

"Diplomacy and economics," he says, "are two languages describing the same events"; and since they remain factors in human history much of Mr. Kiernan's book reads very like history as being enacted to-day. In our present times as in the years under his dissection, British policy in China hinges on the action of other European nations. In the earlier days we were rivals of France in Egypt, we eyed askance any Russian advances to the Afghans, and were uneasy over the foundation of the new German Empire. Mr. Kiernan's book is crowded with protagonists of all the nations; so the book is not easy to read, for French presidents come and go, Russian and German commissioners change. The reader, perforce, must keep close attention to the narrative. It is a pity that there is no map.

Sometimes the author takes it a little too much for granted that we already know the *præludium* to his period. His condensation, for instance, of the events leading up to the Convention of Chefu of 1876 (page 4), runs: "In 1875, a British agent entering S.W. China from Burma was murdered." In point of fact, Raymond Margary, a young consular officer speaking Chinese, was sent down through China to the Burmese border to help pilot a British Trade Commission which was to enter China from the south-west, with the full permission of the Chinese Government. He was murdered, undoubtedly with the connivance and probably by the order of the Chinese official in charge of that border, doubtless in the belief that such action would please Peking, and that it would be a deterrent to further *pourparlers* from the British in Burma—as indeed it was, for many long years. It is a strange footnote to history that in the present years of Japan's aggression, China's leaders are looking to the road from Burma, at long last created, for their war supplies. Again, Mr. Kiernan's story of the French absorption of Tongking, after Annam, is not pleasant reading. France was trying by aggrandisement in the Orient to compensate herself for the two provinces she lost to Germany in 1872. Yet it is through this French Indo-China that Free China to-day is receiving munitions with which to keep at bay her latest and most ruthless aggressor.

Very occasionally Mr. Kiernan permits himself a dogmatic statement, and then one naturally wishes to cross swords with him. "There is no right or wrong in history," he concludes.

And yet, over and over again, by his very choice of facts, by his counterpoising and sifting of motives, he is sitting in moral judgment. In his modern disillusioning—or "debunking"—way, he narrates the French invasion of Tongking, the Russian pressure in the North, and shows us a Germany waiting to see where she could take her bite. But he shows us these things as ugly, greedy, cruel. And what of England? How fares she under his lens? Here, to me, as an ordinary reader, he appears contradictory. To me it seemed, as I read of Sir Thomas Wade, our Minister, that he made prolonged and admirable attempts to prevent the Franco-Chinese War. We are given to understand that this could not have been through disinterestedness or love of peace, but because war is upsetting to trade, and Britain needed the Chinese Empire to remain intact for the same reason. But Mr. Kiernan points out in an early chapter that one cause of constant friction between British consuls and merchants was that the consuls were considered too "pro-Chinese" by the merchants, and indifferent to the exigencies of trade! Perhaps it is true that behind the idealism of John Bright stood the hunger of Lancashire weavers, and behind Cobden the lust for power of Manchester cotton magnates. To-day, no doubt, our motives still are very mixed. But "plain good intention," said Edmund Burke, "is of no mean force in the government of mankind." And on the whole Britain comes out of Mr. Kiernan's analysis rather better than might be expected—except for the stupid episode, in a fit of alarm, of our high-handed but unsustained seizure of Port Hamilton on the Korean coast.

In these days of half-truths and propaganda, it is a pleasure to welcome accurate and dependable work. Mr. Kiernan comes of the right historical lineage, and I hope he will continue his important and revealing researches.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.*

In his latest work Professor A. Berriedale Keith has surveyed the British Constitution "as it stands to-day, based on the history of its evolution since the accession of Queen

* (1) *The Constitution of England from Queen Victoria to George VI.* By A. Berriedale Keith. Macmillan. 2 Vols. 30s. net. (2) *Law of the Constitution.* By A. V. Dicey. 9th Edition revised by E. C. S. Wade. Macmillan. 15s. net.

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agricultural parties and later opposed, and resulting in the formulation of a national agricultural *bloc* on agrarian questions; and (d) the early legislation of the present régime.

The accession of the National Socialist régime was to a considerable extent brought about by the conversion of the North German farmers to its doctrine. This doctrine, founded, as is well known, upon a racial basis, had as its slogan "*Blut und Boden*"—"Blood and Soil"—now so familiar to all who have the opportunity of the perusal of the German agricultural press. Little imagination is needed to discover the appeal that such a slogan would possess for the farming community. In effect, it promised the creation in the German yeomanry of a "new nobility," a reservoir for the procreation of the future race, and contended that, to make the special tasks of the German farmer possible, he should be entitled to certain safeguards. Above all, the policy of National Socialism aimed at binding the peasant farmer to the soil. Agriculture was to be organised on the "corporative" principle, which necessitated the incorporation of all the agricultural organisations into one corporative body, with local yeomen groups (*Bauernschaften*) under yeomen leaders (*Bauernführer*) and, over the whole Reich corporative body, the *Reichsbauernführer*. There were to be restrictions upon the breaking up of small into smaller and uneconomic farms (the well-known "Hereditary Law" was devised for this purpose); a drive to increase the number of "inherited freehold" farms, owned and worked by yeomen; and, generally speaking, an intensification of the efforts towards economic self-sufficiency in food production, in so far as the limits imposed by fiscal and other considerations would allow.

It is a peculiar paradox that any attempt at historical analysis of a period becomes more difficult the nearer one is to it in point of time. Only in the light of subsequent conditions does the glass clear and, when all conflicting emotions and opinions have faded, focus the essential facts impartially and unremittingly in true significance; it is not, therefore, the intention to debate here the policy evolved since 1933, but rather to study the results. Of the general policy itself, we might commence by saying that its aims are clear; the difficulties of translating them into practice in an essentially industrial country, obvious; the results, less so. When an

artist becomes loud in the eulogy of his own work, the impartial person inclines towards scepticism. Likewise, polemics may amuse, but it is doubtful whether they will not confuse, the historian. What is significant is that only the methods (or some of them) are new: the basic purpose has, as we have seen, remained unchanged for the last forty-nine years. But questions emerge which are of very great interest to us, as, for example, what of the educational organisations which we admired in 1916? Have there been changes here? And if so, for better or worse? How have these changes affected the German ascendancy in power of production, so evident in 1914? And has it been maintained? Finally, in what degree has self-sufficiency been achieved, and the errors and difficulties which the conflict of 1914-18 made so evident been rectified or surmounted?

On the first point it is of interest to note that for some years prior to 1916 the expenditure on agricultural education in Germany was relatively much higher than in this country, and other advantages accrued. "The great progress that agriculture has achieved in Germany through the last quarter of a century is the result of the union of practice with science, and proves that money spent on research and on education in every class brings in a high rate of interest," Professor von Rümker, of Berlin, observed just prior to the outbreak of the last war. That the need for this union of science and practice had been kept alive and was not less recognised in 1930 is demonstrated by the success of the *Versuchring* movement, an organisation for farm experimental work by co-operative action among local groups of farmers, to which it is doubtful whether the English farmer would ever have taken kindly in spite of its obvious advantages from the practical-scientific aspect. There were 500 such groups at work on experiments varying from rotational to economic in that year in Germany.

There has subsequently been a systematic removal of all elements and individuals in the teaching profession which could be regarded as opposed to the new order. In the sphere of education, therefore, as elsewhere, the effect of this new factor cannot be entirely overlooked. Higher education, generally, has been restricted. There were, in 1936, quotas for matriculation at the most crowded universities and other evidence that the present Government not only regards too much education as detrimental, but has taken measures to

carry this conviction into practice. Whilst, however, in the general field of research the disadvantages of prescribed thinking, and of the necessity for the scientist to find only those results that are agreeable, must be a doubtful price to pay for questionable advantages, in the rather narrower field of technical agricultural education which we are considering it is obvious that politics count less.

Difficult as it is to gain an impartial valuation of agricultural education in the Germany of to-day, certain facts speak for themselves. We know that twenty-five years ago the structure was exemplary: that the same structure survived the conflict and its aftermath, and was, in fact, improved upon by such admirable movements as the *Versuchring* in the ensuing years; and that, whatever the effect of the new political factor, so far as technical agricultural education is concerned, this can hardly have adversely affected the drive for improved technical knowledge and practice among the yeoman-farming class upon which the bid for self-sufficiency has to a large degree been founded.

The question of "productive power" is even more difficult, if for no other reason than that German official figures have in some quarters been questioned. If, however, we take as a basis that used by Middleton in 1916 (*Recent Development of German Agriculture*), we find that, whereas of the total "energy-value" of the food consumed per annum Great Britain imported, at that time, about 60 per cent., roughly 50 per cent. of total consumption is now imported by this country.*

According to the figures given by the German Institute for Business Research, 16 per cent. of the total foodstuffs consumed in that country were imported in 1936, as compared with approximately 10 per cent. estimated by Middleton for 1912-13. Even based on the official German figures, therefore, the productive power of the German farmer appears to have fallen and, whereas, in 1912-13, he was feeding 70-75 persons

* This latter estimate is based on monetary value, and on Sir John Orr's *The National Food Supply*, Chadwick Lecture, 1934, pp. 5 *et seq.* On the B.M.A. nutrition scale, however, it has been estimated that, in 1934, of a total food requirement for the population of England, Wales and Scotland of 25,690,000 tons, 10,455,000 tons were imports and 14,725,000 tons home-produced. Few of us are living on the B.M.A. scale, or could be forced to do so, unless by rigid rationing, and supplies of some of the foods used for this calculation, e.g. fish (which figured prominently), are automatically curtailed in time of war. (See *Report of B.M.A. Conference on Nutrition*, 1939, pp. 32-4.)

on 100 acres, we might assume that, on this basis, in 1936, he was feeding 66-71 persons.

The following chart is a simple comparison of recent yields of various staple crops in the two countries. The figures are taken from the *International Year-book of Agricultural Statistics*, 1938-9, published by the International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

Crop	Yield in quintals per hectare				
	1928-32	1934	1936	1938	
Wheat ...	21.9 21.1	25.2 20.6	20.6 21.2	25.6 27.4	United Kingdom Germany
Barley ...	20.5 20.1	21.5 19.6	20.6 20.8	23.0 25.4	United Kingdom Germany
Oats ...	20.1 19.2	20.5 17.3	19.8 20.2	20.9 23.6	United Kingdom Germany
Potatoes ...	168.5 154.7	176.8 161.0	159.7 165.9	175.2 175.9	United Kingdom Germany
Sugar Beet ...	206.4 273.6	254.8 291.6	244.7 311.2	164.8 303.8	United Kingdom Germany

However, his ascendancy in productive power over the British farmer appears to have been maintained, although the latter would be able to feed, on the 100 acres, 50-55 persons under peace-time conditions. This, of course, is the real crux of the matter. Under peace conditions agriculture in this country plays a special rôle in a "balanced" economy, and so it is necessary to take into account two factors. One of these is that under intensive methods called for in war-time the British farmer can increase his production considerably in every year, thus by a culminating effort achieving something altogether beyond the German farmer, whose productive power is already taxed to the maximum effort. The other lies in the possibility of bad harvests, and here speculative temptations are to be resisted.


The drive initiated since 1933 for complete agricultural self-sufficiency has failed. The reasons are most interesting. We have already seen that the grain-tariff policy prior to

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1914 was incompatible with an increase in livestock population.* In some quarters the present failure has been attributed to the same cause. On the whole, agricultural production has not been substantially increased, and neither do the figures for imports show any considerable reduction. If anything, a greater increase in domestic production occurred before 1933 than has occurred since. Scarcity of butter and lard became evident in 1934, scarcities of vegetables, fruit and eggs in 1935. There are signs of failure in the livestock industry which show that, in the drive for increased production, the importance of producing grain in preference to some staple crop has been over-estimated, as it was prior to 1914. The shortages that existed then are still evident so far as concentrated feeds, fertilisers, fuels, oils, and labour are concerned. On the other hand, the mistake of failing to recognise the possibility of prolonged shortages of food is unlikely to occur as it did in the war of 1914-18, when two years were allowed to elapse before unified control of production and distribution was effected. There can, however, be little doubt that the very effort towards intensive production by the small yeoman farmer has to some extent been a failure, as a result of labour and other wastages in which this type of undertaking abounds, and that, had the same energy been directed towards development of the large estates and large-scale production, there might have been more success.

K. T. WASLEY.

* This statement should not be considered literally, but relatively. Actually between 1883 and 1912 a net increase of 5 millions in total livestock population was recorded. But it is probable that the increased grain-production resulting from the tariff policy "robbed" pasture-land for the plough, and that the fall in sheep population of 13 millions was a result. Pigs, needing neither pasture nor expensive feeding-stuffs, increased by 12 millions. Although, therefore, the net result was an increase of 5 millions, the "balancing" increase in pig numbers could only have proceeded as far as saturation point. The returns for 1892 are interesting as representing the half-way stage in this change-over, for in that year although all livestock other than sheep registered an increase over the 1883 returns, the total livestock population had fallen by close upon 100,000 head.

DO WE KNOW ALL ABOUT SLAVERY?

... it was from Britain, the largest slave-trader and the greatest offender, that the movement sprang which successfully abolished slavery in the British Isles (1772), then the slave-trade (1806), then slavery itself in the British Dominions (1833), and finally so worked upon the conscience of the world as to secure a large and nearly universal concurrence of action for the extirpation of the evil. ... the predominant force which made abolition possible was a devout sense of religion and morality informing the lives and so dominating the consciences of a small knot of high-minded and energetic Englishmen that they could not rest until a great wrong was righted.

THAT may be taken as a fairly typical quotation concerning the decline and fall of slavery according to the beliefs of English-speaking people. The quotation comes from H. A. L. Fisher's *History of Europe*, vol. III, c. 23 (1938). Is there any single publication that has a better claim to be accepted as a summary of all that is authoritative and recent as regards historical research? It is true that non-English-speaking authorities might query some of these assumptions. The Danes might say, for instance, that they were the first to vote the abolition of slavery (1792); and others might say that slavery existed in Great Britain later than 1772, and that it still exists in the British Dominions. But, on the whole, reference books would be found to agree about the causation of abolition being much as is stated above.

Is it possible that all of these authorities should be wrong? It seems either unlikely, or else impossible. And yet ... and yet ... Consider the evidence. Where were slaves used? What did they do? Is that work still done; and, if so, how does it get done nowadays without slavery, and why? Slaves used to be used everywhere: the work most of them did was that which required power, power to pull on land, power to row at sea; power that is now brought to bear by animals and mechanical means. But before modern mechanical means had been invented, horses had displaced slaves. Not that that happened simultaneously everywhere, or that the process is complete even yet; but that is the contrast as between, say, Roman and medieval times. And what is true of Roman times is true of all earlier times. Let us attend

first of all, then, to this question as between horses and slaves : why did this change take place ?

The change could not be due to moral enthusiasm combined with an acuter sense of the iniquities and agonies of slavery than had previously existed ; there is plenty of evidence of that sense of pity existing earlier, but only combined with acceptance of slavery as inevitable. No authority, either within the Church or outside it, is found advocating the abolition of slavery before slavery had been on the decline for centuries. Even Las Casas, the apostle of humane treatment of Indians in America, did not question the necessity of slavery ; he went no farther than advocating the exportation of negroes thither as being strong enough to be of use, as an alternative to destroying the natives by expecting too much of them : Las Casas did, in fact, start slave-trading from Africa into America.

Is it possible, then, that the change-over, the preference for horse-power rather than slave-power, which did occur, was due to horses becoming more efficient power-agents ? It would seem so, and that for the following reasons. One fact is abundantly proved, namely that, in times gone by, a horse could pull no more than half a ton, whereas now it can pull eighty-five times that weight, or more. Something must be allowed for the invention of nailed shoes which protect the horses' feet from injury and enable them to grip the ground harder ; something for each of many other more recent devices ; and much to better roads. But all these things combined cannot account for so vast a change in power-capacity, an increase which is by itself enough to account for horse-power displacing slave-power not on moral grounds, but as an economy. It has also been proved that that change began in the ninth century A.D. in Europe, and that it was due to a different method of harnessing horses.

The older method was, universally, so to harness the horse that the horse pulled with its neck, that is, a band was fastened round its neck and the weight of the vehicle was pulled from there. The harder the horse pulled the greater the pressure on the neck artery and on the wind-pipe : that was why it could not pull more than half a ton. In the ninth century someone discovered that it was better to take the pressure off the neck and shift it to where it has been put ever since, that is, to where the greatest proportion of its strength

can be employed with the minimum of strain on the animal. Once that was done, there ceased to be any sense in employing slaves to do the work of horses. Horses became the cheaper and the more efficient source of power. Slavery declined. But wherever horses were scarce, as in North America, and whenever, for any similar reason, slaves remained, or became, the cheapest source of power, slavery remained or reappeared, and remains and reappears still.

And so at sea. What the harnessing of horses effected, one way or the other, on land, methods of steering did at sea. Until long after this new method of harnessing had been discovered, ships were still steered by the only method known through all the thousands of years of seafaring up to the thirteenth century, that of an oar used astern. Under such a state of things a ship became uncontrollable if its tonnage exceeded sixty tons. The Egyptians brought seafaring as far as it could go under that condition. William the Conqueror's ships were as backward in that respect as those of the Greeks. Until the possibilities of ships were released from this infancy their other possibilities remained undeveloped likewise, sails and the technique of sailing, etc., and above all the idea of doing anything more at sea than remaining within sight of land. The larger islands in the Mediterranean which could not be reached without losing sight of land were left to themselves. Rowing was the only method of getting along ; and for that, so great was the labour, slavery was the only resource.

When, in the thirteenth century, the idea of a rudder hinged to a stern-post was conceived, again by someone whose name is unknown, everything proceeded to change. Vessels grew bigger and bigger, and higher and higher ; and the higher they were built the more the idea of rowing disappeared and was replaced by sailing. Above all, coasting could be abandoned and vessels could make straight out to sea. Exploration of the world became possible, and what had been dreams hitherto could be turned into ever-broadening realities. Without that rudder, Columbus might as well have spent his life and capacities lying in bed. And not only was freedom of mind at sea set free, but freedom of man from galley-slavery at sea ceased to be necessary or economical. The process was gradual, naturally : long-established custom is too much linked up with other customs for survivals not to

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

JANUARY 1940.

LOOKING AHEAD.

IN the December issue of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW Sir Arthur Salter, with the full force of his knowledge and experience, dealt with the economic strategy necessary for the successful conduct of the war, and the co-ordination needed for exploitation of the Allies' superior resources. It is economic organisation that will win the war. Whatever the final conclusion may be, and whatever material and moral results emerge from it, on those results economic considerations must exercise a paramount influence. But it may not be out of place to examine the possibilities from a different standpoint, so far as some experience in public life can enable me to do so.

The columns of the daily and weekly press have for some time past been overflowing with torrents of opinion on what are styled "War Aims," a term which covers two entirely distinct conceptions, the first the refashioning of the map of the world by territorial readjustments; the second the creation of a new world in the moral sense, based either on a revived and improved League of Nations, or on a system of free Federal co-operation. In his memorable broadcast on November 26th, the Prime Minister more accurately defined War Aims as being the defeat of the enemy and the eradication of the aggressive spirit; other ideals, such as the adjustment of boundaries and the establishment of a new and friendly Europe, being more fitly called Peace Aims. However styled in the earlier stages of the war of 1914, it was the new map that monopolised attention. Britain staked out no fresh claims. That France should regain Alsace-Lorraine was an unquestioned axiom after war was declared. The German colonies would presumably be occupied, but nothing was said of their ultimate destiny.

But with other countries it was a different story. If the Austrian Empire broke up, and if Turkey was hostile, what would Russia, Italy, Roumania and Bulgaria demand from the spoils? How could Serbia be fairly compensated? Had Greece any reasonable claims? Some of us would have

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welcomed a firm declaration from the Allies that whereas victory, as always in the past, would mean just compensation to all who helped to win it, until it was achieved any attempt to define such gains was unwise because probably misleading. But this was not thought possible, lest it should swing the balance of wavering countries in the wrong direction. Some of the results were the hypothetical break-up of Turkey, which at this distance of time reads as a bad joke; and the ill-starred Pact of London of April 1915, to which much of Italy's discontent with France and Britain can be traced. Other agreements, of a more secret nature, were still more pernicious; so that it is satisfactory to know that in the present contest there has been no temptation to indulge in any such legerdemain.

That is by no means to assert that the map traced by the four treaties of the Paris Conference was *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*; or that the utter defeat of Germany in the present struggle would mean its reintegration. Far from it; even the revival of Bohemian and Polish nationality, to which we are pledged, in no way implies geographical retracing on an identical pattern. Equally, while by no means assuming that the existing distribution of colonies and dependencies all over the world is to be deemed eternal, it would be useless and dangerous to attempt any list of particular places which, when peace once more reigns, might change hands and become the possession of some other Power, either by recovered ownership or as new acquisitions. Any consideration of a novel system whereby the less civilised regions of the world would be administered on a different basis must be touched on later.

The Treaty of Versailles has come in for some harsh criticism, but perhaps in view of the circumstances of the moment, and the special characteristics of the statesmen who framed it, it could scarcely have been other than it is. M. Poincaré used to speak of *le Traité* in the reverential accents in which a devout Mussulman might quote from the Koran. He was spared the spectacle of its demise and that of its three adjuncts, romantically named after the Paris environs, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly. Far more now remains of the Peace of Utrecht than of any of them. So the cry of "Not another Treaty of Versailles" goes up from the conquerors of 1918 almost as loudly as from the conquered. As everybody

has recognised, it never was a treaty in the sense in which, for instance, commercial treaties are agreed between nations, but a declaration of terms imposed on an enemy who might again be formidable. Some of the terms were harsh, but they were subject to revision and mitigation. There were two possible policies, either to insist on the exact observance of the penal clauses—limitation of armaments, delineation of boundaries, and so on—or to study from the first, and to keep on studying, the complications and grievances that might follow the dissatisfaction of Italy and the creation of the new Austria, the new Czech State, and the new Poland. As a matter of fact, neither policy was pursued. This was largely due to the unhappy prominence of reparations, which filled the foreground of the landscape for the first five years after the end of the war. The occupation of the industrial district of the Ruhr Valley, in consequence of German default in respect of stipulated payments, always disapproved in Britain, is defended by French opinion not only as having produced a substantial payment, but as having established workable relations between France and Germany. On the other hand, it is held to have stimulated the deep resentment which culminated in the present temper of the German people. Whichever view is held about this, while reparations were the main preoccupation of the victors the larger political outlook was likely to be obscured. It was of course also true that to France her future security must remain her first anxiety. It is indeed difficult to overstate the space occupied by the abstract problem of security in the mind of every Frenchman. A journey through the devastated Departments would have quickened the understanding of every foreigner; but comparatively few could undertake this. Englishmen were not unsympathetic, but they had suffered devastation of their mercantile marine and their fishing fleet, and the industrial counties were devastated by unemployment; from a different point of view Italy, with her long, vulnerable coastline, and her limited self-contained resources, felt that her need for established security was more urgent than that of France. From 1922 onwards Signor Mussolini's attitude on reparations and on inter-Allied debts was moderate and not excessively egoistic.

In rough outline, then, the war aims of the Allies were the defeat of the German Army, security against further German aggression, the exaction of reparations, and the rewarding of

those who contributed to the victory by reshaping the map of Europe on juster lines corresponding to claims based on past history and, so far as possible, on nationality.

What can more strictly be called Peace Aims, except so far as they embodied vague hopes of a happier mentality inspired by a more equitably planned atlas, centred, as the war went on, in schemes for the constitution of a League of Nations. For the purpose of comparison with the present situation it is only necessary to state that, while the idea of such an international association was not new and was discussed by competent British publicists—some of whom thought it Utopian—it was not until the last year of the war, in January 1918, when President Wilson made his Fourteen Points speech to Congress, that it became a common topic of discussion.

It remains to ask how far after four months of a war which may last indefinitely there is any value in speculation on Peace Aims, all the more since before these lines can be in print circumstances may have greatly changed, for the better or for the worse. The reply that many others are doing the same is not entirely convincing. But one or two important differences from 1919 are to be noted, assuming the failure of Germany to retain her illicit gains. Whatever the economic conclusion, there can be no demand for reparations in the old sense; there can be no question of depriving Germany of a square kilometre of really German territory; and it is essential that any treaty of peace should be a product of joint discussion between winners and losers, not dictated by the neutral governments. It is hoped that such a conference might point the way to a permanent "New Europe," prepared as a whole to consider any case of dissension arising between two or more of its component nations, with a practical certainty of ensuring a fair settlement of the dispute. By what machinery can this be brought about? Some rely on a revised League of Nations, either carrying on the existing Covenant or seeking to amend it. Of these not a few would limit its energies to the admirable social causes which it has aided through its labour organisation, and by wholesale repression of such infamies as the drug traffic and the white-slave traffic. But it would be unfair to ignore its political successes, in the Balkans and in the Baltic, for instance.

It failed, wherever the blame may lie, to coerce a great

Power in the case of Abyssinia. Lord Bryce, writing in 1921, pointed out that if the League is to avert wars it must have the constant support and sympathy of the peoples and States concerned, and that this could only be done by more general knowledge and attention given to foreign affairs. The branches of the League of Nations Union in different countries have been active and efficient, but somehow the idea of the League has not really caught on in most of them. To say *laudatur et alget* would be going too far; but perhaps if a great reform has to succeed it has to attract many of the stupider people as well as the more intelligent. In any case it is difficult to foreshadow the return to Geneva of the Powers now standing out or indeed of all those who still nominally belong.

The idea of a Federated Europe makes a strong appeal to others, and used in the widest sense it appears to offer the most hopeful line of advance. But it is difficult to listen with patience to comparisons with the thirteen American colonies, even ignoring the fact that in the last decade of the eighteenth century all the popularity of Washington and the ability of Jefferson and Hamilton barely surmounted the crisis and achieved Federation. It is probably true that without some sacrifice of independence and sovereignty by the powerful countries there is little hope of finally assuring the peace of Europe; but nobody can be blind to the extraordinary difficulty of making a start, even at the most moderate pace.

Disarmament, most would hold, must be the sequel to a system of international understanding. It cannot be the preliminary stage of such an understanding. It is not always remembered that there has been no instance in history of the abandonment of an effective weapon of war on moral grounds, though our more humane ancestors drew the line at such devices as the poisoning of wells. Some combatants would draw no such line now. It is an old story; the finicking courtier who so irritated Hotspur lamented the digging of salt-petre

Which many a good tall fellow had destroyed
So cowardly; and, but for these vile guns
He would himself have been a soldier.

Probably it struck some more martial minds that straight-forward lances and honest bows and arrows were fairer

continue long after the reason for their existence has vanished; the steering oar has not died out even yet for small craft. But the galley-slave has gone.

All these statements seem to be sweeping enough, and put forward without any evidence. But, in fact, the evidence exists in accessible form, and the statements are not mere statements at all, but deductions which follow from the evidence. Nothing of the foregoing is new, or original: it is simply a summary of the researches of a French commandant, Lefebvre des Noëttes, contained in two books, *L'Attelage à travers les âges* (Picard, 1931) and *De la marine antique à la marine moderne* (Masson, 1935). He is one of the greatest scholars, in temperament, in method, and in knowledge, of any age; he has set world history on a new and truer footing than anyone hitherto and he has revived once again that method of contact with the facts of the case which academical persons are everlastingly diverging from. But no discoveries could well be more completely ignored than are his. Sir George MacMunn, in his *Slavery Through the Ages* (1938), seems to sum up, both in his text and his bibliography, all that has been written about, and that has occurred, in the history of slavery: yet he never mentions the name of Lefebvre des Noëttes nor any of his discoveries or conclusions; i.e. not the part of the subject that matters most and the only part, ultimately, that matters at all. Neither is there more notice taken of him in the Cambridge Histories, which consequently deal with the Crusaders without explaining, or knowing, why the earlier Crusaders went by land and the later ones by sea; or giving any explanation of the exploration of the world and all that that has involved, other than these explanations which were invented in the nineteenth century and would never bear examination at any time. The reader can refer to any reference book and find the same state of things existing. And he will find the Middle Ages invariably described as the Paradise of Handicraft, whereas it was, in fact, the period which made as great advances in the mechanisation of labour as have ever been made and laid the foundations of all subsequent improvements in that direction, improvements without which none of the best of modern endeavour could have happened, any more than could any of the medieval cathedrals have been built.

It is specially in respects like these that the researches of

Lefebvre des Noëttes are so remarkable. He brings to light the way in which, not only as regards slavery but, incidentally, as regards all human effort, technical advance is the condition of setting free human efforts for spiritual results, how illusory is the division of effort into material and spiritual, and how the evolution of civilisation does evolve, by fits and starts, by happy ideas, haphazard, by virtue of simple devices, simple ways of achieving this and that technical aim better than it had been achieved previously, and how each successive technical improvement brings with it a train of other improvements, unforeseen, cumulative. Rhetoric, philanthropy, moral enthusiasms, propaganda, may, or may not, play a part in any given achievement of better conditions for the bodies and minds of men, women and children; but it is invariably a minor part compared with attention given to solving a pressing technical problem in a more efficient way.

Most of all, if all the historians have been wrong hitherto on this subject and have had to be set right by one who is not an historian at all, how and why have they been wrong, and how much more of the same kind of stereotyped illusion may still be taken at face value in everybody's history books? The "how" and the "why" may likewise be ascertained from Lefebvre des Noëttes' books, many instances, as amusing as they are sad, of historians' inattention to practical life. In no museum in Europe or America has he seen a model of an ancient vehicle which was accurate, or of an ancient ship which could keep afloat. Reproductions by drawing in publications are likewise so inaccurate that he has had to discard the use of them and rely wholly on originals or photographs. Moreover, he shows that certain beliefs which pass for both ancient and axiomatic arose no earlier than the last century.

The introduction of windmills, for instance, is regularly ascribed to Crusaders who saw them in the East and brought the news home. Lefebvre shows that mills were known here earlier, but that use of them was not developed because there was no transport available for bringing grain to a mill in bulk, nor for carting it back to consumers, until the method of harnessing horses efficiently was discovered. Grinding grain, therefore, continued to be done by hand, which itself involved either slavery or something much like it. In fact, the very idea of the "Rights of Man" could not evolve under the old technical condition: only the rights of the citizen. And the

heavier, therefore, the material in use, the more was this so. Consequently there is no record of worse conditions of slavery than among the Romans, since they used the heaviest materials. Neither did they contribute any technical improvement in transport either by sea or by land, but only solved the question by promoting more and more war to get more and more slaves.

It is true that in museums there are to be found "Roman" nails for shoeing horses, but the Romans never possessed any such things, nor thought of them: all such exhibits are medieval and the belief that they are Roman is about fifty years old. Throughout the "authorities" on these subjects runs the idea, Lefebvre finds, that the equipment of the ancients was fundamentally similar to ours, whereas acquaintance with any practical side of these questions would have shown them, as it showed him, that this idea was an error.

Not only did Lefebvre avoid the general state of error, and all that it entailed, by means of a practical acquaintance with his two subjects of horses and sailing coming first and research into their antiquities coming later, but he checked his conclusions with the help of a transport company, harnessing horses according to the ancient way and ascertaining that the results did confirm his research figures. Lefebvre des Noëttes' work needs to be known in every country, both his facts and his methods.

E. STUART BATES.

WATTEAU AND MUSIC.

TO approach one form of art directly through the medium of another, as does Mr. Gilbert Barker in a study of Antoine Watteau, is a novel if a somewhat dangerous procedure. Unless it be very incisively felt and lucidly expressed, it can easily result in a bewildering jargon. As a lifelong lover and writer upon music, I can say for myself that Mr. Barker's work has helpfully quickened my understanding and enjoyment of painting in general, as well as of Watteau's individual savour. He can, moreover, actually send one upon new trails of appraisal and exploration amongst some of one's best cherished and studied composers.

In discussing Watteau, it is impossible (says Mr. Barker) not to use musical terms and speak of the melody, the rhythms, the cadences, the phrases, the harmonies and orchestration of his works. He is, perhaps, the most musical painter who has ever existed, the one who has most successfully interpreted the magic of sound into terms of form and colour. He is one of the very rare artists who has managed to catch the exact effect of the almost unbearable sweetness of strings, the luminosity and splendour of wind instruments and the shimmer of harps. Watteau has very often been compared to Mozart, and their names have been bracketed together as the two great poets of the eighteenth century, as indeed they were . . . perfection of form and melodic line equally inherent in both is in rare union with a magical fairy-like sensation of loveliness that can never cease and must linger in the air eternally.

Automatically, though, with Mozart another eighteenth-century composer always rises before me, whom I would be inclined to place yet nearer to Watteau than Mozart—namely "*der gute Papa* Haydn," father of the symphony. A miraculous quality in Mozart's story, his brief life-span, precocious inspiration and musical fecundity unrivalled except by Schubert, could so fire the world's imagination that indubitably the steady light, the genial humour and serenity of Haydn were overshadowed. Watteau was the originator of the rococo style in French painting. Landscape was also inseparable from his *genre*, his ever-dominating and exquisite background. An atmosphere of landscape is decidedly characteristic of Haydn but hardly, I would say, of Mozart. Mozart was a townsman. Haydn, though he often resided in

courtlets, remained essentially a countryman, and if we seek a fascinating combination of rococo and landscape in music, where shall we find it more deliciously expressed with real verdant freshness than in Haydn's *Creation* or his *Seasons*? This latter score can, I think, afford a most entrancing corollary to the spirit and mood of Watteau's *Les Charmes de la Vie*. Music is the central idea in this picture. I quote Mr. Barker again:

The sound of music seems to penetrate into every nook and cranny of this canvas, and to fill the room in the Wallace Collection in which it hangs with its lovely harmonies . . . Watteau escapes into a world of pure beauty where his desire is transformed into one of the finest interpretations of the joy of listening to music.

Until Mr. Barker sets it before us categorically catalogued, one does not indeed realise how constantly music and choreography do figure in Watteau's pictures; in—for instance—*La Finette*, *La Gamme d'Amour*, *Le Concert Champêtre*, *Les Plaisirs du Bal*, *L'Alliance de la Musique et la Comédie*, *Le Donneur de Sérénade*, *La Leçon de Musique* and still many others. The musicians in these pictures are soloists—mostly lute players, or it may be a guitarist, a piper, a singer. Their very way of manipulating their instruments, a certain expressiveness in their hands, reveals a cultured, deeply emotional, if simple, craftsmanship. In *Le Donneur de Sérénade* the interest is focused on a singer with his guitar.

"Never before or since," says Mr. Barker, "has a painter interpreted music in quite the same way or with such uncanny dexterity. The nervous play of the fingers, the taut silence that precedes the commencement of a serenade, the pizzicato accompaniment of a suave melody, are presented to the spectator with an astonishing facility."

The audiences in Watteau's pictures are also remarkable. *La Leçon de Musique*—that tiny canvas, I think, at Hertford House—has always intrigued me by reason of its little group of listeners. The keen intelligence in the face of the lady turning over the pages of the score, the solemn eager intentness of the two small children pushing forward their heads, listening "with all their ears"—and there is the player, too.

His whole mien and bearing surely invoke a performance truly of that kind which Toscanini would call "Music, gentlemen—oh! so lovely music!" *

There was probably plenty of vulgarity and sex appeal in the "popular" music of Watteau's day, as in our own; but I cannot sense in any Watteau picture an eighteenth-century equivalent for the repellent aphrodisiacs of jazz, croon or tango. If Watteau's rococoism belonged typically to his own age, he was decades ahead of it in his chromatic impressionism—that same impressionism with which Chopin revolutionised European music and which was to be still further evolved by some of the Russians—or by Cyril Scott, Debussy and Ravel. So comprehensive a critic as Mr. Barker does not fail to bring his beloved Watteau into line with this impressionism. Debussy has often been called the Claude Monet of music, but were not Monet and Cézanne derivatives from Watteau? And Debussy's restrained *volupté*, the lilt of his violins and flutes, clarinets, oboes and harps in their shimmering chromatic meshes weave a counterpart in sound for the typical Watteau landscape. The well-wooded fragrant countryside, the glades of l'Île de France, of Seine-et-Oise with gently flowing rivers, rippling streams, gleaming lakelets—familiar to the painter, were also well known to the nineteenth-century composer; the district in which he was born, and little changed since Watteau's day or, in fact, even now. I cannot, however, possibly imagine Debussy at all happy amongst the elegant, leisured aristocrats in their Louis Quatorze attire, filmy lawns and laces, sumptuous brocades and satins, who somehow seem perfectly at home and strike no incongruous note whatever in a Watteau landscape. Debussy's music has, I know, a *raffinement* of softly rounded elegance. Yet his *Images*; *Nuages*; *Et la Lune descend sur le Temple qui fut*; *L'Ombre des Arbres sur la Rivière*; *Le Tombeau des Naiades*—all this music evokes for me only far solitudes, remote and aloof from all human contacts. In his opera, *Pelléas et Mélisande*, his musical presentment of Maeterlinck's attenuated characters can be still more vague and slightly spineless, but the unforgettable glamour of his orchestra takes me straight into the silence and mystery, the glimmer and dimness of lonely forests. In his *L'Après-midi d'un Faune* he evokes exactly the same accent of remoteness.

* From *The Orchestra Speaks*. By Bernard Shore.

weapons than cannon-balls. There is a better chance of agreement to limit for each country the number of each class of weapon, with a system of mutual, or rather of common, inspection. Allied to this is the proposal of an international police-army, which has attracted many. At the end of the war it certainly was believed that an international air force might be formed, and even that no separate air forces should be permitted. At that time the first expedient would have been possible; but now that warfare in the air plays so leading a part both in naval and military strategy, it is difficult to see on what scale an international force could be set up.

The hope, therefore, is that Europe, after the conclusion of a just peace, will hammer out a lasting model of combined consultation and if necessary combined action. Its prime object would be to prevent or check aggression. The hope is at once confronted by a dilemma. The democracies generally agreed that each nation has the right of choosing its own form of government, whether others like it or not. A form of government imposed on one nation by another has little chance of enduring. The Bourbon dynasty, with all its historic splendour of tradition, failed to take new root in France, partly from the varied shortcomings of the three sovereigns who tried to restore it, but also from the fatal recollection that it had been escorted to the throne by foreign bayonets. The States therefore will keep what form of government they choose. But if their form of government makes them irredeemably aggressive, how can they join any League or Federation that may be instituted? It would seem as if a return to the balance of power or the formation of independent groups must be inevitable.

It may be taken for certain that four great European countries, Germany, Russia, Italy and Spain, will for different reasons reject the democratic form. That we define as involving a governing Legislative Assembly, with an executive responsible to it. Russia never tried the régime; Germany never gave it proper scope; Italy and Spain would say, not without truth, that it was given a chance on the British model, with French or American modifications, but that their people had never succeeded in working it.

But hope need not be altogether abandoned. Is it quite certain that the undemocratic systems which have been

responsible for so many recent aggressions are altogether past praying for?

It has been acutely observed that in many respects National Socialism and Fascism are the legacy not of any stiff-backed autocrat, or high-flying General, but of the *flamboyant* Jewish Silesian Socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle, so romantically dramatised in a novel of George Meredith's. An aggressive spirit in foreign affairs does not seem to be implicit in such a heritage. Cannot its origin be traced otherwise? In Germany the distorted interpretation of Hegel's theories which almost deifies the State might evolve a claim of the German State to override lesser States; but this is not the necessary outcome of National Socialism in its other aspects. Nor need the Italian doctrine of a corporate State of itself imply the desire to encroach on the territory of other countries. It is a commonplace that dictators are not likely to be *good* neighbours, because they must continually assert themselves, and may have to do so at the neighbour's expense. But dictatorships are seldom continuous, even if they can be made hereditary; and it must be remembered that recent dictatorships are the offspring of national discontent, partly with conditions at home, but even more with the aftermath of the war. This in a degree accounts for, though it does not condone, some of the predatory actions which have shocked the world. Let us anticipate, then, that Germany, Italy and Spain, whatever form of government they may affect, will in the long run not turn their backs on the European partnership. The recent emergence of Russia as a sinister force in foreign affairs must affect any forecast of the European future. It was believed until quite lately that Russia, having suspended the prosecution of a Holy War of Classes, to be waged in all capitalist countries, merely desired to be left alone. This sudden change of attitude is bound to qualify any general conclusions that have been reached.

In the limits of this article it is only possible to touch on some events and conditions in Europe. A sufficiently wide settlement must cover much of the world outside, in particular the administration of the less civilised colonies. The notion of shifting these about like pawns on a chessboard is distasteful to many, and schemes of joint responsibility are being canvassed. They are at first sight attractive, but the obstacles cannot be ignored. In the first place, would the

"Have-nots"—who point out that they only produce 8 per cent. of the prime commodities of the world, against 66 per cent. produced by the four great possessing countries and their colonies—be content with a share in the administration of areas predominantly inhabited by native races? Might they not make absolute ownership a condition? On the other hand the overseas possessions of France are treated as French, and send representatives to Parliament; cases like Kenya, where the white settlers hope for Dominion privileges, and some of the West Indian colonies with semi-independent Legislatures, introduce a further complication; how would the Dominions, especially South Africa, regard the concession? The Dutch colonies have a long tradition, not easy to break. Therefore, as with federal plans for Europe, the complications are colossal, and much time will be needed. But they may have to be boldly faced.

Whichever way we look it is utterly impossible to speak confidently of a post-war settlement, and experience warns us not to gambol in a world of illusions. But that is no reason for taking either a lachrymose or a cynical attitude. Cardinal de Retz, who certainly was not a simpleton, wrote: "*On est aussi souvent dupe par la méfiance que par la confiance.*" There are worse mottoes for the political world to hold to in difficult times like these.

CREWE.

RUSSIA, FINLAND AND EASTERN EUROPE.

WHEN Stalin's marauders crossed the Finnish border on November 30th the general idea underlying the technique of certain contemporary Great Powers seemed to be a fair object of confident speculation. Minor additional details might still be added, such as a Russian attempt upon the Aaland Islands or Bessarabia, a German attempt upon Holland or Rumania: but the big idea was now clear enough. Four out of seven of the world's Great Powers—those Powers, that is, who between them had, or on exclusively material criteria appeared to have, a decisive control over the fortunes of the human race—had shown that in essential quality they reproduced the appetite and the performance of the pike in its dealings with smaller fish. Japan and China; Italy and Albania; Germany and Poland; Russia and Finland: a fairly consistent tale. And four is a mathematical majority out of seven. As for the minority, the United States stood for the moment in majestically prosperous and therefore nervous isolation. France, it seemed, was being "by-passed" in the German objective. Britain and Germany, two of the leading civilised Powers in the world, were concentrated upon the exclusive business of reducing each other's people to starvation. Britain and Germany collaborating, could add bountifully to each other's prosperity and could impose prosperity upon the whole world. Instead, they were using their whole resources to the only purpose of wrecking each other. Seven Great Powers destroying the earth: or so it seemed to the superficial eye. One of them, Russia, had conceived and was now putting into operation a plan of sabotage on a gigantic scale, undermining the very foundations of the political, civilised, Christianised society evolved during two thousand years, helped to that end by the obedient strategy of a Germany and a Britain who by going to war again with each other provided the conditions necessary to the Stalin plan. The confusion, the apparent moral collapse of political civilisation, was such that hardly any clear objective in political propaganda could be sustained in any quarter. When a Labour leader on December 5th announced that if any attempt were made to conclude an Anglo-German Alliance for an anti-Russian purpose, British

With Ravel's Symphonic-Ballet, *Daphnis et Chlœe*, on the other hand, I would go wholeheartedly all the way with Mr. Barker in a close approximation with Watteau. The original setting of the ballet was the gorgeous riot and clash of a Bakst *décor*. I can, though, well picture Ravel's lovers dancing with ravishing enchantment and charm amongst the beckoning Cupids in what Mr. Barker sums up as "all the resources of his orchestral powers" sublimated by Watteau in his *Fête Galante of L'Embarquement pour Cythère*.

In some aspects, I notice, Mr. Barker would place Sibelius as near to Watteau as Ravel and Debussy. Here I venture to part company with him. Except for a certain superficiality of chromatics and tone-colour, these two surely can never mingle. The human world of Watteau is still more alien to Sibelius than to Debussy even. The strongest individual appeal of the Sibelius music comes to me through its saturation in the northern, almost arctic, landscape of Finland—the mythological cosmology of the Kalevala epic with its Wäinämöinen wizardry. One attribute, I grant, Sibelius does amply share with the two French composers and the painter—their mutual delight, that is, in the myriad beauties and nature moods of water, still or flowing. Water is rarely entirely absent from the Watteau scene. Especially, says Mr. Barker, is he "a supreme artist in depicting the exhilarating iridescence of a spraying fountain. Ravel and Debussy, though wonderful interpreters of fountains, could not rival him here." The regal magnificence of the Versailles fountains was still a marvellous world wonder, one remembers, for Watteau and his contemporaries. Yet another striking feature in Watteau's style which must always attract musicians is his love for arabesque designs. "With his arabesques," remarks Mr. Barker, "he obtained effects of the utmost delicacy and charm, and even to this apparently gay decoration, he could give a hint of tender nostalgic melancholy." This comment is also absolutely appropriate to the amazing fantasy of arabesque patterns wrought into their music, both vocal and instrumental, by Cyril Scott, Debussy and Ravel. And we may hark back a couple of centuries to Bach, the incomparable creator and interpolater of musical arabesque.

Again, Mr. Barker can suggest a wide field of psychological, even pathological enquiry, when he turns to the possible influences of tuberculosis, the disease of which

Watteau died at the age of 37, upon the calibre of an artist's work. He maintains that this complaint pre-eminently sharpens:

the nervous system, rendering it more delicate and impressionable. Watteau is the first consumptive artist it is possible to study with any certainty as to the relation between his art and his disease.

What, though, of Chopin, or of Keats? Chopin, finally, is the crux and culmination of Mr. Barker's fine musical analysis of the genius of Watteau:

"Within the small world of Chopin and Watteau," he says, "everything is perfection, each detail is polished and beautified, every rhythm is subjugated to searching examination, until the artist is satisfied that it will make the maximum of effect. These two share so many things in common; their minds played round their own morbid emotions and the unexplored possibilities of keyboard and palette. Both achieved their most perfect results in the same manner. They possessed an astonishing facility in their handling of the most subtle rhythmic line; they both loved to transform the simple ideas on which their works are built by the most extreme fantasy of delicate ornamentation and chromatic wash of colour. Both put into their works a tremendous poignancy of feeling and a sense of the menace of fate. They were both revolutionaries, although they did not suspect it, and both had a very great influence upon their centuries. They both left nothing that could be developed further by other hands. Each of them was an artist utterly incapable of producing anything even slightly tinged with vulgarity; each was able to produce countless variations of his own artistic formula that was never permitted to grow stale."

How acutely and accurately gauged is this penetrative paragraph of criticism. A painter has the good fortune to be entirely independent of the reproducers with whom the repute of a composer must rest. Chopin's music, I believe, has suffered more than most from his interpreters. But when one has heard him played by the two Rubinsteins, by Liszt, or more particularly by Paderewski, one is able to grasp in full measure the acumen and insight of Mr. Barker's critique and to thank him for it most cordially.*

A. E. KEETON.

* I tender my thanks to Messrs. Duckworth, publishers, for permission to use quotations from Mr. Barker's book.

Labour would oppose it, he was interesting at any rate as a straw in the wind.

The four normal schools of political speculation—the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the melancholic and the hysterical—were now set upon a clearer course. The Hysterical School assumed that the Russo-German understanding was complete, foolproof and certain to triumph. By that understanding, Russia was to annex Finland, Sweden, and Norway; Germany was to annex Belgium, Holland and Denmark; from the resultant Russo-German air bases along the whole western coast of the North Sea, the island of Great Britain was to be sunk, while France through the back door joined the new Comintern with Germany and Russia; and in the East Germany was to have Hungary and Rumania's oil supply, while Russia took Bessarabia and the mouths of the Danube; India falling like a ripe plum into her lap. While the Melancholic School assumed the worst, whatever it might be, without worrying in detail about what it might be, and the Phlegmatic School pooh-pooed the whole thing as a merely normal manifestation of the muddle that is life, the Sanguine School as usual were constructive in their belief that godless politics were the sure method of driving individuals back to God.

According to the hysterical prophets, God had lost control over the affairs of man. In their fear—their truly godless fear—they demanded an immediate deal between Britain and Germany for the purpose of stopping the present war and starting another: namely a war of united "Christian" Europe against atheist Russia. The demoralisation of European civilisation had gone so far that the absurdities cried aloud. As the mulish peasant minds of Stalin and Molotov copied Hitler's device of lies and brutality to destroy a small and inoffensive Finland, the big idea now dominating high diplomacy was featured as it were in a monstrous simplicity so that no man could mistake it. God, so it seemed, had used the symbolism of an atheist marauder to show to Christian Europe and to the world the true nature of the knavish tricks that now confounded their politics. It was very clear. Yet, was it seen?

Let the eloquence of indisputable fact speak for itself. The Russian mixture of communist and imperialist penetration into Finland was shorn of every possible obscurantist

attribute. It was wholly crude. Stalin lied, and his troops advanced. His bombs were dropped on the Finnish people. There was not even the possibility of a Russian pretence that any Russian interest had been maltreated within the Finnish border. Ribbentrop and Hitler could beguile a stupid German race with tales of Polish atrocities against German people in Poland. Stalin and Molotov could not imitate that particular propaganda. Their lies had to be lies, and nothing else. Not even the shadow of a substance could be given to them. It was as though the modern practice of robbery on the international highway had now been staged in its naked ugliness with Hitler, Ribbentrop and the rest of their gang standing by as enforced spectators. If the Great Powers of the world still could not see it, then there was seemingly no hope for the world; and it did not much matter what happened next. But the evidence on the contrary was that the mystical work was being duly done; that mankind was being forced to recognise that it must mend its methods, or perish; that British rosiness of self-deception (for instance) about its own exclusive role as defender of justice and liberty must give way to something more practical. The threat to the ordered progress of civilisation comes from the use of brute force for political purposes. Can that threat be defeated by the use of brute force? An old, old question (frankly faced by Lord Halifax on December 5th) to which the answer has been given by experience as well as by reason time after time. Yet it apparently needed the grotesquely exaggerated present experience to convince mankind of an obvious truth.

The Russian apologists said that Finland herself constituted no threat to Russia: which hardly needed saying of three and a half million people *vis à vis* a hundred and eighty million. But, they said, a hostile Finland might lend herself to use by a Great Power as a jumping-off ground against Russia: and the nearest Finnish territory was only twenty miles (or less than five minutes by air) from Leningrad. The identity of the hypothetical Great Power enemy was wrapped in mystery, despite some routine propaganda against Great Britain. The Russian apologists hinted that Finnish resistance must have been organised secretly by Britain; but Herr Hitler, who knew all about the game of accusing Britain for everything that happened contrary to his calculation, could not thereby be lulled into an easy acquiescence in

Russia's expansion into the Baltic Sea and the Scandinavian peninsula. Herr Hitler's path had already been blocked in the east and in the south-east. It was being blocked before his helpless eyes in the north; while in the west the crushing of Holland could serve none of his nefarious purposes. A neutral Holland was a buffer against the British blockade and a source of supply for Germany. If Holland were annexed by Germany, the port of Rotterdam would be merely added to the sea avenues blocked against Germany by the British navy. A conquest of Holland therefore would achieve no purpose for Germany except the shortening of the bomber's distance to British territory, assuming the contingency of Germany's deciding to bomb that territory, the direct result of which would be, as he well knew, the retaliatory bombing of Berlin. None of Hitler's dreams at its maddest could be fulfilled by the bombing of Berlin.

There was something galling to German historical sense in the enforced necessity to stand by and not to protest against the Russian attack upon Finland. Even Herr von Ribbentrop's cup had apparently not yet been full when he belied his whole past by signing the Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression on August 24th last. He has since had to watch the growing results of that betrayal. In the case of Finland it happens that the very first treaty entered into by independent Finland was made with Germany. Finland's independence having been confirmed by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 3rd, 1918) she concluded a treaty of alliance with Germany four days later, the clear purpose of which from Germany's side was to make of Finland a vassal state to herself. When the Red Guards therefore with Russian help began ransacking the country, the hurriedly organised White Guards of Baron Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim could not have stemmed the danger had not the Germans given him their help. The Swedes refused him help. By contrast General Count Rüdiger von der Goltz led a German division, some 12,000 strong, to Finland's defence. The victory they won at Karis on April 6th, 1918 enabled General Mannerheim to win at Tammerfors and decisively at Viborg (April 28th-29th), Goltz having entered Helsingfors (Helsinki) in the meantime. In 1918 the new Finland even offered the crown to Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, brother-in-law of the Kaiser. Though the offer (in spite of Prince Charles's initial

acceptance) was allowed to lapse, the interesting thing is that in its origins twenty-one years ago Finland was helped by Germany to withstand the onslaught of Bolshevik Russia and then to establish (June 17th, 1919) an independent Republic. To-day, in face of Russia's renewed attack, Germany, having sold the pass, must needs stand by and even express approval of Russia's aims, the while the German people, despite a twenty-one year tradition of friendship for Finland, are kept in ignorance of what is taking place.

It was on October 7th last that the Russian Government virtually launched its attack upon Finland. On that day Moscow inquired whether the Finnish Government would be willing to send a "special representative" to the Russian capital to "negotiate" about certain unspecified political and economic questions. Only two days before (October 5th) Russia had imposed her Pact of Mutual Assistance upon Latvia. On October 6th Russia had invited, and Finland had refused, a parallel attempt at a Finnish-Russian deal, whereupon promptly the Moscow wireless service broadcast the statement that "faced by the refusal of the Government of Finland to send the Finnish Foreign Minister to negotiate a trade agreement in Moscow, the Soviet Government reserves to itself the right to take the decisions it thinks fit." It was after making such a threat that Russia on October 7th invited Finland to send the "special representative" to Moscow, an invitation which Finland now thought it wise to accept. Dr. Paasikivi, the Minister to Sweden, left for Moscow on October 9th; and on the very following day the Government advised the inhabitants of Helsinki and Viborg to evacuate those cities. On October 11th the Minister of the Interior ordained the compulsory evacuation of Helsinki, Viborg, Turku and Tempere. None the less the Foreign Minister, Mr. Erkko, on October 14th issued a statement about the Russian proposals which was still couched in a conciliatory spirit. "I studied the Russian proposals all day yesterday," he said. "Finland will do everything in her power to preserve peace and I have the firm belief that as regards Finland the Russian Government has the same desire. That at least is my present impression. A defensive alliance or any sort of alliance with any Power is out of the question. No neutral country has alliances."

An unmistakable sign of Finnish nervousness was observed

CROWS, KITES AND SUNDRIES.

THOUGH a garden in Gezira, only separated from the noise of Cairo by the Nile, may not provide subjects fit for the higher realms of ornithology, yet if the owner or visitor has his eyes and ears open it can provide a world of ornithological humour, pathos, drama and beauty. The garden of which I write has several big trees which add a great deal to the interest, for some of these trees are the citadels of the crows and some are castles of the kites—hereditary enemies. During the twenty years that I have watched birds in this garden I have never known a crow and kite truce, I see no reason to believe there has ever been one; the war of the Spanish Succession was the skirmish of a day compared with this ageless warfare. The battles sometimes take on enormous proportions; thirty or forty a side. I have rarely seen hand to hand, or should it be claw to claw, fighting. It is mostly strategical guerilla warfare. The kites, who never lose their dignity, are pestered and baited by the crows, who will come up in a flight of three or four, squawk in a kite's face, then turn tail and fly off. After two or three sallies of this type the kite loses patience and with his shrill though beautiful cry, gives chase. Having achieved some reaction from the kite, the crows assume a justified indignation and return to the charge, six or seven strong. Soon there is a battle royal, everyone joins in, and the air is rent with caws and cries. As children, we found these crow and kite fights absorbing and thrilling. Every crow flying away from the scene of action was a messenger sent back at the risk of his life to get reinforcements, every kite, flying forward, ahead of his fellows, was their gallant captain, every huddle of crows cawing and nodding at each other on a neighbouring tree was the general and his staff in consultation; and so on. Many is the time I have been dragged protesting from the window and made, quite rightly, to continue my dressing or my lessons.

I know of no other bird who shows more palpably than the Egyptian crow what he would certainly be saying if he could speak. In the spring a whole family of crows, with much cawing, will settle most pointedly on a kite's tree near a nest. When the owner protests you can almost hear the crow saying in mock surprise: "Oh, dear me now, I quite thought it was

my tree—fancy, children, this isn't our tree after all!" She will noisily gather her young together and fly off, but not before having wrecked the kite's afternoon peace. Besides being clowns they are really great villains, and in the spring search every bush and hedge for small nestlings or eggs to devour. When I come into the garden and catch one at it, his every movement and expression seem to say, "Now let me see, what was I doing on this hedge?—oh, just walking along: extraordinary nice thing, a hedge to walk on in the spring, don't you think?", and he pretends to look innocently grieved when I shoo him off. One year we put an old earthenware jar in a stand on the lawn filled with water for the birds. The crows were terrified of it. They would come as near as they dared with their ridiculous sideways hop, then suddenly get in a panic and retreat hurriedly in disorder. Now, however, they are only too familiar with it, and instead of nice fresh water it is always a soup of frogs' legs and bits of bread stolen from the gardener's meal.

The Cairo crow behaves, with any food he is unable to eat at the moment, in the same way as does a dog—he buries it. It would be interesting to know if this is a general habit of hooded crows or if the Cairo crows have invented it for themselves. I have often watched them carry off a piece of bread, dig it into the corner of a flower-bed, and camouflage the place by putting leaves and grass neatly over it with their beaks. They will also take a piece of bread which is too hard, and dip it repeatedly in water by the garden tap until it is soft enough to please them. On some occasions a whole company of crows will take on a sort of mock solemnity and dignity. For no apparent reason and usually at sunset they will gather on the roof in rows and caw and caw together, then all will be silent for a moment or two before they start again, often led by a kind of choir-master among them. "How the crows are praying to-night," our maid will remark in awed tones.

As opposed to the crows, only once have I seen a kite lose his very real dignity. This one had become entangled in the long trails of *bignonia venusta* hanging from a tall tree, and he was dangling head downwards, flopping feebly. We sent up a sporting garden boy to free him; it was a perilous climb, but he did it. The bird fell apparently senseless to the ground, breaking its fall on a rose bush. We laid its head in a saucer of water and left it; five minutes later it drank some water,

recovered and flew off. One thing the crows and kites have in common is that they both notice instantly if we are having a meal in the garden. We cannot leave the table for a minute without a crow flopping on to it and pecking at everything, or a kite with its beautiful swoop bearing down and neatly removing a titbit. A kite will remove food like this from a child's hand so quickly and dexterously that the child hardly has time to be frightened. In the same way the kites carry off golf balls, as Gezira golfers know to their cost. If you happen to have a kite's tree in your garden, you are with luck about all square at the end of the season, because after a few days when the kite finds the balls are not edible nor are likely to hatch into anything, it will turn them out of the nest, to be gleaned by the owner of the garden; once I was the richer by a polo ball acquired in this way.

The two sorts of birds which get on best together are the bulbul and the sparrow; both like to be near the house, both like the same type of small tree or large bush, and both go about in pairs or companies, fussy, cheerful and chatty. I have seen two sparrows and two bulbuls bathing simultaneously in a tiny puddle under the garden tap while rows of friends and relations of each waited round for their turn. This alliance is of comparatively recent growth because twenty years ago the bulbul was almost a rare bird in this garden; they have increased enormously lately. The bulbul has some lovely liquid notes; one of his short snatches sounds just as if he is saying "*A beautiful cathedral*." It was amusing to hear this being piped all over the garden in the spring of 1938, when Cairo's new Anglican cathedral was being consecrated by the Archbishop of York.

About the strangest birds to be seen in the garden, though sometimes weeks go by and they do not appear, are three green parakeets. Ever since I can remember there have been three, a couple and a mad one, who dashes behind the others screaming across the sky. Many years ago he inadvertently fell down our nursery chimney and was caught by the "*suffragi*" in the fireplace; the bird bit his finger badly with its sharp curved beak so he let it go, but ever after it has been mad—or is it for love? With only three of them . . . two's company even for parakeets. They used to come nearer the house than they do now. I remember, as a child, being in my bedroom for three weeks with measles and feeling it was just bearable

because from my window I could see these beautiful emerald green birds eating the early bohinia pods among the porcelain pink blossoms of that lovely tree. This species of parakeet was let out of the Gezira Zoological Gardens many years ago to see if it would breed wild; there are several of them in the Zoo gardens living at liberty, and these few at Gezira, but I have seen them nowhere else.

Drama of another sort is provided by the little owls who live under the rafters of the house, and there raise their families. Our guests, if not versed in the ways of Cairo baby owls, come down to breakfast looking white and worn, saying, "I'm afraid I hardly slept a wink all night—there was a man in my room; I heard him snoring most distinctly, he must have been under the bed or in a cupboard, but I could find no trace of him in the morning." To do them justice, the snoring noise of the young owl is almost identical with human snoring and does sound exactly as if it were in the room. One morning we found "the man" in the garden below, having fallen out of the rafters, a woolly white bundle with yellow eyes and a little yellow beak sticking out of all the surrounding fluff.

For sheer decorative value I think the prize goes to the buff-backed heron. He is common enough in the fields, but only occasionally honours us with his presence in the garden. Stalking elegantly across the bright green lawn he looks like a fairy-tale prince transformed into a beautiful white bird. When in the act of catching little frogs and beetles for his dinner the illusion disappears; he fixes them with a hypnotic stare, stretches out his long neck parallel with the ground, waggles it from side to side in the most lunatic way, and then gives a sudden stab at his prey. Sometimes three or four of these herons will decorate the garden for a few days, and then disappear again for months. A still less frequent visitor to the garden is the peewit, occasionally, on spring evenings when the sun has just set, a flock of them wheel round showing the black and white of their rounded wings, and settle on the lawn searching for their supper. They are fascinating to watch, with their little runs for a yard or two, and sudden halts, their head on one side, listening, and their low cries one to another; but they are shy. These peewits appear to roost on the lawn, but are off again in the early morning.

There are many other entertaining residents. The little palm doves, for instance, whose chief characteristics are a

fighting spirit combined with marked idiocy which makes them attempt, day after day, to build on the shutters of the house; the shutters being shut every evening means the collapse of the twigs so laboriously collected. Then there are the beautiful families of hoopoes, who carry on their heads the golden feather crowns, the gift of Solomon. When out walking one day King Solomon found the sun too hot, so the Arab story goes. He asked if any animal or bird could help him. The hoopoes flew up and formed themselves into a close flock between Solomon and the sun. The King offered them anything they liked to ask for as a reward. They chose crowns of gold, though he warned them that it was a vain and unpractical thing for which they asked. Sure enough, a few days later the chief hoopoe came back and begged that the crowns should be removed—they were so heavy that all his hoopoes had stiff necks and could not fly in comfort. Solomon forgave them, and as they were truly penitent provided them with beautiful light feather crowns instead.

The smallest and most endearing of the resident birds is the little graceful warbler. It is about two inches long with another two inches of tail. Every year it builds a beautiful little domed nest in a *lavendula* bush near the house and lays five apricot-coloured eggs about the size of a finger-nail. These little birds hop about eating insects off the bushes twelve inches from your nose, with no concern whatsoever.

Nearly every wild animal has by now disappeared from Gezira—except one large mongoose which can be seen from time to time in our garden. I have not seen a fox for five or six years. But it is encouraging to note that the ordinary garden birds have, if anything, increased. Also the Egyptians themselves are beginning to take an interest in them. In the fine new Agricultural Museum opened by His Majesty King Farouk recently there is a beautiful collection of birds; one of the most artistically arranged that I know. An interest in and protection of birds has more than an intellectual or scientific value for Egypt, as the very life of Egypt depends so much on the success of her crops, and therefore to a great extent on that eternal battle between man and the insect pests—a battle in which many varieties of birds are man's staunchest allies.

MARY ROWLATT.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE BLOCKADE.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN made a fighting speech on January 9th and again on January 31st; Mr. Cross on January 17th and again on January 24th; Lord Halifax on January 20th; Mr. Churchill on January 20th and 27th; M. Daladier on January 29th; Herr Hitler on January 30th. The fury of talk continued at such a pace. But something more was happening than the delivery of fighting speeches—even though “fighting” was in fact being waged largely by speeches and by their effect on civilian *moral*. What was also happening was that the process of mutual blockade by Britain and Germany was producing substantial results on both sides, and the progress towards the final triumph of starving out the women and children—and of course the men too—in both countries was measurably gaining pace.

So far the new technique of war had not been abandoned for the old style; although many of the prophets warned us that the reversion to type might be effected at any moment. The new style, as so far operative, had in it a certain clear-sighted realism. It was obvious, even if the experience of the war in its first performance a quarter of a century ago had not already demonstrated the fact, that the result of the struggle, if prolonged, would be decided by starvation in one country or the other, or in both. If in both, then the war would have to be called a draw. If Germany collapsed from starvation first, then Britain would be deemed to have won. If Britain starved first, Germany would be deemed to have won. It was very simple.

The last time the same simple issue was foolishly and unnecessarily complicated by the heroics of the several battle-fronts where old-fashioned ideas combined with new-fashioned scientific skill contrived to kill about 10 million men. This time—for the human race does apparently learn by its experience—the purposeless waste of 10 million lives in battle is by a sort of instinctive “gentleman’s agreement” so far being avoided; the two combatants, Britain and Germany, have settled down to the essential business of starving each other out. France is not yet deeply involved

on October 15th when the President of the Republic in a statement to the Danish press said that "we are able to remain calm and feel confident that the strict neutrality in which we believe will extricate us from the difficulties which seem to threaten our peaceful life," and went on to quote the treaties of 1920 and the non-aggression pacts of 1932 and 1933 as the "basis" of Finland's relations with Russia. Those pacts, valid till 1945, even defined "aggression" as including any act "injurious to the independence or integrity of either party" (Article 1). Moreover, Article V bound both parties to settle "disputes of any character" by pacific means.

Throughout October the "negotiations" continued, Dr. Paasikivi travelling backwards and forwards between Helsinki and Moscow. On October 21st he was joined by Mr. Tanner, the Minister of Finance (who had been a co-signatory with Dr. Paasikivi of the Finnish-Russian Treaty of 1920). On October 30th Dr. Paasikivi announced that he had received a personal message from President Roosevelt expressing warm sympathy with Finland's cause and begging to be informed at once if anything should happen to "threaten Finland's position." By November 1st the Finnish Foreign Minister announced that "the Russian demands now made appear to be an obvious expression of Russian imperialism." He added that Finland could not give up her means of self-defence, protested that Finland could never become a jumping-off ground for third parties against Russia, and even offered to help Russia in strengthening the defences of Leningrad. Three days later the Prime Minister in the course of a broadcast statement declared that "Finland is prepared in all circumstances to defend herself." On November 12th it was announced semi-officially in Moscow that the Finnish politicians "wanted war" and that the Russian Government would now have to find "other ways" of obtaining what it wanted. A week earlier *Pravda* had ominously compared Mr. Erkkö with Colonel Beck in the "provocative" nature of his speeches.

To cut the story short, the balloon duly went up on November 28th, when the Russian Government denounced its Pact of Non-Aggression with Finland. To denounce a pact of non-aggression was logically to advertise a disposition towards aggression, though it was not clear why so punctilious a prelude should have been regarded as necessary by the

modern type of aggressor. On the following day Mr. Molotov, Russian Prime Minister, made a speech on the exact Hitler model about "a new era of friendship between the Soviet Union and Finland"; and within a few hours his troops had crossed the Finnish border and begun the war. Mr. Molotov copied Hitler so exactly that in the course of his speech he accused small Finland of "hostility," "provocation," and even "aggression," of everything in fact that Russia herself intended to do. He said that Russia had no territorial ambitions against Finland, and that she was prepared to hand over to Finland the richest part of Karelia in return for the cession by Finland of bases necessary to the Russian navy in the defence of Leningrad. His chorus in Moscow repeated the refrain that Finland, though herself small, was the potential channel for an enemy Power's attack on Russia. The said enemy was now specified diffusely as Britain (who was accused of having virtually annexed Finland), the United States (who had expressed sympathy with Finland and had even offered to mediate), and the Scandinavian countries, "lackeys of British and American capitalism."

Mr. Molotov's speech is well worth pondering as an indication of the depth to which the world has sunk: for such a speech indicates the sort of thing the world now has to deal with. Unfortunately no Russian speech can ever be adequately quoted. They are always too long, yet the true effect is cumulative. One or two of Mr. Molotov's more dishonest passages may, however, be shortly summarised. He started roundly by the statement that "the hostile policy of the present Finnish Government compels us to take immediate steps to safeguard the external security of our State." He spoke of Russian "patience" and Finnish "intransigence" during the long preceding "negotiations." He then blandly told his categorical lie that "there has been abominable provocation by the Finnish military on the Finnish-Soviet frontier during the past few days. Our soldiers were even shelled by artillery near Leningrad, and heavy casualties were caused among the Red troops. Our efforts to prevent a repetition of such provocations by practical proposals put to Finland have met with no response, and even evoked a hostile attitude in Finnish leading circles." Next, the Finns "even jeered at our victims"; and "from such a militarist Government we

can expect nothing but fresh impertinent provocation." As for Russia's attitude, he declared that she had no intention of "violating Finnish independence or annexing Finnish territory." He then submitted his *ad hoc* argument thus: "If the Finnish attitude towards the Soviet Union had been friendly, the Soviet Government, who have always striven to maintain friendly relations with Finland, would have been prepared to make territorial concessions. We would have been prepared to give favourable consideration to the problem of a reunion of the Karelian people in the present Soviet Karelia with the kindred Finnish people in a united and independent Finnish nation. The condition for this, however, would have been not a hostile but a friendly attitude on the part of the Finnish Government towards the Soviet Union. Such an attitude would have corresponded to the deepest interests of both countries." So did he think to quash the imperialist allegation, if any such should be made against Russia by stiff-necked outsiders. As for any possible charge of communist designs, Mr. Molotov declared that "We regard Finland as an independent and sovereign State, whatever her régime may be. We consider that the Finnish people are entitled to decide for themselves all matters of foreign and domestic policy in the way they deem necessary. The peoples of the Soviet Union have done what was necessary for the independence of Finland. The peoples of our country are prepared to assist the Finnish people in securing a free and independent development. The Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of interfering with the interests of other States in Finland. The question of Finland's relations with other States is a matter for the Finns to decide, and the Soviet Union is not entitled to interfere with them. The only aim of our nation is to safeguard the security of the Soviet Union and in particular of Leningrad, with its population of three and a half millions." So his speech drew peacefully towards its close: "In view of the present international situation, which is extremely tense as a result of the war, we could not make the solution of this vital and urgent question conditional upon the bad faith of the present Finnish leaders. This matter must be solved by the Soviet Union in friendly co-operation with the Finnish people. Only the successful solution of the problem of the safety of Leningrad can lead to a new era of friendship between the Soviet Union and Finland."

That speech was delivered on the evening of November 29th. At 9 o'clock the next morning the offensive began by the bombing from the air of Helsinki, Viborg and other objectives, by shelling from the sea and aggression by land along the whole frontier. Pamphlets were dropped from the air demanding a new Government (whereby was travestied Mr. Molotov's words about not interfering in Finnish internal affairs). The communist offensive was indeed promptly launched when on the second day of the war (December 1st) Moscow set up a puppet "People's Government" in territory occupied by the invading troops in the neighbourhood of Terijoki. On that same day a new Finnish Government was formed at Helsinki under Dr. Risto Ryti, Governor of the Bank of Finland. Its clear purpose was to broaden the national character of the government. It included Mr. Tanner and Dr. Paasikivi, who had led the negotiations in Moscow. While the new Government maintained the old willingness to negotiate a settlement with Russia, it offered a still stiffer front against the Bolshevik aggression.

Mr. Roosevelt lost no time in expressing the effect made upon him and his country by this new outburst of lawless force. Speaking at a Press Conference on December 1st he said: "It is tragic to see the policy of force spreading and to realise that wanton disregard for the law is still on the march. . . . To the great misfortune of the world the present trend towards force makes insecure the independent existence of the small nations of every continent and jeopardises the rights of mankind to self-government." On the same day Mr. Molotov told the American Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. L. Steinhardt, that the inclusion in the new Finnish Government of Mr. Tanner and Dr. Paasikivi showed that there was no change in the Finnish attitude to Russia, and therefore that Moscow could not negotiate with that Government. He did suggest that negotiations could be started with the "Government" of Otto Kuusinen (the communist who among other achievements had signed the famous Zinoviev letter in 1924) set up that day near Terijoki.

There was an immediate and widespread reaction in such diplomatic quarters as were not merely struck dumb. Though the Italian and Japanese Governments both suspended official comment the Press of both countries expressed strong condemnation of Russian action. The Vatican, through the

Osservatore Romano, exposed the Russian menace with increased outspokenness. The German people were not allowed to know that their friends the Finns had been the victim of a Russian atrocity at which the German Government was forced to connive by reason of its unholy Pact. But the facts could not be wholly obscured even by Dr. Goebbels' omnipotence over German minds, for there are surrounding neutral countries, and neutral visitors cannot be physically gagged at the frontier. The German Press therefore and the semi-official News Agency lightly referred to minor "provocatory attacks" by Finnish troops on the Russian border. The lack of any official German pronouncement perhaps best revealed the German embarrassment, both over the gratuitous spectacle of flattery by imitation in action, and over the contemplation of Russia's next potential appetite for *Lebensraum* across the path of Germany's own *Drang nach dem Südosten*. So far as British opinion was concerned, we had given a pledge to Poland only, against German aggression only. Already three months after the war started we were beginning to look rather academic as the universal champions of order, justice, liberty and whatnot. Germany of course now longed for a British declaration of war against Russia. Like the insurance companies, however, which promise to pay if your injury precisely fits their carefully stipulated catalogue of injuries, we promised help to Poland against Germany but not against Russia. If we were concerned about the fate of Poland and of Czechoslovakia, why not of Finland? Suppose the Germans, diagnosing the Russian expansion through the Baltic to be an indirect threat to themselves, were one day to go to the help of Finland against Russia, as we went "to the help of" Poland against Germany, would it be diplomatically possible even in this crazy age for Britain to fight against Germany *in re* Poland and at one and the same time to fight on the same side as Germany *in re* Finland? As the German annexation of half of Poland had symbolised (for Britain) a too strong Germany, so a Russian annexation of Finland might symbolise (for Germany) a too strong Russia. The attack on Finland was one of a series, following the attack on Poland and on the three Baltic States. Other fields loomed ahead. We all used to say that unless we stopped Hitler at Poland he would go still farther. Could not Hitler argue that unless he stopped Stalin at

Finland Stalin too would go farther? What disturbs the goose disturbs the gander.

The Aaland Islands, for instance, were Russia's property throughout the nineteenth century, being detached in 1809 from their ancient allegiance to the Swedish Crown. Though demilitarised in 1856 by treaty arrangement between Britain, France and Russia, they none the less were of strategic value to Russia by being Russia's; they could not at any rate be used against Russia. They became part of free Finland (with German help) a quarter of a century ago, but continued to be demilitarised until 1939. The spreading international horrors then suggested both to the Finnish and to the Swedish Governments that a demilitarised Aaland Archipelago might jeopardise the defence of both their countries. The two Governments therefore started negotiations last January with a view to modifying the demilitarised status of the islands. Russia intervened so effectively that last summer both Finland and Sweden dropped their proposals for refortifying any of the islands. If now Russia's object was to obtain full strategic control of the Baltic, the Aaland Islands offered an obvious temptation.

And what of Bessarabia? That territory too had been Russia's for a century before the last war. Ceded to her by the Ottoman Empire in 1812, it was taken from her and annexed by Rumania in 1918. The annexation was recognised by the four principal Allied Powers—Britain, France, Japan and Italy: but not by Russia, nor by the United States. Rumania asserts that her claim to Bessarabia, resting upon race and self-determination, survives the arrangement of 1812, and is clearly stronger than a Russian claim which is based only on a mere century of occupation. But who cares to-day about racial self-determination as exercised before 1812, or about Russian occupation for a century thereafter, or about Rumania's subsequent recovery of the territory? In these days the only effective title is possession. Germany, encircled in 1914 by Britain, France and Russia, and having in August 1939 detached Russia (as Herr von Ribbentrop woodenly thought) from the looming new encirclement by those same three Powers, found by December 1939 that after all she was in effect again encircled as effectively as in 1914, by precisely those Powers, and as the result of Germany's own foolish diplomacy. It was an insidious,

in it. The frontier between France and Germany is closed by the Siegfried and Maginot lines, and neither side need do anything more about it. The ring is cleared for the Anglo-German contest, which will be continued (as far as the political theorists can see) until one side or both can bear the pangs of hunger no longer.

In such a contest the speeches of the politicians are clearly of belligerent importance. If Mr. Chamberlain or Mr. Churchill can persuade British listeners that German women and children are being wracked with an agony of suffering, then those British listeners will tighten their own belts and (for such is war) will feel comforted. If Herr Hitler, as he tried to do on January 30th, can persuade his German listeners that Britain is out for nothing else than the destruction of Germany (the truth or untruth of which pretence is quite irrelevant to his purpose) then those listeners will tighten *their* belts and will the less complainingly starve because they believe that the alternative would be even worse.

The extent to which masses of people can be thus bemused by their political leaders is one of the formidable things in human experience. No doubt it does good in the long run. The Kaiser's Germany by such means encompassed its own ruin. Hitler's Germany is now bent upon the like process. Neither the one nor the other need cause the world much regret. Similarly, the once too great and too prosperous British Empire is being impoverished, to the greater happiness, when the deed is done, of the British people.

It is being done, as it were, subconsciously. How many English people even to-day realise that though technical military victory was theirs in 1918, they in effect lost that war, as the prosperous people always must lose wars? In 1930 a certain British student of affairs, who wrote under the pen name Logistes, published a book under the title *The Dupe as Hero* to show by financial, economic, social and cultural facts then clearly established that Britain had certainly lost more, and the United States (who had had the sense to keep out of it till it was nearly finished) had certainly won more, out of the war of 1914-18 than any other country, whether belligerent or not. He was greeted in the typical expression of one national newspaper as a "brilliant cynic." Yet he wrote the simple unadorned truth. Blinded as before by the remaining (though much diminished) assets of national

prosperity, Britain six months ago plunged again into war, with the only probable prospect of completing the process of impoverishment begun in 1914. A period of true and abounding prosperity is indubitably in store for us, and perhaps for the whole world, when the present Third Reich of Germany is defeated (as it is bound to be) and the present Great Britain has shouldered the crippling cost of what she is now doing.

The general destruction produced by the war, even by the present "passive" sort of war, will probably call for reconstruction on so vast a scale that capitalist operations of a corresponding magnitude will be inevitable. But it will not be the old industrialist capitalism of the nineteenth century. The good brought out of the evil of two world wars will perhaps chiefly be visible in the elimination from civilisation of the bad old concentration of wealth in the hands of a few: bad for the few and for the rest. The political feature of the past half-century, directly due to "totalitarian" methods begun in 1914, whereby Governments have been given supreme control over the lives and fortunes of men, is something fateful and insuperable. The justice of that fate consists in this, that it was the blinded and stupid possessors of wealth a quarter of a century ago who, for what they imagined was to be the safeguarding of their wealth, put into power a political dictatorship from which we have all suffered ever since and which has been the very instrument for the squandering of national wealth and the ruin of the very capitalists who were responsible for it. God's Justice has its poetic quality.

The prospective new capitalism, precisely because of the socialist practice instituted (blindly) by the old capitalists, will have a far wider basis. Let those who are depressed by the war and by the blackout spend some time in reflecting upon the incalculably good results in true prosperity that are likely to follow the two world wars, and upon the inscrutable processes of God which have brought them about. The clue and corrective to present gloom are often found in historical retrospect. There are those in both Britain and Germany—traitors, according to the political convention—who hope and work for an arrangement behind the scenes which will stop the war by saving the politicians' faces, and thus save something from the material wreck. They are financiers, business men, men in almost every walk of life except the political.

The politicians go on talking about *Lebensraum* (in Germany) or about defending liberty (in Great Britain), the while they proceed to destroy both. But all these forces in their turn are the (to us) blind workings of an over-ruling fate, fascinating in its tremendous scope.

Several such face-saving attempts have been made since the war started. They have come so far only from Germany. When it was made known at Christmas that President Roosevelt had decided to send Mr. Myron Taylor as his personal envoy to the Vatican in order to co-ordinate American and Papal efforts for peace, the lively German mind judged it opportune to launch another feeler for a "peace settlement." The German machine was put into operation despite the fact that Mr. Roosevelt had himself engaged in the sort of anti-German polemics already familiar to the British public. Addressing Congress and the people of the United States on the state of the American union (January 3rd) he made the distinction that while "we do not have to go to war with other nations" yet America had to face "the vast difference between keeping out of war and pretending that this war is none of our business." He elaborated his point in this way: "Americans (he said) must look ahead to the possibilities for their children if the world came to be dominated by concentrated force alone; if small nations lost their independence, to become mere appendages of vast and powerful military systems; if a large part of the world were compelled to worship the god imposed by a military ruler or were forbidden to worship at all—were forbidden to read and hear the facts, and were deprived of the truth that makes men free; and if world trade were controlled by any nation or group of nations setting up that control through military force."

Mr. Roosevelt in fact re-echoed all the well-known slogans of the British case; and did it at least as well as any British orator when in his peroration he appealed for American unity "to keep ablaze on this continent the flames of human liberty, of reason, of democracy, and of fair play as living things to be preserved for the world which is to come."

Yet Herr Hitler and his team decided to put out their feeler. It might be supposed by innocent people that if Germany wanted peace she could have simply and openly proposed her terms. High diplomacy is not conducted in a way

that would win the approval of innocent people. The method adopted by the German Government was tortuous. On January 19th Mr. Goebbels made a speech at Posen, composed exclusively of crude abuse; an odd way of preparing a peace move, but wholly consonant with Germany's methods. Mr. Goebbels stated in his totalitarian temper that the only thing to do with "the English" was "to destroy them." The reason he gave was this: "We know these gentlemen very well. They are ferocious wolves wearing lambs' skins. They are trying to placate us with pious phrases about humanity and civilisation. If we sink a few of their fishing trawlers they lament about our inhuman methods of warfare. Simultaneously they would be only too glad to starve millions of our women, children and babies if they only could."

At the present moment the civilisation of Europe has reached this pass: that in the outward appearance our minds are wholly concerned with the fortunes of a vast conflict of gangsters. We all talk like gangsters. We all think like gangsters. Nothing else is happening except this gangster business: low, sordid, beastly, based upon the very negation of every decent human quality, including intelligence. And we all seem to conform. We accept the political dictate which cripples our public life.

But the appearance is deceptive. Momentous things are happening deep down in human affairs. The apparently strangling power of politicians the world over has (apparently) gone too far. The effective bondage is this, that we all dance to the tunes of our politicians; and humanity seems to revolt against it. The appearance, however, merely cloaks the method whereby truly big human events are so often consummated. The time cannot be far distant when man will find that his true rights have been restored; not freedom (for there is no such thing), but the right to live, to think and to cultivate the soul. The true world revolution is moving fast. Its effects will be the recognition of God as alone worthy of man's allegiance, and the relegation of Cæsar, whose main task will then have been performed, to a minor competency in exclusively material convenience.

At present we still dance to the politicians' tunes. After the performance of Mr. Goebbels aforesaid it became known from no fewer than four neutral countries (Sweden, Holland, Switzerland and Italy) that German agents, calling

themselves delegations, had crossed the frontier from Germany and had made known their "mission"; namely to suggest still another basis for an immediate armistice. The suggestion this time was that (1) Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria (although in one of the four missions Austria was not mentioned) be evacuated by Germany, but that they should agree to a "customs union" with Germany; (2) that Herr Hitler be deposed and replaced by Field-Marshal Göring; (3) that if these suggestions be not accepted, then hell would be let loose by the German forces on land, on sea and in the air (as was likewise threatened on the former such occasions). There was nothing essentially new in that technique. Its object clearly was not to encompass any honest peace, but to confuse public opinion in the Allied countries, which, unlike German public opinion, is still open to outside influence. If Germany had wanted an honest peace, the honest method was open to her.

The blockade therefore went on. German efforts by torpedo and by mine were concentrated on sinking ships bound for Britain in the hope that the risk to ships would in the end act as a deterrent to any sea-borne enterprise, and Britain would be starved into surrender. It was not so obvious how Britain could hope to cripple Germany, for the British method was less spectacular, and Germany seemed to be adequately protected by an almost complete ring of neutral states, and, moreover, to have at her disposal for supplies virtually the whole of Europe except France. Mr. Cross, on January 17th, threw a corrective light on that apparent situation.

Such light, however, as was available from any quarter did not penetrate far. For six months the man in the street and the politician behind the scenes had been enveloped in a blackout. All the normal processes of national life had been stopped. We were blindly preparing for something, but hardly knew what. We had no clue as to the enemy's intentions, if he had any intention beyond just prolonging the tactic of passive waiting, the while we squandered our wealth at a rate now approaching £8 million and soon to reach £10 million a day. Mr. Chamberlain, on January 9th, called it the calm before the storm; but it was a formidable sort of calm that did more damage at a quicker pace than any storm ever known in the history of the world.

Only at sea was the visible spectacular damage easily assessable. The German fleet had lost by capture, sinking and scuttling some 228,000 tons and the rest of her tonnage was bottled up in foreign ports or in the Baltic. Yet it was doubtful if Germany's use of the sea, belligerent or mercantile, except for the purpose of blockade (which involved only submarine tonnage) could have a decisive bearing on the war. In January of this year no fewer than 11 million tons of British shipping were still sailing the seas. Our mercantile losses, if against them be set our gains by capture, by transfer from foreign flags or by new building, amounted to 122,000 tons, or less than 1 per cent. of the total merchant fleet. If, therefore, the first six months were a fair criterion, and if there were no other factors, there seemed no reason why the war of attrition should not last for ever.

The answer is that there are indeed other and far more important factors. It is merely one result of the general blackout that we are inclined to overlook the fact that we are indeed engaged in a financial *Blitzkrieg*: for the pace in that field is something that had never been approached in intensity by any financial blizzard known in peace time or in war. It was for that reason that the review of the economic war given by Mr. Cross on January 17th was read eagerly by all the bewildered people, who had had no more satisfying information than the military "news."

Mr. Cross wisely acknowledged the entirely different situation that now faced the British contraband control, in contrast with the situation that faced us during the last war. To-day the whole of Europe is open to Germany, excepting only the frontier with France. In the last war Germany was nearly surrounded by enemy territory, including Belgium, Italy, Rumania and Russia. The British navy's work then consisted, therefore, in preventing any goods passing into Germany. To-day such a technique is impossible. A wholly new technique has had to be evolved, much more costly to us, more involved, less effective. We have had to seek the co-operation of the neutral states by means of trade agreements, which in their nature cannot be as effective as a direct British blockade. No fewer than fourteen countries have had to be approached by the British Government in that sense: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Iceland, Spain, Switzerland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Jugoslavia,

spreading encirclement resulting from Herr von Ribbentrop's own work last August. Though it is the way of mortals to misjudge things, few mortals ever so badly misjudged things as did Herr von Ribbentrop when in the hope of preventing Britain and France from taking up Poland's cause he gave his Nordic blessing to the communist Jews who had ruined Russia, only to find that he had thereby made it certain that Britain and France would declare war on Germany and had moreover given to Russia the opportunity, such as Britain and France could never have given her, of closing in upon Germany both in the east and in the north.

Can any student of affairs, not afflicted with mental anaemia, really believe that Stalin, who knows that Hitler's word is as good as his own, and Hitler, who knows that Stalin's word is as good as his own, will ever prosecute a co-ordinated campaign against anybody? There may be honour among the lesser thieves. Hitler and Stalin are the marauding tigers, both at large but deprived of the jungle tigers' saving common sense which bids them avoid each other. Stalin, coveting the collapse of European civilisation so that he could establish upon its ruins the reign of godless materialism which his debased mind has conceived, always postulated an Anglo-German war as the surest means to his end. We obediently did what he wanted, and without much difficulty. There are British "thinkers" well above the average of their race in brains, who instead would have refrained from guaranteeing Poland and left Germany and Russia to fight it out upon Polish soil; in short who from the materialist British point of view postulated by contrast a German-Russian war. They think that maybe by good luck, not by good management, they will now get what they want. If they do, their last state will be worse than their first, unless they take it as an opportunity for calling off the dogs of war impartially from all parties, and building a new world on the ruins of the old. That cannot be until the British people cease regarding themselves as God's chosen people, and instead admit their own grievous faults. Since September 1939 the pace at which diplomacy, out of human control, has produced unexpected results, is an experience that surprises many people, and cheers up a few. In political circles calculations and expectations are nearly always proved wrong. The "well informed" people give a scrupulous weight to all the factors, except one.

If you told an average hard-boiled politician that in human affairs of no matter what kind, it is a mistake in your calculations to ignore the part played by God in them, he would probably behind your back express a sincere concern for your mental welfare, not suspecting that his own mental equipment might be at fault. By December 1939 Britain, Germany and Italy were supplying arms to Finland for use against Russia. The blind political forces never did more interesting things.

A bitter climax was reached in the tale of Europe's irony when on December 11th the Assembly of the League of Nations met to consider a Finnish appeal against Russian aggression. It was Mr. Litvinov, the Russian delegate, who at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in 1932 had proposed "general and complete disarmament" as the only safeguard against aggression, who had proposed that the Great Powers be disarmed first as a safeguard for the Small Powers "most liable to aggression," and who in the series of non-aggression pacts concluded by him with small States had defined aggression as "any attempt whatsoever to settle territorial or other disputes existing between the two countries by violent means." Thirteen years earlier, in answer to Germany's observations on the draft of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies stated that the disarmament clauses imposed on Germany were "the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote." The League of Nations in December 1939 showed a flicker of life as though to mock its own failure, now manifested in the surrounding wars.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

GERMANY, A RETROSPECT.*

BEFORE Bismarck. Germany only became a Nation-State in 1871. Lacking well-defined natural frontiers the Germanic tribes were constantly at war with one another, and their disunion encouraged invasion. The Holy Roman Empire established by Charlemagne vainly strove to unify the country. The Reformation introduced a source of discord between north and south, and the devastation of the Thirty Years' War threw back culture for a hundred years. In the eighteenth century the prowess of Frederick the Great made Prussia a nucleus for a future grouping of North German states, while the Hapsburgs, who were also the Holy Roman Emperors, remained the dominant Power in the Catholic south. For a few years the whole country lay prostrate under the heel of Napoleon; but the Wars of Liberation, culminating in the victories of Leipzig and Waterloo, created the opportunity for a new order.

Napoleon had abolished the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, and the Treaty of Vienna established the *Deutscher Bund* (German Confederation), with its capital at Frankfurt. Austria and Prussia (the latter substantially enlarged by her share in the partition of Poland and her extension to the Rhineland) were the two chief members, and the minor states (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Saxony, Hesse, Hanover, etc.) formed a group of their own. The experiment proved a failure, for the rivalry of Austria and Prussia increased. An attempt to find a better organisation for Central Europe was made by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848, most members of which longed to combine unification with constitutional liberty. Its lofty schemes were wrecked by the refusal of the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, to assume the leadership of the national cause. Brought up in a period in which Austria's primacy under Metternich was unquestioned, he declined to challenge the Hapsburg Emperor. Moreover, his Divine Right conception of kingship prevented him from accepting power from a Parliament. Revolutions broke out in Berlin and other cities, but the excitement was soon over. The failure of German Liberalism, never very strong, left the way open for Bismarck. The gradual

formation of the Zollverein (Tariff Union) under Prussian auspices pointed the way to political unification.

The Hohenzollern Empire. In 1851 Bismarck, a Prussian Junker, was chosen to represent Prussia at the Diet at Frankfurt, and for the next eight years he studied the working of the federal system. He concluded that it could not last; that Austria, which was only partially a German State, must be thrust out; and that the anæmic confederation must be exchanged for a powerful empire under Prussian leadership. Called to power in 1862 by King William I, his first task was to force through the military reforms demanded by Moltke, the Chief of Staff, and Roon, the Minister of War, and for that purpose he suspended the Constitution. The political problems confronting Germany, he declared in famous words, must be solved by blood and iron, not by debates and resolutions. In a few years the Prussian army was the strongest in Europe, and his fellow-countrymen learned why he needed it. Victorious in three wars (in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria, in 1870 against France) King William was crowned German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in 1871.

The Iron Chancellor bestrode Europe like a colossus. Having founded the Empire in three successful wars he knew how to stop, and the man of war became the champion of the *status quo*. Well aware that France would never forget the loss of Alsace and Lorraine he isolated her by the creation of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy). The friendly neutrality of Russia was secured by not opposing her aims in the Near East, and that of England by abstaining from the construction of a fleet. He was the greatest of German nationalists. If we define Imperialism as the extension of rule over alien races, he was not an Imperialist. He founded a Colonial Empire in 1884-5, chiefly in Africa; but it was done in response to the demands of commercial circles and achieved without war. His maxim was limited liability. Europe was his chess-board and he desired no other, for there, with the German army behind him, he was supreme.

William II. With his fall in 1890 a new spirit entered German policy. It was the age of Imperialism, and the young Emperor William II was determined to have his share in the perilous game. We can hardly blame him, for of the eight Great Powers of the world Austria alone was content with her

* This brief sketch and similar outlines written for the use of study circles may be obtained from the League of Nations Union, 60 St. Martin's Lane, London, W.C.2.

European possessions. His mistake, and that of his advisers, particularly Bülow, was that they threw the principle of limited liability to the winds. If the Kaiser, with his love of the sea and his admiration for the British navy, was determined to have a powerful fleet (which would inevitably alarm England), it was his obvious interest to retain the confidence of Russia. If, on the other hand, he resolved to extend German influence in the Near East and Asia Minor by a railway to Bagdad (which was bound to antagonise Russia), he should have made sure of our friendship. One or other of these courses might have been successful, but it was folly to attempt both at the same time. Russia and France drew together in 1891, England and France in 1904, England and Russia in 1907. The Triple Alliance was thus confronted by a Triple Entente. The situation was even worse from a German point of view than it looked, for Italy was slipping away from the Central Powers, and the strength of the Hapsburg Empire was being sapped by the rising tide of nationalism within its borders. Though Germany had grown rapidly in population, wealth and armed strength, her international position was weaker when Bülow left office in 1909 than when he took the reins in 1897. His successor in the Chancellorship, Bethmann Hollweg, made an honest attempt to rebuild the bridges, but it was too late. The Kaiser, with Tirpitz at his elbow, declined to limit his fleet, and Russia's rivalry with Austria in the Balkans was too keen to allow Austria's ally to restore trustful relations with St. Petersburg.

The War of 1914. Germany did not start the crisis which led to the outbreak of war, and to saddle her with the sole blame is ridiculous. Europe was racked by three major antagonisms—the Anglo-German rivalry at sea, the Franco-German feud about Alsace-Lorraine, and Austro-Russian competition in the Near East. Of these the latter was the most dangerous. Austria's immediate quarrel was with Serbia, who with the aid of Russia hoped to play the part of Piedmont in the unification of the Southern Slavs—a programme involving the carving-up of the Hapsburg Empire. The severity of the ultimatum after the murder of the heir to the throne at Serajevo only becomes intelligible when we realise that to Austrian statesmen it was the last drop which made the cup overflow. It was well understood both in Vienna and Berlin that punitive action against Serbia might

bring Russia in, even though no treaty bound her to intervene, for her prestige as the leading Slav Power was involved. But since Austria considered that the time had come to make a stand against Servian ambitions, the Kaiser promised the support for which Francis Joseph asked. He and Bethmann had not the slightest desire for war, but they could have done nothing else. A refusal would have devitalised the Austro-German alliance and left Germany without a friend. Their tragic error was in not insisting on being consulted at every step. A blank cheque was given to Vienna. When the terms of the ultimatum were received at Berlin it was admitted that they were too sharp, though it was too late to attempt their modification. No single country was solely responsible for the catastrophe, but Austria's share was the greatest, for it was she who set the avalanche in motion by an unacceptable ultimatum. The deeper causes were the anarchic doctrine of national sovereignty, the absence of any international machinery, and the age-long tradition that the graver disputes between states could only be settled by the sword.

Political and Economic Ideas. Germany is a land of thinkers, scholars and poets, no less than of statesmen and warriors, and their influence has been profound. The broad difference between German and English political thought is that the former tends to exalt the State while the latter stresses the rights of the individual. Herder called Germany the land of obedience, a term no one has applied to England or France. With our island position and our wooden walls we were able to build up a system of free institutions without compulsory service or the fear of invasion. In Germany, on the other hand, with her lack of natural frontiers, a powerful State and a formidable army seemed essential. Hobbes, who proclaimed the doctrine of unfettered sovereignty in the seventeenth century, was far less representative of the deeper tendencies of British opinion than Locke, who favoured the division of power, or Mill, who pleaded for the flowering of personality. *Habeas corpus* and many similar laws proclaim our determination to clip the wings of the State, which we regard as our servant, not our master. In Germany, on the other hand, the tradition is authoritarian. The modern German mind, which begins with Leibnitz and Lessing, stands for critical methods and independent thought. German historical scholarship, led by Ranke and Mommsen, won its

Italy and Greece. Moreover, the United States as a policy had decreed that British purchases must be paid for in advance, and carried in British ships across the Atlantic. Japan, always sensitive to national affront, real or imagined, resented any interference by British ships, even though the British Government could claim the sanction of what we imaginatively call "international law" for what we did.

International law is a figment of a somewhat disordered imagination, if it be not something worse. It is a spreading disorder. All governments spend much time proving the violations of international engagements committed by other Powers. Nothing could be easier. To those who have not studied the figures, the scope of such controversy will come as a surprise. At the beginning of last November the annual "Report on the Work of the League of Nations, 1938-9" was rather grimly published (London: Allen & Unwin, 4s.). In some respects it may become one of the curiosities of history. In one respect it threw an astonishing light on the subject of international laws. On page 162 was given the record of the "Registration and Publication of Treaties and International Engagements" effected under Article 18 of the Covenant. The opportunity was taken, in what appears now to be a rather ironic spirit, to give the grand total up to date of all such registrations. Between May 19th, 1920, and May 19th, 1939, no fewer than 4,568 "treaties and international engagements" were submitted for registration, 211 of them during the period from May 19th, 1938, to May 19th, 1939. It follows that throughout the post-war period (as we used to call it, or as we ought perhaps now to call it, the "inter-war" period) an average of nearly one treaty a day was concluded. The very bulk of paper and volume of ink thus immolated must have cost a considerable fortune. And for what purpose? Not for the first time in history it is proved that treaties between armed sovereign states, not subject to any higher common sanction, are of as much moral value as the compacts between rival big shots in Chicago.

During the course of an actual war it is lamentably true that one hardly dare give good sense its due weight. To-day the results of a resounding German victory over Great Britain, or of a resounding British victory over Germany, would spell as much misery for millions of people as did the British victory over Germany in 1918.

Yet there is evidence that multitudes of people are being driven to consider this question of "international law" far more realistically than ever before. Every honest person in his heart knows that only one expedient will ever put an end to war. There is even a growing belief that two world wars in living memory will impose the obvious solution almost against our will: namely the effective subordination of disarmed nations to a supernational authority. Disarmament must obviously come first, or it will never come at all. Any child could tell the nations exactly how to stop this war and prevent all future wars; and any child knows that the (at present) insuperable difficulty is not to think out a scheme, but to induce the nations, acting through their politicians, to accept it. The scheme itself is readily suggested by the consideration that if hostilities are prolonged even on the present scale there is the danger not so much of the destruction of the existing social and economic order (which might be a blessing in disguise) but of the development of a state of anarchy worse than the German banditry which Britain and France profess to be combating. Therefore, pure logic might simply suggest: (1) that the belligerents, namely France, Germany and Great Britain, conclude an immediate armistice, and that the other four Great Powers of the world, namely, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States be invited to associate themselves with it, the sole purpose and stipulation of such an armistice being the total, universal and permanent disarmament of the whole world; (2) to ensure that each of those Powers be totally disarmed, that a permanent military commission should be set up for each country, composed of representatives of each of the *other six* contracting parties, who should (a) carry out the total disarmament of that Power, and (b) remain permanently in being to prevent the re-arming of that country, whether secretly or openly; (3) the Seven Powers should "invite" (nothing more would be necessary) all other Powers similarly to disarm. Since "Hitlerism" cannot function without arms it could be argued in simple logic that the Allies would thereby achieve the prime purpose of the war. Nor would there be any need to take Hitler's unsupported word. Adequate guarantees would have been secured.

The settlement of grievances by an International Conference of disarmed Powers would be far more likely to be

just and lasting than any peace settlement arrived at at the end of a long and bitter war.

How many people, however, admitting that such a scheme, if adopted, would do the trick, yet doubt if it could ever become practical politics and therefore dismiss it as "crazy"? Yet the time may come, under the stress of war's destruction and of the unlikelihood of any military decision except through universal exhaustion and impoverishment, when not so few people may be inclined to entertain remedies that go to the root of most things. For consider the practical implications of what Mr. Cross revealed on January 17th. International commerce is in its original theory a means of exchanging between countries the world's goods needed by them all, but not produced by them all. It is a mutual service, a means of helping one another. It has been perverted into the very opposite, and has become a means of mutual injury.

Mr. Cross, for instance, explained as an "encouraging" fact that Germany could not wholly replace on the continent of Europe the markets and sources of supply from which she had been cut off overseas. There were many important commodities, he said, which could reach Germany only by transport overseas, and there were other equally important commodities which she could not obtain in sufficient quantities from Europe. The rival technique therefore was for Germany to sink a maximum of the shipping that carried what Britain needed, and for Britain, having cut off Germany from such of her supplies as formerly came overseas, now to concentrate on "pre-emptive purchases" on the continent of Europe in order to cut her off from the rest.

Mr. Cross gave no details, for such details are regarded as secrets valuable to the enemy (who none the less probably knew most of them); but he gave a hint of the sort of thing he had in mind. "We might," he said, "spend a large sum buying up the whole supply available to Germany of a key material. On the other hand we might also buy goods merely to tighten Germany's industrial belt." In other words, we were pouring out our wealth to buy up things—at any price—not because we wanted them ourselves, but to prevent them going to Germany who did want them. The proverb about a dog in a manger is an insult to dogs, but it seems is not only fair to human beings, but in this particular instance we admit it, boast of it, are even "encouraged" by our success at it.

The tactic was applied not only to essentials but to luxuries. It was announced, for instance, on January 27th by the Ministry of Economic Warfare (that monument of an ironic civilisation) that an agreement had been reached between the British and the Greek Governments. The innocuous content of that agreement was understood to be (though it was not announced) that a three-year deadlock over the debt payment had been resolved, and that Greece had accepted a 43 per cent. basis of payment instead of the 40 per cent. she had formerly offered. For the rest the announcement merely referred to "economic and financial matters interesting both countries." The Germans knew quite well (although it was kept a secret here) that we had undertaken to buy up as much Greek tobacco as would prevent any from going to Germany. To deprive the Germans of their smokes was an excellent stroke in a war of nerves. America knew it too. One result of America's refusal to supply Britain with goods except on payment in advance was that it became an essential point of British policy, in order to safeguard our reserves of gold, dollars and securities, not to buy anything from the United States except what we could not buy elsewhere on better terms. The tobacco growers of Virginia were thus deprived of their best market, for Britain had ceased to buy.

It is as easy to smash markets and spread distress as it is hard to develop them and to serve the constructive interests of mankind. The British Treasury was engaged on the Continent of Europe in the topsy-turvy commercial enterprise of buying anything and everything, not at the best but at the worst price. The British Government went to producers in South Eastern Europe and in effect said: "How much (literally, how *much*) money will you take for your products?" It was a glorious game for the merchants of South Eastern Europe. They had to quote as high, not as low, a price as they could think of. The belligerent consideration was that if Britain doubled the price, Germany could compete as a buyer only by paying a still higher price, and in the process would deplete her own supply of foreign exchange. We wasted our money in order to waste Germany's money. It was a form of auction sale, in which the buyer's concern was not his desire for the thing he was bidding for, but only his desire to prevent his rival from getting it, or to ruin him if he did get it.

Mr. Cross had some terrific triumphs to record in that extremely easy game: easy because whatever money he squandered, he merely paid out of the pockets of the income-tax payer. "Germany's difficulties," he said with great satisfaction, "are serious in regard to the supply of certain materials. There are shortages of petroleum, iron, copper, wool, cotton, oils and fats, and many other commodities. The requirements of the export trade are being given priority over the home market. It is in the export field that we shall find the best test of Germany's industrial discomfort. There are there many examples of shortages. Germany is trying to export cars and bicycles to adjacent neutrals without tyres." That was a gleeful picture. "We look forward," pursued Mr. Cross, "to the day when we shall have so strangled Germany's economic life that she can no longer sustain her war effort."

Much more than Germany's economic life however is being strangled. When Mr. Cross prophesied that thereby he was bringing nearer the day of "victory" he was prophesying, as we shall one day be shown, something much truer than he knew. The evil genius of Germany, which was a necessary challenge to bring into action the earth-shaking forces we now experience, will one day be found to have served a purpose that such men as Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop never could have suspected. The very crudity of their lies, their brutality, their clear violation of all decent human feeling, is totally inexplicable except as the unconscious challenge which is forcing the world to remake itself. Lord Halifax, on January 20th, was unquestionably right when he declared in his speech at Leeds: "While it would be dangerous and wrong in any way to underestimate the organised strength of the enemy, or the severity of the ordeal which that strength is bound to impose upon ourselves and our Allies, I cannot doubt that the factors which will ultimately prove decisive are on our side." But the victory is not what he foreshadowed, though he may in his heart have known the truth. He could perhaps have adopted the words of Coriolanus:

" . . . all the swords
In Italy, and her confederate arms,
Could not have made this peace."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 12th, 1940.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.*

The Editor of the excellent series *Ambassadors at Large* wisely decided to write the volume on England himself. Mr. Carr combines the inside knowledge which he gained as an official of the Foreign Office with the independence of an Aberystwyth Professor. In a brief Foreword Lord Halifax expresses his opinion that the difficult task has been admirably performed, and readers are likely to agree. Needless to say he stands outside party politics, and the criticisms of policy in which he freely indulges are his own disinterested judgments. Even when he feels that mistakes have been committed, he points out how natural it was to make them, and how difficult to foresee some of their consequences.

The first chapter, "Britain and Democracy," surveys the foundations of our national strength—strategic, political, economic, psychological; for policy must depend on the means at our disposal to carry it out. In a democratic community "no foreign policy can in the long run be effective unless the country is prepared to fight for it." In other words, the Government has far less freedom of choice than of old, for it dare not commit us to responsibilities which we should

* *The Foreign Policy of Britain, 1918-38.* By E. H. Carr. Longmans. 6s.
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acknowledged primacy in the nineteenth century through the fearless pursuit of truth. Yet there has always been a gulf between the intellectual and the political worlds. Hegel and Treitschke have had far more influence than Kant, the greatest of German Liberals. While the latter pleaded for a society of self-governing nations in his immortal treatise on Perpetual Peace, the former set no limits to the power of the State, including the right to make war whenever it liked.

Liberalism in the British or French sense has never taken root in Germany, which is the land of the expert just as England is the paradise of the amateur. Both countries strive for the welfare of the citizen, and it is to Germany's credit that she first introduced the system of national insurance. But in the one he looks to the State for orders, in the other he chooses representatives to execute his will. What the Dictators describe and despise as Liberalism is the sharing of power and responsibility, the doctrine that every citizen is both subject and sovereign, that ordered liberty is the greatest prize of civilised mankind. Its philosophy rests on the view that the average man will rise to his opportunities. Bülow used to complain that the Germans were an unpolitical people. It would be truer to say that they lack political experience and self-confidence. In England we have only had one dictator, Oliver Cromwell, and we never want another. In the land of obedience there is a widespread craving for a superman in troubled times.

In the economic field we trace the same tendency to assert the power of the State. Our greatest teacher, Adam Smith, argued that the wealth of nations was best secured by the removal of fetters on industry and trade. The greatest German economist, Friedrich List, taught that the ordering of the economic life of the community was as much a function of Government as national defence. For a portion of the nineteenth century Prussia possessed a lower tariff than England, but Bismarck returned to Protection. In another field, banking, the influence of the State has been much more direct than with us. The vast enterprise of the Bagdad railway, for instance, was financed by the Deutsche Bank (which must not be confused with the Reichsbank), backed by the Government. The relations of the State, the banks and industry have been much closer than with us ever since Germany became a great industrial country in the middle of

last century. Scientific research has also been more actively fostered. The Germans are an exceptionally energetic and hardworking race, and they have proved more successful in the economic than in the political sphere.

The Weimar Republic. The loss of the war in 1918 was followed by the removal of familiar landmarks. The Hohenzollern dynasty disappeared, and every king and prince was chased off the stage. The veto on conscription made Germany a land of civilians. The Junkers, who had provided the officers, took a back seat. The new Constitution, elaborated by a Constituent Assembly at Weimar, set up a figure-head President chosen by the people for seven years, and a Single Chamber elected by adult suffrage and Proportional Representation. The Chancellor was selected by the President, as in France, but he required a majority in the Reichstag. South Germany had enjoyed constitutional liberty for a century; but Prussia, which contained two-thirds of the population, retained the three-class franchise (virtually excluding the manual worker) till the collapse of 1918. When at last the nation was bidden to govern itself, the Socialists as the largest party took the lead.

That the Weimar system only lasted fourteen years does not prove that it deserved to perish. It was certainly not a golden age, but it would be unjust to call it a failure. If we bear in mind the difficulties it inherited and the obstacles encountered, we may say that it made a gallant fight. The experiment of democracy was launched under the most unpromising conditions. Military defeat was followed by the Spartakist revolt, and when order was restored the Treaty of Versailles fell like a thunderbolt. The Weimar system was the child of defeat, and it was identified with humiliation from the start. A further handicap was the multiplicity of parties, which involved coalitions, compromises and frequent dissolutions. The Socialists remained throughout the largest party, but they were never able to dictate policy. For the first few years the country was governed by the middle parties, Centrum (Catholics), National Liberals, Democrats and Socialists, leaving out the Conservatives on the right and the Communists on the left. Economic life was beginning to recover when the French invasion of the Ruhr at the opening of 1923 (on the plea that the payment of reparations was in arrears) paralysed industry and destroyed the value of the

mark. At this moment of suffering and almost of despair Hitler and Ludendorff staged the Munich *Putsch*, which, like the Kapp *Putsch* of 1920, was easily suppressed. Yet there was never much zeal for the Republic, which lacked colour, authority and prestige.

The happiest time began when Stresemann, the outstanding figure of the Weimar era, took the helm in the autumn of 1923 and directed foreign policy for the next six years. A new currency was introduced and kept its value; the French withdrew from the Ruhr; Poincaré's *Bloc National* was defeated; the reparation problem was regulated by the Dawes plan; the Locarno Agreement, at the suggestion of Stresemann himself, accepted the new Franco-German frontier as final; Germany entered the League of Nations; the Kellogg Pact renounced war as an instrument of national policy. It was the period of recovery. When Stresemann died of overwork in the autumn of 1929, Germany was on friendly terms with every country in Europe. He had won the friendship of Briand and Austen Chamberlain, and the three men gave us a period of peace such as we have not known before or since. It was the sunshine of Locarno.

The Weimar Republic was unwittingly destroyed by American speculators. The economic blizzard crossed the Atlantic and burst on Europe in 1930. In Germany the number of unemployed doubled, banks collapsed, old firms shut their doors. At the General Election in September the Nazis jumped from 12 to 107, which made them inferior in numbers to the Socialists alone. For the next two years Brüning fought valiantly against the economic crisis, but in May 1932 he was evicted by President Hindenburg, who called Papen, an officer of reactionary views, to the helm. Though the new Chancellor had only about forty supporters in a Reichstag of nearly 600, he behaved like a dictator, tearing up the Constitution of Prussia and dissolving the Reichstag. The Nazis were returned as the largest party, though without a majority, and Hitler declined the President's offer of a post in a Coalition. The new Reichstag was dissolved at its first meeting, and when Papen again failed to increase his following Hindenburg reluctantly parted with him. This time Hitler received no invitation, for he lost forty seats and two million votes after the August flood-tide. General Schleicher, a notorious intriguer, became Chancellor, but he only held

office for two months. Belonging to no party, he had no followers. Meanwhile Papen, smarting under his failure, made peace with Hitler. When Schleicher begged the aged President to allow a dissolution the request was refused and he was dismissed. Hitler's hour had struck. On January 30th, 1933, he was called to office, with Papen as Vice-Chancellor to keep him in order.

The Nazi Régime. Four factors prepared the Nazi victory—the defeat in the world war, the severity of Versailles, the American slump, and the magic of Hitler. No great nation takes defeat lying down, and the pride of the strongest Continental Power was bitterly hurt. France had dreamed of *La Revanche* after 1871. How could Germany fail to do the same? Secondly, the victors' terms were cumulatively far too severe. "I go to Vienna," declared Castlereagh after the defeat of Napoleon, "not to bring back trophies of victory but to restore Europe to the paths of peace." The Treaties of Vienna were far from perfect; but they brought a generation of peace, and the treatment of France was merciful compared with the treatment of Germany a century later. Thirdly, the new economic crisis made millions of Germans seek for a man who would lead them out of the wilderness. Fourthly Hitler, perhaps the greatest popular orator in history, raised the banner of revolt against the Weimar régime, which he accused of subservience to foreign Powers and domination by the Jews. In its place he offered himself as Dictator. "I know I can save my country," declared Chatham, "and I know that no one else can." That is how Hitler had felt about Germany ever since 1919, when he entered politics and made his first speech. Such massive self-confidence, combined with glittering promises and savage denunciations, brought the desired result. He appealed with special force to the young. So long as constitutional government survived he never secured a majority; but his opponents on the Right, the Centre and the Left were too divided to block his path.

National Socialism, as the name suggests, stands for vigour abroad and an advanced policy at home; but there is nothing original about that. What distinguishes it from other ideologies is its emphasis on leadership and its gospel of the superiority of the Nordic race. Germany for the Germans! cried Hitler, who refused people of Jewish descent the rights

be unwilling or unable to fulfil. Our supremacy, uncontested over a large part of the world during the nineteenth century, is now challenged from many sides, largely because our old economic supremacy has passed away. Moreover, the growing substitution of imported oil for our native coal and the development of aviation have further weakened our position. Our period of Empire-building, which lasted over three centuries, has ended. England is now what Bismarck called a satiated Power, "finding her highest good in the maintenance of the *status quo* and defending herself against the imperialism and expansionism of others." No longer do we proudly proclaim the Two-Power naval standard: we content ourselves with a One-Power standard and perpetual peace with the United States. In the economic field we have recently exchanged free trade for the ideal of Empire solidarity and self-sufficiency, partly owing to the perpetual menace of war. "On the other hand, Britain cannot in the long run abandon her hopes of a revival of the free flow of world trade on which British prosperity in the past has been built, and without which British prosperity cannot be fully restored in the future." If the world is ever again to become a tolerable place to live in we shall have to revert to the Cobdenite philosophy of economic confederation.

The two chapters "Britain and the League" and "Britain and Europe" are inevitably controversial, and it is interesting to learn the judgments of a Foreign Office expert on the hotly contested issues of the past few years. Professor Carr emphasises the undoubted fact that the deep divisions of opinion weakened the hands of the Government, and gave our policy an appearance of fumbling timidity which gravely injured our prestige. That the nation as a whole desired to play its part in the creation and operation of the League is beyond doubt; but until the spring of 1939 no firm line of action was thought out in advance or fearlessly applied. We wanted the reduction of armaments for financial and other reasons, but we never gave a real lead at the Conference. Equally we desired to save Abyssinia from the aggressor, but we applied economic sanctions so half-heartedly that we infuriated Italy and drove her into Hitler's arms without helping her innocent victim. Professor Carr agrees with Lord Baldwin's declaration: "If you are going to adopt sanctions you must be prepared for war." He finds our policy in regard to the League confused

and discouraging, but he supplies the simple explanation. "The coercive provisions of the Covenant will work only if human beings are as ready to risk their lives in the defence of any other country as they are in defence of their own. This condition is not at present realised." Regional pacts are undertaken and understood, but universal obligations under Article 16 tend to be ignored.

The chapter "Britain and Europe" restates the familiar principles of Britain's policy—the Balance of Power and the championship of smaller nations whose rights or independence are threatened by a bully. "Her strongest asset in Europe is that, having no ambitions of her own, she can seem disinterested. She represents the general interest and seeks solutions satisfactory, not to herself in particular, but to all concerned. This attitude may amuse cynics and infuriate rivals. It could not be wholly true as a description of British policy elsewhere. But in the main it correctly describes British policy in Europe." In its application, however, it is often difficult if not impossible to secure agreement. The most searching question which confronted us after the world war was: How shall we treat Germany? The arguments for concession or intransigence were both so strong that public opinion wavered between the two. "It was perhaps the main cause of the chronic indecision and consequent bankruptcy of British policy in Central Europe after 1919 that neither view rallied sufficient support to prevail for any length of time over the other." Locarno was a well-meant gesture, but it was not followed up. Austen Chamberlain, we are told, never wholeheartedly embraced a policy of conciliation. The admission of Germany to the League was bungled. Between 1926 and 1929 no serious attempt was made to remedy German grievances. These were the years of wasted opportunity, when willingness to meet Germany's still modest claims might have produced real appeasement. It was Hitler's trump card to assert that nothing had been or would be given to Germany while she was weak, and that she must be prepared to fight for her rights. We looked on while he tore the Versailles settlement to shreds, and only took vigorous action when the rape of Czechoslovakia showed that we were confronted by Napoleonic ambitions. By that time Germany had grown so strong that any attempt to prevent further aggression was bound to involve a gigantic

of citizens. The new system was rapidly established, for the ruler stuck at nothing. The Reichstag was set on fire, and the elections in April 1933 returned a small Nazi-Conservative majority (the Nazis receiving 44 per cent. of the votes, the Hugenberg party 8 per cent.). When Parliament met, the Communist deputies were excluded, and only the Socialists dared to oppose the demand for dictatorial powers for the next four years. All the old parties were now suppressed, the trade unions were dissolved, the press was muzzled, "non-Aryans" were outlawed, concentration camps were crowded with critics or suspects, the Churches were attacked in the name of a new paganism, the autonomous system of Imperial and Weimar Germany came to an end, and the whole Reich was governed by nominated Statthalters.

Eighteen months after the Nazis came to power Hindenburg died. Henceforth Hitler, Führer (Leader) and Chancellor, as he decided to be called, was head of the State, head of the Government, head of the army. About the same time the bloody purge of June 30th, 1934, removed Röhm, leader of the Brownshirts, Schleicher, an open enemy, Gregor Strasser, an old comrade who had left the party, and scores of actual or reputed enemies of the régime. Papen narrowly escaped with his life and lost his place in the Cabinet. The power of the Brown Army passed to the smaller body of Blackshirts. The Führer's closest associates were Göring, who combined several high offices, Himmler, head of the Gestapo (Secret Police), Goebbels, Director of Propaganda, and Rosenberg, apostle of Nordic ideology. A few outstanding figures of the old régime, among them Hugenberg, Neurath and Schacht, were employed for a time and then cast aside.

It was an orgy of destruction; but the Nazis, who are full of dynamic energy, have built as well as destroyed. The inferiority complex was removed and millions of Germans looked to the future with new hope. Unemployment was overcome, largely by rearmament and the construction of public works. Waste lands were reclaimed, agriculture was encouraged, the peasant was secured against eviction from the family holding, and mineral resources, such as low grade iron, were exploited to the full. What the cost has been and how great the deficit we are not told. There has been a small rise of prices and compulsory deductions for party purposes and winter relief reduce the worker's standard of life; but everyone

has a job, and large families are encouraged. The aim was autarchy or economic self-sufficiency.

Hitler's most sensational performances have been in the field of foreign affairs, and his successes are the main source of his strength. He declared that Germany's first duty was to rearm: then she would find allies and obtain her rights. In the seven years of his dictatorship he has made history quicker than anybody since Bismarck. In 1933 he left the League and the Disarmament Conference. In 1934 he signed a ten-year pact of peace with Poland. In 1935 he tore up the armament limitations of the Treaty of Versailles, restored conscription, and announced that he would have everything that the victors considered necessary for their own safety, including battle-ships, submarines, an air force, large guns. At the same time he made a treaty with England limiting the German navy (except submarines) to 35 per cent. of our standard. In 1936 he marched into the demilitarised Rhineland and constructed the Siegfried Line. In 1937 he helped to fashion the Rome-Berlin axis, receiving Mussolini at Berlin and returning his visit in the following spring. In March 1938 he seized Austria, and in October, after a crisis which brought Europe to the brink of war, he added the German portions of Czechoslovakia to the Reich. At this point he announced that he wanted nothing more in Europe.

He had destroyed the Versailles system as he had sworn to do, but he was not yet satisfied. In March 1939 he annexed what was left of Bohemia and Moravia, and set up Slovakia as a puppet state. Once again he got his way without war. But the rape of a country alien in blood, language and sentiment indicated that, having fulfilled his pan-German programme, he was starting out on the old road of aggressive Imperialism. To apply Talleyrand's famous comment on the shooting of the Duc d'Enghien: It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder. When threats to Poland followed, the British Government scrapped its policy of limited liability, adopted the rival principle of collective security, and solemnly promised assistance in the event of a German attack. When, after making sure of Russian neutrality, German troops crossed the Polish frontier on September 1st, 1939, Hitler automatically involved himself in war with England and France.

G. P. GOOCH.

conflict. Ought we to have raised the banner of collective security at an earlier date? There can be no agreed answer. Among the considerations present to the mind of the Chamberlain Government were our military unpreparedness and the deep divisions of public opinion. The Munich Agreement, declares our author, was not only the high-water mark of the policy of conciliation, but its death-blow; for the Germans realised that substantial concessions had been made only when their country was strong enough to threaten. Trusting that we should continue to yield he struck again and again till the brutal attack on Poland caused the cup to overflow. Once again, as in 1914, 1854 and 1793, we are fighting for the Balance of Power. The chief value of this little book is that it compels us to think more seriously than hitherto what use we should make of victory if it comes our way, and whether we intend to throw our whole energies into the construction of a system of collective security. Until that is done, strong and unscrupulous aggressors will continue to prey on their weaker neighbours.

G. P. G.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.*

A series of volumes on "English Institutions" is being arranged for publication under the general editorship of Lord Stamp. The first to be issued is on the Church of England, and it has been written by Bishop Hensley Henson. No better choice of author could have been made, for the Bishop, in addition to his great abilities and his literary felicity, has had exceptionally wide experience of the Church, culminating in his prolonged tenure of the bishopric of Durham. Moreover, he has for many years been recognised as one of the most learned living authorities on the history of the Church, especially throughout the critical period of the seventeenth century.

The book is comprehensive, including an historical introduction, and treating in succession the subjects of Church and State, the Via Media, Subscription, the English Bishop, the English Clergy, the Parochial System, National Education, the Transformation of the Established Church, and its Relations with other Churches. The Bishop covers this extensive field

* *The Church of England*. By Herbert Hensley Henson. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

with such thoroughness, frankness and fairness that the volume may well become a book of reference for ordinary readers, while its perusal gives the pleasure which is always afforded by Dr. Henson's writings even when, on points, his vigorous treatment may provoke criticism and dissent.

It is impossible in this short notice to deal in detail with the subjects that are treated or with the controversial issues that are raised. As to the latter, Lord Stamp remarks in his preface that the Bishop's views may "get him into trouble in some quarters," though he adds that they "will get him appreciation and gratitude in many others." It must suffice to remark generally that the book is, as might be expected of its distinguished author, weighty and lucid, as well as learned, combining throughout outspoken candour with balanced fairness of appreciation. The present reviewer may perhaps be allowed to add that, in his view, Dr. Henson takes a too pessimistic view as to the prevailing attitude towards institutional Christianity, and does not show a quite adequate appreciation of the contributions that have been made by historic Nonconformity to religious thought, as well as to the spiritual life of the nation.

Bishop Hensley Henson is an outspoken advocate of disestablishment and sets forth with great cogency the usual arguments in support of it, perhaps unduly tinged by the pessimism that has been noticed. In regard to national education the Bishop expounds a way of ending the dual system in elementary education, which has a fairer prospect of being adopted, without serious controversy, than ever before. General opinion is moving towards agreement in this important matter. The Board of Education and the local education authorities are growingly concerned for the improvement of religious instruction in the schools. Churchmen and Nonconformists are moving towards mutual appreciation of points of view that have too long been treated as antagonistic, while the community as a whole is coming to realise the importance of strengthening the sense of spiritual and ethical values by means of religious teaching and influence in the schools of the nation.

With these observations it is a pleasure warmly to commend Bishop Hensley Henson's book as a notable contribution to the important subject with which it deals.

J. S. L.

WAR AND RELIGION.

THE present war is but a continuation of the last. This is the impression one gets from reading the recent *Blue Book* on the origins of the War. Hitler rails against the Versailles Treaty. But even supposing it was as iniquitous as he would have the world believe, it is not so severe as the treaty Germany would have imposed on the Allies if she had won. The fact is that Germany, with what we would call stubborn obstinacy and what she would call patriotic determination, is simply going on with the old war. She never really accepted defeat. She miraculously, and we might even say heroically, recovered herself. Hitler led her on from one success to another till at last he saw himself dominating Europe. He may not seriously have aspired to dominating the world. But most certainly he has aimed at making every small nation of Europe tremble before Germany. German might must rule in Europe.

Germany above all. Germany and no one else. Latterly he did not even speak of the Axis. He could get on without Italy. In his "Peace" speech he did indeed speak of the prosperity of people being "only possible within the framework of the general collaboration of the nations of this continent." And of the great nations of the Continent coming together "to hammer out and guarantee a comprehensive agreement which will give to all a feeling of security and peace." But this collaboration would seem to be only of a temporary character. The formation of a permanent international body was not suggested. And he never even hinted at a United States of Europe, far less a League of Nations, as an ultimate aim for Germany's ambition. Indeed, the League of Nations is mentioned only to be derided. And in his address to the German people at the commencement of the War there is an appeal to them to uphold the honour of Germany, but nothing beyond that. The Germans are Germans through and through. There is no sign of their even desiring to be "good Europeans" or good world-citizens.

We can admire their attitude—up to a point. But as one among other nations who have to live on the same planet with Germany, we have to stand up against the aggressive spirit which she is displaying towards her immediate neighbours. We have to see this war through. And after it is over we have

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to devise some means by which Germany should have full scope to lead her own life in her own way and full opportunity of adding her quota to the general welfare of mankind, but would be checked if she proved unneighbourly and trampled on the rights of others as she has upon the rights of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. And nations might profit from the example of the French. In 1870-1 they were defeated by the Germans. France was overrun, her capital was besieged and captured, two provinces were torn from her, and a huge indemnity was imposed. What did she do then? She rapidly paid the indemnity, recovered herself, again took her place in the Councils of Europe, made friends and allies who stood by her when war from Germany again broke on her, after the war proclaimed the ideal of the "good European," supported the League of Nations and with Italy and England signed the Treaty of Locarno with Germany, and joined in admitting Germany to the League on equality with all other nations.

As for ourselves, some of our critics say that we are just as selfish as the Germans. They affirm that at bottom we think only of our own interests. Having as much as we can possibly want our only thought is to keep it. This may or may not be the case. At any rate we are far-sighted enough to see that our long-term interests lie in the establishment of a world organisation in which the differences between nations can be settled by the ordinary give-and-take process of neighbourly negotiation instead of by resort to war. Our wide experience in every part of the world and in conducting the affairs of a most varied Empire and Commonwealth of Nations has impressed deeply on us the value of this "Round Table" method. It may be self-interest, but anyhow it is enlightened self-interest. And so convinced are we that the application of this method to the conduct of international affairs would be of value to the whole world that we have made reference to it on formal occasions in both the last and the present war.

Mr. Asquith, when Prime Minister, spoke of establishing the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics. And by public right he meant, "an equal level of opportunity and of independence as between small States and great States, as between the weak and the strong, safeguards resting on the common will of Europe, and not Europe alone, against aggression, covetousness, bad faith, wanton recourse in case of dispute to the use of force and the disturbance of peace ;

and finally, as the result of it all, a great partnership of nations, confederated in the joint pursuit of a better and a fuller life for countless millions who, by their efforts and by their sacrifices generation after generation, maintain the progress and enrich the inheritance of humanity."

This was said in 1916, and now in 1939 our present Prime Minister in different words says the same thing :

We want to see established an international order based upon mutual understanding and mutual confidence, and we cannot build such an order unless it conforms to certain principles which are essential to the establishment of confidence and trust. Those principles must include the observation of international undertakings when they have been entered into and the renunciation of force in the settlement of differences.

This new world order is then our ultimate aim. Its political and economic structure will be devised by statesmen and economists ; and the League of Nations is there in existence to serve as both a guide and a warning. But the point I would make is that this revised and reformed League of Nations, or any other world organisation which may take its place, will never function successfully unless it is inspired by a burning spiritual impulse. There must be real enthusiasm for it. And more than enthusiasm—passion. There must be as much fervour for reviving the League of Nations as Hitler has put into the revival of Germany—and a great deal more wisdom. Each nation must learn to vie with all others in showing the greatest regard for the good of the whole.

Such a passion can only be inspired by religion. But not by the Christian religion alone ; all religions can instil it. All preach the one-ness of life. All preach the one-ness of man with God. And all can now fill men with horror—not so much at the physical pain of war—any man ought to be able to bear suffering—as at the bare idea of killing a fellow being. And all religions can inspire men with a passionate intention to do unto others as they would that others should do unto them. This at the very least. But also vastly more.

The new world organisation for the settlement of differences without resort to war will only be effective if it is the outward and visible expression of something deeper and more embracing still—if it is the expression of a real Fellowship of Nations. A fellowship not only for political and economic

purposes, but for the pursuit of all that is highest and best in life—the purest love, the most perfect beauty, and the profoundest truth. And there can be no such fellowship among nations unless there is a strong sense of fellowship among the individuals who compose it.

The really horrible thing about war is that it blurs the fine sense of fellow-feeling men naturally have for one another. In war men get callous about human suffering. The nicety of their feelings is blunted. They become brutal and reckless of human life. Fortunately, this is not the whole story. There is a good side even to war. Men who have risked their lives together have an enduring sense of comradeship—something deeper running even than friendship. They have gone together through the fiery ordeal. They have seen each other bared to the bone. They have seen the worst of each other perhaps. But far more important they have seen the best—the wholly unexpected best which only comes out under the fiercest stress. More astounding still is the fact that the fighting men of the one side have a certain *camaraderie* with the fighting men of the other. There was much fraternisation in the last war. And after the war was over ex-service men of this country fraternised with ex-service men of Germany. Also, after the first heat of battle was over the wounded enemies were most carefully tended by doctors and nurses on both sides.

This only serves to show that even the most horrible war cannot entirely obliterate the inherent fellow-feeling of man for man. The common humanity of men comes out even in war. And it is common humanity that religion can quicken and reinforce till men become so acutely aware of it that suffering in another becomes agony to them and whatever happiness they may themselves possess they pine to share with others.

"Dick" Sheppard possessed this faculty of awakening the sense of humanity, and many another Christian minister of every denomination has shown it. But it is not a monopoly of Christians. Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims also have it. In this great world-crisis all these should be enlisted in the noble service of humanity. And in this realm of the spirit the British Empire possesses untapped resources of extraordinary value. There are, for example, 220 million Hindus who, if they are not of the same martial nature as the Germans, or of the business character of Englishmen, have a finer

SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.*

It is heartening to read nowadays a book on the problem of democratic government which prefers a detailed examination of its successful working in some countries to an account of its tragic failure in others. Sir E. D. Simon's concise study deals with Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland, all of which have been associated with what has become known as the Oslo Group of Neutral States (Switzerland sent an Observer to recent meetings at which Belgium and Holland were also represented). However, history moves quickly these days, and states which, at the time of the publication of the book, seemed far removed from the turmoil of European politics, are now in the very midst of it. Indeed, as particularly in the case of Finland, "the newest of the democracies," "the most surprising instance of rapid growth of democratic feeling which is developing a really democratic spirit within twenty years of a civil war," is now leading a desperate struggle against autocratically ruled Soviet Russia, which seems to resent that "of all her neighbours there is none that enjoys so high a degree of political liberty."

With war raging in the Baltic and in the North Sea the Scandinavian neutral democracies have lost what the author considers the main reasons of their success—a long period of peace and economic security and well-being. In troubled times their small size is rather an invitation to the aggressor, whilst in peace-time it facilitates the handling of social problems. A description of the latter is the main purpose of the book. As a former member of the Housing Committee and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health the author knew how to study local self-government and housing schemes on the spot. That he was Lord Mayor of Manchester and has remained an active participant in this city's affairs accounts for his over-frequent comparisons with Manchester. The facts and figures which he gives are based on his personal investigations and discussions with the various people of the countries visited, and there is little repetition of what has been said in other works of a more general character. Sweden is obviously the country which the author knows best, and he has many interesting things to say about her attempts to

* *The Smaller Democracies.* By Sir E. D. Simon. Victor Gollancz. 1939. 6s.

abolish unemployment and to reconcile the interests of town and country, capital and labour. There is also a most instructive comparison between Scandinavian and British Socialist leaders. The author is most careful not to lay down the law as to what great countries like Great Britain may learn from "the smaller democracies." It is not imitation but inspiration that is needed, and in this book the legislator and administrator might find plenty to digest. To some politicians it might be a warning that paying lip-service to "democracy" is not enough.

GERARD M. FRITERS.

BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN CHINA, 1880-1885.*

The author of this well-documented volume has rendered a signal service to historians, and especially to students of European policies in China. He has taken a cross-section out of a period hitherto neglected, put its six years under the microscope, and given a sharp detailed dissection of events. His Bibliography is admirable, not only for its evidence of industrious research but for the wide cast of his net. The majority of references are to British Foreign Office Correspondence with China, Secret or otherwise; but his list also contains the names of writers of that period who as a rule are known only to that misunderstood group of people whom even Mr. Kiernan calls "The Old China Hands." The consul W. R. Carles, Rockhill the American Minister, Alexander Michie, and brave generous Mrs. Archibald Little—these have all been rescued from their dusty oblivion that he might better comprehend the background of their day. And, as far as anyone can who, I fancy, has not actually been on the ground himself—as have those same "China Hands"—he has succeeded. My own faint memories of allusions in conversations in earlier years confirm, for example, his references to "fiery-tempered" Sir Harry Parkes. He never, so we understood, quite forgot the first treatment meted out to him by the Chinese, who crushed him into a wooden cage and pilloried him. To my thinking, too, Mr. Kiernan has estimated aright Li Hung-chang, "the crafty."

* By E. V. G. Kiernan, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 16s.

aptitude for spiritual things. Living to-day there are Hindus of great eminence, such as Gandhi, Tagore, Pandit Malaviya, Radhakrishnan, in whom this sense of humanity is marvellously developed. Great Muslims there are too. And Muslims possess in a high degree the sense of community. The world over Muslims are brothers. Many of these might be of the greatest service on the spiritual side of the war.

A revival of religion will assuredly take place during and as a result of the war. There will be a swing back from the cold materialism and crude paganism of the times. Man is by nature religious and again he will crave for religion pure and simple. Conceptions of God will doubtless change and vary, but men will see the absurdity of supposing that this marvellous and beautiful world out of which we were born, and with which we are inextricably connected all our lives, is nothing but a giant mechanism. And they will resent the notion that the main motive which actuates their lives is economic—that what principally impels them is not love of love, or love of beauty, or love of truth, but love of food and clothing. They will recognise the reasonableness of supposing that behind all things, pervading the whole universe, and operating through themselves as well as everything, is some unseen mysterious Power urging them to the good rather than to the bad, and to the better rather than only to the good.

Even Hitler, in spite of his brutal treatment of certain German pastors, and of all Jews, has some conception of a God. He believes in a Supreme Power in whose hands we are but instruments. And he ends his speech to the Reichstag by thanking God that He has so marvellously and wonderfully blessed the Germans in their first hard struggle for their right. "I pray to Him," he continues, "that He will guide us and all others on the right path along which not only the German people but the whole of Europe may find a new happiness and peace." Some may think this mere cant and hypocrisy. But Hitler, though he may often delude himself, is at least genuine. He does sincerely believe the thing he says at the moment. That is indeed the secret of his influence. He may have a very curious idea of God and of his relation to God. But when he made that speech, strung up as he must have been by the tremendous responsibilities which were on him, he must have felt in some way, however dim, that there was some spiritual

Power governing the world and capable of guiding it to happiness and peace. He was not an out-and-out materialist of the Marxian type.

Just as scientists base their whole life work on the faith that the universe is governed by order and can be relied on through the darkest night to bring light back in the morning, so does the common man base his behaviour on the faith that the universe is governed by good and can be relied on through the most evil night to make goodness prevail in the end. Sceptics, agnostics, atheists, anti-atheists there are, who are doubtful on this point and deny outright that the world is governed by good. They point to the appalling misery all round them and ask how that could exist if any Being worth calling God were directing the world. Yet it is a fact that in spite of all the horrors of the last war, in spite of all the suffering there has been from then till now, and in spite of the present outbreak of a new war, there are men of the highest intellectual powers in every country and of every religion, in Germany as well as elsewhere, who cling stoutly to this rooted faith that the world is governed for good. And now is the time for those who through long study of the problem and through wide experience of life are convinced that ultimately the world is ruled and directed by the highest and noblest things in life—by joy, and the love that springs from joy; by beauty, and by truth—to do all that is in their power to kindle in these sceptics the same fire of conviction that is burning in their own souls and communicate to them something of the joy which contact with the living God has brought to them.

But the religion which men now call for will be of a more masculine type than the insipid stuff that is so often served up in Europe, and more in touch with actual life than the meditative religion so much admired in India. Though being more masculine need not mean being less tender: the most manly men being often the most tender, and rivalling the most womanly woman. And solitary meditation may often be in keeping with the liveliest activity. The great religious leaders of mankind have been both manly and tender, both meditative and active. Christ, though referred to in the hymn as "gentle Jesus, meek and mild," had the courage of the bravest man and deliberately faced a trial which could only end in death. And Buddha, though he would meditate long in the solitude of the forest, led a life of intense activity,

preaching his gospel from place to place and gathering together a body of disciples.

No nation can live unto itself alone. As in the cells of the body, there are in nations interstices through which influences pass from the one to the other. After the storm of war is over and the nations of the world settle down again to ordinary intercourse, travellers, traders, working men, sportsmen, literary men, men of art, men of religion will be passing from nation to nation and linking nations together. Through the vertical barriers which serve to separate nations there will form horizontal layers which will connect them. Then once more international congresses of many kinds will be held—scientific congresses, economic congresses, labour congresses, and so on. And through them the horizontal links which connect nations will be definitely strengthened, for it is with matters of common interest to all nations that they will deal.

Now among these international congresses none will be of more importance than those connected with religion. Religion has a bad name as causing division. But this need not be. In its essence it should unite. Of necessity the different religions and religious denominations must fight to preserve their own special individuality. But the times are far too serious for sectarians to urge their claims to the extent of forgetting the underlying unity. And now when we are forced down to fundamentals it will be the unity which will be pressed. The unifying power of religion will be emphasised. In the heights of the spirit or in the depth men meet. In the sublimest or in the most fundamental—for the two are the same, the highest being the most fundamental and the most fundamental the highest—men will feel at home with one another.

Those highly influential congresses of the Christian Churches—except the Roman Catholic—which have recently been held in European countries, at Jerusalem, and in India, will be renewed and perhaps be attended by German pastors, as well as men of other nationalities. But there will also be held pan-religious congresses in different countries. Congresses which include adherents of all religions will be held, as before, in India as well as in Europe and America. And among these will be the World Congress of Faiths, whose specific object it is to promote a spirit of fellowship through religion which, with the aid of the French Government, held

a notable meeting at the Sorbonne in Paris last July, and which will be active throughout the war as well as after. Through this and other similar organisations the religious forces of the whole world will be so combined as to put such a spirit into mankind that war between nations will be looked upon as barbaric as duels between individuals.

Even Hitler dreams of Europe finding a new happiness. And with him, in his best moments, we would pray to God that eventually this new happiness may be found in such measure that the mere idea of war will have passed for ever from the minds of men. With the grace of God that is in us we shall create that common happiness in which, like the Queen's smile, all can share and all can meet.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

Victoria." Confined by limits of space to a "summary of authorities and powers," which are outlined with the author's usual lucidity and force, the work is reasonably comprehensive apart from one outstanding omission. All treatment of local government is omitted both on grounds of space and on account of its comparatively slight impact "on the essential interests of the subject." This latter view, however, may well be disputed. Local government is an essential part of constitutional law and in many respects touches the individual most deeply.

The great merit of this work lies in its analysis of the character and practice of constitutional machinery in the light of historical growth. Professor Keith shows, for example, the progressive restriction in practice of the King's personal prerogative, as in questions of foreign affairs. He does not, however, regard the monarch as a mere symbol and ministerial rubber-stamp, but rather as the guardian of the constitution whose powers in an emergency might be independently exercised. The author envisages, for example, the case of a Labour Government with a majority in the House of Commons requesting the King to create sufficient peers to force through the Lords a socialist measure so as to avoid the delay of two years imposed by the Parliament Act, 1911. Since, in the author's view, the latter "unquestionably provides a simple and not at all prolonged method of attaining the objects of the lower house," he questions whether the mass creation of peers is not now extra-constitutional unless immediately preceded by a general election in which the abolition of the House of Lords was directly voted upon. He concludes that the King at least has a discretion to refuse his Ministers' request though he would subsequently be bitterly attacked for partisanship. It must, however, be remembered that in spite of the Parliament Act, the House of Lords does, in practice, enjoy in many cases a definite power of veto. Radical changes in economic and social policy cannot be tacked on to money Bills and the delay of two years in other Bills may well make such a policy unattainable in fact. Professor Keith logically also considers that in principle the royal right of veto on Bills is not obsolete and may be exercised properly where some basic constitutional change, such as the prolongation of a Parliament or a partisan amendment of the electoral system, is proposed without the general

assent of the nation. The danger, however, to a hereditary monarchy of acting as the arbiter of popular feeling is manifest.

Discussing the functions of Parliament, Professor Keith declares that "the essential purpose" of the Commons is to place a ministry in power and to "control" it in its exercise of legislation and administration. He agrees, however, that in effect control is limited to criticism and the focusing of public opinion upon government action. In order to strengthen this function, he appears to approve the suggestion that Parliamentary Committees should be appointed to every Government department with a view to eliciting information and elucidating issues as they arise. As a safeguard in regard to delegated legislation Professor Keith supports the recommendation of the Committee on Ministers' Powers that all clauses in Bills which delegate legislative power should be scrutinised by such a Committee. He recognises the necessity under modern conditions of departmental legislation and of administrative tribunals. But while "there is everything to be said" for the latter he points to the need for protection against abuse. Persons affected should be given "full opportunity . . . to present their cases," and decisions should not be based upon evidence given in their absence. The adjudicators "should have some legal training" and act "in a judicial spirit free from ministerial pressure." Professor Keith, however, is opposed to a comprehensive system of *droit administratif* with administrative tribunals determining issues between officials and the public as being fundamentally inconsistent with the English conception of the rule of law laid down by Dicey. In this he accepts substantially the views expressed in 1932 by the Committee on Ministers' Powers. The contrary view in favour of the French system has been forcefully argued by Dr. E. C. S. Wade in his recent edition of Dicey's *Law of the Constitution* where he critically examines the basis of the latter's celebrated principles and their present application in the light of social and political development. In support of his views on administrative law Dr. Wade has included a short article by Professor René David on *Droit Administratif* in France. The latter points out that "the ordinary Courts are always competent to entertain any proceedings of a criminal nature," and in civil cases the Conseil d'Etat frequently provides a more beneficial remedy

than that granted by the ordinary courts under the *Droit Civil*.

Professor Keith's volumes were written before the war and they only contain some general references to the emergency legislation in the Preface. It is, of course, impossible now to gauge the permanent constitutional consequences of the conflict, but it seems at least to have removed one doubt, namely the ability of a Dominion to be treated as a neutral while remaining technically a member of the British Commonwealth.

HISTORICAL TABLES.*

It is nearly forty years since Dr. Gooch published his *Annals of Politics and Culture*, the first chronology in English dealing with all aspects of civilisation. He now writes a generous introduction to the much more comprehensive work which Dr. S. H. Steinberg has compiled under the modest title, *Historical Tables*. The new volume is attractively produced, easy to handle and clearly arranged. In six parallel columns are listed the chief events of the years 58 B.C. to the end of A.D. 1938, under such headings as "Western Europe," "Central and Eastern Europe," "Islam and Asia," "Ecclesiastical History," "Constitutional and Economic History," and "Cultural Life." The treatment of British and American history is fuller than that of other countries, but is not unduly emphasised. Dr. Steinberg brings to his task a knowledge of continental sources with which few English scholars are equipped, and a glance at the "Cultural Life" columns shows a remarkable range: dates of poems and plays, paintings and sculptures, operas and symphonies are there in ever-increasing abundance up to the year 1914. For the period 1914-38 there is a full diary of political events, which should prove very serviceable to students of contemporary affairs.

A comparison of Dr. Steinberg's work with others of a similar scope is all to his advantage. Indeed, the number of errors which he reveals in some widely-used reference books is disquieting. Among so many facts there are doubtless a few mistakes in *Historical Tables*, but they are not easy to find. "George Etherege: *Love in a Tube*" (p. 149) is an amusing slip, and there are others. As is the way of chronologies the

* By S. H. Steinberg. Macmillan. 16s.

statements are occasionally too dogmatic: on p. 71 Berthold Schwarz is given the dubious honour of inventing gunpowder regardless of the prior claims of Friar Bacon. Similarly, the statement on p. 122: "1562. John Hawkins starts slave trade between Africa and America" requires qualification; the Spanish and Portuguese had been in the ugly business for a generation.

In his Introduction the author says that the New Style has been uniformly adopted for dates after Pope Gregory's reform of the calendar in 1582. Actually, however, he retains the old day of the month in many cases, and rightly so, for who would remember Guy Fawkes on any other day than the Fifth of November? In a subsequent edition these exceptions (and there are a good number of them during the years 1582 to 1752) should be plainly indicated, if necessary by giving a double date. In all other respects *Historical Tables* can be confidently recommended to students and librarians. It is a book which should be on the reference shelves of every self-respecting library.

A. TAYLOR MILNE.

NEW EVIDENCE ON BEHALF OF MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS.

Major-General Mahon's investigations concerning Darnley's murder and those of Mr. Robert Gore-Brown, Bothwell's latest biographer, have provided the pretext for another life of Mary Queen of Scots.* The author is a devotee of the Queen by whose "enchantment" contemporaries owned themselves "bewitched." Yet never was Queen worse treated and for nefarious infliction of such treatment Scottish nobles surely achieved a record. Her Queen's besetting sin is acknowledged by the author:

For in glory and in grief it is always Mary that Mary sees. She could be pitiful and kind at moments, yet she is the supreme egoist. Perhaps that was why her charm and splendour only served to attract Fate's lightning strokes.

She claims that recent researches have enabled her to depict "a new Mary." But previous partisans have depicted a Mary resembling hers who was guiltless of the major charges

* *Mary Queen of Scots*. By M. P. Willcocks. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

STALINISM AND HITLERISM.

THE blindness of Conservatives, Liberals and members of the Labour Party to the reality and the implications of the Russo-German alliance may seem to the historian of the future one of the strangest phenomena of our age. Men do not, however, readily attune their minds to a complete reversal of long-cherished political conceptions. Those who for many years have considered the Nazi and Soviet systems to be antitheses cannot easily accept the idea that these two states have become ideologically, as well as politically, allied. Those who once thought of Nazi Germany as the "bulwark against Bolshevism" are just as blind as those who regarded the U.S.S.R. as a democracy, the "fatherland of the workers," and the strong defender of weak nations against aggression. Both alike now see Stalin as the bulwark against Hitlerism; both alike are determined to believe that Russia's gains are Germany's losses, and that Hitler having let the Bolshevik djinn out of the bottle cannot put him back again.

While almost the whole British press has watched Russia's extension of her domain with few misgivings, the Left has positively rejoiced at each new act of aggression committed by the U.S.S.R. behind the shield of the German army. The new principle which many so-called Left intellectuals would have us accept is that when Germany attacks a small country it is aggression, but that when Russia does so she is taking legitimate measures of self-defence or delivering the masses from oppression. Mr. Churchill, in his first broadcast, addressed honeyed words to Russia and welcomed her advance into Poland, while regretting that the Red Army had taken this action independently instead of as our ally. He, presumably, is under the illusion shared by so many people in all parties that flattery of the U.S.S.R., or bribes, can yet detach Stalin from Hitler even at the eleventh hour. Bernard Shaw, together with a whole chorus on the Left, assures us that "Stalin has taken Hitler by the scruff of the neck." Lloyd George, alone among prominent politicians, appears to have faced up to the realities of the situation.

Is there any evidence to show that Germany is dismayed at Russia's advance? Is it not precisely what was planned when Ribbentrop flew to Moscow? Is there no significance

in the fact that Berlin refused to allow the Finnish Foreign Minister's broadcast to the United States to be transmitted through Germany; or in Hitler's reported message to the Finnish Fascists that he was sorry for them, but Finland is outside the German sphere in Europe? Is it not perhaps true that several tons of gold have been sent to Germany by Russia as the price for the establishment of Russian sovereignty over the Baltic States? Is not the delivery of a million tons of fodder promised by Russia what Germany requires far more than military aid? In a word, is not Russia's benevolent "neutrality" of far greater value to Germany than a few Russian divisions or even airmen could possibly be? Is it not even likely that a neutral Russia, whom we are anxious not to offend, will be able to import for Germany's benefit vital raw materials unobtainable in Europe?

Beyond the evidence which exists of a far-reaching alliance between Berlin and Moscow, is there not also the probability of a real ideological unity between the two great revolutionary movements of contemporary Europe? Is there necessarily any difficulty in harmonising the Stalinist version of Communist theory with the theories of the Nazis? If the defence and aggrandisement of the U.S.S.R. is considered as synonymous with the defence and extension of "socialism," as the orthodox Communist believes, and if the dictatorship of Stalin is accepted as being identical with the "dictatorship of the proletariat," why should not the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist conceptions of the Communists be harmonised with the Fascist conception of a war of the "proletarian nations" against the "plutocracies"? It is conceivable that Nazi-ism and Communism are now merging into one mighty destructive movement to annihilate the "bourgeois democracies" and the Old Imperialism of Britain, France, Holland and Belgium. While the Nazis make their frontal assault upon us the Red Army can enter the backward semi-feudal states of Eastern Europe and the Middle East as the *soi-disant* deliverer of oppressed peasants. The expiring Comintern may yet be resuscitated to undermine the British and French Empires from within by agitation among the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. For there seems little prospect of the British and French Governments having the wisdom to give to the subject peoples of their

brought against her. The author stresses a beleaguered woman's weakness rather than the passions of a daughter of the Guises, revealing (though not admitting) the latter's unfitness to be Queen of Scotland, whatever her gifts and desire at the outset to hold the balance between warring faiths. She portrays what nineteen years of captivity entailed for the Queen and her unfortunate guardians, depicting scenes of royal suffering with a pilgrim's recollections.

It is the deep seas which we feel all about Mary Stuart that keep her still alive; deep seas of suffering . . . she was put in the pillory, used as a pawn in the strife of politics, robbed of everything that makes life sweet, and at the last rose in the face of a hideous death to heights of joy and power that have been reached by few men.

General Mahon's detective examination of the crime at Kirk o' Field is summarised and the following conclusion is drawn:

Absolute proof is impossible after the long lapse of time, but the odds in favour of this explanation are very great indeed.

The General's deductions are briefly these: that Darnley was strangled by the Douglasses in a local plot which was adjunct to a greater, namely a counter-Reformation attempt to blow up Mary's brother, Moray, and other predominant Protestant lords whom she had refused to destroy, and whose peril she appears to have shared from the warnings addressed to her. Her husband, Darnley, smarting under her refusal of the Crown Matrimonial and lured by the prospect of becoming King of a Catholic Scotland, was the decoy for the intended victims, though he may have planned to save his wife's life. The conspiracy failed because it became known. "Cecil was behind Moray and his party, and Cecil's spies were clever fellows."

How Bothwell, who was not "in fact" Darnley's murderer but only "in intention," became the scapegoat for the crime is vividly related; and his delineation, thanks to the author as well as to Mr. Gore-Brown, is a convincing revelation, "a new Bothwell" whose fate was more tragic than his Queen's. Hitherto unpublished details concerning his mistress Anne Tronsons are recorded, and his relations with this Norwegian lady and his wife, Jean Gordon, supply a key to

sonnets and letters in the famous Casket which were used to incriminate Mary.

It is not the author's partisanship which misleads. She knows the history of Mary's case and skilfully assesses the evidence. It is her failure to visualise the significance of the greater drama in which Mary's fortunes were an episode, namely the struggle of England and Scotland to withstand domination by a combination of Great Powers whose representatives were convinced of a sacred obligation to impose it. They regarded Mary as their instrument which became potent when she desired to escape captivity. Her faithful women could not have described John Knox with more virulence than the author. But the biographer of a Queen of Scots might have recognised certain virtues, such as courage, which made him a notable factor in Scotland's destiny; and an historian's vision would have enabled her to depict Cecil and his supporters with the understanding and excuses they merit.

Illustrative portraits add to the attractiveness of her book.
D. P. H.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

So little is generally known in this country of Finland and her people that Mr. Stephen de Ullmann's short book on *The Epic of the Finnish Nation** must serve to intensify our sympathy and admiration for Finland's magnificent struggle for existence. In these short lucidly written pages, the author draws a broad appreciative outline of her history, culture and great social achievements. Her chequered past is characterised by either Swedish or Russian domination; but while the latter always sought to destroy, under Sweden the country prospered albeit subject to the influence of Swedish culture. Mr. Ullmann points out how in the nineteenth century Finland developed her own individual culture and national genius which were to blossom and fructify upon her attainment of independence after the Russian Revolution. The story of the last twenty years has demonstrated beyond all doubt that no nation has been more competent to govern herself than Finland. Briefly, Mr. Ullmann describes the events of the last few months and the complete innocence of the Finns. An added inducement to purchase this little book is the knowledge that half the net profits are devoted to the Finland Fund.

* Pilot Press. 2s. 6d. net.

Dr. Jocelyn Perkins has continued his historical and descriptive survey of *Westminster Abbey, Its Worship and Ornaments*,* in a second volume of great interest. Its chapters include accounts of the Nave and its Chapel of the Holy Cross, the Choir Screen, the Chantry Chapel of Henry V, and more particularly of Edward the Confessor's Shrine and Henry VII's Chapel. The volume deals with recent changes, including the reconstruction of the Altar in the latter chapel after Torrigiano's original structure. Upon developments during the last forty years he writes with particular authority, having been Sacrist of the Abbey since 1900. His narrative generally embodies the results of the latest research, including his own devoted labours. He writes with clarity and great enthusiasm, at once lavish in his praise and unsparing in criticism. Reformation and Puritan iconoclasts, for example, are condemned without quarter and hardly allowed their honesty of purpose, and nineteenth-century restorers are also subject to acute criticism. Personal views, however, do not seriously detract from the value of this work as an historical and descriptive record of very considerable importance. Its interest is enhanced by the inclusion of many excellent illustrations.

* * * * *

Professor Harold Laski has assembled together in *The Danger of Being a Gentleman*† eight essays previously published at various times between 1926 and 1938, and which discuss mainly legal and political questions. The first paper, to which the volume owes its title, is a reflection upon the passing of the leisured upper classes and their unfitness to govern. Several essays discuss the administration of justice and the inevitable bias of judges nurtured in a capitalist system. Almost by way of contrast Professor Laski pays a very high tribute to the late Mr. Justice Holmes, particularly for his ability to approach issues with a fresh open mind and thereby discarding his own social and political predilections. The author's article on "Law and Justice in Soviet Russia," written in 1935, criticises by comparison British criminal justice. It is, however, admittedly only a "limited and superficial" study based upon a month's examination of the Soviet system, and is of not much value. The paper, written in 1932, on "Nationalism and the Future of Civilisation," includes an attack on "economic imperialism" as leading to war and points to the need for some form of international control. Professor Laski's valuable analysis of "The Committee System in English Local Government," first published in a *Century of Local Government*, is usefully reprinted.

* *Alcuin Club Collections*, No. XXXIV. Oxford Univ. Press. 25s. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

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AFTER THE WAR.

FRUITLESS though it may seem to some, the planning of a post-war world is not altogether an idle exercise. There is nothing for us at the moment but to devote our whole energies to one end, and one end only, the winning of the war, the uprooting and destruction of Hitlerism; but what then? It is a sound instinct which sets thinking men and women searching in their quiet moments for an answer to that question. For unless the war is to be the prelude to a better disposition of human life than is ours to-day, it will not be worth fighting. Why should mankind—not only ourselves but millions of other peaceful decent people throughout Europe—face this awful pilgrimage of misery and death unless we have some chance of reaching a land where freedom and truth and fair dealing prevail? Asking this we climb each our little Pisgah and gaze into a terribly obscure future. Some of us see nothing but darkness; some of us catch, or think we catch, stray glimpses of light.

Of late, the voice of the pessimist has been loudest in the land. The powers of evil, he feels, have so far had everything their own way, and they have waxed so strong that, even if they fail, they will bring down the structure of western civilisation in their fall. The optimist will have none of this. He foresees, with the victory of the Allies, a triumph of right over might; out of the darkness, out of the chaos of carnage, he sees emerging a new World Order, which he clothes in many-coloured imagery. A new world then, or a world in ruins, which is it to be? Let us reason first with the pessimist. We must agree with him that war will destroy much that is precious—nothing more precious than the countless young lives sacrificed to the folly and wickedness of nations. It will probably ruin monuments and treasures of art which have for centuries been the glory of our land or of France. It will certainly impoverish us; though in so far as this means less luxury and ostentation, there will be little cause for general lamentation. But in no real sense, unless Hitlerism conquers—which we are not going to contemplate—would our civilisation

Empires the liberty which would prevent any possibility of revolt.

Although the Comintern, in its manifesto of November 7th, called upon the German as well as the British and French workers to turn upon their war-making governments, Molotov in his speech insisted that Britain and France were the aggressors, condemned the ideological war on Hitlerism as unjustifiable, and condemned our blockade as inhumane and illegal. It is by Molotov's speech that Russian policy must be judged, not by the pronouncements of the Comintern which, although it must give some comfort to the faithful, knows well that its fulminations are quite harmless to the German Government since the Gestapo will look after any workers so naive as to take the Comintern seriously. It is only in the democracies that the Communists have the opportunity to harass their governments. Rauschning's *Germany's Revolution of Destruction* has had a wide circulation, but has sufficient notice been taken of his words of warning?

A German-Russian alliance means simply the confluence of two streams which run toward the same sea, the sea of world revolution. National Socialism will submit to *Gleichschaltung* with the Bolshevik world revolution, or will subject that revolution to *Gleichschaltung* with itself; it amounts either way to much the same thing. It will be no ordinary coalition between two powers for normal practical purposes. Germany and Russia, if they come together, will radically transform the world."

There still exists a widespread belief that Hitler has reason to fear the influence of the Communists inside Germany. This belief is based on the idea that the political, social and economic organisations of present-day Russia and Germany are essentially different, that in one the workers rule, whilst in the other the workers are oppressed and rebellious. In actual fact there is no such distinction. In both Germany and Russia the working class has no rights and no trade unions in the original sense of the word. In Russia there are State "trade unions" and in Germany a Labour Front; in neither case have the workers any means to defend themselves against excessive exploitation. In both countries workers, peasants, and intellectuals are alike kept from open expression of disaffection by Terror and the Secret Police. In both countries all are expected to sacrifice themselves for the "fatherland"

and for the "beloved leader," and are not allowed to question State policy on pain of death or the concentration camp.

True that in Germany the State only *controls* land and capital, whereas in Russia the State *owns* land and capital. The thin dividing line between State control and ownership was, however, gradually disappearing in Germany before the war began, and may soon disappear in theory as in fact. The capitalists as a class freely owning and disposing of "the means of production and distribution," to use the classic Marxist phrase, no longer exist in Germany. The State disposes, the State says what shall be produced, what wages shall be paid, what hours shall be worked, what profit may be taken, where capital shall be invested. The "owner" is in fact a State official as in Russia, but his income depends on his being able to work his enterprise at a slight profit; he is not yet a bureaucrat with a certain income from the State, as in Russia. No doubt he would like it better if he were, since he would then have an assured income so long as he never "thought dangerously," and so long as he expressed his loyalty to the Fuehrer at all times. In Germany as in Russia the Party, headed by an autocratic leader, owns the State private property, and through the State has control of land and capital and of the lives and the men.

On October 9th the Swedish newspaper *Svensk* had a report from its Berlin correspondent to the effect that Germany is playing a gigantic poker game to force France to make peace by the prospect of the prospect of dominating the whole of Northern Europe. He adds that this proved to be a miscalculation, Germany is willing to make her last resort to "throw herself into the arms of Communism." Does not this imply that Germany might "go Communist" not by revolutionary action from the Left, but by the formation of the Nazi State under Hitler himself? Is it not a probability that under the stress of war the "remnants" in Germany will be discarded, the capitalists finally expropriated, and a full-fledged military dictatorship emerge? The Socialist wing of the Nazi Party will take control, and the moderate or Conservative wing will be liquidated. Those who, like Mr. Duff Cooper, imagine that the Conservative Revolution in Germany is on the order of the day are, it would seem, blind to the lessons of history.

history teaches us that in times of gravest national danger, when the highest qualities of zeal, courage, self-sacrifice and endurance are required to save a people, the more radical elements take the lead. This was the case after the French Revolution when the young republic was fighting for its life and the Jacobins took control. It was, to a lesser degree, true in Prussia, when, in order to resist Napoleon, serfdom was abolished and the most radical elements among the landed military aristocracy took the lead.

Germany to-day, having once involved herself in war against Britain and France, is fighting for her national existence, or at least thinks that she is. Few Germans can believe that defeat would not be followed by a super-Versailles, especially since we have not yet declared any concrete war aims, and since the French wireless has been lying the German people that the best thing for them would be a break up of Germany and the recall of the old monarchies. Peace now with Germany left facing Russia might give the German Conservatives a chance to crush the extremist wing the Nazi Party. But no revolution is likely during a war of and death when many who hate the Hitler régime feel that they must fight for their country. Can one imagine the generals and big industrialists leading a revolution to open Germany to the French army?

A few weeks ago the Lisbon correspondent of *The Times* pointed out what German propagandists are saying in which gives a foretaste of the form which German propaganda may soon take everywhere:

The German and the National Socialist Reich are the defenders and saviours of the labouring classes. In Germany the capitalist and middle classes have almost gone and cannot in any event ride roughshod over labour, whose condition to-day is that of master and serf, especially if the worker is a staunch member of the Party. For that reason, and because the Nazi leaders have decided themselves that Russia has attained the same ends by very different means, Germany has joined Russia in a world-campaign on behalf of labour in general and of Portuguese labour in particular. It is to forestall and check this altruism of Russia that war is being waged against her, and for this reason Russia has come along with her offer of help.

George Bess, former correspondent of the *Christian Monitor* in the U.S.S.R., recently had an article in the

Saturday Evening Post on Bohemia under the Nazis. He showed that it was the policy of the Nazi Party—as distinct from that of the German Governor von Neurath—to win the support of the workers by forcing Czech capitalists to make various concessions, and he contrasted this New Imperialist policy with the Old Imperialism of Britain and France, which, in colonial countries, rules through the support of the possessing classes. Although Germany has been unsuccessful in Bohemia where the people are intensely nationalist, and have in the past known the blessings of democracy, this does not guarantee a similar failure by Germany and Russia in the backward semi-feudal countries of Eastern Europe, or in Asia.

The fact that both Stalin and Hitler are out for the preservation or extension of their own power, and the fact that both the Russian and the German workers and peasants are mercilessly exploited, undernourished and powerless, do not necessarily mean that German and Russian propaganda will not necessarily mean that German and Russian propaganda when each reinforces and supports the other (instead of as heretofore exposing each other's falseness) may not be believed by the hungry and oppressed of other lands. The purges and the executions, the concentration camps and famines in Stalin's Russia did not prevent many of the "enlightened" intellectuals of Britain, France and the United States from thinking that the U.S.S.R. was a democracy, and maintaining that it was the "Socialist fatherland" any more than the differences between the professions and principles of the Christian Churches have prevented men from continuing to be Christians.

The fact that neither Germany nor Russia will conquer, either can or will give to the oppressed and poor the peace, bread and liberty which they promise, does not necessarily mean that the New Imperialism will not headway in Asia and in Europe. The peasants of Poland have been told by Russia to seize the possessions of the owners do not know that later on they are doomed to State serfs upon the lands they are now joyfully occupying. They, and those of other lands in the future, may be the invaders, just as the heavily burdened serfs on the lands of the Roman Empire welcomed the barbarians who brought the civilisation of the ancient world.

On the other hand since the Nazis, unlike the Bolsheviks,

do not shoot the landowners, the capitalists and the officers, but only the Jews, the ruling classes in Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia may hasten to let the Germans in to save them from the Russians. The threat of further Russian advances may not dismay France and Britain, but it may well dismay the rulers of Eastern Europe. Moreover, Hitler can be confident that if he is once freed from the menace in the West he can at any time force Stalin to disgorge. The Red Army could no more stand up against the German than the Polish. The Russian transport system is hopelessly bad, famine would threaten Russian cities as soon as a real war began, and the Russian people, having suffered more cruelly under Stalin than the German people under Hitler, would have little stomach for a war to preserve Stalin's recent conquests.

So long as we continue fighting Germany, Hitler and Stalin are unlikely to fall out, and if the war continues long it seems most probable that the present uneasy alliance between the dictators will become a close understanding between two states whose social systems come to resemble each other more and more closely.

Stalin's conceptions of socialism are as far removed from Lenin's and Marx's as his Red Imperialism is from their hopes of a world revolution. But his policy may be more successful than theirs. Does Stalin dream of bringing about through the efforts of the Red Army what Lenin and Trotsky failed to do through the Comintern? The ghost of international socialism, banished through the revolutionary action of the united workers of the world, haunts only the tombs and the concentration camps where Lenin's companions and followers lie or suffer a living death. But if the idea of an international socialist society established through the overthrow of capitalism from within, lives on only among the small band of fanatics whom history has passed by, the Stalinist conception of a Soviet Empire won for him by the Red Army may be the dynamic force. Stalin has now abandoned the old masquerade of the past five years. Can he substitute the torn banner of world revolution a new standard? Can the old eagle of the Romanoffs be painted red? Can the Red Army be prepared for and facilitated by the myth of world revolution for Communists outside Russia? Does Stalin in fact wish to raise the spectre of world war to haunt a Europe involved in a life and death

struggle between the Old and the New Imperialisms? Can the personal interests of Stalin be reconciled with a revolutionary policy which might at any moment involve Russia in a real war, which would almost certainly sweep him from power, even if it did not lead to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.?

Trotsky says that Stalin does not wish to see Hitler fall because revolution in Germany would have such repercussions in Russia that the people would "turn upon the tyrants of the Kremlin," and that Stalin's aim is to prevent Hitler falling and to preserve the *status quo* in both countries. This would explain his support of Hitler's peace proposals and the abrupt change in Comintern policy from support of the war to opposition to the war.

Even if Stalin's aim is primarily that of avoiding a war which would destroy him, this does not ensure that the logic of circumstances may not push him further and further along the path of conquest until he involves Russia in war. How could he have resisted the temptation to occupy White Russia and the Polish Ukraine, when failure to do so might allow Hitler to convert them later into bases of revolution in the U.S.S.R., where Ukrainian nationalism has never been stamped out in spite of fearful repression? How resist temptation to acquire suzerainty over the small Baltic countries? How also resist the temptation to divert attention of the oppressed masses of Russia from their own hardships to national glory by extending the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. even beyond those of Tsarist Russia? How could Stalin have failed to seize his opportunity to fill depleted coffers of his parasitic state by the acquisition of millions of new State serfs, or to repair the ruined machinery of the Soviet factories through the help of Germany?

If National Socialism, Red or Brown, is the new system which is to replace our outworn capitalist system, may be spread by conquest or the fear of conquest. Germany and France, in the effort to overcome Nazi Germany, and by Soviet Russia, will be forced to adopt similar measures: State control of land and capital, and a similar reorganisation of their peoples. War will force us to curtail production to nationalise essential industries and banking—in a word, to establish our form of national socialism or State capitalism. Whether or not we shall be able to preserve our civilisation and a measure of the freedom we are fighting to defend

perish. It is true that in past ages a culture has, time after time, been annihilated by barbarism, as Professor Toynbee's great study commemorates. Could ours disappear in the same way? Could it vanish, like the stately courts of the Pharaohs, to be unearthed by archæologists thousands of years hence? Clearly not. Those dead-and-gone civilisations were mostly local and isolated. Our western civilisation—that vast nexus of the relations between man and man and between man and nature—is very different. It is broad-based in the minds and habits of life and thought of men all over the world. Smitten in Europe, it would flourish the more vigorously in the Americas, and even in many an adopted home in Asia and Africa. The enterprise of scientific thought cannot long be checked, nor the instinct of man for literature and art permanently dragooned. No, western civilisation will not succumb to the war; wounded it may be, shocked, dispirited; but it will still live, for it is a permanent stage in human progress, and war indeed may purge it of some of its defects and unwelcome accretions.

Now for the optimist and his new world. He needs to be steadied quite as much as the pessimist. His vision has many variants. One, which is particularly acceptable to old friends of the League of Nations, is a reconstruction of that body, with a revised Covenant and more effective provisions for collective security. Another vision is that of the New Commonwealth, in which an international equity tribunal will settle all disputes between nations which might otherwise lead to war, and an international police force will secure obedience to its decisions. A third and at the moment a closely canvassed vision is that of a federation of the democratic nations, or of Europe, or of the world. It starts with an attack on the system of national sovereignty, to which it tends to ascribe most of our ills to-day; and it goes on to picture the nations of goodwill surrendering some of the essentials of their sovereignty to a federal parliament and executive elected by a democratic franchise. The initial crudities of Mr. Streit's *Union Now* are being remedied by the study-groups which are earnestly engaged on this thesis up and down the country; and the chief danger to the federal doctrine is that it may become too popular. Apart from these and other kindred visions, each of which has its sympathisers and its critics, there is much support for the plea that the new world will be

a world where religion will resume its lost sway, and Christianity will again be given a chance of captivating the hearts of men.

All or nearly all those variants depend on one tremendous assumption, that after the war men will be ready and in the mood to meet and work out schemes for the common weal. "We think," said the Pope in addressing his cardinals at Rome last Christmas, "we think with fright of the immense work that will be necessary—when a world tired of fighting wants to restore peace—to break down the walls of aversion and hatred that have been built up in the heat of the fight." These walls are high enough already; lying propaganda on the one hand and anger at unprovoked violence on the other have seen to that. And to all this bitterness when war has added its atrocities, real or imputed, its pride of victory, its ignominy of defeat, and its unbearable load of private suffering and sorrow, how can we expect men's minds to be attuned to the amiable discussion of the questions implicit in a new world order? They may have to wait for their answer upon the coming generation; and how is the coming generation to be weaned from the prejudices of its fathers? The psychology of the problem is treated too light-heartedly by some of our enthusiasts: the age-long wisdom of the Vatican understands it better.

It may indeed be that we are all wrong in planning a new world as if it were merely a piece of mechanism. Some years ago a Czech diplomat, one of Masaryk's chosen lieutenants, was discussing the point with the present writer. "What is wrong," he said, "with our world to-day"—*our* world, not Germany and Russia—"is the lack of any accepted philosophy of life. Never before has Europe been so long without the guidance of some dominating mind: Aristotle, the Fathers, Spinoza, Comte, Locke, Bentham. We have nobody like them to-day; only Bergson perhaps, and his is hardly the ethic that fires men's minds." There is truth in this, in the view that what we lack is a new evangel, a new apostle, a Peter the Hermit to preach a new crusade against violence and injustice and national self-sufficiency. Power, says Mr. Bertrand Russell, is "the fundamental concept in social science," and then he goes on to distinguish various forms of power—naked power, economic power, the power of propaganda, and so on. We have drifted into a stage at which European politics have

become almost exclusively a matter of naked material power. May it not be that the bridge to the new world will be the substitution of moral for material power; and that, when this is built, the necessary mechanism will fashion itself, perhaps on quite different lines from anything we are thinking of to-day? At the moment, the bridge-builder is not in sight. Will the crisis produce the man, as so often in history before?

Whether it is a problem of political engineering, however, or a crusade which lies before us, it seems certain that we shall still find ourselves in the old world when the war ends—the same old world with its old prejudices and inequalities and selfishness. The best that the war can do for it is to inspire it with an irresistible desire for better things; if that is done, the road will be made clearer to those more distant ideals which our optimists hope to attain. But the road is going to be no primrose path. There will be, as the Pope predicts, an immense amount of discord and hatred and disillusionment to be allayed and dispersed. How that burden is to be lifted is our first and paramount problem. At the risk of oversimplifying it we must start from two assumptions: one, that Germany has sued for peace, the other that we are, in the first instance at least, dealing with Germany alone.

On the preliminary steps there is already in anticipation a large measure of agreement in this country. When the "Cease Fire" sounds, an armistice will be declared in terms which will (1) make it impossible for the German forces to resume hostilities, and (2) oblige the German Government to withdraw all its military and civil officials from the territories of which it took forcible possession. This latter operation cannot be hurried and must be carefully controlled, for the dangers of retaliation by the victims of aggression will be considerable. When it is completed the Allies will then have to undertake such temporary policing of the Reich as will restore full civil liberty to those German citizens whom the Nazi Government has for political reasons deprived of liberty or exiled. This step is essential in order to allow the German people to elect in perfect freedom the Government with which the Allies can negotiate the treaty of peace. That election will take place under the supervision of the Allies, and thereupon their occupation of the Reich will cease, as well of course as any naval blockade. It is not impossible that some part of their

work will have been done for them by internal revolution; but that is a contingency that can be dealt with if it arises.

So far the course is clear. We should not be going beyond what we are pledged to do, or the minimum of what the French would insist upon. It is when we come to the next stage that the political sagacity of Europe will be put to the test, for the Peace Conference will be asked to perform impossibilities. Consider what Europe will be expecting—a new map with agreed and guaranteed national boundaries; a new agency for preserving international peace; assurances that the agency will be efficient; compensation for the victims of Nazi aggression and, by then it may be also, of Bolshevik aggression; general disarmament; economic relief and the opening up of markets; as well as the righting of the many wrongs and injustices that have been perpetrated since the last treaties of peace. It was the attempt to cope with some such combination that was largely responsible for the undoing of Versailles; no corporate human genius could compass so vast a task with reasonable speed, and speed is essential if the broad lines of peace are to be satisfactorily laid. There seems therefore everything to be said for engaging the first Peace Conference solely on the task of re-drawing the map of Europe. In that task there is, alas, no predicting what part will be played by Russia; she may by then have become a belligerent, or she may have sheathed her claws and returned to neutrality. In any case, the help of neutral European nations in the Conference will be essential, and if the United States should care to sit on it as an honest broker, she would be doubly welcome. For the peace must, on this occasion, be a negotiated and not a dictated peace; and the help of friendly intermediaries will be invaluable.

Before a finger is laid on the map of Europe, it is to be hoped that the British delegates will insist upon defining precisely what it understands by two primary terms, "self-determination" and the "rights of minorities." They have led to more confusion and done more harm than any other pair of phrases in the political dictionary. Self-determination can no longer, especially after Hitler's variations on the theme, be treated merely as a matter of counting heads; historical associations, economic relations, strategic and many other considerations have also to go into the balances; and the most carefully worded and guarded plebiscite can be only

well depend on how long the war lasts and how destructive it proves.

"Socialism" may be coming in a form unrecognisable and hated by both the revolutionaries and the reformers who for decades have worked for it and dreamed of it as the ideal society which was to abolish injustice and poverty. "Socialism" may mean tyranny, terror, the concentration camp and the firing squad, secret police and the regimentation of the mind and spirit, whether it comes through the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as in Russia, or as that "dictatorship of finance capital" which the Left still professes to see in the Nazi system.

If we can avoid a war of mutual destruction in Europe we may perhaps, having seen the abyss into which we are heading, transform our present economic and social system into a national planned economy without the sacrifice of all those political and moral values which can alone make the new social system not only tolerable, but an improvement on the old. But if the new system is to come in the heat and passion of war and revolution, it may mean the seizure of power by a ruthless minority, and it will make little difference whether the shirts they wear are red or brown or black.

FREDA UTLEY.

BOHEMIA UNDER NAZI OPPRESSION.

IN a period in which the desire of establishing a lasting basis for peace is universal, the necessity of analysing the enemy's policy is even more urgent than before, both as regards the tactics to be applied, and the forming of the aims indispensable for securing a better future. The war and the Polish tragedy have not contributed, so far, any essential new knowledge of the Nazi mind. They have only confirmed the old experience of the brutal imperialism of Hitler Germany and the ruthless annihilation of the victim, paying dearly for the defeat. It is the Czechs who enjoy the doubtful distinction of being the foreign race whose "peaceful conquest" transformed their country into the first Nazi colony. Bohemia and Moravia became the trial field for Nazi colonial policy which, according to Hitler, has to be based "not on colonies abroad but in Europe, the Nazis being fighters for their own rights, not the defenders of other people, especially not the policemen looking after 'poor small nations'." Hence the fundamental importance of the principles of Nazi rule inside the Protectorate. They have to be well understood as a definite example of the Nazi idea of governing a foreign race indicating what the world has to expect should Nazi imperialism not be crushed.

The protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was blacked out in European history as the result of Munich. It has been sacrificed by its friends and it has been suffering under the terror of its oppressor ever since. It is true the Poles have almost been annihilated, the fourth partition of Poland being even fatal than the three previous ones. It is true, further, that since the ordeal of the Finns has excited an even greater general indignation. May be that before this article is published another victim of aggression will have to suffer the imperialistic power-policy only counts nowadays in the devaluation of all values. If, however, there is no mental reversal of policy, all changes will be effected to the lines tried out and applied in the test case of "Czecho-Slovakia."

Since the blizzard of the Ides of March when Hitler's troops marched into Prague, the Nazis have enforced on the country the two main principles of policy, isolation and intervention. The Czechs are

one factor in a just decision. Similarly, the rights of minorities may be grossly exaggerated, just as they are sometimes grievously violated; and the abundant experience which has now accumulated should offer some guidance as to their proper scope and their reasonable limitations. These are not points of pedantry; they are vital to the future peace of Europe. Every great nation has a Naboth's vineyard somewhere; and if it happens to lie just across the border in a small and provocative state, there is constant risk of trouble. But it is just these small and provocative states that the doctrine of self-determination tends to multiply unless it is curbed. The protection of minorities is an equally fruitful source of danger. In the racial mosaic of eastern Europe, minority patches are scattered over every national area, however carefully its boundaries are drawn. From these small enclaves cries are constantly being raised of unfair discrimination, emotional appeals to be linked up with people of their own blood elsewhere. If the Conference takes all these seriously, it will have to choose between extensive transfers of population and the cutting up of the Danube valley and the Balkans into as many national areas as there are squares on a chess-board. The *morcellement* of Europe was a danger even when the Empire and the Papacy were powerful to correct it; it is far more dangerous to-day.

A new map of Europe; in all conscience a sufficient task for a Peace Conference which will be meeting while the angers and agonies of war are still fresh. Yet it is only a curtain-raiser for the long drama which will have to be played out before Europe can feel at rest. If the drama were divided into the conventional five acts, the character of the acts, and indeed of many of the scenes, would leap to the mind at once; but there the simile ends, for some of the acts must be played simultaneously and some will take years to finish, while others must be pushed through with all speed. Making no attempt therefore, to arrange them in any special sequence, we can readily recognise the five main services that must be undertaken to make Europe habitable. First and foremost is the designing of an organisation for preventing future wars, a design which must provide the steps necessary for immediate security, and then face the whole vast issue of subordinating national sovereignty to international and guaranteed control. Another service of scarcely less urgency will be the systematic

reduction and regulation of armaments. The world will not again tolerate a fiasco in this respect, and at the same time it will insist on the caution which will be necessary to prevent wholesale dislocation of the labour market and consequent misery. A third service, and the most urgent of all, is the repatriation of homeless peoples and the rehabilitation of ruined lands; to be followed by an assessment of the cost and all the complications associated with the word Reparations. The fourth duty, slow and gradual but by universal agreement essential, is the easing of the economic strains and stresses from which the world is suffering to-day. And finally, may we hope that a fifth service will be possible, in the shape of a programme for the moral regeneration of Europe in concert with the churches and other bodies expert in such a task.

How is all this going to be organised? The present writer, looking back on happier days in Geneva ten years ago, turned to Aristide Briand's famous memorandum of September 1929, on the need for a Moral Union of Europe. It was received with chilly politeness by the governments to whom it was addressed, but it is worth consideration now. It proposed the setting up of a regular institution to be known as the "European Conference," with a permanent political committee as its executive, and a secretariat. Briand's ideal was the federal organisation of Europe, and this body was, in his words, to prepare "a general inventory of the programme of European co-operation." The angle of approach may have changed, but it is some such body that would seem to be required, to carry on the work which will remain when the Peace Conference is over. It must be essentially a European body, so that the League of Nations would not fill the rôle. It must represent the governments who constitute the Peace Conference. It must be armed by them with plenary powers to carry through its programme, and with the necessary military authority to enforce its decisions. It would continue to function until it had finished its fivefold task; in other words, it would finally be merged in whatever organisation, federal or otherwise, may ultimately be devised for securing peace among the nations. And its executive at least must be prepared to sit in practically continuous session until its work is finished.

In stating these extremely general propositions, one is

solitary confinement, cut off completely from the world. There is still no freedom of movement to and from the Protectorate except for Germans. Political, economic, spiritual freedom of movement do not exist either. The Czechs do not participate in the war, apart from the *emigrés* who fought in Poland and are now training with General Faucher as a Czech Legion somewhere in France. But it follows from the peculiarity of the legal construction of the Protectorate that, although they are non-belligerents, they are not even allowed to be neutral. Their industrial equipment has to work day and night for the benefit of the Nazis. Their food production has been incorporated in the German war-economy in a similar way to that of Polish agriculture.

Isolation from the outer world is intensified by isolation from within. The inhabitants of the Protectorate have no connection with other countries—except by illegal means. Even demonstrations of spiritual community of ideas, other than the Nazi faith—as recent events have shown—constitute crimes liable to capital punishment. For no other reason than that they have trusted Hitler's promises of Czech self-government (and therefore of cultural autonomy), thousands of Czechs have been either executed or thrown into concentration camps. It has been a silent crucifixion. The only outcry which has been heard in the outside world has been in regard to the slaughter of the Czech students. But it has been all the more terrible for having been silent. In the Nazi mind there is nothing of the moral background, with regard to Bohemia-Czechia, similar to that from which Oliver Cromwell once acted as "Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland and of the Dominions and territories thereunto belonging." It is open national discrimination based on the assumption of the superiority of the German and the inferiority of the Czech race and the fallacious doctrine of the "eastern decline of culture" which is to justify the "eastern policy." Although the outer form of the Protectorate has been preserved so far, Czech autonomy has been completely destroyed. Even in the rudimentary form of the Protectorate's Czech government, Czech jurisdiction, Czech educational system, Czech economy and Czech finance still exist, but executive power rests entirely with the Nazis. Czech is the official language of the country. Czech used by German officials is regarded as "provocation," although

de jure, the Czech language enjoys equal status with the German.

By decree from September 11th the entire executive power has been concentrated in the hands of the Reichsprotector. He has to confirm all laws without exception, and all sentences pronounced by the Czech courts in the course of ordinary legal proceedings in order to make them final. The Czech police has been subordinated to the German police. As foreign affairs, defence and communications have always been prerogatives of the Reich since the establishment of the Protectorate—the Nazis are now in full control of Czech home policy as well. That the Czech educational system had to be adapted to Nazi ideas is already well known. Beginning from the autumn Czech children have to learn history out of books the text of which has been revised by the Germans. As hundreds of new German schools have been opened since last spring and Czech schools have been closed down in large numbers, the education of youth is—except for home life—more and more under Nazi influence. The closing down of the four Czech colleges after students' riots deliberately provoked by the Nazis, completes the destruction of the Czech educational system, founded by Jan Amos Koménský, famous under the name of Comenius, to the Western World. Roughly 1,200 college professors and 25,000 students are affected. Czech students will have to rely in future as far as they are still outside the concentration camps, on the Nazi high schools, should they desire to finish their studies. After the purge of the libraries and school books and the ban pronounced on all but Nazi products of press, philosophy—the listening-in to foreign broadcasts of Czechs is complete and the ground is ready for Germanisation on the largest scale.

Although the establishment of a strong position in the educational system is a fulfilment of the Nazi idea of control and planned education of the younger generation, it guarantees the success of the Nazification at large, which has been effectively furthered by immigration of Germans into the Protectorate on a big scale. An innumerable German officials transferred from West Germany to the Protectorate, there has lately been considerable re-settlement of South Tyrolean Germans in South and North Moravia. How this experiment will

conscious of leaving all the concrete constructive work of the future untouched. That must be true of any paper scheme; most obviously so of a scheme where the postulates will largely depend on the outcome of a protracted war which has hardly yet begun. The argument in essence is that there will have to be three stages in a peace settlement which holds out any hope of satisfying the needs of Europe, and that each stage must have an appropriate body for its direction. First will come the Peace Conference, to settle the territorial disputes out of which this war has arisen. Then will come a European Conference (to use Briand's expression) to clean up the débris of the war and to devise the mechanism, so far as mechanism will avail, for securing a better World Order. Finally, we shall get to the permanent structure of peace and unity, of which Tennyson sang. Who among us will live to see this third stage? We can only strive, in our day and generation, to help with the stages which must precede it.

Lastly, what of the League of Nations? Has it no part to play in all this arranging of the future? Decidedly it has. The problems we have been considering are for the European Powers to settle, though from the experience and machinery of the League much useful help may be obtained. But the problems of the rest of the world will go on, and those on which the League and its sister organ, the International Labour Office, have specialised could not be in better hands. As an agency for collective security and for curbing aggression the League has abdicated; and the Covenant will have to be amended in this respect, as also probably in others. As a centre, however, where the men and women who are prominent in the public life of the world can meet and work together in the service of their common humanity, it will steadily grow in value and influence. It will supplement and buttress whatever measures may be taken towards federation; and its juridical organ, the Court at The Hague, may in time be vested with wider powers, and may help substantially in framing what the world so badly needs, an effective code of international law.

MESTON.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR.

EVERY war has its background as well as its immediate causes.* The present struggle began when Hitler suddenly attacked Poland, whom France and England had publicly pledged themselves to defend. While the responsibilities for the conflict in 1914 are still under discussion, the guilt in the present war is beyond dispute. It was a case of naked aggression, as barefaced as the attack by Japan on China, and by Italy on Abyssinia. All these abominable crimes will be branded in history as they deserve. Yet when the conscience of the world has pronounced judgment, there is something more for us to do. How was it that such outrages were possible, and that the perpetrators were or pretended to be convinced that they were justified in their actions? To answer these questions we must look a long way back.

I. *National Sovereignty.* The root of the trouble is that the human family as a whole has never organised its collective life. Regional attempts like the *Pax Romana* were based on the supremacy of a single state, and therefore could not be expected to endure. Some of the best minds of the Middle Ages conceived the lofty idea of a *Respublica Christiana*, under the joint direction of the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, whose members were bound to each other by common institutions and beliefs. But this glittering vision never took material shape, and the conception itself suffered from fatal limitations. Only half of Europe was envisaged, for the Eastern Church was left out of account; and the cement of the edifice was sought elsewhere than in our common humanity. When the great atmospheric change occurred about four centuries ago with Columbus and Copernicus, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the valuable medieval ideas of unity, imperfect though they had been, were swept away. The reign of Augustine, which had lasted a thousand years, came to an end and Macchiavelli ruled in his place. What Lecky describes as the secularisation of thought had begun. It was one of the greatest revolutions in the history of mankind. The world rapidly expanded, both geographically and imaginatively. Modern science and the modern state were born. The modern man came into existence with new ambitions, new capacities and new needs.

* An address to the World Congress of Faiths, February 12, 1940.

Human beings usually crave for some particular benefit with special intensity at some special time. In the sixteenth century, when people were getting tired of feudal anarchy and when the bourgeoisie advanced towards the centre of the stage, the overwhelming need was for order. The urge took shape in the theory and practice of the centralised sovereign state, strong enough to keep order at home and to repel attacks from without. Its high priests Bodin and Hobbes argued that the civil wars which ravaged their respective countries were the inevitable fruit of divided authority. Autocracy, dynastic or personal, was nothing new. What differentiates our modern assumptions from those of the Middle Ages in the political sphere is the doctrine of the unfettered sovereignty of the state. The good side of the change was that the internal life of the more advanced communities reached a pitch of organisation which it had never known, banishing the spectres of civil war and personal violence, and giving scope to the abounding energies of the individual. When this new security was combined with an ever-growing measure of self-government, so that every citizen came to possess a share of power and responsibility, we could all feel thankful for our lot. The dark shadow in the picture was the complete absence of the conception or the machinery of co-operation between sovereign states. For the last four centuries we have been confronted by the paradox of order within our frontiers and anarchy without. When no allegiance was felt to any authority outside or above them, *raison d'état*—the interest of the state as interpreted by itself—inevitably became the compass of political mariners.

The exploration and exploitation of new continents added causes of conflict to the familiar territorial rivalries nearer home. The law of the jungle demanded teeth and claws. Diplomacy without armaments, declared Frederick the Great, who began his reign with the rape of Silesia, is like music without instruments. A few pioneering idealists like Grotius and Penn, the Abbé Saint Pierre and Kant, preached the unity of mankind and sketched out measures of co-operation, but they were voices crying in the wilderness. The Holy Alliance, its anæmic heir the Concert of Europe, and the two Hague Conferences failed to weaken the grip of a doctrine which became out of date when scientific invention, the great miracle-worker, brought distant states, races and continents

to our own doorstep. It is no wonder that we stumbled into the war of 1914, for war was universally assumed to be the only means of settling the graver disputes. What is surprising is that we failed to learn the lesson taught us so plainly in blood and tears. The League of Nations was founded with high hopes, but there was not enough conviction to make it work. The sovereign state was still firmly entrenched in the consciousness of mankind. *Raison d'état* retained its sway; after a brief halt of exhaustion the mad race of armaments began anew; powerful aggressors continued without a blush to ravish and to steal. We seem as far away as ever from the conception and the institutional embodiment of the unity of mankind.

II. *Unequal Possessions.* This immense disappointment is largely due to the unequal division of the earth's surface. We are so accustomed to being citizens of the greatest empire in the world and the greatest empire in history that we take it as a matter of course. If we think about it at all, we fortify ourselves with the proud thought that we rule it as well as anybody could do and perhaps rather better. But viewed from outside it presents a very different aspect. Why, it is asked, should a single empire possess a quarter of the earth's surface? That (with the exception of Australia) it was hammered together with blood and iron, like most other empires past and present, is no moral justification in critical eyes. If the English helped themselves to the riches of the world, why should not other people elbow their way to the table and snatch what they can? Why should they be content with the crumbs that fall to the floor? Why should latecomers, like Germany and Italy, be penalised because their countries were merely geographical expressions, to use Metternich's phrase, until the third quarter of the nineteenth century? Is it fair that while little Holland, little Belgium and little Portugal possess enormous colonial empires, Italy should have so little and Germany nothing at all? Furthermore, is it right that certain countries should possess more of certain raw materials than they need, while others have none? Is it playing the game to substitute Ottawa Agreements and similar limitations for the generous principle of the open door?

These are searching questions. It exasperates nations who have little overseas territory or none to be told that it is a burden and that it rarely pays its way. Every nation is

the long run remains to be seen. For the time being transfer-orders to the Protectorate are very welcome to the individual, for the obvious reason that the transferred are exempted from war duty at the front, although subjected to extensive training inside the Protectorate. These Reich Germans have been transferred to Bohemia-Moravia because, in spite of the new military units sent into the Protectorate, the German Government feels the position there to be insecure. The Germans would be utilised as a certain counterweight to the Czechs, should the latter attempt any rioting.

Whereas at the beginning of the Nazi rule Moravia was singled out for Germanisation, Bohemia proper is now considered more important, not least because the Germanisation of Moravia has made surprisingly quick progress in local government in the big Moravian towns: Brunn, Ihlava, Moravska Ostrava and Olomouc. The recent nomination of the reputed Sudeten peasant leader Dr. Hubert Preibsch as deputy governor of Moravia confirms this view. By the Germanisation of Moravia, Bohemia has been even more isolated, Prague being almost the only big town with full local government. It is, however, interesting to note that in spite of the considerable emigration, especially from Prague during last winter, the number of the inhabitants of the capital has increased according to a recent Nazi census by more than 200,000. They are almost all German nationals trusted with the special task of Germanising Slavonic Prague.

There is no intention at present apparently of transferring Czechs further to the east. On the contrary, the Nazis are valuing the outstanding qualities of Czech work and economy prefer to incorporate the Czech element rather than allow it to grow and continue its national life nearer to Slavonic language borders. Whereas they had but little patience for the high qualities of the Czech nation there are now remarkable signs that, impressed by the stubbornness, courage and dignity of Czech resistance, they have revised their opinion considerably in favour of the Czechs. This change, of course, that Czech autonomy will be recognised, or that they will exercise a policy of understanding. These indications lead to the conclusion that they will in the younger Czech generation to become the vanquishers of Nazification among the Slavs.

Nazi intervention in Czech home policy and Czech political life always follows these lines. It becomes more visible day by day. All Czech unification movements are strongly objected to by the Nazi authorities in the Protectorate, the idea that unification of policy might proceed parallel with the intensification of religious feeling being particularly opposed. Why fill churches or crowd places of pilgrimage when "our leader Adolf Hitler," convinced that he is the Messiah, has decided to create a new panslavist movement on Nazi lines with the freshly converted Czechs as centre? There is little response to those tendencies for the time being, the inner Czech resistance against Nazification being unbroken. Various attempts to form a representative Czech Fascist Party have definitely failed. The Czech Fascist press, especially the daily *Vlajka*, is largely subsidised by official Nazi Party funds in the Protectorate, but the large Czech majority refuses even to touch those press products. Fascist members of the Czech Protectorate's government, although put by the Nazis in responsible positions, cannot exercise the necessary influence because the entire nation is against them. Attempts to reach the Viennese Czech colony or the Czechs living since Munich in the Sudeten districts under Nazi rule, for the Nazification of Bohemia, failed. If anything has been achieved by those methods it is increased antagonism between the Teutonic and the Slavonic elements of Bohemia, national tension being greater than ever before.

Although Czech internal unity in the fight against Hitler has been preserved admirably, it cannot be denied that Czechs are affected by the long period of destruction through which they have had to pass for now more than a year and a quarter. The Munich partition, the difficulties of the First Republic, the separation of the Slovaks, finally the Nazi rule with all the strain of Germanisation and Aryanisation on their mind even before the outbreak of war. Though the Democracies have finally decided to put an end to the Nazi danger represents one of the rare, almost the only developments for the whole nation since Munich nearer the possibility of restoring Central Europe and Czech independence. The defeat of the German-Russian alliance, the new Russian imperialism, the bitter disappointment for a nation whose belief in secret Pan-Slavonic collaboration against Hitlerism has

died. Knowing that open resistance against the Nazis would only lead to further oppression, if not exercised at the proper moment, the Czechs summon all their energy to be quiet on the surface, using the method of boycott as much as possible. They endeavour to apply Nazi tactics, to prevent a further deterioration of their status, organise a strong internal body of responsible men directing the nation through this most difficult period of their existence. The Nazis, aware of this unbroken opposition, feel highly uncomfortable, almost endangered. They try to provoke open rebellion. The student riots, the student slaughter and the closing of the universities were their only successes so far. Passive loyalty is difficult to distinguish from passive resistance, if properly handled.

Czech internal unity being achieved, the establishment of closer and friendlier relations between Czechs and Slovaks is undoubtedly one of the few pleasant developments in the last month. Apart from Tuka, Durcansky and the somehow peculiar Slovak press chief Sano Mach, almost all leading Slovak personalities realise now the fatal mistake they made last year in allowing themselves to listen to Nazi advice. A Slovak plebiscite held now would produce undoubtedly an almost 100 per cent. vote for the re-establishment of the former Czecho-Slovak collaboration.

What the Czechs think about the future in detail is very difficult to find out. It is, however, certain that all their hopes and desires are connected with an Allied victory, with the triumph of democracy over totalitarian annihilation. As far as can be ascertained at present the federal idea working for collaboration between the so-called Succession States is favoured, the Czech realising that international development against small States and for the establishment of units. They are, however, aware, like Mr. Chamberlain, that the war must first be won, before the peace can be the proper way; and they only hope that Nazi will not succeed in suggesting to the world a peace collaboration with Hitler would be thought essential to the salvation of the Continent from an alleged Bolshevik

R. H. M. WORSLEY.

"THE APOSTLE OF MODERATION."

IT was left to the nineteenth century to discover—or at any rate to interpret—the seventeenth. The eighteenth century was too near, in point of time, to the Civil War, to see the events of that stirring period in true perspective. It was too remote from it in philosophy, in politics, and in ecclesiastical temper, to appreciate the emotions which on both sides that conflict evoked. Not, indeed, until the nineteenth century had run much of its course, until the fervour of the Evangelical movement and then of the Anglo-Catholic revival had spent its pristine force, could the claims of "rational" theology have the chance of a hearing. F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley prepared the way; *Essays and Reviews* and *Lux Mundi* took up again the task of biblical exegesis at the point where it had been dropped by John Colet and Erasmus, before political protestantism had captured the reforming movement in the English Church.

So it came that for two centuries Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland, was forgotten. Falkland founded no party: neither democrats nor high Tories were concerned to recall his memory. Not until 1878 was a monument erected at Newbury to mark the place where the first battle of Newbury was fought, and where Falkland met the death which calumniators have described as virtually suicidal. Not until 1885 was so much as a mural tablet affixed to the walls of the church at Great Tew where Falkland's mortal remains are believed to lie. There is a monument to the Tanfields (Falkland's maternal ancestors) in the church at Burford, but nothing (so far as I know) to record the fact that Falkland was born at Burford, and that the Priory and its estates at one time owned him as lord.

Tardy justice is at long last being done to Falkland. But would it even now be done had not Clarendon drawn the portrait of his friend in colours that will never fade? The cruel insinuation that Falkland "committed suicide" at Newbury was originally disseminated by "wooden-headed old Bulstrode," as Carlyle christened Whitelocke. Horace Walpole practically repeated Whitelocke's tittle-tattle in his *Royal and Noble Authors*, and added his own opinion that "this Lord [Falkland] had much debility of mind and a kind of superstitious scruples that might flow from an excellent

convinced that it could make something of such possessions if it got the chance. The sense of injustice is reinforced by the sentiment of economic claustrophobia. When the so-called Have-Nots are more fertile than the Haves, the problem of the overspill of population adds to the urgency of the problem. If the principle of rationing or sharing is right in time of war, would not the same sound principle hold in the larger field of national claims and rights? If we really believe in the unity of mankind, it is easy to visualise the passionate sense of frustration which fills certain nations and goads them to deeds of violence. Not all communities share this longing to expand. Switzerland is content with her modest portion, and Sweden has long ceased to brood over her vanished greatness. But such cases are exceptional. The urge is so strong and so general that it may be regarded as a sign of national vitality. How it is to be met I cannot argue here. My task at the moment is to stress the importance of the unequal distribution of the globe among the deeper causes of the present war.

III. *The Treaty of Versailles.* Passing from the cult of the sovereign state and the problem of territorial grievances to factors of more recent date, we must first deal with the unsatisfactory settlement dictated by the victors twenty years ago. *Vae victis* is an old maxim, and its futility seems to be as far from general recognition as ever. That President Wilson in all sincerity proclaimed the new gospel of international co-operation before the struggle was over renders it all the more deplorable that so little of his healing message found its way into the peace terms. There has been great exaggeration of their faults, and Mr. Keynes went much too far in calling the Treaty of Versailles a Carthaginian peace. Mr. Lloyd George has argued in two big volumes that the treaties embodied the inquiries and decisions of high-minded men, including English and American scholars; that every important item was carefully discussed by the Big Four; that good reasons can be given for each clause, and that the treaty merely carried out the declarations of Allied statesmen long before it was known which side would win. The fault, he adds, was not in the treaty or its makers but in the bunglers who sabotaged their work by the invasion of the Ruhr and similar mistakes. It is a powerful plea, and everyone knows that the settlement might have been much worse. For instance, but for the opposition of British and American

delegations, the left bank of the Rhine, with millions of patriotic Germans, would have been severed from the Fatherland, while Danzig and the whole of Upper Silesia would have been merged in Poland.

Looking back after twenty years, however, we must admit that it was too severe. "I go to Vienna," declared Castle-reagh in 1814, "not to bring back trophies of victory but to restore Europe to the paths of peace." There were too many trophies of victory in the Treaty of Versailles: the United States alone claimed neither reparations nor territory. It was unwise to retain every scrap of Germany's colonial empire, and thereby to create a burning sense of injustice in a great nation. It was an unprecedented psychological *faux pas* to force the defeated parties to admit their exclusive responsibility for the catastrophe. It was a needless humiliation to exclude their representatives from oral discussion. It was a lamentable mistake to exclude Germany from the newly founded League of Nations. It was a disastrous blunder to omit economic planning from the scheme of the new Europe, particularly in the Danubian basin where the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire left a vacuum. The territorial clauses in the homeland were not, I think, intrinsically unjust, and there is more to be said for the Polish Corridor and the Danzig enclave than hasty critics are inclined to admit. But who could expect the new Germany to sit down under the permanent demilitarisation of the Rhineland while France proceeded—very naturally after the horrors of the invasion—to construct an impregnable Maginot line? Such a one-sided arrangement, by which Germany's front door was to be left open to invasion, could only last so long as France remained strong and Germany weak.

It is quite intelligible that the French, with the devastated districts close at hand and haunting memories of bombers and Big Berthas, should have said Never again! Any country which had endured such prolonged sufferings would probably have done the same. Their search for security was instinctive and legitimate, but their methods were unwise. The treaty should have been either more lenient or still more severe. In the one case there might have been a chance of reconciliation. In the other the new Germany would have been prevented from getting on her legs again. "If we have the Rhine and the bridge-heads over the Rhine," declared Foch, "we have

heart, but by no means from a solid understanding." Walpole, in turn, inspired the harsh judgments of Hallam, Macaulay, and Carlyle. The only reference to Falkland in *The Speeches and Letters of Cromwell* is the contemptuous remark, "Poor Lord Falkland in his clean shirt was killed here" (in the first Newbury fight). John Forster goes so far as to say that Falkland was "far more of an apostate than Strafford."

The modern reaction in Falkland's favour was initiated by Lord Lytton in an essay contributed to the *Quarterly Review* in 1860. "Falkland," he wrote, "from the first to the last, was a lover of Liberty, but Liberty as her image would present itself to the mind of a scholar and the heart of a gentleman. It is no proof of apostasy from the cause of Liberty if he thought that a time had come when Liberty was safer on the whole with King Charles than with 'King Pym.' . . . The objects Falkland desired to attain were a monarchy divested of all pretensions to absolutism, and a Church purified from all sympathies with papacy—excluded from all penal jurisdiction in civil affairs. In fine, a monarchy without a Strafford, and a Church without a Laud."

Even more discriminating is Mathew Arnold's appreciation. No man was ever perhaps better qualified to interpret Falkland to the nineteenth century than the author of the essay on *Compromise*. "If we are to find a martyr in the history of the great civil war, let it be Falkland. He was the martyr of lucidity of mind and largeness of temper in a strife of imperfect intelligencies and tempers illiberal. . . . He and his friends by their heroic and hopeless stand against the inadequate ideals dominant in their time, kept open their communications with the future, lived with the future. Their battle is ours too; and that we pursue it with fairer hopes of success than they did, we owe to their having waged it and fallen" (*Mixed Essays*).

The most recent appreciation of Falkland comes from the pen of Mr. Kenneth Murdock of Cambridge, Mass.* This fantastically named volume contains in addition to an elaborate essay on Lucius Cary, slighter essays on Falkland's mother Elizabeth Tanfield, the first Viscountess Falkland, and on John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester. The connection of the latter with the main theme of the volume is not quite obvious.

* *The Sun at Noon*. By Kenneth B. Murdock. The Macmillan Co., New York. 1939.

The essay on Elizabeth Tanfield is, on the contrary, exceedingly helpful to an understanding of Falkland's own temperament and career. Like most great men Lucius Cary owed far more to his mother than to his father. The latter was a careerist, whose religious opinions were inspired rather by political expediency than by spiritual conviction. His marriage with the heiress of Sir Lawrence Tanfield, Chief Baron of the Exchequer and Lord of the Manors of Burford and Great Tew, was purely one of convenience. Elizabeth was not well fitted to be the wife of a courtier or a pro-consul, but until their separation in 1625 she tried to do her duty—so far as was compatible with the higher claim of her faith—by her husband, and she was devoted to the interests—especially the spiritual interests—of her children. Mistress of many languages, she was a learned scholar, and it was (according to her daughter) her study of patristic literature that convinced her of the inadequacy of Protestantism and led to her conversion to Roman Catholicism. Whether as a result of independent studies, or that (as Protestant authorities avow) she was "one of the victims of the Jesuit missionaries who then invested England," Elizabeth Cary was received into the Roman Church, probably in 1605, though the fact was not avowed until 1625. It was one of the many sorrows of a distressful life that she failed to effect the conversion of her eldest son, though the rest of her children were amenable to her influence.

Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly from his mother that Lucius inherited his studious habits and his enthusiasm for philosophical and theological speculation. Lord Clarendon has drawn a delightful picture of Falkland's life, with a devoted wife and many congenial friends, in his lovely home at Great Tew. Situated in a fold of the North Oxfordshire uplands, some twenty miles from the university city, Great Tew was happily known to Clarendon as a "University in a less volume"; to it there constantly resorted the Fellows of a "college situated in a purer air."

The air of Great Tew was in every sense pure. In Falkland's presence no one ever ventured to utter a coarse jest or tell a ribald story. Yet he was catholic in his literary tastes. His first love was poetry. He sought his associates among gay poets "who resorted thither from London."

Suckling in *A Sessions of the Poets* mentions a large number

of them; he also laments Falkland's transference of affection from poetry to theology:

He was of late so gone with divinity
That he had almost forgotten his poetry,
Though to say the truth, and Apollo did know it,
He might have been both his priest and his poet.

Suckling overstated Falkland's achievement in poetry. His output was inconsiderable, and the quality of his work, though obviously that of a scholar, a critic, a philosopher, and above all a generous friend, is not such as to entitle him to an exalted place even among minor poets.

The *Sessions of the Poets* at Great Tew soon gave place to the *Convivium Philosophicum* and the *Convivium Theologicum*. Theology was, indeed, the absorbing interest of Falkland's ripening manhood. But theological speculation was with him only the intellectual reflex of deep religious earnestness and a lofty moral purpose. On his theological works Mr. Murdock lays special stress, and upon the happy days spent at Great Tew in the company of such men as Dr. Sheldon, destined for Lambeth, Dr. Morley for Winchester and Dr. Earle for Salisbury. But if more successful as ecclesiastics none of these prelates attained, as theologians, the eminence of Henry Hammond or John Hales, still less of William Chillingworth.

Chillingworth, according to Aubrey, was Falkland's "most intimate and beloved favourite"; he was "most commonly with my lord," and it was at Great Tew that he wrote his monumental work on *The Religion of Protestants*. Of a work which was the most notable contribution to Anglican theology since the publication of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* the part which most strongly commended itself to Falkland was Chillingworth's noble appeal for Christian unity on the basis of the widest possible toleration.

That appeal Falkland cordially supported. His own controversial writings were not, of course, on the same plane as Chillingworth's. Chillingworth was a professional theologian; Falkland a highly accomplished amateur. But one advantage Falkland enjoyed over his friend: he was in a position, as a Member of Parliament, to influence policy as well as mould opinion. For the days of quiet but fruitful communion with like-minded friends at Great Tew were numbered. The

Convivium was soon to be broken up by the rude shock of war; the theories of the philosophers were to be put to the test in the hard schools of war and politics. Falkland shrank from none of the responsibilities of citizenship. As little as any one did he like the cause in which he was called to fight in the *Bellum Episcopale*, but resolutely he turned his back on the "violets and limes" of Great Tew and plunged into the horrid vortex of affairs.

The impression made by Falkland's personality upon men who knew him only by repute is reflected in Abraham Cowley's well-known lines:

Great is thy charge, O North; be wise and just.
England commits her Falkland to thy trust,
Return him safe: learning would rather choose
Her Bodley or her Vatican to lose. . . .
. . . And this great prince of knowledge is by Fate
Thrust into th' noise and business of the State,

. . . .
He is too good for war, and ought to be
As far from danger as from fear he's free. . . .

The failure of the attempt of Charles and Laud to impose Anglicanism by force of arms upon Presbyterian Scotland led to the summoning, after a decade's intermission, of Parliament. As a Scottish peer Falkland was (before 1707) eligible for election to the House of Commons, and both to the Short and Long Parliaments was returned for Newport (I.W.), a pocket-borough which provided a seat for no fewer than five Prime Ministers.

Down to the introduction of the *Grand Remonstrance* (November 1641) Falkland acted generally with the Opposition. He supported with vote and voice the motion for the attainder of Strafford, though he had deprecated Pym's apparent anxiety to snatch a verdict, by any means, against the man, whose personality and methods Falkland detested as cordially as Pym himself. With Pym he acted in sweeping away the whole machinery of "Thorough"; in particular he vigorously supported the motion against the action of the judges in the case of Ship-money. But it was on the question of Episcopacy that the essential moderation of the advocate of the *Via Media* came out most conspicuously: "I do not believe [the Bishops] to be *Jure divino* . . . but neither do

everything. If not, we have nothing." The Versailles system was harsh enough to exasperate and humiliate, but not enough to hinder a rapid resurrection. For this lack of clarity the British Government, with the British people behind it, was largely responsible.

IV. *Application of the Treaty.* The lack of clear thinking was no less evident in the application of the treaty than in the document itself. Was it desired that Germany should recover as speedily as possible so that she might be able to pay large reparations, or should she be kept so poor and weak that she would never again be a military danger? It was impossible to have it both ways, though many people, particularly in France, believed that we could. Enormous sums were demanded without the haziest idea how they could be paid. The offer of German labour and materials to help in rebuilding the devastated districts was declined, partly because the presence of the hated foe on French soil was not desired, partly because French industry claimed the profitable right to do the work itself. Mr. Keynes's calculation that Germany could pay about 2,000 millions was brushed aside, and astronomical totals were claimed. A beginning was made with deliveries in kind, but when they fell short of the agreed quantities the French marched into the Ruhr in January 1923 to enforce payment. They were met with passive resistance on the part of the miners, the railwaymen and the artisans; the heart of the German black country ceased to beat; the mark, which had already fallen fast and far, tumbled into the bottomless abyss; clashes between French troops and the inhabitants of the Ruhr aroused passionate resentment, and the old hatred of France, which had begun to die down, flamed up anew.

Poincaré, who was mainly responsible for the invasion, always maintained that it had succeeded in its purpose of convincing the German people that reparations must be paid. Others argue that the Weimar statesmen were honourably attempting to fulfil their heavy liabilities, and that there was no need for a surgical operation. What is not in doubt is that the occupation retarded the convalescence of Europe, strained Anglo-French co-operation almost to breaking point, and encouraged Hitler to undertake the Munich *Putsch* in November 1923. The French had already made bad mistakes in the encouragement of separatist movements and the stationing

of black troops in the Rhineland, but the invasion of the Ruhr was far the worst of all. Poincaré was a great patriot, but he lacked imagination. With his rigid legalistic mind he regarded the Treaty of Versailles as a contract to be enforced. That it had been a dictated, not a negotiated, settlement made no difference in his eyes. Only when the *Bloc National* was defeated in the French elections of May 1924, and replaced by the Left Centre of Herriot and Briand, did it become possible to reach a friendly settlement in the Dawes plan. Even then the burden, though lightened, proved too heavy to bear, and the readjustments of the Young Plan were equally impracticable. When Brüning declared that as a result of the American blizzard Germany could not pay, he spoke the truth. The reparation plan was finally interred at the Lausanne Conference in the autumn of 1932 on the eve of Hitler's accession to power. Sir Norman Angell's familiar thesis that in the modern world vast compulsory transfers of wealth and goods are impracticable was triumphantly vindicated.

V. *Weakness of the League.* That we should not be at war to-day if the League of Nations had fulfilled the purpose of its founders and the promise of its youth is a commonplace, but its failure was not its own fault. Now that the doctrine of collective security, after a temporary eclipse, is coming into favour again, we can see how much wisdom is enshrined in the Covenant. The fault lay with its members, some of whom violated their solemn obligations by unprovoked aggression against their weaker fellow-members whose territory they coveted and proceeded to steal.

The crimes of the aggressors, Japan, Italy, Germany and Russia (three of whom offended while they were still members of the League) cry to heaven, and all the whitewash of totalitarian propaganda cannot wipe out the stain. But is the disappointing record of the League due exclusively to these black sheep? Certainly not. Other members, including ourselves, failed in foresight and courage again and again. I will only mention three points. No serious effort at all-round disarmament was made during the years when Germany was weak. When at last the Disarmament Conference met at Geneva in February 1932, the strong lead which had made the Washington Conference of 1921-2 a success was lacking. A year later Hitler was in power, and all hopes of reduction disappeared. Secondly, no attempt was made to implement Article XIX

of the Covenant, which permitted revision and reconsideration. Small changes would have been useless and large ones were ruled out by public opinion. States who had complaints to make did not invoke its aid, for they knew that they would be knocking at a closed door. Those which were satisfied with their lot took no steps to remedy grievances before they festered into sores. Thus the members were divided into two camps, the champions of the *status quo* and the advocates of territorial change. The tension was so acute that it broke the back of the League. Thirdly, no serious effort was made to check the course of aggression. Japan was scolded, but she continued to buy and sell without hindrance. Half-hearted sanctions were imposed on Italy, but oil, without which she could not have ravished Abyssinia, was freely supplied. To quote the cynical jest, the world was made safe for the aggressor. That standing up to powerful malefactors involved risk is clear enough, and public opinion in the democratic states was too divided for the Governments to take a strong line. It was not the fault of Geneva, but the inability of the League to keep the peace of the world was ruthlessly exposed.

VI. *The American Blizzard*. The orgy of speculation in America at the end of 1929 generated an economic blizzard which blew across the Atlantic and fell upon Europe with pitiless fury in 1930. Nowhere were its repercussions more catastrophic than in Germany. The unemployed numbered nearly 7 millions, and the fear of a fresh devaluation terrified a thrifty people. The country had been governed since the world war by a coalition of moderate parties representing Socialists, Democrats and the Catholic Centrum. When we consider their difficulties at home and abroad it is not too much to say that the Weimar statesmen made a gallant fight. But the blizzard was too much for them, and from the summer of 1930 Nazi and Communist revolutionaries saw their chance. Both movements promised escape from suffering by a change of leadership and a new economic system. The figures of the Reichstag election of September 1930 tell their own tale. In 1928 only twelve Nazis were elected to a Chamber of nearly 600. In 1930 107 were returned, and the Nazis became the second largest party in the state. Brüning fought a losing battle with great courage till he was roughly dismissed by President Hindenburg in the spring of 1932 at the bidding of a reactionary group. Less than a year later, on January 30th,

1933, Hitler was called to the helm. That he would have become the master of Germany without the American blizzard is improbable.

VII. *Nazi Ambitions*. It was not surprising that millions of Germans in their humiliation and distress should yearn for a leader. Stresemann possessed ability, imagination, and popular gifts, but he was never in full control, and he died in harness in middle age before his work was done. In offering the German people personal leadership in place of quarrelsome coalitions, in proclaiming the gospel of national self-assertion instead of the "policy of fulfilment," in denouncing Jews and Communists as the scourge of German life, Hitler responded to deep-seated instincts and prejudices. He believed that the first duty of a Government was to get things done and to free the country from foreign dictation. His gospel of National Socialism attracted those who desired to combine a more spirited foreign policy with sweeping internal change. Millions were convinced that he was the man of destiny, and millions more believed that the experiment was at any rate worth trying. We can only understand his victory if we realise how bleak was the economic outlook, how confused the Parliamentary situation, how weak the self-confidence of the people, between 1930 and 1933. Moreover, Germans of all parties felt that their country had been unjustly treated, and agreed with him that the only way to recover their rights was to recover their strength. *Mein Kampf* is a sermon on the text: Only force counts.

If Hitler had been a better and a greater man he might have carried out a considerable part of his programme of national regeneration with the goodwill, or at any rate with the tacit acquiescence, of the Western Powers. Mr. Chamberlain frankly admitted that our treatment of Germany had lacked generosity and wisdom, and now that the passions of war had cooled there was an almost universal desire among Englishmen to give her a square deal. In France the old bitter intransigence of Clemenceau and Poincaré had largely disappeared. Mussolini had proclaimed himself the champion of revisionism even before his attack on Abyssinia smashed the Stresa front. How little the victors in the world war desired to prevent the recovery of their old foe was shown when Hitler tore up the Versailles system. We did nothing when he reintroduced conscription, nothing when he

I believe them to be *Injuria humana*." Though not essential to Church government he believed them to be "convenient" and as such to be retained.

On the *Grand Remonstrance*, however, Falkland, like Clarendon, and many other moderates, broke with Pym. Falkland regarded that declaration as the prelude to revolution, and after its adoption he took office, albeit reluctantly, under the Crown. With good reason he mistrusted the King, and still more the Queen: nor could he restrain them from acts of insensate folly. He was useful in drafting the King's answers to propositions periodically put forward by Parliament; but the time for negotiation was gone by. When war came Falkland fell into a state of despondency, and could only reiterate the hope that he would meet an honourable death on the field. He met it in the first fight at Newbury (September 20, 1643). Reckless courage he certainly exhibited; calumniators could easily find ground for the charge of suicide. The answer to the charge can be found only in the record of a blameless life. If Charles I earned the martyr's crown, so also did Falkland. But what place is there in times of revolution for an "apostle of moderation"? "He shrank from revolution in Church and State; but he would have liberated both, in a higher sense than his contemporary revolutionists, ecclesiastical or political. His ideas were born out of due time, and the extremes first of destruction and then of reaction were destined to run their course. . . . The voice of reason is unheard among the clamours of party, and a Falkland dies broken-hearted when a Cromwell and a Clarendon take their turns of success. But the seed of wise thought never perishes. . . ."

Principal Tulloch was surely right. Falkland sowed "the seed of wise thought"; the reaping of the harvest may be delayed, but it will come. When it does, the "martyr of moderation" will be vindicated.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

THE POPE AND EUROPEAN DICTATORSHIP.*

ONE of the greatest powers in history, the Roman Catholic Church, has found itself confronted all through its history with worldly power. The rise of the Popes from leaders of a secondary group of believers to be the bishops and finally the masters of Rome is in part to be recognised as a process of this relationship between spiritual power and worldly power. The leaders of the once persecuted and outlawed sect called "Christians" had to secure a status of official recognition for their followers. Brave as these were, unwavering under the onslaught of imperial Roman radicalism, the task of the leaders was plainly to be seen: bodily safety, material security at least as much as the existing order could offer to the entirety of the people. True, the teachings of Christ led the Christians to patience, to voluntary self-humiliation. The revolutionary order that the weak shall be the first before the Lord gave strength to all courageous believers amongst the many peoples and races, ruled over and suppressed by a more and more barbarous Dictatorship of Roman Emperors. But the more the thousands of sufferers of impoverished subjects of these all-powerful tyrants of the late Roman period turned their hopes to Christianity, the more the leaders of the movement had to act politically—and not only spiritually.

It is well known how the Church and how the Popes led Christianity through the centuries. It was a constant struggle not only in the Church's own ranks which trend—the trend for worldly security and power or the eternal tasks—should prevail; it was also a constant fight between the great Powers of Europe and the Popes. The former always showed a tendency to secure a certain supremacy over the Church. They sometimes went so far as to attempt to bring the Pope under their sphere of influence, thus holding the key of St. Peter in their own hands. The Carolings, the Saxons, the Habsburgs of Austria and of Spain and the Bourbons—they all tried it—and they all failed. They reduced the Pope's

* This study was finished and in the hands of the Editor a month before Pope Pius XII issued his first Encyclical "*Summa Pontificatus*." Therein the totalitarian theories are refuted and Christianity is called upon to defend its sacred beliefs and orders.

remilitarised the Rhineland, nothing when he seized Austria. We actually helped him to obtain the Sudeten districts without a blow. Not till he snatched what was left of Bohemia and Moravia did we take steps to resist further aggression. The Pan-German programme had been fulfilled, and the Dictator now proclaimed the explosive doctrine of *Lebensraum* or living space. We learn from Dr. Rauschning's striking book *Hitler Speaks* that the Nazi chief was bent on the domination of Europe as long ago as 1933 and 1934, and that Mr. Chamberlain's well-meant policy of appeasement was doomed to failure from the start.

VIII. *The Balance of Power.* That a neurotic megalomaniac would be tempted sooner or later to set his forces in motion was only too probable, and for the last eighteen months of peace most of us realised that he would go on till he was stopped. Thus the question arose whether it would be our duty to take part in such an operation. Mr. Chamberlain worked with heart and soul for the preservation of peace, and to the last possible moment gave Hitler the benefit of the doubt. But he repeatedly declared that if the German Dictator attempted to dominate Europe he would find us in his path. When Austria was seized in March 1938, and it was clear that Czechoslovakia would be the next victim, he warned Hitler that he could not count on our neutrality and that wars, once begun, had a tendency to spread. After the Munich settlement he proclaimed his belief that it meant peace in our time, but he soon discovered how far Hitler was from being content with his gains. In his last speech before the Christmas recess of 1938-9 the Prime Minister pointedly announced that, if he ever felt his policy of appeasement was a failure, he would take another course. What that would have to be was decided by Hitler himself in March 1939, when President Hacha was summoned to Berlin and compelled by a threat of aerial bombardment of Prague to surrender his country. The brutal incorporation in the Reich of a civilised and patriotic people of alien race transformed the European situation overnight. The Prime Minister announced his conversion at Birmingham two days later, and we promptly promised military support to Poland, whom the Nazi press, pursuing its usual tactics, had already begun to attack.

When Mr. Chamberlain had been pressed in the previous

year to give threatened Czechoslovakia a definite assurance of support in the event of a German attack, he had refused on the ground that it would take the decision out of our hands. His warning to Berlin was ignored and Czechoslovakia was swallowed up. After such an object-lesson plainer speaking was required, especially as the bloodless absorption of a neighbour was bound to encourage Hitler to try the same game again. During the September crisis of 1938 opinion throughout the British Empire was so deeply divided that it would have been difficult for the Government to commit us to a big war, even had our air defences been more advanced. Now, however, it was more united and resolute than at any moment since the violation of Belgian neutrality swept us into war in 1914. In 1938 many voices asked: Why should we fight for Czechoslovakia? In 1939 very few asked a similar question about Poland. For by that time Poland had become the symbol of the right of the weaker states of Europe to live in peace, unthreatened and unafraid.

In a formal sense our declaration of war against Germany was the automatic result of our recent alliance. In a deeper sense it was the result of our traditional policy of the Balance of Power which dates from the sixteenth century. When Pitt was asked during the great French war what we were fighting for, he replied: Security. And security did not mean merely the defence of our possessions against attack. It meant also resistance, by diplomacy or war or both, to any European state whose material strength and potential hostility appeared to threaten our safety and our liberties. That is the meaning of the Balance of Power, for which we fought in 1914, in 1854, in 1793, in the Seven Years' War, in the time of Marlborough, in the days of Philip II of Spain. What John Bright described as a foul idol when we drifted into the Crimean War is merely the course dictated by the conviction that it is dangerous to wait till a potential foe becomes too strong to resist. Since the historic reconciliation of 1904 England and France have stood together in peace and war. Beginning as an insurance against German attack it has grown into an indissoluble partnership for the preservation, not merely of our national independence, but of the spiritual values of our Western civilisation. Let us hope that the Germans, purged of the Nazi virus, may join us in that task; for in the higher things of the mind we owe as much to them as they to us.

G. P. GOOCH.

ITALIAN NEUTRALITY, 1914 and 1939.

THERE happens again, between Fascism and Nazism, what happened with the Holy Alliance after Napoleon's deportation to St. Helena and, even more, after his death, when his name was transformed into a symbol of liberalism. The Austrian, Prussian, Russian Governments and, to a certain extent, the British Cabinet, were jealous and suspicious of each other; but the fear and hatred of Napoleon and of the ideas of freedom which the masses, strangely enough, impersonated into the name of the Corsican meant to the conservative governments of Europe more than their reciprocal suspicions. They kept united as they had never been before.

When French and British newspapers suggest the possibility of a breach between the Fascist régime and the Nazi régime they indulge in wishful thinking. Not that this may not happen; but if, some day, it does, it will be for reasons different from those fancied in London and Paris. The truth is that a sincere sympathy exists between Italian Fascism and German Nazism, which does not mean in the least that the same sympathy exists between the two nations. Moreover, the Nazi-Fascist sympathy is strong enough to create a real political solidarity, but not strong enough to bar silences, misgivings, suspicions. Is not this the common lot of almost all alliances? It was, in any case, the permanent lot of the Triple Alliance. The Vienna of Francis Joseph never ceased being jealous of the constant Italian progress in the Balkans; and Berlin wished the alliance between Rome and Vienna to continue, but without eliminating all the Austro-Italian frictions, since these frictions increased Germany's influence in her relations with her two allies. It is true that neither Italian irredentism, which was only sentimental, nor the Austrian designs in the Balkans ever succeeded in destroying completely a certain readiness to understand each other, which went back to the happy times of Maria Theresa when the Habsburg Empire had not yet become the symbol of European reaction. The family relationships between a certain class of Italian and Austrian families added to this psychological *détente*. Nothing of the kind ever existed between Italy and Berlin; but it exists for the first time in history between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

While acknowledging the admirable success of the Second Reich in almost all its material or economic enterprises, the old statesmen of liberal Italy could never help feeling, in their relations with their German colleagues, a sort of intellectual and moral gulf which they never felt with the English and the French, even when far from any political *entente* with them. They shared the sensation of Jules Cambon who after his Embassy to Berlin and the war of 1914-18 used to attempt certain terrible excuses for the Germans, as when once he told me during my Embassy to Paris: "*Que voulez-vous?*" They have been baptised ten centuries after you and us."

In the four or five years before the war of 1914, being in Rome as *chef de cabinet* first of Count Guicciardini and then of Marquis di San Giuliano, I ended by discovering a strange psychological phenomenon in most of the German statesmen and diplomats with whom I had to mix. The superiority complex which they used to exhibit in comparison with us poor Latins was not so absolute as they wished us to believe.* At the bottom of their souls this complex struggled with a feeling of inferiority as soon as—after a period among us—they were beginning to wonder whether the serene tolerance and the orderly disorder of the Italian people were not the sign of an unborn, unofficial "organisation," which did not need so many rules and regulations. This sensation of theirs was all the more strange, coming from men who had attended the lectures of Treitschke and who, as young diplomats, had all tried to ape Bismarck, the most complete antithesis of our Cavour. And they knew that what we most worship in Mazzini, for instance, was that he had said: "I like my country because I like all countries," a phrase which had seemed ridiculous to Treitschke, and that Cavour was for us the man who used to say: "I never feel so safe as when Parliament is in session."

These Italian characteristics having for the time being disappeared, and Nazism believing this disappearance to be final, it is natural that the relations between the German and Italian rulers are better than ever in the past. For the first time the same moral language is spoken—on the surface—on both sides of our Eastern Alps. If one still hears in

* With one exception, Count Monts, German Ambassador to Rome, who felt only hatred for anything Italian. It is true that, perhaps for the same reason, he despised Goethe, as he told me one evening when I tried to solve the riddle.

territory, they conquered Rome. But they never disorganised or disrupted the Church, because none of these ruling houses ever attempted to strike at the very roots of Christianity itself. True enough, there were great schismatic movements in Germany under Charles V, in Great Britain under Henry VIII. But hard as the blow may have been—Christianity remained more of a unit than the adversaries may have realised at the time and since. Common dangers, such as the approach of the Mohammedan armies of the Turks against Vienna, made this common cause and common faith apparent.

But not until the very foundations were threatened again towards the end of the eighteenth century was Christianity called upon to defend itself. It was the French Revolution which defied the Church not only in France but all over Europe. The French Revolution looked upon the Church as a political power and directed all social hatred and reforms against the wealthy and influential bishops, abbots and priests of France. It struck at the "privileged classes" and it hit the Church, perhaps the greatest stronghold of the aristocracy of France. Even the poorish country ministers, the impoverished village priests and brethren joined in with the *sansculottes*. Thus the Pope lost one of his most flourishing countries and certainly not the least profitable.

However, the Church—thinking in centuries and producing that wise patience which lasting institutions show—did not give up her children in France. It is this moment which most interests us at present: the Pope had lost his stronghold in a suddenly revolutionised country. He did not possess force enough to defend his position there. He retreated before the onslaught of the "Convention." But then the Dictator appeared who took over the instruments and aims of the Revolution: Napoleon, the ambiguous protagonist of Revolution and Tradition, of Upheaval and Despotism. In the twilight of his declarations, calling at once for subordination and revolutionary conquest, the cautious papal secretaries discovered elements which seemed not quite unfavourable to the cause of the Church. The argument seemed to run as follows: If this ambitious and tyrannical personality, once a little captain in the French army, without family and without fortune behind him, not even French born, but Corsican, wants to keep what he has conquered and to maintain his personal rule, then he has to exchange his revolutionary

supporters for a more stabilised following. Consequently, the argument may have concluded, the more conservative elements in France may be called upon and in due course paid with many privileges in order to give their support to the Usurper-Dictator. Who else could offer similarly well-founded, internally still powerful, externally highly reputed advantages like the Church? It is the classic transition from Revolution to Tradition at which every revolution is bound to arrive—and there the chance of big traditional bodies like the Catholic Church seems to appear. It is an enormous temptation; then as now the Pope yielded to it; then as now the attempts at reconciliation failed. The similarity of the two periods—the Napoleonic and the Hitlerite—is so striking that it seems interesting to compare them.

When Hitler, in 1933, slipped into power, he did so as the German protagonist of anti-Bolshevism. He had gathered a large following of discontented middle-class and petty-bourgeois people who were at the same time revolutionaries in an erroneous sense and reactionaries in a social sense. They held dear what the parties of the Left included in their attack: "*Gemütlichkeit*," private property, and the old institutions—amongst them the Churches. The Hitlerites, combining Communist and reactionary elements in an opportunist alliance, were noisy in defending Christianity, while at the same time airing pseudo-philosophic theories which were nothing if not blunt paganism. The then Papal Nuncio in Berlin, Cardinal Pacelli, had carefully observed these various trends for years. He knew more about Germany and the Germans than most foreigners. While Papal Nuncio at the Bavarian capital, he missed no opportunity of seeing as much of the country and the people as he could. His tall, slim figure with the small, energetic, intellectual head was familiar to the man in the street. With almost unreal dignity he used to walk in open-air processions of the Catholic Church. He wore his bluish violet coat, falling down in classic folds from his erect shoulders, like one of those great statesmen of the Renaissance, whose dignity, magnanimity and courage as well as their wisdom and learning have become almost a legend. While thus impressing and being impressed Cardinal Pacelli took Hitler seriously. He apparently convinced himself that the moment Hitler took over the German government for good or for evil, the fate of Germany and consequently the

fate of the Church was delivered into the hands of the National Socialists.

There can be no wider contrast than the one dividing the nature, character, upbringing, religion of these two men, Hitler and Pacelli, who has now become Pius XII. The situation facing the two men is equally dramatic. Hitler, admitted to power by an egoistic, ruthless group headed by von Papen and misusing the old President Hindenburg, Hitler, supported by all sorts of would-be dictators, *condottieri*, hungry masses, frightened and communist-haunted old women; the Papal Nuncio, brought up in secluded Roman aristocratic circles, highly educated, deeply religious, widely travelled, man of the world and man of culture. Hitler, the half-educated, daring, lying (even to himself), the No-more-Austrian and Never-quite-German; Cardinal Pacelli—the super-cautious, the pessimistic, scholastic, thoroughly Italian and thoroughly cosmopolitan. Hitler grasping the moment, living for the hour, risking for the crowd's vanishing delight, throwing the Reich into unheard-of dangers for a shining headline—his great opponent waiting, seeing, feeling two thousand years of achievement, suffering and glory and a world of believers thrown upon his shoulders. Whereas Hitler was not restricted by any code of honesty, by any consideration of tradition, of friends, of family, of nation, Cardinal Pacelli was. But all the same the two men signed a pact, that famous Concordat between Nazi Germany and the Holy See in 1933, the first international agreement concluded between Hitler and a foreign sovereign. The considerations ruling the action of the two signatories can be largely explained by the two leading partners as we have tried to explain them. Cardinal Pacelli hoped to chain Hitler to Church and Conservatism, and by achieving this to save the Church in Germany from revolutionary destruction. Hitler started his favourite game of treaty signing in order to attain the position of friendship whence he could more easily attain domination than if the proposed victims realised too soon what was planned.

The position was complicated by the fact that Hitler as head of a revolutionary group had to take into consideration the constant need for action and achievements which his more radical followers vigorously demanded. Radicals or Moderates, they are out for world domination and believe in nothing but

force. Then it was still possible to hope that conservatism would prevail. The Concordat strengthened Hitler's position towards his most ardent opponents in Germany, the Churches and the Intellectuals. Even non-Catholic Conservatives were shaken in their belief that Hitlerism was the German edition of revolution as such. The similarity between this situation and that created by the Concordat between Pius VII and Napoleon is striking. So is the similarity between the main contracting parties.

There is perhaps less likeness between Napoleon and Hitler. Napoleon was a strategist who realised what enormous prospects the armies and ideas of the French Revolution offered to a cool thinker. Hitler is a political amateur whose talent is a combination of diplomacy and trickery, which was sufficient to fool second-rate diplomatists and powerless states like Austria and Czechoslovakia, but will enrage the rest of the world now since Great Britain and France have given the world back its courage to be enraged. But there is a more striking resemblance between the representatives of the Church now and then. Now it is the statesmanlike personality of Pius XII, at the time of the Concordat still Cardinal Pacelli and the Pope's Foreign Secretary. Then it was Cardinal Consalvi, the Foreign Secretary of Pius VII. Both men share the aristocratic background, the diplomatic experience, the intimate knowledge and the impersonal judgment of their antagonist. Both were inclined to put aside dogmatic difficulties and to save the material existence of Catholicism in the realm of dictatorial totalitarianism. Both were sincere in their hopes for a *modus vivendi* and prepared to make concessions. Both were at the same time true Christians and not prepared to give way in religion.

But it was exactly in the field of religion that both attempts were bound to crash and actually collapsed. It was in 1801 that Cardinal Consalvi signed the Concordat in Paris. Napoleon was assisted in the negotiations by a man who, while being a Catholic, was above all a sly and cunning diplomatist, Abbé Bernier. We know that Hitler also has his Abbé Bernier—von Papen. The difficulties then as now started over the question of the worldly status of the Church. Then as now the Dictator maintained that everything and everybody in this world was subordinate to his totalitarian rule. The Church should stick to religion. In other words, the

Germany sarcastic doubts expressed in private conversation about the solidity of the alliance, one may be sure that the speakers are pseudo-Nazis, people who go on repeating, in the simplicity of their souls, the silly anti-Italian legends to which full vent was given in Germany in 1915 and after. The Nazis never repeat such things, preferring to find in the events of 1914-15 a new proof of the stupidity and incapacity of the Hohenzollern régime. The pseudo-Nazis, on the contrary, find in their doubts and criticisms concerning the new alliance with Rome a safe ground to express their scepticism about Hitler's wisdom without risking a S.A. bastinado.

What is unaccountable is that sometimes one hears people in France, and more rarely in England, saying, with the best of intentions: "After all, these Fascist fellows may well betray the treaty with Germany; did not the Italians betray the Triple Alliance in 1914-15?" The French and the English who speak thus attain a result which to Italians seems almost a miracle: they succeed in uniting, if only for a moment, in an almost identical feeling, the Fascists and my compatriots who, remaining faithful to the ideals of the Risorgimento, long for a free Italy having with free England and free France one of those permanent *ententes* which can only be based on reciprocal respect. Even in the last Peace International Congress which met in Zurich in August 1939 under the auspices of the *Bureau International de la Paix*—an organisation loyally devoted to peace among the peoples—one of the leaders of the Congress, a French parliamentarian of whom I know how honest and generous he is, did not hesitate to speak of an "Italy who had betrayed the Triple Alliance in 1914" as an unquestionable truth, which he quoted only to find there a cause of optimism for the future. What then is the truth? What are the differences between 1914-15 and 1939-40?

The most careful study of the diplomatic documents of the Triple Alliance period shows—contrary to a legend created mainly by German and Austrian historians—that in this *mariage de raison* the incorrect initiatives came always from Berlin and Vienna, though always with a melodramatic verbal display of "*deutsche Treue*"*. May I add, with an

* For a long series of facts giving evidence of Austro-German disloyalty to Italy during the Triple Alliance period see two books of mine: *Les Frères ennemis*, Paris, Gallimard, and *Europe and Europeans*, Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill Co.

Italian feeling of pride and modesty at the same time, that my country had no merit in behaving better than her allies. She knew that in a more or less distant future Habsburg Austria was doomed and that, at this moment, the Italian State would have inherited the Habsburg provinces which geography and language had made Italian. We knew that peace, only peace, would make us progress towards prosperity and influence abroad; therefore we were always on the side of peace; history and events were working for us. In July 1914, at the time of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, it was again Berlin and Vienna who betrayed Italy. Article VII of the treaty bound Italy and Austria-Hungary, in case one or the other should decide to alter the *status quo* in the Balkans, to come "to an agreement with the ally, based on the principle of mutual compensation for each advantage, territorial or otherwise, that either of the two Powers might gain over and above its present position." Austria, deliberately ignoring this article, violated one of the most essential parts of the treaty. It is interesting to remember that Count Kalnoky, the Foreign Minister of Francis Joseph from 1881 to 1895, had strenuously objected in 1887, at the time of one of the renewals of the Triple Alliance, to the inclusion of this formula which then became, on Count Robilant's insistence, Article VII of the treaty. It was Bismarck who persuaded Kalnoky to give in; and the reason he offered to Kalnoky was as follows: "It would be easy, when the time came, to elude the obligations provided under new Article VII." It is a pity that the German document containing Bismarck's advice was not included in the large official collection of diplomatic documents on the *Grosse Politik* published in Berlin after the World War. Two reasons had induced the Ministers of Francis Joseph to keep silence with Italy in July 1914: not to be obliged to give her the "compensation" to which Article VII obliged them; and even more perhaps to avoid Italian opposition to the mad enterprise. Of such an opposition they were sure because of a recent precedent. In August 1913, hardly thirteen months before, Vienna having informed Rome of an Austro-Hungarian decision to attack Serbia, Giolitti had declared his strongest reprobation against an "inexcusable policy of aggression."

If there was an Italian fault—explaining though not justifying the legends against our perfect loyalty in 1914—it

Dictator did not mind the Church taking charge of souls after they had left the body. The body was the State's. Now as then the Church could not submit to such an extent that Catholics were not to be taught to act according to the gospel, but to act according to the Dictator and to leave everything else to life after death. Napoleon protracted the subsequent discussions until after his victory over Prussia—then he had the Pope arrested and brought to France. Pius VII was a deeply religious man, but he was no statesman. The statesman was Consalvi. Consequently statesmanship and religion were separated and Consalvi was imprisoned away from the Pope. Napoleon then started to press the old Pius VII for a new Concordat, and surrounded him with puppet Cardinals obedient to the Dictator's wishes. After years of hard struggle he seemed to have succeeded, for Pius VII signed a Concordat which delivered the Church into Napoleon's hands. But in spite of his age and seclusion, in spite of the fact that he was no statesman and no man of the world, but as many called him a "saint," Pius VII defended himself bravely until 1812. And when he was just collapsing under the pressure of his enemy, the armies of Europe started that great "War of Liberation" which saved Europe from Napoleon.

The situation recently has been similar, but it was changed when the Cardinals elected that great statesman Pacelli. Pius XII, like his predecessor more than a century ago, tried his best to reconcile Christianity with Totalitarianism. He, like Consalvi, failed, but the new Consalvi has become Pope. Now the Church took care that no Dictator should divide the worldly and eternal power of the Church, and that Christianity shall not give way to state-paganism. Hitler's complete cynicism has been finally revealed when it was declared, "Hitler and Stalin are friends now." Stalin has too much to lose to accept this friendship. Hitler, however, had already lost all hope of winning the Christians of Germany for his cause when he chose this path, and he will never gain the support of the Church again. For once more power and religion are united in one personality on the throne of St. Peter, and there will never be peace between the Gospel and *Mein Kampf*.

W. SCHÜTZ.

LUTHER AND THE GERMAN EVANGELICAL CHURCH.

THE German Church controversy has been followed in Great Britain with keen interest and warm sympathy for the Confessional Synod which is resisting the paganising "German Christians" supported by the State, in defence of the purity of the Gospel and the duty of the Christian Churches to preach that Gospel and that alone. But owing to the wide divergence in practice and in theory between the Christian Churches in Germany and in Great Britain the issue is not always clearly and fully understood, and thus the meaning of the facts reported is largely missed. Among us the subject of polity is in the forefront of our differences—episcopal or non-episcopal, established or free. German theology has, till affected by the œcumenical movements, had no concern about the constitution of the Church; some parts of the one Evangelical Church have bishops, others general superintendents and superintendents; and apart from the Free Churches, proportionately small in number and exercising little influence in the nation as a whole, the common assumption was that the State had a right to direct and control the Church, even as other associations and institutions. All the stress fell on the pure preaching of the Gospel and proper administration of the Sacraments, the means of grace. The primary concern in the present controversy is not the right of the Church to self-government, but on its duty unhindered by the State, to give to the people these means of grace. The Churches adhering to the Confessional Synod do not desire to become a Free Church, but to continue the National Church (*Volkskirche*). It is the cruel necessity of oppression by the State that has driven these Churches to form organisations, independent of and even in conflict with the State, which is hindering them in the discharge of their duty. Their organisation is being ruthlessly suppressed; and even if they would they could not form themselves into a Free Church. The Churches generally were prepared to acquiesce in the new constitution imposed by the State in 1933, and were driven into opposition only by the abuse of the powers entrusted to the *Reichsbischof* as a "German Christian" partisan and a tool of the policy of the State. There is no evidence that in the predominant Lutheran

resides only in the character of Sonnino, the Foreign Minister when Italy entered the war in 1915. He was the Italian edition of Poincaré; upright, cold, unimaginative, he never suspected that such a thing existed as "imponderabilia." He showed this in his Green Book of 1915, where he reduced to the dimensions of a lawsuit between two private litigants the tragic problem of the invasion of Serbia, and the consequent danger of a complete loss of all Italian interests in the Balkans. Enough to say that he did not quote in the Green Book—and never quoted it even to Vienna—the precedent I have alluded to, namely the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* to get Italy's assent in 1913 to an immediate war against Serbia. This fact would have sufficed to prove that the murder in Serajevo had been but a pretence—and perhaps a happy one—seized at once by the Austro-Hungarian oligarchy. Sonnino had not found this incident in his own files; that is why he did not speak about it. "Realism" had not yet been invented in 1915 as a political formula, and Sonnino did Italy an ill turn without suspecting it in the least. As the man was honest, his "realism" had nothing in common with the "realism" of certain "statesmen" of post-war Europe who invented it as a synonym of treason, violence and contempt of all moral values. The Sonnino phenomenon was only a case of intellectual dullness. When the Salandra Cabinet decided to enter the war in May 1915 on the side of Great Britain and France, they simply obeyed the most essential necessities of Italy as well as the almost unanimous sentiment of the Italian nation. The treaty of the Triple Alliance had been torn up by the Austro-Germans. And we knew in Rome that when the German Government ended by advising, in vain, the Austrians to cede to Italy the Trentino and thus to provide the "compensation" imposed by Article VII of the treaty, the German advice contained the secret reservation: "Of course, after the war, not only will you take back the Trentino from Italy, but we will together punish her for all she now obliges us to swallow."

It is evident that the position of Italy in 1914-15 was radically different from her political and juridical position in 1939-40. One may even say that the neutrality juridically proclaimed in 1914 was the opposite of the *de facto* neutrality of 1939-40. In 1914 the Italian neutrality was intended to be favourable to the cause of England and France. Moreover,

the political institutions of Italy were identical with those of the two democratic Western Powers. The main Italian leaders were against Austria. May I quote a fragment of a letter Giolitti (who was considered as not inclined to bind Italy to the *Entente*) wrote twenty-four hours after the proclamation of our neutrality to San Giuliano, the Foreign Minister in the Salandra Cabinet? "The way Austria-Hungary has provoked the conflagration is brutal, and shows either a complete ignorance or a deliberate will to impose upon the world a general war. I may be wrong; but my impression is that Austria, more than any other State, will pay for her crime." Is not any honest and far-seeing man obliged to use the same language about Hitlerian Germany?

Today not only has the Berlin pact of May 22nd, 1939, not been denounced, but the chief of the Italian Government declared on September 23rd, 1939, that his policy follows "the political pacts and agreements" now in existence. What matters more, he has spoken (and in December 1939 his Foreign Minister repeated) the words of the "liquidation of Poland" as of a fact henceforth not to be revised; despite the traditional relations of friendship between Italy and Poland, relations that the Fascist régime had even accentuated, not for the sake of Poland but for the sake of the dictatorial régime of the "Colonels." Of course, in a period where half Europe is in the hands of people who baptise as "dynamism" any violation of treaties, one may expect all sorts of sudden changes. The Italians who remain faithful to the noblest traditions of their country ardently hope that Italy will succeed—under any régime, even Fascist—in breaking the existing dangerous links with a Reich whose victory would mean Italy becoming a vassal State. But the compatriots of Gladstone will find it natural if the Italians who keep sacred in their hearts the spirit of Mazzini add that, jealous of the honour of Italy, they hope that, if any breach with Nazism is going to take place, this will not happen as a result of some *bellissimo inganno*—as it was the fashion to say in Cesare Borgia's times—but as the acknowledgment of those permanent moral values which alone, in the long run, assure the greatness of a nation.

SFORZA.

section of the Evangelical Church this "cruel necessity" in practice is leading to any fundamental revision of the theory of the relation of Church and State: and there cannot be so long as Luther's authority remains as absolute as it is generally accepted as being.

It is impossible to understand the distinctive features of German Protestantism apart from Luther. While there are Reformed (Calvinistic) Churches in the Evangelical Church, and they have exercised considerable influence in the present controversy, it is still Luther who rules the minds of men. He did not intend to found a new Church but only to reform the Church already existing in Germany, the one Holy Catholic Church, and to maintain in doctrine and practice the continuity of that Church, freed from the corruptions introduced by the Roman hierarchy. Still less did he desire the Church to bear his name; and the name he would have preferred, if any were used, was Evangelical. Yet Lutheran it is rightly called, for its defects no less than its excellencies can be traced to him and some service may be rendered to a clearer and fuller understanding of the present situation in Germany if we consider Luther in his greatness as well as in his limitations.

I

One of the most appreciative accounts of Luther is to be found in Dr. T. M. Lindsay's *History of the Reformation*, Vol. I, to which I shall make frequent reference. "We may say," says this historian, "without exaggeration that the Reformation was embodied in Martin Luther, that it lived in him as in no one else, and that its inner religious history may be best studied in the record of his spiritual experience, and in the growth of his religious convictions" (p. 193). It was the practical necessity of finding salvation for his distressed soul that led him to the convent and the study of theology there, and not any intellectual interest prevalent in his age. "He had more of the Schoolman in him and less of the Humanist than any of the men who stood in the first line of leaders in the Reformation movement" (p. 200). So long as that goal of salvation was reached, he was content to walk in the old ways, although the course of events drove him to make more changes than he desired. It was in the doctrine of justification by faith that he found "a foundation of rock"

which could not be shaken, and on which he could himself firmly stand, and help others to stand. "The salvation of the common people" was his main concern, and that involved a breach with Rome, and a reform of the Church in Germany. While his theology of salvation by grace alone through faith alone influenced many minds outside Germany, and Lutheranism in its earlier form spread to and became dominant in the Scandinavian countries, yet Luther was himself German to the core, the Reformation in Germany was a national movement as well as a religious, and still throughout the world in the German communities Lutheranism often serves as shield and sword of Germanism. The "German Christians" claim to be following in the footsteps of Luther in seeking to give a distinctively national character to their Christianity, although undoubtedly they are surrendering much distinctively Christian which he preserved with passionate devotion. This same party professing to be œcumenical repudiates pacifism and internationalism. Even the Confessional Synod, as has already been mentioned, desires to remain the National Church (*Volkskirche*), ministering to all who do not formally renounce their membership in it.

II

Closely associated with this nationalism of Lutheranism is its exaltation of the State. Except as regards the relation of the soul to God for salvation from sin, Luther was inherently conservative; his revolutionary principle of justification by faith and of the priesthood of all believers, he applied to matters ecclesiastical in a very cautious way, changing as little as possible. He did not think at all of applying it to matters social, and when it was so applied he was a resolute opponent of change. As a peasant's son he pitied and condemned the oppression of the peasants. And yet, alarmed by the excesses in the Peasants' War, "in his vehement tract *Against the murdering thieving hordes of Peasants*, 1525, he hounded on the Princes to crush the rising. It is this pamphlet, all extenuating circumstances being taken into account, which must ever remain an ineffaceable stain on his noble life and career" (op. cit., pp. 336-7). From the beginning the Lutheran movement, unlike the Calvinistic, kept aloof from the social order, and avoided the

SWEDEN'S DILEMMA.

I REMEMBER an old Oriental poem describing the toil of a camel driver. He falls into a well after his camel has gone wild; from its depth a dragon with foaming jaws and terrible teeth threatens him. At the top of the well appears the camel, snorting with equal fury. But happily for the unhappy man a tree grows in the well to whose frail branches the falling man can cling, and here he finds some comfort with a few little fruits. "*Pourvu que cela dure,*" as the French say.

This old legend symbolises perhaps the situation of all humanity between the terrors of life and death, but especially I should apply it to the situation of Sweden. On one side there is Russia, the deadly enemy, knocking with mailed fist at the very door of Sweden by trying to conquer Finland. On the other side there is the German threat not less to be feared, deriving from Ribbentrop's devil's pact with Stalin.

Sweden with a tremendous outburst of national feeling has espoused the cause of her "brethren" across the Bothnian sea. Every day, almost every hour, new methods of helping are tried. Workmen are giving substantial parts of their wages, employees allow their salaries to be curtailed. Wedding rings are sacrificed. Millions and millions are collected. Every accommodation is provided for women who arrive here, often destitute, having lost their homes and their husbands, and for children who have lost their fathers. Clothes are sent. Every town in Sweden has now constituted a sort of "god-fathership" for a respective Finnish town: Stockholm for Helsingfors, Gothenburg for Åbo, and so on. In the looks of almost every taxi driver, every bus conductor, you can see how things stand in Finland; and I shall never forget the tears in the eyes of these tall and rather grim-looking boys at a halting-place when the news of one of those shining victories came, whose (alas! deceiving) splendour was such a wonderful proof of nearly superhuman endurance, activity and heroism. You cannot go by train or tram without seeing women doing needlework for Finland. Almost no private society, no concert, no radio programme passes without a rousing appeal to serve the "cause."

But unhappily far more and ever more is wanted than money, ambulances, places in hospital and warm underwear

for the long-drawn Finnish winter. Not even the sending of guns, ammunition and a few aeroplanes can possibly be sufficient and decisive. Man-power is needed; fifty thousand men at least to relieve the deadly tired, to give a breathing-space to the exhausted, to fill up the gaps which Russian artillery has made in the ranks of the Mannerheim army. And here the tragic dilemma of Sweden sets in. Is a corps of volunteers ever able to replace a thoroughly trained, organic military unit? Can fervent wishes and enthusiasm be effective, when there is not much time for practical exercise, and for adapting the soldiers to the very special conditions of an unknown country? Never in history have volunteers succeeded in an outstanding way, neither in Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars, nor in France in 1870, nor in Spain during the civil war. Without in the least disparaging the magnificent effort of Sweden in the sending of these unofficial troops, it is clear that their number (about 8,000 at the beginning of March) was too little to decide battles. Only at that date did the first contingent come into the front line, and only then was the serious deficit of man-power clearly realised by the man in the street as a fatal element of the Finnish warfare.

The reasons for this serious lack of understanding were two-fold: First, the impression of three months of Finnish resistance conveyed a very dangerous illusion. It seemed as if no danger was to be expected. Mannerheim was a wizard. He had as a military leader the art of making something out of nothing, he could produce doves out of his top hat like a conjurer in a variety hall. Every fortnight a new division was surrounded and "extinguished," new mass attacks at Karelska Näset had only the consequence of tens of thousands of dead and wounded, frozen to death in no-man's land or killed in their tanks, which the Finns destroyed with marvellous daring. In vain the Finnish Field-marshal Mannerheim himself warned the Swedish public. His own successes were adverse to his purpose, and since everything got on so well, why should a peace-loving population, accustomed for 130 years to a tranquil life, change all their habits suddenly and break all the traditions of their fathers and forefathers? To this reason came a second one, more serious and deeply rooted. The Government of Sweden is a coalition with representatives of all parties, except of course the Communists. The head of the Government is good old "Per

attempt to apply the Will of God, as revealed in Scripture, to it.

The individual believer lives by faith in humble dependence on the Grace of God and in faithful obedience to the command of love in his vocation, the station and the duty which God has assigned to him in Society, but to change that Society so as to bring it into conformity to the law by which he orders his own life is not his business. The ordering of Society belongs to the State, the civil ruler whoever he may be, "This Spirit of Love," says Troeltsch (*The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, II, p. 541), "leads the Christian to submit unconditionally to the social order which had been established by God and by reason for the good of the whole, and it regards the family, the State, society in general, and all labour, merely as methods of realising and exercising the Christian spirit of love and obedience." The existing social order is of divine appointment and conforms to reason, "To Christian love obedience to this Divine and reasonable order becomes a joyful duty." In this static conception there lies no impulse to reform, or to any progress.

At the Stockholm Conference (1925) the German delegates reproached the American and the British with Anglo-American activism, and limited the Christian's duty to philanthropy (the activity of love). This is the mark of the "Inner Mission" of the German Churches. At the International Missionary Conference at Tambaram, Madras, 1938, "a statement by some members of the meeting" was "presented by the chairman of the German delegation" in repudiation of "certain passages in the reports of some sections." One "vital principle of the Gospel" which is affirmed is that "the Church has not to bring into force a social programme for a renewed world order, or even a Christian state." There is a tacit acquiescence in the nationalism and racialism of the German State, which to most Christians seems a flagrant offence against Christian universalism (*Report*, pp. 180, 181). The "German Christians" are prepared to apply the Aryan clause to exclude Hebrew Christians from both membership and ministry in the Church. Some on the ground that the ministry belongs to the Church as the human agency of the Divine grace, would limit the application to the ministry only, and recognise that in Christ the differences which divide men are so transcended that the believing

Jew must still be treated as a fellow-member of the Body of Christ. The Confessional Synod does altogether refuse to apply this clause; but one of the pastors who had been imprisoned for conscience sake confessed to me that he and others felt that they had done wrong in limiting their protest and opposition by the interests of the Church alone.

A trial to those who wish to be as unreserved in their sympathy with the persecuted Christian Churches is their acquiescence in the brutalities and tyrannies of Nazi rule. In a recent statement about the situation in the Churches it was admitted that they were recognising that the Government was pursuing a policy of violence; but the practical conclusion drawn was that pastors should devote themselves more intensely to the cure of souls. Sorrowfully it must be confessed that there does not seem to be in the Churches as yet the promise and the potency for a better social order should the present dictatorship collapse, as there are some signs that it will. Thus is tragically exposed an inherent defect in Lutheranism which can be traced to Luther himself.

III

Consistent with this static dualism of the Church as the sphere of grace and the State as the sphere of social order is the Erastianism of the German Evangelical Church. Distrustful of the Christian community as itself capable of securing the true preaching of the Gospel and the proper administration of the Sacraments, Luther put his trust in "godly princes" who were supporting his cause, because they had not only this motive, but also the power to set the Churches in order as the common people had not. What may be admitted as a temporary necessity became a permanent principle of Lutheranism. "There is no place," says Lindsay, "for the democratic or representative element in the organisation of the Lutheran Church" (*op. cit.*, p. 416), at least as Luther himself desired. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) affirmed the supremacy of the princes in the Church. "Future changes of faith were to be determined by the principle *cujus regio ejus religio*. The secular territorial ruler might choose between the Romanist or Lutheran faith, and his decision was to bind all his subjects. If a subject professed another religion from his prince he was to be allowed to

emigrate without molestation" (p. 397). This was a very partial victory for religious liberty, as only the Lutheran and Romanist but not the Reformed or Calvinistic Church was included in its toleration. Dr. Lindsay concluded that there was less freedom of conscience than there was in the medieval Church (p. 399). The subjugation of the Church to the State continued in Germany till the Revolution of 1919. Then, as one of the leaders in the Evangelical Church of Prussia put it, the Church ceased to be a number of parishes under the control of a Department of State, and became a Church with the opportunity of ordering its own life. The change was far from being generally welcomed, and the "German Christians" are simply continuing the old traditions. When in 1933 the twenty-eight territorial Churches were required to conform to the pattern of the State and become one Church there was acquiescence; and it was, as has been already noted, only the abuse of his authority by the *Reichsbischof*, who was appointed to be the *Führer* in the Church as Herr Hitler is in the State, that the Confessional Synod was formed in revolt, and even that revolt has advanced with halting steps and a *via media* would be welcomed by many.

IV

The resistance of the Churches to the policy of the State has been weakened by division. The Churches which have been under the direction of Lutheran bishops have been more inclined to compromise than those where the Reformed influence was stronger. Confronted by a danger to their independence, there has been in some of the Churches a tendency to emphasise doctrinal differences, even to refuse communion with those who do not hold Luther's teaching on the corporeal presence of Christ *in, with* and *under* the sacramental elements. In the Marburg Colloquy, 1529, Luther and Zwingli signed fourteen articles, on which there was agreement; only on one, that dealing with the Lord's Supper, did any difference remain. Luther insisted on the literal interpretation of the words, "This is my Body," and Zwingli could accept only the symbolic. Luther refused to have any further fellowship with Zwingli, and thus the German and the Swiss movements came into opposition, and the Reformation was weakened by division. Can there be any

doubt that the wider unity would have corrected the defects of the divided parts? Great as was Luther in his religious experience, and in his courage and consistency in resisting and rejecting everything in the Catholic Church which imperilled the individual's assurance of salvation by grace alone through faith alone, and great as is the debt of all Protestants to his leadership of what seemed a "forlorn hope" against the authority and the power of the Papacy and the Empire, yet his theological and ecclesiastical bequest has not proved an unalloyed boon to Germany, and the Church there is even to-day suffering because of its too docile, not to say servile, submission to his authority. The Reformed Churches did during the last century secure in large measure emancipation from the dominance of Calvin; and it is only to be regretted that on the Continent and, even in less degree in Great Britain, there is a neo-Calvinism which seeks to impose again the yoke of bondage. The whole world situation—intellectual, moral, social, and political—has been so changed since the days of Luther and Calvin that incalculable as was the value of their services to the Church of Christ in their own day, we to-day should prove that we did not share their vision and courage if we allowed ourselves to be but echoes of their voices, slavish imitations of their ways and works, instead of following the guidance of the Spirit of God as they did, to new ventures of faith, hope and love in the interpretation and application of the one Gospel, theirs and ours, which because the unchanging Christ reaches men through its preaching, is still the wisdom and power of God unto salvation to every man that believeth.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Albin "Hansson, whom they call with ready familiarity Per Albin. His honesty, his straightforwardness, his dexterity in managing the different elements of the coalition are undoubted. But it is well known also from British parliamentary history that big majorities do not always command in proportion to their magnitude the sympathy of the public. The right solutions of intricate problems are often found by free lances who are independent of all "ticket" slogans and of all the petty considerations which party leaders must bear in mind.

Thiers, if I remember well, said musingly, indicating this worrying position: *Il faut bien que je les suive puisque je suis leur chef*—I must willy-nilly follow them since I am their chief. . . . It is just a bit the same with Sweden's Per Albin, who as a former workman, for all his diplomatic gifts, has retained something of the simplicity of his former profession. Now he stands for neutrality in the conflict between all the Powers, either in the east or in the west. He—surely honestly—thinks that Sweden would inevitably be drawn into the struggle if the country gave Finland more than humanitarian help and volunteer backing. In the great debate when the Riksdag discussed the situation, all seemed best in the best of all worlds but for *one* man. He is to-day the dark horse of Swedish politics, the outsider of the race: the former Foreign Minister, Richard Sandler. He is perhaps the most hated of all Swedish politicians by Hitler. His very presence in office caused the Führer to grow hysterical, as always, when he meets somebody with strong democratic convictions and with will power enough to express them. Now Sandler went overboard because he thought Sweden should have interfered long ago in order to save the Åland Islands, which are only thirty miles off the Swedish coast, from the Russian grip. And now as a private member he spoke up in the debate and dared to use the expression: The idiocy of neutrality. He declared that the meeting of President Kallio with the three Kings amounted to a disaster of Scandinavian unity. He clearly gave it to be understood that he considered the policy of "wait and see" as the gravest danger for the country. Naturally these words fell like a thunderbolt out of the blue sky in the happy family atmosphere. Sandler's speech was followed by a burst of unprecedented anger from his opponents. The chief of his own party openly severed all solidarity with him. Sandler

even submitted at the end to the vote of almost the whole of a nervous and wrathful Chamber.

But his utterances were not forgotten. The public did not quite agree with the self-righteousness of Parliament. A rampant feeling of discontent was not to be concealed. Influential papers followed the line of Sandler whilst others vilified him. The more scare headlines were printed about the terrific Karelian offensive, the more voices cried out their deep-felt anxiety. Have we not heard ten thousand times that Finland's fate is ours? Has there not been the solemn declaration of moral solidarity? Can we leave our brethren in the hour of need? Is it possible humanly and politically that we simply wash our hands in innocence when the towns of Finland are smashed to smithereens, when a horde of barbarians threatens women and children with martyrdom worse perhaps than that which Poland had to endure? There is nothing, or nearly nothing, done by dilettante half-way measures. We must go in with all our forces, and the sooner the better.

This very strong opposition gained ground almost every day, and little was achieved when the Prime Minister, under-rating its strength, tried to "put it down" by simply and curtly invoking the sanctity of his declarations in Parliament, endorsed by the unanimous vote of the two Chambers. There is a secret Parliament called public opinion, and—as in the case of the Hoare-Laval Agreement in England—it went over the heads of the political routine. Only then did the Prime Minister feel the very acuteness of the crisis, and he brought one man into the controversy whom nobody could match: the Grand Old Man of Sweden, King Gustav himself. He summoned his ministers into Council and delivered a speech which, with far greater warmth than Herr Hansson had done it, dwelt on the absolute necessity of intensifying and broadening the help for Finland. But King Gustav also said he could not bear the responsibility of letting Sweden become a battlefield in the conflict of the big Powers. He threw the whole weight of his experience in the scales, the enormous authority acquired by incessant work for the common good, the unrivalled popularity of a real father of his country. So it was no longer to be doubted (as many people had doubted) that Hitler would really perpetrate the worst of all crimes possible, that he actually would go to war in order to protect Stalin;

that he would sooner invade a peace-loving little country than allow her to deliver her stricken friend from the clutches of bloody gangsters, as Hitler himself has named them—a thing not to be believed by unpervverted brains and hearts.

But the facts stood there and no one was allowed to doubt. Surely the Government, as Herr Hansson said very pertinently, had better sources of information than anybody else. And surely all the symptoms led to belief of the very worst about the bosom friend of Stalin. A war on land against Scandinavia could not be much more ruthless than the war which Nazi Germany waged against peaceful neutral shipping. Up till now forty Swedish boats have been lost with three hundred sailors. Even harmless lifeboats have been machine-gunned. Norway lost fifty ships with three hundred and fifty hands, and I am sure, when these lines go to press, the situation will be still worse and far more tonnage will have gone to the bottom and more lives will be sacrificed.

But in this respect also Sweden is in a most awkward position, in spite of her very strong weapons for use against the aggressor. Sweden sends about five million tons of iron ore to Germany. Sweden is one of the very few countries where the blockade cannot possibly work with such vigour as with others, because of the German command of the Baltic. Since iron ore is absolutely indispensable as raw material, Sweden could bring pressure to bear on Germany to alter methods which amount to unheard-of cruelty against innocent people and to the constant and deliberate breach of international law. But just this absolute recklessness of a big neighbour increases the power of what Mr. Roosevelt rightly called the "Gospel of Fear." Between the devil and the deep blue sea one chooses—to protest. Since one does not wish and is not able to act, the only thing to do is to—complain.

And even the stronger words of complaint and of disgust came from Norway, whose Foreign Secretary, Professor Koht, described with eloquent veracity the plight of the neutrals and put their case before the tribunal of international moral judgment. The Foreign Minister of Sweden also, Dr. Guenther, an able and experienced diplomat, with a touch of artistic talent and untainted by the hatred of the "gods" was outspoken (at least *mezzo voce*) about this matter. But what can a David unwilling to fight do against a Goliath?

Could Sweden withhold her iron ore when she needed those products so badly which Germany could furnish, i.e. coal and machinery, even guns for their defence against Russia? Sweden has, as nearly all countries of Europe, an acute shortage of fuel; in many houses people have suffered considerably from frost. For the whole month of March no warm water has been allowed in hotels and private houses in all Stockholm, with a few exceptions. Industries have to be kept going and hospitals have to be provided for. Could a responsible Government dependent on popular feeling start a campaign which surely would have been answered immediately by the most brutal reprisals?

Now I do not wish to convey false impressions. There are probably even limits to the patience and forbearance of the most peaceful nation in the world. All the country is in fact preparing for a war if war proves inevitable. The figures of the estimates for military expenditure have increased by leaps and bounds. Military training is universally kept going. A state of constant mobilisation is absorbing the national energies and the budget, whose deficit has to be lowered by heavy taxes and by a loan which has scored a big success. In Stockholm, as everywhere, black-outs have been ordered for four consecutive days. Sweden has also her Maginot Line, called after Per Albin, and in the north a fortress has been built at Boden, which according to newspaper reports is provided with all the most modern improvements and with troglodyte qualities which make it practically impregnable. Even women—are there still women?—join the ranks, wear the uniform of "lottas," drive motor vehicles, learn to shoot and attend the tramcars as conductors. The granite hills round Stockholm are—as everybody can see—to a large extent worked up for "skydds-rooms," that is shelters against possible air attacks. Almost every day the Government control of raw materials, of industrial production, of exchange marketing, is becoming stricter, in spite of some weighty voices of opposition which (like the very well-known banker Jakob Wallenberg) expressed the opinion that Sweden with her enormous gold and *devisen* reserve of nearly one milliard and a half kroner would lose rather than gain by adopting these measures.

So with all headstrong pacificism the will for national independence and security is equally impelling. One can remember

THE UNITED STATES AS A COLONIAL POWER.

IN happier times it was the comfortable belief of most people in this country that they could sit back and watch the drama of European politics with the detachment of spectators in the dress circle of a theatre. Now we are all conscripted into the caste ; and never again, in all probability, will we be allowed beyond the call-boy's range. But the people of the United States can still see themselves not as actors but as spectators. They form an immense audience whose goodwill is not to be wantonly disregarded even by megalomaniac dictators, and whose opinions all Europe is desperately trying to gauge, forecast and influence. Too often, however, in attempting to make that estimate, we fall into the error of assuming that Americans must judge European problems by the light of European experience. We are apt to ignore the elementary fact that people see problems, however remote in space, in the light of their domestic experience. Since the colonial problem is to-day of the first importance to Europe, it is, therefore, a matter of interest and of some urgency to consider the United States in the rôle of coloniser.

We are met at the outset by the fact that the great bulk of American expansion since the establishment of independence has not been colonisation in the contemporary sense—that is, the possession and domination by a metropolitan power of some land beyond its own boundaries, inhabited largely by a more or less primitive people. In the great migrations which moved the frontier of the United States successively to the Alleghanies, to the Missouri, to the Mississippi, to the Rockies and finally to the Pacific coast, we see a process of colonisation in a far more useful and possibly nobler form, but one with which we are not immediately concerned.

The vast size of the country was, however, from very early days, no sufficient obstacle to attempts to increase it. The Louisiana Purchase and the desire of the Westerners to acquire Canada in the War of 1812-14 are evidence of this. There followed the acquisition of Florida, of Texas and, as a result of the Mexican War of 1846-8, of the vast territories ceded by the Mexican Government in what is now the south-west of the United States. Even these immense gains were not sufficient. At the conclusion of the Mexican War, President

Polk offered to buy from the Spaniards the island of Cuba. The offer then, and afterwards, was firmly rejected. To a considerable extent it was a manœuvre of the Slavery party, who saw in the island another potential slave state. Its acquisition was specifically advocated in the Democratic platform of 1856 ; and although the Whigs never went so far as this, it was a Whig Secretary of State, Everett, who described the annexation of the island as an event which "might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things." Right up to the Civil War, filibustering expeditions organised in the United States and directed against Lower California, Sonora, Cuba, Nicaragua and Honduras showed that there were powerful elements in the country to which the rifle rather than the plough appeared to be the pioneer's weapon ; which dreamed, in Stephen Benét's words,

the purple dream
Of the America we have not been,
The tropic empire, seeking the warm sea,
The last foray of aristocracy.

Here, then, we have two impulses existing side by side ; the migration aimed at forming a replica of American eastern civilisation in all the lands to the Pacific coast ; and the colonial adventure proper.

After the Civil War there were from time to time essays in the latter policy on the part of the executive. Seward succeeded in carrying through the purchase of Alaska from Russia but failed in a similar scheme to acquire the West Indian islands of St. Thomas and St. John from Denmark, while Grant's own project for the annexation of San Domingo did not receive the necessary support in the Senate, despite the lavish use of presidential influence. The fact was that the American people were fundamentally uninterested at that time in overseas expansion. First, the tangled problems of Reconstruction, and then the immense material development of their country absorbed nearly all their energy and interests. But in the end, though they were later in feeling its influence, they were unable to escape the effects of that movement which we know as imperialism.

One is probably entitled to draw a distinction between "expansionism," as a more or less unconscious use of surplus

the time in England when, in the last phase of the Munich policy, the absolute necessity was already understood : to be ready for any emergency. So far the opinions of all parts of the population agree—if they are no traitors, like many communists. But apart from this principle opinions disagree even now as much as before the decisive speech of King Gustav. The optimists believe that Finland will perhaps be able to stand the strain until the spring, that is to say one month longer, when, owing to the strengthening of the volunteer movement, and to the melting of the ice on the lakes, a better stand will be possible for the heroic little army. The sixty thousand lakes which now are no handicap for tanks and heavy artillery would then—so it is argued—form an enormous barrier. The deep mud of the few roads available, the fathomless marsh and moorland would render speedy progress of an army almost impossible. Perhaps—so these wishful thinkers speculate : “ Russia might find it morally possible to finish this senseless and costly war when Viborg, the capital of Karelia, is conquered. She might get a frontier, including the destroyed parts of the Mannerheim Line, and Petsamo as an ice-free port and as a valuable addition to her “outlet” at Murmansk. But even if we assume the worst, if no compromise with a relentless enemy were possible, if Finland ultimately succumbed—then still Sweden would be in a far better position for herself than if she intervenes now. Russia would reach her goal an exhausted, breathless horse. She would be unable at least for a longer time, and probably also unwilling, to form new plans of conquest. She would be fully occupied with pacifying this huge country, where, even after a defeat, guerrilla warfare would doubtless ensue. Sweden would then be prepared to meet the enemy, and her frontier with Russia being far shorter than that of Finland, her army being far stronger, she need have no difficulty in facing the gravest issues.

But we must also present the views of the pessimists. They point out that Sweden and all Scandinavia would simply “lose their soul” if they allowed Finland to perish. That perhaps half a million poor, disheartened, starving refugees would have to be sheltered ; that the daily reports about Russian terrorism, about the *doom* of a whole country which was called a country of brethren would simply create a political and psychological catastrophe. If Russia undertook to smash

Finland in order to bring in the harvest as quickly as possible, which Ribbentrop's criminal light-heartedness procured her, why should she stop before Sweden, since Sweden constituted herself the friend and stalwart of Finland ? Why should she not make use to the utmost of the unique opportunity of Germany being engaged in a hopeless struggle, and England and France probably unable to send an expeditionary force of the tremendous strength that would be necessary ? It is nearly impossible at this moment to visualise even the near future. Every week changes the face of the crisis. I personally think the optimists are right and so the camel driver—to return to the outset of this article—can enjoy a few juicy fruits of a frail and weakening tree. But the dragon does not sleep ; the wild camel does not mitigate its threat. The dilemma of Sweden is sad and depressing. Only one thing is really comforting, and that must not be forgotten. The moral and physical strength of this people is unimpaired. They will fight as stubbornly and as splendidly in the measure in which they were eager to keep out of the struggle. They will sacrifice all, but not their freedom.

OBSERVER.

Stockholm.

March 4th, 1940.

national energy, and a conscious movement such as imperialism, equipped with a philosophy of sorts and bent upon specific objectives. On the philosophical side the teachings of J. W. Burgess are sufficiently typical. In his *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (1890) Burgess found in the "Teutonic" peoples the highest political talent. To hide this talent (as the Americans were inclined to do) was in his eyes a sin against civilisation, for "no one can question that it is in the interest of the world's civilisation that law and order and the true liberty consistent therewith shall reign everywhere upon the globe." The duty of these chosen peoples was "to carry the political civilisation of the modern world into those parts of the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races; i.e. they must have a colonial policy."

The same year saw the publication of the first of Mahan's epoch-making works, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. Starting from the inevitable dominance of that Power which controlled the sea, he went on to point out that one essential of naval strength was the possession of "foreign establishments, either colonial or military," where warships could coal and repair. Colonies, in fact, were "the surest means of supporting abroad the sea-power of a country." A third quotation, this time from a politician—H. C. Lodge—will suffice to show the extent to which imperialistic doctrines had gained the minds of the governing classes. "The great nations," he said, "are rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and their present defence all the waste places of the earth. It is a movement which makes for civilisation and the advancement of the race. As one of the greatest nations of the world, the United States must not fall out of the line of march."

Doctrines such as these fell like oil on the nascent flames of imperialism. The reasons which operated upon the mind of the less articulate "common man" are not so easy to determine. But there was, for one thing, the sense that the possession of colonies was an essential part of national greatness. There was the belief that the "Anglo-Saxons" had a supreme destiny as colonisers. Do you know what expansion means? asked a Texas politician of his audience. Expansion, he told them, "means that if there is any land on earth the Anglo-Saxon people want, they will expand and take it." And, putting the argument on a somewhat higher plane,

Beveridge told his fellow Senators that "that man little knows the people of this Republic, little understands the instincts of our race, who thinks that we will not hold the Philippine Archipelago fast and hold it for ever, administering just government by the simplest method." There was, moreover, the feeling that in an intensely competitive and aggressive world, where nations went seeking markets with arms in their hands, the United States could not dare to lag behind.

It was no wonder, then, that colonies fell thick and fast into their lap in the 'nineties. In 1893 there was a revolt, bloodless and successful, on the part of the Americans and Europeans in Hawaii against Queen Liliuokalani. It was connived at by the American Government and aimed avowedly at annexation by the United States. The advent to power of that sturdy anti-imperialist, President Cleveland, delayed the fruition of this policy, and it was not until 1898, in the excitement of the Spanish War, that annexation was carried through. The territorial gains of that war were a protectorate over Cuba and the cession of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. At the very end of the century the condominium which Britain, Germany and the United States had exercised over Samoa was broken up and in the partition the United States received Tutuila, with the islets to the east of 171° W.L. Finally, negotiations with Denmark were renewed for the purchase of St. Thomas, St. John and St. Croix and resulted in the treaty of 1902. But that treaty the Danish Landsting refused to ratify and it was not until fourteen years later that the bargain was carried through.

It was "a splendid little war," wrote John Hay, Secretary of State, of the Spanish-American conflict, "begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit." In his first message to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed it as the ambition of Americans to do for the Filipinos "what has never been done for any peoples of the tropics—to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations." Nothing, perhaps, is a more striking contrast to the attitude of Hay and Theodore Roosevelt than that taken up in such an important contemporary work as Professor Bemis's *Diplomatic History of the United States* (1936): "Looking back on those years of adolescent irresponsibility," so runs Bemis's contemptuous

POLISH SOCIETY.

HARDLY any European nation with the exception of Hungary had preserved to the present day such an aristocratic basis of society as had Poland. Side by side with the great magnates, the "Jewels of the Crown" as they were called in ancient Poland, were the other landowning families of the high and middle nobility, whilst the lower nobility or *Szlachta* reached far down into the masses, and were not only largely represented in the professions and commerce, but also among the urban artisans, petty employees of every kind and the peasantry. These gentry, little differentiated from the rest of the people as they might be, were nevertheless deeply conscious of their noble descent. When I lived in Warsaw during the World War, I had an excellent Paris-trained Polish *chef*. The German occupation authorities gave him, as they did all Poles, an identity card, and I noticed that for some reason he was obviously greatly depressed. The explanation he ultimately gave me was this: "Look," he said in his halting French, "how they have wronged me! They call me Wolanski, but *moi pas Wolanski, moi de Wolanski!*" This complaint was the more remarkable as the Polish language does not use the particle *de* to denote noble descent; for that purpose the suffix *ski* is employed. But brought up under Russian rule, my *chef* felt himself entitled to a special nobleman's document, and to please him I got the *de* (in German *von*) inserted in front of his name.

Poles are by nature extremely sociable and well deserve the title of "Frenchmen of the North," which was first given them in the eighteenth century. Nowhere was social activity so highly and richly developed as in aristocratic Polish society. Just as in pre-revolutionary France the Royal Court at Versailles was the centre of French society, so the heads of the great Polish magnate families (the Radziwills, Potockis, Sapiehas, Zamoyskis, Lubomirskis and later on the Branickis, to mention but a few of the most important) held each his own court. Each had his own court dignitaries and a whole host of noble families dancing attendance. The magnates competed in banquets, hunts and unceasing festivities of every possible kind, which swallowed a large part of the revenue from their enormous estates. The wealth of the Polish aristocracy, their magnificent style of life, their boundless

hospitality, survived even the partitions of Poland. For the three partitioning empires did not lay hands upon private property, except for the Crown lands and occasional confiscations for political motives. Thus the *latifundia* of the aristocracy continued to reach far beyond genuine Polish territory. In Eastern Galicia and Wolhynia large landed property remained entirely in Polish hands as was also the case to a large extent in Podolia, White Russia and the Ukraine.

In those happy days before the World War the manor houses of these far-flung estates were throughout the greater part of the year the scene of an intensive social life of the most pleasant variety. For their love of hospitality and their talent for it are part and parcel of the Poles of the upper classes. They are each and all *des gens du monde*. There are some beautiful show places on these Polish estates, specimens of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century domestic architecture, but not over many and none dating from an earlier period. Above all there are no medieval castles. This is because such buildings were usually built of wood and were destroyed by fire in the course of time. Buildings of stone and brick were a rarity right into the nineteenth century. Thus one often finds, even on large estates, that the owner lives in a modern building of the villa type or—even worse—in a pretentious nineteenth-century erection in sham-Gothic or some other imitation style. Famous residences excelling in every kind of luxury, filled with armies of lackeys and fleets of carriages and cars for the guests drawn from the *haut monde* of every country in Europe, were Prince Radziwill's Nieswies, Countess Maria Branicka's Bialozerkiew near Kiew, and Count Roman Potocki's Lanzut, near Cracow. On the other hand, only a few Polish aristocrats made their permanent residence in one of the capital towns of Poland. Many lived largely abroad, particularly in Paris, Vienna or on the Riviera. If they lived in Polish towns at all they preferred Lwow and Wilno to Warsaw and Cracow, though these latter were bigger centres of social life. Many aristocrats only used their town houses in the winter or for the six weeks of the so-called "Green Carnival" in May, when dinners, balls and *soirées* followed in rapid succession.

Talleyrand's words about the *ancien régime* in France might well be applied to Poland: He who has never known it cannot appreciate the sweet charms of cultured social existence.

verdict, "we can now see the acquisition of the Philippines, the climax of American expansion, as a great national aberration."

How has so great a change come about in the space of less than two generations? If we can discover the answer to this question we shall have gained some insight into an important attitude of the American mind. The first reason, and the most important, is the essential incompatibility between the idea of a colonial empire and the ideas upon which the United States were founded. "When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature's God entitle them. . . ." So ran the Declaration of Independence. It was a studied protest against the view that any country should permanently have the status of a colony. In the place of a colonial theory, the North-West Ordinance of 1787 first prescribed the arrangements for the organisation of territories and then laid down the conditions upon which the territories could graduate to Statehood, thus eliminating the stage of permanent inferiority and dependency.

Since that day, and even in the very height of the "aberration," men have never been found wanting to maintain the attitude of the Fathers. "We cannot have colonies, dependencies, subjects, without renouncing the essential conception of our domestic institutions." Thus the *Tribune* of 1867. Thirty years later Carl Schurz prophesied that the "manifest destiny" of the American people pointed "to a total abandonment of their conservative traditions of policy, to a rapid deterioration in the character of the people and their political institutions, and to a future of turbulence, demoralisation and final decay." And Walter Lippmann, in an introduction to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt's *Colonial Policies of the United States*, has put the point even more forcibly. "For here," he says, "in the history of one family, of the father who was touched with the imperialist vision and of his son who has dealt as governor of our two greatest colonial possessions with the practical consequences, we find as good evidence as we shall find that the conquest of empires and the governing of empires cannot permanently be the ambition of a truly democratic nation." We in this country have

succeeded in constructing a moral basis for our imperialism. The Americans have failed.

The result of this failure has been a singularly haphazard and somewhat shamefaced colonial development. The word "colonies" has been as much as possible avoided. Instead, the phrase "outlying territories" has been used. It was only with great difficulty that the Supreme Court, in the case of *Downes v. Bidwell*, which turned on the right of Congress to impose duties upon merchandise coming from Puerto Rico into other American ports, came to the conclusion that that island was "a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the constitution." There has been no such thing as a colonial service or a colonial department. In Samoa Congress took no action upon the cessions of 1900 and 1902 and the islands were governed under the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, chiefly by means of naval personnel. The War Department was responsible for the Philippines. Alaska has been governed by the Departments of State, War, Navy and the Treasury. The Virgin Islands have been successively under the Departments of the Navy and the Interior. The organisation of Alaska, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands as Territories and the creation in 1934 of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Department of the Interior are steps towards creating some order out of chaos; but the constitutional position of the other "outlying territories" is still highly anomalous.

In the second place, a nation whose politics are fundamentally domestic politics cannot easily maintain a colonial policy in a state of equilibrium. It must advance or suffer retreat. The annexation of the Philippines was meant, *inter alia*, to provide a base from which the Open Door into China could easily be held open. With the rise to power of Japan it has become apparent that no such easy method will suffice.

"The structure of the Open Door," as Professor Bemis is at pains to point out, "would be threatened as soon as any one power in the Far East should become paramount. Then the United States would have to fight for the Open Door or retreat in the face of the world from its declared principles. At no time have the American people been willing to fight for the Open Door in any part of Asia, or indeed in any other land."

Polish social life was based on good manners. Everyone knew what respect was due to age and rank. Rank incidentally was founded on the part the different families had played in national history, not on the titles of count and prince introduced by foreign conquerors. Due respect never degenerated into servility. Differentiated though the various social positions were, the principle that every nobleman was as good as the other was all-pervading. Without that principle no free social intercourse is possible. It may be mentioned in passing that the clergy took first rank. If a priest was among the guests, he was given the place of honour at table at the right of the lady of the house, however many magnates might be present.

Among the things that contributed to make Polish hospitality give such a feeling of well-being to people of discrimination were the elegance and grace of Polish women, their skill as hostesses, and the infinite tact with which a guest's inclinations, tastes and self-esteem were indulged. And then there was the external setting: the splendid rooms, tastefully filled with beautiful old furniture, paintings and *objets de vertu*, and the magnificently appointed table and choice meals, not inferior even to the best French *cuisine*. As a preliminary to the meal the guests before sitting down partook of *Zakonski*, which in the houses of the best society consisted merely of small caviare *canapés* served with very old Lithuanian rye brandy (the best *schnaps* ever distilled!). After two glasses of this elixir, one felt comfortably ready for an excellent meal and gay and witty table conversation. This conversation was that of people of the *haut monde*, neither deep nor pedantic, but full of spirited ready repartee and apt wit, superior to the average society conversation in other countries. When Poles of the upper classes talk to one another (with Russians and other foreigners they spoke only in French), they continually switched over from Polish to French in a striking manner; they not only occasionally used French expressions, as was done in other countries in former times, but they would start a sentence in French, continue it in Polish, and finish again in French, and so on throughout the conversation. Polish wit like the French could pierce its intended victim like an elegant thrust of a rapier. An example comes to my mind. Among the guests at a great banquet at Warsaw was an old lady. Now but a whited sepulchre of the

great beauty and heroine of many amorous adventures she had been in her younger days, she still, according to rumour, exacted the homage of impecunious young men. The conversation had turned on the doings of a certain young lady who was not any better than she should be, and the old lady condemned her in the heartiest of terms. This obviously annoyed a gentleman sitting opposite to her, who, as soon as she had stopped, remarked with a charming smile, yet so distinctly that everybody heard him: "*Princesse, il ne suffit pas d'être irréprochable, encore faut il avoir un peu d'indulgence.*"

Polish high society was essentially aristocratic. In Warsaw perhaps one or two families of the *haute finance* were admitted, and foreigners, particularly Frenchmen who were not without position in their own countries, found it easier to gain an entrance. The *haute finance* again formed a society of its own, where one would meet famous artists and scholars and male members of the aristocracy. The circles of the upper middle classes and the *Szlachta* were also exceedingly hospitable, a hospitality showing characteristically national features which were missing in the highest society. One of these was the surprising unpunctuality of the guests. If for instance the invitation was for 1 p.m. it would be 2 p.m. by the time the guests had gathered. Then one started off with *Zakonski*, not, as in the aristocratic houses, a few caviare or smoked salmon *canapés*, with *Starka schnaps*, but a complete meal in itself, composed of various kinds of fish, pies, sandwiches and mushroom and egg dishes, served on a special table with a whole arsenal of strong drinks. At this table one stood or sat, tasting of one or the other dish, drinking one glass of *schnaps* after the other, and when sitting down at last to the dinner proper it was often three o'clock, and many visitors showed signs of having fortified themselves too well. This dinner, richly spiced, lasted another good hour, and by the time one said "Good-bye" to one's hosts, it was five o'clock. Another peculiarity was that the ladies of the house did not sit down to table, but passed continually among the guests, saying charming things and offering choice tit-bits. Whoever could afford to frequent such meals was, whatever his profession, certainly not over-burdened with work. That style of dining would not have suited London.

On the evenings when one had no social engagements, one could find stimulus and entertainment in the opera or theatre.

In the third place, the United States, a huge country with a wealth of natural products, has had very little necessity to look upon her outlying possessions as we in this country look upon our tropical colonies. More than that, the products of her outlying possessions have in some instances entered into dangerous competition with native American products. The sugar of the Philippines threatening the sugar of Louisiana is the supreme example of this tendency.

From all the reasons which we have examined, the Philippines have been the chief sufferer—or the chief gainer. Since the rising of Aguinaldo the United States have felt some reluctance to continue the government of a people struggling so earnestly to be free. The Louisiana sugar-growers longed for the day when Philippine sugar would be subject to the high tariff on foreign imports. The isolationists, who saw the islands as a challenge—all the more dangerous because it was an empty one—to Japan, shared the same feeling. The ultimate result was the grant in 1934 of independence to the Philippines, to be consummated in 1946, when, save for the possibility of the United States retaining a naval base, the islands should be politically and economically independent. With this policy also went that of withdrawal from coercive adventures in Latin America. The right of intervention in Cuba was abandoned in 1934. In the same year the virtual protectorate over Haiti which the United States had exercised since 1915 came to an end. In 1933 the American marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua.

The conclusion which one is inclined to draw from these events is that the United States have abandoned not only the colonial idea but any idea of forcible expansion, and have retreated into the fastnesses of isolation. So far as what may be called “positive” imperialism is concerned, this is correct. For instance, the probable damaging injury to the economic life of the Philippines which will result from their loss of the protected American market to which their products were “geared,” and the unlikelihood of their permanently resisting Japanese domination, have left the United States largely unmoved. It is true that the report of the Philippine-American Advisory Committee, which recommended the postponement of the economic independence of the islands until 1961, has received the support of both President Roosevelt and President Quezon. It is true, also, that the American Commissioner

in the islands, Mr. McNutt, has publicly declared in favour of a postponement of political independence. But these are the voices of the *illuminati*. No doubt there are many who would prefer the solution of Dominion Status. But Philippine politicians whose *motif* has been independence at all costs cannot easily change their tune when the cost promises to be fatally heavy. Americans, on the other hand, look askance at the possibility of responsibility without authority which Dominion Status would open out for them. They feel, in fact, that a line must be drawn somewhere; and that it is the hard fate of the Philippines to be outside it, so far as protection by the United States is concerned.

The fever of imperialism over, American “colonial” policy has reverted to what has always been one of its principles, strategic necessity. The rumour that Denmark would be willing to cede the Virgin Islands to Prussia in return for North Schleswig was one of the reasons which prompted the American attempts to buy the islands in the ‘sixties. To-day, the submarine and the bombing aeroplane have made not merely annoying but intolerable to the United States the possession of bases within striking distance of her shores by any potentially hostile Power.

On the east coast, Key West, St. Thomas and the Canal Zone are the focal points of American defence. On the west, an imaginary triangle, with the whole continental coast as its base, would have the Philippines as its apex. Roughly, from the Philippines to San Francisco a line can be drawn through Guam, Wake Island and Hawaii, with the Midways a little to the north. South-south-west of Hawaii are Howland and Baker Islands and Samoa. Public opinion in the United States has flinched from the further fortification of Guam, as recommended by the naval experts, on the ground that such a step would be a wanton provocation to Japan. But it can rest comfortably on the strength of the central point of American Pacific defence—Hawaii. Pearl Harbour, Honolulu, is one of the strongest naval bases in the world, and the works now being carried out there are intended to make it ample, if necessary, for the entire American fleet. So long as the American fleet is in being and Pearl Harbour is intact and adequately provisioned, the danger of attack upon the west coast of the American continent is inconsiderable. And it is to be observed that few of the isolationists are to be found

Nowhere in the world have I seen better acting than in Warsaw. On the stage, as in the best society, Polish culture could be seen to the best advantage. Polish actors of the first rank were fully equal to the best actors of any country, including the incomparable Russian actors of the Stanislawski *ensemble*. Operettas were played with the same light and elegant touch as in Vienna. The ballet was excellent, and the opera, though there was no money for the biggest stars, was quite passable. Polish acting was especially brilliant in comedies adapted from the French. In these, Polish actors were far better than Germans or Italians and quite as good as the French.

He who has been fortunate enough to take part in Polish society life will not easily forget its fascinating quality, as fascinating as the Polish soul. The elements of this charm lay in a certain grace and elegance, a delight and talent for "being on show," a certain magnificent view of life, cultivated right to the finger-tips, an enchanting friendliness towards those they liked. But there was one essential weakness: an extreme sensitiveness, which makes the Pole liable to abrupt changes of mood and waywardness, traits which endangered even the most enjoyable of relations. Thus overnight, as it were, and without being able to guess the reason, friendship might turn into indifference, sometimes into hardly cloaked antipathy. Truth demands that the shadows of so splendid a picture be not omitted, but, taking it all round, this aristocratic Polish culture, as so characteristically expressed in its social life, can be considered a fine manifestation of Western civilisation. The bulwark of Western culture in Eastern Europe, Poland has suffered grievously from barbarian invasions. Who in these fateful days will dare to predict her future?

Not only was Polish culture based on the aristocratic idea; the political strength of the nation in the vast territories which surrounded the relatively small and thickly populated racial home of the Poles (and which formed indeed an essential part of the Polish *Lebensraum*) was based almost exclusively on the Polish landowners. The Bolshevik revolution twenty-two years ago deprived the ruling Polish class in the greater part of the Ukraine, White Russia, and Podolia of all their rights, confiscated their property and sold many of them into Red slavery. The Russian occupation in the autumn of 1939

has done the same work of destruction in the whole eastern area of Poland. After this deadly wound no one can prophesy on what lines the Polish nation will be able in the future to build up again its national existence. Even if one does not give up all hope, one thing seems to be certain. The social and economic conditions which permitted the growth of typical Polish aristocratic culture and especially the splendid social life of the upper classes, and which enabled it to survive despite the political misfortunes of earlier centuries, can never return, since the greatest and richest families of the nation have been beggared. The curtain has fallen on a play and players inspired by a spirit of a now-vanished age. We who were privileged to look on are left only with memories, charming and melancholy.

DIPLOMATIST.

arguing in favour of the abandonment of these strategical strong points. Of all the "outlying possessions" Puerto Rico excites the least interest in the American strategist. But, since it is a Territory, it is difficult to see how its inhabitants (doubled in numbers since the American occupation) can be deprived of American protection. Moreover, it is obviously safer nowadays not to leave unprotected islands about in important areas, even though one has no great use for them oneself.

It is now time to ask how the colonial experience of the United States has affected its attitude towards the Colonial Problem in the European sense. In the first place, the principles of aggrandisement and domination are anathema to the American mind. In the second place, the elaborate structure of political philosophy which Britain has erected upon the fact of imperial possessions is not likely to extort more, at best, than a polite expression of admiration from Americans. The doctrine of trusteeship for native races, the niceties of indirect rule—these are, on the whole, things upon which the average American does not bring his mind to bear—unless he regards them cynically as the decorative exterior of acquisitive imperialism.

But he can see the strategical danger involved in the return to Germany of her former colonies. That is obvious, and more than that. The American policy of defending her coasts from a number of island bases would be seriously imperilled if other territories in the same areas fell into the hands of potentially hostile Powers. If, to take an extreme example, Jamaica and St. Lucia passed from British to German possession at the same time as Japan established permanent bases in Salvador, the United States could not but feel gravely endangered. The result is that Americans are not merely committed to maintaining the *status quo* in respect of their own outlying possessions and Territories, but they are under the necessity of supporting the *status quo* in all areas where they have immediate strategical interests.

In an article in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Mr. A. L. Lowell has declared that "save for an occasional case of some small island that might be useful in perfecting our defence of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal, we should much prefer to have the present owners retain them on the understanding, practically now recognised, that they are not to dispose of

them without our approval." He goes on to point out that, especially if the defence of Latin America is an obligation upon the United States, the Azores, Madeira, the Canaries, the Cape Verde Islands and the Marquesas are among the territories in whose fate the United States must take the deepest interest.

All this is true; but the world has changed since the days when the threat of the displeasure of Britain, conveyed punctiliously through diplomatic channels, could avail to prevent the transfer of territories. The totalitarian technique of the fomented internal revolution culminating in favours to assisting Powers is not one easily susceptible to treatment by Notes and Protests. The depreciation of the American position in the southern Atlantic is no more impossible than has been the depreciation of the British position in the western Mediterranean. In other words, although the United States have avoided certain complications by shaking themselves free of the "aberration" of imperialism, the negative, defensive side of their imperial policy remains, with even wider ramifications than the expansionist generation dreamed of.

W. L. BURN.

A WAY OUT OF THE CONFUSION IN EUROPE.

BY the year 1939 the mechanism of war had been elaborated by science and invention to huge organisms for massacre. The idea was totalitarian war. With every resource at their command, the governments of great nations were to attack the whole nation of their enemies, hurl dynamite at their capitals, and follow it by poison gas to choke them to death in torture. And yet when war broke out between England and Germany two whole months went by without England's war casualties exceeding those of her roads: and in all that time not a single British soldier had been wounded. Yet General Weygand, so lately chief of staff of the most efficient army of the world, says that war is massacre. The conclusion is obvious: England and Germany are not really at war. They are not even fighting a war of attrition. What the Allies are doing is quite a different thing: they are applying economic sanctions. They are doing everything possible to embarrass Germany's trade: and to this we have devoted a whole department of government, the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Not so ruthless as to kill with weapons, we try the most ingenious and thorough blockade.

But do we know that it will succeed? Germany has huge stores of necessities: she can replenish them in a number of ways. Sweden sends merchandise, including heavy minerals, across the Baltic; Roumania exports petrol which is contraband of war; the other Danubian countries continue to trade, and so does Italy. And part of the port of Trieste is a free port to German trade. Besides that, the Germans have long since drawn in their belts, and learnt to live sparingly.

So much for the methods of waging war. What of the aims of war? The first aim was apparently to down Hitlerism. But can you make national war on a theory of government? The second aim was to cut up Germany. But if Germany were weak enough to be divided, would it not already be a prey to Bolshevism? and how as the result of defeat could you set up monarchies, and if you did, were you then admittedly fighting this war to set the King of Prussia on his throne when you fought the last war to push him off it? That, too, would be awkward. And in any case, how be sure

in a democracy that your intention would hold? After such a sweeping victory as that of 1918, the power to coerce was finally abandoned in 1936 when Mr. Eden was Foreign Secretary. Why should not another Eden—and another Delbos (or the same Eden and the same Delbos) not throw away in a few years time all the advantages war could now give just as the strategic power was thrown away in 1936? And even if this did not happen, what proof is there that another Hitler, or another Bismarck, in a few years time might not rise again to reunite Germany? And how probable that this new, national leader would be a Bolshevik!

So much for the methods of war, and the aim of conquest. It was not two months before the British Government had come forward with another plan. This time it was to be the sharing of resources and markets, disarmament, concessions, understanding. This time it was to offer all that the League of Nations had failed to do. This then was the new method of waging war. It was neither massacre, nor attrition, nor sanctions. It was reason and generosity. This generosity faces the supreme fact that the only solution is one that it would pay Germany to keep. That is what Wellington prescribed for France in 1815, and France in spite of a few periods of tension has been England's friend ever since. That plan is what the Allies failed to provide in 1919 with the result that they were again at war twenty years later. In 1814 France was the military power: the aggressive power. She has never been so since. And though there are some that think that Prussia is an incurable abscess in the heart of Europe, a treatment could at least be tried! It is true that one needs to be wary: it is true that the German people, or at least the Prussian leaders, like to exploit even their legitimate grievances into opportunities for revenge: one cannot blindly trust them to become the friend that France has become. But, with care, the situation offers opportunities for management. For War in the West is too formidable for Germany to risk it wantonly. And even in the East she has reawakened the ancient rival who disputed Pan-German dominion on the Danube. Her eastward drive, in fact, has been brought to an end by the power which persuaded her that it was possible. It has lost her the protection of a buffer State. It sees a rival dispute the Baltic. Its encroachments on the Danube are arrested. It has paid an enormous

GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

At the beginning (of the Great War) enemy propaganda seemed to be mad, judging by the impudence of its allegations; later it became uncomfortable, and finally it was believed; after four and a half years a revolution broke out in Germany, the slogans of which were derived from the war propaganda of the enemy.—ADOLF HITLER, *Mein Kampf*, pp. 203-4.

GERMAN war propaganda is as inconsistent with the ideas Hitler expressed in *Mein Kampf* as his foreign policy as a whole. What accounts for this complete breach with the Fuehrer's principles? According to the Nazis, Germany was never defeated in the Great War, but crumbled under the paralysing effect of a cunning hostile propaganda; hence their efforts to win this war by superior propaganda methods. Their propaganda is intentionally stereotyped, because "every propaganda must confine itself to a limited number of view-points. . . . The great masses can only grasp few things, and they forget very easily" (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 203, 198). Atrocity stories are now the core of German propaganda, and have been for the past few years. This is not one of Hitler's own inventions, but a copy of what he most admired in British war propaganda in 1914-18. "It is a sign of the brilliant insight for the primitive way in which the mob feels that the atrocity propaganda made allowances for this state of mind. The preliminary conditions for the moral perseverance at the front were thus secured by means as ruthless as they were ingenious" (*Mein Kampf*, p. 201). Lavish use has been made of this discovery, beginning with the fairy tales about the "persecution" of the poor bomb-throwing Nazis in Austria, the "brutal subjugation of the Sudeten-Germans," and culminating in the allegations of the "bloodthirsty oppression of the Germans in Poland," now being supplemented by accusations of the use of poison gas by the Poles (which was, of course, supplied by the British!) and stories of "agents of the secret service inciting the Polish population to massacre the German minority," and now even "preparing the Munich bomb outrage."

But in other respects the slogans poured out by the Nazi propaganda machine, during the six months previous to the outbreak of war as well as now, deviate from Hitler's earlier

teachings, and there is a repetition of some of the very mistakes which he himself criticised in *Mein Kampf*: it is the contemptuous belittling of the enemy, coupled with gross misrepresentations of the obstacles to the realisation of Germany's ambitions. In 1923 he wrote:

It was, for instance, a fundamental mistake to make the enemy ridiculous . . . because as soon as the soldier encountered the enemy in reality, he at once got an entirely different impression. . . . Now the German soldier, directly impressed by the resistance put up by the enemy, felt that he had been deceived by the enlightenment that had been given to him until then . . . and lost courage (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 198-9).

For years the Germans have imbibed the theory of the "lightning war" (*Blitzkrieg*); they were told that the German army was the best in the world, that the German air force was unrivalled, and that a knock-out blow could be dealt to any enemy in the first round of a war. The experiences of warfare on the Western Front will soon have the effect on the morale of the German soldier which is described in the above quotation; Nazi propaganda, though well suited in peace time to doping the apprehensions of a nation which still remembers the defeat of 1918, is therefore contrary to the original intentions of the man who is now putting them into practice.

The greatest inconsistency in Nazi policy and propaganda is to be found in the attitude adopted towards Great Britain. That Bolshevism, once the deadly enemy of re-born Germany, should now become its accomplice, may shake the faith of the rank and file in their leader's prophetic utterances, but it is better to have Russia as a "friend" than as an enemy. That the Italo-German alliance proves to be just another scrap of paper will not impress the Germans much, because they always distrusted their southern allies and considered them bad soldiers. But that the teeth of the British bulldog grip as tightly as before tears up the whole network of illusions which has been woven by the Propaganda Ministry.

Here again the author of *Mein Kampf* had more psychological insight than the German Chancellor of 1939. To give one more quotation:

What a mistake to believe that Britain would not have the courage to stake its own blood for its economic policy! The fact

strategic price for the chastisement of Poland. Pan-Germanism looks in fact as though in its attack on Poland it had blown its brains out. It can no more stir than a corpse. If this is so, if Germany is caught in this position, that the Western powers have her in on the West and South-West, and Russia (with also a counterweight from Italy) disputes her hegemony of the Danube, she has no choice but sooner or later to come to terms. And in these circumstances, the Allies can afford to view her case with a little more sympathy, and try the suaver method of treatment.

Once they do, they can afford to remember that even on the German side there is an argument. It is just possible that Germany is something other than wantonly and incurably malevolent. It is just possible that aggression itself is the result of provocation. That in fact is what the Chamberlain policy was all along prepared to admit. It wanted to offer Germany a fair deal. It knew that in 1937 Germany had only 181,000 square miles of territory to Russia's 8,000,000 square miles and the British Empire's 12,000,000 square miles. It had not forgotten that until Germany rearmed she was paying reparations, nor that her bond to the finances of the Western powers brought her to misery and starvation both in 1922 and 1930.

Of course Germany had her own share in the responsibility for her sufferings, but the fact remains that the Western powers did nothing to constrain her into well-being. Every concession they granted was given not out of constructive generosity, but grudgingly because Germany, by ruse or violence, forced their hands. The temptation to the ruse and violence would not have been there if the constructive plan had foreseen either the just demands of a hungry people or the dangers of a ruler exploiting their indignation for aggressive purposes. This if true of our former enemy, Germany, was still truer of our former ally, Italy. She obtained much, but neither those markets, nor those resources of raw material which after emigration was restricted were essential to her economic life. Militarism and aggression are the eruptions of impoverished blood. We cannot cure them by surface poultices. We must enrich the blood stream. The fault of 1919 was not that it coerced the Prussian element in Germany: it was well to coerce that, and yet more necessary to keep the whipland of it in 1936 on the Rhine. But the

mistakes of 1919 were two: firstly, obsessed with the ideas of race and self-determination, the Allies forgot that it is by commercial interdependence that men live, and secondly arising from this they allowed that great balancing interdependent whole of Slav and Teuton in Austria-Hungary which had balanced the encroachments both of Russia and of Prussia to split into hostile and impoverished elements, which France attempted to dominate when she could neither win them to herself nor yet restrain them. For their natural economic centre was Vienna.

If a powerful Danubian federation could be reconstituted, it would work with the Oslo powers to balance Europe on either side of Germany. If Otto reigned in Budapest, he would do much to calm Slovakia, Moravia, Bohemia, Transylvania and Austria. Such a reign should neither be coercive nor national. It should be a leadership in a movement towards the closest possible economic interaction.

The lesson of the last twenty years is that democracy fails in what had been Austria-Hungary. The Danube is the region of vigorous and successful monarchies such as those of the Oslo powers. The Danubian princes need to live in relation to one another, as the monarchies of Germany lived before Bismarck twisted them awry. Such a leadership would be a model not only for Germany, but for the Great Powers themselves. It is not the Oslo Powers, and not even the Danubian Powers that are now most in need of coming to an agreement, but the Four Great Powers: for, as Count Grandi has pointed out, it is only when these came to agreement that anything was achieved at Geneva.

The aim of the Great Powers must be a mutual accommodation of advantages, not only between themselves but in relation to Africa, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The need now is to exchange rivalries, supported by armaments, for co-operation. Such a co-operation cannot at once be worked out in a federal scheme of the United States of Europe. It cannot spring armed like the goddess of wisdom from the head of an omnipotent thinker. It will need adjustment, economic, national, ideal, religious in the course of years. But what is necessary now is both to encourage it and to begin it.

The immediate task is to make economic proposals for co-operation both in Europe and beyond to Italy, to Spain and

that Great Britain did not possess a conscripted army did not prove the contrary. . . . Britain always possessed the armaments when she required them. She always fought with those arms which were necessary for victory. . . . I remember the surprise of my comrades when we first encountered the Tommies personally in Flanders. Already after the first days of battle it dawned on everyone's brain that the Scots were not like what it had been thought fit to tell us in comic papers and official reports. In those days I began to ponder about the appropriate manner to make propaganda (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 158-9).

The months which preceded the outbreak of war show Hitler wavering between his original views about the English, which are a mixture of an upstart's admiration for a gentleman and the hatred born of an inferiority complex on the one hand, and Ribbentrop's contention that the British would never fight on the other. Hitler's respect for Britain can be noticed even in his most violent outbursts, the latest Reichstag speeches, his conversations with the British Ambassador to Berlin, etc.; but German propaganda continued to pour ridicule on the lame British lion whose tail could be twisted with impunity.

At all the mass meetings held during the summer months the Nazi speakers told their audiences that Britain would never fight "for Danzig." The Anglo-Japanese incidents were quoted as evidence of her inability to defend even her national honour and interests. Patience was mistaken for weakness. The "British governess," it was said, was only moralising, but the Poles would be left in the lurch, etc. When conscription was introduced in Great Britain, the Nazi papers tried to persuade their readers that the young Englishmen would never go abroad to fight, and that at any rate they were poor soldiers. The comic papers made those very same jokes about the British Army that Hitler himself had criticised in *Mein Kampf*. Was Goebbels oblivious of his master's voice? The truth is that Nazi propaganda had no other choice. The German people had to be told that no major conflagration would result from the Danzig question. Their spirits had to be kept up. The subordinate Nazi leaders believed what they said—Austria and Czechoslovakia had turned them into megalomaniacs. Hitler himself, after having embarked on an adventure in which his prestige was at stake, found it impossible to turn back.

Now they have entered the ring the Nazis must continue to boast and belittle the enemy. "As it was impossible to encounter a British battleship on the high seas, I had to go and find one at its base," the commander of the submarine which sank the *Royal Oak* is reported as saying by the German News Agency. And the German wireless is still indulging in tirades against Britain who "wants to fight to the last French soldier, but is reluctant to risk the lives of her own men." But Hitler was not the only propaganda expert who issued warnings against such methods. The *Handbuch der Neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, edited by Major-General Hermann Franke, states in an article on "psychological warfare":

Though lies of the most apparent improbability are often believed by the unintelligent mob, it must nevertheless be remembered that lies are shortlived and that their poisonous arrows finally wound him who has shot them. Good propaganda, aimed at having a lasting effect, should avoid making allegations which are not based on incontestable facts. . . . Exaggerations should be avoided because they result only too easily in bitter disappointments, which in turn undermine the confidence of the public.

Similar warnings have often been voiced by the more level-headed military writers in Germany.

From this point of view we may rely on Nazi propaganda defeating its own ends; but the propaganda of the allies could usefully benefit from the teachings and failures of the Nazi régime. The charge that Hitler has always broken his word in the past, though it is certainly of considerable moral weight, should not be the mainstay of our psychological warfare. The German people is more concerned about its own sufferings and future than about the wrong done to other nations. Greater stress could be laid on the cynical deception of the Germans by their Fuehrer and on their present privations. Their hardships should be compared with the greater prosperity of the Democracies, and detailed information should be given about the enormous resources of the British and French Empires. It might well be pointed out, and substantiated by simple statistics, that Russia is not in a position to help Germany economically to any considerable extent. The boasts and lies about alleged German successes

to the Oslo Powers which these in turn could commend to the German staff. All that is needed is for disarmament to begin, and economic adjustment to take its place. The solution of the matter cannot be military, for the military object is to lead by attrition to economic exhaustion. Nor can this economic exhaustion lead to a diplomatic triumph, because it will raise as many difficulties as it could possibly solve. A Germany, disordered and impoverished, will certainly not be of advantage to Austria: and to surround the Czech provinces with a ruined empire will not help them either. Such a ruin must press hardest of all upon Poland which is the poorest of the territories now under German control, and therefore the one in which affliction is certain to be the most severe. We cannot save Poland by putting it through a spell of starvation. Nor would a ruined Germany, with the Western powers also weakened by attrition, help to recover Eastern Poland from Bolshevism.

A war of attrition is a war of risks. It can hardly succeed in liberating Austria, the Czech provinces or Poland. It may vastly increase their miseries. We are apt to speak as though the three countries recently centred on Vienna, Prague and Warsaw were happy and united nations which had been suddenly overrun by barbarian hordes. Such an idea is far from the truth. The Austrian people were not prosperous, and unless linked with a larger whole, were in a position economically impossible. Nor was the Benesh state quite as successful as many hoped. Its minorities, amounting to over 40 per cent. of the population, were extremely restless: the State was threatened with disruption from within, and had bitter enemies over nearly all its borders. And what of Poland? It too had large and dissatisfied minorities. The Germans, who were the most advanced, were administered by less efficient Poles; the Ukrainians were much embittered: the whole area of Eastern Poland, amounting to five provinces, was in reality not Polish but Russian. The Jews, amounting to several millions, were also very bitter towards the Poles. Transport and communication was bad: and the Poles could only maintain their State as long as both Moscow and Berlin wished to have it as a buffer State between them. The Poles were quite unequal to defending themselves against modern armies, and no forces from the West could reach them. Impoverished and uneasy they must remain, unless they can

come to a full harmony of understanding and opportunity both with Germany and the Western powers. For Russia makes all weak neighbours uneasy.

The problems of these countries, in other words, are not problems raised exclusively by Germany: the fact is that the solution proposed by Germany to problems which were always there does not seem a complete solution for them, and is likely to raise other and greater problems elsewhere. What are those other and greater problems? They arise from the fear of an ambitious and exclusive Germany seeking the domination of Europe, and therefore of the world. This is what the world resents when it says Hitlerism: for it is that which is implicit in the persecution of the Jews.

And this, in fact, is what the Allies tried to crush before Hitler ever arose, but they went about it in the wrong way: they were led by old-fashioned men thinking in terms of the eighteenth century. The trouble of Versailles was always to make a basis of race. Versailles aimed at strengthening the Slav races of Eastern Europe. It aimed at weakening the German and Hungarian peoples. Hitler, revolving his mind around this problem, was still the prey of the old-fashioned race idea, though he saw how he could turn it to his purpose. He saw that united the Germans could dominate Europe. If race and language were the key to situations, let the Germans unite, and all Europe would be theirs. So he replaced one anachronism by another.

This war, in fact, is a struggle between two phases of an obsolete idea. The world is living by mutual trade, by interdependence: and people are disputing as though it were all a question of race and language, whereas what really matters is prosperity and justice. And in any case languages and nations are composite; peoples intermingle; they live in an economic world. If economic adjustments are made, if economic opportunities are given, dictators will no longer be fearsome. Their trouble was only that they made a virtue of necessity. When Italians found the fields for emigration closed, they said "Very well! if we cannot emigrate, let us have a piece of Italian Empire." When Germans found themselves paying tribute as Germans, they said "Very well! Let us remain united as Germans and see if that is worth their while." They are still living on the momentum of their reaction to stupid ideas. But if a really constructive plan had been brought

should be refuted at once and stigmatised as deceptions of the German population ; statements of German prisoners of war, taken down on records, could be exploited in order to tell the Germans that they neither rule the skies, the seas, nor the land. The Austrian wireless service, broadcasting from French transmitters, recently contrasted the recipes for German housewives and the fare of German households with the reports on the plentiful food supplies for the Paris market ; such flashes are bound to make an impression. It is not enough to tell the Germans that they are badly off, they must also be informed that the British and the French enjoy a standard of living which is paradise in comparison. Every English criticism of British measures is at once exploited by German propaganda, and it would therefore serve a double purpose if the grumblers at our home front were told how little reason they have to complain.

The absence of military successes so far makes the gulf in Germany between facts and claims even wider. The daily threats about the " terrible punishment " to be meted out to Great Britain is strangely in contrast to the monotonous " all quiet on the Western Front " of the German High Command *communiqués*. The Nazi version of the Munich bomb explosion is bad propaganda however it is looked at. If believed by the Germans, it means that the British Secret Service is more cunning than the Gestapo ; if not believed, we have reason to be thankful to Dr. Goebbels. Though the British leaflet raids are now being belittled by the Nazis, an article in the *Sirene*, the mouthpiece of the German A.R.P. League, some months ago described such leaflets as " bombs on the souls of the population . . . capable of causing greater havoc than the fire lit by incendiary bombs." It appears that German A.R.P. measures against such raids are not very effective, provided that these " bombs on the souls " contain the right charge of dynamite.

ERNST ALBERT.

LITERATURE IN FASCIST ITALY.

THERE is no " fascist literature " in Italy. If the reader finds this statement too harsh, he has only to make the simplest of experiments : that is, to ask any Italian to give him the name of a historical or narrative book which may be considered typically representative of the fascist era. The man questioned would have considerable difficulty in remembering a single title and there is little doubt that in the end he would be forced to excuse himself and change the subject.

Fascism has been in power for seventeen years, its dictatorship extends to all fields of national life, and literature is regimented and fostered just like any other branch of production, but in this case there has been no victory. The literature of fascism is non-existent. Even the artificial attempts to create one have failed. Periodically Italian reviews and newspapers announce the usual competition for novels or other compositions symbolising and celebrating Mussolini's epoch : and periodically the various juries have to close the competition with a negative decision. Typical of this state of affairs was the failure of the competition announced together with a wealth of prizes by the *Nuova Antologia*, a famous fortnightly review now edited by Luigi Federzoni, ex-President of the Senate and President of the Royal Academy, who is himself a valuable journalist and writer, and was a champion of Italian nationalism as far back as 1910. Seventeen years, even apart from politics, almost constitute a period in literature, and the problem can be examined from this point of view too. Moreover, it would be quite wrong to affirm the independence and anti-fascism of Italian men of letters : the reverse is true, and with very few exceptions the vast majority of authors accepted the régime with enthusiasm and now live in perfect and total harmony with the ruling orders and ideas. The only thing is that once outside the realism of official anniversary speeches, occasional articles for newspapers and messages to congresses, as soon as the author takes up his pen again to continue writing a novel, story, poem, sketch or travel notes, the fascist environment seems to have no further effect on him and he returns to his simplest and most natural style—except, of course, for sentences inserted here and there in praise of the Duce or of the heroic meaning of fascism.

It must not be thought, however, that there are no books in praise of fascism. For the youth of the country especially only extremely fascist books are provided: from the official set books imposed and prepared by the State for reading in all primary schools to the famous *Cartoccino* child's reader, in which the children used as type are named Bruno, Vittorio, and Edda (the names of Mussolini's children), and the adventures of the *Balilla* which are recounted in full by every school mistress in every elementary school in Italy.

Then there are books by completely unknown authors which start from the very first page in the style adopted by newspapers when describing Mussolini's visit to some town. But no one reads them, because it is a true fact, though a strange one, that books on fascism in Italy are simply not popular, and even from the commercial point of view are inevitably unsuccessful. A classic example is that Mondadori, the official Government publishers, rarely succeed in carrying these works as far as a second edition.

There is not even a proper history of fascism, since the five volumes by G. Chiurco are the work of a doctor of medicine who carefully put together cuttings from fascist newspapers; and the more recent *Storia del Fascismo* by Francesco Ercole, a member of Parliament and a serious student of political history, has not been at all successful, perhaps because the author insisted rather too much on Mussolini's debt to Sorel's theories and on the contribution made to fascist doctrine by the ideas of Italian nationalists especially of Enrico Corradini's interventionist movement.

There is a further reason why the public does not read these books: because fascism in Italy has not succeeded in becoming either a doctrine or a system but remains pure pragmatism, politics of expediences, and those who attempt to theorise such a system cannot fail to write bad books. Naturally biographies of Mussolini have been more successful, especially the first one, *Dux* by Margherita Sarfatti, now banned together with Ludwig's famous *Conversations*, and it is curious to note, incidentally, that the two, in a certain sense, official biographers of Mussolini are both Jews. In order only to complete the list one might mention certain novelists who have introduced fascism into their books, like Giuseppe Maggiore, Emilio Settimelli, and Marcello Gallian; but here too fascism serves only as an episode, a beginning or an end,

and it might easily be replaced by any other literary mechanism without in any way altering the literary harmony of the work. In fact, however hard you look, there is no fascist literature in Italy. Prose or verse collections or even historical books of our time serve rather to show how far removed the literature of fascist Italy is from fascism.

But it is time to take a closer look at this literature. Taking post-war pre-fascist literature as our point of reference, we shall see how little the fundamental lines of these authors' work have changed. There were four main currents to be observed then in Italian narrative literature, as well as the slowly dwindling influence of d'Annunzio: the tradition of Carducci and Manzoni represented by the reactionary peasant humour of Alfredo Panzini; a sympathetic imitation of late nineteenth-century Gallicism with the writing of Ugo Ojetti, Lucio d'Ambra, Luciano Zuccoli and many others; the classic current of the Italian novel which had been represented by Fogazzaro, and now found an outlet in the works of Grazia Deledda, Matilde Serao, Virgilio Brocchi and the rather younger Salvator Gotta; and a particularly sincere vein of regional peasant narrative work already developing widely. This current was followed in varying degrees by the whole of the young school, led by Aldo Palazzeschi, and with Antonio Baldini, Bruno Cicognani, Riccardo Bacchelli, and all the youngest representatives of the Italian novel in the ranks. Let us leave on one side Pirandello, for ever locked away inside his formula and his bitter poetry, because Pirandello now appears to us solitary and unclassifiable, two qualities which are at once his glory and his limitation.

Now if we review these authors who are almost all quite regularly fascist and almost all alive and active, we shall find that after seventeen years of fascism they remain loyally at their posts, and moreover, contrary to expectation perhaps, if there is one flourishing and active school in Italian literature to-day it is precisely the latter, the regionalist, ultra-peasant school. In fact, even though Alfredo Panzini, who died recently, in his last books (e.g. *Decima Legio*) placed his learned and refined spirit at the service of fascist rural propaganda according to the dictates of the "*battaglia del grano*"* and statistical sociological studies, if we look more

* "Battle for the Wheat": that is, fascist propaganda for improving the wheat yield.

forward at Versailles, none of this trouble would have occurred. It is not quite too late even now. This war will not be wasted ; it will even pay for the other war if it releases us from the shibboleths of past centuries and forces us to think ~~new~~ according to the facts by which we live. The model for the new Europe is, as we have seen, the one that Versailles threw away : it was the composite Empire grouped around Vienna. There peoples could amalgamate : there they made the most of the work of one another : there they shared an ideal : there they had caught up with invention, trade and history. There they gave a model of the prosperity, of the mutual interaction which is the vital meaning of peace. Diplomacy was needed : problems existed : but the shared wealth increased. Let Europe restore reality to the Danube and learn the lesson. It must have co-ordination, adjustment, with constructive minds always at work to adapt it and to better it.

It needs also to have in view two great facts of modern life. The first that in a hundred and fifty years of machinery, the peasant who produces the food has been put into the background. We need to make his life more leisured, more interesting, more attractive in relation to manufacture of which we have too much. The second problem is that of currency. Currency should be adjusted neither to gold which is an arbitrary symbol, nor to expansions and contractions of credit which are too often manœuvred to enrich a cunning few at the expense of all the rest. It should be carefully adjusted in relation to the amount of goods required, so that everyone should be as well off as possible in relation to his function in society.

But none of these things, which all make the word peace a reality, brings mutual well-being to men unless men's hearts are ruled by virtue. It is virtue which is the great conciliator, the great conserver. It is virtue which raises relations of business from strife to friendship. And virtue, working with generous ideas, has its source in something above the nature of men, in their aspiration after and their communion with the power and truth above them. It is the inflow of something spiritual and godlike. It is justice, temperance, fortitude and magnanimity raised till they become generosity, sacrifice and love. In a word, it is the life and inspiration of religion. It is what Europe through the ages has associated with an international Church. And without a return to religion—to

worship, and thankfulness and charity and the uplifted heart—there can be no true peace in Europe. Had these been there, hostilities would never have begun : without them peace can never last.

What is peace ? It is not mere release from the black-out, unrestricted petrol, and fuller cinemas, and more bacon for breakfast. It is not even finally a return to lighter taxation and a more normal flow of trade. It is something far more vital, constructive and profound. It differs from complacent imperialism as music does from silence. It is the tuned and directed opera from the choir and orchestra of nations. Indeed its synonym and completion is concord. Its twin aspects are amity and commerce : amity, which is the generous friendship and exchange of minds and cultures : commerce which is the interaction of material wealth in full (but not greedy) traffic. It leads to a mutuality of well-being. It depends upon a central unity of culture and of principle. And ethical peace is the fruit of a spiritual instinct for the unity of order. The source of it is heavenly. It is one of those good and perfect things that come down from the Father of Lights. It is nourished by feelings of sympathy, by affection. It is a work of justice inspired by good counsels and holy desires. Its author and lover is God.

It is the function of the spiritual man to pray for peace. And to pray for peace is to believe that we shall receive it. It is to build up its ideal as a solid and concrete fabric in our minds : it is to warm our wills with a practical effort to attain it. It is the raising up of our hearts and minds till they are one with a higher order. It is a picture of all perfection supplying a shared defect. It is a co-operation with the tranquil success of a perpetual providence—a request warmed and comforted by thanksgiving. It trusts even when it is slain. It looks on tempests and is never shaken. It hopes

till hope creates

From its own wreck the thing it contemplates.

Such is the work of charitable faith for those who really believe in peace.

Finally the leaders in each country must show a proper disposition to correct their own shortcomings rather than those of the other : they need to consider one another's well-being, and those of neutrals : otherwise the fumes of pride and

hatred will in obstinacy harden the attack which has begun ; for war comes from that inseparable sequence of cause and effect by which mutual revenge, in the lack of pardon and the contempt for law, tends to hurl materialistic and disordered States to general doom. Hitler is in an obstinate mood : but if the spirit of peace is sufficiently strong, it will sooner rather than later get the better of him. In the meantime, as we saw, an insistent danger remains : it is that the so-called war is not a war at all, but the old stupid game of sanctions which, in the case of Italy, did such harm to British trade, and was finally abandoned. This time Britain is not the only loser, every neutral is involved, and every neutral is aggrieved.

It is possible that this is the situation which Hitler, wittingly or unwittingly, is engineering in collusion with Russia. If so, the object is not war but economic and finally social revolution. This hypothesis must be examined in all its bearings. If the facts support it, the whole policy must be changed and neutrals who suffer equally must take their full responsibility. It will be a question on the one side not of war, but of the effectiveness of sanctions : and on the other that of countering an insidious manœuvre towards revolution. If that is what is happening, neutrals and allies must act together and act at once. And then they can begin their constructive plan on a basis of reality with the more energy, because they see the menace of the alternative.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

"AGREE WITH THY FRIEND QUICKLY."

WHEN I think of Oxford and Christ Church as I knew them sixty years ago, I remember particularly one friend who was rather peculiar. He was not in our little group of Junior Students (as the scholars of Christ Church were then called). I am sure he never read for any School and I doubt if he ever took a Degree. He seemed naturally to belong to the "toffs," for his father, being Governor-General of a great Indian province, gave him a fairly large allowance, and so, although he had no title, our great Dean Liddell would have spoken to him without reluctance, and might have invited him to breakfast. I do not know what Public School he came from, but his fair hair indicated Eton, though that was unlikely, for he never mentioned it. In appearance he was remarkably handsome—blue-eyed, large, and superbly strong. But in spite of all social and physical advantages, he never seemed quite in place among the rich and great—the hunting set who cracked whips and shouted encouragements to the chase in "Peck" or the set that knew the pedigrees of the Derby runners, or the set who finished their rowdy wines with a quavering "John Peel" in the morning, or the set who were surreptitiously wafted away to Abingdon, Reading or even London now and then, "for purposes of health," as they described it.

Stanhope (he had another name besides) was, as I said, peculiar. He read books. He studied Herbert Spencer. He admired Ruskin, and went with me to Ruskin's lectures. He knew something of Italian painters and architects. It was rumoured that he read Hindu philosophy. He was built to row six or seven in an eight, and his place in the trials on the river seemed certain. But he suddenly withdrew from the Boat Club, because he did not think it worth while to push a thin and polished boat to and fro on the water without further object than to push it fast. He talked little, and usually with a satiric smile. Hearing that he was peculiar, our shrewdest Aristotelian Don once invited him for a walk, but on their return he said in his scornful manner, "There's nothing in that man Stanhope!" I never knew why he took to me. I was a Junior Student of the House, one of those with whom the rich and great never by any chance associated. I rowed in the Torpids. I read for Mods and Greats. I was not

closely at his work we shall at once discover the same traditional savoury humorist of the *Lanterna di Diogene* and *Santippe*.

Riccardo Bacchelli who began to make his name with a good historical novel *Il Diavolo al Pontelungo*, in which he recalled the beginnings of the First International in Italy, continues to entertain us with a series of historical novels on the *Risorgimento* treated from a point of view which is only very slightly bourgeois and reactionary but substantially unchanged. And if Ugo Ojetti now writes against France the same articles which once were directed against Germany, he nevertheless continues to write his usual pages in the vein of Anatole France, just as he did in 1906 when he was almost a socialist and a terrific admirer of 1789. As for Lucio d'Ambra, Salvator Gotta and other straightforward second-class writers, they continue peacefully to produce their one book a year, always in the same bourgeois "highly respectable" vein, and only very rarely resort to dipping their pens into the official inkwell.

In spite of everything there still remains in Italy a certain decorum and love of one's profession, a clean polished tongue and the calm sense of catering for unchanged tastes and the well-established requirements of a public which is only now, and that to a slight extent, turning towards the new school: that school which was already foreshadowed in the rustic regionalistic work of Cicognani, Lorenzo Viani and Delfino Cinelli. These people constitute the fascist generation, basically normal, honest and nineteenth century in literature, with a good dose of tradition and conservatism, writing on some normal themes of provincial and country life, curiously divided according to provinces and literary groups. Then we have the novels and stories of the Tuscan school, Delfino Cinelli, Guelfo Civinini, Bruno Cicognani, and the rather younger Samminiatielli, Pea and Agnoletti; the Venetian provinces described by Paola Drigo, Corrado Tumiati and Giovanni Comisso; Sicily and the South by Corrado Alvaro, Leonida Repaci, Antonio Aniante; Milan and its country by Piero Gadda and Carlo Linati.

All things considered, they are neat, honest writers, avoiding all heroic poses, describing petit-bourgeois and even more strictly peasant happenings. They stand in contrast to the most recent, the under-thirty generation, the boys who have

actually grown up in the fascist environment: that very generation which should in fact be the standard bearer of the régime in literature and which instead show every sign of returning to traditions considered dead, lost in the past, and now revived with an opposite meaning to that originally intended. Hence we have the new "indifferent" hero of Alberto Moravia, Adriano Grego, Dino Terra, Curzio Malaparte: a useless, dispassionate youth, vainly searching for strong sensations in his cowardly life, far from all enthusiasm precisely because he is "indifferent" to everything. Perhaps, if one insisted on attributing disciples to Pirandello, they should be looked for here amongst these very young, inconsistent and indifferent writers, precociously apathetic and disillusioned, even in their style which is deliberately poor, in the obvious and carefully chosen slovenliness which has become a new preciousness.

As for the poetry which is of any value in Italy (the poems of Giuseppe Ungaretti, Umberto Saba, Eugenio Montale and Emilio Cecchi) it is a still more sophisticated version of Valéry's esotericism, reduced to pure expression. And the more or less æsthetic criticism of the new critics, Aldo Capasso, Enrico Falqui and Alfredo Gargiulo, revels in it, in giving page upon page of analysis of a single adjective in a verse, in a tortuous, difficult language which denotes at once extreme introspection and the absence of any enthusiasm, both developed at an equally high degree. The oldest, and more serious, critics with Pietro Pancrazi at their head, are still faithful to Croce, that is, through him, to the best aspects of Francesco de Sanctis's nineteenth-century work.

Where, in all this, does fascism come in?

We shall not find it even in history, much less in historiography. There is nothing new in saying that for thirty years historiographical thought in Italy has been directly based on the lines laid down by Benedetto Croce, and even if nowadays the younger writers affect to despise this man whom they call "a man of the past," all serious works produced in Italy now bear the marks of Croce's influence in the direction of their scientific research.

In fact, it is interesting to note that if a certain decadence, or at least stagnation, is evident in the field of Italian narrative literature during these years, a decided revival is equally evident in the field of historiography. During the last ten

at all peculiar, except perhaps that I was the first who refused to attend the regulation morning Chapels, and so was abhorred by Dean and Dons. Perhaps one half-ironic saying of mine struck him as unusual. At a College Debating Society someone asserted that "politics were a necessary evil." To which I illogically remarked, "Perhaps then we might take them as a pleasure, for all pleasure is a necessary evil." The members howled in derision, and as the saying spread, the rich and great laughed even more, for pleasure was their necessary good.

Perhaps it was owing to this general derision that Stanhope took notice of me, but I was much amazed when, at the end of my last term, he suddenly asked me to go with him to Italy! I could just afford it, for on the top of my scholarship at the House I had unexpectedly received another scholarship from my old Shrewsbury School. So we put fifty pounds each into a bag (fifty golden sovereigns!), and he acted as paymaster because he knew the languages and had wandered about the Continent, whereas I had once walked only from valley to valley in Switzerland, hardly ever entering a house, trying to sleep in a string hammock slung between two fir trees, so cold that when I saw the light at dawn creeping down the hillsides I got up to walk again; and so hungry that once, sitting beside an adipose German in a little restaurant, my ravening jaws almost seized the veal cutlet from his plate; which, in the words of an old drawing-room song, would certainly have been best for him and best for me.

But with Stanhope, for the first and only time in my long life, I travelled like a lord, and indeed I was proud of watching foreigners gaze at him as the highest type of the English race. In Paris we secured a *coupé* for two, and through the ambrosial night, along that glorious route by Macon to Geneva, when I was tired of looking out upon the starlit woods and rivers, I learnt most of Shelley's *Hellas* by heart. For in those days we all tried to grow as much like Shelley as possible, though without great success. And probably Stanhope read Byron, for we thought ourselves akin to those great poets, except that we had not written a line.

At Geneva we stayed at the Beau Rivage, in rooms looking far over the Lake to the snows of Mont Blanc, and, gazing at the mountains, Stanhope quite truly remarked, "Strange to think that those mountains would go on just the same whether

we were here or not!" To which, with philosophic paradox, I replied, "If we were not here, they would not be there either!" Whereupon much scornful laughter, whether at Berkeley or at Kant I could not say.

From Geneva we condescended to the common railway up the Rhone to Brieg, whence four horses with long pheasants' feathers on their heads pulled us over the Simplon, already threatened by the tunnel, down the other side to Domo d'Ossola, Stresa, the islands on Maggiore, the bride-cake cathedral and Leonardo's Last Supper in Milan, the wide plain of mulberry trees, also created by Leonardo, and so to Venice. It was a commonplace journey enough to most tourists, though never so to me even in old age, and then I was twenty-two. In Venice we engaged two gondoliers, dressed in white and blue, to wait every day, ready for the English lords. For many days they rowed us through the canals and out to the islands. Often to the Lido, too; in those days still much the same as when Shelley and Byron galloped along its shore. There we rode, easily transforming ourselves into *Julian and Maddalo*, and there we swam in the moonlight, I once so far, and so full of romantic memories that, imagining myself in the deep Adriatic, I scraped upon a sandbank and grazed the skin of my front so painfully that I was sharply brought back to reality, and felt like Dr. Johnson when he thought he was disproving Berkeley by jabbing his toe against a stone.

But the vision of Venetian glories sped away, and though I have always stayed there for three days on returning from the Near or Far East, I have never recaptured that first delight. But as our joint store of solid gold was running out I had to part from Stanhope, and went on alone to Bologna, Florence and Pisa (again for Shelley's memory). From Florence I wrote Stanhope an exuberant letter in my enthusiasm for George Eliot's *Romola* (which I am now told is a worthless book), and the Carrara Mountains, which I suppose still remain almost as glistening as ever.

So Stanhope and I parted, and it was some years before he discovered me again, in very different surroundings from the Beau Rivage and the Danieli. I was living in a bug-infested attic in what was then called Cecil Street, off the Strand, and was writing a large and long-forgotten book on a period of German literature. Stanhope climbed the dingy stairs,

years the best young men in Italy have worked seriously and conscientiously in the field of history, and a whole new school has appeared, partly Crocian and partly non-Crocian, but all proceeding along Crocian lines. Accordingly the young men have embarked upon a noteworthy work of revision and reconsideration of many theoretical concepts and historiographical applications, investigating especially the history of political thought of Italy from Machiavelli to the French Revolution, the Italian *Risorgimento*, and Greek, Hellenic and Roman history. These concepts do not lack application to other branches of history, such as history of art with Lionello Venturi and his school, of music with Massimo Mila and Alfredo Parente, and of poetry with Attilio Momigliano, Luigi Russo, Giuseppe Citanna and G. A. Borgese.

Naturally the régime noticed the veiled but active anti-fascism disguised in these attempts, and the reaction was prompt and vigorous. But how can a historiography be created when there is no "soil" suitable to receive it? The "fascist" school, led by deserters of the Crocian camp, for instance the Academician Gioacchino Volpe, and non-professional historians such as the ex-Minister for National Education, Count De Vecchi di Val Cismon (now Governor of Rhodes, a position more in accordance with his talents) has tried in vain to belittle the value and effect of the Crocian historical school, by trying to interpret the *Risorgimento* as a native phenomenon and denying amongst its origins the certain influence of European liberalism. But above all the official attitude of the régime consists in an attempt to devaluate history and historiography themselves; and it is a logical, necessary attempt on the part of men who instinctively see an enemy in history as in all that is not practical dynamics or pure pragmatism.

Curiously enough the public in Italy prefers history to the novels; or rather that inferior sort of history that enjoyed a vogue in the form of "*vies romancées*": hence best-known writers in translation are André Maurois, Stefan Zweig and their minor satellites, not forgetting Emil Ludwig who was much admired and widely read, at any rate up to the misfortune which overtook him as a result of his famous and banned *Conversations with Mussolini*. But even more serious forms of historiography enjoyed success in Italy, and Croce's work, although outlawed by the press which has been ordered

never to mention the Neapolitan philosopher except to overwhelm him with insults, is extraordinarily alive and vital, and still remains the best seller amongst Italian published works. In Italy, where a successful novel sells only five thousand copies, Croce's last book *La storia come pensiero e come azione* (History as thought and as action), a severe, difficult work of pure historical method, reached its second edition in one year with a proved sale of six thousand copies.

Amongst the younger historians one of the most eminent was Nello Rosselli (assassinated at Bagnoles-de l'Orne in 1937), noted for his studies on the *Risorgimento* and the origins of the socialist labour movement. To this school may be added Luigi Salvatorelli, a student of medieval and modern history, Adolfo Omodeo, Cesare Spellanzon, author of a voluminous and excellent *History of the Risorgimento*, Rodolfo Morandi who wrote a *History of heavy industry in Italy*, and many others.

There still remain several reviews in Italy which treat these subjects and it is curious to note how few amongst their contributors are officially fascists; it is true, however, that now with the exclusion of the Jews from every kind of activity, both professional and intellectual, those periodicals have suffered a reduction both in the number and in the quality of their collaborators.

The public shows considerable interest in this work of historiographical revision, and even by its choice of novels manifests a decided preference for works of historical interest. This explains the success, amongst Italian authors, of Riccardo Bacchelli, and the preference for those foreign authors still allowed in Italy, for instance *Gone with the Wind* or Charles Plisnier's *Faux Passeports* (banned after a few weeks precisely on account of its success). Moreover, one must not overlook the interest with which the public tries as best it can to follow the foreign literary production (the number of translations, although severely regulated by Government censorship, is still considerably high) and this may be a corollary to its lack of interest in the typically official production: an instance, still in the field of history, is the complete failure of attempts dear to various fascist authors as the dramatist Gioacchino Forzano and the historian Pietro de Francisci, to present the figure of Mussolini under the traits of Julius Cæsar.

Now, if novels do not sell, books of history do, and several

greeted me as though we had never parted, and at once began telling me of Egypt and other marvellous places where he had been wandering. For my researches in German literature he cared nothing at all. There came another long interval owing to my absence in Jena University. The next time Stanhope appeared he found me, under the benign influence of Canon Samuel Barnett of Toynbee Hall, living with wife and baby in an artisans' building overlooking Petticoat Lane, where swarming Jews were holding their Sabbath market, shouting their wares of old clothes, poultry, cabbages, and fish. Again he began as though we had never parted, with unfailing politeness taking no notice of our unusual surroundings, but conversing of the arts and literature. For the first time he then told me that his one object in life had long been to write something permanent and for ever memorable.

Twenty years then went by without communication. I did not know where he was, and my own way of life had completely changed. Under that great editor, H. W. Massingham, I had become war-correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle* and had gone out to the Greco-Turkish War, the South African War, the rebellions against the Red Sultan in Macedonia, the Spanish-American War, the risings in Morocco, and the customary troubles in Ireland, so that I was hardly ever at home. Then on a sudden he sent me three tiny pamphlets containing short essays on his own observations, and asked me to meet him for dinner in High Wycombe.

I found him waiting on the platform, looking older, as was natural, but more magnificent than other men, and as indifferent to the outer world. We had dinner at an inn upon the market-place, and he resumed our conversation where we had left off. It was in July 1914, and what was once called the Great War but is now known as the Last, was looming before us like a cloud shot with lightnings. But we conversed almost entirely upon literature, and again he confessed his longing to write something that the English would not let die. At last very shyly he asked what I thought of his little essays, and I said I had read them with great interest because they represented his honest thoughts without affectation. Chiefly I had noticed one which I remember still, though I cannot find the little pamphlets anywhere now. It was about one of those marble-rimmed wells common in Northern Italy into which deep grooves have been worn by the ropes of buckets

let down for water by generations of peasants. Those deep grooves he rightly thought were real history inscribed by mankind, and more to be revered than all the temples, castles and battlefields in the world.

"But what do you think of the style?" he asked. "To me," I said, "style is not a matter of expression by words. If a writer can express his thought clearly, so much the better; but the only really important thing is the thought. That is the man himself, and the man is the style." He was unwilling to agree; for he was overcome by the wording and rhythm of Ruskin, Pater, and other masters whom we had both devoutly studied. "You must be careful," I went on like a schoolmaster, "when your thought rises above the level, to avoid falling into blank verse. That's a common error when we aim at good prose." "I had not noticed it," he said, rather discouraged. "But you will not find it in the next little book I will send you." We parted at the station, and as the train moved out I called to him: "Don't let it be another twenty years before we meet again, or you may not find me on earth!" We both smiled at the absurdity of such an idea. He turned back to some country house in the Chilterns, and it was exactly twenty years before I heard of him again.

It is true that he sent me the other little book of reflections, as he had promised, and I found that whenever the thought was intended to rise to a height, it fell into blank verse more deplorably than in the former pamphlets. What was I to do? I was sure that as I had been literary editor of the *Daily Chronicle* for some years, and was now writing for the *Nation*, Stanhope would naturally expect me to write some appreciation of his little books. But the truth was they were not good enough. I could not ask the editor to insert a notice. If I wrote it myself, I could not avoid flattering insincerity owing to my great personal admiration of the man; and if the essays were sent out to another reviewer they would be derided as obvious or sentimental. I just let them lie, always intending to meet Stanhope again and tell him more exactly where I thought they failed. But within the week I was sent out to France and Flanders, then to the Dardanelles, to Salonica, Egypt, back to France again, and so with our victorious army to Germany and the Rhine, where I was kept till long after the Armistice. Then Ireland came in, then three visits to the

publishers have added historical series to their catalogues; and perhaps they are not conscious that in this way they are accomplishing, in the long run, an act of anti-fascism. In fact, foreign culture, in spite of the attempts by fascist historians to prove the independent native nature of Italian thought, and the periodical anti-French, anti-English or anti-American campaigns, is still extraordinarily alive and interesting for the average Italian; and a French film (whenever it is possible to show one) regularly attracts twice as many people as an Italian one.

We must not end without mentioning the success of meditative work such as *In the Shadow of To-morrow* by Huizinga, and in general of translations from foreign classics, e.g. *Werther*, *David Copperfield*, *Marius the Epicurean*, even though they are generally "boycotted" by the literary reviews. . . . And we can end this brief outline in noticing a comforting tendency: the main return in sentiment of the Italians to their classics, so that even commercially it has become good business to produce good modern editions of Machiavelli, Ariosto, Petrarca, Leopardi and Manzoni. At least two Italian publishers have launched new and complete editions, which have proved, perhaps to the amazement of some people, an excellent and lasting success.

This fact in itself and in its consequences may be a justification for hope in the future of Italian letters, because it proves that the taste and sensibility of the public are still pure and fresh, anxious for a return to the best sources of Italian spirituality and life. Perhaps some day Italian letters will be able to free themselves from the fascist element without the taste and feelings of the nation having been too far debased, so that we shall be able without too great difficulty to return to the eternal culture of the spirit which is to-day obscured but not lost.

PAOLO TREVES.

THE JEW IN GENTILE FICTION.

IMAGINATIVE literature thriftily keeps a supply of lay figures in stock, to be taken out and borrowed by any writer who lacks the power or the desire to create afresh in the image of man. These dusty dummies are no Galateas awaiting the final spark of life from their enamoured author: clothed by his pen in garments of the period, they shed a waxen simper or a mask-like grin upon their audience, which is usually well satisfied to be spared any effort of imaginative apprehension on its own behalf. The sinister Chinese, the mystic Russian, the grotesque or romantic Hebrew are models which have become shop-soiled from frequent handling, and the Jews, above all, have reason to suffer from stale tradition. A recent inquiry among elementary school-children revealed that Shylock still represents their first immediate reaction to any mention of the word Jew. It is of course true that the Venetian money-lender was an improvement on his predecessor, the monstrous Jew of Malta. Moreover, his creator being who he was, Shylock has actually been given one of the noblest apologies in literature:

I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that.

Nevertheless, to Jewish readers Shylock, with his un-Jewish lack of response to the appeal of human suffering, remains unrecognisable as one of themselves.

The grotesque figures of Fagin and of Du Maurier's Svengali have no beauty to redeem them; yet Dickens was at least as incredible, and certainly more boring, when he strove to atone for his villain by inventing Riah in *Our Mutual Friend*. A Jewish lady had written to him, protesting against the injustice which he had committed towards her people in *Oliver Twist*, so Dickens generously rushed in with an acknowledgment of the offence, put into the mouth of the irreproachable Riah:

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United States, two of them on difficult and engrossing political business.

It may seem peculiar that in all those years he made no effort to write to me, for, in spite of my wanderings, a letter would probably have reached me in course of time, and it must seem equally peculiar that I never tried to find him. I often thought I was like Pharaoh's chief butler, who remembered not Joseph but forgot him. Yet I did not forget even in the midst of campaigns. I remembered very well, and no doubt he too remembered very well. It was not such obvious reasons that kept us apart. It was just those collections of little essays on which he had pinned his hopes. I was too shy and merciful to tell him they were not much good, and he was too shy and proud to refer to them again. It has been a perpetual weight on me to imagine his disappointment as weeks and months and years went by without a mention of them in any paper. Walter Scott has a familiar verse upon the dog who watched beside his master's dead body below a precipice of Helvellyn :

How long didst thou think that his silence was slumber ?
When the wind waved his garments, how oft didst thou start ?
How many long days and long weeks didst thou number,
Ere he faded before thee, the friend of thy heart ?

Certainly I was Stanhope's friend, but far nearer his heart lay the passionate longing to create something permanent in literature—something that would live to flutter through the mouths of men, as even prose sentences of Sir Thomas Browne, Swift and Carlyle still flutter. But all writers and other artists are possessed by that longing. How many long days and long weeks did Stanhope number, and not a word of recognition came! All artists can realise the misery of that unsatisfied waiting. At last, in 1938, being in London, I gathered up courage. I remembered that, though I did not know where he was, he had been a member of the Oriental Club, no doubt owing to his father's high position in India. I entered and asked the porter whether Mr. Stanhope were still a member. "I knew him well," the porter replied, "a very magnificent gentleman." He searched a volume of records, and said at last : "I am sorry to have to tell you, sir, that Mr. Stanhope passed away in 1934, just four years ago." I saw him last in 1914. My last words to him from the

train as it moved away were to urge him not to let another twenty years pass in silence between us or perhaps he might no longer find me here. Exactly twenty years passed, and then it was not I but he who could never again be found.

"Agree with thine adversary quickly," said the Preacher on the Mount, "lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing." I say the same of a friend : "Agree with thy friend quickly." Because I was not quick enough, I lie for life in a prison of unavailing regret, and now there is no one on earth to whom I can pay the uttermost farthing.

HENRY W. NEVINSON.

"For it is not, in Christian countries, with the Jews as with other peoples. Men say, 'This is a bad Greek, but there are good Greeks. This is a bad Turk, but there are good Turks.' Not so with the Jews. Men find the bad among us easily enough—among what peoples are the bad not easily found?—but they take the worst of us as samples of the best; they take the lowest of us as presentations of the highest; and they say, 'All Jews are alike.'"

They might have added with truth: "But in fiction all Jews are not alive." They are, in fact, frequently nothing more than a microphone used for the broadcasting of the author's own view of Semitism, whether friendly or the reverse.

The lovely Rebecca, gliding gracefully through the pages of *Ivanhoe*, belongs to her author's gallery of romantic models, like the figures in armour still to be seen at Abbotsford. Lovers of Scott demand the picturesque rather than the realistic, and Rebecca is so charming that she must have left a favourable impression on multitudes of susceptible young minds. Equally romanticised but more unnatural and less pleasing is Sheva, hero of *The Jew, A Comedy in Five Acts*, by Richard Cumberland. This eighteenth-century playwright has done up a bundle of contradictory qualities and incredible virtues and labelled them Jew, frankly admitting in his Memoirs that he

fancied there was an opening for some originality, and an opportunity for showing at least my good will to mankind, if I introduced the characters of persons who had been usually exhibited on the stage as the butts for ridicule and abuse, and endeavoured to present them in such lights as might tend to reconcile the world to them, and them to the world.

No one can doubt that it was a lofty purpose alone and no desire for "some originality" which inspired *Daniel Deronda*. Leslie Stephen says that George Eliot's "sympathy for the Jews, her aversion to anti-Semitism was thoroughly generous and naturally welcomed by its objects." Yet unlike most of her characters, her Jewish hero never succeeds in drawing life from her deep bosom. This "schoolgirl's hero," as Leslie Stephen calls him, is a creature of such arid idealism, such over-nicety of conduct, that he is more like some spirit floating above the reader's head than a man with feet planted squarely on the muddy ground. "No woman ought to want to marry him," is the comment of a girl in the story, discussing

him with her sister: "Fancy finding out that he had a tailor's bill and used boot-hooks, like Hans," (her brother). The novel is a magnificent treatise on Zionism; but a living Jew, even the most passionate Zionist, is more than an exponent of his creed, just as a living Englishman must be more than a Conservative, a Liberal or a Socialist, more even than an Englishman. In spite of, perhaps because of her chivalry, the author's propaganda is obvious.

Turning to twentieth century literature one is instantly confronted by Leopold Bloom, the gross Jew in *Ulysses*, who, whatever else may be said against or about him, certainly does not suffer from any lack of vitality. Literary critics have seen in him a projection of Joyce's own materialism, of his earthbound self contrasted with his higher aspirations in the person of Stephen Dedalus; Bloom certainly seems to be less of a Jew than of a portrait of the author as a middle-aged man. Dorothy Richardson, who by her stream-of-consciousness method in some ways resembles Joyce, is more detached. Michael Shatov is a credible Russian Jew with a prejudice against non-Zionist English members of his own race, "whose first pride is that they are *British*."

Unconscious of his youth, and his radiating charm, distilled from the modern world; Frenchman, Russian, philosophical German-brained, he sat there white-faced, an old old Jew, immeasurably old, cut off, alone with his conviction, facing the blank spaces of the future. Why could he not be content to be a European?

The pages of *Deadlock* drip with Shatov's vitality, a queer un-English vitality, genuine enough, but of a kind which stamps him on the memory as a foreigner rather than as a Jew.

Bernard Shaw uses the Jew as his microphone in more than one of his plays; in *Geneva* it would perhaps be more apt to compare the Jew to the vibrating pointer needed in order to tune in to the dictators. But in the last scene he permits himself the age-old jibe at the supposed ruling passion of the Hebrew, the love of money surging up even when the end of the world is at hand. Coming as it does at this moment in the tragic history of the Jewish people, it is a cruel jest.

Galsworthy, pitiful always, dealt with the Jewish problem in *Loyalties*, and tried to conceive an educated English Jew who is perpetually and painfully aware of belonging to an

GERMAN MENTALITY.

THE mental sickness and devastation of hearts which has come upon Europe under the name of National Socialism, and has resulted in events which nobody would have thought possible, suggest the question how a people which has produced so many great thinkers and poets could be so barbarised. How could it put up with the spiritual humbug of unscrupulous freebooters, and accept a disgusting mixture of false ideas which declare the loftiest ideals of Europe, humanity and liberty, to be out of date, while substituting some totalitarian "profundities"? In trying to answer these questions we partly follow the conclusions of a book which has achieved some fame during the last year.*

The principal dogma of the Nazi creed is the belief in the pure, homogeneous German race. But going back through the centuries, what do we learn? The other great European nations crystallised their nationality at the beginnings of their history. The Roman character was gradually formed according to the growth of the *civitas*, and was soon completely developed. Very similar was the formation of the nation and the national character. With the English, Spaniards and French, who accepted a Roman inheritance as the higher culture of the conquerors which could be implanted in a young psyche still capable of germinating, the manifold original characterological qualities were soon transformed into a unity by the Roman formative power, the national character then developing from this nucleus. In Germany it was quite different. The elements of German nationality are confusingly numerous. The German areas were for many centuries overrun by Huns, Avars, Magyars, Slavs, and Romans, all of whom left their traces. There was also the original multiplicity and variety of the German tribes themselves with their different features—a medley which we do not find with any other great European nation. If other peoples grew together from different tribes, they could do so through something the Germans lacked. With the latter neither could one German psychic element raise itself above the others and determine

their spiritual development, nor did a stronger and more crystallised national entity effect from without their amalgamation: for the encounter with the Romans had been too transitory to give more than an impulse towards some sort of Germanism. Everything remained in a state of flux.

A German character was gradually formed, completely different from that of other European peoples, puzzling and sinister to them, unbalanced, restless, roaming, noisy. They are always flourishing trumpets, programmes are fanatically declared, always they are "on the march." We remember the words of Goethe that the German nation is "so worthy of respect individually and so wretched as a whole." And Nietzsche says: As a people made up of the most extraordinary mingling of races the Germans are more intangible, contradictory and incalculable than any other people; they like all that is unclear, vague, moist and veiled. "The German is burdened with his soul." He is at the same time particularistic and mass-infatuated, arrogant and submissive, indolent and fussy, fantastic and pedantic, clumsy and sentimental; he is an individualist and has a deep respect for every kind of authority, be it a so-called "leader" or a clerk behind a desk. Platen regarded the Germans as a "nation of slaves." Nietzsche sneered: the German obeys, wherever he can, "as it does a mind good which is lazy in itself." Thomas Mann says the German is inclined to a heroic slavery. He is philistine and wants to be heroic; he is extravagant in his dreams, wishes and feelings and glorifies himself immensely. If Germans are national, they deify themselves, their blood and their soil; then they call the community of nations a hypocritical lie, condemn reason, and declare the irrational to be alone holy and creative. They believe, says Nietzsche, that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty. That there is strength in mildness and stillness they do not believe; they indulge in grimaces and excesses not from strength but in order to be believed.

German history is not homogeneous like the Roman, French and English. It exhibits many threads and their course is not that of an indubitable nationality. Whilst in other countries all is grouped round the great contrasts of life which do not shatter it, in Germany there has always been an uncomposed disunion. The dictatorial pressure which since 1933 weighs on the country has seemingly reduced everything

*Erich Kahler, *Der deutsche Charakter in der Geschichte Europas* (The German Character in the History of Europe), Zürich, Europa Verlag. Thomas Mann called this book "a great work, the most remarkable and spiritually important one of recent times."

oppressed race. In the scene at an exclusive club of which he is a member, De Levis says :

"I'll tell you what seems to me venomous, my lord—chasing a man like a pack of hounds because he isn't your breed."

And again :

"Don't trouble yourselves about my membership. I resign it. You call me a damned Jew. My race was old when you were all savages. I am proud to be a Jew. *Au revoir*, in the Courts."

Although there is imaginative insight here, there appears to be some lack of objective observation. This Jew ("in a voice whose faint exoticism is broken by a vexed excitement,") offends crassly against the unwritten code of a gentleman. Now either he would have come from the same level of society as his host and his fellow-guests, with the same education and the same type of background, taking their values and their behaviour for granted, or else he would have bought his way in from outside, paying heavily for his place amongst them. In that case he would have been doubly anxious to maintain so expensive a place, and would have been abnormally susceptible to every shade of social etiquette. De Levis appears to be a kind of symbol of the Gentile conception of Jewishness rather than the portrait of an assimilated English Jew.

One of the best portraits of an assimilated Jew, not English but French, is to be found in *The Pasquier Chronicles*, by Georges Duhamel, recently published in an admirable English translation by Béatrice de Holthoir. Justin Weill, the hero's Jewish friend, is first presented to the reader as an over-sensitive schoolboy, who is convinced that a master's aside in class that day was a disparaging remark at his expense.

His voice, not yet broken, from time to time gave forth unexpectedly deep tones, which Justin made the most of to imitate certain celebrated actors whom he particularly admired. Under the mop of blazing red hair shone a face full of intelligence and strong feeling. . . .

"What Lyon-Després said—well, I know, although I wasn't there and you were—quite close to him. But I guessed, I guessed. He said : 'Just look at that dirty Jew!'"

"Well, you're quite wrong," I said laughing. "Lyon-Després said . . ."

Justin was shaking with fury.

"Dirty Jew . . . Dirty Jew . . . By the very way they purse their lips, their way of smiling, I know they are speaking of Jews and I

can tell that they are talking about me. But for Lyon-Després, Laurent! It's monstrous!"

"Justin, don't be a fool. Lyon-Després said to the proctor, jerking his chin towards you—this is what he said exactly : 'Remarkable that little Jew-boy! He really is remarkable!'" Justin turned pale. A movement of the head and he resumed his walking.

"Don't forget that Lyon-Després is a Jew himself! Pure Jew but shame-faced. The kind I despise. He gets his name Després from his wife. Can you imagine anything so low? And so as to make people forget he is a Jew, he speaks of me, Justin Weill, with a smile and calls me 'that little Jew boy'—for in spite of himself he is proud of me, the cad! Little Jew, indeed! If I only live, Laurent, I shall be a great Jew, nothing less; a really great Jew."

To push his cap off his eyes he let go his cap and it fell with a thud on the pavement.

"Remember what I say," he said rather theatrically, "a great, great Jew . . . or nothing."

Later on, when the hero and his Jewish friend have grown into young men, they live for a time in a little community of artists and intellectuals, and the enforced close contact inevitably leads to bad temper and friction amongst them; stripped of social graces, character stands revealed like the shape of a tree when the leaves have fallen from the branches. Justin is conscientious but much too demanding, and "in our quarrels always referred to this conscientiousness that not one of us for a moment doubted." He frays his companions' nerves with his clamour for appreciation, which really springs from a pathetic desire to be loved, and then responds to their disdain by vehement outbursts of his own.

At such moments he had that virulent eloquence of the prophets of his race who were nearly all of them lyrical pamphleteers. Climbing down again from those arid heights, he would sink once more into bitterness and melancholy :

"There is a conspiracy against me. You know there is, Laurent. They all say I'm unbearable. Very well, then, I shall take my leave. I shall send in my resignation. In that way no one can ever say that I am a self-seeking Jew, an opportunist or a dictator. That's settled, I shall resign."

I used to try and evade such arguments, for they turned my soul to lead and made my body ache.

There is here no propaganda, either for Jews or against them,

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to silence. In reality the immense disunion which has always rendered connection and continuity in German history impossible will not be much changed; the Germans suffer from perpetual disturbances of the functional circulation. While other nations have soon consolidated their national character, the German people is in chronic puberty. Germany has no history in the real sense of the word; all her experiences are a mirror of the German character, always repeated starts and beginnings. After two thousand years the Germans are still lacking a distinct form: they therefore look with jealous admiration at the mature character of the Western nations. It is characteristic, says Nietzsche (one can over and over again quote this misinterpreted philosopher, the most clear-sighted critic of German nature), that the question "what is German?" never dies among them.

We can only—and only for a short period—speak of a common German spiritual history, beginning with Luther and leading up to the climax of classicism and romanticism. Here we have consequence, connection, steadiness. But also here something remarkable strikes us: all that lofty thought and great poetry has died away as it were in a vacuum. With no other people have the thoughts of its thinkers remained so ineffectual. German thought, German poetry are not the highest expression of the people; they do not grow from the people, influence or consolidate it. Goethe, says Nietzsche, is an event without consequences. But Nietzsche himself, the real Nietzsche, is an event without consequences, as are George, Pannwitz, Karl Kraus. Thoughts of great Germans are remote from earthly happenings. Although they have so often achieved wonderful perfection, they hardly ever effected a real relation with the spiritual life of the people as a whole, nor did they teach it truly to recognise the obligation of the spiritual to the life of reality. As to the thinkers themselves, they are more blind and helpless in regard to political happenings than any other people and more easily deceived than the man in the street. This is the explanation of the almost incredible subservience of nearly all the great intellectuals of to-day (there are not too many of them) before Nazism.

If each of the other great nations has fulfilled a certain historical mission, this was only possible because it had developed its own national character, its own possibilities;

therefore each was able in a certain hour of glory to perform a representative task. The Germans could not do this, as they lacked those preliminary conditions. The Germans are not really humanised. All the great Germans knew that German nature has to be completed from without, that it needs the liberation and formation by supernational influences to achieve harmony and integration. Hölderlin complains: "I cannot think of a people more disunited than the Germans. Mechanics you see there, but no men; thinkers, but no men; priests, but no men; masters and servants, but no men." The striving of the great Germans for super-German harmony meant a belated humanisation; the narrow-minded nationals, however, always spoke of a betrayal of the hereditary character. In the words of George (whom the falsifying propaganda of the German time-servers claims for Nazism): the Germans must allow themselves to be torn out of the "fog and bleakness" by supernational humanism, and not call their humanists "enemies of our fatherland, priests at the wrong altar." The great Germans did not trouble about these stupid invectives and became good Europeans. The German language is the only spiritual deed which the Germans achieved of their own doing. Yet it is remarkable that this common language did not grow unconsciously, owing to the same lack of a fully ripened German entity from which it could have grown and bloomed. It was due to the conscious and hard efforts of Luther, and was achieved through the translation of a book which belongs to mankind, the Bible, which Nazism is trying to defame as Semitic poison.

The other things which represent the spiritual community of a nation, the great literature, philosophy and ethics, the Germans could produce only after foreign patterns. Pietism, coming from Calvinist Switzerland via Holland to Germany, freed Klopstock's soul. Then followed the influence of English eighteenth-century literature and Rousseau's influence on Goethe and Kant. The Anglo-French rationalistic philosophy called forth Kant's philosophy and the whole of so-called German idealism. All these influences helped in making the minds of the great Germans supple and able to reconstruct the inheritance of classical humanism. But only a small number of creative men were affected and transformed by it. What we call German classicism, that short bloom during three generations, had little effect upon the nation; it was

but a living study by a sensitive artist, based on understanding and observation alike.

D. H. Lawrence has drawn a Jewish character ablaze with a similar longing for love, Kangaroo, the social prophet in the novel of that name. In *The Virgin And The Gypsy* there is a spiteful little silhouette of a Jewish woman, to whom Lawrence refers persistently as the Jewess, instead of by her name; but in *Kangaroo* he does justice to a certain type of Jew who, in spite of a suffocating insistence on his personal need for love, does genuinely want "one central principle in the world: the principle of love, the maximum of individual liberty, the minimum of human distress." The man is alive all through with the throbbing neurotic life of his creator.

A less affectionate and more aggressive type of reformer, the Marxian Jew, inevitably makes his appearance in one kind of English, and especially of American, fiction to-day. There is at present a school of writers who are more concerned with the many facets of existence in some great modern city than with the lives of the individuals who compose it. In 1919, by Dos Passos, for instance, scene after scene flashes past the reader's eye, and the Jew flickers in and out with the rest:

but Pop said rabbis were loafers and lived on the blood of the poor, he and the old woman still ate kosher and kept the Sabbath like their fathers, but synagogue and the rabbis . . . he made a spitting sound with his lips.

Pop's son Benny makes friends with an Italian road worker who talks about Bakunin and the revolution.

He taught Benny to roll cigarettes and told him about all the girls that were in love with him; that girl in the box office of the movie in Mauch Chunk; he could have her any time he wanted, but a revolutionist ought to be careful about the girls he went with, women took a class-conscious working-man's mind off his aims, they were the main seduction of capitalist society.

Whatever value there may be in a novel of this sort lies more in its use as a social document than as a psychological study of the men who make up the whole picture.

If the portraits of Jews in Gentile fiction have not on the whole been very successful, it is equally true to say that Jewish writers—Sassoon instantly leaps to the mind as a brilliant exception—have not always brought to life their

Gentile figures either. Why should this be, since Gentile and Jew have enough opportunities to know one another? In both cases it may be partly because in choosing to write of someone belonging to another race it is the difference which has attracted in the first instance, and which tends to become over-emphasised subsequently at the cost of the less interesting likeness; certain traits are exaggerated and the general proportion is lost. All the obvious differences between races, as between classes and nations, spring from environment, and can be grasped without necessarily understanding the underlying implications. The term environment means more than geographical surroundings: it includes all the external factors which go to the shaping of character and of development. In order to understand, for instance, the whole of the vigorous Jewish life of the Eastern part of London, something must first be understood of life in the Eastern part of Europe, whence the former is derived. It is more difficult than ever to-day for the Gentile writer to understand and to draw an educated assimilated English Jew, because for that he would need a deep intuitive grasp of the effect of the German tragedy upon the Jewish soul. The dark night which has closed down upon the Jews of Germany lies as a shadow of with-suffering ("Mitleid" in its most elementary meaning) upon all the members of the race, so that it has now actually become part of their environment, with an influence upon the destiny of every Jew.

Lesser writers may comprehend this fact because separateness has its special importance for them, but it is only the greatest of all who can penetrate below the accidental differences which lie at the circumference, knowing that we are all "fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer." The great artists are for ever searching for something within, for that which ultimately distinguishes every human being from every other, finding its echo in the tone of a voice, the lines of a hand, in the very sound of a footfall. It seems that this last subtle quality of individuality can be captured only by those who work as it were from within outwards, because they believe first and above all in the indivisibility of the human soul. "Hear, oh Israel, the Lord is God, the Lord is One!" is the eternal cry of the Jew. And is not humanity one also?

D. L. HOBMAN.

a supernational triumph to which no echo resounded from the people. Then the German mind was one with that of Europe. The enchantment soon dispersed, and German idealism became a mere phrase. In 1888 Nietzsche wrote: "German spirit: for these eighteen years a *contradictio in adjecto*." And: "The German distrusts the spirit now, politics swallow up all interest in the things of the mind." The foundation of the Reich had such consequences that he exclaimed: "As little state as possible." The Germans were extremely materially minded. Boastfully they tried to develop politically, militarily and economically, and to play the rôle of a world-power. A higher obtrusive nationalism governed public life and challenged Europe. There was a Reich, but not a nation. There was a complete lack of any common rhythm of life, any common spiritual tradition, any instinctively sure and unified will. Everywhere they wanted to play a part, to equal, or still better, to surpass the others. We know that all this jealousy, sprung from a deep uncertainty, to seem what the others were, led to the war of 1914. If the Germans become national, they cannot be so in quiet naturalness; they exaggerate, they are "totalitarian," fanatical.

So it was before 1914 and so it is again since 1933, only much worse, because to-day all moral inhibitions are gone. If other men adhere to their people, that does not at all mean a menace to the other peoples. But if the German does so, he proclaims at once, unbalanced and not really free as he is: "Good is what is useful to the German people" and "The world will be ours to-morrow, as Germany is to-day." Again the German super-nationalism, which now also tries to take the people in under the name of socialism, is directed against the tradition of European unity, and is ready, if thwarted in its blind ravings, to destroy all Europe. For it is clear that Germany will not conquer the world to-day, but she is able to destroy it. Whatever has been—superficially enough—inoculated into the Germans of cultural and ethical European tradition is trampled out again. Nietzsche said that the Germans are eternally vacillating between an inclination towards the foreign and a desire to be original, and when looking back they take their revenge for their shame. Therefore German history is "*aufgenordet*" (nordified), art and philosophy are made "*arteigen*" (corresponding to the Aryan race). Goethe said that patriotism spoils history, and that there is no such

thing as patriotic art and science. Paganism is glorified, although the great romantic poet Novalis stated with his formula "Christendom or Europe" that the European community is bound up with Christianity. There are already German physics and German mathematics—what madness! They return to the nothing-but-German, which is only confused immaturity. Again they dream of world-domination, of the return of the medieval imperial glory, of the conquest of the world with the most cynical means. Amorality is regarded as the sign of a master-race, which, of course, also on principle, glorifies war; their self-praise knows no limits. As they are uncertain in their heart of hearts, they have dug up the racial idea to stimulate the resentments of this unbalanced people. A people of masters? It is ridiculous. That is just what they are not: for they lack quiet dignity, mature self-confidence, gentlemanly superiority. They are extremist, immoderate and uncontrolled, and so unstable that they could be extensively barbarised again. Look back into the history of this people and you will learn that it is not in the least fitted for great politics. What is happening there to-day is a St. Vitus' dance of self-despair, a neurosis *par excellence*. The other great nations, in their hour of glory, have salutarily enriched Europe: Germany always remains a centre of disquiet, something which is unable to assimilate itself to Europe. To quote Nietzsche once more: "The German knows the hidden paths to chaos."

The deep uncertainty with which they are filled is also apparent in their search—carried on with the most insolent falsifications—for crown-witnesses and precursors of their *Weltanschauung*. Every great German of former times—just those who called themselves citizens of the world—must serve these purposes. Lessing is one of them, because he, according to them, fought Christianity, whilst he only declaimed against the hardened orthodoxy and wrote his famous play of humane tolerance, *Nathan*. Round Herder they spin the grotesque cobwebs of their insanity, because he thought so much about national character and history; but they complain that this philosopher of history did not escape from the danger of a pacifistic humanism in his old age. Schiller belongs to them, the singer of freedom and world peace, whose first drama already was written in *tyrannos* and who demanded in *Don Carlos*: "Sire, give us freedom of

THE POSSIBILITIES OF PUPPET DRAMA.

A SURPRISING sequel followed the reopening of the theatres in early Restoration days. All through the time of the Commonwealth they had been closed under a special Act of Parliament so that human actors were prohibited from giving stage plays. It was scarcely to be wondered at that during this period people flocked to see puppet actors produce the plays instead. The surprise lay in this: that when eventually the ban was removed and human actors once more played their parts people still flocked to see the puppets with as great a zest as ever.

The actors' extremity was the puppet masters' opportunity. And the puppet masters did not fail to make the most of it. They vied with one another in producing attractive puppet shows. They looked eagerly for specially written new plays and carefully revised old ones to meet the needs of their puppet actors. They were able to put up their prices because of this increasing demand for puppet shows. So attractive to showmen did conditions in England become that many Continental workers hastened here to share the pickings of the puppet boom. Punch was introduced by an Italian motion-maker. Marionettes began to oust from favour the simpler puppet figures of an earlier day. What was originally mere liking for puppet drama developed into violent enthusiasm. Puppet appeal was something to be reckoned with. Puppets were increasingly the fashion. It seemed that they had come to stay. And stay they did, as an accepted feature of our national dramatic entertainment, for some two hundred years or so.

It is indeed very difficult for us to realise how closely puppets were woven into English life at that time. That Shakespeare in his day was familiar with them is evidenced by the chance references he makes to them every now and then in his plays. Always there is the tacit implication that the matter is one of common knowledge which he fully expects his audience to share. Sidelights on the kind of puppet plays popular in the early seventeenth century are given by Ben Jonson in his play *Bartholomew Fair*. A puppet showman is extolling the merits of his performances:

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O the motions that I, Lanthorn Leatherhead, have given light to, in my time, since my master Pod died! Jerusalem was a stately thing, and so was Nineveh and the City of Norwich, and Sodom and Gomorrah, with the rising of the prentices on Shrove Tuesday; but the Gunpowder Plot, there was a get-penny. I have presented it to an eighteen or twenty pence audience nine times in an afternoon. Your home-born projects prove ever the best, they are so easy and familiar.

Right on through Puritan times did the puppets present these biblical and "home-born projects." During Restoration days their popularity steadily grew. Pepys wrote of *Patient Grizill* and *Dick Whittington* being acted by puppets. He thought the latter "pretty to see" and remarked "how it do work upon people that see it, and even myself too." John Evelyn saw "the famous Italian puppet play" in the September of 1667 about which apparently there had been a prodigious amount of talk. Shakespeare's plays began to be acted by puppets, but whether first on the Continent or in England it is difficult to be sure. A puppeteer with a repertoire of twenty-five pieces toured various small towns in Germany in the sixteen-sixties, and included among the twenty-five were *Titus Andronicus* and *King Lear*. As late as 1685 he was "showing" in Munich where he found large audiences willing to attend his puppet plays. This interest in Shakespeare's plays continued in Germany over a long series of years. There are still extant stringed figures of Prospero and Miranda from performances of *The Tempest* given in 1750.

The same puppeteer who produced Shakespeare in Munich also gave *Cromwell's Ghost* and *Doctor Faust*. Those English strolling players who had been forced on to the Continent in search of a livelihood when the closing of the theatres here had thrown them out of a job took with them the plays they were accustomed to giving. Of these none was more popular than Marlowe's version of *Faust*. Strangely enough this had far-reaching reactions. In 1753 Goethe and his young sister were presented with a puppet theatre, which can still be seen at the Goethe Museum at Frankfurt. Originally, Goethe wrote his plays for puppets, and naturally as he had so often seen *Faust* played by them he set about writing a *Faust* play of his own, eventually of course not for puppets to present but human actors instead.

Eighteenth-century England too still continued to patronise

thought!" Goethe is reclaimed by them—Goethe who called his life-work a triumph of the purely human and said that the word freedom sounds so sweet that we do not want to miss it, even if it should mean an error, but that despotism creates nothing but small despots. He also said that we should regard ourselves as the members of a world-community, this idea being as great as it is simple. When a very old man he said to Eckermann that national hatred is a mean business and only to be found at the lowest stages of culture; there is a point where it disappears altogether and one is above the nations. Nietzsche reminds us that there are words of Goethe's in which he—as if from abroad—condemns with an impatient hardness all the German prides himself on. The most insolent falsification however is practised with the thoughts of Nietzsche. He rejected anti-semitism with the most outspoken scorn: "We are not German enough to speak up for nationalism and racial hatred, to enjoy the national scabies of heart and poisoning of blood." And further: "We are little tempted to participate in that mendacious racial self-admiration which to-day is parading in Germany as a sign of national convictions." He complains that the Germans "suffer from the national nervous fever" with "their attacks of idiocy," now anti-French, now anti-Jewish, now anti-Polish, and then the Teutonic and Prussian idiocy—so many "befoggings of the German spirit and conscience." Himself, however, he proudly called a good European: "We are, in a word, and it shall be our word of honour, good Europeans"; he sees that "Europe will become one" and gives his consent. He reproaches the Germans with establishing, instead of the cult of reason, the cult of feeling; yet he is confident: "These are only the play of the waves in comparison with the great flood upon which we are floating and want to float." Approvingly he states that every good German is solving the question "what is German now?" just by overcoming his German qualities, that the turn to the un-German has always been the characteristic of the able Germans. With epigrammatic brevity he declares: "To be a good German means to dis-Germanise oneself." Among his ten commandments for a free spirit there is also the following: "Thou shalt, to be able to tell the truth, prefer exile."

J. LESSER.

THE POWER OF HOLLAND.

FOR the purposes of the present war Holland occupies a position of great strategic importance. Her position is, on the whole, the most dangerous of all the small States. The country is difficult to defend, the army and navy are small, and she is in imminent danger from her geographical position, which makes the country an effective potential base for submarines and aircraft. Her area amounts to nearly 12,700 square miles, and the population is nearly 9 millions. The area figure does not include the large water surface. The extent is less than that of Belgium, and the population is slightly greater. Amsterdam has nearly 800,000 inhabitants, Rotterdam about 600,000, and The Hague 500,000. No other town approaches them in population. She has a large and flourishing Colonial Empire. The area is 780,000 square miles, the population about 60 millions. Most of the dependencies lie in the East Indies, the principal being Java, Sumatra, the Moluccas, part of Borneo, and the Celebes. As we shall see, their trade is of enormous value. This rich possession is another danger to Holland from Germany—a Power whose greed and perfidy are only limited by the fear of consequences. Therefore Holland is taking every precaution against aggression from that quarter.

The country is dangerously exposed. It is almost a dead flat, the highest elevation being little over 400 feet, and much of the land is below the sea level. At the beginning of the last war Holland promptly issued a declaration of neutrality and mobilised an army of 125,000 men. The next year steps were taken to enlarge the naval and military forces. Dutch commerce suffered severely from the British blockade. It is probable that in the first year or two of the war the neutrality mentality was absolute. Germany was no doubt much more dangerous than ourselves; but there was still lingering against us a prejudice on account of the Boer War, and the Dutch resented the capture and searching of many of their ships. Both Germany and Great Britain had to make several complaints of breaches of neutrality, but, on the whole, Dutch impartiality was well maintained. As the war went on, feeling gradually became more favourable to the Allies. The ruthless treatment of Belgium and the murderous destruction of Dutch ships and crews by Germany raised anger and alarm.

puppet plays. An old miracle play, *The Creation of the World*, was "newly reviv'd with the addition of Noah's Flood" in 1703. As with so many plays of this type there was room in it for the comic element, so that we find some six years later that Powell, a very famous puppeteer of the period, was giving it at Bath when "Punch and his wife were introduced dancing in the ark." Steele thought it worth while to describe this show in *The Tatler* and to comment on the tremendous hold that Punch had on the popular fancy. Punch had various national equivalents in different European countries. He expressed some essential quality in the folk character of each. In France, Germany and Italy as well as in England the puppet showmen in the towns had to face the antagonism of the regular theatres. Even in the reign of Charles II a petition had been presented to ask that a puppet show stationed on "a site in Cecil Street in the Strand" might not be allowed to exhibit or be removed to a greater distance as its attractiveness materially interfered with the takings of the theatre near by. Yet this antagonism, instead of ousting the puppet actors, seemed merely to make them more attractive still.

Curiously enough, however, although puppet theatres strove to alter with the times a change began to come over their fortunes. Gradually people's interest in the little "wooden actors" began to wane and their sphere of influence became more and more restricted. Both here and on the Continent they were confined mainly to fairs in out-of-the-way districts or they played their parts in unsatisfactory halls or even barns to any who would condescend to watch them. It was evident that puppet audiences could no longer be quickened to response by puppet appeal.

Perhaps it was that puppets no longer possessed it. Or perhaps the puppet masters lost all confidence in their little actors' powers. The result alone was obvious, though its cause remained obscure. Soon after the middle of the nineteenth century puppet actors had retired into the background. It seemed their day was over. It even appeared on the face of things that puppet drama was dead. But to the keen observer there were still some signs of activity to prove that life was not extinct. Now and then a show would draw attention to itself and demonstrate the puppet power to "pull." And intermittently, however often they might seem

to have disappeared for ever, there were recurrent resurrections of Punch and Judy shows.

During the first decade of this century the puppet world began to bestir itself once more. Continental puppeteers who had never so completely sunk into dormancy as had our English puppet-masters, were quick to spring to vigorous life again. Some brought their shows to this country and their influence began slowly to be felt. English puppet shows appeared in unexpected places. Showmen were eager to set their puppets in the public view. Audiences collected about these enthusiastic workers. Eventually without any fuss or great advertisement a puppet boom was once more on the way.

This time, however, conditions were very different. Instead of drawing the popular fancy when competition was absent the puppets had extra competition to face. Not only were there ordinary actors in plenty, there were powerfully attractive film stars to take into account as well. Strangely enough at the very time when real actors were most fearing the effect of the screen on their own activities puppets were unostentatiously making their way into prominence again. The double competition instead of defeating them seemed but to inspire them with added zest. These "wooden actors" achieved what seemed the impossible. They actually made themselves into screen material, so that by supplying the cinema with what it happened to be needing they focused new attention on themselves.

Only by following puppet activities closely can a true idea be gained of what is going on. Puppetry is capturing the imagination and enthusiasm of not only the whole-time professional worker but of the amateur as well. It is doing more: it is stimulating inquiry into the history of puppets. It is creating an interest in the puppet drama characteristic of other lands. Thus it is that English puppeteers find occasion to tour the Continent and even to visit America, both to show and be shown what is going on in the world of puppetry.

Within the past few years we have had visits from well-known puppet-masters from Europe. Vittorio Podrecca of Rome played to London audiences as long ago as 1923. In 1934 he was in England again for a time when his *Teatro dei Piccoli* (= Theatre of the Little People) was filmed in its entirety. His cast then numbered eight hundred "little

Germany did not wilfully include Holland in the intensified submarine campaign, but a number of Dutch ships were torpedoed on flimsy pretexts. In November 1918, Holland had cause for great satisfaction in that her neutrality had remained unimpaired throughout in most trying circumstances, and it was also a subject of pride that her Government, in accordance with precedent, had refused to surrender the Kaiser.

The people, of course, hope that the same policy will be maintained successfully, but the danger is now greater. The perfidy of 1914 was but a pale anticipation of that of 1939; we now know that neither Germany nor Russia will honour any pledge or treaty, when it suits them to break such engagements, and that they are ready to seize any small State without regard for justice or humanity. For her size Holland exceeds almost every other country in the extent of her commerce. Agriculture is still the chief industry. The cattle number nearly 3 million, the pigs more than 1½ million. The value of the combined supplies of butter, bacon, and eggs sent to us annually amounts to about 6½ million sterling. It is obvious that Germany would be glad to lay hands on such a source of supply, even though butter be less prized than guns. The exports of condensed milk and bulbs are very large. Much of the trade consists of re-exports mainly to Germany.

It is obvious that trade must suffer severely in war-time. In 1913 the Dutch overseas trade amounted to £700 million; by 1919 it had dwindled to £250 million. A considerable amount of coal is raised, but iron and all other metals have to be imported. The product of woollens, cottons, and several other kinds of manufactured goods is large. The volume of the trade with Germany is normally more than double ours. It is, of course, seriously interrupted by the war. The fishing industry also suffers. The wealth of Holland is so great that, while a temptation to free-booting Powers, it affords the Dutch a capacity for obstinate resistance. This wealth is much augmented by the Colonial Empire. The great Eastern Islands raise and export in immense quantities sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco, petroleum, tin, and rice. The Western possessions consist only of Curaçao and Surinam (Dutch Guiana). The latter is a large tract of territory, resembling our adjacent Colony, and the principal product in each case is sugar.

To maintain communications with these distant possessions necessitates a large mercantile marine. Holland has 993 ships—more than four times as many as Belgium. Holland has at least this reason for being grateful to us—the fact that Britannia rules the waves makes it impossible for Germany to contrive a serious attack upon these Dutch possessions. The defence forces at home and abroad are by no means adequate in face of so powerful and rapacious a State. We have seen that in the early months of the last war Holland was able to mobilise an army of 125,000 men. Before the close of hostilities 600,000 were under arms. But normally the army is of very small dimensions. There is a modified system of compulsory service, making it obligatory on all men between 19 and 40 to serve in the army or navy, if required. But the home army's strength is not much above 16,000. It is said that this force could be quickly expanded to 380,000. The navy has a large coast defence ship, four good cruisers, eight destroyers, twenty-one submarines, and smaller craft. The Dutch army has seen little service in Europe since 1815. In 1831 the train of events that led to the separation of Belgium and Holland brought about a war between the two countries. The Dutch army was far too good a fighting machine for the enemy and quickly beat down all opposition. Fortunately, the war was short; the Powers interfered, and a settlement was made which lasted till 1914.

However, Holland has a supplementary army. The Eastern possessions are closely analogous to what our Indian Dominion was twenty years ago. There is a Governor-General with a Council of four, and there is an assembly which is partially elected. There are also native States with varying powers and privileges. As with us, the larger proportion of the army consists of native troops. It is entirely separate from the home force. It amounts to something over 40,000 all told, but more than half the total is represented by militiamen and *landsturm*. It is obvious that a force, so far distant and liable to attack from raiders and mines, would not be of much avail in a European war.

Holland is dangerously exposed to Germany, her neighbour; Belgium occupies the rest of the frontier. Frontier forts are few, but there is a scheme of defence called the Holland Fortress. The people rely on flooding, as they have relied before in former wars. In 1672 Louis XIV invaded Holland

people," his costumes a thousand or more. The stringing of his marionettes was of a peculiarly complicated character, investing them with a much fuller action than is usual. The "dolls" were three feet or so in height, all of them the object of much loving artistry and skill, having been specially modelled by artists possessing feeling for puppet creation. One critic said of Podrecca's puppets that "they turn, dance, romp, play at ball with one another, reach for objects, pull out handkerchiefs from their pockets and put them back again. . . . Yet the performance does not aim wholly at illusion. It is extremely charming when the puppet so seriously takes the trouble to do what living people do and yet remains wholly a puppet."

It is this quality of "remaining wholly a puppet" which is the keynote of the best work done in modern puppetry. It is seen in the puppet figures of Paul Brann, who has spent so much of his time in showing his marionettes in this country during the past five years or more. His technique, which is very characteristic, is typical of the work of the Marionette Theatre of Munich Artists. In this connection it is interesting to recall that during the last war three Munich artists, a painter, a sculptor and an actor, actually constructed a puppet theatre within the trenches on the German Eastern Front. So successful was the theatre that the puppets eventually toured over a wide area in the Baltic States, giving their plays not only to the German soldiers but to the civil population of many towns and villages in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Paul Brann, like Vittorio Podrecca, endows his puppets with the power of song as well as of speech and movement. Perhaps nowhere does he attain to greater dramatic unity than in his presentation of a Nativity Play, or Crib Play as it is more often called on the Continent. Brann believes that three intellects should collaborate in his performances—those of the manipulator, the speaker, and the puppet itself. This means that movement, speech and puppet "personality" all aim at characterising some ideal type. For each puppet is representative far more of character type than of character individuality.

Another Continental visitor to this country was Richard Teschner, who came here from Vienna in 1935. He did his early puppet work in Prague in the first years of this century. After working on naturalistic lines for some time he became

greatly influenced by the strange puppet figures of the Javanese Wajang. These are shadow puppets whose early history is lost in obscurity. It is not the puppets the audience actually sees, but the shadows of their flat figures cast upon a screen. Such shadows are not necessarily black: they can by special construction of the flat cut-outs be seen in delicate and almost unbelievably beautiful hues. So greatly did these figures appeal to Teschner that he borrowed some of his ideas from their manipulation. He transformed them into rounded figures, putting them on to an ordinary stage. But sometimes he did this with a strange difference: he made it appear that they were reflections in a mirror, as though their actual substance was invisible to the onlookers.

So far, of modern figures, stringed types only have been described. These naturally allow of greater freedom and variety of movement than the more simple hand or glove type of puppet. There are several workers, however, who find in the hand-puppet a medium of wider scope than might be supposed. Perhaps Walter Wilkinson is the best known of these glove-puppet workers. He has toured England, Scotland and Wales with his little figures. He has carried them on to the Continent and led them across many frontiers. He has even, in response to special invitation, taken them over to America, where they gave shows in every variety of place.

The first recorded puppet show in America was given in New York in 1739. During the years that followed puppet players from England, France, Italy and Spain made frequent visits to the cities of the Atlantic seaboard. Then came a time of intensive industrial and colonial expansion and puppets were pushed more and more into the background, until when this century entered its second decade interest in puppetry began to make itself very evident again. Two lines of development seem to be running side by side in America: a sort of mass production resulting in mechanised marionette performances, and a more individual form of expression which promises better things in the realm of true dramatic art.

Significant among puppet productions within the last few years have been *The Mikado*, done in true Gilbert and Sullivan style by Tony Sarg's "dolls" in New York, and Ibsen's *Peer Gynt* with the associated Grieg music, played by the Tatterman Marionettes of Cleveland. Now that puppets are entering so fully into the educational activities of schools and

with a great army. Macaulay says : " The dykes were opened. The whole country was turned into one great lake, from which the cities, with their ramparts and steeples, rose like islands. The invaders were forced to save themselves from destruction by a precipitate retreat." The defending forces are concentrated on a restricted area, and strong barriers defend the east ; these, of course, will be reinforced by controlled inundation. Obviously, if the defences are effective the country is safe, and presumably that is the principal reason why Germany has made no attack. If, however, Hitler could obtain possession of Holland without excessive loss, it would be his best means of carrying out his much-vaunted great offensive. The western barrier might be deemed too formidable, and in that case it would be necessary to invade by way of Belgium. This would let loose a second formidable army against him. It would, of course, be nothing to Hitler that Germany had a second time in little more than a quarter of a century perpetrated the infamy of perfidiously attacking that country. The impudence of German mentality has recently been shown by two extraordinary examples.

The Scandinavian countries are warned that their aid to Finland is a breach of neutrality against *Germany*, which is not at war with Finland. Again, the smaller countries (the larger ones are presumably not guilty) commit an unfriendly act in belonging to the League of Nations and listening to "abuse" of Germany without protest. Such being the German habit of mind, a pretext for the invasion either of Belgium or Holland could never be wanting. It is, however, doubtful whether Germany would be willing to multiply the forces arrayed against her. But in dealing with ruthless dictators of the type of Herr Hitler and M. Stalin, we have always to take into consideration the possibility of a gambler's last desperate throw. During the great offensive in 1918 Ludendorff wished to invade Holland, but was dissuaded by the German civil authorities. The pretext was that Holland was guilty of unneutral conduct in regard to her shipping. It was the merest pretext, seeing that there was a clear right of angary, as the Allies' procedure was called. On March 20th, 1918, the Government of the United States announced its intention of taking over Dutch shipping lying in American ports and requisitioned seventy-seven such ships, promising compensation. Within a few days Great Britain and the other

Allies made similar announcements. The Dutch protested, but the right of the Allies was clear, and was expressly provided by The Hague Convention. Also, as Holland was an unwilling party to this transaction, it was obviously no ground for German hostility. In that particular case the invasion of Holland would probably have been inexpedient from the German point of view—the attacking line would have been unduly lengthened, and there would have been a hostile army on the right flank.

Holland has certainly no reason for friendly feelings towards Germany, the destroyer of her ships and the murderer of her seamen. As far as we are concerned, the only complaint of the Dutch is the restrictions which are necessary to our blockade of Germany. But it should be clear to the world that, if Germany wins a decisive victory, Holland and many another small nation will suffer not inconvenience but ruin. Therefore, the Dutch are rightly doing everything to strengthen themselves and also (as is credibly asserted) have linked their fate with Belgium ; they will stand side by side to resist the aggressor. Thus all has been done on their side that can be done, and we, on our part, must be ready to give them effective help in case of need. Demosthenes told the Athenians : " We must learn the lesson that to manage a war properly, you must not follow the course of events, but yourselves be in advance of them, and just as an army looks to its general for guidance, so also statesmen must take all action that seems to them necessary, and not allow themselves to be dragged at the heels of chance."

W. A. HIRST.

colleges in our own country it is interesting to see that in America too they are considered extremely "sound" from an educational point of view. Miss Marjorie Batchelder, it seems, was granted a Columbus University degree for her puppet production of *The Miracle of the Virgin of Guadalupe*. And this is not her only puppet activity. Among other plays she has given Maeterlinck's *The Death of Tintagiles* with weird yet convincing effect. Paul McPharlin, the President of the Puppeteers of America, visited this country a year or so ago. He told much of what was being done among American puppet players, of whom he is one of the hardest workers. His own charming and delightful Mozart cast can do surprising things with opera. They can also present a play of Mozart's life with fitting background of the composer's own music.

Puppet theatres have been televised in both Europe and America. Waldo S. Lanchester, who with his wife Muriel Bell runs the Lanchester Marionette Theatre at Malvern, was the first puppet player in the world to have his marionettes televised. Since then Walter Wilkinson's "gloves," Jan Bussell's "shadows" as well as many other types of puppets have been used as television material. Jan Bussell has long worked with puppets. His wife, too, Ann Hogarth, is a puppeteer of some years' experience. About six years ago now Jan Bussell produced Pirandello's *The Man with a Flower in His Mouth*, and last year he and his wife together gave Manuel de Falla's opera, *Master Peter's Puppet Show*. The shadow plays that were televised were based on shows of the kind that Jan Bussell saw in Athens. Such presentations as these are descendants of shadow plays of the ancient past. As with the Javanese puppets the shadows produced are not necessarily black. In fact by dexterous use of camera effects and lighting both their beauty and capacity for effective movement can be very greatly amplified.

There are other women puppet workers in this country, the twin daughters of Laurence Binyon, the poet, for instance, who recently gave a series of shows in London. Then there is Olive Blackham, who with her firm belief in the beauty of movement and gesture is experimenting with convincing effect in her puppet studio-theatre in the Cotswolds. Some of our English puppeteers specialise in variety, others do straight drama, others again include burlesque in their repertoire. Morality and miracle plays have been revived,

even to the old favourite of more than two centuries ago, *Noah and His Flood*. Shakespeare is once more acted by puppet figures, old folk types take form and speak to us, sing to us in the words of old folk songs and sometimes even dance.

G. K. Chesterton was a great puppet enthusiast. When writing of toy theatres, he once said that

art is limitation. It does not consist in expanding things but of cutting things down. . . . By reducing the scale of events the toy theatre can introduce much larger events. Because it is small it could easily represent the earthquake in Jamaica. Because it is small it could easily represent the Day of Judgment. Exactly in so far as it is limited so far it could play easily with falling cities or with falling stars.

Limiting the puppets, and the scenery to fit with them; limiting the stage so that all is proportionately right; remembering that a puppet represents not so much an individual as an individual type; and there are the essentials of puppet dramatisation. Ingenious arrangements whereby apparent perspective is heightened and depth of stage increased all help in producing a unity in which colour, lighting and costume play a contributory part.

To-day's puppet drama at its best is approaching more and more nearly to this ideal unity. It is as if one looked at a landscape with its moving figures in the view-finder of a camera. All is there: colour, form, movement. But all is "limited," not however to less clarity of delineation, but to delineation crystallised as it were into a new and intensified quality of its own.

WINIFRED GRAHAM WILSON.

BESSARABIA—AND RUSSO-RUMANIAN RELATIONS.

IN placing the Red Army between Germany and Rumania by the occupation of Eastern Galicia last September, Russia has barred the passage of the Germans to the Black Sea. This was not, of course, from any desire to save Rumania, but to prevent hostilities spreading to the South East, which would have involved Russian interests as well. Meanwhile she strove, unsuccessfully, to draw Turkey into her orbit (e.g. M. Sarajoglu's visit to Moscow), and thus, by keeping England at bay in the Near East, to enlarge the scope of her own initiative in South-Eastern Europe. Since then the manner in which Soviet Russia tried to gain control in the Baltic area, namely first by reducing the three small Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—to a state of vassalage and, secondly, by attacking Finland, has aroused widespread apprehension among the still neutral small states of Central Europe and the Balkans. Not being yet committed to take an active part in the war on either side, but pursuing a policy of "limited objectives" in concert with Nazi Germany, Russia's actions seem even less calculable than Germany's. Such a course calls for constant watchfulness, for it may affect not merely the security and independence of her immediate neighbours, but also the balance of forces engaged in the present war between the Allies and Germany.

Will Stalin call a halt in his Western drive after his Finnish venture? Will the difficulties of his ill-prepared campaign in the North make him look for success elsewhere in order to repair loss of prestige of the Red Army inflicted by the Finns? It is not unlikely that Russia is already resolved to extend her influence to the Balkans and Middle East for reasons of strategy and ideology, while she feels she can do it under the immunity afforded her by the war in the West. Nor should one lightly dismiss the possibility of her being deliberately drawn into war by the Western Powers against her own will, since her neutrality is bound to frustrate the Allied blockade against Germany to a considerable extent. In any case the Russian question will inevitably command attention for some time to come. It is when we try to forecast the future trend of Russian foreign policy and its consequences

for Europe, that we must turn our attention to any source of possible friction between Russia and other countries.

Should she decide to penetrate the Balkans, Bessarabia may well be first involved, since she lies in the path and leads to the mouth of the Danube. Russia might act single-handed as in the Baltic, or in conjunction with a German or joint Hungarian-German thrust into Transylvania and Rumania's oil fields. In the latter case she would, no doubt, justify her intervention in Bessarabia on the plea of keeping the German army away from her greatest Black Sea port—Odessa—and of "recovering" that province which, before the last war, was Russia's for one hundred years. From any angle it is obvious that Soviet diplomacy might in certain circumstances be tempted to make Bessarabia the scapegoat in the furtherance of her schemes in the Balkans, by reviving—in one form or another—her claim to it. The seizure of Bessarabia would give Russia access to and complete control of the Danube Delta, with momentous consequences for the existing balance of power in both the Balkans and the Near East. One of the main and constant aims of Russia's imperialist policy was the domination of the Straits as a pre-requisite to a free outlet to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Bessarabia was part of the Rumanian Principality of Moldavia until 1812. By the Peace of Bucharest of that year between Russia and Turkey, Russia acquired the eastern part of Moldavia confined between the rivers Dniester and Pruth and the Black Sea. Defeated by the British, French and Turkish Alliance in the Crimean War, she was obliged to hand over to Moldavia three districts in southern Bessarabia. These were, however, handed back to Russia by the Berlin Congress that ended the 1877-8 Turkish War. This re-shuffle lasted until 1914, during which time Russia subjected the province to intense Russianisation with a view to using it as a spring-board for her ambitions in the Balkans. The internal collapse of Russia through the October revolution gave the Bessarabians the opportunity first to proclaim an "Independent Moldavian Republic" and then in March 1918 to re-unite with Rumania. The act of reunion was decided by the National Assembly of Bessarabia, sanctioned by the Grand Council of the Paris Peace Conference in March 1920, and later ratified by Great Britain, France and Italy. Rumania regarded the

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AUSTRIA, OLD AND NEW.

Sir George Franckenstein's *Memoirs*,* dedicated "to the resurrection of Austria," reveal an attractive and highly cultivated aristocrat who served a mighty empire and a little republic with equal devotion and skill. They will delight his many friends, who rejoice to know that he is now a British citizen. For a man of such gracious refinement, the friend of Hofmannsthal, representing all that is best in the glorious tradition of Austrian culture, there is no place in Nazi Germany. His grief at the obliteration of his country should be partially assuaged by the hope that it will live again. It the British Government, unlike the French, has not yet inscribed the resurrection of Austria on its banner, everyone knows that victory, if it comes our way, will bring that unhappy country the opportunity of deciding her own destiny and starting afresh.

Baron Franckenstein belongs to one of the oldest families in Central Europe, and his descent from the Schönborns through his mother is equally distinguished. Throughout life he has combined an ardent Austrian patriotism with a sympathetic understanding of other nations. Such a man, even had he not been the son of a diplomatist, was predestined for

* *Facts and Features of My Life*. By Sir George Franckenstein. Cassell. 15s.

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diplomacy, which requires among other qualities the capacity for inspiring confidence and making friends. He has seen the New World as well as the Old, the Far East as well as the European capitals. He writes of all his experiences with infectious enthusiasm, keenly enjoying not only the rich variety of human contact but the entrancing beauties of nature and art. After a brief sojourn at Washington he learned his trade at St. Petersburg under Aehrenthal, of whom he speaks with affectionate gratitude. To most English readers that name stirs disagreeable memories of the Bosnian crisis. In these pages he is seen surrounded by an adoring family and working himself to death in the service of the State. In their first conversation the Ambassador complained that his programme of friendly relations with Russia was endangered by her aggressive policy. Austria merely desired to keep her possessions by preventing any Balkan developments which might threaten them. The best method of averting a clash appeared to him to be that of stressing the common interests of the Austrian, Russian and German dynasties, all of which would be threatened with collapse in event of war. It was a well-intentioned but hopeless policy, for dynastic solidarity no longer meant what it had done when the Tsar Nicholas I helped young Francis Joseph to suppress the Hungarian revolt in 1849. Pan-Slav sentiment and the determination to maintain Russian prestige in the Balkan peninsula had taken its place, and after the defeat by Japan the Near East became the arena where Austro-Russian rivalry was focused.

When his beloved chief succeeded Goluchowski at the Foreign Office in 1906, the author offered his services as secretary. There could be no better training for the young diplomatist than to spend a few years at the Ballplatz, particularly at a time when a strong hand was at the helm. An interesting conversation with the Kaiser in October 1909 reveals his anticipation of a war between the Teuton and the Slav within five or six years. Russia, he declared, was working for a Balkan-Slav union, and Austria should make a military agreement with Turkey. He regretted that she had not marched into Serbia immediately after the annexation of Bosnia. She was about to do so in March 1909, when Serbia gave way and dropped her angry protests. It is interesting to observe that our author approves the policy of Aehrenthal in

reunion as an act of historical reparation and, therefore, the problem of Bessarabia as finally settled. Russia has never formally denounced the Treaty of Bessarabia, by which the Great Powers have recognised the re-acquisition by Rumania of Bessarabia, although her propaganda took great pains to weaken Rumania's just title to it in the eyes of the world.

The Russian claim in their favour the past history of Bessarabia which was a "part of the Turkish Empire" when they conquered it. As no independent state under the name of Rumania then existed, they argue that the latter cannot claim what did not belong to her. Further, it was contended that the vote of the National Council of Bessarabia which decided on union with Rumania in March 1918, was not a genuine expression of the voice of the people since it was not taken by a plebiscite. Finally, the Russian thesis referred to the Russian and Ukrainian minorities of Bessarabia. These points were never put forward in official form and no opportunity was made for them to be discussed in conference. The negotiations of Vienna in 1924 between the Soviet delegate, Krestinski, and an official Rumanian delegation were only concerned with the resumption of diplomatic relations. But Soviet propaganda, exiled Imperialists and the Communist faction in Bessarabia made up for this official reticence on the part of Moscow.

Although no "Rumania" was marked on the map of 1812 when Bessarabia was annexed by the Russians, the Rumanians argue that its existence could not be denied. The Principality of Moldavia, of which Bessarabia* was an integral part, has always enjoyed political freedom, being governed even when under Turkish suzerainty by a native prince assisted by a "House of Lords." The connection with Turkey was rather undefined, just as was that of the other Rumanian principality, Wallachia; actually she was more truly independent than, for instance, Slovakia within the bounds of Nazi Germany to-day.

Let us turn to the second Russian objection. During the Russian revolution of 1917 a new organisation was formed in

* Until 1812 only the southern half of the province was known under the name of Bessarabia, which comes from *Bassarab*, the ruler of the Rumanian Principality of Wallachia, who during the fourteenth century extended his control over the south-eastern part of Moldavia, across the Danube. Bessarabia was always part of the latter Rumanian Principality and as such in point of fact the present name—Bessarabia—is a misnomer.

Bessarabia, the National Assembly, which was a real Parliament. This upheld the principle of self-government, proclaiming an autonomous "Independent Moldavian Republic" owing no allegiance to the Central Soviet Government, the church, schools, administration, etc., all being nationalised. Nevertheless, democratic practices were observed when the Constituent Assembly was set up, the delegates being either elected by free vote or appointed by various political and social organisations. As regards the argument on the occupation of Bessarabia by the Rumanian army, the Rumanian answer is that this occupation occurred long after the proclamation of the Moldavian Republic and only at the special invitation of its sovereign Government. Moreover, the Rumanian army was in no way concerned with political matters, except with the maintenance of order in face of Bolshevism.

The Rumanians query the sincerity of the Russian argument that the Bessarabian National Council deliberately omitted to seek a direct vote from the people, i.e. the holding of a plebiscite, when considering such an important decision as the future of the Republic. But was it not Trotzky who stated in almost cynical terms that holding a plebiscite under a mixed commission, after withdrawing the Soviet Army, would mean "an imperialist trap of the lowest degree under the standard of self-determination"? It follows that the Soviet would not have opposed a plebiscite if taken under the control of the Red Army. In fact the decision of the Bessarabian people, expressed through the vote of the National Council, had the value of a plebiscite since that body was a truly democratic organisation, despite its revolutionary origin, all classes and nationalities being represented. Its resolution in favour of the Union is explained by the fact that the majority of the delegates came from the Rumanian section of the population (103 out of 160 deputies). The vote was taken in the best democratic manner, complete freedom being granted to all parties. Eighty-six votes were cast for the Union, with three against and thirty-six abstentions, the remainder being absent.

Whilst admitting that there are large numbers of Russians and Ukrainians in Bessarabia, the Rumanian population has an absolute majority, rendering the character of the province predominantly Rumanian. This has remained so despite the

1908 and of Berchtold in 1914. He is too humane and enlightened to hate any nation, but he clearly has no love for the Serbs, whom, like most other Austrians, he regarded as bad neighbours. He evidently feels that Austria had no choice but to take up the Servian challenge implicit in the Serajevo crime, and he pronounces the reply to the ultimatum radically unsatisfactory. He feels that Berchtold was better fitted for an Embassy, working under the direction of a Foreign Minister, than for the task of directing the foreign policy of the Hapsburg Monarchy himself. Yet there is no disposition to write him off as a mere mediocrity.

The author's first period in the magnificent Austrian Embassy in Belgrave Square under Count Mensdorff was cut short by the outbreak of war; but he had learned to like us and to cherish the hope that he might perhaps one day represent his country at the Court of St. James's. For that he had to wait six years, filling in the time in Belgium, where he was attached to the German Administration. His picture of the Governor-General will surprise many of his readers no less than that of Aehrenthal, for to the majority of the Belgians and their allies the grim old soldier seemed the reincarnation of the hateful Alva. General von Bissing, he tells us, was a great man, a passionate Imperialist but, so far as war-time conditions allowed, full of paternal regard for the country entrusted to his care. Lest we be tempted to dismiss this judgment as proceeding from an excess of loyalty, we may remember that Brand Whitlock, the American Ambassador, passionately devoted to the Belgians though he was, found the old man better on closer acquaintance than he expected.

The later portions of the book describe very modestly the work which the author accomplished as the first and only representative of the new Austria in London. It was a difficult task to rebuild the bridges, but nobody could have accomplished it so well. With perfect tact, exquisite manners, genuine kindness of heart, utter devotion to his country, a touching affection for England, and an artistic temperament, he won a unique position for himself not only in the diplomatic corps but in English society. Nowhere else could such music be heard, nowhere else did the tradition of Austrian culture seem so radiantly alive. The foundation of the Anglo-Austrian Society, the popularisation of Austria as a paradise

for tourists in summer and winter, the securing of financial aid from the City when the League of Nations intervened to restore the finances of the little State, were among his triumphs. For all those, from Mr. Montagu Norman downwards, who showed practical sympathy for his country, the author finds words of the warmest gratitude. It would be a mistake to believe that his work was in vain because Hitler marched into Vienna in 1938, for it is not always the weakest that in the long run goes to the wall. Belgium survived the horrors of the German occupation in the world war, and Austria will re-emerge when her destroyer is himself destroyed. The story of her rape and plans for her resurrection are reserved for a second volume, to which readers of the first will look forward with eager interest. For the preservation of Austrian culture, momentarily trampled under foot by the Nazis, is a major European interest.

G. P. G.

THE BALKAN FRONT.

The International Research Section of the Fabian Society, under the chairmanship of Mr. Leonard Woolf (who writes the Introduction), has produced an admirable volume of information* about the old, old story of the German *Drang nach dem Südosten*. Five authors contribute their particular matter about Yugoslavia (Barbara Ward), Rumania (Barbara Buckmaster), Bulgaria (Clare Hollingworth), Greece (Vandeleur Robinson) and Turkey (Lilo Linke). They excellently provide the facts which show why Hitler's Germany, and the Kaiser's Germany before it, have coveted these stepping-stones to the Near East. Mr. J. F. Horrabin contributes a series of maps distinguished by his usual clarity; but the map given on page 216 and reproduced on the jacket of the book, illustrative of the title, oddly leaves out Bagdad itself. Bagdad, having performed its titular function, does not figure in the body of the book.

This question of German ambitions in Balkan Europe, both as an immediate source of supply in food and raw materials and as a corridor to still longer ambitions, is the most mocking of all the contemporary ironies. The famous map published in 1916 by the "New Europe" showing the "Pangerman Plan" as then realised by the war with a solid German or

* *Hitler's Route to Bagdad*. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

other nationalities which settled there, encouraged by the Russian régime. Here is a comparative table of the actual distribution of the Bessarabian races as shown by the Russian and Rumanian official statistics :

	Russian census 1897. (1,935,412)		Rumanian census 1930 (2,864,402)	
Rumanians	...	921,000	1,609,000	
Russians	...	158,000	353,000	} 668,000
Ukrainians...	...	379,000	315,000	
Bulgarians	...	101,000	143,000	

Since their emancipation in 1918, large numbers of the peasants have come into the towns, hitherto chiefly inhabited by the minorities—principally Russians and Jews—which has further enhanced its Rumanian character. Therefore, in view of the Rumanian evidence, the Union of Bessarabia was but the fulfilment of the national urge of the Rumanian people. Any other outcome would have been forced and impermanent.

Bessarabia borders on the mouth of the Danube. Presumably Russia is anxious to regain control of this important estuary, and to use it as an instrument for pushing her interests in South-Eastern Europe and the Near East. The constant aim of Tsarist Russia was to gain control of the Bosphorus in order to safeguard her supremacy in the Black Sea and thus to ensure a free outlet into the Eastern Mediterranean. The reasons for this policy may prove equally decisive in the present circumstances. The excuse of "freeing Christian orthodoxy from the Turk" used during the Russo-Turkish wars was no more consistent with Russian aims than her present guise of freeing the Balkan peoples from "reactionary tyranny," or the pan-Slav appeal to the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs. Such pretexts merely conceal ambitions for the tightening of control over the Balkans, thus making Turkey more amenable to her terms. In this sense Soviet Russia is no less imperialistic than in the time of the Tsars, the only difference being the additional desire to disseminate Bolshevik doctrines as widely as possible.

With Russia dominating the Danube Delta, Rumania could no longer enjoy any degree of independence, her position becoming similar to that of the Baltic States, having all sea

strongholds and outlets at the mercy of the Soviet Navy. An independent Rumania in control of such a strategic position as the mouth of the Danube is necessary for the maintenance of a stable balance of forces in South-Eastern Europe. The Bessarabian question also involves European interests. The province once more forms a bulwark, not now against the "non-Christian Turk" but against a conception of government contrary to all traditions still respected by democratic Europe. This consideration is uppermost in the deliberations of all Rumanian and Balkan leaders. The transformation of the Balkans into a centre of Soviet influence by the reconquest of Bessarabia would detract from European authority in that area. Any Great Power dominating the mouth of the Danube would control the Black Sea and, consequently, the Dardanelles. Nothing could perhaps stress with greater force Europe's interest in the neutralisation of the Danube Delta than the fact that in modern times it has always been governed by an International Commission in which all Powers directly or indirectly interested were represented. The change last summer in the international status of the Lower Danube, which increased Rumanian control, was meant to be just another step to prevent any single Great Power gaining excessive influence over the river.

It is obvious that the Bessarabian question must be approached from the angle both of local interests and the wider European interests. If it is to be lasting, the solution cannot be that of restoring Bessarabia to Russia, but of securing an adequate minority policy. The Russians and Ukrainians of Bessarabia are reconciled minority elements, displaying no irredentist tendencies. This is particularly true of the bulk of the peasants who show a natural aversion to the Soviet régime in Russia and to all that it stands for in the social sphere. This is due to the fact that they shared with the Rumanian peasants the benefits of the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian Government in 1918-20, which greatly enhanced their self-respect and standard of living. Besides, their religious and party rights are protected by the basic laws of the country and the Minority Treaty signed by Rumania in 1920. The Russian and Ukrainian communities have joined the "Front of National Rebirth" with the other national minorities, this being yet another guarantee that a *modus vivendi* between minorities and

pro-German bloc reaching actually to Bagdad (Germany + Austria-Hungary + Serbia + Rumania + Bulgaria + the Turkish Empire) with potential ramifications to Hodeida, Cairo, the Cape, made one's hair stand so stiffly on end that the nightmare in its resurrected and smaller form now loses some of its terror. Still, this sort of thing is regarded by the orthodox militarist as good for civilian *moral*. If, having defeated the German terror once, we find we did nothing of the sort, and the terror is still there; if we are to fight the same old war all over again in the same way, for the same purpose, whether or not we achieve the same old end, we may at any rate fortify our resolution with the same old nightmare.

The Fabian Society manfully therefore (if the adverb be admissible before so feminine an array of talent) points out again the inherent horror of Germany's economic and military penetration through Danubian Europe. "The independence, the existence of every state which lies between Nazi Germany and Bagdad," Mr. Woolf tells us, "is threatened; it is the ancient menace of Mittel-Europa or the *Drang nach Osten* revived in its most brutal form." Bogeys and menaces are normally ancient. "Brutes they were," exclaimed A. J. Balfour during the last war; "brutes they remain." He might have added: "Brutes they will be."

The really valuable importance of this book is that it gives essential information about an essential field of war. This, in short, is not the same old war so far as the technique is concerned. The last time the issue was decided by the success of the British blockade, although millions of men had been killed in the most ghastly war on land ever known. This time, as by a tacit understanding, the waste of belligerent manhood is eliminated, and the issue is being decided simply by the competitive starving out of the civilian civilisation. If we succeed in starving the German women and children, we win; and *vice versa*. Therefore the economic resources of Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, and Germany's chances of tapping any or all of them are a matter of the first moment. The war may well be decided by the fate of those countries. The book admirably gives us the nature and content of what is at stake. With the background thus provided the reader may the more competently follow the course of the German, Russian, Italian and Franco-British competition in that field.

G. G.

REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS.*

This book of collected essays by a well-informed scholar deals with the sorrow of us all: the critical state of western civilisation. It explains the sense and value of the different convulsions of our age and gives us cross-sections through their history. The author considers the Russian, Fascist and National-Socialist revolutions, but beyond these also the Turkish, Arabian and Zionist movements of our days. We follow his objective arguments about the last three with interest. We feel, here speaks a real expert. We gladly allow him to awaken in us a deepened sympathy for the endeavours of the new Turkey at modernisation, and are grateful for the interpretation of the rather complicated Arabian question and the difficulties and possibilities of Zionism. His explanations of the Jewish character in this chapter and in the one on Messianism are a masterpiece of sympathetic analysis. Our interest becomes passionate when he turns to the dictatorships of to-day and the misfortunes they have brought on Europe. The ideologies of Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism may be different. Internationally-minded Bolshevism grants the different peoples of Russia a national life of their own, but only because the suppression of the national character keeps alive reactionary nationalism. The Russian tactics aim at extinguishing it in the quickest way so that the national form will dissolve and only the socialistic contents will remain. Fascism and National Socialism on the other hand are ferociously nationalistic and are, or pretend to be, sworn enemies of international Bolshevism. But what is common to all three of them is the barbaric terror and complete amorality and cynicism of their methods.

The chapters with the most burning importance for us are those which deal with National Socialism. The author sees in it a child of Prussianism married to Romanticism, a revolt of the plebeian which has inflicted unheard-of atrocities on numberless human beings. With unparalleled fury this new barbarism turns against religion, humanism and liberty, enslaves its victims spiritually and morally, glorifies blood and war, derides peace and the union of the nations as a dream, because in its megalomania it is willing

**Revolutions and Dictatorships*. By Prof. Hans Kohn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford University Press, 1939. 15s.

majority can be reached, through co-operation rather than separate organisation.

It seems, however, that whatever the conditions in Bessarabia, Russia might still make claims on the province. If the situation in South-Eastern Europe is to be cleared up, a more radical solution must be sought. This can only be found in the removal of the Russian element from Bessarabia on an exchange basis. In Russian Ukraine, between the Dniester and the Bug, about 300,000-400,000 Rumanians are living under the so-called "Soviet Moldavian Republic" set up in 1924. The main difficulty would be the despatch of the Russian peasants into the orbit of the Soviet régime. Those preferring Rumanian rule could be left where they are or settled in other parts of the country, and replaced in Bessarabia by Rumanians. Such a solution is commended by political common sense and foresight and there is no reason why this proposal, doubtless acceptable to Rumania, should not be adopted, unless Russia is not sincere in her anxiety for her co-nationals in Bessarabia, but merely concealing ulterior motives. If so, denial of the possibilities of such a plan would betray her true purposes.

VICTOR CORNEA.

THE ADOLESCENT IN WAR-TIME.

THERE are in Great Britain some three and a half million boys and girls between the ages of 14 and 18. Of these a small minority, roughly one in eight, is (or was, until the outbreak of war) undergoing full-time education. The great majority is engaged in wage-earning work. Thanks to the fact that compulsory schooling, with its attendant care of the child's physical, mental and moral well-being, ends abruptly at 14, to be succeeded by what Earl de la Warr has correctly described as the "worst gap in our education system," this vast host of young workers presents even in time of peace a formidable social problem. A state of war aggravates that problem in every respect, and adds to it novel and alarming features.

The problem may be sub-divided under two heads, the one concerning the working day of the adolescent, the other his hours of leisure. Though we have long persisted in regarding them as such, these are not two distinct problems. They are integral and intimately interrelated parts of the same problem. A boy or a girl who is worked too hard, too long, or at an unsuitable occupation, is thereby unfitted to make profitable use of leisure; and no adolescent who loses the full benefit of leisure can hope to come to the full stature of manhood, whether as worker, as citizen, or as vital human personality.

Until quite recently far more attention was paid to the working day of the adolescent than to his hours of leisure. For well over a century legislative action has been shortening the hours and improving the conditions of labour for juveniles. Slowly, parsimoniously, and usually reluctantly, it is true, but nevertheless continuously and progressively. We have even to-day barely begun to think in terms of legislating for leisure. True to our British tradition that the leisure time of the individual is his own concern (in itself a very proper and truly democratic tradition), we have been content very largely to leave our young people to their own devices outside working hours.

But this attitude ignores the fact that the adolescent is not adult; that he is immature in judgment and inexperienced in the art of living; that he is unstable, unsettled, insecure, impulsive, and irresponsible. We have chosen to regard these characteristics as faults in his make-up, but they are not that;

to prevent them for ever. The self-determination of peoples was only a pretext for it to suppress other nations. National Socialism and Fascism mendaciously usurp the idea of revolution and represent what they want as something young and full of promise in contrast to the democratic ideas of the West alleged to be obsolete and morbid. Their pseudo-religion, a falsification of the old Jewish-Christian Messianism into its blood-stained contrary, has brought anarchy over Europe and threatens to destroy the whole of European civilisation, if it may not continue as it was permitted to do for some time, because the victors of 1918 allowed themselves to be moved by hypocritical complaints about the injustice of the Versailles treaty. "Over how many cities will the swastika fly with all that it implies of crudest barbarism and lawless tyranny?" asks the author of this book. To-day this question is being answered in the only possible way. The whole answer will be the extinction of the barbarism in Europe. We are very grateful to the learned author for enriching our knowledge with many historical and ideological connections, and for rejecting the isolationist politics of certain Americans as not only imprudent, but immoral. For democracy means obligation.

J. LESSER.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.*

Although at the present time of anarchy and conflict the question of the future world order remains academic, its ultimate importance is obvious, and reasoned discussion by experts upon international law and relations must be welcomed as assisting in some measure at least in the eventual formulation of the post-war system. Thus it is well to know that during the war the New Commonwealth Institute is continuing its valuable investigation into problems of international order. Its latest monograph is a useful work, entitled *Making International Law Work*, by Professor G. W. Keeton and Dr. Georg Schwarzenberger. Based upon a course of London University Extension Lectures, the book is none

* (1) *Making International Law Work*. By G. W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. Peace Book Co. 6s. net. (2) *National Sovereignty and International Order*. By G. W. Keeton. Peace Book Co. 7s. 6d. net. (3) *Aspects of Modern International Law*. By Sir John Fischer Williams. Oxford Univ. Press. 5s. net.

the less instructive for having been written before the outbreak of war. In argument and outlook it includes much of the ground covered by Professor Keeton in an earlier monograph published last September, namely *National Sovereignty and International Order*.

In these books the main theme is the inherent incompatibility of both the accepted principles of international law and the existing League of Nations itself with the needs of the modern world. International law is unquestionably in its infancy, but it cannot develop adequately while accepting as its basis the doctrine of national sovereignty. Although in many respects it is conducive to, and regulates, international morality, it is ultimately subservient to the practice of power politics. Its principles acknowledge coercion, as for example, in the validity of treaties imposed under duress, and it accepts war as the normal method of inter-State litigation. This latter view, however, is really inconsistent with the Kellogg Pact which forbids any resort to war except in self-defence. Such agreements count for little when their observance is conditioned only by convenience and self-interest. The criticism of the League relates both to its constitution and to its management and follows not unfamiliar lines. The Covenant possesses the fatal error of accepting the sovereignty of the State and acknowledging its right of independent action. "The League conforms exactly to the general type of confederation, which has always proved unworkable in practice." Moreover, the practical application of the Covenant has been always rendered ineffective by the self-interest of its members, and attempts to broaden and strengthen international authority have been regularly thwarted. Particular stress is laid upon the British rejection of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol. For the failure of the Disarmament Conference in 1932 responsibility is primarily laid upon the United States and Great Britain. The League has rarely represented and enforced international opinion, being always a League of Governments and not of peoples, and in its consequently undemocratic character "lies one of the root causes of its failure."

The authors' precise allocation of blame for past failures will doubtless attract much, and weighty, criticism; but none the less their general deductions, as a guide to the future,

they are characteristics incidental to his age, complementary rather than antagonistic to other more pleasing attributes of youth—courage, initiative, idealism, and energy, for example. They are component parts of that vitality of adolescence which, under wise guidance and firm control, is capable of astonishing achievement, but which, directed solely by the inexperience of youth, is as like to rush to disaster as climb to success. At all times the adolescent needs protection; at work from his employer, at leisure from himself. Particularly if the environment in which he has to grow up is either positively bad or negatively barren. This fact was forcefully illustrated in this country many years ago. Industrialisation left Britain defaced with a rash of drab, overcrowded cities and towns, devoid of amenities for the workers, and in great part degenerated into festering slums. The youthful inhabitants of these degrading areas, having no playground save the foetid street and no playthings save what penniless ingenuity could devise, reverted to the baser instincts of primitive man, and roamed their habitat like hunters lusting for their prey. The boys banded into hooligan gangs which became a menace to society; the girls sold their sole possession of value to whoever would buy, spreading disease far and wide.

Unfortunately the vast majority of the respectable public thought only in terms of deterrence and punishment for these youthful delinquents. Only a few enlightened men and women perceived that these boys and girls were not innately vicious or anti-social, but were the victims of circumstances which stunted and frustrated every nobler instinct; and that the remedy lay, not in repressing their natural energy, but in redirecting it into useful and purposeful channels. Out of the vision of these men and women there came into being the voluntary youth organisations, consecrated to the welfare of the adolescent and the young adult in his leisure hours. As early as 1844 George Williams founded the Y.M.C.A.; eleven years later came the twin organisations which were in 1887 to fuse into the Y.W.C.A. In the 1870's and 1880's pioneers like Alexander Devine of Manchester and Walter Southern of Liverpool began running boys' clubs, which were soon followed by clubs for girls. In 1883 W. A. Smith of Glasgow founded the Boys' Brigade; within fourteen years a Girls' Brigade was in being. In 1907 Baden-Powell assembled on

Brownsea Island in Poole Harbour the historic camp from which sprang the Boy Scouts, a youth movement which appealed so irresistibly to girls also as to compel the formation of the Girl Guides.

Throughout all these years the general public, in so far as it knew anything of these youth organisations, was quite content to leave to them the work of adolescent welfare, its attitude being one of almost complete apathy. The war of 1914-18, for the organisations themselves a supreme test, brought the value of their work into prominence, partly by revealing the profoundly beneficent and stabilising influence it exerted, and partly by showing how swiftly and terribly youth could regress when that influence was withdrawn or diminished. The Boy Scouts, for instance, whose services Baden-Powell with supreme confidence offered to the Government on the outbreak of war, throughout its duration continued to amaze those outside the movement by their efficiency, self-control and initiative. Yet those Scouts were not super-boys; they were just ordinary youngsters who had been trained to regard service as an ideal, and whose abilities and energy had been harnessed to creative ends.

But the war, while it confirmed the faith, and largely the methods, of those who had built up the voluntary organisations, also revealed that voluntary effort alone was quite inadequate to cope with the problem of adolescent welfare. The resources of the voluntary organisations were too limited to deal with more than a small fraction of the adolescent population; and they were without power either to compel juveniles to accept the services offered, or directly to affect hours and conditions of labour. Moreover, in time of war, when more than ever their services were necessary, their work was restricted by loss of leaders, commandeering of premises and diminution of financial support. Between 1914 and 1918, in spite of all their efforts, youth swiftly regressed to a state of appalling indiscipline and barbarism.

The natural tendency of youth in war-time is to react to its atmosphere of strain, tension, moments of extreme excitement and long periods of dull boredom, by greatly increased instability, restlessness and irresponsibility. The tendency of adults, manifest at all times, but particularly when intense and concentrated effort is demanded, is to forget that the adolescent is still only a child in physique and

are decorated with a design built up from circles, some concentric, and others cutting into each other. The shield-rack was constructed to carry sixty-four shields, and this number was presumably buried with the ship; but on excavation only fifteen were found. They are of fir, with a stout rib behind and a leathern "tyre" round the edge. The burial chamber, a tent-like superstructure, built over the stern of the vessel after it was placed in position, is of heavy oak planks, devoid of ornamentation, and stout enough to support the pressure of the mound.

The Oseberg ship, which had been interred upon marshy ground, and over which an enormous stone cairn had been piled prior to the throwing up of the mound, suffered considerable damage due to crushing, the bottom being smashed into several thousand fragments; however, all these, carefully numbered, were removed, and rebuilt into the vessel. Further damage had been done by the grave robbers, who had, in forcing an entrance, cut away the decorated stern of the ship; and in stealing articles of gold and silver, mercilessly destroyed those of wood and other materials. This ship was the burial-place of a queen and her handmaid. Two skeletons, one of a woman aged between 25 and 30, the other a woman of some 60 to 70 years—the younger being the queen—lay within the burial chamber upon beds provided with quilts, blankets and pillows. The interior of the chamber was decorated with tapestry, and in a chest were found lamps, scissors and cotton. The weaving of tapestries was either the queen's hobby or the correct mode for ladies of quality, for in the chamber there were two looms. Apples, it would seem, were a great delicacy, for some were discovered in a wooden pail, and in a good state of preservation. On another part of the ship was discovered a four-wheeled cart constructed from oak, beech and ash timbers, and richly carved—obviously no common vehicle for every-day fetching and carrying, but one specially constructed for some religious rite, possibly that of conveying *Nerthus*, the goddess of fecundity (personified perhaps in this young queen), around the countryside.

The identity of these chieftains buried in their boats has not been altogether satisfactorily established. Both the Gokstad and the Oseberg grave mounds unquestionably cover the remains of members of the royal house of Ynglinger of Vestfold: some claim that the Gokstad ship contained the

mortal remains of King Olav Gierstadalv, since history records that he died from "foot-pains" and examination of the skeleton found in the mound reveals traces of very severe arthritis. In the Oseberg mound, it is contended, lay the body of Queen Aase, grandmother of Harald the Fairheaded, since the name Oseberg is derived from Aase. However, be that as it may, it is clear that these Vikings were highly cultured folk, who gathered about them the finest craftsmen of the age, who gave the skilled wood-carver a position of eminence in the land, and did not neglect the artistic weaver. Sings the *Scald*:

King Magnus the Good was on board his fleet. . . . They saw one day a ship, sailing eastward off the land. It was ornamented all over with gold above the water, and fine dragon-heads were on it, but the sail was of two-fold pell most splendidly woven. . . . The ship was painted with red, purple and gold. All the weather-vanes looked as if they were of gold, as well as the beaks of the dragon-heads; inside these were valiant men dressed in costly garments of pell. King Magnus instantly sent a ship from the port to meet them. . . . they turned towards the shore and lowered the sail. They rowed towards the King's fleet, and came up with that fine beautiful ship to the King. It was found then to be the ship of Harald Sigurdsson, the King's uncle.

Such was the magnificent coastwise scene of Northern Europe 1,000 to 1,500 years ago, when this island, abandoned by declining Rome, was yet an annex of the Scandinavian lands, the language of which took root upon our soil. The Vikings, unconquered by Rome, had themselves kept the Germanic barbarians in check; and such Nordic blood as remains in Germany to-day is discovered only in the extreme north, near the Baltic—the rest harks back to Huns and other wild men who flooded westward out of Asia in an earlier age. England, by the grace of God, is free of the Teutonic taint that recruits children into a secret police system and encourages young men to commit arson on the House of God.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

are sound. The need for a democratic federal union, able to regulate and if necessary to enforce, fair dealings between its members is paramount. The authors accept the general principles enunciated by Mr. Clarence Streit in *Union Now*, and they urge that a practical beginning can be made by making permanent and consolidating the existing "fact of Anglo-French Union."

It is appropriate here to welcome a recent essay written before the outbreak of war on *Aspects of Modern International Law* by Sir John Fischer Williams, who discusses critically a number of legal principles, including those of State sovereignty and recognition, the observance of agreements and the sanctions of international law. He points out that a State is not under any duty to maintain by force the rules of international law, and should not do so even though a victim since it cannot be judge in its own cause. Legal rights can only be determined and enforced as law by an impartial authority; but Sir John treats the creation of such a tribunal as a distant, "may be unattainable" ideal.

THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.*

The Emperor Charles V is one of the key figures in the history of modern Europe. The chance accumulation of so many lands under his control inevitably made him important in his own time; but the nature of his ideas and the hold which they took on his successors gave him a significance which long outlasted his death, and which has perhaps not yet disappeared. Yet it may be said with tolerable certainty that had Charles V been born in any other sphere of life he would have made small mark. Without political insight, without administrative genius, without remarkable intellectual gifts, his greatness lay only in his will-power and his sense of duty. The mortality in his father's and mother's dynasties alone thrust greatness upon him—that and nothing else. Yet, once the position was his, he was able to fill it greatly. Few rulers have left such immense material for the research of later generations, and indeed the huge scope of the subject has frightened off all but the most learned and patient historians. Professor Brandi's life of the Emperor is a monument to the thoroughness, the

* Karl Brandi. *The Emperor Charles V*. Cape. 21s.

grasp, and the profundity of German scholarship at its best; the book is indeed the work of a life-time and no historian can read it without feeling admiration for an effort at once so concentrated and so prolonged.

A life of Charles V must essentially be a history of Europe, but Professor Brandi makes of the Emperor himself the keystone of the whole political structure, as indeed he was. The period of his reign was dominated by his personality to an astonishing degree, and the political world of Europe revolved about him. Yet in spite of this, he did not in spirit belong altogether to his period. Born only to be Duke of Burgundy, he belonged by education and temperament to that fantastic late feudalism of the Burgundian world, nor did he ever throw off the chivalrous and curiously anachronistic ideas of his youth. His beliefs were straightforward, his reactions uncomplicated, his view of life, of himself, and of his dynasty, was cast in bold and simple lines. He never ceased to believe, for instance, that political tensions and economic unrest between growing national powers could be laid to rest by dynastic marriage. In all seriousness he challenged the King of France to single combat. Faced, as a young man and newly elected Emperor, by the recalcitrant monk, Martin Luther, he took up the challenge which the other threw down, grasping, as Professor Brandi indicates, the immense significance of the moment. But he never grasped, and never could grasp, the actual meaning of Luther's words. He was the old world facing the new, and the new spoke in a language that was beyond him. Yet in spite of this rock-like conservatism, Charles obeyed his keen sense of duty in trying manfully to find solutions for the problems which he did not understand. Professor Brandi has worked over the documents until they yield each ultimate grain of information, and it is clear from his reconstruction of Charles' religious policy that he strove honourably to meet and satisfy the Reformers, while his final appeal to arms was the fruit of long and painful cogitation only.

The strange contradiction between the Emperor and his epoch makes his life tragic reading. Champion of the Catholic Church, he was for ever at odds with Popes who were in the worst sense of the word political potentates. Advocate of a Crusade, he found his brother-in-law, the King of France, blandly offering friendship to the Turks. Time and again

mentality. All these tendencies ; repress the nervous energy of the adolescent during long hours of heavy or repetitive labour, remove or weaken the controls which society places on his use of leisure in normal times, and weaken or withdraw those influences which make for social improvement, and you get the state of affairs which actually came to pass during the latter part of the war of 1914-18.

As early as 1915 official inquiries were already being made into both the exploitation of juvenile labour and juvenile delinquency. In 1917 a Departmental Committee on Juvenile Education (the Lewis Committee) was set up. Its final report, issued in 1917, contains gruesome reading. It found that the withdrawal of influences making for social improvement had been followed by a notable deterioration of behaviour and morality among adolescent boys and girls. Hooliganism, drinking, gambling, promiscuity and amateur prostitution had increased greatly, and there had been a sharp upward trend in juvenile delinquency of all sorts. No less serious in the outcome was the very general contempt for all traditional and accepted standards of behaviour, morality and ethics which spread like a plague among even the more outwardly law-abiding members of the adolescent population. The pitifully hectic search for a code of values pursued by so many young people during the years immediately following the war was but one of the results of this moral anarchy.

No full and exact statement of the causes contributory to this war-time unsettlement and turbulence among juveniles is possible ; but the main ones are obvious. Throughout the war adolescent and even child labour was in eager demand. Though the Board of Education strove to prevent it, large numbers of children under 12 years of age were excused attendance from school for wage-earning work. The strongest pressure was exercised to secure the release of boys of 12 and 13 ; in 1916 alone, it is said, 90,000 boys under 14 left school for work. Such early entry into industry, in the exacting conditions then prevalent, had the most deleterious effects. Sir George Newman, Chief Medical Officer to the Board of Education, affirmed in one of his reports that the employment of children in munition works had ruined many boys and girls physically, mentally and morally. Others thought the same. The School Medical Officer for Hampshire held that the long hours, excessive strain, and lack of supervision of young

workers " doubtless produce ill effects which may handicap them for life."

For their long hours and heavy labour juveniles were offered high wages. Employers competed with each other for their services, with the result that boys and girls flitted from job to job in search of ever better money. This industrial nomadism greatly heightened instability and irresponsibility ; the concentration of young workers in large numbers with little or no supervision either at work or in leisure led to aimlessness, dissolution and vice, which the flashy commercialised entertainment offered everywhere did little to discourage ; and the knowledge of their cash value, and the feeling of economic independence it brought bred in boys and girls an arrogance and sense of self-importance which manifested itself in indiscipline at home, at work, and during leisure.

The deductions to be drawn from this evil regression of youth were clear enough. The Lewis Committee drew them, Parliament responded, and the Fisher Education Act of 1918 was the result. For a moment it seemed as though a new era had dawned for the adolescent. But the cold axe of national economy fell ere the measure was implemented, and with singular disregard for the future of the nation lopped its main provision, a system of day continuation schools, from the tree of education. Thus an unparalleled opportunity was lost ; and it cannot be said that during the twenty-one years of uneasy peace between 1918 and 1939 it was recovered. The old story of piecemeal and patchwork was repeated in Parliament ; here a bit of educational, there of industrial legislation. The problem of leisure was again left largely to the youth organisations, which steadily strengthened their individual positions, but moved only very tentatively towards co-operation with the statutory authorities, or even with each other. Right up to the outbreak of war one watched in vain for any sign of a truly unified effort, for the emergence of a national policy for youth. Indeed, during the first month of war it seemed that one might expect the story of 1914-18 all over again, with the additional complication of the wreckage of the State education system by the evacuation scheme. The voluntary organisations were devastated by the calling-up of leaders, a ruthless commandeering of premises, and a sudden diminution of financial support ; the exploitation of juvenile

political exigencies blurred his clear-cut beliefs in right and wrong. Yet, drastic as were the limitations of his mind, he was at heart an idealist. It is true that he believed in the inalienable rights of the Habsburg dynasty; that he divided lands and peoples as though they were his personal chattels; that he was an authoritarian in the narrowest sense. But he believed also that the members of his dynasty were morally and mentally fitted for the task which God had entrusted to them, he was acutely conscious of his responsibility towards his people, and he was sincerely devout. As a statesman at a critical period in the history of Europe he may have failed, but for the integrity of his character and the sincerity of his beliefs he stood out head and shoulders above any other ruler of his time.

C. V. WEDGWOOD.

THE REVOLT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF MAN.

*Man In Revolt, A Christian Anthropology** is the title chosen by Dr. Brunner for the English translation of his *Der Mensch im Widerspruch: Die Christliche Lehre vom wahren und vom wirklichen Menschen*, which was published in 1937. Miss Wyon is to be congratulated on the care and clarity of her unabridged translation. As the author is avowedly addressing not only theological experts, it is regrettable that the "briefer compass" of his resolutions was not possible, and that the vista of the theologian was not confined by the missionary's task.

The message of the Bible, therefore, is this: God, not man, is the centre; this truth must be expressed not only in theory but in practice.

On this simple and profound statement (the truth of which is being enforced by tragic events to-day) he rears his theological structure. From the standpoint of a Christian anthropology, he amplifies, modifies and dissents in important particulars from the teaching of Karl Barth, against whom he stresses man's responsibility and the Biblical doctrine of a general or "natural" revelation of God.

* R.T.S. Lutterworth Press. 15s.

The fundamental idea of my book is this: that even the unbeliever is still related to God, and, therefore, that he is responsible, and that this responsibility is not put out of action even by the fullest emphasis upon the generous grace of God, but, on the contrary, that God requires it. . . . Man remains in the Hands and in the workshop of God, even when he is perverted. . . .

True knowledge of this responsibility is disclosed by the Divine Revelation in history. "Jesus Christ grasped by faith" reveals to men their origin in the Divine Word, in contradiction to the basic assumptions of current anthropologies whether Marxist, Idealist or Humanist. Genuine faith is an event in which "I myself" am vanquished by the power of the truth of the Word of God.

The moment at which I feel that I have been discovered, when I say: 'Yes, that is what I really am,' and the moment at which I believe is one and the same. . . . In the light of the Divine origin of man the heart is the receptive and reacting centre of the Word of God. Therefore, 'with the heart one believes.' . . . It is not the reason as such which is in opposition to faith, but only the self-sufficient reason; and this means, the reason which sets itself up in the place of God, the reason which wills to understand God in itself instead of itself in God, the arrogant self-willed reason.

The maximum of men's dependence on God is the maximum of their freedom. Sin is the illusion that it is possible to be free from God; and "the most sinful thing in sin is the liberalistic, humanistic illusion of freedom." Only by eschewing their false independence can men regain their lost dignity as spiritual persons.

There is no other human dignity than this, that we are called to be the children of God. . . . The goal to which God calls the individual, and to which one comes only as an 'individual,' as one who is responsible for himself, as one who answers for himself, is the Kingdom of God. Thus the obverse of Divinely given responsibility is the most universal and absolute community which we can imagine. Responsible existence is communal existence; existence connected with community; love, in the New Testament meaning of love.

Many Christians to-day feel impotent in a veritable body of this death; and in stressing the inescapable responsibility of individuals, Dr. Brunner lays himself open to misconception by appearing to underestimate their organic connection with

labour began once more; and adolescence immediately reacted by a wave of juvenile delinquency and indiscipline.

Happily, there were soon signs of a determination to tackle the problem with vigour. The Government decided that the Board of Education should undertake a direct responsibility for youth welfare. In October a National Youth Committee was set up to advise the President of the Board, and a special youth welfare branch organised in his department. In November local authorities for higher education were urged by the Board's circular 1486 to form local Youth Committees to survey needs, plan policy, stimulate effort and grant aid; and by March 1st, the appointed day, 111 out of 145 authorities had already taken action, many having allocated in their estimates considerable sums for youth welfare. Early in December the King made an appeal for youth leadership to which several hundreds of men and women responded; and civic authorities have in many areas issued similar appeals, often with gratifying results. The National Council of Social Service have appointed *liaison* officers experienced in welfare work to each civil defence region; the Girls' Group of the Standing Conference of National Juvenile Organisations has launched a campaign for joint action; and local authorities, youth organisations and religious denominations have all been opening new clubs and centres and extending facilities.

All this is excellent, but it hardly yet goes to the root of the problem. As the National Youth Committee have recognised, the questions of work, leisure and education cannot be treated separately. To offer opportunities for the constructive use of leisure to a youth that is overworked and under-educated is a policy doomed to ultimate failure. I urge therefore that the Education Act of 1918 be implemented to make part-time day education compulsory, at least in heavily populated areas, for all working juveniles up to 18. To render this practicable, let local authorities, youth organisations, religious denominations and business firms pool available premises, equipment, personnel and funds. Recruit all unemployed teachers, and place all full-time workers in recognised youth organisations on the reserved list, recalling those already with the Services.

Is this great effort too much to ask? We say we are fighting to save the future for youth; to what purpose the struggle if youth be not fit to face that future?

H. C. DENT.

ENGLISH PERSONALITIES IN CZECH HISTORY.*

THE historical relationship between England and Czecho-Slovakia is but little known. In the course of the centuries three different personalities in political life of English descent make their appearance—the religious reformer John Wycliffe (1310-84), Elizabeth Stuart (1596-1662), the daughter of James I, and the greatest philosopher of modern times, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). If one compares the historical events in which the first two play directly or indirectly a *rôle* with the significant events of our own times, one realises the correctness of the doctrines of two great philosophers, first, that “nations do not learn from history,” and, second, that “history repeats itself”—that is, that in certain circumstances, certain historical events do recur, even though often in a different form. All policies founded on feelings of hatred and revenge, inordinate ambition and lust for power, find before the judgment seat of history an often tardy but all the more emphatic condemnation.

Wycliffe's theology deeply influenced the great Czech leader, Huss (1373-1415), in his efforts for ecclesiastical reform a century before Luther. Similarly Masaryk, before his political activity as founder of the Czech State, was definitely influenced by English philosophy in his philosophical work. As is well known, the attempts to remedy the defects of the Church of the Middle Ages led in the fifteenth century to the holding of several Church Councils which sometimes sat for decades without result. Best known is that at Constance (1414-17), which began by condemning the doctrines of Wycliffe and Huss as heretical. Huss himself was burnt as a heretic—a breaking of the promise of safe conduct from the Emperor and the Pope. In that crime his sovereign, the Emperor Sigismund, at the same time King of Bohemia, bears the chief guilt. As a result, the exasperated followers of Huss started a bloodthirsty religious war and acted abominably in Southern and Central Germany. After alternating military successes, the Emperor Sigismund at last agreed in 1433 to religious and political concessions. The doctrines of Huss and Wycliffe outlasted the Reformation period and all the centuries of the religious and political

* Written after Munich in October 1938.

oppression of the Czech people, and still inspire the community of the Bohemian Brethren.

Two centuries later it is Elizabeth Stuart, the beautiful and ambitious wife of the Elector Frederick of the Palatinate, who, without the consent of her more far-seeing father James I, persuaded her weak husband, the natural leader of the German Calvinists, to accept the royal crown which had been offered him by the rebellious Protestant guild of Bohemia and to exclude the legitimate heir to the throne, the Roman Catholic Emperor Ferdinand II. Bohemia, like the very much reduced Hungary, had already been for nearly ninety years connected with Austria, and by that means also with the German Reich; only thus was protection gained against the Turks, who had conquered a great part of Hungary. For a short time, from March 1619 to November 1620, an English princess was Queen of Bohemia. The allied Catholic armies of Bavaria and Austria conquered the Protestant Bohemia at the battle of the White Mountain, and the Emperor took a terrible vengeance. Bohemian independence was destroyed, the Czech language and the Protestant religion were almost completely extirpated for centuries, the country was terribly robbed, the landed property of the rebels was given to the Austrian nobles, a measure annulled only after 1918. Innumerable people were executed. Ferdinand II and the victorious party were not satisfied with that, but wanted to exterminate Protestantism in Germany and elsewhere on the Continent, or at least to weaken it decisively. As a consequence of the resistance of the German Protestants, from the Bohemian-Palatinate war developed the Thirty Years War, which we may call the first European war. The population of Germany and of the rest of Central Europe decreased by a third. The country became poor in contrast to Western Europe and was weakened for centuries. James I and Charles I also interfered in the interests of their daughter and sister, and also for the cause of Protestantism from time to time during the war. The Electress Elizabeth, through her daughter Sophia, became the ancestress of the Hanoverian dynasty; and her sons Rupert and Maurice became famous cavalry leaders and fought for their uncle Charles I. The breach of faith of the Emperor Sigismund towards Huss, and his condemnation of the doctrines of Wycliffe spread over Central and South Germany the misery of the Hussite war.

The extravagance of Ferdinand II and his determination to destroy Protestantism brought about the disaster of the Thirty Years War, the loss of Alsace to France, and the temporary loss to Sweden of important ports on the North Sea and Baltic coasts.

While John Wycliffe and Elizabeth Stuart are of greater importance to internal Czech history, the influence of Thomas Hobbes on statecraft was a general problem for Central and Western Europe. We are thinking of his doctrine of *Leviathan*, the centralised unified State in which the citizens are only powerless atoms, and which recognises them only in so far as they fit into its machinery. That is the external form of the State; the actual substance and the direction change in the course of centuries. Sometimes freedom of conscience and the creed of the citizen is not recognised, sometimes his economic activities are strictly regulated (the mercantile era which in England was derided by Mandeville (1670-1733) in *The Fable of the Bees*); later on, the exclusion of the citizen from the life of the State is made the chief object, as in Germany; finally, at the present time, a certain State language, a certain cultural activity or racial origin of the citizen is regarded as fundamental. Usually one considers as the practical consequences of Hobbes' doctrine only the periods of the absolute government of the eighteenth-century princes and the State ruled by police at the time of the Holy Alliance in the first half of the nineteenth century. Yet the belief in a unified centralised machinery exists as well to-day in the full tide of liberalism and democracy; it faces us here in the opposition of the governing democratic majority to the others, the minority of different origin. The sentence "*La République Française est une et indivisible*" is the classical definition of the centralised unified State on a democratic basis. To such a conception a limited internal independence, as in the United Kingdom—even this name is a symbol—is impossible, above all in Northern Ireland and Scotland, the Channel Islands and to some extent also in Wales. Even France had to face the problem of centralisation as regards Alsace and Brittany and, at an earlier date, in Provence and Corsica.

In 1919 and 1920 it was thought possible, by the insertion into the constitution of the newly-founded democratic States of an obligatory protection of minorities, for these minorities to live tolerably within a centralised unified State. That was

the temporal communities in which they are obliged to live. That he does not, is amply revealed by his previous book, *The Divine Imperative*,* in which Christian obligations to the economic ordering and to the state are defined with deep understanding and a realisation of modern conditions that has hitherto been lacking in Protestant, theological ethic. In the present work he seeks to reassure men of their divine origin and calling. Without such assurance they can only partially realise or misconceive their responsibility. The range and depth of his scholarship and argument must again impress those who do not accept certain of his assertions or conclusions.

D. P. H.

THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.†

We know of no outstanding English work on the reign of George I. It has been reserved for Professor W. Michael to supply this gap by writing the authoritative biography of Walpole. He reinforces his lifelong labours by a careful and elaborate survey of what led up to the Quadruple Alliance and all that it meant in the peace policy of the great Norfolkshire squire. Nor is this volume in the least confined to a study of diplomatic. The author is much concerned to set before us the forces that made the famous Alliance possible, and thereby he has conferred upon his readers an incalculable boon. No doubt the main figures on the stage of foreign affairs are Alberoni and Bernstorff, Bonet and Craggs, Dubois and George I, Peter the Great and Philip V, Stanhope and Walpole himself. This is as it should be. But in order to understand the motives of these diplomats we are invited to consider such matters as the moralists and Deism, the victory of Whiggism in Church policy, and the internal difficulties standing in the way of the victory of Walpole's great policy of peace. The struggles of the Jacobites to return to England receive a degree of attention for which we had not been prepared. Most of us are apt to assume that the Fifteen and the Forty-Five stood small chance of success, and that therefore Jacobitism as a force was negligible in the days of

* A translation (1937) of *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* (1932).
† *The Quadruple Alliance*. By W. Michael. Macmillan. 21s.

George I and George II. Professor Michael demonstrates with unequivocal strength the circumstance that both Pretenders were men who attracted European attention, and that by the force of this attraction they counted among the powers that Walpole must take into account. Such a plan seems remote from the formation of the Quadruple Alliance, but no reader of this valuable volume will doubt that its author has pursued the right course he has adopted for a clear unfolding of the schemes that French and English statesmen had in view. The more we read this book, the more we are impressed by the statesmanship of Professor Michael. He writes as one who has lived and experienced the changing condition of affairs and the seemingly disconnected affairs that at bottom link them together. It is not a little curious that in all attempts to tamper with English settlements since the Middle Ages we have been remarkably free from foreign efforts to alter them. What might not Richelieu have accomplished in the Great Civil War had he not died? What might not Louis XIV have accomplished had he but realised the true course of Irish affairs? What might not he have also accomplished on behalf of the Jacobites had he not died? Professor Michael has written a book certain to command attention.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE BACKGROUND OF ART.*

It is very rare to find in such a short study material not only for discussion but an introduction to every aspect of the much-neglected subject, the research in art. Here not only the present position of art studies in Great Britain is emphasised but also the current trends of opinion abroad. Interspersed with methodical research are bright sallies, as when Professor Rice deals with the "Herr Doktors" who know a great deal about an object but do not understand art, or when he denounces the "hideousness" of the furniture in Tutankh-Amen's tomb. He gives a comprehensive picture of the critical, anthropological, æsthetic and historical—that is to say the sociological—approach to art. The theories of Marr, Strzygowski and many others are fully explained. It is

* *The Background of Art*. By D. Talbot Rice. Discussion books 64. Nelson. 2s. 6d.

obvious that when such highly controversial subjects as "Race," "Diffusion," "Spontaneous explosion in a state of movement" are discussed, not everybody will follow Professor Rice's lead. But even then, one will have to acknowledge the breadth and fairness of his judgment.

One of a few minor points which may be criticised is the problem of *élites* necessary for the appreciation of art. It is conceivable that a more democratic widening of education would strengthen and broaden them. Another point refers to the exposition of the "bourgeois" side of Russian contemporary art. It is worth mentioning that the really living art of Russia to-day is simpler, more related to peasant art, and finds its expression in posters of the highest quality. Greek goddesses draped are a feature which it seems to me should not be attributed to influences of climate (else they would be also applied to the male figure), but must be explained by the general position of women and the tabus and restrictions particular to them. Referring to details I should not omit the very interesting explanation concerning the figure of St. George which is traced back to Mazdaean art. On the subject of absolute æsthetic value it may be added that one of the criteria may be that such works appeal in different ways to various people and epochs. So Burckhardt, although he lived in an atmosphere of classical tendencies, was too much of an artist himself not to see the dynamic qualities of baroque, and we owe to him some of the best explanations of the art of this period.

For the English reader the part of the most practical importance is the one which deals with the development of art studies in this country. It is amazing to hear that only in the Courtauld Institute of London can art be studied as an independent subject. Professor Rice, the holder of the Chair of History of Art in the University of Edinburgh, suggests a broadening of the basis for art studies in a general course, including anthropology, psychology and other branches of closely linked subjects. This would be part of a truly humanistic education and an excellent introduction for the specialist. On this point the most emphatic approval should meet Professor Rice's suggestions, coupled with the hope that in times of peace the study of art in this country will come into its own.

HELEN ROSENAU.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

There could hardly be a more interesting book to read at the present moment than Mr. Hampden Jackson's account of Finland.* Deeply as the world sympathises with Finland under the present barbarous and unprovoked attack, the difference between her and the Baltic States, her near neighbours, is insufficiently appreciated. The Finns come of a very ancient race, related to the Magyars. Little is known of their early history, but they have their own tradition; and old stories and legend have been written in *Kalevala*, "one of the great folk-poems of the world." Though dominated through the centuries first by Sweden, who is responsible for her high educational ideals, and then by Russia, Finland has always struggled for her own independence. She got it twenty years ago when at last freed from Russia at the end of the World War she set up her own Republic. The Finns are a gifted people, hard-working, not to say plodding, and intelligent. The growth and flowering of a high culture are described in this book and tested by comparison with Western countries. The standard of living, the rates of wages, the percentage of large fortunes, the housing conditions have been carefully gone into by the author and compared with those of other countries by means of statistics compiled by the I.L.O. or appearing in official publications. Although there are a few rich men there are no slums in Finland.

The constitution is the outcome of a long history of steady democratic ideals, which persisted through violent political movements and struggles for power of the aristocratic Swedes or the communists and through the civil war, so that Finland has worked out for herself the middle way between Fascism and Communism. This is told in this book in a clear way which leads up to the present situation and forms an unforgettable picture of the whole. The Finns are Lutherans, a religion which fostered independence and education and made Christianity a living creed. The educational standard in Finland is very high.

Whereas in England there are hardly a dozen decent book-shops outside the University towns, in Finland there is a book-shop in every large village, even within the Arctic Circle. . . . The people of Finland, including the 3,000 Lapps of the farthest north, can read and write almost without exception.

The Finns are pre-eminent in architecture and, of course, in music.

The chapter on Recovery and Reorientation after the slump of 1930-2 is full of good news of the power of the Finns to advance; and the chapter on the Condition of the People at the present time is fascinating. In it there is a description of three typical farms with the manner of life there in peasant style, the agricultural operations and the forest work; and alongside it the various factories for woodwork and pulp, the main exporting industries. All this emphasises the desperate pity that such effort should be interfered with by the war-madness of 1939.

* *Finland*. Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.

a mistake, as the history of Czecho-Slovakia proves. Owing to the close cultural ties which for centuries bound Continental nations to France, it is only too explicable that the Czecho-Slovak Republic as a centralised unified State was founded on the French model, thus carrying out the ideas of Hobbes from a democratic point of view. But in a State with such a mixed population the rights of minorities, even under an honest administration, were necessarily lost sight of. Thomas Masaryk, more far-sighted than most of the other Czech politicians, planned therefore at the beginning to erect the new State as a federation on the Swiss model. But the thought of a centralised unified State for the Czechs after the oppression of centuries was naturally only too alluring.

It would go beyond the compass of this article if we attempted to show that much of the continental internal and external political complications and wars, in the last 150 years alone, has been caused by the belief in the omnipotence of the centralised State. Napoleon realised that very well in the case of Switzerland, which was from 1798 to 1803, as the Helvetian Republic, a centralised democratic unified State on the French model. He restored the old division of the Confederacy into cantons with the words "You are only meant for a federated State." In this one sentence is summarised for many young nations of Central and East Europe the problem of the future which, at the same time, goes back to a medieval model.

WALTHER OSTWALD.

ARCHÆOLOGY AND THE VIKINGS.

We find that a long stretch of coast is not sufficient . . . to make the population of a country a seafaring nation. When the Romans invaded Britain the Brits had no fleet to oppose them. We do not until a later period meet with the love of the sea which is so characteristically English—not before the gradual absorption by a blue-eyed and yellow-haired seafaring people who succeeded in planting themselves in the country.

THE above, which occurs in the preface of P. B. Du Chaillu's book, *The Viking Age*, published fifty years ago (in 1889), strikes one very forcibly upon reading it to-day, for at that time cultural anthropology had not yet revealed the very high probability of all cultural trends being descended from a common ancestor: archæology was not yet put upon a modern footing: history had not learned to discriminate between fact and legend, nor had it become keenly critical of its sources.

To take another pace of equal length into the past, we read in the *Public Ledger* (an ancient London commercial daily paper—still being published) for December 20th, 1838, the following:

Some few days since some curiosity was excited at Blackwall, and below, towards Gravesend, by the novel spectacle of a large heavy-laden ship proceeding down the river propelled by a steam apparatus. Her appearance was that of an ordinary vessel, with the exception of a few bars of iron on her sides . . . to which the propellers appeared to be attached. No paddle-boxes were visible, nor was the water thrown up as in the case of the paddle wheels—and the action seemed to be smooth and equable. This is the first attempt, as far as we know, to adapt the use of steam-power to propel a vessel of the ordinary construction. . . . The ship above alluded to is the *Maria*, going to India.

Thus, unostentatiously, commenced a new phase of maritime history; and since then the gradual evolution of the screw-propelled all-iron ship has brought about the standardisation and mass production not only of ships, but of men to work them, and of nations to own them. It is no longer funny to refer to "the Swiss navy," for Switzerland might conceivably possess a navy—built on the Clyde, and manned by the polyglot "Dutchmen, Dagos and Lascars" who man so many ships.

The late Miss Gertrude Jekyll's instructive book on *Old English Household Life*,* published in 1925, now forms the basis of a fresh volume, with the same title, prepared by Mr. Sydney R. Jones who has added, *inter alia*, many drawings and observations born of his long and intimate contact with the English countryside. Within 116 pages of text the reader will find a brief and attractive sketch of rural household life and domestic methods before the general imposition of a standardised and urban economy. Of particular interest are the descriptions and sketches of domestic utensils and implements, including for example the ancient "coeverfu" or curfew. It is pointed out that originally the word signified the fire-cover used to smother the domestic fire, but that in the thirteenth century it came to be associated with the evening tolling of the bell which announced the hour of "fires out." In addition to the numerous drawings there are some 140 photographic plates which admirably illustrate and fortify the text. Many readers, however, will regret the absence of a bibliography, for this little volume is but the introduction to a great historical subject.

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The latest volume of the Practical Library Handbooks series, entitled *A Handbook of Classification and Cataloguing for School and College Librarians*† by Miss M. S. Taylor, is written with a view to teaching the elements of those subjects and acting as a guide to school librarians. The majority of these librarians are primarily teachers and can give little time to training in librarianship, although some knowledge of classification and cataloguing is essential for the successful working of the smallest library. The first chapters of this volume deal with classification and show the necessity of using an approved scheme and discuss the three main methods suitable for school libraries, the Dewey, Bliss and Cheltenham classifications. School librarians should find the clear criticisms of these methods valuable in considering the most suitable scheme for individual requirements, but it is to be regretted that the Bliss and Cheltenham classifications are not fully outlined in this section. The most confusing branch of librarianship to amateurs is cataloguing, and in devoting more than half this volume to the subject the author emphasises both the need and importance of correct cataloguing. Simplified rules from the Anglo-American Joint Code are given for author and title entries; the different types of catalogues are described and compared, and examples of cataloguing entries illustrate the text throughout. The straightforward explanations of basic rules with examples should make the book an essential guide. The chapters on Subject and Form Catalogues are particularly valuable, for a correct understanding of them will lead to greater knowledge and use of the library.

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

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THE DEEPER CAUSES OF THE WAR, AND ITS ISSUES.*

EVERY event is the effect, not of one, but of many causes. Whether it be the fall of a raindrop or the making of a constitution, the flash of a thought in a human brain, a birth or a death or the outbreak of a war—whatever it may be, every event is the consequence of a vast number of earlier events, interacting, combining. We can see a few of the causes at work close at hand; we know that each one of those is the result of a congeries of other more distant causes; and each of them of others again—spreading out and back, farther and farther, till they extend to infinite numbers in illimitable time. It is the task of the thinker, studying some occurrence, to identify the proximate causes; to disentangle them; to trace back, so far as he can, the prior causes; to evaluate; and to draw the moral, and say, "if this is something to be repeated, then repeat those events that brought it about; if to be avoided, then avoid them."

This war—everyone sees that it is the consequence of a number of events in the political sphere and in the economic. It would be travelling too far to explore through centuries along the paths of history: the German-French rivalry; Louis Quatorze, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, German militarism answering Napoleon, Bismarck, 1870, Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1914: or the German-British rivalry; industrial expansion, colonial expansion, command of the sea, 1914: or the German-Slav rivalry; Austria against Russia, the struggle in the Balkans, and again 1914. Going back no farther than the defeat of Germany and her allies and the Treaty of Versailles, we discern the proximate causes of this war.

On the economic side—Reparations, the occupation of the Ruhr, German inflation and the ruin of the middle classes; the contraction in the imports and exports of the United States, followed by the world-wide depression of 1929; the failure of the World Economic Conference; the unemployment of thirty million workers in the industrial countries,

* Address to the British Institute of Philosophy, December 7th, 1939.

The trans-oceanic liners—floating towns—which mankind admires to-day are famous (when they are famous) for their marble swimming-pools, their cocktail parlours, or their pets' cages; but never for their bravery in the storm and their essential weddedness to the sea. No longer do vessels go out of Bristol, or the Port of London, into a vast wilderness of waters to make a long lone voyage during which their objective distant land draws near only through constant careful observation of the infinitely more distant stars. *Torrens*, a clipper-ship of 2,000 tons burthen, square-rigged on three masts, teak-planked, iron-framed, sheathed in yellow metal, with skysail poles and stunsail booms, who "ran her Eastings down where the strong fair winds of Heaven always blow, and touched sixteen knots by the log, running free before the gale, the rollers towering high above her stern"—on which Jo' Conrad was mate—was last of this noble race, and she outlived her years. Our present ships, ephemeral things in spite of bulk and might, are cut up for scrap iron at an age when such vessels as the *Torrens* were becoming mellowed to the sea and growing famous for their sailing powers.

This mechanised age, which has substituted screws and oil-engines for sail-cloth and cordage, has resulted in the naval strength of a nation being calculated in gross tonnage, which, divided by the number someone first thought of, is written down as the number of ships per national navy; but the seafaring spirit of a people cannot be portioned out by agreement: Drake with his inferior fleet beat the Armada; Nelson, outnumbered, defeated the combined fleets of France and Spain.

Prior to the war we were miserably aware that our Navy was in a deplorable state of decadence, while the German propaganda machine worked hard to persuade us that we were German by inheritance, and that Hitler would "protect" us as soon as we had rid ourselves of the non-Germanic elements that undermined and sapped us; but as a nation we take little interest in theories concerning our origins, and have only vague ideas about Ancient Britons, and Early Saxons, and the Norman Invasion; hence the Erfurt Bureau failed in its mission (for once). However, the facts of our ancestry have been revealed by the archæologist. At the beginning of the Christian Era Germania was a vast tract of undeveloped swamp land and forest, inhabited by cultureless, marauding, acorn-eating tribes; while Scandinavia was peopled by

highly civilised folk, whose *Scalds* recorded deeds of virtue and of daring, and who were more or less democratically governed by means of a parliamentary organisation called the *Thing*, an assembly of the people whereat the voice of experience in the person of the old men was respected. It was to these folk that the itinerant merchants of the Bronze Age came, bartering metal wares for amber: it was in the perilous region of Germania that they were apt to lose both their stock-in-trade and their lives.

Archæology has nothing to tell us concerning the inhabitants of the forest; we gather by inference only that they were both wild and thievish, since the bronze-trader buried his wares to keep them safe; hence we must of necessity depend entirely on the reports of Roman writers. But of the cultured men of the north archæology has much to say. Before turning over the artifacts, however, let us glance at written testimony which is illuminating. Says Tacitus (*circa* A.D. 57-117): "Hence, the States of the Sueones situated in the Ocean itself, are not only powerful on land, but also have mighty fleets. The shape of their ships is different, in that, having a prow at each end, they are always ready for running on to the beach." The *Sueones* have been identified as the inhabitants of Sweden. In the Sagas they are referred to as the Sviar of Svithjod, and all the unscrupulous might of Rome was no match for them; in fact, Norsemen were able to invade and settle in this island (the whole of which they called Bretland, only a specific part being distinguished as England) even while it was under Roman domination: such was the power of a people who possessed a great navy, and maintained it doggedly when it would seem that military frightfulness, as exemplified in the legions of the Cæsars, was destined to conquer the world.

We normally think of the Vikings as pirates and ruffians, whose ships, though seaworthy and capable of fairly long voyages, were anything but beautiful; an illusion for which we may be forgiven when we take into consideration the fact that our knowledge of the Norsemen came in the first place from the writings of monks, with nothing good to record of heathens who on coming ashore were as likely to turn a church into a barracks as not: however, the names of the ships which we get from the Sagas reveal a wealth of poetic feeling which could not have been inspired by utterly utilitarian

Germany suffering among the worst. On the political side—the reluctance of the Allies to disarm; the failure of the Disarmament Conference; the League of Nations, standing for the Rule of Law, but making no provision for amending the law, appearing merely as guardian of the *status quo*; the League condemning Italian aggression in Abyssinia, adopting Sanctions, but not pressing them home, and impotent thenceforth to control events. Lastly, deep discontent, social and national, in Germany; Communist and Nationalist movements; the rise of the Nazis, and Hitler.

I do no more than enumerate, and only the chief of the events, so well known, which in combination have given us the situation that we have. If we were a body of economists meeting here to-day, it would be our function to examine the economic causes, and to draw deductions. If we met as politicians, we should consider the political causes. Meeting as students of philosophy, our task is to search behind the economic and political causes, and to find the ideas by which they themselves were set in motion.

For economics and politics are not self-contained sciences, which can be studied in isolation. The nineteenth-century attempt to posit an economic world, governed by its own laws, with its own manners and customs, failed. It rested on the assumption of an "economic man," animated only by material motives. There are no such men, and therefore there can be no such world. We study now Welfare Economics, and not only Wealth Economics. But as soon as we bring in the factor of welfare we find ourselves in the sphere of ethics; and there is no boundary to separate ethics from philosophy in general and from religion. So also with politics. You cannot draw a line round Political Science and say, This is a matter of forms of government, limits of State action, and the like. At once you find yourself confronted by such questions as Social Justice, International Duty, the legitimacy of War; and again you are in the sphere of ethics, and therefore of philosophy and religion.

When individual men and women decide on a particular occasion that This is right, or That is right, or when they decide not to consider rightness at all, they are determining in some degree, large or small, their own futures, and the future of others, and the future of the world. Those moments

of decision are the seminal moments. Then the seeds are sown that sprout in actions, good or evil, in harvests of well-being or disaster. If the decisions are right, the result is welfare; if wrong, the result is suffering. I am one of those who hold that beliefs and actions are to be counted right or wrong just for that reason. They are right if they are calculated to promote welfare—using that term in its widest sense to include many elements, spiritual and intellectual as well as material, social as well as personal, prospective as well as immediate; and that beliefs and actions are wrong when they militate against welfare. I belong to the school who hold that the long-pursued attempt of philosophy to find an *a priori* criterion of right and wrong has failed; but that that does not mean that no criterion exists. There is a criterion, but it is *a posteriori*, based upon the experience of mankind. From that experience may be deduced various generalisations. We call them the virtues—truthfulness, courage, honesty, loyalty and the rest. Those qualities are virtues because the practice of them conduces to welfare, in that wide sense. And the vices are vices because the practice of them militates against welfare.

Those who believe that wars make in the long run for human well-being will believe that war is a good thing in itself, and that there is no reason to think that the decisions that have led to a particular war need have been wrong decisions. But I am speaking to an audience most, or all, of whom will hold that wars, at all events in the present age and between so-called civilised Powers, do not conduce to welfare; that the war in which we are now engaged is not a good thing to be welcomed, but an evil thing to be deplored; and therefore that the decisions which caused the war were wrong decisions. I start, at all events, from that standpoint.

Let us consider, then, what were the philosophic or religious ideas which were behind the economic and political factors that gave rise to the war. And I do not think it is prejudice that leads us to say that it is the ideas which were current in Germany that are the most relevant. For although the Allied Powers have great responsibility, on account of the imposition of impossible Reparations, and on account of the refusal to fulfil the promise of a general disarmament, neither of those issues was incapable of settlement without war; the Reparations question was in fact settled without war. There is no

and unbeautiful vessels. "Deer of the surf," "Reindeer of breezes," "Elk of the fjords" and "Hawk of the sea-gull's track" bespeak fine ships, capable of developing a respectable speed. Store ships (*vistabyrding*) and fishing ships (*lagnarskip*), besides vessels of war, went to the making of the Norsemen's fleets. The warships were of several types, the most common being the *Dreki* or Dragon, so called from its having both the high prow and stern carved and painted with respectively a dragon's head and tail: the most celebrated of all Viking fighting-ships, and one which lingered as a pattern or model down to the twelfth century A.D., was *Ormrinn Langi* (the long serpent).

The life of a man and his ship were so closely interrelated that when a great Viking passed to Valhalla it was inconceivable that he could enjoy bliss save afloat; hence the ship became the funerary urn of its owner, and fully equipped it was brought ashore and buried in a great mound, generally of blue clay and peat, so that in some cases the vessels are reasonably well preserved. Three classic examples have been excavated and may be seen in the museum at Oslo. The *Tune* ship was discovered in 1867; the *Gokstad* ship in 1880; and the *Oseberg* ship in 1904. And in the summer of 1939 the archæologists unearthed, in our own country, at Sutton Hoo, near Ipswich, an Anglo-Saxon ship of great importance, establishing, as it does beyond dispute, our grand seafaring ancestry. Of the ship itself so much reconstruction will be necessary that but little may be said concerning it save that a burial chamber had been built amidships, and the whole covered with about a thousand tons of turf cut from the adjacent heath. No skeleton has been discovered, hence it is concluded that this Viking ruler, perhaps High King of all England, lost his life at sea and was buried by proxy as it were. On the slender evidence of a silver spoon marked with the name "Paul," it is assumed that this mound is the burial place of Redwold whom Milton mentioned in his *History of Britain* (1670). A suit of armour, orientated with the head to the west, represents the body; and upon and around this there lay a rich treasure including a massive gold buckle, a pair of gold armlets, nine silver bowls, together with an equal number of silver-mounted drinking-horns, a silver dish some three feet in diameter, and a number of Merovingian coins which have been identified as current about the year A.D. 640. The whole

of this find has been generously presented to the nation, and will ultimately be exhibited in the British Museum. Meanwhile we may rest assured that the "blue eyes and yellow hair" of the sea rovers of the North, together with their ability, skill and daring—even "audacity"—when afloat, remain all ours; and no brutal "racial theory" can kill a living culture.

Northward, over the sea from the placid English Estuarine waters, we sail to visit the graves of our ancestors, and to examine the classic mounds unearthed forty years and more ago. The *Tune* ship, which must have been drawn from the sea and interred in the mound some one thousand years ago, was found to be orientated due north and south, and to have had a burial chamber, constructed of oaken planks, built over the aft part. In this chamber were discovered the charred bones of a man, and also of a horse—no doubt a faithful steed, almost as important an adjunct to contentment in Valhalla as was the ship itself. Since it had been handed down by oral tradition that this and similar mounds were the burial places of the great ones of old, and were filled with vast treasure, impious enterprise has resulted in the wanton entry of callous persons for the purpose of looting, and nothing of intrinsic value was left in the *Tune* ship—even *objets d'art* had been destroyed, and fragments of finely carved wood remain to tell the tale of what might have been taken away. The vessel itself was in bad condition, much of the planking being missing, consequently no attempt was made at reconstruction; but even as the hull appears to-day it is possible to distinguish traces of very beautiful craftsmanship and to observe how it was constructed, broad in the beam and low in the free-board, with a mast powerfully supported, so that it could have been propelled by oars in the calm, and sailed in the storm.

The *Gokstad* ship was in a very good state of preservation. The planks, which had warped a little, were steamed back to their original shape, and the entire vessel reconstructed with the addition of only very minor quantities of new material. The ship is clincher-built of oak, having sixteen rows of planking, ports for the oars being cut in the fourteenth. These ports are furnished with oaken shutters which were closed when the craft was under sail; and a stout oaken beam amidships supported the mast. The deck-planks, which are of pine,

doubt that Britain and France were most eager throughout for peace to be preserved; they showed it by their acquiescence in the reduction and then the stoppage of Reparation payments, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the *Anschluss* with Austria, and even in the recovery, by open threat of force, of the Sudetenland. We have the right to believe that posterity will judge aggressiveness and impatience on the German side to have been the decisive factor. The National-Socialist Government was the embodiment of that spirit, and its agent; and our main task, therefore, is to examine the philosophic and religious ideas which underlie Nazi policy. For there is a definite creed which underlies it. Just as history recognises that the French Revolution was the outcome of the philosophy of Voltaire, Rousseau and the *Encyclopédistes*, fermenting in the body of the *Ancien Régime*, so the present war must be recognised to be the outcome, primarily, of the Nazi philosophy fermenting in the body of post-Versailles Germany.

The harm done by the Nazi creed is due to the fact that, while giving right answers to some of the great questions in debate in our present civilisation, it gave wrong answers to a greater number, and those including some of the most vital. (Let me repeat that by right and wrong I mean conducive to welfare, of Germans and of others, or not conducive to welfare.)

The questions to which wrong answers were given may perhaps be summarised thus:

Has a State duties only to its own people, and none to other peoples?

Is any action legitimate which will promote the immediate interest of the particular State?

Ought war to be maintained as an institution on account of the virtues it evokes, and other benefits it brings?

Are the principles of Race and Soil a right basis for a nation's policy?

Should the control of a country's affairs be entrusted to an individual, and loyalty to him be identified with patriotism?

Does the citizen exist for the sake of the State or nation, and not the State or nation for the sake of the citizen?

Should the State direct all forms of education and information, in order to promote its own ideas, and suppress all other ideas; and this with little regard to truth or falsity?

Is the Christian ethic, in its broad outlines, to be rejected, ruthlessness praised as a virtue, justice and compassion condemned as weakness?

The questions to which most of us might say that right answers had been given are these:

Does the civilisation of the modern world deny social justice to a large proportion of the populations?

Ought the improvement of industrial conditions, and of environment in general, together with the ultimate disappearance of class distinctions based on wealth, to be a chief aim of social effort?

An address of this character allows no scope for examining these propositions one by one. But it will not be disputed in any quarter that the Nazi creed says Yes to all of them. Clearly the result has been good as regards the second section, infinitely harmful as regards the first. In the fact that wrong answers have been given to those questions we may discern the deeper cause of the present war.

Let us go one stage farther back and consider why the wrong answers were given. Not necessarily because of the sinfulness of human nature. Bad decisions may be due to bad character, but also to bad judgment. The so-called Wars of Religion were fought on both sides from the highest motives. The authors of the Inquisition were often men of saintly life. Everyone nowadays claims some sort of moral justification for his acts. The Nazi leaders seek to persuade others, and may have persuaded themselves, that their aims are right; and that their methods, even if questionable in themselves, are justified by the ends they serve. In support they quote a whole literature of history and philosophy.

When Plato said that the human race would never have rest from their evils "until philosophers were kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy," he assumed that philosophers would be men who not only were "lovers of Wisdom," but would woo her successfully. In this he was rash, for many fail to win her favour. A king who was a bad philosopher might make a far worse king than one who governed by rule of thumb. If you have read a work which has had a wide influence on present German thought, Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West*, you will have gone through a thousand pages packed with bad philosophy; and if you have read its predecessor, which may have had even greater influence—Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*—you will have traversed an equal stretch of distorted history.

Doctrines of Hegel and of Nietzsche have furnished other materials for the Nazi creed. Nietzsche, it is true, said many things in an opposite sense. For example: "To affirm that the State is the highest end of man and that there is no higher duty than to serve it, I regard this not a relapse into paganism but into stupidity"; "Have nothing to do with anyone involved in that brazen humbug of racialism"; "I wage war on anti-Semitism, which dissipates and poisons so much precious energy." But Nietzsche, for all his trenchant criticism of shams and cants and his fiery exhortations to abandon sloth and rise to heroic action, propounded a system of morals—or non-morals—irrational and perverse, which must bear no small responsibility for the evils of Nazism.

Bad philosophies take hold for lack of better. I have heard it said that "Hitler is a vacuum phenomenon." The vacuum exists because neither the philosophy predominant in the schools, nor, it must be said, the religion offered in the churches, satisfies the mental and spiritual needs of the modern world. The facts about us show quite clearly that they are not effective either to direct the minds of the leaders or to control the actions of the masses.

So far as philosophy is concerned, I am expressing a personal view, which will certainly be unacceptable to many of those present, when I submit that the fault lies in the influence allowed, for more than a century throughout Europe and America, to the teachings of the Idealist school. Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, and their many followers, have been allowed to lead human thought, and they have led it into a cul-de-sac. Conceptions such as "The Absolute," "The Categorical Imperative," "Ultimate Values," are a dead end. Critically examined they prove to be without real significance; they have no relation to the universe in which we find ourselves; but they have blocked the advance of thought. On an occasion such as this it is not possible to argue this proposition. And perhaps that is as well! I merely deposit that bomb and retire to a safe distance.

I may meet with a larger measure of agreement—although I do not expect a full measure—when I stress the importance of the lessened influence of religion. This is indeed undeniable; when we compare the present century with the nineteenth and the preceding centuries it is clear beyond question. And it is plain that this lessening of influence is mainly due, on the

one hand to the establishment by science of many facts that are inconsistent with the ancient and medieval theologies, and on the other hand to the tenacity with which the faiths, western or eastern, insist upon maintaining those theologies none the less. So long as there is this discrepancy between the orthodox presentations of religion and the kind of spiritual provender that instructed minds are willing now to accept, so long will that vacuum remain.

Into it have flowed all kinds of strange doctrines: "Blood and Soil," "National Destiny," "Christianity a slave-morality," "Action for action's sake." The only things worth living for, we are told, are struggle, conflict, victory. Mixed with this farrago are two other appeals; each of them very strong, their strength more than doubled by their combination—the appeal to the working classes of material interest and the appeal to every citizen of patriotism.

Formerly Socialism and Nationalism were seldom friends and never allies. The Socialist was usually an internationalist, and the patriot, with militarist tendencies, was usually an anti-Socialist. Now Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin have shown how to combine elements of real Socialism with a full-blooded Nationalism. As Mr. Walter Lippmann says, "The fascist appeal combines the emotions of patriotism with the grievances of the proletariat. Those who have been socialists become national socialists. The class war is diverted toward international war."

In a time when there is economic suffering, and in a country where there is a bitter consciousness of national defeat, this mixture is highly explosive. Emotions are raised to flash-point. Rational considerations disappear. People say, "This policy may well prove disastrous, but nothing can be worse than our present conditions. At all events these leaders will do *something*; and anything is better than nothing." So they surrender liberty, accept tyranny, and invite disaster. Hence Hitlerism.

There was a period during the Great Depression when it seemed as though those ideas might sweep over the greater part of the world, including countries not defeated in the war. But it proved not to be so. The English-speaking peoples in particular—less attracted to general theories than the Teuton, or the Latin, or the Slav; less interested in any kind of *Weltanschauung*; more experienced in the practice of

LITTLE INNOCENTS.

FIRST impressions are seldom entirely eradicated. Once formed they usually remain, and this certainly applies to the attitude adopted towards any particular bird or beast. There are animals to which some people remain indifferent, mainly because that early appeal to the imagination was never made. Others are regarded askance, having first appeared or been represented in an unfavourable light. And there are always some to whom a special charm attaches, having been first encountered in an attractive setting, or in circumstances which struck some sympathetic chord.

Earliest personal recollections of fox-cubs recall a picture of two oddly assorted naturalists, a village greybeard and a boy, crouching under a holly tree in a wooded ravine. On the opposite slope piles of finely sifted, sandy fox-mould glimmered between the fir boles. It was a solitary spot, even to eeriness, because the heaviest footfall made no sound upon the thick carpet of pine needles, while the giant firs, mounting from the depths of the hollow to claim their share of the sun, attained a height so lofty that few birds cared to nest in their crowns. Even the numerous red squirrels appeared to prefer less dizzy elevations and seldom risked a leap from the swaying branches, descending and climbing the long straight trunks whose spiral staircases did not present the same awful possibilities.

On this particular night the old wood was almost unnaturally still, save for a faint stirring in the remote green roof through which a pale crescent moon peeped although the sun had barely set. All had been quiet for a long while; no pigeon had fluttered or rabbit thumped. Then suddenly, as though a curtain had been lifted, the play began, and the smooth white sand below the fox-earth became occupied by seven minute flitting forms, emerging as imperceptibly as leaves set in motion by a passing breeze, and actuated, it would seem, by almost as spontaneous an impulse.

Kitten-like, they darted about, scarcely distinguishable from, and as silent in their movements as, the shadows that crept and quivered. It was in the main a swift motion picture, the one outstanding incident being that which brought the entertainment to a close. This was the sudden appearance of a larger shadow, framed in one of the many dark doorways,

silent, too, yet compelling, for no sooner was its presence realised than the display ended as suddenly as it had begun. The seven dark little actors vacated the stage, scuttling in like children at sound of the school bell, and as the last vanished into the protecting earth, the dim form of the vixen who had called off the show withdrew as she had come, and the watchers had the lonely hollow to themselves.

Viewed in retrospect, the incident seems little enough upon which to found a lifelong memory, yet the setting, the place, the hour, the hint of mystery and utter wildness, and not least, perhaps, the trouble with which the fleeting glimpse was obtained, combined to form an impression which later and far more intimate experiences have only served to strengthen. Although frequently encountered among surroundings of a very different character, I have always visualised the appropriate home of the genuine wild fox in a desolate sandy ravine with giant firs swaying above, and the correct number of a vulpine family has been regarded as seven, although actually few vixens do their duty to posterity so generously.

By curious chance, however, the "we are seven" condition applied also to one of several litters under observation last season. It was a nomadic family, birthplace unknown, which had established itself in a deep gully, by no means remote, but safe from molestation other than independent action upon the part of local sheep-dogs against which the vixen was continually on guard. The landowner happens to be a young lady who specialises in dog-training, and at the time she was breaking a collie pup with which she crossed an adjoining field one evening, being then ignorant of the foxes' arrival. The first intimation of this was the sudden apparition of the vixen springing from some long grass just in front of the collie, which, running unrestrained at the moment, gave prompt and vigorous chase.

Being wild with excitement, the dog disregarded all calls. It soon became apparent, however, that apprehension was groundless. The vixen clearly had the situation well in hand, and after a few moments interest in the proceedings became so intense that the spectator abandoned all attempts at interference. The fox's tactics were precisely those of a lapwing in corresponding circumstances, but more subtle, for while obviously encouraging pursuit she made no immediate attempt to lead the collie away. Presumably that would have been too

obvious. On the contrary she ran in circles which, however, continuously widened until a quarter of a mile intervened between the racers and the earth, when the vixen, her purpose achieved, easily out-distanced her pursuer.

A day or two later when sheep-dogs crossed the end of the same field, the vixen again appeared at the cover-side and there remained standing in plain view, watching every movement of the dogs as long as they continued within sight, prepared no doubt to repeat her tactics should occasion arise. The danger which she incurred was obvious, for many foxes are killed by collies from whom they make little apparent effort to escape, either not realising the need until too late, or underestimating the speed of the dogs, for whom, curious as it may seem, they entertain very little fear.

A vixen may shift her cubs several times within a brief period, her movements being largely governed by the food supply in which respect the hill fox is very differently placed from its representative of the woodlands where rabbits—the staple vulpine diet—usually abound. In the case of a litter born far out upon the peaty wastes of Dartmoor, there may not be a rabbit within several miles, and a carnivorous animal must either depend upon some lucky provision in the shape of a dead sheep—for which it competes with the buzzards and ravens—or upon reptiles and small fry generally, the latter being not always procurable in sufficient quantities for family purposes. Thus, as in the case of a human household when means are straitened, a fox-cub at an early age must do his part towards bringing grist to the mill, and therefore one is sometimes confronted with the comical spectacle of a diminutive furry oddity assiduously hunting the herbage for anything edible, to take the edge off his appetite. Doubtless it is often a case of Mahomet going to the mountain, and when a vixen discovers a store she adopts the obvious course of lodging her family conveniently near the supply, even as the curlew moves her brood from one marsh to another when the uplands are drying up in midsummer. Prescribed standards of desirability, again, are always recognised, certain earths being requisitioned regularly, while others are ignored although to all appearance equally suitable. And even as good lodgings at holiday resorts are occupied by one family after another, so an approved burrow or clitter may be tenanted by successive litters during the summer.

High upon Cosdon's mighty shoulder is an earth which seldom fails to hold cubs during some period of the nursery season. It was there that an old moorman, searching for litters at sunrise, met an interesting procession in the shape of a vixen picking her way through the dew-soaked herbage with half a dozen wet, weary, little wayfarers stumbling along behind to the accompaniment of minute growls and whimpers, according to temperament, when stubs encountered out-thrust noses or tired little pads found the stones too sharp for comfort. There, too, a year or so ago, some sheep-farmers, returning from the hills at dusk, unwittingly trespassed upon the cubs' playground to the consternation of the vigilant mother whose anxiety found effective vocal expression as she watched the course of events from a near hillside. There is no sound in the English wild more mournful than the plaint of a distressed vixen. By daylight it resembles nothing so much as the agonised crying of a child, for which I have known it actually mistaken. In that eerie period between the lights, however, when moonrise and sunset mingle, the shuddering screams assume a peculiarly unearthly quality which upon this occasion proved too much for the nerves of the listeners. The loneliness of the moors and the "witching hour" completed the uncanny effect, and as one of the men afterwards expressed it: "We comed away quickly, as though the pixies was after us."

This particular earth is strategically situated, the curve of the hill preventing it from being overlooked, except from a considerable distance. A similar precaution is frequently observed by foxes—wittingly or otherwise—in their selection of a nursery. It cuts both ways, however, as one may also approach unnoticed, and it was owing to this circumstance that I recently surprised three cubs at the place, being quite unaware of their presence. It was one of those exquisite June nights which our capricious summer grants now and again in an access of graciousness. So charged with joyous life was the ripe, warm countryside, that bird or beast could scarcely find adequate expression with which to respond. The windless, fragrant air throbbed with sound, from the humming purr of the nightjar to the minute droning of insects, the grasshopper's chirp and the distant ecstatic chatter of little woodland songsters, officially at roost upon their perches, but too keenly alive to the charm of the evening to think about going to

self-government—proved immune to National Socialism, Fascism and Communism. In this country, whenever the issue is tested at parliamentary or local elections, it is clear that not more than two in a hundred of the voters will support any one of those policies. In the Dominions and in the United States it is much the same. Furthermore, those everywhere who are religious-minded, in whatever degree, whether accepting the traditional faiths in their fullness or not, are utterly alienated by doctrines that are of the essence of those political creeds. It is no accident or coincidence—it arises from the very nature of the case—that Nazi Germany in this war finds herself condemned by every one of the great organised religions—Catholic or Protestant, Jewish or Mahomedan, Buddhist, Hindu or Confucian. There is an exception: the Shintoism of Japan; but Shintoism is less a religion than a nationalism clothed in a mythology.

Thus the war has come from the clash when the dynamic energy of National Socialism was withstood by the forces, now united in resistance, of both rationalism and religion. Fascism (which includes the Phalangism of Spain), Communism and Shintoism are in sympathy with many, perhaps most, of the Nazi principles; and not much was wanting for the countries where those doctrines are powerful to have ranked themselves at Germany's side in the battle. They have been deterred, at all events up to the present, partly because of the existence of countervailing forces, especially Catholicism in Italy and Spain; partly by considerations of prudence—the unpromising aspect of the balance of military and economic power.

Let us scan over our genealogy of the war, before turning to the lessons to be drawn for the future. At the first remove we have the decisions of Hitler on Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, applying the policy of National Socialism. At the second remove we have a number of political and economic events, in Germany and elsewhere, spread over the twenty years from the end of the Great War; events which, in combination, produced the Nazi party, fostered its rise, and permitted its ultimate triumph. Although the errors of the Allies contributed to the result, they need not have led to another war if it had not been for the spirit at large in Germany. At the third remove we find the philosophy of Nazism and Fascism, embodying ideas drawn from various writers on history and

philosophy. And at the fourth remove we have the failure of philosophy and religion to furnish any body of right belief or any code of right action, which could command effectively the assent and obedience of the modern world. Thereby room was left for wrong doctrines to take hold on multitudes of minds, astray in a world of material distress and political confusion.

Now as to the future. Let us in the first place discard all ideas of impersonal, undefined "forces" which will determine our fate irrespective of our own decisions and actions. There are no such forces. The word "Destiny" appears and reappears all through Spengler's volumes; it is indeed his key-word. How it permeates German thought may be instanced by the fact that Field-Marshal Goering, in the speech of welcome which he addressed to Herr Hitler on his triumphal return to Berlin after the entry into Prague, said, two or three times over, that that event, like the previous annexations, was the fulfilment of German "destiny"; Hitler was the chosen agent of "destiny." Even in this country the same conception has found expression, though rarely. It was the root of Thomas Hardy's pessimism. In his great epic drama, *The Dynasts*, Hardy shows us the Napoleonic armies like columns of ants crawling across Europe, the armies, the statesmen in their Councils, the people in their homes—all of them acting in obedience to an Immanent Will; while the Spirit Ironical, and the Spirit Sinister, and the Spirit of the Pities, look on aloof. The Will itself acts without consciousness:

Like a knitter drowsed,
Whose fingers play in skilled unmindfulness,
The Will has woven with an absent heed
Since life first was; and ever will so weave.

And this idea of some impersonal "force" was at the base also of the optimistic faith, equally unfounded, which many thinkers of the nineteenth century drew from the discovery of the so-called "law" of evolution. They found there an assurance of a progress that was certain, because automatic. But evolution is not a "law," in the sense of a command that will be fulfilled; it is no more than a name for a process. That process has indeed brought about an upward advance; but over æons of time, and with innumerable retrogressions and failures, as both biology and human history plainly show.

Whole species and genera have deteriorated into parasites, or become extinct; one after another, civilisations have declined and disappeared; ages of enlightenment have been succeeded, not by greater enlightenment, but by ages of darkness.

Putting aside, then, these conceptions both of destined evil and of destined good, we come back to the true doctrine, that as men sow, individually or collectively, so shall they also reap; and it is for them to decide whether they shall sow wheat or tares. It is experience that tells us on what kind of plant we may be nourished and with what kind we starve.

There is need, I suggest, of a new science—the Science of Human Experience. History, as we teach and learn it, comprises both too much and too little. Too much, because it includes the dramatic, the personal and the literary on an equal footing with the facts that are materials for generalisations of scientific value. We would not willingly lose the artistic element in history; it gives pleasure and it gives inspiration; but it is well to distinguish it from the scientific element. And history has included too little: it has dwelt on political and military events, and on the influence of personalities; but it usually omits, or gives insufficient weight to the physiological side of human development; the influence of environment on man, and man's influence on environment; the economic factors; and the effects of religious and philosophic ideas. In the making of the human story all these take part; and it is from that story as a whole that we may draw guidance. I see then, rising in the future, a great comprehensive Science of Human Experience. In Arnold Toynbee's outstanding book, *A Study of History*, we may find a pioneer work in that science.

Philosophy, I am profoundly convinced, must base itself more and more upon the teaching of human experience and upon what are termed the Natural Sciences; and less upon logic, and metaphysical dialectics concerned merely with speculations. When it does this, philosophy will take again its rightful place, leading the leaders of thought, and, through thought, controlling action. But it must submit to one other condition: to the duty of being definite in meaning and comprehensible in style. I was reading again lately Samuel Butler's *Erewhon Re-visited*, and I came upon this passage, describing a gathering of notabilities:

There was Dr. Downie, Professor of Logomachy, and perhaps the most subtle dialectician in Erewhon. He could say Nothing in more words than any man of his generation. His textbook on the *Art of Obscuring Issues* had passed through ten or twelve editions, and was in the hands of all aspirants for academic distinction. He had earned a high reputation for sobriety of judgment by resolutely refusing to have definite views on any subject; so safe a man was he considered, that while still quite young he had been appointed to the lucrative post of Thinker in Ordinary to the Royal Family.

Whether there are any Professor Downies nowadays, and nearer home than *Erewhon*, I should not venture even to inquire.

Side by side with a philosophy linked to science there is need of a religion allied with both. Religion, bringing in the elements of emotion, poetry, tradition, is essential to supplement the rationality of philosophy and to penetrate the vast province that lies outside the scope of science. Religion is not likely to become uniform; different presentations are needed to meet the differences of history, race, sex and individual temperament. But to many who take an objective view—however much those may differ who see the problems of religion only subjectively—it seems that two things will be found essential always and everywhere. First, that the beliefs that are vital shall be disentangled from legend and myth; that the ancient theologies, which once were paths to Deity but now are often hindrances, should no longer be allowed to interpose a barrier between man and God, and spoil the essential simplicity of spiritual communion. Secondly, that all the various faiths, western and eastern, should recognise that they are striving to serve a common purpose, and should emphasise their points of agreement rather than their differences. Religion, if it is to be truly religious, should surely be a force to unify rather than to divide mankind. In this age there are no more wars between Catholic and Protestant, or between Christianity and Islam; but there is still a sense of separateness rather than of co-operation; and there are still open conflicts between Hindu and Moslem, Sunni and Shiah. The antagonisms now embroiling the human race have come down to us from a chaotic past, that has left us a heritage of divisions—races, nations, creeds, languages. If one may coin a word after the current pattern,

sleep, and quite indifferent to the tawny owls already in full chorus in the darkening thickets. Indeed, a general truce appeared to prevail, as though summer, having attained the zenith of her reign, had proclaimed that for this enchanted period every living thing should be at peace. The rabbits, as they reluctantly took cover, gambolled rather than ran in little frisky hops, without alarm, and even the unimaginative mountain sheep had succumbed to the spell. They actually hopped like the rabbits, all four feet striking the earth as they made way for the intruder, while the buzzard, who had a nest in a windswept spinney on the ridge, for once uttered no note of alarm as he cruised around in wide circles, unwilling to yield place to the brown owls whose province it should have been by right.

Deep in a precipitous "cleave" half a mile below, the Taw river rippled over its boulder-strewn reaches, its song providing an appropriate accompaniment to the nightjar's refrain. High above old Cosdon's purpling crown a pale star winked, and as I slowly approached a little open green of rabbit-mown turf above the fox-earth, into view frisked the three cubs, shadow-like in the fading light, as smooth in their gliding gait and almost as noiseless. They had lost the ungainliness of extreme youth and were now perfect foxes in miniature, elfin creatures, infinitely graceful, combining the charm of cubhood with the light-footed agility of adults, and they seemed to float between the curled heads of the young bracken as they gambolled along in sheer *joie de vivre*. They could not have been more than twenty yards away—too near from an observer's point of view, even in the dim light. One could only stand perfectly still, but even so, the unfamiliar stump soon aroused suspicion, and they glided away among some gorse bushes in the direction of the earth.

There was no time, however, for mortification at my lack of caution. A moment later there was a glint of gold in the bracken nearer at hand, and out of the twilight re-emerged one of the cubs—or possibly another—and loped straight towards me, his little velvet pads making no sound even upon the brittle fronds and stalks of last year's fern growth. Whether or not he returned with intent I am still uncertain. However that may have been, he halted a few feet away, and there remained motionless, a Puckish figure in perfect keeping with the enchanted night, and regarded me intently, his sharp,

shrewd little head cocked at an interrogative angle, his eyes ashine and eloquent with inquiry. Possibly a dwarf gorse bush close beside me partly served as a blind, and in any case perfect stillness, while seldom alarming, invariably puzzles a wild creature. It stimulates his curiosity to an irresistible pitch, and after a long scrutiny which failed to satisfy him the cub changed his tactics. He did not bark or growl as some might have done, but keeping one eye upon the object of his interest, as though to mark the effect, he gave a sudden quick sidelong pounce, with the apparent purpose of making me jump, repeating the movement again and again like a kitten at play with an imaginary mouse, his fore-pads coming down each time with a sharp *pat*, noise rather than silence now being his paramount object.

Failing to achieve his purpose, and finding that I would not move or otherwise disclose my character, he went off at last in a succession of ludicrous leaps, presumably intended to invite pursuit. A more comic mode of progression could scarcely have been devised. Had the heath been red hot he could have skipped no higher, and after proceeding at this astonishing gait for fifteen yards or so he came to an equally surprising halt and looked quizzically back over his shoulder, to note the effect of his performance. Its failure to produce any perceptible result must have puzzled him considerably. He sat down for a while, evidently to ponder the situation, then returning very deliberately to his former place repeated the kitten-and-mouse act, if possible with greater exposition than before. I had hoped for another cat-on-hot-bricks withdrawal, but my remarkable little acquaintance appeared to specialise in the unexpected. He concluded the entertainment with a most effective spring, gave me a sidelong glance, as much as to say "you're quite hopeless," and stole away again into the bracken where the green lamps of the glow-worms glimmered like tiny stars to light him home.

I never saw those foxes again. Being obvious lodgers, the chance of their remaining was so remote that it would have been pointless to avoid the place, and the following night, having an opportunity to revisit it, I found that the inevitable removal had taken place. Little else had changed. The spirit of the hill remained benign. The fragrant dusk was still palpitant with life. The buzzard again cruised high in the windless dome, but the rabbits and the glow-worms had the

it should be the task of religion to help to de-babelise mankind.

It is now constantly asked : But how can religion command influence in an age of war and suffering ; if there be a God, and if "God is Love," why these wars, and the abominations they bring ? The answer may be given that the reticence of God is His greatest boon to man. Were there intervention from moment to moment, or even if there were a revealed code of conduct with plain direction for every eventuality, man's freedom would be gone, and with it his greatest glory. He would become, as has been said, "the mere puppet of a divine Ventriloquist." But the cosmic scheme throws him on his own resources. He has to learn that when he suffers it is through his own mistakes ; if he would reap well, he must sow rightly.

To inculcate this vital truth is now the task of philosophy, in close alliance with science and with religion. To draw the deductions, and to apply them in the sphere of practical action, is the task of the politician and the economist. It is for them to find the ways to obviate another war—mutual disarmament, freedom of commerce, some form of polity transcending the nations. But unless there is a *wish* to avoid war—and not only in some countries, but in all countries—the efforts of statesmen and economists will prove futile. If there are still to be peoples and governments who act upon the conviction that war is in itself not a bad thing but a good thing ; or else that good or bad does not matter ; that what only matters is strength, struggle, ruthlessness, leading to victory or downfall—if that faith animates nations, then wars there still will be.

Philosophy, then, has the duty to counter this disastrous doctrine ; to make it known that the tragic history of many civilisations has clearly proved, as Arnold Toynbee says, that "militarism is suicidal." There was a sage of ancient Egypt who wrote these words—and they are words in which philosophy may proclaim her mission in this troubled age :

I will speak that which is great. I will make you hear, I will make you to understand a scheme of life which will be enduring, which will make to flourish that life that is real, and enable you to bring your life to an end in peace.

SAMUEL.

FRANCE'S RESOLUTION.

THE publication of the Yellow Book proves that France was always willing, and indeed anxious, to come to an understanding with Germany, and that the responsibility of the war, provoked by the German attack on Poland, does not lie upon her. That there were grave errors committed in the course of 1939 by the ministers and diplomatists of several European countries cannot be doubted by the reader of these documents ; but neither can it be doubted that the official French policy was a policy of peace. Even after that fateful March when Hitler drove into Prague and demanded the cession of Danzig and of an autostrade across the Corridor, the French people somehow persuaded themselves that the danger of a conflict with Germany had passed. There were a few loud writers in the press, but, generally, there was a desire for a European settlement that the German Government could have obtained, with great advantage, for the asking.

Since this was the mood of France, it may well be asked what is the present attitude of a country which wished to avoid war and which has now been plunged in war for over four months. The problems of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia, however much they may interest the political expert, would scarcely in themselves have interested the French people. But it was gradually borne in upon the French that they were not being invited to fight for Danzig ; that other issues which touched them more nearly, vital issues of human decency and dignity, were at stake ; that the latest German aggression followed a number of earlier aggressions, and would infallibly be followed by others until Germany acquired a virtual hegemony over the greater part of an enslaved Europe. The Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier, in his allocutions, does not hesitate to declare that France's turn would have come next, and that France is fighting not only for "human liberty" but for "French security."

It is for no vain prestige that France mobilised ; but when month after month Germany demonstrated her strength at the expense of a weaker nation and violated all her pledges, the average Frenchman, like the French rulers, could not but believe that he was bound to take up arms to prevent the continued triumph of aggression, the unimpeded victorious

fox-earth to themselves. No light-footed acrobats made merry on the heath. Indeed, there was an indescribable air of emptiness about it all, like that of a newly vacated house, and but for a few gruesome relics, undoubtedly reminiscent of a substantial vulpine supper, one might have imagined the experience of the preceding night to have been hallucination—a mere pixie prank which never seems out of place on a Dartmoor hillside when the shades are falling.

I passed on to another shoulder of the hill where “wind-bitten beech and badger-barrows” broke the green symmetry of the bracken from which the ghost-moths now were rising. Here again the nightjar’s purr throbbed from every quarter of the compass, and I was wondering that the bird should thus habitually betray its whereabouts to every prowler of the night when the lean dark form of a hunting vixen, gliding, banshee-like, between the beech trunks, put to flight all abstract problems. That she was the mother of the cubs which might also be near seemed probable, and I had not proceeded many yards before this hope received definite encouragement. From the fern, no great distance away, came an unmistakable sound. It was not the rustling which is so characteristic a feature of the summer night. There was something more definite about it—an irresponsible scurrying and scampering as of a puppy at play, and now and again a succession of quick light pats which curiously suggested the pantomimic performance witnessed the previous night.

There could be little doubt that this invisible disturber of the stillness was a cub playing some original game of his own. The green jungle effectually concealed him, however, which circumstance had doubtless been taken into account, or he would never have been allowed to make so much noise, and by strategy only was it possible to make his closer acquaintance. By pursing the lips one can produce a noise sufficiently like the squeak of a mouse or young rabbit to interest almost any rapacious animal, and advancing cautiously to the edge of a little clearing, I tried my skill, hoping that the cub would be equally credulous. The rustling ceased, but while I continued to draw upon my limited knowledge of the mouse vocabulary there was no apparent reaction until an inquiring sniff close at hand brought the performance to an abrupt end.

Under a drooping frond perhaps two yards away, something dark appeared, but remained so motionless that its

shape was indistinguishable. A sudden harsh scream from behind suggested for a moment that the vixen was about to interfere, until the creaking swish of a heron’s wings served to identify the voice. Far away, in the purple mist of the lowland spread wide below, a village clock chimed ten. The dark object emerged into the clearing. He was a cub indeed, but a tiny fellow, obviously not a brother of my former acquaintance. Beautiful little beast as he was, his head was still a trifle too big for the rest of him, his legs just a fraction too long, while his minute brush was tagged with just a fleck of white as though a wisp of bog cotton had been attached to it in frolic.

I was standing in clear relief, but once again absolute stillness served its purpose, and the cub began sniffing about in exhaustive search for the illusory mouse. He quartered the ground most thoroughly, but was working away from me, and hoping to recall him, I repeated the squeak. This proved a tactical error. At close quarters, apparently, the imitation lacked some essential quality, and away went the juvenile hunter into the bracken, his tiny brush with its comic tag straight on end behind him.

This was disappointing, but hoping that his exit had been precautionary rather than final, I renewed the call, crouching down this time in order to be less conspicuous, and after a while was again rewarded by the interrogating sniff at even closer quarters than before. Once more he appeared, this time at my very feet, his nose working like a tiny engine as he prospected every possible lurking-place for the mysterious mouse that had neither substance nor scent. Then suddenly he seemed to realise that I was not a part of the landscape, and remained “fixed up,” as the country people expressively term it, so near that one could have placed a hand upon him, while he studied me with an intensity that was positively disconcerting.

I was actually smoking to discourage the indefatigable midges, but neither the smell of tobacco nor the glowing pipe appeared to alarm the little innocent. Bewilderment and overwhelming curiosity radiated from every bit of him, and at last, being quite unable to classify the curious object which squeaked like a mouse and carried a glow-worm, he embarked upon a tour of inspection, edging round me with an odd sidling action indescribably quaint, keeping his face towards

march of injustice. He realised that there were moral reasons for the war, and that the future of France, Europe, and it is not too much to say of civilisation, will be determined in this struggle. Because of this profound conviction, which overrides many other considerations, social, political, financial, France is resolved to do her part.

No doubt this war is, with its lack of excitement, its anti-climax in the West, particularly depressing; France is, against her temperament, compelled to be a helpless spectator, to disorganise all her civil life, to wait passively for an attack that the enemy has shown no disposition to make—while dreadful deeds are being perpetrated far beyond the Maginot Line, in the plains of Poland, and among the ice-locked lagoons of Finland. That waiting attitude does not suit the French spirit. The Frenchman is not bellicose, but he is combative; and he finds it difficult to understand a war without battles. At the same time he is nightly assured by the "Traitor of Stuttgart" that Germany has no quarrel with France—that it is France, not Germany, who has declared war, and that all would be for the best in the best of possible worlds if the French would only refuse to be the "soldiers of England." This propaganda is persistent; it is listened to, in all its variations, by a large percentage of the French, who cannot be prevented from tuning in to the German posts, despite the abortive attempts of the authorities to drown the voice of the speaker. The German thesis is known to everybody; and just because it is known to everybody, it has become quite ineffective. For my part, I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion that it is always useless, and sometimes dangerous, to try to stop people from listening in or from reading what the enemy has to say; it merely excites greater curiosity. The proper reply is counter-propaganda—or rather the revelation of the truth, as in the publication of the Yellow Book.

I have had sufficient occasion to ascertain the results of the Stuttgart emissions to be able to affirm that they have not succeeded in changing French opinion or in influencing French *moral*. Almost am I tempted to assert that radio has been vastly overrated as a method of political propaganda. We have been told that it would work wonders; that no longer could countries be separated from other countries; that an address by wireless would be more decisive than a battle, and that the dissemination of false news (or perhaps of true news)

would be devastating. After four months of these experiments in radio diffusion, I am inclined to think that they have been mostly failures. The people who listen in have their minds made up, they live in a certain atmosphere, they possess a certain mentality, and they know that what they are about to hear is propaganda. At any rate, without indulging in generalisations, the French people after the repeated asseverations of Stuttgart remain unmoved.

Certainly there is no diminution of the French desire to carry this war to its fitting conclusion. What is that conclusion? We here touch upon the delicate question of war aims. It is delicate because, to the natural reluctance of politicians to explain clearly their objectives, that may or may not be attained, that will depend so much on circumstances, and that may be altered in accordance with the possibilities, there must be added a divergence in French and British experience of Germany. The question is delicate, but that is not a reason for avoiding it. It is a subject which we are specially entitled to discuss. The censorship may be justifiable in many respects, but it should not deny to peoples at war the right to ascertain, and themselves define, the things which they think are worthy of the tremendous sacrifices of international strife.

We have conceptions which are very different from those of Germany, and it is the clash of these conceptions, more than a disagreement on precise material points, that has brought about the conflict. Are the conceptions which shock us the conceptions of Hitler or of Germany? The British, in my view ill-advisedly, began by drawing a distinction between Hitler and Germany. The French could not admit that distinction. This is the third war of France with Germany within the Scriptural span of a man's life; and it was certainly not Hitler who waged the two earlier wars. Indeed, Hitler is necessarily far more representative of the German people, who elected his party and plebiscited him, than were either Bismarck or William II. Since Hitler derives his force from the people, it is probable that his power will be more ephemeral than that of the Emperor or the Chancellor of the Emperor. The dynasty was deep-rooted, whereas Hitler is of quick growth. There is a considerable difference between the Kaiser—whose hanging was to have transformed the world—and Hitler; but it is surely only because Hitler truly

the unknown and the obvious possibility of sudden attack with the most scrupulous care, flaring incessantly and staring with eyes so prominent that they almost seemed to be popping out of his head. At such close quarters was the inspection conducted that every moment I expected him to nip my flannel trousers to test their edibility. Before any such thing actually happened, however, he became convinced of my untrustworthiness and, backing away, still unalarmed, he executed a most judicious "slow motion" retreat, safeguarded by more than one rearward glance, until the little receding shadow melted for the last time into the darkening bracken jungle.

Withdrawing in my turn as quietly as possible, so as not to frighten him—which would have seemed a breach of confidence—it was impossible to think otherwise than very benevolently of the quaint little beast, so attractive, and as yet so pathetic in his obvious ignorance of the seamy side—the harsh possibilities of the life before him. There was a sense of disquiet too, as one might have experienced after imposing upon the credulity of a confiding little child, only to disappoint him in the end. One would have liked him to have found his mouse or, at least, to have carried away as pleasant an impression of our meeting as he left behind him.

DOUGLAS GORDON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

FINLAND YIELDS.

IT took the overwhelming numerical and mechanical superiority of the Soviet forces three and a half months to defeat a small nation equal in population to the city of Leningrad. It was on November 30th last that Russia invaded Finland. On March 12th Finland signed a "peace treaty." By that treaty she ceded not only territory, but strategic key positions, including a "lease" of Hangoe, which completed the analogy between the German rape of Czechoslovakia and the Russian rape of Finland. Stalin copied Hitler in the initial talk of Finnish "aggression" against Russia. He copied Hitler in his second tactic. Just as Hitler perfidiously drew the Munich line with a single strategic eye to the destruction of Czechoslovakia, so Hangoe in Russian hands means the end of Finland. The doom of every small nation in Europe east of the Rhine is sealed; but a world in which force, not charity, is enthroned, is itself and by the same token doomed. The redress is inevitable.

AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE WAR.

When Mr. Sumner Welles, United States Under-Secretary of State, stepped off the Italian liner *Rex* on its arrival in Naples on February 25th he began a mission which did not surprise those people who knew enough of the complicated background in American domestic politics, but which did perplex the already bewildered ordinary person in Europe whose curiosity—a perfectly legitimate curiosity—was destined not to be satisfied. Mr. Welles went at once to Rome and conversed with Mr. Mussolini and Count Ciano. He went on to Berlin and conversed with Mr. Hitler, Mr. von Ribbentrop, Field-Marshal Göring, Mr. Hess and others. He then went to Paris and on to London to talk with the leaders of the opposite faction.

What was his purpose? It looked formidably impartial on the part of an American official to hear the story of both sides. These incorrigible Europeans: which side was really to blame? To ask such a question was to be less than fair to Mr. Roosevelt and to his envoys (for Mr. Welles had not

represents a moment of the German conscience that he rose so rapidly to the supreme heights. The French hold Germany responsible—or rather Prussia, which has absorbed the Germanic States—and have no intention of being fobbed off with a scapegoat.

If France has thus found herself at war with Germany three times in less than seventy years, it is not surprising that France should ask how she is to make herself secure—that is to say, how she is to make Germany impotent. There thus sprang up spontaneously in some quarters a campaign for the disruption of Germany. German unity was consecrated in the Galerie des Glaces at Versailles in 1871; in that same Galerie des Glaces, I witnessed the signature of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919—and that Treaty, whatever its virtues and vices, left German unity intact. But the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which dealt with Austria-Hungary, split up the Empire. If the peacemakers in 1919 were right in respecting German unity, they were wrong in breaking up Central Europe. If they were right in breaking up Central Europe, they were wrong in preserving German unity. For it is evident that Germany remained potentially as strong as ever, and that the smaller countries of Central Europe would offer a standing temptation to Germany, and would thus sooner or later, in the process of incorporation into the German Reich, provoke another war in Europe. This is the reasoning heard everywhere in France. It found expression in the newspapers. The censor now frowns on certain indiscretions, but it may properly be said that the general sense of French thought would regard with favour the operation of the disintegrating forces that may hereafter manifest themselves in Germany. In 1919 Marshal Foch made a strong plea for the inclusion of Rhineland in the French system—or, at least, the disannexation of Rhineland from Germany. But even this solution—in place of which a compromise was offered, comporting a limited occupation of Rhineland, and a tripartite pact by which England and America would guarantee French security—might have proved insufficient; since the rest of Germany would have continued to be Prussianised. To-day there is no little feeling that the unification of Germany is inimical to European peace.

There is, however, an alternative, and that alternative may for the moment be regarded as British, though recently I have noticed that the French are beginning to examine it closely.

The objection to the work of the peacemakers in 1919 (I set aside, in this place, the minor mistakes, and most of the decisions that were regarded as unjust by Germany) was not so much that they left Germany intact as that, leaving Germany intact, they smashed the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That Empire, it has been said, was a political monstrosity; but it was an economic masterpiece. The subject races were oppressed; they cried out for autonomy, and that autonomy was promised to them, as late as October 1918, by the Emperor Karl. It is argued that the peacemakers might well have given autonomy to the subject races, but at the same time have constituted a Federation in Central Europe.

Federation is not, of course, a new thing in Europe. It happens that the Germanic States have been formed into a series of Confederations—notably by Napoleon, by Metternich, by Bismarck—that is to say, under French, Austrian, and Prussian direction. But with real astuteness the "Federator" always saw to it that the Germanic States retained their sovereign rights; and the Federation was thus no true Federation and was helplessly divided. The advantages in 1919 of a Danubian Confederation were obvious. It might have been foreseen that a tiny Austria would sooner or later be swallowed by Germany; and that Czecho-Slovakia would then be doomed. If it was not foreseen, it can surely be seen now. It is not a new separate Austria, and a new separate Czecho-Slovakia, and a number of separate countries in Central Europe, which will be able to resist, at some future date, another advance of the German Reich. Only if they are formed into a Confederation—each of them retaining its constitution, its cultural autonomy, but surrendering to the organ of the Confederation such sovereign rights as the direction of the army, of foreign affairs, of Customs, of communications—will they be sufficiently strong to serve as the necessary counterweight to Germany. European equilibrium demands not a number of small separate States but a Central European Federation. The triangle on which it should be built is Prague-Vienna-Budapest—though, for my part, I advocate an extension along the Vistula.

It would be entirely wrong to suggest that there is any real difference of opinion about war aims in France and in England; there is merely a certain amount of discussion in which the French are disposed to take one side—the division of

travelled to Europe alone. He was accompanied by Mr. Myron Taylor, whose mission was to the Vatican). In the case of Mr. Taylor there was little mystery, at any rate about his intention. He had been sent, as Mr. Roosevelt had openly explained, to "co-ordinate" the parallel "peace" efforts of the Capitol and of the Vatican. Yet the greatest care had been taken in the corresponding announcements about Mr. Welles's purpose to disclaim any intention of "peace" efforts. With laboured reiteration American official pronouncements had protested that Mr. Welles was concerned, not with the making of peace but with American participation in the work of reconstruction that would follow the making of peace. That at any rate seemed honest.

In war time, however, honesty is both weak and unpopular. The influential people of the earth were not interested in the honesty of Mr. Roosevelt's verbal preliminaries to his European inquiry. They knew, or thought they knew, what his real purpose amounted to. There was nothing obscure, subtle, or even new in it. The contest between Germany and Britain has already once been staged. Then, as now, American official opinion had sought first to estimate America's potential interest in the struggle, and then to launch the appropriate plan. Then, as now, the most thorough methods of investigation had been employed. Colonel House was sent to Europe in 1915 as Mr. Welles in 1940, to discover the facts at first hand. But there was a difference. In January 1915 Mr. Wilson sent Colonel House to visit London, Paris and Berlin with the frank and open intention of mediating for peace between the belligerents. An attempt was duly made in that sense. By contrast in 1940 it was believed in influential circles, both in and out of the United States, that Mr. Roosevelt was speaking the literal truth when he denied any intention of mediation for peace.

The superficial perversity of historical comparisons never seems to fail. In 1914 and 1915 the United States made enormous profits in trade and finance out of the European war. Yet Mr. Wilson wanted to stop the war. In 1939 and 1940 the United States by contrast lost enormously in trade and finance from the war in Europe. Yet Mr. Roosevelt did not want to stop it.

Is that statement unfair? It was on February 9th last that Mr. Roosevelt announced his intention of sending Mr. Welles

to Europe. He stated that his object would be to gather information about conditions in Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain. He went on at once to say that it had nothing to do with negotiations on the general subject of peace. On the same day Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, did intimate that the United States was in touch with the neutral States about peace possibilities, and that those conversations could be extended to include the belligerents, but in his turn insisted that the conversations did not involve any plan. "In view of existing hostilities," he said, "in many parts of the world, in view of the effect of such hostilities in many parts of the world and on the neutral nations, and in view of the desire for world peace on a sound and lasting basis for all nations, diplomatic conversations of an informal character have been commenced with neutral Governments and will probably be continued with all neutral Governments." He added that "these conversations involve no plan or plans, but are in the nature of preliminary inquiries relating to a sound international economic system and at the same time to world-wide reduction of armaments. Matters involving the present war conditions will not form part of these preliminary conversations. The conversations can, of course, be extended to belligerent nations, in so far as they involve these two common problems of future peace."

At the same time a semi-official emphasis was added in Washington to the circumstance that the United States Government had no intention of attempting to mediate in the war itself, and that its interest was confined to the after-war period. Even when, just before Christmas, Mr. Roosevelt announced his intention of sending Mr. Myron Taylor as his "personal representative" to the Vatican so that "our parallel endeavours for peace and the alleviation of suffering may be assisted," he put on record, even in so circumscribed a field of inquiry, the proviso that "in these present moments no spiritual leader and no civil leader can move forward on a specific plan." There can be no doubt that the reiterated negative attitude in relation to the actual war was of a palpably clear design. Out of his own mouth, Mr. Roosevelt did not want to stop the war. Would it be fair to him to go further and say that he even wanted not to stop it: that is, wanted it to go on, at any rate till November 1940?

Republican propagandists in their private propaganda did

Germany into a number of States, and the creation of bastions in Central Europe—and the British are disposed to take the other side—the preservation of German unity, with the Federation of Central European countries as the counterpart. But these two points of view, which are only tentatively held, tend to approach each other, and will be brought nearer as the war continues, and as we see more clearly how it may properly be brought to a close. The Federal idea has already made some headway in France. I notice, for example, that the *Oeuvre*, with the omission of only a few censored lines, has reproduced the article of Sir Walter Layton on the Federal solution; while M. Jean Hennessy, the former Minister, has publicly expounded the Federal idea. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Aristide Briand actually proposed the creation of the United States of Europe ten years ago. I do not think that the Briand proposal was in the least satisfactory, or that it had the smallest chance of acceptance: Briand himself seems to have been unable to clarify his thoughts on this subject, since he gave the amazing assurance that Federation and Sovereignty are quite compatible! But then most of the British advocates of Federation are equally vague. The fact is that a comprehensive European Federation is impossible at present, but that, as I have myself endeavoured to explain at length elsewhere, it will be perfectly practicable for the Great Powers to adopt the rôle of "Federator," and to guarantee a Central European Federation, economically, diplomatically, and militarily.

It may be rightly objected that it is more important for the moment to win the war—though this must not be allowed to mean that we should decline to study problems of reconstruction. The Finance Minister, Paul Reynaud, warning the country that the greatest restrictions are necessary, startled many people by frankly admitting that unless we are prepared to do our utmost victory may easily escape us. The inactivity on the Western Front apparently surprised the authorities, though I myself heard, months before the war, a German speaker by radio affirm that Germany had learned the lesson of Verdun, that is to say the folly of throwing men against modern steel and concrete fortifications; and the pains with which German diplomacy surrounded the country with a corset of neutrals plainly denoted for me Germany's intention of remaining on the defensive in the West, while

rearranging at leisure the map of Europe in the East. Now the effect of this inactivity is twofold. The soldiers suffer from boredom; the civilians fall into apathy. The French correspondents at the front have not hidden the *ennui* of the troops; the French soldier is second to none in action, but he finds these days of idleness, of weary waiting, away from his home, his business, his amusements, excessively dreary. In anticipation of a tremendous conflict practically the whole manpower of France was mobilised, and although classes have been restored to civilian life, there were millions of men who appeared to have little that is useful to do, but who had plenty of time to grumble. One of the problems for the military authorities is to keep these masses of men occupied and cheerful; and they are undoubtedly applying themselves successfully to this problem. For it is the test of a good general to see that his soldiers are, in all circumstances, contented.

At the same time, I think a mistake was made in informing the public that the war would be won by the blockade, or by a revolution in Germany. I am paraphrasing a French newspaper when I say that the country was induced to believe, by this misplaced optimism, that no real effort is required. Germany is immensely strong, and it is now realised in France that no good will come of the *bourrage de crâne* which consists in constantly representing Germany as on the point of collapse. It should not be forgotten that five European countries which were the enemies of Germany in the last war are now neutral—to say nothing of extra-European countries. It should not be forgotten that eight countries in Europe have disappeared, or have lost their independence, or are fighting for their life. The temptation to make the least possible effort, to fall into facility, to regard the war as a sort of prolongation of the peace, is real. It may well be that Hitler is speculating on the well-known tendency of the French to quarrel when the danger seems to have passed. In this he will assuredly be disappointed.

Nor must it be overlooked that there were a million Communist voters in the last election, and that both Socialists and Radicals, under the Front Populaire, received Communist votes. In the Trade Unions the Communists were influential, and until last year fomented hundreds of strikes that nearly ruined France. A year ago France began to recover, and to-day many of the Communist Deputies are in

not hesitate to make so terrible a charge. Mr. Roosevelt, they said, had determined to run a third term as President. His domestic record was such that, irrespective of party, it could not stand an electoral examination. The New Deal had caused such havoc to the economic and financial welfare of the United States, that at all costs it was necessary for Mr. Roosevelt to sidetrack the attention of the electorate from that subject. Indeed, they went so far as to say that but for the war in Europe he could never have dared to stand for a third term.

American public opinion is a naïve and superficial thing, crude in its reactions, easily swayed by any propagandist politician who has a straightforward and readily digested tale to tell. If, therefore, Mr. Roosevelt could go on telling the American public that he was keeping them out of the war, but that the war and its issues were of profound interest and importance to America, then he would achieve the dual purpose of keeping their minds off the New Deal and cultivating his own reputation as benefactor and protector of the American people. It is always possible that human nature, even political human nature, cannot sink so low; and Mr. Roosevelt's public statements have certainly given ground for the belief that his own conception of political exigency has not deteriorated to anything like such a depth.

Whether or not the Republican critics of Mr. Roosevelt were to be given any greater measure of respect than any political party in any country on the eve of an election, it was clear on other grounds that there was something else in the collective American interest in the European war than the exigencies of domestic politics. The truth is that human societies, organised as nations, are actuated by motives of material selfish greed in their crudest form. The world is very young. There are incidental differences in the quality of national life, differences of form, of taste, of "civilised" amenities. The modern German conception of national welfare is such that few Englishmen, Frenchmen or Americans would regard life as tolerable, if it had to be lived in Germany or under a German system. Yet it is even worse in Russia. Those differences, however, fall within the general framework of a world-wide society whose essential ethical object is the same: to acquire wealth and possessions competitively and selfishly, and to keep them by force of one kind or another.

In his address to the third session of the seventy-sixth

Congress on January 3rd last, Mr. Roosevelt, for instance, excellently observed that one of the contributory causes of the present war was "the blind economic selfishness in most countries, including our own." Such economics defeat their object, as selfish policies always defeat their object. The Seven Great Powers of the world to-day present a spectacle of reciprocal disservice to each other, when there is no good reason why they should not instead work to each other's benefit. The interesting thing is that the truth is so simple, and so obvious: namely that individuals and nations can encompass their own welfare *only* by encompassing that of others, and yet they act on the contrary principle, with the certain result (known in advance) that they thereby can achieve only each other's ruin.

The apparent occasional exceptions to that rigid rule of life are true exceptions that prove the rule, for they are seen sooner or later not to be exceptions at all. In the last Great War the United States was the obvious and only party that benefited—or seemed to benefit—from the general wreck, just as in the present war Italy is the only party that appears to be reaping any benefit. By acting as shopkeeper to Great Britain and her allies in the first part of the Great War (and like a good shopkeeper granting credit to her solvent customers) America did a quarter of a century ago make a vast amount of money. Her trade balance, which in 1913 had been \$691 million, rose by 1916 to \$3,000 million; as much as \$3,000 million in gold and \$2,000 million in foreign bonds found their way to New York. America (to take a random instance of what it all meant in practice) was able to plant her cinemas throughout the British Isles and to ensure that for at least a generation the profitable business of catering to the leisure recreation of the masses of the British people would almost wholly flow to American pockets.

But the nemesis of such worldly wisdom has a way of defeating the best laid schemes. The bill for some £1,000 million worth of goods bought in the United States (on credit) by a spendthrift British Government was destined not to be paid. If the shopkeeper American Government had not been so intoxicated by the dizzy fury of its roaring trade, it would have foreseen that such a bill could never be paid except by a reversal of the dizziness aforesaid: by American acceptance from Britain of the corresponding volume of goods or services,

prison, and the Trade Unions are purged of Communist leaders, and the municipalities have been relieved of their Communist councillors. But it has been asserted in Parliament and elsewhere that revolutionary propaganda is still conducted clandestinely, and that there are secret cellules, and concealed agitators in the factories. The Government is resolved to pursue these treacherous and demoralising forces pitilessly. It is, of course, for a professional agitator, trained in the school of Moscow, not difficult to find subjects of discontent. The wives of soldiers are paid eight francs a day—less than one shilling—and the soldiers themselves receive less than one franc a day. There is no doubt that the strange reluctance to declare war on Russia, who took half of Poland and subjugated the three Baltic States and attacked Finland—or even to break off diplomatic relations with her—has served the cause of the Bolsheviks, and therefore of the Germans, in France, for Russo-German agents enjoy immunity and facilities; while there are doubtless, in certain salons, those who, anti-Bolshevik, would now be prepared to accept even Hitler as an ally in the struggle with Bolshevism. This dispute, in England or in France, as to whether Russia or Germany is the chief enemy, is deplorable: surely it is obvious that they are both enemies and should be treated as such.

I mention these matters not because I think they have a real importance, but because they cannot be altogether left out of the picture. Happily, the leaders of the French Trade Unions are patriotic, and have unreservedly co-operated with the Government, while the bulk of the workers now realise that they were misled by the extremists. It is impossible to doubt of the soundness of the sentiments of the vast majority of the workers; and as for the minority, the Government is adopting the most strenuous measures to suppress defeatism.

There remains the question of French finances. Frédéric Jenny in the *Temps* estimates the total expenditure of the State in 1940 at something like 328 milliard francs. Others have put it even higher, and have talked, in round figures, of a milliard francs a day. The ordinary civil budget is over 79 milliards. These are extraordinary amounts, and if the civil budget is to be met by taxation, now that industry and commerce have been dislocated by the war, that is already a remarkable effort. The rest must be raised—or at least most

of it—by loan. For a number of years it has been stated by the Finance Ministers, by the Rapporteurs, and by the Deputies, that the limit of the "contributive faculty" of France has been reached, but year after year there has been a new turn of the screw. M. Reynaud argues that the very diminution of private revenues by taxation will help the war finances: there will not only be the direct payment to the State, but the reduction of private purchasing power will keep down prices. It should be remembered that although France has considerable gold reserves, and many milliards of exported capital have returned, these last twenty-five years have been years of profound perturbation in France. Before 1914 (when the annual budget was around 5 milliard gold francs!) there had been several generations of financial stability and of prosperity. It was easy to raise loans, and it was easy to inflate. The cry was raised that "Germany would pay." But after the war there was crisis on crisis. There were repeated political upheavals, and a succession of devaluations of the franc which leave it at a tenth of its former value. The bourgeoisie in particular has suffered. The result of the social unrest, the economic difficulties, the financial depreciations, of the Front Populaire, is still felt, despite the recent excellent management of Paul Reynaud. Nevertheless, it is cheering to note that the Finance Minister has a plan: he has rejected inflation, he has increased taxation and restricted civilian consumption, and he seeks to bring back into the coffers of the Treasury as large a proportion as possible of the sums that the State spends, and since the exchange control prevents the exportation of capital, the "circuit" may be said to be closed.

The fear has been expressed that the weight of the debts contracted by the State will be unbearable when the war is finished. M. Reynaud remarks that a total victory which would re-establish security in Europe would make disarmament possible. France ought in that case to be able to effect an economy of 50 milliards a year on armaments, and this sum would assure the service of a debt of 1,000 milliards. It is to be hoped that this wish will be, at any rate, partly realised.

On the unity of purpose of France and England everything depends. There is no doubt that the co-ordination of the two countries, financially and economically, is far greater than it

has ever been. It is a very notable achievement that France and England should have agreed to these proposals. They are to make the best use of their resources, by the use of their production, their shipping, their air, to launch every possible programme, and they are to carry out repeated operations almost daily. They will find the time, and they are to stand by them not only till the end of the war, but for six months after. There is a complete understanding as to the conduct of the war, and presumably as to the course of the peace. It would be foolish, and in many ways unhelpful, to pretend that the task before us is easy; it may be desperately hard indeed; but if the two Governments and the peoples they represent, in the spirit of complete and unshaken solidarity, which have hitherto displayed, they will certainly accomplish that to which they have set their hand.

STELLA HENDERSON.

FINLAND'S STRUGGLE.

IT is now exactly two months since the Soviet onslaught on Finland began. In the early morning hours of Thursday, November 30th, 1939, Stalin's janissaries, without warning, crossed the Finnish border and embarked upon their wanton work of destruction. Whatever the future development of the Soviet war on Finland may be, certain facts during these first two months have emerged quite clearly. And since events nowadays move so rapidly that news is stale or forgotten almost before it reaches the public; since, moreover, facts are liable to be distorted or altogether falsified with equal rapidity, it is well to record some of them now—while they are still fresh in everybody's mind.

The two most striking revelations of the struggle to date are on the one hand the heroism and efficiency of the Finns, and on the other hand the utter incapacity and lack of preparedness of the Soviet military authorities. During the whole first month of the struggle Finland had to stand up to the invaders alone. Volunteers from Denmark, Sweden and Norway only started to arrive early in January. Yet throughout December, i.e. the first month of hostilities, the Finns not only managed to keep their positions on the Karelian Isthmus and on the Ladoga front, but they also wiped out substantial Soviet armies in the north and, in fact, threw out some of the "glorious" Red invaders beyond their national frontiers. Separate Finnish units even penetrated Soviet territory where they caused considerable damage to the Murmansk railway and various Soviet military bases.

When the disproportion in numeric strength and resources is fully realised, this achievement is even more stupendous than would appear possible. The Soviet Union, with its population of 180 million, and completely self-sufficient as far as supplies go, can put up as many millions of men as Stalin chooses to order. Finland's total population is barely 3·8 million, and apart from her forests and agriculture she has little natural wealth of any kind. Thus her supplies of man-power are limited, and for equipment she has to rely on what she was able to purchase abroad before hostilities started, or on what she may obtain now—despite immensely difficult transport conditions which almost amount to blockade.

It seems hardly credible that the "invincible" Red Army,

which in its turn would have spelt a riot of prosperity for Britain. But America instead put up an unscalable tariff barrier which prevented Great Britain from paying her debt in the only way in which such debts can be paid.

America has for a whole decade been very sore about that unpaid debt. Now that a new European war has started, and American commercial instincts have cast about for the new openings thus foreshadowed, the poetic mockery of a corrective Fate has inspired no less remarkable a reaction than the decision to reverse the former experience by an acceptance of the losses first, rather than last. The soreness aforesaid suggested now to the shopkeeper aforesaid that no credit this time should in any circumstances be allowed. If Britain wanted to buy things from America this time (as of course, so it was thought, she would) then she must pay in advance. The cash-and-carry system was thus solemnly instituted.

The surprising thing is not that America lost the business, but that she did not foresee that she would lose it. To a Government such as the British Government, fighting for its life in a contest of starvation by rival blockade, it was obvious that its reserves of gold, foreign exchange and foreign securities would have to be retained to the grim last, and that therefore the British Government, now in control of Britain's entire trade, would cease to buy anything at all from the United States except aeroplanes; in other words, would cease to buy everything she could buy elsewhere.

When on February 7th last the Secretary of the United States Treasury announced that it was a practically fixed policy to demand of the Allies that they should provide the money for any additional factory facilities that might be needed for the manufacture of war supplies which they wished to buy in the United States, he was making a rather sorry riposte to the devastating blow that had already been suffered by herself. The United States mercantile interests, including the shipping lines and the tobacco growers of famous Virginia, are all feeling the pinch: for Great Britain was their chief foreign market. Mr. Sumner Welles may well have found himself in a painful dilemma. On the one hand the party politics of Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, his chief, may well have diagnosed a grotesque source of help in the fact of war in Europe, at any rate up to next November. On the other hand the general and true interests of the United States

clearly postulated the earliest possible end of that war, with or without American participation in the prosecution of it.

TURKEY AND THE STRAITS.

Recent speculation, encouraged by the news made known on February 24th last, that the Supreme Defence Council of the Turkish Republic had declared a state of emergency throughout the country, has been directed to the question of the status attaching to the Dardanelles in the event of open war in the Middle East. There are two aspects to that question. One is the theoretic prescription of "international law," or of the relevant valid instruments; the other is the practical possibility of what might happen in an actual emergency. It is hardly to be expected, in the light of history, that "international law" would count for much, even if that law could now be clearly or even honestly interpreted by the parties concerned.

The ruling rubric is the Montreux Convention signed on July 20th, 1936. That convention was negotiated to replace the Lausanne Convention of 1923, for the only reason that the circumstances of 1923 had so completely changed in thirteen years that a new understanding had become imperative. To-day, less than four years later, a wholly new set of circumstances again present themselves.

The main change brought about in 1936 was that whereas the chief motive of the Lausanne Convention had been to secure "free transit and navigation" through the Straits, the chief motive operative at Montreux was to safeguard the security of particular parties (including Russia, then closely allied to France) who were prominently concerned in the use of the Straits. The essential provision of the revised convention signed at Montreux was that Turkey was empowered to refortify the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. How practically relevant to the 1936 situation was that provision was promptly illustrated, for Turkey took steps to carry out the said refortifications on the very morrow (July 21st, 1936) of the treaty's signature. The three Black Sea Powers, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria, were given free use of the Straits in peace time, while the use of the Straits by the other Powers, not bordering on the Black Sea, was subjected to restrictions.

The important part of the treaty, however (for such is life in its political aspect), was that which concerned the use of the Straits in war time. In 1936 there was still in existence a more or less operative League of Nations. The war-time use of the Straits was therefore regulated with the specific object of serving the interests of those Powers who fulfilled, or in the future would continue to fulfil, their obligations as members of the League. The question suggested to one's mind even in 1936 was whether in the actual event of war the new convention would have the slightest practical effect. All such questions depend upon the aggregate lawlessness of the seven Great Powers of the earth. Japan (who was engaged in defying the League of Nations over the Manchurian conquest) made reservations, before signing the treaty, about its subordination to the League of Nations. Neither Germany nor Italy signed it.

The only obvious probability as far as could be foreseen in 1936 was that the treaty would buttress the Franco-Russian Pact and might lead to some sort of Russo-Rumanian-Turkish-French solidarity. How shifty is the ground on which the diplomatists normally work is shown by Russia's present contribution to the problems of Middle Eastern strategy. But even if Russia had not completely altered the factors concerning the strategic implications of the Black Sea and the Straits, it was obvious that what was done in 1936 bore no discoverable relation to what had been done (though never ratified) at Sèvres (1919) and at Lausanne (1923) about the same matter. It was equally obvious that the new convention of 1936 could in practice have little ultimate value unless Italy could be induced to accept it, for to make elaborate arrangements about the eastern Mediterranean without the participation or concurrence of a chief Mediterranean Power was to play *Hamlet* without the Prince.

Yet Italy was not even represented at the conference, having the previous year been plunged in the Abyssinian adventure to the estrangement of her relations with every Power still bent upon League of Nations principles. Italy's subsequent acceptance of the Montreux provisions would obviously depend upon other more general factors of European high diplomacy such as in fact developed *ad nauseam*. The convention was necessarily unsound because, when a certain

thing depended upon the agreement of all the interested parties, unless those parties were in fact all agreed, there was in effect no agreement at all. Yet the convention was duly negotiated and solemnly signed.

The conference had met as the result of a request by Turkey herself for a revision of the Lausanne Convention. Turkey frankly now demanded the right to fortify the Straits and to make her own provision for the defence of her own territory. The 1923 arrangement had offered the Covenant of the League of Nations as Turkey's only defence: an arrangement that no longer appealed to Turkey's sense of the realities. The particular views expressed in 1936, and the particular steps taken to the resultant treaty, are of some practical interest in present circumstances when the Middle East has become a potential field of war. Before the conference met, Mr. Rushdi Aras, then Turkish Foreign Minister, had prepared a new draft convention, in which the chief changes proposed were that Turkey should be allowed to fortify and garrison the Straits; that not more than 28,000 tons of war vessels belonging to States not bordering upon the Black Sea should be allowed within the Black Sea at one time, nor should be allowed to stay there for more than fifteen days; that the Straits be closed to aircraft, civil or military; that the Four-Power guarantee of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to defend the Straits against attack should lapse; and that the Black Sea States should be allowed by Turkey to send one of their existing vessels of not more than 25,000 tons through the Straits into the Mediterranean.

The discussion of the Turkish draft produced some contributions, especially from the Russian delegate, which cannot now be recalled without a bewildering sense of the deterioration that has for several years been undermining the fabric of European civilisation. The British contribution happened happily to be colourless enough. Lord Stanhope merely agreed that the conditions had indeed changed since 1923, and that Turkey should be allowed to refortify the Straits provided only that an agreed convention on the general problem could be negotiated.

Then up spoke Mr. Litvinov. He claimed the right for Russia to send as many ships as she might choose to send from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and argued that free passage should be safeguarded so that, if the need arose,

has ever been. It is a very notable achievement that France and England should have pooled their resources. They are to make the best use of their raw materials, their means of production, their shipping; they are to have joint import programmes and they are to avoid competition in purchases abroad. The pound and the franc are to stand together not only till the end of the war but for six months after. There is a complete understanding as to the conduct of the war, and presumably on the nature of the peace. It would be foolish, and in my opinion mischievous, to pretend that the task before us is easy: it may be desperately hard and long; but if the two Governments and the two peoples face it together in the spirit of complete and confident collaboration they have hitherto displayed, they will certainly accomplish that to which they have set their hand.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

FINLAND'S STRUGGLE.

IT is now exactly two months since the Soviet onslaught on Finland began. In the early morning hours of Thursday, November 30th, 1939, Stalin's janissaries, without warning, crossed the Finnish border and embarked upon their wanton work of destruction. Whatever the future development of the Soviet war on Finland may be, certain facts during these first two months have emerged quite clearly. And since events nowadays move so rapidly that news is stale or forgotten almost before it reaches the public; since, moreover, facts are liable to be distorted or altogether falsified with equal rapidity, it is well to record some of them now—while they are still fresh in everybody's mind.

The two most striking revelations of the struggle to date are on the one hand the heroism and efficiency of the Finns, and on the other hand the utter incapacity and lack of preparedness of the Soviet military authorities. During the whole first month of the struggle Finland had to stand up to the invaders alone. Volunteers from Denmark, Sweden and Norway only started to arrive early in January. Yet throughout December, i.e. the first month of hostilities, the Finns not only managed to keep their positions on the Karelian Isthmus and on the Ladoga front, but they also wiped out substantial Soviet armies in the north and, in fact, threw out some of the "glorious" Red invaders beyond their national frontiers. Separate Finnish units even penetrated Soviet territory where they caused considerable damage to the Murmansk railway and various Soviet military bases.

When the disproportion in numeric strength and resources is fully realised, this achievement is even more stupendous than would appear possible. The Soviet Union, with its population of 180 million, and completely self-sufficient as far as supplies go, can put up as many millions of men as Stalin chooses to order. Finland's total population is barely 3·8 million, and apart from her forests and agriculture she has little natural wealth of any kind. Thus her supplies of man-power are limited, and for equipment she has to rely on what she was able to purchase abroad before hostilities started, or on what she may obtain now—despite immensely difficult transport conditions which almost amount to blockade.

It seems hardly credible that the "invincible" Red Army,

Russia could carry out her obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations : in protecting the weak against aggression.

Mr. Paul-Boncour for France warmly seconded Mr. Litvinov's contention, and even added to it by stipulating a free passage not only for ships engaged in League of Nations work but for those engaged in upholding any regional pact concluded within the framework of the League. A Franco-Russian bloc was thus triumphantly featured on the hypothesis that the Franco-Russian Pact wholly derived from League principles. Mr. Paul-Boncour went so far as to claim that in the event of war those Powers which were engaged in fulfilling Geneva obligations should have the right either to restrict or to extend the principle of free passage according as their strategic plans might demand. Thereupon Mr. Litvinov, not to be outdone in his advocacy of a good cause, went still further and proposed that all belligerent naval forces should be totally excluded from the Black Sea unless they were engaged on League of Nations work : a proposal which Mr. Paul-Boncour of course at once endorsed. The real motive behind that demonstration was a desire, by means of a paper instrument, to exclude both German and Italian ships from the Black Sea in the event of war : a demonstration that had at that very moment to be adjourned while the Assembly of the League of Nations gave its mind to some of the results produced by its sanctionist policy against Italy.

It is also interesting to recall, in the light of what has happened since, the main proposal made in a British counter-draft for a convention which was circulated on July 4th, 1936. It was called a "new version" of the Turkish draft, its main new proposal being that instead of 28,000 tons as the limit for foreign naval forces allowed at one time in the Black Sea, there should be a sliding scale, subject to a maximum of 45,000 tons, to become effective if and when the strength of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea were increased by 10 per cent. Russia protested both that the new limit of 45,000 tons was too much, and that the sliding scale should not operate until the Russian increase amounted to 30 per cent. (instead of 10 per cent.). The upshot was that, all parties having decided to make certain minor concessions in order to gain their substantial points, a new convention was in fact adopted unanimously on July 18th, 1936, the parties

being Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Russia and Turkey.

Its chief provisions—still operative, as far as any international treaty can be said to be operative—are these. Turkey is authorised to refortify the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Straits are left open to commercial vessels, but the war vessels of external Powers are subjected to restrictions in number and in size. In peace time, except for "fleet auxiliaries specifically constructed for the transport of combustibles, whether liquid or solid," any foreign Power is permitted by itself to send through the Straits in day-time and after a week's notice a force consisting of "light surface vessels, small war vessels and fleet auxiliaries" up to a maximum of nine vessels and 15,000 tons. But such a force is not to include vessels of more than 10,000 tons or carrying guns of more than 8-in. calibre, or submarines or military aircraft. External war vessels are not allowed to concentrate in the Black Sea to a greater aggregate tonnage than 30,000 unless and until the Russian Black Sea Fleet be increased by 10,000 tons over its existing strength, in which contingency the aggregate tonnage of external vessels shall be allowed to increase *pari passu* to a maximum of 45,000 tons : and the maximum stay is to be three weeks.

Humour being seldom absent, consciously or unconsciously, mostly unconsciously, from diplomatic work, it is provided that external Powers may send an additional 8,000 tons into the Black Sea, if Turkey agrees, for "humanitarian" purposes.

In war time and in the event of Turkey being neutral, the Straits are to be completely closed to the passage of belligerent ships except those engaged in missions ordered by the League of Nations against an aggressor, or alternatively, in the event of the League having failed to order such missions, engaged in assisting a victim of aggression by virtue of "a mutual assistance pact engaging Turkey which had been concluded within the framework of the League Covenant, registered and published in conformity with Article 18." In such an event the belligerent vessels of the Black Sea Powers cut off from their base are to be allowed to return.

In the event of war and of Turkey being a belligerent, Turkey is given full discretion to close the Straits. She is given the like discretion in the event of her reaching the decision that she is menaced by war, provided only that she

whose praises not only the Soviet leaders themselves but also legions of their foreign hirelings and sycophantic admirers have been singing for more than twenty years, should have given such a poor account of itself; or that the equally "glorious" Soviet economic and administrative system should have failed so lamentably in its arrangements for supplying the Red Army with food or other essentials. Let it be said at once that the most pathetic victims in this mad adventure are not even the Finnish civilians who are being bombed and machine-gunned by Soviet aviation, but the many thousands of ignorant and wholly innocent moujiks who have no quarrel with the Finnish people and whom an obstinate, ruthless and ill-informed gangster sends to certain death by bullet, frost or starvation.

Yes: ill informed. For the total absence of supply preparations shows that Stalin never thought he would actually have to *fight* this war. He must have assumed that either the Finnish Government would surrender to his threats and that once again he would score a triumph without the least exertion; or else he must have believed that the Finns—dying to be "freed" from their social-democratic and liberal "oppressors"—would revolt and would help him in. Either alternative would have enabled him to stage an impressive parade of Soviet tanks and troops down the Esplanade, Helsinki's main boulevard, and the world would have looked on in fear and admiration. But that the whole Finnish nation would rise to fend off the invading Reds, and that a regular war—demanding proper quartermastering arrangements—would develop from the very first day, must have been something of a genuine surprise to the "father of all peoples."

Hitler made a mistake over Poland: he did not think that Britain and France would come into the war on account of his aggression against that country. Mr. Chamberlain, provided that he genuinely believed in the "peace in our time" effects of Munich and was not merely trying to win time, made a "slight miscalculation" too. By completely misreading the Finnish situation the Soviet dictator has shown that he can also commit gross errors of judgment—though after his adroit manipulating of the last few months this appeared to many as rather unexpected. But perhaps something is fundamentally wrong with the intelligence service of all these countries. Otherwise it is hard to understand how, on the one hand, the

whole world could be taken in by the "formidable strength" of Soviet Russia—as legend had it; or how Stalin, whose spies are said to be swarming in Scandinavia, could have believed in an easy triumph over one of the toughest, most passionately patriotic and united nations in the world.

The sudden Soviet attack on Finland has come as a surprise to everybody except the Finns themselves. Not that the moment and the manner chosen by Stalin, first to present his demands, and then to invade the country, were not a great shock to them. But the possibility that sooner or later Russia might make an effort at re-establishing herself has been uncomfortably lurking in every Finn's mind for over twenty years, i.e. since the secession of Finland from Russia after the revolution in 1917. And they organised their system of national defence accordingly. Despite this latent danger and ever-present suspicion, relations in recent years were quite correct though never friendly. The bolsheviks, for their part, always accused the Finns of being pro-German and of having secret arrangements with the Germans that would enable Hitler to use Finland as a base against Soviet Russia. One might have thought that the present Russo-German friendship disposes, at least for the time being, of this excuse. Yet it was used in the beginning. Since it failed to impress, other excuses were promptly put forward. First of all, of course, that Finland herself was about to invade Soviet Russia and reduce her to the position of a vassal state. To avoid this imminent subjugation of 180 million "heroes" by 3¼ million "clowns," the bolsheviks had to strike first.

In a little poem that appeared in the *Observer* and was entitled "*Par Nobile Fratrum*," Mr. A. A. Milne has neatly summed it up as follows:

Press fury (well controlled), a "hostile act,"
 "Exhausted patience"—and the broken pact.
 Which is the prettier? Stalin, 'tongue in cheek,
 Or Hitler thinking proudly "My technique"?

But, before long, another reason was given. The "semi-fascist Finnish dictatorship" had to be removed forthwith by Stalin to save the people of Finland from their brutal masters. This new reason, by the way, was in glaring contradiction with a declaration made by Molotov barely a month earlier, viz. on October 31st when he said that war is "criminal" if

must revoke the measures she takes in the event of the League Council by a two-thirds majority deciding that her fears are groundless, and in the event of a majority of the signatories of the present convention agreeing with the League Council's view.

For the rest, the Black Sea Powers, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria, retain their right in peace time to send their warships out from the Black Sea without restriction; the international commission is abolished and its powers are transferred to Turkey; the convention is left open for the signature of any Power signatory to the Lausanne Treaty; and the duration of the new convention is fixed at twenty years.

It is a melancholy thing to-day to remember that only three and a half years ago the Russian delegate, on the occasion of the signing of that convention, could greet it with the exultant cry that it "dealt the first crushing blow against those who sought the supremacy of brute force," the palpable object of his scorn being Germany, who was at that time openly incensed by what she regarded as a victory for the Franco-Russian Pact and as an instrument of mutual assistance against aggression between France, Russia and Rumania.

The unfortunate fact is that the relevant present "international law" concerning the Straits in time of war is virtually subordinate to a no longer operative Covenant of the League of Nations, and for the rest is based upon the hypothesis of a no longer operative Franco-Russian Pact of Mutual Assistance—that pact which in its own words was "calculated to maintain peace in Europe."

GEORGE GLASCOW.

March 12th, 1940.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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DR. BENEŠ.

Mr. Godfrey Lias has written the best biography of Beneš,* and a good deal of history is to be learned from his pages. Though neither official nor semi-official, he speaks with inside knowledge, and his story is dramatic in the highest degree. The youngest of a peasant family of ten was born in southern Bohemia in 1884, sought education in Prague, where he came under the influence of Masaryk, studied in Paris, where he met his future wife, returned to the University as a lecturer and formed his political views without joining a party. On the outbreak of war he joined Masaryk in the arduous and perilous struggle for national independence. He has told his tale at length in his well-known memoirs, and it is summarised here. While his chief worked in England, America and Russia, Beneš lived in Paris, where a few influential politicians and publicists, among them Briand, opened many doors. Had the war lasted three years instead of four, all the efforts of the Czech nationalists would have been in vain, for it was not till 1918 that they were officially recognised. The Hapsburg Empire still stood erect, like the ancient keep of a mighty fortress, but already there were ominous cracks, and everyone

* *Beneš of Czechoslovakia*. By Godfrey Lias. Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.

its purpose is to change the government system of another country. "There is absolutely no justification for a war of this sort," he said, "it is therefore not only futile but criminal to make such a war." These remarks were made in defence of the Hitler dictatorship, and Molotov was answering those British spokesmen who had proclaimed the allies' hostility to the Nazi régime. Were it not for the fact that it is a waste of time to expect logic or intellectual honesty from the dictators in red, brown or black shirts, one might ask why it is "criminal" to wage war on Hitler's system but permissible to attack President Kallio's Finnish Republic; indeed, not only permissible but the self-proclaimed sacred duty of the U.S.S.R.?

However, even the bolsheviks themselves did not dwell on this "freeing the Finnish people" business too long. They soon found yet another excuse. Finland, so it appears, was no longer the "satellite of the fascist German aggressors," but an instrument in the hands of Britain and France. The western democracies, so it was proclaimed, wished to use Finland as an alternative front to embarrass Germany by involving Soviet Russia. From alleged Nazi vassals of the recent past, the Finns—and the other Scandinavians who have expressed their sympathy for them in this ordeal—have promptly been turned into the obedient slaves of England and France. The whole thing is such a miserable and disgusting travesty of elementary truth that it should be dismissed with the contempt that it deserves—if it were not for its immediate and immensely far-reaching consequences.

First of all let us consider Finland herself, the immediate and direct victim of Stalin's aggression. Though she is a young republic (since December 6th, 1917) she is an old state and, what is more, an old democracy. From 1154 to 1809 Finland formed a part of the kingdom of Sweden, but enjoyed a high measure of self-government. Like the Swedes, the Finns have never been serfs. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century they had their own Diet, the electoral basis of which remained practically unchanged until 1906; the system adopted then has survived with but few modifications to the present day. And it is most significant that the legal system of the Finnish Republic is still based on the "*Codex Gustavianus*" which for several centuries has been maintained under Swedish kings, Russian tsars, during the

civil war and since the establishment of modern Finland. That continuity is worth recording.

From 1809 to 1917 Finland was a Russian dominion, styled as a Grand Duchy, the Tsar being also Grand Duke of Finland. Up to the first "Russification" attempt, which lasted from 1899 to 1905, the independence and freedom of the Finns were strictly respected by a succession of Tsars; indeed a monument to Alexander II still adorns Helsinki, and his services to Finland are gratefully remembered. It was the last Tsar, the unfortunate Nicholas II, who allowed a policy of petty "chicaneries" to be introduced by his administration. But however wicked, stupid and unpardonable these may have been—after a liberal pause of some three years between 1905 and 1908, a second "Russification" period was initiated, lasting well into the Great War—it must be said here and now that their effect was more in the nature of moral humiliation than practical "aggression."

There were of course some perfectly scandalous instances of political persecution and arbitrariness. But on the whole Russia's interference was mainly in the cultural sphere, where it was successfully met with the grimmest of passive resistance. It is significant, for instance, how many Finns of the older generation know no Russian despite the fact that the teaching of it was compulsory at the schools. Or again in 1914, i.e. when the second wave of Russification had lasted six years, out of the 391 newspapers and reviews published in Finland no less than 274 were in Finnish, 103 in Swedish, 7 in Swedish and Finnish, only 3 in Russian, 2 in German, 1 in English and 1 in French. In 1811 the Bank of Finland was established which has functioned to the present day without interruption, and in 1860 a separate currency was created. Private banking and industry began to grow during the second half of the nineteenth century. Both the co-operative movement—which is so vital a part of Finland to-day—and Social Democracy—the principal political party for the last forty years—originated in the 'nineties of the last century.

When in 1906 a parliamentary reform was carried through, establishing a single chamber Diet of 200 members (which it still is) 37 per cent. of the newly elected members were socialists. This proportion of about 40 per cent. has been maintained to the present day. In the 1936-9 Diet the

realised that complete victory for the Allies would involve its total collapse.

Beneš became a world figure when the victors met in 1919 to divide the spoils. Mr. Lias deals fully with the accusation by Mr. Lloyd George and other critics that he showed himself grasping and short sighted. In the first place he was acting on instructions from Prague, and secondly those instructions in some instances went beyond his own wishes. On the crucial question of the Sudeten Germans he was convinced that if an amputation took place the new State would be unable to defend itself or to maintain its economic life. That the frontiers had been unchanged for a thousand years was a trump card. On the other hand he, like Masaryk, was prepared to cede several areas in the north and west, containing nearly a million Germans. British and American experts approved the plan as a fair compromise, but the Big Four turned it down. Equally he would have been content with a smaller Slovakia. On the Teschen question the partition of the area is defended as probably the fairest available settlement, despite the dissatisfaction of the Poles; for the area taken by Czechoslovakia had a majority of Czechs and Slovaks, and Czechoslovakia needed the Teschen coal and iron more than Poland.

The mixture of races in the new State created a problem of minorities which was never satisfactorily solved. But before we condemn the statesmen of Prague too severely we must remember our own failure in Ireland and the extreme difficulty of combining central authority with local self-determination. A federal system is the ideal arrangement, but it can only succeed when there is an underlying community of sentiment to cement the edifice. Both Masaryk and Beneš were well aware of its merits, both within the borders of the new republic and between the succession States. "We believe that the free nations of Central and Eastern Europe can easily be federated if they think it necessary," wrote Masaryk in the Declaration of Independence drafted in Washington in October 1918. Beneš agreed with him and both men regretted that feeling in the Danube basin was still too raw to create the closer ties which would have been good for all concerned. But what of the provision made for the minorities within the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, where the Prague statesmen could do what they thought right? At Paris Beneš indicated

that it was intended to provide a form of free government similar to, though not identical with, Switzerland. This has sometimes been represented as a solemn pledge, but it was nothing of the sort. Beneš was never Prime Minister, and Czech opinion was unripe for such a far-reaching concession to the Sudeten Germans. Moreover, in Slovakia and Ruthenia there were not enough educated natives to go round. "It would be wrong to assume that he was guilty of deliberately attempting to deceive," writes his biographer. "A simpler and more charitable explanation is that his enthusiasm ran faster than his capacity to perform. Ancient antipathies coupled with new vested interests were too much for him." When he succeeded Masaryk as President he urged the Government to arrange for a large measure of autonomy, and steps were taken months before the Sudeten crisis began. But by this time Hitler's shadow had fallen across the scene, and many of the Sudeten Germans had begun to look to Berlin. If it is unfortunately true that the opportunity of the pre-Nazi period to conciliate the minorities was not more fully utilised, it is also true that nowhere in Europe did racial minorities possess so many rights and receive so much consideration.

The final chapter, entitled "Surgical Operations," tells once again the poignant story of the September crisis and the destruction of the State six months later. Mr. Lias writes with indignation of one of the greatest crimes in history, in which the Western democracies played a humiliating part. If they had informed Prague in good time that in their opinion surrender at any rate to a considerable portion of Hitler's demands was inevitable, and that if their advice was ignored they would refuse support, it would have clarified the situation, however bitter the dose. Since, on the contrary, France was an ally; since Mr. Chamberlain, after the destruction of Austria, had pointedly warned Hitler not to count on our neutrality in the event of further aggression, and had repeated the warning on May 21st, 1938; since the Foreign Office promptly issued a *démenti* when *The Times*, in a celebrated leading article, advocated surrender, President Beneš and his Ministers naturally expected support in resisting military dictation from Berlin. That they were deserted by their friends in the hour of need rendered the humiliation even harder to bear. They were not even consulted on the Munich

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Social Democrats had 83 out of 200 members, in the Diet elected last summer they won another two seats, having now 85 members. The first Labour cabinet under Vaino Tanner, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, held office in 1926. Women, who were given the vote in 1906, have been strongly represented ever since. In the Diet of 1907 their number was 19, or nearly 10 per cent. of all the members; the following year they had 25 members—a peak figure; in the present Diet their number is 16. Women are eligible for many of the highest posts in the national administration. They are also prominently represented in business and the professions. According to the census of 1930 the number of women wage-earners in Finland was 700,000 or 40 per cent. of the number of people engaged in earning their living. In certain trades and professions this percentage was much higher, e.g. commerce and banking, catering and education.

The only excuse for these excursions into Finland's past is my desire to prove that not only has the Finnish democracy old and solid roots; that not only can there be no question of these people wishing to be "freed" from the system they have so successfully evolved and maintained for generations; but that even the old Russian régime—with all its faults—was a haven of justice and sanity compared to the present Soviet "liberators" and emancipators with their machine guns, air raids and incendiary bombs.

No wonder that the Finns, who have shown their mettle again and again, now command the sympathy and admiration of the whole world. But sympathy and admiration, or mere promises of help in this unequal struggle, are not enough. True, the Swedes have proved good and active friends. They have poured in equipment on as great a scale as has been found possible. And let not the German or Soviet dictators and their friends complain about that. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin have given us a sufficiently convincing *ad oculos* demonstration of what "neutrality" and "non-intervention" mean in certain circumstances. Nor is there any justification in the frequently heard remark: "why don't the Scandinavians do something?" Without Swedish equipment all the genius and determination of Mannerheim and his assistants would have proved of little avail. Now, in addition to munitions and supplies, all the three Scandinavian countries are sending volunteers and also much needed medical help.

If future developments allow more active military intervention, or make it desirable, there is little doubt that this will be forthcoming. At the moment not enough is known about the true nature of the Hitler-Stalin agreement to say whether Sweden, Denmark and Norway will not have to fight for their own independence. Nor is it clear whether at this stage it is not more advantageous for the Finns that the other Scandinavians should remain "neutral."

Much fuss has been made about Italy's help. This seems to be vastly exaggerated and to be used by Mussolini as an instrument in some political game of his own. In any case, it is hard to see what Italy, which has not yet fully recovered from the Abyssinian, Albanian and Spanish adventures, can give. A host of other European and overseas countries have promised help. Would that it came before it is too late. The Americans may still decide to lend some money. But what of Britain and France? Their sympathy for Finland and their desire to help is undoubted. Yet until recently they have approached the problem in far too detached and orthodox a manner. Ammunition for Finland is not quite in the same category as if the Shah of Persia wished to buy a couple of locomotives, or if Guatemala were considering the purchase of industrial installation—subject to suitable credits. Finland urgently needs planes and equipment of various kinds, which should reach her at the earliest possible moment. This is not a case where one can proceed in the traditional democratic way—"au ralenti." Happily it seems as if this were at long last appreciated by "the powers that be," and as though an effort to speed up matters were really being made.

The conditions of warfare in Finland are by now well known. For the next three months or so the climate, the *terrain*, and the general physical conditions of the country will continue to be of inestimable help to the Finns. Again the military training of the troops; their astonishing marksmanship and their unusual attainments as skiers, runners, riders, swimmers (even in icy water), gymnasts and all-round athletes are infinitely superior to that of most other nations.

They have the strongest and most truly national government that the country can muster. All parties, all sections of the population are represented in it. Mr. Ryti, the Premier, and his team of ministers are—every one of them—men of proved organising ability, courage and patriotism. This is

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settlement, and the Munich terms were never accepted by Prague. Beneš is now an exile, but we are told that he faces the future with supreme confidence. "He believes that dictators, like the lies of the old proverb Masaryk liked so much, have short legs." That he may live to render further service to the country he has served so loyally and so long will be the wish of readers of this instructive book.

G. P. G.

THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN MONARCHY.*

Sir Bernard Pares has presented us with a most interesting book. It tells the story of the reign of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra. It covers a period full of events which shook the world, from the war with Japan until the Bolshevik Revolution. The last six years are dealt with in a particularly detailed way, and here the sinister figure of the monk Rasputin looms large. The author calls his book a "Study of the Evidence." We have here a sifting and a competent summary of the evidence in so far as it comes from two out of the three parties which took part in the political conflict, viz. the Tsar and the supporters of the Russian autocracy, and the Constitutionalists who failed to achieve their policy of Reform even after Tsardom had broken down. The book comes to the conclusion that the Russian Revolution was brought about from above, by the complete failure of the Autocracy to cope with the situation as created by the war, the inefficiency of the administration and its corruptness which, through the intermediary of Rasputin, reached even the innermost circles of the Imperial family. It is, then, the Imperial family around which centres the whole story of the disruption of the Russian Monarchy. The relationship between the Tsar and his Consort, between the crowned couple and their son suffering from the then incurable disease of hemophilia become the key to an understanding of one of the most grandiose though sinister periods of European history. The Empress was devoted to her husband and devoutly Orthodox. The monk Rasputin, so she believed, could save her son's life by some supernatural power of his. On him she leaned when the actual rule of the realm fell more and more to her.

* *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy*. By Sir Bernard Pares. Jonathan Cape. 18s.

Rasputin, a monk and probably a member of a religious sect given to erotic orgies, represents, though in a somewhat peculiar form, a type often found at courts of despotic rulers. According to the peculiar circumstances, court jesters, quacks or some Madame de Krudener have fulfilled a similar function. Sometimes their influence has led to results serious to those in power for whom they catered. Rarely, however, have their activities proved to be disastrous for a political system and caused its breakdown. If Rasputin's influence could not only forestall constitutional reforms but even be instrumental in ruining the Tsarist régime, factors more fundamental than his machinations alone must have come into play. It is indeed a characteristic of every autocratic system based on a landowning nobility, as the Russian Monarchy was, that it cannot change into a different form of government by peaceful means. A *coup d'état* can bring about a change with respect to the ruling monarch as had happened in Russia on various occasions. The Tsardom itself had to exist as an autocracy, or to break down and perish.

With sympathetic understanding, the family life of the unfortunate Imperial couple, their characters and personal relations, are painted in pastel shades. The Emperor reveals himself the perfect gentleman, the Empress a mother of the Victorian age. Accordingly, in spite of all the horrors and shocking events, the history of the whole period is told in a minor key. The book has been written, the story been conceived with a detachment becoming a judge and an historian when sifting the evidence. Whether the jury of History will accept the summing-up it is difficult to foresee. "Think, my wifey, will you not come to the assistance of your hubby now that he is absent?" With these words, the Emperor handed over the reins of government to the Empress. In no case must an autocrat be a weakling. "Russia loves to feel the whip. . . . How I wish I could pour my will into your veins. . . . Be the Emperor Ivan the Terrible . . . crush them all under you. . . . Now don't laugh, naughty one." She signed the letter "Russia's mother, blessed by our friend," i.e. Rasputin. Her words seem to remind one more of a Greek tragedy than of a Victorian idyll.

Apart from his personal experiences in Russia where he lived for long periods of time, the author has made use of the

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many letters, memoirs and books which are accessible to the student of history. Furthermore, the seven volumes of the Report of the Extraordinary Investigating Committee of the Russian Provisional Government, which is available only in Russian, has been extensively drawn upon. One has to be grateful to the historian for having made all this material accessible to a larger public, to the author for the attractive form in which he presents it. It is a book valuable for the student of history, and delightful to read as a story of human weakness and suffering.

G. O. GARDENER.

ALLIED TREATMENT OF GERMANY.*

Unfinished Victory is based upon a larger work on post-war European history which Mr. Bryant had prepared before the outbreak of war in the hope of influencing an Anglo-German settlement. The chapters now published as an independent volume are concerned with the making of the Peace Treaties, the treatment of post-war Germany and the rise to power of the Nazi Party. The book is, in short, a highly critical analysis of Allied policy which is attributed to war passions and British ignorance of German conditions. It is a plea, by way of historic example, against sowing dragons' teeth at the next peace conference. As such the book is much to be commended, but unfortunately Mr. Bryant's interpretation in some fundamental respects will be very widely challenged. Indeed, the reader is often forced to conclude that the author is pleading a cause rather than writing history objectively, as he intends.

The book opens with a moving account of the effectiveness of the British blockade and of the misery it caused. While reluctantly acknowledging its legitimate use, Mr. Bryant is most critical of its continued operation between the Armistice and the Peace Treaty. He fails, however, to appreciate that the delay in providing food relief was partly due to the Germans themselves. Moreover, it is worth quoting here the expert opinion of Mr. W. Arnold-Forster, recently expressed in his pamphlet *The Blockade 1914-1919*, that the blockade "was not even a very substantial cause" of Germany's

* *Unfinished Victory*. By Arthur Bryant. Macmillan 8s. 6d. net.

continued shortage of food. Mr. Bryant's attack upon the Peace Treaty may be summed up when he says: "The peace which began to emerge under Clemenceau's guidance bore, therefore, no resemblance to that outlined by the Fourteen Points. It was based on no abstract or humanitarian principle: it was not even concerned with honour." It is sufficient here, by way of comment, to recall the view of that distinguished authority Professor G. M. Gathorne-Hardy in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938*, that "there has surely seldom or never been constructed a peace of a more idealistic character." Mr. Bryant is on firmer ground in his criticism of subsequent Allied, and especially French, enforcement of the treaty, including in particular the occupation of the Ruhr. Moreover, his criticism of the League for its attachment to the Peace Treaties, its unanimity rule and failure to provide for peaceful change, will evoke a wide response.

In order to explain the rise of the Nazi Party, Mr. Bryant dwells at some length upon conditions in Germany. During the post-inflationary period he draws a picture of extreme national degeneration. He lays a measure of blame upon a comparatively small Jewish element, largely attracted from abroad, which exploited to its own advantage the German collapse and in some degree at least tainted the body politic. National-Socialism was "a revolution . . . against a corrupt social system" and set forth ideals for which young Germany was hungering. In the light of such conditions Mr. Bryant seeks to explain, and at times justify, Hitler's theories and methods during his years of struggle. It is the author's view that in 1933 the British people failed to appreciate the essential character of the Nazi movement, regarding it simply as a brutal, ruthless and tyrannical engine of oppression and aggression. This attitude was heightened by the exodus of Jewish and other refugees who "were naturally little inclined to minimise their sufferings." Such an attitude contributed to the failure of a sympathetic understanding between the two peoples. Mr. Bryant's views will, of course, attract much dissent. He urges a negotiated peace and it would be interesting to know his terms. It is right to add that he does not in any way condone the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Poland, or the brutal Nazi policy of persecution and annihilation.

not an *ad hoc* compliment intended to encourage them. I mentioned Mr. Ryti and his present Minister of Supply, Mr. Rainer von Fieandt, in a similarly appreciative way five years ago in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW in an article entitled "Finland Revisited."* Then there are the military leaders. Field-Marshal Baron Mannerheim has for the second time established his place in history. He saved Finland in the struggle for her independence in 1917-18, driving the Reds out of the country and seeing his nation through its early stages as an independent State. Then he withdrew from public life. But since 1931, as Chairman of the Defence Council, he it was who built up Finland's national defence. It is a fitting reward to him that the modern Thermopylae should be associated with his name. More than anybody in his country he is responsible for the excellent state of the army (numbering about 300,000), the civic guard (about 150,000) and the women's auxiliary defence organisation "*Lotta Svärd*" (about 100,000); the women of Finland not only enjoy every privilege in civil life, but also accept equality in service and sacrifice.

Among Mannerheim's assistants "the three O's" must be named: Generals Oesterman, Oesch and Oehquist. Also Wallenius, who is in charge in the North, and Nenonen, who is chiefly responsible for the training and equipment of Finland's artillery. Like Mannerheim, he began his military career in the Russian service and was famous as one of the best gunners in the Tsar's army.

Yet another, final factor in Finland's favour must be mentioned: the Finns know what they are fighting for. To quote Premier Ryti's broadcast:

If we must fight, we shall fight to the end—and even after. The Russians will not have a parade march through Finland. We will defend every inch of our land, and every step taken by the Russian aggressors will mean heavy losses for them. For a successful fight a nation must have an honourable cause. We Finns have a high and sacred cause. We fight for our independence and our very existence. We fight for our homes, our families and for the future of our children, and of generations to come. We fight for human justice against brute force, and for all that makes life itself worth while.

And what of the wretched Russians? They certainly do not know what they are fighting for, or why. It would be

• November 1935.

wrong, and certainly no compliment to the Finns, to underestimate the inborn valour of the Russian soldier. But nowhere is the old adage more applicable than "there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers" than in the case of Stalin's Red Army. With its officers who are periodically "purged"; with political commissars, who constantly interfere; with a General Staff of ignoramuses; with commanders who are shot if they lose a battle and who are also shot if they win one—because that might make them dangerously popular; with a poor transport system, often imperfect equipment and quite inadequate food supplies; with all that, and a good deal more, how can the Red Army be expected to meet successfully the resistance even of a foe that is numerically ten times inferior to it?

The aggression on Finland has not merely revealed the fact that this army may look impressive enough in "Red Square" parades, but that it cannot sustain a real war. It has also proved once more the hollowness of Stalin's economic and administrative system. How is it that after the triumphant completion of three five-year plans everything should be in this hopeless mess? And, incidentally, that 27 per cent. of all Soviet industry should still be in the Leningrad district after all the alleged successes of decentralised industrialisation? How is it that for the continuation of this insane war the red Tsar has to draw troops from all over his vast empire—Siberia, Turkestan, and even his native Caucasus? He does not care if a few more millions of lives are destroyed in the process: there is nothing new in that for Stalin. But he has shown the world the weakness of the Soviet Union, and some day the Russian people will have to pay for that. His present friends in Germany and Japan must be watching these developments not without hope or relish.

If help for Finland does not come in time, if by sacrificing more and more troops Stalin finally succeeds in exhausting Finland's own defence possibilities—what then? Ryti has summed it up as follows:

Those who sit to-day in their peaceful homes, feeling and expressing sympathy for us, may to-morrow be in our position unless the landslide can be stopped before it gathers momentum.

Meanwhile the Finns fight on. "*Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour continuer.*" As yet Finland is both hopeful and successful.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

WHAT SHALL WE MAKE OF EUROPE?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN has wisely said that the first and paramount purpose of the Allies must be to defeat the enemy and thereafter to establish a new Europe. No one seems to dispute today that the present war is the proof positive of the breakdown of the peace system so laboriously erected after the conflict of 1914-1918, the defects and fissures in which both the British and the French ministers declare must never recur. In other words after the present struggle to vindicate liberty and to suppress "that aggressive and bullying mentality which seeks to dominate other peoples by force"* we must have no recourse to what has been ironically called, "the bristling parapet of the Versailles peace." Many causes contributed to the failure of the bold experiment essayed at Versailles; two of them seem of special and particular importance and deserve careful study and consideration if there is to be no recurrence of that frustration which has mocked the hopes and the ideals of the sincerest of men. The first is a purely local one. While taking insufficient guarantees against a resurgence of Germany's military power, the Allies nevertheless imposed upon the German people an intolerable financial and an insupportable economic burden. The second cause for the failure was of a general European application, namely the fact that the peace treaties resulted in an intensification of national and racial particularism, without providing a practical working basis for the new piece-meal system.

It is no slight to the Letts, the Lithuanians or the Esthonians, for instance, to observe that Europe managed to exist for centuries without these "nations" being foisted upon its notice and without them being constituted into sovereign states. They either co-operated with or were absorbed by their greater neighbours and somehow they managed quite comfortably to fit themselves into the framework of these larger states. But after our statesmen had proclaimed so insistently throughout the whole of the war of twenty-five years ago that we were fighting for the liberties of small nations—a remark intended to apply specifically in the first place to Belgium and Serbia—the ante-rooms of the chancelleries of the world were suddenly filled with frequently

* Mr. Neville Chamberlain in a broadcast speech, November 26th, 1939.

self-elected "representatives" of all sorts and manner of obscure tribes and small peoples claiming sovereign rights. Some of them did not succeed in forcing the doors of the mighty. Some had to give up the struggle for the adequate reason that their "fellow-countrymen" were unable to raise the requisite funds to continue to pay for the hotel accommodation of these undistinguished "plenipotentiaries." But on the other hand a more than sufficient number did succeed in crashing the gates and in winning the ear of one or another of the "Big Four." The consequence was the creation of a series of small states unable to support themselves economically or to defend themselves militarily. In this way there was provoked a permanent temptation of aggression on the part of their more powerful neighbours. Many instances of this kind could be cited but that of Austria will suffice. The truth is that the basis of a state is, or should only in part be, a matter of race or tribe; what is infinitely more important is that the state should constitute itself a self-supporting economic entity. The basis of Great Britain is geographical and economic, not racial. There is a greater difference between a Scottish Gael and the average Englishman than there is between a Hungarian and a Slovak or between an Esthonian and a Lithuanian. And that solid cohesive mass which calls itself the people of France is a medley of many widely different races. Even where racial dissimilarities are artificially emphasised for political purposes it is still a fact that in times of crisis they tend to disappear. Thus the age-old conflict between the Flemings and the Walloons during late years enlivened Belgian politics and sometimes created a little anxiety among Belgium's well-wishers and friends, and yet the 1939 crisis showed a complete re-birth and revival of Belgian national consciousness.

We were told in 1918 that justice and equity demanded the grant of self-determination to small peoples. That seems a moral principle to which no one is likely to object on ethical grounds so long as its translation into practice can be conciliated both with economic necessities and with the interests of European peace. Actually a rigorous application of the principle *per se* would plunge us into unutterable chaos. The smaller the people the greater its need of self-determination, because the greater is its chance of helplessness in the face of oppression. That being so, why was sovereign

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The naval officer, as he reminds us in his first part, did not spring into life all of a sudden like Pallas Athene from the brow of Zeus. A long and gradual evolution was needed to weld the medieval "Knight-Captain" and "Seaman-Warrant Officer" into the modern "Naval Officer," seaman and fighter alike, not definitely established as a permanent body until the Restoration. The main essentials of such a permanent officers' corps, the securing of the necessary supply by entry and training, the varying forms of service, finally the vital question of pay and retirement, form the second and perhaps the most outstanding part of Professor Lewis's study. The complicated problems involved in the constitution of Pepys' "volunteers per order" or "king's letter boys," the development of a systematic training, the age-long struggle between "post" and "rank," the difficulties of establishing a satisfactory scheme of employment, pay and retirement are admirably set out. One point only is conspicuous by its absence and that a point which undoubtedly has been of great influence in the development of the British Naval Officer and probably the point in which he has differed most pronouncedly from the military officer of the Continental states: prize money. "The influence of prize money upon British Naval Strategy" has been for many years the special

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Under the title of *The Stranger at the Gate* Professor Haarhoff, who holds the Chair of Classics in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, offers a study of the reconciliative and assimilative qualities of the ancient Greeks and Romans as vouched for by history and illustrated in literature. It is a study with a purpose: Professor Haarhoff sees in the mixed Græco-Roman culture and the bilingualism of the Roman Empire a good augury for the future of S. Africa. He is himself a pioneer of Afrikaans, into which he has translated the *Georgics*. It was inevitable for the Greeks that after the first May-morning freshness, as in Homer and again in Herodotus, their very genius should sharpen the sense of the gaps in nature and culture between themselves and the races of the *barbaroi*. Even among themselves their sense of clash and difference was too sharp. Their culture gained on most of their neighbours, but was not a force making for political cohesion among themselves. Professor Haarhoff finds the Romans much more to his purpose. Their characteristic

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independence ceded to one million Esthonians, to two million Lithuanians and to two million Letts whilst it was refused to the 40,000 Wends, who throughout the centuries have maintained their customs, their culture and their native speech as a Slav island in the heart of Germany? It is evident that although the Wends undoubtedly possess sufficient distinctive characteristics to substantiate a claim that they constitute a national unit, it would be out of the question to accede to that demand since they have no possibility of separate existence either from the economic or the military point of view. Recent events have demonstrated that when it came to a trial of strength the small Baltic states previously named were also incapable of maintaining in the economic and military fields that absolute sovereign independence with which ill-inspired, if well-intentioned treaties had endowed them.

In their case, as indeed in that of many another small nation, a further factor comes into play: that of geography. Outlets to the sea are the lungs of a state. That is a rule to which there are but few exceptions. Switzerland for example, where special conditions obtain, has seldom been reproduced elsewhere. Russia is a vast country with 170,000,000 inhabitants with but very few and imperfect outlets to the sea. The principal one is Leningrad. But Leningrad is, or was until lately, blocked up at the end of a long gullet by harbours, islands and fortresses belonging to small states, the economic weakness and military impotence of which rendered them an easy prey to a stronger and unscrupulous neighbour. There was little or nothing to prevent that neighbour from using them as bases for offensive operations against Leningrad notwithstanding the fact that for a quarter of a century no such menace had presented itself. But the possibility was there. Thus in the same way as Napoleon avowed that Antwerp was a pistol held straight at England's heart so Leningrad might possibly at any moment have found herself menaced by many such revolvers.

Even this transparent fact, however, provided no justification or excuse for the act of cynical aggression and ruthless brutality such as history has rarely known and which towards the end of November and the beginning of December of last year set the whole civilised world aflame with mingled horror and indignation. The mistake of the Treaty-makers of 1918,

in regard to Leningrad's precarious situation, clearly called for redress. Finland was prepared to make the concessions which would have met Soviet Russia's demand in this respect whilst still preserving her independence. But with Russian mentality as with that of Germany, there remains no such thing as sanctity for treaties or for the pledged word. Yet such an act of unprovoked ferocity and naked barbarity would not have been possible had the whole equilibrium of international stability not been destroyed by the sheer inanities of Versailles. Ethical purists notwithstanding, it is as certain as that tomorrow's sun will rise that sooner or later the Great Power which finds itself obstructed in what it selfishly conceives to be a vital task, by the existence of a tiny state open to penetration by the great power's adversaries, is certain, ruthlessly or otherwise, to remove that neighbour's landmark and to end what it deems to be a virtual blockade. In the case of Finland it is indisputable that had Bolshevist Russia had no ulterior motive, this end could have been achieved by peaceful means. But the act of trespass, armed infiltration and destructive irruption despite the fact that it was a violation of all the canons of international honour and as such morally indefensible, had been planned during the period of the Anglo-French-Russian negotiations and when discountenanced by the western democracies received the assent of Germany as the price of the Russo-Germanic pact of non-aggression. That apart, it must be conceded that there arise moments in the evolution of world affairs when even a cherished racial particularism (which sometimes is nothing more than a sinful national pride or mere historical snobbery) must be subordinated to the larger issue of international well-being and order. Mass well-being has two facets: the material and the spiritual. There are few more fervid local patriots than the Highland Scots. But the immense majority of them would much prefer to have a regular repletion of food and the other necessities of life as citizens of Great Britain than to toil and starve as the citizens of a non-viable Scottish Free State. The spiritual side is avowedly also of great moment, since it connotes civic and religious freedom, the possibility of employing one's own language and the maintenance of one's own racial culture, art and traditions. But this too is attainable within the framework of a Great Power or even of a medium-sized

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but economically viable and militarily defensible state. For let it not be overlooked that wherever the internal policy of a state is inspired by liberal and democratic sentiments, local, tribal, and national spiritual inheritance is fully guaranteed.

Now let us transfer this thought on to the larger plane of Europe. There is something more important for mankind as a whole than the satisfactions of a purely local vain-glory and that is the economic well-being of Europe. To take but one instance: no one can deny that the Hapsburg Monarchy, whatever its political demerits may have been, contributed materially to the equipose, the balance of power which is the condition *sine qua non* of sane economics in Europe. Its disintegration entailed the abrupt disappearance of an economic entity, the existence of which was essential to European wellbeing. In its turn, the economic sanity of the world depends largely upon that of Europe. To sacrifice it is surely to pay too costly a price for the satisfaction of having a sovereign Austria, a sovereign Hungary, a sovereign Czechoslovakia and inflated states like Poland and Roumania. There are of course instances where such states have succeeded in building up a sound economic life of their own. The brightest example of this was Czechoslovakia. But even so their relative military weakness renders them a too easy prey to stronger and insatiably covetous neighbours.

For all these reasons, the existence of a multitude of small sovereign states on a racial basis becomes a danger to European peace as well as to European prosperity. Moreover in the form in which they were set up at Versailles and at Trianon, they were not even a logical application of the ethical principle which their creation was intended to embody. Reflection will show that there was absolutely no logical reason for destroying the Hapsburg Monarchy on the ground of the sacred principle of racial self-determination and, for producing simultaneously a Czechoslovakia, which under a centralist government in Prague comprised such varied and dissimilar national groups as the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Sudetens and the Ruthenes. In its racial structure the Czechoslovak Republic was a microcosm of the much reviled Hapsburg Monarchy.

If we leave for the moment the rights of the small racial units to consider that of national minorities, the chaos

becomes more apparent than ever. In Europe as she was moulded and shaped at Versailles, there were foreign racial enclaves in Poland, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia, in Roumania, in Italy, in Belgium, in Germany and in Russia. There are Danish and Slav enclaves in Germany; there is a Slav fringe in Southern Austria; there are Yugoslav "islands" in Italy and *vice versa*. The list might be prolonged almost indefinitely. Now the existence of such national minorities is an unfailing source of trouble, for they naturally look to their own national centres which lie outside the frontiers of the state of which they are citizens. Irredentism is the result. Likewise there occur perpetual pretexts for interference by various powers in the internal affairs of other states.

Is there a remedy for this chaotic and highly dangerous state of affairs? There is, of course, no absolute remedy, since there is nothing absolute in international politics. Such remedial specifics as are available are, at best, merely workable palliatives. Before examining what is probably the best palliative balm for this malady, one word must be said of the system which has been suggested and advanced as a sure and certain cure, namely, the wholesale transfer of populations. Of late, Herr Hitler himself has propounded this theory with some resonance. An attempt to carry it into practice has been made in the Tyrol; little is known as to its practical results and what little is known points to a failure. An even more recent instance is that of the hurried transfer of German elements in the Baltic states to parts of the Reich and to parts of German-occupied Poland. The full story of this adventure has not yet been told but enough has been disclosed to make manifest the injustice and inconvenience with which it was accompanied. Anyone conversant with conditions, say in Transylvania, where Saxon "islands" have maintained their existence for several centuries and have left their unmistakable imprint on the country, will confirm the view that to uproot such a population from its habitual *milieu* would be simply to court disaster even were it to be imposed upon it by main force. To attempt to settle and resolve the problem of national minorities by a series of mass transfers would entail such universal disorganisation and incite such dissatisfaction that it cannot be seriously contemplated for one moment. In some isolated instances

gravitas often sank, as he admits, into grim prejudice or callous and ruthless conduct, but these defects were much more than compensated by a steady thread of policy which he calls elasticity and the principle of growth. They gradually and sincerely assimilated Greek culture, little as many of them liked or respected the Greek character. And their genius for political compromise and for a truly imperial liberalism turned enemies into allies and fellow-members in the great commonwealth which, until the northern barbarians burst their way in, did for civilised Europe what the League of Nations of 1919 was meant to do.

It is a tale that has been told before. But Professor Haarhoff tells it with an eye for the big trend in small details and with a minute persistent solicitude for the abiding humanity and goodness of Roman policy. His patient method vindicates Rome with a cogent freshness that will dispose any and all readers to reflexion, and if taken to heart, not by one side or the other in South Africa but genuinely by both, would ease the high tensions in that country. He accepts the differences and the tensions, not as unavoidable evils but as the condition of creativeness and success. Greatness in nations and in history comes far oftener from amalgamations than from "pure" races. The old and obvious tension in South Africa of Dutch and English is familiar. The racial position, however, is really a more complex affair of Dutch, English, French, Scotch and German. These five races make a "nap hand": different enough for variety, and not too different for stability. Professor Haarhoff does not exactly preach bilingualism. But he means it: and the very favourable example of the Græco-Roman world backs his feeling. He talks of the three souls of Ennius, who could speak Latin, Greek and his own provincial Oscan. It might be said that unless a man has two souls, through familiar assimilative intercourse in two languages, he has no soul at all, and is immured within himself. The easiest way out is a foreign grammar. There is much more about the Romans in this book than about South Africa, and that is right. Professor Haarhoff is pointing the parties away from each other to a great ensample. If his next book were a study, in equal detail and in the same spirit of hope, of the mixed race and mind and culture that are in fact evolving in South Africa, many outside South Africa would be grateful to him.

JOHN MURRAY.

THE EMPRESS MAUD.*

This book on the Empress Maud is popular in the sense that it refrains from having more than a few footnotes and references and that it possesses no index; but it presents in a well-written form facts about the life of Matilda. For this reason it may well perform a useful task in acquainting the general public with one of the most interesting feminine lives in the Middle Ages. In many respects the life of Maud, as the author calls her, was typical of medieval ruling families. Born a princess, the daughter of Henry I of England, and married young, political and private life are so mingled in her existence that it is hard to tell where one begins and the other ends. After the death of her first husband, the Emperor Henry V of Germany, she became the wife of Geoffrey of Anjou, and mother of the English King Henry II, who dedicated to her the following revealing epitaph:

By father much, spouse more, but son most blest
Here Henry's mother, daughter, wife does rest.

The Earl of Onslow only gives a free English translation. It is adapted from Matthew Paris' *Chronica Majora*, A.D. 1185:

*ortu magna, viro major, sed maxima partu,
hic jacet Henrici filia, sponsa, parens.*

Through her second marriage Anjou, Touraine and Maine came to the English crown. It was also during her life-time that the Plantagenet heritage of Poitou and Aquitaine passed to England, through the marriage of her son Henry to Eleanor of Aquitaine, one of the most brilliant heiresses of her time, and the founder of the courts of love. (Amy Kelly in *Speculum XII*, 1937, p. 3 ff.)

It is much to be regretted that the Earl of Onslow omits to trace the background of Maud's life, which would facilitate the understanding of her character as a ruler and as a queen. It is equally regrettable that the beautiful seal and coins giving her portrait, although discussed in the book, are not published. On the other hand the significance of Maud's being proclaimed "Lady and Queen" is adequately explained

* *The Empress Maud*. By the Earl of Onslow. James Clarke. 10s. 6d.

where conditions lend themselves to the experiment, it may succeed. Such was the case with the exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities after the world war. But these instances will remain few and far between.

The most effective palliative seems to be a system of local autonomy. In a state which has not, like France, attained complete national unity and cohesion, local autonomy means the establishment of a Federal system. In the years preceding the world war there were, among Austro-Hungarian statesmen and even among Hapsburg princes, some who favoured a reconstruction of the Danubian monarchy along federal lines. Can anyone doubt that had they succeeded in achieving their aim the history of Europe in our time would have taken a very different turn from what it has? Or take the vexed case of Czechoslovakia. Had that Republic been cast on federal lines, there would have been no opportunity for Germany to fan the local grievances of the Sudetens into flames that threatened a European war and which actually led to a total dismemberment of the young state. It is significant to note that when Lord Runciman was sent upon his ill-fated mission to Prague in 1938, the only practical conclusion at which he could arrive was a recommendation to re-cast the Republic upon the methods of government which have proved successful in the case of Switzerland. The proposal was made at an inopportune moment and when it seemed foredoomed to failure. But it could have been successfully achieved in 1919. It may be that an opportunity to re-mould it will recur after the present war is over. Obviously there are difficulties in the way of its attainment which it would be childish to under-estimate. Slovakia and Ruthenia for instance, at their present stage of cultural development, lack the elements requisite for constituting a civil service of their own. But with a little goodwill on both sides, these difficulties can be soon mitigated if not wholly overcome. To-day men in the entourage either of Dr. Beneš, the natural leader of the Czechoslovakian national cause, or of M. Osusky would reject as utopian or at least as impracticable any idea of a federal republic with autonomous states like Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Sudetenland, and Ruthenia and a federal government at Prague. This seems so to them because they have ever before their mental eyes the vision of the Republic as they founded it and for some

years directed it. That mental conception excludes all others. Nevertheless a study of the local conditions, whilst disclosing many very real and practical difficulties, does not by any means confirm their preconceived and may be not entirely disinterested prejudices.

The next question which inevitably arises is as to the limits which are to be set to this system of Federalism. To develop the case just cited: Is Czechoslovakia to be restored as a Federal Republic in which Czechs, Slovaks, Sudetens and Ruthenes are each given their place under the sun? Is she then to subsist in that form as an isolated item in the European body politic? Or is she, always on a federal basis, to become linked up with other states with Danubian interests? The question seems to be one calling for careful and special consideration in each individual case. Czechoslovakia has shown herself capable of independent economic life. Austria has not; Hungary has not. The determining factor should be the economic one. The restoration of the Hapsburg Monarchy as a federal unit may or may not be impossible as a political proposition, but the fact remains that a Danubian economic entity must be re-created. What applies to the Danube applies with equal force to the Baltic or any other region. The principle remains the same. If it were possible for the Federal principle to be applied universally the ideal would be within our grasp. Not only would it divide Europe rationally in a relatively small number of strong political and economic units whilst respecting the rights and culture of each racial atom, but it might in time by a natural process of evolution lead to those United States of Europe which have been the dream of visionaries and statesmen alike and which were sketched out a few years ago by M. Herriot in a volume which, alas! received by no means the attention which it deserved. But in politics principles cannot be too rigorously applied. Nearly every attempt to do so results in their snapping and breaking. There are huge and probably insuperable obstacles to the creation of a broad, all-embracing Danubian federation. One occurs as the last sentence is penned. The Czechs and Slovaks are republicans; the Hungarians, Roumanians and Jugoslavs are monarchists. The Austrians would probably accommodate themselves with either monarchy or republic. But if the Austrians "opt" for a monarchy they will naturally

and so are the cultural implications of this constitutional method of settling the succession of a woman ruler.

in publica se civitatis et fori audentia dominam et reginam acclamari praecepit.

In conclusion it may be said that the life of the Empress Maud is a valuable contribution to popular historical literature which should be followed by many others, in order to make the people of this country even more alive to their medieval traditions.

HELEN ROSENAU.

FOR DEMOCRACY.*

The thirteen essays which the volume under review contains were written by a group of Catholic writers under the general editorship of Don Luigi Sturzo. The result is a most interesting and stimulating book which makes a valuable contribution to contemporary political thought. The aim of the writers, who belong to the "People and Freedom Group," has been to expound the ideas of the Christian Democratic Movement in Europe and to give a reasoned defence of democracy. It is inevitable that a book of this kind is not completely homogeneous in spite of obvious attempts at co-ordination and although all the writers are inspired by the same fundamental ideas. Thus Lincoln's famous dictum, "Government of the people, for the people, by the people," on p. 54 is described as a "sound and sensible principle of government, likely to bring the largest measure of life and liberty to its subjects," whereas on p. 2 another writer sees in it merely an ideal of which the attainment is still far off.

It is, however, in the historical sections of the book that the scholar will chiefly find faults. Historical introductions to theoretical works tend to over-statement and over-simplification, and it seems to me that the present writers have not quite escaped this danger. To say, for instance, that Simon de Montfort borrowed the representative form of government from the Dominicans is such an over-statement, and to say that the German liberal movement of 1830-48 was linked up with Romanticism is a simplification which does violence to the true facts. It will also be a surprise to the student of German history to learn that the Catholic Popular Party in Bavaria

* *For Democracy*. Burns & Oates. 8s. 6d.

was "more social" and collaborated with the Socialists, whereas in fact this party was one of the most reactionary groups in Germany. It is undeniable that the Catholic Church has too often associated itself with the forces of reaction, as in the case of Austria, whose history is emphatically more than "a melancholy history of failure"; it is one of the darkest chapters in the history of political Catholicism. It is to the credit of these writers that they readily admit the association between the Catholic Church and reactionary forces, and their defence of democracy from the Catholic point of view will do much to win over those who oppose Catholicism as a reactionary force.

A discussion about democracy is particularly opportune at a time when the two greatest European democracies are fighting for their existence. Even if the reader cannot agree with the definite religious tenets on which these writers base their conclusions, he will find an intelligent statement of all the problems with which democracy is confronted. Professor Laski, in his book *Democracy in Crisis*, wrote in 1933: "There are in every society little groups of devoted men and women who know that the spirit of evil can be exorcised where there is the will to find the terms of peace, the ardour to discover the conditions of fellowship." There is no doubt that these writers have the will and the ardour of which Professor Laski speaks. This book makes one thing clear to every reader who has eyes to see. Democracy is not only fighting against external foes, it is fighting at the same time on the home front. We have had too many books in which democracy is defended with high-sounding phrases and appeals to an unrealistic idealism. We simply cannot go back to the slogans of 1914. The new generation, disabused by years of retreat and failure, will no longer swallow rhetoric; it wants facts by which reality is adapted to the democratic ideal so ardently professed by its leaders. The present writers are quite aware of this state of affairs. They realise that democracy must solve the social problems of our age if it wants to survive. They point out that such a solution can only be brought about by intelligent and carefully planning leaders. "Democracy must storm the entrenched citadel of plutocracy." There will be few amongst the young generation of all camps who will not agree with this statement, although many will doubt whether Corporatism is really the panacea the writers think it to be.

R. ARIS.

desire that the Hapsburgs should return. Likewise the Hungarians. But the Hapsburgs are anathema in Prague, in Bratislava and in Belgrade. Moreover the Jugoslavs have their own royal House. In addition it may be expected that the stoutest opposition would be offered to the constitution of such a federation by several great powers, notably Italy and Russia, not to speak of Germany which will however be in no position to object to anything after this war is ended. The reason for this opposition is because both Italy and Russia hope in their respective ways to secure the hegemony over the Danubian and Balkan regions, and because a strong Balkan Federation or alternatively a strong and resolute Danubian Federation would place an insuperable obstacle in the path of any realisation of that ambition. This very fact shows, however, the importance of discovering some method of linking up the Danubian and the Balkan States with each other, for otherwise a field of intrigue and conflict would be opened up between two great powers and might quite simply lead to an endangerment of European peace once again. A solution of the difficulty might be tentatively offered. It would consist of the following compromise: (a) that the federal basis should be applied within existing states, or states which are, after the present war, to be restored to sovereign independence, (b) the grouping together of these states in large economic groups that answer geographical, industrial, agricultural and commercial requirements by means of regional customs unions. This policy might be summed up in one phrase: the use of the federal system in the political and of the customs union in the economic sphere. The suggestion is not promulgated in any sense as a final or definite solution but is in fact as well as name a suggestion, but perhaps one grounded in the facts of history and geography. It may, at least, be considered worthy of discussion, and discussion of these themes is not a negligible task at the present hour. It may well be that the present war will last for a long time; on the other hand it may be short. In either event European opinion must be ready with definite ideas as to the sort of Europe the peace will create. Otherwise the fatality of 1918-1939 will be repeated; we shall have a misconstructured Europe as the fecund nest of new wars.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF BULGARIA.

WHAT can be the main impression of a traveller returning from a short visit to Bulgaria during this fourth month of the World War? It is a mixture of surprise and admiration that the Balkans should have managed so far to maintain a precarious but successful neutrality despite every effort to the contrary from outside their frontiers. One does not realise in this country to what extent the Balkan capitals have become a stage for the conflicting efforts of the belligerent and neutral Powers alike. One fact emerges from it all: the deep resolve of the Balkan countries to avoid—by every possible means—participation in the present war. The greatest number of visits from foreign missions, diplomatists, trade delegations, unofficial emissaries from every part of Europe have of late been paid to Bulgaria, considered at present to be the key state of the Balkan peninsula. Bulgaria, neglected in spite of her strong strategic position by all and sundry since 1918, has been wooed during the last few months by many eager suitors suddenly conscious of her geographical position and economic assets. It is to her full credit that her own loyal policy of preserving peace at all costs and entering into no adventures has prevailed up to now over all these international intrigues.

Bulgaria's Prime Minister, M. Kiosseivanoff, broadcasting a New Year message last January, expressed the firm wish of the Bulgarian nation to remain outside the present conflict in the following words: "The Government, aware of the desires of the people, and confirming the lead given by the King, who guides his country with farsightedness, prudence and evident love of peace, will make every effort to ensure that the Bulgarian people shall enjoy the precious blessings of peace, while at the same time safeguarding their vital interests." At another time M. Kiosseivanoff declared that Bulgaria's problems can be solved at a Conference table and not on a battlefield. Official Bulgaria since 1918 has lost no opportunity to prove that the policy of the country was one of strict neutrality, friendly relations with all her neighbours, and determination to avoid all moves which could further complicate the European situation. But during my recent short stay in the country I found it interesting to study the unofficial Bulgaria, and I felt very strongly that no one

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Dr. H. A. L. Fisher's *Pages from the Past** reprints fifteen pieces of varying length and on widely diverse subjects. He describes it as "a modest sheaf of occasional papers, mainly relating to topics of historical or biographical interest, and conveying, as I would fain believe, a gentle invitation to humane studies and a rebuke to the menacing barbarism of our age." It is also in some measure a confession of political faith by a man who believes that the prime source of evil in the world to-day is the eclipse of Liberalism, defined as an attachment grounded on reason to civil, religious and political freedom. No one handles our tongue with greater mastery, and no living Englishman possesses a wider acquaintance with the men and the ideas of the last half century. There is a quiet distinction about his work, even in his lighter moments, which makes it a delight to read. The first item, "If Napoleon had escaped to America," is a delicious fantasy. The massive address to the British Academy on "The Whig Historians" contains a noble tribute to Macaulay, whose *magnum opus* is boldly described as the best general introduction to the understanding of English history and English political life ever written. "The Real Oxford Movement" portrays the brilliant group of seventeenth-century Oxford scientists who prepared the way for the Royal Society. Of the biographical studies, that on Lord Morley is the longest and the most carefully composed, and it will be read with special pleasure by those who knew him. The volume closes with a careful analysis of the first three volumes of Professor Toynbee's monumental *Study of History*. Mr. Fisher excels in such philosophic surveys of all time and all existence, and he is never weighed down by the burden of his far-ranging erudition.

This amiable book† plunges you into a dilemma. Its genuine piety and love for peace fill the reader with grateful sympathy, but its unconditional Pacifism can hardly be approved of. We share in the author's concern about the deep unrest by which the earth is shaken, about economic disorder, unemployment, irresponsible property and fortune, and, above all, the great inner disquiet from which many are suffering. And who that is thinking righteously will not agree with him when he complains about unimaginably large sums being spent on armament, sums which might much better be used for social purposes? But is there any other possibility to-day? The author himself speaks of the violence of the totalitarian States, of the evil of the wrong nationalism which has fallen upon great nations like an epidemic, of the pseudo-mystical race-theory which is nothing but hatred, and of the Fascist

* Clarendon Press. 10s.

† *Mankind Set Free*. By Maurice L. Rowntree. With an Introduction by the Rt. Hon. George Lansbury, M.P. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.

ideology which glorifies war in itself and regards eternal peace as a bad dream. If he then says that war is not unavoidable (he wrote his book before the outbreak of the war), we must object that efforts to maintain peace were not wanting. Proof of the practicability of Pacifism is to the author the idea of non-violence, and he mentions examples of individuals devoted to this idea which certainly make the best impression on us. But whole nations cannot possibly follow this idea. Would it have been of any use for the Czechs and Poles against such a barbaric movement as National-Socialism? And if the author as a Christian expects all for the future from a religious rebirth, he can expect such a rebirth in Germany least of all, as long as Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, and their criminal henchmen are in power. And if he praises democracy for being the expression of Christianity, and does not want the State and Nationalism to be made a religion, we can only repeat that all forms of Christianity as he sees it, namely freedom, self-government, and tolerance for those of different opinion, are completely destroyed in Germany. We agree perfectly with Mr. Rowntree when he advocates disarmament, real union and economic co-operation of the nations, but we do not believe that these ideals can be realised before Hitlerism is stamped out. Without restriction, however, we agree with the second part of the book which deals with religious matters and their ethical importance. Whether you profess the dogmas of Christianity or not, no man of insight will deny that it is one of the two pillars of Western humanity: the second is the Humanism of Antiquity. And we are glad that the author holds—against the end-of-the-world pessimists—that humanity will not perish in ignominy and horror. J. LESSER.

Eight recent *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs** include *An Atlas of the War* which contains fifteen maps with short explanatory texts. They are mainly concerned to show territorial revisions since 1914 and the economic situation of the European powers most affected by the war. There are no war maps of the Western Front or the Russo-Finnish struggle. Sir William Beveridge's pamphlet on *Blockade and the Civilian Population* follows the argument of his article in *The Times* of October 26th, 1939, and should be widely read. A comparison of the economic and man-power resources of Germany and the Allies has been usefully outlined in *The Sinews of War* by Mr. Geoffrey Crowther, who stresses our overwhelming superiority, if properly directed. He also discusses war finance in *Paying for the War*, emphasising the necessity for drastic reduction in public consumption. He points to "increased taxation and large-scale borrowing" and a likely "margin of expenditure that will have to be financed by inflation." In *The Naval Role in Modern Warfare*, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond discusses the functions

* Oxford, Clarendon Press. 3d. net each.

in the country admitted for a moment the necessity of resorting to arms to clear up the tangle of the past few years.

This does not mean that the Bulgarians expect their problems to unravel themselves; but they are convinced that any method of solution is preferable to war. They do not want their wounds to remain open for many more years, but they feel that some remedies must be available in this century of so-called progress. Since last September, however, it would appear that too many doctors have arrived with too many conflicting prescriptions. At the present moment the position of the Balkan States, more especially Bulgaria, in regard to the respective influences of the Great Powers in South Eastern Europe has been profoundly modified by the intervention of the Soviet Union in Central and Northern Europe.

The Balkan States are bound to take account of these influences in order to maintain their neutrality and to avoid the possibility of the return—through external pressure—of the old rivalries in the peninsula. When left to themselves they have always managed to come to an understanding. One can trace all their divisions to foreign influences. The situation could just now be summarised on the following lines:

1. The Balkan States are all well aware of the dangers which are surrounding them on all sides like a surging sea of evil. All the Great Powers of Europe seem to have their own views on the Balkans. Some regard them as convenient sources of supply during the world war. Others on the contrary do not wish the wealth of the Balkans to compromise the success of the economic blockade. A third group are waiting for the clash which might occur between the first two factions, so as to be able to fish in troubled waters. There is a further group who would like to keep the Balkans as a preserve, protected from the storms of the world war, and in which they could replenish their stock, depleted by too many years of imperial or semi-imperial adventure.

2. I need not add that each one of these Great Powers states that it is solely concerned with the welfare of the particular Balkan country and with the peace of the Balkans by Balkan union and Balkan neutrality. But each Great Power would like this ideal to be realised by its own system and methods; and it is only too easy to understand that the rules are entirely different in each case.

To avoid all these complications it would seem to the most casual observer that the Balkan union—or bloc—could best be achieved by the Balkan States themselves without any outside help or interference. However, to realise such a bloc many problems have first to be solved, and the most important arise from the claim of frontier revision of some of the interested parties. I would refer students of Balkan politics to *The Times* of November 21st, 1939, which contained not only a leader but a special article by the Balkan Correspondent, both written in the spirit of conciliation and impartiality which has always characterised its attitude towards the Balkan peoples since the days of the great Bouchier. Both allude to the complication in a situation already complicated, arising from the reappearance of Soviet Russia as an active factor in Balkan and Danubian politics. Both emphasise the danger of neglecting Bulgaria's legitimate claims, and remind us that "the popular desire to regain the Southern Dobrudja, of which Bulgaria was deprived against all ethnographic justice in 1913 and again after the last war, has been held in check by M. Kiosseivanoff's Government. But it is still alive and might be encouraged by a Great Power which hoped to further its own ambitions by playing on Balkan discords."

The Dobrudja question is as follows: This fertile province of South East Rumania was the cradle of the Bulgarian race and for 400 years part of the ancient Bulgarian Empire. Like the rest of this Empire it remained under Turkish rule for five centuries. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, from which Bulgaria emerged as a free nation, the northern part of the Dobrudja was allotted to Rumania in exchange for Bessarabia, which was given to Russia. Southern Dobrudja was left to Bulgaria and remained Bulgarian until lost to Rumania under the Treaty of Bucharest, following the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, when Rumania attacked Bulgaria at the eleventh hour. This disastrous treaty was wiped out in 1916 when the Bulgarians took the first available opportunity to reoccupy the lost province. It is interesting to note that under the Salonica Armistice of 1918 Bulgaria was allowed to keep certain troops under arms to hold the Dobrudja, but that by the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919 she was forced once again to give up the province.

I visited the Dobrudja last July and found that, although

of sea power and summarises the principles of international law relative to the seizure of contraband, the position of neutrals and the rules of sea warfare so flagrantly broken by the Germans. In *Britain's Air Power* Mr. E. Colston Shepherd deals with the general principles of strategy in the air and describes the work of the Air Force. Mr. J. Hampden Jackson's pamphlet on *The Baltic* contains brief sketches of the history and characteristics of the States bordering on the Baltic and sums up the events leading to the Russo-Finnish conflict. In *The Nazi Conception of Law* Mr. J. Walter Jones summarises the chief characteristics of German legal theory and its fundamental repugnance to liberal systems.

It must suffice here to welcome with appreciation the tenth and concluding volume of Dr. Ernest A. Baker's immense work on *The History of the English Novel*. In volume nine he discussed *inter alios* Hardy, Mark Rutherford, George Gissing, George Moore, Oscar Wilde, Henry James, and his influence on the English novel, and R. L. Stevenson. In this final volume, entitled *Yesterday*,* Dr. Baker deals in particular with Conrad, Kipling, Katherine Mansfield, Arnold Bennett, Galsworthy, and D. H. Lawrence. As such this volume should reach a wide, appreciative, if not wholly uncritical, reading public. Thus terminates a great work, characterised particularly by its comprehension and the erudition and vast reading of its author.

* Witherby. 16s. net.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
DEAR SIR,

Respecting my article "King Carol and Rumanian Unity," which was published in your March issue, I beg to state that my version of the King's return to Bucarest in 1930, though it is that which is generally believed in Rumania and elsewhere, and given in all works of reference so far as I know, appears to be incorrect. Maniu, I am assured on the highest authority, was not privy to the plan, Carol acting on his own initiative and taking care not to associate himself with any political party or group.

37 Queen's Gate Gardens, S.W.7.
March 7th, 1940.

Yours faithfully,
ROBERT MACHRAY.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY 1940.

FEDERALISM: A HOOK FOR LEVIATHAN.

PEACE Plans, War Aims, Declarations of Rights, Denunciations of Wrongs, are piling up in the pigeon-holes of under-secretaries and paper-baskets of sub-editors. Meanwhile, the British Public is wanting a word—a word of umpteen letters, ending in "ation" and meaning "permanent peace." What about "Federation"? Are there not Employers' Federations and Miners' Federations? Were there not Federations in Greece and Germany? Will there not be Federations in India and Mesopotamia? Is not Federation clearly a blessed word? For the politically minded public is still mediævally minded in the matter of words, and invests them with a moral value not necessarily involved in their meaning. It is also modern in following the fashion in Words of Power as it does that in Paris hats. Last war the "League of Nations" was the only wear; this war it is the "Federal Union."

Foreign peoples already have their Master-Words of Power. Such are Führer, Duce, and Caudillo. In these the "Power" is obvious enough. It is the "autocracy tempered with assassination" of the God-King, who is sacrificed more or less ceremonially when the dog has had his day. But what is the "Power" implicit in the word "Federation" which will give us permanent peace if we write it into our crossword puzzle of politics? Will it be "Power that like a pestilence pollutes whate'er it touches," or will it be a "Power of the thought, a magic of the mind"? Will it be—to come down from Byronic tags to brass tacks—a Word of Power like "League of Nations" that will only land us in another war? If not, when and why will it lead us to a more protracted peace?

That the *Route Nationale* through Versailles to Geneva ran straight to another German front was obvious to many of us who were working on the first stages of the League a quarter century ago. Our fears have since been fulfilled and the advocates of Federation are now able to adopt, as an axiom,

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the Rumanian population has of late been increased by colonisation involving the expulsion of thousands of Bulgarians from the province, the population is still mainly Bulgarian. I found that they had been fairly well treated in patches, but the bulk of information was a sad story of apprehension and distress. It must be understood that Bulgaria has no pretensions to the entire extensive territory called the Dobrudja, but only claims the southern strip, which has very little political importance and no great riches except potential agriculture. But it is irrefutably a Bulgarian land, and the question has the same importance and should receive the same solution as that of Alsace-Lorraine—it must be hoped without bloodshed. The possession of the Dobrudja is of national importance to the Bulgarians, for without it the Bulgarian ports, Rustchuk on the Danube and Varna on the Black Sea, remain deprived of trade and importance. To Rumania, already so rich in wheat lands, the gain is insignificant; to Bulgaria the loss is enormous. Moreover, Rumania has acquired few of her own nationals and Bulgaria has lost a big productive majority.

After this rapid sketch of the troubled Dobrudja question I must add that Bulgaria has not yet been granted an outlet to the Ægean, despite the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Neuilly signed and ratified by Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers. Feeble attempts of an abstract character have been made by the latter to solve this problem, but no practical, workable arrangement has been reached. After discussing the matter with many Bulgarians one comes to the conclusion that Bulgaria would be satisfied with free economic admittance to the sea on the Ægean coast in conditions that would in no way affect her neighbours adversely or allow the port to become an advance post for any foreign Power. Whether it is or is not an opportune moment to raise the question of the Dobrudja and that of the Ægean outlet for Bulgaria is a matter which opens up a great field of conjecture. Public opinion is bitterly reproaching the Bulgarian Government for their apparent inaction. The Bulgarians feel that, because they have behaved well since 1918, their problems have been completely obliterated from the minds of statesmen and politicians alike.

One must not forget that Bulgaria is at present the only democracy in the Balkan peninsula. She returned last year

to a régime of democracy with an elected Parliament—no mean feat under the eyes of the three neighbouring dictatorships in Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania. For this privilege the Bulgarian Government pays a price—the price of having to reckon with the *vox populi* in a land of free peasant proprietors even when under the Turkish yoke. King Boris and the Bulgarian Government have to reckon with independent citizens, not with serfs, and to rule without dictaphones and spies.

Let us recall the history of the past four years under the government of M. George Kiosseivanoff. The name of this cultured, charming man, educated in Paris, who has spent all his life in the regular diplomatic career, came into European prominence the day a treaty of perpetual friendship with Yugoslavia was signed in January 1937 at Belgrade. This historic event, which ended a feud between two Slav nations of similar religion and economic interests, is the greatest proof of what patience, goodwill and intelligent compromise can achieve even in the most divided political sphere of Europe. It was only made possible by the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding established by M. Kiosseivanoff's efforts whilst holding the difficult post of Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade during the preceding years.

He concluded his fourth year of office last November, and the press at home and abroad seized the opportunity to voice wide appreciation of his work. He took over the reins at the critical hour when Bulgaria was emerging from a succession of political upheavals due to the shortcomings of the party system. This system, further weakened by the results of the last war, had exhausted the strength of the nation by producing constant struggles between various sections of the people. State budgets had closed with heavy deficits, and the condition of the Treasury was most precarious. The new Prime Minister was faced with innumerable tasks—to establish internal peace and order, to reconstruct and strengthen the economic and financial life of the country, to guide and pacify the large masses of the people, to bring about a return of confidence in the sphere of foreign affairs. In a very short time and supported in every way by King Boris, he accomplished this difficult programme with outstanding ability. When one meets him for the first time he does not give the

usual impression of resolve and self-confidence that his achievements would lead one to expect. A kind of lazy charm, guileless blue eyes and a drawl almost reminiscent of Oxford joined to the somewhat portly figure of a man who enjoys the amenities of life more than its struggles, do not in any way suggest that he sits in the first row of the Balkan political arena. But after the first words one understands why he has managed to earn the trust and respect of so many friends. He conveys an impression of dignity and sincerity.

After his first great diplomatic success, the *entente* with Yugoslavia, M. Kiosseivanoff negotiated the Salonika agreement, by which the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly were annulled and Bulgaria was allowed to organise her national defences on a base of equality with her neighbours. Ever since, his foreign policy has been distinguished by its prudence and foresight. The French Yellow Book published in December states that he foreshadowed the Russo-German pact—months before it was announced—in a conversation with the French Minister at Sofia, expressing his fear in that case of a possible fourth partition of Poland. Outside foreign politics his government has been beneficial in every respect. The army has reached a state of efficiency in keeping with the modern necessities, whilst peace and security have enabled the people to settle down to creative work. The economic life has much improved, and I was greatly struck by the progress of agriculture. The land-owning peasants represent about 70 per cent. of the 6 million inhabitants, and they are now assisted by the Government to introduce up-to-date methods. In every district I found trained agricultural advisers whose presence did not seem to be resented by the peasants. In the old days they chiefly grew cereals and tobacco. Now they have added industrial and vegetable crops, and curiously enough intensified the crops that require more labour, so as to absorb more workers. More than ever it seems that every piece of available land in Bulgaria is tilled and planted with crops essential for the national life or valuable for export. Travelling through the country apart from its great natural beauty is like passing from one garden into another. The present agricultural programme as directed by the Bulgarian Government has recently been studied by experts from the United States and will soon be introduced overseas. It revolves round the Agricultural Bank founded in 1903 to enable the

peasants to secure credits, whilst agricultural implements are renewed through co-operative societies. The standard of life in the villages seemed much higher, due in part to the construction of new roads, railways, water supplies, and better schools, and the peasants were particularly contented.

There was general satisfaction about the return last year of the country to parliamentary government, for the Bulgarians are democrats to the core and although they appear to have learnt the bitter lesson taught by the failure of party politics, they are individually as keen as ever to take part in the Government. Last October M. Kiosseivanoff temporarily resigned to allow the King, in view of the international situation, to consult with former Prime Ministers and statesmen. These conversations lasted for three days and enabled him to obtain the views of all the leaders of political thought. The outcome was the formation of his seventh reconstructed Cabinet, and the new Government passed a resolution to dissolve the National Assembly. The general election is now in progress and is being held by instalments. The final results will be known early in February. When the Assembly was dissolved the Government held 90 out of a total of 160 seats.

One must face the fact that a section of the Bulgarian people have not as yet realised the perils of the international situation. Certain groups cannot forget that Bulgaria has been cruelly neglected during the last critical years. Some do not appreciate the wisdom shown by King Boris in keeping Bulgaria out of all the post-Munich adventures which benefited Hungary—and at the time Poland—to such an extent. Some feel that after being docile for twenty years Bulgaria has never had a square deal. During an election every country is vulnerable and open to the intrigues of irresponsible people, but this danger is greater in the Balkan peninsula than elsewhere. I felt in Bulgaria an intense, almost pathetic desire of the people to do the right thing by Europe and above all to keep out of the war. At the time of the declaration of war last September her economic position had reached a stage of definite improvement; since then the country has felt the adverse repercussions affecting international trade.

In the field of international politics Bulgaria remains the scene of the liveliest diplomatic tug-of-war. The freedom-loving Bulgarian people are definitely opposed to the Nazi

that the League failed because it was a diplomatic Confederation and not a democratic Federation. Because it was composed of and controlled by Sovereign Executives and had no contact with pacific and progressive public opinion. Which is somewhat too simplified and superficial. For every civilised citizen is subject to a series of loyalties to authorities—from Parish Councils to Empire Cabinets—each of which under the “social contract” has a residual sovereignty in its own sphere. Unfortunately, owing to the course of the National Movements, of the Industrial Revolution, of the Scientific Age, and of Armed Autarchy, together with the decadence of democratic development, all Sovereign Power has concentrated in the central National Executives. Each Executive conducts its amassed money-power, man-power and munition-power by power-politics. Their policies are practically diplomatic when professing to be democratic, and predominantly despotic when professing to be demotic. Each has at best a diplomatic, and at worst a despotic relationship with other Sovereignities in regard to what has, in the meantime, become a common continental civilisation and an economic entity of Europe. So long as this lasts, whether Governments are Conservative or Communist, Liberal or Labour, there can only be “Anarchy amidst the noise of endless wars.”

“Federal Union,” we are told, is the panacea. It sounds too easy. Certainly, the first transcendental transatlantic visions of a Federation of the World appear to the eyes of experience as either Utopian or Laputan. World Federation at the Utopian extreme seems to be no more than subscription to a Declaration of the Rights of Man. Burke denounced the first and most famous of such declarations as a “Digest of Anarchy.” And, if its sanction is to be the right of one State to impose its own interpretation of the Declaration on another, our Utopia would be an Anarchy that would be a diuturnity of indigestion. But if, at the other extreme, it is to be Federation of the British and French Empires for the imposition of another penal peace, then it is simply Laputan, a dotard diplomacy. Yet both these features of Federalism, the Declaration of Right and the Defensive Alliance, have their proper place; the former as a preamble to the new Constitution of Europe, the latter as a procedure for keeping the peace until it is established. None the less, by themselves, they

would merely aggravate the essential evil which is the rivalry in self-assertion and self-aggrandisement, in usurpation and unruliness, between the Great Powers.

The real problem is how to redistribute over the whole pyramid of relationships between man and man, that centralisation of sovereign authority and that segregation by armed frontiers that prevent the peaceful and progressive regulation of the international relationship. For Sovereignty of the Great Power is the real Hobbes Leviathan—the reason why “the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” It is just as much a Leviathan, whether we loathe it or love it. Whether it is a gangster Killer Whale, with a voracious carnivorous head and a body of hard-boiled devotees or a gentlemanly Right Whale with a head full of stay-bones and a body of half-baked voters. In either case Leviathan must be liquidated. But could The Hague do it, could Versailles do it, could Geneva do it? Why—No! Well then—“Canst thou draw out Leviathan with a hook?” Why—Yes! It could be done if the hook were baited suitably, bolted slowly, and backed by a stout rod and reel. In two words; to make diplomacy democratic you must make democracy diplomatic. Nor is there anything sinister in this. For diplomacy is, or ought to be, only the art by which free citizens or communities arrive amicably at their agreements.

Now, as a hook for Leviathan or a democratic diplomacy, the Federal principle offers great opportunities. It has, so far, only been advocated as a super-sovereignty to which national sovereignty is to be subjected. The objection to this is that trying to do this from the top down the League could not effect such a subjection, nor could a Federal Union either, however many “teeth” were put into it. European Leviathans, like African elephants, will not carry a “howdah”; even though it be occupied by a Parliament of Man. But, as a matter of fact, Federalism works from the bottom up as well as from the top down. It not only works by putting together a superstructure over outgrown States, but also by underpinning overgrown States with new democratic substructures. It centralises small Sovereign States which have a sufficient solidarity, first into a Confederation (*Staatenbund*), then into a Federation (*Bundesstaat*), and thence into one large Sovereign State again. Or, conversely, it decentralises. The United States of

America are a Federation in the last phase of centralising—of federating into an Imperial Power. The British Empire is in the last phase of decentralising—of federalising into Sovereign States, such as Ireland and the Dominions. The Germanic (Holy Roman) Empire has, since it ruined Europe in the Thirty Years War, passed through all the decentralising phases and back again through the centralising phases to the present totalitarian Leviathan. So that, if we wish to use the federal principle to go fishing for Leviathan, we must trim our sails to any decentralising wind and row our boat with any stream of devolution. And, if Federalists are really democratic as they claim to be when condemning the League for being diplomatic, they must begin at the bottom and work up. They must recognise that their own pet national or imperial Leviathan must federalise itself before it can actively federate with others. In co-operating with them British Liberals and Labourites must be guided by the philosophies of Bentham and Bakunin, and not by the power politics of Machiavelli and Marx. While our French friends have only to be true to the tri-colour of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality.

Equality is indeed the rock on which Federalism, sooner or later, has gone aground and sometimes has gone to pieces. This is because factual inequality in the natural conditions of the component Sovereign States has to be reconciled with their formal equality in the new Constitution. For example, the League bumped heavily on this rock. It was on this rock that the last German Federal Republic was wrecked and, from it, that the crazy raft of Hitlerism was launched. When, before Versailles, I was working with Dr. Preuss who was drafting the Weimar Constitution, his principal problem was the military and material preponderance of Prussia. Because such preponderance in the Federation would obviously make the radical Republic a mere camouflage for the reactionary Reichswehr and its Federalism a mere façade for a centralised Police State. But, for various internal and external reasons, it proved impossible to partition Prussia and to establish an equitable equality between the "Länder"—the units of the Federal Union. So the Prussian Empire was rapidly restored by easy stages.

Again, the history of the American Federal Union is instructive in this respect. The "*Mayflower Compact*" (1260)

and the "United Colonies of New England" (1643) were established on equality. But first the French imperialist menace, and then the movement against British imperialism, together with the growing preponderance of certain colonies and practical considerations of defence, caused Franklin to submit to the Colonial Congress his first plan (1754) and his second (1775), both of which proposed representation of the colonies proportionate to their importance; and both of which were rightly, for that reason, rejected. The subsequent "Continental Congress" was consequently only a loose Confederation of Sovereign States. The "Articles of Confederation" left the States their integral independence, subject to certain contractual concessions—e.g. as to treaty making and war making. As this failed to fulfil the first function of the Union, that of making a defensive front against the British Empire, there followed the Federal Convention (1787) and the present Constitution. But this fulfilment of the external war-making function led eventually to a failure in the function of maintaining internal peace. Had the Union remained a Confederation it might have kept the peace between the Free and Slave States until slavery reached its ethical and economic extinction as elsewhere. Moreover, as Lord Acton argued, the Union thereby lost the opportunity of combining the whole of North America in a Confederation of four Federations—the Anglo-German Federation of the East and Centre, the Anglo-Negro Federation of the South, the Anglo-Spanish of the West, and the Anglo-French of the North. If this be so, then Federalism in North America failed of its full development by being diverted to a defensive purpose, which is the mistake that we and the French may now be about to make in Europe.

The Swiss, the American, the Russian, and the late German Federations have all failed to enjoy the full advantages of Federalism from having to form a defensive front. On the other hand the League, which was a Confederation, failed in its function because it could not so far federate as to form such a front against the impudent imperialisms of the Dictatorships. We can best avoid making either mistake if we prolong our present balance of power between Anglo-French and Russo-German armaments long enough to protect the new infant Federalism until it has established itself. Such a balance of military, naval, and air power will be, for a preliminary and

system ; but a nation must live, and during the last decade Bulgaria, like all the Balkan States, had to rely on Germany for the purchase of her exports and for raw materials, and Germany treated South Eastern Europe as her natural trade outlet. England on the contrary made little effort to obtain markets in the Balkan peninsula, as many English residents have sadly pointed out for many years. The eleventh-hour manifestations of the British Council have not been sufficient to destroy as yet the Balkan tradition of trading with Germany. Apart from commercial relations there is no love lost between Nazi Germany and democratic Bulgaria. For historic reasons the Bulgarians are pro-Slav, but most apprehensive of Soviet propaganda in a country where Bulgarian peasants have always been masters of their own loved piece of land. Soviet Russia's diplomatic efforts have been, however, much assisted by the existence of the feeling of gratitude of the Bulgarian population for the Russia of Czar Alexander II who delivered Bulgaria from a foreign yoke in 1877. The monuments to the memory of the Czar Liberator in Sofia and to the glory of Russian soldiers at Plevna, cannot be destroyed or ignored.

A treaty of commerce was concluded in December between Soviet Russia and Bulgaria, but the Russian failure in Finland has certainly stiffened the Balkan attitude towards Russia and has greatly strengthened the position of King Boris and M. Kiosseivanoff in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians were recently referring to Germany and Russia as the Bull and the Bear, eager to devour the Balkan Lambs; but they were also afraid that some of the lambs might themselves be disguised as wolves! Bulgaria's relations with Great Britain and France remain excellent. The traditional affection for Great Britain which began with gratitude for Gladstone should be rewarded with recognition by more efforts to increase trade. With France the Bulgarians are closely linked by cultural and economic ties. Italy's great interest in the Balkans is expressed in a recent wireless message from Rome : "The Italian frontier is now on the Danube." There have always been trade relations between Italy and the Balkans, but her political interest has naturally increased since the conquest of Albania. Italy now likes to be called a Balkan Power. She looks askance at any extension of Russian influence in an area in which she has been able to consolidate her own position enormously since

Germany has been occupied elsewhere. With Bulgaria Italy has recently signed a new trade agreement and a new convention regarding the export of tobacco. An Italian Cabinet Minister visited Sofia in December to appoint King Boris Doctor *Honoris Causa* of the University of Rome. But it is through Hungary that Italy is working on the Balkans. The January conversations between Count Ciano and Count Csaky have helped to clarify the position in South Eastern Europe, in so much as for the first time Italy openly declared that she would tolerate no Russian interference in the Balkan peninsula. Italy has been suspicious of Bulgaria as regards possible Russian influence, but has not made the mistake of taking a most indefinite situation for an established fact. The non-belligerent attitude adopted by Italy so far in the European conflict has been of the greatest service to the peace of the Balkans.

Turco-Bulgarian relations, which have always been very friendly, were somewhat obscured last August by a series of misunderstandings dispelled by an exchange of talks at Ankara and Sofia. But the real *détente* was achieved by the efforts of British diplomacy in November when the British Minister to Sofia paid a special visit to Istanbul to confer with the British Ambassador to Turkey and with leading Turkish officials. The withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Thrace was arranged, and the demobilisation of several classes of Bulgarian troops. After the last distressing earthquakes in Anatolia the Bulgarian Government and public sent prompt assistance to the Turkish people, who have greatly appreciated this generous movement. Regarding Yugoslavia I will quote the words of a British student of Balkan affairs : "The eventual South-Eastern bloc will be as hamstrung as was the Balkan *Entente* if Bulgaria is left outside ; to that bloc Bulgaria is the key. Yugoslavia can help it fit the lock." Any visitor to Bulgaria will be amazed by the constant exchange of friendly visits between Belgrade and Sofia of politicians, industrialists, farmers, teachers and various social organisations. The traditional meals known as "banquets" take place in either capital, with the traditional swan made of pure local butter as the centre-table decoration. Relations with Greece are good. One of the strongest links of the future Balkan chain would be a friendly agreement between all the Balkan States and Turkey regarding the

probationary period, essential, because it ensures the sanction of reprisals. The same sanction that is, at present, substituting a "*Sitz Krieg*" for a "*Blitz Krieg*," a war of bonds for a war of bombs—the sanction that is saving civilisation from destruction in totalitarian warfare. But this provisional protection should on no account be incorporated in the future federal system. The prospects of that system would be completely and permanently prejudiced (as the League was prejudiced by its association with Versailles), if it were imposed by an Anglo-French military alliance, camouflaged as Federation. Partly because such a Federation can have no real democratic basis. The present forms of allied war co-operation, though they may look like embryo Federal organs, have no democratic viability or vitality. They are only unwilling conscripts billeted for the duration on inconvenienced civilians.

The essentials for any democratic government can be broadly defined as common interests or ideals in (a) race and/or ruling class, (b) region, and (c) régime and/or religion. A Nation must have all three; a Federation, the last and one of the others; and a Confederation need have the last only. Therefore the future Union of a Free Federated Europe must be, like the British Empire, a Confederation and not a Federation. A Confederation that, like the Swiss Republic, will have an Executive elected by both Houses and a President from each State (Canton) in rotation. National Sovereignty of the Great Power, moreover, will not, as a whole, be subjected to a federal super-sovereignty. The provision made for this further on is essential; seeing that loyalty to the national régime has become a native religion and objection to the omnipotence of National Sovereignty now borders on blasphemy.

If this is the sort of thing to go for, what is the sort of way to get it? First of all we must face facts, and not reckon without our host on the Continent—those French hosts without whom we cannot win the war. We shall have to line up with them on their logical and limited objective of national security. As a distinguished Frenchman recently told us, we see the world in terms of Empire and Europe, whereas the French see it in terms of France and Germany. While we are all talking Federalism the French are all telling one another that *il faut en finir*. And though we may not approve we

must accept that the finish for which the French are fighting is not only the disarmament but the disintegration of Germany. Moreover, as they will again pay the piper, they will again call the tune. And, as the Germans will again resent, and again repudiate a *Diktat* for disintegration even more resolutely than they reacted against the *Diktat* for disarmament, we shall again, unless we do something about it, have another peace that is no peace and another war to end war. In which war we should fight as an Anglo-French ethical *entente* against a Russo-German economic entity. Which is an ambush for which the Reichswehr and other *Real-politikers* are praying and preparing.

If, however, our Federated Europe is a moral fact and not only a military fake, we can get the voluntary participation of both Germans and French. For the Germans only rejected disarmament because the Allies did not also disarm and imposed it as a penalty. They will similarly reject the restoration of a federalised Germany as a penalisation, and rightly. But they will not resent it if it be a general qualification for participation on equal terms with us and the French in a European Confederation. The French are out to cook the German goose. But, if sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, Berlin would admit in its own dictum that '*ne gute gebratene Gans ist 'ne gute Gabe Gottes*.'

This international innovation would also be in our own internal interests. Civilisation is collapsing. Not only because civilised peoples are organised into Sovereign Powers that will neither restrict their arbitrary sovereignty nor renounce security by arms. But also, because such centralised sovereignty cannot provide democratically the social reconstruction required by scientific civilisation even for the national community, still less so for the new continental collectivity. The road along which we must make our way in one direction towards a better international security is Federation; in the other direction towards the betterment of national society it is Federalisation. This is a war for wages and houses as well as for ore and oil. There can be no Federation without federalisation.

What then, in brief, are the broad principles by which we might fish for an oily Leviathan in troubled waters and liquidate him into oil on the waters he has troubled? Here is a rough draft. 1. The States composing the European

common defence of the Straits. If Bulgaria were granted her promised outlet to the Ægean she could better co-operate in such a scheme of general protection.

The general attitude of the Balkan countries so far is one of peace; to be obtained through a united front or not, is a different question. The word "bloc" as applied to a possible Balkan alliance is far too rigid, and I would prefer the word "agreement." Italy should be able to provide, if not the cement for the bloc, all the elastic bands and silken threads which constitute agreements. Mussolini has proved that a country can trade with Soviet Russia without prejudice to its own independence; he has also shown by his present relations with Turkey how reconciliation can be achieved between nations even across a sea strewn with dangerous rocks—not to mention islands. I doubt whether a more sagacious adviser could be discovered to assist the Balkan States to avoid the traps of war. Bulgaria, far from being a stumbling-block as regards a Balkan agreement, represents the very essence of this agreement. If there is a stumbling-block it can be found in the attitude of Rumania's ruler. Let us hope that the brilliant King Carol will ultimately discover one of the Seven Pillars of Wisdom.

King Boris could show him the way. Born in 1894, and ascending the throne in 1918, he is rightly considered one of the master minds of Europe. Friends and opponents alike have never had reason to doubt the loyalty of his intentions. And of all European leaders since the first World War, he has steered the straightest course. He has never swerved from his programme of maintaining peace within his frontiers and friendly relations with his neighbours and all other nations. I found him deeply distressed by the outcome of war and dreading the general exhaustion and social unrest which must inevitably follow in its wake. He is not a man who allows a haze of wishful thinking to hide the rocks ahead. Many tributes have been paid to his ability, courage, charm and wisdom by the men and women in every sphere of life who have been privileged to meet him, but it is difficult to express his unique, almost wistful attraction and deep, almost poignant interest in humanity. Europe appreciates that King Boris is Bulgaria's greatest asset.

NADEJDA MUIR.

RULING AND OVER-RULING.

THE war raises again the grave problem of the relationship of God to the world and of His activities in the affairs of men. Many are asking "Why did not God intervene to prevent this dread calamity, to spare mankind this tremendous ordeal?" Is God inactive in His Universe, and His very existence problematic? If not, what is the method in which His Sovereignty is expressed, and what is the end it seeks to achieve?

Before coming to grips with these problems, a preliminary question must be asked. We desire peace; but what do we mean by peace? Is it merely the power to go on our way undisturbed, pursuing our material and social ends without fear, and without the costly burdens of waging war or of preparing to wage it? This is naturally our starting-point, but is this all that is meant by and involved in peace? Surely peace in its essential meaning demands catholicity, the commonwealth of mankind, and the community of a truly human fellowship. Have we desired, sought after and prepared the way of peace, so conceived? Is the structure of human society, at present, sufficiently strong and righteous to rear and sustain this weighty and glorious edifice? Obviously it is not. Should not the war, therefore, be regarded as, in part, the Divine judgment upon us? If so, mercy is at its heart. It is an inevitable purgative, a tonic stimulant, awakening us from our slothful contentment, and rousing us to the creative endeavour to establish a nobler order of human life. Our own default and liability must not be overlooked because of the enormous crimes of which German and Russian dictators have been guilty. Let us search our hearts and prepare our minds in examining the problem of the Divine government of the world.

This problem of Divine ruling and over-ruling is raised by religion and above all by the Christian Faith. The concept of Divine intervention has been common to all religions, yet the expectation of intervention *on behalf of righteousness, freedom and humanity* has been, in its full extent, peculiar to the faith of the Old Testament and the New. For polytheism, Divine intervention has been actuated for the most part by fondness and favouritism, even by freakishness, perversity and cruelty. It has meant a conflict between the gods

Confederation must have (a) equal rights, responsibilities and representation ; (b) equivalent restriction of their armies, navies and air forces ; (c) equated populations of less than ten and more than five millions. That is : a Nation whose population is more than this must federalise itself into a Federation of States of a size qualified to enter the Confederation. If less, then the National Government must federate with others, and, with them, enter the Confederation as a Federation. For example, Great Britain would federate into seven Free States, as defined later ; France into North, South, Central, West and East Cantons and Algeria ; Germany into ten or more equal "Länder," such as Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, East and West Prussia and so on. There is the Hook for liquidating Leviathan. Now for the Bait.

2. For a preparatory and probationary period Great Powers, thus converted into Confederations, could accumulate the armament quotas of their constituent States under control of their own Federal Defence Ministry which would co-operate with the Defence Ministry of the European Confederation for its police and protection. If the Peace were dictated by the Allies, Germany would federalise ; but, for a term of years, would not federate its armaments. For a period the armament quotas of its States would be, as in the case of other National States, at the disposal of the Confederation—of which they would be components as though they were National States. In any case, France would get permanent disintegration of Germany and dethronement of Prussia ; also for a period, perhaps, German penal disarmament. Germany would, in any case, be in no way penalised under the constitution of the Federation, and would have equal opportunity for economic expansion within a European Confederation having pooled colonies and commerce, materials and markets.

3. In order to give each Leviathan time to take its hook the new Federations, formerly the Great Powers, would continue to co-operate for purposes of world politics in the League, under a slightly modified Covenant. But the Great Powers would have to co-ordinate their policy as Federations in the League with their policy as States in the European Confederation. Now, as States in the Confederation, their policy would be pacific and progressive because public opinion in such a State could not easily be concentrated by national

Press and propaganda on international issues which would be automatically and democratically regulated in the Council and Congress of the Confederation. Moreover, public opinion in such a State would be mainly concerned with its own issues of social development. The consequent tendency of internal interests to replace international issues would be common to all, and would be combined with another tendency—the gradual substitution of the democratic States for the diplomatic Federations in the control of public opinion and in the conduct of foreign policy. Both these tendencies would be especially marked in the case of Germany, where the new States would be rooted in ancient cultural traditions and would revive the former national sentiment of Saxony, Austria, Bavaria, etc. This would therefore be no artificial reaction. We have noted how the German pendulum swung from centralisation to decentralisation and back again. It has now swung so far and so fast into centralisation that it has stuck there and stopped the clock. You cannot put back the German clock, but you can start it again by freeing the pendulum.

As an example of the internal advantages that Federal decentralisation might bring to the other larger peoples of Europe, it is worth while to see how it would work with our peculiar problems in our more or less United Kingdom. Federation within the British Isles has long been advocated and has lately had to be applied to Ireland. But, unfortunately the motives and methods of this application have been diplomatic rather than democratic. Consequently the results might have been better, and have been, in some respects, bad. It is regrettable but irremediable that the reluctance of our ruling class to let devolution develop normally in the British Isles, as it was doing in the British Empire, has resulted in a civil war, a secession of the Irish Free State, and a setting up of the federated State of North Ireland. It is regrettable, but remediable, that this State should have a dissentient and disfranchised minority of one-third of its population which is ruled by coercion, a coercion that is a cause of discredit to England and of discontent in Eire. Fortunately, the elimination of this old Anglo-Irish *duello*, the enlivening of our English democracy and the ensuring of European peace can now be sought by nothing more than a democratic development of the federal principle already diplomatically established

themselves, or between celestial and infernal powers. It has, therefore, given no consistent support to ethical values. More often than not it has withstood them. For Hindu philosophy the impersonality of God prevents the problem from arising. For Mohammedanism the dominant idea of God as inscrutable and absolute power has led to unquestioning submission to the dread decrees of arbitrary will. For us, the conception of Divine intervention has arisen from the prophets we read and the psalms we sing; most of all from Christ and His Apostles to whom we listen. We have inherited the idea of God as Supreme Personality, Universal Sovereign, perfect in His character, infinite in His righteousness and mercy, unfailing in His Providence, almighty in His Power. He sustains, orders, guides mankind that He may establish His Kingdom by redeeming men from evil and bringing them to blessedness. Above all, Christians have learnt that "God is Love."

How then did this Idea of God arise, with the consequent conception of His ruling and over-ruling the activities and concerns of men? The answer is that its growth and development can be traced and described, but that its origin cannot be explained. Its mark, from first to last, is that of Givenness. It appeared to the Prophets, was borne in upon them, became "the light of all their seeing." It grew, from stage to stage, as a revelation to faith, not through the reasoning of philosophers. Yet it appeals to and fulfils the *sensus communis* of mankind, and welcomes the investigation of the wise. This faith is instinct with reason. It is congruous with the activity of the human mind, alike in ordering the world and explaining its phenomena. Reason in man assumes Creative Reason in the Universe. Without this assumption man is doomed to agnosticism and is restless both in heart and mind under its contradictory restrictions. Though shrouded in mystery and confronted by difficulties, Theism shines in its own light, and the spiritual valuations revealed in and supported by it are essential to the inmost well-being and the outward progress of mankind.

Yet the advent of this Idea of God involved a provisional and preparatory stage of human imagination before its essential meaning and method could be apprehended, and its ingredients could be brought into a satisfactory synthesis accordant with the constitution and process of the world.

God is conceived, above all, by Old Testament Theology as First Cause, as all-seeing and ordering Providence, supreme actor in the history of nature of man. Instead of Carlyle's dreary complaint, "God does nothing," the Old Testament prophet proclaimed that God does everything. This emphasis upon Divine causality carried with it the concept of transcendence, viewed, for the most part, as involving externality, occasionalism, the expression of will in might. The analogy of human causality as operating upon alien material was projected upon the activity of God. The holy perfection of God carried with it the notion of His apartness from an imperfect world, and yet of His supremacy over it.

It was clear to the Old Testament prophets that there is disorder in the world, creaturely opposition to the holy and perfect Will of God, ignorance of and rebellion against the spiritual and moral values eternal in the Godhead. The burden of evil lay heavy on them. Yet this opposition could only be subordinate and could not be final. The Sovereign God must eventually prevail, and meanwhile must restrain that He might ultimately transform the naughtiness of man. Hence arose the conviction "Surely the wrath of man shall praise Thee; the remainder of the wrath shalt Thou restrain" (Psalm lxxvi. 10). Because the Kingdom of God is real it is coming. And it is coming, not of necessity, but of the purpose and activity of God. Hence the conception of Ruling and Over-ruling from above. "The day of the Lord" must dawn in judgment that it might culminate in mercy and salvation.

Yet another note is struck even in the Old Testament, that of inwardness and immanence. "It is not in heaven. . . . But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it" (Deut. xxx. 12-14). So also the great saying of Proverbs, "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord" (xx. 27), and this although demonic gusts may at times cause the candle to smoke badly and even blasts may threaten to extinguish it altogether.

Thus the way is prepared for the great, perhaps the greatest, parable of Jesus.

So is the Kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed upon the earth, and should sleep and rise night and day, and the seed should spring up and grow he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself (*αὐτομάτη*, automatically); first the

in North Ireland. Under this development, England itself would have to be divided into States of less than ten million each that must have not only political viability, but also enough economic and ethnic vitality for political progress. We should begin with Greater London and give it an area adequate for its administration and amenities with a population of about nine million. The City of Westminster would be excepted as an enclave for the Imperial Crown and the Federal Government, on the analogies of the Vatican City and the District of Columbia. This metropolitan State of London would be, of course, a democracy developed out of the present County Council and Borough Councils. The rest of England might then be divided into four other States, such as South England (King Alfred's Wessex), with capital Reading and ports at Bristol, Southampton and the Thames; a Central England (King Offa's Mercia and Anglia), with capital Birmingham and ports at Immingham, the Thames and Birkenhead; a Northern England of Lancashire and Yorkshire with capital Manchester and ports at Middlesbrough, Hull and Liverpool; a small Border State, with capital Newcastle; and also States for Scotland and Wales. The Congress of the European Confederation would then contain forty English members from five States, four Scots and three Welshmen. Elections in all States of the Confederation would be by P.R. with transferable vote—thus avoiding P.R. by party lists which made elections of the German Republic indecisive, and the weighted majority which made those of the Spanish Constitution undemocratic.

As for Ireland, however England be divided federally, we might then hope that England and Ireland, Eire and Ulster, would again be united fraternally. For, if the minimum population of a Federal State be fixed at two million, Ulster would have to be absorbed, either in the English Border State or in the Irish Free State. In any case it would be democratised by complying with the requirement of the Federal Constitution and with the Declaration of Rights of the European Confederation. If you say such limitations of population are artificial, I say that they are less so than those of the constituencies by which our Imperial Parliament is at present elected. The important point is that such a redistribution of representation would end the conditions that have

caused discontent in Eire* and some dissatisfaction in England that the bombs which were expected to be German were, quite unexpectedly, Irish.

To sum up—during a preparatory post-war period there would be either a European balance of power between Anglo-French and Germans in the case of a negotiated peace, or an Anglo-French condominium of Europe in the case of a dictated peace. This would, in either case, in no way prejudice the organisation and operation of a European Confederation composed of British, French, Germans, Scandinavians, Dutch, Belgians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, and possibly Swiss. The Spanish, Italian, Greek, Hungarian and Balkan peoples would be admitted on acceptance by their Governments of the Confederation's Declaration of Rights. Russians and Turks might accede, on the same acceptance, in respect of European Russia and Thrace. During this period the internationalist control of the Federation and its component States over European issues would be increasing, and the Imperialist conduct of foreign policy by the Great Powers would be decreasing. With European issues thus eliminated, the U.S.A. could enter a League that would deal diplomatically with the relationships of the new U.F.F.E. (Union of Free Federated Europe), the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and such Asiatic and South American Confederations as might arise. The dependencies and Dominions of the European Empires would have their places either under the European Confederation or in the World League. With its basis thus broadened to extend from regulation of super-sovereign Confederations on the one side, to representation of cosmopolitan citizens on the other, it might reasonably be hoped that, following the Federal principle, the League would eventually develop an authority and action that would be democratic rather than diplomatic. We might thus view as not wholly vain our larger vision of a "Parliament of Man and Federation of the World."

* The Irish case, as stated by Captain Harrison and cited by Mr. Villard (*New York Nation*, February 17th, 1940), is appended: "What does Eire want England to do? The answer is that England should terminate the unconstitutional oppression of the Nationalist or Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and all financial support of the partition of Ireland by direct and indirect subsidies. Northern Ireland might then become an undifferentiated fragment of the United Kingdom if it so desired. There is little doubt however that, sooner or later, it would be joined to the parent body of Ireland on fair and freely negotiated terms, as soon as it ceases to be a British imperial interest (whether avowedly or covertly pursued) to keep Ireland divided by fomenting religious difficulties."

blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear. But when the fruit is brought forth, he putteth in the sickle, because the harvest is come (St. Mark, iv. 26-29).

This is to substitute the concepts of life and process, of immanent and unconquerable vitality, for those of externality and intervention in the ever-active and eventually triumphant purposiveness of God. The poetry of the parable embodies, while transforming, the message of the Prophets. For the apparent carelessness of the farmer is the mark of his confident mastery. Personality and purpose dominate the whole. The selection of the seed and its casting on the earth, the preparation of the soil, the acceptance of the risk, the confidence in the process, the alertness when the harvest is ripe, all imply and indeed assert personal activity and supervision. Only the personal qualities, the experience and labour of the farmer, account for his freedom from anxiety, impulse and impatience. So, says our Lord, is the purposive activity of God. His wisdom wills the process, because His activity pervades the whole. The parable can only suggest what our Lord intended to convey, that God is not only transcendent over, but immanent in the initiation of the process, in all its conditions, and in the spiritual sovereignty which insures the final result. As holy Love He is Himself the seed.

The same conception of Divine activity throughout a process that is immanent because it is transcendent, that is spiritual yet all-embracing, is expressed by St. Paul in a great passage in the Epistle to the Colossians. Of the Son of God, become incarnate as the Christ, he says, "For through Him, and unto Him are all things: and He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together" (i. 17, 18). This momentous saying is illustrated and supported by the fact made patent at the present time that anti-Christian influence is responsible for the calamitous disorder of the world and for the relapse of great nations into barbarism. The universe is organic with man, and man, in the truth and intent of his being, is organic with Christ. Christ is the forthgoing of God. The dynamic energy of the universe that directs and pervades its evolution is first of all spiritual that it may become material, and that the material may thereby serve the consummation of the spiritual. The Apostle's gospel of redemption involves for him a prior gospel of Creation. The spiritual values which are becoming manifest in history have their

source, their vitality and the secrets of their process in the eternal. On a lower level Professor Whitehead declares that "the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life" (*Modes of Thought*, p. 96). Thus the personality, the creative activity, the providential direction and guidance which were proclaimed by the Old Testament prophets stand unshaken. It is the method by which these attain their end, the method of immanence—the activity of sovereign spiritual energy—that has been revealed and illuminated by Christ.

On reflection it will be seen that if God be indeed Supreme Personality, inactivity and aloofness must be foreign to His nature. It is of the essence of personality that it should go forth from itself in self-giving, in order that it may return to itself in satisfaction. The going forth of Divine creativity must, however, be accordant with the Personality of God. It must aim at the origination, the advent and the advancement of creaturely personalities in fellowship with Himself. His ways must be consonant with His nature and His end.

If this assumption be true, it involves that God should stand back, so to say, like the farmer of the parable, from His creation, in order that free personalities in society may come into being, with all the responsibilities and risks of their freedom. The standing back of God is the condition of His deeper indwelling, His profounder influence, His spiritual Self-giving as Love. The conception of occasional intervention is altogether too crude, too external and superficial, to represent the truth. Even the familiar lines of Tennyson, while suggestive are inadequate,

Closer is He than breathing,
And nearer than hands and feet.

God has intervened (though even here the word is so inadequate as to be somewhat misleading) to give the revelation of the nature and method of His redemptive activity in our Lord Jesus Christ, Whose advent in the "fullness of the times" was the culmination of the universal activity of God in the previous history of mankind. The continuity of this activity, its sphere and its efficacy are revealed in the pervasive energy of the Spirit of Christ. Hence the realm in which God exerts His Fatherly kingship is in the hearts of men, though in them, not as separate from the Universe,

It is a principle both of diplomacy and democracy that a problem which is insoluble, when presented in principle, will solve itself by an appropriate procedure. It seems to me, as a professional diplomat for twenty years and a practising democrat for another twenty, that we have such a procedure in thus transferring the problem of peace from the international relations of diplomacy to the internal relationship of democracy. Diplomacy can never impose in the international relationship the necessary restriction of arbitrary sovereignty and renunciation of armed security. Transfer the task to the internal national relationships, and each democracy will evolve its own solution. It is federation by democracy that has enabled our Empire to become a power for peace. Federation by democracy would save Europe from another international war and England from another internecine war.

Finally, what hope is there of getting Germans so to react against Hitlerism as to become progressive and peaceful Saxons, Bavarians, and so forth? What hope of getting Paris to devolve power to cantonal capitals at Lyons, Marseilles, and so forth? What hope of getting our ruling class so to repent of its hatred for "Home Rule" as to relieve the English from being ruled by Celts and to renounce England's rule over Celtic countries? The answer is that in peace the hope would be about that of getting butter out of a dog's mouth or of making a snowball in Hell. But in war all things are possible. Six months of war has made German, French and British sick of the soulless, senseless, National-Socialism of war censorships and controls and sighing for the real protection of collective security and the progress of really socialised communities. We have had to swallow in our hearts and by our hearths such caravans of camels that we are not likely to strain at a few more gnats getting Home Rule. War will in any case end in disintegration and disillusionment. Disintegration that is planned and purposeful will be a protection. Disillusionment may be something better than a death-bed repentance. To quote the latest Encyclical of Pius XII: "Hours of disillusionment are often hours of Grace."

GEORGE YOUNG.

IMPRESSIONS OF A BALKAN JOURNEY.

CONTACT with our Continental neighbours is always delightful and instructive, but in times like the present when we are isolated and when our news is coloured by the circumstances, the opportunity of meeting neutrals is doubly precious. Of these, the Balkan peoples are not the least interesting. Not only have they the same preoccupations as other neutrals, but their position and resources make them of importance in the economic and perhaps the strategic war. My recent journey was to Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Cernauti, Cluj, and home by Venice, Rome and Florence. I propose first to set down my impressions, which are necessarily incomplete and subject to correction by better knowledge, and reserve to the end a few general observations which I believe to be accurate.

Not long ago the Balkan States seemed to be chiefly concerned with their mutual relations. Roumania had the task of satisfying her minorities and opposing Hungarian and Bulgarian claims. Yugoslavia faced the problem of consolidating a triune kingdom. Bulgaria had her demands for a Mediterranean outlet and the return of the Southern Dobrudja. All these questions affected the peninsula alone, and the creation of the Balkan *entente* together with the assurances given by Bulgaria, appeared to promise peace and quiet. The Russia of Litvinov seemed to be a pacifying factor and Italy was not considered important by the Western Balkans. Yugoslavia alone had been directly touched when the *Anschluss* gave her a border with the Nazis. Further, the creation of the Axis made her position still more difficult and drove her to come to terms with Italy, now Germany's partner.

The events of the autumn: the Polish war, the German-Russian agreement and the Allies' war of course affected all the Balkan States, but in different ways. I will begin with Yugoslavia, as that was my first call. The effect of the obvious external danger was to consolidate the country. An agreement was made with the Croats and Machek is now thought to have his compatriots in hand. Despite this, however, there is no date fixed for the elections; party feeling still runs too high.

but as organic with the Whole. The universe is both their environment and their instrument. Its situations and occasions enable, condition and adjust their activities. Within the depths of the human spirit God speaks and acts, inspiring and illuminating, converting and enabling prophets that they may arouse and guide men, turning their hearts to His righteousness, wisdom and love. He influences and inspires mankind through His immanent access to the hearts and minds of men, to their faith, their consciences, their reason. The real battleground is not on the stricken field where armies are massed, but in the hearts of men. There, thanks to the living Spirit of God, the spiritual values have the vitality, the tenacity and the eventual overcoming of the seed. Conditioned by the universe itself, they manifest its meaning and end.

If this be true, Ruling and Over-ruling are two allied manifestations and dealings of one ceaseless and immanent activity. The meaning and authority of the spiritual values, by which and for which alone mankind can truly live, become more fully realised in their reaction against the insurgent forces of the world, the flesh and the devil. Their fuller realisation will ensure their final triumph. As His Holiness the Pope has so impressively said in his recent Encyclical,

It is quite true that power based on such weak and unsteady foundations can attain at times under chance circumstances material successes apt to arouse wonder in superficial observers. But the moment comes when the inevitable law triumphs and strikes down everything constructed upon a hidden or open disproportion between the greatness of the material and outward success and the weakness of the inward value of its moral foundation.

The persistent though trembling hope expressed in the lament of the Chorus in the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus, "Notwithstanding may the good prevail!" (τὸ δ' ἔτι νικάτω) has become the sure confidence of the Christian faith. In the dire conflict between Christ and anti-Christ described in the *Apocalypse*, when the forces of anti-Christ appear to be overwhelming, the shout goes up to heaven, "The kingdoms of this world are become the Kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ." The struggle is costly, the process is prolonged, but the issue is assured. Men, like Christ, must be "made perfect through suffering."

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

POLAND'S NEW LEADERS.

IT is not easy to-day to write about Poland's hopes for the future. However well founded they may be, the tragedy of what is happening every day on the banks of the Vistula, where the Nazi conquerors are wielding their bestial rule, is so overwhelming that one is too oppressed by the martyrdom of the present to be able to enjoy the anticipation of a brighter future. Yet the hopes are there, and one is certain that the darkness of to-day must be followed by the light of to-morrow, unless European civilisation is destroyed for ever. And no one believes that that can happen. It is also difficult to write about Polish problems. But it is a hundred times more difficult to work out to-day the future solutions of these problems, to inspire the inmates of the vast concentration camp on the Vistula with courage and fortitude, and at the same time prepare practical measures against the day of Poland's resurrection. That, however, is the task with which a group of Poles have charged themselves. They are the members of the new Polish Government, which functions in exile, in the old town of Angers in France.

The world may perhaps be under-estimating the significance of the fact that the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen a people, the complete defeat of Poland by Nazi Germany, has not affected the legal continuity of the Polish Government. The former President, Professor Mościcki, has exercised a constitutional right in nominating a successor. He has handed over his difficult office to Władysław Raczkiewicz. This might be expressed in another way: that a Polish emigrant in Roumania has transferred his power to another Polish emigrant in Paris, and President Raczkiewicz acted under a living Constitution in appointing a new Government to replace the Składkowski-Beck-Smigly Rydz Government. The new Government is the lawful guardian of the continuity of Poland's political life in overwhelmingly tragic circumstances; it is zealously endeavouring, and is to all appearances fully competent, to preserve the symbols of Poland's national existence until it becomes a reality once more. It came into being without fuss, without spectacle; its members are all men who want only to serve. They are all conscious of the immense national and historical significance attached to their heavy task.

Hitler's new friendship with Stalin indirectly brought comfort to Belgrade, because of the strain it put on the Axis. It was no longer to be assumed that Germany and Italy were in close accord. Italy's position became more independent. That is not to say that Yugoslavia felt safe. She remembers the entirely unannounced invasion of Albania, and even if Rome took up a position definitely favouring the Allies, Serbs would wonder if it implied some secret agreement, possibly at their expense. For this suspicion there is, of course, no ground. But the Moscow accord had other effects. The people, as Slavs, have a mystic love of Russia, yet Belgrade has never received a Soviet Ambassador and Russian activity can only be an embarrassment. It revives the old mistrust of Bulgaria and indeed some Serbs look on the Molotov-Ribbentrop scheme as just the sort of thing that might have been concocted at Sofia.

The Serbs are glad to feel that the Blockade has not been affecting their trade; and further they believe that Germany will remain satisfied with their deliveries. They demand, of course, payment, but the latest agreement about pre-war bonds shows how easily accounts can be adjusted. Yugoslavia thinks—it may be wishful thinking—that Germany will always find it more profitable to leave her alone and views anxiously anything that would seem to be opening a Balkan front. She does not wish to be the one to provoke a hitherto invincible military machine. At the same time there is no doubt whatever as to where the heart lies. In Croatia we have always had the warmest of friends, but this year Belgrade was every bit as warm as was Zagreb three years ago.

In Sofia there is a much greater feeling of reserve. The Bulgars consider they have been ill rewarded for their very correct behaviour. In the Second Balkan and Great Wars they lost heavily. They have faithfully observed the severe terms of the peace treaties, and yet no recognition of all this seems to have been given, not even an organised attempt to rescue them from the German trade monopoly. Germany is a vital market, and naturally the Bulgars would not like to see it ruined in a disastrous defeat. But that is not to say they are pro-German. They may be too far off to fear the subjugation the Czechs have experienced, but they remember how they were exploited by their ally in the last war. Further, leaders who have been to Berlin have come back disappointed. For

these reasons Bulgaria believes she will do better, in the event of trouble, to preserve a loyal attitude to her neighbours. The students' demonstrations some time since for an attack on the Dobrudja were defeated, with the assistance of the present Prime Minister, then Rector of the University. Under his guidance Parliament is again meeting. There are no parties, but about twenty deputies consider themselves in opposition. The speaker, a non-political lawyer of distinction, said they hated Fascism, Communism and Nazism alike. They were determined on neutrality and wished their correct behaviour had been recognised. Why for example had they had no help to secure their outlet on the *Ægean*? Here, of course, Russia means much more even than in Yugoslavia—Russia the Emancipator. If she fell on Bessarabia she would liberate Bulgarians there, and the Dobrudja would follow. This would mean a Bulgaria in the Soviet circle, and it might be a means for Russia to reach the Mediterranean. But for these very reasons anti-Bolshevik Bulgarians fear Russian plans, rejoice in the assembly of a force in the Near East and would hope to see it active.

The railway line from Sofia to Rustchuk on the Danube passes through a mountainous country dotted with villages and townships which looked very beautiful in the snow. The river of course was frozen and the steam ferry in which the crossing is made lay listed over, fixed in the ice. During the hard frost the passage is made in large flat-bottomed boats used as sledges. For some reason the craft which should have left the Bulgarian shore was not available, and I was told that under the rules, passengers from Bulgaria should cross in a Bulgarian boat and those from Roumania in a Roumanian boat—a striking instance of the protection of coastwise shipping. However, an exception was made and we awaited the arrival of a craft which we could see on the ice approaching from the opposite bank.

Perhaps the reason for the exception was that the ice was melting and our crossing could not be delayed. Accordingly the Roumanian Consul (an old friend of an earlier visit) and I, heavily wrapped in rugs, took our places and with fourteen men harnessed to ropes or shoving at the gunwales of the boat we began the return journey. The twilight, the sea of lumpy ice, the bright electric lights of the two stations, Giurgui and Rustchuk, and the chanties of the team, made up

But let them speak for themselves and tell us how they view their duty. Here is a passage from the Manifesto which the new Government addressed to the Polish people on December 18th, 1939 :

The Government recognise as fundamental the principle that the source of power in Poland is the Polish people. The Government are only an instrument of the authority of the nation and of its united will, and their duty is to serve the nation. . . . While not wishing to judge in advance what should be the structure of the Polish State, the Government affirm that Poland will take its stand on the side of Christian principles and civilisation ; Poland will be a democratic State. . . .

What are the principal tasks of this unique Government, which, incidentally, has been recognised not only by the Allies, but also by the majority of neutrals ? What are its tasks, in addition to the most important one of preserving and guarding the symbols of Polish nationhood ? Above all, the new Polish Government considers it its duty to contribute to ultimate victory by organising the available Polish manpower. Poland is temporarily under a foreign yoke, but there are still Poles fighting on the side of Britain and France on land, sea and in the air. There is a new, modern Polish army, inspired with an ardent patriotic spirit, actually in training on French soil. The Poles living in the Allied countries have received a call from the Angers Government to join this army, and soon there will be contingents of volunteers from the United States, Canada and other countries. The new Polish army will take its place on the Maginot line, or wherever it may be required, and will, no doubt, prove to be a worthy successor to the Polish champions of freedom in the nineteenth century, the Polish Legion of Pilsudski and the heroic defenders of Warsaw in September 1939. A sure triumph awaits the new Polish Army at the end of the war : its return to a liberated Poland.

The Polish fleet, which was fortunate enough to escape, is actively collaborating with the British fleet. Polish destroyers have already distinguished themselves and earned high praise, while the skill and daring of the Polish submarines in eluding the German Fleet in the Baltic have aroused the admiration of the world. In addition, there is a considerable body of Polish airmen who are impatiently waiting for their chance to serve

in the war. They, too, managed to escape and struggled to England or France. They will be incorporated in the Royal Air Force and the French Air Force.

A brief sketch of the careers of the men of Angers may be of interest to the British reader. President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz is 65 years old. He studied law and mathematics at the Universities of St. Petersburg and Dorpat and became an advocate. In 1914 he was called up into the Russian Army as a reserve officer, but from the year 1917 he played a prominent rôle in the organisation of the Polish military units in Russia. After the war he was twice Minister of the Interior, then Marshal of the Senate, and several times *Voivod*, or Governor, of various Polish provinces. In addition he rendered valuable services as President of the Polish Associations in foreign countries.

General Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in France, is now 69 years old. He is a graduate of the Polytechnic School in Lwów. He directed the regulation work of the Vistula. During the Great War he commanded the Third Regiment of Pilsudski's Legion. In the early 1920's he was Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, then Prime Minister and Home Secretary and, finally, Prime Minister. He is one of the best Polish strategists, and the author of numerous strategical and political works in Polish and French. He is a staunch democrat, and a determined opponent not only of dictatorship, but also of anything that savours of totalitarianism and even authoritarianism. This brought him—one of Pilsudski's most brilliant soldiers—into conflict with the then all-powerful Pilsudski bloc, with the result that, although as a publicist his warning voice found a strong echo in the country, he was excluded from the Government.

August Zaleski, Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of General Sikorski, son of a Polish squire, is 57 years old. He was educated in Poland and at the London School of Economics. During the Great War he was active for the Polish cause in France and Britain. He was editor of the *Polish Review* in London (1917-18) and wrote *Landmarks of Polish History*, which appeared in London in 1917. After 1918 he was charged with important diplomatic tasks, while from 1926 until 1932 he was Polish Foreign Minister, in which office he was followed

a fascinating scene. As we neared the Roumanian shore the surface got thinner and one of our men went through. His fellow who moved to help him, of course went through too. In the general excitement the boat began to heel, and it looked as if we were all for a dip; but poles and ropes from the bank soon drew out the victims and we landed dry.

Marked changes have taken place since I was last here, a few years ago. The riverside stations have been rebuilt and a train ferry is to operate this spring. The saving of time and labour in the journey from Sofia to Bucharest will be very great. More important still the institution of the ferry is a welcome evidence of the great improvement of late years in the relations between Bulgaria and Roumania. Perhaps there will be a bridge before long. Bucharest has much changed and is still changing. Houses have been removed, open spaces made, new buildings are rising everywhere. For instance the Royal Palace, with its new wing, now faces the makings of a large square. Germans are everywhere and the hotel posts a courteous notice begging that political discussions shall not take place. But *Heils* are common, and it is hard to distinguish between the stiff Nazi salute and the crooked arm of the Roumanian greeting. I was not so fortunate as to see any parades of the Renaissance Front, but in their offices the Ministers wear the brilliant blue uniform. At other times they discard it. Indeed the regimentation beloved of the Germans seems not to suit Latin peoples—this can be noticed in Italy—however much they are attracted by the colour and glitter. For the foreigner, living is very cheap in Roumania, far cheaper than in any of the other five countries through which I passed.

I was glad to know that in addition to Bucharest I was to visit Cernauti in the Bukovina and Cluj in Transylvania. Both are acquisitions of the Great War, the first from Austria, the second from Hungary. They afford the usual contrast between lands which enjoyed the liberal rule of Vienna and those which bore the harder Magyar yoke. This difference is to be remarked in many parts of the dismembered empire. The journey to Cernauti revealed the energy which is being displayed in the defence of the country. The train, which I was told was usually empty, was now filled with officers; very charming and approachable and preferring to speak, as many of them could, English even to French. Active work on

the line, which is partly single track, and on the bridges was in progress, and we passed train loads of troops, fine healthy peasants well clothed in homespun. They whiled away the time of waiting with country dances. Some of their transports were just simple wooden farm wagons. Stations and bridges were everywhere closely guarded.

Cernauti itself lay in deep snow, very attractive with the sledges and their bells under the clear sky and in the bright street lights. The show-piece of the town is the Palace of the Metropolitan, a large modern building, designed I was told by a Czech architect. Its central feature is a marble hall in which the independence of the Bukovina was proclaimed after the Great War. Cernauti has a very mixed population. There are many Jews, and the general feeling is very warmly with the Allies. Of that there could be no doubt whatever. Its most recent memories are of the flight of the Polish Government when, for a spell, it looked as if Roumania was to have Germany as a neighbour. Instead, it got a new strip of Soviet frontier. Despite precautions, a good many persons escape over this border. They have sad stories to tell. The Roumanians inflict what is a nominal punishment of one month's confinement without repatriation. The memory of a short stay in Cernauti is in every way delightful.

Cluj or Kolozsvár, as the Hungarians call it, is different. It is an ancient university town with many faiths and many nationalities. Our cause has here distinguished and loyal friends, but sympathy for the Allies was not, as elsewhere, to be taken for granted. I was reminded of this when I found that a fellow guest at the very handsome University Hostel was a German professor who was to lecture on a Himalayan ascent. Though I was not so fortunate as to hear his address I was told that he had paid tribute to the courtesy of the British and emphasised the universality of scientific achievement. Goga was a professor at Cluj and his portrait hangs in the professors' common-room. He was much admired as a poet, but my friend admitted that he had not been a success in his political office.

Cluj has many churches and at least four bishops. The Unitarians, who are strong, boldly proclaim by an inscription, "We worship *one* god." Troops of theological students are to be seen soberly garbed in cassocks and bowler hats. Together with bands of girls in white berets, many of them,

by Colonel Beck. Naturally he knows Britain well and has many British friends. In recent years he was President of the Anglo-Polish Society in Warsaw, and always advocated a policy of close collaboration with the Western Powers.

One of the most interesting personalities in the new Polish Cabinet is General Casimir Sosnkowski, Minister without portfolio. He was born in Warsaw in 1885 and educated in Warsaw and Lwów. In 1914 he became Chief of Staff of Pilsudski's Polish Legion. He was Minister of War during the Soviet-Polish War of 1920. He held the same office twice more during the succeeding years. In 1926 he retired from active public life, except the strictly professional activities of an Inspector of the Polish Army. In 1936 he represented the Polish Government at the funeral of King George V. General Sosnkowski is known for his firm and straightforward character. As a student of architecture he takes a deep interest in the arts. He speaks English, French, German, Italian and Russian with great fluency.

That the new Polish Government is genuinely endeavouring to uphold the principles of democracy is proved by the fact that all parties—in so far as their prominent members are available—are represented in it. In addition to representatives of the Right, the National Democrats Stanislaw Stroński and Marjan Seyda, it includes the Socialist Jan Stańczyk, a representative of the Polish Peasant Party, Professor Kot, a member of the Radical Peasant Party, Dr. Graliński, and a member of the Christian Democrats, General Haller. Other members of the Government are Alfred Falter and Karol Popiel. The Government has established a consultative body, the National Council. The first member to be appointed to this body is one of the oldest and greatest Polish patriots, Paderewski. It is a noteworthy fact that the National Council also includes a Jew who is a Polish Zionist leader, Dr. Ignacy Schwarzbart.

Polish life in exile, in addition to the principal centre in Angers, has two other main centres in Paris and London. From both capitals there are several daily news and other broadcasts in the Polish language. In France there is a considerable number of Polish periodicals, and there is even a daily paper, *Głos Polski* (Voice of Poland). On the other hand the Polish Refugee Committee has its headquarters in London. The official Polish Telegraph Agency has not interrupted its work and, of course, the Polish embassies, legations and

consulates everywhere continue to function normally, despite the abnormal conditions.

As to Polish war aims, it would be futile to theorise on this subject to-day. However, it is certain that the Polish people are determined to achieve complete political independence. Naturally all the efforts of the Government of Angers are directed towards that end. It is a most encouraging fact that this aim coincides with that of Britain and France with regard to Poland. At the same time, the Polish people are bound to interpret complete independence in the sense that their resurrected country should never again be exposed to an attack from three sides. In September 1939 Nazi Germany attacked Poland not only from the west, but also from the north (East Prussia) and the south (Slovakia). The next Peace Conference will, no doubt, ensure that this should not occur again. Indeed, it is possible that in the new, post-war Europe, if it wants to abolish war for ever, or at least ensure peace for several generations, a mighty peace bloc extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic will be created. It will be preponderantly Slav, but will also include other national States, like Hungary or Roumania. If such a bloc should come into existence the new Poland will have an important task within it, if only for the reason that it will be numerically the strongest.

As regards the internal structure of the Polish State, it is probably safe to anticipate that, after the bitter experiences of recent times, it will be based on the only sure foundation: that of freedom and equality for every citizen and every national minority, that of a genuine democracy. The democratic system, despite all its faults, has so far always proved to be the soundest and strongest. In addition, it alone ensures the greatest degree of human happiness that is possible in an imperfect world. The Polish Government at Angers, which is to-day opposing the concentration-camp system of the Nazi tyrants with a concentration of all the Polish forces in the struggle for liberty, is destined not only to carry the banner of triumph into a liberated Poland, but also to bring to the banks of the Vistula and carry into effect there, the ideas and principles prevailing on the banks of the Thames and the Seine.

SZYMON WOLF.

led by Church dignitaries, welcomed a Uniate bishop who arrived early one morning at the station. Flowers were offered him and unaccompanied hymns were sung as the bishop in a purple skull cap stood in the very middle of the railway track to give his blessing to the throng. I suppose that in Roumania everything must have a political significance, but even so the ethnographical museum at Cluj deserves independent praise. Racial origins are traced from needlework, implements and customs with copious specimens excellently arranged. The Roumanian director has long had the assistance of an English artist in this work.

But internal questions both of minorities and parties have become secondary in face of the external threats. The Renaissance Front is an attempt at once to forestall the paramilitary methods of the Nazis, to give representation to men of all parties who are prepared to recognise the need for national unity, and to bring the racial minorities into the picture. It is very hard for a passing stranger to judge how far the party interest, which must exist in its best form in so politically minded a people as the Roumanians, is satisfied. Ministers are well spoken of, but such leaders as Maniu and Titulescu are by no means forgotten. The severe repression of the Iron Guard which followed the murder of Calinescu cannot but have left much soreness, and the recent gesture of the King may be attributed as reasonably to a desire for reconciliation as to German pressure. Opinions varied as to the outlook of the German minority. Hitler's fame has undoubtedly stirred the younger folk, and some said the Gestapo were in evidence, but everyone agreed that any attempt to treat these Saxons and Swabians like the Balts would be strongly resisted. At the same time, in Cluj, for example, the Hungarians, Germans and Roumanians make no social contacts. The Hungarian nobles have a club of their own, in which hang the portraits in oils of the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania. All this of course spells difficulty, but does not mean that Hungary would allow herself to be used as a road for German attack.

Roumania is the richest of all Balkan sources of supply to Germany. The Reich sends its own wagons, or those taken from the Poles and Czechs—and many of these are to be seen—to fetch the oil. The general calculation is that with a home

production of 3 million tons, plus half a million from Galicia and one and a half from Roumania, Germany, so long as no active war takes place, is actually accumulating stores. Apart from the difficulty of transport there is of course the difficulty of acceptable payment which provokes a good deal of bitter comment. Roumania wants, not barter, but free exchange to buy raw material, for example cotton, for lack of which the home-weaving of the peasants' clothes is held up. But Roumanians attach far more importance than we are apt to do to the fruits of German-Russian collaboration. They consider supplies of oil from Baku via the Black Sea a serious factor. Italian storage ships are now stationed at Varna. For these reasons most Roumanians believe that before long time will turn against us. They are quite firmly convinced that one day Russia will attack them—perhaps when Germany has been weakened by a long war. When the attack comes they think Turkey will inevitably aid them. By a like reasoning our Near Eastern Forces are very welcome. The Nazis skilfully play on these fears. Everyone knows that Germany would not willingly allow the Soviets to hold the mouths of the Danube, and thus the argument follows naturally that Roumania had better come under the wing of Germany, for she alone can control Moscow.

Let me add a few general impressions. The Balkan governments never forget Germany's unbroken might. The Polish war has taught its lesson. The peoples are in the main for the Allies. External events may have driven them to semi-totalitarian forms of government, but they have all proved in the past their willingness to fight for liberty. They all supply Germany and all hope to escape attack on the ground that it will pay to leave them alone. The recent German invasions will make them reflect and the outcome must have a strong, even a decisive effect on their attitude.

WEDGWOOD BENN.

NIETZSCHE AS AN ÉMIGRÉ.

HALF a century has passed since the greatest German psychological genius had to leave the ranks of the spiritual workers owing to insanity. When the letters of the first days of January 1889 with the post-stamp Turin reached his friends, Jakob Burckhardt hurried from Basle to Franz Overbeck, who went to Turin, only to be able to bring home a madman. This collapse drew the attention of the world to Nietzsche's work. He often spoke of himself and his friends as the "emigrants of the spirit." Perhaps we may think to-day, when the bitter destiny of emigration is imposed on so many Intellectuals, of the fact that the greatest revaluer of all values of our times also lived for many years like "a fugitive, a homeless."

It is true, he was fortunately saved the agony of statelessness, the sorrows for a passport and the extension of the passport, for being allowed to enter a country, to stay, to work there—he was saved these sufferings and humiliations of the political refugee of to-day. But the difficulties and privations of a man who—outside his native country—suffering from illness, with limited means, without any security for his work, without family or friends, continually changing his residence, wants to produce spiritual values—those Friedrich Nietzsche felt in profusion.

His Basle lectureship he had to give up for reasons of health already at the end of the seventies. For the liberty of production he won in that way on the one hand, he always had to pay with constant economic restriction on the other. Less clearly than in his works we see with deep emotion from his letters to friends and relatives, how the sufferings of illness and loneliness were increased by the privations to which the sick man was forced. Certainly, he over and over again found his spiritual superiority which helped him to overlook outward inhibitions and limitations. But the bad state of his health made want all the harder for him. With some bitterness he sometimes writes of his "dog-kennel existence." The extremest misery which so many men of the spirit have to suffer owing to persecution and expropriation—complete destitution—he was saved. Thanks to the considerateness of the Basle University authorities—together with some other institution—he was granted a pension. It amounted at first

to 3,000 francs a year and was reduced to 2,000 later on. It remained for a pamphleteer of our days to object to this pension as being superfluous. Nietzsche's old mother, his faithful nurse during his mental illness, over and over again asked Professor Franz Overbeck in Basle in her letters if she could reckon on this modest help also in the future.

Tragical irony of fate: almost abruptly—after his submersion in mental derangement—came fame! And together with fame at last—very late, for Friedrich Nietzsche *too* late—also outward success, money. Only then were the publishers trying to get his works for publication. They reached more editions now than the works of any philosopher before him.

A short time before his illness Nietzsche had to complain: "Nobody knows how to behave towards me." So dependent are men on outward success. What could this lonely, suffering man, this pensioned scholar have to say to the world? Even in Rhode's, the beloved friend-of-his-youth's, critique one can feel something of the superciliousness of the "ordinary professor" towards the turned-out. In the deeply moving Dionysos-dithyrambus *Of the Poverty of the Richest* he complains:

"Ten years have gone—
no drop has reached me,
no moist wind, no dew of love
—a rainless country."

He suffered more intensely than any other man from "the agony of overfull barns, overfull heart." Moreover he was never free of sorrows during his time of spiritual production. It always remained a problem for him to bring his works nearer to the people even just outwardly. He was denied what so many mediocre spirits who can speak to a larger audience have been able to find: an understanding, capable publisher. The effect craved for so intensely: to stir the world, to win friends, therefore failed to come.

On the contrary: the choice of his publishers was always tragically unfortunate. One was an anti-Semite. He made Nietzsche—to his great alarm—suspected of being an anti-Semite himself. Nietzsche regarded anti-Semitism as a spiritual epidemic which made him ashamed and terrified him. No action of his sister hurt him so much and alienated her so much from him as her marriage to the "chief of

PALESTINE TO-DAY.

I HAVE lately been in Palestine, where I find a remarkable change from my last visit, two years ago. Then the situation was bad: the relations between Arabs and Jews were strained, outrages were becoming frequent; there was the prospect of much worse. So it proved. Every form of violence increased: assassinations, bomb outrages, train wreckings became everyday occurrences; transport was brought almost to a standstill, Government administration had to be withdrawn from the rural districts; the disturbances grew to the dimensions of a rebellion. Now everything is transformed. There have been no serious outrages for a long time. One can travel freely throughout the country. The concrete block-houses that are to be seen everywhere as a new feature in the landscape have no garrisons. The broad barbed-wire entanglement, built for sixty miles to protect the northern frontier from raiding bands, remains only as a relic of a phase that is past. In place of the constant patrols on the roads, of armoured cars with police or soldiers with machine-guns, and the troops on guard throughout Jerusalem and the other towns, one sees now only a rare sentry or an occasional patrol. It is true that a few outlaws still roam the hills, and that military action is sometimes needed to suppress them. As a measure of precaution night travel on the roads is not yet permitted. But in the main conditions are normal.

This has come about almost suddenly. After three years of grave disturbance, the people of Palestine breathe a sigh of relief to find themselves all at once in peace and quiet. They are like travellers at sea who, after weeks of stormy weather, wake up one morning to discover blue sky and calm water. I was told on all hands that the improvement is chiefly to be attributed to the effective action of the large military forces which had been brought to restore order. At the same time that the rebel bands had been scattered and their leaders disposed of, the funds that had fostered the revolt, whatever may have been their origin, dried up. The Arab middle classes saw themselves faced by ruin; the Arab villages were weary of the exactions and the crimes of the terrorists; and the military came to be regarded, not as oppressors, but as rescuers from oppression. The action of the Arab princes of the neighbouring countries in advising the substitution of

friendly negotiation for armed violence: the Conference that was held in London early last year: the declaration of policy by the British Government which followed—these may have contributed as well. Finally, the outbreak of the European War has made both Arabs and Jews less ready to push their controversies to extremes. Whatever their grievances against Britain and against each other, the opposition of both to Nazi ideas and policy is now a far more important consideration. Both Arabs and Jews can be relied upon to do nothing that could even remotely endanger the victory of Britain and her Allies, and invite the risk of an aggressive totalitarian Power becoming dominant in the eastern Mediterranean.

Prophecy is always dangerous, but at present the indications are that this quiet will continue. Arms are now being surrendered more freely in the villages than at any previous time; partly because information as to their whereabouts is more readily forthcoming, now that the well-disposed villagers are no longer in danger from terrorists. With the exception of one or two towns, Arabs and Jews are mingling freely everywhere; they have resumed business relations, and are again good neighbours in the rural districts. For there is not, and never has been, any innate antagonism between the two peoples. Palestine enjoyed an unbroken quiet for eight years—from 1921 to 1929; and what has been once, may be again.

Yet the political tension still exists—as it existed also during those years. The problems raised by Jewish immigration, Jewish land purchase, and the Arab demand for self-government, have not been solved. The London Conference and the Government's White Paper have not produced any formal agreement between the two parties. While that policy assured to the Arabs a large part of their claims, it denied to the Jews a still greater proportion of theirs, and they are unreconciled to the present policy. The restrictions on land purchase, lately announced, have aroused a vehement opposition. Yet the Jews also—in view of the over-mastering considerations raised by the European War—have not taken up an intransigent position. If this truce continues it is at least possible—I should hesitate to go further and say that it is probable—that a friendlier spirit may grow up between Arabs and Jews, due mainly to closer co-operation in economic affairs; and that in a few years' time the whole situation may be viewed in a different light.

anti-Semites," Bernhard Förster. Another publisher had first to print some hundred thousand Christian hymn-books, before finding time to print *Zarathustra*. Nietzsche never had a pennyworth of income from his works, but at last had to print them at his own expense. After two decades of uninterrupted spiritual production he had given to the world more than a dozen books. But these invocations from the depth of the soul remained unanswered. To-day they are translated into most of the languages of the world.

So the creator of these spiritual riches had to live in constant sorrow for the maintenance of his modest minimum of living. His friend, the Sanscrit explorer Professor Deussen, during his last years once advanced him 2,000 marks for the printing of his books; then he was trembling lest somebody might learn about this gift. For there was the danger of his pension being even more reduced. In that case he would have been unable to bring to light his spiritual products. The only thing that gave a meaning to his terrible sufferings, that solely gave him the strength heroically to stand the tormenting stages of his physical existence, his creative possibilities, were in danger.

On account of his health Nietzsche was forced to live in places for which "he is not rich enough," as he writes. The only places the climate of which is bearable are the Riviera and the Engadine. These places, however, are—and were even more so half a century ago—only provided for the rich. A person who wanted to live there on a small income had to put up with very primitive lodgings and very modest food. A man with sensitive organs, with so definite a sense of beauty, therefore suffered immensely from the unattractiveness of his surroundings. His unhappiness about his forced restless moving "from one little closet to another" is often painfully expressed in his letters to friends and relatives. Innumerable people have since stood before the memorial tablet on the modest house of Mr. Durisch in Sils-Maria in the Oberengadin, but those who have seen the narrow room (it has not been shown for a long time now) will understand, when Nietzsche confessed once that he could hardly bear these whitewashed walls around him any more.

When once on the Riviera he succeeded in finding a room for which he was allowed to choose the wallpaper himself beforehand, he was happy as a child. He was even very

grateful when he once was granted the "luxury" of a *chaise-longue* in his room, and he expressly mentions this to his people as a special kindness of destiny. "For without a *chaiselongue* I can hardly live any more," the sufferer adds who—tormented by terrible *migraine*—had to spend about a third of his days in his room. It is already an alleviation for his state of health, when he is able to rent not merely a "closet," but to live in a boarding-house, although even there he cannot always find the necessary consideration for his delicate stomach. His sister Elisabeth had established a home for him in Basle—because of his health which got the first heavy shock during his occupation as a patient-nurse in the Franco-German War—where a special diet was provided for him. Pupils, friends or admirers who visited him there, report unanimously how carefully and cosily everything was arranged for him. The return of his sister to their mother in Germany about the middle of the 'seventies certainly increased his loneliness and misery. Her marriage to Professor Bernhard Förster took the couple to Paraguay for the foundation of the colony New-Germania. With it his sister no more played any important part in Nietzsche's life.

Much as Friedrich Nietzsche enjoyed the South—he once confessed with deep emotion what it might have meant for him to die without having known the South—his limited means in Nice and Genoa were a great drawback for his health, for he was compelled to put up with rooms looking to the north which he mentions often and in which he suffered very much. A small stove sent to him from Germany to reduce the cold in these rooms a little—an effect which seems to have been only partly achieved—is therefore often mentioned in his letters. In spring and autumn, when he changed his "winter-residence" on the Riviera or his summer-stay in the Engadine, he generally stayed a while in Venice to meet Peter Gast, the friend, musician and indispensable corrector of his writings, for his bad eyes made this friendly help an absolute necessity. There is then much talk beforehand in the letters about a room and prices. It is not to cost more than 25 francs per month and should not be too noisy and unfriendly. Even in his last letter to Jakob Burckhardt of January 6th, 1889, when his mental illness was already manifest, he mentions his "little student's room" in Turin for which he had had to pay 25 francs, service included.

Both sections are injured by the economic conditions created by the war. Both are largely engaged in the orange industry and the citrus trade generally. The war has gravely affected it. The lack of tonnage to carry this, the principal product of Palestine, has reduced the export this year probably by 60 per cent., involving a loss of some £2 million to the merchants, the growers and those dependent upon them. There is a difficulty also in obtaining materials for the building industry. Further, the severe restriction now imposed on Jewish immigration has checked the inflow of capital, and has hindered development of all kinds. Unemployment and partial unemployment have been widespread.

At the same time there are some favourable factors. Since the Hitler persecution began in 1933, over 70,000 Jews from Germany, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia have come into Palestine; some among them have succeeded in bringing with them a proportion at least of such capital as they possessed, together with a great deal of industrial and professional skill and enterprise. This, added to the factors already in the country, helped to create a large volume of productive power, which is now showing its results. Scores of new industries of many kinds have been established; and the products of Palestine not only supply most of the home market, but are finding their way in increasing volume into Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and even India. The Iran Petroleum Company and its associates are erecting at Haifa a vast new refinery, covering half a square mile, and involving a capital expenditure of nearly £5 million. In its construction 3,000 men are being employed—both Arabs and Jews; and there is no friction whatever between them. The Palestine Government are now providing substantial loans to the chief municipalities to enable them to undertake some very necessary works—a step that might well have been taken long ago.

In other directions developments have continued in spite of the disturbances. Jewish land settlement has made further strides. Twenty thousand of the German-Jewish immigrants have gone to the villages, where they are a valuable element. They supplement the earlier colonists in extending the area of cultivation. I visited a new settlement, far in the north, close to the Syrian border, where a group of men and women, originally from Poland, Lithuania and Rumania, with some Germans also, founded a colony eight

months ago. They had all been for some years in Palestine, learning their trade as agriculturists. On land which had been owned by absentee Syrian landlords, they have already built themselves wooden houses, and have begun the intensive cultivation of a large area, part of it in vegetable growing. This was the first of six settlements that have been newly founded in that locality, giving employment now to about 500 people, and intended ultimately for a 1,000 families. They are well provided with the means of defence, but have had no occasion to use them. Provision having been made on favourable terms for the few Arabs who had lightly cultivated the area, there is no local opposition. On the contrary, the inauguration of the Jewish settlement was celebrated by a feast of friendship in which both sections heartily joined. Similar colonisation is going on elsewhere.

An example of development of another order is the vast new hospital on Mt. Scopus, near Jerusalem, adjoining the Hebrew University, with 300 beds, no ward containing more than six; a nurses' hostel and training school; and a medical post-graduate college and research institute—it is the last word in planning and equipment, and by far the finest medical centre in the Middle East.

The population of Palestine continues to expand, and is now close on a million and a half, compared with a million at the time of the census of 1931, and about 600,000 at the end of the last war. The three chief towns, Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel-Aviv, stretch their new quarters far and wide. In spite of the grave difficulties caused by war conditions, the economic situation shows signs of improvement. The favourable factors are beginning to outweigh the unfavourable. Those who are in a position to speak with knowledge all assured me that a turn for the better had lately become apparent. Although it is impossible to foresee what may be the course and the effects of future events, political and military, at the moment there undoubtedly prevails in Palestine a spirit of greater confidence. And that is a welcome difference from the conditions that I found two years ago.

SAMUEL.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing, even before Nietzsche's physical death, the way of living of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche in her villa "Silberblick" on the hills above Weimar—the Nietzsche archives—must have been struck with bitterness in view of the fate of genius on earth. What a contrast to the "dog-kennel existence" of the fugitive, the homeless, the perpetually wandering, the "emigrant Nietzsche." "To be driven from all father- and forefather-lands" seems to be the lot of the spiritual, the creative on this earth. To the administratress of his spiritual inheritance, however, there came from all parts of the globe those who thought themselves to belong to the spiritual cream of Europe: princes of the spirit, poets, artists, scholars, distinguished personalities of politics, of society. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, who collected his legacy with admirable energy and tenacity, certainly did a great deed, despite its having had some defects. She was allowed to enjoy what was definitely denied to the genius himself.

Never, fortunately, did Friedrich Nietzsche doubt that his work to which people in his lifetime turned a deaf ear would find a hearing and understanding in the future, a small satisfaction when compared to the misery and hardships of his loneliness and destitution! He did not live to enjoy the acknowledgment of his importance, the echo of his high strivings in the spirits and hearts of those he tried to awaken.

In spite of his straitened circumstances which complied so little with his suffering state and his own æsthetic requirements, he has given to the world deep spiritual delights, new unheard-of cognitions, highest values. Perhaps it might be sorrowfully comforting for many expelled, spiritual men who have been deprived of their profession, home and living, to remember the fate of that great and sensitive genius who shook the world through new beliefs. He was allowed, according to the hardships of his own life, to address to others the admonition and demand: "To such as matter to me I wish sufferings, loneliness, illness, maltreatment, disgrace—I wish that the profound self-contempt, the torment of self-distrust, the misery of the vanquished may not be unknown to them. I have no pity for them, for I wish them the only thing which can prove nowadays, if a person has any worth or not, *that he hold his own* . . ."

HELENE STÖCKER.

GERMAN OPINION AND THE NAZIS.

WITHOUT an intimate knowledge of Nazism and the actual German moral, or perhaps better amoral, attitude born out of Nazism, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to understand what is going on in Germany and why the Allies show no hurry to start what is popularly called "a real war." The widespread criticism of the German people's behaviour, and the allegation that "every country gets the government it deserves," appears to be rather severe, for it must be borne in mind that the National Socialist party did not come into power by election in the regular way. On the contrary, Hitler failed twice in his attempts to become President of Germany in Hindenburg's place and the last proper parliamentary election showed a heavy drop in National Socialist votes. However, the Nazi party was then by far the strongest and it may be presumed that General von Schleicher handed the Chancellorship over to Hitler to give the Nazis a chance, but certainly not with the idea that this was to mean the end of legal government in Germany. It must be further recollected that Hitler's dictatorial power was not conferred upon him but that he usurped it, giving this usurpation at each step a more or less legal appearance.

The question arises repeatedly why the German people did not revolt at the very beginning: Hitler came into power in 1933 after a four years' period of world depression which was particularly felt in a Germany weakened by the lost war. Unemployment numbered 6 millions out of a population of 60 millions, which meant, in the cities at any rate, at least one unemployed in every family. The Nazis attacked unemployment at once without worrying about the means or the cost; plans which lay ready on the governmental desks and measures no government before had dared to carry out (e.g. labour service) were put into practice. The unemployment figures melted as snow in the sun and one family after another was relieved of its unproductive members. So Hitler won his first campaign, not—as he always claims—because the whole German nation was longing to "break the chains of Versailles" but because he conformed to the old Roman prescription "*panem et circenses*."

Hundreds of thousands who had been lukewarm and had stood aside, seeing the strong Nazi party victorious and being

PALESTINE : THE NEW LAND POLICY.

THE Land Transfers Regulations promulgated on February 28th constitute the latest development in the British Government's interpretation and application of the Palestine Mandate. The enactment was foreshadowed in the White Paper of May 1939 (Cmd. 6019), in which the Government set forth their policy for the future administration of the country in consequence of the failure of the efforts of the Royal Commission, of the Partition Commission, and of the official conferences in London with Jews and Arabs to bring about a satisfactory settlement. That momentous document announced three main fundamental proposals : first, to establish within ten years an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with the United Kingdom, which would involve the termination of the Mandate ; secondly, to restrict Jewish immigration during the next five years to some 75,000 persons (including 25,000 refugees), subject to Jewish and Arab representatives being consulted before each periodic decision was taken, so as to limit the Jewish population to approximately one-third of the total, and to make subsequent Jewish immigration dependent upon the assent of the Arabs ; and thirdly, to give the High Commissioner general powers, in the interests of the Arab cultivators, to prohibit and regulate transfer of land.

The White Paper formed the subject of important debates in both Houses of Parliament, in which it was severely criticised by members of all parties, particularly by two former Colonial Secretaries, Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Amery, and by the ex-Prime Minister who made the Balfour Declaration, and it was adopted by the Commons (on May 23rd, 1939) by the comparatively small majority of 89. It was then submitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission for examination, with a view to a report being made to the Council of the League of Nations on the question of its compatibility with the Mandate. After a four days' session the Mandates Commission unanimously declared that " the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate." The Commission also considered whether the Mandate " might not perhaps be open to a new interpretation

which . . . would be sufficiently flexible for the policy of the White Paper not to appear at variance with it," and the majority declared that they " did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate, any contrary conclusion appearing to them to be ruled out by the very terms of the Mandate and by the fundamental intentions of its authors." The minority (the representatives of France, Great Britain and Portugal) considered that " existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the Council did not oppose it."

Owing to the outbreak of war there was no meeting of the Council to consider the Commission's report, and it was therefore believed that, in consequence of the nature of this report, the Government would take no steps to carry out their proposals. Nevertheless, a reduced immigration schedule was decided upon for the five months from May to September ; and after the terrible disaster that befell Poland, from which tens of thousands of Jewish refugees fled to neighbouring countries, it was further announced that the schedule until March 1940 provided only for the admission of 300 non-Jews and excluded Jews altogether. This decision was justified by the Government on the ground that there had been a large influx of illegal Jewish immigrants. It must, however, be pointed out that these immigrants, who were all fugitives from barbarous persecution, could find no asylum except in the Jewish National Home, and their act of self-preservation is apparently regarded as a heinous transgression for which the Jews in general must be punished. This official embargo—temporary though it be—upon Jewish immigration into Palestine, where the Jews had been assured by a previous White Paper (1922) that they were " as of right and not on sufferance," has now been followed by an enactment that will limit their enjoyment of that right to only a tiny part of the country.

According to the new Land Transfers Regulations (Cmd. 6180) Palestine is divided into three zones, " in which land sales from Arabs to Jews should . . . be restricted, prohibited, or remain free respectively." Zone A, in which the transfer of land to a person other than a Palestinian Arab will be prohibited save in exceptional cases, " includes the hill country as a whole, together with certain areas in Gaza and Beersheba sub-districts where the land available is already insufficient

for the support of the existing population." Zone B includes the plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, Eastern Galilee, the maritime plain between Haifa and Tantura and between the southern boundary of the Ramleh sub-district and Beer-Tuviya, and the southern portion of the Beersheba sub-district (the Negev). Within Zone B transfers of land may be sanctioned if they can be shown to be for the purpose of consolidating, extending or facilitating the irrigation of holdings already in possession of the transferee or of his community, the land to be transferred being contiguous to such holdings; or for the purpose of enabling land held in undivided shares by transferor and transferee to be parcellated; or in furtherance of some special scheme of development in the joint interest of both Arabs and Jews to which the Government may have signified its approval. The parts in which there will be no restrictions include all municipal areas, the Haifa industrial zone, and the maritime plain between Tantura and the southern boundary of Ramleh sub-district. These regulations, although first issued on February 28th, 1940, are to be deemed to have come into force on May 18th, 1939.

The significance of this enactment can be better appreciated by examining the comparative areas represented by the different zones. Of the 6,717,250 acres of Western Palestine (exclusive of lakes) only 335,750 acres or just under 5 per cent. is in the "free zone." Of the rest 4,289,000 acres, or about 64 per cent., is in the "prohibited zone," and 2,092,500 acres, or about 31 per cent., in the "restricted zone." In the "prohibited zone" the area of Jewish land is 81,500 acres. But this figure includes the 19,000 acres of the Palestine Potash Company concession, which is not available for agricultural purposes, while most of the remainder lies in the plains of the "prohibited zone." In the actual hill country, with the exception of the three settlements in the corner of Northern Galilee, and a few more round Jerusalem, the Jews have practically no land. In the "restricted zone" there are 132,250 acres of Jewish land, and of the 1,960,250 acres in this zone not in Jewish possession 1,700,000 acres constitute the southern Negev, which is to-day arid and as yet unexplored. Finally, the "free zone" contains 172,000 acres of Jewish land and 163,750 acres of Arab land, and it is these 163,750 acres (or 2.6 per cent. of the area of Western Palestine not in Jewish possession) that constitute the margin of possible

Jewish land acquisition free from administrative restrictions; but there are to-day 48,500 Arabs on that land.

If we compare the 5 per cent. of the area of Western Palestine in which the Jews are free to acquire land with the extent of the territory contemplated or understood by the Balfour Declaration, we shall have a true measure of the whittling down of that historic promise and likewise of the bitter disillusion of the Jewish people. For, as the Palestine Royal Commission testify in their Report (p. 38), the area in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was originally understood to be "the whole of historic Palestine," which includes Transjordan, and it was the definite intention of the Government to establish a Jewish State (p. 24). Now the vision of a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan has shrunk into a "Pale of Settlement" only one-sixtieth of the original area.

The Government have decided upon their new policy without having given the Council of the League any opportunity of expressing its view. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the League they state that they are of opinion that their action is in no way inconsistent with the provisions of the Mandate, although the Mandates Commission unanimously adopted a declaration to the contrary effect. But they thought it right to inform the members of the Council of the position "in case any member of the Council should wish to ask that the Council should be convened to discuss it"—a contingency that it is fairly safe to discount. In support of their decision they recall that under Article 6 of the Mandate the Administration of Palestine is charged to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land. But they observe that this obligation is qualified by the requirement that the Administration should ensure "that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," and that they have been advised that "the rights and position of the Arab population on the land will be prejudiced unless land sales are prohibited in some areas and regulated in others." It is difficult to see how the rights of the Arabs will be prejudiced if they continue to exercise the right to sell their own land to Jews, or how their position will be prejudiced, considering that it has so greatly benefited by Jewish settlement. It has been mainly due to the

afraid to miss the opportunity, hurriedly joined up. They were regarded with some contempt by the "old fighters" of the party and had to show much more enthusiasm to make up for their lack of standing. Furthermore it must not be forgotten that the opinions of the average man are formed largely by his newspaper. Since all the newspapers expressed nothing but Nazi ideas it needed the strength of an independent mind to avoid the infection of the suggestive Nazi ideology which so cleverly had a lure for everybody. Those who still stood aside found themselves suddenly in an apparent minority and they soon adopted an attitude of "wait and see."

This period of mass suggestion and of waiting was extremely well used by Nazism to establish a country-wide gangster system and when the Germans awoke—not all of them did—one by one they found themselves nicely tied up and gagged and with a machine gun directed against their chest. It was then too late to revolt. However, neither in this early stage nor later have I ever met a single person, Nazi or otherwise, who believed that "this" would go on for ever, though Hitler was continually speaking about the realm built up for the next thousand years. There was a significant rumour that a woman had been arrested because she told of a dream she had had: she dreamt that she was fast asleep and when she awoke "the 1,000 years were over." No man had more than very nebulous ideas for the destruction of the Nazi régime and what should succeed it, but more or less the general feeling was that only the army could do the job. It was popularly believed that army and party did not agree and that the officer corps had great contempt for the lance-corporal who had become "leader" of Germany. The army was the only organisation in Germany which was left intact and, of course, it was armed.

But the army did not do anything of the sort and not the slightest protest was uttered when, on the notorious June 30th, 1934, General v. Schleicher was murdered by several S.S. men who entered his private home and shot him and his wife in the presence of their little daughter; they were secretly buried at night like criminals. In the session of the Reichstag which followed, and in which the Führer explained to an amazed nation why he had murdered some of his best friends and several hundred others, the name of Schleicher was not

mentioned, but General von Blomberg, then Minister of War, was present and received the leader's praise for his chivalrous attitude during the purge. On reflection, the reason for the army's strange behaviour is obvious; one of the main points of the Nazi programme was the annihilation of the Versailles Treaty and this implied full rearmament of the German nation which, as a result of the treaty, was restricted to 100,000 men. In promising to provide ways and means for the building up of a new army, Hitler gained the support of the officers corps and, besides, of the industries which were expecting big profits from army orders. And if Hitler ever kept a promise it was this one of rearmament.

It was always common talk in Germany that in fact Hitler was a prisoner of the army and had to do what the generals wanted him to do. Later on it will be the task of the historians to find out how far this is true, but it seems singularly incompatible with the fact that at any decisive moment Hitler was able to dismiss whatever general he wanted. At the time of the Austrian crisis it was Blomberg, Fritsch, and fifteen others. The repercussion of the dismissal of Fritsch, who had a very strong following in officer circles, was enormous. But nothing happened and Austria was annexed. Then came Czechoslovakia, and General Beck went. Again nothing happened and Czechoslovakia was annexed. Apparently there must have been a strong party in the German High Command which agreed completely with Hitler's policy of aggression. There remains open the question whether this party was aware that Great Britain and France would go into the war or if they were made to believe that the annexation of weaker neighbours could go on forever without major complications.

Aware or unaware, the fact remains that a great part of the responsibility for this war must be laid upon this army clique, which, knowing that only the army was able to smash Hitlerism, did nothing to stem the flow. This submissive attitude of the army had a deep effect on that class of Germans who had kept or regained a fairly clear judgment. They lost all hope that this curse would ever end and eventually realised that there was only one way out—war. It is hardly believable, but keen observers will confirm that after the Munich agreement when the danger of war was over there was no sign of joy or relief in Germany, but a strange calm.

"Apathy," said the foreign observers; but hidden behind this apathy, well hidden from foreign eyes and ears, there was great disappointment that again everything remained as it was and that again the Führer had been successful. The Czech crisis showed already clearly how thoroughly "fed up" the German people was with its government. Foreign stations and foreign news were absorbed eagerly. Moscow was the favourite station, but also the most dangerous, since reception of its programme was strictly forbidden. A lady friend of mine went to buy a powerful wireless set and asked if she really could hear all stations. The salesman affirmed that she could, but she reiterated the question so that eventually he lost patience and retorted: "Yes, Madam, you can hear Moscow." It must be said that years of Nazi propaganda have been successful in perverting the German mentality to a certain point; so that nearly every German, without being a Nazi, is willy-nilly infected by one or other of the constantly repeated Nazi doctrines which particularly appeals to him, maybe the hatred against the Jews, maybe the tale of the "*Lebensraum*," etc. On the other hand, all of them realise that their own newspapers and their own broadcasts are not reliable. Hence the great readiness to believe what comes from outside, so that it can be said that Dr. Goebbels' publicity has been overdone.

Where are the Nazis to be found in actual Germany? Certainly not amongst the elderly workmen who fought in the last war, becoming communists or socialists afterwards and finally joining some party organisation for the sake of their family and their living. The denomination "beef-steak" (outside brown, inside red) defines this category fairly well. Neither is the farmer a Nazi, as he has to grow and to breed what the Government wants, has to market his goods at regulated prices, and can neither sell nor mortgage his own property. The officers are not Nazis. They are as a rule sons of officers or landowners or industrialists and have no sympathy for this party without tradition. The gap between army and party cannot be concealed, and not in the smallest garrison, where incidentally men from the army and Labour Service (a party organisation) are billeted, will an officer sit at the same table with a leader of the labour camp. Equally lukewarm are the industrialists who fear that the money they earn may not be worth the paper it is printed

on; or the tradesman breaking down under the burden of the various taxes. Nor the women who have to cook without eggs and fat and to wash without soap.

But what of the youth who has been brought up with National Socialist ideas and does not know anything else? For years my profession brought me into daily contact with Hitler youth, Labour Service and soldiers. My impression is that a 100 per cent. Nazi amongst the youth is a rarity. The boy in the Hitler youth hates the compulsion and is bored by having to be on duty at least twice a week, while the students at the universities complain that no time is left for their studies. Discontent in Labour Service, which is the most unpopular of all the Nazi institutions, is general. Some youngsters, of course, accept what they are told from stupidity or mental laziness; the rest, when they feel it safe to voice their opinions, despise and deride the "bunk." Towards their "leaders" and in public they all pretend to conform, for the remark "politically unreliable" would severely endanger their career, so they lift their right arm and shout "Heil Hitler" whenever it is expected of them.

The mentality of the young German soldier is, of course, of the utmost interest, now this country is at war with Germany. Although the "death of honour" for the fatherland was daily pictured in the brightest colours, I could never detect any enthusiasm for this heroic end. The lack of pilots which has always been a source of alarm to the Air Force is a striking example and it was an open secret that casualties in training were very heavy, which prevented the young men from applying. Not one of the many privates I spoke to, when asked if he would become a pilot, said "Yes." "No" was the usual answer, or "I don't fly and I do not want to. I belong to the ground personnel." (To become a pilot was a voluntary task and, as far as I know, no compulsion was exerted.) The young German soldier is, of course, proud of his uniform, but he has lost contact with the idea for which it stands. His private thoughts are very peacefully centred on a comfortable life and all the big words such as "fatherland," "Germany," "honour" have but a poor response. They are worn out by over use.

In the search for true Nazis three classes of people can be found:

(a) Harmless citizens without the slightest trace of an

sale by Arabs of part of their land that they derived the money with which to develop and improve the rest. The expansion of Arab citriculture has been largely financed by the capital thus obtained, while Jewish example has done much to improve Arab cultivation in general.

Since the framing of the new regulations is attributed to the recommendations of previous commissions of inquiry, it is pertinent to recall the attitude adopted by the Government after the most exhaustive inquiry into the land problem had been made by Sir John Hope Simpson in 1930. He came to the conclusion that there was no available land on which new immigrants could be settled without serious displacement of the existing cultivators. But, after a few months of serious reconsideration, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in his letter (February 13th, 1931) to Dr. Weizmann, gave an assurance that the Government would institute an inquiry into the question of what State and other lands were, or could be made, available for Jewish settlement, that there would be no prohibition of further land purchase by Jews, and that it was the Government's "definite intention to initiate an active policy of development, which it is believed will result in substantial and lasting benefit to both Jews and Arabs." The present Colonial Secretary can hardly be said to have shown much respect for his father's undertaking.

The practical reason advanced for the new regulations is that "if land sales remain unrestricted there is likely to arise a 'landless Arab' problem of such dimensions that it will be extremely difficult to find any solution to it." When the Colonial Secretary was asked in the House of Commons debate on March 6th whether he had any figures of Arabs rendered landless by Jewish purchases of land, he readily admitted: "We have not any statistics." The only detailed inquiry into the facts was made in 1931-2, when it was ascertained that some 600 Arabs, mostly tenants, had been displaced during the ten years in which the Jews had purchased 115,000 acres of land. Of these displaced Arabs only about 100 availed themselves of the opportunity of resettlement offered by the Government, and according to the Official Report for 1937 about fifty of these families have "deserted the settlement and are engaged, for the most part, in other than agricultural work." Since then the Government have passed a Tenants' Protective Ordinance to prevent further displacements.

Moreover, no data have ever been adduced to show that peasant proprietors are being dispossessed. The fact is that the Arabs sell land which they can spare, and with the proceeds they develop the remainder.

In soliciting Parliament's approval for the new policy the Colonial Secretary said it was necessary "to enable us to mobilise our forces to prosecute to a victorious conclusion the war against Nazi Germany." This would seem to suggest that as soon as the Land Regulations were passed, a few hundred thousand Arabs would volunteer to fight for the Allies. No such offer has ever been made. On the contrary, although there are twice as many Arabs as Jews in Palestine, those who responded to the Government's call for recruits for service overseas were (according to the latest figures) 1,709 Jews and 392 Arabs. The Jews even offered to raise three divisions of their own, if they were allowed to fight as national units, but this proposal was turned down by the Government. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald further tried to sway the House of Commons by stating that the Government had "had a most stern warning from Palestine in recent weeks that despite the appearance in Palestine there was, beneath the surface, a growing unrest in the Arab villages." It seems strange that this "growing unrest" has not been noticed by experienced press correspondents or other unofficial observers on the spot. On the contrary, there is an abundance of evidence of the general improvement of relations between Jews and Arabs during the past six months, and several Arab villages have actually protested against the regulations. It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that the Government have given way to pressure on the part of the rulers of the neighbouring Arab lands, who have played an unwarranted part in Palestine's affairs since the so-called "strike" of 1936 and have taken advantage of the war to impose their view.

The new policy will prevent the Jews from applying their capital and industry to the development of any part of the land beyond the tiny area to which they have been assigned. It will cause them to flock into the towns and thus reproduce the evils of urbanisation in Eastern Europe which they had hoped to escape in their National Home. It will strike equally at the Arabs, who will be denied one of the surest means whereby they can improve their surplus land. It was publicly admitted by the Arab Delegation at the St. James's Palace

independent opinion. These became Nazis because all the others were supposed to be Nazis, and they will remain so as long as there is nothing else.

(b) The dangerous and rather numerous class of those who have something to lose or to fear through a change of régime. Here we find those who have lucrative party and other influential jobs, those who profited by the rape of Jewish property and—most despicable of all—those who spied and betrayed, tortured and murdered German Jews and their own Aryan countrymen.

(c) A small group of genuine fanatics who blindly believe in the Führer's infallibility and refuse to identify him with all the horrors which have been carried out in his name. These heterogeneous elements will have to be fought down once the day of the revolution comes, and it will be a serious problem to decide what to do with them.

In view of the widespread discontent it seems as if the Nazis must perforce already be in a dangerous minority; but they have a leader, a tremendous organisation, they are heavily armed and ruthless. Everything considered, it appears fairly obvious that the German, in the mood in which he entered the war, will not be prepared to stand the strain for an indefinitely long time, and the prophecy that revolution is bound to come is not too risky. However, it is impossible to foretell how long it will take him to revolt and if the push will have to come from outside through a military victory of the Allies, or if, quite independently of the military operations, there will suddenly be a right or left wing revolution, or the outbreak of armed resistance in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, or even Southern Germany. Possibilities are numerous.

The Nazis themselves seem to realise that their game will soon be up and they disguise their uneasiness more or less successfully. One rather piquant attempt of this kind is the change of name from "Siegfriedline" into "Westwall." Siegfried was the hero of a German legend; he bathed in the blood of a dragon and became invulnerable with the exception of a small spot on his back where a leaf from a tree had fallen. Thus the dragon's blood could not get through, since Siegfried, the gallant hero, would never show his back to an enemy. But Siegfried was treacherously stabbed in the back by a false friend. Hitler always maintained that in 1918 the German

Army was not beaten by the Allies, but by the "*Dolchstoß von hinten*" (stabbing in the back), by which he meant the crash of the German civil population. The Nazis have realised that no name for the fortifications could be less appropriate than Siegfried's, which unpleasantly evoked the idea that not the strongest defence could withstand the crack behind the lines.

From the point of view of the Allies a German revolution without any preceding major military operations would be the best solution. Therefore, whatever can be done to promote this revolution should be done. Broadcast and leaflet dropping are certainly most excellent means, and the too often repeated opinion that bombs would be better than leaflets, the contents of which are not believed by the Germans in the same way as this country does not believe in German propaganda, should not pass without protest. An attempt has been made to show that the German is eager to get news from outside his country and that he is perfectly prepared to trust it. This assertion finds its official confirmation in the Nazi regulation which threatens with death those who listen to foreign broadcasts and allows only wireless sets strong enough to get the German stations. A better avowal of their own weakness cannot possibly be imagined. Of course, the leaflets cannot be expected to show an immediate and direct result, but bit by bit they will do their work in opening the eyes and clearing the brains of the Germans whose sense of right and wrong has been thoroughly perverted by six years of Nazism. Revolution can shorten the war, and every single day less of war means less of human sacrifice and misery.

FRITZ KURZ.

Conferences last year that there were some 19 million dunams (about $4\frac{3}{4}$ million acres) of land in Western Palestine, out of a total of 27 million dunams (about $6\frac{3}{4}$ million acres), which were not cultivated by the Arabs and could not be cultivated by them. The greater part of this land will now inevitably be condemned to remain waste. Moreover, the new regulations are a violation of Article 6 of the Mandate, which requires that the Administration shall encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, and likewise of Article 15, which prescribes that "no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion, or language." It is, indeed, ironical that whereas the Jew may buy land in all countries save those under Nazi domination or influence, he is now forbidden to buy any in 95 per cent. of the land of his internationally guaranteed National Home, and that, too, at a time when his people are subjected to unparalleled persecution over such a wide area in Europe. It would seem as though the Balfour Declaration, which was acclaimed as one of the noblest products of the last war, has found its nadir in the present one.

ISRAEL COHEN.

HITLER'S SCANDINAVIAN BLUNDER.

HISTORICAL analogies are sometimes interesting, and sometimes even useful. Hitler's Scandinavian blunder in April 1940 seemed promptly to justify the analogy generally drawn with Napoleon's Peninsular blunder at the beginning of the last century. Being both temperamental and spoilt by easy successes, Hitler savagely mishandled his own clock-work when it first went wrong. Having overrun one by one a series of small, weak States with goose-stepping perfection and bullying brutality, he now came across the snag of a British naval threat to his Scandinavian supplies which irritated his sublime sense of infallibility. To be thwarted was a personal insult. Success does warp the judgment and blunt the acumen of men, whether normal or abnormal. Suddenly cut off from Narvik by the British mines, he furiously tried to turn the tables by annexing incidentally Denmark and thereby Norway so that the whole supply of the north Swedish ore would be reserved for him, and none at all for Britain (nor incidental pulp for paper). He struck with typical speed, efficiency, largeness of conception and, it must be added, blindness. He exposed a flank to the British navy. Within a week his own navy was crippled, and the entire coast of Germany, Western and Baltic, was bottled up by mines.

The whole strategic circumstance of the war was transformed. Hitler no longer was protected by the ring of small, scared neutral States who both allowed him (after the manner of fascinated rabbits before the weasel) to crush them in his own good time, one by one, and warned off their friends in the sacred name of a neutrality they thereby travestied and jeopardised. *Tertius gaudens* and drunk with the spoils, Hitler lost his head and blindly threw away his main advantage over the Allies.

The unexpected has again therefore confounded those who were bold enough to speculate about the prospects. Just as, when war was declared eight months ago, the speculators expected a preliminary "three months of hell" from the air (which did not happen), so now they had come to expect that Hitler and his men would go on playing the waiting, intriguing game behind the Western Wall and within the protecting ring of neutral States, the while the Allies concentrated on the

PROPAGANDA IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

A HUNDRED years ago the British Foreign Office paid attention to the foreign press but it did not maintain a press department. Relations with the newspapers were a part of the ordinary duties of British ministers abroad and most of the Foreign Secretaries kept their eye upon the need for putting the British case before foreigners ; but it was felt that this task could be adequately accomplished by the simplest operations, as for example when Palmerston in 1847 ordered his subordinates at the Foreign Office to send the Ministers at minor German courts "the article on Greece in this Day's *Chronicle* to get it inserted in *Allgemeine*, in the Leipzig and Hamburg Papers." This is "public relations" in embryo. To-day propaganda is different from anything that existed before, though there are of course points of resemblance with conditions during the last war. Not only have mechanical inventions revolutionised the methods by which statesmen can get into touch with the public, but the very aim of propaganda itself has changed. The "war of nerves" is not completely without a parallel in the past, but there has never been anything to compare with the use of the Press by modern totalitarian governments. There are more differences than similarities between what we see happening to-day and such campaigns as the German Press attack on England after the Jameson Raid or the famous "War Scare" of 1875.

Some basic principles, however, do not change. The world of Prince Metternich may be vastly different from the world of Dr. Goebbels, but the aims of Mr. Chamberlain must ultimately be the same as those of his predecessors—to convince the world, in circumstances rendering the statement of truth almost overwhelmingly difficult, of the justice and benevolence of British policy. There has lately been much discussion of the way this should be done, and it is curious to observe how often the best advice on method has unconsciously summarised the activities of those statesmen who were the greatest masters of the technique of propaganda. One writer for example urges that it is essential to have a narrow and clearly defined objective ; "propaganda" in general lacks effect, while a campaign dealing in particulars,

as an adjunct to a positive and distinct policy, succeeds because it shows what is promised coming to pass. Whatever its ultimate aim, the method of propaganda must be comprised in short-term programmes. Another writer, in the *Spectator*, asserts with pardonable exaggeration that "idealism is a vital point in our propaganda. . . . Stated in purely material terms there is not the slightest doubt that a moral foreign policy and a moral cause are worth twenty battleships and a million men under arms." Whatever we may think of this equation, there can be no doubt that it contains a grain of truth. A policy suffused with idealism but at the same time dealing in hard facts and making straight for each particular object as it looms ahead is most effective. There are analogies in the world of advertising ; but there are also analogies in the past. There has perhaps never been so sustained, so effective or so illuminating a campaign as that conducted by Cavour to secure support in England for the union of Italy under the King of Piedmont. His methods in many respects would be as anachronistic as a muzzle-loading rifle, but his aims and his principles are not without interest. Neutral opinion to-day is hardly less important to us than British opinion was to the Piedmontese.

The first stage of the successful war for Italian Unification began in 1859. As is well known, not only was British opinion sympathetic to the movement but the goodwill of the British Government and people was of material value to Cavour. It must not however be supposed that this goodwill was the spontaneous recognition of a just cause on the part of the public. A bias in favour of a Liberal, or at least liberating, movement indeed there was, and also hostility towards Austria which for years past had been losing British sympathy. Propaganda can only grow and bear fruit where the soil is fertile. What made British opinion strong and decisive, what kept it loyal to Cavour in spite of cross-currents in favour of Mazzini or of Garibaldi and in spite of hatred of Napoleon III, was, there can be little doubt, the extreme ability with which Cavour put the Piedmontese case before the British public.*

From his earliest days in public life, Cavour had paid

* *Cavour und die Presse* (1939), by Adolf Dressler, is interesting but disappointing. The essential work is *Cavour e l'Inghilterra* (Bologna, 1933), a collection of letters chiefly in French.

slow chance of a tightened blockade becoming effective. And lo! by the greatest surprise of all Hitler exposed his naval flank. It is an unending quest to explore the vagaries of Hitler's mental processes. The obvious guess is that the Allied plan to cut off the Narvik channel for Swedish iron ore appeared to him to be so potentially decisive that nothing less grandiose seemed to be dictated than an attempt to capture the whole of Scandinavia.

Whatever be the true explanation, Germany plunged. She attempted a new field of annexation which involved a line of communication across the sea. The challenge to the British navy was direct. Though the Baltic so far had been closed to the British navy (precisely because of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish territorial waters), and though the German navy now laid an extensive minefield, the British navy could not ignore, indeed welcomed, the challenge. Moreover, by removing the Danish and Norwegian waters from the technical category of neutral waters the main obstacle so far preventing an Allied attack upon Germany was removed. For the first time since the war began the Allies could now come to grips with Germany. No less vast and no less potentially decisive an opportunity was now given than a straight issue for the total control of the Swedish ore, for the command of the Baltic, and for an almost endless series of possibilities such as a landing in East Germany, the liberation of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the opening of battle fronts all round Germany. Was Germany so confident of being able to annex the Scandinavian countries, that she never considered those dangers? Or was she driven with her eyes open to so desperate a gamble?

It may be that the Swedish metal was judged by Hitler to be so decisively important that when the Allied mines were laid in Norwegian waters he saw that the issue had to be faced and fought. Iron and steel in war are vital. The present case is most simply illustrated by the latest normal figures relative to Germany's supply of iron ore. For the last complete year before the war, 1938, the supplies available in Germany and Austria were largely dependent upon Sweden. The iron content of the home-produced ore in that year was 4,041,000 metric tons, and of the imported ore 11,412,000 metric tons. Of the imported ore, no less than 44·1 per cent. in iron content came from Sweden (5,550,000 metric tons) and another

5·8 per cent. (726,000 metric tons) from Norway. The supply from Scandinavia therefore was more than half as much again as the total home production. Scrap iron, though important (in 1938 for instance Germany obtained nearly three-quarters as much metal from scrap as from new ore) is a source of supply with a clear limit set to it. The Norwegian port of Narvik was the only practical channel of supply to Germany. That channel was kept open only because Norway was neutral, and the German ships could thus shelter within the Norwegian territorial waters. By invading Norway Germany made an unexpected strategic present to the Allies.

The "spring offensive" of 1940 had therefore been precipitated in roundabout ways. First, the Supreme War Council of the Allies met in London on March 28th, and decided to take immediate steps to shorten the war by an intensification of the blockade. The British envoys were at once recalled from Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. They were all in London by April 7th. At the same time a new company was formed to develop British trade in the Balkan countries, the entire capital being subscribed by the British Treasury. Next, the British fleet mined certain Norwegian territorial waters (April 8th) to block the passage of the German iron ore transport ships. On April 9th Germany invaded Denmark and Norway.

It looked therefore as if, by a conspiracy of circumstances, the "stalemate," or the modern method of war by blockade backed by "shadow" armies, was after seven months to be abandoned. As a result of Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark direct belligerent contact was for the first time established between Germany and the Allies. The "neutral" ring protecting Germany was at last broken. Not many students of the unholy mess that is Europe had foreseen even the possibility of this particular development. The change was accompanied by the normal technique which ordains that the politician shall put out his verbal smoke screen even without expecting that he will deceive anybody. In this case Germany varied it in unimportant detail. Instead of announcing that the Scandinavian countries had committed acts of aggression against herself, she announced that those countries were in danger of aggression from the Allies, and that Germany had therefore decided to "protect" them: by

attention to the Press. He had himself taken part in journalistic ventures; in his maturity he publicly gave expression to the striking sentiment that "if I had not been a journalist, I would not have become a statesman." The manipulation of the Press was an important factor in his policy and he paid particular attention to Great Britain. Here he was much assisted by the very capable Piedmontese Minister in London, the Marquis d'Azeglio, who was a notable social figure and had the advantage of the assistance of such exiles and enthusiasts as Antonio Panizzi, the famous Librarian of the British Museum. The basic principle upon which Cavour acted should be the golden rule of all propagandists: "One must use facts, facts and not declamation. With the former and not with the latter can we hope to discredit the Austrian Government in the eyes of public opinion, especially in England." It is significant that Cavour played an active part in the creation of the Agenzia Stefani, which in 1853 gave Italy for the first time a native news agency and which during his life-time, and indeed afterwards, maintained close relations with the Government.

Like all men of genius, Cavour chose his instruments well and left them a wide discretion. Understanding of local conditions is essential to a successful propaganda. He was ignorant of English conditions, whereas d'Azeglio's understanding was acute and informed; hence the subordinate frequently acted on his own initiative. Nevertheless Cavour himself assiduously studied the English newspapers and regularly telegraphed to d'Azeglio instructions to secure insertions tending to justify the Piedmontese cause. "I regard it as of the highest importance," he would write, "that Count Buol's dispatch and my reply should appear in the English journals," but, he would add, "I leave it entirely to your discretion. If you judge this publication to be at all premature, do nothing about it." D'Azeglio made himself thoroughly acquainted with the character of the British Press, and he always considered it more valuable to obtain insertions in hostile newspapers than in those which were openly and consistently Italophil. In this respect his action resembled that of the later Imperial German Government; Bülow for example, on questions of foreign affairs, maintained relations with papers domestically hostile to him. Cavour was accustomed to make bargains of the supply of

news. Knowing that newspapers were eager for information, he wished to discriminate against those which failed to support the Italian cause. "Give the memorandum to the *Post* or the *Daily News* and to the *Nord*; *The Times* does not deserve it." D'Azeglio disagreed and was indeed more loyal than Cavour to the latter's principles. One fact would counter-balance much pro-Austrian declamation and a paragraph in *The Times* was worth a column of the *Daily News*, since, apart from the different weight of the two organs, the latter was expected to argue the Italian cause while the former was not.

It would be tedious to go step by step through the laborious activities of these statesmen during the five years before the war of 1859. A thousand small successes, rather than a few grand coups, mark the progress of a successful public relations officer. Cavour was less concerned to organise a noisy campaign in favour of Italian unity than daily to place Piedmontese diplomacy in a favourable light. No occasion was too humble and no affair too trifling to be the object of hard thought and vigorous action; a sense of proportion as well as an understanding of the machinery was necessary since it was as dangerous to over-emphasise as to ignore the little problems. An error in the *Morning Chronicle* in May, 1855, gave d'Azeglio an opportunity to explain the presence of the Piedmontese troops at the Crimea, but in the measures he took he was careful to avoid making "too great an affair" out of it.

It is interesting to observe that the vigilant Cavour saw that public opinion could be reached by other channels as well as the newspapers. In 1857 he wrote: "See whether you can set Lord Shaftesbury and Exeter Hall to work. This party has been inactive for a long time for want of a rallying cry. The menaces of Austria against Sardinia should furnish it with one that ought to have a great effect." Yet neither he nor d'Azeglio quite understood the Nonconformist Conscience, which provided Italy with some of her strongest supporters. At the beginning of 1858 James Grant, editor of the *Morning Advertiser*, then a powerful religious organ, wrote to warn d'Azeglio that British support would be jeopardised by the persecution of Protestants in Piedmont. "I can assure you that without the sympathy and support of the religious Community of this Country, no cause can

armed conflict with the beneficiary. The spectacle of Norway resisting by armed force a German invasion whose proclaimed purpose was to protect Norway from invasion is now so threadbare as a typical subject of comment that it ceases to excite any comment.

Many people were stung into indignation by the swiftly established fact of still another aggression. After Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, came Denmark and Norway; next (it was now no longer doubted) it would be the turn of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Rumania, Hungary. To look at the map of Europe is to see between the Rhine and the European frontier of Russia a mosaic of small states, many of which owed their sovereign independence to the Allied "victory" in the last war. For many years they have all been shivering with panic. Austria and Czechoslovakia went down without resistance (Czechoslovakia on Allied instigation). Poland survived three weeks. Denmark capitulated without ado. Italy applauded Germany's action in Scandinavia for the main probable reason that she also would rather see Germany knocking down the ninepins northwards than southwards. The Balkan States (knowing that they were "on the list") were tongue-tied and incapable of comment. It was the panic that in advance decided the fate of the small states. If the Norwegian attempt were now defeated, the whole psychology of the European neutral States, including Italy, would be transformed.

England is at war with Germany. What for? To defend "liberty." In other words to prevent Germany from dominating Europe by force. The case against Germany is overwhelming and clear. There is however a slight muddle in the British argument. In international affairs the deciding factor is, and always has been, force. The British Empire, which in fair truth is in many ways unlike all other empires known to the world's history, yet in its origins and in its continuance pays tribute to the majesty of force. Why does British opinion object to Germany's annexation of Denmark, potentially commanding the entrance to the Baltic, when we ourselves have annexed Gibraltar because it commands the entrance to the Mediterranean? The Germans at any rate are consistent. In a Europe where the very principles of the Christian Faith are denied, and where the only law is that of the jungle, whereby the strong survive and the weak perish,

Germany's purpose is to be strong, to destroy, lest she be destroyed. She stupidly does not mix humanity in her conception of strength. The spectacle is wholly revolting to those people—and only to those people—who are conscious of something better in the human destiny. It has to be roundly confessed that the political tradition of the entire world is godless. Britain is not only included in that world, but has done as much as any other single Power to fortify that tradition. The essential conflict to-day, despite the difference in humanitarian practice, is between the rival organisations of force. The present German Government and therefore a majority of the German people are actuated by a motive of brutal, selfish, material acquisitiveness. In their practice they defy God, and spurn the crucified Christ. Their ugly inhumanities therefore cannot be a source of surprise. "Their works do follow them." What of the British Government, and the British people? The muddle in our present outlook corresponds to something characteristic in ourselves. We have no present policy (except "defending liberty") because our only effective motive is the negative one of fear of Germany. True, we are centuries ahead of Germany in the mellowing of the natural, or pagan, virtues. As a nation we could no longer commit the sordid bestialities that are committed by the raw natives of northern Germany. But we subscribe to the essential principles of Power politics, while hating (and fearing) the brutal German application of them. Such politics are impartially godless. No man not wholly bemused would claim that Britain as a whole has the slightest practical conception of what is implied, or intended, by Christianity. Even the original Catholic Church in its diminutive English province is in some ways, and in the attitude of its individual constituent members, more English than Catholic, though the pristine purity of the Faith is undimmed. The bitter wit who talked of the "Roman Catholic Church of England" had some slight basis to his wit, even though it is one of the abiding miracles—not surprising to any simple, true Christian—that in a materialist irreligious England the Church has weathered the storms, diminished in extent, but pure in its intrinsic quality. The vast secondary, derivative or modern Churches, rival and protestant, from the "Established" Church of England through the many re-entrant variations to the Salvation Army, estimable, good

prosper." D'Azeglio's irritated reception of this letter indicates that he failed to understand its force and justice.

Throughout the aim had been consistently to demonstrate the justice and moderation of Cavour's policy. Each little brick that d'Azeglio handled went to construct an edifice whose walls were of fact but whose foundations were an idealism thoroughly approved by the British public. On the eve of war in 1859 the building nearly collapsed because the British public was sharply alienated by Cavour's alliance with Napoleon III and by the new strain of aggressiveness which entered his policy. D'Azeglio made vigorous efforts to regain sympathy by convincing the newspaper editors of his Government's moderation. His most striking success was to organise a dinner at which Delane of *The Times* was placed next to an Italian advocate who managed to convince him that Cavour had not taken leave of common sense. Next day (April 4, 1859) Delane wrote to Panizzi mentioning his support of the Italian cause and adding: "Even now, I can scarcely realise that your objects are so moderate and within such easy reach as you describe." Needless to say the conversion of *The Times* had a great effect.

There has not been a better example of a propagandist campaign, honourable in its methods and successful in its achievement. Even if at the present time quiet methods seem out of date, it is probably still true that the best propagandist is not the noisiest but the most vigilant, the most tactful, the most laborious and the most resourceful. The secret of Cavour's success was clearly less his own genius, great though that was, than the inexhaustible tact with which his agent in England adapted himself to English conditions and the infinite capacity of both for taking pains. It is most noteworthy for our present edification, perhaps, that Cavour was not content to rest quietly upon the assurance that British opinion was very largely on his side. Such indolence would have been fatal. He was determined that Englishmen should thoroughly understand his case, that Italophil feeling should increase rather than diminish, and that it should take the form of active, though strictly neutral, support, not merely of passive or academic goodwill. Therein is a lesson for the treatment of neutrals.

FELIX FRIES.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ART OF CHESS.

A CERTAIN respect, dating back centuries, has been accorded to the game of chess even among the wide mass of uninitiated laymen. This respect expresses itself partly in the crediting of distinguished chess masters with special gifts in the domains of judgment, precise calculation and extreme cunning. Every chess master will be more than familiar with the following remarks: "You must be wonderful at mental calculation, of course." "Mathematics must be very easy for you." "What an amazing memory you must have." These are a few of the many flattering questions frequently directed at him. Questions, however, which he must for truth's sake answer, in the great majority of instances, in the negative.

Very common among non-players is the opinion that chess talent and strategic gifts have something of a bond of union between them, and that consequently in every chess master a great general has been lost. This, may I say at once, thoroughly mistaken assumption is very probably due to the fact that chess is regarded as a form of war game; and this not unjustly, for doubtless the conception of presenting a battle in the form of a game must have been in the mind of its Indian originator. In the Indian term for chess, "*tchaturanga*" (literally translated, "The Four Parted"), we have good evidence of this, since the word also referred to the Indian military power, which consisted of four main divisions, namely elephants, chariots, cavalry and infantry.

It is, in itself, highly improbable that any kind of deeper relationship exists between the symbolic representation of a battle on the sixty-four squares and the art of the war-lord. Furthermore, the aim of each differs sharply from the other. The purpose of the real battle is the destruction, or at least the repulse, of the enemy's forces. In chess, however, it is the capture of a single definite piece, i.e. the king of our opponent, upon which all one's thoughts and plans are centred. It is therefore impossible, in principle, to re-enact the course of an actual battle through the medium of a chess game. Chess literature, it is true, contains a few humorously conceived problems which are meant to portray some interesting skirmish, or the finale of a famous battle. The rôle of

and even beautiful in some ways, deplorable in others, have yet in their aggregate effect contributed to the spiritual muddle that has been England since the Reformation.

We talk to-day about political "liberty" in a sincere conviction. But we are less sound than sincere in our talk. Hitler was wrong when he admired our "propaganda" on the ground that liberty was a first-rate slogan for bamboozling a people and mobilising their *moral* for war. We do not consciously bamboozle ourselves. Indeed, though we mix the bowsprit with the rudder, there is something real and fine in the British conception of political liberty. That conception, if achieved, would represent an advance on the prevailing circumstances. But our difficulty is that our own roots as a nation are embedded deep in precisely the same sort of power politics that we now confusedly think to combat. England's position to-day is not without its tragic aspect. We do fight for a better international system than the depraved concepts of German *Machtpolitik*; yet our motives are mixed, and we stand alone. In such a fight, those who are not for us are against us. The United States, Italy, Russia, Japan in their effect as distinct from their words, connive at the German bid for domination in Europe. The pathetic conglomeration of the European small States—who are the victims and the booty—do not hang together, and therefore they hang separately. Norway, for instance, helped to provide Germany with the weapons now turned upon her. Britain and France stand shoulder to shoulder; but France so far has been "bypassed" behind the Maginot Line. Britain so far has borne the brunt. It may be however in the military sense that the salvation of Norway will decide the whole future of the European small States, and therefore of Hitler.

The details of the diplomatic manoeuvres that led to the first big armed clash of the war may well be of lasting interest. The intensification of the conflict dates roughly from the time when Mr. Sumner Welles, United States Under-Secretary of State, left for home after a month of fact-finding in Europe. He sailed from Genoa on March 20th. Two days earlier Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had met on the Brenner frontier, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano. Only a week earlier Herr von Ribbentrop visited Rome. On the day after Mr. Sumner Welles's departure, M. Paul Reynaud formed a new

Government in France, ostensibly to give a more vigorous push to the direction of the war. The Supreme War Council met for its sixth session in London on March 28th, exactly a week after M. Reynaud formed his Government. The two Governments on that day decided not only to intensify "total war" on the three fronts, economic, diplomatic and military, and to make public and unmistakable avowal of that resolve, but to put on record an understanding about Franco-British co-operation for the purpose of what may perhaps be called "total peace" (which phrase has as much or as little meaning as "total" the other thing). The joint official statement issued after the meeting on March 28th established three principles: one, that the two Governments will entertain proposals neither for an armistice nor for a treaty of peace except by mutual agreement; two, that such agreement presupposes "an effective and lasting guarantee of their security"; three, that after the war they will continue their community of action until that guarantee is firmly and unassailably operative. An interesting personality in that meeting of the Supreme War Council was M. Roland de Margerie, newly appointed Chef de Cabinet to M. Reynaud. Up to the beginning of the war he had been First Secretary of the French Embassy in London, had left the service to rejoin his *Chasseurs* in the Maginot Line, and was now recalled to political work; one of the liveliest and best-informed minds on either side of the Channel. The understanding reached about Anglo-French community of action for post-war purposes led to the immediate appointment of a Cabinet Committee in London to consider how best to give effect to it. On the British side it was hoped that the necessity of pushing the French frontier up to the Rhine to satisfy the French General Staff's diagnosis of "security" in the future peace settlement might be obviated if an Anglo-French instrument of permanent co-operation, military, economic and financial, were devised in a convincing enough scope to deter any future German aggression. Such a machinery already operates for war purposes and for six months after the war. The new question was: could it be made to operate permanently? It was made clear that the British Government was not disposed to risk a repetition of the mistake of 1919, when the guarantee to France was in effect withdrawn. As long ago as February 24th last Mr. Chamberlain had sought to make that

the cavalry is played here naturally by the knights; the pawns are the infantry, the rooks the heavy artillery and so on. But all this is, after all, mere dallying with chess. It is granted that in chess, this distinctly "fighting game," certain common-sense laws dominate, precisely as in war, or, for that matter, in daily life. That one's energies be directed against the weak points in the enemy's armour and not against the strong; that, with both forces equal in strength, storm attacks have little hope of success, etc., are fundamental laws, which both the chess player and the strategist must obey. The game offers an excellent basis for such rhetorical comparisons, of which clever writers and speakers have often enough aptly made use.

The favourite anecdotes about great generals showing their power to much advantage on the chequered battlefield have been proved to be without historical foundation. Napoleon played chess only occasionally, and is said to have visited, while yet a young officer, the famous chess resort, the "Café de la Régence," on a few occasions. He was by no means a player of any strength, and several of the games credited to him, in which his victories are crowned by astounding manœuvres, have been verified as concoctions made up only after his death. Charles XII of Sweden was an enthusiastic, but in all probability very poor, chess player; for we are told that he had a curious preference for moving his king often. It was to this well-known fact that Frederick the Great alluded, in a letter to Voltaire at the beginning of the Seven Years War, in which he writes, "*Je suis comme le roi d'échecs de Charles XII, qui marchait toujours*" (I feel like Charles XII's chess monarch, who had always to be on the march). The great Prussian king was probably the only one of all the famous strategists who had a deeper interest and an understanding of the game. During the visit to Berlin of the great French chess master, Philidor, in 1751, Frederick was several times to be seen among those witnessing the games between the Frenchman and the best players in the Prussian capital. Von Moltke, too, is said to have been a chess enthusiast in his youth, but although we possess nothing definite on this point, it is certain, on the other hand, that as the "Great Moltke" he never played.

A fable, similarly lacking in historical support, is the often-made assertion that the inclination and talent of chess are to

be found with striking frequency among distinguished statesmen and diplomats. To my knowledge there is no marked instance of this to be discovered in history; although among the politicians and diplomats of our century I know of three men who could really claim to consideration as chess players, namely Freiherr Marschall von Biberstein, the late English statesman Bonar Law, and the present British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon. Von Biberstein held the post of German Ambassador to Turkey some years before the Great War, and during this time not only acted as president of the "International Chess Club," then meeting in the "Pera Hotel" in Constantinople, but was also acknowledged one of the strongest players of that city. Regarding the chess abilities of Bonar Law I am enabled to judge from personal experience, for in 1900, during the time I spent in his native city, Glasgow, as a guest of the local chess club, he was my daily chess opponent over a period of several weeks. His practical playing strength and comprehension of the deeper points of the game actually extended far beyond mere dilettantism. Nowadays Sir John Simon is very likely the only living statesman who has, no doubt, the playing strength of a really good amateur. He is a member of the "National Liberal Club's" Chess Circle and is considered to be one of its best players. His remarkable knowledge of the openings shows that there must have been a period in his life when he had devoted himself rather closely to scientific chess study.

The common, deeply-rooted prejudice that chess combinations require mental mathematics, or that the latter at least lessens the difficulties, rests upon the mistaking of the very nature of chess art. The fact that the game has numbered among its distinguished masters comparatively many excellent mathematicians (we might mention here only the former world champion, Dr. Emanuel Lasker) is naturally very impressive; but one could compile a list almost as long indicating the very opposite conclusion. Fundamentally examined, chess has not the least in common with mathematics. A certain power of "plastic visualisation" is indeed an essential part of chess talent, but this is not necessarily in the mathematical sense. It is not a planimetric or stereometric picture that appears before the mind's eye of the chess player; neither has he to cope with algebraical calculations. His task lies rather in mentally picturing the constantly

changing formations of the pieces and fixing them accurately in his memory. This process is indeed more closely allied to the department of "topographic sense."

I consider it very questionable indeed that chess talent implies any gift, even in minor proportions, for other fields of mental activity; or that aptitude for chess enriches the mind universally. In this connection I should like to warn young people, at all events those yet at their studies, against any too intensive occupation with the game. It is true that chess is one of the noblest of mental recreations, a real "stamping ground" of cleverness; but it contains a world all its own, an abstract world of strange charm. Whoever has once experienced this fascination may easily succumb to it and thereby develop one-sidedly; particularly since chess, as fundamentally a game of combat, lends powerful impetus to one's ambition to improve in it. It is precisely the talented youngster who is most exposed to this danger. Only he who has attained a certain degree of completion to his general education and spiritual development and whose character has passed the moulding stage may devote himself freely to the goddess of chess without fear of the consequences. The noble game has its depths, in which many a fine and gentle soul, alas, has vanished.

Up to this point I have treated the subject regarding psychology and the art of chess only from the negative side. There is nevertheless a very positive view of the question which, in my opinion, merits the greatest attention on the part of psychological science. We know that psychological-biological research has long busied itself with the problem of ascertaining at what age the human being reaches the apex of his powers, and at what point of the chart the downward curve begins. This question is incidentally of great importance not only for science, but also for the affairs of everyday practical business life. The answer would be very simple if the phases of the physical and mental development ran parallel to each other; since there can be no doubt that in the purely physical respect it is youth, more exactly youth in the third decade of life, to whom the world belongs. The determining of this fact offers no difficulty, as we possess the three absolute measuring rules for the valuation of physical achievements, namely time, space and weight. These are applicable to every sphere of physical activity, and enable us,

in the field of sports for instance, to measure each effort with the utmost precision. Unfortunately, or shall I say rather happily, there has been no method invented up to now which might enable us to measure similarly the achievements in the realm of mental activity. In appraising the work of great personalities, be it in whatever sphere, the judgments of experts and connoisseurs will only rarely be found to agree; often enough they are sharply at variance. Can it be maintained that the thirty-years-old Beethoven of the *Eroica* had scaled greater heights than the fifty-years-old creator of the *Ninth Symphony*? Is *Herrmann und Dorothea* more valuable to us than *Tasso*? Had Bismarck's statesmanship already achieved its apex in 1866 or, for instance, only later at the time of the great Berlin Congress? Such questions can never be satisfactorily answered. We recognise as a fact that certain qualities, such as originality and fantasy, are chiefly phenomena of youth, whereas others, such as comparative judgment, appear more frequently in the riper stages of life. But it is just this fact which complicates the problem and increases the difficulties of solution.

Every mental activity is the product of a proper co-operation between various components of the intellectual and moral make-up of the human being and for each sphere of such activity there must be necessarily a different mixture of these components. Were it possible to have a form of "mental sport arena," a "*palestra ingenii*," where the individual achievements, freed from arbitrary critical estimation, could be rated according to absolute measurements, then our psychologist would be in a position to draw valuable conclusions from his (at first necessarily one-sided) observations, conclusions which would later permit probably accurate and wide generalisation. We do possess, however, one such "mental sport" which *sui generis* lends itself exceedingly well as the gauge we seek, and this is chess. We also have mental sport arenas of a kind, namely the tournaments and matches which have become, ever since the middle of the last century, customary practice among chess masters.

To illustrate this point clearly, the following explanation may serve. Chess is elevated by its innermost character, its mental and spiritual content, far above the *niveau* of a game. In certain respects it could be placed almost on the level of science, in so far as chess-theoretical researches involve the

point clear by declaring in the House of Commons, in a careful statement which at the time went almost unnoticed: "This intimate understanding which has grown up between us must not be allowed to come to an end when the war is over. It must remain to help us to work out the problems of the new Europe which must come after the war in an association in which we shall gladly welcome others who share our ideals. We and France are determined to do what we can for security by the continuance of that complete identity of purpose and policy which now unites us and which will serve after the war for the firm foundation on which the international relations between our two countries are built."

Another immediate result of the Supreme War Council's meeting on March 28th was the recall of the British envoys from the Near and Middle East: namely Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen from Ankara, Mr. George Rendel from Sofia (one of the best-informed members of the British diplomatic service on Mediterranean questions), Mr. Owen St. C. O'Malley from Budapest, Sir Reginald Hoare from Bucarest, Mr. Ronald Ian Campbell from Belgrade (not to be confused with Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell who happened to precede him in that Legation), and Sir C. M. Palairret from Athens. Sir Percy Loraine, British Ambassador in Rome, happened also to be in London. The consultations between the returned envoys and the Government leaders, in particular Mr. Cross, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, began on April 8th. The stage was set for an economic drive against Germany. Mr. Churchill on March 30th and Mr. Chamberlain on April 2nd had publicly hinted at such a purpose. The Allied plans were still hampered by the neutral buffer belt surrounding Germany. M. Georges Monnet, the French Minister of Blockade, arrived in London by air on April 5th to concert plans with Mr. Cross. On that day Lord Halifax in London and M. Reynaud in Paris handed identical communications to the Norwegian and Swedish Ministers about the Allied purpose.

In the north the problem was to prevent Norwegian territorial waters being misused (or used as a cloak) for the sea-transport of North Swedish iron ore to Germany from the Norwegian port of Narvik. That ore not only constituted nearly one-half of Germany's total normal import, but contained the high phosphate content needed by the German machinery. The normal German import from Sweden had

already been reduced to one-third (in the three months December to February last only 478,058 tons were sent as against 1,286,181 a year earlier). The object now was totally to block the passage from Narvik so that the only available route would be via the Swedish ports on the Baltic, especially Lulea. Not only are those ports frozen for three or four months in the year (whereas Narvik is free the whole year), but Lulea and Oxelösund together handle less trade than Narvik.

In the south-east of Europe, while it was recognised that the Balkan countries must be allowed to continue their trade with Germany for normal purposes, the object was to prevent the imposition of a German monopoly over the whole trade, and in addition to block the still open channels of essential war supplies that were reaching Germany through those countries. The most important single commodities are Rumania's supply of the various oils, especially lubricants, and Jugoslavia's metals and minerals. By her agreement with Rumania Germany is entitled to receive 31·8 per cent. of Rumania's total oil exports. But they have to be transported and (as Rumania no doubt hopes) paid for. Rumania's need of a market with a strong currency and an adequate supply of foreign exchange was one of the bases of Allied calculations. Another hope lies in transport difficulties. Normally the bulk (74·5 per cent.) of Germany's supply of Rumanian oil has to be borne by sea (via Constanta, the Mediterranean, the North Sea and Hamburg or the Rhine). That line of transport has already been totally prevented. Upstream transport by the Danube, even when the river is not frozen, is made difficult both by the swiftness of the adverse current below Vienna and by the shortage of tank barges. Rail transport is made negligible by the shortage of railway tank cars; and the proposed 500-mile pipe-line to Bratislava is not only hedged with difficulties, but would take at least two years to complete. There was therefore thought to be a good chance, by sheer buying power, to restrict still further the benefit received by Germany from Rumania's oils, as well as from Jugoslavia's agricultural produce, copper and minerals. As Germany had already been cut off from the original sources of cotton, wool, rubber and tobacco (except Bulgarian), hopes began to run so high that Mr. Chamberlain on April 4th, speaking at the Central Hall,

fixing of clearly defined maxims and general principles. Much closer, however, is its kinship to art, for it is only with the help of fantasy and intuition that the summits of chess play may be attained. And as the artist pours his whole personality into his creation, so too do the games of great masters bear the unmistakable stamp of their individualities. Thus in chess circles one speaks of a game in the style of Morphy, Lasker, etc., just as one does of a painting in the manner of Rubens or a poem "*à la* Byron." Style and individuality remain the criteria of art . . . and chess.

In its modern form of public performance, however, chess differs completely from artistic and scientific activity. Here we find the giants of the chess-board struggling often for weeks in tournaments and matches, for the profit and glory of winning the prize. The scholar or artist works and creates, in most cases, only when "the spirit moves him." The chess master, on the contrary, must appear at a given time and place to do battle. Whether inclined to or not, he must play for the prescribed number of hours and make the equally prescribed number of moves in each of these. Veterans and young players are alike subject to these merciless tournament rules. We may perceive therefrom that chess is an art which makes constant demands on one's originality and creativeness, coupled with the power of cool, scientific appraisal; and yet simultaneously a nerve-trying battle, a battle of brains. This to-day is the nature of a chess master's profession, and just as physical strength and suppleness may be measured by the athletic sports, so do the chess masters' strengths allow of quite exact measurements through the medium of tournaments and matches. For here, too, we have an absolute measure, i.e. the win-point, as the basis of valuation. He who wins the most games and therefore can show the greatest sum of points receives the victor's prize, precisely as in athletic sports.

There now remains only the question of purely chess historical statistics to deal with; at what age did most of the great masters attain their best results? This statistical information must indeed be approached with a certain degree of reservation. It should be applied only in the cases of those masters who enjoyed fairly good health, and were able to participate in match and tournament play until an advanced age. Thus we must at once exclude for instance the American

genius Paul Morphy, since his public career extended only from his twentieth to his twenty-second year and ended abruptly with his complete retirement from competitive play. On the other hand, excellent material for our consideration is offered in the case of masters like Anderssen, Steinitz, Blackburne, Winawer, Zukertort, Tarrasch, Lasker and, up to a certain point, the present world champion, Alekhine. From the careers of these and other first-class masters, one fact of importance to our subject stands out with striking and undoubted consistency. All great players had already in their youth shown excellence of a high order; then slowly ripened, perhaps the more slowly and persistently the profounder their gifts; until, at approximately 40, the summit of their powers was reached. On this summit they remained for a period of from fifteen to twenty years, their sixtieth year marking as a rule the beginning of a more or less gradual decline.

It is in any event noteworthy that chess serves us valuably in offering itself in psychological and biological fields as a comparative measuring-rule for mental abilities; and thus substantiates, in an enlarged sense, the well-known words of Goethe on chess: "This game is a test-block of the brain."

J. MIESES.

Westminster, brought his audience to their feet by a mild indulgence in optimism. He declared that he was "ten times as confident of victory" now as when the war started, and that "Hitler had missed the bus."

The hilarity was helped in some small degree by Mr. Molotov, who had made a speech on March 29th, affirming that Russia was determined to remain "neutral" towards the major war. That statement had the negative value of exploding the Nazi dream, which had taken Ribbentrop to Rome on March 10th, of a full military alliance between Berlin, Rome and Moscow. It was even suggested by Moscow in private, that the time was ripe for improved Anglo-Russian relations. In more detail the suggestion was that Russia's interest was vested in peace, whereas Germany's was vested in war; that there was no commitment or understanding between Russia and Germany other than the trade agreement, which involves a turnover of only 1,000,000,000 marks (say £50,000,000) or of 500,000,000 marks (say £25,000,000) on each side; that it was Moscow's desire in principle, and for the deliberate purpose of fortifying her neutrality, to conclude a trade agreement also with Britain and France.

After missing the bus, however, Hitler made a typically spectacular attempt to catch another: the attempt characterised by Mr. Churchill on April 11th as a political and strategic blunder. The several official pronouncements, though not in the least important, may be regarded as important by those who have a taste for controversy. The Allied mines were laid in Norwegian territorial waters on April 8th and an Allied statement was issued during the morning of that day. It contained the following passages: "International law has always recognised the right of a belligerent, when its enemy has systematically resorted to illegal practices, to take action appropriate to the situation created by the illegalities of the enemy. Such action, even though not lawful in ordinary circumstances, becomes, and is generally recognised to become, lawful in view of the other belligerent's violation of law. . . . The Allied Governments have observed that a heavy proportion of the losses inflicted upon neutral countries both of human life and in material has fallen upon the Norwegian Mercantile Marine. Yet while the German Government repeatedly sink Norwegian shipping and murder

Norwegian seamen they continue to demand from the Norwegian Government the fullest use of Norwegian territorial waters for their own commerce, and the Norwegian Government have even felt obliged to provide armed escort in these waters for German ships, while unable to take effective action against German brutality on the high seas, of which their own vessels have been the victims. . . . The Allied Governments can no longer afford to acquiesce in the present state of affairs by which Germany obtains resources vital to her prosecution of the war, and obtains from Norway facilities which place the Allies at a dangerous disadvantage. They have therefore already given notice to the Norwegian Government . . .," etc. (Here follow the details of the minefields laid.)

The Norwegian Government promptly protested in terms which were destined within twenty-four hours to be invested with an irony seldom paralleled in the world's history. While that protest was being issued the German ships were already moving against Norway. The protest in its essential passages ran: "The Norwegian Government makes a serious and solemn protest against this open breach of International Law, and such a violation by force of Norwegian sovereignty and neutrality. Throughout the war Norway has observed all the rules of neutrality with the strictest care. By keeping her waters open to all legitimate traffic of ships belonging to the belligerent countries, Norway has acted according to those rules which are generally acknowledged. . . . The Norwegian Government cannot in any way agree to the belligerent countries placing mines in Norwegian territorial waters. The Government must claim that such mines be removed at once, and that patrolling by foreign warships shall cease."

The German invasion of Norway began at dawn on the following day (April 9th). The first news was conveyed in a laconic communiqué of the German High Command, thus: "In order to counter the British attack now in process against the neutrality of Denmark and Norway the German armed forces have assumed the armed protection of those States. For this purpose strong German forces entered or landed this morning in both countries. To safeguard these operations extensive minefields have been laid." The German Government then transmitted a Note to the Danish and Norwegian Governments elaborating the argument that Germany had decided to "protect" those countries. The following

passages are taken from the text of the Note to Denmark, being identical, except for the change of name, with the Note to Norway: "The German Government is now in possession of irrefutable documents proving that Britain and France were determined to wage war in the territories of the Northern States. . . . The German Government has therefore given orders to begin certain operations which will lead to the occupation of certain points of strategic importance on Danish territory. The German Government hereby undertake the protection of Denmark for the duration of the war. . . . German troops do not enter Danish soil with hostile intentions. The German High Command does not intend to carry out war operations against Britain from the bases occupied by the German forces so long as Germany is not forced to do so by British measures. . . . The Government of the Reich expect the Danish Government and the Danish people to understand the German procedure and expect them not to offer any resistance. Any resistance that might be made will be broken and must be broken by all means, and such resistance would therefore only lead to needless bloodshed. . . . In view of the traditional good relationship between Germany and Denmark the German Government assure the Danish Government that Germany does not intend by these measures to destroy Denmark's territorial integrity and independence, either at the present moment or in the future."

It might have been thought that the German propagandist technique (devised obviously for exclusive entertainment of the German people) could no longer serve any useful purpose. The fact that the present German Government so confidently shows its contempt of German popular intelligence, or so confidently believes the German people to be cowed and harmless, does not wholly explain the circumstance. No honest person could believe that the armed (and resisted) conquest of a country was a method of "protecting" that country. Either a cynical German people has no scruple about its present Government's conduct (which cannot be the case) or, in the alternative, there is smouldering in the hearts of that people a hatred of that Government which must sooner or later burst into flame.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 12th, 1940.

RIBBENTROP.

THE first German Encyclopedias appearing in 1934 under Nazi censorship do not even mention "Ribby's" name. Yet he had been Hitler's saviour, the purse-bearer of his party at the most critical moment of its career, when in November 1932, one length from the post, it was about to suffer financial breakdown. The son-in-law of the champagne magnate Henckell, together with the ex-cavalry officer von Papen, convinced the industrial magnates of the utility of the ex-housepainter as a battering-ram against the trade unions and extracted the necessary millions for his cause.

A cause he, Joachim von Ribbentrop, had adopted only a short while before, drawn by an alluring picture of his great chances as a politician by his friend, Count Helldorf, now Police-President of Berlin. Count Helldorf was then better known as the organiser of the first tentative "pogrom" in Berlin's West End than as the hero of a scandal which had ended with a considerable term behind iron bars for a forged signature. But Hitler had never been squeamish, and he succumbed readily enough to the diplomatic appearance of the former commercial traveller in sparkling wine, whisky and other potable amenities. He had a good excuse: the only daughter of the German champagne millionaire had yielded to the same charms, and she had had more opportunities to come in touch with men of breeding and education than Adolf Hitler, the hero of the outcasts. Ribbentrop—at first without the handle "von" to his name acquired later in a somewhat curious way by having himself adopted by an aunt, widow of an ennobled General of the same name—must have been a slender, good-looking young fellow, with a glib tongue as befits the wine merchant, and with many ready anecdotes collected during his roving years, and during the war which brought him a commission. They had led him to Canada, Britain and France.

His smattering of foreign languages combined with the splendour of his father-in-law's wealth reflected in the Dahlem home of the Ribbentrops convinced Hitler that here indeed had he found the ideal representative of his own future diplomacy. It did not matter that Ribby—so his intimates called him—spoke an English which smacked more of the

MAETERLINCK.

ON the 24th of August, 1890, a twenty-eight-year old Belgian barrister, descendant of a distinguished Flemish family, awoke, like Byron, to find himself famous. That morning there appeared in the Paris *Figaro* an enthusiastic account from the pen of the dreaded and esteemed critic, Octave Mirbeau, of a new and unknown Shakespeare who lived within the borders of France. This enthusiasm in a man to whom not many things were sacred was occasioned by a play in verse, *La Princesse Maleine*, by Polydore Marie Bernard Maurice Maeterlinck. In this play a fantastically sensitive princess is driven into the cruel arms of an early death by fantastically wicked kings. Since Voltaire had applied to Shakespeare the epithet of "savage genius," French critics have been wont to liken to him all manifestations of dramatic talent which seemed somehow strange or contravened the accepted canons. Victor Hugo, for instance, had spoken of the young Rimbaud as "Shakespeare *enfant*," Mirbeau—always thorough—roundly declared that Maeterlinck's *Princesse Maleine* excelled the greatest of Shakespeare's works.

Though this judgment was wildly astray, it yet served to prevent a great and self-willed genius from remaining merely the adored master of a small circle of admirers. The true worth and achievement of this Belgian poet was only to be revealed to us later, when we realised that in him we had a genuine lyricist. Here was one of those "pure poets" in whom ideas and subject were but a pretext round which feeling crystallised in language. Here was a magician, a master of song, whose words had the power to make the most secret emotions of the heart vibrate. But of Shakespeare the investigator of the soul and the inspired creator of stirring life and red-blooded men, we find in Maeterlinck no trace. That this man, whose works were played on all the great stages of the world a quarter of a century ago, and who was honoured by the Nobel prize, should mean less than nothing to the present generation, is only to be explained by the mistaken judgment which prized Maeterlinck, first as a dramatist, then as a thinker and now turns in disillusion from both.

The secret of Maeterlinck's greatness long escaped me,

though I could not doubt it. It speaks to us directly in the juvenile poems of the *Serres Chaudes* and in all his plays; in his scientific works as much as in the philosophically intended prose-works. What is it that gives a charm and everlasting value to these plays, though they lack all dramatic power? What are we to say of these songs alternating from the child-like to the childish, in these "Mysteries of the Universe" with their cheap mysticism, in the attribution of life to inanimate objects, in the crude anthropomorphising of flowers and animals?

No great acumen is needed to see that Maeterlinck's fairy plays are more akin to the horrific pseudo-romantic tragedies that thrilled our great-grandparents, than they are to the theatre of Shakespeare. Such plays as the *Burggraves* of Victor Hugo, on the other hand, and German "fatal tragedies" of the nineteenth century such as *The Twentyfourth of February* and the *Miller and his Child* and again more recently the horrors of Grand-Guignol, belong to the same world as the "much dressed and frequently caressed *Princesse Maleine*"—to use the *mot* of *Haupt und Staats Aktionen*, or as *Pelléas and Mélisande*, *Aglaraine and Selysette*, *The Blue Bird*, *The Interloper* and *The Blind*.

The philosophy of the *Treasure of the Humble*, *Wisdom and Fate*, *The Buried Temple*, and *The Great Secret* gives us nothing more profound than might be garnered by any well-read eclectic mind from Christian, Classical and Buddhist sources and from the modern Free Mysticism. All we know is that we can know nothing. Man is the measure of all things, but let him beware of an immoderate desire to measure. What would God be without man, who, while not exactly inventing Him, has nevertheless deduced Him by subjective contemplation and observation of the Universe. There is nothing transcendental, nothing surpassing man or beyond his intellectual comprehension. But our longing for immortality guarantees us immortality in the community, though it is not made clear that this immortality is in any way personal. It will be seen that Maeterlinck's philosophy has affinities not only with those of ancient India and Greece but also with those modern attempts to put the religion of the community in the place of the "Community of Christendom."

But astonishment at finding such a symbolist as the poet of the *Twelve Songs*, whom we had believed safe in his ivory

platelayer of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Ribbentrop's pre-war profession, than of the Diplomatic Corps; there were not many around Hitler who could have found out. It did not matter that the old Nazi guard hated him; Hitler likes feuds between his lieutenants, for they give him a chance to remain supreme. When he rose to power, he had four Foreign Ministers: Rosenberg the Balt, the theoretician of the Party, the race-wizard; Dr. Goebbels, whose Propaganda Ministry at once snatched half its tasks from the F.O.; Ribbentrop, who was permitted to build up a huge Foreign Office of the Party with 700 employees; and Baron von Neurath, the official bearer of Germany's Foreign Service.

The inner circle gave Ribbentrop the name of Iago quoted by Sir Nevile Henderson. Not that Hitler had qualifications for an Othello; but Ribby duly "poisoned his ear" and within a few years won unlimited favour and beat all his competitors. Alfred Rosenberg, the fanatical anti-Bolshevik upon whose teachings the whole Nazi doctrine was built, was first driven into a blind alley and then made ridiculous by the Ribbentrop-Molotoff treaty. Neurath, one of the few members of the real nobility who swallowed their pride and accepted the "régime of the hooligans," lost his job early in 1938 when, together with the more responsible of the Generals, he opposed the mapped-out strokes upon Austria and Czechoslovakia; he now lives in honourable exile as "Protector" at Prague and most likely racks his brains about how to protect himself. Goebbels, whom Ribbentrop found the most flexible and the most likely co-plotter among the adepts surrounding the new Teutonic divinity, has to do all sorts of jumps and pranks to regain the favour of the All-powerful which he had lost more than once already. Only Goering so far dares "the greatest German diplomat that ever lived, Bismarck not excluded"—as Hitler once tactfully within earshot of the present Prince Bismarck praised his dear Ribby. But Goering does not feel so happy about it either.

Is it a curious blind spot in a leader who otherwise, with the cunning of the schizophrenic (split personality), varies his favours and tantrums so as to prevent anybody from feeling safe? An incapacity to read the mind of a man as perspicuously hollow as that of this pseudo-gentleman, this sham-diplomat, covetous of the most superficial form of fame bought with the happiness and the life of millions? An

unusual loyalty towards a comrade who stood by him at a critical moment? Whatever it be it is hard to believe that the Fuehrer should not have seen with the rest of the world what a series of blunders Ribbentrop has made wherever he has exercised his amateur diplomacy. There was not much to spoil at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, his first task, or else he would have spoiled it. As an ambassador "in partibus" his positive results were confined to contradicting in principle the Foreign Office—as long as he could not rule it—and to making the services at home and abroad gape at his profound ignorance. Even so he resolved, as Ambassador to the Court of St. James' in 1936, to break the Franco-British relationship.

His method for that performance, starting with a Hitler-salute to H.M. the King when he presented his credentials, having extended and rebuilt the Embassy of the poorest Great Power on earth with an expense of hundreds of thousands of pounds, earned him the nick-name "Brickendrop," the scorn and contempt not only of his foreign colleagues, but of his own ridiculously numerous staff. Yet for wellnigh two years he flattered himself with being about to conclude an Anglo-German alliance coveted as fervently by Hitler, until the present war, as he now slanders Britain as the "war-monger." The Ambassador tried to outdo his colleagues in London in opulent dinners and receptions; he made speeches whenever the opportunity presented itself, and tried to win British public opinion by claiming her colonies. He certainly won the record of having missed no opportunity to blunder.

His wooing turned into the most furious anti-British campaign as soon as he was entrusted with the Foreign Office. Hitler liked it because he had begun to see his hopes dispelled and wanted the frantic applause of somebody he—in his innermost conscience—probably considered as a social superior, when he started the series of conquests planned long before and resisted by all those around him who had preserved a grain of reason. Ribbentrop became his "*âme damnée*," repeating like Cato his "*Ceterum censeo*" about the necessary destruction of the British Empire; and at the same time assuring his master that Britain—and with her France—would never fight, whatever Hitler would attempt elsewhere. As he proved right in that assertion when Hitler tore up the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, when he occupied

tower from the vulgar throng, to be in agreement with contemporary collectivistic ideas, will vanish when we have traced to its roots this wisdom which fades into the nebulous twilight of a Rembrandt painting. This mixture of aristocratic scepticism and resignation, of democratic optimism and the will to work, of "strength through joy" and heroic self-sacrifice, can be traced through Emerson, Carlyle, Nietzsche and Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, back to those enthusiasts of the autumn of the Middle Ages—to Tauler and Ruysbroeck. Here again we find the true source of Maeterlinck's idea of God and of his untranscendental metaphysics and the link with the Silesian mystics of the seventeenth century, with Jacob Boehme, Swedenborg and the early German romantics. This gives us the clue to the essentially Germanic character of Maeterlinck the thinker; for a poet's true character is most clearly revealed by the spiritual companions he chooses.

How then explain Maeterlinck's influence, not only in his Belgian fatherland, but in the whole domain of the French language? The influence of his *philosophic* books in Germanic and Slavonic circles has been greatly enhanced by his manner of thinking and the effect of mysticism that radiates from his plays and is so akin to the Nordic soul. But it is clear that Frenchmen, not to mention other Mediterranean peoples, were universally shocked by Maeterlinck's attitude to nature and the supernatural, towards men and objects. There have been innumerable imitations of his works, his mannerisms and his stylistic affectation—that failed without exception because they kept too closely to external features—but they give proof of two contrary interpretations of life which come into collision in the medium of the French language. Maeterlinck's unbelief, which he proves by ethical arguments, does not doubt of itself like that of Voltaire or Renan, his belief is not so clear and logical as that of Descartes or Bossuet. He neither analyses character nor explains the origin of events. Briefly, in his poems there lies revealed to us the Germanic-Slavic world of infinite largeness, of tormenting struggle, sacred awe, and blessed pain—this world so hated of Henri Massis—so beloved of Josef Strzygowski.

Maeterlinck has settled down, however, in this landscape so hostile to him by instinct and inclination—for years he has been living in a marvellous fairy-castle on the French

Riviera—not physically only, but also in the higher meaning of the word, and by virtue of the extreme sensibility of his artistic manner of expression. Now we have penetrated into the secret of the Belgian master. Maeterlinck's victory over all obstacles is that of the expression over the idea, the triumph of the music of language over the context; it is the supreme victory of mere sound against meaning. It is founded upon a principle quite contrary to the French one of the harmony of content and form, and the Latin one of the enjoyment and instruction inherent in poetry. Its ultimate expression has been realised amongst not the Germanic but the Slavic peoples who incline to extremes.

Russian theoreticians of pure form have declared that poetry is nothing but beauty of sound and music, existing for its own sake and offering nothing else, if combined with valuable ideas or with stirring events, than a new, second value, incommensurable with the first literary value. According to this doctrine one might compare a poem valuable because of its ideas or increasing our knowledge of the human soul, with a beautiful woman, who at the same time is a professor of astronomy or the successful manager of some industrial enterprise. Both qualities are highly appreciable, but their mixture is mere chance and not at all inner necessity.

When to-day, forty years later, we consider the *Serres-Chaudes* and the *Douze Chansons* by Maurice Maeterlinck, they remind us of the *Mirochlad* by the poor Polish Hoelderlin. Mood and sound, nothing more, but what a mood and what sound! "*Un pur charme*," pure charm found in a language free from all other effects but that of music and sensualism. In only a few of Maeterlinck's verses do we find meaning and reason—this must be granted to the critics—for the most part they are nonsense; the material of the poet's lyric and dramatic drama is very simple—and here we are approaching Shakespeare—sensitive, timid maidens, castles with stately, scornful battlements, evening, twilight, mourning, weariness, remembrance, transitoriness, death, tears, kisses, longing, moon, night and horror. But with this analysis of the subject any rationalist can destroy every shred of romanticism, and the prosaic cookery-book will have the precedence of Hoelderlin and Novalis.

To criticise the thinker Maeterlinck does not detract from the artist of language. It might even seem that intrusion

the Rhineland, when he denounced the Locarno Pact, when he raped Austria and swallowed Czechoslovakia, Ribby's prestige became unassailable. Both forgot that the pitcher can go to the well once too often.

It is evidently upon Ribbentrop's "inside knowledge" that right from the beginning the Nazi propaganda built its campaign against Britain. As long as Mr. Chamberlain was still remembered in Germany as the harbinger of peace, the Man of Munich, the poison pens were directed against Churchill, Eden and Duff Cooper, who had neglected to win favour with Herr Hitler's Ambassador while he clumsily tried to impress London Society with the Cæsarean splendour of his receptions. Not satisfied with the new gigantic dimensions given to the one-time modest and dignified abode of Prince Lichnowsky, Dr. Sthamer and Dr. von Hoesch, on the lines of the Fuehrer's architectural—and not only architectural—megalomania, he had equipped the Embassy with carpets, paintings and other treasures "borrowed" from public art galleries. He had employed the best chef, the most accomplished pastrycook, the most expert butler available—and yet the British had failed to see in him the great ambassador, the Talleyrand and Metternich of our day.

They needed a lesson. More and more Hitler's confidant neglected his London office, where a competent staff of experienced diplomats, richly blended with uniformed party officials, did the routine work, while the nominal chief rushed to Berlin and back in his large private fourteen-seater monoplane kept ready for his sudden whims day and night. When he succeeded in supplanting Neurath he took good care that his successor was a man without ambition, exhausted by years of struggle against Nazi displeasure. The "reform" of the Foreign Office, besides diluting this old hitherto nearly autonomous body where the Junker class had been all-powerful with his minions from the Brownshirt ranks, consisted above all in the creation of a new diplomatic uniform. The modest, dark-blue coat reluctantly adopted by Stresemann as a concession to international observance, gave way to a sort of comedy admiral's make-up vying successfully (in German eyes) with Goering's most exuberant fancy uniforms. And where other representatives of a country's foreign policy used to appear with a secretary, perhaps an interpreter, Ribbentrop presented himself with a suite of

from forty to fifty retainers in a fleet of aeroplanes or flashing cars.

He takes good care that as often as possible he is seen and photographed with Hitler, or he delegates that rôle to his wife or the youngest of his four children, so that it is known when the Fuehrer honours the thirty-room Ribbentrop home in Dahlem, or his impressive country estate, sixty miles from Berlin. He has called his last boy Adolf, after Germany's "saviour," and he relies on the many ties, including their fervent jealousy of Britain, which bind the chief of the government and the leader of his foreign policy, in order to avoid disfavour with all it implies in Nazi Germany should some of his daring and heedless plans miscarry. Whether one or both of them consider the pact concluded in Moscow on August 26th, 1939, by now as a blunder, is an open question; in their blind hatred of British statesmanship they certainly counted it then as Ribby's masterstroke. They were both incapable of feeling the shame which reddened the face of most of their old followers. Ribbentrop's recent reception in Rome, the Pope's condemnation of the Nazi misdeeds may for a moment have opened the haughtily sleepy eyes of the would-be Talleyrand. But it needs more than that to awaken this queer mixture of mental dullness and ambitious polypraxy (trying many remedies on the patient). I am afraid there will have to be a world catastrophe before somebody can tell this Iago:

"Look on the tragic loading of this bed;
This is thy work: the object poisons sight . . ."

EDGAR STERN-RUBARTH.

of northern sensibility within the bounds of the French language has brought a decisive impulse to the French lyric just at those moments when that too hide-bound tongue was on the point of being suffocated in its own rules. At any rate symbolism, the last great productive movement in French literature, has been created and most gloriously represented by men of Germanic, Dutch-Flemish origin or poets who were open to Germanic influences. Thus we must consider Baudelaire and Mallarmé honorary citizens of the Anglo-Saxon Parnassus; Verlaine is the grandson of an immigrant Dutchman, Maeterlinck and Verhaeren come from Flanders. The encounter of the Germanic spirit with the highly cultivated but alien French language has borne the noblest fruits.

As to Maeterlinck's fame, we have to confess no more and no less than that his work, the dramatic as well as the lyric, verses and prose are a lovely, charming, childish-precocious, delightful and touching symphony of harmonies, in which we become conscious of the most intimate connection with nature, of the primitive fear of the finite and the infinite, of the compassion with suffering and with suffering people, and of a resignation that is more passive than proud. When giving an estimate of Maeterlinck's work, we must overlook successes on the stage like *Monna Vanna*—which was due not least to the delicacy of the subject—and to the fact that the "Cloak of Monna Vanna" had become a symbol for the reaction against the prudish moral heroes of earlier days; we must overlook the applause of the snobs during the last years of the nineteenth century and the naive enthusiasm of half-educated people, who admired the great poet as a deep philosopher. A just posterity will assess the thinker Maeterlinck from a psychological point of view—as they have J. J. Rousseau—and his doctrines from an historical, sociological, and perhaps also racial-historical point of view; but it will concede to the stylist vital actuality and grant him hearty admiration. The legend of the Franco-Belgian Shakespeare originated one morning in a daily paper and it will disappear with our generation. Though we must give due weight to immense racial influences, yet the truth about the great inimitable lyricist Maeterlinck is that he belongs to the literary heritage of all nations.

O. FORST DE BATTAGLIA.

ANGLO-YUGOSLAV CULTURAL RELATIONS.

THE earliest cultural contacts between England and Yugoslavia date from the twelfth century. They were in the form of a literary co-operation which was not without consequence to European learning in general. Robert the Englishman, while on his way to the East, met in Dubrovnik with Hermann "the Dalmatian." They became good friends and decided to travel together. In 1136 we meet them in Spain. They worked in Barcelona and in Toledo, earning the reputation of Arabic scholars. When Peter, the Venerable of Cluny, visited Spain he came across them and engaged them to translate the Koran for him into Latin and some other Arabic works on astronomy. Four of their translations were given to the world with a preface by the learned bishop, the Koran among them. That was the earliest translation of the Koran into Latin. In 1437 a MS. of this translation was discovered at Constantinople and was printed for the first time in 1543 with an introduction by Martin Luther.

The interest of England in the part of the world to which Yugoslavia belongs awoke gradually. The first book in English that contained information about the Balkans appeared in 1481. It was Caxton's translation of *Godfrey of Bologne or the Siege and Conquest of Jerusalem*, which describes the adventures of the crusaders in the Balkans. In the sixteenth century about twenty books in all were published. But sixty appeared in a single year when England was roused by Gladstone's campaign against Turkish atrocities. To-day there are about one thousand books and pamphlets in English dealing with the history and people of the Balkans in general and of Yugoslavia in particular.

The direct influence of English thought upon that of Yugoslavia begins in the fifteenth century, when George Dragišić, or Benignus, came to Oxford. When the Turks occupied Bosnia, his native country, in 1463, he fled to Dubrovnik. There he joined the Franciscan Order and was subsequently sent to Oxford to study philosophy under the followers of Duns Scotus. Upon his return he was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pisa. A friend of Lorenzo de Medici and his circle at Florence, he defended Pico della Mirandola from accusations of heresy. In Rome he

FRANCE AND ITALY.

SINCE the outbreak of the war the relations between France and Italy which for a while had not been too good had somewhat relaxed, at least for the first months of the war. When Mussolini declared that Italy would not enter into the struggle on Germany's side this affirmation had caused sincere relief in France, though he had not called Italy's attitude neutral but had used the word "non-participation." This *nuance* was not taken too seriously because as a matter of fact France was relieved from a possible menace on her south-eastern frontier. Very soon the Italian frontier was reopened and traffic resumed. The relations remaining normal between the two countries, the French General Staff released the districts of the Alps and the *Côte d'azur* from the severe regulations which had been established in the *zones d'armées* of which these regions had been declared to be a part. On both sides of the frontier the military guard was reduced. At the same time the French Government and the French press were eager to refrain from anything which might be regarded as an unfriendly measure or unfriendly remark. No Italian volunteer was permitted to enlist in the French army, and the "League of the Garibaldians," which in the first days of the war had opened a recruiting office in Paris under the guard of members wearing their traditional red shirts, was asked to close down. In Parliament, Daladier paid homage to Mussolini's efforts to maintain peace; and in some French newspapers, anticipating the later published official British and French documents on the outbreak of the war, could be found very agreeable remarks on the indefatigable activity of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, who had spared no exertion to prevent the catastrophe. From Italy, too, came no disturbing gesture. The news bulletin of the Italian radio, both in Italian and French, remained strictly neutral and gave its listeners impartially the version of each side. The French press was not allowed by the censor to comment on Italian measures, so that even Count Ciano's great speech of December 16th, 1939, in which he gave some precise explanations of Italy's policy, was only reproduced fragmentarily in the French press and without comment.

When the Russians attacked Finland there seemed to have been found a common basis of political judgment. The very

sharp and even contemptuous remarks of the Italian newspapers and the Italian broadcasting stations on the attitude and military value of Russia caused no small satisfaction in France. At the same time it could not be ignored that with regard to other events Italy did not share French views or approve the Allies' policy. The escape of the German ship *Bremen* from Murmansk to Germany, sailing inside Norwegian waters, was described by the Italian press as a heroic achievement, and some remarks on the rôle played by the French and British fleets were not very pleasant. When the incident of the *Altmark* took place, in the course of which France stood firmly by Great Britain, the Italian comments were also not very favourable. Were it only these not very alarming things, the French would not have been induced to examine more closely the Italian attitude. But there are other things which in combination are regarded as serious enough to be watched with growing attention.

Although Mussolini had called his policy "non-participating," he continues the assimilation of Italy's internal conditions to German examples. The war has not interrupted the application of the previously decided anti-Semitic measures. From March 1st no Italian Jew can be a lawyer, editor or doctor. Italian newspapers and the Italian radio have explained the fundamental difference between the Italian and the French and British views on race, not without letting it be understood that the Italian standpoint was more logical if not more just. This at least shows that Italy is far from repudiating her former acceptance of one of the most important items of National-Socialist aims. The fact that all the draconic anti-Semitic laws have been put into force, in spite of the war, is important enough to claim the attention of France. It shows that mentally Italy continues to be opposed to French views on human dignity and racial questions. The well-known slogan of the "plutocracies" has also reappeared in the Italian press. When it was previously used it was linked with the "unchangeable" Italian claims, and it is sufficiently known what they are. Finally, it has been remarked in Paris that Mussolini does not conceal his hope or his wish that peace may soon be restored, and that he obviously means a peace which should do very little harm to Hitler and his régime.

All this has somewhat changed the atmosphere of the first
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performed another worthy task when he defended Reuchlin against Pfefferkorn. He wrote several books on metaphysics and ethics under the influence of his teachers and enjoyed a very high reputation.

The first book written by a Yugoslav to be translated into English was a description of the sufferings of the Christians under the Turkish yoke. It was written by one Bartol Georgević, who spent thirteen years in captivity, but at last succeeded in escaping to Europe and telling his woeful tale. His work was translated into English and published in 1570. About the same time appeared in English a book of Thomas Mandevill on "the true Order and Methode of wryting and ryding Hystories according to the precepts of Francisco Petricio. . . ." Patricius or Petrić, a Yugoslav from the island of Cherso, was Professor of Philosophy in Ferrara and Rome in the sixteenth century. He wrote many books on many subjects. The one of which Blundevill gave an epitome in English appeared in 1560. Benedetto Croce devotes a chapter to it in his *Theory and History of Historiography*. Petrić was the first Yugoslav thinker to secure for himself a permanent place in the history of philosophy and to exercise a certain influence upon human thought. His influence upon El Greco has already been mentioned. Alberto Fortis, the famous eighteenth-century Italian traveller, accused Bishop Burnet, author of the *Sacred Theory of the Earth*, of having plagiarised Petrić. His military ideas have been praised by experts, while his political theories have been recently revived by some Italian scholars.

In the seventeenth century we notice an increase of contacts. Travel books become more instructive. Religious controversy had its share when James I appointed Marc Anton de Dominis, a former Archbishop of Split, to be Dean of Windsor. Politics added a new note when Sir Francis Wotton, British Ambassador to Venice, brought with him to England John Francis Bjundević, or Bjondi, a native of Dalmatia. Bjundević entered the service of King James, and after a successful mission to the Court of Savoy was knighted and married to the daughter of the King's physician. The outbreak of the Civil War obliged him to leave England and settle in Switzerland. He wrote a history of the Wars of the Roses, published in Venice in 1637 in three volumes and translated into English a little later by Henry Carey, Earl of

Monmouth. Bjundević probably enjoyed some reputation as a novelist as well, for two of his novels, *Eromena or Love and Revenge* and *The Banish'd Virgin*, were translated.

There can be little doubt about the importance of the eighteenth century in our intellectual relations. Three Yugoslavs were elected members of the Royal Society. Two of them, Simeon Stratico and Rudjer Bošković, were mathematicians. The third, George Baglivi, was a great physician whose works were translated into English. But Bošković was no doubt the greatest of them all and the greatest scientific name that Yugoslavia possesses. His significance rests primarily on his atomic theory, which he himself described as being midway between Leibniz and Newton. When he arrived in England in 1760 he had already a great reputation and was received with honours. Among other people he twice met Dr. Johnson. Boswell describes a Latin conversation at the house of Mrs. Cholmondeley, when Dr. Johnson maintained the superiority of Newton over all foreign philosophers "with a dignity and eloquence that surprised that learned foreigner." While in England, Bošković published his Latin poem on the eclipses of the moon. The Royal Society charged him to undertake a journey to Constantinople on their behalf in order to watch the transit of Venus. He also published an essay in English on the same subject before he left. His most important work, *Theory of Natural Philosophy*, was only translated recently, although it was known in England in the original for nearly two centuries and duly appreciated by Kelvin and Faraday. Under the influence of Bošković his younger contemporary and countryman, Benedict Stay, wrote a long poem in excellent Latin on the philosophy of Newton. It appeared at long intervals in three volumes with interesting commentaries by Bošković. It is probably the most exhaustive study of the great philosopher written on the Continent, and its value is greatly enhanced through the co-operation of Bošković, with whom the ideas of Newton were a lifelong preoccupation.

Up to the end of the eighteenth century cultural contacts were sporadic. With the turn of the century the scene changes. Yugoslavia gradually discovers England in her literature and her practical wisdom. The wisdom of life of the English left a deep impression upon the first Serbian Minister of Education, Obradović, when he visited England, and it

months of the war, and although the official relations of France and Italy are not disturbed by any drastic measure from one side or the other, it is remarkable that the French press now discusses more freely the future of French-Italian relations and of Italy's policy. Reports from Rome do not conceal the changing attitude of the Italian press. Even *Le Temps*, whose Rome correspondent had for a long time expressed an optimistic view on the Italian standpoint, has been forced to notice some strange shiftings. It seems that even the first violent attacks against Russia on behalf of the war in Finland fall within this category. The question has already been discussed whether these attacks can be taken as a sure indication of policy, or whether they were only destined to back Germany by trying to mobilise European public opinion against Russia as the only common enemy of European civilisation and to minimise the importance of the war against Germany. Important French newspapers have raised the question whether Finland, in spite of the first violent campaign in her favour, will not be finally dropped by Mussolini, as Austria and Poland have been abandoned. There exists a doubt of the sincerity of his attitude towards Finland and his final policy towards Russia.

As to Mussolini's standpoint with regard to Germany, the original optimism has given way to a more cloudy view. There is a growing belief that he has remained neutral because he thought a German victory possible, or at least counted on an issue of the war which would not be too unfavourable for Germany. That would have maintained the balance of the two blocs and would have allowed Italy to get advantages from both sides. Now, as the war has taken quite another course, his calculation has proved a mistake. But the prospect of a German defeat would change Italy's position and perhaps deprive her of her present comfortable situation. All these things may indicate future surprises. Madame Tabouis writes in *L'Œuvre* that during his conversation with Mr. Sumner Welles, Mussolini mentioned the Italian claims to Tunis and Corsica.

After the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass the Italian press developed once again a hostile attitude toward France. The well-known Italian journalist, Signor Gayda, who generally expresses views which for some reason Mussolini himself cannot explain, wrote at the beginning of

April: "There exist still vital Italian interests which must be defended and constitute part of a new European organisation." He added that Mussolini's old plan of a Four Powers Agreement was not abandoned because only this could "harmonise" Europe. In a much more violent manner Roberto Farinaci, a member of the Italian Government, attacked France in a speech delivered on March 25th. He said:

Gentlemen of the Anglo-French plutocracies, do not abandon yourselves to any illusions. The hate and the contempt of the Italian people caused by the sanctions cannot be transformed to love and sympathy, and this all the less as the conduct of the war proves the selfishness of the democracies with regard to the neutrals and Italy.

A few days later he wrote in his newspaper *Regime Fascista*:

All those who are not stupid or paid by France know very well that the official France and the other one and the whole French people are guided only by the feeling of hate of Italy and the desire to destroy her power. The French have always been and continue to be our worst enemies.

Taking as a pretext the fantastic story of a map of Europe which obviously was a forgery, Farinaci continued in another article:

We have to be grateful for this warning which we shall not forget. It permits us to spit in the face of all those who would here in Italy continue to show sympathy for the French cause.

There remain also the Balkans and especially Yugoslavia. Italian-Yugoslav official relations are at present much better than before and, according to Italian comments, even cordial. This is a notable change after the strained period which followed the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in 1935, when Mussolini refused to deliver the Croatian instigators of the crime who had taken refuge in Italy. Since then the Croats have reconciled themselves with the Serbs and obtained nearly all they demanded. But there are strange things going on in Croatia. In spite of the fresh reconciliation of the Croatian leaders with the central government in Belgrade (August 1939), Dr. Matchek is faced with a new tendency in his own country. Bombs are thrown and riots are started. A new Croatian group has arisen which claims the union of Croatia with Hungary, repudiating the real

found a permanent place in his books. The conduct of life according to the English pattern found many admirers. Books by Samuel Smiles and Lord Avebury enjoyed no small popularity. The latter's *Pleasures of Life* was considered a model for a well-ordered existence. His advice on the hundred best books was taken very seriously at least by one generation.

Next to these, though of a different order, come Mill and Spencer with their theories of liberty and education respectively. Darwin represents the most significant popular scientific influence of the second half of the nineteenth century. Carlyle became a part of the intellectual armour of every self-respecting young man, thanks to the wide influence of Božidar Knežević, a thinker of unusual power. Knežević was almost exclusively under the influence of English thought, though he never left his country. He did more than anybody else to familiarise his countrymen with the works of Buckle and Macaulay.

While English art and music remained practically unknown to pre-war Yugoslavia, English poetry and drama made a wide appeal. On the whole, poetry exercised a stronger influence than prose. In the course of the last eighty years over forty translations of the various works of Shakespeare were published. There are eight different versions of Hamlet. At the moment the State Printing Press is engaged upon publishing a Shakespeare for Everyman. The influence of *Paradise Lost* on Yugoslavia's greatest poet, Njegoš, deserves special mention. There was a time when Byron dominated the scene. He and Shelley had no small fascination for a generation of poets and readers. Blake was a late comer, together with Wordsworth and Browning. The real worth of Keats is waiting for an adequate revelation. Perhaps the revival of English studies in the Yugoslav Universities will widen the literary horizon. Among prose writers Dickens must be given a place of honour. There are five different versions of *David Copperfield* and *Oliver Twist*, and no end of *Christmas Stories*. He is followed by Scott and Galsworthy in popular taste. The esteem in which the latter is held is particularly worth noticing. Oscar Wilde and Kipling come next. While Bacon's *Essays* are the best-known book of English essays, Mr. H. G. Wells as populariser has the largest reading public.

Perhaps we could speak with a certain justification about a corresponding discovery of Yugoslavia on the part of England. It was prompted by the publication of the Serbian popular ballads in German, and the praise they received was their entrance card to the sanctuary of world literature. Ever since Scott translated one of the most beautiful of those ballads the interest in them has been kept alive by a constant stream of new translations.

The struggle for freedom led by Serbia did not escape the attention of England. If the knowledge of the country remained limited in many respects, its political destiny was carefully followed ever since Serbia obtained a measure of political independence. The heroic stand of Montenegro won her many admirers in England besides Tennyson. To increase her knowledge England was not slow to translate the outstanding works of others. The famous eighteenth-century travels through Dalmatia and Istria of Alberto Fortis were translated at once into English. The same was done later with the travels of Lamartine, which contain some fine passages about Serbia. While waiting for an adequate interpretation of her own England translated Ranke's *Serbian Revolution*, which deserves to be considered a classic. In the *Travels through Bosnia and Hercegovina* of Sir Arthur Evans she followed her best traditions of careful observation and description which still make that work an inestimable guide. In Sir Thomas Jackson's three volumes on Dalmatia, Istria and the Quarnero England erected a monument to her own scholarship.

DUŠAN STOJANOVIĆ.

A MARSUPIAL ARISTOCRAT; THE
BANDED ANTEATER.

AUSTRALIA'S banded anteater is noteworthy for, among a number of things, its ancient lineage. With the lungfish (*Ceratodus*) and those two closely related but superficially different monotremes the duck-billed platypus and the Echidna or native porcupine, the banded anteater (*Myrmecobius fasciatus*) links our own time with times prehistoric. It is believed to be an unchanged, unmodified survivor from the Mesozoic era, come down to us with blood untainted through many millions of years.

It is a slender, shapely animal rather larger than the common rat, generally fawn coloured but banded white or yellowish over the back, and having a bushy grizzled tail. It is diurnal, active for the most part during the last hours of daylight, and therefore lives a more exposed life than it would were it a nocturnal wanderer. Feeding on termites, or "white ants," it is adapted to the ways of peace, has no weapons of offence, and no idea of defensive tactics save that of hiding. Considering these facts, we must be astonished, wondering how it is that the creature has survived unchanged as to form and habit since those dim days when its ancestors fled from the footfall and the shadow of the stalking dinosaur. It has, indeed, endured through ages which saw the extinction of a number of animals, some of them doubtless better equipped than itself for the battle of life. Among these were the ancestors of the existing marsupial wolf (*Thylacinus cynocephalus*) and the raccoon-like "devil" (*Sarcophilus harrisi*), which, however, are now extinct on the mainland and occur only in Tasmania. A third form of interest was the pouched lion, believed to have approximated in size to the African lion of our time; though there is doubt as to whether it was a hunting carnivore of the same kind or a scavenger of hyena type.

Some Australian zoologists include the anteater in the group of flesh-eating dasyures, which comprises not only the native cats but also the phascogales and some other pouched rats and mice. Other students, however, place it in a family by itself, taking into account its different structure and habits. In the Australian fauna the animal takes the place of the anteaters of America and Asia in their worlds, and

its tongue, like theirs, is most markedly adapted to its natural feeding habits. This is long, slender and serrated, and it can be moved about with whiplike rapidity. Commonly it is said that anteaters feed simply by extending their tongue, coated with a sweet saliva, into ant-nests, withdrawing the tongue when loaded with ants. The banded anteater, however, must seldom adopt this method. Most species of hill-building termites raise a structure which in Australia sets so hard that it is tough work breaking it down with a mattock. The banded anteater has only small digging claws, contrasting with the huge curved "tools" of that raider of anthills in South America, the great anteater. Many species of termites live in rotten logs, in forest *débris*, and elsewhere where the banded anteater can obtain them more easily than by burrowing into an anthill of the type described.

The numbat—to use for the moment the aboriginal name by which it is commonly known where it occurs—is among the prettiest of our mammals. In spite of its striped markings, however, it is not easily observed when squatting in the bush, but once it moves the bushy grizzled tail quickly catches the eye, for this is carried erect. Until very recent times it was thought that the numbat proceeded hopping like a kangaroo, and many descriptions in the literature of the Australian fauna will be found to accept this view, which seems to be based on the observation of one of the early collectors, Gilbert, who said, of the numbat: "It appears very much like a squirrel when running on the ground, which it does in successive leaps, with its tail a little elevated, every now and then raising its body and resting on its hind-feet." (See Gould's *Mammals of Australia*.) It is true that the numbat may sit up like a kangaroo. Even so do other anteaters elsewhere in the world. But no numbat yet ever hopped like a kangaroo. The animal runs on all fours, but may leap and bound over bushes when running in scrubby country; and it also has a quaint habit of leaping about when at play. Some years ago I had occasion to discuss this question as to the numbat's mode of locomotion with several bush observers and collectors. All agreed that the anteater was a running animal, and their opinions might be crystallised in that of one who wrote: "I have had several for pets, and the only hop I have seen them make was to get inside my shirt when I held it open." Subsequently it was my pleasure to

Croatian leaders and their accord with Belgrade. What would be the consequence of such a union? A common frontier of Italy and Hungary, opening for Italy an avenue to Bulgaria, Rumania and the Black Sea! Although there is no sign that this group is backed by Italy, Mussolini proclaimed on September 18th in a speech in Trieste the right of the Slovaks and Ruthenes to a plebiscite. In demanding such a right he forgot his own Croatian minority, which is rather badly treated and strongly attached to the Croatian movement in Yugoslavia whose leaders have just obtained nearly all their demands. It is rather strange that now a new small group has sprung into life which demands the separation of Croatia and seems to wish to form a link between Italy and Hungary. Can it be that it expresses secret Italian wishes? There is certainly the new official Italo-Yugoslav friendship, but unfortunately the history of the last years has proved that Italy's friendships are not always lasting. Austria and Poland have had this experience. Here we touch a rather delicate matter. We know that Italy is not satisfied in spite of the conquest of Abyssinia. She claims Djibuti, Tunis, Corsica and Nice. None of these claims has at present a chance of being taken into consideration. But there is Yugoslavia, a country which contains many minorities, and since the annexation of Czechoslovakia and the partition of Poland such countries are in great danger. Perhaps a day may come when Yugoslavia will be faced with demands which would endanger her unity, and in such a case Italy might be one of the profiting parties.

All this may prove erroneous. Yet it is not certain that during the war many things might not change. For some time the belief was maintained in France that even in the worst case Italy would not exceed certain limits so far as France and Great Britain are concerned. But since the beginning of April Italy has taken military measures which are rather alarming. It was announced that new fortifications on the Italian frontiers, especially in the Alps, had been completed, and on April 2nd the Italian Cabinet decided on a new plan of mobilising the whole civilian population in the case of war, including all women and even all children from the age of 13 years on. These are the considerations which occupy some French non-official circles.

R. A. FRIEDMAN.

JAPAN'S SENSITIVE NATURE.

ONE of the most obvious factors that comes out in the *Asama Maru* affair is the peculiarly sensitive nature of Japanese people. The ship was a Japanese ship, the incident took place under the shadow of the sacred mountain Fuji, and the captain of the liner had to hand over some thirty-one German passengers. The Japanese feel very deeply about this interference with the exercise of their own authority. It matters not that British ships have been stopped and boarded by Japanese naval men, that British people have been insulted in Tientsin and in Shanghai, that trading rights have vanished into thin air and, in fact, that foreigners generally have been made to suffer every kind of indignity. It looks as though the sensitivity of the Japanese, where their own interests are concerned, is balanced by an incapacity to appreciate the sensitive nature of foreigners.

It is interesting perhaps to analyse the position a little more closely, for it explains a good deal of what is happening at the present moment. The mood of the Japanese people is undoubtedly hypersensitive, as is clearly shown by their irritability. In their inmost hearts they know that past diplomacy has led them into an impossible position from which they cannot with grace extricate themselves. They still cling to the hope that something will happen in China, and that all their expenditure in men and bombs will produce something. There is no sign of this however on the horizon, which is at the moment black with threatening clouds, in whatever direction it is surveyed. Apart from that there is the maddening thought that if the Chinese are not laughing at them being bogged and helpless while floundering in that illimitable and treacherous morass of Central China, they are waiting, waiting, and quietly confident of the issue of the struggle.

The patent folly of advancing further into China and the equally painful prospect of withdrawing from it produces that inner conflict which is called hysteria—an idea of persecution, due to a tendency to misinterpret the facts. That is the cause of this sensitive nature. There are several others, too. There was the painful shock to Japan's self-esteem when Germany linked on her fortunes with Soviet Russia, against whom the anti-Comintern pact had been specifically aimed. That a European nation, and that nation Germany, should so

patently default and forsake her erstwhile pupil in military matters was too big a strain. It shattered Japanese faith not only in Germany, but in herself. How could she have been quite so blind, so incapable of estimating German thought and policy? It was a most painful blow to Japan's pride, as it convicted her of want of judgment and of lack of foresight. "*Et tu Brute*" hardly brings out the bitterness, the disillusionment, and the supreme pain Japan felt in this betrayal of her trust. In this mood, then, Japan must obviously be suspicious, resentful, and extremely sensitive, for her trust having been betrayed by her closest friend, how can she be sure of her acquaintances and potential enemies? Germany has lowered the stock of international goodwill by this cynical disregard of her obligations to her friends—Japan and Italy. It is hard enough to be insulted, but to be in a position of being laughed at by the rest of the world is still harder to bear. Japan, then, has been thrust into the ignominious position of having to treat with Russia on equal terms. That she is able to do so more successfully than she hoped is due to gallant little Finland, and not to her renegade friend Germany. Japan had hoped, with the help of Germany, to dictate terms to Russia, not to ask for them.

Then again, the past policy pursued in co-operation with Germany has led to the termination of the Trade Pact with the United States. It was assumed that Germany and Italy would not only keep Britain and France fully employed in Europe, but Russia too. None of these things has happened. Italy and Japan can hardly attack the Allies and so back up Russia, Germany's ally, whom they recently and most emphatically undertook to destroy. There is something that is painfully amusing in that, too. And yet that situation has produced the delicate and most unpleasant economic situation *vis-à-vis* America. Japan obtains 58 per cent. of her raw materials for her heavy industries from the United States; but the latter can so easily dispose of these things on the other side with a clear conscience instead of selling them to Japan with a bad one, since on one side of the Atlantic the Americans are penalising aggression by aiding the Allies, while in the Pacific they are beginning to feel guilty of abetting the aggressor. The two policies at any rate are considered to be incompatible, because they are now thrown into relief against the background of Poland, Finland and

Czecho-Slovakia on the one hand and China on the other. America is also in the tantalising position of being able to dispense with this trade, while Japan is not.

The policy of Japan during the past three years, then, has been infructuous in so far as it has resulted in the alienation of a powerful and wealthy customer—America, and the loss of a so-called friend—Germany. It has given the militarists a footing in China, at enormous financial cost to Japan, almost crippling in fact, but the greatest cost is the goodwill of China, whose antagonism has in the course of time somehow or other to be overcome. Japan was evidently thinking of China in terms of twenty or thirty years ago, when communication was extremely poor, and when one section of the nation neither knew nor cared what was happening to the other. Those days are past and unification by road, telegraph, radio, etc., has produced this solid bloc which all attempts to break, through dealings with such persons as Wang Ching-wei, merely strengthens.

But there is another factor which obviously makes Japan more irritable than usual. There is not only the conquest of China so clearly envisaged and so earnestly attempted that is eluding her grasp, but above all there is the golden opportunity—all the more golden because it is denied—of repeating the splendid commercial and industrial triumphs of 1914-18. Japan is not only pouring out her treasure in a fruitless attempt to conquer China, but is compelled because of that military adventure to forgo the pleasure of multiplying her wealth. That again is a painful situation for Japan to be in, and merely painfully amusing to Chinese observers. Japan then seems to be caught in the toils which her militarist leaders have woven. Thus imprisoned she struggles in vain for release. In order to distract attention from this internal dissension, she seeks to focus all her effort on the affair of the *Asama Maru*. In this way she seeks to create unity of opinion out of the discordant notes that are continually being sounded. Would it not be better, however, for Japan if she retraced her steps and sought alignment with those who did not fail in the past? The matter is important, for Japanese observers have stated that Germany cannot be successful in this war. That being so, what is to be the future of Japan? The whole purpose of statesmanship is to provide for the present and to safeguard the future. It is obvious that the Allies are only

observe the anteater in the bush and to confirm those views.

The numbat may quickly be tamed and readily becomes attached to human friends, and it makes an interesting pet because it does not, like the possum and many other marsupials, sleep all day and become active by night, but will move about during the day. A difficulty for the person who tries to domesticate the animal is to provide it with food. It soon learns to drink milk; for the rest it must have termites, and these, too-plentiful though they are in this world of ours, are not always easy for the human to obtain. The numbat is a better hand at termite-hunting than is man, and as a pet must necessarily have some freedom.

Surprised in the bush the numbat will head for the nearest hollow log, usually halting several times to sit up and look back and making its last survey at the entrance to the log. From that log it may be chopped out and picked up without fear. It will make no attempt to bite, for all that it has more teeth than any other animal on land, save an armadillo. It will struggle to free itself, and the power of its muscles as it wriggles in one's hands is rather surprising. Obviously the animal is accustomed to rooting and burrowing, pushing and heaving, in the confines of decaying logs and under fallen branches and other rotting vegetation, if not in the mountain-like anthills. Once I had one brought to me in a country town in Western Australia. It escaped from one farmer's hands and fled beneath the local store, whence it was retrieved by one of several children who had gathered to the scene. I had difficulty in holding it in my hands, but at length it desisted from its attempts to escape and nestled quietly against my shoulder. It was taken away by a daughter of another settler, and two days later had apparently settled down to semi-domesticity. It was drinking milk, and moving about on the trail of the termite, watched by the lady. For a couple of weeks it stayed about the farm, but gradually worked farther away and then returned to its native haunts. It was always a quiet animal. Probably it made its most noise during those hectic moments by the store, when it voiced a few low throaty coughs, sounds characteristic of marsupials generally. Between the sibilant whisper of the pygmy possum and the noise between cough and grunt uttered by an old-man kangaroo lies all.

sound possible to members of the great order Marsupialia, surely one of the least articulate of groups of mammals on earth.

In popular imagination, a marsupial is a pouched animal. The kangaroo, for example. And indeed the kangaroo is so definitely pouched that no artist would dare to sketch it without also sketching the head of a "joey" somewhere about its middle. I wonder why my fellow-toilers with the pencil never seek inspiration in the appearance of that much-maligned marsupial, the bandicoot. It, too, has a well-developed pouch—opening backward and downward. But how absurd this seems. If it does, then what shall we think of the native cats, the rat-like phascogales and the banded anteater which, though they all produce and nurture their young in the same way as the kangaroo and bandicoot do, have no true pouch? In the breeding season one or two folds of skin form a kind of pouch in the case of the dasyures and of the phascogales, whilst the numbat remains without any sort of pouch, growing, however, a coating of hair to afford some protection to her babes. The young of all these animals, born in a curiously premature state, as is the case with Australian marsupials generally, become affixed to the teats of the mother and cannot be dislodged without rupture until they have developed into furry, open-eyed youngsters able to enjoy some freedom of activity. When they do reach that stage, the mother, doubtless feeling relieved of a number of burdens—which in the anteater's case varies between four and eight—smooths out her skin, casts what hair remains on her much-worn body, and possibly reflects that a marsupial having a permanent pouch should have been born related to an ass. One may suppose that among young kangaroos and wallabies there occur a few lazy, luxury-loving youths who make overlong use of their mothers' pouches. The numbat cannot practise any such spoiling of the child. And the question here for us is: should we or should we not congratulate the banded anteater on having put a stop to the story of evolution, in its case, back in that far-distant age when monsters roamed the earth: in other words, for having failed through untold millions of years to develop a true pouch?

One curious legend, perchance a half-legend, there is about the numbat, which credits the animal with being a killer of snakes. It crops up occasionally in the talk of bushmen;

temporarily embarrassed, and that as far as sea-power is concerned must emerge from this war with colossal fleets. It is obviously a good thing to be of assistance when one's strength has its maximum value.

Japanese statesmen, however, cannot decide upon policy even though the Germans have repudiated the terms on which the pact with Japan was made: there is still a feeling among some that Germany did this in her extremity and that she means well, that the arrangement with Russia will be terminated when it has served its purpose, and normal pre-anti-Comintern pact arrangements with Japan will be resumed. The fact that Japan has consorted with Germany means that she condones her devastation and rape of Poland—one of Japan's closest friends before September 1939—and that makes it difficult for her to veer to the side of America and the Allies. The only common link between Japan and the democratic powers was a desire to see Russia defeated in Finland. What divides Japan from the democracies is her own desire to conquer and colonise China. Japan sees no similarity whatsoever between Russia's wanton attack on Finland, Germany's invasion of Poland, and her own war of conquest in China. The Allies and America put them all in the same category. Finland is merely the culmination of the series in point of sheer ruthlessness, cynicism, and complete disregard of the rights of others.

The Japanese plead day after day that the Western Powers, always excepting Italy and Germany, cannot appreciate their point of view. The democracies regard this "new order in Asia" idea and this charge of insincerity against the Chinese as a huge joke. Strange as it may seem the Japanese do, and many of them most sincerely, believe that they have a divine mission in China. They point to the contrast between the efficiency of Japan, and its remarkable development, and the conditions during the past thirty years in China. They regard the latter as one of the world slums, which, in this period of reconstruction, must be taken in hand. From that point of view they claim they are acting on behalf of the civilised world, and not from any selfish motive. If certain profits in the way of trade, greater territory, as for instance in North China, and the island of Hainan do accrue, then these things are merely incidental, and are necessary if Japan is going to establish the new order in Asia.

It is a mistake to sneer at this idea of a new order in Asia as the Japanese, even more than most nations, do bring a spiritual note into world affairs, especially when a critical decision has to be taken or a contest has to be entered. Thus the wrestler will go to his favourite shrine and commune with the spirits before he engages in the struggle. There must be harmony within, if the full strength is going to be exerted. As it is with wrestlers, so it is with Japanese statesmen. They firmly believe they are the instruments of the Divine will, and that they must fulfil their destiny cost what it will in life and treasure. They believe quite honestly that a China organised by the Japanese and controlled by them will be a better and a finer country. That this view is not shared by other important Western Powers pains them. It is evidence to them not of Japanese conceit, but rather of the foreigners' incapacity to see things clearly or of their obtuseness and unreasonableness. So firmly rooted is this idea in the Japanese mind that it is quite impossible to dislodge it. It is an article of faith that no argument and no defeat in war would ever eradicate. Japan believes in herself as no other nation does.

Japan is, we repeat, strangely sensitive to world opinion, and in that respect she shares her psychological condition with the German people. Each nation believes that she is misjudged and misunderstood by a world that is smug and self-satisfied, and which now stands in judgment on her, having itself passed through that state of aggrandisement which it is now condemning in others. Still, there is no blinking the fact that China excites the world's sympathy, because from a cultural standpoint China has contributed infinitely more to the world than Japan, which is obviously a copyist. This is more and more important, seeing that material success such as Japan has achieved has brought in its train so much evil, and does not now excite our admiration as it did before. It is rather the cultural values which China has maintained for centuries that arrest attention, than the industrial and commercial achievements of Japan, as the latter are common and unexceptional, while the former are unique. Japan suffers from the stigma of a League of Nations verdict which was given by a jury of her peers against her, and included in that jury was Germany. To be branded as an international law-breaker by a jury of equals is a serious matter.

and in popular literature it appears occasionally in nature tales. The European hedgehog is a snake killer. The Australian native porcupine (*Echidna*) is often called native hedgehog. It is also called the spiny anteater. It is an anteater (of true ants rather than white ants). So also is the numbat an anteater. By such slender threads a legend may be woven. Again: ant-nests often harbour various small forms of life, among them the diminutive and harmless worm-snakes or blind-snakes. Let a man disturb a numbat from an ant-nest, observe that the animal had left there a portion of a worm-snake, and a legend may well be born. Moreover, the numbat bears some resemblance to a striped mongoose.

If in course of reading these notes it has been assumed that the banded anteater is one of Australia's rare and scarce animals, the reader has not been led astray. Its recent history is like that of many another animal native to countries colonised by white men. Less than a century ago it was so plentiful that an old bushman could write me saying he once made a rug of fifty numbat skins. To-day no man knows where with certainty he could observe a numbat. Until comparatively recent times it occurred over an extensive portion of South and Western Australia. To-day there is doubt as to its existence outside of a portion of the western state, and that a portion comprising the settled wheat and pastoral areas of the South-Western Division. The clearing of thousands of acres of bushland and the introduction of man's animal friends and enemies, dogs and cats and rats and rabbits and foxes, have contributed disastrously to the decline of the interesting numbat. Nevertheless, it is by no means extinct and individuals are observed from time to time at widely separated points in the area referred to. It is now protected by law; man is no longer its enemy; and though wild cats of the domestic breed, and foxes, are numerous throughout its territory, it appears to be evading them. We shall hope that it continues to do so, to go on living successfully. An animal which lives by preying on one of man's greatest enemies is worthy of his knowing and of his protection. 'Twould make a melancholy last chapter in the story of this marsupial aristocrat, if man were to prove responsible for its extinction.

JAMES POLLARD.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"NOT YET"

THE fifth month of an ill-defined, demoralised state of war in Europe brought no relief from the tension or the uncertainty. The experience so far had disproved most of the prophecies and expectations that had been entertained. A new crop of prophecies, threats and speculations took their place. Neither war in the full blast nor a way out of the deadlock could yet be discerned. Speaking at the Mansion House on January 9th Mr. Chamberlain said: "The New Year, which will probably be a fateful one in the history of the world, has opened quietly, but it is the quiet of the calm before the storm. We are at war. Vast numbers of men, armed with the most powerful weapons of destruction that science can devise, are watching one another from behind their defences. From time to time we hear the sound of the guns, but as yet there is no general engagement. We do not know how long it will last." If the truth were known, no politician probably in the world felt that he could any longer exercise any control over those vast forces, though he had helped to create them. Later in that speech Mr. Chamberlain, no doubt afraid that the blackout (in all senses) might obscure the incentives to endurance and deaden the mood of alertness, added this warning: "We must not think, because this war has not yet taken the form hitherto that it took in 1914, that we can carry on our lives as if we were still at peace. . . . Although we are not yet actually fighting on land, we are making preparations to enable us to do so with the greatest effect whenever the right moment comes." In other words, except at sea, the war was not yet, but might be, operative at any moment. What could be said with obvious truth was that no glimmer of reason, goodwill or good sense yet penetrated the blackness in which the governments, not of Europe only, but of the entire world, had enveloped themselves: neutral as well as belligerent.

The Pope at Christmas made a pronouncement to the Faithful, sadly and truly reflective of what was being visited upon mankind. His Holiness, for reasons that no one can honestly contest or fail to respect, while indicating the ultimate road to wisdom, refrained from throwing a light

This knowledge naturally rankles, and produces on the one side that spirit of arrogance and defiance, based on the belief that the jury was packed, and on the other a desire to conciliate and stand well in the eyes of those whose respect is valued. The Japanese, as we have said, are peculiarly sensitive to world opinion, partly due, some may say, to a bad conscience, but more likely due to being a late comer into the Western system, and anxious to play a dignified part in it. The resentment against the foreigner, and especially the Englishman, is because of his so-called superiority which is so frequently manifested when insults and indignities are heaped upon him without in some mysterious way breaking his spirit, or making him lose face. The Japanese feel that their insults recoil upon themselves when the foreigner accepts them and excuses them on the ground that the Japanese know no better than to behave in this way. The blockade of Tientsin was a case in point, and the boarding of the *Wing Sang* was another. These incidents undoubtedly inflict hardship, but that is not the aim of the Japanese. It is something more important than that. It is just this so-called superiority which, instead of being destroyed as they intend, is merely emphasised by these acts. What then can the Japanese do? If only they would abate their claims on China and be satisfied with far less than they are demanding, if only they had the large-mindedness to treat with General Chiang Kai-shek, and settle the problem on fair and just terms instead of indulging in vain dreams of Eastern hegemony, they would consolidate their position, and be a welcome member of the councils of the world powers, and incidentally they would get the advantages which await them at the moment of repairing their damaged fortunes, not to say their lost prestige.

LANCELOT FORSTER.

Director of Public Information,
Hong Kong.

GIVING WITHOUT TEARS.

FOR the benefit of those whose income from property leaves a margin beyond what is needed for living or saving, I feel called upon to commend a financial method which I have been fortunate enough to experience. How often do we hear affluent people lament the flood of appeals which make their riches a curse? Too seldom do the rich get value for their money; what dull lives our millionaires lead, and what a pitiful absence of extra pleasure for their extra cash! More often than not their affluence is not only wasted, but leads them to an attitude of mind that makes them abnormally stingy.

I suggest to those who have (as in my own case) a moderate surplus, that this may produce for them an engrossing interest, if the plan is adopted of placing surplus funds in trust for public objects. Not, of course, the whole of what one is able to give; charitable obligations in these days are so multifarious that countless small sums must be paid without delay; it would be inconvenient to wait until every guinea had been passed by the Trustees. Further, one may be interested in objects about which a body of trustees would be divided in opinion. But with this proviso, I claim that the method of creating a charitable Trust has immense advantages.

Let me illustrate these advantages from the experience of a Trust with which I am personally familiar. The terms of this Trust permit of the widest possible freedom of choice of objects, specifying every possible sphere of educational, philanthropic, political or religious aim, provided it is in line with public welfare. For example, here are some of the purposes to which assistance has been given:

1. *International Peace and Friendship.* Help to such bodies as the League of Nations Union; National Peace Council; International Student Service; Friends' Service Council.
2. *Housing.* Various Housing Associations; Local Housing Surveys; National Housing and Town Planning Council.
3. *Direct relief of distress.* Help to refugees from Germany; Relief work in Abyssinia, Spain and China.
4. *Child Welfare.* The Save the Children Fund; Nursery Schools; Mothercraft Training; The Foundling Site Appeal.

upon the immediate path that would lead to it. If the world were such that it could follow good advice, it would not be the world it demonstrably is. Immediate initiative was therefore hushed in the appalling dangers, for it was impossible to tell whence even the ultimate danger might come. President Roosevelt, while he announced a step, interesting and encouraging enough in itself, towards co-ordinating with the Vatican what he called "our parallel endeavours for peace and the alleviation of suffering" yet seemed to share the Holy Father's sense of frustration by prefacing it with the caveat that "in these present moments no spiritual leader and no civil leader can move forward on a specific plan." Signor Mussolini remained enveloped in the enigma now common to all governments. While the non-belligerent forces of the world thus non-committally and even helplessly looked on as European civilisation was faced with potential disruption, the belligerents themselves appeared perforce to have surrendered themselves to a tacit acceptance of that disruption.

There was something sinister in the German contribution to the general enigma. No man knew the full truth about Germany's internal condition, nor therefore about her strategic plan, if any. What was known was that she was still engaged in the brutal and stupid enterprise of attempting to crush every manifestation of Czech and Polish culture and vitality in the territories she had occupied—"exploiting their resources, carrying off their food, starving and shooting the people, tearing and uprooting them from their homes in order to make way for Germans who in their turn have been forced to leave the land where they and their families have been settled for generations," as Mr. Chamberlain truly put it on January 9th. Field-Marshal Göring continued to wage another of the modern German methods by thundering out another threat: this time, forsooth, that the whole weight of German ferocity would in due time, and when the Führer gave the order, be launched from the air upon Great Britain and in particular upon London. The famous "secret weapon" of the Führer was thus in its turn succeeded by another barrage of words designed to make the hair of Britons stand on end.

Russia with the clumsy millions of her man-power had been hurled by Stalin and Molotov against the puny forces

of Finland, and in the first campaign had been made by the heroism of those puny forces to suffer the penalty of such folly. The precise effect of what was taking place in the far north of Europe upon the obscured deadlock of the continent of Europe could not be gauged by any of the bewildered politicians in London, Berlin, Paris or Rome. It had been made clear that Italy was anti-Russian; that Germany still pretended to be pro-Russian; yet Mussolini continued his acrobatic attempt to combine a publicly pretended Rome-Berlin axis with a publicly pretended opposition to Berlin's ally. When, on January 6th, Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, met and conversed with Count Csaky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, in Venice, a virtual notice was given to all whom it might concern that Italy was disposed to organise a Balkan resistance to any further Russian encroachment; but all those whom it did concern knew perfectly well that the chief menace to the Balkans came, not from Russia at all, but from Germany. Yet the fact that Hungary undertook not to grab at Transylvania in the event of a Russian attempt upon Bessarabia helped to organise a bloc that was ostensibly anti-Russian, tacitly anti-German. The open pretences of Signor Mussolini were therefore known (and he knew that they were known) to be of no importance compared with his true object which he had to conceal in deference to his open (and misleading) pretences in regard to Germany. The fact, as distinct from the façade, of Italian policy was that Signor Mussolini, who as one result of his axis with Herr Hitler, had been warned off the Balkans and had therefore been forced to evacuate one of the main fields of his material ambition, now felt strong enough, under the cover of the blackout aforesaid, to steal back into that field, on the calculation that the now clearly demonstrated weakness and moral turpitude of Russia reflected upon the already weakened prestige of Germany herself. In Chicago the gangsters behave in exactly the same sort of way.

Europe was the cradle of the Christian civilisation. Through two thousand years of the Christian era, helped by the precedent pagan intellectualism of Greece, that civilisation had developed into the dominant political, intellectual and religious influence in the whole world. It was now in the twentieth century of its evolution plunged in the apparently devastating process of destroying the foundations at least

5. *Research.* Help to individual workers, and also to schemes of joint research, such as the New Survey of London Life and Labour.
6. *Other causes.* In addition to the above, other causes may be mentioned towards which assistance has been given: Facilities for the Unemployed; Prison reform; Animal Protection societies; Preservation and creation of amenities, through such bodies as the London Gardens Guild.

The objections to this "Trust" plan are so obvious that I had better face them at once. For those with a family to provide for, there is a duty to consider the risk of the children developing special needs, or of investments depreciating in some sudden economic crisis. There is a case for trying to make the future as safe as possible, by saving all we can; but, in practice, do any of us act upon this principle? Surely, none of us. It would imply spending only upon pure necessities, and giving away nothing. No; we all compromise, and we do so with careful reason. We estimate that for our children to have the best start in life, much must be provided besides a maximum income; including not only the best possible education, but also a social background of friends, and a share in that tradition of open-handedness which has saved England from revolt, and which condemns miserliness as "not done"; and much else besides must be spent for their future benefit.

It is further objected that children may bitterly resent the alienation of part of what they regard as their patrimony. They, too, may aspire to possess, in due time, resources of spare cash; to give largely; even to found Trusts. This objection may apply when a parent bequeathes to his successors less than he himself inherited; but the argument is far less strong when he has himself greatly increased his fortune. The parent's duty is to make provision for his children's *real success*; and in thousands of cases this is perfectly consistent with alienation on a considerable scale, as is illustrated by the case of the late Lord Kinnaird, who is said to have given away half of his income every year. A son who, while inheriting amply, condemns his father's generosity; is in any case not the sort of person who would be likely to make good use of a still larger income than he has. We may

also reflect, with a wholesome cynicism, that whatever we succeed in leaving at death, however well we may "cut up," the State will take most of it!

Refusal to give at all is rare, and is mostly confined to those whose reasons for saving every possible penny are the least sound. If we belong to the normal type which gives in practice, the method to be adopted for giving deserves study. I suggest that the method of giving through a Trust is a convenient form. It offers advantages both to the donor and to the recipient.

Let me enumerate some of the advantages to the owner himself. The co-operation of fellow-trustees, with kindred aims, makes the allocation of donations vastly more interesting than if one acts alone, allows oneself to be governed in the main by the chance arrival of multifarious appeals, and deals with them at moments when the general subject of rational giving is far from the mind. At periodical meetings of the Trustees (ours were held not more often than once a quarter) one can view things as a whole, and find a keen interest in making the benefits of one's giving go the farthest.

Moreover, having once handed over to the Trust either property or block sums available from the year's budget, one is free from the pain of parting with money, which (I confess!) qualifies the pleasure of drawing a cheque upon one's private account, however good the object. The pain of parting is already over, and one can enjoy the actual giving to the selected objects in a way that, as a private giver, only the most inhumanly perfect altruist could experience!

Again, one secures oneself from the temptation to be guided by the credit which is to be gained from the gift, out of which may spring a bias in the choice of objects, which is to be avoided. If one's name appears in the title of the Trust, it is as one of several.

When times are bad, the influence of the Trust saves one from yielding irrationally to panic. The Trust's income suffers with the rest. But if one has no Trust, donations are cut to the bone, in response to the instinct of alarm, and one gives less in the end than one's judgment dictates. Long-term views are desirable in finance, and the Trust is the means of securing them. If this method of giving became the common practice, the unedifying spectacle would be less painfully frequent of rich people worrying how they can cut off one of

of the political and intellectual heritage. In Europe the leaders of peoples by now wielded a totalitarian power over the lives, fortunes and freedom of their peoples. They were using that power to the only probable end of mutual destruction, so far at any rate as the material attributes of life were concerned. Their weapons were lies and brute force. The still small voice of the cultured, good and religious people extant was mostly silenced because the general demoralisation had gone so far that the very instinct of goodness had in some degree been warped into a crusading zeal on behalf of one belligerent faction against another in the general process of destruction. If European civilisation had indeed produced such a result, then it did not deserve to survive; indeed, the destruction of Europe by Europe would be the just and inevitable result of the very laws of Nature. There is no escape if Europe really persists in being what it has been since the beginning of the present century. It is still possible—and the perhaps instinctive hesitancy on both sides to unleash the main fury of the weapons held in readiness keeps open the possibility—that Europe by some means yet undiscovered will halt on the very edge of the precipice, turn back, and, chastened by the experience, will begin a really new and better phase of its history.

Moreover, something beyond the control of man seemed to be at work. On January 13th Sir John Simon, speaking in Glasgow at the second of the Government's propagandist meetings launched by the Prime Minister four days earlier, gave a momentous defence of the monster income tax that was levelling classes by making riches impossible. Sir John said that "it was designed to discourage unnecessary spending by diverting a larger part of the national income into the essential business of providing supplies which were directly needed for the war." Out of his own depths Sir John could hardly have said anything so profoundly cheerful. God (for one must trace these things to their origin) has a fine sense of method; and the good that is coming from the destruction of European civilisation becomes more and more obvious.

It was on Christmas Eve that the Pope and Mr. Roosevelt—the two forces outside the belligerent camps that had the clearest opportunity of giving good counsel to Europe—made their contribution to the cause. On Christmas Eve—when the Prince of Peace was mocked by the routine roaring of the

stationary cannon—the Holy Father received the customary address from the Sacred College of Cardinals. On Boxing Day he answered it. Having himself since the middle of the last war concentrated much of his thought and action upon the cause of peace in Europe, he now formulated a courageous indictment of the lawlessness and godlessness of the modern type of marauder government in Europe and suggested a plan for peace. The plan, let the truth be frankly faced, sounded less confident than the indictment, whence is to be measured the difficulty that confronts the peacemaker in the present phase of European chaos. The Holy Father had the courage to state the obvious truth that "peace must be founded upon disarmament"; but he was constrained to give to disarmament the second place in the moral order of redress. First, he postulated the "reparation" of wrongs already inflicted. "All nations," he declared, "great and small, strong and weak, have a right to life and independence."

He was promptly misunderstood. The Rome correspondent of *The Times*, for instance, honestly no doubt believing that the Holy Father had been indulging a little pro-British propaganda, quoted the first Papal point thus: "The will to live of one nation must never be equivalent to sentence of death for another. When this equality of rights has been destroyed or damaged or imperilled the juridical order calls for reparation 'based on justice' (*Times*, December 27th, 1939). The quotation marks were a bit mixed. But what the Pope said was "... juridical order calls for reparation, *which cannot be found by means of the sword* [my italics] or by selfish arbitration, but by justice and reciprocal equality." The correct text of the Pope's allocation was published in *The Tablet* of December 30th, 1939.

As in so many of life's problems reason in this case seems to conflict with expediency. On the one hand experience teaches us that if wrongs are to be repaired *before* peace based upon disarmament can be considered, then the present war must run its course, as all former wars ran their course, and—must we accept it?—as all future wars will run their course, before reason can be invoked. That no doubt is precisely the reason why the Pope cautioned us that reparation "cannot be found by means of the sword." Indeed, the cumulative experience of all history, last exemplified in 1919, suggests that wrongs inflicted by the use of brute force

their housemaids or their gardeners, not because income has actually diminished, but impelled by an irrational panic.

Turning to the point of view of the recipients of benefactions, or the charities which it is desired to benefit, does the system of the Trust present any advantages? Clearly, for any such object as a recurring grant (e.g. assistance to a student taking a three or four years' course), it is of the greatest value that the recipient should be able to rely upon continuance of the grant for the required term. One might, giving privately, be equally willing to help the particular case; but there would be the chance of a sudden cutting off of funds through one's death, and the student's course would thus be precarious. He might even feel unable to embark upon it.

This same factor of permanence facilitates the use of money for research. This is important, because, as Lord Passfield has pointed out, there is no important public need that is more neglected in this country than research upon social subjects. A further advantage is that the recipient does not feel in the same manner the embarrassment of being indebted to a single individual; he can regard a Trust as something impersonal.

Perhaps the greatest advantage lies in the far greater care and skill that are bestowed upon the useful allocation of the funds in question. Most individual givers follow the taste of the moment; but nothing can so effectively ensure that the greatest value is obtained for the money spent as the consideration of objects by a committee of friends, similar in outlook, pooling their knowledge, and employing a Secretary versed in the practice of similar Trusts, who can be charged with the duty of making inquiries as to the record of bodies and persons which apply to the Trust for aid.

Let me end my argument with an unanswerable point. The authorities at Somerset House do not class the income of such a *bona fide* Trust with the income of the donor for the purposes of super-tax. In the absence of a Trust, the amount of tax to be paid reduces the sum left at the disposal of the donor for useful charitable objects. Where a Trust exists, the amount available for interesting benefactions is very largely increased.

A PARENT.

JACQUELINE PASCAL: A TRUE DAUGHTER OF FRANCE.

HOW many know that behind the religious life of Blaise Pascal moved his sister Jacqueline, quietly directing and influencing him? For in this young Frenchwoman dwelt the unquenchable spirit of independence and fixity of purpose that characterises her nation. Jacqueline was the youngest of the three children of Etienne Pascal, a magistrate and mathematician, who lived at Clermont Ferrand, in the province of Auvergne. The elder daughter Gilberte was born in 1620, Blaise in 1623, and two years later, Jacqueline. She was only a year old when their mother died, leaving a distracted father to bring up three delicate and clever children. In Paris, whither he moved, he soon gathered around him the leading men of science. Whilst Blaise listened with awe and delight to his father and his father's friends discussing the future possibilities that science would bring, not least among them submarines and aeroplanes, his sister Jacqueline was quietly composing poetry. At eight years old her gifts were widely recognised; at twelve, she wrote a sonnet that won her reputation at court.

The children's home life became saddened by their father's exile, for he had used seditious language against Richelieu over financial transactions, and exile was his only course. However he returned in secrecy to nurse Jacqueline through smallpox. Then an opportunity came to the child to recall him. It happened thus; Jacqueline, in spite of her pock-marked skin, was chosen to take the leading rôle in a play by Scudéry, *L'Amour Tyrannique*, organised for the Cardinal's pleasure, and entirely played by children. Jacqueline excelled in her part, for a good reason. It was important to please Richelieu. The play over, she hurriedly left the stage and bravely approached the great man, when she recited lines of her own composition. The Cardinal listened to the child, and tenderly took her upon his knee. She pleaded for the recall of her father, and so touched him by her childish courage that he yielded, and not content with pardoning Etienne Pascal, appointed him "Intendant" at Rouen. So this Normandy town, the home of Corneille, henceforth became the abode of the remarkable Pascal family.

Rouen welcomed Jacqueline. The author of *Le Cid* admired

cannot be repaired by the use of brute force. On the other hand, the wrongs inflicted by Germany do cry out for redress. The method approved by the overwhelming opinion of influential people in all countries is that when military force is used, it can be countered only by the use of military force. Yet it is clearly possible to argue that thereby "Hitlerism" is not defeated, but is in principle vindicated. It is merely proved in its own original practice not to have been efficient enough. Hence the next war, and the next. This particular problem, which no politician in the history of the world has yet solved, lies heavily upon us in our time.

There are those who go so far as boldly to argue that in a world demonstrably not Christian in its collective practice, a distinction must be made between the individual and the public conscience; that, in short, while the individual may try to be Christian within the bounds of his individual responsibility, he must consent, if the overwhelming facts compel him, to be unchristian as a member of the public body. It is a perplexing dilemma, as every honest man has always discovered. We know that Mr. Chamberlain was indeed sincere, according to the normal and traditional British standards, when on March 17th, 1939, he made his famous *volte face*: "I do not believe there is anyone who will question my sincerity when I say there is hardly anything I would not sacrifice for peace. But . . ." It had apparently not occurred to him, nor does it occur to the vast majority of Englishmen, that we as a nation have made precisely no sacrifice at all for peace during the past half-century. What we have wanted so sincerely and so blindly is the continuance of peace on our own terms. Let us at any rate be honest. Let us say that in our public profession we are not "Christian" in the clear sense; dare not be; perhaps cannot yet be. We keep what we have. We meet brute force by brute force. We always have; perhaps as yet must. Must the Christian Church, if for the sake of the argument one regards Nonconformist, Protestant, Eastern and Catholic as one Christian Church, then admit, not its defeat—for supernatural grace is not, cannot be, defeated—but its own still inchoate effectiveness? Pope Benedict XV in 1917, with firm good logic, propounded the thesis (and the thesis was in that year taken to the Kaiser by the present Pope, then Papal Nuncio at Munich) that the effective way of stopping wars and of preventing them was

simply to disarm. He was ignored. At Christmas 1939 (when Pope Benedict XV's logic was duly illustrated, for lo! another war was in progress) Pope Pius XII chose to refrain from propounding again in its full simplicity a thesis that he knew, or had ground to suspect, would be ignored. Like the early Christians who had to live in a Godless Roman Empire, European Christians to-day have to live in a Godless Europe. The facts are always what they are: and will not be argued down. In Europe in the year of grace 1940 the fact (which we are not able to explain) is that in our public affairs we are not Christian, while in our private affairs we may without insuperable obstacle try to be. Though we do not understand that contradiction—there may even be some mystically good basis to it—we do know that in its individual subjective scope the truth is terribly simple and terribly hard: "But I say unto you which hear, Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you." One day, maybe, the world also will be Christian, the gap will be bridged, and wars will not be. In the present case it may well be argued that unchristian politics serve an ultimately Christian purpose by destroying the very wealth that has been set up as an idol. The price we now pay for Godless politics is resulting before our eyes in an historic Christian revival among individuals.

On December 23rd President Roosevelt summoned the Protestant and Jewish Churches in the United States to send representatives for conference with himself, and announced to Pope Pius XII that it would give him "great satisfaction" to send a "personal representative" to the Vatican to co-ordinate their efforts for peace. In each of the three letters thus sent out he stated that Christian teachings lay at the core of Western civilisation. With simpler truth he remarked that the Western civilisation had been "built by men and women who knew in their hearts that all were brothers because they were children of God." Christianity goes further and demands that they behave as brothers. Precisely because Mr. Roosevelt could not appeal to any actively Christian "core" in European civilisation, his initiative of December 23rd did not add much to the immediate joy of nations, though Mr. Myron Taylor—the personal representative aforesaid—when he reaches the Vatican may perform an excellent service in taking up, as Mr. Roosevelt in his letter to the Pope expressed it, "questions arising out of the abnormal world

her verse, her wit, and her intelligence, and encouraged her to compete for the annual prize at the poetic competition in his town. Jacqueline, tempted by the subject, complied. "Mademoiselle Pascal, la cadette," said the *Recueil d'Utrecht*, "at the age of fourteen carried off the prize for verse at Rouen, presented each year on the day of the Holy Conception, when verse from all over France is submitted." Her prize poem shows an unexpected dignity.

Exécrables auteurs d'une fausse créance,
Dont le sein hypocrite enclot un cœur de fiel
Jetez vos faibles yeux sur l'arche d'alliance
Vous la verrez semblable à la reine du ciel!

Si donc une arche simple et bien moins nécessaire
Ne saurait habiter dans un profane lieu
Comment penserez-vous que cette Sainte Mère,
Etant un temple impur, fut le temple de Dieu?

The same spirit pervades it as was valiantly flung forth to the world eighteen years later in her famous letter, when Sub-Prioress of Port Royal. It was not for the sake of winning the prize that Jacqueline competed, but to express her contempt of those who could doubt the truth of the Divine Conception. When the Prince, presiding over the ceremony, pronounced the name of Jacqueline Pascal as the winner, she was found to be absent. Her dolls at home claimed her. But a friend of the family rose and thanked the Assembly and its President in the name of the winner. This friend was Corneille. Marguerite Perier, Gilberte's daughter, years later records the incident in her "Recueil," together with Corneille's improvised lines:

Pour une jeune muse absente
Prince, je prendrai soin de vous remercier.

Corneille brought her the prize with "a flourish of trumpets," but found her unmoved by the ovation.

During all this time Jacqueline and Blaise shared interests. He proudly saw her at the age of fifteen, shining in the Rouen society as the protégée of Corneille, and the author of sonnets, *chansons* and epigrams. Then, through him, her life suddenly changed. Blaise became converted to Jansenism and inspired his young sister with an equally great fervour. Jansen and his followers aimed at austerity, purity and truth,

and this simple and beautiful message thrilled Jacqueline, as it had thrilled Blaise. Her old life, beside the new mission, seemed aimless.

Soon after his conversion, Blaise was again absorbed in his scientific work. He claimed to have verified the theory of atmospheric pressure, but was immediately accused of having filched the discovery. A bitter controversy ensued, affecting his health, whereupon his father sent him to Paris in Jacqueline's care in order to get the best medical advice. This was in the year 1647. Jacqueline secretly welcomed their visit. It gave her opportunities to follow her new faith, and her brother encouraged her in her zeal. He would accompany her to church, and on visits to the Abbey of Port-Royal-de-Paris, at the same time passionately following the scientific movements of the day. There is a letter to her father, dated June 19th, 1648, that has been likened to the prayer of Racine's *Iphigénie*, in which Jacqueline promises not to undertake any vows without his consent.

In Paris she listened with eagerness to the sermons of M. Singlin, renowned at Port Royal. But the personal influence of that rigid disciplinarian and big-hearted woman, Mère Angélique, was more convincing than any sermons by any great preacher. The abbess of Port Royal, Jacqueline Marie Angélique Arnauld, sister of the "great Arnauld," realised, in meeting Jacqueline, the importance of obtaining this ardent and gifted convert; yet she would not press Jacqueline to take the veil without her father's consent. Étienne Pascal remained firm. After his death, he pointed out, she would be free; now he needed his daughter. The distracted father fetched her and Blaise, and took them to Clermont Ferrand, in the hope that distance might modify their views on Jansenism.

The year 1650 saw Jacqueline returning to Paris with her father. A greater devotee, she now shunned all society, and dressed in severe black. She practised self-mortification, passing her days in solitude and prayer. She rarely communicated with Port Royal. But at the feast of the Ascension, when invited by Mère Angélique, she composed meditations on the death of Jesus Christ. These *Pensées* of Jacqueline show how far, in spirit, she was already a member of the monastic order. They are so beautiful that it was seriously considered whether they should be joined with the *Pensées* of Pascal after her death. In *Pensée XIX* we read:

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situation." He may even discover, and pass on the discovery to the President, that the world situation is not, and few situations ever are, "abnormal." Causes produce normal results. If you put your foot through your hat, the result to your hat is not abnormal.

On Christmas Eve the Pope sketched his five postulates for peace, to be launched "at an opportune and propitious moment" and whenever "the opportunity offered with the requisite guarantees and securities":

"First, a fundamental postulate of an honourable and just peace is that of the right to life and freedom of all nations, both big and small, powerful and weak.

"The will to live of a nation must never call for the death sentence on another nation. Whenever and wherever this equality of rights has been destroyed, damaged or endangered, then juridical order calls for reparation, which cannot be found by means of the sword or by selfish arbitration, but by justice and reciprocal equality.

"Secondly, true peace will be established when the nations are freed from the heavy slavery of armaments and from the danger of that material force which, instead of protecting rights, becomes violent in its oppression.

"Thirdly, in creating or reconstituting international institutions which have lofty missions, but at the same time missions which are full of difficulties and grave responsibilities, the experience of the past should be kept in mind. Ineffectiveness and faults in practice from which any similar institution has suffered should be taken into consideration so as to avoid them in future." (This was an obvious allusion to the League of Nations.)

"Fourthly, a better order in Europe is desired, attention must be given to the true needs and just demands of nations and peoples, and also to such demands on the part of ethnic minorities.

"Fifthly, rules, even though they are the best that can be obtained, will not be perfect, and they will be doomed to failure, unless those who govern the destinies of peoples, and the peoples themselves, become permeated with the spirit of goodwill and thirst and hunger for justice and universal love, which is the final aim of Christian idealism."

STARVATION OF THE MIND

It was one of the characteristic effects of the blackout that no man knew what was really happening or was likely to happen. As a routine method of maintaining civilian *moral* certain of the influences which moulded public opinion went on warning us that Germany, all in her good time, would undoubtedly unleash the dogs of war. In the meantime Herr Hitler and Field-Marshal Göring perforce had to greet the new year with such messages of cheer to the German people as they judged would be appropriate or effective. The Führer recapitulated the German triumphs of 1939—"due exclusively to the internal reformation of Germany by National Socialism"—and told the people that "organised at home, economically prepared, and armed to the teeth, they entered the most fateful year of German history." He formulated his war aims in a crisp passage such as could hardly be bettered for its unconsciously ironical comment upon the modern Europe that is also largely but by no means exclusively due "to the internal reformation of Germany by National Socialism." The interesting thing is that even Herr Hitler felt compelled to parade before the bemused and frightened eyes of the German people a high-sounding and high-motived purpose. There is perhaps some subtle consolation to be derived from the fact thereby proved that the mass of the German people had to be prompted into thinking the very opposite of what their prompters knew to be the truth. Herr Hitler thus defined Germany's war aim: "We have, therefore, a clear war aim: Germany and Europe must be freed from the violence and perpetual threats which have proceeded from former and present-day England. The weapons must be struck this time for ever out of the hands of the warmongers and war-declarers. We are fighting not merely against the injustice of Versailles but to prevent a still greater injustice which is to take its place. We are fighting for the creation of a new Europe, for, unlike Mr. Chamberlain, we are convinced that this new Europe cannot be created by the senile forces of a decaying world."

The particular lies or fancies used by the leaders of Germany for the deception or oppression of their people no longer caused much interest. Minds were being starved for lack of interest. For five months the intellectual activities of nearly the whole world had been stopped, and there was nothing to

Jesus Christ, as he spoke by the mouth of his prophet, was shamed of men, and the object of scorn to his people.

I learn from this to support joyfully the scorn of the world.

Such a fire of zealous faith, and passionate longing for complete renunciation, must have astonished even the Mère Angélique.

In 1651 Etienne Pascal died. The gates of Port Royal stood wide for Jacqueline to pass within. But her brother—her “twin soul” and confederate—rose up as a barrier. Pascal’s complex personality is forcibly shown in this new attitude. He became suddenly out of sympathy with Jacqueline and her vows. (Did he forget that he had converted her to Jansenism?) Opposing his young sister’s plan seemed to him one of the decrees that the grief for his father demanded. Etienne Pascal had enjoyed society. To carry on his father’s habits, it meant plunging into a gayer life. The young scientist bought a coach and four and drove about Paris, comforted in his illusionment. His sympathy with Jacqueline temporarily severed, he induced her to sign a contract by which she made over her small fortune to him. She probably already knew that Mère Angélique was prepared to take her into the convent without a dowry.

Gilberte alone was told of Jacqueline’s plans of leaving home for Port Royal and with her husband and family hastened to Rouen to stop her. Jacqueline calmly informed them that her departure was arranged for the morrow. She asked Gilberte to break the news to Blaise. This she did; and he was overcome with grief. The night before Jacqueline’s departure Gilberte lay awake, dreading the separation. She rose early, and went into Jacqueline’s room. “I thought she, too, had not slept,” writes Gilberte, “and I was afraid she might be ill, so that I went to her bed, when I found her in a deep sleep. The noise I made awakened her; she asked me the hour; I told her, and having inquired how she was, and if she had slept well, she answered she was in good health, and that she had slept peacefully. So she arose, dressed quickly, and went forth, doing all with a tranquillity and repose of soul which was inconceivable.”

In a long letter written from Port-Royal-des-Champs (the sister convent) to her brother, Jacqueline points out that, although he has no rights over her, yet she invites him to give

his permission and to take part at the ceremony of her profession on Trinity Sunday. Jacqueline says: “You cannot withhold from me something which is not yours to give, but you can give your blessing—and give it generously.” “*Faites de bonne grâce ce qu’il faut que vous fassiez, c’est en dire, en esprit de charité.*” Jacqueline had learnt the art of biding her hour. She waited patiently, knowing that her brother’s present outlook on life was but a passing phase. She understood him better than, perhaps, he understood himself.

If Jacqueline believed that by entering Port Royal she would be folded in a tranquil existence, she erred. Persecution was the fate of the French Jansenists. When in 1652 she was admitted as a novice, Paris was again in an upheaval over the war of the Fronde. The refugees fled into the country, and asked succour of the nuns at the convent of Port-Royal-des-Champs.

This abbey was founded by Malthica de Marli, who on his departure for the Crusade in 1202, left money with his wife, Mathilde, to purchase land and build a nunnery, where prayers could be said for his safety. His wife chose a site in the wooded valley of the Yvette, seven miles from Versailles, a quiet but unhealthy spot. In winter-time the mists rise, which chill to the marrow; in summer the closed-in valley steams with oppressive heat. The architect of Amiens Cathedral, Robert de Luzarches, is credited to have designed the church of Port-Royal-des-Champs, which was completed in 1229. Those who visit it to-day will find only the foundations, together with stumps of the pillars of that church described as “*un pur joyau de l’architecture gothique.*” It was pillaged and destroyed in 1712 by soldiers, under royal order. In the small museum, now raised on the site of this ancient convent, there is preserved the sole portrait of Jacqueline Pascal. Sitting in a chair, she is dressed in the cream-coloured robes of the Bernardine Order of Cîteaux. On the scapular which covers her breast is sewn a large red cross; her head is covered by a black hood. The oval of her face resembles her brother’s, so, too, do the prominent hooked nose, and the large, intense eyes.

Jacqueline, now settled in this convent, remarked on the disinterestedness of Port Royal in taking her without a dowry, but felt the disgrace of living on charity. When Pascal visited her, driving out from Paris in a coach, she found

brood upon but the war ; and the war itself was the object of speculation rather than of information. In particular the question that exercised most minds was that of Germany's intentions, military or diplomatic. Official British and French opinion necessarily assumed the worst, for the obvious reason that in war there is no greater mistake than to underestimate the enemy's power, and for the further reason that expectation had to be maintained at striking pitch. There was therefore nothing of interest to be extracted from the official British channels of information nor from those public commentators who naturally played the same game. In neutral circles, particularly those whose territory bordered upon Germany, a sense of perplexity was frankly confessed. In one such quarter, where an equal knowledge of German and of Russian conditions was held, speculation tended to expect (as the explanation of Germany's inactivity in the main sphere of the war) a new turn in the Hitler-Ribbentrop technique. It was believed that despite the stubbornness and success of the initial Finnish resistance to the Russian invasion, the sheer weight of the Russian attack was bound sooner or later to make itself felt. When that moment arrived (according to the speculation here being recorded) Herr Hitler would launch a plan that had never been absent from his mind since the Non-Aggression Pact was signed with Russia last August.

It would be launched in the guise of a new peace overture to the Western Powers, the suggestion being the familiar one that the Western war be transfigured into an Anglo-French-Italo-German crusade against Bolshevism. According to that technique Herr von Ribbentrop would be featured as the consistent enemy of communism, his deal with Stalin being defended as an expedient forced unwillingly upon Germany by the threatened encirclement of Germany by the Russo-British-French combination. The sting of the plot would now be that Hitler and Ribbentrop would claim, on behalf of the new Western grouping, the exclusive or main rôle in dealing with Russia, it being the continuing conviction of Germany's leaders that Russia was negligible as a military factor, to the end that the *Drang nach Osten* (now closed by Germany's enforced pretence of an alliance with Russia) be again thrown open to Germany. An offer to reconstitute an "ethnographic" Poland would be held out as an inducement to Britain and France to call off the war in the West. The

real, and rather transparent, purpose of this new bid in Realpolitik would be, with British and French help, to recapture German control of the Baltic and to impose German dominance over the Balkans in the guise of Defender of the Faith against Godless Bolshevism. In more detailed support of the manoeuvre particular emphasis would be laid by Herr von Ribbentrop's elastic mind upon the argument that the German system wholly differed from the Russian in that it had always been founded upon the sanctity of the family: that first objective of communist sabotage. The plan would thereby be insinuated that the German fear of Russian communist expansion was both sincere, and, as Herr von Ribbentrop declared three years ago, consonant with the true imperial interests of Great Britain and France (and, of course, of Germany).

THE GERMAN "PROTECTORATE"

More detailed information, through various slow and roundabout channels, has reached this country about the methods adopted under Baron von Neurath for the "protection," in the German sense, of Bohemia and Moravia. The elaborate thoroughness of the dragooned press, the substitution of German for Czech administrative officials, the Germanisation of schools, universities and of the whole country, the appropriation of economic assets and of food, the atrocities, vindictive and deterrent, committed upon the civil population, including students, male and female, the oppression of the Catholic Church: is a story never surpassed even in German records. The unexplained thing is that so many Germans should be available, and enthusiastically disposed, for work which revolts the natural instincts of man. The Czech newspapers are virtually written, including the advertisements, by a German army of officials whose single object is to mislead the reader, at home and abroad, and to serve the strategic purposes of the Reich on all fronts. Not even a variant phrase is allowed in presenting a prescribed piece of news, nor any unauthorised advertisement, lest the words so used constitute a secret code for an exchange of messages between Czechs. The atrocities perpetrated upon students after the events of November 15th and 23rd last, the treatment of school children, even to the length of mysterious

it hard to hide her trouble. Blaise, noticing her paleness and air of depression, guessed the cause. Deeply touched, he repented, and not only promised to pay over all Jacqueline's money, but offered it "*au nom de Dieu*," and added to the sum from his own purse. Had Jacqueline not persevered, would Pascal have ever joined Port Royal?

At the close of the year 1654, Pascal made his second and final conversion. The communion of soul between brother and sister, for a while severed, became again united with new fervour. "*Sûrement leurs âmes n'étaient qu'une âme*," writes Gilberte. Jacqueline had bided her time. The convert rushed to extremes of severity, against which even the ardent sister remonstrated. She wished to protect him from his own impetuosity. In the same small museum where Jacqueline's portrait hangs, is the iron chain which Pascal wore, in penance, next his flesh.

The years passed. The life of meditation and work in the close valley suited Jacqueline. In 1657 Sister Euphémie—or in other words Jacqueline Pascal—was nominated as *Sous maîtresse des novices à Port Royal*. The poet, the charmer of Cardinal Richelieu, now filled the rôle of supervisor of the novices, teaching them the rules of the house, buying their shoes, pins, and other necessities. She explains to Gilberte that this sudden elevation is bewildering. To her duties was added the control of the education of the children at Port-Royal-des-Champs. She consulted her brother, who expounded to her his new method of learning to read. The theory was explained later in the *Grammaire Générale* of Port Royal, which became a standard work. His method of teaching is, perhaps, the original of the modern phonetic system. There were two main rules laid down by Jacqueline in the curriculum of her pupils: to pray, and to keep silence.

Whilst Jacqueline was training the young, her brother had produced his famous pamphlet, "A Letter written to a Provincial, by one of his Friends." Its purpose was to clear his friend Arnauld—the hero of Port Royal—of the accusation of heresy. *Les Lettres Provinciales*, although a literary triumph, unfortunately brought greater persecution upon Port Royal. Orders were given to disperse the inmates, including the children—those silent children of Jacqueline's upbringing. Among the pupils was Racine, then a boy of sixteen.

But a strange occurrence happened at this critical moment at Port Royal. It was the Miracle of the Holy Thorn, performed on Gilberte's little daughter, Marguerite (Jacqueline's future biographer). No one was more rejoiced by the message of the miracle than Pascal. "There is a Voice that sets at naught the laws of Nature," he now uttered, joyful in his steady conviction, when before, as a scientist, he had maintained, "the supernatural does not happen." But the miracle, far-reaching in its effect, did not stay the hand of persecution. Soon after the attacks on the Jansenists were redoubled, and the climax was reached in 1661, the year Jacqueline was elevated to the post of Sub-Prioress of Port-Royal-des-Champs, for Mère Angélique had, in April, removed to the sister convent in Paris.

One June day of this same year, the old Prioress was suddenly visited by a Commission of Vicars-General, who questioned her and all the nuns about their Faith. Undaunted, they answered every question. The Commissioners departed. They had found no proof of heresy. Mère Angélique failed to let Jacqueline know about their coming to her, and the young Prioress found the Vicars-General descending upon Port-Royal-des-Champs. Although in heart sympathisers with the convent, these men were powerless in the hands of the Pope. They not only questioned her but brought a Pastoral Letter which, when read out, filled Jacqueline with indignation. Submit to the Pope? Never! That was her answer to what she considered a document of "false prudence, and true cowardice." Little did she suspect that her beloved brother had helped in drawing up this letter, which he had considered of political necessity.

In Jacqueline's statement, which she sent to the Prioress in Paris, there vibrates a passionate scorn. To sign a paper which omitted whether the condemned propositions *were*, or *were not* in Jansen's book, seemed to her like consenting to a lie, without denying the truth. "It might not be the province of a woman," she writes, "to speak in defence of the truth, yet when bishops have only the courage of women, women should have the courage of bishops, and if they could not defend the truth, they could at least die for it!" This letter she demanded to be shown to Arnauld. The day after, she wrote to Arnauld to soften her meaning and asked him to show her letter to her brother. Pascal read it, and repented

vaccinations by "doctors" until demented mothers made the physical proceeding impossible: such things would pass belief if the evidence were not irresistible. They almost pass human comprehension. The like evidence comes from occupied Poland. Twice in living memory the organised political State we know as Germany has, in the honest belief of her fellow States throughout the world, been guilty of inhuman cruelty to her neighbours and to others who have fallen under her power. The mere fact that one of the standing discussions of our time is whether "the German people" as well as "the German leaders" should be held responsible for such things, gives away something that is peculiar to Germany, even though first causes and the root fault may be more general.

We all know how gentle, charming and human can be an individual German. We all know that in the present instance the German population is subjected to an oppression in effect as inhuman as that applied to the non-German victims. But there is something not explained. Normally there is a point beyond which human nature cannot be driven. Is there something distinctive in German human nature? Are the German people, not in the sense of Herr Hitler's boast, but in an even more unfortunate sense, different from the people of every other country in the world? No nation can claim sanctity. The British record is besmirched enough: and as lately as 1919 in India it was further besmirched. But the inescapable thing is the fact that twice in the present century Germany as an entity under different leaders has outraged the feelings of the vast majority of the civilised countries of the world. Can it be that "the people" of Germany have twice allowed themselves, at no matter what disadvantage, to be misled, exploited and perverted by their rulers? and are not their rulers German? Fair-minded students of history do concede that German atrocities are different, and worse, than, say, British or French. Yet there cannot be a special mould of human nature reserved particularly for the German race. There must be some other explanation which historical and humanitarian research has not yet discovered. It is probable that though we are all expert in our knowledge of present results we have not explored the true original causes that would explain them.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 12th, 1940.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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EUROPE AFTER MUNICH.*

Two years ago we were all reading Miss Wiskemann's *Czechs and Germans*, the ablest and sanest analysis of the difficult Sudeten question. Her second book, *Undeclared War*, takes up the story of Europe's sickness after the false dawn of Munich and brings it, by means of a brief postscript, to the outbreak of the present war. It is distinguished by the wide knowledge and broad outlook which we have come to expect from the author. There is a quiet mastery which is most welcome amid the flood of propaganda and recrimination.

Her subject is Germany's preparations for the diplomatic or military struggle which the Munich *intermezzo* merely encouraged Germany to undertake. The book falls into two parts, dealing respectively with the States east and west of "the Axis Powers." Since it was written, the Rome-Berlin axis, which is here taken as the dividing line, has wilted under the shock of the Russo-German partnership; but so long as it exists on paper it still cuts the Continent from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and prevents its foes or rivals on either side from helping each other. The author devotes far the larger part of her space to the East, partly because she knows

* *Undeclared War*. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. Constable. 12s.

of his former decision. He broke with the compromising Vicars-General, with Arnould, with Nicole, with all the cautious dignitaries of Port Royal. There and then he refused to sign the formulary.

The fact of having her brother beside her in her fight gave Jacqueline new strength. On the other hand the courage of the women fortified him. In spite of her age and affliction, Mère Angélique, with Jacqueline beside her, stood firm in what they considered the only honest course. Processions were formed, in which the aged Prioress carried the Cross. Her figure, old but dominant, brought tears to the eyes of spectators. Worn out, she collapsed one day in the church, and death released her of the responsibility of signing.

Jacqueline still considered that to put her signature to the document was betraying truth, and death was better than that. She could not understand how the men of Port Royal, who stood for the defenders of truth, abandoned it for the sake of politics. "I cannot express," she writes, "the sorrow which overwhelms me when I see that the very persons to whom God confided his truth, should be so unfaithful." If she signed, Port Royal would not be holding to the truth; if she refused to sign, Port Royal was lost. Jacqueline stood confronted by the two alternatives.

More days of agony passed, then the young Prioress capitulated. The act broke her spirit. She died in the following October, at the age of thirty-six—four months after having signed, so reluctantly, the scorned document. "One knows but this," says Victor Giraud,* "that those who can die for their faith are worth both admiration and envy; and that in Jacqueline Pascal's life, so short and yet so crowded, the French ideal found its highest and most enduring expression." Pascal's sister—the inspiration of his religious life—was dead. "God give us grace to die as good a death," he exclaimed when the news was brought to him. He survived her by ten months.

THEODORA ROSCOE.

* "Jacqueline Pascal." Article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, by V. Giraud. (April 1909.)

LORD HALDANE AND GERMANY.

IN 1915 Lord Haldane was driven from the War Office by an abusive campaign of the yellow press, which accused him of having called Germany his "spiritual home." Haldane actually had used this phrase in a talk with a German scholar at the International Historical Congress in London in 1913. What was the precise significance of this pointed confession of his? Did it mean that this British Cabinet Minister admired the ruthless methods of German Imperialism in world affairs? Was he really impressed by the pomp and glamour of the Wilhelmian Germany? Some light may be thrown on his attitude towards Germany by an incident which occurred through an official visit paid by him to the German Emperor in August 1906. A state carriage having been placed at his disposal, Haldane one day ordered the coachman to drive to the old churchyard of the Dorotheen church, in order to visit the graves of Fichte, Hegel and Solger. At the cemetery the graves of these philosophers were hardly known and turned out to be in a deplorable condition. Haldane expressed his concern about this to the Emperor, but the Emperor replied that these names no longer mattered to Germans. The British Minister then drew the Kaiser's attention to the fact that the Berlin *Siegesallee*, which contains statues of distinguished German princes, statesmen and warriors, lacked some figures best known in German literature, and offered to add at least two statues at his own expense. "I know," William II answered, "you want to put in the statue of Körner, my great war poet." * But Haldane by no means had Körner in mind, as the latter was perhaps a hero in the War of Liberation, but certainly not a poet of any importance.

This conversation truly reflects the paradox of Lord Haldane's experience of Germany. Like Goethe's Iphigenie, whose thoughts turn lovingly to Greece, his philosophical mind concentrated again and again on the timeless land of German idealism, reaching for the stars of truth and beauty. Yet the statesman Haldane was quite aware of the actual Germany, dominated by Pan-Germanic ideas and Prussian militarism. Against her he created a formidable weapon in the British Army, whose reform he carried through most efficiently between 1905 and 1912.

* R. B. Haldane, *Autobiography* (1929), pp. 89 sq.

it best, and partly because it is there that Germany has spun her web with the greatest skill. The examination of German pressure and intrigue involves an analysis of the parties and leading personalities in the various countries, a task which her personal contacts render her well fitted to fulfil. She reminds us that the widespread anti-Semitism of Eastern Europe prepared the ground for the Nazi agents, while the severe economic pressure from Berlin is difficult to resist. Hungary is particularly hard pressed, since Germany has made no secret of the fact that she wishes to destroy Hungarian industry so that the country shall cease to compete with her in any way, but shall concentrate upon producing food and aluminium for the Reich. Dr. Basch, the Nazi leader of the Hungarian Germans, is at work, and it is suggested that Imredy, recently Premier of Hungary, might conceivably become another Seyss-Inquart and open the gates to the enemy of national independence.

The chapter on Roumania is equally interesting and scarcely less alarming. The Iron Guard, with its terrible record of political murders, has been suppressed by mass executions; but the country is still far from unity and stability. King Carol, we are told, is unpopular, as dictators, dynastic or otherwise, usually are. The Press is stifled, elections are a farce, and the National Peasant Party, the largest of all, is ignored. The Minorities are denied their rights. Transylvania is seething with the racial discontent which is the raw material of Nazi successes. Both the King and his people desire to maintain their neutrality and independence. But Roumanian oil is a glittering prize, and we are left wondering whether it will be possible to resist German economic domination.

The third chapter, on the Southern Slavs, unravels a tangled skein, and helps us to envisage not only the circumstances and aspirations but also the characteristics of the various racial elements. The Croats are described as incorrigible *frondeurs*, and the emotional instability of Raditch, their murdered leader, is kept in view. The Slovenes, on the other hand, of whom less is known and heard, are praised as unheroic and sensible. One of the few patches of blue sky in dark heavens is the reconciliation of the Croats with Belgrade, mainly owing to the Russo-German *rapprochement*.

The fourth chapter, written of course before the outbreak

of the war, depicts the Poles as romantic and picturesque, whereas the Czechs are clumsy, matter-of-fact and reliable. The so-called Government of Colonels, which ruled Poland after the death of Pilsudski, is rightly classified as a quasi-dictatorship, and Miss Wiskemann believes that it had the merest fraction of opinion behind it. The Peasants' Party probably represented the majority, but Witos, its leader, was an exile and its members were excluded from all share in power. It is difficult to be sure how far the recent military collapse was connected with the unwisdom of the Pilsudski clique. What is not in doubt is the moral weakness of a minority government which dares not risk a free vote of the country. That is the lesson of Austria under Schuschnigg and of Poland under the Colonels. Nowhere was the failure of Polish statesmanship more regrettable than in the Ukraine districts of Galicia. The pages on the Ukrainians (the word merely means frontiersmen) are a particularly helpful introduction to the study of an interesting people divided up between Russia, Poland, Roumania, and Hungary.

The second part of the book is notable for a full analysis of the situation in Switzerland, which was shaken to its foundations by the shattering events of 1938. Nowhere else have the Nazis worked so openly to undermine the feeling of national security as in the little country whose eastern frontier suddenly became endangered when Austria was swallowed by the Reich. And nowhere is the ideological gulf deeper than between the Nazi German and the Swiss. Miss Wiskemann pays eloquent tribute to a gallant and highly civilised nation. "Three *Weltsprachen* (German, French and Italian) open three doors for the Swiss into the very citadel of civilisation, while their political training has taught them the advantages of smallness with diversity as opposed to bigness with regimentation." The whole idea of the human quality of the individual, without which society can have no value, is implicit in the attitude of the Swiss. They "have organised a society which is the exact antithesis of the barbaric tribalism of Nazi Germany; for it rests upon agreement, and through its various peoples links the individual with humanity as a whole, instead of breaking up humanity into primitive biological groups which can know no law but force."

The concluding chapter reinforces the lesson of the

Haldane's interest in German culture was aroused in early youth and persisted throughout life. When less than 18 years of age he left the University of Edinburgh in April 1874 for Göttingen, where he studied Philosophy. Professor Lotze, the idealistic metaphysician, became his admired guide who made him read Fichte, Berkeley and Hegel. He then struck up a friendship with a former headmistress, who taught him German and had an extensive knowledge of German literature. He remained in touch with her for many years and she kept him well-informed about new movements in German thought and letters. He was an M.P. when he visited Germany again in 1898 and from then until 1912 each year during the Easter recess he went on excursions with his friend, Professor Hume Brown, in order to collect material for the latter's *Life of Goethe*. Weimar and Ilmenau were the centres of their pilgrimages, which closely followed the traces of Goethe in Thüringen. Besides these private excursions which Haldane partly made incognito, his official missions, as a member of the Cabinet, to Berlin in 1906 and 1912 also kept him in contact with Germany.

Haldane's great intelligence was not that of the dynamic type of mind which often changes its ideas and is quickly open to new suggestions. His was rather the static mind which clings to certain ideas from the beginning, elaborating them again and again. Thus one of his many friends justly spoke of his "German obsession." There existed to some extent a natural affinity between the German mentality and his own. He himself regarded as the main difference between the German and the English outlook the fact that the Germans think in concepts, the English in images. Yet he was very un-English in this respect, for his own approach was entirely one of abstract concepts, not of concrete images. That was the reason why in politics Lloyd George was and still is a success on the platform and Haldane was not. Haldane was neither metaphorical nor passionate, his only passion being for philosophy. Dr. G. P. Gooch has truly remarked of his attitude towards Germany: "Germany was to the idealist philosopher what Greece is to the sculptor and Italy to the artist."* This explains why as a philosopher he showed himself far more interested in the German idealism of a

* G. P. Gooch, "Lord Haldane" in *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, 1928, vol. 134, p. 432.

hundred years ago than in the more realistic German thinkers of his own time. As a metaphysician he hitched his wagon to the cold majestic star of Hegel, and unfortunately did not heed Kant's warning that metaphysics is a labyrinth wherein the human mind must inevitably lose itself.

The judgment on Haldane's philosophy is above all the business of the professional expert. The historian of cultural relations has to confine his task to enquiring into the specific approach of the foreigner Haldane to the German system of Hegel. A glance at his Gifford Lectures, *The Pathway to Reality* (1902-4) proves how much he preferred Hegel the metaphysician to Hegel the dialectician and philosopher of history. For there is a gap between the approach of the organiser and politician Haldane, who dealt with special problems and facts of natural life and that of the metaphysician who indulged in well-formulated speculations on the character of the ultimate reality.* The *principia media* between the pure ultimate ideas of metaphysics and the realistic facts of everyday life did not attract or worry him very much. He devoted much thought to the problems of the absolute mind and the finite mind; yet one seeks in vain in his work for reflections on history, on its causal process and structure, on change and social readjustment such as for instance can now be found in Professor Toynbee's monumental volumes. Thus H. G. Wells had reason to complain that Haldane's philosophic works move far away from any vulgar reality in a special universe of discourse. He disrespectfully compares *The Pathway to Reality* with a very large soap bubble that for some inexplicable reason fails to be iridescent. "A legal training," says Wells, "directs the mind to equity and settlement rather than progress. And the absolute is very constipating in the mind. I imagine that he just thought that 'history goes on—much as ever' and left it at that."†

It must be admitted that Haldane shared his antipathy or indifference towards history with his second great German guide, with Goethe. On his pilgrimage to places like Weimar and Ilmenau, Jena and Wetzlar, he acquired that rare intimacy with Goethe's life and works, to which he could justly

* Haldane's speculations have never been more simply or better expressed than in the last chapter of his last book, his *Autobiography* (1929).

† Cf. H. G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography*, II, pp. 766-8.

whole book. In the struggle which has been going on during the last two decades between the democracies and the dictators, human dignity itself is at stake. As Burke said of the Jacobins, we are confronted with an armed doctrine. "The men of the West found it so difficult to believe that National Socialism despised peace, and that war, open or undeclared, was a condition of its life. The West longed to protect and preserve the civilisation which had descended to it directly from Greece and Rome through so many generations, and to which Christianity had contributed so much. But to the rulers of Germany to-day that civilisation is alien and worthless; it costs them nothing to destroy it." When they go they will leave ruins behind them.

G. P. G.

DEMOCRACY TODAY AND TOMORROW.*

As a statesman who has been in the front line of European politics for more than twenty years, Dr. Beneš can claim that a book from his pen should be read by every student of politics with the greatest attention. The book under review, which contains lectures delivered in America, deals with the problem of democracy and there is perhaps no one in the world who could be considered more fit to state its case before the tribunal of history than the former President of Czechoslovakia. The struggle which this small State was forced to carry on against German Fascism has already become a symbol for the greater struggle which started only a few weeks ago.

It is therefore with considerable interest that the student opens this slender volume. He cannot help being impressed by the obvious sincerity and deep love of justice by which the man and politician is imbued. For Dr. Beneš' belief in democracy has the characteristics of religious belief. Nothing perhaps is more significant than the author's dictum that "Democracy in its essence and nature is spiritual." But it is this spiritual and even mystical element in Dr. Beneš' thought which is most responsible for the weaknesses of this book. As a passionate plea for the ideal of democracy it cannot but move the reader, particularly since this plea is uttered by the man who was President at the time of the

* By Eduard Beneš. Macmillan & Co. 8s. 6d.

Munich settlement; but as a contribution to political science it is open to severe criticism.

It is perhaps inevitable that a statesman who writes on politics tends to write an apologia, and much of this book is in fact an apologia for the blunders and errors of judgment committed by democratic leaders during the last twenty years. Dr. Beneš is far from denying that there have been such blunders and some of them he admits quite candidly. On the whole, however, he exonerates the democratic leaders, though I am afraid history will not agree with him. He thinks, for instance, that the League of Nations tackled the problem of minorities fairly competently, "although it was not always quite just to them." It is more probable that future historians will pass the verdict that the whole problem of minorities was hopelessly bungled after the Great War.

The account of the rise of Fascism in Europe suffers from generalisations and above all from the complete absence of a scientific analysis of the social forces which worked behind the movement. In this respect it is significant that such a vitally important phenomenon as that of the German inflation is not even mentioned, and that no attempt is made to analyse the peculiar position of the middle classes in Europe. I agree with Dr. Beneš when he rejects an interpretation of history which is one-sidedly materialistic and which overlooks the importance of emotional and irrational factors; but on the other hand no satisfactory analysis of society, that is no political science is possible if the economic factors are neglected. Dr. Beneš, it is true, is aware of the importance of the economic problems for the future of democracy, but in the thirty or forty lines which he devotes to them he contents himself with vague generalisations. It is not enough to say that democrats "must continue to examine and study these questions in order to arrive at an evolutionary conception of the solution of these social problems in the future." If we want to keep youth in the camp of democracy we must tell them how we are going to tackle problems that affect every member of society. Merely to demand synthesis, as Dr. Beneš so emphatically does, will not lead us very far. The last chapter, which deals with the future of democracy, is open to criticism in still another respect. On page 83 he states that democracy must not use the methods of the authoritarian State, and on page 199 he maintains that democracy and

refer in his stimulating address as president of the re-established English Goethe Society in 1923. It was entitled "Goethe the Thinker" and is indeed in its grasp of essentials and lucidity a little masterpiece.* The divergence of Goethe's outlook from that of the physicist, his opposition to Newton's physics, his theory of colour are all dealt with in a very comprehensive manner. The same can be said of his chapter on the Second Part of Faust, which he contributed to Hume Brown's book on Goethe. Like Faust he was a man of action as well as a thinker. His persistent efforts for a reorganisation of higher education in this country were largely inspired by the German model. He always had taken a great interest in the work of educational reformers in Germany like Wilhelm von Humboldt. He wanted an extension and democratisation of the English University system. He recognised the background of privileges of the ruling class behind Oxford and Cambridge, and demanded that a better chance should be given to the boy from more obscure social strata. For this reason the Liberal Imperialist became a champion of the movement which aimed at the establishment of a new type of university in big industrial cities like Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, etc., "the Civic University," as Haldane called it in the title of an interesting address at his installation as Chancellor of the University of Bristol. He compared the German system which preferred *Bildung* for everybody with education in England, hitherto limited to one class only.

Haldane was by no means blind to the dangers of uniformity and lack of individualism in the German Secondary Schools, and he mentioned proudly that a leading German educationist like Professor Gurlitt had held up the team spirit of the English public school as a model for the reform of the German school system. On the other hand the German university system seemed to Haldane exemplary in a double way: firstly through the greater liberty granted to the undergraduate, who can move from one university to another, and thus choose the professors under whom he wants to work. Undoubtedly he recalled his own happy experience of direct contact with Lotze in Göttingen. Even more important from the point of view of university reform in England was the second advantage of German university life: the combination of pure science and its application for practical purposes;

* Printed in THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, vol. 124, 1923, pp. 137-48.

he stressed this point particularly, as he tried to win above all the support of business circles for his ambitious university projects. There existed a fierce commercial rivalry between Germany and England in the two decades before the war, and he made therefore a point of examining the causes of the superiority of the German rival. In his remarkable address "Great Britain and Germany," delivered to business men at Liverpool in 1901, he took up the struggle which no less a person than Matthew Arnold had started more than thirty years before for the enlightenment of the middle classes; but his arguments are more realistic. It is a sociological law that in order to survive, competitor A has to imitate the more successful methods of competitor B. "Our rivals in commerce fight with science, we only with courage, energy, enterprise." *

The Germans, Haldane points out, not only think methodically but apply their scientific knowledge more efficiently to practical problems. For instance, by 1901 the German brewing industry was exporting nearly as much as Britain. Whereas some thirty years previously the knowledge of brewing was at a low ebb in Germany, the Germans had in the meantime adopted a scientific attitude towards this industry. They had established research departments which explored and solved all technical problems with which the brewer has to grapple. Moreover they created special brewing schools all over Germany and Austria, which the student could only enter after two years of practical experience in breweries. Above all, the State itself took a hand in assisting the application of science. Haldane was very much impressed by his visits to the well-equipped German technical high schools whose low fees made them accessible to students from all classes.

What were Haldane's views on the German character as a whole? They differed to some extent before and after the war of 1914. Between 1900 and 1912 he tried hard to further the understanding between the two nations. In his Oxford address, "Great Britain and Germany," which he called "A Study in National Character," † he complains of the fact that members of the two nations were too keenly conscious of each other's infirmities and shortcomings. He wants both

* R. B. Haldane, *Education and Empire* (1902), p. 6.

† In *Universities and National Life*, 2nd ed., 1911.

dictatorship cannot coexist. Yet much of the last chapter is devoted to an attempt to show that democracy can only survive if it adopts certain features of the totalitarian régimes. This reveals a certain confusion of thought which only a deeper and broader analysis of the political problems of our period could have avoided.

R. ARIS.

NEW REVELATIONS OF GERMAN COLONIAL AMBITIONS.*

One turns gladly from the monotony of arguments on German colonial policy to a study which does the rare thing of throwing new light on some aspects of this subject. Dr. Pick had the good fortune to draw on material hitherto completely unknown. The diaries and papers of Dr. Regendanz, a German merchant with legal training and experience in the German Colonial Office, now a British subject, who was *persona grata* with some officials of the German Foreign Office, have provided the facts for the arresting narrative. Dr. Regendanz himself, whose presence is never unduly imposed on the reader, emerges as a great schemer in the best sense of the word, a strategist who prefers to think in continents instead of contingents, and might have liked to achieve for Germany in Africa what Rhodes did achieve for his country.

The book deals with two separate episodes. The first shows German attempts to get a foothold in Morocco and reveals new facts about the Agadir crisis of 1911. The second recounts endeavours to found a German colony in Angola and, mainly, in Nyassaland, Portugal's East African dependency. In describing the events surrounding the Agadir crisis, the author inclines perhaps a little too much to the reluctance of all good young historians in refraining from giving the background of the story more fully. He dismisses this more or less by simply referring to "the famous diplomatic happenings of 1911." Yet the average reader might wonder whether in our harassed times, in which, to give only one instance, many people at the end of 1939 seem already to have forgotten that, apart from the German and Russian

* *Searchlight on German Africa*. The Diaries and Papers of Dr. W. Ch. Regendanz. A Study in Colonial Ambitions. By F. W. Pick. Allen & Unwin. 1939. 5s.

invasions, we witnessed an Italian annexation of Albania at Easter of the same year, some refreshing of memories is not desirable. This drawback might have been overcome by a short bibliographical note.

As Dr. G. P. Gooch stresses in a Foreword, the evidence produced by the author compels us to revise our estimate of the forces behind the German move to gain a footing in Morocco in 1911, as well as of the motives of the retreat. This cannot be explained solely by the fact that Germany was given some compensation in the Cameroons. Firstly, we learn that it was not the firm of Mannesmann Brothers, as many authors assert, which was the driving force of German official interest in Morocco. It was a group of Hamburg firms represented by Dr. Regendanz which, thinking highly of the economic possibilities of Morocco, succeeded in interesting the Berlin Foreign Office in the matter. Secondly, we see that Dr. Regendanz' personal investigation in Morocco, which showed that its mineral resources were greatly over-estimated and the possibilities for European agriculture extremely doubtful, was the reason for Germany abandoning her schemes. The explanation given later on, chiefly by the Foreign Secretary Kiderlen, that Germany never had any intention of taking part of Morocco, and aimed at only obtaining some compensation for leaving it to the French, is not borne out by the facts.

The description of this last attempt of Germany to back colonial claims by force is followed by the analysis of German efforts in Portuguese Africa unbacked by force. The author's contention that practically nothing of what he has to tell us has been known until now seems to be well sustained; and, incidentally, that is perhaps why the presentation of this part of the book is superior to the preceding chapter, since the author need not desperately avoid repetition of what others have said before him.

The story of the attempt to gain a considerable part of Mozambique as a German colony leads us right up to the end of the Weimar Republic. This area, called Nyassaland, lies in the northern part of Mozambique and nearly equals Great Britain in size. The Mozambique Company possessed a Royal Charter for this region, and this, coupled with former Portuguese lack of interest, made it possible for Dr. Regendanz' Hamburg group to try to acquire it. This account of Dr. Regendanz' untiring work over many years, so nearly

the Germans and the English people "to look for and to believe in the best in each other." There is an astonishing lack of knowledge of the other nation's mentality on both sides. Business people, lawyers and politicians are ignorant of the essence of the other country. Thus Germans have misjudged the meaning of British policy, and English politicians have thought it wise to indulge in vague and sentimental appeals to German statesmen—a procedure which the historian of our own time cannot help adding was no less frequent before the war of 1939 than before that of 1914.

Haldane pointed out two main barriers to the approach of the Englishman towards the German character: the structure of the German mind and the German language. The German systematic mind displayed itself at first only in philosophy and philosophical poetry; but now it has entered the realm of social life too, and celebrates its triumphs in the fields of the organisation of the army and of education. The Prussian mentality starts by defining a principle and then deduces everything from it, whereas the English mind is characterised by subtle intuition.

The German language too is a handicap to an understanding of the German character. Haldane, strangely enough, finds it precise, but, unlike the French or English language, not suited to the expression of *nuances*. Moreover the Gothic type of the letters is irritating to the British eye. It is interesting that the sage of Cloan quotes here with approval the dictum of a great fellow Scotsman. Thomas Carlyle, whose passionate mentality and original character differed from the stoic Cabinet Minister, characterised the German vernacular as "a language terrible in the mouth of the stupid and pedantic people but superb in the hands of the gifted." Yet Haldane is fair enough to see the other side of the medal. He truly admits that it is not always easy for the foreigner to understand England and the English. As he modestly puts it, the English too have some admirable qualities which are obscured by their other characteristics. Their successful methods of colonial development and of vigorous local government deserve to be studied by the Germans who have hitherto confined themselves to the study of English history and literature. "For one Briton who can read and speak German, there are five Germans who can read and speak English."

Yet this knowledge of the language does not amount to a true insight into the English character. It is, according to Haldane, unjustifiable to accuse this country of "concealing deep-laid plans and selfish schemes under the guise of obscurity in word and deed." On the other hand the English are too conservative, take things as they are too much for granted, and "provoke the world by their apparent unconsciousness of the transitory nature of national institutions."

After the war the problem of the English and German character is again discussed. The English are described as being very insular and not internationally minded, but also as very kind at heart. It is astonishing how clearly Haldane recognises the vague contours of the English character which is averse to sharp contrasts and antitheses. In *Before the War* (1920) he states: "To predict what we will do in a given case is not easy for a foreigner. It is not easy even for ourselves." Stress is now laid on one feature of the German character never mentioned before the war by Haldane, namely their strong inclination to obey and to carry out whatever they are told by their rulers. Only now he recalls the observations he made on his many unofficial tours incognito, when he mixed with the peasant and the people smoking and drinking beer. What struck him most was the little part they had in directing their government and their little knowledge of its doings. "There was general disposition to accept, as a definition of duty which must not be questioned, whatever they were told to do by the *Vorstand*." * Even Goethe's work is not free from the German reverence for the authority of institutions which is explained by Haldane as being a result of the attitude of the abstract mind. This attitude had long been overcome in England and in France, but in Germany it persisted and afforded "a fertile soil on which to raise an exaggerated disposition towards submission and authority." Yet in 1920 mankind was rather optimistic and looked forward to the construction of a better world. Thus he expressed the hope that the recent breakdown of the Wilhelminian system would mean for Germany what the French Revolution had meant for France: the liberation from the chains of the abstract mind and through it the emancipation from the worship of power and of "corporalism."

* R. B. Haldane, *Before the War*, p. 25.

crowned with success, should be read by all those whose treatises on "peaceful change" are so sadly lacking in factual examples of recent times.

GERARD M. FRITERS.

NATIONALISM.*

The significance of nationalism in the modern world is the subject of a valuable investigation by a study group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and their Report upon this most controversial problem deserves to be widely considered. The group consisted of Professor E. H. Carr, Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, Professor Morris Ginsberg, Professor N. F. Hall, Messrs. T. H. Marshall, L. G. Robinson, D. A. Routh and C. G. Vickers, and a draft of their study was submitted for criticism and comment by a large number of distinguished experts. The members of the group, however, retain full responsibility for their conclusions. The study points to the "infinite gradations of national feeling" and concludes that "the danger of nationalism lies, not in its existence as an emotional force, but in the chauvinistic exaggerations to which it is liable." Such variations are due not to the inherent personal characteristics of particular peoples but rather to the historical course of their integration as national states and, above all, to the impact of their environment. The Report briefly reviews the growth of national movements and distinguishes between nations which only comparatively recently have achieved statehood and those, particularly Great Britain and France, which have maintained for centuries a continuous existence with little interruption and consequently have developed a fundamental unity. In times of stress the latter have less need than younger states to appeal to extreme forms of national feeling to maintain their cohesion; but none the less they may be acquisitive and militant as in the nineteenth century. Comparing nationalism then with that of to-day the Report concludes that the former owes its better repute to the fact that the world "was a less crowded place and that clashes could be 'adjusted peacefully' at the expense of weaker races."

In the post-war period the "most morbid and menacing

* *Nationalism*. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

form" of nationalism has been assumed by those states most dissatisfied with the results of the last war. Humiliation and dissatisfaction after war act as potent spurs to the revival and reinforcement of national spirit and determination. The demand for unity and strong government in a young state without the tradition of freedom or internal cohesion leads to an authoritarian system. Moreover, the dissatisfied states were among those least able, after the war, to withstand the increased strain of economic competition. In consequence they resorted first and most intensively to measures of economic nationalism. This Report stresses historically the "vital causal connexions" that "have existed between nationalism and the economic system." With regard to the present time, "it seems that not only the ends, but also the immediate origins, of the post-war excesses in economic nationalism are primarily political." But whatever its particular manifestations, excessive nationalism, the Report would conclude, is largely due initially at least to the peculiar internal and external circumstances of the nation in question.

Although this study is not concerned to discuss the future, it recognises the possibility that "pressure from common enemies or some other stimulus" may well lead to "larger 'multi-national' political and economic units." To succeed, such a system would have to generate a common feeling of unity which, it is concluded, would simply evolve into nationalism on a larger scale.

SAINT-JUST.*

Every actor at all prominent in the drama of the French Revolution has found his biographers and, what is the same thing, his admirers. We have been asked to see in Mirabeau, in the Girondists, in Marat, in Danton, in Robespierre, in Chaumette the representative of all that was best in the Revolution, and each biographer has told us that if his hero's advice had been followed the good of the Revolution would have been reaped and the evil avoided. Mr. Morton writes of Saint-Just with the practised pen of a *littérateur* who has explored many fields of his art, and he has given us a very bright and readable narrative. It is true that the biographical

* By J. B. Morton. Longmans, Green & Co. 15s.

This concept of the German abstract mind prevails also in Haldane's last book, the *Autobiography* (1929). He now finds the Germans a difficult people, because the abstract mind predominates with them, though he is confident enough to assure his readers that "this very quality makes them exact and reliable in their dealings, when an agreement has once been arrived at." Here his knowledge of Kant, who preached the necessity of keeping obligations as a moral duty, was greater than that of the German character. The breach of the agreement of Munich ten years after his death is a rather grotesque commentary on this hopeful statement. To be fair, he was certainly not the only man in this country who thought in 1920 that "for generations to come Germany would not dream of building again on a military foundation." Unfortunately he proved a bad prophet! Fifteen years afterwards German militarism had raised its head again and more formidably than ever. Perhaps he was too much of a humanist and an idealist philosopher to realise the full and permanent discrepancy between the ideal Germany and the actual Germany, between the golden land of German literature and philosophy and the iron camp of her ruthless militarism and efficient authoritarian organisation. A German statesman and a British diplomat, who both lived in post-war Germany, were more acute in their interpretation of the puzzling and complex German character. Walter Rathenau, whose patriotism is unquestionable, wrote soberly in 1919: "A people of poets and writers we have never been, any more than the Jews are a race of prophets, the French or the Dutch a race of painters, or the inhabitants of Königsberg citizens of the world of pure Reason." And Lord d'Abernon, British Ambassador in Berlin from 1920 to 1926 and a man fully familiar with the virtues as well as with the defects of the German character, hit the mark by applying a saying of Greek Sophists to the German mentality: "Let me always believe that he who commands thirty legions is the wisest man of the world."

E. K. BRAMSTEDT.

THE MOSLEMS AND THE WAR.

IN giving a ruling regarding the justice of the cause of any belligerents, Islamic Law cannot take into consideration any heritage of diplomatic entanglements of the contesting parties. It judges only on ethical grounds, endeavouring to discover positive phases of right or wrong; and that science of morals stands completely independent of all extenuating circumstances. A wrong is always a wrong—a sin always a sin. It is so because the Koranic Law is not believed by the Moslems to be a product of the human mind; for if it is true that the Chief and the Only Officer of man is Allah, there can be no law other than God's Will. Whence it arises that obedience to it is both a social duty and a point of inviolate religious belief with us, and a transgressor not only breaks the law of the land and outrages international dealings, but also sins against God. It is, therefore, in this aspect of political correctitude that a Doctor of Moslem law is called upon to give a decision upon any sets of international outrages which may be alleged to have caused a breach of peace; for spiritual law or merely religious observances are so closely interwoven with the Positive Law in Islam as to be inseparable.

In virtue of that conception, then, one will have to evaluate the issue by examining those four points of moral turpitude which are said to have compelled the Allies to enter into this war, and to see, if an Islamic State were faced with them, whether its reactions would have been the same as those of the Allies. In other words, does Islam's international morality permit persecution of a people in consequence of their religious or social belief; secondly, the breaking of solemn promises; thirdly, seizing a nation's property; and finally aggressively attacking another State? What Commandments have we in Moslem Canonist Laws regarding them? Also, when and if they have arisen during the progress of Islamic history, how have they been generally dealt with, in countries where Moslem Law guides a state?

A difficulty arises at the outset, before one can work out the essential theme; it is in relation to the standard of equal rights of negotiation; for although Islam acknowledges the right of other nations to have their own political ideology, yet it definitely refuses to admit a dictatorship. It is not easy, therefore, to see how a Caliph, being an elected and removable

approach is hardly the best way of appreciating the Revolution. The movement is so much greater than any of the actors in it that they are explained by it rather than it by them. After reading Mr. Morton's pages my mind turned back to Taine's treatment of the same period and whatever his inaccuracies and his dogmatism in psychology he seems to adopt the more illuminating method.

The book is dedicated to Mr. Belloc, of whose social, political and religious teaching Mr. Morton seems to be a disciple. We have references to distributism and denunciations of "the abominable depravity of Russian Marxism." There is a good deal about the servile state. The glorious achievements of the French army are contrasted with the barrenness of "our meaner day." The memory of what the revolutionary armies did, we are told, "still calls generous youth to follow the drum and still disturbs the money-lender in his den." This propaganda does not add to the historic value of the book and provokes sometimes unnecessary opposition. For there is much in the book of value to the student of history. There is, for instance, the story of Saint-Just's imprisonment by *lettre-de-cachet*, for a theft from his mother of which he was admittedly guilty. It all seems a friendly humane affair, something very different from the horror that is usually evoked by the phrase. Then the Festival of Reason and the worship of the Supreme Being are told with welcome detail, and we are really made to see the characteristic ceremonies. Most valuable of all is I think the part of the book which describes the action of Saint-Just as representative of the Convention with the armies on the frontier. It is a great tribute to the will-power and drive of Saint-Just and his friend Le Bas that they were able to enforce their views against the notions and lethargy of the generals. "We will march from every quarter in thunderbolt fashion without a pause, without giving the enemy time to breathe," he wrote, and his method triumphed and laid the foundation for further triumphs. But it is not a method suited to all times, and the historian of the war of 1870 believes that the memory of the way in which the victories of the Revolution were won was a real drawback when France was pitted against the Prussia of Bismarck.

The book is not so satisfactory when it deals with the internal struggles and the revolution which sent Saint-Just

to the guillotine. It is hard to maintain the tone of hero-worship. It is true that Mr. Morton does not defend Saint-Just's action against Danton: "he acted against his conscience and dishonoured himself" and not for the last time. But his treatment of Danton is so bad that admiration of him during the last months of his life is impossible. There is a good deal that reminds me of Nazi Germany and even of "the debased doctrines of Moscow." "What constitutes a Republic is the complete destruction of everything opposed to it." I can hardly think that that squares with the doctrines of distributism, but it would provoke a cheer in Berlin or Moscow. The account of Thermidor is brilliantly written and produces a real tragic impression.

A. J. GRANT.

THE GRAND WHIGGERY.*

It was a happy idea of Mrs. Villiers to give a consecutive account of the "brilliant . . . and distinguished [set] which formed itself round the personality of Georgiana Duchess of Devonshire, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Succeeding to a conventional and circumscribed generation, whose greatest ambition was to leave things as they found them, these young people stood for innovation and experiment." Most of the leading personalities in this set, such as Fox, Sheridan, the Hollands, Prinny and the Duchess herself, have long been familiar to us as individuals; but their conjoint influence on politics and still more on society has never before been so well brought out. How great that influence was is indicated in Lady Stafford's "sharp reprimand" to Georgiana's sister, Lady Bessborough, on her spreading unfavourable reports on the Russian Court sent her by Lord Granville: "We must remember that what was written to one lady at Devonshire House became almost instantly the property of the whole set with all its ramifications. As well give a piece of news to the town-crier as to one of their number." It was the Devonshire House set, inspired originally by the Duchess, who almost revolutionised the dull formality of court and polite society by altering the hours for dinner, introducing Byron's "voluptuous waltz," allowing their ladies, headed of course by Georgiana, to take an active part in the hurly-burly of elections; while, well into the

* By Marjorie Villiers. John Murray. 1939. 16s.

Leader of the democratic Islamic State, can deal with one not so elected and holding the power through no free assent of a people. The two heads of the Government must have a parity in mandate, for the Koran lays down: "Take counsel with them in the affair . . ." (chapter III, verse 58); and further that: "There can be no Leadership of the Faithful without counsel"; thus making the Leadership of an Islamic Empire completely subservient to the law; whilst the other, judging from what has been reported regarding the persecution of even Christian priests, seems to be above the law; placing the State above the Church, the State law becoming the will of the dictator.

Disregarding this anomaly for the present, let us examine the four points of contention, beginning with persecution. Islam abhors religious persecution and, indeed, gives it such a prominence as to permit a holy war in consequence of it; for what else is it when one reads expressly in the Koran: "And fight with them until there is no persecution . . ." (chapter II, 193)? The Prophet considered the life and property of a non-Moslem subject of the State inviolable: "Whosoever kills a Zimi, he shall not scent the odour of Paradise . . ." The victorious Caliph Omar's Charter of Freedom and Protection granted to the Christians at Jerusalem is a famous document of religious toleration and acknowledgment of complete liberty of non-Moslems within the Islamic State. Non-Moslems were enrolled as high officers during Omar's Caliphate: even on his death-bed his only thought was that justice and good government should always be given to the non-Moslems. With these luminous examples of cordial treatment in their own annals, how is it possible for a Moslem State to admit the right of persecution? Let alone persecution, even treating a people with contempt for their views is prohibited: "Let not a people despise another," says the Koran (chapters X-XI, 11), "haply the latter may turn out to be better than the former . . ."

The next point is the breaking of solemn pledges. In this regard Koranic injunctions are very explicit: "So fulfil their agreements to the end of their term," says the Book. "Surely Allah loves those who are (careful of their duty)" (chapter IX, 4). It has been styled as a "duty" of the faithful to keep their international engagements. And again: ". . . do not break the oaths . . ." (chapter XVI, 91) is further commanded in the

Koran. To this can be added the Tradition of the Prophet saying that: "On the Day of Judgment all those who break their covenants shall be placed under a banner, and cry will be raised that these are the men (who broke their promises) and their names called out." The Caliph Omar's last instructions may be usefully quoted here as well: ". . . To my successor I commend faithfully to observe agreements . . ." In the face of these and many more injunctions, the guilt of breaking one's promises in the eyes of Islamic Law is worthy of the highest condemnation, and there is a distinct parallelism with present-day matters, when it was considered a matter of open hostility by the Prophet to receive a message through Caliph Ali from the non-Moslems, saying: "Let your cousin (Mohamed) O Ali, know that we have thrown our engagements behind our backs. The only covenant now between him and us is the striking at the chest with lances." This unilateral breaking of solemn treaties was a challenge which the Moslems were compelled to accept.

Closely allied to this point, of course, is the subject of Aggression. Islam terms the perpetrators thereof as Tyrants, Transgressional Disturbers of Peace. Against the crimes of each and all such, Holy War (*Jihad*) is permitted: *Jihad* meaning here "striving in the way of Allah"; because it is held that forces of aggression are of evil and the faithful must fight against it in order to maintain peace during which alone the purpose of Creation—Worship of Godliness—can be effectively fulfilled. When the Fitna—"discord and disturbance"—is destroyed the war is to cease. Now, whereas aggression, according to the Moslem thought, may not only include the breaking of treaty obligations as moral transgression, it quite justifiably means also an attack upon another nation's territory; and, what is worse, forcibly to possess their property—whatever it be, land, resources or heritage of all kinds. With regard to this the Koran teaches us: "Do not lift thy eyes to those worldly benefits which we have bestowed upon other nations in order to try them in their action. That which thy Lord has bestowed on thee is best for thee, and most lasting" (chapter XX, 129). To which the Prophet's tradition might be added: "Whosoever takes another's land forcibly, he shall be thrust through seven layers of earth on the Day of Judgment."

Finally, if the people of Islam are to ask their Jurist-

nineteenth century, many of the political traditions, though far less of the social amenities of the *Grand Whiggery*, were still upheld by Creevey's formidable hostess, "Madagascar," at Holland House. But, indeed, by that time the set had little left of the spring and zest in life that had characterised it under Georgiana at Devonshire House. Already by 1806, when Fox, on whom all its political hopes were fixed, had at last obtained office, "the dawn of power," as Mrs. Villiers sadly notes, "revealed a sadly shabby and exhausted band. For twenty-two years they had strained their weight against Pitt, so that when this barrier fell, they could not recover their balance, but seemed to fall prostrate on his grave."

But in its prime, and even afterwards in Lady Holland's time, what a wonderful and distinctive set of people composed the Whiggery. Georgiana with her entrancing charm, her sister Lady Bessborough and her *cavaliere servante* Granville, Bristol, earl and bishop, that most eccentric of all the eccentric Herveys, one of whom indeed succeeded Georgiana as the second wife of her duke, Sheridan in all his glory at Drury Lane and at the Warren Hastings trial and in his sordid decrepitude, even Prinny whose love for Mrs. Fitzherbert seems at least to have been genuine, the Melbournes with the strange sad story of Byron and Lady Caroline, and later the despotic American, Lady Holland, with such men as Count d'Orsay and Sidney Smith to run about for her—what a richly flavoured medley is here presented to us!

The book is so entertaining that a few defects might be amended in any new edition. Could Canning ever really have been "impregnated with dullness"? Could George III really be said to have approached Chatham "with magnanimity" in 1778—he refused even to talk to him unless he came into the ministry under North? Again, it was the English, not the French, who refused "to evacuate Malta" in 1803: nor is it true that George II could not talk English. In the bibliography it is strange not to see Lord David Cecil's book on Byron and Caroline Lamb quoted, and it would be an improvement to have the dates of publication added to the authorities quoted. Lastly, it would be an immense assistance to the reader if a genealogical table were supplied: those not so entirely familiar with the "set" as Mrs. Villiers are occasionally at a loss to remember who "Hart," "Bess," etc., are, and what were the set's complicated relationships.

BASIL WILLIAMS.

RUTHERFORD.*

The scientific career of Lord Rutherford is one of the most wonderful in the annals of modern discovery, and Professor Eve does full justice to his theme. Lord Baldwin writes a Foreword which does not say a whit too much for the man as well as for the discoverer. The simplicity of Lord Rutherford's manner and his agreeableness stand out in this attractive biography. The tale of the splitting of the atom is told in untechnical language, and runs so easily that any layman can read it. Nor is it possible to ignore his share in the detection of submarines in the last war. Great as he was as a scientist, he was as great a patriot. His patriotism took the widest basis, for he was a good European. To the depths of his soul he was stirred by the treatment of scholars in Germany, and he stood at the head of the movement seeking to succour scientists in their grave distress. Professor Alexander delivered his judgment. "It is curious," he said, "that two of the greatest men of our day were both boys. Einstein was a merry boy, until sobered by recent tragedies, and Rutherford was a merry boy." We doubt if the biographer has penetrated the inwardness of this judgment.

R. H. M.

ENGLISH SCHOLARS.†

Professor Douglas has written a remarkable book on mediæval historians who flourished within three decades after the Restoration. Dugdale and Madox, Philipps and Wanley, Brady and Hearne, Hickes and Wharton, are names known to the mediævalist, who has often used their writings. The men as well as their writings are clothed with flesh and blood in the vivid English of the author. Opposed in faith and in policy, they were united by the deep reverence they all felt for the document, and they all tried to ensure its preservation. They were men of historical learning, bound together by their common devotion to Clio. Nor does the author omit to show that there was as close a tie between the labours of Dugdale, Brady and Rymer as between those of Somner, Thwaites and Wanley. The serious advances they made between 1660 and

* By S. A. Eve. Cambridge Univ. Press. 21s.

† By D. C. Douglas. Jonathan Cape. 15s.

Consultant for a ruling about their attitude towards a nation, saying: "The leader of an adjoining nation is not elected, according to the strict rules of Islamic democracy, and who cannot be removed as Yazid III offered to be dethroned when he said: 'If I do not keep my word, you are free to depose me . . . Should you, however, know a man of tried judgment, who willingly offers you what I have offered, choose such an one, and if you so desire I shall be the first to do him homage and render him obedience'"; or as Caliph Omar, of his own free will, invited the nation not to obey him if they did not like what he commanded and to demand their right from him as the trustee of the State in virtue of universal suffrage of free men—free to form their own opinion on matters of general welfare; or again like Caliph Malik who admitted the right of a Mecca Jurist not to vote for the Caliph's nominee whilst the Leader of the Faithful still lived for fear of influencing the Electors' judgment. If such a man is to be at the head of a State, who does not keep his international promises, has amalgamated into his territory the national heritage of other free-born people, and has actually launched an aggression upon those who were in treaty agreement with him; what will be the ruling of the Islamic Law? The only reply a Moslem Jurist can give is that fighting is enjoined upon the Faithful if the State so subjected happens to be an Islamic one. About such objects the Prophet had also fought, for he had Koranic injunctions which may be repeated here: "Permission to fight is given to those upon whom war is made, because they were oppressed . . ." (XXII, 39). Also: "What! will you not fight a people who broke their oaths . . . and they attacked you first . . ." (IX, 13).

To be engaged in a war of self-defence against such injustices of so extreme a kind is necessary in the cause of godliness against things of evil: whosoever falls in defence of that cause is regarded a martyr according to the Moslem conception, for the Cause is just. This ruling is obtainable because Islamic conception of law is based upon the right of man to perfect freedom of conscience and unqualified individual liberty to the extent that he, as a free man, has no right of self-disposal.

IKBAL ALI SHAH.

THE BUTLER OF SCOTLAND.

THE literature of the eighteenth-century controversy between Christianity and Deism now makes, for the most part, dull reading. Only Butler's *Analogy* and Hume's *Dialogues* have survived as philosophical classics. There is at least one other product of this controversy, however, which still deserves more attention than it receives—the "approved" answer of Christianity from the other side of the border, that of Thomas Halyburton, Professor of Divinity from 1710 to 1712 in the New College, St. Andrews. Halyburton's *Natural Religion Insufficient and Revealed Necessary* aims at proving that the proper religion for an intelligent man is an intelligently stated Christianity, that is to say a quite definite "positive religion" different from other positive religions and opposed to them all. It is, he believes, simply not true that "gentlemen, men of wit and reason," have to have a "fine, modish, reasonable religion" of their own, abstracted from all positive religions and distinguished from them as their "natural," "rational" core and basis. "Gentlemen" also must be brought to the point where each must be "a Christian or an atheist; or which is the same upon the matter, a man of no religion." This "special religion for the intelligentsia" is certainly by no means a dead issue to-day.

The first "hurdle" that Halyburton has to take—and it would still be the first today—is the apparent absurdity of thus singling out Christianity from the variety of positive religions offering themselves for our consideration.

The Deists . . . would bear us in hand, that a choice is impossible to be made of any particular religion, till we have gone through, with such a particular examination of every pretender, and all things that can be said for or against it, as no man is able to make. . . . And so in effect, it is pretended impossible to be satisfied about the truth of any particular religion.

But

If this reasoning did hold, I should not doubt to make it appear that no truth whatever is to be received. . . . If we can be satisfied upon rational grounds about no truth, till we have heard and considered all, that not only has been said, but may be alleged against it; what truth can we believe?

1739 make the lack of successors all the more puzzling. The torch of learning dropped from their hands till the mediævalists of the early nineteenth century picked it up. This volume tells us so much we wanted to know that we heartily hope its success will encourage Professor Douglas to continue it by telling the fine tale of the succession of early nineteenth-century mediævalists.

R. H. M.

ROGER FRY'S LAST LECTURES.*

The present volume contains a series of lectures delivered by the late Roger Fry in Cambridge and London Universities in 1933-4. The paper on "Art history as an Academic Study" is perhaps the wittiest inaugural address to which an academic audience has ever listened. Some of its suggestions should be carefully studied by authorities in charge of adult education. In two chapters headed "Sensibility" and "Vitality" Fry sums up his artistic creed, which, moreover, is expounded and critically examined in the brilliant Introduction by Sir Kenneth Clark. The main body of the lectures is concerned with the arts of the Ancient World, China, India, and the primitives of Africa and America. Three hundred and forty-six illustrations, well chosen and splendidly reproduced, do great credit to the publisher and printer.

These lectures convey a deep impression of the author's intellectual sincerity and strong power of sympathy. He stands out unrivalled as an interpreter and theorist of art—to avoid the ambiguous term "critic"; and it will be difficult ever to surpass his delicacy of feeling and ability to give it adequate expression. This fits in well with the fact that not only Sir Kenneth Clark but also every reviewer of the book dwells at some length on the personality of Roger Fry. He must, in fact, have exerted a great influence upon anybody who came under his spell; and everybody who met him seems at once to have been fascinated by his power of persuasion. Students of art history who have not had the privilege of meeting Fry in the flesh will, I am afraid, be somewhat reluctant to share quite so wholeheartedly in the general praise of his work. For whatever qualities may be

* Cambridge Univ. Press. 1939. 21s.

attributed to him, one thing is certain: an historian he was not. The very qualifications which made him a great judge in all matters of æsthetics prevented him from conceiving art as an integral part of the process of human civilisation. He approached his subject from the systematic angle of the philosopher and psychologist. His dependence upon the "vitalist" tenets of Henri Bergson is quite obvious, although the latter's name does not occur in these lectures.

A casual remark on expressionism strikingly reveals the misconception of historical data, almost inevitably bound up with psychological methods, and incidentally confirms the qualms which filled even an admirer like Sir Kenneth Clark as regards the treatment he would have meted out to mediæval art history. "Expressionism," Fry says, "is almost as marked a peculiarity of German art as Beauty is of Greek." Now, early mediæval illuminators in Germany were the direct artistic descendants of the extreme expressionists of Irish and Anglo-Saxon book illustration. German masons of the twelfth century only kept expressionistic forms for some decades after their French colleagues had abandoned them. Generally speaking, there is only one outstanding expressionistic painter to be found in Germany, namely Matthias Grünewald, and no sculptor. Surely the exceptional position of the wholly expressionistic English draughtsman, William Blake, does not justify calling English art as a whole "expressionistic." And what about expressionism in its narrower sense, i.e. the artistic and literary movement of the early twentieth century? Fry, the *connoisseur* of French art, was certainly aware of the fact that expressionism as art originated with the French painters Cézanne and Gauguin, who were soon joined by the Belgian, Van Gogh, and the Norwegian, Edvard Munch. Expressionism as well as impressionism are two forms of artistic language common to every country and very often found with artists of the same generation, as shown by a comparison of Grünewald with Dürer. It is rather pathetic to read that Fry was completely out of sympathy with German æsthetic philosophy and even refused to read books on the theory of empathy. As a matter of fact, any German University would have welcomed him among its Professors as the truest representative of everything considered most typically German in German *Kunstforschung*.

S. H. STEINBERG.

I doubt very much whether either the argument or the answer need be put in any different terms to-day. If religion concerns the intelligence at all—if it is not a mere matter of feeling—it must be possible to distinguish true religion from false, and in standing on the truth, to defy all falsehoods whatsoever, no matter how varied they are nor how many people have held them, just as one does in any realm whatever in which knowledge of the truth is possible.

Halyburton goes on to point out that such a “relativist” argument can only serve one purpose.

The intendment of such reasonings is obvious; some men would cast us loose as to all religion, that we may be brought under a necessity to take up with any fancy they shall be pleased to offer us; a man that is sinking will take hold of the most slender twig. The papists have vigorously pursued this course in opposition to the protestants, to drive them into the arms of their infallible guide.

In the nineteenth century F. D. Maurice warned Protestants against using the same tactics; and said that Dean Mansel’s argument that “constitutive” truth, real knowledge, was not to be had in religious matters, but only “regulative” truth, was playing into the hands of Roman Catholicism.*

If other positive religions besides Christianity are examined, most of them can in fact be dismissed with relative ease. “The wisest of the heathens scarce ever pretended to satisfy themselves, much less others.” “Their religions were, generally speaking, calculated for other purposes, and look’d not so far as eternity.” Most positive religions claim no more than a local significance—they are expressions of the contacts made with the “numinous” in their own community. They do not even pretend to express a universal truth which all men are bound to believe. There are exceptions to this, Halyburton adds, in Mohammedanism and Judaism. He here hints at the fact emphasised by modern students of comparative religion, that all positive religions are either “naturalistic” or “religions of revelation,” and that the latter, for all practical purposes, only comprise Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism, which have definite historical connections with one another. Halyburton considers Mohammedanism condemned by the absurdities of the Koran, while none of his

* F. D. Maurice, *Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament*, p. xi.

opponents are liable to be attracted by Judaism; so that there is now a “straight run” between the one “religion of revelation” worth considering, and the Deist “religion of reason,” considered as a real attempt to give us absolute and universal truth, and stripped of the sophistical relativism with which it tries to trip its opponents.

His method of argument, as indicated by the title of his work, is what would now be called an “eristic” rather than an “apologetic” one. “We have stood sufficiently long upon the defensive part; we have repulsed their efforts against revelation. It now seems seasonable that we should act offensively, and try how they can defend their own religion, and whether they can give a good account of it, as has been done of christianity.” This course is demanded partly by the nature of his adversaries, who for the most part take little notice of the positive defences that Christianity has put up for itself, but continue to brush it aside, because “they design not so much to conquer, as to disturb.” “The best way to make such rovers keep at home is to carry the war into their own country and to ruin those retreats they betake themselves to when attacked.” But the same course is also indicated by the nature of the subject. Other defenders of the Christian revelation have tended to argue as if it merely “completed” the religious edifice which men could build by “the light of nature”; but in point of fact Christianity involves a definite attack on “natural religion.” The “light of nature” is not only insufficient, it is deceptive.

This “offensive” method does not mean, however, that the rules of argument by which we find our way to truth are to be relaxed. Halyburton does not think that “any stick is good enough to beat Deists with,” though he is certainly setting out to beat them. But the original purpose of the whole work was “the satisfaction of the writer’s own mind about the question he had proposed. I entered not upon this inquiry with an eye to oppose any man, or triumph over adversaries, and so did industriously wave those catches, subtilties, and other niceties used frequently by writers of controversy. My only design was to find the truth.” The first “Deist” that he had had to track to his lair by this “eristic” method was not Blount or Aikenhead or Lord Herbert, but Thomas Halyburton.

The fundamental proposition to be thus attacked is that

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In his *Legal Essays and Addresses** Lord Wright has assembled together fourteen papers prepared during recent years for various occasions, both in this country and the United States. While most of the articles deal with specific legal questions and are of a technical nature there are some of a more general character, including a tribute to the late Sir Frederick Pollock and a brilliant survey of "The Common Law in its Old Home," which the layman will readily appreciate. Though dealing with different topics, all the papers are animated by Lord Wright's conception of the common law as a living process to be adapted to the changing conditions and needs of the time. He is impatient of legal fictions and rules which owe their enforcement to the bare logic of historic origin. As Lord Wright points out, much already has been accomplished, including for example, the famous "snail in the ginger beer bottle" decision. Much, however, remains to be done, and in this volume Lord Wright is concerned *inter alia* to attack the place of quasi-contract in the field of law and also the rule of consideration in the enforcement of agreements. Upon this latter question the Law Revision Committee, of which Lord Wright is now chairman, has already recommended the abolition of the rule in written promises, but there remains a great divergence of legal opinion. On the other hand the iniquity of the rule of common employment is generally acknowledged by all lawyers and laymen. Many rooted doctrines require for their reform legislation, but the judges can accomplish much, as Lord Wright's view of their function makes manifest. In place of a "literal interpretation and reconciliation, in a narrow and technical spirit, of decided cases," judges of the future "will think more of the spirit of the decisions and will strive to mould and control them so as to serve the exigencies of social welfare and justice." This volume impresses the reader with the author's extensive learning and his critical and expositional power.

Although Mr. Granville Roberts actually wrote his terse little book, *The Nazi Claim to Colonies*,† before the outbreak of war, the volume remains of some continuing value. Apart altogether from a very effective analysis of the German claims, he argues the need for greater co-operation, preferably federation, of the three East African territories, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. "Centralisation is becoming an urgent African necessity in matters of major policy." The author, writing as a local colonist, is impatient of the Colonial Office and also highly critical of the British public's apathy in imperial affairs. He is strongly opposed to any system of international control as being, *inter alia*, detrimental to native interests and the British policy of trusteeship. Mr. A. Duff Cooper writes a short preface.

* Cambridge University Press. 15s.

† John Murray. 2s. 6d. net.

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THE NEW NIHILISM, OUR MORALE
AND THE COMING SETTLEMENT.

THE Prime Minister has told us in a much-quoted passage that the purpose at which we aimed in entering the war was to "enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and liberties" as the indispensable condition of preserving our own.

Even before the war, in explanation of the guarantee to Poland, he had pointed out this interdependence between the preservation of the freedom of others, and the preservation of our own. In his statement to Parliament of April 3rd of last year he said :

What we are concerned to do is to preserve our independence, and when I say our independence I do not mean only that of this country. I mean the independence of all states which may be threatened by the pursuit of such a policy as I have described. Therefore we welcome the co-operation of any country, whatever may be its internal system of government, not in aggression, but in resistance to aggression.

A little later (June 29th) the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, was even more definite in enunciating this same principle. He said :

We know that if the security and independence of other nations are to disappear, our own security and our own independence will be gravely threatened. We know that if international law and order is to be preserved, we must be prepared to fight in its defence.

In another passage the Foreign Secretary is even more explicit :

We have tried to make it clear by word and deed that we are prepared to assist those countries which feel their independence immediately threatened and are ready to defend their freedom. . . . That is why we gave our undertaking to Poland. . . . In failing to uphold the liberties of others we run great risks of betraying the principle of liberty itself and with it our freedom and independence.

there are certain fundamental beliefs—the being of God, the moral government of the world, etc.—which all men may arrive at by the natural light of reason, and which constitute all the religion they need. Halyburton's task is to prove against this the "insufficiency" of "natural religion," judging it by standards which his opponents themselves can be reasonably expected to accept, or be persuaded to accept. This does not mean that he accepts their set of tenets as a "sufficient" religion, and merely attempts to prove that these tenets can only be established by the help of a revelation, though he does attempt this too. He definitely does not think Deism in itself a "sufficient" religion; but he believes that this can be shown to Deists even on their own criteria of what a sufficient religion must be. Nor does he assume that the Deists are right in thinking that they have arrived at even these criteria by their unassisted reason—he simply uses the criteria as an agreed measure of the sufficiency of "natural religion," and in point of fact believes that the Deists would never have thought of them—certainly not so clearly—apart from an influence from Christianity upon themselves of which they do not take account. His very first chapter is an historical account of the origin of Deism written with a view to indicating that it is not really the "fine flower" of universal intellectual progress which it purports to be, but a residuum left after a widespread degeneration of Christianity.*

In determining whether the natural light of unassisted reason may enable men to frame a religion that comes up to these standards, Halyburton admits only one test—experience. It is no use, he says, arguing, for instance, that if God is all that we believe Him to be, He must have left men with the power to arrive at such a religion. For

1. It seems a little presumptuous for us to prescribe or measure what was fit for God to do, by what appears to us fit to have been done. . . . 2. If in fact, what we think fit, or conjecture fit for God to have done, it be evident that God has not done, that he has given no such power or extent of it, as we judge necessary, our judgment is not only weakly founded, but plainly false; yea, and impious likewise; for if God has done otherwise, it is certain the way we

* Cf. J. Dickie, *The Organism of Christian Truth* (1931) (a theological textbook now used in Scottish divinity schools), p. 68: "'Natural Religion' . . . has never existed as a religion, except as a residuum from, or attenuation of, some actual, positive religion."

prescribed was not best, nor can we hold by our apprehension, whatever shews it is built on, without an implicit charge of folly upon God.

Nor does he think it much use trying to prove what man's rational powers can achieve by an inquiry into the intrinsic nature of those powers; for there is no agreement and little chance of agreement as to what these powers are. So we must fall back upon experience, and

Judge what man can do by what he has done. If not one has made sufficient discoveries of God, it is rash to say that anyone can by the mere light of nature make them. . . . It is strange to pretend that all are capable of that which none has done.

The main "insufficiencies" in the actual achievements of natural religion thus studied, concern its "discoveries of a deity," its directions as to "the solemn worship of God," and its "leaving us in the dark as to that wherein man's happiness lies," as to the "means leading to future happiness," as to a "rule of duty," as to "sufficient motives to duty," and as to "the origin of sin" and the "means of obtaining pardon." His handling of these different points may be illustrated by his discussion of the insufficiency of natural religion in its "discoveries of a deity." Just how much must we regard it as "sufficient" for a religion to tell us about God? Halyburton suggests that it must at least be enough to evoke in us the unique kind of reverence which is God's due—a reverence which must, for instance, be

extensively superior to that paid to any of the creatures. . . . Every action is a dependent of God's, and owes him homage. It is otherwise with men; for to one sort of men, we may owe respect in one sort of actions, and owe them none in another. A child, in filial duties, owes his father respect; as a subject he owes his governor reverence; and so of other instances of a like nature: But to no one creature is he in all respects subject, or obliged by every action to express any regard: And the reason is plain, he is subject to none of them in all respects, wherein he is capable of acting. But, with respect to God, the matter is quite otherwise: Whatever he has, is from God, and to him he is in all respects subject; on him he every way depends.

"Natural religion" is not "sufficient" if it does not save us from the kind of confusion which leads to every kind of respect being given to, let us say, a totalitarian dictator. Had

The very fact that the act of aggression which caused us to take up arms was not against ourselves, but against a state on the other side of Europe, was itself dramatic illustration of the truth that nations (like individuals) must co-operate if they are to achieve security against violence and oppression. Since the outbreak of war Government spokesmen have been insisting that if we will not defend others—that is to say the principle of freedom from violence, or the law against violence when others are the victims—then it becomes ultimately impossible to defend ourselves. That is, of course, the basic principle of organised society. Without it no society could exist: the society which will not defend its members from lawless violence is, from the point of view of its members, not worth defending and they will refuse the sacrifices necessary to maintain it. The truth as applied to international relationships has been tragically illustrated the last few years. A powerful aggressor, or aggressor combination, has confronted a number of lesser states. If the strength of the latter were combined it would be greater than that of the aggressor and make them impregnable. But if each of the lesser will only defend himself, individually, arguing that defence of others is no affair of his, refusing aid to the victim of aggression, then it is quite clear that all the lesser states can be destroyed in detail, picked off one by one. In the familiar phrase of the American, the less powerful “must hang together in order not to hang separately.” If, in such circumstances, defence is not collective, there can be no defence at all.

It is for this principle, embodying surely a general interest, that of self-preservation as against violence, destruction, death, that Britain now fights. It is a general, indeed a universal interest, in the sense that the law against murder embodies a universal interest. Some, it is true, may desire for various purposes to commit murder, but none, presumably, desires to be murdered. It is largely by virtue of this principle that law becomes more powerful than those who assail it. But the governments of the Allies have done more than merely indicate a general principle. They have forecast the methods by which the principle is to be made after victory a political reality, so that the tragedy of 1918—a costly victory so undone in the course of two decades that it has to be fought all over again—shall not be repeated. On October 12th last the Prime Minister said :

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We are not only aiming at victory but rather looking beyond it to the laying of the foundations of a better international system which will mean that war is not to be the inevitable lot of every succeeding generation. . . . The peace which we are determined to secure must be a real peace, not an uneasy truce interrupted by constant alarms and repeated threats.

And a few weeks later M. Daladier, as well as Mr. Chamberlain, indicated the process by which they hoped to see a new international order develop. The intimate co-operations of war time between France and Britain would be prolonged into the peace for peace purposes, developing into what would amount to an Anglo-French Federation, a Federation open to all who shared its peaceful aims becoming thus the nucleus of an ever-widening European organisation.

So far so good. We have outlined for us here a purpose, an aim, a cause, as great as that for which nations ever fought, or men ever died, since the purpose is to make possible the elimination of unmeasured cruelty and misery from the life of mankind. And deep feeling for some cause men must have if they are to fight and endure as, for instance, the Finns have fought and endured. It is an indispensable part of morale, and morale is an indispensable part of victory. In the last few months we have seen a tiny people of 4 millions holding up the forces of a nation of 180 millions. A great many military critics have been engaged in explaining the miracle of the Finnish resistance and practically all have agreed in attaching supreme importance to the factor of morale. Napoleon knew its value ; all great commanders have known it. Foch said : “ War is the domain of moral force.” Of the Finnish resistance one military critic notes :

The Finns have fought as individuals, with individual initiative and resolution, with supreme morale, whereas the Russians have been like sheep driven to the slaughter. Something has emerged in this campaign that redeems war of its horror and futility, the glowing passion for freedom.

The Finns fought as we know on an issue of great simplicity: to resist actual invasion of their own soil. It is true, as is so commonly said, that they are defending the cause of civilisation, the principle of freedom. But they are not fighting because that principle has been violated in the case of some

Halyburton lived today he would doubtless have made use of the contemporary evidence that Christianity can withstand this confusion when apparently little else can. He does, in fact, when discussing the insufficiency of nature's "rule of duty," mention the part played by the idea of "self-deification" in the morality of such men as Seneca (and in that of Hinduism), and the exaggerated emphasis of pagan writers on "national honour." This confusion ends only when, as a recent Gifford lecturer has said, God in His revelation "makes Himself known through Himself by distinguishing Himself *in* the world *from* the world."*

In this chapter, however, Halyburton contents himself with indicating the more theoretical defects of even the best heathen philosophers, such as Plato, who were all "shaky" as to the complete dependence of the created world upon the Creator, and attributed a certain amount of independence, of "necessary being," to the matter with which He had to work. To quote one of his earlier fellow-Scots, John Wemyss of Lathocker, "Man before his fall, could clearly make up this conclusion; here is a world, therefore God hath made it, but since the fall he maketh not this conclusion clearly, for the greatest Philosophers thought the world to be eternall with God, and here they stucke as mice in pitch."†

He also insists that the condition of "vulgar heathenism" is relevant to his argument, and that if the beliefs of the philosophers could not spread to the common people that was a very serious "insufficiency" in natural religion. The tendency of natural religion to become a matter for "specialists"—be they priests or "gentlemen"—is something very dangerous. Halyburton had the Reformation not far behind him, and the overthrowing of the "engine suited only unto the selfish design of the villainous priests, who, that they may have the conduct of men's souls, and so the management of their estates, have endeavoured to hoodwink man, and make him brutish, where he should be most rational; and that they may have the best, they make him present God with the blind and the lame, which his soul abhors." He was the heir of men who had fought for an educated ministry and educated congregations, for a faith that would not accommodate itself to the ignorance and natural superstition of men but had striven

* Karl Barth, *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*, p. 21.

† John Weemse, *The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man* (1632), p. 74.

to bring all men up to its own level and give all their birth-right—and had succeeded as no religious group had done outside the Jewish-Christian heritage.

No doubt he remembered how John Knox had written to the Scottish "Commonalty," "Neither would I that ye should esteeme the Reformation and care of Religion lesse to appertain to you, because ye are no Kinges, Rulers, Judges, Nobils, nor in auctoritie." And he had made this appeal because he believed that those to whom he wrote were "Goddess creatures, created and formed to his own image and similitude, for whose redemption was shed the most pretious blood of the onlie beloved Sonne of God, to whome he hath commaunded his gospell and glad-tidings to be preached, and for whom he hath prepared the heavenlie inheritance."* Apart from the "gospell and glad-tidings" that constitute the Christian revelation, this "democracy" in religion does not exist.

Halyburton then goes on to mention the use to which men have put their "natural reason" after they have "had access to the scriptures," and "since the christian religion has obtained in the world." "And here," he says, "it must be owned, that since that time philosophers have much improven natural theology, and given a far better account of god and demonstrated many of his attributes from reason, that were little known before, to the confusion of atheists." He thinks these demonstrations should not be over-rated, and they do not in themselves build up a "sufficient" religion—they are, for example, not very certain, and often incomprehensible to the ordinary man—but he has no desire to detract from them in their due place.

He cannot believe, however, that it is a mere coincidence that these remarkable developments of natural theology, on which the Deists themselves have drawn, should have taken place within; and not outside, the sphere illuminated by revelation—that they should have been begun, to all intents and purposes, by Augustine, under the influence of Hebrew ideas, and continued by men like Anselm and Aquinas, within the boundaries of the Christian Church. "The accurate systems of natural theology have come from christian philosophers, who do readily own that the scripture points them, not only to the notions of god they therein deliver, but also

* *The Works of John Knox*, Laing's Edition, Vol. IV, p. 526.

distant state, but because it has been violated in the case of their own. They did not take up arms against Russia because she had violated a principle, but because she had violated their soil. They suddenly found it invaded by an enemy setting up his own puppet government; and they had either to fight instantly and resist this direct attack, or accept the end of their nation and their chosen way of life. To the directness and simplicity of the issue the Finns owe much of their magnificent morale.

The issue on which we fight is wider, more universal, but certainly not as simple. We did not take up arms because *our* soil was invaded, but that of a state on the other side of Europe. We defend a certain principle, not because we ourselves have already been the victims of its violation, but because others have been; and because for the moment we believe that only by the vindication of the principle itself can our own independence be defended. We were not directly attacked; nor was France. Germany was not asking anything directly of us as Russia was asking cession of territory from the Finns. Germany's demands for territory, like Italy's and Japan's, have been in every case made upon others, not upon us. Germany desired keenly that we should stay out of her disputes with others (as she desired us to in 1914); insisted that she had no quarrel with us, that we had no concern in her quarrel with a third party, Poland.

We insisted that we had supreme concern: that the preservation of the principle violated in the case of Poland was indispensable to our own freedom and security. Again and again in politics certain concrete ends can only be secured by defending certain abstract principles. If a foreign power were suddenly to invade and annex some intrinsically unimportant morsel of British territory—the Seychelles Islands, say—and command us to accept this modification of the *status quo* forthwith, we should fight to the death to resist the aggression. For if we did not, if we proceeded to be “realist” and argue that, after all, the Islands were not worth a war, that they were pretty nearly valueless and foreigners might as well have them—if we so argued after sudden and forcible seizure of British territory, the world would know that the rapid disintegration of the British Empire had begun. Our “realism” would destroy us. Unless we were prepared to defend the abstract thing, the principle

of the integrity of our soil, we should very rapidly be unable to defend the concrete thing, our soil.

We, like other people, see readily enough this relation between the defence of a principle and the security of the concrete thing for which it stands, in the case of our own territorial integrity. But do we see as clearly the relation between defence of the principle of the territorial integrity of others, and our own defence? Do we really feel that if we are to defend ourselves we must defend others? That defence of what Lord Halifax has called the principle of freedom, even when others are the victim of its violation, is indispensable to our own freedom?

Yet it is clear that if we have no deep feeling on that issue, our morale can have no such basis as that which has turned the Finns into supermen. We fight in the first instance for Poles and Czechs, not ourselves; and since we are fighting Germany only twenty years after having completely defeated her before, we fight with the knowledge that mere victory of itself achieves nothing permanent; that only if victory can be the means of making a political reality of the principle Lord Halifax enunciates, can the next victory be more permanent than the last. Only if we have the same passion of conviction that the principle expressed for the moment in the freedom of Poles and Czechs, is as indispensable to the world's freedom and our own, as the Finns have that the expulsion of Russians from their soil is indispensable to Finnish freedom, can we sustain a morale equivalent to Finland's, in a war, perhaps of torment and horror, perhaps of prolonged boredom and weariness—which may prove a greater trial.

But here we encounter a strange and disturbing paradox of British politics; a fact to which we tend to close our eyes because it is an uncomfortable fact, mention of which is deemed “tactless.” A convention has grown up to disregard it, to say nothing about it, to set aside discussion of it and “get on with the war.” A very influential school of political thought which has grown up during the last few years in Britain, a school of thought which is, perhaps, the most influential in the long run in the shaping of policy, takes the view that any such “principle” as that enunciated by Lord Halifax and for which we are presumed to be fighting is an

to many of the proofs likewise, and that their reasons, if not thus assisted, would have failed them as much, as that of the old philosophers did them."* He adds to this that the more "watered-down" Christianity becomes, the weaker becomes its "natural theology," as in the case of "the Socinians and some others," who "do give most lame and defective accounts of god."

By heaping together pieces of empirical evidence of this kind Halyburton builds up a case against "natural religion" which still remains a weighty one. His work is probably as typical of the Church of Scotland's approach to Deism as Butler's is of the approach of the Church of England; and it deserves at least as careful a hearing in England as the *Analogy* has always had in Scotland.

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* Cf., again, J. Dickie, *op. cit.*, p. 68: "(The theistic proofs) do not produce conviction, except where the existence of God is already admitted."

THE SPANISH COURT PHYSICIAN.

THE period of Spanish history covering the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth is often called the "Golden Age." Such hyperbole may be explained (or excused) with regard to those who seem to have coined the term: the feeble bearers of a great tradition. The Spaniards of the eighteenth century and in part those of the nineteenth had little to be proud of except their past history. The first modern Empire, the Spain of Charles I and of Philip II, had turned into the poorest, the least enlightened, the worst-organised corner of western civilisation. A diagram of Spain's history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would, as a whole, show an ascending tendency. The beholder of Spain's past from the more elevated standpoint of newly rising standards of Spanish life is less willing to accept the Golden Age as a period of flawless brilliancy.

In 1886 the Spanish physician Dr. Luis Comenge y Ferrer drew a diagram to illustrate the development of Spanish medicine in relation to the status of medical science in other countries. In this diagram the line symbolising Spanish medicine tops the picture between the years 1050 and 1400 (the period of Arabic medicine), and after a decline suddenly rises about 1500, soars above the lines representing other countries, only to drop again in the beginning of the seventeenth century beneath the level of Italy and of France.

The careers and achievements of Spain's leading physicians were closely connected with the deeds of their royal masters. The politics, wars and conquests of the monarchs, the adventures of Spanish seamen, the ever-growing religious fanaticism of the period, all influenced Spanish medicine. Each of the great doctors bears the imprint of the grandeur and also of the inherent evils of his period. There are ingenious innovators among them, men who opened up new vistas, yet at the same time they remained blinded by superstition. None had the strength to make a decisive stand against the religious fanaticism which was one of the main destructive forces of Great Spain; none had the independence to speak to overbearing princes who were toying with their health as well as with affairs of state.

No man of medicine won fame under the rule of Queen

illusion, a fallacy; that there is no such principle; that it cannot express the general interest of mankind because (this particular school believes) there is no such general interest capable of embodiment in an international order; that such an order, whatever its form, is a chimera; that collective action against aggression as such, whatever its type of organisation, is a completely unworkable idea; misleading, mischievous. This political philosophy (not in its basis new, because it seems to draw deeply upon Machiavelli and Marx) is a great deal more than mere scepticism concerning the League or Collective Security, or the possibility of a peaceful Europe. Scepticism implies doubt: "We don't know." But this particular school of thought takes the view that it does know; that it knows all such plans and projects to be based upon fallacy, sham, pretence.

An early expression of this particular intellectual—or temperamental—development of the post Great War mood is to be found in the writings of the American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, whose work has greatly influenced certain political writers in England. His message is first of all one of hopelessness and pessimism in so far as human society is concerned, and secondly one of moral negation or nihilism so far as the behaviour of communities is concerned. What we usually regard as social and moral principles embodied in law are in fact, he insists, mainly instruments by which the privileged maintain their position. The title of his best-known book, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, indicates sufficiently its general theme: individual men may be moral and rational, improvable by education, guided by intelligence; but not nations, not communities. "It may be possible," he writes, "though it is never easy, to establish just relations between individuals within a group purely by moral and rational suasion and accommodation. In intergroup relations this is practically an impossibility . . . the limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behaviour, make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end." When middle-class moralists talk of peace, and law and order, what they really mean is the perpetuation of a *status quo* by which they benefit.

Some similar pessimism, though expressed in different form,

runs through a recent book, *Unto Cæsar*, by Mr. F. A. Voigt, the well-known diplomatic journalist and B.B.C. commentator on foreign affairs. In a sense he carries both the pessimism and the disparagement of reason further even than Dr. Niebuhr. Not only is the attainment of permanent peace impossible; not only is our reason or intelligence incapable of devising any constitution or system for dealing with that problem of recurrent war in every generation to which Lord Halifax has referred, but the very desire to make the effort systematically, to have ideals in respect of it, is contrary to the will of God. In the introduction to a new edition of his book (it has gone through several editions and reprints), published since the war began, Mr. Voigt writes: "I am convinced that the crisis and the second world war to which the crisis was moving are a judgment that has come upon us because of our disobedience to the first commandment . . . that we have an ultimate responsibility for the crisis and the war because we have disregarded and continue to disregard the limitations set upon all human endeavour, by striving to establish the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth." The European problem "can never be solved by any predetermined policy . . . nor by any ideal scheme or plan" (p. 262). "There is no universal remedy for war. . . . No system that man can devise will remove the causes of war, because these causes are inscrutable. They lie deep in the nature of man, and not in any specific economic or political system" (p. 264). An ideal is a very dangerous thing. "A national ideal is the most dangerous thing of all" leading to "the worship of Cæsar. And it is immaterial if the ideal be true or not. Even its truth will be the truth of those 'who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator'" (p. 268). On these grounds are condemned all such proposals as common resistance to an aggressor, disarmament, collective security, an international air force ("a monstrous proposal"). Indeed European peace "cannot be a primary object of foreign policy" (p. 262).

Sir Edward Grigg, recently appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Information, has expressed vigorously and at great length, particularly in his book *The Faith of an Englishman*, similar scepticism concerning the possibility of common resistance to aggression, any plan for defending in common the victim of aggression, for upholding

Isabella (1474-1504), the monarch who founded Spain's unity and strength. When her only son, Juan, fell ill soon after his marriage to the Austrian Princess Margaret and the physicians recommended the Prince should be separated for a short while from his too beloved bride, Isabella annulled the medical decree and did it "in the name of God," that God by whom they had been brought together. Isabella was a robust woman, although she died at the early age of fifty-three, after a short period of heart trouble.

Charles V, Isabella's grandson and real successor, and his son and heir Philip II, kept numbers of doctors busy, conferred wealth and titles on them, but seldom obeyed doctor's orders. One of the court physicians of Carlos Invictus bequeathed his (and his colleagues') grievances to posterity in a letter which runs as follows: "It is necessary to induce him to believe that measures that ought to be taken are to be taken on his own suggestion, and that it is for me to accept his orders." Charles did not shrink from forging medical prescriptions so as to enjoy his gluttonous meals undisturbed by the warnings of the gentlemen of his table; his appetite outstripped his gout. The post of a Medico de Camara was much sought for. The salaries amounted to about 100,000 maravedi yearly, and the intimacy with the monarch implied in the post was inestimable. The Medico de Camara had admission to the king's apartments without special permit, and the king's ear was nearer to a medical courtier's intrigues than to any others. Men who showed character outside the palace turned meek before those who claimed to be more than mere kings of a land. The kings of Great Spain pretended to be God's own representatives on earth, the defenders of Christianity.

The story of the illness of Joanna the Mad (the daughter of Isabella and mother of Charles V) sounds like an appalling medical failure, but to some extent it may be explained by the particular relationship between a Spanish court physician and his royal patient. It was indeed a case of sham treatment for the sake of appearances. Joanna was an invalid for forty-six years. Her life was passed in darkened rooms, her moods alternating between dumb melancholy and outbursts of rage, of self-accusation, of charging her ladies-in-waiting with villainies they had never committed, such as the soiling of a crucifix or cursing the name of Christ. The people of Spain

knew that their Queen was demented and that they were ruled first by her father Ferdinand and then by her son Charles, but no official statement of her insanity was ever made. The first outward indication of her derangement was her insensate passion for and jealousy of her husband Philip the Fair. His sudden premature death (1506) kindled her feelings still further and no one prevented the mourning procession through Castile with Philip's open coffin and Joanna's extravagant love-making to the corpse. A Queen of Spain was too great a person to be admittedly mad. Joanna sank to imbecility and her limbs were paralysed, but the appearance of reverence was retained. The doctors' only measure in the later years was to keep her in a remote country palace. At that time the whole world regarded lunacy as sin and shame rather than as an illness.

The contemporary physician Christopher de la Vega wrote on the subject of dealing with people "demented by love" as follows: "... They shall be cheered up by all means. Let them travel and visit spas, let them attend parties. Don't forget that the sure way to cure them is a thorough change of environment. ..." Yet Joanna was kept in seclusion, and her physician, Mosen Ferrer, prided himself on having secured her peace of mind. Dr. de la Vega must have been an advanced thinker among more traditional mental healers of the period, who were often called *Conjuradores de Nublados* ("Conjurers of clouded minds"). Conjuring was indeed their method. To the credit of contemporary Spanish knowledge in matters of mental treatment is the case of Don Quixote. Cervantes is supposed to have thoroughly studied monomania before having given expression to it in art. His hero illustrates the career of a monomaniac in all the consecutive stages of the disease.

In 1516, when Charles V left the Netherlands to take over the regency in Spain bequeathed to him by his grandfather, one of his attendants was Dr. Luis Marliano, a medical man of Italian origin. A Spanish prince of the "Golden Age" had gentlemen of various tongues in his suite, representing the many provinces of the Spanish Empire. Each of the cavaliers was a man of varied parts. Marliano rendered diplomatic services. He invented Charles' famous slogan "Plus Ultra," indicating that there could be no limit set to the ambitions of the heir of half Europe and the first American colonies.

any general law for the defence of national freedom. He takes the curiously Pacifist view that resistance to aggression amounts to coercion of the aggressor, is as much war as aggression, and is therefore wrong. He writes :

If I am to take up arms to prove that the taking up of arms is a crime against humanity, I am surely no better than my neighbour who takes up arms merely to prove that he can use them better than I can and is therefore entitled to govern me. His object and mine, his method and mine, become precisely similar. I am to rule him by force, or he is to rule me. . . . If I denounce Hitler for imposing his creed by force upon the German people and proceed in the name of progress to impose my creed by force upon him, I am surely denying and destroying that for which I myself stand and enthroning that for which I condemn my antagonist. (p. 166.)

Sir Edward quotes with strong approval a speech made by Mr. James Maxton to show that the erection of common power against aggression can never endure. Mr. Maxton argues that you had in 1914-18 "a great array of nations to restrain an aggressor in the interests of international law," most complete sanctions, economic and military. "You smashed Germany flat. You won. And here is the aggressor again." Having quoted that argument Sir Edward Grigg, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Information, adds :

If anyone knows the answer to that argument, he ought to produce it. None has yet been produced by the Covenanters.

Dr. L. P. Jacks, in his book *Co-operation or Coercion?*, makes this same assumption that to extend aid to the victim of aggression, to help him defend himself, is to coerce the aggressor. The League failed because it was "an attempt to impose upon sovereign states a system of coercion which their nature as sovereign forbids them to tolerate" (p. 91). Nations will, and may with good morals, defend themselves individually ; but if a number combine to resist in common attack upon them on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all, at that point the defence becomes coercion of the attacker. He, too, takes the view that such combinations are certain to collapse (p. 88) since they are based on an altruism of which nations are not in fact capable.

Another eminent sceptic concerning the possibility of such collective defence is Lord Lloyd, the head of the British

Council. His opposition to any plan of mutual and common defence, his scepticism of its ever being a permanent feature of foreign policy, is well known.

But the most notable expression alike of the pessimism and the moral nihilism is to be found in a brilliant work, which has appeared since the war—Professor E. H. Carr's book, *Twenty Years of Crisis*. The book carries, of course, immense authority in view of Professor Carr's position and record. He has had a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Office, has more lately occupied a chair of International Relations in one of our Universities, and at present occupies a very prominent position in that Department of the Ministry of Information responsible for the presentation of Britain's case to the outside world.

Commonly, when it is asked why the principle applied in the case of Poland, the guarantees then given and which led directly to war, had not been given in earlier cases of violation of the law—in the case of say, Manchuria—when there could have been no question of air attacks upon London (Hitler had not yet come to power), or in the Abyssinian case (Germany had not yet occupied the Rhineland)—the reply is usually that we had not the power, or that our statesmen were not sufficiently far-sighted. The reply given by Professor Carr is different. Not only, he insists, are nations in fact incapable of acting together for long in pursuit of a common interest, but there is no common interest, of a nature to make peace possible, to pursue. The trouble is not that statesmen did not live up to their principles but that there are no principles to live up to. He writes :

The charge is not that human beings fail to live up to their principles. It matters little that Wilson, who thought that the right was more precious than peace, and Briand, who thought that peace came even before justice, and Mr. Eden, who believed in collective security, failed themselves, or failed to induce their countrymen, to apply these principles consistently. What matters is that these supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time. . . . As soon as the attempt is made to apply these supposedly abstract principles to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparent disguises of selfish vested interests. (p. 111.)

Greater doctors and greater statesmen followed Dr. Marliano in the suite of Charles.

A remarkable figure was Dr. Andrea Laguna, whom the frequency of wars, of political crises and of epidemics caused to move about the empire. Charles spent two decades of his reign travelling between provinces and battlefields, and with the Emperor went his doctor. To Metz in Germany he came just in time to combat an epidemic of pestilential fever; in the Netherlands a strong man was needed to suppress a political upheaval and the Emperor deemed Dr. Laguna to be the right dictator for the danger spot; back to Germany he went, to the University of Cologne, to act as orator on the theme of "Europe the Unfortunate." The speech was a dramatic performance. Laguna dressed in black garments and appeared in a hall draped with black hangings. From a pulpit in the form of a tomb he lamented the endless wars between France and the Spanish-Austrian Empire of the Habsburgs. He called Europe "that infirm and desperate woman." This display of statesmanship before the audience of the world was followed by a period in an idyllic country house, the Tusculum, near Rome, where Cicero had lived. Here the doctor turned poet. He translated a comedy of Lucian in which the insuperable power of the gout was given its classical comment. Then followed a period of science, and Dr. Laguna composed commentaries to writings of Aristotle and Galen.

Another striking personality in the galaxy of Charles V was Dr. Nicolas Monardes from Seville. He, too, was a man of extraordinary versatility, but on Spanish-Quixotic lines rather than in the Classic-Humanistic style of the Renaissance. Dr. Monardes, a respectable medical man, became a familiar figure on the embankments of Seville, where the boats from The Indies (America) were landing. A motley crowd used to wait for the boats, for the gold, the slaves, the exotic plants they brought. The unknown lands across the seas were stirring the imagination of the people, and Dr. Monardes was one among the many who were seduced by visions of riches. He joined the firm of Nuñez de Herrera who specialised in the thriving business of buying negroes in Africa and selling them to America, where labourers were needed in the metal mines which the Spanish Treasury bled to exhaustion. This enterprised to substantial debts, possibly because of the more imaginative than commercial aptitudes of the doctor-tradesman

Monardes. He fell back on science and became a benefactor of humanity by discovering the curative values of many of the newly imported simples. Any kind of illness, in his view, has its antidote in some sort of herb; he strongly commended herbal treatment instead of the usual ruthless bleeding and aperients. So far Dr. Monardes was a man of scientific research, but he was also steeped in superstition. He held that precious stones, especially pearls, were an antidote to any kind of poison, and also helped as medicine in cases of heart disease, fever, plague, and last but not least, in treatments for rejuvenation.

Under the war-waging Charles V surgery was a promising field for a doctor. Dr. Daza Chacon was called to the post of Medico de Camara for services rendered to the imperial army in Flanders. His treatment of gunshot wounds (the gun was then a novelty) had made him famous. He objected to the unconditional extraction of bullets. (Don John of Austria's death, for instance, was due to loss of blood caused by the doctors' eager search for a bullet in which his flesh was cut to shreds.) Contemporary physicians were greatly concerned to devise anti-gunshot measures. They regarded the new bullet of 100 lb. weight which endangered twenty to thirty soldiers at one blow as a menace to mankind.

Philip II (1556-98) not only employed numbers of Medicos de Camara but showed his interest in medicine by taking the chair at medical discussions and patronising the publication of medical manuals. Dr. Mercato, one of Philip's most celebrated doctors, was a specialist in diphtheria. His nickname, "The Spanish Thomas Aquinas," meant to some a title of honour, to others a derisive indication of his conservative methods. Dr. Francisco Valles was another versatile figure in the Renaissance style, an ardent student of classic philosophy as well as a many-sided physician. He advised his colleagues to rely on their own experience and judgment rather than on the theories of Galen and Hippocrates, whom the majority still regarded as oracular authorities.

Spanish medicine proved its value in various subjects: in epidemiology (plague and diphtheria), in diseases of the urethra, in the struggle against the new scourge of syphilis. In 1555 the first Spanish chair of Anatomy was founded in Valladolid. It was an event in those days, when the dissecting of the human body was generally thought of as sacrilege. The

The supposed moral superiority of those who desire peace over those who desire war is a misapprehension. When a writer had suggested that, after all, international law and order were in the general interest and the reign of violence in international affairs an anti-social desire, Professor Carr remarks that "this is precisely the argument compounded of platitude and falsehood in about equal parts which did duty in the early days of the British or the American labour movements," and adds:

Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace which guarantees its own security and predominance and denounces class war which might threaten them, so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant Powers. . . . To-day, when no single Power is strong enough to dominate the world, and supremacy is vested in a group of nations, slogans like "collective security" and "resistance to aggression" serve the same purpose of proclaiming an identity of interest between the dominant group and the world as a whole in the maintenance of peace. (p. 104.)

That is, of course, the Hitlerian argument. Those who desire to upset the *status quo* may be as right as those who desire to preserve it.

Like all utopias which are institutionalised, the post-war utopia became the tool of vested interests and was perverted into a bulwark of the *status quo*. It is a moot point whether the politicians and publicists of the satisfied Powers, who have attempted to identify international morality with security, law and order and other time-honoured slogans of privileged groups, do not bear as large a share of responsibility for the disaster as the politicians and publicists of the dissatisfied Powers, who brutally denied the validity of an international morality so constituted. (p. 289.)

And it is a fallacy to suppose that war can be waged for the mere purpose of "resisting aggression." A war of defence, of resistance to attack, is almost certain to become itself a war of annexations and aggressions (pp. 144-5).

Like Dr. Niebuhr, Professor Carr is "unconvinced that wisdom can save us."

The breakdown of the post-war utopia is too overwhelming to be explained merely in terms of individual action or inaction. Its downfall involves the bankruptcy of the postulates on which it is based. The foundations of nineteenth-century belief are themselves under suspicion. It may be, not that men have stupidly or

wickedly failed to apply right principles, but that the principles themselves were false or inapplicable. It may turn out to be untrue that if men reason rightly about international politics they will also act rightly, or that right reasoning about one's own or one's nation's interests is the road to an international paradise. (p. 53.)

It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt a critical analysis of these doctrines, but to show their nature and their relation to the principle for which we are supposed to be fighting; the extent to which they dominate the thought of influential Englishmen in very commanding positions, and consequently have bearing upon policy, public opinion, morale during the war and the settlement afterwards; and to suggest that in the light of the event—the war—these ideas need reconsideration and revision.

They are, as we have seen, defeatist, as to our aims; of a degree of pessimism which often ignores one supreme factor in human affairs: the human will. Whether we emerge from our difficulties or not will depend in the long run on that one ultimate factor. For while it may be untrue to say that where there is a will there is a way, it is certainly true to say that where there is no will, there is no way. And unqualified pessimism is as destructive of the will as unqualified optimism is fatal to its useful and practical application. If your boat is above the rapids likely to be drawn over them and the occupants are so optimistically minded that they refuse to take to the oars and just drift, they are likely to be destroyed. But equally will they be destroyed if, seeing the power of the current, they decide it is folly to try to row against it. Doubt as to whether they can stem the current or not should be the signal for an attempt to try to do it, not for refusing to try. The decision to make the utmost effort *may* justify itself by success; the decision that it is not worth trying will quite certainly justify itself by disaster.

NORMAN ANGELL.

founder and first holder of the Spanish professorship of Anatomy was Dr. Guevara. In his lectures on the circulation of the blood he compared the rôle of the heart in the human body with that held in the world by the Pope; the brain with that of the Emperor; the liver was related to the Turkish Sultan. Spanish authors claim that Dr. Servet of Aragon was the forerunner of Harvey, and that he had come near to disclosing the flow of blood between heart and lungs by means of vessels and not through a porous wall of the heart, as was generally thought in his time. One Spanish physician should be mentioned particularly for his work on syphilis, not so much for his medical distinction but because of the singular artistic style with which he conveyed his theory. Dr. Lopez Villalobos chose the form of poetry, the stanza, for his description of syphilis. He belonged to the school which opposed the theory of the American origin of the disease.

The royal patients of Spain's Golden Age were tainted with hereditary diseases. Joan's madness had been foreshadowed by her maternal grandmother's melancholy. Charles V suffered from epilepsy; his gout was at times so terrific that he had to be tied to his horse during campaigns. His lower jaw was disproportionately big and heavy, so that he could hardly close his mouth and his breathing and chewing were hindered. His tendency to melancholy was not the least of his ailments. Philip II showed similar ill-health. The Tuscan ambassador did not hesitate to compare the monarch on whose empire the sun never set with goats, hares and other timid animals which react with diarrhoea to a sudden fright. This cynical remark may give a clue to the exaggerated sternness with which Philip II cloaked himself. He was in the habit of greeting visitors, intimidated in the presence of the so mighty master, by saying "Compose yourself!" Perhaps his words were meant to ease his own disquiet.

The medical reports on Don Carlos contradict Schiller's presentation of him as a prince led to catastrophe by a disappointment in love. When Elisabeth of France, who had been betrothed to Carlos, entered Spain as Philip's bride and thus as Carlos' stepmother, the young prince was sent to Alcala de Henares for "a change of air." Here, it is said, he made love to a country lass, and when he once tried to catch her he fell down a flight of stairs and injured his skull. An

illness of three months and a dangerous operation followed. Don Carlos unquestionably had inherited a share of the mental derangement of his ancestors, and his abnormal state of mind cannot be blamed upon the loss of his bride to his father.

The history of the treatments used in curing Philip III, Philip IV and Charles II, the later Spanish rulers of the Habsburg dynasty, is nothing but a record of superstition. Processions with holy images, endless chants and exorcism of evil spirits were the methods applied to any royal disease, culminating in the application of holy relics to the patient's body. Spanish life as a whole degenerated in the seventeenth century into exuberance of form without content, and medicine shared in this general depreciation. In 1613 a royal edict commanded that physicians should henceforth refrain from superfluous "curiosity" and confine themselves to the teaching of the Classics. Thus it only remained to the doctors to seek self-expression in finding new words for worn-out ideas.

ALMA ST. WITTLIN.

NEUTRALITY AND ITS CRITICS.

WHEN a country is engaged in a deadly war, public opinion soon becomes critical of the position of neutrals. Deeply convinced of the righteousness of their cause, the belligerents cannot witness without impatience the attitude of those who wish to remain out of the conflict. They soon feel inclined to twist the meaning of the Gospel's words, and to say that those who are not with them are against them, or, worse still, that neutrality is the child of fear. Thanks to the fair-minded statements of the Prime Minister and to the moderating influence of the principal papers, these feelings have only seldom found expression since September last. There have been, however, during the last weeks, a few speeches and articles which may be considered as danger signals. We cannot, in the light of previous experience, rule out the possibility that an anti-neutral prejudice may develop in this country. Such a prejudice might do a great deal of harm and affect the deep sympathy which exists between the Allied and Neutral peoples. The United States, Italy and Japan are not so directly concerned. The situation of the smaller States of Western Europe is far more critical and far more likely to be criticised.

The political régime adopted by these small States enjoyed a greater prestige in the nineteenth century than it does to-day, because, after the Napoleonic wars, neutrality was acknowledged as the necessary complement of the balance of power. The political system in Europe depended on the relative strength of the large States and on the non-interference of the small States. Peace was maintained, on several occasions, because the aggressive Power realised that war involved too many risks, especially as long as Great Britain acted as arbiter between the parties. Any breach of neutrality was strongly discouraged, since it disturbed the balance. Switzerland requested to be granted perpetual neutrality at the Congress of Vienna. Fifteen years later, neutrality was imposed upon the new independent Belgian kingdom by the delegates of the five big Powers gathered in London. It was considered at the time as a somewhat utopian device for preventing a European conflict. Its remarkable success silenced the critics. The same status was applied later, on several occasions, as the best means of ensuring the

independence of small and peaceful nations, while providing a political barrier between powerful rivals.

How is it that this régime which was so much in favour up to the end of the last century, and contributed to localise the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, is now looked upon by many people as a mere device to shirk political and moral responsibilities? The violation of the Belgian frontier in 1914 is no doubt a contributory cause of this change of outlook, but the main reason is the substitution, in 1919, of a general international organisation for power-politics, and of the League of Nations for the balance of power.

For twenty years we have ceased to think in terms of *Real Politik*, and have fixed our attention on the Covenant, its sanctions, its regional pacts and its collective security. The failure of these new systems is too recent to allow us to readjust our judgment to the present state of affairs, which is, from the historian's point of view, a return to the nineteenth century policy, an attempt to restore the balance which has been seriously upset by recent developments. Neutrality is no longer considered by the general public as a natural guarantee of independence and security for the small European States, but as an abnormal régime which is no longer justified by modern circumstances. People may recognise that small and exposed countries cannot be expected to take part in the present conflict, but at the back of their mind lurks the suspicion that failure to do so is a confession of weakness. These critics do not even appreciate the heavy sacrifices made by the Neutrals in order to ensure their self-defence. The larger these forces, the more reason there seems to be for their being enlisted in the service of the "common cause." Disappointed at the break-up of the new system, people are reluctant to acknowledge again the old system. After the signature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928, Mr. Stimson declared that neutrality was "obsolete." It is now cold-shouldered by many who believed that this pact was not worth the paper upon which it was written.

No doubt every writer, every orator, who broaches this subject is convinced that the policy he propounds would greatly benefit the small countries whose security and prosperity are jeopardised by the war. He overlooks the fact that neutrality is not only imposed upon the small European democracies by the position which they occupy on the map,

THE ENGLISH : ARE THEY DEMOCRATS?

SOME years ago a compatriot of the present writer had the temerity to publish a book on England under the title, *The English : are they human?* It is a provoking question, but the implied mockery may seem mild compared with the paraphrase which I have dared to choose as my title. Yet the offending question needs to be put. For to the foreign observer, at any rate, the answer is not as self-evident as one would expect.

First of all it is the outward aspects of England's social and political life which strike him as being difficult to reconcile with his native notions of what a democratic society should look like. On all sides he sees evidence of an aristocratic form of life, a great style and a social hierarchy almost feudal in its gradation of the three estates, lords, gentlemen and people. He goes to Ascot, the Derby, or any one of those occasions where the three estates come together, united and yet separated under that typically English device : *in equo unitas*. On one side of the racecourse the *élite* in the distinctive uniform of their class, as handsome and elegant a throng as is to be seen anywhere in the world. On the other side, among the fair booths and crowding around the shouting bookies, the people : raw, noisy, but obviously thoroughly enjoying itself. Yet in spite of this violent contrast, in spite of the self-assurance bordering on disdain with which the *élite* parades its glory and its wealth before the admiring gaze of the people, not a trace of envy or rancour among the good-natured democrats on the other side. The foreigner witnessing this fascinating spectacle marvels that a society which can and does present this delightful scene, so strongly reminiscent of the aristocratic past, can be described as democratic.

True, he may have seen an outwardly similar scene at Longchamps or Saratoga, but there the thought that all this seemed difficult to reconcile with his notions of a democratic society did not present itself. There the feeling of historical continuity with an aristocratic past was lacking. There the display of style and splendour seemed largely but a vain and artificial froth superimposed on a truly democratic society. Not so in England. Wherever the foreign visitor to England

meets with the social manifestations of the *élite*, he is struck by the ever-recurring thought that this society with its aristocratic style of life, with its great country houses and its great hostesses, with its centre in London and its ramifications in the counties, unofficially still exercises much of the power formerly officially and constitutionally possessed by that narrower aristocracy out of which and around which it has grown. He cannot but notice that in England society and politics are not, as in other democracies, two separate worlds. He sees that Cabinet Ministers are continually dining or spending their week-ends at the great houses in London or in the country. He learns to appreciate the great rôle played in English political life by club-land where the constitutional rulers come in frequent and friendly contact with that society which may and does include new wealth as well as old names, but whose code of values, style, outlook or *Weltanschauung* remain patterned on the model of its inner circle and historical core, the old aristocracy. He realises that the two worlds of politics and society are so inextricably, because traditionally, intermingled that those who would play a rôle as a constitutional power at Westminster cannot escape the frequent contact with the unconstitutional powers of St. James's, Mayfair and Belgravia. Finally, remembering the illuminating example of a once fiery radical turned mellow under these subtle and restraining influences, he begins to understand that it would take a fanatically one-sided, ruthlessly intolerant, and therefore very un-English politician not to succumb in some degree to the charm, the grand style, sometimes even the mature wisdom of the best representatives of this traditional and inescapable society.

Perhaps even more striking than the prominent, not to say dominant, position of the "quality" is the respect, even the admiration, in which this *Beau Monde* continues to be held by the democratic people of England. The outward signs of this admiring interest of the third estate in the activities of their social superiors are too abundant and obvious to escape notice. There are the crowds at theatrical first-nights and fashionable weddings, waiting patiently to catch a glimpse of the Great. There is the considerable amount of space devoted to the doings of society in the popular press. There are the numerous society weeklies, filled almost entirely with photographs of the *Beau Monde* and eagerly read in

innumerable servants' halls and kitchen basements all over the country.

Even before the foreign visitor has had an opportunity to wonder at these things he is, in another way, forcibly struck by the English democrat's natural acknowledgment of the social hierarchy. At his very first contact with England he finds himself addressed by the customs or immigration official as "Sir" (at least if he looks sufficiently like a gentleman), and he quickly discovers that no one would be more surprised than the official himself if he should reciprocate the compliment. He learns not to translate his French "*Pardon, monsieur*," "*Merçi, monsieur*" into a literal "Sorry, sir," "Thank you, sir," when addressing the Customs official or any member of the "ungentry." He learns also not to be surprised at the unfailing courtesy of the taxi-driver, the bus conductor or the policeman, whose American colleagues would in nine cases out of ten rather bite off their tongue than forsake their democratic birthright by addressing him as "Sir."

Thus, in these usages of common parlance, is revealed to him the strong class-consciousness which still pervades every section of democratic England, a class-consciousness, not in the perverted Marxian sense of class-antagonism, but in the feudalistic sense of knowing oneself to belong to a certain class without making that a reason for hating every other class. The English democrat, he discovers, is rarely if ever an egalitarian. His democratic feelings never express themselves in the aggressive "I am as good as you are" attitude which his cousins on the other side of the Atlantic are wont to adopt. His manners have not suffered from the conquest of equal rights. If it appears to the foreigner that his attitude towards the upper classes leaves something to be desired it is not because of lack of courtesy, but rather because of an occasional tendency to excessive deference, sometimes amounting to servility. It is this deferential attitude towards the upper classes, especially noticeable in rural England, and even more its acceptance by those classes as part of the natural order of things which the foreign visitor often finds it difficult to understand and which sometimes inspires him to vent his not altogether incomprehensible irritation in books like *With Malice towards Some*, or in a film like *Ruggles of Red Gap*.

There remains another feature of English democracy which is apt to cause the foreigner considerable surprise. I refer to

the unbroken connection of the aristocracy—in the wider sense of the historical upper class—with the political life of the nation, its active and official participation in the business of government. Whereas in other democracies the "best people" mostly keep aloof from politics, Westminster continues to attract them in considerable numbers. For statistical proof of this statement I may refer the reader to the interesting figures in *Tory M.P.* This analysis of the social and economic composition of the Ministry and the Conservative Party in the House of Commons certainly points to the presence of a very much stronger aristocratic element in the body politic than is to be found in any other democracy.

A word must be said about one more highly important side of English life where the aristocratic influence still prevails: education. Institutions like Eton and Harrow, whose governing body and faculty are still so largely recruited from the cream of English society, and whose educational ideal remains the production of gentlemen, may not receive more than an infinitesimal fraction of the English people within their portals, but their influence radiates very far beyond their proverbial playing-fields. For the code of conduct, the standards and moral values which they inculcate, in short the public school spirit, historically the educational ideal of a ruling class, remains to a large extent the moral pattern and the model for the entire nation.

To sum up, active participation of the traditional *élite* in the political life of the nation often amounting to direct or indirect leadership, a powerful and admired society with a great style and aristocratic *train de vie*, a strongly developed class-consciousness in all three estates; these three seem to the foreigner to be the special characteristics of English democracy, distinguishing it from all other free societies. He could, no doubt, find still other differences. He could point to the fact that, due to the English form of franchise, and the two-party system (three, if one must be polite to those who are down and out), the parliament of the world's model democracy is both qualitatively and quantitatively one of the most unrepresentative institutions of its kind. He could remind himself that the sovereignty of parliament in which Mill and Bagehot used to glory has to-day become largely fictitious, that parliamentary government has been replaced by Cabinet dictatorship, that the Prime Minister can govern

but also by the attitude of a great majority of their citizens who have followed the disintegration of the European situation during the last ten years with increasing disappointment and anxiety.

The British public has not been sufficiently informed of the reaction which followed the failure of the League to check aggression, the estrangement of Italy from the Stresa front, the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, the collapse of Locarno and the conflict over the Spanish civil war.* After each of these crises the smaller nations realised more and more clearly that their hope of finding security in the League or in regional pacts within the League were illusory. The cleavage between the Axis and the Entente split Europe once more into two rival groups and brought it back to the pre-1914 position. Attempts to improve economic relations, like the one made by the Oslo Powers, were not supported by this country. The van Zeeland report was not followed up by any practical proposal. The failure of every step taken to further economic collaboration, combined with increasing political and ideological hostility, brought the catastrophe nearer and nearer. The small Powers did not wait for it to return to neutrality. Singly and jointly, they repeatedly declared during these critical years that they no longer considered themselves bound by the sanctionist clauses of the Covenant. As early as July 1936, the ministers of Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian states (including Finland) stated publicly that "as long as the Covenant was only incompletely applied, they would be obliged to take this fact into account in their interpretation of Article XVI." Later, the small States insisted more and more on preserving their complete freedom, pointing out that they could not be expected to take military action against one of their neighbours in a divided Europe. These initiatives were not taken against the League which the small nations had done their best to support in all its activities. They simply acknowledged the *fait accompli*, the return to power-politics, and the obvious fact that so-called "collective security" can only bring about security if it is truly collective.

Anyone who is in touch with Switzerland, the Low Countries or Scandinavia knows that this return to neutrality

* Sir Norman Angell is one of the few writers who has dwelt on this question, in *For What Do We Fight?* (pp. 86 and 107).

was strongly supported and in some cases urged by public opinion. It was ratified at Geneva by the representatives of Great Britain and France on the eve of Munich, not only because they considered it justified, but also because they realised that a division of opinion inside these countries would only aggravate the critical situation in which Europe was placed. Collective security being impracticable, they did not wish to weaken national defence.

The position of Belgium in 1936, after the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact and the denunciation of Locarno by Germany, affords a good example of this interplay of national and international politics. In March of that year the four remaining Locarno Powers had agreed on close co-operation and military consultations, pending the conclusion of a new Western Pact with the Reich. During the following six months Belgium was neither a partner in the general system of a treaty of mutual guarantee, nor a Neutral, since her staff worked in connection with the British and French military authorities. At that time the military superiority of the Allies was still large enough to justify such an arrangement, even after the estrangement of Italy. Nevertheless, public opinion became restless. It was not so much because the people had lost confidence in the Allies' methods of dealing with post-war problems; it was because they did not wish their country to become the satellite of big Powers, without being able to make her voice heard. They were prepared to join the League, or even Locarno, as independent members of an association; they were not prepared to enter an Alliance as confederates dependent on the protection, however friendly, of two of their neighbours. As a consequence, new military credits were refused by Parliament. The Belgian Government was placed before the alternative of pursuing a one-sided policy, under Locarno, in a divided country, with inadequate defences, or of renouncing their Locarno obligations and adopting voluntary neutrality in a united country, with adequate defences. Their decision for the latter course was inevitable. Its wisdom was recognised a few months later by Great Britain and France, and nothing which happened since could justify any change in their public "Declarations."

The small Western European States were not born yesterday. Some of them are as old as France and England, and possess deeply ingrained traditions. They know from

according to his lights in the safe knowledge that—except in the case of issues touching the heart and soul of the nation—his disciplined majority can always be relied upon to sanction his decisions.

But, unlike some native critics, the foreign observer might see in these seemingly undemocratic aspects rather a sign of healthy growth than of stunted development. Thus he could argue that the transformation of parliamentary government into Cabinet dictatorship, which has accompanied the tremendous extension of the scope of government, is but another example of the English genius for adaptation without which no society can hope to survive. Again, in the refusal to carry democratic theory to the logical conclusion of proportional representation he could detect that sound political instinct which has always avoided the mistake of attempting to force a living organism into a theoretical strait-jacket. Whatever the validity of these views, the theoretical flaws in the English system may well seem justified by the practical results, the efficiency and stability of government which often seems sadly lacking in democracies whose machinery was constructed with more regard for the logical niceties of democratic theory.

What is of special interest to the foreigner, however, and what makes him wonder whether England can really be called a democracy, is not these technical peculiarities but the spirit, the appearance, and the living content of the social and political organism. Reflecting on the dominant position of the "best people" in many fields of English life, or on the class-consciousness pervading all sections of the English people, he is only too easily induced to join the chorus of those native critics who never stop reviling England's "sham democracy."

But is it a sham? The answer depends on the meaning attached to that much-abused word "democracy." If by "democracy" is meant a system of government, a piece of political machinery, based on certain elementary principles concerning individual liberty and equality of rights, then the accusation is certainly unfounded. But to the critics that is not the whole content of the term "democracy." When they use it they are thinking, perhaps unconsciously, of that vast complex of sociological theories and ideals centred round the cry: *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. To them a democracy is only worthy of the name when next to *liberté* it has also embodied at least the spirit and the appearance (if not the substance)

of the other two factors of the triad. Thinking in terms of this eighteenth-century castle in Spain, with its strong revolutionary association, they are bound to view the democracy of England, where all the stress is laid on the first factor of the triad, and where leadership is still so largely in the hands of the traditional upper class, as a very lop-sided affair.

It is this lop-sidedness and this continued influence of an aristocratic element which they object to when talking of England's "sham democracy." And it is because of these same characteristics that the foreign democrat, whose native thinking is likewise coloured by the revolutionary triad and the doctrine of the Rights of Man, is at first often tempted to join in these facile accusations. Only when he recalls that these doctrines never crossed the Channel, when he remembers to view the present as the outcome of the past, only then will he begin to understand and appreciate much in English democracy that at first seemed paradoxical and undemocratic by his own very different standards.

Thus history gives him the clue to many a puzzling question. Why, he asks, do the democratic people of England elect such a surprisingly large number of members of the traditional upper class as their rulers and representatives? Why is this class still able to take such an active and important part in the government of the nation? Partly, Clio answers, because this class has never really failed the nation as it has done in other countries. Because, with the good horsemanship for which its members are renowned, it has always known when to give the people their head and has thus avoided having the reins snatched out of its hands. Because, as Trevelyan says, it "never retired to its tents in anger at lost privileges but went down in the street to appeal to the masses." Because, partly due to primogeniture, partly to good sense, this class never shut itself off from the world below, but has always absorbed and assimilated the new elements that came to the foreground, thus being continually strengthened and reinvigorated, thus also continually keeping its finger on the pulse of the nation. Finally, because through centuries of governing England, and on the whole governing as well as could be expected from fallible human beings, this class has established the tradition of its right to govern.

Then there is that other puzzling question which is bound to rise in the mind of every foreign visitor. How is it that the

experience that they cannot afford to become their big neighbours' enemies. They know also that it is almost as dangerous for them to become their associates. As long as power-politics remain what they were, and what they have become again since the break-up of the League, these nations cannot hope to preserve their independence, which is the condition of their existence, unless they avoid at one and the same time the Scylla of hostility and the Charybdis of alliance. That is what neutrality means to them. When Switzerland asked to be recognised as a neutral country at Vienna, it was because the Swiss realised that if they took any active share in European conflicts, they could not remain masters in their own land. When the Powers imposed perpetual neutrality on Belgium in 1831, it was because they were convinced that any departure from that policy implied protection or annexation. The disproportion between the strength of the country and that of any of her neighbours made association on equal terms impossible. There are certain axioms in European politics which will remain true as long as the principle of nationality is not radically altered. One of them is that Great Britain must resist any attempt at establishing military hegemony on the Continent; another is that no small State can afford to enter into any alliance or any system of alliance.

Nothing shows better the inveterate tendency of certain representatives of the big States to subordinate the interests of smaller States to their own than a criticism levelled at the League on the ground that the latter were over-represented in the Assembly, and might have been able to out-vote the former. This is considered by Streit and his Federalist followers as "undemocratic," since every nation should, in their view, be represented according to the figure of its population, the individual, not the Government, being the unit of the system. In their sincere efforts to establish future international justice they are promoting a régime which would wipe out the influence of the small nations from the international field. Would it not be wiser to recognise that the Council of the League (controlled by the Allies) played throughout the dominant part in world affairs, and that no important decision could be reached without their approval? For many years public opinion among the Neutrals has been criticising the Powers, not for allowing too much scope to the smaller nations, but for allowing them too little, and, finally,

for ignoring them altogether. It is to be feared that Federalism will not become popular among the smaller democracies as long as it appears as an ingenuous plan to subordinate them to their leading partners. It might afford a great many material advantages which they would not find in the old system of balance of power, but, in its present form, it would deprive them of the right to control their foreign defence and foreign trade policy by compelling them to delegate this right to an international body upon which they would be virtually incapable of exerting any appreciable influence. How could Finland or Denmark, with their small populations, have a chance to oppose in the Federal Congress any policy supported by France, for instance, or Great Britain and the Dominions, let alone the United States? The mere fact that these small countries enjoy a constitutional régime is not a sufficient guarantee that their aspirations and interests coincide with those of the real leaders of the new Commonwealth.

Such schemes, it is true, are not for to-day, but they show nevertheless that even the most enlightened representatives of American and British public opinion cannot entirely rid themselves of the self-assurance of the strong when dealing with the weak. Conscious that they entertain no annexationist ambition, they fail to see that the smaller States might possibly lose in entering an association which would ensure their security and economic stability. There is, nevertheless, a psychological problem which no statistics can overcome. Just as the representative of a big Power is apt to become patronising, so the representative of a small Power is apt to become touchy. We should beware of despising or underrating these susceptibilities. Governments may take their decisions on other grounds, but the popular support on which they depend rests frequently on these fragile and irrational sentiments.

The difficulty is a very real one, and it should be faced in due time. There is no doubt about the sympathy of the small Western nations for Great Britain and France, to whom they are bound by a common outlook, a common culture and unforgettable memories. But there are two principles which are sacred to them and which cannot be questioned without alienating part of their public opinion. The first is the right to retain their neutrality, which they consider as the only guarantee of security left to them, now that the League

system has failed. The second is the right to retain their individuality, what they call their independence, their right to manage their own affairs in their own way. Any doubt expressed on these points provokes at once a discussion on the shortcomings of Versailles and on the negative policy followed ever since.

There is, perhaps, as much exaggeration in these views as in the conviction generally entertained in allied countries to-day that the recurrence of the 1914-18 struggle could in no circumstances have been avoided. The failure of the League was due to all its members, and it might be objected that if the smaller States were not satisfied with its policy, they should have opposed it openly, and if necessary severed all connection with it. Had they agreed together in time on certain political principles, as they agreed on economic principles, the Oslo Powers might have made their influence felt. The risks involved by the adoption of a more independent and positive policy ten years ago appears small indeed compared with those which have to be faced to-day. It would be useless to try to allocate responsibilities for the catastrophe. But it would be still more useless to ignore or gloss over the fact that the inhabitants of the small European countries have not yet overcome the disillusionment resulting from the present conflict, and entertain serious doubts concerning the recurrence of the two evils which have done so much harm during late years, vindictiveness and wishful thinking.

However painful, these things should be said; for they are the natural result of a long period of doubt and uncertainty, during which selfish and unselfish motives have been so strangely mixed that it has become difficult for outsiders to disentangle them. Neutrality is not, as often supposed, a painful necessity enforced upon small countries too weak or too timid to join in the struggle. It is the deliberate choice of their people, the inevitable reaction of the failure of Versailles. If the last Peace Treaty had been a true Peace Treaty, and the League a true "Society of Nations," such a reaction might never have occurred, but, things being what they are, no other result could be expected. Nothing is more likely to jeopardise future hopes of a satisfactory settlement than the development of an anti-neutral prejudice in this country. Preservation of the smaller nations of Western

Europe, not only as "buffer States" but as truly independent States in internal and external affairs, has always been one of the main principles of British policy. It is not merely the outcome of nineteenth-century Liberalism, still less that of twentieth-century self-determination. It is also a primary condition of British security. Both idealism and realism point in the same direction. Any pressure exerted on the small democracies to induce them to join the big democracies in this war would be a denial of traditions followed by England ever since she played a prominent part in European politics.

Reluctance to recognise the freedom of smaller nations may nevertheless affect the most enlightened and far-sighted critics. When American or British Federalists, for instance, speak of the desirability of enlarging the political unit they are convinced that they are not prompted in doing so by national ambition. They are shocked at the objections raised by the representatives of the smaller democracies and inclined to attribute them to reactionary obstructionism. Some of them go farther and consider such unwilling partners as negligible quantities, derelicts of the past. The fact is that there exists throughout the world a big power mentality and a small power mentality, which exerts its influence beside the democratic mentality or the autocratic mentality. Whether national sovereignty leads to the same abuses in a strong State as in a weak State is a question worthy of some consideration. The solution of our future difficulties does not lie in suppressing it, but in limiting its range of action.

There are two tendencies, among belligerent countries, with regard to these peace proposals. The first is to ignore them altogether and to "get on with the war." We know, from bitter experience, the results to be expected if this opinion prevails. The other is to prepare peace while waging war, and to try to avoid the repetition of certain faults which contributed to the failure of Versailles. Most of those engaged on this work recognise that non-belligerent co-operation will be indispensable, either in the framing of the settlement or in the economic reconstruction which must inevitably follow. How can such co-operation be effective if most Neutrals become involved in the conflict as they were in 1914-18, or if neutrality, the last bulwark of international law, is to be undermined in the countries which have dedicated themselves to its defence?

EMILE CAMMAERTS.

free people of democratic England still show such an ingrained respect for the traditional social hierarchy? Why has the conquest of political freedom and equal rights not been accompanied by the emergence of a strongly egalitarian spirit? The answer this time is psychological as well as historical. Historical inasmuch as the absence of egalitarianism is no doubt at least partly to be ascribed to the failure of the doctrines of the Rights of Man to strike a response across the Channel. Psychological inasmuch as this failure in turn is partly due to the Englishman's native disdain for abstract theory. The would-be Rousseaus who tried to spread the French creed in England never received more than scant attention. For just as the British working man of to-day is more interested in the practical work of his trade union leaders than in the theories of Sorel, Hegel, Nietzsche or even Marx, so the common people of an earlier time showed far more interest in the leadership of the thoroughly practical Cobbett than in the agitation of the ideological Tom Paine.

Finally there is this. Whereas in France and the U.S. the conquest of political freedom is historically associated with strongly egalitarian notions, the historical associations which it evokes in the mind of the Englishman are of an entirely different character. When the French democrat prides himself on having achieved the dignity and responsibility of political freedom he inevitably thinks of the Tricolore and all the revolutionary ideals it stood for. Similarly, when the American glories in his liberties he thinks, as on Thanksgiving Day, of the founding of a truly egalitarian community or, as on the Fourth of July, of its vindication against the aristocratic oligarchy overseas, or lastly of the rededication at Gettysburg of this community "where all men are born free and equal." For both these peoples the concept of political freedom is historically, and therefore psychologically, associated with thoughts and memories of egalitarianism.

Not so in England. When the Englishman prides himself on having achieved freedom long before anyone else or when he is exhorted to "preserve the glorious heritage for which his ancestors have fought," the historical reference is not, as in France or the U.S.A., to freedom in the sense of the sovereignty of the people but to the sovereignty of parliament, to the victory of an aristocratic oligarchy over the Crown. The "struggle for freedom" to him means Magna Charta, the

Civil War, the Glorious Revolution. It means the struggle of an upper class against the central power, often supported by the people, frequently beneficial to the people inasmuch as it was a struggle for the preservation of law and civil rights, but never led by the people, never waged on behalf of the political sovereignty of the people.

Moreover, the Englishman in talking about his ancestors' fight for freedom usually considers the struggle closed and freedom won with the final victory of Parliament over George III; in other words he identifies freedom rather with the protection of law and civil rights by an aristocratic oligarchy than with the political enfranchisement of a later day. Historically, therefore, the concept of freedom in England seems as closely associated with the sovereignty of parliament, that is to say the rule of an upper class, as in France and America it is associated with the eighteenth-century notions of the sovereignty of the people. Therein lies no doubt a partial explanation for the fact that, when the civil liberties of the English people, for centuries safeguarded by an aristocratic parliament, were at last supplemented by the grant of equality of political rights, this new measure of freedom was not felt as a tremendous liberation justifying an outburst of egalitarian feeling, nor seized upon as a means to snatch leadership out of the hands of the established ruling class.

In the light of history, then, it becomes possible to give some answer to the question which inspired this article. I would submit that it must be a positive answer, that the unique English conception of democracy, as it has emerged and is still emerging out of centuries of unbroken development, is one of which no free man need feel ashamed. Avoiding equally the delusions of egalitarianism and "popular government" the English seem to me to have evolved a society where all men are free and equal before the law, where the ethical values of democracy, freedom of conscience and personal responsibility, as well as the cultural values of an aristocratic style of life are allowed to flower freely, and where at the same time leadership remains to some extent in the hands of an upper class, no doubt like every other class possessed of vast imperfections, but none the less in many respects better qualified than any other for the task of keeping England true to its great and beneficial tradition of evolutionary development.

J. H. HUIZINGA.

KING CAROL AND RUMANIAN UNITY.

DIFFICULT is inevitably the word that rises first in the mind to express the situation of Rumania and the position of her King, but in view of the continuing crisis in South-Eastern Europe, dangerous or perhaps even desperate may be quickly added as a second thought. It is highly significant, however, that in any case it is the King himself, Carol the Second, upon whom universal attention is concentrated, because he does stand, it has come to be realised, for Rumania, not so much as a dictator, but rather as the trusted and accepted representative of the vast majority of her people, who rightly believe in his devotion to their interests. The outside world, as well as they, recognise the remarkable combination of firmness and prudence, plain speaking and restraint, that characterises his leadership in these perilous times. It is now a commonplace of our own popular Press to praise him for his "shrewdness" and "astuteness"—one of our papers the other day called him the "cleverest politician in the Balkans"—but the quality of his policy should be put far higher, for it is that of a statesman, calm, patient, steadfast and strong. That it has not always been so with him must be admitted, the truth being that he has grown in stature with the years.

That he is the veritable spokesman, the *porte-parole*, of the unity of Rumania, King Carol on three days, each a week apart but all closely connected in spirit, made manifest to the world in the most illuminating circumstances, so that there could be no mistake as to his meaning. On Christmas Day, 1939, he delivered a short speech at Oradea, "the city which lies," said he, "at the gates of our frontier." The particular frontier ran with that of Hungary, and only a short time before masses of Rumanian and Hungarian troops had glared at each other across it, but fortunately peace was preserved. Oradea lies in that strip of territory known as Crisana and Maramures which, with Transylvania, passed from Hungary to Rumania after the Great War. The Magyars demanded the return of the strip even more insistently than of Transylvania: it is the one concession, it has been suggested, in any bargaining with Hungary that an independent Rumania could possibly make, but Carol was serenely unconscious of anything of the sort. Addressing officers in the Army Club

of Oradea he noted the apparent contradiction in celebrating the birthday of the Great Peacemaker in such a gathering of soldiers, but submitted that the aim of his Army was not to covet that which did not belong to them: "it was, with peace in their hearts, to defend with determination that which was Rumanian." Later on that Christmas Day he went to Cluj, in the heart of Transylvania, and again he was among his soldiers. To them he said that in the conception of peace he wished to see included and become ever stronger in theirs, as in his, the idea that the Rumanian people should form a single unit, with a single thought and belief. "Let the soldiers who today guard our frontiers with arms in their hands," he continued, "have with them always this belief: let them see clearly that behind them there is only one people, one faith, and one desire." A determined defence by a united people was in effect his message to Hungary.

Nor was King Carol's message to Bulgaria less firm and clear. With the Crown Prince Michael, and attended by members of the Government, the heads of the Army, and other dignitaries the King spent New Year's Day, 1940, among the troops stationed in the Dobruja. At a public reception during the day at Constanza, the capital of the Dobruja, the King delivered the most important speech of the series. Though he did not refer specifically to the demand of Bulgaria for the "return" of Southern Dobruja, he gave no scintilla of encouragement to the "appeasers," not a few of whom are British, who appear to believe this should be granted because it would pacify her and lead her to join the Balkan Entente—a belief that the history of that country for the last thirty years does nothing to justify. Carol offered a review of the past year, and his tone was grave. He said that events which were beyond their control and they did not desire had caused the effort of Rumania to be mainly directed toward perfecting national defence, a term that had never before had a more vivid or a stronger meaning.

"It signifies," said the King, "our peaceful but determined policy. We do not strengthen our defences," he went on, "and complete the equipment of our Army in an aggressive spirit, but in a spirit of determination to defend what is ours and those rights which have been consecrated by the free decision of the meetings at Chisinau (Kisheneff), Cernauti (Czernowitz) and Alba-Julia. From within this definitely Rumanian framework we stand ready

AGAINST RACE-MADNESS: FIFTY YEARS AGO.

AS long as there is a specific Semitism there will always be its antithesis, Anti-Semitism. Only a classless society will eliminate existing sources of friction, the cause of former conflicts and wars. This truth is as old as Marxism itself, since Marx gave utterance to his thoughts on the Jewish Question. These thoughts are still true to-day. The Jews were persecuted by Asiatic despots, by Roman Cæsars, by English kings and Austrian emperors, by half-mad Bavarians and German lackeys. Hatred and persecution is not a new thing for the Jews. Two thousand years ago they were cast to the wild beasts in the Circus Maximus; to-day they are thrown to uniformed S.S. troopers. Torture and sacrifice remain the same; only the methods and the torturers have changed.

Reason revolts against this mass production of race-hatred, but it is one of the bitterest disappointments of our time that those who raise their voices against it are so few. The majority fear the proscription lists of the pogrom-makers that are already being drawn up in other countries in order soon to be publicly transformed according to the will of the "noble" Aryans. Wisdom, often the mother of cowardice, leaves the Jews to themselves and even all of them do not always venture to protest. One collects, one gives, one helps, but they are drops of water on a hot stone that is made to glow even more brightly by the demoralised and mendacious policy of our day. "Whose turn next?" whisper the Liberals of the still free countries as they anxiously scan the faces of the dictators, while the attitude of the great masses remains expectant as before, that is, dangerous and ambiguous.

These preliminary remarks are necessary in order to introduce the experiment that a compatriot of Hitler had undertaken, perhaps in an ingenious anticipation of rescuing his fatherland—Austria—which no longer exists to-day. Hermann Bahr, born on July 19th, 1863, in Linz, died on January 9th, 1934, in Munich, already the "capital of the Movement," is unjustly forgotten to-day. Not his work, which attained to some hundred volumes, was the essential result of his life, but the intensity of his changed opinions made him into a symbol of the last fifty years. His motto

was a saying of Goethe: "If the people believe I am still in Weimar, then I am already in Erfurt!" And Hermann Bahr was often in many Erfurts. He began as a Social Democrat. Then he was an atheist, a member of the "*Burschenschaft*," a pan-German, a naturalist, a symbolist and impressionist. Later he became a liberal, clerical, Austrian monarchist, and died as a convinced Catholic. A kindly fate shielded him from a final transformation into a Nazi. As already indicated, his books are forgotten, his dramas are no longer staged, although they are gay and still of some interest, his ten volumes of diaries are read only by literary historians, for their wealth of information and ideas, his novels have been replaced by more easily digestible stuff, his monographs are already literature, i.e. they are dead. His legacy and inheritance have a sad appearance. His own generation has died out, the succeeding one came into the world still-born.

But there is one book that deserves to be rescued from oblivion, perhaps even to be republished. It is entitled *Anti-Semitism, an "International Interview" collected by Hermann Bahr*. It was published by Fischer of Berlin in 1894, i.e. at a time when the future Führer was taking his first anti-Semitic steps. Hermann Bahr did what no one before him, and so far as I know no one after him, has undertaken. He sought out the most important men of his time and questioned them about a problem of the day. And these men in Germany, Belgium, England, France, Scandinavia, actually answered. The replies then appeared in a Vienna journal and later in book form. We will examine in detail the contents of this volume for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it is interesting even to-day to know what the men of yesterday and the day before yesterday had to say of this curse of humanity. Secondly, it is important to see how far the attitude towards Anti-Semitism has changed up to the present. Thirdly, it is useful to investigate whether any of the remedies then suggested have been realised.

The book opens with an introduction by Bahr himself. What he has to say is still worthy of attention to-day, even if the method and the scientific foundation of Anti-Semitism have fundamentally changed. If the Anti-Semitism of that time was a purely foreign doctrine imported into Germany through the works of the Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the Frenchman Count Gobineau, the Russian

F. M. Dostojevsky, and the Austrian Jörg Lanz-Liebenfels, then the Germans forty years later with Gross, Günther and Rosenberg produced their own. At first Bahr explains Anti-Semitism as a matter of biological morphology. "It is a sign of our times that our jaded and weary nerves require some artificial stimulus to recover their equanimity. Anti-Semitism is the morphia of small-minded people." But he also finds an ethico-psychological foundation for it—"Because they lack the pleasure of love, they attempt to replace it by the pleasure of hatred. *Who* is hated does not in fact matter. The Jew just happens to fit into the picture. If there were no Jews they would have to invent them. For the Führer there is no more obvious instrument than demagoguery. Perhaps Socialism is the only cure for Anti-Semitism."

When one bears in mind that these words were written when Anti-Semitism and its present-day Führer were still in swaddling clothes and when its earlier protagonists, such as Biehelolawek, Lueger, Schönerer and Weisskirchner *et hoc genus omne*, had just arrived at adolescence, then one must admit that Hermann Bahr was hot on the scent. The first of those interviewed was the poet, Friedrich Spielhagen (1829-1911), whose novel *Problematic Natures* was then world famous but is now completely forgotten. Friedrich Spielhagen expressed himself briefly but to the point. (Bahr's "local colour" descriptions in this as in all other instances are delightful. Considerations of space, however, compel us to omit them.) The poet declares: "On psychological grounds Anti-Semitism cannot be understood. It is an economic question that demands an economic solution. Its religious and national aspects are nothing more than masquerade and phantasy."

Theodor Barth (1849-1911), a Liberal politician and a member of the Reichstag, editor of the weekly *Nation*, said: "Anti-Semitism is a kind of socialism of the Junkers . . . by the Junkers for the Junkers. Nationalism and religion are only a cloak. Their hatred of the Jew is only their hatred of progress. For them the Jews are the symbol of that new age that means their end. They require confusion and unrest, in order to bring the people once more under their power." These are equally prophetic *dicta*, especially if one only realises that the Nazis are nothing more than the heirs and successors of the Junkers who plunder the people in the same way through their new party hierarchy.

The third on the list was August Bebel (1840-1913), the co-founder and leader of the Social Democratic party and author of *Woman and Socialism*. He stated: "Kronawetter said 'Anti-Semitism is the socialism of the stupid.' That is a pretty idea, but it does not solve the question. The Romans are more strongly intermingled with the Jews and cannot distinguish them from their own nationality. The Germans recognise the Jew more easily and therefore regard him as a stranger, and so on account of a lower intellectual development, hatred plays a great rôle. This Anti-Semitism can be fully explained from these facts. To this must be added that it is artificially stirred and fostered by all kinds of people. *We look on calmly and wait.*" It would be unfair to reproach a man who has been dead twenty-five years that only in the Anti-Semitic question has the "calmly wait and see" attitude been bitterly avenged. As an example of a falsely conceived historical determinism, Bebel's reply is at any rate for all time significant.

Next comes Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903), the great jurist and historian, Nobel prize-winner, already at an advanced age. His reply is perhaps the clearest, sharpest and most surprising. "I have formerly again and again protested against the disgrace which is called Anti-Semitism. But it is useless, in vain. All our arguments are always logical and ethical, but no Anti-Semite listens to them. They only listen to their own malignant instincts. They are deaf to reason, right or morality. Against the rabble there is no remedy. *Canaille* remains *canaille* and Anti-Semitism is the conviction of the *canaille*. It is a frightful epidemic like the cholera. One can neither explain nor cure it. One must wait patiently until the poison has worked itself out and loses its power." Mommsen closes with a plan that may still have force to-day. "If one would draw up a short protest against Anti-Semitism that should repeat in a few sentences the best-known principles and be signed by all the most important persons of Europe, by the intellectual noblemen of all countries and peoples—that could not miss its effect. That might surely after all bring one or other person to his senses and would at least save our honour with posterity if we could bequeath a document to them that would show that the good of all peoples are in league against the most disgraceful disease of our time." The good old professor! His imagination, which was more familiar with the

to extend a friendly hand to whoever is disposed to grasp it loyally."

The reference to the "meetings"—at which in 1918 the new provinces themselves voted for union with the old Rumanian Kingdom or Regat—deals with the strange misconception or misrepresentation that the Greater Rumania which emerged from the war of 1914-18 was an artificial creation of the Peace Treaties. It is astonishing how widespread is this mistake and in what unexpected quarters it is found. For instance, the Military Correspondent of a popular British paper declared, in commenting lately on the Balkan situation, that Rumania held Transylvania as a "reward" for coming in on the side of the Allies in the Great War—an absolute misstatement of fact, but perhaps a compliment to tendentious propaganda.

In the Constanza speech King Carol branched off from foreign policy to internal affairs, particularly the institutions for whose existence he himself was and is responsible, and which undoubtedly, as things stand, do make for the unity of Rumania. His precise words may be quoted:

"The new constitutional régime, strengthened by the organisation of the National Renaissance Front, from the ranks of which I appointed the present Government, offers us the frame within which must take shape, in a spirit of efficient administration, the policy of the country. The Government has laid down a programme of desirable achievements which calls for strenuous work and long-continued service and action, but I am sure that with my support and the support of all men of goodwill it will be completed without any hesitancy."

That is the unshifting ground of Carol's appeal—to all men of goodwill. After the Goga fiasco in governing the country in the first part of 1938 the King, tightening his control, replaced the loosely democratic Constitution of 1923 by a new Constitution, according to which Ministers were responsible only to the Crown and the voters' age was raised from 21 to 30. This was followed first by a decree abolishing all political parties and, second, toward the close of that year, by the creation of one great, single, legitimate political organisation, the National Renaissance Front or Front of National Rebirth. Continuing his speech Carol said: "Today, when through the National Renaissance Front the unity of the country's policy has been realised, when the sterile struggles governed

by personal interest have been eliminated, the way thus cleared is made secure for necessary and effective achievements. . . . In difficult times the labour of those at the head of the country should be strengthened by the concentrated effort of all the active and creative forces of the nation. Today there is no longer any place for personal interest that cannot be harmonised with the common good."

On January 6th King Carol made a speech at the Army Headquarters in Chisinau, the capital of Bessarabia, and neither could he nor anyone there refrain from thinking that sinister Soviet Russia lay just across the Dniester, waiting an opportunity to cross it. The King did not mention her in his remarks any more than Hungary or Bulgaria in his other speeches. What he did say was, it was with great joy that he took the opportunity of spending Epiphany among the soldiers who guarded the eastern frontier of Rumania. "Every time I come to this corner of our land, between the Pruth and the Dniester, what I feel is not," said he, "that I am coming to a country which has been re-attached to Rumania, but to a country which has been, is and always will be Rumanian land." Earlier that morning there had been service in the cathedral and the "Blessing of the Waters"; the King's speech was preceded by addresses of welcome from representatives of the German, Ukrainian and Russian minorities of Bessarabia, and Carol told them how deeply he was moved to hear they were content to be, body and soul, a part of the Rumanian entity, while maintaining their own beliefs and languages. The union of all and everything Rumanian, regardless of racial origins, had preoccupied him for years, and he rejoiced in witnessing every day the bringing of its fulfilment nearer and nearer. "The songs of our poets of old," said Carol, "which declared that no enemy can penetrate where there is unity, must eternally resound in the souls of all Rumanians. . . . Only through unity in thought and feeling will the country be determinedly and permanently defended. I am sure the reality of union is firmly implanted in all living in this part of the country and indeed throughout Rumania, and that this union can never be eradicated from the Rumanian land and the Rumanian soul."

Primarily the set of the three days' speeches was addressed to the Rumanian Army by the King, who himself is a soldierly man, usually is in uniform, and loves to spend some time with

his troops, and secondarily to the Rumanian people, but the Press of the whole world took it up and commented on it. What Carol made abundantly plain was that instead of being prepared to cede territory, as some urged her to do, Rumania, on the contrary, was ready and resolute to defend all of it against any attack. Hungary, Bulgaria and Soviet Russia had been warned off, but what about Germany? That was the question asked everywhere. It was well known that Hitler was putting severe pressure on Carol for the supplies of oil and other things needed by the German Army, and that the King had deemed it essential for the security of his country to comply to a considerable extent with the Fuehrer's behests, a fresh agreement in December having been signed in supplement of the trade convention of the previous March which gave the Reich great advantages without corresponding benefits to Rumania. Then there was the intimidating obscurity that hung over the relations of Hitler with Stalin, despite the latter's defeats in Finland, though these for a time encouraged all the other small nations to stand to their neutrality *faute de mieux*. And what of Italy? To say nothing of the Allies' guarantee? Across all this complex of speculation, much of it not disinterested, there came in mid-January an authentic report that, thanks to the initiative and drive of Carol, a formidable network of dykes, tank traps and pill-boxes, a sort of Maginot Line of defences hundreds of miles long, was rapidly nearing completion on the frontiers of Rumania. Known as Carol's Dyke, the line stretches alongside the Hungarian frontier and reaches up to the Bukovina in the north, thence descends parallel with the Dniester, ending finally on the Black Sea. The King started the work on it as far back as September 1938—a result or an echo, it might be called, of the tragic Munich Agreement. On or behind this wonderful system of fortifications and obstacles Rumania can hold up even Germany, at all events for a time. One thinks of the high value of the Mannerheim Line to Finland and of the fatal lack of such a line to Poland.

Nearly ten years have passed since Carol, then ex-Crown Prince, returning from exile, stepped out of a plane on the Bucarest airport and within forty-eight hours was proclaimed King in place of his son Michael, a boy of 10. Already regarded by many as a romantic figure, Carol thrilled all Europe by the daring and success of the *coup d'état*—until it

transpired that the whole affair was in reality a premeditated move of the Rumanian Government, then headed by Juliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party, which had come into office in the previous year, and was of a democratic character. The famous family of the Bratianus had ruled the country almost dictatorially for about sixty years as the heads of a so-called Liberal Party, but towards the end of that period the economic condition of the State was almost chaotic, and this gave the National Peasants their chance, for under their opposition the Bratianus took fright and permitted the Regency Council, appointed for Michael's minority, to call Maniu to power—for all that, Maniu's position was not too strong; the Bratianus recovered their wits, and attacked him in various ways, their chief weapon being their hold on the National Bank. In the spring of 1930 Maniu's Government was greatly affected by a deepening of the financial and economic crisis largely engineered by his opponents, though its basis was the "world slump." The Bratianus were bitter enemies of Carol, and his recall by Maniu was an obvious and probably a decisive move on the political chess-board. It was decisive in a manner not in accordance with Maniu's plans, which had counted on Carol's taking his place as one of the Regents. Carol himself said he would leave the matter to the National Assembly, but his friends had been active, and that body, convoked in extraordinary session, declared null and void the Act of 1926 which had decreed his resignation as heir to the Throne and driven him into exile.

"There is a tremendous task to be done here," said the new King to M. Sauerwein, the distinguished French journalist. "Rumania has vast resources and we must make them productive, thus strengthening the country economically. The Army must be organised. Restored to a normal régime and enjoying the advantages of stability, Rumania may aspire to a high place in Europe." Carol set himself to become the stable element in his kingdom, high above all its factions, but naturally it took some time to live down the reputation given him of being the "Ruritanian playboy of Europe," as he had been named not too kindly. He acquired more and more power. In an interview published in 1935, after declaring that if he wished he could easily be a dictator like other dictators of the age, he said that considering the factional strife with which Rumania was cursed when he reached the throne, no

mind of the old Nero than with that of his present-day successor, could surely not have dreamt that such a document would long since have gone the way of the Reichstag, the Oberfohren letter and Hindenburg's testament. Nevertheless, it might still have some value if a man of international repute would reopen the question and bring this legacy of Mommsen into being.

The next is Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), the celebrated political and social economist. He says: "You cannot to-day renounce the equality before the law of Aryans and Jews, in our central and Western-European civilised states. One must merely strive to promote the assimilation of the various race elements by a uniform system of education and strengthening the unifying elements in ethics and morals. There must, therefore, be no incitements. The good among the Jews should be well treated, the bad ones badly, i.e. as individuals, not as a rank or class." A certain pastor Schneider (1826-1905) declared briefly and conclusively: "I find no cause either from the Christian or national standpoint to combat the Jews." Maximilian Harden (1861-1927), the well-known political journalist and author, formulated his point of view as follows: "You can do nothing with complaints about Anti-Semitism. One must ask: 'What is at fault, whence comes this disease, how can one constrain it or guard against it?' One must fight against the corrupting power of capitalism, whether one is Jew or Christian, then there will be peace in the family between Jews and Germans, which is so much more difficult with us than elsewhere, since Jews and Germans resemble each other too much."

Moritz von Egidy (1847-1898), Christian, officer and author, protagonist of an undogmatic Christianity declared: "Judaism flourishes among the civilised people and so fulfils its destiny for the development of the human race. So long as Anti-Semitism clings to such wretched ideas among us Germans that half a million human beings of a different race can oppress our fifty millions, so long will the normal and right-minded person see in the whole movement only the expression of an un-Christian mentality, that wishes to saddle its own deficiencies and pitiable state upon a defenceless minority." Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), philosopher and zoologist, author of the *Riddle of the Universe*, in the course of a richly complicated discussion with Bahr, said: "The

enlightened and distinguished Jews have always stood for freedom and progress and were reliable combatants against the men of darkness. We must not dispense with their proved courage." Adolf Wagner (1835-1917), economist and state-socialist, stated in evidence: "These people abuse the Jew and mean the capitalist. The social question remains unchanged with or without the Jews and demands a solution for itself that will perhaps hit this or that Jew just as it hits the Christian capitalist, but with Jewry itself as such it has nothing to do."

Prince Henry von Schoenaich-Carolath (1852-1920), for forty years National Liberal member of the Reichstag, found that Anti-Semitism should be fought as a great danger to our whole civilisation because it threatens to thrust us back to the age of intolerance. The more the Jewish people assimilate with the German the more it will lose that peculiarity which sometimes hurts our feelings. Heinrich Rickert (1863-1934), historian and philosopher, states laconically: "Words are no use against Anti-Semitism. We need work." The poet, John Henry Mackay (1864-1934) assured Bahr: "One cannot expect that a serious-minded person should take Anti-Semitism seriously. He who nowadays still quarrels about race or religion, instead of as a human being fighting for humanity, stands self-condemned. The Germans are always the last in matters of culture, but in that of universal stupidity they are always the first, as, for instance, in Anti-Semitism. I have given up looking for reasonable people among them."

So far the Germans whom Bahr interviewed. Of the Scandinavians, Ibsen and Björnson answered in writing. The former wrote: "I can say nothing about Anti-Semitism since the whole movement is completely beyond my entire comprehension." Björnson replied: "What do I think of continental Anti-Semitism? The hatred of capitalism has lost its direction." Of the Frenchmen, the author Naquet, the politician Jules Simon, the economist Leroy, the journalists Magnard, Arthur Meyer, Ed. Pailleron, Severine, and the philosopher Ch. Morice rejected the whole idea of Anti-Semitism. Only Alphonse Daudet, General Cluseret and Henry Rochefort approved of it. Two Spaniards, Al. Sawa and N. Zorilla opposed it. Of the two Belgians, P. Janson was against and Ed. Riccard for Anti-Semitism. Of the six British authorities, Sir Charles Dilke, Arthur James Balfour, Henry Labouchère,

course was open to him except to make himself supreme arbitrator and insist that his decisions be accepted and fulfilled. At that juncture Carol thought and said he would never force a dictatorship on his people; he still maintains that he is not a dictator in the full English sense of that term, and that in any case party labels have not the same meaning in Rumania as in England. Races, it has properly been observed, which had been kept for centuries under the blighting rule of Imperial Turkey, could not be expected to practise skilfully the difficult art of parliamentary government. Personal interests had ruled Rumanian politics far too long and too much; not national interests. Carol's tremendous task has been not only to conserve the latter but to get the Rumanians as a nation to support him loyally and gladly in performing it. Doubtless he has his enemies and detractors, for instance, in the disgruntled politicians of the Bucarest coffee-houses, but most observers on the spot agree that he has made good and that the nation is with him.

Perhaps the most formidable opposition to King Carol has been that of the Fascist movement, known for some years as the Iron Guard and more recently as the All for the Fatherland Party. Originally a "Youth" movement of disillusionment and disgust with conditions after the Great War, and having an attractive element of mysticism about it, the Iron Guard, under the leadership of Codreanu, a Ukrainian Rumanian, was powerful enough to bring off the assassination of Duca, then Prime Minister, in 1933, and other political murders, the result being frankly terroristic. Efforts to put down the organisation were only superficially successful; it drew fresh life from Nazi support, and in the elections in November 1937 it had about 17 per cent. of the votes, to the 38 per cent. of the Liberals, and 22 per cent. for the National Peasants, with whom Codreanu had made an election pact which discredited both parties. Out of the confusion came the fantastic Goga Cabinet of the National Christian Party, and its rank failure caused its dismissal by the King and the suppression of parliamentary government, as of all parties, already noted. The All for the Fatherland Party was dissolved. In November 1938, Codreanu, who had been arrested, was shot with some of his followers "while attempting to escape," but sympathisers retaliated in September last year by assassinating M. Calinescu, then Prime Minister. Carol must

still have to reckon with such gentry, but it is characteristic that he takes no special precautions to preserve his life. He believes that he is popular enough for that; he looks for loyalty from his people. To his personal friends he has always been loyal—until he found them unworthy of trust; his loyalty to Czechoslovakia in her darkest hour caused one of her sons to say that Carol was the "only gentleman in Europe." As for the Rumanian minorities the Government, by his direction, published in 1938 a new Minority Statute authorising the German, Hungarian and Bulgarian minorities to organise themselves into national communities for the defence of their cultural, economic and social interests. In short, King Carol is a great Executive, showing besides in himself an example of a working day of from twelve to fourteen hours, and a purposefulness that has absolutely nothing casual, small or mean about it.

ROBERT MACHRAY.

Annie Besant, Sidney Whitman and Timothy Healy, we need quote only Arthur James Balfour: "There is no Jewish question in England at all, and although the problems connected with immigration from Russia and Central Europe have excited and still excite a good deal of attention in this country, this is not because the immigrants are Jews, but because they are paupers."

After the thirty-eight interviews, Bahr wrote a brief epilogue. "I found the question different in every country. German Anti-Semitism is reactionary, French revolutionary. In Spain, England and Scandinavia, there are no Anti-Semites; in Belgium, one. All kinds of reasons are given for and against Anti-Semitism, but they seem to be without force. It confirms my suspicion that it originates more in a special arrangement of the nerves than in an hysterical greed. Because they cannot find help in this woebegone age they lap up the narcotic of hate. One ought to seek a new ideal for them." So ends the book that appeared more than forty years ago, with a longing for an idea. Here it touches upon the lines, published a generation later by the German, Carl von Ossietzky, murdered by Germans:

"We shall surely have to begin again with new human beings."

FRITZ GROSS.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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RECENT REVELATIONS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY.*

The first edition of this well-known book came out in 1927. The novelty of the information in it was largely accountable for its original attractiveness. The successive editions, however, prove that its value to students and to the general public extends far beyond its revelations which naturally by this time are no longer new, except in so far as material has been disclosed subsequently to the publication of a previous edition. This is, indeed, what has happened. Dr. Gooch has an unrivalled knowledge of contemporary work in modern history, whether put forth in books, pamphlets, reviews or even in the daily press. Accordingly though the period of history that it deals with is 1888-1919, the present edition is completely up to date in the sense that it includes any material disclosed down to the present time. As a result of revision, rewriting, omission and addition, this fourth edition is, in about one-half of it, a new book.

Dr. Gooch calls the book a *causerie*. It is written in pleasant, easy, narrative style. It is, accordingly, not in the ordinary sense of the word a bibliography, which is a list or collection of lists of books with, perhaps, notes. Dr. Gooch's book is a

* *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. By G. P. Gooch, C.H., D.Litt., F.B.A. Fourth Edition. Longmans. 10s.

DANUBIAN UNION.

THE aims and prospects of a Danubian Union can only be rightly understood against the historical background provided by the experiences of the old Austria-Hungary which really was such a union. The old Monarchy was primarily formed through a voluntary combination of the forces of different peoples for the purpose of repelling the Turks and for general co-operation. The need of such co-operation had already been felt before the Turkish menace. Several German, Czech, Hungarian and Polish rulers had tried to form groups of some of the Danubian peoples with more or less success. At last the Habsburgs succeeded in building up a big Empire which became a mainstay of the European Balance of Power, checking the aggressive ambitions of Turkey, France, Prussia, Russia and Italy. In this policy Austria was the natural ally of England, particularly as she was the only Great Power not striving for colonial expansion. The long struggles about the Balance of Power frequently resulted in expansion, but in the course of time it became more and more evident that the internal structure of the Empire, composed of many autonomous territories and ten or more nationalities, was not compatible with a policy of aggression and expansion. With the rise of nationalism the Empire was shaken by violent internal struggles, first between the central government and nationalities striving for independence, later between different nationalities, striving for a privileged and dominating position in their territories. The Emperor and his officials stood for a strong central authority and central institutions, for without them the Empire would have been unable to hold its own against the ambitions of other powerful states. Its existence was obviously a necessity for the Danubian peoples, which in isolation were too weak to secure their freedom and economic progress.

The pioneer of the Czech national movement, Palacky, declared in 1848 that if Austria did not exist she would have to be invented, for otherwise the Czechs would either be swallowed by Germany or by Russia. This forecast has been confirmed by the tragic fate of the Czech people in our days. The Emperor Francis Joseph, however, soon realised the necessity of winning all his peoples by meeting their political and national demands to such an extent that the existence

and strength of the Empire would not be impaired. He began by granting a very wide measure of autonomy to the Hungarians, Poles and Croats (1867-8), and he expressed his willingness to make the same concessions to the Czechs (1871). A reform of the constitution was worked out by the ministers Hohenwart and Schaeffle which was hailed by the Czechs as fulfilling their national aspirations. But it aroused the violent resistance of the Germans, who were supported by the Hungarians, and as these two nations were more than three times as numerous as the Czechs, the scheme could not be carried out. The crucial point of most national problems in Austria-Hungary was that it proved impossible to satisfy one of the nationalities without arousing the wrath of others, ready to go to extremes if their standpoint was disregarded. Any nationality having attained a certain level of civilisation claimed the right to a ruling position in its territory and domination over the minorities. The Emperor, therefore, could win the Hungarians and the Poles because the minorities in their territories were backward, passive and weak. But he could not fully satisfy the Czechs because their national rivals the Germans were foremost in wealth, civilisation and political power. After the Compromise, concluded between the Crown and the Hungarians in 1867, Austria and Hungary were separate, sovereign states, having the ruler and some institutions in common. Hungary was a rather centralised state, though Croatia had her own parliament and government, and enjoyed a wide autonomy which was abolished by the Serbs after the war. In Hungary the Magyars vigorously maintained their supremacy and to some extent tried to impose their language on the other nationalities. On the whole the results of this policy were not very great, as statistics show, but it was certainly unwise and provoked violent complaints of national oppression. After the Great War, however, the Magyars had good reason to complain of similar measures of some Succession states against Magyar minorities. Austria formed a sort of federation in which no nationality had paramount power, though some were more influential than others because of their larger number, their more advanced development or historic rights. Such differences were more and more levelled up by the progressive development of other nationalities. In 1906 a great franchise reform for the central Parliament was passed, granting the

literary work which, incidentally, can serve as a bibliography for it does mention every important collection of documents and many other sources, titles which few, if any, other scholars could collect for themselves. No title is mentioned without a good critical account of it, a marvellous amount of information and judgment conveyed, often, in just a few lines.

The *tempo* of contemporary history is so tremendous that we are apt to think of material published fifteen or twenty years ago as already old. It is good for us to be taken back to the majestic publication of the Weimar Republic, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, completed, in fifty-two volumes, in 1926. Dr. Gooch does not confine himself to analysis. He delivers judgments, the result of his enormous and thorough reading. Bismarck, from 1871 to 1890, was "the chief pillar of European peace." He was a virtuoso, such as appears "perhaps once in a century," and he obtained his results by diplomatic means of intricate but consummate artistry. "With the dismissal of Bismarck, the control of German policy passed to lesser men." Indeed, the documents and all other sources of the period 1890-1914 show, though Dr. Gooch does not explicitly draw this conclusion, that the control of policy in every country was passing to lesser men. Not big men but respectable might perhaps be the verdict on the statesmen who collectively allowed Europe to drift and then finally to rush into the World War. The German Government of 1914 was as respectable as the rest. The documents "disproved the legend that the directors of German policy deliberately unleashed a general war"—though they took certain steps which they knew involved a serious risk of general war.

Dr. Gooch searches the printed documents or memoirs from every country which materially contributed to the subject. There are excellent pages on the publications from the Balkan States including Turkey. The Young Turks came very badly out of the Turkish memoirs. Considerable space is devoted to Serbian revelations, somewhat disturbing to people who remember the perhaps naïve explanations of Serbian policy in 1914. The author deals at considerable length with Austrian policy, and has some particularly helpful paragraphs on Aehrenthal, after reading the relevant

three thousand pages of *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, a series published since the first edition of Dr. Gooch's book. The character and policy of Francis Joseph remains enigmatic, although a good deal has been written about him. More informing material has been published about the Emperor Karl who saw how to save the Monarchy but was not quite big enough for the task. When Count Berchtold, whose ultimatum started the war, called himself (in a publication of 1935) a pacifist, the reader is not wholly convinced; but Berchtold, doubtless, only *wanted* a local war. None other of the statesmen of 1914, however, seem to have been so simple as to expect that the war could be localised.

The commentary on British publications has about eighty pages. Far and away the most important British publication is the *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, in ten volumes (really twelve, for two of the volumes are each divided into two massive, separately published parts). This amazingly frank series (containing most secret memoranda of permanent officials) was edited by Dr. Gooch and Dr. Temperley and was completed only about a year before Temperley's death. The plentiful English memoirs, particularly Lloyd George's, are naturally given considerable prominence, and some very impressive passages are quoted. Using these in the chapters on France and the United States, it is impossible not to obtain a fine conspectus of the Peace Conference of Paris and the making of the Treaty of Versailles which comes rather well (as it deserves to do) out of the survey. In the section on the United States, Mr. Charles Seymour's *Intimate Papers of Colonel House* are picked out as "the most important American contribution to the diplomatic background of the war." There is a brief but very valuable analysis of Professor Shotwell's *At the Peace Conference*; a timely summary of Newton D. Baker's *Why we went to War*, published in 1936; and an apposite long quotation from Admiral Sims' *Victory at Sea* of a conversation between Sims and Jellicoe at the time of the great sinkings of mercantile ships in April 1917.

The book is packed with information, judgments, evidence, ideas. It is one of the "closest" historical works ever penned, the whole being contained in 470 pages, every line of which tells.

R. B. MOWAT.

vote to every male adult. This was chiefly due to the Emperor, who ordered the Government to use their whole influence in favour of the bill. His intention was to overcome the sterile bickerings of the nationalists by opening Parliament to representatives of the broad masses who were more interested in social reforms. He wished to carry through the general franchise in Hungary too, which would have decisively improved the position of the national minorities and the masses. This, however, was foiled through the war.

Besides the Austrian central Parliament there existed in every one of the seventeen countries composing Austria a territorial Parliament with wide powers. The administrative functions were divided between the Imperial officials, appointed by the central Government, and the autonomous officials, appointed by the president of the territorial Parliament, who had also executive powers. The majorities in the territorial Parliaments were formed by different nationalities, in the central countries by the Germans, in Bohemia and Moravia by the Czechs, in Galicia by the Poles, in Carniola by the Slovenes, in Dalmatia by the Croats, etc. In addition, the towns and other smaller districts possessed a good deal of autonomy, which was often abused by nationalists in discriminating against minorities in local affairs.

After the break-up of greater Austria all the Succession States, except the small Austrian Republic, suppressed these territorial Parliaments and introduced a centralised Government in order to secure the predominance of the ruling nation over the minorities. In Austria the language rights of the different minorities, their share in schools, cultural and economic institutions and in the administration, were regulated in a very liberal way, which on the whole was certainly not surpassed in fairness by the legislation and practice of any of the Succession States, and in many cases was not equalled. As an illustration the position of the Czechs in old Austria is shown by the following figures. Their share in the population was 23 per cent., in the number of M.P.s 21 per cent., in Cabinet Ministers (1900 to 1914) 19 per cent., in officials 24.9 per cent., in teachers 24.9 per cent. Of the elementary schools 24.5 per cent. were Czech, of secondary schools 23.3 per cent., of students in universities and technical colleges 19 per cent. Among all the nationalities of Austria the Czechs had the smallest percentage of illiterates, namely

2.4 per cent., while the Germans came second with 3.1 per cent. The Czechs also possessed a highly developed agriculture and industry, and their banks had assets of more than 200 million sterling. Extensive statistical calculations show that in the last twenty years before the Great War the national income, wages and savings in Austria almost doubled. Twenty years after the outbreak of the war the national income was everywhere smaller than before 1914, in spite of the tremendous technical progress in the world. Certainly national and social conditions could still have been much improved, and many most promising reforms were proposed by successive Governments which would have gone far to meet the claims of nationalities. Unfortunately, progress was frequently impeded by the uncompromising opposition of one nationality against reforms to the advantage of other ones. The radical Pan-Germans were particularly aggressive and obstinate in this respect. Nevertheless the great majority of the Austrian peoples did not think of breaking away before the war. The irredentist sections were quite insignificant. In Hungary they were larger, but even there they were far from forming the majority.

This is confirmed by the findings of the most competent English experts. Professor Seton-Watson wrote in his book, *The Future of Austria-Hungary* (1907), that the view that the Monarchy would soon collapse was entirely superficial, and that he disbelieved not merely in the probability but even in the possibility of a break-up of Austria-Hungary. In any case, France and Great Britain should make every effort to preserve the Dual Monarchy as a political and economic unit. In his book on the Southern Slav question (1913) he called the view that Austria-Hungary was a weak, decadent state ripe for partition a senseless myth. Mr. Wickham Steed declared in 1913: "I have been unable to perceive during ten years of constant observation and experience—years, moreover, filled with struggle and crisis—any sufficient reason why, with moderate foresight on the part of the dynasty, the Hapsburg Monarchy should not retain its rightful place in the European community. Its internal crises are often crises of growth rather than of decay." The peoples of Austria, indeed, had become weary of the national squabbles and the conviction was spreading more and more that no nation was strong enough to defeat its adversaries. The German-Czech

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE.*

This little book which is dedicated to that great European, Aristide Briand, is a restatement of the well-known ideas of the author. It is written in simple and incisive language and may be described as the manifesto of the movement which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi founded in 1922. There were a number of men and women who after the last war realised that there was something fundamentally wrong in the political structure of Europe, and that only a complete reorganisation of this sorely tried continent offered any chance for Europe to prosper again, indeed even to survive. The present war amply proves how right people like the author of this stirring appeal to Europe were. At a time when everywhere in the world there is a tendency to create large economic and political units, Europe is still disunited and is engaged on what Napoleon would rightly describe as a civil war. The American continent is such a unit, Russia stretching over one-sixth of the land surface of the globe is another, a third unit is in process of formation in the Far East; only Europe is divided by economic and political frontiers and even in peace time is organised or rather disorganised into hostile camps in which powerful armies wait to fall on the enemy. This state of affairs is sheer madness if one considers that the North American Federal Republic is greater in area than the disunited states of Europe.

Nine people out of ten with whom one discusses this question will readily admit the futility and lunacy of European nationalism, but most of them will shrug their shoulders and declare that they see no way out. Obviously it would be the most sensible thing if the states of Europe united, at least in some form of economic collaboration, but what can one do in the face of stupidity against which, according to Schiller, even gods fight in vain? If anything can convince these people, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's book will do so, at any rate it will make them think. It is not essential that one should agree with all the details of the solution which the author offers; the important thing is that the spirit which animates the book should prevail. It is for this reason that it should be read by everyone who is concerned about the future of this continent of ours, the cradle of western

* *Europe Must Unite*. By Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. Paneuropa Editions. 5s. 6d.

civilisation and, if we do not take care, its grave. The author is quite aware of the immense difficulties which lie in the path that should lead us to the United States of Europe. He does not merely gloss over these difficulties with the glib adage that the utopias of to-day are the realities of to-morrow, he discusses them with profound historical knowledge and insight.

It might seem that at the present moment the ideal of European unity is further from any hope of realisation than ever before. There is little doubt that a victory of National Socialism would put an end to all such hopes. But it may well be that the bitter experience of this gigantic struggle will create such a surfeit with the old conditions amongst all the European nations that the task of creating a better and saner Europe will not be quite as herculean as it might appear to-day. One thing is certain, the more people want a just and reasonable settlement of all outstanding problems, the smaller is the chance that the mistakes of Versailles will be repeated. Europe must be united in a collaboration of free peoples, whatever form this collaboration may take, or it will perish. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's book should lie open on the table of the next peace conference.

R. ARIS.

A SACRAMENTAL UNIVERSE.*

This book, "Being a Study in the Metaphysics of Experience," is an important contribution to present-day philosophical discussions. Its production has been complicated by the lamented death of the author, Professor Archibald Allan Bowman. He had been preparing to give the Vanuxem Lectures in the United States, but passed away before the work was completed. He had prepared a lengthy and detailed statement of the metaphysical prolegomena which led up to his specific theme as Part I of the volume, and had prepared notes for Part II of the Lectures. The work as thus left has been carefully and efficiently edited by Professor J. W. Scott, of the University College, Cardiff.

The treatment of the subject is complex and difficult. In this brief review only a general account can be given. Professor

* *A Sacramental Universe*. By Archibald Allan Bowman. Oxford Univ. Press. 22s. 6d.

compromise of 1905, establishing national peace in Moravia, was a hopeful symptom. Yet this development was completely foiled through the outbreak of war. The internal struggles had encouraged external enemies longing for expansion to organise irredentist movements within the Empire, and this had led to the formation of a small but active war party among Austro-Hungarian generals and diplomatists, which in spite of long resistance on the part of the Emperor and the leading statesmen at last attained their aim. The declaration of war against Serbia can only be described as suicidal folly. However, it must not be forgotten that Serbia had gone very far in provoking Austria-Hungary in the years preceding the war. She was also hardly entitled to pose as the champion of national freedom considering that she had just annexed the non-Servian Macedonians, had then almost embroiled Europe in war by her attempt to annex the non-Servian Albanians, and after the war treated the Croats in such a way that they hated their "liberators" as their oppressors. Moreover, Germany was backing and inciting the Austro-Hungarian war party and she was responsible for enlarging the Austro-Russian conflict to a world war by her invasion of Belgium.

The Great War aggravated the antagonism between the nationalities to such a degree that the break-up became almost unavoidable. Twenty years of separation, however, have taught bitter lessons to the peoples formerly united in Austria-Hungary. The destruction of the Empire has proved disastrous for European peace and most of all for the Danubian nations themselves. National grievances have not decreased, and in many cases the position of minorities has become worse than ever. Several of the nations concerned have lost their freedom and the others are in the greatest peril of sharing their fate. Though the reconstitution of the old Empire is out of the question, it is ever more widely recognised that at least some of its former members must come together again in the form of a free federation. The insane economic nationalism which has destroyed the foundations of wealth and progress must give way to free trade and intercourse between the Danubian nations. But economic co-operation is not enough. Common defence is still more important—for if the Danubian nations cannot defend themselves, who else shall do it? Can England be expected to act as the guardian of their independence for ever? A mere alliance for defence would not be

enough. Czechoslovakia had such alliances with France, Russia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, but they were all ineffective when the great crisis arose. Neither can a European federation make a Danubian Union superfluous. Only states with extended common frontiers, forming a geographical unit, protected by natural barriers, tied together by strong economic and historical bonds, and menaced by the same dangers, could be trusted to assist one another in a really effective way. Efficacious common defence, however, cannot be achieved without sufficient preparation in peace time. This not only requires the closest possible contact between the military leaders and the co-ordination of their plans, but also a common foreign policy. Otherwise powerful states striving for the domination of Central Europe would always be able to split the group of smaller states by threats, allurements and propaganda. In brief, common defence is impossible without a political union. Such a union is also indispensable for a really efficient economic co-operation. All experiences show that only states united by a political bond are willing to abandon the policy of economic seclusion in favour of close co-operation by free trade and intercourse.

The decisive questions are: (1) which states shall form this union?; (2) in which form?; (3) how can it be brought about?—the two last questions cannot be discussed here. Theoretically the greatest possible number of central and eastern European states would form the strongest union, but in reality it is not so. *Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien*. Any attempt to include too many states would multiply internal and external difficulties to such an extent that the scheme could either not be realised at all or only in an inoperative way. The most natural allies would surely be Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Another natural group would be formed by Yugoslavia, Roumania and Bulgaria. Of course, certain territorial adjustments would be necessary before some of these states would agree to co-operate. A union of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would greatly facilitate a sound settlement of the questions of Sudetenland and Slovakia.

What is the alternative to such a union? I can only speak of Austria with some certainty. After careful consideration of existing political forces it must be said that for Austria the choice lies only between that union or a union with Germany. The third possibility would be that of a small isolated Austria,

Bowman explained in his Introduction what is meant by "A Sacramental Universe." The fundamental thesis of the book is that "any attempt to qualify the duality of the spiritual and the physical, any monistic prejudice which tends to obscure the absoluteness of the cleavage between these two ultimate modes of being, is fatal to an understanding of either, and is indeed apt to issue, not in a genuine monism, but in a dualism more invidious than that which it is designed to obviate." Hence "nature reflects the life of spirit in meanings that spirit imparts to the inanimate and non-spiritual. A universe in which such possibilities exist is a sacramental universe" (pp. 9-10).

This position is laid down in opposition to the systems of S. Alexander, Santayana, and Whitehead, each of which seeks to overcome the fundamental dualism upon which Professor Bowman insists. A close and searching examination of the work of Santayana and Whitehead is given in Chapters II and III, and the conclusion reached after this examination is that "a theory of being which would partly submerge the spiritual in the physical, and partly permit it to play as a faint iridescence on the surface of animal life, is unable to sustain the weight of all those disciplines—political and social adjustment, economics, art and religion—in which the spirit demands for itself a position of centrality and of pre-eminence over the conditions of a natural existence" (p. 129). Thus "the emphasis has been placed on the ontological independence of the physical and the spiritual" (p. 375), though Professor Bowman went on to outline in his Notes his view of the inter-relation between the physical and the spiritual, emphasising their reactions upon one another. This inter-relation depends upon spiritual values, and the position laid down is that "all values without exception have their origin in a relation to spirit. Hence the *being* of spirit itself, i.e. its life, must be the *supreme* value" (p. 379). It is Professor Bowman's "opinion that the view set forth cannot be fully substantiated on any but a definitely theistic basis" (p. 11), but argument in support of this affirmation "is beyond the scope of the present investigation, which is accordingly limited and incomplete" (p. 11).

In the course of his general outline, Professor Bowman describes the yearning of man "in his anguish of self-defeat" for the incarnation of a "saviour of mankind," and concludes

that in his view "the doctrine of the incarnation of God in the man Jesus is the one possible solution for the tragedy of a world that has lost itself." It is clear from this conclusion that the volume—important as it is—is incomplete. Had he lived, we may hope that the author would have dealt with the theistic argument which he declined for the present to pursue. The relation of God to the mutually independent realms of physical nature and spirit is essential not merely in itself, but for the explanation of the combined independence and interdependence of the two realms of existence which must be in some way unified by God. In rejecting the solution propounded by Santayana and Whitehead, Professor Bowman's own view is left incomplete.

This notice is all that can be given of this important work in this review. The volume challenges serious attention, especially from those who seek to establish a monistic view of the Universe.

J. S. L.

GRAHAM WALLAS.*

There is an incomparable charm in the autumn of genius, in the works which contain the final harvest of a great and quiet mind, in *The Tempest* for instance, in *Don Quixote*, and the Second Part of *Faust*. For some reflective, critical, melancholy natures the latter season is best. They have once felt much; in the fall of the leaf their old intensity of sensation has reached the perfection of insight. They have wrestled with the secrets of the universe, like Jacob, all night long. On the eve of their departure they seek to leave a testament or message to the minds of their own race. So it is with Graham Wallas when he gives us his matured thought in his last book. Professor Gilbert Murray contributes a short preface in which he calls to mind the qualities that rendered his friend one of the wisest and best of men. He dwells on the serenity of the philosopher in the spirit of Samuel Johnson's friend. Unquestionably "a keen sensitiveness to the wrongs of mankind and conscientiousness about his own action were an integral part of his nature, and no doubt gave him many sleepless hours. But he was unperturbed, or at least presented an

* *Men and Ideas*. By Graham Wallas. Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.

nominally independent but practically defenceless against the nationalism and protectionism of powerful neighbours, in brief the state of things created by the Treaty of St. Germain. This solution would never be accepted by the Austrian people, neither does it seem possible that the Allies would agree to impose it by force. The Austrians would probably be willing to discuss a union with the Czechs and Hungarians. If this attempt fails, a union with a democratic Germany would have a chance, especially if the power of Prussia is curbed by means of a federalist constitution. The Hungarians would then have the choice either to federate with Yugoslavia and Roumania where large Hungarian minorities exist, or to turn to Germany where they would find the best markets for their agricultural products. As regards the Czechs they would have great difficulties in finding a suitable partner. Poland is hardly suited because of geographical and strategical reasons. A union with Germany would certainly not be acceptable. But it might be that Pan-Slav sentiment will favour co-operation with Russia. Such a solution, of course, would raise grave questions outside the scope of this survey.

FREDERICK HERTZ.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF A DECISION.

NAZI Germany controls a population of some 110 millions, living in a compact, wealthy and highly industrialised area. Not more than 85 millions are Germans and can be trusted for battle purposes. The remainder, Czechs, Poles, and other non-Germans, can be made to perform valuable economic services as helots for their Nazi masters. The British Empire rules over more than 450 millions, and the French Republic over some 93 millions. Only a fraction of these millions are, however, of white race, and they are distributed over oceans and continents instead of being in a compact mass.

The white population of Great Britain available to take the first shock of battle is only 45·6 millions, that of the French Republic only 41·8, i.e. the combined total is only 87·4 millions, slightly superior to the pure German element of Germany. To these figures must be added a white population of some 19·5 millions distributed in Canada (9,500,000), Australia (7,700,000), New Zealand (1,400,000); but after making all allowance for the magnificent patriotism and superb fighting qualities of the Dominions, these are populations which cannot reasonably be expected to make the same intensive sacrifices as those of Britain and France. In the last war they gave ungrudgingly, and they gave of their best; but to them the war was something which was far away. They could not feel the same intense realisation of danger as the peoples nearer at home.

In the last war Canada, from a population of 7,206,643, raised 628,964 men, of whom 399,807 were sent to France; Australia, from a population of 4,478,068, raised 412,953 men, of whom 331,781 served in France and other theatres; New Zealand, from 1,008,468, raised 128,505 men, of whom 117,175 served with the Expeditionary Force; the United Kingdom, from a population of 39 million, raised 4,971,042 men. For various reasons the contribution from the Union of South Africa, 136,070 men from a white population of 1,276,242, was used mainly in other theatres than in Europe. In the course of the prolonged war the Dominions put roughly 10 per cent. of their populations into the field, the United Kingdom roughly 13 per cent. These are figures not likely to be improved upon in the present struggle. The totals

unperturbed front to the world, because he was not pre-occupied with small things, not troubled by resentments or phobias, not distracted by the whispers of egoism. He was always studying human nature, always amused by it, laughing at it, but not bitter about it; studying in order to help, not to destroy. We have deadlier enemies about us now, or at least we think we have; and we are afraid of them and hate them." Had he lived till now, he too would have been afraid of them and would have hated them, for had he not a lifelong devotion to freedom in its manifold forms? Surest mark of an able free man, he never hesitated to change his opinions when he ascertained they were wrong. He never fought for freedom or truth because those great words masked subtle designs of his own, but because he wished to bestow it upon others, just as he fought for truth because he sought to communicate it to all worthy of it. Contact with such a man, whether by the spoken or the written word, made others feel that they had come across one who was capable of permanently altering their outlook. If Gilbert Murray can write that "the Great Society" could seriously affect for the future his outlook on human conduct, what can other mortals declare? Therefore we welcome with all our heart the final legacy of one who was a thinker to his marrow, who left his mark upon men whom he met casually as well as upon his undergraduates. Part I, which is biographical, describes Jeremy Bentham the man as well as the political inventor, W. J. Fox, Robert Owen, John Ruskin, and the career of Lord Sheffield on the London School Board. Part II, which examines society and politics, analyses Darwin and social motive, comments on Dr. Jacks's article on the peacefulness of being at war—the present war scarcely allows us to do justice to such an article—Socialism and the Fabian Society, the British Civil Service, and the price of intolerance. Such a stout defender of liberty as Graham Wallas can hardly contain himself as he estimates all we pay for the lack of toleration. Much of it relates to life in the United States, but no one can pursue it without realising to the full that what happens to our cousins may easily befall us. Part III analyses problems of education, and, time-worn as this subject is, Graham Wallas contrives to invest it with fresh life. The comparison of the universities and the nation in America and England sets the reader thinking in many directions. The

part played by the President of a college in U.S.A., the share taken by Greek Letter societies, and the like, have no adequate parallel in our own land.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE GERMAN ARMY.*

A wise military writer in the time of Frederick the Great said: Prussia is not a country but the quarters of an army. If ever, this was literally true under Frederick William I, Frederick's father, whom many have considered to be the most important among the Hohenzollerns. He did away with the last remnants of the feudal rights and liberties of the territorial nobility, the so-called "Junkers." And he gave them a great task: to command his large army, which was indeed quite disproportionately large compared with his territory. It was also he who registered the serfs on the estates and compelled them to be soldiers. He spent five-sixths of his revenues on his army, and subordinated all other interests to it. He was the first prince who continuously wore army uniform, since proudly called "the king's coat." He was his army's best drill-sergeant and its supply minister, and consequently his own finance minister. The state was nothing but an army commissariat. Prussia, in fact, had achieved "Total Mobilisation" long before this apt name had been coined. Ever since, the Prussian Junkers and officers have been one close class or caste of absolute slaves to their king-general and absolute rulers over their serfs. They were treated as "a race so valuable that everything must be done to preserve it," to quote Frederick the Great. They enjoyed this state of affairs immensely, and whatever happened later in Prussia (or Germany) they always struggled hard to bring back that paradise. Even he who does not like them must admit that they proved astute and tough in their task. They did not invent or use the word "class war," but they showed themselves much sturdier "class warriors" than those who are so fond of that slogan.

It is most enlightening to look at modern German history from this angle. The special sociological structure of the Prussian state and army led them again and again to defeat;

* *The German Army*. By Dr. Herbert Rosinski. The Hogarth Press. 12s. 6d.

for the Empire were: white troops, 7,130,280, plus native, 8,654,467. Not more than one quarter of these were available as field troops at any given time, and the maximum strength in any one theatre, France and Belgium, was in 1917 2,500,000, of whom however not more than 1,500,000 were combatants.

The native races of our Empire constitute undoubtedly an immense reservoir of man-power, and in the last war we raised altogether 1,524,187 of such troops. But there are great practical difficulties in using such troops for European warfare. First there is the language difficulty. The shortage of white men capable of addressing these troops in their own languages is only paralleled by the scarcity of native tribes possessed of knowledge of English. Then there are climatic difficulties. The Indian Corps did yeoman service on the West Front in the winter of 1914 and spring of 1915, but suffered cruelly under cold and damp, and was subsequently withdrawn to serve under more favourable conditions elsewhere. Moreover, primitive tribesmen, unable to read or write, and minus any mechanical training, are handicapped in the matter of using effectively modern weapons. All in all, the North West Frontier of India would be the best recruiting ground for service on the West Front, but this is a thinly populated area. Our possibilities with regard to using native races as combatants in Europe hardly exceed a million men, and even this is probably an extravagant estimate. We should be capable, however, of using native troops should the war spread to other regions.

The position then is this: the strength of the German field army at any one period must be taken as not less than 4,250,000 men, the maximum strength in the field of the United Kingdom may be taken as 2,000,000 men. That of France is about the same. The maximum strength to be expected from the Dominions at any one period may be taken as 900,000 men. In the matter of native troops we and the French, tapping our resources to the maximum, cannot expect more than a million men at any one period, an estimate which in practice might quite well be halved. The total represents, say, 5,500,000 to 6,000,000 Allies against 4,250,000 Germans. How are we going to win this war?

It is hardly surprising that many people are already beginning to talk of a war doomed to end in a stalemate;

others reject altogether the idea of obtaining a decision by land warfare. There are those who pin their hopes on starving Germany into surrender by our naval blockade. Others who, realising that to do this will mean a war lasting for very many years, even if it is possible at all, talk about "shortening the war" by bombing Germany. The position with regard to bombing may be put very briefly. Either air-bombing can do what is claimed for it, or it cannot. If it can, we undoubtedly have it in our power to destroy German cities and industrial centres, paralyse German traffic communications and, generally speaking, reduce Germany to flaming ruin. Unfortunately, Germany has it in her power to do exactly the same things to us. Thus, for this policy to become at all a reasonable proposition in the matter of producing a decision, one side or other must start with an absolutely overwhelming air-superiority, a superiority of at least 3-1, and preferably 5-1. If Germany can practise "frightfulness" on a three times bigger scale than we can, then it is reasonable to believe that we should get sick of this particular game before she would, and totalitarian air warfare becomes, from the German standpoint, a reasonable policy. But if for every German bomb dropped upon England there comes an equally effective bomb dropped on Germany in answer, then the best that can happen is that both sides will find themselves quickly reduced to the happy state of the Kilkenny Cats; and whether one of the tails left over is a quarter of an inch or so longer than the other will be, one imagines, of little interest to the handful of dazed and demoralised survivors.

Thus, on the assumption that air-bombing can do what is claimed for it, it is ruled out of court as a means of enforcing a decision because neither side actually possesses the overwhelming superiority needed to make this a reasonably safe policy, nor is likely to acquire any such superiority. In the last war, after 4½ years of effort, and with America actively on our side, we never got anything like a 3-1 air superiority over Germany. Germany is even less likely to acquire the necessary superiority over Britain and France. If air-bombing cannot do what is claimed for it, and there is evidence that the claims made are wildly exaggerated, then it is ruled out of court as a means of enforcing a decision.

We come back to the question: How are we to win this war? We must win it. For Great Britain and France stalemate;

in 1806 when Napoleon conquered them, in 1850, the "diplomatic defeat" of Olmütz, and again in 1914-18. After each defeat new social and military features were grafted on to the old body and gave it new strength. Then, victory won, the forces of tradition made a mighty effort to overcome the reforms and either to expel or to assimilate the newcomers as one would any foreign body. Thus they overcame the *Landwehr*, the civilian part, so to speak, of the armed forces, set up by liberal reformers after Napoleon's triumph. Thus they succeeded to a large extent in excluding parliamentary influence in the second half of the nineteenth century. The German Republic was comparatively easy game for them, because the republicans themselves entrusted the arms to their arch-enemies. However, the cunning and tenacity shown in each period deserves admiration. To-day they are involved in a new class war of this kind, the combat against the Nazi. It is too early to know whether they will once more achieve victory in both wars, abroad and at home, or whether perhaps that old mighty force, Junkerdom, is coming to an end.

To this most recent period Dr. Rosinski contributes much that is new and interesting, in this way completing the fascinating picture drawn by Dr. Rauschnig in his *Revolution of Nihilism*. With the earlier history of this old class war he appears to be less familiar. He is not quite fair to William I in supposing that this king was not aware of the political significance of the suppression of the *Landwehr*; and he underestimates the Army's influence in the imperial period. About the beginnings of the Republic he gives rather the popular legend than the facts. Actually the rearming of the old officer class was not so urgently needed for crushing the revolutionary workers; but the upheavals continued for a comparatively long time just because the workers saw the arms again in the hands of the officer class which they deeply mistrusted. Moreover it is hardly admissible to call the *Reichswehr* a "loyal instrument" of the Republican government; on the contrary, the very tragedy of both was that it never could be loyal. There is a much more appropriate description of Brüning's new start of the *ancien régime* in Wheeler-Bennett's admirable book *The Wooden Titan*. But Dr. Rosinski's two last chapters on the Nazi and the New Army are definitely worth reading. It is a pity that the development of tactics in the army is hardly mentioned. For therein

can be seen the clearest reflection of the social alterations undergone by an army. Nor are the attempts at reform undertaken by Colmar von der Goltz and by Ludendorff *before* the Great War taken into account, although the reasons of their failure are so characteristic of the whole story.

RUDOLF OLDEN.

THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM.*

Dr. R. M. Jackson, who is a well-known Cambridge law teacher, has written an interesting and useful volume on *The Machinery of Justice in England*. It is an ambitious work which deals comprehensively with the whole field of our legal practice and is both expository and critical. Addressed to the layman the book provides an informative and lucid account of the English legal structure and its practice and procedure. It is written with varying detail and it is to be regretted that the civil work of the courts is not considered at greater length. In general, Dr. Jackson's narrative is both reliable and instructive upon a subject of which the general public is remarkably ignorant. The professional lawyer, however, will find, perhaps inevitably in a work of this kind, a number of mistakes; for example, no affidavit is now required in support of a default summons in the County Court, civil work on circuit work is not confined to the hearing of jury cases, and in stating that Quarter Sessions are debarred from hearing "any case carrying the death penalty or penal servitude for life on a first conviction," Dr. Jackson has forgotten the most important and extremely common exception of burglary. He is also quite wrong in stating that a plaintiff in a High Court action may have his action remitted for trial to a County Court, and thus be deprived of the most capable and appropriate court "simply because he happens to be poor." The gravity and difficulty of the case are the deciding factors. This last error is particularly important, for Dr. Jackson makes it a main ground for his proposed abolition of the High Court and the County Courts and the substitution of local circuit District Courts which should try civil actions of whatever amount.

Dr. Jackson is extremely critical of much in our legal

* *The Machinery of Justice in England*. By R. M. Jackson. Cambridge Univ. Press. 16s. net.

means defeat. Germany *vis-à-vis* Poland is the man in possession. We must either drive her out or buy her off. That we should buy her out is unthinkable. It would stultify our whole policy. For us to fail to drive her out would be equally ruinous. It would mean the end of our prestige. A peace of exhaustion, carrying with it the public confession of our helplessness to redeem our pledges, would be merely a truce, after which Germany would start a fresh war at her own chosen moment, with renewed strength, and with all the small states so terrorised that they would be her vassals. There is no doubt about it. Now that we are in this war we must win it. Our very existence as an empire is at stake. But how are we to win?

We must start by getting rid of all this talk of "the superiority conferred by modern weapons on the defensive." It is a doctrine of defeatism, for if it were true then there would be no chance of our winning this war, and we might as well resign ourselves to relinquish our empire. But it is not true. It is a confusion of ill-assimilated facts and ill-digested theories. War at sea reflects the same social and economic factors as war on land, and if this doctrine were true we could expect to see the same paralysis of the offensive at sea as is claimed to have happened on land. We see the exact contrary. When, in 1859, *Warrior* was designed as our first sea-going ironclad warship, 4½ in. of wrought-iron could defeat at point-blank range the heaviest gun afloat. Our latest battleship, *Nelson*, has 16 in. plates of hardened steel; but these are vulnerable at 10,000 yards to a 16-in. gun. The modern battleship is a floating fortress, heavily armed, massively armoured, taking three to four years to build, costing from £7 million to £10 million. She can be destroyed at long range by shells falling almost perpendicularly upon her decks, and at close range no armour will keep out big-calibre, armour-piercing shells. There is no paralysis of the offensive. On the contrary, the prolonged duel between gun and armour has ended in the triumph of the gun. These factors, which we see operative in naval warfare, are, of course, equally operative in land warfare.

The "evidence" as to the "superiority conferred by modern weapons on the defensive" is a matter of special pleading and distortion. It is taken from only one front in the last war, the West Front, and from a particular phase of

this front. On the East Front, the weapons used were substantially the same, but the Germans at Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes (1914), in their break-through at Gorlice (1915), in their Rumanian campaign (1916), and on the Trentino (1917), achieved brilliant success in attack.

The paralysis of the offensive on the West Front in 1916-17 was only temporary, and due to special conditions, mainly sociological. The chief of these was the increase of population, leading to a vast increase in the size of armies, with the result that for the first time in modern history it was possible for a State to cover its whole frontier with fortified lines, allowing no scope for strategy or manœuvre. This was a problem as new to the soldiers of those days as was armour to the naval men of 1860-1; but in like manner as the introduction of armour at sea led to a prolonged duel between guns and armour, in which the balance fluctuated first to the one side, and then to the other, but with the gun more and more in the ascendant, so the stabilisation of the front in France led to a prolonged duel between means and methods of attack and those of defence, with the balance at first fluctuating in favour of the one or the other but with the attack steadily gaining until in 1918 it had definitely won the upper hand. To argue that because the Somme meant bloody losses every offensive on land is going to mean equal losses, is as reasonable as to suggest that because at Sinope the Russian shell-guns destroyed the Turkish fleet, therefore every modern naval engagement is going to be another Sinope; to say that because Paschendaele was a slow blundering attack every modern offensive will be another Paschendaele, is as logical as to suggest that because in 1861 *Monitor* and *Merrimac* blazed at one another for hours without doing any real damage, therefore every modern naval action must be a fiasco.

Since war has been war every improved means of defence has brought in its train an improved means of attack to beat it. It is ludicrous to believe that this process, which has endured since the dawn of time, is going to come suddenly to an end because the Germans have built the Siegfried Line, or the French the Maginot Line, equally ludicrous to maintain that war has crystallised itself into perpetual re-editions of Sommes and Paschendaeles. In the prolonged duel between means and methods of attack and those of defence, all other things being equal, the truly decisive factor is superiority in

system and suggests many changes. Some criticisms will find a very wide response, as for example on police court justice. His general view that lay "magistrates and the clerk are biased in favour of the police version of facts in issue" will be widely accepted. He compares them with professional magistrates who "whatever their feelings . . . do understand the primary duty of 'acting judicially'." However, in the experience of many practising lawyers, the latter are equally inclined towards the police, though more observant of the rules of evidence and procedure. There is much to be said for the view, supported by Dr. Jackson, that all benches should have a legally qualified chairman, but this in itself will not create the judicial detachment and complete open-mindedness which is comparatively rare to-day. The author would remove from criminal judges the power of sentencing, and vest it in "Sentencing Commissioners" who as specialists and administrators could give more expert attention to the treatment of delinquents. It may be noted here that the author is critical of the superior judges even in their civil work. He follows to some extent the views of Professor H. J. Laski in holding that the judges, nurtured in the *laissez-faire* principles of the Common Law, are out of touch with the trend of modern legislation and strain to obstruct the operation of social laws.

The author appears to be partly influenced, in some respects at least, by continental practice. For example, he favours a system of local District Courts and also the trial of all indictable cases by three judges and a jury. He suggests the creation of an appellate tribunal to hear appeals from ministerial tribunals, presumably on the lines of the *Conseil d'Etat*, thus ousting altogether the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a book of this size it is impossible for Dr. Jackson to elaborate all his views and as a consequence the value of the volume as a critical work is very restricted.

LOTTE IN WEIMAR.*

In this Goethe novel Lotte Kestner, Goethe's former sweetheart and the heroine of *Werther*, comes to Weimar in 1816, and Goethe receives, after forty-four years, "a visit from

* *Lotte in Weimar*. Novel by Thomas Mann. Bermann-Fischer, Stockholm. Swedish kr. 11.50.

ancient times." Thomas Mann succeeds in making of these commonly known affairs something delightfully new. Lotte is characterised with sympathy and irony. She accepts homage with a friendly dignity and says with a mixture of pride and embarrassment: "I belong to the history of literature, as an object of investigation and pilgrimage and a holy figure before whose niche the crowd is thronging in the dome of humanity." Goethe we see first through the eyes of his secretary, Dr. Riemer, who, although very gaily caricatured in his feelings for Goethe, which waver between slavish admiration and vain rebellion, gives a very profound and novel analysis of the greatest German poet; secondly, with the eyes of August, his melancholy, inwardly divided son, who himself is very interestingly characterised. Finally, we see Goethe himself in three great scenes: in his lonely soliloquies, in a large company during Lotte's visit, and in a remarkably beautiful dialogue with Lotte, in which Goethe speaks of all sensuous life as being a simile of higher connections, of renunciation and sacrifice, and of metamorphosis, his greatest hope and deepest passion. Dr. Riemer regards Goethe as "spirit that has become wholly nature" and a poet "of absolute freedom and boldness." As his innermost being he recognises a universal irony, "so that out of one of his eyes, so to say, heaven and love are looking, and out of the other the hell of the iciest negation and most annihilating neutrality." Goethe, in his morning soliloquies, which are full of profoundly inspired utterances about life, poetry, culture, sees himself almost exactly as Riemer sees him. "The demi-god and the monster," he says once, "did I not think them together . . . did I not take the one for the other?" He analyses his nihilism and thinks that only "by the warming delusion of the heart" life becomes tolerable. But he also says: "What is all the work of man, deed and poem, without love?" We hear him also express himself several times about the Germans (Thomas Mann thus indirectly condemns Nazism). Goethe says: "It is impossible to live with the Germans, be it in victory or defeat. The Germans, instead of keeping themselves to themselves, must harbour the world to influence the world. It does not suit them to get obdurate as an original nation, to get stultified in absurd self-glorification, nay, to want in stupidity, through stupidity, to govern the world. Not hostile isolation from other peoples must be the

resources. It is by working along these lines that we can solve this problem and beat Germany ; it is by working along these lines that Germany, unless we realise the danger in time, can beat us.

It is a fatal fallacy to see military problems purely in terms of particular weapons or methods, whether of attack or defence. It is the community which creates weapons, and not weapons which create the community. Given that there are resources enough and that there is "drive" enough, weapons can be improved or invented, every military problem can be solved. The vast industrial superiority of the Allies, if mobilised in time, should give us the possibility to produce weapons of attack for land warfare infinitely more formidable than anything existing at the present time ; we can acquire land supremacy in exactly the same fashion as we acquired sea-supremacy, by hard thinking, hard fighting, hard work. But time will be needed to mobilise our industrial resources. Germany, by reason of her totalitarian system, started at a much more highly developed phase of industrial mobilisation, and she may be expected to reach her maximum "potential" more rapidly than ourselves or France. The danger is that she may seek to exploit this temporary superiority by devising revolutionary means and methods of attack. We are the more likely successfully to meet this danger, the more we set ourselves to anticipate her probable lines of attack.

We can expect developments along three main lines : (i) improved artillery methods and *matériel*, (ii) a special form of "break-through" tank, (iii) improved methods of mining. It was the evolution of "predicted" firing which in 1917 really ended the paralysis of the offensive. We must expect the adaptation of "predicted" firing to mobile warfare. To suggest the possibilities of television, and of photography from the air with the use of infra-red and ultra-violet rays, may seem fantastic, but is no more fantastic than "predicted" firing seemed early in 1917. Television at present needs thirty seconds for the picture to get through, too slow a process for use against moving targets. An attack on the Maginot Line means, however, dealing with stationary targets, and the time needed for transmission may conceivably be reduced. The adaptation of photography with infra-red and ultra-violet rays would open up enormous possibilities for seeing through camouflage, or into deep dug-outs.

Improvements in artillery *matériel* may take the form of bigger self-propelled guns, say 6 in. or 8 in., and multiple-part guns, i.e. guns built in parts to be carried on teams of caterpillar tractors as the mountain-gun parts are carried by mules. These are developments which would produce a mobile heavy artillery capable of being pushed rapidly forward.

"The tank floats by distributing her weight over a broad bearing surface, her caterpillar tracks, instead of concentrating it on four or more wheel-points. But she does not displace earth as the ship displaces water, she is a land-raft not a land ship. By comparison with the ship proper, she suffers serious disadvantages. The whole of her body is raised up above the land and needs protection, whereas the bulk of the ship is submerged and thus protected. The ship can concentrate armour upon her vitals, leaving the rest of the structure unarmoured. The tank is a steel box crowded with men, guns and machinery. It is impossible to use from a tank instruments for fire-control or directors, or to measure the rolling period as at sea, thus fire from tanks is very inaccurate save at point-blank range. The size of the tank is limited by the need of being able to use roads, railways and bridges, besides the tactical consideration of keeping the size of the target down. The duel of tanks *versus* stationary infantry and guns partakes of the elements of ship *versus* fort, and the tank largely shares the ship's disadvantages."*

The normal balance between ship and fort can, however, be upset by the surprise use of new inventions, as happened with the ironclad batteries at Kinburn, and if it is a matter of producing a special "break-through" tank, most existing limitations could be discarded. Thus the tank could be built in parts to be assembled at the point of attack ; she could be given twice the width of any existing tank, and three times the length, multiple tracks could be used, say six instead of two, to be driven by multiple engines. This halving or even reducing to a third the pressure per sq. in. of track, would render her more "buoyant." Over the whole structure could be spread a tortoise-shell-like shield, say of 3 in. steel, with, on top, a turret containing two short 6 in. guns, with side turrets armed with multiple barrelled pom-poms and machine-guns. With her great length, such a tank could cross existing anti-tank

* The "Mechanisation" of War. By Germaines.

aim, but amicable intercourse with everybody. I stand at a distance from the German," Goethe continues, "and have an eye for his meanness. I have taken great trouble to purify him in clearness and grace and irony. But the Germans hate clearness—that is not right; and they do not know the charm of truth—that is deplorable. That mist and intoxication and all Berserker excess is so dear to them is abominable. They credulously deliver themselves up to every ecstatic scoundrel who calls up their meanest qualities, strengthens them in their vices, and teaches them to interpret nationality as isolation and barbarity. That they believe themselves to be great and glorious only when all their dignity is thoroughly lost, and look with spiteful gall at those in whom the foreigners see and honour Germany, is wretched. They don't like me. All right, and I don't like them either, so we are quits. I have my own idea of what is German—may the deuce take them together with the malicious philistinism they call German. They think they are Germany, but it is I. Miserable people, its end will be bad, for it will not understand itself, and every misunderstanding of itself rouses not only the laughter, but the hate of the world. Destiny will beat them, because they betrayed themselves."

J. LESSER.

A HISTORY OF ITALY.*

Almost a century has elapsed since the appearance of Cesare Balbo's now famous *Summary of Italian History*. Not only did this product of the Risorgimento mark a date in the history of the Italian historiography but it still deserves to be regarded as a standard work. Since 1846 (the date of the publication of Balbo's *Summary*) no one has, to my knowledge, attempted to repeat this achievement, and I think I am justified in assuming that Professor Salvatorelli's aim was to write a new "Balbo," or at least to link up his new work discreetly with the old one.

This impression is confirmed by more intimate reasons than the identity of the title, namely by the sameness of scheme and a visible concern to keep close to the model. But, apart from the exterior appearance, which does not afford the possibility of an historical judgment, I do not think that one may

* *A Concise History of Italy*. By Luigi Salvatorelli, translated by Bernard Miall. George Allen & Unwin. 21s.

reasonably characterise this book as a new "Balbo." Actually, from the typical preface down to the end, Balbo gave us a history in accordance with his ideas and political purposes: "it has always seemed impossible to me—he declared—to write a history without more or less expounding our own opinions" . . . That is perfectly obvious, but the new work of Salvatorelli does not conform to Balbo's dictum. We see in it a wonderful historical sketch of Italy from prehistoric times down to our present day, but hardly one line calculated to assist our meditations on history. This is, of course, no reproach to Professor Salvatorelli, for the best way to analyse a work is not perhaps to suggest to the author how the reviewer would have dealt with the subject. . . .

Professor Salvatorelli has apparently no theory to expound or to confirm in his book. He devotes only a few lines in the notes (p. 644) to a problem which is undoubtedly at the basis of the whole work, and which might have proved the most interesting he could have discussed; namely, the problem of the very existence and unity of the history of Italy.

Benedetto Croce has denied (*Proceedings British Academy*, 1936) both the existence of a history of Italy as a whole, and the possibility of writing national histories at all. Salvatorelli's point of view is that the question is to decide if and when, before the period of the Risorgimento, we can speak of an Italian consciousness, and therefore of an Italian people. It seems that he is inclined to admit this as an adequate criterion for the acceptance of a possible unity, and here lies the foundation of his historical construction. But the problem is certainly not exhausted, and it may prove useful to approach it anew, without neglecting Professor Salvatorelli's contribution to it.

It is only just to add that this book rests on a very thorough and first-hand acquaintance with the sources. Its usefulness is increased by the fact that the author, far from confining himself to a mere account of political events, deals also at length with the history of Italian literature, art and thought, in order to grasp the whole of Italian life in the manifold variety of its aspects and problems. The more, therefore, has one to regret the overwhelming number of misprints in the spelling of Italian names which may mislead the general readers and inexperienced students of history to both of whom this book is chiefly dedicated.

PAOLO TREVES.

ditches, and she could, at need, be given the equivalent of fascines.

An attack by, say, 400-500 of these monsters, each weighing 500-600 tons, would be a terrific ordeal for any army to face. Supported by an overwhelming weight of artillery, this artillery fire would destroy obstacles, explode mines, and the tanks themselves would be invulnerable to anything short of a direct hit from a 6-in. gun. The number of such guns available would be limited. The base of even the strongest fortification, like the battleship's bottom, is vulnerable to a mine, which is the torpedo of land-warfare. The use of machine-tools for driving galleries, improved forms of drills and cutters, more powerful explosives, may revolutionise all existing estimates as to the scope and nature of this danger, and of the means needed to counter it.

We must undoubtedly anticipate developments on these lines, and we can have the satisfaction of knowing that with our vast industrial resources we are far better equipped for taking advantage of them than is Germany. We have the largest and best-equipped armour-plate factories in the world, a far more highly developed motor-car industry than has Germany. If we set ourselves wholeheartedly to solving this problem, we can produce armies capable of going over any system of defence, however formidable. Money, in the larger sense, as representing control over raw materials, the products of industry, the mechanism of production, continues to be the sinews of war.

VICTOR WALLACE GERMAINS.

THE END OF AN ERA.

IT has often been suggested in the last twenty years that we may be living in a period of decline, the decline of a great civilisation which, in this view, attained its climax in the nineteenth century. There are many facts which may be advanced to support this theory—the decline in the birth-rate, the increasing age of the populations, the growth of cities, the decay of the countryside, the crushing taxation, the colossal public debts, the loosening of conventions or of conventional moralities, the poverty of literature, the lack of great men, the loss of the belief in progress, the inability of mankind to control itself and to prevent the perpetual recurrence of wars. This is a formidable list of evidences of decline and none of them seems to contain any germ of a new birth, of a renaissance, such as came out of the decline of the Middle Ages. Perhaps we really are in a decline like that which ended the achievement of the Babylonians and Chaldeans or the majestic and magnificent civilisation of the Greeks and Romans.

Every discussion, however, of a process in history which is not yet completed is simply hypothetical and a matter of interpretation. The idea that we are living in a permanent decline is a reasonable interpretation of facts, but it is not the only reasonable interpretation, nor does it envisage all the salient facts. There is undoubted resemblance between the decline of the ancient world and the present decline of the society of European states. There is, however, also resemblance between this and the decline of the *Ancien Régime* towards the end of the eighteenth century, which, after another period of unrest and crisis and war, was followed by a glorious renaissance, the brilliant and progressive nineteenth century. The circumstances of the decline of the *Ancien Régime* and the subsequent twenty-six years of revolution and European war represented a process or course of development perhaps similar to what is going on now.

European civilisation in the eighteenth century, represented at its best by the *Ancien Régime* in France, was—politically at any rate—outworn by the year 1789. There was a tide, slow but steadily rising, of political consciousness among the growing bourgeoisie. The framework of government on the Continent had not been adjusted to this at all;

NOTICES

The Oxford Book of English Verse, 1250-1918,* edited by Sir Arthur Quiller Couch, was first published in 1900. In this latest edition many things have been added, to the extent of more than 100 pages, and some repairing of the old structure has been done, but the Editor hopes he has "left it as weatherproof as when it was first built." Writing in 1927 he deplored "the fashion of morose disparagement, of sneering at things long by catholic consent accounted beautiful," but the reader will find in turning the pages of this book the old note of valiancy and cheerfulness. "It is indigenous, proper to our native spirit, and it will endure."

* * * * *

Few writers are better qualified than Mr. Hugh MacDiarmid to discuss *The Islands of Scotland*.† He not only resides upon one of the Shetland Islands and has a close personal knowledge of the Orkneys and Hebrides as well but has also made a close study of their cultural tradition and place in Scottish life. He writes as a fervent poet and Scottish nationalist and his appraisal of the spiritual soul and economic well-being of these 800 islands and their inhabitants is thought-provoking. His descriptive passages take a somewhat secondary place but they are supplemented by eighty-eight photographs which vividly indicate the beauties and physical characteristics of these remote outposts of Scotland.

* Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d. (India Paper 10s.)

† Batsford. 10s. 6d. net.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,

We notice that in the March issue of your review of *The Church of England*, by Bishop H. Henson, the reviewer has stated that this is the first book to be issued in our series of "English Institutions." This statement is inaccurate as we have already published two previous volumes, *The G.P.O.*, by E. T. Crutchley, and *British Shipping*, by R. H. Thornton. We shall be much obliged if you could insert a correction.

Yours faithfully,
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JUNE 1940.

THE FIGHT.

AFTER the morning and evening of Friday, May 10th, many millions in this country and elsewhere felt relief, amounting almost to a sense of liberation. The morning brought news of the German onslaught on Holland and Belgium. (So, at last, watchful waiting was at an end, and the great issue fairly joined.) In the evening Mr. Neville Chamberlain resigned, and Mr. Winston Churchill succeeded him as Prime Minister. Nothing in Mr. Chamberlain's tenure of that high office became him better than his manner of leaving it. With good grace he bowed to necessity and pledged his loyal support to Mr. Churchill. Thus the Churchill Administration came into being auspiciously, commanding, from the outset, a higher degree of general goodwill than the Lloyd George Administration enjoyed in December 1916.

No other satisfactory solution was practicable after the House of Commons debate on May 7th and 8th. In that debate the crisis, latent since the outbreak of war, came to a head. The Labour Party boldly took a risk by forcing a division. Its boldness was justified by the event. A movement had, indeed, been on foot to bring about a change of leadership after the debate, without a vote; but in view of the German invasion of Holland and Belgium it is doubtful whether this movement would or could have overcome reluctance "to swap horses while crossing a stream" had there not been so drastic a reduction of Mr. Chamberlain's majority. Mr. Churchill, for his part, strove with might and main to defend the Government against its critics. To some of them he spoke with acrimony, despite Mr. Lloyd George's plea that he should "not allow himself to be converted into an air-raid shelter to keep the splinters from hitting his colleagues." But the revolt was too strong to be quelled even by Mr. Churchill's eloquence. Retrospectively, it was a revolt against all that "Munich" had meant; actually it was inspired by the determination of the country to get better and more resolute leadership than Mr. Neville Chamberlain,

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Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare (with Sir Horace Wilson in the background) were able to supply.

The country has yet to learn—it may not learn in any near future—how heavily the dead hand of “Munich” had weighed upon it. Mr. Churchill himself hardly seemed aware that faith in him might wane should he identify himself too long and too fully with the men who had belittled his foresight and spurned his counsel until they invited him, tardily, to join them as First Lord of the Admiralty on the outbreak of war. He was intent only upon the work in hand. In point of fact his self-devotion proved to be the highest wisdom. The supreme crisis found him without a rival.

During the past twenty years I have sometimes criticised and sometimes praised Mr. Winston Churchill. When asked, as I have often been asked abroad and at home, whether he would ever be Prime Minister and, if so, whether he would be a good Prime Minister, I have always answered, and have written more than once, that in a supreme crisis he might be the ablest head of a Government whom Britain has known since the days of the younger Pitt. The supreme crisis is now upon us, and Mr. Winston Churchill is there to meet it. He is the only man in British public life whom his fellow-countrymen regard as being more than a match for Adolf Hitler. For years past he has gauged the strength and the weakness of Hitler’s Germany as no other Front Bench politician gauged them. Almost alone among the members of Parliament he warned the country, from 1934 onwards, of its danger from Hitler’s expanding air force. For his pains he was snubbed by Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Sir Philip Sassoon—until Hitler himself blurted out a part of the truth to Sir John Simon in April 1935. Almost alone he held aloof from the manifestation of mass hysteria with which the House accompanied, on September 28th, 1938, Mr. Neville Chamberlain’s decision to fly to Munich. And after Mr. Chamberlain’s return from Munich, amid equally hysterical benedictions and congratulations, Mr. Winston Churchill said in the House of Commons on October 5th, 1938:

If I do not begin this afternoon by paying the usual, and indeed almost invariable, tributes to the Prime Minister for his handling of this crisis, it is certainly not from any lack of personal regard. . . . I will, therefore, begin by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing. I will begin by saying what everybody would

like to ignore or forget but which must nevertheless be stated, namely, that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have.

It is scarcely an accident that Mr. Duff Cooper, who resigned office as First Lord of the Admiralty in protest against Mr. Chamberlain’s Munich policy, and who gave the reasons for his resignation in a statement of great force and dignity on October 3rd, 1938, should have been recalled to office, as Minister of Information, by Mr. Winston Churchill. He has enjoyed, with Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. Churchill, the privilege of Hitler’s special hatred, the hatred of the “wild beast”—to quote Mr. Chamberlain’s farewell statement to the nation—“that has sprung out of his lair upon us.” The sense of liberation which I, in common with millions of others, felt at the news of the change in our national leadership was inspired by the thought that the men who had long known Hitler to be a “wild beast” were to be responsible for the conduct of national affairs in the most fateful hour that has ever struck for the British peoples and their freedom.

Mr. Churchill’s success in forming a truly representative National Government ought not to efface the memory of the peril from which we have narrowly escaped. This peril lay in the prospect, nay, the certainty that the country would have been deeply divided and bewildered if its leadership had remained unchanged. I write of what I know. Nobody questioned the purity of Mr. Neville Chamberlain’s intentions or his devotion to his own view of national interests. What was questioned, to the point of vehement denial, was the rightness of that view. In it, as Mr. Harold Nicolson has pungently and truthfully written, “the only thing that was lacking was an understanding of the true nature of the Nazi movement. Mr. Chamberlain imagined that he was dealing with a (German) national revival; he was really dealing with a world revolution, led by an almost demented fanatic. He and his adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, stepped into diplomacy with the bright faithfulness of two curates entering a pub for the first time; they did not observe the difference between a social gathering and a rough house; nor did they realise that the tough guys therein assembled did not either speak or understand their language. They imagined that they were as decent and as honourable as themselves.”

Had not the feeling which prompted Mr. Harold Nicolson

nor had the framework of society been much adjusted to it. Government was autocratic (with a good deal of aristocracy and bureaucracy in it), and society was feudal. Though society had been growing in all directions, the political and legal framework had in no Continental country altered much—not even in Joseph II's Austria—in the last two hundred years. Intellectually too the Continent seemed to be becoming used up. Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire were dead; there were no longer any great men of letters in France. Italian literature and painting were in decline, Russia as yet had no native culture at all (apart from some ecclesiastical ornamentation); Germany had Goethe, Schiller and Herder; Austria had Mozart. What was good in art, letters and the other things of the spirit belonged mainly to the past. There was, undoubtedly, a feeling of *fin de siècle*, of *malaise*, of spiritual indifference, of scepticism.

In 1789 the crash came, the Revolution, beginning in France and soon involving the whole of Europe, if not in revolution, at any rate in war. The wars lasted, with scarcely an interval, from 1792 to 1814 or, with the Hundred Days and Battle of Waterloo, until midsummer 1815. By the end of these twenty-three years of war, feudalism had been wiped away, society had assumed its modern contours, and a political settlement was made for Europe (by the Congress of Vienna) which proved to be a satisfactory and adjustable framework for the development of the states in the next hundred years. These hundred years, 1815-1914, were a great flowering period of modern civilisation. Thus the decline of the *Ancien Régime*, and the Revolutionary-war period, were the prelude to a magnificent renaissance, sometimes called the Romantic Age, which expanded, flowered and then, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, declined. It looks as if there were a kind of rhythm in human affairs which we can only perceive if we observe not just the age in which we live but a period of at least a hundred years at a time. If the rhythm of the last two hundred years is being maintained, we may feel some confidence in the belief that we are at the end of a period of decline and are in a revolutionary-war period of transition—transition, presumably, towards something stable and good. The reasoning that leads to this conclusion is somewhat as follows.

The nineteenth century after 1815, which ensued upon the

decline of the *Ancien Régime* of the eighteenth century and the French Revolutionary-war period, was a century of astonishing and, for years, rapid progress. The bourgeoisie assumed more and more political power. Machinery was enormously improved. The whole system of medicine and surgery was remade with marvellous benefit to mankind. An immense humanitarian effort was successfully undertaken to end the slave trade and in other directions. Romantic literature blossomed in England and France; a great "realist" literature was produced in Russia. Communications were improved from the stage-coach to the express train. Food was produced in increasing abundance; population advanced in number every year, and was easily sustained by capitalist industry and agriculture. Great missionary enterprises showed the spiritual zeal of large sections of the European communities. Representative institutions were adopted in all the European states. Great movements for national union were successfully carried out in Italy and Germany. Vast areas of the world were opened up and successfully colonised. There was a deep feeling of optimism on every side. Everybody believed that mankind was growing better and that there was for all a secure future to look forward to.

The last twenty years, however, of the century 1815-1914 was a period of decline. There were now few giants of arts and letters; such as existed were, most of them, survivals from the previous generation. Spiritual zeal was almost exhausted. Even the *tempo* of mechanical inventions and improvements was relaxed, although there was some invention and development in the internal combustion engine—science's dangerous if not fatal legacy to the following hundred years. The great statesmen, all but Lord Salisbury, were dead or had retired from active life by 1895. There were no Peels, Metternichs, Thiers, Bismarcks, Cavour, Gladstones. Salisbury was a lonely survival, and he too had lost his sure touch, his grasp and control of affairs, by 1895. The first fourteen years of the twentieth century were a time of *malaise*—of labour strikes; of diplomatic *coups* (Agadir); of occasional wars; of feeble constitutional experiment—Russian Duma, British House of Lords "Reform," Turkish Committee of Union and Progress. It was a pleasant enough period to live in, but there were no great men, no bountiful givers, enrichers of European civilisation like the poets and thinkers, the artists and

prophets, the statesmen, of the generations before the 'nineties. The years 1890 or 1895 to 1914 were a new decline of an *ancien régime*: 1914 was another 1789.

The next period, 1914-1940 or 1941, is the revolutionary-war period which ends a period of decline and is the transition to a fresh start, to a renaissance. Since 1914 Europe has been literally in revolution. The war of 1914-18 was not inevitable; it was Europe's colossal blunder; rightly regarded it was the Great Civil War within the community of civilised states. Every civil war is a revolution; and this, the most colossal of civil wars, was the most colossal of revolutions since the fall of the Roman Empire. This is why the disturbance which it made is still going on; this is why real peace did not come at the settlement of Versailles in 1919. The revolutionary-war period is still with us. Three stages of it can be discerned.

The first stage was the war of 1914-18. It was a revolution from every direction—in men's views upon civilisation and society; in the attitude of the Oriental peoples towards the Western peoples; in the habits of individuals; in the use of labour-saving machinery; in communications; in women's work; in political constitutions; in the distribution of wealth; in scales of taxation; in prices.

After the Armistice people thought that the revolution was finishing, and when the Treaty of Versailles was signed and ratified they thought that the revolution was complete. They had in their minds the Congress and Treaty of Vienna, 1815, which provided a fairly stable settlement for about fifty years and indeed, without any general war, for a hundred years. The Congress of Vienna, however, came at the end not of four years, but of more than twenty-two years, of European war. The European Revolution, which began as a domestic revolution in France and developed into general war, was really over by 1815. All peoples, including the vanquished, were genuinely ready for a long peace. Moreover, the statesmen of 1815 were not over-ambitious. They did not place upon human nature more than it could carry. They created a Balance of Power and a Concert of Europe—a merely consultative and somewhat vague concert—which proved to be a workable "system" (as Metternich called it), conformable to the standards of morality and civilisation of the time. The statesmen of 1919 conceived a splendid ideal in the League of Nations, but it proved to be beyond the moral stature of the member-states.

The Versailles Settlement, for this and other reasons, was only a temporary halt in the revolution which began in 1914.

The second stage was the period 1920-38. During this time the revolution was carried on by other means, for the most part, than by war. There was incessant agitation—about frontiers; about war guilt; about reparations and interstate, chiefly American, war debts. There were violent alterations of constitution in Italy, Germany, Greece and Spain. There was bitter economic warfare in which even the most enlightened governments, such as the United States and Great Britain, took part. The increased and increasing speed of mechanisation dislocated many industries and created "technological" unemployment. Perhaps the greatest evidence of revolution in this second stage of the revolution is the tremendous alteration in the moral outlook of most people, particularly of the young; they lost the idea of progress, the belief that there was a secure future for each one and for all mankind, which was fundamental in the nineteenth century.

The third stage in the revolution began with the outbreak, better called the restarting, of European war in 1939. For it is really the same war which began in 1914, died down in 1918, was continued by other means in 1919-38, broke out again in 1939; and the whole forms the Great Revolution of the modern world. If this interpretation is correct—and it may be correct, for there is as much evidence in its favour as there is for the catastrophic interpretation—the future need not be regarded with dismay. The Great European Revolution is still going on. It has been going on for over twenty-five years, nearly as long as the complete duration of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War period. There is a *possibility* that it will go on indefinitely until European civilisation decays and disappears, but there is no particular reason why this should be deemed *probable*. The decline and fall of the Roman Empire, which Gibbon calls the most tremendous revolution that has ever been, went on for many generations and ended with the collapse of a civilisation. Most other revolutions have lasted for a much shorter period; and generally at the end the peoples directly concerned have established a fairly durable settlement and have made a new start with building instead of destroying.

Revolutions are always costly. Few have been worth making.

to write thus, soon after the outbreak of war, been widespread at home and abroad, and had it not grown and deepened during the winter and early spring until the evacuation of Central Norway brought it to seething point, the country would have been shocked by Mr. Amery's Cromwellian apostrophe to Mr. Chamberlain and his pre-war colleagues: "You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!"

It may well be, as Mr. Chamberlain suggested in his farewell address, that Hitler hastened to strike his blow at Holland and Belgium because he imagined our political crisis to be a crisis of disunion instead of what it really was—a determined striving for more effective unity. Hitler's knowledge of Britain is at least as inadequate as was Mr. Chamberlain's knowledge of Hitlerite Germany. Nor is this the last blunder Hitler will make. Neither he nor Ribbentrop understands what a response this country, and the British people overseas, will give to Mr. Churchill's first words to the House of Commons as Prime Minister: "I have nothing to offer but blood and toil and tears and sweat," while we "wage war by sea, land and air with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime." Our aim, he added, is "victory; victory at all costs; victory in spite of all terrors; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival—let that be realised—no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind shall move forward towards its goal. I take up my task with buoyancy and hope, and I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men. At this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all, and I say: 'Come then, let us go forward together with our united strength'."

Mr. Churchill will get the aid of all in ever-increasing measure. We have before us, we are now undergoing, a grievous ordeal, with many months of struggle and suffering in prospect. Its climax has not yet been reached. Yet it is a relief that the weary months of anxious waiting are at an end, that soon we shall know beyond a peradventure who is friend and who is foe, and that the last veils which shroud

malignant ill-will must soon be rent. From this knowledge, too, springs a sense of liberation. Either the evil things we fight against will be destroyed, or we shall perish. They will be destroyed, and we shall not perish. Freedom, which alone makes life worth living, will be justified of her children.

In such an hour it is well to take stock of the position with open-eyed and cool appraisal. By our side stand France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland and Belgium. (Why, by the way, is not the Czechoslovak National Anthem broadcast by the B.B.C. on Sunday evenings together with those of our other Allies? Is it because of some lingering belief that there was virtue in the policy of "appeasement," of which Czechoslovakia was the innocent victim?) Behind us morally, and with growing eagerness to render material help, stands the United States. Switzerland, too, has mobilised as though she had good reason to fear that her neutrality will be respected as little as other neutralities have been. (The very notion of neutrality is wearing thin.) Turkey, Egypt and the Middle East are with us. In the Balkans a movement of solidarity is noticeable, a movement of which the efficacy may soon be put to the test. If Soviet Russia and Japan cannot be reckoned as friends, neither can they be accounted active foes. Spain professes neutrality. How strict her neutrality would be, should the war spread to the Mediterranean, remains to be seen.

Our main foe is Nazi Germany, that is to say Hitler and Hitlerism and, pending proof to the contrary, those sections of the German people who support them. We have not always measured Hitler and Hitlerism with true measure. Dr. Rauschning has shown us that they represent a Nihilist revolution. But many of us have entirely failed to understand that Italian Fascism has always been and must be closely akin to Hitlerism. Before these lines can be published Mussolini may have taken the plunge which he has more than once promised Hitler to take; or the course of events, or resistance from Pope and King and from those sections of the Italian people which abhor the thought of fighting by the side of Germany, may cause him still to waver. His personal interest, and care for the future of his system, assuredly incline him to intervention against the Western Allies.

On this point I have been at pains to consult the most qualified and experienced judges of Italian policy who are to

They dislocate all the fruitful ways of life and habits of society. They release evil forces. They destroy wealth. They destroy people. As a rule the vast majority of the peoples involved in a revolution have had little or no choice in regard to the making of it ; but once in, they have to go through it. Most revolutions end within periods of one year to five years. Yet the German religious revolution was a Thirty Years War, 1618-48. The French Revolutionary-Napoleonic period covered nearly twenty-six years, 1789-1815. The Great European Revolution has already lasted between twenty-five and twenty-six years, 1914-40 ; it may finish in 1940 or '41. Then comes the opportunity for a durable settlement and for the restart of fruitful, peaceful life.

The year 1914 was undoubtedly the end of an era which, however, had already begun to decline about 1890 or 1895. Such periods are not necessarily followed by catastrophe ; for human nature is rich in powers making for recovery. The appearance of a single genius—a Dante, Wesley, Rousseau—might supply the quickening influence to arrest the decline ; or recovery might come through one of the mysterious movements in society such as happened in the later Middle Ages without being attributable to any single genius or prophet. There was no such luck, however, in the decline of the Edwardian-Georgian age. The mediocrity of the politicians in every country after the death of Lord Salisbury allowed the European peoples to plunge into the war of 1914, a revolution which those same politicians were wholly unable to control. The Armistice of 1918, the peacemaking of 1919, the various world conferences subsequently convened—Washington Naval Conference, 1922, World Economic Conference, 1927, Hague Reparations Conference, 1929, Disarmament Conference, 1932, Second World Economic Conference, 1933—offered opportunities to the politicians (or statesmen) for taking control of affairs and stopping the revolution. They failed to do so and the revolution which had been going on as an economic and propaganda war became the land, naval and air war of 1939-40. And this may be the last stage. There are many indications that the impetus of the great revolution is being exhausted. Such a revolution, though not inevitable, is quite likely to happen in the decline of one era, but it is temporary ; the instinct in the peoples for creation, organisation, peace, asserts itself ; and a new settled era will begin.

R. B. MOWAT.

EVACUATION.

WHEN the history of this strangest of wars comes to be written, a chapter will have to be devoted to the subject of evacuation. Prosperous cities have before now gone down under the impact of war, or have suffered convulsions of nature, but it has been left to the citizens of the twentieth century to witness the mass depopulation of their towns in view of possible air raids, hundreds of miles from the battle front. Those of us who saw it in England in 1939—and who did not ?—will never forget it, for it was a sight to make the angels weep : mankind fleeing from the shadow of his own making, his new-found mastery of the air and his enormously increased power of hurting his fellow-men. As war became imminent, the cities seemed to be in the grip of a centrifugal force pushing the people out into the rural districts. Little children bravely marched off to unknown destinations far from their mothers' care ; aged blind or sick persons were taken by coach or ambulance to hastily commandeered country mansions ; hospitals, asylums and prisons were closed at a few hours' notice, to stand sandbagged and empty for official uses ; Government Departments and institutions occupied hotels in " safe " areas, while whole schools were politely invited into the country seats of the landed aristocracy. The lead given by the Government was followed by the public, and soon nearly everyone was sheltering strangers or living precariously in someone else's house, waiting for what might happen. And then came the long anticlimax of five months without air raids.

Nowhere were the effects of this grand exodus, which cut across every section of the community, so deeply felt as in London, so that in the first week of September it looked as though the Black Death had swept through the city. Every second house stood empty, shop assistants idly gossiped in shops without customers, and not a child stirred in the forsaken courtyards of the slums. A visit to a turbulent street usually teeming with young life in one of the poorer quarters was like going to a stricken area : silence everywhere, no play, no games, no laughter. It was Hamelin town after the Piper had passed. It is the effect of the evacuation on the working-classes with which the writer proposes to deal in detail.

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be found outside Italy. All believe that what they call the "solidarity of dictatorships" will bring Mussolini into the war against us unless Hitler's offensive in the West should be swiftly and overwhelmingly defeated. At the meeting on the Brenner Pass last spring Hitler convinced Mussolini that nothing can prevent a crushing German victory this year; and Mussolini promised Hitler Italian support. His promises, like those of Hitler, are worthless except when self-interest moves him to keep them. In truth, he has little choice. He cannot afford to see Hitler and Hitlerism destroyed, lest Italian Fascism crash likewise. Nor can he afford to see Hitler triumph without Italian support; for, in that event, his share of the spoils would be meagre. But the strongest bond between the demoniac of Berchtesgaden and the glorified Romagnolo faction-leader is their common contempt for the democracies or, as they call them, the "pluto-democracies." Both Mussolini and Hitler are convinced that France and Great Britain are ripe for overthrow, and waiting to be looted by the "young and virile nations" who have learned that war is the highest form of national activity. This conviction has governed and governs "Axis" policy. It alone explains Hitler's Herostratic incendiarism. Otherwise he would hardly have challenged the British and French democracies to a fight to the death, even if he believed that they would not fight. He and Mussolini may have thought—they certainly had some reason to think—that their methods of propaganda, their success in bamboozling French and British statesmen, and their organisation of "Fifth Columns," would enable them so to paralyse in advance the will and the power of the "pluto-democracies" to offer serious resistance that their triumph was assured. Yet, in the last resort, they were determined to fight, as desperate gangsters will fight when interfered with by armed police.

As I have said, Mussolini promised Hitler at their Brenner meeting the support of Fascist Italy at a given moment, though he stipulated that Germany should go "all out" before he came in on her side. He wished also to see Great Britain and France engaged, as deeply and as widely as possible, before he struck. It may not be generally known that the curious campaign in which some organs of the French and British press incautiously indulged during the Russo-Finnish War—the campaign for an immediate

Franco-British declaration of war against Russia—was inspired indirectly from Berlin and directly from Rome. The (real or alleged) despatch of Italian aeroplanes and airmen to help the Finns was part of it. Its object was so to extend the war that Italy might take her place more safely and more effectively by Hitler's side when Great Britain and France should be at grips with Soviet Russia. This campaign failed. Mr. Winston Churchill was one of the first to see through it. Then came the German decision to invade Denmark and Norway. Mussolini approved of this plan in the expectation that Great Britain, at least, would be heavily involved in Scandinavia and her main Fleet held fast in Northern waters. But the mauling of the German navy in the Norwegian operations, and the consequent release of British naval units for service in the Mediterranean, made him hesitate. So Hitler called the German Ambassador, Dr. von Mackensen, from Rome and sent him back with an urgent message that now was the time for Italy to come in.

At this juncture President Roosevelt, the Pope and, in some degree, the Italian Royal Family used their influence against Italian intervention. Mussolini fumed, and mobilised more men. He preferred to wait for Hitler's great offensive in the West and, perhaps, for a German attack upon France through Switzerland, before making his projected dash across the Adriatic into Dalmatia and into Southern Yugoslavia from Albania. He has long concerted plans with Hitler for joint action in South Eastern Europe; and both he and Hitler have promised Slovakia to Hungary as the price of her acquiescence in those plans. Circumstances may combine to defer their execution—or they may be carried out at any moment.

Like Hitler, Mussolini is a gambler. One who has reason to know him well describes him as a "supremely clever poker player." A man who once gambled heavily, with unexpected success, explained to me some years ago the fascination of gambling. It amounts, he said, to an intoxicating belief that one can dictate to chance, destiny, fate, or whatever you may call it, that the gods are on one's side and that luck is at one's command. Mussolini has gambled repeatedly, and has won. He attacked Abyssinia in the autumn of 1935 and—thanks to the shortsighted instability of British and French policy—succeeded in making King Victor Emmanuel

"Emperor of Ethiopia." He and Hitler then intervened openly in Spain and—thanks to the tragi-comedy of British and French "non-intervention"—succeeded once again. Having persuaded Mr. Neville Chamberlain to remove Mr. Anthony Eden as an obstacle to Anglo-Italian agreement, Mussolini made an agreement without giving pledges that he would observe it—and, on the strength of it, invaded and annexed Albania. Part price for this agreement was the British Prime Minister's toast on January 11th, 1939, to the King of Italy in Rome as "Emperor of Ethiopia." On the following March 15th Hitler tore up his Munich "Agreement" with Mr. Chamberlain by occupying what remained of the Czechoslovak Republic; and before a month was out Mussolini had occupied Albania and persuaded sundry Albanians to offer the Albanian crown to the King of Italy, who accepted it and assumed the title of "King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia."

At that moment Mr. Chamberlain said to the House of Commons: "It is not only the future of Albania that is at stake. Unmistakable signs of disquiet and uneasiness have been manifested in adjacent areas, and in other countries bordering on the Mediterranean or included in the Balkan peninsula." Yet he added: "So far as I am concerned, nothing that has happened has in any way altered my conviction that the policy of His Majesty's Government in signing the Anglo-Italian agreement a year ago was right. . . . I frankly confess my deep disappointment at an action by the Italian Government which has cast a shadow over the genuineness of their intentions to carry out their undertakings. No doubt some would say that we should now declare the Anglo-Italian agreement must be considered at an end. I do not take that view myself."

Until very recently the spirit of these observations still prevailed at No. 10 Downing Street whence the Foreign Office was effectively controlled under Mr. Chamberlain's Administration. It was not a spirit calculated to check successful gamblers. The sending of a strong Anglo-French naval force to the Eastern Mediterranean, after the mauling of the German navy in Norwegian waters, was more in accordance with the only language that dictators understand. It may not be enough to prevent the European conflagration from flaring up throughout the Mediterranean, Northern Africa

and the Near and Middle East. Much may depend upon the outcome of the immense and fateful battle that began in the second week of May in Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. It would be unwise, in my view, to overlook the possibility that when Hitler, as supreme head of the armed forces of Germany, strikes with all his might and with utter carelessness of human life, he may achieve important gains and inflict heavy losses. Equally if not more unwise would it be to believe for a moment that with or without the help of Italy, Hitler can keep up indefinitely his gigantic effort. The surest and the safest view is to expect, in Mr. Churchill's words, "many long months of struggle and of suffering," and to face them with courage unshaken and faith undimmed. If we hold fast, spare no effort and put forth our utmost strength, we shall win this fight sooner, maybe, than some now reckon. Then, in Kipling's words, we shall hear the "Dawn Wind," at whose breath,

Suddenly, all men arise to the noise of fetters breaking,
And every man smiles at his neighbour and tells him his soul is his
own.

WICKHAM STEED.

Much has been written about the "success" or "failure" of the evacuation of working-class mothers and children. To begin with, there are two sides to the question, that of the parents and that of the children. There is further the undoubted fact that if there had been persistent air-raids, many of the failures might have turned out successes, and some of those who have come back disgruntled to the towns might have been thankful to stay where they were. When we learn that by February 59 per cent. of the mothers and children who were evacuated in September have returned home, and that the question of compulsorily evacuating all children under five with their mothers is now under discussion by three Scottish cities, it is time to take stock of the situation and inquire why the first lot of mothers came back, whether they were justified in doing so, and how the evacuation is affecting the children both in the country and in the towns.

In a block of modern flats for rehoused slum tenants, more than 61 per cent. of the normal population had gone away in that first week of the war, and of the children, 94 per cent. had been evacuated. The sad-eyed mothers, trusting implicitly in the school authorities, had let their little ones go, they knew not whither, choosing the lesser of two evils. In the crisis of September 1938, a similar situation had been faced. In that week, on the living-room table of one flat had lain five labels for the children, five bags of biscuits, five gas-masks, while hastily mended shoes were put ready for the children to wear when the call should come. The call did not come then, but the parents were ready for the evacuation when it came a year later. These particular children are still away, they are much improved physically and are not fretting, though they are in different billets, and the mother goes out to work to swell the family budget and earn the extra money to keep the children in clothes. For evacuation has been a source of great expense to working-class families. Warm underclothes, mac-kintoshes and rubber boots are essential needs for children in the country, who may have got along quite happily without them in the city. Then there is the expense of constant repairs to shoes, knocked about on country roads. Added to this is the inevitable higher standard of even poor country cottages compared to the slums. The absence of night clothes, or at best the possession of one night shirt, is not understood by the kind hosts, who tell the children to write home and ask

for a second to be sent as soon as possible, not dreaming that such nice children should only have one of anything. And just as better-off mothers have tried to fit out their children properly for their boarding-schools, so have the working-class mothers tried to keep up a standard which will pass muster with strangers and is really hopelessly out of reach of their purses. The payments for the cost of keeping the children have been willingly paid, and the interval between the date at which the children left and the date at which the parents began to pay was a godsend, for it enabled the parents to fit out the children with some of these much-needed extras, and in many cases to get down to see them in their new surroundings.

In those first weeks of war, hardly anyone paid any rent and many families disappeared completely into the blue. The desire to keep the home together, however, soon reasserted itself, and after a while even those who went away "for the duration" paid up all the arrears by post, while little by little the others have been coming back. There are often excellent reasons for this much-criticised return, and it may be said that in almost every case where the schoolchildren have settled down, the parents strain every nerve to keep them in the country. But with the younger children it is a different story. They call for so much loving care that only the mother can give, and if she goes with them, what is to be done for the poor husband, the breadwinner, who returns after a hard day's work to a cold hearth, no comfort and no supper? The plight of the men left behind is pitiable. Few of them are able to cook, wash, mend and fend for themselves in addition to working all day. The soldier is under discipline, he has learnt to do without his wife and family when he is on active service, but the civilian is under no such control, nor is anything done to organise his life comfortably. Some unfortunates, turning away from their dirty neglected homes in an ache of loneliness, have found solace in the public-house, and soon the wife comes hurrying back with the young children to save the situation—and the home—before it is too late.

The economic factor also plays an important part. If the breadwinner falls out of work, there is not enough money to keep two establishments going, even if the wife is in billets provided by the Government. She it is who knows how to buy and cook nourishing food which will feed a family of six at

very little cost, and she guesses only too well what inadequate costly meals her husband is getting for himself in his lonely home. Torn between her duty to her husband and her children, she borrows the money for the fare and arrives home without notice, to look after him. What a reunion it is, what joy it brings, what loving sympathy on both sides, and a desire to do what is best all round, and dare we say she was wrong to come back?

Then there are the mothers with young children put into top rooms without fireplaces. It seems incredible that with so much hospitality of the right kind lavished on the evacuees, there should have been any families so lacking in imagination or common kindness that the young children were never invited to warm themselves by the kitchen fire, but were expected to eat their meals in a cold attic room with their coats on. Round and round the little country town the mother would push the pram in the wind and the rain, knowing there was no comfort indoors, until the ill-health of the children would bring home to her the necessity of facing possible bombing rather than certain bronchitis.

So as every week has passed, a few more mothers and children have returned. First there were two children in the playground, then six, then nine, until by the beginning of February 43 per cent. of the children who had gone in September had come back. (This figure is the same as that officially given for the whole country.) The playing in the courtyard is a little subdued, for all the noisy brothers and sisters are away. But there is method in the return, for there are plans in being "to send the children down to Granny if anything should happen." And if this were not possible, there is still the air-raid shelter, now being constructed by the Borough Council, good and solid, in the playground.

The women, with that stoic quality which distinguishes the working-classes, want to share with their men the difficulties and dangers which may lie ahead. Thrown on their own resources they were miserable, and the problems involved in sharing a kitchen with a strange family, often with quite different standards and habits, can be imagined. The glory of the working-classes is their pride in their homes and their families. In breaking these sacred ties, we risk destroying something which may never be replaced, and the women have acted instinctively in coming home. When a man goes to the

war he is immolated, a nimbus of knight errantry surrounds him, and should he return he will find his hearth is kept warm for him. But when a woman is evacuated—horrid word—there is no nimbus for her, she is just dumped in a "safe" area, and her home goes to pieces as like as not. It is a new kind of tragedy, very hard to bear, and we should not ask the working women to bear it if they are ready to stay with their men, come raid, come fine, in the cities. To separate the young children from their mothers—unless of course they can be sent to relations in the country—can only be really satisfactory when it is done under the ægis of a Nursery School, so that the mother has complete confidence in the arrangements, and the children have proper supervision and companionship. Otherwise it seems best to leave the young children with their mothers, if they have already come home, but to keep those who have settled down in the country where they are, and to push on with arrangements for increasing the number of nursery schools in evacuation areas.

The older children, on the other hand, flourish in their new surroundings. It is the birthright of a healthy boy or girl to run about in the open, to climb trees or to swim in the sea. It was a wonderful sight to see the slum children making for the sea in those warm September days when the evacuation began. The naughty boys, always in trouble in the cities, are naughty boys no more, and it is pleasant to think that they may now decide to become farmers in Canada instead of cat-burglars in Bermondsey. Reports come from all over the country that the children have put on weight and are much improved physically as a result of their time in the country. Strange misunderstandings occurred in the early days. A farmhouse tea, with butter and milk on the table, was refused, for none of the children could face the strange diet. Margarine and condensed milk was what they understood and liked, and cow's milk was an unknown and distressing phenomenon. A major crisis was provoked when three brothers, expecting to share the same towel, were billeted far from one another at the opposite ends of a village. These minor embarrassments are a thing of the past, but the educational problems are a present embarrassment and perplexity. In the improvised conditions in the country much has depended on the character and quality of the school teachers, who as a whole have responded magnificently to a trying situation. The board schools have

PAYING FOR THE WAR.

A GAIN within twenty-five years the three great Western Powers of Europe, once regarded as the leaders of civilised progress, are locked in a life and death struggle for victory. Armed to the teeth with all the latest weapons and contrivances of chemists and mechanics, their conscript forces are fighting by land, sea and air at a cost which defies computation. Our own Treasury finance, as we now see, while maintaining its superiority over other systems, can only guess at what may be the national expenditure as the area of warfare extends and more and more men are drafted from civil life into the defence services. In the case of France and Germany the official expenditure is unknown. "What is the use of pretending to keep accounts," said a French economist to me not long ago. What indeed? And how can the figures of the French expenditure on the army and on the production of munitions be related to ours in view of the immense disparity of wages and salaries?

Owing to the strength of the Maginot and Siegfried lines there had been until after the Budget no such massacre as that which began in August 1914, and lasted without intermission until November 1918. The stalemate is over. Perhaps the lawless brutality of Hitler's fiendish invasions of Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium signifies the last convulsive effort of a desperate tyrant. If so the war may be shortened by his fall. But more probably it will be brought to an end by financial and economic exhaustion, which indeed played a big part in the collapse of Germany and its allies in 1918. That being so, the question how we are now paying for the war and how we may best find ways and means of prosecuting it when taxation reaches its limit, and borrowing in a normal way—as we did throughout the last war—becomes more and more difficult, is a major problem, possibly the greatest and most puzzling of all the problems that have to be solved.

Already it is clear to every competent student of finance that a war of this magnitude has to be paid for by a number of methods in combination which act and react upon one another and almost defy separate treatment. The two well-tried methods by which Great Britain has carried on great wars in the past have been by increasing the tax revenue and

providing for the gap between tax revenue and expenditure by borrowing. The third device, adopted in the last war by nearly all the belligerents, is that of inflation, which in its crudest form means simply issues of inconvertible paper money to supply the needs of the State. This device leads straight to ruin; for a rise of prices or a shortage of food and raw materials is the inevitable consequence. If you double the quantity of paper notes in circulation, you double, broadly speaking, the prices, or to be more accurate you halve the value of the standard money—be it the paper mark, the paper franc, or the paper pound. That process is by all possible means to be avoided or postponed to the very last; for it portends bankruptcy and famine.

To avert this deadly mischief another device has to be tried and is being tried, that of rationing food and necessities such as boots and clothing, and of cutting down the supplies of all comforts and luxuries which are not vital to the maintenance of the nation's life and health. In the case of Great Britain one of the main objects of rationing and of reducing consumption is to provide a larger surplus of exports to pay for the importation of food, raw materials and munitions of war from foreign countries and from the British Dominions or Crown Colonies. To promote the export of coal and of all manufactured articles which can be spared from home consumption is one of the objects of the Controls which were established with such profusion and indiscriminating haste at the beginning of the war. Another object is to stop the importation of commodities which we can do without and to reduce the importation of others such as timber which can be supplied by cutting down our own forests and woodlands.

If State control of production, distribution, overseas trade and exchange may be summarised as the fourth means of supporting the war, I would say that the fifth and last is Privation, which may take and probably will take in the end several forms. The most obvious is for the Government to cut down all public expenditure which is strictly unnecessary or can be dispensed with in a crisis like this. Thus the expenditure of all local authorities could probably be halved by a sweeping reduction of salaries and a cutting down of staffs and a suppression of the various amenities which have grown up by degrees to the great advantage of us all. Perhaps the worst of the inconveniences that have already been imposed

become boarding schools overnight and those who never thought to look after children out of school hours are now faced with a whole-time job.

According to latest reports there are just over 400,000 official evacuees still away, as well as tens of thousands of unofficial ones, and of these between 80 and 90 per cent. are getting some sort of schooling, usually in shifts, with a country school. As to the future, the Ilford Borough Council is pointing the way by opening two elementary boarding schools for children over eleven years of age, and twenty new camps have been allocated to schools as a beginning. It is an important step, for it is going to keep children out of the cities and give them privileges hitherto only enjoyed by the children of the well-to-do.

But the plight of the children still in the cities is lamentable. The President of the Board of Education in his speech of February 7th in the House of Lords revealed that of the 1,150,000 children still in the evacuation areas, 400,000 are receiving no schooling or care at all. Such a situation cannot be allowed to continue. Where voluntary helpers are available, invaluable work has been done in organising small groups, and the children evidently enjoy these unofficial experimental lessons, but such an effort is necessarily on a small scale. The excellent broadcasting service for schools has also been of the greatest help both to schools working on the two-shift system and to small classes organised in private houses. "Owing to the war our school has been closed," writes a Liverpool child to Mr. S. P. B. Mais, "so we go to each other's houses to do our work and listen to broadcasts to schools." But others are less fortunate and complaints come from many quarters that hordes of youngsters are virtually running wild. The children miss their lessons, and unless education is compulsory there will always be found some black sheep among the parents who keep their children at home for frivolous or selfish reasons, even if there is a school to go to.

The decision to re-open more schools in the evacuation areas and to make attendance at school compulsory once more has already been foreshadowed. But this should be coupled with a measure forbidding the return of school-children from the country except for urgent reasons. Only so can the drift back to the towns be prevented. And if the evacuation has not been as complete as was hoped for, even

to have got 400,000 school children away into the country is no mean achievement. There is one more aspect of the evacuation which should not be lost sight of. When the castles of Scotland, the manor houses of England and the little country cottages of the West Country opened their doors to the children, a thrill of horror ran down the spine of the "comfortable classes" in Britain at the poverty, dirt, squalor and inadequate food and clothing which the slum children had got accustomed to. Was it not time that such a shock should be administered and that a better environment should be provided for the citizens of the future?

JANET LEEPER.

are the reduction of transport facilities and the increase of fares on railways and motor buses. These, and still more the black-out, have made life and work much more difficult and have prevented production and employment from attaining a maximum. Then there is the control of food, which aims partly at substituting such foods as bread and potatoes for the meat and fish whose supply is diminished by lack of imports and the requisitioning of trawlers by the Navy. The substitution of margarine for butter is another unavoidable consequence of this policy, all of which is intended to extend the period during which we can maintain without insupportable privations a long war of economic exhaustion. To encourage and strengthen our belief in ultimate victory we are told—and there seem to be convincing proofs—that conditions of life in Germany are much worse than here and considerably worse than in France.

Before tackling the problem of how the war is to be paid for in the current financial year, Sir John Simon in his financial statement made some observations on "the question of economy in public spending"—a subject, as he said, which is in the minds of all serious persons in the country. The burdens of the budget and the privations which must become more and more severe would be borne with as little complaint as may be, provided the people "are satisfied that every effort is really being made to reduce waste and therefore to see that we pay no more than we need pay." This, he added, is a daily preoccupation of the Treasury, and every citizen is doing a service who brings to the notice of the spending department or of the Treasury well-authenticated cases of waste. Not only Ministers and officials but private individuals should do all that they can to reduce the unnecessary outlay of public funds. To assist the spending departments and the Treasury in this work a Select Committee of the House of Commons has been charged with the task of investigating the expenditure of public departments, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer welcomed their help.

In view of the probability that the war may be ended by the financial and economic exhaustion of one of the combatants, it does seem to me amazing that an able critic of the Government like Mr. Amery, assisted by several newspapers and supported (apparently) by Mr. J. M. Keynes, should have blamed Sir John Simon for not spending more;

as if the Treasury were the great spending department of the Government, and as if its duty were not to prevent waste and cut down all superfluities, but to force the spending departments to spend more regardless of cost or efficiency. During the discussion of the Budget on April 24th Mr. Amery said: "Figures which have not been challenged or contradicted show that Germany is spending at this moment on war purposes alone something in the nature of 3,200 millions sterling," which he went on to describe as "greater than the total effort of Great Britain and France." But these German statistics are pure guess-work. We do not even know the names of the persons who concocted them. How is it possible to tell what is the yield of German taxes, or what the amount of borrowing, the amount of inflation and the amount of privation which added together constitute the total war effort of Germany? And when the four guesses have been added together in marks, how are they to be translated into sterling? Finally, if the guess-work is correct—an absurd assumption—and if the guess-work about the cost of the war to France is also correct, is it not possible or even probable that the German financial system is very near to breaking down under the strain, and that, as an acquaintance prophesied the other day, the Nazi system will soon "crack up"? We know at least what Dr. Schacht thought about it when he resigned before the war, and Dr. Schacht is undoubtedly the greatest living authority on the theory and practice of German finance.

To spend more for spending's sake would surely be madness. Next to the navy and our merchant service, which constitute our Maginot line of defence, comes finance. A financial breakdown would be the ruin of the Allied cause. To conserve our reserves and to delay by every possible device the process of exhaustion is one of the supreme duties of British statesmanship. Every ounce of gold, every pound of sterling which is spent on non-essentials is so much deducted from our war effort and so much added needlessly to the exhaustion of our resources.

Listening to Sir John's second (and last) war budget on the afternoon of Tuesday, April 23rd, I was impressed, as on the occasion of his first war budget, by the admirable clarity of his exposition and by the grim acquiescence of the House of Commons in the tremendous burdens and the awful prospects which it opened out for the financial future of the

LORD HALIFAX.

THE emergence of Viscount Halifax as a European figure is a fact as fascinating as it is reassuring. Two or three years ago he was, to the man in the street, not more than a name amongst others. To-day, whenever he states our case, the British peoples feel that he speaks their heart. The world, too, knows him by now as the spokesman of all that is best in European civilisation. How did he come to be one of the few outstanding figures in European politics to whom perhaps more than one nation looks for guidance about a better future? The answer gives confidence. Neither a flair for publicity nor any big reform, both considered to be the jumping-off board necessary for an ambitious politician in our times, marks his way. He shuns publicity of every kind. The public never even came to realise very clearly that the Mr. Edward Wood who, for sixteen years, was a Member of Parliament, and Lord Irwin, the trusted Viceroy of India, is identical with the man who, to-day, as the third Viscount Halifax, holds the high office of Foreign Secretary. As to popular reforms, moreover, the stony field of foreign politics hardly offers itself. What, then, is the reason of his surprising and even sudden emergence as a national figure? A glance at his career may supply the answer.

Mr. Edward Wood entered Parliament in 1910 to join the throng of the Conservative opposition. He was only 29, and it was not until another ten years had passed by that he held his first office. Amongst the back-benchers of the pre-war Conservative party he did not shine with any particular brilliance. He heckled Ministers, as others did, but he was unable to catch the Speaker's eye in any of the really important debates, with one notable exception. From 1912, right down to 1914, he rose again and again to oppose the Established Church (Wales) Bill. This could perhaps be expected from the son of so great a leader of the English Church Union as the second Viscount Halifax. His son's words, however, had the true ring of personal conviction when he opposed disestablishment, or when he protested against the theory which tries to cut a man in half, a tax-paying citizen on the one hand and a religious being on the other. "What we need to learn is that every citizen is individually responsible for any other citizen, and that there is a real social membership

in the State. I am quite sure that the Labour Party will agree with that, and I submit that you can only establish that on a moral basis. It is obvious that the State cannot do so itself." For a Conservative back-bencher thus to address himself to the Labour Party was, in those days, a sign of considerable independence. To this day he has, indeed, always shown himself eminently free from petty party spirit, and he has generally won the approval of the Labour leaders and the Liberal and Conservative Parties alike. The moral values he then stressed hold good to-day when we are fighting the State-idolising forces of Hitlerism. "Religion," he said in 1914, "and the religious instinct is the real underpinning foundation of society, and is the basis upon which society as a whole must always rest." From this fundamental belief he has never swerved. When he was Viceroy of India this essentially religious outlook impressed his Indian adversaries so much that he was admiringly referred to as "that thin tall Christian." A Christian—I do not think that he himself would have wished for any other tribute.

During the World War he spent most of his time in France with his regiment, the Yorkshire Dragoons. Only once in 1916 did he come home to speak in the House of Commons and to urge the necessity of a smaller War Cabinet. "A Cabinet," he said, "even if it were a Cabinet of arch-angels, is not an ideal body for administering a great war in which you require prompt decisions and, above all, men to be at liberty to think without being immersed in departmental work." These arguments, familiar as they may sound to us to-day, did not, however, convince the Prime Minister of the day, Mr. Asquith. Nor was his second point received with approval. Sir John Simon, who had preceded him in the debate, had declared himself an unabated opposer of compulsory military service. Major Wood, however, urged its speedy introduction: "I think," he said, speaking with great emphasis, "that in after years it will be thought a somewhat extraordinary thing that in the twentieth month of the war we should still have been having one delay after another, that we should still up to the last moment have been making frenzied efforts in the cause of straightforward voluntary recruiting, and that we should have been having one recruiting statement after another." There can be no doubt that this speech by a young Conservative straight from the

country. There were few active signs of opposition to any of the new taxes from the Labour Benches. Such interjections and interruptions as were made, the Chancellor answered with his usual skill and patience. No one surpasses him in the art of expounding the intricacies of income tax, surtax, customs or excise. Now and then a lighter touch afforded welcome relief to the strained attention of Members.

The broad outlines of our war finance are clear enough. The estimated expenditure of the first war budget for the financial year ending on March 31st was 1,933 millions, but the actual realised expenditure amounted to only 1,816 millions. The estimates of revenue from taxation were 995 millions and the actual realised revenue was 1,049 millions, a highly encouraging result. Last September it looked as if we might have to borrow 938 millions before the end of March. But as a matter of fact we only borrowed 768 millions. Our total expenditure was 1,817 millions, and we found out of revenue 1,049 millions, an extraordinarily large proportion which redounds to the credit of the country and to the courage of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and of the Government. Moreover, in making comparisons, we have to remember that when we declared war on Germany our taxation, direct and indirect, was much heavier than in the last year of the last war, and the national debt was also considerably larger.

I have taken pains to investigate in the light of precedents the question whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his two war budgets has lived up to the precepts and practices of his predecessors. The French wars (1793 to 1815) left us with a crushing debt of over 800 millions. Mr. Gladstone, who examined the subject in 1853, declared that if there had been resolution enough to submit to the income tax in 1793 or 1794 "our national debt need not at this moment have existed." But in 1854, when Mr. Gladstone himself had to provide for the cost of the Crimean War, he did not put on enough taxes for the purpose, nor did Sir George Cornwall Lewis, his successor. The total expenditure on the Crimean War came to about 80 millions, and more than half of it was borrowed. When the Boer War started in October 1899, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not propose any additional taxation, though the income tax on the highest incomes was then only 8d. in the pound. Afterwards taxation was

increased, but out of the 250 millions that the war cost only 76 millions were provided from new or additional duties.

In August 1914, when the Great War began, taxation was so low that it would have been quite easy to cover the cost of the war during the first financial year without resort to borrowing. Not until the last year was the income tax raised to 6s. in the pound. I examined the war finance of 1914 to 1919 with much care and at considerable length, and came to the conclusion that only 28 per cent of the total cost of 9,593 millions was defrayed out of tax revenue. Even in the last year of the war, Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, only raised 889 millions from taxes out of 2,579 millions expenditure. In the first year 1914-15 of the last war, as Sir John Simon pointed out, when Mr. Lloyd George was Chancellor of the Exchequer, only 59 millions were taken from the income-tax payers and only 10 millions from the super-tax payers. Sir John Simon in the first year of this war collected 390 millions of income tax and nearly 70 millions of super-tax!

If he could have assumed that the rate of expenditure would not grow, or that the war would come to an end before the conclusion of the financial year, Sir John Simon might well have been contented with a tax burden much higher than that which seemed so oppressive at the conclusion of the last war. In the first seven months of the war which fell within the last financial year our war expenditure amounted to 905 millions. At that rate the cost for this year would be 1,500 millions, but, as he put it, the pace of war expansion has been increasing and is likely to go on increasing. He assumes that the amount needed by March 31st next for war purposes only will mount to the colossal and appalling sum of 2,000 millions. To this has to be added 230 millions for the service of the debt, 420 millions for the Civil estimates, etc., and 17 millions for other purposes, making a total estimate of 2,667 millions for the whole expenditure of the country in the present year. On the basis of the September scale rates he anticipated a tax revenue of 1,133 millions. To increase this he began by raising the income tax to 7s. 6d. in the pound, which means that with super-tax added the rate on the highest incomes will be 17s. in the pound, comparing with 10s. 6d. in 1918. He is also reducing super-tax exemption from £2,000 to £1,500.

The increases of income tax on the smaller incomes since the

front influenced the speeding-up of the war machinery. If Great Britain entered the present war with compulsory service in force and with a War Cabinet ready to take over, it can safely be said that Lord Halifax has been responsible for it in no small degree. He was ready to split the Coalition in 1916 and to give his help to any party—he expressly included the Labour Party—which was “prepared to carry on the war, as I conceive, with more vigour.”

In 1917 Major Wood took part in the work of the National Service Department, the first Director of which was Mr. Neville Chamberlain. His first Government appointment, however, did not come till well after the war, when his outspoken criticism of the Coalition and of Mr. Lloyd George had lost its sting. “It is mainly political co-ordination that we lack,” he said at the end of 1917. In the following year he stated his case in greater detail in a small book written in conjunction with Sir George Lloyd (the present Lord Lloyd). *The Great Opportunity*, as it was hopefully called, appeared at the end of 1918 and covered all the main aspects of national life. “We have affirmed,” the authors said, “the responsibility of service which lies upon every individual; but for the more efficient discharge of this duty we have emphasised the obligation that lies upon the State to ensure that individuals may live their lives under conditions of reasonable security and content.” Though the book did not deal with foreign politics, several speeches showed his special interest in the future of the League of Nations which he called the one solid gain to be derived from the sufferings of the last four years. “As I understand, the ultimate ideal of the League demands at least three things: it demands universal disarmament, it demands economic freedom, and it demands arbitration.” None of them, we can add, has been given a fair trial, either singly or together. Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, repudiated his “noble and interesting idealism,” and declared: “Nations that do not want to keep the peace will not be bound by these treaties of arbitration.” There is truth in this cold sentence, as no one knows better than Lord Halifax.

The busy years after the World War found Mr. Wood engaged in the ordinary work of a keen Parliamentarian. In all the great debates, for instance in the dark days in Ireland, he took an active part, always favouring a progressive

non-party policy. In April 1921 he was made Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office. Nominally it was still a Coalition Government, but a glance at the Under-Secretaries—Mr. Amery, Lord Londonderry, etc.—showed the increasing weight of the Conservative Party. His chief was Mr. Churchill. The Colonial Office offered an excellent start to a young politician. He had to work hard to make himself familiar with the innumerable problems of the British Empire (there was no separate Dominion Office in those days), and in July he formally moved the Vote of Supply of his Ministry. There was, at the time, a widespread interest amongst Members of the House in the future of one outlying district of the Colonial Empire, namely the West Indies and British Guiana. The Under-Secretary therefore decided to pay an official visit to those colonial dependencies—the first of its kind.

With an independent Member of Parliament, his friend Mr. Ormsby-Gore (the present Lord Harlech), he spent two crowded months touring the islands and interviewing people. He returned with such a wealth of material that his official report became a best-seller in the West Indies. Moreover, it helped to focus the general interest on this outlying but very loyal part of the Empire. The constitutional changes carried out from 1922 onwards are mainly based on his conclusions. This journey and the report made him popular in all parts of the House. When he next moved the Colonial Office Vote he had the satisfaction of hearing the Labour spokesman call his declaration “winged words of wisdom.” The young Under-Secretary had become a political force. When, in October 1922, the Conservatives took over from Mr. Lloyd George, he became President of the Board of Education and a Cabinet Minister. Mr. Wood had taken particular interest in educational matters before he was attached to the Colonial Office. It was, however, no small thing to succeed Mr. Fisher, whose great reforms were among the successes of the outgoing Government. It was, perhaps, only natural that the Liberal Opposition tried to mark Mr. Wood’s efforts down as retarding rather than promoting education. The Board of Education, said Sir John Simon reproachfully, was acting merely as an outpost of the Treasury. Mr. Wood, however, could show that his department, in spite of heavy cuts in expenditure, was following the principles laid down in Mr. Fisher’s reforms. He retained his office in the Baldwin administration, and there is no doubt

war began were illustrated in the Financial Statement. To take one instance, a married man without children earning £400 a year will pay £30 12s. 6d. this year instead of £17 10s. last year and £12 12s. 6d. the year before last. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer had adopted Mr. Keynes' scheme this same man, who now pays £31 in income tax, would have been compelled to contribute out of his income a forced loan of no less than £68, so that his total contribution would have been £99 out of £400 apart altogether from indirect taxation. Further, to increase this year's revenue the Chancellor of the Exchequer made large additions to the Customs and Excise Duties on beer, spirits and tobacco and to the Excise Duty on matches. He also raised enormously the postal charges, and added considerably to the charges for telephones and telegrams. Considering the wonderful improvements in transport it is indeed remarkable that in the centenary year of the penny post a British Chancellor of the Exchequer should be driven to impose a twopence-halfpenny stamp on letters and a twopenny stamp on postcards. The anticipated yield of the additional taxation imposed in the second war Budget is 101 millions, to which the income tax contributes £42,500,000. Adding the 101 millions to the 1,133 millions which would have been the tax revenue if no changes had been made the Chancellor arrived at an estimated total contribution from revenue of 1,234 millions, leaving a deficit of 1,433 millions to be raised otherwise than by taxation. To meet this he had in hand a balance of 100 millions from the proceeds of the recent 3 per cent War Loan and secondly "in so far as we meet our large purchases abroad this year by the use of some portion of our gold reserve, that process itself reduces proportionately the budgetary problem."

Allowing for these two deductions I think it may be fair to assume that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will, if the war continues to the end of the financial year, have to raise by long-term loans and short-term loans and Treasury Bills about as much as he hopes to get from taxes—say, 1,234 millions. This is a very big sum and horrible to contemplate. It is an addition to the deadweight debt, which may be regarded as a floating charge on the wealth and industry of the country. Last year the national debt rose from 8,163 millions to 8,931 millions. We may therefore assume provisionally that at the end of this financial year it will be considerably more than

10,000 millions. But in the last war we borrowed nearly 7,000 millions, entirely by voluntary means, though at rising rates of interest. In my judgment there is no reason why the Treasury and the Bank of England should not be able to raise in the course of the year by voluntary means the amount necessary to square the account.

Nor is it easy to see how any Government, even a dictatorship, could force everyone who has any spare cash to invest it in war loans or certificates. The idea that when compulsion is applied lots of people will go on investing as before seems to me fantastical. As Sir John Simon said :

Experience goes to show that the first effect of compulsion is to kill the voluntary method. We should run the gravest risk of losing at one blow what the National Savings Movement has done for us. I would rather make it plain to the wage-earners of this country and to all others who can lend a portion of their income to the State that, so far from having lost faith in their willingness to help the country at this crisis, we are confident that the response will be greater than ever.

This opinion has been confirmed by very strong statements to the same effect by Sir Roger Kindersley, Sir T. Chambers and others responsible for organising the National Savings Movement, which between Christmas and the end of March was raising a million a day in Post Office Savings, Baby 3 per cent Bonds and Savings Certificates. If these considerations were not overwhelmingly convincing, there is another adduced by the Chancellor which would suffice to turn the scale. One of the terrible consequences and injustices resulting from the war is that the nation is divided into two parts—those who have lost the whole or part of their income or savings and those who have gained in income or profits and sometimes even in their invested capital. Take the simple cases of a man whose income has fallen from £600 to £400, and of another whose income has risen from £200 to £400. To expect the former to pay or lend £100 to the Government would be cruel ; to ask the latter to do so might be reasonable. Compulsion would treat both alike. In the circumstances it is not surprising that Sir John Simon's decision to stand by the voluntary system in regard to borrowing was accepted by the Labour Party as well as by the supporters of the Government.

If more money has to be found for the war than can be got

that his department was generally looked upon as the one least open to adverse comment.

In 1923 Mr. Wood stepped upon the open platform of international politics. He was sent to Geneva to represent Great Britain at a League meeting dealing with the thorny question of the Saar. The position of the British delegate was especially delicate as his Government did not agree with the latest decrees issued by the Saar administration (curtailing freedom of speech, etc.). Nor did they, or he personally, agree with the proposed candidate for the governing body of the Saar. Mr. Wood was able, without offending French feeling, to throw all his weight on the side of moderation and thus to eliminate another point of possible friction with Germany. This was generally considered a promising *début* on the international stage. In the second Baldwin administration he took office as Minister of Agriculture, a subject after his heart. As a Yorkshire landowner and a typical country gentleman, he was keenly interested in agricultural problems. His tenure of office, short as it was, definitely secured him a position in home politics. This was the more important because, in November 1925, he was appointed Viceroy and left home politics for six years.

He was now forty-four. He took the name of Lord Irwin, which is for ever connected with the Irwin-Gandhi agreement of 1931, the pact that overcame one of the most dangerous deadlocks. Without the tact of the Viceroy and—still more important—without the fact that the Indian leaders trusted him and believed in the purity of his purpose, this agreement would never have been reached. But for him it might well be that the history of India, and thus of the British Empire, would have been very different. In November 1927 he announced that the Indian Statutory Commission, which was due to review India's constitution in 1929, would be set up forthwith. This body, the so-called Simon Commission, had a somewhat rough reception in India; and it failed to prevent Gandhi's crusade of civil disobedience which was trying to force the hand of the British Government. The first Round Table Conference in London was a failure. Things came to a crisis when Gandhi was arrested. It was then that Lord Irwin saved the situation. "That thin tall Christian" was trusted everywhere. Even extremists like Mr. Bose admitted his uprightness and admired his good intentions. When, on March 5th, 1931,

Gandhi and Lord Irwin reached an agreement, a sigh of relief went through the whole of the Indian continent. Dominion status, India's long-cherished aim, seemed to be nearly within reach. Peace was restored to the Indian world. This outcome was the crowning of Lord Irwin's tenure of office. It was followed by the second Round Table Conference in London which was attended by Gandhi. The foundations had thus been laid for the tremendous attempt at introducing self-government embodied in India's Charter of August 2nd, 1935.

On his return in 1931 Lord Irwin took his place in the inner circle of Imperial statesmen. In India he was revered as a saintly man and a true Christian who had acted upon the highest principles; and these qualities made him the figure he is to-day. He helped the National Government by very modestly taking the Ministry of Education, thus returning to the office he had held in 1922. When Mr. Baldwin took over from Mr. MacDonald in 1935 Lord Halifax, as he now was, became Secretary for War for a short time. From then onwards, that is since the autumn of 1935, he was, as Lord Privy Seal, so to say, a Minister without departmental duties. In this capacity he did not catch the eye of the public until the autumn of 1937 when he went to Berlin and Berchtesgaden to establish personal contact with the German leaders and to see Nazi Germany for himself. His main concern, indeed, had been foreign affairs, and he had deputed for the Foreign Secretary whenever Mr. Eden went abroad or on leave. His visit to Germany had been carefully prepared and had the backing of influential circles in this country. It was one more in the long series of British pilgrimages to the maniac of Berchtesgaden. It will be remembered that Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden had visited Berlin in 1935 and that Sir Robert Vansittart went to see Hitler in 1936. Now it was the Lord Privy Seal who undertook, like Lord Haldane in 1912, to find out what was in the mind of the German Government.

On his return he gave a full account to a meeting in London attended by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of England and France. The main point raised by Hitler was the colonial question, and both Governments were prepared to examine this problem if it formed part of an all-round settlement. Amongst the other questions discussed was the Czech problem. Here both Governments agreed that the German minorities enjoyed considerable freedom and that it

without an inflationary rise of prices under the present system, it may be suggested that the income tax should be extended downwards and modified so that those who are gaining by the war, whether in wages or salaries, should pay more in proportion than those who are losing by it. Another method of contributing to the cost of the war which would certainly have the approval of public opinion would be a general graded reduction of all State salaries and wages. The luxury establishments of many of the Controllors and of the thousands of officials appointed since the war have astonished and disgusted the country. If we are to have a socialist bureaucratic state without public and private bankruptcy along with a conscript army, it will have to be of a very frugal type, modelled, say, on that of France whose highest officers and officials in the fighting services and in the civil services do not receive more than £1,000 a year, with pensions to match. How little money there is left for distribution may be judged from the fact that if all the incomes of the very rich were confiscated it would only pay for a week of the war, or from the further calculation that, if all incomes exceeding £2,000 were confiscated, the additional revenue would only amount to 60 millions a year. It is difficult to see what scheme of finance would be adopted by the Labour Party if it came into office. Its favourite nostrum is a capital levy; but to attempt it during the war would be madness, and if it were to be introduced soon after the war in the post-war depression, as Mr. Keynes suggests, it might easily start an industrial catastrophe. Though the confiscation of private property is certain to be one of the economic consequences of a long war, and though the process is already beginning, I confess I was a little startled on reading in Dr. Hugh Dalton's Front Bench contribution to the Budget discussion a suggestion that the Government might well impose an income tax and surtax not merely of 20s. in the pound on wealthy people. "Why," he asked, "should we not push the total poundage up to 25s. or 30s. or even 40s. in the pound?"

This may seem a tall order even to those who hope that by the end of the war a totalitarian bureaucratic state will have been created in place of the free democracy for which we are fighting.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE SCANDINAVIAN DÉBÂCLE.

THE whirligig of time is rich in the revenges he is bringing in, and the Scandinavian *débâcle* is only one of them. Nevertheless it deserves special mention because both its causes and its consequences—the immediate ones as well as those of a more far-reaching character—are of a rare precision and clarity. There is no haziness or uncertainty about them: with brutal harshness they stick out a mile, even though Lord Stanhope may have questioned whether our withdrawal from Southern Norway is so much of a setback or Mr. Chamberlain—in possession of unrivalled information—may have stated as his considered opinion that on balance the position is in Britain's favour.

What are the facts? The Scandinavian *débâcle*—for as I will attempt to show, it is a *débâcle*—did not begin with Stalin's onslaught on Finland, nor has it ended with the withdrawal of the Franco-British forces from Southern Norway. To appreciate the full scope of the calamity that has befallen Northern Europe, and its significance for Great Britain, it is necessary to place these developments against a certain historical and psychological background.

During the twenty years that separate the present war from the last one, Scandinavia was deservedly considered as "Europe's Quiet Corner." Though they had managed to remain neutral in the war of 1914-18, Denmark, Sweden and Norway had emerged from it with their economy shattered and their social and political order considerably unbalanced. They used the twenty years that followed not only in rebuilding and consolidating their prosperity, but in evolving an entirely new form of government based on the final accession of Social Democracy to power. This meant great transformations in their social, economic and political system; it was in the truest sense of the word a "New Deal," and it developed almost simultaneously, with a striking degree of parallelism, in all the three Scandinavian countries. As far as foreign affairs are concerned, throughout that period they pinned their whole political faith to what also appeared to be a "New Deal," but on an international scale, viz. the League of Nations, with collective security and all the other good things this implied at the time. They went farther than any other nations in disarmament, which then was considered in

was thus out of the question to urge Czechoslovakia to grant them autonomy. The Halifax mission is an incident in the long chain of attempts at appeasement. It shows, just as Munich did in a more dramatic and drastic way, that all reasonable German aspirations could have been easily fulfilled.

The Lord Privy Seal became Foreign Secretary when the public was deeply disturbed by the resignation of Mr. Eden on February 20th, 1938. It soon became apparent that the new Foreign Secretary was in no way less sincere in his purpose. Yet at the beginning and right up to Munich he was somewhat overshadowed by the Prime Minister, who made a determined attempt to appease Germany's dictator. When, however, in March 1939 this policy was finally shipwrecked by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, and when, therefore, the building up of a firm front against aggression was the need of the hour, Lord Halifax came into his own. He then emerged as that great statesman in whose hands, perhaps more than in anybody else's, our future and the future of Europe seemed to rest. The last few months before the war bear witness to his driving power. The speedy conclusion of the treaty with Poland and the alliance with Turkey, the pledge to Rumania and Greece, the neutrality of Italy and of Spain, the close union with France—all these show his handiwork.

As early as March 20th, 1939, he solemnly declared in the House of Lords what, to-day, is one of the noblest peace aims of the Allies: "Twenty years ago," he said, "the people of Czechoslovakia recovered their liberty. They have now been deprived of it by violence, and in the course of their long history this will not be the first time that these tenacious, valiant and industrious people have lost their independence." In these last months of semi-peace his efforts were aimed at creating an anti-aggression front strong enough to make the would-be aggressor shrink from the *ultima ratio*. On April 19th he once more stated his policy: "Our policy is founded on the principle that the rights of smaller States shall not be set aside by the stronger; that force shall not be the deciding factor in the relations between peoples; and that negotiations shall not be overshadowed or overborne by strain." When Hitler sinned, once more and once too often, against these fundamental conditions of European peace, he unleashed the War. The words of April 1939 still hold good to-day.

Shortly afterwards, on June 29th, 1939, in a historic speech at the annual dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, he outlined once again the policy of this country "with such plainness of speech" as he could command. "British policy," he told the world and Germany in particular, "rests on twin foundations of purpose. One is determination to resist force. The other is our recognition of the world's desire to get on with the constructive work of building peace." This warning, so clearly understood the world over, remained unheeded in Hitler's Germany whose aggressive spirit did not change, though the scene now changed with dramatic speed. The Anglo-Franco-Russian talks broke down and Herr von Ribbentrop stepped in, handing over to Soviet Russia, as we now know, the three Baltic States and Finland. What, at first, looked like a major diplomatic defeat of the Allies, turned out to be one further, and in some neutral eyes perhaps decisive, proof of the sincerity of the allied war aims. Lord Halifax, though straining every nerve to build as firm a front against aggression as possible, did not for one moment think of paying the price Russia demanded. Here was the ultimate test of the sincerity of his aims, namely to guarantee the smaller nations their right to live their own lives. Had his policy been directed against Germany as such; had he aimed at the annihilation of the German nation, as the Nazi propaganda pretends to believe, he would certainly have paid the price, handed those countries over to Russia and secured the Anglo-Franco-Russian pact. As it is, he stood and stands for the liberty of the smaller states against aggressive forces anywhere. He therefore was unable to make the agreement Nazi Germany entered into with Russia—on the back of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. Who knows which nation we shall have to add, before this article is in print, to this list of states sacrificed by Germany on the altar of pure power politics?

How earnestly Lord Halifax worked for peace we can read in the British Blue Book. When the history of the last few years comes to be written he will be compared to Sir Edward Grey, whom he resembles in his unshakable belief in the moral values which are ultimately decisive. Grey saw the lights go out over Europe. May we hope that it will fall to the lot of his successor in an equally critical hour to see the lights shine brightly once again?

F. W. PICK.

the liberal and labour circles of Great Britain—or, indeed, in most other countries—as a “great constructive contribution to peace.” From the Geneva point of view the Scandinavians were ideal nations, for they took international collaboration seriously and fully contributed their share, and often more than their share, to the practical application of the Geneva spirit. Apart from that, however, they had the most undramatic of all human ambitions: that of being left alone in order to concentrate on their trade, their social reform work and their economic progress.

Finland, the youngest of the Northern countries, joined the Scandinavian trio somewhat later, thereby turning it into an impressive quartet. She did not become an independent state till her secession from Russia on December 6th, 1917. But though a young republic, she was an old democracy with firm roots and definite national traditions, so that within the shortest of periods she was able to embark on a process of internal consolidation and expansion similar to that of the three older Scandinavian kingdoms. Finland's economic development between 1918 and 1939 is a truly stupendous achievement.

With a combined population of only 16.5 millions the Northern countries could until now claim an unusually high percentage of world trade. Their aggregate exports represented well over 5 per cent. of the world's total exports, and their imports also amounted to over 5 per cent. of the world's total imports. In recent years only the U.S.A., Great Britain and Germany sold more than the Scandinavian unit, and only Great Britain, the U.S.A., Germany and France bought more. The share of the Northern countries in certain specific trades was even more impressive. Eighty-five per cent. of the world's wood-pulp exports, 71 per cent. of those of cellulose, and 27 per cent. of those of paper normally came from the Northern countries. They were also responsible for nearly 40 per cent. of the world's exports of sawn timber, 59 per cent. of those of bacon, 27 per cent. of those of butter, and 26 per cent. of those of eggs.

Scandinavian commercial interests are world-wide. By far the greatest part of their external trade, however, has for a long time been concentrated in two markets, namely Great Britain and Germany. In days gone by, when bilateral trade was as yet unheard of, and every country in the world was

free to buy and sell in its best markets, the Scandinavians sold to Great Britain and bought from Germany. Great Britain has for the past century found in Northern Europe one of her chief sources of supply. At the same time, until a few years ago, no special importance was attached here to commercial reciprocity, and Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland were free to cover their own requirements in the cheap and much more active German market. Not until the complete reversal of Great Britain's commercial policy in 1931-2 took place were the necessary adjustments initiated. These adjustments took the form of trade agreements, signed in London in 1933 with all the four Northern countries, and stipulating that henceforward these countries should also buy “British” if they wished to go on selling in this, by far their best and, in respect of certain commodities, their only market. The striking change in the course of trade which has since taken place can be judged from the following statistics, showing the share of Scandinavia in Britain's world trade. The figures represent percentages of Great Britain's total imports and exports:

	IMPORTS to Great Britain		EXPORTS from Great Britain	
	1929 %	1938* %	1929 %	1938* %
Finland	1.22	2.09	0.46	1.17
Sweden	2.11	2.67	1.45	2.49
Norway	1.16	1.20	1.35	1.61
Denmark	4.60	4.11	1.46	3.35
Scandinavia	9.09	10.07	4.72	8.62

Scandinavia's share of Great Britain's European trade alone was for 1929 22.8 per cent. of British imports and 13.5 per cent. of British exports. In 1938 the import percentage was 29.9 and the export percentage 23.7.

The three most important sources of British imports in 1938 were:

- (1) U.S.A. £117.8 millions or 12.81 per cent.
- (2) Scandinavia 92.5 „ „ 10.07 „ „
- (3) Canada 78.5 „ „ 8.53 „ „

* Full figures for 1939 are not available.

RUSSIANS AND GERMANS IN THE BALTIC.

THE thunderstorm which is sweeping away the last 80,000 Germans from the former Russian "Baltic provinces" may be regarded as a real historical tragedy. It does not only concern the Baltic Germans themselves who are in any case accustomed to hardships of every kind. They have lost half their number during the last twenty-five years and almost all their land since 1919. But they have clung all the more to their home country. Throughout history they have been conscious of the fact, as a Russian Governor-General once said, that "the small Baltic provinces have always been a battle-ground of fundamental ideas in politics." The crushing of such a tradition not only affects purely German interests but will be felt by Estonia and Latvia too. Perhaps at first for merely ephemeral reasons they will not disapprove of the elimination of an element racially different, which formerly ruled over them. But the question arises whether the German resettlement, ordered by Hitler, does not endanger the economic and cultural independence of Estonia and Latvia and their important rôle as European "border states" even more than do the Russian naval bases and aerodromes. A powerful military position in the Baltic was gained by Russia 200 years ago, when Peter the Great flung open the famous "window to the west." In his time and up to the middle of the nineteenth century the Baltic Germans played a prominent part in the westernisation of Russia. But they remained what they had been since the beginning—an outpost facing Asia and Asiatic despotism. Being descendants of knights and merchants who brought with them Germanic ideas of corporative life they stood for the principle of autonomy on the very brink of the seething masses of the East. On the basis of this principle they developed a type of self-government which they themselves were always proud to proclaim as being rather similar to old English institutions. This conception of freedom and community was the soil from which sprang the modern form of national autonomy, and the Baltic Germans can justly claim this as an achievement which promised to play an important part in the reconstruction of the whole Eastern area, equally menaced by Nationalism and Bolshevism. If this is kept in mind the retreat of the Baltic

Germans from their century-old position assumes the aspect of a genuine European tragedy.

As an outpost of Western Europe and Western Christendom they first appeared on the borders of the Dvina at the end of the twelfth century. The Luebeck merchants were soon followed by the missionaries; in 1184 the first church built of stone was erected; fifteen years later the bishopric of Riga was established by Albert, the "last great missionary bishop of Germany." Under his influence the Livonian order of the "Knights of the Sword" was founded, who later joined the Prussian Order of the "Teutonic Knights." As a matter of fact it was the "*ecclesia militans*" through its German branch which at last conquered the Baltic provinces. Only by these means, by sword and by cross, did Western Europe succeed in expanding as far as the River Narva and Lake Peipus. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Russians from Plesk and Polozk, christianised by Byzantium, were already about to occupy the Baltic borderlands and invasions from Novgorod and Moscow followed; all of them were repulsed until in 1502 the *Ordensmeister*, W. v. Plettenberg, once more warded off the Muscovites in a decisive battle. Thus the state of the Teutonic Knights proved to be a fortress defending western civilisation on its northern flank. A real cultural frontier was established, and to the present day the German and Russian castles facing each other on the borders of the River Narva have symbolised two different conceptions of life.

What did this conquest and this defence mean for the previous inhabitants of the Baltic provinces? Admittedly they lost their independence, but they escaped the fate of the neighbouring small tribes of Ugro-Finnish descent. All of these merged in the Russian race. On the other hand, the German domination not only preserved but ended by strengthening the Estonian and Latvian nationalities. The knights introduced improved methods of agriculture and cleared the forests, but no German peasants followed them into this remote colony. Thus the preservation of the "indigenes" was demanded by the aristocracy's own interests. Neither the Letts nor the Estonians were ever in danger of being wiped out. Admittedly their number was decimated by plagues and wars, especially when in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Poland, Sweden and Russia again and again fought their battles on Baltic territory. Large parts of

As regards exports, out of Great Britain's total of £470·8 millions in 1938 the share of the four Scandinavian countries combined amounted to the imposing sum of £40·6 millions. South Africa came next with £39·5 millions (as far as individual countries go—our best customer), then Australia with £38·2 millions, and then India with £36·4 millions. Even more striking is the fact that little Denmark alone, with her population of 3·5 millions, was Britain's second largest customer in Europe, being exceeded in this respect only by Germany. She was also Great Britain's fourth largest individual "foreign" customer in the world, as is shown by the following table :

British exports to—					1929	1938
					£ millions	
Germany	...	...	...	...	37·0	20·6
U.S.A.	...	...	...	...	45·6	20·5
Argentina	...	...	...	...	29·0	19·3
Denmark	...	...	...	...	10·7	15·8
France	...	...	...	...	31·7	15·1

In 1938, Scandinavia, taken as a whole, was Great Britain's best customer in the world. She was also Great Britain's second largest source of supply in the world and first source of supply in Europe.

So much for Scandinavia's economic importance to Britain. The importance of Britain to Scandinavia was even greater. Over 25 per cent. of Sweden's and Norway's exports found their way to the British market up to the present war, over 40 per cent. of Finland's and over 60 per cent. of Denmark's. That in itself would have been a sufficiently strong link between their vital interests and this country. But, in addition to that, there was something else. After the close of the last war the Northern countries had developed a strong political pro-British orientation. To Denmark and Norway this was not entirely new, but in the case of Sweden and Finland that meant a serious break with the past. For generations these two countries had been under the influence of Germany, partly as a natural consequence of their hatred and fear of Russia, partly because German culture and German institutions—which, unlike those of other countries, they knew well—commanded their unqualified admiration. But the Germans themselves succeeded in gradually killing this deep-rooted and strong goodwill. Their ruthlessness

during the war, their record of bluff and default in the years that ensued, the rise of Hitler to power, and a variety of other causes on the one hand, and on the other hand the consolidation of Social Democracy in Scandinavia brought about the new pro-British orientation.

The Northern countries saw in Britain the pillar of democracy, the paragon of decency and fair play, the champion of a new world order as represented by the League of Nations. Between 1920 and 1936 the pro-British orientation of Scandinavia gathered so much momentum as to become an important factor in international relations. Scandinavia's spokesmen at Geneva were proud to collaborate with the delegates of Britain, and again and again they rendered this country not inconsiderable services. This position afforded Britain a unique chance but also great responsibilities. It is many years now since I first raised my voice to point out the necessity of cultivating and consolidating first Scandinavia's nascent goodwill, then her genuine friendship and admiration for everything British. A hopelessly unheeded Cassandra, I pleaded for a more active attitude on our part all round : for better and more sympathetic diplomatic representation in the four Northern capitals, for a more enlightened and at least reciprocal cultural intercourse, for more efficient and effective salesmanship on the part of our exporters.

We preferred to take Scandinavia for granted : these countries were happy and prosperous, so why bother about them ? Moreover, since they were so largely dependent on our markets, why bother to go beyond an occasional peremptory official or semi-official harangue calling on them to buy more in Great Britain and less from Germany ? I argued and pleaded that our goodwill should be used, instead of being neglected or actually abused ; but always in vain. On the other hand, Germany—though not at all popular—managed to keep up a certain amount of respect because she showed active interest and went out of her way to cultivate the Northern countries. Her salesmen were efficient to the point of being a nuisance, but they knew how to cater for Scandinavia's taste and how to deliver the goods. Her visiting actors or writers or musicians or government representatives were invariably celebrities, front rank men who knew how to talk and whose very presence was a compliment to the Scandinavians. Britain sent nobody or nobodies. How often have I heard in Stockholm or Oslo

the country were completely devastated. One of the consequences was that the legal status of the peasants deteriorated considerably: they had been "*glebæ adscripti*" since the fifteenth century; now they became saleable even without the land. The racial difference clearly aggravated this kind of "serfdom." Rulers and ruled were generally kept apart, no systematic attempt being made to Germanise the indigenes. But this merely negative conception of social and racial exclusiveness developed into a new and constructive attitude. The first step was taken by the Lutheran Reformation, which once again connected Northern Germany intimately with the Baltic and Scandinavian peoples. It resulted in expanding the German spirit but not in Germanisation. Preaching in the mother tongue being a capital point in Luther's doctrine and the only way to make the gospel of God understood by the people themselves, the Reformation out of its own innermost requirements strengthened and deepened the national individualities around Germany. So especially did the German pastors in the Baltic provinces. They fostered the native languages, and it was by some of them that a century later the first Lettish and Estonian grammars were published.

Another important effect of the Reformation was that the old Livonian *Ordensstaat* disappeared. The tendency to follow the Prussian example and secularise the ecclesiastical community coincided with converging aggressions from abroad. The net result was that in 1561 Sweden and Poland overcame the Baltic provinces; they partitioned the country and fought over it until at last Russia became the heir of both (1710, 1795). But the Protestant character of the country remained. When the Counter-Reformation made its decisive onslaught in order to force Europe back into a uniformity of rule, when the Armada launched its attack upon England, a similar attempt started in the East. Sigismund III of Poland clearly co-operated with Spain and his Catholic policy of conquest was directed over Sweden and Norway against England too. This campaign of encirclement suffered its first reverse on Livonian ground. Once more the little country proved to be a battlefield of "fundamental ideas in politics," a German-Protestant barrier in the East.

A no less important feature which remained was the corporative structure of this European borderland. Surrounded by monarchies of the "modern" absolutist type, it

preserved a form of constitution which had been widespread in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. The country was represented by corporations of noblemen, the municipalities were ruled by "guilds" of merchants and craftsmen, and a network of associations covered the whole of Baltic life. Thus the Livonian *Ordensstaat* was an essentially federalist community; and when after the Reformation the *Ordensmeister* and the bishops disappeared, the aristocratic corporations became the only political authorities inside the country. They succeeded in getting their privileges confirmed by Poland and Sweden as well as by Russia, a fact of far-reaching importance. When he incorporated the Western borderlands, Peter the Great himself had to fall in with their cultural traditions in order to rule over the country; he found among the Germans and nowhere else in his realm a deep-rooted system of self-government which he agreed to maintain. He concluded formal treaties with the Baltic "estates," which have since been regarded somewhat as a "Bill of Rights." These fundamental articles, however, did not contain individual but mainly corporate rights; they confirmed the aristocratic privileges within the provincial and local administration; they ensured the freedom and independence of the Protestant Church and—most important of all—the rights of the German language.

Thus a federalistic constitution of a seemingly old-fashioned type was preserved in the Baltic provinces almost up to the end of the nineteenth century. The main partners of these treaties with Russia were small fellowships of strong social exclusiveness, the Baltic *Ritterschaften*; in the eighteenth century they closed their rolls and they almost monopolised the provincial diets. On the other hand these treaties were one of the last victories which the autonomy of corporations won against the modern State-concept, against the centralising and atomistic trends of the enlightened century. And the narrowness of the privileges was somewhat counter-balanced by a sense of social and national responsibility, by a system of volunteering on behalf of the country. All administrative posts were purely honorary offices and the connection between corporative self-government and cultural independence raised the feudal traditions up to a higher level. A spirit of autonomy pervaded the provinces from bottom to top. When Herder came to Riga in 1765 there were two facts which impressed

or Helsingfors or Copenhagen: "Cannot the British show a little more interest in us?" The smallest sign of encouragement could have gained Britain hosts of new and influential friends. After all, the pro-British orientation was new and had not yet penetrated as deeply as the almost inborn respect for Germany.

For their part, the Scandinavians also missed many an opportunity of explaining their true position to the British public. They were always extremely reticent about any open discussion of their difficulties, of their local as well as their inter-Scandinavian problems. They were proud of the inter-Scandinavian co-operation they had developed, especially during the last decade. But this was largely limited to economics and to certain purely organisational questions affecting their respective governments or certain professional interests, e.g. lawyers, or publishers, or bankers.

In foreign affairs this inter-Scandinavian co-operation found its expression in regular conferences between the Foreign Ministers of the four countries which often—but not always—resulted in a united front in dealing with League or other matters. Yet it was always emphasised that there were no military or other defensive arrangements of any kind, that indeed there was nothing binding for any one of the four countries in that respect. An unhealthy deliberate vagueness or reticence was maintained on the degree of assistance, if any, the Northern countries were to render each other in case one or more of them were attacked or got otherwise involved. When specific proposals for a military understanding were initiated by Sweden, it was much too late. Until then, such ideas had on various occasions cropped up but had never taken the shape of practical politics.

So much, then, for the background. The drama began with the adoption by Great Britain of "Appeasement." Here the record speaks for itself. Abyssinia, Spain, the *Anschluss*, Munich, finally the invasion of Czechoslovakia had a devastating effect on Britain's prestige in Scandinavia. Everywhere they saw Britain in retreat, half-hearted, fumbling, shuffling and visibly incapable of asserting her authority. They watched the abandonment by Britain of one position after another with growing dismay and, later, with indignation. Was this the pillar of democracy, the mighty empire on which they had pinned all their faith and whose success was of paramount

importance to them? They felt profoundly disturbed. For they all knew that Britain's strength was their strength, and her weakness their weakness. They were ardently hoping for a strong and successful Britain; a Britain not merely paying lip-service to the high principles which they were proud to share with her, but one capable of demonstrating their practical application.

Between 1936 and September 1939, to the horror not only of our friends, but of the public at large, and to the manifest joy of our enemies, Britain's prestige suffered a complete collapse in Scandinavia. There were still possibilities of regaining some of the lost ground. I ventured to point out at the time that Scandinavia was being threatened by the double danger of German activity and British inaction. A vigorous effort on our part to explain *in time* our position, and not just feeble attempts to explain away failures after they had actually occurred, might have saved a great deal from the wreckage.

When the war broke out nobody in Northern Europe believed Britain could or would fight. Hitler's conquest of Poland only confirmed that impression. By that time the difference between the Scandinavian attitude to Britain and Germany was this: whereas our goodwill was still considerable, our prestige was low. In the case of Germany it was the other way round: she had little or no goodwill at all, but her political, military and even commercial prestige had risen to unprecedented heights. Not only did the Germans appear to go from success to success conquering one country after another under the very nose of Britain, but they were even able to maintain or actually increase their trade with Scandinavia. British deliveries, on the other hand, were unsatisfactory in the extreme—indeed they had been so for quite some time prior to the opening of hostilities. German propaganda was actively exploiting this situation; we had none. When at long last British Press Attachés were appointed to the Northern capitals there was little left they could do. It is no reflection on these four excellent men if their work has not been fraught with better results: they were in an impossible situation from the very start.

I now come to the Finnish War. To those who want to get an accurate and well-informed detailed picture of it I cannot recommend too warmly Herbert Elliston's admirable book,

him most. The first was the aspect of a corporatively articulated whole quite different from what he had experienced in the bureaucratic atmosphere of Prussia. He admired the common spirit and the sense of independent communal life among the Baltic Germans. The second fact was the innate richness of the Lettish primitive and unspoiled culture, the originality of its songs and dances. Here Herder first met one of those small primary entities by which his doctrine of national spontaneity became so deeply influenced.

These two facts were to some extent connected with each other. As the German communities enjoyed their own language and their own institutions under foreign rule they were opposed to any centralisation anywhere else. Being strong autonomists and even particularists they did not want to annihilate any historic peculiarities or to assimilate their own subjects. In addition to this the humanitarian sense of the eighteenth century took an increased interest in the variety of the human species and deepened the sympathy with social distress. Whereas the liberation of the peasants elsewhere was carried through by monarchical power, in the Baltic provinces the privileged classes themselves took the initiative. While this reform was being successfully pursued the question arose once more whether the freed peasants should become Germanised. In a very significant discussion in 1819 the prevailing opinion was that to deprive a race of its own language would be something like spiritual murder. The conception of Herder and the Romantic movement as well as the Baltic tradition itself stood against the rising wave of national centralism.

The far-reaching importance of this attitude became apparent when, after the middle of the nineteenth century, Pan-Slavism began to attack the cultural independence of the Baltic provinces. A *Kulturkampf* arose which foreshadowed many later events; here at first the divergency was experienced as between the "fatherland" and the "motherland," between loyalty towards the State and affection for the national culture, a divergency which was to become an almost common fatality within the European borderlands after 1918. The Baltic Germans remained up to the very end true servants of the Czars. They did not enter any irredentist movement but firmly stood for their national autonomy, for a federalistic State concept. They could do so because they

were no less opposed to Pan-Germanism than to Pan-Slavism. With them nationality was rather a spiritual and cultural than a biological fact; it ought to be "light, not flame." In this attitude they had the approval of Bismarck, who shared the conservative view of what nationality meant in Eastern Europe. But for diplomatic reasons he could not interfere with Russian affairs, and he could not prevent the unification of Germany from deeply affecting the position of German minorities abroad. Thus the Baltic Germans stood aloof and had to suffer many defeats. The Russian language was forced upon all branches of public life, but the spirit of autonomy did not break down.

When the *Kulturkampf* first started the Baltic German historian Schirren published his famous "Livonian answer," one of the most striking pamphlets ever written in German. Here he glorified the mission of his country as facing the uniform masses of the East, which "can be led by legitimate or illegitimate leaders to any act of destruction," to any new *Mongolensturm*. This prophecy became true when, in 1918, the Bolshevik revolution overran the country. Thousands of Germans were murdered or exiled. But once again they took an important part in defending Europe. Whoever could carry a rifle joined the volunteer *Kampfverbände*. They stood side by side with German, Latvian and Estonian troops. The liberation of Riga in May 1919 was brought about by the *Baltische Landeswehr*, and in spite of heavy losses and internal conflicts they fought until the whole of Latvia was free.

Within the new national states, originating out of the crisis of 1918, the Baltic Germans were small minorities. They had lost all privileges and the war had destroyed a good deal of old property. New losses followed. "Guild"-houses and other cultural institutions became "nationalised" and an "Agrarian reform" was introduced which amounted to mere deprivation. Only small slices of land were left in German hands. But in the Baltic provinces, if anywhere, the doctrine of "Blood and Soil" stood the test. Many of the old "Barons" persevered in cultivating what remained of the *rura paterna* in spite of an almost proletarian position. The German youth introduced a voluntary land service, getting in touch with the small groups of peasant colonists which had been settled during the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.

*Finland Fights.** It is well worth reading even now, when that epic struggle is over. But what matters in my particular context is that the disparity between Britain's professions of sympathy with Finland and the help actually given only went to confirm still further the belief that the British were unable ever to act in time, on a sufficiently large scale and with the necessary vigour. Had Britain intervened in December, when the Finnish campaign had just started, no Swedish or Norwegian Government standing in the way of such help could have survived a day. By the time we *said* we were ready, although no evidence exists that we really were, no one in Scandinavia believed in us any more. Subsequent events in Norway have unfortunately proved that the Finns were right in coming to terms with Stalin as they did.

The Finnish campaign ended in mid-March. Almost precisely a month later Germany seized Denmark and invaded Norway. What followed is recent history. We promised the fullest support, went in, and, as Mr. Garvin put it in the *Observer*, "were bombed out of Norway." We remain committed to help the Norwegians, however, who are still holding the northern part of that country; at the moment of writing the ill-conceived and utterly inept fight for Narvik continues. By attaching a significance that is quite out of proportion to its real value to the iron-ore port of Narvik and by failing to appreciate the overwhelming importance of Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim, we have done ourselves and the Norwegians unspeakable harm. But more of this later.

Let us consider at this juncture the consequences of what has happened so far. I have already indicated the commercial value to Britain of Scandinavia both as a market and as a source of supply. We have lost the whole of it. The Baltic Sea now being closed to us Finland is inaccessible, and in any case after the havoc and devastation of the Russian war she is a broken reed. Denmark is under Germany's domination, and so is the greater part of Norway. Sweden—though nominally still independent—is encircled by Germany and entirely cut off from Western Europe. Trade with her is now out of the question. In other circumstances these countries would have offered the most obvious field for our much-needed export drive. Instead of that we have lost our best customer, not

* *Finland Fights.* By Herbert Elliston. George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. London, 1940. 15s. net.

only for the present but for a long time to come. For Scandinavia's purchasing capacity is bound to be largely diminished or altogether wiped out under present conditions. Similar considerations apply to the question of supplies from Scandinavia, and one need only mention our acute paper shortage to make this plausible.

So much for trade. Of the military and strategic consequences I am not competent enough to speak. But it is clear even to the unenlightened that the resources of Denmark and Norway, which the Germans are looting mercilessly, are a useful addition to Hitler's war potential. As far as the attempt to cut off Germany's Scandinavian iron ore supplies is concerned, even the belated taking of Narvik would not alter the position very much to our advantage. Through the Baltic ports of Luleå, Oxelösund and Gävle, Germany used to obtain in normal times some 6 million tons of ore, i.e. somewhat more than through Narvik. The advantage of that Norwegian port is that it is ice-free, whereas the three Baltic ones are frozen up in the winter. But there is nothing to prevent Germany from shipping enough iron ore across the Baltic, where she is unmolested, during the summer months and building up a nice stock for the winter, before these harbours freeze up again.

Perhaps even more important than the economic and military consequences to Britain are the political ones, both at home and abroad. At home the Norwegian fiasco has brought to a head a process that had been at work for some considerable time and which has resulted in a change of government. Writing after the Parliamentary inquest on Norway, but before the announcement of Mr. Chamberlain's resignation and Mr. Churchill's accession to the Premiership, the sober *Economist* said:

Sweden's bitter comment that small peoples from henceforth must depend upon their own strength only, and Italy's ironic amusement at the work of allied "amateurs" are two typical reactions to our very unsuccessful campaigning. We might, perhaps, have blunted the edge of criticism if we could have said that the Norway coup caught us before our war machine was properly forged, that our relative lack of essential equipment was simply due to Germany's long lead in the armaments race, a lead we were steadily overhauling. Unfortunately the Budget, coming in the middle of the Norwegian campaign, suggested that a war

The old idea of a national community gained a deeper social meaning. Even more important, the old idea of "Group-personality" revived. The German minority in Estonia suggested a law for cultural autonomy which was accepted in 1925. It provided for the self-government of any cultural and racial entity which was prepared to undertake this responsibility. The aim and the result were to a large extent educational: purely national divergencies were kept out of Parliament and political life. The members of such a community had to make considerable sacrifices. The German minority did so, and built up a complete system of educational institutions whereas the Russians—nearly five times as numerous as the Germans—did not avail themselves of this opportunity. The solution worked out in Latvia was on similar lines, though not as comprehensive as in Estonia. On the whole it can be said that this was a first successful break in the principle of "*cuius regio eius natio*" embodying a federal structure of the State. At a moment when the federal conception is a main topic of discussion it seems worth recalling the contribution to this idea achieved by the Baltic Germans throughout their fateful history.

HANS ROTHFELS.

THE JUGO-SLAVS IN THE JULIAN MARCH.

ITALY, like all nations, has a dream. That dream was born at the time when Romulus and Remus laid the foundations of Rome, it has grown with her and assumed different outward characteristics, was swept to paramount aims by the high tides of Italian national life, as the "*Imperium Romanum*," Machiavelli's and Cesare Borgia's state of the ideal "*principe*," or Mussolini's "*Roman Empire*." And it fell to shreds as a starving hope when the dream was submerged in civil strife and acquiescence in foreign invasions. In our time the Italian dream has been permanently connected with the liberation of the "*irredenta*," partly represented by those mysterious shores of the blue Adriatic where some crumbs of the Venetian Empire still linger in a half-Italian fisher population, and the trading populace of some ports.

But Italy is not the sole dreamer on the Adriatic. Already more than 1,000 years ago we find a compact block of South-Slavs (Jugo-Slavs) firmly established on the eastern shore of that temperamental sea. And those Slavs have remained there ever since, despite suppression by Christians and Turks alike, despite deprivations as hardly any other people had to suffer. They remained as one dogged unity under Turkish rule, but split into different sections when the Turks were in slow stages pushed out of their territory. And when an independent nation, Serbia, at last emerged from these struggles she made herself the champion of a dream to reunite Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats alike into one Jugo-Slavia which was to have the Adriatic as its western border.

Both nations sought fulfilment of their dreams in the Great War. Both Italy and Jugo-Slavia, when re-established in the Peace Treaties, coveted the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Their dreams began to clash. And in the north where there was no dividing sea the drawing of a border became a serious problem for the peacemakers, a problem that nobody could solve satisfactorily. The attempt became such an overwhelming failure that Italian aggressiveness claimed free scope for further dives into Jugo-Slav territory. With the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) and the seizure of Fiume (1925), Italy swallowed hundreds of thousands of Jugo-Slavs, and despite all guarantees

machine forged at this snail's pace would continue to be ineffective for many years to come. The Budget played fairly and squarely into the hands of the propagandists. Here was the richest empire in the world fixing her expenditure below that of "starved, encircled" Germany; Norway proved that Britain could not fight for victory, the Budget that she could not even spend for it. . . .

This brings me to the point where I should like to examine the present *débâcle* from the Scandinavian point of view. If it be true that we have little justification for moral indignation, that is equally true of Scandinavia—except Finland. The Finns fought heroically and gave the world a lesson in patriotism, courage and efficiency. But for the moment they are out of the picture, and so are the Danes. There is not much the Danes could have done to defend themselves in conditions of modern warfare, even if they had spent the whole of their national income on armaments. Of the possibilities of an invasion they were always aware, but deluded themselves into hoping that they would be spared this ordeal. With rare exceptions they never even had the will to fight. Norway's attitude was much the same as Denmark's, though the natural possibilities of defence are far greater. But the Norwegians at least are redeeming their past improvidence and indolence in the matters of defence by a gallant fight now. We must not fall down on our promise of continued support. Several airfields north of Narvik are at long last ready for use. Whatever the demands of war elsewhere, it is essential both on moral and on practical grounds that the utmost help be given to the Norwegians who are still in possession of quite a large part of their country.

But what of Sweden? She rendered Finland active and most generous help, and in doing so she faced great dangers herself. Again, the desire of the Swedish Government not to be rushed, and to mobilise its army, to man its defences, to put the whole country into a state of military preparedness in its own time is understandable and least of all open to criticism from Great Britain. But Sweden's attitude since the German invasion of Norway is hard to comprehend. As I have said before, there is little room in the Scandinavian *débâcle* for moral indignation on either side. But what is the Swedish position from a purely practical point of view? The Swedes, and as things turned out only the Swedes, could have relieved Trondheim. By doing that they would have saved Norway,

helped Britain, and saved themselves. The danger, of course, was that had they intervened in this way they, too, very likely would have been invaded or mercilessly bombed by the Germans. Are they certain to have escaped that peril now? For years they have raved about an alleged Russian threat to Narvik and have looked to Germany as their potential saviour from the Russians. Is it not a curious paradox that, instead, it is the Germans who are at Narvik, whereas it is Soviet Russia which is very largely sustaining Sweden's territorial integrity at the present moment? And what are Sweden's economic prospects? Germany will supply her with cheap Polish coal in payment for the iron ore and other raw materials she so badly needs. And the Swedes will be obliged to trade on these terms, having no other markets. Even if Sweden manages to remain "neutral," she will share with Finland, Norway and Denmark the grim experience of the very foundations of her national life being shattered or destroyed.

The four Northern countries had been able to evolve their much admired social and economic system, with its model farms and co-ops and schools and hospitals, because they were highly prosperous and efficient trading communities with world-wide ramifications, but especially thanks to their British market. What will happen when accumulated resources are used up? Poverty and social unrest is not the least of the dangers threatening Scandinavia as the result of the present position. However justified the Northern countries may have been in their distrust of Britain and their fear of Germany, I cannot help feeling that it was their paramount interest to throw in their lot with us—despite the obvious risks. Similarly, however true the substance of our complaint, that they themselves are to blame for their misfortunes, the fact remains that we need these countries as much as they need us. Having fooled away their goodwill, we might still have saved the situation by intervening with sufficient promptness and on an adequate scale to secure success. Had we done so we would now be driving "the bus" instead of hopelessly missing it. If we ever catch it again, I hope that the lesson of the present *débâcle* will not have been in vain.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

given she has ever since made every effort to extinguish that minority, to Italianise it to such a degree as to make it impossible for that territory ever to be reclaimed by Jugo-Slavia. Her efforts have failed up till now. In her agreement with Jugo-Slavia, in 1937, Italy had to acknowledge in special promises given by Count Ciano, and later repeated by Signor Mussolini, the existence and the cultural rights of a Jugo-Slav minority, more than half a million people who—despite all efforts—refused to dream the Italian dream.

Between the Isonzo and the Jugo-Slav border, the Julian Alps and the sea, covering the whole of Gorizia, Istria, and Carnaro, and including the towns of Trieste (Trst), Pola (Pula), and Fiume (Rijeka), is the Julian March, old frontier land, mainly inhabited by Croat and Slovene peasantry with a strong Italian element in the ports. Excluding the colonists pushed there by Mussolini's régime, there is hardly an Italian in the country, which is closely cultivated by the same stock of Croat and Slovene peasants who till the soil across the frontier in Jugo-Slavia. Forcibly incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy, the sufferings of that Jugo-Slav minority have been worse than those of most other minorities in history. Just as the Germans in South Tyrol, now utterly abandoned by Herr Hitler, had to submit to being forcibly made Italians, the Jugo-Slavs of the Julian March were subjected to such harsh treatment that it is a sign of the miraculous strength of that population that they still hold out and still dream the Jugo-Slav dream.

Anybody who has never left this happy island or experienced the crudities of continental life, particularly in central and eastern Europe, will find it difficult to understand and appreciate the long road to Golgotha along which minorities under the dictators' fists have to crawl. There lies this graceful peninsula in the north of the Adriatic, with good ports and an old tradition, once upon a time part of the "*tierra firma*" with which Venice for centuries held the balance of power between Orient and Occident—when the Mediterranean was still the sea of all seas, the trading centre of the western world, and Messer lo Doge's rule was gracefully accepted by many a Jugo-Slav. But Venice's splendour has fallen, and now the lictor's *fascies* sweep through the peninsula, and their cleansing process is somewhat arbitrary.

Italy has many a time pledged her word to treat those

minorities according to the high standards of our civilisation. The Treaty of London, the Pact of Rome, the Treaty of Rapallo, the Agreements of Santa Margherita and Nettuna, and the Treaty of Belgrade are just some of the outstanding occasions when Italy declared that—

such national fractions as may be included within the borders of the other nation shall be guaranteed the right to protection of their language, their culture, and their moral and economic interests.*

... That the verse of Dante may be fulfilled, which defines in immortal fashion Italy's borders on the Quarnero, and in order to secure that Julian frontier which the blood of our soldiers has consecrated, we have had to receive within our borders hundreds of thousands of Slavs. To these Slavs, who ought moreover to remain in contact with their natural, though intensely Italian capitals of Gorizia and Trieste, we shall guarantee the most ample liberty of language and culture. This will be for us at once a point of honour and an act of political wisdom. Therefore we feel certain that our new citizens will feel satisfied in this respect, in belonging to a great State which, strong in its incomparable culture, will guard their local life with jealous care.†

Thus spoke Rome—but there was no ancient, unflinching unity in word and action. Nobody knows whether or not one day the Italians will—by their ruthless methods—succeed in extinguishing the last remnants of a formerly Jugo-Slav population. Despite all great words the Jugo-Slavs have not a single member in the Italian parliament,‡ their territory has been split into Italian provinces under exclusively Italian administration, and even local autonomy has been entirely abolished, the *podestas* being appointed by royal decree since 1926. In other words, every chance of political self-expression has been taken from these outcasts of treaties and declarations.

But that is not the worst. There have been cases when annexed or subjected populations, deprived of any political autonomy, were able to unfold a prosperous and highly individual flower of cultural development. The Italians prevented any such inclination by a series of laws destined to take even the slightest shred of ancient liberty from the Slavs of the

* Pact of Rome, § 7.

† Count Sforza as Minister for Foreign Affairs, during the debate on the Treaty of Rapallo.

‡ According to the number of their population they ought to have nine members.

COLONIES AND PEACE AIMS.

A FEW weeks ago, Dr. Goebbels, speaking upon peace aims and post-war settlement, told his German audience that they were entitled to share the "vast riches" of Colonial areas. He said nothing about the rights of the inhabitants, nothing which indicated service to them, he merely held out the bait of crude exploitation. One wonders what purpose can possibly be served by propagating such misleading absurdities. Dr. Goebbels should know only too well that there are no "vast riches" in Colonial territories; he at least knows that Germany could not even make her Colonies pay, and that so far from "vast riches" being obtained, the boot was very much on the other foot for the German taxpayer! At the same time, the return to peace conditions will present all nations with Colonial problems, the nature and extent of which are even now barely realised outside Government departments. These problems fall into the two main groups of (a) domestic, and (b) international.

Great Britain herself is confronted, outside the Dominions, with a veritable reconstruction of her own Colonial Empire. This fact has received striking emphasis in the British White Paper* on what has been called our "New Colonial Policy." The reason for this White Paper is the shock administered to our Colonial complacency by a whole series of expert inquiries, principally the West Indian Royal Commission under Lord Moyne, the Royal Commission under Lord Bledisloe upon the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the historic Survey of Africa by Lord Hailey, the reports on Sir Alan Pim's Economic inquiries and those on Colonial labour by Major Orde-Browne.

These reports taken together make very unpleasant reading for any section of the public deluded by Dr. Goebbels, for they shatter to fragments the theory held even in many circles in Great Britain that Colonies are always and everywhere a lucrative investment for the Mother Country. The reports by these experts give a formidable array of things needed to be done and things that can only be carried out with the help of large subsidies from London. In the political sphere the reports show that the native people are everywhere intensely loyal to Britain, largely it must be admitted because they look

* Cmd. 6175.

to London to save them from reactionary tendencies in the Dependencies and neighbouring areas. For this reason the Colonial Office in London was never more popular with native people than it is to-day.

The Dominions and Colonial Offices, faced with this reconstruction work in some forty administrative areas covering over eighty territorial units, have now issued a preliminary statement of general Colonial policy, coupled with an acceptance of the recommendations made by Lord Moyne's West Indian Royal Commission. These two official papers taken together set forth Britain's general proposals for full adoption when peace once more reigns in the world. It is proposed to make a modest start even during the war, but the main proposals are in fact a domestic "Peace Aim" for Great Britain.

The scheme under the caption of "Colonial Development and Welfare," when fully applied, will, with the Moyne recommendations, embrace the following:

£50,000,000	for Colonial development spread over ten years.*
£20,000,000	for West Indian Welfare spread over twenty years.*
£1,500,000	"upwards" further subsidy for cane sugar growing.
£500,000	per annum for a Colonial Research Advisory Committee.
£100,000	per annum for staff and organisation in connection with the West Indian scheme.
£	unspecified amount for extension of Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture.
£	ditto for campaign against banana diseases.
£	ditto for a small sugar factory in Nevis.
£	ditto for cocoa industry in Grenada.
£	ditto for a regular shipping service in the West Indian Colonies.
£	ditto Subsidy for a broadcasting service.
£	unspecified purchase price for two trading ships.

These figures envisage a total reconstruction expenditure spread over the next ten to twenty years of just over £70 million in specified sums. The unspecified amounts for subsidising other projects will carry the total to well over £100 million. The British taxpayer may gasp at this huge post-war figure, but the Colonial Secretaries will be lucky indeed if they

* It is not yet clear how much, if any, of the West Indian Fund will come out of the 50 millions, but presumably not more than 10 millions.

Julian March. In 1913 that territory boasted proudly of 418 Slav schools. In 1923 the Italians decreed :

With the commencement of the scholastic year of 1923-4, Italian will be the language of instruction in all First Classes of all elementary schools of alien speech. In the succeeding years, the same procedure will be applied to the Second Classes, and so on, so that after a number of years equal to the number of classes, Italian will be the sole language of instruction at all elementary schools. Provision will be made for the study of the second language.*

This law is known as the "Gentile School Reform," and has been vigorously executed. To-day there is not a single Slav school within the borders of the Kingdom of Italy—the exception to prove the rule being the Slav school in Trieste where only children of actual Jugo-Slav subjects resident in Trieste may be educated. The only paragraph of the school reform which has never been taken seriously is the "Provision for the study of the second language," school-children being forcibly prevented from attending any lectures in their mother tongue.

The hold of the Italian authorities over the Slav youth under their administration is, as a matter of fact, complete. Those children are not even allowed to converse with each other in their mother tongue on their way to and from school. They have to join the Fascist youth organisation when they are four. They leave it at the age of twenty to serve in the Italian army, acquiring, as has been the case, the "right" and "privilege" to die for the glory of Mussolini's "Roman Empire" on some Ethiopian rock, or in a remote valley in Spain.

Every aspect of family life has been gripped by the Fascist pincers. Since 1920 "for telegraphic communications with and from the Julian March only the Italian, French, German and Japanese languages are permitted."† All Slav inscriptions on the tombs of great Slovenes and Croats had to be removed, all new tombstones must bear solely Italian inscriptions and Italianisations of the Slav names. The messages on the wreaths must be in Italian. If that order is not complied with the *Carabinieri* tear those last farewells off with their

* Quoted from *Life-and-Death Struggle of a National Minority*, by Dr. Lavo Čermelj, p. 31.

† Čermelj, p. 59.

bayonets, as they have done in many a case. No shop, no firm, no business enterprise whatsoever is allowed to indicate the name of its owner in its original, non-Italianised form. Slavs receive no permits to own wireless sets. Since 1925 the Slav language has been rendered illegal in all procedures at law. A Slav is not even allowed to speak his own language when buying a stamp or a railway ticket in his home town or village. There truly is nothing that the Italian authorities have not included in their purposeful campaign against any Jugo-Slav cultural self-expression in the Julian March.

One might think that at least Divine Service was left untouched, as had been the case under Austrian rule. But no. Italian interference began well with the bloody Christmas of Baška in 1920. Then d'Annunzio's *Arditi* went with bombs and machine-guns to church. Since then churches and vicarages have been burned and ransacked again and again, and priests who would not, or even could not, conform to Italian wishes were forced to swallow, in many cases fatal, doses of castor oil. A priest who refuses to obey the orders of an Italian *podesta* (who with his adjunct and a few policemen is generally the only Italian in a small Jugo-Slav village) to preach his sermon entirely in Italian is sent to prison. And that is still the case, as the arrest of the priest of Kojško, one of the more recent incidents, well proves. All this happens despite the signature of the Belgrade Treaty in 1937, when Count Ciano declared that :

the Croat and Slovene minorities in Istria and Venetia Giulia should enjoy cultural rights (for instance that the publication of journals in their native language should be permitted and that facilities for teaching these languages in schools should be provided).*

A sermon in their native tongue is obviously not considered as a "cultural right" by the Italian authorities. Actually, in March 1939, an assembly of Fascist secretaries ordered all mayors to see to it that in their communities no Slav sermon is preached.

As for the publication of journals—nothing has been done. Under the Austrian régime there had been one Slav daily and a considerable number of Slav periodicals. By 1929 they had completely disappeared. All that has since been published in

* Quoted from the 1937 year-book of the Royal Institute for International Affairs.

can carry through this extensive reconstruction for anything like that relatively modest sum. It must be remembered that these reconstruction loans and subsidies are open to applications from areas which total no less than 2,350,000 square miles, occupied by 61 million people. The relative significance might be measured by the cost of Germany's Colonial Empire of 1,028,000 square miles and less than 15 million inhabitants, for which Germany had to place on the shoulders of her taxpayers more than £70 million within a period of twelve years, and was still costing Germany nearly £6 million a year in 1914. Yes—Colonies are an expensive burden to carry; even the Mandated territories in Africa (including General Smuts' estimated costs of conquest) must by now have involved the British taxpayer in something approaching £80 million.

In the political sphere a reconstruction of our mental attitude is even more necessary than the economic overhaul. The foundations of British Colonial policy are as sound and as firm as when they were first laid down, the trouble is that we have departed from them badly within the last fifty years. The British Colonial Empire rests upon one main pillar, namely a common citizenship, which to use the language of official Treaties and Proclamations is to be accorded to all peoples regardless of race, creed or language. The Royal Commission, under Lord Bledisloe, but still more the members of Lord Moyne's Royal Commission, were shocked at the evidences of departure from this sound basis of Empire policy. Both Commissions confirmed what private bodies and persons have been reiterating for years, namely that Equal Civic Status as a policy was being replaced by "Colour Bars" and "racial discriminations" in law and administration. Lord Moyne's Commission was so impressed with the urgency of action upon colour prejudice that the members passed the following recommendation, the gravity of which speaks for itself:

... the active assistance of all persons of standing, and of all available means of publicity, such as broadcasting, should be enlisted in an organised attempt to prevent any further extension of colour prejudice.

When peace aims come to be considered we can be quite certain that peoples overseas, immigrant white settlers no

less than indigenous peoples, are going to make large political demands on British statesmanship; European communities will demand a further extension of self-government towards Dominion status, native inhabitants in British and other Colonial territories are going to ask, first, for a citizenship status, and then with it a real share in the government of their own country. The basis of these demands in both cases will be the advocacy of democratic principles, as set forth by allied statesmen during the war.

What answer can Great Britain make? The 25,000 Kenya whites (3,000 settlers) and the Southern Rhodesian Government will press their respective claims for a dominant white Legislature and Government, but without any place either now or projected for the 3 million British African subjects in Kenya, the Southern Rhodesian demand will be made for total exclusion from administrative activity of the 1,250,000 African subjects of the King. Then Southern Rhodesia will demand with insistent emphasis the transfer to her of the territories north of the Zambesi, which if granted would place an area more than twice as large as France, with nearly 4 million inhabitants, under the dominant control of a population of less than 70,000 white people! To these demands British Colonial Secretaries can surely make but one reply, namely a democratic Government cannot draw a racial barrier between populations based on colour alone, therefore, only when these Governments have worked out a native policy which provides for the attainment of full citizenship, based on capacity and character and not on an arbitrary colour line, would the mother country be justified in relinquishing effectual control of the affairs of millions of her subjects. It may be hoped that the stress of war, the loyalty of millions of Africans, and above all a sense of democratic justice, will inspire Kenya and Southern Rhodesia to follow the bold lead which nearly 100 years ago New Zealand took with such advantage to herself in the case of the Maoris, whose full citizenship rests on ability and not colour.

In this domestic sphere, the British overseas people have to choose between Adolf Hitler and Lords Moyne and Bledisloe, with the powerful forces behind them. The former has declared for racial discrimination in language which has outraged millions of Asiatics and Africans alike, for he has proclaimed that the uplift of the Africans to a higher plane of

either Slovene or Croat is a bilingual edition of the Fascist *Termini* of Fiume during the months of August and September 1937. *Il Corriere Istriano* wrote on March 27th, 1937, two days after the signature of the Treaty of Belgrade, that "the Slovenes and Croats must cherish no illusions about these promises, as there are only Italians and Fascists in the Julian March."*

Another of the promises given by Count Ciano on the day and at the occasion of the signature of the Treaty of Belgrade was that the political prisoners who are serving long sentences solely because they are Slavs would be returned to liberty. Admittedly some Slovenes and Croats have been released, but only because they had either served their full sentences or were physically and mentally broken and thus unfit for further confinement. There is still many a Slav in prison serving sentences of up to thirty years.

Life has also become economically more difficult for the Slavs under Italian rule. Slav peasants have tilled the poor limestone soil of the Julian March ever since they settled there in the sixth century after Christ. Owing to the increase in population they were already before the war unable to live entirely on what they got out of agriculture. Men and women used to migrate into the ports and cities, where the men could get easy employment in the docks, while the women were in high demand as domestic servants. The Fascist administration has stopped that internal migration. Slavs are not allowed to take employment in town—and if the land does not feed them they have to emigrate altogether. Moreover, the old markets for the Julian March were in what has now become German-Austria. Nowadays the Slavs have to trade their harvests in the Italian market where competition is sharp, and the Italians have all the advantages of better soil, earlier harvests, and for that reason cheaper prices.

How thoroughly the Italians control the individual life of each Slav can perhaps best be guessed at from a look at the Fascist syndicate system. No teacher can teach, no painter paint, no trader trade, and no craftsman exercise his skill, without being a licensed member of his syndicate. Those syndicates charge very high fees, and every applicant has first to prove himself a good Italian, his *Weltanschauung* being permanently supervised and tested by the Fascist authorities.

* Čermelj, *La minorité Slave en Italie*, p. 269.

It is hard for anybody who has not actually lived under this strain to imagine what it means for a good Slav to have to pretend from morning till night that he is a good Italian, because he does not want to lose the job on which his family depends.

Under Austrian rule the Jugo-Slavs of the Julian March enjoyed considerable cultural freedom. They were able to build up a large organisation with clubs, reading-rooms, repertory theatres, and communal evenings. Since the sacking of the "Narodni Dom" one Slav clubhouse after the other, libraries and other cultural centres have been reduced to ashes by "irresponsible elements" that never could be traced, and never were punished or held liable for the damage to Jugo-Slav property. The new school reform, decreed after the agreement with Jugo-Slavia, not only confirmed the abolition of all Slav schools but made it even more difficult than before for any Slav to be taught in his mother tongue. According to that new reform "the Fascist school represents the principle of public instruction which is inspired by the eternal values of the Italian race and civilisation."* That principle excludes *a priori* the education of youth in any but the Italian language. Couples who want to get married are by law obliged to pledge themselves to educate their children in the Italian language—even at home.

The only cultural manifestation which was allowed in the Julian March after the signature of the Treaty of Belgrade consisted of a single *tourné* of the Ljubljana opera. Concerts of the Zagreb Choral Society have been prohibited and a schoolmaster who sang Slovene songs with his pupils on All Saints Day, 1938, was sent to prison for three weeks.

But when last year Herr Hitler declared that the Slovaks and the Ukrainian Ruthenes must have self-determination, Signor Mussolini blew the same horn, demanding in a letter to Viscount Runciman, and proclaiming on September 18th in a speech on the main Square of Trieste the right of the Slovaks and Ruthenes for a plebiscite. Many a Jugo-Slav was listening—but not a syllable was spoken about the Jugo-Slav minority in Italy. And the Duce, self-proclaimed protector of suppressed minorities, refused to receive any Jugo-Slav deputation.

DR. H. G. DITTMAR.

* *Carta della Scuola*.

GERMAN AGRICULTURE : THE DRIVE FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

THE ability of German agriculture to meet the demands that must be placed upon it in any war involving the use of economic weapons by a formidable opponent, depends almost entirely upon the extent to which its avowed objective of complete self-sufficiency has been attained. For forty years prior to the war of 1914-18, German agriculture gained a steady ascendancy over that of this country in the power to produce. Whereas, in 1914, on a given 100 acres of land, our own farmers could feed forty-five to fifty persons, the German farmer fed seventy to seventy-five. There are sufficient indications that before the dearly purchased experience of economic blockade in which that war resulted, the importance, both in peace and war, of a thriving and virile agriculture was never quite absent from the minds of German economists and legislators. Indeed the movement towards the protection of the agricultural industry which gained momentum from 1890 can be indisputably attributed to the realisation of the need of an assured, rather than a cheap, source of food supply. The policy subsequently evolved had resulted, by 1914, in an almost complete self-sufficiency in grain production. If there were a mistake in that policy which affected the war, it was almost certainly due to the fact that the move towards self-sufficiency in cereals had been executed at the expense of the dairy industry. It is of interest to note, in passing, that the present German Government has experienced the incompatibility of a grain-tariff-restriction on imports of feeding stuffs with an attempt to increase the live-stock population.

Moreover, the system of intensive cultivation upon which the agriculture of Germany was based (and which, incidentally, was largely responsible for the immense disparity between production power in the two countries) made little account of a probable, and as it proved, a prolonged and increasingly acute shortage of labour in the war which followed. Germany relied, even in 1914, upon roughly 400,000 immigrant seasonal labourers, mostly Poles. It seems, therefore, that although superior to that of this country both in its organisation and in the degree, though not necessarily in the skill, of its technical and intensive methods of cultivation in 1914,

German agriculture was still far from self-sufficient. Dependence upon foreign sources of supply for concentrated animal foodstuffs, for saltpetre and phosphates, and for motor fuels, are additional evidence of that.

But if there were any doubt then of the German realisation of the danger of an agricultural economy which could not adapt itself to prolonged stringency, such doubt could hardly exist to-day. In the political history of Germany since 1918 this question has loomed large. Even in the earliest post-war times when the struggle for political *versus* economic democracy was being waged, and all parties were primarily concerned with increasing food supplies by whatever means to the maximum, one can perceive an undercurrent of argument which implied the importance of this question. Quite apart from the food emergency created by post-war conditions, agriculture had to be fostered in the national interest by even greater efforts than before. Though there was never any denial that we had much to learn from the organisation of German agriculture—administrative and commercial—in 1914, in the light of the history of subsequent years there can be little doubt that Germany herself had something, at least, to learn. The question is, to what extent has she done so? To what extent, that is, has her avowed endeavour to reach complete self-sufficiency in the sphere of food production been successful? And is there anything in these efforts towards that end by which we might in present circumstances profit?

Agricultural legislation in Germany since the Great War has been summarised in Holt's *German Agricultural Policy, 1918-34*. It can be briefly analysed as follows: (a) a period of emergency food control immediately following the revolution of 1918, commencing as a strict enforcement of the apparatus created by the previous Imperial War Government, and emerging in a period of increasing demands from the producer-parties for the gradual release of the agricultural market from government control; (b) the period from 1921-4, during which an inflation breakdown in the food administration scheme forced a division of policy between either a ruthless requisition of all grain supplies or "a free market," in which the Government food administration was eventually relinquished; (c) the decade from 1923 onwards, which saw the rise of industrial influences, at first co-operating with the

education is an offence and a sin against the Almighty. Lord Moyne and Lord Bledisloe have added their warnings against such policy to those of Queen Victoria's advisers, of Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill, General Smuts.

The foregoing then are some of the Colonial peace aims with which, in the domestic sphere, the nations, particularly the British, will be confronted in varying degrees during the international peace discussions which will follow armistice terms. In the international sphere, the last ten years have witnessed numberless suggestions for redistribution of the Government responsibility for the Colonial areas of the world. What are the principal suggestions? (a) "Give Germany, Italy and other claimants territory capable of producing raw material and providing for white settlement." (b) "Let Great Britain make a friendly gesture to all nations by handing over forthwith the eighty odd British Colonial territorial units with their forty Governments to some international body, either the Mandates Committee or a specially created body drawn from all nations." The Federal Union, with engaging audacity, advertises as its objective the placing of all Colonies under a Common Government—and as a diplomatic aside adds "with guarantees for the native inhabitants"! Mr. W. B. Curry, whose book is so strongly supported by "Federal Unionists," says: "The only way to take the question of Colonies right out of the arena of international squabbling is to put them once and for all under international control"—for all time be it noted, and no democratic nonsense about "consent" of the people or the aim of self-government for the inhabitants!

The foregoing is a fair summary of the proposals made almost exclusively—and also obviously—by those who appear to have had neither experience nor interest in Colonial affairs hitherto. All these proposals have certain common features:

- (a) They ignore the *rights* of the inhabitants, for not one of the authors of these schemes suggests that their consent should be asked!
- (b) They ignore immigrant populations and natives alike.
- (c) The proposals ignore scores of Treaties and other written obligations, which apparently are to be treated as waste paper.
- (d) They envisage taking over a total of world Colonial

territory (exclusive of Dominions) of nearly 13 million square miles in extent, run to-day by nearly 100 separate Governments and occupied by a population twice that of the U.S.A. The astounding levity with which this gigantic problem is approached is shown by the fact that apparently less than three complete paragraphs of a whole book are devoted to the subject!*

- (e) With striking unanimity it is suggested that an International Government in Europe should be created, to whom all "First Loyalties" will be due, and this Common International Government is to appoint all Governors and Colonial officials.
- (f) There is, however, a remarkable omission from every proposal. This is so large and vital a part of any International Colonial scheme that its omission must be deliberate—nowhere is any indication given as to who will pay for this world-wide experiment!

None of these schemes could be adopted without at least the following: (1) the consent of the inhabitants; (2) the tearing up of all treaties; (3) the provision of millions of money for an international "Common" Government of all Colonies. As each and all of these conditions are utterly unthinkable except under the collapse of civilisation, it becomes clear that something a little less grandiose and more feasible should be attempted.

The line of advance appears to be clearly marked out as that of some form of co-operative partnership within defined territorial and other limits. There is nothing revolutionary about such a plan so far as British policy is concerned; whether the two larger Colonial Powers (by population), Holland and France, would accept such policy is more than doubtful. The principal elements in such international co-operative effort are mainly the encouragement of suitable nationals of other States in territory under national sovereignty. There are numberless instances of this, such as British assistance in the legislative work of German Cameroons before 1914; Dutch and Japanese economic co-operation in the British East Indian mineral developments; the early American predominance in activity in gold mining on the Rand, and of course the wide open door to missionary and

* *The Case for Federal Union.*

scientific labours. By a further turn or two of the wheel in specified areas a much fuller measure of co-operative partnership should be a practical proposition.

The Peace Conference, when it is held, should envisage carrying out the overdue obligations of Article 15 of the Convention of St. Germain which covers the Congo Basin areas and under which a Colonial Conference was to be arranged for considering modifications to the provisions of this instrument and its forerunners. The "modifications" which "experience may have shown to be necessary"* could hardly fail to take note of many Colonial considerations. In the first place, an extension of the areas subject to this Convention should be possible. To-day the absurd position obtains that only parts of certain territories come under the Convention, so that tribal lands and areas are cut in half. An amended Convention should abolish such anomalies, whilst an extension of the area to cover all territories under the terms of the Convention would at once add nearly another half million square miles to the "Basin" areas. If satisfactory terms could be arranged between all parties, this vast area might well provide opportunity for a contribution in its development by the peoples of nations not recognised as Colonial Powers to-day.† It is essential that the old conception of Colonies as national "possessions" should be abandoned, but whether they are annexed as Colonies, or Protectorates or Mandated areas, they cannot be "given" as political compensation to "unsatisfied" nations.

At the same time the conditions laid down in the amended Convention might with advantage be extended to provide opportunities for social, scientific and commercial activities for the subjects of nations other than those immediately engaged in administrative work. Subject to the establishment in Central Africa of a system of this character, and the loyal acceptance of existing treaty obligations, there might be room for consideration of a place for the respective powers in some such co-operative plan, with a real international complexion, avoiding, of course, any attempt at creating international administrations. Would such a proposal offered on

* Convention of St. Germain, 1919. Cmd. 477.

† To-day these territories include, in whole or in part, the Congo, Abyssinia, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Angola, Cabinda, Ruanda, Urundi, French Congo, Cameroons.

generous terms and for so vast an area satisfy such "have nots" as Germany? Probably, but only if a reasonable solution of Colonial questions is the real objective. No, if there are undisclosed motives of domination. It must not be overlooked that in fact none of the German reasons for a return of Germany's former Colonies from the Mandatory system actually fit in with the German conception of restoration; moreover, German spokesmen have never disguised the fact that they want something other and larger than the return of their former Colonial areas.

If Germany's real objective is the Antipodes, as many observers seem to suppose, then the first "stepping stone" is South Africa, and that fact alone would account for Nazi political activity everywhere South of the Limpopo. But control of development in the Antipodes would satisfy only part of Germany's advertised needs. If Germany's Colonial objective also includes a place in the West Indies, that would meet many more German needs, for it would provide raw materials, oversight of territories in the West which are at present full of German settlers and capable of absorbing more, and more important still the ultimate use of the Panama Canal with all that it would mean. Many Americans think that this is Germany's main Colonial objective; one thing it certainly is not, and that is the simple return of the old German Colonies which could not satisfy German requirements as stated by themselves. Colonial development implies always and everywhere a large element of service—and beyond question much unrewarded service to the inhabitants. A careful examination of German pronouncements reveals the startling fact that there appears to be no single modern pronouncement which recognises this; nothing in fact but the crude exploitation of "vast riches". Along these lines any international solution of Colonial questions will be very difficult.

JOHN HARRIS.

The Editors desire to express their deep regret at the death of an old and valued contributor.

agricultural parties and later opposed, and resulting in the formulation of a national agricultural *bloc* on agrarian questions; and (d) the early legislation of the present régime.

The accession of the National Socialist régime was to a considerable extent brought about by the conversion of the North German farmers to its doctrine. This doctrine, founded, as is well known, upon a racial basis, had as its slogan "*Blut und Boden*"—"Blood and Soil"—now so familiar to all who have the opportunity of the perusal of the German agricultural press. Little imagination is needed to discover the appeal that such a slogan would possess for the farming community. In effect, it promised the creation in the German yeomanry of a "new nobility," a reservoir for the procreation of the future race, and contended that, to make the special tasks of the German farmer possible, he should be entitled to certain safeguards. Above all, the policy of National Socialism aimed at binding the peasant farmer to the soil. Agriculture was to be organised on the "corporative" principle, which necessitated the incorporation of all the agricultural organisations into one corporative body, with local yeomen groups (*Bauernschaften*) under yeomen leaders (*Bauernführer*) and, over the whole Reich corporative body, the *Reichsbauernführer*. There were to be restrictions upon the breaking up of small into smaller and uneconomic farms (the well-known "Heredity Law" was devised for this purpose); a drive to increase the number of "inherited freehold" farms, owned and worked by yeomen; and, generally speaking, an intensification of the efforts towards economic self-sufficiency in food production, in so far as the limits imposed by fiscal and other considerations would allow.

It is a peculiar paradox that any attempt at historical analysis of a period becomes more difficult the nearer one is to it in point of time. Only in the light of subsequent conditions does the glass clear and, when all conflicting emotions and opinions have faded, focus the essential facts impartially and unremittingly in true significance; it is not, therefore, the intention to debate here the policy evolved since 1933, but rather to study the results. Of the general policy itself, we might commence by saying that its aims are clear; the difficulties of translating them into practice in an essentially industrial country, obvious; the results, less so. When an

artist becomes loud in the eulogy of his own work, the impartial person inclines towards scepticism. Likewise, polemics may amuse, but it is doubtful whether they will not confuse, the historian. What is significant is that only the methods (or some of them) are new: the basic purpose has, as we have seen, remained unchanged for the last forty-nine years. But questions emerge which are of very great interest to us, as, for example, what of the educational organisations which we admired in 1916? Have there been changes here? And if so, for better or worse? How have these changes affected the German ascendancy in power of production, so evident in 1914? And has it been maintained? Finally, in what degree has self-sufficiency been achieved, and the errors and difficulties which the conflict of 1914-18 made so evident been rectified or surmounted?

On the first point it is of interest to note that for some years prior to 1916 the expenditure on agricultural education in Germany was relatively much higher than in this country, and other advantages accrued. "The great progress that agriculture has achieved in Germany through the last quarter of a century is the result of the union of practice with science, and proves that money spent on research and on education in every class brings in a high rate of interest," Professor von Rümker, of Berlin, observed just prior to the outbreak of the last war. That the need for this union of science and practice had been kept alive and was not less recognised in 1930 is demonstrated by the success of the *Versuchring* movement, an organisation for farm experimental work by co-operative action among local groups of farmers, to which it is doubtful whether the English farmer would ever have taken kindly in spite of its obvious advantages from the practical-scientific aspect. There were 500 such groups at work on experiments varying from rotational to economic in that year in Germany.

There has subsequently been a systematic removal of all elements and individuals in the teaching profession which could be regarded as opposed to the new order. In the sphere of education, therefore, as elsewhere, the effect of this new factor cannot be entirely overlooked. Higher education, generally, has been restricted. There were, in 1936, quotas for matriculation at the most crowded universities and other evidence that the present Government not only regards too much education as detrimental, but has taken measures to

POLAND UNDER THE SWASTIKA.*

ADEQUATELY to discuss the processes being employed to-day by the Nazis in Poland is not easy. Most of them are only in their initial stages, some will never come to maturity but rather be discarded for fresh ones, while others will reach fruition quickly and then disappear. Further, what I myself saw, before escaping in November, is now out of date, and the scarcity of precise information makes only tentative conclusions possible. It is difficult for a Pole to write without emotion of what is going on in his country, yet only cold analysis can really meet the case.

What used to be Poland has been divided into four—if we count the Jewish Reservation separately five—jurisdictions. First come the areas incorporated in the Reich, which include some districts known as Russian Poland before the Great War. The Reich frontier is now only thirty miles from Warsaw. Roughly this means 55,000 sq. miles, with about 9 million inhabitants. Nineteen-twentieths of them are Polish. Here the worst persecutions are in progress, the Poles being deported to make room for Germans from the Baltic Provinces or the Reich. Already the forced migrations reach hundreds of thousands. Even so, the net result of all this is only a veneer of Germanism.

The second area is the Rump State—central Poland, including Cracow, Warsaw and Lublin. It is known as the *General-gouvernement*, and has Cracow as capital. Only on the east are its boundaries fixed; its area is roughly 43,000 sq. miles, and its population about 14 million. Its German name *Restgebiet* describes exactly its destiny: it is to play the rôle of absorbing the old and the young, unfit for labour in the annexed provinces, in particular the Jews, not only Polish, but also Austrian and Czech. These Jews are all to be crowded into the Lublin reservation, which will thus become a smaller ghetto within a larger one. Details are lacking as to how far this plan has been advanced.

The third zone is of course the Soviet, where the social theory and practice of U.S.S.R. are being rapidly pushed forward. The fourth is small—the city and environs of Vilna, which have fallen to Lithuania. These two areas are not included in our present study.

* An address to the Le Play Society.

Turning to our analysis of the relations established between the victorious Germans and the vanquished Poles, it seems best to make use both of personal observations and of recent information. The most useful framework in which to picture those relations is that of a system of castes. By this the sociologist means a form of division into groups or classes, with well-restricted connections between them. No reciprocity is permitted. A barrier is set to social contacts, the caste favours one group and disqualifies the other. The one is superior, the other inferior; and the norms of behaviour of each are sternly regulated.

In the present case we have on the one hand *das Herrenvolk*, which by victory as well as by inherent race superiority—not to mention the title known as *Lebensraum*—is now destined to be the master; to subjugate all others and remove them if necessary from their patrimony; and to reduce them to the level of unprivileged slave labour, to live and work only for others. If we look closer, we shall find this working out in Poland in an extreme form. Intercourse between the groups is forbidden, Germans are to keep Poles at arm's length. The *Oberpräsident* of East Prussia issued decrees early in January to this effect. "Personal relations" are not permitted with prisoners of war. These include sitting at the same table, or even in the same room, inviting prisoners to a bar or a restaurant or even serving them there, being in their company at a church service. But the rules apply just as much to civilian Poles also. Posters were stuck on the walls in Western Poland: "Poles must now use the servants' entrance!"

The caste system insists on a sex taboo between the groups involved. Intermarriage is forbidden, and the lower caste is deprived of the right to marry at all. This was made clear by the Protestant Bishop of Poznan, though I very much doubt whether any attempt can be made to enforce it. Irregular intercourse between the two castes is severely dealt with, amounting in effect to *Rassenschande*. A German girl of 22 having "insulted the honour of a German woman," was sent to prison for six years, and her hair was cut off by the *Gauleiter*. On the other hand the exploitation of the "native" woman is encouraged. I saw a manual of colloquial Polish compiled for German troops, in which a whole section was filled with expressions making this kind of approach easy. The superior caste demands constantly acts of veneration on the part of the

vanquished. Posters were put up in many places, bidding all Poles uncover their heads in the presence of German officers or civilians in authority. Poles are expected to give way on the street or on the highway; in Torun and elsewhere the pavements were reserved exclusively for the use of the conquerors.

More interesting, however, is the set of positive privileges of a purely economic character awarded to the superior class. It is a strange trait of the German mentality that abstract and mystical concepts like racial superiority are instantly turned to prosaic ends. In Poland this means ruthless exploitation. National Socialism specialises in translating ideologies into material terms. The fine of 1,000 million marks imposed on the Jews in Germany for the assassination of vom Rath in Paris is the best example. In Poland, superiority gives a prior right to purchase all goods, to get them in a larger quantity and better quality. This is a great gain in a time of general shortage, when ration cards are universal. The markets are reserved first of all for German buyers. Only after they have been served can Poles make purchases. The same is true of the shops, where German soldiers and civilians do not have to queue up as do Poles. On the other hand, they make use of a privileged position for selling goods to their Polish neighbours, of course pocketing the profits.

We thus reach our first conclusion. The caste principle, though wrapped up in a picturesque disguise of mythology, is meant above all to achieve the exploitation of everything Polish. At the same time it has also a secondary function. A social standard is created, a social model of a superior order meant to attract all non-Germans. This instrument is of peculiar value along the western borders where the German language is widely known, at least by the older generation. The criterion of language is very important. People speaking German without an accent will always be more favourably treated by the conquerors. Here we see the uses of the special category of people known as the *Volksdeutsche*, who were born on what was once Prussian territory and are Germans by race, but owing to causes over which they had no control have been unfortunately compelled to live among Poles. The loophole has been created for these people, provided they speak German, to regain their national status. They are offered virtually the same social position as is enjoyed by the *Reichsdeutsche*.

There is no doubt that the caste system is so planned as to form an incentive to the acceptance of German nationality, often enough through the intermediary stage of *Volksdeutsche*.

Of course the caste system is a most useful and efficient police measure. The Gestapo takes care that the higher-class invaders shall not mix too much with the non-German underdog. Such contacts with outsiders might not only produce cracks in the structure of the Nazi morale, but eventually lead to the weakening of the whole Party organisation. German officers in Cracow are discouraged from asking directions of any civilians in order to find a street in the city.

I should like to add a few words about the other side of this caste system, the service it is meant to render to the Nazis as a community, and the dangers connected therewith. Caste seems to satisfy deep urges of the German mentality, but it is also useful as an instrument for propaganda. Without discussing what is an extremely complex problem, I want only to draw attention to the light thrown on it by the fierce German propaganda developed in Poland after their victory. It contained boasting and bragging as to the overpowering might of German arms, and their crushing superiority in the face of which neither Polish nor Allied resistance could look other than ridiculous. The printed papers would be filled with pictures showing destroyed aerodromes, the ruins of Warsaw, the triumphs of the victors, etc. The aim was, of course, to crush the morale of the nation as a whole and destroy isolated points of resistance.

What struck one was that all this propaganda had far more effect on those who brought it than on the Poles for whom it was meant. I have seen the soldiers on more than one occasion carried away by it, intoxicated by their elation, in a word enjoying it all to the full. They were afforded a means of constant reassurance which they greatly seemed to need. Though kept under guard in a war prisoners' camp, I was neither crushed nor impressed by all this propaganda, but had a fine chance of turning the tables on the man who guarded me. In conversation I explained to him that the war was not over; on October 10th he did not yet know that Germany was at war with France and England! I explained that we should not return home now, but would all be sent to the Western front; and that the war may last for years. A few days later he had this confirmed by the Führer himself; and it was interesting

to observe how the grain of doubt planted in this elderly member of the *Landwehr* (in civilian life a quite normal human being, a farmer from the Rhineland), not only broke through the layer of official propaganda, but grew into a plant that disturbed the whole harmony of his convictions. Of course my conversations had to be carried on without witnesses, the morning buying of cigarettes offering the only good opportunity; but this cannot be an isolated case. The truth is that the whole mentality of caste superiority, and the propaganda based on it has had little moral effect on the Polish community, while it finds itself in conflict with facts and even with other main lines of German propaganda. Though aimed at the Poles, it seems to be conducted very largely *pro domo sua*.

We must return to the use of the caste system for purposes of economic exploitation. Meant to furnish the Reich with resources for carrying on the war, this exploitation is planned on two main lines. On the one hand it seeks to reduce the consumption of the indigenous population, on the other at extracting from the country the limit of its productive possibilities—both natural resources and human labour. The first of these blows falls chiefly on the Polish intelligentsia, while the second affects most of all the working classes. Taking first the reduction of the level of all consumption, and looking at the position of the intelligentsia, we see that this latter is a specific product of European society. It includes the educated people, maintaining their class consciousness as distinct from the peasants or the workers in factories and mines. In Poland the intelligentsia were the only consumers' group which approached somewhat closely to the standards of Western Europe. It included the whole of the governing classes, the professions, and certain parts of the middle class in the towns. Typical for an East Central European community is the fact that there exists here a relatively strong class consciousness. A member of the educated classes, if of peasant origin, considers himself quite different from anyone else in those classes, say a bourgeois; and this sense of difference plays an important part in his thinking and general behaviour. The caste principle functions as a significant economic measure.

What has happened to the intelligentsia since the Nazi conquest? Deprived of its former income, very often a state-paid salary, it must seek other means of support. Only two

openings are left: manual labour, and the petty trading which means chiefly selling off one's possessions. Not everyone, however, is fit for manual labour; and the trading can only last until the stocks end. From the start there is a shortage of goods of all kinds and this can only increase. Even if the selling of private possessions produces a brief boom, it cannot last long. The result is that most of the intelligentsia will either enlist voluntarily or will be drafted for state-controlled labour. They will then be carried off to the Reich, to what might be called the white slavery of the twentieth century.

The position of the working classes is hardly better. It is quite true that during the first few months not many of them were unemployed, but this condition is now virtually ended, and most of them will be compelled to migrate. This temporary period of employment was chiefly due to the fact that most of Poland's heavy industry was not destroyed, thanks to the swift progress of the war; and having important stocks of raw materials (calculated to keep them going for about three months), they offered much more profitable booty to the Germans if operated on the spot until these stocks were exhausted. For a time they were running at full capacity, but we know of more and more now closing down, with the machinery being dismantled and either transported to Germany or sold to the Soviets. The workers, of course, are helpless, and are at the mercy of those who seek to enrol them for the Reich. Exact figures cannot be given as to the number of Polish labourers being taken by force to the Reich. Swiss papers report an average of two to three trains leaving Warsaw daily. They estimate the total number, apart from 300,000 war prisoners already in Germany, at not less than 1 million workers of both sexes. In addition to these they speak of 10,000 skilled workers in the field of metallurgy.

There is still another factor at work, draining the resources of the Polish countryside. I refer to the host of German officials of all kinds, taking up various kinds of posts—civilian, administrative, economic, etc., both in town and country. They are, as a body, little less than parasites meant to live at the cost of others. It is for this kind of thing that taxes are imposed; but on top of taxation come the frequent and severe fines. These are easily inflicted, cannot be resisted, and rob the pockets of the Polish people of such ready cash

as they have. The press has already reported the scheme for exploitation in agriculture. Bigger farms and estates have been placed under "trustees," who manage them for the Reich. The owner is fortunate if he is allowed to remain on his farm, or to retain even a small part of the produce from it.

It is the position of the peasants as a class which has relatively least changed. They may even draw momentary advantages from the fact of belonging to the highly industrialised German Reich. They are likely to obtain better prices for all produce, although in view of the general shortage of goods they will not be able to buy much with their money. As a result they will avoid selling for cash, but will do their best to get goods directly in exchange. Though it is forbidden, they will try to smuggle to the market town a little wheat or rye or flour, for which they can get sugar, soap, salt or paraffin oil for lighting. These goods, of course, are also rationed, and often cannot be had for cash, but some smuggling is always possible. Of course the exploitation system affects the peasant as well; and here we are still in the dark as to how far he will have to submit to this, and how far he may be able to evade it. All his livestock is registered, he is not allowed to sell without a permit; but doubtless he will find ways and means to do some "hoarding" and both buy and sell behind the back of the authorities.

Of special interest are the social transformations taking place inside the peasant class. The German invasion is only accentuating a process which is much older, and has roots that go far back. Some reference has been made to it already, when we spoke of the intelligentsia. In the past it is the latter which has constituted the Polish nation. The masses of peasantry, over two-thirds of the total population, lived for the most part in a state of isolation, and had little share in social and political privilege. The last generation has seen a great change in this regard. The peasants have woken up and come to demand their share in the national life. They have demanded not so much economic advantages, e.g. the raising of the standard of living, but rather what may be summed up in a single word—education. Understood rightly this would go far to remove the existing isolationism and to introduce the largest single occupational group in the country to the privileges of citizenship. The lead has been taken by younger men and women of peasant origin, who have passed

through school and university and become the champions of this important cause. Peasant biographies recently published show what great changes have come over village communities in general. The field of social studies has been for them the channel by which they have achieved class consciousness, and this has led them not away from but closer to a truly national patriotism. Naturally enough political interest has also played its part. It has taken the form of a general opposition to aristocracy as a ruling élite, or indeed to any form of semi-totalitarian government, incompatible with what the farmer regards as true democracy. For the first time in Polish history the vast body of rural Poland is being absorbed into the national tradition, and itself becoming a carrier of that tradition. There is no doubt that the Nazi invasion will help this process along as nothing else could. Not only will the presence of a foreign ruler not succeed in checking it, but, as even Bismarck before his death had reluctantly to admit, the invader will find that alongside the landed gentry and the clergy, the Polish farmer will prove the hardest possible nut to crack. The ordeal is a bitter one, the hardship great. All are suffering together, whether in town or country; but every Pole is convinced that they will not suffer in vain.

ANDRÓZEJ WALIGÓRSKI.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND MAN-POWER.

THE question is often asked why Germany should be able to solve the unemployed problem while we have failed even in time of war to absorb such a large proportion of idle labour. When Hitler boasts that he has abolished unemployment in Germany he does not of course state that much of this labour has for years past been engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war on a colossal scale. The aim of the Nazis has also been of necessity to make the nation self-sufficient; to exclude all goods that can be artificially made within their own frontiers. The one word *Ersatz* sufficiently describes the many substitutes for imported food and raw materials. They have not succeeded and certainly never hope to succeed in dispensing with all external supplies; and this is shown by their incessant threats and bribes directed to the somewhat distraught neutral States. They have, however, undoubtedly used their abundant man-power with great advantage, and in addition have press-ganged 100,000 Poles, compelling them to work for little or no wages, a method recently employed also in Czecho-slovakia. The whole of the man-power of Germany has been mobilised. Hitler once said "our capital is our labour" and we may agree that all labour in Germany stands behind his entire economic and military effort.

With regard to England and Wales the most recent official figures, April 15th, show the total of unemployed at 972,695, the lowest recorded since December 1920. This does not include over 90,000 temporarily unemployed. Even if a number are unemployable for some reason or other, there is still left this large surplus of men and women who ought to be engaged either in the production of goods and food for home consumption or manufactured goods for export. Why have we not been able to show the same results as Germany? Mainly because we have been on a war footing for so short a time compared with that country, yet we are told that there is a likelihood, if not a certainty, that Great Britain will be needing all the man-power available before the war is over. No one would of course include the unemployable or a certain hard core of the unemployed who have lost both energy and skill and lack the initiative which would enable them to find work even where labour is in demand. We may however include all such labour as is at present unemployed owing to

the dislocation caused by the war, for example the men in the building trades, or the miners, or labour that suffers usually from seasonal unemployment. We may also include all the unemployed who are left derelict in certain parts of the south owing to the big shift of movement of trade to the north. At present one and a quarter million men are either in the army or actually called up for training. If at the end of this year an additional million men are under arms this might mean, looked at superficially, that the unemployed would be totally absorbed. But after making all allowances we probably have still about 750,000 to 800,000 who are either idle or are passing at the time from one job to another. The improvement in the last month has chiefly been in seasonal and outdoor trades. We can hardly expect to see a reduction in the metal and engineering trades since they are almost fully employed. The fact remains that there are many men who need to be transferred from slack to busy occupations and who need to be trained if the transfer is to be effective.

If the war effort fails to find them a place some at least could be employed in less essential work rather than allow them to be a burden on the State and Unemployed Insurance. In addition to the temporarily unemployed there must be a very large number of unskilled or semi-skilled men who could be engaged in the manufacture of goods for export or employed in agriculture which is short of labour some 100,000 men and women. There are still a very large number of small factories and workshops and much machinery and equipment standing idle or only half utilised. We are spending enormous sums on the war services, certainly over £6,000,000 a day if we include the money spent on all kinds of emergency work like A.R.P., all of which seems to entail little actual labour and no production of goods. Many critics think that we are not getting an adequate return for all this colossal expenditure. In time of war men are taken out of normal and wealth-producing industries and insufficient effort is made to fit others into the occupations left vacant. The truth is that we cannot afford to-day to have any unemployed. We should be using all our resource not only to meet the needs of the army, navy and air forces and supply the wants of the civil population, but all the surplus man-power over and above these requirements should be turned into productive channels and if possible into the manufacture of goods for export.

The recent report of the Unemployed Insurance Statutory Committee with its balance of £57,500,000 is a favourable sign, but this surplus is in the main a saving effected before the war and does not alter the fact that a large army of unemployed still remains. The surplus has however had one good result. This is the allowance for the first two children of unemployed persons which is now to be increased by 1s. a week so that these two children will now get 4s. each as from April 15th. The large sum of £37,000,000 is to be used to pay off a part of the Insurance Fund debt, and since the Committee expects an increase of unemployment after the war it is difficult to quarrel with this decision.

What then ought to be the aim of the Government here and now? It is surely to see to it that all who are at present unemployed in any strict sense are trained to take the place of the men who will be or are being called up, and to reduce the unemployed to the minimum by careful planning of our productive resources and man-power. In the building trades a considerable percentage of the men last month were idle, including bricklayers, masons, carpenters and tilers. Much of this unemployment is due to lack of timber. It may be costly to import timber for building; it may be too bulky to make it worth while since cargo space is so much in demand. No doubt also much of the timber we have is requisitioned by the Government for the construction of camps and hutments. Builders say the control has been overdone. By the end of September last there were five orders issued by the timber control and the situation was much confused. The view of the writer is that much valuable timber has been wasted in A.R.P. work in many parts of the country where elaborate protection was unnecessary, but even supposing that the Government has a good use for nearly all the timber that can be imported, it does not follow that there are no other alternatives or that the building trades should be so idle. Germany often finds substitutes when imports are unavailable, and we have concrete and brick almost without limit, so that it should not be impossible to employ at least a proportion of those who are unemployed in the building trades. Some of these men are above the age likely to be required in the services for many months to come if at all. A place should be found for them in some useful work. We have perhaps called up too many key men in the skilled trades and lack of key

men may mean inability to employ the unskilled or semi-skilled. Great care should be taken to employ skilled men on skilled jobs and so to utilise existing machinery to the fullest possible extent.

The Ministry of Supply has taken an essential step in the right direction. It has ordered a census of labour in the engineering, motor and aircraft trades together with the ship-building and ship-repairing industries. We shall then know the number of workpeople skilled or unskilled engaged on Government work, or export work and work for the home market in these industries. Every firm small or great is required to fill up the necessary forms and the result should give us some idea of the man-power of these trades. It will enable the Government to allocate labour so as to get the right proportion of skilled to unskilled and so secure a planned use of all available labour. Mobility is of first-rate importance. When it is discovered that more skilled men are required in any craft the opportunity must be seized to train such men as speedily as possible and place them at any cost where they are needed. There are still a considerable number of shipyards standing empty, the slips unfilled for lack of orders. The call is for more merchant ships to replace those we have already lost, especially for cargo vessels with the latest equipment and fast enough to speed up the convoy system. We have already lost a large tonnage and no doubt shall lose more in the future. It seems to be important that these gaps in our shipbuilding industry should be filled even though Norwegian and Danish and Dutch ships should be at our disposal. It may be argued, why try to find work for these unemployed, if in a year's time or less owing to the demand of our fighting services they will be all called up. The answer is first of all that many of these men owing to age may not be required even in twelve months' time, and some at least should be employed at home since not a single skilled man can be spared in this day of scientific equipment.

The war will be won not merely by the large number of men in the armies, nor even by our well-equipped navy and air force, but by the utmost use of our man- and woman-power whether at home or abroad. Every able-bodied man and woman should have his or her allotted task and every endeavour should be made to see that no important element in our national life is neglected. The fact that our armies are

largely mechanised may mean in the end fewer soldiers at the front and more work in the factory and workshop to maintain the necessary supplies of tanks and armoured cars, of shells and guns and all the equipment of modern warfare.

No doubt the tide of unemployment is on the ebb. After the interruptions to outdoor work caused by the weather which increased the number of unemployed, we are beginning to see the effect of the removal from the industrial to the fighting army of another 500,000 men. We have also to remember that the revenue figures for the year show an excess of seventy million pounds over last autumn's estimates. There is a very close connection between Government finance and employment and especially so under war conditions. The figures seem to show that the transition from peace- to war-time activity—always a painful operation—is gradually achieving success. The danger is as in the last war that we may be drawn into that vicious spiral of inflation when prices rise and wages follow prices. It is inevitable that normal business must to some extent suffer and consequently the revenue from such industry, but it is also true that all war industries are taxed by the Chancellor and the export trades are being encouraged to expand, thus absorbing a proportion of the unemployed. No doubt the civilian consumption of luxuries must be reduced but not too suddenly. We must see our way to absorb some at least of those still unemployed before we attempt to transfer all labour to absolute necessities. It is no easy task and requires clear judgment if we are to assess rightly the pace of the transfer. The Government is compelled to damp down private consumption but if this takes place too soon there is the risk of further unemployment and if too late we are sure to see the beginning of the reckless spirit so noticeable in the last war. For the moment, as the unemployment figures show, as well as the revenue returns, the first alternative has been chosen and hence the rather caustic and to some extent justifiable criticism of the Government.

The acid test of its success will be whether the unemployment ebbs or flows, whether the trend of employment is up or down. By the autumn there should be no unemployed. All who are not called up and enlisted in the fighting forces of this nation should be engaged in war industries or in manufacture of goods for export so as to give us currency abroad and therefore food and raw materials. For the remainder there is

the usual work of the nation which must go on, otherwise heavy and necessary taxation cannot be met. Such work must therefore be regarded as part of our war effort.

The contrast between peace- and war-time unemployment is so great that comparison is almost useless. In peace time we are accustomed to the dislocation in industry due to changes in fashion or the introduction of new methods or new commodities. A bad harvest may make all the difference in some years to the percentage of the unemployed, while seasonal employment in certain trades is accepted as unavoidable. There always will be in peace time a certain amount of unemployment which is due to the mistakes made in production. At one time employers or manufacturers may over-produce because they have no exact knowledge of what their competitors are doing in the same field. This is followed by underproduction due to the drop in prices and to the inability to get rid of old stock. If we spread unemployment over a period of years in normal times the average unemployment is not very great, the percentage being between five or six, but a war destroys the balance that exchange of goods usually produces. Very long periods of peace in industry are therefore periods of prosperity, although this does not mean that you avoid the trade cycle. But the outbreak of war, especially a long and costly war, means such dislocation in industry that it takes a generation to restore equilibrium in the markets. The last war, like the present, involved a huge expenditure on war service and munitions and therefore the diversion of resources, of men and machinery from peace-time production. It is difficult to say how large a proportion of the economic resources of the country are absorbed by the necessity for meeting the demands of the army, navy and air force, but probably not less than about half the man-power of the nation is engaged in supplying the needs of the services. We know from past experience how difficult the task of getting back to normality. As a matter of fact we have never got back to that position.

During a world war we naturally expect that international trade will be greatly diminished but in the peace following the last war we discovered that international trade was so disorganised from a variety of causes that the whole world suffered together with the belligerent States. When once the demand for munitions came to an end the country found

itself faced with the problem of production of goods and manufactures greatly in excess of the capacity of the world to absorb. Even before the present war the dislocation of industry and commerce was very marked; prices fluctuated to such an extent as to bring about not only a redistribution of national income in our country but in most countries. Currencies collapsed and unemployment increased owing to the difficulties confronting the process of exchange and the disturbance of the balance in the world between agriculture and industry. The first three or four months of the present war intensified the degree of unemployment in the distributive trades as also in building and furniture making. The only remedy is the absorption of these unemployed in the army or other industries. The problem we shall have to face is whether anything can be done when this war comes to an end to redress the condition of unstable equilibrium which will then exist, to restore the balance between agriculture and industry and to find employment for those tens of thousands who will be idle when peace falls like a guillotine on war production. It is perhaps unwise to speculate, since we are without any knowledge of how long the war will last, what will be the extent of the expenditure involved and what changes in industry are likely to take place. One thing is quite certain and that is that sooner or later we shall be confronted, although not necessarily at once, with so severe a depression that it will have its reactions throughout the world and the cumulative effect of this depression will be debts so heavy as to be almost unbearable, and a state of insolvency in nearly all the countries that have been closely allied to the belligerents. We can only hope that in Great Britain at all events the Unemployment Insurance Acts, although only a palliative, may lessen the hardship that must be felt by the unemployed and that gradually people will begin to recognise that stocks must be replaced, that costs must be reduced, that consumers must be encouraged to consume by a reduction in prices if necessary and that industry may be able to adapt itself to a condition of things which has certainly never been witnessed in this country for over a century.

PERCY ALDEN.

GERMANY'S FIRST COLONY.

“WE look on Hitler as the tool of God's providence. We thank him for having freed us. We can hardly imagine our State without him.” The speaker is not Konrad Henlein, Artur Seyss-Inquart or Karl Hermann Frank. It is the Slovak deputy Ferenčík, speaking in the Slovak parliament on March 13th. How far does this slobbering servility represent Slovak feelings towards Germany? How much is due to fear, how much to sympathy? What is the reality behind the so-called independence of Slovakia?

Slovakia is vastly important to Germany. First, as a store of raw materials. In a normal year she produces $4\frac{1}{2}$ million cubic metres of timber, besides 3,650,000 railway sleepers, and since the war this output has been doubled—for “export” to the Reich. She has iron, lignite, antimony, naphtha, gold, silver and salt; wheat, rye and barley; cattle and leather. Her $2\frac{1}{4}$ million inhabitants are a comforting reservoir of cheap labour, which can be used at home or transported to Germany: the Slovak Government agreed to send 55,000 men to Germany last year, and there are at this moment at least 60,000 Slovaks at work in German farms and factories. Slovakia can be used to pile up further foreign debts in neutral countries, or to negotiate favourable new trade treaties with them. A few weeks ago Slovakia concluded a new treaty with Yugoslavia, by which she imports 40 wagons of pigs, 22 wagons of pork fat and 12 wagons of bacon every month. These go to Germany.

Politically, also, Slovakia is useful to Germany. Germany is holding out the “independence” of Slovakia as an alluring ideal in separatist propaganda directed to the minorities of south-eastern Europe—especially to the Croats, who are the most easily tempted. And the Germans can always use Slovakia as a bargaining counter: they can hand her over to Russia or Italy, or even Hungary, in exchange for concessions, or they can use her to threaten Hungary as they threatened Russia and Poland through Carpatho-Ukraine. As for Slovakia's strategic importance, she *was* essential to the campaign against Poland; she *is* essential for any drive to the south or south-east. In consequence of Munich and the Ides of March the Germans held Poland half encircled, and could capture Krakow within five days. Now they could

move just as swiftly on Hungary. They hold the Danube bridge-head at Bratislava, the Váh valley, and the east-west railway across Slovakia. Troops centred on Prešov could be on the Roumanian frontier in not many hours.

Hitler (so Ferencik said) "freed" Slovakia. Slovakia is paying for her "freedom," and paying heavily. German control of her economy is complete and ruthless, and her economic situation now is woeful. There is a shortage of everything, and what little there is is prohibitively expensive. For some weeks past the Bratislava radio has been broadcasting in German market reports which proclaim that a couple of wagons of soap have arrived, or that there is a little coal in Bratislava again, or that fruit and vegetable prices have dropped by 5 per cent. On February 28th, for instance, listeners were told that:

Several wagons with lentils from Roumania have arrived. The lentils are not of the best quality. The price of one kilogram is 10 crowns. Lately we have noticed a shortage of rice, but this will soon be removed, as several wagons of rice are on the way from Italy. . . . Eggs were not supplied to Bratislava, so that for several days you literally could not get any unless you paid usurious prices. The price was officially fixed in Bratislava at 0.90 crowns each, but in the country the price was not fixed, and over one crown for an egg was paid there.

In February and March the price of indifferent soap in Bratislava was 15-16 crowns per kilogram—exactly twice the price of the best quality soap under the Czechoslovak Republic. Poor butter cost 18-20 crowns a kilogram, where in 1938 it had cost 9-12 crowns. Fat cost 20 crowns a kilogram, a rise of over 50 per cent. There were no shoes to be bought in the land of Bat'a, no clothing, although Brno and Prostějov used to clothe half central Europe; no textiles, no woollen goods, practically no coal. On August 18th last year the Government newspaper, *Slovák*, had proudly declared that the existing supply of rice was enough to provide for the whole Slovak market; this was due chiefly to the trade agreement with Italy, but also to the German-Slovak clearing, which was supposed to secure the export of a "certain quantity" of rice from Germany to Slovakia. But on February 21st *Slovák*, in an article headed "Do we need rice?", called upon the Slovaks to be more economical in their consumption of rice and to replace it with barley rice.

At the same time, crops are in danger because of the shortage of seed, especially in the sugar beet and clover districts. Clover seed, which until "independence" was grown and tested by the Agricultural Scientific Institute, is now sold without any guarantee at twice the 1938 price. Shamrock, which used to cost 1,000-1,200 crowns per 100 kilograms, now costs 2,500-3,000 crowns. Beet, pea, lentil, flax and hemp seed has also risen sharply. The sowing plan is fixed by Germany, without the slightest consideration for Slovakia's needs.

Slovakia, in fact, is being systematically and pitilessly plundered. Whilst the native Slovak sawmills and cellulose factories are at a standstill for lack of raw material, while wood cannot even be got for heating houses, Slovakia's timber is being cut and exported to Germany so fast that within five years, at most, the country will be completely stripped and its forests ruined for centuries. The Slovak iron and steel industry is unemployed, because the whole of Slovakia's iron production is needed by Germany. There is scarcely any coal in Bratislava, although in February the Slovak Government proudly announced that it had concluded an agreement with Germany by which 80,000 tons of coal and 20,000 tons of coke would be delivered every month from the Karvinná district, from which Slovakia's coal came in the days of the Republic. But the 200 kilometres of railway through the Jablunka Pass and the Váh Valley are in such an appalling state of repair that the transport of 10,000 wagons of coal is out of the question. As for petrol, it costs from 4.10 crowns to 5 crowns a litre, and is scarcely to be found. Slovakia has modern refineries which used to run on oil imported from Roumania. This has now practically stopped, partly because of the difficulties of transport, but chiefly because Roumania is bound to deliver first to Germany and then to the Allies, and Slovakia's needs are never likely to be taken into account.

For all those who cannot or will not help themselves by graft, corruption, pillage, profiteering or treachery, or who are not of the superior German race—that is, for at least three-quarters of the population—life is a desperate struggle. While prices rise, wages fall and social services are cut down or disappear altogether. The average wage in Bratislava in November last year was 28 crowns a shift. A Slovak workman

had to work six shifts to buy a pair of shoes, where in the days of Bat'a he had had to work one. Miners, according to the Slovak deputy Mora, are earning 29.80 crowns a shift—8 per cent. less than in 1938, with at least a 200 per cent. increase in prices to face. Factories running on short time pay the same wage per shift as before, so that a workman's pay may suddenly be halved or quartered. The unemployed receive no help, except from a highly suspect and vastly inefficient *Winterhilfe* aping the German model; and Bratislava has just reduced the sum for social work in its municipal budget by nearly 20 per cent. "By our work we remove the slave spirit and replace it by the spirit of a free people."*

Financially, Slovakia, poor and weak, is at Germany's mercy. According to the last report of the Slovak National Bank (December 31st, 1939) it has paid to the families of Slovaks working in Germany 100 million crowns. Germany has sent the National Bank a note saying that it recognises the debt and that it will be paid after the war! Medrický, the Slovak Minister of Economy, declared cheerfully in a speech in March that "Slovakia is able to export 70-80,000 head of cattle a year. We are living, however, in such times that the price of the exported goods is paid to the buyer through clearing accounts, and our farmers have therefore to wait for their money eight months or even more." This was small comfort for the revolting farmers, who are still waiting to be paid for their cattle and grain. Slovakia's claims against Germany and the Protectorate—Germany imports lavishly through the Protectorate, though the Protectorate naturally never sees the imports—amount, according to Medrický, to 1,000 million crowns—two-thirds of the total Slovak budget. If, how and when this is to be liquidated even the most sanguine or slavish Slovak Minister does not care to say.

The present Slovak Government has no virtues and few defenders. It is inefficient, weak, craven, corrupt and hopelessly divided. On one side stand the "moderates" ("moderate" only in the sense in which it is usually applied to General Goering or Dr. Schacht), headed by the President, Tiso, a vain, weak and silly man; on the other side, the out-and-out gangsters and German helots, led by Šaňo Mach, the chief of the Hlinka Guards and head of propaganda. The Prime Minister, Tuka, seems to be trying to blot out his

* Minister Durčanský in a speech on March 19th.

Magyarophile past by the fervour of his Germanophile present; the Minister of Home and Foreign Affairs, Durčanský, swims tirelessly from one camp to the other. For several months past Mach has been intriguing to get possession of the Ministry of the Interior, which would give him control not only of the Hlinka Guards—who are armed with daggers and revolvers, but untrained, cowardly and unreliable—but of the army, the gendarmerie and the police. To do this he needed German backing, and at the beginning of March he paid a State visit, with much pomp, to Berlin, rightly remarking in an interview that "if we do not help ourselves, not even God will help us." In Berlin he promised, in return for German support, to prepare the Slovaks for the inclusion of the Slovak army within the German, and its appearance against the Allies; for an increased number of Germans in the Slovak administration, and a heightened economic exploitation. Unfortunately his plans went wrong. When he returned to Bratislava he asked for an audience of Tiso, and in the presence of the Prime Minister demanded that the Slovak Parliament, an institution which did not correspond with Slovakia's changed circumstances, should be abolished. Tiso refused. Mach handed him his resignation as chief of propaganda. Tiso accepted it. As soon as Mach had left the Palace Tiso gave orders to the army to prevent any attempt at a *putsch*, and within a few hours Mach's preparations were baulked. Mach, seeing that the situation was hopeless, appealed to the German Minister in Bratislava. The German Minister advised him to withdraw his resignation; he telephoned to Tiso saying that he wished to do so, and would consider the affair closed!

Of course, none of this little intrigue remained secret, and the Slovak people, already angered and embittered by Germany's economic exploitation, were furious. In one town, for instance, the people refused to sweep snow from the roads to make them ready for the passage of German artillery; and more than 700 citizens of that town have been charged under the law for the defence of the Republic. But the Slovak Government is quite unable to stop these demonstrations, even though Germans have been called in to act as "supervisors" of the tribunals.

The feebleness and inefficiency of the administration is a byword. Germans, either from the Reich or from Slovakia

itself, do not trouble to hide their contempt for it. The National Socialist press of Slovakia recently published a declaration by Karmašín, the local *Führer*, that Germans of Slovakia serving in the Slovak army will not fight for Slovakia against any State that is not at war with the German Reich. What does this mean? If Slovakia is again attacked by Hungary, the Germans will sit by with their arms crossed? Again, the German broadcasts from Bratislava, which are run by the Nazi party of the local Germans, constantly attack the Slovak Government for its fumbling incompetence. On March 20th, for instance, it attacked the Milk Syndicate:

We have been having the Milk Syndicate for a long time now, but in spite of this we have been unable to obtain butter for several days. The Milk Syndicate took measures which were said to prejudice the producer. But those measures prejudice the consumer as well. This is proved by the butter famine we are experiencing just now. Slovakia always used to import butter during the spring from Denmark and Hungary. This is known to any child in the street, but it seems to be unknown to the gentlemen in the Syndicate, though they are in a monopoly. We hope that this reminder will help the gentlemen in the Milk Syndicate to do everything in their power, so that sufficient butter shall be secured for the Easter holidays.

This attack is only one of many.

Amongst the Slovaks themselves criticism and contempt, though of course less open, are not less strong. Everyone knows that Istvančin, head of the transport section of the Hlinka Guard, has been arrested for stealing 2½ million crowns of State money; that Durčanský's three days' visit to Berlin in March 1939 cost 80,000 crowns; that the President of the Slovak Parliament, Sokol, who has never been a lawyer, was appointed public attorney in Banská Bystrica, where he makes nearly a million crowns a year. Everyone knows that the Slovak Legionaries' leader, Dr. Ivan Markovič, has just died in the concentration camp at Buchenwald, to which he was sent at Tuka's express demand; everyone knows that the Social Democratic Senator, Zimák, died after his imprisonment in the concentration camp at Jihlava. The growing feeling against the régime is shown by a series of sunshine articles which appeared in *Slovák* during January, and by the mixture of polemics, exhortations,

commands, reprimands and soothing syrup broadcast by the Bratislava radio. On January 24th *Slovák* declared:

Nothing has changed in Slovakia but people. Those who spread enthusiasm and were burning for the Slovak programme are now like frost—they spread cold; instead of being cheerful they damp down everything and croak like ravens. He who does not spread enthusiasm and optimism, and does not know how to advise, let him at least know that his silence is as valuable to us as gold, or even as real diamonds.

How far has grumbling discontent crystallised into organised opposition? It is quite certain that the opposition is exceedingly widespread, that it includes many moderate Populists, the whole of the so-called Sidor group—support of Sidor being the only form of open opposition that the Government allows—and many Catholic priests who go in fear of the Vatican; practically the whole Evangelical Community, which in spite of threats and cajolements has refused to join the Hlinka Guard; many former Agrarians and Social Democrats; and many army officers. The Slovak Ministry of National Defence has twice recently (February 5th and March 22nd) broadcast a warning that:

All officers and non-commissioned officers who did not yet register must do so by March 30th at the latest at the nearest garrison. Those who do not report will not be recognised in their ranks as officers.

This shows plainly that there has been a serious number of desertions.

The Slovaks, in fact, after one year of "independence," realise that they have been deceived and exploited, that their country, led by fools and scoundrels, has become simply a German colony. They hate the Germans. They hate the Hungarians. The intelligentsia, which has no respect for Tiso, Mach or Tuka, is preparing the ground for a new collaboration between Slovaks and Czechs, while the ordinary people openly declare that the good old times of the Republic will return again. The present Slovak leaders know that the nation is not behind them, and are trying frantically to plant a foot in the other camp—with the Czechoslovak National Committee. They say privately, and let it be said, that they do not oppose collaboration with the Czechs, but that they have their own ideas as to how it should be carried out.

JOAN GRIFFIN.

THE RT. HON. GEORGE N. BARNES,
P.C., C.H.

AN APPRECIATION

I HAVE just returned from George Barnes' funeral. It was a very simple one and there were few people present. At the age of 81 he passed away peacefully, although his health had been indifferent for a long time and for many years he had been the victim of insomnia. When the end came, one could not help remembering Lindsay Gordon's lines :

When our work is done, 'tis best
Brother, best that we should go :
Draw the curtain, close my eyes
I am weary, lay me low.

George Barnes is dead, but his work will live, and his example will never be forgotten. He was one of those who may be described as the salt of the earth, because although he was a man of action and occupied most responsible positions, he never lost sight of his ideals. In the old days before the last war, he won the esteem of his colleagues, irrespective of Party, in the House of Commons. When he rose from his corner seat below the gangway, the House rapidly filled, because his speeches were always impressive and overflowed with sound common sense. Whatever the subject was, he brought to bear upon it his independent judgment : he could always see both sides and he possessed a persuasive eloquence which often carried conviction even to the unwilling hearts of his opponents.

Barnes started his career as an apprentice in an engineering works at Dundee. He soon developed into a keen Trade Unionist and eventually became General Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. In this position not only did he win the confidence of the members of the Society, but also the respect of the employers. His transparent honesty, his unfailing courtesy and tact impressed everyone with whom he came into contact. His belief in the righteousness of the cause he espoused, combined with his moderation and sense of humour, enabled him to win many battles without a fight. He had no use for coercion, nor did he brandish the strike weapon. On the contrary, he was a firm believer in the victory of reason over force, and if negotiation and conciliation failed, he was an ardent advocate of arbitration, not only in industrial

but also in international disputes. Moreover, with a rare courage he practised what he preached, even though on occasions his advice and actions were not popular with the extremists in his own organisation. However, the results of his moderation and common sense were reflected in the ever-increasing influence and prosperity of the Amalgamated Society and its members. After all, it is results which prove the fitness or otherwise of the leader, and whereas in other industries, devastated by strikes and lock-outs, the still small voice of reason had been suppressed by acrimonious strife, George Barnes could point to increased wages and improved conditions won by processes of argument and arbitration, backed by honesty of purpose and goodwill.

But it was not only in the Trade Union field that George won his spurs. He was a devoted disciple of Robert Owen, and for many years played a leading part in the Co-operative Movement. Eventually he became a director of the Co-operative Printing Society and Chairman of its London Branch. I have already alluded to George Barnes's achievements in the Parliamentary arena. In 1916 he was invited to join the Coalition Government as the first Minister of Pensions, and later he became one of the most indefatigable Ministers Without Portfolio of the War Cabinet which Mr. Lloyd George had created to ensure the active prosecution of the War.

The ideas which he championed in the industrial sphere naturally led him into the Peace Movement, to which perhaps he has made the greatest contribution in our day and generation. But there was nothing namby-pamby about his ideas of peace, and how to secure it. He always insisted that peace must be based, not upon disarmament, but upon justice ; in other words, that force should be the servant of law and not the law-giver. He never suggested that force and armaments could be dispensed with. On the contrary, he firmly believed in the substitution of co-operative for competitive armaments, which would enable force to be used exclusively for policing purposes—to protect law-abiding nations and prevent aggression.

At the Plenary Assembly of the Peace Conference at Paris, when the provisions of the Covenant were being discussed, he had the courage to get up and say so. This is what he said :

I am afraid that when the time comes for the enforcement of decrees, if ever it does come, which God forbid, there may be delay

and confusion on the part of the League. What I am afraid of is that an aggressive nation might again try to break through, and win its way to its object before the forces of mankind can be mobilised against it. Therefore, I should have been glad to have seen some provision for the nucleus of an international force which would have been ready to strike against an aggressive nation.

If George had been listened to then, if he had been supported by his British colleagues, who knows?—perhaps to-day we should not find ourselves in the throes of another Armageddon. As the President of the League to Abolish War and the International Section of the New Commonwealth, he fought hard for his conception of justice—arbitration, an Equity Tribunal, and sanctions, an International Police Force—until the day of his death.

George Barnes was one of the British signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. In this Treaty was incorporated the International Labour Office, perhaps his most successful and greatest achievement. It was sponsored by Barnes and Albert Thomas, who must be regarded as the joint founders of this institution. It is indeed fitting that his portrait hangs upon the walls of the I.L.O. Library at Geneva.

We have said farewell to a man who deserves well of Britain. All through his life he fought for his ideals—never for himself. He was animated by love for his country, which did not exclude allegiance to the eternal principles of justice and loyalty to humanity as a whole. He sought no honours, he amassed no fortune. Unselfish devotion to duty was his watchword. A lovable disposition, a sturdy independence, unflinching courage and a keen sense of humour were the key-notes of his character, backed by an exhaustive fund of knowledge and practical experience. In fair and foul weather he was always a true friend whose word was his bond. He has bequeathed a noble example to the youth of our country, as indeed to all of us. Let us cherish his memory. Britain will never perish, humanity will not be submerged, so long as men of the calibre and stature of George Barnes make their appearance amongst us.

April 25th, 1940.

DAVIES.

TWO INDIAS.

THE Lahore session of the All-India Moslem League had two immediate effects. It stimulated resistance by Indian minorities, especially Mohammedans, to the communal authoritarianism (as they call it) of Congress hegemony; and it revived interest in the Pakistan scheme for the division of India into two independent Dominions. Here in England we have had much criticism of the Pakistan idea, but no adequate explanation of it. It is mentioned so vaguely as an "Indian Ulster" that very few people can give it with understanding the treatment it merits—to be damned as a nightmare, tolerated as an academic dream, or entertained as a *pis aller* to mitigate communal difficulties when other expedients have failed. If we are doomed to argue about it, for or against, we had better try to see exactly what it is.

The Indian Statutory (Simon) Commission and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Reform put the premises concisely in their study of the communal problem. "Differences of race, a different system of law, and the absence of inter-marriage, constitute . . . a basic opposition manifesting itself at every turn in social custom and economic competition." "They (the Hindus and Moslems) may be said to represent two distinct and separate civilisations." Mr. Jinnah said much the same in his presidential speech to the Moslem League on Good Friday. His inference seems to be that some partition of India may become the only means of satisfying the legitimate hopes of Hindu and Moslem alike, and of giving each community a form of self-government appropriate to its distinctive traits. In this he is supported by others, not Mohammedans only, who reject the obstructionist doctrine that India cannot or must not be emancipated completely except as a single geographical polity, one huge compound of federated units. If, they say, we cannot agree among ourselves on terms for our advance hand-in-hand to freedom under a single responsible Government, let the Hindu nation and the Moslem nation go ahead as well as they can separately; don't hold us back together just because we quarrel.

Hence the Pakistan scheme—the oldest and least fissiparous of several efforts by different authors to re-draw the map. Taking numbers-cum-vigour as the yardstick, it assumes with obvious reason that Indian Mohammedanism is most

conspicuously concentrated, most virile and self-contained, in the bloc of contiguous territories comprising the Punjab, Kashmir, the North-West Frontier Province and Agencies, Sind, Baluchistan, Khairpur and Bahawalpur. These seven components would make up Pakistan, with a Federal or Dominion capital at Lahore and a growing air- and sea-port at Karachi. It would have an area roughly seventy-five times the size of Ulster and approximately equal to Spain, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Albania, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Lithuania and Eire combined. It would contain as many people as Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Switzerland together. (None of these countries is usually considered, except by Germany, too small to deserve an independent sovereignty.) But that disposes only of a quarter of India and less than a tenth of her population. The rest of her, constituting a separate Dominion of Hindustan, would still have nearly three times as many people as any other nation in the world except China, and would be the seventh largest in area. Calcutta, Lucknow or Madras might be its capital.

These calculations take account of an ancillary proposal. Each of the two Dominions might have a Governor-General. For the discharge of its Commonwealth responsibilities—always limited, and often an expression of sentiment only—the Crown would still be represented by a Viceroy seated at Delhi. The Delhi enclave to-day is very small, and at least one of the plans published in India suggests it might incorporate parts of the Amballa and Jullundur Divisions of the Punjab. In both of these adjoining Divisions—contiguous partly with Delhi, partly with the United Provinces—Hindus and Sikhs together are a substantial and robust majority. They might be restive in a Pakistan under Moslem control, and the Pakistan Government uncomfortable with them; and their separation would avoid the difficulty of letting Patiala and other Sikh statelets stand as islands in Pakistan territory. The Delhi enclave, thus enlarged, would have an area and population just about twice the size of Switzerland's, and might be a useful buffer between the two great Dominions on their strategic border. In its strictly domestic affairs it could be a condominium administered by the Viceroy, its own representatives, and nominees of the Hindustan and Pakistan Central Governments.

In this same authority, too, would vest control of India's

continental defence—her Navy, Air Force and the greater part of her Army—and perhaps the Customs Revenue required to pay for them. Pakistan and Hindustan each would want a small army for internal security, but the pooling of first-line troops under Delhi's neutral though representative command would guarantee each against assault by the other. There are very obvious flaws in the idea. Its supporters think, rightly or wrongly, that they have answers at least to some of them.

(1) A third of all the Indian Mohammedans live in Bengal, several hundred miles from the nearest point in Pakistan, and are the Presidency's majority community. If they are to be forgotten, or reckoned as Hindustanis, what becomes of the plan's main purpose? It is argued none the less that the comments already quoted from two reports to Parliament are true more especially of the difference between Pakistan and Hindustan—that the test of numbers-cum-vigour holds good. It is the distinguishing characteristics of Hindustan and Pakistan that would be most likely to aggravate serious conflict if a single Federal Parliament, with a large majority from the one dominating a minority from the other, were obtrusive over the whole of India. The Bengal Mohammedan has more in common with his Hindu neighbours than the Punjabi Hindu with the Madras Hindu. For these reasons, and also because Europeans hold the balance of power in the Bengal legislature, the Presidency should be able (it is said) to muddle along as an integral part of Hindustan. If not, it is invited either to detach itself with a constitution similar to Burma's, or to let its districts east of the Brahmaputra become a self-governing colony of Pakistan or the Delhi condominium. Rather a cavalier dismissal.

(2) Kashmir—in area a big part of Pakistan, though its population is small—is a Hindu State inasmuch as its ruling dynasty is Hindu. But nearly 90 per cent. of its oppressed people are Moslem, and democracy of some sort is a motive of the whole scheme. Hyderabad, where a Moslem dynasty rules a big Hindu majority, is expected to federate with Hindustan, so why not Kashmir with Pakistan? This argument may be less repugnant to a timid Political Department than the suggestion that the Maharaja of Kashmir should exchange thrones with the Moslem ruler of a Hindu majority in Bhopal.

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(3) The scheme cannot kill the communal problem: there would be minorities scattered about in both Dominions. In round figures, Pakistan would have 25 million Moslems to 6 million Hindus and/or Sikhs: Hindustan would have 255 million Hindus to 55½ million Moslems if it included Bengal, or otherwise 233 to 27½. Yet the suggested partition is defended as the least impracticable means of signifying India's great religio-racial division in politico-geographical terms: as the only way of giving each community a governmental system it can approve of. Thus gratified (it is argued) they should have less quarrel with their minorities; and the minority in one Dominion would be hostage for the good behaviour of its co-religionists in the other. Hideous thought; but the existing Constitution, or any other seriously contemplated, must create a similar condition in autonomous provinces. Mohammedans all over India observed a special day of thanksgiving for escape from Congress rule when the Congress Ministries had retroceded their duties to British officials. They say that under an All-India Federal Government and Parliament the Mohammedans, both outside and inside their own special provinces, would be hostages to Hindu fortune. They resist their subjection to a Hindu majority just as the Jews in Palestine dislike the idea of majority rule by the Arabs—and India, about 180 times larger, lends itself better to partition plans. Hence the Pakistan idea is favoured by Jinnah and other Moslems in Hindu provinces where it cannot directly benefit them.

(4) Could Pakistan be financially solvent? Orthodox economists say "Not unless the Punjab continued to provide the backbone of the Indian Army." There is some reason to suppose it would. The Punjab, containing nearly two-thirds of Pakistan's population, was found to be the only province needing no redistribution of funds from the Central Government when Sir Otto Niemeyer recommended his adjustments between Central and Provincial Finance. Other nations have carried on, somehow, long after orthodoxy has condemned them to ruin. Hopes also are fixed on the development of Kashmir (whose Maharaja cannot really need twelve times the Viceroy's salary), the prosperity of newly-irrigated Sind, and something like durable peace on the frontier.

Of all these speculative answers to much less hypothetical objections, the last challenges the most interesting discussion;

for it is based on belief in the Pakistan plan as a remedy for the tribal sore on the North-West border. In the words of officialdom, "the time has arrived when an effort should be made to bring under our control, and, if possible, to organise for purposes of defence, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along our North-Western frontier." A well-groomed phrase; but it was written fifty-three years ago by the Government of India to the Government of the Punjab. Nothing came of it then: we can see how much has come of it since. Parliament was told last July that seven years' disturbances in Palestine had cost the Army and Air Force 113 men killed and 377 wounded. People were worried about those casualties, and dismayed that we needed a garrison of nearly 20,000 troops in Palestine. Very few noticed that in two years' unfinished campaign against the Wazirs we had employed some 40,000 troops, losing 306 killed and 888 wounded. And now, when every available man, weapon and penny is to be called into the war with Germany—when economy in all other directions is preached everywhere—we learn that three years of scrapping and skirmishing have not been enough to settle Waziristan, but a new expedition has had to go prowling about the Ahmedzai salient.

It is a tiny whisper as modern war goes, of course. The sixteen frontier expeditions or military demonstrations of the last ten years cannot have cost, in aggregate, the price we pay for thirty-six hours' war in Europe, nor the loss of life we suffered in H.M.S.s *Courageous* and *Royal Oak*. But the cost in money is a big sum for India, and Britain is still constitutionally responsible for military activity in India. Nobody thinks it pernicky to cry aloud when he hears of loaves and fishes being wasted in an Army camp at home. Nobody seems to wonder how much longer we must tolerate the jerry-building of India's land gateway, a political sore that does no one's appearance any good, and annual fireworks that end nothing except a few young lives and a few more dreams (in peace time) of retrenchment.

Abdul Ghafar Khan, leader of the Frontier Red Shirts, once told me his alliance with the Congress was an expedient to be abandoned so soon as it seemed to interfere with Pathan notions of independence; "for what have we to do with Hindustan?" If that was the mind of a Pathan in British India proper—if the Simon Commission, the Joint Parliamentary

Committee and Mr. Jinnah were right—we can hardly expect the militant zealots of Islam in tribal territory to accept laws made by the votes of a Hindu majority in Delhi. The argument runs that the tribes cannot be wholly subdued except by costly and amoral violence, nor inveigled into an Indian comity, for their own and the general good, if this requires their submission to an alien authority. Rule by a Hindu majority from Madras, Bombay, Bihar, the U.P., and so on, would seem at least as alien to them as the present British mixture of bribery, camaraderie and battery. But offer them a square deal and tolerable amenities in their own territory; let them see a Mohammedan Government established at Lahore on principles they can appreciate; let that Government persuade them, with such coercion as they make necessary, to co-operate with it in digesting the responsibility and fruits of civilised administration. It is possible they may then at last reconcile themselves to a new and better order of life within an Indian commonwealth. Some people think this could be done without the creation of an independent Pakistan; others are convinced that the bogey of an over-riding, alien, Delhi-made régime would either deter the tribes at the outset, or provoke their secession eventually, from a system of provincial autonomy embracing all India.

Pakistan may be a Utopian dream, or something worse. The arguments against it need no advertisement. But at the moment it seems to be gaining favour for reasons, and in a particular manner, that bode nobody much good, whether there is anything to be said for the idea or not. It would be a mistake to assume that all Hindus to a man are opposed to it and will always be ready to resist it. If we believe it to be something worse than a dream, we had better make a reconnaissance flight over its last lines of defence, so that we may know exactly what, where and how we must attack if we want to win our offensive with the minimum cost to either side—or all three sides. This, perhaps, is the last-ditch argument:

The unity of India is the artificial creation of a unitary government imposed from without, whether the binding force is popular approval, submission or antagonism. It is a Good Thing, but not indigenous to the country or natural to its people and history. The British were able to take India because they found it divided against itself. They took a large part of it from the Mussulman Moghuls: they fought a variety of Hindu chieftains. They

conquered at times with Moslem allies, at others with Hindu allies. The country has never known unity from Gilgit to Trivandrum and from Quetta to Calcutta save in the peace imposed on it by British rule. Many breaches and divisions have been healed, probably for ever; but the fundamental differences between Mohammedan and Hindu remain, and look as if they must remain, and it is no more Britain's business to subordinate the one civilisation to the other than to aid the subjection of Bohemia to German *Kultur*. The alien bond of unity is now to go, and lest its disappearance should release full-blast the disintegrating tendencies now reappearing there is something to be said for redistributing India as fairly, naturally and securely as possible to the rival claimants from whom the British seized it—and who helped the British in each other's dispossession. In a talk reported to the *Manchester Guardian* nine years ago Mr. Gandhi spoke with regret, but without noticeable emotion, of the possibility that independence might plunge his country into civil strife, and that this might end in the destruction of one community by the other. If that is a possibility, and if the only alternative to it is a choice between two lesser evils, let us decide now what our choice shall be. Let us say we would rather have two free Indian Dominions, each as nearly homogeneous as it can be, than one enormous cockpit of feuds under the ignominy of alien rule.

PATRICK LACEY.

TWO CENTENARIES: ZOLA AND DAUDET.

THIS year we commemorate two writers who, though contemporaries, friends, and considered as so-called naturalists by conventional literary history, differ widely as artists and narrators of human destinies. Zola must be regarded as the greater personality, but the greater stylist, the more genuine epic poet, is Daudet. For, while the former does not put much store by composition and diction and often lacks taste and tact, the latter avoids all these shortcomings. Zola stands at the end of a development which reaches from Stendhal through Balzac to Flaubert, and reflects the spiritual development of the nineteenth century in France. In the books of those four authors we can see the world being gradually deprived of its gods and life becoming more and more materialistic. But whilst sadness and longing for a lost paradise are still throbbing through the hard objectivity of Flaubert's prose, nothing of that sort is to be found in Zola. It is the scientific point of view as he and his contemporaries understood it, the philosophy of the positivist atheism which governs his life-work. Yet it had quite a different effect with him than for instance with Flaubert, resigned and despairing in his atheism and pessimism, whilst Zola becomes a fighter, not only towards the end of his life in the "*affaire Dreyfus*," but almost at the very start of his career as an author. He depicts the worthlessness of his age, not to draw some self-betraying gratification from it, but with the intention to educate, to instruct, to warn, to improve. Zola is the representative writer of industrialism and the proletarianised masses. The soul and the problems of the individual he declares to be an out-of-date affair; the documentary novel must show society, the masses. The author has to proceed like a scientist, to collect the material, make experiments and watch the results. Zola, however, did not experiment as objectively as he thought he did and as a scientist should, for he started from prejudiced opinions, from the dogmatism of his age. Taine had formulated it: vice and virtue are results like vitriol and sugar, determined by time and *milieu* and calculable. Zola calls himself an experimenting moralist, and he speaks of the human machine and the mechanism of passions; he believes that as soon as he knew the latter, he

would be able to foretell the reactions of a passion in certain surroundings. And he believes—a belief which seems profoundly naïve to us—that once all those mechanisms were recognised, it would be possible to regulate them so as to achieve the best social state. He was an odd idealist, an idealist of philosophical materialism. When twenty years old he had called reality sad and declared himself ready to hide it under flowers (for he was a romanticist by birth). Later he called idealism a lie, and declared that it and lyrics in general spoiled literature.

In this spirit and conviction he drafted, wrote and finished in twenty-five years the large cycle of novels, the Rougon-Macquarts, books of differing value, good and moving, and weaker ones, all of them telling the story of a widely ramified family under the Second Empire which had begun with violence and was carrying on in corruption—for a while. They represent an immense collection of material, with more than a thousand figures, slightly or circumstantially characterised. Five generations of this family pass before our eyes; their rise has the same origin as that of Bonaparte himself. In the case of the usurper it is called a *coup d'état*, in that of the Rougon-Macquarts rascality. The progenitress of the family is a simple peasant woman; one of her grandsons, who of course stands for Bonaparte, becomes Minister, another a great financial adventurer. The other grandchildren and great-grandchildren we see in the course of years in different social stages. Impressively as some of these destinies are told, this is not the main thing for Zola; he is above all concerned with the social and political life, and he depicts a society of speculating, pleasure-loving, cynical corruptionists, full of intrigues, scandals, demoralisation. The symbolic figure of that age is Nana, the great courtesan, unconscious of the harm she is doing. Nana, we remember, was another name for Ishtar in Babylon. Besides the ruling class of the rich and upstart Zola shows us also the middle class, and here too much is rotten and only covered by the veil of respectability. Then we see the hard and miserable life of the working class, depicted with grim naturalism, even originally good characters sinking always deeper and dying in poverty and distress, broken by circumstances. *L'Assommoir* is a cruel study of the consequences of dipsomania. In *Germinal* we are shown the life of the miners, a hard life on low wages which cause strikes

naïvety and humour are blended into a unity bewitching soul and sense. The idyllic alternates with the passionate, gay with tragic scenes. The names of Avignon, Arles, Nîmes sound like rich chords of the South in the primitive life of man and landscape, and from the richly shaded prose lyrical jewels shine up unawares. Says a simple mountain shepherd: "*Vous savez qu'à l'heure où nous dormons, un monde mystérieux s'éveille dans la solitude et le silence. Alors les sources chantent bien plus clair, les étangs allument des petites flammes. Tous les esprits de la montagne vont et viennent librement; et il y a dans l'air des frôlements, des bruits imperceptibles, comme si l'on entendait les branches grandir, l'herbe pousser.*" Daudet loved the South and he glorified himself in it. He praises its light, the lucidity of its air, the vivacity of its naïvely eloquent people, and this love becomes creative for the first time in the letter-tales of his youth which are full of an immortal charm. Fate soon carried him away from this landscape into the noise and bustle of the capital, but all his life his heart was homesick for the glowing Southern sky and the stormy passions of Southern men. The best parts of his books are connected with his homeland.

Daudet's phantasy was not confined to Provence. *Fromont jeune et Risler aîné* is a Parisian novel of outstanding form. This picture of the two families of Fromont and Risler delineates certain types of the French capital with great precision in a clear and simple plot. If this picture is a cultural study it becomes so unawares, for sociology was not his ambition. The main thing for him is the individual man, his destinies and the way he is shaped, furthered, or hampered by the people surrounding him. His figures are naturally rooted in social relations, but their creator does not believe that men are essentially determined by the social factor. *Le Nabab*, a Parisian picture of manners, shows that. Pleasure-loving, greedy, sinful Paris is depicted in strong colours. But the main, human and artistic, interest is centred in the hero, that curious hawker who goes to Tunis, becomes immensely rich, returns to Paris where he aspires to play an important part, has himself elected—with a great expenditure of money—deputy for Corsica, and is struck with apoplexy when the election is declared invalid. The psychology of this man interested Daudet above all, and he looks into the remotest corners of this soul. A grand characterological study is also

the novel *Numa Roumestan*, the epic of the contrast between North and South. Numa, the Meridional, marries, in compliance with the wishes of a rich aunt, a girl who is as Nordic, cool and matter-of-fact as her husband, the Provençal, is passionate, vivid, and romantic. Of course such a marriage is very difficult, and Daudet describes most wonderfully, with much art and much feeling, the effects of these contrasts: the emotional naïvety of the Southerner who in his joy promises everything to everybody without thinking of the consequences (Numa has become a deputy, party leader, and Minister of Education), his gay and grotesque self-satisfaction, the flights of his fancy, his unbroken will to life. This very curious type is represented in scenes of the highest symbolical power and in a style most naturally congenial. Another great book is *Sappho*, the moving story of the ruin of a young man who for a courtesan gives up his career and *fiancée*, cannot free himself from this passion, sinks always deeper into it, till the girl has enough of him and jilts him. A work of special character is *L'Immortel*, a whimsical satire of the French Academy which roused a great storm in its time.

The most popular and merry figure Daudet has created is Tartarin de Tarascon, this humorous incarnation of the Philistine who, vainglorious as he is, becomes the victim of his boasting and his excessive phantasy. In the sunny town of Tarascon, the inhabitants of which are passionate hunters, lives, smoking his pipe and reading adventures, the good Tartarin, he too a famous huntsman. By and by he begins to feel bored in his native town and the quixotic half of his soul whispers to him to go into the world and cover himself with fame. But the Sancho Panza in him advises him to stay at home and drink chocolate. A menagerie visiting the town gives his destiny a turn towards the heroic. Before the lions' cage he stands deep in thought and murmurs: "That would be a hunt!" His countrymen take him at his word and he must go hunting lions. Firearms and abundant provisions are provided, his fellow citizens see him off. His adventures in North Africa are very humorously told: how his passion for a supposed Moslem woman makes him forget lions and fame, how he pulls himself together, how an alleged prince robs him of his money, and how in the least courageous moment of his life he at last shoots a lion, unfortunately only a blind one, which is shown round for money. But the hide

he sends home secures him a triumphal arch and procession on his home-coming. In a second volume, *Tartarin sur les Alpes*, the *bonhomme* experiences similar gay and glorious adventures as a mountain climber in Switzerland. In *Port Tarascon* we meet him again as the Governor of a colony.

Zola called Daudet a naturalist, which he was not, certainly not in the sense that Zola understood and practised naturalism. But if the author of *Nana* and *La Terre* dreams of a future classical naturalism, we can perhaps regard Daudet as the fulfiller of this prophecy. Classical naturalism—that is nothing but what we have got used to calling realism. A realist is an artist who depicts the reality of life without varnish, who does not try to idealise it by romanticism or idealism, yet does not represent the whole reality, because he does not think every single thing worth describing. In this sense Tolstoi, Thackeray, Daudet are realists, and for that reason they seem to be greater artistic personalities to us than the extreme naturalists like Gorki and Zola. Daudet was too great an artist and stylist to identify realistically minded life-likeness with indiscriminate description, artistic truthfulness with that of a photographer. He has again brought beauty nearer to truth. Besides, by his cordial humour he spreads something like reconciliation over the darker side of life. The clearness of eye and fineness of nerves, the sensibility and colour sense of his southern temperament make him the artist of "*l'enthousiasme doré des peuples du soleil*." Yet he remained a child of his age, which means that his works lack everything metaphysical. The psychological conflicts in them, both tragic and humorous, are conflicts of earthly powers, though in another way than Zola's, without a programme, without a definite tendency, in calm naturalness.

J. LESSER.

GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN GERMANY.

Notwithstanding regulations and personal admonitions a farmer in Naumburg considered the Polish prisoners of war who were working on his farm as part of the team. The meals were taken in common with the family in the living-room, and the relations were almost of a friendly nature. Since warnings were of no avail, the farmer was arrested.—(*Der Neue Tag*, Prague, Jan. 17th, 1940.)

Criminal friendliness. A Halberstadt court passed sentence of 1-4 months of prison against three accused who failed to keep at an appropriate distance from Polish prisoners of war. A man aged 49 threw a box of cigarettes to a Polish prisoner of war. . . . A man of 39 gave a prisoner a pullover and a cake. . . .

Compared with the crimes the penalties may appear hard to some people. However, they are much too mild, if we remember the 58,000 murdered Germans who in September became the victims of Polish hatred and sadism. Every Pole is an accomplice to this abominable crime. The death of the 58,000 will therefore stand for ever between Germans and Poles. Every German who forgets that commits a crime against his people.—(*National-Zeitung*, Essen, Feb. 23rd, 1940.)

IT is not for the sake of adding to the abundant evidence of Nazi barbarities that we quote these extracts from the German press. We have selected them because they give evidence of something that is much less widely known and recognised; they give evidence of a conflict between the Nazis on the one hand and ordinary German citizens on the other hand, a conflict moreover which does not arise in connection with the citizen's striving for his own material advantage. The conflict which we witness here lies in a different sphere. Is it then true that the Nazis are not the German people? That a line of distinction can be drawn? And if so, where can it be drawn, and how? Many people have become impatient, because even now, after the end of seven years of Nazi rule and nine months of war, the German people do not seem to be inclined to rise in revolt against Hitler. Is it true after all that Teutonic barbarism and Prussian insolence are the unalterable features of the German national character? Can Europe ever be free from constantly recurring aggression without the extermination of the German people? We do not propose within the framework of this

article to point out what we consider to be the basis of Prussia's aggressiveness, and how this scar might be removed from the heart of Europe. We have dealt with this problem in our recently published book, *How to Conquer Hitler* (Jarrolds). In these pages we intend to discuss the more immediate problems of whether there are points at which a wedge can be driven between the German people and the Nazis, and what the thin end of this wedge must be.

From the introductory quotations we can learn some lessons which are pertinent to these problems. The first point we have noted already above: the articles quoted concern the relations between three parties which are clearly distinct from each other: Nazis, ordinary German citizens and Poles. Secondly we should note that in spite of Nazi slander ordinary German citizens refuse to consider anyone as a subhuman outcast merely because he is of Polish origin. This does not prove that the very same German citizens would in general do justice to the Polish people. From our quotations we can only gather that in everyday relations human standards are sometimes applied in the treatment of Poles, in spite of the considerable dangers which such "tender-heartedness" is liable to entail. We may add—and many Jewish refugees from Germany will bear out the truth of this statement—that what we may call the German man-in-the-street has shown on innumerable occasions not so much that he disapproves of Antisemitism in general, but that he regrets the injustice that is done to individual Jews in everyday life, and that he tries to ameliorate their hard lot.

To make the third point clear let us dwell for another moment on this example of the attitude of Germans to the Jews. When Jewish doctors were thrown out, many people regretted this because they were forced to find another doctor for themselves; but they did not necessarily reject the official explanation, that Jews, in general, were unfit on racial and moral grounds to give proper medical attention to Germans. After all, everybody's particular Jewish doctor may well have been an exception to the general rule! How can the individual judge the meaning, never mind the justification of this rule? But if you have a peaceable Jewish neighbour with a shop next door, and one fine morning, without any feasible reason, youngsters break in, armed with iron bars and other prehistoric armaments, and under the leadership of their teachers

they begin to smash all breakable objects and carry away with them what suits their fancy, and if afterwards not the house-breakers but their victims are thrown into concentration camp, then indeed no Goebbels propaganda will be able to convince a considerable section of the German people that justice has been done.

The situation is not far different with regard to the Poles. Comparatively few people will think about the general allegations that the Polish State was an arena of British Imperialism and a danger to Germany. The Polish labourer on your farm, on the other hand, is a real human being to you, and without being familiar with the evil ways of British Imperialists and Polish warmongers you feel able to judge that he ought not to be treated like a filthy dog. Even if the Nazis tell you that the Pole is a criminal and a brute, and only out to exploit your kindness, they cannot shake your conviction; because you know the man.

Only two ways will then be open to the Nazis to suppress the elementary feeling of right of the people. They are the methods by which the Nazis produce the appearance of popular consent and national unity. The first method is that of pushing the argument off the plane of everyday life and common experience, and on to another plane, which the man-in-the-street cannot survey without guidance. The Nazis will not say: The Polish labourer who is working on your farm is plotting to kill your family. The Nazis say: Because he is a Pole he is an accomplice to the murder of 58,000 Germans; you besmear the memory of 58,000 valiant German nationals by treating him kindly. In a country where for over seven years there has been no public discussion or free press, quite a considerable amount of critical intelligence would be required to make you ask back: Is it true that as many as 58,000 Germans were murdered? And why were they murdered, at the beginning of September, i.e. after Hitler's invasion of Poland? And what justification have we for rendering the whole of the Polish people responsible for this murder? The average citizen will not put these questions. He will be, more or less deeply, impressed. The Propaganda Ministry has scored a success.

The second method is that of the Gestapo. Undue "sentimentality" will be suppressed by terror. If you are not convinced by arguments, you will be intimidated by terror.

It is an indication of the seriousness of the situation that in the case of the treatment of Poles by Germans the Nazis need the argument of the 58,000 murdered Germans, and the weapon of an amazingly ruthless terror. If only in a few individual cases Germans were caught fraternising with Poles, surely such heavy sentences would not be pronounced against the defaulters. The terror sets in at the earliest, seemingly most trifling signs of defiance. Surely a love affair between a German girl of nineteen and a Pole cannot imperil the integrity of the State. But the girl is sentenced to seven years' hard labour. Because the Gestapo realise that the first step of non-conformity will be followed by the second step, and after that will come the third, and who could tell where exactly the road begins which leads to insurrection? By quelling from the very outset every symptom of a possible opposition, the Nazis forestall the much more onerous task of having to repress organised revolt.

The effectiveness of this repression in the earliest stages can hardly be overestimated. The "criminal" who by some small action or neglect has "outraged the elementary feeling of right of the German people" (a verdict which authorises a German Court to pronounce even the death penalty) will in the majority of cases not have intended to commit an act of political rebellion. What reason have we, for instance, to believe that the girl of nineteen became involved in a love affair with a Pole just in order to demonstrate her disregard of Nazism? But to those who do feel inclined to prepare for revolutionary action against the Nazis, her fate will serve as an example of the futility of any such attempt. How can you ever hope to achieve an organised revolt, they will argue, if you cannot even dare to offer a box of cigarettes to a Polish prisoner of war? How impotent it makes them feel!

At this virtually weak spot of the relationship between the Nazis and the German people, at this spot whence the wedge ought to be driven in, the minute terror immobilises the German would-be allies of the anti-Hitler front, and it immobilises them to a much larger extent than they are conscious of. The terror drives people to lose faith in the possibility of political action against the Nazis, and it is precisely the fate of the small, unpolitical transgressor that makes resistance seem so futile. Realising this many potential opponents of the Nazi régime have made their peace with the

Nazis, they have found for it excuses and justifications. Because nothing can do more to wear out people's nerves and energies than to live in a state of constant impotent opposition.

Nazi terror and Nazi propaganda try to cement a wall, which no opposition wedge can hope to penetrate, and other factors serve as pillars to that wall. One of them has been erected since the war began. It is a feeling of an ill-conceived but very natural loyalty towards husbands, brothers, sons and fathers who are risking their lives for "the defence of the fatherland." Germans who are critical with regard to the Nazi régime have a feeling as though it amounts to something like the famous "stab in the back" if they now lend an open ear to enemy propaganda. The other obstacle which we have to overcome if we are to arouse the German people to the defeat of Nazism is their deeply rooted distrust of the Western Democracies, and a complete failure to visualise anything like a feasible alternative to the Nazi system. This indeed we consider to be the cardinal point which tends to make the propaganda of the Allies ineffective in Germany.

The Poles and Czechs, and even the Austrians may be driven to revolt against the Nazi domination by their very hatred of the foreign tyranny which bleeds and oppresses their country. For them it may be largely a matter of looking out for an opportunity of striking back, and that opportunity given they will strike without having very definite ideas of the sort of system that is to follow afterwards. In Germany only an insignificant minority of the population holds this view that nothing could be worse than Hitler. But many people dislike Hitler and desire his overthrow—provided that something better is going to follow.

Conditions being what they are the task of suggesting a better alternative naturally falls in the first place to the German emigration, since they are the only Germans who are free to express their views, and it would be an everlasting disgrace if a substantial measure of agreement could not be reached within their ranks on a programme of reconstruction that is liable to impress the potential opposition in Germany as a better alternative. But it would not be enough if such a programme was published and broadcast to Germany. The refugees are, after all, not a factor in power-politics. The question will remain open for the German people, how the Allies mean to deal with them after the defeat of Hitler. And

accordingly they will do more or less to bring about Hitler's defeat.

What then are the Allied War Aims? If a substantial section of the German people is to be gained for assistance in the defeat of Hitler, war aims must be declared which suit this purpose. But the declaration of war aims will not be enough. It would be difficult to over-estimate the suspicion in the minds of the Germans against "foreign imperialists and emigrants." To the talk about Allied victory they oppose the Norwegian campaign—as they see it. Federal Union reminds them of the League of Nations, the right of national self-determination reminds them of the colonial empires, and when a better international economic order is forecast to them, they ask why Britain has not yet abolished unemployment at home. Democratic liberty is translated to them in terms of weakness and inefficiency. Bulwarks of prejudices will have to be overcome by word—and action. Constructive co-operation between Britain and France may be considered a beginning. Indispensable are decisive military setbacks for Hitler's army, because they alone will convince the Germans that it is he who has missed the bus. But even the fortune of battles affects only the relative strength of the opposing forces. To establish *confidence* in the Allied cause something else is required—namely to make it clear to the Germans that the Allies are not only powerful, but that they are also pursuing war aims which are not evil—like Hitler's. If this is not done, increased and prolonged privations of the necessities of life may nevertheless one day drive the German people to revolt against the Nazis—and once that stage is reached the propaganda of the Allies may be effective no matter how little confidence the Germans have in its sincerity. But let there be no mistake about it that this stage of utmost despair and starvation is not likely to be reached for a considerable time to come, and that the result of a mere rebellion of hunger may be of doubtful value for the future stability of Europe. Our aim should therefore be to win over the German people to the fight against Hitler, to drive the wedge between him and the German people; and if this is to be our aim, we must realise that the thin end of the wedge is confidence, and that it must be created by action.

HELLMUT VON RAUSCHENPLAT and HILDA MONTE.

THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AND THE WORLD OF TO-MORROW.

THEY are both real concepts. That Society is a fact, even though in the swirl of events it may seem like a white ideal which is often submerged by dark waves. That World, too, will be a fact, even though for certain minds it seems as if it were impotent to be born. The doubt of their reality rises from the same source: an absorbing interest in the details of external form. We conceive of the Society in organised forms which are old. We are avid to know what shape the World will have. Both are natural manners of reference; and both as easily elide the right attitude towards the two realities.

Western chronology says that the two began together nearly two thousand years ago. Thus they appear to be as root and vine to one another. The blurring title of Christian Civilisation, for what Europe has to show by way of achievement during that period, bears witness to that opinion. The contemporary comment of history upon it is that the vine has borne huge and varied clusters of grapes with poison for blood and bloom. The civilisations of the West then look as if they are the fruit of strange graftings on to the original vine-stock. At least that is what the apologetic which confuses the Society with the Church would like to think. When, therefore, this defensive wish opens its eyes towards the World of to-morrow, it is sure to be invaded with an agony of desire. It wants to be its ancient self in a resultant of the crisis which will not be a too inimical caricature of all it has been thought, and sometimes wrought, to represent. Thus a formal view of the one demands a formal view of the other. The spire must be seen in topographical tenure.

This attitude involves a dual fault of vision. It sees only churches or a church, and scarcely recognises the datum of the Christian Society. It sees but a quaint half of the World, as if it were composed only of an ecclesiastical Western hemisphere. This same fault of vision, we should note, was yielded to in the last war. The well-meaning but deep-rooted astigmatism of the book *The Church in the Furnace* offered elaborate testimony for the optical fault. It will be remembered that it was written by a number of men who had acted as chaplains during 1914-18. The deficiencies of the Church were

summed up in the slang of the trenches. A prominent phrase was, "The Church is a wash-out." Violence or vulgarity of metaphors, however, do not cause a reformation. The historian of the last twenty years will record that this manifesto, and what ancillary efforts it denotes, made for the aggrandisement of the ecclesiastical *status quo* rather than for the capture of some brightness dimly seen in the trenches. Thus, the Institution had no influence upon the planning of civilisation subsequent to the war, which was to end conflict in some segments of the universe. It could not; for it lived on metaphor and evaded the labour of thought. It would not; for it dallied with its own formal conditions and almost ignored the vital concept of the Christian Society.

There can be no wonder that in 1919 Grotius, for example, was treated as being only the patron of the policeman who should stand at the cross-roads of Europe. All other legalists and thinkers who, during the Christian era, had shaped a maxim or a theory which might teach men a little of the art of civilisation were treated in the same way. Thus it is more than remarkable that in twenty years' time, the space between the two wars, a Court of International Law and a *corpus* of formulæ for its administration should have been projected, and had worked justice for certain small nations. But Grotius could have done more than create a policeman, even of a novel type. If we had allowed him he would have introduced us to the *Everyman* of the world, to the human being, with equal right of existence and sanction of long social practice, who ought to be linked with the man of the Society: the man, that is, of Ancestor Worship; of the Mihrab; of the Ninefold Path; and of the Shekinah. In 1919 we passed over this basal union of men. We forgot the active fundamental of all human societies, whether national or universal—that an Ethic of Civilisation is a matter of pooling the finest attainments in social behaviour of *Everyman*; and that this radical linkage of men must precede any attempt to set up a body of international legal maxims and a judiciary for their guardianship. It is not strange that within two decades Geneva and The Hague should have been brought to a virtual standstill. But it is passing strange that they should have exercised so much beneficent power through the enforcing of some rules of civilisation in a universe which had never been consulted, and therefore not awakened to

thought, concerning the working principles of civilised behaviour.

This inversion of right order, of which all students of comparative jurisprudence must be aware, was a sign of the shallow haste with which some things were done after 1918. It also is the ineffaceable index of the lack of initiative on the part of the Christian Society. She came nowhere into the picture of reconstruction. The august voices which could speak with hers, from Jerusalem to Peking, were silent. There was no attempt to use the immemorial and universal body of evidence concerning the conduct of the vast society of men. We come thus to the following points. That a new universe of men will not be fundamentally ensured by causing again the sequence of behaviour and law to stand upon its head. Second, that religion being everywhere the creative custodian of all that goes to make laws; it is necessary for such men as are truly moulded by its influence to concert together for the rendering of the universe available to mankind.

Let us be clear what now is our quest. We are seeking not another international sentimentality, but a creative and new mentality. Therefore, we shall not be putting Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*, for instance, on a greater stage than he had dreamt of. He, it will be recalled, dramatised the notion that no scheme of doctrine should be dominant over men. That the Arab, the Jew, and the Knight Templar should tolerate one another. He certainly got the scimitar and the sword to the salute. It is doubtful if he succeeded in getting them to cause the Jew to wander no more. After all, tolerance is but a petty theological virtue. Both the literature and practice of his country have shown how small a step there is between a tolerant Lessingite and an arrogant Nordicism. The literatures and practices of other countries yield the same sort of evidence. "Live and let live" is a thin commonplace; whether seen through the refracting light of romance in 1779 or of war-weariness in 1919. There is no guidance for us in its cheap assonance in this year of 1940. Now we have to see others as they see us, or the creative thing cannot be done for the World of to-morrow. They are to be viewed as human beings, moved by the profoundest energies in the varied civilisations, for the union of the best which is felt and practised in each and all of their forms of organised life. Men and women, then, are to be seen in the actual

and shadowless light of the right to live humanly and securely.

That is the most certain and primary manifestation of the conditions of the World, when the war is ended. It will remain an empty hope by any attempt to work the see-saw of rhetoric thus: that the conflict was corporate malevolence; that the peace will be corporate benevolence. What human beings ought to have will never be attained by the incantatory use of platitudes concerning good fellowship, by parson or politician. That is a lesson written on every page of history. The hard labour of thought, and the contacts it dictates, can alone accomplish even the first sketch of a universal society of men and women. This is where the Christian Society, as distinct from any denomination under the sun, should come forward to bear the burden with gaiety of discipleship. That most certain result of the war will create a situation of this sort. We have no Ethic of Civilisation. The A B C of living in civilised harmony has not been thought out. In spite of the fact that as soon as a westerner steps out of his own territory, he meets the Buddhist, the Confucian, the Hindu, the Jew, and the Moslem, he has, of course, not to go far before he can meet some natives of the countries beyond Europe who are merely strange ethnological specimens; since they have outwardly conformed to a current Western ideology. The first meet him as men whose civilisations have been made by their religions. The second belong to the No-man's-land of politics: an unmapped haunt of the self-disinherited. Further, we should note that when this westerner turns, for example, to Arabian civilisation, he will have to meet an Arab, though he comes from the desert, who is on the same road of spiritual achievement as Al Hallaj. Or when he desires to have contact with Hindu civilisation, he cannot avoid meeting Rabindranath Tagore. Or when he inquires for Buddhist civilisation, he will be bound to go to that complex of gracious personality and thought in Anagarika Govinda. The best are to be sought in the service of the humblest.

Why is this westerner not invited to meet Mr. Gandhi? He is a politician. There is no help towards an Ethic of Civilisation in his policy of a return to primitive rural conditions in Indian economic and social organisation. Tolstoyanism, speaking an Hindustani which is marred by a German

dialect of national self-determination, is and will be hybrid speech; and were it able to overcome as a policy it will not restore the fabled golden past of India nor realise the spiritual possibilities of Hindu civilisation. The main girder of his political opportunism is the doctrine that a country has a right to choose its own form of national society. It is, of course, an inhuman heresy, especially in the year 1940. It sins against the notion of a universe of human beings. In 1940, the aeroplane and wireless transmitter declare its untruth. There are better witnesses than these for the prosecution. In this year of conflict the Humane World is against the Enslaving State. Therefore, a Confucian, or an Indian, or a Mahometan, can turn sensitive ear and eye to the sociological promise of certain odes in the *Shih Ching*, or of certain Sutras and Vedas, or of certain portions of the *Kuran*, and be sure that the increasing civilisation of his country must contribute to the means and ways of an organised and universal society of men and women. A missionary is not wanted to inform him of that truth. He finds it in his own classics.

It would be a phenomenon if a member of the Christian Society could not look with attuned ear and eye, and not recognise the same Springtide in the acts and writings of Alfred the Great. A cardinal conclusion is emerging from our illustrations: a politician cannot be sent out to meet a politician for the mutual fashioning of an Ethic of Civilisation. He could go were the quest for a novel internationalism, or even for a transitory theosophy. Since these mean, if we inquire of experience, merely extra-national emotion for some stay-at-home movement. The plight of the World demands more than either or both of them.

At present the Christian Society has no consciously directed influence, by bulk or thought, upon the veritable spade-work for the civilisation which is to be after the war. She seems asleep. There is small evidence as yet that the crisis has stabbed her into the wakefulness which can do fundamental brain-work. Let it be supposed, however, that certain of her members are as alive to the infolded social splendours in the deeds of Alfred as certain Chinese are to the same loveliness in the Confucian classics. They surely must go on to take the next step in thought. The proof that they saw the flower within the bud can be made only as they do that. Therefore,

world of men is a prime necessity of the cause of civilisation. Splendid service can be done in anticipating the morrow which will desire, with the fever of exhaustion, an Ethic of Civilisation; those concerted guiding principles for man's life on the earth. A warning must be spoken. A crisis in history is not worked on the lines of mechanised pantomime. In it the dread giants are not overthrown at the fall of a curtain to make space for the designed transformation scene. The beauty and graces of universal social structure will only appear as the Christian Society assumes the burden of thought and foregathers with the thoughtful representatives of other civilisations. Then may be lit "lights upon an earth more fair, than shone from Plato's pages."

V. BURCH.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I. THE SECRET WEAPON?

THIRTY-NINE hours before the German army invaded Holland, the German wireless (11.30 a.m., May 8th) announced that after Norway "the English aggressor was seeking a new victim to attack." On the following day (11.30 a.m., May 9th) within fifteen hours of the German invasion of Holland the German wireless announced that the rumour that such an invasion was imminent was "an English fairy tale." The superb confidence of a propagandist technique which perverts the truth broadside and launches an attack before you get your breath back is typical of the audacious form of the attack itself. When Hitler in his speech at Danzig on September 19th last announced his famous secret weapon ("against which there is no defence") he perhaps consciously had nothing so humdrum in his mind as magnetic mines. The experience of Denmark and Norway, where the German forces entered at dawn and by breakfast time were in possession of all the air ports, strongly suggests that the really secret weapon he had in mind was the previous corruption of the countries invaded. The quick evacuation of the British troops from Norway, heralded by the mysterious and puzzled reticence of the official Allied communiqués, is perhaps explained by the extent to which Norway as well as Denmark had already in effect been annexed by bribery, espionage, quislingism and treason. If the States surrounding Germany be thus rotten in advance, who shall save them? How shall Germany be defeated? Italy obviously has been at the mercy of German political control for many months. The anxious question as these lines were written was, could Italy throw off the shackles and save her own soul? There even arose, for the first time in sober minds, the practical doubt lest the incredibly detailed machinery of German espionage might have made preparations for a parachutist invasion of England: so much so that the soberest minds for the first time now recognised that on the balance of justification the wisest course would be to round up and intern without a single exception every German in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The suffering of the

they will think of Early English institutions within the context of Alfred's own additions to his rendering of *Orosius*—those vital hints of a ninth-century society thinking beyond its own margins; and realise that their origins make them guardians of a perfect concept of society for themselves and for the World. Inside the Christian Society, they are said to be "members of one another"; outside, they will be bound to seek the realisation of that perfect social concept.

The step in thought which succeeds the one just taken is not to rush to the evangelising of the Buddhist, the Confucian, and the Moslem. Our evangelism will be weak if we call others to enter into what we so lightly possess. Does that consideration bring us to our Waterloo before a blow is struck? Most certainly not. The practical utility of the crisis is proven in the instance of the nation: it has made us one against the menaces to our liberties. It can as well vitally weld the Society into one. First, to realise its own genius. Second, to go out to others who are architects with us of the criteria of civilised behaviour. Without the one, the other will not be done. Except the Society rises to the labour of thought in these two manners, the World of to-morrow will be as void of the canons of civilised interoperation as it was in the yesterday of 1918. Its perils, then, are twofold. It can demonstrate that it is asleep. And it can betray its trust of mutual craftsmanship in the basal stuff of to-morrow's civilisation.

At this point it will be well to look at a fashionable theory which makes for inertia in the Society. A poet, who sometimes flies over the boundaries of theological ideas, has crystallised the theory in this sentence: "A community of men and women, not individually better than they are now, except for the capital difference of holding the Christian faith." He believes that he is defining the Christian Society. What he has done is to equate the Society with an English State Church; and with such close association as to consider the criteria of its behaviour to be a constitutional affair, so that the difference between its members and other Englishmen is a matter of philosophical assent. A poet can have forgotten to read the New Testament. The claim has been set up that he is fighting Liberalism in religion with Tractarianism. Also, that his views are to-day's residuum of Richard Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. If the motive is exactly apprehended,

then he has committed the great blunder of deposing the sole adjective which can accompany the word Society. If the chemistry of time has truly precipitated his Elizabethan source, then neither Hooker nor he has so much as heard whether there was or is a Christian Society. An "English" Society can only become more and more John Bull; and it is certain that it will have less and less hold upon Elizabethan and Caroline theology.

We must speak of John Bull with much respect. We are his "members." He has achieved in the realm of national and contingent civilisation such remarkable things as to make the Roman Empire look like the dream of an imitation of a modern dictatorship. Even the lineage of his commonwealth of nations, for example, is noble and venerable. The scholar can trace its steps back to Alfred the Great. Indeed, it is difficult to assess what he has done in terms of pure John Bull. Much of it appears to have Christian inspiration. However that sum in proportion is to be worked out, the crisis has control of the conclusions we have to reach. And here it says that we can no more go out to our fellow-craftsmen in civilisation as John Bull, than we can hide him behind a vanguard of ecclesiastical officials. The Church must give place to the Christian Society.

Is that a practical suggestion? Or do we move from the acquired inertia of the settled institution to what some say is the obvious inertia of the amorphous and unlocalised? This talk about formlessness rises from the lack of lucid or even illucid hold upon the primary sanctions for the Society's existence. It abides. The many churches change and pass. Let anyone listen to history thoughtfully and the immortal Society takes its shape. Who to-day says that the nation is formless? Its compact and co-operative effort against evil gives us its form. The crisis is great enough as a motive to marshal it into biological cohesion. Will it fail with the Christian Society?

There ought to be a more poignant and urgent call for the Society than even the crisis, in the making of the world of to-morrow. Its members profess that the very genius of the Society is in the metabiological claim: we are members one of another. The time has come that the Society shall be no more a thing of ancient report or a phantasm among utopias. Its creative participation in the making and upholding of that

innocent with the guilty, though deplorable, could no longer be given any consideration.

2. HITLER AND THE SMALL STATES.

The German invasion of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg on May 10th seemed to cause both surprise and relief in Rome. After the German "triumph" in Norway the general expectation was that Hitler would strike next at Hungary, and that Mussolini would be forced into abandoning his "non-belligerency." Hitler by his second blunder saved Mussolini temporarily from his embarrassment: although no cautious man would attempt to look far ahead in this war of surprises. The most general guess—apparently shared by Mr. Chamberlain in his resignation broadcast on the evening of May 10th—was that Hitler had diagnosed the British Cabinet crisis as the signal for revolution in England, and therefore plunged westwards instead of eastwards. Despite the quick withdrawal of the British forces from an unequal contest in Norway, there were those who still regarded Hitler's northern thrust as a blunder from his own point of view: not only because of the damage suffered by the German navy, but because it made a vulnerable opening in the hitherto protected security of Germany. The new German thrust against the Low Countries widened that opening. The relief that must thereby have been caused to the Duce's mind was apparently accompanied by some minor embarrassment. During the following week-end at any rate his policy, in addition to being non-belligerent, became remarkably non-obtrusive, partly no doubt because the Italian newspapers on the very eve of the new German aggression dutifully copied the Germany wireless announcement about the "English fairy tale." Italian newspapers, even in the Duce's cause, cannot willingly be made so promptly to look silly. The battle now was fairly joined in Western Europe. Not Norway after all, but the Low Countries were to be the cockpit. It might well be that the Allied experience in Norway would prove to have been a blessing in disguise. Hitler's judgment, already undermined by easy success, was symbolised in his apparent belief that a Cabinet crisis in London was a sign of weakness. He thereupon annexed enough rope to hang himself.

It is true that the unhappy Allies—unhappy because the

only effective method of defeating Hitlerism was to use Hitler's own weapons which *ex hypothesi* gave him a formidable initial advantage—were led during the Norwegian campaign to disclose something short of the severe truth during the course of the campaign itself. In war the truth becomes a factor of belligerent value, to be used or suppressed as strategy dictates. But the truth always emerges the stronger after violence. "*Tous les efforts*" (as Pascal put it) "*de la violence ne peuvent affaiblir la vérité et ne servent qu'à la relever davantage.*" In other ways, too, the Norwegian experience threw light upon the difficulties that confront those who have no alternative but to defeat Hitlerism by the use of Hitlerist weapons. The man who wholly despises principle has an important initial advantage over the man who acts from an idealist motive. Hitler always calls: heads I win, tails you lose. Having lost what Mr. Churchill called the "cursed corridor" of Norwegian territorial waters, which had been protected by the Allied respect for Norwegian neutrality, he proceeded to construct a new "cursed corridor," this time by land, not by sea, by building a railway connecting Oslo with the Swedish line that goes to the Swedish mines in the north. That part of the line which ran through Swedish territory was thus in its turn protected by the Allied respect for Swedish neutrality. Having violated Norwegian neutrality to safeguard his supply of iron ore, Hitler next made a point of respecting Swedish neutrality because such respect was the simplest and most effective means of safeguarding his new channel of supply. In other words Hitler has the gangster's versatility. By contrast the Allies, pledged both to respect the neutrality and to protect the independence of the small states against whom Hitler drives, are compelled to wait until Hitler has violated those States before they can come to their assistance: and then it may be too late. Hoist, as it were, with their own excellent petard, the Allies are hindered by their very respect for the neutrals from taking such steps as would most effectively safeguard their neutrality. Hitler laughs first. He scores first. There is this much to be said for him, that he is consistent and logical. Rejecting God, he takes the devil for his guide in the devil's work. His strategy knows no moral scruple.

When Sir Samuel Hoare, Air Minister, broadcasting on

April 27th last, talked about the enemy's dastardly methods and declared that we should refuse to copy them, he made a contemptuous present to the enemy. "Let no one have any illusions," he said. "The war has entered an intense and vital phase. The enemy will wage it without mercy. He will give us no quarter. He will certainly not spare the brave people of Norway who have been so shamefully, so wantonly dragged into war after generations of peaceful and progressive life." He then pointed the contrast of our own ideas on the conduct of the war. "For our part," he said, "we will not imitate his dastardly conduct. We will not let helpless seamen drown. We will not bomb open towns. We will not attempt to defeat the Germans by terrorising their women and children. All that we will leave to the enemy. But we will *not* leave him any monopoly of energy and skill and resolution." The glee that was no doubt caused to German hearts by that statement was one of the factors that led Germany on to her more and more certain undoing. Since the series of these modern wars started in 1914, no battle had yet been fought on German soil, no bomb had yet been dropped on the German mainland. Sir Samuel Hoare, Air Minister, virtually announced to Germany on April 27th that she would be allowed to bomb the women and children of Britain before Britain would consider the unpleasant business of bombing German women and children. The mixture of "sportsmanship" with war is Britain's present weakness, but her final and decisive strength.

It is one result of that weakness, as so far operative, that the belt of European small States that lie between the Rhine and the Russian frontier, on whose behalf partly and ostensibly the Allies are fighting, have in effect helped their own enemy, and hindered their own ally. Norway, on the eve of the German invasion, protested vigorously against the Allied mining of Norwegian waters, the purpose of which was to deprive Germany of the iron ore with which she manufactured the munitions destined for Norway's own destruction. Sweden stood by, in a gaunt and unimaginative neutrality, while Norway was invaded, waiting her own turn if and when it should suit the enemy's convenience. Holland and Belgium by the continuing effect of neutrality kept Britain and France at bay until such time as Germany *had* invaded their country and scored an initial advantage. The spectacle was of small

States playing into the hands of the aggressor who encompassed their destruction. Britain and France could—so it appeared—have best helped those States by jumping the formality and concentrating on the substance of the business in hand: by occupying the bases first, with or without permission. But that expedient would have been so equivocal as to be ruled out of the question.

The dilemma clearly resulted that the advantage and the initiative had to be surrendered in the first round to the aggressor. The ultimate deduction is that there can be no political health in the world until the world has enough collective sense to reject war as a political method. The immediate problem is that of resistance or non-resistance to the evil. The world is clearly not advanced enough for the doctrine of non-resistance to be applied to the political field. We must therefore go on having wars until the slow wisdom has dawned, despite the viciousness of the circle which tends to perpetuate the Miltonic circumstance that war can breed only endless wars. The mystery of Christian truth is unpromising. We are not Christian in our politics. We therefore suffer what we suffer. The merciful aspect of the present dispensation is that, as before, Germany is so grossly the more brutal, the more wicked and therefore the more stupid party that in advance she ensures her own defeat.

3. POLAND'S TRUE NEED.

The greatest sympathy has been rightly shown to Poland under the terror of German treatment. Sympathy is perhaps not enough. Help of various kinds is urgently needed. Not least among the friendly offices that can be performed by the English friends of Poland is that of sound advice for the future. Already grandiose plans are being dreamed, against the day of the Allied victory. The truth is always the shortest route to wisdom and the soundest basis of friendship. The best friends of Poland warned her at the outset of her new-found freedom twenty years ago, that her swollen frontiers were a source, not of strength, but of weakness. Must the dreamers repeat a proved mistake? Let the cold facts perform their corrective function, painful though it be, ungracious as it may seem in the present background of Polish suffering. The deplorable fact is that Vilna has again become a cardinal

factor in Polish ambitions, as formed by the exiled leaders; and may again be the foundation of a Polish tragedy.

There is no sense in shutting one's eyes to the fact that the first of all the aggressions in this age of aggression was the Polish aggression on Vilna in 1920. It preceded Corfu, Manchuria, Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, Poland herself, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg. The story and the irony are well enough known. Vilna has been the capital of Lithuania since the State was founded by the Grand Duke Gediminas in the early fourteenth century. It is predominantly Jewish (the "Jerusalem of Lithuania") and for the rest contains a population of Lithuanian and Polonised Catholics, some Germans and White Russians. On February 16th, 1918, when Lithuania's independence was again proclaimed, it was proclaimed in Vilna. Vilna became the capital of the country after peace was made. The Suvalki Agreement (October 7th, 1920) left Vilna to Lithuania. On October 9th, 1920, General Zeligowski annexed the town by force to Poland. Though the Polish Government disowned him, it retained the spoils. Mr. Balfour, with the authority of a British Cabinet Minister, described the Zeligowski coup as a "European scandal." The Prime Minister of Great Britain, speaking in the House of Commons eight months later (May 13th, 1921), made this comment: "Lithuania, by a settlement to which America was a party as well as France, Italy and Britain, was given Vilna. Vilna was occupied by regular Polish troops in defiance of the Allies." M. Léon Bourgeois, who was then President of the Council of the League of Nations, in a letter addressed to Mr. Paderewski (October 14th, 1920), wrote: "The occupation of Vilna is a violation of the engagements accepted *vis-à-vis* the Council of the League of Nations, and the latter is compelled to demand of the Polish Government what immediate steps it proposes to take to ensure respect for engagements." No such steps were proposed or taken. One would not recall these things were it not for the fact that even to-day the lesson seems not to have been fully taken to heart by the Poles themselves. For eighteen years Vilna was in Polish hands. It was restored to Lithuania by Russia, after the fall of Poland last autumn (October 10th, 1939). The transfer was based on the legality of the Lithuanian treaty of July 12th, 1920, with the U.S.S.R., the sole successor to

the title over Lithuanian territories after old Russia. That treaty recognised Lithuania's sovereignty over Vilna. Though the eighteen years of Polish occupation embittered Lithuanian feeling against Poland, the present Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, has publicly acknowledged that after the rape of Poland by Germany, "the Lithuanians have shown themselves very friendly in Poland's hour of need." Refugees have been welcomed and cared for. But those refugees have unwisely restarted, by the widespread distribution of leaflets and other methods, a subversive campaign against the Lithuanian Government. Some thirty arrests have been made of Poles possessing incriminating documents and instructions from abroad for agitation against Lithuania. Secret wireless sending stations have been discovered. It is inevitable that these things shall, if continued, sow the seeds of something other than friendship for the new Poland, if and when she again arises. Poland knows what it is to be the victim of a stronger Power. Lithuania in size and power stands to Poland, as Poland to Germany. It is Poland's present concern, if she be wise, not to ensure future enmity from those who would be her friends, but to atone for past unwisdom. Of that unwisdom there is unfortunately too much evidence. The secret document dated February 11th, 1936, drawn up by Governor Bocianski, and found by the Lithuanians among the Polish archives last October, is an unpleasant reminder of German methods in the denationalising of subject races. The methodical substitution of Polish for Lithuanian Catholic priests, the barriers set against Lithuanian entry into the Vilna University, such as the prescribed qualifications in Polish subjects, are a familiar device. Will not Poland learn by her own present distress to avoid the stigma and the danger of Cromwell's famous dictum about every sect demanding liberty and when given it, denying it to everybody else? They are not the true friends of Poland who encourage or condone Polish extravagance. It is the harder and better way to give advice, which though unpalatable, best serves Polish interests.

4. BRITAIN AND THE WORLD.

The really interesting fact that emerged in the ninth month of the war, after the German victory in southern Norway, was

that Britain was almost as strikingly deserted, as in the first war she had been befriended, by the other Great Powers except France. What was still more interesting was that Hitler's plunge into the Low Countries at once transformed that situation by destroying one of his main sources of strength. Whereas in the last war not only France, but Russia, Japan, Italy and the United States had fought on Britain's side, three of them were now tentatively turned against Britain by reason of the fact that Britain was not regarded as a certain winner, and they all had an eye on the "pickings" they foresaw in the event of Britain being defeated. The crudity of German barbarity manifested in the climax of the new aggression on May 10th, suddenly threatened to turn the whole world again into opposition, thereby recreating the circumstance of 1914-18. The most reliable approach to the probabilities in international affairs is the comparative measurement of rival strengths; but moral factors have great weight. It is possible, even easy, to miscalculate; but the calculation itself is the only accepted method of deciding allegiances or lesser attachments. In the case of Italy, for example, before the German invasion of Holland and Belgium, the distaste for German methods, for German purposes, and for the virtual control of Italy by Germany, weighed less in the balance than the fact that Germany had won the first phase of the war in Norway, and that Italy also coveted something at the expense of Great Britain. Russia, though essentially as afraid of Germany as she had been in 1914, yet calculated in the present instance that Germany was stronger than Britain, and her allegiance therefore went to Germany. Japan wanted to oust Britain from China and the Far East as much as Italy wanted to oust her from the Mediterranean. The United States was in the difficulty that her own benefit from Britain's troubles depended upon an ultimately victorious Britain, helped in the end to be victorious by American financial support. In the last war the gains scored by the United States in that way were substantial. A German victory now would jeopardise them. In one form or another, therefore, American support for the Allies was regarded as likely in the new as in the last war, even apart from the circumstance that a Japanese Far Eastern Empire, strengthened at the expense of Britain, would constitute a direct challenge to the United States. It

is such broad and crude considerations of self-interest that explain much that has excited recent comment about the attitude of the Great Powers to Britain.

5. THE ITALIAN MOTIVE.

The clearest example is Italy. It came as a shock to the average proud Englishman to be told in the early days of May 1940 that although Italian popular feeling was more sympathetic to the English than to the German character, yet Italy could not "trust" Great Britain. It is always easier to see the mote in one's neighbour's eye than the beam in one's own. In international affairs, where the almost exclusive criterion of values and the almost exclusive motive of conduct is that of self-interest, it is always safer to assume one's antagonist to be sincere, if not in his protestations, then at any rate in his calculations. Why should he not be? It would be wiser to examine the Italian charge of perfidy than to throw up one's hands in horror at the thought that in matters of good faith there could be any honest doubt about Great Britain. Let the serious Briton look up the history of the unfulfilled British promises made to Italy in 1915 and 1925 before he jump to any further conclusions. Let him wonder why the spring of 1935 (when Italy joined with Britain and France to form the Stresa front against German exuberance) became the turning point in Signor Mussolini's attitude to Britain and to France. The Allied treatment of Italy has been one of the most unfortunate of Allied blunders. Before the last war Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. She remained neutral when the war broke out in 1914. In 1915 she was bought—little is to be gained by mincing words in a field where materialist realism is the main consideration—by the Allies. She agreed to enter the war on the Allied side in return for the offer contained in the secret Treaty of London of that year. The promised reward was never given. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1924 did, it is true, give Jubaland to Italy, including the watering well of El Wak; but the gift was a mere travesty of what had been promised in 1915. In 1925 Italy was again offered the south of Abyssinia in return for Great Britain's receiving the waters of Lake Tsana, another of Abyssinia's sovereign possessions. The relevant fact in that

sordid story is that the British Government twice pledged its signature to a promise that Italy should have the part of Abyssinia she wanted. Though we had no more "right" (except by the traditional standards of a godless diplomacy) in 1915 or in 1925 to offer Abyssinia to Italy than Italy had to take Abyssinia in 1935, yet the ruling fact is that we did offer it. When a British Foreign Minister tried to honour the British pledge by the so-called Hoare-Laval proposal of December 1935, he was hounded out of office by a British public opinion as ignorant as it was indignant. The League of Nations Powers who attempted sanctions upon Italy were either as ignorant as British public opinion, or they were guilty of the worse motive of attempting to use the League of Nations as a means of preventing Italy from performing in the colonial field the same sort of enterprise as Great Britain, France and other Powers had themselves performed in the past. It was after that episode that Signor Mussolini made his earth-shaking pact with Herr Hitler.

When the new war started last September Italy maintained, not her neutrality, but her non-belligerency. In other words she advertised her solidarity with Germany; but let it be known that her solidarity was for the moment dormant, not actively belligerent. Hitler announced at the beginning of the Polish campaign that he would not yet "call upon" Italian assistance. Diplomacy being what it is, there could be no doubt that Italy thereby tacitly invited the Allies to pay her a price for deserting Germany, but equally left no doubt that she would not be disposed a second time to trust to Allied promises. She offered the Allies a cash-and-carry sort of deal, as it were, and for precisely the same sort of reason as the United States adopted that technique in the financial field. Italy this time demanded payment in advance. But the Allies took no action. There were those in British quarters (for neither side in the present war has a monopoly of stupidity) who argued that as Italy was on our side in the last war it would be only fair (to us) if Italy this time were on Germany's side. Such folly was given no echo in France, where thought tends to be more realistic. Unfortunately France, though she had been offering negotiations to Italy over outstanding issues since 1926, had not made any firm offer to Italy. When, therefore, in the spring of 1940 the Norwegian victory raised the question whether Herr Hitler

would strike next at Holland or the Balkans, it became an inescapable need for Italy to demonstrate where she stood. She demonstrated it by an outburst of pro-German and anti-Allied propaganda in her controlled press. The immediate result was that most diplomatic quarters by the first week of May regarded it as probable that Italy would now abandon her pose of non-belligerency and would actively intervene in the war on Germany's side. The doubt, however, was not yet abandoned that Signor Mussolini was still trying to force an offer from the Allies as a means to his own escape from Germany.

French quarters now quoted the remarkable statement made by M. Reynaud at a time when the outcome of the Norwegian conflict was still uncertain. In that statement, made to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate on April 20th, M. Reynaud declared that both before and since the new war began, the French Government had let the Italian Government know that they wished to reach a settlement of outstanding questions, but had had no answer. Efforts had also been made, he said, to improve relations with Spain. "Setting aside all ideological considerations," he said, "the French Government will pursue their efforts regarding those two countries in search of a Mediterranean understanding, which constitutes one of the indispensable bases of peace." Again there was no answer from Italy to that gesture, except renewed abuse of the Allies in the Italian Press. The explanation most generally given by serious Italians was that Signor Mussolini had decided that, unless the Allies made an eleventh-hour offer, Italy's interests would be the more probably served in association with Germany. In his view, Italy as one of the "have-not" Powers would help herself best by helping Germany to defeat the two main possessor Powers, France and Britain, with a view to sharing the spoils. Neither the more sympathetic feeling of the Italian people for Britain and France than for Germany, nor the Pope's clear condemnation of German and Russian aggression, counted as much in Signor Mussolini's mind as what he calculated to be Italy's political and material interests. The gravity of the situation was somewhat increased by the fact that the Allies, far from making any new offer to Italy, instead sent a powerful fleet into the eastern Mediterranean. A further source of anxiety was contributed by the news that Signor Attolico, one of the

wisest and shrewdest diplomats in Europe, was at that precise time recalled from the Italian Embassy in Berlin to change posts with Signor Alfieri, the Italian Ambassador to the Vatican. Signor Attolico was well known as a critic of contemporary Germany and a sympathiser with the Allies, Signor Alfieri as a fiery advocate of the Rome-Berlin axis. Yet it was doubtful if the change could do much harm. Certainly Signor Alfieri could do no further harm, once his Nazi sympathies were swallowed up in Berlin, while Signor Attolico might conceivably do some good by being brought nearer to his Government at home. At the beginning of May the Allies adopted the attitude that they were ready for war with Italy (and assumed war to be likely), but at the same time recognised that certain restraining factors (other than any contribution of their own) might still deter him.

There was, for instance, the highly important position of Spain, whose opposition to Russian communism and bolshevik atheism was undiminished and essential to her policy. If Italy by inference abandoned her own opposition to Russian atheism, it would be at least difficult for her to cultivate closer relations with Spain. Moreover, Spain was becoming more openly anti-German in proportion as the Hitler-Stalin association continued to flourish. A straw in that particular wind was revealed on May 3rd when General Franco's Falangist paper *Arriba* paid a tribute to British frankness about the defeat in Norway. In Signor Mussolini's calculations therefore the possible opposition of Spain as well as of Turkey had to be added to the certain hostility of France and Great Britain. It was therefore perhaps not surprising when in the first days of May it became known that under pressure from the United States Government Italy had given assurances to Washington that she would not "at present" abandon her non-belligerency. When Herr Hitler crossed the Dutch and Belgian frontiers the Allies were given another and probably the last chance of repeating the history of 1915 by detaching Italy from Germany.

May 12th, 1940.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE DEEPER CAUSES OF THE WAR.*

Of the eight thoughtful addresses published in this attractive little book under the auspices of the British Institute of Philosophy those by Dr. Gilbert Murray and Sir William Beveridge are perhaps the most valuable. The former, choosing the Herd Instinct for his theme, begins by quoting the Prime Minister's famous peroration on September 3rd, 1939, "We are fighting against evil things." Dr. Murray, like the rest of us, believes these words to be true, and he devotes his lecture to the grounds of his belief. We have been aggressive in the past, but our period of empire-building is over. "If we claim that in the present struggle the cause of Britain represents the Right, or the Good of Humanity, that does not mean that Englishmen are by nature specially unselfish or virtuous; it means that owing to historical causes it has come about that the chief interest and aim of the British Empire is wrapped up with the general good of the human race. Our care for peace, our desire for reconciliation, our faith in the ideal of the League of Nations, are neither due to hypocrisy, as our opponents say, nor to some special dose of

* *The Deeper Causes of the War.* By Various Writers. Allen & Unwin. 5s.

of all or most dependencies with the national governments, while giving the Federation powers of supervision and control greater than those now possessed by the Mandates Commission. The problem would also have to be discussed between the Federation and the States outside, for economic internationalism is as essential to a stable world as the protection of native interests. In answer to the criticism that his scheme may seem Utopian, he argues that it is based on the immense recent changes which have rendered the old tribal groupings and isolations out of date. Moreover, "the choice is between Utopia and Hell."

G. P. G.

THE POLISH WHITE BOOK.*

The Polish White Book is a great human document. It has long been recognised that the despatches of Ambassadors to their Governments constitute a very trustworthy method of reconstructing past history. The Ambassador must be objective: he must see events steadily and he must see them whole. Here, brought together in successive despatches and memoranda, we can trace the history of Nazi aggression in Poland from May 2nd, 1933, when Mr. Wysocki, Polish Ambassador in Berlin, had a momentous interview with Hitler, until October 10th, 1939, when Mr. Lipski, the last Polish Ambassador in Berlin, made his final report in Paris. From the very beginning we can see that Hitler was working on some plan more or less clear in his own mind, and that he seemed to see in Poland an instrument which he imagined it might be possible to bend to his purpose. He was always laudatory in his references to Marshal Pilsudski. In his Reichstag speech of May 21st, 1935, he declared that "with the understanding and the heartfelt friendship of true Nationalists we recognise the Polish State as the home of a great, nationally-conscious people." On the other hand Russia was a great and constant menace: he was disturbed by the number of births in that country and regarded Poland as "an outpost against Asia. The destruction of Poland would be a misfortune for the states which would consequently

* "Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939." The Polish White Book. Hutchinson & Co. 3s. 6d.

become neighbours of Asia. The other states should realise Poland's rôle as an outpost."

These seemed to be the thoughts in his mind when he signed the famous Polish-German Declaration of January 26th, 1934. But there is no evidence that he ever intended to treat other races as on an equality with the German race. Indeed he speaks of the "mutual protection of races" in a way that suggests he already thought of something like a Protectorate. He was, however, proud of the fact that the revolution in Germany had been carried out without bloodshed, and he appears to have imagined that if he waited long enough he might be able to get Poland to do all that he desired. He declared at first that he was ready to acknowledge existing treaties, but as the days went on it was clear that he had ideas about Danzig and the Corridor which, if realised, would have reduced Poland to something like a vassal state. It was not until May 23rd, 1935, that, in an interview with Mr. Lipski, he admitted that he "had an idea, premature to-day but which might be possible of realisation in some fifteen years' time, namely the building of a special railway line and of a motor road for transit through Pomorze." He had probably spoken from time to time of changes in Danzig to which the Poles after the lapse of time might be inclined to assent. From the first Colonel Beck reacted critically against these suggestions, but Hitler found it difficult to imagine that anyone would finally oppose his will. It was only when Ribbentrop put forward these proposals definitely at a luncheon as a total solution, and it was plain that they were unacceptable, that Hitler evidently determined to change from negotiation to aggression. Poland, he saw, would be no mere plaything in the hands of the Nazi State.

The latter part contains despatches relating to Russia and ends with a deeply interesting final report from the former Polish Ambassador in Moscow. From the German part we learned that Hitler had made several proposals to Poland to join him in a crusade against Russia, and that Poland had consistently refused. Russia made a bad return to this attitude. The despatches from former Polish Ambassadors in Moscow and the successive Pacts of Non-Aggression quoted therein reveal a record of treachery which in these latter days can scarcely be paralleled.

J. H. H.

original virtue, as we are sometimes apt to imagine, but to the circumstances of our history." When Bismarck, after founding the German Empire in three wars, declared "we are satiated," he spoke for himself, not for his countrymen. When we say the same thing to-day, it is true of us all. Why, indeed, should the British Empire, which embraces a quarter of the earth's surface, covet its neighbour's vineyard? On the other side stand Germany, Italy and Japan, the hungry nations, whose unprovoked aggressions have turned the world upside down during the last nine years. Yet there is no reason for despair. "The gangster in his war against society wins success after success. It looks as if his methods were the real dictates of nature. But society generally wins in the end. . . . Mutual protection is the hardest but also the most necessary of the tasks of the civilised world." Dr. Murray does not despair of finding in Germany after the war a Government ready for peace and fair dealing if only a partially ruined world can help such a Government to some tolerable degree of economic well-being.

In the last and longest of the addresses Sir William Beveridge discourses on Peace by Federation? His title includes the query, not because he doubts the necessity and the efficacy of his plan, but because he is not sure of its acceptance. No one indeed can be sure, but he is hopeful. "I believe that when the issue is raised, the peoples concerned will be prepared to barter arms for security and sovereignty for civilisation." Federation of kindred nations would work if the peoples desired it, not if it were imposed on them by their rulers. The first step is to discuss it, to work out details, to overcome constitutional difficulties. In attempting such a large transformation we must proceed with as much caution as courage. On the vital issue of the states to be included, he proposes as a start England, France, Germany, Scandinavia, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Eire, the Dominions. Except for the Dominions, the proposed units lie close together, and with the exception of Germany they are what he calls "effective democracies." Germany, it is assumed, may become sufficiently democratic after the war to fit into the new pattern, and indeed without her the federation could not be an assured organ of peace. Dictatorships would be excluded, for they cannot be trusted to play the game. If the federation is to succeed it must be composed of partners who

recognise their need for mutual protection and are prepared to fulfil their responsibilities. Any other form of association, as the collapse of the League has shown, is a house of cards. Sir William emphasises the need of limiting the area and of certain qualifications for membership. "Federalism is a strong remedy for a virulent disorder, not a healing lotion that can be sprayed over the world. World federation is for the millennium; the federation projected here is for the next Peace treaty: it is a federation of nations which from fresh experience of war will be determined to make as certain as they can that war will never be repeated." The inclusion of the United States is too much to hope for, though a measure of co-operation is quite possible without the federal tie.

The most interesting pages in the discussion of the powers of the Federation concern the crucial problem of armaments. The first lesson of the last twenty years, we are told, is that there can be no assurance of Peace with Justice in Europe so long as the German people have arms at their discretion. "The powers of organisation and discipline of this highly talented and numerous people in a central situation in Europe, combined with their readiness to hand over their destinies time and again to leaders whose creed is power, leave no other conclusion possible than that the condition of permanent peace in Europe is permanent disarmament of Germany." The policy of breaking up that country into separate states and undoing Bismarck's work is rightly rejected, and it is recognised that Germany, like other countries, will need protection. If Federation is to come into being it must control defence and foreign affairs. "This means that all the armed forces of all the federated nations will become a single force, owing allegiance to the federal government and not to the national governments. There will be no British navy, no German army, no French air force, but British, German, French, Swedish, Belgian and other contingents of a federal navy, army and air force. To many this will be a hard saying, at first, perhaps, too hard to be accepted." The proposal, of course, is based on the supposition that the Federation is confined to members who can trust one another. On the question of dependencies Sir William steers a middle course between pooling the lot and leaving national sovereignty unimpaired. A better way would be to leave the administration

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT*

The forthcoming elections in the United States give to Professor H. J. Laski's latest book, *The American Presidency*, an additional importance at the present time. Based upon lectures delivered in the spring of 1939 at Indiana University, the volume seeks to examine the actual working of the Presidency in the face of contemporary conditions and social and political needs. Professor Laski, who, of course, is no newcomer to the field of American constitutional study, rightly warns the reader against the "sub-conscious personal equation" which is vital in the conclusions of even the disinterested and detached observer. He cites, for example, Lord Bryce as being influenced in his interpretation of the American Constitution by his own, the then prevailing, attitude to economic and social questions. *The American Commonwealth* was first published in 1888 and recently with great advantage a commemorative volume has been published under the editorship of Professor Robert C. Brooks. Bryce's great work is analysed and reviewed in the light of the last fifty years by eight well-known American authorities. It is not possible here to discuss each contribution and it must suffice to say that the student will gain great assistance in fully appreciating *The American Commonwealth* by having this new volume at his side.

Professor Laski is well known, of course, for his socialist views, and in his book on *Parliamentary Government in England* argued that in this country an extra-constitutional struggle was imminent owing to the basic antithesis of socialism and capitalism, the latter having made every concession consistent with its fundamental character. In the author's view it seems that in the United States this stage has not yet been reached and consequently he is little concerned with the question of revolution. He compares the two great American parties with the British Conservative and Liberal parties before the full impact of the Labour Movement was felt in this country. Both Republican and Democratic parties, being fundamentally similar and capitalist in outlook, favour weak government for which the American

* (1) *The American Presidency*. An Interpretation by Harold J. Laski. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net. (2) Bryce's "*American Commonwealth*," Edited by Robert C. Brooks. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

constitution is particularly adapted. The great immediate need, however, the author argues, is for a strong central executive which can plan and execute on a nation-wide scale a great programme of social and economic amelioration in the light of existing conditions.

Professor Laski holds that the President is alone fitted in the American system to initiate and carry out a strong policy but that he is inevitably thwarted by an obstructive Congress and sectional interests. He does not minimise the great authority exercisable by the President, his power to influence public opinion and his ability to carry Congress with him during his "honeymoon period" of office and in periods of acute emergency. Moreover, "all the fundamental relations in the building of foreign policy are in his hands"; in this field embarrassment by the Senate has been greatly exaggerated. While accepting in principle the desirability of legislative control of treaty-making, Professor Laski condemns the present system because it enables a small minority of Senators to reject a beneficent treaty on purely extraneous grounds. He would substitute for the two-thirds rule a majority of both Houses.

In normal times the separation of powers involves a continuous rivalry between the Executive and Congress. A strong President invites opposition which is bolstered up by personal, factional and sectional interests. The system inevitably makes for "incoherency and irresponsibility." It lacks the necessary concentration of responsible authority. Professor Laski rejects the suggestion that Cabinet members should sit and speak in Congress. They would tend to become the servants of the legislature, thus undermining the President's position. In short there is no satisfactory half-way house between the Presidential system and the British doctrine of ministerial responsibility to the legislature. The author concludes that co-ordination between President and Congress will have to be found in party policy and discipline. At present this is not effective since both the great parties are fundamentally agreed on political and economic principle and also are greatly affected by sectional influences. The repercussion, however, of great social and economic changes which are now taking place will create a realignment of parties into conservative and progressive. The consequent cleavage of party policies will add enormously to the penalties

of electoral defeat and oblige the majority party in Congress, with a President of its own political complexion, to follow fully the latter's leadership in the execution of the party programme. Where, however, the President is in a minority it would appear that deadlock must ensue and only be resolved at the next election. It is difficult to see how a permanent system of strong administration, so strongly urged by the author, can be attained without constitutional amendment.

CONTACTS AND CONTRASTS.*

Lady Helena Gleichen has been happily inspired in choosing her title, for she has throughout her life been in touch with notable persons—royalties, diplomats and artists—in England and abroad, while there could be no greater contrast to her life in society, in the hunting-field, or in her studio than the grim scenes of the Italian war front, where she and her friend Mrs. Hollings did invaluable work as X-ray operators among the wounded. (Our War Office had declined their services because they were women.) Her experiences during those two years are related in a series of vivid letters home, in which, with a complete absence of bravado, she treats as a matter of course trials and dangers such as extremes of heat and cold, roads impossible for most people's motors, earthquakes, work actually under shell fire, and the ghastly episodes of war. The writer's intrepid spirit and resourcefulness carried her through, and resourcefulness is one of the qualities she specially praises in the Italians. She found her art training in anatomy useful in locating bullets; on one occasion the King of Italy watched her at work. The ladies were awarded the medal struck to commemorate the taking of Gorizia. Meanwhile their friends at home were collecting large sums for equipment, the Red Cross contributing £500.

Lady Helena is first and foremost an artist, her pictures of horses and hounds, some of which are reproduced in the book, are full of life and energy; several sketches of war horses in action were bought by the Italian Government. Lovers of dogs and horses will revel in the pages devoted to her favourites. Other chapters describe her introduction as a girl

* *Reminiscences: Contacts and Contrasts*. By Lady Helena Gleichen. John Murray. 1940. 12s. 6d.

to her formidable relative, Queen Victoria; hunting adventures; art school life; a yachting cruise with the Empress Eugénie; early visits to Athens, Constantinople and Rome. In Rome she moved in both "Black" and "White" circles, introduced to the former by an elderly cousin, a Cardinal. The author has had more than one uncanny psychical experience—in St. James's Palace, on a Hampshire farm, at Vézelay, and elsewhere—which she relates graphically. She showed herself a steady friend to the sculptor Alfred Gilbert when poor and unpopular; it was through her influence that he was induced to return to England, which he had quitted in a huff, and was given fresh commissions.

This book is on quite a different level from the ordinary run of society memoirs: it reflects its author's many-sided personality, and there is not a dull page in it.

E. G. S.

THE BASIS OF HUMAN PROGRESS.*

Mr. Spalding's survey should serve as a tonic to those who despair of human progress amid its apparent eclipse to-day. His is a pioneer work, he claims, to which "much must be forgiven." It is the child of talks at Oxford with "men and women of many kinds and kindreds"—"a book to pull to pieces and criticise and improve." The author has a wide knowledge of religions and civilisations, enthusiasm for spiritual values and faith in men to discern them. He writes with clarity and mastery after emphasising that compression (324 pages of large print) has been "difficult and severe with so huge a theme." But it is just this simplification of complicated issues which can mislead the unwary, evoking justified protests from those who discern cardinal omissions in the author's arguments and summaries, and reject certain assumptions. Yet admitting all criticism of the kind and the author's natural prejudices ("in the crush some toes may have been trodden on; but never with unkind intent") his survey is stimulating and valuable.

No civilisation, he shows, has succeeded in viewing Reality as a Whole and until different civilisations widen their view

* *Civilisation in East and West. An Introduction to the Study of Human Progress*. By H. N. Spalding. Oxford University Press. 15s.

of Reality, learning from each other while tenaciously retaining their individual ideal (a necessity which is stressed), the brotherhood of men remains an unrealised dream. It can only actualise as men enlarge their conception of God and do not limit it to that of their nation or faith. By realising their common approach to Him from different angles, as they do not now, divergent civilisations can achieve mutual respect and understanding.

As the Abbot Dorotheus says: The nearer men draw to God, the nearer they draw to one another. As the Fourth Gospel says: The Truth shall sanctify men, that they may all be one.

The greatest teachers have taught men to look upon reality in its entirety.

Such was Leonardo; such were Socrates and Plato; such above all was Jesus. In their view men were to be 'spectators of all time and all existence, ever longing after the whole of things both Divine and human'; they were to 'love God with heart and mind and soul and strength, and their neighbours as themselves.'

The author anticipates the Kingdom of God as "the ideal society that is to cover the earth," basing his prediction on "the marvellous moral and spiritual progress made by mankind in the last few thousand years." The Materialist State, of which the ruler aims supremely at "the aggrandisement of his own State or Church or Class" has never (unless in Japan) "been able to maintain itself in the past. It has always sooner or later issued in morality." Chinese and Nordics who lack—with notable exceptions—a natural genius for religion, have created Moral States, in which "harmony in society" has been the ideal of the Chinese and "freedom in society" that of the Nordics. Judaism, Islam and Catholicism are classified as Moral-Spiritual States, of which Catholicism inclines most to the viewpoint of other-worldly societies. Indians and Russians have produced Spiritual States—Hinduism with Buddhism, and Orthodoxy, which "soar to a mighty conception of the Godhead and the fundamental Divinity of man." Their "flight from experience" has resulted in a view of the universe which "is loftier than any other" but "largely out of reach of the mass even of the peoples who have originated it"; and "between their spiritual virtues and their unsocial vices a great gulf yawns."

Despite the author's concern with history, he is pre-occupied with great seers who have inspired what is best in it. Evil and anguish in men's hearts and lives and that which impels them to ignore, misinterpret or deny their seers, are veiled, minimised or even ignored—doubtless intentionally. But the omission haunts the reader. Men's salvation, the author insists, lies in "true education," which "must culminate in a study of God—at this stage a Personal or Moral God." Universities must co-operate to provide the new studies "which will make the new men." Assuredly, they can develop, but not remake, men of good will, weak will and bad will. "Reason, the moral and spiritual principle," often lacks the motive force which empowers men to tread "the Way" enjoined by seers. Such a dynamic has been experienced as the power of Christ Crucified and the cleansing fire of the Holy Ghost.

D. P. H.

ERICH MARCK'S BISMARCK.*

When the first volume of Erich Marcks' great biography of Bismarck appeared in 1909, it at once received an enthusiastic welcome, though it contained only his early life up to his marriage in 1847. Readers looked forward eagerly to the next volume that was to continue the story into the time of the revolution of 1848 and beyond; but it did not appear. Then the Great War intervened; Marcks proved by publishing some essays that the subject still occupied his thoughts, but it was denied to him to compress them into a picture of Bismarck's whole personality and life. At last, in 1936, he published a work in two large volumes, *Der Aufstieg des Reichs*, which deals with German history from 1815 to 1871 and has Bismarck as central figure, but was generally regarded as the abandonment of the prosecution of the biography. He died in 1938 at the age of 78, and Professor Andreas of Heidelberg, his disciple and son-in-law, has edited a volume of some 200 pages. It covers three years, 1848-51, and ends with Bismarck's appointment to the post of Prussian Minister to the *Bundestag* in Frankfurt, the decisive turning-point of his political career.

* Erich Marcks' *Bismarck und die deutsche Revolution, 1848-1851*. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1939.

Thus it is a voice from the grave which speaks to us, a voice from a past age too. For the manuscript, which subsequently underwent only minor corrections, was finished in 1910. That was a time when Bismarck's work seemed to rest on firm and stable foundations; all the doubts and anxieties were dormant which since its breakdown in the Great War came even to his most enthusiastic admirers. Marcks had grown up at a time when German youth was completely under the influence of Bismarck and his work. He had conversed with him and treasured the impression of his personality, overwhelming still in his old age and after his overthrow, as the most precious recollection of his whole life. So Bismarck became not only the object but the measure of his historical work.

Therein lies the stamp and feature of this volume. There is perhaps no period in Bismarck's political life which provokes so much criticism as these years when, as a hot-headed "Junker" and an extreme Prussian reactionary, he fought against everything which was dear to German patriots. This period culminates in his defence of Prussia's subjection to the Austrian dictation in the Treaty of Olmütz, which later nobody stigmatised more unsparingly as a Prussian humiliation than himself. Although Marcks realises and does not fail to mention that Bismarck was at this time pre-eminently a party man, he puts this forward in such a mild and reserved way that few readers will feel what tremendous obstacles Bismarck put in the way of a sound development. He emphasises all the more his splendid powers as a parliamentary debater and journalistic free-lance, his unceasing activity in critical days, and the deep impression which his superior personality made upon friend and foe, even the older and more experienced. Marcks sums up Bismarck's political views at that time in a chapter well worth reading. Perhaps the most interesting but not always convincing section is his study of Bismarck's relation to Stahl, the great theorist of Prussian conservatism, whom Bismarck himself compared to Disraeli. His marriage and the much disputed question of his religious faith are treated with much attachment and subtle understanding. As compared with the first volume this contains little new material, for in the meantime almost every important document and letter seems to have been printed.

ERICH EYCK.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In *Those Days** Mr. E. C. Bentley has recorded his personal experiences in the period between the 'eighties and the outbreak of war in 1914. His description will revive many memories for his contemporaries, while their successors will read with interest of a very different London and Oxford, a very different Germany, from those of to-day. At St. Paul's School the author formed that intimate friendship with G. K. Chesterton which only ended at the latter's death. From his schooldays also date those witty, four-lined biographies, now popularly known as Clerihews (from their inventor's second name), though the first series did not appear in book form till 1905. At Oxford, Mr. Bentley was President of the Union and in close touch with John Simon, F. E. Smith, Hilaire Belloc and John Buchan. After being called to the Bar, he embarked on his serious life-work, journalism: as a leader-writer on the staff of the *Daily News* and, later, of the *Daily Telegraph*, he knew, and here portrays, many of the foremost members of his profession. The deep convictions on social and political questions, the wise judgment, the urbanity, which mark this book have made his press work notable. But in the public eye this solid achievement of many years has been eclipsed by the dazzling success of his *Trent's Last Case* (1913), admittedly a pioneer in detective novels, and unsurpassed since; an amusing account of its composition is given here.

The first four volumes have been published in a new Batsford series of *Home-Front Handbooks*† which are intended primarily for the thousands of evacuated town-dwellers who are new to rural life and desire an introductory guide to the beauties and pleasure of the English countryside. As such these little books, so far published, should prove a real boon, being packed with information and informally and lightly written by writers of distinction. Each volume contains some ninety-six small pages and is well illustrated, including between thirty and forty excellent photographs. Mr. Harry Batsford's contribution to the series, *How to See the Country*, covers the widest ground in sketching the main varieties and characteristics of the country scene and of rural buildings, and generally in describing how best to explore the countryside. Architecture is dealt with more specifically by Mr. Edmund Vale in *How to Look at Old Buildings*, which touches upon the main styles and historic significance of ancient buildings, both lay and ecclesiastical. Miss Frances Pitt's volume on *How to See Nature* is a most lucid and fascinating "introduction to the everyday birds, beasts, insects, plants, and so on that may be met with during a walk." *How to Grow Food* is a practical volume, wittily written by Miss Doreen Wallace for the novice who aspires to grow vegetables and to manage efficiently a garden. It is full of tips and information which even the experienced gardener may well appreciate.

* Constable. 1940. 12s. † Batsford. 3s. 6d. net each.

Professor Lillian Benson has contributed a short supplementary section in a new impression of that standard textbook, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 1789-1939*,* by Professor H. J. Grant and the late Professor Harold Temperley. In fifteen pages she summarises very usefully the main course of international events after the Munich Agreement until the end of last year. Apart from this addition, the full text remains unchanged, as contained in the original impression of the fifth edition published in January 1939.

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How Britain's Resources are Mobilised, by Mr. Max Nicholson, is a new *Oxford Pamphlet on World Affairs*† which describes the main organs of Government directing and administering the British war effort. He sketches the principal functions of the various Ministries, particularly on the economic side, and the general co-ordination of control. Unfortunately in certain respects the pamphlet requires revision owing to various changes made since its publication, including the reorganisation of the War Cabinet, the creation of a special Ministry of Aircraft Production and changes at the Ministry of Information. A short guide through the war-time maze of Government machinery fulfils a very real want, and it is hoped that this pamphlet may be revised and also enlarged at an early date.

Another pamphlet in this series which deserves to be read is *The Life and Growth of the British Empire*, by Dr. J. A. Williamson. It contains the briefest historical sketch, lucidly planned and written, of the foundation and growth of the second British Empire after the loss of the American colonies. For the reader who is ignorant of the main lines of imperial development during the last century and a half, this little pamphlet should prove a useful introduction to a vast and living subject.

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A new addition to "The Face of Britain" series is an attractive volume, *South-Eastern Survey*,‡ by Mr. Richard Wyndham. The author knows Kent, Sussex and Surrey intimately, and here he describes his wanderings in these counties, particularly through the lesser towns and villages and along the by-ways. Mr. Wyndham enjoys a power of vivid descriptive narrative which is here greatly enhanced by local historical knowledge and the inclusion of numerous good stories. The book should certainly be enjoyed by the "arm-chair travellers of the second Great War" to whom it is dedicated, and also be appreciated for the information it provides on many places in this great area. The text is admirably illustrated by more than 140 photographs taken by the author.

* Longmans. 16s. net.

† Oxford University Press. 3d. net each.

‡ Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.

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