based on the intention of bringing the enemy to a standstill

by exhaustion. Its means to achieve this was the strategic defensive carried out under cover of the most vigorous counter-attack. Clausewitz holds the defensive to be the stronger form of war. How far the modern practice of war has written its reservations upon this thesis can be seen in the development of the Russian campaign. It is certain that the Germans have won their successes by attack and that the Russians have reached their present situation by adhering to defence. In so far as they have succeeded in their main purpose it is by means of counter-attack.


The German armies set out to destroy the Russian armies in the field, to make it impossible for Russia to raise fresh armies by occupying the territories that supported her war effort, and so to crush her will to continue the struggle. Territorial objectives inevitably figured in their plans, since Russia's war potential depends upon certain parts of the country rich in natural resources and developed industrially, and since the supplies upon which her armies fought reached them along certain communications. From the beginning, therefore, the German armies aimed at cutting the Russian communications; and it became increasingly clear as the campaign developed that Moscow, the main centre of the communications of European Russia, would for that reason be the chief territorial objective. To-day, more than ever, the strength of an army is the strength of its communications. In striking at Moscow, therefore, the Germans were aiming at the Russian armies, and only in a secondary sense at the territory which supplies them, since this will inevitably fall into their hands once the armies are defeated. It will be remembered that on the evening of July 13 the official German News Agency announced that "the route to Moscow is open and no further natural or artificial barriers intervene". Conquerors tend to be defeated by their victims, and here Germany is found taking the same fatal attitude towards defences that had betrayed France.

But it was not long before the Germans came up against the real barriers on the route to Moscow. Smolensk was only evacuated on August 11, and while major operations were

being prepared against Kiev and Moscow the attack upon Leningrad was launched. It was stated to be "immediately threatened" in the announcement already referred to, but terms have a way of becoming a debased currency in German reports. The purpose of the attack was not so much the capture of the city itself, as the city in its rôle of support to the main Russian armies. Marshal Vorishilov, the commander-in-chief of this sector of the front, was to be faced in the development of the attack with a dangerous dilemma. Marshal Ritter von Leeb, who is only less famous as a strategist than von Rundstedt, intended Vorishilov to be presented with the choice of locking up his armies in Leningrad and leaving them to be reduced by siege, or of leaving the defence of the city to a garrison, in which case he hoped to storm it easily. In either case it was thought that not only would Leningrad fall to the double encirclement which is the core of German tactics, but that it would also be possible to develop the northern flank of an enveloping attack upon the central group of armies. It seems possible that the attack at Gomel which took place about the same time was intended to form the platform for the southern arm of the envelopment, and that it was only developed in a southerly direction when the advance north-east towards Briansk was checked, and when it was seen that Vorishilov had evaded the dilemma and that the fall of Leningrad was still far off.

The outer defence of Leningrad was the Estonian force, which appeared to be always retreating and yet always in being. In the third week of August it was announced that the German armies west and east of Lake Peipus had joined hands between the lake and the Gulf of Finland, and Kingisepp, which lies 14 miles east of Narva on the railway leading to Leningrad, was captured. This claim had been made nearly two weeks before, but now it was substantially true, and with the occupation of the land bridge between Lake Peipus and the Baltic the first stage of the envelopment of the Russian forces in Estonia was complete. The Germans had been steadily advancing along the Tallinn (Revel)–Kingisepp–

Leningrad railway, and the capture of Kingisepp was the climax of a fortnight's bitter fighting. They now began a general advance which developed into a concentric attack upon Tallinn. The Russian forces were inevitably driven into the Estonian ports of Haapsalu, Baltiski and Tallinn. The Baltic



By courtesy of "The Times"

fleet still controlled the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic islands were still in Russian hands and, though the resistance was doomed by all the logic of the position, in Estonia as elsewhere the outmanœuvred troops fought on defiantly. Vorishilov even reinforced his garrison from the sea, in spite of the attacks of German naval units. Similar attempts at landing Germans fared worse and came to little, though they were not abandoned until the purpose that inspired them had been realised in other ways.

In the fourth week of that month the immediate attack upon Tallinn began by land, sea and air, but it was only after four

days of the heaviest fighting and only when the bulk of the forces had been evacuated by sea that the base was evacuated. The rearguard with a considerable amount of material fell into German hands. The loss of Tallinn was a severe blow to the Russians, because so long as they could maintain even the coast of Estonia they could hold off every attempt to restrict the mobility of the Baltic fleet and to operate against Leningrad from the sea. Baltiski fell with Tallinn. A few days later Haapsalu was captured, but when all seemed over the Russians stubbornly fought every mile of advance along the shore, assisted by coastal artillery and the guns of the Baltic fleet. It was not until September 5 that the Germans claimed that Estonia was clear of the Russians, and even then, when the back of the resistance was broken, the Baltic islands remained in Russian hands. Attempts were made upon Oesel and Dago, after capturing the smaller islands Mulu and Vormoi that lay between them and the mainland. Landings were effected in the third week of September, but over a fortnight later a part of Oesel was still holding out, and not until October 21 was Dago captured.

This stubborn resistance, though it appeared to be a self-contained campaign, played its part in the defence of Leningrad. When Kingisepp was evacuated, after the Germans east and west of Lake Peipus had joined hands, they stated that the pressure on Leningrad was "visibly increasing"; but in point of fact it was not until three days later that Kingisepp was claimed, and by that time the first real successes in the attack on the city were obvious. The positions between Lakes Peipus and Ilmen were heavily fortified, and before any considerable advance could be made von Leeb's forces had to secure elbow room. They exerted their pressure towards Novgorod, which lies some 50 miles from the railway line that connects Leningrad and the capital, and heavy fighting took place in that direction and on the neck of land between Lake Peipus and the sea. Even after the capture of Narva and Novgorod the direct threat had scarcely begun to appear, although Vorishilov on the day that they fell called upon the inhabi-

tants of Leningrad to resist to the last. The Russians continued to resist with characteristic stubbornness about Kingisepp, and only finally abandoned Novgorod on August 25. But they stood firm south of Lake Ilmen, and the German attacks continued for some time in that direction while they were making headway between the two lakes. Vorishilov even launched a heavy counter-attack south of Lake Ilmen, which if successful might have brought to a standstill at once the German progress to the north. It was held, however, and meanwhile the advance continued to gather coherence and strength between the Baltic and the north of Lake Ilmen. The pace remained slow, owing, the Germans said, to the continuous rain and cloudbursts. On September 1 they inflicted a heavy defeat on the Russians north of Luga and, adepts in exploiting such a situation, their vanguards pressed forward to within about 15 miles of Leningrad. Vorishilov on the following day personally took over the direction of the city's defences.

The immediate attack had now been proceeding for over a fortnight, and the tone of excuse in the German *communiqués* appeared to suggest that greater difficulties had been encountered than were expected. It was even stated that their very success was in part responsible, since the main body of von Leeb's forces was detained in attempting to complete the capture of "encircled" troops. Yet on September 4, held at the approaches to Leningrad, they announced that the encirclement of the city was "nearly complete". The Vologda railway was still open, although the main line to Moscow had been cut; and official Berlin found it prudent to inform the foreign correspondents that Leningrad might fall in a week, or it might be a month. The German Staff however was more optimistic, in spite of a very active and vigorous defence which on September 7 resulted in the Germans being thrown out of several villages. The fighting had now reached a climax of violence in which both sides suffered heavy losses. Vorishilov's operations south of Lake Ilmen were heavily checked, and Leningrad began to experience that almost continuous day and night bombing which is normally the prelude to the

final assault. On September 8 it appeared to have started. Mobile units covered by dive-bombers reached the Neva and entered the fortress of Schlüsselburg on Lake Ladoga, some 20 miles east of Leningrad. It was claimed that, with this advance, all the land communications of the city had been cut, and indeed Schlüsselburg could not have been reached except across the Vologda railway. It stands some 10 or 11 miles to the north of the line, and it was reasonable to conclude that the communications had actually been severed. But it seems to have been a purely momentary operation, and in fact the Germans could not exploit as they wished their very considerable success. They were still announcing their difficulties, and though their claims gave the impression that the fall of Leningrad was near, two days afterwards land communication with the city was possible. Von Leeb was said on that day to have ordered its capture at all costs within a few days.

Vorishilov's manœuvring room had significantly shrunk, but he had resisted the temptation to pen his forces within the city, and his armies were delivering strong counter-attacks against the right flank of the Germans, while the Baltic fleet was bombarding their left. On September 12 the first snows began to fall, and the movement of the German armoured units was slowed down. Nevertheless, two days later they made a further advance and forced their way into the inner fortifications. Now at last it seemed that Leningrad was about to be captured. Taking time by the forelock, the Germans spread abroad the fiction of explosions in all parts of the city. The impression conveyed was the imminence of surrender. But the Russians refused to admit the logic of the situation. The enemy closed in farther, against counter-attacks by heavy tanks. Vorishilov's counter-attack south of Lake Ilmen was bearing fruit, however. Failing of a strategic purpose, it had at least succeeded in compelling a diversion from the main thrust on Leningrad. The Germans struck back to defend their flank and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Russians, but their impetus to the north suffered.

The immediate attack on Leningrad had been in progress

over a month, and it appeared to be impossible that it should now quickly succeed. It was stated that on September 24 the Germans were in the suburbs of Leningrad; but suburbs is an elastic term. There was an unofficial claim to have taken Peterhof, some 18 miles west of the capital, and this may have been the suburb referred to, but it is doubtful if the town was ever in German hands. Oranienbaum, some 12 miles to the north-west, was reported officially as being shelled, which suggested that the Germans were well to the west of Peterhof. There was evidence that the land communications were open, and the Russian attacks south of Lake Ilmen were resumed; and so this attempt to capture Leningrad and turn the northern flank of the Russian central armies died down. Miscarrying as a *coup de main*, it failed for the time completely. The interest had already turned to the south flank, where real victories were being won.

The operations which resulted in the capture of Kiev may be regarded by history as the most elaborate, concerted and successful of the campaign against Russia. It is difficult to discover whether their objective remained constant from the beginning, but at some time in the third week of August it seems certain that von Bock's right flank was being directed to achieve contact with the forces of von Rundstedt in a great movement aimed at the destruction of the southern group of Russian armies. The battle of Uman, which resulted in the capture of a number of Russian divisions, tore a gap in Marshal Budenny's front. Even in a war in which "fronts" had become obsolete, no army can with impunity risk meeting an enemy so forceful and so skilful as the German with its forces separated by many miles. The southern Russian front, if not in that condition, only escaped it through the provision of reserves. Not all the divisions which the Germans claimed to have encircled were captured, and the resistance which those surrounded continued to oppose prevented the exploitation towards the east that would have followed if they had surrendered at once. But, as the operations developed, the enemy forces from the west effected a junction with those on the east,

and the Russians were shepherded towards the south and the Black Sea coast.

Von Rundstedt's very success might have saved the Russians if it had fallen to less skilful hands. His problems, fortunately for Russia, were almost as great as hers. At one and the same time he had to destroy the remnants of the defeated armies and march eastward to exploit the disorganisation consequent on his victory, while attending to the possible reactions on his flanks. He failed to escape completely the disadvantages of attempting too much. He struck at the Russian position on his left flank and captured Korosten. He pressed his advance towards the east, and Kitovograd with Pervomansk fell into his hands. He turned towards the Black Sea, reached it between Odessa and the estuary of the Bug, and directed a column east and west of Nikolaiev. He at once began the encirclement of both ports, but fared very differently in the operations against them. Nikolaiev was evacuated on August 17 but, although the "final offensive" against Odessa was announced two days later and successes in the attack were continually reported, Odessa was abandoned only when the Russians decided that the strategic situation demanded it. The port was evacuated in complete order on October 16, after the Rumanians had suffered such heavy losses in the attempt to take it that General Antonescu thought it his duty to warn his fellow-countrymen of the seriousness of the casualties. Nikolaiev was left as completely ruined as Odessa. Though the Germans attempted to deny it at the time, the truth was allowed to leak out later on.

Kherson, at the mouth of the Dnieper, fell a few days after Nikolaiev. By this time the enemy had made much progress in his advance to the Dnieper from the west. Krivoi Rog, a great iron centre, fell on August 15. The following day *Panzer* units pushed to within 12 miles of Kiev, but were beaten off. The left flank of von Rundstedt's army was still held up by the steadfast defence of Budenny's right, but a week later the enemy had reached the lower course of the river and driven the bulk of the Russian forces across it. The bridge-

head at Cherkasy was seized and, a few days after, Kleist's armoured force captured Dnepropetrovsk and then Zaporozhe. By this bold stroke a considerable number of prisoners was



By courtesy of "The Times"

The arrows show the directions of German pressure just before Kiev fell.

taken, but by a heroic renunciation that has few, if any, parallels in history the Russians destroyed the great dam upon which so much labour had been spent.

There is an organic unity between these events—the deferred dividend of the battle of Uman—and those which

followed, though the latter formed part of a more ambitious operation. The occupation of the Dnieper bridgeheads took place while von Leeb was attempting to secure Leningrad, and it was while that offensive was nearing its abortive crisis that the southern attack was moving toward the success which has tended to shape the sequel. In the second week of August Marshal von Bock suddenly struck at the important junction of Gomel. This town stands on a railway which throws one offshoot to Briansk and Moscow, another towards the line that connects Moscow and Kiev. Lying near the junction of Timoshenko's and Budenny's armies, it threatened a sensitive part of the main Russian organisation. Success gave the Germans the alternative of striking north towards Moscow or south towards the rear of Kiev. Apparently the blow was a complete surprise, and the Germans claimed to have captured a great number of prisoners. The advance was continued north, east and south, in a fanwise extension of the initial penetration. The Germans were held near Klintsi, on the Briansk railway, but towards the east and the south they broke through for some 60 miles and were soon on the upper and middle course of the Desna, which flows west and south to join the Dnieper a few miles above Kiev. The importance of this advance was that it placed the Germans facing the rear of Kiev from the north. By the possession of the bridgeheads in the Dnieper bend, they were already overlooking the rear of the Ukrainian capital on the south. Kiev was, in fine, being brought into position for that double envelopment which forms the basis of German tactical training.

The meaning of the operations was certainly not missed by the Russian Command, and the most vigorous efforts were made to restrict their development. The fighting continued in the Gomel area for many days after the town itself had been evacuated; but von Bock had a large area of choice for the exploitation of his success. In spite of this, it is significant that for almost a complete fortnight no success of any moment was claimed by the Germans. Then, with no recognisable context, it was announced that Chernigov on the Desna had


been evacuated by the Russians. This town lies some 70 miles south-east of Gomel and 80 miles north-east of Kiev, and the immediacy of the threat to Kiev was at once appreciated. Chernigov was evacuated on September 12; the following day the right flank army of von Bock and the left of von Rundstedt joined hands, and the operations which led to the cutting off of a number of Russian divisions east of Kiev and the fall of the Ukrainian capital gathered pace. General Guderian's *Panzer* group of von Bock's army co-operated with General von Kleist's armoured units in the south, and Field-Marshal von Reichenau shaped their collaboration with his army. Kremenchug was evacuated on September 14, after a long and bitter struggle in which the Germans lost heavily. This town lies on the Dnieper 160 miles south-east of Kiev, and the Germans at once exerted renewed pressure to widen the breach in the Dnieper defences. On September 16 they were advancing eastward on a broad front, and the next day the final assault upon Kiev began. Von Reichenau had been given a strong concentration of artillery, and after a heavy bombardment the armoured units were sent ahead, closely followed by motorised infantry. The immediate battle for Kiev still continued, but the Russians knew that now its days were numbered, and set themselves to the methodical destruction of all the industrial plant. On September 19 the Reich flag was hoisted over the citadel, and Kiev passed into the hands of the enemy. It was a serious loss morally and industrially, a graver loss militarily because it was the centre of the communications of the southern front. But worse than the fall of Kiev was the plight of the Russian armies. A number of them had been caught in the double envelopment from the north and south. The German columns had joined hands about 120 miles east of Kiev, and though many of the Russian troops fought their way out of the trap many were ultimately compelled to surrender. The southern group of armies, which had escaped complete disaster little more than a month before and had reformed, was in the same plight once more. Poltava was captured on the day after Kiev fell, and the rest of the

month was occupied in the exploitation of the victory, the greatest and most skilfully executed of the whole campaign.

In view of these facts, it is a matter of importance to identify the factor that limited its success. There can be little doubt that the Germans thought they were about to secure at least a partial decision, and instead they found the sorely tried Russian army pulling itself together and setting about the formation of a new "front". There is as little uncertainty that they recognised what had saved the southern flank from complete destruction. Budenny was able to pivot his resistance on the central group of armies, which had been endeavouring to prevent the onslaught upon his front. This Timoshenko was unable to achieve, but it is clear that he robbed it of the power that might have made it overwhelming. Throughout these operations he had been counter-attacking, with the intention, though not the weight and skill, to spoil the southern attack. One of his armies decisively checked the attempt of Guderian to exploit the success at Gomel towards Briansk, and in the remaining days of August the Russians began to develop their attack towards the west. Near the end of the month a German headquarters was captured; a few days later, after a number of enemy divisions had been almost encircled and had suffered heavy loss, the Germans were compelled to retreat under peril of annihilation. At the beginning of the second week of September the Germans were heavily defeated near Elnya, which lies some 50 miles south-east of Smolensk, and were compelled to give ground north-east of Roslavl. They reacted sharply, but Timoshenko was able to develop his movement towards Smolensk on the north as well as the south. The Russians threw back the Germans beyond Yartsevo, only 35 miles to the north of that city, and were threatening investment. Towards the end of September, they compelled the Germans after heavy losses to retreat near Briansk.

In the eyes of the German Staff, however, the position at this moment seemed to be promising. The battle of Kiev was over, and nearly 700,000 prisoners were claimed. The armies of Vorishilov were regarded as so completely defeated as to be

incapable of operations beyond the scope of a local counter-attack. But the central armies, well trained and thoroughly equipped, were still advancing, and though the force of their thrust had been canalised they were still capable of creating



By courtesy of "The Times"

The dotted line indicates the approximate German front on October 14; the arrows show the points of contact a week later.

a diversion and of forming the core about which the northern and southern groups might reform. It seemed that the time had come to wind up the campaign by a decisive attack upon Timoshenko. The capture of Moscow would form an important incident in the operations, and even if a decision could not be immediately secured it would materially contribute to that development, and at worst provide good winter quarters. Hitler's Order of the Day, the paraphrase given in an interview with foreign correspondents and the Berlin statement of October 6, prove that this was the actual outlook. The last

promised that the vast operation begun on the night of October 1 "will carry Moscow in one irresistible rush".

The "gigantic operation", to use Hitler's description, has so clearly failed of its major effect that at the time of writing the detail of its mechanism is still incompletely known. It can now be seen that Timoshenko's counter-offensive had been pushed too far for prudence, but not far enough for safety. A considerable body of his troops lay in the neighbourhood of Smolensk, 70 or 80 miles west of Vyasma. Another body was across the Desna on both sides of Briansk. On the night of October 1 von Bock struck heavily north and south to envelop the armies in both these areas, and with the weight and speed of the attack he secured a rapid and very considerable measure of success. It was already clear, when Hitler spoke on the night of October 3, that the outer crust of the resistance had been broken; but it was a few days before the Germans claimed that several armies encircled in the Vyasma area were approaching their "inevitable annihilation", and on October 8 it was stated that the three armies which were being attacked in the rear near Briansk were threatened with the same fate. In Berlin the announcements began to assume a lyrical tone. It was said that between 70 and 80 divisions were trapped, and even that "Timoshenko has sacrificed the last thoroughly trained and equipped army capable of fighting on the whole Russian front". This statement, however, offered something to every type of mind. The careful and accurate could fasten on the word "thoroughly", the more haphazard on the general impression of a decisive victory.

It is certain that the Germans secured a very considerable victory, but the dimensions were as usual grossly exaggerated and the impression given was false. Numbers of units fought their way free from the German pincers, and Timoshenko extricated his main force. The success of the Germans once more contributed to their embarrassment. Not until October 15 were they able to announce that "the bulk" of the forces engaged in the two enveloping attacks were free for the continuation of the operations, and by this time Timoshenko had

been able to pull his army group together. For nearly a week, trained and fully equipped reserves had been moving up to the front. Briansk was only evacuated 11 days and Vyasma 12 days after the launching of the offensive; and these places are 220 and 140 miles from Moscow respectively. Orel had been abandoned earlier, but is a little farther away than Briansk. Places, of course, are of only relative importance. The armies once defeated, they can be occupied without trouble. But it is impossible to take over-seriously Dietrich's claim of Russia being destroyed "as a military Power", at a time when her armies continued to hold the enemy at bay between 140 and 220 miles from the main gage of success.

The German attack was inevitably focused about the main communications of Moscow. Orel, Briansk and Vyasma lie upon three of them. Rzhev and Kalinin are centres on the other two of the five main railway lines entering Moscow from the west and south, and severe fighting developed about each of these places. Around Kalinin the struggle revolved for weeks. At times the two armies shared the town, at others it lay in the hands of either the Germans or the Russians. Rzhev was captured at the beginning of the third week of October, but it was not until October 28 that the Germans reached Volokolamsk, 70 miles to the east. From Orel the advance was forced against a heavy resistance that left the road strewn with the debris of tanks, guns and German dead. It was on the lines of communication lying in between that the heaviest blows were struck and the greatest advances made. Mozhaisk, only 70 miles from Moscow, was attacked the day after Vyasma was evacuated, Maloyaroslavets (about the same distance from the capital on the Briansk line) only a few days later. These were the nearest points to Moscow, and the resistance that gathered strength in its defence continued to centre in them for nearly three weeks. The front of the attack was a rough crescent between Kalinin and the neighbourhood of Orel. Those two places represented the arms of a pincers movement, and advance from them was skilfully impeded. The most serious thrusts were about Mozhaisk and Maloyaro-

slavets, and when they developed the imminence of the threat to Moscow was recognised. The embassies began to leave the capital for Kuibishev to join a number of the Russian administrative departments. A few days later General Zhukov, the Chief of Staff, was appointed to command first the outer defences of Moscow, and later Moscow and the north, while Timoshenko took over the command of the south.

By this time the offensive had been under way for three weeks, and normally such an operation begins to die down. Replacement, repair, the evacuation of wounded and the reorganisation of the communications tend to fetter the advance and bring it to a standstill. Moreover, guerilla operations had now become a major problem. It is astonishing in such circumstances that the offensive was continued; but in the third week of the month the Germans, on the sector directly facing Moscow, even secured a further penetration and reached to within 40 miles of the capital, while at Kalinin, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga, some 40 miles to the south-east, street fighting was in full swing. In the following week the Germans extended their grip on the Rzhev road to Volokolamsk, and from Orel into Tula. The struggle welled over the main lines of communications to the rivers that cross them, the Nara and the Oka. But there was no significant change in the position, and if the persistence of the German drive upon Moscow was astonishing, no less remarkable was the Russian reaction. The central armies had suffered a terrible blow, but although the battle front had moved much nearer the capital the resistance appeared to be as stubborn as ever and was conducted with evident skill. Indeed, the front appeared to be hardening to stability, and the interest had again moved towards the south.

After the fall of Kiev and the battle with the enveloped part of Budenny's forces, von Rundstedt again set himself to extract the utmost advantage from the defeat of his adversary. German infantry had crossed the lower Dnieper and reached the Sea of Azov in the fourth week of September, and a number of divisions with tanks and artillery were directed against the

Crimean peninsula. The isthmus which joins the Crimea to the mainland is only about 5 miles wide at Perekop, and the necks of land between the lakes beyond vary from one to two miles in width. It was admirable defensive country and should have been easily held. It seems certain that it would have resisted attack if Budenny, realising its importance, had organised the defence more thoroughly. Unfortunately, when he saw the threat growing, he chose to strike from Melitopol at the flank of the advance, and some of his troops were caught once more in an enveloping attack. By the middle of the first week in October the Germans were past the narrows and pressing southwards. Their objective was the reduction of the Black Sea fleet to impotence by the destruction of its main base, Sevastopol. If this fell, only the ports of Novorossisk and Batum remained for its use. The former is not more than 80 miles from Kerch and the eastern extremity of the Crimea. If the narrow Kerch Strait could be crossed, the fleet could be put out of action and the Rostov position turned. At the other side of the strait lies Caucasia. If the Black Sea fleet was rendered useless, it could be invaded in force from the sea, and the Russian communications with the Allies might at once be imperilled. It says much for the fibre of the Russian soldier that these possibilities only came to the foreground during the early days of November.

Meanwhile von Rundstedt was pressing his advance towards the east. It was not until the second week of October that the battle of Melitopol was over. Some of the encircled troops had escaped, some had been compelled to surrender, and the Germans began to occupy the towns on the north shore of the Sea of Azov. A mixed group of German, Italian, Hungarian and Slovak troops was steadily moving eastward to the industrial centres of the Donetz basin, covered by the divisions advancing towards Rostov on the Don. During the third week of the month these troops were sharply checked at Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. There, after a very heavy engagement lasting several days, the Russians were compelled to fall back towards Rostov. About Stalin and Makeeva, 70

miles to the north-west, the Germans were still held. It was about this time that the Rumanians incorporated Transdniestria in Rumania, a temporary extension they had certainly paid for in casualties; but the military successes that would give it permanence had still to be harvested.

In the last week of October the advance into the Donetz basin began to gather definition. Kharkov was evacuated towards the end of the month. It lies less than 80 miles to the north-east of Poltava, which had fallen more than a month before. Timoshenko had only taken command of this front a few days before Kharkov was evacuated, and he inherited what appeared to be a crumbling situation. His first work was to reform, regroup and reorganise the armies, which had suffered a succession of the heaviest blows. Such operations, carried out under the pressure of an active, strong and skilful enemy, are liable to be protracted. He was unable in these circumstances to prevent the advance into the Donetz basin. The upper streams of the Donetz were reached on November 1. Before its big bend towards the east, the river flows in the general direction of the Ukrainian railways. At Kharkov the Germans were little over 20 miles from its upper waters, at Kramatorsk hardly as far from its lower course. Before Rostov they made small headway. The river was in flood and operations were difficult. Yet it was obvious that the Donetz basin was being overrun, and the question which the future (perhaps the immediate future) must decide is when and where Timoshenko can decisively arrest his retreat and give battle with an organised group of armies. This may depend upon the events in the Crimea. It seems certain that, if the Russians had fought half so skilfully and stubbornly at Perekop as they did in the heart of the peninsula, that critical situation could never have arisen. In the third week of November, when the Crimean snows had begun to fall, they were still holding Sevastopol firmly, but were forced to evacuate Kerch. The assault on Moscow was being violently resumed. The Leningrad railway to Vologda had been cut, but the garrison of the city was continually counter-attacking. Indeed, the Russians appeared,

momentarily at least, to have captured the initiative over the northern front.

It would be foolish to ignore that the Russian commanders have been frequently outgeneralled. Their strategy appeared to violate the principle of economy of forces. They used, piecemeal, resources which if thrown into a single massive attack, planned on lines of which Zhukov at least was capable, must have had a profound effect on the campaign. Yet it cannot be said even now that their strategic purpose was void. In spite of all the repeated claims of the German Staff the Russians did not suffer the losses credited to them. The operations were almost as wasteful in material as in men, but it is impossible to determine if the losses in either were gravely disproportionate to the relative resources. When a Russian general said that the campaign would be determined by reserves and that the Russian reserves are inexhaustible, his statement was broadly true. The one point omitted was the factor of training. Time has no fixed loyalties, and it is a question whether the really immense resources in man power can be mobilised and put into the field, fully equipped and trained, with the requisite speed. At least it must be admitted that, up to the present, the Germans have secured no gain commensurate with the cost. The decision has still eluded them.

III. Iran

THEY have, however, brought the war nearer to Britain. With the threat to Caucasia the shadow of a campaign in the Middle East has crept perceptibly closer. Syria and Iraq had been cleared of inimical elements. There remained Iran, which is the most important of the three. Its northern frontier abuts on Russia. Its south-western and southern frontiers bound waters that are vital to the safety of Imperial communications. On the east its borders run with those of Afghanistan and Baluchistan, which form the approaches to India. On the west it is the gateway of Iraq. Within it lie the great oil territories upon which Britain depends. Through it



By courtesy of "The Times"

runs the most serviceable line of communication with Russia. For all these reasons it could not be tolerated that the Axis centre of intrigue should be driven from Iraq only to find a home in Iran. Russia already had a treaty with Iran providing for her intervention in case another Power should use Iran as a base of operations against her, and she made common cause with Britain against the enemy infiltration which was as notorious as it was sinister. The evasions of Riza Khan's Government at length compelled the Allies to act, and on August 25 the Russians crossed the northern frontier as British and Indian troops entered southern Iran. The movements that followed can scarcely be judged entirely as military operations. Of the Iranian army of some 150,000 men, only a few divisions were fully trained and equipped. Its air force was under 200 aeroplanes, and it had but one armoured brigade. General Quinan was in command of the Imperial forces under the supreme direction of General Wavell.

The actual fighting, never very organised or consistent on the part of the Iranian troops, did not last more than four days. An Indian detachment occupied Bandar Shapur, the southern terminus of the Trans-Iranian railway, on the morning of August 25. Another column landed at Abadan, while a British and Indian force crossed the western frontier from Khanikin and without serious opposition occupied the oil installation at Neft-i-Shah. The Iranian resistance in the south-west was therefore threatened from the north, while the Russians advancing upon Tabriz and Ardebil in the north were moving towards the rear of the resistance facing the Khanikin column. In the advance upon Kermanshah this column had to traverse the Patiak pass, which was covered by guns and Iranian troops; but the British commander had no intention of shedding blood unnecessarily, and while one offshoot of the column moved south-west through Gilan to Shahabad another came down in the rear of the pass from the north. The 100 miles between Khanikin and Shahabad were covered in 48 hours, and with the clearing of the Patiak pass the way was open to Kermanshah, Kazvin and Teheran. The

Russians, also advancing rapidly, were by this time in Tabriz, Ardebil and Lissar on the Caspian Sea. On the following day they reached Urmia. By this time the Abadan area was quiet again; more troops had been landed at Bandar Shapur, and their way of advance was being cleared by gunboats on the Karun river. On Thursday (the fourth day of the campaign) Ahwaz, almost 70 miles up the railway, had been captured by detachments landed from the river, and envoys from the Shah had met the British troops to arrange for a cessation of resistance. On Friday the Russians were in Pahlevi and Meshed on the Caspian, and the next day met the Imperial troops in Kazvin, on the road to Teheran. The Imperial troops were also in occupation of Kermanshah, and the resistance was over.

IV. Supply

THE negotiations to secure the objects in view and to clear Iran of Germans followed a somewhat protracted course, but at length they wound to a close with Riza Khan's son on the throne and a new Allied and Imperial position developing in the Middle East. The campaign as a military operation showed the characteristic converging strategy which General Wavell had found to be so profitable in his other campaigns, and its force was accentuated by the Russian movements. But now that the situation had been cleared the outline of a new front in the Middle East began to appear. On October 21 was announced the creation of two Army Commands dependent upon the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. One of these comprised Syria and Palestine under General Sir Maitland Wilson, while the other under Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham covered the forces in the Western Desert. Both remained under General Sir Claude Auchinleck. General Wavell's writ before ran as far as the western borders of Iraq. Now it inevitably included Iran. The importance of this extension was that the Allied communications ran through Iran. They were imperfect, because the Trans-Iranian railway only went to the eastern edge of the Caspian Sea, and the road

system scarcely added to the conveniences of supply. But poor as they were the communications were almost invaluable, though to reach them from Britain involves a journey of some 11,000 miles. The alternative routes were through Vladivostok and through the White Sea. The former suffered under the handicap of the vast length of the Trans-Siberian railway and its limited carrying capacity. The latter was liable to interruption by the enemy or by the season. Archangel can normally be kept free of ice during most of the winter months, but an interruption of a few weeks might spell disaster. The Persian Gulf therefore came into a new importance.

The problem of supply, vital to the Allied strategy, seldom receives the attention it deserves. In Lord Gort's dispatches, which were published on October 17, there are two passages that should never be forgotten by anyone who has the Allied interests at heart. He states that he had on several occasions called the attention of the War Office to the "shortage of almost every nature of ammunition, of which the stocks in France were not nearly large enough to permit the rates of expenditure laid down for sustained operations before the war". Armour-piercing shells for field guns had not been provided even by May 10, 1940. "There were also deficiencies in technical apparatus for light anti-aircraft requirements such as Kerrison predictors, signal lights, technical and specialised vehicles of many types. . . . It is, I think, justifiable to assume that the presence of the" (note the definite article) "Armoured Division and of a complete Army Tank Brigade would have been an invaluable aid." These are cold and studied words, but if they point a moral they do little more than touch the fringe of the real problem. The Allied theory of victory does not turn upon adequately equipping an expeditionary force of a quarter of a million. To conceive the matter in such terms is to live in a world of illusion. The Germans have mobilised about 9 million men. They have or have had the service of Finns, Hungarians, Rumanians, Slovaks and Italians. Though the losses on the Russian front have been immense, the Axis Powers still command resources in man power that reduce the

British Expeditionary Force in France to the dimensions of one of their nine or ten armies on the eastern front. It is, therefore, not upon numbers we must depend, nor on equally perfect equipment, but upon a great superiority in equipment of all sorts—guns, tanks and aeroplanes.

Such a vista presents problems of a scope and variety to which indeed lip-service is paid, but which are never realised in their full material implications; and if that was the position before Germany attacked Russia, it is vastly worse now. It is true that the loss of the industrial centres of the western Ukraine and the Donetz basin is not so grave as the Germans affect to think. The transference to the country beyond the Volga and beyond even the Urals has been greater than they realise. But if Russia is to continue to play her part effectively in the war against Germany, the balance between the losses in the Donetz basin and the supplies of Eastern Russia must be made good by us and the United States. British and American production had not even remotely sufficed to make good the disparity between British and German equipment before Russia entered the war, and it is doubtful if the increased calls upon it have begun to be appreciated yet by the public mind on either side of the Atlantic. Accessibility is a factor that governs supply. The industrial output of the territory east of the Volga is not actually as great as it seems, since the communications that convey it to the fighting line are so much inferior to those which have been lost. The same consideration applies to the material made available by Britain and the United States. Its actual value depends upon the length of the journey it must make to reach the Russian front, the volume of the shipping required to transport it, the amount of naval support available to ensure its safe arrival and the carrying capacity of the railway lines from the port of unloading. The war, in fine, has invaded the factories. There is nothing more formidable in the German menace than the astounding rapidity with which their Staff recognised the situation in the summer of 1940 and set the factories of the Continent at work in preparation for the present campaign, and the way

n which they have once more mobilised the labour of occupied ountries for next spring. This problem of supply, with its nultiform ramifications already suggested, is cardinal to the Allied victory, and it would be more reassuring if thought, magination and resolution were directed to its solution rather han to the suggestion of strategic decisions without the equisite knowledge. It will indeed be simplified—though not olved—by the revision of the Neutrality Act, the ultimate mplications of which may be much wider than at first appear.

V. The Far East

EVERY development of the war casts us back upon this fundamental problem of supply. The diversions which Germany has been at pains to initiate are indeed designed for hat purpose. The Japanese threat in the Far East is not the east of these. Considered militarily, Japan is simply a question of the number of warships. If the British Navy were twice as arge, the Far Eastern problem would be transformed. As it s, Japan, centrally situated with regard to Asiatic Russia, China, the Malay States, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, is a nation with an impressive fleet. An island kingdom, she would be powerless otherwise. It is not at all clear that in naming the nations threatened the most important has not been omitted. Whether Japan can attack north or south without the intervention of the United States is a question that only the future, perhaps the immediate future, can decide. Mr. Churchill's assurances that, should the United States become involved in war with Japan, "the British declaration will follow within the hour", and that we are now able to provide "a powerful force of heavy ships for service, if needed, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans", cannot fail to have their influence upon a position of apparently growing delicacy.

The reorganisation of the Imperial position in the Far East has now been proceeding for some time. It seems certain that the best has been made of not unlimited resources. Numerous minds have gone to its shaping, and the position must be left

there. While many nations are eager to assist the victor, few are willing to establish even a formidable pretender. The decision will not come in the Far East. It is unlikely that it will be significantly conditioned by any tentatives in that quarter, unless the war looks much nearer its penultimate phase than it does at present.

THE FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE*

I. Diplomacy's Changing Status

WAR is the great revolutionary, and those who have reforms to press or innovations to launch always see in it the chance to have their hopes of change fulfilled. It is most natural that diplomacy should appear to be a particularly fit subject for reform amid the disasters of war, for the soldier begins when the diplomatist has ended. And, since war seems to register the failure of diplomacy, everybody hopes that in future better methods of diplomacy will be found, which will achieve its purpose of controlling the intercourse of nations, solving their problems and regulating their growth, while all the time avoiding war.

The breakdown of peace may not, of course, have been due to defective diplomacy, any more than the death of a patient is necessarily due to the incompetence of his doctor. The diplomatist is the instrument, not the author, of national policy. In the case of Hitler's war it is apposite to recall that two successive ambassadors in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold and Sir Eric Phipps, accurately foretold the trend of Nazi policy; but insufficient account was taken of their warnings by the Governments of the United Kingdom—and, for that matter, by the Governments of the Dominions. It is remarkable that many of those in Britain who now are blaming the diplomatists of the inter-war period, and are to the fore in urging the reform of the Foreign Service, were themselves among the most ardent advocates of that policy of unconditional peace and one-sided disarmament which gave so much encouragement to the Germans.

* "Foreign Service" is henceforth to be the official term embracing the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic and Consular Services.

If, however, they base their claim for the reform of the Foreign Service on more general grounds, they can make a good case. The law of adaptation to new conditions applies to all living organisms. Without any doubt the increase of education and knowledge, and the exploitation of propaganda for national purposes, have rendered even recent ideas and methods of diplomacy out of date. Foreign policy has become the affair of the many. The development is irrevocable, because universal education has spread the study of it to the millions, and because universal suffrage has given to those millions the means of making their opinions felt. The extension of interest in foreign affairs was particularly rapid after the last war, and one of the reasons why its consequences did not flow towards the reorganisation of diplomacy was that the League of Nations came into existence and was by many believed to have taken the place of the Chanceries. The League embodied the principle of public discussion and "open covenants openly arrived at", and became the happy hunting-ground three or four times a year of hundreds of journalists who reported at length, and managed momentarily to interest their readers in, such relatively obscure questions as minorities in Transylvania or the administration of Upper Silesia. The result was that the work of the Chanceries went on comparatively unnoticed and comparatively unchanged. Changes there have been in recent years, as we shall see; but the limelight of publicity was turned upon Geneva, until the political inefficacy of the League had been proved. Then once again attention was switched on to the ambassadors, and they were soon seen in the familiar posture of helpless physicians grouped around the death-bed of peace.

The transfer, or attempted transfer, of diplomatic action to Geneva failed to produce adequate results. This time it may be hoped that a healthier public instinct will demand not the transfer of negotiations to the market-place, but a democratisation of diplomacy itself, in so far as that is possible, and at the least its adaptation to the far wider calls which will inevitably be made upon the representatives of Great Britain in foreign countries.

II. The Old Type of Ambassador

THE idea of the ambassador as the head of a diplomatic family and as almost the sole executive of the embassy has become just a memory of bygone days; but the process of the delegation of work and of authority has to be carried much farther than it has been during the last twenty years. The basic function of an ambassador is to represent the person of his Sovereign to the head of the State where he is accredited. This personal status, as laid down by a *règlement* of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, still retains its validity and its value. But the rôle of the British monarch has been profoundly modified in the course of the last 125 years; and it seems desirable that the rôle of his envoys should be made to conform to the latest and far more democratic conception of monarchical duties. A reinterpretation of their mission is necessary in order to adapt it to the representation of people to people, which they in fact increasingly personate. There have already been several examples of the newer type in the British Foreign Service. When Lord Lothian succeeded Sir Ronald Lindsay in Washington, he embodied the idea of speaking to the whole nation on behalf of Great Britain. Sir Ronald had been a successful ambassador of the older type. He had as far as possible avoided public speaking. He had had little direct dealing with the press. His mission, he considered, was from Government to Government. It was accordingly his duty to establish close and confidential relations with the political leaders of the country and with President Roosevelt; and he undoubtedly performed this duty very well. His successor, without neglect of or detriment to his relations with the official hierarchy, made himself a public figure well known by reputation over the whole of the United States, and personally acquainted with an exceptionally large number of politicians and journalists. When he died, he was popularly acclaimed as a great ambassador. It is probable that history will endorse the contemporary verdict, and Lord Lothian may be regarded as a pattern for future ambassadors not only in Washington but in other capitals.

But the United States is the archetype of a democratic country where education, information and publicity are most widespread and influential. All nations are different and systems of government vary, and although the democratic forms will no doubt predominate in the post-war world, it must not be taken for granted that there will be no further need for the older type of diplomatist, who believes that the more inconspicuously he does his work the more he is likely to achieve results, and that excursions into anything like an address to the nation may be unwelcome to the Government with whom he is dealing and detrimental to his own purposes. The concealment of ultimate aim may always be a necessary expedient of negotiation between diplomatists of different countries just as much as between business men. Nothing could be more disastrous than to imagine that nobody is a rival or that everybody is animated by goodwill. Suspicion, properly controlled, is a useful ingredient. It will seldom be wholly superfluous in Europe and the East, even if elsewhere it may sometimes be misplaced. Certain races have a genius for dissimulation—and one or two of them inhabit Europe. Patience and self-effacement will often be as necessary in the future as they have been in the past.

It is evident, therefore, that what we may call the new school of ambassador will not be suitable for every post; and this brings us to the vital importance of sending the right man to the right place. It might seem to be unnecessary to draw attention to this self-evident truth, but if the administration of the British Foreign Service has blundered during the last two decades it is precisely in this respect. Much too much importance has been given to seniority—the place on the list—and the supposed need to push on younger men. The result has been that ambassadors have been got rid of when they were still efficient and well placed, and vacant posts have been given to others not so well qualified for that particular appointment. Sir Ronald Graham was dropped from Rome on the score of age, and Sir Eric Drummond (as he then was) was appointed in his place. Sir Ronald had the priceless advantage

of having seen the rise of Mussolini and having acquired considerable authority with him, for the young Duce was not well acquainted with foreign affairs and found in the British Ambassador a trustworthy guide. Nevertheless, Sir Ronald was forced to make way at the age of 63 for his successor, whose qualities had won excellent opinions at the League headquarters but were not such as to impress strongly enough the now more assured Mussolini. Another clear example occurred in an appointment to Baghdad. Sir Basil Newton had no previous experience of the Arab world; he is the most cultured type of European diplomatist, with an exceptional knowledge of continental affairs. Apparently for no other reason than that the Baghdad embassy became vacant and he was due for promotion to ambassador's rank, he was sent to a post for which he was not specially suited. Only afterwards was the obvious choice made for Baghdad of an official outside the Service whose career had been spent in the Middle East and who possessed diplomatic qualities.

III. Mr. Eden's Scheme of Reform

THE recruitment of the personnel of the Foreign Service is clearly a most important matter, and it is made the central point of the scheme of reform drawn up by Sir Malcolm Robertson at the instance of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and since endorsed in principle by Mr. Eden himself. Its chief recommendations are that the Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular Services should be amalgamated, and that the field of recruitment should be enlarged so as to include candidates who would in present conditions be financially debarred from entering them. There is to be a specialised set of officers with knowledge of Eastern countries. Keener selection is to be introduced into the process of promotion, and members of the Service who seem unfitted to occupy the highest posts will be retired on a pension at a lower age than is now permitted. There is to be provision for ensuring to heads of missions expert advice on financial and commercial

questions, and advisers on labour and social problems are also to be attached to our missions abroad. The highest posts will be open to all members of the Foreign Service. The scheme is admirable as far as it goes, and should, if carried out, remove some of the defects which have been mentioned earlier in this article. In particular it should finally abolish promotion by mere seniority, and introduce a more flexible system of selection which will take into account not only general ability but personal suitability for the vacant post. Henceforward it should not be regarded as a stigma on a man's efficiency if a vacancy is given to a junior who is known to possess distinctive qualifications for it.

The scheme favours the closer association of diplomacy and economics. Economic questions are indeed certain to play an even more important part in future international relations than in the past. There is extensive agreement that the peace-makers of 1919 paid too little attention to economics, and general determination that, in the peace-making of the future, economic reconstruction will be given a prominent if not the highest place. The steadily growing influence of the British Dominions in world affairs, the devotion of American opinion both in the United States and in South America to the primary importance of international trade and finance, the widespread destruction of the present economic system—all these demand that reconstruction shall be begun, if it be possible, in such a way that the whole world shall ultimately be included in the same economic system. But this ideal will probably take generations to achieve, for at the outset some regional economic barriers will be allowed to stand and even new ones may be raised. It will therefore be necessary that the heads of our missions abroad shall be capable of dealing with those commercial and financial problems which have hitherto been out of their hands. Sir Malcolm Robertson's recommendation that members of the Consular Service shall in future be eligible for ambassadorships on absolutely equal footing with other aspirants should ensure that, in those posts where economic questions are of primary importance, men equipped with the

requisite knowledge will be chosen. The further stipulation that expert advice must be available on commercial and financial subjects should make every foreign mission well qualified to serve both national and international interests. It is eminently desirable that the economic policy of all countries should not be purely national, but should have the common objective of the widest possible prosperity. The traditional reluctance of ambassadors in the past to become commercial travellers for their own country arose partly from the instinctive recognition that general prosperity advances the prosperity of each separate community; and it may be hoped that this motive will never be lost.

IV. Some Criticisms

THE details of the reform scheme have not (at the moment of writing) been published, and it is therefore impossible to say in what respects the new methods of providing expert advice in economic questions will differ from those that already exist. Attached to all the principal embassies are commercial and financial advisers, whose services have been appreciated and utilised by the heads of missions during the inter-war period. The innovation in the reform scheme is that there should also be special advisers on labour and social questions. But these, even more than commercial matters, should be internationally treated; in any case it must presumably be from that point of view that they are to be studied in an embassy. It is difficult to see what the duties of a labour or welfare attaché are to be, except to study and report upon the conditions obtaining in the country where he is posted, and it may well be asked whether this information is not already admirably supplied by the International Labour Office. The League of Nations, broadly speaking, has proved a failure in political but a success in non-political work. It was a mistake to overload it with the work of diplomacy. Let us now avoid the other mistake of overloading embassies with work which is always likely to be most satisfactorily handled from an international centre.

The proposed appointment of labour and social attachés—if this, indeed, is the intention of the scheme—would be a concession to Labour opinion at home, as is also the extension of recruitment to candidates for whose training, even before final acceptance, the State is to make financial provision. The objection to the first concession is that the posts appear to be unnecessary and therefore a waste of public money. An objection to the second is that it is impossible to judge before a man is 25 years old whether in fact he will make a success of diplomacy or not. It is true that at a later stage he will now be more easily dropped, with the solatium of a pension; but it is wholly unsatisfactory, from the national point of view, that a man may be specially favoured with financial supplies from the State to get him into a profession, and then once more provided with State funds to get him out of it. The profession of diplomacy requires certain definite qualities of outlook and character, which the test of a competitive examination does not prove. It is also one in which, even more than in most professions, success can be greatly furthered or marred by the envoy's wife; and it is in general quite impossible to say whether or not a man will be suitable to occupy the highest positions until he has passed the age of 40 or 45.

This is not to say that the Foreign Service at home and abroad should not be thrown open to a wider range of candidates. The criticism suggests rather that the process should be carried still farther, and that a larger field should be taken for later appointments as well as for recruitment. There should be more interchange in the later stages. Whereas the Diplomatic, Consular and Foreign Office services are to be thrown together, they are still, according to Mr. Eden's plan, to be separate from the remaining Civil Services, including the Colonial Office. But a member of the Colonial Service might have excellent qualifications for an ambassador, and it ought to be regarded as possible and even normal to take men from any branch in the public service for the highest posts in any one of them. Normally the best ambassadors will no doubt come from the Diplomatic Service, and the best governors from the

Colonial Service. But it is the present custom to give some of the best governorships to men who have had no training in the Colonies; should not men of the Colonial Service, in their turn, be eligible for embassies? And vice versa, if (as now proposed) members of the Foreign Service are to be dropped because after all they prove to be unsuitable to conduct embassies, should it not be made possible for them to occupy other posts, for which their qualities may better fit them? They would hardly have passed a severe examination against the increased competition of the future unless they had natural talents, and even though there may be material reasons for keeping the Foreign Service administratively distinct, nothing must be allowed to hinder the aim of always being able to find the right man for any particular post. A failure may be merely a misfit. The range of selection ought to be wider in the highest ranks, just as the range of selection is being widened at the bottom. It is even more important to get the right ambassador than to get the right recruit.

V. The Dominion Services

No consideration of the future of diplomacy can be complete without taking full account of the growth of the diplomatic representation of the Dominions, of which there is no mention in the summary of Sir Malcolm Robertson's scheme as announced to the House of Commons, presumably because it was outside his terms of reference. Its growth has been rapid indeed since Mr. Vincent Massey was appointed Canadian Minister in Washington in 1926, and independent representation will assuredly continue to expand after the war. Foreign policy must always have, even in the best-regulated world order, a direct relation to power, and both militarily and industrially every one of the four great Dominions will be stronger. They will count more in a world which will be more deeply imbued with British ideals than ever before in history. Whereas in 1924 the Eire Minister in Washington was the only diplomatic envoy from any part of the British Commonwealth

to have an official residence in a non-British capital, there are now 18 posts (including Geneva and the Vatican City) to which altogether 27 Dominion and Eire envoys are appointed. The following is a list of Dominion representatives possessing diplomatic status in 1941.

CANADA has representatives accredited to foreign countries as follows:

United States	Mr. Leighton McCarthy, K.C.
Japan	Mr. E. D. McGreer (Chargé d'Affaires).
Belgium	* M. Pierre Dupuy (Chargé d'Affaires).
Netherlands	* M. Pierre Dupuy (Chargé d'Affaires).
France †	* M. Pierre Dupuy (Chargé d'Affaires).
Argentina	Hon. W. F. A. Turgeon, K.C.
Chile	Hon. W. F. A. Turgeon, K.C.
Brazil	M. Jean Desy.
China	Exchange of Ministers arranged; appointments not yet made.

In addition, Mr. Hume Wrong is Canadian Representative to the League of Nations; while still holding that post, he is at present also Minister and Counsellor in the Canadian Legation in Washington.

Within the British Commonwealth, Canada has the following envoys enjoying by courtesy diplomatic status in most respects:

United Kingdom	Rt. Hon. Vincent Massey.
Australia	Maj.-Gen. Victor Odlum.
South Africa	Dr. Henry Laureys.
New Zealand	Dr. Walter A. Riddell.
Eire	Mr. John D. Kearney, K.C.

It is, however, a point of capital importance that Dominion envoys in the United Kingdom do not possess rights of exterritoriality. Their residences and personnel are subject to the laws of the land where they reside.

* Temporarily resident in London.

† Until the German occupation, Col. G. P. Vanier, D.S.O., M.C., was the Canadian Minister in Paris.

AUSTRALIA, in addition to having the Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce, C.H., M.C., as High Commissioner in London, has three envoys in foreign capitals:

United States	Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, D.S.O., M.C.
Japan	Rt. Hon. Sir John Latham, G.C.M.G., K.C.
China (Chungking)	Hon. Sir Frederic Eggleston.

SOUTH AFRICA has Mr. S. F. Waterson as her High Commissioner in the United Kingdom and Mr. D. de Waal Meyer as her accredited Representative to Canada, these likewise enjoying diplomatic facilities but not in law possessing diplomatic immunity. In addition she has the following Ministers Plenipotentiary and Envoys Extraordinary:

Sweden	Dr. S. F. N. Gie.
United States	Mr. R. W. Close, K.C.
Portugal	Lt.-Col. F. F. Pienaar, O.B.E.
France	* Capt. C. Bain-Marais.
Netherlands †	* Capt. C. Bain-Marais.
Belgium †	* Capt. C. Bain-Marais.
Greece	* Mr. S. F. Waterson.
Germany ‡	Dr. S. F. N. Gie.
Italy ‡	Dr. A. Heymans.
League of Nations ‡	Mr. H. T. Andrews.

NEW ZEALAND has agreed to exchange Ministers with the United States. She is represented in London by Mr. W. J. Jordan as High Commissioner.

EIRE has diplomatic representation in Vichy, Berlin, Vatican City, Washington, Geneva, Berne, Madrid, Rome and Lisbon, in addition to High Commissioners in the United Kingdom and Canada.

Like all British institutions, the machinery of imperial foreign policy has been built up part by part, as each has

* Temporarily resident in London.

† Until the German occupation of The Hague and Brussels, South Africa was represented there by Dr. van Broekhuizen.

‡ Legations temporarily closed.

been required. The mechanism accordingly presents, like the constitution of the United Kingdom, a haphazard appearance, but serves its purpose well. Every Dominion envoy is a plenipotentiary, appointed by his own Government, and authorised to carry on negotiations with the foreign Government to which he is accredited, independently of the representative of the United Kingdom or of other Dominion envoys who reside in the same capital. The only formal restrictions are that each is acting in the name of the same Sovereign, and that each autonomous Government has undertaken, at successive Imperial Conferences, to inform those other autonomous Governments "that might be interested" of the separate negotiations upon which it is embarking, and to give them the opportunity of expressing their views "if they think that their interests may be affected". Furthermore (according to the Resolution adopted in 1930) no one Government can involve other Imperial Governments in active obligations without their definite consent.

In practice it has been found that the closeness of collaboration in foreign capitals between the different British envoys varies considerably according to the inclination of the Governments they represent and the personality of the representative. Nothing, for instance, could be closer than the partnership between the present Australian Minister in Washington, Mr. Casey, and successive British Ambassadors. The help is reciprocal, and there are occasions when questions of common interest to Australia and the United Kingdom—the Pacific has supplied several—can best be introduced to the American Government by the Australian Minister. But co-operation is by no means always so close, either in Washington or in other places where several British envoys are present. The advantages of not having a rigid uniformity, however, are considerable, as at the present moment in France. Canada, alone of the belligerent British Governments, maintains diplomatic relations with Vichy, and Whitehall has through that connection its surest official information of what is going on in unoccupied France. Another recent example of the interplay

of imperial foreign departments has been given in the Timor Archipelago. The establishment by Japan of an air terminus in the Portuguese part of the island of Timor, to connect with her mandated islands of Pelew, was a matter of immediate concern to the Australian Department for External Affairs, and was presumably taken up by the Australian representative in Tokyo. It also concerned the Portuguese and the Dutch Governments, which share possession of the island. In these cases, if representations or discussions took place (nothing has been made known on this point) the matter would have had to be raised by the United Kingdom envoys in Lisbon and London (The Hague being in enemy occupation), since Australia has no independent envoys accredited to those countries; or the Foreign Office may have taken up the matter on its own account with the Portuguese and Dutch representatives in London.

There are at least two ends to all diplomatic negotiations, and in all Dominion negotiations there are usually three, because they are each represented by a High Commissioner in London, who now devotes much of his attention to foreign policy. He is entitled to approach directly any Cabinet Minister, including of course the Foreign Secretary; but for the sake of convenience in present war conditions, when the study of the whole war situation is pursued by all the Dominion representatives every day, regular meetings are held with the Dominions Secretary, Lord Cranborne. Lord Cranborne attends the War Cabinet, and is perfectly informed of the progress of the war in its military as well as in its more general aspects. He has, moreover, held the responsible position of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and has represented the United Kingdom Government in Geneva, where he regularly met the representatives of the Dominions, India and Eire. The advantage of having a Dominions Secretary who is thoroughly conversant with foreign affairs could not be more convincingly illustrated.

In addition to the channel of communication through the Dominions Office, there is the Dominions Intelligence

Department of the Foreign Office. In a general way it may be said that information passes outward from this Department to the Dominions, and comes inward from overseas via the Dominions Office. But Dominion Governments may communicate directly with the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Secretariat, and every communication either way is, of course, brought to the cognisance of the respective High Commissioners in London. Similarly it may be said that nothing will remain unknown to the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Mr. Eden has *ex officio* the primary responsibility for the foreign policy of the United Kingdom; but every matter, great or small, inward or outward, relating to policy or personnel, will come into the purview of Sir Alexander Cadogan. These are points of contact for every current of information or policy, in whatever direction it flows.

The separate and independent foreign services of the United Kingdom and Dominions are thus dovetailed at both ends, not by law or by compulsion, but by voluntary association and a sense of common interest. The community of interest is clear and incontestable in war-time. It may not be quite so unquestioned in the years to come, when the pressure of external danger has been removed and the individual stature of the Dominions and of India has increased. It is inevitable, for instance, that Australia and New Zealand should look at Far Eastern affairs through rather nearer spectacles than the United Kingdom. Canada will always have her own view and her own special interest in American affairs. In one of the Resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1926 it was laid down that full powers to act for it could be conferred by any Government of His Majesty on the plenipotentiary of another Government of His Majesty which was the Government "mainly concerned". The phrase is significant; it marks and, as it were, endorses a trend that is bound to grow stronger as the authority of each Dominion is enlarged. The Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have supported Great Britain in European affairs, and especially

at the successive crises of her history in 1914 and 1939. Their peoples have come spontaneously from thousands of miles away to uphold the attitude of the United Kingdom in what were originally European quarrels. How easily could Canada have taken a similar attitude to that of the United States, or Australia and New Zealand have argued that the situation in the Far East demanded all their attention! They did nothing of the sort. They came to our help with all their resources. Can it be doubted that the people of these islands would reciprocate the service if one of the Dominions were threatened?

In the present war the independent lives of all are in jeopardy; the war for us is primarily a joint and common effort to ensure the survival of British civilisation. But this natural system of reciprocal support indicates that, when problems in different parts of the world arise in future, the Dominion "mainly concerned" may wish to take the lead and will expect to be supported by the other Imperial Governments.* The broad tendency for Dominions to assume greater responsibility in their own part of the world already exists, and is probably irresistible. But if the good fruit-grower does not resist the growth of his trees, he nevertheless watches and tends and prunes them. Wise statesmanship will encourage the desire for more responsibility; but it will check the naturally separatist tendencies of the maturing independent Diplomatic Services. Much might be done by a regular interchange of members of one into another. It would be as beneficial for members of the United Kingdom service to do spells of duty under a South African or Canadian or Australian Foreign Department as for the member of an oversea service to see Europe from the window of a British Legation.

* Since these words were actually written, the following passage occurred in a message to *The Times* from its correspondent in Canberra: "Australia's claim to full partnership in the initiation and control of Imperial policy in the Pacific is held to be incontestable. . . . While anxious to play a more prominent part in the formulation of policy, Australia will not be found unwilling to shoulder the resultant responsibilities."

VI. Conclusion

IN concluding this survey it may be said—in defiance of the sentiment expressed in its opening sentence—that the British Foreign Service will continue to develop and expand in fundamental conformity with its own traditions, which correspond to the national character and interests. How much it has already developed in the course of the last few decades is perhaps not generally recognised. In a recent article Sir Francis Lindley has described the considerable changes that have been effected within the span of his own career. When he entered the Diplomatic Service it was a quite separate service from the Foreign Office. Staffs were extremely small, and contained no stenographers or typists. The present writer can bear witness that the British Minister in Bucharest at the beginning of this century had no help in the Chancery whatever, except that of a vice-consul who also had his ordinary duties to perform and had from time to time to leave the capital on visits to the Black Sea ports. In 1939 there were six secretaries, counsellors and attachés in the legation, as well as an archivist and a staff of typists; and during the war the numbers have been multiplied several times. Similarly, in Santiago de Chile the Minister Resident at the end of last century had to get through a revolution (in which his house was burnt down) with absolutely no official help of any kind, his wife copying out his despatches for him in fair hand. Now the Santiago post ranks as an embassy and has an establishment of five, in addition to the clerical staff. In 1914 there were 114 members of the Diplomatic Service, and they had to do their own copying, ciphering, archive and account keeping and press work. In 1939 there were 199* members and 43 more holding "local" diplomatic rank, innumerable attachés, specialist and other, and full clerical staffs. Entertainment allowances abroad used to be rare and small; now they are general, and rise in individual cases to several thousand

* This number includes Second and Third Secretaries on the joint seniority list in H.M. Diplomatic Service and Foreign Office.

pounds. The total cost of the service to the country was then only a fraction of the present figure. The embassy or legation was a "one-horse show".

That is all changed, and the change will go farther. More specialists will be added to the envoy's staff, and it will probably be less important that the head of the mission should be an expert himself than that he should be able to guide and exploit the varied talents of his team. But more than ever the ambassador must be truly representative of his country and of the British people. He will be expected to make more frequent popular appearances. He will have to be more of a public figure and less of an expert negotiator. He should be a man of wide outlook and many interests, so that he can make the greatest possible number of contacts in the country where he resides, as well as being able to direct the varied business of his large staff. It will be more than ever important that the right man should be sent to the right place. If the suitable envoy cannot be found in the ranks of the Foreign Service, he should be chosen from outside it. If in war-time it has been necessary to appoint Sir Samuel Hoare, Lord Lothian, Sir Stafford Cripps and Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to diplomatic posts, at a time when London is crowded with diplomats *en disponibilité*, it is surely proof that public life at home is sometimes the best training for representation of the country abroad. It will especially be desirable that the ambassador of the future shall have some acquaintance with the British Empire; and this very important proviso urgently suggests that Colonial and Diplomatic posts should be interchangeable, and that at the least the junior members of the Foreign Service should be seconded for duty in the service of the Dominions.

The question of the reform of the Foreign Service is to be brought before Parliament, and it is most desirable that it should there be fully debated. It is not a matter for diplomatists alone; they are very naturally inclined to regard it as the close preserve of a specialised and privileged body. The cultured and courtly specialist of the past will still have his part to play, but he will not in the future deserve the highest

rank unless he can add to his many qualities the directness of ready companionship and the personality of a public and representative man of the people. The British visitor abroad is always in the eyes of foreigners a sample of his fellow-countrymen. The ambassador's ideal of duty is to be the perfect embodiment of the race he represents.

JAPAN'S NEW ORDER

I

IT was in November 1938 that the first official announcement was made by the Japanese Government that the object of their policy was the establishment of a New Order in East Asia. Canton had been captured on October 21 with unexpected ease, after a brief campaign in which the Japanese forces had met with practically no resistance. The strategic results of this victory were important and far-reaching. Free China was cut off from Hong Kong, her most important channel for the supply of war materials, the Canton–Hankow railway could no longer be used, and the Chinese Government immediately decided that it was useless to continue the defence of Hankow, the great city on the Yangtze, 800 miles from the sea, to which the seat of government had been moved after the fall of Nanking. Four days after the capture of Canton the Japanese armies entered Hankow, and the Chinese Government withdrew to Chungking beyond the Yangtze gorges.

The Japanese are greatly addicted to the vice of wishful thinking, but this time it did seem as if large-scale resistance to their armies might soon cease. An even more important factor in their calculations was Munich, which seemed to make it certain that there would be no interference from Europe, while active opposition by America was a risk which—with fear and trembling, it is true—they had long been accustomed to take. A week after the fall of Hankow the Japanese Government issued a statement to the effect that the ultimate purpose of the campaign in China was the establishment of a New Order founded on a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields, and other Powers were exhorted to adapt their attitude to the new conditions

existing in East Asia. Prince Konoye, the Prime Minister, declared that Japan, in establishing the New Order, had no desire to impair the legitimate rights and interests of foreign Powers, but, he explained, these Powers must "formulate policies suited to the new conditions". This was elaborated on December 19 in a statement by Mr. Arita, the Foreign Minister, to the effect that foreign Powers would not be allowed to engage in any activities that might interfere with the formation of Japan, Manchukuo and China into a single economic unit, self-sufficient in times of emergency as regards vital supplies. In the meantime, the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo had declared on November 3 that the Nine Power Treaty, in which Japan had agreed to maintain the "principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China", was considered to be obsolete. This was followed on November 18 by a statement which constitutes the nearest approach Japan has yet made to formal denunciation of the Treaty. Replying to a protest by the United States, the Japanese Government deprecated "any attempt to apply to the conditions of to-day and to-morrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past". Among the objects that the New Order was expected to attain were joint defence against Communism and international justice. In this latter phrase the Japanese had chiefly in mind compelling the Western Powers to give up the privileged position under the unequal treaties which had enabled them to exploit China. The New Order was declared to be in complete conformity with the spirit in which the Japanese Empire had been founded, and its establishment to be the immutable policy and purpose of Japan.

There was nothing new in any of the several ideas that combined to make up the New Order. What was new was the shape into which they had now finally crystallised, and what was significant was the evidence contained in the various declarations of the feeling that, in shaping her future destiny, Japan should no longer rely on external influences but should seek inspiration in a return to the purely Japanese system of

ideas as it had existed, not merely before her first contact with the West, but before she had fallen under the influence of T'ang Dynasty China over a thousand years ago. The charge has often been brought against Japan that she originates nothing, but that all her achievements are a mere copy, possibly with some improvements on the original model, of what has been thought out by others. There is considerable justification for this criticism, but in their policy towards modern China the Japanese have copied nothing from either Fascism or Nazism. On the contrary, Hitler might be said to have borrowed the idea of the New Order and many of its methods from Japan. Ever since they emerged from their seclusion in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Japanese have cherished the idea that the position of leadership in the Far East belonged by right to them. They resented the intrusion of the Western Powers, and they blamed China for going downhill into social and political disorder, for submitting to the unequal treaties, and for letting her splendid civilisation fall into decay. It was the great historic mission of Japan to rescue the East from the clutches of the West, and this idealistic conception chimed in very well with that other conception of Japan pursuing a career of expansion on the mainland of Asia, which had lain dormant for 250 years since Hideyoshi, at the end of the sixteenth century, had failed in his attempt to win a great empire by conquest, succeeding only in laying the civilisation of Korea in ruins. The two conceptions now combined in the "immutable policy" of the New Order of East Asia, the limits of which were soon expanded beyond those announced in November 1938. Self-sufficiency demanded control over a wider area, and it presently appeared that Japan's intention was to conquer or dominate Manchukuo and China, extend her conquests southwards and establish over the whole of Eastern Asia a Japanese-controlled system where peace, stability and prosperity should prevail and all enjoy the benefits of Kodo, the paternal rule of the divine Emperor who embodies in his person the virtues of the Japanese race.

Japan fell under the influence of China at about the time that Chinese civilisation, under the Sui and T'ang dynasties, reached the highest point it has ever attained. She took over with enthusiasm the art and literature of China, and Japanese tribalism was clothed for the next 1,200 years or more in an attractive garment fashioned out of the literary and aesthetic side of Confucian culture; but it was a garment only. Philosophy was beyond the reach of the Japanese mind. They never understood the thought that lay behind the civilisation that they copied, and tribalism in its most primitive form, fostered by an isolation more complete than any other race or nation has known, persisted as the dominant characteristic of Japanese life and institutions. Tribalism cannot attain to universality. Anyone outside the tribe is treated as an enemy, and it is essentially a system the benefits of which must be confined within the limits of the tribe. The civilisation of China is the very opposite of tribalism. When the Chinese styled their country the Middle Kingdom and claimed that the whole civilised world was included in its bounds, when Chinese Emperors declared in State papers that "Our Dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under Heaven", or spoke about "exercising a pacifying control over barbarous tribes the world over" or of "swaying the myriad races of the globe", there was a considerable measure of reality behind this magniloquent language, for in fact China was surrounded by nomads and states who, if not barbarous, were at any rate at a lower level of civilisation, who imbibed her culture, accepted her superiority, and looked up to her with respect and veneration. China was not destroyed, as Rome had been, by recurrent invasions, for the barbarians, before invading, had already fallen under the Chinese spell and absorbed her culture in a way that Japan never succeeded in doing, so that each invasion infused fresh vigour into the Chinese system and served to spread its influence into wider regions than before. The method by which the Empire of China was expanded was by the conquest of men's minds, and her universal genius gathered into one vast political body

people inhabiting widely separated regions, and numbering one-fifth of the human race.

Such an achievement is not possible for tribes, however powerful, who only understand the use of force. China was known to Japan as the Ta Kuo—the Great Country—and the Chinese Emperor was the obvious model for the Japanese Emperor to copy. In Japanese Imperial edicts the tone and language was similar to that of the Chinese Emperors, but it was a mere form corresponding to nothing real, either in the facts or in the mind of the author. Later, when Japan had become a powerful nation state, when China had ceased to be the Great Country, when she had fallen into social and political confusion and the attention of the Powers was distracted elsewhere, this pose of universality which before had been slightly ridiculous became a cloak for tribal aggression. In the 21 Demands presented to Yuan Shih Kai almost immediately after the outbreak of the 1914–18 struggle, Japan took the first step in the campaign of aggression against China that has culminated in the present war; and it was not long before this naked tribalism was again dressed up in a garment borrowed from China. The press in Japan began saying that it was the Emperor's spiritual mission to rule and govern the whole world, and that it was Japan's aim to unify the world under the sway of Japan. This bombast attracted no attention at the time, but 20 years later the Japanese Government announce that it is the immutable policy of Japan to extend the benefits of the paternal rule of the divine Emperor over the whole of the Far East. Japan has borrowed none of these ideas from Hitler or Mussolini. The words in which they are expressed sound like an echo of the Chinese phrases that rise so readily to Japanese lips, but the source from which they spring is pure Japanese. It is the undiluted tribalism of pre-T'ang Dynasty Japan.

The Japanese have for so long fallen into the habit of clothing ideas peculiar to their own tribalism in phrases borrowed from Confucian conceptions that they appear to suffer from what may be described as split minds. They seem

to be capable of thinking different things simultaneously with different parts of their minds, and of holding at the same time beliefs which appear to be conflicting. Whether they are conscious of this peculiarity it is difficult to say, but it is useful to them in a number of ways. They can, for example, give with apparent sincerity the most solemn assurances that Japan intends to respect the principles of the open door and equal opportunity, at the very moment that the Japanese Government is flagrantly violating both these principles. They appear to be quite unconscious that others expect some correspondence between words and deeds, things which they themselves quite happily keep in watertight compartments. It must have been an unusually vehement emotional crisis that impelled them to say—in guarded language, it is true—that they did not intend to observe the Nine Power Treaty any longer, instead of merely continuing to violate it. They can gravely announce that they propose to co-operate with China in spreading the benefits of paternal rule, at the same time that their armies are endeavouring to destroy the Chinese way of life and reduce China to the status of a vassal.

The several different ways in which Japan regards modern China have this as a common basis, that Japan resents the fact that when China fell into decay she sold the pass to the Western nations, and that when her national spirit revived she committed what Japan regards as an act of treachery in seeking the friendship and aid, not only of Great Britain and America, but even of the arch-enemy Soviet Russia. With one part of her mind Japan believes that it is her manifest destiny to pursue a career of expansion on the mainland of Asia, with another she pictures herself as rescuing China from the clutches of the West and leading her back into the path of ancient virtue. She wants China to throw off all Western influence and become again the China of the T'ang Dynasty, the Great Country which she copied and revered for so long, but she somehow identifies this with the wholly different desire that China should accept Japanese tribalism as the equivalent of her own ancient culture, and become a sort of junior partner with Japan under

the paternal rule of the Japanese Emperor. She wishes China to be prosperous, but she also wishes that China shall never be able to compete with or resist Japan. If China's resistance prevents the spread of the divine Emperor's paternal rule, it is better that she should be weakened. Japan therefore deliberately destroys all institutions of higher learning, and takes no measures to prevent the sale of cocaine in occupied China. She wishes to be friendly with China, and thinks that friendship can be secured by the use of force. The result of this medley of beliefs is that the Japanese are able to persuade themselves that the war with China, with its ghastly tale of horrors, is a Holy War, and that the establishment of the New Order, with Japan as the dominant State surrounded by satellites serving her needs, is a great historic mission which she must carry out at the cost of much present toil and suffering for the sake of the blessings it will confer on mankind at large. It is of the essence of tribalism to believe that whatever is for the good of the tribe cannot possibly be morally wrong, and these are the mental processes by which the Japanese arrive at that belief in the case of the New Order.

II

FOR a thousand years Japan copied China. Then the Western Powers appeared on the scene, and she selected new models among them for the different branches in which each excelled—Great Britain for the navy, Germany for the army, and so on. In spite of their sublime belief in the superiority not only of their race but of each individual member of that race, this habit of dependence on a foreign model has bred among the Japanese a curious fear of isolation. Japan as a nation dreads to stand alone, and in a crisis Japanese have the greatest difficulty in making a decision. It was a bitter grievance when Great Britain terminated the alliance and turned Japan adrift in 1921. She valued her membership of the League because it brought her into the company of others. It was with the greatest reluctance that she resigned from the League in 1932,

and she did not feel happy again until she joined the Axis in 1936. In every development of Japanese policy, the initiative never comes wholly from within. Each new orientation is a reaction to something that has happened elsewhere. A rare exception to the rule is the attack upon Manchuria in 1931, when the Army forced a change of policy on the Government by the method of the *fait accompli*, but even after the Manchurian adventure the direction in which Japanese policy would finally move remained uncertain until Hitler's rise to power in Europe. Aggression was then immediately resumed, in the form of the disreputable autonomy movement in North China. The fiasco of sanctions against Italy was followed by the signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which brought Japan definitely into the camp of the Axis Powers and ended the isolation that she so dreaded; and in the following year, 1937, the purge of the Russian army emboldened her to begin hostilities in North China. The next milestone was Munich, the reaction to which was the announcement of the New Order, the veiled denunciation of the Nine Power Treaty, and the offer of terms to China which, by another of those gigantic miscalculations which Japan so often makes, it was believed that Ch'iang Kai Shek might be tempted to accept.

Munich, whatever its effect elsewhere, convinced all sections in Japan of the decadence of both France and England. The lowered prestige of Great Britain was reflected in the increase in intensity and violence of the hostile demonstrations against British interests in the Far East, and at one time an attack upon Hong Kong seemed to be imminent. The extremists believed that, if Germany entered the coming war with Japan as her ally, the cessation of British aid to China might just suffice to turn the scale and cause Chinese resistance to collapse. The moderate elements, consisting mainly of the business world, supported by the Navy, feared a final break with Great Britain and America, for the economic mechanism that supported Japan's war effort in China might be smashed by the pressure that would then be brought to bear upon it. This contest was at its height when the news of the Russo-German

pact of August 1939 dealt a shattering blow to Japanese opinion. Any unexpected turn in world affairs generally produces a great emotional crisis in Tokyo, and, after much heart-searching, relief of tension is found in a change of Government and a reorientation of Japanese policy. This was no exception to the rule. The Cabinet resigned, and General Abe became Premier.

The first task of the new Government, as indeed of every Japanese Government that has come into power, was to concentrate all the energies of the nation on the liquidation of the China incident. Subject to that overriding consideration, General Abe was pledged to continue the creation of the New Order and to avoid any further entanglements in European affairs. For a brief moment a more conciliatory tone was adopted towards the democracies, and an armistice brought to an end the spasmodic fighting that had been taking place for some months past on the Manchukuo–Mongol–Soviet border. Frantic efforts were also made to set up Wang Ching Wei as the puppet Government of China, but it was not till March of the following year that Wang's Government was inaugurated at Nanking. A Treaty of Basic Relations was signed in the following November, but neither of these events had the slightest effect on the China incident, and all suggestions of peace continued to be treated with contempt by Ch'iang Kai Shek at Chungking. It was believed at first that the Army's ideas on foreign policy had been finally discredited by the Russo-German pact, and that there could be no further prospect of a military alliance between Germany and Japan, but that was far from being the case. Every other turning that Japan tried to take was found to be a blind alley leading nowhere. Her attempts to destroy Ch'iang Kai Shek were defeated, her attempts to make peace were pathetic failures, and her half-hearted overtures to the democracies were accompanied by the condition that they should recognise the New Order. Hitler's treachery lay on one side, confession of failure on the other. It was an unhappy choice, but only in the direction of the Axis could a glimmer of light be seen, and

a small group accordingly continued to press for a policy of close association with Berlin and Moscow. This particular plan was scotched by the Russian attack on Finland, but the German conquests in the spring of 1940 caused another reorientation of Japanese policy.

The invasion of Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium in April and May opened up the problem of the Far Eastern colonies of European Powers who might no longer be able to continue to own or control them. If Japan was to take full advantage of this opportunity, she must clearly condone the treachery and betrayal of the previous August and join the winning side. It was also necessary to enlarge the conception of the New Order, so as to include within its limits the South Seas Region, an expression that was sufficiently vague to include any territory that it might be convenient and practicable for Japan to seize. A statement issued by the Foreign Minister on April 15 referred to the relations of "economic interdependence and co-existence and co-prosperity" between Japan and "the South Seas Region, especially the Dutch East Indies", and hinted that Japan might, if necessary, take the Netherlands East Indies under her protection. A few weeks later, after Holland had been conquered, Germany informed Japan that she was not interested in the Netherlands East Indies. The real crisis, however, came in June after the fall of France. There was great excitement and emotion in Tokyo, where it was felt that a supreme effort must be made to organise all the resources and energies of the nation for the tasks that lay ahead. Prince Konoye became Prime Minister once more, with that curious figure Mr. Matsuoka of Geneva fame as his Foreign Minister.

The Prime Minister announced that a new political structure was necessary in order to prevent the people being misled by the enunciation of divergent views, but though the military had by this time recovered all the ground that they had lost, the moderates still retained sufficient control to prevent the adoption of some of the more objectionable of the extreme measures that had been pressed for some time past. A Supreme

Economic Council and a Supreme Cultural Council were set up, charged with the function of giving unified direction to all activities throughout the Empire. Trades unions and cultural associations were dissolved, labour was organised somewhat on the lines of the German Labour Front, and the Churches were transformed into national Churches and brought under a unified system of control. Existing political parties were merged into one party, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was created as a kind of pale copy of the Nazi party in Germany. The Diet, however, resisted all attempts to reduce its status, and its life was prolonged for one year. The complete nationalisation of industry, which the military had long desired, was also defeated, and the more objectionable schemes of industrial organisation were shelved. The new Government seemed very nearly to have constructed a one-party totalitarian State on the German model, but the form of Japanese institutions seldom corresponds with the reality beneath. There could be no military dictatorship, so long as the Emperor remained the Supreme Head and could be surrounded by moderate advisers. There had moreover been no nationalisation of industry. The new political structure might fairly be described, therefore, as a compromise between opposing views. The new measures of control were accepted with complete docility by the people at large, and Japan now turned her attention southwards—to Indo-China, Thailand, and the Netherlands East Indies.

In the last-named, thanks to the stout attitude of the Dutch and their evident determination to defend their independence and liberty, Japan has made no progress at all. Thailand has been subjected to the usual methods of infiltration, pressure and threats, but Japan still hesitates on the brink of actual aggression. In Indo-China, however, thanks to the abject policy of Vichy, she has had a great measure of success. Immediately after the fall of France Indo-China was faced with demands by both Thailand and Japan, the former reasonable and moderate, the latter purely aggressive. In September, under pressure from Germany, Vichy yielded to

Japanese threats, and before the end of the year Japan had established in Indo-China a position which amounted to virtual military occupation. Meanwhile the dispute between Thailand and Indo-China had given Japan an opportunity to fish in troubled waters which she was not slow to seize. Japanese agents encouraged each side to be intransigent, and when eventually hostilities broke out Japan insisted on her right to mediate. The Vichy Government again yielded to threats. The negotiations between Thailand and Indo-China took place in Tokyo, and were concluded by a protocol signed on March 11. Indo-China was not only forced to cede the greater part of the territory claimed by Thailand, which was much more than the original demand; she had also to pay the price demanded by Japan for her mediation. In effect this amounted to complete economic domination of Indo-China. By a mixture of menaces and intrigue Japan had thus obtained almost as much as she could have gained by a successful military campaign. Her subsequent invasion of Indo-China added little to the position she had already acquired.

A week after the successful conclusion of the Thailand and Indo-China negotiations, Mr. Matsuoka paid a visit to Berlin and Rome, and on his way back signed a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia on April 13. Japan has always entertained a wholesome fear of Russia. In the nineteenth century the advance of Russia across Asia was a serious menace that had to be met at the cost of a war in which Japan staked her national existence. Russia was checked in 1905, and in the war of 1914–18 the whole Russian Empire appeared to have collapsed; but this only added to Japan's anxieties, for the menace, which had been political and military, now assumed an ideological form that she feared far more. Ever since their first contact with the Bolshevists in the Siberian expedition of 1919, the Japanese have had an almost unreasoning terror of Communism. One of the main objects they hope to secure by their continental policy is the erection of barriers to prevent the infiltration of Communism into Manchuria and North China, and one of their chief aims in their policy at home is to

prevent the springing up of Communism in Japan; and, in this, their continental helps their domestic policy. In the years before 1931 there was much Communism in schools and universities and among the hordes of intellectuals for whom no jobs could be found, but it all disappeared when a field for the energies of these young men was opened up on the mainland of Asia. Since 1935 Soviet Russia has made no secret of her support for the movement in China to resist Japanese aggression, and has urged that the United Front should be adopted for that sole purpose. With the development of the bombing plane, the menace has become both military and ideological, for from air bases in Vladivostok and the Maritime Province every Japanese city could be destroyed. Since the seizure of Manchuria, Japan and Soviet Russia have had a long common frontier in Asia, and during the last ten years there has not been one when serious fighting has not taken place.


With a background such as this, a non-aggression pact would probably be, at best, but a fragile instrument. When Mr. Matsuoka signed the pact in Moscow, it was a reasonable inference that Japan might then withdraw the large number of her troops that she kept in Manchukuo to watch the northern frontier, and embark upon aggression in the south. What passed between Mr. Matsuoka and Hitler must remain a matter for speculation, but it is certain that Hitler has been constantly pressing Japan to move south and attack the British Empire, and possibly America too. The moderate elements in Japan have resisted the Nazi blandishments, because it was plain that Hitler merely wanted to involve Japan in war for his own ends. These prudent counsels prevailed once more. What would have happened in Europe if Japan had attacked in the Far East it is perhaps idle to speculate. In fact, Japan made no such move, and Hitler turned on Russia two months later. This second example of Hitler's treachery and of his contempt for Japan caused the usual surge of emotion in Tokyo, relieved by the usual Cabinet crisis. The new Cabinet, from which Mr. Matsuoka was dropped, anxious apparently to do something to restore

Japan's self-esteem, decided to invade Indo-China with a force reputed to number 40,000 men. Though this looked like the prelude to further adventure, nothing more happened, and there was a long pause while the Japanese Government apparently made some attempt to buy off the hostility of America. In October there was another Cabinet crisis, which seemed to be a reflection of the highly nervous condition of the country owing to the continued political and military stalemate in China, the lack of success in Washington and the possibility of serious developments in Moscow.

The high hopes of an early termination of the "China incident" that were entertained in the autumn of 1938 have been succeeded by three long years of disappointment and frustration. The announcement of the forthcoming establishment of the New Order in East Asia was followed up on December 22, 1938, by a statement wherein Prince Konoye outlined the terms upon which Japan was prepared to make peace with China. These were immediately and decisively rejected by Ch'iang Kai Shek. From that time onward Japan has continued to stage large-scale campaigns hoping to synchronize some dramatic victory with the emergence of a Government at Nanking under Wang Ching Wei competent to accept on behalf of China the terms offered. During 1939 the Japanese armies attempted without success to extend their control over the Yangtze and Han river valleys above Hankow. There was heavy but inconclusive fighting in Shansi and in Kiangsi, and there was also a big campaign in Hunan, where all efforts to capture the important key city of Changsha were defeated. The only important success was the capture of Nanning in Kwangsi, which enabled them to cut off supplies from Indo-China, but after the occupation of Indo-China Kwangsi was immediately evacuated. The campaigns of 1940 and 1941 have been in the main a repetition of those of 1939. Ichang was captured in June 1940, but though in both years there was strenuous fighting in Hunan, Changsha has remained in Chinese hands.

The Japanese hold the chief towns and lines of communica-

tion in North China, the Yangtze as far as Ichang, and Canton and Amoy on the coast; but very little of the occupied territory is under effective Japanese control. They are unable to check the activities of the guerrillas behind their lines, or to circum-



By courtesy of "The Times"

vent the ingenuity of the traders who, in spite of the blockade of the whole coast, find innumerable gaps through which a steady flow of imports and exports is maintained. Armies totalling 800,000 to 1,000,000 men are bogged down in China, and in the course of four years of fighting the Japanese have suffered about a million casualties. It is a complete stalemate. Even if the Japanese Higher Command were free from their other preoccupations in the north and the south, it seems doubtful whether the Japanese armies would ever be equal, in numbers or in quality, to the task of breaking through the mountain barriers behind which the Chinese Government has retired.

For the first time in the course of her long career of aggression Japan now finds herself exposed to something very like economic sanctions. It is estimated that the freezing of

Japanese assets in the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, which followed the invasion of Indo-China, has cut off 60 per cent. of Japan's trade with countries outside the yen *bloc*. It has also inflicted enormous losses on Japanese traders, whose businesses are paralysed and who are left with large stocks of commodities on their hands which they are no longer able to export. Strenuous efforts are being made to meet the situation by still further curtailing industrial production for civilian uses, so that these export goods may be gradually diverted into domestic consumption while the capital and labour thus released can be drafted into the armament industries. But to carry any such scheme into execution must present enormous difficulties, even in Japan. None of the huge stocks of materials accumulated by the military authorities is to be released for civilian consumption, and it is estimated that imports still coming in may suffice to keep these stocks at existing levels. Japan is, however, faced with the grim prospect that she may soon be forced to begin using up her reserves of essential materials in order to maintain her armies in the field, and this may lead to a situation in which she would either have to call off her war against China or begin a new war against America. Each horn of this dilemma is so unpleasant that the Japanese are now trying to persuade themselves that America may yet be cajoled or threatened into recognising the New Order.

The seizure of Indo-China is the one real gain that Japan has made since the policy of the New Order in Asia was announced three years ago. It is a very rich territory, producing, in addition to rice (of which Japan is now badly in need), rubber, tungsten, tin, zinc, coal and cement, and it will provide a valuable market for Japanese manufactures. That, however, is for the future. Its immediate importance is that, if Japan should decide to take the plunge and risk a war with England or America, or with both, it may serve as a convenient advanced base from which to launch an attack against either the Dutch or the British possessions in the South Seas. For the last three years Japan has been constantly reminding herself that

she must concentrate all energies on liquidating the Chin incident, and has as constantly allowed herself to be diverte from her main objective by the sight of some new prize tha has come within her reach. East or West the folly and gree of the aggressor know no limit, but it is at any rate probabl that if Japan does decide to attack, it will be in the direc tion where she is least likely to meet determined oppo sition. She may move north instead of south, but it is mos probable that she will not move at all until a decision is force upon her by some fresh development in Europe or America.

THE IRANIAN BACKGROUND

I

THE year 1907 represented a turning-point in the position and consequently in the policy of Iran. For generation after generation she had taken advantage of the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in Asia, when Great Britain, realising the danger of her comparative isolation in view of the growing German menace, determined to come to terms with her rival. Under the Anglo-Russian agreement signed in that year, the two Powers bound themselves mutually to respect the integrity and independence of Iran.* They then divided up the country into two zones of commercial influence, with an extensive and fertile neutral area separating the zones in the south-west. The territory assigned to the northern Power contained the capital and, with the exception of Shiraz and Kerman, all the cities, together with the largest and most productive regions. Great Britain contented herself with a small semi-desert area on the south-east, but the boundary as drawn prevented Russia from marching with the western frontier of Afghanistan and took in the strategically important district of Seistan. In the Persian Gulf it included the port of Bandar Abbas, thereby preventing access by Russia to the open waters of the Arabian Sea.

What did Iran think of the agreement? Apart from the slight involved to the honour of an ancient nation which had fallen on evil days, she considered that, in the case of Russia, the creation of spheres of influence would prove to be but a stage on the road to annexation—and she was right. Britain, on the other hand, whom she had believed to be her friend, became an object of suspicion. To quote an Iranian proverb, "enemies are of three kinds, enemies, enemies of friends and

* A map of western Iran, including most of the places mentioned in this article, will be found on page 40.

friends of enemies". There is no doubt that the remarkable success of German propaganda among Iranians during the last war was mainly due to the openly avowed reason that Great Britain was the friend of their Russian enemies. To take the wider view, the agreement certainly prevented Great Britain and Russia from fighting for supremacy in Asia. Moreover the fact that we renounced so much, at a period when Russia was weakened by her defeat in the struggle with Japan, proved our earnest desire for peace, and undoubtedly contributed to her fighting on the side of Great Britain in 1914.

Two years after the signature of this historic agreement Muhammad Ali Shah, who had determined to destroy the constitution granted by his dying father, was forced to take refuge in the Russian Legation. In July 1909 he abdicated and was succeeded by his son Sultan Ahmad Shah, a lad of twelve.

Russia, ever bent on increasing her hold on Iran, was rightly opposed by Mr. Morgan Shuster, an American financial adviser who, however, brought many of his troubles on himself by his lack of tact. In November 1911 a Russian ultimatum, enforced by a landing of Russian troops, led to his dismissal. In the following year the Russians bombarded the sacred shrine at Meshed, a wanton outrage deeply resented by all classes. They also began to collect revenue in north-western Iran. In the south Great Britain, owing to the disturbed state of the main trade-route from Bushire to Shiraz, had insisted on sending a small force of Indian cavalry into the country. This action having failed to ameliorate the situation, in 1911 with British consent twenty Swedish officers took up the task of raising a gendarmerie. In view of the fact that a Russian Cossack force had been in existence in the north for nearly a generation, the task should surely have been entrusted to British officers. We paid dearly for this mistake.

Meanwhile the Germans had not been idle in the Middle East. Their main objective was the construction of a railway across Asia Minor to Baghdad, and to link with a port in the Persian Gulf. In 1900 a German mission which was deciding the alignment of the railway reached Koweit and attempted

to purchase a large area of land from Sheikh Mubarik, to serve as its terminus in the open Persian Gulf. Fortunately, owing to the foresight of Sir Percy Cox, the British Resident, the Sheikh in the previous year had signed a secret treaty with Great Britain, by the terms of which he had agreed not to lease or sell any of his territory without the consent of that Power. Later, in 1910, at the famous Potsdam meeting between the German and Russian Emperors, Sazonoff, scarcely loyal to the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement, consented to further the project of the Baghdad railway, while Germany in return pledged herself to support Russian interests in Iran. Within Iran Germany attempted to obtain concessions in the Karun valley and elsewhere, but everywhere was foiled by vigilant Cox. Her most definite success was the foundation of a college at Teheran, staffed by German professors, to which the Iranian Government was induced to make a liberal annual grant.

II

AT the outbreak of war in 1914 Iran, unable to defend herself, proclaimed her strict neutrality and, like other neutral States, was out to spot the winner. There was little patriotism among the powerful Kajar princes or great landowners, who determined to make as much money as possible from one side, or preferably from both. Actually the Cossack division under its Russian officers was not used against any of the invading belligerents, while the Swedish gendarmerie officers helped the Germans in every possible way. The Turks during the previous decade had occupied strategic positions to the west of Lake Urumia on the north-west frontier of Iran. Advancing across it, they seized Tabriz, but were expelled by a Russian force. They were afterwards defeated by the Russians at the important battle of Sarikamish, the advanced position covering Kars, whereupon Turkish activities in this area ceased for the time being. To turn to the south-west, in November 1914 British troops occupied the important oil refineries of the

Anglo-Persian Oil Company on the island of Abadan and, pushing up the Shatt-al-Arab, marched into Basra. Later a force was sent up the River Karun to Ahwaz for the protection of the pipe-line, and ultimately the Turks were driven off Iranian soil. Our advance on Baghdad, however, ended in disaster by the capitulation of Kut-al-Amara in the spring of 1916.

The organisation of an important Turko-German mission to the Amir of Afghanistan, which it was hoped would lead to an Afghan invasion of India, was planned by Enver Pasha. It was strengthened by a proclamation of *Jihad*, or "Holy War", at Constantinople and at other Moslem centres. Indian seditionists who had assembled in Berlin were included in the mission. Agents who formed advance guards in Iran, aided by the Swedish officers of the local gendarmerie, drove out British subjects and seized the treasuries of the British and Russian banks. So far as southern and central Iran were concerned these bands accomplished their purpose, and the British and Russian colonies were forced to leave the country. The most successful German agent was Wassmuss, who carried out the seizure of the British colony at Shiraz and later, as we shall see, organised a combination of the Kashgais with other tribes which in 1918 invested the British forces at Shiraz. The position at Teheran was critical, since the escape of hundreds of German and Austrian prisoners from Tashkent turned the enemy legations into armed camps. The Iranian Foreign Minister contemplated a *coup* to jockey Iran into war with the Entente. However, in November 1915 the advance of Russian troops towards the capital caused the enemy Ministers to flee, after a desperate but fruitless attempt to persuade the young Shah to accompany them.

Captain Niedermayer, the leader of the mission to the Amir, had travelled widely in Iran and had spent some months at Meshed in 1913–14. His mission included Kazim Bey and a staff of Turkish officers, who were unfriendly to the Germans, and only worked on the lines of the union of Islam. Twelve Germans and two notorious Indians, Mahendra Pratap and

Barkatulla, with an escort of some 80 Iranian gendarmes, completed the party. Crossing the Afghan boundary without any incident, the mission arrived at Herat on August 24, 1915. A month later it reached Kabul, where it was placed under guard in a garden outside the city. The Amir's position was most difficult, in view of the proclamation of *Jihad* by the Sultan, who was also the Caliph. Fortunately the declaration of *Jihad* in Turkey was not binding in Afghanistan, unless proclaimed there by its ruler also. Apart from this, just as in the case of Iran, the basis of Afghan policy had been the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia. These two Great Powers thus entirely occupied the stage, whereas Germany and Turkey were far distant countries having practically no direct contact with Afghanistan. The credit side of the somewhat alarming situation was that the Amir was able to point out to his fanatical councillors that a declaration of *Jihad* would certainly involve the ruin of the kingdom.

The Amir received Niedermayer some weeks after his arrival, and exhibited great diplomatic skill in keeping him in doubt as to his policy. During this period a letter from Niedermayer, asking the German Minister at Teheran to send him a Turkish force, was intercepted and shown to the Amir, who was, however, unwilling to let the mission leave in case the position should change in the favour of Germany. It was the capture of Erzerum by the Russians in March 1916 that proved the impossibility of a Turkish division reaching Kabul, as Niedermayer had promised. Accordingly the Amir, who kept the Viceroy fully informed throughout, dismissed the mission, many members of which were captured on their return journey.

The German plan also included the raising of an Iranian army. Field-Marshal von der Goltz proceeded on a visit of inspection to Kermanshah, where German officers were busy training recruits who had been enlisted. The Iranians disliked his escort of Turkish troops, and detested the German instructors. In February 1916 von der Goltz reported: "Anarchy in Persia; nothing to be done; dust, cupidity and cowardice;

vast expenditure and no result." Little more was heard of that army.

In 1916, up and down the historic route which led from Baghdad to the heart of Iran, battle ebbed and flowed. In the early spring, after the great feat of capturing Erzerum, the Russians swept the German instructors at Kermanshah out of the country. But in the summer, as a result of the capture of Kut, a powerful Turkish army was dispatched to attack the weak Russian force, which evacuated both Kermanshah and Hamadan and took up a position that would cover Kazvin and threaten a force marching on Teheran. For a long time there was no change in the situation, while the Russians were gradually strengthening themselves by the arrival of reinforcements. In the spring of that year a mission under Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes had landed at Bandar Abbas with instructions to raise a force, which was finally termed the South Persia Rifles. While he was recruiting a regiment for the defence of the port, letters were received, followed by deputations, offering to lay out supplies and begging him to hasten his march to Kerman and drive out the hated Germans, who had made life insecure and whose followers were committing outrages. Accordingly, with a column of Indian troops some four hundred strong, the mission marched 300 miles to Kerman, where it was welcomed with enthusiasm. The German missions fled in small parties; some 60 officers were captured by the tribesmen and were handed over to Sir Percy Sykes. From Kerman the column marched to Yezd, where the European colony had recently returned.

The intention had been to proceed by the direct route to Shiraz, but the Russian commandant at Isfahan, whose appeal was supported by our Consul-General, telegraphed to Sir Percy Sykes to join him there, as the place was threatened by a brigade of Turkish troops. Consequently, although the Russian force consisted only of two squadrons of Cossacks and one gun, the column marched on Isfahan, where much to the general relief the information had been received that, owing to its strength having been exaggerated, the Turks had

retired to Hamadan. The column then proceeded to Shiraz, the headquarters of the Swedish gendarmerie. The Swedish officers had disappeared, except one or two who were captured, but many of its Iranian officers were pro-German. It possessed field-guns and machine-guns, and was five times as strong as the British force. Although realising the risk, Sir Percy Sykes decided to act quickly and to embody it in the South Persia Rifles. During the winter the German prisoners, a source of grave anxiety, were evacuated to Isfahan, where the Russians took charge and forwarded them to Baku. In the spring of 1917 sorely needed reinforcements were received. The raiding tribes were dealt with and, after one or two punitive expeditions, trade revived and the empty main route was once again thronged with caravans.

The capture of Baghdad in March had influenced the political situation most favourably, and the South Persia Rifles were officially recognised by the Iranian Government. An attempt was made to secure friendly relations with the powerful Kashgai tribe, about 136,000 strong, who ranged from near the coast to the uplands of Fars. As, however, the tribesmen were inveterate raiders, it was evident that they remained hostile to the British policy of law and order. The fall of Baghdad had made the position of the Turks in western Iran untenable, and they were speedily expelled by the Russians. However, the memorable month of March 1917 also saw the abdication of the Tsar and the beginning of the collapse of the Russian army. This constituted a serious menace to the British Empire since, unless steps were quickly taken, German troops might appear in Afghanistan. Accordingly it was decided to dispatch a military mission to Tiflis for the purpose of organising some defence against the Turks in the Caucasus. It was hoped to rally the Georgians and Armenians to defend their homes; but that the Armenians, at any rate, did not attempt to do. The leader of this dangerous mission was Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, a man of fine physique and a commanding personality, who possessed an invaluable knowledge of the Russian language and mentality. Dunsterville decided to cross

Iran to the Caspian Sea with an advance party, but upon arrival at the port of Enzeli he quickly realised that the Russian Bolshevists in control of the port were hostile to his onward progress. But for his quick retreat and the respect inspired by his armoured car, he and his staff would probably have been made prisoners.

Upon his return to Hamadan he watched the rapid disintegration of the Russian troops under General Baratov, while General Bicharakov's Cossacks, although attached to their commander, wished to follow the rest of the army back to Russia. Fortunately Dunsterville was able to keep some Russian troops at Hamadan until a British force arrived on the scene and put him in a position to control his long line of communications to Enzeli, which he occupied. At Baku meanwhile the Bolshevist Government had been overthrown, and Dunsterville was invited to join in the defence of that important city. There he conducted a most gallant defence against overwhelming Turkish forces, badly supported by the Armenians, who refused to fight. Finally the British force, whose courage in the face of overwhelming odds had denied the Germans the oil of which, as Ludendorff has recorded, they stood in such need, evacuated Baku.

In March 1918, a few days before the curtain was raised on the last act of the war in France, the British Government in a conciliatory note asked the Iranian Government for the formal recognition of the South Persia Rifles by the Cabinet then in office. Liberal financial assistance was offered, together with the suspension of the obnoxious agreement of 1907. In its reply the Iranian Government, at a time when victory appeared to be in the grasp of Germany, denounced the South Persia Rifles as "a foreign force and a threat to Persian independence and integrity". This hostile declaration, strengthened by the adverse situation of the British army in France, led to serious desertions from the South Persia Rifles, followed by a powerful combination of the Kashgais and other tribes united by the efforts of Wassmuss and by hopes of loot. The Kashgais declared war in May, and were attacked by a British

column 1,600 strong. After a desperate fight lasting throughout the long summer day the tribesmen fled. New and larger enemy forces were met by a sally from the fortified camp outside Shiraz; but since the British retired after the fight, a victory was claimed and the city rose against them. A midnight seizure of its key points and a third attack on the enemy finally routed the besieging tribesmen. When the Armistice came, the British were supreme in southern Iran.

III

SHORTLY after the Armistice a delegation from Iran arrived in Paris to submit her claims to the Peace Conference. They demanded the abrogation of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which Great Britain had already conceded. They also included the abolition of consular courts, which, under the unsettled conditions prevailing at that period, would have been most undesirable. Iran furthermore claimed the cession of Transcaspia, Merv and Khiva to the east, of the Caucasus to the north and of Asia Minor as far as the Euphrates. Her claims for reparations were more reasonable, since she had undoubtedly suffered by the repeated march of Turkish and Russian armies in her western provinces. In southern and central Iran, on the other hand, the large sums spent by Great Britain on the South Persia Rifles, on supplies for British troops and on improvements in communications, together with some restoration of law and order, had made those areas distinctly more prosperous. The delegation was not entitled to put its case before the Peace Conference, but it was later laid before the Supreme Council and had a most sympathetic hearing.

In August 1919 an agreement, drawn up under the instructions of Lord Curzon, was signed at Teheran between the British and Iranian Governments. By its terms Great Britain agreed to furnish expert advisers for the several departments of the administration. British officers would be supplied for the formation of a uniform force, a substantial loan would be

provided, improvements in communications would be undertaken by Anglo-Iranian enterprise and, finally, a revised customs tariff would be drawn up. In the opinion of Lord Grey of Fallodon, it was unfortunate that this agreement was not promptly submitted to the League of Nations. The failure to do so gave an unhappy impression to the world, especially to the United States of America and to France, where an idea prevailed that we had turned Iran into a private preserve. An official with a long experience of Iran strongly opposed the agreement on the grounds that both national feeling and powerful private interests would be hostile to it and would wreck it. The Prime Minister, who probably realised the situation, delayed summoning the *Majlis* (Parliament) to ratify the agreement according to the constitution, and the question was accordingly held up indefinitely.

In May 1920 the Bolshevists from Baku attacked and captured General Denikin's fleet, which had fled from Baku and had taken refuge at Enzeli. The British detachment of 500 men, representing the northern link of a long chain that stretched from Iraq to the Caspian Sea, was withdrawn not without difficulty to Resht and later to Kazvin, where a brigade of British troops under Brigadier-General Ironside (now Field-Marshal Lord Ironside) was stationed. The Bolshevists occupied Resht, to the great alarm of the Iranian Government. Protests were made to the League of Nations, but it was frankly pointed out by the French representative that, since the Anglo-Iranian agreement had not been submitted to the League, that body could not discuss the problem. The Iranian Government then asked for British help, and was advised to dispatch the Cossack division under its Russian officers to expel the invaders. At first this body, which was incidentally being financed by the British Government, won some success, but finally it was defeated and fled in utter disorder to the shelter of the British at Kazvin. The British Government insisted on the dismissal of the Russian officers, and General Ironside took steps to reform the disorganised force. Inspecting it some weeks later, he asked the British

officer in charge to tell him who was the best Iranian officer. The prompt reply was Riza Khan, who was immediately promoted to command the entire force. Riza Khan, of peasant extraction, a man of striking appearance and strong personality, reorganised his command and, upon the suggestion of a Teheran politician, marched on the capital at the head of 3,000 Cossacks and seized the Government.

Among his first acts was the arrest of the members of the Cabinet. The new Cabinet then announced the annulment of the agreement. The *Majlis*, which had assembled, confirmed the decision, and marked hostility to the British was displayed during the debate. Lord Curzon, who had refused to listen to advice, to quote his biographer "sang a mournful requiem over his perished hopes". Riza Khan speedily arranged for various branches of revenue to be handed over to the War Department, thus securing money for his officers and men and, with it, their devotion. He soon dominated the Government, and in 1923 became Prime Minister. In that year the weakling Shah, Sultan Ahmad, who was probably in fear of his life, left Iran for Europe, where he died in 1930. He was deposed in 1925 and, with due pomp and circumstance, the peasant of Mazanderan ascended the throne of Cyrus and of Shah Abbas as Shah Riza Pahlavi.

The new ruler determined to assert his authority over every province, to disarm the predatory tribes and to restore law and order. The taming of the tribes was a difficult task, but by taking advantage of their internal dissensions and by ruthless military action, which in some cases involved decimation, he finally rendered the country relatively safe for travellers and for caravans. Although opposed to foreign influence, Shah Riza proved his realisation of the importance of modern communications by the construction of several roads, and, using a system of barter, placed orders with Germany to provide machinery for sugar refineries and textile mills. But his most important work was undoubtedly the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, a stupendous enterprise. Starting from an inlet in the Persian Gulf, where the construction of a

harbour termed Bandar Shapur was most costly, it crossed the River Karun by a fine bridge and entered the mountainous country of Luristan. Avoiding the important cities of Shiraz and Isfahan owing to engineering difficulties, it only struck the main caravan route at Qum, some 90 miles south of the capital. It then pursued a generally north-eastern direction, traversing the mighty Elburz range by tunnels requiring great engineering skill, and descended to Bandar Shah, a harbour in the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea, distant 870 miles from the port on the Persian Gulf. A far better alignment from Teheran would have been to Enzeli, but general belief had it that the Shah's vast estates and private factories were the cause of this uneconomic carrying of the line to a point where no harbour works existed. Another important track under construction runs from Teheran to Tabriz. There it will meet the Tabriz–Julfa line which itself joins the Russian railway service, thus completing railway communication between the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus.

To turn again to external relations, Bolshevist Russia in spite of her recent invasion of the northern provinces, which had been practically unopposed, finally decided to make friends with Iran. The treaty which she concluded renounced all debts due to the Tsarist Government, and made a free gift to Iran of the Banque d'Escompte, the Julfa-Tabriz railway, various roads and the port of Gazian opposite Enzeli, besides abandoning all rights under the Capitulations. This treaty was signed by Iran on the same day that the British agreement was annulled. In addition, Russia signed treaties of *bon voisinage* with Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. Relations with Russia afterwards became strained owing to her economic attitude; in 1926 an embargo was placed on exports from Iran. Two years later, however, less unreasonable terms were agreed upon, and in 1928 Enzeli, which had been seized from Iran in 1920, was finally handed back. The general feeling towards Russia was nevertheless that she not only treated Iran unfairly in commercial relations, but threatened her existence. The British, although the policy of Lord Curzon had caused

ill-feeling which took many years to lessen, were no longer considered to be aggressive.

The Capitulations, which had been imposed on Iran by victorious Russia in 1828, had always been resented. Since the Shah had restored order in 1927 and had inaugurated the New Judicial Regulations, based mainly on French law, he used the occasion to secure the abolition of the hated Capitulations. In the negotiations which ensued, certain safeguards for foreign residents against arrest or confinement in Iranian prisons were insisted upon. Actually it can be said that the new system is now working, but hardly satisfactorily. A new customs tariff was also brought into force on the same day as the abolition of the Capitulations. By its terms the highest scales of duty were made applicable to all countries which did not negotiate fresh treaties with Iran.

Iran lies on the direct air route between Britain and India. It would be natural to traverse her territory, if terms could be arranged, and in 1925 the Iranian Government, which had acceded to the International Air Convention of 1919, signed a provisional agreement granting the British a right of way along the southern coast. However, since Iran later insisted on an alignment across the centre of the country which experts pronounced to be entirely unsuitable, the Shah unwisely cancelled the agreement by which he would have secured an unsubsidised air route and the ownership of all aerodromes. The present route via Bahrein was adopted, and is a success from more than one point of view.

When the new Kingdom of Iraq was established, the status of the large number of Iranians who inhabited that country became a serious point at issue. In 1924 persons desirous of renouncing Iraq nationality were called upon to do so. This question affected thousands who neither understood the purport of the announcement nor were able to pay the fee that was demanded. At this juncture the Iranian Government claimed for those nationals who declared for Iranian citizenship the privilege of Capitulations, at a time when in Iran it was denouncing them in the case of Europeans. Finally the

Shah, who had shown to little advantage in the negotiations, formally recognised the Kingdom of Iraq. Some years later, in 1935, the thorny question of the Shatt-al-Arab was brought by the Shah before the Council of the League of Nations, but without result. Finally, owing to the feeling of the four Moslem Powers of the Middle East towards co-operation, Iran and Iraq settled the Shatt-al-Arab question on the terms that Iran should be granted an anchorage off Abadan island. This agreement, signed on July 8, 1937, was the precursor to the Four-Power pact of Saadabad signed at Teheran by Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey. It was essentially a pact of *bon voisinage* and not a military alliance.

The financial position of Iran is outside the scope of this article, but the sheet anchor of the State is, of course, the large income accruing from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which has also facilitated the rapid growth of mechanical transport. Moreover the liberal treatment of the 30,000 Iranian employees and their families, for whom housing, education and medical care are provided, is having important results in more than one direction.

The ex-Shah, whose amazing rise to the throne has already been described, believed entirely in force and unfortunately never benefited from contacts with European Ministers or officers. He was brutal in his habits, beating and kicking his own ministers and generals on occasion, and putting to death any prince of the late Kajar dynasty or indeed anyone else who fell under his severe displeasure. He banned all social contacts with Europeans except on official occasions, and especially resented any criticism in the foreign press, forbidding the offending journal to be sent to Iran. The German Legation, the German bank, the German-staffed university and many engineers and business men made up a body of German nationals which, two or three years ago, was estimated to approach 2,000 in number. Needless to say, a Brown House had been founded. After the Iraq rebellion the generals concerned and the notorious ex-Mufti of Jerusalem also took up their residence in Iran. It must be remembered that the ex-

Shah could not realise the importance of sea power, and felt convinced that Germany would certainly win the present war. In consequence he decided to throw in his lot with her. As the years passed, his ruling passion was avarice. Indeed, according to popular belief, he was determined to become the richest man in the world. He acquired enormous estates, partly by unjust confiscations, and on them he founded factories in which his subjects were forced to work more or less as slaves.

To sum up, Shah Riza, like Mussolini, rendered invaluable service to his country during the first years of his rule. In the end he became a curse to Iran, even though its modernisation was undoubtedly due to his courage and outstanding capacity; and his forced abdication was welcomed with relief by his oppressed and half-starved subjects.

IRISH DEVELOPMENTS AND DIFFICULTIES

I. Mr. Dillon's Protest

THE first really full and frank discussion on the policy of neutrality adopted by the Government of Eire took place in the Dail on July 17, as the result of an impassioned protest made by Mr. James Dillon during the debate on the vote for the Department of External Affairs. Mr. Dillon, who is the deputy leader of the Fine Gael party and a member of the all-party Defence Council, is no parvenu in Irish politics. His grandfather, John Blake Dillon, one of the founders of the *Nation*, a famous patriotic newspaper, took part in the abortive rebellion of 1848, whilst his father, John Dillon, was one of Parnell's principal lieutenants and afterwards himself chairman of the Irish Parliamentary party. His mother's family gave to Ireland Father Mathew, the great apostle of temperance. He therefore stands in the true national tradition, and can claim to speak with authority. As the proprietor of a prosperous business in County Mayo he is well acquainted with the life of rural Ireland. Coming from such a source, his speech was both interesting and remarkable, if not altogether unexpected. He had in fact made a somewhat similar speech some months previously at the Fine Gael party convention, which was censored.

He began by stating that though the policy of indifferent neutrality was the policy of the Government and of the majority of his own party he did not believe it was in the interest, moral or material, of the Irish people. Whilst he admitted that responsible men must recognise that the majority of the people favoured the Government's policy, nevertheless, when the choice lay between dishonour and material ruin on the one hand and the risk of war on the other, terrible as the risk might be, he thought a nation with their traditions

should face the risk and refuse to submit to a blackmail of terror designed to make it sell its honour and stake its whole material future on the vain hope that it might be spared. He therefore urged that the Irish people, in the exercise of their sovereign right, should co-operate to the limit of their resources as expeditiously as possible with Great Britain and the United States of America in resisting the German attempt at world conquest. That co-operation, he suggested, could only take the shape of granting naval and air bases to the forces of those Powers. The fact that Soviet Russia had become locked in deadly conflict with its prototype Nazi Germany was, he said, a stroke of luck for which Christian civilisation might devoutly thank Providence. But let it create no false sense of security. The utmost endeavour of all Christian men was requisite if the Nazi threat to Christianity was to be repelled. It was, he claimed, fear of the German *Blitz*, not doubt as to the right and wrong of the moral issues involved, which deterred the people of Eire from making the right decision. Whilst no prudent man would minimise that danger and no just man deride that fear, it was a lesser evil than failure to face them. If the Germans won the war, the first thing they would do would be to demand and seize naval and air bases on the Irish south-west coast so that they might maintain conquest and dominion over the continent of Europe and the ocean highways of the world. If Great Britain could not be guaranteed supplies of food and warlike materials from the United States of America she would be defeated by Germany, and the day she fell Eire would fall too. To them the only issue of significance was whether Christianity should survive or not. They had a glorious opportunity and a terrible responsibility.

The reactions to Mr. Dillon's speech were significant. General Richard Mulcahy, one of the leaders of his own party, immediately intervened to make it clear that they did not agree with his views. He suggested that the United States and Great Britain were at least partly responsible for the present situation in Europe, and that the Irish people were

not called on to interfere. Such interference would, he claimed, divide them utterly. Mr. Cosgrave, who followed, was even more explicit. After stating that he had no information concerning Mr. Dillon's statement and that the wisdom of making it had not impressed him, he said that the dominant consideration was for the Irish people to show a united front, which could only be done by preserving their neutrality, thus securing the stability and integrity of the country. The belligerents were not thinking of the Ten Commandments, which in recent centuries had never governed the history of Europe. Consequently it was not the question of right or wrong which prompted or agitated their minds. In his opinion, the best contribution public men could make was to show that they were united in the view that neutrality was the best policy for the country, and that if aggression came a united country would meet the attack.

Mr. De Valera concluded the debate with an interesting explanation of the Government's attitude. They were, he said, in an extremely difficult and delicate situation. Neutrality was not by any means an easy policy, and it was not a cowardly policy. It would require as much courage to put that policy through as any other. Complaining of statements in the American press which suggested that Eire was belligerently anti-American and anti-British, he said that everybody in Eire knew that was not true. Their difficulty was that their policy of neutrality did not fit in with the policies of the United States and Britain. They were not against those Powers, but they had a right to choose their own course. He alluded also to the treatment of Ireland during the last war, and to the subsequent division of the country, which he claimed were tests of Britain's sincerity. Speeches like Deputy Dillon's were only likely to start a quarrel amongst their people at a time when it was very foolish to quarrel. It would be quite impossible to lead the country along the line advocated by him. He agreed with Mr. Cosgrave that, in times of crisis like the present, one should make up one's mind what one was going to do and then stick to that decision.

There should be no hesitation or shifting about. Although he personally would like to see people express their views, he would be inclined to say of a statement such as Mr. Dillon's that it was magnificent but not common sense. He had not got any special revelation to tell him that this was a war for Christianity and that it was their duty as a Christian people to go out on a crusade. They wanted to live peaceably and to be left alone. If they were attacked, they could die if necessary fighting for what they were certain was a just cause. That was their position, and it was not a cowardly one. Ireland in this war was doing its national duty, its duty to its own people—of that he had no doubt.

During the subsequent debate only three speakers ventured to express even modified approval of Mr. Dillon's views. In spite of a suggestion by Mr. De Valera that it would raise difficult problems for the censorship, the debate was not censored. It is understood that Mr. Dillon subsequently tendered his resignation to Mr. Cosgrave, but it was not accepted. The real effect of the debate was to make it evident, for good or ill, that no party in Eire is prepared to depart from the present policy of neutrality. Even Mr. De Valera and Mr. Cosgrave are apparently for once agreed on this matter. To that extent, at all events, Mr. Dillon's protest has cleared the air and served some purpose. Speaking at Mullingar on October 5 Mr. De Valera, after stressing the dangerous position of Eire, said that so far their rights had been in the main respected, and he thought it only fair to acknowledge that the belligerent nearest to them, Great Britain, despite the temptations and urgings of certain propagandists, had not succumbed to them, and had not behaved unworthily. Even this tardy and qualified recognition of Britain's attitude is satisfactory.

II. Political Problems

THE progress of the war has also raised other political problems in both North and South. During August Mr. Frank MacDermot tabled a motion in the Dublin Senate

asking the Government to take immediate steps to obtain the full and effective co-operation of the United States in securing Ireland against attack. He subsequently withdrew it on representations that it might lead to undesirable statements being made during the debate. He said at the same time that it was inspired by genuine and intense anxiety about the country's defences. Mr. MacDermot has since gone to America, where he is reported to have broadcast a statement to the effect that the defeat of Hitler was a major Irish interest, and that the defeat of England would reduce Ireland to "rags and beggary". It would be the worst sort of tragedy, he asserted, if the American friends of Ireland "were to put old hatreds and old catchwords before the interests of the Irish people and their prosperity, to say nothing of the interests of America herself".

The Dublin Government has recently sought a renewal of the special emergency powers granted them at the start of the war. During the debate in the Dail Mr. De Valera said they were faced with a prolonged period of emergency and a situation that would become increasingly difficult. It was, however, of tremendous value that all parties were united in favour of neutrality. Replying to criticism, he denied that the censorship had been used for party purposes, but admitted that owing to the tremendous pressure of work the public had not been given enough information about some of the emergency orders. The fact was, he said, that the people, notwithstanding two years of war, did not yet realise the peril in which the nation stood from the point of view of either military attack or the hardships they were going to suffer before the war ended. He looked forward to the coming winter with great apprehension.

In a subsequent debate on the work of his own department, Mr. De Valera said they were asked why they did not bargain with other countries. The answer was that, if Irish policy did not suit those countries, they were not going to bother very much about accommodating Eire, and even if Eire were in the war they might not be able to accommodate her. The

principal charge made against the Government by Opposition speakers was one of inaction and lack of foresight. Mr. Cosgrave asserted that a coalition Government was impossible because the two principal parties differed in their conception of civic duty and responsibility. Mr. O'Kelly, the Minister for Finance, gave the deputies cold comfort when he informed them that as the war went on he was afraid that taxes were going to increase. He subsequently told the Senate that an increase in income tax was probable, and that he would have to borrow £10,000,000. The present rate of tax is 7*s*. 6*d*. in the pound. The Eire exchequer returns for the first six months of the financial year 1941-42 show that during that period expenditure has exceeded revenue by £2,578,999. Revenue is £400,359 higher and expenditure £1,904,368 more than in the corresponding period of last year. The capacity of the direct taxpayer in Eire is however not unlimited. Conditions there are quite different from Great Britain, because the income-tax paying class is relatively small, and there has been no expansion of incomes owing to the war. A further increase of income tax would therefore be both unpopular and inadvisable. The Irish bank returns show, however, a considerable accumulation of savings, and the monetary situation therefore favours borrowing operations. It would therefore seem to be the lesser of two evils for Eire to use its abundant credit to meet the deficit in revenue due to the emergency situation.

Another difficulty under which the Eire Government labours is the apparent lack of competent men to fill Ministerial posts. When quite recently Mr. P. J. Ruttledge, the Minister for Local Government, resigned his office in order to take up a lucrative legal position in the gift of the Government—an action strongly criticised by the Opposition—Mr. Sean McEntee, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, was appointed to succeed him, and Mr. Sean Lemass, the Minister for Supplies, who had formerly been Minister for Commerce, was reappointed to that position, so that he now holds two portfolios. Mr. Hugo Flinn, one of the Parliamentary Secretaries, also has two posts. Clearly Mr. De Valera

does not favour the introduction of new recruits into the Ministerial camp.

Here in Northern Ireland we are naturally more concerned with problems concerning the prosecution of the war. Much criticism has been heard lately of the lack of proper control over communications between Eire and Northern Ireland, and a demand has been made for a closer censorship of letters and restriction of travel between the two parts of Ireland. Some tightening up of the regulations has taken place, and travel permits must now be obtained before one can travel from Belfast to Dublin or vice versa. But it is clearly almost impossible to control effectively a long straggling land frontier such as that between Northern Ireland and Eire, sparsely inhabited on both sides by people of similar nationality and language. Real control can only be effective on the sea frontier of the entire island. In this instance geographical facts emphasise the unity of Ireland.

Nationalist organisations here have protested strongly against the detention of Mr. Cahir Healy, who represents Fermanagh in the Belfast Parliament. He was arrested on an order of Mr. Herbert Morrison, the British Home Secretary, who had shortly before visited Belfast. The order was made on the grounds that the Home Secretary had "reason to believe that Mr. Healy had recently been concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts". In a letter to the Home Secretary Mr. Healy, who is a Republican in politics, after declaring his belief in a free and united Ireland stated that he was not anti-British and never had any liking for Nazism. He would like, he said, to see the peoples of Ireland and England living in peace and good fellowship. At the same time he refused to appeal to the Advisory Committee. The present position of the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland is far from happy, and its leaders have no clear or settled policy. Two Nationalist members of Parliament representing the Tyrone–Fermanagh constituency in the Imperial Parliament were elected on a pledge not to attend, which they have duly

observed. In the Northern Parliament two of the Nationalist members for Belfast attend regularly and take part in the debates, whereas other Nationalist members representing country constituencies do not. In the Senate all the Nationalist members attend. There are about 400,000 Nationalists in Northern Ireland and many of them are disfranchised by this policy of abstention, which as things are at present leads nowhere.

The Labour members, however, do not hesitate to criticise the Government. Speaking at Stormont on September 2 Mr. J. Beattie, M.P., one of that party, declared that there was a council within the Government which was as great a menace to parliamentary government as Hitler. Six men were ruling Northern Ireland, and the representatives of the people were denied any hand in what was being done. Democracy, he said, did not exist within the confines of the Northern Cabinet; it was dictatorship from beginning to end. Other speakers complained of the treatment meted out to evacuees from Belfast, and pointed out that the Northern Parliament only met for about 25 days in the year. Considerable friction has also arisen between the Belfast business community and Sir Dawson Bates, the Minister of Home Affairs, because the latter refuses to suspend the Belfast Corporation, whose management of civic affairs has received most unfavourable attention. In this matter Belfast has something to learn from Dublin, where the city manager system has been in force for some years with excellent results.

III. Portents

ALTHOUGH the noise of battle has recently rolled away towards the east we are reminded by events that this situation is not likely to be permanent, and that our island is precariously situated on the verge of the European conflagration. In the small hours of July 26 enemy aircraft were again over Northern Ireland, and some bombs were dropped which caused neither damage nor casualties. The same night bombs

were also dropped near Dundalk in Eire, not far from the border of Northern Ireland, causing minor damage but no casualties. On the morning of August 15 an unidentified aircraft flew over Dublin and was fired on by the ground defences. On August 26 a German bomber crashed near Kinsale in County Cork, the crew, who were uninjured, being interned. A domestic tragedy arising out of the war took place on September 15, when 15 soldiers of the Eire army were killed and 20 seriously injured as the result of the explosion of an anti-tank mine at a training ground in the Wicklow mountains.

More serious, however, is the situation disclosed by recent doings of the Irish fifth column, better known as the I.R.A. On July 18 a miniature skirmish took place at a farm-house in County Longford, when the police and military arrested a member of that organisation called Richard Goss, who was wanted for several bank robberies. Goss fired on the military, and was tried by the Special Military Tribunal in August for this offence. He was convicted, sentenced to death and executed a few days afterwards, as the Government refused to commute the sentence. This was the first case in which the death penalty was inflicted in Eire under the special emergency powers for an offence other than murder. On September 8 a far more sensational event occurred. On that afternoon a dishevelled and distraught man, his legs and arms bound with chains and ropes, with a revolver in his hand, tottered into the police station at Rathmines in the southern suburbs of Dublin. He was identified as Stephen Hayes, the reputed "chief of staff" of the I.R.A., who had been wanted for some time. Armed detectives proceeded at once to a house in Castlewood Park, which is in the vicinity. When they appeared there a man named Stephen Rice, a native of Belfast, ran from the house and was fired on by the detectives. He fell wounded on the road and was taken into custody. On September 18 one Sean McCaughey, otherwise Sean Dunlop, who had been arrested by the police on September 2, was charged before the Military Tribunal with the abduction of Stephen Hayes.

Light began to be thrown on these mysterious events. The story told by Hayes was, in the words of the prosecuting counsel, a harrowing tale of terror. Hayes described how, while discussing "army matters" in his capacity as I.R.A. chief of staff at a house at Coolock in County Dublin on June 30, he was seized by McCaughey and two other armed men and taken to a deserted farm-house in County Louth, where he was beaten and questioned concerning his "contacts with the Free State Government and information given to the police". He was told he would be shot if he did not admit certain accusations. Later he was taken to another house in the Dublin mountains and from there led to a river-bank, where he was again told he was going to be shot. He then apparently made a statement under threat. Afterwards, on the night of July 12, with a rope tied to his left leg, he was marched across bogs and fields to the house in Castlewood Park. For some days after arriving there he was left alone; eventually on July 23 he was "court martialled" by his captors, McCaughey, who was described as adjutant-general, acting as prosecutor. He was charged with "treason" against the Republican Army and conspiracy with the Eire Government. The trial lasted all night. After these proceedings he alleged that he was again beaten and tortured in other ways, and that as a result of the beating he recounted imaginary happenings which they spent a week recording. Finally on September 8, during the absence of his guard, he escaped through a window and managed to reach the police station in a state of collapse. Medical evidence was given as to the marks of beating and violent treatment on the body of Hayes. McCaughey was sentenced to death, but the sentence was subsequently commuted by the Government to one of penal servitude for life. Rice, the wounded man, has not yet been tried.

The conviction of McCaughey did not, however, conclude the matter. On October 2 the Eire Government Information Bureau issued the following remarkable statement:

The Government is aware that a printed document, purporting to be a confession by Stephen Hayes of Enniscorthy, Wexford, has been widely circulated in the form of a "special communiqué" issued by an unlawful organisation. The circumstances under which Hayes made the alleged confession were stated in evidence by him during the course of a recent trial and are familiar to the public. The document contains allegations of relations between Ministers and leading members of the organisation, and of collusion on the part of certain Ministers and the Government in activities of the organisation. Fantastic though these allegations are, the Government and the Ministers named in the document think it well to state categorically that they are wholly untrue and without any shadow of foundation.

Public opinion in Eire has been profoundly disturbed by these disclosures. That it should be possible for such an illegal organisation to carry on its fell work without detection, in the manner described by Hayes, and for circumstantial charges of collusion in its activities to be made against individual Ministers and the Government, is most disquieting. It may be surmised that the last has not yet been heard of the matter.

IV. Economic Problems

PROBLEMS of supply remain in the foreground of the Eire economic picture. Restricted and unpunctual train services, the prohibition of the use of gas-bags on motor-cars and the severe rationing of turf all indicate that the supply of coal from Britain has almost vanished. Trains between Cork and Dublin are now reduced to one a day. Tea, sugar, petrol, matches are already rationed, although the tea ration has been recently increased. In the country districts lack of kerosene and candles has led to a revival of primitive methods of lighting. The growing scarcity of raw materials makes it probable that further rationing may be unavoidable, and the Government has recently announced that it proposes to establish a national register so that individual ration books may be issued if necessary.

The food position in Eire seems to be reasonably secure, at least as regards essentials. Owing to some abuse, the privilege of sending small food parcels to Great Britain and

Northern Ireland has been suspended. There is a surplus of meat, owing to the fact that the export of cattle to Great Britain has been reduced by more than half since the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, now fortunately almost eradicated. The harvest has been the most bountiful since 1847, and a fine autumn enabled it to be saved and threshed without difficulty, although threshing operations were somewhat handicapped by the lack of coal. The area under wheat was the largest ever recorded. The agricultural statistics indicate that there is a continuous growth in tillage crops and an increasing reliance on the home market. Should the war drag on for a long period, lack of artificial manures, already causing serious concern, is bound to lead to a diminution in yield and a consequently grave situation. Owing to the sharp rise in the price of wheat and the cost of production, the Eire Government has decided to subsidise bread in order to prevent any increase in the present price to the consumer. It is calculated that the sum required for this purpose will amount to £2,000,000 in the coming year, £750,000 of which will be provided from the reserve fund of the semi-public organisation which imports and purchases wheat, and the balance from public funds. Arrangements are also being made to provide communal cooking facilities in the large cities in order to meet the situation created by the scarcity of fuel.

The problem of unemployment, which is increasing in Eire, has been partly met by abnormal emigration. Between May 1 and the end of August some 16,000 men emigrated from Eire to Great Britain, though half of these would be migratory labourers who cross to England for the harvest and return later. Many of the emigrants are skilled artisans or young agricultural labourers. The Catholic Bishop of Galway has recently made a public protest against this situation, but failing the provision of employment at home it is difficult to see what can be done. The British and Eire Governments have agreed to try and regulate emigration through the Labour Exchanges, and only those who are redundant in Eire will be permitted to leave. In Northern Ireland, on the contrary, the

tendency is to encourage such a movement, for we realise that anything which helps to increase the output of munitions in Great Britain also benefits us. The Eire trade statistics show that, owing to the reduction of imports by half through war conditions, the trade balance is more favourable and in consequence the sterling assets of Eire are increasing.

Problems of interest to both North and South have been raised by the recently published report of the Eire Transport Tribunal. The terms of reference of this body, which was appointed in 1938, were to examine the position of public transport, excluding air transport, the causes of the unfavourable position of the railways and the measures necessary to ensure an efficient public transport system. The majority report, which is qualified by the reservation that present conditions make premature any attempt to provide a final solution, recommends that the board of the Great Southern Railways should be reduced in size and assisted by two expert controllers, the chairman to be a whole-time official nominated by the Government, and that the company should make a debenture issue of £1,250,000, guaranteed by the Government, for the purpose of improving existing road services and acquiring compulsorily the interests of private competitors. It also recommends that additional taxation should be imposed on private motor vehicles, the proceeds of which would be available to meet deficiencies in the railway company's fixed-interest obligations. A minority report by Dr. Henry Kennedy, the able secretary of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, approaches the problem from the consumer's standpoint, and advocates State ownership of the railways on the ground that there is no prospect of their paying their way without Government subsidies and unfair restriction of outside motor transport. Any real solution of Irish transport problems must however be on a national basis, as the larger part of the Great Northern Railway is in Northern Ireland. Such a solution is only possible with the co-operation of the two Governments concerned, which under existing conditions is hardly likely to be attempted.

Another question which affects the commercial community throughout the whole country is the increase recently announced by the Banks Standing Committee in the charges for keeping current accounts. This increase, which is on a sliding scale, raises the present charges—admittedly nominal—by amounts that seem to be excessive and inequitable. Business men in all parts of Ireland naturally feel that, when their profits and dividends are controlled drastically by the State, the banks should also be prepared to make a sacrifice, and they have expressed their indignation in no uncertain terms. As a result of this agitation, the banks have agreed to postpone the enforcement of the increased charges until the Government of Eire have had an opportunity of investigating the matter. Should they decide that the new charges are excessive, it will hardly be possible to enforce them in the North.

Northern Ireland,
October 1941.

INDIA AND THE WAR

I. An Extended Viceroyalty

THE extension of the Viceroy's term of office until 1943 came as a surprise to most people in India, where political commentators had been speculating for some time about his likely successor. An interesting variety of names was canvassed, ranging from the right to the left in British politics, and including such candidates as Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Duke of Devonshire, Sir John Anderson, Mr. R. A. Butler, and several others. Few anticipated that the reigning Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, would have his tenure of office further extended, although those who were closely watching war events in the Middle East and elsewhere did not hesitate to predict that his continuance as Viceroy was inevitable. His acceptance of an additional year may be regarded as an expression of his sense of duty in responding to a call made to him in difficult times, both in India and abroad. This spirit of service is also shared by Lady Linlithgow, who has devoted much attention to humanitarian activities during her time in the country, particularly in the organisation and establishment of the Tuberculosis Association of India, which has consolidated and co-ordinated all bodies previously existing for combating this disease and has covered the country with a network of sanatoria and clinics for the treatment and care of those suffering from it.

It is always the misfortune of a ruling Viceroy that the nature of much of his important work is generally unknown, and that judgments of his viceroyalty are frequently based on a lack of that full awareness necessary to make a fair and complete appraisal of his services. This is particularly true in time of war, and Lord Linlithgow has suffered from it; but when the archives at Delhi are opened it will be found that

he has contributed in great measure to the prosecution of the war not only as it affects India, but also in that wider strategical sphere in which India maintains those outer bastions of defence that guarantee her security. In the domestic political field the Viceroy has faced some exceptionally difficult problems, and he has handled them with a tact and patience which reflect a deep toleration and a wide appreciation of the important issues underlying the constitutional controversy. The inauguration of Provincial autonomy, which he witnessed, proved that the reforms had opened a new era for India, and only the circumstances of war have retarded that constitutional progress which the Viceroy has endeavoured to advance. New declarations have superseded the former ones made by His Majesty's Government, but their designs are the same in purpose and intention. They aim at maintaining Indian unity and at contributing to that advancement towards Dominion Status, which the majority of moderate men believe is synonymous with independence.

Since the outbreak of war Lord Linlithgow has laboured unremittingly in the cause of winning it. His imaginative enterprise was largely responsible for the creation of the Eastern Group Supply Council, an organisation based on three continents, which is provisioning Allied and Imperial forces operating or situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Iran, India, Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand. Through its agency important and vital supplies have been despatched to meet the requirements of His Majesty's Government, the material supplied being obtained from sixteen British territories in the Eastern hemisphere under a policy of co-ordinated effort without precedent in the experience of the British Commonwealth. The value of this supply organisation to the war effort in the Middle East and elsewhere can scarcely be computed, and under the Viceroy's initiative it was established in time to mitigate the dangers arising from the partial blocking of the sea route by the Mediterranean, and to meet any change in the strategic situation which might develop. The organisation consists of a Central Provision

Office, under military control, to deal with "provision", and a Supply Council, under civil control, to deal with "supply and production". The Provision Office estimates the immediate and long-term requirements of all (except local) supplies needed for the armies in the East, and places demands for these requirements on the Supply Council. The functions of the Supply Council are to meet those demands by drawing on the available resources of all the Eastern Group of British countries, and to arrange for new production through the supply organisations in these countries.

In addition to this important project Lord Linlithgow has given significant assistance to three Commanders-in-Chief, including Sir Claude Auchinleck and Sir Archibald Wavell, two soldiers whose names are already household words. The exchange of appointments between these Generals surprised the world, and its inner significance has not yet been disclosed. General Wavell will go down in history as the man who demolished the Italian Empire in North Africa by a series of brilliant campaigns in which his forces were outnumbered by about ten to one. General Auchinleck has yet to earn his laurels in the Middle East, but to that war zone he carries with him experience acquired at Narvik and during the Battle of Britain, which is augmented by a unique understanding of those Indian soldiers who form an important element of the troops under his command. Both Generals would admit the valuable help they have received from Lord Linlithgow, who has been a student of military affairs for more than thirty years, and has watched events in this war in such a manner that the strong Allied position east of Suez is in no small measure due to his foresight and enterprise. It may therefore be safely assumed that in extending the Viceroy's term in India by another year the home authorities were largely influenced by Lord Linlithgow's notable part in the war effort, not only as to India's own massive contribution but also in that wider field—the protection of the British Commonwealth in the Eastern hemisphere.

II. The Menace to Asia

THE invasion of Greece was regarded in India as an opening move in the German attempt to subdue British resistance by striking at the component parts of the Commonwealth east of Suez. It predicted new dangers to India, which might have reached fulfilment but for prompt British action in Iraq and Syria. The Viceroy and his military advisers recognised the dangers, and efforts to counteract them found final expression when British and Russian forces occupied strategic positions in Iran, where German penetration had been more intensive than in any other part of the Middle East. This had the effect of linking Allied forces with the Russian armies in the Caucasus, and opened up possibilities for consolidating an Allied front from Archangel to Tobruk. The direct threat to India lay through Iran, and the unwillingness of the Germans to be dislodged from their hold in that country reflected their anxiety to maintain themselves in a strategic position vital to their plans for Asiatic conquest. Their presence in Iran constituted a menace not only to the Middle East and India, but also to Russia and to the route leading to Burma and Malaya. While invading German troops would face tremendous difficulties in attempting to approach India through the Caucasus, it was already obviously part of their plan, and by rounding up their agents in Iran the Allied forces strengthened the defensive position from Libya to the Caspian Sea.

The threat to India has not yet been wholly removed, but the Allies are now in a much better position to meet it. The enemy's determination to reach the Caucasus indicates his anxiety to break the new front which Allied action in Iran has created. This front gives fresh shape to the old theory of encirclement which the Germans have always feared; the fact that the greater part of Europe is now under their domination is of little value to them if the process of encirclement can be completed in a manner that will enable the Allies to determine where the last battle of this war is to be fought and won. The collapse of the Russian armies is necessary to Hitler's success,

for, if he cannot disentangle himself from his adventure in Eastern Europe, adventures in other directions will be greatly complicated. With the elimination of the menace from Iraq and Iran, the way has been opened up for consolidating our military position, while the political situation throughout the Middle East has been much improved. Recent developments have heartened Turkey, have given Afghanistan greater confidence in maintaining neutrality, have encouraged the new régime in Syria and have opened the way for Lease-Lend supplies from America to reach Russia by a route through Iran hitherto unavailable.

Indian troops have done their full share in bringing about this improved situation. They played important rôles in Iraq and Iran, and they are earning praise from objective observers for their prowess and skill under conditions of modern war. The Indian Army is being rapidly expanded; General Wavell said in a recent broadcast that it borders on 1,000,000 men. It has been asserted by some that a much larger army could have been raised by this time, but the policy has been to keep recruitment in line with supplies, so as to ensure that when Indian armies take the field they are completely equipped in every sense. Equipment is now available in ever expanding volume from new sources of supply in India, from other parts of the Commonwealth and from the United States. Proposals made by the Chatfield Committee which visited India just before the war, and by the Ministry of Supply Mission which came shortly after war broke out, are now being implemented. Indian ordnance factories have been greatly enlarged and are still growing. Civil industry is fully co-operating in turning out material for the men of the new armies, who are coming forward in increasing numbers. The Royal Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force are also being developed. The navy has done notable work in connection with the campaign in North Africa, and Indian airmen are regularly engaged in attacking Germany and German-occupied territory in Europe.

III. The Domestic Political Scene

PREOCCUPATION with the war has not prevented the British authorities from making further efforts to lessen the acerbities of the political controversy in the country. On July 22 the Viceroy announced an expansion of his Executive Council and the creation of a National Defence Council. By a redistribution of old portfolios and the creation of new ones the Executive Council now consists of twelve members, of whom eight are non-official Indians. The National Defence Council, comprising representatives of British India and the Indian States, provides the Government for the first time with a non-official body as part of its official machinery for bringing the Provinces, the States and the Centre into collaboration. Its establishment was designed to "associate non-official Indian opinion as fully as possible with the prosecution of the war". Its members were chosen to give representation on a territorial basis in a manner that would represent the various elements in the national life of the country. Different communities, functions and interests are represented, including Indian women.

The reconstruction of the Executive Council is of prime importance, both politically and constitutionally, although it was effected chiefly to enable the administration to function more efficiently for war purposes. But the fact that Indians now have a complete majority on the Council represents a departure from former policy, which has not been without influence on current political thought. The expansion does not imply an attempt to satisfy or circumvent the demands of any political party, and has been made within the terms of the existing constitution; but its constitutional significance has had a direct bearing on domestic politics, even although the Indian members have been appointed without regard to party, political or communal considerations. The principal political parties are not directly represented, but the men selected can be genuinely described as representative Indians whose status in the country is recognised. Indeed, in the absence of party representation,

it is doubtful if the Viceroy could have selected a better group of men, and tested by itself as a war measure the decision represents a notable strengthening of the personnel and machinery of the Government. The conflicting policies of party leaders made it impossible for the Viceroy to draw upon the main parties; yet all the men chosen have an all-India reputation, and many of them are experienced administrators. Their presence in the Central Government gives that body an entirely new character, and the expansion reflects an imaginative attempt to interpret the existing constitution in a new spirit. As an earnest of British intentions for the future, it gives emphasis to official declarations that Indians are to be given a primary say in whatever new constitution may hereafter be devised.

The new Council came into being against a curious political background, which accounted for the form it has assumed. The principal parties had their own ideas about a reconstructed Executive Council. Although the Congress Party was roaming the political wilderness in fulfilment of Mr. Gandhi's policy for freedom of speech to oppose the war effort, that policy actually emerged from the constitutional demands which the Congress Party was making. These demands sought the establishment of a National Government, enjoying the confidence of the elected members in the existing Central Legislature. The Moslem League opposed the Congress demands, on the ground that their fulfilment would imply the subservience of the Moslem community to a Hindu majority. To counteract this, the Moslem League insists on equal representation with the Congress Party in any central machinery which may be established, or, alternatively, a substantial share in any Government from which Congress men may be absent. Other political groups have other proposals. Notable among them are the recommendations made by a group of prominent public men, unaffiliated with any specific parties but inclining to the Liberal school, who urge the formation of an Executive Council responsible to the Crown but consisting entirely of non-official Indians. Not one of these proposals agrees with

the original British suggestions for expanding the Council, which implied that party representatives should collaborate at the Centre under the existing constitution.

The new Council meets none of the party demands in full, although it indirectly meets some of them. The British Government has clearly indicated that the new constitution for India will be examined after the war, when the Act of 1935 will be reviewed in all its aspects. This means that all that could be done in regard to the Executive Council had to be done within the terms of the existing constitution. Nearly all the proposals put forward by party leaders imply fundamental changes in the present constitution; but the new Council neither prejudges these issues nor excludes them from future consideration. All the promises made in British declarations can be fulfilled when the time comes, and although the support of the principal parties might have influenced the scale and personnel of the expansion it could not within the framework of the present constitution have affected its form. Notwithstanding this, the Council is something wholly new to Indian experience. It reflects a substantial accession of Indian opinion to the inner councils of the Central Government, and is bound to have a deep influence both on the administration and on the future course of political tendencies in the country.

The significance of the change has been noted in India. While commentators, in urging more liberal policies, have indicated dissatisfaction with what has been done, the admission is nevertheless made that the new Council represents a political advance on its predecessor. The political deadlock has not been ended, but political thinking has been diverted into new channels. The fact that such prominent public men were prepared to serve on the Council suggests that they have the support of a large body of moderate opinion, which is wearying of the ineffective policies of party leaders. These leaders have not modified their respective attitudes, but party extremism has been tempered by the change. Even in Congress circles there are spokesmen who are urging an alteration in Congress tactics, asserting that Mr. Gandhi's leadership is

unreal against the background of war. Such commentators would like the Congress Governments to resume office in those Provinces where they vacated it, but there is no indication that Mr. Gandhi has changed his views about applying non-violence to Nazism. In the Moslem League many members are dissatisfied with its President, Mr. Jinnah, but his ability to maintain disciplinary control makes it impossible for alternative leadership to emerge. Moslem League policy is mainly governed by a desire to maintain Moslem solidarity in opposition to the Congress Party, although this does not mean that the Moslems do not seek independence of the British. But it is clear that Mr. Jinnah favours no collaborative action unless he is satisfied that such collaboration will be on equal terms with the Hindus, and that it does not preclude the League from pressing its own claim to establish independent Moslem States as a solution for the constitutional controversy.

IV. The National Defence Council

THE expansion of the Executive Council met with wider approval than political commentators in general were prepared to admit, although party spokesmen naturally pointed out that party demands had not been met. This was particularly true of the Moslem League, Mr. Jinnah directly resenting the step which had been taken, particularly as one League member had agreed to serve on the Executive Council and four on the National Defence Council. The controversy created about this issue centred mainly on the Defence Council, on which Premiers in office were invited to serve to represent their Provinces. The Premiers of Bengal, the Punjab and Assam agreed to serve in that capacity, and the Begum Shah Nawaz accepted nomination to represent Indian women. All belonged to the League. In view of this, Mr. Jinnah threatened these members with disciplinary action. He held that, according to a communication addressed to him by the Viceroy through the Governor of Bombay, the Premiers had been invited to serve as representatives of the Moslem community; he indicated that the Premiers should have sought his sanction

before agreeing to serve, although he also implied that his sanction would not have been forthcoming.

The Premiers of the Punjab and Assam accepted Mr. Jinnah's interpretation of their appointments without much hesitation and resigned from the Defence Council; but the Premier of Bengal contested Mr. Jinnah's right to interfere in Provincial affairs and, while he too resigned from the Council, he also resigned his offices in the Moslem League. All three Premiers obviously left the Council in order to maintain the solidarity of the League, particularly as sections of the Nationalist press hoped that the Premiers would defy Mr. Jinnah and bring about a split. The Begum Shah Nawaz refused to resign, contending that she had clearly been invited to represent Indian women and not the League as such. In securing the resignations of League members Mr. Jinnah has deprived the Moslem community of substantial representation in the Defence Council, solely in the interest of retaining his dictatorial control over the League.* That dictatorship thrives on the complexities of the constitutional controversy, and his desire to prevent League members from serving was prompted largely by his unwillingness to see them associating themselves with more moderate policies than he himself accepts. Behind the façade of unity thus maintained, there is nevertheless discontent with League leadership, and opposition to the Pakistan project which the League is now endorsing.

The withdrawal of League members from the Defence Council places the League in the same position as the Congress Party, which is also unrepresented there. What Mr. Jinnah's attitude will be should the Congress Ministries return to office is not known, but he will be put in a dilemma if Congress Premiers should in due course take their places in the Defence Council. The changed position at the Centre, particularly in

* To register disapproval of the manner in which the expanded Executive Council and the National Defence Council had been set up, Mr. Jinnah announced on October 28 that during the session which opened on that day members of the Moslem party would absent themselves from the Central Legislature.—EDITOR.

regard to the Executive Council, has encouraged the view that new political tendencies may emerge such as might enable the Congress Ministries to resume office in the Provinces. It is generally held that the new Indian members of the Executive Council will be prepared to vacate their places if the two principal parties show a willingness to co-operate, and developments in this direction are not impossible. While nobody claims that the expansion of the Executive Council and the creation of the Defence Council have ended the political stalemate, there are many who believe that these new departures should encourage men of moderation to continue their efforts in finding a solution for those serious problems which keep the two main parties from collaborating.

V. The Atlantic Charter

THE promulgation of the Atlantic Charter had a special interest for politically minded Indians, who contended that its genuineness would be tested by the manner in which its principles were applied to India. Consequently there was professed disappointment with Mr. Churchill's interpretation of the Charter in relation to India. Mr. Churchill said that it did not in any way qualify the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma and other parts of the British Commonwealth. He reiterated that the British Government is pledged by the declaration of 1940 to help India to obtain free and equal partnership in the Commonwealth, subject to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the long British connection with India and British responsibilities to the many creeds, races and interests in the country. Mr. Churchill regarded the re-establishment of European sovereignties ruthlessly destroyed by aggression as quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in regions whose peoples own allegiance to the British Crown.

The unwillingness of Indians to accept British declarations as sincere is one of the distressing features of the constitutional

controversy. Mr. Churchill's plain assertion that British policy in India aims at bringing about equal partnership was generally regarded as an inadequate application of the principles outlined in the Charter. It was held that British obligations and responsibilities in India should be more specifically defined, particularly as Indians have been told that the task of framing a new constitution will rest largely with themselves; it was claimed that what India really wanted to know was the nature of the relationship that would exist between Great Britain and India after the war. But it is clear from British declarations, whatever Indians may say, that the British purpose is to lead India towards Dominionhood at the earliest possible date. The fulfilment of that intention is largely dependent on Indians themselves, and some real attempt to remove the domestic difficulties which exist would go far to securing that final solution which is so ardently desired in both countries. The conflicting policies of opposing political parties are mainly responsible for the stalemate which now exists, and they have so complicated the problem that a solution along lines formerly contemplated has been made more difficult, if not impossible.

The right of all peoples to choose their own form of government is a fundamental principle of the Atlantic Charter, and the theory is inherent in all the British efforts which have been made to find a solution in India. The particular form of government embodied in the Act of 1935 represented the nearest common agreement that could be reached at that time, notwithstanding the memorandum of the British India delegation to the Round Table Conference which demanded something different. How far the Act of 1935 has been destroyed by intervening events cannot be determined with certainty until the Act comes under review after the war. But there is no doubt that political manœuvring in India, coupled with a complete unwillingness to compromise between parties, has raised entirely new problems, including that presented by one party which professes to find a solution only in the division of India.

India,
September 1941.

GREAT BRITAIN

I. Help for Russia

PARLIAMENT reassembled for a new session on November 12. It would be idle to pretend that in the last few months there has not emerged a vague feeling of dissatisfaction, or that Mr. Churchill's assurance of the cohesion of the Government and of his intention to make no further changes at the present moment has genuinely allayed it. There are not, of course, either in Parliament or in the country any real doubts about who should be Prime Minister. Apart from a few perpetual malcontents in the House of Commons, nobody questions for a moment that Mr. Churchill should remain the country's leader; the people still trust him absolutely, and not only because there is apparently no person to take his place. It is difficult to define the undercurrent of uneasiness with any precision. In the summer it turned on the question of production—on some inability of industry to deliver the goods because of a suggested inability of the Government to mobilise the nation for war. This question is still foremost in people's minds, but it has been given a new significance by the relentless advance of the German armies into Russia and by doubts raised whether Britain can give the Soviet the help we have promised. Thus current criticism has centred on "help for Russia", and the Government has been subject to the steady pressure of public opinion expressed both in and out of Parliament to make our promise good. The possibility of a western offensive by Britain has been debated in Parliament, in the press, in the home, in the parks, at the street corners and even on the screen, but in military matters the Government has always the answer that it alone knows the facts, and that public discussion of strategy must in such circumstances be largely irresponsible and may even do harm. The critics then ask why members of the Government are allowed to give gratuitous information

to the enemy by saying that a western offensive is impossible. They quote Lord Halifax's statement at a press conference on his return to the United States that "at present, shipping and equipment are both insufficient to make the project feasible", though they omit a sentence in the same statement that a force would be landed somewhere when the time was ripe.

It is not difficult for the Government to prove that the help for Russia that is practicable is being granted. Lord Beaverbrook's broadcast and his speech in a House of Lords debate after his return from Moscow must have convinced the most sceptical that the Government is determined not to stint supplies. It is quite obviously not being viewed merely as a question of letting go a few obsolete aeroplanes or guns which Britain's armed forces can spare—these, indeed, would be very scanty—but of delivering the things that Russia wants. Wheat has been sent from stocks in Canada. Sugar has been sent from stocks in Britain. Aircraft and tanks, although the lack of tanks in almost every campaign of the war has hitherto meant Britain's failure, are arriving and are on their way; "we simply gave what Stalin asked and in full measure". Whatever justification the critics may have on their side they cannot honestly plead that the British Government is withholding supplies, either from ulterior political motives or from a reluctance to denude our armed forces of the equipment which at long last they have been beginning to receive at an effective rate.

But "help for Russia", in its political aspect, is merely a point of focus for expressing that indeterminate dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. The comparative peace which Britain is enjoying, owing to relative immunity from air raids, has stirred in the people a feeling that they ought to be doing something more to help the Russians, now bearing the full brunt of the German attack. It is an emotion which, properly capitalised, might lead to a huge increase in production, and it is a welcome sign that the people no longer feel on the defensive. The country is willing and eager to respond to Mr. Churchill's original offer of "blood, toil, tears and sweat";

it agrees wholeheartedly with Mr. Bevin that this is not "a comfortable war". Its demand is that the Government should live up to these stern words, and should never, for fear of giving offence in this quarter or in that, rest content with a lower degree of thoroughness than the Germans are no doubt applying—as the Prime Minister has again warned us—to the perfecting of their plans for the attack on Britain.

II. The Government and Parliament

SOME reflection of these movements of thought has been apparent at by-elections. There have of course been no officially contested elections since the beginning of the war, because under the terms of the party truce a vacancy in a constituency is filled by a candidate of the same party which held the constituency previously. This has not, however, prevented a medley of independent candidates from presenting themselves in opposition to the Government selection. In the early days of the war such candidates were mostly pacifists or Communists, who stood for "stopping the war", and an occasional Fascist. These, especially the Fascists, secured comparatively few votes. In recent months the independent claimants have been of a different character. They have stood generally for nostrums for winning the war (thus one of them, who has already contested three by-elections and is standing at a fourth, comes forward as the "Bomb Berlin" or "Win-the-War-in-the-Air" candidate) or else for the alleviation of some particular grievance such as soldiers' pay. The very nature of their candidature shows them to be thoroughly irresponsible—"frivolous" is Mr. Churchill's word—but the fact remains that Independents at four by-elections this summer and autumn secured 4,146, 4,869, 8,086 and 7,121 votes, which in two cases reduced the Government's majority to 1,365 and 2,825 respectively. Obviously, in the absence of big issues to fight over, most people do not trouble or are too busy to turn out to vote, and it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the Independents' success. It is nevertheless true that they have

been able to trade upon some of the popular restlessness, because the Government has not fully seized the opportunity for turning it into the right channels.

The question of soldiers' pay which featured in one or more by-elections has, even more than help for Russia, been a sore point at issue between Government and Parliament. In the latter case the Government has proved from the beginning its keenness to meet to the fullest possible extent the needs of the situation and the unmistakable wishes of the people, and most back-bench members for their part have shown themselves alive to the difficulties in the way. But in the debate over soldiers' pay at the close of the last session every speaker was critical of the Government's new scheme. Briefly, the position is that every person serving in the armed forces receives a certain basic pay, with fixed allowances for wife and children; but as in very many cases the sums thus granted by the Service departments are insufficient to prevent hardship, the War Service Grants Committee of the Ministry of Pensions has been established and empowered to make supplementary allowances in cases of proved need. Too often, however, neither the ordinary nor the supplementary allowances have sufficed to prevent families from suffering real hardship, and for some months the Government has been pressed to improve the serving men's position. When the Government's new plan appeared, it was found that it did not grant an all-round increase in pay as of right. Instead, it was concerned with improving the system of allowances paid by the War Service Grants Committee. The maximum supplementary grant is proposed to be raised from £2 to £3 a week: subject to this maximum there is a guarantee of a minimum income of 16*s*. per unit of family after reasonable commitments such as rent have been met, two children under school-leaving age or one adult counting as a unit: the income per unit will be made up to 20*s*. if the family income was on such a scale before the father joined the forces: moreover, the pre-Service income will be calculated after allowing for war-time increases in the cost of living. There are also further provisions dealing with cases

of sickness and with proficiency pay; in the latter case there will be no reduction of allowance until the soldier receives an increase of more than 4*s*. a day, when four-sevenths of the increase will go to his family with a corresponding reduction in the grant.

To a certain extent this extremely complicated scheme can be commended. It is a further extension of family allowances, and in preventing hardship it represents a considerable improvement. But its great disadvantage, which was the main burden of complaints in the House of Commons, is that by administering it through the War Service Grants Committee and not through the Service departments the Government gives the appearance of regarding the whole question as one of charity. It means that every household applying for the increase must go through some kind of means test, an unpopular procedure when applied to unemployment assistance and other forms of public relief, but doubly so when applied to the family of a man who is fighting for his country. There is also the discrepancy between the income of a man and his family when he is in the armed forces, and that of a man serving in war industry. Generally speaking, the latter receives high wages, and the frequently unfavourable contrast between the family of a fighting man and that of a war worker living in the same street has lain behind much of the campaign for higher Service pay. The Government's scheme by its very nature ignored this anomaly—which indeed can have no ready solution, since the risks borne by a fighting man can hardly be compensated in terms of money—and its apparent acquiescence in this serious contrast was roundly attacked in Parliament.

Another occasion on which the Government was roughly handled by the House of Commons in the closing days of the old session was over the rights of members of Parliament to visit places banned to the general public for reasons of security. Mr. McGovern, one of the three members of the Independent Labour party in the House, applied to the Home Secretary for permission to visit Ireland, both Northern Ireland and Eire,

for the purpose of political observation and survey. In view of the nature of his party, which is opposed to war, and of the existence of a German Legation in Dublin, Mr. Morrison refused. Then Mr. McGovern sought permission to go to Northern Ireland in order to investigate the case of Mr. Cahir Healy, a Nationalist member of the Ulster Parliament, who is detained under Defence Regulation 18B. Mr. Morrison again refused; and the debate, when the refusal was taken up at Westminster, turned on the question whether members of Parliament should in security matters be treated differently from members of the public. Mr. Morrison's opponents claimed that they should: that membership of Parliament was a responsible office implying responsibility in its holder and involving certain duties towards the public: and that these duties could only be fulfilled if members were given latitude in the application of the regulations.

Mr. Morrison and Mr. Churchill, who intervened in the debate, relied on the argument that has been used throughout the war on occasion after occasion—and which is still valid. In time of war it is necessary to confer absolute powers on the Executive for the conduct of the war. Parliament itself conferred these powers, which must be exercised at the absolute discretion of the Executive, or in many cases they would be worthless; but the Executive, or more particularly the responsible Minister, is still accountable to Parliament for the way they are used. It may indeed be argued that this accountability is of no avail if it leaves the position unaltered. But the very fact that the debate was held will serve as a check to unnecessarily arbitrary action in the future. The Home Secretary's lot in war-time is certainly not a happy one. He is responsible for the administration of all the regulations affecting the liberty of the subject most nearly. He is bound to receive kicks if he goes too far and on the other hand, as Mr. Morrison pointed out in the debate, he frequently receives kicks when he does not go far enough—when he does not detain persons whom other people think should be under lock and key, when he does not suppress all newspapers which adopt

an attitude considered detrimental to the war effort, and when he does give permission to members of Parliament to leave the country. Judged by all reasonable tests, Mr. Morrison's administration of these powers of his has been on the whole both lenient and sound.

In the meantime his discretionary power has been the subject of an appeal to the House of Lords. Of all the hateful regulations that the war has brought upon us, Regulation 18B, which authorises the detention of British subjects without trial, gives the greatest offence. At the outset it was applied only rarely, but after the Western campaigns of 1940 hundreds of people who were or had been members of the British Union of Fascists were detained under it. Over 1,500 persons have been detained altogether, but many were released after their cases had been reviewed by the advisory committee set up; the total number now detained is only about 700, while new cases of detention are rare. Nevertheless, the fact that any British subject can be kept indefinitely in prison on the Home Secretary's order has always been a cause for uneasiness, and the administration of the regulation has frequently been raised in Parliament.

On several occasions the person detained has applied to the court for a writ of habeas corpus, but the court has held that an affidavit by the Home Secretary to the effect that he had reasonable cause for believing that the person in question came within the terms of the regulation, and that it was consequently necessary to exercise control over him, was a good answer to an application for a writ. In the case recently heard on appeal by the House of Lords, the legal point at issue was slightly different, though the effect was the same. A detained person had sued the present and previous Home Secretaries for wrongful imprisonment, and had claimed damages. The defendants admitted that the plaintiff was detained under Regulation 18B, which was, in fact, their defence, whereupon he took out a summons asking that they should give particulars of the grounds on which he had been detained. The lower courts having given judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff

appealed to the House of Lords. By a majority of four to one, this final court of appeal decided that by the terms of the regulation there is no onus on the Home Secretary to prove that he has reasonable cause for believing that a person should be detained. The matter is one for his exclusive discretion, and provided he acts in good faith his action is not subject to challenge in a court of law. The whole issue comes down to the question whether in time of war the safety of the State transcends the liberty of the subject. If it does, the matter must remain within the Home Secretary's discretion, because, as Lord Maugham pointed out in his judgment, his action could hardly be discussed in court, whether in public or *in camera*, without a danger of confidential information being revealed which would prejudice the future actions of the Home Secretary, jeopardise the security of the State and thereby defeat the purpose of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. On the other hand those who agree with Lord Atkin, the dissenting Law Lord, argue that Parliament never intended the Home Secretary to have an exclusive discretion. They point out that the original regulation, made in the early days of the war, used the words "if he is satisfied", that this wording was challenged by Parliament and amended after consultation with an all-party committee to the present phrase "if he has reasonable cause", and that consequently Parliament must have meant to make the Home Secretary's action answerable to a court of law. There is, therefore, every likelihood of the regulation continuing to be discussed in Parliament, which can only serve, whether it is further amended or not, to emphasise that although in theory the Executive is absolute, in practice it has to walk very warily indeed.

III. Man Power

SINCE help for Russia is being translated into supplies, the call on Great Britain's production is greater than ever, and ways and means of expanding it are still in the forefront of debate. Mr. Bevin himself has called for an increase of 30 to

40 per cent this winter. The difficulties in the way of increasing output were described in an article in the last issue of The Round Table.* Since then, no new factors have arisen, apart perhaps from an added determination on the side of labour, which has been spurred on by Russia's resistance. A shop stewards' conference in October showed a welcome recognition that trade union rights must give way to the common cause. But however much the existing labour force can add to its already tremendous achievements, production will still be hampered by inadequate man power unless there is a much more effective mobilisation than has so far taken place. Expectations were disappointed when it was found that the King's Speech at the opening of the new session contained no reference to further action for this purpose. It was concluded not that the Government failed to recognise the need, but that its plans were still incomplete.

This limiting factor, the relatively small man power available to Great Britain, has been underlined by the Russian campaign, which has inflicted huge losses on both sides, losses that Great Britain could not endure. There is thus a clear need for the utmost economy in the use of man power in civil industry, in war industry and in the armed forces themselves. To secure the first was one of the objects of the concentration of civil industry described in a previous number of The Round Table.† This process has been virtually completed, but has not released as many workers as was expected when it was first announced. Against the unofficial estimate then given of between 500,000 and 750,000, the Board of Trade has now declared that some 144,000 have in fact been released. This is somewhat misleading, because it was found when concentration started that many of the factories scheduled to be concentrated had already gone over to government work either wholly or partly, and the process has thus indirectly transferred more workers to war work than the figure of the numbers released indicates. On the other hand, owing to lack of

* No. 124, September 1941, p. 636.
† No. 123, June 1941, p. 561.

foresight and sufficiently firm action by the Ministry of Labour, steps were not taken in time to see that the people who were made available actually moved to war jobs. Far too many of the 144,000 have gone into shops and other service trades from which it is difficult to extract them. In true stable-door fashion, Mr. Bevin has now decided to extend the Undertakings (Restriction on Engagement) Order to all women between the ages of 20 and 30. This will mean that such women will only be able to obtain fresh jobs through an employment exchange, and an employer seeking to engage a woman in this age-group will have to prove that the work is of national importance. Moreover, all shop girls between the ages of 20 and 25, except in food shops, are to be moved into more urgent work.

Another important step is the substitution of individual reservation for block reservation. In other words, men under 41 will no longer be reserved because their nominal occupation happens to fall into a particular category, but only if the actual work they are doing is of national importance. The original Schedule of Reserved Occupations had long been considered completely out of tune with the needs of the hour, and had already been substantially revised. By this step it will be almost completely set aside. As a corollary it has also been announced that all men under 25, except those working in a few specified essential industries, have had their deferment from military service cancelled. It will no doubt come as a surprise that there are men of this age not working on munitions or else in the armed forces, but the Ministry of Labour estimates that as many as 30,000 to 40,000 will thus be released for the Services.

In the armed forces themselves the question of the best use of men is under consideration by a committee with Sir William Beveridge as chairman. This committee has already produced an interim report endorsing the need of all three Services for more skilled men to keep the machines of war in action, and commenting that "so long as men of military age are used on work within the capacity of women or older men, the Govern-

ment will not escape criticism for waste of man power". The need therefore is clear; there must be a further dilution of skilled men in industry in order to release more skilled men for the Services, and a further substitution of women for men both in industry and in the armed forces. The Auxiliary Territorial Service (the women's branch of the army) alone is calling for another 200,000 recruits in the next twelve months, and there can be no doubt that the Ministry of Labour's oft-promised "drastic action" will have to be taken if these numbers and the demands of industry and the other women's Services are to be met.

IV. Food Policy

ONE big improvement in the conduct of the home front has been the adaptation of food policy, on which the health of the nation and its efficiency largely depend, to war purposes. To begin with, rationing was merely looked upon as a means of securing a fair distribution of foods in short supply, and that still remains its primary aim. In applying it, a distinction has gradually been drawn between the different needs of different sections of the community. Restaurants and catering establishments of all kinds have had their supplies of rationed goods severely cut, but subject to that have always been allowed to feed their customers outside the ration. To avoid the discrimination in favour of the wealthy which this system would otherwise give, as well as to encourage communal feeding and to meet the needs of heavily blitzed districts, British Restaurants (Ministry of Food establishments, run on a non-profit-making basis) were opened in various towns and rural areas to serve less wealthy people with a good meal, off the ration, at a very low price. Furthermore the establishment of canteens for industrial workers was officially encouraged. Thus, besides the right to a certain basic ration, most people have the possibility of a supplementary ration in canteen or restaurant. But a drawback of this system is that it implied that all people needed the same amount of food at

home and the same kind of foods, whereas it was quite obvious that children (to take one extreme) and coal-miners (to take another) have very different requirements.

Gradually therefore a system of differential rationing has been devised. For some time, underground and certain classes of agricultural workers have been allowed an extra 5 ounces of cheese a week, making 8 ounces in all, but it can hardly be said that this met their particular needs fully. When the necessity of some form of milk rationing became apparent, a special system of priorities was put into force. Expectant and nursing mothers and children under 5 years of age were guaranteed a minimum of 7 pints a week. Children between the ages of 5 and 17 were guaranteed 3½ pints, and special priorities were announced for certain classes of invalids and for hospitals. To other consumers no amount was guaranteed, but it was estimated that an adult would probably receive a minimum of 2 pints of liquid milk a week and would be allowed the equivalent of three pints of unsweetened condensed milk in addition. The expected winter stringency started in the beginning of November, and by the end of the first week retailers had been told to cut their total weekly sales by 15 per cent. This meant, of course, a considerably larger cut for the non-priority consumer, since the priority classes were to be allowed their guaranteed amounts. By the fourth week of the month no adult, at any rate in the larger towns, could expect to receive more than his minimum of 2 pints a week. It is too early to say how well the scheme will work in practice throughout the period of winter shortage, but at least there is cause for satisfaction that those who most need liquid milk will be guaranteed adequate amounts.

A further extension of differential rationing was announced in October, when it was decided to allocate food to canteens and restaurants according to whether they served heavy workers, other industrial workers or "the rest". Canteens in the first category will receive 2*d.* worth of meat per main meal compared with the previous pennyworth, more cheese and cooking fats and three times their old allowance of sugar. The

second category will receive 1½*d.* worth of meat, more cooking fats and double the amount of sugar, while the third category will continue on their present allowances.

There have been alterations in the basic or domestic ration as well. In the middle of November the sugar ration was increased from 8 to 12 ounces a week and the fats ration from 8 to 10 ounces, of which not more than 2 ounces may be taken in butter and not more than 7 ounces in margarine. A novelty is the introduction of point rationing for certain tinned foods (tinned meat, fish and beans) on the same principle as clothes rationing. Each consumer will be allowed to spend 16 points a month on these foods, which are all given a point value. If the scheme works successfully, and there appears no reason why it should not, it might with advantage be extended to other goods not yet rationed.

But in the long run the most important development of food policy is the expansion of the school meal service for schoolchildren. The peace-time scheme for supplying cheap milk to schools is to be extended by raising the Exchequer grant to local education authorities to 100 per cent, which will prevent any of them from pleading poverty for not putting it into universal force. This, it is hoped, will raise the proportion of children receiving milk under the scheme from the present level of 60 per cent to virtually 100 per cent, and in addition they will be entitled to their guaranteed 3½ pints a week at home. Moreover, the Exchequer grant in respect of school meals is to be raised to a minimum of 70 per cent and a maximum of 95 per cent. The lack of equipment, which with finance has been the main cause for the relatively small number of meals served in schools, is to be made good by allowing local education authorities to use the Ministry of Food's emergency cooking depots and the facilities of British Restaurants. It will still be some time before the provision of school meals, at present only available for some 300,000 children, can cover the full 5,000,000 attending elementary and secondary schools. But an immense step forward has been taken to eliminate malnutrition, from which too many children in the

poorer areas suffered even before the war, and to free for war work mothers whose children's dinner would otherwise have been a daily responsibility.

That this many-sided programme for improvement of the feeding of the nation is possible at all is directly due to the success of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, partly relieved in their tremendous task by invaluable American aid, in bringing the unfailing men and ships of the merchant fleet to the end of their ceaseless dangerous journeys. Shipping losses in the four months ending with October fell to little more than one-third of their seriousness in the previous four months. We are still losing 6,000 tons of shipping a day, but if Hitler has been relying more upon starvation than upon invasion to bring us to our knees, as the Prime Minister has disclosed that Hess has told us, then the summer and autumn of 1941 have proved disappointing to certain people in Germany. Our farmers have done their share too in helping that plan to miscarry. The area under crops in this island has been increased by nearly half since 1939, and we had an excellent harvest. From both sides, therefore, the Minister of Food has been enabled to build up his reserves. But they are not to be lightly dissipated in giving extra food to classes of people who do not really need it, just because the food is there. Larger reserves render lower imports possible, and lower imports of food release sorely needed ships for more militant purposes. No one can properly appreciate what Britain is setting herself to undertake in this war, who overlooks the strain on her shipping and the strain on her man power and woman power.

Great Britain,
November 1941.

CANADA

I. Canadian Defence

THE situation of those charged with responsibility for the preparations for communal defence is almost worse than that of billiard sharps condemned, as W. S. Gilbert proposed, to play billiards "on a cloth untrue with a twisted cue and elliptical billiard balls". The military and political considerations to be taken into account are never twice the same, and indeed—to make the parallel a closer one—the billiard table would have to be set up on a vessel at sea and the cue be not only twisted but flexible. If there is any foundation for the gibe that during each interval of peace the armed forces of any country usually engage in preparing for the last war but one, it is probably because the statement is rather one of ineluctable fact than a criticism. Broadly speaking, it is impossible to make preparations for war on military assumptions based upon facts more recent than the last war which has been fought. Almost everything else is speculation.

Imperfect definitions are sometimes useful. For the purpose of discussing preparations for defence it helps if military strategy is thought of as consisting in the reconciliation of military means and military ends. By analogy, political strategy would consist in the reconciliation of political means and political ends. The adjustment of means to ends and ends to means in any field is difficult enough; military strategy is itself a fine art, and political strategy equally so. But the settlement of a defence programme is an even more complicated task. It involves the reconciliation on the one hand of military means and political ends, and on the other of political means and military ends. A problem involving four groups of factors is much more than twice as difficult as one in which only two groups have to be dealt with.

In deciding on a defence programme the first step is to

inquire what are the supposed interests of the community it is desirable to defend. Some interests which it might at first sight seem possible to omit from the list may have to be retained in it because public opinion insists upon regarding them as important, and cannot, it is assumed, be corrected in time. Others, although in fact important, may have to be omitted because the public cannot be educated to appreciate their significance. Turning to military points, the list has to be revised from two angles. In the first place, against certain vital interests there may at the relevant time be no threat or sign of threat. These may be crossed out. Others must be treated likewise because it is obvious that the communal strength is insufficient to justify an attempt to defend them, even with the assistance of possible allies. There remain on the list certain interests which it is conceivably possible to defend if appropriate preparations are made. But even then the extent of the preparation which should be undertaken has to be determined. This is contingent primarily upon the nature and extent of possible threats or, speaking technically, of possible scales of attack, a factor upon which again public and professional opinion may be at variance. Secondly, therefore, the details of the programme may depend upon the balancing from time to time of political expediency and military security. Recent history affords examples of the dominance of all these varying considerations. Discussions of what should be done and decisions as to what shall be done are consequently intelligible only in the light of the circumstances of the time, both military and political, including in the latter group not only the international situation but also the domestic political climate.

Of all the aspects of defence problems, only the geography remains stable. It is of fundamental importance, and is of course peculiar to each country. In discussing Canadian defence one must not forget that the settled part of Canada consists of a strip some 2,500 miles in length and seldom more, though frequently less, than 200 miles in width. The strip is divided into two great portions, eastern and western, by some hundreds of miles of wild country, and each of the parts

subdivided again into two by mountain ranges. At its two extremities the strip faces on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. One of its long sides marches with the northern boundary of the United States. On the other lie great expanses of rock, forest and tundra, stretching towards the North Pole. On the north-west, reaching almost to north-eastern Asia, is the United States territory of Alaska, and towards the north-east is Newfoundland (including Labrador)—once a Dominion and perhaps still entitled to be so called, but at present under the government of a Commission appointed by the United Kingdom—and farther north Greenland, which forms part of the North American continental mass and is normally under Danish administration. Greenland is the nearest North American land area to the north-west corner of Eurasia, and between Newfoundland and the Azores there lie only about 1,300 miles of sea.

Before the completion of confederation in 1867 the provinces now comprising Canada had during the nineteenth century resisted two attacks from the south—the war of 1812 and the Fenian raids of 1866. After 1867, Canadian troops took part in the suppression of two western rebellions, those of 1870 and 1885, but if we disregard the Canadian *voyageurs* who went to Egypt in 1888, the only other wars in which Canada was concerned until 1939 were the South African war and the war of 1914–18. Even as late as 1920, military thinking had by no means excluded the conception of resistance to further attacks on Canada from the United States, a conception dictating the basic army organisation under which Canada is divided into ten military districts, each including a slice of the settled strip facing the United States and having its back to the northern wastes. In the last 20 years, however, this conception has in effect been entirely abandoned. The ideas governing such military activities as were undertaken have been directed to the maintenance of a non-permanent militia, some air activities and the provision of certain land defence works at the principal harbours on the two ocean frontages. There have also been somewhat half-hearted moves towards the development of

coastal naval forces. In 1939, however, the only permanently embodied land forces numbered about 4,500 of all ranks, with a high proportion of officers. The non-professional militia had a total strength of only 55,000, but again the proportion of officers was large. The navy had some thirteen ships of all kinds, with a personnel of 3,600, and the numbers of the air force were likewise very small. It had no combat aircraft, and few of such machines as it possessed were adapted for any use except training. While efforts had been made to survey the potential productive capacity for munitions, the actual capacity was negligible. The possible output of rifles from Dominion arsenals was very limited, and the facilities for the manufacture of small arms ammunition was equally exiguous. There was no factory adapted to the production of artillery of any kind, and although provision had been made for the production of Bren guns, the manufacturing facilities were only in course of completion, and the contract under which the guns were to be produced had been the subject of bitter political criticism and of investigation by a Royal Commission.

Allowing for the changed value of money, in the first decade following the Treaty of Versailles the annual appropriations for all the defence services, navy, army and air, including such civilian air activities as were undertaken, had been hardly greater than in the years immediately preceding 1914, if indeed as great. As a result of the depression in the early thirties they had been drastically reduced even from this low level, and actually fell below that at which they had stood nearly 20 years before, when most of the money made available by Parliament had been devoted to the permanent and non-permanent militia, notwithstanding that out of them provision had by this time to be made not only for the land forces but also for the navy and the air force. During the depression the air force organisation, which had been very slowly increased and developed, was in a large measure destroyed in consequence of the financial pressure. It was not until about 1936 that appropriations began to reach their pre-1914 level, and even then they remained very small.

The reasons for this penuriousness are not far to seek. In the first place, not only were strenuous efforts being made towards disarmament in Europe, but the only tasks which it was thought the armed forces of Canada might be proximately called upon to perform were to ensure internal security and to police the coastal waters. Such progress as was permitted to the air force was rather a relic of the fine record of Canadians in the R.F.C. during the last war, and of the feeling that the peculiar adaptability of Canadians to air activity should not be permitted to remain without opportunity for development. In the second place, although Canada, as one of the first half-dozen exporting countries in the world, was concerned with the policing of the high seas, Canadians regarded the safety of the Atlantic lanes as being assured by the Royal Navy and, less importantly, the policing of the Pacific as assured by both the United States and British fleets. A third reason, to a certain extent involved in the other two, was that there was thought to be no serious threat to the orderliness of the world at large. It is true that even before 1932 scepticism as to the effective functioning of the League of Nations had begun to spread, and that Canadians generally were shocked at the supineness of the League in face of the flouting of it by Japan in relation to Manchuria. But notwithstanding that many of them were distrustful of Sir John Simon's conduct of foreign affairs, they did not feel sufficiently well informed to press for the adoption of a stronger policy.

Among the younger intellectuals there was a feeling that if Canada again appeared likely to become involved in a major war, the line of cleavage for and against participation would not be between its French-speaking citizens, who had resented the adoption of conscription in 1917, and their English-speaking compatriots, but between the older traditionalists, who were prepared without question to accept Great Britain's lead in foreign affairs, and the younger and more insistently North American generation who were violently opposed to what they regarded as capitalistic wars and were affected by the isolationism then tending to dominate the thinking of the

people of the United States. Having regard to the racial and religious divisions in Canada, to its geography, and to its intimate connection with the United States, the reluctance of successive Canadian Governments to incur substantial military expenditures cannot properly cause surprise. What is astonishing is rather that such military establishments as existed were not even more severely restricted than they were.

In 1937 and 1938 the appropriations for war services and the development of Canadian defences substantially increased. This was, however, more on the initiative of the Government of the day than as a result of popular pressure. The programme was directed rather towards the tightening up of Canada's military muscles by providing for somewhat greater training facilities and strengthened harbour defences, than towards preparations to take part in operations overseas. Indeed, some of those who gave any thought to the share Canada might take in a future major war were of opinion that the development of aviation had made the dispatch of substantial forces overseas so dangerous a military operation as to exclude it as a practical policy. They tended to regard Canada rather as a field for the manufacture of munitions out of range of enemy aircraft, and considered that the most useful function the country could perform in the event of her taking part in a war in Europe would be to turn herself into an arsenal as quickly as circumstances permitted.

The events of September 1938 made a difference in this respect. When Mr. Chamberlain came back speaking of "peace for our time", and contemporaneously making hasty preparations against the risk of war, the atmosphere changed. On the actual outbreak of war a year later an uprush of popular feeling had the effect, under the shrewd guidance of the Prime Minister, not only of carrying Canada into the war with almost no dissentient voices, but of compelling the prompt formation of an expeditionary force. This it was happily found possible to dispatch overseas without mishap. At that time Canada would have welcomed the immediate organisation of the production of munitions, but encouragement from Great Britain

seemed lacking. As it was, embarkation on the Joint Commonwealth Air Training Plan went far to satisfy the public demand, and indeed is to be regarded as one of perhaps three Canadian events of first-rate importance in relation to the effective prosecution of the war.

It was not until after May 1940 that the munitions programme got into its stride, even as a programme. Since then the transformation of an industrial organisation directed to peaceful ends into one primarily concerned with the supply of munitions of war has proceeded apace. Early efforts were concentrated upon the provision of necessary equipment for the Canadian forces, but as time went on the field of activity continuously widened, until now there is hardly any kind of munitions which is not either made or about to be made in Canada. It is said that the industrial facilities available would permit the complete equipment of an infantry division every six weeks, and in addition aircraft and specialised munitions of all types are being produced, much being on British account though financed by Canada. Not only does Canada supply substantially everything required for its own forces, but the expenditures already taken care of out of Canadian funds on British account are said to approach $1,000 million, an amount exceeding the total annual budget of Canada for all purposes for two years of peace.

II. Transformations since 1939

In the two years of war there has been a notable change in the Canadian public's angle of approach to the struggle, and to the sacrifices for which it calls. Initially the emotional driving force was based rather on the idea of aid to Britain. To-day the emphasis has altered. There is a growing recognition that what is involved is national survival, that the issue will be decided for Canada by the battles in Europe and at sea, and that Canada can be effectively defended only by the exertion abroad of every ounce of strength which can usefully be withdrawn from production at home. This change has been

due to a succession of events, including not only the series of invasions with their attendant horrors and exhibitions of brutal violence, but more specifically the air attack on Great Britain, of which the critical character was gradually appreciated, the setting up by Canada and the United States of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the leasing of bases by Great Britain to the United States, the occupation of Greenland and Iceland, the Canadian Prime Minister's speeches in England and on his return from there, and the assumption by the United States of responsibility for the protection of traffic in the western Atlantic.

In sharp contrast with the situation in the United States itself, any vocal opposition to the Government in Canada has been on the part of those who contend that not enough is being done. There has been strong and recently effective pressure in support of the formation of auxiliary forces of women. Conscription for overseas service in the army has also its vehement supporters, particularly in Toronto and the cities of the Pacific coast, where there is dissatisfaction with its application only to service in Canada, in respect of which it is already in operation. There is evidence, moreover, of a demand for protective forces and measures. Particularly on the west coast the public is concerned with the possible belligerency of Japan, and in the interior with possible air raids, either direct from overseas or from northern bases. With Government backing, experimental black-outs have been carried out in inland cities on a rather artificial footing. The Attorney-General of Ontario was reported on September 19 to be so greatly apprehensive about raids as to telegraph, instead of merely mailing, from Toronto to Ottawa a recommendation for a substantial appropriation for the installation of sirens. If the Government conceded all that is demanded because of fears of this kind, the concentration of its available resources in or about the critical areas on the Atlantic coast and in Great Britain would be seriously interfered with.

The position as to conscription is a curious one. The number of men in the fighting services who have been embodied

as volunteers available for duty anywhere already exceeds the figure at the end of the second year of the last war. Recruits for the navy and air force have continued to offer themselves faster than it has been possible to absorb them. Recruitment for the army has been slower, perhaps in part attributable to an instinctive popular feeling that the final decision is not likely to turn on any proportionately small difference in the numerical strength of the land forces, and in part to the fact that the Canadian army, unlike the navy and air force, has not yet been seriously engaged, while training as such has no particular attraction. Balancing the demand for conscription, there is a widely held and not uninformed opinion that pressure in the direction of compulsory general service has already had an adverse effect on the production of food and munitions, which should be given a clear priority over service in the army though not over service in the air force or in the navy. Those who take up this position may be placing the value of land forces too low in comparison with productive activities, but their view can be supported by cogent examples and argument. They think that too much concession has already been made by the Government to popular clamour, induced rather by memories of the last war than by a clear conception of the necessities of this one.

The civil organisation of the country for total war is difficult enough. Foreign exchange control, including the practical prohibition of unnecessary visits by Canadians to the United States—visits which were one of their chief forms of diversion—the attempt to control prices over so large and varied an area, the enforcement of restrictions on building, the reduction of the supply of non-essential articles in face of an increasing demand for them, and the enormous extension of direct taxation, to which some ten or twenty times the number of persons have become liable during the last year (the actual multiplier even in respect of income tax is still a matter of conjecture)—all these activities give abundant scope for mistakes and consequent irritation. Acquiescence has, however, been extraordinarily general and extraordinarily cheerful. On

the civilian side the only serious anxiety is the temper sometimes shown by labour. Strikes have been too numerous, and the men concerned too recalcitrant. No adequate explanation of this symptom has been given. It is chiefly ascribed to the lack of experience on the part of manufacturers in collective bargaining; but no doubt the opportunity to add to the membership of their unions is too great a temptation to some labour leaders, and occasional reports of the intentional stimulation of disorder have had some currency. One labour leader the Department of Justice has found it advisable to intern. The occurrence of strikes is, however, the only serious indication that the war machine requires adjustment on the civil side and, notwithstanding the large number of lost days which have resulted from them, their proportional significance has probably been over-estimated.

On the military side, apart from the slowness of recruitment of the army, such minor difficulties as have arisen are chiefly organisational. The enormous growth in the production of munitions directed by the Department of Munitions and Supply, of which the personnel daily increases in number, has already been referred to. In the Service departments proper, Canada suffers somewhat from its adherence to the traditional plan of separate departments for the army, navy and air force. That tradition was too strong to permit of the logical development of the idea underlying the establishment of the Department of National Defence in 1923. In that department the army and navy organisations continued their distinct existence, and recently the air force achieved its independence of the other two services. Common action is sought to be achieved by inter-service committees, but the separation has led to curious results. The effect of the independence of the three Service departments has in Canada never been mitigated by an organ analogous to the British Committee of Imperial Defence. Short of the Minister of National Defence there has never been in Canada a public servant who by virtue of his office became responsible for the study of Canadian defence problems in terms of all three forces, land, sea and air. The scope of

even that Minister's responsibility has, since the war began, been somewhat restricted by the appointment of associate Ministers severally charged with the administration of the navy and the air force. Each of the three services has its own highly articulated headquarters staff, and by their independence the administration of auxiliary services, such as medical, postal and the like, is made complicated and difficult. The army and the air force each has its own medical service, and authority has recently been given for the constitution of at least two women's auxiliary services, separately administered. Duplications or triplications of this kind give rise to some friction and inefficiency which, theoretically at least, a more logical organisation would avoid.

The relations between Canada and the United States are all that could be desired. For the solution of problems of the direct defence of North America, the Permanent Joint Board affords appropriate machinery which has worked smoothly. Industrial questions are efficiently dealt with by joint economic and material co-ordination committees. In the west, Canada has undertaken and has almost completed a series of staging aerodromes; as a result of their construction United States forces in Alaska will no longer be isolated. On the east, the occupation of Iceland and Greenland by the United States assimilates the relations between the two countries on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. In Newfoundland surprisingly smooth co-operation is achieved between the six local authorities concerned, namely, the Newfoundland Commission of Government and the five officers in separate command of the local forces of the Canadian army, navy and air force and of the United States army and navy.

Any Canadian, even the most ardent imperialist, who can in imagination survey the present scene from the point of view even of 1939 would, if he were honest with himself, be compelled to admit amazement at what has been effected in two years. If anyone in 1939 had been bold enough to suggest that such an achievement could be practically and politically possible he would have been regarded as a wild visionary. It

would then have even been thought unlikely that Canada could have been carried into participation in a European war without violent cleavages which might rock the social structure, and madness to suggest that in 1941 Canada would have raised forces somewhat greater in number than those raised by the summer of 1916: that there would in addition have been undertaken such an enormous industrial expansion as to permit the production of munitions in quantities beyond comparison greater than 25 years ago: and that effective machinery would have been set up and put into operation for preventing unnecessary expenditure abroad, for restricting the supply of luxuries, and for collecting direct taxes (to which the Dominion Government for the first time resorted in 1917, and then only with the greatest hesitation) from at least one-fifth of the whole population. It would have been thought even madder to prophesy that this would have been done not only without any violent political conflict, but with the almost unanimous concurrence of all races, creeds and factions, and that the rigid restrictions and compulsions imposed would be criticised only as insufficiently onerous, all this notwithstanding the absence of any direct attack on Canadian territory and the lack on the part of any but a negligible fraction of the population of any personal experience of the ruthlessness and bitterness of modern war. Canadians may justifiably take pride in what has been accomplished, and give credit to those to whom credit for it is due. For constructive and informed criticism there is, of course, ample field, but none for the noisy nonsense heard from a few seekers after notoriety who assert that nothing has been well done. The proverbial short public memory is hardly so short as to prevent such assertions from being recognised as the rubbish they are.

III. The Future of World Trade

CANADA, in view of the extremely large *per capita* external trade which characterised her peace-time economy, is vitally interested in the conditions under which international

trade will be resumed after the war is over. These conditions are bound to be determined by national policies. They may be in part policies imposed in a peace settlement, but are more likely to be those of individual nations free to act as they please. It is important to recognise that serious political dangers are involved in the conscious freedom of choice. When matters which concern our material well-being and indeed our very livelihood are determined by the courses which we and others deliberately decide to pursue, quarrels can arise very easily. We accept the weather day by day with joy, with cynical laughter or with grumbling because we know that it is not the result of human policy. We do not quarrel about the weather; at most, we pray for something better. But consider how bitter our quarrels would be if we had to come to a political decision as to a weather programme. Consider how many groups would regard themselves as entitled to preferential treatment, or would claim some right to determine the decision of others.

The conditions under which the national policies governing the development of trade after the war are framed will lend themselves to disputes that may easily become acrimonious. In order to win the war as economically and as expeditiously as possible, Great Britain and the United States have already made some promises, or at least some declarations of policy which will be construed as promises. The peoples of the Axis Powers have been encouraged to yield in the confidence that they will receive generous treatment in such matters as access to raw materials and to markets in which they may secure the means of payment by the sale of their goods and services. Our memories of the last peace-making should remind us how dangerous it is to disregard, or even to construe narrowly, what others have come to look on as solemn pledges. Claims based on statements as to war aims are at least precise to the extent of referring to documents or to recorded speeches. Much vaguer claims may exist. The United States, for instance, has unquestionably the right to demand some return for the goods and services supplied under the Lease-Lend agreements.

The return of unused equipment or the supply of similar equipment may obviously be asked. Other goods, such as raw materials which cannot be economically produced in the United States, have been mentioned. Can political conditions also be exacted? We do not know. Probably much will depend on the temper of American public opinion when the time comes for peace-making.

Even vaguer are claims based on the hope of having aroused gratitude. A victorious Great Britain will no doubt have some claim to the gratitude of the peoples rescued from German domination, as well as of the peoples whose defence against German aggression has been made possible by the courageous endurance of the British. But both the countries that have been overrun and those which have defended themselves by helping Britain will also have some claim to British gratitude. It will require statesmanship of a high order to bring about a mutual cancellation of these imponderable debts or, better still, to translate mutual gratitude into a sense of comradeship, just as it will require great statesmanship to allay the international resentments which have arisen during the last few years. These resentments have played a powerful part during the war in maintaining the will to achieve total victory, and in sustaining the spirit of revolt among conquered nations. But when victory is achieved their usefulness may be gone. At the appropriate moment they must be sterilised so that they will not affect national policies in the period of reconstruction, or drive infuriated peoples to break the pledges which their leaders have given in their name.

The crisis of peace-making may bring forth inspired statesmanship, but we cannot be absolutely confident of the temper of the victorious Powers and their assistants when the time for a peace settlement arrives. It is not impossible that there may be a determination, purified by suffering and sacrifice, to build a world order in which the united force of all mankind can be devoted to the promotion of human welfare. Neither is it impossible that sacrifice and suffering may lead to an insistent demand for the immediate restoration of consumers'

incomes in the economically stronger countries, regardless of what may happen elsewhere. It seems, however, more probable than either of these clear-cut alternatives that the result will be different in different countries in accordance with the degree of strain which has been borne, the fairness with which burdens have been apportioned, the idealism which has been inspired by political or religious leaders, and the education of public opinion which has resulted from discussion. If the state of opinion at the end of the war is difficult to predict, so too are material conditions. The consequences of every great war are far-reaching, and both the economic structure of nations and their economic relations to each other may be profoundly altered. After the present war every belligerent, besides having to frame policies for economic and social reconstruction, will have to keep a watchful eye on the corresponding policies of other nations whose co-operation it may desire or whose competition it may dread. To predict the future of world trade requires a forecast of the resultant of a large number of separate national policies.

This is no easy task. We do not know what post-war problems Canada or other countries will have to face. We cannot tell, for instance, what provision we shall have to make here for national defence, or what provision some countries may wish to make for a war of revenge. We do not know what the social services may require in the post-war world. But we must not exaggerate our ignorance. We can safely assume that every country, within the limits of the power which it may enjoy, will seek to secure as large a national income as may be possible consistently with the sustained employment of its labour and its capital, and will endeavour to avoid the political discontent to which any glaring disregard of legitimate interests would give rise.

Armed with this assumption we may make some conjectures as to the post-war economic policies of the United States and of Great Britain, the two countries whose policies matter most to Canada. The United States is likely to have the greater freedom of choice. She will have sustained far less material

damage than Great Britain, and will be free at pleasure to write down the great Lease-Lend debt or to call for deliveries imposing a heavy burden on the British economy. As regards post-war trading policies two sharply opposed views exist in the United States. One is that full employment and a large national income should be sought with as little dependence as possible on foreign countries, particularly on countries outside the Western hemisphere. Surpluses—that is, stocks of commodities which cannot be consumed within the country if they must be paid for at prices remunerative to their producers—do not constitute a very serious problem for those who hold this view. Their only value consists in the possibility of exchanging them for things which cannot be economically produced in the United States. Once these necessary imports have been acquired it matters little what happens to the surpluses and, sooner or later, capital and labour should be diverted from producing them. It would probably be conceded that the level of national income which can be reached on this self-contained basis is not as high as that which might be obtained if full employment could be secured under conditions of substantial international trade. But it would be asserted that this trade would involve dependence both in peace and war on foreign sources of supply, and that an economy which is practically self-contained can be kept free from the risk of large-scale unemployment. It might be added that a large American export trade had in the past led to part of the national income assuming the undesirable form of war debts, dubious investments in Europe and South America, heavy and needless importations of gold and silver, or (at best) reckless touring of Europe.

The other view is that the United States should endeavour to build up world trade and should aim at reducing trade barriers everywhere. This policy has been strongly advocated by the present Administration. Its purpose would not be confined to obtaining the largest possible real income for the people of the United States. It would also be designed to make things easier for other nations, afford them greater

economic opportunity, and help to remove the economic causes of war. There are countries which depend for their prosperity on their ability to obtain exports from the United States, and to acquire the means of payment by the sale of their goods and services in the American market. Those who hold this second view consider surpluses as the result of the way in which many people obtain their means of livelihood and are enabled to maintain a way of life to which they are profoundly attached. The surpluses must be sold if these people are to prosper. If the United States, emerging from the present war as a great creditor nation, is to sell its surpluses abroad it must import very largely, invest freely abroad, send its tourists to the ends of the earth and, perhaps, forgo the collection of some of the debts which are owed to Americans. It may even have to relinquish the attempt to export things which are not, strictly speaking, surpluses—the services of its merchant marine, for example, or the products of some of its industries. The United States as the heart of a world trading area would be a very different country from the United States as a closed economy. Neither of these extreme views may determine actual policy when the time comes. Both will involve serious political and economic difficulties. A compromise policy, based on no precise doctrine, is quite likely. It might produce political tranquillity in the United States at the cost of great uncertainty elsewhere.

The United States is not the only nation that will have to make a choice of this character. But other countries are likely to have far less real freedom of action, partly because for the most part they have not the same varied resources, partly because they are likely to be influenced by the decision which the United States adopts. Japan, for instance, is economically dependent on buying raw materials from abroad and processing them for re-export. A not improbable effect of the war will be to deprive her of any chance of dominating politically the lands which could round out her domains into an area capable of economic self-sufficiency. Japan in that case would have to rely on the access to sources of raw material, and the

access to foreign markets, which the victorious Powers might allow. If they did not make provision for her needs, she would have to do the best she could by bargaining, saying to each country in turn, "I shall be glad to buy a portion of your surpluses, but it will be possible for me to do so only if you will make purchases of corresponding amount in Japan." If she uses this language, her bargaining power will depend entirely on the need which other countries may have to find a market for their surpluses. To carry that a step farther, Japan's bargaining power will be reckoned according to the political power enjoyed by those men and women in other countries whose means of livelihood and whose way of life depend on selling their produce in Japan.

The policy of Great Britain is second in importance only to that of the United States as a determinant of world economy. The traditional British course has been to seek sustained employment and a large national income by trading as freely as possible with the rest of the world. But even those who in the past have defended this policy most vigorously have admitted that it might be necessary to use some sort of coercion. It was suggested, for instance, that a high punitive tariff might be imposed against nations which refused to open their markets on reasonable terms. Indeed, Great Britain might actually refuse to buy from countries which would not accept payment in the form of British goods or British services, either directly or by way of three-cornered trade. As she is the only great market for the surpluses which many countries will continue to produce, and as she has in most cases several alternative sources of supply, her bargaining power would be very great. It might be folly not to use it. Of course, if the United States were to pursue consistently a policy of developing trade on a world-wide basis, Great Britain would probably be glad to co-operate. But if the United States is inclined to seek a self-contained economy in order, for instance, to minimise the risk of mass unemployment, Great Britain will inevitably be driven to a policy of confining her purchases to areas in which she can secure the means of payment. She

cannot after the war face the political risks incidental to mass unemployment; equally she cannot face the economic risks involved in maintaining employment by governmental expenditure on reconstruction, if this expenditure may lead to large imports from countries that will use their credits not to buy British goods and services, but to create short-term debts dangerous to Britain's financial position and to her ability to buy the imports which are essential.

The choice before Britain may not be simple. There may be in the United States, as there has been in the past, an Administration which advocates the lowering of trade barriers but which is not legally free to lower its own barriers very far. There may be an Administration anxious for economic co-operation, but likely to be replaced at the next election. Co-operation, in other words, may be difficult and may involve serious risks. In the anxious period after the war British statesmen may seek safety first. They will certainly need to have regard to the exchange value of sterling. The sterling *bloc* requires a comment here. An area within which currencies are stabilised in terms of each other is possible only when international payments balance themselves, or are brought into balance by national policies, so as not to impose an intolerable strain on some debtor country whose currency will be forced to depreciate. A nation whose policies will tend to impose intolerable strains on the currencies of other countries cannot safely be admitted to the *bloc*. Its trading with the *bloc* will have to be so controlled as to enable the relationships of its currency with that of the *bloc* to be controlled. The control need not necessarily be very severe. If we want an example we can consider the degree of control which Canada exercises to-day over her trade with the United States.

In the post-war world Canada's position will depend in great measure on the trading policies of the United States and of Great Britain. If the United States pursues self-sufficiency and if Great Britain is thereby constrained, at any rate as a temporary policy, to seek the shelter of the sterling *bloc*, Canada will no longer, as was the case before the present war,

be able to rely on the sale of her surpluses in the United Kingdom in order to procure funds with which to pay for goods and services purchased from the United States and to meet interest due to United States investors. Like other countries desirous of selling surpluses in the United Kingdom, she will have to buy British goods and services of equal value. Unless she was prepared to make the necessary readjustments in her economic life, she would be an unwelcome and perhaps even an impossible member of the sterling trading area, and her trade with it would have to be controlled by authorities in that area just as she to-day controls her trade with the United States. It is not within the scope of this article to consider whether in such a difficult situation Canada would seek to eliminate her surpluses, or to enlarge her capacity to absorb British goods. She might endeavour to come to some arrangement with the United States, by which her trade with that country could be balanced without making use of her sterling credits. The situation may never arise. It should not arise if the United States adopts whole-heartedly the policy of developing world trade, and makes American economic behaviour conform to standards appropriate to the world's greatest creditor nation.

Canada,
October 1941.

AUSTRALIA

I. Sir Thomas Bavin

THE death of Sir Thomas Bavin, K.C.M.G., removes a figure distinguished in letters, politics and law. A New Zealander by birth, he came to New South Wales in his early youth as the first stirrings of the Federal movement were beginning. Men such as Parkes, and later Barton and Deakin, were framing their appeals for Australian nationhood in terms which drew a response from all generous and idealistic youth. It is not surprising therefore that, after graduating brilliantly in law, young Bavin threw himself into the fight for federation with all the vigour and enthusiasm which throughout his life he brought to great causes. He attracted the attention of Edmund Barton, who, on becoming Australia's first Prime Minister, made him his private secretary. When Barton was appointed to the High Court Bench, Alfred Deakin succeeded to the Prime Ministership and to the secretary. For three years Bavin served a political apprenticeship with these men, the best introduction to political life any man could have. It confirmed him in his determination to enter Parliament when opportunity offered. Meanwhile, in 1904, he returned to the Sydney Bar, and appeared in many of the early cases to test and interpret the new Australian constitution. Later he became also a recognised authority on industrial law.

In 1911 W. A. Holman, then Labour Premier, appointed him a Royal Commissioner to enquire into the cost of living. His report was the foundation of the living-wage system in New South Wales. He had a long association with Sydney University through the University Law Society, of which he was president twenty-one times. He founded the University Settlement while he was a student, and soon after graduating in Arts and Law acted as Professor of Law in the University

of Tasmania for a year during Professor Jethro Brown's absence in England. He was an original member of THE ROUND TABLE and, until pressure of affairs prevented him, he remained a regular contributor. His faith in the Empire was expressed in many notable speeches and articles; he was one of the first public men in Australia to realise that the immediate result of the Peace Conference and the establishment of the League of Nations was to create constitutional problems which might threaten the unity of the Empire, and to call attention to this fact from the platform and through the press.

During the war, on being rejected for active service, he abandoned his large practice at the Bar to become Naval Intelligence Officer with the rank of lieutenant-commander. He did not enter Parliament until 1917, when he became Nationalist member for Gordon, the seat he held until his retirement in 1935. During that period he rapidly forged to the leadership of his party, filling in turn the offices of Attorney-General, Colonial Treasurer, Leader of the Opposition and Premier. His political career was characterised by foresight, unfaltering courage and unshakable integrity. He did much to draw together town and country, and succeeded in stamping out the sectarianism which, until his stand against it, was rife in public affairs.

The economic depression was commencing as he became Premier, and he had to contend with the insoluble problems of adjusting falling revenue to increasing expenditure, and of making unpopular economies with all the party bitterness they caused. When however he faced the electors in 1930, at the height of the depression, he scorned political subterfuge and paid them the compliment of taking them into his confidence. In his own words he appealed not to their selfishness but to their patriotism, stressed not their rights but their obligations, deluded them with no false hopes, gulled them with no flattering promises, but told them the truth as he saw it. The people's response was to put him out of office. But no man ever went out holding his head higher, and his words were

remembered and a tribute was paid in later days to all he had done and tried to do. His term in public life was not an easy one. No man who puts duty before personal advantage, principles before party and truth before expediency can expect it to be. But it is given to few to leave it knowing, as he did, that he had sacrificed no principle and lowered no ideal, but with courage and a resolute mind had followed the truth as he saw it.

A painful physical disability made itself felt during his Premiership, and in 1932 on medical advice he relinquished leadership of the party for a less strenuous rôle. On that occasion he defined his attitude to a political career. "If", he said, "a man regards his life, as he should regard it, not as a mere timid pilgrimage from the cradle to the grave, in which he is to get the maximum of comfort with the minimum of risk, but as a high adventure from which he aims to get as much as he can, in the way of knowledge and experience and self-realisation, and to give as much as he can, in the way of effective and honourable participation in the life of his time, I know of no better or more satisfying form of human activity than politics."

In 1933 the honour of K.C.M.G. was conferred on him. Two years later his appointment to the Supreme Court Bench ended his political activities, but his wide culture and keen questioning mind gave him many interests in which he continued to take an active part. He was president of the Australian Institute of International Affairs from 1934 until a week or so before his death, and was chairman of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Lapstone in 1938. His liberal outlook and his zest for life remained undiminished by thirteen years of almost continuous physical suffering. Doomed to go in company with pain, he bore it with dignity and fortitude, and seemed more able to endure as more exposed to suffering and distress. No one ever heard him complain; the self-pity and bitterness of the invalid were never his. So far as it was possible to do so he ignored his disability, and bent all his failing strength to carrying on his work and his interests.

He warmed both hands before the fire of life. It sank before he was ready to depart, but he lives on in the hearts and minds of many who counted him friend. He had a gift for friendship. His charm, his endearing boyishness, his tolerance and humour, his high courage and, above all, his love for his fellows drew friendship from people of every class and creed. But with all his gaiety and love of human things, the keynotes of his character were sincerity and a deep spiritual spring whence he drew his strength and his unswerving allegiance to those standards of conduct which were the fountain light of all his day, the master light of all his seeing.

II. Japan, China and Russia

WITH the Japanese move into southern Indo-China and the subsequent freezing of Japanese assets by Great Britain and the United States, the possibility of Japan becoming an active belligerent was brought more prominently before the Australian people than at any time since the February crisis.

Informed opinion was divided on the probability of a further immediate Japanese advance into Thailand following the occupation of Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay, as it also was on what the reaction of Great Britain and America would be in such an event. In general, however, there was little evidence of any real apprehension by the public about the effect on Australia of any further southward expansion by Japan. This lack of concern on the part of the man in the street appeared to be due more to a failure to appreciate the fact that the Far East might indeed become the very Near North than to any balanced assessment of the deterrent effect on Japan of the unexpectedly stout resistance of the Russians, or to the belief that the active intervention of the United States was assured should Britain be involved in war with Japan. Malaya and Borneo, to the great centres of population in southern Australia, appear hardly less remote than Syria and North Africa. The sedative influence of reports about the preparedness and confidence of the Netherlands East Indies, about continual reinforcement of British

strength in Malaya and Singapore and about transference of American naval and air units to the Far East, has no doubt played some part in allaying popular fears.

On the other hand members both of the Government and of the Opposition, as well as the press, endeavoured to awaken the country to the imminence of danger. The Minister for National Emergency Services of the new Labour administration in New South Wales instituted a series of partial black-outs of the city of Sydney, which culminated in the first complete black-out of the whole metropolitan area on August 17. Similar measures were taken in Brisbane. At the same time it was announced that £1,000,000 would be made available to the States by the Commonwealth for air raid precautions, and this in spite of the dubious reassurance by one authority that thanks to the difficulties of Japanese communications not more than 70 tons of bombs could be dropped on any one centre in 24 hours.

What feeling of tension there was reached its height towards the end of July, when conviction grew that Britain would resist a Japanese move into Thailand; references to the possibility of general mobilisation again appeared, and many officers and n.c.o.s of the militia forces were called up for service for the duration of the war. On August 9 it was announced that the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, had abruptly abandoned a tour which he had just begun of all States of the Commonwealth, and had returned to Melbourne. Here a meeting of the War Cabinet was held on August 11 at which the defence chiefs were present, and subsequently the Prime Minister and leader of the Opposition issued separate statements emphasising in general terms the critical state of relations with Japan and the dangers which confronted the people of Australia. "I put it as plainly as I can to every man and woman that the safety of this country is at stake," said Mr. Curtin.

If any further stimulus were necessary it was provided by the wholesale departure of the Japanese business community and the mysterious movements of Japanese ships in or bound for Australian waters. Several ships due to call at Australian

ports suddenly disappeared "into the blue", including the last of the N.Y.K. passenger liners, the *Kasima Maru*, on which was the new Japanese Consul-General to Australia. This vessel finally arrived off Sydney after a silence of ten days, and passengers told stories of her having been suddenly blacked out and then wandering aimlessly to the south of the Philippines. With her departure from Sydney on August 14, the last commercial link with Japan had apparently been severed, though it was stated that several Japanese business men had cancelled their passages at the last minute and had returned to join the managers of the major Japanese firms, who had been instructed to keep their offices in being. In the light of subsequent events the apparent belief of the Japanese principals of these firms that business might still be possible—in contrast to the opinion of their countrymen in Australia—is not without significance. It was noteworthy also that, though great prominence was given in the papers to the departure of Japanese residents, there was no evidence of any public animosity towards them on the part of either the public or the press.

Whatever the outcome of the crisis, there was never the slightest suggestion that Australia would seek any accommodation with Japan or that she would not unhesitatingly accept her full responsibility for whatever might be the outcome of uncompromising resistance to Japanese aggression. In preparation to play her part in the strategy of British Far Eastern defence, not only have further contingents of Australian troops and airmen recently arrived at Singapore, but also a considerable Australian force is now based on Darwin. The transport of large bodies of troops to this centre by land across Australia's "dead heart" has directed attention to the engineering feat which has been accomplished in the construction of an all-weather motor road connecting the Tennant's Creek terminal of the existing road joining the rail at Alice Springs in the south, and Birdum 307 miles to the north, whence the railway runs to Darwin. Responsibility for the task was accepted jointly by the Queensland, New South Wales and South Australian Governments, and by working

twenty-four hours a day it was completed in three months in spite of the tremendous supply and transport difficulties. It is maintained that the marked development of Darwin as a military, naval and air base has contributed materially to the general plan of Netherlands East Indies defence, and has made possible the inclusion of the eastern sections of the Indies in a comprehensive scheme involving British, Dutch, Australian and American possessions.

By the virtual cessation of all commerce between the two countries, the progressive decline over the past six years in Australia's trade with Japan has been completed. This decline was begun by Australia's trade diversion policy in 1936, which checked the growth of a trade that for some years had been heavily in Australia's favour and, it was anticipated, would continue to expand. At that time Australia's wool exports to Japan reached the record figure of 770,000 bales, or roughly 25 per cent. of the wool clip, while 13 per cent. of Australia's total export trade was with Japan. For the year 1935–36 this country had a favourable trade balance of £9,131,213, but in 1936–37 the balance, owing largely to the decline in Japanese purchases of wool, fell to £3,744,596, and in 1937–38, a year of low wool prices, it became adverse to the amount of £638,430. Following the outbreak of war and the conclusion by Australia of the wool purchase agreement with the British Government, a period of some months elapsed before Japan was enabled to resume regular purchases of Australian wool. Since the war began, however, the British Government, which is now the owner of the wool, has allowed her to ship a total of about 325,000 bales. During 1940 Japan also bought 20,000,000 bushels of Australian wheat on long-term credits, but her purchases of iron ore in this market were ended by the embargo of May 1938 on the export of this commodity to any countries outside the British Empire, and of scrap iron by the embargo of November 1940. Australia has up to the present continued to import from Japan considerable quantities of artificial silk and cotton piece-goods.

At the beginning of July the name of Sir Frederic Eggle-

ston was announced as that of the first Australian Minister to China. Sir Frederic has long taken a deep interest in Pacific affairs, and as a leader of various Australian delegations to conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations he has had personal contact with many of the leading figures in the political life not only of China but also of Japan and the United States. His standing in the public life of this country (he held office in the Victorian Parliament, and has for many years been chairman of the Commonwealth Grants Commission), his high integrity and scholarship afford proof that by his appointment the Government recognises Australian representation in China to be no less important than in Japan or the United States.

Though initially motives may have been somewhat mixed, there was general and profound relief when the news was received that Germany and Russia were at war. Following the evacuation of Greece and Crete, the announcement of the heavy losses of Australian troops and the deduction that losses of equipment must have been no less severe, apprehension had been felt lest the full weight of the German army should now fall on British and Dominion troops in North Africa and the Middle East. The campaign in Syria did little to restore confidence in the British resources available to resist such an attack if it came. The reorientation of opinion in regard to Russia was made the more difficult by the almost general anticipation that Stalin would go to any lengths to avoid war and by the prevailing scepticism in regard to Russia's ability to offer any effective resistance. The vexed question how she should be regarded, whether as an ally or merely as an unexpected obstacle in Hitler's path, was resolved for many people by Mr. W. M. Hughes's statement that "he who fights at my right hand is my friend".

The pæans of praise for Russia's action from the die-hards of the Left, who suddenly found an imperialist war transformed into a battle for freedom, were countered in the first week by admonitions on the part of those equally intransigent of the Right, lest we should imagine that the Russian leopard had

changed his spots since the days when the Russo-German Pact had cleared the way for Hitler's attack on Poland and the West, and Russia had invaded Finland and the Baltic countries. In general, however, the press reflected public opinion in upholding the view that, whatever the factors determining Russia's entry into the war, we had found a welcome ally when hard pressed, with and for whom the closest co-operation and support were desirable. On the other hand there was little disposition to question the decision of the Government to maintain the ban on the Communist party, which had been declared illegal under the National Security Regulation at the beginning of the war. Indeed, the Australian Labour party has decreed that any of its members associating themselves with the various organisations which have sprung up to promote cultural and trade relations with, or to organise aid for, Russia are liable to expulsion from the party. It is felt no doubt to be politically dangerous for the party to lay itself open to the accusation of being tainted by Communism, when it has so recently achieved unity after being weakened for years by the existence of breakaway groups, the most important of which in the Federal sphere bore the name of the Non-Communist Labour party.

With the continuance of Russian resistance there has been a growing demand for the development of trade relations with the U.S.S.R. and for the provision of medical aid, and the arrival at the end of July of the first steamer ever to fly the hammer and sickle in Sydney harbour attracted great interest. Amongst all shades of political opinion there is to-day nothing but the greatest admiration for the magnificent and efficient Russian resistance and for the morale of the Russian people. That flows from something more than the special interest which the course of the Russian campaign had for this country from the beginning, in that it was hardly to be expected that Japan would commit herself to any irrevocable policy in the Pacific until such time as it could be determined whether Germany was capable of winning a decisive victory against the Soviet.

III. Political Hostilities

DURING the period under review the growing political disunity overshadowed other internal matters. It might have been expected that industrial disturbances would concurrently tend to increase, with serious effect on the war effort. In fact these fears have not been realised. Recently, however, a serious strike began in the textile industries in New South Wales and Victoria, affecting important defence contracts. The strike appeared to be related to the whole question of the war-time loading of wage rates. This principle was first approved by the Federal Arbitration Court, which granted a war-time increase to certain workers in Government munitions plants because of the arduous nature of their employment. The anomaly was thereby created that some workers not working on munitions, but in munition annexes, were paid less than their fellows employed on similar types of work, an obviously fruitful source of discontent. The demand for increased margins has gradually spread to other sections of the heavy industries. There is little doubt that the demands of the textile workers were influenced by the war-time increases granted elsewhere. Recently their case for a 6*s.* increase per week for men and 4*s.* for women was heard by the Arbitration Court, and increases of 2*s.* and 1*s.* respectively were granted. Against this award the workers struck. Another important factor has been the knowledge that textile mills are making substantially increased profits when compared with the pre-war period, and the workers have felt that they should share in this increased prosperity.

With the approach of the new financial year the problems of war-time finance became prominent. Mr. Fadden, then Treasurer, announced that £250,000,000 would have to be found for war expenditure in 1941–42, an increase of £60,000,000 on the previous year. A large part of this increase would have to be raised by additional taxation, but there the Commonwealth was faced by the problem of the inequality of State taxation, which greatly limited its taxing powers. For example, in the

State of Queensland a taxpayer without dependants having an income of £50,000 a year pays £20,694 in State taxation alone, but in Victoria only £6,290. The Treasurer therefore proposed to a meeting of the Premiers' Conference that for the duration of the war and one year afterwards the States should forgo the right to collect income tax, and that in place of it they should receive a *per capita* payment from the Commonwealth. In this way he believed he would have an additional £6,000,000 at his disposal from increased Federal taxation. This proposal was opposed by all States, with the exception of South Australia, on the ground that it was an abrogation of the States' constitutional rights and also because it would necessitate drastic curtailment of State expenditure, amounting in the case of Queensland and New South Wales to over 30 per cent. of their estimates. The matter was left with the Treasurer declaring that the money must be found, and would be found by the Commonwealth exercising its powers under the war-time financial regulations. At a meeting of the Loan Council the States' demands for loan expenditure of £30,000,000 were cut to £20,000,000, even though the Commonwealth Public Works Co-ordinator, Sir Harry Brown, had recommended an amount of £24,000,000. These matters, together with dissension over the effect of childhood endowment payments on taxation deductions in respect of children, promised in any case a highly contentious budget session when Parliament reassembled in September.

The high hopes held that Mr. Menzies on his return to Australia would be able to achieve a workable degree of political unity were disappointed by the acrimonious debate in the House on its first meeting after his return. Following this, Mr. Menzies stated that he had abandoned all hope of a National Government. Shortly afterwards he announced the reorganisation of the Government and the creation of several new portfolios, which increased the number of Ministers to 19 out of a total membership of the two Government parties in both Houses of 57. At the same time he made known other measures taken to intensify the war effort, including control

of all shipping and the appointment of a Federal Coal Commission. In view of the continued depletion of oil reserves it was stated that petrol consumption for civilian purposes would be cut from a peace-time figure of 35,000,000 gallons a month to 12,000,000, necessitating far more severe rationing, which would be progressively imposed in July and August.

In July serious criticism of Mr. Menzies' leadership was voiced by members of his own party—the United Australia party—the dissident group comprising men who, it was said, were disappointed that they had not received preferment when the Government was enlarged. It must be recognised that with the evenly divided membership of the Lower House, which gave the Government only 36 seats out of a total of 75, a portfolio in the swollen Cabinet almost ceased to be a distinction, whereas omission from it might be considered a reflection on the ability of the members concerned. Mr. Menzies refused to call a joint meeting of the Government parties, but agreed to hear his critics at a meeting of his own party. At this meeting no vote was taken and the rebels' case for a change in leadership of the party was not sustained. Shortly afterwards it was announced that Mr. Menzies would visit all States of the Commonwealth, a decision criticised by the Opposition as being mere political manœuvring.

Mr. Menzies left for Adelaide on Thursday, August 7, and on the following day in a public address there he referred to the gravity of the situation in the Pacific in such terms as to indicate that his Government was seriously concerned at the possibility of a Japanese move into Thailand. On information received that week-end he cancelled his tour and, as described, returned to Melbourne for a meeting of the Federal Cabinet. As a result of this meeting, and after conference with the leader of the Opposition, he announced that the Cabinet had unanimously requested him to proceed to London without delay to represent to the British War Cabinet the special interests of Australia in the menacing situation in the Pacific. He stated, however, that he would not go without the approval of Parliament, and he summoned a meeting

of Parliament for Wednesday, August 20. In the interval much speculation went on as to the reasons for his sudden change of plans, and it was clear that the question of Australian representation in London could not be considered apart from the atmosphere of political suspicion which had developed since the last sitting of Parliament. Though the leader of the Opposition had approved the proposal that the Prime Minister should visit London, and had consulted the former Prime Minister, Mr. Scullin, the elder statesman of the Australian Labour party, before giving his approval, none of his colleagues on the Advisory War Council endorsed the attitude he had taken up. The matter was therefore left for decision in Parliament, and meanwhile Mr. Menzies announced that he would not go to London as Prime Minister without the approval of all the parties. When the House met it went into secret session to consider the international situation and the projected visit of the Prime Minister to London. No decision was taken on the latter, because in the meantime the Labour caucus had decided to oppose the plan. On August 22 the Prime Minister with the unanimous approval of the Cabinet submitted to the leader of the Opposition a proposal for a National Government in which Labour would have half the representation. Mr. Menzies offered to serve under Mr. Curtin as Prime Minister or, alternatively, to serve under any leader to be jointly approved. This was the most generous of the many offers made to the Labour party for a National Government, but it was unfavourably received by the press, and particularly by that section which had announced its hostility to the continuance of Mr. Menzies as leader.

In replying, the leader of the Labour party, Mr. Curtin, made three points. First, he held that his party had loyally co-operated with the Government in the war effort: secondly, that the difficulties of the Government arose from dissension within its own ranks: thirdly, that these difficulties would not, in the opinion of the Labour party, be removed by deposing Mr. Menzies. There followed a series of Cabinet meetings which led finally to Mr. Menzies announcing to the Cabinet and to the

combined Government parties on August 28 his intention to resign. Thereupon the parties sitting together unanimously elected the Treasurer and leader of the Country party, Mr. A. W. Fadden, as Prime Minister.

In announcing his resignation Mr. Menzies gave as his principal reason the criticism of his leadership within his own ranks and in a certain section of the press, and his desire to secure political stability. He accepted office as Minister for Defence Co-ordination in the new Government, and remained leader of the United Australia party. Mr. Fadden continued to hold the office of Treasurer as well as Prime Minister, and announced his intention of summoning Parliament at an early date for a budget session, after which he would reconstruct his Ministry.* This whole operation under which the two leaders changed places in the Cabinet was described by Mr. Curtin as "face-lifting", and as by no means satisfying the Labour party that the Government was more interested in the war effort than in maintaining office under a leader who would be more popular than Mr. Menzies.

IV. Mr. Menzies' Achievement

IN considering the expansion of Australia's war effort it is fitting that a tribute should be paid to the achievements of the Government under Mr. Menzies' leadership. On the testimony of the leader of the mission from the British Ministry of Supply, a very remarkable feat has been accomplished in the development of a comprehensive and efficient munitions and machine-tool industry. For the vision and initiative to which this and much else are due, high credit must go to Mr. Menzies personally. He will go down in history as the war-time Prime Minister who, in very difficult circumstances, including the critical year in which he lacked a working majority in the

* On October 3 the new Government was defeated by 36 votes to 33 on a vote of censure directed against the budget. Mr. Fadden resigned, and Mr. Curtin became Prime Minister at the head of a Labour Government, pledged as fully as its predecessors to organise all the resources of Australia for victory.—Editor.

House, was rewarded by seeing his country play its part in the common war effort to a degree which even the most sanguine would have considered impossible two or three years earlier. It is one of the tragedies—let us hope history will find it a minor one—of the war that his outstanding intellectual capacity was not matched by that sympathetic understanding and tolerance of human nature which, far more than ability, is capable of evoking and holding the loyal co-operation and support of a Government and people. Whatever effect the political situation may have had on the war drive—and it is impossible to assess the intangible factors involved—there has been no suggestion that any of the political parties have deviated from their policy of complete and united prosecution of the war. Indeed, shortly after the formation of Mr. Fadden's Government, Mr. Curtin expressly stated that no question of the fullest co-operation with the Government in the Advisory War Council and in other activities was in any way involved.

There is no slackening in the enlargement of all branches of Commonwealth forces, and during the period under review the number of men accepted for entry into the R.A.A.F. reached 200,000. Another noteworthy development was the flight of the first Australian Bristol Beaufort bomber, which completed highly satisfactory tests. The air force is also receiving continual additions to its strength of Catalina flying boats, which are arriving from America as fast as they can be ferried over the Pacific by Australian pilots. Small naval craft are being launched at frequent intervals, and the number of naval personnel now equals one-fifth of the whole pre-war British Navy. The organisation and training of the first Australian armoured division are well advanced, and great competition has been experienced for inclusion in it. Active recruiting of reinforcements of the A.I.F. is proceeding, and it is understood that the rate of intake is quite satisfactory. The expansion of the munitions programme shows no sign of slackening, and the position will soon be reached where 150,000 workers will be employed in these and ancillary industries, compared with approximately 3,000 during the

war of 1914–18. In view of the increasing demand for man power for the services and munitions industries, the decision has been taken to establish a Women's Auxiliary Service under the Department of the Army. In Victoria the Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board, a semi-Government utility, is training married women as conductors on trams and buses, it being understood that in many cases these will be the wives of men on active service. The employment of these women will be governed by a Federal award making it obligatory for them to receive the same wages as men similarly employed.

Australia,
September 1941.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. South African Economy and the War

As the Union of South Africa is the Commonwealth's chief source of gold production, special importance attaches to her economic progress. It is true that the passage of the Lease-Lend Act has modified the position; there is no longer the same urgency attached to the demand for gold. Nevertheless, South Africa's gold production is still a most important source of purchasing-power in America, especially for orders placed before the Lease-Lend Act and for goods not covered by that Act. It also helps to meet the Commonwealth's requirements from other countries, so it is satisfactory to note that monthly production has been well maintained at about 1,200,000 fine oz., valued, at present prices, at about £10 million. It is all the time creeping steadily but slowly upwards, and new monthly records are frequently announced.

We cannot say what happens to the gold, but the Governor of the Reserve Bank mentioned to the shareholders at the annual meeting last July that "whatever I should be able to tell you but for the prohibition would be of a satisfactory nature". As the most beneficial use of the gold is to provide foreign exchange, and the least beneficial use is its retention within the country, employing skilled labour and scarce equipment to provide a basis for unnecessary currency expansion, we can assume that the bulk of it is exported, or else earmarked in South Africa for foreign buyers. There has, however, been a 70 per cent. increase in the gold holdings of the Reserve Bank since the war began. This the Governor described as "a clear indication that South Africa is not only paying its way, but is able to create a reserve fund from which it can pay for extra imports to be expected in connection with Government demands for war purposes and replenishment

of commercial stocks after the war". From the standpoint of raising South Africa's war effort to the maximum, this ought to mean that the increased local gold stocks simply represent a temporary accumulation, waiting on the expansion of American war production and on shipping opportunities for its most effective utilisation.

Readers of THE ROUND TABLE should, however, be aware that the war effort here does not altogether depend on the expansion of production elsewhere. From the outbreak of the war up to March 1941 South African merchants and manufacturers had fulfilled orders to the value of £19 million out of a total of £43 million placed by the Director-General of War Supplies. The engineering workshops of the mines and of the railway administration have become arsenals. The Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor), private engineering firms, textile, clothing, footwear and furniture factories have been harnessed to war production. The canning industry has undergone a revolutionary development to provide tinned rations for the armies "up north". The foundations of a machine tool industry have recently been laid. Over 600 factories are engaged full-time or part-time on the production of war supplies; and dilution of skilled labour has permitted the employment in war industries of women, of "emergency workers" (mostly unemployed artisans from other occupations) and of trainees under the Central Organization for Technical Training, though it has not resulted in more effective utilisation of Native labour on skilled or semi-skilled work, save in unimportant isolated cases. Overtime is being regularly worked—in fact, 6 hours overtime on top of the basic 48-hour week has been made compulsory in engineering—so earnings are showing a significant increase.

Agricultural incomes have also on the whole been well maintained. Fixed prices and a guaranteed market or increased demand either at home or abroad (including army requirements and the vastly increased demand for ships' stores) have favoured producers of wool, livestock, dairy products, wine, tobacco, wattle-bark, sugar and vegetables. Most of the

1940 citrus crop was sold to Britain at very satisfactory control prices, and farmers were said to have had the best season ever known. This season a shortage of shipping has brought about a rather different state of affairs, and it still remains to be seen how far the efforts of the Citrus Control Board to control local markets have affected the orange-growers' incomes. No great deterioration of their position seems likely, however. Similar uncertainty attaches to maize farmers and to some extent, on account of short supplies of fertilisers, to wheat farmers. The deciduous fruit farmers were undoubtedly badly hit as the result of loss of export markets through lack of refrigerated shipping. A hastily constituted Deciduous Fruit Control Board scarcely improved matters with a hurriedly conceived and executed scheme for selling "export quality fruit" at higher prices in local markets. A sudden lavish advertising campaign towards the end of the season culminated in the discovery that there was little "export quality fruit" available, as farmers had saved labour costs by dispensing with pre-thinning, and had in many cases sold their whole production to the jam and canning factories. Moreover such "export" fruit as came on to the market quickly acquired a poor reputation among consumers, as it had mostly been picked in its usual export condition, too green for immediate local consumption, while in some instances export varieties were regarded by South African consumers as sacrificing flavour to appearance. Financial assistance from the Government enabled the Board at least to soften the blow to the fruit farmers, but despite the increased demand for jamming and canning their position remains insecure. On the whole, however, it can be accepted that farming incomes as well as industrial incomes have increased as a result of war, and this seems to be reflected in the 25 per cent. increase in the note issue and 27 per cent. increase in bank deposits. Summing up, we can say that South Africa is more prosperous than before the war. She is producing more and also improving her terms of trade as a result of war-time conditions.

Such an increase of prosperity, however, brings its own special problems and drawbacks. We cannot, owing to official

secrecy, gauge the present position of the Union's balance of payments, but in his budget speech last March the Minister of Finance estimated that a favourable balance of over £20 million had been created in the previous year, despite the repayment of nearly £8 million of Government loan held in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately the mere amassing of such balances tends to pump money into circulation within the country, when the gold producers are paid. Unless it is pumped out again to pay for imports, some degree of inflation is inevitable. Yet imports of commodities must be restricted, both to save shipping space and to prevent a diversion of resources from war needs to unnecessary consumption.

South Africa is only just waking up to the needs of total warfare. Overtime wages, and additional family incomes from a rise in the number of wage-earners per family, have brought increased expenditure. Last Christmas shopping season is reported to have constituted a record, but the volume of retail trade seems to have fallen off very little since then. Large departmental stores report that the increase in their turnover is nearly all due to casual cash sales, their regular customers who purchase on monthly accounts contributing very little to it. Holiday passenger traffic, as well as the movement of goods, contributed to our bounding railway revenues. The private subscriptions to last year's Government loans formed a comparatively small part of the issues. Every month, reports on business conditions mention the flourishing condition of the confectionery trade.

Such unnecessary consumption is often stimulated by the loftiest of motives. Until the Government restricted the milling of white flour in May, South Africans had never eaten so much cake as they were then buying at charity bazaars. Many needless purchases were (and still are) made with the object of "buying British". When the late Lord Stamp in the autumn of 1940 appealed to the people of the Dominions to do without imports of luxuries from Britain in order to let the materials, equipment, labour, power and transport facilities employed in their manufacture and delivery be used on war production

instead, his appeal met with an incredulous and even indignant response. The British Trade Commissioner was asked whether Britain wanted to supply South Africa or not, and naturally replied that she did. The issue was never, at that time, placed fully and fairly before the public. Only a summary of Lord Stamp's remarks was available, and it was obvious that an export drive to South Africa to earn the gold to sell for dollars was an easier task for British exporters than to invade foreign markets directly. It was not clearly put to South Africans that the common war effort would be more effective if South Africa was willing to make her gold available for dollar exchange, without demanding goods in return whose production interfered in any way with the British war effort.

It is at this point that Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr enters the picture. South Africa is fortunate in not merely having General Smuts as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence at such a time, but also having a Finance Minister of Mr. Hofmeyr's calibre. He is sometimes criticised as too academic, but such criticism is lacking in perception. From a narrowly academic point of view, his last budget does not impose taxation heavy enough to enforce economy and obviate inflation. But taxation on such a scale would have been politically impracticable, and, in the absence of any compulsory reallocation to war service of men and resources released by curtailing demand in such a manner, it might have caused more harm than good. As it is, like President Roosevelt, Mr. Hofmeyr has cautiously felt his way, leading public opinion so skilfully that it is unaware of being led and tends to be restive at times on account of his lack of hurry. One finds representatives of the Chambers of Commerce now chafing because business is not called upon to make bigger financial sacrifices; yet they would no doubt have protested vigorously if they had been asked to make them much earlier. By June of this year Mr. Hofmeyr judged the time ripe to start a vigorous propaganda campaign for economy and saving for the benefit of the State. Despite one or two pronouncements by Cabinet colleagues which have hardly been helpful, this campaign now seems to be making headway.

One or two initial practical steps have already been taken, including a ban on new building work costing more than £2,000 unless a special licence is obtained, and an optional substitution of Union Loan Certificates for cash in payment of army allowances to dependants. Incidentally, the monthly sales of Union Loan Certificates mounted by 50 per cent. in the five months from March to July this year, and compare favourably with those of other Dominions. In July an advisory committee on the avoidance of inflation was set up, including business men, industrialists, trade unionists and university economists, who have already held two meetings, doubtless informative both to the Minister of Finance and to themselves.

Exhortations and discussions will not of themselves check inflation, reduce increased costs of imports or obviate real scarcities. Despite the prohibition of "unjust" retail profits by the emergency regulations of September 1939, the cost of living has undergone successive increases, though the published statistics indicate a much smaller rise than in most other parts of the world. The weighted average of the nine principal urban areas shows an increase of 10·4 per cent. in the cost of food, 1·11 per cent. in the cost of food, fuel, light, and sundries, and 8·3 per cent. in the cost of food, fuel, light, rent and sundries above the level of 1938. To strengthen the check on price increases, Mr. A. B. Macdonald has now been appointed as Price Controller, with extended powers. To alleviate hardship amongst poorer sections of the community a compulsory cost-of-living supplement must now be paid to workers earning less than 74*s*. per week. The appointment of a commission to advise on raising Native standards of life through improved social services has also just been announced.

Further important measures have recently been taken. An advisory committee on import priorities proved the immediate forerunner to the appointment, on August 20, of an Imports and Exports Control Board under the chairmanship of a Controller of Imports and Exports. On the same day the appointment of a Purchasing Commission in the United States was

announced. Since September 15 a permit issued by the Controller has been required for all imports. An extensive list of non-essentials has been drawn up, and it is announced that no imports of these will be allowed from foreign countries or from Canada or Newfoundland. Imports of non-essentials from the rest of the Commonwealth are not prohibited, but may conceivably be affected by the necessity of regulating shipping priorities. Exports shipped within the Commonwealth are in general exempt from permit, but permits for shipments to other destinations are necessary, with few exceptions.

This should provide additional help in the campaign for economy, which thus emerges beyond the bounds of exhortation and propaganda. On the other hand, in the absence of counter-measures the risks of inflation would be increased. By this time, however, the Treasury seems to have the situation well in hand. When Mr. Hofmeyr announces his proposals for further Government borrowing, it is anticipated that they will be so devised as, in part at least, to counteract the tendencies towards a plethora of money; and it would not be surprising if his next budget is designed to reap the fruits of the patient campaign he has been conducting to acquaint the people of South Africa with the realities of the economic and financial situation. We can probably look forward to increased taxation, which will go a considerable way to remove the excess purchasing-power from the pockets and bank balances of the people, and instead make it available to the Government. In the Government's hands it will finance the increased war effort that the restriction of unnecessary expenditure will make possible, through the transfer of capital and labour at present employed in providing for the satisfaction of consumer demand. In the political circumstances of South Africa, Mr. Hofmeyr's policy of hastening slowly may prove to have been an invaluable counterpart to General Smuts's similar policy in consolidating his Government's position. The Minister of Finance has certainly never lost sight of the goal.

II. The Afrikaner Front

DURING the last month the anti-Government and anti-war front has undergone a further disintegration. To explain the position which has developed it will be useful to take a short retrospect. When the war broke out two years ago the United party of Generals Hertzog and Smuts split in two. General Smuts thereupon formed a Government, which had the support of the English-speaking section as well as a considerable minority among the Afrikaners. General Hertzog joined forces with Dr. Malan, the leader of the National party. It was loudly proclaimed at the time that this Reunited National party was destined to unify all Afrikaners into a single *bloc*, which would rule the country and hold "unnational elements" in subjection. But the protagonists of this policy reckoned without General Hertzog, who had no sympathy with the idea of a dominant Afrikaner *bloc*.* He left the Reunited National party, and his followers formed the Afrikaner party, whose representation in the House of Assembly at present amounts to ten.

After the departure of General Hertzog other antagonisms began to develop among the anti-war Afrikaners. Mr. Oswald Pirow, who had been Minister of Defence in the Hertzog-Smuts Cabinet, began to propagate his new "New Order", whose Nazi parentage was obvious and indeed avowed. Mr. Pirow gained many adherents among the Nationalists, including several members of Parliament. But he roused much opposition too. Eatnest Dutch Reformed churchmen condemned all totalitarian ideologies. Mr. Strydom, the leader of the Transvaal Nationalists, stood forth as the champion of democracy, though he and the other Nationalist democrats agreed that the "British-Jewish or parliamentary or liberal

* On October 23, 1941, just after this article had been written, General Hertzog complicated his own position and the political scene and embarrassed his colleague and successor as leader of the Afrikaner party, Mr. Havenga, by declaring that National Socialism accorded with the Afrikaans national character and way of life and that he believed in a National Socialist system for South Africa.—Editor.

system was out of date". What they wanted was the indigenous democracy of the Boer Republics. Kruger's South African Republic was often cited as an example of Boer democracy, and there is little doubt that one of the features of that "democracy" which especially appeals to the Nationalist "democrats" is its denial of political rights to the "Uitlanders", whose present-day counterparts (according to the Nationalist conception) are the so-called "unnational elements".

But, true democrats or not, many Nationalists were obviously getting more and more impatient with Mr. Pirow and his propaganda. Last June the Union congress of the Nationalist party adopted resolutions which condemned the authoritarian principles of the New Order and deprecated the formation of groups within the party. Mr. Pirow nevertheless continued propagating his ideas. In the meantime other dissensions were developing within the Afrikaner front. The origin of the Ossewa Brandwag was explained in a previous issue of The Round Table*. Professing in its early days to be a cultural association, it soon became obvious that it was in reality, as is to-day admitted, the "action front of Afrikanerdom". The association is organised on military lines. It has at its head a Commandant-General assisted by a Grand Council, and under them are Chief Commandants, Generals, Commandants and Fieldcornets. It exacts an oath from its members, who are said to number 300,000. It tries to keep its activities secret, but the Government claims that it knows them all. Like the New Order, the Ossewa Brandwag is Nazi-inspired. It embodies the *Führerprinzip*, and (like the National party) it proclaims an exclusive and intolerant nationalism. It argues in its defence that the Afrikaner needs discipline, but the sort of discipline it favours is that which is applicable to beings who can never become responsible. Speaking at Stellenbosch some time ago, its present Commandant-General told the university students that they should study less and "act" more, their "action" being, of course, prescribed by himself.

The Government has given the Ossewa Brandwag a great

* No. 122, March 1941, p. 374.

deal of rope. All it has done so far is to keep a close eye on its activities and to forbid State employees (including school teachers) to belong to it; and it seems to have been justified by the event. The "High Command" of the National party for a long time clung to the hope that Mr. Pirow and the Ossewa Brandwag would adapt their policies to meet the wishes of the party leaders. Dr. Malan was conciliatory. He said that there was a great deal in the New Order which did not conflict with the party's policy. So far as the Ossewa Brandwag was concerned, Dr. Malan went out of his way to befriend it. He accepted the association as the action front of the party and encouraged party members to join it. Prominent party men came to hold high positions within it. Then, early this year, the Ossewa Brandwag came under new leadership. Dr. van Rensburg resigned his position as Administrator of the Orange Free State in order to become Commandant-General of the association. He is a young man, and he soon began to display considerable vigour. He showed that he meant to enforce discipline. What is more, he indicated that he had no excessive respect for the party's politicians. Their wrangles were distasteful to him. The Ossewa Brandwag, he said, was not the action front of any one political party but of Afrikanerdom as a whole. The National party leaders were hoist with their own petard. According to their ideology the will of Afrikanerdom must dictate South African policy. There could presumably be no doubt as to the content of that will, since true Afrikaners thought alike. It was to realise that will that the Afrikaner front had been formed. All that the new *Führer* of the Ossewa Brandwag proposed to do was to carry out the task which the National party with its outworn democratic machinery and internal wranglings seemed incapable of performing.

Preparatory to taking action against its rivals the party reformed its machinery, taking a leaf out of the Ossewa Brandwag's book. The principle of election of office-bearers was, however, retained. A hierarchy of leaders was created from the Chief Leader down to the Group Leader, the leader of a group or cell of eight members. Each Group Leader was

to take an oath of loyalty to the party. To the Chief Leader or "Leader of the People" (Dr. Malan) were given wide powers. At times when the party congress was not in session he might take action to meet urgent situations, though he had to report such action to the next congress.

Last August, at the Transvaal provincial congress of the party, Dr. Malan brought Mr. Pirow to book. He told him that there was nothing Afrikaans about National Socialism and the compulsory single-party system. In his reply Mr. Pirow had the temerity to say that "if those who stand for National Socialism were put out of the party, the reaction overseas might not be as expected by some". Here was another of the party's chickens come home to roost, its leaders having always stressed the importance of being on good terms with the German *Führer*. It would seem that the congress did not share Mr. Pirow's notion of his importance overseas, though he did not fail to remind it of his interviews with Hitler, Mussolini and Franco during his Ministerial days. The upshot of the debate was an overwhelming vote prohibiting Mr. Pirow from propagating his New Order. Out of 500 delegates present at the congress Mr. Pirow found only about 20 to support him. Immediately after the vote he and his principal backers issued a statement in which they expressed their determination to continue agitating on behalf of the New Order. The statement was signed by 19 persons, 17 of whom are members of the House of Assembly. This portends a serious weakening of the National party in Parliament, should it push matters to a split. That Dr. Malan will no doubt do his best to avoid. He has already stated that he does not wish to proceed to extremes—in other words, to expel the recalcitrants, which he may do under the reformed party constitution—if such a step can be avoided.

Having dealt with the men of the New Order, Dr. Malan proceeded to an attack on the Ossewa Brandwag. After the congress resolution, Dr. van Rensburg had declared that National Socialists would be welcomed in that association. "The more political division there was", he continued, "the

wider would the Ossewa Brandwag open its gates." In a speech at Stellenbosch on August 28 Dr. Malan brought matters to a head. He declared that Dr. van Rensburg was, like Mr. Pirow, a National Socialist. Since he became Commandant-General the leaders of the Ossewa Brandwag had become more and more critical of the National party. Leading Nationalists who were also officers in the association were gradually being ousted from their positions. Contrary to its undertakings it had trespassed on the preserve of the party. He accordingly asked Dr. van Rensburg "to remove the Ossewa Brandwag immediately from the territory of the party", and in particular to withdraw a certain "order" he had issued embodying a republican constitution for South Africa; otherwise he (Dr. Malan) would have to declare the Ossewa Brandwag a hostile organisation and forbid members of the party to belong to it.

A word must be said about this republican constitution. It was drawn up by the so-called Afrikaner Unity Committee, which came into existence in order to assist in preserving the unity of the Afrikaner front. The committee contains representatives of the National party and the Ossewa Brandwag, as well as of two other organisations which are supposed to further the cultural and the economic interests of Afrikanerdom. According to the chairman of the committee the proposed republican constitution provides for a "people's government", in which

> Afrikanerdom will predominate and the people will be disciplined into unity, with the barring of everything in the democracy that is false or that is detrimental to the people. . . . The formation of anti-national bodies and anti-national propaganda will not be tolerated in the republic.

The excerpts from the draft constitution appearing in the press confirm the correctness of this summary. In defence of their decision to publish the constitution the leaders of the Ossewa Brandwag argued that many Afrikaners desired to know the kind of republic they were going to get. The argument did not appeal to Dr. Malan. He objected to publication at this

stage, because it might lead to division (an instructive commentary on Afrikanerdom's much-advertised unity of outlook), and secondly because, by publishing the constitution, "one would be putting up a target for political opponents to fire at". The Unity Committee tried to effect a conciliation between Dr. Malan and Dr. van Rensburg. The latter admitted that his association had made a mistake in entering the field of party politics, and agreed to withdraw his offending order. But this did not satisfy Dr. Malan. He wanted from Dr. van Rensburg and his Grand Council "an expression of goodwill" towards the party. They must show "positive friendliness". In fact the Ossewa Brandwag must consent to become the action front of the party. But since Dr. Malan saw no signs of any of these things coming about, he felt the time had come to retract the advice he had given to all good Nationalists to join the association. So far as he was concerned they might resign their membership.

Resignations followed thick and fast. Among them was that of the Rev. C. R. Kotze, the chairman of the Grand Council, one of those political predikants whom we reckon among South Africa's minor afflictions. It would be foolish to try to predict the outcome of the quarrel. Will Dr. van Rensburg resign his leadership in order that a reconciliation may be effected between his association and the party? At present his mood is anything but sacrificial. If the dispute develops into an irreparable breach, what will be the effect upon the political situation? On the present party alignments in the House of Assembly almost none, since the Ossewa Brandwag, unlike Mr. Pirow, has apparently ceased to command the allegiance of any members of Parliament. The National party's strength in the country is bound to be adversely affected, though the present indications are that the association will suffer more than the party. Whichever of the two antagonists comes off worse, the spectacle of their antagonism cannot but add to the confusion and discouragement in the ranks of the Afrikaner front.

Our story suggests certain morals. First, Afrikaners do not

think alike. They differ, in fact, on fundamentals, political as well as non-political. This applies also to the anti-war Afrikaners. The unity of anti-war Afrikanerdom just after September 1939 was therefore illusory. What held the Afrikaner front together for a time were certain common antipathies. It was anti-British, anti-Smuts, anti-Jewish, anti-Coloured and anti-Native. It was easy enough to know what the front was against. The difficulty was to find out what it was in favour of. The trouble started when certain of its members began to frame a constructive programme for the proposed republic. They could think of nothing better than the Nazi model. In opposition to them Dr. Malan, after some hesitation, accepted the democratic Voortrekker or Boer model, modified to suit modern conditions. But while Mr. Pirow and Dr. van Rensburg were prepared, in some measure, to take the public into their confidence, Dr. Malan refused to give any content to his "Boer model modified". To do that, he said, would be bad tactics. It would cause division. He knows his Afrikaners. But what he has still to learn—it is a lesson his former chief General Hertzog could teach him—is that a racial *bloc* with a racialist doctrine cannot rule South Africa, unless it is prepared to accept a dictatorship established with the help of the foreigner.

South Africa,
October 1941.

NEW ZEALAND

I. New Zealand in the World

SINCE the evacuation of the British forces from Greece and later from Crete the New Zealand troops overseas have naturally been less in the public eye—at least for the time being. Rumours persist that not inconsiderable numbers remain in hiding in Greece and Crete, particularly the latter, and from their hiding-places continue to harass the German army of occupation. It is of course impossible to verify these rumours, but they are accompanied by enough circumstantial detail to suggest a basis of truth. For the size of the population, and having regard to the numbers of men overseas, one cannot disguise the fact that New Zealand suffered severe blows in Greece and Crete. Casualty lists, although now naturally diminishing in size, continue to be published, and every town and district of New Zealand has had its quota of losses. And now the hospital ships are beginning to arrive, bringing a further reminder, if any were needed, of the reality of war and of the fact that New Zealand is playing its part in the conflict.

Various writers have from time to time commented upon the tendency of New Zealand to regard the world through the eyes of Westminster—to think, for instance, of Japan as the "Far East" and not as the "North-West". Professor F. L. W. Wood in his book *New Zealand in the World* remarks:

> Throughout her history New Zealand has been curiously detached from her Pacific environment. The voyage to Australia is short though stormy. Groups of islands to the northward in some measure link it on the one hand with Asia and on the other with America. Yet New Zealand thinks and acts as part of Europe, living in virtual isolation from the ancient cultures of the East and from the energetic modern people of North America. To this day New Zealanders see Asia, America and Europe through the eyes of London. They inhabit a detached outpost, using modern perfection

of communications constantly to refresh cultural and economic associations with England instead of to forge links with Pacific neighbours.

This attitude has been so marked that although Canada has had a High Commissioner in New Zealand for more than two years, New Zealand has not reciprocated. But with the outbreak of war and a deterioration of the situation in the Pacific, bringing a threat to the "modern perfection of communications", a change has been taking place. There has been a growing demand for the appointment not only of a High Commissioner to Canada but also of a Minister to Washington. So far the Government has contented itself with a twofold temporary mission, which proceeded to the United States in May 1941. It was headed by Mr. F. Langstone (Minister of Lands) and Mr. J. G. Coates (Member of the War Cabinet). The idea was that Mr. Langstone should discuss trade matters generally, and Mr. Coates the supply of essential munitions. Mr. Coates has now returned, and it is understood that satisfactory arrangements have been made. Mr. Langstone is still in the United States, and there are of course many difficult problems awaiting solution. Not the least of these is the effect upon New Zealand of the Lease-Lend Act, involving as it does the direct supply to Britain of several categories of primary produce formerly supplied by New Zealand. Everyone hopes that some solution will be found, and that any threat to the Dominion's economy as a result of Lease-Lend aid by America to Britain can be balanced by mutual arrangements between New Zealand and the United States. It is understood that Mr. Langstone has also discussed the appointment of a Minister to Washington, but there is no information to show exactly how far the arrangements have proceeded. In any case, an appointment will be welcomed in New Zealand, and it looks as if the Dominion is at last ready to take a more direct interest in relationships with Pacific neighbours.

Meanwhile the crisis in the Pacific, which has been simmering for so long, threatens once again to boil over. The German

invasion of Russia, followed closely by a change of Cabinet* in Tokyo (involving the exclusion of Mr. Matsuoka), has undoubtedly speeded matters. Hitler's admirers in Tokyo seem to have realised that a sudden end to the Nazi-Soviet hostilities, one way or the other, might also mean the end of Japanese ambitions. If Hitler went down, the present ruling clique in Tokyo could not expect to last long. If Hitler won, he might not see eye to eye with Tokyo about the control of Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. Clearly, argued the militarists of Tokyo, the thing to do is to get in and help Hitler by creating a diversion, and at the same time face him with a *fait accompli* if, after defeating Russia, he should enter the Far Eastern arena via the overland route from Europe. Here was the one policy which seemed to answer both ways—help to prevent a Nazi defeat, and at the same time make sure of some pickings in East Asia. From the point of view of Japanese imperialism there was much to be said in favour of the policy, and little against it.

In such circumstances the fact that there is an obvious anti-war opposition in Tokyo—indeed, within the Cabinet itself—is a significant and perhaps a hopeful indication for the future. To begin with, the existence of such an opposition is a tribute to the strength of the Soviet defence, as well as a recognition of a determination on the part of the British and United States Governments to resist aggression in the Far East. It is also a tribute to the good sense of some of the more peaceful forces which still have a say in Japanese public life. The whole situation shows that, among the leading political lights of Japan, there are those who are by no means certain of a Nazi victory and who, if they do not advocate a conciliatory attitude towards the English-speaking world, at least want to continue sitting on the fence for the time being. At the moment of writing there is no certainty here as to what exactly the Japanese propose to do, even assuming they know themselves.

* The reference is to the third Konoe Cabinet, which in its turn resigned on October 16, shortly after the dispatch of this article from New Zealand.—EDITOR.

Every day brings further reports of troop movements to Manchuria and Indo-China, but the probability remains that Japan will take no irrevocable step whilst the outcome of the German war against Russia remains in doubt. A major Russian defeat would, however, almost certainly precipitate a smash-and-grab raid by the Japanese, partly to claim some share in an Axis victory and partly to forestall Hitler.

It is only natural that this situation should have had a profound effect upon the outlook of many New Zealanders, and that steps should have been taken to encourage closer relations with the United States. It is generally recognised that the fate of peace in the Pacific area may be decided by the battles raging for Leningrad, Moscow and the Ukraine. Indeed, with the local press filled with news from the Nazi-Soviet war and also with news of the "Far Eastern" situation, it is significant that the vast majority of readers seem primarily interested in the war news from the Russian front. Consciously or unconsciously New Zealanders seem to have a good grasp of the factors which may ultimately govern the issue of peace or war in the Pacific area, and the maximum aid to Russia is strongly supported by nearly all sections of the community. The fact is becoming apparent that New Zealand, under the stress of the last two years of war, has begun to develop a more self-conscious attitude in regard to international affairs, an attitude less exclusively dependent upon the mother country and showing greater disposition to recognise that in future she may have a political part to play in the Pacific arena. This will not affect the real political and sentimental ties between Great Britain and the Dominion, but may have profound economic effects. East Asia offers an almost unlimited potential market for primary produce, and some day the demands of the people of that area for a higher standard of living must become effective.

The dependence of New Zealand upon the Foreign Office in political matters has not been so marked in the economic sphere. For some years now New Zealand has on occasion negotiated trade agreements direct with foreign countries

without the intervention of Whitehall. Such agreements have always been of a studiously non-political character, and the New Zealand Governments concerned have invariably succeeded in avoiding any suggestion of independent incursion into the sphere of foreign affairs. Among these trade agreements was one with Japan in 1928. The following table has some interest, as showing the volume of trade between the two countries. The figures represent thousands in £N.Z.

Exports to Japan

	Wool	*Casein*	*Tallow*	*Butter*	*Live sheep*	*All items*
1928	588·1	45·2	*	13·3	*	657·9
1929	339·1	63·6	*	17·2	*	428·6
1930	76·1	60·0	5·1	11·6	—	154·7
1931	179·0	50·2	28·7	4·1	—	267·9
1932	181·2	30·9	9·5	3·1	2·0	236·8
1933	233·2	52·4	10·9	1·6	—	354·5
1934	689·9	92·3	24·4	2·4	—	856·0
1935	241·7	128·7	8·5	0·4	0·8	432·5
1936	1265·8	142·4	49·9	0·5	4·7	1554·8
1937	2705·9	173·3	62·1	24·9	28·8	3132·0
1938	478·2	56·3	4·4	—	18·6	592·7
1939	326·7	24·9	—	—	23·0	390·7
1940	*	*	*	*	*	79·5

* Not available.

Imports from Japan

	Silk and piece-goods	*Cotton piece-goods*	*Timber*	*Boots and shoes*	*Clothing*	*Fancy goods and toys*	*All items*
1928	368·2	51·6	48·9	—	25·0	16·8	576·5
1929	377·6	58·1	61·0	—	29·1	16·5	625·7
1930	316·0	58·8	63·8	1·5	29·8	18·1	589·4
1931	163·1	24·7	16·4	8·3	20·0	13·7	332·3
1932	230·1	26·2	14·3	24·4	27·0	12·3	476·8
1933	231·1	62·7	16·6	65·6	54·6	39·2	675·6
1934	294·3	89·4	27·9	56·0	50·2	39·9	836·6
1935	396·5	141·6	23·5	50·1	64·0	45·5	1100·2
1936	416·0	268·8	38·7	50·9	90·1	52·9	1328·2
1937	431·6	279·9	66·4	52·4	114·2	63·0	1629·2
1938	308·3	229·3	41·2	47·5	75·3	57·5	1208·6
1939	308·3	224·9	52·0	22·8	32·9	14·7	1038·6
1940	312·1	172·5	64·2	4·2	1·2	1·9	809·2

The sudden increase in exports in the years 1936 and 1937 was due largely to the fact that, owing to certain trading difficulties, Australia in the years in question stopped exporting to Japan.

II. Inside New Zealand

WITHIN New Zealand, mobilisation of resources continues at a satisfactory pace. The system of conscription adopted is to call up the single men of the prescribed ages first. The point has been reached when the supply of available single men has been practically exhausted, and it is expected that before the end of the year a call will be made upon married men. Of the drafts that have proceeded overseas to various stations, those based on Egypt have been mainly in the news on account of their feats in Greece and Crete. But New Zealand has substantial forces in other places. These are of course in addition to the steady stream of recruits to the Royal Navy, the R.N.Z. Navy, the R.A.F. and the R.N.Z.A.F.

Meanwhile home defence has not been neglected. The numbers in training are steadily increasing, while the Home Guard is a force capable of playing an important part if the need arose. The Home Guard, on the recommendation of Sir Guy Williams, who has been advising the New Zealand Government on defence matters, has now been placed under Army control. Alongside the Home Guard is the E.P.S. (Emergency Precautions Scheme). This corresponds to the Civil Defence services in England, but has a different and somewhat longer history. The framework of the organisation of the E.P.S. was prepared as long ago as 1931. After the earthquake disaster which wrecked Hastings and Napier, the public became somewhat apprehensive in case a similar blow should strike Wellington or one of the other larger cities. It was considered desirable to work out the basis of a scheme to cope with such a disaster should it occur. Committees were set up which went into questions of rescue work, medical aid, provisioning, transport and evacuation, and a scheme on paper duly emerged. The actual task of organisation was never carried

very far, but with the outbreak of war it afforded a framework which has since been expanded into the present E.P.S.

The appointment of Major-General Puttick, D.S.O., as Chief of the General Staff in succession to Sir John Duigan has met with general approval from all who are acquainted with this officer's career. His experience of New Zealand's Defence Forces, his knowledge of local conditions and his actual campaigning experience in the last war and in the present conflict are all factors which combine to make the appointment a particularly fortunate one. Major-General Puttick was in command of the Brigade which covered the withdrawal of New Zealand and other British forces from Greece, and later he was in charge of all New Zealand forces in Crete when Major-General Freyberg, V.C., was made Commander-in-Chief there.

At the time of writing the Dominion's Parliament has been in session for some weeks. With the exception of three contentious Bills the session has been uneventful, and at one stage gave the impression that the Government was marking time pending the return of the Prime Minister, Mr. Peter Fraser, from abroad. The position of the New Zealand Government differs substantially from that of the Federal Government in Australia. In the Commonwealth the fact that the two main parties are almost equally divided, and that a solitary independent practically holds the balance of power, has made for a good deal of instability. In New Zealand the Government party has a majority of more than two to one, and consequently has been in a position to dictate its own terms so far as co-operation with the Opposition is concerned. Nevertheless, the approach of a general election scheduled for the last quarter of the year has had an unsettling effect. It is not even certain yet whether an election will actually take place.* Nobody seems to know what is in the Government's mind, and the probability is that it does not yet know itself. No doubt events in the Pacific as well as local political considerations will

* An agreed Bill has subsequently been passed extending the life of Parliament to November 1, 1942.—Editor.

ultimately decide the issue. In the meantime members of Parliament, taking no chances, have been speaking in debates with one eye obviously on the constituencies. Some people find this electioneering symptom unedifying at a time like this, but in the main it is tolerated as an unavoidable if regrettable aspect of the working of democracy in its present form. Few seem to have any fixed ideas on the question whether or not an election is desirable, or what issues will be decided if one is held.

There is an issue, although in the present circumstances it may not be very sharply defined. Broadly speaking, the Opposition considers that in order to further the war effort it may be and probably is desirable to call a halt to general social legislation, and curtail State expenditure on social purposes. They point out that, with the increasing shortage of labour and the necessary reduction in the quantity of goods for consumption, some reduction in the standard of living will be unavoidable. The Government, whilst it agrees that nothing must stand in the way of the war effort and that some reduction in the standard of living may be inevitable, maintains that the burden of any reduction in consumption should be evenly spread, and that there is no reason why the standard of living of the wage-earning classes should be attacked while other sections of the community still enjoy larger incomes. In short, the Government has definitely laid down the principle that no reason other than actual physical shortages justifies a reduction in the standard of living of the people. The Opposition and their supporters have more than once drawn attention to the discrepancy between the pay and family allowances of those serving with the armed forces and the comparatively high wages and substantial overtime received by those employed in industry. This argument seems just and reasonable as far as it goes, but supporters of the Government have replied by pointing out that if the argument is sound it must be carried to its logical conclusion and nobody must receive incomes in excess of military pay and family allowances.

On one aspect of social life all parties and most of the people seem to be agreed—the need and desirability for national unity.

But, not unnaturally, there are widespread differences as to what the term unity implies. Some people seem to regard disagreement and opposition as disunity, and to think that unity is secured by the suppression of criticism. Others more liberally inclined recognise that disagreement and criticism are inevitable in every free institution, and that open opposition may be evidence of a deeper unity. It must, however, be admitted that many of our public men appear to think that unity can be produced by bitter attacks on opponents for allegedly causing disunity. This rather unaware attitude may not do much real harm, but on occasions it is embarrassing and in any case it is a waste of time.

It is with regret that we record the death on active service of Captain W. J. Lyon, M.P. Captain Lyon went overseas with the forces which later took part in the operations in Greece and Crete, and was killed during the fighting in Greece. He was Government member for the Waitemata electorate, and his death resulted in a by-election for that seat. The National party abstained from nominating a candidate, but nevertheless five candidates in all went to the polls. The election aroused some interest but no enthusiasm. The interest was due to the fact that the Democratic Labour party (political expression of Mr. J. A. Lee's dissident wing of the Labour movement) took the opportunity to measure its strength against the official Labour party. The result from Mr. Lee's point of view was unsatisfactory; his candidate made a low score and came out third best. The figures were: Mrs. Dreaver (Labour) 4,089, Darlow (Independent) 3,669, Douglas (Democratic Labour) 908, Gardiner (Independent) 398 and Head (Pan-New Zealand) 74. The electors did not turn out in any great numbers. Only 9,100 went to the polls, as against 13,300 in 1938, when Captain Lyon had a clear majority of 2,261. As a result of the by-election there are now two women members in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Nash's budget had a mixed reception. It can be fairly described as unsensational, unless it is sensational not to impose any new taxes. The expenditure proposed is, for a

country of 1½ million people, enormous. Under their separate headings the amounts are:

	£
War Expenses Account	69,700,000
Consolidated Fund	39,212,000
Society Security Fund	14,673,000
National Development	20,615,000
Gross Total	£144,200,000
Deduct transfers from Consolidated Fund (1941–2) and developmental revenue to other accounts	12,765,000
Net Total	£131,435,000

Mr. Nash expects to obtain £63,683,000 (£38. 12*s.* per head of the population) from taxation, which leaves a gap of £67,752,000. Presumably this will have to be met by external and internal loans. The press in general has criticised the budget and has queried the financial methods employed, but against this the fact must be remembered that the whole of the daily press in New Zealand expresses only one point of view and is generally unanimous in its opposition to the present Government. Some quarters claim to see in the fact that no taxation increases have been imposed an indication that the Government has decided upon a general election and is anxious to grease the political skids. It is quite as likely that Mr. Nash has recognised that there is a limit to the possibilities of increased taxation, and that the Government has come near to killing the goose.

Externally the Dominion's financial position is at present fairly satisfactory. The net overseas assets at the end of July in £N.Z. stood at £26,948,000 (Reserve Bank £15,552,000 and trading banks £11,396,000). This may be compared as a matter of interest with the figure for the corresponding month in the three years immediately preceding:

	July 1938	*July 1939*	*July 1940*
Reserve Bank	£15,098,000	£5,505,000	£13,019,000
Trading banks	£8,238,000	£3,418,000	£12,555,000
	£23,336,000	£8,923,000	£25,574,000

As far as the trading position is concerned, the local import restrictions on the one hand and export restrictions imposed by supplying countries (mainly Great Britain) have made for a substantial balance of exports over imports, as will be seen:

	Exports	*Imports*	*Balance*
Year ending July 1938	£60,879,000	£57,310,000	£3,569,000
,, ,, 1939	£57,668,000	£55,965,000	£1,703,000
,, ,, 1940	£67,331,000	£46,051,000	£21,280,000
,, ,, 1941	£65,767,000	£46,185,000	£19,582,000

These figures do not tell the full story, of course, when a heavy bill is being incurred in respect of New Zealand forces overseas.

The age and sickness benefits under the Social Security legislation have been in operation for a considerable time. Moreover, a part of the Government's intentions in regard to medical benefits has been put into practice. Fixed fees are paid to the medical practitioners out of the Social Security funds for maternity work, and every citizen is entitled to free service at any public hospital and a contribution of £2. 2*s.* per week towards any private hospital expenses he may incur. During the current quarter, arrangements have been made whereby the State out of the Social Security funds pays for medicines and drugs obtained on a doctor's prescription. But the balance of the Government's plans with regard to medical benefits has hung fire, mainly because of failure to reach a basis of agreement with the profession. The essence of the Government's original idea was a general medical practitioner scheme under which doctors willing to co-operate with the Government would receive a capitation fee of 15*s.* per head per annum for every patient on the doctor's panel (though the scheme was not analogous to the English panel system); this was to be exclusive of any specialist services. Only a very small proportion of the New Zealand branch of the British Medical Association consented to work that plan, and the Government was forced to reconsider its position. It considered itself bound by its electioneering platform to introduce some scheme of medical benefits, and indeed a substantial propor-

tion of the Social Security tax is referable to that. It has now introduced a Bill into the House of Representatives under which the general medical practitioner is to continue on his present basis, except that from October 1 he is to be remunerated from the Social Security funds. A basic fee of 5s. per consultation at the doctor's surgery, with certain additions for visiting the patient's home and for distances covered, has been laid down. This does not apply to specialist services, anæsthetists and other classes which may be excluded by regulations made under the Act; provision made for obstetrical work has already been mentioned. The medical practitioner is bound to accept the fees prescribed in full satisfaction, and has no legal claim to further payments.

The New Zealand branch of the B.M.A. reacted immediately and with uncompromising hostility. They indicated that they were not prepared to co-operate in working the scheme, and they have maintained their opposition. They argue that it interferes with their personal liberty and with the proper relationship between doctor and patient, and that the financial position of the medical profession will be prejudiced. Moreover they argue that the Bill leaves no loophole for private practice. The Minister of Health, Mr. Nordmeyer, denied that there was any interference with the liberty of the doctors or with the relationship between them and their patients. He indicated that the Government was prepared to negotiate with the profession on the question of fees, and suggested the possibility of an offer to make up doctors' incomes to an amount equal to their previous earnings plus 5 per cent. To this suggestion the medical profession have directly made no immediate response. They emphasise, however, that no change vitally affecting the status or financial position of the profession should be made whilst large numbers of doctors are overseas serving with the armed forces, and they have reiterated that they object to the entire scheme on principle.

The attitude of the B.M.A. is strongly endorsed by some sections of public opinion, particularly those which normally

support the Opposition, and several well-attended public protest meetings have been held. Protagonists on the one side argue that it constitutes an infringement of the personal rights of the doctors and is an important step in the direction of further socialisation. Supporters of the Government, on the other hand, point out that the electors have on two occasions expressed their desire for a publicly financed medical service, and that the medical profession cannot be allowed to be sole arbitrator in a dispute in which on its own showing it is a deeply interested party. It is not yet possible to forecast what the ultimate solution will be, but probably a compromise will be reached sooner or later. Matters of heated public controversy in New Zealand have a habit of settling themselves, usually when the leading spirits on both sides have in a prolonged and apparently bitter battle of words exhausted themselves and everybody else.

The second of the three contentious measures mentioned earlier was a Bill to abolish capital punishment and flogging. This piece of legislation was greeted with the usual criticisms directed at such proposals, but it was quickly passed and is now on the statute book. The third, introduced at a late stage in the session, was the Standards Bill. The very name was enough to arouse the Opposition, already heated after debates on medical benefits and the abolition of capital punishment. Gruesome pictures were painted by some members of the standardisation of everything, but a little more consideration of the nature of the Bill had a reassuring effect, and some Opposition supporters gave their blessing to its principles, although they criticised certain of its features. The Bill proposes the establishment of standards councils within the Department of Industries and Commerce to approve of standard specifications, by reference to which goods and materials can be ordered without detailed individual specifications in each case. The facilities to be provided are intended primarily for the use of government departments, local bodies and public authorities, but they are available for any private persons and organisations choosing to resort to them. One

criticism was directed at the fact that the councils to be established are in effect to be under government control. This is true, but on the other hand it is pointed out that New Zealand manufacture is still too small in scale to enable industries to establish their own standards councils. Probably the Opposition suspects the motives of the Government and the purposes for which it may endeavour to use the Bill, rather than the Bill itself. They may be smelling a non-existent rat; in any case, the Bill has now been passed.

The Prime Minister returned on September 14 from his travels abroad. Civic receptions in Auckland and Wellington extracted speeches from him, but no information not readily available from other sources. Immediately after his arrival in the capital he addressed a secret session of Parliament, at which no doubt many vitally important topics were dealt with. It is one of the major difficulties of this war that so much has to be concealed from so many by so few. That is, however, not peculiar to New Zealand, and at the moment there seems to be no remedy. Necessary secrecy is accepted philosophically by most sections of the community, but it is a development which demands vigilance, particularly at a time when the foundations of democracy are threatened from a diversity of angles.

New Zealand,
September 1941.

THE ROUND TABLE *is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish, once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of* THE ROUND TABLE *in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way* THE ROUND TABLE *serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.*

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The necessity for saving paper has presented a choice between adopting smaller type in order to print a greater number of words on each page, or else cutting down the amount of reading-matter and making the quarterly survey proportionately less comprehensive. By one or other of these methods it was essential to reduce further the number of pages in each issue. The former course has been chosen; and, although THE ROUND TABLE is thinner in bulk than heretofore, there will be found no appreciable reduction in the quantity—none, it is hoped, in the quality—of the information which it provides.

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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PROSPECTS OF 1942

APRIL is past, May lengthens towards June, and no decisive move has yet been made in Europe, comparable with the German invasions of various neutral countries which determined the character of the summer campaigns of 1940 and 1941. Viewing the war as a whole, it is not possible to speak of a summer campaign of 1942, owing to the strong probability that an important part of it will be fought in the Australian winter. But, although the still unchecked impetus of the Japanese advance is likely in any event to provide the largest movements of the year, the crucial decisions, which all feel to be impending, await the real joining of battle in Europe.

The broadest lines of the strategy of the year are apparent. The Japanese drive to the west; if they simultaneously strike southward, as is well within their power to do, it is primarily to secure the rear of their westerly advance. The Germans must at all costs intensify their pressure towards the east—whether by opening up new fronts, or by concentrating their whole power on those already engaged, we shall soon know. The opening assault on the Kerch peninsula suggests the former course. The worst danger to be apprehended is that both these converging movements should so far succeed that our two principal enemies, before the fighting season ends, should join hands somewhere in the region of the Persian Gulf. The best to be hoped is that, while the Japanese thrust is checked at the frontiers of India, the power of the *Wehrmacht* may be finally shattered under the tremendous attrition of the Russian front—a result that M. Kalinin, the President of the Soviet Union, has not hesitated to forecast.

Balancing these extreme possibilities of disaster and victory, the conclusion points to the predominant importance in 1942—not to the European Allies only—of the European rather than the Asiatic front. The areas threatened by Japan are remote from the main centres of Allied power. While Great Britain and the United States have to sustain their many commitments against Germany, including the Battle of the Atlantic, supplies to Russia and the defence of the Middle East, they can at the best only limit the extent of Japanese conquest without the prospect of reaching a decision by an offensive blow. Any great diversion of strength to the Pacific or the Indian Ocean entails a disproportionate increase in the risk, either that the Atlantic life-line will be cut, or that the Germans may break through the Russian resistance, make contact over the land-bridges with their eastern allies and prolong the war for many years. On the other hand, a collapse of the Axis system in Europe would release overwhelming sea power for concentration against Japan and, provided any bases at all remained from which to operate in the Far East, would compensate for temporary sacrifices which might have to be faced in order to hasten the date of such a concentration.

This comparison of the magnitudes of the objectives at which the Allies may aim in the west and in the east may be reinforced by applying the

general doctrine of strategy, that the principal blow should be delivered at the enemy's weakest point. Immensely formidable as the German war machine remains, and great as the effort has been during the winter to equip it on a more massive scale than ever, signs have begun to appear that Germany rather than Japan is to-day the weak spot in the hostile combination. For this purpose Italy may be treated as a mere military appendage of the Nazis, an occupied country without control of its own share in the Axis enterprises. Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on April 26 sounded a new note of disquiet, and was interpreted throughout the world, in Italy above all, as betraying the apprehension of the future now felt in the highest quarters. It has to be read with the various indications which have been given that Hitler is perturbed for the safety of his rear in western Europe on the eve of major operations on the Russian front. There has been the insistence on the return of Pierre Laval to control at Vichy, coupled with a new régime of terror in occupied France, obviously aimed at breaking the spirit of a people who might be summoned to revolt in support of a British invasion. The daring with which the local population joined in the fight at St. Nazaire at the side of the British commando shows that the Nazis have good reason for their fears, and the rather hysterical early broadcasts issued on that occasion betray the state of the German garrison's nerves. Simultaneously, repressive measures have been redoubled in Scandinavia and the Low Countries—everywhere, that is, where a possibility of invasion or raids exists. Inferences drawn from the enhanced reign of terror in western Europe may be reinforced from quite another direction by the curious episode of the escape of General Giraud. Whether he reached Vichy charged with a political mission may be as mysterious as a similar question relating to Rudolf Hess a year ago; but on any interpretation his escape from his fortress prison is scarcely conceivable without collusion in moderately high quarters, and this justifies the deduction that there are now influential persons in the enemy's camp who think it worth while to look to their personal prospects in the event of a German defeat.

The Reichstag speech, in which Hitler proclaimed himself supreme over the judiciary as well as the administration and the armed forces, makes the motive of fear almost as essential to the German war effort as it is to the control of the occupied countries. He has of course always kept down his opponents by fear, but now there is an unmistakable threat even to the party enthusiasts, whose loyalty has hitherto been buoyed up by promises of victory, *Lebensraum*, and the New Order. There may or may not be a "purge" in preparation. What is certain is that the spectre of defeat is being invoked to spur on the flagging spirits of the people. "We Germans have everything to win in this struggle for existence or non-existence, for the loss of this war would be simply the end of us. Asiatic barbarism would descend on Europe as the Hun and Mongolian once did." As the new eastward thrust is launched, the promise of swift triumph is no longer held out. On the contrary, the German people, who were told last autumn that the Russian armies were already disintegrated, now learn that the Soviet has hitherto succeeded in keeping its most formidable troops out of action,

and are warned that they may have to contemplate a second winter campaign.

It would be rash optimism to doubt the response of the Germans to the new tone of their ruler's appeal. The more they feel that they are fighting to stave off defeat, the more stubbornly they are likely to resist—far more stubbornly than in 1918, for now they believe themselves to know what defeat means. As a party the Nazis originally gained their hold over popular allegiance in the guise of deliverers from the economic consequences of the Peace of Versailles. They may now make a bid to consolidate their power on its first foundations. So long as the German people believe that a victory of the Allies means for them a renewal of the miseries which they endured after the last war, so long is their will to resist likely to prove unbreakable. A clause of the Atlantic Charter pledges the United Nations to provide for the economic security of the enemies whom they hope to defeat and intend to disarm. If the German people are to be induced to break with Hitlerism before its armies in the field are destroyed, it can only be by persuading them to put their faith in this clause, as they certainly do not at present. The apparent faltering of confidence among their leaders therefore suggests that a much fuller definition of Allied intentions for the economic future of Europe, and its promulgation with all the resources of publicity, would be particularly appropriate to the time. Reports from Germany of the failure to prevent listening to foreign broadcasts indicate that if the case can be presented it will be heard. Apart from this, the signs of waning confidence in Hitler's and other Nazi utterances—which are fully confirmed by American diplomats and journalists who have been repatriated from Germany during May—do not mean that the war can be won by a psychological assault. They do, however, demand exploitation of the military weaknesses from which they proceed.

The cardinal weakness in the enemy's position is that for the first time his main forces are pinned down. In previous springs he has disposed of vast armies of manœuvre, which he was free to hurl in any one of several directions. This year his main body must advance or stand in Russia. Even there he cannot be sure of the initiative, as the great thrust which Marshal Timoshenko delivered around Kharkov shows. Although his capacity to open up new fronts is not exhausted, they can now only be subsidiary. This would even be true if he attempted an invasion of England, which is still not to be accounted impossible, though it has become so unlikely that the barges collected for the purpose in 1940 are stated to have been dispersed. Victory being by definition the destruction of the enemy's main striking power, the Russians alone have the opportunity to achieve decisive success on land this year, and the strategy of their Allies is dictated by the need to second their efforts by every possible means.

The aid that Great Britain is already rendering to Russia is threefold. In the first place we remain pledged to a very great effort of production, in order that our Allies, who have an increasing superiority of man power on their front, shall not fail for lack of arms. The British share in the ambitious programme laid down by the Moscow Conference of last year has so far

been faithfully performed. It has entailed a political crisis at home, culminating in the elevation of production policy to War Cabinet rank, and the appointment of Mr. Oliver Lyttelton to supervise it. The paramount need of help for Russia has also brought about the first acute conflict for man power between industry and the armed forces, the choice being between the recall of many thousands of soldiers to the mines or severe and irksome restrictions on the domestic consumption of fuel—the Government hitherto preferring the latter course. Supply to Russia also involves a great problem of shipping, and requires the keeping open of the two main sea routes for traffic from both the British Isles and America—one by Arctic waters, the other by the Persian Gulf. Since the main strength of the German fleet, concentrated in the Norwegian harbours, hangs on the flank of the one, and the Japanese irruption into the Indian Ocean threatens the other, the sustenance of the Russian armies presents one of the principal tasks for the Allied navies in 1942.

The second contribution of the British Empire to victory on the Russian front is the holding of our positions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The indications are that Hitler will launch great offensives on both flanks of the 2,000-mile Russian line, but that the more dangerous will be that against the left—which actually opened in the Crimea during the second week of May—where the immediate prize is the much-needed oil of the Caucasus, and the distant goal the Persian Gulf and the final breaking of the Allied blockade. It is our task to prevent the turning of the Russian flank by secondary thrusts on other fronts, whether through Anatolia, challenging our forces in Syria and Persia and Iraq to sustain the defence of the Turks, or towards Suez, over the approaches hitherto barred by the Army of the Nile. Gayda, in the *Giornale d'Italia*, lately wrote: "Italy will send bigger forces to the eastern front; Germany will do the same in the Mediterranean, which becomes more and more the centre of European resistance to British imperialism." Hitherto the magnificent defence of Malta has immensely impeded any projects which the Axis may nourish for a successful offensive in North Africa, but we can by no means afford to be unprepared for operations on the largest scale on these fronts—with all the strain on sea power that their maintenance involves.

Thirdly, Great Britain is assisting Russia by direct attack on those regions in rear of the invading armies for the safety of which Hitler has shown himself so anxious. The raids carried out by the commandos on critical points in Norway and France are perhaps less effective for the actual damage they do, though that has sometimes been great, than for the general insecurity they cause along the thousand miles of the vulnerable coast-line of the occupied countries. The threat of them is in itself one of the two factors—and it aggravates the other, namely, the possibility of revolt—which cause the Germans to keep in western Europe thirty or forty divisions which might otherwise reinforce the assault on Russia. By giving the first example on the Allied side of really intimate combination of all three services into a single striking force, they hold out promise for much larger operations in the future.

More continuous and more destructive than the commando raids are the attacks on Germany and the occupied countries by Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force. There has been considerable criticism of the Air Ministry's policy of devoting so much of our productive facilities to heavy bombers; but in its own direction the policy chosen is beginning to yield impressive returns. Production has been slow, but it is now revealed to have been imposing. Devastation has already been wrought in the Ruhr and at Lübeck, Rostock, Warnemünde, Augsburg, Cologne and elsewhere which is beyond comparison more damaging to German war industries than anything the enemy accomplished at the height of the assault on England in 1940–41. Moreover, these raids are the beginning and not the finish of a campaign. The help which heavy bombers can render to Russia by attacking the production areas of Germany while the summer campaign is actually in progress should be of the first importance. The Royal Air Force can count to its credit, in addition to the damage it inflicts on hostile factories and shipyards, the fact that the Germans are compelled to keep at least half the fighter strength of the *Luftwaffe* in western Europe, away from the Russian front. German bomber strength in the west is now small—so small that, in order to satisfy the demand for reprisals for the very visible damage inflicted in Germany, Hitler has had to recourse to the ignoble device of the intensive bombing of cathedral cities. It is possibly within his power to resume bombing in England on a scale comparable to that of a year ago, but he could now only do it by a great diversion of strength from the east, and so by playing into the hands of Allied strategy.

Heavy as is the pressure exerted by British air power upon the rear of the German advance, the question is asked in many quarters whether some still more direct intervention in the Continental war is not our duty. The Prime Minister has spoken sympathetically of the demand for an invasion of the Continent, as evidence of the high-spirited popular desire to come to grips with the enemy. It is certain that such an invasion is a necessary part of our plan of war. It would at the same time be preposterous that those who have to determine the appropriate time for the enterprise should allow themselves to be influenced in any way by the resolutions of public meetings or the arguments of the uninformed. The elements of the problem are simple, though their weight can only be assessed in the inner councils of the War Cabinet and the General Staffs. We have in the British Isles an army more than sufficient to open up a new front in France or the Low Countries. So far as production goes, it could be fully munitioned. The Navy could guarantee the passage of the Channel; the R.A.F. could effectively cover the landing and provide all necessary collaboration in the subsequent campaign. The major difficulty is to find shipping for the supplies of the expeditionary force during perhaps many months of fighting. The question therefore may depend on what surplus of ships is available after meeting all our necessary commitments for other purposes.

The first of these purposes which take precedence over a possible expeditionary force is the provisioning of the United Kingdom by the Atlantic route. This in pure strategy is paramount, since it maintains the only base

whence the ultimate counter-offensive can be launched into western Europe. In estimating its demand on shipping, regard has to be paid to the Prime Minister's recent intimation that the figures of losses by submarine attack took a marked turn for the worse during the winter months. Secondly, a large fleet of cargo ships—incidentally requiring strong naval protection—is and must continue to be employed in carrying munitions to Russia by the Arctic route. Thirdly, an immensely heavy strain is imposed on shipping by the task of supplying the forces in the Middle East, mainly by the long route round the Cape of Good Hope. These forces, as has been argued above, must at all costs be sustained—but each division in the Middle East requires as much shipping as fifteen divisions fighting in France. These three demands are at present irreducible. The fourth introduces a more flexible element, for the quantity of shipping used in the Pacific and Indian Oceans may vary according to the intensity of the strategic effort which it is proposed immediately to exert against Japan. It is important to remember that convoys sent into the Indian Ocean have been proved liable to severe loss, which may permanently affect our merchant navy in other theatres.

If, as seems probable, the inescapable demands that have been enumerated are already taxing the combined shipping resources of the United Nations to near the limit, it follows that the opening of a new front in Europe would require one of two things—either the finding of new ships, or some notable economy in the use of the existing ones. The chief future source of new cargo ships is the great shipbuilding enterprise of the United States, promised by the President at the New Year. Unfortunately this part of the American programme is bound to be the slowest of fulfilment, and cannot be expected yet to affect the situation decisively. By far the greatest possible economy of ships would result from the reopening of the Mediterranean as the normal route of supply to the armies of the Middle East, and through the Suez Canal to India. By the present route round the Cape the average convoy takes four months to reach Alexandria, unload, and return to an English port; travelling through the Straits of Gibraltar, the time would be reduced to about three weeks. Three voyages in the year have to be compared with seventeen. To reopen this route, however, would evidently require a considerable campaign by combined forces of all three services, entailing a diversion of naval strength to that theatre, a heavy reinforcement of our Middle Eastern air power, and the temporary use of a large additional merchant fleet. The only theatre from which the necessary naval and cargo ships could be obtained is the Indian Ocean.

Thus the most immediately practicable way to hasten the opening of a land front in western Europe seems indirectly to entail the reduction to a minimum of our commitments against the Japanese, and resignation perhaps to further temporary losses of territory in the East. The strategical minimum, it might be argued, is the defence of Australia, as the necessary base for the ultimate counter-attack against Japan and Japanese-occupied Asia, exactly corresponding to the position of the British Isles at the other side of the globe. Indeed, there are signs that this counter-attack has already begun; the success of the American and Australian navies in the Coral Sea points

towards a possible cutting of the extended Japanese lines of communication, which might relieve the dilemma of sea power between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The political minimum of resistances to the Japanese advance raises large issues of Indian affairs, which must be examined independently and not at the end of a general article. The present indications are that the Government do not contemplate any early attempt to clear the Mediterranean, since the occupation of Diego Suarez, involving the employment of still more troops and ships in the southern hemisphere, is directed to strengthening the defences of the long supply route round the Cape.

A mainly defensive strategy in the Japanese war, imposed in the hope of an early overthrow of the Axis in Europe, means that the most difficult and anxious part in the war of 1942 has to be sustained by Australia. Something comparable to the effort made by Great Britain in 1940 may be required of the Commonwealth, perhaps including—what in the Battle of Britain was staved off—actual invasion. The mingled sentiments but the magnificent and unified resolution with which the people of Australia are facing that prospect stand recorded elsewhere in this issue of THE ROUND TABLE. Happily Australia is not alone, as Britain was. The United States and the British Empire, conjoined, look to Australia now as the undoubted jumping-off point for the final phase of the Far Eastern war; it is inconceivable that either should fail to bring every available resource to the defence of so crucial a stronghold in the days when its peril is near.

PARLIAMENT IN WAR

FREE institutions constitute part of the guarantee of freedom, and in a war fought to defend the latter it is pertinent to take stock of the former, and to submit to audit their war-time value to the national life. If this article focuses upon the House of Commons sitting at Westminster, that is not through blindness to the qualities and special elements of importance in all the other elected Legislatures of the Commonwealth and of the world, but because Westminster has been a model for all and remains in some not too distant sense a touchstone for all; a collapse there would inflict a shattering blow on the prestige of democratic government, and any serious failure or incapacity would acutely call in question the capacity of democracy anywhere to meet a war situation.

The present Parliament at Westminster was elected in November 1935. Had war not come, it would probably have been dissolved in the autumn of 1939. The timing of this war, therefore, as of the last, happened to fasten on the United Kingdom a relatively elderly House of Commons. It would be a superficial judgment, however, to say that the House of June 1942 was identical with the House that met first after that last general election 6½ years ago. Between November 1935 and the outbreak of war 78 seats out of 615 fell vacant, and were refilled at by-elections fought on normal party lines. Since September 1939 no fewer than 93 further vacancies have occurred, about half of which have led to the unopposed return (under the electoral truce) of a candidate nominated by the local constituency association of the party which won the seat in 1935, and the other half to contested by-elections between candidates thus nominated and opponents representing either some lesser group or simply their own ebullient selves. These emergency methods are all of them far less satisfactory than that which war renders impossible, a clean-cut general election; nevertheless, the allegation of a "tired Parliament" must be tempered by recognition that a considerable part of its membership, relatively newly elected, may indeed be inexperienced but has no political excuse for being fatigued.

There are other criticisms levelled. It is said that under war conditions Parliament affords a platform for ill-founded charges, a forum for ill-judged views, and an inevitably operating machine for conveying information to the enemy. In peace as well as in war the first of these criticisms has a certain validity; but is it not part of the price which all upholders of free speech must pay? Every member, whatever his motives, can put on the order paper a question casting blame upon the action of any Minister in any matter for which that Minister is responsible. In war-time it is true that the Speaker would withhold from the paper a question which in itself clearly might convey vital information to the enemy; but the general right freely to question Ministers remains intact, and is vigorously exercised. Immense good results, and—within Parliament itself—small harm, for the vehemence of any reproach implied is discounted by all other members in proportion to

the value which they have learnt to put on the reliability of the particular questioner. The real possibility of harm from critical Parliamentary questions lies rather in the use which the press may make of them. The appearance on the order paper of a sensational question alleging failure, scandal or muddle is headline news, and receives treatment in the popular press accordingly. The reply which the Minister gives two or three days later, probably exposing the falsity of the story or at any rate putting it in truer and less startling perspective, is not exciting enough to demand equal publicity, and the press is likely to ignore it. Readers of the more lively newspapers, therefore, easily gain an impression that all kinds of things are wrong which are never put right. This may not go deep when Government prestige on general grounds is high, but may relentlessly sap confidence at times when a Government's reputation has started to sink.

An ill-judged view expressed at Westminster is less dangerous than an unfounded allegation, unless it should gain acceptance by a majority; and that, thanks to the curiously consistent quality of good sense which every Parliament retains, is rare. Many a speech is wrong-headed, and some are powerful to mislead, but their power is braked and their influence corrected by the almost certain intervention of someone else who is recognized to know quite as much about the subject and has saner judgment. Members are seldom completely informed themselves, but they never commit the mistake of attributing perfection of counsel to each other; and the potency of sheer unsupported rhetoric to carry conviction is nowhere lower.

Necessarily no measuring-rod can be available to determine how far the proceedings of Parliament, published verbatim in *Hansard* the next day, carry information to the enemy. It is likely that actual disclosure—inadvertent, of course—of censorable facts hardly ever happens; and although the House resolved last month to hold its own inquiries into allegations that two of its members had referred to what occurred in secret session, these were the first such cases in 2½ years of war, and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that leakage from secret sessions has been, to all intents and purposes, non-existent. If there was evidence to the contrary, the Government obviously could not allow them to continue. Presumably the enemy reads regularly the printed reports of public sessions, and draws his own conclusions about the state of feeling in Britain—for the censor cannot delete a question or a speech, still less a debate. It must therefore happen that some material of value is transmitted overseas, and to that extent the Germans are the gainers from our adherence to free speech in war-time; but whether they can learn much from Parliamentary proceedings which they could not equally well extract from the British press and other sources of information already open to them is a question impossible to answer with certainty.

The objection that in these busy days Parliament imposes a devastating waste of time is not one which the average person will take seriously. Stated in more specific form, however, it becomes important. Attendance on Parliament compels almost every Minister to cut several hours a week, at least, out of his already too short working-time. The leading men in a totalitarian state do not have to leave their desks in the middle of the day in order

to sit on a bench and wait their turns for standing up and answering a surprising variety of usually somewhat unimportant questions in public. Even in that crucial period after Dunkirk the Secretary for War had to switch his mind every week on to mastering and delivering the answers to all kinds of relatively trivial questions about the cooking at —— camp or Private Snooks's pay. Worse, the House can show its insistence on debating some subject, and the Minister concerned, however busy he may be on war plans, must put them aside so as to be ready with his prepared speech for the occasion, and to sit listening to the greater part of the back-bench contributions which follow. The world applauds the superb language in which the Prime Minister clothes the events of war and the determination of our people; it hardly pauses to wonder from what other duties the man snatched time to order and polish his material for these brilliant utterances. The appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as Leader of the House now gives Mr. Churchill overdue respite from the daily attendance and attention which were his special task till recently. But democracy never spares any of its leaders. Parliament demands always the extra effort which they can hardly call forth without neglect of something, the extra hour which they can barely find.

Is it worth while? Has Parliament, with all its imperfections and liabilities, contributed something unique to the winning of the war? Should we be worse off if, since war broke out, Parliament had ceased to sit? A more subtle question, testing the individuals rather than the institution—might we be much better off, had we had a different and more distinguished set of 615 citizens to do the work of Parliament in war?

To begin to answer, one must visualize a Britain where official acts are not open to be challenged by any voice to which the official world is forced to listen. There are countries in which that would matter but little; there are peoples who accept instructions even when in clean conflict with common sense. No member of the British House of Commons, however acquiescent his constituency, would dare, after looking through his daily postbag, to agree that Britain was one of these. The right to redress of grievances through Parliament may not enter into the lively consciousness of millions; but it is claimed enough, and it is taken so universally for granted, that its suspension would slam and lock a door which would seem the gate of the prison house. Any citizen who believes himself the victim of wrongful Government action can post a letter to his M.P. on (let us say) Monday. The member, receiving it on Tuesday, can—if he thinks fit—put a question on the order paper immediately, and thus impose on the Minister concerned the obligation to stand up on Thursday, in Parliament assembled (and this is a more searching experience than to face any press conference), and answer not only the original question but, point-blank, any relevant supplementaries which the Speaker may allow. That is the modern essence of Magna Charta; that is the kernel of the procedure whereby a twentieth-century Parliament defends the liberty of the subject.

Fish, as all the world knows, is sold at Billingsgate market. In an excess of zeal when war broke out, although no raiders came near London, the Ministry of Food clapped on to the merchants a complex scheme of dispersal planned against the contingency that Billingsgate might become unusable. Chaos fell on the fish trade, but no bombs. The Ministry stood by its scheme. Only when Parliament let him see in no uncertain manner what it thought did the Minister sense the situation aright and allow the porters of Billingsgate to revert to their normal lives and language. A week or two later, Parliament was taking in hand that monstrous and misbegotten infant, the early Ministry of Information, now schooled and moulded (under constant Parliamentary vigilance) into an active and powerful, though still not uncriticized, partner in the nation's efforts. The original Defence Regulation authorizing the Government to detain a British subject without trial, if Britain's security was deemed to require it, Parliament refused to accept at all. The present Regulation 18B, which now gives this power under safeguard, owes its actual form largely to a panel of back-bench members whom the Home Secretary invited to consult with him about the drafting of it; and there is nothing on which Parliament continues to keep a stricter eye. Right through these 33 months of war, case after case of Parliamentary scrutiny and check on departmental action could be listed, up to the clear challenge issued from the back benches to the Beveridge scheme for coal rationing only last month, compelling its postponement for reconsideration if not its ultimate withdrawal.

Not as a faultless instrument, and often maybe in an ungainly way, Parliament under stress of war has in fact supported public confidence both in assuring the individual that his rights are not forgotten and in curbing policy at the departmental level. Yet it possesses a greater claim on national gratitude than these. It has unmade Ministers, and it has changed a Government. As a spearhead in war, the weakness of the Chamberlain Government—which history will grant a higher place than popular opinion nowadays allows it—was that, so long as it held office, the Labour and Liberal Opposition was determined to remain an Opposition, and the full strength of national unity could not be attained; there are countries to-day where the force of those words needs no emphasis. On May 8, 1940, in a debate on the formal motion "that this House do now adjourn", the majority on the Government side fell to 81, about 40 of its usual supporters voting in the other lobby. The next day Mr. Chamberlain resigned, and the Opposition, which at the outbreak of war had refused his invitation to participate in the Government, accepted Mr. Churchill's. The unity that was needed came. Parliament, which alone had the power, had cleared the way to unity. The motion was not a vote of censure. The outgoing Government had not been defeated. Indeed, much of the sharpest criticism during the debate was against a decision which events have proved amply justified—the withdrawal from Norway. Nevertheless, though the ways were illogical, the end was right, for the nation's requirement was met; and whether the ultimate credit should go to Parliament or to Providence, Providence without Parliament might have been impotent.

It is too early yet to see 1942 in perspective, and the course of political events for the year may be far from finished. Yet, as the last issue of THE

ROUND TABLE showed,* it was the direct influence of Parliamentary opinion which forced substantial changes in the composition of Mr. Churchill's Government during February. In the lower Ministerial ranks, generally speaking, there has been small cause to regret them, and the War Cabinet was indisputably strengthened. If such a crisis was to recur, Parliament would exert its intangible, irresistible power again; and because its exercise of that latent power would be determined and controlled in accordance with the present individual make-up of the House, it is among those who fear or dislike the directions which it might take that one finds wild-brained advocates of turning aside from the war for a period in order to hold, despite the absence of millions from their homes, a war-time general election.

In one particular respect Parliament has had to make the best of a uniquely difficult job these past two years. It has been basic to British political development that at any given moment there is always an alternative Government. If the batting side loses all its wickets, the bowling side of course will go in. But since the formation of an all-party Government in 1940 there has been no bowling side at all; the batting side has been bowling—quite energetically—to itself, and though a stray opponent or two may have lurked in the slips there has never been even the semblance of an opening pair of batsmen to start a rival innings. This fact constantly warps debate. Whether or not it leads Government spokesmen towards complacency, it assuredly encourages irresponsibility among the professional critics, because in a Parliamentary sense there is no ultimate logical consequence to what they are saying. It is silly to break your teapot when you have only one.

There are other little-liked innovations, such as the war-time Act which enables a member to hold an "office of profit under the Crown" without vacating his seat, if the Prime Minister certifies that it is in the public interest. Not only does that silence a dozen or two independent members by linking them to the Government, but when it covers the prolonged absence of a member abroad—for instance, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, whose temporary loss the House keenly regrets, even while not grudging him to Canada—the representation of a territorial constituency becomes a farce. It was a healthy carefulness lest innovations might crowd on too swiftly that prompted opposition which killed the proposal that one of Mr. Churchill's speeches in the House should be broadcast. Equal debate among the equal representatives of the people is the grail which the House jealously guards, conscious that more than is easily realized hangs upon its unsullied preservation.

One war-time development has, however, established its reputation and possibly earned its permanency. This is the Select Committee on National Expenditure, a body of 32 members reappointed in each session, on a precedent of 1917–18, to "examine the current expenditure . . . for the Defence Services, for Civil Defence, and for other services directly connected with the war, and to report what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the Government may be effected therein". Besides publishing some 50 reports, it has resulted in training groups of back-bench

* No. 126, March 1942, pp. 290–3.

members to study and comprehend, as they could hardly have opportunity to do otherwise, the administrative and financial arrangements of one Government department after another. A constant complaint before the war was that the House was seldom sufficiently informed to fulfil its essential duty of controlling expenditure. A projection of this war-time Committee into peace-time conditions would not merely lead to earlier exposure of waste, but would fortify the House with a number of members who, at the price of hard extra work, could make themselves formidable debaters on topics too often neglected in the Chamber.

Westminster is less than 100 miles from the Germans at Calais, and for two years now Parliament has sat regularly and discharged its immeasurable responsibilities within that short range of bombers. When the House met on Sunday morning, September 3, 1939, to hear of Britain's declaration of war in support of Poland against Germany, even as the Speaker's chaplain was reading prayers the sirens were echoing their first "all clear" over London. In a raid on the night of May 10, 1941, the Commons Chamber was utterly destroyed. The story will never be better told than in the words of Mr. Maxton, on the Speaker's golden wedding day—Mr. Maxton, the rebel whom Glasgow sent to Westminster 20 years ago, the unyielding upholder to-day of Parliament as the real protection of the common people.

"Your period of Speakership has been a striking one, and will have a great place in history. You have seen the death of a Monarch, the abdication of a Monarch, the coronation of a Monarch. You have seen the declaration of a great war. You have seen the historic Chamber in which we were accustomed to meet shattered practically about your ears. You saw the Chair in which you sat for those years smashed to matchwood. The Chamber of stone and lime vanished, but under your guidance and direction the living flesh and blood, the sentient, thinking House of Commons, continued in its daily tasks with no break in continuity."

More than 100 members of that House have joined the Services, and 6 have given their lives. Many are serving overseas, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Parliament, like the nation, is feeling the strain on man power. Often it is the best who are away, in uniform or on special duties. The average age of members untrammelled by Government or Service responsibilities is high—which means that the reserve of back-bench members who can combine freshness and physical vigour with sound judgment is dwindling low. When the war is ended, the younger men will be free again. Even so, the tasks ahead of the British Parliament, in helping to fashion a world which parents can hand on to their children without shame, will be such as no chance assemblage of men can perform. In all the grand plans for reconstruction, small thought seems given to the simple fact that the Legislatures of the nations that will carry high responsibility must be good enough in their personal quality, or else these plans will be inevitably doomed. The manner of selection of candidates for Parliaments may, more than all the ideas of the wise, determine the well-being of hundreds of millions throughout all continents in the years ahead which the locusts have not yet eaten.

THE HIGH COMMAND

THE loss of Singapore, Rangoon and the Malayan archipelago has caused much anxious discussion of our system of Higher Command, because it is very widely felt that the weight and vigour of the Japanese attack were not, as they should have been, foreseen. Of the actual fighting by sea and land too little is known to justify comment on the local command. There is no doubt that splendid gallantry was shown in the long retreat down the peninsula and in many other phases of the campaign. The performance of the local Dutch forces in defence of the archipelago was magnificent. But whereas, when once Singapore had fallen, there was little hope of saving either the Dutch islands or Rangoon, Singapore island was regarded as a bastion capable of long resistance even without command of the sea and air; and it has been hard to understand the capitulation of the very strong land forces which it contained, with comparatively unimportant casualties and a formidable supply of munitions still in their hands. It is, however, commonly conceded that the local leadership cannot be fairly judged until the more important prisoners can tell their own story at the end of the war. A verdict is all the more readily suspended, since it is generally recognized that the defence of the whole Singapore position was compromised from the outset of the local fighting by decisions taken in London many months earlier.

The facts in that regard are not in dispute, though opinion varies to some extent on the question whether they can be adequately explained or justified. The conditions of successful defence changed decisively from the time when, in September 1940, Vichy France conceded military control of French Indo-China to Japan. The defences of Singapore had been constructed to defeat sea-borne attack, and the Japanese occupation of Indo-China clearly facilitated to some considerable extent an attack from the landward side. Sea-borne invasion of the peninsula would be one thing when conducted from bases 3,000 miles distant in Japan; it would be a very different thing when launched under cover of shore-based aircraft from bases one-tenth of that distance on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam. Since Thailand moreover could not be regarded as a substantial buffer, it was probable that a land attack would be organized to coincide with the sea-borne attack, unless we took military action to forestall it. All these possibilities were carefully studied in London, and there has been some demand in Parliament and the press for an official inquiry into the reasons why the actual steps taken to meet them were not more complete. The Prime Minister has refused such an inquiry, however informal, on the strong grounds that it would ventilate matters on which it is undesirable to give the enemy more information than he already has, and that Ministers, Commanders-in-Chief, Chiefs of Staff and others concerned should not be diverted from their immediate and immensely important duties. The demand has been rather tentative, but it continues to have influential backing in both Houses of Parliament.

The fact is that such an inquiry would inevitably tend to deal rather with the working of our system of Higher Command than with the course of events in the Malay peninsula. The salient causes of the latter are already fairly well known. It is clear that our Government under-estimated both the probability of Japan declaring war and also the scale and quality of her armaments. Her failure to obtain a decision in China, after 4½ years' campaigning against patriot forces that were always ill-equipped and imperfectly organized, seemed to show that her armies were less formidable than they have since proved to be. The strength and quality of her air force were also gravely underrated, and we seem to have had no knowledge of her extensive preparation for the transport of aircraft by sea. Her naval strength is still unknown to the public, but the main surprise has unquestionably lain in the brilliance with which she has combined the operations of her ships and of her powerful air arm. We have also to allow for the fact that Japanese action in Thailand was assisted by the inhibitions which have always prevented us from taking timely precautions against the collapse of weak neutral states. From the first declaration of war the Thai Government acted as an ally of Japan. It should be added that our military advisers had certainly over-estimated the difficulties with which the swamps and jungles of the Malay peninsula would confront both landings on the coast and a land advance from the north. The Japanese had made a minute and exhaustive study of the terrain, they had guides and intelligence bearers ready to help them in every part of it, their troops had been specially trained and equipped for infiltration tactics, and they had been hardened by actual battle experience in the long Chinese campaigns. There is no question that we must in any case have been hard driven to get the better of all these circumstances, with the American Pacific fleet suddenly put out of action by the disaster at Pearl Harbour, and with our immensely exacting preoccupations in the Middle East, the Atlantic and the business of Russian supply.

It is essential to see this picture in perspective if justice is to be done to the difficulties of our Higher Command. Critics are rightly required to avoid the pitfalls of wisdom after the event, and to put themselves in the position of those who had to distribute our inadequate resources over theatres of such extent that we were bound to incur risks at some point in order to take effective action elsewhere. To do so is to limit, but within those limits to accentuate, the criticism that can justly be made. There has been widespread discussion of the subject, not only because unexpected disaster naturally provokes a desire to investigate and understand, but because it is generally felt that some change of system is necessary to make the most of our expanding resources in this extremely critical period of the war.

What, then, is the main point upon which criticism has taken hold? People in general admit the justice of Mr. Churchill's observation that if, when you are already fighting for your life against two powerful foes, a third leaps unexpectedly upon your back, the consequences are bound to be disagreeable. They also admit that the complete neutralization of the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour gave Japan a freedom of action in the South-Western Pacific which could not have been countered by any

movement within our power, even if it had been miraculously foreseen. Nor do they seriously dispute the Government's contention that adequate preparation against a purely contingent menace in the Far East would not have been possible without an undue weakening of effort in other theatres in which we or our Allies were already conducting struggles of life-and-death import to our cause. Conceding freely the justice of these arguments, they have fastened rather on the point that the forces nevertheless detached and sent out to Singapore were not of the character which hard and costly experience in other theatres had shown to be required. The naval and military forces dispatched before the outbreak of war with Japan were both of substantial strength, and it is believed that they would have given a very different account of themselves had they been furnished with adequate fighter and bomber support—but particularly fighter support—in the air. Why, it is asked, were the lessons of Norway, Flanders, the Atlantic, Crete and Africa once more so signally ignored? Was it because the imperative necessity of integrating the action of the three Services in our strategical plans was still imperfectly provided for in our system of Higher Command?

There is no doubt at all, in the first place, that the operations of the Navy and the Army in the Malayan theatre were fatally handicapped by lack of adequate air power. The capital ships which set out to destroy a sea-borne invasion across the Gulf of Siam were sunk by air torpedoes because fighter cover was not available. It is believed that the aircraft on the spot were not only weak in numbers but obsolete or semi-obsolete in type. Their pilots fought most gallantly, but the extent to which the men were handicapped by poor equipment was pointed by the striking success of British and American airmen in Burma, where the Japanese air force suffered severely at the hands of superior air skill in superior machines. Having thus lost command at the outset both of sea and air, we had to watch our land forces fighting a battle of retreat all down the peninsula against an enemy who was able to turn every successive position by disembarking forces behind it and threatening its rear. It is true that our troops had not in the main been trained to deal with the tactics of infiltration and encirclement practised with unfailing skill by the veteran Japanese; there were splendid exceptions, but lack of instruction and experience is probably the reason why position after position was successively and rapidly abandoned in a country which should have lent itself to prolonged and resourceful defence. It is not right to gloss over the fact that our troops were constantly outmanœuvred and therefore outfought, and that the final capitulation on the island of Singapore cannot be explained away by our weakness in the air, although elucidation of all that happened there must await the end of the war. But what is even now incontrovertible is that the tactics of encirclement would not have been open to the Japanese had we been able to maintain command of the sea and air. Strong fighter and bomber reinforcements were in fact dispatched at an early date from the nearest possible source; but the essential aerodromes had been lost or rendered unserviceable by enemy fire before they could arrive, and the bases in Sumatra were too distant to enable fighters to cover our positions in the later stages of the assault on Singapore. It is therefore unquestionably true

that that great bastion of Empire, the key not only to strategic positions but also to economic resources of vital importance, impregnable though it had been made against attack from the sea, fell to a landward invasion with terrible suddenness because the forces sent out for its defence, despite all previous experience, lacked one indispensable component, proportionate cover in the air.

No one is prepared to believe that the imperative need of stronger air forces to balance those available on land and sea was not pointed out many months before by the local command. Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham has been most unjustly criticized in this regard. He was himself a highly trained airman, and his views must have been shared by the representatives of the other two Services, not only locally, but at headquarters in Whitehall. The issue therefore narrows to the question whether stronger air forces could have been spared for Singapore, with due regard for our needs and commitments elsewhere. There is no question that they were available. The timely diversion of quite a small proportion of the fighters under promise to Russia might well have been sufficient to prevent the loss of our capital ships and advanced positions in the Malayan theatre, and it is hard to believe that Russia would not have concurred in such a diversion had the case been presented to her, since her interest in the produce of the Malayan archipelago was equal to our own. There is no doubt, moreover, that strong air reinforcements were hurried to Malaya when the disaster had occurred; and there is a prima facie case for the view that, since they were available for dispatch after the disaster, they might have been sent in time to avert it, had the need been justly assessed. It is therefore believed that our Higher Command did in fact fail once again to appraise the absolute need of supporting sea and land forces with a proper complement of air power; and that, while that same omission in Norway, Flanders, Crete and Africa might reasonably be ascribed to the weakness of our resources at earlier periods, it was not justifiable after those costly experiences and two whole years of war.

The anxiety thus aroused has caused yet further probing into the Government's methods of long-term planning for the war. It is known that great importance has been attached to the only way in which a single Service can take offensive action without assistance from the other two, namely, the strategic bombing of towns and industries in Germany. There was a powerful popular demand for reprisals of this kind against Germany when the enemy air attack on this country was in full swing during the winter before last; and there was also a school of thought which held that the war might be won, without ground fighting, by bombing on such a scale as to break down German morale. Neither the Navy nor the Army ever put great faith in bombing as a weapon capable of achieving a decision alone, but the doctrine had a strong hold in many influential quarters. The bombing of Germany is giving sterling assistance to Russia, and causing the German people to experience the full horror of a method of warfare which they themselves are responsible for forcing upon the civilized world. But in the public mind as well as in the Services there has been doubt whether

production policy which of necessity reduced the assistance that the Royal Air Force could render to its sister Services, in favour of a strategic rôle which it pursues alone, was ultimately wise from the standpoint of grand strategy, and whether the bombing of Germany can be regarded as an adequate offset against all which we may have lost as a result of that policy elsewhere. However that may be, it is asked whether the representatives of the two senior Services concurred in a decision which was bound to have such important repercussions upon their own efficiency and upon our whole strategic plan. Were all the implications of the heavy-bomber policy worked out and approved by the Chiefs of Staff as part of a well-balanced plan for bringing our total striking power effectively to bear upon the armed forces of our principal enemy? And, if so, did the representatives of the Navy and the Army show a faulty anticipation of what their own Services would require, or did they allow themselves to be overruled? There is no answer to these questions; but they still cause concern, because it is felt that we have reached the end of the period of grace which the fates can allow, even to a nation as fortunate as ours, for reparable miscalculations and retrievable mistakes.

That the present organization of the body which plans and directs our strategy affords some ground for this concern was shown by a remarkable series of leading articles and letters in *The Times*, as well as by several very informative debates in the House of Lords. The manifest necessity is that the three Services should not pursue independent strategies, combining so far as their separate preoccupations permit when tactical co-operation is required, but that they should be planned for and handled as a single force in which the air element is invariably combined with the sea or land element, if not with both in a solid integration of the three. General Wavell pointed clearly to this need for integrating the action of the Services and studying them as a single whole in the lectures on generalship which he delivered at Cambridge before the war. Speaking of the qualifications which a "great captain" would in future require, he said that a study of naval strategy and tactics would be essential to him, as also a capacity for handling air forces with the same knowledge as forces on land. "It seems to me immaterial", he said, "whether he is a soldier who has really studied the air or an airman who has really studied land forces. It is the combination of the two, never the action of one alone, that will bring success for a future war."

In the earlier stages of the present war our plain failure to act upon this principle could reasonably be attributed to lack of both experience and strength; but such excuses are wearing thin, and there is in any case no doubt that, in our operations both by sea and land, air action must now be closely combined with that of the other two Services if further defeats are not to be incurred. In the Battle of the Atlantic, in the Middle East and in special minor enterprises such as commando raids the principle is well established and the execution satisfactory. The fault which cost us so much in the Malayan theatre lay in the strategical allocation of our forces, not in any lack of tactical co-operation between those which were actually there; and it is therefore reasonably attributed to neglect in our larger strategy of a

principle which is now thoroughly accepted in the field of minor operations. Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, with equivalent rank in the Army and the Air Force, has been made a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the purposes of his special command. That arrangement is admirable so far as it goes. Why then limit it, people ask, to minor enterprise, when nearly every great offensive operation in which the Empire may be engaged requires the interaction of the three Services in a common plan?

Widespread discussion of the whole subject in the press and the aforementioned debates upon it in the House of Lords were followed on May 19 and 20 by an important debate in the House of Commons. Sir Edward Grigg, lately Under-Secretary of State for War, argued that members should face their individual and collective responsibility for satisfying themselves that our system of High Command was equal to the critical calls being made upon it. He laid great emphasis on two points which he regarded as vital, and in which he considered the present organization at fault. The first was to ensure that the military and strategic advice tendered to the War Cabinet should not be coloured in any way by the intrusion of political suggestion or surveillance. The ultimate decision must of course rest with the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet, and it was their duty to balance political against military considerations in any case where reconciliation was difficult. But he did not think that the War Cabinet would ever be sure of receiving pure and undiluted advice on the military side unless it were "tendered in the first instance by a detached professional mind concentrated on that task, the mind of a man who has nothing else to think about". His second point was the need of further measures to ensure that "in production policy and also in the allocation of strength a proper balance between the Services is observed in every important theatre, and that nowhere is any Service compelled to suffer and to fight under unnecessary disadvantages because co-ordination is deficient". He led up to the broad conclusion that the Prime Minister's great political and strategic capacity should be reserved for judgment on the military advice tendered to the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet, over both of which he presides, and that he should not also act as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. That body should be strictly professional in character and should have a Service chairman, who should be its guide and watchdog, seeing that nothing important, however far ahead, was overlooked, that the action of the three Services was fully co-ordinated, and that all military considerations had been given full weight in the plans submitted to the Cabinet.

Colonel Stanley, Secretary of State for War in Mr. Chamberlain's Government until May 1940, and since then a member of the Combined Planning Staff in Whitehall, also spoke in the debate. He strongly supported Sir Edward Grigg in the latter's main contention that military advice must be worked out and tendered in complete freedom from political preoccupations. "I think it is absolutely essential", he said, "that any right honourable gentleman sitting on that front bench as a member of the War Cabinet and having to take responsibility for great decisions should get his military

opinion undiluted." But he saw objection to putting any Service officer in the chair of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, on the grounds, first, that the views of any such officer must to some extent be coloured by the Service to which he belonged: secondly, that no single officer could be given executive control over all three Services: and, thirdly, that a chairman without executive power would be overshadowed by the colleagues who wielded it. He argued that the vacant place in the Committee—"I believe", he said, "there is a vacant place"—should be filled not by a Service chairman, but by an independent Service member whom he described as a "swinger". That phrase is used in the army for an odd-job man, and Colonel Stanley defined the duties which should be delegated to such an officer in terms which were not so comprehensive as, but not entirely dissimilar from, those applied by Sir Edward Grigg to the functions of a Service chairman.

The other main contribution to the debate from the private benches came from a second ex-Secretary of State for War, Mr. Hore-Belisha, who preceded Colonel Stanley in that office. He was equally strong in the view that Service advice must be tendered undiluted, and traced the present evil to Mr. Chamberlain's decision, announced to the House on May 7, 1940, just before the fall of his Government, that Mr. Churchill had been "authorized by the Cabinet to give guidance and direction to the Chiefs of Staff Committee". The decision to allow a Minister, whose first responsibility was political, to give "guidance and direction" to the supreme Service Committee in the actual process of its professional deliberations was, in his opinion, a bad one. "I do not think", he said, "that you can divorce the almost unending and unbroken sequence of strategic disasters from this mixture of the political and military elements in your war machine."

Sir Stafford Cripps, winding up the debate as Leader of the House in the absence of the Prime Minister, threw little fresh light upon the discussion but made it clear that the Government intended no change at the present moment. "I am convinced", he said, "that, given the present personalities of the Prime Minister and of the Government, the alteration that is suggested would not effect any improvement and would indeed tend to hamper and make less effective the supreme war direction of the country." There for the time being the matter rests, but it cannot rest indefinitely. It is now 19 years since a Committee presided over by Lord Salisbury recommended the appointment of a chairman to the Chiefs of Staff Committee other than the Prime Minister of the day; and the demand for some change has been so strongly supported by experienced and authoritative opinion that it is certain to be further pressed in both Houses of Parliament.

Meanwhile the differences of opinion upon the efficiency of our present system of High Command are not to be read as any sign of national weariness or disunity. On the contrary, the mood of Parliament and of the whole country is forward-looking and aggressive. We dwell upon the reverses of the past only to make sure that we are learning everything possible from experience, and that the striking power of the Empire is concentrated, with that of all the United Nations, upon an offensive strategy which will lead without avoidable sacrifice to early victory.

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XI

THE last issue of THE ROUND TABLE brought the account of the war in the Far East down to the fall of Singapore, but could not include any full appreciation of the extent of that disaster. The British Government has refused to issue any detailed account or to hold any official inquiry, on the compelling argument that the information consists of bits and pieces and that many of the chief witnesses are prisoners. It is useless therefore to discuss whether reinforcements were sent to the wrong place and why they did not have more effect. We can only record the fact that they were absorbed by the Japanese assault like a splash of ink by blotting-paper, and that the wiping out of this large British army had an effect upon Japanese strategy comparable to the American disaster at Pearl Harbour.

An attempt was nevertheless made to hold Java. It cost the whole of a Dutch and British naval squadron, destroyed by the greatly superior escort of a huge Japanese convoy in an attack which deserves to rank as a naval Balaclava. The garrison of Java—Dutch, British, Australian and American troops—was overwhelmed in ten days' fighting. Timor was invaded and overrun, and the enemy established himself in New Guinea. He was thus well placed to press his main attack either southward against Australia or westward against Burma. He chose the second course, which, if it succeeded, would again give him the further choice of concentrating against China or against India. Perhaps his decision was influenced by the resolute front put up by Australia. The return of great numbers of Australian troops from other theatres of war, the arrival of American troops, the receipt or the construction of strong air reinforcements made an attack on Australia a formidable proposition. From about the middle of February, powerful air counter-attacks by Australian and American machines began against the Japanese bases in New Guinea. They did not prevent Japanese bombing, chiefly of Darwin, but they certainly slowed down the rate of enemy reinforcements; and the Darwin raids became increasingly costly. The future alone can disclose whether enemy activity was designed merely to contain large forces in Australia, or to mount a serious attack. The former seems the more probable, though the risk is obvious that the forces in Australia will become strong enough to refuse to be contained. That conclusion is on the whole supported rather than shaken by the Battle of the Coral Sea. This action, nominally a sea battle but really more of an air battle over the sea, cost the Japanese a number of medium-sized and small warships out of a section of their fleet which was intercepted by a combined American and Australian force in the triangle between the Solomons, New Guinea and Queensland. It has not yet been disclosed whether there was any action, beyond attacks by the aircraft of both sides upon each other's ships. What is clear is that the Japanese claims to have sunk Allied battleships and aircraft-carriers are untrue, and that the survivors of the Japanese fleet retired to their bases. In this, though in nothing else, the battle compares with Jutland.

Strong Japanese attacks developed in Burma immediately after the fall of Singapore. Some reinforcements had landed at Rangoon before the British command of that sea had been finally lost, but thereafter nothing substantial could reach the garrison, except Chinese troops moving down the Burma Road. The Burma campaign, which came to an end with the fall of Mandalay and Lashio in the early days of May, was one of the most difficult in history. The same troops fought rearguard actions for about four months, always outnumbered, without proper food or adequate water, in a trying climate and without hope of relief or victory. Though there were loyal Burmese, a particularly distressing feature of the campaign was that, on the whole, the people sided actively with the enemy. There has been no better fighting in the war than that of the British, Indian and Chinese troops concerned; and they never showed a sign of collapse. After the loss of Rangoon, it was impossible to give them effective air support. Long-distance bombing raids from India, and the American Volunteer Group operating with the Chinese, did all they could; but time after time the Army *communiqués* revealed that it was not enough. Nevertheless the heroic sacrifices of the troops in Burma have not been in vain. They have gained precious months for the strengthening of the bastions of India and Australia. Burma has been a continental Bataan.

The next move of the enemy must be a matter for speculation. The most likely guess is that he will gamble on the impossibility of an effective flank attack and race up the Burma Road into China, and that he will reinforce this arm of a pincer movement whose other arm will be a renewed assault against Chungking from the east. His aircraft have raided Ceylon, where the first attacks were heavily punished, and they have subsequently sunk two British cruisers and an aircraft-carrier in the waters off the island. But it may well be that these are diversionary moves, and that the main object is the final crushing of China. President Roosevelt has guaranteed to get supplies through to General Chiang Kai-shek in spite of the cutting of the Burma Road, and elementary strategy suggests that a relief offensive will have to be launched on some other Far Eastern front.

That will not be so easy as it looks, for meanwhile the enemy has had successes elsewhere. On April 9 the great defence of the Bataan peninsula in Luzon came to an end; and though the garrison of Corregidor island continued to hold out bravely for another month, large Japanese forces were released for use elsewhere. Some three weeks earlier General MacArthur, whose foresight had made Bataan the only properly defended place in the Far East, had been called away to take over supreme command in Australia. The appointment was greeted throughout the United Nations as an instance of putting the right man in the right spot. Thus the picture shows at the moment the Japanese far flung and flinging wider, checked on their Australian flank but nowhere else. The Allies are, however, weaving the other end of a *cordon sanitaire*. The occupation of Madagascar, which was begun by British troops on the morning of May 5, must be reckoned as an attempt to prevent the culmination both of Japanese and of German strategy, namely, junction over the ruins of our Middle Eastern front. Madagascar lies across

both the route to Suez and the route to Russia through Persia. The Vichy of Laval could not be expected to defend it against anybody except France's friends. It will be defended now.

At this point, it is necessary to observe that the Japanese victories ought to have surprised nobody. Those who were old enough during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–6 will recall that the Japanese were then considered to be one of the finest fighting races—and one of the best equipped—in the world. For a time they can be just as strong and all the time they can be as good soldiers as the Germans, or better. Their navy is, of course, much more powerful than the Axis navies. Their weakness is that they have no such background of essential war production. To some extent their offensive is living on previously accumulated stocks, as a tree lives on its sap. That probably explains why an air raid on their cities (now revealed, after a long period of anonymity, to have been carried out by American Army bombers) made them extremely jumpy. But it is this tremendous military empire, fully prepared for war, which the United Nations have faced on distant battlefields at the same time as they have had to meet Germany at the peak of her power, and all Germany's satellites. No possible dispositions could have averted a period of recoil. The strength of the Japanese was grossly underrated, mainly because of their poor showing in China and Manchuria. It is now clear that they were reserving themselves for the larger struggle which they have been plotting for years. The revelation is disquieting. It may mean that their strength, though perishable, has not yet reached its peak, and that they have power to conduct several major campaigns simultaneously. Their ability to do so has been increased by their conquests, which have given them vast potential resources in rubber, tin and oil.

Passing to the Middle East, the last instalment of this review left the Eighth Army suspended between the heaven of its advance to Jedabia and the hell of a possible retreat back to Egypt. It oscillated not to rest but to a standstill about half-way across Cyrenaica, in the old purgatory of the Western Desert. There, until almost the end of May, both sides remained feeling for each other across an immense no man's land. The centre of the stage was taken by Malta, which has now endured many weeks of almost constant air attacks from the enemy (mostly German) based on Sicily. The island has put up an epic fight. During the month of April its defences destroyed 154 machines for certain, and it gained the award of the George Cross for its unflinching courage. Early in May air reinforcements which reached the island accounted for 112 aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed in four days. The enemy's immediate object was presumably to prevent interference with convoys by surface craft. Interference has in fact been limited to submarines and aircraft, and Rommel has certainly received substantial supplies. The ultimate object, without doubt, was to prepare the southern wing of the much-heralded Axis spring offensive. There have been many other signs of preparation. Mussolini has shown symptoms of uneasiness about his people, who were promised a gala and got the Gestapo. Early in May he was summoned to Salzburg to meet Hitler. At a guess, the result will be more Italian divisions for Russia and more German police

and troops for Italy. Another topic at the meeting may well have been the fate of France, where Hitler has forced Laval on Marshal Pétain, and Laval expects some sops for collaboration. These can only be at the expense of former promises of loot for Italy. It is doubtful whether the foisting of Laval on France really helps to consolidate Hitler's western front while the bid for victory is made in the east. Laval should not be underrated. He is the French equivalent of a consistent Little Englander in politics and of a Horatio Bottomley in finance. "Faith unfaithful keeps him falsely true" to the conception that nothing matters except the farm and the franc to France and a good many francs to himself. This author of the Franco-Soviet pact and part author of the Hoare–Laval plan and of the French capitulation can, however, be all things to all men. His broadcast on taking office was a masterpiece of special pleading. But a review of strategy can only concern itself with his power to harness France to the German chariot. Can he hand over the French fleet? Can he resist a liberating invasion? Can he send French workers to Germany, or make them work more for Germany in France? Can he attack the Free French colonies, or share in an attack on Syria? Some of these projects are less improbable than others, but all are improbable.

This consideration of Laval leads to the question of the so-called "second front", and to an analysis of the eastern front, from which that question springs. So far, we have opened a second air front on a really big scale. Night after night, from the very moment the weather became possible, strong bomber forces have attacked the centres of the enemy's war machine. There has even been one brilliant daylight attack on Augsburg, though at the heavy sacrifice of seven out of twelve bombers. By day, within the range of our fighters, there have taken place daily "sweeps" and attacks on industrial objectives by escorted bombers. The effects of this air offensive are indisputable. They have stung the Germans into retaliation with such few bombers as they had in the west, in Baedeker raids (so called because they are deliberately aimed at medium-sized cathedral cities) which have proved very costly. They have kept half the enemy's fighter force in the west. They have interfered with his supplies for the eastern front. They have one distasteful feature, namely, the infliction of casualties on friendly populations in occupied countries. It is stupid to pretend that anybody likes being bombed; but after the raid on Billancourt the Germans could not get one French workman to say a word against the British before the microphone, and it would be equally stupid to pretend that the reason for these raids is not understood. "An unhappy business" and "they might have come on a Sunday" (the holiday)—these were the comments on the Renault raid. Occasional commando raids have also been undertaken, the most ambitious being that against the submarine base at St. Nazaire, which was a miniature Zeebrugge. Far too much importance has been attached to these raids. They have been successful in fulfilling specific tasks, and they are a good tonic, but their only strategic significance is their proof that the German covering lines could be easily pierced. There is powerful backing for the idea of a real invasion. Lord Beaverbrook gave it his support in a

speech in the United States a few weeks after he ceased to be a Minister, though this proved little except the orator's passionate conviction that Russia must be helped at all costs and in all ways. This is no place to discuss whether, when, or where an invasion should be tried; but two things may be said. The first is that, as the raids have proved, a merely temporary landing would expose the civil population to horrible reprisals after the British troops had left. The second thing is that shipping is the key to the problem of a more than temporary landing.

The strain on shipping is intense. The Allies have experienced a bad patch in the Battle of the Atlantic, and heavy losses, notably along the American seaboard. The claims of the Middle East and of the Far East have not grown less. Immense quantities of new tonnage are in sight, most of it for the latter part of 1942 and onwards; and Colonel Knox has reported an improvement in Atlantic coast sinkings. Present difficulties are not therefore permanent, but they are present. The strain is not confined to the Atlantic. The enemy is making great efforts to check our convoys to Russia. It was almost certainly for this purpose that on February 11 he ordered his three ships out from Brest and brought them successfully through the Channel back to Germany. The findings of the judicial inquiry ordered by Mr. Churchill into their escape could not, for obvious security reasons, be made public, and consolation had to await confirmation that they were mauled by the heavy air attack and the assault of a few destroyers—the only interference which could be organized in time along the route chosen. Nearly three months later it was officially reported that all three ships, thanks to British attentions, were still out of action.

Meanwhile the Russian winter offensive did not secure the startling geographical gains which some people expected. Leningrad was not cleared as Moscow had been, there was stalemate in the Crimea, and the big German centres of resistance—the "hedgehogs"—mostly held out. So did the "encircled German army at Staraya Russa". The fact that the Germans were able to hold on is, however, no reason for despondency. The Russians seldom or never delivered great frontal attacks. So soon as it was clear that there was not going to be an extensive German collapse during the winter, the Russians had to think about the spring. They did enough to strain severely probably a third of the whole German Army and more than that proportion of the *Luftwaffe*, without overstraining themselves. By an extraordinary feat of organization they have bodily shifted huge industrial centres from near the front to the Urals. If the Germans have massed reserves for the summer, so have the Russians. The latter are supremely confident, though it would be idle to pretend that they would not welcome Allied attacks elsewhere to take some of the weight off their shoulders. Meanwhile, though Hitler's main offensive has been delayed longer than expected, he began on May 8 a strong local assault on the Kerch peninsula, which is the gateway to the Caucasus. After a fortnight, however, the peninsula had still not been completely cleared, and the German *communiqués* significantly began to lose again any reputation for accuracy. Meanwhile the Russians launched an important offensive farther north towards Kharkov,

probably designed more to anticipate an enemy attack than to make territorial gains. On May 20 a German flank attack was noted and repulsed at Barenkovo. The next day the Germans reported a fresh Russian offensive near Taganrog. Thus the cogs of the opposing machines are engaging one by one. Though none can foretell the result of the grinding, we can already observe two strategic features. The first is that *Blitz* tactics apparently no longer possess their former efficacy. Critics would do well to ponder whether the period of the superiority of attack over defence may not be nearing its close. The second is that the Germans can no longer smoothly operate preconceived plans. On May 20 Göring let out a tremendous wail about their difficulties, and how Germans must trust a God-given *Führer*. When Göring begins to look over his shoulder towards the Almighty, things must have reached a pretty pass.

Hitler has already had to throw mysticism into the scales. As noted in the last review, he required to make himself War Lord to rally the army for the winter. He has now been forced to make himself Law Lord—not merely the supreme but the overriding judicial authority—in order to rally his people for the summer. *Sic volo, sic jubeo. Sit pro ratione voluntas.* Does Hitler remember this echo from the Kaiser whom he so much despised? In the speech before the Reichstag where he demanded these new powers, he also felt bound to foretell another winter of war. The German people are not shaky, but some seem to be beginning to be sullen.

To sum up, during the past three months there has been no fundamental change in the strategic lay-out. The war can be seen more clearly to be going extremely well for the Japanese, and rather badly for the Germans—badly enough to warrant speculation on what would have happened to the Axis this year, if it had not been for the Japanese. But the great trial of strength in 1942 has still to come; and until it has arrived its results cannot be forecast.

THE CRIPPS MISSION VIEWED FROM ENGLAND

THE mission of Sir Stafford Cripps focused the attention of the world on India in a remarkable degree. From day to day the interest shifted with dramatic suddenness from one point of controversy to another, and the connexions were sometimes hard to trace. A word on the different structures of government in India may help to provide a background. In British India, Parliament is the source of authority, and the inhabitants are British citizens. It comprises the eleven Provinces with their separate Governments, and contains about four-fifths of the total population. At the head is the Government of India, consisting of the Governor-General and the members of his Executive Council, who are appointed by the Crown. They are responsible to Parliament, and administer collectively all matters requiring central control or uniform treatment. Outside British India are the Indian States, under the personal rule of Indian dynasties whose position is regulated not by Parliament but by treaty or similar relations with the Crown.

In British India the first step towards responsible government was taken by the Montagu–Chelmsford Act of 1919, which transferred a group of functions to the control of Indian Ministers, responsible within this sphere to elected majorities in the Provincial Legislatures. At the Centre it made no change in the bureaucratic character of the Executive; but it recast the Legislature into two Houses, each with an elected majority, while giving power to the Executive to secure essential legislation and supplies if either House refused them. The intention was that the Executive, though not responsible to the Legislature, should become "responsive" to it, by giving weight to the majority view so far as was consistent with its own duty to Parliament. In practice, the position had its drawbacks. The Government, not being removable by the Legislature, could neither fortify itself by votes of confidence nor hand over to an alternative Ministry if defeated, while the non-official members of the Legislature found themselves forming a permanent Opposition with no prospect of occupying the Government benches; and since the Act of 1935 continued in these respects the provisions of the Act of 1919 until a Federation could be formed, that is still the constitutional position at the Centre to-day.

So far, constitution-making had been confined to British India. The Indian States were almost part of another world. Except for a period in which States territory was brought under British rule if there was a break in the direct succession, British policy has been to preserve the integrity of the States as representing natural organisms in the Indian polity. The Crown guarantees the defence of the States against external attack and conducts their foreign relations. It confirms the accession of the Rulers and secures them in their personal rights. In internal affairs the Ruler is supreme, though if a Ruler should be guilty of flagrant misgovernment he is liable to be

removed and replaced by a successor of better promise. The States cannot, however, live in complete isolation, even if they wished. Many of the Rulers are fully abreast of modern thought, and in some States the level of administration sets an example to the rest of India. In any case, British Indian policies are bound to touch the States at many points, particularly in the economic sphere. States territory covers some two-fifths of the area of India, but forms nothing like a compact enclave. A glance at the map will show how closely it is interwoven with the areas of British India. The authors of the Act of 1919 looked forward to a scheme of government for India in the distant future in which there would be room for the Indian States, but its formulation was still to come. Thereafter the pace quickened. At the Round Table Conference which followed the issue of the Simon Commission's Report in 1930 there were converging influences at work which carried the idea of Federation into the forefront, and the States representatives at the Conference were among the first to give it support.

It was on this basis that the Act of 1935 eventually took shape. Besides transferring the remaining Provincial subjects to Ministerial control, it gave the Provinces an altogether new status as autonomous units capable of joining in a Federation. At the same time it laid down safeguards for the due protection of extra-Provincial and minority rights and interests. At the Centre it provided for a Federation in which the Indian States could combine with the Provinces and have a voice in matters of All-India concern while preserving their own institutions. The Rulers were left free to choose between acceding and standing out, and within limits to attach conditions to their accession. No such choice was given to the Provinces, whose powers had already been designed to fit in with the Federal scheme. The inauguration of the scheme was to depend on the accession of a sufficient proportion of States. Meanwhile the Central Legislature and Executive remained as they had been left by the Act of 1919, except for certain adjustments consequential on the Provincial changes. The Provinces, however, were launched on their new career in 1937 without having to wait for Federation.

With each prospect of an effective transfer of power to Indian hands, Indian political leaders have been confronted with the question who would wield the power and how would it be used. A sharp conflict of ideals has emerged, and the different schools of thought have been at pains to establish their doctrines by pushing them to their logical conclusion. Undoubtedly the most prominent body of opinion is that represented by the Indian National Congress; and the views of other groups have been in part determined by their reactions to its attitude. The Congress is a political movement which, since its birth in 1885, has consistently claimed to speak for Indian political opinion as a whole. Its ranks are open to all who accept its creed and discipline, and have included both Moslems and Sikhs; but the fact remains that in its composition and outlook the Congress is predominantly Hindu. It has shown a marked gift for political organization, and a leaning towards strong leadership of a distinctly autocratic type. For the individual, it prescribes self-discipline as a preparation for freedom: for the community at large, the expression of the popular will through adult suffrage and its

realization through the rule of the majority: for the nation, full independence as a sovereign unit. It has sought to remedy social abuses as a means of integrating national life, and under Mr. Gandhi's inspiration has paid special attention to the Depressed Classes, the outcasts of Hindu society. But there is another side. The democratic principle of majority rule presupposes that there are political issues which cut across the strata of society, and that on the turn of these the minority of one day may become the majority of the next. If the majority should rest on a purely racial basis, its supremacy can never be challenged. In that case another principle may be invoked—the principle of self-determination. This conflict of principle is not absent from Western democracies; and it is the crux of the Indian problem of to-day.

The Moslem reaction is that the Congress claims mean the perpetual domination of Moslems by Hindus. From early days Moslems have insisted on separate electorates, and during the discussions of the Federal scheme they were concerned to strengthen the position of the Provinces against the Centre. Lately they have gone farther still, and have evolved plans for dividing India into new areas on more or less communal lines. These units are each to have the status of a Dominion, with power to combine for common purposes in a loose kind of confederation. The Moslem claim is inspired not merely by the fear of unjust treatment, though Moslems, like other groups, maintain that experience has shown that they cannot rely on the pledges of other parties or on legal safeguards to secure respect for minority rights. The claim rests also on a consciousness of cultural and religious unity which in their view entitles Moslems to the status of separate nationhood, however well they might be treated as part of a more composite nation. Here too, however, there is another side. In the post-war period no nation can hope to preserve its integrity without some measure of self-sufficiency in the spheres of economics and defence. The Moslem plan would break up the existing unity of India at a time when the need for consolidation will be paramount. If, as seems certain, there will have to be some central authority to co-ordinate economic policy and defence, it would be as well to face the fact now, instead of starting afresh on separatist lines and leaving the rest to the future.

Of the other groups, the Hindu Mahasabha represents the more orthodox school of Hindu thought. It condemns the Congress for breaking with Hindu traditions, but sides with it in denouncing the Moslems for disrupting the unity of India. The Sikhs have followed the Moslem example in claiming that the areas in the north-west of India where Sikhs predominate should be grouped to form a separate Sikh unit, though they assume the continuance of the present structure of government for India as a whole. The leaders of the Depressed Classes, who vigorously repudiate the Congress claim to speak on their behalf, have apparently convinced themselves that any sweeping change can only worsen their position. The group of Indian Liberals headed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has affinities with Congress thought, though it is more moderate in its views. Standing apart from all these, the Rulers of the States have made it clear that they will be jealous to preserve their rights and the independence of their institutions, which have been

guaranteed by solemn undertakings. They feel that they have done as much as any for the prosperity of India by maintaining tranquillity in their States and contributing actively to the defence of India. All this, they say, would go by the board if the Congress succeeded in forcibly democratizing the States and sweeping away the patterns of government that have been evolved to suit the needs of the people.

Two of the main preoccupations of Indian political thought are the external status of India and the manner of settling her future Constitution. In external affairs India, since her admission as an original member of the League of Nations, has acquired in many respects an intermediate position which is hard to define. Indians have pressed for an unequivocal declaration of her external rights, and till lately were united in demanding full Dominion status. The replies given by the British Government in the early 'thirties were held to be ambiguous, and it was not long before the Congress, followed by the Moslem League, declared for complete independence. Other groups have recognized that Dominion status is a natural evolution which offers all the advantages of independence without its drawbacks. On the second question, Indians complain that the Constitution of 1935, like all its predecessors, has been imposed on India by the will of Great Britain, and they claim the right to settle their own form of government in their own way. In this matter there are certain outstanding obligations to be met—obligations, not to satisfy British interests, but to ensure the stability and contentment of India herself. They include the protection of minorities, respect for the rights of the States, a proper measure of security for the Civil Services, which have loyally discharged their many duties in times of increasing difficulty, and adequate arrangements for defence, in which the position of the British forces maintained in India must be an important factor. Behind all this there is the urgency for agreement among Indians themselves on the fundamentals of the Constitution. Failing that, there will be no cohesion unless imposed from without, which would be the negation of self-government.

At the outbreak of the present war the Congress controlled the Government in seven of the eleven autonomous Provinces. Its first reaction to the war was to rally to the Allied cause; but it soon fastened on the fact that, the Constitution being what it was, India had been committed to war without the power of choice that was exercised by the Dominions. As a protest, the Congress headquarters ordered the Congress Ministries in the autumn of 1939 to resign in the seven Provinces, which under the "breakdown" provisions of the Act of 1935 were thereupon administered by the Governors with the help of official advisers. In the following months further statements were made on behalf of the British Government affirming that full Dominion status was the goal of their intentions for India, but these failed to move the Congress or to produce any concerted effort by Indians to find a basis of agreement. In this situation, a much more comprehensive declaration was made in August 1940, which contained the seeds of all that has followed. While referring to the obligations just noted, it promised, in the Prime Minister's recent words, "that, as soon as possible after the war, India should

attain Dominion status, in full freedom and equality with Great Britain and the other Dominions, under a Constitution to be framed by Indians, by agreement among themselves and acceptable to the main elements in Indian national life". As an immediate step, it was proposed that the Viceroy's Executive Council, which already included Indian members drawn from non-official life, should be enlarged to admit representatives of the leading parties. But the Congress was still unshaken, and the Moslem League would not commit itself unless its claims *vis-à-vis* the Congress were secured. Additional appointments were, however, made to the Council in 1941 which had the effect of converting the official into a non-official majority; and a tribute is due to the ability and public spirit consistently shown by the non-official members in an ungrateful task.

Those who took the declaration on its merits found themselves in doubt on two points. Did it mean that the British Government reserved the right to override any Constitution framed by Indians, in order to secure the fulfilment of the outstanding obligations? And did it mean that complete agreement must be forthcoming before any progress could be made? If so, an intransigent minority could block the way indefinitely. These were not in fact the intentions, but more precision was clearly desirable. The draft Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps took with him to India last March was framed to remove all such doubts. It offered a constructive set of proposals in the hope that they might win "a reasonable and practical measure of acceptance". At the end of hostilities a constitution-making body would be elected, through the system of proportional representation, by the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures acting collectively; and the States would be invited to appoint representatives. With this body the British Government would negotiate a Treaty covering all such matters as the outstanding obligations. The Constitution would provide for an Indian Union; but any Province which was unwilling to join would be entitled to remain outside and to receive separate treatment with the same rights as the Union. In other words, the Provinces were to be given as much freedom of choice as the States, while the creation of a Union could not be blocked by a dissentient Province. On these conditions the British Government undertook "to accept and implement forthwith" the Constitution so framed; and the status of the new Union was defined in the explicit terms of the Balfour Declaration. Meanwhile, for handling the crucial problems of defence policy and organization, the responsibilities of the British and Indian Governments must remain unchanged, but the co-operation of all sections was invited in terms which foreshadowed the possibility of adjustments within the Executive Council.

In the talks that followed, Sir Stafford Cripps exerted himself to the utmost to make contacts in every quarter. It was an unhappy sign that the various Indian leaders made no corresponding effort to confer with each other. Instead, they reiterated their conflicting claims with renewed emphasis. The Moslem League raised a series of objections, of which the essence was that the scheme both in its aims and methods cut right across the claim for the establishment of independent Moslem States. The primary task of the

constitution-making body would be to create a single Indian Union; decisions affecting the future of the Moslem community would not depend, as they should, on Moslem votes alone, and in any case the existing Provinces provided no proper basis for the future demarcation of India. The Congress, it is true, admitted that a unit could not be compelled to remain within an Indian Union against its will, but it insisted that no radical change should be made which might hinder the growth of a strong National State, a proviso which must clearly be unacceptable to the Moslem League. It also demanded, in effect, that the right to appoint States delegates to the constitution-making body should be taken from the Rulers and given to the people, regardless of treaty obligations. These and similar stipulations were enough to show that as regards the future the Congress was in no mood to compromise. But the point to which it gave the greatest prominence was the statement in the draft Declaration that for the present the British Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the defence of India. To begin with, Congress asked that a representative Indian should be appointed to the Viceroy's Council in the capacity of Defence Member, side by side with the Commander-in-Chief who at present holds the portfolio of Defence. The distribution of functions between the two presented obvious difficulties, but they were not insurmountable. A settlement was actually in sight, when the Congress made a new and much more sweeping demand that the Viceroy's Council should be transformed into "a Cabinet Government with full power"; in other words, that the responsibility of the British Government in regard to the Central Executive should cease. Only thus, the Congress maintained, could the energies of the people of India be brought into full co-operation with the war effort. The demand traversed a fundamental principle of the draft Declaration, and no agreement could be registered.

Here note must be taken of the claim that there are in India vast untapped sources of man power, material and endeavour which can only be made available if the Government is popularized. It is a complete misrepresentation. There are already more men who are willing to fight than there are weapons to arm them; and the production of weapons is limited by industrial capacity and war conditions, not by politics. Taken on its political merits, the Congress demand, which was backed by the Liberal group, would have created an Executive responsible to no one but itself and its own ideas of what the nation wanted, or ought to want. Possibly this reflects the Congress leaning towards autocratic leadership. But even if such an Executive later became responsible to a popular Legislature in the ordinary sense, the result would be to establish once for all a binding precedent for the future form of government in India, at a time when no agreement has yet been reached on the essentials of the problem. The Moslem case would go by default, and the States would be brushed aside.

Whatever may have been the driving motives behind all these demands, they led to a complete rejection of the British plan. A common complaint was that the proposals were too rigid. They were, in fact, far more elastic than was appreciated. They suggested a method of forming the constitution-making body, but left the way open for any alternative that could command

agreement. Once this body had got to work, it could sift the objections to any particular draft Constitution and make adjustments to meet reasonable claims. If, after this, one or more Provinces still held out, the discussions would have served to indicate lines on which their future relations with the rest might eventually be settled. The possibility of some rearrangement of Provincial boundaries by consent before a final decision was not excluded. At the same time there was likely to emerge an effective nucleus in favour of a Union, and its creation was not left, as in the Act of 1935, to depend on the accession of a prescribed number of units. But, above all, the draft Declaration made it plain that the responsibility for shaping the future course of political life in India must be shouldered by Indians themselves, if they are to translate their aspirations into fact.

When Sir Stafford Cripps left India he said: "We revert to the position as it was before I came out here—though not quite perhaps to that position." Fortunately, there are already the first signs of a change. Mr. Rajagopalachari, a prominent Congress leader who has been Prime Minister in Madras, has already proposed an acknowledgement of the Moslem claim. The proposal has been rejected by the All-India Congress Committee; but the Congress President himself has now suggested the appointment of a Congress delegation to confer with Moslem delegates with a view to a settlement. If the first step can once be taken, there is hope for the future. With any real approach to agreement in India, the great possibilities offered by the recent British plan may be brought within reach.

Great Britain,
May 1942.

THE CRIPPS MISSION VIEWED FROM INDIA

THE draft Declaration brought to India by Sir Stafford Cripps has turned Indian political thought into new channels. The purpose of the Cripps mission was to secure assent for fresh proposals which the British Government had prepared to meet Indian constitutional and political demands. The proposals had the united endorsement of the British War Cabinet, and the Declaration would have been promulgated as official British policy, had the necessary assent of India been forthcoming. That assent was not available, and the Declaration is withdrawn; but its withdrawal only implies the end of a chapter, not the end of the book. Although the British proposals merely clothed in precise terms those official statements which have embodied British policy towards India during the past twenty years, the draft Declaration has given a wholly new orientation to Indian politics, and has clearly indicated how the complexities of the Indian problem may be finally unravelled.

The Declaration laid down in definite form the steps which the British Government proposed to take for the earliest possible realization of self-government for India. The main objective was the creation of a new Indian Union, constituted as a Dominion associated with Britain and the British Dominions. By allegiance to the Crown the Indian Union would have equality with the Dominions in every respect, and would in no way be subordinate in any aspect of its domestic and external affairs. The measures to bring this about were explicitly outlined. Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps were to be taken to set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for the country. Provision was made to associate the Indian States with this constitution-making body. The British Government undertook to accept and implement the Constitution that might be framed, subject to certain conditions. These conditions were obviously introduced to meet the peculiar political circumstances prevailing in India, and their inclusion represented a definite attempt to overcome those special difficulties which had hitherto hindered constitutional advance. Any Province of British India not prepared to join the new Union was given the right to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession to the Union if it so decided. With such non-acceding Provinces the British Government would be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution being framed, giving them the same status as the Indian Union.

The other principal condition laid down was the signing of a Treaty negotiated between the British Government and the constitution-making body. The Treaty would cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. It would make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by the British

Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but it would not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other Member States of the Commonwealth. Regarding the Indian States, whether they adhered to the new Constitution or not it would be necessary to negotiate a revision of their Treaty arrangements, so far as the new situation required. Details for creating the constitution-making body were also included in the Declaration, although the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities were given the opportunity to prepare an alternative procedure if they so desired. The suggested British procedure implied that Provincial elections would be held at the end of the war, and when their results were known the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures would, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body would represent about one-tenth of the electoral college. Indian States also would be invited to appoint representatives to the constitution-making body.

These proposals were entirely concerned with the constitutional issue in its long-term aspects. A special clause in the Declaration dealt with the interim war period. It indicated that until the new Constitution was framed the British Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for, and retain control and direction of, the defence of India, as part of its world war effort, but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. For this purpose the British Government invited the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations, in a manner that would enable them to give constructive help in the discharge of a task vital and essential for the future freedom of India. This clause, which became the main subject of contention during the Delhi discussions, clearly indicated that no fundamental constitutional changes were contemplated at this stage, although it was generally understood that far-reaching alterations in the composition of the Viceroy's Executive Council were in view.

When Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India the terms of the Declaration had not been published. In the House of Commons on March 11 Mr. Churchill had said that its publication at that stage might do more harm than good. He felt that the Government must first assure itself that the scheme would win a reasonable and practical measure of acceptance, and it would ill serve the common cause if a declaration were made which would be rejected by essential elements in the Indian world, and which would provoke communal disputes at a moment when the enemy was at the gates of India. This was a wise decision, particularly as he indicated that the vital communal issue must inevitably be dealt with in any declaration which the British Government had to make. In this connexion he said that the conclusions on which the War Cabinet had agreed would avoid the alternative dangers "either that the resistance of a powerful minority might impose an indefinite veto upon the wishes of the majority, or that a majority decision might be taken which

would be resisted to a point destructive of internal harmony and fatal to the setting up of a new Constitution".

The decision to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India was a brilliant stroke, calculated to impress India and the world with the genuineness of British intentions. In India he was welcomed as the most suitable ambassador that could have been chosen, although it was felt in minority circles that he might perhaps be too sympathetic towards Congress aspirations. In all political camps, however, there was a tendency to suspend political judgments until the British Declaration was made known. The general attitude of the main political parties on the eve of the consultations remained virtually the same as it had previously been. Congress adhered to its demand for independence, and sought the creation of a National Government in a form implying the transference of real power. The Moslem League sought guarantees that its demand for the creation of Pakistan in the future would not be prejudiced by anything which might be done meanwhile. The non-party representatives who had petitioned Mr. Churchill in Washington asked for Dominion status in the future, with a form of government at the Centre now which would imply Dominion status in practice. The minority elements wanted assurances that their political position would not be undermined in any proposals which might prove acceptable to the main parties. Underlying all these political demands was a genuine and general anxiety that something should be done forthwith which would enable Indian opinion to be more closely associated with the war effort, particularly in the field of defence.

Sir Stafford Cripps began his work with confidence and high hopes. He kept in close touch with the press correspondents, including representatives from Britain, America, Australia, Canada and other parts of the world, as well as a large number of Indian journalists, who showed extraordinary skill in eliciting information from the Lord Privy Seal. At press conferences he gave a broad and liberal interpretation of the British Declaration, indicating some of the far-reaching implications in its terms. At the first conference he expressed the hope that a generally acceptable line of practical action could be laid down at once, with a view to removing the main obstacle to India's full co-operation in her own defence. He felt confident that, with the political atmosphere thus clarified, the leading political organizations would be enabled to put forward their maximum effort in preserving the country from the brutalities of aggression. How best their effective participation in the counsels of their country could be immediately arranged would also be a matter for discussion. He emphasized that his stay in India would be brief; he was certain that the political leaders would be prepared to take quick decisions.

Before his arrival in the country, Sir Stafford Cripps had issued invitations through the Viceroy to party leaders to come to Delhi. All who were invited expressed their readiness to take part in the consultations. Those whom he interviewed represented every aspect of Indian political life. They included the leaders of the Congress Party and the Moslem League, non-party representatives, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Indian Princes, the Sikhs, the Scheduled

Castes, the European community, the Anglo-Indians, the Indian Christians and other political units, as well as outstanding Indians in their individual capacity, including Mr. Gandhi. Most of the Provincial Governors were also interviewed, and as the defence question was of paramount importance Sir Stafford Cripps of course had consultations with the military authorities, particularly with General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief. All these talks were carried out in a spirit of goodwill, and an obviously sincere attempt at finding a solution was made by every political body. Some of the lesser political groups, including the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes, drew the conclusion that Sir Stafford Cripps was chiefly concerned about coming to terms with the two main parties, and there were some apprehensions among these minorities lest their long-championed causes might suffer in any agreement that was reached. There was, however, a deep-rooted feeling that Sir Stafford Cripps was determined to secure a "just and final" settlement, and there was an abundance of co-operation in India to assist him in doing so.

The proposals contained in the British Declaration reflected that genius for compromise which is characteristic of British political methods. The Declaration adroitly incorporated the essential features of those conflicting policies underlying party demands in India, and while no party under the Declaration could satisfy its political ambitions in full, each found that its principal aims had been recognized, although this was truer of the two main parties than of the lesser ones. Each party therefore analysed the proposals in the light of its own declared policy, and in doing so did not relate its own policy to that of any other party. The ideal of compromise, on which the Declaration was based, engendered no similar compromise among the parties it was intended to satisfy. One of the unfortunate omissions in the Delhi consultations was that at no time was any attempt made to bring the party leaders all together, with the result that the Declaration was rejected by each party for reasons peculiar to itself. Thus, while the Declaration synthesized the political aims of each party, no like synthesis was attempted to harmonize the current relations between the different parties, so that the compromise embodied in the Declaration could be implemented by practical means.

Both the Congress Party and the Moslem League found that their principal policies formed the basis of the Declaration. Congress has long claimed independence as its goal, and the right to secede from the British Commonwealth was implicit in the British proposals. Congress has also been demanding a Constituent Assembly for devising the new Constitution, and this too was granted. The Moslem League has lately been insisting on the establishment of separate Moslem States in India, and the principle of separation was partially conceded in the right given to Provinces to remain out of the proposed Indian Union. The reply sent to Sir Stafford Cripps by the Congress Working Committee reiterated the oft-expressed Congress view that "only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis". This meant that for the duration of the war the Declaration did not meet the party's demand. After

pointing out that the Declaration related chiefly to the future, the Congress reply said that the principle of self-determination offered was fettered by the introduction of provisions which imperilled the development of a free and united India; this referred to the proposal permitting a Province or Provinces to remain out of the Union, which Congress leaders regarded as a severe blow to Indian unity. Objection was also taken to the proposal which would permit the Indian States to participate in the constitution-making body, on the ground that self-determination was vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements. Regarding the interim period, the Congress reply criticized the Declaration as vague and incomplete, implying no vital changes in the existing governmental structure. Congress leaders argued that, as Defence was withheld from the sphere of responsibility in the interim period, the interim Government would not function as a free and independent Government during the war.

The Moslem League expressed its gratification that recognition had been given to the League's demand for Pakistan, by providing for the possible establishment of two or more Unions in India, although it held that the separatist policy of the League had not been met by the mere right of non-accession to the Union. The League disliked the proposed constitution-making body because Moslems would be denied the protection which they had hitherto enjoyed through the system of separate electorates. Regarding the interim period the League felt unable to express an opinion, in the absence of a more complete picture of the form of government envisaged. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar, who are generally regarded as speaking for non-party representative Indians, emphasized in a memorandum that Indian opinion attached the greatest importance to the transfer of real power to the Central Government for the interim period. They realized that the transfer of absolute control over defence forthwith would not be in the best interests of England and India, but they urged the appointment of an Indian Defence Member, whose sense of responsibility would enable him to work harmoniously with the War Cabinet. Such an appointment would be regarded as an unmistakable token of the reality of the transfer of power. Regarding the right of Provinces to remain aloof from the Union, the two signatories regretted the introduction of this principle, but were prepared to experiment with it if necessary. On behalf of the Scheduled Castes, Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Rajah indicated that the Declaration would not be acceptable to those whom they represented, as it would place the Depressed Classes under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. They asked Sir Stafford Cripps to convey to the British Government their deepest anxiety about the future of the Depressed Classes, saying that it would be regarded as a breach of faith if the British Government were to force the Depressed Classes to submit to a Constitution to which they did not give their free and voluntary consent. The Hindu Mahasabha objected to the opportunity given to Provinces to remain out of the Union, maintaining that the right of non-accession could not be justified on the principle of self-determination, and contending that the proposed Treaty for minorities ought to satisfy all reasonable minority demands. The Sikhs raised similar objections to the principle of separation

being recognized, and said that they would resist by all possible means the separation of the Punjab from any Indian Union.

As the negotiations proceeded, it became clear that less interest was being taken by party leaders in the long-term proposals than in what was contemplated for the interim period, although this was truer of the principal Hindu groups than of the Moslem League. Some commentators asserted that Sir Stafford Cripps should have confined himself to the present and left the future for later consideration. But this view overlooks the demands of the two principal parties. Congress had insisted, ever since war broke out, that a clear declaration of British intentions regarding the future of India was essential to any settlement for the interim period; the Moslem League had long indicated its unwillingness to be associated with any interim Government until the principles of its separatist demand had been accepted as a basis for a general settlement. The Congress Party would have rejected the Declaration out of hand, had it contained no specific proposals about the future constitutional status of the country; the Moslem League would have agreed to no interim solution until it was satisfied that its policy for the future had been recognized. As it has turned out, neither the Congress Party nor the Moslem League was wholly dissatisfied with what was contemplated in the future, although both parties would have preferred that their particular policies should have obtained fuller expression and endorsement than they did.

But the insistence on a settlement being procured for the interim period justified the decision of Sir Stafford Cripps to strive to obtain one, particularly as the question of the defence of India was of supreme importance. His negotiations in this connection were almost entirely with Congress leaders—Maulana Azad (the Congress President) and Pandit Nehru. These negotiations were mainly concentrated on the functions to be exercised by an Indian Defence Member, who would be included in the Viceroy's Executive Council in addition to the Commander-in-Chief. Agreement was virtually reached on this matter, assistance being given during the negotiations by Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's personal representative in India. At this stage hopes ran high that a settlement might be reached, although these hopes flourished principally in the Congress camp. It became clear that Sir Stafford Cripps was going far to meet the general demand for associating Indian opinion more closely with the prosecution of the war, for, although the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief to the War Cabinet was left unimpaired, Indians were being invited to fill all the other posts in the reconstructed Executive Council, and were being given the control of important military matters coming under the Indian Defence Member. As Sir Stafford Cripps wrote in a letter to the Congress Leaders, "nothing further could have been done by way of giving responsibility for defence services to representative Indian members without jeopardizing the immediate defence of India under the Commander-in-Chief".

The final break came neither on the subject of defence nor on the question of the constitutional future of India. As seen from here, the consultations failed because Congress leaders lacked the courage to assume responsibility

during the interim period under the existing constitutional system. Nothing but a fundamental change in the Constitution could have met the Congress demand at this stage. That was clearly brought out in a resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee, which said: "It has been made clear that the defence of India will in any event remain under British control. At any time Defence is a vital subject; during war-time it is all-important and covers almost every sphere of life and administration. To take away Defence from the sphere of responsibility at this stage is to reduce that responsibility to a farce and nullity, and to make it perfectly clear that India is not going to be free in any way and her Government is not going to function as a free and independent Government during the pendency of the war." This view implied that the effort of Sir Stafford Cripps in delimiting functions between the Commander-in-Chief and the proposed Indian Defence Member did not in itself meet the Congress case, for these functions would have been nullified if the Commander-in-Chief had been made responsible to an Indian Cabinet endowed with full powers—which in the last analysis sums up the Congress demand. Congress leaders professed surprise that the negotiations broke down as they did, but they obviously broke down because these leaders demanded a full transfer of power immediately, although all others who were consulted at Delhi made it clear that fundamental changes in the Constitution were impracticable at this stage. While Congress leaders implied that no change in the Constitution was being sought, they actually wanted these changes to be made by means of an agreed convention which would bind the Viceroy to accept decisions of his Council.

But few in India regard the outcome of the Cripps mission as failure. Much has been achieved. There is now a widespread recognition that the long-term constitutional issue has been determined with some finality, and in a manner which enables Indians to devise a new Constitution for themselves. British sincerity can no longer be questioned, for it has been proved that British policy aims at the establishment of self-government on a basis of self-determination at the earliest practicable date. The principal demands of the principal parties have been utilized to lay the foundation for a future Constitution under which minorities will be protected by treaty arrangements between Britain and the Indian Union. The fact that treaty relations between the two countries are envisaged proves in itself the far-reaching character of the British proposals. Although they have been withdrawn, they cannot be forgotten, and will indeed become the final basis for the final settlement of the vexed problem of the future of this great country.

India,
May 1942.

WAR PICTURE FROM U.S.A.

DESPITE the several discouraging aspects of the American war effort —and they will all be mentioned in proper order—the general picture is sound and encouraging. Our arms output is really rolling. Our soldiers and air forces and equipment are gradually being transported to the places where they are most needed. We are learning lessons. Perhaps that is the most important fact of all, even if we do have so many to learn. The awakening to the meaning of modern war and its urgencies is steadily coming to Americans. The closer you get to officialdom in Washington, the more impressed you are with difficulties. The closer you get to the people out in the country, or to the big factories, the more encouraged you become. If the Germans bombed our east coast, if the Japanese made a few token raids on the west, it might help our morale a good deal. "Best" of all would be a long-distance German raid across the Arctic to some Middle Western point. But, even without raids, the people are steadily realizing that ever-increasing efforts and sacrifices are necessary. There are absolutely no serious complaints. The only difficulty is that the war is slow in coming home to all the people. Isolationism dies very reluctantly, but it dies. It dies, not as a political aspiration, but as a practical mode of action. An isolationist just received the Republican renomination for his seat in the United States Senate from Illinois. He may not be elected, but he was decisively nominated. Yet the people of Illinois are sending their sons to war as bravely as the people of any other State, and they are building armaments as vigorously as any others. They will sacrifice, but they still wish that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and the Appalachian and Rocky Mountains were barriers. This is a post-war problem, not a severe difficulty of to-day.

President Roosevelt has just said that "we are going to have a couple of years, perhaps three years, before we can make sure that our type of civilization is going to survive". As this time-table is interpreted by Washington, the most reasonable estimate is as follows:

In 1942. Try to halt Hitler. Here the vital point is to bring all possible aid to Russia, while carrying out all practicable diversions, and keeping the Middle East as well defended as possible. If Hitler is stopped throughout this year, it is generally concluded that his jig is up. If he gets to oil and other resources in 1942, the prospect is for a very long war.

In 1943. Finish the job on Hitler, if he has been stopped in 1942. It is felt that the Nazi decline in power might come rather swiftly, after another winter—or even sooner, provided Hitler does not get to or flank the Caucasus. Meantime, 1943 should see the war of attrition against Japan intensify, pushing back over ground that has now been lost.

In 1944. Bring the war to a climax against both Germany and Japan, trying hard for a decisive knock-out. If Hitler is held in 1942, it is felt that, though the overthrow of Japan may be even more difficult than the defeat of Germany, it is no less certain.

The optimistic phase of these current calculations is entirely based on ability to keep Germany bottled up this year; and it is hardly profitable to speculate about the prospects, now that the spring campaigns in Russia and the Near East are at hand. Since Washington so clearly recognizes the need of helping Russia and reinforcing the Near East, it can be assumed that a good proportion of our war production is going to those two areas. It is unwise to write precisely about what is actually known to have been done. Figures, specific places and dates naturally cannot be mentioned. Yet it is as well known to the Axis spies as it is to well-informed citizens here that our South Atlantic ferry service has been extremely active, and it has been repeatedly published that small American garrisons, to protect the air highway, have been established virtually all the way to India and China. Here is a back-door to Russia as well as to the Middle East. As our production of freight-carrying and transport airplanes increases, the traffic over this route will be increased; and it is a highway not subject to submarine dangers. Only if the Axis struck in West Africa or on the bulge of Brazil, to obtain air bases, could the route be effectively menaced. Again it may be assumed that we are ready for such blows.

It is fully realized, however, that the decisive factor in saving Russia or the Middle East will not be American aid, but rather the Russians and the British themselves; and these two forces can be more capably discussed elsewhere than from the United States. But, as the war is viewed from this side, moderate optimism is felt justified. Even assuming the worst, and that Germany does break through into the Russian oilfields, or deep into the Middle East, it is taken for granted that the Nazi legions would have to pay a fearful price. Already, it is calculated, a million Germans have lost their lives on the Russian front, and a million more is felt to be a reasonable estimate of German casualties in 1942—succeed or fail. Thus, even if they had pierced through the Russian and British lines, the German strength would be severely weakened. Japan's losses, likewise, have been extremely heavy. Meantime, Britain and the United States have lost relatively few men. They would be coming into the fight of 1943 fresh. They would have the latest weapons, and the most of them. Thus it is concluded that Hitler might lose the war in 1942: that the Allies are unlikely to win it in 1942: and that it is unlikely that the Allies could lose it in 1942.

Of course, optimism is far from universal here, and even in its brightest rays is moderate and restrained; and a good many areas of pessimism are marked. The darkest, perhaps, is the naval outlook. The Allied nations, it is soberly realized, are now faced by the gravest sea threats of their history. Japan's successful blow at Pearl Harbor and the skilful use of her air forces since, with the chance of Germany using the Vichy navy, brought the Allies face to face with the possibility of losing what measure of control of the seas they still possessed. Japan's escape through the flood-gates of Singapore into the Bay of Bengal, followed by Vichy's swift turning toward collaboration, meant that Japan might dominate the approaches to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. France's large units in the Mediterranean, Germany's in the Atlantic, add to the shadows of the picture. Linked

with all this are our problem of supply lines and the submarine sinkings off the Atlantic coast. The latter, in their deliberate purpose of drawing the American Navy from more urgent needs elsewhere, have plainly failed, but they have taken a severe toll of tankers, small merchant ships and seamen. Morale, even including that of the merchant sailors, has sustained the losses with admirable fortitude. But the toll in tonnage is no light loss, while war industries, not to mention private citizens, are threatened with fuel oil shortages. Presumably these off-shore losses will be cut down by continuation of our air patrols and by the placing in service of a sizable number of small patrol craft. The Navy has found 173-foot patrol boats to be extremely effective, and they can be built swiftly. Moreover, the tankers and merchant vessels have now better instructions as to movement, and are more effectively armed with anti-submarine and anti-aircraft guns. The trouble will be solved just as soon as the question of unity of command is mastered.

The whole grievous democratic problem of organizing war-time command is the second big dark spot in our war effort to date. There is no great value in washing this particular batch of dirty linen in public by specific illustration, and yet it is perfectly obvious to all American students of affairs that the greatest need here to-day is for modernization, simplification and unification in the Army and Navy commands. Both in Washington and in the crucial coastal areas there is still confusion, complexity, duplication—all the sins of bureaucracy and the tangles of red tape. Some of the worst traits, as well as some of the best, of the Army and Navy services come to the surface at the start of war, and have to be ironed out under fire. The ironing-out process has apparently begun here, but there is a great deal still to be accomplished. This writer, and any other alert observer either in Washington or at a major coastal center, could pile up instances of duplication and confusion which would amply document the point. It is to be hoped that the brass-hats, the bureaucrats and the pompous newcomers and ignoramuses who now have more authority than ever before in their lives will speedily be put under control by the sensible and able men who are scattered liberally through the services. But the problem of simplification and unification exists all the way up and down the ranks, and it is perhaps the hardest of all for a democracy to solve. One hopeful note was the theoretical unification of command against invasion, as between Army and Navy on the two coasts. There is reason to believe that the orders to unify this protective work were but a beginning, and it is certain that they have not yet been adequately implemented. But they constituted great progress. Unless democracy can master this problem of organization in its armed forces, its survival will be doubly difficult. Some of the reverses we have encountered here and there may be a good stimulus for better organization, but Pearl Harbor seems not to have accomplished the whole job. Nothing wears down so slowly as the preconceived notions of bureaucrats or brass-hats. That is the crux.

Closely joined, in this organizational tangle, is the question of an over-all Allied plan of campaign. The evidence is that unification of planning at the very top still has a long way to go. The dilemma of allocation of forces

between the world-wide theaters of action is obviously one of burning acuteness. Plenty of internal evidence shows that one over-all plan has not been drafted, but that expediency and defensiveness are still forced upon the inter-Allied war councils. Since we face a single, ruthlessly and recklessly pressed plan of campaign, developed and rehearsed for decades—and that is the case in Japan's operations—the lack of unification and agreed planning becomes desperate. Yet here, again, the Allies must extemporize and count on the advantages of resources and basic strength to pull them through, coupled to their own skill and bravery in tackling the separate operations which they undertake. It should be said that, as observed from America, a good many enterprising and effective single tasks are being carried out. Even our war effort, which only became official after December 7, has achieved some results which are more than might have been hoped. Illustrations are the string of garrisons stretching outwards, the small but heroic American Volunteer Service of fliers in China, the effectiveness of long-range bombers in the South Pacific, the naval raids against Japanese outposts. But these single deeds need greater integration in order to assume broad strategical significance. When the leadership of our armed forces really begins to take to heart its war-time lessons and forgets its departmentalized rivalries, traditions and fetishes, when the over-all planning concepts approach the scale of Japanese and Axis plans, then the tide of war may be said to have turned. Nowhere are these grave needs more obvious than in the United States. The fact that they are obvious so soon after our entry into the war may itself be encouraging, providing it spurs action.

One more grave American problem may be mentioned before passing to our outstanding aspects of strength. It is the question of the Fifth Column, or sedition and treason within the United States and in the western hemisphere. There can be no doubt that the enemies within our gates are numerous and dangerous. They include not only spies and saboteurs in familiar guises, but a whole brood of fanatics, crack-pots and racial haters who have been our burden from two decades of economic and social dislocation. This lunatic fringe, which has grown in the United States during these many years of uncertainty, emotionalism, experiment and jitters, has been particularly vulnerable to Axis propaganda. Until the other day, nearly a hundred publications were preaching the pro-German and pro-Japanese line in the United States without let or hindrance. Men arose in public meeting to declare that it would be better if Germany or Japan won. Magazines, newspapers and fly-sheets spread the Goebbels doctrine day in and day out. The same subversive poison was being poured into soldiers at camp by agitators from the outside. It all came from a sort of fetid underworld, not perhaps very extensive in scope, not affecting the thought or action of the great majority of Americans—who are sane—but nevertheless a disgusting and dangerous cesspool area.

Such almost inconceivable phenomena were tolerated because the United States, and particularly its liberal and humane Attorney-General Biddle, remembered the indefensible violence that was done to civil liberties in the United States during and just after the last war. But finally the noisome

activities were too much even for the liberal stomach, and one by one the worst agitators were arrested and silenced. Just how deeply these activities have penetrated, and how dangerous they may be, remains to be seen. There is little evidence to date of positive sabotage; but it is too early to know. If the Japanese or Germans were ever in position to strike a real blow at continental United States, the Fifth Column would be mobilized and called into action. Since that day seems still to be somewhat remote, there is hope that these seditionists will be in hand in time, and that the gullible Americans who were under their foul spell will have largely come to their senses. Mostly, these activities rotated around anti-Jewish propaganda. Economic panaceas were grafted as camouflage over the real doctrines of hate and sedition, and served to delude the miserable victims; or there was an overlay of philosophical pacificism, or some kind of mystical symbolism which seems to gull certain types of Americans. Anyway, due largely to the hammering of several important newspapers, the obstructionists and defeatists have been brought out into the open. Some of their direct connections with the Axis have been exposed. Some guilty persons are in jail, and clean-up is under way. But the testing time is still ahead. It cannot be denied, whatever the outcome, that this lunatic fringe has constituted a potential menace of no minor proportions, that it is a characteristic result of post-1918 society, and that if such phenomena cannot be expunged under the blows of a Dunkirk or a *Blitz*, they must be rooted out by considerably more difficult means.

And now to some positive factors. Despite all the difficulties, American production is still a major world force and is bound to make its influence felt increasingly, just so long as the Allies can hold their lines. The motor-car industry converted itself into munitions with miraculous effectiveness. Barriers have now been broken; the flow of weapons is already most substantial and will shortly be immense. The central problem will be shipping, but even so the production outlook is far better than it looked a few months ago. As already published in American newspapers and periodicals—although exact figures cannot be stated—the situation now may be summarized in these terms:

Aircraft. Output well above 3,000 a month, and headed steadily toward the 1943 goal of 10,000 a month. The rate of bombers is increasing. The major difficulty is a shortage in some key parts, but on the whole the picture is very good.

Tanks. More impressive still. At the current rate, United States industry could fill all American army requirements in two months. That leaves a substantial margin for Britain and Russia—or a total limited only by the quantity that can be transported.

Guns. At last, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine gun bottle-necks have been broken, and ordnance is on a mass-production basis. It is mounting rapidly.

Ammunition. Also a broken bottle-neck. Supplies are rapidly increasing, and no longer give special cause for worry.

These key figures could be matched by production all down the line. There probably could never be enough merchant shipping, no matter how

much we built, but our warship building continues in many instances to be months ahead of schedule. New programs are constantly being approved, such as the plan for 100 new submarines which was brought up only in April, and speedily passed by Congress. Better still, American weapons seem to be proving themselves most emphatically in action, and on a basis of standardized mass-production plans. All along the line, where tested in battle, these arms are showing their mettle. American airplanes are producing as glowing reports as the best British designs, whether in the hands of American or British crews. The Garand semi-automatic rifle, the Winchester light carbine, the machine-guns, all add up to a fire-power in the hands of American infantry which is believed to be well ahead of the Japanese and equal to the best German units. Our artillery on Bataan peninsula and at Corregidor was most effective; but it does not compare with the new mobile artillery which is in production, including some of the most powerful field-pieces in the world. Anti-tank guns, aircraft guns and anti-aircraft guns are all now in mass production on the best designs, including Bofors.

In sum, the tables of equipment are turning—and, of course, Americans know that Britain's production is still as great as their own, although the power of our massed industry may soon be counted upon to take a lead which will not be distressing to the other partner at all. America's mobilized industry is changing the war's outlook and future course. The Axis is fast losing its formerly enormous advantage of accumulated weapons. All depends, of course, on the strength of Hitler's spring offensive and on the naval situation in the Atlantic, through the Mediterranean, into the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. If the offensive does not achieve complete break-through, if the Allies do not lose their endangered command of the sea, then the future seems clear enough. Once more, therefore, we face crucial days.

For America, it is doubly plain that our first and greatest problem is within ourselves. Pearl Harbor might have been turned into a disastrous defeat for the Japanese if the American forces had been adequately vigilant and active, just as air protection would have prevented some of Britain's severe naval losses. Likewise, our great loss of aircraft in the Philippines on December 8, which has just been revealed, was preventable. The "enemy from within"—not especially the Fifth Column, but the enemies who consist of disorganization, over-confidence, lethargy and sheer stupidity—were then the most grievous foes. If we have conquered this particular weakness, and act as vigorously on a universal basis and in the proper moments as we have acted on certain isolated and glorious occasions, then the war is won. But this ultimate effectiveness has still to be proved. When our internal weaknesses are conquered, democracy will have shown that it can triumph in the "Survival War".

United States of America,
April 1942.

IRELAND TO-DAY

THE significance to the Allied cause of the arrival in Northern Ireland of considerable numbers of American troops is so evident, and the promise of immediate assistance in the European war against the Axis so encouraging to Britain, that the effect of this landing on the policy of Eire may seem to be of merely academic interest. A protest against the presence of these forces in Northern Ireland was made by Mr. De Valera on January 27.

"The people of Ireland," he said, "have no feeling of hostility towards, and no desire to be brought in any way into conflict with, the United States . . . but it is our duty to make it clearly understood that, no matter what troops occupy the six counties, the Irish people's claim for the union of the whole of the national territory, and for supreme jurisdiction over it, will remain unabated. Four years ago the British Government and Parliament recognized fully the sovereignty of the Irish nation over that part of the national territory included in the twenty-six counties, and the bond has been honourably kept in that regard. But the maintenance of the partition of Ireland is as indefensible as aggressions against small nations elsewhere, which it is the avowed purpose of Britain and the United States in this war to bring to an end."

Mr. De Valera's refusal to accept the partition of Ireland as a tolerable permanent condition is so fundamental to his policy and has been expressed so often and so clearly as to need no comment. But this statement was a repeated indication that the entry of America into the war in Europe involved no change in Eire's attitude of neutrality. A fortnight before the landing of the Americans, in a speech at Navan on January 12, Mr. De Valera had reiterated the determination of his Government.

"What we are doing is our God-given right to do. We have laid down our policy clearly from the beginning, and that is that we intend not to enter into this war if we can possibly avoid it, and we will avoid it, please God, unless we are attacked. If we are attacked we have to take it as God's will and sell our lives as dearly as we can."

In the same speech he denied that any bargains had been made about the use of bases in Ireland.

"There are rumours being spread about bargains. There are no bargains. When this war started I said that there was no inch of our national territory for sale. Our policy has been this—that we will defend ourselves against attack from any quarter. . . . We did and are doing our best to try to get arms. . . . These arms are to be used to defend our territory against any aggressor, no matter who the aggressor may be. That is the open policy. There is no secret one."

Although Eire in general is sensitive to American opinion, and has not forgotten the great help that the country as a whole and Mr. De Valera's party in particular received in the past from the United States, there is to be no departure from the policy of strict neutrality. With the spreading of the war the use of the bases in Eire would perhaps be of greater value than before

to the Allies, but there seems to be no chance of their being placed at the disposal even of the Americans. Invasion by Axis forces is considered as most unlikely; but there is a feeling amongst some people that the American forces may be used to intervene in Eire in place of the British, to whom opposition would be more bitter.

In refusing to abandon neutrality Mr. De Valera has the almost complete support of the country, even of most who are personally sympathetic to the Allied cause. His own party is unanimous, and only one member, Mr. Dillon, of the main Opposition party has broken away. As far back as July 17, 1941, in a speech in the Dail Mr. Dillon pleaded for participation in the war, admitting the suffering and dangers which that might entail. His views were then disavowed by his leader, Mr. Cosgrave, but Mr. Dillon remained a member of the party and its deputy leader. On February 10 this year at the annual conference of the Fine Gael party he repeated his plea.

"The United States has been treacherously attacked by Germany, Italy and Japan. I would to God those nations were the enemies of a united Irish people. . . . The survival of the Irish nation depends on the maintenance of the Irish-American alliance. . . . If in some awful hour our people commit the supreme folly of accepting in exchange for the traditional Irish-American alliance any form of co-operation from the Nazi-Fascist Powers it will end in this country being turned into a German Gibraltar."

The party dissociated itself from these views, and on February 19 Mr. Dillon resigned from it. The "supreme folly" to which Mr. Dillon alludes is a very unlikely eventuality, and though some of the Independent members of the Dail support his plea for participation in the war on the Allied side, their numbers are small and they have no press support.

In Northern Ireland Mr. De Valera's protest was echoed by some of the Nationalist leaders, who argued as he did that, Ireland being essentially one country, the majority of whose people are in favour of neutrality, the presence of non-Irish troops is an act of aggression. Mr. Andrews, Premier of Northern Ireland, in reply reaffirmed the insistence of Northern Ireland on separation from Eire, whilst reminding her of the reality of her danger.

"We in Northern Ireland take our stand on the constitutional position as it exists, and from this we will not deviate. The presence of American troops in Northern Ireland is part of a vast strategic plan for the defeat of the Axis Powers. . . . Eire is no less in danger of invasion by Germany than is Great Britain or Northern Ireland. If such an attack were made the people of Eire would be glad of any help they could secure, whether British or American."

Discussion of partition is perennial, but a more novel constitutional question was raised in March by a decision in the Court of King's Bench on the liability of Irishmen in England to national service. The Court dismissed appeals raising the question whether men born before the establishment of the Irish Free State in what is now Eire were liable to military service. The Lord Chief Justice held that the Free State was undoubtedly given the position of a Dominion in the British Commonwealth, but that legislation promulgating this in no way affected the status as British subjects of persons who up to that time had been of British nationality. The fact that by the

Statute of Westminster the Free State Legislature gained the power to pass laws whether or not repugnant to an Imperial Act did not of itself imply separation from the British Commonwealth. He held, furthermore, that Eire had not declared that the so-called right to secede had been exercised, and, even had Eire done so, it might be doubted whether such secession would be valid unless other members of the British Commonwealth had recognized Eire as a foreign state, and its inhabitants, with others born in Eire but not residing there though intending to return, as aliens in the other Dominions of the Crown.

This decision aroused much interest and some condemnation in Eire; but it is difficult to see the legal grounds for questioning the verdict. Certainly Britain has never recognized the severance of Eire from the Commonwealth, and it is not easy to decide whether Eire has declared her secession, or, if so, when. In criticizing the decision Mr. De Valera invoked the Nationality and Citizenship Act passed by his Government in 1935, when Southern Ireland was still the Free State and, as such, still expressly claimed membership of the Commonwealth. The Crown is admittedly not mentioned in the Constitution of Eire adopted by plebiscite in 1937; but although the Crown has no part in legislation for Eire, and in fact has had none since the abdication of King Edward VIII, it is recognized in a subsidiary Act as Eire's instrument for action in external affairs, subject to the advice of Irish Ministers and so long as Eire shall be associated with the British Commonwealth. "External association" with the British Commonwealth is Mr. De Valera's own consistent definition of the rôle of Eire; but it is difficult to prove that Eire has on some specific date separated herself from the Commonwealth. One sympathizes with a fairly widespread view that, if men who are Irish by birth live in England and have there enjoyed the benefits of English citizenship, it is their simple duty to accept its obligations.

The illegal activities of the Irish Republican Army have continued sporadically. Since the Devereux trial in December, notable because of a special order under the Emergency Powers Act to allow depositions made to the police to be submitted as evidence when the witness refused to give testimony in open court, there have been heavy punishments for shooting at members of the police force and for possession of illegal wireless transmitting apparatus. Allegations that the I.R.A. are in co-operation with German agents have been repeated, most importantly by Mr. Dillon; but there has been no clear case of this since the arrest of the German parachutist, Hermann Goertz, who landed in Eire in June last and was for some months at large and in contact with extremists.

In accordance with the report of the Banking and Currency Commission of 1938 a Bill was introduced into the Dail in March for establishing a Central Bank to take over the functions previously exercised by the Currency Commission. The main differences between the new Bank and the body which it will replace are that, whilst the latter was constitutionally an independent body, the Bank will be controlled by a board nominated by the Government, and the Minister of Finance will hold all its capital; and, unlike the Commission, it will not be debarred from membership of such organizations as

the Bank for International Settlements. This second point may not be of immediate importance in the present state of world affairs, but the increase of governmental control is in harmony with the general policy of Eire under Mr. De Valera.

In overseas trade the year 1940 showed an adverse balance. Total exports, including income from investments abroad, remittances from emigrants and pensions paid by the British Government to residents in Eire, came to £51,723,000, and total imports to £54,597,000. It was expected that the figures for 1941 would disclose a substantial improvement in exports, sufficient to convert this to a favourable trade balance, though there will probably have been a fall in remittances from emigrants; those from countries other than the United Kingdom (mainly, that is, from the U.S.A.) had fallen by a million pounds, or practically 40 per cent, in the years 1938 to 1940, and the entry of America into the war will accentuate this decline in the future. The export trade in general seems to be in a fairly healthy position. The estimated figures for February 1942 show exports at £2,717,000, as against £1,692,000 for February 1941. The bulk of this commerce is with Great Britain, and the very substantial rise is mainly due to the resumption of the cattle trade, which last year suffered severely owing to interruptions caused by the widespread outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease. Imports, also mostly from Great Britain, are estimated at £2,411,000, as against £2,369,000 in 1941. There is small likelihood of Eire's imports rising very much, as the commodities most needed from abroad—coal, oil and grain—are likely to become increasingly difficult to procure. This apparent prosperity of Eire, reckoned in monetary terms, is of importance in that it may enable the country to come through the war without inflation to any ruinous extent, and it enables the Government to borrow on fairly easy terms, as was shown when the last Defence Loan of £8,000,000 at 3½ per cent was fully subscribed in four days.

These trade figures, reflecting Eire's continued or rising exports in a time when her imports are drastically limited, are illusory if they suggest actual widespread prosperity or material welfare. The shortage of consumer commodities is serious, and is becoming worse. Most alarming of all is the wheat situation. To maintain the wheat loaf without admixture, 370,000 tons were needed annually, but in January Mr. Lemass, Minister of Supplies, explained that only 190,000 tons had been delivered by the farmers, though last season's probable yield had been estimated at 290,000 tons; 40,000 tons had been imported, and a further 60,000 were expected. Even if this amount was delivered, a deficiency of 80,000 tons remained. The flour now in use is a 100 per cent extraction, and appeals for economy in the use of bread have been made. A scheme for rationing is prepared, but even this might only solve the problem until June unless 80,000 tons can be imported. It is impossible to exaggerate the crucial character of such a shortage, as bread is in Ireland a particularly important article of diet of the working classes, especially of the town artisan class. There is equal stringency in the supply of fuel. Peat can be had in limited quantities, and its distribution has been very well organized, but for household use coal is unprocurable. In the

cities, gas is of poor quality and is only turned on for certain hours each day. In the country, lighting and cooking are rendered equally difficult by the shortage of paraffin, widely used in normal times. The lack of fuel is having effects on a scale wider than domestic inconvenience. Public lighting is cut down, and advertising light-signs have been abolished. The train service, through scarcity and poor quality of coal, has been reduced to the very minimum, and travel is inconveniently slow. Road transport has suffered equally from scarcity of motor fuel, and with America's entry into the war this will become even graver. Private cars are being taken off the roads to help to conserve the meagre supplies of oils and rubber. Even essential industries may suffer from the shortage of fuel, transport and raw materials. It is in fact doubtful to what extent it may be possible to maintain some of the social services and industries of the country. Admittedly this is in part the price which Eire is having to pay for her policy of neutrality, though not wholly; and it must be understood that this stringency, even if gravely aggravated, will not be likely to cause any great wavering in that policy.

The Northern Ireland budget will be introduced shortly, and the estimated figures of revenue and expenditure for the year 1941–42 were published on April 2. These provisional figures indicate a total expenditure of £16,221,000, and a total revenue of £16,263,000. It is estimated that this year Northern Ireland will make a contribution to the Imperial Exchequer in the region of £11,750,000. In addition, Northern Ireland now advances to Britain the entire proceeds of the sale of Ulster Savings Certificates; formerly only 75 per cent of this borrowing was loaned to the British Exchequer, but the proportion was raised to 90 per cent and then to 100 per cent. From this source it is calculated that a sum of £3,060,000 will have been advanced during the past year. Estimates of the revenue for the coming year will, of course, be given in the Finance Minister's budget statement. In view of the increases in taxation imposed by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, it is clear that Northern Ireland will be able to contribute even more to British finances in the year 1942–43.

The Unemployment Suspense Debt came under discussion when on March 11 measures for speedily paying it off were introduced. "The 1926 agreement with the British Government required that the debts of the Northern Ireland and the British Funds should start from parity," it was explained, "and, as there was an excess debt of some £3,400,000 on the Northern Ireland Fund, this was placed to Suspense. . . . Repayments to date have brought this down to a figure of £2,120,000." Certain substantial sums had accrued to the Northern Ireland Exchequer from repayments by shipping firms of guaranteed loans, and these windfalls were to be used for the accelerated reduction of the Suspense Debt, which was previously to have been paid off gradually by 1995.

There has been Opposition criticism of the Northern Ireland Government for the existence of unemployment in the province at a time when all-out effort in the industrial field should be being made. Speeches by members of the Government, notably by the Prime Minister and by Sir Basil Brooke, Minister of Commerce, have explained the causes of a state

of affairs which all regret. On March 21 there were, said Sir Basil, 28,000 unemployed registered; of these there were none who were skilled men, and over 15,000 were women. In fact, many skilled workers from Eire have found employment in Northern Ireland. Of the women, most were out of work owing to the situation in the linen industry, much of whose supply of flax was lost with the German control of the Continent. The linen trade is working almost entirely for national purposes, but orders for war purposes are not as yet able to absorb the whole potential output. An intense effort is being made to encourage farmers in both Great Britain and Northern Ireland to grow more flax this year, and it is hoped that the demand for linen products will increase so as to absorb more of the unemployed. In the meantime many have been transferred from Northern Ireland to jobs in Great Britain, a proceeding which has been criticized as involving hardship. The Government admits the hardship, but points out that it is no greater than that suffered by many workers who have been moved from one part of Great Britain to another. It has been repeated that the Government would prefer to see work brought to Northern Ireland rather than be obliged to transfer the workers. In the textile trades much has been done to secure orders for goods other than linen. But in other trades the absence of skilled workers to provide the nucleus for new production is a difficulty, and the moving of unskilled or semi-skilled men to Britain has been the most practicable course. Finally it is pointed out that the Government's policy is not aimed at the simple abolition of unemployment, but at the direction of available workers into industries engaged in work of national importance.

The special functions of the Minister of Commerce in assisting Ulster to fulfil her part in the war effort were described by Sir Basil Brooke in the House of Commons on February 4. Speaking of the period before his appointment to this Ministry, he said:

"An Area Board had been set up by the previous Ministry of Supply. The Area Board consisted of officers of the various Supply Ministries and representatives of the employers and representatives of the men. They had no executive functions in this country whatsoever. They could not order any man to do any work. . . . It took me some three months to persuade the Ministries on the other side that the only satisfactory way was to transfer responsibility for production to this Government. Finally it was decided and, as the House knows, I became agent for the three Supply Ministries—the Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Ministry of Supply. . . . I reconstituted the Area Board with a larger representation of labour. . . . We have appointed in two firms production committees, whereby the management and employees can get together, and get rid of those small irritating troubles which might, if they were not cured, have led to a strike."

The Minister then went on to explain how the new machinery was able to correlate the war effort, to obviate bottle-necks in production and to regulate the flow of labour and materials within the province, so as to make possible the maximum effort which public opinion demands.

There is little to record of purely political or constitutional importance during recent months. There have, it is true, been a number of instances of

I.R.A. terrorist policy, particularly around Easter, when acts of violence are usually expected in commemoration of the 1916 rebellion. But there is no reason to presume that there has been any increase in the importance of the I.R.A., large numbers of whose members are at present under detention. Seven of them are awaiting trial for the murder in Belfast of a policeman, who incidentally had shown courage of an admirable quality. Public opinion has been especially shocked to note that the ages of the accused range from sixteen to twenty-two.

The proceedings of the Belfast City Council still give rise to some criticism. A special committee of six of its members last autumn made certain proposals for reforms, which were adopted in October; on April 3, four of the main recommendations then accepted were rescinded by 18 votes to 14, with a fairly considerable number of absences or abstentions. The result of this action by the Council has been to revive the feeling among its critics that it is unwilling to put its house in order by any quick resolute change, and that it is doubtful whether it will be able to achieve the desired change on slower and more traditional lines. At the April meeting the minority declared that the action taken would be likely to provoke direct intervention by the Ministry of Home Affairs. This forecast has since been fulfilled, and the Council has been given a limited time in which to adopt the original resolutions again or else new ones of intended similar effect. The question remains at the moment still unsettled, but its solution is of importance, as so much of the population and of the wealth of the province is concentrated in the city of Belfast.

Northern Ireland,
May 1942.

GREAT BRITAIN

I. Restive Determination

IN the general estimation of the public and of Parliament Mr. Churchill retains his place as unquestionably the one great national leader in sight. The broadcast which he delivered at the end of two years of office was acclaimed as the most masterly of his career. Although critics—serious-minded critics, many of them—are by no means silent, it brought home to all of us the extraordinary change in the fortunes and the strength of this country which has taken place under his guidance since the fall of France; and after many bleak months of war it told us decisively of our Prime Minister's conviction at last that ultimate and complete victory was coming within our reach, unless we failed in resolution or in unity before we grasped it.

There is no sign of popular over-confidence or of slackening. It is true that the war, in the sense of immediate personal danger, has receded from the nation at large, though not from the targets chosen by frequent small forces of enemy bombers—Exeter, Bath, Norwich, York and many coastal towns. London has not been raided for nearly 12 months, and the imminent threat of German invasion, under which we lived for so long that its constant possibility became a part of our normal thinking, has obviously lifted for such time as Hitler's main forces continue to be desperately engaged in Russia. Perhaps we are slow to realize our new-found if temporary security. At any rate, we are taking no chances, and an invasion attempt or a reversion to heavy bombing later in the year will not find us forgetful or unprepared. But the real source of our vigour of mind and body in these days is not the lessening of danger nor indeed the return of summer, valuable as summer can be in dissipating the petty vexations of life under strain of war. The key to our altered feelings is that we are passing from the imposed defensive to the self-chosen offensive, and we know it. Total current output of aircraft in Britain, the United States and Russia is already far outrunning that of Germany, Italy and Japan, and the disparity is increasing. From now until the end of the war we have the power to make the nightly experiences of the *Herrenvolk* grimmer and grimmer. But there is something more. On May 20 the Lord Privy Seal referred openly in Parliament to "such time as we are able to make a carefully planned attack upon the Continent of Europe, *which we intend to do*".

It is part of Mr. Churchill's skill in leadership that he impels us with cogent reasons for optimism to look forward, and yet does not hide from us the enormity of past disasters and present perils by sea or land. From the naval losses in December to the withdrawal from Burma in May we suffered a succession of tragic blows; small wonder that doubts were expressed in and out of Parliament, not whether the war was worth while (German and Japanese barbarities have solidified opinion for ever on that), but whether

the framers of policy were worthy of the tasks they faced. The Prime Minister's relative lack of interest in affairs on the home front, as compared with his passion for military detail, allowed this restless state of mind to become for a time unhealthily common, until his broadcast steadied it. The extraordinary tenacity of Russian resistance has sown among numbers of people, who forget the equal tenacity with which Britain fought at Dunkirk or in the Battles of Britain and of London when she stood alone, the seed of an idea that Russia possesses some secret of patriotism which our political system partly denies to us. The Communist party of Great Britain, with which our Labour party from hard-earned experience refuses even now to have any dealings, waters this seed assiduously, and the overwhelming admiration throughout the country for Russia's magnificent fight is surreptitiously exploited by those who would like to persuade our generous-hearted civilian population that Britain has everything to learn from Russia, Russia nothing from Britain. Lord Beaverbrook, claiming a remarkable freedom of utterance for one who was at the time on a Government mission to America, made a speech asserting that "Communism has produced the best generals in this war" and urging the Allies to "strike out to help Russia —strike out violently—strike even recklessly". Apart from the newspapers under his control, however, the press in general has given small encouragement to those who, in fine disregard of shipping considerations, clamorously belabour the Government for refusing to "strike now in the west". We owe a debt to Sir Stafford Cripps, whom none can accuse of belittling Russia's past, present and future contributions to world history, for having reminded an Anglo-Soviet youth gathering the other day that in the matter of ultimate ideals "the path to our goal is conditioned by our own environment and not by that of any other country".

Thus Britain just now presents a typical mixture of universal insistence on war to victory and of restiveness in the pursuit of it. The last issue of The Round Table described how, four months ago, this was venting itself in pressure on Mr. Churchill to make changes in his Government, until in February he carried out a double set of new appointments. That was followed by a period of virtual unanimity in Parliament, except among a few professional malcontents, that the best Parliamentary contribution to helping the war would be to give the new Ministers two or three months to get to know their departments and settle down to the job. These months are up. With hardly an exception, the new Ministers seem to be doing well. The popular search for new stables to clean out has transferred itself for the time being to political party matters, and not only have we seen a recrudescence of Independent candidates at by-elections, but although most of them have suffered defeat three have lately been successful—in two cases by narrow majorities—in Conservative seats which had fallen vacant through the raising of the late member to the peerage. In so far as it will cause local party associations to exercise more careful thought in selecting their candidates, this outbreak of Independents is wholly salutary; and in that manner, from the party standpoint, it ought to bring its own corrective. The crop of Independents would, however, be more welcome if there was any sign of its

bringing into the House of Commons men of really high calibre who could not make their contribution through any party medium. Present indications are, rather, that those who offer themselves as Independents surpass normal party candidates more in the sensation of their appeal than in the soundness of their judgment. It can well be understood that the three Independent successes have put fresh strain on the party truce, for many with sympathies towards the Left want to know why, if Conservative seats can be captured in this way, authentic Labour candidates should be debarred by the truce from joining in and extending the discomfiture of their traditional peacetime opponents. Were this done, the very foundations of all-party unity in a National Government would of course be undermined, a fact upon which Labour Ministers have a firmer mental grip than many of their more excitable supporters. There are interested parties so keen to take quick advantage of the swing to the Left—which Russian feats have strengthened—that they are even canvassing the possibility of a general election before long. Therefore, whereas "calm generally, slight swell" might be the report on the Westminster sea these last three months, signs are visible again of squally political weather ahead.

The only new man brought into the Government since February is Mr. Casey, who from being Australian Minister in Washington was appointed by Mr. Churchill to succeed Mr. Lyttelton in Cairo as Minister of State with a seat in the British War Cabinet. The idea of inviting a Dominion personality to join in his own right a British Government, with the goodwill of his own people, is one which in principle would at any time appeal favourably and strongly to this country. Mr. Churchill had met Mr. Casey in America, and had liked and admired him. He believed he was paying Australia a compliment and binding the two peoples and the two Governments closer together by extending so unique an invitation. Unhappily there was misjudgment and misunderstanding. Mr. Churchill over-hastily suggested that Mr. Menzies would make a good substitute in Washington; Mr. Curtin disclosed to the world his Government's unwillingness to let Mr. Casey go. We here know that Mr. Churchill is not a man who cares for opposition, and it was widely regretted that a proposal which promised to be of happy augury threatened to lead to a rift. Whether Mr. Casey was the strongest available candidate to be found for this post in the whole Empire we cannot tell, but we sympathize equally with him, with Mr. Curtin and with Mr. Churchill in an affair whose historical outcome will, let us hope, be sunnier than its clouded opening.

Misrepresentation overseas of the state of opinion in this country caused us grave concern earlier in the year, as the facts came to be known. Had there been any true foundation for a pernicious type of message which was then being flashed abroad, purporting to describe our alleged state of soft living, slack working and indifference to the fate of the Empire, Parliament would certainly not have accepted with so little demur the Government's decision to apply censorship to outgoing press messages in respect of the dissemination of false impressions to our friends, not only the conveyance of secrets to the enemy. Distance perennially obstructs a full understanding in this country of the states of mind in every other country under the British Crown. We have, during the past three months, advanced farther than ever before towards a genuine popular appreciation of the differences between Indians and ourselves. We are not prepared to tolerate any influences, on either side, which seek deliberately to mislead one part of the Empire about another. For ourselves, we are not boasters about Britain's doings, but if challenged we can quote plain Mr. Bevin in the House on May 21: "No country in the history of the world has mobilised its man power to such a point as we have had to do in this war."

II. Austerity, Finance and Production

An article in the last issue of The Round Table* suggested that for further relief of the man power stringency we must look mainly to a tightening of our civilian belts, by such means as cutting down yet more our tobacco, our petrol and our clothing ration. One after another, these measures have been adopted. From June 1 the clothing ration is being cut by one-quarter; a form of utility cloth and standard suit is coming on the market, and frills which waste material—such as pleats in officers' uniforms or permanent turn-ups on civilian trousers—may no longer be made. Hats are the only personal wear still free of coupon. The basic petrol ration, a very small monthly gallonage hitherto allowed to every car-owner without inquiry into his use of it, is to stop on June 30, after which date no car will be permitted on the road except for essential purposes. Rail travel is being successfully discouraged by popular appeal, by a restricted passenger train service, and by many a tale of the tedious and overcrowded journeys which may be the lot of those who travel for pleasure. At Easter and Whitsun the Government's wishes in this matter were respected to an extent altogether different from last year. Dog-racing has been forbidden except on Saturday afternoons and republic holidays, lest it should interfere with work, and horse-racing is restricted for the remainder of the war to a few courses accessible from towns without long journeys. White bread has disappeared from our table; the now universal "National Bread" is decidedly lighter and more palatable than that of the last war. From July onwards chocolate and sweets are to be rationed, with a preference in favour of children. Without forbidding public luncheons and dinners, the Government has effectively stopped them by letting it be known that they are contrary to the national interest. Restrictions are being placed on the cost (and tightened up on the composition) of meals in hotels and restaurants, not because the consumption of food in those places is anything but negligible in relation to consumption elsewhere, but on the ground that expensive eating in public places is an offence to general morale.

So the austerity policy develops, with full popular approval. Though working long hours, the nation has never been physically healthier. Unfortunately, however, there has been no Lord Woolton to plan for our coal needs as skilfully as for our food. After the collapse of France and the loss of export markets in 1940 there was unemployment in the coalfields, and the Government too freely allowed miners to join the Services or to enter well-

* No. 126, March 1942, pp. 230–2.

paid munitions work. The rise in demand for coal for war production has now more than overtaken the available man power at the coal-face. For a year and more, Parliament warned the Government that this would happen. The Secretary for Mines, Mr. David Grenfell, a Labour ex-miner personally popular among all parties, realized it himself but failed to convince the Minister of Labour and the War Cabinet that really drastic measures to recall colliers to the pits were essential. Instead of resigning he stayed in office, and must therefore share with the Cabinet the blame for present difficulties. A critical debate in the Commons on March 17 persuaded the Government, which by then was combing industry for ex-miners, to release some 7,000 from the Services, but that is known to be only a fraction of the main body of ex-miners in the armed forces whom, so far, the Cabinet has refused to let go. Rather than weaken the Army further, it decided that 10 million tons a year must be cut off domestic consumption, and Mr. Dalton (Labour), the President of the Board of Trade, to whom Mr. Grenfell as a junior Minister is responsible, commissioned Sir William Beveridge to work out a comprehensive rationing scheme for coal, coke, paraffin, electricity and gas. The House of Commons, especially on the Conservative side, took strong objection to the complexities and cost of administration of the Beveridge scheme. In a second debate on May 7 it plainly told the Government to think again, dissatisfaction with production policy in the past influencing many members' minds as strongly as doubt about rationing procedure for the future. In practically no quarter was there any dispute that restriction of some kind had to come. The Government hesitated, and eventually withdrew to re-examine the problem and to bring forward after Whitsun a plan which would cover both production and consumption. With the longing of the Labour party to see the mines nationalized, and the conviction among Conservatives that nationalization would lead to a further decline in productive efficiency, the ingredients for a political explosion are present. Thus has the price to be paid for weaknesses and faulty planning apparent 18 months ago and more, but never properly put right. It is perhaps to the credit of our democracy—which had to improvise for war—that such mistakes on the large scale and over a long period have been so few.

War finance, which might have given rise to much greater political disruption than coal policy, goes forward with singular smoothness, and in so far as Sir Kingsley Wood (Conservative), the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is responsible he receives less than his fair share of praise. Market prices of Government stocks continue to advance, and he can now borrow at a flat 3 per cent for as long a term as 28 years. His 1941 budget raised income-tax to 10*s.* in the pound and surtax to a point where a man must have a gross income of £66,000 if he is to enjoy a net income of £5,000. This year the Chancellor faced an estimated budget expenditure of £5,286 million—the immediate burden which this nation of 46 million people has to carry, and to which must be added for completeness the entire unstated value of Lease-Lend supplies receivable from the United States. The superb generosity of a gift from Canada reduces the net total by £225 million. Some £2,660 million is to be found by savings and various forms of "disinvestment".

The task in front of the Chancellor was to raise £2,400 million of revenue. He estimated income-tax and surtax on their existing basis to bring in practically £1,000 million, and excess profits tax another £425 million. These taxes he left almost unchanged, except for a concession on a married woman's earned income. This time he sharply raised all the duties on the luxuries which to many are almost necessities—tobacco, beer, wine, spirits and entertainments. The budget increases the price of tobacco by 10*s.* a lb., beer by 2*d.* a pint, whisky by 4*s.* 8*d.* a bottle, the 1*s.* 2*d.* cinema seat to 1*s.* 5*d.* In addition, the purchase tax on many categories of luxury and semi-luxury goods is doubled. After all adjustments, the changes are estimated to add £158 million net to the revenue in 1942–43, no small slice of the income left to us after four previous war-time budgets. Yet both this and its predecessor last year gained the almost unanimous approval of the country, and not one of the major increases of taxation was challenged in the House. The commonest criticism against the new budget was a regret that the Chancellor had not done more (he promised some administrative changes) towards simplifying income-tax and rendering more straightforward and comprehensible the system of weekly deductions from wages.

Production is high and still rising. Considering all that is involved, the calling-up of women for war work of all kinds goes forward with remarkably little friction. Women are to register up to 51, and not only single women but married women without children are now being interviewed, if they are not already engaged in essential occupation. All men of suitable age are being made liable to compulsory part-time duty in either the Home Guard or Civil Defence, and each service is to have training in the duties of the other. These plans are intended incidentally to permit the release of many thousands of full-time Civil Defence staffs to work in industry during periods of lull. But we are approaching the time when the real problem will be to make maximum use of the men, women, machines and materials which industry has on the spot. In a two-day debate at the end of March Mr. Lyttelton—after, as he said, 11 days of work and 10 days of influenza since taking up his duties as Minister of Production—completely won the confidence of the Commons by his serious and systematic analysis of the task before him, a welcomed contrast to window-dressing methods of which this country has grown rather tired. In a later statement on May 19 he accepted in general the recommendations of a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Citrine for strengthening the regional organization to play a greater part in raising production to the peak. If Mr. Lyttelton has not yet disclosed the qualities of a future Prime Minister, he has quickly established his prestige as a first-rate administrator. Over the same period another newcomer of whom the public expected the highest things, Sir Stafford Cripps, has hardly yet fulfilled the extreme hopes which many placed in him, though none allot to him anything but praise for his tireless personal efforts in India. We still count on Mr. Churchill as the one leader; and if we seem to indulge in the luxury of differences and petty fissures, that is democracy—they close instantly whenever the chance comes to get to grips with the King's enemies.

Great Britain, May 1942.

CANADA

Man Power and the Plebiscite

THE announcement in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, of a national selective service policy is the first definite approach by the Government towards the full mobilization of man power for the prosecution of the war. It is however no more than an approach, because while Mr. King was very lucid and definite in describing the aim in view—"as complete as possible a mobilization of the material resources and man power of the country in the direct furtherance of a total national effort"—the administrative machinery set up to achieve this aim is far from complete. The assumption in Government circles is that the crisis in man power is at least six months distant, in which case there would yet be time to create and put into operation the administrative machinery necessary to select men and women for the most essential war service.

The policy followed up to the present has been that of voluntary enlistment for the navy and air force, and for overseas service in the army. For home service in the army there has been conscription since early in the war. Under this system enlistments up to the end of 1941 were 27,000 in the navy, 295,000 in the army, and 100,000 in the air force, a total of 422,000. The number of workers in manufacturing industries has increased meanwhile from some 600,000 to more than 1,000,000, owing principally to the growth of munitions production. The new national selective service policy is the Government's answer to the country's demand for a war programme of attack, not merely of defence. As a first step in the implementing of the new policy the Government is asking the country to relieve it of the promise which it gave—as did the Conservative Opposition—prior to the election of two years ago and before the fall of France, that it would not introduce conscription for overseas service.*

Since the outbreak of war, two factors have combined to hinder a comprehensive consideration of an intelligent approach to the man power problem. Most important has been the disposition of people to think of this war in terms of 1914–18. In the last war Canada's chief contribution was the army. The Canadian navy was insignificant. Indeed, our Atlantic seaboard was defended by British and Australian squadrons up to 1917, when the United States navy took charge. The total personnel in the Canadian navy in 1918 was 5,400 officers and ratings. There was no air force. Many Canadian boys served in the R.F.C. or R.A.F., but not until the need of air patrols on the Atlantic coast became urgent did the Government attempt to organize a distinctive Canadian air arm. Again, the entry of the United States made it unnecessary to go on with the job. Equally important in the psychological sense is the fact that Canada had no war industry of her own. Canadian plants began to make shells in 1915 and the munitions output grew greatly until 1917 (it declined in 1918), but the Canadian Government at no time assumed any responsibility for munitions production. The orders came from Britain and were handled, at first, by a shell committee set up without Government sanction by Sir Sam Hughes, then Minister of National Defence. Later an Imperial Munitions Board was organized by representatives of the British Government. As the debates in the Canadian Parliament make plain, the employment of military man power by munitions plants was widely resented, and at no time was war industry accorded any place of importance in the disposal of man power.

* The plebiscite, which took place just after this article was dispatched from Canada, resulted in a nearly two-to-one vote for releasing the Government from its pledge.

The record of 1914–18, therefore, may explain why the public at large has continued largely to think of war in terms of the army. Whatever the cause, the fact is that there has been a much greater demand for a big army—for overseas conscription—than for the expansion of war industry. That point of view has been unfortunate for another reason. Many ardent big-army men have calculated what this country should do in the present war upon the basis of what was done in 1914–18. In 1914 the population was 7,500,000, and 619,000 Canadians passed through the Canadian Expeditionary Force. With a population in 1939 of 11,200,000, it is argued, we should have an army of 1,000,000.

As to this, it is relevant to keep in mind the changes which occurred in our population between the two wars. In 1914 we had come to the end of the greatest inflow of immigrants in our history. Between 1911 and 1914, for example, more than 1,000,000 people came to Canada, chiefly from the United Kingdom. The age groupings show that an exceptionally large proportion of our man power was excellent fighting material. Equally important, out of a population of 7,500,000 no less than 1,266,951 were British-born. Enlistments in Manitoba, for example, were higher than in the City of London. Mr. Lloyd George has put it on record that enlistments among the British-born in Canada were 35 per cent, the highest in the Empire. Certainly about half the Canadian army in 1914–18 was British-born. Figures given to Parliament in the conscription debates of 1917 revealed that out of 380,000 recruits only 125,000 were Canadian-born. The Quebec anti-conscriptionists argued that allowance must be made for the length of time spent on this continent. Thus, they said, the British-born had gone home to fight in greater proportion than the Canadian-born, and naturally, the French-Canadians, having been on this continent 300 years, had not felt the call as deeply.

In 1939, out of a population of 11,200,000, there were only 631,411 British-born, and these were almost all in the upper age brackets—too old to fight. There had been only a trickle of immigration from Britain between the two wars. In addition, the Canadian birth-rate has fallen sharply since the turn of the century and, apart from Quebec where large families are still not exceptional, the gain in population over 1914 is largely in the age group of 40 years old and higher. Comparisons on the basis of population are therefore obviously unsound. In 1914–18 relatively few French-Canadians served in the C.E.F., whether under the voluntary or the compulsory

system, whereas in the present war much better results have been obtained. No official figures have ever been given with respect to French Canada, in 1914–18 or in this war, but it is known that so far the French have provided five or six times as many recruits as in the last war. Recruiting in Quebec in 1914–18 was undoubtedly mishandled. This time few mistakes have been made.

In 1942, with a critical shortage in man power not far ahead, there is special reason for caution in appraising the position. Most of the unofficial, and no doubt the official, estimates of man power are based upon the national registration taken in August 1940. If the age group 18 to 45 is fixed upon and allowance made for enlistments in the armed services prior to the registration, Canada's total potential fighting man power can be placed at 1,800,000. From this, one-third should be deducted as being physically unfit for full active service, reducing the pool to 1,200,000. As has been stated, the total enlistment for army, navy, and air force up to the end of 1941 was 422,000. That is not all. There are 3,000 killed, missing or prisoners of war. Another 6,000 men have been conscripted for home defence and will serve for the duration. The air force strength must be an under-statement. For three months, the nominal figure for the air force has remained steady at 100,000, although it is well known that the air training plan is operating at capacity. The explanation is that this number does not include air force personnel sent to Britain. All told, more than 500,000 men are in the services, and the total pool of 1,200,000 is thus reduced to 700,000.

War industry in Canada on January 31 was employing 600,000 persons, of whom only 75,000 were women. How many of the 525,000 men are of military age and physically fit is not known, but undoubtedly a substantial part of our remaining 700,000 is in war industry. Incidentally, war industry now is employing about double the maximum number so engaged in 1914–18. The value of munitions production in the last war, in round figures, was $1,000 million. The out-turn in 1942 will be $2,500 million, and to-day's dollar is worth more than the inflated dollar of 1917 and 1918. Then there is agriculture which, equally with the shell plants and the gun and tank factories, is a war industry. Shipment of foodstuffs to Britain is regarded as on a par with munitions. The registration showed that there were 600,000 farmers, 250,000 farmers' sons and daughters and other unpaid workers, and 280,000 hired helpers. It is estimated that, by the end of 1941, 130,000 men had left the farm to enlist or take jobs in industry. How many men of military age remain on the land is unknown, but it must be large.

The demands of essential war activities for man power up to March 31, 1943, have been announced. The active service army will require 100,000 men, the air force 80,000, the navy 13,000, war industry 100,000 (not divided as between sexes), and the home defence army approximately 35,000. Assuming that half the additional war workers are men, the total drain on man power will be 278,000. Finally, in this assessment of our resources no real effort has yet been made to estimate the number of men required to maintain essential civilian services. All this is enough to prove that the

statistical position gives every reason to believe that Canada is nearing a crisis in man power. Moreover, the fragmentary character of the data now available bears evidence of the lack of preparation to meet such a crisis when it does come. True, our past experience warns against placing too much emphasis on statistics. Canada is a vast country and difficult to appraise. In the last war the man power crisis occurred in the spring of 1917, and the Government based the conscription policy upon a report by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics which showed that there was plenty of military man power to be had for the taking. The Government required 100,000 men, and the report claimed that there were 760,453 unmarried men in the country between 20 and 45 years of age. On that assumption the Government was generous with exemptions—farmers' sons would not be conscripted, and so on. But when the registration was completed it was found that the report had calamitously over-estimated the available man power. The exemptions had to be cancelled, and the disaffection which swept the English-speaking provinces, as distinct from Quebec, started farmers' political movements in both the national and the provincial fields.

The chances are that the man power situation is more critical than the foregoing figures indicate, and that the difficulties to be surmounted in carrying out the 1942–43 programme for industry and the armed services, while at the same time expanding agricultural production, will indeed be great. Hitherto, very little has been done to ease the situation. In the early months of the war industrial training was actually cut down. Then, in December 1940, a programme was adopted whereby in 1941 some 120,000 persons were given sufficient training to enter industry. Unfortunately very few women were trained. All the studies made in recent months agree on one point, namely, that the only remaining pool of unused man power is composed of women who, for the most part, have never worked in industry. Mr. King made this clear when he said in the House of Commons on March 24: "If we except women who, for domestic or social reasons, have not desired or sought employment, we are now well past the stage where there is any considerable reserve of employable persons. Women, therefore, constitute the most important available reserve of man power." Hitherto, no serious effort has been made to enlist women in the war effort.

All factors considered, it is difficult to be optimistic with respect to military man power. There is some slack to be taken up, but not as much as the big-army advocates believe. On the economic side, however, the prospect is more encouraging. There is no need of statistics to show that Canada is at present enjoying unprecedented prosperity. The war boom far surpasses 1929 conditions. It is quite true that the relatively small group with incomes of $2,000 and more has been hard hit by war taxation, but the great mass of the people, earning less than $2,000, has never had so much money to spend. Every index of prosperity now stands at an all-time "high", and most of the belt-tightening that has taken place has come not as a result of the demands of war industry but involuntarily; rubber is a case in point. It is true that there are 600,000 persons in war industry. It is equally true that there are thousands more people employed in non-war

industry than in 1939. On the industrial side, therefore, there is no question that great expansion is still possible in war production, provided that the Government diverts man power from civilian to war needs; but, as has been stated, no effort has yet been made to appraise essential civilian needs and to cut down accordingly. To a degree, however, that statement requires qualification. Canada's war effort on the industrial side is based to some extent on raw materials imported from the United States. Steel and coal are two important items. Canada has always relied upon the United States for about one-third of her steel requirements, and it may well be that since December 7 the surplus available for export to Canada has been shrinking. In other words, it is possible that the expansion of Canada's war industry will also be limited by factors other than man power.

The first positive step towards a selective service policy was taken on March 24. The policy comprises a dozen Orders-in-Council, and the purposes in view were explained in detail by the Prime Minister. Mr. King was explicit in stating that the object is to achieve by selective service the greatest possible war effort—in the armed forces, in industry and in agriculture. The means adopted to obtain this end, however, are less clear-cut. That is why much will depend upon the administrative machinery now being set up. All the Orders-in-Council are of interest, but only a few of them bear directly upon selective service. Farm labour, except for overseas enlistment, is prohibited from leaving the agricultural industry except by special permit. This should ease the problem of food production. It means, as well, that farm workers will be exempt from home defence military service, where conscription now applies. Up to the present, home defence conscription has extended to single men and childless widowers of 21 to 24 years of age. This will now be raised to 30 years of age, and the purpose is clearly to simplify the raising of two infantry divisions for coast defence and, in addition, to stimulate enlistment for overseas service. The experience is that young men prefer to enlist for active service rather than be conscripted for home defence.

Non-essential industry is forbidden to hire men of military age, 16 to 45 years of age, who are physically fit, and technical workers in non-essential industry who desire to do war work are now encouraged to do so. Their employers must release them, and must reinstate them when their war service is over. Industrial training is to be expanded, and a greater effort is to be made to enrol women in the classes. Free medical care is to be given to men who have failed to pass the medical examination for the armed services, but who can be brought up to service standard. An effort is to be made to relieve the shortage in management. Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, has said in recent weeks that the most serious bottle-neck is the lack of men with experience in management and in dealing with personnel. With the help of the universities, courses of training are being planned to make good this deficiency.

With respect to selective service, a National Board is to be set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour. This Board will comprise representatives of employers, labour, agriculture, women's organizations, and all Government departments that have to do with man power. Under this Board, and responsible for the administration, will be a Director of Selective Service. Throughout the country the employment offices of the Unemployment Insurance Commission will be the agents of the National Selective Service Board. A special representative of the Board will be placed in each of these offices, and there will also be local volunteer citizens' committees to help the work forward. An inventory of employable persons of 16 years and over will be taken, and every effort will be made to keep it up to date. There are 3,000,000 persons working for firms that are covered by unemployment insurance, and complete data on these people will be available at once. Nor should there be difficulty in keeping these records up to date, because employers, under the Insurance Act, are required to report all changes in staff from time to time.

It is early to pass judgment on the policy. One obvious point is that very little compulsion is involved and, where restrictions are applied, no means of enforcement are apparent. Mr. King met this criticism in advance by pointing out that the greater the degree of compulsion the harder it would be to enforce the policy. The restrictions placed on employers in non-essential industry would have been simpler to administer if these employers had been compelled to hire only through the employment offices; but this has not been done. Another point which has occasioned criticism is that the inventory, as now being taken, will include only those at work for insured employers. The unemployed and the women, who comprise the greatest remaining untapped pool, will not be reached in this way. Indeed, the policy as announced gives no hint how the women are to be brought into war service. Still another point of dissatisfaction is that the policy is designed to bring workers to industry, and in a country like Canada this may mean transferring people over long distances. Apart from the hardship thus caused, homes and services will be needed for these workers, and there was already a shortage of houses when war broke out. The advantages of bringing war industry to the workers are obvious, and with that in mind an inventory of machines is being proposed.

But, however late and inadequate the policy may seem, it has been generally welcomed. The National Selective Service Board is assured of enthusiastic public support and, if the experts are right and no crisis arises for six months, it will have time to find its feet. This is a case in which everything depends on the administration. If the Board desires more of compulsion, there is no reason to believe the Government will say nay. The one power, however, which most people deem essential to full mobilization—conscription for overseas service—is, pending the plebiscite, withheld. At the moment of writing, the future in this respect is obscure. If the country releases the Government from all restrictions on the raising of men for military service, the way should be clear.

Canada,
April 1942.

AUSTRALIA

I. Adjustment to Danger

IN the past six months, what happened to Britain in 1940 between the invasion of Norway and the evacuation from Dunkirk has happened to Australia also. By a series of swift and unexpected successes the enemy has overrun almost the entire intervening belt of neutrals and Allies. Until Japan entered the war, our rôle, albeit on a small scale, had been in essentials rather like that of Britain before the fall of the West—an island belligerent but itself inviolate, assisting the common cause by expeditionary forces abroad on land and in the air, by the export of munitions, and by help in keeping the sea lanes open. Now the enemy subjects our own coasts to attack by air, and threatens us with a general invasion.

Of course, the greater distances in the South-Western Pacific do from some points of view lessen our peril. Our large cities in the south-east angle of the continent are as far by air even from Darwin as Alexandria is from London. But this means, on the other hand, that our defence must be organized at a great distance from our main bases. Nor will it be forgotten that, when the Japanese began to sweep through Malaya and the East Indies, some of Australia's finest and best-equipped forces were serving far away from the homeland, on land, at sea and in the air: that by agreement with the rest of the Commonwealth our air efforts here have been concentrated on training men for overseas and on the production of training machines: that, in a word, our entire defence programme had been built (in accordance with the official United Kingdom view) upon the assumption that the British Commonwealth would be able in all probable contingencies to retain control of the approaches to Australia. The Japanese victories confronted us with a situation wholly new, a situation moreover with which Australia's 7,000,000 people, unaided, could not by any possibility deal.

The story of Australia in the first half of 1942 has, therefore, been that of a people painfully adjusting itself to an unimagined danger. Folk in Britain, having themselves so recently undergone a like experience, will understand their kinsmen here. The reactions of public opinion have been crude, confused and sometimes violent. We have had no Churchill among our leaders. Even now we have not achieved the political, social and moral unity of which Britain has given so superb an example. But we have made progress. Internally the Government has been further mobilizing the resources of the nation. There have been misgivings in some quarters, heightened by occasional outbursts of Radicalism from the irrepressible Mr. Ward, Minister for Labour and National Service; but the Government has been able to count on very general support. In external affairs Australia has been establishing new relationships both with Britain and with the United States. The numerous and, at times, rather excited official statements by which this process has been accompanied caused so much comment both in Australia and abroad that a retrospect may be useful. But the underlying strategical

problem which has confronted the Australian Government and people must be kept carefully and continually in view, if any fair appraisal is to be made.

The defeats of the Imperial forces in Malaya and the siege and capitulation of Singapore were followed in Australia with grief and amazement. Reports came to hand, among them extracts from an article by *The Times* correspondent, of the inadequacy of the preparations made in constructing airfields and in equipping and training troops, and of lack of co-operation between the different arms and again between the British and Australian commanders—a repetition of the worst examples in the last war as recorded by the official Commonwealth historian. It was felt that the events preceding the final disaster constituted one of the darkest pages in the history of the British Empire—the failure of the British community to win the adherence of the native inhabitants, and the failure of the military, naval and air authorities to prepare for an attack of which they had ample warning. Criticism of these events in Australia did not come only from a small minority which expresses a distrust of all things English, nor is it to be confused with a failure to understand the grand strategy of the war. It sprang from a belief that the forces available had not been handled with energy or reasonable forethought, and that this defeat was in one sense worse than Dunkirk because it showed that the British had failed to learn the lessons there taught them, reinforced as they had been by the campaigns of Greece and Crete. Reasonably minded Australians admitted that their country, like the other democracies, had neglected its own defences, that it had done little for the defence of Singapore, and that it might have done more. But they felt, and many of them said, that their manhood had been needlessly sacrificed, and that in future wars an Australian Government must share responsibility for the leadership under which our forces are to be placed, and for the preparations made for their equipment.

Mr. Churchill's broadcast after the fall of Singapore was a salutary lesson in the conditions of Allied strategy. It reminded Australia of the importance of the Russian front, of the exigencies of the Russian command, and of the strain which the voyage round the Cape imposes on Allied transport. But it did not answer criticism of the Malayan campaign; and, even though nine-tenths of the Australian people acknowledge Mr. Churchill's supremacy as a leader, they still believe that Mr. Curtin was right in demanding for Australia a direct voice in the determination of Allied war policy, and also in urging that help should be sent to this country against the time when it should be threatened by a Japanese armada. The demand for a direct voice in policy was twofold. First, the Government requested the establishment of an Imperial War Cabinet. This was not a novel idea in Empire history, nor was it a party matter in Australia. A similar expedient had been used for like purposes during 1917 and 1918. It was Mr. Curtin's predecessors in office who had revived the idea in 1941. For rather different reasons, Canada and South Africa were known not to favour the plan, but the change in the whole strategical position of Australia on the outbreak of war with Japan forced Mr. Curtin to make a definite and urgent request, irrespective of the desires of other Dominions.

Mr. Churchill was unwilling, it seems, to establish anything as formal as the practice of 1917–18, more especially perhaps because the Dominions were not unanimous on the point. When the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917–18 was in session, all major war matters (except those that concerned the United Kingdom alone) were dealt with by the Imperial body. At the end of January last, Mr. Churchill told the Commons that the Government had decided to invite a representative of each of the belligerent Dominions to sit with the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom whenever matters arose which, in the opinion of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, urgently affected the Dominion concerned. This was not quite what Canberra had asked for. As Mr. Menzies had remarked in a press article, it was desired that a Dominion representative should sit constantly with the Cabinet, because "only by doing so will he be able to secure, at the right time, Australian consideration of many matters which would not on the face of them appear to touch Australia at all". On the other hand, the continued political representation of Australia in London by Sir Earle Page, who was sent last year by Mr. Fadden's Government, is anomalous, and is scarcely consistent with the importance which Mr. Curtin attached to the subject. Sir Earle Page is now a member of the Opposition in Parliament, and his personal experience and qualifications have not lain in the spheres either of military affairs or of international matters in general.* The unfortunate inability of the Government to send a senior Minister to London springs from the acute pressure on Labour's small group of outstanding men.

Canberra's other request was for the establishment in Washington of a Pacific War Council on which Australia would be directly represented as one of the United Nations, along with the United Kingdom, the United States, China and the Netherlands. This plan, though not at first adopted owing (it seems) to a strong reluctance on the part of President Roosevelt to establish a formal Allied organization on the politico-strategical side, was eventually accepted during the visit to Washington of Dr. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs. Australian opinion evinced no active interest in these questions of constitutional machinery, but there is no doubt of general support for the course which the Government has taken. The Australian request sprang partly from a feeling, expressed also in some quarters in England, that under existing arrangements the general strategical plan was too much the creation of Mr. Churchill's individual mind and personality, partly from a desire to get arrangements made which would emphasize more firmly the responsibility and initiative of Washington in Pacific affairs. The case for direct representation of Australia was clear. To determine the strategy of the United Nations in the Pacific is to decide the plan for the Australian mainland itself, whether in defence or in offence. Where the fate of the nation was being decided, the nation's voice should properly be heard.

Questions of machinery apart, Canberra also urged both on London and on Washington the importance of sending help to this country against impend-

* For the period of his short stay in England Dr. Evatt has become Australia's representative at meetings of the War Cabinet.—EDITOR.

ing or probable Japanese attack. Right or wrong, there has been a strong impression in Australia that the discussions involved matters more general than the desirability or otherwise of making certain specific dispositions, and that the British strategical plan for 1942 was to concentrate the available resources of the Allies primarily upon victory over Germany, no matter what the fate of Australia might be meanwhile, in full confidence of the Allies' ability to hurl the Japanese back, once Hitler's power was broken. Such a plan, in view of the supply problem of the democracies and after consideration of the available alternatives, might have turned out in the end to be necessary, no matter how painful. But no Prime Minister of Australia would be justified in allowing his country to be overrun by Japanese hordes without doing his utmost to obtain maximum assistance from his country's Allies. We have not been adequately guided either by the press or by the Government in understanding the general plan of Allied operations, and it has been hard for us to see our country's peril in true perspective. The Government has been insistent, even perhaps importunate, in stating Australia's needs. But importunacy, in an extremity, may be both necessary and fruitful.

II. Attitude to Britain

Mr. Curtin had two especial claims on the attention of the British and American Governments. The first was that Australia had sent overseas, either to the Imperial Air Force or to the armies of the Middle East and Malaya, a picked volunteer force numbering many scores of thousands: the second, that if the democracies were ever to recover the wealth of the Pacific and to protect their ally in China, Australia was indispensable as a base from which an offensive should be launched. Criticism under these two heads has been widely expressed, but it must not be inferred that Australia has ever wavered either in its admiration for the courage of the people of Great Britain, and in particular those of the bombed cities, or that we are insensible of the efforts now being made by the two great democracies. We acknowledge gratefully Britain's willingness to set free enough ships to bring home again a large part of the A.I.F., and her co-operation in the policy of diverting to Australia from the United States men and material that would otherwise have been available for different theatres of war. There may be exceptions, who constitute a blot on our democracy, but ninety-nine out of a hundred Australians are convinced that the cause of the Allies is just and that its defeat is incredible, since it would bring about that darkness of the Middle Ages unilluminated by the mercy of Christ to which the prospect of Nazi domination was once compared by a French Premier.

When war with Germany broke out, Mr. Curtin as leader of the Opposition read a statement of Labour policy drawn up by a party meeting:

"In this crisis, facing the reality of war, the Labour party stands for its platform. That platform is clear. We stand for the maintenance of Australia as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The party will do all that is possible to safeguard Australia and at the same time, having regard to its platform, will do its utmost to maintain the integrity of the British Commonwealth."

Since war was declared against Japan, the substance of this declaration has been repeated both by Mr. Curtin as Prime Minister and by Dr. Evatt as Minister for External Affairs. There have been two occasions recently when actions of the Government have been interpreted as showing a desire permanently to weaken the ties between Australia and Great Britain. The first was on the declaration of war between Australia and Japan, the second shortly afterwards when Mr. Curtin published an article in a Melbourne newspaper. These occasions have been seized upon by propagandists in Berlin and Tokyo. When examined, they give little encouragement to the sedulously propagated idea of the disintegration of the British Commonwealth. After the shock of this war and the participation of the United States in the defence of Australia and of British colonies, it is not to be supposed that the relations of the Dominions and the British Government will be exactly the same as they were in September 1939. But there is no reason to believe that Australia will look for a position of isolation, or for a change from its present relationship to that of an independent ally.

When war broke out between Germany and Great Britain, the view taken by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, was that by virtue of His Majesty's declaration of war at Westminster all his subjects in the Dominions were automatically at war. In the case of the war with Japan a different procedure was adopted, which followed the precedents set by Canada and South Africa in 1939. Dr. Evatt, himself the author of a treatise on the prerogative, was oppressed by a doubt whether the Governor-General would have power to declare war in respect of Australia except by specific assignment from the King. He therefore obtained, through the High Commissioner, Royal instruments expressly conferring upon the Governor-General the power to declare that as from a date to be specified a state of war with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Rumania existed in Australia. These Royal instruments, like the Governor-General's proclamation, were to be countersigned by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth and, with His Majesty's permission, at Mr. Bruce's suggestion they were sent to Australia by picturegram.

Dr. Evatt, as a Minister, is conspicuous for his energy and ambition as well as for his learning. In his speech on the declaration of war with Japan he expressed views which can hardly be criticized by anyone acquainted with the constitutional developments of the past twenty years. He asserted the privilege of Australia, like other Dominions, to tender separate advice to the King in relation to her external affairs, as a right established by constitutional convention. But he also claimed that his course of action was "a complete answer to those who had maintained that separate action means a weakening of the tie of association between the British nations", and that it illustrated the fact "that separate action by the King's Governments in the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions is perfectly consistent with close co-operation in all matters affecting their common interests".

Mr. Curtin's article was a statement of the dangers with which Australia was confronted and of our determination to hold out "until the tide of battle swings against the enemy". It contained the following passage:

"The Australian Government regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces, we know the constant threat of invasion, we know the dangers of dispersal of strength, but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on."

The article should be read as a whole, but this passage was taken apart from any context. In answer to immediate and emphatic protests against some expressions in the passage, Mr. Curtin explained that his words were a reference to the facts of geography and the needs of Great Britain, and were not intended to convey a separatist implication. He said:

"It did not mean that Australia regarded itself as anything but an integral part of the British Empire. No part of the British Commonwealth is more steadfast in its devotion to the British way of life and to British institutions than Australia. Our loyalty to the King goes to the very core of our national life."

The extent and depth of British sentiment in Australia has often been remarked on. The fact that our Parliament has not so far thought it necessary or even desirable to adopt the Statute of Westminster indicates a widely prevalent Australian view of our place in the Empire. That Mr. Curtin's outspoken avowal of our present dependence upon the United States should arouse a good deal of anxiety, criticism and even resentment is therefore not surprising. There would probably have been more, but for the restraint which, in view of the grave responsibilities now resting on the Government, is being exercised by the press. Many have feared the separatist possibilities inherent in some things that have been done and said, intrinsically justifiable though they may have been. Nevertheless Mr. Curtin has gained a place in the estimation of the Australian people such that an assurance given by him will be accepted. It is admitted that his choice of language is sometimes unfortunate, his quotations from the poets almost invariably so; but his sincerity and his disinterested desire to serve Australia in her present need have not been doubted. In the substance of his appeals or demands for help to Britain and America and of his claim that Australia should have a voice in the councils of the Allies he has support in all parties. The reproach of "squealing" should not be directed against a Dominion which has done everything that Great Britain has asked of it.

III. Reinforcements from America

Personnel and equipment from the United States actually began arriving in Australia from a surprisingly early date, and no doubt we have received some reinforcements originally intended for the Philippines and the East Indies. The size of the American forces in the Anzac area cannot of course be stated, but it is known that they are large and that they include important technical units, tanks, guns and modern aircraft. The result of their arrival has already been manifest in the increased resistance and striking power of our northern defences. To what extent this reinforcement is the direct result

of the representations made by the Australian Government obviously cannot be known to the public at present. Be that as it may, there has been an immense lifting of the horizon for every Australian. We are not under any illusion that our dangers are at an end; but we are girding ourselves for the coming conflict in the spirit of the offensive.

Unprecedented steps have been taken in Australia to secure the fullest co-ordination of the efforts of the United Nations in the Anzac area. The appointment of General MacArthur, the hero of Bataan, as Commander-in-Chief over all arms of the Allies in the South-Western Pacific has been received with enthusiasm by the public, for he is the very embodiment of what in our opinion the spirit of the Allied operations should be. An Allied Works Council has been established under energetic and able direction to ensure the effective handling of the vast programme of public works required for purposes of Australian defence. Perhaps most important of all, the Prime Minister has given an explicit assurance that, as far as the actual conduct of the war in Australia is concerned, neither the Commonwealth Government nor the Commonwealth Parliament will interfere in its military direction.

Of close consultation and co-operation with the British Government in handling political and strategical questions, and close co-ordination in the field with other Imperial forces, Australians have had experience. The relations that have been set up with the Government of the United States and with American commanders of the forces on our own soil are entirely new to us. Their difficulties and complications are as yet unexplored. Mr. Curtin has certainly realized that so intimate an association will bring under the review of able and efficient men our own performance, alike in war administration, in politics and in industry. The public is still naturally in the stage of enthusiastic welcome. We have liked and admired very much the outlook and behaviour of the members of the United States forces whom we have seen and met. They are quite frank with us in disclaiming any thanks for coming to the assistance of Australia. They tell us laughingly but truly enough that they are here because the best place to defend the United States is on distant territory and in somebody else's air. Our responsibility will be to ensure that, so far as in us lies, they will remain convinced that the defence of Australia is the best defence for the United States. Of the ultimate political and economic consequences of the present alignments we have not yet begun to think. The first task is to beat back the enemy's assaults upon the postern gate.

The people of Australia now stand at the crisis of their fate. Like every democracy, they are suffering the consequences of past neglect—neglect of defence, of poverty, of industrial relations and of education. There can be no doubt of their determination to repel the Japanese invasion at whatever cost. Of nine out of ten it may be said that they would rather not live than see an enemy occupy this country, and that when the invasion is repelled they will fight on until assured of the ultimate triumph of the Allied cause.

Australia,
May 1942.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. The War Draws Closer

SOUTH AFRICA is tightening its belt. True, it is only a notch or two, and after 2½ years of war it is almost ridiculously little compared with what other countries have had to do. But for this country, so long insulated from the main currents of war, it marks a big step towards realization of the fact that with the entry of Japan into the war we are no longer spectators; we have become a potentially important strategic centre of the battle between the Great Powers. Throughout the country there can be discerned a graver attitude to the war and a sterner appreciation by the private individual of his personal obligations to forward the war effort.

The spread of war to the Pacific immediately affected the shipping position, and the Union Government took rapid action. Hitherto there had been provision for a strict control of imports, but publicly the effects were little felt beyond a small degree of unofficial rationing imposed by the merchants. The first hint of sterner things came with the imposition of petrol rationing. Incredible as it may seem, up to a month or so ago the South African was at carefree liberty to waste as much petrol as he liked in joy-riding or touring. Even now the petrol ration which has been introduced is mild enough. Every owner of a car is given enough petrol for 400 miles a month, with generous supplementary allowances, and with whole classes of vehicles exempt from any rationing at all. Control of paper followed, and at last the South African newspapers, always generous in size compared with English standards, are showing the effects of having to reduce their consumption of newsprint to three-fifths of the pre-war standard. Motor-car tyres, oil and rubber are also strictly rationed, and further restrictions are heralded by the appointment of a Food Controller, who will probably proceed shortly to the rationing of foodstuffs. The food situation, though by no stretch of imagination serious, has been worsened by a bad season and poor crops; but in spite of that and of the shipping position there is little indication that this country will ever be tried nearly as hard as England. These restrictions have been accepted by the public with cheerfulness and in a spirit of co-operation, which is a measure of the new appreciation of the gravity of the war situation.

There has also been a decided improvement in recruiting, easing if not resolving our gravest immediate anxiety, which is to maintain at full strength our two divisions in Egypt. Much more attention is being paid to matters of home defence, particularly the defence of our ports. Coast garrison units, run broadly on the lines of the British Home Guard, have been reorganized and are being lavishly equipped and thoroughly trained. With other measures which are being taken, it can be said that the standard of coast defence is rapidly approaching battle pitch. Hitherto the day-to-day life of the big towns has not been noticeably affected by the war, but now uniforms are to be seen everywhere, and most of the big business houses are

restricting their hours of business to fit in with the requirements of military training for their staffs. From a larger point of view, General Smuts took an important step towards tackling the long-range problems of war and after the war when he announced the appointment of a Social and Economic Planning Council. The Council will be charged with investigating the question of social reform, and with laying the groundwork of a system which will give social and economic security to all. Its progress will probably be slow, but General Smuts has undoubtedly made a definite move towards meeting the difficulties of to-morrow.

II. Political Hatreds

In contrast to the steadiness and homogeneity with which the Smuts Government and the majority of the people are buckling down to the increased seriousness of the war situation are the turmoil, chaos and bitterness of the political scene. Only an enthusiast on the spot can disentangle all the threads, and even an expert is discouraged by the complexity of the state of political confusion which changes almost from day to day. The current position is that the original Opposition of 68 members, which came into being under General Hertzog on the outbreak of war as a compact and potentially formidable force, has been broken down into three major groups in Parliament and one large and a number of small Nazi-inspired organizations outside Parliament. The first break occurred last year, when General Hertzog and Mr. Havenga, disgusted with Nationalist party intrigue, resigned from Parliament.* The first effect was the hiving off of the Afrikaner party, an anomalous group of some nine or ten members, whose influence is small and whose opposition to the Government and the war effort is uncertain and variable. General Hertzog, for whom there was, if he chose, the dignity and influence of an elder statesman, has preferred to burst into print at intervals with long and rambling statements, the upshot of which is that he is now blatantly pro-Nazi. His influence has waned proportionately, and to-day he is of little importance except perhaps as a tool in the hands of some of his unscrupulous former supporters.

The next step in the decline of the Opposition was a final break between Dr. Malan's Nationalist party and the Ossewa Brandwag.† This followed hectic negotiations of remarkable complexity, which can be summed up as a clash of ambition between Dr. Malan and Dr. Van Rensburg for the leadership of the future South African Republic if and when it arrives. Both sides have undoubtedly been weakened by the contest. To-day they are fighting each other with extraordinary ferocity and with a degree of personal bitterness to be found only in Afrikaner politics at their worst. The position at the moment is that the Nationalist party is boycotting and outlawing the Ossewa Brandwag, which in its turn is refusing support to Nationalist party candidates at elections and has declared an organized boycott of the Nationalist press. The break between Dr. Malan and Dr. Van Rensburg had the result of finally ousting Mr. Pirow, South Africa's self-

* See The Round Table, No. 122, March 1941, p. 367.

† See The Round Table, No. 125, December 1941, p. 183.

declared National-Socialist, from his ambiguous position in the Nationalist party, to lead the so-called "New Order" party in Parliament which is devoting itself to propagation of Nazi doctrines. Mr. Pirow took with him sixteen former Hertzogites and one former Malanite, and the next step will probably be a formal alliance between the Pirowites and the Ossewa Brandwag.

The current position of parties is: Government supporters 89, Nationalist 39, Pirowites 17, Afrikaner party 9. General Smuts thus has a comfortable working majority. The various Opposition groups are assailing each other with a venom and malice which is only on rare occasions exceeded by their attacks on the Government, but too much must not be read into these displays of Afrikaner invective and mutual hatred. Virulent outbursts of anti-British feeling disgraced the Union Parliament at the time of bad news from the Far East, and it is significant that the only signs of cohesion among the Opposition which have so far been detected made their appearance at this stage. The incident was a warning that in a crisis General Smuts must be prepared for the full weight of the Opposition parties in Parliament and of their organizations outside Parliament to be thrown against him.

The futility to which schism has condemned the Opposition has strengthened the position of General Smuts in Parliament. The first test of strength came on an Opposition motion for a Republic. He neatly took advantage of the occasion to move an amendment, validating recent declarations of war and affirming in categorical terms the adherence of South Africa to the Commonwealth; and he carried the day without difficulty. The voting showed a majority of 25, the climax in a series of votes on the war issue in which the majority has steadily increased since that first and biggest test in September 1939, when General Smuts won through with a majority of 13. At every opportunity the Oppositions bitterly assail the war effort and Britain, although there are signs that they are becoming increasingly unhappy about the logical absurdity of their position. They claim to be guided by the principle of "South Africa First", but they cannot answer the obvious question: Why on earth should a victorious Germany present the gold and mineral wealth and the strategic ports of South Africa as a gift to an intellectually negligible, militarily non-existent and—in terms of world affairs—almost microscopic group of quarrelling Afrikaners?

In addition to financial affairs, Parliament has been able to dispose of a surprising amount of solid routine work. The outstanding achievement of the session was the enactment of a War Pensions Bill, designed on broad lines with most generous treatment for disabled soldiers and their dependants. It is one of the most enlightened measures of its kind in the Commonwealth. Many Bills were passed which have nothing directly to do with the war, on subjects such as hire-purchase, unemployment, banking, rents, wages, insurance, and the steel industry and industrial development generally. The session has thus been particularly fruitful and encouraging, in terms both of the work done and of the evidence which it disclosed of the Government's growing power. When the history of our times comes to be written, the success of General Smuts in organizing a substantial South African war

effort, in face of the violent attacks of a large Opposition and without infringing in any major way the elementary democratic freedoms of speech and of the press, will rank as a major political achievement.

The Provincial Council elections, which were to have been held about now, have been postponed. As a matter of party advantage, the Government would probably have gained, but the campaign would have degenerated into a wild, whirling attack on the war policy, which must have hindered the war effort. An opportunity to test opinion was given in a series of twelve by-elections, representing a fair cross-section of the electorate. The various Oppositions spared no effort to make a good showing, and were driven to a device which was used by General Hertzog in 1929 with considerable success—the Black Manifesto. Temperamentally many Afrikaners still look at the native along the sights of a rifle, and the Opposition concentrated on rousing traditional passions by exploiting a statement by General Smuts that in the event of immediate danger from the Japanese he would arm the natives. Logically the statement is unexceptionable, but the Opposition raised the bogy of armed natives who would one day turn on the white people. It profited them little in the elections. In three of the twelve constituencies, almost entirely Afrikaans-speaking and traditionally Nationalist, the Nationalist candidates were returned with substantial majorities. In a similarly powerful Nationalist stronghold the United Party man was returned, as a result of the Opposition vote being split by one of Mr. Pirow's "New Order" men. In the remaining eight, five of which were rural or semi-rural seats, the Government candidate was returned comfortably. Of the total votes cast, 35,000 went to the Government and 20,000 to the Nationalists, a division with which the Government can be well satisfied.

III. New Taxation

The total expenditure of the Union Government in the coming fiscal year 1942–43 is estimated at just under £140 million. Of this, £88,400,000 is to be raised by taxation, representing an increase of something over 11 per cent on the year 1941–42. The amount of fresh borrowing required, however, will not be much more than £43,500,000, a sum which it should not be difficult to raise locally, even though four important municipal loans are also being floated. The two largest of these loans, totalling £5 million, issued on behalf of the Capetown and Johannesburg municipalities, each bearing interest at 3½ per cent with an issue price of 99, have already been on offer and were oversubscribed within a few hours.

Last year Mr. Hofmeyr made important changes in the basis of levying income-tax on individuals and companies, and he is not interfering with this again. A flat surcharge of 20 per cent is to be levied on individuals, half of which is to be placed into compulsory saving, bearing interest at 3 per cent over six years. An attempt is also to be made to spread the net of direct taxation wider, not by lowering the limits of exemption from payment of income-tax, but by imposing a general poll-tax on all who are earning more than £250 a year. Married men who are earning between £250 and £350 will pay £1 tax plus £2 compulsory saving; all others (in addition to any income-tax liability) will pay £2. 10*s*. tax plus £2. 10*s*. compulsory saving. While the adoption of the principle of compulsory saving is of some interest, its application is of so mild a nature as to suggest that it is being introduced for educational reasons rather than as an important positive contribution to the fight against inflationary spending. The necessity for an educative process of this kind has been very evident. Though they are by no means severe the new proposals have been rather vehemently attacked—even from the Government side of the House—and Mr. Hofmeyr has already agreed to modify them for a married man earning less than £350 by allowing a rebate of £1 for every child.

Another new tax aimed specifically against inflation is a special tax on profits from speculative dealings in land. A tax of 13*s*. 4*d*. in the pound is to be levied upon profits reaped on the subsequent resale of land purchased after budget day, and a tax of 6*s*. 8*d*. in the pound on the resale after budget day of land first purchased between October 1, 1939, and budget day. The largest estimated yield from any of the new taxes is a sum of £4 million expected from a Trade Profits Special Levy. This levy is also the most original of Mr. Hofmeyr's innovations. It is intended to supplement the existing Excess Profits Duty. The latter at present amounts to 13*s*. 4*d*. in the pound on profits in excess of a pre-war standard, or (in the case of firms for which an acceptable pre-war standard could not be obtained, such as recently started enterprises) on profits in excess of 8 per cent. There have been complaints that this discriminates unfairly in favour of firms with high standard rates of pre-war profit. Since the yield of the Excess Profits Duty in 1941–42 is now expected to reach £6,500,000, or nearly double the original estimates, an increased contribution from business profits seems an obvious means of securing additional funds; but in order to meet complaints of unfair treatment the Minister of Finance has decided not to raise the rate of Excess Profits Duty. Instead, this further Trade Profits Special Levy is to be imposed, which, it is claimed, "will at once be fairer and also more productive even than an increase of Excess Profits Duty to 100 per cent would be". In place of applying the standard of an 8 per cent return on capital merely to more recently established businesses, it is now to be applied to all; and all profits over 8 per cent not subject to Excess Profits Duty will be subject to the Special Levy, no matter what was normally earned before the war. The rate of taxation is to be progressive. It is not, however, to vary simply with the rate of profit earned. A more complicated formula has been adopted, under which the rate of taxation is to vary according to the relation between the rate of war-time profit and the rate of profit enjoyed as the pre-war standard, with a maximum rate of 6*s*. 8*d*. in the pound where a pre-war standard profit in excess of 8 per cent has been fully maintained, and a lower rate where the trading results have been relatively less favourable but profits in excess of 8 per cent have none the less been made.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Hofmeyr has made a determined effort to discover an equitable system of assessment, and one must admire the ingenuity he has shown in tackling the problem. Few details of the method of assessment have yet been given, but it seems probable that in spite of his

efforts some difficulty may arise in the successful application of the new scheme to the restoring of equity between old-established and newly established businesses. It may well happen that this time the balance will be redressed too thoroughly, to the detriment of the former, as it is normally only in respect of new businesses that the capital invested can be readily calculated, while that of established concerns is likely to be undervalued both by current accounting practice and by the Department of Inland Revenue. In view of the necessarily complicated nature of the new tax it is not immediately apparent that it has sufficient advantages to justify its being preferred to the simpler expedient of raising the rate of normal income-tax on companies, particularly as this would largely have obviated the need for making special provision for the small man, whose rate of profit on his nominal capital has always been exceptionally high, since his chief investment was in fact his own skill and enterprise.

There is not a great deal to be said about Mr. Hofmeyr's further proposals. The special contribution from gold mines is to be increased from 16 per cent of their taxable income (before deduction of redemption allowance) to 20 per cent, bringing in another £1,600,000. Estate duties are to be more progressive. Customs or excise dutes have been reduced in the case of tea, abolished on knitting wools, and raised on films, petrol and tobacco. All the various tax adjustments mentioned are expected to result in an increased yield of £9,300,000, leaving an estimated deficit for the year of £210,000.

IV. A Still Buoyant Economy

Turning from future proposals to past results, there is much that is encouraging. The revised estimates for 1941–42 now show, instead of the anticipated deficit, a surplus of over £6 million, which will be transferred to loan account and used for repatriation of external debt. This is not the only windfall by which the loan account has been benefited. Receipts from other sources have also been buoyant. The repayments of State loans by farmers, for example, have exceeded expectations by the satisfactory total of £1,680,000, and an aggregate saving of over £5 million on the amounts needed to be borrowed is hoped for. The figures of foreign trade, from which Mr. Hofmeyr partially drew back the war-time cloak of secrecy, show that imports of merchandise (excluding the important and still secret item of Government stores) have risen from £85 million in 1939 and £96 million in the following year to £100 million in 1941. Month after month the expected drop in imports has not tsken place, largely as a result of increased trade with the United States, which became our principal supplier with a total of £38 million. As Mr. Hofmeyr pointed out, "this fact is not without significance in relation to the success with which the Battle of the Atlantic has been fought". What the coming year will bring is still presumably a matter of conjecture to the Treasury as to us all, and a serious fall in imports can scarcely be avoided. But an easy arithmetical calculation from the expected yield of the additional tax of 2½*d.* a gallon on petrol shows that no really significant drop in the importation even of that rationed commodity has entered into the budget calculations.

Owing largely to the record gold production of £120 million, the Union's balance of payments was so favourable as to permit the repatriation of £30 million of overseas debt, and still leave the Reserve Bank with about £2 million of newly mined gold surplus to all foreign exchange requirements. So far, the repatriation of foreign debt has largely been met by the creation of additional bank credit internally. The net increase in bank credit during the year has been nearly £43 million—not perhaps an alarming amount in view of the increase in production which has taken place, but certainly enough to justify all Mr. Hofmeyr's preoccupation with the means of staving off inflation, and, regarded from a non-political angle, one that might invite more vigorous action than has yet been taken. One final point of importance in the budget speech was Mr. Hofmeyr's statement on the future of gold. His budget, he said, was based on the assumption that the demand for gold and the price of gold would not decrease as a result of United States belligerency. Apparently the view of gold production which is being taken in the Allied counsels is either a long-term view looking beyond the immediate necessities of war, or a short-term view not looking beyond the dislocations likely to result from any change. The middle view of a temporary diversion of resources of the gold-mining industry to more direct participation in the war effort, as a joint responsibility of the United Nations, is evidently not under consideration.

South Africa,
May 1942.

NEW ZEALAND

I. Mr. Nash, Finance and Washington

BEFORE his departure for Washington, where he has been appointed New Zealand's first Minister, Mr. Nash, the Minister of Finance, gave details of the ordinary revenue account of the Consolidated Fund, the Social Security Fund and the War Expenses Account for the nine months April–December, 1941.

"Apart from unforeseen factors that might arise," he stated, "I think it can safely be said that the final results for the year should be very satisfactory. Whilst the growing momentum of our war effort means steadily increasing demands upon our resources, the revenue is buoyant and should enable all demands to be met. It is also pleasing to state that we have been able to repay to the United Kingdom all the moneys which had been borrowed up to September 30, 1941, under the Memorandum of Security arrangement. To avoid the accumulation of overseas debt as far as possible, and to restrict our demands on United Kingdom resources to the minimum, every effort has been made and will be made to keep our debt under this heading to the lowest possible figure."

In the nine months ending December 31, 1941, compared with the corresponding months of 1940, revenue of the Consolidated Fund increased from £21,930,000 to £22,052,000, and expenditure from £23,661,000 to £25,234,000. Unfortunately the figures relating to that highly interesting development, the Social Security Fund, do not permit a reasoned analysis and comparison, since they are for nine months only, and the new taxes imposed in the middle of the last financial year are just getting into their stride. But it is clear that the impact of war upon our financial structure has not shaken it, although during the nine months our expenditure on the fighting services was more than double that in the same period of 1940. The gross amount of loans raised (other than departmental credits and bank advances) in the nine months was £18,192,000, of which £10,841,000 was received from War Loan stock, £2,238,000 from National Savings investments, £4,985,000 from the United Kingdom under the Memorandum of Security arrangement, and £85,000 from interest-free loans. Against that, £7,323,000 was expended in the redemption of securities, £6,940,000 of this being utilized for repayments to the United Kingdom. The campaign for War Loan moneys which was instituted by the Government in March 1941 under the name "Bonds for Bombers", with a special appeal for the small investor, resulted in a total subscription of £2,603,000.

Mr. Nash safely reached Washington, and on January 31 was given his first introduction to a press conference. In a frank and candid statement he made certain suggestions as to the best method for meeting the war exigencies of the moment, emphasizing the willingness of New Zealand to co-operate in all measures for the common cause. Asked whether he had a message from New Zealand for the people of the United States, he replied

that he had brought the keenest appreciation of the assistance already given and of the willingness of the United States to help on every occasion required, and that New Zealand had received much equipment for which she was grateful beyond measure. Mr. Nash represents New Zealand in America as a member of the New Zealand Cabinet. He is not an Ambassador, and his personal position differs from that of Mr. Casey, who represented Australia as a non-Parliamentary Minister. It differs again from that of Mr. Jordan, who is High Commissioner in London; so in some of our really big matters we do discard precedent and convention. Mr. Nash retains various portfolios, and the duties pertaining to them are performed by colleagues acting for him. Parliament passed an Act of general application, which allows him to keep his seat in the House and gives him, if absent, the right to contest any general election that may be held. From this one may assume that Mr. Nash does not intend to abandon politics for diplomacy. His great energy and determination will be missed by the Cabinet, and it is an open secret that the Labour caucus hesitated to let him go. His opposite number, the new American Minister to New Zealand, has arrived—Brigadier-General Patrick J. Hurley, who from 1929 to 1932 was President Hoover's Secretary for War, and served with distinction in the last war as major and then lieutenant-colonel with the American Expeditionary Force, receiving the United States decoration of the D.S.M. He has carried out many notable tasks of national importance in his own country. The appointment of so distinguished an American as the first foreign diplomatic representative in New Zealand is warmly appreciated, and he has already won a high place in the affections of the people. His first public utterances at a State luncheon and civic reception given for him at Wellington were marked by vivid realism combined with an inspiring appeal. The knowledge that he had played an important part in the naval operations which conveyed supplies to General MacArthur's forces in the Philippines against great odds increased the *mana* he has already acquired.

II. War, People and Politics

With the enemy at our gates, the *tempo* of life has definitely quickened, although in his placid way the New Zealander shows little sign of uneasiness, causing observers to wonder if this is apathy rather than self-control. Perhaps he and his family may, if they think of it at all, be rather proud of the manner in which they are facing the threat of invasion. To some of them the danger comes as a sop to their pride, having felt a little ashamed that their boys should be fighting and dying for them in another hemisphere while their own daily routine goes on undisturbed. Many think that not enough is being done by our politicians to enable us all to take our share in the offensive. We sigh for leaders of the type of Mr. Churchill and General Smuts, whose vivid appreciation of the situation calls for the maximum effort and sacrifice from every man, woman and child in the community. As our people realize more and more fully the gravity of the situation, they grow increasingly impatient of any hindrances in the way of national unity and the maximum war effort. The Government naturally becomes the chief object of popular

criticism. There is a widespread desire for more vigorous leadership, for a clarion call to action, and for effective measures which will harness every individual to that task for which he is best fitted. With the inevitable war-time extension of State control over business activities, administrative weaknesses become more obvious and more intolerable. Irritation and resentment are aroused by bureaucratic methods which stifle individual enterprise and initiative, by the failure of Ministers—themselves not trained to large-scale business organization—to co-opt the most efficient business executives and give them authority to get on with the job, by the tendency of Ministers to become cluttered up with petty administrative details and therefore unable to devote sufficient time and thought to national policies, and by the wastes and inefficiencies of over-centralization and departmental red tape. There is also much dissatisfaction with the failure to eliminate wasteful and unnecessary services, such as racing, and to concentrate all available resources on essential production and winning the war. These are healthy signs of a community which has awakened to realities and now seeks the leadership and organization that will make possible the fullest national co-operation.

The suggestion that New Zealand might have a Government representing all parties was finally disposed of at the annual Labour party conference at Easter, when the following resolution was passed:

"That while this Conference is prepared to support any and every measure which in its opinion will promote national unity in this hour of national danger and crisis, it does not consider that a National Government, as advocated by the Opposition and other political opponents and the hostile press, would further promote such desirable national unity, but on the contrary would engender disunity; it expresses itself in favour of everything calculated to increase and improve the country's war effort and national solidarity, and requests the National Executive of the party, the Government and the Parliamentary party to co-operate at all times with this objective in view."

On the same occasion the Prime Minister clarified his own personal position. He outlined the procedure that would be followed in the event of his feeling it impossible to carry on as Prime Minister of a purely Labour Government, owing to a situation being reached in which sections of the people were not co-operating in the national war effort. Stating that he realized his personal views were out of line with the opinion of the Parliamentary party and with those of his colleagues in the Cabinet, Mr. Fraser continued:

"I believed and had the vision, which I still have, if it is not a delusion, that we should be strong enough to lead the country as a united force through the war until our country is out of danger and our cause victorious, without sacrificing any of our ideals or our principles. If the occasion did arise when I felt that the position as at present could not continue, the first thing I would do would be to consult my Cabinet colleagues, the Parliamentary Labour party and the National Executive. Then they would consider the situation. If this situation arose and I felt impelled to hand in my resignation, I would then go to the Governor-General and tender my resignation as Prime Minister and recommend him to call upon the leader of the majority party to take my place. The fact that the election had been postponed would no doubt play a part in subsequent events."

In his previous statement in the House Mr. Fraser had said that if he as Prime Minister could not get better support from the industrial workers of the country it was his duty to step down altogether. A further resolution was passed by the Labour conference to the effect that the Labour party should remain prepared for a general election. This was followed by a statement by Mr. S. G. Holland, the leader of the Opposition, that the National party accepted this challenge and would also regard a general election as inevitable.

The Prime Minister has followed Mr. Churchill's attitude of respect to the House of Commons, and has called Parliament together on several occasions to consult it on the war situation. It has sat in secret, and the general public knows little of what it is doing or discussing, but the fact that it is in session gives some confidence to the people at large. The leader of the Opposition prepared a lengthy memorandum on the war effort, and the House was given several days of secret session in which to debate its contents. In the meantime we are moving ahead. On April 23 the Prime Minister announced the constitution of a new Command—separated from the South-West Pacific Command which is under General MacArthur—to be known as the South Pacific Area and to be placed under American naval command. This arrangement has been agreed to by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. The area of the Command embraces New Zealand and the islands, including Fiji. The Government has called up the balance of the single men and the married men with no children, and now married men of 18 to 28 with children are to be placed at the disposal of the Army. Under a recent National Service Emergency Regulation men from 46 to 50 are obliged to register for the purpose of interview, selection and direction into suitable essential work. They will be asked to serve in defence works and various industries and other activities which link up with the main war effort. Women of 20 and 21 are also registering, and they too will be drafted into essential work, after being interviewed by district man-power officers in conjunction with the Women's War Service Auxiliary. The National Military Reserve Battalions have been linked with the Fortress Battalions, taking the same names, and the Home Guard has been taken over by the Army. Service in the Home Guard has been made compulsory; it constitutes nowadays a formidable body of troops, intelligent, steady and knowing their job. The Army has adopted a wise course in bringing back to New Zealand from Egypt 57 senior and junior officers and 64 non-commissioned officers; in addition to providing the best available instructors, this will preserve a real cohesion and bond of comradeship between the troops at home and those overseas, which in the last war was at times sadly lacking. With royal intuition the King has allowed the New Zealand Army Tank Brigade to be affiliated to the Royal Tank Regiment and to use its colours, wear its tie and play its marching tune. The forces in the outlying islands have been much strengthened and better equipped.

The two silent Services are still expanding in ways little known to the public. Air-Commodore H. W. L. Saunders, C.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., M.M.,

has left us, and we were delighted to see gazetted his promotion to Acting Air Vice-Marshal. He has supervised the growth of the R.N.Z.A.F. into a big force fulfilling all its obligations to the Old Country in the number and the training of its airmen sent overseas. To-day we may well be proud of its organization here, and we are grateful to him for what he has done. His successor, Air-Commodore R. V. Goddard, C.B.E., appears to be a man of untiring energy and drive, and already has made a good impression on the public. The Royal Navy, as usual, says nothing. We see the familiar caps and uniforms of sailors in the streets for a few hours, and then they disappear to carry on their arduous and dangerous tasks in the Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Their numbers have increased, and we are sending many of our best lads to England for training as officers, the reports on whose conduct seem very favourable. Our casualty lists are mounting up, and the burden of caring for the needs of nearly 6,000 prisoners of war is a heavy one. New Zealand is a great letter-writing country, and the letters and parcels go in an unending stream to prison camps on the Continent.

III. Preparations and Supplies

In our cities and coastal towns E.P.S.* precautions are being taken. It cannot be said that we have neglected this aspect of war, and when the bombs drop all but the laziest should know what to do and where to go. As in the Home Guard, service in the E.P.S. scheme has been made compulsory. On the supply side New Zealand is doing her best. The production of food has not slackened, and munitions and equipment are being manufactured in ever-increasing quantities. However, we are not independent as regards modern machinery of war, and Mr. Sullivan (Minister of Supply) and Mr. Coates, both members of the War Cabinet, have recently visited Australia to discuss the conduct of the war with the Australian authorities and to arrange further supplies of munitions, wheat, etc. Mr. Coates is one of the two National party representatives in the War Cabinet, and he was recently in America to confer with the United States authorities regarding Lease-Lend supplies for New Zealand. He and Mr. Sullivan report that a complete strategic scheme has been worked out for the defence of Australia and New Zealand, and only awaits the approval of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Australia, they say, met them most generously with regard to sending us munitions and other necessities.

On March 12 the Government set up a Defence Construction Council, with the Prime Minister as chairman and Mr. James Fletcher, managing director of the Fletcher Construction Co., Ltd., as vice-chairman and commissioner. The remainder of the members of the Council are Cabinet Ministers and Civil Servants. Mr. Fletcher has been given very wide and autocratic powers concerning, amongst other things, the supply of materials and labour. The ostensible objects are to give absolute priority to all defence works and to establish proper co-ordination between all Government departments connected with their execution. On the face of it the scheme invites little criticism. If bureaucratic methods are too slow and cumbersome, by all means let us call in an experienced person to help Civil Servants to do a job not usually entrusted to them, even if we invest him with dictatorial powers. The job will be done quickly and (we hope) well, and perhaps a little more cheaply, so let us go ahead. Mr. Fletcher has acted promptly, and on March 14 a standard rate of wages for men engaged on building construction was announced by Mr. Webb, the Minister of Labour, which suspended all existing awards. In his press statement Mr. Webb said that the normal hours were to be 54 a week, shifts to be worked as required, and wages to be calculated on the basis of the total amount payable under the relevant award or agreement for a 50-hour week, with overtime at the rate of time-and-a-half for hours in excess of the ordinary. For example, carpenters would receive 3*s.* 3*d.* and labourers 2*s.* 9*d.* an hour, or £8. 15*s.* 6*d.* and £7. 8*s.* 6*d.* respectively for a 54-hour week. No overtime or holiday or Sunday rates were to be payable for work on such occasions. Each man would be paid a minimum of £5. 5*s.* a week, except for any week during which he was absent from work through his own fault. On country work, unless board and lodging were provided, an allowance of 30*s.* a week would be paid, and provision would also be made for work being performed by contract on a co-operative basis where necessary. In respect of matters not provided for in the suspension order, such provisions as were contained in existing awards or agreements would apply.

An interesting point of constitutional law arose in connexion with a recent strike of employees in a freezing works at Auckland. The Minister of Labour acted promptly and de-registered the union concerned, and legal proceedings were taken against men who had joined in the strike. Consequently a considerable number were sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. The strike was ultimately settled at a conference between the employers and the Federation of Labour, upon terms the basic feature of which was the re-engagement of the men without discrimination within 14 days. This left the Government with the awkward problem of what to do with the men in gaol. Application was made on their behalf for a rehearing of their cases. Counsel for the Crown said he had been instructed not to offer opposition. Referring to the question of constitutional procedure, the stipendiary magistrate, Mr. J. H. Luxford, said:

"A communication was made to me by the Under-Secretary for Justice, asking if in view of the particular circumstances I should recommend the exercising of the Royal prerogative. My view was that it was a matter solely for the Executive, but I expressed the view that this matter should come back to the court if new circumstances justified reconsideration. Apparently the Executive has decided to allow the court to exhaust its statutory functions before the question of the Royal prerogative has been determined."

The magistrate then held a special sitting of his court in Auckland prison and reheard the cases, ordering each man to come up for sentence if called on within a year. A somewhat similar incident occurred in connexion with a strike at a Belfast freezing works, where summonses were issued against a considerable number of employees, but, on the workers resuming their employment, were withdrawn before the hearing.

* Emergency Precautions Services.

Preparations for general rationing if necessary are being made, and ration books have been issued to all persons who could produce their social security cards. Sugar and stockings are already rationed, sugar at 12 oz. a week and stockings at one pair in the next three months, after which the position will be reviewed.

Since the December number of THE ROUND TABLE appeared we have had four by-elections, three members of Parliament—Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Allen (Hauraki), Major A. N. Grigg, M.C. (Mid-Canterbury), and Lieutenant A. G. Hultquist (Bay of Plenty)—having been killed in action, and Mr. T. D. Burnett (Temuka) having died suddenly. Major Grigg's widow was elected unopposed for her husband's seat. The National party opposed the Government candidate at Bay of Plenty, who was beaten fairly handsomely, the Government thus losing a seat won at the general election. At Hauraki and Temuka, Independents opposed the National party candidates and were bad seconds; neither the Government nor the Democratic Labour party offered candidates for either of these country seats.

Thanks to the prices which are being paid by the Imperial Government for our exportable produce and to the maintenance of a high standard of production, the income of New Zealand is well maintained, and in spite of the Battle of the Atlantic a remarkable proportion has been shipped away. The problem of cold storage is always present, but every possible step to assist the position is being taken. With half the meat year gone, the Minister of Marketing has reported that stocks in cool store are 13,000 tons below the total held a year ago, and he is of opinion that the industry will get through the current season without experiencing any undue pressure on storage capacity. This is decidedly encouraging, because it will be remembered that the season commenced with 83,400 tons carried over from 1940–41. Killings for export have been running a little ahead of last season's returns, especially in the case of lambs and wethers. From the latest figures it appears that the improvement in the stock position must have been effected in part by other factors, of which the canning of boneless beef and ewe mutton would be one.

This article unavoidably presents some sombre aspects of the picture of current events, but the canvas has atmosphere, and that, we venture to say, is the underlying courage of the British race, which appears in its brightest colours when difficulty and danger are near. The New Zealander has shown himself in the past to be sound and reliable, on the field of battle steady in defence and relentless in offence. He will be the same to-day.

New Zealand,
May 1942.

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.

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The necessity for saving paper has presented a choice between adopting smaller type in order to print a greater number of words on each page, or else cutting down the amount of reading-matter and making the quarterly survey proportionately less comprehensive. By one or other of these methods it was essential to reduce further the number of pages in each issue. The former course has been chosen; and, although THE ROUND TABLE is thinner in bulk than heretofore, there will be found no appreciable reduction in the quantity—none, it is hoped, in the quality—of the information which it provides.

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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THREE YEARS OF WAR

THE opening of a fourth year of war finds the United Nations still conducting a strategic defensive, which now embraces the globe, but which reaches its maximum intensity in two areas of supreme hazard—one on the Atlantic highway between the New and Old Worlds, the other at the Caucasian gateway from Europe into Asia. Now that every important nation in the world has become involved, the final pattern of the conflict seems at last to be perceptible, and to offer on the present anniversary an unusual temptation to retrospect.

September 1, 1939 seems of course an arbitrary date at which to begin the history of the war. If comparison be made between the preceding Christmas, when Hitler was digesting the Sudetenland and British volunteers were studying A.R.P., and the Christmas following, when Hitler was digesting Poland and the R.A.F. was scattering leaflets over Berlin, the contrast between peace and war is not very violent. Perhaps an English chronicle of the war ought to begin with the evening when Neville Chamberlain, about to start on his flight to Godesberg, moralized on the tragedy of seeing London citizens, twenty years after the war to end wars, hastily digging trenches in their parks. But whether the formal declaration of war be regarded as a starting-point, or as the first annual milestone on the way, it will serve as a fixed date from which to measure our subsequent progress.

SEPTEMBER 1939—THE OPENING PROSPECTS

ENGLAND, at the outset of open hostilities, had not quite completed a year of hurried rearmament, undertaken immediately after the Munich settlement in the hope that visible preparedness for war might yet save the peace of Europe, and continued after the rape of Czechoslovakia in the deepening conviction that war itself was inevitable and imminent. The cadres of a conscript army had been formed, and the first drafts had had a few months' training. A great expansion of the Royal Air Force was projected, but waited for the most part on the building of the necessary factories. In immediate action on the Continent against a Power that had been practically on a war footing for more than six years the country could not yet play anything but a minor part. Great Britain expected to supply the decisive reserve of strength to the coalition against Hitlerism, but the brunt of the first onslaught must, as in 1914, be borne by others.

Nobody doubted the prompt adhesion of the Dominions to the cause; but their strength, even more than that of the mother country, was potential rather than actual. The consciousness of this lack of immediately available force in the Empire had dictated, during the summer of 1939, an anxious diplomatic search for allies in eastern Europe, the Government repressing its old distrust of the Soviet system in the attempt to make Russia a cornerstone in a "peace front", and so reproduce approximately the alignment

of 1914. It was under the shock of the disappointment of this hope by the sudden conclusion of the German-Soviet treaty that Great Britain entered the war. Even without Russian support Poland, estimated by the numbers of her mobilized infantry, at that time still the accepted military criterion, could no doubt hold out for some months, perhaps until the spring. After that the fate of the British Empire would be staked on the solidity of the Entente with France. It was commonly taken for granted that Great Britain had once more at her side the France of Clemenceau and Foch, with its defensive strength enhanced by all the difference between the mighty fortifications of the Maginot Line and the comparatively simple entrenchments of Verdun.

In the general judgment, therefore, the prospect opening in September 1939 was of a repetition of the Four Years War. That war had established the immense tactical advantage of the defence. Sooner or later the Germans would secure their eastern frontier by overcoming the resistance of Poland, incurring great casualties in the process. They would then be condemned to waste their strength in frontal attack on the prepared positions of the west, held by a French army of millions and a British expeditionary force, which would grow continually in numbers as the months or years went by. Meanwhile the British and French navies would hold the seas, securing to the Allies free access to supplies from America, and subjecting Germany to the slow strangulation of blockade. Italy would be helpless in the face of superior Allied sea power in the Mediterranean, and might be constrained to neutrality until evident self-interest brought her in on the allied side. Japan's persistent failure to overcome Chinese resistance suggested that the threat in the Far East—which could hardly become actual without provoking the United States to intervene—need not be considered grave.

The one outstandingly new factor since 1918 was the immense progress of aerial invention. It was feared that the competitive destruction of the great cities of all belligerents, with enormous civilian casualties, would begin immediately. Therefore, even before the outbreak of war, hosts of children were dispersed from the towns, while the great part-time force of civil defence workers took up its posts. With this exception the approach to war was dictated mainly by the experience of 1914–18. The statesmen who had built on the Munich settlement their hopes of a new era of peace, and those who had denounced it as a betrayal, closed their ranks in equal resolution. The Government was reinforced by the inclusion of the outstanding survivor of the war leaders of twenty-five years before, and the consistent champion of preparedness, Mr. Churchill. A unified command was instituted, with a British admiral to control allied strategy at sea, a French general to control it on land, and the formulation of air strategy left rather indeterminate, pending revelation of the enemy's policy. A Supreme Allied War Council co-ordinated the whole at the political level; but any conception of the need for a combined strategy in the three elements, worked out by the service staffs themselves, was equally absent in both countries.

So the western Allies entered the war.

September 1940—Shattered Hopes

Long before September 1940 the whole of this scheme and expectation had been shattered. By contrast, save in one vital respect, the whole process of the year's war seemed to have moved, with mechanical precision, on a plan dictated from Berlin. The tactical advantage of the defensive on land had proved sheer illusion. It had been reversed by a German capacity to wield air and mechanized ground forces as a single unity, of which the Allied commanders had formed no conception.

As a consequence France now lay prostrate, under a Government pledged to an ignominious "collaboration" with the enemy. He occupied half the country, including all the Channel and Atlantic ports. The German armies had overrun, not only Poland and the Low Countries, which was always thought probable, but also Norway and Denmark. Italy, thinking that total victory was already in sight, had entered the war in order to share it. Every coast facing the British Isles had become hostile; the Allies had lost their last foothold on the continent of Europe. Indeed there was no longer an alliance: the British Empire stood alone.

At sea the balance of power had shifted disastrously. The German submarines had gained free access to the Atlantic. The strain which the necessary counter-measures imposed on the Royal Navy, and the simultaneous loss of the help of the French fleet, ended the unchallenged Allied control of the Mediterranean, instituted a fight for the mastery of that sea, at first on less than even terms, with Italy, and compelled the diversion of much merchant shipping round the Cape of Good Hope to sustain the troops in north Africa and south-east Asia, on which a new responsibility was placed to bar a possible eastward drive of the Axis.

On land the situation had only just begun to recover from a condition that most of the world had considered desperate. Although the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force had been brilliantly rescued from Dunkirk, it had lost the whole of its equipment; and, at a time when the full power of the *Wehrmacht* had been set free by the French surrender to turn against England, there was not even one fully armed division ready to confront them. The enemy had only one further requirement to make his invasion irresistible—the command of the air over England, for the attainment of which he seemed to possess overwhelming numerical strength. It was this, however, that was denied him. At the beginning of September the Battle of Britain was still in the balance; but the sublime effort of the outnumbered fighter squadrons had aroused hopes of a successful issue, and before the month was out the *Luftwaffe* was to confess itself beaten in the daylight struggle by turning away to the bombing of civilians by night.

On the remoter horizon one light of hope was beginning to shine. The spirit of isolation from European affairs, which had dominated American policy at the beginning of the war, had waned rapidly as the catalogue of Nazi crimes was unfolded. Since the fall of France the gallantry of the British airmen had won the hearts of the American people, and now both candidates for the approaching presidential elections were pledged to support

the anti-Nazi cause. On the actual day of the anniversary the practical sympathy of the United States was shown by the transfer of fifty destroyers to the British flag in exchange for the lease of bases in the West Indies.

But in the immediate crisis Great Britain had to depend on herself alone. An immense change had been wrought by the events of the year in the temper of the country, which a year before had been by comparison lethargic. Mr. Churchill, called to the supreme office after the first disasters in Norway, stood at the head of an administration pledged to total effort on a scale unknown in the previous war. The leaders of Labour, who had held aloof at the outset, were now in office, prepared to co-operate in a supreme attempt to stimulate production and make good the desperate deficiencies of equipment. Over a million civilians, as yet almost unarmed, had been enrolled in the Home Guard. Legislation had empowered the Government to conscribe all persons and all property for the service of defence. These measures, unprecedented as they were, were behind rather than ahead of public opinion. The people were awake as never before.

But on the highest level the power that could master circumstance had not yet emerged. The Government now in office still showed signs that it had been formed as much by a bargain between parties as by a determination to concentrate the whole available leadership of the nation, and its organization was still a compromise between the departmentalism of peace-time and the release of the principal leaders to become a detached executive for the untrammelled conduct of the war. Of an all-embracing strategic plan, capable of being pitted against the deeply laid plans of the enemy, there was at this moment no possibility. Every resource had to be thrown into a hand-to-mouth fight for bare survival; and survival was still in doubt.

September 1941—Isolation ended

By September 1941 the perilous phase of British isolation had been overpassed. Six months of nightly bombing of London had shown that the war could not be lost by the breakdown of civilian moral. Mr. Roosevelt was in office for an unprecedented third term, with a mandate to make American productive power the guarantor of the Allied cause. From the "arsenal of democracy" a steadily increasing supply of the munitions of war, sent under the lease-lend arrangement, might now be expected; and the signature of the Atlantic Charter had recently pledged the United States to a joint responsibility with the British Empire for the future settlement of Europe on declared principles of international justice.

Meanwhile the whole of Europe west of Russia, with the exception of the Iberian peninsula and isolated Sweden and Switzerland, had passed under the control of the Axis. After the submersion of the Balkans a new defensive line had had to be formed to bar further advance to the south-east. It ran through Egypt, Syria, and Persia, and at its western extremity in the Libyan desert was involved in alternating vicissitudes of fortune, which at the date of the anniversary had become adverse. Although the Italian Empire in East Africa had been overthrown, and Ethiopia liberated, little progress

had been made towards reopening the Mediterranean route to imperial traffic, and thus relieving the grievous strain on British shipping resources.

The whole aspect of the war, however, had been transformed by the German onslaught upon Russia. In spite of the German advance over vast expanses of territory, the early battles had shown that the military efficiency of the Russian armies had been quite unjustly doubted; and now the prophets were speculating whether Moscow and Leningrad could hold out long enough to subject the invaders to the hardships of a winter that might bring upon Hitler a disaster comparable to Napoleon's. At the same time these great events had brought to the British people, no less than to the Americans, an enlargement of understanding concerning the identity of the cause of freedom throughout the world; there was an increasing readiness to recognize China as an associate in the struggle, and British supplies were being sent in great quantities along the Burma Road.

Thus, as the new year of war opened, the foundations had been laid of a new Grand Alliance against the Axis, to take the place of the Entente. So greatly had the prospect improved in a year, that there was now in England a tendency to complacency, an apparent willingness to relax the tension at home and wait for Russian man-power and American production to win the war. The capacity for passive endurance among the British peoples had indeed been put beyond doubt; but there was as yet little sign that their leaders had any coherent plan for seizing the initiative and the direction of world events.

September 1942—Defects of Organization

The enemy still seemed to be superior, not only in available resources, but also in the intellectual vigour he brought to bear upon the conduct of the war. In comparison with the swift incisiveness of his blows, the strategy imposed on the British forces in the Middle East seemed tentative and ill co-ordinated, vacillating between the driving home of the attack in Libya and the attempt to defend the Balkans, and in the end failing in both. Tactically also the Germans showed, particularly in the battle of Crete, that there were lessons in the combined handling of sea, air, and land forces which their opponents had scarcely begun to master. These failures, by common consent, were not attributable to the commanders on the spot, but were implicit in the whole scheme of organization, training and equipment laid down for the forces by the authorities at home. At the top remained a Cabinet still largely immersed in departmental responsibilities; three general staffs for the three services, with provision for consultation, but not for subjection to a single professional command; and only a rudimentary system for linking the direction of operations with that of the production on which they depended.

It seems mainly due to these defects of organization that, as we look back on a third year of war, although the power available to our hands has vastly increased, our achievements have not been worthy of our opportunities. The grand alliance has now been fully in being for nine months. The adhesion of the United States as a belligerent must, in the not very long run,

greatly outweigh the addition of Japan to the ranks of our enemies. The long effort to overtake the enemy's lead in equipment is nearing success; the Allies already possess general, though not always local, superiority of numbers in the air; and preponderance in all armament is in sight. But there remains a danger period, during which defeat might overtake us before these unanswerable advantages can be brought to bear; and they will never be brought to bear if we fail to read aright the lessons implicit in the last year's disappointments.

No doubt it was inevitable that Japan, long prepared and striking at her own carefully chosen moment, should inflict devastating damage on an Empire already so deeply committed against two formidable enemies. Probably the temporary loss of Hong-Kong, Singapore, Malaya and Burma, with the cutting of the main communications between China and her allies, could in no case have been prevented. The American naval victories have already shown that the alliance has the resources that can restore the situation. But the tactical failures remain a rankling memory.

If the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* betray an inadequate comprehension of combined tactics at sea, and the arrival of unnecessarily large forces at Singapore only in time to surrender shows a lack of liaison between the staffs in Whitehall and the commanders in the theatre of war, the defeat in the summer campaign in Libya suggests insufficient mutual adaptation between strategy and production. In quantity of armament the heavy handicap with which we entered the war is now overcome. But we still find that the types of tanks and guns supplied to our armies in the field are less exactly adjusted to local conditions and tactical needs than those of the enemy. The inference is inevitable that the Ministry of Production, which, in conjunction with that of Labour, has done so much to stimulate output, is not yet working in such intimate contact with the service Ministries as to make production and strategical planning an inseparable unity.

Urgency of Unified Strategy

It is of extreme urgency to remedy what defects the past year has revealed, standing as the United Nations do on the brink of an evident crisis in the war. The enemy is making a supreme effort to bring Russia to her knees in time to draw off his forces from the eastern front and plant an impregnable garrison in western Europe before America can deploy her full power and the Allies begin the reconquest. This is the question of the so-called "second front". The urgency of the undertaking has been publicly proclaimed. When and how it can be initiated is a question on which no opinion is of any value whatever except that of the few responsible men who are in possession of the full facts. It is difficult to understand the state of mind of those who think so great an enterprise would have the slightest chance of success if it were launched under the control of men who were capable of letting their judgment in such a matter be influenced in any degree by the resolutions of mass meetings or agitations in the lobbies.

On the other hand it is rightly the concern of public opinion to demand that the machinery for forming decisions on this high strategic question, and

on many others related to it, shall be more adequate in the fourth year of war than it has seemed to be in the third. Certain needs have been demonstrated. The first is for the whole plan of war, on its technical side, to be conceived in terms of the co-operation of all three services, and thought out by strategists to its strategic end, before it is co-ordinated with policy by the intervention of any Minister. Secondly, there is need for production to be so wedded to strategy by co-ordination at the highest level that the ordering of operations and the provision of the weapons they require are parts of one and the same plan; which implies as a corollary that scientific invention must be raised from consultative to executive status in the counsels of the high command.

Thirdly, there is at least a strong case for vesting the ultimate authority in a small number of outstanding minds, set free from any other responsibility but that of thinking ahead and planning the whole conduct of the war. It is possible that it is too late to expect exactly this reorganization—that the small War Cabinet of non-departmental Ministers for which The Round Table has argued cannot be achieved with the human material at our disposal and under a leadership that we have no desire to change. Yet it is significant that criticism of a system under which one man bears a superhuman burden while his nearest colleagues are relegated to mere administration is not confined to England: elsewhere in this issue it appears that much the same things are being said in two other countries, South Africa and the United States, where exceptional personalities are at the head of the Governments.

Finally, whatever form the machinery for British war planning may take, it has to be fitted at last into that which will evolve the plan of the United Nations. Since the entry of the United States into the war a complex apparatus of councils and committees has been set up on both sides of the ocean to co-ordinate the execution of policy in all its manifestations. In many parts of the world joint forces of the Allies are serving under a unified command. It is not yet possible, however, to discern the authority capable of laying down a master-plan of war to be followed in harmony by all the four major Powers of the alliance. This is not surprising, since even within the British forces a visitor successively to naval, military, and air force high commands may hear expounded three contradictory conceptions of the process by which victory is to be sought. But all the enemy's forces, at any rate in Europe, are moved by a single authority; and that fact at present secures to them a dangerous advantage.

TWENTY YEARS ON

IT is to be hoped that concern for the post-war age is not confined to those Planners who have so long been busy allotting the spoils of a war which has not yet been won, and in any case is unlikely to yield many spoils. Where shall we find ourselves twenty years after the end of this war—twenty years, it will be remembered, representing not only the term of the recent Anglo-Russian alliance, but also, more ominously, the interval between Versailles and Munich? The twenty years which followed the last war, we can never afford to forget, were one of the most tragic eras of our history, the period in which men who had evaded the labours and perils of the war did most of our writing and talking for us; the period in which the workaday virtues by which wars are won, and civilizations maintained, were derided and abandoned by the vocal; in which Christianity and the British Empire were accorded a consistently bad Press by the intelligentsia, and we seemed likely to part with most of the anchors of our civilization. Despite conscription, large-scale war kills off so high a proportion of the more courageous and unselfish, that its aftermath is always likely to enthrone timidity and selfishness, and we must expect powerful currents to set in the same direction as soon as the last shot is fired. Against moral decadence at home only the lessons of war-time, if we learn them, can protect us. Against political nihilism and incompetence abroad we can do something to guard ourselves by reflection now.

The Terms of the Russian Treaty

In the mists of the future some landmarks are already beginning to take shape. After the Atlantic Charter, the chief is the Anglo-Russian Treaty, signed on May 26. Let it be said at once that it stands in the main tradition of British foreign policy, and that, in the eye of history, it is no stranger that Britain should now be allied with Soviet Russia than that she should once have been allied with the Tsar. The Treaty contains two parts—the first dealing with the war, and the second with "the post-war period"—and, while there are those who would have liked to see the second part even more explicit, enthusiastic and comprehensive, there are others who would have preferred it to be omitted altogether, so that the whole alliance might be limited to the present war, and our post-war activities as widely associated with as many of our other allies as possible. We should certainly not allow ourselves to build, these critics say, upon Stalin's apparent readiness to acquiesce in the language of the Atlantic Charter. Communist newspapers in the United States have been arguing, quite lately, that just as, for practical reasons, Stalin had temporarily to profess friendship for Germany, so, for practical reasons, he has now temporarily to profess friendship for Britain. We should remember, say these critics, that when, eight years ago, the French, like us, made an alliance with Russia, and for the same reason —that Russia was needed as a counterpoise to Germany—the immediate

consequence in many countries, and particularly in Central Europe outside Czechoslovakia, was a recoil from France.

There is doubtless something in these warnings, though not so much as the alarmists suppose. It is certainly desirable that the British Press should be somewhat more discreet and clear-headed in its commentary. We have so long and so roundly denounced all dictatorships, as such, that some of the language we now use of Russia is bound to bewilder foreign audiences. It should surely be possible to salute a gallant ally, and admire the organization and discipline on which Russian military prowess is based, without failing to recognize that the organization and the discipline are totalitarian, and have been equally responsible for the military prowess of the Germans. It should be possible to welcome Soviet Russia as an ally, as we welcomed Tsarist Russia in 1914, and to hope, and pray, for its success without using language which makes nonsense of all our more solemn pronouncements as to the meaning of the war, or suggests that we may end by embracing the very principles we took up arms to destroy.

Learning from one another

Granted this much at least of discretion, it should be possible for both Britain and Russia to learn much from each other. In Russia, after all, we see a country which for years before the German armies crossed her frontiers had lived the austere and disciplined life which we now see to be not only morally desirable but indispensable for those who intend to be ready to defend themselves against aggression. It is true that the austerity and discipline were imposed by compulsion, and that, though we may well admire the results, we should not wish to imitate the methods. It is true too, though it is not generally understood, that the military rigours of life in peace-time Russia are all embracing—not merely no profits, but no high wages, the liability of all to work anywhere under a soldier's discipline for a soldier's pay—and, since we have never dreamt of going so far as this in war-time, it is unlikely that we shall stomach such severities after the war is over. Nevertheless, there are surely lessons for us here. From the first day of war, and before it, our fundamental problem has been how to produce in a free society, and in peace as well as war, the discipline, the sacrifices, the austerity which the totalitarian State can enforce by compulsion. That problem was originally set us by Germany; it may prove an advantage that it has been, so to speak, restated in new terms by Russia—provided always that we remember that the secret police is still the secret police, whether it is called the Gestapo or the Ogpu. Provided, too, that we see the Russian landscape steadily, and see it whole. At present too many British citizens appear wishfully to suppose that to imitate Russia all that is necessary is to eliminate profits, overlooking the fact that for the rank and file of industry high wages, and the right to strike for them, are equally excluded. A soldier's pay and a soldier's discipline for all, even in peace-time; that is the model which we shall have to bear in mind. How much of it can we, how much of it ought we, to imitate? Such is the searching moral and political problem set us

originally by our totalitarian enemies, but now popularized, reinforced and clarified by our totalitarian friends.

The Russians, surely, have at least as much to learn from us. Can we hope that alliance with the West may induce them to mitigate the rigours of intolerance? Can the Soviet system coexist with freedom to think, to criticize and to worship? Will not dangerous strains develop in a close peacetime alliance with a State in which Christians, unable to propagate their faith, may almost be said to have returned to the Catacombs? It is possible, of course, that an era of the Catacombs might be good for Western Christianity; the Danish philosopher, Kierkegaard, suggested as much at the beginning of the last century. And it is true that before the war the fate of the Orthodox Church, and indeed of many Russian Christians, appeared to provoke little sympathy, or even interest, from organized religion in this country; but then there was pastor Niemöller and the German Christians to occupy British attention; could the Churches remain equally apathetic, if Russia had become the only scene of the repression of Christianity on the grand scale? These lessons can only be learnt upon a foundation of much greater mutual understanding than has been achieved in the past. We must cease to think of the Russians as non-Europeans and outlaws; the Russians must cease to think of us as exploiting capitalists and imperialists.

World Government of the Future

But—although this has often proved, unexpectedly enough, to be the major consequence of an alliance entered into for very different reasons—the Russian Alliance was not primarily created in order that the allies should exercise a mutual influence on each others' internal affairs. After the primary object of joint self-preservation and victory, the chief aim of the treaty-makers is clearly the preservation of the peace of the world, at least during the somewhat ill-omened period of twenty years for which the alliance is to last. Some of the general principles of post-war action are laid down in the second part of the Treaty, and they appear to involve a certain contradiction. Both parties (Article III) resolve to take all measures in their power to "render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her . . .". But they also agree (Article V) to act in accordance with the principle "of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States". The two declarations are not entirely compatible; for the internal affairs of Germany, or one of the States associated with her, might again take such a course that timely interference with them by Britain and Russia, and whatever other Powers were then acting with them, might well be the only means of maintaining the peace, even for twenty years.

But clearly, however fruitful the Treaty proves, however fully the contracting parties understand and sympathize with each other, however closely and faithfully they act together, nothing envisaged in this alliance can be regarded as a solution of the problem of future world government. It is impossible to peer even cursorily into the future without thinking at once of the chairs which were empty when this Treaty was signed. Who can think

of the future of Europe without thinking of France, or of the future of the world without thinking of the United States—or of either without thinking of the British Empire? The truth, surely, is that this Treaty is essentially an *ad hoc* arrangement. It cannot be intended as the nucleus of a future world government. Its objects are at once more precise and less comprehensive. It is intended as an instrument first for defeating, and then for restraining, Germany and her satellites. So much indeed is suggested by its very selection of the term of twenty years, the period within which Germany collected sufficient strength, after her last defeat, for yet another spring at the throat of civilization. Victory, and the police work which will tame and muzzle the German wolf during these crucial first twenty years—it is easy to see how Britain and Russia must bear a dominant responsibility here. But as to the pattern of world-government to be, that is a very different affair.

Principle of Growth

The Treaty itself clearly recognizes the principle of growth. Article III speaks of uniting "with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression". And, after the signature, Mr. Eden declared that "there is nothing exclusive in our agreement. . . . But understanding between us is one of the foundations of peace, not for us alone, but for the world". All this is very true. The Anglo-Soviet alliance is the indispensable instrument for discharging the first practical obligations of the post-war period. But within those first twenty years there are not only the first police, salvage, hospital and rescue operations to be carried out; there are the foundations to be laid of a more permanent structure, that structure without which peace may indeed not outlast the twenty years' term of the Treaty. This is certainly not to suggest that a brand new international authority should be put together on paper, as in 1919, as soon as the last shot is fired. After this war we must not be in a hurry. Police work first, constitutions in God's good time. The League of Nations was manufactured, and therefore doomed. Its successor must grow.

And if it is to grow, it must grow from the union of the harmonious and like-minded. Allies need not share a common ideology in order to fight a war, or to police a continent, nor doubtless need all the nations which eventually combine in the mature and elastic international organization which will one day be. But for the first living and growing nucleus of the wider structure must we not look for elements which can coalesce because their roots are in a common political tradition, and because history has proved that they no longer contain the germs of serious discord? And where should we look for the core of such future growth if not to the British Empire, a third of the human race in a working and long-developed League of Nations, which has already banished war from within its own boundaries? And, indeed within the British Empire, to its own inner core, Britain and the Dominions, with their intimate union, their long political experience, their shared traditions, and their roots deep in four continents? There, surely, is a structure which was not manufactured, but grew, repeatedly adapting itself to changing circumstances, and which still contains the seeds of growth.

Here is a nucleus with which not a few of the United Nations would welcome, in the fullness of time, closer co-operation. And if a world organization to preserve the peace of the world is indeed eventually to grow up, it will only be because the United States has learnt the hard lesson of the great withdrawal after the last war, and determined this time to shoulder the inevitable obligation. Exactly when and how the United States will co-operate in the new world order no one should now predict, for it is much more likely that Americans will find themselves tackling the job, and subsequently rationalizing the *fait accompli*, than that anybody should draw up in advance a prophetic blue-print of how they are to set about it. But here again, in co-operation between Britain and America, there will be no question of linking unlikes, of reconciling or ignoring conflicting ideologies and ambitions. The natural elements of growth are there. And with the Empire and the U.S.A. combining to shape the new pattern, so solid an advance would already have been made towards a world organization that further growth is not difficult to imagine.

The Atlantic Charter

"Further growth"—but it need not necessarily be growth in time. It is possible that the whole of the United Nations, themselves so immense a majority of mankind, may from the first retain, and increase, their working unity in face of the vast problems of the post-war age. But even so one must believe that the Empire and the U.S.A. will provide the moral and intellectual nucleus which gives coherence to the whole. And this indeed appears to be the pattern envisaged by the framers of the Atlantic Charter. That declaration was itself, in the first place, a new bond between the British and American peoples. But it looked forward not only to "the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field" but to "a wider and permanent system of general security". There again is the principle of natural growth from a living nucleus. And may there not be historic significance in the fact that this nucleus is Christian? The Atlantic Charter speaks of "access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world". If that means anything it must mean sacrifices by the wealthy. The central teaching of the Christian religion is that sacrifice is the key to life. In the British and American traditions there has always been a latent idealism which may soon be given its greatest opportunity.

PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTION

Since The Round Table last dealt at length with the subject of war production,* much water has flowed under the bridges. Many of the old controversies have been resolved and from their ashes others have arisen. Misgivings have shifted from the volume to the quality of production. After long travail a Ministry of Production has come to birth, but in a shape that was not expected and with a destiny still only vaguely and obscurely apprehended by the public mind and, as it sometimes seems, imperfectly revealed to the Minister himself. Important as these changes are, they are of little moment by comparison with the impact of the war itself on production as on every other problem. The outstanding facts of the last twelve months are that the United States and Japan are now belligerents and that shipping losses from enemy action have risen to a level that would have been dangerous even if the course of the war had not added substantially to the Allied need of shipping tonnage. All these considerations suggest that this is an opportune moment to review what has been accomplished, and what remains to be done if the armed forces of the United Nations are to be equipped at the right time and place with instruments of war adequate in quantity and in design to ensure victory.

Magnitude of the British Effort

In a speech in the United States during his recent visit and in a subsequent debate in Parliament Mr. Oliver Lyttelton has given figures which illustrate the magnitude of British war production. They will not have astonished readers of The Round Table, who have been consistently warned that much criticism, in and out of Parliament, did less than justice to the workers and managements of this country. But the figures are worth repeating. Two-thirds of the population between the ages of 14 and 65 are enrolled in whole-time service in industry, in the forces or in civil defence. Five and a half million women are engaged on full-time work in industry, and one and a half million of these are not peace-time workers. Strikes have caused the loss of less than one hour a worker a year. We are producing over 250,000 mechanical vehicles of all kinds in a year and guns—2-pounder and upwards—at the rate of 60,000 a year. Our production of aircraft, calculated by structural weight, has increased nearly two and a half times in the last eighteen months and the output of our shipyards by 57 per cent in the same period. Mr. Lyttelton might have added that this advance could not have been made without the simultaneous expansion of the manufacture of innumerable components and of ancillary apparatus of every kind. It is inevitable that in a programme on this scale there should be disappointments. There have been, and there still are, shortages here and there and failures, sometimes serious in their consequences, to synchronize production. Manufacturers are not all efficient, workers are not all industrious and Government

* See The Round Table, No. 124, Sept. 1941, p. 636.

departments still make mistakes. There is room in some directions for further growth and there are many openings both for increased efficiency and for closer correlation with the industrial effort of the United States. But, broadly speaking, the volume of our production is no longer the subject of substantial criticism.

Quantity and Quality

Recent reverses in the field, and particularly the unexpected defeat of the Eighth Army in Libya, have diverted attention from quantity to quality, from numbers to details of design. From the indisputable facts that Rommel's German tanks were more heavily armed than most of ours and that he has been using powerful long-range anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank weapons, a myth is in danger of being born, the myth of the technical incompetence and degeneracy of our designers. It is true that the myth is not universally accepted even by the most resolute and devoted critics. Mr. Harold Laski, for instance, has told us* that "The reverse in Libya is an epitaph upon a system. . . . It is the necessary consequence of a Government which seeks to revitalize a society that is dying instead of being urgent to hasten the birth of a society that is seeking to be born." But when millions of men and women are spending their lives making the instruments of war, not even the lamentations of Mr. Laski are so likely to discourage them as a belief that the work of their hands is being wasted on weapons that are obsolete. For that reason alone, apart from any questions of historical accuracy, it is important to examine what truth there is in current criticism of the quality of our war production.

On a broad survey of the whole field there is much cause for gratitude to our scientists, designers and engineers. They have given us aircraft, both fighters and bombers, of outstanding quality and performance; guns of all kinds and calibres certainly not inferior to the corresponding types and sizes used by the enemy; delicate and intricate apparatus for all the applications of radiolocation and for many other purposes. Moreover, they have succeeded on the whole in striking a tolerable mean between the two courses of unrestricted production of the obsolescent and unlimited technical development without adequate production. That in itself is seen to be a remarkable achievement when it is remembered how inevitably modern methods of quantity production tend towards rigidity of design. The British four-engined bombers of to-day, which in offensive and defensive power have no equals in the world, took shape on the drawing-board in 1936. It was over four years before they came into operation. In order to build up a production of two bombers a day, a manufacturer would require, apart from buildings and machine tools, to spend not less than a million pounds on jigs and tools to ensure perfect interchangeability and rapid manufacture. To maintain his production schedule he would need contracts at any time for 18 months ahead. Every modification suggested by experience or by technical advance—an additional turret, a more powerful engine, suspension apparatus for carrying a heavier bomb—interrupts the schedule and necessitates far-

* *New Statesman*, July 11.

reaching rearrangements of one kind or another. Successful compromise between progress and rigidity may have decisive results and the verdict of history may well be that our policy in seeking it has been wiser than that of our enemy who has sacrificed a great deal to obtain uninterrupted output of his obsolete Stukas and Ju. 52s.

Tanks and Torpedo-Bombers

The high quality of most of our production has been obscured by the accumulation of evidence that in two weapons, both widely felt to be of first-rate importance, we have been outstripped by our enemies. Those weapons are tanks and torpedo-bombers, and the sense of comparative failure is the more galling because in both fields we were the originators and pioneers. In each case we are reaping the harvest of years of neglect, the years in which Governments and parties almost acquiesced in the belief, shared by so many sections of public opinion, that the Navy and the Army were a tiresome and expensive survival from a less enlightened age. The Government has not failed to explain that after losing in France all the tanks we had, it was driven to produce first whatever could be produced quickest. At the time that decision was right, and it is well too to remember that the modern tank, with speeds several times higher than those of its forerunner of the same weight, raises formidable problems of mechanical design, particularly of suspension, which can be solved only by extensive trial and experiment. But, though much weight should be given to these arguments, the fact remains that after three years of war we have not had in action any tank which in performance, offensive power and reliability is outstanding. There can be few engineers, amongst those concerned in the manufacture of tanks, who would not agree that we ought to have done better or who would not attribute our shortcomings to two main causes. The first would be indecision and lack of imagination at the War Office as to what the Army needed, and the second defective organization, of which frequent and often unaccountable changes in the functions and personnel of the Tank Board have been a symptom.

Japanese successes and the escape of the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* have shown our torpedo-bombing in an unfavourable light. As with tanks in Libya, we have had to use our torpedo-bombers in conditions for which they were not designed and the result has been to make the machine seem worse than it is and to distract attention from the skill and courage with which it has been used. But when other navies are dropping heavier and deadlier torpedoes from aircraft less vulnerable than our own, criticism is inevitable and, like all criticism in war, will strike both the just and the unjust. Naval spokesmen have attributed all deficiencies to the long, and in their view unfinished, struggle for naval control of the Fleet Air Arm. The layman is tempted to look farther. He has come to doubt whether the higher ranks of the service apprehended in time the revolutionary limitations placed by modern aircraft on the exercise of sea power. The Navy has never been conspicuous for its failure to obtain equipment which it judged to be essential for its well-being and, if it has relied for too long on aircraft

inadequate in numbers and obsolete in type, its professional judgment of what was essential may well have been at fault. We are brought back in fact to the fundamental weaknesses of a system in which the three services are not welded, in peace and in war, by a combined general staff.

The Agreement with America

Much has been done, and is being done, to correct the defects which experience has exposed both in tanks and in naval aircraft. The task has been greatly simplified by the entry of America into the war. The ultimate capacity of America to produce tanks and aircraft is far in excess of our own, and under the arrangements which have now been made that capacity is placed at the disposal of the United Nations without distinction between the forces of one nation and another engaged on the same strategic task. A far-reaching agreement has been negotiated for the maximum standardization and interchangeability of British and American tanks and derivative vehicles. The tanks now in production in the United States and in this country will give to the Allies over the whole range equipment in no way inferior to that of the enemy. The agreement is a model of what can be accomplished by mutual goodwill and common sense. The tank is not, like the aeroplane, an article of commerce, and few of those who are making it to-day have any wish to make another when the war is over. That is one of the reasons why a tank agreement was found to be attainable when a similar plan for the standardization of aircraft would have presented great difficulties. But the fact that an agreement has been signed will not be without influence on the joint programmes of the two countries in other directions.

Whether on a short or a long view, American belligerency has strongly reinforced Allied war production. No nation could be expected to make the same effort or submit to the same sacrifices for a cause in which it was not itself a combatant. But combatants are liable to be attacked, and the transfer of the submarine war to the other side of the Atlantic has for the time being created new production problems both for the United States and for ourselves. In order to get full value from the tanks and guns and shells which we are producing here and in America, the U-boats must be defeated and the losses which they have caused much more than replaced. Merchant ships and the naval craft to protect them have necessarily taken first place in the list of priorities. Astonishing feats of rapid construction have been performed by the shipbuilders of the United States. Admirably though our own shipyards have laboured and different though our conditions are, we have something to learn from American methods, particularly in the use of welding and prefabrication. There is no field in which correlation of the activities of the two countries can be more fruitful than in shipbuilding—unless indeed it is in the use of the shipping available at any period.

Plans for merging the war industries of Britain and America in a unified effort are being facilitated by the machinery which each country has set up independently in the search for a more efficient production organization of its own. Drift and confusion at the centre led in the United States to the progressive concentration of power in the hands of Mr. Donald Nelson and his assistants. For internal reasons not very different in kind Mr. Oliver Lyttelton was made Minister of Production here. Their powers and responsibilities in their own countries are not identical; if there were no others, historical reasons would prevent that. What is more important is that their appointments have made it possible to set up a joint Production Council, with Mr. Nelson and Sir Robert Sinclair in Washington, Mr. Lyttelton and Mr. Averell Harriman in London, and thus to provide machinery at the centre for interlocking British and American war production ever more closely. It is in the working of that machinery, and in the sphere of planning rather than in detailed responsibility for the British productive machine, that the usefulness of the Ministry of Production may be found to lie.

The growth of American war industry to its full gigantic stature is the first condition of victory. But nothing that is done in America can release this country from the duty of expanding and perfecting by every means in its power the immense industrial effort which it has already made. Over a wide range we are producing war material of the highest quality. We have the technical equipment and the fighting experience to enable us to improve it still further both in quality and in quantity. We have not yet reached the highest use either of labour or of machine tools and in all the services there is much to be done in raising the standard of maintenance and thus indirectly increasing effective production. In a word, concerted effort here is vital and there can be no relaxation until the war is won.

RECRUITING OF PARLIAMENT

OF thinking and writing about reconstruction there is no end. It is all necessarily founded on some forecast of circumstances that are unknown. Hardly any prophecies can be made now which are certain of fulfilment; but one of these is that all the nobler plans for a finer world are bound to suffer wreck unless the British House of Commons is composed of members worthy of its vast responsibilities. The like condition applies with appropriate force to all the Parliaments of the Empire, to the Congress of the United States and to democratic assemblies throughout the world. It is peculiarly important in the British case, only in the sense that Westminster lies politically at the centre of a great Empire and geographically—maybe politically also—between the United States on the one hand and Russia and the European storm-centre on the other, so that any weakness or unwisdom there must be reckoned as radiating ill effects everywhere. It rests entirely with the people of a country to determine the quality of their elected representatives, unless they drowsily abdicate their power and interest in this matter to energetic self-seekers, or narrow local groups, or bodies ready to pay for the chance of having their own direct nominees in Parliament. How much of the future of the world will depend upon the whole people of Britain awakening to realize that it must send to Westminster the best-fitted men and women in the land, and then taking the steps which prove needful to accomplish that relatively simple but all-important object?

This, the primary essential, has been long kept in shadow by the focusing of discussion on points of political machinery which are all of them secondary to it—the franchise, proportional representation, the procedure of the Commons, the future of the Lords, an "Economic Parliament". The Commons control their own procedure; there is no external force inhibiting them from altering it, if a substantial majority of their own number reach the conviction that the allocation of Parliamentary time could be changed for the better. In other words, if the British people elect members of sufficient quality and intelligence to judge rightly whether the arrangements for the discharge of business in the Commons are or are not (that issue is not prejudged here) in line with what the modern tasks of government require, then the right course will be followed; there is no other road to an effective Parliament—no short cut if the wrong direction was taken at the outset in the choice of candidates.

For the past thirteen years every man and woman over 21 years old has by statute enjoyed the right to vote. Ancient controversies about unfranchised classes are dead. But whatever other benefits the universal franchise has brought, in the light of experience few would now claim that it has been accompanied by marked improvement in the quality of elected members, man for man (or woman for man), compared with 50 or even 100 years ago. Parliaments to-day contain, as they did not then, numbers of men who worked with their hands after leaving school, and that in itself is thoroughly

to the good. But Parliament must be not only individually representative—though this is essential—but also collectively capable of statesmanship; and all parties are backward just now in producing members with just that combination of intelligence and large-minded courage which government in the twentieth century requires, and which the British race can richly produce but is not at present insisting upon in its political candidates. For this failure there are definite and remediable causes.

Short Cuts to Parliamentary Reform

An item in the programme of the Labour Party at the last general election was to abolish the House of Lords; and if in some future Parliament, when the electorate had declared for a Labour Government, the Lords should act so foolishly as to obstruct important legislation which accorded with the evident desire of the majority of the country, they would speedily and deservedly find their remaining powers stripped from them. But the hypothesis of their so acting becomes more and more improbable, and no realist, chiefly concerned to see Britain fitting herself to pursue wise policies, would think at this moment of contending that an immediate *sine qua non* was the abolition or even the reform of the House of Lords. Overt party strife in Parliament has been stilled for two years. In this period the Lords, not being for the time an object of suspicion to anybody, have raised their reputation as a practical debating assembly higher perhaps than it has ever stood. It is still the Commons who force great decisions; that remains as it should be. But anyone who cares to apply the test of reading consecutively the verbatim reports of Lords and Commons debates on the same great issues of the war will notice how frequent in the latter, how rare in the former is the speaker who has something quite unimportant against the vast background to say, or even nothing at all, yet feels that he must say it, and does. It is striking that on the average, in the principal debates on high policy which the Lords have held this year, seven out of every ten speakers have been men who earned and did not inherit their titles; most of the other participants have either sat in the Commons themselves at some time, or else belong to families distinguished in the service of the State for generations. It may be a popular idea that debates in the Lords are conducted by august seniors, slow-witted landed proprietors, and millionaires who bought peerages with princely donations to party funds. The stranger who went to the public gallery expecting this, and then found himself listening in succession, as he well might, to Lord Moyne, Lord Chatfield, Lord Swinton, Lord Hankey, Lord Trenchard, Lord Milne and Lord Hailey (to mention only men who did not inherit their titles), would not be far wrong if he decided that the Lords was a much more dangerous Chamber in which to make an ill-informed speech than the Commons. The return of peace, restoring livelier domestic politics, will in all likelihood bring changes in the right to sit in the House of Lords. If they are chiefly directed toward preserving the high standards of performance attained under the special conditions of war, they ought not to involve embittered controversy. It would be a sad anomaly if dispute over the position of the Lords were to divert thought from the quality of the

predominant partner—the Commons. The latter, as always, will be the mouthpiece of the broad trends of public opinion. The former render an invaluable service in supplying men of special experience who might not otherwise be in Parliament at all.

Another of the short cuts periodically suggested towards a more effective system of government is the creation, as a Second or a Third Chamber or in some undefined status, of a so-called Economic Parliament. The idea gathered attractiveness from the indisputably unsuccessful endeavours of the House of Commons between the two wars to handle industrial, commercial and monetary questions with that degree of constancy, intimate knowledge and bold judgment which their importance and their complexity combined to demand. Few debates on economic subjects in the Commons were other than dismayingly disappointing to anyone outside the House who was fully familiar with the points at issue. It was natural to argue that this defect might be made good by establishing an Industrial or Economic Parliament of representative experts, to relieve the geographically-elected Commons of tasks which they were obviously tackling very badly. It was natural, but it was fallacious; for democracy, though it might delegate initial discussion to a specialist body of that character, would never in these days delegate power to it, except on matters which would not—as these obviously would—touch the daily life of the people at points where the shoe might pinch. The analogy of the Church Assembly is hostile and not helpful to the plan, for on the single occasion when that body sent forward to Parliament a popularly controversial proposal—the Prayer Book Measure—the Commons overruled it, and in two days stultified months of the Assembly's labour.

All this is not to say that no means can be devised for securing better continuous advice for Parliament and the Government on economic and industrial affairs. The mere fact that there exists no one body fully representative of the employers in industry, with which the Government of the day can consult about all industrial questions as it can with the Trades Union Congress on the trade union side, proves how piecemeal and haphazard are the present arrangements to cover this now vital field of relationship between the State and the economic life of the nation. It might be of definite advantage to Parliament and the country if an authoritatively constituted body could come into being of people who, not without personal responsibility for economic affairs themselves, would supply Parliament with the fruits of direct and systematic study of these subjects, as dispassionately as, in its small sphere, the Statutory Committee under the Unemployment Act of 1934 sets forth periodically the latest facts and appropriate recommendations regarding the finance of unemployment insurance. But the economic body, if it is to have value, must conceive itself primarily as bringing objectivity into political discussion of economic questions—as providing facts which will delimit the scope of controversy, not as superseding the process of controversial debate leading to final decision, which democracy justly cherishes as the right of Parliament alone. In other words, however far the advice available to the House of Commons may be freshened, systematized and perfected, nothing can prevent weakness and error in the final, crucial stage of controlling policy, except a House composed (so far as may be) of the best-qualified men and women whom the country can produce.

The present House of Commons can excellently debate subjects which are of current importance, are close at hand, and require no specialized knowledge for the formation of a reasonable opinion on them. It can discuss with profit, for instance, the purposes of the Ministry of Information, but hardly the organization for achieving those purposes. It can debate Regulation 18 B (which empowers the Government in war-time to detain British subjects without trial) and ensure, as Parliament should, that all the pros and cons are ventilated; but on a day when it debates Colonial questions its weakness immediately becomes apparent, because only a handful of its members have the personal knowledge, or the requisite mental grip of far-off situations, to enable them to participate even as fully intelligent listeners. Fewer and fewer members are drawn to-day, as were almost all in the nineteenth century, from a leisured and therefore a travelled class. When this war is over, the House of Commons will almost certainly have to shoulder greater responsibilities for external policy—towards India, the Dominions, the Colonies, the United States, Europe, Russia, and all the rest of the world—than in any previous age. There is but little sign that those who take an interest in the choosing of Parliamentary candidates pay a moment's regard to that pregnant fact.

How Candidates are Chosen

The votes cast on polling day at a general election settle which party shall have a majority in the next Parliament and shall form the Government; but it is not on polling day that the human quality of the new Parliament is really determined. For 615 seats the voters have the duty of selecting 615 out of some 1,400 candidates seeking election. Choose they never so wisely, they cannot raise the new House of Commons above the level of personality and competence set by the best 615 of the 1,400 who have been nominated. In stricter terms, the elector can vote for one out of two or three or four candidates standing in his constituency—but as often as not he is perfectly right in his vexed feeling that none of them is really the kind of man to send to Parliament. Being politically sleepy except at election times, this feeling unfortunately comes upon him too late, and dies too soon after the election is over, for him ever to discover the actual methods by which candidates are chosen or the reasons why they are not the people he would like. He is merely added henceforth to the large number of those who talk sceptically about parties and politics. But if he (and thousands like him in every constituency) can be fired to interest himself in the first choosing of candidates—for that is where democracy is undermining its own health at present—the weaknesses of Parliament can be made to disappear. The selection of the 1,400 out of our 46 millions, not the election of the 615 out of the 1,400, is the point at which the nation is in peril of betraying its old political genius.

Curiously few are aware of the machinery by which party candidates are chosen for a constituency, although there is no mystery about it. According

to popular belief, party headquarters in London normally dictate the choice; but this is not so. The practice of the two chief present-day parties, Conservative and Labour, differs slightly. In almost every constituency there are a Conservative Association and a Labour Party Branch. Full membership of either is open to anybody in general sympathy with that party, on payment of a minimum subscription within the reach of the poorest. When a candidate has to be chosen, the members or the annually elected executive committee appoint a selection committee, which in due course recommends a single name or a short list of two or three names for the full body finally to decide upon. In the Conservative party the local Association can, if it wishes, consult London and ask for names from the list of those who have entered themselves through party headquarters as would-be Conservative candidates for any vacancy; but it is under no obligation to do this or, having done it, to decide in favour of anyone from the headquarters list. Whoever is ultimately chosen by the local Association becomes *ipso facto* the official Conservative candidate for the constituency. Although in almost all cases the Association does consult with headquarters in the early stages, the free right to make the final decision locally and without interference is most jealously guarded. Local autonomy in the Labour party is somewhat less. The Branch must consult headquarters, must take into consideration any names submitted from there, and must submit its final choice for headquarters endorsement. This gives to the centre some definite power of control, but none of dictation.

Any man or woman wishing to enter Parliament, however, whether as an independent or as a party candidate, must first give thought to two matters—time and money. Parliament in war-time is meeting three days a week. Before the war it sat from 2.45 p.m. to (normally) 11 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, and from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Friday, for about 35 weeks of the year. On the time factor alone, therefore, it is hard for anyone to undertake Parliamentary duties seriously unless he is either a person of leisure and independent means (these once were many, but now are few), or a trade unionist whose Parliamentary salary is augmented by his union, or a member of a limited list of professions (such as barrister, stockbroker, insurance broker, accountant or journalist) which allow him to earn a living in London while not neglecting Westminster. As a result these categories tend to be over-represented in the House. Retired business people are common, but men actively in touch with modern industry surprisingly few. Agriculture is represented by landowners, not by land agents, working farmers or agricultural labourers. The more powerful trade unions have numerically strong representation, but working men not belonging to one of those are largely excluded. The great middle class—the backbone of the professions, of local life, and some would say of the nation—is almost totally unrepresented, for its members can afford neither the time nor the money.

The salary of a member of Parliament is £600 a year, subject to income-tax. His financial sacrifice is twofold: loss of time for earning a living by normal means (for anyone worthy to sit in Parliament ought to possess greater ability than a £600 salary in ordinary employment would indicate);

and in addition the direct expenses of membership. The cost of a contested election in England ranges usually between £300 and £1,000, averaging about £600 (in Scotland it is lower—odd testimony to native carefulness). That will recur probably every four years, possibly oftener. A member not living in London will need to pay for accommodation there while the House is sitting. Free rail travel between London and the constituency, free postage on one communication to each voter at election-time, and a deduction of certain essential expenses from salary before income-tax is charged, are the only financial mitigations granted by the State. In some places a bad tradition persists that the member is expected to give hundreds of pounds a year to local charities, but this is growing rarer; it only survives in constituencies which have been grossly spoilt by rich members in the past, and the average member need not reckon that item at a figure much higher than he would gladly give to charities of his own choice if he were a private citizen. Rather, it is the continuous upkeep of a party organization in the constituency between elections which may impose the really severe strain on his purse, if no one else is prepared to pay for it. Some such organization is essential, if any kind of political education is to be carried on. Apart from that, if one party maintains an office, a full-time agent, perhaps an assistant agent and a typist, all working week in week out to further the cause, while the other party does nothing of the kind, there is little doubt which will start with a long advantage at the next election. An efficient constituency organization can hardly be run for less than £700 a year, and most people would put the minimum higher. Party supporters must either raise the whole of that sum locally, or turn to their member for whatever is the anticipated deficit.

The Money Barrier

Consider the position of the local party Association or Branch. If Labour, it is overwhelmingly tempted to accept as candidate the nominee of a trade union or a co-operative society, either of which will in return contribute from its political funds the whole of the election expenses and a substantial part of the annual cost of the constituency organization; a local man, however meritorious, may have small chance against a rival with this backing, or indeed against one of the rich individuals whom even the Labour party does not lack as would-be candidates. On the Conservative side the same hard decision has to be made; if selection is not confined to candidates willing to pay their own election expenses and contribute £100 or £250 or £500 a year towards running the organization, where is the money to come from? It is constantly alleged against parties that they sin against the light by exercising their free choice in favour of wealth and against merit. But commonly their choice is not free, and will not be, until those very complainants and thousands of others face the question what price they as citizens are prepared to pay, out of their own pockets, in order that their Parliamentary representatives may be chosen from the best of the nation, without a money barrier.

Election expenses are restricted by statute to 6*d.* per elector in county constituencies and 5*d.* in boroughs; but the actual expenditure nowadays

runs usually well below this. Partly for that reason, an amendment of the law to reduce the limits would probably be agreed to by all parties. If the reduction was drastic, it would ease the quadrennial burden somewhat, but would not touch the annual one, which is cumulatively the heavier. Nor could an increase in members' salaries (whatever case there might be for that on other grounds) be relied upon to eradicate the main trouble. It would only tempt some of the constituencies which are already the worst offenders to look to their members for more. There is only one genuine remedy, and that is a widespread public understanding of the dangers to the State, followed by a hot determination to remove them. Few areas could not render themselves independent of the purses of their members or the funds of an organization, if groups of people in every constituency made up their minds that they must have the best Parliamentary candidate possible. This is not visionary talk. It is realism, for unless a vivid popular awakening to political responsibilities lies ahead, the nation cannot hope to fulfil the destinies to which its heart is summoning it.

Understanding of present facts must come first, and there must be no illusion that some mechanical device—proportional representation or any other—will abolish the barriers of time and money which now cause the 1,400 to be chosen from far too few sections of the 46 millions. It cannot be right that, as at present, one-tenth of the House of Commons is over 70, one-quarter between 70 and 60, and barely one-eighth under 40; nor can the high average age be explained away by reference to this Parliament being in its seventh year, for it was old when first elected. Some 22 Labour members and 38 others are over 70; there one sees the elderly trade unionists and the retired men. Only 6 Labour members, but 68 others, are under 40; there one sees the handicap on young men of ability without large means, for the 68 include a number who sit in Parliament by virtue less of merit than of money—yet without these the younger generation would be hardly represented at all.

There is no lack of intellect, experience or integrity in the country, and political ambition of the finest kind still exists; it would be stronger and commoner if the barriers which shut out so many from developing and fulfilling it were pulled down. Dust and heat and petty domestic issues cloud the fighting of elections, but he who fears these and cannot ride through them had better shun the political field; he will not be the man to stand the buffetings of greater affairs. It may seem alien to British thought, but legislation to pay election expenses from the Exchequer up to a fair figure for every candidate who secured a percentage of the total votes might well, under modern conditions, bring benefits outweighing the cost. But it would be useless in itself, unless accompanied by genuine local resolve to remove the other money obstacles. If this can be done, those who possess enthusiasm and initiative and the right ambition will find their own means of overcoming the time obstacle, and will not let that permanently debar them.

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XII

IN the final sentence of the instalment of this review published in the June number of THE ROUND TABLE, an attempt was made to temper the rather intemperate optimism prevailing at that time. "The great trial of strength in 1942 has still to come; and until it has arrived its results cannot be forecast." It has come; and its results so far have not been pleasant.

Hitler can have required no astrologer to tell him that 1942 would be the year of his best chance. If he could strike down Russia and capture Egypt before the United Nations had fully absorbed the shock of Japan's treacherous attack, before the British Empire had reached the quantitative and qualitative peak of its armaments and before the Americans could make their tremendous weight felt, he would have won one war and equipped himself far better to fight another, even supposing that the undiminished determination of the democracies made that necessary. He therefore struck in three directions—at sea, with a swarm of U-boats to keep us relatively quiet; in Africa to pinch out the bastion of the Middle East; and in South Russia to split the Soviet armies and disrupt the Soviet economic and military organization. These three great blows must be considered in succession.

The most insidious has been the U-boat offensive. It is no longer the battle only of the Atlantic, but the battle of the three oceans, the Atlantic, the South Atlantic and the Arctic. The main areas of conflict have shifted away from the seas near these islands to the American seaboard, the Caribbean, and the northern convoy route to Russia (where the U-boats are heavily supplemented by aircraft). Precise figures of losses on both sides are unknown, but the broad fact is clear that up to the end of July our losses were considerably in excess of new building, without counting ships temporarily out of service through damage. The United States officially announced that the sinkings during the week ending July 12 were the highest in history. This does not mean that Hitler's first blow has given him permanent success. There is no reason to think that in time the U-boats cannot be cleared out of the western and southern Atlantic as effectively as they have been cleared out of the neighbouring waters. In time also American shipbuilding alone will reach figures equal to probable present losses. But meanwhile it would not be surprising to learn in some remote future that the development of Allied strategy in 1942 had been modified and delayed. The U-boat campaign has not, however, prevented the reinforcement of the Middle East, and Hitler's second blow, after some very anxious moments, has been parried. It was struck on June 2 against the Allied line from Gazala to Bir Hacheim and at first seemed to be foiled. The line was a series of strong points, or "boxes" interspersed with and covered by continuous minefields. The strong points held, and special delight was caused by the tenacious resistance of the Fighting French at Bir Hacheim. The enemy, however, made a lane through the minefield in the centre, made

a box out of it himself, overran a contiguous strong point, forced the evacuation of Bir Hacheim after eleven days, and finally appeared ready for the main clash south of the famous box of Knightsbridge. There on June 13 the British armoured strength was decimated, and general retreat became necessary.

Fall of Tobruk

During the retreat, the greatest disaster of all occurred. The decision was taken to try to hold Tobruk; and two divisions were added to the original garrison. They were unable to withstand a whirlwind attack, and Tobruk fell in 36 hours. The news caused a profound shock, partly because of the former successful holding of Tobruk, partly because it seemed to confirm rumours that the Allied army was out-gunned, out-tanked and out-manœuvred. One of the results was that a group of members in the House of Commons put down a motion censuring "the central direction of the war", and though, when the motion was debated on July 1 and 2, they mustered only 27, this sign of exasperation was a reflection of the first defeat that had no obvious explanation. On the battlefield the result was a further retreat over the frontier, back past Mersa Matruh to El Alamein some 60 miles only from Alexandria. The retreat was skilfully conducted, and after bitter fighting on the first days of July, the enemy was definitely stopped. Later in the month a series of limited attacks pushed him back a few miles. As things have turned out, therefore, there was no great strategic disaster in the loss of some hundreds of miles of desert. The enemy is no more and no less able to use his supply lines across the Mediterranean when he is at El Alamein than when he was at Gazala. West from Alexandria, Benghazi is the first point of any strategic importance because it is the first point from which consistent interference with Axis convoys can be attempted. The serious features of the June defeat were the loss of between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners and the revelation that some of the equipment —the fruit of two years' toil—was defective.

These criticisms of weapons have such a bearing on the strategy of the war that they must be examined a little more closely. The main charges are that our tanks are too lightly armed, their two-pounder guns being out-ranged by the much heavier guns in some of the Axis tanks; that our anti-tank guns (mostly two-pounders) were useless except at very short range against any kind of German tank, and useless, even at short range, against some; and that we had no dive-bombers. The answer is most difficult to give without imparting information to the enemy; and one of the disadvantages of the censure debate is that there were probably too many disclosures rather than too few. It is, however, safe to discount both Lord Beaverbrook's protestations that everything was all right and the cries of the censurites that everything was all wrong. Nor can there be any harm in saying that the two-pounder tank and the two-pounder anti-tank gun are at a disadvantage in open country like the desert, where the range of guns tells almost as surely as in a sea-battle. As for artillery, our 25-pounder is a first-class field gun, but a bit unwieldy to be the sole or main weapon

against a moving target. Nevertheless, even for this purpose it is every bit as good as the German 88 mm.—a converted A.A. gun which won its reputation in this battle more because of its use in mass than on its individual merits. The answer both to this gun and to the German tank is our own six-pounder, whether mounted in tanks or used as an anti-tank weapon. We had some of this weapon, but not nearly enough. Lastly, the absence of dive-bombers is, in the writer's view, no considerable handicap. They were only effective on the German side when the R.A.F. was moving back—the period of a few hours only, which unhappily covered the fall of Tobruk. During the whole of the rest of the battle the R.A.F. has been on top of the *Luftwaffe*, and the dive-bomber has been their easiest meat. The fairest comment on this whole story is that inferiority of tanks and anti-tank guns did materially contribute to the loss of this battle; but that the inferiority is remediable. Speaking strategically therefore, this defeat is less disquieting than it seemed to be.

No account of this theatre of war would be complete without mention of Malta. The island has been subjected to continuous air attack in order to make it unusable by ships and bombers and thus obviate danger to enemy convoys. The heroic defence of the island cannot blind us to the fact that this object has been very largely achieved; but that does not detract in any way from the exploits both of our fighters and of our A.A. gunners. They have inflicted very heavy losses on their assailants, rising as high as 12 aircraft in a single day, and averaging four a day for month after month. It has proved possible to fly in the necessary reinforcements of fighters, but the supply of munitions and food is extremely difficult. Nevertheless Malta shares largely in the honour of having made Hitler's Mediterranean blow the least effective of the three.

Russia and the "Second Front"

The third is the blow in South Russia. The doubts suggested in the former accounts of the Russians' winter and spring offensives have proved justified. The German offensive was delayed but not sensibly weakened when it came. Using rather more than 20 Panzer divisions organized in a new way so as to pad them better against encirclement after a break-through, the enemy first crossed the Don at Voronezh to secure a defensive northern flank, just as the capture of Sevastopol had cleared his southern flank. He then launched an offensive, sustained without a break for over two months, which in that time cleared the whole Donetz basin, reached the Don throughout most of its course between Voronezh and Rostov, captured Rostov itself, and threatened to achieve a big strategic victory. It has already cost the Russians a highly important agricultural and industrial area. It has already reached Caucasian oil-fields and threatens to split the Russian armies of the North from those of the South. It has, however, destroyed no Russian army. The enemy himself claims no more than 100,000 prisoners, and the Russian retreat has never become a rout. That is the silver lining to a dark cloud. Some people may detect hope in the enormous German losses, but their effect can easily

be exaggerated. An advancing Army can repair its tanks. A victorious army does not feel its losses until it is checked—for example the Allied losses in the victorious months of 1918 were heavier than at any other period of the war, but never lowered moral in the slightest. No sign of lower moral can be detected either among the Germans or among their Allies.

The dangerous success of this third blow has naturally raised in acute form the question of a so-called "second front". The enemy has always been nervous (ever since Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf*) of having to fight really hard both in the East and in the West, and both the U-boat blow and the Mediterranean blow have been designed to make an Allied invasion of the Continent impracticable. When Mr. Churchill visited President Roosevelt in June, the joint announcement issued after the meeting was reasonably taken to show an intention to make the attempt this year. Such an attempt is, indeed, the obvious strategy whatever the course of the Russian campaign. It would be both dangerous and stupid to discuss what stages preparations may have reached for this particular form of lessening the pressure on Russia, but there has been so much loose talk about a second front that some statement of the conditions required for such a venture is necessary. They are, effective air cover, not merely for a landing but until such time as a bridgehead containing airfields has been established; strong predominantly mobile and heavily armoured forces to make the bridgehead, and far stronger reserves of all kinds to follow up; ships not only to transport the first batch but also to ensure reinforcements and supplies; air-borne forces to cut the enemy's supply lines far inland and sustain any organized rising against the enemy; at least qualitative equality of equipment with anything the enemy can deploy. All these conditions would, of course, occur to any general staff; but they do not seem so obvious to impatient critics.

Meanwhile the bombing offensive against Germany has been developed, though hampered by a run of extraordinarily unfavourable weather. Very heavy attacks have been delivered against the industrial Ruhr and Rhineland, and against some ports which are large centres of submarine and aeroplane construction. Some of the results have been ascertained by photographs, and the enemy have been unable to conceal the devastation caused. We should not look for sensational results—such as a perceptible decline in German equipment or in German moral or in the number of U-boats—too early. We should not look for continuous 1,000-bomber raids. There is no virtue in this particular figure and no special effort—such as the employment of obsolescent machines or partly trained crews—should be made to attain it for every big raid. We should not rely on the results of bombing alone. But if the results of a continuous air offensive are unpredictable, they are also indispensable. It is better to destroy the egg than the maggot and the maggot than the moth. The U-boat is easier to kill in the factory than at sea, and at sea than in concrete-covered docks. The destruction of one factory is reputed to have destroyed the equipment of five Panzer divisions. While, therefore, the present bomber offensive is only an embryo and can probably never be the only form of offensive, it must be recognized that even in embryo it has inflicted as much damage as many battles.

The night offensive has also been supplemented by a day offensive. Day attacks on factories by single bombers using cloud cover can do a great deal of damage; and many of these attacks have been carried out over Germany recently. Over occupied territory, targets have been expanded to include railway engines, which the Germans would, of course, use to resist the establishment of a second front. The term, incidentally, is very misleading. There are already an Air Front, a Sea Front, an African Front, an Indian Front and an Australian Front. The proper name for any front resulting from the invasion of the Continent is therefore merely "another front".

Japanese Activities

The enemy's blows against Russia and Egypt have rather overshadowed the activities of Japan. After driving the Allies back to India and Australia, it seemed likely that the Japanese would try to complete their work in China. They did indeed launch heavy offensives, which so far have met with very indifferent success; and for the first time in five years they have had to meet something in the air. The American Volunteer Group, now incorporated in the American Army Air Corps, has been considerably strengthened. Japanese airfields and positions have been attacked. On the whole it seems certain that the Chinese can continue their remarkable resistance for many more months; and it has been announced that the supplies reaching them by the newly organized air-freight routes are as great as those formerly sent by the Burma Road. In the Pacific, the Battle of Midway Island is seen more and more to have been a very heavy Japanese defeat; and it may well explain their quiescence in the southern Pacific. Allied aircraft have given them no rest in New Guinea; and not until the middle of July did they attempt further action against Port Moresby, by landing a considerable and considerably battered force at Buna on the north coast. Towards the end of that month there was skirmishing, in the interior, between Australian and Japanese patrols. In the neighbourhood of Australia, however, it cannot be said that either side so far shows many signs of an offensive on a large scale. The strongest recent move on either side has been an Allied attack on the Solomon Islands of which details are awaited at the moment of writing. On the other hand there are repeated reports from the northern extremity of the Far Eastern war zone that the enemy is preparing an attack on Vladivostok. On the Burmese frontier there is nothing to report, but nothing was expected until the end of the monsoon.

Some observers seem to detect a ground for satisfaction in some theory that the Japanese will wage their war without regard for German interests. It really makes very little difference whether this is true or not. The picture just given of the Japanese poised to thrust or to resist on so many fronts is a measure both of their intrinsic strength and of its usefulness—even if it be only incidental—to Hitler. The Japanese have contained very large Russian forces; accounted for at least five British divisions quite apart from attracting very large British reinforcements to India; secured the withdrawal

to Australia of very strong Australian forces; forced the diversion to Australia, China and India of considerable American supplies. They have done all this when every man and gun is required to meet the Axis in the Caucasus and in North Africa, not to speak of the requirements of a second front. The Germans owe a very deep debt to the Japanese, whether it has paid the latter to allow the Germans to contract it or not. It would be idiotic to imagine that there is not in fact the closest co-ordination between German and Japanese strategy. The hyaenas are convinced that the corpse of civilization will be quite big enough to allow both to eat their fill.

The Japanese intervention is indeed directly responsible for the most dangerous feature of Allied strategy, namely, the dispersal of forces. It has greatly prolonged the period of what Marshal Foch used to call "sticking on wafers" over holes; and the wafers have not always held. It has masked the scale of our mobilization and production and forced a switching of priorities from front to front, thus greatly delaying and complicating the wresting of the initiative from the Germans and the Japanese alike. There can be no analogy between this war and the last either on the battlefield or in the Council Chamber. The biggest difference in the military sense is, of course, that Japan ranks among our enemies and must seem to the more short-sighted in the United States to be the principal enemy. But the biggest difference in the economic sense is the loss of the munitions industry of France, handy, vast, efficient, which supplied from bases adjoining the battlefield not only the French armies but a large part of the American armies.

On the whole, therefore, the Minister of Production was right when he said recently that this was the most critical hour since Dunkirk. But it is pregnant with possibilities of good as well as of evil. The enemy has gone all out this year. If he does not succeed, the end of the year may well find him all in.

EDUCATION IN EMPIRE

Awakening Interest

THERE are reasons for hoping that, when this war is over, there will exist in Great Britain a livelier and more intelligent interest in the Empire. In the stress of the last war the loyalty of the Dominions and the fine fighting qualities of their troops aroused both gratitude and admiration. When the danger was past and the last Anzac had crossed the ocean to his home, the Empire again receded into the distance. The collapse of speculation in America, the distress caused by unemployment at home, the threatening rise of the Dictators in Europe—these were things immediate and insistent. Sydney and Auckland and Pretoria were a long way off, and once again things out of sight passed out of mind.

Now a second time the German belief in the fragility of the bonds which unite the Commonwealth has proved baseless, and with the addition of Japan to our enemies the safety of the Dominions is threatened, as it was never threatened in the previous struggle. Their continued loyalty, and the peril in which they stand, have awakened the desire to learn more of these new nations, and the determination to prevent the recurrence of the ignorance which is so often the cause of indifference.

There is much leeway to make up. It is as true now as it was in the days when Macaulay assured us that every schoolboy knew who murdered Montezuma, but that very few Englishmen of cultivated minds were familiar with the events of the conquest of India, that the history of the growth of the Empire is unknown to a very large proportion of our population. The reason is that they are never taught it. In an ideal world men and women would leave their schools and universities anxious to go on learning and eager to enter on untrodden paths of knowledge. As things are, most people, so far as they continue to be learners, pursue the studies on which they entered at school or college. If a man's acquaintance with the development of Canada stops short at the death of Wolfe and his information about South Africa begins with Rhodes, it is because in his schooldays his attention was drawn to the overseas possessions of the Crown only when their fortunes were dramatically and inextricably interwoven with the fortunes of England.

The Examination Test

THERE is a rough and ready test of what is taught in schools, the test of examination. A good school will teach much that is outside the examination syllabus, and a bad school will content itself with cramming for the School Certificate. But even if we admit that our test is imperfect, it can hardly be held that the present position is satisfactory. In 1941 a Sub-Committee of the Head Masters' Conference made enquiries of the eight Boards which conduct the examination of schools. It appeared that in the School Certificate

Examination four Boards set a special paper on Empire History. That set by the Oxford Delegacy was the most successful, for out of 10,000 candidates in history 600 attempted the special paper. Twenty only out of 1,800 candidates availed themselves of the chance of taking a similar paper in the London Matriculation Examination, 225 out of 6,500 in the Cambridge Locals and 5 out of 5,500 candidates of the Central Welsh Board. The other Boards stated that they set alternative questions in their Modern or English History papers. No Board made these questions compulsory, or was prepared to say whether many candidates attempted to answer them. In the Higher Certificate Examination the Oxford and Cambridge Joint Board and the University of London set an optional paper on Imperial or Colonial History attracting 22 and 118 candidates respectively.

The significant feature in this return is not that the Boards did not set papers on the Empire, but that the schools did not ask for them, and made but a meagre use of them when they were set. It would be a mistake to suppose that the course of study in schools is imposed upon them by the requirements of an examination. All the Boards have the necessary machinery for consultation with Head Masters and Head Mistresses, and are willing to listen to any representations they may make about the nature and content of the examination. When we find that Empire History occupies so small a space in these examinations we must infer that it is the schools, not the universities, who fail to recognize its importance.

There is some evidence of a change of heart. The Sub-Committee of the Head Masters' Conference, after collecting the information summarized above, issued a series of questions to the members both of the Conference and of the Head Masters' Association. Of the replies received more than 80 per cent were in favour of the inclusion of the History of the Empire in the School Certificate Examination, and more than 90 per cent desired to see a special paper provided in the Higher Certificate. They were careful to insert the proviso that the questions should not be compulsory, but such a proviso is only to be expected from men who are rightly jealous that their freedom in deciding what is to be taught in their schools shall not be infringed by the regulations of external bodies.

Clearly, however, there is in some schools a reluctance to depart from the time-honoured programme, and the reason is not difficult to guess. There are few men who at the university have studied the history of the Dominions. Most history masters are familiar with some special period, it may be with the Middle Ages, or the era of the Renaissance and the Reformation. They are more competent to deal with the events and the movements of thought which aroused their interest in their college days; and it is easy for them to persuade themselves that it is more important for boys to know about the Constitutions of Clarendon than about the Statute of Westminster, if it happens that the former belong to the period which they mastered at Oxford and which has been the favourite study of their later years. It is not likely that eager and stimulating teaching about the Dominions will be available in schools, until they have on their staffs men whose enthusiasm for the British Commonwealth has been kindled at the university, or who after

taking their degree have taught for some years in a school overseas. Four English Head Masters at the present time have personal experience of one of the Dominions, and, thanks to the hospitality in particular of Upper Canada College and of the Diocesan College, Rondebosch, there are in several of our schools assistant masters who have enjoyed the same advantage. It is improbable that, in the schools where they are now working, boys will hear nothing about the Empire. When the war is over, it is to be hoped that the number of men with educational experience gained abroad will increase, and that it may be possible to arrange a regular interchange of teaching staffs. Englishmen may learn much from a year or two spent at Geelong or Grahamstown, and Afrikaners or Canadians much from a like period spent at Rugby or Shrewsbury.

For more than twenty years the Royal Empire Society has offered prizes for essays written on subjects connected with the Empire by boys and girls in schools at home or abroad. It has been more successful in attracting competitors in the Dominions and Colonies than in this country, some essays being sent in from the remotest outposts. It is interesting to find an Indian from the Blood Reserve, Cardston, Alberta, awarded a prize for an essay on the theme that "the inherent strength of the British Empire lies in the willing co-operation of free peoples". Some truths which are hidden from Bloomsbury are revealed to the Far West. The boy who produces such an essay, if it is a serious piece of work, has been obliged to read for himself and to think for himself, and such activity is likely to be much more fruitful than many hours spent in a Form Room. Only selected essays are sent in for the competition. In 1940, 358 were submitted, and it is believed that these were chosen from some 3,500 actually written. The efforts of the Society have done something to make up for the shortcomings of the schools, but the number of essayists, large though it is, is a very small percentage of the children of school age.

Oxford and Cambridge

The University of Oxford is the fortunate possessor of an endowment received from Mr. Alfred Beit, whose munificence has done so much not only for the University of Cape Town, but also for the schools and roads of Southern Rhodesia. His desire was that British Colonial History should form "an integral part of the teaching of Modern History at Oxford". From this Fund are provided a Professorship and Lecturership in Colonial History, an annual essay prize, and an annual grant to the Bodleian for the purchase of books. Money is available also for the award of Research Scholarships and for assisting the publication of books. The Rhodes Trustees give generous support to the Rhodes House Library, which contains one of the finest collections in the country of books on the Empire. In addition to the Beit Professorship and Lecturership there is also a Readership in Indian History. In the Modern History School questions on the Empire are set, but need not be answered, in the English Political History paper. One of three alternative papers on Constitutional History requires the study of documents illustrating constitutional developments in the Empire.

It attracted, in 1939, 32 out of a total of 269 candidates. In order to obtain a first or second class it is necessary to offer one of eleven special subjects, two of which are British Colonial Policy 1830–1865 and British India 1772–1805. In 1939 of the 269 candidates 15 chose the former and 9 the latter. In the school of Philosophy, Politics and Economics the papers on British Constitutional History and on Political Institutions may contain questions on the Empire, but they are not compulsory. One of eleven "further subjects", of which two must be offered, is the "Political Structure of the British Empire". In 1939, 22 out of 147 candidates chose this subject.

Oxford is well equipped for the teaching of Imperial History. In peacetime she has the additional advantage of the presence of the Rhodes Scholars, living links between the Dominions and what Rhodes hoped would be the University of the Empire. But only a small number of undergraduates, less than 60 in the two schools, are studying the problems of the Commonwealth, while a few graduates are doing research work for higher degrees. It is fair to ask whether Imperial History really forms "an integral part of the teaching of History at Oxford" so long as the great majority of candidates can obtain an Honours Degree in History without any knowledge of the Empire.

At Cambridge the Harmsworth Professorship of Naval History, founded in 1919, became in 1933 the Professorship of Imperial and Naval History. In normal times a Lecturer in Indian History lectures chiefly to candidates for the Indian services. Besides the University Library, the Seeley Historical Library and the Squire Law Library contain much valuable material for Empire studies. The Holland Rose Studentship open to graduates of any university in the Empire is intended to encourage research into Imperial problems.

Thanks to the influence of Alfred Marshall the claims of the Empire for some time obtained more recognition from the economists than from the historians. In the Economics Tripos the History of the British Empire was included with that of England, Europe and the United States in two compulsory papers on recent Economic and General History: but since 1930 the History, with the exception of English Economic History, has been dropped. In the Historical Tripos beside a special optional subject in Part ii, the Unification of South Africa, it has been the practice in Part i to include in the paper on English Constitutional History questions on the Constitution of the Empire. Although candidates have not been required to show knowledge of the Empire, they have generally had the opportunity of gaining credit, if they possessed such knowledge. Certainly in the days when Seeley was delivering in Cambridge the lectures which he afterwards published as *The Expansion of England*, students of history were encouraged to turn their eyes overseas.

The position at the present time is improving. It is stated on good authority that interest in Imperial history is growing among senior and junior members of the university. All the three groups, in which the colleges are associated for the award of Entrance scholarships, propose to include in their examinations questions on Imperial and American history. In Part i of the Tripos in 1943 one of the three compulsory papers will deal with the Constitutional History of Great Britain and the British Empire, and one of the two optional papers with modern European and American History. The monopoly of Europe is breaking down.

Other English Universities

The University of London is to be congratulated on possessing a Chair of Imperial History, the Rhodes Professorship at King's College. It was also to be congratulated on having that Chair occupied by Mr. Newton. During his tenure of his Professorship he presided for some time over the Board of Studies in History and was able to ensure in the courses prescribed for Degrees an adequate recognition of the Empire. In the Honours School questions on Imperial History are included in all the papers on English History, and a large number of candidates offer, as their special subject, some aspect of Imperial History, studied in the original documents. It cannot be said of the teachers of history sent out by this university that they are ill equipped for one of the most important parts of their duty.

Professor Newton also organized in the Institute of Historical Research a highly successful "Seminar", which attracted students from every part of the Empire. After three or even four years of research they have qualified, by the production of a dissertation, for the degree of M.A. or Ph.D. The results of their research have sometimes been published in the Imperial Studies Series of the Royal Empire Society, and not a few universities both in the Dominions and in the United States have appointed to their staffs students trained in this way by Professor Newton. Professors sometimes, like prophets, are not without honour save in their own country.

In its Institute of Education this university has the advantage of having as Director Professor Clarke, who has spent 24 years of his working life in South Africa and Canada. Since 1935 he has been engaged in building up a library for the study of problems of Dominion education and culture, which, if it escapes the fate which has befallen the fine special library of the Royal Empire Society, should be of great value to students when normal activities can be resumed in London. The School of Economics and Political Science has a Lecturer in Colonial Administration, and Westfield College a Reader in Imperial History. In the School of Oriental and African Studies one professor and nine lecturers, of whom four are not on the regular staff, are engaged in teaching the history and culture of British dominions in Asia.

Bristol, as becomes a university which had as its Chancellor that consistent Imperialist, Lord Haldane, has a Reader in Imperial History. For the Honours Degree students are required to offer a special subject studied with reference to the original sources. In the present year two of the special subjects are English Colonial Reform 1830–1850 and the Third British Empire. Higher degrees have been obtained by dissertations written after a period of research in Imperial History. Edinburgh has a Lecturer on the Constitution of the British Empire, St. Andrews a Lecturer on American,

Modern and Colonial History, Aberystwith a Lecturer on Imperial History. None of the other universities and university colleges in this island appear to make any provision for the teaching of the subject.

The W.E.A. and the Army

Sir Richard Livingstone has reminded us of Aristotle's dictum that the young are not fit to be students of politics. The understanding of philosophy, politics and history comes more easily to those with some experience of life. Wisely therefore the various organizations which now provide education for the adult offer a large number of courses in these branches of study. The Workers' Educational Association in its report for the year ending May 1941 publishes a list of the classes held at various centres. Those in General History totalled 227, in International Relations 549 and in Political and Social Problems 133. It is probable that the syllabus of some of these courses included some reference to the Empire and its place in the modern world, but it is certainly disappointing to find that out of the whole list of classes only 21 are explicitly described as concerned with the Empire.

The Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies at Oxford furnished in 1936–37 courses bearing directly on Empire problems in five centres and in the succeeding five years seven courses. In the same five years nine classes selected the Empire or the Commonwealth for serious study. The numbers are not impressive. In August of this year the Delegacy, in co-operation with the British Council, is holding a vacation course for foreign students, which will include a series of 13 lectures on British Freedom and the Development of the British Commonwealth.

The programme of these lectures for adults must be largely determined by popular demand. The experience of the Cambridge Board of Extra-Mural Studies confirms the impression that Imperial topics do not attract. The evidence afforded in local centres of the absence of interest in overseas problems was borne out by the small attendance at the Summer Meeting of 1938, whose object was "to survey in an objective manner the British Empire as it exists to-day". The suggestion is made that audiences are afraid that they will be subjected either to "flagwagging of the old-fashioned variety" or to outbursts of the modern prejudice, which "condemns everything that bears the name of imperialism".

At a time when so large a proportion of the manhood of the country is enrolled in the fighting services, the work of these agencies is necessarily curtailed, and the responsibility of the army educational authorities correspondingly increased. The War Office is warmly to be congratulated on the selection of Mr. Burgon Bickersteth to organize and inspire this most important work. Those who know what Hart House has meant to the students of the University of Toronto and what Mr. Bickersteth has meant to Hart House, heard with delight of his appointment as Educational Organizer to the Canadian forces. Now his influence will be more widely felt. Of one thing we may feel sure, that he will spare no pains to foster mutual understanding and appreciation among the various contingents and the comprehension of the Imperial inheritance of liberty, tolerance and good faith.

The Royal Empire Society has published a comprehensive list of books dealing with the Empire, but some of these are out of date and others out of print. The standard work of reference is the massive *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, seven volumes of which have now appeared. It is a monument of sound learning to which compilers of popular summaries may turn with confidence for accurate information. On a similar scale are the *Historical Geography of the Empire* edited by Sir Charles Lucas and *The English People Overseas* by Mr. Wyatt Tilby. Professor Berriedale Keith has examined in a series of publications constitutional questions. Of more manageable size are Ramsay Muir's *Short History of the British Commonwealth*, H. E. Egerton's two volumes on *British Colonial Policy* and Williamson's *Short History of British Expansion*. Perhaps the best description of the Empire to-day is to be found in Newton and Ewing's *British Empire since 1783*.

One thing is lacking. There are scholarly books, informative books, readable books; but there is still an opening for the writer who can catch the public fancy as Mr. Bryant caught it with his *English Saga* or Mr. Adams with his *Epic of America* or, to take an older example, as Macaulay caught it a hundred years ago. Will not his great nephew, who has shown us how the power to write clear and forcible English can be handed down to a third generation, give us that history of the Empire which he is so well qualified to write? He has told us that his *British History of the Nineteenth Century* treats of Britain "as the centre of a great association of peoples, enormously increasing in extent during the period under survey". Sir George has written of the centre; will he not now write about the circumference?

"Empire" and "Imperial"

The interest is reawakening, but there is still a widespread ignorance of how the Empire has come into being and of the purposes for which it exists. Sir Samuel Turner, in an introduction to Ramsay Muir's pamphlet *The British Empire, how it grew and how it works*, tells us that he found in the United States a general belief that "the Empire is based on the successful pursuance of a policy of aggression", and adds that since his return to this country he has encountered "a distinct tendency to share this viewpoint and to be almost apologetic about the Empire". Realizing that such an attitude was the outcome of ignorance, he has circulated at his own charges nearly a million copies of the pamphlet, in the hope that greater knowledge will bring a wider realization of the fact that "in the history of the growth of the Empire there is a very great deal of which we are entitled to be proud, as compared with relatively little of which we need to be ashamed". It is charitable to assume that ignorance is the excuse for the Socialist lecturers described by Lord Elton in *St. George or the Dragon* as "touring North America to explain that what the Empire 'is for', is to enrich a few capitalists and to obstruct the forces of progress". It is the ignorance of their audiences which is their excuse for accepting as plausible such a travesty of the truth. It may be pardonable in America, in England it is lamentable.

In 1919 Lord Milner delivered an address at Oxford to the students at a Summer Meeting. He began by quoting what he had said years before:

"The word Empire, the word Imperial, are, in some respects, unfortunate. They suggest domination, ascendency, the rule of a superior state over vassal states. But as they are the only words available, all we can do is to make the best of them and to raise them in the scale of language by a new significance."

To-day in the Dominions they have lost all sinister implication. Canadians and Australians know the facts. There is no need to tell them that they belong to a Commonwealth of Nations, "autonomous communities equal in status and in no way subordinate one to another". Secure in that knowledge, they are proud to belong to the great free league which we call the Empire. In this country it is idle to pretend that the word Empire has yet undergone the rehabilitation which Lord Milner desired. Used in certain political circles as a term of reproach, it is not allowed to divest itself of its old association with aggrandisement and domination. If there are enough people who persist in suggesting that a term is disreputable, it is difficult to give it the aroma of respectability. Words seem more often to descend than to rise in the moral scale, and this unlucky word has been weighed down by memories of school-rooms adorned with maps in which "British Possessions" were coloured red. "Possessions" is a misleading expression. No one who knows the facts supposes that Canada is possessed by Great Britain. No one who knows how under the inspiration of Guggisberg the cocoa industry of the Gold Coast has been developed by and for Africans, would think of that territory as anything but Trust property. Only when the present ignorance has been dispelled, when schools and universities alike recognize their duty to foster an interest in the idea and the ideals of the Empire, will that name shake itself free in this country of the associations of the past. Perhaps when that has happened, the Board of Education, which is rightly uneasy about the neglect in England of the history of the United States, will have some pricks of conscience about the neglect of the history of our daughter nations.

INDIA—WAR AND POLITICS

The following article, necessarily written in India during July, was in the hands of the printer before the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay. It is a picture of the military and political situation as it appeared to a well-informed observer on the spot up to the publication of Mr. Gandhi's Wardha resolution. The adoption of that resolution by the Bombay meeting, and its consequences, must be left for subsequent discussion.

The Burma Campaign

MILITARY events in Burma have lately overshadowed political developments in India, though some sections of the Nationalist press continue to regard domestic political issues as being of greater concern. The forced withdrawal of Imperial forces from Burma was, of course, an event of immense significance to India, as Japanese troops have now assumed defensive positions on the Burma side of the Assam frontier. It is only a few years since Burma was a Province of British India, and its recent constitutional independence added to the complexities of its defence; the command of military forces in Burma reverted to India when the enemy was almost at its gates, and there was no time to adapt former policies to current needs. Although five months of campaigning have enabled India to strengthen and reorganize her own defences, the fact remains that the Allied front in the East has been gravely weakened, chiefly because the swift and dramatic moves made by the enemy have driven a wedge between India and China, and have deprived the Chinese of that large volume of material support which had been flowing along the Burma Road. Our Chinese ally again has been thrown largely on her own resources.

Dispatches on the Burma campaign have been prepared by those generals who directed it, and Generals Wavell, Stillwell and Alexander have given their views on the causes of the Allied reverses. With characteristic American candour General Stillwell, Commander-in-Chief of American forces in China, Burma and India, remarked to journalists in Delhi that "we took a beating". Briefly it was the old story of the enemy's numerical superiority, of his greater readiness for the kind of warfare that ensued, and of his greater skill in applying somewhat elementary military tactics against forces trained for another kind of campaign. The Japanese have proved in Burma that a highly disciplined, specially trained and lightly equipped force can achieve notable successes in modern warfare by reverting to the simple tactical methods of old-fashioned open campaigning. By insistent infiltration they threaded their way through or past our positions, knowing that our forces, by relying mainly on mechanized transport, were inevitably forced to operate in the vicinity of roads. When the enemy needed transport he used what came to hand—human beings, pack ponies, bullock carts, and such motor transport as fell into his possession. The toughness of the individual Japanese soldier, and the fact that he lived on the country, enabled

undermined by the Party's unwillingness to compromise at this crucial stage in the world's history. The Moslem League continues to buttress the prestige it has lately acquired, largely because the British Declaration for the first time gave formal recognition to the Moslem demand for separation. Men of moderation, particularly those affiliated with the Non-Party Conference, feel that their efforts to end the deadlock have been frustrated by the leaders of the two main parties, and express their regret that their own ideas for constitutional advance find so little favour with the authorities. The Scheduled Castes and Sikhs, deeply distressed by some aspects of the British proposals, are trying through their leaders to remould public opinion in a manner more favourable to their special claims. The Indian Princes have made a fresh examination of the British proposals, and are determining their future policy in the light of British intentions towards this country.

Indians in the War Cabinet

Meanwhile the Imperial Government have given practical evidence that they have not been deflected from their course by the reception of the Cripps Mission. On July 2 it was announced that India would in future be represented both at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council in London; and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar and the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar were nominated to these positions. These changes had been foreshadowed by Mr. Amery long before Sir Stafford Cripps began his negotiations; but they are, of course, in full accord with his proposal to bring Indians into more responsible association with the war effort. At the same time the Viceroy's Executive Council was enlarged from twelve to fifteen members, thus further increasing the preponderance of Indians. The enlarged Council includes a new Defence Member in the person of Sir Firoz Khan Noon, who will take over, not only the work at present discharged by the Defence Co-ordination Department, but also a wide range of responsibilities hitherto exercised by the Commander-in-Chief—a proof, incidentally, of the sincerity of the offer made by Sir Stafford Cripps in this connection. It also, by the inclusion of representatives of the Scheduled Castes and of the Sikhs, meets the apprehensions, referred to above, of these communities.

These changes have, however, done nothing in themselves to clarify the attitude of the leaders of the two chief political parties. Disruptive tendencies within the Congress Party have lately been so serious that Nationalist newspapers have been urging the party leaders to harmonize their views and issue a clear statement regarding their future policy, both in the international and domestic spheres. During the actual visit of the Cripps Mission and shortly after its departure several Congress leaders, including Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, tended to give the impression that their attitude towards the war had undergone a change. Perhaps too much was made of this new mood by the wishful quotation of extracts from Pandit Nehru's speeches which, removed from their general context, led to the belief that his grievance against British "imperialism" was of less importance than his hostility towards Axis aggression. It should never be forgotten that, so far as the Congress Party is concerned, the international situation takes second place

to the domestic problem. In both fields there has been much confused thinking. In the international sphere Congress spokesmen profess to see a distinction between the war aims of Russia and China and those of Great Britain and the United States; in the domestic field the Congress leaders have been urging a variety of contrary policies, finding no common agreement in their suggestions for extricating the party from the political quagmire in which it has become bogged by its rejection of the Cripps proposals.

A Campaign for Hindu-Moslem Unity

The dissentient attitude of Mr. Rajagopalachari has been the most dramatic outcome of the Cripps Mission. With the support of a section of Congress followers in Madras, Mr. Rajagopalachari has been conducting a crusade in the interests of Hindu-Moslem unity. Realizing that no final settlement of the constitutional controversy is possible until Indians reach some broad measure of agreement among themselves, Mr. Rajagopalachari has come to the conclusion that the Congress Party would be pursuing the path of wisdom if it were to recognize in the last resort the Moslem League's claim to secession from the proposed Indian Union. He made a gallant effort to convert the Congress Working Committee to his view; but that totalitarian body has no use for independent thinkers and he was forced to resign his membership of the Committee. He next attempted to influence the All-India Congress Committee, but in that more broadly based body he could only muster fifteen supporters. Undaunted by this opposition he took to the public platforms of Madras, preaching in favour of that unity between the two main communities without which no political or constitutional settlement is possible. There have been hints of disciplinary action against him in some Congress newspapers, which strongly oppose any effort to encourage the Moslem League in its demand for the creation of separate Moslem states. He has since anticipated such action by resigning from Congress altogether. Mr. Rajagopalachari's policy is generally supported by Moslem opinion, including most of the few Moslems associated with the Congress Party; but the principal leaders of his own party do not agree with his campaign, and it is clear that the views which inspire it are seriously in conflict with official Congress policy.

The fact is that, while Mr. Rajagopalachari's campaign is designed to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity, it has, paradoxically enough, tended to give emphasis to the disunity which exists. Moslems note that the orthodox members of the Congress Party are hostile to Mr. Rajagopalachari's aims, which deepens their conviction that they can expect to obtain no recognition as something more than a mere minority in India's political make-up. Congress commentators in the Nationalist press have been extremely bitter towards Mr. Rajagopalachari, and even more bitter towards the British proposals on which he bases his case for Hindu-Moslem agreement. The British suggestion that an Indian Province may secede from the proposed Union is regarded by the Congress Party as another device by the British *raj* to maintain its rule—a view which ignores the attitude of the Moslem League, whose leaders say without any qualification whatever that they will

accept no new constitution that subjects their community to majority Hindu rule. Hitherto the British Government have been trying to devolve power upon India while remaining trustees for the unity which British rule has created, and nothing in the British Declaration has altered that general policy. Any readjustments of policy which have been made derive from the political circumstances prevailing in the country, where no agreement has been reached in regard to the formation of a unitary government. The Declaration has made it clear that the British Government are ready to go to the full length of devolution, even at the cost of a divided India. As one British commentator has remarked: "We have made it clear that Indian unity must be preserved, if at all, by Indians, and those who will the end must will the means." It is in the spirit of this observation that Mr. Rajagopalachari has been conducting his realistic campaign for harmonizing relations between the Congress Party and the Moslem League.

Mr. Gandhi's Attitude

The lack of statesmanlike leadership within the Congress Party may have regrettable consequences. Mr. Rajagopalachari's determined effort to end the political stalemate by common methods obtains no endorsement in Congress circles, while the declarations of other leaders of the party are nothing but a jumble of confused thinking. Congress men are becoming more and more conscious that the party's rejection of the British proposals has greatly undermined its prestige and authority, and a sense of frustration permeates the party as a whole. In these circumstances there is always a tendency to turn to Mr. Gandhi, who himself realizes that the party has lost much ground since last April, and will lose more unless it can be welded together by some common policy which will end the schisms within its ranks.

In his more recent utterances Mr. Gandhi has asserted that it has cost him much to come to the conclusion that the British should withdraw from India, adding significantly that it will cost him more to work out his conclusion. "It is like asking loved ones to part (he says) but it has become a paramount duty." The beauty and the necessity for the withdrawal lie in its being immediate. He thinks that if the British go now, while the Japanese are still outside India's borders, there is a likelihood of both Britain and India being safe. But if they do not leave India "heaven only knows what will happen". This defeatist attitude professes to have its roots in truth and non-violence, and in Mr. Gandhi's opinion it also fulfils his own contention that the British must not be embarrassed during the war. Elaborating his argument in "an appeal to every Briton", Mr. Gandhi has urged the British to retire from every Asiatic and African possession as well. He regards such a step as essential for the safety of the world and for the destruction of Nazism and Fascism. He says that acceptance of his appeal will confound all the military plans of the Axis Powers "and even of the military advisers of Great Britain".

It was against this background that the Working Committee of the Congress Party met in Wardha early in the present month, and embarked on discussions whose very length suggested division of opinion and embarrassment. Their main outcome was a resolution released to the press on July 14 and sent forward to the All-India Congress Committee which is to meet in Bombay on August 7. The resolution itself bears every sign of the confusion of thought which produced it and represents, no doubt, a certain watering down of Mr. Gandhi's original draft. It demands that British rule in India should end "immediately", but points out that the Congress Party wishes to take no hasty step and would like to avoid, as far as possible, any course of action calculated to hamper the war effort of the United Nations. Failing compliance with its demand for British withdrawal, the Congress will be reluctantly compelled to make use of all its strength, within the bounds of non-violence, for the vindication of the political rights and liberties of India under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi. The resolution is calculated, in fact, to encourage the aggressor nations while disclaiming any intention of the sort, and indeed accepting the continued stationing of the armed forces of the Allies, if this should be desired, in order to ward off Japanese or other aggression and to help China.

The deterioration, as the resolution regards it, of the Indian situation is attributed mainly to the Cripps Mission. And there is no doubt that a sense of frustration, of disappointment after high hopes, was the prevalent feeling left by the Mission's failure. Yet nothing, it might be thought, was lacking to Sir Stafford Cripps's conduct of his negotiations that lucidity, sincerity and patience could supply. They were not a sudden attempt to solve a crisis under the stress of war. On the contrary they followed precisely the line which had been put forward consistently by the British Government—witness a little collection of speeches delivered during the last two years by the present Secretary of State for India, which has just been issued by the Oxford University Press. It may be hoped that these plain facts will become increasingly recognized during the interval which still remains for reflection before the meeting at Bombay on August 7.

Certainly there is a growing conviction in India as a whole that this war must be won by the Allies if Indian independence is to become a reality. The Congress Party has already lost much of the sympathy which has hitherto reached it from across the Atlantic, and American sympathizers will dwindle further if Congress men, for domestic political reasons, embarrass the Allied war effort at a time when American troops are on Indian soil. Mr. Gandhi has indicated that he will give the British authorities ample warning of his plans, which he appears to have discussed with Pandit Nehru and Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, the Congress President. But it is becoming increasingly clear that so far the party's leaders have failed to rise to any heights of statesmanship in their attitude to the war. Few people in India believe that non-violence can be applied to the Japanese; in any event the Japanese would make short shrift of it.

India,
July 1942.

AMERICA AT WAR

HANS THOMSEN, Berlin's last chargé d'affaires in the United States, is reported to have told the German people in a broadcast upon his return there in June, that the United States is short of food, is angered over the shortage of rubber and gasoline, and has fallen down badly on the job of war production. If Germans believe these things, it is very good. Because then they will be producing self-deception which cannot help them win the war, cannot assist in meeting the gigantic war potential which the United States is building. For none of those things is true. The only trouble with American war moral is that the people are ready and willing to make more sacrifices than they have been called upon to undergo; hence they are rather less grim and serious, their war effort is rather less "all-out", than it might be and probably will be.

The point for British readers to remember is that the American continent is removed some 3,000 miles or more from the major war fronts. And so the greatest handicap to our war effort is that we are not subjected to immediate, daily physical danger. There are no bombers based a few score miles away. Our food supply is relatively secure and amazingly ample. There is nothing—to most of us—which is adequate to chill our backbones and curdle our insides and thus make the war real and our effort grim and relentless. This does not necessarily mean that our war effort is notably less effective. The induction and training of our millions of fighting men has proceeded with real speed. The moral of these soldiers and sailors and airmen is perhaps the brightest element on our entire scene. Despite the diverse racial origins, despite the recent differences over isolationism, our fighting services are united and serious. Our men have acquitted themselves not only cheerfully and bravely, but also effectively, one gathers, on the fighting fronts which they have reached. The heroism of our merchant marine crews, who have borne the brunt of sacrifice in the battle against the submarines, is beyond praise and can only be compared to that of the British sailors who have returned again and again to the danger-ridden seas.

Administrative Weaknesses

THE weakest part of our effort does not lie with the people, whether civilian or military, but in the field of administrative leadership. What Winston Churchill described as "muddles and mismanagement" constitutes our gravest problem. And yet, men who worked at the center of things in Washington during the first World War give their opinion that administrative conflicts and inefficiencies are being ironed out to-day much more speedily than they were 22 years ago. We are "six months ahead", they say, even in the field of administrative orderliness. Of course our preparedness and production measured by results already is far superior to 1918. Despite this relative advantage, the fact remains that our major weaknesses are administrative and in the field which might be called "lesser leadership".

Blunders and inconsistencies are more apparent the closer you get to Washington. Doubtless it is much the same in Britain. This is, perhaps, the democratic way of war. There is no doubt that we have badly managed the rubber situation, that better progress should have been made against the submarine campaign in American waters, that our stock-piles of strategic materials were handled very short-sightedly. Such wisdom-after-the-event could be extended indefinitely. Moreover, if armchair strategists are to criticize some details of the military conduct of the war—as they freely do in press and conversation—they can find much of which to complain. Probably a lot of their criticism will be sustained by the analysts after the war. We will never really know to what extent the limitations of our military traditions and experience have prolonged the war. We can, in effect, only hope that the men charged with the vital job of managing this effort are mastering their problems with a minimum of "muddle and mismanagement".

On the whole, this question of democratic leadership has not yet begun to trouble the people. They are proud of many of their leaders and they are tolerant of apparent mistakes. They are willing to make sacrifices. And they have some checks and safeguards. Not the least of these—and it is a bright note among the various ineptitudes of Congress—is the work of one particular investigating committee of the Senate, the Truman Committee. This body, fortunate enough to obtain an extremely able counsel, has probed deeply into various aspects of war production. It has exposed many mistakes in time for their correction, and has kept up pressure—the equivalent of parliamentary question-time, perhaps—so that the same mistakes are not made over and over again.

Public and Congress

CERTAIN other Congressional committees, notably the Dies Committee, have abused their power, wasted time, and confused the public. But the rôle of Congress in war-time, which is at best secondary, finds its most useful expression in constructive investigation and criticism as expressed in the Truman Committee. Public opinion, which suspects that there ought to be some check on administration, finds an outlet through proper Congressional investigations, and the members of Congress themselves obtain adequate information for their debates. This is almost the only available external way of keeping the administration of our war effort up to the mark. The need for some such check is particularly great since the Roosevelt Administration, with all its immense historical merits, possesses, like most other reform governments, a good many administrative and operative shortcomings. President Roosevelt is a great originator, the scope of his imagination is tremendous, but he has been inclined in the past to take the plan for the deed. And, on the other hand, the business men who have been called into the administration of the war definitely require some form of external checking. Each tends to represent a separate industrial or group interest, and with the best will and highest integrity in the world, their different interests require balancing and co-ordination.

The administrative weaknesses and conflicts are a substantial contributing

factor to such relative shortcomings of public awareness and sacrifice as may exist. The public are prepared to do what they are told is necessary to do in order to win the war. When one official tells them the rubber situation is grave, and requires nation-wide gasoline rationing, and another tells them the situation is not nearly so bad as pictured, then the common citizen is baffled and marks time. And when irresponsible, reckless politicians indulge in foolish forecasts that the war will be over "probably in 1942, and certainly in 1943", the public sinks into exasperation and confusion.

Nevertheless it would be a grave mistake to over-emphasize the vagaries. The particular forecast referred to above—of an early end to the war—was immediately countered in Washington by such blasts of pessimism as more than corrected the balance. And those politicians who are unscrupulously appealing to the voters on such promises as "tires for everybody by Christmas" deserve to be crushed at the polls, and probably will be. We still have our lunatic fringe, but there is much reason to believe that the people are seeing through the charlatans. Americans returning from the battle fronts, especially those who have lived and worked long abroad, tend to be horrified at the aspects of "business as usual" which they meet here. The conclusion is based to a great extent on the many normal earmarks of life which prevail. Naturally things look very different in the United States than they do in Britain, or more particularly than they do in Berlin, or did in Singapore. These returning visitors tell us, quite properly, to "wake up". Their injunctions do a great deal of good. But people in Britain, or other democratic nations abroad, need not worry about the willingness of the United States to work and sacrifice. Our people at home will be just as determined as our people on Bataan, when their tasks are laid before them. The difficulty is simply that the tasks have not been wholly set before the people, the demand has not come in specific detail, and—as we said in the beginning—we are not 20 miles from the enemy.

Production and Transportation

It is notable that those who are most critical of the failure of American public opinion to act as if the bombs might drop at any moment are not usually those who have studied our war production most closely. Indeed observers —American and foreign alike—generally return from these plants in a state of goggle-eyed amazement. And by now British readers must be thoroughly tired of articles about factories that cover townships and assembly lines that turn out Liberator bombers every hour on the hour. They doubtless want to know what progress is being made at getting the materials to the places where they are needed.

It is, of course, not possible to go into the figures of merchant ship sinkings along the Atlantic Coast in any kind of completeness. The latest tabulation, computed from United States Navy figures and authorized by the Office of the Censor, stood on July 10 at 354 sinkings since December 7 in western Atlantic waters. Progress at cutting down the rate of sinkings which the Navy expected to make, and has announced periodically, has not lived up to plans. The situation has been grave, and Americans have been deeply

alarmed. Newspapers generally, and the public along the seaboard, have been outspoken in their criticisms. And the Navy has been far from idle. Despite the past and present seriousness of the situation there are reasons to believe that the toll on German submarines has been large and cumulative, that crew replacements must now be extremely difficult, and that American counter-measures are rapidly being perfected. It can be said that the Navy is using more and more little ships on coastal convoy duties—110-foot, 173-foot, and 190-foot craft. Such ships are now being produced in increasing volume. Before long, it will probably be seen that we have won the submarine campaign. Our cost will have been heavy in merchant ships, tankers, and crews. Yet, surely, it will not have been an insuperable cost, and once the bill is paid our assets will start to pile up.

When the coastal sinkings are curbed, the long-range transport problem will remain. There, of course, the same methods which will have driven down to a minimum the submarines in the western Atlantic can be counted upon to some degree. The small patrol craft can be used in other narrow waters and near other coasts, if they are needed. They will not be particularly valuable for the perilous route around the North Cape and into the Barents Sea unless United Nations bases are established in Norway. Nor will the distance from the United States to the Red Sea, or to Australia, be any shorter. But the drop in sinkings of merchant ships which we can count upon will make it possible to put more ships on the long routes.

The Air Ferry Service

In addition, our Air Ferry Service has made magnificent strides, and will surely become an increasingly vital factor. It is a romantic tale, the shuttling of indispensable materials and men from America to the far corners of the world in a matter of hours or days. As our production of freight-carrying airplanes mounts—which it is doing—we can go far to help the transportation problem in the air alone. The Burma Road, for instance, can be replaced entirely by air transport from India, and to some extent has been. The major line, of course, is the North Atlantic ferry. Typical of its intensity of operation was the feat of a civilian crew of two Americans and two Canadians who, in July, crossed the Atlantic five times in nine days in the same Liberator. They were loaded with passengers or freight on all the trips. After two and a half return trips, the crew took 72 hours rest in Britain while the plane was overhauled, and then returned to Montreal. This same crew has had more than 500 hours of trans-ocean flying during the last 90 days, including eight trips to and from Australia. Such magnificent achievements, which are only the beginning of our air transport possibilities, show not only one large area of solution to our present transport difficulties, but open glorious peace-time vistas. The Liberator planes used on these trips are the same as those turned out in the mighty Willow Run plant, under Ford management, where one plane of this type an hour, 16 hours a day, seven days a week, is the production schedule. The planes are primarily bombers, but of course are equally adaptable to ferry service.

The ferry commanders have many thrilling tales to tell. A General in

Washington has a problem to discuss with his opposite number in London. It would take weeks to work out by cable. He jumps into a plane, goes to London, clarifies the matter to everyone's satisfaction, and is back in his Washington office within four days. What an immense gain, what extremely real and practical achievements are possible through this service, can be readily visualized. The ferry service is the greatest contribution to a unified command that could be imagined. The two ferry lines, one across the Pacific to Australia, the other across the South Atlantic to Africa and thence to the Middle East, India, and China stir the imagination to new heights. British Airways, of course, have long extended to far corners, and so have Pan-American. But never has the traffic flown these airs as it is being flown to-day. The line which Britain pioneered across Africa has been greatly strengthened. The ferry officers tell another delightful story of the earlier, pioneer days when a four-motored plane dropped into an African field and the American pilot asked for 1,200 gallons of gasoline. "Do you really need that much?" groaned the British supply officer in charge. On being assured that was necessary, he and his men proceeded to dig it up, in four-gallon tins, buried to be safe from bombing attack. The tins had to be brought 500 miles to that spot on camel back, with a 25 per cent wastage from tins that dropped from the camels. To-day, at this same spot, the gasoline is fed from pumps and tanks, and there is enough to supply four-motored planes in considerable quantity.

Raw Materials

It is not necessary, at this stage, to pile up again such figures as may safely be published on American war production. They are thoroughly satisfying. On the whole, they are larger than was expected. The conversion process from civilian to war production has surprised everybody. And as a result it is now no longer necessary to build many new plants. Indeed our productive capacity has a tendency to pyramid as managers—who estimated their powers, oddly enough, with some conservatism—find they are running at a faster tempo and can handle more orders. The new articles they were called upon to produce, they are finding, are easier to make than they feared. Their industrial experience was more valuable than they calculated. And so it is fair to conclude that production is no longer a problem at all.

There remain only the questions of an adequate supply of raw materials and of proper transportation to the fronts. As to raw materials, there will undoubtedly be many severe difficulties. But American ingenuity is still very vigorous, and hidden reserves are substantial. We can undergo many changes in our private lives. The country is extremely rich. There is a lot of fat from which we can live. We have not been through a decade of war privation, as in Germany. We have been acquiring our surplus, actually, for many decades.

Consider rubber, for example. There was recently conducted a campaign to obtain scrap rubber. The results were fairly good. But probably we only tapped the surface. In two New England towns, for instance, the sites of two abandoned rubber factories were searched. In the foundations there

were found millions of pounds of scrap rubber, still entirely usable as reclaimed rubber. In one case a widow had bought for $1,000 a little house near the site of the rubber dump. It had a mortgage of $1,000 on it. But she owned the scrap rubber, previously considered only a nuisance. To-day the widow's mortgage has been paid, and the rubber is being made into useful articles. Behind a cobbler's back window, in a western city, they found a pile of discarded, worn-down rubber heels weighing hundreds of pounds. Many city dumps are lined with piles of old tires. There is rubber, and scraps of all kinds, littered across this lavish nation. From this we can fight a long war if we must.

Security after the War

Mention was made earlier of the moral and efficiency of American fighting men. Words are poor enough to tell of the way they are tackling the job on hand. They are mechanically apt, trained by men some of whom have learned more than a little from the three years of war that have gone, and they will not fail at the task which they now take up at the side of their more experienced allies. They are exuberant young men, a lively mixture to fit in with civilian populations overseas, but the measure of their fighting abilities is their vitality. They are anxious to do a good job, a quick job, and an effective job. And they don't want to do it all over again. They want to avoid future world wars. They feel that we failed in the last two decades, and they are determined to avoid a second failure. They know that the war will be won not only on the battle fronts but in the settlement afterward. This mood toward the post-war settlement extends far beyond the armed services. It is the prevailing conclusion of American youth generally, and indeed, among a generality of citizens. There will be an unavoidable recrudescence of isolationism when the tension of fighting relaxes, but the conviction that this settlement must not lead to another tragic climax has penetrated deeply into our national thinking. And so, in conclusion, it may be said that while the American war effort does not yet have the intensity and sacrificial grimness of the Russian, nor the firm, disciplined resolution of the British, it is buoyant and exceedingly willing and ready for whatever is in store. We have a lot of staying power. But we know that the crisis is now—in Egypt, in Russia, perhaps soon in Siberia. If our allies, with such help as we have been able to give, can hold this summer then we know that our forces will swing forward to inevitable victory. We believe they will hold.

United States of America,
July 1942.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Central Direction of the War

On July 1 and 2 both Houses of Parliament held debates of unusual importance, focusing many of the anxieties which affected British minds in this summer of military shadow. Mr. Churchill had paid a short visit to the United States between June 17 and 27, and a tendency for the political air to become unquiet whenever he is absent has been noted before in The Round Table. This period of absence, however, was dominated by the thunderclap of one event. On June 21 came news of the fall of Tobruk, utterly unexpected (as the Prime Minister himself said) by the War Cabinet, by the Chiefs of the Staff or by General Auchinleck. A back-bench M.P. of considerable seniority, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, who has represented Kidderminster for 20 years, tabled a motion in the Commons when Mr. Churchill was still in America, to the effect that "this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endurance of the armed forces of the Crown in circumstances of exceptional difficulty, has no confidence in the central direction of the war". He was widely criticized for his tactics in threatening the Government at a moment when those very armed forces were struggling under Rommel's blows and Egypt was in day-to-day jeopardy. Many of those who felt no less acutely disturbed about the handling of some affairs in the past were unable to see either logic or national advantage in voting for the overthrow of this Government without having an alternative leader or Cabinet to suggest. Seven Conservatives, seven Labour members, one Liberal, the three representatives of the Independent Labour party and seven Independents went into the division lobby in support of the motion—not an opposition party, but a mixed bag of personally distrustful individuals. On the other side 476 votes were recorded—in number the largest support which Mr. Churchill's Government had ever received. He himself was obviously proud when members rose and cheered him as he left the Chamber; yet that which the vote expressed was not blind support of one man, but in part the determination to stand by him if he could guarantee the improvements for which speaker after speaker in the debate had called, in part the plain British resolve to close ranks when in danger from the enemy and to leave political fighting until the guns were quieter.

Science and Equipment

The chief theme of the debate in both Houses was our equipment in Libya. The Government case—that quantity production of existing types of tank and anti-tank gun, in the perilous year after Dunkirk when we were critically short of both, could not have been suspended in order to change over to initially slower production of newer types—was cogently put and earned a respectful hearing. But members of both Houses who were personally in

closest touch with our progress in mechanical equipment would have been more sharply outspoken had not two of their main pleas been notably met by the Secretary of State for War only a few weeks earlier. Sir James Grigg had created the new post of Scientific Adviser to the Army Council, bringing in for the first time a distinguished man of science (Sir Charles Darwin) to assist the War Office at the highest level with its equipment problems, a service which Sir Henry Tizard had been rendering for some months to scientific development in the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Ranking with this overdue improvement was Sir James Grigg's other decision, announced on June 10, to divide the General Staff Department at the War Office into two main parts, one to deal with the planning, operational and training aspects, the other with organization and equipment, and to put in charge of the latter Lieutenant-General Weeks, a man of high administrative ability combined with industrial as well as military knowledge. General Weeks holds the title of Deputy-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and all who have seen him at work since his appointment testify not only to the essential nature of his new office, but also to the skill and energy with which he is already closing the gap that hitherto has undoubtedly existed between real Army requirements and their translation into production terms.

The "Second Front" Agitation

This is the place not to discuss the merits, but to record the importance, of the controversy which persists as to the effectiveness of the machinery for joint planning between the three services under the Ministry of Defence in fighting a common war. The public has been as disquieted about lack of dive-bombers as about defects in tanks, and the Air Ministry has been criticized in Parliament and out for its alleged unwillingness to depart from purely Air Force operations in order to follow a policy of full co-operation with the Army on land and with the Navy in destroying U-boats and protecting shipping. Nothing in the war situation has troubled Parliament more deeply, for its bearing on the future, than the shipping losses of the United Nations, though it is known that these have not been sustained around our coasts. Secret sessions on shipping were held in both Houses on July 16. Were the whole conduct of the war as completely co-ordinated as it should be, cuts might usefully have been made this summer in food rations, not because of actual shortage of stocks, but as a decision of high policy to bring home to the man in the street, who can otherwise easily forget it, that (in the words of the joint British-American announcement of June 27) "transportation of the fighting forces, together with the transportation of munitions of war and supplies, still constitutes the major problem of the United Nations".

The 20-year Anglo-Soviet Treaty, announced by Mr. Eden on June 11, received a universal welcome from the country, not only as a strengthening of the Allies for war, but as a factor making for stability in the world when the war was over. The secret of Mr. Molotov's presence had been extraordinarily well kept, and the terms of the Treaty, when they became known,

pleased all those who had had any reason to guess that such an instrument was being negotiated. Naturally the phrase in the official *communiqué* that "full understanding was reached between the two parties with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942" gave rise to speculation as to its exact meaning. The idea that we had led the Russians to count upon early military action in the west permeated the country, as the weeks went forward and Marshal Timoshenko's armies were pressed back beyond the Don. It has been exploited, of course, by the Communist party of Great Britain, who are as clamorous in support of instant invasion of the Continent to help Russia as they formerly were critical of the whole anti-Hitler war until the day when Russia was attacked. But the man who has put himself at the head of the demand for an immediate "second front" is Lord Beaverbrook, with that extraordinary flair of the modern newspaper proprietor for sensing a popular desire, fanning it into a blaze and representing the dictates of reason as the caution of incompetence.

After leaving the Government in February, Lord Beaverbrook went to America for some months on a Government mission. While so engaged, he startled this country by a speech urging the British War Cabinet to "strike out recklessly" in support of Russia. Since his return here he has held no capacity but that of private citizen. His departure from office, however, caused no permanent break in his personal friendship with the Prime Minister, and recently one of the special anxieties weighing on Parliament, which has little faith in Lord Beaverbrook's erratic genius as a purveyor of victory, has been a fear lest he, and not the War Cabinet or the Chiefs of Staff, might become Mr. Churchill's principal source of advice.

Reference was made in the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE to evidence of a desire for an early general election, in quarters which found the present Parliament not to their taste. Since then, a campaign for a new Parliament has been opened in the Beaverbrook press, belittling the difficulties of conducting a general election in a bombed country with the enemy at hand. Public response to the suggestion has been anything but favourable, and *The Times* has boldly and probably rightly declared it dead. But it was disturbing to find so unreal a proposal in these days gaining acceptance anywhere. Suspicions of intrigue are not conducive to sound planning, and without the soundest of planning it is obvious that we cannot aid our Russian allies as swiftly and as massively as Parliament and the country alike desire. When Parliament, after sitting nearly continuously for seven months, rose on August 6 with the intention of not resuming before September, many members who felt chary of agreeing to so long a break were actuated not by desire for Parliamentary interference in strategic planning, but by apprehension as to how the Churchill-Beaverbrook relationship might develop behind the scenes while the Westminster curtain was still down.

Meanwhile war has begun to change the outward face of Britain once again. From the west, American troops in growing numbers have poured into this island. An Act without precedent in our annals has been passed, having the effect that any of their members who offend against the criminal law will be subject not to British courts but to their own military authorities.

It was unfortunate that, on the plea of urgency, Ministers had to ask the House of Commons to pass this unique Bill through all its stages in a single afternoon, for it gave rise to a spirited debate capable of being misinterpreted abroad, though in fact illustrative of nothing other than the jealous care with which the House rightly examines any proposal by the Executive to modify established procedure for administering justice. But while Governments have to take thought for occasional crime, our people are far more interested in making their many thousands of guests feel at home here. The hospitality which hitherto we have endeavoured to offer, despite rationing difficulties, to Dominion and Allied troops will, we all recognize, need to extend now to much greater numbers; and we mean to do it successfully, for if opportunities in war-time of getting to know and understand each other are not utilized to the full, the finest chance in all history of eliminating Anglo-American mutual prejudices will have been missed.

BOMBING AND CIVIL DEFENCE

FROM the east, the enemy bombers have begun to come again, and after a full year London's immunity from nightly disturbance has at last ceased. The curious interlude of the "Baedeker raids" on cathedral cities has given place to quick attacks on industrial towns with small forces of bombers, dropping mostly incendiaries. During the long lull the Government had been disappointingly slow in developing schemes for employing full-time members of the Civil Defence forces on munitions production, and many of these welcome the chance to be in real action again. There had been no slackening in the general efficiency of Civil Defence. Some of the harshest Parliamentary critics of the Regional organization in old days now testify to its marked strengthening, and the merging of all the local fire brigades into the National Fire Service a year ago has led to undoubted improvement in operational quality. Where more system, better training and more compulsion seem particularly needed now is in the civilian fire-guard service for houses and business premises. It is a tedious night-time job to impose on millions of citizens who have been working hard during the day, and maybe for that reason Mr. Herbert Morrison, the Minister of Home Security, has not taken full advantage of the year's respite from heavy bombing to insist on genuine training and punctual performance of all duties in this direction. He has recently made fire-watching, already compulsory for men in all vulnerable areas, obligatory also on women between 20 and 45, unless they have children at home or are working more than 55 hours a week. There will be no objection to this, provided that it is raised into a properly trained and disciplined service like the other branches of Civil Defence, not left for the conscientious to perform their duties scrupulously and the rest to neglect them with impunity. Fire does not forgive. If raids grow heavy and we are not prepared at all points, there will be no excuse. Mr. Morrison (who carries all the peace-time and war-time burdens of Home Secretary as well) and his Parliamentary Secretary Miss Ellen Wilkinson are the two Ministers

responsible now for Civil Defence; should there be any operational failures a demand will be heard that the team must be strengthened.

Lord Woolton, who has won for himself the confidence of the whole nation, warns us of an impending cut in our meat allowance, and has brought biscuits, chocolate and all kinds of sweets within rationing schemes.

Since July 31, the last day when motor vehicles could be used for non-essential purposes, a further and spectacular change of the British scene has occurred, and private cars have almost disappeared from our roads; no one has questioned the necessity. To maintain fitness for work, a clear week's holiday has been the general rule this summer, but those who disregarded the Government's appeal to spend it at home have mostly had cause to regret that they decided to risk crowds and travel by train. It is more than likely too that those who have failed to respond to the injunction to save fuel will find their homes cold next winter. Faced by strong Parliamentary representations that the Beveridge scheme of coal rationing would be intolerably complex and ought to be unnecessary, the Government postponed a decision to ration and adopted instead a triple policy of creating a special Ministry of Fuel, Light and Power, subjecting all coal mines to war-time State control (but not State ownership or management) and undertaking a nation-wide campaign for fuel economy on a voluntary basis. The most universally popular element in the new plan was the selection of Major Gwilym Lloyd George, son of a famous father and until recently serving under Lord Woolton as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, to be the first Minister of Fuel. This and the appointment of Lord Swinton (formerly Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister) to be Minister Resident of Cabinet rank in West Africa have been the only recent changes in higher Government posts; but the heavy burden on Mr. Lyttelton has been eased by the appointment of a Labour M.P., Mr. Garro Jones, to the new post of Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Production.

The Social Services

WHATEVER talk goes on about a new social order after the war, no one can sustain an allegation against us that when war is at our door we neglect the social services. The 1942–43 estimates for the Ministry of Health totalled £266 million. Infant mortality in the first three months of this year was the lowest for any March quarter on record. In spite of all war-time dislocations and emergencies, no increase of infectious diseases has occurred. Under our State scheme four out of every five children now receive milk daily at school below cost. On June 23 the Commons, undeterred by having passed another supplementary Vote of Credit for £1,000 million for war purposes a week before, unanimously adopted a Conservative member's motion that "this House, having agreed to the supreme importance of further safeguarding the health and well-being of the rising generation, commends for the immediate consideration of the Government the institution of a national scheme of allowances for dependent children as an important contribution

to this vital object". A month later it was announced that old age pensions for more than a million recipients were to be raised by 2*s.* 6*d.* a week, in order to help them through war-time expenses of living, at an additional cost (including other minor improvements) of £11 million a year. The figure of 2*s.* 6*d.* was approved by the Cabinet, including its Labour members, but a large section of the Labour party in the House wanted more, and, disobeying its own leaders both inside the Government and out, carried its dissatisfaction to a vote. In the division lobby the dissidents numbered 63, which was higher than any previous vote cast against Mr. Churchill and his Cabinet on any subject. Though without direct bearing on war policy, it was a disturbing incident, because it disclosed a limitation on loyalty to the whole principle of National Government.

The military determination of the country, like its health, is as sound and strong as ever. The compulsory transfer of women from their homes to munitions work in distant parts, which imposes a domestic strain not commonly realized in countries where the man-power stringency has not yet necessitated such a measure, continues with astonishing smoothness and absence of serious complaint. All women up to the age of 43 have already been required to register; and they are being interviewed at the rate of 50,000 a week and moved at the rate of 20,000 a week into war industry or the uniformed services. Financially, the measure of our effort is a rate of national expenditure which exceeds £84 million a week, and our total expenditure since the war began is now not far short of £10,000 million—far more, of course, than in the whole 4¼ years of the last war. According to newly published Treasury figures, direct taxation of wealth has reached a point at which, if the Chancellor were to strip from those whose gross income exceeds £2,000 a year every penny which he now leaves them, he would collect not enough to finance the war for 17 days. But what is money? It has been officially made known that up to September 1941 the casualties suffered by the armed forces of the Empire totalled 145,000 from the United Kingdom, 24,000 from the Dominions, 8,500 from India and Burma, and 6,000 from the Colonies. In addition there are all the losses of the merchant navies, and nearly 100,000 civilians killed or seriously injured by air raids in this country alone. During the past twelve months these figures have sadly increased. These are the real price of war. It is a price which we all know must be paid for the total eradication of a gigantic and intolerable evil.

Great Britain,
August 1942.

IRELAND—THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEUTRALITY

I. Political

IF it is true to say that in the autumn of 1939 we were too much preoccupied with the political implications of neutrality to consider the economic consequences which would be its inevitable result, it is equally true to say that to-day, in the autumn of 1942, we are so concerned with these consequences that we are apt to forget the long-term significance of the decision to remain neutral. While three years ago the majority of the people of Eire hoped that Mr. de Valera would be able to keep her outside the conflict to the bitter end, few of them really believed that even his political astuteness would be equal to the task. Since then these doubts have been largely removed and the most notable feature of the last three months has been the growth of a belief that, so long as Hitler is preoccupied in Eastern Europe, this island will remain outside the war.

As a result of this new sense of security, to which there is little doubt that the presence of the American troops in Northern Ireland have made a notable contribution, Ministerial speeches designed to dispel complacency are now discounted as alarmist. On May 24 Mr. de Valera took the opportunity of warning the country that the danger of invasion was likely to increase as time went on. "If we are fully prepared", he said, "other countries who would make an attempt to attack us must count the cost and it is necessary for us to see that that cost will be as high as possible." While no Minister could publicly admit the obvious fact that the presence of the large numbers of British and American troops in Northern Ireland is better calculated than anything else to discourage invasion by making the cost prohibitive, public opinion is undoubtedly inclined to accept this as the most reassuring factor in the situation.

Neutrality as a national policy, however, has continued to survive, and by this mere fact it has acquired a prestige so great that it is doubtful if even Mr. de Valera's influence could now secure its modification. In the early days of the war Mr. Cosgrave's "shadow cabinet" was urged by a few of its supporters from time to time to sponsor a change in national policy and to come out openly in favour of the Allies. To-day, on the other hand, it is not subjected even to such very modest pressure; and Mr. Dillon's speeches favouring all aid to the United Nations have been a source of acute embarrassment to the political leaders of Fine Gael, who realize that their party must be in a position to claim a share of the credit for maintaining Eire's neutrality if it is to retain even its present strength at the next election.

One of the more forceful leaders of the Fine Gael party, Dr. O'Higgins, denounced Mr. Aiken's exercise of the censorship in one of the periodic debates held in the Dail on July 2, saying that the Minister had used it for party purposes. Dr. O'Higgins went on to recall Mr. Dillon's dramatic

challenge to the policy of neutrality and observed that every single line of that speech had appeared in the newspapers. "It was allowed to be published", he said, "because it was clear that its publication would create political embarrassment to the Opposition in the House. Provided it caused embarrassment to one particular party, then it did not matter one jot if it jeopardized the neutrality of the country." There could be no more conclusive evidence than this of the fact that neutrality has already become a part of our national tradition. Only the impact of a Nazi invasion could alter the opinion of the people.

It is clear that the ever growing support for Eire's foreign policy has been powerfully assisted on the one hand by its tangible effectiveness on a short-term view in securing comparative immunity from the hardships of war and on the other by the censorship. As regards the former, Mr. Lemass, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, said in the Dail on July 6 that this country had suffered less than any other country in Europe in the past three years. This obvious truth, so often forgotten by people here who have little or no opportunity of hearing at first hand what the Nazis' rule has meant on the continent which they have overrun, is used effectively enough by Government spokesmen to silence potential critics. Still more effective, however, is the existence of a censorship whose powers are periodically extended so that the Censor can now control any expression of opinion which might defeat the Government's declared policy of keeping the political temperature low. The policy has a two-fold purpose in view—externally the negative one of not giving offence to any of the belligerents, and internally of discouraging the utterance and preventing the publication of provocative political opinions. In the debate (to which reference has already been made) held in the Dail on July 2 to discuss the exercise of the Censor's powers Mr. Aiken was bitterly criticized both by Opposition and by Labour deputies for using his powers in such a way as to destroy the confidence of the country in parliamentary institutions. Many particular incidents were quoted in support of this sweeping denunciation. It was stated, for example, that when a leading article in the *Kilkenny People* was submitted to the Censor he suggested that the title should be altered to "Liberty and Licence of the Press", and also suggested that the editor should add a paragraph, which was then dictated over the telephone. Mr. McGilligan, a former Minister for External Affairs, stated that a letter from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Ossory which was read in full in the Churches of the diocese was not allowed to be published because it contained criticisms of the price to be paid for growing foodstuffs. Similarly an editorial in the *Irish Independent* proposing that the price for wheat should be investigated to see what relation it bore to the cost of production was suppressed. To this and many other criticisms the Minister in effect replied that in such an emergency he must enjoy a very considerable latitude in the exercise of his powers and that he must be the sole judge of the national interest. In principle the Opposition parties agreed that a rigid censorship is necessary and the complaint was only that the powers rightly given to the Censor are abused.

There is no doubt that the exercise of these powers, and perhaps even

more the consciousness of their existence, has an undeniably steadying, not to say soporific, effect on public opinion. The apparently insignificant fact that no news reel, nor indeed any film dealing with any aspect of the war, has been publicly shown for the past three years in this country creates an atmosphere of detachment in which illusions inevitably flourish. How impressively frequent Ministerial injunctions to eschew complacency would be supplemented by the showing of a short film of the winter's war on the Eastern Front! As it is, the censorship has achieved its purpose and has cooled party passions. The appearance of national unity which has resulted has undoubtedly been a factor in creating a real unity. There remains a widespread popular wish that the Allies should win, coupled with a fatalistic attitude towards the war, which is generally viewed rather as a geological eruption for which no individual or nation can be held responsible.

II. Economic

The Budget introduced by the Minister for Finance, Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly, on May 6, both confounded the prophets and gave the maximum pleasure to the people by introducing no new taxation. The deficit of £4,500,000 is in fact to be met by borrowing. Critics in other countries were disposed to regard the Budget as a refusal to face realities, whilst observers at home suspected that it might be an electioneering stunt. In fact, however, there would appear to be a solid and realistic basis for the decision that was taken. Mr. O'Kelly stated that the gap between expenditure and revenue could not be closed either by taxation or by economies. Since 1938 expenditure on the Army had increased five times and now stood at £6,000,000. The Minister regarded this as exceptional expenditure to meet exceptional circumstances. Indeed the difference between the financial position in Eire and the financial position in the United Kingdom and the other belligerent countries is obvious. National income in Eire is not expanding, there is considerable unemployment, and there is no capital expenditure such as that which is generating a great expansion of incomes in the United Kingdom. On the contrary capital expenditure in Eire is far below normal and, since supplies for essential industries are no longer available, it is likely to decrease still further. In the circumstances informed opinion in Eire feels that the budget is economically justifiable, since any increase in taxation would accentuate the slump conditions which already exist and which cannot be wholly alleviated. For many years Eire has enjoyed a strong creditor position and war-time conditions have tended to strengthen it by eliminating the substantial adverse trade-balance which is a feature of the country's peace-time economy. To meet a deficit by borrowing is merely to take advantage of the one favourable aspect in our economic situation.

So far as the shortage of supplies in Eire is concerned, this gives rise to ever increasing anxiety. In recent months the country's dependence on raw materials and other supplies shipped from overseas has become more painfully evident. The lack of petrol has brought private motoring to an end; the lack of rubber has led to an acute shortage of both car and bicycle tyres; the lack of newsprint may lead to the disappearance of our newspapers in September unless supplies can be imported from overseas; lack of coal is not only causing hardship in private homes, where the full rigour will not be felt till winter comes, but has also dislocated our whole transport system. To-day only a severely restricted train service is run on the railways, and travelling from Cork to Dublin is something of an adventure. This journey, normally scheduled to take five to six hours, has many times taken over 12 and once or twice over 20 in recent months. On the local lines travelling is frankly a gamble, since the engines, stoked on a mixture of wood blocks and turf, and eked out with some inferior quality coal whenever this is available, reach their destination how and when they can. Perhaps some champions of economic self-sufficiency may be induced to modify their views after one of these protracted journeys! By the public as a whole, however, these inconveniences are accepted with a tolerant good humour that is altogether admirable.

On July 2 Mr. Lemass solemnly warned the Dail that the supply position was deteriorating and would continue to deteriorate. Since, as he very truly observed, there is no surplus in the United Kingdom of the raw materials which Eire requires, there is no possibility of concluding a barter agreement under which coal, iron or oil could be exchanged for foodstuffs. It is true that Eire is, as she always has been, a considerable exporter of live stock, but as the Minister for Supplies pointed out the United Kingdom is not, and indeed cannot be, prepared to trade stocks of raw materials urgently needed for the manufacture of arms merely to secure additional supplies of food. Neither the Minister nor the public as a whole doubt Britain's good faith. They recognize the hard priorities imposed by war, but the conclusion to which the Minister was reluctantly driven is not a happy one. Eire has, he said, at the present time no bargaining power.

A fortnight previously the Department of Supplies decreed that all clothing should be rationed. A quota of 52 coupons was allotted to each individual for the period of a year on condition that 26 of them should not be used until October. These drastic regulations provoked a storm of protest from the drapery trade. In the face of this protest the Minister for Supplies decided immediately to increase the annual quota of coupons from 52 to 78 and to rescind the order which prohibited the use of one-half of them until October. Despite these concessions, the drapery trade were not satisfied and they staged a one-day strike. Once again the Minister met them halfway, and a Committee was appointed to enquire into the whole clothes rationing scheme. This lack of firmness on the part of the Government has undoubtedly made an unfavourable impression.

If the supply situation has deteriorated more rapidly than might have been anticipated, the food situation has somewhat improved. The gloomy prognostications of food shortages—and even of famine conditions—have hitherto happily proved wholly unfounded. Even the shortage of bread has been considerably less severe than was anticipated. At the same time the distribution of foodstuffs and indeed of all essential goods still leaves much to be desired. Reluctance to impose a rigid rationing system has brought

many evils in its train, and even where rationing has been imposed its detailed administration has not been planned with sufficient care.

In order to ensure adequate food supplies the compulsory tillage order was extended last autumn. One-quarter of the total arable land was tilled this spring. Increased dependence on home-grown food has, in fact, brought belated recognition of the predominant importance of the farming community in our national life. It has also helped to develop public opinion in the countryside. Whereas formerly tillage inspectors have been lenient in the exercise of their powers of compulsion, this year heavy fines were imposed to enforce compliance with the tillage order. Despite the greatly increased area under crops, the food situation cannot be viewed with any complacency, particularly since the weather has not been favourable to wheat in the greater part of the country. On the other hand, the response of the farming community as a whole to the emergency is a happy augury for the future.

III. Social


A direct result of the shortage of supplies has been to cause unemployment on a wide scale. Every month fresh industries are affected and factories, workshops and garages are compelled either to close or to retain only a skeleton staff. Since industry in Eire has been deliberately decentralized, it is not only the larger cities, but also the country towns that suffer. This summer the motor trade has been hit most heavily, and many garage proprietors have been forced out of business, whilst the skilled technicians whom they previously employed are thrown on to a labour market which cannot absorb them.

The remedy for this new wave of unemployment, as in the past, is emigration to the United Kingdom. It is reckoned that in the last twelve months alone some 50,000 of Eire's young men have crossed the Irish Sea to take up war work. Though the loss of the younger, more skilled and more enterprising members of the community cannot be viewed with equanimity, this exodus is far preferable to unemployment at home. The Government has controlled emigration, but is not prepared to stop it. Ministers admit that emigration may weaken our national position, but, despite pressure from certain quarters, they decline to deprive a large number of their fellow citizens of the opportunity of earning their livelihood. After all the compensations are not to be despised. In the United Kingdom these emigrants, whether skilled or unskilled, earn wages that are considered remarkably high on this side of the Irish Sea. A large proportion of these wages are sent home to the emigrants' families week by week and enable them to live in decent comfort. In some country districts working-class families have more to spend to-day than at any time since the last war.

In the long run the social and, perhaps even more, the psychological consequences of neutrality will prove more far-reaching than either the political or the economic. Certainly in districts where emigration has been considerable those who remain are very conscious of the gap caused by the loss, temporary though it be, of so many of the younger members of the community. The population of Eire is about 3⅞ millions. In a population of

this size an appreciable gap is made by the absence of some 50,000 to 60,000 of our young men on war work overseas in addition to a number, which cannot be much smaller, of those who are serving as volunteers in the armed forces of the Crown. It is too early yet to decide what the long-term consequences of this emigration will be, or what impact on our society these emigrants will make on their return. It is certain, however, that they will not be satisfied unless they can secure reasonable wages and reasonable security. In common, therefore, with the belligerents, Eire will have her post-war labour problems, and there is anxiety that plans should be made now to prepare a solution for them.

Ireland,
July, 1942.



CANADA

I. The Conscription Plebiscite

THE national plebiscite on the issue of conscription for overseas service was held on April 27.* The question put to the voters was: "Are you in favour of releasing the Government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?" The Government had given a pledge not to conscript for service outside Canada. The result of the vote was a 4 to 1 affirmative in the eight provinces other than Quebec, and a 72 to 28 negative in Quebec.

The voting was preceded by a nation-wide campaign of education, in which the Opposition parties and citizens' committees in the larger cities took an active part, as well as the Government itself. The Government, which was believed to be seriously divided on the merits of the question of compulsory overseas service, closed its ranks and was unanimous on the question of asking the country to release the Government from its pledge not to conscript for overseas service. Thus the French-Canadian Ministers campaigned actively in favour of an affirmative vote, assuring the electors that an affirmative vote was not a vote for compulsory overseas conscription, but simply a vote in favour of empowering the Government to introduce compulsory overseas service, if, in its opinion, the need for it should arise. They laid emphasis on the point that if, at some future time, the Government should decide to introduce it, Parliament would have an opportunity of debating the question in the light of the then circumstances, and the French-Canadian Ministers expressly reserved the right to oppose it, if they were not convinced of its necessity. For the rest, the arguments advanced followed the familiar lines set out in the March number of The Round Table.

The hope that the plebiscite vote would clear the air and restore national unity was not fulfilled. The interpretation put on the vote by the English-speaking provinces was well expressed by *Saturday Night* (Toronto).

"Before the plebiscite it was possible for the anti-conscriptionist press in Quebec to maintain that the demand for all-out conscription was the product solely of a group of 'Imperialist die-hards' in strategic points like Toronto, Winnipeg and Vancouver, and that the people of Quebec represented the true but silent opinion of Canadians all over the country. That claim has been demolished. The people of Quebec are faced with the inescapable fact that their view is not the view of the great majority of Canadians—that in all the rest of Canada only one-half as many people voted No as voted No in their province alone. Also a surprisingly small percentage abstained from voting.

"The question now is not what the people of Quebec think about all-out conscription, but how they will receive the action which the Government must inevitably take, sooner or later, in deference to what the people of the rest of Canada

* See The Round Table, No. 127, March 1942, p. 301 *et seq.*

think about it. Deeply as we who voted Yes may regret the fact that so large a majority of the people of Quebec still oppose the idea of overseas conscription, we have no right to criticize them for voting as they did. They were as fully entitled to vote No as we to vote Yes; and Canadians who can understand and sympathize with the position of a highly self-conscious minority will realize that they had some reasons for voting No which do not apply to us. What they are not entitled to do, and what we sincerely believe they will make no effort to do, is to seek to prevent the will of nearly two-thirds of the Canadian people from going into effect.

"For there is no doubt now that it is the will of nearly two-thirds of the people. There can be no more talk—there never was much, and it never had much significance—of French Canada uniting with the 'New Canadians' to save Canada from the 'dead hand' of British Imperialism or the superannuated hand of Mr. Meighen. Canada has spoken in her own name and with her own voice. To that voice French Canada must listen, and will listen, with respect. The plebiscite vote itself is not an evidence of disunity, only of difference. To refuse to accept the plebiscite result would be a sign of disunity indeed."

The majority French-Canadian view, on the other hand, apparently was that in spite of the substantial affirmative majority in the other eight provinces, the Government would be breaking faith with Quebec if it were to disregard the overwhelming negative vote in that province.

A Government Bill

In these circumstances the Government introduced a Bill repealing the Section of the National Resources Mobilization Act which prohibits conscription for overseas service. This was the signal for a strong protest from the majority of the 65 Quebec Members of Parliament, and for the resignation of Mr. Cardin, the senior French-Canadian Minister, after an exchange of letters with the Prime Minister in which Mr. Cardin declared that Mr. King's pre-plebiscite promise not to introduce conscription until war necessity required it and Parliament had debated it, had been broken, while Mr. King declared that the amendment did not mean conscription but only gave power to the Government to apply it, if need should arise.

The debate has just ended as this article is being prepared. Mr. King has defined the Government's policy as: "Not necessarily conscription, but conscription if necessary"; and he has amplified this definition by announcing that, when the Government decided that it was necessary and advisable to resort to conscription for oversea service, an Order-in-Council would be passed covering the entire Army. There would be no coming back to Parliament for approval, but a vote of confidence would be sought before the Order was actually enforced. This plan was at once denounced by the Opposition as another exhibition of procrastination, a last valiant move to sustain the Liberal party and the Prime Minister; and it is true that it leaves the question of date, and even of action, a matter of complete uncertainty. The speeches made by Ministers lend colour to the belief that a strong section of the Cabinet, mindful of the substantial affirmative vote, favours the early application of overseas conscription, while another section, fearful of Quebec opposition and consequent national disunity, counsels the post-

ponement of the day of decision in the hope that the need may never arise, or, if it does, will arise in such a way that Quebec will fall into line. As regards the country everything will naturally depend on how the war goes. So long as the bulk of Canada's armed forces suffer no substantial casualties and the Government gives assurance that the voluntary system is producing all the men required, there will probably be no effective pressure on the Government to adopt compulsory overseas conscription. If, however, serious losses in the field had to be made good, the affirmative majority would demand the immediate application of overseas conscription, regardless of the opposition of the Quebec minority.

II. Future Plans for Agriculture

One of the things that immediately impress visitors to Canada and students of Canadian life generally is the vitality of national associations of all types. In spite of vast distances and consequent cost of travel, members of the same profession in Canada know each other and meet frequently. Professional men, manufacturers, educationists, industrial workers, belong to national organizations with provincial branches, and annual conventions or conferences, following the American pattern, are fixed Canadian customs. In addition, church organizations, service clubs, lodges have their district and national assemblies, and many men and women, who meet regularly at annual conferences within their own professions, meet again as members of service clubs, church committees, fraternal orders, etc. This is our national unity, and it exists in spite of sectional and political divisions.

It may be said then, that on various levels of interest those Canadians who have achieved positions of local leadership within a social or professional framework meet frequently and know each other well. Until recent years, however, this was not true in the case of the 728,000 farmers who make up the personnel of Canada's basic industry. About the only thing the Alberta farmer and the Nova Scotia farmer held in common during the years between 1929 and 1939 was a back-breaking mortgage, and the general knowledge that agriculture from Halifax to Vancouver was a depressed industry, whether one were a producer of hogs or apples, wheat or butter. But falling prices and mounting costs of production accomplished in a few years what prosperity had never succeeded in doing. They provided a national platform for Canadian agriculture. It is true there had been a tradition of organized agriculture dating back to the closing years of the last century, and since the last war strong provincial organizations such as the United Farmers of Alberta, the United Farmers of Manitoba, the United Farmers of Ontario, had taken shape.

In the provincial field the United Farmers of Alberta had the longest record of political power. From 1921 till 1935, when the Aberhart Social Credit Party came into office, the farmers' government of Alberta gave to that province enlightened and progressive direction. In Ontario the United Farmers of Ontario held office for three years. In addition, 14 Members in the House of Commons at Ottawa represented farmers' interests from 1921 to 1935, when the Social Credit Movement, as in the provincial field, made a clean sweep of the western members of the "Ginger Group" and thus broke up a *bloc* of earnest and highly intelligent agricultural representatives, who, during their fourteen years of office, had earned the respect and admiration of all parties.

A National Farm Movement

It was not, however, until 1935 that a national farm movement took shape. In that year 75 farmers, from all parts of Canada, met in Toronto and unanimously decided to attempt to build an organization which would include all provinces and all branches of agriculture and be in a position to speak with one voice for their industry.

To-day, seven years later, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture has been more successful than its founders ever dreamed it could be in so short a period of time. It now includes the great majority of all farm organizations in Canada and has a membership, through its affiliations, of more than 350,000. As the name suggests, it is a federation of existing farm and co-operative organizations. Each province has its own federation, with three directors on the national board, and in some of the provinces county units are organized as well. The Federation maintains a National Office and Secretariat in Ottawa.

Sad experience in the political field during the past twenty years has placed in the constitution this plain safeguard:

"This organization shall not be, nor shall it become, a political organization, nor shall the Federation of Agriculture, nor any Committees thereof, discuss any matters from a party political point of view."

The objects of the organization are set forth in Article 2 of the Constitution. It will be noted that the principle of collective action is accepted at the outset. The Constitution states that:

"The objects of the Federation of Agriculture shall be:

(A) To co-ordinate the efforts of the different branches of agriculture throughout the Dominion for the purpose of promoting their common interests through collective action.

(B) To render such services to those engaged in agricultural pursuits as conditions may justify.

(C) To assist in formulating and promoting national agricultural policies to meet changing national and international economic conditions. To collaborate and/or negotiate with other organized groups of producers *within or without* the British Empire for the furtherance of objects set out in Article 2, Sub-Section 1."

The Federation has already had a stimulating effect upon the farm organizations and the farm people of Canada. It is true, of course, as is always the case with a new organization, that it is possible to find numbers of farmers who have never heard of the C.F.A. Slowly but surely, however, through provincial and county organizations, the promise of a new deal for agriculture, based on a philosophy of self-help rather than political paternalism and hand-outs, is filtering into the back concessions, and farmers' conventions everywhere in Canada are beginning to take on the appearance of

national assemblies; so that the Eastern or Western farmer alike begins to realize that he has everything to gain and nothing to lose by giving his support to a national movement which represents the interests of every commodity group and every district in Canada.

The war has already stripped the Canadian farmer of a large part of his labour supply. To keep pace with the war-time production demands he must work longer hours, usually with partially worn-out equipment he has never had money enough in the past ten years to replace. His demands upon the Government at the present time stem, not from any desire to take advantage of the world's need for his own profit, but rather from his intense desire to live up to his own patriotic spirit. He wants to produce to the limit to help win the war, but the cost of his products is stabilized and his costs of production are enormously higher through the necessity to compete for farm labour in an expanding labour market.

Manifesto of the C.F.A.

For this reason, at the annual convention of the C.F.A. held in Toronto on January 20, 1941, a manifesto representing the war aims of Canadian agriculture was adopted by the convention and a few days later presented to a meeting of the Federal Cabinet. It reads as follows:

"Canadian agriculture's first task and paramount duty is to place its whole strength and unite its resources from sea to sea behind Canada's war effort. The war must be won, and the greatest possible degree of national unity is essential if our war effort is to reach maximum efficiency.

Victory cannot be achieved without sacrifices. All classes of our people will be called upon to make sacrifices, and the agricultural industry is ready and willing to bear its full share of the heavy load which Canada has shouldered. It is vital, from considerations of national unity, that no one class shall be called upon to carry an undue share of the burden and that there should be equality of sacrifice by all classes.

As the tempo of industrial production is speeded up to meet the urgent need for munitions and war supplies, there is a grave danger that the present disparity between agricultural and industrial income will increase. More than three million Canadians now live on farms, and engage in the production of food supplies. Another two million live in rural areas directly dependent on the farm income for their livelihood. But, while there has been a tremendous rise in the national income, agriculture's share of the national income continues to decline, in the face of steadily increasing cost of production.

The continued production of abundant food supplies may be a vital factor in bringing the war to an early and successful conclusion. Already the British Prime Minister has dangled before the eyes of hungry Europe the prospect of abundant food supplies available from British sources, when he said in the British House of Commons:

'We shall do our best to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held before the eyes of the people of Europe, including—I say this deliberately—the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of Nazi power will bring them all immediate food, freedom and peace.'

We believe that the men and women engaged in the production of these food supplies are doing work just as vital to the successful prosecution of the war as the men and women engaged in the production of munitions and other supplies.

In order to enable these millions of Canadians engaged in the business of agriculture to play their proper part in the greatest crisis the world has known, two things are necessary:

1. There must be an immediate and substantial increase of farm income in relation to the national income.
2. A properly co-ordinated national policy for agriculture, including marketing as well as production, must be instituted.

The Canadian Federation of Agriculture, therefore, proposes:

(*a*) That since agricultural production costs have already increased, and will inevitably continue to increase as the war develops, our Governments should adopt measures to establish a proper relationship between the prices of agricultural commodities and the goods and services the farmer must purchase. Otherwise, there could easily be a decline in the efficiency of agricultural production, which would seriously hamper the war effort.

(*b*) That immediate steps should be taken to develop a national wartime programme for agriculture. In taking this stand the Canadian Federation of Agriculture realizes that changing international conditions may call for changes in policy, but this makes it all the more necessary that there should be a greater degree of consultation between governmental authorities and the representatives of organized agriculture."

The requirements of the Dairy Industry, the Live Stock Industry, and Wheat were then set forth in detail. For the Live Stock Industry a Board of Live Stock Commissioners, with powers to handle and regulate all live stock problems, similar to the existing Board of Grain Commissioners, was urged. It was suggested that the problem created by heavy surpluses of wheat in Western Canada could not be equitably solved by restriction of seeded acreage, but that the Wheat Board should state the total amount of wheat it would accept for delivery. Having thus established the maximum amount of wheat to be delivered, the quota of the individual grower should be based on a policy which would preserve to each farm unit an equitable share of such maximum amount in proportion to the past production of the crop district in which it is located. Further recommendations with regard to wheat were an increase in the initial payment to farmers and financial assistance to farmers for the construction of storage facilities.

The above manifesto was presented in January, 1941. Since that time a delegation of some 400 farmers from Saskatchewan—whose expenses were paid by a voluntary gift of 25c. per family by members of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool—descended upon Ottawa in February, 1942, and presented a dignified and extremely forceful demand for "dollar wheat". Meeting at the same time, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture endorsed the demand of the Saskatchewan delegates and again presented a manifesto to the Cabinet, in which the following recommendations were made:

1. That in order to assure the necessary volume of production of live stock and live stock products, required as a result of war conditions, the Government should announce that presently prevailing prices for live stock and live stock

products will be guaranteed to farmers for a definite period, preferably two years.

2. That there should be guaranteed to farmers purchasing feed grains an adequate supply at prices consistent with the level of live stock prices, to implement which, if necessary, government wheat stocks could be made available, while the present freight assistance policy should be continued.
3. That a basic price for feed barley at lakehead or seaboard terminals of 60 cents per bushel should be guaranteed; the production of oats, we believe, will be sufficiently encouraged by a live stock programme such as recommended.
4. That the Government should vigorously promote a programme of soil conservation and continue to encourage the seeding of land to grass and clover.
5. That to secure the production of flax-seed to the extent required on account of the present scarcity of fats and oils, a guaranteed price of from $2·25 to $2·50 per bushel should be assured to the producers.
6. That the present carry-over of wheat be regarded as a necessary wartime reserve, the carrying of which should not reduce the returns to producers from current crops.

Insistence on Education

To the writer of this article the most convincing evidence of a new kind of spirit among Canadian agriculturists is their emphasis upon the necessity of continuous, progressive education. While it is true that of the 728,000 farmers in Canada over half belong to some kind of co-operative enterprise, it is only in recent years that major emphasis has been placed upon the necessity of thorough education in the philosophy and techniques of co-operation. The history of the consumers' co-operative movement in Canada is dark with tragedy. Particularly was this true in Western Canada, where in some provinces paternalism in the form of government subsidies had an unhealthy influence on co-operative enterprises. The working philosophy of self-help is basic in co-operative ventures and the assurance of assistance destroys the very thing it strives to foster. But a far greater cause of failure lay in ignorance, lack of loyalty, a failure to understand that basically co-operation is an attitude, a way of living, rather than a smart way of doing business.

In fact, there has been enough grief in co-operative history, particularly in the consumers' end, to make the farmer suspicious of it for life. It remained for St. Francis Xavier University of Nova Scotia to set the fires burning again, and it is no exaggeration to say that the St. Francis Xavier technique of education first and organization last is now recognized throughout Canada as the safe and sensible procedure. Without its strong back-log of study groups (numbering fourteen or fifteen hundred) the co-operative movement in Nova Scotia, as directed from St. Francis Xavier University, would not have attracted the attention it has, as one of the most interesting and effective adult education movements on this continent.

The social philosophy of the Canadian farmer throughout Canada finds its best and most democratic expression in the Co-operative Movement.

And the emphasis placed upon co-operation by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture has had its effect already in the extraordinarily rapid growth of the Credit Union and Co-operative Movements. This is true not only in Western Canada, where the Producers' Co-operative Movement has had a long history, but in the older provinces, Ontario, the Maritimes and Quebec. The United Farmers' Co-operative of Ontario, for example, has an annual business turnover of eleven millions of dollars.

Few people even in Canada realize the extent of the co-operative movement in Quebec. This movement had its inception in the Desjardins People's Banks, an organization founded in 1900 by Alphonse Desjardins, with the opening of the first People's Bank or *Caisse Populaire*, as they are more commonly called, in the town of Levis, opposite Quebec. These People's Banks now number 615, with a capital of over $30 million, and they work in close co-operation with the *Coopérative Fédérée*, which has an annual business of over fifteen millions of dollars.

Much could be written also of the huge and successful Producers' Co-operatives of the West, such as the Wheat Pools of the three prairie provinces, but this article purports to deal more broadly with the resurgence of agriculture from local and provincial interest to national policies and national and international outlook. A striking evidence of such an awakening is provided in the story of the Radio Listening Group project sponsored jointly during the past two years by the Canadian Association for Adult Education, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. While the Radio Listening Group idea had had a period of experimentation through the sponsorship of the C.A.A.E., it has only reached its present success through the team-work and inspired co-operation of all three. Seventeen thousand registered listeners meeting in groups of from twelve to twenty throughout Canada every Monday night for six months is an impressive showing, especially when it is recalled that for every registered group listener there were probably ten more who preferred to listen and read as individuals rather than in groups.

These 17,000 people received each week a compact little magazine called *Farm Forum Facts*, which contained in its centre spread an authentic article based on careful research and covering the subject matter on which the dramatized broadcast was based. Scripts were written by two employees of the C.B.C., both of whom know Canadian farm problems at first hand, and the dramatized production, which was presented as from a farm home in a country community in Ontario, was most skilfully handled by the experienced and able dramatic personnel of the C.B.C. Group discussion continued for hours after the broadcast had ended. Reports of attendance, findings and details of the meetings were sent in every week to a provincial secretary and found their way to the National Secretary for use in the weekly magazine, with the result that the farmers of Canada are beginning to realize that through their own *Farm Forum* they have at last become articulate as a national industry. Subjects discussed are basic and cover a wide range, as shown by the following, picked at random from the list: Food for the People; Men and Machines; Home and Export Markets; Is the Farmer

Inefficient?; Buying Together; We can't Afford to be Sick; Will the Soil Last?; Education for Rural Life.

In every province in which the *Farm Forum* listening groups have been well organized and ably directed definite community projects have been undertaken, based on the studies covered in the broadcasts. In Ontario, for example, the study of public health problems has grown into a full-scale provincial move for legislation enabling the adoption of the Municipal Doctor System. The larger unit of administration in public schools in rural areas has received great attention and local experiments are under way based on the Alberta system. Much attention is being given to housing, child welfare, dental care, improved farming practice, nutrition and world food supply. Thus democracy gets down to the grass roots and the Canadian farmer is moving out from his isolation and provincial individualism and becoming more and more international in his outlook and understanding.

Agriculture and Labour

The war has stimulated the farmer's thinking; given it an edge, so that he can watch with intelligence the progress of war-time planning and controls, with a shrewd eye as to its effect upon his immediate economic problems. Unfortunately no entirely satisfactory formula has yet been evolved which would provide a working agreement between agriculture and labour. Labour and agriculture stand aloof from each other and neither group has yet given national support to the third party in the House of Commons. There is evidence that in industrial Nova Scotia, and in some of the Western provinces, labour is finding common political ground with the C.C.F. (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation), but except in isolated cases agriculture has not given its enthusiastic support to the progressive third party in Canada. Whether the war and the vast problems which must follow its conclusion will have the effect of closing the divided ranks of labour and bringing about a *rapprochement* between labour and agriculture remains to be seen. Meanwhile the Canadian Federation of Agriculture has the sympathy and co-operation of the Dominion Department of Agriculture, the Provincial Departments of Agriculture, the Faculties of Agriculture in the Universities, and the organizing facilities of University Departments of Extension. It also has the backing of such unofficial national organizations as the Women's Institutes, the Canadian Association for Adult Education and many others.

Such sympathy and co-operation is based upon the conviction in the minds of all public-spirited people that agriculture, as Canada's basic industry, is entitled to a square deal, and that, if the drift of population from country to the city is to be stopped, life on the farm must be made more attractive to the young and ambitious. This means better homes, better schools, more attention to public health, library facilities—in fact, a more equitable share of the national income. That is the ultimate aim of the C.F.A. The writer of this article believes that dream will be realized.

Canada, June 1942.

AUSTRALIA—THE AMERICAN IMPACT

For six months we have lived under the threat of a major attack, if not an actual invasion, by the Japanese, with an acute and disquieting consciousness, at least in the earlier months, that we were desperately ill prepared for the conflict. In the last few weeks the tension has sensibly relaxed. Events in Libya and Russia have pushed Japan temporarily into the background and restored the war as a whole to better perspective. But the Japanese menace has rubbed in, as nothing else could, the vivid realization of the effort still before us, and it is still bringing home more and more to the individual the magnitude of the demand which must be made upon him. In the critical months which have passed, and which may easily recur, we have realized our dependence on America; and that has filled the public mind and the press, where there is not much recognition, or perhaps knowledge, of the extent to which our fighting strength is and will be dependent on British help.

Perhaps this is natural enough. Americans are very visible in the flesh and give a general impression of keenness and competence. The Commander of the Allied land forces under the Commander-in-Chief, General MacArthur, tells us "divisions" of American troops are continually arriving. They fill the streets of our capital cities, while our own fighting men are relatively inconspicuous. As we are known to have over half a million under arms, the comparison is eloquent, though, of course, misleading. Colleges, schools, hospitals and boarding houses are being taken over wholesale for the accommodation of our Allies and a great administrative organization is evidently being set up. The Government is undertaking military works for the Allied forces, mostly, it may be supposed, aerodromes and communications, to the tune of £50,000,000. Impressive descriptions of some of these works, constructed at amazing speed somewhere in Australia, are appearing in the newspapers. What has been happening is clearly a major event in Australia and merits some survey of the past and the present before coming to the very interesting implications of the future.

In the cool strategical outlook of pre-war days a Japanese invasion was generally reckoned an impossibility, with the United States Navy, even only potentially hostile, threatening the long line of communications. Now the achievements of the Japanese in south-west Asia have shaken this earlier confidence. So many impossibilities have happened that the most sceptical must admit that the popular bogy has a substantial chance of taking on flesh and blood. It seems certain that the Government, with full knowledge of the facts, has for six months judged the threat a real one. Last Christmas there could be no holidays lest we were caught off our guard. In May the invasion might come "any hour", the Prime Minister told us. It was abundantly clear that "invasion" was not just a whip to increase war effort, but a grave anxiety to the Government.

First Impressions

In these circumstances the arrival of the Americans has been greeted with a deep-felt relief, which has inevitably taken at times rather emotional and embarrassing forms. Relief from anxiety of this kind is always likely to be accompanied by some abandonment of conventional restraints, and the streets of our capital cities have presented at times an unpleasant picture. The Americans themselves have in general behaved sensibly and decently, giving the impression of wanting chiefly to get on with their job.

The first excitement over, the question is how well are Australians and Americans going to understand and respect one another, a matter which is going to be very important, for Australia at least, in the post-war world. Our relations with America in the past have never been very intimate. It has been a foreign country and a distant one. Now we have an opportunity of getting on better terms.

On the whole the Australian is feeling a new respect and liking for the American, and the Australian does not easily respect anyone. Internationally his manners are bad. With Americans he shows something more than a spontaneous hospitality to visitors. The men of the vanguard in particular gave him the impression of competence and responsibility. Their obviously higher standard of education has also carried weight. This general impression remains, though a little diluted by the later arrivals. Of course there is something on the other side. Here and there the American will throw his weight about rather crudely, and will talk in terms of Australia as a poor relation taken over by the United States with no choice but to do what she is told. An occasional incident of this kind is reported widely, but not taken seriously by many people. Fears of the future dominance of United States interests are not widespread. The army demands again are apt in general to be rather arbitrary, regardless of the reasonable requirements of civilians. With our visitors the standards of administrative comfort and convenience are high, and insistence on them causes irritation. But it is not serious.

The reactions of the American are not so clear. He appreciated our hospitality and friendliness, and was pleased and a little surprised to find surroundings in which he could feel at home. When it came down to business it was a different matter. Soldiers keyed up to active service conditions are apt to find Allied civilians rather unsatisfactory to deal with. That was our experience in France in the last war, until we had time to make friends individually. Civilian ways do not accord with military forthrightness, and a soldier intent on his job is apt to get a low opinion of both the efficiency and the moral of the civilian. Pungent comment has had occasional publicity and probably finds its way into a good many home letters. No doubt a good deal is justified. Incidents have recurred of American soldiers unloading ships themselves rather than wait for the dilatory operations of the waterside workers. When you come to fight for a country you expect that country to stir itself. Irritation and some scorn is natural.

Nevertheless, these occasional fireworks are not to be taken too seriously.

It is an amiable weakness of the American to believe that he is always dowered with an intense business efficiency, and evidence to the contrary seems to make no inroad on that belief. He may with justification have fallen foul of certain trade union practices here, but in comparison with an Australian on any solid job, whether civil or on service, we have no reason to be uneasy. In fact from some of our armed forces we get the quiet comment that the American is "so slow". On the whole we may regard American criticisms as a pious expression of the national faith, and see no cause for international ill-feeling on their account. Despite small irritations, Australians in general are so conscious of their debt to American help in a very precarious position that feelings of thankfulness and gratitude will probably remain with them when the danger period is over. But on the amount of that help there is a good deal of popular misconception, and it will be as well to try to appraise it, so far as the slender information available will allow.

Support from Great Britain

After the *débâcle* in Malaya the natural inference was that it was impossible to look to Britain for help. If help could have been given it would have been thrown in to fight in Malaya, Singapore, Java and Burma. Some newspapers drew that inference in so many words. Therefore we could look only to America. Mr. Dean Acheson, speaking of lend-lease contributions, is reported in cables to have made a strong disclaimer against this sort of inference generally. "It is a great mistake", he said, "to believe that our supplies are equipping the armies of the United Nations. Although our contributions are indispensable, they are part of a much larger whole." This is probably true even of Australia. What we have lacked is equipment and munitions. The numbers enlisted were probably adequate to meet any possible threat of invasion, if only they could be fully equipped. Equipment has improved enormously over the last few months, but it has not been mainly from American sources.

But this has not been obvious. The most impressive thing in the public eye has been the presence of American troops, though man power was not our acutest need. Equipment and munitions are not easily seen, except aircraft. Every schoolboy can spot an American plane when it is only a dim silhouette. The evidence of American planes was incontestable, in fact all the visible evidence of increased strength in the air pointed to an American source. It was not realized that even American planes might be British supplies diverted by Britain to Australia. No public statement of lend-lease contributions is possible because of the United States' stipulation that no values are to be mentioned in connection with lend-lease. A careful censorship is, in fact, imposed on all references to lend-lease. In the absence of official figures, only rather broad general inferences are possible.

It is probably safe to say that during the last twelve months war material received from and through Great Britain was several times as great as the amount received through lend-lease and was probably about half our own production of munitions and equipment. The flow of lend-lease goods is

now much greater, but in the year before us it is not certain whether it will exceed receipts from Great Britain, and our own production will be considerably greater than the two together. That is probably the rough order of the magnitudes. The American contribution will be very great; it will be indispensable, but it is not the whole story. The conditions under which this indispensable help has been received and the obligations we incurred on that account have not so far aroused much public interest. We wanted help badly and took it without question wherever we could find it. The terms and conditions could be thought about later. The immediate question was the war on our frontiers.

Mutual Aid Agreement

An account of the mutual aid agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States was given by Dr. Evatt in Parliament in February. He referred especially to Article 7 in his speech, and made it clear that the Government were fully committed to the whole agreement. No reference, however, was made to it during the three days' debate on international affairs which followed. There was little public comment and what there was showed no realization of the practical significance of Article 7. Two aspects of the agreement may be noted here—the provision of mutual aid and post-war reconstruction policy. Lend-lease is to be accompanied by reciprocal lend-lease. Each country is to do everything possible to help the other in the fight against the common foe. With large American forces in this country there are possibilities of a very substantial reciprocal contribution from Australia.

The exact terms of the lend-lease and reciprocal lend-lease are not known. The Prime Minister stated recently that they were under negotiation. It is probable that no definite lend-lease agreement has yet been signed. It is understood that we are supplying the American troops, as reciprocal lend-lease, with all supplies that can be most conveniently furnished by Australia. What that means has not been officially defined, but it may be taken to include food, housing, transport and probably a substantial amount of munitions. There is then the question of works. An Allied works programme of £50,000,000 has been mentioned, but spread over what space of time has not been disclosed. It has not been specifically stated whether Australia will bear the cost of these works, but it may be fairly assumed. On the whole it appears likely that our aid for the American forces will be at least as great as theirs to ours. This does not mean that accounts are square on a material basis with the United States, because we have, in addition, American man power for which, no doubt, their own Government is providing the pay. Moreover lend-lease goods are those of which we are in dire need, while much of our supplies will be goods of which we have surpluses or which can be supplied, at worst, by diversion of exports. Nevertheless reciprocal lend-lease involves a considerable additional strain on our man power and limits to some extent our war effort in other directions.

Our problem of farm surpluses has been radically changed by increased local demand due to the arrival of the American troops, the return of our own men from abroad and some influx of refugees. The effect is even greater than the very considerable number would imply, because army rations are on a high scale compared with average civilian demand. Men during active campaigning will put up with anything, but in training or during rest periods they must be fed well if serious discontent is to be avoided. The effect has been that, instead of shipping difficulties causing surpluses, there is considerable difficulty in filling all available ships with what is left after local demand has been satisfied. The long period of drought now ended has contributed further to shortages. In order to carry out our export commitments to Great Britain there must be lease or release of farm labour from the army, and that device is now being used. It may be that some rationing of foodstuffs will also be needed, a contingency which has always been confidently regarded as impossible in Australia. Local shortages of several foods have, in fact, been frequent, though not serious. This is mostly a question of distribution, as railways are absorbed by service requirements and shipping services are much reduced. The only shortage of any importance has been that of milk, which is due chiefly to drought conditions.

Post-War Implications of Mutual Aid

The effects of the American alliance will take many forms, both now and in the future. The immediate consequences of the unified command under an American Commander-in-Chief have some interesting aspects, both legal and political. For example, agreements between the Prime Minister and General MacArthur relieve the War Cabinet of much of the burden of responsibility for detailed decisions. For the future there will be consequences both political and economic. It may well be that we shall look to the American Navy in future for control of the Pacific, with bases in southern waters. The set up of the British Empire must be affected by this development, as well as by the economic consequences of Article 7. Our survey, however, will be limited to the economic aspects.

The conditions of American help are, first, that we reciprocate, which we are in a position to do and are doing in a very substantial measure; secondly, that we shall collaborate in post-war measures directed to the expansion of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, and the removal of trade barriers. Stated more precisely, by our adherence to the mutual aid agreement we are committed to "agreed action" with the United States, the United Kingdom and

> "all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom".

There is no doubt that we are committed to this post-war collaboration and that the aims set out in Article 7 touch Australia very nearly. So far

the matter has aroused little public interest. There has been practically no discussion in the press, no exposition from the platform. There has, however, been a good deal of private discussion among groups interested in public affairs, and public interest is likely to follow. The Parliamentary Committee on Social Security is about to take up certain aspects of the subject. There are some signs that the Government is likely to give a good deal more attention to post-war problems provided the war position does not take on new urgency.

Imperial Preference and Lower Tariffs

There are two demands which will be made under Article 7 which cause particular difficulty to Australia. These are the abandonment of Imperial Preference and the lowering of the tariff. Any action which would have to be taken under both heads is not likely to be fatal to any Australian interest, and the damage done might be more than offset by compensating advantages. This balancing of benefits and losses is always a difficult matter in any democracy, particularly when the losses affect special groups and the benefit is general. In both these matters the action required in Australia runs counter to deep-rooted prejudices.

Imperial Preferences will touch some farmers. The farmer asserts the right to make a living in the particular kind of farming which he practises. If the market prices do not pay, then the market prices must be raised in some way so that he can make a living, and he must be subsidized directly until this is done. He rejects on principle the proposition that he should change his way of farming to suit the demand for farming products. He may submit to change under pressure, but he does so reluctantly under protest. This claim has been largely conceded in practice by Governments under political pressure by farming interests. When a proposal is made which may displace farmers in some particular product, the whole farming world is concerned. A principle is at stake on which they all depend. Damage to one kind of farmer is not considered to be offset by any benefit which other farmers may get. Those immediately affected pull the political strings and the whole weight of the land interests is likely to be thrown against the proposal. Any deliberate measure which requires the reorganization of farming activities is bound to come up against serious political difficulties, even though the net effect is beneficial to farming as a whole.

On the industrial side the prospects are even worse. Very crude protectionism reigns in Australia. "There is no such thing as uneconomic industry. Any industry gives employment and that is the main thing. If it relieves us also from the necessity of importing its products, that is so much more to the good." That closes the discussion. This feeling about protection has always been with us, but had been intensified by the experience of the depression. We still suffer from a depression complex. Moreover the war has almost proved that even high protection was worth the price. Further, a political principle is involved. We are very touchy about any attempt to dictate what our tariff policy should be. Few politicians could afford to compromise with this issue.

Balance of Trade

It does not seem likely that the demands made under Article 7 will involve much more than refraining from starting new industries with very little prospect of economic production. But any such undertaking will be repugnant to popular feeling and a very few interested parties could set a match to an impressive bonfire. These are obvious difficulties. It is not suggested that they are insuperable. They will, however, provide a severe test of the sanity and reasonableness of Australian democracy. There are more fundamental difficulties which are not so obvious. They are implicit in two irreconcilable demands—irreconcilable at least under our probable conditions—which are already being bracketed in the popular press. We must maintain full employment after the war by "huge public works", and all war-time controls must be immediately swept away.

The trouble, of course, will be our balance of trade. We know our London funds have run low through the demands of war finance. There does not seem any prospect of building them up under war conditions. The post-war prospects of exports are uncertain and may well be unfavourable in the absence of effective measures to expand the international demand for our products. With employment maintained at a high level, and enormous accumulations of spending power in the hands of the public, imports will greatly exceed our ability to pay for them and we shall have small reserves to call upon. We shall be obliged to maintain many internal controls to give even the possibility of avoiding international default. With these controls we should be forced to the raising of trade barriers in some way or other instead of lowering them, to which we are committed by the mutual aid agreement. Under these circumstances we could expect retaliation—perhaps organized retaliation—from the rest of the world, and our last state would be worse than the first. Australia is the last place to attempt self-sufficiency. To consume our own wool and wheat would be an acutely dyspeptic way of life, and for much of the resources involved there is no alternative production.

Our post-war prospects generally are not very bright unless we get a world expansion of employment, consumption and trade, as envisaged in Article 7. There is no doubt that this end could be attainable by an agreed resolute international action. Shall we get agreement and resolution, that is the question? The United States will have great power for good or evil at the end of a successful war. She may use that power to promote prosperity with stability in the world, with benefit in the long run to herself. She may use it to placate sectional interests, avoid internal political embarrassment and let a prostrate world fend for itself. The present Administration seems set on a long-term policy. There will no doubt be strong pressure groups working against it.

Importance of Mutual Understanding

It is here that good feeling and understanding between Australia and America will be important. We may assume that genuine proposals for the

betterment of the world will be made by the present Administration. They will involve some immediate sacrifice probably in most of the countries which accept them. There may also be proposals not so genuinely altruistic. The danger is that we should be so suspicious of the Americans—*et dona ferentes*—so ready to see a selfish policy camouflaged as idealism that we shall not be able to distinguish the evil from the good. If we were stubbornly non-co-operative, the effect might be more serious than our numbers would suggest. One may imagine the American Administration having a good deal of difficulty in controlling sectional interests and putting forward genuine proposals for the betterment of the world. A good response from all the nations concerned may well be a necessary condition for getting its policy accepted by the people of America. Any country which will make no response, but appears concerned solely with its own interests, is going to make the President's job a harder one, and may even make it impossible.

The successful carrying out of Article 7 is going to be vitally important to Australia, possibly more important than to any other country. But it is not going to be easy. We shall have to get away from political catch-cries and try to make a sober estimate of future happenings in real terms. It will be, as suggested above, a severe testing time for the good sense and reasonableness of the Australian democracy. It will be difficult to be hopeful of the outcome unless we begin negotiations on the basis of mutual understanding and confidence between ourselves and the Americans.

Australia,
July 1942.

SOUTH AFRICA

THE fall of Tobruk, involving the loss of many thousands of South Africa's best troops, was a severe shock to the Union. South Africa was aintaining two divisions on the North African front: of these only one id a fragment remain. The dismay was all the greater in comparison with ie remarkably light losses sustained hitherto. Sound training and good adership had enabled the South African troops to take a distinguished art in the Abyssinian campaign at very light cost in casualties and, until obruk, the losses in North Africa (except at Sidi Rezegh) were relatively ight. General Smuts's announcement after his recent visit to Libya that oth South African divisions were to be fully mechanized had given satisction in the thought that every man in our small fighting force would be iven the fullest striking power. The severe losses at Tobruk, therefore, ainly in prisoners, came as a staggering blow.

"AVENGE TOBRUK"

HE country's reaction, however, has on the whole been good. There as, not unexpectedly, a tone of elation in the Opposition press at a British efeat, together with the conclusion that this, after all, is the proper result f the Union's participation in Britain's wars. The demand of Dr. Malan iat a special session of Parliament should be summoned to debate the ituation met with no response from the Government, and has since evapoated. On the other side of politics, organs of the extreme Left have used ie occasion to raise the cry of "total war" as an argument for revolutionary conomic and social changes. Apart from these two extremes there has een no panic or squealing, and the general reaction of the country is to cho the words of General Smuts's broadcast—"Avenge Tobruk"—and to nd the men to fill the gaps. Time will reveal the tactical errors or mishances in Libya; but there has been, fortunately, little tendency to indulge i public recrimination or to seek for scapegoats. Instead, there is a wider ealization that the war demands a very much greater degree of austerity nd sacrifice than has hitherto been supposed. The note of urgency sounded y members of the Government has been reinforced by developments which elp to bring the facts of war closer to the ordinary citizen. Durban has ad more than one air-raid alert and, with Port Elizabeth, is now permanently lacked out, while a six-phase scheme for the black-out of the Union's other hief centres is now in force. The tale of ships sunk off our coasts emphasizes he length of the enemy's arm, the vital strategic importance of the ports ve have to defend, and the significance to the Union of the recent operations n Madagascar, in which South African troops are now taking part. The radual tightening of the petrol rationing, the stringent tyre rationing and he drastic reduction and simplification of the railway services are beginning o confine travel to the limits of necessity, and the outcry raised by the July xodus to Durban races shows that the public conscience is being stirred.

Again the Government's demand for less spending goes hand in hand with the increasing difficulty in finding anything to spend on. After two fat years as one of the world's favoured nations, South Africa now faces a period of considerable stringency. Goods with a priority rating over five have no chance of admission, and shops in many of the chief centres are closed for days or part-days, while shoppers are finding their spending limited, not only by the rationing of certain commodities, but by the fact that others are not there to ration. In most respects, however, and particularly in the matter of food, South Africa has as yet little cause to complain.

Parliamentary Tendencies

The last number of The Round Table brought the account of South African politics up to the end of the Parliamentary session. There is, therefore, little to record in the way of specific political events. A brief survey, however, of present trends may be of value. The animosities prevailing among the Opposition groups remain unabated, but there are signs that Dr. Malan, though still not altogether satisfied with Zeesen's expression of goodwill towards the projected Afrikaner republic, is feeling somewhat more sure of his ground in the Opposition camp and is rallying to the Herenigde party some of the support which at one time seemed to be drifting in the direction of the Nazi groups of Mr. Pirow and Dr. Van Rensburg. This may be due in some part to a genuine disgust and anxiety felt by rank and file Nationalism at the bomb-throwing sabotage by which, mainly in the Transvaal, extremists have endeavoured unsuccessfully to disrupt the Government's authority. The arrest and committal on charge of high treason of Robey Leibrandt and a number of his associates, with the death sentence recently passed on two bomb-throwers, may also have a sobering effect upon the Opposition. The small Afrikaner party, apart from occasional sniping, maintains an attitude of "passive non-belligerency" towards the Government. It is among the Government's own supporters that one must record a new note of criticism.

And here the situation in the Union is more difficult than that in Britain. In England criticism of Mr. Churchill or his Government, by both the press and Parliament, has been on occasion sharp and searching without involving the critics necessarily in the charge of endangering the war effort, and Mr. Churchill continues to command the support of the vast majority of the people of Britain and of the House of Commons. In the Union conditions are less favourable for constructive criticism of the Government by its own supporters. The Government groups command a majority of only 20 in a House of 153: constituencies are small and majorities often slight enough for outspoken criticism to swing the balance: there are Opposition parties whose desire is, not to win the war, but to lose it, and to whom criticism of the Government by its own supporters would fall as manna from heaven, and provide capital enough for volumes of political speeches: further, a general election is due next year and, though the Provincial elections have already been postponed, the indications are that Parliamentary elections will in fact be held. Members of Parliament, therefore, and the great majority of the newspapers which

support the Government, have to a large extent been inhibited from public criticism of the Government by a natural anxiety not to risk selling the fort. An account of public sentiment in the Union at the present time would not, however, be accurate if it did not record the fact that a considerable volume of criticism exists among those whose only purpose is to win the war. There is in the broader aspect a feeling that the Cabinet needs new blood, that some Ministers have too much to do, while others do too little. For the latter part of this claim there is probably insufficient ground: a Cabinet of only 13 members leaves, in war-time, comparatively little room for passengers. For the former there is more justification: there are no under-secretaries to take the strain of the routine of the more heavily worked departments; and General Smuts, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, and Mr. Hofmeyr, as Minister of Finance and Education, are felt by some to be shouldering a heavier burden of work than they should. It is, moreover, in regard to these departments, Defence and Finance, with that of Commerce and Industries under Mr. Stuttaford, that there is a good deal of latent criticism.

Defence, Commerce and Finance

In regard to the Department of Defence, it must be realized on the credit side that the Union, thanks to Mr. Pirow, started the war almost from scratch. It has built up on a voluntary enlistment basis from at most 70 per cent of the white population an army as big as that of New Zealand under conscription and, proportionately to its white population, comparing favourably with that of any other Dominion: its soldiers and airmen have given a fine account of themselves in Abyssinia and North Africa: its war industrial organization has grown at a remarkable pace to supply its own forces and help those of its Allies. In a development so rapid there must be confusion, extravagance and maladjustment. But there are still too many complaints of avoidable mistakes made by the Defence Department, mainly in regard to its home establishment. An alternative to General Smuts as head of the Defence Department is as far to seek as an alternative to Mr. Churchill in the same capacity, nor is it the business of this article to suggest one; but there is little doubt that the higher ranks of the defence organization need some fresh air and fresh blood. The Department of Commerce and Industries which controls imports has also come under fire in recent months. The public is now beginning to feel fairly acutely the shortage of many imported commodities, and the business community has for some while past complained bitterly of the long delays in answering applications for import permits, of incalculable vagaries in priority ratings, of difficulty in securing permits even for goods high on the priority list and ready for shipment. In complaints as so stated there is some truth, but it is inevitable that importers should have a different understanding from that of the Minister of the meaning of the word "necessities", and it must be realized that the immense and rather sudden expansion of the Department's functions in import control has created staffing problems which, in the present shortage of labour, are not easy to solve. Further, with the increased public appreciation of the gravity of the shipping problem there is, perhaps, more understanding of

the strategic necessities beyond local control which dictate and may alter import policy from day to day.

The Treasury is the third target for criticism. The Minister handling war finance and taxation has a thankless and arduous task in probing constantly deeper into the taxpayer's pocket and in meeting the momentous problems raised by the change to a war economy. But it must be recorded that, among business and financial sections of the community, considerable criticism is expressed regarding certain aspects of Mr. Hofmeyr's policy, in particular his excess profits duty and trades profits special levy. With his purpose of securing a fair distribution of burdens and checking tax evasion there can be no quarrel. But it is felt in some quarters that his methods tend to defeat themselves by their very intricacy and that firms and companies, already sorely under-staffed, are put further out of gear by heavy additional legal and accounting problems and the uncertainties that arise therefrom. Apart from criticism of the Government, a healthy tendency towards self-criticism is also evident. To a good many has come the realization of how far we in South Africa fall short in those things for which we profess to fight, in the achievement of the liberal ideals of true democracy, in the establishment of a sound standard of social security and human dignity for all races and classes in our community. The Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr in particular have spoken eloquently of these, and the creation of a Social Planning Council has already been announced. The lead thus given is in keeping with the reactions of many South Africans to the growing sacrifices of the war and to the astonishing achievements of the Russian people—reactions which express themselves in criticism of democracy as we represent it, in an earnest demand for a better world for all after the war and in a socialist trend of thought which, till these days of crisis, had but little place in the political philosophy of South Africans.

The Bantu and the War

The life of the Bantu people of the Union and Protectorates has been considerably affected by the war. This is true of the dwellers in remote villages with whom, though often ill-informed, the war is a frequent subject of conversation and on whose simple transactions at traders' stores war conditions have impinged. It is still more true of the growing number of educated Bantu men and women. In the early months of the war the Native Affairs Department of the Union Government with commendable foresight took steps for the publication of a weekly bulletin giving the latest war news. This they put in charge of an expert in native life and mentality, whose literary work is well known in South Africa and overseas. The bulletin is printed in English and Afrikaans, but is also translated into the principal South African vernacular languages, and is given a prominent place in native weekly newspapers, which are now an influential force with a wide circulation among Africans. At native educational institutions also steps are regularly taken to satisfy the Bantu craving for information about the course of the war by giving talks on current events, by placing loud-speakers in common rooms so that the B.B.C. and other news bulletins may be heard,

and by a supply of newspapers. Few statements of leading world personalities have had such a wide publicity among the Bantu, or so bitten into African minds, as Hitler's declaration in *Mein Kampf* that it is a sin against reason and the Creator to train black men to become lawyers, teachers and the like. Many educated Bantu are aware that the future of the African races is being decided in the world's theatres of war.

Soon after the beginning of hostilities the Union Government created the Native Military Policy. Later it was decided to give a wider field of activity to African soldiers, and so a Native Military Corps was formed, and the first body was merged into it. This Corps has drawn recruits from the various tribes. Some have come from the Zulu and Hlubi in Natal, others from the Xhosa, Tembu, Pondo and Fingo tribes of the eastern part of the Cape Province; the Sotho, Tswana and Swazi of the Protectorates have been specially noteworthy in the numbers they have provided, while smaller contingents have come from the Venda, Pedi and Shangana of the Transvaal. Native battalions are under the command of a European Colonel and subordinate officers who have knowledge of one or more native languages and who are acquainted with native customs and outlook; not a few of the officers are drawn from the Native Affairs Department. Chaplains experienced in native work have also been appointed, and there are several native assistant chaplains. There have also been appointed educational officers who, in addition to their duties as teachers, keep the troops informed as to the progress of the war, as well as to its causes and the plans for post-war reconstruction.

The total number of Africans recruited is seldom published, but it certainly comprises several scores of thousands. The Governor of Kenya recently declared that there were 90,000 African troops from different territories serving with the forces in East Africa. Incidentally it has been found that recruiting is most brisk in districts where camps are situated, and where men can learn from their compatriots who have joined up the nature of the work and conditions.

The Native Military Corps

Soldiers of the Native Military Corps are employed as motor drivers, stretcher bearers, male nurses, mechanics, infantrymen, batmen, cooks, boot repairers, tailors, clerks, typists and in repairing roads and railways. Those who have to deal with them declare that they are easily disciplined and display many of the best qualities of a soldier, whether in camp or under fire. As guards they have proved how meticulously they can obey orders. In various camps known to the writer there are current stories of senior officers who, believing themselves to be so well known that they could pass sentries without question, found themselves held up at the point of an assegai. As stretcher bearers they have particularly distinguished themselves. For gallantry under fire three stretcher bearers have been awarded the Military Medal. It has been found also that, as aids to artillerymen, they have been cool and resourceful.

Some months ago the first batch of native casualties arrived in Pretoria

from Egypt and were given a warm-hearted welcome both by Europeans and by their own people. A number of them had been through various campaigns: in East Africa and Abyssinia and had taken part in the Libyan campaign. The Under-Secretary for Native Affairs declared them to be war veterans.

While men have been serving far from home they have not been forgotten by their womenfolk. The latter have busied themselves with knitting comforts—socks, pullovers, scarves, balaclava caps and other articles. At one native tuberculosis hospital a number of men patients learned to knit comforts for their fellow Africans on active service. These and other gifts are being constantly sent to the native troops through the Gifts and Comforts Committee. During the recent period of six months 4,100 parcels were sent north.

The Bantu have also been subscribing to war funds. Their donations have ranged from small sums given by herdboys and others to a donation of £5,000 from the United Transkeian Territories General Council. The latter gift was for the purchase of a warplane which was appropriately named "Bunga", the native term for the Bantu Council. Considerable concern was felt in the Transkei recently by a report that the Bunga plane had been shot down. In all, native contributions from the Union have amounted to about £24,000. It was intimated some time ago that Basutoland had given over £63,000 to war funds, of which more than £17,000 was from native sources. In addition, 5,866 pounds of sheepskins had been donated by Basutoland in order that they might be tanned and made up into warm coats for the navy. A handsome motor ambulance of the most modern type and equipment was subscribed for by the African people of Johannesburg, and there have been other notable gifts.

Remaining Grievances

Despite the considerable effort made, it must be admitted that the Bantu support of the war has not been completely whole-hearted. This is almost exclusively due to political causes touching the Union of South Africa. The Bantu are passionately loyal to the British Crown. Even with regard to the Union they do not imagine that they would be better under Japanese or any other invaders. As one of their leaders recently put it, "Better the devil we know than the devil we don't know". They are aware that, under German rule, their condition would be worse. But certain happenings in South Africa have made them sore. In the last war 93,000 Bantu went to German South-West Africa, German East Africa and France. In various fields they did invaluable work. According to Colonel Pritchard, head of the Native Affairs Department of Johannesburg, they gained a high reputation in France for conduct, courage and work. He said they established themselves as the best labourers in France. Hundreds of them perished in the *Mendi* disaster, when a troopship was sunk in the English Channel. Yet, despite the services of the Bantu, when the war was over, the Government of South Africa refused to award them war medals. Compensation was paid to the disabled and to the dependants of those who had died—compensation not pensions. These things have been remembered.

In the present war a more liberal view has prevailed. Field-Marshal Smuts has given instructions that African soldiers must receive medals in exactly the same way as others. It has also been declared that non-Europeans "form an integral part of the Union army". African soldiers are now included in the War Pensions Act. Injured soldiers will be given pensions if their injuries are serious and permanent, and in each case there will be allowances for wives and children. If a soldier is killed, his widow may receive a pension with an allowance for each child. Africans, too, are to receive benefits from the Governor-General's War Fund.

Two major grievances, however, remain. Africans of influence and undoubted loyalty protest strenuously that the scale of pay for native recruits is not adequate. A native private receives 2*s.* 3*d.* a day, of which he must allocate 1*s.* 3*d.* to his wife. Africans ask how a soldier's wife can live on 1*s.* 3*d.* a day. It is maintained that natives are not joining up in large numbers because they cannot afford to. No African, of course, can hope to reach commissioned rank.

Another and much greater grievance is the fact that Africans are not given firearms: they are furnished with assegais. Assegai parades have been the subject of much scornful comment. It is being asked what chance has a soldier with an assegai in the face of modern weapons of war. Even more, the refusal to allow African soldiers to carry rifles is taken as another badge of their servitude. They are reckoned as a people apart. The appeal for recruits being confined to non-combatant work leads the Bantu to say "the Government distrusts us so much that it cannot put rifles into our hands when we ask for them in order to fight for the Empire; well then, we are disloyal, dangerous people; we cannot, of course, do anything". The refusal to arm the Bantu, following so closely on their removal from the common voters' roll in the Cape Province—a privilege they enjoyed from 1854 till 1936—has deeply affected the attitude of the native people to the Government of South Africa. Some go so far as to draw a parallel with conditions among non-Europeans in the population of Malaya. Not a few of the intelligentsia demand equal political rights before they will volunteer for military service. While these attitudes may be confined to a small minority of extremists, there can be no question that the general position is unsatisfactory to a large number of the Bantu people and also to many Europeans.

South Africa,
July 1942.

NEW ZEALAND

A National War Administration

IT is gratifying at last to be able to record a definite approach towards political unity by the formation of an enlarged war administration with full responsibility for the direction of New Zealand's war effort. As has been explained in previous issues of THE ROUND TABLE, repeated overtures for a coalition have been made by the National Party Opposition in Parliament and have been rejected by the dominant Labour Party. The real obstacle throughout has been the fear of the Labour Party outside Parliament that, by abdicating its right to govern, the Government might enable hostile elements to sabotage the social security system which is the corner-stone of Labour's policy. Having been put into office in 1935 with a majority of 55 seats to 25, and again in 1938 with 53 seats to 27, Labour feels that, war or no war, it is entitled to implement its social policy. The Opposition's claim that "the war should not be used as a means of socialising the country" was tantamount to demanding that, because of the war, Labour's social policy should be halted. In face of this fear, the Labour Party Conference consistently frowned upon overtures for a coalition or national government.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, has been less intransigent. With a better understanding of the war peril than the party at large, he stated a year ago that he personally was in favour of some form of national government; but, as the party rejected any form of coalition, he undertook not to enter into fresh negotiations without full authority while the Labour Party Conference was preparing to face a general election. This, in Mr. Fraser's view, was unthinkable under war conditions. In 1941 the life of Parliament was extended for a year without restriction on Labour's authority to legislate, beyond the Prime Minister's assurance that he would bring in as little purely party legislation as possible. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Holland, renewed his offer to negotiate, and Mr. Fraser repeated his invitation to Mr. Holland to join the War Cabinet of five, in which the Opposition already had two seats. Now there has been a new development. On May 16 the Dominion executive of the New Zealand Returned Services Association suggested the reorganization of the War Cabinet by the inclusion of men from outside Parliament, "thus creating a National War Cabinet with full executive powers to prosecute the total war effort". It suggested that party politics should be eliminated for the duration of the war. These proposals have already been submitted to the National Executive of the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Caucus, both of which agreed with the principle. The National Party Opposition adhered to their previous conviction that the only way to produce political unity was by the formation of a national non-party government. Mr. Fraser cordially approved of the proposal of the Returned Services Association, saying he could speak for the united Labour Party, which saw great prospects of achieving unity in the country's

war effort, which he considered absolutely necessary. The objections to the appointment to the Cabinet of men from outside Parliament had been overcome in the United Kingdom and could be overcome here. Mr. Fraser agreed to approach Mr. Holland on the proposal to develop a united war effort through an enlarged war administration, leaving the domestic Cabinet to carry on the social and other services not connected with the war. Negotiations continued during the five weeks before Parliament was to meet again.

Composition of the New Government

ON June 24 both party Caucuses approved the arrangement arrived at, and Mr. Fraser and Mr. Holland announced to the House that it had been decided to set up a War Administration of seven members of the Government and six members of the Opposition, including all the existing members of the War Cabinet, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Jones and Mr. Sullivan of the Government party, Mr. Coates and Mr. Hamilton of the Opposition party, and a representative of the Trade Union movement from outside Parliament. The Ministers of the new Administration who were sworn in on June 30 are Mr. Fraser, Prime Minister and Chairman of the War Cabinet; Mr. Holland, in charge of war expenditure and Deputy Chairman; Mr. Jones, defence; Mr. Coates, the armed forces and war co-ordination; Mr. Sullivan, supply and munitions; Mr. Hamilton, Associate Minister of supply and munitions; Mr. Semple, transport; Mr. Polson, primary production for war purposes; Mr. Paikea, in charge of the Maori war effort; Mr. Broadfoot, national service; Mr. McLagan, industrial man-power; Mr. Bodkin, civil defence; Mr. Nordmeyer, health. This Administration is responsible for all matters connected with the war effort. Its executive body is a War Cabinet consisting of the previous War Cabinet with the addition of Mr. Holland and Mr. Nash if he returns to New Zealand from his post in Washington. The members of the domestic Cabinet retain their positions, Mr. Sullivan being Deputy Prime Minister to act in the event of Mr. Fraser being absent from New Zealand. Mr. McLagan, the only non-parliamentary member of the War Administration, was appointed to the Legislative Council forthwith. He is the President of the New Zealand Federation of Labour and was a member of the War Council appointed in 1940. It is noted that the Minister of Health who administers the social security legislation is a member of the War Administration. Whereas in the past the three Labour members of the War Cabinet had portfolios to administer, while the two Opposition Ministers were merely advisory, now all have tasks allotted to them. Both leaders admit that the arrangement is not perfect.

"We have made an honest effort", said Mr. Holland, "to comply with the people's will by bringing about the greatest possible degree of unity. It should be realised that what is involved is a political revolution. In the past we have looked at each other through the smoked glasses of party interests, but are now trying to rise above it."

There was some demur throughout the country to the proposal to extend the life of Parliament for the duration of the war and a year beyond. Not only the Opposition press, but also Labour and other bodies preferred to

extend it for a year at a time rather than give Parliament an indeterminate lease of life dependent upon the end of the war. The Labour Caucus wished Parliament to have an opportunity each year, on the demand of five members, to discuss the extension. Eventually a Bill was introduced on July 10 with the proviso that at least once every year after 1942 the Prime Minister should move either to continue the extension or to fix an earlier date for its expiry. There was a lively debate on an amendment to refer the matter to a committee, but this was defeated by 51 votes to 3 and the Bill was passed through all its stages. In closing the debate the Prime Minister disclosed an important piece of inner history.

"One of the first things", said Mr. Fraser, "that the Leader of the Opposition said to me when he approached me on the matter was that there was no desire on the part of his party to interfere with the social legislation of the country."

One wonders what effect such an assurance, if given earlier, might have had upon the course of events since the outbreak of war.

War Finance

The interim financial statement delivered by Mr. Fraser on April 30 bore out the favourable forecast made by Mr. Nash on his departure for Washington. As immediate steps were required to finance the huge expansion of the armed forces and the diversion of production to war purposes, the Prime Minister did not await the complete accounts for the past year or the estimates for the current year. In the Consolidated Fund, he said, there was an excess of revenue under all the main headings, and a surplus for the year of £1,500,000. For the current year, owing to the probable shrinkage in customs duties, sales and petrol taxes, he anticipated a fall in revenue of about £3,000,000. Debt charges called for an extra £1,700,000, and the increased cost of living bonus to State employees for £700,000. Social security revenue would probably be the same as last year, that is to say, £14,500,000 including £3,600,000 from the Consolidated Fund, and there would probably be an increase of £2,400,000 in expenditure. This would be met out of the existing balance of £3,000,000, but £400,000 would be required for increased allowances to the wives of soldiers. These increases all follow from the 5 per cent cost of living bonus granted by the Court of Arbitration in April.

Last year borrowing for national development was curtailed to £11,952,000. This year the works would be reduced to a care and maintenance basis, but £1,100,000 would be provided for urgent extension to the hydro-electric works, £300,000 for the production of linen flax for war purposes, and £900,000 for land settlement for the rehabilitation of soldiers. Housing would be reduced to £5,500,000, but a great expansion was planned as circumstances permit. During 1941–42, £43,719,000 was raised by borrowing, of which £8,252,000 was for development, £3,700,000 for housing, and £31,767,000 for war purposes; £10,982,000 was raised by public loan in New Zealand, £1,684,000 in advance subscriptions to future loans, £5,086,000 by National Savings, £130,000 by voluntary loans, interest free, £8,243,000 under a memorandum of security with the United Kingdom, £5,861,000 by a National Development Loan and £11,733,000 by departmental issues and from the Reserve Bank. Loan redemptions totalled £10,585,000 and, with exchange on remittances to repay the debt in London, the net increase in the public debt was £35,907,000. The war expenditure for the financial year was £53,000,000, and the estimate for this year was £133,000,000, more than the whole cost to the Dominion of the last war. This expenditure will include £7,000,000 for the army, £10,000,000 for the navy, and £19,000,000 for the air force. It is proposed to borrow £46,000,000 under a memorandum of security, £10,000,000 under a lease lend arrangement, leaving a net deficit of £50,000,000.

Guarding against Inflation

While the volume of goods available for civil consumption, said Mr. Fraser, had decreased since the war began by 30 per cent, spending power had increased by 10 per cent. Serious inflation might result unless the surplus spending power was withdrawn without undue delay. The most equitable way to do this was by increased taxation; but to take half everybody's income would have a crippling effect on industry and personal effort. The Government proposed to increase super-tax from 15 to 33⅓ per cent, which would yield an additional £3,000,000. As 70 per cent of aggregate private incomes were beyond the effective scope of income-tax, the Government proposed to increase the national security tax by 6*d.* in the pound on all wages and incomes, including company profits. This would bring social security and national security taxes to 2*s.* 6*d.* in the pound, and would yield £4,900,000. For the balance of the year these increases raise direct taxes to 18*s.* in the pound at 2·5 unearned income and at 3·7 earned income, while companies at the maximum rate pay 14*s.* 0⅜*d.* in the pound. These taxes, with the increases in sales tax from 10 to 20 per cent on goods which do not enter into daily living costs, an extra shilling on a gallon of beer and similar duties on wines and spirits, and an extra 2*d.* on a packet of cigarettes and 5*d.* on an oz. of tobacco, should yield a total of £14,400,000 and leave a balance of £35,600,000 to be found by borrowing. National Savings and State Department funds would yield £8,000,000, leaving £27,600,000 to be raised by public loans.

The House at once passed the necessary resolutions without a division and, at the next sitting, opened the usual financial debate. In this it struck a very high note and the broadcast had a distinctly tonic effect on public moral. The prospectus of the Liberty Loan for £15,000,000 was published on May 4 and, when subscriptions closed on June 4, they amounted to £17,131,000, of which £6,122,000 was at 2½ per cent repayable in 1947, and £10,818,000 at 3 per cent repayable in 1952–55. This result, following the successful flotation of the Bonds for Bombers issue in April, is regarded as highly satisfactory. The public accounts for the year 1941–42, gazetted on June 18, show an actual surplus in the Consolidated Fund of £1,672,000. Revenue under all heads exceeded the estimates, the total being £41,241,000 compared with £39,296,000. Expenditure totalled £39,569,000, including £11,120,000 for debt service and £11,037,000 for social services. The Minister of Health, Mr. Nordmeyer, said that the expenditure on monetary

benefits, old age, invalidity, widows' pensions, etc., was £10,576,000, on medical and hospital benefits £2,437,000 gross, and on administration and emergency expenses £520,000. Provision for medical benefits and general medical services from November 1, 1941, amounted to £205,000, pharmaceutical benefits from May 5 to £280,000, and radiological services to £28,000. He pointed out the unavoidable lag in bringing the charges into the account owing to the time that elapsed between the service of the doctor and the actual payment. The contribution of £3,600,000 from the Consolidated Fund was much smaller than originally contemplated. It was actually less than the amount from that source contributed for pensions before the social security was inaugurated.

On August 9, 1940, a general increase in the basic rates of wages was granted by the Court of Arbitration in consideration of the rising cost of living. In December 1941 the Court refused an application for a further increase of 7·9 per cent. On February 18, 1942, the Rates of Wages Emergency Regulation was amended to empower the Court to grant something less sweeping than a general order. The Court then considered a fresh application for an advance of 9·6 per cent. In its judgment of April 1, it found that the entry of Japan into the war had affected the trade and industry of New Zealand "to an almost unbelievably small extent"; but, looking to the probabilities of the period of six months before another application could be made, it did not consider the conditions of crisis now obtaining a sufficient reason for refraining from using the increased powers conferred on it by the amended regulation. In England the actual threat of invasion and the cutting of overseas communications did not appear to have prevented wage increases, but had had rather the opposite effect. The Court believed that there had been a definite acceleration in retail prices since the increase granted in 1940 and accordingly granted a general increase of 5 per cent on men's wages up to £5 a week and on women's wages up to £2. 10*s*. a week.

Changes in Social Life

In the meantime the impact of the war upon social life becomes every week more marked. Where not engrossed in war production, New Zealand capital and management are increasingly devoted to producing commodities and raw materials hitherto procured from abroad. Following the rationing of sugar at a weekly allowance of 12 oz., the rationing of tea was brought in on June 1 at 2 oz. On May 28, a few weeks after the rationing of ladies' stockings at one pair in three months, the Government forestalled panic buying by a sweeping order, which became effective forthwith, for the rationing of clothing. This covers all classes of wearing apparel, knitting yarns, fabric cloth and articles made therefrom, footwear and household linen. The allowance is 52 coupons for the year. A man's suit calls for 16 coupons, an overcoat for 12, a shirt for 2, socks or stockings for 1, boots and shoes for 3. Leading women's outfitting allowances are: costume 11 coupons, fur coat 15, dressing-gown 4, undervest 2, corset 3, stockings 2, boots and shoes 2. Only in respect of sugar is it necessary to register with a retailer. Petrol is still severely rationed, and rubber and tyres have recently been

taken under strict control. With regard to foodstuffs, New Zealand has not yet suffered any hardship. The most noticeable shortage has been in citrus fruits, bananas, pine-apples and other sub-tropical fruits, for which we are largely dependent on Australia and the Pacific islands. These have all been completely off the market for weeks at a time. There has been uneasiness, too, regarding the supply of potatoes. Controlled prices have been adjusted from time to time to prevent profiteering and to conserve increased quantities of seed for the larger area it will be necessary to plant in the coming season. On July 22 the Government offered a guarantee of £7. 5*s*. to £11 a ton for main crop potatoes at the end of 1943. Eggs have been very scarce, partly owing to reduced production and partly to the increased demand for the troops within the Anzac area. The Government claims that the steps that have been taken to control food prices mainly by virtue of guaranteed and fixed prices have been conspicuously successful. The Minister of Supply, Mr. Sullivan, answering criticism on May 6, gave the following figures to show how retail prices had risen in the principal Allied countries from the outbreak of war to the end of 1941:

	Percentage Increase	
	All Groups	*Food Groups*
Australia	11·1	10·5
Canada	14·8	17·3
Great Britain	30·00	30·00
South Africa (to October)	11·4	14·6
United States (to November)	10·6	22·4
New Zealand	0·5	2·9

Mr. Sullivan claimed that the very slight increase in the food groups in New Zealand was due to the Government's purchase of most foodstuffs at fixed prices, which considerably curbed inflation.

An inflationary factor on the other side of the balance is the announcement on May 25 by the British High Commissioner that the British Government had agreed in negotiations with Australia to pay an additional 15 per cent for the 1942–43 wool clip in consideration of the increased cost of production and handling. The South African and New Zealand wool-growers are to receive similar treatment, and thus the money income of our wool-growers will be expanded by probably more than £2,000,000. The Government calls for the greatest possible sowing of wheat for the 1943 harvest and to encourage growers, the price for Tuscan, March f.o.b., is increased to 6*s*. 1½*d*. a bushel, which is 4½*d*. over the price for the present season. Fertilizers are now being rationed on a considered plan, and a small beginning has been made in the manufacture of linseed oil for meal and oil cake.

Naval Appointments and Others

The Governor-General, Sir Cyril Newall, concluded on June 6 a comprehensive tour of the Pacific islands which lie within the defence jurisdiction of New Zealand. He visited Fiji, Samoa, American Samoa and Tonga, inspecting the units of the New Zealand military, naval and air forces, whom he congratulated upon their bearing and fitness. He also attended civil

gatherings and native *fonos* in Samoa and took part in the celebration of the King's birthday at Apia on June 1. Owing to changes in the naval command in this region, Commodore W. E. Parry, R.N., who has been the senior member of the Naval Board since May 1940, is assuming other duties and severs a happy association with New Zealand. Since taking command of *Achilles* in January 1939 he participated brilliantly in the Battle of the River Plate. Commodore Parry's successor, Commodore Sir Atwell Lake, has already assumed duty. On April 15 we also welcomed Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley of the United States Navy, who is in charge of the new South Pacific area command. He will operate under the orders of Admiral Nimitz of the United States Navy commanding the Pacific area. The exact limits and jurisdiction of the office are not yet published.

On April 22 it was announced by the Prime Minister that Mr. F. Langstone, who has been in North America for the greater part of the year as member of the New Zealand Supplies Commission, has been appointed the first New Zealand High Commissioner in Canada. It is two years since Canada appointed her first High Commissioner to New Zealand, and when Mr. Fraser was last in London he was urged by his Canadian confrère to make a corresponding appointment. Mr. Langstone has been Minister of Lands since the advent of the Labour Government in 1935. He represented New Zealand at the International Labour Conference in New York in 1941 and signed the Declaration of the United Nations in Washington in January. By virtue of the Overseas Representatives Act, Mr. Langstone may retain his seat in Parliament and the Cabinet regardless of his absence, and may also contest his seat at the next election.

New Zealand,
July 1942.

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.

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INDEX AND TITLE-PAGE

Owing to the restriction on the consumption of paper it was found impossible to insert the Index and Title-page for Volume XXXII in the December issue. A limited number of copies are, however, available, free of charge, to those subscribers who bind THE ROUND TABLE, and may be obtained on application to any of the above agents, or to The Round Table, Rhodes House, Oxford.

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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A FOUR YEARS' PLAN

THE fanfares of the Allied triumph in Tunisia are still resounding across the Mediterranean, striking most significantly of all upon the ears of the enemy; and the lines of future victory are beginning to shape themselves out of the ruins of the Axis dominion in Africa. East and west and south the Allied forces are arrayed for the coming entry into Europe; and, however gravely and justly Mr. Churchill warns us that the hardest fight is to come and that no slightest remission of effort is anywhere permissible, it is neither necessary nor possible to forbid the mind of the Allied nations, even while their loins are girded for battle, to speculate upon and plan for what lies beyond victory.

The contributions to this number from the British Dominions show that throughout the Commonwealth there is eager debate upon the planning of the post-war world, deriving much of its material from the example of the various formal plans that have been propounded by Sir William Beveridge and others in Great Britain. Interest in the principles and process of international reconstruction is certainly not less acute in the United States. To the enslaved nations of the old world, whose attitudes at this crisis of their fate are discussed in the article "Europe on the Eve", the nature of the society that shall supplant the "new order" under which they groan is itself the fundamental question, the solution to which is likely to determine the part they will be willing and able to play in the coming fight for their own liberation.

It is a commonplace of historians that, when classical and Christian civilization was submerged in the Dark Ages by the tide of Teutonic barbarism, the remnants of the ancient culture were tended and preserved for generations in the monasteries, to be brought forth when the tide receded and provide the material for reconstruction on the old foundations. Though the present Dark Age of Europe will be measured in years instead of centuries, we are now in the presence of an analogy to the same secular process. On this occasion it has fallen chiefly to the people of the British Isles to maintain the sanctuary in which the lights of the European tradition are kept burning As the Allied armies of the coming invasion press back the frontiers of barbarism, it will be fundamentally the immemorial civilized order, which is the life of Europe, that will spread over the liberated lands in their wake But just as the culture that emerged from the cloister at the end of the Dark Ages had markedly changed and developed, under the stress of the siege from that which took refuge there at the beginning, so the ideas about the social order, which it is the mission of Allied arms to restore to their authority in Europe, will have progressed greatly, through the searching experiences of these years, beyond what was thought tolerable before 1939. The enslaved peoples, even while they strain their eyes for the glint of Allied bayonets on the horizon, will certainly be asking what we, within our inviolate shores, have made of the common inheritance, of which we alone have been able to

preserve the continuity; and in what form we shall bring it back to them and call on them to fight for it. The first answer to be given them is, no doubt, to point to the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter; but if they go on to ask what in practice these abstractions will mean for their own future life, it is natural that they should base their opinions largely on the plans we are forming for the application of the principles to ourselves.

It is for this reason that the planning of the post-war Britain, as well as Britain's plans for the post-war world, is inseparably connected with the grand strategy of the coming campaign for the reconquest of Europe. Mr. Churchill, when he broadcast to the world on the subject his memorable address of March 21, 1943—significantly the first day of spring—was not turning aside in the smallest degree from his supreme function, the national leadership in the fight against the Axis. He ranged from definition of broad strategic purpose to departmental projects of home administration; but all his subjects merged easily into one another, not through any conscious artifice even of this great orator, but because of the inward unity that the cataclysm has imposed upon them all.

The Prime Minister began with a warning that, although we must take long views and plan the future, we cannot bind it. He has never made promises to his followers, and he makes none now. The future will bring its surprises and its disappointments, and no plan laid down in advance can relieve of its responsibility the leadership of the moment which has to confront each emergency as it arises. With this caution Mr. Churchill approached the design of the future in the natural way, through the strategic picture as it presents itself to the present Government at the opening of this year's campaign. The present programme is to maintain a holding action in the Far East while every available resource of the Alliance is concentrated upon Europe in order to "beat Hitler . . . into death, dust and ashes". That will be the grand climax of the war; and thereafter Great Britain will honour her pledge to her allies, and not least to the British Dominions in the south, of which so much self-abnegation is demanded by this strategy, by transferring all her applicable strength to the East and completing the destruction of Japan.

It is, however, a physical impossibility to transport to the Far Eastern theatre the whole gigantic man-power that can be employed in Europe; and hence a partial demobilization of British and Imperial forces may be expected to coincide in time with the beginnings of the resettlement of the Old World. It should be possible, therefore, for Great Britain to grapple with the problems of international and domestic reconstruction while the campaign in the Far East is still being waged. The phase of successive liberation of European peoples should pass by a continuous process into that of the organization of a "Council of Europe". (Its work may be well advanced before the time comes for contemplating a parallel "Council of Asia".) What is to be the constitution of this council: whether it is to be another league of sovereign States, like that of Geneva, or whether the time is ripe for some dilution or mitigation of sovereignty by consent; what is to be the place of the small nations in it—whether, as Mr. Churchill suggested, they can best

hold their own in the company of the great Powers by combining themselves into federal or other groups—these are problems still demanding the urgent study of statesmen in all countries. Any form of grouping that may be attempted must certainly learn much from, and be buttressed by, the one system of collective security that has maintained its cohesion through the catastrophe of our generation; and the continued collaboration of this system—the British Commonwealth of Nations—with the United States, will be as vital to the internal recovery of Europe as to the general peace of the world. For it is scarcely disputable that the future international government, developing at first, perhaps, out of the Allied High Command or a provisional peace conference, or both, will have to guarantee the framework of reviving order within which the first steps in social reconstruction of the devastated countries must be taken. It is equally obvious that, of European nations, Great Britain, by virtue of her proximity, her immunity, and her participation in the experience of the world-wide Commonwealth, is best placed to take the lead in domestic reconstruction, and to provide a model for the rest.

Thus Mr. Churchill passed logically from the future of Europe to the future of his own country. The Four Years' Plan for Great Britain, which he projected, has to be conceived as an organic part of the common task of the United Nations, which is to "achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of so many ancient and historic races". Moreover, just as abroad it must be held up as an example, demonstrating what a people can build up for itself out of the havoc left by war, so at home it cannot be imposed. Four years is a little less than the duration of a Parliament. The essence of Mr. Churchill's project is not to dictate the process of reconstruction but to formulate a scheme that may be proposed to the nation as the task for the next Parliament, and the administration in which it will place its confidence, after the general election that must be held as closely as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

The approach in war-time, therefore, has to be preparatory, not only because so small a part of the national effort can be spared from the immediate struggle, but because it is not yet possible to ask the electorate to pass judgment on the issues. There is unlimited room for study, of which so much has already been undertaken; there is room for enabling legislation; but the time is scarcely ripe for action. For that reason it is not a fair reproach to the Government of to-day that it hesitates to commit itself in advance to every detail of the Beveridge and other plans; it has done its duty if it clears the ground so as to facilitate the carrying out of these plans, with or without modifications introduced by whatever leaders bear the responsibilities of government after the war.

At the same time Mr. Churchill made his conviction very plain that his Four Years' Plan, taking up and transcending all the partial plans that have been proposed for one and another aspect of the national life, will require for its fulfilment as great a fusion of different party points of view as has been necessary to win the war. The process of working it out will have been

successful only if it transfers to a new foundation, durable in peace, the collaboration of parties on which leadership has depended, so that its authors and advocates can, without sacrifice of their various political principles, present it to the people for their assent with a reasonable claim, if they receive the commission of the electorate to proceed with it, to continue to call themselves a National Government.

Mr. Churchill's analysis of the elements of his plan shows how many-sided is the task; but its universally favourable reception shows how wide is the measure of agreement on the objectives to be sought along each of the parallel roads of social progress. It is no doubt a psychological necessity for a people that has faced for four years the enormous hazards of war to see peace first and foremost in terms of security. An article on a later page shows that the acuter controversies over the Beveridge Report have now subsided, and that its main principles are becoming common ground between parties. Mr. Churchill, for his part, makes universal economic security the first goal of the Four Years' Plan. But he links it with the highly important corollary of universal work. "We cannot have a band of drones in our midst, whether they come from the ancient aristocracy or the modern plutocracy or the ordinary type of pub-crawler."

It is primarily to ensure the general employment of the people, and only secondarily to ensure them against the consequences of unemployment, that economic planning has to be undertaken. After the war a cardinal factor in the situation will be the impoverishment caused by the loss of most of our foreign investments, which were the inheritance of Victorian prosperity. It is left for the energy and enterprise of our generation to rebuild prosperity on new bases. Good may thus be extracted from evil—for instance, by the reinvigoration of rural life through the fresh fostering of agriculture, which our reduced capacity to pay for imported food now makes compulsory. For a time, no doubt, full employment in one direction will be maintained by the necessity to rebuild the shattered cities of England. Beyond that lie the possibilities of exploitation of the vast scientific advances that the demands of war have stimulated. First among these ranks civil aviation, the limitless prospects of which are surveyed, with some grave warnings, in an article in this issue. We are on the threshold of a revolution in transport as great as the transition from the roads to the railways; and much of the future of England depends on seizing its opportunities, as we seized those of a hundred years ago.

The national future, however, depends not on possessions or on instruments but on the quality of the people. The supreme object of the Four Years' Plan is to maintain and develop those capacities of British men and women which have enabled them to sustain the leadership of the forces of freedom in every world war against tyranny, in order that they, with their mighty associates, may be worthy to continue the leadership into the years of peace. Mr. Churchill dealt successively with the three great aspects of life on which national character depends: on the bodies of the people, on their minds, and on their souls. National health, and especially the health of children and their mothers, is the groundwork of them all. "Healthy citizens

are the greatest assets any country can have." Moreover the quality cannot be maintained without attention to the quantity. Therefore few paragraphs in the speech are more important than that which directs attention to the urgent and still unsolved problem of the birth-rate.

If healthy bodies can be ensured, it is then possible to foster in the nation a mind worthy of its responsibilities. "The future of the world is to the highly educated races." Any Four Years' Plan must put the steady and progressive increase in the opportunities of intellectual training in the forefront of its objectives. It must widen the access to the springs of knowledge; at the same time it must not, through misinterpretation of the principle of equality, put constraint upon the highest forms of education because it is not possible to bring them within the reach of all. "You cannot conduct a modern community except with an adequate supply of persons upon whose education, whether humanitarian, technical, or scientific, much time and money have been spent." The true interpretation of the principle of equality is to ensure that the beneficiaries of the special training for leadership should be selected from the worthiest rather than from the richest.

Finally Mr. Churchill spoke of the soul. One of the four freedoms is freedom of religion, which is a very different thing from religious indifference. The Prime Minister rejoiced in the new understanding of the common fundamentals, the new facility in setting aside the controversies that divide, which has come to religious bodies through the necessity to co-operate against the onslaught of pagan barbarism. In the future that he plans religion will continue to be, what it has been through our fortunate history, "a rock in the life and character of the British people upon which they have built their hopes and cast their cares". None of the four freedoms, no clause of the Atlantic Charter, no project of social amelioration that can be embodied in a Four Years' Plan, will have life or reality unless it is rooted in a sense of the spiritual purposes of human life on earth.

EUROPE ON THE EVE

LIGHT OUT OF DARKNESS

SPRING broke majestically in England. Ordinarily, the weather is banned as a subject of public comment; but it is permissible to record in the number of THE ROUND TABLE appearing in June that in the April of 1943 sunshine of tonic quality blessed the land and stimulated the hearts and the hopes of the people. There was a sense of re-birth as the trees burgeoned under blue, sunlit skies; and a premonition of great events. Across the waters in Europe the people were waiting. They had waited long. In the spring of 1942 they had hoped, with an intensity pathetic in remembrance, to welcome to their shores the soldiers of liberation. Deliverance was delayed. The months passed, and the thraldom worsened. Spring brought renewal of faith; and when it is understood how sorely the men and women of the enemy-occupied countries have been tried, their unbroken resistance may fairly be counted among the finest evidence of the undying spirit of man to conduct his life with dignity and shape it in freedom. The full story of Europe's sufferings under the German yoke cannot yet be known, but a not altogether inadequate assessment may be made on the basis of proclaimed German policy itself and of information dangerously transmitted by patriots to this country. It is a story which gains in glory when seen against the background of events.

A MOMENT OF COLLAPSE

THERE was one fateful moment after the collapse of France when it was within Hitler's grasp to become a mightier Charlemagne. The continent of Europe was cowed and awed, hopeless and hapless. First Poland had gone down fighting with all the fine heroism of her crucified children. Denmark swiftly and Norway more hardly had been overrun. The Dutch, after a brave stand against heavy odds, had capitulated; followed soon by the Belgians, broken by bombs. To crown the collapse of Western democracy France, riven by faction, stricken in part with defeatism even before the blow fell, and in any event ill provided to meet the hellish assault launched against her, succumbed. There remained Britain. Dunkirk, a miracle in retrospect, was for most Europeans at the time the death-knell of hope. They knew our military weaknesses better than we ourselves did, and as well as the Germans knew them. Some few in those days had faith, but the many were sick at heart.

The chances are—and we may recognize and discuss the fact frankly now that the horror is long past—that when Hitler entered Paris in triumph in June, 1940, he had Europe at his feet and, with wisdom or even slyness, could have had Europe at his behest. The military might of the Germanic tribes was indubitable and acknowledged. A weary, brow-beaten, and bewildered Europe was in the mood for, and in need of, direction and leadership. The essential littleness of Hitler, and with it the meanness of the German mentality, was exposed in that moment. By her conduct Germany revolted rather than reconciled Europe. She behaved first as a bully and then as a blackguard. In the hour of overwhelming military victory she lost the glittering prize. It is enough to record the result: historians may be trusted to sort out and establish the reasons. The "new order" which was offered to Europe gained adherents but never acceptance, and it has played so puissant a part in the evolution of European feeling and in shaping and strengthening the movement of resistance that a closer examination of it is warranted.

THE "NEW ORDER"

IT is more than clear that the Germans had no precise conception of the "new order" which they offered to Europe. Hitler's "last territorial claim" was both an experience and an example: it was valid for the moment and the opportunity, and only for then. Similarly with the "new order". It was capable of an infinite variety of expression. The theory of *Lebensraum* was stretched to embrace *Grossraum* and then to sanction—and almost to sanctify—the *Herrenvolk* or, as some apologists called it, the *Führungsvolk*. The conception changed with changing circumstances. The "new order" at one stage was to have a racial basis; at another an economic. In the same way, its frontiers on the east were to be pushed up to the Urals, and in the south probably down to Capetown, for German day-dreamers were prone to picture Africa as the pendant of Europe: *Eurafrika* was the name they gave to this tremendous twist of the Germanic *Lebensraum*. The core of the conception remained the idea of the *Herrenvolk*, although, as the war developed and the prospect of total victory darkened and deteriorated, the master-race assumed an unwonted and unwarranted modesty.

When Hitler launched his war against Russia the chance was seized to represent it as a "holy crusade" in defence of European civilization. When the war in Russia went wrong and catastrophe was consummated at Stalingrad, the emphasis on Germany as the defender and saviour of Europe against Asiatic hordes became hysterical. The "new order" was pictured as giving Europeans a safe anchorage from the disorder of Bolshevism. Indeed Germany's own military defeats were turned to account on the naïve plea that the menace must be indeed dire seeing that even Hitler himself had miscalculated its strength and scope. In February, 1943, after a meeting in Rome between Mussolini and Ribbentrop, a revised version of the "new order" began to be put out. In April, after Hitler and Mussolini had talked for four days at Berchtesgaden, there was a still sharper—and more shameless—revision. The "new order" was no longer described as consisting of *Herrenvolk* and *Hilfsvolk*, hewers of wood and drawers of water for the Germans. Instead the nations of Europe were promised freedom, fellowship, security, and independence within the system which, the two destroyers of nations let it be known, they were striving to shape "nearer to the heart's desire". Between the two meetings that supreme opportunist Goebbels had assured neutral journalists in Berlin that even the democratic régime could be and would be tolerated by the "new order". By the middle of April Axis jurists were busily drafting, and Axis commentators deliriously discussing, a "Statute

of Europe" to give form rather than effect to these novel—and, in view of the source, these nauseating—ideas.

The significance of all this is apparent. It is not too much to say that with the collapse of France and the withdrawal of British forces from the Continent a dark cloud settled over Europe. People everywhere were bewildered and afraid. Hope for a time went from their hearts. Their worst fears seemed on the point of being realized; for it has to be remembered that Europeans had a pretty shrewd idea of comparative military strengths. German air superiority *vis-à-vis* Great Britain, for instance, was known to be in the ratio of at least four to one. Little wonder that in many countries men and women contemplated gloomily and grimly a victorious Germany holding Europe in thrall. Even in the United States the depression and misgivings were such that a serious inquiry was sent to London for an assurance that in no circumstances would the British Navy be surrendered to Germany. The inquiry was answered light-heartedly enough from this side, but there is no doubt about the perturbation which prompted it.

The revival of hope in Europe began when Britain put up the barricades. When, later, "the few" shot Göring's *Luftwaffe* out of the skies of Surrey and Sussex, Essex and Kent, hope was fortified, and soon hope became a flaming faith never again to be quenched. The resistance of Britain made all the difference to the resistance of Europe. This is not recorded in arrogance nor without regard to the truly heroic spirit of the overrun lands. It is a fact whose profound significance the Germans understood much more certainly than we did, absorbed as we inevitably were with our bombed cities and broken lives. The resistance movement on the Continent had in fact found a sure foundation, and every individual act of sacrifice was at one and the same time justified and transfigured. Everything—persecution and the firing squad, hunger and bereavement, terrorism and rapine—could be borne, and was borne, in the knowledge that the day of retribution would dawn.

Oppression and Resistance

The German mood and method were brutally revealed with the conquest of Poland. The Poles were classed and treated as sub-humans, and there is no question that the Germans put into practice a deliberate policy of getting rid, by death or deportation, of those who might provide the leadership and inspiration of a movement of resistance. Himmler's *S.S.* and later his *Waffen S.S.* were given scope to apply the torments in which they had been trained. Professors and teachers were shot; the schools were starved; intellectual and cultural life was stunted. Concentration and labour camps were overflowing. Many hundreds of thousands of people were driven from their homes and holdings to make way for alien settlers. With a view to military developments the Germans began to build a belt of settlements so that they might have a friendly population behind the future front. Humiliation was added to plain terror. Everything was done to stamp the Pole as an inferior and to denationalize his community. The meanest of rations was one mark of discrimination. Something of the ghastly story of the fate of the Jews will be told in a later paragraph. It has been said that Poland has a

tradition of crucifixion. Certainly her agony under the German occupation was bitter. Yet nowhere did the enemy find a quisling. The underground movement has been relentlessly hunted but has never been suppressed; the activities continue and its secret newspapers circulate. Poland has lost much —but not hope.

The Germans applied much the same technique elsewhere, although they varied it to suit the local conditions. In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, for example, they set out to destroy—as they had done in Poland, and failed—the national consciousness. Their rule, backed by the Gestapo, was directed to the elimination of those classes which keep the spirit of liberty and independence alive. In Czechoslovakia the number of scholars and students executed or persecuted is the appalling proof of the invader's aim. The killing of Heydrich, foremost pupil of Himmler, was followed by the razing of the village of Lidice, the shooting of all its men, and the sending of its women to concentration camps—an act of sheer terrorism which shocked the outside world and branded the "new order" for what it was. The martyrdom of Yugoslavia and Greece has its equal sacrifice.

In western Europe the Germans proceeded differently. In Norway they produced a Quisling, in Holland a Mussert, in Belgium a Degrelle, in France a Laval—a motley crew of adventurers and defeatists through whom they worked, and still work, subtly to secure collaboration in a germanized Europe. In not one of these lands have they succeeded. Each in turn has been looted to give effect to Göring's pledge that no matter who else starved in Europe it would not be the Germans. Each has seen its sons face the firing squad and its workers sent off in labour gangs to feed the war machine of the enemy. Humour has survived the horror—*La Libre Belgique*, valiant secret newspaper of two wars, announces its telegraphic address as the German *Kommandatur* in Brussels and its publisher as Peter Pan, whose statue stands in a public park of the capital. Even Denmark, which, defenceless, went down in a morning and without a fight worth the name, has its "Churchill Clubs" among schoolboys.

That the spirit of resistance has not merely survived but is steadily strengthened is a matter both of wonder and of homage when the physical and mental distress of the enslaved peoples is considered. The standard of health has everywhere fallen. In parts of France and Belgium deaths from starvation are recorded; the privation in Greece is painful, although wheat shipments have brought some small mitigation. Everywhere there is under-nourishment and malnutrition. Children are among the most pitiful sufferers. Babies are born under-weight. Where rations are concerned the Germans naturally favour those workers useful to their war industries, but there is discrimination even against them. The deterioration in health has gone so far that the fear has been expressed that when the armies of liberation land on the shores of Europe the stamina of the people will have been so sapped that they will be in no condition to aid the Allies with organized, resolute risings in the enemy's rear. There is, indeed, a strong suspicion that the Germans have used under-nourishment to undermine resistance.

The deportation of workers to the Reich has been hardly less heart-

breaking. After Stalingrad Hitler announced—in terms as stark as Göring had used in speaking of food—that at a time when so many Germans were being killed he was not going to spare foreign lives. The industrial mobilization of Europe was therefore taken thoroughly in hand. The process had really begun long before. In France the so-called *relève*, the system under which workmen were surrendered to the Reich to "relieve" prisoners of war in the ratio of about five to one, had been enforced by Pétain and Laval. At the time of the capitulation there were some two million Frenchmen in German hands. Hitler shamelessly bartered them not for equivalent but for excessive concessions by the French. Laval, who had publicly professed his desire for a German victory, pleaded that at a time when Hitler's troops were suffering such heavy losses in Russia it was only right that Frenchmen should share the sacrifice by serving in German war factories. At first the fiction was maintained that the men so taken were volunteers; after the German military setbacks in Russia the pretence was dropped and outright conscription was imposed. The distress and disruption of family life, in France and elsewhere, were deeply felt, and as bitterly resented, throughout the occupied lands. Sauckel, Hitler's director of man-power, announced that the "dirty work" in the war factories was not to be done by German women: there were plenty of foreigners to do it.

Extermination of the Jews

It was inevitable that, given the obsession of Hitler and the proved sadism of his régime, the Jews should be put on the rack. Their ordeal was indeed severe. Automatically and axiomatically the Nuremberg laws were everywhere put into force in both satellite and occupied countries. Persecution reached its peak in 1942, when Hitler decided on the elimination of the Jew from Europe. Himmler, one of the most sinister of the German leaders, was his agent. He rounded up the Jews wherever they were to be found. Large numbers were deported, as the phrase had it, to the east—a euphemism which as often as not meant that they disappeared, never to be heard of again. France, which had so often given asylum to the oppressed and the outcast, befouled her own fair name and fame, at Vichy's behest, by deporting the Jews who had sought sanctuary within her frontiers, and had brought enrichment to her cultural heritage. The crime called down the condemnation of the Pope and the hierarchy. The new intolerance sickened and saddened the soul of free men and women. In Poland the Jews, who had from the outset been subjected to every form of discrimination, humiliation and torture, were now systematically exterminated. There is only too much reason to fear that the stories of mass murders by what are called extermination squads were well founded. According to figures which reached Polish circles in London in March of this year only 10 per cent of the Jews in Poland were still alive. That meant that some three million had perished. And the toll had not yet been exhausted.

In the German-occupied territories of Russia the story is the same, but has often taken, if that be possible, more frightful forms. Deportations, shootings and lootings have been carried out on a mass scale. In several official documents the Soviet Government have drawn up the indictment. It is little

wonder that the Germans are reaping a harvest of hate. The desecration of Tolstoy's home at Yasnaya Polyana—a small enough detail in the general picture of destruction and defilement—moved Russians and all Europeans to indignation because of its senselessness and spitefulness: it was an offence to a common patrimony. The Germans have rarely understood other people's psychology, and in their treatment and maltreatment of the Russians they went astray fatally. The eviction of Russians from their bits of treasured earth in the conquered lands and the settlement there of Germans did much, for instance, to sustain the fighting spirit of the Red Army through the dark eriod of its long retreat and to inspire it in its triumphant stand at Stalingrad nd its great winter offensive of 1942–43.

Faith in British Pledges

HE effect on the resistance movement throughout Europe of the Red Army's oughty fight was indubitable. It would be a fundamental mistake to underate it, and no survey is complete without taking it into full account. Yet t is not too much to say that in the April of 1943 eyes were turning gain to Great Britain. The Germans themselves betrayed their awareess of this in all their propaganda. This was directed to insinuating that 3ritain was powerless to intervene on the Continent either politically or nilitarily, that she was a spent force, and that in any case she was dominated by an imperialistic United States on the one hand and by a Bolshevist Russia on the other. Britain, the Germans said—though not in their hearts—was a cipher. At the time of the publication of the Beveridge Report the German criticism had a significance which was not fully grasped in this country. There is no question of the deep impression the Report made on the enslaved peoples and also on neutral countries. We ourselves interpreted it too narrowly in terms of domestic politics: the enslaved peoples at least regarded it as a foreshadowing of the future order for all. This the Germans understood. That is why their commentators were at such pains to assert (1) that National Socialism was already practising what Britain was only proposing, and (2) that in any event the plutocrats of the City of London would see to it that the plan of social security was not put into force. In April, 1943, looking back to June, 1940, when Britain challengingly faced the exultant Axis virtually alone, we realize how great an act of faith was called for, and forthcoming, by our leaders and people. We do not, perhaps, realize how great, too, was the act of faith of those many millions of Europeans who saluted our standard, trusted our pledge, and, by deed and thought, increasingly shared our struggle. Britain has borne many responsibilities since the decision of September 3, 1939. Not the least of them is the responsibility to Europe after victory. Little as we know, and can know, of the feelings of those who have patiently suffered under the Axis yoke in the closed and oppressed lands, this much is certain: the longing for a new order is profound—but the source of such new order will not be Berchtesgaden.

AIR TRANSPORT

THE URGENT NEED FOR AN IMPERIAL POLICY

ON air matters, more closely perhaps than in any others, it is impossible to draw a clear line between war and post-war developments. Since May 1912, when the Royal Flying Corps, the foundation of our air power, was born, aviation has grown systematically in the variety of its uses and in the volume of its importance in war. It has become the welding—and bids fair to achieve supremacy as the dominating—factor in operations both on sea and land. Air transport is its latest development. By its assistance fighter and light bomber squadrons can be made mobile and self-contained; troops can be reinforced and supplied, and casualties evacuated; air-borne brigades and even divisions will play a leading part in the campaigns of the near future.

Air transport is equally essential to military and to commercial operations. The future of our overseas Empire depends on the maintenance of a flourishing air service; in the midst of war we must prepare for peace, or we shall be left hopelessly behind when peace comes. Conversely, the best preparation for air warfare is the maintenance in peace of a strong commercial air service to form a nucleus from which the military air forces can be reinforced and expanded at need. As Germany long ago realized, the large air transport services required for war can be built up only by fostering civil aviation in time of peace. After the war, international rivalry for commercial air supremacy is inevitable. Every nation will naturally put its own interests first and international considerations second.

Just as the flying arm in warfare has been shown to be an indispensable complement to a modern army and navy, so in peace-time commercial aviation will be an essential adjunct of the sea and land transport of the future. There should be no fear of competition between sea, road, rail and air. During the lifetime of the present generation heavy goods will continue to be carried in the main by land and sea, except in the case of inaccessible countries such as exist in Central Asia and elsewhere, which offer insuperable obstacles to land transport. The air will be reserved principally for the rapid conveyance of passengers, mails and perishable articles over long-distance routes. After this war, in an even greater degree than after the last, we shall have to depend for our existence upon superior scientific skill and energy and upon the most highly developed utilization of our resources.

WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

IN 1919 the British Empire had greater opportunities in the air than any other nation. We were at the height of our prestige, and we had a world-wide network of bases. Our design, research and production, our flying and maintenance personnel and our material were of better quality and in greater volume than those of any other nation. We made a promising start. After the Armistice we were responsible for the International Air Convention and

for blazing the Imperial routes to South Africa, and to Australia and New Zealand via India; and, greater than all, the first trans-Atlantic flight was made by two British airmen in a British machine. But then a blight seemed to set in. The plant which had sprung up so auspiciously began to wither for lack of political support. A Department of Civil Aviation was indeed set up, but from the outset it was rendered almost nugatory by the decision of the then Secretary of State for Air to put supply and research under Service control. This was fatal. If civil aviation was to be developed effectively, it was essential that the Civil Aviation Department should hold the keys of progress, design, research and experiment, linked up with operational development. By this it was not meant, of course, that the Government should have a monopoly of design. Competition should be encouraged. The Government department should lay down what is wanted, and private enterprise designers be asked to fulfil the requirements, or should design independently in the hope of getting production orders. In 1919 the Service side had its own preoccupations, and was naturally and rightly absorbed in them. It was not interested in the broader questions which were vital to the progress of civil aviation.

Moreover civil aviation was starved financially from the beginning. The edict that it must "fly by itself" well-nigh signed the death warrant, not only of British air transport, but of British command of the air. The staff of the Department was consistently under-manned and over-worked. In the Air Estimates for 1921–22, £17,000,000 was budgeted for the Service side against £1,000,000 for civil aviation. The Department did what it could, and what might have been achieved with adequate support was shown some years later, when air-borne mail within the Empire rose from 2,400,000 letters in 1931 to 6,000,000 in 1934 and 10,500,000 in 1935. But only 12 per cent of the British mail to the Continent was flown by British lines, and we were actually paying France and Germany £100,000 per annum to carry our letters to South America. This was due to the fact that we were handicapped by lack of research and operational experience, particularly in regard to blind and night flying. In November 1934 the Post Office established an air panel of its Advisory Council and announced that it intended thenceforward to send letters and parcels by air without extra charge when time could be saved by so doing. This policy was opposed at the time as uneconomic; but, if the Government had adopted it in 1919 or 1920, the air mail over long-distance routes would have quickly become a paying proposition and we should not have had to subsidize foreign countries to carry our mail for us.

Even to-day few people realize the fatal results to which the mania for economy in civil aviation condemned us after the last war. The climax was grotesque enough. Our commercial air services inevitably decayed and finally ceased to run. The result was that, as *The Times* pointed out, the sum voted by Parliament for aerodromes, housing, lighting and so forth was, in effect, spent "for the benefit of the very aircraft that had swept British machines from the cross-channel services". Croydon was being maintained almost entirely for the convenience of foreign planes. We were not only killing the goose that laid the golden eggs, but destroying the eggs already

laid. It was only the patriotism of private concerns like *The Times* and the *Daily Mail* which, by offering substantial inducements and rewards for pioneer flights, enabled them to be carried out. The British Government contributed little or nothing. Is our policy at the end of the present war to be a repetition of what happened after the last? The time has arrived when the Government should declare its air transport policy. There should be a clear and unequivocal statement. We have the scope and opportunity. What is the Government's view? Nationalization or private enterprise, monopoly or competition?

Risk of a Clash of Interests

In the future our chief difficulty will be to avoid a clash of interests with America. Since 1921, and now during the war, air transport has received the strong financial and political support of the United States Government, and large sums of money have been spent on research. America is reported to be turning out many thousands of transport planes a year, while our factories are engaged almost exclusively in the construction of fighters and bombers. If, therefore, the war were to end to-morrow, the position would be that this country would be cluttered up with superfluous war aircraft, while America, with a round-the-world air route already staked out, would be in possession of initial advantages against which no other country could hope to compete.

The United States has long since begun to organize her airways. The country is ideally suited for air transport, enjoying as it does the benefits of great distances and a unified language, currency and administration. By 1939, with strong government backing, she had developed 30,000 miles of domestic air routes and 54,000 miles of international air routes in regularly scheduled operations by American companies. That was four years ago. How the war has speeded up the programme and widened the outlook of American companies was described in *American Aviation* of October 1942. The writer pointed to the report of the North-West Air Lines.

"This company", he observed, "which had only 881 employees ten months ago, now has over 3,600, and plans extension to 8,000 or 10,000. With other air lines increasing proportionately for war work, think what this will mean in terms of qualified personnel for post-war expansion."

The Americans have already a global air chain running across the Atlantic to Africa, across Africa to Persia, India, China, and from China across the Pacific to America.

As regards other countries, before the outbreak of the present war, operational research enabled the Reich to rearm in the air. Civil aviation was really part of the *Luftwaffe*, and Germany had 1,200 planes ready for use as troop-transports. Aviation in France and Holland, fostered by high subsidies, forged steadily ahead. The Dutch line to India was preferred even by British officials to Imperial Airways. The experience gained by all these countries was immensely valuable. To say this is not to underrate the work done by Imperial Airways and British Overseas Airways, working as they did under great handicaps. It was very valuable up to a point. Nevertheless it is unfortunately true that England alone, thanks to the lack of suitable support of civil aviation on the part of Government, lagged far behind.

If after this war we are again beaten out of the air, as we allowed ourselves to be in 1919, we shall quickly lose our position in the world's markets. It will not be long before this has its inevitable reaction upon our commercial supremacy at sea, on which our national existence hangs. We must realize that at the Armistice we shall find ourselves face to face with totally new conditions, and our commercial policy will require reorientation in order to adjust itself to them. Already Moscow is only nine and Cairo ten hours' flying distance from London, and the Atlantic has been flown twelve times in a fortnight. The Pacific route to Australia is an established fact.

Civil Control Essential

It would, of course, be unfair to assume that civil aviation has been entirely inactive during the war. British Overseas Airways flying boats and aeroplanes flew about 10 million miles during 1942, carrying 43,000 passengers, 850 tons of mail and 2,250 tons of freight. Regular services are in operation with Baltimore, Lagos and Lisbon; across Africa to the Middle East; and from South Africa to India. Others are maintained between the Middle East and Persia and Iraq, to various places in Africa, including Madagascar, and across the Western Desert from Cairo. That, of course, is in addition to the ferry service across the Atlantic to Canada. This, however, will be far from sufficient when peace comes. We must have a co-ordinated policy, and this policy should be viewed from three aspects—internal, imperial and international.

It is absurd to expect that we can rely upon converted bombers to operate the air traffic of the post-war world. While there should be no tendency on the part of any country to capitalize a war factor such as air transport for peace purposes, and we cannot, of course, divert a large proportion of our manufactures at the present moment from the supreme task of winning the war, we should concurrently give more attention to laying plans for the future. America is perfectly right to do all she can. We must do the same. We hear much about post-war reconstruction in the social and economic spheres, but little about the post-war reconstruction of our civil air-services, although this will be the life-line of the Empire, on which the recovery of the country will largely depend.

Great developments are taking place in aeronautical design and performance and in engine power and reliability. Much greater are still to come. The production of the right type of machine well in advance is essential. Different types will be required for the various great routes—the North and South Atlantic and Eastern air routes, and those running to Central Europe and the Mediterranean. The Minister of Production should be made responsible for seeing that an immediate start is made upon designing aircraft for post-war purposes, and an adequate programme should be taken in hand at once; leading private firms should be subsidized for the same end. This is sound policy even from the military point of view. Air transport will have to be used on an immense scale in the invasion of the Continent, and for policing and feeding post-war Europe. Transport craft should be built simultaneously with fighters and bombers. Suitable factories should be allocated for this

purpose, and agreements made for them to continue their supply for some years into the peace. Civil aerodromes and sea air ports should be an integral part of our air planning, if the United Kingdom is to be the hub of imperial and international air traffic in the future. As regards personnel, at the time of being posted, air crews and maintenance staff should agree to being transferred to the civil air transport services at the Armistice, and they should be selected with this end in view.

The Air Transport Command

The setting up of an Air Transport Command is a step in the right direction, but it does not go nearly far enough. The aim should be for this Command to incorporate within itself all the main requirements of a self-contained body which can be transferred *en bloc* to the control of a Civil Ministry. The British Overseas Airways Corporation should therefore be included in the new Command and its personnel be put into R.A.F. uniforms and perform their proper functions for the duration of the war. In parenthesis it should be stated how entirely inadequate are the arrangements to do with the direction of the Corporation made by the Secretary of State for Air and announced by him in March. The Command should also include sections for planning, supply, design and research, meteorology, navigation, wireless and radio location, so that it can be ready to take its place as a going concern in a really up-to-date peace-time Ministry of Transport or of Communications or, best of all, as a separate Ministry of Air Transport. Of two points there can in any case be no doubt: supply, design, research and experiment are an integral part of air transport, and the whole organization must be self-contained and divorced from the Air Ministry. Bitter experience in the years after the last war showed that the Air Minister is totally unable to cope with the dual functions of military and civil aviation. This is more than ever true to-day. To place air transport under the Air Minister in 1919 proved just as impracticable as it would be to put the Merchant Service under the Admiralty.

Having put the question of production and home organization on the best basis we can, the next essential is to arrive at a concerted imperial family policy. The greatest asset which we possess is the character of our Empire. It is admirably suited for the development of air transport, with Great Britain as its economic and geographical hub. Its chief weakness is the difficulty of maintaining close touch between its widely scattered members. The greatest Imperial problem of our time is the unification of our Imperial policy, foreign affairs, defence, &c. In inter-Empire air lines we have an incomparable opportunity to link up British Commonwealth policy into a constant and harmonious entity. Shall we be prepared to avail ourselves of it while there is time? If a satisfactory international arrangement is to be reached, our first object must be to agree among ourselves. An Imperial Air Conference should be convened for this purpose at the earliest possible date. It is understood that preliminary conversations are already taking place, but the matter is very urgent; otherwise the Dominions may be forced by outside pressure to set up their own individual policies. Great Britain, with her long experience, should give the lead to the Empire. The sooner the conclusions are reached and made known to the world the better for all concerned.

An Imperial Family Policy

The first question which will have to be faced will be the problem of the "free" as opposed to the "closed" air policy. The latter is based on the doctrine which caused so much trouble after the last war, namely that every nation is entire master of its own "air" and can at will prevent foreign aircraft from flying through it. The "free" air theory, on the other hand, would lay it down that "innocent" aircraft have the right to fly where they will. All the arguments are against the "closed" air doctrine; the air should be as open as the sea. The Dominions would probably favour a free air policy subject to each Dominion reserving to itself the right to develop its own internal air routes, while linking up with the Mother Country and each other in a chain of Imperial lines. But if they are in favour of the principle, the term "freedom of the air" will have to be very carefully defined. Will it mean the right of innocent passage and the right of free landing? Everything will depend upon the interpretation of the term.

It appears probable that America may insist upon her right to regard traffic within the United States as "internal", and to be reserved for American machines. By "internal" she will no doubt intend to include traffic with her overseas territories. If so, our reply would naturally be an insistence upon our right to regard all Imperial routes as "internal" also. France would do the same. This would leave the United States the routes to her possessions in the Pacific, while we controlled the great Imperial Airways to the Cape, to Australasia via India, and across Canada to the Far East. Canada would especially be favoured by such an arrangement. As stratosphere flying develops, she will be able to use the short routes across the Polar Ocean to northern Europe, Russia, Siberia and the Far East.

When once an Imperial air policy is formulated, the Ministry of Air Transport must contain Dominion and Colonial representatives who will help to carry out its administration. Such arrangements as those existing at present between the British Overseas Airways Corporation and the Australian Quantas Company, by which the former carries the mails to Port Darwin, where they are taken over by the latter, might be widely copied. Canada would have others of a similar character. In addition to questions to do with "freedom of the air" it would be desirable that the inter-Empire policy should include consideration of subjects such as monopolies, state or private enterprise, competition, subsidies, rates, and so on, so that there may be unanimity of view before the meeting of an international conference. Briefly speaking, it would seem best that there should be no monopolies, whether as the result of state or private enterprise, and no hidden subsidies, and that rates should be laid down by an International Board of Control. Monopolies and subsidies are both unhealthy in principle. A unified Imperial policy and agreement about the means to carry it out are of paramount importance.

International Agreements

Next there is the question of international agreements. It is improbable that the nations will be willing to return to the international chaos which resulted after the last war from the claim of each State to control the air over its territories. There were over one hundred reciprocity agreements between European States, strictly balancing the grant of facilities between pairs of nations. This points to some type of international control of the air. But will Great Britain agree to the control of its commercial air lines by an international body? Will the Dominions agree? Will America or Russia? It is not to be supposed that any nation would consider seriously the question of internationalization of air transport, if this is to mean international ownership, operation and control. The question of defence is too closely involved. In defence matters of the future, the transport plane is bound to play an ever increasing rôle, and will be an integral factor in policy. This is especially true of our widely scattered Empire. Our power to maintain peace will be immeasurably increased if we can rapidly concentrate our Imperial forces at the required place. The way to do this is by building up a Merchant Service of the Air in peace-time.

Above all the importance of coming to a friendly understanding between the United Nations upon our post-war air policy cannot be too strongly emphasized. It is essential for peace. Healthy rivalry is stimulating, but cut-throat competition would be fatal. As Mr. Sumner Welles recently said, "there could be no surer road to disaster, no surer means of bringing unmitigated havoc in the future, than for the United Nations to enter the post-war period as rivals and opponents in their commercial and financial policies, rather than as collaborators in a common task of seeking and achieving international economic stability and well-being. Together we can solve this gigantic problem; opposed to one another, no one of us will profit."

We must hope that American public opinion will support this attitude.


To small countries with large and distant dependencies, like ourselves, France, Holland and Belgium, the freedom of the air, combined with domestic reservations, is a vital matter. Though specific areas may have to be closed for military reasons, we must insist upon the right of unrestricted flying over foreign countries and the international use of air ports, subject, of course, to regulations drawn up by an International Board of Control. Such a Board would be responsible not only for drawing up and enforcing customs and quarantine regulations, but for arranging international air co-operation between countries which find it to their mutual advantage to combine for certain specific purposes. For instance, the Board might by agreement take the necessary steps to fix tariffs and prevent a rate-war between rival companies. Freedom of the air, then, should be our aim, and it should include three well-defined rights—freedom to fly over foreign territory, freedom to use foreign air ports and their auxiliary services, and freedom of air-trade, i.e. the right to carry goods to and from foreign countries without restriction.

To sum up, then, the essence of the problem lies in the four main factors—development and improvement of material, internal organization, an Imperial

air policy, and, finally, international co-operation. And there is no time to waste. Mr. Eden's statement in Washington that air commerce should "serve to bring all nations more closely together after the war" expresses a hope that everyone will share: but it is one thing to hope for international co-operation and another to achieve it successfully. If a satisfactory solution can be reached, international air control may well assist international collaboration in other spheres, political and economic; and, if so, it may pave the way to the world peace to which all our policy is directed. For if we cannot agree to a common and equitable policy in the air, the prospect of co-operation in other spheres may well seem to be as remote as ever.

MAIN AIR ROUTES OF THE FUTURE

The Position of London



STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XV

GERMANY'S HOPE OF A STALEMATE PEACE

BY the time this article appears in print Africa may have been cleared of the enemy. It must be hoped so, for, as the enemy well knows, an early Allied victory there will be worth infinitely more than a victory delayed only so much as to prevent an effective invasion of Europe this year. When Hitler failed to crush Russia in 1941 and 1942, Germany lost the hope of a victorious peace. All her *écrasez l'infame* propaganda since has been complete bunkum designed to shroud a switch from offensive to defensive strategy. But she did not lose the hope of a patched-up peace. If she can hold the "Fortress of Europe" long enough to sicken the Allies of attempts to break into it, she can hope to get a peace of sheer weariness. That would give her the whole essence of victory, for she would in fact be mistress of the Continent whatever measure of apparent independence she restored to the European nations and she would be completely free to organize her next bid to extend her domination.

All the events of the past three months must be viewed against the background of this new purpose of the enemy. To take the African front first, his sacrifice of the equivalent of between 30 and 40 divisions between Egypt and Tunis has not been a mere bid to maintain prestige. It was essential to keep off an Allied invasion of Europe until two things had been achieved, first, the disengagement of very large forces by shortening the front in Russia—it may not be generally realized that the length of the front there has been cut by about 40 per cent; and second, the fortification and defensive organization of southern and south-eastern Europe. Of course both these purposes reflect the collapse of Hitler's intuition, and the renascence of the influence of the General Staff. Speculation as to Hitler's exact position is a waste of time; but it is a pretty safe bet that he has been reduced to a military cipher, while carefully preserved as a political asset. In short the German General Staff has done to him what the same combination did to the other All-Highest War Lord, Wilhelm II. The only comment worth making is that the emasculation of Hitler is a serious disadvantage to us. We could do with much more of the architect of the Stalingrad disaster—to mention only one of his military blunders.

TUNISIA—THE EIGHTH ARMY'S ACHIEVEMENT

IT is doubtful whether the commitment of some 200,000 of his best troops, not to speak of the Italians, to the North African campaign was among these blunders. They were, of course, doomed from the moment that the Eighth Army gained a shattering victory at El Alamein and the Allies landed in real force in French North Africa. But they absorbed a very large fraction of our military energies for over two years. The final all-in cost may be put at 400,000 Italians (exclusive of the Abyssinian Campaign) and 250,000

Germans, with disproportionately heavy losses in tanks and aircraft. Time alone can show whether this price was too high for a free hand meanwhile (barring Allied air attacks) in Europe. In favour of the enemy's strategy are this temporary immunity in Europe outside Russia, and the closing of the Mediterranean for so long to everything except heavily escorted and costly convoys. Against it are the heavy losses mentioned, and the fact that they did not stave off a resounding defeat.

For the defeat has been resounding, and accompanied in its closing stages by such a sample of what Allied strength will become in wider fields as will put new hope in our friends all over the world. The Eighth Army's pursuit of Rommel from El Alamein to Enfidaville would have been a remarkable feat if there had been no enemy at all; and in fact they fought many considerable actions *en route*, culminating in two big victories at Mareth and Akarit. It is not invidious—indeed it is only to repeat a curious Italian tribute—to say that the Eighth Army has made itself the most formidable fighting unit in the world. Those who are interested in historical analogies may think there is some resemblance to Napoleon's Army of Italy. Both had their periods of dejection and deficiencies in equipment. Both were suddenly galvanized by their commanders into an extraordinary degree of mobility and endurance and into an unbroken series of victories. Both found and kept that spirit of "knowing what they fight for and loving what they know" which (as Cromwell indicated) is the hall-mark of great armies. Both, curiously enough, were about the same size numerically, and that means a very small size for what they achieved. Artillery played a large part in their victories. It may seem a far cry from Marmont's batteries to the 500 guns that paved the way to victory at El Alamein and Mareth, but tactically they were identical.

This remarkable Eighth Army has fully deserved its fame; but that fame should not exclude the giving of proper credit to the British First Army, the Second American Corps, and the very considerable French forces organized by General Giraud. These forces, incorporated with the Eighth Army into the Eighteenth Army Group with General Eisenhower in supreme command and General Alexander in operational control, came into their own in the later stages of the campaign. They could not do so earlier. The First Army, entrusted with the gambler's rush for Tunis and Bizerta last November, was originally a very skeleton force. When the full story can be told, it will be known how nearly their skill and endurance came to bringing off the gamble. Of the Americans it can be said that no troops ever learned faster or better from experience. In February and March they suffered a disquieting defeat at Gafsa and Kasserine. In April they failed to get through at the critical moment at Pichon and Fondouk; and thus Rommel, at the cost of jettisoning his unhappy Italians, was able to get most of his Germans away from the Eighth Army at Akarit. But in May their resolute and sustained offensive in the north forced the first large German withdrawal, carried Mateur, and exercised a profound effect upon the speed and result of the final operations. The French also gave a remarkable instance of military revival. They were entrusted with two sectors, one on the left flank of the Eighth Army and

the other along the coast in the extreme north. The receipt of quite small quantities of modern equipment inflated to an extraordinary degree both their spirit and their success. Their substantial share in the North African victory is of the happiest augury. Like all the other events reviewed in this article, it must be set against the background of the enemy's long-term calculations which have already been defined. One of the chief of these calculations is that no war can be considered lost by the Germans which results in the permanent knocking-out of France.

THREE STAGES IN NORTH AFRICA

To turn to the actual course of operations in North Africa, they fall into three distinct stages. In the first the enemy attacked strongly on all sectors. A most dangerous push in the centre drove up through Kasserine towards Thala, and the First Army's communications were only saved by rushing down troops and armour to check this thrust. Next, in what was probably intended to take advantage of a weakening of the line in the north, the enemy struck hard there, and was not held until he had got beyond Sedjenane. Lastly he launched a major attack at the Eighth Army, but achieved nothing whatever except heavy casualties in tanks and men.

The second phase was the constriction of the Axis bridge-strip thus expanded into a bridgehead. This was achieved mainly by the Eighth Army, which inflicted on Rommel two major defeats at Mareth and Akarit and drove him back beyond Sousse. This phase was not decisive, owing to the failure, already recorded, of the simultaneous flanking attacks to break through. The third phase therefore had to be a period of prolonged and ferocious fighting to carry the bridgehead running in a rough semicircle from Cap Serrat to Enfidaville. At the moment of writing this phase is not concluded, but the bridgehead has been badly shaken and looks like dissolving into three parts or enclaves—round Bizerta, round Tunis, and in the Cape Bon peninsula. It remains to be seen whether the Allies will concentrate upon liquidating these fragments or can afford to contain them, by-pass them, and strike further afield. It would be militarily correct to reduce them by the indirect method of occupying their supply bases. The only matter of real importance is that there should be no lull in the pressure on the enemy in the West.

Full credit has been given to the qualities of the Allied Armies, and it may be added before passing from the subject that these qualities have had to be all the greater because the Italians have been fighting extremely well. There has been a deplorable and dangerous tendency away from the battlefield to sneer at the Italian soldiers. Large numbers have not had their hearts in their job, and when fighting alone or when abandoned by the Germans have readily surrendered. But Fascist propaganda has infected them very deeply during the last 20 years. Some at least have a good conceit of themselves in battle as well as before it. To represent them as a lot of timorous sheep is stupid for two reasons. It is unfair to our own men. It is the worst possible propaganda towards the Italians. Therefore by all means underline the folly, the egotism, and the treachery of Mussolini, which indeed can hardly be exaggerated, but do not depreciate the capacity of the Italian people.

One further feature of this African campaign must be noted. Not all the valour of the Armies could have won it without the establishment of a crushing air superiority. An American estimate put the air casualties of the two sides between March 8 and April 18 at over 8 to 1 in our favour—over 1,500 to 185. This air power has been used as it ought to be used, namely as a tactical weapon for co-operation with the armies and as a strategic weapon for blasting the enemy's communications and supplies. The part of the Navy has been less spectacular. Its greatest achievement has not been publicized, for there is little romance about opening captured harbours to supplies within a miraculously short time, and bringing vast convoys from Great Britain and the United States. But our light forces have had their spectacular triumphs. Our submarines from November to April sank 110 enemy ships for certain and damaged 94 others; and who knows whether before the story is finished our big ships may not get their chance?

THE BOMBING OFFENSIVES

Now that these powerful Allied forces are on the point of being released for other operations, the next question logically is how far the enemy has been "softened up" elsewhere. So far, outside Russia, the only strategically important operations have been the bombing offensives; and until a year ago these were not very severe. They are becoming so now, and they will become more so. Apart from the far greater weight and continuity of our night raids, we have found in the American Flying Fortresses and the British Mosquitoes machines capable of heavy and persistent unescorted day raids without incurring prohibitive casualties. This is incomparably the most significant recent development in air warfare. It threatens to disrupt the whole of the enemy's new strategy. No matter where he transfers his war industries, they are liable to attack at all times of the day and night. He has carried out substantial transfers from France and western Germany to central Europe and thereby paid a handsome tribute to the work of the heavy night bomber. But extremely heavy attacks have been carried out by our home-based bombers on the distant targets of northern Italy and the Skoda works at Pilsen. There are also the Russian heavy bombers now attacking eastern Germany with some regularity.

It is tempting to guess what results these raids are achieving. Locally, no doubt, they are already substantial. To give only one instance, photographs taken after a Flying Fortress raid on Vegesach, near Bremen, showed at least 12 U-boats destroyed or damaged on the slips. Nevertheless prudence suggests that even larger forces will have to be even more continuously employed before the Axis equipment becomes visibly crippled. Moreover, while the attack improves, the defence does not stand still. We must therefore expect considerable air casualties, and, since we publish them with complete frankness, these losses may cause questionings. Any loss of these highly trained and magnificent young men is distressing; but they know, and we should appreciate, that the losses are extremely light in view of the results achieved. Take the Pilsen, Mannheim, and Bremen raids which cost us 71 machines (or say 450 airmen) on April 16–17. Assume that these three

objectives were just on the enemy's side of a land front. An attack upon them which caused comparable damage might well have cost not 450 casualties but over 60,000—the actual figure of British casualties on July 1, 1916. So long as these air attacks are delivered against the proper targets (i.e. those which chime best with future strategy), with the best possible technique, and in the most suitable weather for each target, there can be no complaint. One further point should be noted because it may have a bearing upon the enemy's future strategy. The Germans have clearly failed signally to add to the defences of Italy. Our losses in the big raids on that country have been quite negligible. It really would be extremely humorous if Italy one day found herself left outside the "European Fortress" by the Germans, on the ground that the Alps were a better defence line than such a salient. In any case Italy will have to do most of her defence herself. The most probable explanation of the recent stream of puppets—Boris, Mussolini, Antonescu, Horthy—to Hitler is that Italy is to draw in the forces policing the Balkans, and that others must take over the job.

RUSSIA AND THE FAR EAST

It was explained that the Axis stand in Tunisia was partly dictated by the need to buy time for a reorganization of the Russian front. The Russian campaign cannot be called off, nor treated as a side-show. As the last instalment of this review anticipated, the enemy was forced to make a supreme effort to halt the Russian drive. The sacrifice of the Stalingrad Army helped to gain time to gather very large German forces along the Dnieper. Army and people were put on their mettle to do or die by a spate of intensely pessimistic and emotional propaganda. Massive reserves were engaged and after bitter fighting recaptured Kharkov and Bielgorod, thus averting the Russian threat to encircle the armies west of Rostov. This success was due to two causes. A surprisingly early thaw restricted large-scale movements to railways and good roads. The enemy had much the better communications—not only because he had more railways and roads, but because he had converted the railways captured from the Russians from their gauge to his, and the Russians had to change them back again. The thaw also took the stuffing out of the Russian offensives on other fronts and thus restored the initiative to the Germans on their chosen sector. The remarkable thing is that this great counter-offensive failed to cross the Donetz. But the loss of Kharkov was a heavy blow, and leaves open the chances of the forthcoming summer campaign. The enemy has preserved two spring-boards, one in the Kharkov region and the other in the Kuban. In spite of his losses during the winter campaign, he can certainly rake and claw together enough men and material for another really big summer campaign. The comb-out of man-power organized in Germany since December exceeds in severity even that carried out by Ludendorff, in 1917–18; and, because of the mass importation of foreign labour and the much greater use of woman-power, will be far more productive of soldiers. The chances are that the enemy do intend another ferocious fling at the Russians this summer, probably on a narrow front, and this time with a single objective, so as to avoid more

Stalingrads. That is why time counts so much in our operations in the West. Of course, the Russians are not going to sit back and let others do the fighting. They have not been idle during the lull. Indeed theirs has been the first big move, since they launched a heavy attack on the Kuban bridgehead in the first week of May.

In the Far East the war on our side has been a holding war, as was made clear at the Casablanca Conference. In this limited sense the Allies have, on the whole, been successful. The results of the campaign in southern Burma have, however, been disappointing. Our troops failed to clear the Mayu peninsula and to reach Akyab, though the effort must not be mistaken for a major offensive. The land fighting was fierce, but on a small scale; and probably nothing less than a large-scale sea-borne invasion from the south will ever clear the land route to China. The Pacific war is a story of keeping the Japanese at arm's length from Australia by the use of air power. This has been extremely successful. One large enemy convoy was entirely destroyed, and very heavy losses have been inflicted upon his shipping and Air Force. It must be added, however, that both military and political leaders in Australia repeatedly declare that their margin of safety from invasion is extremely small. With the return to Australia after El Alamein of the Ninth Australian Division practically the whole of the Australian Army is available to hold the outposts and resist invasion. But the cry for more aircraft and shipping is very insistent.

Yet, when we survey the whole broad picture of the war, it is clear that the focal point of danger and of interest is not in the Far East but in the West. Will the Allies be able swiftly to force a landing in Europe? Will the Russians anticipate or, if not, repel a new German offensive? Will the better turn in the U-boat battle continue? On the answers to these questions depends whether Germany, who has already lost her hope of outright victory, will have to abandon also her hope of a stalemate victory.

[POSTSCRIPT]

While this article was in the press, the hope expressed in its first sentence was amply fulfilled. The American capture of Mateur proved to be the prelude of the sudden and complete collapse of the Axis armies in Africa. On May 5 the First Army in a dusk attack carried Bou Aoukaz, the height north-east of Medjez-el-Bab which had bolted the door to the Tunis plain. Next day our armoured forces, strengthened by a division brought up from the Eighth Army, burst clean through and roared across the flat towards Tunis. Simultaneously the Americans broke the Axis resistance west of Bizerta, and the two strongholds fell at almost exactly the same minute of the same day (May 7). By May 10 the Americans had mopped up everything beyond Bizerta and between that place and Tunis. Without a pause the British armour, supported by lorried infantry, drove on south-east; and by the evening of May 10 had secured the neck of the Cape Bon peninsula, cutting the remaining Axis forces in two. The enemy air force gave up the struggle completely on May 8, and the military refugees in the peninsula

were bombed into disintegration. The Navy saw to it that no evacuation by sea was possible. The only organized resistance remaining was in the mountains north of Enfidaville. This pocket, already compressed by a French forward bound to Zaghouan, was completely surrounded. The total number of prisoners will probably reach 150,000, most of them Germans, and the material captured is colossal.

The main features of this victory are, first and foremost, that it is in time to permit of further major operations this year. Secondly, for the first time in this war, except at Stalingrad, the enemy has surrendered not in straggling groups but in formations. The Americans alone took six German generals, who accepted their demand for unconditional surrender. What this means to a world so long dazed by the myth of German invincibility can easily be conceived. Thirdly, the Russians have at last been impressed into genuine appreciation of Anglo-American quality and determination. Fourthly, the victory has been won by a small fraction of the force which the Western Allies can bring to bear. It would be surprising if more than 25 to 30 divisions, including the French, have been used for this phase of the war. Fifthly, they have not been used up. The British casualties in the First and Eighth Armies during the whole of the fighting from the middle of April until the end of the campaign are unlikely to be over 12,000. Such is the result of the achievement of continuous and effective air cover and of the skilful leadership and direction of properly trained troops. It is wholly fitting that Nemesis should have fallen on the enemy three years to the day after he began to administer similar trials to Western Europe. The further meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Roosevelt in Washington which began on May 12 will doubtless arrange details of further trials for the Axis.

UNITAS AND BANCOR

TWO PLANS OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENT

THE simultaneous publication in April of two international monetary plans, one British and one American, supplies a measure of the difficulties of the task of post-war planning in the international economic sphere. Both plans, we are told, are put forward as a basis for discussion, neither Government being committed to the details or even to the principles of either. The idea seems to be that a process of expert discussion will now begin, in which all the United Nations will participate, and that from this process some generally acceptable plan will eventually emerge. In practice, however, the working of this process will necessarily be affected by difficulties connected with the subject-matter, the existence of two schemes, and the fundamentally different positions held by different countries in relation to the problem.

Bagehot declared in *Lombard Street* that it is "awful" to write upon the currency; and the task has certainly not become simpler since his day. There is no branch of public policy which the ordinary intelligent citizen finds so bewildering; and it is not easy even for experts to assess the true significance of two such schemes as these, which are so different in technical approach that they almost seem to be talking different languages. At the same time the fact that the two schemes are presented simultaneously, under different national auspices, and in apparent rivalry, invites partisanship. In these circumstances there is a real danger that attention will be unduly focused on secondary aspects of the schemes, which can be understood fairly easily, such as the distribution of voting power in the projected international institutions, and that polemical emotions may be aroused upon such matters which may make it more difficult to secure the adoption of any variant of either plan.

Common Features

IN fact the two plans, though their differences are by no means unimportant, are far nearer together than their appearances suggest. They are both designed to discharge the same function, namely to supplement the international purchasing power of countries which may otherwise be short of foreign exchange resources. They both propose to do this through the creation of a new international monetary institution, the membership of which will be open in the first instance to all the United Nations. They both recognize that behind the international monetary problem there lies the larger problem of the balance of payments, and that in the long run it is essential that each country should bring its balance of payments into equilibrium. They both provide accordingly for definite limits to the amount of the financial accommodation which any particular country can obtain under the proposed arrangements, and they provide further that as this accommoda-

tion is drawn upon, the country concerned must take steps to put its house in order, and that the international institution shall have some say in what these steps shall be.

On the other hand both plans recognize (the British plan in express and emphatic terms and the American plan by implication) that the problem of correcting disequilibrium in the balance of payments is not the sole responsibility of countries with adverse balances, but that countries which maintain persistently favourable balances which they refrain from investing abroad, may be equally at fault; and they both contain provisions under which the international institution may make "recommendations" to countries in the latter position. They both seek to secure stable exchange rates, while providing for the possibility of alteration where circumstances make this desirable, though upon this matter there are important differences between the two schemes. They recognize the need for schemes of international co-operation in other fields—notably long-term international investment, agreeing that this problem can be best dealt with by a different type of institution. They both hope to facilitate the removal of trade barriers and the return to a more liberal international economy, though they envisage the retention of exchange control for the purpose of regulating capital movements, the British plan advocating this and the American plan tolerating it. They both recognize the need for special measures to deal with "abnormal war balances", i.e. the huge sterling balances which many countries have accumulated during the war. All this represents a very large area of common ground, and it is important that its extent should be appreciated.

Different Approaches

What then are the different approaches which give the two plans so different an appearance? The British plan, in devising which Lord Keynes is understood to have played a leading part, proposes to establish an International Clearing Union "for the clearing and settlement of the ultimate outstanding balances between Central Banks . . . such as would have been settled under the old gold standard by the shipment and earmarking of gold". To make this possible it proposes to create a new unit of account, called "bancor", the value of which is to be "fixed; (but not unalterably) in terms of gold, and accepted as the equivalent of gold by the British Commonwealth and the United States, and all other members of the Union". Countries requiring accommodation would obtain it by means of overdrafts upon their accounts at the Union, and each country would be assigned a quota, based on the volume of its foreign trade, indicating the maximum extent to which it was entitled to overdraw its account. Rates of exchange of different currencies in terms of bancor would be fixed by agreement.

What would this mean in practice? The individual trader would continue to finance his overseas transactions much as he does now; but if, as the result of the complex of commercial and financial transactions between, say, Great Britain and the United States, the Bank of England became liable to pay a certain sum in dollars to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it would instruct the Clearing Union to transfer the equivalent sum in bancor

to the account of the latter bank. As a consequence the Bank of England, unless it was receiving payment from other countries to a corresponding extent, might become overdrawn at the Union, while the Federal Reserve Bank would acquire a balance to its credit. The obligation to accept payment in this form and the right to overdraw are the key technical features of this plan.

The American plan would create an International Stabilization Fund to which each member country would subscribe. It also contemplates a new unit of account to be called "unitas"; but this would be merely for the book-keeping purposes of the Fund, and, unlike bancor, would not represent a medium of international payment. Transactions between Central Banks would not be settled through the Fund, but would have to be discharged directly in terms of particular currencies as now. But the Fund would facilitate these transactions by selling foreign currencies to countries which needed to acquire them. To revert to the previous illustration, if the Bank of England was due to pay so many dollars to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it could purchase these dollars from the Stabilization Fund, paying sterling for them. The Fund's possession of dollars to sell would arise from the subscription to the Fund made by the United States.

America's Favourable Balance

These are the main features of the two schemes. It seems unnecessary at this stage to follow them further into their technical details. How would they differ in their practical effect? The most important difference is a natural consequence of the different standpoints from which the United States (as the principal country likely to have a strongly favourable balance of payments) and the United Kingdom (as a country to whom the prospect of an adverse balance is especially formidable) approach the problem. Under the American plan the amount that the United States would have to put into the Fund would be clearly defined. It would be the amount of its subscription. On the other hand the extent of the accommodation which a particular country with an adverse balance could obtain would be undefined and indeterminate. Great Britain might need dollars and so might many other countries, and none could tell how much would be available for each.

Under the British plan the extent to which any country could overdraw would be clearly defined. But the extent to which the United States might be obliged to hold bancor in consequence (and from the American standpoint, this would be equivalent to putting dollars into the Clearing Union) would be uncertain. It might reach any figure, subject only to the maximum of the aggregate of the quotas of all countries, other than the United States. This maximum would probably far exceed any contingent liability that the American authorities would be willing to assume.

This, it may be hazarded, is the really crucial point of difference between the two schemes. There is much that might be said on either side of the question upon the merits of the case. It is perhaps more profitable, however, to observe that the issue is one which we can hardly expect to be settled by the balance of objective argument, or by the balance of opinion, in inter-

national discussion. The preference of any country for the one plan or the other must necessarily be affected by the position which it expects to hold in relation to the balance of payments problem. It seems probable that the countries who will fear that they may have to wrestle with a difficult adverse balance, and who will tend therefore to favour the defined overdraft facilities of the Clearing Union scheme, will constitute the large majority of the United Nations. But it is the countries who expect a favourable balance (principally, and most certainly, that is to say, the United States) who will really be paying the piper under either scheme and who will feel accordingly that they can claim in the last resort the right to call the tune.

To secure the adoption of any new international monetary arrangement by the United States will represent a long and difficult process. The obstacles interposed by the American constitutional and political systems are well known. It is therefore upon the reaction of American opinion to the two plans that the feasibility of either really depends.

SEQUEL TO BEVERIDGE

SIX MONTHS OF PUBLIC COMMENT

SIX months have passed since the Government published Sir William Beveridge's *Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services*. While still receiving frequent mention in Parliament and the press, it is no longer headline news. In so far as there was at any time a stage of acid controversy, that has passed. For their own political purposes, not too scrupulous demagogues and publicists reiterate that there are sinister forces—whether "the Government", or "the Tories", or that Aunt-Sally maid-of-all-work, "vested interests"—out to "destroy" the Beveridge plan. The truth, however, is that opinion has been quietly consolidating behind the general purposes, if not all the precise details, of the famous Report. The irreconcilable objectors in public life are so few that they can almost be enumerated. Sir Ernest Benn and his newly formed "Society of Individualists"—mainly Liberals of the old school, whose red rag is the word "planning"—have convinced themselves that social security spells death to initiative. Sir Herbert Williams, a Conservative M.P. whose passion is destructive criticism and who professionally enjoys being in a minority, has constituted himself perhaps the most outspoken preacher of the view that the whole Report is financial madness. But these voices cry in a wilderness which grants them few echoes and thin applause.

The possibilities of controversy have been narrowed in these six months by two developments. One is the partial statement of Government decisions made by Sir John Anderson on February 16, and elaborated (or, some would say, obscured) by Sir Kingsley Wood the following day. The other is the transition from winter to summer, with all that that means in this year which promises to bring the war against Germany to its climax. Attention was drawn in the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE to Sir William Beveridge's good fortune in the timing of his Report, appearing as it did when Rommel was in flight from Egypt, North Africa occupied, the Russians advancing, and ultimate victory rising at last over the distant horizon. Victory is still nearer now, but the hardness of the road is fully apparent; it is instructive to look back over half a year to the first reception of the Report in those December days, when the name of Beveridge occupied the leading place in the newspapers.

FIRST REACTIONS

APART from those who had made up their minds beforehand to like or dislike the plan intensely, opinion on it was interestingly slow to crystallize, and Parliament wisely showed no anxiety for an immediate debate before there had been ample time to study so intricate a document. The ranks of Tuscany could not withhold a cheer for the remarkable workmanship which had gone to the making of it. The less responsible enthusiasts were naturally

inclined to treat as negligible the financial cost. That unattractive class to whom "something for nothing" means everything criticized because benefits were not lavish enough and because the workers were to have to contribute towards their own security, instead of looking entirely to that supposedly limitless treasure-house called the State. But this pernicious doctrine was not endorsed by the trade unions or by the Labour party. These considered the plan jointly and declared their approval. So did the Liberal party, rejoicing specially because the policy of family allowances, which many Liberals had long advocated, now received such a powerful impetus.

The Conservative party has no similar machinery for making a short-notice declaration of its views, except through the mouth of its leader; and as he is Mr. Churchill, Prime Minister of an all-party Government, he clearly could not prejudge Government decisions by giving a party lead. Major Dugdale, the chairman of the party, in an early speech commended the Report as a bold and imaginative conception and a classic contribution to the nation's deliberations, which deserved the closest study and for which cordial congratulations should be extended to its author. Among Conservatives generally there were, at first, signs of a definite age cleavage. A number of the older men shook their heads in doubt. Most of the younger seemed determined that the plan must go through—and this was particularly true of all who had touch with the Services, where its favourable reception was practically unqualified.

The real refusals to swallow the plan whole were found among the diehards and among the honestly cautious. It was a pity that its keen supporters so frequently treated the latter like the former. An arid controversy arose on the absurd suggestion that the British nation only displays its best qualities under the spur of poverty. This occupied time and energy which would have been far better devoted by all sides, from the outset, to dispassionate study of the probable post-war budget and the impact upon it of the finance of the plan. Here was one of the two shortcomings of the otherwise thorough, informative and prolonged treatment of the Report throughout the British press. The other was an almost universal failure to cast even a glance at that fraction of the population, unfortunately not negligible in any country, which prefers a bare living and idleness to comfort and work. Democracy must not run away from questions like these. No Minister, whatever his party, can ignore them; on every new policy it is the plain duty of civil servants to advise their political chiefs, not in a negative but in a strictly practical spirit, on "how can this be paid for?" and "what sanctions will apply against the handful of people who try to cheat?" Unfortunately there is a momentary disposition in this country, not discouraged as strongly as it should be by responsible organs of the press, to hold up anyone who makes such enquiries in public as a potential opponent of progress and a doubter against the nation. If we are to plan correctly and powerfully for the post-war world, it is going to be essential that the public should distinguish between the motives of those who pull difficult questions out into the open in order to find the right answers, and those who do so because they want a shelter for inaction.

Sir William broke with precedent by conducting an ardent publicity campaign in support of his own views. It has always hitherto been axiomatic that the expert invited to advise the Government, once he has presented his report, is *functus officio*, and should no more engage in propaganda in its favour than the Judge after a trial should make public speeches urging the Court of Appeal to uphold his summing up. Without doubt, Sir William was acting from the finest intentions. But his enthusiastic advocacy did not predispose minds to cool quantitative reckoning of commitments, although therein has lain perhaps our greatest national failing between the two wars, and may do so again.

Confusion in the Commons

The House of Commons debated the Report on February 16, 17 and 18; the Lords followed on February 24 and 25. The three days in the Commons ended with a sharp division in which most of the back-bench Labour members, with a few Independents and Liberals, turned against the Government, mustering 119 votes against 335. Yet the debate had started with an agreed and innocent non-Government motion, supported by leading back-benchers of all parties, welcoming the Report "as a valuable aid in determining the lines on which developments and legislation should be pursued". Mr. Arthur Greenwood, a Labour member of the War Cabinet from 1940 to 1942, introduced this motion, but finished by voting against it and in favour of an amendment expressing "dissatisfaction with the now declared policy of His Majesty's Government", and urging "reconsideration with a view to the early implementation of the plan". Something clearly went wrong. Mr. Churchill was ill, and, not for the first time, his colleagues in his absence failed to handle the House of Commons with skill. The direct result was a nation-wide and persistent feeling of doubt about the Government's intentions, and this was exploited to the full by ardent spirits on the extreme Left, who felt complete satisfaction with Mr. Greenwood's famous dictum during the debate that "pounds, shillings and pence have become quite meaningless symbols".

The truth is that, though there had been nearly three months for study, no one was quite ready for the debate when it came. Within the Conservative party there were differences and a good deal of indecision, largely consequent on the important fact that there is no one in this war supplying leadership to the party within the House, as Mr. Bonar Law did during the last war. The other main party, Labour, had made the mistake of reading the Beveridge recommendations as quite conclusive and quite simple to apply. Many Labour members therefore believed that there could be no difficulty in the way of entire and immediate acceptance except the opposition of "vested interests", and were taken by surprise when Mr. Willink, whose friendly but searching speech was by common consent the outstanding contribution from the back benches, drew their attention to curiously anomalous results which would follow in such fields as workmen's compensation, rent allowance and old age pensions, if the Beveridge plan were to be treated as sacrosanct and enacted without further thought or improvement.

The Government, meanwhile, had made up its mind to accept about three-quarters of the recommendations, to reject two or three, and to retain the rest for further examination. Gossip attributes to Mr. Lloyd George, in his eighty-first year, the comment that, if he had had the chance to make a speech embodying the Cabinet decisions with which Sir John Anderson was briefed, the country would have thought that it was getting not 75 per cent of the plan but 120 per cent of it. The opportunity was certainly a magnificent one. No one knew that the Government was far enough ahead to announce any decisions at all, because the debate had been always described beforehand as an occasion for back-benchers to express their views on the Report, not for the Government to anticipate that process by proclaiming its intentions. A strong, clear, enthusiastic lead from the Government, given unexpectedly early and sweeping away the state of confusion or of indecision which reigned in so many minds, might have evoked nearly unanimous goodwill, even though it set aside some of the Beveridge recommendations. The decisions which the Government was already in a position to declare constituted far the greatest and most comprehensive advance in social policy ever announced to Parliament in a single day.

The Government Speakers

Instead Sir John Anderson, masterly administrator but dull House of Commons man, read from a voluminous typescript a painstaking statement, highly charged with logic but not with fervour, containing scarcely one memorable phrase but any number of the qualifications and defences dear to a civil servant's heart. The manner ruined the matter; but Sir William Beveridge, who was listening in the gallery, went away apparently pleased, and delivered a speech the same evening in which content was more obvious than disappointment. The fat was not in the fire till the next afternoon, when Sir Kingsley Wood as Chancellor of the Exchequer—and incidentally a very tired man that day—delivered a speech which was apparently intended to fortify Sir John Anderson's reservations, but succeeded in creating an almost universal impression that a severe degree of financial contingency attached even to what Sir John had announced as firm decisions. That was what brought forth, on the third and final day, the dissident Labour amendment; and not even a brilliant Parliamentary defence of the Government's policy by the Home Secretary (Mr. Herbert Morrison) against his own back-bench colleagues in the Labour party sufficed to avert a division. Only two Labour members, in addition to the Labour Ministers, voted with the Government. On the other hand, although a group of about 40 younger Conservatives whose views were eloquently expressed by Captain Quintin Hogg—lately back from two years' service in the Middle East—was left unsatisfied by the Government's attitude, and particularly by its refusal to establish immediately a Ministry of Social Security, there were no abstentions on the Conservative side and the party went solidly into the division lobby against the amendment.

For a few days speculation ran high about the future of the Labour Ministers, deserted as they had been by their own rank and file. But nothing happened, and the storm blew itself out. Their party considered them to

have been ultra-loyal to national government; there was every sign that they believed the policy to be right and the party mistaken. But the tumultuous feelings aroused were enough to affect even the usually calm tenor of the Lords, when in the following week they debated the Beveridge Report with full knowledge of the Government attitude. Like so many debates in the Lords, this one received less attention and public interest than it deserved. Lord Dawson spoke with personal authority from his medical background, Lord Rushcliffe from his experience as first chairman of the Assistance Board, and Lord Bennett from his "detached position" (so he described it) as ex-Premier of a great Dominion. But the most effective intervention of all was by Lord Lang of Lambeth, former Archbishop of Canterbury, with his balanced recognition of all the Government had done and his moving plea to the Cabinet to go forward boldly, because in a lifetime there had been "no occasion on which the convictions and feelings of the masses of our people were more united than on this".

Intentions in Doubt

There for a month or so the matter rested. The Government had committed itself to children's allowances at 5*s*. a week, along with a big extension of child welfare services; a State medical and health service universally available; a comprehensive social insurance system requiring contributions from, and offering benefits to, rich and poor without exception; increased and standardized rates of sickness and unemployment benefit, at or near those suggested in the Report, which were 24*s*. for a single person and 40*s*. for a married couple; a universal funeral grant; and the consolidating of all the social insurances under a single administering organization. It had expressed doubts about altering the basis of workmen's compensation, rejected the Beveridge recommendation on widows' pensions as too harsh, insisted that there must be stronger safeguards against abuse of unemployment or disability benefit, and declared for a fixed old age pension somewhat higher than the initial rates suggested by Sir William (14*s*. for a single person and 25*s*. for a married couple), in preference to his scheme for a scale rising over a period of 20 years, with the enormous ultimate liability to which that would forthwith commit the Exchequer.

Yet, because of its maladroit handling of its case, doubt persisted extensively in the public mind about the real intentions of the Government, and large sections of the press encouraged its growth. Keenness, the essence of leadership, had been so signally absent from the two principal Ministerial statements that wise prudence was easily given a sinister misinterpretation. Moreover, instead of charging one specially selected man with the direct personal duty of pressing on the outstanding investigations and casting Government policy at the next stage into legislative form, the Cabinet had apparently delegated all that to Sir William Jowitt, the Minister without Portfolio, lightly adding this new and mountainous task to the varied and innumerable jobs of post-war planning for which he was already responsible. Even those who thoroughly approved the Government's decisions on policy found it difficult to reconcile this mode of procedure with an energetic

determination to give effect to them. The administrative arguments were cogent against the immediate appointment of a Minister of Social Security, at a time when much of the early work had necessarily to be done within the existing departmental machinery; but the psychological case for some outward guarantee of activity was very strong, and yet nothing was given—nothing to carry inescapable conviction to the ordinary man and woman that something was really going to happen.

Mr. Churchill Intervenes

In this unhappy and rather worrying situation, the Prime Minister himself suddenly took a hand. "I personally am very keen", he said in his Sunday evening broadcast on March 21, "that a scheme for the amalgamation and extension of our present incomparable insurance system should have a leading place in our Four Years' Plan. . . . You must rank me and my colleagues as strong partisans of national compulsory insurance for all classes for all purposes from the cradle to the grave. Every preparation, including, if necessary, preliminary legislative preparation, will be made with the utmost energy." It was hard to get away from that. No one henceforth could allege that the Government was out to sabotage or destroy the Beveridge plan, without committing the tactically disastrous error of insinuating that Mr. Churchill was a liar. The House of Commons was further reassured when it learnt from Sir William Jowitt just before Easter, almost incidentally, that the original plan of leaving him with the whole responsibility had been departed from, and that instead the complex programme of work on the Report had been divided up between the most appropriate Ministers, with a powerful Cabinet Committee in charge at the top.

Although opinion favourable to what Sir William Beveridge and the Government are both trying to do has been consolidating since the Prime Minister's speech, there is room for genuine differences of opinion still. Opposition from the industrial assurance companies to the proposed funeral grant never cut any ice; it was impotent in face of the evidence that the State could do for something like 6*d.* what they were doing for 7*s.* 6*d.* But there will be criticism from within all parties if the approved societies, with their special experience and generally good record, are abolished entirely and given no part at all to play in the future of health insurance. The great issues, however, centre round employment prospects and budgetary finance. Well on the Right, some critics question whether we can stand "the cost of Beveridge", even should the war end within a year. Equally far to the Left, others deny that there is any doubt of our ability to afford it, even if the war goes on till 1955. Between these two there is a growing body of opinion which feels convinced that we can and must afford it, with or without modifications, provided the war ends moderately soon. Some few see the wisdom of clinching the matter now, when willingness to face the heavy personal contributions involved (4*s.* 3*d.* a week for a man) is probably greater than it will ever be when the exaltation of war effort and high war earnings are over. Financially the predominating item is old age pensions, which under the Beveridge recommendations would cost £300 million a year by 1965.

The Cabinet, as has been explained, refuses to enter into so high an ultimate commitment. Critics say that the Government's alternative proposal in this matter will not only increase the immediate burden on the Exchequer, but will leave old age pensions to be bid up to new heights by political auction as soon as the war is over. On the other side it might be argued that the Beveridge plan likewise would leave scope for the political auctioneers to offer, at heavy financial cost, to speed up the slow process of attaining the maximum scale of pension.

Employment and Taxation

The most certain need now, in social insurance as in every other question of post-war resettlement, is to stimulate private and public discussion on a basis of reality, not of political manœuvring. It has become fairly generally agreed that the Beveridge proposals should not in themselves make a substantial difference to Britain's competitive export ability; that question will settle itself, in any case, if other countries are fired to follow Britain's lead and adopt similar plans of their own. But the effect of the Exchequer contribution, and the increased taxation that it will necessitate, on the capacity of this country to keep employment at a steady high level after the war is absolutely crucial; for, much as our people in and out of the Services are pinning their hopes to an insurance plan for freeing them from risk of want, they not merely desire but demand that their Government will guard them against mass unemployment.

The Beveridge debate in the Commons gave our political unity a shake. There are the makings now of an endless controversy, up at cloud-level, on the relationship (if any) between employment and taxation. If that starts, it will strain unity further and lead nowhere. As a nation we need people who can talk sense on this subject, neither reactionaries nor illusionists, to discuss it seriously in public, to interpret it intelligibly, to make it come alive with piquant illustration, and thus to narrow the field of ultimate political dispute and queer the pitch for every charlatan who seeks to exploit ignorance or fear.

EDUCATION IN EMPIRE. II

AWAKENING PUBLIC INTEREST

IN the September number of THE ROUND TABLE an attempt was made to discover the causes of the widespread ignorance which exists in this country of the nature and history of the Empire. The conclusions reached in that article were not cheerful. The evidence there produced showed that the mass of our population was not only ignorant of what the Empire stands for, but was sometimes so indifferent as to be unwilling to learn, and sometimes so prejudiced against "Imperialism", as to be loth to believe that it could ever assume a sound and healthy form.

In the last six months there has been a marked change. Those who are responsible have awoken to the danger of the situation. Mr. Churchill has told us that he will not preside over "the liquidation of the Empire", and the fact that he should have found it necessary to make such a declaration has revealed to many the need for prompt and energetic action. The need has been emphasized by American criticism of "British Imperialism". Misunderstanding in the United States of our aims and methods, as Sir Edward Grigg warned us in a remarkable article in the *Sunday Times*, may be a formidable reef in the channel which our two nations will have to navigate together when the war is done. The development of colonial administration has been expounded by Ministers and seriously debated in both Houses of Parliament. Though debates are not so fully reported as they were in mid-Victorian days, when Parliament was a powerful instrument of political education, even a short summary of a Ministerial statement and of one or two speeches can impress on the mind of the electorate that there are weighty questions to be settled when peace comes.

SIGNS OF NEW ACTIVITY

THE Colonial Office has appointed a special committee to consider what steps should be taken to bring home to the people of this country what is being done for the natives of our great African dependencies, and what is the actual work of the officers of the Colonial Service. A London Public Library arranged a public discussion on post-war policy, under the title "Empire or Commonwealth?" It is all to the good that the meaning of these terms, not necessarily mutually exclusive, should be examined; for the task is impossible without some knowledge of the growth and nature of the Empire and the Commonwealth. The B.B.C. has recognized that listeners are not so apt as they were to switch off their sets when the subject of a talk is South Africa or the West Indies, and has managed to secure competent speakers on Imperial concerns. But the most heartening change is in the press. It is no longer possible for a Canadian to ask the question which was put in 1939, "Why has England forgotten that Canada exists?" The Dominions, India and particularly the dependent Empire occupy their rightful

place in the columns of the leading journals, despite the reduction in the size of newspapers and the insistent claims of despatches from the various fronts.

The Director of Army Education has produced for the assistance of instructors to the forces a series of brochures entitled *The British Way and Purpose*. No. 3, written largely by well-known authorities, deals with the growth of the Empire, the Dominions, India and the Colonial Empire. No. 5 contains four sections, Government of the People, Government by the People, Government for the People, and an admirable summary "Empire and Commonwealth", rebutting "the German assertion that the process of Empire was one of force and fraud, conquest and aggression". The existing organizations—Chatham House, the Imperial Institute, and the Royal Empire Society—despite lack of staff and damage by enemy action, are exerting themselves to seize the favourable moment. The first named exists for the study of international affairs in general, and gives only part of its time and energy to the problems of the Empire. Its researches are thorough and scholarly, and provide the material indispensable to the historian and desirable for the politician. It has the further advantage of working in close co-operation with daughter Institutes in the Dominions. Its aim hitherto has been mainly research, and its publications have been addressed rather to the instructed than to the uninstructed reader. Recently, however, it has produced short and inexpensive pamphlets of a more popular appeal. Among them is Sir Frederick Whyte's *India, a Bird's Eye View*, published at the end of last year, which packs into 70 pages a great deal of information invaluable to anyone who wishes to understand what is now the position in that great Dependency. An interesting recent addition to the work of the Institute has been the provision of advanced courses in international affairs for officers of both the Canadian and British armies. Each of these courses is attended by some 300 officers and cannot fail to stimulate the serious study of important problems. The next course for Canadian officers will deal with the British Commonwealth.

PROVISION OF LECTURERS

THE Imperial Institute is admirably equipped to disseminate information about the products of the Empire. Its galleries contain a permanent exhibition illustrating the industries and handicrafts of the various territories, which, though temporarily closed to the public during the continuance of hostilities, can still be visited by parties from schools. These facilities are in practice only available for London schools, and the Institute endeavours to help teachers in other parts of the country by the issue of films and lantern slides and the publication of leaflets explaining the cultivation and use in industry of such products as cotton seed or sisal. The Institute also provides, free of charge, lecturers with first hand knowledge of either a Dominion or a Colony. Between 700 and 800 lectures were given in the school year ending August 1942, and in the first six months of 1942–43 a considerably larger number than in the corresponding period of the earlier year. It is desirable that for secondary schools there should be less emphasis on what the Empire produces and more emphasis on what the Empire is. Young children should be taught

about the things within the range of their intelligence, such as the cultivation of tea or cotton, but the older children need to be instructed in their privileges and responsibilities as citizens of a world-wide community of nations already free or learning to be free. To meet this demand the Institute is endeavouring to form a panel of lecturers capable of dealing not specially with sugar or lumber or wool, but with the stages in the growth of the Dominions and of the Dominions yet to be. The Royal Empire Society also is proposing to provide lecturers for schools in co-operation with the Ministry of Information. This Ministry is co-operating with the Colonial Office, the Board of Education, the Army Education Council, the Y.M.C.A. and the principal Missionary Societies. It hopes to be able to act as a clearing house for the numerous agencies now engaged in disseminating information about the Empire. There is an obvious danger of their becoming competitors rather than collaborators, a danger which may be averted by keeping in touch with the Ministry.

Some of the activities mentioned above belong rather to propaganda than to education. From its origin with the *Congregatio de propaganda fide* the former word has been associated with the effort to inculcate a belief or an opinion rather than with the process, more strictly educational, of enabling learners to form their own opinion on a basis of ascertained facts. A single lecture may arouse interest; and, if the interest it arouses is sufficient to induce the hearer to examine for himself the statements made by the lecturer, the result may fairly be regarded as educational. When a course of lectures can be arranged and something in the nature of private study encouraged between one lecture and the next, the learner is required to make the personal effort without which no education is possible. Whatever results may be achieved by the activities of societies and institutes, the education of the citizen in the responsibilities that rest upon him must in the main be the concern of the schools and universities.

Responsibility of the Government

In the earliest stages the responsibility rests upon the Board of Education and its inspectors. It should be possible to ensure that children in elementary schools shall realize something of the diversity of the subjects of the Crown. They have too often been provided only with picturesque representations of "children of other lands". Children like to learn not about the lives of other children but about the work that men do, and a teacher who is himself interested in the great task of training the African to take his place in the world of to-day should be able to make even youngsters understand how far we have advanced since the days when Livingstone was battling with the slave traders. For this essential duty many teachers are at present ill equipped. It is much to be desired that the authorities in all training colleges should include in the programme for their students the study of the Empire, of how it came into being, of the diverse elements of which it is composed and of the purposes for which it exists. Teachers already at work need, and often welcome, help and guidance.

Headmasters and headmistresses of secondary schools are rightly suspicious

of suggestions that the curriculum of their classes shall be imposed upon them by external authority. They claim that freedom to decide what they shall teach is essential for the healthy growth of the individuality of a school, the most precious of its possessions. That freedom is necessarily restricted by the requirements of examinations; it would not be further restricted if in the School Certificate Examination the various examining boards permitted candidates who wished to do so to offer, instead of the history and geography prescribed in the existing syllabus, the history and geography of the British Empire. The modern world can be understood without studying the Norman Conquest, the English manorial system or the Crusades. If we were content to leave the Middle Ages to professed historical students in Sixth Forms and at the universities, a full programme of four years' work could be provided for the ordinary boy or girl. If we began with Columbus, the sixteenth century would give not only the Renaissance and the Reformation, but the discoveries of the Portuguese and Spanish navigators. With the seventeenth century would come the struggle with the Stuarts, the foundation of the American Colonies and the wars with the Dutch. The eighteenth would tell the story of the rivalry with the French in America and India and the loss of the first Empire, the nineteenth that of the spread of the second Empire and its development under the hammer blows of war into the third. At this stage we must be concerned more with facts than with ideas, more with men than with political theories, and not only with Wolfe and Clive, but with Durham and Wakefield, Livingstone and Grey, with the United Empire Loyalists, Macarthur and his sheep, the leaders of the Great Trek, and the missionaries who made the Treaty of Waitangi.

It cannot be argued that the vast territories included in the Empire do not offer sufficient scope and variety to a teacher of geography. Candidates for the London Matriculation Examination were at one time given the option of offering Imperial geography. It is to be regretted that that paper is no longer set, but its discontinuance can hardly have been due to lack of material in Dominions and Colonies distributed in regions so diverse. There is much to be said for the view that the history and geography of Britain and the Empire should form an integral part of the instruction of all boys and girls up to the stage of the School Certificate Examination; if that aim is not yet attainable, there can be no reason why the examining boards should not prescribe Imperial history and geography as a subject of study alternative to the present requirements. No compulsion is thereby brought to bear on headmasters, but those who are alive to the urgent need of more knowledge of the Empire would have the opportunity of ensuring that their pupils leave school better equipped than their parents to understand the meaning and the responsibilities of Empire citizenship.

"The ideas and ideals of the British Empire", admirably expounded by Professor Ernest Barker in the lectures which he has published under that title, should be the subject of study for older students whether at the universities or in the groups that are guided by the various organizations for adult education. As Sir Richard Livingstone has reminded us, politics and philosophy are suited, not to schoolboys, but to those who have had some

experience of life and of affairs. It is particularly that large section of the public which has absorbed half unconsciously the very widespread prejudice against what they conceive to be "Imperialism", which needs to learn what those ideas and ideals are.

A Great Experiment

The Empire is a great achievement and it is also a great experiment. Its story is marred by errors from which we have had the wisdom to learn, and by sins of which we have had the grace to repent. The teaching which is needed would not minimize the faults, but equally it would not ignore the repentance. Writers of the Marxist school appear to have been surprisingly successful in spreading the belief that Imperialism is the sinister scheming of capitalists anxious to "exploit" the backward races. It is difficult to fit into this picture the founders of New England, or the United Empire Loyalists, or the settlers on the Canterbury plains, or even the original unwilling colonists of New South Wales and Tasmania. The truth is that the expansion was due to the most varied motives—the desire for religious freedom, the longing for wider opportunities, rivalry with the French, the love of adventure and, mixed with these, the hope of successful trade. No one would deny the existence of the commercial motive; but to dwell on the Assiento and to leave out Wilberforce, to emphasize the Stamp Act and to omit the Durham Report, to magnify Rhodes's mistakes and to obscure his real aims, is to falsify history in order to force events into the narrow limits of an economic theory.

It is easy, for example, to represent Rhodes as a "capitalist", influenced only by the desire to add more and more millions to his gigantic fortune. Nearly forty years have passed since his death and few survive who were admitted to his intimacy. On Empire Day last year one of them, Sir Herbert Baker, was moved to write down some of his memories of Rhodes in a letter to a friend in the United States, and the editor of *The Washington Post* was allowed to print them for his American public.

"The prophetic vision", wrote Sir Herbert, "which as a young adventurer he dreamed alone on the African Veldt, or in the crowded mining camps of Kimberley, or at Oxford as an undergraduate, was of an extension and strengthening of the British Empire or Commonwealth and of its partnership in an Anglo-American Union; by this he hoped the peace and civilisation of the world would be assured. His Imperialism was to be based on responsibility as opposed to Jingoism; the service which is perfect freedom; home rule for the Dominions and Ireland, and for the Colonies and Dependencies, as soon as their political development entitled them to govern themselves. All his life work was directed to that end; first the union of the Dutch and British races in South Africa, and then the federation of the British Colonies with the Dutch Republics in a United States of South Africa under the flag of British freedom. . . . Rhodes had, as one who knew him intimately said, far-reaching world-wide aspirations, which rendered absurd the speculation of his critics as to his real motives. His political faith was to build through the union of the English speaking peoples the foundation of so great a power as to render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity. He was colour-blind between the British Empire and the American Republic. 'We could', Rhodes said, 'hold the Federal Parliament five years in Washington and five years in London.' . . . The qualifications of his scholarships are, as is well known, the Christian virtues of manhood, truth, courage, devotion to duty, sympathy for the protection of the weak, kindliness, unselfishness and fellowship. Lord Lothian, for long the Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, always laid stress on the point that Christian civilisation was the basis of Rhodes's ideals. 'The word Imperialism', he wrote to Sir Herbert, 'has acquired a bad significance, as meaning governing others against their will. Rhodes meant two things, (1) civilisation for really backward people like Africans, (2) unity and self-government for Briton and Boer, English and Irish.'"

If we exclude the mere savage conquerors like Attila or Jenghis Khan, Empire has always meant more than domination, more than the imposing of alien rule on a conquered race. The Empire of Augustus brought with it the *Pax Romana*, the conception and the observance of Roman law and a general diffusion of the Stoic philosophy. The Empire of the Middle Ages, which inherited the name and the majesty of Rome, was at least in theory a great civilizing power. It bore the title of Holy. The Emperor ruled as the Vicegerent of God; and despite the long struggle between the Hohenstaufen and the Popes, he was regarded as the champion and protector of the Church of Christ. Dante plunged into the lowest depths of hell not only Judas Iscariot but also Brutus and Cassius, the one a traitor to the Founder of the Church, the others traitors to the founder of the Empire. To the poet the Holy Roman Empire was the continuation of that of Julius, the only refuge from the conflicts and disasters of the time, the appointed guardian of the faith. To have been untrue to the founder of an institution so precious to men was to have merited unending torture in the jaws of Lucifer. For Dante, as for Marcus Aurelius, Empire meant not domination but responsibility; its task was not *parcere subjectis et debellare superbos* but to preserve and diffuse a civilization, a body of beliefs vital to the welfare of mankind.

Wardship and Partnership

The conception of the Trust as the sole justification for alien government is the addition made by the nineteenth century to the stock of ideas which constitute the meaning of our Empire. The twentieth century is developing another. Lord Lugard in *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* has argued that Empire implies a double Trust. The Imperial Power is responsible for the ordering, training and developing of the native races under its sway; it is also responsible for ensuring that the kindly fruits of the earth, the products of its territories, their minerals and their wool, are available without let or hindrance for the enjoyment of mankind. The declared aim of the Atlantic Charter, that there shall be "access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world", gives reason to hope that this second trusteeship will be recognized both by the British Empire and by the United States of America.

Even this doctrine, almost before it has won general acceptance, is being superseded or at least modified. A Trust implies the obligation on the part of the Trustee to surrender the possession of the property to the beneficiary

on his attainment of full age. The attempt is now being made to hasten the time when the African can be released from wardship, by giving him an increasing share in the manifold activities which are involved in modern colonial development. The missionaries have for long been training native teachers and clergymen. The interesting experiment known as "Indirect Rule" has invited the natives, either as paramount chiefs assisted by their counsellors or as a tribal council, to be responsible for some definite part of the administrative and judicial work of the district. That this tendency is becoming the recognized policy of the Empire was emphasized by *The Times* in a remarkable article published last October. "Lord Hailey has shown", the writer said, "that recent Imperial legislation has passed beyond the conception of guardianship and Trusteeship and is leading to the still more liberal idea of partnership between the peoples of the suzerain country and the colonies." So far from the colony being treated as a source of profit for members of the governing race, the tax-payers of Great Britain are now called upon to contribute towards the expenditure necessary for the civilization and the education of the African; and, where the African is capable of helping, he is asked to help. British engineers have built the harbour of Takoradi, but the profits of the cocoa plantations of the Gold Coast are mainly in African pockets. The task of education is no longer left to the devoted hands of missionaries whose honour it is to have been the pioneers in India, Australasia and Africa. It was the Colonial Office which founded for West Africa the great educational centre of Achimota, and it was significant of the new Imperial partnership that the original teaching staff included a Scottish missionary from Ceylon, an Australian, a Canadian Rhodes Scholar and a West Coast African, the famous Aggrey. Again on the initiative of Whitehall, just before the outbreak of the present war the Master of Marlborough resigned one of the most attractive positions open to an English schoolmaster to become the first principal of a similar college for East Africa at Makerere. In this work of education the African who is capable of the task is asked to take his share, as he is in agriculture, in forestry, in medicine and in administration. How the chiefs of even the most backward races can be inspired with the ideals of order and justice is familiar to the readers of the letters of *Fergie Bey*. In a real sense the African is being called into partnership.

The rule of law, the right of self-government, the double trust, partnership—these are the commodities of our Imperial freight, the doctrines implicit and gradually becoming explicit in our dominion. But the later doctrines are not always easy of reconciliation with the former. The Afrikaner enjoys the right of self-government, but he is not yet willing to accept the duties of trusteeship for the Bantu races. The obstacles to free trade in India and in the Dominions are erected not by the Imperial but by the local Governments. Nor can even the older principles exert their full and beneficial influence, unless there goes with them what we may to-day fairly claim to be a characteristic of the English temper. There are parts of the Empire which have yet to learn the lesson which experience has taught us, that responsible government cannot be successfully conducted except in a spirit of toleration

and forbearance. Religious bitterness and the cherishing of ancient grievances have resulted in the partition of Ireland. The mutual antipathy of Moslem and Hindu bars the road to the acceptance of a constitution for India. No one would claim that ours is a wholly Christian Empire, but the necessary condition for its maintenance and development is the existence of a Christian spirit, a spirit that emphasizes duties rather than rights, that can tolerate differences of outlook, that endeavours to understand the reasons for disagreement, that welcomes a diversity of gifts devoted to a common end.

Education in Empire, then, should not be limited to the tale of the achievements of explorers and pioneers and warriors, nor to statistics of the square miles included in its territories or the greatness of its trade. It is right that boys and girls should learn something of the heroism and suffering that have gone to the making of this great Commonwealth of Nations, something of the variety and the opulence of its resources. But for the maturer minds reached by the universities, by the training colleges and by the various agencies for adult education, something more is needed. They should be told honestly of the mistakes we have made and the faults of which we have been guilty; and then they should be enabled to learn how by trial and error, by sin and repentance we have worked out and are still working out a conception of Empire which is our greatest contribution to the good government and the welfare of mankind.

CHINA AND BRITAIN

PAST RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE

FOR nearly six years China has borne the brunt of Japanese aggression. In the campaign of the United Nations which will lead to the defeat of Japan China will play a leading part. Notable during the past year was the Chinese victory in Chekiang Province in August 1942, described by *The Times* as a Japanese campaign which had opened with impressive successes but ended with a retreat which no excuses can disguise. It would be idle to speculate what arrangements may be made for the co-ordination of Allied strategy against Japan. That there will be such co-ordination and that China's part will be large is clear. It is not, however, the purpose of this article to discuss China's achievements in the common cause, which are gratefully admired by the British people, or to guess at future military strategy, but rather to attempt to indicate the steps which should be taken to strengthen the ties between China and the British Commonwealth.

The signature, on January 11 of this year, of the treaties by which the United States and Great Britain relinquished their extraterritorial rights in China closes a chapter of history which has lasted exactly 100 years. The time is opportune to take stock of the position before we enter upon what must be a new era. It would be idle to pretend that there is nothing amiss with Sino-British relations. Both the Chinese and the British have fears and doubts which must be examined frankly if plans for the future are to be based on sound foundations. The quick succession of reverses a year ago, and more especially the fall of Singapore, were a bitter blow to China and inevitably shook Chinese faith in Britain. Contrasted by them unfavourably with their own five years' military resistance to Japan, the British effort seemed to the Chinese inadequate and unworthy and, though these events can now be seen in a truer aspect, doubts were felt both as to our ability and as to our will to resist aggression in the Far East. These doubts must be dispelled by deeds, not words. The Prime Minister has pledged the whole might of the British Commonwealth in the struggle against Japan, and we can be confident that our actions will prove to our Chinese friends both our sincerity and our invincibility.

"Unequal Treaties"

To the Chinese the 100 years that have just come to an end are regarded as the age of the "unequal treaties". The stumbling-block in the way of China's taking her rightful place in the comity of nations, the treaties providing for extraterritoriality have aroused fears and resentment; and of that resentment Britain, the Power which has been most successful and has had the largest share of foreign trade in China, has been the main target. The "unequal treaties" have been abolished, but the legacy of past resentment cannot be expected to disappear overnight. British relations with China

must be rebuilt on a full and ready acceptance of the new position by British merchants and capitalists. In the words of the China Association, the leading organization in London of those with special interests in China,

> "approval of the Government's decision connotes a good deal more than acceptance without demur of an action so obviously necessary. It includes also a keen desire to work with China's business men on a footing of cordial and constructive reciprocity."

It is far from the writer's intention to advocate that our attitude towards China should be an attitude of repentance for the past. Britons who return to the new China after the war can rightly return with their heads held high. Our prominence in foreign trade has led to our being associated with charges of commercial exploitation; but the same prominence has enabled us to point to a record of solid achievement for the benefit of China. That achievement will be given recognition by fair minds in China and will not be forgotten. It was a Briton, Sir Robert Hart, who developed the Chinese Maritime Customs, one of the finest Civil Services of the world, responsible not only for the honest collection of revenue, but also for the lighthouses along the China coast and the buoys along the coast and up the Yangtsze river and other aids to navigation. It was a Briton, Sir Richard Dane, who reformed the Salt Gabelle and by his administrative efficiency increased its annual revenue from approximately $32,000,000 to $100,000,000. British capital and rolling-stock were prominent in the development of China's railways.

The Story of Shanghai

But perhaps most notable of British achievements in China is the British share in the building up and administration of the International Settlement in Shanghai. The history of Shanghai too provides the best illustration of the mixed complications and achievements of the age that has just ended. A hundred years ago Shanghai, a Chinese walled city of no great size, was opened to foreign trade as a treaty port, and the British Consul, Captain Balfour, reached an agreement with the Chinese authorities for the setting apart of an area in which British subjects might acquire land from Chinese owners. In 1848 the Settlement appears to have had a population of something over 100 foreigners, including representatives of 24 merchant firms of which 3 were American and the rest British. By 1930 the foreign population of the International Settlement (several times extended in area) had risen to nearly 30,000 and a further 9,000 foreigners resided in the adjoining suburban areas. In the Settlement alone the Chinese population rose from 20,000 in 1885 to well over a million in 1935. In 1941 the total population of Shanghai, including the French Concession and the Chinese area of Greater Shanghai, was approximately 4 millions. A small port for junks had become the fourth or fifth port of the world and all but the very largest ocean-going vessels docked in the Whangpoo river. The small treaty port has become an up-to-

date modern city with municipal and public utility services that for efficiency and economy compare (or until the outbreak of the Pacific War compared) favourably with those of any city. Visitors to Shanghai were surprised to find that they drank "Grade A" T.T. milk; that their meat was inspected in a municipal abattoir where cattle were slaughtered in accordance with the latest modern methods; and that the Council's Industrial Division was listened to with respect by international experts on problems of industrial safety and welfare.

All this was no mean achievement when one bears in mind the unrivalled complexity of the task of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the ruling body of the International Settlement. A municipal body only, and yet not forming part of any sovereign State, the Council had to fulfil all the functions of government, to secure law and order with its police force of Chinese, Japanese, Russians, Sikhs and Britons; to provide education for both the Chinese and foreign communities; and at times even to defend its territory with its Volunteer Corps—a cosmopolitan citizen army commanded by a British officer lent by the War Office. First-class health services were provided, educational progress was rapid, and the municipal budget was balanced. The achievement is all the greater in that the Settlement was not backed by the authority of a single foreign Power. Since 1854 the Council had to face all the problems that arise not only from the diverse needs of a cosmopolitan community, but also from the potentialities for friction that were inherent in a régime with an international status. The original governing body of the Settlement consisted of "three upright merchants", but from 1869 to 1928 the Council was composed of nine foreign members elected by the foreign ratepayers. The British lead in trade and the predominant British share in the development of the Settlement resulted in there always being a British majority on this Council. In 1928 there were added three Chinese members, and in 1930 the number of seats was fixed at fourteen with the addition of two more Chinese members. By an informal understanding between the leading national groups, the nine foreign seats were for many years apportioned as follows: British 5, American 2, Japanese 2.

The Council and the War

It was a Council thus constituted that was called upon to face the complications arising from the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in 1937. Japan, herself a partner in the International Settlement, was making war upon China on whose soil the Settlement stood. Under an American chairman the Council faced its test with credit. Asserting its neutrality as an international body, it concentrated on safeguarding the existence of the community which it governed. Rice was imported by the foreign-led municipality; camps were established to give refuge in the Settlement; and in the larger part of the Settlement Japanese aggression was successfully resisted even against the threat of armed force. The future, however, was gloomy. Japanese armed forces occupied the industrial area north of the Soochow Creek, and there the Council could only exercise its jurisdiction in so far as the Japanese permitted. None of the other Powers with interests

in the Settlement was prepared to make the jurisdiction of the Council an issue involving a risk of a clash with Japan.

The years from 1937 to 1941 were unhappy for the British leaders in Shanghai. The local Chinese authorities were puppet administrations, acknowledging the pro-Japanese Nanking Government. With these authorities, who held all the surrounding country-side, it was necessary to have dealings on local affairs, and yet such dealings were naturally viewed with intense dislike by the National Government at Chungking with whom British sympathies lay. In 1941 an electoral clash which might have led to open violence was obviated by an increase in the size of the Council from 14 to 17 members, thus allowing for a broadening of the international base. British and Chinese seats were reduced by two each to allow for one additional American and one additional Japanese member and also for Swiss, German and Dutch members. The reconstituted Council with members of both the Axis and United Nations provided the one example in history of a genuinely international body functioning successfully during a world war.

On December 8, 1941, the Pacific War broke out, the British gunboat H.M.S. *Peterel* was sunk in the Whangpoo river and Japanese armed forces occupied the whole of the Settlement. The American, British and Dutch members of the Council resigned at the end of the month after an anxious three weeks during which they strove to reconcile their duty to the civil community with their loathing of any form of co-operation with their countries' enemies.

The recently signed treaty between Great Britain and China records that His Majesty's Government considers that the International Settlement at Shanghai should revert to the administration and control of the Government of China and agrees that official rights therein shall cease. His Majesty's Government further agrees to co-operate with the Government of China in reaching necessary similar agreements with other Governments having rights in the International Settlement. It may be assumed that after the war the control and finance of the International Settlement will, with general approval, revert to China. Many regard Shanghai's foreign community as consisting mainly of wealthy merchants and their employees temporarily sojourning in Shanghai. Far other is the truth. To many British families with two generations China-born, to a community of several thousand white Russians and, of recent years, to many thousands of Jewish refugees from central Europe, Shanghai is their only home. The Government of China can be relied upon to safeguard the interests of this large foreign community, most of whom are now interned by the Japanese and will have to make a fresh start in life when they regain their freedom.

A Draft Constitution in Being

There must be faced not only China's doubts of Britain but also British doubts of China. The dominant position in China of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) has led to fears that China is not truly democratic and that,

therefore, Britain and China may find themselves in ideological conflict when the war has been won. We must beware of being misled by words and must pay due regard to China's war-time difficulties. The democracy of China may never be the democracy of England or the United States; but there is here no cause for conflict. The history of the democratic movement in China is the history of the Kuomintang which was formed and led, until his death in 1925, by Sun Yat Sen the founder of Chinese Nationalism. The famous three principles San Min Chu I—nationalism, political democracy and livelihood for the people—are the accepted tenets of modern China. The introduction of popular constitutional government has never been abandoned as a goal. The early years of the Nationalist Movement were devoted to a period of military rule when the war lords were reduced to subjection and the country advanced rapidly towards unification. In 1929 there was officially introduced the period of political tutelage designed to last for a six-year period. In May 1931, in response to popular demand, there was held a People's Congress and a Provisional Constitution was adopted. Plans were laid for the election of a National People's Congress in 1935, but proved impracticable owing to the necessity of coping with Japanese aggression in the north. In 1932 there was promulgated a Draft Constitution which accorded to all Chinese citizens, above the age of 20, the right to vote, provided that they took the oath of Chinese citizenship and professed loyalty to the republic and the people's principles. The draft contained also a comprehensive Bill of Rights including freedom of speech, press and assembly.

The war with Japan has prevented the establishment of the Draft Constitution. In time of war, when existence is at stake, unity and discipline must come before freedom; but no more in China than in Britain have the promised aims of freedom been forgotten or abandoned. The institutional democracy of China with its different traditions and different problems will in all probability differ much from our own, but for the traditions and outlook of China we can have nothing but admiration. The Chinese have a national genius for common-sense practical solutions and for compromise. They are a nation of individualists. Their society is based on strong family loyalties. They have a long tradition of local self-government which, as our own history has shown, is the best basis for the establishment of a national democratic Government. To the ancient traditions of China there is being added, under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the realization of the necessity of self-sacrifice and self-denial.

If, as the writer believes, and as is confirmed by the warmth of the welcome recently given to the Parliamentary Delegation which visited China from the United Kingdom, British achievements in China are recognized when the "unequal treaties" have been forgotten; if British merchants accept unreservedly the new position arising from the abolition of extraterritoriality; and if the difference in our practice of democracy is understood and respected, there should be a real opportunity for development to the advantage of both countries.

Advantage does not mean commercial advantage alone. We have surely learned that understanding of each other is essential for those who desire to

work together to seek peace and ensue it. The surest path to mutual understanding is the path of education. Provision must be made for Chinese students to come to British universities, and facilities for such visits should not be confined to the United Kingdom, but should be extended to universities throughout the British Commonwealth. We must think not in tens but in hundreds of students. It is not, however, sufficient that there should be a one-way traffic. British students must be encouraged to visit China and to study Chinese institutions and culture. In particular those who mean to trade in China must study the language and culture of the Chinese people. There can be no better way of learning than by sharing in the life of a Chinese university.

Political and Commercial Co-operation

Our co-operation with China must be both political and industrial. With her vast man-power and her immense resources of both labour and materials China will, after the war, be in every sense of the word a great Power. Whether it be as fellow members of a Council of Asia or in some other form of association it will be necessary for China and Britain to solve, together with other members of the United Nations, the problems of the Far East. The large Chinese population in many parts of the British Commonwealth is but one factor necessitating co-operation between the two.

China is destined to be an industrial as well as an agricultural nation. We have learned how desirable is a balanced national economy. This should in no way diminish the opportunities for trade between China and Britain. China will need capital goods and Britain will need Chinese exports. Both as a means of assisting the reconstruction programme of our ally and as an industrial investment for our own benefit we must take our share in supplying the capital goods which China will need. What will be the machinery of post-war trade with China is as yet unknown. There are forces in China aiming at a system of government monopolies, but there is also a very strong tradition of individualism among Chinese traders. British traders must adapt themselves to new conditions and create an efficient organization to handle the importation into China of British goods. Use must be made of the goodwill and special knowledge of existing firms, but overlapping and wasteful competition must be eliminated by amalgamations or agreements. The Chinese will doubtless realize the value of conducting trade through well-tried organizations brought up to date. The Chinese—and there are 400 million of them—are a nation of traders. We are a nation of shopkeepers. Both nations have common sense. That ways for trading enterprise will be found no one can doubt.

THE UNITED STATES

A SUMMARY OF RECENT TENDENCIES

THERE is so much to report in America this crucial spring that one is tempted to throw style to the winds and give a simple list of the big trends. Here they are:

We have settled down for the long pull. Our mobilization phase is over, our production machine is geared to top speed, and we have simply to carry on.

Drafting and training of our man-power proceeds apace. There are 6,984,134 men and women now under arms, with 11,213,040 the goal by the end of 1943. The whole face of America is changed by the training of these people, but they are steadily getting ready for their tasks at the far corners of the globe.

As noted, our woman-power is swiftly being organized. The auxiliary forces in all branches of service are large, popular and useful. More than that, women have taken over nearly all sorts of jobs in factories and every phase of civilian life. Their hidden capacities are coming to the fore. We are mining and minting human resources—and thus adding to our national wealth—in a manner undreamt of.

Our civilian population, beginning to grasp how tough this war can be, learns a bit of what fighting in the Solomons or Tunisia can be, and accepts its sacrifices at home. Restrictions and curtailments in this land of abundance have begun to make the pattern now so familiar in Britain, and the people do not grumble overmuch.

We are ready for the great adventure—the invasion of the continent of Europe—and have been soberly warned that the price in casualty lists will bring the war really home.

Above all, Americans are widely and surprisingly interested in the post-war world. A complete relapse into isolationism seems thoroughly unlikely. The structure of the United Nations seems likely to survive long after the last gun has been fired. The real stress is not threatening to come over isolationism, but over the fruits of our collaboration.

The least satisfactory aspect of the American scene is the Congress, coupled with the hazard of fourth-term Presidential politics. Congress has proved to be thoroughly inept. A clear and stable majority does not exist. The President's leadership is often threatened, but his more or less right-wing opposition does not have a sure majority either. So Congress wastes three months in the struggle for a desperately needed tax Bill, and ends with nothing. Ultimately Congress's weakness and stalemates may result to the President's advantage, for the country may recognize that he alone can conduct the war. But there is already vigorous opposition to a fourth term, although the issue will not come to a vote until November, 1944.

Physically there are many changes in America. Most striking is the dwindling of motor-cars, for the ordinary civilian motorist in this motorized civilization has only six quarts of gasoline a week. For many months now, the big phenomenon will be the Victory Gardens with which Americans, like Britons, will strive to supplement their rations. Every back-yard is being spaded, and the loyal carrot will bloom where dandelion and milk-weed blew.

The industrial map of America is being re-made, too. Not only for war-time production. Vast industries, once centralized in Pittsburgh or Detroit, have been scattered over prairie, range and bayou. It will not be the same again.

HIGH-LIGHTS IN WAR-TIME AMERICA

THESE are but a few of the high-lights in war-time America. What do they portend? As early as January, 1943, President Roosevelt ended his Annual Message to the Congress and people with these words:

> "The state of this nation is good.
> The heart of this nation is sound.
> The spirit of this nation is strong.
> The faith of this nation is eternal."

The words were not only poetry in prose. They were true. During the same week that they were spoken, Americans in the seventeen eastern states were placing their motor-cars in their garages. "Pleasure" driving—motoring for all except business and essential purposes—was ended for the time being. Many families, particularly in poorer sections of these same states, were very cold with shortages of kerosene. Wealthier families were living in houses ten or more degrees colder than they have been for decades. Food rationing was well under way. Ice cream, so beloved of Americans, was half as rich in quality as it had been in October, and getting scarce. Butter was difficult to obtain, and so was margarine. Coffee, another American speciality, was rigidly restricted. Beef, pork and other meats were not easy to find in many localities. People were hard at work, steadily being drained from consumer industries into war factories. To cap it all, the President submitted to Congress an annual budget of $108,903,047,923. The total national income last year was estimated at $114,000,000,000.

Since the beginning of the year the conditions listed above have intensified. There are, of course, many rough spots in the application of war-time living. Price ceilings have been a notable difficulty, for in many instances the calculations of the Office of Price Administration have left too little margin for distributors' income, and as a result the merchandising system for several basic commodities has gone temporarily out of order. Moreover prices continue to rise alarmingly. Our inflation controls, while considerable, are not nearly so iron-clad as those in Britain. Particularly the delay in writing a drastic tax Bill for 1943 has meant that a great pool of inflation-money is still untaxed. It rests threateningly over our national economy. On the whole Americans have learned how to use food and shoe ration coupons and public transportation with less difficulty than any student of

our highly individualistic ways would have believed possible. Even so, typical American effervescence and lack of inhibition have kept some of the regulations from working as well as they would have done in a more regimentable nation. On the other hand, these same American qualities of originality and drive have helped people to contrive expedients to meet many shortages. Commuters, housewives, workers are all ingeniously coping with novel problems. The over-all picture, despite the rough spots, is a good one.

A Nation Finding Itself

In short, America had gone to war with a vengeance. Of course, this degree of participation and sacrifice does not yet come anywhere near the British level, not to mention the Russian or Chinese. But we are 3,000 miles away from the guns and bombs. Not only self-sufficient in basic foods and fuels, we are a great surplus-producer. Our easy way of life was not actually taken from us at the point of a bayonet. Much of our sacrifice was deliberate, because it was necessary to assist our allies. What America is in process of proving is of fundamental importance. We have already shown, on Bataan and Guadalcanal and at sea and in the air, that our young men—the product of a decade of depression and a century of aloofness—are made of as good stuff as their pioneer ancestors were. But to this proof we are adding another: that our civilian population can also stand up under fire. We have triumphantly disproved Hitler and his propagandists, who said that America—like Britain ahead of us—was soft and decadent. We have shown that men in peril and people at home know how to co-operate and sacrifice in the democratic way.

This demonstration must be of great interest and cheer to the British peoples. Perhaps you, too, wondered about the polyglot American folk. Perhaps you thought that our isolationist ways of thought, our materialistic civilization, our racial mixtures, our jazz and our movies and our central heating had perhaps resulted in a softening of the nation. Perhaps you asked some of the same questions about yourselves in the 'thirties. We did. And now we see that Hitler was wrong, and that those who had faith in democracy were right. We have stood the test of fire and of cold, of gluttony and of hunger, and we are coming through. We have found America again. As a nation we have the same qualities that tamed the frontier and conquered the wilderness, that fought a stubborn and tragic civil war, that organized a powerful machine civilization. We have lost neither our mechanical aptitudes nor our spiritual foundations. We have found them again.

This may all sound boastful. And, in a way, it is. But it is the boastfulness of strength revealed, of doubts dispelled, of nationhood reaffirmed. It is Elizabethan, if anything, in its boastfulness. And why should not we, and Britain too, be Elizabethan in our thinking? The prodigies of production that we are achieving, the miracle of organization that this war calls forth on land and sea and air, can only parallel the greatest days of our race. Our task is far greater, in some respects, than that which faced the Axis. We are achieving it. And in the magnitude of a Willow Run bomber plant, covering its square miles, is the same kind of colossus that men achieved when they

set forth to conquer the Spanish Armada or to gird the globe. For we live once more in a time of prodigies. America in 1943 is a vastly different nation than it was a year ago. In his 1942 Annual Message a worried Mr. Roosevelt had spoken with grim resolve, saying that "the future and safety of our country are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders." Now he could say: "Last year we stopped them. This year we intend to advance."

Production and Distribution

While the greatest proof of the will and power to advance lies in the American spirit, proved in foxholes and stokeholds and on the empty highways and in garages, the outward evidence, still, lies in our production figures and the distribution of our men and supplies. The expansion of our production remains one of the marvels of the time. Here are a few of 1942's figures: 670,000 machine guns, six times greater than 1941 production; 10,250,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, five times greater than 1941; 181,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, twelve times greater than 1941. All the products have not yet hit the goals, while others have exceeded them. Thus plane production totalled 48,000 planes against a goal of 60,000, but 5,500 were made in the month of December, at the rate of 66,000 a year. Tanks and self-propelling artillery reached 56,000 in 1942, over a goal of 45,000. Shipping tons constructed totalled 8,090,800 against a goal of 8,000,000. The arsenal of democracy, it appears, was doing well. These rates of production have continued and in most instances increased since the beginning of the year. Adequate present figures are not available. Yet in general the production chiefs are more than satisfied. In tanks, for instance, it has been revealed that we are producing more than can be shipped. There are very few instances of behind-schedule production, and the roster of plants which have discovered they can produce a greater volume of material at a higher rate of speed than they anticipated is growing daily. The conclusion clearly is that the production problem has been decisively licked.

The distribution problem is still with us. While the rate of shipbuilding is also good, it is not yet high enough above the toll of sinkings. Statistics in this field are doubtless available to British readers, and of course they represent the darkest spot in the entire war picture. Hope lies in the increasing number of escort vessels being built, the greater quantity of aircraft, better organization of convoys, and establishment of new, shorter and better-protected routes which will greatly cut down shipping mileage. It is obvious to all, however, that the great problem of the spring of 1943 lies on and under the seas. Fortunately planes are being delivered by air to more and more fronts. They can rarely be kept supplied by air, so the ocean transport difficulty remains. With the looked-for opening of the Mediterranean, Americans anticipate that the supply task will become somewhat lighter on the one hand, though doubtless increased by the needs of a second front on the other. In any event we are confident in the ultimate ability of Britain and the United States to defeat the U-boats, although we realize that for a time at least progress against them may not be spectacular.

Even more important than the flow of production is the present and forthcoming improvement of type. This, of course, will have a profound effect upon all fighting fronts. American correspondents who have been permitted to visit certain war factories have come back breathless with excitement at the tremendous strides ahead that are being made. These, too, cannot be described specifically, but they are thrilling. It is necessary of course to compare them not with the enemy's present production, but with what he too may be able to develop in future. Yet we may have complete confidence in the engineering inventiveness of American and British designers and manufacturers. And from what we learn at the factories our confidence, far from being misplaced, is almost understated.

Americans are encouraged by the rôle of their men on the fighting fronts. Our armies in North Africa seem to have acquired experience swiftly, and are ready for larger tasks. Above all, our airmen have given proof of their tactical skill and superiority of equipment, so that we look forward to increasingly crushing blows side by side with the R.A.F. which will constitute a real and deeply penetrating second front, no matter what else happens on the Continent. The nation has also fully accepted the decision of "Hitler first". While a few isolationists of the Hearst stripe still clamor for a greater diversion of effort to defeat the Japanese, the great bulk of people are entirely sure that present decisions are right. And we are not dissatisfied with the progress that has been made in the Pacific. Our footholds in the Solomons and in New Guinea appear secure, our supply lines safe, and the attrition of Japanese shipping is proceeding steadily. Meantime long-range plans are being laid to defeat the Japanese when the time comes. Many significant techniques and routes of approach are being pioneered which it would be impossible to describe specifically but which hold great promise.

Congress and the President

Congress, with control of the lower House potentially in the hands of Republicans and anti-New Deal Democrats, began its 78th session with the new year. And the American Government bade fair to reassume after 10 New Deal years—as nearly as could be possible in war-time—the system of checks and balances which is the basis of the federal Constitution. That is to say, President Roosevelt can look for no favors from Congress and will have to get his measures through by means of unmistakable merit or an even more skilful kind of politics than even he has hitherto displayed. The situation is both more and less critical than when Woodrow Wilson, in 1918, lost his majority in the House of Representatives altogether. It is more critical because President Roosevelt's opposition, accentuated by economic and social cleavages, has been 10 years in gathering. And it is less critical because this President, unlike Woodrow Wilson, is a shrewd politician and fully forewarned. The bitterness of Woodrow Wilson's tragedy etched itself deep into Franklin Roosevelt's thinking. As a junior member of the Wilson Administration, as one who in 1920 thanklessly stumped the country as a vice-presidential candidate, Mr. Roosevelt thinks he knows what was wrong with President Wilson's technique. Ever since the hand of fate revealed the large rôle to which Mr. Roosevelt would be called in world affairs, he has studied means of avoiding the Wilsonian twilight.

These facts are of primordial world importance. They are a partial answer to the question which must be troubling Britain: "Will the United States stick this time?" It can be set down as a premise that President Roosevelt will do everything in his power to prevent this issue from becoming a political football. His opening address to Congress was conciliatory and non-partisan. He delivered it as a world leader, not as the head of a party. But at the same time, unlike President Wilson, President Roosevelt is keenly aware of the political factors. His electoral reversal has come in ample time for him to prepare his positions. Among other things, he can give his rather inadequate Republican adversaries plenty of rope with which to hang themselves. Above all, assuming that the war is still in an acute stage in mid-1944, and that at the very least a tremendous job of readjustment and clean-up is on hand, the chances for Mr. Roosevelt's election to a fourth term would be very good. The country would hesitate to throw aside his experience, would not dare to trust the alternative candidates. It is a far cry from electing a Republican Congress to bringing in a President whose only experience has been in some mid-western state capital, or less. And so, while the opposition in Congress is bound to be troublesome and rambustious, it will not be controlling. It will simply force President Roosevelt to compromise, to seek national unity. Some of the compromises may not be happy, but they are unlikely to be tragic.

The Post-war Settlement

Moreover already we are being integrated into the peace settlement. We are integrated by Lend-Lease, which furnishes a vehicle for post-war economic interchange and rehabilitation. We are bound by the world rehabilitation and relief organization set up under the very able ex-Governor of New York, Herbert H. Lehman. His is a potentially vast organization, carrying American aid to the four corners of the stricken globe, and with the aid political stimulus and a certain American responsibility. We are wrapped in world events by the air ferry command, through which a network of air lines encircles the globe. We are tied to world organization by the system of air and sea bases, roads, assembly plants, railroads and storehouses we have built in all accessible parts of the world. These networks are available, together with the systems of the other United Nations, as the basis of a world police force. And here is an important point: Americans of all ranks of opinion, from isolationists to interventionists, express vigorous agreement on two things—that disarmament if not dismemberment of the enemy nations will be essential, and that the peace will have to be preserved by an international police force. As to "freedom from want" and Vice-President Wallace's quart of milk for the Hottentot there may be disagreement. His "century of the common man" may be challenged. The wide extension of social security and of economic controls may be questioned. But nearly all Americans are agreed on the need for joint policing of the world, chiefly by air forces.

Just think of it! What a far cry from 1940, to say nothing of 1932 and

even 1920 and 1918. Now, if the factions in America which today clearly recognize the need of maintaining the peace by force remain true to these war-born convictions, do we not have the assurance of United States participation in the peace? And who would have imagined that this kind of progress would be possible! There will, of course, be much disagreement on the kind of peace-preserving organisms. But men have seen that the aggressors should never again be permitted to gain the power through which they have terrorized the rest of us. If the fighting forces of the United States, when their main job is accomplished, also see the need of this continuing police function, then we are inextricably involved in world organization. And there is every reason to believe that a sizeable portion of our men under arms, especially our aviators, will look forward to future careers in the air service. Their function as commercial aviators may well be linked to the task of keeping the peace. The two rôles can be complementary.

A Stable World Order

There will be a lot of sticky partisan politics in the United States in the next few years. Much of it will dishearten and alarm observers in other countries. It is the price we pay, the forfeit, perhaps, for the values of democracy. But it can be kept from dashing the world's hopes for maintaining peace. It can be kept within proper bounds if President Roosevelt and his colleagues are able to follow through their present techniques of world policy without getting them involved in a political campaign and a referendum on the fundamental issues. It looks as if the very nature of the case, the basic involvements which already bind us, will save the day. It is not 1920, and Europeans should not think it is. Our present rôle is global, and we feel it. Our expeditionary forces are not on a muddy picnic in France, joining well-established allies there. They are everywhere, tackling the hardest of jobs. We know, too, that war debts cannot be collected in money, and we do not wish to ruin our economy by accepting goods for all we have lent or leased or will lend or lease in future. We are glad that certain compensations are now possible in return for lend-lease; but mentally we have already written off much of the cost of lend-lease as the cost of the war, our war.

Indeed, despite our political mannerisms—which currently are evoked, not by world policy, but by domestic affairs and conservative or partisan resistance to Mr. Roosevelt as New Dealer—we have come a far way since 1920. Seeing the world go down in flames a second time, we know we are partly to blame. We do not want to go through it all again. These are our inmost convictions. Our airmen, our sailors, our soldiers know that this continent cannot be isolated. And they, too, will not want to go to war a second time. Some of them, perhaps more than a few, will want to share in the rehabilitation of the new lands they are visiting. Others will be zealous to get back to the United States, and to preserve its peace. Both categories will have a vested interest in the maintenance of a stable world order. That is the hope that looms before us.

United States of America.
April 1943.

INDIA

I. MR. GANDHI'S FAST

For three weeks, from February 10 to March 2, Mr. Gandhi's fast drew the eyes of the world to India. But the inevitable publicity for this demonstration was but the momentarily focused limelight of a wider stage. The characters are Indian, but the setting is a world-wide scene; the "voices off", and the clangour of mighty forces in the orchestra pit, are no less essential than the miming of the actors to the development of the plot to its hidden *dénouement*.

The physical crisis of Mr. Gandhi's fast was an emotional crisis for India, and inflated that element of unreason which habitually strays into popular opinion on her political problems, both in Great Britain and in the Dominions and the United States. The emotional strain need hardly have been so tense; for the calculation with which Mr. Gandhi prepared and embarked upon his ordeal suggested that he had no intention of letting this be a struggle of wills *à outrance*, but only a wager with a stake that he could afford. The Government of India accepted the challenge, and won the stakes. But the strain was too much for three of its members (all Hindus, and two of them former supporters of the Congress and friends of Mr. Gandhi), who resigned sooner than run the risk of being thought accomplices in the Mahatma's suicide, unable as they were to contend that the Government could have given way to such pressure, or have acted radically otherwise than it did. Their places have been well filled: the three new members of the Viceroy's Executive Council are Sir M. Azizul Haque, Sir A. K. Roy, and Dr. N. B. Khare, the first Congress Premier of the Central Provinces.

The hard-headed saw that the issue at stake was whether responsibility or irresponsibility should rule in India, whether the Indian Government or Mr. Gandhi should be master in that house. Mr. Gandhi is a remarkably shrewd political judge, and he certainly calculated that the odds of his wager were worth while; for, whereas the prize that he stood to win was tremendous, he could hedge his political losses by setting against them the restoration of his own publicity value. He may have assessed this countervailing gain a little too high. In fact the emotional tension was very soon relaxed; the world had other things to think about, and by the time the British Parliament (which is still the supreme authority in India, and answerable for its destiny) debated Indian affairs a month later the limelight on his personal position had faded. One or two Opposition speakers, indeed, urged that Indian political leaders should be allowed to consult Mr. Gandhi, but the Government had no difficulty in showing that this, of all steps, was unlikely to lead to a settlement.

II. THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

The House of Commons on March 30 and the House of Lords on April 6 debated resolutions to enable the proclamations suspending responsible parliamentary government in six Indian provinces to continue in force. It is

now three and a half years since the original proclamations were issued, following the resignation of the Congress Provincial Governments on the orders of the party's High Command. Governors had then no alternative to taking to themselves, as the Constitution Act provided, those necessary governmental powers which the representatives of the people rejected. Certain modifications of their "one-man rule" may be possible, but there is still no real alternative to-day, short of constructing a new constitution for the provinces, an effort not only inopportune in the midst of war and civil strife but premature in that it would imply the final bankruptcy and writing-off of responsible parliamentary government of the British type in India. This form of government may, indeed, be inept for a country where politics follow the lines of religious communities held immaculately apart from each other by faith and law and social custom, so that majority and minority are permanently riveted in their places; but the decision is one which only Indians can take. The British people have offered of the best from their own experience, and if it is in the end repudiated the decision cannot be theirs.

The resignation of the Congress Governments in October 1939 was hailed by the militant Muslims as an end of oppression and servitude, and its anniversary is celebrated by them as Deliverance Day. They swear that never again shall they submit to Congress rule; and that, in the condition of Indian politics that is liable to last for a good many years, implies over a large part of British India that never again will they accept majority rule. But this attitude is itself the by-product of an inner fact which not only provoked the Muslim reaction but directly caused the resignation of the Congress Governments and the subsequent refusal by the Congress to accept office or even to resume attendance at the Central Legislature during the war—save on terms of immediate independence, which common sense at once rejects as out of the question while the enemy is at the gate, and while India still lacks any kind of agreement upon a constitutional system under which independence would be exercised. That inner fact is the totalitarianism of the Congress party, the dictatorship of its High Command, and the dominating influence over that caucus, and indeed over the whole party, of Mr. Gandhi with his essentially negative, quietist and unconstructive philosophy.

Position of the Congress

Thus, although it was a pity that Parliament in debate on the resolutions paid little attention to the details of the problem of provincial government, to which they directly related, yet it was right that the discussion should have revolved largely upon the position of the Congress under Mr. Gandhi's fatal leadership. The Secretary of State effectively rehearsed the story of Congress ambition, from the elections of 1937, when success went to the party's head, to the rejection of the Cripps offer in a mood of defeatism about the war which was one of Mr. Gandhi's worst misjudgments, and to the subsequent rebellion against established order and government. Mr. Gandhi's recent correspondence with the Viceroy, said Mr. Amery, showed no sign of that complete change of attitude and conduct, on the part of those who had already brought such unhappiness to their country, as alone could justify the Government of

India in adopting a different policy towards them. The problem of obtaining unity among the chief parties in India, though not in his view insoluble, could not be solved unless both British and Indians could get away from the idea that there was only one sealed pattern of democracy. Like wasps buzzing up and down a window-pane, with an adjoining window wide open, we were held up and frustrated by the unrealized and insuperable barrier of our own constitutional prepossessions. It was for Indians themselves to find the way. We could help them by showing our continued goodwill towards India, by encouraging any endeavours which Indians might make to escape from the present deadlock, and, above all, by imparting some measure of our own faith in the future.

For the Labour party, Mr. Ammon supported the Government in the attitude they had taken last August. With the brightening of the military outlook, however, he felt they might now take the initiative; and he appealed to the Prime Minister to develop his theme of a Council of Nations, in which India and China would assume the leadership of the Far East in helping to rebuild the world. Sir George Schuster also appealed for a new initiative. A Labour member suggested that, if conversations with responsible Indians showed a hopeful prospect, they should be held in London, not Delhi. Mr Attlee, replying for the Government, made a vigorous and impressive contribution. One of the terrible aspects of the situation in India, he said, was the incredible levity with which a man of Mr. Gandhi's experience contemplated the falling into anarchy of the great sub-continent of India. Terrible though this reflection is, it becomes less amazing if one recalls the essentially anarchistic cast of Mr. Gandhi's mind, with his repudiation of violence (the necessary if veiled sanction of all government) and of industrialization and urbanization, the inevitable concomitant of India's rescue from chronic stagnation and periodical famine. As a democrat, Mr. Attlee objected as much to the dictatorship of a reputed saint as to the dictatorship of a notorious sinner.

In the House of Lords the Government's chief spokesman was Lord Munster, Under-Secretary for India. He expressed himself as not without hope that when India was confronted with her own position in a post-war world, with all the opportunities that would be opened to her and all the dangers that would persist, the prospect of agreement among Indian political parties might be more hopeful than at present. This is indeed the hope on which present British policy towards India, when analysed, is found to be essentially based. If it proves false, then the end of the war will see the difficulties in India heightened rather than diminished; for the external and internal pressure for a settlement will be far greater, yet the means of reaching it will be as unattainable as it is now.

This prospect may have been in Lord Hailey's mind when, having shown how impossible it would be to retire from India forthwith, leaving her to open dissension and conflict, he urged that we should take any measures in our power which would help to confirm confidence in the genuineness of our policy. Lord Hailey concluded:

"We are often told that we ourselves are wanting in inspiration about the constitutional position of India, and that we have ourselves no constructive vision. We have such a vision, and indeed we may well feel that we have made

a very definite contribution to the world in our conception of the Commonwealth of Nations. . . . But so long as the question of India is unsettled then that vision is blurred, and we shall seem to the world to have failed in our loyalty to our own conceptions and to have halted in the path. That is not so."

The debates as a whole showed an overwhelming approval of the Government of India's general policy towards the Congress, mixed with a growing feeling that, if deadlock lies along the path of offering self-government in a form which India rejects, the time is coming for a more active attempt to find some other form more suited to India's peculiar problems; in other words, that the constructive effort which culminated in the Cripps Mission cannot be wholly resigned to Indians, whose responsibility for finding agreement among themselves is matched by British responsibility for promoting that agreement.

III. THE WHITE PAPER

BEFORE the debates the Government had issued a White Paper* reproducing a Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's responsibility for the Disturbances in India since August 1942. The evidence marshalled in this document is overwhelming. It is all the greater pity, therefore, that it was not allowed to speak for itself, instead of being wrapped in argument. The facts make their own impression on the mind, and there is no gainsaying them; but the inevitable mental reaction to the contentious style in which they are presented is doubt, resistance and counter-argument.

The White Paper is the less telling because it seeks to prove too much. It tries, in effect, to identify the Congress with Mr. Gandhi, the non-violent Mahatma with the essentially violent rebellion of last August, and the deliberate plotting of sabotage and violence, which could only help the enemy, with the Congress as a whole. The truth is much more complex. The Congress has several wings, from the pacifist to the militant revolutionary, from the surreptitiously pro-Japanese to the passionately pro-Chinese, from those who would have accepted the Cripps offer to those who saw in it the temptation of the devil. It was because the Congress was so divided, and was aware of its own division, that it delivered itself over once more to the dictatorship of Mr. Gandhi, who turned to account the one common characteristic of all its wings—an acute sense of frustration after Sir Stafford Cripps's visit—to unify the Congress under a revolutionary banner. We may be sure that he accepted rather than devised the violent measures which this scheme required. His utterances on the point are not so much expressions of his own beliefs as glosses on the beliefs of others to give them the semblance of coherence with his own. The pacifist in him submitted to the anarchist; the anti-Axis wing of the Congress, who put the defence of India first, submitted their wills to those who put first the mirage of independence at any price.

Amid such a conflict of motives and confusion of wills it is impossible to pin deliberation of the whole result upon any one man. Even Hitler cannot have foretold and intended all the evils that his war has brought about. The

* Cmd. 6430.

broad facts about the Indian rebellion, however, are plain, and are amply documented in the White Paper. In a mood of open defeatism the Congress, led by Mr. Gandhi, passed a resolution which offered the choice between acknowledged anarchy on the one hand, if the Government should give way, and on the other, if the Government should have to be coerced, "open rebellion", "as short and swift as possible", going if necessary "to the extremest limit". The quotations are from Mr. Gandhi; some of his lieutenants went much further in their open avowal of violent revolutionary intent. Secondly, after the passage of the resolution and the arrest of the principal Congress leaders, a large-scale and violent rebellious movement broke out in certain areas of India, all of them areas where the Congress had been the dominant political party. The acts of sabotage, in the objectives that they chose and the objectives that they avoided, in their often skilled and deliberate design, were of such a character that only an organized movement could have inspired them. Many Congressmen, including some second-rank leaders who had escaped arrest, took part in these violent and criminal activities; the Muslim community held almost entirely aloof. Literature circulated in the name of the Congress told its readers how to light and fan fires of destruction and revolution. It is open to the authoritative leaders of the Congress to repudiate any particular item in this literature, but they cannot deny the broad fact that what remained of the Congress organization turned itself to the work of destroying government by every means at hand. All this happened with Japan hammering at India's gate.

IV. PROFESSOR COUPLAND'S REPORT

PROFESSOR COUPLAND, who is about to complete a survey of the constitutional problem in India for Nuffield College, Oxford, would have dealt more effectively than the authors of the White Paper with the facts about the August rebellion had they been fully known to him. Part II of his report, which has recently been published as a separate book,* ends with a chapter on the rebellion which, lucid and compelling as it is, suffers inevitably from the incompleteness of evidence and shortness of perspective which handicap the historian of too recent events. As a whole Professor Coupland's book is a quite invaluable contribution to the study of India's problems, and through their study to their solution.

It is so for two main reasons. The first is that it tells straightforwardly, with enough detail for mature study yet not too much to clog the movement of the tale, the story of Indian experience of self-government in the critical testing-time after 1937, when Indians first assumed, over a limited field though it may have been, the full powers of responsible government. In chapter after chapter Professor Coupland records with luminous yet detached comment the actual experience of the eleven Provincial Governments, both Congress and non-Congress: how they fared with the civil servants and police, who had often been as enemies to them and were now under their authority; how they managed their finances; how they handled communal disputes

* *Indian Politics 1936–1942*, by R. Coupland. Part I was published last year with the title *The Indian Problem 1833–1935*. Oxford University Press.

and disorders; what legislation they passed; how the Oppositions reacted to their law-making and their administration; and a score of other topics. This is not the dry dust of forgotten affairs but living matter to build a new growth; for only out of experience—her own first, and that of other nations in so far as it applies—can India draw knowledge for her future essays in constitution-making, and the British Parliament, too, can draw the knowledge needed to discharge its responsibility for guiding India forward.

A Record of Self-Government

It is a story not discouraging in many of its aspects. Considering their inexperience, the new Indian Governments as a group could claim, after two and a half years in the Congress provinces and longer elsewhere, a worthy record in public finance, sound administration and useful law-making. Some of them tackled social and economic problems to which, in the nature of the case, an imperial Government could not enforce the radical solution needed. Naturally, there were mistakes and failures; but, had the account in terms of practical experience included no larger debit, it would have shown a clear balance in favour of popular Indian self-government along traditional lines. Unhappily Professor Coupland has had to set down one far graver disappointment—the growing acuteness and danger of the communal problem. Hindus and Muslims for generations have been much as they are now, and for generations there have been occasional rows and riots between them when religious passions have been inflamed by some cause like the playing of music in front of mosques or the slaughter of cattle under the eyes or ears of cow-venerating Hindus. What has happened now is that the approach of Indian self-government has translated this religious division and friction into political terms. Parties have been built not upon social policies but on religious allegiance. They thrive by working upon religious prejudice and promoting communal claims. The National Congress set out to avoid this, by including all creeds and communities on an equality; but under its present leadership it carried this policy to such a pitch of totalitarian ambition as to produce a violent reaction among the minority communities, which has not yet spent itself.

This is the second main reason for recommending Professor Coupland's book to all students of Indian problems: that with chapter and verse it analyses the character and policy of the Congress, as a body aiming implicitly if not overtly at the one-party state, and thus producing the reaction most notoriously expressed in the Pakistan movement. It is a story which has led British statesmen, as this article has recorded, to ask whether some totally new form of constitution is not needed to meet the needs of India. "The major question now", writes Professor Coupland, "is the relationship between Indians and Indians." It is a question to which, of its nature, only Indians can give the final answer; but British people, too, as still the ultimate wielders of power in India, have a responsibility for helping to find that answer and for moulding practice to meet ideas half-way.

London,
May 1943.

GREAT BRITAIN

PARLIAMENT AND POLICIES

THE past three months have brought no further changes in the Government, nor any serious call for them. Mr. Churchill, after a sharp illness which might have pulled down many a less-burdened man of 68, has returned to apparently sturdy health. Mr. Eden came back physically tired from his crowded visit to the United States and Canada; but the account of his overseas discussions, which a few days later he gave to Parliament, had an almost universally favourable reception there and outside—particularly the news that he had carried an invitation to Mr. Cordell Hull from the British Government to pay a visit to this country during the summer.

Two Speakers

But there is one personal loss to record at the very heart of our Parliamentary life. In the midst of the annual debate on the Navy Estimates, when Lieutenant-Commander Brabner (who won the D.S.O. last year in a Malta convoy) was speaking, the Deputy-Speaker stepped down from the chair, and one of the Clerks at the Table said to a hushed assembly: "It is with extreme sorrow that I have to inform the House that Mr. Speaker died this afternoon." Captain FitzRoy, who had been Speaker since 1928 and had been wounded at Ypres in the last war, was in his seventy-fourth year. He had aged, but to the end he possessed complete command over the House and the unforced respect of every one of its members. Politically he was a Conservative; perhaps it was fitting that among the tributes to his Speakership the words which came nearest the mark were uttered by a back-bench Labour member—"his spirit of justice, his unfailing sense of humour, and that peculiarly English habit of understatement which so often in his rulings turned the edge of what might have developed into an unseemly incident."

A battle does not stop because the general is killed, and some outside criticism was voiced against Parliament suspending its work for six days until a new Speaker was elected. Constitutional difficulties apart, the critics (like many other people) failed to take due account of the immeasurable importance of making absolutely certain that there is no mistake in the choice of a Speaker. It is profoundly true, though seldom realized, that the successful conduct of our Parliamentary institutions depends nowadays, as much as on any other single factor, on the ability of this country to breed a line of men with the rare gifts which qualify them to preside over that uniquely powerful body, full of human strength and weakness, the House of Commons. "The great thing, Mr. Speaker, about the office which you now hold is this fact"—so said that one-time rebel from Clydeside, Mr. James Maxton, to Captain FitzRoy's successor—"that the man who occupies your position sits there not maintained by force of bayonets, with no powerful bodyguard, no powerful statutes. The man who occupies that position occupies it because he has the confidence and respect of his fellow Members."

The Government does not appoint the Speaker, and in those intervening days searching care was taken to discover who would be most acceptable to back-benchers of all parties. The names of two present Ministers were mentioned, Mr. W. S. Morrison and Major Gwilym Lloyd George. But opinion quickly crystallized in favour of the one man who, first as Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means, and then as Chairman and Deputy-Speaker, already had several years' experience in the chair, where he was well liked and trusted. Colonel Clifton Brown, 63 years of age, is Conservative M.P. for Hexham in Northumberland. He possesses all the attributes of a Speaker, except commanding stature. A Liberal proposed his election, a Labour ex-miner seconded it, and the supporting voices included that of our solitary Communist M.P., Mr. Gallacher. In a world torn by strife and tragically divided in its standards of values, it was a strengthening reflection that the 600 representatives of the British nation, rising above all sectional feelings, could agree freely and unanimously which of their number was best fitted on personal merit to rule their proceedings and command their obedience. So far every day has justified their choice.

Strains on the Party Truce

Meanwhile the whole idea of all-party government is coming under greater strain than at any time since 1940. A section of the Conservative party, with genuine sincerity but a lack of political sensibility, opposed Mr. Bevin's Catering Wages Bill and mustered 116 votes in the division lobby on its second reading. This Bill, which has now passed both Houses (for the opposition tapered away), sets up an *ad hoc* commission instructed to enquire into and, where necessary, effect improvements in conditions and wages in the catering trades. That Conservative split was followed by practically the whole of the Labour party (except the Labour Ministers) recording its dissatisfaction with the Government's interim decisions on the Beveridge Report; and talk revived of ending the political truce under which, at all by-elections since the outbreak of war, the party to which the outgoing member belonged is left free to nominate its candidate without opposition from either of the other two principal parties. At the annual conference of the Labour party in 1942 the continuance of the truce was endorsed by only a narrow majority, and there are many, though perhaps not the best-informed, who believe that the party's forthcoming conference at Whitsun will reverse that decision.

Labour is certainly the most obvious sufferer from the truce, because it offers golden opportunities for a mixed assortment of Independent candidates to come forward and, by playing on hopes and grievances, steal votes which under normal conditions would go to the Labour man. The latest phenomenon of this sort is a new party, calling itself Common Wealth, led and inspired by Sir Richard Acland, a young M.P. who recently gave up his former Liberal allegiance. In a book entitled *What it will be like in the New Britain*, a curious, fervent mingling of sense and nonsense, he has developed his basic theory that the transfer of the principal kinds of productive resources to common ownership (this he attempts to distinguish from State ownership, which is Socialism) will remove "frustrations" and release all the hidden springs of new social and political energy that Britain needs to find. For people who feel cynical about the established parties this is heady wine, especially if they have never given a serious thought to politics before, nor studied any of its problems in real terms. At five recent by-elections Common Wealth has polled 39,000 votes in the aggregate, against 49,000 given to the Government. One of them, in a rural Cheshire constituency, was actually won from the Liberals by a young Common Wealth candidate who has seen war service with the R.A.F. Common Wealth could not survive the ending of the electoral truce between the three older parties. It is too shadowy and its roots are too shallow; and Sir Richard Acland, though he can sway a mass audience, is deficient in the organizing and the common-sense qualities of a real political leader. But its transient success proves what a force of political enthusiasm is latent in the younger generations, which the other parties will never similarly tap so long as they continue defending old ditches and attacking old ideas that are all as dead as the dodo in the eyes of the young.

The Home Front

One fact is certain. Nothing in Britain's internal politics is deflecting her purpose or diverting her energies from the harrying of the enemy. Throughout the spring the main feeling in all quarters was expectancy, awaiting the new and culminating clash of arms with the Germans somewhere in Europe which everyone thought to have been planned at the Casablanca meeting. War production was going well; all along the line the emphasis was shifting from quantity (so sorely needed after Dunkirk) to quality. Thanks partly to substantial voluntary economies, but largely to exceptionally mild weather, we reached the end of winter without either industries or householders suffering the handicap of a shortage of coal. In amazing contrast with the experience of Germany, enemy bombers have hardly interfered with our industrial production this year at all. Occasionally they have flown inland in small numbers; and during one of these light raids on London a shocking tragedy took place at a London tube station, where crowds seeking shelter fell on some ill-lit stairs and more than 170 people were crushed to death. The Home Secretary ordered an independent judicial enquiry, but for security reasons its results could not be published. With this grim exception, the main sufferers from enemy action are still the coastal towns, especially along the south coast, where single "tip and run" raiders sweep in at low level from the sea, drop bombs in the streets, and within seconds are skimming the waves and away again.

Naval losses are always announced in full by the Admiralty as soon as that can be done without jeopardizing operations. But the opposite policy (reaffirmed by the Government in spite of recurrent Parliamentary criticism) of withholding from the public official figures of our losses of merchant shipping tempts the ordinary man to forget from day to day the deadly peril of the U-boat war, and the magnificent ceaseless efforts of the Navy to protect his essential supplies. As a result the short and victorious Battle of Britain in the air, nearly three years ago now, remains more vividly present

to the public mind than the vast scale of the constant far-ranging Battle of the Atlantic on which the continued life of this island entirely depends. And yet no one serving in the Army or the Royal Air Force in this war who has seen the Navy at work is likely to begrudge it the title of the Senior Service. Lord Woolton, whose personal prestige as Minister of Food stands as high as ever, has warned us that there may be ration cuts in store but, apart from a seasonal reduction in the cheese ration, we notice no difference in the very reasonable scales on which we are allowed to feed—limited as they might appear to the eyes of people not yet subjected to the full force of rationing. The truth is that, in the main, we have completed the drastic process of social adjustments to war needs, and habit makes our new standards cease to hurt, though there is still the odd screw here and there to be tightened. For instance, the Ministry of Labour, having already exercised its powers of compulsion on all women between 19 and 45 who could reasonably be expected to do full-time duty in the Women's Services, in nursing, on the land or in a factory, has now started conscripting for part-time work women whose domestic circumstances would preclude them from giving full-time service.

Taxation

Even taxation has been screwed very near the limit. With income-tax already at 10*s.* and surtax on the largest incomes ranging up to 19*s.* 6*d.* in the pound, Sir Kingsley Wood in his 1943 budget proposed for the second year in succession no rise in direct taxation, and sought additional revenue exclusively from increasing indirect taxes—tobacco, alcohol, entertainments and the purchase tax on luxuries. The cheapest packet of ten cigarettes now costs 10½*d.*, beer is up to 1*s.* 2*d.* a pint, and 1*s.* 3*d.* cinema seats have become 1*s.* 6*d.* out of which 7½*d.* goes to the Exchequer. Altogether we are taxing ourselves in the coming year to the tune of £2,900 million—over £60 per head of the population. No one would single out Sir Kingsley Wood on personal grounds as a great Chancellor of the Exchequer. Yet he has made for himself the all-important reputation in war-time of distributing the burdens fairly: witness the fact that, in spite of heightened tension between the political parties, taxation policy shows no sign of being a dividing issue between them at the moment, and debates on the budget this year, as in 1942 and 1941, have disclosed a unanimity of approval which was quite unknown in days of old when budgets were less than a third of their present colossal magnitude. We have a Chancellor who has resoundingly refuted, somehow or other, Burke's dictum that "to tax and to please, no more than to love and to be wise, is not given to man".

In 1941 we met 48 per cent of all our home expenditure by taxation, in 1942, 52 per cent, and in 1943 we are aiming at 56 per cent, although the rate of expenditure has now reached £15 million a day. We have succeeded in stabilizing food prices at about 20 per cent above the level of August 1939, whereas at a similar stage in the last war the rise had exceeded 100 per cent. These are measures of the remarkable improvement effected this time in the conduct of our financial and economic policy. All is not perfect. Waste of Government money is not eliminated, and there is still a margin of personal

expenditure on non-essentials which ought to be cut down. But broadly speaking we have pursued the right paths; the Government has taxed fearlessly, and the nation has been at one in accepting the necessity for it. The next tasks for the Treasury, now that war expenditure and war taxation are both near their peaks, are first to devise means of using the financial levers in its hands for helping the wheels of peace-time industry and commerce to restart quickly when the right moment comes, and secondly to educate the public mind in the principles which will have to rule our post-war budget policy.

Industry and Agriculture

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Herbert Morrison and other Ministers have been ventilating in recent speeches the idea that there will be a proper place for State ownership, for private enterprise and for a variety of compromises between the two in our future industrial system. Nevertheless a sharp clash between opposing views on these matters seems a certainty as soon as the governing condition of unity to win the war is removed. We have just had a foretaste of it in the decision of Sir Stafford Cripps, now Minister of Aircraft Production, to appoint a controller over an important aircraft firm, to remove the directors from office and to buy out the shareholders. Sir Stafford's action was wholly devoid of political motive or bias, though suspicions to the contrary were inevitably whispered, his personal opinions being so well known. In reality he acted on the authoritative findings of a private enquiry which he had asked two independent persons of high business competence to undertake. But there were naturally questions in Parliament about the Government's post-war intentions towards the aircraft industry, and the Prime Minister himself thought it fitting to give an assurance that anything like the nationalization of such an industry was not a matter to be embarked upon without consulting the country first.

But, if industry promises to be a field of controversy, there are growing hopes of an agreed agricultural policy in Britain after the war. A succession of valuable reports prepared by various bodies, some agricultural and others political, has been appearing recently, and though they differ in detail they are unanimous in their main recommendation of a dual policy combining price stability with effective machinery to guarantee efficient farming. Unfortunately these studies and pamphlets tend to be written by agriculturalists for agriculturalists, and the cardinal task of securing the permanent goodwill of the towns in favour of realistic measures to preserve rural prosperity is not yet being tackled. The opportunity for that is here, for the British farmer's contribution to our food supply has earned him universal gratitude. This summer, with arable acreage breaking its 1942 record, we are planning ahead for an exceptional labour supply to get the harvest in, and harvest camps for thousands of schoolboys and other volunteers are to be organized all over the country. It is an appropriate moment for another of the Government's "reconstruction" committees set up in 1941—the Committee on Agricultural Education, presided over by Lord Justice Luxmoore—to have presented its report, recommending broadly the transfer of responsibility for all agricultural

education from the county authorities (whose keenness and financial resources vary widely) to a specially appointed National Council. This takes its place alongside the Barlow, Scott, Uthwatt and Beveridge Reports in the library (impatient critics might say the pigeon-hole) of documents awaiting final Government decisions. The Luxmoore Report has some bearing, too, on the great Bill for comprehensive advance in English education which Mr. R. A. Butler, the President of the Board of Education, is likely to be presenting to Parliament within the next few weeks.

Forward-looking Policies

The pigeon-hole suggestion would be unfair, for in several matters of major importance the Government has been moving decisively forward. Parliament has welcomed the offer of a new constitution to the Colony of Jamaica, involving universal adult suffrage and a very considerable advance towards responsible government. Coinciding with the appearance of the first report on the working of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act which we bravely passed at the height of the 1940 crisis, and also a remarkable progress report from the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, this gave rise to the almost unprecedented event of a two-day House of Commons debate on our West Indian responsibilities. A livelier and more intelligently constructive interest in Colonial problems is becoming evident not only in Parliament but in widening circles outside. Colonel Stanley's speech at Oxford, in which he roundly declared the Government's disbelief in international administration for colonial territories, did nothing but good. But the rejection of that course puts us on our mettle to develop something better.

A second direction in which far-sighted planning for the future is afoot affects the important category of men and women whose education or professional training has been interrupted by war service. A detailed scheme is already in being for financial assistance to such people to cover their training in professional, commercial and industrial concerns when the war is over, as well as at universities and technical colleges. Lord Hankey has accepted the chairmanship of a supervising committee to make sure that the educational arrangements keep in step with the prospects of employment in each field at home and abroad, and special machinery is being created for placing purposes. Alongside all this the Service Departments have undertaken to arrange corresponding facilities for those who are not likely to qualify for early demobilization. Taken as a whole it is the clearest evidence yet available that the Government is carefully planning for the transition back to peace, whenever that may come. Our people will certainly not fight less well through having an assurance that the needs of the future are not being overlooked by those in authority. We are stripping ourselves of the old pride in "muddling through"

Great Britain,
May 1943.

IRELAND

I. THE IRISH LANGUAGE

THE lack of any major controversial issue in the forthcoming general election is likely to lead to the renewal in rather acute form of the recurrent controversy about the teaching of Irish. During the past two months this issue has been debated with vigour in Dail and Senate, and because of one particular incident the public has become acutely conscious of the language problem once again.

It has always been the aim of the more extreme Nationalists to make Ireland a Gaelic-speaking nation. Since Gaelic ceased to be a living language centuries ago except along the Atlantic seaboard their prospects of success inevitably depend upon a high degree of compulsion. More moderate Nationalists, anxious to restore the language but reluctant to apply wholesale coercive educational methods, would be more than content were the country as a whole to become bilingual. The protagonist of an exclusively Irish-speaking nation is the Gaelic League, founded in the last years of the nineteenth century by Dr. Douglas Hyde, now President of Eire. Originally cultural in purpose, the League's activities became more and more political as it became more intimately associated with the Sinn Fein movement. Patrick Pearse, the Leader of the 1916 Easter rising, declared that the Gaelic League had been the most important single influence in modern Irish history. Whatever the truth of that statement it is certain that a tradition has been created which no Government can now ignore. True, the ideal of an Irish-speaking nation is not easily to be realized in practice; and true, too, that the early enthusiasm soon waned as the magnitude of the task became more and more apparent. As a result of 22 years of compulsion, most citizens of Eire know a smattering of Irish to-day, but it is still not a spoken language except in the West. A candid recognition of the difficulties, and an official report on the experience gained, though demanded by the National School Teachers at their recent annual conference, are not forthcoming because no Government is willing to run the risk of being stigmatized as lukewarm on this issue.

The critics of government policy maintain that the present method of teaching compulsory Irish has failed because in trying to go too fast too great a burden has been thrown on schoolchildren. Professor Tierney said in a debate in the Senate on the Irish language on March 19:

"You can get no enthusiasm for Irish until the people are persuaded that there is intelligence behind the method, and you cannot persuade them of that while they see what is happening to their children in the schools. There is no hope for the language if it is to be tied to narrow-minded prejudices and arrogance."

Professor Tierney's view is not the view of the majority, but it is the view of by far the greater number of those who are actively interested in education. Few of these competent observers are prepared to deny, whatever their feelings about the revival of the Irish language, that the standard of education

in the twenty-six counties is low and that one of the reasons for it is the compulsory teaching of other subjects through the medium of Irish, a language which is in many cases the native language neither of the teacher nor of the pupil. To quote Professor Tierney once again:

"We teach nationalism through the English language and algebra through Irish, and we expect the children to associate Irish with nationalism through some quadratic equation."

While criticism of the existing methods of teaching the Irish language has been a commonplace in university and educational circles for many years, the problem has not been in the public eye for some time until attention was focused upon it once more in March by the decision reached by majority vote of the Senate of the National University to appoint a Professor to the Chair of Education who did not claim to be able to lecture through Irish. The detailed background to this controversy is a matter only of local interest, but the passions which it has aroused may well have far-reaching repercussions if only because Mr. De Valera, as Chancellor of the University, is known to have voted with the minority. The champions of the Irish language immediately challenged the decision of the Senate of the National University and denounced an appointment which in their opinion would set back the advance of the Irish language by 50 years. The Gaelic League, in particular, advocated that the State subsidy to the National University should be withheld until the University statutes had made it impossible to appoint anyone to a professorial chair who had not a competent knowledge of the language, and threatened that the National University had "got to toe the line or go". In defence, the spokesmen of the University maintained that it was concerned only to appoint the best possible candidate to the vacant Chair of Education, and if it was agreed to be unfortunate that the candidate selected claimed no knowledge of the Irish language, that did not amount to contempt on the part of the University "for the ideals of the nation and for government policy". Students at University College, Dublin, gave unmistakable evidence of their views, and when challenged defended by physical resistance the academic freedom of the University, which is the real issue at stake.

Mr. De Valera as Chancellor of the National University was intimately concerned with the controversy. There was no doubt from the first where his sympathies lay and in his St. Patrick's Day broadcast, which followed shortly on the appointment, he underlined the fact that the "country's greatest uncompleted national tasks are the restoration of the unity of the national country and restoration of the language". He said little on the former issue in this speech, but he did say a great deal about the necessity for reviving the language. He maintained that a national language was the chief mark of a distinctive nationality. It was no mere symbol and its restoration was an essential condition of the survival of the nation. How far Mr. De Valera could carry the country on this issue is doubtful. Certainly the younger generation, as the undergraduates of University College so clearly indicated, are not prepared to sacrifice the intellectual life of the country to the ideal of reviving the language, and in this they are representative of the four-fifths

of the country to whom the language is not, in fact, a native tongue. But the issue is not so simple as that. The language carries with it associations of the heroic days of Irish nationalism and, while contemporary influences are against Mr. De Valera, historical influences are on his side. It would not be surprising if the revival of the language proves to be the main plank of his electoral platform. It is certainly significant that several County Councils have already withdrawn their financial contributions for scholarships tenable at the National University until "there is a clear definition about all future appointments in relation to the national language".

II. EMPLOYMENT IN EIRE

From the early days of the war the problem of employment has assumed formidable proportions. At the present time the number of unemployed is about 80,000. This is a very substantial figure in a country with a population of 3¾ millions, but it is small indeed in comparison with what it might have been. A large number of young men have been absorbed into the army and into other national work connected with national defence. In addition there is the heavy drain of emigration not only to the United Kingdom but also to Northern Ireland. The Minister of Labour at Stormont told the House of Commons on March 25 that since the beginning of the war 2,300 skilled workers had been brought from Eire by his Department to do work of national importance. On the same day the Minister for Home Affairs stated that the number of men and women from Eire who had applied for residence permits in Northern Ireland amounted to just over 15,000. Added to this total must be the number of young men serving in His Majesty's Forces and working in war factories in Great Britain. Taken together the total could not be less than 120,000 in all, of whom rather more than half are engaged on one form or other of war work. There is no doubt that much of Eire's comparative prosperity is due to this safety valve of emigration, and because this is realized, it is a matter of some anxiety whether the United Kingdom labour market will be able to absorb even a comparatively small proportion of this number when the war is over. The Minister for Agriculture indicated on March 21 that plans for dealing with the situation that would be created by the return of those emigrants would be prepared, and Mr. De Valera, in a speech at the National Planning Conference in Dublin on April 9, emphasized that radical improvement in rural conditions must be the principal aim of the post-war reconstruction programme. He added that a sub-committee of the Cabinet met each week to consider the problems involved, but despite these indications of governmental activity the public remains sceptical.

The facts mentioned above should always be borne in mind whenever the effects of the war on Eire are considered. Had a very large volume of surplus labour been left on the home market the economic and social stability of the country might have been seriously jeopardized. But the existence of this safety valve has meant that the position has not deteriorated to an extent it would otherwise certainly have done. On March 12 the Minister for Supplies struck a reassuring note when he said: "In all essential foodstuffs our position is better than in any European country. It is much better than in the other neutral

countries." Sober evidence of the truth of this statement is given by the recent League of Nations publication entitled *Wartime Rationing*. This shows that Eire is the only one of the four neutral countries in Europe which rations neither bread nor potatoes. It also shows that of the ten principal foods only two are rationed in Eire (sugar and tea), and of these the sugar ration is both liberal and probably seasonal if the hopes of the Minister for Supplies are realized. In view of the fears entertained a year ago this maintenance of supply position gives solid ground for satisfaction for which the Government justifiably takes credit. The revenue and expenditure returns for 1942–43, which show an increase of £2,700,000 and £2,400,000 respectively, suggest that the financial as well as supply situation has entered upon a period of comparative stability likely to endure till the end of the war. The supply estimates for the coming year, whose most notable feature is a not inconsiderable decline in the allocation for the army, reinforce this impression. The Minister for Finance, Mr. O'Kelly, stated in the Dail that £11,000,000 of the £44,000,000 estimated national expenditure would be devoted to "emergency" services. Even the Cosgrave Opposition, though continuing their denunciations of governmental extravagance, have little hope that any substantial reduction can be effected while the war lasts.

This comparative economic and financial stability is of course the product of an economic situation resulting directly from our political isolation. There are not wanting indications that this isolation will have consequences in the post-war world which will not be altogether welcome. On March 25 Mr. De Valera indicated that Eire had not taken part in the discussions on post-war financial questions which have taken place between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India. On April 8 Mr. De Valera disclosed that his Government had not received an invitation from the United States Government to the Conference on Food Production to which 38 nations had been invited. These are only straws in the wind, but they may help to dispel some illusions. Neutrality is a policy which may have short-term benefits, but judgment on it even on a purely material plane cannot be pronounced till its long-term consequences have become apparent.

Eire,
May 1943.

CANADA

WHAT IS HER FUTURE TO BE?

THERE can now be no doubt that either before or immediately after the end of the war the people of Canada and their Government will have to face very important decisions about the rôle which their country will play in the post-war world and the policies required to make it worthy of their traditions and record and to promote their security and prosperity. There is already in progress some exploration of the issues and problems involved through such agencies as a series of broadcast debates upon post-war reconstruction, which the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has organized, and editorial utterances in the press. But much remains to be done before the Canadian public secures the enlightenment required for an intelligent decision. National unanimity cannot be expected, and there may well be raised sharp issues which will provide material for bitter controversial debate in a general election.

The war has supplied an expensive education in international realities. Even if the Canadian people cherished no aspirations to assist in the building of a better world, their own fundamental national interests would seem to forbid a policy of isolation and impel close co-operation in the spheres of political action and defence with Britain and the United States. The Atlantic Ocean, on which Canada has a long seaboard, may divide but it also unites and has done so from the first beginnings of colonial settlement in North America. The changes in the political ties which linked this continent to Europe deeply affected, but did not destroy, the wide and intricate network of relationships, economic and cultural, which made the Atlantic world; and the whole history of North America has been permeated with contradictory elements of separation from and association with Europe. It was under an Atlantic order, whose main buttress was the might of the British Navy, that the North American nations were enabled to grow to full maturity.

Control of the Atlantic

Professor George W. Brown of Toronto University, contributing the Canadian point of view to a discussion in Chicago on the subject of "The History of the Americas", has pointed out that the fundamental identity of British and American interests in maintaining control of the Atlantic, while often obscured by superficial differences, has never been far below the surface, and that it was an intuitive sense of this basic identity of interests —the necessity of helping Britain to maintain control of the Atlantic— that brought the United States into the war of 1914-18. The failure to recognize the implications of this situation was one of the tragedies of the decades between the wars, and now the peoples of the Atlantic nations are being taught a fresh lesson about the fundamental identity of their interests.

For the first time since 1823 North America is directly faced with the threat that a hostile system might be extended to the western hemisphere; and to that threat the answers are the Atlantic Charter and the Battle of the Atlantic, in which the British, American and Canadian navies are fighting on the same side.

But the Atlantic world of the nineteenth century has vanished, because Britain by herself can no longer provide the naval power necessary to sustain it; and there must be built a new order in whose construction both the North American democracies ought to have a guiding hand. They have a common historical background of responsibility for the order now disappeared for ever, and they cannot shirk the duty of co-operating with other nations for the translation of the essential principles of the Atlantic order into a new world order. It is in forging links of harmonious co-operation between the United States and the British Commonwealth for the support of the new order that Canada can play her most useful rôle. In the past extravagant emphasis has been placed upon her mission as an interpreter between Britain and the United States; it would be more accurate to say that she had been always a conditioning element in their mutual relations. To-day she is in a strong position to exercise her influence for the harmonizing of British and American policies; but it cannot be exercised effectively if she elects to plough an isolationist furrow in the international field.

Canada's Own Interests

Even if this were not apparent, the material interests of Canada seem to dictate the need for the abandonment of isolationism and for active co-operation in the reorganization of the world's political and economic structure. A few years ago a group of American economic experts, who after an investigation of Canadian conditions on behalf of the magazine *Fortune* published their conclusions in its pages, described Canada as

"a land of difficult geography, rather severe extremes of climate, endowed with natural resources, vast in quantity, rich in quality but limited in variety, with a relatively small population settled in half a dozen separate areas, each with its own distinct economic interest and outlook"

and delivered the verdict that she had "one of the most precarious economies in the world". Moreover the comparative thinness of Canada's population and the distribution of her natural resources contribute to the precariousness of her economy by making its prosperity enormously dependent upon her export trade. It may be a matter of pride that in some pre-war years Canada ranked first among the nations of the world as an exporter of newsprint, nickel and asbestos, second as an exporter of wheat, third in regard to exports of flour, and fourth in respect to exports of woodpulp and motor vehicles; but the very fact that in the average year one-third of the country's total production is planned for exportation also carries perilous implications. If the demand for Canada's exportable surplus of foodstuffs and raw materials is strong and there is, as a concomitant, a satisfactory price available for them, then she is assured of reasonable prosperity. But let acute economic depression, bringing a curtailment of purchasing power, prevail

in the countries which furnish the best outlets for her products and economic strains, and difficulties soon begin to emerge in Canada. For example in the boom year, 1929, the total value of Canada's export trade was roughly $1,115 million, but by 1932, the worst year of the slump, its value had shrunk to $535 million; and this loss of $580 million worth of purchasing power for the producers of Canada was the largest single factor in aggravating the depression which had begun in 1929, and raising unemployment to its highest level for many years.

So her dependence for prosperity upon the success of her export trade, which in turn depends upon the prosperity of other countries, ought to make Canada vitally interested in the establishment of a new régime for the whole world which will provide a reasonable guarantee of permanent peace and lay the foundations for a speedy revival of international prosperity. Her people would therefore be consulting their own interests if they insisted that their Government should take an active part in supporting policies, even if they involve certain sacrifices, which will produce a stable international system; and they would be taking grave risks with their own prosperity if they encouraged abstention from any effort to exercise Canadian influence in the shaping of a new order for the world. If Canada declined to accept any responsibilities in connection with it, she could hardly expect to be a beneficiary of the economic arrangements devised by the co-operating nations for the stimulation of their common prosperity.

Before the war the feebleness of Canadian foreign policy was in a large measure due to the fact that Canada is a highly synthetic nation, whose unity of outlook is impaired by sectional cleavages. A positive foreign policy, which would have pleased one sectional group, would have antagonized another and, as no section was strong enough to impose its will upon the Federal Government, all the sectional elements became more or less reconciled to a policy of silent passivity in the international sphere. Unfortunately these sectional cleavages still persist, with one of the worst of them intensified by the developments of the war; and they will provide the most serious obstacle to the formulation of a coherent policy for Canada in her international relations.

A "Symposium" of Regional Opinion

Some light upon the trends of public opinion about this paramount problem in the different sections of Canada was recently thrown through a "symposium" conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association of the United States. Taking cognizance of the existence of five sectional groupings in Canada, it invited a prominent journalist from each of them to offer an appraisement of public sentiment in his own region about the part which Canada should play in the reorganization of the world; and the results revealed the usual divergencies of outlook.

The spokesman of the Maritime Provinces claimed that their inhabitants were probably readier than any other set of their Canadian brethren to undertake economic commitments and collaborate in the demolition of tariff barriers; but that they were still reluctant to face the stern realities of the

political, social and economic changes which the drastic process of reconstruction needed by the world implied. The representative of the Prairie Provinces depicted their citizens as anxious above all things to find outlets for their huge accumulated surplus of wheat and to make certain sacrifices for this end; but he doubted whether there was among them any general disposition to accept the implications of long-range schemes of political security. British Columbia, on the other hand, was represented as ready to sanction a very generous contribution to international collaboration and as requiring very little conversion to the desirability of far-reaching schemes of economic and social reconstruction for the world. The account given of the people of Ontario, which contains one-third of the total population of Canada, was that the most important influence upon their outlook about international problems would be the leadership of Britain—not so much of the British Government as of the obvious desires of the British people—and the view was advanced that, while American opinion established an atmosphere in Canada, British opinion, when solid and vigorous, supplied an impulse. But the spokesman for French-Canada reported that the present undercurrents of French-Canadian opinion ran against any suggestion of new and bold concepts in the settlement of the problems of the world. He also explained that French-speaking Canadians would be disinclined to favour after the war any tightening of the bonds with Britain, especially if the process of tightening implied a permanent assumption of responsibilities on the basis of a common international policy for the whole Commonwealth. He admitted, however, that there were paradoxical features in the attitude of the French-Canadians because, while their unreasoning suspicion of and coldness towards Britain was in strong contrast to the sentiments of uncritical friendliness and confidence manifested towards the United States, they clung at the same time intuitively to the fabric of the Commonwealth as the most secure safeguard of their ethnic and spiritual aspirations.

If these diagnoses of regional sentiments are accurate, the difficulties confronting a positive and progressive international policy for Canada are apparent. It will be exceedingly difficult to wean a large body of the French-Canadian element away from their ingrained conviction that, if they want to preserve, as they do passionately desire, their special racial culture and traditions, they must keep Canada as far as possible immunized from dangerous influences by avoiding close relations with other countries. The primary concern of the extremists of Quebec, now organized in a new party called *Le Bloc Populaire*, is to preserve and enlarge their racial enclave on the banks of the St. Lawrence. They are afraid that, if Canada were pledged to wholehearted co-operation in a comprehensive programme of international reconstruction, the influence of the French-Canadian race would be quite helpless against a redistribution of the population of the world which would send a large annual stream of immigrants flowing into Canada and nullify the proportionate strength of the French-Canadians. On the other hand there are others—in the prairie country, for example—who would regard even a merger of Canada with the United States as a preferable alternative to the continuance of French-Canadian domination over her destinies.

Canada is a repository for British traditions and ideals upon the North American continent, and it is not unnatural that the question should be asked whether the experiment is worth continuing, if non-British elements, who care nothing for British traditions and ideals, are to control its destinies. Meanwhile there is a prospect that any attempt on the part of French-Canadians to veto Canadian support for bold and progressive plans of international reorganization would have the effect of stimulating enthusiasm for them in the English-speaking Provinces, because the majority of the inhabitants of the latter are deeply exasperated by French-Canada's opposition to conscription for overseas service, and its imperfect sympathy in other directions with the national war effort, and would be disposed to see merits in any policies of which the French-Canadians disapproved.

Government and Post-War Policy

It is unfortunate that so few members of either the House of Commons or the Senate are equipped with an informed knowledge of international problems, and, until this situation is remedied, the present disinclination of Canadian politicians to initiate or even participate in public discussions on foreign policy will continue to allow them no adequate attention in Parliament. The House of Commons has now been in session for more than two months, but there has so far been no serious debate upon Canada's position in the international field, and such references as have been made to it have been spasmodic and unsatisfying. So the policy of the Ministry remains wrapped in an obscurity which, according to the Washington correspondent of the *Toronto Telegram*, even created difficulties in Mr. Eden's recent discussions at Washington. This correspondent reported that it was a favourite jest among American politicians that Canada was on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays a partner member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays a satellite ally of the United States, and on Sundays an independent sovereign State, untrammelled by any ties or obligations.

This caustic description of Canada's attitude impelled Mr. Graydon, the acting Leader of the Opposition, to draw the Prime Minister's attention to what he characterized as a serious allegation, and to solicit from him a statement which would elucidate the policy of the Government and remove all misunderstandings about Canada's position. Mr. King preferred to describe the contents of the despatch as mischievous conjectures, and deprecated them as tending to convey an erroneous impression that divisions, which did not exist, were impairing the harmony of the mutual relations of Canada, the rest of the Commonwealth, the United States and the other United Nations. Then he proceeded to parry the demand for an exposition of Canada's foreign policy by the assertion that, as far as his Government was concerned, there had been no departure from the position outlined in a statement which he had made to the House of Commons on May 24, 1938, and he quoted verbatim the following passage:

"Our foreign and external policy is a policy of peace and friendliness, a policy of trying to look after our own interests and to understand the position of other

Governments with which we have dealings. It is a policy which takes account of our political connections and traditions, our geographical position, the limited numbers and the racial composition of our people, our stage in economic development, our own internal preoccupations and necessities—in short a policy based on the Canadian situation. It is not and cannot be under these circumstances a spectacular headline policy; it is simply the sum of countless daily dealings with other countries, the general resultant of an effort to act decently on every issue or incident that arises, and a hope of receiving the same treatment from others."

Nor did he make any modification or amplification of it beyond saying that his Government intended, "wherever and as often as opportunity offered, to do its utmost to make difficult situations less difficult and to further as far as it can what is likely to prove most in the common interest". Incidentally he put upon Hansard the full text of the famous Balfour declaration of 1926 as reported in the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of that year under the heading "Status of Great Britain and the Dominions". In the closing paragraphs of his speech he admitted the need for adapting from time to time to the ever-changing circumstances of the world the machinery which exists for conducting the mutual relations of the members of the Commonwealth, and he proclaimed the determination of his Ministry to stand in its relations with other parts of the Commonwealth and foreign countries on the ground "of a status of our own, equal to that of each and all of the self-governing communities—the Dominions and the United Kingdom included".

This pronouncement did not satisfy the *Toronto Globe and Mail* and other Opposition newspapers, and a few days later Mr. John Diefenbaker, one of the ablest of the younger Conservatives, urged that Parliament should be allowed to debate international affairs and their implications for Canada before Mr. Eden fulfilled his engagement to address a joint session of both Houses of the Canadian Parliament on April 2, and that it should commit itself to a declaration of Canada's policy in regard to the new international structure, which must be evolved to assure permanent peace for the world. "I believe", he said, "that, when the war is over, the United Kingdom should not be permitted any longer to assume the entire defence of the Empire, if armaments must be maintained. Canada after the war will have great importance as a reservoir of food for many nations. With an enhanced position go increased responsibilities. Canada's Parliament should declare now that Canada supports the declarations of Empire statesmen that the Axis nations shall be prevented from ever again plunging the world into war; that Canada supports the other United Nations in assuring punishment to the Axis criminals; more than that, because words without actions will mean little, that Canada will contribute her share to the measures necessary to achieve those aims, namely the establishment of a world court and an international police force. I repeat that Canada today, by reason of her contribution in this war, has achieved an importance which makes it necessary for her to express her viewpoint among the United Nations."

Mr. Diefenbaker argued that, apart from other factors, developments in aviation had now placed Canada in the geopolitical centre of the world and made the policy of benevolent isolation, which had been pursued before the war, no longer practicable. He also expressed his belief that Canada could by her example give valuable leadership for the settlement of the paramount question whether the nations of the world will revert to the anarchy of separate political nationalisms or join in creating a new and better League of Nations or make a voluntary surrender of a portion of their sovereignty to a world federation.

Progressive Conservative Views

Mr. Diefenbaker spoke only for himself, but there is good ground for believing that his sentiments expressed the views of the great majority of the Progressive Conservative party. Its new leader, Mr. Bracken, who has not yet obtained a seat in the House of Commons, has so far been dealing mainly with domestic issues in his public utterances; but in a speech which he delivered at Ottawa, on March 14, he declared that the Canadian people must not shirk the assumption of responsibilities beyond their own bounds in the post-war world and must be ready to contribute to the maintenance of an international police which will safeguard peace and to pay the price required for successful international co-operation in trade. Such pronouncements can fairly be interpreted as signs that the Progressive Conservative party will range itself behind a positive foreign policy, whose aim will be to enable Canada to exercise an influence, commensurate with her contribution to the winning of the war, upon the measures devised for the reorganization of the world's political and economic structure.

The Co-operative Commonwealth party, in conformity with its socialist programme, has always taken pride in its internationalist outlook and in its hostility to Imperialism in any shape or form. One wing of the party has been rigidly isolationist; but its leader, Mr. M. J. Coldwell, does not endorse its views and in a speech delivered on March 2 in the debate on the Address he pleaded strongly for the formation of an executive council of the United Nations, arguing that its creation was essential for the achievement of greater unification and closer co-operation in the formulation of a more effective war strategy, for a clearer understanding of war aims, and for a more regular exchange of views regarding the post-war world for which the democratic peoples are fighting. He urged that such a council should be concerned also with evolving an international instrument capable of dispensing justice and enforcing law and order in the post-war world. Under Mr. Coldwell's leadership the C.C.F. party, whose strength has been growing steadily, will certainly oppose isolationism; and it contains influential members who, noting that Socialist Ministries are in power in Australia and New Zealand and that the prospects of a Labour Ministry in Britain after the next election are not negligible, see great possibilities for the furtherance of the C.C.F. programme in linking Canada as closely as possible to countries where the Socialist creed has won widespread acceptance.

Mr. Blackmore, the leader of the Social Credit group, has revealed himself this session as a vehement opponent of internationalism, chiefly on the ground that any supernational Government would inevitably be controlled by a group of sinister international financiers, bent upon preserving an obsolete financial system, and compassing the general enslavement of

mankind. He even went so far as to declare that anybody who advocated a supernational Government deserved to be arrested for high treason to Canada and the British Commonwealth.

Meanwhile the revelations about the complications which have arisen at Washington have brought into high relief the urgent need for giving some form to the existing vague organization of the United Nations, if disputes about the methods of international co-operation are to be avoided and satisfactory progress made towards agreement about the solution of international problems. The *Winnipeg Free Press*, commenting upon a disclosure made in the *New York Times* that relief during and after the war was being planned at Washington without the inclusion of Canada as a full partner, declared that such a situation promised possibilities of grave misunderstandings. It demanded that the King Ministry without any delay assert the right of Canada, based upon her relationship to the war and her contribution to the common cause, to be treated as a principal in all matters affecting her interests or involving the disposition of Canadian lives or materials. Mr. King in his recent statement to Parliament had referred to a "difficult situation which might become more difficult"; and upon this the *Free Press* offered the opinion that a vigorous affirmation of Canada's rights would not tend to make a difficult position more difficult, but would have an exactly contrary effect. So the King Ministry may soon be forced to clarify Canada's position and reveal whether it proposes that in the negotiations for international co-operation during and after the war Canada shall play a lone hand or work in co-operative partnership with the other British nations. If these nations enter a peace conference without having reached some concordat about their policies in regard to the paramount problems awaiting solution, they may find themselves impotent to prevent the United States and Russia, in whose delegations there will be no divisions of opinion, from dictating the basic terms of the peace settlement. But the British peoples have a tradition of liberalism and a sympathy with the rights of small nations, not always perceptible in the policies of the United States and Russia. If British influence could be powerfully asserted at the peace conference, the interests of the minor nations could be assured of sympathetic consideration. Obviously it cannot be exerted with its full power unless the whole Commonwealth is united behind a common policy.

Canada,
April 1943.

AUSTRALIA

A DOMESTIC CHRONICLE

THE article for the June number of THE ROUND TABLE leaves us greatly cheered by the strength and persistence of the Russian effort right through the winter, and increasingly hopeful at the turn of the fighting in North Africa. On the Pacific Front the immediate threat to Australia has lessened, with some unfortunate domestic consequences. Responsible opinion, however, is concerned even more seriously than before with the strength that Japan is continuing to build up in the Western Pacific. Within the strategy of "Beat Hitler first" there is room for considering the Japanese menace. It would be a poor result to advance the defeat of Hitler by a month at the cost of lengthening the war in the Pacific by a year. That is the fear which prompts the Government's urgent requests for more planes. This is a chronicle, however, of domestic happenings. These in the last month or two have been influenced strongly by political considerations. Some knowledge of the political situation is necessary to an understanding of the ensuing story of finance, prices, man-power and reconstruction.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

A GENERAL election must be held some time this year. Its postponement is not possible without a referendum. Moreover there is a political as well as a legal necessity. The election of 1940, after a year of war, returned the opposing parties in almost equal strength. By a refinement of indetermination, the same electorate swung towards Labour for the House of Representatives and against Labour for the Senate. We have carried on ever since under most unhappy conditions for a democracy at war—with no clear majority for either party. Since August 1941 Labour has governed with the aid of two precarious Independents in an evenly divided House, and with a minority of two in the Senate. A political party with convictions must believe that the salvation of the country depends on its return to office. Hence, when the inescapable election draws near, this major consideration tends to dominate proceedings. The merits of any particular measure in the legislation or the administration may be less considered than its effect on public opinion. It may well be that the verdict of the country will go to the party which best subordinates to the winning of the war its very proper belief in its own merits. The position of the Senate makes further complications. A Senate hostile to the Government generally keeps its hostility within moderate bounds because it is exposed to the risk of a double dissolution, on which all Senators (not only half of them, as usual) would have to go to the electors. After a certain date in the life of a Parliament this risk is removed under the Constitution. From this date in February a new spirit informed the Senate's activities. It has got a lot of its own back and has been making the most of its opportunities—sometimes with small regard to the electoral interests of its friends in the House of Representatives.

Moreover within the parties there are very marked cleavages. In the Opposition there is unconcealed rivalry for the leadership, and each section is playing for position. Recently a "cave" has been formed among Opposition members to promote a policy of more aggressive tactics in Opposition. This led to a public exchange of recriminations between its members (who include Mr. Menzies) and Mr. Hughes, the official leader of the United Australia section of the Opposition. As might be expected, Mr. Hughes, thus hampered by no reticences, retained the leadership on a party vote. Within the Ministerial party differences are fundamentally still more acute, but have not come to a head. Members, even Ministers, have publicly disagreed with the Government's policy, sometimes in violent terms. The differences, however, have mostly been confined to words and the Prime Minister has succeeded beyond expectations in maintaining his authority over his wayward flock. With all this political manœuvring the parliamentary sessions which have just concluded make a sorry chapter in political history. Parliament will reassemble in June with no better prospects. One can only hope, though without assurance, that the purge of a general election will leave one party indisputably in power.

Finance

The financial year, which will end in June, provided a September budget when war expenditure was tentatively estimated at £440 million. As reported in the December number of The Round Table,* the Treasurer's proposals postulated a response to the war loans a good deal greater than seemed at all probable. The Government was hampered in its programme of taxation by the uniform taxation measures described in our December article. In order to get these measures through in face of the instinctive opposition of the States, and some real inequities between the different States, the rates of tax for the overwhelming majority of taxpayers were somewhat reduced. The Government, however, tied its own hands. The object of uniform taxation was to give greater scope for increased taxation, but it was morally impossible to propose an immediate increase. The Prime Minister in fact found it necessary to give an assurance that taxation on 1941–42 income would not be increased. This left rather unsatisfactory financial prospects and the growth of war expenditure made them worse. War production generally increased faster than seemed likely, and more provision was found necessary for oversea expenditure. The net result was that the war would require at least £540 million instead of £440 million for the year ending in June.

The assurances of no increased taxation had to give way to necessities, although some attempt was made to adhere formally to the assurances that had been given. In February the financial position was laid before Parliament with proposals to increase individual income tax from £92 million to £132 million for a full year. The new rates would apply to incomes for 1942–43; but instalments on wages and salaries, instead of beginning next August, would be collected from April 1, and continue in future through the whole year. The proposed increase fell mostly on the lower incomes, which had

* No. 129, p. 88.

hitherto escaped lightly, though high incomes had been severely taxed. Exemption was lowered from £156 to £104. Taxation on income under £400 was nearly doubled, from £400 to £1,000 it was increased 50 per cent. On incomes over £1,500 the increase was only 8 per cent. Incomes under £1,000 will in future pay 63 per cent of the total tax instead of 51 per cent. The outright taxation on incomes in Australia will, for low and middle incomes alike, be about equivalent to the British scale, which includes post-war credits. Above £1,500 the Australian taxation is heavier. It is to be noted that the Government resisted the temptation under political pressure to seek additional revenue by increasing the already over-heavy rates of company taxation. This was a medicine very difficult for a Labour Government to prescribe. To sweeten the pill it was coupled to a provision that one-quarter of individual income tax collections up to a limit of £30 million a year would be credited to a social welfare fund, which would finance unemployment and sickness benefits, and the health service. Not much of this could operate until after the war, but the expenditure of the fund might be £5,000,000 to £10,000,000 in 1943–44. The remainder would be used for the war. The proposal might be described as post-war credits for the community instead of for the individual.

These proposals for taxation were in general accord with the policy of the Opposition. The failure to tax lower incomes had been a standing complaint against the Government. Even the provision for social welfare was similar in kind, though less in amount, than the provision of child allowances made by the Fadden Government. The reception of the proposals was acutely hostile. Two amendments aimed at reducing the revenue to be obtained were forced on the Government by the Senate. On the other hand some of the Government's own supporters were bitterly hostile to the taxation proposals and were very willing to see them sabotaged. It was by a very narrow margin that the Government escaped both Scylla and Charybdis and brought its craft practically undamaged safe into harbour.

It is at least a possible view that taxation has now been pushed far enough from an economic standpoint. The taxation of individual incomes, except those above £1,500, as already noted, is above the British level which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said could not be usefully increased. The fact is that we need to raise £400 million in the present financial year, and even an optimistic forecast cannot give more than £250 million without help, directly or indirectly, from the banks. That means that we still have in the year something like £150 million of excess spending power in the community seeking an outlet. To that must be added substantial unspent balances carried forward from last year. The Government's policy is to deal with this excess by direct controls on spending so as to prevent it being used. That, of course, is the policy of all belligerent countries, but it will be a relatively bigger job and a harder job here than in Great Britain.

Control of Spending

The excess of spending power, after taxes and loan contributions, direct and indirect, have been paid, will be this year about 25 per cent greater than the

value of the goods and services available at current prices. With so much excess income, the control of prices becomes very difficult. Increased demand has already expressed itself in higher prices for goods which are difficult to control. Fruit and vegetables in particular have been short owing to the needs of the services and a bad season, and prices have soared. Farmers in general are taking the opportunity to press their claims, both reasonable and unreasonable. Altogether there is a danger that price control may break down. The full index of retail prices has risen by about 22 per cent since 1939. The total increase is not out of line with other countries, but the increase last year contrasts unfavourably with the relative stability in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. This relative stability is partly due to subsidies, and subsidies play a large part in the new price policy just announced by the Treasurer. The aim is an almost universal ceiling for retail prices, supported when necessary by subsidies. Prices are not to exceed those prevailing on April 12. The success of this policy will depend on the stability of wages, which were pegged a year ago, subject to adjustment to the cost of living and to the correction of anomalies. Apart from these adjustments, the pegging of wages has not been thoroughly effective. It is notorious that bidding up for scarce labour still goes on, but no one knows how serious the total is. A price ceiling will certainly discourage the practice.

There are, however, two increases in wages threatening which will raise awkward problems for the price ceiling. One is farm wages, which will have to be brought nearer to city levels. The other is women's wages. When women have undertaken work normally confined to men, rates have been fixed after probation at 90 per cent of men's wages, whereas women's rates are in general about 60 per cent of men's rates. A good many women on the 60 per cent rate are doing work as skilled and as difficult as those on the 90 per cent rate, and their claim to the higher rate is being admitted. It is difficult to draw the line anywhere and we may end in equal pay between the sexes—with far-reaching effects on costs and prices on the one hand and social conditions on the other.

Man-power—The Militia Controversy

The strain on man-power has become severe. The total number of men employed, including the armed forces, is still increasing slowly; but this must come from extensions of the working age upward and downward, and from the employment of people who were previously working on their own account. The increase of the number of women in employment has been greater, and there must still be appreciable reserves. The call up of women in age groups has now, rather belatedly, begun. The total increase over the last six months, however, has been less than half of our requirements, as stated by the Prime Minister. In consequence, the transfer to essential industry and to the armed forces must be pushed further. Country districts have already been denuded too severely, and the return of some to the farms is necessary to maintain maximum production. From remaining sources, chiefly retail business and some of the less essential manufactures, it does not

seem possible to get the numbers required for the war programme and the swollen requirements of reciprocal lend-lease.

Apart from the total of our forces there was the question as to where they could be used. The A.I.F., the Navy and the Air Force were voluntarily enlisted and could be sent to fight in any theatre of war. The Militia was restricted to Australia and its territories, which included that part of New Guinea where fighting is going on. This limitation looked likely to be embarrassing, but "no compulsion" for fighting overseas was the principle to which the Labour members were pledged. Mr. Curtin sought and obtained from the inter-State Labour Conference a modification of this principle, which would allow the use of the Militia in the South-West Pacific area. The appropriate legislation, introduced to give this enlarged sphere for the Militia, was eventually carried, not without storm and stress. Time was required for these negotiations, and it seemed to many people a shameful thing to haggle over degrees of longitude. There was a burst of indignation in press and Parliament. It was an added bitterness that the "haggling"—which took place not only in the Parliamentary Labour party but in the Labour Conference—was given much publicity. It was only the restraint exercised by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Fadden, that prevented a deplorable crisis on the question.

The feelings of shame and anger at the Government's procedure were natural enough, but there is much feeling also on the other side. There has been a strong Australian sentiment in favour of voluntary service for fighting overseas, a sentiment which had become solidified—perhaps petrified—in the party principles as a result of the controversies over the last war. The fact, however, was that we had—at great strain—just managed to retain voluntary enlistment in the last war and had made a decent showing in fighting overseas. That was at a time when we could safely send all our forces to any corner of the world, which is clearly impossible in this war. For over a year the battle has been on our frontiers and must continue to be for an indefinite time ahead. Nearly all our fighting forces must be held in the South-West Pacific area, to which by general strategy they have been assigned. The number of our forces available for service anywhere in the world is given officially as "over 350,000"—it is obvious we could never want to use more than a small fraction of this number outside the South-West Pacific area in the present persistent phase of the Pacific war. Even when Japan is in the end thrown back on the defensive, the number available will probably be more than ample for all purposes; but the question can be left to be settled when the time comes. Meanwhile it would have been poor policy to stir up old bitter controversies for the sake of a noble gesture.

Reconstruction—Commonwealth Powers

General interest in post-war policy is increasing. The Prime Minister has publicly committed the Government to willing international collaboration to increase living standards, and to maintain a high level of employment as a necessary foundation for the revival of international trade. In domestic affairs a new Department of Reconstruction has been set up

under the Treasurer, Mr. Chifley, and association with Mr. Chifley means business. The activities of the Department are, however, somewhat hampered by the uncertainty as to its post-war powers.

No progress has been made with the task of dealing with the Constitution so as to provide sufficient national authority for the post-war reconstruction period.* Indeed the problem is in some ways further from solution than it was at the end of 1942. The attempt to solve it by the method of "reference" from the States—a method always beset with difficulties—is still technically in progress, but offers little hope of success. The Commonwealth Powers Bill which emerged, hopefully enough, from the unanimous Constitutional Convention last December, soon became bogged down in the State Parliaments in a morass of legal controversies, constitutional doubts, regional jealousies, business fears and political antagonisms. In two States Labour Governments have passed the Bill in an agreed form—New South Wales and Queensland. In South Australia the Liberal party refused to follow the Premier's lead and amended the Bill almost out of recognition. In Western Australia it will only be carried, if at all, with different amendments. In Tasmania, after its rejection by the Upper House, the Bill has been reintroduced with good prospects of passing; but only if the Government will accept substantial amendments. Victoria has passed the Bill, but with an amendment precluding the Governor proclaiming it unless all the other States have passed a substantially similar measure. There has been talk of further conferences with a view to some acceptable compromise, but that would now be impracticable since the Bill contains a provision prohibiting the repeal of an amendment without a State referendum. This was intended as a safeguard, but has become a barrier. The four States that have passed the Bill with or without amendments are now for all practical purposes powerless to alter it.

The ordinary method for altering the Constitution remains a Bill passed through both Federal Houses by absolute majorities and then submitted to a nation-wide referendum. The Government is playing for time and has given no hint of its immediate intentions. The prospects of success by this route are also distinctly cloudy, whether one looks to Parliament or to the country. The present Opposition parties, when themselves in office, sponsored more than one attempt to secure wider commercial and industrial powers for the Commonwealth. In the existing political situation, however, they are not in the least likely to accept any proposals for constitutional change which the Labour party might now put forward with an eye to holding a referendum concurrently with the forthcoming elections. Failing the agreement of the Opposition no proposal could possibly secure the absolute majorities that the Constitution requires. No proposal for constitutional change therefore is likely now to emanate from the present Parliament.

The Government might, of course, introduce proposals that would serve at least as one of the election issues. But in the electorate the people here are passing through a phase of impatience and reaction. Improvements in the military situation have brought us relief from our most immediate perils

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 130, March 1943, p. 176.

and have given us a breathing space which makes us feel and express irritation at the restrictions we must observe and the inconvenience we have to put up with. Any suggestion that the Commonwealth Government will need in the post-war world the wide social and economic powers it is now wielding is apt to provoke at once the common objections to bureaucracy and socialization. The Government is having to submit to a certain amount of public petulance as the cost of frequent failure on the part of its predecessors, as well as of itself, either to explain its novel measures sympathetically or to organize them adequately. In general public opinion is not such as to encourage the Government to put its "post-war powers" in the forefront of its election programme.

Australia,
April 1943.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE INDIAN PROBLEM

THE last stages of what will probably be the last session of this Parliament were marked by one of those outbreaks of controversy on the racial issue which it is South Africa's fate to suffer periodically, whatever Government is in power and whether the country is at war or at peace. This time it was again the Indian question which fanned into flames the embers of racial passions; and this time it precipitated a potentially serious political crisis, coming to a climax in the tendering of his resignation by Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, the Minister of Finance and Second Minister in the Smuts coalition Cabinet.

The Indian problem is one of those South African problems which is apparently insoluble as long as the circumstances and traditions of the country demand that its solution must leave untouched and unthreatened the privileges of the white minority. For nearly a hundred years the Indian problem has been the occasion for violent displays of racial emotion. It has been the reason for more commissions and select committees than any other topic, and mass legislation affecting it includes more than 60 Acts of Parliament and provincial ordinances. Broadly the problem has its origin in the demand of the Natal sugar planters in the middle of the last century for that cheap labour which the warrior Zulu was not prepared to give. Then began the system of indentured labour which lasted from 1860 to 1911 and has left this country with more than 250,000 Indians, over 80 per cent of them born in South Africa. Through the years they have drifted to other provinces, finding a means of livelihood in semi-skilled work, but chiefly as small traders. The South African Republic enacted in 1885 the fundamental discrimination against Indians in the law which prohibits Indian title to land in the Transvaal. The Orange Free State prohibited the entry or residence of Asiatics in any form. In the rest of the Union, Indians enjoyed most of the rights of citizenship, including in some instances the right to vote. But the tide of colour prejudice was set against the Indians, and with the passing of the years further restrictions were placed on them.

A Series of Commissions

PERIODICALLY the Europeans raise the cry of "the Indian menace", and successive Governments have been forced to try to deal with the matter. The lines of attack have been three—by expatriation; by colonization in some other country, the chief requirement of which shall be that it is a long way from South Africa; and by segregation. The influence of the Indian Raj achieved the postponement of the most reactionary proposal yet—the notorious Class Areas Bill of the first Hertzog Government; and the Cape Town Agreement of 1927 opened the way to a solution along the twin paths of expatriation and of raising the standard of living and dignities of those Indians who choose to make this country their home. But expatriation

exhausted itself, and with it the "uplift clause" of the 1927 agreement became of diminishing practical value.

Only a few years later the Government was confronted with another anti-Indian agitation and more restrictive Bills were drafted. This culminated, in 1932, in the appointment of the Feetham Commission, which for five long years laboured to ascertain the facts and law of the Indian position in the gold-mining towns of the Transvaal, and to make proposals which would set at rest the eternally nagging fears of the European. The Feetham Commission recommended the recognition in those areas of a fairly large volume of Indian occupation which, while technically illegal, had been so long condoned as to create a vested interest. But this measure of formal segregation did not allay European anxiety, and the Murray Commission was appointed to investigate the allegations that there were large-scale and systematic evasions of the restriction of ownership in the rest of the Transvaal. Another scare was raised that the Indian trader was penetrating into the white zones of interest to a dangerous extent, and a Bill was rushed through the 1939 Parliament "pegging" the trade position in the Transvaal. A year later—after a change of Government—the Broome Commission was appointed to ascertain whether there was any ground for European fears. This Bill, although only a standstill measure, was a naked act of economic discrimination, giving a Minister the power to have a licence withheld for no other reason than that the applicant is an Indian. Mr. Hofmeyr, who was at the time a private member of the House, objected to this measure on the grounds that there was no evidence that an evil existed, and that in any event the far-reaching local ordinance which governs trading licences was sufficient to cope with any abuse. Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Leslie Blackwell were expelled from the United Party Caucus on this issue, and the Bill became law.

"Pegging" was revived for another two years in 1941 since the Broome Commission had not finished its work; and Mr. Hofmeyr, now a member of the Cabinet, agreed to this step pending the receipt of the Commission's report. The Transvaal agitation of 1939 coincided with an agitation at Durban on a totally different aspect—that by means of the purchase of property Indians were penetrating into exclusively European areas in that town. The Broome Commission also went into the facts in Natal as well, and in the meantime an attempt was made to deal with the matter in a non-statutory way by a Joint European-Indian Committee. When the Commission reported in 1941 it was to state quite unequivocally that the penetration was most acute in Durban but not serious in the rest of Natal, and was neither alarming nor surprising in the Transvaal. Nevertheless, some time after the Commission reported, the Durban City Council withdrew from the Committee which had been trying to handle the Durban situation by way of agreement, alleging that since the Broome Commission had reported large-scale purchases of European property had been taking place. To meet this new allegation, the Broome Commission was reappointed and found that in 1942 two and a half times more property had been bought by Indians in Durban than in any other year, and that there was evidence of a substantial measure of penetration of the type feared by Europeans.

The Second Broome Report

The position when the second Broome Commission reported in the second week of April this year was thus that a serious land problem had arisen in Durban, but that the Transvaal trade situation was unchanged. But it so happened that the Transvaal interim Act lapses in May this year, and it was not politically possible for the Government to deal with Natal while allowing the Transvaal to revert to the position existing before 1939. Accordingly the Bill which caused the trouble this session pegs both the Transvaal trading and the Natal land transactions for three years. The clauses relating to Durban are made more palatable by the fact that no formal discrimination is made against Indians, since Europeans are equally prohibited from buying land in predominantly Indian areas; that the new restriction is limited to Durban; and that yet another Commission will be appointed, this time to investigate the counter-allegations (which are supported incidentally by the second Broome Commission) that Indian penetration in Durban was not so much the fault of Indians as the lack in Durban of decent living and other facilities for Asiatics. With these qualifications Mr. Hofmeyr agreed to accept the Bill in so far as it relates to Durban, but he was adamant about the Transvaal. There the discrimination is naked and unashamed and, far from being justified by the facts, a Commission had found that the facts do not justify any such drastic legislative action.

There the matter rests. Supporters of the Bill take up the realistic point of view that no material harm is done to anyone by three years' prolongation of the Transvaal situation, and maintain that the interim legislation has in fact held the situation and assisted towards better relations between the two communities. And in the three years perhaps a happy solution of the whole problem will be found, which will satisfy Europeans and do no injury to Indians. The people who are mainly worried are, of course, the Indians. Segregation of an Indian trader is economic strangulation; a trader cannot operate if he is insulated from his customers. This is why, in the powerful representations which have been made by the Indian Raj and by influential Indian leaders, they have urged any solution except one by way of statute, which they fear will be the beginning of permanent, compulsory and crippling economic segregation. But it must be accepted that, in the circumstances of this country to-day, a solution except by way of legislation was a political impossibility.

II. THE IMPENDING GENERAL ELECTION

The Parliamentary crisis on the Indian Bill has not made much change in the general political situation. Mr. Hofmeyr was without support in the Cabinet and almost without support in the House, but of course General Smuts refused to accept his resignation. There are precedents both here and in Britain. The Cabinet is a coalition formed to prosecute the war, so that it can be claimed that little violence has been done to the doctrine of collective responsibility. The Bill was put through Parliament with an enormous majority and, the representatives of the white electorate having found temporary unity, the parties proceeded to return to their normally divergent courses.

By the time that this appears in print the Union will probably be in the throes of a general election. Government supporters are facing the prospect with considerable confidence and it is noticeable that the Opposition is talking less about sweeping the Government out of power than about the need for a strong Opposition. The patent Nazis of the Opposition, the Pirow group, have decided to commit a sort of mass political *harakiri* and to boycott the election as an effete symbol of an outworn democracy. This leaves the Malan party and the Afrikaner party to fight the United-Dominion-Labour party coalition. All the opponents of the Government are pinning their faith to the "Communist Menace", and there will probably be a "Red" edition of the "Black Manifesto" which carried Hertzog to power in 1929. Under the convenient label of a "Red Menace", the Opposition can appeal to all the unpleasant passions which the racial make-up of this country has produced—anti-native, anti-coloured, anti-Jew and anti-British. Nevertheless, while these prejudices are deep and widespread, the issue of the war will probably surmount them all, particularly if there is further evidence that Germany's chances of winning the war are evaporating. But to ensure anything like stability in the immediate post-war years, General Smuts needs more than just to maintain his present position; another 10 seats or so would give the United party an over-all majority in the House, and would build something of a bulwark against the storm which will break when the war has ceased to be a powerful cement binding the Ministerial groups into unity.

III. THE BUDGET

South Africa's war expenditure continues to mount, but her capacity to pay shows no sign of faltering. The revised estimates of tax revenue for 1942–43 show a net increase of over £6,500,000 above the original estimates—an increase which is all the more remarkable since the growing difficulties of import had reduced customs revenue by £2,500,000. The yield from income and super tax, however, has proved to be some £3,000,000 more than the original estimates; and another increase of over £3,000,000 is yielded by excess profits duty. The total tax revenue is not very far short of £95,000,000. If the defence expenditure had kept within Mr. Hofmeyr's estimates, he would have ended the year with a surplus on the revenue account of about £5,000,000.

But, as Mr. Hofmeyr himself points out, in war-time there are no such things as surpluses. For many reasons—more particularly the rapid expansion of home defences which followed on Japan's swift progress towards the Indian Ocean at the beginning of 1942—defence expenditure has been one-fifth higher than last year's estimate, and surpluses have been more than used up. In addition to the sum raised out of revenue, the year 1942–43 has seen a net addition of over £45,500,000 to the public debt. Loans to the total of nearly £80,000,000 have, however, been successfully floated in the Union during the past year. More than £30,000,000 has been applied to the repatriation of external indebtedness, which now totals only about 4 per cent of the National Debt.

Upon the existing basis of taxation the revenue for 1943–44 would not equal the total of the year just ended. Further reduction in the yield from customs is only to be expected. It is reckoned at over £1,300,000. The increased yield from excise on spirits, beer, cigarettes and tobacco is, however, estimated to make up more than half this deficiency. A diminution of nearly £2,000,000 in income tax on gold-mining companies and of all but £800,000 in the yield of the gold mines special contribution indicates increasing difficulties before the gold-mining industry. These would have further repercussions on the yield of super tax, reducing it by over £200,000, while the normal income tax on individuals and excess profits duty would each yield about £450,000 less than in the year just ended. On the other hand the yield from the trade profits special levy is estimated to produce over £1,000,000 more and death duties nearly £250,000 more (in each case because new levies will for the first time be in operation for the full year). The revival of diamond mining would bring in another £280,000 from income tax and special contribution, while a further £200,000 might be expected from the Post Office. Taking everything into consideration, however, at the existing rate of taxation, a net decrease of revenue of close on £3,500,000 might be expected in 1943–44. Mr. Hofmeyr is also sacrificing a further £230,000 by handing over the whole yield of the native tax for the first time to the Native Trust. The total revenues at his disposal would amount to £90,796,000.

Expenditure on defence alone is tentatively estimated at £96,000,000, of which £48,000,000 is to be raised by taxation and £48,000,000 by loans. Other items of expenditure from revenue total £52,540,000. These include the provision for subsidizing local authorities for expenditure on civilian protective services (A.R.P.), and for making a start with the scheme for providing at least one free meal per day for all schoolchildren, irrespective of race and colour. When the latter scheme really gets going, the cost will run into millions, but in the first year the expenditure upon it will hardly be significant. Altogether £9,744,500 has to be raised from new taxation. Even so an amount of not less than £55,000,000 will have to be borrowed.

Meeting a Deficit

In attempting to make good the anticipated deficit, Mr. Hofmeyr has this year eschewed spectacular innovations. Old revenue providers have been stepped up. Increased excise duties on spirits, beer, cigarettes and tobacco will bring in nearly £3,500,000. Increased postal charges and surcharge on telephone accounts are estimated to yield £685,000. The normal income tax on non-mining companies has been raised to 4*s.* in the pound, bringing in more than £1,000,000. Excess profits duty has been raised to 15*s.* in the pound, which is estimated to bring in another £825,000. The gold mines special contribution has been raised another 2½ per cent to 22½ per cent, bringing in some £900,000. Another £130,000 will be found by increasing the rate of income tax upon diamond-mining companies and raising their special contribution. A surcharge of 15 per cent on normal income tax and super tax on individuals will bring in a net £800,000. A portion of the

personal and savings fund levy, which does not vary with income, has also been increased by half, adding £350,000. A 50 per cent increase has also been made in a special tax on foreign shareholders, increasing its yield by close on £500,000, while another £500,000 is expected from the new surcharge of 15 per cent on the fares of railway passengers—a tax which is also expected to relieve the railways of some unwanted passenger traffic.

These taxes are together estimated to produce £9,195,000, leaving a deficit of £549,000. As Mr. Hofmeyr claims, that is not a significant figure in a budget of £100,000,000, especially in view of the regularity with which budget expectations have been exceeded in the past. Yet evidently everything hangs upon the Defence vote. When Mr. Hofmeyr presented his budget on February 24, the Select Committee on Soldiers Pay and Allowances was sitting. It reported at the end of March, with recommendations for increases in pay and allowances, which will probably cost between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000 per annum. These recommendations have been accepted by the Government, and come into effect from the end of June. There is, however, no immediate prospect of this resulting in a further increase in taxation, since savings may well be made in other directions.

South Africa,
April 1943.

NEW ZEALAND

PRODUCTION FOR THE WAR

AN important part of New Zealand's contribution to the war effort of the United Nations consists of exportable farm produce, mainly butter, cheese and meat, to help to feed Britain's industrial population, and wool for its textile factories. The export figures for the past year indicate that, in spite of the diversion of over 150,000 men and many women to the armed forces serving at home and abroad, production has been well maintained. Behind these trade figures is a story yet to be written of loyal service and heroic endeavour on innumerable farms throughout the Dominion, service involving long hours, hard work and few holidays. Sharing in this work are thousands of women, helping to keep the farms going while their fathers, husbands, sons or brothers are engaged in the grimmer tasks of war. For the year which ended in December the value* of exports from New Zealand reached the unprecedented figure of £80·9 million, the main items being butter, cheese and milk products £29·1 million, meat £19·4 million and wool £18·3 million. Expressed in quantities these values represented 264,000 tons of dairy produce, 313,000 tons of meat and 934,000 bales of wool. The aggregate value of goods imported during the year was £53·7 million, the highest figure since the outbreak of war.

In accordance with the terms of the agreements for purchase in bulk between the Governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, payment for almost all exports is made either before or at the time of shipment. As a result of the present arrangements, the net overseas assets of New Zealand's banking system at the end of 1942 were unusually high, and included what might well be regarded as an essential reserve to fill the post-war gap likely to occur if former methods of marketing are resumed. These net overseas assets at the end of December totalled £40·6 million as against £25·8 million and £23·4 million at the end of 1941 and 1940 respectively, and of £8·6 million at the outbreak of war. An additional reason for this accumulation of overseas funds is the low level of imports relative to exports. War exigencies have limited imports to commodities needed for the war effort and the bare maintenance of primary and industrial production. At the termination of the war much leeway will have to be made up in the importation of goods necessary for the restoration of capital equipment, for replenishing stocks and for the provision of essential raw materials for factories and farms in order to avoid serious loss of productive capacity, and to meet post-war needs. Such factors as these, with the uncertainties of post-war markets for primary products, have to be regarded in any useful consideration of what may primarily appear a favourable financial position concerning our net overseas assets.

* Values are in New Zealand currency unless otherwise stated.

CURRENCY AND CREDIT

CURRENCY and credit conditions within the Dominion are partly a reflection of the "favourable" trade balance and partly of the methods adopted to finance the war. During 1942 the total amount of spending power in New Zealand, so far as represented by bank deposits and by notes and coin in active circulation, increased by approximately £26 million. The aggregate demand deposits of the six trading banks increased by £16·9 million, Government deposits in the Reserve Bank by £1·8 million, and notes and coin in active circulation by £7·3 million. As indicated above, there are two main causes for this increase in spending power. One is the increase of £14·8 million in income from exports and other overseas receipts as compared with payments for imports, overseas debt service and other external charges; and the other is the net expansion of £8·9 million of bank credit made up of an increase of £4 million in the Reserve Bank's investments and advances to Government and an increase of £11·4 million in the investment of the trading banks, partly offset by the fall of £6·5 million in their advances and discounts.

The implications of these figures are worth examining. To a limited extent the record figure of £70·9 million of trading-bank demand deposits includes what might be called idle money held by traders awaiting the opportunity to use it for the purchase of imports when available. The fall in the trading-bank advances and discounts is the result of two factors, namely, the depletion of importers' stocks and the reduced demand for bank accommodation from dairy companies, freezing works, farmers and traders. The rise in trading-bank investments in Government securities and in the Reserve Bank's advances to Government to some extent indicates the support given by the banks to the financing of government expenditure. The chief reasons for the expansion of the active note and coin circulation are the increase in the total amount paid in wages and salaries, including the pay of members of the armed forces and their dependants, the greater amount of cash needed to meet higher price-levels, and the usual war-time tendency to hoard currency. Another noteworthy recent cause of currency expansion is the heavy demand for New Zealand notes and coin by the American forces stationed here.

The dangers of monetary inflation implicit in the expansion of spending power relative to the reduced supplies of goods for civilian consumption are realized by the Government and to some extent by the general public. There has been a good response to the various war loans placed on the market. National Savings schemes have been widely adopted and have drawn off much of the surplus spending power, and the total at the credit of depositors in the Post Office Savings Bank has risen from £56·5 million in September 1939 to the record figure of £78·8 million in December 1942, the increase for 1942 being £10·8 million. In December the official index number of retail prices was 13·4 per cent higher than in August 1939, and for wholesale prices the increase was 6·3 per cent. The rise in wholesale prices is mainly due to the increase of 52·1 per cent in the prices of imported items which are, of course, outside the control of the New Zealand authorities,

as against the rise of 13·9 per cent in the prices of locally produced items. For 1942 the increases were 2·6 per cent in retail prices and 7·3 per cent in wholesale prices.

The Growth of Expenditure

The measures adopted by the Government to meet civil and war expenditure have been mainly designed to ensure obtaining the required revenue by non-inflationary methods—taxation and loans from the savings of the people. Civil expenditure under the heading of the Consolidated Fund is met from taxation. Medical services, pensions, sickness and unemployment payments and other benefits, generally known as social security, are provided mainly by direct taxation on wages, salaries and other income, supplemented by subsidy from the taxation receipts of the Consolidated Fund. According to official statements the total war expenditure to the end of 1942, exclusive of imprest account balances of £12·8 million, was £161·8 million; £92·2 million allocated to the Army, £11·8 million to the Navy, £32·8 million to the Air Force, and £25 million to civil expenditure (including various expenditures for defence purposes in New Zealand not yet allocated to the appropriate armed service). The progressive scale of war expenditure is indicated by the fact that, for the first 18 months of the war, total expenditure was £34·3 million; for the next 12 months £52·5 million; and for the 9 months which ended in December 1942, £75·2 million. Of the total war revenue of £174·6 million, £82·5 million, or 47 per cent was provided by taxation, including transfers from the Consolidated Fund. The balance consisted of loans of £83·4 million raised in New Zealand, and £8·8 million sterling in respect of New Zealand's war expenses advanced by the United Kingdom in the terms of the Memorandum of the Security Agreement. Up to December the total amount that had come to charge under the Memorandum was £20·2 million sterling, of which all but £808,000 has been paid. It is, of course, possible that the amount which has come to charge is only a portion of the full cost to be met when overseas accounts are finally made up; but satisfaction is felt that, in addition to providing from our own resources large and increasing war expenditure in New Zealand, the country has met the costs of imports, has promptly paid the charges on the overseas portion of our pre-war national debt, as well as the half yearly instalments of principal and interest involved in repayment of £16 million 3½ per cent 1939-45 sterling loan, and has met the charges under the Memorandum of the Security Agreement. This is in keeping with New Zealand's traditions and practice in the honourable fulfilment of obligations.

Another aspect of New Zealand's war effort, which is likely to have an important bearing on its present and future economic and financial conditions, is that involved in its lease-lend relations with the United States. In common with other members of the British Commonwealth, this country is receiving on a lease-lend basis supplies of war equipment and materials for war industries. According to the report of Mr. E. J. Stettinius, the American Lease-Lend Administrator, early in March the supplies already provided for New Zealand amounted to $139 million. Conversely, our

Government has spent large sums on military camps, hospitals, store depots and other requirements for the accommodation of American forces, and has supplied large quantities of food for the forces here and in the South-West Pacific, including 1½ million dozen eggs, over 2 million pounds of butter, 3 million pounds of sugar and 16 million pounds of beef, mutton and pork, as well as supplies of blankets, clothing and army shoes, and has provided for the expansion of certain types of farm production and of food dehydration and canning industries to meet further needs. Until the accounts are published, the cost of these reciprocal operations is unknown; but our people are glad to work in full and hearty co-operation with our American allies, and are in accord with the statement of Mr. Stettinius:

> "For such aid there is no possible yardstick, either quantitative or financial, just as we cannot measure by feet or dollars the value of the lives sacrificed to defeat the Axis. Yet this pooling of brains and resources may well prove of equal importance to the pooling of weapons in shortening the war."

Organization of Man-power

The maintenance and expansion of primary and industrial production as an integral part of our war effort has made prominent the question of the organization of man-power and its distribution between civilian work and the armed forces. For a small country of under 2 million, New Zealand's record on both production and fighting fronts may fairly be described as creditable. The provision and reinforcement of a New Zealand division in the Middle East, the supply of men for service in various parts of the Pacific, and for the Air Force and Navy at home and abroad, plus the maintenance of adequate forces for full-time home defence have involved the calling up for military service of all single and married men between the ages of 18 and 46, and the registration for essential civilian service of men between 46 and 60 and women in the 18 to 30 age groups. Large numbers of women are voluntarily serving in the defence forces as W.A.A.C.s, W.A.A.F.s and W.R.N.s and in civilian employment where they have enabled the release of men for other war work. Meanwhile the improved position in the Pacific has made it possible to allow youths of 18–19 years to be released from the Army in certain cases to continue their occupational training. The whole question of man-power relative to war commitments and requirements was the chief business of the March session of Parliament. The main points of the discussion were the maintenance by New Zealand of two overseas forces, namely, in the Middle East and the Pacific, the rapid expansion of the Air Force, the capacity of the country to meet at any time an attack from sea or air, and the progressive transfer of men between the Army and primary and secondary industries as circumstances permitted. In winding up the debate the Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, referring to our war commitments, stated that the House had decided that the future of the Middle East division would be determined at the appropriate time, and that the Dominion must assume its fair share of responsibility in the Pacific.

The Maori Contribution

A notable contribution to the war effort of New Zealand is that made voluntarily by the Maoris. Large numbers are serving as volunteers with gallant distinction overseas. The Maori Territorial and Home Guard battalions are taking a useful part in the defence of New Zealand, and the Maoris are active producers in various essential occupations. To stimulate this effort the Maori War Effort Organization was formed about the middle of last year, assisted by a Committee of five members of both Houses of Parliament under the Chairmanship of Mr. P. K. Paikea, who for several years had been a Cabinet Minister representing the Maori race. Tribal and executive committees have been established in various parts of the country, thus utilizing for the war effort traditional Maori associations and leadership. The functions and duties of the organization, apart from rehabilitation, include recruitment for the armed forces, the control and direction of all Maori man and woman power in essential industries in co-operation with the district man-power officers, and increased production. In the course of a recent survey of this work Mr. Paikea said:

"The operations of the Maori War Effort Organization have inevitably opened up latent problems in connection with the present and future welfare of the Maori people. Not only is the future welfare of the race vitally involved in these problems, but the social, economic and industrial life of New Zealand is also directly or indirectly involved, by reason of the large and increasing Maori population. With regard, however, to many outstanding claims and grievances, the Maori people generally speaking have decided to allow these to remain in abeyance till a more propitious time. In any case at present their thoughts are directed to one thing only, that is the war effort."

Elections and Appointments

A by-election necessitated by the death of Mr. H. T. Armstrong has resulted in the return of the Government candidate, Miss M. B. Howard, who secured 4,280 votes, her chief opponents, a Democratic Labour party candidate and a Nationalist candidate, scoring 2,471 and 2,201 votes respectively. When Parliament resumed the Prime Minister moved in the House of Representatives,

"That it is the opinion of this House that, in view of the continued improvement in the war situation, a general election should be held during the present year to enable the people in accordance with their democratic rights to elect their representatives in Parliament."

The unusual procedure of a resolution and debate on the question as to whether a general election should be held arose from the arrangements made in July last for the prolongation of the life of Parliament for the duration of the war and 12 months afterwards, subject to the qualification that the matter should be reviewed each session and that a decision in favour of a general election could be made by a resolution of the House. Since the present Parliament was elected before the outbreak of war, there is much to be said in favour of providing the electors with an opportunity to pass judgment on present legislation, administration and policies, and to clear

the political atmosphere by ensuring that the Government, in personnel and policies, truly represents the will of the people, so far as a parliamentary election can achieve this. The Prime Minister's resolution was carried with only one dissentient, Sir Apirana Ngata, whose opposition was based on fears that the holding of an election might engender feelings of complacency regarding the war situation and impair the national unity. To ensure that those fighting for their country are not deprived of their franchise in the forthcoming election, arrangements are being made that, irrespective of age, all New Zealand service men on active service overseas will be afforded an opportunity to vote.

During the past four months there have been two changes in the New Zealand Cabinet, Mr. J. O'Brien, one of the old stalwarts of the Labour party with many years of parliamentary experience taking the place of the late Mr. H. T. Armstrong, and Major C. F. Skinner replacing Mr. F. Langstone, who resigned his Ministerial portfolios together with the position of High Commissioner in Canada. The appointment of Major Skinner is notable in that he is at present on active service with the New Zealand division in the Middle East, having enlisted as a private and risen to the rank of major. He won the Military Cross during the fighting in Libya last October. Though a Member of Parliament only since 1938, he was unanimously selected for Ministerial rank by the Parliamentary Labour party caucus, and the appointment is popular and opportune.

Another wise appointment is that of Mr. C. A. Berendsen as New Zealand High Commissioner in Australia. Mr. Berendsen is an outstanding officer of the New Zealand public service, having for many years been Secretary to the Department of External Affairs, and more recently Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department and Secretary to the War Cabinet. He has attended all Imperial Conferences since 1926, has been overseas with the present Prime Minister on several occasions and has expert knowledge of the foreign and defence problems of the Dominion. It has long been felt that the increasing importance of the relations between New Zealand and Australia and the community of their interests in the Pacific make the closest liaison between the two countries desirable. Occasional visits by Cabinet Ministers in the past have made some direct consultation on specific questions possible, but the many common problems now arising make it essential to have a fully accredited diplomatic representative always available. As the Commonwealth Government has agreed to make a reciprocal appointment, an exchange of High Commissioners marks a further stage in the realization of that mutual understanding and co-operation which is for ever symbolized by the word Anzac.

Jurisdiction over American Troops

Any doubts as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the United States Service Courts over members of the United States forces in New Zealand or on board New Zealand ships or aircraft have now been settled by the United States Forces Emergency Regulations 1943, dated April 7. These empower such courts and authorities to exercise, in relation to members of those

forces, in matters concerning discipline and internal administration all such powers as are conferred upon them by the law of the United States. No criminal proceedings shall be prosecuted in New Zealand before any New Zealand court against a member of the United States forces except in cases exempted by the Minister of Justice on representation by the United States Government. Provision is made for the arrest by New Zealand police and delivery into the custody of the appropriate authorities of the United States forces, for the summoning by the Clerk of a Magistrate's Court of the witnesses required to give evidence before the United States Service Court, and for the punishment of any witness so summoned for failing to attend, to give evidence, or for committing perjury. The United States Service Courts are given the same immunities and privileges as New Zealand Service Courts. Provision is made for the imprisonment or detention in prisons or detention in barracks in New Zealand of members of the United States forces at the request of the officer commanding the United States forces. Members of the United States forces are exempt from the provisions of the Aliens Emergency Regulations 1940. The Coroners Act, 1908, and Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1924, do not apply respecting death or burial of any member of the United States forces, but a Coroner may hold an inquest on a member of those forces, at the request of the commanding officer. Where a member of a United States force is a party to an intended marriage, no Registrar, under the Marriage Act, 1908, shall issue a certificate of marriage (which must be produced before solemnization of the marriage) except upon production of the written approval of the intended marriage given by the senior Commander of the United States forces in New Zealand. These regulations apply also to the Cook Islands and Western Samoa.

New Zealand,
April 1943.

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.

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INDEX AND TITLE-PAGE

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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Hay Wrightson, London

SIR PATRICK DUNCAN
1870–1943

PATRICK DUNCAN

PATRICK DUNCAN was a great public servant. He was also a great South African; but a South African by adoption. He was the product of an older and more settled civilization, but of one which has its origin in conditions of life not less simple and rugged than those of the veld. He was the son of a Scottish farmer in Banffshire, a Lowland country, but within hail of the Highlands, a land which, like South Africa, breeds sturdy sons of the soil, of whom many of the most gifted have risen to high eminence in the learned professions and in the world of politics; so that between South African and Lowland Scot there is close affinity.

Duncan was born in 1870. He received his early education in his own land and at Edinburgh University, where he won a scholarship at Balliol, that famous Oxford college which is itself of Scottish origin, then in the last years of Jowett's Mastership. Duncan's interests in philosophy and in classical literature were just those which it is Balliol's special function to foster; and it was inevitable that he should win first-class honours in the school of *Literae Humaniores*. He was also Craven scholar in 1890. From Oxford Duncan went on to the Civil Service and in 1894 joined the staff of the Board of Inland Revenue. Here he became Private Secretary to Sir Alfred (afterwards Lord) Milner, then Chairman of the Board—an event which was destined to determine the whole tenor of his life. Milner, it will be remembered, went out to South Africa in 1897 as High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. In 1901, while the South African war was still being fought, he exchanged the Governorship of the Cape for that of the newly annexed Republics to the north, and set himself to the hard task of establishing there a British Colonial Government with the duty of repairing the ravages of a struggle which was not to end until nearly the middle of 1902. For this he needed young and able helpers, and thought first of the private secretary who had served him so well at the Board of Inland Revenue. He sent for Duncan and made him Treasurer of the Transvaal. So it fell out that Duncan became the *doyen* of that band of brothers, Milner's young men, who were nicknamed, half in derision half affectionately, "The Kindergarten", then in the first flush of youthful enthusiasm. It is a fast ageing and dwindling band now; but it has played a part in the union of the South African colonies, and it is responsible for the foundation and conduct of THE ROUND TABLE. For forty years and more, so far as the vicissitudes of life have allowed, it has kept together; and always, while looking up to Lord Milner and to his successor in South Africa, the late Lord Selborne, as its political Chief, has revered Patrick Duncan as the Captain of the band.

Duncan continued to serve with great ability first as Treasurer, then as Colonial Secretary, and for a time as acting Lieutenant Governor of the Transvaal under Milner till 1905, and under Selborne till 1907 when responsible government was established in the Colony. A career which could not have failed to lead to great distinction was obviously open to him in the

colonial service; but South Africa had laid strong hold upon him. He had given himself to her service, and must, he felt, make that service his life's work. But having no private means he had also to make a living. Accordingly at the age of 37 he went to London, became a pupil in a barrister's chambers, was called to the Bar and returned to the Transvaal to practise his new profession.

His return synchronized with the movement for the union of South Africa in which his friends of the "Kindergarten" were actively engaged. He had already, while that body was preparing for submission to Lord Selborne the first draft of the document known to South African history as the Selborne memorandum, presided over its deliberations with characteristic wisdom and authority, restraining when he thought it necessary the exuberance of the draftsman with a humour sometimes caustic but always kindly.

When the Union Convention met in 1908 Duncan accompanied the Transvaal delegation as its legal adviser. The part which he played behind the scenes in that beneficent crisis of South African affairs was important; and the close association in which he worked with General Botha and General Smuts led to relations of mutual respect and confidence between him and them which were to lead to even closer relations between him and General Smuts later on. Not that he was yet to become a member of the party led by the Generals. In the first years of Union the party political division was on almost wholly racial lines; and for many years from 1910 when he was first elected to the Union Parliament, Duncan, who continued to practise the legal profession, was one of the most trusted leaders of the British party in Opposition. It was not an Opposition which always conceived it to be its first duty to oppose. On the contrary, its main function in the war of 1914–18, largely under the influence of Duncan, was to support the loyal hands of Botha and Smuts against their nominal but less reliable followers. But it was not till 1921 that Duncan became a Minister. By that time General Hertzog with his Dutch Nationalist supporters had split away from General Botha, and General Botha was dead. The British party had made common cause with General Smuts and the Afrikaners who remained loyal to him; and Duncan entered Smuts's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, Public Health and Education, applying to the vexed problems of South African government the sound administrative principles which he had learnt in early life. Another period of Opposition was to follow from 1924, when General Hertzog came into office, till 1933, when the financial crisis of that year resulted in a coalition between him and General Smuts, followed a year later by a fusion of their parties from which the intransigent Nationalist element again split off under Dr. Malan. Duncan now became Minister of Mines under General Hertzog and held that office till 1936, when he was appointed Governor-General of the Union, the first South African to hold that exalted position. Opinions might differ as to the wisdom of the precedent established by the appointment as his Majesty's Representative in a great Dominion of one who had been a Minister there in a party Government; but there could be no two opinions about Duncan's personal qualifications. No nobleman from Great Britain could have represented the Sovereign more worthily,

or with greater dignity and impartiality. No one could have played his part with more skill and firmness than did Duncan in the grave crisis of 1939 when Hertzog's proposed resolution for South African neutrality was narrowly defeated by the loyal courage of Smuts who, taking his political life in his hands, saved South Africa for the British Commonwealth, and may well have saved the Commonwealth itself.

The closing years of Duncan's Governor-Generalship have been darkened by the shadows of war, by the loss in action of a gallant son, and by the onset of a fatal illness; but they have been happy in the unbroken trust which he and General Smuts, as his Prime Minister, have reposed in each other. And he has died in harness. Under the very shadow of death, and until the moment of death itself, he has done his duty with a brave endurance which must command our reverent admiration.

No bald account of the facts of Duncan's career can convey an idea of the man himself. To those who did not know him intimately, particularly in his earlier years, he may have seemed somewhat aloof and austere; for along with great personal dignity went a certain shyness in unfamiliar company, and he did not wear his heart upon his sleeve. But those who did know him, his friends, could feel in his company as though they were warming themselves at a great fire which glowed rather than blazed. His talk did not sparkle with epigram and he had the gift of silence; but the spirit of humour was incarnate in him. Like all good men he was tolerant of human weakness, and he was incapable of injustice; but absurdity, especially if pretentious, would suffuse his strong countenance with crimson and shake his whole body with mirth. Along with his humour went a quality of genuine hospitality and of rich enjoyment of good things. Behind it all, as General Smuts has well said of him, was "the scholar and philosopher, the man who was deeply imbued with the ultimate religious values of life". His intellectual tastes were critical and classical. He was devoted above all to the poetry of Wordsworth, to the dialogues of Plato, to the sonatas of Beethoven; and he shared his love of music with his wife, with whom his domestic life was beautifully happy. He leaves behind him a splendid record of service to his fellow men and the memory, loved and honoured, of one who in all his voyages over the stormy seas of South African life never made an enemy.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE SETTLEMENT

THE strength and the weakness of the British Commonwealth of Nations, as a political institution, lie in its being taken for granted by ordinary people in ordinary times. It is strong because it is assumed by its citizens; it is part of their accepted apparatus of thought. At the same time there are dangers in its being merely assumed and accepted—the dangers of inaction and drift within and of misunderstanding abroad, because we see no need to defend or explain our accepted inheritance.

War has awakened our own awareness and has sharpened both the wonder and the criticism of the outside world. To-day there is great and still rising interest in the character and future of the British Commonwealth, among the peoples alike of its own and other countries. This war-time interest has passed through four phases. The first, corresponding with the early, slow-moving period of the war after the conquest of Poland, was a phase of admiration, not unmixed with surprise even within the circle of the British nations, at their instant solidarity when one of their number, though not directly attacked, called a halt to Nazi aggression and launched itself upon a war of defence and deliverance. Not only the Dominions but also India and the dependent Empire voluntarily gave their men, their money and their goods to a cause which they recognized as being as much their own as that of Britain herself. Here was inescapable proof that a community of nations, bound neither by political compulsion nor by geographical contiguity, could act as one for the sake of common ideals and of the community itself, given a sufficient sense of "belonging together" in the minds of their people. The emphasis dramatically shifted from diversity and national separateness to unity and solidarity. The Commonwealth air training scheme, one of the most creative concepts of our generation and a symbol of this renewed stress on unity, was born and passed through adolescence.

The second phase corresponded with that grim period of the war when the collapse of France left the British Empire alone to face a triumphant Germany with most of Europe at her disposal as slaves or sycophants. While it was only the United Kingdom among the Commonwealth countries who had by this time any large forces—sea, land or air—fully trained and equipped (and hers were pitifully small), and while it was she who bore the brunt of Nazi attack, it was the British Commonwealth, not the British Isles, that saved the world in 1940. Without the active help of the rest of the Commonwealth in men and materials and in geographical station, however friendly the neutrality of this great fraction of the world had been, the United Kingdom alone could never have survived those dark days of 1940 and 1941. The fact that the Commonwealth remained solid—with every excuse for division and retreat—meant that Hitler could accomplish the defeat of Britain only in the conquest of the world. This indeed he conceived and

intended; after his failure to invade or pulverize the British Isles, he certainly planned with his ally Italy to strike down the British guardianship of the oceanic world, by blows at the Middle East. He was frustrated by a truly Commonwealth army, air force and navy. Small as those forces were, they had such a character because every country of the Commonwealth realized that the security of the whole depended on the defence of this critical corner, a key bastion of the vast Indian Ocean area, which with the Southern Dominions on its fringe contains the greater part of the British Commonwealth by area and population.

The first Cyrenaican campaign, the conquest of Italian East Africa, and the thwarting of Nazi plans in Syria and Iraq, turned the edge of the Axis blade. Hitler was forced to realize that the conquest of the British Commonwealth could not be achieved without the concentration of his whole force, first on one key point, then on another. Hence his fatal decision to clear his flank by rounding on Soviet Russia. The Russian resistance, together with the strategically vital occupation of Iran, ended this period of the war, and afforded a short breathing space to prepare for the next blow.

THE EMPIRE IN DANGER

THE third phase of the development of public thought about the Commonwealth came with the Japanese attack. Where Germany had failed to smash through the defensive key points of the British Commonwealth security system, Japan succeeded. The fall of Singapore, which began with the sinking of H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* and was sealed (as we can now perceive) by the smashing within a few days of such poor air defence as we had in Malaya, placed the British Commonwealth in danger such as it had not experienced since before the Battle of the Nile. The danger was immediately addressed to Burma, who succumbed, to India and Ceylon, and to Australia with the dependent territories to the north; but ultimately and equally to the whole British Commonwealth. The conquest by Japan of India or Australia would have had as devastating an effect upon the prospects of its survival or ultimate victory as the conquest of the United Kingdom would have had two years earlier.

This phase, then, was dominated by the idea of the Empire in danger. It was characterized in some panic-stricken or misguided quarters by attacks on the whole British imperial system in the Far East and generally. It is well that we should be alive to the deficiencies of British management of colonial affairs, and to the need to find freer room for the trenchant and expanding force of colonial nationalism; but those deficiencies were neither the proximate nor the basic cause of our defeats in the Far East. The real cause was the failure to maintain through peace and war a defence equipment adequate to the commitments we had implicitly accepted in governing peoples unable to defend themselves. This in turn was due partly to the war-weary quietism that saturated the outlook of all the British nations between the two wars, the wishful belief that the League of Nations could achieve by influence what we were unready to achieve by arms; partly to a failure, except in the construction of the Singapore base itself, to make

due allowance in practice for the new turn that was taken in Far Eastern affairs after the last war, when for the Anglo-Japanese alliance was substituted the Washington Conference system of a balance of power in the Pacific; and partly, perhaps decisively, by the lack of any permanent means of pooling the interests, the policies and the power of the British Commonwealth countries in respect of this vital strategic zone. The belief in the impregnability of Singapore was the British Commonwealth equivalent of the "Maginot mind", inhibiting not only adequate national preparedness but also adequate international collaboration among the countries of the Commonwealth.

We are now entering upon the fourth phase. In relation to the course of the war it corresponds to the period of eviction of the Axis from Africa, preparation for the invasion of Europe, and a forward movement in the Pacific. The question which people are beginning to ask themselves now is what part the British Commonwealth is going to play in the peace settlements and in the future world order. Despite its solidarity in war, despite the fact that its existence and its unity saved the world, despite the object lessons in failure to provide in advance for joint defence, many people feel, or at least seem to assume in their approach to post-war problems, that the British Commonwealth is either out-of-date or must play an essentially secondary and incidental rôle in the new world order. Ideas of this kind found favour in many quarters in 1919 and in the twenty years that followed; but the respective fates of the League of Nations and of the British Commonwealth are plain for all to see. Or, to follow a line of thought more popular to-day, the post-war world order will depend essentially upon the attitude of the United States; therefore, runs the argument, let us not run any risk of prejudicing Anglo-American—or Canadian-American, or Australian-American, as the case may be—relations by committing ourselves in advance to policies of Commonwealth integration, whether in defence or diplomacy or economic affairs. Again there is a lesson from the inter-war period, a lesson which our just hopes for American co-operation in world order next time ought not to erase entirely; it is in effect the lesson of common sense, to build first on facts rather than hopes, and not to seek in the still doubtful aid of others a discharge from duties which lie upon ourselves, and which in any case such aid can only lighten, not abolish.

Lessons of the War

Happily the currents of popular thought in the British Commonwealth are far from being all in the direction of universal internationalism or pusillanimous "wait-and-see". Both in Great Britain and in the Dominions, as the pages of The Round Table testify, more realistic and thoughtful ideas about the character and future of the British Commonwealth have taken their hold on the public mind. The great and expanding war-time interest in these matters, to which a stream of popular books and pamphlets bears witness, is itself a healthy symptom. To some extent the interest is critical, and that is right, for criticism is the essential preliminary to construction; but at the same time it is generally practical and realistic, not only because it has been

so largely aroused by the intermingling of men and women from all over the Commonwealth in the various forces and theatres of war, but also because it has had to digest the hard lessons which the war has taught about the strength and weakness of the British Commonwealth in its own defence and in the maintenance of world security.

The British Commonwealth is a working instrument of international co-operation. It has worked successfully in the past, both to enable its own peoples to advance in material welfare and political stature, and to form an indispensable element in the power system under which the Americas and the oceanic world at large have enjoyed a century and a half of amazing political and economic development undisturbed by the direct impact of world war. It is certainly capable of contributing no less to the post-war progress of the world, adapted and adjusted as it must be to meet the new conditions both within itself and beyond. Its ability to work successfully, and to adapt itself through all the revolutionary changes in its environment in the past two generations, has been due, at heart, to its sense of "belonging together", of having a common purpose and a common destiny. This sense is the life element in political institutions. Without it, no association of states or smaller groups can live in health; with it, the precise character of the organization for expressing it becomes a matter of secondary though still very great importance—very great, for feelings and aspirations by themselves are not enough, without the proper means of action.

Here is the practical answer to the conundrum, with which some political theorists present us to-day, of Anglo-American—or, for some, Anglo-Soviet or Anglo-European—co-operation as the rival or alternative to Commonwealth integration in the post-war order. In so far as we in our several countries of the Commonwealth have a genuine and well-grounded sense of belonging together with the United States—or with the Soviets or with Europe or whatever it may be—and in so far as that feeling is reciprocated, we shall have the necessary platform for rearing a structure of co-operation with them; it will then be our business to do so, to the fullest limits of political and economic integration that such a faith permits. In so far as we have a mutual sense of belonging together in the British Commonwealth—and this is proven fact—it will be equally our business to translate that faith into the strongest and most closely knit institutions that the necessities of our common life demand. In fact we possess in differing relative degrees both these kinds of feeling, and our task will be the complex but not insoluble one of proceeding with world co-operation on several planes simultaneously, and of linking with each other the various institutions that we raise or retain for that purpose. In this task the various countries of the British Commonwealth may conceivably proceed along different lines, according as they have special degrees of common interest with certain foreign countries or areas—such as the United Kingdom with Europe or Canada with the United States. Variation is not to be deplored. What should be deplored is not the existence of a sense of community with foreign countries but the possibility of wasting the sense of community among ourselves in the Commonwealth.

"Belonging Together"

That sense is based not merely on sentiment and habit, but on the hard facts of common vital interest, and would soon fade it it were not so. First and foremost, the Commonwealth has a common interest in a particular system of world security. Security, in a restless and power-dominated world, is not a mere atmosphere, to be generated by pacts and formulae; it depends on the existence at all critical zones of forces and equipment adequate in size and character to meet the dangers to security that may arise there. Such is the character of the British Commonwealth, in terms of political geography, that, with or without a wider system of international defence, its security depends on the presence of adequate forces in and about certain zones—pre-eminently the British Isles, the eastern and western orifices of the Mediterranean, the defensive line from Malaya to Samoa which constitutes the strategic frontier of Australia and New Zealand, and at large in the oceans. Because the nations of the Commonwealth "belong together", they have this common interest; having this common interest, they must hold together to maintain it, or perish, whether or not in holding together they also hold to other countries which share the interest or recognize that it is part of the universal interest in a stable and secure world order.

The diplomatic and military means whereby the major security interest of the British Commonwealth, and therewith of half the world, was upheld before the war are common knowledge. They consisted chiefly in a supreme navy (provided almost entirely by the United Kingdom), relatively small air and land forces (also mainly provided by that one country) disposed at certain key points, a chain of naval and lately air bases (many furnished and defended by the self-governing Dominions), a conviction of permanent friendship with the United States and a close defensive reliance on France, certain valuable political connexions in the Middle and Far East, and a tacit expectation that Japan would never have to be faced without the alliance both of France and of the United States. The responsibility for maintaining this system as a whole, both diplomatically and militarily, fell first and foremost on the United Kingdom.

In considering the reconstruction or adaptation of the system after the war we have to weigh many new and still only partly known factors. Prominent are military developments, above all the rise of the air arm. No less vital are changes in the political scene. What is to be the fate of Germany, and her place in the future order of Europe? Or the fate of Japan and her place in the order of Asia? The international policy of Soviet Russia is in transition. The United States may be imperialist, internationalist, isolationist, according to the course of the war, the stresses of her internal politics, and other factors moulding her still immature attitude towards world affairs. The Islamic countries are awakening; Far Eastern nationalism, within and beyond the British Empire, will have advanced by great strides. We can be sure only that we cannot be sure of anything but the dangers and uncertainties. It is reasonable, amid all the unknowns, to say as a rough first judgment that after the first years of victorious supremacy the task of the British Commonwealth in maintaining security will be no less onerous in the future than in the past.

Strength to Prevent Wars

We are therefore wise to remind ourselves that only by the barest margin was that task discharged, in the sense of saving the Commonwealth from defeat, in 1940 and again in 1942, as by a slightly wider but still precarious margin it was discharged in 1914–18; and that in the juster sense of preventing rather than winning wars—which is the sense in which we must conceive it for the future—the British Commonwealth has failed to discharge it twice within our lifetimes. It follows that we must plan to make the system stronger in the future than in the past. For this strengthening the Commonwealth cannot rely on the main provider and organizer of its security in the past, the United Kingdom—and this for two reasons. The first reason is that the United Kingdom will be poorer in international assets, in purchasing power, and shortly in man-power. The second reason is that—whoever pays the bills—more and more plainly the defence of the British Commonwealth is seen to be a problem in integration of all the resources of its several countries available for the purpose—money, men, materials, industries, communications, air and sea bases, opportunities for exercise and training. The pooling of resources, which is requisite in total war itself, is no less necessary in the provision of defence against the contingency of total war. That provision is therefore beyond the powers of one small country, however rich and however willing, at a great distance from the defensive zones and possessing only a fraction of the composite resources required. British Commonwealth security must therefore, by the logic of present-day facts, be based in the future on such integration for the purpose as will assure in peace and war the necessary pooling of resources and the broad base of financial and material provision which is demanded by the magnitude of the task.

Of the institutions necessary to effect that integration it is too early to be precise. They ought to become progressively the topic of discussion both by the leaders and by the electorates of the Commonwealth countries that will have to approve and support them. Without public opinion behind them they will be of little strength and short survival. Public opinion will not be rallied unless the system somehow gives scope, not only to the common interest and sense of unity of the Commonwealth nations, including those like India newly rising to full stature and therefore anxious to exert and savour their new sense of independence, but also to their diversity and separate nationhood. The answer at this stage may be found in institutions built to meet particular requirements, perhaps to some extent regional, which are accepted in common, and varying according to the purpose, the region, the participating members. But the nature of the problem, as we must never forget, insists upon more than compacts and conferences; there must be executive machinery and joint resources. There must be means of action as well as policy, joint finance as well as mutual agreement.

In the economic sphere, too, including communications, there is an opportunity and a need for closer integration. In economics, as in defence, the British Commonwealth together can be far stronger than the sum of its parts. If it fails to draw upon the strength of its own unity, its members will fall into the respective positions, in the conduct of world affairs and the sharing of world progress, which are indicated by their resources and influence as separate countries: a collection of second-rank states, with one of the first rank, peculiarly vulnerable both politically and economically, and commanding much smaller resources than either the United States or Soviet Russia. This is the danger that the Commonwealth faces if it waits upon others for leadership, and allows the asset of its own community of feeling, of purpose and of interest to run to waste.

When final victory comes it may already be too late to exert this joint Commonwealth leadership and to build the new world on sure foundations of Commonwealth unity. For our enemies may collapse quickly, and vital decisions may have to be taken at a few days' or hours' notice, when full consultation between the United Kingdom Government and the Governments of the Dominions and India may be impossible. Even in advance of decisive victory the gradual re-occupation of enemy-held territories, in Europe or in the Far East, will from day to day throw up problems for urgent settlement which will vitally affect the long-term post-war order. It is idle to pretend that the present system of liaison is adequate to ensure unity of policy and of action on these problems. The Dominions, no doubt, are kept fully informed through the High Commissioners and otherwise, but that is by no means the same thing as having a voice in important decisions while they are being made. There is urgent need for a full meeting of all the Dominion Prime Ministers—including the Viceroy and a representative Indian member of his Council—with members of the British War Cabinet to discuss and agree upon the broad policy which the Commonwealth as a whole is to contribute to the post-war settlement. A series of Dominion elections has lately prevented such a personal gathering; but that obstacle is now rapidly being removed, and to postpone further the necessary steps to united action by the Commonwealth in the settlement is to jeopardize the purposes for which all its members are fighting.

FOUNDATIONS OF PROSPERITY

THE REBUILDING OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

WHEN the war has been won the people of Great Britain, as individuals and as a nation, will turn again to the task of making a living in a competitive world. They want it to be a better living than many of them have known in the past. They have too much good sense to believe that life will be easy or that the devastation and the passions of war are likely harbingers of the millennium. They are not slavish adherents of any political dogma. But, whether they are serving now in the forces or the factories, they hope at least for steady work after the war, for a fair share of the pleasant things of life, decent houses, social amenities, reasonable leisure. It is not too soon to ask what is the prospect that their modest desires will be realized or—to speak in national rather than individual terms—that British industry trade and commerce can be rebuilt on a firmer and wider foundation.

Increasing the Export Trade

It is a commonplace that we live by foreign trade and that the imports of food and raw materials on which we depend are bought by the export of goods, by the payments of other nations for our services in shipping, banking and insurance and by the income that comes to us from our investment abroad. The war has upset the balance of that account. On the average of the three years 1936 to 1938, we imported goods to the value of £930 million and went a long way towards paying for them by exports of £540 million, investment income of £200 million, shipping earnings of £110 million and insurance and banking commissions of £40 million.* But even in those years before the war we were falling short of equilibrium by £40 million a year. A great part of our investments abroad has since been swept into the furnace of war, much of our merchant tonnage has been sunk. Doubtless we shall grow more food and import less; we shall build ships and trade with them again in the seven seas. But in the final count it is clear that if we are to maintain a standard of life no lower than that of 1938 we must increase our exports, not by 5 per cent. or 10 per cent. but probably by as much as 50 per cent. That is a formidable task and will call for all those qualities of skill and imagination, enterprise, tenacity and initiative, by which our position in the world was created and by which in this war it is being preserved.

But, though the task is formidable, we can face it with a new confidence in the prospect of material progress now unfolding before the world. Under the deadening spell of those decades which we spent in the wilderness after the Armistice of 1918, it was widely believed that we were nearing the end of the age of invention and that the technical background of our life would soon be stationary. Man seemed to have reached the limit of his powers

* *The Economist*, June 19, 1943, p. 780.

and the industrial revolution to be ending in an arid epoch of rationalization and restriction. Science and the immense impulse of the war, which has placed money without stint at the service of the world's technicians, have shown that view to be a shallow illusion. No one can look at the achievements of recent years in chemistry, in metallurgy, in wireless and in aviation without being convinced that, so far from having reached the end of the age of invention, we are standing on its threshold. Those same qualities of skill and imagination, enterprise, tenacity and initiative, on which the rebuilding of our own economy depends, alone hold the key to the future which science has made possible.

These potentialities of our age are not mysteries revealed only to the British people and withheld from the rest of the world. We shall have to re-establish our prosperity in the face of strenuous competition. Friendships and alliances can blunt the sharp edge of rivalry, but in the last resort we must look to our own efforts in the future. Certainly we can rely on no privilege derived from our past inheritance. We cannot hope to escape in our export trade the harsh test of quality and price. In some fields we shall have to meet the industries of neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland, efficient and progressive and inured to laborious days. Overshadowing them all we shall find the United States immeasurably stronger relatively to other nations than ever before, conscious of its resources and of its new predominance in the world, and convinced that applied science to-day offers to the individual and the country which can earn them rewards hitherto unimagined. The people of the United States approach the tasks and, as they hope, the triumphs of peace as men wedded by instinct and tradition to private enterprise. Through it they have grown to their present stature, and the history of American industry, down to the astonishing achievements of its factories and shipyards in this war, is a long saga of bold and imaginative innovation and adventure. But free enterprise means something more to them than continuity of tradition. They believe it to be the best guarantee of those other democratic freedoms which they cherish, and they do not doubt that a planned or totalitarian economy is inconsistent with the retention of those other freedoms and has been proved to be inconsistent with them by the experience of the Soviet Union and of the Nazi and Fascist States.

These, then, are the elements of the problem which will confront us after the war—our own impoverished situation, conditions favourable to the rapid creation of new wealth and, finally, the certainty of severe competition. On the answer which we find to that problem depend all our projects of social reform and national betterment. Wealth cannot be distributed, fairly or unfairly, unless it is being created. Steady employment and social security are meaningless phrases unless we can hold our own in the trade of the world.

Indirect State Control

In that crusading spirit which wars induce in a peaceful people much has been said and written as to the future organization of commerce and industry, both by those who have leisure for these matters and by some who might

be thought to have none. Many trends of opinion can be discerned. Nationalization and direct operation by the State find fewer advocates than in the heyday of Marxist doctrine. But it is inevitable that there should be apostles of indirect State control. They would like the State to retain in peace—not, as would be generally accepted, for a brief and inevitable period of transition but indefinitely—many of the powers which it has exercised in war, to tell us what goods to make and where to sell them, when to invest our money and how to spend it. Modern war cannot be conducted without the most extensive control by the State of the lives and resources of the people. Only a central government can know the facts, and many of them it cannot disclose. It is natural, therefore, that after four years of unfettered power over employers and labour, capital and the means of transport, agriculture and the distribution of food, some at least of the practitioners of the system should fall victims to its attractions. They find it easy to forget that in war the only competition is on the field of battle, that it is the number of guns and tanks and ships which matters and not what they have cost, that aircraft are not made in Millbank or tanks in the Adelphi and that the work of the supply Ministries stands or falls in the end on the ability of industries built up by private enterprise to adapt themselves to the demands of a war economy. In its extreme form the belief in State control is unlikely to survive the fresh air of peace, if for no other reason than that it is repugnant to the notions and instincts of the ordinary man. He has no difficulty in detecting waste and inefficiency, and will not tolerate in other conditions what he recognizes to be an inescapable evil in war. Under his guidance even the most hardened bureaucrats may come in time to forget their fugitive triumphs in the ordering of our lives and to reflect that it was not the State to which they owed the Merlin engine and their salvation.

Mr. Morrison's Policy

There is another school of thought which has found its most pointed expression in some of the recent speeches of Mr. Herbert Morrison. The Home Secretary is indeed himself an advocate of control but it must be "wise" and it must be "social"—epithets which might be thought to beg the question. He "can see no sharp distinction in nature between the economic problems of war and the problems of the strenuous, difficult peace that lies before us. If control is right and useful to-day, nobody can assume it will be wrong and dangerous to-morrow." But his main line of approach is in appearance that dear to all Englishmen, the *via media*. The future lies, we are told, in the combination of State ownership or State control and private enterprise. Each has its appropriate field. There are "the so-called 'natural' monopolies, like gas, electricity and (in effect) transport, which are also, like coal, common-service industries and, like it, are ripe—or over-ripe—for public ownership and management". Then there are the large-scale basic industries, which have "come nearer and nearer to being monopolies in fact . . . We can't leave them alone in their monopolistic glory. . . . The answer may be anything from a public corporation to some form of management

under a board of directors with a nationally nominated chairman." Finally, "there are kinds of business where individual enterprise has a lot of value even in modern conditions—small businesses and some kinds of medium and small-scale manufacture". Elsewhere Mr. Morrison has summarized his views in these words: "A case can be made for private enterprise in appropriate fields. There is a very powerful case for public enterprise. There is no case whatever for private unenterprise. . . . Unless private enterprise is prepared to take the risks which are its historic function, then private enterprise has no function"—this last a judgment from which no one is likely to dissent.

To his fellow members of the Labour party Mr. Morrison has commended his doctrines as "the working policy to which the Socialist ideal commits us as practical men in this age and at this stage. It is a policy that can repel only the reactionary, and will evoke a response among men of all types who share our determination to put the nation and mankind above any sectional interest." Something more than faint echoes of the policy have indeed been traced in the most august columns of the press. There were hints of it in the Prime Minister's domestic broadcast. Members of Parliament who have never been accused of Socialist affinities have repeated with approval some of its catchwords, if only in apologetic parenthesis. Indeed Parliament has gone farther and in the Hydro-Electric Development of Scotland Act has authorized the Treasury, without a dissentient voice, to guarantee capital to the extent of £30 million in order that a public board may experiment in the operation of a "natural monopoly". It is with the risk, therefore, of being called reactionary, but with none of being accused of political partisanship that THE ROUND TABLE ventures to examine the merits of Mr. Morrison's policy.

THE "PUBLIC CORPORATION"

IT rests on dislike of "monopoly", belief in the "public corporation" and complete confidence in the capacity and power of Government to inject vitality into an anaemic industry with the same almost nonchalant skill as a doctor making a blood transfusion. In the exposition of the policy words take on strange meanings. The only true trading monopoly in this country is the Post Office, and to speak of gas, electricity and transport as monopolies is an abuse of language. Railways and roads, coastwise shipping and aircraft are competitors. Gas and electricity practise an ardent and invigorating rivalry, and in their industrial uses both are subject to the competition of oil, waste heat and other sources of power. The supply undertakings, very many of them municipally owned and administered, have met every demand made on them during the war, and have kept industry going at an unprecedented level of activity in spite of crass departmental mismanagement of the coal situation. It might be thought that they were ripe for praise rather than for "public ownership". That term is itself a misnomer. In the jargon of the day it connotes management by a public corporation or board, created by statute as a legal entity without share capital but with stock carrying fixed rates of interest and issued to the former owners of the property. Thus a shareholder in the

Underground, for example, becomes a stockholder in the London Passenger Transport Board. Ownership of the capital is not changed by this transfer and is no more and no less public than before. But the owner has been disfranchised when it comes to electing the management, and his rights have passed to a government department or to any other body of persons who may be designated in the Act as a suitable authority to nominate the governing body.

Whatever else may be said of the public corporation it is clearly an authoritarian rather than a democratic conception. Its board of management is either nominated or indirectly elected. It has no direct responsibility to anyone, and none of any kind to the owners of its capital stock. If the citizens of Manchester, on the other hand, are dissatisfied with the management of their gas undertaking or the shareholders of an electricity supply company with their directors, they have the remedy in their own hands, they can vote the delinquents out of office. These safeguards may be rarely used, but the mere fact of their existence has a salutary effect on the conduct of the business. What is of even more importance is that the financial structure of the public corporation is totally unsuited to the acceptance of risks. It is essential to the progress even of the "common service industries" that they should be able and willing to cast their bread upon the waters. But if there is no cushion of ordinary shares which have covenanted to absorb losses in return for a right to profits, any governing body will be bound to play for safety or, like the new Board in Scotland, to seek the protection of some outside guarantor. There is no one who can be cast for that rôle except the taxpayer.

INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE

IF anyone should be inclined to regard these criticisms as the quibblings of a formalist, let him ask himself whether he believes that a public corporation, not trading for profit and governed by a Board nominated by the Air Ministry or some other department, with that impeccable judgment in these matters of which we have so recently had an example, is the instrument that he would choose to uphold British interests on the air routes of the world in competition with Pan-American Airways. (He must not evade the question by saying that he disapproves of competition in air transport or that he thinks it should be internationalized. On that subject he will have no deciding voice.) Or let him ask himself whether he believes that a public corporation so constituted could have been relied on to develop the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia, as in fact it was developed, in the face of every sort of difficulty and disappointment. Or—to turn to another aspect of Mr. Morrison's proposals—that the national interests would be best served by our saying to the potential Morrises or Boots or Hirsts or Courtaulds of the future "You propose to launch a new industry. By all means go ahead. We believe in private enterprise in small or medium businesses. But take note that if you prosper and build up a great business, and establish an American subsidiary worth £27 million, and in the process are able to improve the wages and the working conditions of your employees and to give work to thousands where now you number them in tens, we shall come along and tell you that you

have become a large-scale basic industry and we shall nominate a Chairman of your company in your place, unless, of course, we eliminate you entirely by turning you into a public corporation."

On such terms individual enterprise will not flourish, and, when it withers within an industry or business, no Government and no bureaucracy can take its place. It is more than 20 years since THE ROUND TABLE wrote this of enterprise, in an article* which can be read to-day with profit:

> It is perhaps of all the conditions of renewed prosperity the most important, for without it the world stands still. Yet it is also the most elusive. It cannot be organized. Examinations cannot detect it, hence bureaucrats seldom have it. It cannot even be easily selected, for in most cases it is only discovered after it has begun to create.

There is profound truth in those words, for this generation as for the last. This country has never lacked men of strongly marked individuality in every class of society and in every form of activity, and they have played the leading part in building up our trade and industry. They have sought to earn profits and have been glad to take risks, and they have seen no more reason to be ashamed of the profit motive than the workman who claims payment by results. But the mainspring of their work has been not profits but the freedom, within the law, to take decisions and to manage their affairs according to their own judgment and in the light of their knowledge and experience of the business, without seeking government permits and without fear of government interference. To rob them of that freedom is to destroy their usefulness.

What is the alternative to Mr. Morrison's policy? This is an age in which the problems both of business management and of public administration have grown more complex, and in the process have revealed deficiencies in men and in methods. The remedy must come, in industry as in the departments, from within, and it would indeed be a fantastic world in which "private unenterprise" could be cured by the "wise control" of bureaucrats or politicians—or a lack of skill amongst surgeons corrected by compulsory membership of the Law Society. Both Government and industry have formidable responsibilities if we are to win back prosperity in this country. Only disaster awaits us if either of them tries to do the work of the other. Their true functions are complementary.

FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND OF INDUSTRY

INDUSTRY has to recognize that in the world of to-day efficiency is the first condition of the survival of private enterprise. There are two sides to efficiency, the personal and the technical. In our business life we have too many drones; and it is the urgent concern of industry, trade and finance to eliminate them, and to raise our standards of the working hours and the personal effort which it is right to expect from those who hold positions of responsibility and receive corresponding rewards. We have allowed our standards to slip back, and in doing so have put it in the power of a small

* *The Round Table*, Sept. 1921, "National Prosperity and Industrial Peace".

minority to become a cause of offence and scandal dangerous to the whole system of private enterprise. On the technical side the failures of industry—and again, measured over the whole range, they are the exception and not the rule—have come mainly from inadequate support of scientific research and from unwillingness or inability to scrap obsolete plant. As a nation we still present a curious contrast between the most outstanding individual achievement in every branch of science and a certain suspicion and scepticism concerning the practical value of the scientific approach to industrial problems. There are still managements and workers in the iron and steel and engineering industries, and doubtless in many others, whose belief in traditional practices is a constant obstruction to the use of metallurgical or physical knowledge.

Neither industry nor Government alone can provide a remedy for these technical deficiencies. It must be the contribution of Government to raise the standard of technical education, to promote scientific research, in national institutions and in the universities as well as by industrial concerns, and to devise a system of taxation which will encourage instead of penalizing the modernization of equipment. In these fields there are no more urgent tasks to-day in research than the extension, on the firmest and most ample foundations, of the scientific study of aerodynamics, or in administration than the reform of the Inland Revenue. Taxation has come to be looked on departmentally as an end in itself; and until that notion is killed, and the whole monstrous corpus of statutes and interpretations built up round the income tax over a century and more is swept away and replaced by principles more in accord with the facts and requirements of modern life, it will remain true that the industries most in need of modernization are those least able to afford it. But whatever Governments may do, or fail to do, to foster research and to reform our tax laws, industry has its own obligations. No Board of Directors in these coming years of stress and reconstruction will be acting in consonance with the spirit and the needs of the age, or indeed with the interests of its shareholders, unless it puts back into the business a substantial part of the profits to cover research, development and obsolescence. No organized industry can hope to survive in a world market if it falls behind in these matters or is deluded by the Inland Revenue into the belief that advertisement is more than all these things.

Apart from these matters in which Government and industry have each a direct responsibility, it is clear that by the manner in which they exercise their proper functions Governments can profoundly influence the well-being of industry. The first object of any Government must be to ensure national security. For twenty years a succession of Governments in this country, encouraged by the political parties and the electorate, neglected that duty, and their dereliction was a principal cause not only of the loss and suffering of this war but of much that was disastrous in the economic field. The distressed areas, a dwindling merchant marine and that restrictive policy in shipbuilding, by which Mr. Morrison is so rightly, though so belatedly, shocked, can all be traced to the subordination of national defence to other purposes. By mere avoidance of the same error the Governments of the

next generation will do more to stimulate our industries than by any attempt at direct intervention in their management. Foreign policy is second only to defence in importance; and industry will look to Government not only for active support of the legitimate interests of British trade in all parts of the world, but for strenuous and consistent efforts to alleviate those political difficulties which have obstructed the channels of trade between nations. There is no branch of the public service on whose strength and competence industry and commerce are in the long run more closely dependent than the Foreign Office, and none perhaps in which those qualities have in recent years been less conspicuous.

The policy which has here been outlined has no heroic or revolutionary features. To believe that they were needed would argue a strange failure to appreciate what the individualism of managements and of men has accomplished in the last five years. But the policy does at least point to weaknesses still to be eradicated, and it does suggest that both Government and industry have much to keep them occupied without either of them encroaching on the field of the other. None of us should underestimate the assets which we retain as an industrial nation, for they are of great price. We still have our geographical position, our natural resources, the skill and special aptitudes handed down through generations, and a great measure of enterprise and initiative. Most important of all, we have come nearer than any other country to establishing a tolerable relationship, based on mutual respect, between capital and labour. We have in this long war reasserted the virility of our people and restored their confidence in themselves. There is no reason why, by hard work and by giving free rein to individual initiative, we should not create out of this new world of science a future no less brilliant or exhilarating than the age of Elizabeth.

THE FIRST LEAF FALLS

DISAPPEARANCE OF A DICTATOR

GENERAL DITTMAR, the Nazi commentator, applying on the most grandiose scale the fashionable strategic metaphor of the present war, describes the simultaneous Allied offensives in Russia and Sicily as a pincers movement against the fortress of Europe. If they are to be so regarded, then that overworked implement has already closed its jaws upon Mussolini. For it is beyond dispute that his overthrow results from the most direct interaction yet achieved between the two land fronts now established in the Western theatre of war. The sudden downfall of the senior dictator has taken all the world by surprise—not excepting his German ally, as was shown when the controlled Nazi press, at the beginning of the week of his sixtieth birthday, came out with fulsome congratulations on the unshakable position of the Duce on the morning following his dismissal. Looking back on the crisis after the lapse of only a week, it is possible to feel that all nations should have been better prepared for it; the really surprising event, of which this was the logical consequence, had occurred in Sicily a fortnight earlier.

There is no more hazardous operation in war than the landing of a large army on a long-prepared and resolutely defended hostile coast; and it becomes more hazardous with every advance of military science that makes the necessary equipment of an army more elaborate and extensive. Yet this landing was accomplished at only a small fraction of the expected cost in casualties, and within a few days the invading force had established itself ashore and had gained more room for manœuvre than the Gallipoli expedition of the last war failed to gain in eight months of grim attrition. The immediate assumption that this result must be attributed to the effect of overwhelming sea power, with its essential component of overwhelming air power, was soon perceived to be only a partial explanation; these factors must have been discounted in advance by the high command, whose expectations of rapid success were being far surpassed by the event. The unexpected factor was the attitude of the Italian troops and people. The resistance of the Italian formations, never to be despised during the African campaign, had only grown more stubborn in the final phase of their fight against odds in Tunisia; it had naturally been assumed that their comrades, defending their native soil, would be formidable. In fact, within a few days of the landing in Sicily, it was realized that the defence of the island depended entirely on the few German divisions engaged: the heart of the Italian garrison was no longer in the fight, and the majority of them were merely looking for a suitable opportunity to surrender. As for the civil population their feelings were determined by war-weariness, disillusion with the Fascist régime, and hatred of the dominant Germans; their welcome to their nominal enemies as their real liberators culminated when the men of the American Seventh Army marched through cheering crowds into Palermo.

When the will of an overstrained people to resist breaks down, the revulsion is apt to be sudden; and it is possible that the signs of imminent collapse took Mussolini—who, like other autocrats, was accustomed to be shielded from the impact of unpleasant truths—as much by surprise as his adversaries. At any rate these signs of failing spirit, far more than the actual loss of territory in Sicily, where the Germans were maintaining a powerful delaying action round Mount Etna, must have shown him that his existing resources gave him no hope of organizing a successful defence on the mainland when the Sicilian bridgehead should be overrun. His army, left to its own resources, could no longer be trusted; the people, if they should be found to share the feelings of their Sicilian kinsfolk, no longer offered any solid foundation to the régime. In these circumstances it was obviously imperative to address an urgent appeal for help to Germany. This was evidently the subject-matter of the meeting between the two dictators at Verona on July 19. Mussolini presumably presented his demand for immediate and large German reinforcements. He may have backed it with a threat, in case of refusal, either to recall the score of Italian divisions doing Germany's police work in the Balkans, or even to abandon the struggle altogether. Both threats were in fact inherent in the strategic situation, as Hitler must have seen. But precisely at this point the Russian jaw of the pincers began to press.

The Appeal to Germany

The demand for reinforcements came just at the moment when German reserves were strained to the utmost. Two-thirds of the German army was inextricably locked in the struggle on the Eastern front. According to a reasonable explanation his local offensive against the Kursk salient had been dictated by the urgent need to shorten the line in order to gain a strategic reserve; it had failed, and now the much more formidable recoil, beginning against Orel and spreading to other parts of the front, threatened disaster if any attempt were made to withdraw troops for service elsewhere. The garrisons of occupied Europe had already been reduced to a minimum, having regard to the rapidly increasing power of the United Nations to maintain the threat of invasion along thousands of miles of coast. The *Luftwaffe* was even more severely strained than the army, its inferiority to the total of Allied air strength having been shown in several places, and especially in its failure to prevent the devastation of Germany's war industries. When the two dictators parted without the customary announcement that agreement had been reached at all points, it was easy to guess the reason for the breach of precedent.

There are variant versions of Hitler's reply to Mussolini's appeal for help. That which is gaining general acceptance at the time of writing bears no particular external authority, but it follows so logically from the military situation of the Axis that it cannot be greatly in error. As locally in Russia, so over the whole European theatre of war, the supreme need of the enemy is to shorten his line of defence. If the Italian armies can no longer be trusted to carry their share of the burden, the need is all the greater. Hitler's terms for the sending of help to Mussolini were therefore, it is supposed, the abandonment of all Italy south of the plain of Lombardy, a mere delaying action being fought along the peninsula, mainly by the Italians, while a strong defence was organized by the Germans in the valley of the Po—or even before the Brenner Pass. Whether Mussolini personally accepted or rejected such proposals as these really matters little. Material success constitutes a dictator's only claim on popular allegiance. Mussolini's abject failure had already been demonstrated from El Alamein to Palermo. His popular support had shrunk to almost nothing. His only remaining value to Italy lay in his personal relations with Hitler: it was supposed that he was still able to guarantee effective German protection against the invader. The confession that he could no longer render this service left him a mere incubus, helpless in war and an obstacle to peace. Only the long habit induced by twenty years of Italian servility prevented Europe from perceiving that this inflated figure was ready to collapse at a prick—until the prick was actually administered by the revolt of the Fascist General Council.

A Makeshift Government

As Mr. Churchill observed to the House of Commons two days later, the effect of long-continued totalitarian rule by a single party, an all-powerful executive, and a secret police is to leave a people without any independent figures apart from the official classes. The attempt to provide an alternative government by exploiting such popularity as remained to the dynasty and the most eminent Italian soldier is an obvious makeshift, designed to fill an uncomfortably conspicuous void. Both the "King-Emperor", and Marshal Badoglio, "Duke of Addis Ababa" are too deeply compromised in the enterprises of the Fascist régime to give expression to the obvious desire of the people for a real break with the past; and the stability of the new régime is highly doubtful. No less doubtful is its policy, which, at least in the first week, seemed to vacillate between defeatism and defiance.

Badoglio's first act, after declaring that "the war continues" was to proclaim martial law and therefore inaugurate a still greater concentration of power in the hands of the executive. Such a measure is the natural resort of every nation in the moment of extreme peril. It was several times adopted by the Roman Senate in emergency; and so also in the desperate days of Dunkirk the British Government was equipped with unprecedented authority to demand the service and the life of every subject. But it was one thing for a people, on the exhortation of a Churchill, to press spontaneously upon its leaders the authority to require of it every sacrifice needed for victory; and quite another for a Badoglio to impose a new dictatorship from above upon a people already dispirited and recalcitrant. The strikes and demonstrations in many parts of Italy show that there is little prospect of rallying the Italians to a forlorn hope, such as succeeded in England in 1940. At the same time the inaugural proclamations of the King and the Marshal betrayed hints of the desire to seek a way out of the war. Mention of Fascist principles was ostentatiously avoided; instead there was insistence on the older traditions of Italy, which seemed to echo, and no doubt were designed to echo, the

invocation just addressed to the Italian people by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, promising them after surrender a restoration under free government to their respected place in Europe. It was already plain that the abandonment of Fascism in favour of such ideas offered the only hope of popular support; and it was no surprise that Badoglio proceeded shortly to the dissolution of the Fascist party; although, considering the intimate association of the party with the war, the inferences that would be drawn from such a step were inevitable.

While the intentions of the Badoglio Government remained thus ambiguous, there was no foundation for any change in the attitude of the Allies towards Italy. The war must continue. Italian propaganda broadcasters might complain disingenuously that the abolition of Fascism, which the United Nations had proclaimed as the essential enemy, had brought no modification of their implacable demand for unconditional surrender. But Italy was still in alliance with Nazi Germany, and still in occupation of wide territories of Allied nations, in Greece, Yugoslavia, and France. The United Nations were pledged, not only to liberate these countries, but also to enforce as much use of Italian territory as might be required for operations against the principal enemy. Both Mr. Churchill in Parliament and Mr. Roosevelt in a broadcast therefore rightly advised their countrymen that this was a time to intensify the military effort against Italy; while simultaneously giving more explicit assurances than ever to the Italian people that, when they should induce their government to submit to the Allied demand, an honourable future in freedom was guaranteed to them.

Although at the time of writing the Badoglio Government has made no attempt to open negotiations, although indeed its latest utterances seem designed to stiffen Italian resistance, it is reasonably certain that its policy is to find a way of escape from the war. There could scarcely be any other motive for the dismissal of Mussolini. Possibly Badoglio had assumed that the demand for unconditional surrender applied only to the Fascist régime, and that he himself would be permitted to capitulate on terms. Disappointed of that expectation, he may now have decided that he must fight on for a time or be repudiated by his own followers. It is easy to discern the menace that constrains all his actions. Whether the Italians remain belligerent or not, Hitler has evidently determined to treat Italy simply as a glacis in the defence of the fortress of Europe. The surrender of Badoglio might be immediately followed by a German occupation of so much of northern Italy as may be thought useful for this purpose; the Germans are already strongly entrenched there, and it is obviously beyond the power of Italian diplomacy, or even, as has been seriously suggested, of Italian arms, to turn them out. It may be Badoglio's best policy to postpone his surrender until Allied forces have arrived where they can directly undertake the expulsion.

Reactions in Europe

None of this, however, affects the conviction of all Europe that the overthrow of Mussolini is a plain confession of defeat, and that a realignment of the policy of many nations and a revolution in the war situation has become

urgent. Whether as a consequence of surrender or as a last measure of defence, it is taken for granted that Badoglio must recall the garrisons in the Balkans, which until recently amounted to more than half the entire fighting strength of Italy. Either they must be replaced by Germans, thus enhancing the condition of overstrain of the *Wehrmacht* which underlay the original crisis; or the Balkan peninsula must be left open to Allied invasion, a general insurrection of the enslaved peoples hastened, and the Nazi satellites in the south-east of Europe abandoned to their fate. In a frenzy of embarrassed diplomacy these unhappy States are already attempting to readjust their position on the evident assumption of an early Italian surrender and an eventual German defeat. In Hungary, whose policy has generally been dependent on Italy's, the Nazi-dominated Government has become suddenly unstable and there is talk of the return to power of the disgraced Count Bethlen. Rumania, whose armies have already been ruthlessly sacrificed in the German campaign in Russia, and Bulgaria, who has every reason to fear the just revenge of her Balkan neighbours and is now confronted with an obvious object-lesson in Germany's inability or unwillingness to rescue a dependent ally, will seize any opportunity to escape from the sinking ship.

In France the reaction to Mussolini's fall may be less immediate. But here also the probable withdrawal of the Italian garrisons from the Riviera and Savoy will cause the German army of occupation to be spread everywhere more thinly, and so render the defences more vulnerable at every point. The improved prospects of early liberation, opening from the Italian collapse, may have had their influence in assisting the latest step towards harmony between the two parties in Fighting France, whereby the combatant forces are merged under the command of General Giraud, and the political direction consolidated under the presidency of General de Gaulle.

There remains for the United Nations as a whole the conduct of the general war, in which the elimination of Italy, whether it comes now or later, is only a phase. Mr. Churchill gave Parliament a salutary warning that the strength of Italy is to that of Germany only as one to ten, and that there are still 300 German divisions to be fought by the Allies into submission. While that situation continues, the Allied treatment of Italy has to be subordinated to the overmastering strategic needs; it is for instance necessary to insist upon, or enforce by arms, control of the whole country, in order to obtain the use of the airfields in the north from which southern Germany can be bombed, and ultimately to open up the lines of invasion into the Reich. But, subject to these needs, the United Nations are confronted also with a delicate political problem and a great political opportunity. The greater part of Sicily is already under the rule of the Anglo-American administration known as Amgot. There is good reason to expect that this system will be required to extend its control rapidly over the Italian mainland. Although it has been created primarily to smooth the way for strategy, Amgot will inevitably be watched from every part of Europe, and judged as the first test in action of Allied policy for the political future of the world. Mr. Churchill has wisely remarked that it would not be even to our military advantage to batter Italy into anarchy; although we must continue to wage relentless war against

every Italian administration that holds out against the demand for unconditional surrender, we desire the survival of an effective Government through which we can come to terms with the Italian people. The political task, developing from the work of Amgot, will be to foster the growth of such a Government. It must be precluded from hindering the Allied strategy against Germany; at the same time it must be so firmly rooted in the will of the Italian people as to make it impossible for its members to be branded as Quislings or Lavals. To achieve such a middle course may test all the resources of Allied statesmanship.

Amgot and After

Before the process has gone far it may well be found necessary to broaden the basis of Amgot. So long as its horizon is limited to strictly military administration, its purely Anglo-American composition may be adequate; it corresponds to the structure of the high command in Sicily. But its work must gradually merge into that of the political reconstruction of Europe, which must be undertaken on a basis fully representative of the United Nations. It may, for instance, be hoped that the British Dominions may soon claim or accept their share of responsibility; and the co-operation of the French National Committee—to which formal recognition is a necessary preliminary—will become more urgent as the frontiers of France are approached. That, however, is by no means enough. There is as yet no sign of a joint policy, concerted with Soviet Russia, for the political treatment of Italy and any other countries that may come into Allied occupation, whether through Amgot or some more comprehensive system. Until it is clear that Europe is being re-settled on principles fully discussed and agreed between, at least, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States, the dangers of post-war misunderstanding and divergence of purpose are manifold. Such an agreement, on the other hand, is the best guarantee of a truly liberal reconstruction of the world; for the three great Powers are too diverse in their social structure and political philosophy to find any basis of co-operation except mutual tolerance. It is above all things leadership that every nation in Europe will require when the Führers and the Duci have gone to their own place. Some sort of initial and makeshift leadership will necessarily devolve upon the United Nations. But for native leadership there is no substitute—as indeed the Atlantic Charter implicitly acknowledges.

RUSSIA IN THE FUTURE

DISSOLUTION OF THE COMINTERN

When the formal dissolution of the Communist International was announced from Moscow in May there was much surprise, but also some scepticism. The most favoured view was that the decision was an event which marked a turning-point in the evolution of modern Russia. In a rough-and-ready sense that was true enough. Actually, however, the decision publicly recorded a modification of Russian policy and ideology which had been in progress over a series of years. The Third (Communist) International —or Comintern as it was universally and for some people sinisterly known— had for long been an embarrassment to the Russian Government. The earlier bland assurances from Moscow that the Comintern had no connection with the Russian Government impressed no one who had any knowledge of the facts and the inter-relationship of Bolshevist organization. It was in effect an instrument of Russian policy through the Bolshevist Party, and the periodic disavowal of its actions and agitations was wholly beside the point, and in no way altered the fundamental fact. In self-defence the Comintern itself claimed to speak in the name of the Communist movement throughout the world, but that again was a mere matter of form. It is true that Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese never officially associated the Comintern with Russia, but that was just propaganda. Their so-called Anti-Comintern Pact had no higher inspiration than to catch the support of the less enlightened capitalist circles in Great Britain and the United States for the coming war.

A Growing Liability

There is no doubt at all that for some time the Russian Government had come to regard the Comintern as a liability rather than as an asset. It had steadily receded into the background. Indeed even before Russia came into the war the day of its usefulness had clearly come to an end. Stalin, the one man who really mattered, certainly put little faith in it. He had taken his stand, in known opposition to other Bolshevist leaders, in favour of a Communist Russia drawing strength both from patriotism and to a significant extent from nationalism. When war came—the war which he at any rate had foreseen and had prepared to meet with all Russia's marshalled might—the need to work with the two great Western democracies was paramount. The Comintern was dissolved. It would be utterly wrong to think of the decision as nothing more than a tactical move designed to appease the democracies who were associated with Russia: that was the propagandist line adopted by the Axis. Rather, it was intended as an assurance that the Kremlin was sincere in its desire for a continuing co-operation with its democratic allies and associates. In so far as the Comintern was an irritant, such co-operation was weakened and hindered. Stalin understood this, as he had understood many other things. Not all the Bolshevist leaders see eye to eye with him, and, although it would be a complete distortion to speak of the existence of an

anti-Stalin faction in Russia, it would probably not be wrong to suppose that at least some Bolshevists are not always in agreement with him. They are, however, such a mere handful, and Stalin's own position is so strong, that only the collapse of the Red Army in the field could undermine his authority, and of such a collapse there is now less likelihood than at any period of the war. Stalin is established as both the architect and the artificer of victory. That title and his services in building up the new State put him beyond challenge.

Blundering of the International

The record of the Communist International is not impressive. The leadership was inept more often than not. The intelligence service was hopelessly incompetent. Sheer ignorance—and, even worse, sheer irresponsibility—dictated its policy at critical moments. Sometimes the pure doctrine of Marxism rather than the prevailing reality shaped decisions; sometimes an all too obvious opportunism. In Germany, France, Great Britain and elsewhere the International committed the national parties (if we may use a rather self-contradictory phrase) to positively disastrous courses. In the crucial period before Hitler's seizure of full power the German Communists, for instance, were directed to assail not the National Socialists, the essential enemy, but the Social Democrats. There was even the strange spectacle of Communists and National Socialists associating in support of a strike. Whether the defeat of Hitler's dictatorial and predatory designs could have been achieved by the firm alliance of the German working class as a whole is a moot question; once the National-Socialist movement was assured of the benevolence, and in certain contingencies the support, of the Reichswehr the great issue of power was settled. It is, however, certain that a united working-class movement would at least have made a fight of it. The general strike which brought the Kapp *Putsch* to naught may be recalled. No doubt the movement lacked the old revolutionary fire and the sure instinct of such leaders as Bebel and Liebknecht (the father, not his Spartacist son); but against that it was extraordinarily well and widely organized. The party, the trade unions, the co-operative societies, and the press (*Vorwärts*, for example, was one of Europe's outstanding newspapers)—these and other instruments gave it an influence with the mass of the nation which, if only it had been intelligently used and jealously husbanded, might well have preserved something of German democracy and, with it, dignity and decency. The Communists, taking their cue from the Third International, were more concerned about destroying the power of Social Democracy than about frustrating Hitler. Indeed the Social Democrats came to be regarded almost as capitalism's Fifth Column. Few episodes are more ignominious and tragic than the pusillanimous surrender to Hitlerism of the organized working-class movement in Germany—contrast it with the gallant fight of the Austrian Socialists, who for days stood up to the howitzers brought into action against the homes of Viennese workmen. Years of dissension, feuds, and indiscipline told when the test came in Germany. The Communist International bore its share of responsibility for the *débâcle*. About that there can be no serious dispute.

Germany provided a glaring case. There have been others since, and as bad. Communist policy in France exposed the blundering of the International to the whole world. There were valid reasons for the strenuous—and, as it proved, successful—efforts of the Communists to build the Popular Front, but it was as regrettable as it was reprehensible that they should refuse to take a part in the Government proportionate to their parliamentary strength. That was just tactics. The Communists, if they had had any realization of their public responsibilities, would not have held themselves aloof in this way from final decisions on policy. It was about this time, or not long afterwards, that they were speaking of themselves as good Frenchmen prepared to give their lives in defence of *la patrie*. The patriotic exhortations of Thorez, for example, were unexceptionable and stirring. The assumption that this line was taken in consequence of the International's own change of front is well based. The International, in short, found it helpful to sound the patriotic and even the nationalistic note. It continued to be sounded until the signature of the German-Russian pact late in 1939.

A Factor in France

It is no longer open to question that one of the contributory factors to the demoralization of France in 1940 was the effectiveness of Communist propaganda. The patriotic duty which had been urged on all Frenchmen only a few months before was suddenly forgotten, and instead they were told that the war was imperialistic, that the soldiers should not shoot, and that in any case it was only the capitalist and reactionary elements in both France and Great Britain who rejected Hitler's "peace" offer of October and who wished to plunge Europe into a gargantuan blood bath. The propaganda made a certain impression. For one thing, it gave the French Government a good excuse for putting Communists under detention. For another, it produced the oddity of French Communists seeking sanctuary in Hitler's Reich, which had already seen to it that such men as Torgler and Thälmann were in the safe keeping of the Gestapo. Above all the Third International had done much to undermine the fighting spirit of the French armed forces.

The tactics adopted in France were repeated in Great Britain. It is actually the case that at the moment when British Communists were giving confident assurances to all and sundry that Russia would never sign a pact with Hitlerite Germany the newspapers were on sale in the streets of London with the news that such a pact had in fact been signed. If it were merely a matter of the British Communists being made to appear ridiculous, the point would not be worth emphasizing. There was more to it than that. The Communist party, which so short a while before had been calling for the most resolute resistance to Germany, was constrained in October, 1939, to issue its manifesto with the flat declaration, "This war is not a war for democracy against fascism. It is not a war for the liberties of small nations. It is not a war for the defence of peace against aggression." There was much more in the same strain. Numerically the British Communist party is not strong—it cannot be compared in this respect with the French Communist party—but its power for mischief is not to be underrated on that account. There is only

too much evidence that in its anti-war phase the party succeeded in lessening industrial production. With the entry of Russia into the struggle as an ally of Great Britain, the British Communist party became as energetic in demanding the most vigorous prosecution of the war as it had been in denouncing the continuance of the war. Its mass demonstrations in support of the immediate opening of a second front caused both bewilderment and disgust, not because the national conscience did not feel the urgency of giving every human aid to the Red Army, then sacrificing itself nobly for Russia's own survival and for ours, but because the fundamental irresponsibility of the British Communists was revealed for all to see. Second fronts are fought with weapons, and those weapons the Communists had done their worst to deny to the forces they were ready to hurl against Hitler's European fortress.

Stalin and Trotsky

It is said that Stalin regards most of the Communist leaders in countries outside Russia as poltroons. It would not be surprising. If these leaders had shown any sense of independence, any self-respect, any public spirit, they would have served their cause and country better. Above all, if they had understood the change which was taking place in Russia herself, the international proletariat's Fatherland, they would never have committed the political and psychological follies that they did. There is no need at this time of day to review the historic controversy between Stalin and Trotsky except to say that the one believed that Communism could be established in Russia no matter what happened in the outside world, and the other held that revolutionary action outside was necessary if Communism in Russia was to survive. Trotsky wanted world revolution: Stalin was content to make Russia safe for Communism. In this matter, it may be observed, Trotsky, not Stalin, was continuing the Lenin tradition, although the guess may be hazarded that if Lenin—one of the masterful minds of the age—had survived he would have done as Stalin did. *Vis-à-vis* Trotsky, Stalin prevailed in a rather draconian fashion. The consequences were little short of portentous. Stalin understood that in the last analysis Russia had to rely on her own resources; that she must be militarily strong; that her industrial power must be developed to the utmost; that national pride must be encouraged; that patriotism must be nourished, though transfigured. The bitter and glorious battles of 1941, 1942, and 1943 showed the rightness of Stalin's judgment.

Not many men stand close enough to Stalin to know what is in his mind, but, if we are to judge by his public actions, it may be said that Stalin is thinking more and more of Russia in national rather than in international terms. Years before the war Russia was again being represented as Mother Russia, something to be loved, and defended and at need to die for. Since the war the note of patriotism and love of motherland has been predominant. It might be said, as the Germans have said, that the dissolution of the Third International was a gross fake designed to allay the fears of Americans lukewarm towards military association with Russia, and that in any case Moscow could still manipulate foreign opinion through the national Communist parties so that the ending of the International meant no fundamental change.

The evidence we have refutes any such speculation. Rather, the truth is, there has been a change in the sense of the re-emergence of Russia.

Russia Reasserting Herself

In a recent book, *Keep the Lamps Burning*, Dr. van den Tempel, the Netherlands Minister of Social Affairs, expressed the view that it could never be Russian policy to transform Germany into "a centralized Communist State under Bolshevist dictatorship", and he went on to argue, "An active and powerful Germany, even a Bolshevist Germany, will constitute an active threat to Russia for a long while ahead". The contention is a little startling at first sight, but if it is granted that Russia has indeed become more national in her feelings and aspirations, then Stalin can hardly contemplate with equanimity a ruthlessly efficient Communist Germany—for such a Germany might easily be tempted to expand at Russia's expense in the cause of Communist *Lebensraum* and *Grossraum*. A large question-mark lies over the future of Russia, as it does no less over the future of Great Britain and the United States; but if after victory Stalin is going to follow a Russian rather than an international Communist policy there will be fewer troubled minds. It will mean, for instance, that no attempt will be made to bolshevize all Europe east of the Rhine; it will mean, too, that whatever political and territorial adjustments are claimed will be prompted not by Communist ideology but by national interests. If such proves to be the case it will conform to Stalin's record and what is known of his character. After the war Russia will have a mighty task of reconstruction on her hands. For many years her energies and resources will be required in making good what has been destroyed and, when that has been done, in raising the standard of life throughout a vast and varied land. The successive Five-Year Plans cost Russians many sacrifices in personal comforts and amenities, because the overriding consideration was national security. Not all Russia's sacrifices have been made on the battlefield: for many years civilians went short so that when the hour came the Red Army and Air Force would be strong and supplied. As we know, it was a near thing, but Russian preparedness sufficed to avert catastrophe.

Generalizations are always dangerous. If therefore one writes that the essential Russia is reasserting herself, the statement must be accepted with certain well understood qualifications. Stalin, who is a wise as well as a resolute man, realized long before conventional Communists did that, although internationalism might appeal strongly to the party hierarchy and the doctrinaires, the masses—on whom he must rely to feed the people, to produce the weapons for the armed forces, to fill the factories, and to run the railways—were moved by motives which at bottom were Russian. The change of emphasis came long before the war, so that it cannot be said that it was made in deference to capitalist Britain and America and with a view to courting their support. Certainly the war has accentuated it. To-day, then, it may fairly be said that under Stalin Russia is pursuing not an ideological but a national policy; and if that is the case the implications are far-reaching and the dissolution of the Comintern is no surprise.

Religion and Reorganization

The future of Russia is a fascinating speculation. Rauschning, who was an associate—and an impenitent associate—of Hitler's National-Socialist movement until he decided that the so-called German revolution which he held to be necessary was in the wrong hands, has expressed the opinion that if there is a religious revival in Europe after the war it will originate in Russia. Sir Bernard Pares, who knows Russia rather better than Rauschning, has been content to go no farther than to explain how religion in Russia has survived the campaign for godlessness and how the Bolshevist authorities have been brought to take religion into account and in a sense to recognize it. It is a significant fact. But the important thing in Russia's case is that her alliance with Great Britain and her association with the United States have ended an isolation which, except for some fleeting, fitful, and fruitless contacts, had lasted a quarter of a century. The Russians are still deeply suspicious of the Western Powers—that is one of the difficulties with which British diplomacy has to contend even to-day—but the war has broken down at least some barriers, and it would be obtuse to suppose that others will not go the same way too. The war in fact has definitely brought Russia back into Europe, and clearly she is going to play a leading part in framing the future. It may be hoped that the transfer of M. Maisky from London, where he has done such good work, to Moscow, where he will have a closer influence on foreign policy, will strengthen Anglo-Russian co-operation.

The view has already been expressed in this article that Stalin will have something better to do after victory than to attempt to bolshevize Europe, a perilous enterprise in any case. After all he has proved himself a realist, and it may be reasonably assumed that his first concern will be the taking in hand of the immense task of repairing the grievous devastation which the Germans have inflicted on the western domains of his country. After the effectual elimination of the German menace he will, we are also entitled to assume, require tranquillity on the frontiers so that Russians may devote their strength and enthusiasm to the social advance and economic welfare of their teeming millions. This has been their essential passion hitherto. Is it not right to suppose that after the war also it will be the same? There is much to criticize in Russian policy. There is, for instance, already more than enough talk—some of it loose and tendentious—about Russian imperialism, and however much that is discounted it would be a major mistake to think that coming territorial rearrangements will be easy. Poland and the Baltic States are a case in point. Turkey has her misgivings. The control of the Persian Gulf is also in question. Nevertheless it is fair to suppose that the co-operation in war will develop in peace. The war, with all its bereavements and privations, has none the less brought Russia into close and active association with the outside world. That is a formative and, it may be hoped, an enduring fact. The Russians will learn much from it. If on its side the outside world does not also learn much from the vast social enterprise that Russia has undertaken, it is not extravagant to say that the common victory will prove vain, and its fruits sour.

HOT SPRINGS

THE FIRST UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

THE Food Conference at Hot Springs is the first full Conference held by the United Nations since President Roosevelt gave the idea of the United Nations to the world. That fact alone makes it an event of great importance. If this first Conference had been an ill-concealed failure, worse still if it had proved a downright fiasco—and there were many in Washington and elsewhere on the eve of the Conference who prophesied complete failure—the consequence might have been very serious indeed to the cause of the United Nations.

War Aims and Peace Aims

War aims are quite different in character from peace aims. Loose thinking and loose writing have blurred the distinction between the immediate object of victory and the distant object of world settlement. Peace and war aims are, however, inter-connected because they must be pursued concurrently. The hardest task of those concerned with foreign relations to-day is to take the virtues which have emerged from war-time collaboration and which have been given practical expression in the war-time agreements and alliances and to give them fresh and permanent currency in terms adapted to the less makeshift world of peace. It must have been observed before that of the three virtues, faith, hope and charity, the first two generally play a more conspicuous part in international agreements than the last. The representatives of the American people avowedly adopted lease-lend for Britain not from emotional impulse, but because they recognized that the integrity of the British Isles was necessary for the defence of the United States. But lease-lend, from being primarily an agency for reinforcing Britain when she was hard pressed, has developed into the principal means by which the United Nations give practical help to each other where help is most needed. This honourable competition in good-neighbourliness is indeed international charity in the true and not the debased sense of that word. The Mutual Aid Agreements have now laid down the outline of the method by which the nations will repay their mutual indebtedness; but however that account is settled, the nations will remain in debt to President Roosevelt and to the people of the United States for the new and constructive step in international relations which lease-lend as an idea represented.

It should not be forgotten that the Hot Springs Conference was in the President's view the first of the conversations between nations of like mind which were contemplated in the Mutual Aid Agreements to give, as the President said in his speech to the delegates, practical expression to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The link with the past and the direction for the future are clearly indicated in this sequence. If Mr. Roosevelt succeeds in his design there will be built up a series of agreements and understandings between the nations in the economic sphere sufficiently

concrete to bear the strain which peace will impose upon the whole structure.*

Why did the President choose food and agriculture as the first of the subjects for discussion under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement? There was much scepticism of his choice when the Conference assembled. There were many who said that this was just another of the President's bright ideas, inspired by internal political reasons but ill-thought-out and foredoomed to failure. The importance of the event was overlooked and its context forgotten in the campaign waged in Congress and in the newspapers against the restrictions which the White House wished to apply to publicity at the Conference. Both Congress and the press demanded a withdrawal of the ban on outside attendance at the meetings and free access to the delegates; and the Administration failed altogether to satisfy the press and only partially succeeded in pacifying Congress with their explanation of the nature and purpose of the Conference. The most fantastic stories were freely believed—as that under the veil of secrecy subjects quite other than food would be discussed or secret commitments entered into by the Administration. If in the event Mr. Roosevelt, as he has done so often before, confounded his critics and proved the reliability of his instinct, it may be worth examining for a moment the pros and cons of the particular approach which he chose to adopt.

Two Ways of Approach

There are broadly two ways in which the international economic problem might be approached. One way would be to consider first the fundamental divisions of the problem on the lines foreshadowed, for instance, in the preface to the Clearing Union plan—the basic problems of international finance and investment, the international distribution of commodities, and the general code of commercial policy or ethics which nations should pursue in their dealings with one another. Logic might suggest that this is the wisest form of approach, for, after agreement on an economic framework

* Article VII.

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of the 11th March, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provisions for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration [the Atlantic Charter] made on the 12th August, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.

designed to free and to expand national and international trade, the discussion of individual products and groups of products would fall into its proper place. Without such an agreement on principles—under which, it is to be hoped, regulation of production would only be allowable as a means to expansion and not of constriction—the discussion of separate commodities might degenerate into a battle between producers and consumers in which certain groups might achieve their own advantage to the detriment of the national as well as the international interest. Another difficulty is that, unless the basis of the economic framework is settled, each particular problem is apt to depend for solution on the settlement of every other problem. This last dilemma obviously faced the Conference at Hot Springs, which in the opening resolution, after pointing out that

"the first cause of hunger and malnutrition is poverty; it is useless to produce more food unless men and nations provide markets to absorb it",

went on to say:

"There must be an expansion of the whole world economy to provide the purchasing power sufficient to maintain an adequate diet for all."

The resolution called for

"full employment in all countries, enlarged industrial production, the absence of exploitation, an increasing flow of trade within and between countries, an orderly management of domestic and international investment and currencies, and sustained internal and international equilibrium"

if the objectives of the Conference were to be attained.

Why the President began with Food

But that is only one side of the picture. Aristotle long ago pointed out that the logical order was different from the order of experience, and that the latter frequently was the necessary order for the attainment of truth. And the men who built the great cathedrals of Europe, which were designed to serve and have served successive generations, did not lay the foundations and build the whole framework at once, but started with modest beginnings and built on to them, so that one part of the structure was in use while building was in progress in another. Our generation will have deserved well of posterity if it succeeds in doing no more than driving a few supports here and there into the morass which will confront us when the flood of the barbarian invasion has receded and been dammed at its source. Men who will subscribe to build a chapel may not be willing yet to do so for a cathedral; and certainly it will be better to have built a solid construction here and there, which succeeding generations can build upon and expand, than to embark on too ambitious a design which may have to be abandoned when halfway to completion through lack of continuing interest and support.

It may be that Mr. Roosevelt had some such notion in mind of the limitations of the theoretical when he chose his subject for the first United Nations Conference. He was looking for a topic of universal interest and appeal which would strike the imagination both of his own people and of the people of

other countries. The approach of the American public to a problem tends towards the concrete and individual; and recent political trends suggest that this mood is in the ascendant. The American public accepted food as a suitable subject for international discussion because food is something tangible and understandable about which it seems reasonable to do a deal with other countries. If agricultural products had been examined merely as a problem in the technique of production and consumption, the results might have been disastrous. But the Conference approached the problem in the light of the human and universal need of freedom from want, and was able therefore to bring the whole economic problem under review and to place the individual needs of producers and consumers of particular commodities in their proper perspective.

The greatest achievement of the Conference was probably this setting of the individual problem in its proper place in the whole, and the setting of the economic problem in its place in the political problem. The Conference recognized that the first task is the winning of the war and the deliverance of millions from tyranny and hunger. The consensus of opinion was clearly that no action should be taken by the Conference, or by the organizations recommended by it, which would hamper either of these paramount tasks. It laid down that in the shortage period immediately after the war long-term plans must give way to the short-term work of rescue. The agricultural resolutions were particularly concrete and helpful, suggesting a common policy which, if carried into effect, would deal first with the shortage period, then with the avoidance of surpluses after that period, and finally with the period when the great fluctuations have ceased and some steady progress should be possible. It pointed out that freedom from want cannot be achieved without freedom from fear—that is to say that the economic problem cannot be solved apart from the political problem. It called for an immense expansion in the production of food: but it pointed out that in order to achieve this markets must be created by an expansion of the whole world economy. It said in effect to the Governments of the countries represented: "We have studied the problem of food in its most universal aspects. We find large areas of the world suffering from acute shortages, while others after the war will suffer from surplus unless much more drastic steps are taken to expand and to regulate international trade than have been taken in the past. With full employment, greater industrial production, an increasing flow of international trade, an orderly management of domestic and international investment and currencies and sustained internal and international economic equilibrium, the food produced can be made available.* It is for the Governments to attempt the solution of these problems if they wish to see the world and their own peoples properly fed."

A Permanent Organization

Apart from recommending the study by other machinery of these wider economic problems, the Conference proposed the establishment of a permanent organization in the field of food and agriculture. The precise functions of this body were wisely left for determination by an interim commission on which all the Governments and authorities participating at the Conference will be represented. The Conference resisted the temptation to define too closely the field in which the permanent organization will operate; for the latter, if it is to exercise even advisory functions successfully, will have to establish its reputation as a wise and impartial authority. It may well be that only an embryo body will come into being before the end of the war, for at the moment it is difficult to imagine that a staff of experts of sufficient calibre could be collected from among the belligerents. Meanwhile in the course of studying the constitution of the permanent body the interim commission will discover fields in which preparatory work might be conducted. But the full activities of research and advice proposed by the Conference can hardly be carried out before the end of the war. At present experts in all countries are engaged in activities connected with the war and hard-worked Governments are unlikely to be able to supply even the information necessary for the full functioning of the system.

That the permanent organization should not come into full existence before the end of the war is not necessarily a disadvantage. If further international discussions produce, as it may be hoped they will, agreement on other economic bodies designed to promote international action in such fields as currency, investment and the regulation of commodities, it will be better if these bodies are set up or at least agreed upon in outline before other organizations of a more particular nature come into the field. The functions of the food organization would have to be considered and if necessary reconsidered in the light of the constitution of these general economic councils, and the machinery of the interim commission devised by the Hot Springs Conference takes account of this possibility. It might be that the food organization would have some specific executive function as part of a general commodity council, if such were set up; but it is perhaps more likely that it would serve as a source of technical and scientific advice to the commodity council, which itself would be the political body authorized to take executive action by the United Nations. It seems important above all to secure a position of authority for the food organization as an impartial source of information and advice in agricultural and nutritional matters. Such a body, able to provide a meeting ground for the expert and a forum for the discussion of matters of common concern, capable of conducting expert enquiries or undertakings at the request of Governments or groups of Governments, would play an invaluable part in carrying out the aims of the Hot Springs Conference irrespective of the progress which may be made in organizing economic relations internationally in more general fields. Other and more contentious ground, particularly that in which emergency agencies are now operating or may operate in the near future, it would do well to avoid, at any rate until the general international picture becomes clearer. If the Governments represented on the interim commission bear these points in mind, as they will clearly do, there is little doubt that the organization will prove to be a most important and valuable piece of international machinery.

* Resolution I. 4.

Success of the Conference

There can be no reasonable doubt that the Conference was the success which the chief participating Governments claimed it to be. Many of the early doubts and fears dissolved as soon as the delegates assembled at Hot Springs, and many others were seen to be illusory as the discussions proceeded. In Washington before the Conference met there was considerable anxiety about the short time given for preparation, particularly for those delegations who had to come from distant parts. Old conference hands recalled the proverbial lobbying, the interminable speeches, the hasty compromises, the banal resolutions of their previous experience, and asked themselves whether in little over a fortnight, with no very precise direction and no previously agreed machinery of management, 44 nations with equal voting rights could achieve results sufficient to justify the Conference to the world. When the Conference was over many with previous experience seem to have thought that no other international conference had been held in quite so encouraging an internal atmosphere.

This impression is important because it suggests that the nations have learned a good deal since the days between the two wars. This was the first Conference of all the United Nations and their associates. Their representatives discussed a practical problem relating immediately to the period following the war. These representatives were officials and experts rather than politicians. They were not plenipotentiaries of their Governments. But, meeting on that level and within the limitations of their subject, they solved pretty well, on their own account and without prior guidance or arrangement, the problem of how to combine the democratic principle of one nation one vote with the undeniably necessary principle of leadership by the Great Powers. If any conference is to reach conclusions which can be put into practice, it is necessary that the leading Powers, who will have the chief duty and the chief responsibility for carrying them out, should be in agreement upon them. But at Hot Springs the Great Powers seem to have evoked little, if any, jealousy, and if one may judge from appearances, what leadership they gave was expected and welcomed by the others. Important resolutions may have originated from the principal delegations, but if they did so the resolutions and proceedings bear no evidence of the fact.

A striking point about the Conference was that there were no resolutions put forward by single Powers for purposes of prestige and accepted by a reluctant majority for purposes of appeasement. From this point of view the lack of preparatory work may have been an advantage. No one can have imagined that the Great Powers had arrived at the Conference with the final resolutions in their pockets. At the same time there would seem to have been a very obvious general determination that national pride and pride of authorship should not be allowed to assert itself immoderately. Anonymity of work and the pooling of ideas was the prevailing rule. The exclusion of the press from the hotel in the early stages may have assisted in this result, since it excused delegations from committing themselves to precise attitudes too early in the proceedings. The Conference accepted such practical

arrangements as the one language rule, which resulted in a great simplification of procedure, the self-denying ordinance whereby there were no opening speeches by each delegation, but only written statements, and the innovation by which the Conference began by agreeing to a closing date. No conference seems to have been less affected by love of precedent and formality and by personal and national jealousies, which have done so much to mar public international gatherings in the past. The American Secretary-General and his staff contributed greatly by devising these arrangements and by the quiet and efficient manner in which they conducted the proceedings on the technical side.

This happy result would not have been achieved if the delegations had not been of good and in some cases of outstanding quality. It would be a pity at this date to mar the cordial atmosphere which developed at Hot Springs by making comparisons between one delegation and another. But it may be said that the principal Powers sent delegations of exceptional ability and that the British Commonwealth played a fruitful part in the Conference because its delegations were admirably chosen and had important and valuable ideas to put forward. The United Kingdom sent a very large delegation—the delegates and advisers in the published list alone numbered 23. This enabled them to cover the whole work of the Conference in all its ramifications and to contribute to the discussions in all the sections and committees which sat independently and often simultaneously throughout the Conference. Mr. Richard Law deserves a special tribute for his leadership of this delegation. He was a most popular and respected figure at Hot Springs, both with his fellow delegates and with the press. His first press conference in Washington before the opening session gave the press and the public at large the first constructive picture of what the Conference might be expected to achieve. The manner in which he handled the press then and later contributed much to the changed attitude with which the public came to regard the Conference. His chief anxiety at Hot Springs must have been to dissuade the press from contrasting his willingness to talk with the silence of the White House and the State Department in the early stages.

Commonwealth Representation

A word should be said about the significance of this meeting for the British Commonwealth. Foreign nations are inclined to regard with jealousy the claim of the Dominions to send separate delegations and to exercise separate votes at an international conference. They feel that the arrangement is unfair as giving a plural vote to what they regard as fundamentally a single interest. Members of the Commonwealth take the equal status of all His Majesty's Dominions so much for granted that they do not always realize how little other nations understand the peculiar relationship existing between His Majesty's subjects. The majority in every country think that the power of the Crown still resides in London and emanates from there alone. They interpret disagreements between members of the Commonwealth, which we regard as natural and healthy signs of life, as an indication that the common loyalty is dissolving. Hot Springs, where the Dominions and India were all

represented, where each played a full and independent part in the deliberations and contributed their own experience and point of view, exemplified the true relationship as we should wish to see it exemplified. There was no feeling on the part of the Conference that the Empire was getting together behind the backs of other delegations in order to put across a common Empire policy. There was no common Empire policy, except in so far as the Commonwealth delegations were in agreement on the common objectives which the Conference set out to attain. But equally there was no lack of harmony. That view of the imperial relationship—independence combined with interdependence—seems to be one which it is worth while to impress on every possible occasion on foreign nations. If members of the Commonwealth can bring home this lesson they will contribute much to a better understanding of what the Commonwealth means and what is the secret of its strength and permanence. If they do so successfully, the Empire which saved herself by her exertions may yet save the world by her example.

Procedure for Future Conferences

There remains the question what is to be learned from Hot Springs as regards procedure for future international discussion. The Conference was exploratory and technical. Hitherto diplomacy has generally regarded such exploration as better done by confidential discussion between a gradually widening group of Powers. But it is at least possible that we may make better progress now by laying the basic problems before a series of United Nations conferences at an early stage, before views have crystallized and positions have been adopted by nations or groups of nations, hoping thus to obtain agreement on at least a series of principles which would facilitate later agreement on the practical machinery required. Again, it is arguable that we should encourage the idea of technical conferences as opposed to conferences of plenipotentiaries for clearing some of the ground in post-war questions, including even perhaps political questions in the restricted sense of that word. There is much food for thought here, though it seems hardly possible to dogmatize at the present stage. But the attitude of the nations, and in particular of the United States, must be taken into account. If the United States Government tend to avoid individual discussion and prefer the United Nations approach where it is at all possible, their feeling is shared by many other nations. There was no part of Judge Jones's concluding speech which evoked greater applause than where he said "there are no super-states, there are no master races among the United Nations". The American people are suspicious of negotiations with foreign great Powers, partly because of the legend that the United States Government is always outmanœuvred and made the victim in these contests. For this reason they may feel that there is a certain safety in numbers. The democratic principle also requires that the public should be educated to the policy for which they will ultimately have to take responsibility. At Hot Springs President Roosevelt combined all these requirements with the obvious principle that exploratory discussion must precede international decision and called an exploratory conference of all the United Nations and their associates.

There are risks in this procedure, particularly the risk of a deadlock or of a compromise which suits nobody, since the ground cannot be as well prepared as in the method of reaching agreement stage by stage. But there are advantages also. The method was certainly very successful at Hot Springs, and the results there could probably never have been achieved in any other way. If we refuse to dogmatize, we may find that President Roosevelt, when he summoned the Conference on Food and Agriculture, not only successfully launched the United Nations on their first trial run into the yet uncharted seas which they must traverse, but made an important addition to the technique of diplomacy.

Mr. Krutikov, the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in a very able closing speech, which deserves study as indicating the constructive and hopeful attitude adopted by the Soviet Government towards the Conference, observed:

"At the present time it is difficult, and even impossible, to estimate fully the importance of this Conference and of the recommendations here adopted. Of this, the future will judge. It is safe to say, however, that in the solution of current problems the Conference has played a positive rôle by further strengthening the collaboration of the United Nations."

The future will indeed be the judge of the success or failure of the United Nations to reach agreement on the elements of post-war international collaboration. Words of warning have a soporific effect if they are too often repeated, and we are in danger of forgetting, because we have been told so often, that the need for agreement is urgent. We have a year, perhaps two years; little if any more before the disintegration sets in. It is a race in which boldness will win and rashness or indecision will invite disaster. If the Conference on Food and Agriculture has made the first few paces in the right direction we can be grateful to those who carried it to a conclusion and to the President of the United States who summoned it to meet at Hot Springs.

STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XVI

THE INVASION OF SICILY

IT required no expert to tell that the sudden collapse of the Axis in Tunisia was a military portent. The figures of captures—340,000 prisoners and an amount of material so great that it has not yet been enumerated—proclaim the fact. The truth behind the figures, however, is even more significant. Coming, as it did, upon the heels of Stalingrad, the Tunisian victory showed the German claim to superiority both in strategy and in tactics to be false. Upon only one assumption could the decision to try to hold Tunisia be excused. If indeed the bridgehead could have been held long enough to make sure of stopping the Allies farther on; if time had been gained to harden the "soft under-belly" of the Axis (as the sacrifice at Stalingrad gained time to hold the Orel–Taganrog–Kuban line); then the sacrifice in Tunisia might have been worth while. On their side the Allies had, of course, begun planning further steps long before the collapse, but its suddenness involved a lapse of some time before these plans matured. The lull might have been longer but for two factors which could hardly have been foreseen. The first was an unexpectedly favourable turn in the war against the U-boats, which made available much more shipping for operations. The second was the fading out of any effective challenge to our local mastery of the air. These two factors made possible in the Mediterranean amphibious operations anywhere, at any time, and at low cost.

BOMBARDMENT FROM THE AIR

BOMBARDMENT from the air does not cause heavy casualties to troops. It seriously embarrasses, but does not wholly frustrate, supply by motor transport. It achieves results, which are sometimes startling, for two main reasons. The first is noise. The menacing roar of approaching aircraft, the horrible whistle of bombs, the shattering explosions undoubtedly exercise an effect upon the physical structure of the human body which is comparable to wholesale shell-shock. The second reason is that when everyone is having to dive repeatedly for shelter, touch between commanders and their units disintegrates. The staff cannot maintain quiet, impersonal objectivity or receive a constant stream of news upon which to base orders. When General von Arnim was captured in Tunisia, he had not the slightest idea where his troops were nor what was happening to them. Of course, if the air bombardment lets up for a few hours, or if it is not swiftly followed up by ground troops, or even if air mastery is not so great but that the enemy sees some of his own machines in action, good troops quickly recover. Recovery, therefore, may take place when the objective is so large that bombardment cannot be continuous or supply lines are so numerous that they cannot all be continually covered. The best summary of the case is that air bombardment

is a symptom of air mastery, and that air mastery produces both moral and physical confusion in an army. In short the popular phrase "softening up" is exactly what air bombardment does.

It follows from this analysis that a small target like Pantellaria could be so softened by air bombardment as to collapse altogether, but a large target like Sicily could not. The invasion of Sicily therefore required immense preparations in addition to softening from the air. It was hardly possible to conceal the fact that Sicily would be the next objective, because it was the only objective within reach of effective fighter cover. Therefore, though our air bombardment ranged far and wide, and included large-scale attacks on Sardinia, many parts of the Italian mainland, and Crete (not to speak of devastating raids from this country on western Germany and communications in western Europe) the enemy must have been expecting us in Sicily. He had collected there about seven Italian and more than three German divisions. He had had ample time to fortify all likely landing places; and the Allied expedition which embarked two months after the Tunisian victory, so far from being entitled to expect an easy task, was the most hazardous ever undertaken since Gallipoli.

THE LANDING

BUT the enemy, though he could not fail to guess that Sicily would be attacked, failed to guess exactly where the attack would come. He seems to have expected it at the western tip of the island and to have made his dispositions accordingly. It was in fact delivered against the south-east corner along the 100 mile stretch from Licata to Syracuse. The American Seventh Army was on the left; a Canadian Division, going into action for the first time since the fearsome experience of the Dieppe raid, was in the centre; and the British Eighth Army was on the right. In advance of the invasion fleet a large body of air-borne troops were dropped by parachute and glider. A high wind made accuracy in dropping them at the proper spots difficult; but the fine gallantry of the troops overcame all difficulties, and apart from some gliders which came down in the sea, all the 5,000 men involved contributed very greatly to the success of the landings and to the further advance from the beaches. It must be admitted, however, that something like a weather miracle was vouchsafed to the invaders. The invasion fleets set out in a gale with a heavy sea running, and if this weather had continued the landing craft would have had great trouble in reaching the shore at all. But towards dawn the wind fell suddenly and only some of the landing parties were inconvenienced by a swell. As the barges stood in towards the shore, a continuous stream of aircraft roared overhead and a great fleet of warships opened up with their guns. It was in every sense of the phrase a "combined operation" and it was brilliantly successful. There was no effective opposition to the actual landings, and only on the American sector did any serious counter-attack develop during the first critical 48 hours. Near Gela the Germans, attacking with a number of tanks, broke through momentarily to the beach, but resolute and skilful fighting sealed off the break and destroyed the enemy.

The operation had not been in progress many days before it became clear that only the Germans were going to fight, and that their plan was only to fight in the north-east corner where the bastion of Mount Etna covers the line of retreat through Messina to the mainland. Here, just south of Catania, the Eighth Army after a swift advance from Syracuse ran against a solid line and sat down to hammer it. In the centre the Canadians and the British 78th Division, driving north and north-east, encountered gradually stiffening opposition. Their performance in advancing so far and so fast was remarkable. The Americans, after the first few days, encountered a collapse of the Italian defenders. In less than a fortnight they had taken 60,000 prisoners, cut right across the island to Palermo, and occupied the whole of the western tip. It must be remembered that the Axis had had four years to prepare their defence, and we had had fourteen days to mount an attack, every man and machine for which had had to be brought across 100 miles of sea (some had come from very much farther away), unloaded, and brought up to the front. The attitude of the civilians was more reminiscent of a friendly than of a hostile country. In most places they greeted our troops with acclamation, which no doubt owed something to the fact that so many civilians have friends or relations in the United States, but seems to have been mainly prompted by hatred of the war and of the Fascists and Germans who had brought war to them. This friendliness to the enemy was possibly the last straw which broke Mussolini's back. It was quite unexpected, and the earlier Italian communiqués drew pictures of the fierce resistance of the Sicilians. The Fascist Government should have known better. The present writer happened to be in a Sicilian town many years ago when a rumour gained currency that Mussolini was dead. Even then the rumour was greeted with the most tactless demonstrations of delight.

A Meeting with Hitler

The rapid and unequivocal success of the landings in Sicily shook Mussolini to the marrow. He knew the game was up, and that no jugglings within the Fascist hierarchy could save it. On July 19 he went to meet Hitler in northern Italy, presumably to tell him that only very large German reinforcements could keep Italy in the war at all. On the very same day the crowning proof of her inability to defend her own country was given by a heavy bombardment of marshalling yards and aerodromes on the outskirts of Rome by a force of 500 American bombers. A strategic review cannot concern itself with the political aspects of this attack. It must limit itself to observing the military deductions from the fact that the Fascist capital could be thus attacked for the loss of only 5 bombers. It is worth recalling that the only similar German raid on this country cost the enemy 185 machines. That is far more significant, from the military point of view, than any effect which the raid may have had on communications from north to south. It is, of course, not known what reply Hitler gave to Mussolini's appeal. The most probable account says that he proposed fighting a rearguard action back to the Apennines where a German army would meanwhile take up positions. The communiqué, which baldly stated that military matters were discussed,

was a pointer to the dramatic sequel. It was clear that Fascism could no longer expect anything from the Italians, and from the Germans only what was convenient to them. Perhaps some other régime could get something better from both. Recourse was therefore had to the alternative which has been in the background at every crisis in the history of Fascism, namely, the Crown acting through a professional soldier. On July 24, therefore, Mussolini resigned. The King appointed Marshal Badoglio as his successor, and monarch and marshal both issued proclamations calling upon all Italians to rally to their national duty round the throne. The key phrase in the Marshal's proclamation was "the war continues"; but whether this portended blackmail on the Germans to send more support or an attempt to extort favourable terms for surrender from the Allies was not immediately apparent.

The Collapse of Fascism

Once again it must be recalled that a strategic review can only deal with the military implications of the collapse of Fascism. They are far-reaching: since that collapse was caused mainly by military defeat in Africa and Sicily and by devastating air bombardment of the mainland, it is pretty safe to say that the change of régime was required and interpreted by the Italian people as the prelude to peace and not merely to a more efficient war. Therefore, whatever the King and the Marshal may hope, what they will get is wholesale surrenders of their troops in the field and hectic pressure to capitulate from the people at home. Again, whatever the new Government's intentions, nothing can save the Germans from a terrible quandary. They will have to do all the serious fighting henceforward in Italy. The forces they have there already are too great to be lightly sacrificed and too few not to be swamped unless heavily reinforced. Where are reinforcements to be found? Out of Mr. Churchill's latest estimate of 300 German divisions, the best part of 200 are on the Eastern front engaged in or destined to nourish a struggle in which it would be fatal to weaken. At least 50 are in Norway, the Low Countries, and France. We know there are already 3½ in Sicily, and there may well be the equivalent of 4 or 5 in Italy itself. Perhaps 5 or 6 more are in or near the Balkans. These, now that the 20 Italian divisions are earmarked for withdrawal or as untrustworthy, will have to be reinforced; for it is most unlikely that the Bulgarians will take over the whole job of holding down guerrillas from Croatia to the Peloponnese and guarding against an Allied invasion. This leaves between 35 and 40 divisions in reserve. Assuming that these divisions are exclusive of those required to man the defences of Germany herself, the number is none too large to meet emergency calls which may come at any moment from many quarters outside Italy. The conclusion is that any attempt to hold in Italy must involve serious risks somewhere else. On the other hand, if Italy is not held, German prestige slumps; by the end of the year the Allies will have extremely powerful forces well placed to strike west into France, east into the Balkans or north-east into Austria; and southern Germany as well as central Europe will be within easier reach of our heavy bombers. That is the German quandary.

Any weakening of the German forces on other fronts would involve serious risks. During the period under review the writing on the wall has appeared in the East as well as in the Mediterranean. At the end of June the Germans launched an attack with 30 divisions, of which not fewer than half were armoured, against the Kursk salient. The significant features of this attack compared with previous summer onslaughts were the narrowness of its front and the quickness of its failure. It has been plausibly argued that the explanation is at long last that shortage of fuel which some optimistic commentators have been detecting ever since 1940; but the cautious will prefer to think that the attack was designed mainly to forestall a Russian offensive known to be in course of preparation. However this may be, the Germans gained neither tactical nor strategic advantages. No advance of any consequence was made, and a Russian counter-offensive was not prevented. This counter-stroke was directed against the Orel salient, and achieved steady, if not at first spectacular, success. At the moment of writing both Orel and Bielgorod have fallen and the Russians are driving on to Briansk and Kharkov. It must never be forgotten that the fighting in the East is on a much greater scale than anything so far in the West; and that it is in the East that the bulk of the *Wehrmacht* is being held and bled. It is quite obvious that here the Germans cannot safely withdraw a single man or machine.

As for the Balkans, it has already been noted that Italians must—but Germans cannot—be withdrawn from this sector. In mid-July a heavy air attack (in which Greek squadrons participated) took place against Crete, and earlier there had been a small raid on the island by land forces. Is it really supposed that the Allied armies in Sicily exhaust the present possibilities of action in the Mediterranean? Anyone can think of masses of troops known to be in these regions but not known to be in Sicily. Anyone can see that the opening of the Mediterranean sea-route cuts 10,000 miles off our lines of communication and adds 2,000,000 effective tons to our shipping. Anybody can see the immense strategic objective of the Rumanian oilfields, heavily bombed by the Americans early in August, and the imperative call to liberate the gallant Greeks. But at this point it would be appropriate to imitate the Delphic oracle, having pierced obscurity to the point of showing that the enemy would be mad to weaken himself in this sector.

Air Offensive in Western Europe

What of Western Europe? There the enemy has thrown up the air sponge. He cannot throw up the land sponge as well. This sector contains the only area, except Sicily, within reach of effective fighter cover from existing Allied bases. It is adjacent to the collecting ground of the main Allied military strength. How could its garrison be reduced? In fact its air and anti-aircraft garrison has been considerably and ineffectually strengthened. Here the great experiment, foreshadowed by the Prime Minister, of seeing how far the enemy can be reduced by air attack alone is in full swing; and it is essential to grasp what it has achieved and how.

The method is simple. A vital and fairly compact area such as the Ruhr is selected. A large force of heavy modern bombers—equivalent to between two and three times its number of earlier types of bomber—is sent to bomb it methodically bit by bit. The force is so large and its attack so concentrated that the A.R.P. services are wholly and the A.A. defences partially swamped. As a result fires get well hold and casualties among the raiders are nearly always light in proportion to the force engaged. The same target is attacked in the same way until photographs show that the damage is beyond repair. This may take two, three, or more visits; but it can be done by the bomber force now available. Some attacks affect the whole area, such as the skilful and gallant attacks which breached two out of the three main reservoirs supplying most of the Ruhr with water for industrial purposes. As for the results, the damage has been far too great for the enemy to conceal or even obscure it.

It must be noted that the mass night raids of the R.A.F. are only part of its tactics. They are supplemented in three ways. First, repeated attacks by naval aircraft and Coastal Command against sea convoys. These air attacks are rounded off by repeated and most skilful attacks by our light naval craft. Secondly, both by night and by day aircraft operate singly on "intruder" patrols, against targets ranging from lorries to airfields. Last and most important are the mass attacks by American heavy bombers in daylight. These are becoming continuous and formidable not only to ground targets but to enemy fighters. A formation of 24 Flying Fortresses has a battery of over 300 heavy machine guns. It flies in a protective aura of lead. Thanks to its instruments, it can bomb with reasonable accuracy on a perfectly clear day from a height of 4 or 5 miles. Not for the first time in these notes it must be observed that the discovery of a machine and a technique which can ensure unescorted day bombing without crippling losses makes the value of the air arm incomparably greater. One instance may be given. On July 25 getting on for 1,000 R.A.F. bombers dropped 2,300 tons of bombs by night on Hamburg. Next day the Americans dropped several hundred more tons on the same target. Next night R.A.F. Mosquito bombers titivated the damage up again. Two nights later more than 2,300 tons of bombs were dropped on the same targets. It only remains to note that more distant targets can expect the same fate as the nights get longer. The extraordinary change of fortune in the U-boat campaign has already been included among the major causes of the change of fortune in the war as a whole. One illuminating figure has been given. In the month of May submarines were destroyed at the rate of over one a day; and destruction has continued since at quite as good a rate in proportion to the number of U-boats operating. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this victory, which has been secured by the maturing of a number of protective and offensive devices, including the provision of small aircraft carriers and of more effective escort vessels. The enemy has been trying hard but so far ineffectually to think out new tactics and new designs for his U-boats. But meanwhile the total of Allied tonnage available is leaping ahead and enlarging the possibilities open to Allied strategy.

War in the Far East

So much for the war in Europe, the course of which gives reason at last to hope that victory by the end of next year may be in sight. There remains, and will then remain, the war in the Far East, the strategy of which is governed by the Allied agreement that accounts must be finally settled with Germany and Italy before turning on Japan. It has however always been necessary, and has recently become less difficult, to spare enough force from the prior task in the West to check and even to strike back at the Japanese. A very large army has been built up in India, though so far, owing to the great difficulties of supply on the Burmese frontier and the great geographical and climatic handicaps, its offensive power has been very limited. The remarkable exploit of Brigadier Orde Wingate, who led and maintained for many months a force of 1,000 men miles deep into enemy occupied territory, did not procure success for the more formal operations along the coast. It is clear that there can be no easy nor early re-opening of the Burma Road—the overland route to China. Nevertheless a further powerful attempt by the Japanese to extend their hold on that country has again failed. It has been possible to supplement the consistent valour of the Chinese with a fairly powerful American air force; and nothing is more certain than that one day Chinese territory will be the base for an air onslaught against the heart of Japan. It is of the highest importance that this prospect should not fade; for the alternative strategy of forcing the Japanese back mile by mile from Arakan to Saigon, and island by island from the Solomons to the Philippines, cannot give rapid results.

The cream of the Australian and American armies, supported by a powerful fleet and air force, have continued meanwhile the job of "island hopping". Having cleared Papua, they have invaded the adjacent territory of New Guinea and are now closing in on Salamaua. Having taken Guadalcanal, they have hopped on to Rendova, another of the Solomons, and look like polishing off New Georgia. Their aircraft range daily on an immense arc from Timor through the Celebes to the Solomons. Their submarines take steady toll of Japanese shipping. All these operations have clearly weakened the enemy on the sea and in the air. They have changed the whole atmosphere from one of justifiable anxiety to justifiable hope—so much so that it is felt safe to hold a general election in Australia. Moreover, away amid the fogs of the extreme North, Attu, one of the Aleutians, has been recaptured, and Kiska is likely to follow suit. The strategy everywhere, however, is still a holding strategy. The groups of men who grapple in the matted, sodden, and malaria-infested jungles are small groups. Such is the character of the crack Japanese troops that the surrender of unwounded men is virtually unknown. Two things therefore emerge clearly from this fighting. The first is that the Japanese expansion has reached its limits. The second is that Japanese contraction, failing a successful blow at the heart of their Empire, will require an immense effort.

A Year Ago and To-day

Nevertheless it is legitimate to believe for the first time, on a survey of the war as a whole, that the game is up for all our enemies. Little more than a year ago Mussolini was in Benghazi, waiting to enter Alexandria in triumph. Now nobody except Marshal Badoglio and a few Italian policemen know where he is. A year ago the Germans were in full cry for the Caucasus and the Volga. Now they are retreating from a desperate defence of Orel. A year ago the Axis bestrode the world like a Colossus. To-day it is doubtful whether there is an Axis at all. A year ago the U-boats were eating out the heart of the Allied mercantile marine. Now they are eating their hearts out in harbour. A year ago Germany was only sporadically scarred. To-day general ruin is spreading from her western provinces as spilt ink spreads on blotting paper. The contrast is no longer between bad and less bad, but between bad and good. Nothing is ever certain in war; but it is long odds that the next contrast will be between good and better.

AMERICAN CONTRASTS

SOME GRIEVANCES AND GREAT ACHIEVEMENT

IT is very easy to misunderstand what is happening in the United States. News dispatches during the latter months of Congress, before its long recess, told of disagreements and deadlocks which made it look as if President Roosevelt were heading toward the tragic fate of Woodrow Wilson. The coal strike, the slight decline in over-all war production, the squabbles over methods of fighting inflation, and the incessant complaints of citizens against slight inconveniences or privations, must have made the United States look from the outside to be on the verge of disorder and chaos.

In point of fact the ratio of smoke to fire has been pretty normal. Before recessing Congress dealt the President only one really significant blow, and that was in over-riding his veto of the anti-strike Bill. Yet that vote to override may help the President much more than it hinders, since it has partly reestablished Mr. Roosevelt's popularity with labor, and if the Bill proves unworkable he will be proved right all along. Otherwise Congress finally enacted pretty much the program that the President needed, and it did not in the end cripple his anti-inflation program or prevent sound war taxation. Actually, as it turned out, the President's control of legislation was far better than last November's electoral victories for anti-administration members indicated it would be. And while the various domestic war agencies, such as the Office of Price Administration and the Office of War Information, have had their difficulties, they are probably organized and operating better than they were a year ago. The coal strike and other aspects of labor relations were and are serious. If prices are not kept under better control, there will be still more pressure for big wage increases, and the inflation fat may be in the fire. But prophecies of runaway inflation have been rife for years now, and we are still holding a more stable price level than we did in the last war. In short, British and other overseas readers need not get unduly excited about all they hear from the United States. Our air may be blue with the smoke of politics, but President Roosevelt remains a very resourceful politician, possessed of much patience, and highly expert in the art of giving his opponents plenty of rope. He hasn't really lost an innings yet.

POLITICS-AS-USUAL

IT is, of course, unfortunate that we permit ourselves this luxury of politics-as-usual. But it is natural. There are two main reasons. First, we are 3,000 miles away from actual physical danger. We have not been fused into unity by peril. Our peril was there, but less palpably. Incredibly enough the war has not come real to a great many people, some of whom are in Congress, in high administrative posts, in big business, or in labor. It has not come real in the sense which would make them subordinate their selfish interests to the needs of the whole. Second, President Roosevelt has not drawn together a

genuinely "national" or coalition Government. It is true that early in 1940 he brought two Republicans, Secretaries Stimson and Knox, into his Cabinet. But they were hand-picked and non-representative. He did not even include in his top war administration the leading members of his own party if they had been critical of his domestic policies. A genuine Government of national union would have brought together such talented, albeit sometimes mistaken, men as Herbert Hoover, Wendell Willkie, Bernard M. Baruch, James A. Farley, Joseph P. Kennedy, Alf M. Landon. An American war effort under the direction of a thoroughly representative group would have required many concessions and sacrifices to hold together, particularly on the part of the President; but it would have been a magnificent objective and it would have thrilled the people. Lacking representative leadership, it is quite natural that politicians, labor leaders, industrialists and others have acted as if the ordinary political rules were in effect, and that politics-as-usual was permissible.

If this decision of politics-as-usual prevails at the top, in the very Cabinet and war-planning agencies, how much more does it exist in lower ranks! There are, of course, Republicans and thoroughgoing conservatives in various posts in the war agencies. But they do not make the big policy decisions. That duty is reserved to the President and his inner circle, and there the orientation is still in the direction of social reform. Moreover, in many war agency posts of responsibility, the President has placed Democratic "lame ducks"—Congressmen who were defeated at the polls last November. Some of them were able and worthy men. But their appointment cast an aura of politics and patronage over the war program. Few active Republican politicians have been called to any posts of responsibility at all. They are left to languish—or to flourish—in the opposition. And once more politics-as-usual is invited.

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

IT is a great pity that the United States had to do its part in the greatest war in history without the inspiring effects of truly national leadership. It may be a tragedy for the post-war period if we do not rise above our political divisions, and develop a national foreign policy. Perhaps one may say that President Roosevelt's next great historical rôle is to get the nation out of these political morasses on to the high ground of unity. To achieve that result, the President must undo a great deal of political background. The fact is, of course, that he stands to many Americans as the leader of the New Deal, not as a world leader. And the New Deal is a thoroughly disputable platform.

Many conservatives think that the President, or those around him, are now seeking to further domestic "reforms" under the guise of a war program. Harry L. Hopkins, who still resides in the White House, is to them a symbol of all that is most extreme in New Dealism. They are highly suspicious of the kind of controls now maintained over war-time industry, banking and agriculture, and they apprehend even more what the effects will be of the post-war unscrambling process. Incredible as it will seem, there

are still a good many Americans who worry more over the New Deal than they do over Hitler. They are, of course, zealous to bring about the defeat of our enemies. But the New Deal is, or was, right here at home and its effects were felt in their board room or counting house. Hitler never came that close. This isn't to question their loyalty. My next-door neighbor, for example, is a manufacturer of storage batteries. He makes very good ones, and is working very hard to reach high standards of production for the armed forces. But he sees nothing wrong in working and talking for the defeat of President Roosevelt, not only if he stands for reelection next year, but in current tests of strength with Congress. I believe nine out of ten business men, nine out of ten conservatives in whatever walk of life, would take much the same attitude. The Gallup Poll, published on July 11, showed —with whatever strict accuracy—that the President's handling of domestic matters had lost the support of over 50 per cent. of the country, while his control of foreign policy and the war was favored by an overwhelming majority. This proves the point that President Roosevelt's mandate as a world leader is under constant guerrilla warfare for reasons of strictly domestic politics. His authority to carry on, at the elections next year, may be revoked for these reasons. And it is principally up to Mr. Roosevelt himself to extricate his leadership from this ambush. One principal avenue of escape would be to broaden the base of the War Administration to include Opposition leaders. It is pretty late in the day to suggest such a step, but perhaps it is better late than never. Such action would require various concessions and compromises from the President, which he would not relish. But the end result might be assured authority for his Administration.

Complaints against the Government

If the War Administration, so broadened, resulted in more efficient organization and heartier popular support, it would be worth almost any price. As things stand now, various domestic aspects of the war program have not been impressively administered. There is, indeed, much reason to believe that a good many more eggs have been broken than any omelet should require. The public knows that the rationing program has been filled with inconsistencies and miscalculations. It has also been marked by a constant changing of the rules. This uncertainty has destroyed public confidence and conformity more devastatingly than anything else. Price ceilings have constantly shifted. Point values are changing every few weeks. Some commodities have gone off the market altogether because suppliers have not been able to pay expenses out of the gap between wholesale and retail ceiling prices. Bureaucracy and paternalism have challenged and abused American ingenuity. Local rationing boards have been far from consistent. Some are rigid and stern, others lenient to the point of venality. In the face of colossal expenditures—the current Congress appropriated a total of $130,000,000,000 —the public is far from confident that its money is not being too much wasted. Everybody knows that war is by nature wasteful, but there are plenty of signs that among the magnificent industrial achievements of our war production program there were also included some grandiose follies.

We are prepared to pay for the experiments and errors in judgment of our army and navy procurement officers, but the public suspects that the waste has not stopped there. There are also grave matters of national policy and natural resources. Recently, after a vigorous outcry by the Department of Justice, the Navy Department cancelled a lease it had signed with a big oil company which would have opened a naval oil reserve at Elk Hills, Wyoming, in circumstances embarrassingly reminiscent of our nearby Teapot Dome scandals of the 'twenties.

Added to this catalog of grievances must come the operation of the selective service system. While nearly everybody welcomed the draft as a democratic method of recruiting national forces, the timing and method of selection has constantly been changing and confusing. Thus, one day one official will say: "Fathers are to be drafted in October" and within 24 hours an equally authoritative official will insist: "Fathers are not to be drafted at all." So it has gone. Such statements came from the men responsible for carrying out the law, and they are the result of administrative muddling and confusion which should not be tolerated. Another serious flaw is the fact that for a long time local draft boards differed drastically from one another. Mr. X in one locality would be drafted early, while Mr. Y in another district —with precisely the same case history—would not be drafted at all, or not for months, because there happened to be more men available in the other district, or it was not the policy of the local board to select men as drastically. As the manager of an office with some hundred workers, the writer can bear witness that our proper claims for speedy handling, for deferment, &c., are treated variously and inconsistently by the many draft boards in the localities where these workers reside. Such a situation produces resentment and ill-feeling.

Behind organized labor's grievances there are a number of understandable causes. Prices have certainly been rising faster than wages. The wage ceiling has been holding within certain bounds, prices have risen more sharply. And yet to break the wage ceiling would have made it certain that prices would soar almost out of control. So it is necessary to ask labor to absorb the differential for some time to come. Every breach in the wage ceiling, and there have been a few, threatens to start the deluge. We have simply not been spartan enough, or efficient enough, to keep wages and prices completely in line. And stragglers beget stragglers. While labor's discontent springs mainly from these cost-of-living facts, there are other reasons for the working man's restiveness. It is pretty certain that industrial management and capital are pasturing in lush fields. Profits in some factories and operations have been colossal, and while the Government takes a tremendous tax, there is nevertheless a margin left. When labor knows that its employer's profits have been over 100 per cent., it is not apt to accept meekly a wage ceiling which is rigid in the face of rising prices. Many working men, too, have run into the effects of too hasty or unthinking industrial expansion. Despite labor shortages, some factories have overhired workers in order to have a surplus for expansion. One man is quoted, a fine workman, who was hired and told never to walk about the plant without a

screwdriver or spanner in his hand, but given little or nothing else to do. He was being "held" for a new factory to be opened by the same company in a few months. His state of morale was not good, and he helped swell the statistics of absenteeism. There have been managerial difficulties aplenty in the vast expansion we have experienced, and labor is very sensitive to fumbling or inexpert supervision. In innumerable instances women were hired without any thought to the continuance of home or community life—poor housing, no nurseries or adequate schools, very difficult shopping facilities.

Tremendous Production Figures

This picture of the little ills of the American home front could be continued quite extensively; but it would be a mistake to do so, for the over-all picture would be misleading. These details may explain to the overseas reader some of the factors which are bumping into the daily lives of ordinary Americans. They are important—psychologically, politically, and economically—but they do not tell the whole story. Actually, despite all such irritants, the American war effort is going forward even better than might have been expected. Our production totals, though they slumped slightly in June, are still tremendous. In many categories we alone are building more war materials than all our enemies, and in some categories we are building more than our enemies and friends put together. Now that the submarine menace seems under reasonable control, and our shipping volume is mounting satisfactorily, the war seems to await only the steady, patient, and immensely complicated deployment of forces. The production is already fully assured, although we must keep busy to see that our types are constantly improving. Recapitulation of the dazzling totals of production is not necessary: the fact is that the material is at hand, and is being shipped with reasonable speed to the fronts where it is needed. Our success in reducing the submarine dangers is ranked as one of our major triumphs, but Americans realize they must remain vigilant in seeing that the Battle of the Atlantic stays won.

Thus we may chalk up two great victories—the Battle of Production, and the Battle of Transportation. Of equal importance is the recruitment and training of men. Despite the strictures a few paragraphs above about the inequalities of the draft, the fact is that the training of the American Army, Navy, and Air Forces is proceeding even better than might have been hoped. Now that our forces are getting ample baptism of fire and actual battle experience, we may look forward to the active operation of land, sea, and air forces which—with our allies—will constitute a physical power such as the world has never seen. Our troops learned to do well against the enemy in Tunisia, while our sailors and our airmen have done well since the beginning. There is constant improvement in the training of our various technicians. The air squadrons reaching the European front show a steady advancement in skill and training. Our mechanized troops are similarly deriving swift benefit from their hard and practical training programs. We have one training center in California larger than the State of Massachusetts. The upshot is that, as these men turn into seasoned veterans, we may expect

everything of them. They will not long be green, and already we have men almost totalling millions more adequately trained than any sizeable units we were able to send to France in the last war.

The President's Future

Men—materials—movement. If we have surmounted these three big problems, why do we worry about morale, especially morale at home? Well, doubtless we can overdo our estimates of the importance of squabbling in Washington and across the nation. Yet two overwhelming questions present themselves: President Roosevelt's future as it relates to America's rôle in the post-war world, and American action on the race problem in relation to the world race question. These are both questions of greatest magnitude. As has been set forth, President Roosevelt has been willing to remain a strictly party leader in the eyes of many of the American people. He has not sought by large measures to conciliate his opposition. He has won many political victories in the past by riding out the storm, and that is what he appears to have determined to do now. That means that, if the war is still on in 1944, he is presumably intent upon running for a fourth term. If the war situation then is sufficiently grave, and its gravity cannot be blamed to maladministration through President Roosevelt, his chances for reelection would be thoroughly strong. Even politics-torn America may hesitate to change horses in the midst of the stream, or to dismantle the war administration that has been erected. But there will certainly be a stiff electoral campaign, with all the divisive influences that such a process must inevitably produce. Upon the spirit and consequences of that campaign is likely to depend America's rôle in the post-war world for some time to come. If both candidates, as in 1940, pledge themselves to a large and responsible concept of America's place, then the stress will be vastly lessened. But if President Roosevelt's opponent is an isolationist—or *is one* under a cloak of fine words, as President Harding was in 1940—and since many votes against the President will be cast on purely domestic issues, then we may see an equivocal decision and a period of uncertainty.

Though many members of Congress today display leaderless or misguided irresponsibility toward world relationships, there are also discernible some basic currents of great hope. It is not clear what kind of world organization the President favors. In an apparently "inspired" article, one recent writer ascribed to the President ideas leading to the loosest possible kind of regional understandings, like the Pan-American Union, and precious little else beside. What the State Department favors would be difficult to say with confidence. Within the Administration, and among the Republicans, there are also some outstanding individuals who support a strong form of Federal Union. But they are not very numerous, nor dominant, and there are many who stoutly resist a greatly diminished national sovereignty. On the other hand, some of our chief isolationists have recently come out in favor of American membership in a revived League of Nations. Certainly we are a very long distance in advance of 1920, or of 1940. The forces of black reaction, which would pull out of all sorts of world relationship, do not now dare to raise their heads.

There is now no visible resistance to a post-war continuance of the United Nations, particularly if an over-all organization were formed rather soon, so that the direction of the war could be generalized somewhat and *not* left in the hands of two individuals. A great opportunity exists, in short, to get a world organization into operation while the pressure of the war still binds us. That is the chance now confronting President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. If they lay a good enough groundwork now, particularly before next year's elections, they can prevent devastating reaction, no matter what befalls President Roosevelt. Actually his re-election is reasonably likely, although under circumstances and with a Congress which would force a government of compromise and adjustment. Reaction there already is, and plenty of opposition, but it has come early enough to enable the President to broaden the base of his appeal, and to realize that he must appeal to Americans—as to Europeans—in the character of world leader. If the President does not apply his best political talents to this problem, the tragedy of Woodrow Wilson looms before him—repudiation at the eleventh hour. But Franklin Roosevelt was at Woodrow Wilson's side during those bitter days, he tasted the gall, and of all men in public life today he would seek to avoid such a fate. There is still time for him to do so.

The Race Problem

The race problem in America is never far from the surface, and men in Europe, in Asia, in Africa are also deeply conscious of our unfinished business in this field. We are beginning to know, too, that it is no longer our problem, and that the tides of racial action are running in the world. Beginning with Hitler's assertion of race supremacy, the vile doctrine of race conflict has swept the colored races and put torch to their proper and noble aspirations for advancement and equality. The ferment is felt in America, of course, almost more bitterly than anywhere else, and it produces excesses from white and negro alike. Since we have large areas, notably in the south, where the negro population constitutes either a very sizeable minority or sometimes an actual majority, we witness the effort to maintain white supremacy by terrorism and force. We have lynchings and riots, springing from fear and hate—the very poison that swept Germany. In the fetid, fevered atmosphere of war-production boom towns we have violence. Some Americans, more than a few, are beginning to realize that if we do not make substantial progress toward racial harmony in the United States, we will sow the seeds here of a later world conflict with appalling potentialities. We need, Americans are pointing out, a new moral order that will include black man and yellow man and white man. Americans know, too, that such a moral order should be based on the admission of basic spiritual equality, implemented by an effort to provide equality of opportunity in all material ways, but kept in discipline by the same lines of distinction that are drawn between white men. That is to say: enlightened Americans feel we must admit that all men are brothers, and in democratic nations and a democratic world we must see to it that they have equal opportunities for advancement. But in practical life, in certain areas, perhaps we must retain certain separations, always striving to base the separations on economic, educational, or cultural lines rather than along the sharp color line. And we cannot go ahead faster than both white men and black men are ready. In the United States, black men—spurred, perhaps, by their heritage of the best Anglo-Saxon blood—have been seeking much more than white men have learned they can give. Unless we bring the white men along, we are headed for further clashes. It is not possible to be bland and optimistic about the United States' probable handling of its racial question. We have a hard time ahead. But it is progress to take the issue on to the world plane, as many Americans are doing. That softens some of our local prejudices. It is progress to seek a workable moral order. The best of the American South, which has a deep and warm love and appreciation for the Negro, can do much to solve the problem. The worst racial riots in recent months were not in Alabama or Mississippi, but in Michigan and California. America knows it has a new, a world-challenging, racial problem. It is seeking solution.

What then, is the dominant conclusion from a survey of America in mid-summer, 1943? A nation 3,000 miles away from the bombs, luxuriating in politics, thinking gravely of its post-war duties, grousing about the war and regulations just as vigorously as any army private ever did, and challenged by a big race problem. A nation which is producing up to its quota in materials of war, is getting them steadily where they are needed, and is turning its men into a steel-forged fighting machine. A nation whose leader, so respected in the world, needs to restore fully his position with his fellow Americans. And even now is setting about the task.

United States of America,
July 1943.

INDIA

I. POLITICAL—THE NEW VICEROY

THE promotion of the Commander-in-Chief to the Viceregal House was something with which political India had not reckoned, so that the communiqué of July 19 had almost the effect of a bombshell. It had indeed been commented often enough that there were only a few obvious candidates for the post in British politics, and that Mr. Churchill might not want to spare any of them from their important posts elsewhere. That, however, did not start Indian eyes searching for candidates in other fields of British public life. The tendency was rather to conclude that the British Government would solve the difficulty by persuading Lord Linlithgow to accept a fourth extension of office. It may be said that there would have been a great deal of satisfaction in many Indian quarters if they had. Lord Linlithgow's prestige stands extraordinarily high. He has inspired in Indian collaborators a personal affection as well as a great respect for his judgment and foresight. His honesty of purpose has been unchallenged by his political opponents even in moments of the bitterest controversy. His unequalled grasp of the realities of politics in India has won for him the complete confidence of the minorities. It could also be said that there is a very large public on the periphery of Hindu Nationalist politics who, if they cannot help taking sides in irresponsible political games, are at the same time grateful for the presence in India of a Viceroy who can be relied on to maintain stability without fear or favour.

The first reaction to the choice of Lord Linlithgow's successor was that a firm but sympathetic statesman was being replaced, in effect, by a military governor. It need not be supposed that India as a whole was horrified. The Indian Princes were well enough content. The same applies to the Muslim martial classes of north-western India. The leaders of the Punjab—which supplies half India's army—hold that the post-war interests of their soldiers must take precedence of political settlements or constitutional discussions, and it is not unreasonable to expect that Field-Marshal Wavell would be more sympathetic to their point of view than a political Viceroy. The Muslim League of course fulminated, but one suspects that its commentators often had their tongues in their cheeks. Hindu India was more genuinely upset. It does not like soldiers at any time, and the explanations issued in London for making one of them Viceroy of India were not convincing. It was agreed that India is becoming increasingly important as a military base of the United Nations; also that Field-Marshal Wavell has an unexampled knowledge of the needs of modern warfare. It was pointed out in India, however, that the same communiqué which announced his appointment also made it known that the conduct of military operations against the Japanese was in future to be outside the province of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief

in India. That meant that the Viceroy's tasks in connection with the prosecution of the war would consist mainly in attempting to solve the most complicated political and economic problems, in none of which is Field-Marshal Wavell known to be an expert. The Nationalist press accordingly felt justified in drawing the worst conclusions. What was perhaps more serious was that the large Hindu public which, although Nationalist in sentiment, co-operates with the Government were hurt in their feelings at the thought that military rule was to be the reward of their loyalty.

Reception in India

SECOND thoughts, however, were less gloomy. Sir Archibald Wavell's tactful change of clothes gave him a much more pleasing appearance to Hindus. His statement that political advance during the war was not precluded inspired hopeful sentiments. Nationalist commentators discovered that, although in principle the appointment of a soldier was objectionable, they had nothing against Field-Marshal Wavell personally. As for his political views, too little was known about them to justify at once prejudging his handling of the situation. It is true that his association, as a Member of Council during the past two years, with Lord Linlithgow's policy gave grounds for suspicion. It is also true that the emphasis in his first statement as Viceroy designate was on the victorious prosecution of the war against Japan rather than on internal political progress. Yet, even from that point of view, a political settlement leading to the hearty co-operation of all sections of the people in the war effort might appear to Field-Marshal Wavell as imperative. It was not inconceivable that a soldier might be found capable of taking a more detached view of the political situation than a civilian, and solving the deadlock by a bold and original stroke. "Events and men have a way of falsifying expectations", wrote the Nationalist *Tribune*, and "it would be foolish to rule out the possibility of a new Viceroy bringing a fresh mind to bear on Indian problems".

On the whole, therefore, the reception of Field-Marshal Wavell's appointment may be described as satisfactory. Responsible Indian circles still have some misgivings on the score of his comparative inexperience in political life and civilian administration. It is pointed out that the qualities required for the conduct of a Government of which the majority of the members are non-official Indians is best developed by long experience of high political office. It is also a fact that the efficiency of the administration in India depends largely on the Viceroy personally, and that Field-Marshal Wavell has hitherto been more distinguished as a strategist and tactician than as an administrator. But he has seen a good deal of the working of the political and administrative machine in India and, with Mr. E. M. Jenkins as his Private Secretary, he has at his disposal a wide angle of administrative experience in the Provinces and at the Centre, and an intimate knowledge of the details of India's war effort on the industrial side. In any case it is agreed that the British Government, if they could not spare a first-rate civilian, have done well to give India a soldier whose intellectual and moral calibre is admittedly equal to the demands of the exalted office to which he has been appointed.

Mr. Jinnah's Letter

The political situation in India has not undergone any material change in recent months, but they have not been entirely uneventful either. One interesting incident was the Government's refusal to forward to Mr. Jinnah a letter from Mr. Gandhi suggesting that the two might meet. According to the Nationalist press this was typical of the Government of India. They would neither do anything themselves to end the deadlock nor allow others facilities to do so. Without waiting to hear what Mr. Jinnah had to say, a section of the Muslim press and some home newspapers joined in the chorus of criticism. They would have done better to wait. It was true, said Mr. Jinnah in effect, that he had dared the Government of India to withhold any letter sent to him by Mr. Gandhi from his place of detention. But anyone who had read carefully his speech to the All India Muslim League on April 24 would have realized that this particular letter could not be of any interest to him. It did not indicate any change of position on Mr. Gandhi's part, and could only be construed as a move by him to embroil the Muslim League with the British Government. To do Mr. Jinnah justice, it must be said that his reply, although it surprised a good many people, was quite consistent with his previous declarations of policy. He has always insisted that the essential preliminary to negotiations is for Congress to drop the pistol which it has pointed at the British Government with the object of extorting political concessions detrimental to the Muslims. Accordingly he was not disposed to quarrel with the Government when the latter refused to contemplate the return of the Congress leader to active politics until the civil disobedience resolution had been called off.

Meanwhile Mr. Jinnah has continued his work of consolidating the Muslim position in the Provinces. A Muslim League Ministry has been installed in Bengal and in that former Congress stronghold the North-West Frontier Province. Mr. Jinnah is also pushing hard to have the unionist Ministry in the Punjab converted into a League Ministry. At present he is showing the Muslim League flag in Baluchistan. From speeches which he has made there it would appear that North-Western Pakistan is envisaged as a federation of the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan; but the League's eyes are also being cast in the direction of Kashmir. Congress supporters have watched the progress of the League with dismay, which is not diminished by the informal talks proceeding in Bihar, Madras, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces for the formation of coalition Ministries by the Muslim League and the Hindus. So far these movements have not come to anything, although they have the blessing of Mr. Savarkar, President of the All India Mahasabha, subject to certain conditions. They are indicative however, of a more realistic outlook in Hindu politics. Nor are they the only indications of Hindu restiveness under the barren policy of non-co-operation. A prominent member of Congress in the United Provinces has just proposed that, if Mr. Gandhi will not call off the civil disobedience resolution, those members of the All India Congress Committee who are out of jail should meet and do it for him. From Mr. Munshi, a former Congress Minister in Bombay, have come mutterings about a revival of the Swaraj party to lead Nationalist India into paths of co-operation. All this has provoked the more rabid members of Congress into counter-propaganda designed to keep alive the interest of the Congress movement and the Congress High Command. A rumour has been started and given wide publicity in the Nationalist press that Mr. Gandhi has written to the Viceroy offering to withdraw the August resolution and that big political developments are in prospect. There has of course been no such letter, and it is a fair guess that if Mr. Gandhi does write to the Viceroy it will be in the contrary sense.

II. MILITARY—GENERAL AUCHINLECK'S RETURN

If India has doubts about Field-Marshal Wavell, she has none about General Auchinleck, whose return as Commander-in-Chief has been acclaimed almost with joy. In his short tenure of the command before going to the Middle East, General Auchinleck succeeded in impressing his personality on this country in a way that few Commanders-in-Chief have done. He enjoys the complete confidence of the Indian army. He also stands in high esteem with political India. Rightly or wrongly he is regarded as being more sympathetic to Indian aspirations for self-government than the majority of the British in high office in India, and his responsive attitude towards Indian desires to be more closely associated with the conduct of the war department is gratefully remembered. This is a factor which will smooth his task, not always an easy one, of popularizing the army in India.

The same communiqué which announced the appointments of Field-Marshal Wavell and General Auchinleck also made known the fact that the conduct of operations against the Japanese, which had hitherto been the function of the India command, was to be entrusted in future to a new East Asia command. General Auchinleck accordingly succeeds to a command of which the main responsibility will be the maintenance in India of a sufficient military base and the administration and training of the Indian army, although operational responsibilities are not excluded. The defence of the North-West Frontier will remain as before the province of the India command. The position as regards the eastern frontier has not been cleared up. Who is to be responsible for the defence of India if, instead of the East Asia command's forces advancing into Burma, the Japanese invade India? One would assume it would be the Commander-in-Chief of India, but on the other hand the troops occupying the areas most vulnerable to Japanese attack would presumably be those of the East Asia command. The difficulty will solve itself once the East Asia command moves eastwards out of India. Till that happens, however, it is evident that the closest understanding and collaboration between the two commands will be required if serious difficulties are to be avoided.

A Separate East Asia Command

Apart from that the wisdom of the decision to set up a separate command able to concentrate on the business of fighting the Japanese is not seriously

questioned. The remoteness of Delhi from the East Asian front and the burdensome range of responsibilities which, under the existing system, fall on the Commander-in-Chief in India had both suggested to observers here the need for reform in the military organization before large-scale land, sea and air operations were launched from India overseas. At present the Commander-in-Chief in India, besides the responsibility for overseas operations, has to look after the recruitment, administration, training and supply of the Indian army, navy and air force; he has to plan the defence of India's lengthy frontiers; he is responsible for co-operation with the Allied forces and the Eastern Fleet. As a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council he must also take part in the civil government of India. The system worked well enough when the Indian army was comparatively small, and operations were thought of seriously in terms only of small-scale actions on the North-West Frontier. To-day the situation is different. The Indian army is about 2½ million strong, and its administration and training present the most complicated problems. And just across the eastern frontier there is a formidable enemy, to dislodge whom will take air, land and sea operations on a grand scale.

It seems reasonable to expect that the Commander-in-Chief of East Asia, with no responsibility except that of planning and executing, in collaboration with our Allies, an attack on the Japanese, would have a better chance of success than a Commander-in-Chief of India with numerous important responsibilities on his shoulders. The East Asia command will presumably draw heavily on the Indian army for its fighting units, so that the efficient administration and training of that army are also vitally important from the point of view of victory over the Japanese. One would expect here also some benefit from the concentrated attention which the Indian Commander-in-Chief will in future be able to give them. It can hardly be expected of course that a vastly expanded Indian army will maintain the technical standards of the small peace-time army, to whose efficiency the Fourth Indian Division is such a brilliant testimonial. Regular European officers, both for regimental and technical duties, are comparatively thin on the ground. The nucleus of trained non-commissioned officers for the new units is small. That applies particularly to those areas in which recruiting had been suspended for a good many years before the war. The dispersal of trained personnel among new units is restricted by barriers of caste, religion and language. The enthusiasm of new recruits for mechanical equipment is not matched by the same degree of aptitude that one would expect, say, in soldiers recruited in a Western country. It is not the least of the advantages of having General Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief that, having made his own career in the Indian army, he is familiar with the mental and physical capacities and peculiarities of the material with which he has to deal. There is general confidence that, under his command, the expansion of the Indian army in the service of the United Nations will be completed without more loss of efficiency than is, in all the circumstances, unavoidable.

III.—ECONOMIC—THE FOOD PROBLEM

THE food problem is again giving trouble, with Bengal, Travancore and Cochin as the black spots. These are rice-eating areas and, as is known, there is an absolute shortage of rice in the country. Taking the grain supplies as a whole, however, it is estimated that there is enough in the country to go round without too much tightening of the belt, provided that there is rational distribution. That, however, is just what there is not. Between the general disposition of the producer, the middleman and the consumer to hoard food, the strained transport facilities and the inexperience of both the Central and the Provincial Governments in the matter of food control, there is a tendency for areas that are not self-sufficient to come off rather badly. Wheat in Bengal is three or four times the price it is in the Punjab, while rice is or was three or four times dearer than in the neighbouring Provinces of Bihar and Orissa. Rather grim tales are circulating about food shortage in Bengal. Some of these may be of a political origin, but there is no reason to doubt that the position is difficult.

GOVERNMENT'S "BASIC PLAN"

THE policy of the Central Government has passed through several phases. In the beginning they tried fixing a maximum price for wheat. That drove supplies underground and created an immense black market. Grain was not moved to those places where it was most needed, but to where it fetched most money. The price ceiling was accordingly done away with, but the Government assumed the monopoly for purchases for export in the Provinces estimated to have a surplus. Grain was to be distributed in accordance with an all-India plan—the so-called "Basic Plan"—based on the estimated surpluses and deficits of each of the Provinces and States. The elimination of competition in inter-provincial trade would, it was thought, give the Central Government an effective indirect control of prices. That policy was not a complete success. Certainly wheat moved to the markets more freely than during the period of price fixing. But it still did not come out of the Punjab as quickly as had been hoped, and other Provinces with surpluses also failed to export the quantities for which the Central Government had budgeted in their Basic Plan. So Bengal, Cochin and Travancore found themselves in difficulties. The Central Government then tried the experiment of decontrolling the grain trade in the north-eastern zone. That meant that Bengal merchants could buy freely in neighbouring Provinces where the price was low. That worked out well enough for Bengal, but produced protests from Bihar, Orissa and Assam which found their stocks being drained away and their domestic prices soaring.

The reaction in influential sections of opinion in Delhi was that, as free trade appeared to produce the grain, while the Basic Plan did not, the right policy was probably the progressive restoration of free trade to the rest of India. It was immediately apparent that some of the Provinces thought otherwise. The financial experts were also critical. How was free trade in food to be reconciled with the Government's efforts to check inflation? And

the cotton industry, which was in process of being brought under Government control, protested that the Government could not have cheap cloth in a country of dear food.

A Conference in Delhi

In this situation a Conference of the Provinces and States with the Central Government was convened in Delhi to consider the food policy anew. The Member in charge of food, Sir Aziz Ulhaq, presided, and the Viceroy went to the opening sitting to welcome the delegates and give them a few words of counsel. The general conclusion of the Conference—the Punjab and Bengal dissenting—was that it was impossible to allow supply and demand to operate freely in an inflationary situation. The Government's Basic Plan was approved subject to the revision of the assessments of surpluses and deficits for the various Provinces and States. The procurement operations under Government auspices were to continue; vigorous anti-hoarding drives were to be organized; and rationing in urban areas was to be extended as soon as possible. It was suggested also that the Provinces with a deficit, instead of relying on the Central Government, should have freedom within the limits of their quotas to buy direct from the surplus areas and make their own transport arrangements.

The Central Government adopted these conclusions as their own short-term measures. They have been criticized as being unlikely to produce co-ordinated food control and price stability. That may very well be the case. For example, the question of fixing prices on a uniform basis for all India is left in abeyance—presumably in deference to the objections of the Punjab to direct price control. But the Provinces are left free to do what they like in the way of fixing prices, and nobody can forecast how their activities in this direction may affect the supply position. The short-term policy will, however, have served its purpose if it unearths enough grain to keep Bengal, Cochin and Travancore going till the Kharif harvest comes along in the late autumn. A long-range policy is at present being studied by a representative committee of the States, the Provinces and the Central Government. If they can produce a uniform plan it will be for the Central Government to decide whether they will, if necessary, enforce conformity on all the Provinces whether the latter like the plan or not.

India

July 1943.

GREAT BRITAIN

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

Headed by the King and Queen, representatives of this and all the other United Nations gathered in a great company at St. Paul's Cathedral on May 19 to give thanks for victory in North Africa. It is a measure of the security which air power has given us that such a service could be planned and held within 100 miles of enemy-occupied territory. No more striking figure walked up the aisle that day than General Sikorski, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces, who on July 4, in company with a number of his compatriots and two well-liked members of our own House of Commons, was to lose his life in an air accident at Gibraltar.

Travellers' Risks

That tragedy brought home to all of us the risks run by other distinguished travellers. Only ten days earlier the King had returned by air from a fortnight's visit to North Africa and Malta. His presence there followed closely on that of the Prime Minister, whose mobility in spite of his sixty-eight years has been one of the real unifying factors in Allied strategy. In Washington and in Africa, Mr. Churchill had been absent from this country for more than a month. It has been remarked before in The Round Table that, whenever he is away from London, the political weather at home becomes less settled, with demands being made on the Government which seem less effectively handled; and this trip of his was no exception.

Yet of serious political storms this year there has been none. No calls are heard for changes in the Government. With not a dissenting voice Parliament agreed to adjourn on August 5 for more than six weeks, though it must be said that both Houses reckoned with the likelihood of events in Italy causing them to be recalled earlier. The vote of censure moved by a handful of members against Mr. Churchill's Government after the fall of Tobruk seems like an unreal and better-forgotten past. Never during any war in living memory has the British public experienced such a solid spell of good news as has continued ever since the defeat of Rommel at El Alamein last October.

At an earlier stage in the war it might have given rise to light-heartedness. We have endured too much for that. Optimism is kept under control. In spite of the removal of a few of the 1940 restrictions—church-bells are a signal of worship again, not of invasion, and signposts are being re-erected, and except in coastal counties cars may again be left unlocked—we have difficulty as a people in awakening to a recognition that the risk of large-scale invasion of this island is past. Just as in 1940 the ordinary Englishman hardly measured the immensity of his peril, so in 1943 he has not yet adjusted himself to the fullness of his deliverance. Stamina, not reckless hope of easy victory and a quick end, carries him on. Sober warnings in the words with

which the Prime Minister described to the Commons on July 27 the collapse of Fascism checked any tendency to overestimate the value of knocking Italy out. The visit of Dr. Evatt to this country in June reinforced the work—which Mr. Churchill has never neglected—of keeping the British public aware that there is a Japanese no less than a German enemy to be beaten, and that, however far away Japan may be, there will be no peace for the world till both are down.

Parties and Policies

Politically, the season of party conferences has come and gone. Owing to the Munich emergency and then the war, the Conservative conference which met in May was the first to be held since 1937. Observers formed the impression that youth had gained a much greater share of influence in the party than critics who couple the terms Conservative and reactionary have been accustomed to admit. The younger men in the Labour party felt less satisfaction with their conference. It was dominated, as always, by the trade union influence, which is staid and chary of running after new ideas. The application of the Communist party for affiliation to the Labour party was defeated, in spite of the dissolution of the Comintern, by nearly three to one. The majority for continuing the electoral truce, which at the 1942 conference had been narrow, this year was overwhelming. At the same time it was explicitly stated that the truce would end with the war and that the Labour party—despite Mr. Churchill's implied invitation in his broadcast on a Four Year Plan—would not enter any post-war general election on the basis of a continuance of the war-time coalition. Time may bring changes, but we must reckon now with the possibility that when the war with Germany is over, and although the war with Japan may be still in progress, the Labour party will withdraw from the Government. If that were followed by the dissolution of the present Parliament, now nearly eight years old, it is difficult to see what result a general election could have other than an overwhelming victory for Mr. Churchill and all who still supported him.

Whether the Government would by that time have a coherent policy for post-war reconstruction to put before the country is more open to doubt. Extensive work within the Government departments concerned is known to be in progress on the issues raised by the Beveridge report; the first-fruits are expected to take the form of an early White Paper from the Ministry of Health outlining, for discussion and criticism, the possible structure of a comprehensive national health service. On such vital matters as export trade, shipping, and civil aviation, we have hardly progressed beyond the stage of repeated assertions that the Government recognizes the crucial importance of the issues which will arise when the war ends, and is giving its earnest attention to them. Of its attitude to the three weighty documents now in its hands on industrial location, utilization of agricultural land, and compensation and betterment—known respectively as the Barlow, Scott, and Uthwatt reports—we know nothing. If this situation arose out of a deliberate decision that no thought or attention could be spared from the conduct of the war for the problems of the peace, it would be understandable. There is a

widespread feeling, however, that the real cause is an inability to reach agreement, especially on questions touching the post-war use and ownership of land, among the members of the different parties represented in the War Cabinet. Colour is given to this by a frank statement of the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Hudson—admittedly during an interruption in debate when he may have been off his guard—that he was "under instructions not to talk about post-war agriculture". Here is a field in which war-time unity of purpose has enabled us to increase our own food production by no less than 70 per cent compared with 1939. Is there a real chance that unity can be preserved when the pressure of war is over? On external matters, probably yes; but on internal questions which traditionally divided the parties before 1939, the answer remains in serious doubt. Maybe Mr. Churchill will succeed here also in performing a miracle of unification. At present he can give them only the residue of his attention. The war claims his mind.

Far-reaching Education Reforms

It is all the more to the credit of our young President of the Board of Education, Mr. R. A. Butler, that he has obtained Cabinet approval for, and has successfully submitted to Parliament, the most far-reaching proposals for the improvement of our education system since compulsory schooling was first introduced in 1870. It is true that they still have to be embodied in detailed legislation—a comprehensive Education Bill promises to be the principal measure before Parliament next session—but a White Paper indicating the suggested principles has been debated in both Houses with warm and widespread approval and a relative absence of destructive controversy, which augur well for the process of putting a practical scheme on the statute-book.

Compulsory education at present runs from the fifth to the fourteenth birthday. The upper limit is to be raised to 15 as soon as possible after the war, with provision for a further extension to 16 later. Hitherto children for the whole of the nine years have been described as receiving "elementary" education, unless they were fortunate in an examination at the age of 11 offering entrance for a limited number to a "secondary" school, where they might stay till 15, 16, or even 18 if they were of university calibre. The disliked word "elementary" is to disappear. In future, "primary" education will run from 5 to 11, and every child—not only a select few—will go on to "secondary" education until the age of 15 at least. There are to be three distinct types of secondary school, known as grammar, modern and technical schools; and to prevent false social bias in favour of a "black-coated" education every effort is to be made to establish what current jargon calls "parity of esteem" between them.

A greater novelty still in our system of education—though the late Mr. H. A. L. Fisher tried to introduce it at the end of the last war—is the requirement that every boy or girl between 15 and 18, if no longer in full-time school, shall attend part-time at what are to be known as young people's colleges. The minimum attendance will be one day a week, and the Board of Education clearly hopes to see that period progressively increased. There will be objections raised, not from large industries but by smaller employers

and shopkeepers, that the difficulty of release for even one day a week is insuperable. On the other side, however, will weigh the overwhelming opinion of all who have studied the results of our national education system that its greatest defect is the abruptness of the transition from school to work, which catastrophically minimizes the influence that each of the two environments has on the other. Whether we can succeed in giving these young people's colleges a quality and vitality commensurate with their purpose will be one of the tests after the war of the amount of resilience, imagination and initiative latent in the national character.

These are the compulsory features of Mr. Butler's plan, which has many other branches. For children under five, who too often at present start their school life at that age with defects of health or of habit which ought to have been taken in hand earlier, a large extension of nursery schools, particularly in the poorer districts of large towns, is planned, where parents may if they desire send their children from the age of two onwards. At the other end of school life the Government recognizes that in many parts of the country the pre-war facilities for vocational training were neither up-to-date nor adequate, and on local education authorities will in future be imposed the duty of seeing that the provision for technical, commercial and art education in their areas is in all respects satisfactory. Much closer collaboration between industry and commerce and the education service is to be evoked. It is high time indeed for Britain to awake to the distance by which other industrialized countries have outstripped her in their arrangements for technical education; in competition she cannot expect to fashion her future with blunt tools.

Other items in this comprehensive programme concern nutrition and health, inspection of all schools outside the State system, improved access to universities, better facilities for adult education, regrouping of the responsible local authorities, and further encouragement of voluntary youth organizations. What all this means in terms of the recruitment and training of staff is being studied by a committee that is not likely to report before the end of the year. In terms of finance, it means that the total cost of all the educational services, which before the war approximated to £110 million a year, will ultimately be doubled. Nevertheless, the nation seems determined to go forward.

On one rock the ship might still be wrecked; but Mr. Butler has steered it so patiently and skilfully up to the present that the danger has already become less than most of the prophets foretold. That rock is the religious issue. He has set himself two tasks—to give religious education a more defined place in the life and work of all schools, and to find a solution to the hitherto intractable problem of the 10,000 schools built, owned and managed by the Churches, many of which they can no longer afford to keep abreast of modern requirements. For the Church schools he has offered alternative proposals which appear to be meeting with more or less willing acceptance from all but the Roman Catholics; and they seem now unlikely to carry opposition to the point of jeopardizing educational advance on the wider front. What Mr. Butler's plans for religious education will bring forth—whether their eventual impression on the national life will be light or deep—the years alone will show. But for the first time it will be made universal in all schools (subject of course to a conscience clause for the individual parent) that religious instruction shall be given, and that each school day shall begin with a corporate act of worship.

The Home Front

The war is not won yet, and there is no slackening on the home front. Man-power is so strained that Mr. Bevin has felt it necessary to propose directing boys of 16 to 18 into aircraft factories or into coal-mines, and registering women for war-work from 46 (hitherto the upper age limit) up to 50. The two last of these proposals aroused a good deal of Parliamentary criticism, and members secured a promise from the Minister that he would take no final action under either of them before the House of Commons reassembles and has a chance to discuss them with him. There is a common feeling that the comb-out method, inside Government services as well as elsewhere, might usefully be applied once again before any further extension of age limits upward or downward is agreed to. It is a welcome feature of Mr. Morrison's new fire guard orders, which are due to take effect on September 30, that they appear to embody a really serious attempt to ensure that everybody who ought to be liable for fire-watching duty shall actually do it, before less suitable classes of people are called on to fill the gaps.

Our total war expenditure has reached the huge figure of £14,500 million. Taking the first half of the year in each case, and treating 1940 as 100, our munitions production has been officially estimated as 150 in 1941, 230 in 1942, and 300 in 1943. Despite the stupendous growth of war factories in America, the British Commonwealth is actually contributing 22 per cent of the war production of all the United Nations, and 17 per cent of it comes from Britain and Northern Ireland.

Great Britain,
August 1943.

IRELAND

I. NEW GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

THE resignation of Mr. J. M. Andrews, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland since the death of Lord Craigavon in early May, was an event of more than passing significance. Owing to the fact that the principal Opposition party in Northern Ireland challenges the existence of the State itself, it has for long been difficult to see how any alternative to the established Unionist Government, whose period of office has been co-terminous with the existence of local self-government in the Six Counties, could come into power. Government strictly controlled by the party caucus seemed likely to endure, since any division on social or economic lines within the majority could so easily be stigmatized as a disloyalty all the more reprehensible because it played straight into the hands of an irreconcilable minority. Inevitably, therefore, the political life-blood of the Six Counties became so congealed that more and more members of the Unionist party recognized that it was a matter not for satisfaction, but for serious misgiving, that the Government constituted by Lord Craigavon in 1921 had remained in office longer than any Government in Europe. Mr. Andrews, who succeeded Lord Craigavon in 1940, and who had been a member of his Cabinet from the first, deliberately ensured that his advent to the office of Premier should involve only the minimum of change. Deprived of Lord Craigavon's leadership, a Cabinet whose average age was remarkably high, and the majority of whose members had been in office for more than 20 years, became tired and its policy lost its resilience. The challenge of war accentuated the growth of dissatisfaction, as recent by-elections have only too clearly indicated, but the return of discontented independent Unionists did not provide the material from which an alternative Government could be formed. The change had to be effected from within, and Sir Basil Brooke, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Production, led the revolt. Despite the fact that Mr. Andrews controlled the party machine Sir Basil secured sufficient following within the ranks of the party to terminate a rather prolonged crisis in his favour.

In fairness to Mr. Andrews it should be emphasized that he succeeded to a *damnosa hereditas*. Only Lord Craigavon's long experience, and still more his great personal prestige, had kept a united party behind the Cabinet, and when the problems of war came in an acute form to complicate an inherently difficult situation, Mr. Andrews's position became impossible. When he relinquished office Mr. Churchill paid a high tribute to the outgoing Prime Minister and to Northern Ireland which it is fitting to recall;

"But for the loyalty of Northern Ireland, and its devotion to what has now become the cause of 30 Governments or nations", wrote Mr. Churchill, "we should have been confronted with slavery and death, and the light which now shines so strongly throughout the world would have been quenched."

It may be that this is the most appropriate commentary that could be made

on Mr. Andrews's period of office. It would be idle to pretend that the dissenting Unionists had not had just cause for complaint in the handling of Northern Ireland's war effort and still less that they had no justification for claiming that Northern Ireland's man-power and resources were inadequately used; but in a very real sense these are details in comparison with the fact that under Mr. Andrews's leadership Northern Ireland had unreservedly united her fortunes with those of the Commonwealth and Empire. The years 1940–41 when he was Premier were decisive years in the history of Ireland, and the mere fact that in those years Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom sharing the burdens and dangers of war must inevitably establish a tradition which will make a union of hearts between Belfast and Dublin difficult indeed to achieve. To quote Mr. Churchill again, "the bonds of affection between Great Britain and the people of Northern Ireland have been tempered by fire and are now, I firmly believe, unbreakable".

The Brooke Cabinet and its Policy

With one exception, Sir Basil Brooke dispensed with the services of all the members of the former administration. Younger and, in some cases, untried and virtually unknown men were given Cabinet posts. The Prime Minister himself retained the portfolio of Commerce and Production, and Mr. William Grant, the only member of the old administration to survive, was transferred from the Ministry of Public Security to the Ministry of Labour. As an old trade unionist, Mr. Grant's new appointment has given no inconsiderable satisfaction in Labour circles. Two Presbyterian clergymen, the Rev. Professor Corkey and the Rev. Robert Moore, were given the portfolios of Education and Agriculture respectively. The most interesting appointment, however, was that of Mr. Harry Midgley to the Ministry of Public Security. Early this year Mr. Midgley defeated the official Unionist candidate at a by-election in Belfast, and his victory on that occasion accentuated the demand of the Unionist rebels for a stronger administration. Mr. Midgley is a unionist, for he is a strong supporter of Northern Ireland's remaining part of the United Kingdom, and it was on the ground of these strongly held and forcibly expressed views that he resigned some little time ago from the Northern Ireland Labour party. His accession to Cabinet office has been generally welcomed, and has given some slight satisfaction to those who demanded that the basis of the Government should be broadened. A fairly drastic cut in the number of junior ministerial appointments was welcome and indeed long overdue.

The policy of the new Government was outlined by Sir Basil Brooke in the House of Commons on May 11. That policy has two principal components—union with Great Britain and more effective prosecution of the war. On the former Sir Basil Brooke's own words deserve to be quoted:

"Union with Great Britain is and remains our ideal. We should not have to repeat this so strongly, but for the fact that our neighbour Eire is constantly attempting to brush it aside as being non-existent and of no importance. She asserts that it is the Border that causes the division between Ulster and Eire. The truth is that the Border merely acknowledges the fundamental differences between

us. To pretend that fundamental divergences do not exist between us, and that there is not an irreconcilable conflict of loyalties, is not statesmanship—it is folly."

This reiteration of Unionist policy was necessary, but there is a general hope that Northern Ireland's increased sense of security will now allow more emphasis to be laid on the positive and less on the negative side of Ulster's policy. That certainly appears to be Sir Basil Brooke's intention. He is very conscious that he was called to office primarily in order to remedy the unsatisfactory state of Northern Ireland's war effort, and as Minister of Commerce and Production he has had unrivalled opportunities of acquiring first-hand knowledge of its achievements—which are very considerable—and of its shortcomings, on which his attention is now concentrated.

Unemployment and the War Effort

In January 1941, when Sir Basil became Minister of Commerce, the number of persons registered as unemployed was 68,000. Since that time the unemployment figure has declined fairly steadily and now it is between 15,000 and 16,000. This very substantial decrease shows that a large number of Northern Ireland workers have been absorbed into war industries, but neither Sir Basil Brooke nor anyone else in Northern Ireland has been really satisfied that everything possible has been done to obtain maximum employment on war work. It must seem anomalous to the public in Great Britain and in the Dominions that there should be even a small surplus of labour in Northern Ireland. Its existence, however, is due simply to the fact that neither conscription for the services nor full conscription for industry has been extended to the Six Counties. Mr. Churchill recently commented in the House on the unsatisfactoriness of a situation in which "large numbers of Americans should be taken from their homes by compulsion and are sent to stand on guard while large numbers of the local inhabitants are under no such obligation". Citizens of Northern Ireland are exempt even from conscription for the Home Guard and for fire-watching. Consequently those who do not wish to contribute to the war effort in any way are not compelled to do so. The view of the United Kingdom Government, by whose decision the Northern Ireland citizens remain exempt from these duties, is that the trouble of imposing conscription upon a reluctant minority is not worth while. Though the wisdom of this decision is not disputed, the situation is none the less irksome to those in Northern Ireland who would prefer to see the Six Counties bear all the burdens of war equally with other parts of the United Kingdom. It is because the new Premier recognizes that conscription is not practical politics that he is devoting his attention to securing the maximum industrial mobilization on a voluntary basis. To achieve this there is need both for further decentralization of industry and for the creation of more war factories in Northern Ireland. Both are understood to be receiving careful consideration by the Minister of Production and the Minister of Aircraft Production. The latter, Sir Stafford Cripps, paid a visit to Northern Ireland in June with the express purpose of seeing whether his Department could exploit local resources more fully.

In recording dissatisfaction with the war effort in Northern Ireland it is well to remember two things. Though recruitment is voluntary the number of men who have enlisted in the armed forces since the beginning of the war is roughly 27,000. The number of women is over 5,000. In view of the high proportion of younger men in reserved occupations in the shipbuilding yards and other war industries and in agriculture the proportion of voluntary enlistment is one of which Northern Ireland can justly be proud. The news of the achievements of Northern Ireland regiments in the North African campaign gave pleasure throughout the Six Counties. On the other hand it must be remembered that the Government at Stormont is neither wholly nor even in greater part responsible for Northern Ireland's war effort on the Home Front. The allocation of war work is in the hands of the appropriate United Kingdom departments in Whitehall, and no decision taken at Stormont can effect any radical changes. The problem, therefore, confronting Sir Basil Brooke is that of persuading the Whitehall departments that it would be wise to utilize the man-power available in Northern Ireland by the allocation of a higher proportion of essential war work than has been done hitherto despite certain obvious difficulties involved. The decision will have to be taken in London, and that is why it is rightly felt in Northern Ireland that the lasting significance of the change of Government lies in the fact that it has established a precedent which may well provide a possible solution to the outstanding problem of Northern Ireland's polity by enabling the political atrophy always created by one-party government to be dispelled without in any way affording the minority an opportunity of endangering the continued existence of the State.

II. ELECTIONS IN EIRE

For nearly four years there has been no discussion in the Eire newspapers either of the principles for which the war is being fought or of the country's attitude to the policy or practices of any of the belligerents. Consequently it was a matter for no surprise that the issues which decided the election held on June 22 were of purely local interest. Not only does foreign policy provoke no division of opinion, but so settled has the national opinion on this subject become that there was no indication of any desire to discuss its merits.

Early in the election campaign Mr. Aiken, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, who is responsible for the censorship, stated that "he would not try to prevent any candidate asking the electors either by word of mouth or through the press to support a policy advocating participation or non-participation in the war". The announcement of this relaxation created scarcely a ripple of interest and only Mr. Dillon responded to the Minister's gesture by fighting his campaign in County Monaghan on the platform of all aid to the United Nations short of participation in the war on the Continent. It is significant that Mr. Dillon's views, forcibly expressed as they always have been, aroused more interest outside the country than in it, and his subsequent election is little or no indication of his constituency's views about foreign policy. This complete lack of interest in the war may cause pardonable satisfaction in the Censor's office, but on any wider view it is disturbing.

Lack of Interest in the War

All parties were agreed that so long as the war lasted no Irish Government could do more than mark time, and in the light of that depressing conviction the programmes of all parties were moulded. In such circumstances party orators whose choicest blooms were nurtured on the leaf-drift of more than twenty years of unforgotten recrimination had the field almost to themselves. Though an Irish audience has a nice appreciation of flowers springing from this fertile soil, there was no mistaking a certain anxiety on their part to see something new, and it is to this anxiety that the comparative success of the smaller parties may be attributed.

Mr. De Valera, who has now been in office for nearly 12 years, was content in the main merely to defend his record. The fact that Eire had been kept out of the war was his ace of trumps. At Athy, on May 30, he drew the moral. "Remember", he said, "that this nation is being watched, and if you turn down the Government, foreign people will represent it as a turning down of the policies for which the Government have generally stood." This theme was elaborated historically in many speeches. Mr. De Valera and his colleagues reiterated the fact that without the 1938 Agreement, under which the ports were handed over, Eire could not have remained neutral. Mr. Cosgrave was taunted with his support of the Treaty of 1921, under which the ports and other naval harbour facilities would have been available to Great Britain in time of war and, but for the providence of Fianna Fail in scrapping the Treaty, Eire—so the argument ran— would have been embroiled. Obviously this interpretation is difficult to contest for it is on the whole logical. On June 3 at Tullamore, Mr. De Valera elaborated his view of the settlement.

"Quite rightly", he said, "we are proud of the settlement of 1938. It cleared away all the points of dispute between Britain and ourselves except one—partition of the country. It laid the foundation for good relations between the two countries. We have always been anxious for these good relations, not because it was Britain or because it was an Empire or anything else, but because they were our neighbours and wars between peoples always occur as a result of quarrels between neighbouring countries. It was quite impossible to establish good relations so long as Britain interfered in our affairs. It was fortunate for us that that settlement was made before the present war broke out."

For the rest the Fianna Fail party devoted their attention to attacking the not very impressive programmes put forward by their principal opponents, and to underlining in every possible way that they were the true guardians of the national tradition. In particular everything was done to suggest that Mr. Cosgrave was lukewarm about the national language. At Waterford on June 15 Mr. De Valera went so far as to say that the English language in Eire was the badge of serfdom and that he hoped to establish a popular organization to restore Gaelic as the language of the country.

Mr. Cosgrave's party could offer little likely to offset Mr. De Valera's personal prestige or to undermine the confidence of the people in a Government which had successfully kept them out of the war. Indeed his advocacy of a National Government composed of all parties was in itself an indication

of weakness, an indication of the steady decline in the fortunes of the Fine Gael party which he leads. For 10 years that party had been in office, but its decline since 1931 had been ominously consistent and it was destined to be continued in this election. Mr. Cosgrave's plan for a National All-Party Government would have had more attraction had any of the smaller parties been prepared to constitute a component part of such a Government. But this was the one thing to which neither the Labour party nor the Farmers would commit themselves, and in consequence Mr. De Valera was able to taunt the Opposition with their inability to come together before the election and to tell the people what the policy of a "National" Government would be. On neutrality the Fine Gael party was scrupulously careful to insist that the Government had its full support, and this was generally recognized as an acknowledged fact. But, though Fine Gael was not prepared to modify Eire's policy during the war, they were exceedingly anxious to lay the foundations for closer co-operation between Eire and Great Britain in the years after the war. General Mulcahy, who was destined to be one of the election casualties, stated that his party stood courageously for neutrality but that "if returned to office members of the Cabinet would attend economic conferences and would go to London to discuss means for improving trade between the two countries".

The smaller parties had exceptional opportunities for improving their position and it is clear from the results that they used them to some effect. While the Labour party had no hope of being returned in sufficient strength to constitute a Government, they were quite determined on the one hand not to enter any coalition with Fine Gael, and on the other not to allow their hostility to the Government to be restrained by any post-electoral considerations. Indeed one of the interesting aspects of the electoral campaign was the vituperation hurled at the Fianna Fail party by Labour spokesmen. It is clear from their denunciation of "apostate republicans" that this party is relying for its support now and in the future not only on a Labour vote, but also on the extreme Nationalist electors, discontented as they are with Mr. De Valera's growing moderation.

The Results and their Significance

The final results of the elections which may usefully be compared with those of the preceding election held in 1938 were as follows:

	Fianna Fail	*Fine Gael*	*Labour*	*Farmers*	*Independents*
1943 . . .	67	32	17	14	8
1938 . . .	77	45	9	—	5

In one sense the results were a disappointment to Mr. De Valera since his party no longer has a clear majority over all other parties. Fianna Fail was returned with 67 members, the other parties if they united could muster 71; but a union of all the Opposition parties is so remote a contingency that Mr. De Valera may well disregard it. The Labour party is even more bitterly opposed to Fine Gael than it is to Fianna Fail, whilst the Farmers and Independents are undecided and unlikely to vote as a whole against the Govern-

ment on any issue. Certainly the conclusion to be derived from the early debates in the new Dail is that the Government will continue in office until such time as Mr. De Valera feels that there is a good moment for securing an absolute majority. This may well mean that there will be no further election until after the war, and on that assumption Mr. De Valera's rather ominous allusions to the unsatisfactory composition of the new Dail may be designed merely to discourage the smaller parties from playing at politics.

The significance of the election is two-fold. On the one hand both the larger and well-established parties declined. Mr. De Valera lost 10 seats, Mr. Cosgrave 13. After nearly 12 years in office the loss of 10 seats is not and obviously need not be regarded with any great misgiving by the Government party. The loss of 13 seats by Mr. Cosgrave's party on the other hand amounts almost to a death blow. All the indications are that the principal opposition to Mr. De Valera in the not too distant future will come from the Left—both socially and politically. This is a fact which is unlikely to be altogether pleasing to Mr. De Valera, whose history and whose mental equipment fit him for dealing more effectively with opponents on the Right than those on the Left: In some quarters the election has been interpreted as an indication that Eire is drifting still further away from the Commonwealth. Inevitably this to a certain extent is true. Three years of isolation in war-time have meant that the hopes and fears which animate the other parts of the British Commonwealth are not shared by this country and indeed are to no inconsiderable extent repugnant to its present outlook. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that a growing political detachment implies a corresponding desire for economic detachment. On the contrary the interdependence of Britain and Ireland has been one of the facts most clearly brought home by the war, and it is probable that in the early years of peace Eire's external policy will be directed towards a closer economic collaboration without involving any corresponding political commitments.

Ireland,
July 1943

[The usual quarterly contribution from the Round Table Group in Canada arrived too late for publication in this issue.]

AUSTRALIA

ISSUES IN THE GENERAL ELECTION

THE Australian Parliament was dissolved in July and there will be a bitterly contested election. For this the Labour party must bear the responsibility, since it has persistently refused to enter a National Government. There has been a nearer approach to political unity under the Labour administration than under either of its predecessors, but the credit for this is not entirely due to Ministers. Danger has been more imminent, the Opposition more restrained and the press more sympathetic. The Prime Minister has shown unselfishness and devotion to duty as he sees it. Unfortunately he believes that Australia's safety depends on the unity of his party and has sacrificed too much to preserve that unity. On two important questions which divided the Labour party—opposition to the taxation of lower incomes and compulsory service outside the Commonwealth—he has met the Opposition more than half way. Despite his admission that the war cannot be won without a serious modification of Labour policy, Mr. Curtin has remained implacably opposed to the formation of a National Government. This disservice to the Commonwealth almost cancels out the value of his services as a war-time leader.

On June 21 the Leader of the Opposition moved a motion of no-confidence, thus making patent the precarious position of the Government, which had one pledged supporter fewer than the Opposition, and was kept in power by the votes of three Independents (one a Labour Independent). The grounds for the debate will not be credible except to those who have some knowledge of Australian political history. The shape of Australian politics to-day is largely conditioned by the history of the Australian Labour party. Beginning in the 'nineties of last century in all the Colonies, it became the dominant party in the Federal and State Parliaments between 1910 and 1913. In 1916 it split on the issue of conscription, and its most prominent leaders, except in Queensland, were expelled from the party executives or conferences. Ever since then the political outlook of those who led the anti-conscription movement has dominated the party, with the result that, until it assumed office in October 1941, its attitude to foreign and imperial affairs and to national defence had been unrealistic. A close analysis will make this plain.

HISTORY OF THE LABOUR PARTY

THE Labour party sprang from the trade union movement and its primary purpose was to secure benefits for the wage earner. But because it was a radical movement it attracted other radical elements. Among them were Australian nationalists who wished to cultivate "Australian national sentiment", either as a substitute for, or as a complement to, the traditional patriotism which regarded mother land and native land as inseparable. These

men were often imbued with a fine idealism. There were also some Socialists of the pre-Bolshevik type and men of Irish birth or ancestry, who form a distinct group in Australia, as they do in the United States, and who were attracted by the un-English sentiments of the new party, by its nationalism, and by its support of Home Rule for Ireland—then a live issue in imperial politics.

These radical elements tended to take a narrow interpretation of the obligations of British citizenship—a tendency counteracted, however, by the sense of kinship with the British people felt by most Australians, and by the influence of the leaders of the group who fully accepted Australia's duty to defend itself and to co-operate with the mother country in defence of the Empire. J. C. Watson, Andrew Fisher and W. M. Hughes, the first three Labour Prime Ministers, shared with their Liberal opponents the responsibility for the establishment of the Australian Navy and the system of military defence based on compulsory training, and in 1914 Fisher promised that Australia would stand behind Great Britain to "the last man and the last shilling". The Labour party, though professing to be "nationalist" rather than "imperialist", was not particularist. Until 1916 there was no serious cleavage in Australian opinion on war policy.

Then came the great schism, the effects of which are being felt to-day. The attempt of the Labour Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, in 1916 to raise the necessary reinforcements for the A.I.F. by conscription led to the expulsion from the Labour party of the Liberal Imperialists who had hitherto dominated it. Those who were determined to prevent the participation of Australia in "imperialist" wars gained and kept the ascendancy. These strangely compounded elements were somewhat changed by international events to which they professed to be indifferent. Some Australian nationalists had become isolationists. Some socialists had acquired a communist tinge, some of the militant trade unionists were more sectional in their outlook than before, and some of the Irish Australians looked with favour on the conception of Dominion Status that gradually took root in Southern Ireland. It would be easy to over-estimate the influence of any one of these elements; it is impossible to ignore their combined effect. The anti-conscriptionists, from 1916 till Mr. Curtin's Ministry assumed office in 1941, exercised a generally dominating influence in the trade unions, in political Labour leagues, in the party conferences and caucuses. The attitude of the party to foreign and imperial affairs, even to the defence of the Commonwealth, was determined by the attitude of these men. In 1921 the defence plank of the Labour platform was discarded. The Inter-State Conference which lays down the policy binding on all Labour members of the Federal Parliament decided that compulsory training for home defence should be abolished, and further that there should be "no raising of forces for service outside the Commonwealth or participation in any future war except by a decision of the people". There had been two distinct trends in the Labour party from the beginning, one towards imperial co-operation in defence, and one towards a more Australian policy in that regard. After the great conscription schism in 1916 the latter trend prevailed.

THE Scullin Labour Government of 1929–31 faithfully carried out the policy thus prescribed during the period of general retrenchment. It abolished compulsory training, closed the military and naval colleges, reduced the already inadequate military and naval establishments to a shadow and a skeleton. As the international situation became more dangerous, the Labour party became more pacifist. At the Inter-State Conference of 1935 the resolution proposed by Victoria, which demanded that no military action should be taken against a potential enemy until Australia was actually invaded, received the support of the ex-Prime Minister, Mr. Scullin, and the present Minister of Aircraft Construction, Senator Cameron. The belated attempts of the Lyons Government to prepare for war were bitterly opposed by the whole Labour party. As late as November 2, 1938, after the Munich Agreement, Mr. Curtin said in the House of Representatives, "any increased defence expenditure so far as Australia is concerned appears to be an utterly unjustifiable, hysterical piece of panic propaganda". Mr. Curtin had, in his 1936 election speech, advocated building up an air force, and other Labour members had echoed this obvious proposal; but it was not related to any general plan of defence, still less to any policy of imperial co-operation.

MR. MENZIES' RECORD

THE election of 1940 found the Labour party opposed to the full participation in Empire defence to which the Menzies Government had committed the Commonwealth. Mr. Curtin was, however, now a realist, and until his own assumption of office gave every possible assistance to the Government. None the less the party as a whole remained hostile to conscription for overseas service, and accepted without enthusiasm the policy of sending reinforcements to the expeditionary forces abroad. The defence policy of the United Australia and Country parties was to train a citizen force for defence, to keep a small auxiliary naval and air force, and to send an expeditionary force overseas in the event of war. They regarded Australia as a partner, with limited liability, in the Empire which had liabilities limited only by the strength of its enemies.

Considering the unpreparedness with which they were faced when the war opened, the Menzies Government did a creditable job. They equipped and sent overseas three divisions of volunteers, mobilized a large militia force, made the port defences efficient, initiated a training scheme, created a department of supply, and began the manufacture of much war material. In all this they were opposed by the Labour party, though Mr. Curtin was covertly converting opinion, until, in 1940 after the fall of France, he persuaded the Labour Inter-State Conference to approve of compulsion for militia service in Australia.

The fall of the Menzies Government and the stop-gap Fadden Government was preceded by dissension in the United Australia party which lowered the prestige of the party and its leader. The Curtin Government, therefore, though depending for support on the vote of an expelled Labour member

and two Independents, began its career with more public support than the party's record warranted. The Opposition was studiously moderate, and criticism by the press was sympathetic. Some of the daily papers, notably the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Melbourne Age*, gave it more support than they had done to the two previous Governments. Since the Curtin Government assumed office in October 1941, Australia has passed through the greatest crisis in her history. She has escaped invasion of the mainland and has suffered only from air bombing on one or two outlying places. The protection of the Commonwealth has been provided by Allied fleets and air forces in addition to its own naval, military and air forces, all of which, apart from some air force and other technical units, are now concentrated in the Commonwealth and its territories. General MacArthur and a large American force have arrived in Australia. The Japanese have been driven out of all but a few outposts in New Guinea. Notable victories, in which Australian ships have played their part, have been won at sea. The productive capacity of the nation has been diverted to the war effort. The claims of Australia have been persistently kept before Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. Mr. Curtin with some justice may claim to be "the pilot who weathered the storm".

Policy of the Curtin Government

On what grounds then can his Government be challenged? It can be challenged on the ground that its members have not ceased to be narrow partisans who refused to play their part in the defence of the Empire, and that even under the stress of actual hostilities they subordinated national to party interests. For long months they refused to apply compulsion for service outside the Commonwealth. When at last Mr. Curtin decided that he could no longer preserve the "no conscription" dogma, he asked permission at the Inter-State Labour Conference and waited till the matter had been referred back to the State branches and back again to the "supreme authority of the movement" before he dared present to Cabinet and Parliament the Bill which allowed the militia to be sent to the east as far as the 159th meridian and west as far as the 110th, and north to the Equator. Even this inadequate measure was not certain of continuous Labour support until the majority of the State Labour Conferences had ratified it. The Victorian branch, for its part, demanded its repeal, and Mr. Curtin allowed one of his Ministers, Senator Cameron, under the aegis of that branch, to continue his opposition to the measure in the Senate. Then, to place his partisanship beyond doubt, the Prime Minister went to the New South Wales State Labour Conference and assured it that "the Labour party of this country has incorporated in it the very soul of the Australian nation". This was no random flight of rhetoric. The whole tenor of his speech was the justification of the particularist attitude the Labour party has adopted since 1916. "Labour's inheritance on coming into office of a home defence plan defeatist in outlook and preparation", he said, was a vital cause in the change of Labour policy towards conscription. He described the Menzies and Fadden Governments as primarily concerned with military co-operation in overseas theatres,

whereas the Labour party's plan, "long advocated", was the responsibility for the local defence of the Commonwealth. This poses the issue squarely not only between the Curtin Government and the Parliamentary Opposition, who are now criticizing it on other counts, but between Mr. Curtin's Government and those Australian citizens who regard their British citizenship as an obligation. The Prime Minister refused the rôle of a national leader which his former opponents were almost thrusting upon him. A long period of service in the trade union and the parliamentary Labour movements has given him a keen political sense, but has blunted his perception of the ordinary man's reactions.

The "Brisbane Line" Controversy

The Prime Minister has also laid himself open to the charge of profiting by the false allegation of his subordinate, Mr. Ward, who accused Mr. Menzies of willingness to surrender to the Japanese all Australia north of a line drawn near the latitude of Brisbane. Mr. Curtin's admission that the plan was first submitted to his own Government disingenuously or irrelevantly mentioned that Sir Iven Mackay, *its author*, was appointed by the Menzies Government. Round this "Brisbane line" or "lie" debate has clashed furiously; but Mr. Curtin's lack of candour in this matter is less important than his deliberate attempt to win support on the ground that only he and his party have pursued the right war policy and that they have saved the Commonwealth. Full credit must be given, and more than full credit has been given, to the Labour Ministry for their efforts to atone for past political errors, but they did not save Australia. Australia was saved by the resistance of Great Britain and Russia, by the assistance of the United States, and by the efforts of her own fighting men in North Africa, Syria, Malaya, at sea and in the air, no less than in New Guinea. If the defence policy of Labour had been consistently followed, no expeditionary force would have left Australia to receive battle training and to earn the respect of her allies. Mr. Ward's "Brisbane line" story is merely a cruder form of Mr. Curtin's thesis that Australia had no proper part to play in a "European war", but has the right to demand unlimited assistance, while carefully limiting her own contribution, in the Pacific war. By implication, he has supported even Mr. Ward's thesis. After gratuitously stating in a letter to Mr. Fadden that Sir Iven Mackay was appointed by Mr. Menzies' Government, he told the New South Wales Labour Conference that "General MacArthur decided against defending Australia from the suburbs of our eastern cities". It is plain that the Government aim at winning a partisan victory at the next election by presenting themselves as the indispensable magnet which drew American assistance, and as the men who concentrated the Australian fighting forces on local defence. Their hope lies in creating a widespread belief that their predecessors failed. Playing on this, Mr. Curtin told the New South Wales Labour Conference that:

"Neither the Menzies Government nor the military advisers provided for the contingency that Singapore might fall, or that the British fleet might not come. Both these things happened and Australia lay almost impotent at the feet of the enemy."

An invidious charge of this kind is difficult to combat when it has been ungenerously pressed. The belief that Mr. Menzies was incompetent is more general than his actual record as Prime Minister would justify. "Planning is not performance" remarked a leading newspaper as it bowed him out of office, as though planning far ahead of performance were not an essential war policy.

Political Bewilderment

Mr. Fadden will lead the combined Opposition parties in the election. He has earned the respect of his colleagues for his unspectacular ability and loyalty, but he lacks magnetism. Mr. Hughes, although nearing his eightieth year, retains the audacity of youth and has a very strong personal following—especially among the veterans of the last war who feel that, if "the soul of the Australian nation" was ever "incorporated", it was not in a political party but in the A.I.F. Movements to put new men into Parliament have arisen, but these express dissatisfaction with the existing parties rather than any positive political movement. The truth is that the great mass of the Australian people to-day is politically bewildered. If they continue to support Mr. Curtin's party Government it will be because they regard it as better than any possible alternative. The consequences of a partisan victory in such circumstances cannot be foreseen. The case for a National Government is strengthened by the existence of the partisan bitterness which has prevented its formation.

Australia,
July 1943.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. GENERAL SMUTS'S TRIUMPH

General Smuts appealed to the country on July 7, as head of a Coalition Government pledged to fight the war with every ounce of South Africa's energy. Against him he had the Nationalist party violently opposed to his war policy, and vaguely committed, in the event of a victory in the election, to open negotiations with the enemy for a separate peace. A victory for the Government was confidently expected, but even the most experienced observers were startled when General Smuts romped home with no fewer than 110 seats in a House of 153—a majority on the war issue of 67.

There has been no comparable victory in an election in the history of South Africa. In the 1938 general election the fusion Government, headed jointly by General Hertzog and General Smuts, obtained a very large majority, but in those days the Opposition was negligible—just the rump of the old Nationalist party. The same cannot be said of the Opposition this time. The Nationalist party grew in size after the split in 1939 between General Smuts and General Hertzog, and it improved in cohesion when the Malanite section ousted General Hertzog and his most important followers from the party in 1940. For the purpose of the election they hoped to capitalize the inevitable grievances of war-time and to exploit racial prejudices—against native, coloured and Indian, Jew and Englishman—with which this country abounds. They entered the election campaign having prepared for it intensively for years, and they were backed by a highly developed party organization and an efficient and unscrupulous press. Outside Parliament there were Nazi and anti-war movements, such as Mr. Pirow's New Order and the Ossewabrandwag, with undoubted potentialities for considerable mischief. In these circumstances the country would have been grateful if General Smuts had achieved safety with a majority of 25 or 30; his return with a majority of 67 shows how uncertain are South African politics, and how much deeper than is realized is the appreciation in this country of the principles for which the United Nations are fighting their fight.

State of Parties Analysed

The state of parties in the new Parliament, with the previous position in brackets is as follows:

United party	89	(72)	
Labour party	9	(4)	
Dominion party	7	(8)	
Independents	2	(–)	
Native representatives	3	(3)	
Pro-war total	110	(87)	
Nationalist party	43	(41)	
New Order	–	(16)	
Afrikaner party	–	(8)	
Independents	–	(1)	
Anti-war total	43	(66)	

The United party made the most spectacular progress, improving its position by 17 seats and obtaining an absolute majority of 25 over all other

parties and groups in the House. With the two Independents, both of whom stood as such only in order to dodge an election agreement with the Dominion party, and who are almost certain to join the United party caucus as soon as Parliament meets, this means that the United party can rely on an independent majority of nearly 30, considerably more than the Coalition majority on which the country has been run since the outbreak of war. Another party which made especially and unexpectedly good progress was the Labour party, headed by the veteran Mr. Madeley, Minister of Labour in the Smuts Cabinet. The Labour party had 4 seats in the former Parliament and was guaranteed a further 5 by the United party. It won all 9 seats, returning 9 out of 11 candidates, in nearly every case with thumping majorities. The only pro-war party to make no progress is the Dominion party. This party is a rather illogical survival of the days of the Smuts-Hertzog régime, and owed its creation to the constitutional disputes of those days. What is the reason for its existence to-day no one seems quite to know; and this doubt appears to have been shared by the electors, for, in spite of their 8 seats being guaranteed by the United party, they were able to hold only 7 and made no other gains, and 6 of these 7 seats are in Natal, a province which can usually be relied on to take an individual, if not always a logical, course in South African affairs.

Another survival of past disputes, the Afrikaner party, was entirely wiped out. It came into being when General Hertzog was manœuvred out of the Nationalist party by Dr. Malan, and it dedicated itself to keeping alive the old General's ideals of race equality. But General Hertzog, before his death, burdened the party with his pro-Nazi ideas, and Mr. Havenga, its present leader, chose the minority opinion on the war issue. The party was kept alive on nothing much more than veneration for General Hertzog, and Mr. Havenga went to the country with the most nebulous of programmes, his antagonism to Dr. Malan on general grounds being as marked as his antagonism to General Smuts on the war issue. The measure of his failure is that Mr. Havenga himself was at the bottom of the poll, while all the 8 former members of the Afrikaner party in Parliament were defeated, and most of their 25 candidates were unable even to scrape together the small percentage of votes necessary to avoid forfeiting the £50 deposit which every candidate for election must find. The New Order, Mr. Pirow's Nazi movement, had 16 members in the former Parliament, but its leader, doubtless with an acute sense of things to come, announced that, as a measure of his ideological disapproval of democracy, his group would boycott the elections. There is now no doubt that, even if he had not done so, his group would have been removed just as firmly from the South African political scene. The New Order candidates and other Nazis who stood as Independents were uniformly returned at the bottom of the poll, most of them losing their deposits as well.

The heaviest knock was taken by the Nationalists. There is no disguising the fact that they had high hopes of this election. For years the party has been torn and weakened by internecine strife, and Dr. Malan seized the opportunity of the election to clean up his organization. The Ossewabrandwag was decisively expelled; election pacts with the Afrikaner party or any other party were firmly refused; and every Nationalist candidate had to sign an undertaking of obedience to the party dictates which was almost totalitarian in its strictness. The Nationalists assumed as a matter of course that at any rate they would get 50 seats, with a possible 60 or 65, or even more, and that then, freed from internal troubles, they would be well set for victory in the next election. But their hopes have been blasted, as they themselves are almost tearfully admitting, and they emerge from the battle with only two more seats than they had before, and this in spite of the 16 New Order and 8 Afrikaner party seats which they assumed they would naturally inherit. No fewer than 9 of their former members of Parliament were defeated; they lost seats in parts of the country which they have regarded as Nationalist strongholds, and even in their strongest seats the Nationalist majorities were ominously reduced.

Communism and the Coloured Vote

The elections tempted numerous Independents and minor parties, but one and all they were decisively rejected. The newly born Communist party entered the fray with a flourish and went out feeling despondent and looking a little ridiculous. Nearly every one of the Communist candidates lost his deposit, including their deputy leader and their strongest member, and their leader had the mortification of being beaten by thousands of votes in a constituency which was regarded as offering him an excellent chance of victory. The fate of the Communist party has brought reassurance to many who were disturbed by one feature of the election campaign. The Communists made their main appeal to the coloured voters, of whom there are many thousands in the Cape seats, and their hopes of victory were dependent on the co-operation of the coloured people. The appointment by the Government of a Coloured Affairs Commission about a month before polling day was taken by a section of the coloured people as evidence that the Government was contemplating segregation for them. The charge was false, but it was exploited for all it was worth by the Communists, and at one time it seemed that the coloured people were going to be the victims of an unscrupulous campaign of misrepresentation. The best friends of the coloured people have always warned them against linking themselves and their political fortunes with any one political group, and the warning was the more urgent since the party concerned this time was the Communist party. If it had been possible for the enemies of the coloured people to burden that community with the substantial prejudice which there is against the Communists, there is no doubt that the coloured community would have suffered very gravely. At any rate the warnings seem to have been taken to heart, for the coloured voters rejected the Communists as decisively as they boycotted the openly segregationist Nationalists. The stock argument of the segregationists is that the coloured people are politically immature; but in this election they displayed a measure of political maturity which will go far to safeguarding those political privileges of theirs which are always at least being threatened.

General Smuts's victory was as satisfactory in a geographical sense as it was in point of numbers. There is a traditional split in this country between the political opinions of the urban and the rural areas, and the tendency in the past has been for the English-speaking and more liberal opinion to be concentrated in the cities and towns. The strength of nationalism and of reaction generally has always been in the distant *platteland*, but this election has shaken even those distant fastnesses. Most significant was the capture by the United party of five rural seats in a part of the Cape Province hitherto dominated by the Nationalists. These seats were regarded by the Nationalists as cast-iron certainties, and their loss has left them feeling more heartsore than about anything else in the election. There are 36 rural seats in the Cape and of these the United party now has 17 to 19 of the Nationalists. How significant this is can be realized from the fact that in 1938 the combined strength of General Smuts and General Hertzog was able to wrest only 12 of these Cape rural seats from the Nationalists, who were entrenched in the remaining 28 of the 40 seats which were then delimited as rural. Equally satisfactory is the position in the rural areas of the Transvaal where Dr. Malan was able to win only 8 of the 26 available seats.

Town and Country Figures

For many years to come the political complexion of the Union will be largely determined on the Rand, where 32 seats are concentrated in a small area. Of these the Nationalists have been able to capture only one, the remainder going with huge majorities to the United party, except for 6 which, under the electoral agreement, were left to the Labour party. The conservative Cape Peninsula presented the Government with all its 13 seats, the Government parties thus capturing all but 5 of the 68 urban seats in the country. Natal voted solidly in favour of the war, the 16 Natal seats, after 2 each going to Labour and Independents, being evenly divided between the United party and the Dominion party. In the process Dr. Jansen, who has been for nearly 20 years the much respected Speaker of the House of Assembly, was unseated. This country has not developed the tradition of giving the Speaker an unopposed return, and Dr. Jansen, when he had to declare himself, naturally did so on the side of the party of which, during all his political career, he has been a faithful if politically inactive member. The electors in his constituency of Vryheid felt that the war was more important than the traditions of Parliament, so the Assembly's first business will be to elect a new presiding officer.

The only province which the Nationalists can regard with any satisfaction is the Free State. This province is the spiritual home of nationalism, and it lived up to its traditions by returning 13 of its 14 members to the Nationalist side of the House. But even in the Free State there are factors which serve to chasten the Nationalist ebullience. In three seats they were in a minority to the combined votes of the United party and the Afrikaner party, and there is no doubt that the Afrikaner party suffered from poor organization and lack of enthusiasm. If, as seems likely when the Afrikaner party is finally disbanded, its members turn to General Smuts rather than to the hated Dr. Malan, there is some promise that the United party might win as many as 6 of the Free State seats.

Of the million votes cast, about 650,000 have gone in favour of the war, with about 350,000 against it, nearly a two to one majority, which is better than anything that was reasonably expected. The soldiers' votes are not declared as such, but there is evidence that, in spite of earlier misgivings, the vast bulk of these went to General Smuts. To sum up: the election has shown, as General Smuts claims, that the people of this country can be relied on to make a right decision in moments of crisis. It also shows that the people of this country have overwhelmingly rejected the doctrines of totalitarianism and racialism imported from Central Europe. Dr. Malan's progress towards more liberal and democratic ideas, after a period of flirting with Nazism, is likely to be accelerated, and the votes show that the size of the Pirow and Ossewabrandwag schools of thought is in inverse ratio to the noise they make. As a matter of practical politics for the future, the outlook has been stabilized, with General Smuts's Coalition Government entrenched in power for the next five years. There is a further influence for stability in the fact that, even in the event of internal troubles in the Coalition after the war, there is a United party with a powerful majority able to see the country through by itself for five years. From the Labour point of view the rout of the Nazis and racial extremists brings the promise of a return to the racial co-operation and harmony which were the inestimable gift of General Smuts and General Hertzog to this country when they formed their fusion Government in 1933.

II. DEATH OF SIR PATRICK DUNCAN

Sir Patrick Duncan, the first South African Governor-General of the Union of South Africa, died on July 17 after a long and exceedingly trying illness. Some months ago he rallied as the result of an operation, and hopes were entertained for his recovery. They were falsified. But it was characteristic of his courage and determination that, during this short rally, he insisted on taking again into his hands the reins of office, which had been held for him when he was too ill to do his work by Mr. Justice de Wet, Chief Justice of the Union. He continued to perform his function of Governor-General till the day of his death.

Sir Patrick Duncan was appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation of the Hertzog-Smuts Government towards the end of 1936, and assumed office early in 1937. His term was extended by the present Government some two years ago. It is common knowledge that, when General Hertzog and General Smuts chose him to be the first South African appointed as Governor-General, he was extremely reluctant to accept the appointment. Only his sense of duty, to which fervid appeals were made, finally reconciled him to abandoning his resistance to the wishes of the Cabinet. Yet the judgment of the Cabinet as to his eminent fitness among all his South African contemporaries to be the first South African selected to be Governor-General was endorsed with impressive unanimity by the whole community. There could have been no more remarkable evidence than this of the profound

impression which he had made on his countrymen of whatever race or colour.

It was the product of a long South African career—first as a civil servant under the Milner régime in the Transvaal, then as a member of Parliament and an advocate of the Supreme Court in the Transvaal, and for many years as a Cabinet Minister of the Union. Duncan had none of the facile graces of a politician. He was grave in mind and grave in bearing and speech. He unbent with difficulty. The essential benevolence, genuine kindness, subtle and rich sense of humour that were his revealed themselves only to his intimates and to them only when, on rare occasions, the veil of reserve which clung round him was drawn aside. But he was impregnably modest, firmly tolerant and wisely patient, and these virtues, which he carried into politics, built for him a reputation unique among the political leaders of the time. So that, when it became known that he was to be the first South African Governor-General, the objection to the appointment of a politician, which would have been bitterly strong against most others, hardly clouded the choice at all.

In office he fulfilled quietly with his invariable diligence and conscientiousness, and with constantly growing ease, his burdensome duties. His acquired knowledge of Afrikaans put him on kindly terms with those whose language it was. When the war crisis came in 1939 and General Hertzog, who had been defeated in the House of Assembly on the war issue, asked the Governor-General for a dissolution of Parliament, Duncan refused him decisively but not impulsively, leaving even the most emotional of the followers of General Hertzog satisfied that the Governor-General had acted as his sense of justice and of constitutional propriety bade him act. That was the high peak of his career. But all through his period of office as Governor-General he had the spontaneous love and respect of his countrymen. Some murmured at times that he was personally too secluded, and that at Government House in Cape Town or Pretoria the régime was stiffer and more formal than at Buckingham Palace itself. There was an element of truth in this, but the fault was little in keeping with the Governor-General's own character. In any case it was no very serious fault, and Sir Patrick leaves with all South Africans a grateful thankfulness for his personal accomplishment as their Governor-General. Lady Duncan, who survives him, was always his devoted helpmate, as diligent as he in doing her duty as she saw it.

South Africa,
July 1943.

NEW ZEALAND

POLITICAL CHANGES

THE last quarter has been marked by certain notable events in the political sphere. On April 5 Mr. Walter Nash, New Zealand's Minister in Washington for the past year, returned to consult with the Government and, as Minister of Finance, to present his budget to Parliament. Mr. Nash's speeches since his return have exhibited an extraordinary grip of the situation and of the economic problems underlying our war effort. They have not only educated public opinion widely on war and peace aims, but have confirmed the belief that Mr. Nash's appointment to Washington was in the best interests of the Dominion. After presenting his financial statement, which was delayed owing to the death of Mr. Coates, the Minister took an active part in raising the third Liberty Loan. It is understood that he will remain in New Zealand until after the general election in September.

DEATH OF MR. COATES

THE death of Mr. Coates on May 27 was deeply regretted throughout the country. As one of the representatives of the National party in the War Cabinet since its formation in July 1940, he has given enthusiastic and untiring service as Minister for the Armed Forces and War Co-ordination. Since the outbreak of war he had ceased to regard himself as a party leader, and shortly before his death his constituents gave him a free hand to contest his seat as an independent candidate. He entered Parliament in 1911 and, after serving with distinction in the last war, became a member of the Massey Government in 1919. In 1925 he succeeded Mr. Massey as Prime Minister. During his service in the Cabinet, he held the portfolios of Public Works, Railways, Justice and Native Affairs, and the office of Postmaster General. His Government was defeated in 1928, but three years later he joined the Coalition and served under Mr. Forbes as Minister of Public Works and Transport, of Unemployment and of Finance till the defeat of the Government in 1935. Mr. Coates became a Privy Councillor during the Imperial Conference of 1926, and also attended the Ottawa Conference in 1932 and the London Conference in 1935. His place in the War Cabinet has been filled by the appointment on July 10 of Mr. William Perry, who last year took the initiative in an effort to bring about the widening of the war administration, and who is also a veteran of the last war and has long been President of the Returned Soldiers' Association. The vacancy in the Government caused by the death on April 6 of Mr. P. K. Paikea, Minister representing the Native Race, was filled on May 26 by the appointment of Mr. Eruera Tihema Tirikatene, the Member for the Southern Maori, also a veteran of the last war. In consequence of the resignation from the Cabinet of Mr. Langstone, Mr. H. G. Mason has assumed the portfolio of Native Affairs and Mr. J. Barclay that of Lands. It is evidence of the interest the Government is taking in the rehabilitation of soldiers that a special portfolio

is being created for this work, and Major C. F. Skinner, M.C., whose selection for Cabinet rank was mentioned in the last article from New Zealand, is to be the Minister.

General Freyberg's Visit

Parliament met again on May 19 in a secret session at which consideration was given to the question of man-power and the disposition of New Zealand forces overseas. The public learned with great pleasure of the visit of Lieut.-General Sir Bernard Freyberg, V.C., Commander of our forces in the Middle East, who was taking the first opportunity after the victories in North Africa of paying an extended visit to the land in which he was educated and brought up. He was entertained at a state luncheon and addressed both Houses of Parliament in secret session. He conferred with the War Cabinet on the future disposition of New Zealand's armed forces and toured the whole country with the object of seeing the military activities and meeting the relatives of his soldiers. His departure almost synchronized with the arrival in New Zealand of the first contingent of long-service men on furlough from the Middle East. We still have one division there and another in the Pacific area. It emerged too during General Freyberg's visit that our air force has distinguished itself in the Pacific. From New Zealand General Freyberg went to Australia to confer with the military chiefs, and thence to Washington on a similar mission.

The improved aspect of the war in the Pacific is reflected in the decision of the Government to reduce the strength of the mobilized army in New Zealand so as to release men for the expansion of the air force and for war industries. This decision, the Prime Minister said, was arrived at after the secret session on May 19 and 20. The arrangement will provide a territorial army of which a small portion will be mobilized for coast defences and similar duties. The remainder, who will be trained and kept ready, will be drawn from those single men and married men without children in grades I and II, between the ages of 18 and 40, and married men with not more than three children in grades I and II between the ages of 18 and 30, whose call up has been postponed for special reasons, such as health or essential occupation. They will do one month's service in camp each year and two whole day parades each month. Regarding the Home Guard, Mr. Fraser said:

"It is considered that the military situation does not necessitate the intensive training and degree of readiness of the Home Guard, and it is now possible to give considerable relief to this large body of men who have been animated by a splendid spirit of service and have displayed great enthusiasm in their training. It has therefore been decided that the Home Guard can be allotted a reserve rôle as from July 1. In every other respect the Home Guard will retain its identity and organization."

The Home Guard is being asked to assist in the production of vegetables and other foodstuffs, the demand for which for the troops in the Pacific area is enormous. It has in fact become an urgent matter to release any available men from the armed forces to cope with the rapidly expanding demand for supplies for the Allied forces in that area.

The Financial Position

The financial statement delivered by Mr. Nash, the Minister of Finance, on June 3 gave a heartening impression of the state of the Dominion. The Minister said that, in spite of the heavy demand for man-power for the armed forces, our factory output in the year 1941–42 reached the record value of £155,000,000,* which is more than 35 per cent above the pre-war figures. Primary production also, notwithstanding a slight fall last year, still exceeds in value all pre-war records. A large proportion of our production is now required for the maintenance of the American forces in the Pacific area. Nevertheless, as shipping was made available, we were able to maintain our shipments to the United Kingdom, where our banking assets during the year reached a peak of £46,600,000. At the end of the year these assets were £37,100,000 as compared with £30,900,000 a year earlier. War expenditure for the year was £144,000,000, of which £88,900,000 was spent on the army, £24,300,000 on the air force, £500,000 on the navy, £14,900,000 on civil works, and £7,000,000 on reverse lend-lease. The receipts of the Consolidated Fund included £39,600,000 from war taxation, £26,800,000 from lend-lease and £15,400,000 under the Memorandum of Security, while loans raised in New Zealand amounted to £62,600,000. The estimate of expenditure for the year was only £133,000,000, which was itself "an astounding increase" over the previous level. New Zealand has met her own war costs to the extent of £101,800,000 compared with an estimate of £77,000,000.

On the other hand the charges financed through the Memorandum of Security with Britain were £30,600,000 less than expected. This was due to the very generous offer made by the British Government regarding the loss of equipment by the New Zealand division in the campaigns in Greece, Crete and Libya. The estimate was compiled on the assumption that claims for replacement might have to be included in the charges, but in the course of the discussions between Mr. Nash and the British Government in London a settlement was arranged on the basis of New Zealand being charged the full cost of all initial equipment and the provision for maintenance being compounded for by the monthly payment of £400,000 sterling, a basis considered most satisfactory. The charges against New Zealand under the Memorandum were £15,400,000, and repayments of £8,000,000 were made from our assets in London. Our army expenditure in New Zealand was £12,000,000 in excess of the estimate, due mainly to the incalculable cost of the expansion in the Pacific area. The assistance received from the United States under the war agreement for the whole period since early in 1942 comes into these accounts to the amount of £26,800,000, which is not a charge but an accounting estimate. For the last half-year reverse lend-lease was operating, and under this head New Zealand furnished supplies, material and services to the United States forces to the value of £7,000,000 including camps, hospitals and ships £3,200,000; food £2,000,000; transport, repairs and rentals £1,700,000. Up to last March New Zealand

* Amounts are in New Zealand currency unless otherwise stated.

spent on the war the net total of £229,400,000, which is equivalent to £140 per head of the population, and the rate of expenditure now is nearly £3,000,000 a week. The total expenditure of the last world war was less than £100,000,000.

Revenue and Expenditure

Our total expenditure was found as follows: taxation £88,100,000, loans in the Dominion and overseas £123,500,000, lend-lease assistance £26,800,000. Thus 52 per cent of war receipts came from loans. The estimate for war expenditure for the current year is £148,000,000. This includes a 40 per cent increase in the expenditure on the air force and 20 per cent. decrease in the outlay for the army, due partly to reduced requirements for equipment, the tapering off of capital expenditure in New Zealand and reduction in personnel. The Minister expects taxation to yield £40,000,000, the Memorandum of Security £12,000,000 and lend-lease £40,000,000. As against the last mentioned item, we shall furnish to the United States foodstuffs, ships and services to the extent of £20,000,000, including meat and vegetable rations 4,200,000 lb., potatoes 48,300,000 lb., apples 21,800,000 lb., biscuits 3,200,000 lb., butter 14,200,000 lb., pork 15,400,000 lb., ham 7,800,000 lb., bacon 15,400,000 lb., mutton 14,000,000 lb., and beef 46,800,000 lb., amounting to a total value of £6,500,000; and cereals and other foods to a value of £2,500,000. After transferring £6,000,000 from the Consolidated Fund, the Minister has to find £50,000,000, of which £10,000,000 will come from departmental funds and the balance mostly from the third Liberty Loan. The total revenue from taxation for the year was £86,800,000, of which 68 per cent. came from direct taxes. Income tax yielded £25,600,000 (an increase of £6,600,000), social security £10,400,000, national security £16,800,000 (an increase of £6,300,000). Of indirect taxes, the sales tax was increased by £3,900,000 to £11,000,000. The total expenditure for the year, including war expenditure, amounted to £199,900,000 of which the debt charges took £12,400,000 and the social services £25,600,000.

Taking into account £80,000,000 borrowed for war purposes and £3,400,000 for national development, the public debt during the year increased by £83,460,000; £28,900,000 was obtained from loans in the Dominion, £3,900,000 from National Savings, £15,400,000 from the Memorandum of Agreement, £35,100,000 from departmental issues and the Reserve Bank, of which the Reserve Bank provided £13,900,000. Allowing for repayments, the debt increased by £78,400,000, of which only £4,500,000 was in the United Kingdom. The national debt domiciled in the United Kingdom has been reduced by £10,700,000 since the Labour Government assumed office. Even including the war debt there is still a net decrease in the external debt of £1,100,000. The surplus of £4,200,000 in the Consolidated Fund (which will be transferred to War Expenses Account) is largely due to the increase of £2,600,000 in income tax. The Consolidated Fund expenditure provided for in the estimates shows an increase of £3,000,000 over actual expenditure in the last year. Debt charges alone account for an increase of £2,500,000, which is actually a war cost being met from ordinary revenue.

Social Services

There will also be an additional £1,000,000 for increased pensions. The disablement pension is to be raised from £2 to £3 a week, with increased economic pensions yielding to a disabled service man with a wife and two children £6. 16*s.* a week. Widows' pensions are also to be increased. The expenditure of the social security fund is estimated at £17,400,000, an increase of £1,400,000. The total monetary benefits, including pensions, sickness and superannuation benefits are estimated at £12,500,000, and hospital benefits at £4,300,000. Old age pensions are estimated at £1,100,000 and universal superannuation at £800,000. The revenue will all come from the social security charge except for the transfer of £4,100,000 from the Consolidated Fund. There is a balance of £2,300,000 in the war damage fund. So far there have been practically no calls on the fund, but the Government points out that it would not go far to meet the costs of damage, should a raid occur on city areas. The insurance rate will accordingly remain at 5*s.* per £100 insurable value until the close of the year, when a reduction will probably be made. This fund, the Minister said, will be a valuable reserve for relief in case of an earthquake or other major disaster. The estimates also include £4,000,000 for housing and £2,000,000 for hydro-electricity. Housing is considered urgent especially in Auckland and Wellington, and it is proposed this year to build 3,600 houses. The Minister stated that the Government's goal was to pay at least half the cost of the war from taxation. This was not achieved last year owing partly to abnormal capital expenditure.

Discussing the demand for raising money by the creation of credit, the Minister demonstrated very clearly that harm instead of good must result from a further increase in the supply of money by means of the Reserve Bank, except in an extreme emergency, and "even then the price would have to be paid". Another feature of a very frank and lucid exposition of the country's finances was Mr. Nash's commendation of the stabilization scheme.* In conclusion he reminded the House that, while no less than £230,000,000 has been spent on the war over 3½ years by less than 1¾ million people, the aged, the sick, the widow and the family have been fully cared for. He made it clear, as did the Prime Minister to the Labour Party Conference, that the Government intends to persevere in its social policy,

"Laying the foundation of a productive and distributive system in which all who serve with hand and brain may so serve without fear of poverty, unemployment or the menace of uncared for ill health."

The goal of the third Liberty Loan opened on June 1 was £35 million, which was equivalent to asking each household in the Dominion to provide £100. The rates of interest were, as before, 2½ per cent. for the short-dated

* See The Round Table, No. 130, March 1943, p. 193.

loan 1947–49, and 3 per cent. for the long-dated loan 1953–56. There was a universal desire that this large single loan should be successful, and the very capable committee which managed the campaign had no need to appeal to patriotism. The people showed a whole-hearted readiness to subscribe, and so achieve the double object of furthering the war effort and curbing inflation. The result was unexpectedly successful. When the loan closed on July 10 the amount subscribed was £39,276,840. The Prime Minister claims that, in the number of individual subscribers which was 431,839, New Zealand has created a record for the Empire. Inscribed stock was taken up by 63,501 people to the value of £29,826,600, bonds by 193,338 to the value of £2,134,277, and 175,000 National Savings subscribers lent £7,315,863.

"This magnificent response", said Mr. Fraser, "demonstrated in no unmistakable way New Zealand's determination to do her utmost towards winning the war."

Suggestions of Rationing

Late in April, at the Conference of the Labour Party, the Prime Minister hinted that, even in this food-growing country, we might yet have to institute the rationing of some commodities of which we had never dreamt it possible that we should ever be short. We had then already provided 18 million eggs, 6 million lb. of butter and 38 million lb. of meat for the armed forces in the Pacific area. In view of these demands on our resources it is not surprising that the civilian population has found eggs very scarce for upwards of twelve months and that honey, of which the output has been lower than usual, has been almost unprocurable. It is now suggested that eggs will be regularly rationed for the more urgent civilian needs, and the Government contemplates commandeering 70 per cent of the total production of honey. The Government has, moreover, commandeered all pork till the end of September. The rationing of butter and meat is also likely to be considered. It is scarcely necessary to say that measures of this sort which have been imposed by the Government have been accepted without demur by the public. The Prime Minister said that, to the end of 1942 the cost of living index showed an increase of 12 per cent since the war began. The increase now stood at 13·4 per cent, but that of essential foodstuffs was only 8·4 per cent. In 1914–17 the increase was 35·4 per cent. The Government statistician states that, whereas the prices of bread, flour, oatmeal, sugar and butter have not changed since 1939, they increased in the last war by 50, 40, 50, 40 and 34 per cent respectively. During the debate on the budget the Minister of Finance defended the policy of subsidies which has been adopted both in Britain and in the United States as a means of stabilizing prices and farm costs. The accounts showed that, during the year, nearly £3,400,000 had been spent in subsidizing wheat, coal, fertilizers, butter, bread, sugar, tea and potatoes. Discussing New Zealand's stabilization policy, Mr. Nash explained the agreement reached on June 18 between the Government and the Farmers' Federation for the marketing of produce. It is provided in the last clause that, irrespective of the effect of internal or external markets, the prices for farm produce shall not be allowed to fall

below the level ruling when stabilization was inaugurated, namely, December 15, 1942. The National Dairy Conference has also accepted the assurance of the Minister of Agriculture that the Government would adopt as a principle that costs in butter and cheese production in the dairy farm factory and other costs should, as far as practicable, be brought back at the beginning of next season to the level of 1938–39. Incidentally a judgment given by the Arbitration Court on May 31 raised the wages of dairy factory workers by 6*s*. 6*d*. a week all round. This will be offset forthwith by an adjustment between the dairy companies and the marketing department. Though all these arrangements were fully discussed with the producers' organization and formally accepted, the Farmers' Union has recorded the uneasiness with which it regards the extension of state control in marketing. It urges primary producers to organize co-operative societies for handling their own produce.

External Affairs

Following the example of the other Dominions, New Zealand has now set up separate departments to deal with overseas affairs. Hitherto the administration of Western Samoa by New Zealand under the mandate from the League of Nations has been entrusted by the Samoa Act of 1921 to the Minister of External Affairs, while that of the dependency of the Cook Islands and Niue has been cared for by the Minister in charge of the Cook Islands under the Cook Islands Act of 1915. This rather odd arrangement has now been regularized by the passing of two Acts. The External Affairs Act provides for the appointment of a Minister, Under-Secretary and other officers to have charge of the external and foreign affairs of New Zealand including our relations with other countries, communications between the Government of New Zealand and other Governments, and the representation of New Zealand in other countries and of other countries in New Zealand. This Act provides for the appointment of New Zealand High Commissioners abroad for a term not exceeding three years. There was some objection to the clause empowering the Minister to appoint such officers as he thinks fit to these overseas staffs, the Public Service Act not being applicable to them. The Island Territories Act empowers the appointment of a Minister, Under-Secretary and staff to administer Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and any temporary dependency or mandate entrusted to New Zealand. The Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, was gazetted on July 7 as Minister in charge of both these new departments.

In view of the general election in September, members participated freely in the financial debate extending over a whole month. The proceedings being broadcast, 65 members out of a total of 78 took advantage of the opportunity afforded by this medium of speaking to the country. The members taking part in this parade were 42 Government supporters, 18 for the Opposition, four Independents and one Democratic Labour. As a measure of economy a Bill was passed suspending by-elections; this covers the seats of three deceased members, Mr. Coates, Mr. Paikea and Sir Alfred Ransom, and any others falling vacant up to September 30. Provision is

being made for soldiers on active service and essential war workers residing temporarily away from home to vote in their home constituencies. It has also been announced that all soldiers on active service will be entitled to vote, even though under age.

New Zealand,
July 1943.

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.

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INDEX AND TITLE-PAGE

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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EXPANDING HORIZONS

As winter closes in upon a year of almost unbroken Allied victory, the world looks forward with every expectation that 1944 will see the consummation of the European war. It is likely, as the Prime Minister has warned us, to bring harder fighting and heavier losses than any the western Allies have yet known; but we are moving unmistakably into an era in which the decisive stages of the enemy's destruction merge with the constructive effort destined to form the edifice of the future. This sense of a new world coming to birth has been manifest in the British Dominions, all but one of which have held general elections and given fresh mandates to their governments to proceed with the expanding tasks that lie [illegible] very fact that it has been possible to hold these elections i[illegible]g sense of confidence, of the British peoples' mast[illegible] their own fat[illegible]ich the flowing tide of victory has brought about.

The Moscow Conference

It is less easy to consult the constituencies in an island still lying [illegible] in a few minutes' flying time of the enemy's airfields, and the life of the Parliament at Westminster has just been extended into [illegible]th year. But nowhere more conspicuously than in Great Britain is strategic thought being moulded by the constructive domestic and international policy into which strategy must henceforward begin to merge. The transition will become an immediate issue in carrying out the decisions of the Moscow Conference. Outstandingly significant among these is that which sets up in London a standing commission of the three principal Allied Powers, to deal with the problems of Europe as the military process of reconquest brings them into issue. With the exception of the similar but more narrowly localized Mediterranean Commission, this is the first practical organ of the United Nations to be created; but it should become the starting-point for the whole task of world reconstruction. In effect the future of the continent is committed for the time being to a body in which no country of Europe proper is represented. But at this stage responsibility can only be exercised where there is power to support it; and the constitution of the commission faithfully represents the power on which alone the resurrection of Europe depends. Only when the enslaved nations, leaning upon this nucleus of strength, have so far recovered their foothold that authority can once more be diffused into their hands will the revolution be liquidated which began with the German inundation of western Europe in the terrible spring of 1940.

The wheel set turning by that catastrophe now begins to come full circle. One of the most painful memories remaining from those days is of the arrogant broadcast speech in which Hitler gloated over the fall of France. As the harsh and rancorous voice went on and on with its tale of provinces overrun and booty taken, its catalogue of easy victories won by

this, that and the other German army corps or division, one seemed to hear the jack-boots of the eternal barbarian trampling the ruins of a civilization he hated because it was beyond his understanding. Of those who listened in regions that were still—they knew not for how long—outside the destroyer's dominion, all were revolted as much by the vulgarity of the manner as by the cruelty of the attitude; and many must have prayed that when the time should come for reversal of fortune the leaders of their own peoples would be able to speak in a very different, a worthier and more generous tone.

In the autumn of 1943, with the unconditional surrender of Italy, the Allies reached a stage in their long and arduous process of recovery and counter-attack comparable to that at which Hitler stood on the morrow of the downfall of France. The two most eminent statesmen of the British Empire, Winston Churchill in the House of Commons and Jan Smuts in Guildhall, have reviewed the year of remarkable events which has culminated in this great instalment of victory; and it is possible to record with gratitude that both speeches were able to keep pride in the imperial achievement untainted by vainglory, that both were redolent of the magnanimity, the sense of the tragedy of war and of compassion for its innumerable victims, and the aspiration to secure a happier future to mankind, which have sustained the peoples of the Commonwealth through these terrible years, and which they hope to preserve untarnished to the end. To these two statesmen belongs the principal credit for maintaining through all vicissitudes of fortune, sometimes at great risk and against divergent opinions in the highest Allied councils, the Mediterranean strategy which has at last yielded fruit so abundantly. The two speeches together reveal something of the depth and foresight of the planning by which the victory has been brought about. In mid-October of 1942, in General Smuts's informed judgment, the Allies reached the nadir of their fortunes since Dunkirk; for the U-boat campaign was at its climax, in the East we were retreating to the frontiers of India and the last islands protecting Australia, the enemy was deep in the Caucasus and approaching the Volga and the Caspian, while his victorious armies on the borders of Egypt were threatening Alexandria and Cairo. To those outside the councils of grand strategy the situation seemed even more menacing, for they did not know of the counter-strokes, described in Mr. Churchill's speech, which he had been planning with the President in Washington at the time of the fall of Tobruk.

El Alamein and Stalingrad

In this grave conjuncture of events the aspect of the war was transformed by two resounding victories. "The battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein mark the real turning-point in this war, and will rank in history with the other decisive battles of the world." The truth of this judgment of General Smuts is apparent in the chronicle of the year that has followed the two great battles. Stalingrad decided once and for all that the German invasion of Russia must end in failure, although the extent of the disaster inflicted is still not to be calculated at the time of writing, while the German armies

of the south are in headlong flight from the shattered Dnieper line. From the defeat of Rommel at El Alamein have flowed all the successes achieved by Allied arms in the Mediterranean, the phases of which were surveyed in Mr. Churchill's speech. To say that both Stalingrad and El Alamein were decisive battles of the world is to set them in a class where comparisons of their relative magnitude become irrelevant. Whether thousands or millions of men be engaged, there is nothing more decisive than decision. General Smuts therefore included in his address some remarks on the proportion of the British effort in the whole scale of the world war, which are worthy of the attention of all the Allies, and not least of those sections among the British peoples themselves who have been disposed, in their just admiration for Russian heroism, to underestimate the part that has been played by their own countrymen. In the past year, in the course of a mighty revival of the Empire's effective power, to which the manifold efforts and endurances through the years of adversity made an indispensable contribution, three supreme blows have been struck in the West towards the enemy's overthrow; and in each, although the United States have given great and increasing assistance, the predominant rôle has belonged to the Empire. The first is the bringing the U-boat campaign to at least a temporary standstill, thereby ensuring the supply of vital material of war across the Atlantic, which was indispensable to Russian as well as British fighting power. The second is the devastating offensive of the British and American bomber commands against German war industry; and, to judge by the embarrassed endeavours of the enemy's propaganda, including Hitler himself in his anniversary speech at Munich, to conceal, to explain and to promise mitigation or revenge, this offensive, of which the culmination has been by no means reached, is now recognized in Germany to contain as deadly a threat as operations on any other front. The third is the campaign following El Alamein, with all the military and political results that have ensued from its success. In the final phases of the war, no doubt, as General Smuts suggested, the United States, the Power among the Allies that has as yet been least fully engaged and therefore has been least strained, will be enabled by her inexhaustible reserves of wealth and man-power to assume a predominance that will be grudged her by neither of her associates who have hitherto borne the principal burden. But "nothing will rob Russia and the British Commonwealth of the glory which is theirs—the honour of having turned the tide of war"; and "from El Alamein onwards we of the British Commonwealth have done things on the battle front which will stand comparison with the achievements of any of our allies".

The Turning-point

Mr. Churchill's summary of the outstanding events in the campaign since El Alamein is sufficient to show how accurately the war now moves to a plan laid down by the leaders of the United Nations. This, perhaps, is the deepest significance of that turning-point of last November, which he at the time described with proper caution as "the end of the beginning", but which General Smuts in retrospect sees as "the beginning of the end". In

Washington, in June 1942, no decision was taken beyond the occupation of the French provinces of North Africa by American troops. Mr. Churchill went on to Moscow, where Premier Stalin assured him of Russia's ability to withstand the attack on Stalingrad; and to Cairo, where the command was changed and the plans laid for the battle of El Alamein itself. It was fought in the last week of September; by the time Mr. Churchill met the President again, in January, the Eighth Army stood at the gates of Tripoli and it was possible to look ahead to the complete conquest of Tunisia and prepare for the invasion of Sicily. At the Washington meeting in May, with Tunisia conquered, the two statesmen took their decision to make their principal objective the knocking of Italy completely out of the war this year.

Almost from the first landings in Sicily on July 10 it must have been apparent to the President and the Prime Minister that their ambitious programme would be carried out well ahead of the time-table. For the Italian army, except when directly under the eye of their German task-masters, had practically ceased to fight; and the Sicilian people everywhere hailed the invading forces as their liberators. On July 25, by which time two-thirds of Sicily had been conquered, the logic of the situation was recognized in the Fascist Grand Council in Rome by the deposition of the Duce who had led Italy to such a depth of humiliation. Tentative and improbable theories that the change of government portended a stiffening of resistance were read into the early pronouncements of the new Badoglio administration; it is now known that the revolution bore its obvious face value. The dictator had been "cast down and vehemently repudiated by the whole mass of the Italian people". Badoglio had taken office with one mission only, to make peace at all costs, which he knew well meant the unconditional surrender demanded at Casablanca; with only one effective obstacle to that mission, the presence of an army of his allies which had already become an army of occupation. The Italians were "intruded upon and overlaid at all points by the Germans". Thus, when negotiations were opened at Lisbon, the real question to be discussed was not the conditions of an armistice; after some show of reluctance, Marshal Badoglio revealed that he was willing to go even beyond unconditional surrender, and bring Italy in on the Allied side—an offer that was obviously difficult to accept immediately, at a time when two of the smaller Allied peoples were still suffering under oppressive Italian rule. The more important instructions of the Italian envoys at Lisbon and afterwards at Syracuse were to obtain guarantees of immediate Allied protection for Italy when the unconditional surrender should be made public.

Treatment of Italy

Failure to recognize the true purport of these negotiations involved the more captious critics of strategy in a severe castigation by Mr. Churchill when they attempted to heckle him in the House of Commons. The complaint was that tenderness for the defeated Italians—by implication tenderness for Fascism—had protracted the discussions throughout the month of August, so giving time for the Germans to prepare the defence of Italy and

ultimately involving the landing force at Salerno in grave and avoidable danger. The facts, as revealed by the Prime Minister, were precisely opposite: far from delaying the invasion for the sake of the negotiations, he had actually hastened it in order to make possible the earlier publication of the surrender. Indeed the margin of strategical safety had been cut so fine that the Fifth Army was for a few hours in real danger of being driven back into the sea—a danger that was surmounted by the timely intervention, according to a long-prepared plan, of the Eighth Army from Calabria and Apulia. From the time of the junction of the armies their progress up the peninsula has been continuous, although bad weather and a determined German resistance have, up to the middle of November, kept it slow. The slowness may be at least prima facie evidence that a primary object of the invasion, the containing of a substantial hostile army far from the Russian front, is being achieved.

This first test in practice has shown that the formula of "unconditional surrender" has to be applied by means of a conditional armistice. The result does not differ perceptibly from that of the two armistices dictated in the railway carriage of Compiègne; for in each case the conqueror in effect dictated whatever terms suited his purposes. It is conceivable that, as the reconquest of Europe proceeds, unconditional surrender may take a different form in some countries, where perhaps government may melt away before the invasion and leave no authority capable of accepting and enforcing terms of armistice. Although at present only the severe military terms are published, and the more numerous financial and economic clauses, which were signed at the end of September, remain undisclosed, it may be taken that the effect of the armistice with Italy is to define the authority and the task of the Badoglio Government, which becomes the semi-autonomous agent of the United Nations for the supervision of Italy's contribution to the Allied war. In a previous parliamentary review Mr. Churchill had disclaimed any desire to reduce Italy to anarchy; the existence of the armistice secures the better alternative of a native government, able to preserve domestic order within a territory secured to it by Allied arms, and to act as a focus of allegiance to the population of German-occupied Italy, which is without doubt overwhelmingly on the side of the Allies. Since the position of Marshal Badoglio, carrying on the government from within the Allied camp, has been stabilized, it is notable that the campaign of criticism against the supposed political intentions of Amgot has subsided. That ambiguous organization has settled to its proper function as an agent of purely military purposes; critics who wish to impugn Allied policy for the future of Italy must read that policy in our relations with the Italian Government itself.

New Accessions of Strength

Assessing the immediate value of the overthrow of Italy, General Smuts said that "no greater events have taken place in this war". As a step towards the final overthrow of Germany and Japan it has brought three enormous accessions of power. First, the Mediterranean line of communication to the East is finally and securely established. Secondly, by the accession of the

Italian fleet—with the loss of one capital ship—to the Allied side, the whole balance of the naval war is altered, and a force of perhaps double its strength may before long be released for service in the Far East, since the British and American ships formerly engaged in watching the Italians are also set free. Thirdly, Italian territory—at present occupied up to a few miles beyond Naples—becomes a base of attack upon German-occupied countries and the Reich itself. Most immediately significant, no doubt, will be the important group of airfields centred upon Foggia, from which it will be possible to bomb all those regions in the south and east which have hitherto been a refuge for German war industry from the attacks of the British and American air fleets based on the British Isles. At the same time the occupation of the southern ports of the Adriatic gives easy access, should occasion require, to the Balkan peninsula, and that of Sardinia and Corsica to the French Riviera. Those clauses of the armistice, on the other hand, which stipulate for active Italian assistance in the prosecution of the war have proved of rather equivocal value. Mr. Churchill testifies that the Badoglio Government has loyally discharged its engagements. There is no doubt about the universal goodwill of the people towards the Allies; and in several regions, notably Corsica, they have played a useful combatant part in the expulsion of the Germans. In parts of Jugoslavia and Greece, even, where the continuance of very bitter feeling was to be expected, guerrilleros fighting for liberation have been willing to avail themselves of Italian help—an apparent suspension of feuds which presumably influenced Allied policy in accepting Italy as a "co-belligerent" when Marshal Badoglio declared war on Germany in the middle of October. But it is evident that, more than trust in the Allies, extreme war-weariness is the prevailing mood of the Italian people, and enterprises based on the expectation of their effective help in the field are very hazardous. Miscalculation of this factor, it must be supposed, underlies the failure of the Allied attempt on the island of Cos; for the strength of the landing force was gravely inadequate to meet the swift German reply in the absence of active help from the Italian garrison. The same Italian passivity accounts for the success of that spectacular German exploit, the rescue of Mussolini. Its value, as a blow to Allied prestige at a time when the allegiance of the German satellites was most severely shaken, must be conceded; although the present worth of the fallen Duce to his masters is probably negligible. The "Republican Fascist Government" is the merest puppet of German military rule; and as a puppet almost anyone would serve as well as a defeated dictator. The military value of Italy's change of sides may turn out to be principally negative, and to depend on the strain it imposes upon German man-power for the replacement of the Italian armies of occupation in the Balkans.

The task awaiting the Italian people as co-belligerents under Marshal Badoglio's administration was clearly defined by Mr. Churchill; like the other Axis satellites, their future depends on how well they "work their passage home". Co-belligerency does not make them partners of the United Nations; they remain on probation. All the conditions of the armistice remain in force. Retribution for war crimes will be exacted from the guilty men; and

at the best Italian claims at the peace congress must necessarily take second place to those of the peoples Italy has so grievously wronged. Fascism has been emphatically repudiated; and there is no need to suppose the conversion insincere because it has been delayed until the military failure of Fascism was visibly consummated. But every people is the architect of its own history, and must bear the responsibility for the acts of its government, whether a government of its own active choice or one that it has pusillanimously endured. Slaves as they have permitted themselves to be, Italians can no more claim immunity from the consequences of Fascist aggression than the British from the sufferings they have borne as the result of the military unpreparedness they tolerated before the war. The present power of the Italians over their own future is therefore limited, as always, by the past. Nevertheless it is real. Italy is promised by the Atlantic Charter a proper share in the economic and political opportunities of a liberated world—subject to the condition that her power for renewed aggression will be taken from her. The nature of that share will be largely determined by her people's own efforts to show, during the remaining time of hostilities in Europe, the genuineness of their adherence to the declared ideals of the United Nations. Marshal Badoglio, who has been accepted by the Allies as *de facto* head of the Italian administration without prejudice to the constitutional settlement of the future, has announced his intention to retire on the attainment of victory and leave the people free to determine the form of their own self-governing institutions. Meanwhile he is making genuine efforts to broaden the political basis of his government. Some of the anti-Fascist exiles have returned to Italy, including notably Count Sforza, a statesman with a debatable record, but with a great following among Americans of Italian blood; and there are signs that parties are re-forming. The lines of the new Italy may have begun to take shape before the Anglo-American armies have reached the Alps, or even the Lombard plain.

Europe swinging with the Tide

Thus the disruption of the Axis entails the opening of the phase of international reconstruction. Like ships at their moorings at slack water, the lesser States of Europe are swinging with the tide. Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria made immediate efforts, on the fall of Italy, to find some way of escape from their German fetters. Although all three found themselves too securely held for any effective change in their diplomatic alignment, they now find themselves further threatened by the sweep of the Red Army along the shore of the Black Sea; and their uneasiness is more conspicuous than ever. Portugal, always loyal in sentiment to the ancient alliance with England, but naturally perturbed by the terrible fate of so many small neutrals whom the Allies were powerless to succour at need, has now sufficient assurance of approaching victory for the United Nations to offer non-belligerent help in the Azores for the protection of the Atlantic seaways. Sweden is emboldened to oppose an altogether new front of opposition to German usurpation, and, with a disillusioned Finland on her flank, may yet become a fulcrum for the swing of all Scandinavia into a new line. In all the enslaved countries

there has been an upward surging of the movements of liberation—of which the force is unhappily weakened in some places by divisions among the patriots themselves.

The closing in upon the southern ramparts of Hitler's fortress, which Mr. Churchill foreshadowed as the immediate strategic programme, will no doubt give greater coherence to these various stirrings against the German domination. But that which will do most to give clear and co-ordinated direction to the drifting units of Europe is the Anglo-American mass invasion from the West, which he indicated as the culmination of the Allied plan. General Smuts prophesies that "the crises and climaxes will come more sharply and suddenly, until the final overwhelming collapse of the enemy"; and, having regard not only to military considerations, but to the tragic draining of the life-blood of civilization which continues with every day of Nazi domination, he declares it urgent that the final decision be forced as early as possible next year. With these prospects ahead, and the object-lesson of the interrelation of military and political planning before our eyes in Italy, it is not surprising that there has been a demand for closer consultation between the principal Allies, who have assumed so great a responsibility for the future ordering of the world.

Literature of Reconstruction

The extensive literature of international reconstruction, which had so great a vogue in the first year of war, dwindled away in the evil days after the fall of France, when there was little certainty that there would be any international order to reconstruct. As hopes of survival grew brighter, popular and literary fervour began to concentrate first upon domestic social reform, destined to secure a worthier life to the men and women whose devotion would have won the war. But in these latter months, with final victory hovering on the horzion, there has been a fresh realization of the inseparable connexion between social and international justice, and a notable revival, in books and pamphlets, in newspapers and private discussion, of the early interest in world planning for peace.

To this profound sentiment General Smuts gave moving expression in his Guildhall speech. He made the dream of 1914, of "a war to end war", live again, for, in spite of all the failures, all the mockery of the cynics, its nobility has never been discredited, and on the recapture of that vision at the crisis of a greater war the hope of the future is likely to depend. "Let it be our will and firm resolve that this war shall be the last." The problem of aggression, General Smuts holds, is "the basic problem before our race and the future of our civilized society". The world has to be so ordered that aggression can always be stifled at the outset of its career. After this war, as after the last, the problem will still be to create a world authority capable of acting as the permanent guarantor of peace.

In General Smuts's conception, of which it may be hoped that he will fill in the outline before his stay in England ends, it is clear that this authority must ultimately enlist in its support the national devotion of all the world, including those nations which must for some time to come be inevitably

treated as potential breakers of the peace. It was perhaps not by accident that he chose to mould the loftiest phrases of his peroration on a paraphrase of the national poet of Italy. It is further apparent from his language that in his opinion what this war has especially taught the lovers of peace is a new acceptance of the just place of force in human affairs. The revulsion against force, which induced the treaty-makers of 1919 to leave the League of Nations without effective power, will not prevail again. We have learnt to recognize the truth in the old epigram that there is nothing worse than injustice except Justice without her sword in her hand.

THE POWERS AND THE PEACE

OUTLOOK OF THEIR PEOPLES

THE quickening momentum of the war in Russia, the Mediterranean and the Far East—reinforced, as it has just been, by the Moscow Conference—has kindled discussion throughout the world about the return of peace. Fluid as much of this speculation may be, certain firm conclusions are already taking shape; and in the English-speaking world there is a rapidly growing demand that leaders should give their peoples some clearer indication of the settlement they have in view. One signal result of this pressure was the broadcast on world organization and on a four years' plan which Mr. Churchill delivered last March. Other Empire leaders have since thrown their opinions or aspirations into the common pool of thought. Discussion, marked by growing controversy, is widespread in the United States. Marshal Stalin has contributed a pronouncement which, like all his statements, is clear and full of meat. In Britain the output of speeches, articles, pamphlets and books is, in the literal sense of that word, immense. These issues touch the life of the British Empire at a thousand different points. Its procedures after the war of 1914–18 had much that was constructive and progressive in them, but they did not enable it to avert another mortal challenge to its way of life. It is now once again at the parting of the ways. There can be no world order worth the name in the period that opens after this war if the British Empire is not organized as a co-operative system comparable in human and material resources to the great American and Russian Unions. Only so will it be able to work with them effectively in promoting economic recovery and maintaining peace.

What, then, is the state of mind amongst the nations of the Empire and in the world at large upon economic co-operation and the organization of peace? In some ways it is more promising than that which prevailed in 1918, because the twenty years which separated the two great wars have taught us something at least of the dangers and difficulties which will beset our path. Few people, for instance, cherish the illusion, which was almost universal at the end of 1918, that the armistice will be followed by a Peace Conference at which all the world's outstanding problems will be decisively solved. The evils which have darkened the world in this enlightened century have deep and tenacious roots, and it is essential that hot-gospellers should not persuade the men and women of to-morrow that they can be extirpated at a stroke. For there is assuredly no sovereign nostrum by which, when once the cease-fire has sounded, a new world may be conjured into being overnight. The architects of policy will be the elder statesmen; they hold the seats of power. Yet in democracy and autocracy alike statesmen, however powerful, must broadly reflect the deeper trends of opinion in the peoples they represent. Failure to do so, even in despotisms, would put other leaders in their place; for—let us make no mistake about it—the Nazi

tyranny itself was thoroughly popular in Germany so long as it was able to show success. What, then, are the deeper trends? They are not obscure in Britain, and they do not seem to be different in other parts of the Empire or the earth.

SECURITY AGAINST WAR

THERE is no doubt *in primis* that those who are sacrificing the better part of their lives to hard and dangerous service are asking themselves and others whether the Governments which have taken from them so much of their youth can make the rest of their lives worth living when they have won to peace. This is not a purely material or selfish demand, though it rightly and properly reflects the natural desire of every normal human being for scope and happiness. They know—who better?—that one of the essential conditions will be security against another war. They wonder how that is to be achieved, and they also ask insistently whether the civilized world they are saving from annihilation will give them work on which they can count and earnings on which a hearth of reasonable happiness can be built. They are also deeply concerned with what is usually described as "social justice"—a wide and comprehensive aspiration which includes generous provision for those disabled by wounds, bereavement or other causes beyond their control, war on poverty (often combined in their minds with war on wealth), educational opportunity for all classes, greater consideration for labour in the conduct of industry, and in general a new deal for the under-dog. This is the natural feeling of many millions of human beings all over the world. With every allowance for differences of education, outlook and origin, it is probably much the same among men and women of every nationality. Governments henceforth must make life good for the many, and not only for the few, if they are to hold their place.

The achievement of this new order would not be simple even if mankind were a single society, united under one Government with common standards and a common aim; but progress towards that far-off ideal is not in fact much assisted by the sense of maladjustment in both national and international affairs which undoubtedly exists. The world at this moment is like a sea in which strong tides and currents conflict. Enlightened opinion everywhere is manifestly more conscious than it used to be of the need for international co-operation if any kind of security is to be achieved and national standards of social welfare raised. But, whether in democracies or in despotisms, nationalism has otherwise gained rather than lost in strength. The standards of life at which the individual nations aim are national standards, and national particularism has been steadily reinforced by the increasing demand for equal participation by all the members of a nation in that nation's standard of comfort and wealth.

It is now possible to distinguish the trend of those national policies or states of mind which will govern the settlement after the war. The main lines of the settlement will inevitably be fixed by the three most powerful members of the United Nations—namely, the British Empire, the United States and Russia—acting, it is intended, in close collaboration with China,

which alone is capable of becoming in this century the equal of the other three not only in resources but in warlike strength. All these are actual or potential unions commanding or capable of commanding great internal markets, vast and varied resources, and a proportionate capacity for the manufacture of commodities and armaments. Their relations with each other and towards the rest of the world will determine the life of every continent. They therefore hold the keys of the future, for better or for worse.

Russia's peace aims are fairly clear. She is no longer predominantly interested in Communist propaganda aiming at internal revolution in the countries of other Powers. As General Secretary of the Communist party, Marshal Stalin was the main force behind the New Economic Policy which since 1921 has transformed the Russian economy and enabled Russia to overmaster Germany in this war. He has been the single commanding spirit in Russia ever since his decisive defeat of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev in 1928; and the many fundamental changes he has wrought in his vast Union, more particularly in the revival of Russian nationalism under the welding fires of war, prove that the fanatical dogmas of the early Communists have no hold on him at all. He has raised Russia to the status of a World Power, which no country in Europe, Asia, Oceania or America can afford to ignore, but there is little sign that he will make of Russia a disturbing element in international affairs, provided that his main purposes can be peaceably secured. What he will surely demand is security for Russia upon her eastern and western frontiers in order that she may repair the devastation wrought upon her by the German hordes, develop her enormous resources in Siberia, and raise her peoples to the cultural and material standards of life which their innate quality deserves. For all these purposes he requires the co-operation of the British Empire and of the United States. Our twenty years' treaty of alliance with Russia is proof that, so far as Britain is concerned, the desire for a creative friendship is reciprocal.

American View of Alliances

No such clarity is yet to be found in the policy of the United States. Isolationism in its extremer forms has been shattered by Pearl Harbour and the German declaration of war. Most Americans now understand that the world will continue to break in upon them, however much they might prefer to keep themselves to themselves, and that they must therefore in their own interests engage in some co-operative international system which will help them to a stable enjoyment of prosperity and peace. We shall be wise to assume that American policy will insist on combining two definite ideas. It seems fairly certain, in the first place, that the people of the United States will wish to take some effective share in guaranteeing the world against another war. Opinion in every part of the Union has been shaken so deeply by the revelation of what inadequate precautions against world-war may involve that isolationism in its traditional form has passed into the limbo of forgotten things. But the very notion of alliances is fundamentally unpopular, and ancient traditions are not uprooted in a day. Alliance with

some Power or group of Powers seems to the American mind to involve alliance against some other Power or group of Powers, and Americans are instinctively opposed to a world-order balanced in that way.

This strong instinct gives emphasis to the fact that the American Constitution puts obstacles in the path of alliances which are almost impossible to overcome. Treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate—a provision of the Constitution which means that thirty-odd Senators may prevent any alliance from being ratified. The further fact that the alliance in view can only be one with Britain and Russia sets the seal upon the political complex which would have to be resolved. Russia is profoundly distrusted in many quarters of the United States which exercise a strong influence in the Capitol. Foremost among those are big business, the Roman Catholic Church, and certain communities, such as the Poles, of Eastern European origin; but there is also a widely spread conservative dislike of close association with Communism. Britain, on the other hand, is second only to Russia in rousing apprehension in the American soul. Anglo-American history has too long been misinterpreted and Britain misunderstood. Belief in the superior cunning or obliquity of British statesmanship is still too deeply ingrained. The obstinate fact, of course, remains that some solid understanding with Britain and Russia will be indispensable to the security which the American people desire. But that essential understanding will probably have to be contained in some wider system of international or collective security, and even that wider system will probably have to be expressed in some form of international instrument or agreement for which a two-thirds majority of the Senate is not constitutionally necessary.

China is at present the least of the four Great Powers which must be the nucleus of the coming peace settlement; but her potentialities are immense, and much will turn upon the way in which her future is shaped during the next twenty or thirty years. She has a very strong hold upon American sentiment, and she is a field for American external trade. Her relation to Russia, on the other hand, is difficult to predict. We do not know whether Marshal Stalin will be prepared to declare war upon Japan when quit of the German menace on his Western front, nor whether the possible development of another first-class military Power upon the mainland of Eastern Asia will accord with his conception of Russia's vital interests. China dislikes and despises Japan; but whether that sentiment will last when the Japanese invader is cast out is unpredictable. Japan, it is fair to remember, has always had a case, since her island territories cannot provide a decent living for her population without a large external trade; and the two great peoples, with five hundred millions to feed and nurture up, might well come together in seeking a place in the sun if the other Pacific Powers combined to keep them out of it.

The Rôle of the Commonwealth

The British Empire is vitally concerned with all the problems outlined in this summary review. There are two great crucibles from which war may

again break out, if the Empire fails to make a right use of its strength in the coming post-war settlement, as it did after 1918. The first of these is Europe, the future of which will probably have taken some clear shape before the end of next year. The other is the Far East. In that area the war will certainly take longer to conclude, and the lines of settlement will inevitably be affected by the kind of understanding achieved between the chief Allies in European affairs. Europe therefore will be the crux, as it has always been before, and there are few in this country who do not grasp the importance of keeping the Commonwealth united behind British policy in this continent. It was the unity of the Empire which enabled Britain to weather the awful crisis of 1940 and 1941. Without that unity the solid front now presented by the United Nations could never have been achieved, and the war could not have been won. Unity will be as essential to the security and progress of the Empire in peace as it has been to its survival in the life-and-death struggle of the last four years.

The points essential to a sound peace settlement from the Empire's point of view are indeed already clear in principle, though opinion differs widely as to the method by which they may best be won, consolidated and held against future strains. The first essential is a close understanding for immediate purposes with the two chief military Powers which will in conjunction with us have won the war—namely, the United States and Russia. The two latter are Unions covering a vast area of contiguous territory, with enormous natural resources, large populations, internal markets of great consuming power, and all the varied manufacturing capacity essential in these days to military and political leadership amongst the nations of the world. The nations of the Commonwealth will be collectively the equal of those great Unions, if they can work together effectively in a common policy aimed at security and economic development for all. In both fields Britain is the essential link between the other two, and her most important task is to keep them in harmony. She is well equipped for this task by the position which she holds. The hopes reposed in her by the other European nations were never so great as they are to-day, and air power has made a definite alliance in Europe more necessary than ever to her security; she is still an island, but Shakespeare's "moat" is no longer the saving barrier which it has proved throughout her past. Her interests in Europe correspond with those of all the nations which want peace; they are economic prosperity and internal freedom for all, together with a solid guarantee against the renewal in any quarter of ambitions leading to war. These are also the Russian interests proclaimed by Marshal Stalin. Europe will be a political cauldron from a line between the Baltic and the Black Sea to the Iberian peninsula when the German oppressors have been overcome. It is only by an understanding between Britain and Russia—approved and supported by the United States—that order, freedom, prosperity and stability can be restored. The twenty years' alliance between Britain and Russia will, it is to be hoped, be endorsed by the other nations of the Commonwealth. But American partnership in the restoration of Europe is equally indispensable to success in the economic field, and highly desirable in that of security against war.

This is where the nations of the Commonwealth can by pursuing a common policy do more than any other nations to assure their own welfare and that of the world. Their unity in this mortal struggle has given them an influence which only they themselves can, by disunity, destroy. British leadership is in sober fact the hope of Europe, and Europe understands that Britain could not have stood foursquare against a triumphant military Power which ringed her insular position and threatened her vital sea-lines but for the moral and material support of the splendid family of nations to which she belongs. The Commonwealth is felt to have found some secret which the European family as urgently requires. Its moral cohesion is an essential element in Britain's European leadership; she cannot play an effective part in guaranteeing European peace without its approval and support for the European engagements she must incur. And that is not her interest alone. Stability in Europe, as two global wars have proved, is necessary to the peace of every ocean and continent. By backing Britain firmly in Europe, the Dominions will not only be strengthening her security; they will be strengthening their own. Yet that, important as it is, is only one aspect of the benefit not only to itself but to the world which the unity of the Commonwealth behind the coming peace settlement can assuredly obtain. Given the support of the Commonwealth in Europe, Britain will have strength, as before, to project her stabilizing influence into every ocean, to hold the strategic lines and bases on which the coherence of the Empire depends, and more especially to play an effective part in keeping the peace of Asia and the Pacific, where lies the next most dangerous crucible of war. The British Commonwealth and Empire are in reality three political systems—the Commonwealth of Nations, the Indian Empire, and the Colonial Empire—and these are mortised into the framework of international and inter-racial society as no political system since the Roman Empire has ever been. Britain is still the one universal factor which holds this system together; but she can no longer be an Oceanic as well as a European Power if the other nations of her family do not understand the importance of both those essential rôles and support her in discharging them. She, with her forty-six million souls, is no longer an Atlas who can shoulder a global burden alone. But she can still do it with such support in peace as her family has given her in war; and, since the peace of the world depends in no small measure upon her capacity to do it, the kindred nations have a common interest in sharing some part of the responsibility.

British Schools of Thought

What, then, of opinion in Britain itself upon the main lines of the peace settlement? It is still extremely mixed, and different schools of thought approach the problem in different ways. There is still in many quarters here, as in the United States, a strong dislike of alliances as savouring of "power politics" and the division of the world into camps. Associated with this is an unwillingness to believe that collective security on the old League of Nations pattern will not give us all that is required. This school, which belongs in the main to the Left in politics, demands that all control of colonies

and of strategic lines and bases shall be internationalized, and Mr. Churchill's resounding declaration that he does not propose "to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire" is abhorrent to it. But the political leaders of the party do not seem to concur in all the views of that character which its intellectuals propound. Mr. Herbert Morrison, for instance, has replied in the following fashion to American criticism of British Imperialism:

"We live", he said, "in a high-powered, closely integrated, rapidly developing modern world. It becomes increasingly obvious that in the most tangible and concrete sense we are all members one of another. This is no time to give the principle of political separatism free rein—to multiply the numbers of half-grown autonomous states dotted about the world. What we want is surely to have less exclusiveness, not more—to hold fast to every fragment of cohesion and unity in the world, to build it up, to give it a fuller meaning and fit it into a wider pattern. This is the real meaning of the British Empire to-day."

Mr. Morrison clearly therefore believes that the crying need for closer structure and coherence in the world is not to be effectively met by weakening or destroying such structure and coherence as some parts of it have already attained; and it may be taken as assured that Labour will not seek to break up the Empire by internationalization or by any other means, if the present coalition should be dissolved and if, at the general election which must follow, Labour should be returned to power. There is indeed some reason to hope that the political parties may continue to remain in general agreement upon the main principles of Imperial and foreign policy in the present state of the world, and all the more because solid engagements with Russia will thereby be more easily maintained.

Another school of thought holds that the League of Nations as a whole, and more particularly the British nations within it, failed to keep the peace because they relied upon the co-operation of sovereign governments and did not realize that nations, to use their strength effectively for common ends, must combine under a super-national government with power to pursue a single foreign policy, organize a common system of defence, and allocate the cost of it in accordance with the capacity of each federated State. This may be called the constitutional approach to the problems of our time. Those who dissent from it do not dispute the manifest truth that national self-government cannot be the last word in the political organization of mankind. They are not bound for all time by the *status quo*. They are just as convinced as any other school of thought that the Empire will need a new technique after this war if it is to be a factor of decisive weight in reconciling the divergencies of the leading nations, and more particularly of Russia and the United States. But they regard the suggested federal union as impracticable. Democracies, they believe, under the conditions created by the present stage of national development, will insist upon keeping absolute control of such fundamental matters as the conscription of life and wealth which go with the issues of peace and war.

Regional Organization

As usual, the steady political sense of this old country is looking for a middle path between extremes, and it is likely to prove far more hard-headed and less visionary than in the twenty years of illusion which followed the last armistice. The two Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth who are most experienced in international affairs and stand highest in the opinion of the Empire and the world, Mr. Churchill and General Smuts, have both indicated their belief in regional or continental organization for achieving a more practical treatment of the problem of security and for bringing together those governments of the Empire, whatever their character, which have common interests and responsibilities in each continent. Whatever form this regional organization may take, the fact that Mr. Churchill and General Smuts have declared for it makes it certain that regional co-operation by oceans or continents will be actively studied and pursued.

The critical importance of the time factor must in particular be grasped by all who wish to understand the momentous problem confronting the states-men of the Empire as the triumphs of 1943—particularly at El Alamein and Stalingrad—make way for the further triumphs of 1944 and all that they will entail. Decisions will have to be taken in the coming year affecting the whole future of mankind. They will be taken in the first instance by the three partners, the British Commonwealth, the United States and Russia. These three political systems have been the architects of the coming victory, and they must be the architects of peace, if peace is to be laid on solid founda-tions, proof against all sabotage and strain. The foundations will not be solid if they are laid, like those of 1919, without real unity of aim.

The policy of our two great Allies is still inscrutable in many ways. In the United States the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1944 will govern the thought and speech of public men. Russia, on the other hand, is being steered by a powerful and decisive mind which has little need to trouble about dissensions at home. Her contribution to the triumph of our cause has been immense, and we have to make as sure as we can that her views of what the world requires will dovetail with our own. She will have a population of 300 millions before the end of this century—a figure half as large again as the white population of the British Empire and the United States combined. She is therefore bound to be a dominant Power, strongly nationalist of mind, with a potent influence upon the course of international affairs. It will depend upon British and American policy whether or not her conception of peace and progress corresponds with our own.

There is no need of argument to prove that the British Commonwealth must do its utmost to harmonize the relations of the mighty eastern and western Unions with which it has been united by the war. It stands nearer to both than they to each other; and the tidal forces which are moving to-wards greater social justice within the boundaries of every nation as an individual national aim will make but little way if these three great Powers fail to work on common principles for peace and stability in the inter-

national field. There can be no lasting peace in Europe or Asia without Russian collaboration to that end. There can be no economic recovery for any part of the globe without the collaboration of the United States. The Allies were falling apart in the last war even before final victory in the field had been achieved; they were never in fact sincerely united in their post-war political aims. That must not happen again, but it will happen relentlessly if Britain fails in the harmonizing rôle which none but she can perform.

Case for an Imperial Conference

In order, however, to perform it with any hope of success she must have the solid support of the Commonwealth for the main lines of the peace settlement, first in Europe and then in the Far East. It is of great assistance that General Smuts should have come again to London after a resounding electoral victory which has, as he said, "affirmed South Africa's continuing membership of our world-wide Commonwealth". What is now needed is an Imperial Conference—that is, a meeting of all the Empire's Prime Ministers—to decide upon the organization of peace and economic recovery which they will jointly pursue. In deciding that they must moreover decide how the moral and material strength of all their nations is to be combined in making peace and progress secure. Britain can achieve little of lasting value in her harmonizing rôle as between the other Great Powers if she is faced with disunity or dissidence or even indifference amongst the nations of her own family.

General Smuts in October reiterated his faith in the British Commonwealth in very moving words:

"This great Commonwealth of sovereign States, spread over the world, forerunner of the future government of man, is to-day, under the most searching of tests, more of a reality than ever before, just as it is to-day a greater power for good, a stronger buttress of man's future, than it has ever been in the past."

No one realizes more keenly than he, its former enemy and now most valiant champion, that policy and structure will be necessary to keep the Commonwealth true to that great human rôle. No one understands more clearly, as he showed in the same speech, that its foremost immediate duty is to harmonize the purposes of the United States and Russia with its own. He has already outlined his views of structure in his own continent, and Mr. Curtin has shown that the Australian Government is equally aware of the need for a common British policy in the international field. The future will be brighter for all the Empire's peoples and for the world at large if all the Empire's Prime Ministers can meet without further delay to affirm their unity of purpose and to decide how best that unity can be expressed and preserved.

POSTSCRIPT

Since this article was written a debate on the subject has been held in the House of Lords where Lord Cranborne, as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, expressed the anxiety of the United Kingdom Government that a

meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers should be held at the earliest possible moment convenient to all. He said:

"If I am asked when a meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers can take place—that is a very natural question—I would quote again what was said by the Prime Minister on the same occasion: 'I have been trying for the last two years to get a meeting of Prime Ministers.' And, my Lords, I can tell you that another attempt has been made within recent weeks. Field-Marshal Smuts was already here and it seemed an appropriate moment to try and bring other Dominion Prime Ministers together. Soundings were accordingly taken. But unfortunately Mr. Fraser was unable to come owing to a temporary illness. All those who know Mr. Fraser, and admire him as I do, will hope that he will soon be recovered, but that temporary illness makes it impossible for him to be here at the present juncture. Moreover, it now turns out to be impossible for Mr. Curtin himself to make the journey here at the present time. No one who knows the complexities of a Prime Minister's life will fail to sympathize with Mr. Curtin in his difficulties. We can only regret that his other unavoidable preoccupations render his presence here impossible.

"I only explain these facts in order to make it clear that it is not His Majesty's Government here who are putting hindrances in the way of such a meeting. On the contrary, we ardently desire a meeting of Prime Ministers at the present stage of the war. We believe it could achieve very useful results both for the present and the future, and we can only hope another opportunity will soon occur. In the meantime, let me assure your Lordships' House that the only desire of His Majesty's Government is to perfect the machinery of Imperial collaboration and to achieve co-ordination both in the sphere of defence to which the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, so rightly drew attention, and in the sphere of foreign affairs. Such co-ordination is obviously equally essential with regard to other cognate questions, social and economic, to which the noble Lord, Lord Craigmyle, drew attention as being vital to the prosperty of the British Commonwealth and the world.

"But I would emphasize this: it is not for us alone, for the United Kingdom, to decide what new machinery should be devised. We are only one of five."

Lord Bennett, speaking with exceptional authority as an ex-Prime Minister of Canada, emphasized the same point. He said:

"The position is changed since the Imperial Conference of 1907, when it was resolved that the Conference should meet every four years. In the last resolution passed before the outbreak of war it was provided that the Conference should meet annually, so that what had been regarded as problems important enough to be dealt with once in four years then became problems to be dealt with annually, and now, I think, have become problems to be dealt with monthly, if not weekly. And the way in which they can be dealt with has been speeded up, not only because of air transport: we have greatly improved our communication facilities; telephones and the wireless have come into full play."

STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XVII

PREPARATION FOR THE GRAND ASSAULT

THE last section of this review ended with the fall of Mussolini and with some speculations about what that event portended. Two things were clear—that the Italians wanted to get out of the war and that they would have great difficulty in doing so. For since it is the cardinal principle of German strategy to fight wars outside their own territory, the prospect was that they would not abandon their hold on Italy without a prolonged struggle. So it proved to be. The capitulation of Italy was no surprise to either side, though some efforts were made to conceal it from the Germans until the invasion of the mainland was well under way. This event did not take place until six weeks after Mussolini's resignation. In the interval the Allies completed the conquest of Sicily, though without catching many Germans there, and carried through the vast preparations necessary for the invasion of the Continent.

There has been a widespread impression that the development of Allied strategy has been slow and uninspired—in short, that the Allies did not "cash in" on the capitulation of Italy as they ought to have done. It is therefore proper to draw up a balance sheet of what was done and what was not done, in order to answer the question whether the gains were as great as they ought to have been. They were, of course, intrinsically very great. Practically the whole of the Italian Fleet escaped from German attempts to retain it and surrendered to the Allies. There seems to have been very little left of the Italian Air Force to surrender, and for many months the *Luftwaffe* had been conducting practically all the limited air activity of the Axis. Consequently the Mediterranean became an Allied sea, our lines of communication were shortened to the great economy of our shipping, and it became possible to send strong naval reinforcements to the Far East. That was the first gain.

In the second place Sardinia and Corsica fell with very little trouble into Allied hands, when otherwise their occupation would have involved a major operation. The taking of Corsica was, however, a dramatic and significant affair. One fine day a telegram was received in Algiers saying that Corsican patriots were masters of Ajaccio and were co-operating with the Italians in driving out the Germans. These patriots had been armed and organized by General Giraud's emissaries, and the way they did their job is eloquent proof of the potential value of resistance movements in all occupied countries. A small French expedition was hastily organized in Algiers, and Corsica was cleared in a fortnight by the patriots, assisted by some French regulars, Moroccan Goums, and a few American rangers. It was a nice little piece of work.

The third gain was the practically unopposed landing of two divisions of the Eighth Army on the toe of Italy, followed by the capture intact of the

two great ports of Taranto and Brindisi. A firm bridgehead was thus established without any serious fighting at all.

SALERNO

THE rest of the plan had been to land two British and two American divisions at Salerno—the point at the extreme range of land-based fighter cover, sweep east across Italy, and cut off all German troops to the south. The operation did not work out as planned. The Salerno force found a German armoured division awaiting them, which in a few hours was reinforced by two more divisions from the south and one more from the north. For four days the invaders were hard put to it to prevent these fresh and formidable forces from driving them into the sea. The Fleet, including six battleships, was brought up to cover our hard-pressed troops. Every available aeroplane was turned on to the battle. The Eighth Army came up from the south as fast as very thorough demolitions would allow. Reinforcements, including armour, were landed. Finally, by very gallant fighting, the Allies made good a bridgehead and began to creep nearer Naples. Though an operation intended as a swift encirclement thus ended as a slow frontal advance, it can be counted as a gain that the enemy was deprived of the great psychological fillip of a local victory.

This would clearly have been of such value to him that the real question is why he did not reinforce his troops more strongly from the north, where he had at least 20 divisions. He undoubtedly had some trouble from the Italians, though probably not as much as rumour has suggested. He had more trouble from air attacks, particularly near the battlefield. But the main reason for not risking more troops farther south was probably the danger of other Allied sea-borne landings farther north. It must therefore be counted a gain that he was thrown definitely on the defensive, though he certainly had more troops in Italy than the Allies. In consequence, he has not been able to frustrate our occupation of the huge air base at Foggia from which heavy bombers are already raiding Austria, Dalmatia and Albania. The establishment of this new air base, which brings so many targets within easier range, is not the least important of the Allied gains. Lastly a few troops were sent to help the Italians in the Dodecanese; but this, as will be shown, did not in the end constitute any permanent gain.

The Germans were compelled to do everything in order to offset the capitulation of their ally, which, besides its military dangers, was a tremendous blow to their prestige. Their first reaction was to send a strong body of parachute troops to rescue Mussolini, who had been sent by the Badoglio Government under guard to a remote hotel in the Abruzzi. This was a sound move on their part, not because Mussolini can be made into anything but a physical and political wreck, but because Hitler could duly pose as a knight errant, and because there was widespread bewilderment why, if the Germans could get to him, the Allies could not get to him first. The answer is a little complicated. The Badoglio Government were anxious to conceal their intention to capitulate, and so were the Allied High Command in order to derive from it the greatest possible military advantage.

If Mussolini had been handed over, the intention would have become plain. Later, in the crash and chaos of the capitulation, the writ of the Badoglio Government probably did not run very far, or at least very fast. So the Germans got in first. The argument that the Duce would have been an embarrassing prisoner tastes slightly of sour grapes. Both the Allies and the Badoglio Government fully intended that he should be handed over, and it is only fair to avow that they were outwitted. His escape, however, has no direct military importance. Neither the 'Fascist Republican Government' nor the military units which he is reported to be trying to form show any signs of being more than phantoms.

German Troops in Italy

Far more serious was the fact that between July 25 and September 3 the Germans were pouring troops into Italy, and, in spite of Italian resistance after the capitulation, they were ready and able, when it was announced, to seize Rome, overpower the Italians there, and force the King and Badoglio to escape. They are certainly strong enough therefore in Italy itself to carry out their programme of fighting a rearguard action up the peninsula while collecting a formidable army in the north—either to make a stand on some permanent line or, in due course, to make a counter-attack on a strategic scale. Both sides in Italy seem rather afraid of putting their heads out of their shells for fear of a local disaster. At least the idea that the capitulation of Italy would be immediately followed by Allied landings at other points of the European perimeter has not proved accurate. The active and extensive campaign begun by the Yugoslavs may have been helped by a few Allied officers, but not by Allied formations, and the Germans were able to retake Corfu from Badoglio's Italians. As has already been noted, a few feelers were put out in the Aegean; but that which reached Cos ended in disaster. A strong German air-borne and sea-borne force effected a landing, and there was soon nothing left of the British garrison except a few stubborn men holding out in the hills, who were withdrawn towards the end of October. It is difficult to understand why, if these operations could not be supported, they were undertaken at all. Far too much confidence seems to have been placed in the fighting capacity of the Italians. Of all the German reactions, the loss of Cos is the one which cast the gravest doubts upon the foresight and capacity of the Allies to take full advantage of the collapse of Italy.

Nevertheless, when the account is balanced, the outstanding result is that the Germans have been, and will be, forced to divert great forces from the Russian front, and since that has been the object of Allied strategy for two years, the background of satisfaction should overshadow any disappointing features in the foreground. General Alexander has put at between 35 and 40 divisions the strength of German reinforcements in Italy and the Balkans, which otherwise would have been reinforcements for the enemy in Russia. It has been frequently observed in these notes that no Allied landing can be contemplated which does not possess a good chance of being adequately supplied. Supplies mean ships on an almost inconceivable scale.

The invasion of Sicily required 3,000 vessels of all kinds, many of them highly specialized, all of them loaded in exactly the right order. It may therefore be suspected, that in spite of the virtual collapse of the U-boat offensive, the Allied pool of shipping was not yet big enough to stage more than one major operation at a time. It is all very well to say that the greater the number of invasions the greater the embarrassment of the Germans. Working as they are on interior lines, the Germans might well be able to concentrate against and overwhelm one invading army before the others could make their weight seriously felt. There is accordingly much to be said for the policy of concentrating the strength of the Allies into only the number of invasions which are too well mounted to be overwhelmed in detail. In any case the Russians have got their diversion for which they have rightly been clamouring—Marshal Stalin has said that it amounts to "something like a second front"—and it will assume ever greater proportions. How magnificently they have deserved and used their chances! It is less than a year since they wrecked the German offensive strategy at Stalingrad—with some help from us at Alamein. During the last five months they have looked more and more like wrecking the German defensive strategy also.

The Retreat in Russia

The German offensive against Kursk in July—powerful but on a narrow front—was an attempt to reach a defensible line and, incidentally, to undermine the Russian power to take the offensive this summer. It did neither; and there was no course open to the enemy except a retreat to a defensible line far to the west. The retreat had to be long, for otherwise the front could not have been substantially shortened. It had to be accompanied by every conceivable form of demolition, for otherwise the Russians would have had no problem of communications across reconquered territory. It had to be inexpensive in casualties, for otherwise even a shorter line could not be held, and no *masse de manœuvre* could be created. Moreover, unless it is cheaply carried out, there is no greater strain on the morale of an army than a sustained retreat. With these considerations in mind, it is easy and essential to draw a contrast between the expected and the unexpected in the German retreat. It was, for example, to be expected that the great line of advanced fortresses would fall—Kharkov, Bryansk, Smolensk, Rzhev, Poltava, Kremenchug, Taganrog, &c. What was quite unexpected was that the Russians would force the Dnieper line before the river froze, for the enemy repeatedly declared that this line marked the end of his retreat. It was in fact forced at many places during the first fortnight of October, the most important breaches being those near Kremenchug which, if they could be exploited fast and far enough, might produce a bigger and better Stalingrad within and to the south of the great loop of the river. The capture of Kiev on November 6, followed by a rapid drive to the south-west, and following the breaking of the Melitopol line and a triumphant sweep right up to the Dnieper estuary, held out the prospect of still wider encirclement. In any case these fresh victories make the line of the river untenable by the enemy. If he is to rescue anything of his defensive strategy, he must

go farther back, and the consequences of further retreat will, in terms of geography, be startling. It must mean the loss of Finland and the Crimea at the two extremities of the vast front. It ought to mean withdrawal from Leningrad to Riga, and therefore the recovery up to that point of the Baltic States. In terms of economics it means that the Russians will have recovered the former sites of some of their major industries, just as they have already recovered huge coal and mineral deposits, and vast stretches of agricultural land. The industries will take long to restart; but by next autumn indispensable coal and food should be pouring out of the recovered territories.

But what will further German retreat mean in the military sense? Clearly it will make final victory more inevitable; but will it make victory come quicker? At the risk of repetition, let us state once more what the German plan is: In the first place, it is to hold in the east on any line outside German boundaries which can possibly be held with modest forces. Next, it is to constitute a mass of reserves which can be used in decisive mass against any attack or invasion. Lastly, if these attacks can be held, or, better still, if some local victories can be gained, it is to sicken some or all of the Allies with the prospect of a long war, offer a negotiated peace, and set seriously to work on preparations for the next war. As General Smuts said in his speech in the City of London on October 19, "Hitler is fighting for time"—time to negotiate for the survival of his régime or, if that proves impossible, time to ensure that if he perishes European civilization perishes with him.

This plan—the description of which is based, not on speculation but on the sober declarations of Germans from the humblest German prisoner to Goebbels himself—will fail at the very outset if no line in the east, south, or west can be held for long. That is why the study of German losses both in men and material is the key to all strategic conclusions. What results does such a study give? So far, since Stalingrad, the Germans have avoided any similar loss of prisoners. At Stalingrad about 200,000 surrendered. Since then, in the course of a retreat over hundreds of miles, marked by persistent Russian attempts at encirclement, prisoners probably total less than half that number. The Russians claimed only 98,000 up to November 5. Prisoners are not the only barometer of losses. In Russia the fighting has been acutely bitter, and the proportion of killed to other casualties has been very high. There is no speculation about the Russian claims. They have been consistently advancing and have been able to count the corpses. The Germans killed since July can therefore be put at about 900,000, without counting the permanently disabled or those incapacitated for a considerable time by wounds or sickness. Formidable though they are, these figures certainly do not mean that the German Army is yet too crippled to be capable of a defensive strategy; nor have their casualties in Sicily and Italy yet been heavy enough to tip the balance. It would be unwise to endorse Marshal Stalin's verdict that the enemy is "facing catastrophe" without also recalling his warning that to give a respite might permit a recovery.

Losses in Men and Material

But, if the German Army is intrinsically no weaker, it is certainly no stronger, and it has been robbed of two assets on which it might have counted to prevent deterioration of relative strength. At the end of September, after two months of almost complete quiescence, the U-boats tried to renew their attack, and it has become clear that their vaunted new methods and equipment have not been good enough either to avoid or to inflict serious casualties. Again, it has become clear that the German Army must fight in future on all fronts in circumstances varying from inferiority in the air to the complete absence of air cover. German air power, or what is left of it, has been mainly concentrated at home in the form of masses of fighters trying to repel the Allied day and night bombing attacks. Even on the ground all military strength is relative, and, if we are to assess the chances of the German Army, we must also assess the strength of the Allies. As for the Russians, their casualties have also been heavy, but not heavy enough to prevent a sustained offensive. There is nothing more remarkable in the whole Russian campaign than their triumph over viciously bad communications. And the land casualties of the Western Allies have been negligible—probably under 50,000 all told in the three months up to the end of October.

In the matter of material, the Allies are in an even stronger relative position than in the matter of man-power. British and American production is practically untrammelled except by the much publicized strikes which, though they have almost every other deplorable feature, have so far been no more than tiny spots on a huge and healthy body. Very different is the position of German industry. The British and American bombing offensive has inflicted extremely heavy damage on some of its most important centres. Hamburg is a corpse. Most of the Ruhr and of the Rhineland is a ghost. Bremen, Hanover, Cassel, Stuttgart, Munich and many lesser places are moribund. It is futile to assess the damage as a percentage of German war production, because nobody knows exactly what transference of works and workers has taken place, or what contribution occupied countries are forced to make. There are said to be ten million foreign workers in Germany alone, apart from the millions forced to work for Germany outside. But air reconnaissance can show this or that group of factories destroyed, this or that airfield rendered unusable; and since factories were originally built in the most convenient places, even their displacement means inconvenience and strain on transport and labour.

To sum up these considerations, the conclusion is that nothing has yet occurred to make the German defensive strategy impossible; but that all the portents are that it will become hopeless. The enemy's strategy is based on too big a gamble—the gamble that an Eastern front will hold; that home morale will stand heavy bombing and uninterrupted defeat; that the Army will not sicken of steady defeat more quickly than the Allies of steady victory; that something will prevent the accumulating power of the Western Allies smashing through his Atlantic Walls and Siegfried Lines, and that all these things will not happen simultaneously and permanently. The gamble is so

big that General Smuts has felt it safe to announce to the world when it will be put to the test in every detail. The "grand assault" will be next year, as the culmination of a grand strategy which after three years of desperate and agonizing holding on has delayed the full counterstroke until it can be delivered with full weight. It is possible that the Moscow Conference and the visible deterioration of German strength have caused this date to be somewhat advanced.

Alternative Choices for 1943

It is pertinent at this point to note what were the alternatives at the moment —little more than a year ago—when the tide really turned. The Allies had at their disposal against Germany the unbroken Russian Army with, as we now know, the prospect of reinforcement during 1943 by immense masses of material and men. They had the British Imperial Armies in three main groups stationed in Great Britain, North Africa and the Far East. The last group could not be counted against Germany and would have to be (and was) reinforced. The North Africa group, with large American assistance, was capable of reducing Axis outposts and, as it proved, of knocking out Italy; but that was a very different matter from invading the European continent at other points. The group in Great Britain had to serve both as a reservoir for overseas and as the nucleus of some new expeditionary force. The size of the whole was limited by the man-power available in a nation of 48 million people which had simultaneously to run a great arsenal, produce an immense Air Force, and build, man and operate a huge Navy. Besides the British Imperial Armies, there was the American Army, of which the first samples had reached North Africa and Great Britain. But the number of American divisions which could be deployed on the Western battlefronts could not possibly be large during 1943.

The Allies could therefore in 1943 either dribble quite substantial but certainly not decisive forces into action (as they did in 1915 and 1916); or they could make North Africa and Italy their main effort during 1943 and pile up the new American strength for one shattering and final blow on several new fronts in 1944. It looks as if they had chosen the second course; and quite probably, in the long run, this will shorten the war more than the engaging of more limited forces in 1943. The plan has however its disadvantages. Since the Thirty Years War there has been nothing to equal the barbarity of the German Armies in Russia, Italy and Yugoslavia. Their conduct has sunk to lower depths even than in those countries where they have been practising for some years terrorism ranging from a deliberate attempt to exterminate the higher classes of the population (as in Poland) to the repression by executions of actual or possible resistance. The prospect that occupied Europe will have to endure these sadists for another winter is profoundly disturbing. From the military point of view this outbreak of butchery is a confession of despair of victory. But it lays an obligation upon Allied strategy to see that the grand assault when delivered is so overwhelming that the Germans have no time to " make a solitude and call it peace "

Let it be noted that Allied strategy might have had no choice. If Stalingrad and Cairo had fallen a year ago, it might have been obligatory to strike in the West with everything that could have been scraped together. We should have had to risk a Western Tannenberg in order to make possible an Eastern Marne. But now there is a choice. That does not mean that in the West there is the slightest relaxation or hanging back. It would be offensive alike to common sense and to self-respect to allow the Russians to bear the main burden on land for one superfluous minute. But a few extra months employed in intensifying the air offensive; in containing, dispersing and bringing to action more and more enemy reserves; in collecting ships, as the defeat of the U-boats enables them to be collected; in perfecting the special equipment necessary (as Dieppe showed) to assault the special and varied defences of the Atlantic Wall; and in assembling really big forces for the main blow—all these things may shorten the war both for the Russians and for ourselves by many more months than the months of delay. The general recognition of this fact was forthcoming at the Moscow Conference—of which it must be enough to point out here that the military result was a strategy accepted and agreed in every detail and the ending of any trace of that reserve or even rancour which so often frustrates the plans of Allies.

The Japanese Part

And then there will be the Japanese, whose Emperor has just flatly contradicted his Prime Minister by declaring that the war situation is very grave on the same day that Tojo declared the certainty of victory to be unimpaired. The Son of Heaven seems more accurate than the scion of hell. During the past three months the Japanese have been given a bad time on the fringes of their conquests in the South-West Pacific. They have been driven out of three big bases in New Guinea—Salamaua, Lae and Finschafen. They have lost all the central Solomons. The Allies have been able to deploy real air strength, and in the middle fortnight of October alone destroyed 900 Japanese aircraft—most of them in two big raids on Rabaul. Of course it would be foolish to think that we are on the eve of any " grand assault " in the Far East yet. But the new South-East Asia command seems to have the means for something more formidable in Burma than the abortive Arakan campaign; and, though the cloud over Japanese prospects is yet no bigger than a man's hand, beyond the horizon there are signs of a big storm brewing. It must be confessed, however, that all theories that the Japanese do not care what happens to the Germans and that they are of very little use to them are very silly. The Japanese know very well that if Germany loses, the game is up, and they have been of the greatest possible use to the Germans. They have drawn off from the West practically the whole of the Australian and Indian armies, together with immense American forces. If it had not been for the Japanese, there would have been no reason whatever for disappointment at the follow-up of the Italian capitulation. The " grand assault " would already have been launched.

But when all grounds for dissatisfaction and caution have been examined;

the fact remains that the summer of 1943 has proved complete victory to be only a matter of time. Nothing can now prevent a military triumph greater than 1918 except serious industrial or political troubles at home, serious quarrels between the Allies, some attempt to swap strategic horses in mid-stream, some yielding to the peace propaganda which the enemy will certainly try when he knows the game is up. None of these stupidities is likely to be committed on any really important scale—most of them have been completely ruled out by the success of the Moscow Conference—and the future can be regarded with a confidence no longer intuitive but rational.

AIR TRANSPORT. II

HEADS OF A POST-WAR POLICY

AN article which appeared in the June number of THE ROUND TABLE expressed the need for the early formulation of an Imperial air policy. The demand has since been impressively reinforced from a number of authoritative quarters. The subject has been debated in both Houses of Parliament, and in both there was very strong pressure for a definite policy on the part of the Government. The Society of British Aircraft Constructors and other important bodies have urged that the British Empire must take a leading part in the development of post-war aviation, and the independent committee which has been engaged in examining the question of civil aviation has demanded a declaration of imperial policy to give a lead to the world, and an early understanding with the United States.

If the opportunity which the conclusion of the war will offer us for the development of civil aviation is not to be thrown away, there is no time to be lost. We must have our plans cut and dried before the Dominions enter into separate arrangements and we must set public opinion at rest by stating unequivocally what we intend to do. After the last war we made a number of blunders. The incorporation of civil aviation in the Air Ministry, the lack of government and financial support, and the neglect of research and experiment were wellnigh fatal; and these mistakes must not be repeated. Much valuable time has been lost already and there is all the more need for prompt action. It is essential that we should get to work without delay, and in order to do so, we must take matters in their proper precedence. First, we must set our own house in order; secondly, we must come to an understanding with the Dominions; and, thirdly, we must negotiate a world-wide Air Convention with the United Nations, as a basis for an international agreement after the peace. A far-flung empire like ours cannot hope to continue without stable, regular and progressive air communications; our aim must be an Air Transport Service, economic, imperial and strategical, running throughout all the world routes in which our interests lie. The War Cabinet must lose no further time in issuing instructions for the production in quantity of aircraft suitable for the equipment of such a service.

THE AMERICAN EXAMPLE

As regards our air transport policy, we might well take an example from the United States. There the Air Transport Command has been working all along in close collaboration with the principal air lines, and its operations are already extensive. These lines for the period of the war are practically part of the United States Air Service, and the personnel are in uniform. It has played an important part in the Mediterranean. In order to carry on the

Japanese campaign in the Pacific a vast organization has been built up, in the face of what appeared to be insuperable geographic and climatic obstacles, complete with airports and other flying facilities. It is not too much to say that in the invasion of Germany, and still more in the campaign against Japan, air transport will play a predominant part. In the transitional period it will be a great factor in distributing supplies to the devastated countries, and keeping order. Mobility is the essence of war, and military predominance in the future will depend upon the possession of a great fleet of transport planes, capable of being switched over at need from civil to military purposes and vice versa. Unless we take early steps to establish parity with the United States in air transport, that country will be ready to exploit the world's markets, and we shall not. This in its turn will have an adverse effect upon the British aircraft industry. After the last war the American motor companies flooded the world, and if this happens in the case of aircraft we shall only have ourselves to thank for our lack of pre-vision.

The solution lies in building up a similar organization for ourselves. At present we have the Air Transport Command and the B.O.A.C., which operate, mostly with American aircraft, in two separate departments of the Air Ministry. These should be replaced by an independent Air Transport Service, entirely self-contained, and equipped with British machines and engines; British goods should be carried by British planes. The replacement should be effected as soon as opportunities occur to do so without impeding the adequate output of purely military machines. The great difficulty confronting the air-transport industry after the war will be adequate supplies of specialized types of aircraft. The Avro-York, the best heavy transport aeroplane which we possess, will not be really suitable. In this, as in so many other directions, progress is barred by the lack of any knowledge of the Government's future policy and of its decisions.

It is good, as far as it goes, that, as a result of recommendations made by the Committee presided over by Lord Brabazon, five aircraft firms have been asked to get out plans for leading types of air-transport machines. But mere plans and prototypes are not enough. Unless we are to suffer from the time-lag at the turn-over from war to peace conditions, production in quantity of these machines should be sanctioned by the War Cabinet as a matter of urgent priority. If they are ready in time, they will be used for war transport; if not, they will ensure that we have suitable types to restart Empire air routes as soon as peace is declared. Four of the types to be laid down are to be land planes and one a giant flying-boat, with a range of 4,000 miles and capable of carrying 200 passengers on a short journey. All will be larger and more advanced in design and performance than any aircraft yet turned out in this country. As soon as the war is over, the whole organization should be handed over to an independent Ministry of Air Transport to form a nucleus for restarting civil aviation.

England's geographical position makes her admirably suited to be the hub of the world's mercantile air services of the future. But if she is to attain that position, she will require a great imperial airport in the vicinity of the capital, capable of accommodating commercial landcraft and flying-boats

of the largest type. Suitable plans for such an airport should be drawn up and sanctioned. They should include an airfield with criss-crossed runways, three miles long, and an area of water to act as a marine terminal. The airport buildings should be on a generous scale, including a railway station, hotels, restaurants, car parks and garages. This terminal airport should be able to handle some 8 to 10 million passengers a year, and large quantities of freight. It would undoubtedly act as a great focus for airborne commerce, and would materially increase the prestige as well as the general industrial prosperity of the country and the Empire.

Monopolies and Subsidies

The next question is that of monopolies and subsidies. One of the secrets of American success has been the encouragement extended to healthy rivalry between reliable firms. As we saw from our experience after the last war, monopolies are seldom successful. Imperial Airways was safe but unprogressive, and quickly lost its Eastern traffic to an enterprising commercial competitor like the Dutch K.L.M. The other extreme is, of course, uncontrolled competition, which is wasteful and ruinous and bound to end in disaster. What is required is controlled competition. The various air routes within the Empire operate in widely different conditions, and require specialized types of vehicle. The Ministry of Air Transport should license a limited number of reputable companies for this country, to operate in each of these routes. The B.O.A.C. for instance, in view of its experience, might operate the Australian route via India in conjunction with Quantas and Indian National Airways.

Some five or six companies will probably be required in the early stages to meet our continental and imperial requirements, and Lord Beaverbrook suggests that they would require about 2,000 civil planes all told. It will of course be necessary to ensure the closest co-operation between air transport and shipping. "Now is the time", says Mr. Geddes, the President of the Chamber of Shipping, "to harness the energy and experience of shipowners to this new form of transport". Heavy goods will continue to be carried mainly by sea; aircraft will be used for mails and perishable goods, and in cases where speed is the essential factor. Various shipping companies are already taking powers to establish concomitant air services. Recently the five main shipping lines trading with South America have combined to organize an air line to run between the United Kingdom, America and the Continent, as soon as machines are available.

Subsidies present a difficult problem, for the inability of civil aviation to "fly by itself" after the last war was one of the rocks on which it foundered. Uncommercial subsidized competition is bad in itself, and tends to hamper initiative and independence. It can best be avoided by careful administration; services must be maintained at economic speeds, but progress must not be hindered by reluctance to write off aircraft before they are out of date. Subsidies will probably be unnecessary if adequate remuneration is given for carrying mails, and if the Ministry is liberal in its support of

research and arrangements for pooling information and the like. The State must be responsible for the maintenance of airports, wireless communications, the supply of meteorological information, traffic regulation and other similar services, but otherwise there should be the minimum of government interference.

Agreement with the Dominions

The next question to be considered is that of an agreement on air policy with the Dominions. The importance of this step can scarcely be exaggerated. If we are to come to the council table with the United Nations, it is necessary that we should speak unanimously. The necessity of holding an Empire Conference on the subject has long been apparent. Mr. Hughes, the Leader of the Australian Opposition, was himself anxious that Mr. Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, should attend. If the "four freedoms" of the Atlantic Charter are to operate, he said, control of post-war aviation must not be centred in one or two nations; all must have a share. It was clear from this statement that Australian opinion knew no more than our own of any imperial air policy. South Africa was equally ignorant, as a passage from the *Natal Mercury* showed. "The unfortunate impression seems to be gaining ground", wrote this paper, "that in post-war flying South Africa is to be left at the mercy of whatever Britain and America decide. . . . Britain would be well advised to take the Dominions into her fullest confidence and counsel." Whatever we do they cannot be ignored. "By the end of the war", says Mr. Vernon Bartlett, describing a visit to the new Canadian airfields, "Canada may expect to have a quarter of a million trained men ranging from mechanics to pilots, and any number of fully equipped airfields. If the paved runways of the flying stations were laid end to end, they would form a twelve-foot highway from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a distance of well over 3,000 miles." "It is not surprising", he concludes, "that the Canadian Government expects to have its say in any Anglo-American negotiations about the future of civil aviation." Canada has already taken certain important decisions on her own initiative. Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, has announced that the trans-continental and other important air routes are to remain the preserve of the government-controlled Trans-Canadian Airways, and the company is to be given the right to operate a trans-Atlantic service.

This makes it plain that the Conference which met under Lord Beaverbrook on October 11 came not a minute too soon. It was attended by a number of English politicians, by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions in Canada, and representatives of the other Dominions, of India and the Crown Colonies. The conversations, the main subject of which was the co-ordination of Empire air policy, were stated to be mainly exploratory, and, though the conclusions arrived at on main lines of policy were unanimous, they will have to be sanctioned by the Dominion Governments. According to the Secretary of State for Air, the recommendations included the constitution of an air-transport authority which would be associated with, and responsible to, any security organization which might be set up by the United Nations. It is to be hoped that this air-transport authority will take the form of an Empire Air Council, consisting of one or two members from Great Britain, the Dominions and the Colonial Empire. If the conclusions are ratified, we shall be in a much stronger position for our forthcoming conference with the United States.

An International Understanding

An international air agreement is a more complex matter, and raises a number of delicate questions. Lord Beaverbrook has been holding conversations at Washington as a preliminary to a full-dress conference which is to be attended by Russia, China and other members of the United Nations. The place which Russia will ultimately occupy in a really "air-minded" world must not be overlooked. In future the most direct air lines between North America, Asia and Europe will lie across the Arctic. In the new air age, Russia will be an important link between them. Enemy countries must be severely controlled; and it may be some time before many of the others have recovered sufficiently from the havoc of war to come into the picture. An understanding between the United Nations is essential, for the future peace of the world depends upon their co-operation. It would be a bar to world progress if there were a delay in arriving at a clear and timely policy upon the many points about which friction might otherwise occur. Paragraph VII of the Atlantic Charter lays down that the peace which it envisages "would enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance"; but it does not state whether this applies equally to the air. Air routes fall under three main categories—those which are entirely internal; those which run between two countries; and those which traverse a foreign country in transit. President Roosevelt says that he has discussed the matter with Mr. Churchill, and that they are in general agreement upon the main principles of a "free air" policy. The conclusions arrived at were that (1) internal aviation should be operated and owned by the countries concerned; (2) machines of other countries should have the right to use airports to refuel, but not to pick up goods or passengers; (3) wherever possible and profitable, air lines should be run by private concerns, and not by Governments, though exceptions might be made in the case of some part of the earth with which communications might be desired but which could not be made to pay. In that case a line controlled by a member of the United Nations would be run by international agreement.

As an example of what he meant, the President said that if the Canadian Government wished to run a line to the Bahamas or Puerto Rico, there was no reason why that line should not be allowed to land planes for refuelling in America. But if a plane landed, say, at Buffalo, it would not be allowed to pick up goods or passengers and put them down at Miami. Again, a British firm might desire to run an air line from England to New Zealand and Australia via the United States. It could land at New York for refuelling, but would not be allowed to pick up passengers for the Pacific coast. This right of "innocent passage" is a very important one, as everyone knows who remembers the absurd restrictions about flying over France and Italy

which hampered our air lines to the Far East after the last war. Mr. Roosevelt was also reported to be in favour of the opening of airports in all countries to traffic in the same way as seaports are at present; an International Air Board would no doubt be constituted for drawing up rules and regulations for their use. The question of an agreement to prevent cut-throat competition between nations was not, apparently, discussed. This will doubtless be considered at the forthcoming conference, but it will be difficult to claim parity with the United States upon an agreed basis unless we are able to show that we shall have the organization and the number of planes necessary for the purpose. It should be agreed to consider the traffic between a nation and her dependencies as "internal". That would give the United States the exclusive right to operate the routes to her Pacific bases, while England would enjoy a similar monopoly as regards her great imperial life-lines to South Africa, to Canada, and to Australia and New Zealand via India and Singapore. The same rule would apply to France, Belgium and Holland, when their overseas possessions are restored, and also, if she desires, to Portugal. One clearly very important point is the question of bases. In this we possess a unique asset, which it is imperative that we should use to the utmost advantage. America has been spending vast sums on airport construction throughout the world. On the other hand the British Empire provides an incomparable series of air bases. Mr. Roosevelt has said that it is all "a question of mutuality" and of "sharing bases". But it may be rather more difficult than that. The claim that bases built for the war effort should belong after the war to the country that built them, irrespective of their site, is evidently inadmissible. In each zone, such as for instance in South Africa, there should be a small number of airports open to international use, but there could of course be no claim of sovereignty over them by any external Power. The importance of up-to-date international airports, however costly, cannot be over-emphasized. A clear statement by the joint Empire Governments on this subject also is overdue.

To sum up—the development of post-war aviation, so far as this country is concerned, is dependent upon three factors. The first is an Imperial air policy accepted by the Dominions. The prospect of this has been brought nearer by the Empire Air Conference held in London. The second is an agreement between the United Nations on the parts which they are to play in the new air order. As to the third, the re-definition of international rights in the air, it is clearly a problem which must be solved and cannot be indefinitely postponed. The solution lies in giving a lead to the world by building up a self-contained organization of our own, fully equipped with British aircraft of the most modern types.

EDUCATION FOR GREATNESS

Mr. BUTLER'S FORTHCOMING BILL

PARLIAMENT at Westminster is on the eve of considering the most notable Education Bill since compulsory schooling for every child was introduced in the year 1870. Wars are strangely favourable to educational advance. Perhaps they cause more searching thought than usual about the future of the race; or alternatively there may be the less uplifting explanation that, because it is notoriously a thorny topic, a coalition government tends to be less frightened than a normal party administration of attempting to grasp it. At any rate it was at the end of the last war that Mr. H. A. L. Fisher's brave Education Act reached the statute book—in advance of its time, as events proved. To-day all the signs point with hope to the fifth year of an even greater war marking the nativity of a still finer Act patiently and skilfully nurtured by Mr. R. A. Butler.

Support from Public Opinion

THE most crucial question about an Education Bill is not what it contains, but what range of positive agreement it commands. The keystone of the Fisher Act crashed tragically within a short three years. Its central plan of universal part-time education for boys and girls in their 'teens had too shaky support at that time, in the minds of the millions, to enable it to keep its stand when the cruel winds of a national economy campaign crying "squandermania" blew upon it, rocked it, and destroyed it. One can find plenty of cynics to aver that of course the same fate is in store for the Butler proposals.

There is no evidence on the side of this cynicism, however, except a memory of what happened last time; and, if we are to start by postulating general failure to improve on last time, we had better strike such words as "peace" and "progress" quickly out of our vocabulary, and write "chaos" and "disillusion" there instead. Mr. Butler, who graduated politically in hard, practical schools as Under-Secretary for India and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs before this war, received his first appointment of Cabinet rank as President of the Board of Education in July 1941, at the age of 38. Conscious of his opportunity from the start, he thought and listened for two years, and talked a little, but mostly he listened—listened to innumerable deputations, and pundits, and wise men, and studied the excessive flood of books and pamphlets on almost every aspect of educational improvement which fell jostling from the printing press. At the end of two years, by which time the whole educational world had been standing expectantly on tiptoe for so long that it was becoming resigned to disappointment, he presented his ideas to Parliament in a White Paper so comprehensive, well-balanced and inspiring that it temporarily silenced not merely the critics but the cynics. Weeks of discussion in the press, and two days' debate in

each House, disclosed that the main structure of the Butler plan stood practically unchallenged. Plenty of combustible material lay around the walls; but even among those who felt most tempted to drop matches and start local fires, there was none who wanted to be responsible for burning down the building.

What is at Stake?

It will be well to remember that salient fact in the weeks ahead, when clauses other than the cardinal ones are being fought over in Parliament, and controversy grows unpleasantly hot about the fringes of the measure, as no doubt it will. Dispute seems likely to rage not round the main purpose, but about a few contentious points—the church schools; the so-called "public schools"; release from employment for part-time education; changes in the administrative machine; the distribution of the cost; the speed of the programme. Important as these are, they are all of them partial questions. Division might go deep on almost any one of them, and yet the new conception of the national education system would still be substantially safe. A letter sent to every member of Parliament over the joint signatures of the two Archbishops and the leaders of the Free Churches handsomely recognizes that, whatever differences may divide them over the teaching of religion, much more is at stake than even that, and the whole must not be jeopardized.

"In common with all who care for the welfare of the country" (it read) "we are looking forward eagerly to the new Education Bill. We believe that one of the primary requirements of social justice is an effective move in the direction of full educational opportunity for all. It may be that in the discussion of the Bill in Parliament and elsewhere we ourselves and other spokesmen of the Churches will be obliged to give special attention to the clauses dealing with specifically religious instruction. For that very reason we want now to say that we eagerly desire to see carried into law a truly effective educational reform, creating something like equality of educational opportunities for all. We trust that if differences arise between the religious bodies they will be confined to a small area of the Bill and will not be such as to impede the educational advance so urgently needed for the general welfare."

Anyone old enough to remember the bitterness of the quarrel between Church and Chapel at the time of the Balfour Act 40 years ago can appreciate the triumph of good sense without sacrifice of principle which this new attitude implies. It is not confined to the Churches; it prevails among almost all the disputants. They may strike here or there, but they will never be aiming at the heart to kill. Politically that is reassuring. But educationally—? If no one questions that the heart must be preserved, that seems a sign of grace. But is it? May it not equally be—disturbing thought—a sign of ignorance? Is it possible that people, believing they are true to all the best in their nature when they repeat "education for everybody", are drugging themselves to overlook the vital, determining question—education for what?

The Butler Plan

The main features of the White Paper were described in the September issue* of The Round Table:—more extensive provision of nursery schools for

* Pp. 367–9.

children under 5; universal "primary" education from 5 to 11; universal "secondary" education from 11 to 15, and later to 16; universal part-time attendance at "young people's colleges" (a new institution) up to 18; raising of the varying standards of technical, commercial and art education throughout the country to the levels of the best; improved arrangements for adult education; broader facilities for entrance to the universities; greater care for the health and physical fitness of boys and girls; further encouragement to voluntary organizations for young people out of school or working hours; and, underlying everything, fresh emphasis in all schools on the religious basis of education.

One may assent to all these, and yet reasonably inquire about the machinery for carrying them out. Since 1902 the real power in organizing British education has lain with the local education authorities; that is, the education committees of the elected county councils, county borough councils, borough councils or urban district councils, as the case may be. The Board can advise and inspect, but in a tussle with a local authority it has not been able to insist. It has had no sanction to apply, except withholding of the Exchequer grant, and if it were ever to take that drastic action the direct effect would be to worsen, instead of bettering, the education given in the recalcitrant area. This system of local autonomy has historically been upheld as a practical safeguard against State despotism or undue political influence from the centre over the content of education. It has the defect of permitting inexcusable downward variations of quality in poor or negligent areas. The time has come for vigorous thought on two questions here—first, whether it would be safe and wise to give the Board more effective power to enforce minimum standards, and, second, whether the average quality of the elected or co-opted members who sit on local education authorities can by any means be raised.

At present nine children out of ten leave school at 14. Thereafter, in peace-time, they were subject to no educational compulsion whatever; in war-time boys become liable to service at 18, girls at 19. The new plan will impose fresh obligations between 14 and 18. Industry is being asked to adjust itself to these, at the very time when fewer young people will be coming out of the schools each year, owing to the diminished numbers of births in the nineteen-thirties. Up to the present there have been few protests. Large employers have shown themselves perhaps unexpectedly favourable to the plan, partly because the value of intelligent recruits is being increasingly recognized in far-sighted industries. But small employers, who may not yet adequately realize what is to be demanded of them in the matter of releasing every boy and girl under 18 for at least the equivalent of one day a week, are not going to find the adjustment easy. Public opinion, however, gives definite support to the general thesis that the State should have regard to boys and girls up to 18 as learners first and earners afterwards. Success or failure will most depend on the vigour and imagination which education authorities throw into their pioneer task of designing and developing the young people's colleges. Happily, also, it is becoming better understood that the manner in which boys or girls are occupied during working

hours in the factory or elsewhere has immense potentiality for educating them, or for injuring them.

The Dual System

Popular controversy, by focusing on two particular points in educational policy, diverts attention from other equally crucial issues. The average voter who is dependent on newspapers for his information might be excused for supposing that the only two subjects of lively importance were the religious question and the future of the public schools. There are 10,000 elementary schools originally built by, and still the property of, the Churches, which took the lead in children's education a hundred years ago and more, long before any national system at all was established. There are about the same number of schools built by local education authorities. The Churches do not know how they can continue to afford to maintain the fabric of their schools, having regard to increased costs of all repairs and the higher standards in school buildings of which (it is universally agreed) all children should have the benefit. The White Paper attempted to meet this notoriously intractable situation by offering alternative choices. If the church authorities could meet half the cost of essential improvements and repairs, they would retain all their rights in the school, and the whole of the rest of the cost would be met by public funds. But if not, the rights of the church authorities over the school, particularly in respect of appointing teachers, would (with certain exceptions) pass to the local education authority.

It was a masterly attempt to achieve a balance fair to all interests. If it had a weakness, that lay in finance and finance alone becoming the deciding factor. The Church of England as a body, though with a dissident minority, proclaimed the offer fair and accepted the challenge. The Free Churches, although they would have liked the "dual system" ended, acquiesced in the suggested settlement. Only the Roman Catholics stood out. Determined not to abandon any of their schools, they feared that the first alternative placed on them a financial burden greater than they could bear. It is the duty of the State, they maintain, to provide out of rates and taxes, without special financial demands on parents, schools where they can know that their children will be brought up in their own religious faith.

Here is the issue, clear cut. The Roman Catholic claim, put forward in the deepest sincerity, and pressed to the farthest point which political action would allow, is not and never has been accepted by a much larger number of our people, who contend that if it is interpreted as involving not merely religious instruction, but instruction designed to attach the children to a particular form of worship, that is not a fitting object to be paid for entirely out of public funds. The Church of England asserts with no less sincerity than the Roman Catholic Church its profound belief in special religious teaching. Where it differs is in its willingness to bow, not without protest, to the opinion of the rest of the nation that those who claim distinctive religious teaching for their children must be prepared to make a distinctive contribution towards the cost of the school where it is to be given.

The National Union of Teachers and the Association of Directors and

Secretaries for Education, both of which bodies have published valuable contributions to thought on educational policy, would like to see the dual system abolished. So would the Trades Union Congress, and a great many members of the Labour party. Almost all those concerned on either side, however, except perhaps the Roman Catholics, have shown themselves willing to make concessions if a settlement can thereby be obtained. Whatever the final decision, the principle of settlement must be that the higher the contribution from public funds, the greater must be the measure of control transferred to public authorities.

Boarding-school Education

The "public schools" have hitherto maintained a position of almost complete independence from the national educational system. One of the criticisms against them indeed—and its force must not be minimized—is that they train for leadership a governing class of men whose own school life is apt to leave them ignorant of the manner in which almost all the rest of the children of the nation are educated. A committee presided over by Lord Fleming was appointed by Mr. Butler 18 months ago to report how the public schools could be brought into closer relationship with the national system. If it can produce before long an agreed report (the interim majority and minority reports which it has already presented deal with a separate subject), it will have put the country deeply in its debt. Its task is nothing less than to merge a fine legacy from the past into the new democracy wherein we all want to see flourishing all the high qualities, old and new alike.

The real challenge to the public schools is carried in the phrase "equality of opportunity". Small wonder that those words have a magic appeal, when opportunity in the past has been so vividly unequal. Can they be held consistent with the continued existence of a class of relatively expensive school to which money gives access, even though entrance be eased by scholarships and bursaries? Fortunately the authorized representatives of the public schools are united in desiring that a public school education should be accessible to those who can profit by it, irrespective of their parents' means. The problem then becomes one of finding the money, and of securing that public grants do not impair all that is of essential value in the independence of the schools.

A year or two ago it was common, especially in egalitarian quarters, to hear the public schools denounced as possessing nothing except a snob value. Last summer a remarkable letter in *The Times* from a Labour M.P., who with several of his colleagues had visited a number of public schools, helped to drive out that false judgment on them. A shallow and unworthy statement approved by the Labour majority on the London County Council, describing them as "educationally undesirable", and a waspish condemnation of them by the Workers' Educational Association, compare ill in spirit—and indeed in practical knowledge of the subject—with a little book of singular excellence on *Freedom in Education*, in which Mr. E. H. Partridge has appraised the value of the country boarding school as a storehouse where boys can come to find the highest qualities in British education.

Up to the present only a tiny proportion of boys and girls have passed through boarding schools. The war-time experience of evacuation of schools from vulnerable areas has served to spread two important ideas: that a great many children can derive something good from a period of education on their own away from home, and that every town-bred child without exception can benefit from spending a part of its school-time in the country. Camp schools, and the conversion of military and other establishments when they are no longer needed for their original war-time purposes, can help to meet the latter need. The public schools, which in fact vary widely in their fees and are far from being the private preserve of the sons of the very rich, offer the models on which, it is widely hoped, a more extensive system of boarding schools linked on to the national education system can be developed.

Independence and Freedom

But freedom is essential. The pursuit of equality must not be allowed to restrict the maintenance of quality.

"It is just as important" (says the White Paper) "to achieve diversity as it is to ensure equality of educational opportunity. But such diversity must not impair the social unity within the educational system which will open the way to a more closely knit society and give us strength to face the tasks ahead."

Agreed; yet that is not all. Education can fulfil itself only where the parents are willing and keen to play an active part in helping their children to derive the most from it. No child should be crowded out from schooling which its talents deserve, because another with wealthier parents snatches the place it might have had. But it will be a dark day for the future of this nation if parents who desire to secure for their children a specially good education, and are ready to make sacrifices for it, without depriving any other child of its chances, are ever debarred from so doing.

Exceptional quality may be found in any school; but freedom and independence are conducive to its growth—elsewhere it is a chance product. Local government in this country is becoming, for good or ill, increasingly permeated with party politics. Whereas there are enlightened education committees which select headmasters carefully and leave them as free as possible in the exercise of their responsibilities, there are unhappily others which allow considerations divorced from education to influence their choice of headmasters, and keep them in leading-strings when chosen. As a result, the school is there, but not the spirit. Some people who imagine their own views of education to be democratic, whereas in truth they are authoritarian, would like to end the existence of all schools independent of the State system, and bring them all under the direct control of representative bodies elected (largely) for other than educational purposes. The issue may have to be fought out in the next year or two between them and their wiser opponents, who see that excellence in education can only be secured and preserved if freedom from rigid external control is ensured, through properly qualified governing bodies, not only to the public schools as such, but to the broadest possible range of schools that come within the State system. For broad administrative arrangements these latter must look to the local authorities and the Board; but for educational quality they should look to their own governing body, composed of real friends of the school, and seized of its purposes.

Deciding the Purpose

There must be a purpose in all education, beyond the acquiring of facts and the passing of examinations. Some would say that that purpose is the developing of the personality of the individual. There is a growing body of opinion which holds that that is not enough, and that self-centred perversions of that purpose were among the causes which have contributed to the failure of our education system in the past to achieve the high results we had hoped. The recent report of Sir Cyril Norwood's Committee on curriculum and examinations in secondary schools states the bolder view:

"Human personality contains many possibilities; some are worthy to be developed, some are not; the task of education is to develop those which are worthy and good and to control those which are unworthy and base. We believe that education cannot stop short of recognising the ideals of truth and beauty and goodness as final and binding for all times and in all places, as ultimate values; we do not believe that these ideals are of temporary convenience only, as devices for holding together society till they can be dispensed with as knowledge grows and organisation becomes more scientific."

Such a statement has its appeal, or not, for each one of us. The genius of the nation must give its verdict. As a practical, if limited, guide to the right answer, there is no disputing that absence of the Norwood outlook has led to cynicism in the past; it has created a world not strikingly good at utilizing its material advantages for human happiness. In his own shining contribution to the multitudinous new books on education, Sir Richard Livingstone has named this world; he has taken as his title *Education for a World Adrift*. He sees our age as an age without standards. He finds profound truth in Professor Whitehead's dictum that "moral education is impossible without the habitual vision of greatness". His demand on the educational system amounts to this, that it must teach boys and girls the virtues of a citizen, by enabling them to live as citizens within it.

Parliament is about to put its hand to enlarging the building, modernizing it, and widening its entrance doors. All that is good. It is timely, and the nation approves it. But so much will depend on the guides—the teachers, upon whose future recruitment and training Sir Arnold McNair's Committee is due to present its report in these coming months. And there is one need more. In dedicating themselves to greater equality of opportunity, will parents, teachers, authorities and Parliament work also together to fill the whole of the edifice with an heroic spirit, not for self-aggrandizement, but for service to fellow men and women—the spirit which flickers already in nearly every school, but till now has glowed and flamed in but a few?

AMERICA FACING FACTS

TOWARDS A FOREIGN POLICY

AMERICA is confident that the United Nations are winning the war, but not at all sure what we will do with the peace. This unoriginal observation, which is probably true of most people in all the allied countries, really sums up to-day's mood as we enter another winter. And yet in the uncertainty with which we are looking ahead beyond the fighting there lies an element of encouragement. We are at least not walking on clouds. We are not building up disillusionment. We are far from the evangelical and rosy-tinted mood of 1918, which led to such sore disappointment and reaction. Indeed in the very discouragement of to-day there is an awareness of the grave need for thought and action to win the peace. And that is definitely a sound mood.

Three Groups in Congress

Now what are the main facts of America to-day? Here are some of them: Our fighting forces, significantly well led in the field (this observation will be examined later), are gradually making their influence felt. It must be obvious to the Germans and Japanese that the United States has arrived on time, that its forces—now tried and tested—will roll up into a formidable power alongside our allies. Thus our enemies have gone on the defensive, and have only desperate hopes at best for some division of the United Nations or protracted stalemate. American production and home morale, sometimes spotty, are nevertheless still good enough for the job. Sobered after over-optimism during the North African and Sicilian campaigns, as well as over earlier naval victories in the Pacific, Americans are settling down again to the long pull. Industry—temporarily misled by cancellation of some orders, such as tanks, and tempted by staggering production totals to think that we must be building too much—is beginning to realize that the volume of material needed is far beyond the layman's conception. We have gone some distance into inflation, the cost of living is up about 25 per cent, our tax program is none too sound; but our wage structure has not collapsed and we are more or less holding the line against a runaway inflation.

Both Congress and the people are demanding a clarification of American foreign policy. Nobody knows what our long-range policy is; they want to know. The Fulbright Resolution is one sign of this demand, the urgent appeal for a policy by the five globe-trotting Senators who visited all our forces this summer was an even more urgent indication. President Roosevelt, seeking above all to avoid the repudiation which met Woodrow Wilson, is attempting to construct a congressional majority, and behind it a popular majority for re-election next year. There are roughly three groups in Congress—the Republicans, numbering conservatives and liberals, isolationists and co-operationists in their midst; conservative Democrats;

New Dealers. Since the Republicans will vote in opposition as a matter of course on controversial matters, and on issues of left–right cleavage will be joined by the conservative Democrats, the President obviously faces a continuous potentially hostile majority. His only recourse, since there is no present chance of a liberal majority, is to appease the conservative Democrats who, combined with the New Dealers, would make a majority. That is what the President is now doing. And it would seem that no sacrifice to domestic conservatism—which often extends to world policies like relations with the Darlans, Badoglios and Francos—is too great for him to make. The Republicans, possessing only the unity which is natural to an opposition, have their two leading presidential candidates in Wendell Willkie and Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York. Mr. Willkie has irritated many Republican politicians down through the years, and Governor Dewey could have the nomination if he were prepared to accept it. But probably he will not run unless he is pretty certain of victory. That makes Mr. Willkie's nomination possible, if not probable, and opens the way to a moderate and non-vituperative campaign. Governor Dewey, having endorsed a post-war Anglo-American alliance, is also no isolationist.

There are considerable tides of anti-British criticism running. These spring from odd and diverse causes. In part they come from the old isolationists who have no arguments left and have fallen to twisting the lion's tail. It is old political technique to abuse John Bull here, but it is a confession of weakness. Another part of the criticism of Britain comes from Americans who, consciously or unconsciously, feel that Britain will come out of this war leaner and healthier than America and thus are fearful of its competition. The five peripatetic Senators took this view, most complimentary to Britain's ability to survive and its historic talent in practical world affairs. Along with such feelings runs considerable American imperialism. Ex-isolationists, and some others, are demanding air and naval bases in all parts of the world. Such demands certainly exhibit no fear of "commitments". Perhaps this imperialism can evolve into some kind of world policing or collective security. Criticism of Britain is accompanied often by covert or direct attacks on Russia. There is frequently a clerical source behind such attacks, or a kind of toryism. But in the main Americans are filled with deep admiration for Russia, and recognize a kind of continental—almost "mid-western"—kinship with the pioneering achievement of the Soviet Union.

German Propaganda

The foregoing points, by no means exclusive, and quite arbitrarily selected, illustrate the wandering of American thought. In some directions these vagaries tend to handicap the war effort. Thus the attacks on such allies as Britain and Russia seem indefensible in war-time. They are an outgrowth of the unhealthy strains in our thinking which existed before Pearl Harbor. They are, in short, the finest fruits of Nazi sabotage. For it is now obvious that the German enemy this time did not seek to blow up bridges or poison reservoirs, but to poison minds. There has been a significant absence of any

form of physical sabotage against the American war effort by enemy hands. Such an absence is unthinkable in a country so great, so open, and so diverse as ours. It is only explained by the inference that the Nazis have sought to sabotage us by psychological or propagandist methods. There is doubtless no direct connection between the McCormick-Patterson-Hearst press and the Nazis. But these newspapers none the less effectively do the work of the Nazis here.

It is almost inconceivable—indeed it is a proof of our strength—that newspapers should be permitted the extremes of criticism of the McCormick-Patterson-Hearst press. British readers would find it hard to credit their eyes. Abuse of the Administration, which the *Chicago Tribune* regularly calls "alien", is commonplace. But there is more than mere rhetoric. In mid-September, at a time when we were losing much equipment in Sicily and suffering on the beaches because we did not have enough spare parts to keep our mechanized equipment going, the *Chicago Tribune* ran an editorial stating that the United States had already produced enough war material to supply ourselves and our allies for the rest of the war: all war production could, and should, cease at once! That is how far free speech in war-time runs in the United States.

The extremes to which the McCormick-Patterson-Hearst press has gone tend to be self-defeating. Some people are deceived by them, but in the main Americans are sensible, and they do not believe such guff. Furthermore they are hearing from their sons at the fighting fronts of the constant need for more equipment, and that it is a tough job on which they are engaged. There is no proof that the Hearst press, through almost a half-century of violent jingoism, has deeply affected the public thinking at any time. Polls of public opinion show people doing their own thinking. The *New York Daily News*, largest single organ in the hostile group, is a tabloid picture paper, and it has many subscribers who don't get beyond the pictures, comics, sports, scandal and a few headlines. The *Chicago Tribune* is in a different class, and its long-run effect on mid-western thinking should not be minimized. Even so, its partisan reporting and violent editorializing have alienated many readers even when they keep on subscribing to the paper for its excellent feature sections.

The main aim of these organs would be to elect a President next year who would turn in an isolationist or imperialist direction. The word used nowadays is "nationalist". Much can happen by November, 1944, but so far there is no prospect of this group's success. The leading "nationalist" aspirant for the Presidency, Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, is less favored than he was a few months ago.

Moreover it does not appear that such opposition forces are having a particularly serious effect on war production, civilian or military morale. There are places where our war effort lags, but these defects are generally produced by community, managerial, or labor causes. Mismanagement, rather than propaganda, may be found at the root of such shaky spots in military morale as may exist. And, of course, it is always easy to confuse the grousing which is endemic to men in service with genuinely porous

morale. When the pinch comes our fighting men have done their duty with striking devotion.

Party Declarations

Thus it is clear that the vociferous activities of our internal oppositionists are not gravely affecting the nation. Indeed there have been many signs that our attitude toward the war and the peace was getting more and more sober and responsible.. It is worth putting on the record the declaration which representatives of the Republican Party formally adopted at Mackinac Island:

"1. Prosecution of the war by a united nation to conclusive victory over all our enemies, including (*a*) disarmament and disorganization of the armed forces of the Axis; (*b*) disqualification of the Axis to construct facilities for the manufacture of the implements of war; (*c*) permanent maintenance of trained and well equipped armed forces at home.

2. Responsible participation by the United States in post-war co-operative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world."

And the text of the Fulbright Resolution, which passed the House of Representatives by vote of 360 to 29, is:

"Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) that the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes."

These texts are general, but they go far beyond pre-war American thinking. Some full-fledged isolationists voted for them, stating that they might as well vote for or against the Ten Commandments. But the two resolutions represent, after all reservations, a perfectly definite recognition that the United States must shoulder a substantial responsibility in the post-war world.

On the heels of these resolutions comes the demand of our globe-trotting Senators for a more definite policy. After visiting American forces on all the fighting fronts, these five Senators said:

"The need for a clear national policy is strikingly apparent. With such a policy should go an American representation abroad in which our military, diplomatic, and business personnel work as a team, with appropriate international rank. We owe this to ourselves and to the world."

These observations were made out of comparison with Britain's position. To the travelling Senators British policy in the world is clear and unified, supported by military, diplomatic and business team-work. This is a state of affairs that has impressed Americans for many years. By comparison the United States is doubly unfortunate. Not only do we lack the single policy

itself, but our representatives are very often sorely divided among themselves. To-day in North Africa, for example, serious divisions between various branch representatives of the American Government may be found.

Of course a "policy" cannot be extemporized. It is a product of the centuries. In so far as there is an American policy in inchoate form, it is negative. Yet the times demand specification. And so on the basis of our years of geographical aloofness—protected by the British Navy—and out of the imperative needs of our present world position, we must develop a policy. If it is to be genuinely a policy, our attitude must be based on historical experience and fundamental needs, but it must be adjusted to the times. It must be more positive than negative. It could be put into words by President Roosevelt, whose roots go back deep into our history, if he can rise to the inspired rightness of some few of his state papers. But it is certainly needed.

Relations with Russia

Whether or not any doctrine is enunciated which satisfies Americans, and the world, we must go on with our diplomacy. Thus the nation welcomed the tripartite conference in Moscow. The rank and file of Americans want an understanding with Russia. The nation's attitude toward the Soviet Union is a mixture of admiration, astonishment and apprehension. Certainly Russia puzzles us. Thus any detailed diplomatic dealings with Russia will constitute a gain. Our diplomacy has become reconciled to the need for putting relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the right of each nation to a feeling of security. It is prepared to go far in recognizing "strategical frontiers" for Russia. How territorial concessions to Russia will be taken by the American people remains to be seen. They may smack a great deal too much of the pledges to Italy in the last war, which produced such disillusionment afterward in the United States. But our admiration for Russia's fight will probably be big enough to absorb the shock.

At least we are progressing more actively than ever toward a pattern of participation. The Republicans, the House of Representatives, the Senators —all potential opponents of such a policy—are now endorsing some broad form of action. As for President Roosevelt, it may be said that his major purpose to-day—along with winning the war—is to bring the United States into a peace pattern. That, beyond any doubt, is his present great ambition, his concept of the crowning achievement of his political life. To that end Mr. Roosevelt has just about scrapped the New Deal, and is seeking to form a new congressional coalition which will command a majority.

And, as has been said, the greater influence on this nascent policy would seem to be imperialism rather than isolationism. Nationalism has turned outward, and finds recruits in the land far beyond the ranks of the old isolationists. Such imperialism is probably an inevitable outgrowth of our vast exertions. We flex our global biceps. So it is that the travelling Senators demand air bases wherever we happen to be building them at the outposts of the world. So, too, they demand parity in international communications—

perhaps as a lend-lease counterpayment. So, likewise, other Americans are talking of a great post-war merchant marine, and a world air system.

Now these attributes of imperialism are already a long step ahead of isolation. They might carry with them, also, either economic liberalism or conservatism. It is possible that the production and export capacity of our factories after the war will produce a sort of Manchester school of traders. In any event, if we are to retain bases, operate global air networks and keep our ships on the seven seas, we shall certainly be committed up to the hilt for participation in world economic and political relationships and arrangements. It will probably be better for the world that we should be too conscious of our power than that we should be unconscious of it. Hitherto, by denying responsibility, we have denied power. There seems no possibility, whether the American imperialists or the American idealists win the battles to control our policy, of a return to the old kind of isolationism.

General Marshall and his Men

There are many points of specific interest in Anglo-American relations which should be mentioned. First, Mr. Churchill continues to be a welcome visitor, high in American esteem. Not only are he and Mr. Roosevelt on unprecedentedly confidential and friendly terms, but so are the Prime Minister and the more important of our staff officers. Here a word should be spoken of our Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. General Marshall may be the man to take command of the channel operation, and the British public will want to know more of him. He is, first of all, very well liked by Mr. Churchill, although he has defended the American point of view rather vigorously at times. General Marshall is a Virginian, with all the charm of the Southern gentleman, and he possesses the qualities of the diplomat as well as of the soldier.

General Marshall seems to close observers to be one of the ablest men thrown up by the earthquake of war, and it would not be surprising if he became President one day. He can handle Congressmen as well as he handles Generals and Admirals. When he is called upon to speak before a Congressional Committee, he never uses a text or notes, but speaks freely and clearly with no visible aids. He is a powerful man in a negotiation, but a fair man and a man of good will and enormous good humor. He should be liked in Great Britain above any of our other Generals, and will not stand revealed as a bigoted nationalist but as a true world statesman. In his reorganization of the American Army General Marshall has drawn tremendously on youth, turning his back on seniority and brass hats. There are Lieutenant-Colonels in the Army in their late twenties, and Generals in their early thirties. That is largely General Marshall's doing. He himself, like General Eisenhower and many another key officer, jumped many grades in rank to his present responsibilities. And the only trouble, from the American viewpoint, in General Marshall's taking over the channel operation will be his detachment from duties as our Chief of Staff.

As a layman who is far from being a military expert or armchair strategist,

your correspondent is not competent to judge the calibre of our leadership; but a number of recent confidential conferences have given him the greatest of confidence in the men who are leading the American Army, Navy and Air Force. Not only the top officers, but their staffs—the men who are doing the hard thinking and planning—seem lean, tough, youthful, modern, uninhibited. In fact your correspondent, as a student of history and of the Anglo-Saxon way with military affairs, is surprised that such able American military men have come to the fore so rapidly. Generally the marshal's baton does not come out of the knapsack so swiftly. But one who listened, as your correspondent did, to a score or more of lectures this month by our foremost staff officers, outlining the problems of the war, could not fail to be deeply encouraged.

But to return specifically to British and American relations. These American Generals and Admirals get on, in the main, exceedingly well with their British opposite numbers both here and in the field. There is an excellent, if somewhat breezy, Eisenhower story that has just reached Washington. It may be worn threadbare in London. But it seems that a dispute had broken out between a British and an American officer on General Eisenhower's staff. Since that General has achieved a degree of Anglo-American military joint operation unparalleled in history, between our own and perhaps any other great Powers, he investigated the dispute at once. He found that an American officer had used strong words to a British colleague. General Eisenhower called in the American, and spoke to him in these words:

"Colonel——, I understand you used strong language to one of our British friends. Now, I have investigated the whole matter, and I will say frankly that on the facts, I believe you were right. You applied the word 'louse' to this officer. Well, I have looked into that matter, too, and perhaps you weren't far wrong. But Colonel, so long as I am in command here, you will not call anybody a *British* louse."

British-American Contacts

There was a time when Mr. Churchill's visits here might have been viewed as salesmanship, or an effort to woo the United States along rose-strewn British paths. Scarcely anybody has made the charge now. Mr. Churchill's remarks to Americans have been so candid—particularly his Harvard speech, which came out flatly to propose an Anglo-American alliance—that nobody could charge sophistry or guile. Even the *Chicago Tribune* commended the frankness of the Harvard speech. Americans recognized its realism.

Latterly some American newspapers and publicists have criticized the way in which Mr. Churchill "scoops" the American press in his House of Commons speeches. His last great report contained at least three or four big pieces of information which some American newspapers knew about, but had been refused permission to publish. Doubtless the British press has felt the same professional jealousy. But such talk is not serious: nobody expects to tame Mr. Churchill, the old war correspondent, although there

may be a tendency for American war news to be released more freely in view of his frank speaking.

Anthony Eden has always made a strong impression here, Americans regard him as a highly competent foreign secretary, and a man with whom they can deal most satisfactorily. He, too, has many friends in high political and military office, as well as in public life outside the Administration. Never, in fact, have British and American leaders been on more intimate and well-informed terms. These facts augur very well for realistic negotiations in the years ahead.

Many well-informed Americans regret the resignation of Sumner Welles, our Under Secretary-of-State, who was very like Mr. Eden in many ways. Mr. Welles became too powerful and vigorous in the State Department, and his chief, Secretary Hull, finally called for his resignation. Such a situation often arises in public as well as private life. The first mate just can't be too able, too vigorous, too ambitious. But it is deeply regrettable that the services of so able a man have been temporarily lost to our war effort. Mr. Welles's successor, Edward Stettinius, is an outstandingly good choice. As Lend-Lease Administrator he has had years of apprenticeship in a vital sector of our foreign relationships, and he is expected to help bring some order out of the somewhat confused situation in the State Department.

Another long article could be written about various events on the domestic front. Some of our commodity shortages—many of them—are better. A few are much worse. Inflation is biting deeply into the standard of living of those who have not received greatly augmented incomes. Confusion reigns in the field of tax legislation. The food situation seems to be very good, while fuel is in bad condition. That is to say, the coal strike last spring and the poor morale situation among the miners dominated by John L. Lewis have left much of the country without nearly enough coal. Fuel oil is somewhat better. American victory gardeners and canners put up an estimated 50,000,000 cases of vegetables more than normal in the growing season just ending. As the shipping situation improves, British consumers should feel the effects of our improved food supply, although not all commodities will be better. We face, for instance, a shortage of pickles, but presumably our war effort will not suffer therefrom. Evidently the Army and Navy have cornered all the pickles.

We are still 3,000 miles away from the war, and we act that way. But this progress report is, in the main, good. Our softest, rottenest spots spring from areas of narrow-minded stupidity. But we are fighting a war for the privilege of putting up with stupid people in our midst. It's up to us to see that there aren't too many of them.

United States of America,
October 1943.

INDIA

LORD LINLITHGOW'S REIGN IN RETROSPECT

LORD LINLITHGOW has gone home to enjoy, it may be hoped, a well-earned leisure after bearing the heavy burden and responsibility of government in India through seven and a half momentous years. His viceroyalty is the longest since the Crown took over the responsibility for the government of India from the East India Company in 1858, and it covered a period in which the business of governing India made more exacting demands on the brain, nerves and sinews of the Viceroy than, perhaps, on any of his predecessors. A full and fair appraisal of his work cannot yet be attempted. It must await the lifting of the veil on many things, including the highest political and military strategy of the war. It will be surprising, however, if history does not record that Lord Linlithgow has served the Empire well.

He had his triumphs and also his fair share of the disappointments that fall to the lot of most Viceroys. Pre-war India knew him as a patient, tactful and reasonable statesman, who succeeded in launching provincial autonomy in the teeth of Mr. Gandhi's resistance. That was no mean success. But the attainment of federation, the coping-stone of the Constitution provided by the 1935 Act, just eluded him. He had always foreseen that the period between the introduction of provincial autonomy and the coming into existence of the Federal Government would be awkward (just how awkward the later years of his viceroyalty were to show), and from the moment of his arrival in Delhi he set himself assiduously to the task of getting a sufficient number of acceptances from the Princes. What with the natural tendency of the Princes to procrastinate and the number and the complicated nature of the questions to be settled, progress was slow; and Congress, although—except for the left-wing elements—on the whole favourable to federation, was not above throwing a spanner into the Viceroy's work by carrying on political agitation among the subjects of the States. In the result the outbreak of war found the Viceroy in the position that the requisite number of accessions was not to be obtained without further negotiations of a more difficult and complicated order than could be contemplated during the war. Federation was accordingly postponed. As a consequence India, which had functioned since the beginnings of British rule as an economic entity, found itself in the later years of Lord Linlithgow's viceroyalty facing major economic problems without an authoritative and representative Central Government to co-ordinate the activities of the Provincial and State Governments in the handling of them. What might be termed provincial nationalism has become a force to be reckoned with, and the Muslim community, which would—although, perhaps, without much enthusiasm—have worked federation in 1939, have organized themselves into a formidable movement with the division of India as its goal. The question as to whether the Viceroy could have prevented this situation by being a little more imperative in his

dealings with the Princes is being much discussed. Against that view it may be said that it is easy in this country to carry pressure to a point where it defeats its purpose, and that Lord Linlithgow knew the people with whom he was dealing better than most of his critics.

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

FROM September 1939 onwards Lord Linlithgow's main concern was the organization of India for war. In this his experience in military affairs was of great value to successive Commanders-in-Chief, who would acknowledge the strong support they obtained from him. He was himself a tireless administrator—his normal working day began early in the morning and finished in the early hours of the next morning—and his judgment and foresight impressed all who came into contact with him in the business of the government of India. The mobilization of India's industries for war was entrusted by him to a supply department of his own creation, to which he appointed as secretary the able officer who is now Private Secretary to Lord Wavell. Its achievements in the production of military supplies of all kinds are, like India's efforts in the field of man-power for the army, navy and air force, well enough known. Besides looking after her own defence India became largely responsible for the maintenance, in many respects, of the British forces in the Middle East, and Indian divisions fought not only in the Middle East and in Africa but in Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma. Much of what was accomplished must be laid to the credit of the steady stream of impulses which came down to the departments from the Viceroy, and to his personal intervention to remove bottlenecks and bring about a co-ordinated effort.

The organization for war had, of course, its political as well as its military and economic aspects. In this the Viceroy was less successful. That is to say that, on the positive side of his task—the recruitment of the great political parties for co-operation with the Government—he was defeated. On the negative side, however, he was successful in protecting the war effort from the deleterious impact of political confusion, and that is an achievement which can be estimated at its true value only by those who have a close enough acquaintance with Indian conditions to appreciate what might have happened with a weaker man at the helm. It may be doubted indeed in retrospect whether, having regard to the environment of the war, the ingredients of success in the positive side of the Viceroy's task were ever present. The war was for the political parties and their leaders an opportunity for pitching their claims higher and realizing them. Congress, the largest and most powerful political party in India, was not to be conciliated except on terms that compromised Britain's ability to fulfil her responsibilities to the minorities and her engagements with the Princes. The Muslims, who are the backbone of the war effort on the military side, had organized themselves, through the Muslim League, as powerful opponents to the Hindu claims put forward by Congress. Their goal of Pakistan was vehemently opposed by the Hindus and that small but formidable community, the Sikhs. The Viceroy appreciated the fact that any transfer of power, which gave one of these mutually intolerant religious and social communities a real or apparent advantage over the other,

contained the seeds of the gravest trouble; that it only required one communal riot in Amritsar to shake the cohesion of the Indian army and upset the morale of the divisions overseas. The Princes and Chiefs of India, governing one-third of the population and half the area of the country, and containing not a few turbulent elements among them, also could not be denied an interest in the constitutional changes in British India. These circumstances left the Viceroy with more scope for firmness than for conciliation. Concessions within the framework of the Constitution, provided they did not prejudice British ability to hold the balance in India, were possible; changes outside or within the framework of the Constitution, which involved any transference of power from British hands to Indian, were, however, not possible without prior agreement among the more important Indian parties and interests.

Dealings with Political Parties

The chronicle of the efforts made by Lord Linlithgow to secure the co-operation of the parties in the conduct of the war is long and involved. One declaration and reassurance as to India's post-war constitution followed another. The right which Indian nationalists had been demanding for Indians to frame their own constitution instead of having one imposed from outside was conceded; and finally Sir Stafford Cripps came out from England with a complete scheme for the realization by India, through a constituent assembly, of full self-government within the Empire as soon as hostilities ceased. As a complement to these assurances for the future, immediate seats on the Viceroy's Executive Council were offered to party leaders, culminating in the offer by Sir Stafford Cripps of what amounted to a National Government functioning within the present Constitution and reserving from Indian hands only the Commander-in-Chief's responsibility for the control of the army and General Head-quarters. The net result of all this was not to bring the parties together with each other and with the Government, but to harden their divisions. Each was more intent on establishing in advance those particular claims which it wanted to realize in the independent India promised by the British than in combining to make the independence of India a reality. The Congress idea was to gain power in all India and to consolidate it with the help of British bayonets. The Muslim League's concern was to prevent the Hindus gaining their end and to secure from the British, as the price of their co-operation in the war effort, a guarantee of a separate Muslim State after the war.

Mr. Gandhi set out in 1942 to break the deadlock in favour of Congress by means of mass action generally known as the "Quit India Movement". The moment seemed favourable. The war had given a fillip to revolutionary sentiment in India. The Germans were delving into the Caucasus, and the Japanese, having thrown the British out of Burma, were sitting on the frontiers waiting presumably for the return of fine weather to continue their march westward. It looked as though the British were at least in for rough handling and their prestige was at the lowest ebb. A most dangerous agitation developed under Mr. Gandhi's direction, which culminated in the

decision in favour of mass civil disobedience passed by the All-India Congress Committee in September. The situation tested to the full the courage and resolution of the Viceroy and of the Government of India, and the manner in which they rose to the occasion is common knowledge. A later attempt by Mr. Gandhi to impose his will on the Government, this time through the weapon of fasting, was handled with equal firmness, although the crisis cost the Viceroy the loss of two Hindu and one Parsee members of his Executive Council, who resigned rather than face the public obloquy which they thought would descend upon them if Mr. Gandhi should die. From that time the Viceroy was complete master of the situation in India, and every section of the community went about its business in tranquillity born of full confidence in his capacity to hold the balance of power fairly and firmly.

Agriculture and the Social Services

Lord Linlithgow's efforts in the fields of agriculture and the social services should not pass unnoticed. Agriculture aroused his keenest interest and was the field in which he was most expert. But he avoided the temptation of over-emphasizing it and strove rather for progress all along the line. He was also at particular pains to ensure that the war should not be allowed to put a stop to all progress, but that beneficent activities should be kept alive in every field, even if at a lower temperature than in time of peace.

The Indian Constitution, in which agriculture, public health and education are provincial subjects, limits the activities open to the Viceroy in these fields to research, co-ordination and advice. Lord Linlithgow was active in promoting all three. He had not been long in India before he started a campaign for improving Indian livestock, and later he inaugurated an all-India cattle show. A dairy research institute was established at Bangalore during his viceroyalty, and he was responsible in 1939 for marked expansion of the Imperial Research Institute. A scheme for nutritional research and a village economic enquiry were also set going by him. The Central Advisory Board of Education had been revived shortly before his viceroyalty. Lord Linlithgow gave it the fullest support and was responsible for the appointment of an educationist of high standing as Educational Advisor to the Central Government. Public health owes to Lord Linlithgow the establishment of the Central Advisory Board. He left his mark also on the fields of forestry, survey, Indian archaeology and town improvement in Delhi and Simla. His beneficent activities were ably supported by Lady Linlithgow, who gave to India a soundly constructed organization for fighting tuberculosis and whose appeals raised very large sums for many good causes.

The last three months of Lord Linlithgow's viceroyalty were busy ones. In August he gave his farewell address to the Central Legislature, the main feature of which was his reiteration of his faith in the federal ideal. He then made a tour of the south by air, visiting Madras, Cochin, Travancore and Bombay. A few days before his departure he presided over the annual session of the Chamber of Princes, and took occasion to give them a final word of advice as to the necessity of their being zealous in internal political and social reform if they were to play the part in India's future to which their tradition

and importance entitled them. It was apparent, from the reply given by the Chancellor, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, that the Princes think Lord Linlithgow was rather more enthusiastic than he need have been on the subject of reforms in their States, but they took his speech well enough. Lord Linlithgow made a point of paying a tribute to the great services the Princes have rendered to the Empire during the war, which prompted the Jam Saheb to express on their behalf the hope that Britain, after the war, would not let down those who had stood by her in her time of need, in order to embrace her enemies.

Famine in Bengal

Lord Wavell arrived in Delhi on October 18, having travelled from Britain by air, but at the time of writing had not been installed. Political India awaits with interest the opening of what he has called his mental handbag. Generally, however, there is no great political pressure on the Government from any side at the moment, and it is economic problems, such as food and inflation, which are likely to strike him as more urgently requiring his attention. The Government of India had succeeded some time before Lord Linlithgow's departure in steadying—by means both of monetary action and the application of controls to commodity markets and important industries such as cloth—the wholesale price index. This must have been upset again, however, by the high price of food in some parts of the country, more particularly Bengal, where the difficulties mentioned in the last number of The Round Table have since developed into famine. It may be said that the Bengal Government were warned last December that there would be famine in the province by midsummer, and that it is for the then Ministry, a Muslim-Hindu Coalition, to explain why they did not take the necessary measures to prevent it. The Central Government in fact were handicapped in their efforts to rescue the province, first by the indifferent co-operation by the Provinces in their plan for the controlled distribution of grains as between the surplus and the deficit districts, and second by obstruction on the part of Bihar and Orissa when, as an alternative method of helping Bengal, they threw the eastern region open to free trade. So a good many thousand people in Bengal have died of starvation—beggars, landless labourers, old and infirm persons and the chronically diseased, of whom there are plenty in Bengal. Quite a number of them would probably have died in any case, famine or no famine; but that does not alter the fact that the situation was scandalous and distressing, and one which, in a province of the greatest strategic importance, gave people furiously to think.

The indications now are that Sir Thomas Rutherford, who has been appointed Acting-Governor owing to the serious illness of Sir John Herbert, is pulling the Administration together, while the Muslim League Ministry, which took office last May, is admittedly working hard to improve the situation. Between local supplies and what they are now getting from outside the province, they should have enough food to feed all the population on a modest ration till the main harvest comes on to the market in January. The main difficulties now are to obtain enough transport to take the available supplies

into the famine-stricken country districts, and perhaps not less to ensure that the food is not stolen on the way. Some of the less admirable traits of the Bengali have been given rather too much scope by the slack Government of the past few years, and corruption is unfortunately rife.

The States of Cochin and Travancore are, next to Bengal, the worst sufferers from the food shortage; but their energetic Administrations made the most of the States' resources, and these, along with the imports supplied by the Central Government, have enabled them to keep the wolf of starvation from the door. The rations their people receive are, however, meagre. Madras and Bombay, with less difficult but still difficult problems to handle, have also succeeded in feeding all their people. But in fact, since the Japanese occupied Burma, the food position in India has been precarious. It is not that the quantities of rice imported from Burma were ever very large relatively to India's total consumption. But, as the Food Grains Policy Committee pointed out, they were a large proportion of the supplies of certain areas and constituted a safety-valve, the loss of which gravely impaired the psychological situation, with resultant reactions on the food situation quite disproportionate to the actual size of the imports.

A Plan of Action

Accordingly this Committee—which had been appointed by the Central Government to make proposals for a plan of action by the Central, Provincial and States Governments—recommended that the Central Government should arrange to import one million tons of grain annually until further notice, with an extra half-million tons in the first year to form a central food-grains reserve. In addition recommendations were made, subject to the procurement of supplies, for rationing, price fixing and distribution to be under the control and co-ordination of the Central Government with a view to making the best use of the food supplies grown by India itself. The Government of India accepted the recommendation as to imports, and the British Government has responded by arranging for the immediate shipment of substantial supplies to India. All the Provinces and States, however, have not been so quick to accept the recommendations affecting them, and we look like going forward into the next food year with administrative machinery rather less than adequate for the efficient handling of the problem. It can only be hoped that the next harvest will fulfil expectations.

There has inevitably been a demand, in view of the distress in Bengal, that the Central Government should use its emergency powers to make the Provinces conform. The political and constitutional issues involved were ably dealt with by Mr. Amery in his speech at Birmingham in October. It is obviously necessary to think twice before overriding responsible elected Governments because they do not comply as quickly as might be desired with the Central Government's views on subjects that are provincial responsibilities. Apart from the principle involved, there is a practical question. The Punjab may or may not be open to criticism for being reluctant to sell at any price below the highest obtainable. But what does any one hope to gain by,

say, dismissing the Punjab Government on the issue of requisitioning their farmers' crops? The whole countryside would be solid behind the Ministers, and the Central Government certainly no nearer to getting wheat to the market at lower prices.

The East Asia Command

A week or two before Lord Wavell came, Lord Louis Mountbatten, supreme Commander South-East Asia Command, descended upon Delhi, which accordingly now houses a Field Marshal and two Commanders-in-Chief. There are, presumably, intricate questions of organization to be discussed and settled with General Auchinleck and General Stilwell, who commands the American forces in China, Burma and India, and with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whom Lord Louis Mountbatten is already visiting in Chungking. He has not yet announced his naval, army and air force commanders, but it has been made known that Lieut.-General Sir Henry Pownall will be his Chief of Staff and the American General Wetemeyer his Deputy Chief. General Pownall was Chief of Staff to Lord Gort in France and also to General Wavell in the A.B.C.D. Command.

Lord Louis Mountbatten's arrival coincides roughly with the opening of the campaigning season on the Indo-Burma frontier, which for the past few months has been deluged by the monsoon. This has aroused great hopes for this winter—greater, perhaps, than are warranted in view of the strength of the Japanese position in Burma. However, the formation of the East Asia Command presumably implies the existence of naval and air as well as military material for a large-scale offensive, which is in itself encouraging, while its commander is in a position to concentrate his efforts on fighting the Japanese in a way that the Commanders-in-Chief of India, with their great responsibilities, were unable to do.

India,
October 1943.

GREAT BRITAIN

HEIRESS TO THE THRONE

THE Crown unites the whole Commonwealth. The heiress to the Throne is a girl who will be eighteen next April. Law would permit her at that age to succeed without the necessity for a Regency. The nearness of her coming of age in the royal sense has been brought home by the discovery of an anomaly, which Parliament at her father's request has just corrected. If the Sovereign falls gravely ill or leaves the United Kingdom on a journey, Counsellors of State have to be appointed; and the fact emerged that the minimum age for a Counsellor of State was twenty-one. For three years, therefore, Princess Elizabeth would have been deemed fit to reign, and yet not fit to play the lesser part of acting as one of the Counsellors if her father went overseas on a visit. The King's expressed desire that she should be granted every opportunity of gaining experience in the duties that would one day fall to her commanded universal sympathy. As the Bill to remove this disability from her concerned the Sovereign's presence in this country, it was clearly a matter for the United Kingdom Parliament alone, but the Dominion Governments were naturally told beforehand of the change which it was proposed to enact.

Rebuilding the House of Commons

On the night of May 10, 1941, the Chamber in which the House of Commons had met since 1852 was destroyed by one of the last bombs of the last heavy German raid on London. The House has now set up a committee to consider plans for rebuilding it. That bare fact is significant of the change in the tides of war. No less an authority than Mr. Churchill himself proposed the motion, and he is not the kind of poultry-keeper who has a reputation for counting chickens before they are hatched. He cherishes no illusions whatever about the immense strength and sacrifice still needed to execute the plans for victory. But the war plans are by now made, and the planners will fall behindhand if they are not thinking ahead to make sure that a second time victory does not turn to ashes. The sparkle of Mr. Churchill's speech on the old House and the new must have shaken the opinions of any listeners who had imagined that the burdens of war would leave him too tired to face tasks of reconstruction. It is not a man exhausted by four years of military responsibilities who could, in the very midst of the conduct of the war, utter such vital truths about democratic government so neatly and so smilingly:—

"The House should be oblong and not semi-circular. Here is a very potent factor in our political life. The semi-circular assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink as the weather changes. I am a convinced supporter of the party system in preference to the group system. The party system is much favoured by an oblong form of Chamber. It is easy for an individual to

move through those insensible gradations from Left to Right, but the act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious consideration. I am well informed on this matter, for I have accomplished that difficult process, not only once but twice. Logic is a poor guide compared with custom. Logic, which has created in so many countries semi-circular assemblies which have buildings which give to every Member not only a seat to sit in, but often a desk to write at, with a lid to bang, has proved fatal to parliamentary government as we know it here in its home and in the land of its birth."

And if M.P.s felt flattered when they heard the Prime Minister say that he ranked "the House of Commons—the most powerful assembly in the whole world—at least as important as a fortification or a battleship, even in time of war", they could not but be mindful that a country having reason to be proud of its Parliament would enter testing times ahead with twice the resilience of one that was sceptical about its institutions.

Delayed Decisions

Fleeting attacks of popular scepticism, not about victory but about the future beyond victory, are one of the minor mental maladies of the fifth year of war. They would not have secured any hold, had not the Government laid itself open to valid charges of dilatoriness in making definite its attitude towards obvious domestic questions—and they are many—which will closely affect the common man when hostilities are over. With so much anxiety removed about the outcome of the war, and consistently good news coming in from every front, the summer and autumn brought a swelling demand for proof that national demobilization plans would be ready when the time arrived: for evidence of progress towards Government decisions on aspects of the Beveridge report: for a statement of long-term agricultural policy: for decisions on the reports of the Barlow, Scott, and Uthwatt committees, concerning planning powers and land development, without which it was felt to be useless and indeed impracticable to start framing post-war housing policies: all these giving rise to uncomfortable doubts whether, despite the Government's general assurances, the end of the war would not catch it unprepared.

The root cause of these delays has not been sufficiently understood. It lies in coalition government. Under the party system, which after all has shaped our political life and customs for two centuries now, one party governs, acting, or at any rate trying to act, according to its own vitalizing principles, while the other party watches keenly and leaps to criticize; the challenge and the conflict come in the open, on the floor of the House of Commons, and, with or without concessions, the party to which the electorate has given a majority gets its way. Not so when, as now, all parties join to form a Government. Without all-party government we should almost certainly not have achieved the unity to enable us to survive 1940; but there is a price to pay. The clash nowadays comes not in the House of Commons, but in the Cabinet, behind closed doors, and, unless the question in dispute strikes the Prime Minister as crucial enough to warrant the exercise of his personal diplomacy in search of a compromise solution, it

is apt to remain unresolved and to drop to the bottom of the agenda. Mr. Butler was fortunate in getting his education proposals through the Cabinet unscathed. Other Ministers have been less lucky—or less skilful.

The Next General Election

This has its moral for the future. In that memorable Sunday evening broadcast on March 22 Mr. Churchill made his bid for a continuance of all-party government after the war, to carry through a Four Years Plan aiming at objectives on which party opinions might largely coincide. The bid has not yet irretrievably failed, but up to the present it has certainly not succeeded. Few people to-day would care to prophesy that the parties will make a joint appeal to the country at the next general election. The Conservatives and the Liberals seem willing; but, whatever the leaders of the Labour party may wish, the temper of its rank and file has been setting strongly against any such course. An over-simplified summary of the proceedings of the last Labour party conference was given in the article corresponding to this in the September issue of The Round Table, and it may have created an incorrect impression. That is a matter of regret, for the facts are important to any interested watcher of our political affairs. The chairman of the conference, Mr. A. J. Dobbs, said in his opening address:

"I cannot imagine any conceivable set of circumstances that would induce the Labour party to tolerate a coupon general election. . . . When the disabling restrictions of the war are removed, we want our full freedom of action so that we can make our appeal to the people on Labour's own policy and programme, and put forth every effort to obtain a Labour majority."

Later in the proceedings a delegate moved a resolution in general consonance with the chairman's remarks; it declared absolute opposition to the continuation of coalition government after the end of hostilities with Germany, and an intention of fighting as an independent party on a full Socialist policy. No one from the body of the hall opposed this resolution. A vote upon it was staved off by the action of Mr. Attlee, the leader of the party, in giving a pledge that:

"When hostilities with Germany cease, or when there is any question of a general election, the party conference which authorized the entry of Labour into the Government will be called to consider the continuance or ending of that participation."

That pledge was accepted, and the conference passed to the next business without recording any formal decision. Its hands, therefore, are still free.

Yet experience at war-time by-elections, and indeed at contentious moments in the House of Commons too, shows that members of the Labour party not holding official positions of responsibility are becoming increasingly restive. They chafe at the restraint which all-party government imposes upon their desire to go before the country with a complete and unfettered Socialist programme. To save the statutory five-year limit from compelling a war-time general election, each autumn since 1940 Parliament has passed a Bill prolonging its own life by a further year. It has now outlived the

Parliament of 1910–18. But the remark was commonly heard, when this year's Prolongation Bill was going through, that it was the last which would be necessary. Forecasts are hazardous, but a general election before November 1944 would surprise nobody; and the early defeat of Germany would render it a certainty. Legislation was passed at the end of the 1943 session to enable men and women on war service overseas to vote by proxy, and also to facilitate the making at short notice of a new register of voters—the first since 1939—on which a war-time election could be held if need be. Redistribution of seats in closer accord with present population is also to be arranged, for the last redistribution took place as long ago as 1918, with the natural consequence that some constituency areas stand absurdly in need of revision. Finally, a conference presided over by the Speaker will be held, as was done towards the end of the last war, in order to examine any other improvements in the franchise law or in the conduct of elections that may be responsibly suggested. All this is evidence of a healthy determination to see how much rust has accumulated, and clean it off.

Taxes and Chancellors

Meanwhile, although the present Parliament is eight years old and alleged by detractors to be senile, we have lately witnessed one of its most successful assertions of the plain man's view that his Government must find means of doing what is obviously the right thing, however difficult. Income-tax in this country has hitherto been collected retrospectively, on income actually earned some months previously. Obviously this was going to lead to grave difficulties after the end of hostilities, when high wages in war factories will shrink. Stimulated by Parliamentary criticism, the Chancellor of the Exchequer published a White Paper last year demonstrating the weaknesses inherent in every scheme so far propounded for conversion to a pay-as-you-earn system. But the criticism continued, and the Chancellor and the Board of Inland Revenue thought again. On September 21, 1943, Sir Kingsley Wood was ready to announce a solution. That morning, before the House met, he died. He was only 62, but the strain of continuous office since 1931 had worn him down. Neither a great statesman nor a great financial Chancellor, he was missed by people of all parties—and of none—for the man he was: human, cheerful, friendly, a public servant who never spared himself, a bonny fighter who always fought fair. He made his reputation first as Postmaster-General and then at the Ministry of Health and the Air Ministry, but his unique gift to the nation was that from 1940 to 1943 he imposed far the highest taxation in its history and no voice criticized, because he convinced everyone that his taxes were just to all.

Sir John Anderson, the most masterly administrator we have, was appointed to the Chancellorship, and took over the new pay-as-you-earn plan. It was designed to apply to weekly wage-earners only. Parliament protested. He extended it to everyone earning up to £600 a year. Parliament asked—why £600? Agreeing with the justice of the question, but perceiving real technical difficulties, he at length proposed a means of making it universal. So Parliament and common sense triumphed in the end over

all the complexities of the income-tax law, and *two* Chancellors earned the gratitude of the public.

Assuredly Sir John Anderson has been increasing his Parliamentary stature of late. He proved this in one of the most important debates of the autumn, on the famine in India, which had been causing intense disquiet and anxiety in this country. The explanatory speech of the Secretary of State, Mr. Amery, added considerably to true understanding of the causes of this tragedy, but did not succeed in stilling criticism. It was the cogency of Sir John Anderson, Governor of Bengal from 1931 to 1937, in winding up the five hours of discussion, which convinced a restless House that no charge of grave dereliction of duty could be sustained against either the British Government or the Government of India.

Ministerial Changes: an Instalment

Mr. Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister, left the Dominions Office in order to succeed Sir John Anderson as Lord President of the Council and chairman of the Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Everyone was glad to see Lord Cranborne moved back to the Dominions Office. More mixed feelings were aroused by the return of Lord Beaverbrook's electric personality to the Government as Lord Privy Seal. The adjective "mischievous" can mean either Puck-like or trouble-making, and his friends and his enemies would apply the same word to him in those two different senses; but none would deny his drive. As the new Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs the appointment of Mr. George Hall (a universally popular ex-miner M.P. aged 61), in preference to some younger man with an accepted knowledge of foreign questions, gave rise to serious criticism—not against Mr. Hall himself, but against the principle or lack of it on which he was selected. He succeeded Mr. Bonar Law's son, Mr. Richard Law, whose elevation to Cabinet rank as Minister of State was generally welcomed. Taken as a whole, these changes commended themselves as a practical way of filling the sudden and tragic gap which the death of Sir Kingsley Wood created. But the feeling grew that there was more yet to be done and that, in particular, the approaching urgency of reconstruction questions demanded changes on that side, both of machinery and of personality.

Impacts of War

London has been hearing the sirens often again, like many of our coast towns; but, whatever propaganda value these raids may have in Germany, even their nuisance value here is not large, and their military value negligible. They keep the Civil Defence services on their toes; and a few shattered homes scarring a happy neighbourhood are a fresh reminder that war strikes blindly.

The surrender of Italy came as grand news, but Mr. Churchill had gone out of his way to warn us of the relative strengths of Germany and Italy; and no one was tempted to slacken off merely because the thin end of the Axis was broken. Now that the Battle of the Atlantic, for the year 1943 at any rate, seems gloriously won, man power and woman power have

succeeded to supplies and ships as our most pressing anxiety. The screw keeps on turning, though it can travel not much farther. What the British Government has achieved, and the British people has uncomplainingly accepted, in organizing a community for the work of making war is a remarkable story. Out of a population of 33 millions between the ages of 14 and 65, 15,200,000 men and 7,100,000 women are fully employed in the Services or in industry. Of those women 2,500,000 are married. Nine out of ten unmarried women between 18 and 40 are in full-time occupation outside their homes, in industry or in uniform. More than a million men and women over 65 are out at work. All men born between 1892 and 1925 inclusive, and now all women born between 1893 and 1925, have been registered and are liable to have to go where they are sent. Women compose more than one-third of all the workers in engineering, and in the whole of our great chemical industry to-day there are more women employed than men. Altogether 2,200,000 more people are at work on munitions than the highest number ever reached in the last war.

Coal and Control

We have managed most of our industrial and economic affairs in war-time so competently that the continued failure to remove coal from the list of major problems is all the more prominent and aggravating. Too many men were allowed to leave the pits in the autumn of 1940, when the fall of France brought the export demand to an end. We need at least 720,000 men in the industry now, and are still a bit short of that, although 60,000 ex-miners have been brought back from the Services and elsewhere within the last two years. In response to an appeal for volunteers some 3,500 have given in their names to be trained for the job, but the shortage is still so clear that men who become available for the Armed Forces are being given the option now of working underground instead, and may indeed find themselves directed to do so. That course has been deliberately chosen by the Government in preference to pulling out of the Army any more ex-miners who are trained and fit for the fighting line.

The mines are under Government control. But we are still not obtaining sufficient tonnage. Output per man-shift has fallen by about one-tenth since before the war, partly because the average age of the hewers has risen. Avoidable absenteeism persists among a section of the younger men, especially at week-ends. Managements say that the Essential Work Order (which forbids summary dismissal) has deprived them of their powers of discipline, with the consequence that men can work slackly. From the men's side it is claimed that the changes needed are a further wage increase, speedier extension of welfare facilities, and—above all—permanent nationalization of the mines in order to convince the miner that his extra effort will not be used to line the pockets of the owners, and that he will not be thrown on the scrap-heap of unemployment at the owners' whim when peace returns. In the middle of a two-day Parliamentary debate the Prime Minister unexpectedly intervened to say positively that the machinery of war-time control had got to be made to work with the collaboration of everyone,

and that he was not going to be a party to a drastic permanent change in the ownership of this industry without the country having an opportunity to express its views on it at a general election. Mr. Churchill's personality, as it always does, averted a political crisis; but the industrial problem of output remained intractable. Major Gwilym Lloyd George, the Minister for Fuel, handled it with so velvety a glove that many people wondered whether there was an iron hand inside at all; and, if not, whether there ought not to be a new hand, and a firm one.

The future control of industry is coming nearer and nearer to the front as the major question of our home politics. Mr. Herbert Morrison, who has been a member of the War Cabinet for the past year, continually proclaims the necessity for full public management and control after the war; but he is trying to wean his party from the traditional Socialist idea that all one needs in order to make industry prosperous and efficient is to hand it over to a Government department. A more strictly practical approach was displayed in an important speech by Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport, winding up a debate in the House of Lords. "A transport service so co-ordinated and run that it can provide and does provide the best possible service for the least real cost to the community as a whole" was his avowal of his aim; and he went on to make it clear that that, and not any political predilection of any kind, would be his sole criterion. "The problem will not be solved on doctrinaire lines", he asserted, with an eye no doubt on some of the members of Mr. Morrison's party.

Health and Mind

Britain faced her crisis in the first year of war. The Germans struggle with theirs in the fifth. It makes a difference in our favour. Fatigue grows; it cannot be otherwise. We have had a run of small unofficial strikes. The trade unions condemn them, but cannot always exert sufficient discipline to stop them. Where this petty unrest starts, one or other of two local conditions is usually present: either it is a new works which has expanded so hugely that the resources of management are over-taxed, or else it is an area which suffered heavily from unemployment in the years between the two wars, so that people are ready to lend an ear to the man who comes along and says, "What will happen to you when the war is over?"

The health statistics give an accurate picture of our state. Slight, short illnesses are on the increase, which is just what one would expect after four years of strain. In serious illness, on the other hand, the nation's record keeps amazingly good. Nutrition is definitely better on the average than in 1939; that is due partly to higher earnings and no unemployment, partly to the special rations carefully worked out by the Ministry of Food for expectant mothers and children. At the end of the last war puny children were talked of excusingly as "war babies". That phrase is never heard here now. We can be proud that the infant mortality rate last year was the lowest ever recorded in the history of our country.

Great Britain,
November 1943.

IRELAND

AFTERMATH OF THE EIRE ELECTION

THE failure of the Fianna Fail party to obtain an absolute majority in the new Dail is unlikely to affect the security of Mr. de Valera's Government. That is the dominating fact which has emerged during the past three months. On the morrow of the election the political pundits explored the possibilities of a united Opposition, but the more closely they analysed the composition of the new House, the more secure did Mr. de Valera's position appear. It was evident that the two parties, the Labour party and the Farmers' party, which had notably increased their strength at the polls, would incur certain unpopularity were they to form an unnatural coalition with Fine Gael to oust from office a party whose strength in the Dail was double that of its nearest competitor. Mr. de Valera, confident of the underlying strength of his position, has not hesitated to admonish the waverers in a series of speeches whose import has evidently not been lost on the Farmers' party, and to threaten the country with the prospect of another general election if his authority is seriously challenged. Further, he has openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the electoral system. At the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis—the annual party conference—Mr. de Valera stated that the party's failure to obtain an absolute majority was to be attributed to Proportional Representation. Had the single-vote system been in operation it would have meant, according to Mr. de Valera's rather rosy calculations, that Fianna Fail, with a majority of first-preference votes in 30 out of 34 constituencies, would have had a majority in the same proportion, i.e. 30 to 4 in the Dail. The deduction is obviously not altogether valid, since a majority of first-preference votes in a five-member constituency does not by any means necessarily involve a majority in each of the five single-member constituencies into which it would be divided. But it has, none the less, sufficient foundation to make the Opposition anxious not to provoke Mr. de Valera to embark on a policy of electoral reform. An analysis of the votes cast at the recent election shows in fact that mathematically Mr. de Valera has no ground for complaint because, as one would expect, the larger parties are slightly favoured. But for the smaller parties P.R. remains a condition of continued existence. Consequently Mr. de Valera's hope that "when national matters come up for consideration none of those sectional interests will be tempted to put sectional interest before the national interest" is likely to be accorded a more thoughtful reception than is usually granted to such pious utterances.

THE SENATE

WHATEVER satisfaction Mr. de Valera may feel in having secured once again a docile Second Chamber in which his party duly preponderates must be outweighed by the unfavourable comment with which the results were acclaimed in every quarter. The Constitution ordains that a candidate for

the Senate should be distinguished for his culture, or for his work as an administrator, or for the part he has played and the experience he has acquired in the industrial, commercial, or social life of the country; and it prescribes an extremely complicated system of indirect election designed primarily to ensure a substantial measure of vocational representation. From the results it is painfully evident that the qualifications of candidates weighed little indeed in comparison with political affiliations in determining the choice of the electors. The nomenclature of the "Cultural Panel" invited witticisms in this politically irreverent country, and the fact that a well-known and deservedly popular racehorse owner topped the "Cultural" poll was not calculated to moderate the astringency of the comments. The complicated electoral machinery not only proved too much for the new Farmers' party, who paid for their inexperience by failing to secure a single seat, but was also held to have afforded opportunities for bribery and corruption which it was widely believed were not entirely neglected. No single case has, however, been substantiated. When the question was raised at the Ard Fheis, Mr. de Valera, rightly dismissing the wilder allegations, concluded not very reassuringly that though there was no smoke without fire there was often a great deal of smoke from a very little fire.

In addition to the elected members, the Constitution provides for the nomination of 11 members by An Taoiseach. On this occasion Mr. de Valera's selection was a convincing demonstration of his loyalty to his party. Nine of the nominated Senators are members of Fianna Fail; many of them candidates who have been rejected by the constituencies and some of them defeated candidates for the Senate. The composition of the new Senate indeed emphasizes once again that the artificial creation of a Second Chamber in a unitary State presents a most difficult constitutional problem. Since 1921 this country has experienced a Senate elected on national suffrage; a Senate elected jointly by the two Chambers; uni-cameral government; and finally from 1937 a Senate indirectly elected on loosely framed vocational lines with 11 nominated members. And now, provided that the recommendations of the Commission on Vocational Organization, whose report is expected shortly, result in the creation of a system of statutory vocational organization, Mr. de Valera is contemplating a Senate directly elected by vocational Boards.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

THE shadow of the post-war world—for the colours in which it is depicted in ministerial speeches are now invariably sombre—looms large. The nadir of depression was reached in a speech by the Minister of Supplies, Mr. Lemass, on October 13 in which he concluded that "the main task now is to stay alive in a world where we have few friends". At the Ard Fheis Mr. de Valera for the first time went so far as to imply in a public utterance that he thought the United Nations would prove victorious. At least that was the interpretation generally placed upon a speech in the course of which he contemplated the possibility of something in the nature of retrospective sanctions against this country because it had remained neutral during the war. His observations, which gave expression to misgivings which are widespread, deserve quota-

tion. "There are a number of people", he said, "who do not like our attitude of neutrality. We have got to look ahead to the time in which efforts may be made in some way or other to penalize us because we have taken that attitude." The moral which An Taoiseach drew was the imperative need for continued national unity after the war. That a united nation would react against any penalization of the kind Mr. de Valera contemplates is beyond question; but one would also have thought it was beyond question that the wise restraint and understanding which had been shown by the United Nations in general, and Great Britain in particular, to this country in the great crises of the war was a sufficient guarantee that no short-sighted policy of discrimination would be applied when the war was over. The harvest of war-time policy is worth gathering. One of its fruits may perhaps be seen in Mr. de Valera's more conciliatory allusions to Partition. While he remains adamant on this country's right to independent action in all circumstances, and on Ireland's right to Unity, and is consistent in reiterating that the one could not be sacrificed in order to obtain the other, he allowed that talk would not "help much at the present time". It is sobering indeed to reflect that the Border is one of the few problems whose solution is brought no nearer by discussion.

Few events in recent months have made a more profound impression in Eire than the granting by Portugal to Great Britain of naval and other facilities in the Azores. Dr. Salazar's régime has for some years been more generally admired in governing circles in Eire than that of any other country, and satisfaction was widespread when an exchange of diplomatic representatives was recently arranged. Portugal's foreign policy in this war has been freely quoted as a model for ours. The analogy between naval bases in the Azores and naval bases in the south-west of Ireland cannot be pressed too far, but it does exist. It remains, however, extremely unlikely that there will be any modification of Eire's strict neutrality. Indeed the official attitude appears, if anything, to be hardening, not because of any lack of sympathy with the cause of the United Nations, now so obviously prospering, but because of a determination that the policy adopted in 1939 shall be pursued without deviation to the very end of the war.

Eire,
October 1943.

CANADA

CHANGES IN PARTY FORTUNES

THE past summer has witnessed a startling change in the picture of the domestic political situation in Canada. It was almost inevitable that favourable developments in the war, which removed anxiety about its ultimate outcome, would induce the Canadian people to pay more attention to their home affairs and terminate gradually the torpor which had descended upon the Canadian political scene after the King Ministry had secured a fresh mandate in March 1940. The reorganization of one of the two historic parties, now styled the Progressive-Conservative party, was another factor which stimulated political interest, while labour unrest brought many recruits to the younger Leftist party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, and impelled it to vigorous activity in propagating its Socialist programme. In the spring it was evident that fresh breezes were stirring through the political woods, but few people were prepared to see during the summer startling evidence that the war seems destined to produce revolutionary changes in the fortunes of Canada's political parties and fresh alignments of a very important nature.

A year ago the Liberal party, which in the two decades between the world wars enjoyed as marked an ascendancy as the Conservative party had in Britain during the same period, appeared to have lost none of its popular strength. It possessed commanding majorities in both Houses at Ottawa, and it controlled the administrations of six out of the nine provinces. There seemed no prospect that its dominating position could be seriously challenged until the war ended and new issues emerged; and the majority of impartial observers would have cheerfully predicted that it was destined to have a permanent future as the Rightist party of Canada and eventually swallow the Conservatives, whose chances of recuperation even with a new leader and a fresh programme were not rated high. The chief threat to Liberalism seemed to be the growing strength of the C.C.F., which had polled such a heavy vote and won so many seats in a provincial election held in British Columbia in October 1942. The Liberals and Conservatives, each lacking a clear majority in the Legislature, had been compelled to form a Coalition Ministry. Other portents also seemed to indicate that sooner or later the two senior parties would have to coalesce on a nation-wide scale, though there seemed every reason to expect that the Liberal party would be the predominant element in the future combination. But elections held in the late summer in different sections of the country disclosed such a revolutionary change in the political temper and sympathies of the Canadian voters that the outlook for the future of the Liberal party is now regarded as much darker than that of its two chief rivals.

LIBERAL REVERSE IN ONTARIO

THE first blow to its fortunes and prestige came on August 4 through a provincial election in Ontario, which contains almost one-third of the total

population of the Dominion. In this province the Liberal party, thanks largely to the stimulating energy and electioneering gifts of Mr. Mitchell Hepburn, had won the two previous elections and held office since 1934. But Mr. Hepburn had long been at loggerheads with the Federal Liberal party and had been, since the war began, a persistent critic of the inadequacies of its war programme. His critical attitude had antagonized the devout partisans among his colleagues in the Cabinet and his followers in the Legislature, and in the autumn of 1942 he found his position so uncomfortable that he resigned the Premiership, which he handed over without consulting his party to his Attorney-General, Mr. Gordon Conant. This action, however, aggravated internal dissensions among the Liberals to such a degree that it became necessary to hold a provincial party convention to decide the issue of the leadership. At this convention Mr. Conant, suspect as a nominee of Mr. Hepburn, could muster very little support, and through the exertions of the Federal party machine the leadership was entrusted to Mr. Harry Nixon, an experienced politician who had resigned the office of Provincial Secretary rather than serve under Mr. Conant and who had an almost flawless record of loyalty to Mr. Mackenzie King.

There was great relief at Ottawa when an administration completely sympathetic to the King Ministry was installed at Toronto, but it proved an illusory gain. The impending expiry of the statutory life of the Ontario Legislature, which had been extended a year in 1942, made a provincial general election unavoidable, and so the Nixon Ministry appealed for a fresh mandate. It had to defend itself against a double attack—by the Progressive-Conservatives under the leadership of Colonel George Drew and by the C.C.F. under the leadership of Mr. E. B. Jolliffe, a Toronto lawyer who was a Rhodes scholar. It found itself at once committed to a difficult defensive battle, since its appeal for a mandate on the strength of the Liberal party's administrative record was countered by the retort that whatever merit that record had was due to the vigour and skill of Mr. Hepburn, who had been discarded by his party.

Colonel Drew sought to lay emphasis upon the progressive tendencies of renovated Conservatism by propounding an elaborate 22-point programme, which committed his party to measures of reform covering virtually every phase of Ontario's social and economic life. But he and his followers also strove with considerable success to make the close concordat between the Nixon and the King Ministries a dominant issue in the election. They argued that, if the former were given a fresh lease of power, it would simply be the subservient tool of a Federal Government which was still dominated by the French-Canadian influences and had flouted the will of the people of Ontario, as expressed in the plebiscite, about recruiting policy. For this electioneering strategy they received unexpected assistance near the day of polling from a very maladroit speech delivered at Ottawa by Mr. St. Laurent, the able French-Canadian lawyer but inexperienced politician who is Federal Minister of Justice. This Minister, electing to defend Quebec against charges that its contribution to the national war effort had been inadequate, offered an exaggerated account of its actual contribution, which official data did not support, indulged in severe strictures against the critics of his province, and also essayed a provocative rebuttal of accusations about the influence exerted by the Roman Catholic hierarchy. If Mr. St. Laurent had wanted to lose the election for his party in Ontario he could not have made a more effective speech. It inflamed the strong Protestant sentiment which is always latent throughout Ontario, with the result that thousands of former Liberals either voted for other parties or stayed at home. Probably the chief beneficiary of the Liberal revolt was the C.C.F., which, while advocating a large instalment of its ultimate Socialist programme, had directed continuous fire against the alleged unfairness of Liberal policies towards labour and had managed thereby to rally to its banner the bulk of the labour vote of the province, which had a deep sense of grievance.

Colonel Drew succeeds Mr. Nixon

In any case the Nixon Ministry, despite the active assistance of Federal politicians, proved completely unable to cope with the twofold attack and was overwhelmingly defeated on polling day. The Liberal party, which at dissolution had held 63 seats, found itself reduced to an insignificant minority with only 15 seats, and the Progressive-Conservative party, increasing its membership in the Legislature from 20 to 39, found itself the strongest group. But the C.C.F., which had held no seats in the last Legislature, achieved a spectacular success by carrying 34 seats, while 2 more fell to former Communists, who, on account of the legal suppression of their party, stood under the designation of Labour-Progressives. These Leftist gains came as a profound shock to both the older parties. They revealed that a party with a Socialist programme had captured the allegiance of most of the industrial workers of Canada's largest province, that it had considerable backing in purely rural constituencies, and that it had attractions for the French-Canadian workers in the northern mining areas. The leaders of a party which had increased its popular vote in five years from 77,000 to 383,000 had every reason to feel elated with such a result, although part of its support probably represented a protest against the unsatisfactory performances of the two historic parties in recent years.

After the election the Nixon Ministry had no alternative but to tender its resignation, and the Lieutenant-Governor entrusted Colonel George Drew, as the head of the largest party in the new Legislature, with the task of forming a Ministry. There was speculation as to whether Colonel Drew might form a Coalition Ministry by offering places in his Cabinet to Mr. Hepburn and another Liberal Minister who had survived the débâcle, but what he did was to rely upon the political talent in his own following. He was able to form a presentable Cabinet (he wisely reduced the number of members from 14 to 10), and he has made an energetic start in office by proceeding to carry out without delay some of the measures of reform in his programme. But he is faced with a formidable Opposition, containing a group of able young men and, since he lacks a majority in the Legislature, his Ministry will depend for survival upon Liberal support and will of necessity lead a

precarious existence. He may at a later date buttress his position by bringing Liberals into his Cabinet, but he will no doubt hope that he will be able to survive as Premier long enough to demonstrate his administrative capacity and to carry out some of his projected reforms; so that, if he encounters defeat, he will have a reasonable prospect of a favourable response to an appeal for the clear majority required for a stable government.

Significant Federal By-elections

Five days after the contest in Ontario, four Federal by-elections held in constituencies of very different types confirmed its evidence that the Liberal party has suffered an ominous loss of popular favour. All four of the vacant seats had been held by Liberals with comfortable majorities at the election of 1940 and all of them were lost. In the Cartier division of Montreal, a working-class seat, the victor out of five candidates, Mr. Fred Rose, a Communist running like his friends in Ontario under the guise of a Labour-Progressive, had only a narrow lead over a candidate of the newly organized French-Canadian party, the *Bloc Populaire*, while the nominees of the Liberal party and the C.C.F. ran respectively third and fourth. In the Stanstead division of Quebec, a predominantly rural constituency, Mr. Davidson, a Liberal, who after winning the seat in 1940 had been unseated on account of some illegal action by one of his agents, found himself deserted by all save a small minority of his former French supporters and, although he secured most of the votes of the local Conservatives, was easily defeated by a candidate of the *Bloc Populaire*, while a C.C.F. nominee polled a trivial vote. In the Selkirk division of Manitoba, which the Liberals had carried by a majority of 4,154 in 1940, their candidate in a four-cornered fight was only able to muster about half as many votes as his C.C.F. rival, a Scot who had served as President of the Manitoba Federation of Agriculture. A more serious blow was the loss by a decisive majority to the C.C.F. of the Humboldt division of Saskatchewan, which had only once before since its organization in 1903 rejected a Liberal. Here was very ominous evidence that in a great city like Montreal both a Leftist and a *Bloc Populaire* candidate could muster more votes than a Liberal; that the rural voters of Quebec had moved away in droves from the Liberal camp to that of the *Bloc Populaire*; and that the prairie farmers had become disillusioned about Liberalism and were prepared to give a trial to the Socialist programme of the C.C.F. One regrettable feature of these by-elections, however, was their failure to give any indication of the voting strength of the Progressive-Conservative party, because its leaders for reasons best known to themselves decided that they would not contest any by-elections until they had completed their plans for the rebuilding of their party's organization. In September there followed a provincial election in Prince Edward Island; but no serious significance could be attached to its outcome since it tested the sentiments of less than one per cent of the total population of Canada. The Liberals lost six seats to the Progressive-Conservatives and had their popular majority pared down from 11,500 to 3,543; but they held 20 out of the 30 seats in the Legislature and were able to extract from this minor contest the comfort that in the maritime provinces the erosion of

their popular support had been smaller than in other sections. The C.C.F. made no headway in its first invasion of the Island; for the nine candidates whom it nominated all polled trivial votes and lost their deposits.

Emergence of the Younger Parties

On the evidence of these elections a new state of fluidity has developed in Canadian politics, and the monopoly of alternating supremacy, which the Liberal and Conservative parties have enjoyed since Confederation except during the years 1921 to 1925, is now seriously threatened by the sudden growth of support for the C.C.F. and the *Bloc Populaire*. Of these the former is the more formidable, and a variety of factors have contributed to its increase in strength. A widespread admiration for the sustained fortitude and heroic exploits of the Russian people and their armies helped to stimulate a flowing tide of dissatisfaction with the fruits of the capitalist system and made many converts to the Socialist faith. Among the plain folk of Canada bitter memories are cherished of the pre-war days, when in a country of vast and varied resources nearly a million people were for some years dragging out a miserable existence on a meagre public dole and thousands more were finding life a constant financial crisis. But since the war began the expenditure of vast sums of money on the war programme has virtually banished unemployment and raised the general level of wages to a point higher than Canada has ever known before. So the workers naturally ask why the same diffusion of prosperity could not have been achieved without a war by intelligent and efficient planning of the national economy. They are determined not to countenance any return to the old economic order and are quite deaf to exhortations about the perils of abandoning the system of rugged individualism. They believe that generous expenditure by the State has rescued thousands of Canadians from straitened circumstances and are resolved that, if necessary, this expenditure shall continue. And when the leaders of the C.C.F. pledge themselves to maintain this expenditure and to expand the activities of the State, they have a ready-made programme which appeals to thousands of voters. The C.C.F. is also particularly fortunate in its chieftain, Mr. M. J. Coldwell, a Canadian of English birth, but long a resident of Canada, who is not only very competent in parliamentary debate and on public platforms, but has also a very attractive personality and a rare gift for expounding radical doctrines in moderate language.

But the path of the C.C.F. for the attainment of a working majority at Ottawa is by no means clear. For the moment it has attracted the support of a large body of western agrarians, because they are intensely dissatisfied with the policies of both the older parties. They feel that the control of prices has operated greatly to their disadvantage and that the prices of farm products should have been allowed to rise to a level which would have compensated them for their unremunerative pre-war prices—as well as for the serious increase in their costs of production caused by the war. But the great majority of Canadian farmers still retain the fundamentally conservative bias ingrained in small landed proprietors, and it causes many of them

to balk at accepting the full implications of the Socialist programme of the C.C.F. Not a few of them are convinced that some of their troubles arise from the high wages demanded by industrial workers, which increase the costs of manufactured goods, transportation and other services; if labour elements achieve domination in the councils of the C.C.F., as they threaten to do, it cannot expect much increase in its agrarian support. Moreover the elections in Quebec and Prince Edward Island revealed that outside the mining areas of Nova Scotia it had accumulated very little popular support east of the Ottawa river in regions which contribute 94 out of 245 seats to the Federal House of Commons. Until it can capture a substantial proportion of these seats, it can hardly hope to obtain a clear majority at Ottawa. It has a prospect of increasing its strength in Alberta, where the Social Credit party was losing ground even before the death of its founder, Premier Aberhart, dealt it a serious blow. But on the other hand, having rejected an offer of alliance made by the Communists of the Labour-Progressive party, it has to reckon with the quite serious competition of the latter for the votes of the extreme radicals among the workers.

Controls and Conscription

Some account must also be taken of the possibility that, after the next election, the contingent of members of the *Bloc Populaire*, which will certainly be sent to Ottawa from Quebec, might make common cause with the C.C.F. For the moment the *Bloc Populaire* is primarily an anti-war isolationist party, engaged in exploiting the resentment of the French-Canadians over their commitment to another European war and their subjection to conscription even of a limited kind. The *Bloc* has also a radical side to its programme and professes great concern over the exploitation of French-Canadian workers by powerful corporations controlled by English-speaking capitalists. A growing movement for the absorption of all the private power companies in Quebec in a state-owned system owes its popularity to the belief that a large share of well-paid executive and technical posts in these companies, which are now practically monopolized by the English-speaking section of the population, would, under a state-owned system, become open to French-Canadians. But the shrewder leaders of the C.C.F. who know that Australia and New Zealand have confirmed Socialist Governments in power and that the British Labour party has at least a reasonable prospect of attaining office, discern political advantages in the advocacy of schemes of closer Imperial co-operation. They could only contemplate an alliance with the *Bloc Populaire* if the latter agreed to discard its isolationist creed, a move which is unthinkable.

The Progressive-Conservative party naturally derived great encouragement from its recovery of control of its old stronghold of Ontario; but it has still to prove that it has made parallel headway in the rest of the country in the Federal arena. It pins its chief hopes on the ability of its new leader, Mr. John Bracken, for twenty years Premier of Manitoba, who, as a former professor of agriculture and a practical farmer, has an informed appreciation of the farmers' problems and a consistently good record as a champion of

their interests, to capture the confidence of the rural communities, whose voting strength, favoured as it is by the present electoral arrangements, still remains the most powerful single factor in determining the fortunes of Federal elections. Mr. Bracken, who is being criticized for not securing a seat in Parliament, cannot afford to delay his entry into it much longer, but meanwhile he has been spending the summer profitably in touring the country and reconstructing his party's organization. His speeches, which have been mostly blunt, plain-worded expositions of his views and policies, do not stir many pulses, and his criticism of the King Ministry has been too temperate to please ardent partisans; but there is general agreement that he has made a very good impression everywhere and particularly in the rural areas and built up there a fund of good will, which may yield rich political dividends at a general election.

Liberal Heart-searchings

Yet, whatever the future may hold for the other parties, the Liberal party remains in control at Ottawa with ample majorities in both Houses. The first effect of its recent reverses was to create bewilderment and despondency among its parliamentary representatives, and there followed a process of heart-searching and inquisition into the causes of its sudden loss of popular favour. The *Winnipeg Free Press* advanced the theory that the King Ministry, having shown immense courage in imposing for the purposes of the war taxation of unprecedented severity and in instituting a rigid system of controls over practically every phase of the national economy, was now, as the result of the varied resentments which such drastic measures were bound to arouse, threatened very unfairly with martyrdom for its virtues at the hands of an ungrateful and short-sighted people.

It is possible to admit some validity for this argument and to believe that the Government has incurred considerable popular odium through its stern measures of economic, financial and social discipline, which were essential for the prosecution of the war; but the causes of its growing unpopularity go deeper than resentment over the operation of controls. In spite of a record of achievement in the prosecution of the war which is undeniably impressive, the Government has found that a monopoly of the glory of organizing Canada's contribution to the cause of freedom has also involved a monopoly of the unpopularity which inevitably befalls all war Governments as a multitude of grievances against them accumulate during the course of the struggle. If three years ago the other parties in the State had been invited to join in the formation of a representative National Ministry, the Liberal party to-day would not be in such an unfortunate plight.

It would have been freed from dependence upon the massed *bloc* of French-Canadian supporters, whose obdurate opposition to conscription for overseas service has prevented its enactment, and it would not have been necessary for it to resort to the various manœuvres adopted for the avoidance of this measure, which have increased the antagonism to the Government. First there was the enforcement of compulsory military training for one

month for home defence; then the enlargement of the training period to four months; and, finally, the creation of the home defence army. Later, when the agitation for full conscription grew acute, the device of the national plebiscite was adopted; but its overwhelming verdict, except in Quebec, for the removal of the limitations upon conscription has so far been disregarded.

Mr. King and the French-Canadians

So it is little wonder that in the English-speaking provinces Mr. King has to meet the accusation that he regards the preservation of the good will of the French-Canadians as the paramount consideration in framing his policies and that he has allowed the elements in Canada which have been least enthusiastic for winning the war to impose their will about fundamental issues relating to the national war effort, and to humiliate Canada in the eyes of the United States, whose people cannot understand why Canada does not enforce full conscription. But for Mr. King the supreme tragedy is that, while his policy of the appeasement of French-Canada has alienated much of his former support in the English-speaking provinces, modifications of it, which were forced upon him, have aroused deep hostility to his Government in Quebec. The French-Canadians regard the dispatch of French-Canadian conscripts to Kiska and Labrador as equivalent to overseas service and the *Bloc Populaire* gets a sympathetic hearing for its charge that he has forsworn his pledge never to enforce full conscription.

The urgent need for the speedy rehabilitation of the fortunes of the Liberal party resulted at the end of September in a grand assize about them in which its parliamentary members and the leading figures of the National Liberal Federation participated. There was no lack of plain speaking by critical delegates, and there was a general disposition to attribute the party's recent reverses to the arbitrary administration of the control systems which Ministers had permitted and to their failure to make the country properly acquainted with the realities of their magnificent accomplishment as managers of the nation's war effort. At the closing dinner of the conference Mr. King delivered a fighting speech in which he essayed to revive the drooping spirits of his followers by arguing that the Ontario election was lost on purely provincial issues, that there was no real evidence that his own Government had lost the confidence of the country, and that under its direction Canada's war effort had won the unqualified admiration of all the United Nations. He declared that it was his hope to avoid a general election until the expiry of the life of this Parliament in the spring of 1945; but he served notice upon the Opposition parties that, if they continued their unjustifiable criticisms, the exhaustion of his forbearance might result in an appeal to the voters at an earlier date. He had the satisfaction of receiving a unanimous vote of confidence from his followers; but he has still on his hands a twofold task of pacification, which will tax all his well known political dexterity.

Canada,
October 1943.

AUSTRALIA

THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS

THE portents of this age are unmistakable. There are dynamic movements in political democracy towards economic equality and social security by the whole-hearted use of the State as an instrument for the active promotion of social welfare. Only those parties or groups will be trusted with power which are believed to align themselves in this direction. The watchwords of the nineteenth century have lost their magic. Majorities will not vote even for freedom if they suspect that it may turn out to be the freedom of the unemployed. The conservative elements in democratic politics, if they are to take their full part in constructive leadership in the future, must effect a drastic overhaul of their programmes.

Whether or not the result of the Federal elections in August illustrates and justifies these observations, the marked swing-over to the Curtin Government has given the Australian Labour party the opportunity that it has not had since the elections held just after the outbreak of war in 1914, the opportunity of governing with a majority in both Houses. Before the election Labour had 35 seats in a House of 74, and had been kept in office for nearly two years by the votes of three Independents. In the Senate, of 36 members, the Opposition held 19 seats. Labour in the new House will number 49, an absolute majority of 12. Because only half of the 36 Senators, together with those elected to fill casual vacancies, retire every three years, the position there is more complicated. Labour captured all 19 seats at the polls. Till July 1944, when the change-over takes place, the numbers will be 18 all: for the remainder of the present Parliament Labour will hold 22.

In war-time government demands, above all, as Britain knows so well, an administration which is sure of its position both in Parliament and in the country. Throughout the last two critical years Australia has not had that. The Opposition gave effective co-operation in organizing the country for war, and, until the last few months of the old Parliament, used its numbers with great restraint: but even if our written constitution had not inexorably decreed that the House must expire this November, an election had become politically necessary. All sides have some measure of satisfaction in the fact that Australia has now, like the other English-speaking belligerent democracies, a Government with a clear majority and a mandate.

A Swing-over to Labour

THE swing-over to Labour was greater than even Mr. Curtin's most optimistic supporters had anticipated. The turn-over of primary votes (the ballot in all constituencies is preferential) was substantial. But the turn-over of seats was more striking still. The following brief table will tell the story. The figures in brackets are those for the old Parliament.

	Labour	*United Australia*	*United Country*	*Independent*	*Total*
New South Wales	21 (16)	4 (8)	3 (4)	— (—)	28
Victoria	9 (8)	6 (6)	3 (3)	2 (3)	20
Queensland	6 (6)	1 (2)	3 (2)	— (—)	10
South Australia	5 (1)	1 (5)	— (—)*	— (—)	6
Western Australia	5 (2)	— (1)	— (2)	— (—)	5
Tasmania	3 (2)	2 (3)	— (—)	— (—)	5
TOTAL	49 (35)	14 (25)	9 (11)	2 (3)	74

* In South Australia the Liberal and Country parties have a joint organization. Their figures are shown under the United Australia party.

All told, 16 seats changed their party allegiance, but only one was lost by Labour. Perhaps even more significant still is the fact that, in several of the wheat-belt constituencies which would normally have been reckoned as strongholds of the Country party, the sitting Labour members greatly increased their majority by comparison with their performance in 1940. The Senate results show the same tendency even more clearly, for there each State votes as a single constituency and the vote is less influenced by personal considerations. Thus, in the elections of 1940, 48 per cent of the primary votes cast for the Senate went to Labour and 52 per cent to the anti-Labour parties (independent miscellaneous small groups being for this purpose disregarded). In 1943 Labour polled 58 per cent of the primary votes and the anti-Labour parties 42. The general swing towards Labour was thus of the order of 10 per cent. In 1940 Labour headed the Senate poll in New South Wales alone. In 1943 every State showed a Labour majority.

The issues on which the electors have pronounced so decisively in favour of Labour are few and simple. The Government chose its ground with discernment, and the Opposition did not succeed in drawing the conflict away to a terrain more favourable to itself. The Prime Minister went to the country on his Government's war record. The unremitting maintenance of the nation's organization for war—that, he said, was the real issue. For his party he made the high claim that it alone had the proved ability to give and to maintain the necessary lead. Under Labour leadership Australia had turned the sharp corner of the war. "If you are satisfied with Labour's record as a war Government", he said, "give us a chance of finishing the job with victory and, perhaps, peace." This first question was supplemented by the Prime Minister's colleagues, and particularly by Dr. Evatt, by a second: "Are you satisfied with Mr. Curtin's leadership?" To which they added, tellingly enough, "If you are not, then to whom among the leaders and potential leaders of the Opposition parties will you turn for a better?" Thirdly, the Labour leaders asked the electors, "Do you want a post-war policy of full employment? If so, what likelihood is there that the Opposition parties would be willing, when peace returns, to maintain the economic, social and financial controls that such a policy implies?" "Remember", they said, "that the unemployment level stood at 30 per cent in the depression years in Australia."

THE OPPOSITION CASE

To these questions the Opposition had many replies. Indeed one of their troubles was that they had too many replies. First of all, Australia should not be satisfied, they urged, with Labour's record as a war Government. Labour had not, even in face of the Japanese onrush, merged the conscript Militia with the volunteer A.I.F. in a single Australian army. It had limited to an artificially drawn area in the south-western Pacific the territories to which the Militia could be ordered beyond Australia and her colonial possessions. It had truckled to the militant trade unions, especially in the mines and at the waterfront. It had not dealt effectively or even boldly except in words with strikes in vital industries. It had perpetrated administrative muddles in rationing and in the organization of man-power. The extent of its reliance on bank credits to balance its budgets had endangered the stability of the currency. For all these reasons, they claimed, Labour should not be returned to office. In the view put by the Opposition, the merits or demerits of Mr. Curtin's leadership were not really relevant. They criticized him trenchantly. But their case was that the effective maintenance of the war effort required a national all-party Government, as in Britain, harnessing to the task all the ability that Parliament could provide. As to post-war policy, said the Opposition, the Labour programme meant the indefinite prolongation of restrictions and controls; a bureaucratic administration; trade-union dictation in politics; a door open to the Left for the entry of the Communists into power. In a word, it meant socialization and the end of democratic freedom.

These were the issues as the leaders stated them. On both sides there were partial statements to the point of distortion. The Prime Minister, for example, arrogated to Labour an unduly large share of the credit for Australia's war effort. He did far less than justice to the achievement of his predecessors, notably in the training and equipping of the A.I.F. and in the organization of the production of munitions. On the Opposition side, on the other hand, those who talked bravely about the way in which industrial stoppages should have been handled gave no credit for the substantial improvements since Labour came into office, and did not make comparisons with the position in 1917–18, which was much worse. But such things are inevitable. One does not look to the hustings for the integrity of a judge's charge to a jury.

The people's verdict was decisive enough. There has been much searching of heart ever since in the defeated parties. The explanations generally current range through various degrees of humility and cynicism. Many of the Opposition supporters are convinced that the vote was in reality one against conscription for overseas service, and that the Opposition was defeated because it advocated the establishment of a single Australian army, which could be sent to fight anywhere, as might be required. Another explanation is that many believed that Labour would make available unlimited finance in peace as in war, but the Opposition parties would not. "One does not usually kill Santa Claus", was the summary of an unsuccessful candidate. Just how much truth there is in these unflattering estimates

of John Citizen in Australia it is very hard to say. But certainly they are not the whole truth. An indisputable factor in the result was lack of leadership and divided leadership in the ranks of the Opposition. To vote for Labour was to vote for Mr. Curtin. But nobody could be sure which leader a victorious Opposition would agree to support. Mr. Menzies having been eclipsed by their own act, the other Opposition leaders showed themselves simply unequal in the electoral combat to Mr. Curtin and Dr. Evatt. Many thousands of votes were cast for Labour, not from any deep Labour convictions and not without anxiety, but simply because Mr. Curtin and his inner War Cabinet, at all events, were the best war administration in sight. Many voters forecast post-war chaos if the Opposition parties were returned to power in this election. Both the Prime Minister and his Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, emerged from the campaign with enhanced prestige. Mr. Curtin is not a Churchill, but with persistent dualism he combines a determination to wage the nation's war and a sharp consciousness of his responsibilities as head of his party. For the Australian Labour party, its aims and its traditions, he has an unshakable loyalty. This has led him again and again into compromises and the acceptance of decisions that exasperate and disappoint everybody who stands outside his party. But, in politics as in the kitchen, you cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs. No course is without its disadvantages. What the Prime Minister has set himself to do is to organize the nation to play its full part in the war, and yet to preserve intact the Australian Labour party. In that task he has so far succeeded. It is worth remembering that in the last war, in possibly less difficult circumstances, no less a person than William Morris Hughes in his prime essayed the same task and failed.

Mr. Curtin and his Party

For Mr. Curtin's achievement Australia has had to pay—in particular, for the necessary corollary of his refusal to allow his party to enter an all-party Government. In a Parliament so small and so evenly divided, the loss to the tasks of government of at least half the available ability must, in the nature of things, be serious. History will record, however, that to have held the Australian Labour party together in the crisis of this war is in itself an important gain. The present chaos in the Opposition parties serves only to emphasize this point. Indeed the policies put forward by the Opposition at the polls went a long way to vindicate Labour's refusal to form a composite Government. Agreement on fundamental policy is a necessary preliminary; and between many of the policies of Mr. Curtin and Mr. Fadden there could be no satisfactory compromise at all. The verdict at the polls was distinctly one in favour of the moderate section of Labour.

Loyal though he is to Labour ideals, Mr. Curtin insisted throughout his Prime Ministership that the Government did not intend to use its powers to achieve the party's platform of socialization. In going to the polls he renewed this pledge. He asked for a mandate to organize the nation for victory and to exercise any and every social control necessary for that purpose. His policy was victory and not socialization in the life of the new

Parliament. Dr. Evatt, fresh from the success of his second mission to the United States and Britain, spoke in a similar vein. He emphasized the gravity of Australia's continuing responsibilities in the war and the fundamental importance of a policy of full employment in the post-war plans of the United Nations. He urged that Labour "could not govern merely as a trade union party", and appealed boldly for support to the "small man" in every walk of life. The voting endorsed in full measure these spokesmen of responsible Labour. In Fremantle, where in 1940 he had almost lost his seat, Mr. Curtin had a sweeping and absolute majority. At Barton (a suburban electorate of Sydney) Dr. Evatt obtained the greatest primary vote ever recorded in New South Wales.

Dissatisfaction with the present party situation, especially on the Opposition side of politics, led to the nomination of an unprecedented number of candidates—349 for the House of Representatives and 70 for the Senate. There were more independents than ever before, and many new parties, mostly of the mushroom variety, some bearing quaint names. Of 18 new members of the House only two come with established political reputations—Dr. J. F. Gahn, who was Minister of Health in Tasmania, and Dame Enid Lyons, the widow of the former Prime Minister, who is the first woman member of the House and probably the most effective recruit of the Opposition. For the first time also a woman has been elected to the Senate, Miss Dorothy Tangney from Western Australia. Among the new recruits for Labour very few belong to the familiar trade-union type. The party has broadened its own basis in the pre-selection ballots by bringing in people with very diverse experience, including a number of professional men. At the polls Mr. Fadden did not prove himself an effective leader of the Opposition. In the new Parliament the two Opposition parties have dissolved their coalition. Mr. Fadden remains the leader of the Country party and Mr. Menzies, who has been re-elected leader of the United Australia party, has become leader of the Opposition. He is fully aware of the double responsibility that lies upon him for healing the personal divisions which so sorely weakened his own side in politics, and for laying the foundations of a reorganized liberalism which will concede more to social security while still pressing the case of individual initiative.

The New Parliament's Problems

The new Parliament will face great problems. With the removal of the invasion threat to our shores, the gradual recovery of the island territory from the Japanese and the prospect of major offensives in south-east Asia, the task of organizing the war effort will enter a new and even more difficult phase. Hitherto the emphasis has been on the man-power needs of the forces and for munitions. The nation has seen the need and the danger clearly enough to accept without serious question whatever direction and restriction the Government has thought necessary. The solid majority accorded at the polls to Mr. Dedman, Minister of War Organization and Industry, and the return of an Independent, Mr. Coles, who has been chairman of the Rationing Commission despite desperate efforts by the Opposi-

tion to unseat both, has shown that the people are realistic and are ready to face continued restrictions for the sake of victory. But Australia is being asked to produce vastly more food supplies for Britain and our Allies both in and around Australia and in other theatres of war. The Government will have to strike a new balance of man-power and probably to establish new controls and priorities, and it will no doubt have to state its case more carefully than before. Farther ahead there lie the problems of administration and organization which the reconquest of island territory will create; preparations for formulating a policy of full employment when hostilities are over; the crucial question of international economic relations in the transition period; the place of Australia in the British Commonwealth and among the United Nations. As usual too there lie at the root of all far-reaching questions of policy in the Australian federal system awkward unsolved questions of constitutional power. At the end of last year the Commonwealth sought to secure by " reference " from the States adequate economic powers for the immediate post-war period. The attempt failed decisively. The Commonwealth's present powers are insufficient to enable Government and Parliament to carry out the mandate that the electors have now given them—for post-war reconstruction based first and foremost on a policy of full employment. The Government has announced its intention to initiate an early amendment to the Constitution.

There had been some expectation that in the new Parliament there might be an opportunity for the reconstruction of the Cabinet. These hopes, however, were disappointed. Under its rules the Labour party caucus (all members of the party in both Houses) elects the Cabinet; the Prime Minister merely allotting the portfolios. The caucus (greatly enlarged by the new members) showed itself a highly conservative body by re-electing the existing Cabinet with only one change. Mr. Curtin did a little minor reshuffling but nothing more. He could have exercised a dominating influence on the choice by expressing an opinion, but did not do so. Neither in the letter nor the spirit would he infringe the party rule that the choice of a Labour Government is the act of caucus. Mr. Curtin's inaction is open to obvious criticism. But so would be any positive step that he could have taken. He has been saddled with three Ministers who have had repeated and sometimes violent disagreements with him. But he knows that one of his most difficult tasks throughout this Parliament will be to keep his majority together. If by his own act he had kept those three out of the Government, he might himself have taken the first steps in forming a cave of recalcitrants at the very start. As it is his stormy petrels are in the Government and under mandate of the caucus to follow him.

Mr. Chifley's Third Budget

Mr. Chifley has already opened his third budget. Income tax for the current year was imposed in April and has not been increased.* The budget

* In a previous article on this subject in the June number, the reference on page 285 to "the taxation of individual incomes, except those above £1,500", should have read "below £1,500".

was unspectacular and contained no surprises. The Treasurer introduced it in a speech which placed the Government's plans in a setting of a realistic survey of the economic situation and statistics of the nation's war effort. Two features are outstanding. One is that the war expenditure is estimated as little greater than in the past year. The other is that the estimates anticipate a financial position substantially more satisfactory than that of 1942–43.

The war expenditure for 1942–43 reached £562,000,000; for 1943–44 Mr. Chifley estimates it at £570,000,000, though with the warning that the need may prove greater. The fact is that the diversion of the working population from civil requirements to war needs has about reached the limit. The working population has increased during the war by 22 per cent to 3,370,000. For the proportion which is devoted to war needs all sorts of different figures are quoted, calculated of course on different bases. If, however, direct war work is defined as work which does not minister to human needs in Australia, something like 1,600,000 (47 per cent) are engaged in direct war work. That figure excludes those who are employed in feeding and clothing our own fighting forces (which we should have had to do in any case), and producing food for export to the United Kingdom. In the nature of things, therefore, with a ceiling put on prices, it may be expected that war expenditure is also reaching a limit. Another outstanding aspect of the budget is the probability of considerably less use being made in 1943–44 of Treasury Bill finance. In the past year the gap between expenditure and receipts from revenue and public loans was nearly £190,000,000. This year it is estimated at just over £100,000,000, and, even when allowance is made for some optimism in the relevant items, it will probably be under £140,000,000. The danger of Treasury Bill finance was clearly stated in Mr. Chifley's speech. It should be elaborated again and again so that the public may realize its implications, frankly mentioned by the Treasurer. And it should be recalled that the estimate is based on an estimated increase in public loans from £215,000,000 to £300,000,000 in the current year. The general position can be seen from the following table:

(£ *million*)

	Expenditure			*Receipts*			
	War	*Other*	*Total*	*Revenue*	*Public Loans*	*Gap*	*Total*
1942–43 (actual)	562	108	670	267	215	188	670
1943–44 (estimate)	570	145	715	312	300	103	715

The increase in " other " expenditure is due to payments into the National Welfare Trust Fund. This year it will be almost entirely available for war purposes.

Australia,
October 1943.

SOUTH AFRICA

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

SINCE the smashing victory of General Smuts and the United party, with their Dominion party and Labour party allies, in the general election on July 7 there has naturally been a lull in political and other activities, though this has been broken to some extent by the Provincial Council elections, which took place a few days ago. The victorious coalition of parties under General Smuts as Prime Minister approached them with some anxiety. There was a delay of more than three months between the general parliamentary election and the elections for the Provincial Councils. There seemed to be good reason to think that it would be hard for the Government parties to keep up the enthusiasm, which had carried them to overwhelming victory on July 7, at the same pitch during more than three months, till October 13. The Nationalist Opposition, which had been staggered by its heavy defeat at the general election, would certainly do its utmost to make a better showing at the Provincial Council elections. The Nationalists had lost seats at the general election, both in the Transvaal and the Cape, which they had thought certainties for them. It would not be easy for the Government candidates, fighting a provincial election contest in those seats, to repeat their general election victories. Two parties, which had fought in the general election and had been wholly unsuccessful then, retired altogether from the provincial contest. They were the Afrikaner party and the Communists. No one knew what the effect of the disappearance of the Afrikaner party might mean in the Free State. It was possible that these survivors of the old Hertzogism might now, in default of candidates of their own, vote for the United party and General Smuts. But they might as possibly abstain from voting or allow their anti-war sentiments to carry them into the Nationalist camp. The general election had shown that the Communists were negligible. Independent candidates were much more rare in provincial elections than they had been in the general election, and again no one knew how their absence in many constituencies would influence provincial results. When the provincial nominations were handed in the number of unopposed returns was large—in the Cape 28 (exactly half the total number of seats); in the Transvaal 24; in Natal 15 (out of a total of 25 seats); in the Free State none. This large number of unopposed returns in three of the provinces might in itself be taken as a proof that the public interest in the provincial elections was by no means as keen as it had been in the general election. The worst enemy which the pro-war coalition had to fear in the provincial elections was apathy among their supporters. The large number of unopposed returns was ominous for them.

BILINGUALISM AND EDUCATION

THE United party chose one main issue for these elections—education and its effect on bilingualism. The Provincial Councils control all education

other than higher and technical, which are under the Union Government. Each province has its own director of education, its own education department, its own scale of salaries for teachers, and so on. Bilingualism—adequate knowledge of the two official languages, Afrikaans and English—is recognized as the ideal for all South Africans. The United party and its allies said that this ideal was not being kept in mind in the educational policy of the provinces. They declared for dual-medium schools. These are to teach their pupils, after a certain standard, partially through the medium of the second language. The United party maintains that in this way only can all South African children become genuinely bilingual. The Nationalists contest this, saying that education through the medium of a second language, even if only after a certain age and standard, would be ruinous to educational efficiency. They denounce the dual-medium proposal as aimed against the welfare of the Afrikaans-speaking children, though they do not seem to have produced much evidence in support of this charge.

Obviously politics is not the only interest involved in this controversy. Many teachers, indeed, think that the language question should be kept out of politics altogether, and some teachers' organizations have passed resolutions to that effect. The United party retorts that this may be all very well in theory, but that in fact the Nationalists have been using the schools, through those teachers whose obsession is politics of the Nationalist sort, as forcing beds for recruits. The general belief is that there is considerable justification for this charge. If so, the answer to the teachers' protest against education being dragged into political strife is that it is already being dragged into it, and mostly by the Nationalists.

A SURVEY OF LANGUAGE CONDITIONS

As for the controversy about the effect on educational efficiency of compulsory teaching, from, say, Standard V upwards, through the medium of the second language, a remarkable book has just been published which tends to overthrow previous assumptions. Doctor Malherbe, its author, was Director of the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research, and has recently been busy with important war work. His reputation stands very high. He has been making a survey of the language condition of more than 18,000 children. Of these he found that the home language of 25 per cent was exclusively Afrikaans; of 32 per cent it was English only; and of the remainder both English and Afrikaans in varying degrees. Thus, if education is to be solely in the home language, the nearly 40 per cent whose home language is both Afrikaans and English should anyhow be taught through the medium of both languages, and that from their earliest childhood. Doctor Malherbe explodes, too, the hitherto prevalent idea that children educated through the medium of two languages, with one of which they are presumably less familiar than with the other, will be inferior in their mental attainments to children educated solely through the medium of the language which they know best. He found, on the contrary, that, in general subjects at least such as arithmetic and geography, results in bilingual schools

are, on the average, better than in unilingual schools. The survey showed also two other things. First, that children of lower intelligence do better work in bilingual than in unilingual schools; second, that bilingual children reach a higher all-round level of scholastic achievement than unilingual children, whether English or Afrikaans.

Election Results

The provincial elections can hardly be said to have roused the voters to much visible enthusiasm. There was a long delay, owing to the counting of soldiers' votes and to Nationalist queries about the validity of some of them, between the polling and the declaration of the results. Polling took place on October 13. The results show an even greater victory for General Smuts than in the general election. He has held all the country seats, which he won in the general election, in the Cape and the Transvaal, and has won one more in the Cape and two more in the Transvaal. All his victories in the general election in the urban seats have been repeated. In the Free State he has won 4 seats—an unexpectedly good result. General Smuts's coalition of parties now has a decisive majority in the Transvaal, the Cape and Natal, and can elect 3 out of 4 members of the Executive Committee in each province. This is an unprecedented position since Union. In these three provinces General Smuts's party has a clear majority over all other parties. In the seats remaining to the Nationalists the diminishing size of their majorities is marked, whereas the majorities for General Smuts have generally been increased. The Dominion party has lost 3 seats to Labour and an Independent in Natal, and 2 to Labour in the Cape. The Labour party gained 4 seats in the Transvaal, where it now has 12 seats. The elections are a very remarkable verdict for General Smuts and a crushing blow to the Nationalist Opposition.

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Inflation Dangers

The governing factor of the Union's economy is the large monetary expansion which has taken place since the outbreak of war. At the beginning of September 1939 the note issue was £19,500,000. Four years later it was £47,000,000, of which £4,500,000 was not, however, in circulation but held by the commercial banks. The demand liabilities of the commercial banks had increased from £78,000,000 to £196,000,000, and their total time and demand liabilities had increased from £95,000,000 to £218,000,000. An increase of £3,000,000 in private and government deposits with the Reserve Bank had also taken place. Thus the effective supply of money had been more than doubled. Though there is reason to suppose that there has been a decline, not only in the velocity of the circulation of bank deposits subject to transfer by cheque, but even in that of banknotes which are liable to be hoarded, the effects upon the price structure and upon economic activity within the Union are necessarily very great.

The main source of the great increase of money is the acquisition of the

output of the gold mines by the Reserve Bank. This has enabled it to increase its holdings of gold by £50,000,000 (at a currency valuation of 85*s.* an ounce) and thus increase its other assets in the form of gold premium by a like amount, while still adding £5,000,000 to its portfolio of foreign bills and increasing its investments (mostly repatriated loans not yet exchanged for new internal ones) by nearly £20,000,000. A further £30,000,000 or so appears to have been created by the commercial banks, representing a net balance of increase of their investments over a decrease in their discounts and advances. This does not, however, represent an active creation of credit by the banks, but rather the limits of a self-denying ordinance. The commercial banks have added £90,000,000 to their balances with the Reserve Bank, and their ratio of reserves to liabilities is nearly 55 per cent.

Precise information on the Union's external trade is lacking. The increase in the local supply of money appears, however, to be mainly the result of accumulating favourable balances of payments, and the size of these in turn is due to the lack of imports to correspond with the output of gold. The accumulation of gold in the hands of the Reserve Bank is not due to any difficulty in disposing of it, but, as the Governor explained at the last annual meeting, is the result of a settled policy of keeping the balances of the commercial banks "in a form which will be acceptable all the world over". It is true that the voluntary savings campaign has made considerable headway. Apart from the success of the various loan flotations of the Treasury, including the specifically anti-inflationary redemption issue, post office savings bank deposits are now mounting by nearly £1,250,000 monthly, and the monthly sale of savings certificates is not far from £1,000,000. Nevertheless, this is a long way from "mopping up" the additional money in the commercial banks.

Price Control

In view of this substantial inflation of South Africa's money supplies, it is not surprising that there has been a steady elaboration of the system of price control. To begin with, nothing more was attempted than the issue of an order freezing the pre-war rates of profit. This was soon expanded by the actual fixing of maximum retail prices for a considerable range of commodities, which was steadily increased when, after a long interval, a Price Controller was appointed in August 1941 (and later provided with deputies and an extensive organization). The Price Controller was given fairly extensive powers over manufacturers' and wholesale prices as well as retail ones. Many changes followed, such as the introduction of the "cost factor" method of regulating maximum prices, by which the permissible rate of profit was diminished by the cost factor, which increased with the percentage rise of cost over the pre-war level. This was supplemented by the fixing of profit margins for sales between dealers for a large range of commodities, while the retail price lists have frequently been enlarged and revised. About 450 price control notices have been promulgated in the Government *Gazette* since August 1941. More price control inspectors have been appointed and their powers have been enlarged. Steps are being taken

against hoarding which presumably affords the basis for black-market operations. The provision of invoices to accompany the sale of goods has been made compulsory, the information they must contain is laid down by regulation, and their preservation is also stipulated.

In this way the upward surge of prices has been held in check, though it has not been halted. There is indeed no possibility of halting it by such means, for all it can do is to ensure that prices do not mount more rapidly than costs. The control over the prices of agricultural produce—which is not within the province of the Price Controller—has always been incomplete and uneasy, partly owing to the vagaries of climate and partly (it is hardly too unkind to suggest) owing to the vagaries of control boards. The Price Controller (at first Mr. A. B. Macdonald and later Mr. E. J. Crean) appears on the whole to have performed his work tactfully and efficiently—though the introduction of the profit reducing cost factor caused some confusion in the business world—and the limited objectives of the price control organization have been well achieved. But no price controller can obviate the effects of inflation if causes are present, either within the country or as a factor inflating the costs of imported supplies. Up to the end of August this year the official price indices show that the retail prices of food have risen by just under 33 per cent since 1938. The more comprehensive index of food, fuel, light, rent and sundries has risen by a little over 25 per cent. The wholesale index, however, has risen by 50 per cent since 1939, the rise being 41 per cent in the case of locally produced, and 65 per cent in the case of imported commodities. These figures are, however, of less value than in normal times, since the "weighting" of various items which go to make up the indices is upset by shortages of many articles which necessitate recourse to others instead.

Supplies Control

Price control is necessarily linked up with supplies control. In the earlier period of the war little attempt was made to mobilize South Africa's resources under a comprehensive system of control. A capable Director General of War Supplies, Dr. H. J. van der Bijl, was appointed, though his effectiveness was at first limited by a less careful selection of subordinates in the rank and file positions of his organization. Eventually these staff difficulties were largely overcome, and the War Supplies Directorate achieved remarkable results in many directions. In a subsequent issue of The Round Table it may be possible to give a fuller account of its achievements. A preliminary report appeared in the issue for June 1941.*

Apart from price fixing, little was done in the way of regulating supplies for civilian consumption, and for the first two years of the war there was expansion in all directions. Even the establishment in the Union of such a trumpery industry as the manufacture of Christmas crackers was warmly welcomed in war-time by the Department of Commerce and Industries. Sudden import scarcities, which followed the extension of the war at the

* No. 123, p. 592.

end of 1941, set a new complexion on affairs. As already noted in The Round Table,* a control organization for imports and exports was set up in September of that year under the Secretary of Commerce and Industries, Mr. E. P. Smith. Its activities had been envisaged largely as operating to restrict imports from "non-sterling" countries, but they were rapidly converted to the allocation of import priorities, in order to ensure that the more essential imports were not displaced by comparatively unnecessary ones, in competition for shipping space.

Since many commodities vital to the life of the community—such as rubber, chemicals, building materials, petrol or agricultural machinery—were dangerously short, controllers were set up to augment supplies as much as possible and to allocate them among different users. These controls represented a necessary improvisation, but during 1942 it became evident that they required co-ordination. In particular it appeared that the allocation of supplies between civil and military requirements needed revision, as there was a possibility of something like a collapse of civilian well-being. In October therefore the Prime Minister announced the formation of a National Supplies Council, with himself as Chairman, to work with the Directorate General of Supplies. Dr. van der Bijl became Director General, thus assuming supreme control of civil as well as military supply requirements. Food control and the control of petrol, building prices and industrial man-power were, however, excluded.

His organization has been built upon twin foundations. To the Directorate of War Supplies has been added a counterpart for civilian supplies, the Commodity Supply Directorate, with a board of supply and three important executive committees. These are the Controller's Executive Committee for the co-ordination of the control of different commodities; the Imports and Exports Committee, which has taken over control from the Department of Commerce and Industries; and the Industrial Committee, which sees to the production of manufacturing industry being as far as possible directed to serve the more urgent needs of the community, and which advises on the difficulties that arise from conflicting demands on controlled materials by manufacturers who are all engaged in the production of articles of which the country is short. There has latterly been a great improvement in the supply of such essential commodities as children's clothing, which from napkins upwards had become almost unprocurable. (Unfortunately the improvement has not extended to prices as well as to the quantities available.) In other directions also the supply position has been greatly eased. Some credit for this must be due to the shortage of Allied shipping having taken a less acute turn, but a great deal must undoubtedly go to the new Directorate of Supplies. At present the organization is busy making schedules of the Union's import requirements quarter by quarter for 18 months ahead. This involves a detailed inquiry into locally held stocks, local production possibilities, and local needs. Its successful completion will facilitate the apportionment of South Africa's fair share of the exports of the other United Nations.

* December 1941, No. 125, p. 178.

Food Control

Not all South Africa's war-time controls have worked so easily. Before the war the marketing of a number of agricultural products was regulated by control boards under the Marketing Act of 1937. These normally arranged for compulsory export—at a loss—of part of the production in order to keep up the price of the remainder. With the outbreak of war and the expected closure of export markets, fears were expressed that the effect of retaining these so-called "export surpluses" in the country would prove disastrous for South African farmers. In the case of other products, such as oranges, which were largely grown for sale abroad, similar fears led to the creation of a number of new control boards, one of which was the Citrus Board, based on an existing co-operative marketing agency of exporters of oranges, the Citrus Exchange.

In the first two war-time seasons, 1940 and 1941, the expected difficulties of exporting oranges did not materialize. On the contrary, sales were good, and higher prices were obtained. In 1942, however, shipping space was no longer available for oranges. The Citrus Board then adopted a policy for internal marketing, under which only sales by auction were permitted, and the amounts allowed to be offered for sale at auctions were strictly limited for the purpose of raising the price. Complaints which began to circulate of the wholesale destruction of fruit, with this end in view, were met with bland denials until confirmed by an important body of advisers to the Government, the Social and Economic Planning Council, which condemned the procedure. Reformation was promised. For the 1943 season sale by auction was discarded and sale at fixed prices was substituted. But the output could not all be marketed at these prices, so resort was again had to destruction. Public resentment was aroused. An attempt was made to allay it by demonstrating the impossibility of doing anything else. Public opinion was unconvinced and within a few days the impossible was done. Millions of oranges were saved from destruction in favour of subsidized distribution through the Department of Welfare.

Maize provides another more important example of the failure of this type of control. Before the war substantial exports normally took place. The Maize Industry Control Board estimated internal consumption at about 15 million bags a year, and financed the export of the "surplus" from a levy upon the rest. For the 1939–40 crop it started on the same plan while instituting a rebate of 1*s.* 6*d.* per bag for maize used as stock feed. When the export programme of 5 million bags had been half completed the "surplus" had somehow disappeared and export had to stop; the export of only 4 million bags—which the United Kingdom Government was induced to buy—was ordered for the 1940–41 crop, even though this was estimated to be 1½ million bags larger than the previous season's. This again proved much too large. When only 1¼ million bags had been exported, it became apparent (in February last year) that there was insufficient maize to last till the next crop was harvested. The rebate on stock feed was withdrawn and strict limitation through the permit system had subsequently to be instituted instead, even though drought had increased the need for it. The small size of the 1941–42 crop (only 16 million bags) aggravated, or at least did not relieve, the shortage, and the native population for whom maize is the staple food have in too many cases *had to go hungry.*

Maize and Meat

In view of its traditional policy, the Maize Control Board may be excused for its attempt to export in 1941–42. This was the crop grown in the 1940–41 season and marketed in 1941–42. But the maize trade was anticipating a shortage even before the marketing of the crop had begun. It shows a lack of contact with the realities of the situation on the part of the Board that it should have pooh-poohed this in official statements asserting that there was no possibility of the occurrence of a shortage. The consequence of the maize shortage was a shortage of eggs and poultry, and it contributed, along with drought, to a shortage of milk, butter and cheese. Vegetables, wheat and meat have also been notably short. It was this position which led in March 1942 to the establishment of a food control organization to develop and control the production of food. The Minister of Agriculture became the Food Controller and the Secretary for Agriculture the Deputy Controller. Their controls operate to the exclusion of all others in the case of farm products, but distributors of farm products are subject to a price controller or to prices fixed by various control boards which have continued their functions under the food control plans.

Since the Secretary of Agriculture has always regarded South Africa as what he likes to call a "surplus producing" agricultural country, one might have thought that the task of the Food Controller would have been easy. Actually it has proved far otherwise; and part of the blame for this must lie with the fact that control has been exercised throughout by those whose whole administrative career has been spent in the service of price raising and market restriction deemed suitable for a "surplus producing" country.

At present a special commission is investigating the recent complete breakdown in the meat supply of the main urban centres. Even before it reports, this much can be said. Before the war the Meat Industry Control Board also adopted a doctrinaire preference for sales by auction coupled with severe restrictions on the entry of slaughter stock into the abattoirs of the main cities. A settled policy of arbitrarily varying the number of entry permits was followed, in order to tempt wholesale butchers to bid higher prices when they had the chance, since they would never know whether they would be able to meet their requirements next time. No change was made in the permit system, even when serious meat shortage was occurring in the main towns.

The permit system, with its arbitrary variations, greatly strengthened the position of two classes of intermediaries between the farmer and the consumer—first the auctioneer and second the "speculator" who had time, patience, knowledge, contacts and influence to enable him to secure permits for the movement of the stock (which he had just bought from the farmer) more easily than the farmer himself could secure them for selling direct.

The Price Controller, attempting to check the rising cost of living, fixed maximum wholesale and retail meat prices in the largest urban centres, thus automatically setting a ceiling to the amount which butchers could afford to pay for slaughter stock and abolishing the *raison d'être* of auctioneers. Auctioneers and speculators believed that they could nevertheless force prices up, and arranged to withhold supplies accordingly. They were aided in this by the permit system and by the absence of fixed maximum prices for meat outside the three largest towns. Some of the larger wholesale butchers, who also have retail shops, kept up supplies to their own establishments at a loss, paying more for their slaughter stock than they were allowed to charge for the meat. Such is the suspicion in which they are held, however, that this was not accounted unto them for righteousness. When they, not unnaturally, refused also to make up, at a loss to themselves, the shortages of their competitors, they were accused of withholding supplies and charged with using their superior resources to contrive a monopoly. Next they were ordered to share out their supplies with the rest of the trade on a quota basis. Being unwilling to subsidize other butchers, they declared they also would pay no more for cattle than they could afford in view of the fixed prices for meat, and a deadlock occurred. Acute meat shortage followed in Durban, Johannesburg and Capetown, only alleviated by the food control organization itself buying up cattle and transporting them from South-West Africa. Such are the results of following two incompatible policies of keeping down the cost of living and of improving the marketing position of the farmer (and speculator).

It is still not known how far the small offering of slaughter stock reflects a real shortage of sheep and cattle, and how far it is only a contrived scarcity. For conservation purposes one meatless day a week has now been promulgated; though this cannot be enforced among the great consumers of meat in the country districts. But the size of the Union's cattle population is completely unknown owing to the suspension of the agricultural census. The general opinion is that the shortage is not real, and this has led to considerable agitation against the food control organization, and to an attempt to create "Action Fronts", "Vigilance Committees", and so on. Most of these are already showing signs of lapsing into ineffectiveness; but, if the recent food muddles are repeated, popular clamour may stampede us into the adoption of forms of rationing ill-suited to South African conditions.

It is noteworthy how few of the complainants against the shortage and high price of food connect it with the inflation of the currency. One trade union leader did indeed put the position rather well. "Before the war", she said, "there was plenty of food, but we had not the money. Now we have plenty of money, but we cannot buy the food." But she saw none of the implications of her remark.

It is indeed remarkable how the market for all sorts of foodstuffs has expanded more than the absorbing of all "export surpluses" (even allowing for a special demand for military purposes and the victualling of ships) since war-time inflation set in. This casts interesting sidelights on the old controversy between the economists in our universities and the agricultural

departments. The marketing schemes of the latter were based on the assumption of an almost completely inelastic demand for farm products, while the economists asserted that considerable elasticity of demand might set in at lower price levels. The marked increase in consumption which has followed the decline in the value of money—for example, lower price levels relative to earnings—suggests that the university scholars were right.

South Africa,
October 1943.

NEW ZEALAND

THE NEW PARLIAMENT

THE twenty-sixth Parliament ended on August 26, after a life of five years, two beyond the normal span. In 1941 an election was impossible. When the leaders of the National party entered the war administration, it was agreed that the life of Parliament should be extended till one year after the end of the war, unless the House decided otherwise. When this co-operation broke down, it was felt that an election was necessary; and early in the session the Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, moved that an election be held this year. This was carried with few dissenting votes, and later the Government announced the date as September 25.

The closing days of Parliament were filled with a spate of legislation reminiscent of "the bad old days" when contentious Bills were kept back and rushed through in the dying hours of the session. This year much of the legislation was not contentious, dealing with increases and the removal of anomalies in war pensions and with benefits under social security; but these measures did not receive the consideration they deserved. At least two of the Bills would have been stoutly resisted by the Opposition at any time, and the inducement to do so was increased by the imminence of the election. Section 4 of the Industrial, Conciliation and Arbitration Act allows a worker, who alleges under-payment by his employer, to sue for the balance in the Arbitration Court, from which no appeal lies. In practice all such claims for wages will henceforth be brought up in the Arbitration Court, and no appeal will lie no matter how many employers and how large a sum are involved. The Act also provides that, if a worker is dismissed within twelve months of his engaging in certain union activities, the employer must prove that these activities are not the reason for his dismissal or suffer the appropriate penalties. The denial of appeal to the Supreme Court and the placing of the onus of proof on the defendant have been increasing here, and make believers in British justice apprehensive.

TWO CONTESTED BILLS

THE Servicemen's Settlement and Land Sales Bill provoked the most strenuous opposition and, though the Government made some important amendments, the Act was a prominent topic in the election campaign. The purposes of the measure were to provide for the acquisition of land for the settlement of discharged servicemen, to provide for the control of sales and leases of land to facilitate the settlement of discharged servicemen, and to prevent unduly high prices for land and the use of land for speculation and uneconomic purposes. The Opposition claimed that the needs of servicemen could be met by existing legislation and that, under the guise of providing farms and homes for our fighting men, the Government was really implementing its socialistic policy. The Act provides for a Land

Sales Court consisting of some eligible person, such as a Judge of the Supreme Court, and two other members, and for various land sales committees, each not exceeding three members. All these are appointed by the Government. With minor limitations, the Act provides that the Government may take land suitable for subdivision into two or more farms for discharged servicemen at a value determined by one of the committees, with a right of appeal to the Land Sales Court. After October 18 no sales of land in urban or rural areas, or lease of land for three years or more, can be made without the consent of the Court. The basic value of farm land is deemed to be the productive value increased or diminished by the Court so as to ensure a fair value. The basic value of land other than farm land is the value on December 15, 1942, as determined by a land sales committee, increased or diminished by it so as to make it a fair value. The Bill was forced through the House by all-night sittings and by the use of the closure. The Act does place very great powers in the hands of the Government. It is not often that the Law Society enters the political arena, but it did so on this occasion to point out the difficulties and uncertainty that would result. The Act operates until five years after the end of the war, and everything will depend on its administration, which will not be easy, for the terms productive value, basic value, basic rent, fair value and average efficient farming are economically very vague. The Act also provides another of the steadily increasing fields in which a citizen is denied the right of appeal to the Supreme Court.

The holding of an election was indicative of the strength of our form of democracy, and also of its weakness. In face of a world struggle like the present, a democracy alone can stage an election, for only in a democracy can the people be trusted to make decisions in times of national crisis. It was the improved position of the Allies, especially in the South Pacific, that made the election possible, and New Zealand should realize that, for the security she enjoys, she is dependent on forces other than her own, namely the grit of the British people, the courage and efficiency of the Navy and the R.A.F., the growing strength of the United States in these seas. It was our good fortune to be able to hold an election, and on the other hand an election was just as obviously a sign of weakness. It was rendered necessary by the inability of political parties to settle their differences and thus present a common front to the common foe. Perhaps if the scourge of war had actually come to this land, these differences might have shrunk to their real proportions. The attempt to establish a War Administration in addition to the ordinary Cabinet failed as it was bound to do, for this separation in itself implied differences that the parties were not prepared to sink even in a life and death struggle.

A SET-BACK TO THE GOVERNMENT

THIS was an election in which votes were cast in many corners of the earth. Hence the final figures will not be available for some time, but the Government has certainly received a sharp set-back. The changes in the party composition are disclosed by the following figures:

	1935	1938	1943
Labour	55	53	45
National	19	25	33
Other	6	2	2

At present the Government has a majority of 12, and this is not likely to be changed. In the 1935 election 35 members represented minority votes in their electorates; in 1938 this applied only to one member; in 1943 some 18 members will probably find themselves in this position. Two constituencies had no election, as the sitting members, both of the National party, were on active service and were not opposed. The following figures show the movement of the voting:

	1935		1938		1943	
	Votes	Per cent	Votes	Per cent	Votes	Per cent
Labour	392,927	46·1	530,432	56·1	444,349	47·5
National	280,152	32·8	388,213	41·0	400,457	42·8
Democrats	66,696	7·8	—	—	40,139	4·3*
Other	112,795	13·2	27,763	2·9	49,705	5·4

* The 1943 figures are for Democratic Labour representing the Left wing of Labour; in 1935 the Democrats were anti-Labour.

There was a falling off in the total vote. In 1938 the number of valid votes was 95·1 per cent of the number on the rolls; in 1943 it was only 91·7 per cent. Dealing with the 1938 election in THE ROUND TABLE,* it was said:

"The general policy of social amelioration is not likely to be an issue at any future election. The pace at which the policy can be most safely implemented, and the methods that are most likely to bring about the desired changes without producing economic and social instability, these are questions on which there may well be differences of opinion. It is probable that in the future political parties will struggle, not over the aim, but over the means."

UNITY AND DIFFERENCES

THE recent election has justified this forecast. On the great issue of the war all parties were at one. The party in power naturally emphasized its achievements in the difficult war years, namely, the very creditable war effort of this small country, on land, at sea and in the air, in the fields and in the factories; the maintenance and extension of the benefits of social security; the maintenance, by means of subsidies, of relatively stable prices of the common commodities necessary for the life of the people; the maintenance and extension of production, in both primary and secondary industries; the development of the housing scheme; and the financial arrangements, including the method of paying for the war (half by taxation and half by loan). Naturally, too, there was a promise of better things to come (including a minimum family income), a foretaste of which had been provided

* No. 114, March 1939, p. 337.

immediately before the election by concessions to wool-growers, dairy farmers and those who looked to the State for pensions or benefits under social security. On the other side the National party under the leadership of Mr. S. G. Holland, while just as keenly interested in the prosecution of the war, held that we have been over-committed in man-power and that some re-organization is necessary. Still haunted by the shadow of the depression years, it promised not to reduce wage rates or social security benefits, indeed it would plan improvements to remove anomalies and extend benefits where the need existed. In industry it favoured profit-sharing and team-work as aids to progress. It would reform taxation and give every citizen the privilege of owning, not merely renting, his home. To men on the land it offered, instead of the marketing department, control of marketing by the producer in co-operation with the Government, with guaranteed minimum and ceiling prices to be determined by the producer and the Government. It promised a Royal Commission on the licensing laws. It would amalgamate the two broadcasting services, reduce the licence fee and terminate political propaganda over the air. It would also see that the Government was not dominated by influences and organizations outside Parliament.

In its broad social aims, therefore, the National party did not greatly differ from the Labour party, but it favoured a non-party war-time Government and believed in private enterprise and freedom of contract, as against state control and regimentation. It held strongly to the right of persons to the freehold of their farms and to individual ownership of their homes. The policy of the Democratic Labour party, with Mr. J. A. Lee as leader, centred round two topics. First, it believed that the over-commitment of man-power was affecting detrimentally both primary and secondary industries, and thus interfering with our continued effective contribution to the war and with our capacity to carry on in the post-war years. It believed that we should be content with one division in the field and that that field should be the Pacific area. Secondly, it believed in the full use of social credit. It inveighed against increasing the debt with an ever rising burden of interest. It claimed that its policy was that advocated by the Labour party in 1935 and subsequently betrayed by its leaders. The People's party and the Independents mainly denounced the evils of party government and called themselves a non-party independent group. They claimed that, if returned, they could form an effective Ministry. No party put forward a policy of "blood, sweat and tears".

Naturally each leader interpreted the result of the election in his own way. The Prime Minister said:

"I had asked for the support of the people of New Zealand for the unflagging prosecution of the war, the efficient and successful rehabilitation of our service-men, the maintenance of our standards of living and social security. The country has given that mandate and we propose to execute it in the interests of the people of the Dominion. The country has commanded the Government to carry out its programme for the war period and in the post-war period. We will do so. We will do it without any hindrance, even if proffered as help, by any person or party. The Labour Government has won the general election."

The leader of the Opposition saw in the result an indication that the people were not satisfied with Labour's policy and administration.

"I believe", he said, "that the people want to see party political bickering dropped and the best men from both sides formed into a non-party administration to prosecute the war, but it would appear that outside pressure is too strong and that the Prime Minister is determined to carry on with the present sectional administration."

Influences Affecting the Electors

It is, of course, impossible to determine all the influences that helped to change the minds of the voters, but some of those that brought this sharp rebuff to Labour are obvious enough. The Labour party, with its large majority, was inclined to rest on its achievements, to treat rather cavalierly the criticisms, not only of its opponents, but also of the great middle party, and even of some of its own supporters. Its leaders tended to become somewhat dictatorial and extremely sensitive to criticism. They sometimes even interfered with the administration of justice. The resentment thus engendered was increased by incidents which showed clearly that there were persons and organizations outside Parliament exerting undue influence on the administration. The Democratic Labour party was born of the internal conflicts of the party. It was inevitable, too, that the failure to administer effectively the internal marketing department—as was clearly shown in connection with such produce as eggs, honey, fruit and vegetables, which touch the lives of all—would lose the party some support; and the attitude of the Minister of Marketing, Mr. Barclay, did not improve the situation and led to his own defeat. Further, it was unreasonable to expect that the voter in the rural areas would continue to support Labour, once the antipathy to its predecessors had waned, and farmers realized that stability of prices, without corresponding stability of costs, had had effects which they had not expected. Finally, the Nationalists were really a new party with a new leader. It had a progressive policy which it put before the people much more skilfully than in the past. It did not make the old mistake of trying to frighten the voters with a bogy, but endeavoured to appeal to their common sense. It was a party also that included many younger men among its candidates, so that the cry of "the old gang" either lost its force or was more appropriately applied to its opponents. Probably the ardent supporters of both the Labour and the National party voted as they did in 1938, but a section of the great middle party cast their votes differently or, as the voting seems to indicate, did not vote at all—some because they thought the election ought not to have been held, others because the weather on polling day was unpleasant.

In a few cases the Democratic Labour party or the Independents split the vote and changed the result. Unfortunately, for some reason not easily understood, the votes of soldiers were returned separately and as, in six constituencies, the majority of their votes was sufficient to change the decision from National to Labour, it has been claimed that the soldiers' vote saved the Government. If other classes of votes had been recorded

separately, the same might have been said of them. It was an election of many candidates, and demonstrated that, under a scheme of first past the post, people did not care to risk the loss of their votes by casting them for those not belonging to the main parties. Of some 50 candidates of the Democratic Labour party, none saved their deposit except their leader, Mr. Lee, and he found himself in a minority of 5,648, whereas in 1938 he had the largest majority of 8,607. The solidarity of Labour was well shown in the fact that both Mr. Lee and Mr. Barnard, the Speaker, who had left the party, were not able to hold their seats against candidates of official Labour. No real Independent won a seat, for, of the two elected, one was allied to Labour and the other to the National party. All four of the Maori seats fell to Labour, and included that which Sir Apirana Ngata had filled since 1906. He was the father of the House, and his defeat and the retirement of Mr. George Forbes close two long records of parliamentary service. The defeat of Mrs. Dreaver and Mrs. Stewart, and the retirement of Mrs. Polson leave only one woman, Miss Howard, as a Member of Parliament, and this in the month in which women celebrated the jubilee of women's franchise. There were 128 candidates who failed to obtain a quarter of the votes cast for the winning candidate, and thus lost their deposit of £10. In the new Parliament there will not be many National members representing urban areas, and still fewer Labour members representing rural constituencies. This may tend to emphasize the problem of town versus country, and may also raise again the thorny "country" question.

Facts of the War Effort

A government pamphlet, *New Zealand at War*, was distributed to the public early in September. It disclosed the main facts and achievements of our war effort. The following figures were given. The population of New Zealand in September 1939 was 1,632,000. Of the male population of 804,000, 355,000 were of military age between 18 and 45; 189,000 were enrolled in the Navy, Army and Air Force, and of these 95,000 were sent overseas. The number of women enrolled in civil defence &c. was approximately 100,000. The number of men who have joined the R.N.Z.A.F. increased from 1,800 in 1939 to 42,000 in 1943. Women in the armed forces and auxiliary services numbered 8,500. The number of women in industry and other essential work had increased by 40,000.

"Our man-power commitments", states the pamphlet, "have been decided by Parliament. Our division in the Middle East is proud of its membership of the Eighth Army and will stay to fight in Europe. Our division in the Pacific is ready to play its part. New Zealand sailors and airmen who have fought in every theatre of war are building up their strength to fight the Japanese."

The Problem of Man-Power

In the election campaign the problem of man-power occupied a prominent place. Both the Democratic Labour party and the National party claimed that the Government had over-committed New Zealand and that it was impossible to maintain production in primary and secondary industries if

we kept two divisions in the field and continued to supply men to the Navy and the Air Force. The Minister of Defence, Mr. F. Jones, had said that, since April 1, 11,000 men had been released from the Army to return to industry. Notwithstanding this, at the end of August an official of the National Service Department announced that there were 8,000 vacancies for work of the highest priority in the civil community. Further the Prime Minister, speaking in the House on August 10, admitted the need for a review and later, on the conclusion of the election, in a tour of North Island, confessed that more men should be released for essential industry. More recently it has been announced that university and college students will undertake seasonal work from December to March inclusive.

It is unfortunate that this important matter should have been allowed to become a party question. No one recalling the dire threat to our country in 1942 can for a moment suggest that the Government could then have done too much to prepare for the defence of these islands. We are safer now, but we should give the Government credit for the energy then displayed. When leaving New Zealand, Air Vice-marshal Goddard in a review of the "black year" of 1942 said:

> "There is no need for me to say any more about the considerations that determined the War Cabinet to go full speed ahead for the total defence of New Zealand. It was plain common sense, and it was the will of the people."

But the threat has become more distant and the Government must not use the threat of 1942 to excuse the defects of 1943. Are we at present putting undue strain on the man-power of the Dominion to supply our forces on active service? Are the men and women who have been taken into the forces being used to the fullest extent in the work for which they are best fitted? No one should criticize the Government for what it felt compelled to do in 1942, but the people will not excuse it if it allows a policy to continue that may, before long, bring grave weakness to our war effort, both in the armed forces and in our fields and factories. If the Government places the needs of New Zealand first and is even prepared, to this end, to disclose any skeletons that may be in its cupboards, it will at once proceed to have a review of the man-power problem by a competent and independent commission.

New Zealand,
October 1943.



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