

The
POLITICAL QUARTERLY
 VOL. XI. No. 1
 SEP 1940
 JANUARY-MARCH, 1940
 GOVERNMENT
 CONTENTS

	PAGE
Democracy and Nazism <i>By</i> SIR ERNEST SIMON	1
What is Wrong with the Germans? <i>By</i> A. L. ROWSE	16
The Great Evacuation <i>By</i> A. D. K. OWEN	30
Evacuation, Town Planning and the War <i>By</i> WILLIAM A. ROBSON	45
The Finance of War <i>By</i> PROFESSOR H. O. MEREDITH	59
The Attitude of Labour and the Left to the War <i>By</i> P. C. GORDON WALKER	74
SURVEYS	
Literature in Hitler's Party and State <i>By</i> HERSIN	89
Some Aspects of Soviet Foreign Trade <i>By</i> S. F. OSIAKOVSKI	102
Memoranda on Russian Economic Conditions	114
BOOK REVIEWS	
Parliament (Jennings) <i>Reviewed by</i> WILLIAM A. ROBSON	116
The Town that was Murdered (Wilkinson) MARGARET COLE	118
The Smaller Democracies (Simon); Democracy Up-to-date (Cripps); The Defence of Democracy (Murry); Democracy and Socialism (Rosenberg); Personality in Politics (Thomson) LEONARD WOOLF	120
Hitler's Route to Bagdad (Ward and others) ELIZABETH WISKEMANN	123
Stalin (Souvarine) R. H. S. CROSSMAN	126
Karl Marx (Berlin) A. L. ROWSE	127
Down River (Lehmann) VANDELEUR ROBINSON	131
National Capitalism (Davies) BARBARA WOOTTON	134
War Without Violence (Shridharani) SIR JOHN MAYNARD	136
Our Case (Hollis)	140

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VOL. XI. No. 2

APRIL-JUNE, 1940

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Who Shall Pay for the War? By BARBARA WOOTTON	143
The Presidential Election in the U.S.A. By PROFESSOR LINDSAY ROGERS	155
Utopia and Reality By LEONARD WOOLF	167
Parliament in Wartime. I By W. IVOR JENNINGS	183
Falangist Spain By BARBARA WARD	196
After Finland By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER	209
Britain's Town-Country Pattern: The Report of the Royal Commission By F. J. OSBORN	223
The Political Use of Broadcasting By A. LISTENER	234

SURVEYS

Public Opinion during the First Six Months By KINGSLEY MARTIN	249
Public Libraries in Peace and War By LIONEL R. MCCOLVIN	258

BOOK REVIEWS

The Constitution of England from Queen Victoria to George VI (Keith); How Britain is Governed (Muir) K. SMELLIE	268
The Politics of Democratic Socialism (Durbin) LEONARD WOOLF	271
After the Deluge. Vol. II, 1830 and 1832 (Woolf) H. L. BEALES	274
A History of Poland (Slocombe); Memoranda 1-5 (University of Birmingham) D. MITRANY	277
A Programme for Progress (Strachey) JOAN ROBINSON	280

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The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. XI. No. 3

JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1940

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Italy and the German Alliance	By BARBARA WARD 183
Notes on the Anglo-Saxon Character	By KINGSLEY MARTIN 198
Government Publicity	By WILLIAM A. ROBSON 219
Parliament in Wartime. II	By W. IVOR JENNINGS 232
The End of an Epoch	By A. L. ROWSE 248
Indian Self-Government	By D. GRAHAM POLE 261
A New Approach to America	By ALARIC JACOB 273
SURVEY	
The Truth about the Rates	By WILLIAM A. ROBSON 286
BOOK REVIEWS	
The American Presidency : An Interpretation (Laski)	Reviewed by H. N. BRAILSFORD 293
The Unemployment Assistance Board (Millett)	A. SUSAN LAWRENCE 296
The Unemployment Services (Hill)	298
Men and Ideas : Essays by Graham Wallas	LEONARD WOOLF 301
Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (Mannheim)	A. L. ROWSE 303
Mediterranean Problems (East)	306
Labour and Democracy in the U.S.A. (White)	HAROLD J. LASKI 308
Feeding the People in Wartime (Orr & Lubbock) ; Feeding the Nation in Peace and War (Walworth)	P. LAMARTINE YATES 310

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The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. XI. No. 4

OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1940

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Then and Now: A Comparison of Thoughts and Emotions in 1915 and 1940	By BONAMY DOBRÉE 314
The American Election	By D. W. BROGAN 322
Democracy at Bay	By LEONARD WOOLF 335
Paying for the War	By Q. FABIVS 341
Parliament in Wartime. III	By W. IVOR JENNINGS 351
What is Public Opinion?	By TOM HARRISSON 368
The Colonies in the War	By A. CREECH JONES, M.P. 384
The Family and the State	By EMMELINE COHEN 396
Britain and the Far East	By H. J. TIMPERLEY 405

BOOK REVIEWS

Reviewed by

Population Policies and Movements in Europe (Glass)	PROFESSOR A. L. BOWLEY 411
Federation and World Order (Wilson); Federal Union (Channing-Pearce); A Federation for Western Europe (Jennings)	PROFESSOR LAUTERPACHT 413
The History of Local Government in Manchester (Redford & Russell)	W. IVOR JENNINGS 416
Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (Gooch); The War Crisis in Berlin, July-August, 1914 (Rumbold); Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, Vol. II (Petrie); Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers (Sutton); The Causes of the War (Keith)	LEONARD WOOLF 419
Modern Turkey (Parker & Smith); Turkey at the Straits (Shotell & Deák)	DOREEN WARRINER 422
Evacuation Survey (Padley & Cole)	LADY SIMON 423
Food Production in Western Europe (Yates); Britain's Food Supplies in Peace and War (Smith)	C. S. ORWIN 425
The Jewish War Front (Jabotinsky)	RITA HINDEN 427

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DEMOCRACY AND NAZISM

By SIR ERNEST SIMON

INTRODUCTION

THE Prime Minister has stated our war aims as follows: "To redeem Europe from the perpetual and recurring fear of German aggression and enable the people of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties."

This expresses pretty well the views of the ordinary man; he is fighting to stop Hitler's aggression. But many people think this is not enough, and that the Government ought to state its war aims in more detail. I doubt whether this is either possible or desirable at present except in very general terms. But I am quite sure that there is one thing which we should begin to do at once and with the utmost vigour: to educate ourselves so as to be in the frame of mind when the war ends to make a just and enduring peace. There is grave danger that we may devote ourselves wholly to the winning of the war, that the foul brutalities of the Nazis, combined with the stress and horrors of a bombing war, may cause a bitter hatred of Germans, resulting in an evil peace. Nothing is more important than that we should, during the war, make every possible effort to maintain and strengthen our democratic faith, in the hope that, when the time comes to make peace, our representatives, backed by strong public opinion, may do all that lies in their power to make a durable peace based on justice and liberty.

It is true that we in Britain have democracy in our bones. It is equally true that most of us think very little about it and would find it difficult to explain clearly what are the ideals of democracy and what are the fundamental differences between a Nazi and a democrat. The finest statement of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

our war aims has been made by Sir Richard Livingstone in the following passage:

"... at bottom, and in our best moments, and so long as we are true to ourselves, we are fighting for some words which came into the world within the last few thousand years, and which are the core—the growing core—of real civilisation. Such words as justice, freedom, good faith, the right of the weak to consideration and to their place in the sun. The issue at stake at this moment is whether these words shall continue to have meaning and force in European politics, or not.

"The tragedy of modern Germany, the greatest evil of the Hitler regime, is that four at least of the great lights of the human mind—four essentials of any real civilisation—have gone out in Germany: mercy, freedom, justice, truth, have no meaning or force there.

"If any German could hear me he would probably say: 'More English hypocrisy. Have you always been just? Have you always stood for freedom? Have you always considered the rights of the weak?' And if we are candid, we should have to answer 'No.' And yet we can claim that a belief in justice, law, fair play, ordered liberty and the rights of the individual, have marked the Anglo-Saxon race, and are perhaps the greatest contribution of Britain to world history. One would like to think that they have become a permanent part of the national character. And certainly at this moment we might claim that we do stand for them, and that Germany does not."¹

Sir Richard makes a high claim for the democracies: that whereas the Nazis have destroyed the ultimate values which make civilisation in Germany and will destroy them wherever they have the power, the democracies have fostered these

values and will on the whole continue to do so. Let us consider as fairly as we can typical examples of the behaviour of Nazi Germany and of the democracies in each of these four fields—liberty, justice, mercy and truth.

LIBERTY

Of these four essentials the first in most men's minds is liberty. Wherever men are unfree or persecuted, the finer spirits are ready to die for liberty. From the days of Magna Carta, Britons have fought against the tyranny of kings, the tyranny of barons, the tyranny of churches. Bitter experience has taught us that no man or group of men are good enough and wise enough to be given arbitrary power over the lives of others. We are rightly proud of our seven hundred year struggle for the rights of the individual to live the life of a free man; a struggle to impress on those in authority the words of Cromwell's officer: "The poorest he hath a life to live in England as well as the richest he."

While it is true that those who are persecuted hold liberty as the most desirable thing on earth, those who have liberty as we have it to-day tend to forget it and to grumble about what they still lack. It is, however, surely a fact that though we are engaged in the most perilous war in our history, our freedom now is probably greater than has ever been allowed by any government to its people when engaged in a great war. Contrast life here with life in Germany to-day. We are free to listen in to the radio of the world, enemy or neutral. Indeed, listening to the egregious Lord Haw-Haw of Zeesen, the world's most impudent liar, is one of our most popular national amusements, and we know that listening to him will not lead us to the concentration camp.

In Britain we are safe in our own houses; we can go where we like, do what we like, say what we like. Two anecdotes illustrate the different conditions in Germany.

¹ *The Steadfast Mind—The Listener*, October 19th, 1939.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The first recounts a conversation between a German and a Dutchman: the German boasts of the greatness of the Third Reich, its power, its future. "It is true," replies the Dutchman, "we are a small people without a great future, but when early in the morning we hear a loud knocking at the door, we *know* it is only the milk." The second anecdote illustrates the danger of talking politics in Germany. Three men were sitting on a bench, one of whom was reading a paper. He said "Tch! Tch!" The second man picked up the paper, looked at it and said "Tch! Tch!" The third man rose to his feet and said, "If you fellows are going to commit the dangerous folly of talking politics, I'm off!"

In England the Press is politically free; in Germany the Press is gagged—there is no single opposition newspaper. In England Parliament is free; in Germany the Reichstag meets for the sole purpose of applauding on the rare occasions when Hitler deigns to make a speech to them. In Britain the leader of His Majesty's Opposition is a personage of importance treated with respect only less than that accorded to the Prime Minister. Where are the leaders of the opposition to Hitler in Germany to-day? Mostly dead or exiled; Schuschnigg is being slowly tortured to death.

The treatment of minorities is one of the best tests of liberty. The ruthless persecution of the Jews by Hitler sets up a new world record in intolerance: his treatment of Austrians, Czechs, and other minorities is only less relentless. The classic case of liberty and equality for minorities is Switzerland, where the rights of the Catholic and French minorities are as carefully safeguarded as those of the German-speaking majority. During the last war the German-Italian, who only had 30 per cent of the voting power between them, an actual majority of four out of seven places in the Cabinet.

DEMOCRACY AND NAZISM

It is not always realised that the treatment by England of its Scottish minority is at least as good as the Swiss case. I well remember whenever we had dealt in the House of Commons with an English Housing Bill, the House then proceeded to spend two or three days discussing a similar but separate Scottish Bill, with the sole object, so far as I could see—and certainly with the result—of giving a larger subsidy from the general taxes to the Scottish houses than to the English ones! And since 1867, when England may be said to have become a democracy, there have been twelve prime ministers, no less than six of whom have been Scotch, and one Welsh.

JUSTICE

If liberty is in men's minds the basis of civilisation, law is the basis of liberty. As Luigi Sturzo said: "The protection of a law common to all, without distinction of race or opinion, is the first, the lowest rung of freedom. If this no longer exists, a country has no right to call itself civilised or Christian."

The best statement I know of the importance of law to civilisation is in a brilliant chapter entitled "The Struggle for Law" in Walter Lippmann's book "The Good Society," from which the following is largely taken.

Lippmann distinguishes two schools of thought: first, the belief in the supremacy of man over man. This is the belief of tyrants and oligarchs: "It is the legalism of the barbarian, for every man, until he has been taught differently, is predisposed to believe that what he wills should have the force of law."

The other school of thought holds that "the idea of arbitrary power exercised at the wilful discretion of any man is alien to the very conception of civilised society. . . . That there is a law which is superior to kings, parliaments, magnates, majorities and mobs. . . . And that the gradual

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

encroachment of true law upon wilfulness and caprice is the progress of liberty in human affairs. . . ."

Lippmann proceeds to illustrate the slow progress of the struggle for law by showing that in England not more than four hundred years ago, the great mass of the agricultural workers had no access to the King's Courts against the arbitrary power of their lords. But by the early 1600's the emancipation had reached a point where Coke could write :

"But now copiholders stand upon a sure ground, now they weigh not their Lord's displeasure, they shake not at every suddaine blaste of wind, they eate, drinke, and sleepe securely ; onely drawing a speciall care of the maine chance to perform carefully what duties and services soever their Tenure doth exact, and Custome doth require ; then let Lord frowne, the Copy holder cares not, knowing himself safe and not within any danger, for if the Lord's anger grow to expulsion, the Law hath provided severall weapons of remedy ; for it is at his election either to sue a Subpena or an Action of Trespass against the Lord."

It is true that the English common law at that period was full of cruelty and injustice, but the essential point is that England had "arrived at the conception of a law governing human affairs which did not originate in the arbitrary fiat of the sovereign."

Locke thought it an evil thing that men should be subject to "the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man," but it is unlikely that he conceived a human will so arbitrary and so evil as that of Hitler.

The most shocking thing in Hitler's Germany is his open and contemptuous defiance of the rule of law. He kills and tortures men who in any way dispute his supreme authority—Protestants, Catholics, socialists, communists, or liberals ; he even kills and tortures thousands of men merely because

they are Jews, and because he personally hates them. Not only are his laws unjust, not only does he issue decrees having the force of law without any regard to the usual standards of civilised justice, but the courts have equally little regard to justice in administering the law when the victim is accused of anything contrary to the interests or wishes of the Nazi party. Germany under Hitler has reverted to a state of lawlessness far worse than the worst that existed in England three hundred years ago.

MERCY

If we have to choose a single quality in men that most makes life worth living, it is, of course, love (or mercy, or charity)—the degree of kindliness that prevails in the relations of man to man. And it is here that the contrast between Germany and Britain is most startling. One of the reasons why one believes in democracy is that stable democracy seems to make human beings more kindly. There has been plenty of cruelty in Britain in the past. Seven hundred years ago King John tortured Jews to squeeze money out of them. Three hundred years ago witches and heretics were burnt alive. A hundred and fifty years ago Howard's report on prisons at the end of the eighteenth century describes them as undrained, filthy and foul, with little water ; bedding consisted of rotten straw, food depended on charity, prisoners were heavily ironed whether felons or awaiting trial. Less than one hundred years ago Matthew Arnold "saw a multitude of children eaten up with disease, half-sized, half-fed, half-clothed, neglected by their parents, without health, without home, without hope."

But during the last one hundred and fifty years there has been an immense growth of humanitarian feeling. Slavery was abolished at a cost of twenty million pounds ; the treatment of prisoners, lunatics, paupers and children has

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

steadily improved. We are spending nearly five hundred million pounds a year on social services, health, education, social insurance, old age pensions; we have provided since 1920 millions of good houses with gardens at low rents for the workers—the world's finest achievement in working-class housing. Our police spend their time controlling traffic and looking after the safety of children going to school. A German refugee said recently: "I confess that I make an excuse to go to the police station occasionally. I have not yet got over the amazing joy of being treated kindly by the police." Though immense tasks still remain, humanitarian feeling is strong, and the great mass of individuals are really anxious to prevent suffering or cruelty.

In Germany also there was a great growth of the social services; but kindness was certainly less widely spread than in England. Now cruelty has been elevated by Hitler into a principle for the purpose of suppressing and terrorising all opposition. Contrast the English treatment of conscientious objectors in war-time with Hitler's methods in peace-time. The following report of the first meeting of one of the tribunals to deal with conscientious objectors is taken from the *Manchester Guardian* of November 3rd, 1939:

"Judge Burgis, when the tribunal assembled, expressed a desire for a friendly and understanding basis of approach. They realised, he said, the suffering that war entailed, and entered upon their duties with sympathy. They also did so with diffidence, because they realised that matters of conscience were sacred and something to be respected and revered. 'We hope those who come before us will not resent our questioning, nor think that we are persecuting conscience.'"

It is unnecessary to describe here the foul horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, since they have been fully dealt with in the recent Government White Paper. Surely these

DEMOCRACY AND NAZISM

facts more than justify Mr. Attlee's statement—"I believe that the issue before the world of democracy or dictatorship is one between civilisation and barbarism. I put it as strongly as that."

TRUTH

"Who ever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?" asked Milton.

Who ever knew Hitler to allow truth a chance of a free and open encounter? His contempt for truth, as tested by the methods of science, is complete. He uses it when convenient, otherwise he disregards it entirely. In physics and industry the scientific method is indispensable to a powerful Germany, and is used at least as freely and successfully as elsewhere. In biology truth is permitted so long as it is not inconvenient, but must conform to Hitler's racial theories; for instance, a text book on anatomy, after describing the liver, adds that the liver of a Jew is, of course, inferior to that of an Aryan!

When we come to politics, Hitler not only lies, but is perhaps the first national leader for centuries to boast that he lies. He says in "Mein Kampf" that the very first condition of national propaganda is to build up "a systematically one-sided attitude towards every problem that has to be dealt with," and adds in another part of the book: "The bigger the lie, the more readily will it be believed. Something always sticks from the most impudent lies."

That Hitler practises what he preaches is well shown by the following extract from the Prime Minister's broadcast on September 3rd, 1939:

"He gave his word that he would respect the Locarno Treaty; he broke it. He gave his word that he neither wished nor intended to annex Austria; he broke it. He declared that he would not incorporate the Czechs in the Reich; he did so. He gave his word after Munich

that he had no further territorial demands in Europe; he broke it. He gave his word that he wanted no Polish provinces; he broke it. He has sworn to you for years that he was the mortal enemy of Bolshevism; he is now its ally."

HITLER AND THE FOUR ESSENTIALS

Hitler is the greatest demagogue in history, he has a single aim, pursued with relentless fanaticism: power and domination; the military greatness and glory of the Reich, with himself as arbitrary and unquestioned leader. His success has been amazing and without precedent. He has made Germany an immensely powerful tool under his personal control. He has terrified the whole world.

While he has rendered immense services to Germany in the sense of making her powerful and feared, his disservices to German and to world civilisation are tragically greater. He is entirely without the fundamental virtues; what *he* wishes is right, what *he* believes is true. He cares nothing for freedom or justice, mercy or truth, and without these all his other great qualities, courage, initiative, tenacity, temperance, and his tremendous personality and oratorical power are merely means to enable him to do evil more successfully.

It was a German professor who pointed out that the building of civilisation has been a slow process: the Greeks first taught mankind the free use of human reason; the Hebrews gave us Christianity with its doctrine of love and respect for the personality of every individual; the Romans taught us how to establish the rule of law over a great empire; France and Britain have shown the way in the struggle for liberty. These, he said, were the four essentials of civilisation: truth, love, justice and liberty. And he added that Hitler had destroyed them all in Germany, and would destroy them throughout the world if he had the power to do so.

TWO IRRECONCILABLE IDEALS

Professor Breasted, the great American archæologist, pointed out that certain words such as justice, conscience, character, emerged between four and five thousand years ago in Egypt—the greatest discovery in the whole sweep of the evolutionary process. Man had existed much as he is at present since the days, perhaps half a million years ago, of the Neanderthal man, whose brain was the same size as ours. For the whole of that period man fought against nature and against other men—an unending fight for power. He has been fighting for spiritual values only for five thousand years. The age of material conquest has lasted half a million years, the age of character less than five thousand. Professor Breasted regards this story of the rapid rise of man in the last few thousand years as an incomparable basis for confidence in the future.

The Hitler regime in Germany is by far the greatest and most sudden blow ever struck against the progress of civilisation in the last 2,500 years. It has become clear to all democrats now that nothing can stop Hitler except force; and France and the British Commonwealth are doing what lies in their power. As Lord Halifax has said: "The method and consequences of German aggression are nothing less than the destruction of everything that gives life its value. England and France seek to re-establish for themselves and others the liberty of the reign of law, the right of people to decide their own destinies, to trade freely, and to live without fear."

It is true that democracy has been well defined as the search for agreement by discussion, that compromise and tolerance are essential virtues of democracy. But there are limits: democrats must never tolerate hatred and lies, nor those who attempt by violence to abolish liberty and mercy and truth. There must be force behind any system, however civilised it may be. Our dislike of Nazism is not that it uses

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

force, but that it uses excessive force and hateful types of force to promote barbarous objectives. It is partly because the most civilised people have shut their eyes to the need for maintaining a civilisation by force that Hitler has found his opportunity. The vital difference is between the use of force by a government based on the will of the people in support of peace and freedom, and the use of force based on the arbitrary will of a group for purposes of aggression and domination. It is a dangerous delusion to believe that we can substitute an age of reason for an age of force; we must see that ample force is provided and maintained under full social control behind our ideal of civilisation. If democracy is timid and half-hearted in these matters it cannot survive in a world of violence.

Nobody suggests that the democracies are perfect. Far from it. There is some truth in the accusations so freely hurled against Britain by the extreme left of "Imperialism," "Monopoly Capitalism," "Exploitation"; there is still poverty, injustice and inefficiency in all democracies, even in the smaller ones like Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, where perhaps the best results have been achieved.

But while freely admitting their defects, it still remains true that the fifteen democracies which exist to-day are undeniably the countries which most consistently seek peace and the rule of international law, the countries in which the essentials of civilisation have progressed most steadily and furthest. And while the achievements of the democracies are great, their promise is far greater. The whole course of history, as well as a study of the contemporary world, justifies, I believe, an optimistic faith that, given peace and security, the democracies will steadily progress towards a world order in which all men and women will have the opportunity of developing the best that is in them. That is the faith and inspiration of democrats.

We must beware of self-righteousness. But surely our cause in this war is the cause of justice; surely the Prime Minister was right in saying "It is the evil things that we are fighting against." During the last century Britain and the democracies have been the dominating powers in the world till Hitler challenged their authority. During that period the smaller democracies of Europe lived in peace and security. It is sometimes said that war never settles anything—a dangerous and nonsensical statement: this war will certainly settle, among other things, whether the smaller democracies of Europe are to be free to carry on their great experiment in the art of living together in peace and freedom, and whether the three million Jews in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia are to be tortured to death.

The civilised world is facing one of the supreme crises of its history. It is confronted by a clash between two irreconcilable ideals, the ideal of liberty supported by the democracies, and the ideal of arbitrary force supported by Hitler. A Nazi victory will not only destroy the freedom of Europe; it will endanger every fine achievement of democracy. A democratic victory will leave the way open to a finer and nobler world civilisation.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

What can we do here and now to strengthen our own democracy? How can we prepare ourselves to make a peace based on democratic principles when the time comes?

One fundamental fact which democracies have never sufficiently understood is that democracy depends on education. The best minds have known it for thousands of years. Plato put it forcibly: "We call man a gentle animal; and, if nature has been kind to him and his education has been right, he is the most gentle and godlike of creatures. But if his education is inadequate or bad, he becomes the

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE GERMANS?

By A. L. ROWSE

THAT there is something wrong with the Germans, something profoundly wrong, the whole of modern European history in the past century is so much evidence. But what it is precisely that is wrong, what is its nature and its roots, is a difficult matter to diagnose. And yet it is exceedingly important that we should understand the issue, for the problem of Germany is the problem of Europe. It is the heart of the problem of how to organise European order. And yet many English people hardly realise that there is a problem there. They may see quite well the threat to ourselves and the rest of Europe involved by Nazidom, and be prepared to resist its aggression; and yet they do not see that there is a problem behind that, the nature of the German mind, or at any rate the dominant German mind, for the last hundred years, its essential *difference* from the mind of civilised Europe, north, west and south.

English people, particularly the more uneducated they are, are prone to think of Germans as only another sort of English people who happen to talk a different language. The post-war years of a comparatively liberal régime under the Weimar Republic—and how many Germans hated it, groaned under its “oppression”!—served to encourage the delusion. But it is interesting to observe that it is precisely those people who know Germany least well, who do not know German history or the language or its literature and have never lived there, who entertain most illusions about Germans. English people with a superficial acquaintance with Germany are always impressed by “how much easier

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE GERMANS?

it is to get on with Germans than it is with the French; after all, they are our cousins,” etc. But the real truth about that was once put to me by a very intelligent person who knew both well; he said that all the similarities between us and the Germans were on the surface, and all the differences between us and the French; but with a German, the more you got to know him the more you saw how different he was, whereas with a Frenchman, in spite of the differences on the surface, when you really got down to rock-bottom, you realised how like he was, that he accepted the same standards, the same fundamental values. The fact is that the French and the English are part of Western civilisation; it is questionable whether the Germans are. At any rate, there is a problem there, in spite of the great and admitted contributions of many Germans to Western civilisation.

The fact is that it is a problem, and a tragic one, within Germany herself: a struggle, which has been lit up with a lurid glare for all the world to see in these last years, though the best observers have known that it has been going on for much longer than that, a struggle for the German soul. On one side the forces of reason and culture, of science and the will to co-operate with the rest of Europe, contributing from the resources of German genius to the common stock; on the other, the forces of barbarism, the denial of reason and culture, the cult of violence and aggression, the inflamed inferiority-complex, the envy, the jealousy, the *schaden-freude*, the megalomania—in all these things Hitler is the very mirror of the German soul, or the dominant elements of it: hence his success, accompanied by the deliberate cutting themselves off of Germany from Western civilisation, which these dominant elements fear because they know it is superior, taking refuge in the depths of their own hideous Teutonism, making of their very worst faults and characteristics a national creed and a doctrine.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

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Why on earth are they like that? Whatever has made them what they are? One may well wonder. Some historians, going back a long way, put it down to their never having been conquered by Rome. Certainly those parts of Germany which came under Roman rule, the Rhineland, Bavaria, Austria, have always been the most civilised parts of Germany. But there remained the interior depths of the country, with its barbarian population of Teutons, which—alas for themselves!—retained their integrity, a solid core of Teutonic barbarism unaffected by the influences of civilisation, which we know—despite the ravings of lunatics like Houston Stuart Chamberlain—have all come from the Mediterranean peoples, Greece, Rome, the Jews, Italy and France. From that solid core of Teutonic resistance, those interior depths, have come a succession of anti-Europeans, leaders whose mission it has been to encourage the Germans, often very heroically, to resist Europe, to assert their own difference, to make a virtue of their barbarism as against reason and civilisation. Luther was the greatest of all such leaders: he came from those depths, not from the civilised fringes of Germany whence sprang his great opponents, Charles V and Erasmus: he spoke out of the burning welter of unreason and belief within him to the hearts of his Germans, ready as always to respond to that sort of appeal.

Luther has been well described as the typical German, the man who of all others sums up the character of the German people. Hitler is in the direct line of succession to Luther; there are very striking similarities between them and in their rôle as Germans against Europe. What is more comic is that as one reads Tacitus' account of the Germans under their *fürher*, Arminius (I suppose he would have been called Hermon), one might be reading about contemporary Germany: there is the same *volksgemeinschaft* with its *volk-und-blutsgefühl*, the principle of *führerschaft*, the same back-

ground of intrigue and disunity disguised behind the façade of following the leader, the same herd-spirit, the primitive love of fighting for its own sake, the people in arms. What a pity for them that they were not conquered by Rome! Western Europe has owed everything to the Roman expansion; if only Germany had come fully within the pale of Roman civilisation, she would have been perhaps supreme in Europe.

But the Germans have always resisted Europe; the influence of Rome in the shape of Christianity came to them late and incompletely. It came in the person of one of the greatest of Englishmen—Boniface, the apostle, who was slain in interior Germany by the Nazis of the eighth century.

At the crisis of Renaissance and Reformation we again see the same dichotomy in the German soul. On one side Luther, the apostle of blind, unreasoning faith, of thinking with the bowels, of nationalism and force, in short of Germanism; on the other Erasmus, a Low-German, born in the ancient civilised Low Countries, the protagonist of reason and moderation, of toleration and reform, of peace and a Christian international order, a true European. It is a matter of great historic significance that the issue on which their famous dispute took place was on the freedom of the will; that Erasmus wrote his plea *De Libero Arbitrio*, while Luther replied with his *De Servo Arbitrio*, taking pleasure in the thought how little freedom there is in the human will, revelling in the insistence upon the necessity for submission to the divine will (whatever that may mean: *he* meant Luther), an ultimate denial of individual volition and individual responsibility. How German; how disgusting! "The Holy Ghost is not a sceptic," cried Luther in triumph; for Erasmus, with an audience of primitive and foolish people, could hardly reply, "The Holy Ghost is just a delusion." Luther was very subject to delusions. The Germans being what they are,

Luther had not much difficulty in winning. But civilisation was with Erasmus: his is the truly tragic figure.

At the time of the Enlightenment, there is the same dichotomy between the pacific cosmopolitanism of Kant (he had Scottish blood in his veins), and the calculated fraud, treachery and violence of the Prussian Frederick (whom foolish old Carlyle made his hero). There is the same contrast later between the great European, Goethe, and the loathsome German megalomania of Hegel; between the *blut und eisen politik* of Bismarck, which put back the clock in European politics fifty years and led ultimately to Europe uniting against Germany and compassing her overthrow in 1914-18, and the internationalism of Marx pointing to the future. In our own time there is the contrast between the hopes of social progress and peaceful, international co-operation raised by the Weimar Republic, all too ineffective though it was, and the relapse into barbarism of the Nazis with their deliberate terrorism and brutality, their pursuit of power at all costs and without any restraints, their denial of all political morality.

The point is, why are the Germans like that? It is impossible to acquit a nation of all responsibility for the way it is governed and the way its government behaves. It is very unreal to make a complete disjunction, as so many illusionists are doing in this country, between the Nazis and the German people. Those who know Germany know that there is something in the German people which responds to this sort of thing, which likes kicking a man when he is down, which does not mind torture and brutality, which respects success at all costs, thinks breaking your word is a sign of cleverness and aggression a sign that you have Providence on your side, which rejoices at the thought of being on the side of the big battalions and does not care who goes to the wall. The problem is, why are they like it? What is wrong with them?

There are many reasons, geographical, historical, social, which may be suggested why they are as a people so unsatisfactory, such bad Europeans. (I do not need to point out that I do not mean all Germans individually; we all know many who are among the best Europeans: I mean the Germans collectively, the dominant impression they give of themselves to the world, of which some of the most intelligent Germans have been painfully conscious.)

In the first place, they are rather a frontierless people, and that has had a profound influence upon their mind. They have never had the precise and perfectly definite frontiers that England has enjoyed throughout much of her history, or France, or Spain, or Sweden or Italy. They inhabit a block of central Europe and the North European plain, ill-defined by geographical features though rather cut into by them within. The effect has been to make them emphasise their unity as a *volk* speaking the same language, for the want of the very political unity as a nation which England and France achieved so early. But the effect has been even more profound than that, though more difficult to define: this circumstance has had its influence in communicating a certain frontierlessness, a lack of precision such as classical peoples like the French and Italians so admirably possess, a haziness such as has made them so difficult to deal with diplomatically, which yet expresses itself by its very nature in the boundlessness of its claims and of which the reverse side is the brutal emphasis, when it does crystalise, upon *macht* which appeals to every German, or at least the dominant German type. All this may be read at large in their diplomatic dealings, not only in the period since 1933—and it is notable how many Germans have felt happier since then, it has enabled them to give rein to what they really feel: in that sense, as their peculiar friends in this country used to claim, Hitler restored their self-esteem, their pride as Germans once again—not only since 1933, but

long before that throughout the whole epoch of Bismarck and William II.

We know very well the historical reasons that are adduced to excuse this attitude, and they certainly do explain a good deal: the facts of German disunity and particularism, the fact that the achievement of a national state was so belated, that when it was achieved it was not through the victory of the more civilised and liberal elements, but by means of the most reactionary, the Junker aristocracy of Prussia with its obedient, submissive peasantry, that makes such good cannon-fodder politically and militarily. (So the Nazis have found, too.) It is just as if England had achieved political unity under the ægis of reactionary, fighting Ulster, an Ulster five times as large and ten times more powerful, which extended in a bulk across the whole North of England and into the Midlands, instead of having been united centuries before under the civilised South. One can see with sympathy the plight of the more civilised Germans of the Rhine, the northern sea-board with its cities and their tradition of liberal culture, and the Catholic south with its heart in Vienna. But, all the same, it is hard to forgive the total ineffectiveness, the spinelessness, the disastrous disunity of the liberal elements in Germany. They completely failed to take their opportunity in 1848; Bismarck and the Prussian militarists took it for them. It has been the central tragedy of modern Europe that the unification of Germany came about that way: a liberal, federal Germany, peaceful and co-operative, would not have collected around itself a world of enemies, brought about by the constant threats to their independence, would not have reduced Europe to a theatre of internecine conflict whose only arbitrament is war, with Germany taking delight in having reduced us to such barbarism, making a cult of it when they should be repenting their sin against civilisation in sackcloth and ashes—and no doubt in time

they will receive their punishment as once before they did. But Bismarck succeeded where German liberalism failed; and the latter has failed signally again in our time. I know there were external factors aiding the process, but the German people could have made a better stand for the Republic if they had wanted to, whereas they gave the game to the Nazis. And behold now!—it looks as if Europe will have to go in and civilise the Germans, if we are to have any lasting peace in the world: that is at root what we are fighting for.

But whatever the historical and social causes—and this is no place to traverse the whole of German history—there can be no doubt about the upshot, the problem of the dominant German mind, its character and the threat it holds for European civilisation. It has been uppermost now for over a century, since the romantic reaction against the cosmopolitan rationalism of the French Revolution. Santayana, in a brilliant diagnosis of the intellectual situation published in the last war, traced its roots back to the tradition of German philosophical idealism, from Kant and Fichte to the magnificent and monstrous megalomania of Hegel, with whom it reached its fullest and most umbrageous flower. And certainly no country can show such a tradition of thought which has so consistently distorted the evidence of common-sense experience, insisted that the world we know is not what we think, erected another world of German egotism writ large in metaphysical terms, and imposed it for philosophy upon the world. It is certainly an astonishing achievement; Santayana diagnosed the truth about the situation twenty-five years ago in a magnificent passage which does not need a word of alteration but only underlining to-day.

“The transcendental theory of a world merely imagined by the ego, and the will that deems itself absolute, are certainly desperate delusions; but not more

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

desperate or deluded than many another system that millions have been brought to accept. The thing bears all the marks of a new religion. The fact that the established religions of Germany are still forms of Christianity may obscure the explicit and heathen character of the new faith: it passes for a somewhat faded explanation, or for the creed of a few extremists, when in reality it dominates the judgment and conduct of the nation. No religious tyranny could be more complete. It has its prophets in the great philosophers and historians of the last century; its high priests and pharisees in the Government and the professors; its faithful flock in the disciplined mass of the nation; its heretics in the Socialists; its dupes in the Catholics and Liberals, to both of whom the national creed, if they understood it, would be an abomination; it has its martyrs now by the million, and its victims among unbelievers are even more numerous, for its victims, in some degree, are all men."¹

No country in the world has had such a tradition of thinkers who believed only in the assertion of the will as against reason and common sense, in the supremacy of force, the desirability of war, the State as the *terminus ad quem* of all politics, the be-all and end-all of all social endeavour, the denial of freedom and international order, the futility and even the unmorality of international peace: Fichte, Herder, Arndt, Schlegel, Hegel, Treitschke, Clausewitz, Nietzsche, Houston Chamberlain, Bernhardt, Spengler, and the still lower and coarser vulgarisers of the tradition among the Nazis, Rosenberg, Hitler, Moeller van den Bruck, Goebbels. The strength of the Nazi *weltanschauung* is due—English people do not realise it, for they regard it, quite rightly, as a mixture of mystical nonsense and calculated lies—to its being the culmination of a long tradition going on in Germany for over a century. Nazi-ism is but the contemporary

¹ v. Santayana: *Egotism in German Philosophy* (published 1916, republished 1939), p. 69.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE GERMANS?

version of that tradition, coarsened and jazzed-up to appeal to the total lack of any cultural standards in the lower middle-class. It is this tradition translated into the language of Hollywood.

Inconceivable as it is that any civilised person should fall for it, yet the Germans do: it is no use blinking the fact that the Nazi creed and code answer to something deep down in the German nature—it would not else be so successful. The fact is that the Germans are a singularly credulous and gullible people, without any critical standards, so that they can never tell a good egg from a bad egg intellectually, whether in politics, or art or life. No other people in Europe would have believed the inspissated, congealed nonsense first of Fichte, then of Hegel, then of Treitschke and Houston Stuart Chamberlain, then of Spengler, now of the Nazis. The intelligence of the French, the common-sense of the English, the scepticism of the Italians, would never have stood it. Yet the Germans lap it up, and the more pretentious and pseudo-academic it is, the more they like it. Hegel was undeniably a genius, though a first-class disaster to European thought; but nobody except the Germans could have swallowed the pretentious rubbish of Houston Chamberlain's "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century." The book was intended to prove, with a wealth of irrelevant references and misplaced ransacking of books good, bad and indifferent, that the culture of Europe was the work of *die Germanen*, i.e., the Teutons, in which term Chamberlain was good enough to include the French, the Celts, the Latins and even the Slavs. If he meant to say that European culture was the work of Europeans, he did not need two volumes to say it in. If he meant to say that European culture was the work of the Northern-European peoples, he was plainly wrong, for it owes its whole foundation to the Mediterranean peoples. But the Germans must have their pernicious rubbish or their pretentious nonsense in two

fat volumes: there are the pseudo-philosophisings of Keyserling, the "Travel Diary of a Philosopher" (in two vols); the notorious *Untergang des Abendlandes* of Spengler (another two large volumes), of which it is only too easy to read the motive, a piece of *schaden-freude* erected after the German manner into a whole system of thought which argued that because Germany was defeated in the last war, *ipso facto* Western Europe was declining to its fall. So naïf, so simple; yet all elaborated and systematised *ad nauseam* in the typical German manner! So also with the even coarser and more brutalised doctrines of Rosenberg and Hitler: the former's *Mythus des 20 ten Jabrhunderts*, fat and foolish and indigestible, while *Mein Kampf* also has its two volumes.

Why are the Germans such fools as to swallow it all, or even in part? The answer is given by Hitler himself in a celebrated sentence which he removed from the text of *Mein Kampf* as he drew near to power: "German political leaders have no conception of the extent to which the German people have to be gulled in order to be led." He understands his Germans well; and indeed, it must be said to his credit that nowhere does he disguise his contempt for them or his low estimation of their intelligence. "*Die Intelligenz der gewöhnlichen Leute ist sehr beschränkt und dafür ist die Vergesslichkeit gross,*" etc., again and again. He has certainly proceeded to act in accordance with his estimation of them, and he does not seem to have been mistaken. Nor is it a new feature in their character. Before they lapped up the pernicious Nazi rubbish, they lapped up the Hohenzollern claptrap: so much so that it took four years of war, with all the nations against them before they broke. For the Germans are an obstinate, and —no one will deny—a physically courageous people. If only they had less physical and more intellectual courage, Europe and Germany herself would be the better and the happier. But perhaps, as Santayana says, they do not in their hearts want

to be happy: according to Fichte, self-assertion, not material success, is the goal. He elaborated an educational system so thorough-going that men should be incapable of willing anything but what the State wills them to will. The Nazis have brought that into being: he was an exact precursor of their ideas: they are very deep-rooted in the German mind.

The greatest asset in the inculcation of these savage and retrograde ideas in the mind of a passive people is their submissiveness, their readiness to obey, their lust to be led. They are an excessively obedient, docile people: as someone has said, the only great people in Europe who have never had a Revolution, at any rate a real Revolution. Penetrating observers both without and within have noted this fatal trait in the German people. "They will never rise," wrote Bakunin. "They would rather die than rebel . . . perhaps even a German, when he has been driven to absolute despair, will cease to argue, but it needs a colossal amount of unspeakable oppression, insult, injustice, and suffering to reduce him to that state." Nietzsche observed from within: "They are always so badly deceived because they try to find a deceiver. If only they have a heady wine for the senses they will put up with bad bread. Intoxication means more to them than nourishment; that is the hook they will always bite on. A popular leader must hold up before them the prospect of conquests and splendour, then he will be believed. They always obey, and will do more than obey provided they can get intoxicated in the process."

How prophetic and true this is. When Bismarck made it clear that he did not want any more conquests, he became comparatively unpopular; so was William II for the first few years when he tried to carry out a good neighbour policy, genuinely pacific in intention. It cannot be denied that his glittering, competitive rodomontade after 1892 appealed to the Germans, their naïveté, their childishness, their self-

THE GREAT EVACUATION

By A. D. K. OWEN

IT may well be that events more tragic than any we in these islands have experienced will dwarf the happenings of the first four months of the present war, and cause us to look back upon the domestic excitements and disturbances of this period with new eyes. To our normal vision, however, it appears as though we have already experienced a major social upheaval. A vast movement of population has taken place, due, not only to the mobilisation of the armed forces and the expansion of employment in the war industries, but also to the fear of aerial bombardment. Thousands of families have been broken up. Husbands have been parted from wives, children from parents. Domestic privacy has been invaded. Urban and rural ways of life have been brought into sharp conflict. Class barriers have been not so much broken down as ignored, often with heartening, but sometimes with unfortunate, results. The education system has been reduced temporarily to a shambles and a great strain has been placed upon local government authorities in areas which have received a great influx of population. Happily, the "*Blitzkrieg*," in the shadow of which these things have been endured, has so far not broken upon us. We still enjoy sufficient immunity from the worst evils of war to be able to pause for reflection, to correct some of our mistakes, and even to make a new start where things have gone irremediably badly.

THE OFFICIAL EVACUATION SCHEME

The recognition by the Government of the need for an official evacuation policy, in view of the danger to our cities, is astonishingly recent. The word "evacuation" did not

appear in the Civil Defence Bill which was introduced in November, 1937, and there was some doubt as to whether an obscurely worded general clause in that Bill did, in fact, cover the powers required to arrange evacuation.¹ It was not until July, 1938, that a Committee of the House of Commons, under the Chairmanship of Sir John Anderson, recommended that "schemes of evacuation covering the main industrial centres of the country" should be worked out and the necessary organisation set up.² The Government accepted the Report in principle and steps were taken, without further delay, to implement its recommendations. It was not possible, however, to do much before the September crisis, which made it necessary to improvise an emergency scheme for the evacuation of London school children.

After the emergency had passed, preparations for working out a detailed scheme were resumed at a more leisurely pace. "Evacuation," "neutral" and "reception" areas were defined according to the estimated degree of risk in different parts of the country, and plans were made for the transference of certain priority classes—rather more than 3 million school children, mothers and young children, expectant mothers, and blind and crippled people—from the "evacuation" areas to the "reception" areas. Early in 1939 a detailed survey of accommodation in the reception areas was undertaken with the help of the local authorities and a large army of voluntary workers. As a result of this survey, billets for over 4 million official evacuees were discovered, in addition to which it was noted that about a million billets had been earmarked for private evacuation. If the scheme had been prepared several years earlier, it would have been possible to have made special provision for considerable numbers of "evacuees" in camp school and holiday camps designed to

¹ *Security: Can we retrieve it?* Sir Arthur Salter, p. 189.

² Report of Committee on Evacuation, Cmd. 5837. Para. 29.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

importance, their envy of others with a more secure place in the sun. After a whole essay on the subject of the jealousy the English felt for the Germans, Ernst Moritz Arndt concluded naively, "If only we were where you are now!" A great, but sober-minded man like Stresemann did not really appeal to the Germans, nationalist as he was; it needed somebody like Hitler—who is in all his moods a medium of the German people, a mirror to express their rasping inferiority-complex, their envy, their brutality, their unreliability, the simple belief of peasant cunning that it is clever to lie, to go back on your word—it needed a Hitler to arouse the German people. They like that sort of thing, or at any rate a certain side of them does, the dominant side. Then it is idle to deny that they are responsible and to put off their misdeeds on to their leaders.

But why are they like this? Is it that they cannot bear the sober reality of the world, as the French or the English or the Americans or the Scandinavians see it? There is a great deal in this: they feel uncomfortable with a plain, common-sense view of the world and life: it revolts them. Their characteristic writers all animadvert against our lack of idealism, our low commercialism, our want of chivalrousness. Why cannot they bear the plain truth? Why must they assert themselves against the facts of life, the very conditions of existence? The answer was once given me by a very distinguished German, who confessed that they feared that if they did not they would go under; that they had to assert themselves or they felt null and void, insufficiently alive, just nothing at all; that at the heart of the German people there is a real neurosis.

Of that neurosis we are all, as Santayana says, now in some degree victims. All these characteristics of the German mind, the inverted sentimentalism the reverse side of which is their brutality, the unsureness of themselves which expresses

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE GERMANS?

itself in their disgusting exhibitions of aggressiveness towards others, their persecution of minorities, their erection of anti-Semitism into a deliberate policy—it has been called the "socialism of the lower middle-class," but it is rather a pathological disease, a crime against civilisation: all these things are very understandable psychologically. They are symptoms of a dominant neurosis verging upon madness.

But one does not cure a homicidal maniac by letting him have his way. One shuts him up for the safety and security of the rest of the community. At the very least, our estimation of the German mentality must influence our conception of our war-aims and the kind of peace that is safest for Europe. A mentality such as has been dominant in Germany over the past century does not bear trifling with; it is no good trying to compromise with it; the only safe thing is to root it out.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

serve two purposes. Arrangements were actually made for the use of the existing permanent camps and other buildings which appeared to be suitable and, in response to a widely expressed demand, a modest scheme was introduced whereby 50 camps, suitable for holiday and evacuation purposes, were to be constructed by two state-aided non-profit-making concerns.¹ It was evident, however, that, in the circumstances of the time, the burden of hospitality would have to be shouldered almost entirely by private householders. The scale of allowances for the maintenance of evacuees which was announced by the Government was not ungenerous (though experience has shown that additional allowances are needed in some cases) and the response to the Government's appeal to householders for offers of hospitality was magnificent.

Promises of what was considered to be adequate accommodation having been secured, detailed arrangements were made for the registration of those who wished to take advantage of the scheme; the distribution of evacuees among the various reception areas; the organisation of transport facilities; the reception and billeting of evacuees; the payment of billeting allowances; the recruitment of official "helpers"; the provision of stores of bedding and blankets; the organisation of medical, nursing and educational services in reception areas; and the establishment of local tribunals to hear grievances and adjust differences arising out of the billeting arrangements. A surprising number of government departments were involved in these arrangements: the Ministry of Health, which was responsible for the general organisation of the scheme in England and Wales,² the Board of Education, the Ministry of Transport,

¹ The National Camps Corporation (in England and Wales) and the Scottish Housing Association (in Scotland).

² In Scotland the Department of Health for Scotland was in charge of the arrangements, acting in conjunction with the Scottish Education Department.

THE GREAT EVACUATION

the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Labour, the Unemployment Assistance Board, and the A.R.P. Department of the Home Office. Detailed arrangements in the evacuation and reception areas were placed in the hands of the local authorities in each case, and the co-operation of thousands of voluntary workers was sought for the purpose of arranging welfare activities. In the light of experience it is easy to point to faults of organisation and errors of judgment, and even to put a finger on mistakes which appear to be inexcusable. Nevertheless, when the full story is told, the organisation of the evacuation scheme will probably be recognised as one of the most remarkable achievements of the British Civil Service.

THE SCHEME IN OPERATION

When it became clear, during the last few days of August, 1939, that war was virtually inevitable, and that heavy bombing might be expected at any hour, it was decided to put the scheme into immediate operation. During the first week-end of September, in the shadow of the breaking storm, the great movement took place. The first surprise came early. The numbers coming forward to be evacuated under the official scheme were unexpectedly low. Less than half of those for whom billets had been promised went away. The story of the lengthy train from which descended one small boy is doubtless apocryphal, but it is certainly the case that many evacuation trains carried very few passengers. Nevertheless, it is a remarkable thing, reflecting great credit on those who made the arrangements and on those who took an active part in conducting the evacuation, that the task of moving nearly a million and a half people, under the threat of war, should have been carried through without a single casualty and with no serious mishap of any kind. Occasional mistakes were made, children were delivered at the wrong

destination, expectant mothers descended upon communities which had made great preparations for the reception of schoolboys. And there were some delays and minor confusions. By and large, however, the job was carried out in an orderly and efficient manner, with patience and forbearance, tact and good humour. Parents and children, officials, teachers, transport workers, police and public-spirited volunteers in their thousands co-operated in making a success of this gigantic undertaking. It was a notable democratic achievement.

When these things have been said it has to be admitted that, as a contribution to the safety of the civilian population in the most vulnerable areas, the evacuation was only a partial success. In all the evacuation areas taken together, more than half of those in the official priority classes were left behind and, if the heavy bombing which was expected had taken place during the first week of the war, it is certain that there would have been a large number of casualties among those who ought to have been away in the country.

In London, the response to the scheme was fairly good. Fewer unaccompanied school children than were expected came forward, but an unexpectedly large contingent of mothers with young children presented themselves for evacuation. In all the English provincial evacuation areas, the movement of women and young children appears to have been on a very small scale and in some towns the percentage of school children evacuated was extremely low. There were some striking and inexplicable differences between the percentages of school children who were moved from some of the provincial evacuation areas.¹ Newcastle-on-Tyne sent away 80 per cent of its school children and Gateshead, across the river, sent away 60 per cent. But two equally vulnerable

towns on the East Coast, Sunderland and Middlesbrough, sent away only 33 per cent and 29 per cent respectively of their evacuable school children. In Lancashire, Liverpool evacuated about 74 per cent of the number who registered, but this was only 55 per cent of those who were eligible. Manchester sent away two-thirds of its school children, and Salford evacuated about the same proportion. Across the Pennines in Yorkshire, evacuation was taken less seriously. Leeds sent away only 26 per cent of its school children, Bradford only 31 per cent, and Sheffield (one of the most obvious target areas in the country) a derisory 17 per cent. In the Midlands, Derby sent away 46 per cent of its "evacuable" school children, but Birmingham evacuated only a quarter of those who were eligible. Of those who made up the priority classes in Scotland, only 173,748, or 34 per cent, were actually billeted in reception areas. It should be pointed out, however, that in all these places there was a certain amount of private evacuation outside the official scheme, even among those who were included in the official priority classes.

How are we to account for the general reluctance of a large proportion of the population in all evacuation areas to take advantage of the scheme? The present writer's personal experiences in Scotland suggest that uncertainty concerning the financial aspects of evacuation played a considerable part in deterring many people from going away, or from permitting their children to go. Quite apart from the compulsions of natural affection, all that is meant by the phrase "home ties" and the devastating fears which grip so many people when they are faced with a step into the unknown, there is no doubt that many mothers with young children were deterred from going away because they were in financial difficulties, often unknown to their husbands, or because they feared that a divided household would upset their precariously balanced domestic budgets. Others were uncertain of their

¹ I am indebted, for the figures in this paragraph, to an interesting series of articles appearing in the *Manchester Guardian* during November, 1939.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

husband's position as an applicant for unemployment assistance or public relief. Lack of respectable clothing deterred some. A few had visions of lucrative employment in local factories on war work. And there was often a reluctance to lose touch with local sources of charity or family help. Compared with the risks of bombing these matters may seem trivial, but for many working class housewives living on a small income they had much more reality than the possibility of being killed or maimed in an air raid. The principal reason, however, for the poor response of mothers of young children was undoubtedly their unwillingness to be separated from their husbands. "If he stays, I stay," was a frequently encountered phrase in more than one evacuation area.

Economic factors also deterred some parents from sending away their children of school age. Unable to pay for proper boots or clothing for their children, they preferred to keep them at home. The allowances paid by the Unemployment Assistance Board for children are not large but there were parents who felt that they could not afford to lose them even though their household expenses would presumably have been reduced in their children's absence. But, as in the case of the mothers, it is non-economic factors which appear to have been principally responsible for the low percentage of evacuated school children. Thirty-eight per cent of the parents interviewed by the Liverpool University investigators, in the course of their illuminating survey,¹ gave as a reason for refusing to allow their children to go away that one or other of the parents could not bear the separation. And it is not unlikely that many of the other reasons which were given ("child is in bad health, bad nerves, is difficult," "child became suddenly ill") were often rationalisations of parental possessiveness.

It is probable that more careful preparatory work and

¹ Preliminary Report on the Problems of Evacuation: University of Liverpool Press.

THE GREAT EVACUATION

more effective publicity, directed towards the poorer sections of the population, relating to the financial implications of evacuation, would have resulted in a more satisfactory response to the scheme. It seems doubtful, however, whether anything short of compulsory measures would have achieved the results which were aimed at.

AT THE RECEPTION END

The public spirit shown by the population of the reception areas when the evacuation began was remarkable. In hundreds of towns and villages throughout the country large numbers of people turned out to welcome the evacuees. Fleets of private cars were placed at the disposal of the billeting authorities, and no effort was spared by the local committees and their helpers to make the mothers and children as comfortable and as cheerful as possible while billeting was in progress. In some places, an unfortunate sense of anti-climax was produced when it had to be announced that none of the expected guests were going to arrive or when a small batch of a dozen or so children arrived where a hundred or more had been expected. Many householders were crestfallen when they found that there was no need for them to take anyone after all. On the other hand, there was a good deal of grumbling and occasionally flat refusal when householders, who had promised to take unaccompanied children, were invited to give hospitality to small family groups, or expectant mothers. The difficult and often invidious task of the billeting officers would in many cases have been eased if the sending authorities or transport officials had informed them of the changes in numbers. But poor local organisation, and failure to prevent enterprising householders from collaring the healthiest-looking evacuees immediately on arrival, were also responsible for many unnecessary difficulties in some places. Billeting promises

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

were sometimes not honoured, and this caused a good deal of embarrassment in reception areas where full numbers (or more) were received. In Scotland, where the mistake was made of allowing mothers who were being evacuated with pre-school children to take their older children with them, great difficulties were experienced in finding proper accommodation for large families. Mothers stubbornly refused to be parted from any of their children and, as the reception authorities refused to countenance urban slum conditions of overcrowding, rooms in boarding houses and public institutions had to be requisitioned.

It would be a mistake to lay too much stress on these difficulties. Much more serious problems arose when rural Britain woke up to the fact that the personal hygiene of a considerable section of the urban population of these islands is anything but exemplary. The stories of unclean heads, body lice, dirt, and generally unsanitary behaviour may have been grossly exaggerated, but there was sufficient truth in them to give great concern to thousands of householders and officials in the reception areas. In some places, cleansing stations were improvised at central points, after the experience of the first day, but the chief burden fell upon the householders. The discovery of skin diseases and other minor ailments needing prompt attention provided a more difficult problem, which was tackled in some areas by establishing amateur clinics until it was possible to supplement the local school medical and nursing services with doctors and nurses sent out from the evacuation areas. Bed wetting and other unpleasant habits could not be dealt with so readily but, in time, the worst cases were moved from private billets and segregated. The policy of institutional billeting, not only for cases of the type which have been mentioned, but also for "difficult" and unruly children, has been followed increasingly in recent months. If it had been adopted from

THE GREAT EVACUATION

the start (and here the existence of a large number of permanent camps would have been extremely useful) a great deal of heart-burning and much of the ill-odour into which the evacuation scheme has fallen could have been avoided.

THE DRIFT HOME

Before the end of the first fortnight of evacuation, it was evident that a considerable drift home from the reception areas was in progress. The expected air raids had not taken place and there was a change in the mood of the population, both at the evacuation and at the reception end. The drift back was most noticeable in the case of mothers with young children. Absence had reinforced the feelings and considerations which had made many mothers doubtful about leaving their homes. Even when they were not unhappy in their billets, the strain of separation from their husbands, loneliness, nostalgia for familiar sights and sounds, financial anxieties, and a sense of "not belonging" as it was sometimes put to the present writer, led numbers to return. Unsatisfactory accommodation in outhouses, empty buildings, attics and cellars, resulted in the return of some women, and there were many other cases, where the accommodation itself was excellent, but where incompatibility of temperament or of social habits led to friction with the hostess and an eventual break. Of the unaccompanied children, a much smaller proportion have returned but, in the aggregate, their numbers appear to be considerable. The principal factor here has been the unsettling effect of parents' visits, and it is worthy of remark that the proportion of returned children appears to be much larger in cases where the distances between evacuation and reception areas are short. Failure to understand the terms of the Government's proposals for the recovery of billeting expenses (abruptly and ambiguously announced on the wireless some weeks after war had broken out) resulted in the recall of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

some children. And unhappiness due to billeting misfits was responsible for many returns. A cardinal weakness of the preliminary arrangements appears to have been the failure of the sending authorities to take the receiving authorities into their confidence concerning such important questions as the social class, religion, and general characteristics of the evacuees who were to be sent to them, and there was some lack of imagination shown in the distribution of particular groups of evacuees to particular areas. This failure, together with the absence of proper institutional provision for the inevitable "problem cases" of all kinds, made intelligent billeting well-nigh impossible. Better staff work on these points would have prevented many minor tragedies and misfits and would almost certainly have reduced the number of those who returned to their homes. Thanks to the excellent work of the Tribunals and to the endeavours of bodies such as the Womens' Voluntary Service, many personal difficulties have been solved and much has been done to make the evacuees feel at home in their new surroundings. It is probable, however, that a great deal more could have been achieved if these activities had been supplemented by the use of trained social workers, itinerant child guidance clinics, lectures and wireless talks to help hostesses who were unfamiliar with the ways of children to deal with the baffling problems with which so many of them have had to struggle.

THE POSITION TO-DAY

It is impossible to feel anything but profoundly dissatisfied with the present state of the evacuation scheme. In spite of all the work which has been devoted to it and the sacrifices which have been made, the fact remains that very few mothers, and probably less than a third of the school population of the evacuation areas, are now away from home.

THE GREAT EVACUATION

Christmas will be a severe test (mitigated by the admirable plans which are being made for the seasonable entertainment of evacuees) and by the time this article appears even lower levels will have been reached.

In the reception areas, the situation is in many ways not unsatisfactory. "Natural selection" and a considerable amount of reforming zeal has transformed the unhappy situation of three months ago. The survivors appear to have settled down quite cheerfully. The few mothers who remain have had time to make the necessary adjustments and many of the children have become so attached to their new mode of life that it is plain that another crop of emotional problems will have to be faced when the remains of the official scheme have to be put into reverse gear. All evacuated children are now receiving some schooling, either in groups which preserve the identity of their old school, or by assimilation with local children (or, in some cases, with private evacuees drawn from many different parts of the country). Thousands of teachers from the evacuation areas are now working in the country, and excellent use is being made of the educational opportunities which life in a rural area presents. Arrangements have also been made for supplementation of the local school medical staffs by doctors, dentists, and nurses sent down by the education authorities in the evacuation areas. And some of the reception areas have become a laboratory in which many fascinating educational and social experiments (residential nursery schools, communal housekeeping, the extension of school meals and so on) are being conducted.

But this is very much less than half the picture. The situation in the evacuation areas is very different. Owing to the requisitioning of many schools and the absence of adequate air raid protection for most of the others, more than half the children of school age in these areas have been without normal education since before the summer holidays.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of drift, possibly inspired by the belief that, if and when bombs begin to fall upon our cities, there will be time enough to evacuate those who will then wish to go. But drift is always wasteful and in the present circumstances it may lead us to irreparable disaster.

EVACUATION, TOWN PLANNING, AND THE WAR

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

THE exigencies of warfare against a totalitarian state have already induced Great Britain to establish a series of Governmental controls immensely greater in scale and scope than any hitherto imposed at the beginning of a war. The immediate introduction of compulsory military service for men up to forty-one years of age ; the rationing of petrol, coal, electricity and gas ; the restrictions on foreign investments, capital issues, foreign currencies and the sending of remittances abroad ; the control of all important raw materials ; the prohibition of specified exports and the restriction of imports ; the requisitioning of hotels and other large buildings throughout the country on an unprecedented scale ; the requisitioning of stocks of foodstuffs and commodities in the hands of manufacturers and dealers ; the control over the food supply exercised by the Ministries of Agriculture and of Food ; the control over news, photographs, news-reels, information and propaganda carried out by the Ministry of Information ; the system of national registration of every individual and the issue of identity cards ; the large powers possessed by the Minister of Home Security in regard to black-out regulations and air-raid precautions generally : a parallel to these and similar phenomena can only be drawn with Government intervention introduced under great pressure at a late stage in the Great War of 1914-18. And even so, many of the present controls either had no counterpart in those days or are so much more comprehensive and severe that they cannot be identified with those previously known.

The resource of parents, teachers and education authorities in improvising modern "Dame Schools" in private houses, has done a little to relieve the situation in some places and, after a long delay, some classes have been re-opened in ordinary school buildings. But it is a matter of deep concern to all who take a long view of the future welfare of this country that a whole generation of school children should be suffering such irreparable loss.

THE FUTURE OF THE EVACUATION SCHEME

What is to be the future of the Evacuation Scheme? We are still at war and there is no sign of peace on the horizon. We must, therefore, be prepared for the air raids which have so far not taken place. There is no place which is absolutely safe from German bombing planes anywhere in these islands, but it is obvious that some areas are in much greater danger than others. The evacuation of these areas on a voluntary basis has failed. Does it not follow, therefore, that we should adopt the logical, if drastic, course of organising the *compulsory* evacuation, at any rate of school children, from some of the present evacuation areas, and plan a war-time system of education in the reception areas? If serious air raids do take place, compulsory evacuation may become a dire necessity. Then why not plan it now and carry it out before the end of the winter? The answer is, of course, that such a policy, involving as it would, on the one hand, the compulsory disruption of families, and, on the other hand, compulsory billeting, will remain a political impossibility until there is some positive sign that the enemy intends to make a practice of raiding our great cities in considerable force. There are, however, two limited measures of compulsion, which appear to be within the bounds of practical politics, at the present time.

There can be no strong objection to scheduling certain

districts within the existing evacuation areas as being specially dangerous—(all places, for example, within a certain distance of military or naval targets, shipbuilding yards, docks and important railway junctions)—and prohibiting any child of school age from living in them, save in very exceptional circumstances. And it is unlikely that serious opposition would be aroused if the law of school attendance were amended in such a way as to prevent parents from bringing their children home from reception areas without good reasons. The corollary of the first measure would be to transfer all schools serving the prohibited districts to reception areas, where some of them might be established in requisitioned mansion houses or other buildings as residential schools. The second measure would make it possible to plan ahead with some assurance that the population for which plans were being made would not melt away before they matured. Schools in those parts of the evacuation areas which lay outside the prohibited districts should be opened as soon as they have been given reasonable protection. The dangers of ignorance and indiscipline are more serious than the risk of being killed or maimed by an enemy bomb. But a new approach should be made to parents in these areas to persuade them to allow their children to be evacuated (or re-evacuated) voluntarily.

In the absence of any compulsory powers, it is difficult to see how the evacuation scheme can be successfully rebuilt on its present ruins. Moreover, until there is some certainty as to how many children are to be provided for at home and how many in the different reception areas, it will be impossible either to restore order in the public system of education or to work out satisfactory solutions to the many financial and administrative problems which have arisen as a result of the overlapping activities of sending and receiving authorities in the reception areas. The present policy is one

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Considering the promptness with which the need for all these Governmental controls was foreseen before the outbreak of hostilities, and the various Ministries and bureaux required for their operation either organized on paper or actually established in a "shadow" form, it might be thought that the war has heralded the opening of a new and important chapter in our national life, a chapter in which planning would be the principal theme. There are certain unobservant people who are labouring under the impression that September 2nd, 1939, may be regarded as the Great Divide between the old regime of competitive, chaotic, capitalistic individualism and a planned economy in which community needs will receive prime consideration.

That this is a profound fallacy I shall show from an example which, seen in its proper context, is so important as to be virtually conclusive.

The example occurs in the domain of town and country planning: the one sphere in which the need for planned control has received Parliamentary recognition for thirty years. The first statute authorising town planning was passed in 1909, when Mr. John Burns introduced the Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act of that year. During the three decades since then a long series of measures on the subject have found their way to the statute book, whereby the scope of territorial planning was extended from the town to the countryside, and from the undeveloped outskirts of cities to their built-up centres. An ever-increasing stream of powers was showered on the heads of local authorities of all classes.

The impetus behind the town planning movement came at first from a desire to improve urban amenities. It was later reinforced by a desire to preserve the countryside. Neither of these objects was realised in any considerable degree. The paradox was revealed that despite a manifest

EVACUATION, TOWN PLANNING, AND THE WAR

increase in public sensibility to æsthetic considerations and social welfare, as compared with the Victorians, for example, our own age has been far more destructive of the things we value than was theirs. The Victorian era despoiled only the towns and industrial places such as mining areas; while we have desecrated the countryside as well.

The reckless expansion of London, Birmingham and other overgrown centres; the industrialisation in terms of one huge industry of such a town as Oxford; the hopeless decline of the derelict areas in South Wales, the Tyneside and elsewhere; the loss of coherence and compactness in suburban settlements; the frustration of main highway functions by ribbon development; the destruction of rural loveliness over vast stretches of countryside without the emergence of villages or towns; the frequent destruction of coastal amenities and downland beauty by bungaloid eruptions: these features of the most recent phase of the Industrial Revolution since the end of the Great War are so well known and well marked as scarcely to require recapitulation. They are the measure of the failure of the town and country planning movement up to the present.

The causes of that failure are twofold. In the first place, the administrative machinery was wrongly conceived. The essential initiative was left to local authorities, and not even the larger ones were selected for the task. It was assumed that the correct procedure for territorial planning was to start at the bottom with comparatively small units. For any larger type of organisation reliance was placed on the hope that local authorities would voluntarily form themselves into regional committees. This was done in a certain number of cases. The Minister of Health was given a few limited functions in regard to the supervision of local planning bodies, but his jurisdiction is mainly confined to approving their schemes, and hearing appeals against their decisions.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The second cause of failure was that no attempt was made to control the location of industry on a national scale. Local authorities could zone particular parts of their areas for industrial or commercial or residential purposes; but this left untouched the crucial question of control as between areas. There was no organ that could look at Britain as a whole, and decide in which areas, if any, further industrial expansion should be prohibited; and in which places it should be permitted; and in which places it should be definitely encouraged. Without a fundamental control of this kind exercised by a central body, all local territorial planning was in vain, even where the intentions were good.

It was abundantly clear that effective planning could only take place if the initial responsibility rested with a national department or commission, which would be charged with the formulation of a master plan laying down certain essential matters on a nation-wide basis, including the location of industry, trunk roads, national parks, railway development, harbours and docks, coastal reservation and certain other factors; while it would be left to regional and local authorities to work out detailed regional and local plans in conformity with the master plan. Planning would thus start from the top and work downwards instead of beginning with the small local unit devoid of knowledge, skilled personnel or resources.

The almost complete absence of effective control over urban development during the past twenty years was accepted by the unthinking multitude of citizens because they did not realise that modern techniques in public administration and applied science have placed within our hands the power of conscious control and the possibility of deliberate design in the pattern of social living. The business world accepted it partly because they regard any form of planning as a danger to profit-making, partly because they failed to understand

EVACUATION, TOWN PLANNING, AND THE WAR

the economic advantages of territorial planning, and partly because they were still imbued in these matters with the mental outlook of the nineteenth century. Politicians accepted it because they did not see that the matter had any political significance.

There were, however, a number of individuals and groups who voiced with increasing emphasis their concern at the evil effects of unplanned urbanisation and industrialisation. The Commissioner for the Special Areas in England and Wales attributed much of the misery with which he was confronted to the excessive expansion in London and the South-East region. The Garden Cities and Town Planning Association put forward a reasoned plea for the planned decentralisation of population in satellite towns of moderate size. The Council for the Preservation of Rural England, S.C.A.P.A., and the National Trust devoted themselves to the special task of resisting the impact of the Petrol Age on the countryside. Numerous other bodies were concerned with particular aspects of the question. The forces of protest were too divided and scattered to produce any large effect on public opinion until their agitation began to be reinforced by the sinister march of events in the realm of international relations.

The darkening European scene, and the possibility or probability of war, gave a new and sharper point to the arguments which had been advanced on social and æsthetic grounds against the unrestricted expansion of huge conurbations and the concentration of industrial undertakings in giant cities. The problem of defence against air attack began to loom large as a major problem of national security. By the autumn of 1937 the subject had become sufficiently relevant to immediate issues for the Government to appoint a Royal Commission "to enquire into the causes which have influenced the present geographical distribution of the

industrial population of Great Britain and the probable direction of any change in that distribution in the future ; to consider what social, economic or strategical disadvantages arise from the concentration of industries or the industrial population in large towns or in particular areas of the country ; and to report what remedial measures if any should be taken in the national interest." Sir Montagu Barlow was appointed Chairman.

An interesting and acute account of the proceedings of this enquiry was given by F. J. Osborn in an article entitled "The Problem of the Great City : A Royal Commission at Work" which appeared in *The Political Quarterly* for July-September, 1938. In his concluding words Mr. Osborn remarked : "The Report of the Commission will be awaited with great interest not only in this country but in all parts of the world. For the problem of the great city is one of the most difficult and dangerous problems of our civilisation."

The Commission's labours continued until late in the summer of 1939. A great mass of evidence, both official and unofficial, had been taken and required sifting ; and there were numerous points of difference between the members of the Commission to be thrashed out. It is believed that on certain crucial matters it was impossible to obtain agreement, the most important being the question whether the central planning body should have executive or only advisory powers in regard to the location of industry. Ultimately, the Commission divided ; and majority and minority reports were prepared. It was arranged that the Report should be published in the autumn.

Meantime, war broke out. On 27th September, Mr. A. Edwards, M.P., asked the Prime Minister in Parliament whether, as the necessity for evacuation on a large scale emphasises the necessity for the scientific planning of the location of industry, he would call for the immediate

publication of an interim report of the Commission studying this subject. Mr. Chamberlain replied : "I am afraid that in present circumstances the pressure of urgent work more directly connected with the war precludes the printing and publication of a report."

Mr. Edwards : "Can the Prime Minister say whether it is not a fact that this report has been held up for a long time owing to a disagreement among the members of the Commission?"

The Prime Minister : "I am not aware of that."

The abandonment by the Government of the Reports of the Royal Commission, and the suggestion by Mr. Chamberlain that its task was so remote from war-time needs that it no longer deserves serious consideration, involves far more than the mere frustration of two years' work and the throwing away of a vast mass of evidence which had been accumulated with great labour during that time. It involves an attitude of mind in regard to war-time problems which is of great importance. It also betrays a deplorable inability to learn one of the great lessons from the present emergency.

The terms of reference of the Royal Commission, it will be noted, emphasised the "social, economic or strategical disadvantages" arising from the concentration of industry and population in large towns or in particular areas : no mention was made of any advantages arising in that connection. So it is a fair inference that in 1937 the Government was apprehensive of the social and military results of uncontrolled urbanisation, and anxious to consider the possibility of planned decentralisation of population.

Any remedial or preventive action which might have resulted from this recognition of danger was, of course, entirely ruled out by the short interval which still remained before the outbreak of war. Hence, in preparing measures of passive defence the Government was compelled, quite

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

properly, to consider the actual situation as it existed, and to leave out of account any modifications in that situation which might be introduced by long-term planning.

In the prevailing circumstances a policy of evacuation was, I think, unquestionably the right one to adopt in the event of war with Germany. The particular methods employed are no doubt open to criticism from various angles; but no government in its senses would have left the civilian population crowded together in the great cities with no better guarantee against indiscriminate bombing than the humane instincts of Field-Marshal Goering. The fact of evacuation may even itself have deterred the German Government from a *Blitzkrieg* attempt on London and other giant centres.

But to concede this should not blind us to the profound sociological and political implications of this policy of evacuation. It represents a complete reversal of historic trends.

For thousands of years men flocked to the city in search of safety. The Greek *polis* was a citadel before it was a city: some high rock or fortified hill from which the citizens could defend themselves in time of war. The walled city of the Middle Ages was essentially a fortress, and innumerable towns were built in the shadow of a fortified castle. The military strength of the large town was an important factor in urban growth all over Europe until modern times.

Now, for the first time in history, men, women and children are fleeing from the great city in search of safety. They are seeking refuge against the danger of air attack in country villages, in remote seaside resorts, in smaller towns, in the stately homes of England, in far-off villas and cottages. This is something entirely different from the evacuation of cities threatened by advancing armies, which has been a commonplace of war through the centuries. It indicates

EVACUATION, TOWN PLANNING, AND THE WAR

that the normal pattern of our existence in peace-time is such that it is not merely useless in time of war, but a positive menace to life and limb, according to the prevailing military opinion.

With European society in a condition in which war is an ever-present possibility, whether conducted in furtherance of the principles of collective security, or merely on the lines of individual conflicting Powers, we ought never to have allowed this country to drift into a state of affairs in which wholesale evacuation is an essential measure. The critics of unrestricted urbanisation, far from being the Utopian and impractical dreamers they were apparently considered to be by successive governments, were advocating measures which were not only desirable on social grounds, but highly necessary from the standpoint of national security.

Yet this is certainly not recognised either by politicians, Civil Servants or the public. The reckless, unplanned urbanisation which produced the overgrown cities and conurbations that are regarded as the danger spots of Britain, has been succeeded by a headlong evacuation no less heedless and unplanned. The remedy is as irrational as the disease.

The disadvantages of a policy of evacuation are painfully and abundantly clear. On its personal side, it results in the destruction of family life on an unprecedented scale; the separation of parents from children and of husbands from wives. On its local government side, it leads to a dislocation of social services which is having the most serious effects in the spheres of education, public health, housing and public finance. On its commercial side, it leads to an exodus of banks, insurance offices and other undertakings to unsuitable country mansions which must inevitably have detrimental economic consequences. In regard to the dispersal of Government offices it has led to a great outcry from hotel proprietors whose premises have been requisitioned; but

that is only a minor aspect of the matter. We can only guess at the disorganisation caused by the removal *en bloc* of huge Government offices—or parts of Government offices—at a time when they are working at exceptional pressure.

The uncertainty of the period for which evacuation is to last adds to the difficulties of the situation. If the war lasts a year or two years, the break-up of family life will no doubt be endured with fortitude and resolution. But if it continues, not merely for the three years envisaged by the Government, but for four or five years, will parents and children, husbands and wives, be willing to bear the separation? These difficulties must be mentioned because the evidence shows that the essential lesson which should have been learnt from the mistakes of the past, and which has resulted in our present discontents, has not been learned. That lesson is the necessity for effective territorial planning.

For some months before the outbreak of war, the menacing international situation was beginning to have an effect on previous tendencies. There were signs that industrial expansion was slowing down in Megalopolis, and increasing in smaller and more remote places. Industrialists were beginning to question the assumption they had made for so long that proximity to the largest consuming markets is a supreme and indispensable advantage. Banks and large commercial houses were beginning to acquire "alternative accommodation" for their records and headquarters staffs. The Government had embarked on a scheme of camps to be used for holiday purposes while peace lasted and for evacuation in case of war.

Now that war has started, this reversal of trends will, of course, be intensified and extended in many different ways. No new factory will be established in or near the greatest cities; and existing factories situated in those cities are not likely to be extended. The building of flats, shops, houses,

garages, etc., in the principal industrial and commercial centres has stopped completely, since evacuation immediately made such projects certain to be uneconomic, and existing premises of all kinds in those areas became under-used or empty in large numbers. Suburban development, again, has been arrested by the curtailment of motoring through petrol rationing and the black-out.

On the other hand, reception areas have received a considerable stimulus. There is a shortage of almost every type of building in such places. Shops are catering for a substantially enhanced demand; schools, hospitals and other municipal institutions are crowded and overcrowded; private houses are being used as offices, as hostels, as college lecture-rooms, and for a dozen other purposes for which they were not intended. Thus, the small or smaller towns, the seaside resorts, the university and cathedral centres, the capitals of the more rural counties, the larger villages, are suddenly congested with a great influx of population and purchasing power brought in almost overnight. And though no one knows how long either the war or evacuation will last, it is inevitable that a great deal of building construction will be put in hand in such places in the near future to relieve the pressure on existing accommodation.

Quite apart from this is the tremendous demand for premises coming from the military and civil authorities. The immense expansion of the Royal Air Force and the Army means not only a pressure on existing accommodation through billeting, but the provision of a vast number of new buildings of many different kinds in and near camps or aerodromes. New aerodromes and camps are seldom, if ever, situated on the outskirts of metropolitan cities, but in the open country. And since soldiers and airmen have money to spend and leisure hours, they create a demand for shops and cinemas and public houses in the villages and towns

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

nearest to their camps or aerodromes. The surprising thing is the relatively short time it takes for a response to be made to such a demand. Our economic system is extremely flexible in this respect, whatever else may be said of it.

The evacuation of Government offices on a large scale has exerted a similar deflection of demand in geographical terms. The towns to which the various Ministries have exported their headquarters staffs are of course feeling the effect in improved trade, in a shortage of housing accommodation, in all the ways which normally result in building expansion.

One cannot mention particular names, but it is obvious that the places to which civil staffs are evacuated and where military camps and aerodromes have been established are in no sense coincident with the pre-war centres of attraction for population. On the contrary, their sites have been determined by factors which are the precise opposite of those social and economic causes which set in motion the trends that had prevailed since the opening years of the twentieth century.

This reverse movement may easily become as detrimental to the environment, and entail as many social, economic and æsthetic disadvantages, as the unplanned, unrestricted urbanisation against which it is a reaction. The large country mansions which have recently been acquired by banks and commercial firms for business premises will no doubt in course of time become surrounded by blocks of offices plumped down in convenient spots in the grounds to provide additional accommodation. These in turn will give rise to a rash of bungalows, hutments, garages, canteens, club-houses, cafes, Y.M.C.A. centres, and all the other structures which will clearly be required for the office staffs. One can imagine the result after two or three years of war.

It has recently been announced that the Government's

EVACUATION, TOWN PLANNING, AND THE WAR

future policy in regard to evacuated Civil Servants is to accommodate them in camps and hutments rather than in hotels. Here again is a fruitful source of muddle, waste and despoliation unless it is carefully controlled.

The requirements of the military authorities will no doubt provide the most powerful argument in favour of planned control in war-time. Of course, the demands of the War Office and the Air Ministry for camps and aerodromes must be met without question or delay. But there are different methods of meeting even urgent military demands. Quite often an intelligent civilian planner can suggest a site which is better even from the military or Air Force point of view than the one asked for by the authorities, while at the same time avoiding unnecessary social or economic disadvantages.

Armament firms, and those engaged in making commodities for the troops or for the war needs of the civil population, will require new works on an extensive scale. There is no one at present to tell them where to go. The War Office might perhaps warn them against selecting certain places, but that is all the guidance they can expect to receive, for the simple reason that it is no one's job to think about the matter. It would certainly not come within the ambit of the Ministry of Supply.

It would be the gravest mistake to permit all these new and necessary constructions arising from the military, Air Force and civil needs of the Government, and from the consequences of evacuation, to take place in utter confusion, or on the basis of *laissez-faire* and with a complete disregard of the peace-time situation which will follow the war. Most of our war-time exigencies are, strangely enough, entirely consistent with socially desirable peace-time purposes. The reversal of trends of which mention has been made is, indeed, the very object which many enlightened persons interested in social affairs and territorial planning have long been

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

advocating. The movement is in the right direction. Whether it will turn out to be beneficial to the nation depends entirely on whether it is brought under the discipline of a central planning organisation, armed with adequate powers and endowed with practical vision and creative imagination.

There were some gigantic mistakes in the Great War in this sphere of activity. The selection of Richborough, for example, for the cross-channel ferry, regardless of the immense amount of dredging continually required to keep the river free, was a conspicuous instance of costly waste which in no way helped to win the war.

We can avoid this type of error and surmount with a reasonable degree of success the many problems arising from the transition of the country from peace to war. But we cannot hope to do so unless we resolutely divest ourselves—and the Government—of the fallacy that we can or should avoid planning during the war; that planning is in some way an impediment to victory; or a peace-time luxury. On the contrary, now is the time when town and country planning should acquire a new and more important status, and be placed in the hands of a strong central department competent not only to deal with the special needs of the service departments and the Government offices, but also to take over the long-overdue task of directing the location of industry and formulating a national plan for the whole country.

THE FINANCE OF WAR

By PROFESSOR H. O. MEREDITH

EXPENDITURE by our central government during the war may be expected to amount to more than 40 per cent of national income before the war, *i.e.* to exceed (at pre-war prices) £2,400 millions. Taking local expenditure into account, we shall be lucky to escape with less than 50 per cent of national income during the first twelve months of hostilities and may probably have to concede a higher percentage if the war continues.

I propose to discuss some of the economic considerations which are relevant to the financing of such large expenditures.

In the strict sense no such thing exists as a financial impossibility. Finance is merely a mechanism for enabling the assembly or dispersal and the functioning of economic force. A community may break because it has not enough munitions or food: it cannot break because it has not enough money. It may, nevertheless, be undone in the region of finance if it does not see essentials clearly, or lacks initiative and discipline to act in accordance with them when seen. If, for example, we drifted into such a spiral of inflation as did Germany in 1923-4, our civilian front would probably give way. And the like might happen if we piled taxation too heavily at points where it could only be borne with exasperation, and involved a rapid decay of will or power to produce.

What we require to raise is income rather than capital: it must at least be taken from the income-producing capacity of the community and not from its capital accumulation. The exceptions to this are not unimportant but they are limited. In so far as we can import advantageously from abroad, such importation may be balanced by sale of securities,

especially those of the countries concerned (our own will not be marketable in bulk). Secondly, in so far as we can postpone repairs and replacements of our domestic accumulation, we may divert productive resources to the supply of current needs. Each of these possibilities is limited in extent and is a wasting asset, valuable rather as an initial mass of manœuvre than as a permanent resource.

This consideration is relevant to a claim which is often voiced that capital as well as men should be conscripted. This claim is well-founded if it means conscription of the *uses* of capital. That, however, is already provided for by our scheme of high taxation. It is unsound if it suggests that capital wealth can by any juggling be converted into currently consumable goods and services. Taxes levied on capital, in so far as they might exceed what the owners could retrench out of income and were met by sale of capital assets, would merely provide cheap bargains for those who had income surpluses to invest: they would set up a special type of war profiteering which incidentally would evade excess profits duty.

It is generally agreed that if the whole expenditure of government exceeds reasonable tax revenue, the excess should be covered by borrowing, and that the alternative of direct or indirect inflation is to be deprecated. Let us consider briefly why. If prices rise without limit, there ensues an enormous and random differentiation between those whose incomes are fixed or relatively fixed and those whose incomes rise more than in proportion to the rise of prices. This is in itself a considerable evil, but its consequences—privation for some, extravagance of others, accentuation of envy and suspicion, continuous quarrelling over attempts to adjust income, disinclination to save (and lend to government) are much worse. Note: A decline of purchasing power induced by inflation cannot be prevented by rationing, for

this cannot cover a tithe of the things on which income money is spent. Rationing, indeed, somewhat exaggerates the evil, since the increase in spending money is applied to a narrower range of commodities whose prices in consequence rise disproportionately. To argue thus is not to condemn all increase of prices. A moderate increase, sufficient to give confidence to entrepreneurs and ensure fuller employment, may be very desirable at a period when a good deal of expensive and risky change over is needed from one line of production to another. I would not say that a general increase in prices of 10 to 20 per cent is undesirable or that a rise of even 100 per cent would be disastrous. I do say that the latter would be very wasteful as compared with alternatives which are open to us.

We are already moving in the direction of inflationary methods of the indirect kind—*i.e.* finance of loans by increase of bank deposits rather than by curtailment of consumption on the part of lenders. For though the short term borrowings of the past quarter may possibly have been met without net additions to deposits, this has been made possible in the main by the growth in the entrepreneur demand for liquidity carrying with it that widespread contraction which has pushed up unemployment figures: there has been no considerable saving out of personal income available for expenditure on consumption. Moreover, up to the present, little effort has been made to bring home to the general public the need for personal economy. The screw has been turned in some degree upon public authorities and is doubtless being twisted by many large institutions: but this, in the main, is to turn it in the wrong direction, to reduce expenditures which nourish the national dividend rather than to promote economy of what is *de facto* produced.

Accepting the view that we should aim at raising out of non-inflationary taxes and loans as much as government

spends and that this must be in order of magnitude 50 per cent of national income, let us begin by considering the chief difference between these two methods.

Note first: what the government is going to buy with the money is the same in each case—viz., current services and material products. We shall not, by taxing, have more to consume in the future than if we borrowed: we shall not, by borrowing, have more to consume in the present than if we taxed. Broadly, that is, present and future stand each on its own bottom: what is borne now will not be to bear in the future, nor can we levy toll on the future for what has to be borne now.

To this first and fundamental consideration we should add that in various indirect ways either taxation or borrowing power may impair our productive forces of the future. Taxation may undermine the vigour of adults and inhibit the development of the young: borrowing may by generating unearned incomes reduce the will to produce, may clutter the investment market with unwieldy masses of long and short term debt, may impose a need for crippling taxation and unsettling schemes of interest conversion. Such considerations are not unimportant: they are, however, *less* important, in my opinion, than the more fundamental truth which I have enunciated.

If it be agreed that in the main the burden of to-day cannot be shifted on to to-morrow, why do we not raise the whole of the necessary money by taxation? Many minds, when they first grasp the principle in question, sweep to this easy conclusion: it is not, however, to be accepted without further examination. If it were both tolerably easy and tolerably fair to raise the total sum by arranging such tax contributions out of incomes as could at the moment be most easily endured, we should have to prefer taxation as the simpler method. This condition would be fulfilled if

society consisted of a single person who, or one homogeneous family which, endured for ever. But since, actually, society consists of numerous individuals whose lives will last for unequal and uncertain times and whose incomes during those lives will be distributed in various ways, it is impossible to fulfil the condition. Take two individuals whose circumstances are to-day identical but whose prospects are different. Is it proper that each should contribute equally? Surely he who is going to be better off should at the end of his life have paid more and he who is going to be worse off less. If we knew what the future was to be, some allowance (though hardly an adequate allowance) might be made in their present taxation: in the absence of such knowledge, however, nothing at all can be done. An obvious merit of loans as compared with taxes is that they make possible a more reasonable adjustment in such cases—provided that the tax system now and in the future is suitably adjusted to incomes.

Apart from this, it is notoriously impossible to arrange any scheme of high taxation which will not involve grave inequities between persons who are, *primâ facie*, so similarly situated as to contribute equally. Personal circumstances vary infinitely and taxation can go only a little way in following their differences. The question: what a man can afford, is ultimately subjective. Nobody can, beyond certain limits, demonstrate objectively the injury which he suffers from a tax of a given amount. It is even necessary to rule out, as far as possible, any intimate and detailed scrutiny of individual circumstances: partly because a man's secrets are so largely his own, partly in order to minimise the labour of unmasking pretence and detecting falsehood. In short, if we take by taxation no more than 5 or 10 per cent of individual incomes, we may be sure we are doing no one a mortal injury: if we take 50 per cent of the representative income, we ought, on

the contrary, to be deeply conscious that this must inflict almost unbearable outrage in a significantly large number of instances.

Finally, it is perhaps unnecessary to labour the point that the difficulties which are inseparable from high rates of taxation are bound to weight the balance in favour of dubious taxes whose incidence is either random or objectionable in principle, and whose effects in disturbing and misdirecting the course of production are large.

For these principal reasons it seems certain that we cannot properly rely only upon taxation but must include borrowing in the armoury of war-finance. Let us begin by considering its most obvious merit and defect. In favour of borrowing is the fact that men lend more readily than they pay taxes, partly because lending, as things are, is voluntary, but also and principally because taxation does while borrowing does not imply that they will never themselves enjoy the spending of the money in question. For both these reasons it is easier to borrow than to tax, and for the second of them it is less onerous to lend than to contribute. Indeed there will often be, in the individual, a positive desire to lend corresponding up to a point with the need of the community to borrow. Borrowing in a word attracts, as it were automatically, that fraction of private incomes which individuals can most easily dispense with: it does not in the same degree as taxation cut down consumption against the individual's interest or will.

The chief disadvantage of loan finance, as ordinarily practised, namely the burden of interest, is equally evident. Less obvious, but possibly even more important are, first, the far stronger tendency of loans than of taxes to promote indirect inflation; and, secondly, the fact that interest upon war loans is essentially usurious.

On the first point it is clear that the more we borrow at

interest the greater, as times goes on, is the amount of national revenue which must be assigned to pay it. Unless, therefore, the tax and loan-raising power of the community increases during the war the more intense will the difficulty become of raising the necessary revenue. It is true that the interest payment in any year does not, *primâ facie*, reduce the consumable income of that year: it merely redistributes that income, giving more to the interest recipients and less to others. This redistribution however, in a broad sense, increases inequality of incomes and thereby reduces the vital force of their total; the advantage to a rich man of gaining a given sum being substantially less than the disadvantage to a poor man of parting with that sum. That interest must operate, upon the whole, in this way follows from the condition that loans are obtained principally from those who can most easily cut down their income expenditure, *i.e.* from those who are already relatively speaking well off. This evil may be mitigated in part by persistently steepening the rate of progression in taxation, a procedure tantamount to retaining in higher taxes from the recipients of interest some or all of the interest which has been promised to them. Apart, however, from the savour of double-crossing inherent in such procedure, it involves precisely those evils of excessive tax burden which we accepted at an earlier stage as an argument in favour of borrowing.

Next is to be noted the fact that the tighter the financial screw is turned the greater the difficulty of borrowing becomes, and the higher the rate of interest is likely, *primâ facie*, to be driven. It is at this point that we begin to uncover the tendency of loan finances to promote indirect inflation. The facts, here, are broadly as follows. Neither tax nor loan will prevent inflation if instead of being provided out of somebody's income by restraint of personal expenditure it is paid from a net addition to bank loans or overdrafts.

Now in the case of taxes, people do not much like borrowing to pay them, nor are banks much inclined to finance their payment by lending. From the point of view of the taxpayer his contribution is an ultimate outgoing: the money will never come back to him. From the point of view of the bank, payment of the tax produces no security which would serve as collateral. Far otherwise is it, in both cases with a loan. Here the lender secures an asset which he can, in case of need, sell for something (he hopes) not much less than what he may borrow from the bank to buy it, and his asset is by the same token adequate collateral to the bank for lending nine-tenths of its value.

There results, in the case of loans, a constant temptation to finance them with bank money in advance of actual saving. If subsequently the savings are made and if the banks as they are repaid cut down the increase of their loan total, there will be no inflation. The first of these conditions is normally fulfilled but not the second; for it often happens that before the savings can be made prices and wages will have been so forced up that it is necessary to maintain the higher level of bank money in order to finance industry at this higher level of prices. Moreover, it is very often *viâ* this inflation of prices, and profit-incomes, that the actual savings which discharge the advance borrowings from the banks come to be made, with the curious consequence that many of the people who actually make those cuts in consumption which are required, whose economies provide the material (so to speak) of what is lent, have nothing to set against these economies: the loan assets are largely in the hands of men whose incomes may have been inflated even by more money than they have lent. Those whose incomes are fixed are compelled by rising prices to curtail their consumption: those whose incomes rise obtain the loan assets!

The above paradox is by itself sufficient to suggest that

a considerable element of usury is inherent in war-loan interest, as often as military expenditure is sufficient to shake the economic system in an appreciable degree. It is, I take it, notorious that a large proportion of the war interest paid during the past twenty years has inured to the benefit of men who individually did pretty well out of the last war.¹ War conditions created for them not merely increase of earning power but opportunity for profitable investment of a large proportion of this increase at the expense of their fellow-citizens. Let us now look at this side of the matter from a slightly different point of view.

The most sensible distinction between interest and usury is supplied by the line which separates cases where the borrower uses the money to obtain a positive improvement in his position from those in which he uses it to ward off or repair a deterioration of that position. Where the borrower will be positively better off, it seems reasonable that the lender should share the advantage: where, on the other hand, it is a question of mitigating disaster, the charge of interest has a flavour of taking advantage of another man's distress. It is clear, however, that in general war-time borrowing on the grand scale falls within the second category. No one supposes that the community is going to be better off in the positive sense: it is simply a case of trying to minimise the losses which the war will inflict upon our society. In principle, it is evident that money lent in war-time ought, from the moral point of view, in nine cases out of ten, to be lent free of interest.

This conclusion confronts us, however, immediately, with the practical problem of getting the butter out of the dog's mouth. Interest, I may be told, is necessary in practice (however the moral issue may lie) as an inducement to saving

¹ The actual beneficiaries may no doubt in many cases have sold out to widows or insurance companies incidentally to reinvestment—*i.e.*, there is no argument here for repudiation.

or (at the very least) to the investment of what may have been saved. This point clearly requires most careful examination.

It is highly questionable whether, in the short period, variation of interest has any appreciable influence on the total of genuine economies. In the long run, no doubt, a high rate of interest should, in times of normal trade, enlarge accumulation if only because it then implies expansion of those interest and profit incomes from which the bulk of savings come; but I make bold to say that no man ever consciously cut down his expenditure on consumption merely because he was offered 5 per cent instead of 4 per cent for his money. Let us face the fact that, whereas what is needed is economy of consumption, it is impossible to procure this quickly in any significant degree by the offer even of so high a rate of interest as 10 per cent or 15 per cent. If, on the other hand, the aim be not to increase saving but merely to induce investment rather than hoarding of money, a low rate of interest—say 1 per cent or $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent—should suffice amply for the purpose. In view, however, of the inability of a free-lending system to procure adequate economy, we are compelled to look round for other means of attaining that end and come so to take contact with schemes of compulsory lending at zero or minimal interest as a supplement to taxation.

A compulsory loan at zero interest has in fact a great deal to recommend it. If it lacks the full power of voluntary lending to select automatically those income fractions which can most easily be spared, it is far less penalising in its impact on individuals than any form of direct or indirect taxation, and therefore far less likely to foster fraud or evasion. To say to an individual: you must pay in tax 70 per cent of your income is one thing. To say: you must pay 70 per cent as to 40 per cent in tax as to 30 per cent in interest-free loan is

a very different proposition. Yet each implies in the present the same contribution to the financial needs of the community. In formulating a suitable scheme the following would seem to be the most important foci of discussion:

First, it must be from the point of view of individuals so substantially preferable to taxation as to make them, relatively speaking, eager contributors.

Secondly, the money raised by it must represent genuine economies out of income, *i.e.* neither loans from others, nor the cutting down of expenditures which even in the present situation are desirable.

Thirdly, it must not unduly interfere with or complicate the structure and working of the general loan and investment markets.

Lastly, its post-war aspect should be at least no worse than that of money borrowed at interest.

On the first point, its chief merit as compared with taxation from the point of view of the individual is that it leaves him the hope of enjoying his money in the future. It is important that this hope should not be too vague and that he should be guaranteed repayment (*a*) in all cases within, say, twenty years of the cessation of hostilities, and (*b*) at any moment, even during the war, in certain specified cases of urgent personal need: sickness, old age, and infirmity, should nearly cover them. It should not be available for repayment of debt, or to stave off bankruptcy, but should be, probably, to meet legal expenses and fines or damages at law. Licence to spend should be granted or refused on application to a tribunal. After cessation of hostilities, the list should be enlarged to include expenses up to some modest figure incurred in educating children or starting their careers. On these lines it would be possible to retain for the loans even during the war no small part of that feeling of security against disaster which is one of the main motives

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

savings were guaranteed against depreciation in the event of prices moving upwards, it is doubtful whether an interest inducement would be needed to bring in loans where wages were high enough to provide any genuine surplus. The important thing is to make the machinery of saving easy and maintain a suitable propaganda.

It remains to consider the bearing of such a scheme upon the post-war situation. And here it seems sufficient to remark that if we succeeded in raising all the money needed on an average 4 per cent basis we should in 25 years have paid in interest as much as would have redeemed the whole principal had it been interest-free. It is true that such rapid repayment of capital would involve dangers if it exceeded the rate at which new investment could absorb the amount set free: but the fact that a reduction in the rate of repayment did not involve continuance of interest burden would simplify that difficulty materially. The plain rule would be that repayment should cease when investment demand slackened and rise when it became more active: it will be noted that when investment demand is active, tax revenue comes in freely, while its ebb is usually associated with decline of revenue—in other words, the proposed rule agrees broadly with the normal features of revenue variation.

Lastly, it should be remembered that the scheme, if adopted, need not and probably should not determine with the conclusion of peace. An obligation to repay individuals at stated dates could be met in part by continuing to borrow at zero interest from other individuals of the rising generation, if circumstances made it undesirable to reduce the outstanding debt-total rapidly. Nor is this the only advantage which might flow from making the scheme permanent. One main source of our troubles during the past twenty years has been the chronic tendency for desire to save to outstrip possibilities of remunerative investment. As often as this situation recurs

THE FINANCE OF WAR

it may be desirable to meet it, at least in part, by compulsory borrowing at zero interest of so much of surplus saving as will establish a market for the remainder, the amount so borrowed being used either to extend social capital of non-remunerative types or to reduce taxation in ways which will promote increase of expenditure upon consumption rather than increase of saving.

for saving. It would probably be desirable to intensify this attraction by a guarantee that for every £100 lent, a sum of the same purchasing power would be returned: more money if prices had risen, less if they had fallen during the period of the loan.

On the second point, of obtaining genuine economies, it is of course impossible to prevent altogether the financing of these as of any other payments by loan. It would, however, be desirable to minimise it by providing that sums so lent should not be saleable or assignable to others during the life of the lender and should pass at his death to his natural heirs: provided that other testamentary disposition might be made by leave of the tribunal. On the other hand, in drawing schedules of assessment considerable care should be taken to avoid trenching upon expenditures whose curtailment cannot add to and may diminish the total of national income. Thus, in principle, expenditure up to reasonable maxima on house rent, education, medical or legal service, and also upon domestics, insurance premia and charities should not be reckoned in the surplus available for attack. If we went at it in the narrow spirit in which income tax abatements are (upon the whole properly) restricted, we should find ourselves involved in some of the worst evils of extravagantly high taxation.

As regards the general loan and investment markets, the rule should be to keep the scheme as far as possible out of them. The scheme which has been submitted here in outline should, in fact, affect these markets less seriously than if an equivalent amount of money were obtained by higher taxation. Moreover, so considerable a reduction in the sums requiring to be raised through them at interest either on short or long term ought in many ways to reduce instability and uncertainty in the money market and on the stock exchange, whilst a further gain of the same kind would result from the lessened

danger of inflation and the brighter financial prospect for the future. A word should perhaps be added on the difficult question of the use of business profits for expansion and reserves. It seems evident, in principle, that the scheme should take account only of income which actually reaches the individual and it would, so far, encourage the holding back of profit from distribution so long as anything could be earned in a business on money so retained. To attempt to check this by insisting upon distribution "up to the hilt" would be eminently undesirable, and yet *some* check there should be. A logical remedy would be to permit the retaining of profits within a business subject to payment of interest to the government upon the sums retained at a rate somewhat lower (say 1 per cent less) than the government is paying at any time in the open market for bonds maturing in (say) ten years. This would put shareholders approximately in the same position as they would have occupied had the money been distributed to them in dividends, lent by them to the Government at zero interest, and relent by the Government to their firms at a little under market rates.

Compulsory saving should not attack any income below the point at which income taxation begins, though it might be admissible to fix the point of departure somewhat lower with an initially high ratio of saving to tax. It should be accompanied by intensive propaganda in favour of saving out of wages and at the same time reduction to zero of interest on new savings bank deposits and new issues of savings certificates. Incidentally, the existence of large masses of certificates at low rates of interest payable on demand, creates a serious problem in the way of loan finance at such rates of interest as ruled in the last war. If the State were paying to the relatively well-to-do rates up to 4 per cent or 5 per cent, it would be difficult to resist a claim for higher rates to the poor. On the other hand, if the poor man's

THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT TO THE WAR

By P. C. GORDON WALKER

THE war has inevitably subjected the Labour Movement to serious moral and political strains. For war intensifies and brings into sharper conflict the two rival tendencies that are at work in any powerful Labour movement: namely, the tendency towards co-operation and acceptance of the existing social system with a view to extorting the best possible terms for the working class out of it, and the tendency towards an independent challenge to the right of the existing system to continue at all in its present form. Shall Labour, in the recent words of William Green of the A.F. of L., become "an army with banners flying, enlisted for a crusade" or shall it be content to be "groups of workers interested in having a job and in doing a good day's work"?

The real war-problem of the Left is the manner in which the war poses this problem in particular domestic and foreign circumstances and at a particular stage of Labour's evolution. The problem naturally presents itself to Labour in two aspects; Labour is concerned on the one hand with the internal balance of forces inside its own ranks, and on the other with the problem of its relations to the Government of the day.

It will be profitable to bring out at the beginning two ways in which the foreign political set-up has modified the terms of Labour's essential problem in this particular war; for these have had a determining effect upon the general situation.

In the first place, the rise of Hitler has helped to obscure the difference between Labour's foreign policy and the

THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT TO THE WAR

Government's. For the imperialist and the socialist enemy are united in a single person and a single system. Had the play of world politics impelled the British Government to ally with Fascist Germany, the strain between Labour's tendency to behave as an integral part of the national society, especially in emergencies, and its tendency to challenge the existing system and develop its own policies would have been immeasurably intensified and even perhaps (at the present stage of Labour's development) intolerable. Some foretaste of this dilemma was provided in the Spanish Civil War in which Labour and official foreign policy were sharply at variance. On the other hand, the apparent immediate identity of interest between Labour and the Government has permitted Labour to conceal from itself the essential nature of the problem with which it is faced and to rest on an internal compromise which may in the event prove dangerous.

In the second place, the rise of Hitler has meant that Labour has had a more conscious and assured interest than the government in the destruction of Fascism and has therefore been able once already to "speak for England." This gives Labour a chance of leadership she might not have enjoyed in a different war.

The whole problem of course goes beyond the Labour movement; it concerns the whole Left, including the various tendencies in the left intelligentsia, the various smaller organised parties, and the still important mass of the unorganised working class, large sections of which are bound to become politicised and organised as the result of the war. The central problem, however, remains the examination of the various tendencies in, and probable future development of, the Labour movement; because the Labour movement has the overwhelming preponderance and the initiative in the Left. Labour's policy and development will be the determinant of what happens in the Left.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The clearest method of bringing the whole matter into focus seems to be, first, to examine the repercussions of the foreign situation and the war upon Labour and the Left up to date ; and, secondly, in the light of this analysis, to investigate the nature of the problems that will probably develop during the war and Labour's chances of surmounting them.

First, then, the reaction of the war upon Labour to date. The first steps of this investigation are made easier by the fact that Labour's general attitude towards the war was not the result of a sudden decision, but of public discussions prolonged over a number of years and completed before the war broke out. These discussions provoked a particularly acute clash of views because Labour was engaged in a change, or rather a critical development, of its foreign policy. The controversy was thrashed out in every organ of the movement, political or industrial, that cared to express its views ; in the responsible bodies of the national unions ; and finally in a number of Party Conferences, at which were staged some of the most impressive political debates heard in this country. This great debate started at Southport in 1934 and was completed by 1939 at Bournemouth.

Long before 1934 Labour had abandoned its pre-1914 attitude that it should abstain from the dirty game of imperialist politics, be content to establish its ideals in general proclamations, and—in effect—abandon the whole field of foreign affairs to the ruling class. Since 1918 it had become an important mass-party, it had twice governed the country, and had come to realise fully that foreign policy is inseparable from the political interests of the working class. The first Labour Government stood and fell by its foreign policy ; the second Labour Government was nowhere so successful as in that field.

But down to 1934 foreign policy faced Labour with no dilemma. The world was at peace and seemed relatively

THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT TO THE WAR

stable. An active foreign policy directed towards strengthening the League, disarmament, and the revision of Versailles, was quite compatible with pacifism. Both could be embraced within Labour's general peace policy without provoking any conflicts of conscience. The 1933 Hastings Conference saw no incompatibility in passing one resolution in favour of a general strike to stop a war and another in favour of the League of Nations.

The rise of Hitler meant that a League of Nations policy must take on a new meaning ; to stand for the League now meant readiness to fight in a real war. Although this meant a radical resorting out of Labour's traditional ideas, Labour began to adjust itself surprisingly quickly to the new situation. Already in 1934 the Labour Party Executive in its Annual Report told the movement that "Labour policy recognises . . . the duty unflinchingly to support our Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take part in collective action against a peace-breaker." The Labour leadership was advancing with caution and continued to restate its old ideas as well. (See "War and Peace" Labour's official statement of policy in 1934.) But at Brighton (1935) and Edinburgh (1936) the issue was fully joined.

The now openly declared official policy of "firm support of any (government) action consistent with the principles of the League" had to face the opposition of the pacifists under Lansbury (who was then Party leader) and of those who wished to have nothing to do with capitalist foreign policy in any circumstances. Sir Stafford Cripps at Brighton put succinctly the attitude on which the Party was turning its back, when he said : "It is unfortunate, tragic, but inescapably true that the British workers cannot at this moment be effective in the international political field." The opposition was soundly beaten ; though at Edinburgh it was swelled by discontent at the Party line over non-intervention in Spain

and reached 657,000. By Whitsun 1939 the Party had firmly made up its mind and the opposition mustered only 55,000—probably nearly all pacifists.

The new line was not absolutely clear. Care was taken to dress the policy as far as possible in the old traditional peace language; in 1934 a "Peace Act" which should renounce war as an instrument of policy became an official item in the Labour program; in 1935 Labour obviously paid attention to the peace ballot (as did the Government). In the meantime the Parliamentary Labour Party was finding it difficult to translate the new policy into terms of votes on the estimates. It at first attempted to distinguish between armaments as such and the foreign policy of the Government; not till July, 1937, did it abstain from the vote on the defence estimates. As late as this year Labour felt impelled by its traditions to launch an attack upon the principle of conscription.

More important than this time-lag in adjusting the whole Party line to the new orientation of foreign policy was a deeper division that can only be detected by reading through the speeches at Conferences and by comparing the pronouncements of the political and industrial sides of the movement. There was no clear indication of how far the new Party policy reflected the tendency to accept Labour's position in the social and economic system and, therefore, to follow the Government's lead in foreign policy; and how far it represented the tendency to strike out on a new, independent line. Both elements were undoubtedly present. The conflict between them (like the conflict between Labour and the Government) was obscured by the rise of Hitler as the common enemy of both.

Realisation of this division was beginning to dawn on the movement on the eve of the war. At Southport, in 1939, the political critics instead of attacking the main lines of the new policy concentrated rather on trying to give it "a socialist

content." Mr. Ernest Bevin made a most significant speech in which he asked the Executive Committee whether it had "considered what is to follow peace pacts and collective security? I am anxious," he continued, "to prevent this movement fighting for the preservation of the Paris Bourse, the London Stock Exchange, the Amsterdam Exchange, and Wall Street."

It was at this stage of Labour development that the war broke out. Labour had sharply and with practical unanimity redefined its foreign policy in terms of the general line to follow on the outbreak of the particular war which everyone foresaw. Labour had united on a clear foreign policy of its own; it had turned its back on its old pacifism and abstentionism. But it was only just beginning to probe the deeper political implications of its new line. This was perhaps the most difficult stage of evolution at which the war could have found the Labour movement. The weak and pioneering movement of 1914 could without difficulty or damage join the Government and could be converted into an important mass-party by the aftermath of the war. A more fully-developed Labour movement that had resolved its ultimate internal contradictions could have taken a line clearly and proudly directed to its fully grasped aims.

As things have actually turned out, Labour's presettlement of the main lines of its foreign policy has been sufficient to permit of a satisfactory solution of the problems of early war. But nothing save the main strategy had been laid down; extremely difficult tactical problems had yet to be solved.

These were infinitely more ticklish than in 1914. Labour was impelled by a sense of double responsibility: on the one hand to the Government of the nation at war, on the other hand to its own independent conception of policy. This division of purpose corresponded to an unresolved conflict of tendencies within the movement itself. In terms of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Parliamentary tactics Labour had to maintain its independence in face of the fact that it had a much firmer interest in the defeat of Fascism than had the Government ; to conduct an Opposition without impeding the conduct of the war or strengthening the appeasers, who were to be found not only in the Government but to some extent in Labour's own ranks. Labour felt a far more conscious and deliberate sympathy with this war than the last ; but it also felt a more conscious need for independence.

Labour's solution of these problems as they have so far arisen in the early stages of the war has been on the whole successful. When the Government seemed to be hesitating in the first days of September, Labour "spoke for England" ; but it refused, quickly and with unanimity, to join the Government. In its Manifesto it called upon its members, not to stand behind the Government, but to stand behind the Labour movement. It agreed to the election truce, but took an early opportunity, over the sugar duty, to divide against the Government, and has refused to conduct a joint platform campaign with the Government. It has anticipated the Government with an announcement of detailed peace aims. Only occasionally so far have issues arisen which really tested Labour's compromise and threatened to divide her double responsibility. The chief was the problem of India, over which Labour was clearly embarrassed and somewhat contradictory.

Labour's attitude to the war cannot be exhaustively described by a recitation of public and Parliamentary pronouncements. The political side of the movement is equally concerned with the organisation and independence of its local organs. Transport House has sent out a number of circulars to local parties containing detailed advice about war-time activities. They have undoubtedly been met by a fine response from the local parties, which had in many cases already

THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT TO THE WAR

spontaneously set about adapting their work to the new conditions of the black-out and the election truce. This is of the utmost importance, for the political Labour movement cannot exist apart from the constant activity of its local units.

The industrial side of the movement has been concerned with a similar problem of local organisation and with the protection of the interests of its membership. Constant pressure has been brought on Government departments for orders and the release of supplies to bring work to war-stricken industries. It has been made clear to the branches that there is going to be no question of a cheap sacrifice of members' interests.

It is essential to take this unpublic activity into account when assessing the reality and significance of Labour's conduct in this war.

What has, so far, been the reaction to these activities in the movement at large and in the rest of the Left ?

It is one of the hardest tasks of political analysis to assess accurately the strength of various trends in the Labour movement. Minorities are vociferous and deceive themselves ; the mass of the movement is often mute. On the other hand the movement is democratic and can be changed again, as it has been in the past, by changes in the composition or views of its members. It is easy to exaggerate signs of division. Much has, for instance, been made of the twenty Labour M.P.s who came out for an immediate (though conditional) peace conference ; of Sir Stafford Cripps's refusal to rejoin the Party ; of the real discontent felt at the refusal of discussion at the meeting of Labour M.P.s and Candidates at which Mr. Attlee announced Labour's peace aims ; of the activities behind the scenes of prominent politicians and individuals of the Left.

All these things have their significance. Some are no more than the ordinary friction and personal manœuvring

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

known in every political party ; some may assume importance in the future. But at the moment all the signs go to show that the movement at large is content with the activities of the leaders.

So far the most important opposition has been the pacifist. It has a handful of respected M.P.s at its head ; it is rooted deep in the traditions of the movement. Its chief strength seems to lie in the older members and in the women's organisations of the Labour Party and the Co-operative Movement. (These organisations are, to an extent that is often not realized, the guardians of the traditional continuity of the movement). But the Party debates before the war showed how insignificant was the pacifist opposition in numbers ; it has nothing to-day to compare with the vigorous and youthful leadership of the majority of the I.L.P. of 1914 ; and in its strongholds, the women's organisations, it is countered by an equally strong instinctive patriotism and horror of being pro-German.

More significant is the internal struggle which has gone on in the minds of countless loyal members of the party between their horror of war and their detestation of Hitler. To judge from speeches at small conferences and in the branch rooms this dilemma of conscience is being resolved in the great majority of cases in favour of a reluctant support for the war ; often on the significant ground that Labour would otherwise abdicate its chance to lead the country. This desire to lead, though hardly yet clearly formulated or grasped, is finding expression in many ways : in the view that Labour is too much " falling out of the picture " ; in the mounting opposition in local parties to the election truce ; in the opinion that I have heard expressed in a number of local Trade Union branches that the real task of the movement is to prepare to handle the crisis that is bound to follow the war.

In short, there does not seem to be any significant

THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT TO THE WAR

movement of opposition in the Party as a whole ; but a beginning can be detected of tendencies that may prove serious for the Party in its evolution during the war.

Amongst the rival opposition parties, the Communists seem still to be the most important. Their recent change of line does not seem to have seriously reduced the core of the party ; though the majority of fellow travellers have jumped off the train. To make up for this, there have been signs of a certain tendency for the anti-war members of the Labour movement to follow the communist analysis. This cannot be called an alliance ; for the two types are totally different. An instinctive distrust of the Communists is still very strong amongst members of the Labour Party. The Communists may be able to draw support, as war-weariness increases, and if the Labour Party fail to rise to the occasion, from newly politicised sections of the people ; but the prestige they derive from representing Russia is losing its gilt, and they may become very seriously embarrassed if further developments of Russian foreign policy compel them to come out as apologists for Hitler's Germany.

The I.L.P., although it takes by far the most consistent line upon the war, is unlikely to benefit to any significant extent. It is a movement that has long been going down hill ; it is still divided internally and is having some difficulty in distinguishing itself from the Communist Party with its new line, though it will be aided in this respect by Russia's adventure in Finland. Above all, the chief people that it might expect to attract in the Labour movement are themselves to a very large extent old members of the I.L.P. who left it just because they realised that their only hope of attaining their aims was in the single major party.

It is, in the nature of things, hard to find clear-cut tendencies in the intellectual Left. There are signs of the same desire for a more constructive and striking Labour line

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

that can be detected in the rank and file of the party ; though amongst the intellectuals this is often accompanied by a failure to grasp the extent to which Labour has advanced since the last war and by an impatience that does not take account of the real nature of the movement. There is, as would be expected, a clearer recognition amongst the intellectuals than in the Party at large of the essential problem that lies ahead, namely, the necessity to find some means of combining economic centralisation with democratic forms. On the other hand there is a dangerous tendency amongst some Left intellectuals to leave the Labour Party out of account altogether in their solution of this problem, to regard it as a spent force.

It may be that some of these tendencies in the Left and in the socialist Opposition may assume great importance in the future. But it seems certain that this will only happen if Labour first fails to seize its opportunities. Labour is still the overwhelming force on the Left ; it is intact and has suffered no serious defections. Not merely in its central organs but in its local units it is united and active. In an extremely testing situation it has displayed a tactical ability and powers of leadership beyond the expectations of many observers. These have permitted it to keep its leadership over the effective Left. They have also won Labour a respect and sympathy amongst many who are not of the Left.

The vital question, then, is whether Labour will fail in the future or whether it will rise to a very difficult occasion. The tests of the future will be more searching than those Labour has already surmounted.

As the war grows more bitter and desperate, Labour will have the opportunity and the choice of more and more radically challenging the Government. Labour possesses certain unique powers that can contribute to victory, whose

THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT TO THE WAR

full employment may be necessary for complete victory. It can speak to the neutrals and especially to the working people of Germany in an authentic voice that it alone commands. It alone can speak to the great mass of our own people, and speak for them, in such a way as to draw from them the necessary sacrifices in return for the assured hope of a worthy reconstruction of Europe and of Britain.

These things cannot be done if Labour appears as the subordinate handmaid of the Government ; they cannot be done by detailed criticism. They can only be done by a Labour movement that is ready to challenge and claim leadership of the people. There are many stages through which such a policy may develop from the first formulation of conceptions different from the Government's right up to the tactically difficult attempt to take over the Government, or a decisive say in it, during war-time. In one way or another, however, Labour will have to make this choice between challenge and acceptance.

Simultaneously Labour will be faced with the fundamentally related problem of an influx of new members into the industrial working class and into the organised Trade Union movement. The problem will not be so easy as in 1914, when these social forces naturally flowed into Labour's ranks, as the only political party that had its hands clean and looked hopefully to the future. This time Labour will have serious competitors in the Communist Party, the I.L.P., perhaps some new popular movement. Labour, it is true, in its general unions, possesses an unrivalled instrument for the recruitment of these new elements into its ranks. But such an influx of people who do not share the traditional discipline of the older parts of the movement, who demand new and more vigorous policies, and who are eager to take risks they do not fully comprehend, always imposes a strain on a Labour movement. The strain will be doubled by the

tendency of these new masses to manifest war-weariness at a time when Labour may have to urge them to stand firm. Organisation alone will not hold these forces. Labour will not have unsoiled hands; one way or another it will have had to take its share of responsibility. It will have to come forward on its record and with its future policy. It will be by these alone that it will be able to keep the new recruits in its ranks.

Behind these two problems will be a third that is even more profound. Labour will be challenged to adjust both its methods and its manner to take control of rapidly developing new social conditions, which will be quite unlike those of the old society in which Labour arose and from which it derived many of its traditions and forms.

It is in this perspective that the present attitude of Labour and the Left to the war must be weighed up. Labour cannot escape the test. How will it respond?

Labour has so far conducted itself with ability and success in the midst of the problems posed by the first days of the war; it has retained its overwhelming predominance in the Left; it has kept the chance of the initiative. But all this will avail nothing if Labour does not rise to the tests that are coming.

One cannot speak with such confidence of Labour's future as of its conduct in the war so far. Labour's line of policy in this war was so easily decided and has won such general acceptance in the movement not only because it was an able adjustment to the political situation but also because it represented a balance inside the movement that has fortunately suited the particular political situation.

Labour's decision to support the Government without joining it reflects a certain indecision in the movement, a balance between tendencies that have not yet become quite clear. To some extent this balance represents consciously

opposed trends in the movement. There is a significant difference between the Labour Party Manifesto, with its attempt to lead the people, and the T.U.C. Manifesto which concentrated almost entirely upon the continued defence of the rights of the organised workers. There does not however yet seem to be anything approaching a split. Rather it would be correct to speak of the indecision of a movement that is in doubt because the great part of its membership is in the same state. Labour's policy represents the equipoise that can be found in the mind of practically all its members between the desire for independence and the desire for victory under the present Government.

Here are real dangers. The tone of certain Labour pronouncements, and of the known and reputed views of many Labour leaders, indicates that they are not merely pleased with the results of the present compromise policy but are planning to continue this policy throughout the war, limiting their political activity to criticism that will be "constructive" however sharp its tone. The whole tone of the "Peace Aims" indicated a desire to make a declaration of future rather than of immediate independence. It is perhaps significant that it has been issued not as an official Party pronouncement but as the declaration of the Party leader.

The results of this would probably not be a split inside the movement itself, but a political paralysis and inability to respond to the challenge of events. Labour would be condemned to fighting rearguard defensive actions which would lead to its social isolation and perhaps to its extinction in the rise of a different society to whose demands it would have proved unable to adjust itself and which it would in consequence have lost the right to lead and mould according to its own ideas. Labour would fail to absorb and hold newly industrialised and politicised masses, it would even in all probability lose its hold on some of its own membership.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Rival movements would arise in the Left and, perhaps, reactionary popular movements which would not, in the new circumstances, always be easy to distinguish from progressively intentioned movements. In these conditions the various fissures and tendencies in the Left, which are at the moment insignificant, would assume real and dramatic political importance.

There are signs that Labour, in spite of its present official complacency, will be able to rise to the occasion. The movement is rapidly developing; it has already been able to take up an attitude to this war far in advance of its 1914 attitude. It may be impelled by the national interests in the war and by its own interests, in circumstances that it has not yet clearly foreseen, to take further steps along the road of national leadership and responsibility on which it has already set its foot.

More than the fate of the Labour movement is involved. The destiny of this country in the scales of totalitarian dictatorship and modern democracy may rest on Labour's ability to rise to the occasion to which it has so long looked forward but which will be so different from all expectation.

SURVEYS

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

IT is either not generally known—or it has been forgotten—that Adolf Hitler himself is a literary creation or—better said perhaps—the creation of a literary personality known as Dietrich Eckhardt. In Germany, prior to 1914, Eckhardt was an unsuccessful playwright and pamphleteer known only to a small circle of *Alldeutschen* or Pan-Germans who were the precursors of Teutonism and of the dream of world-domination as it emerged both before and during the Great War. A hard-headed, bull-necked type of Bavarian, much given to eating, drinking and love-making, he had enough means at his disposal to enable him to publish a small weekly entitled *Auf gut Deutsch* (In good German) in which, as Editor—and as chief contributor—he fumed and raged against the Socialists, the Democrats and—needless to say—the Jews!

Eckhardt lived in Munich, at that time the rendezvous of all the post-war German reactionaries; and from there, he tried to force his inferior plays on the German theatres. Their rejection is said to have accounted very largely for Eckhardt's anti-Semitism. For, as a result of the lack of aptitude for theatre management shown by the Germans themselves—as the history of the German theatre since 1933 suggests—the leading figures in the theatre at that time were Jews.

In Munich, during the spring of 1919, Eckhardt met the young Adolf Hitler who, although a crude personality, was yet possessed of an amazing gift of oratory. He was, in fact, the born demagogue. Eckhardt took this young man under his wing, lauded him amongst his own friends and followers, saying that out of this rough clay he would fashion not only a champion propagandist, but a man fit to stand up against the Republic and the Jews. Eckhardt thus became personally interested in this uneducated youth to whom he taught manners as well as a number of political slogans. He nicknamed him the *Trommler* ("The Drummer.") Or perhaps one should say that he christened him thus—with all due solemnity.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

In Adolf Hitler, Eckhardt, the dramatist, created his most successful character. Although, in order to do him justice, one must admit that he had had one other, earlier triumph. This was during the pre-war period when he both translated and arranged Ibsen's masterpiece, "Peer Gynt," for the stage, and when in this form it enjoyed a long run at the "Koenigliches Schauspielhaus" in Berlin. But it cannot be denied that Eckhardt transformed the hero from a peasant visionary into a "Germanisch-Nordisch" (Germanic-Nordic) figure of poster dimensions! He thus misinterpreted the purpose of the great Ibsen. But in its turn, the purpose of the lesser dramatist, was also to be misinterpreted—or thwarted. For Eckhardt had created Adolf Hitler to be a forerunner and propagandist—a "Drummer." Whereas, as it turned out, the drummer became the Messiah himself with Dietrich Eckhardt as his principal propagandist in the shape of the editor of a new small weekly called the *Volksischer Beobachter*, which has since become the mouthpiece of the National Socialist Party and of the German Government.

Dietrich Eckhardt, the *bon vivant*, died from a disease of the kidneys, soon after the failure of the Munich "putsch" of November, 1923, which had been both instigated and led by his friend and hero, Adolf Hitler. In the famous march on the Feldherrnhalle, a number of the rebels were shot. But, thanks to their war experience, Hitler and General Ludendorff escaped this fate. Eckhardt was too ill to take part; and I myself saw him driving beside the ranks in a car.

II

A year later, another young man of literary associations joined Hitler's company. This was Dr. Joseph Goebbels, a little Rhinelander, who was rather Jewish in appearance. He had studied under the well-known Professor, Dr. Friedrich Gundolf, in Heidelberg, and held the degree of Dr. phil. in the History of Literature. His university contemporaries assure me that he attracted no particular attention either in the seminars or debates presided over by the brilliant Jewish Professor Gundolf. Indeed, at that time, he seemed destined to become a good average *Oberlehrer* (Secondary schoolmaster) or journalist.

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

Thus, Goebbels began to write feuilletons for the post-war German Press. These, he very naturally sent to the most important democratic newspapers, where the interest in German culture was both greater and of a higher order than that evinced by the patriotic-reactionary Press. But his articles were refused. I myself saw entries in the post-book of a great democratic newspaper which showed when articles by Goebbels had been received and duly returned.

But here, Goebbels was only sharing the fate of many a young writer and journalist. Nevertheless, he was at the same time too ambitious and too impatient to wait for literary or journalistic success. He, therefore, turned his mind to politics; and chose Hitler's Party as being the least well-equipped from the literary point of view. For a young man of between twenty and thirty years of age, this party was excellent soil in which to sow lightly and reap rapidly. It was an easy choice for him. In fact, Goebbels had found his niche. Amongst so many uneducated, he was the only educated member of the National Socialist Group. He played the part of the whale among minnows!

Meanwhile, the unsuccessful draughtsman and painter, Adolf Hitler, had achieved literary success. During his short term of imprisonment, he had written *Mein Kampf*. The style was bad; and even the syntax was not always correct. But the book served as a model and a textbook for "The Movement." Those who were out for the "Renaissance" of Germany, and for the revival of the German race in life and in art, were henceforth tempted to write in this way and in no other. No matter how coarse and brutal "this way" might be.

The lowest level in both literature and journalism had been touched. But it was a level on which Dr. Joseph Goebbels, who had been spurned by a self-respecting Press, could move with ease.

And so there came about an inevitable reshuffling of the parts. Dietrich Eckhardt's "Drummer" now played the part of "Führer"; and the small, unsuccessful journalist that of the "Drummer." He became both the propagandist and expert in literature and publicity for the Party.

In 1933, this man of all others was the one to be entrusted not only with the supreme command of the German Press,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

but with the whole literary output of Germany, including that of the theatre and the screen. He had been created by Adolf Hitler; just as Adolf Hitler had been created by Dietrich Eckhardt. Both Hitler and Goebbels thought that, in literature, they could reap where they had not sown. In consequence the harvest is of the quality that one would expect.

III

But let us return to the days before 1933. At first, Goebbels was not so much of a Party pen as a Party mouthpiece. He was the Party's Public Orator, and, as such, in course of time, the Führer sent him to Berlin to conquer the city on his behalf. And Goebbels did conquer it, thanks in no small degree to a newspaper which he founded called the *Angriff*, in which he was at liberty to write in the style—if anything more crude than the Führer's own—which had made his articles unacceptable to the Democratic Press.

Goebbels' promotion to the post of Public Orator (and Parliamentary Representative) left vacant the post of literary adviser and speaker within the Party. But, two candidates were already waiting for it.

One of these was Alfred Rosenberg. He is a native of the Baltic States, and is consequently as little German by birth as Hitler himself. From the first, his attractive appearance and his gift of oratory were enough to recommend him. Eventually it turned out that he had had a tolerably good education and—what was much more important—was possessed of a strong tendency towards radicalism. He became Editor-in-chief of the *Volksischer Beobachter*; and showed himself eager to specialise in foreign politics. Gradually, however, his attention became diverted to the study of cultural problems, and he began to write books and pamphlets on *Weltanschauung* (Philosophy of life). Finally, he became the supreme *Reichskulturwalter*, with authority to deal with all questions of principle, doctrine and education within the Party. His book, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* (The Myth of the 20th Century), achieved phenomenal sales and became henceforth the Bible of National Socialist doctrine in its Crusade against Catholicism and the Pope. And, not-

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

withstanding the fact that it is full of errors and superficialities, this book achieved for Rosenberg the position, not only of a literary authority in the New Germany, but that of Dictator of literature for the Party.

The other candidate was Hanns Johst. He is a Thuringian who first appeared in Munich either just before, or during, the Great War. He was known then as the author of several stage-plays and of one book of lyrics. He is undoubtedly talented. And in spite of being young, broad-shouldered and a perfect specimen of health, he succeeded in avoiding the barracks. Indeed, at that time, he was an out-and-out defeatist. Slowly and unobtrusively, however, he became a right-wing politician, attacked Thomas Mann on political grounds, and thus found himself amongst Hitler's followers. He is even said to have advised Hitler in the composition of a number of Party documents.

With the seizure of power by the National Socialists, Johst came into his own. He dramatised the story of the student Schlageter who was shot by the French for sabotage during the occupation of the Ruhr. It is in this cleverly written—if excessively tendentious—play that the characteristic sentence occurs: "When I hear the word *Weltanschauung*, I get my revolver ready." The author of this remarkable line was appointed by Adolf Hitler to be President of the *Dichterakademie* (Academy of Literature).

IV

In the Germany of to-day, literature exists only by permission of the central authorities. We have above described the kind of people of whom the latter are composed. And this in itself is sufficient indication of the present state of German literature.

One of the worst vices of the National Socialists consists in their megalomania and in the arrogance of their attitude towards life in all its varied forms. This makes itself felt, not only in politics, but in the sphere of literature as well. The creators of literature in the Germany of to-day set to work at once to promote, as part of their programme, the growth of a new flower in the form of a renaissance of the German arts. A new "Age of Pericles" had begun, or, rather, had got to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

begin! Those were the instructions. But who were the men in command of this new age? And who were the models? A mediocre poet like Johst, a half-educated historian and philosopher like Alfred Rosenberg, a pamphleteer-journalist like Joseph Goebbels, and, finally, the author of a book written in execrable German—Adolf Hitler himself! What these men understand by literature, is not literature at all. What they understand by art, is mere parochialism. Hitler's taste in painting is represented by the sentimental oleograph, and in the theatre by "The Merry Widow." Thus, it is not surprising that he and his followers seek to confine literature to a cheap glorification, either of himself and his doings, or of those of others like him. As he himself once painted amateurish landscapes so he expects of German writers that they shall plaster the German countryside with sugar and cinnamon. Poverty, misery and despair must never be described. For these would destroy—or at least, blemish—the technique of the oleograph. The Nazis demand a flowering of poetic genius—but what they really mean thereby, is the flowering of their own desires.

There are, of course, some writers who have survived in the Germany of to-day, and who are allowed to go on writing as they did in the days before the new heroic "Age of Pericles." There is only a handful of them—but they are looked upon by the supreme representatives of the Party and State as something of a nuisance, albeit not dangerous. They must, of course, keep off politics—and they must never give expression to their thoughts and wishes regarding the German people of to-day. In the eyes of the Nazis, they are, while still living, essentially of the past.

One of the most outstanding amongst such writers, is undoubtedly the poet, Hans Carossa. He is a country doctor who writes both novels and lyrical poetry of exquisite quality. He is so little a fighter that even his would-be opponents cannot put up a fight against him. Yet even he resigned from the Academy of Literature and stated his reasons for doing so in a fine letter to the President, Hanns Johst. Needless to say, the letter was never published in Germany.

Another writer who might have been expected to become a pillar of National Socialism, reacted to it in much the same

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

way. This is Hans Grimm, an extremely gifted story-teller or writer of narrative. He was, at one time, a farmer in South Africa and wrote short stories of an unusual kind about African life. Finally, he published a very successful novel entitled *Volk ohne Raum* (People without space). The slogan *Lebensraum* (living-space) which Hitler himself is so fond of using, owes its origin to this book. (Incidentally, the even more popular term, *Das dritte Reich* (The Third Realm), was the title of a book written years ago by Moeller van der Bruck, whose name is never mentioned in Germany because Hitler claims to have invented the phrase himself.) Grimm was made a member of the Academy of Literature and seemed imminently likely to be proclaimed *Nationaldichter* (National Poet or Poet Laureate). But, against him, he had Hanns Johst—and his own sincerity. At a meeting of the Academy, there was a sharp difference of opinion between him and the President; and he is said to have unburdened himself—admittedly behind closed doors of all that he felt about the new German culture. He escaped the concentration camp, but he forfeited the favour of the men of the new "Age of Pericles." Like Carossa, he is now living quietly in the country as far away as possible from the "flower" of the new literature.

In the Germany of to-day, one or two other writers of the same type as these and dating also from the days before 1933 are still to be found. We refrain from mentioning their names lest we embarrass them. Like many a flower, they bloom—or fade—unseen. Amongst them is one tragic figure—the novelist Wiechert, who as the result of an outspoken lecture to undergraduates, did penance in a concentration camp. He has since been released—but his mind is still in prison. Only his closest friends know how and where he lives.

An even more tragic figure than he was the poet and sculptor, Ernst Barlach, who died last year—an old and broken man. He was one of the noblest and most sensitive German poets and artists of our time whose plays and wood-carvings are superb. He was denounced almost at once as a *Kultur bolschevist* and forbidden to go on working. This meant starvation for him. He succumbed almost literally to National Socialism. He became a martyr in the cause of his gentle,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

dreamy art for which in the crude and noisy Germany of to-day, there is no place.

Until last year, Georg Kaiser, another writer of great power and significance, remained in Hitler's Germany. He is the most important post-war German dramatist. One might describe him as a cross between Shaw and O'Neill. He, too, was branded as a *Kulturbolschevist*; and his plays were banned for ever from the German theatre.

V

Gerhart Hauptmann must have a chapter to himself. Next to Thomas Mann and Stefan George, he was the best-known figure in modern German literature. He is a Nobel prize-winner whom Republican Germany loaded with honours. Thomas Mann no longer lives in Germany and Stefan George, who died in Switzerland, recorded in his will the wish not to be buried in Germany. (This, despite the fact that the Nazis would dearly have loved to have him on their side!) But Gerhart Hauptmann still lives in Germany. In 1933, on the eve of the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, he openly supported Hitler. His article in what used to be a democratic paper, was headed "I say Yes!" And he refused to defend the persecuted Jews at a time when, it is true, it would have taken courage to do so; although it did not as yet involve any danger to life and liberty, least of all for a man of Hauptmann's standing and prestige.

Hauptmann's failure to defend the Jews is an important enough symptom to merit further comment. In the days when he was facing a great deal of hostility, only the Jews recognised and encouraged his talent. His publisher was Samuel Fischer (S. Fischer Verlag). The firm's reader, Moritz Heymann, a man admirable both in character and as a writer—and, incidentally, Hauptmann's brother-in-law—became his guide, philosopher and friend. The well-known theatre manager and producer, Otto Brahm who, until his death, was Director of the—artistically—most important theatre in Germany, produced Hauptmann's plays and revised them for the stage. And the critic who, from first to last, defended Hauptmann's art and style, was Alfred Kerr. Fischer, Heymann, Brahm and Kerr—all were Jews. Brahm

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

and Heymann died some time ago, Fischer, in 1934, in agony of mind and spirit. Kerr had to leave Germany. But Gerhart Hauptmann, the representative writer of the German Republic, remained a silent witness of all that was being said and done against Jews. Kerr, in exile, had to confess that he had not even received a picture-postcard from his former friend.

But even this "good conduct" did not win for Hauptmann the approval of the National Socialists. For them, his writing is not heroic enough. It is too social. He is suspect—if not precisely as a *Kulturbolschevist*, at least as a former left-wing man. Hence they rejected unequivocally his shy attempts at a rapprochement. He is allowed to write and to have his plays performed; otherwise he must keep silent. He no longer represents German literature. He is no more than a shadow of himself. He is a literary Hindenburg—a turncoat—to whom even the betrayal of his old ideals could not bring success. His is a dying life, a living death.

VI

And now, at last, we must attempt to answer the inevitable question: whose then are the names and works that really make up the literature of Hitler's Germany? Both the Party and the State have offered prizes for literature, some of these being renewals of previous prizes, others newly established. Both Party and State crave to play the part of a Maecenas. But, in their hands, such prizes are nought but bribes for the extraction of Nazi literature. In effect, they say to the writers: we hand you the money, and you deliver us the kind of goods that we want. And although the Nazis preach the reverse, this is sheer Mammonism dominating literature. The result is only too easy to foresee. It is the triumph of the unprincipled and the mediocre.

The "New Drama" consists of attempts to glorify German history as interpreted by the National Socialists. Lyrical poetry takes the form of marches and fighting songs, all crammed with a false romanticism. Prose writings, belles lettres, novels, short stories, etc., are either inoffensive "escape" literature—mostly without love interest—or else, they consist likewise of nothing but heroics and false romanticism. Kaiser William II, who was equally lacking in

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

literary judgment, tried, half a century ago, to create, by force, an official German literature. But he failed completely. For, while the Court poets (like the Court painters) were spurned by the German people, a genuinely popular literature and a genuinely popular art sprang up. This was the realistic school of which the young Gerhart Hauptmann was the first exponent. But nothing of this kind can arise under Hitler's whip and sword. For it is the duty of the people to be silent when they cannot shout: "Heil Hitler!" and the people—the real people—of Germany are silent. The nation of poets and philosophers has lost its voice. It is left with only that which authority decrees shall pass for literature.

The slogan: *Blut und Boden* (Blood and Soil), imposed from above, has only encouraged mediocrity and dilettantism. What used to be known as *Heimatkunst*, or literature having its origin and inspiration in a particular part of Germany and reflecting both the character of the country and its inhabitants—for this reason the literature most coveted by Hitler and his adherents—is totally extinct. Literary production has been standardised. It is not worth while to mention names; for behind the names in German literature to-day, there is only a naked nothingness—or else a decadence which is reminiscent of the unproductive period which followed the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. This is the spirit—if spirit it can be called—which animated Dietrich Eckhardt, the creator of Adolf Hitler. And Hitler himself is full of it. It is the spirit of trumpets, drums and banners. It can never bring forth literature; it can only produce noise and rhetoric. Noise and rhetoric now drown what once was German literature. The Roman proverb: *Silent musae inter arma*—"In the midst of arms the arts of civilisation are hushed"—is still true. Hitler's Germany bristles with weapons of every sort and kind. And Hitler's Germany has been forsaken by the civilised arts.

For five long years—from 1933 to 1938—I tried to read, to recognise and to discover the new German literature. But I could not trace in it even the most rudimentary beginnings of a new poetic vision; nor could I discover even the tiniest seed from which one might expect a future crop. All that I found was imitation, more or less skilled craftsmanship, or

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

mere dilettantism. Apart from the exceptions already mentioned, the older writers have grown really old and weary; and the younger ones, while still posing as youthful spirits, are in reality becoming like the *alte Kämpfer* (Veteran warriors). Party pressure and uniformity have combined to make them old before their time. They do not even know what writing means. They are out of touch with the true German tradition because they have it continually drummed into them—and repeat it continually to themselves—that a brand-new Golden Age of German art and literature began in 1933.

A century ago, there was a school of literature—the Romantic School—whose exponents extolled, amongst other things, the Dark Ages, the Fatherland, Blood and Soil, and Chivalry. Men like Heinrich von Kleist, Achim von Arnim, Clemens Brentano and others, founded a new patriotic and even race-conscious school of literature. Their works are immortal because they contributed new (or old) beauty to German literature, in the form of lyrics, plays and stories which rival even those of the great classic writers themselves. These might well have served as models for a National Socialist literature. But their sublimity is beyond the reach of a generation of drummers and trumpeters. German Romanticism, to-day, smells of the breath of prisoners—souring by confinement and darkness.

VII

In 1936, the *Deutsches Theater* (German Theatre) in Berlin, which was formerly directed by Max Reinhardt and is now under the protection of Herr Goebbels, produced "Don Carlos," that brilliant play of Schiller's youthful genius. In one famous scene, the Knight of St. John, the Marquis Posa, cries out under the very eyes of the Spanish tyrant, Philip II: "Sire! Give us liberty of thought!" On the first night, when Herr Goebbels was present, this line was greeted by thunderous applause which lasted for several minutes. In the successive performances of the play, this line had to be omitted. Thus, Germany's greatest dramatist, became a victim of the Hitler-Goebbels censorship.

This incident, significant in itself, is also important as a

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

symptom. In a country where the words of a classic author, in one of the loftiest passages of the whole of German literature, are sacrificed, how is it possible for new poetic values to be created and expressed? Under the present system it is impossible.

This system begins its campaign against the poetic spirit with its onslaught on the youth of the country. The education of children and young people is—even when unintentionally so—subversive of all creative tendencies. Two years ago, the Principal of the leading school of dramatic art in Germany poured out his grief to me. Nowadays, he said, it is no longer a question of whether any of the young people attending his school possess or do not possess, dramatic ability. The factor of paramount importance is that all these young people who, either before or since 1933, have been influenced by the National Socialists, have lost all aptitude for, as well as all understanding of, art of any kind. They make no distinction between their chosen future career and their compulsory military service. Their motto is: that which is commanded from above must be obeyed. And their hearts beat no whit faster at the thought of *how* this is to be done. And yet—concluded the Principal—without that fast beating of the heart, no truly creative work can ever be achieved.

Here, he hit the nail well and truly on the head. Imagine for yourself, the life led by the boys and girls of the Germany of to-day—or even, alas! of yesterday. At five or six years of age, they learn to march, to drill, to become drummers or trumpeters, to give commands and to obey them, to strike, to thrust and to shoot. How can anything delicate or fine or “of such stuff as dreams are made of” dawn in these young minds? Hardly are they out of the cradle they are brought into contact with all that is hard, brutal and uncivilised. Thus Spartans may be made, but not Athenians! Thus Teutons may be bred, but not Europeans! This is the essence and acme of the arch-enmity between National Socialism and every form of art and literature. The inclination, the urge, the love and even the passion for them, are choked before they see the light. Alas! Poor Germany! Alas, poor German art! Together with the Socialists, the Democrats and the Jews, it has been uprooted by Adolf Hitler!

LITERATURE IN HITLER'S PARTY AND STATE

VIII

The character of Adolf Hitler was created by the mediocre dramatist, Dietrich Eckhardt. Originally, he was a drummer. Now he is a Leader. But, fundamentally, he is still the same. He is still the maker of crude noises who, with his drumming, drowns all subtlety of thought and sensitiveness of spirit. German literature—with so much else besides—has been silenced.

The conditions for the existence of any given literature can never be judged in isolation. Literature is always a mirror—and a flawless one—of conditions in general. As a nation is, so will its literature become. The German nation, to-day, has no literature. It has ceased to be a nation. It is merely a conglomerate of “followers”—a *Gefolgschaft*, to use a favourite Nazi term. In other and better words, it is a one-way Society. Germans have always had a weakness for such societies; and Hitler has exploited this weakness. Out of that which was once a great nation, he has created a mammoth society with banners, with processions, with meetings, with uniforms—and with himself as its President. Incidentally, a society of this description depends for its prestige on being able to debar certain people from membership. The German-Society debars the Jews.

And so the once-honoured literature of Germany has become the literature (in another sense) of a society. It is forced to be subservient to the narrow interests of that society, and must have the approval of the President and the rest of the committee. Above all else it must extol the German-Society as being more glorious than any other.

Once more the question: what has become of literature in Hitler's Party and State?

Literature in Hitler's Party and State has become a harlot. The harlot of a one-way Society!

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SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

THE Soviet Government continues the policy it has been pursuing since 1917—the policy of business relations with all countries, so long as they maintain like relations with the Soviet Union. Socialist society should not be conceived as an entirely isolated unit. Socialist economy engages in both export and import trade. In international law the Soviet Union, as any other neutral in this War, is free to trade with Germany as well as with Britain and France. How Soviet trade relations will be affected by the War is unpredictable. This article is concerned with some aspects which played a characteristic part in those relations; they will be stated briefly and with a view to show their peculiarity.

Normally such trade relations would depend on three factors. First, the willingness of the capitalist world to purchase Soviet exports and the Soviet ability to export them. Second, the ability of the capitalist world to supply the sort of goods required by the Soviets. And third, the credit question. Before describing those special factors which disturbed or otherwise the above normal course of trade, let me make a brief mention—not purporting to be a complete statement—of what the Soviet Union now is, economically, and something about her foreign trade.

On the basis of national ownership of the means of production and a scientifically planned national economy, the Union of the eleven Socialist Soviet Republics with their 183 million citizens has now achieved the rank of a world economic power which is first in Europe in the physical volume of industrial production, second in the world in this respect after the U.S.A. The Soviet Union dominates the world in large-scale mechanized agriculture (with 1,000 million acres of collective farms alone), it is first in the world in the production of manganese ore, tractors, harvester combines, beet sugar, flax, potatoes, wheat, oats, barley and rye (nearly half of the latter in the whole world). The U.S.S.R. is second in the world in the production of iron ore, oil and gold (holding one-third of world's deposits of the last). The U.S.S.R. possesses the greatest reserves of timber in the world, as well as of coal. Since 1913 the production

SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

of coal has been quadrupled, of oil, cotton and sugar more than trebled. But the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. never reached pre-1914 figures.

The average turnover of foreign trade for the years 1909-1913 was, in million roubles, 11,508.0, with export at 6,513.9 and import at 4,994.1. Under the Soviets in the peak year of 1930 the foreign trade turnover reached (in million roubles) only 9,176.8, consisting of export at 4,539.3 and import at 4,637.5. In 1937 Soviet trade turnover at 3,069.9 million roubles amounted to only one-tenth of that of the U.S.A. Since 1935 both balances of trade and payments are in favour of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has practically no foreign debts and is renowned for punctual payments. Soviet exports never exceeded 2 per cent of the entire national production, but at present they are less than 1 per cent. The U.S.A. export about 16 per cent, Britain about 25 per cent and Belgium even 50 per cent of their national production. Russian wheat exports before 1914 amounted to 24.5 per cent of the world's wheat exports, whereas in 1930, despite a harvest exceeding any pre- or post-war one, Soviet exports of wheat made out only 13.6 per cent of the world's wheat exports. While in 1909-13 agricultural goods formed 70.6 per cent of the average annual Russian export and industrial goods only 29.4 per cent, the average for the years of the first Five Year Plan (1928-32) of agricultural exports dropped to 39.5 per cent and that of industrial exports rose to 60.5 per cent. For the second Five Year Plan (1933-37) the corresponding figures were 27.6 per cent and 72.4 per cent respectively. From a backward agricultural country the U.S.S.R. developed into a highly industrialised one, capable of producing at home every kind of machine and instrument. As a result, the import of machinery and other metal goods was reduced from 1931 to 1936 to less than one-fifth, while production within the country more than trebled during that period. To complete this rapid sketch of the dynamics of Soviet foreign trade I may add that 95 per cent of it is shipped by sea (Baltic, Black Sea, Murmansk) and for Soviet-chartered tonnage British shipowners received in 1937 alone one and a half million pounds.

This short sketch must strike one as giving a picture of

an enormously rich country playing a comparatively small part in international markets. The answer to this lies both in the home economic policy of the Soviet State and in the fact of its trading in and with what is called the "capitalist encirclement." The home policy is to "build socialism in one country" by developing highly all the resources of the country with the aim of "catching up and surpassing capitalist countries." Far from entertaining the ideal of autarchy of the Fascist countries, the U.S.S.R. from the earliest days tried to trade abroad. As a sequel to nationalisation of production and transport, the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly was proclaimed in April, 1918. The Monopoly thus became an integral part of the Planned Economy, with a view, in the first place, to importing what was required for industrial restoration and further construction, and in the second place, without dissipating home resources, with a view to exporting goods of such a quantity and value as would pay for the imports. Thus the Monopoly became a mighty weapon in the process of industrialisation of the U.S.S.R. In order to impede the "building of Socialism," difficulties were made for a normal operation abroad of one of its instruments, namely, foreign trade. Such difficulties, to be analysed below, were the result of the trade and foreign policies of the "encirclement."

The State Monopoly of Foreign Trade is an instrument of Soviet trade policy and the latter is inseparable from Soviet foreign policy. The connection between the two has been emphasised by M. Stalin who, speaking last March at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said: "Our foreign policy is clear; it is a policy of preservation of peace and the strengthening of commercial relations with all countries. That is our position, and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the U.S.S.R. and as long as they make no attempts to trespass on the interests of our country." The trouble is that such attempts have been made from the beginning of Soviet trading. Although established in 1918, the organs of the Foreign Trade Monopoly were prevented from starting operations for two years owing to the Wars of Intervention and the Blockade by the Allies. The first

breaches in the latter were made in 1920-21 when the Soviets began trading with the Baltic countries. L. B. Krassin, then People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, justly applied Peter the Great's word to these countries, they became Soviet's "window to Europe," chiefly for Soviet transit trade. 1921 saw the introduction of the Soviet New Economic Policy, "a strategic retreat in order better to advance." This policy gave a certain latitude to private trading within the country and it was misinterpreted abroad as a return to capitalism. The author of the Memorandum on Soviet Foreign Trade issued (1934) by the University of Birmingham links up this misconception with the plethora of agreements and recognitions which followed. Britain was the first country to regularise its trade with Soviet Russia by signing a trade agreement on the 16th March, 1921, although *de jure* recognition was withheld until 1924. Britain occupied second place, after Germany, in the trade of Tsarist Russia, one-fifth of the latter's total exports having been shipped to, and 12-14 per cent of her total imports provided by, Britain. 98 per cent of Tsarist exports were foodstuffs, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods (timber, flax, eggs, butter, rye, barley, oats, bristles) and a quarter of the imports was coal, another quarter being raw materials (cotton, wool, rubber and non-ferrous metals). The Anglo-Soviet Agreement was followed by a German-Soviet one and a number of agreements with other countries. In 1909-13 the share of Germany amounted to 25-30 per cent of total Russian exports and as much as 42-48 per cent of total imports, Russia exporting grain, animal products, timber, flax, bristles, and importing machinery, chiefly for agriculture and for light industries, chemicals, etc. Germany was the first great power to recognise *de jure* Soviet Russia already in 1918.

These two great European countries, Britain and Germany, continued to play an important part in Soviet trade, competing for the first place in Soviet imports and reaching it alternately, for instance, Germany in 1927, Britain in 1935, with a tendency in later years for Germany to become the chief market for Soviet exports (grain, timber, oil, butter and gold) and for Britain to become the chief supplier of Soviet imports (machinery, rubber, non-ferrous metals). Britain

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and Germany, and Europe generally for that matter, found a very serious belated rival in the U.S.A. who was eleventh among direct buyers from Russia in 1913 and fourth among direct sellers to Russia. The first direct contacts between Soviet Russia and the U.S.A. in 1923 (the *de jure* recognition took place a whole decade later) resulted already in the following years of 1924-25 in U.S.A. occupying temporarily the first place in Soviet imports (cotton, copper, agricultural and industrial machines), 27.9 per cent of the total. Europe, which furnished in 1913 76.8 per cent of Russian imports, lost in favour of America and Asia, and in 1926-27 supplied only 55 per cent of Soviet imports and, in fact, never recaptured its former predominance in the Russian market. Soviet imports, chiefly from U.S.A., Britain and Germany, and consisting chiefly of machinery imported at a cost of eight and one-half milliard roubles (25 roubles = £1, as fixed on the 1st April, 1936) during the First and Second Five Year Plans, greatly helped with the progress of these Plans. As a consequence, the structure of both Soviet imports and exports, as indicated earlier, was changing during that period. While, for instance, in 1932 the U.S.S.R. absorbed 68.2 per cent of the total world export of machine tools, in 1934 this figure was reduced to 20 per cent. The import of agricultural machinery has ceased altogether since 1932. Only special technical equipment of the highest quality is being imported now, and such colonial goods as rubber, jute, hemp, cocoa, etc., and some of the former imports such as ferrous metals, tractors, fertilisers, are being exported. At the same time the nature and value of exported goods is changing. In place of crude oil, more and more petrol; in place of rough timber, sawn goods; in place of undressed, manufactured furs are being exported.

The oscillations in Soviet trade with the above principal and other countries during the past 20 years cannot be followed up here in so far as they (the oscillations) were caused by such "purely" economic factors as demand for industrial equipment, the vital question of credits, the world economic crisis, etc., But in the trade relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world the "normal" (among capitalist countries) economic factors, even "economic wars,"

SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

for instance, had a specific tinge which, in the course of the two decades of trading, often assumed the character of an open political act which generally hindered the normal intercourse. Some of these acts are worth recording now when two of the Soviet Union's principal contracting parties, Germany and Britain, are at war with each other and when much will depend on the attitude of such an important factor in the result as the U.S.S.R. What efforts in the economic field that country has undertaken in the course of the fateful year of 1939, especially with all her neighbours, will be shown at the end of this article.

I am aware of the difficulty of drawing a line between, say, economic discrimination, as practised between capitalist countries themselves, and a hostile political act, except that all politics are concentrated economics. And war itself was rightly diagnosed over 100 years ago by the Prussian general von Clausewitz to be politics conducted with other means. Anti-Soviet politics which link up the early days of armed intervention with suggestions from some quarters that the war with Germany might be "switched over" into an anti-Soviet crusade, can be seen in the "purely" economic relations with the U.S.S.R. In the latter field this "ideology" wrecked as early as 1922 the Genoa Conference when economic help was promised to the then very poor Soviets by Mr. Lloyd George on condition of their dropping the Foreign Trade Monopoly. Further, the notorious case of the late People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, A. P. Rosengolz, has shown the justice of the old wisdom that, failing to kill one's enemy, one embraces him. The characteristic reluctance of the British Government to enter into negotiations with the U.S.S.R. for a new economic agreement (as well as their backwardness in having sent in place of a Cabinet Minister, officials for both economic and political talks in Moscow in March and June, 1939, respectively) has been these days much commented upon. The present casual exchanges of rubber and Cornish tin against the much-needed Russian timber, as well as the announced "forwarding to Moscow of further lists of goods for a two-ways trade" are piece-meal methods not likely to impress one as a serious attempt to improve trading (and political) relations with the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Soviet Union to the mutual advantage of both peoples. The unfavourable wish-fulfilling Press conjectures as to Soviet export possibilities remind one of similar "estimates" of the value of the Soviet armed forces at the time of the Czech crisis in 1938. If anti-Sovietism in politics proved fatal to the preservation of peace, then selfish considerations alone, apart from any others, should keep this virus out of trade relations with the U.S.S.R. Trade between states ruled by private-monopolistic interests, eagerly searching for or bitterly defending markets and colonies landed the World in two Wars within our memory. Soviet trade, in contrast to Tsarist trade (whose motto was the famous ministerial pronouncement: "We shall rather starve than stop exporting"), does not aim at capturing foreign markets or enslaving them by the export of capital. The best example of economic non-aggression is provided by Soviet trade with the Eastern countries, former semi-colonies of Tsarist Imperialism.

There remains, of course, the 22 years' co-existence of the Soviet and the capitalist economic systems. The continuous, enormous growth of the former was outlined briefly. Two World Wars and a world economic crisis have badly shaken and deformed the latter. Quotas, tariffs, etc., made trade exchanges between capitalist countries an affair of high foreign politics. But in their commerce with the U.S.S.R. it was the "spectre of Communism" which haunted and choked additionally "normal" trade relations. It coloured them often to the exclusion and at the expense of vaster national interests and led to regrettable and avoidable incidents, some of which will be listed later. Speaking at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party last March, Molotov said: "History confronts the U.S.S.R. not only with the question of collaborating with the capitalist countries but also with the question of a competition between the two economic systems, the new and the old, between the U.S.S.R. and the principal capitalist countries—for primacy in the economic field." And previous to this he said: "This, of course, is no threat; and such a peaceful competition can injure nobody. Nevertheless, it will be a trial of strength on a big scale." Now four out of six "principal capitalist countries"

SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

are conducting what was formerly "peaceful" War with other, more drastic means. Should the War last the officially-calculated three years, its end may coincide with the completion, barring complications, of the Third Five Year Plan of Socialist Construction. By then the result of the uninvited competition between the two systems will be seen more clearly and we are likely to need Soviet goods not less but more than ever before.

Returning to the impediments of a specific character referred to above, they fall into two categories closely related with each other. The first consists of acts and manifestations undertaken by big vested interests and directed against Soviet trade or its organs. The second category consists of acts prompted by the said interests but undertaken by the "protecting" Government itself. Such protection is often an expedient by which competing monopolistic combinations use the power of the State (*L'état—c'est nous*) for their narrow, anti-national group interests. This is the essence of State Capitalism, particularly under War conditions, when quite openly the planning and regulating and distributing offices of the State are "controlled," "advised," etc., by big business men filling these official posts.

A nationally owned and planned economy cannot, obviously, have a foreign trade run by private or group interests motivated by *their* profit. No wonder that when Soviet trade made its début, it was met by the group interests in question with a hostility where the "ordinary" fear of endangered profits was mixed with a special fear of the "spectre" and a fellow feeling with the "former owners." According to J. D. Yanson ("Foreign Trade in the U.S.S.R." 1934), former chairman of Arcos Ltd., in London: "The first attempt to export Soviet timber was met by the resistance of the English Timber Exchange, influenced by some timber trading firms which had interests in pre-War Russia and therefore considered themselves affected by the nationalisation of property." Space forbids listing and going into all the cases of attacks on Soviet exports, raids on Soviet trade organisations; of gold and credit blockade, of slanderous attacks about Soviet "dumping," using "forced labour," etc., crusades culminating in Acts imposing an embargo on

Soviet trade. To-day it is the alleged "help" to Nazis that is made to arouse anti-Soviet feeling. But let me give a few additional examples out of the history of Soviet Foreign Trade.

The campaign against "stolen" Russian oil products by Sir Henri Deterding, the oil king and benefactor of Nazi Germany, will be remembered in this country. Likewise the allegations of Soviet's "financial insolvency." And earlier in 1923, Lord Curzon's ultimatum on a dispute over fishing rights and in 1927 the police raid on Arcos Ltd., followed by breach of diplomatic and trade relations. Sir John Simon's ultimatum in 1933 over the then still *sub judice* case of British engineers led to an embargo on Soviet trade. Soviet reprisals by diverting their orders elsewhere account for the oscillations of foreign trade mentioned before. Soviet desire to avoid such mutually inimical actions as voiced by Litvinov in his suggestion of economic non-aggression pacts at the 1933 World Economic Conference in London was rejected by all except Turkey. Similarly treated was his declaration that, given terms, the U.S.S.R. was open to import from the then crisis-ridden, "over-produced" world, goods to the value of one thousand million dollars. This occasion was also memorable for the speech of Hugenberg, the Nazi delegate, advocating the colonisation of the Ukraine. To finish with this chapter let me mention the only instance when the Soviet Union allowed itself to be used to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for others (which she refuses to do now). I mean her participation in the economic War (sanctions) against Italy in 1935. As will be remembered, the oil kings through their Governments turned down the proposal, which was supported by the U.S.S.R., to apply to the Fascists the vital oil sanctions. The U.S.S.R. has learned the meaning behind such Western phrases as "Fighting the Fascist-Nazi Aggressor."

Having dealt so far with examples of chiefly political factors of a negative kind, I shall now give a few contrary examples from the experience of Soviet trading with Eastern countries and I shall conclude with the more recent experiences. On its formation, the Soviet Government declared the rejection of the Tsarist colonial policy, the abrogation of all existing agreements based on inequalities

and of the concessions in Eastern countries. Soviet assistance to achieve equality and independence and industrial development was undertaken in agreements in 1921 (and later) with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey and Mongolia. Supported by the Soviet Union, Iran in 1927 and Turkey in 1929 ended, the former the capitulations, the latter the ruinous Lausanne agreement and both established an autonomous customs system. The large State textile mills in Turkey were planned and equipped by the U.S.S.R. Iran, simultaneously with a new trade agreement, signed in 1935 a contract for Soviet technical aid in the construction of elevators, rice-cleansing and wool-washing factories. Tuva and Mongolia have a Foreign Trade Monopoly and a Soviet-built industrial combine is working up local raw materials. The share of the East in Soviet trade is steadily increasing (now about 16 per cent). Wool, cotton, hides and skins are Soviet imports. More and more metals, machinery, cars and equipment are Soviet exports. During the economic crisis, when world markets were crippled, the Eastern countries found a ready market in the undisturbed economy of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet policy of seeking closer commercial relations was pursued throughout the crisis leading to the War and has continued since the outbreak of War, especially in case of neighbours of the U.S.S.R., who include now Germany. As one investigator (Mr. W. Hoeffding) wrote in 1936: "Political antagonism between Communist U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany does not seem to present any insurmountable obstacles to the maintenance, and even to an extension, of trade relations between the two countries." In Soviet exports Germany occupied in 1934 first, in 1935 second, in 1936 third place; in Soviet imports Germany occupied in 1934 second, in 1935 third, in 1936 first place. The trade agreement of the 19th August, 1939, provide, *inter alia*, for a financial credit of 200 million Mk. on the best terms ever obtained by the U.S.S.R. for long-term credits (7½ years). In the words of Molotov (31st October, 1939): "The present negotiations carried on in Germany are preparing a broad basis for the development of trade between the Soviet Union and Germany." It is noteworthy that Tevosyan, the Commissar for Shipbuilding, heads the

delegation. The intensified home and foreign supplies (including Italian) of ships will further destroy the "dearest wish" behind the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935. Soviet deliveries to Germany of one million tons of grain and fodder is in keeping with her neutrality and refusal to regard foodstuffs as war contraband. It may well be that "Red Bread" will prove more effective help to German workers to fight Hitlerism than the opposite method. And also, it is unlikely that "after Hitler" they will be easily "switched over" to "defend Civilisation against Bolshevism." It is unwise to underestimate Soviet capacity to export. Soviet exports are elastic and determined by the necessities of import. The question is, will other, especially belligerent countries, in need of Soviet supplies, be able to satisfy Soviet import requirements? British firms, for example, could not fulfil, because of war orders, their Soviet contracts. How the adapted eight railway lines connecting Germany with the U.S.S.R. and the improved Baltic facilities will affect Soviet-German trade cannot be answered yet.

On the basis of Pacts of Mutual Assistance, trade agreements were concluded last October with Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, providing for trade "increase several fold" (Molotov.) Nazi interests on these shores of *Mare Nostrum* have been sent packing and there is less likelihood of this Soviet's "window on Europe" being smashed in. News is coming in of an impending Soviet-Japanese Trade Agreement. Soviet-Japanese commerce has never been brisk. The "incidents" in the summer of 1938-39 gave the Japanese a bitter taste. Herein lies the political significance of the impending agreement. Thus the increased might of the Soviet Union within a few weeks after the start of this War, pacified, so to speak, the two focal points of War, the two aggressive Fascist neighbours, Germany and Japan. Soviet efforts in the course of the fateful 1939 show an intensification of the policy of closer commercial relations in the face of the approaching catastrophe. Thus in January and February, 1939, a renewal of trade pacts with France, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania was stipulated. In February a new commercial agreement was made with Poland and it was reported that not waiting for ratification (which took place only in June),

the U.S.S.R. began soon heavy shipment, *inter alia*, of cotton and manganese ore (both important for war), evidently believing in the success of Pact negotiations with Britain and France regarding Poland. Also in February, following a good deal of trouble and even suspension for over one year of normal relations, a new Soviet-Italian trade agreement was signed providing for considerable increase in trade. In June a comprehensive trade agreement with China was signed, and there were reports of a Soviet loan to that country. In August a new agreement with U.S.A. was reached on the basis of enlarged Soviet purchases, and a few days before the War the already mentioned Soviet-German commercial agreement was signed. Britain has not concluded a new agreement with the Soviet Union, although Mr. R. S. Hudson, Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, visited Moscow at the end of March.

At the time of writing (end of November) trade negotiations were proceeding with Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia, which is not without importance for Balkan developments. That Bulgaria has been lately, as reported in the Press, moving out of the Nazi orbit and drawing closer to the Soviet Union, is of some consequence, seeing that Bulgaria is situated on important Black Sea trade routes. No less interested in the Black Sea region are Hungary, the new Soviet neighbour, and Yugoslavia. It will be remembered that the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary on the latter's joining the anti-Comintern Pact a few months before the War. The present trade talks are, apparently, a preliminary to a resumption of normal diplomatic relations. As to Yugoslavia—that field of Italo-German rivalry—she was one of the few remaining countries in the world which had not recognised the Soviet Union. This refusal has been at last broken down.

Summing up, one may say that Soviet trade persevered in its policy of peace and economic rapprochement with all countries, despite numerous provocations and obstacles in the course of the last 20 years. No doubt, Soviet trade will be called upon to play an even more important part as a factor of peace now and later, when the War is over and the work of reconstruction will begin. S. F. OSIAKOVSKI.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

MEMORANDA ON RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. First Series, Nos. 3 and 4, 8s. Second Series, Nos. 5-8, 10s. 6d. Third Series, Nos. 9-12, 10s. 6d. (*Birmingham Bureau of Research, The University, Birmingham.*)

THE Russian Department of the University of Birmingham, under Professor Konovalov, has during the last eight years issued from time to time memoranda on Russian economic conditions which deserve to be widely known. The amount of opinion, *pro* and *con*, with regard to the Soviet Government and its economic system and achievements ladled out to the world is excessive; to find facts uncontaminated or undistorted by opinion is extremely difficult. These memoranda at least give the facts which are available. Economic facts are nearly always figures; the figures which the memoranda provide us with are necessarily those supplied by the Soviet Government. Professor Konovalov gives them to us and analyses them; he also often states his own conclusions. He is probably, like practically everyone, not unbiased with regard to Russia, and he is not, we should guess, very sympathetic to the Stalin regime. But he keeps the facts and his own conclusions distinct, and the result is extremely interesting and valuable.

The memoranda cover a wide range. Four of them, if taken together, give a useful picture of the expectations and achievements of the first two five-year plans. They are Memorandum No. 1, Remarks on the Five Year Plan, published in May, 1931, and now unfortunately out of print; Memorandum No. 5, Remarks on the Five Year Plan, published in May, 1932; Memorandum No. 10, Remarks on the Second Five Year Plan, published in November, 1934, and Memorandum No. 12, Results of the Second Five Year Plan and the Project of the Third Five Year Plan, published in July, 1939. It is extraordinarily interesting to study the figures and the comments and analysis issued at these intervals during the last eight years. The most striking fact is the great increase in production which took place during the second five-year plan. In the two tables on pages 5 and 13 of Memorandum No. 12 the detailed figures are given of the quantities planned and actually produced in all the chief industries and in agriculture for each year from 1928 to 1937.

MEMORANDA ON RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The most marked difference between the achievement of the two plans is, of course, in agriculture, but the figures also show the enormous development of the coal, iron and steel industries.

The foreign trade of Soviet Russia is dealt with in three memoranda. Memorandum No. 4, published in February, 1932, deals with the balance of payments and the foreign debt of the U.S.S.R. in the years 1924-25 to 1930-31. Memorandum No. 7, published in October, 1932, analyses the statistics of exports and imports in the years 1930, 1931, and the first six months of 1932. But Memorandum No. 9, Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., published July, 1934, is the most valuable study of this subject. The statistics cover the years 1924 to 1933 and are compared with those of 1913, the exports and imports being classified in the tables both according to countries and commodities.

Memorandum No. 3 (1931) deals with the National Income of the U.S.S.R.; No. 6 (1932) with Wages of Industrial Workers in the U.S.S.R., and No. 8 (1932) with the Communist Policy towards the Peasant and the Food Crisis in the U.S.S.R. Two other items deserve particular notice. There is a very interesting section in the first memorandum dealing with the actual legal position of compulsory labour in the U.S.S.R. and in Memorandum No. 5 there is a section dealing with Oil Consumption and Export in the year 1932. With regard to Russian production of oil and the available quantities for export, it is interesting to note that in 1932 the maximum plan of production for 1933 was 40 million tons. The actual production in 1932 was 22.3 million tons, and the memorandum considers the planned figure "utopian" and estimates that the maximum in 1933 would not exceed 30 million tons. Now if one turns to the statistics of oil production in Memorandum No. 12 one finds that the amount actually produced in 1933 was 22.5 million tons, and that an output of 30 million tons was not reached until the year 1937 when the planned output was 46.8 million tons and the actual output 30.5 million tons.

BOOK REVIEWS

PARLIAMENT. By W. IVOR JENNINGS. 548 + xiii pp. Cambridge University Press. 25s. net.)

A BOOK on Parliament could not hope to reach the level of achievement attained by Dr. Jennings's great pioneering work, *Cabinet Government*. Too much has been written and too much is already known about the subject. But despite the large existing literature, the present volume possesses distinctive merits. The author is realistic, original and extremely erudite.

His realism is shown by the detailed description of the part played by pressure groups such as the Farmers' Union, the National Association of Local Government Officers, and many others, in the process of legislation: his chapter on "Who Makes the Laws?" is most illuminating on this topic. His originality may be indicated by the fact that there are long chapters devoted to such little-studied aspects of Parliamentary government as Parties and Officials, the Framework of Oratory, the Art of Management, and the Technique of Opposition. His remarkable erudition is displayed on almost every page. It is of the kind that one would have thought it almost impossible for anyone outside Parliament to acquire. It makes one feel that Dr. Jennings may one day be asked to give a W.E.A. class in Westminster Hall for the benefit of the Speakers' Counsel, clerks of the two Houses, Government and Opposition Whips, and M.P.s desiring to specialise in procedure! Incidentally, he is never misled by the outward forms of procedure, but invariably explains their real purpose or utility.

Dr. Jennings takes the view that Parliamentary government in Britain is strong, healthy and firmly established; and that it is extremely responsive to comparatively small changes in public opinion, once they are manifested. His opinion concerning the nature of the party conflict is the very opposite of that recently put forward by Professor Laski in *Parliamentary Government in England*, in which it was argued that a crisis is impending owing to the irreconcilable nature of the policies to which the Conservative and Labour Parties are respectively committed.

The author of the present work sees no such fundamental

BOOK REVIEWS

divergence. "The effective differences between the immediate policies of the two great parties are never very great," he writes (p. 128). "The Government and the Opposition cannot be divided except in emphasis, enthusiasm and skill" (p. 155). And in a later passage he declares: "The policies put forward by the respective parties differ more in spirit than in substance" (p. 430). Such differences of principle as now exist between the parties "are no greater than the differences that separated Tories and Whigs or Conservatives and Liberals during the last century. Naturally, the organised capitalist groups are on the one side and the organised workers' groups on the other. But the appeal is to the whole, and because it is to the whole the immediate differences cannot be fundamental" (p. 504).

Parliament is a masterly exposition of our greatest institution. Yet it is somehow a curiously unsatisfying book. In the main, perhaps, because it is not critical, comparative or constructive; in part because we scarcely feel the need for a purely descriptive text-book of political institutions at the present time.

What one would like to know is how efficient Parliament is in relation to its functions; how it compares, for example, with the legislative assemblies of the smaller democracies, or with the French *Parlement*. Are the inconveniences of the Palace of Westminster a serious handicap? Is it necessary for a division to occupy ten minutes? Would Parliamentary business be aided if Members of Parliament were provided with individual office accommodation, as is done in Washington for members of Congress? Why is the library of the House so inadequate? Why is there not a legislative drafting bureau to assist members? These and a hundred other questions spring to the mind. Dr. Jennings might reply that he has already written a little book on Parliamentary reform which deals with certain questions. But one could still have wished that the present work had not been planned and executed on purely expository lines. Nevertheless, it will be a useful addition to the list of books which can be safely recommended to students of public law, constitutional history and politics, to Civil Servants and Local Government officers, and to Parliamentary candidates.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

THE TOWN THAT WAS MURDERED. By ELLEN WILKINSON, M.P. (Gollancz. 7s. 6d.)

AT the present time, anyone who walks about the streets of England can study at frequent intervals a poster which says "*Your courage, your cheerfulness, your resolution will bring us victory.*" I do not suppose that I am the only person who has meditated upon the possible significance of these pronouns, or wondered a little whose courage, and whose resolution was to bring victory to whom. To anyone so wondering, and thinking, moreover, how much difference, both in standard of life and purpose of life, is to-day disguised, as it was between 1914 and 1918, under the phrase *National Unity of Effort*, Ellen Wilkinson's new book comes as a unique reminder.

Unique is a dangerous word for a reviewer; but so far as my knowledge goes, this story of Jarrow is unique. Jarrow may be most succinctly described as the town of 35,000 people in which a penny rate yields only four hundred pounds—as against fifteen hundred in Bedford and nearly seven thousand in Holborn; the primary fact about Jarrow to-day, therefore, is its poverty. This poverty, and its results upon the lives and the health of the 35,000, Ellen Wilkinson has set out clearly and in cold figures. But many other books (even Blue Books) have set out, fully as cogently, the facts about the poverty of the poor and its contrast with the riches of the rich; what this book does is to show its direct relation to the *policy* of the rich—or, rather, of the industrial as opposed to the industrious classes. What emerges very clearly from these pages is the way in which British capitalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries played ducks and drakes with the economy of towns like Jarrow, and, by basing its conduct firmly upon the pursuit of the "beneficent private war" for individual profit, wasted, to an almost inconceivable extent, not merely the human material of Jarrow, which was so easily replaceable that the nineteenth-century capitalist, at any rate, was prone to ignore it altogether, but the economic possibilities of Jarrow, to which one would have thought an industrial capitalism would have been alive. The most interesting part of Ellen Wilkinson's book, therefore, is in the chapters which describe the history of Jarrovian industry,

BOOK REVIEWS

which trace the tale of its development from the sea-coal of the beginning of the nineteenth century through the rise and greatness of Palmer's Shipbuilding Yard to its decline and death in 1933 at the hands of National Shipbuilders' Security, and to the attempt, strangled by the steelmasters, to bring blast-furnaces to Jarrow to replace the empty slips. The book was finished in May of this year; since when Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain have between them pointed the moral of the lost steelworks even better than the author could have done.

It is an extraordinary story; and it would appear, one would imagine, still more astonishing to the future historian, if there be any history to come. The chapters relating to the coalfield, with its strikes and cholera, its appalling housing, are familiar to all students of the industrial revolution, causing the reader to do no more than observe for the twentieth time the astounding unimaginativeness of man to man. Part Two, the saga of the shipyard, begins as a Samuel Smiles story of Victorian enterprise, proceeds to the profiteer's dream of the war years, and ends with the deliberate destruction, by a number of industrial and financial magnates, of one of the finest shipbuilding yards in the country. Thus did finance eat men. In Part Three the meal is complete; another and similar group prevents, by methods that are fully set out in the text, a steelworks, for which plans and capital were available, from coming to revive Jarrow's fortunes. The remainder of the book describes Jarrow dead; it includes a vivid description of the Jarrow March, the first occasion for generations on which a whole English town, irrespective of party, made a vain effort *openly* to bring its plight home to its governors, and an explanation of the failure of "enlightened capitalism," as exemplified by Sir John Jarvis, to plaster the wounds which "realistic capitalism" had made.

Easy to read, and well-balanced, this book is an excellent tract to put into the hands of the most innocent student.

MARGARET COLE.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

THE SMALLER DEMOCRACIES. By SIR E. D. SIMON.
(Gollancz. 6s.).

DEMOCRACY UP-TO-DATE. By SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS.
(Allen & Unwin. 2s.).

THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY. By JOHN MIDDLETON
MURRY. (Cape. 10s. 6d.).

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALISM. By A. ROSENBERG. (Bell.
12s. 6d.).

PERSONALITY IN POLITICS. By DAVID THOMSON. (Nelson.
2s. 6d.).

IT would be salutary if one could make it illegal for anyone to write about democracy during the next three years who had not satisfied a Board of Examiners that he had read and understood Sir E. D. Simon's book *The Smaller Democracies*. For it might help to eradicate both the ignorance and defeatism of democrats and the ignorance and complacency of anti-democrats. The decay, decline, disappearance, or death of democracy is dinned into our heads from all sides, either with lamentation or hallelujah according to taste. Sir Stafford Cripps begins his book with a statement that "there is no country left in the world where the old-fashioned liberal democracy which was regarded as the pattern for progressives in the nineteenth century is still in fact functioning," and he gives as proof the statement that France has accepted a dictatorship and that "British democracy is rapidly approaching the same condition"; he maintains that "the demoralisation of democratic government" is "apparent all over the world." *The Smaller Democracies* should be read by Sir Stafford Cripps and he will find that he has overlooked at least five countries of Europe. Sir Ernest Simon has made a personal and careful study of political and social conditions in Switzerland, the three Scandinavian countries, and Finland. It is an admirable book; it gives the relevant, and only the relevant, facts, clearly and objectively. It enables one to understand both the formal organization of national and local government in these five countries and the way in which the system actually works in practice. Sir Ernest does not hesitate to interpret what he saw and point its moral, but he is scrupulous in marking the line between fact and opinion. He shows conclusively that in these countries democratic

BOOK REVIEWS

government is not demoralized; on the contrary it is functioning vigorously and in Sweden at least it has advanced beyond the stage of liberal democracy to the beginnings of a true social democracy. In a valuable last chapter he considers the question why these democracies have succeeded. For the citizen of a Great Power it is depressing to find that one reason of their success is, in his opinion, their small size.

Sir Stafford Cripps's book has a definite and practical purpose. He wants to save democracy by bringing it up to date. He is concerned with democracy in our own country and in the mother of parliaments. He believes that a good deal of the difficulty here is due to the inefficiency of the machinery of democratic government, and that the machinery is inefficient because it was developed to deal with social and economic conditions which have now ceased to exist. His proposals are mainly directed to a reform of parliamentary procedure by an extension of the committee system. The principles of policy and legislation would still be debated in and controlled by the whole House, but the details of legislation and the control of administration would be in the hands of committees. Sir Stafford's criticism of the existing system and his arguments for reform are extremely interesting and there can be little doubt that development on the lines suggested by him is desirable. But a study of Sir Ernest Simon's book might show that we could learn much from Scandinavian experience. For instance, the question of size in the unit of democratic government, referred to above, is not necessarily insoluble for us merely because we have to apply democracy to a large population and the centre of an empire while Sweden has a small and homogeneous population. The experience of Sweden suggests that the advantages which Swedish democracy obtains from the size of its population might be enjoyed by British democracy by means of devolution and federation.

The three other books are more theoretical or historical. They are well worth reading. Mr. Thomson has written a really admirable little book which examines the problem of government and of democracy from an original angle. It is a study of the interaction of the personal and the impersonal

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

in politics. His conclusion is that the impersonal element, the machinery of government, is designed and used for certain purposes, and that these are the purposes of the personal element, the politically effective part of the community; the object of democracy is to ensure that as large a part of the community as possible shall be politically effective. The value of his book consists largely in his detailed analysis of the ways in which the effectiveness of the personal element is thwarted, encouraged, narrowed, or widened.

Mr. Murry's and Professor Rosenberg's books deal with the relation between democracy and Marxian socialism and are extremely theoretical and historical. They have another bond of resemblance; they both have extremely good things in them, but as a whole are unsatisfactory, leaving the reader at the end in a state of hazy muddle. The reason for Mr. Murry's failure is clear. As a critic and analyst he is clear and objective. He begins with a brilliant critique of Marxian socialism. He shows the profound significance both for democracy and for socialism in the modification of the position of the proletariat in the industrialized states of Europe under liberal democracy. Every one who still calls himself a democrat, a socialist, or both can learn a great deal from this analysis. Having taken the machine to pieces, Mr. Murry then proceeds to try to put it together again, and this part of his book seems to us as great a failure as the first part is a success. It leads into a world of hazy religious mysticism and uplift which may comfort those to whom that sort of thing appeals, but which has no relation to the grim realities of the world we unfortunately live in.

The unsatisfactory nature of Dr. Rosenberg's book is more difficult to understand. It is a historical analysis of the relation between socialism and democracy from the French Revolution until the present day. Much of the history and a good deal of the analysis are admirable, and, as with Mr. Murry, the earlier part of the book is very much better than the later sections. The analysis of the attitude of Marx and Engels to democracy at different periods of their life is particularly valuable. But the book suddenly seems to lose its grip on reality. The reason seems to be that Dr. Rosenberg bases his analysis of the historical development after the middle

of the nineteenth century upon a distinction between different forms of democracy, e.g. "revolutionary democracy," "social democracy," "liberal democracy." Unfortunately he does not succeed in making the distinctions between and the reality of these types clear or permanent in the mind of the reader. The fault may in part rest on the translation, which is not at all good, but the result is to leave the reader in a haze.

LEONARD WOOLF.

HITLER'S ROUTE TO BAGDAD. By BARBARA WARD, the HON. BARBARA BUCKMASTER, CLARE HOLLINGWORTH, VANDELEUR ROBINSON, LILO LINKE. (*George Allen and Unwin*. 10s. 6d.).

THIS collection of studies is clearly a valuable addition to the books on Balkan affairs which have been published in English. Each of the five essays it contains is competent and informative, and, on the whole, they are written in a lively and attractive way. The story of modern Turkey is perhaps the most remarkable, for Turkey's achievements have been veritably miraculous since Mustapha Kemal was elected as leader and military commander at Angora in 1920. As Miss Linke points out, the other Balkan states had hitherto found it possible to combine only against their traditional oppressors, the Turks. Yet since the signature of the Balkan pact in February, 1934, Turkey has more and more become the head of the Balkan family. The Kemalist regime seems to have achieved, both at home and abroad, precisely those things which many honest people vainly hoped from Hitler, including genuine reconciliation with old enemies and ex-subjects, peaceful, legal revision at Montreux, and, internally, a progressive yet intensely nationalist despotism, but one which was far less aggressive, far less brutal, even less Byzantine, than that of the Nazis in Germany.

In some ways Miss Hollingworth's section on Bulgaria is the most illuminating of these five, and her account of the intricate Macedonian Question is admirably clear. The wrapper of *Hitler's Route to Bagdad* claims that one of the book's objects is to analyse the extent and the quality of

German influence in the South-East, and it is Miss Hollingworth who is most instructive with regard to Nazi penetration. "The German Legation (in Sofia) and Consular staffs," she writes, "mix freely with the local people and thus facilitate the commercial negotiations of their salesmen." On the other hand, "Many of the British officials in the Balkans, and especially in Bulgaria, are reluctant to mix with the 'natives.' They do not, like the Germans and Italians, sit about in the cafés, and many educated and English-speaking Bulgarians have told me that they find it quite impossible to get on to friendly terms with the staff of the British Legation." This indictment, levelled by all open-minded travellers at British diplomacy in general, is particularly alarming in war-time when neutral opinion and feeling have a special importance of their own.

Perhaps the best contributions which Mr. Vandeleur Robinson makes are those of a general kind. His account of the plebiscite organised by Kondylis in order to bring home King George II of Greece is a classic description of "popular" voting as it has been staged in central and eastern Europe of late. And it is often not sufficiently well understood that, as Mr. Robinson writes of Metaxas' "Third Civilisation," the evils of dictatorship are far greater in the moral than in the material field."

Miss Buckmaster sums up the dilemma of the Rumanians to-day when she writes that "experience in the (last) war led the Rumanian people to fear their Russian allies more than their German enemies." Miss Ward surmounts the confusion of peoples and problems in Yugoslavia with great skill. She deals particularly well with the "crucial difference between Croatia and Slovenia," *i.e.*, that "up to 1918 Slovenia had always been a province among provinces, and the Slovenes alone among South Slav peoples had not one hour of independence in their past history," while the Croats had, until 1918, ever been able to cling to some form of autonomy at the least. Where many of those who knew Yugoslavia either from within or without will part company with Miss Ward is where she contends that Stoyadinović was a relatively liberal ruler. This is perhaps a matter of opinion. But the map of Yugoslavia here given is positively misleading, for

it depicts all Bosnia as inhabited by Croats while in fact its mixed Serbo-Croat character has been one of the most difficult points in the Serbo-Croat discussions this year.

Contrary to the expectations of Miss Ward and other competent observers, these discussions at last bore fruit under the stress of the events of last August. One longs, of course, for far more exact information about the practical results of the agreement which was then at last reached. But the book under review does what is possible to provide the background for the new epoch ushered in by the Russo-German Pact, which has in fact brought back Russia to rival Austro-German influence in the Balkans. In view of the great sentimental attachment of the Southern Slavs to any kind of Russia this rivalry is full of possibilities which are not diminished by assuming the disguise of Russo-German friendship. Yet although Rumanians are bound to react to the new situation very differently from Slavs, most reports since the outbreak of war suggest that Balkan unity, already in bud, is now beginning to flower, and that Italy is diligently tending the blossom. Hungarian-Rumanian enmity, re-emphasised from Budapest, is at least as serious a hindrance as the question of Southern Dobruja, but Hungary, now alienated by the Berlin-Moscow Agreement, is regarded as Axis territory and consequently omitted from *Hitler's Route to Bagdad*.

This book suffers, naturally, from a certain degree of overlapping, but above all it lacks an epilogue to link it up with the situation of to-day. With no conclusion but that to Miss Linke's section on Turkey, the general theme of the *Drang nach Süd Osten* too abruptly disappears. It seems a pity that Mr. Leonard Woolf did not, in addition to his explanatory introduction, round off the statement of the separate investigators.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

STALIN. By BORIS SOUVARINE. *Translated by M. R. JAMES.*
(Secker & Warburg. 155.)

THERE is a danger that this book will be both read and neglected for its obvious defects. Anti-Socialists will find it a mine of useful quotations, while Stalinites will excuse themselves from taking it seriously by pointing to the prejudices of both its author and translator. Indeed, it seems a pity that Mr. James, in spite of his lively style, should have been given the task of translating Souvarine. His sympathy with Trotsky was bound to influence him and to turn a book, which in the original French was outside the Stalin-Trotsky controversy, into a part of that barren war of words.

In spite of these defects, the "critical survey of Bolshevism" can be warmly recommended. Souvarine is an omnivorous reader and has collected a mass of biographical material from the most unlikely sources. It is improbable, in view of Stalin's care in covering his own trail, that we shall learn much more about his early life than is to be found in this book. From the days of his theological education to his seizure of power, he has been the ambitious executive within an organization which demands more exclusive loyalty and confines the intellect more rigidly than even the Jesuits. Stalin is neither an intellectual nor a party-boss, in the American sense of the term, but a conscientious member of a secular religious order. Though he does not care about philosophy, his whole outlook has been formed by Marxism, which has given a hard edge to his ruthless personality and a rational justification to his natural pleasure in domination.

Souvarine shows, more clearly perhaps than he intends, that the attempt to distinguish the vices of Stalinism from the virtues of Leninism or Trotskyism is unjustified. All the Old Bolsheviks were revolutionaries who genuinely believed that the means justify the end, and all were guilty of that glorification of the Party and suppression of the Opposition which destroyed the possibility of a "workers" state and created the social basis of the present Bonapartism. The difference between Lenin and Stalin was that the former believed in a limited freedom of speech within the Party and the latter did

BOOK REVIEWS

not. Lenin was prepared to shoot any critic except a Bolshevik: Stalin destroys Bolsheviks as well.

Another characteristic of Stalin which Souvarine stresses is his peculiar hatred of national minorities. Himself a Georgian, he was reprimanded by Lenin for his cruelty in suppressing his countrymen. Indeed, he surpasses any Muscovite in his passion for centralised autocracy, and his treatment of Finland is not surprising when we recall his methods of dealing with national minorities inside Russia. The present foreign policy of Russia, in contrast to that of the League period, is in exact accord with the whole character both of Stalin and of Russian Bolshevism, which found it inconceivable that anyone could disagree with the official line without being a venomous and dangerous foe. Such a doctrine leads inevitably to imperialism, when once the holders of power are entirely unchecked by the wishes of their subjects.

For fundamentally imperialism, whether of the capitalistic or Stalinite brand, is the product of fear. The craving for security drives inevitably to an unending series of conquests, first of internal, then of external neutrals or opponents. Stalin is the perfect example of the fear-driven autocrat, the classic example of "power politics," because he not only practises it but acts on the theory of politics which seeks to justify it. Souvarine's book shows the dreadful sense in which Bolshevik theory and practice have attained a unity in the personality of this singular man.

R. H. S. CROSSMAN.

KARL MARX. By I. BERLIN. (*Home University Library. 2s. 6d.*)

At last, thank goodness, we have reached the time when Marx and Marxism can be written about in a reasonably intelligent way. No longer the dreary, squalid little manuals written by insufficiently instructed persons on the one hand—the uneducated writing for the uneducable—nor, on the other, the blank ununderstanding of the academically superior. At any rate, if such works continue to appear, we do not need to read them.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

With Cole's writings and those of Sidney Hook, Lindsay and Carr, there has at last come into existence a small literature on Marxism in English—quite enough to go on with—which one can read without contempt for the ignorance of some or irritation at the obtuseness and self-sufficiency of others. That is to say that this recent work—it has only come into existence since the last war—is sympathetic yet critical, understanding and intelligent; it exemplifies the same intellectual standards as would be applied, say, to John Stuart Mill or Darwin or any other great figure in the history of thought. Marxism is neither swallowed whole uncritically as so much revealed and unquestionable truth, nor condemned outright as so much nonsense. Why should it be either? Either attitude is extremely silly.

Mr. Berlin's attitude to his subject is exemplary, and on the whole it is the best introduction to it that we have. His little book has several advantages: it is not merely a biography, but gives as much space to Marx's thought, and, for once, from the point of view of a professional philosopher. It is most interestingly and well-written, if a trifle over-exuberantly, the first book in what we hope will be a career of many such, by a brilliantly intelligent young writer. The book is not perfect: who could write a perfect book on Marx of all people? The proportions are a little out: much more space is given to the early than the later Marx. That is right, on the whole; but the later economic writings, with *Capital* at their centre, are inadequately dealt with: there is a lacuna here. Mr. Berlin is more interested in the formation of Marx's doctrine, and a fascinating job he makes of it. The great quality of the book is its absence of *parti pris* and its completely impartial and objective approach. In consequence it makes Marx intelligible, both as a person and as a thinker; and without any undue admiration—in fact, Mr. Berlin is a little too cold about him, admires the G.O.M., extraordinary and unattractive person that he was, rather insufficiently in my opinion. One can admire even where one does not like.

This is no place to argue the familiar, the stock pros and cons of Marxism, but to draw attention to what I think most original in what Mr. Berlin has to contribute. He realises, as so few have done, the fundamental rationalism of Marx's

outlook. Not in the sense of liberal rationalism: Marx did not fall, no one less, for the most superficial of rationalist fallacies, the view that people in the mass are essentially reasonable, will respond to rational persuasion, etc. We all know now how untrue that is. But he held, all the same, that "a man's actions were inevitably guided by his real interests, by the requirements of his material situation." But what if, after all, they¹ are not? or are only partially or discontinuously so? Marxism has certainly opened our eyes to the way in which men's behaviour is motivated by interests, but it does not allow for the extent to which it is the result of sheer foolery or stupidity. What is so astonishing in the contemporary world is not so much that some men (and groups) are motivated by their interests, as the way that others are not: not for the old liberal-idealist reason that they are above them, but the only too realist one that they are so stupid that they do not know what their interests are. When you universalise that degree of idiocy over the map of Europe and beyond, you arrive at the contemporary scene. It almost seems that they would prefer to take the path of destruction instead of that of rational calculation and both self- and group-preservation.

To take a plain yet very important example for Marx's politics: he placed all his hopes in the working-classes, yet nobody understood better what fools they were, "infinitely gullible, obstinately loyal to the agents of their own worst enemy, who deceived and flattered them only too easily to their destruction." Look at the way in which the masses have followed the Hitlers and Mussolinis, the Baldwins and Chamberlains in the past few years! There is a discrepancy between Marx's pessimistic view of human nature, which was, on the whole, well justified, and his political optimism, which looks as if it were premature by a century or two. The reason intellectually, no doubt, was part of his legacy from the awful Hegel: the assumption that the historic process is itself rational and progressive. But suppose if it is not? It is really much too simple to assume that "history does not move backwards or in cyclical movements: all its conquests are final and irrevocable"; that the bourgeoisie must necessarily be defeated by the working-class, as the

feudal nobility was by the bourgeoisie; that the victory of the working-class will mean the abolition of all classes, etc., etc. It is really all very naïf, making history march *comme sur le papier, que souffre tout*. Whereas history is, in fact, a much more complicated process. Over long periods there is retrogression; civilisations have disappeared; societies have been defeated as often as they have won; men have failed, leaving the ground encumbered with the ruins of their hopes, or vanished off the map without leaving a trace to show that they could not solve their problems. If it would be an advantage to Professor Toynbee to have read a little more Marx, it would have been no less an advantage to Marx to read Professor Toynbee.

What is more important for contemporary politics, it is this which explains why Marxism has been so caught out and its hopes postponed by the reaction of the decades in which we live. We do not need to insist here that its analysis of society is more profound and true than any other before us; but it is insufficiently sceptical, too rigid and formalised, too Hegelian still. It must learn something of the wisdom of Hume. Even so the thought crosses my mind that in these degenerate days people are perhaps unworthy of Marx and Marxism; they understand neither him nor it nor anything very much. It is much too intelligent a system, even as it is, too enlightened, too reasonable, too right. Now perhaps in the twenty-first or twenty-second century people may see the point of it and it may come into its own. But a great deal of retrogression may also take place before then.

A. L. ROWSE.

DOWN RIVER. By JOHN LEHMANN. (*Cresset Press*, 12s. 6d.)

MR. LEHMANN has written in "Down River" two distinct books, and has brought them together in a single volume, with a concluding chapter in which he draws together the lessons to be learnt in both parts of the work. Part One of the book is a new account of the decline and fall of between-war Austria; Part Two gives pictures of the five countries threaded upon the course of the Danube below Austria. Although both halves of Mr. Lehmann's book have necessarily a close resemblance to many works on Austria and on central and eastern Europe which have appeared in the last few years, mostly from the pens of eminent journalists, it must be said that he gives us something more. He analyses with considerable clarity the elements in the lives of the Danubian peoples, shedding a revealing light upon each in turn of the forces, the interests, the aspirations, which go to make up the immensely complicated economic and political problem of the Danube basin. There is an especial emphasis, expressive of Mr. Lehmann's personal point of view, upon the importance of the actual river itself in the general problem.

The melancholy story of the between-wars Austrian Republic may become in the hands of a writer a chapter of accidents, a memorial dirge, a tirade against traitors, or a meditation upon human folly. For Mr. Lehmann it is a demonstration of the working of politics, from which politically-minded persons may draw certain conclusions, and which may sign-post the way to future state-builders in whatever dispensation follows the present war. Here are some of the morals to be drawn from his story: First, that a social-democratic state, especially when it operates in a large city, can effect marvellous transformation in the lives and the spirit of the working people. The achievements of socialist Vienna live after the destruction of Viennese socialism.

Secondly, it is not enough to return by democratic measures a socialist government, and let it carry out social reforms in capitalist society. The power which democracy gives to numbers is outweighed by the economic power of capitalists, and if a workers' paradise is to function in a free democratic state it is first necessary that the social democrats

obtain control of the sources of economic power; the social-democratic state cannot live by democracy and social reform, but must transform the state system from capitalism to socialism if it is to survive.

Thirdly, a large part of the working classes consists not of urban proletariat but of peasants. This is specially true in eastern Europe and in under-developed countries generally. If a workers' movement rests entirely upon the urban workers, and forgets or fails to win the peasants, it starts its career maimed, and will find the peasants against it in the day of difficulty. The two great sections of the working class must combine in order to prevail.

Fourthly, politics is a gentlemanly game only so long as nothing much is at stake. The "correct" behaviour of capitalists is like the Christianity of many of them—for use on Sundays. The unhappy social democrats who, in the name of democracy (in which they really believe, and the capitalists do not) try to behave in a gentlemanly manner every day of the week, only betray themselves into the hands of unscrupulous opponents. Democratic fair play is immensely valuable to the community—so long as it is applied by and to democrats. Give a fascist liberty and he will take away yours. The determined moderation of the Vienna socialists was their undoing.

In the second half of the book we leave Austria, and are taken into the other countries of Danubian Europe—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Roumania. We see the timber-workers bringing their logs by way of mountain torrents to the Danube. We see, everywhere, the peasants, forming four-fifths of the population of Danubian Europe, scratching a living—usually a desperately hard one—from the soil, and being cheated of the fair reward of their labours by feudal magnates, or by economic crises, or by imperialist autarkies. We see the honest achievements of the Czech statesmen, maligned and eventually destroyed by a lying imperialism; the republican loyalty of the Slovaks distorted by heavily bribed politicians. We see honest and industrious German minorities, scattered about Europe, haphazard, as from a pepper-pot, deluded into madness by a lying myth that they are superior to all other peoples.

Amid all these competing ideas and forces, there runs throughout this book the liquid thread of the Danube. Mr. Lehmann performs a real service when he brings into the light of day the little-known activities of the international commissions, whose efficient administration has enabled the Danube to play its part as the all-important economic artery of eastern Europe. It is comforting, at a time when international institutions have largely broken down, to be shown an object lesson in the admirable results of international co-operation.

One of the merits of this book is that, unlike so many of the recent books on central and south-eastern Europe, it is not exclusively concerned with the selling "down river" of socialism, or democracy, or Austria, or Czechoslovakia. It does not concentrate upon the problem, urgent though it is, of how (or whether) the aggressive advance of Germany can be stopped. On the contrary, it assumes that some day or other the Hitler nuisance will be abated, and considers the great problems of the Danube basin which will still remain to be solved. It considers the problem of combining national liberty with economic prosperity. It considers the need for social democrats to unite and remove the dead hand of capitalism from the sources of economic power. It considers the formation of a federation which may unite without unifying, which may secure the welfare of peasant and townsman, which may secure freedom, diversity, democracy, and a decent life for the Danubian peoples. These are the problems that we need to consider—what is their solution, and how is it to be brought about. Mr. Lehmann is not content to mourn our defeats; he is choosing the materials to build our victory.

VANDELEUR ROBINSON.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

NATIONAL CAPITALISM. By ERNEST DAVIES. (*Gollancz*. 1939. 10s. 6d.).

THIS book is a vigorously critical commentary on the National Government's handling of a number of major economic problems. It would have been first-class electioneering material, had not the defence of democracy deprived us of such democratic luxuries as elections. The author seems to have written rather hurriedly, perhaps with an eye on the possibility of an early election. (At least he has written with a curious disregard of the common usages of English syntax, a practice which sometimes obscures his meaning; and an indifference to minor points of accuracy, exemplified by the habit of referring to all governmental enquiries indiscriminately as "Royal Commissions.")

The story covers, among other topics, tariffs, steel, housing, electricity, shipping, beet sugar, London Transport and civil aviation. The picture which Mr. Davies draws (in very vivid colours) is that of a government which acts consistently on the assumptions that private is to be preferred to public enterprise; and that, since profit is the stimulus which keeps industry going, it is the government's business to put unprofitable enterprise back on to a profit-making basis by subsidy, tariff, control of prices or of output, or any other instrument that it can lay hands upon. Such a study is useful as showing up the vastness of the difference which separates the National Government's assumptions from those of the socialists. It does not, of course, convict the government of behaving in a way that is indefensible in terms of its own principles and standards.

That charge, however, can also be effectively sustained with material from the pages of this book. For what defence can there be for establishing a Tribunal for the specific purpose of making an independent valuation of coal royalties, and then throwing the Tribunal's estimate over, under pressure from coal owners? or for a scheme under which British owners are enabled to buy up foreign ships solely in order to make the British government pay for scrapping them? or for protecting sugar refiners from competition from an enterprise which the government is itself subsidising?

or for subsidising one system of air lines to compete with another which also draws a state subsidy? This is the kind of evidence that Mr. Davies uses with great effect.

Nevertheless, it is difficult not to feel regret that the author did not steel himself more resolutely to resist the temptations of political pamphleteering. It is time that authoritative Labour writers gave up tricks like quoting aggregated totals of dividends without stating precisely over what period these have been paid; using profit figures without explicit reference to the capital on which these profits have been realised; or slipping unostentatiously from nominal to market values of capital where this suits the argument.

One further, and more serious, protest it is perhaps legitimate to raise. One of the chapters in which Mr. Davies uses his specialist knowledge in a particularly illuminating way is that in which he describes the sabotage of the Blum government in France, and to a less extent of the New Zealand socialist government, by the monarchs of finance. In this he writes: "The object of this chapter is more to indicate possible ways and means of attempts to wreck the programme of a Labour government than a detailed analysis of the means of counteracting them." *And this is his last word on the subject, thirty pages before the end of the book.*

Mr. Davies is not alone in this habit of treating diagnosis as the end of the practitioner's art in politics. The effects are disastrous. Up and down the rank and file this is the inference that one hears drawn: "If we try to do anything serious, we shall be sabotaged. Therefore, what's the good of trying?" Will Mr. Davies please write another constructive book to put this right?

BARBARA WOOTTON.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

WAR WITHOUT VIOLENCE. By KRISHNALAL SHRIDHARANI.
(Gollancz. 9s.).

THE idea that power may be reached without striking a blow makes a fascinating chapter in the history of Hindu thought.

The great ascetics of Hindu legend terrified the gods by their self-immolating practices: so that the masters of creation sent temptations to break the resolution of their would-be conquerors. Chastity gave extraordinary powers. The Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir—that unique example of a Hindu historian's history of a Hindu kingdom—shows how the mediaeval practice, out of which Satyagraha has grown, became an institution in the Kashmir state before the twelfth century A.D.

The technique was generally self-starvation, endured in public, with a display of images and other emblems, and an uproar of drums and cymbals, to attract public notice. Ordinarily it was performed by Brahmans whose sacred character made their deaths a deadly sin for the person fasted against. Sometimes they drowned themselves.

In two cases the chronicler notes that the Brahmans accepted bribes and withdrew their minatory fast: in a third that the fast was the result of a political intrigue by the King's Brahman counsellors: in a fourth that it was the prelude to an insurrection. In one case the troops, to enforce a claim for extra campaign allowances "blocked the doors of the royal palace with drawn swords, and everywhere held solemn fasts": a sort of combination of the violent with the non-violent method. The usual procedure was that the king's officers, hearing of the demonstration, arrived to enquire into the grievance: and so a sort of litigation against oppressive action was instituted.

Under a saintly leader such as Mahatma Gandhi, it is likely that the claims which Satyagraha is meant to enforce will make a widespread appeal to the general sense of justice. Mr. Krishnalal Shridharani, in his interesting description of the technique, emphasises the necessity of a fundamental unity of moral outlook in the disputants. The oppressor, or his instruments, must be capable of being convinced that those who perform the sacrifice are in the right: must have

a conscience, in fact. Perhaps this is only another way of saying that the parties to the quarrel must not have, each his own separate and different sense of right, or even each his own separate and different conviction of what is right in the particular dispute. It seems unlikely, for instance, that a body of persons holding the opinions of racial superiority and racial contamination which are common in Nazi Germany, would be deterred, by any method analogous to Satyagraha, from driving the Jews out of their country: though the author (p. 258) thinks that Satyagraha might have succeeded there.

Modern Satyagraha, as described by Mr. Shridharani, has borrowed much from political and economic agitation in the West. But its fundamental principles are best summarised in its fifteen commandments (pp. 144-146). It is not passive resistance: but rather, disciplined direct action, without striking a blow, without uttering an insult, and—this is the unique feature—accompanied by an active courtesy and an active assistance to opponents and their agents. It makes enormous demands, therefore, upon the patience and self-restraint of those who practise it: and it broke down at the end of the great campaign of 1920-22 because the mob failed in these qualities, and slaughtered a body of policemen: whereupon Mahatma Gandhi, following fearlessly the logic of his doctrine, *called the movement off*.

It is more than a technique of peaceful rebellion, or of agitation for the redress of grievances. Mahatma Gandhi is not a systematiser: but it is plain that he looks to Satyagraha for more than this. "Those who have to bring about radical changes . . . cannot do it except by raising a ferment in society. There are only two methods of doing this, violent and non-violent." Satyagraha is thus a necessary alternative to war: for without one or the other, society may stagnate. Its resemblances to war are the subject of Chapter X of Mr. Shridharani's book. Not the least of these resemblances is that both parties to the quarrel can use the same weapon. "Satyagraha," says Gandhi, "is available to either side in the fight." But he adds that there are checks that automatically work for the vindication of truth and justice. Is this more than age-old cry of the nations entering the battle:

"May God defend the Right?" It is of the essence of every tragedy that there is more than one Right, and that the conflict is not, plainly and straightforwardly, one between Right and Wrong.

Strangest, perhaps, of all, is that this mystical weapon is at the discretion of each, to use as the spirit moves him. He uses it at his peril, for it is "to be employed (p. 262) only when anything, except violence and war, is more desirable than the existing state of affairs": a condition of which the individual apparently is the judge. What must happen to the rules of caste, and the other age-old bonds upon Indian society, when such a solvent is at work? It is the reversal of what seemed to be the modern trend. Immensely much has been done—and more is doing—to depersonalise and officialise differences, to take them out of the hands of the disputants, and create machinery for their disinterested settlement by third parties. That process seemed to be passing—with numerous set-backs—into the international sphere. And here we have a trumpet-call to return, as it were, from the judge to the prophet, from the organisation to the inspiration, from the machinery of a world society to the impulse of the individual.

This is not the prospect which presents itself to the author: for, in his concluding conjectures (p. 270) he tells us that Satyagraha cannot win victories by itself. "It is the relative strength of the people that decides its success or failure. Man-power, financial resources, industrial development, the quality of the individual soldier, and the like, play a substantial part in the Satyagraha campaign, as they would in a war." As special examples the author cites the restrictions placed upon Bombay's commerce and finance in 1930, and the conditions imposed upon production in the textile mills. These examples show how much has been borrowed from the technique of Western agitation and organisation: and how the original conception of Satyagraha has been modified in the process. They seem to bring us back once more to the "big battalions" as the instruments of victory.

Satyagraha, the author tells us, means, etymologically, insistence upon truth. But he falls into mis-statements of fact: of which the most glaring is (p. 120) that India has

been excluded from the League of Nations. His account (p. 80) of the modification of the communal award by Ramsay Macdonald is not candid. The original award was subject to the proviso that it would be modified if the communities concerned should agree upon a practicable alternative. Under the pressure of Mahatma Gandhi's fast, the communities did agree upon such an alternative so far as the deprived classes were concerned: and this alternative was accepted by the Prime Minister. It is not true (p. 118) that Bengal was to be partitioned in order to benefit British immigrants, or that there was ever any plan of British immigration there. The writer does much less than justice to Mr. Gokale, and a score of other early leaders, when he says (p. 211) that the nationalist movement before Gandhi "consisted of a few organisations formed from the wealthier class, whose sole function was to bicker mildly with the Government, when the latter drastically violated the former's vested interests." It is not true (p. 113) that the Akali Sikhs acquired the privilege of keeping a dagger by their non-violent direct action of 1922. The right was conceded to them at an earlier date by reason of their prowess in the Great War. They were generally, but not always, non-violent in their use of the permitted weapon.

These are blemishes: but the book is one of very great interest, leaving upon the mind an ineffaceable impression of the unique potentialities of a war which strikes no blow and utters no insult, and bids fair to conquer by kindness. Whether or no it spreads outside of India, it will continue to be applied to the solution of many problems there, long after the last British ruler has disappeared into the setting sun.

JOHN MAYNARD.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

OUR CASE. What We are Fighting for—and Why. By CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS. 63pp. (Longmans. 1s. 6d.)

A NUMBER of publications have recently appeared explaining to the British public, to the German people or its Government, to neutral countries, and sometimes, one suspects, to the writer himself and his friends or critics, why this country is at war. Our interest in such publications is not exhausted by the official Blue Book or Sir Nevile Henderson's further despatches, Mr. Harold Nicholson's little Penguin Special, or Sir Norman Angel's more ambitious statement. It reaches quite a high point with the present pamphlet, because Mr. Hollis presents a remarkable "case" in a remarkable way.

The author is a supporter of Mr. Chamberlain and an avowed Christian. Indeed, he founds his whole attitude towards the War and international politics on the Christian faith, which, he states, is the only cause in politics deserving support. In his view the conflict is neither a national war nor a class war. It is a religious war against forces which are nakedly anti-Christian. The war marks the final breakdown of secularism, of the attempt to organize a society apart from God. "The cause for which we fight is not Poland, nor France, nor the British Empire. The cause is the cause of Christian freedom, the right to tell mankind of his true nature and of his immortal destiny . . . we fight to free Germany from her pagan rulers and to re-include her in the Christian unity." Our quarrel is not with the German people, nor do we hold them responsible for "the details of the things that their rulers have done."

There is not the slightest reason to doubt Mr. Hollis's honesty and sincerity, or the depth of his belief. He quite frankly tells us that he has constantly pleaded in recent years for the cause of Anglo-German friendship and understanding, and has belonged to societies dedicated to that cause. The important point, however, is neither his honesty nor his sincerity—nor even his naivety—but the fact that an educated Englishman who professes to be an ardent Christian should think the thoughts which Mr. Hollis thinks, and believe the things which he believes, concerning the European situation of to-day and yesterday. It explains a lot.

He agreed with Mr. Chamberlain's policy at Munich because there was still a possibility of believing in the ultimate honesty of the Nazis. "Utterly unscrupulous in their means, they yet might still just possibly be sincere in their ends." We in Great Britain, he asserts, had no direct obligation to Czecho-Slovakia—the League Covenant presumably being for Mr. Hollis a mere scrap of paper. The great justification of the Munich settlement was the hope that it might lead to "that partnership between the four Great Powers of Western Europe in which all good Europeans see the main hope of peace and progress"—in other words, the Four-Power Pact.

Hitler was wrong in thinking that we had disinterested ourselves in Eastern Europe; but if the Nazis had only had "the tact to advance cautiously and to preserve carefully the outward forms of independence in the countries in that part of the world which they brought under their influence," it would have probably been difficult to induce Britain to take any action. Mr. Hollis makes it abundantly clear that in his view it was Hitler's tactlessness in method, not the substance of what he did, which led to British intervention. But, since Poland is the outpost of Christendom in the East, "if a man must fight for a country not his own, there could be no nobler cause for which to fight than that of Poland. This nation has, it seems, been set by Providence to be the guardian of the Christian frontiers against the menace of the barbarian."

The Soviet defection was not a blow, Mr. Hollis remarks, but a merciful deliverance, because so long as Nazis and Bolsheviks were on opposite sides, "how could anyone say with a whole heart that either the one or the other was a wholly Christian cause?" But now all is clear, and there is no longer a shadow of doubt as to which side is the side of Christianity.

The author regards the Nazi claim to include within the boundaries of the Reich all lands where the majority of the population is German-speaking as not unintelligible; nor the feeling that religious differences are an obstacle to German unity, "and that therefore racial unity should be exalted over religious disunity." It is not difficult for him to see, moreover, how the Germans have come to believe q

honestly that for them racial unity is "the very condition of freedom." Italy, too, is all right, because "it is possible to find many things said and written by Fascist leaders which show a high conception of Italy's civilizing mission."

On page 34 Mr. Hollis mentions the declaration by Britain and France that they would honour their obligations. "From that moment Hitler was defeated." General Gamelin will no doubt be gratified by the news. But on page 41 he explains that "Wars are not won by wishful thinking."

There is not a single reference in the booklet to the League of Nations or to the rights of man, or to the rights of particular groups of men such as Poles, Czechs, Austrians or Jews. He is concerned only with nations.

If Mr. Hollis is a typical English Christian, it is extremely important that the implications of his political outlook should be understood both by himself and by others in this country.

WHO SHALL PAY FOR THE WAR?

By BARBARA WOOTTON

I

THE economics of how to pay for the war,¹ and (what is more important) of who is to pay for it, may be discussed from two distinct points of view. The first treats the war as a gigantic extra burden which has to be carried by the existing economic machine in such a way as to cause as little dislocation as possible. The second sees in the stresses of war conditions an opportunity to make changes which are desirable in themselves, which ought to have been made anyhow, and which it is intended should either themselves be permanent, or should at least contain the germ of permanent change. In this article I propose to discuss the subject quite shamelessly from the second point of view.

It is necessary first to get some idea of the magnitude of the problem. All the estimates are guesswork; but there seems to be a fairly general agreement that we should calculate in terms of an overall cut in private civil consumption of the order of 40 per cent.² Now the question whether the war is to be paid for by taxation, by loans (voluntary or compulsory) or by inflation, is wholly secondary to the primary issue: How are you going to share this 40 per cent cut as between the rich and the poor? Of all our various authors Mr. Clarke tackles this question most directly, with a suggestion that the burden might be distributed on the basis of a 60 per cent reduction for those in the over £250 per annum class, and 25 per cent for those below this figure.

¹ *The Political Economy of War.* By A. C. Pigou. (Macmillan. 5s.)

The Economic Effort of War. By R. W. B. Clarke. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

How to Pay for the War. By E. F. M. Durbin. (Routledge. 3s. 6d.)

Paying for the War. By Geoffrey Crowther. (Oxford Pamphlet. 3d.)

How to Pay for the War. By J. M. Keynes. (Macmillan. 1s.)

² Mr. Keynes works on much lower figures; but he budgets for one year only.

(This is not of course intended to rule out sub-gradings within each group.) Mr. Clarke, however, also points out that, if we accepted a flat standard of equal incomes for all, then the under £250 group would not need to be cut by more than 10 per cent. This is a very remarkable figure. While we may agree in rejecting absolute equality as not being a serious proposition, we need not necessarily endorse the further statement that "redistribution of income as such is not an objective of the war," or the author's plea for relatively tender treatment of "the essential salariat of the war machine." After all, the salariat are not the only essential part of that machine; and they do already enjoy a relatively favourable situation.

The distribution of income in this country is abominable. Everybody knows that it reduces the democracy for which we are supposed to be fighting to a farce which is easy material for Nazi sarcasm. Is not this the occasion for frankly making radical changes in this distribution for their own sake, and of limiting these changes only in so far as we come up against the difficulty that the rich have not, by themselves, got enough money to provide all that is likely to be required? If we look at the matter from that angle, we ought, I would suggest, to begin by fixing a definite and absolute upper limit to income, i.e., by grading surtax up to 100 per cent somewhere. Mr. Crowther points out that even if you took the whole of the excess of personal incomes over £2,000 you would not raise more than about £60 millions of new money, over and above what is already taken by existing taxation. This is no doubt true. But the psycho-political effect of such a measure would be tremendous. We are supposed to be fighting for our lives, not for our surtax incomes. Up till now it has not altogether looked like that. A family man with a gross £2,000 per annum before this war retained about £1,650 after payment of direct

taxes. The war has reduced that to just under £1,500. And we have not even yet imposed a 100 per cent excess war profits duty!

From an æsthetic and social point of view, there are very strong arguments at any time in favour of the imposition of a ceiling on incomes. In a capitalist society there are also some (though I think now much exaggerated) arguments against this course. But in wartime (at least after the war demands have warmed up) all the orthodox objections collapse into nothingness. The arguments that large incomes must be treated with consideration, because they are the source of savings, the stimulus to enterprise and the support of luxury employments become of negligible importance. For the primary task of a wartime government is to get a monopoly of saving and investment into its own hands, and to stamp upon all our little (and big) luxuries. The last thing that it wants to see is enterprising business investing new capital in civil production and rich men wasting the national substance in riotous living. It can therefore attack large incomes without fear or favour. And it should. Extreme inequality is a bad thing in itself. It is a symptom of the acquisitive poison which has permeated our whole social tradition. There is an exceptional chance here to start getting it out of the system once and for all.

It is tempting to enlarge upon the social effects which a ceiling policy for incomes would bring in its train; especially if we descended (as in a tough war we should have to descend) well below the two-thousand-pound mark. To mention only one point, it would strike a radical blow at our present class system in education, since it would give substance to the fear (which is already beginning to haunt the public schools) that, what with the well-to-do thinking themselves unable to have children, and finding themselves unable to pay public school fees for the children that they do have, the end of

the school-tie epoch is in sight. But these are incidental, if fascinating, issues.

Inequality must be attacked at both ends. Now it appears to be fairly generally agreed that you cannot impose further strains on the lowest income groups of all. Though we do not yet accept the necessity for ensuring that people should be well-fed in peace time, so that they can follow their peaceful pursuits with healthy vigour, we are beginning to realise that they must be well enough nourished in wartime to keep up their efficiency in the work of destruction. Totalitarian war ranks the feeding of the civil population very little behind the feeding of the soldiers.

We have not, however, yet reached the point at which the feeding of the civil population is treated like the feeding of the soldiers—not even in essentials. It is true that we have a per head rationing scheme. But since we do not have per head incomes, per head rations are a paper fiction. It has been competently estimated, for example, that as much as one-third of the present population cannot afford to buy its butter ration. Such rationing by coupon-plus-price is obviously a clumsy compromise. The only satisfactory way to ensure that people have enough to eat is to tackle the problem from the physiological end, and to supply free, or practically free, an iron ration of a few basic essentials. This would have, amongst others, the very substantial advantage that it would automatically relate real income to size of family. A great proportion of the tricky problems of our economic life—the acute cases of malnutrition, or the paradox of being better off when you are unemployed than when you are working—arise from our practice, to use Miss Rathbone's vivid phrase, of making provision for millions of phantom children in childless families, and simultaneously ignoring the existence of a million or two real children in the families of more than average size.

It is very good news that Mr. Keynes has now tacked on to his compulsory savings scheme a proposal for family allowances. Family allowances, if they come at all, will certainly come to stay. Their absence is one of the greatest anomalies of the present income structure. The iron ration also might very well come to stay. It might well be the beginning of a system in which all the elementary necessities of physical welfare gradually found their way on to a free list, communally paid for, like our parks and museums. (I am inevitably making optimistic assumptions about the outcome of the war and the economic strength that will remain to us after it is over.) During the war there will be coupons. After the war is ended the coupons might be withdrawn, and the free or near-free supply retained. Free and subsidised milk in schools and clinics, free and subsidised school dinners have already conceded the principle. (And so, in another field, have free air-raid shelters.) All the stock arguments about waste are really very small beer against the demonstrable tendency of our economic system to choke itself with its own productiveness. Does anyone seriously suggest that if, in peace-time, milk were completely free, the amount that would be wasted down drains would approach the present waste from restricted production, diversion to manufacturing purposes, or under-consumption from sheer inability to pay? Why not, then, make up our minds once and for all that we will guarantee a physically necessary minimum to everybody, and at the same time put a definite upper limit to our poisonous inequalities? After all, we *are* living in a state of siege; and the principles of siege economics are not less applicable when the besieged number forty million odd than when the numbers are much smaller and the besieging army is much more literally at the gates. Iron ration, family allowances and a ceiling on incomes ought to be the minimum terms on which we will accept any sort

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of wage tax or compulsory savings levy on wages. They are good terms, too, because they all contain something that can be switched over with lasting benefit to peace-time conditions.

If these terms are conceded, the precise grading of the 40 per cent reduction in consumption between top and bottom income limits becomes less important. I should myself probably like to go a great deal further towards absolute equality than responsible opinion would generally approve. In the meantime we may welcome the Government's decision to keep down the cost of living by direct subsidy as a small beginning along these lines. This method, however, obviously does nothing to meet the phantom children problem, nor is it consistent with the retention of taxes upon such articles as sugar.

Before we leave the subject of *who* is to pay for the war, there are one or two other points relating to taxation that deserve a word or two. The first is the capital levy. The capital levy is always popular in the Labour world because it can be called conscription of wealth. But it is a tiresome and elaborate affair; and personally I do not think that it is worth bothering to undertake the rather heavy administrative tasks involved, when we have so much else to do. At least I do not think that the capital levy has sufficient to commend it in preference to the alternative of an income ceiling (and a ceiling that descends progressively as may be necessary), which is very much simpler, and has such permanent attractions for the piping times of peace. After the war, however, a capital levy, as proposed in the Keynes scheme as a method of repaying our compulsory loans, seems to make more sense. The wealth which we shall have subscribed to compulsory loans will, of course, all have been blown up or otherwise dissipated during the war, and will not have created any fund from which those loans can subsequently

be repaid. Their repayment, therefore, will present the same kind of problems as the task of carrying on the war itself—except that in the one case the Government wants money in order to give it away, and in the other in order to dissipate it. For a once-for-all job like repayment of loans, there is a special appropriateness in a capital levy. And (for what promises of this kind are worth) a definite committal now to a post-war capital levy might diminish the very real danger that if our deferred pay ever is paid up, this will be done by inflation.

The other point has to do with the proportion of war expenditure which we can reasonably hope to raise by taxation. All our authors extol the merits of this method, and all argue that, unhappily, we cannot hope to pay the whole cost in this way. The arguments that they use, however, run dangerously close to arguments that we cannot afford to pay for the war at all. It boils down to this. You cannot get as much as the innocent suppose from the rich, and the poor are poor enough already. Taxes on the rich, says, for example, Mr. Crowther, and "fancy" taxes also, are disappointing in their yield, so that you are forced back on "plain honest taxes that hurt plain honest people"—who presumably will not stand being hurt too much. You are thus compelled to resort to borrowing and/or inflation. But since the rich will, on the preceding argument, have precious little left to lend, it is obvious that *whatever* you do, it is the "plain honest people" who are going to be hurt just the same. Yet how odd it is that, when you simply dare not raise the beer or sugar tax by another penny, or put a penny more tax on wages, you can raise the price of these articles by inflation and get away with it! The only reason why this can be true is that the public do not appreciate the fact (explained with great lucidity alike by Messrs. Clarke, Durbin and Pigou) that with minor exceptions, you *must* pay as you

go—or at least that somebody must. If that were understood, then all the fuss about inflation and borrowing would become irrelevant, and there would be only one argument left in favour of paying for the war by any other way than plain honest taxation. That is the argument that voluntary contributions, such as voluntary subscriptions to loans, can take account of variations in individual circumstances in a way which is beyond the capacity of the most refined system of taxation.

II

Let us now look at the problems of organisation involved in trying to get the best out of the bad job of paying for the war. Here we may distinguish two roughly distinct spheres, which must for the time being, at any rate, be treated rather differently. Borrowing the Russian phraseology, we may call these respectively the socialised and the non-socialised sectors, though the terms are not here used quite in the Soviet sense. The socialised sector must cover all the trades concerned with the supply of our minimum rations, and a considerable area of near-necessities outside that. It must also cover the munition trades, so long as the war lasts. Its distinguishing character is, not that there is any legal expropriation of existing owners, but that normal market processes are entirely superseded. Production is for government, and wholly government-controlled; and although in the case of some articles (e.g., non-rationed foods) a limited amount of "free consumer's choice" is permitted at the very end of the chain of production, nobody has any such choice at any intermediate stage. In a somewhat confused way the organisation of meat supplies in this country (immediately prior to rationing) approximates to this pattern. You could buy what you liked of what meat there was in the shops; but your butcher had to take what was sent to him and could make no choice himself. Prices and control of

supplies were in government hands throughout. The key position for the exercise of this kind of control is the wholesale distributing point (in meat, the central slaughter-houses). If there is effective control backwards from this point to producer and forwards to retailer, the essential machinery is in being.

It does not, however, follow, that powers will in fact be exercised in the right way, even if the opportunity to exercise them is there. In the socialised sector there are certain jobs which fall into our "ought to have been done anyhow" category, and certain conditions which alone make it possible for those jobs to be tackled. One such task is the suppression of the fantastic cost of retail distribution. On and off for twenty years and more this has been exposed by official enquiries and has been the subject of repeated public outcry. It is therefore the more alarming to find that costs have actually been increasing during the inter-war period. Between 1924 and 1931 the percentage of sales prices which is estimated to have been absorbed by costs of retailing rose from about 22 per cent to 32 per cent.¹ The waste involved here is almost incredible.

A second necessary task is the suppression of the advertising of proprietary goods. This proposal is very unpopular with the Press, owing to the substantial revenue derived from such advertisements. The Press will therefore always voice "public dislike" of pooled unbranded goods: witness the campaign against government margarine and government tea some weeks ago. But any government that reflected for a moment upon how this public opinion is formed would ignore it; and would seize the opportunity to free the unfortunate consumer from the snares of interested advertisement and to offer him goods of standardised quality vouched for by public authority.

¹ I am indebted for these estimates to figures taken from the report of Mr. S. P. Dobbs's address to a Fabian Society Conference.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Next comes the much-debated problem of "marginal prices." Now, in our socialised sector, the government is, practically speaking, the only buyer, and production is conducted either in completely State-managed enterprises, or in enterprises which work so closely under State order that the difference is not of primary importance. In such a case the academic argument that it is wasteful to sell the products of the least efficient firm at prices which do not cover the actual costs of that firm, since that is equivalent to producing stuff which the public does not rate as worth the cost of its production—that argument (which, in a community with such unequal incomes as ours is at any time quite fraudulent) simply falls flat to the ground. In the socialised sector cost must mean cost of *most* efficient; and this must be used as a measuring rod, by which to pillory those who cannot come up to such a standard. In so far as there still remain some efficiency differences which are unavoidable and permanent, and in so far as the elimination of others must take time, weaker units must be subsidised from the surpluses of the stronger.

This is perhaps rather a technical economic matter. What is not at all technical, and is very relevant here, is that none of these jobs will be done, unless the socialised sector is so organised that they can be done. Obviously it will be necessary to a great extent to use existing personnel in the industries in question. But there is personnel and personnel, and there are ways and ways of using it. The heads of big trade associations are sometimes figure-heads, and not necessarily the best people upon whom to devolve the actual management of great public enterprises. Further, it should be a primary condition that no one can act both as a government servant and as an agent of private enterprise. Business people whose services are required should be employed and paid by the Government as civil servants, and

WHO SHALL PAY FOR THE WAR?

required to devote their whole time to the public service; even if they are actually doing, in one sense, much the same work (e.g., as buyers or agents) as they were engaged in before the war. The part-time system, with its divided loyalties, is intolerable. I do not know anything about the service of God, but you certainly cannot serve both a public authority and the mammon of private enterprise.

If the socialised sector is handled in this kind of way, then control of the market sector can be left to the indirect influence of the general State controls over certain key points in the economic system. Of these there are three, namely: foreign trade, capital investment, and prices. The State must not take its hands off these. Allocation of shipping space and of priorities for imports and exports must be a national matter. Without State sanction all new capital investment must be forbidden. And there must be universal powers of price control, even if some prices are in fact left free to find their own level. These three basic controls set up a high fence which should be sufficient, even after the war, to prevent the vagaries of the price system from robbing the people of the common heritage that might so easily be theirs. If in fact anything does go wrong, the boundaries of the socialised sector can always be moved outwards.

This kind of policy has two further implications. The first is that somebody *must* look at the allocation of our resources as a whole. The present government is resolutely and incomprehensibly opposed to the establishment of any general Ministry of Economic Planning during the war: though it would seem fairly obvious commonsense that you cannot distribute a limited supply of anything efficiently or fairly for any purpose, unless somebody has his eye on the picture as a whole. But however great the importance of a Ministry of Economic Planning may be for the efficient conduct of the war, the need for it will be even more urgent

when the war is over. For war is an immense simplifier. To decide what to do with your resources when everything is subordinated to the one end of destruction is nothing like so complicated as making a similar decision between the fascinating variety of constructive possibilities. Planning we must have, and, since planning decisions are in fact policy decisions, the planning authority must be under direct Cabinet control.

The second implication calls for much thinking. It has to do with the methods by which we may ultimately make the transition from private to public enterprise. Old-fashioned evolutionary socialist doctrine always visualised this as coming about by a change in the legal ownership of property rather than by changes in the *nature* of ownership. We pictured the State buying out (or, in the imagination of the wild men amongst us, throwing out) existing owners, and itself assuming the mantle of ownership. Actually modern experience suggests that this may play quite an unimportant part. During the war industries will not be formally nationalised. We shall get control of them by the simple process of divesting ownership of most of the rights over production and management which that ownership is generally supposed to imply. The owners will do what they are told to do, and that will have to be the end of it. There are some long-term implications here for socialists to which we should do well to apply our minds. It is perhaps not treacherous to add that there may even be some lessons to be learnt from certain of the economic policies of the Third Reich.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE U.S.A.

By PROFESSOR LINDSAY ROGERS

IN his book, *Pleins Pouvoirs*, which was published just before he became head of the information services of the French government, Jean Giraudoux declared that "we no longer live in an age " when the speaker or writer has the leisure to choose his subjects. Today the subjects choose him, or rather *the* subject, for there is only one: the preservation of life for our country or for ourselves." M. Giraudoux was thinking of Europe and of France—of the destruction which would be unloosed because of orders issued from a Bavarian mountain top. The ways of living now being threatened by that destruction are so much American ways and the Atlantic Ocean is so narrow that, in the United States, *the* one subject is only slightly less compelling.

To its consideration much thought has gone. On it there has been much writing. But despite or because of this, opinion in the United States is now more uncertain and disordered than it has been for many years. To the desirability—even necessity—of maintaining neutrality which, though mercenary, is benevolent, there is little dissent, but there agreement ends. Congress hesitates to make up its mind about a loan to Finland. We join in will-o'-the-wisps such as the Declaration of Panama which proclaims a non-combatant zone of vast extent in the seas adjacent to the western continents. "Hemispheric defence" is a mouth-filling catch phrase, but nothing more. Our neutrality regulations make illegal the flying of American-built planes across the Canadian border but permit them to be pushed across. We are appropriating huge sums for larger and larger military and naval forces but are in a dense fog concerning the

foreign policy with those defense forces might be called upon to support.

Confusion reigns in respect of internal policies as well and is independent of, although increased by, the certainties and uncertainties of the war. From this side of the Atlantic it seems plain that the coming of war greatly increased national unity in England and France and compelled thought on policies and action in implementing them. In comparison, American democracy is disorganized and confused. Is it a tragic weakness of the democratic form of government that it must seem to be facing disaster—war or economic collapse—before its underlying spirit is released and it can gird its loins and tackle its problems? In the United States, confusion is increased by two factors—one long-standing and one recent.

American political parties, as every school boy knows, are not composed of groups of voters who are in substantial agreement on major issues of public policy. Macaulay's famous metaphor of the forelegs and hindlegs of a stag was never true as applied to Democrats and Republicans. Those terms are little more than labels on old bottles which contain wines, both vintage and ordinary, and sometimes spirits as well. During the last seven years, moreover, the Roosevelt administration has put unprecedented strains on the public mind. Critics and supporters must at least agree in this: Mr. Roosevelt has not been content with routine and has not eschewed invention.

Experiments have come in rapid succession and frequently only with brief debate and explanation. When confronted by novelty any public has difficulty in making up its mind whether it should like or dislike, and may do first one and then the other. Novelties that are numerous and come in rapid succession proliferate likes and dislikes. Again, confusion waxes when governmental policies are in conflict with each other—when, for example, measures seeking economic self-

sufficiency must lie down with reciprocal trade agreements and when possible results of governmental pump priming are made less likely by legislation and (more importantly) a political atmosphere which dry up the private pump. So the farmers may thank the Roosevelt administration for agricultural subsidies but object bitterly to expenditures on a merchant marine or on armament. Others, shuddering at mounting deficits, would reduce them by cutting expenditures on relief and on agriculture, but then increase appropriations for the national defense. Meanwhile the public debt goes up and up and in an election year no one will propose an increase of taxes. All the members of the House of Representatives must submit themselves to their constituencies and one-third of the Senators to their state electorates. (The Senate is now so overwhelmingly Democratic that, whatever shift of opinion there is in the country, it will remain so.) Candidates will not advocate increased taxation even though, as President Roosevelt has himself said, "too often in recent history, liberal governments have been wrecked on the rocks of loose fiscal policy." No one would maintain that the government's fiscal policy is not loose. The only doubtful question is the nearness of the rocks.

Meanwhile, we endeavour to forget the great reservoir of unemployed and remain oblivious to certain key problems of the national economy. In that great, distressed industry, railroading, for example, many of the companies are in bankruptcy, many are headed that way, and few are prosperous concerns. Perhaps if there were no European war, neither the executive nor the legislature would have a program, but concern about the conflict is a sedative on our domestic thinking. Unhappily, it is also a drug which as yet has kept us indifferent to the catastrophic economic changes and trade shifts that are in progress and which are likely to be even greater if and when peace comes.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

As the presidential campaign proceeds, the confusion is not likely to become less. The Republicans have hardly more of a program than had the French Right in the days when the political pendulum which André Siegfried was able to discern swung slowly from one end of its arc to the other. Siegfried's generalization was that a French government oriented toward the Left tried to do something for the people. It showed that its heart was in the right place. But, as the drain on the pocketbook became greater and greater, the ministry gradually lost popularity. Hence sentiment gravitated toward the Right. The country desired a cessation of experiment and a return to economy. When the results seemed ruthless and unprogressive, the pendulum swung back. Perhaps this interpretation of French politics was only partly true but it has elements of appositeness in respect of present trends of opinion in the United States. The Roosevelt Administration has had its heart in the right place. Unfortunately, its head has not kept pace with its heart. Fine purposes have been frustrated because plans were poorly conceived in themselves and were inadequately articulated with other plans. Promising experiments have failed to achieve the success that they deserve because of inattention to good housekeeping. The result is that more and more voters have become critical and restless but as yet they are probably not numerous enough to turn the Democrats out. The shift is not due to the attractiveness of any alternative program because the Republicans have none. They do not dare to rely on Alexander Hamilton's statement that "to reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert." If successful in 1940, they would be able to undo little that the Roosevelt Administration has done. Hence the campaign is not likely to dispel confusion from the public mind or to dissipate the fog which has

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE U.S.A.

penetrated the nation's capital and even the White House.

Already, as I have said, we are in the first stages of the disguised civil war which quadrennially ends in the choice of a President of the United States. Scouting has been in progress for some months. Candidates for both the Democratic and Republican nominations are making speeches and touring the country. In one-third of the states, delegates to the nominating conventions will be chosen at presidential primaries of the voters of the two parties. But many of these primary results will not turn on whether the delegates chosen are to favor one rather than another presidential candidate. Others will do little more than suggest vaguely that in certain areas, six months in advance of election, one aspirant seems to be more popular than another aspirant. Nor will the choice of certain delegates mean that the candidate under whose label they have been elected will necessarily have their votes in the convention. For the most part, presidential primaries are advisory, not mandatory, and in two-thirds of the states the delegates are chosen by the party organizations.

In other words, candidates for the American Presidency are nominated by the party Tapers and Tadpoles who are sometimes more and sometimes less willing to follow the leadership of men who dominate the state machines—the governors, the Senators, or in many cases men who hold no public office and whose power comes only from their position in the party hierarchy. That method of nomination makes it possible for a dark horse to win the presidential sweepstakes. The intention of the Founding Fathers was that the Presidency should be filled by the choice of the best by the best—that is, by the Electoral College. The College does choose, but it is no more than a rubber stamp which puts its imprimatur on the result of the popular election. Hence one may now doubt the truth of Hamilton's confident boast in the Federalist: "The process of election affords the moral certainty that the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications."

Lord Bryce expressed those doubts in his famous chapter in the American Commonwealth which he entitled "Why great men are not chosen President." His argument was that the race was not to the swift nor the battle to the strong; that the parties preferred a safe man to a brilliant man. "Party feeling strong enough to carry in on its back a man without conspicuous positive merits is not always strong enough to procure forgiveness for a man with positive faults." Most attentive observers of the British political scene could, I imagine, agree on two or three Ministers, one of whom would certainly become Prime Minister if Mr. Chamberlain suddenly retired. When in Great Britain there is a change of government, attentive observers can be in agreement on the names of perhaps three-fourths of the members of the new Cabinet. The American scene is entirely different. It is possible for men to emerge from obscurity and suddenly to occupy the brightest limelight. The prominence may come not because talents are recognized but much more fortuitously: because a man is a resident of a state whose popular vote is doubtful and it is thought that a "favorite son" might procure the vote of that state in the Electoral College. Indeed the possible effectiveness of a presidential candidate over the wireless may weigh as heavily with the convention as will his political views, his mental capacity, and his administrative experience.

For the Republican nomination there are at the moment three principal contenders. Two are United States Senators—Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan and Robert A. Taft of Ohio. The third is Thomas E. Dewey, District Attorney of New York, who has only recently emerged from obscurity and made himself known to the public as a prosecutor of criminals. A good "radio presence" is one of his chief advantages. It

is too early to say which of these gentlemen should be considered the favorite or whether unable to choose among them, the Republican convention may turn to a really dark horse.

For the Democratic nomination there are several candidates: the Vice-President, John N. Garner; the ex-governor of Indiana, the ex-governor of the Philippines, and at present Federal Security Administrator, Paul V. McNutt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; and a number of lesser senatorial and gubernatorial lights. Hardly one of these candidates stirs up any real enthusiasm. His supporters are for him *faute de mieux*. Other professions in the United States develop outstanding leaders whose primacy is recognized by their fellows as being based on ability. On occasion the profession of politics has developed leaders, but some little while ago it must have declared a moratorium. In the United States at the moment, there is visible a distressingly small amount of available political talent. There are few for whom the country can cheer loudly. There are few that it can hiss sincerely.

With one exception: President Roosevelt himself. He is loved and hated, and the aspirants for the Democratic nomination are being compelled to hope in the dark shadow of uncertainty as to whether their party chief proposes to offer himself for a third term. To every question as to his intentions the President replies with jocular evasion. Perhaps it would not be far from the mark to conclude that he does not himself know the answer; and, indeed, that he may not know the answer until after the Republican convention which meets the latter part of June, with the Democratic convention following in a fortnight. His answer may be determined by the progress of the war.

If Mr. Roosevelt seeks a third term, it seems to me clear that the Democratic convention would have to nominate him even though some, even many, of the delegates would do so

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

with great reluctance. No Democratic candidate could win without President Roosevelt's support. Since the party would value the spoils of victory more highly than the satisfaction of returning the President to private life, it would prefer to try to win with him rather than face certain defeat with another candidate. Whether Mr. Roosevelt's chances of success would be good is a question which it is fruitless to consider until after the nominations are made—perhaps until shortly before the election. One thing, however, can be said positively: his continued refusal to announce his intentions has contributed vastly to diminishing the importance of the third term issue. Twice within the memory of the present generation, the issue has been trotted out to affright those who wanted their man to have a residence in the White House lasting longer than eight years.

I describe the two incidents in this fashion because in each the principal figure had succeeded to the Presidency from the Vice-Presidency. William McKinley was assassinated in 1901 and Theodore Roosevelt became President. Elected in his own right in 1904, Mr. Roosevelt announced that he did not intend to seek another term and kept his promise. But in 1912, dissatisfied with the record of the crown prince whom he had favored (William H. Taft, the father of the present Republican candidate), Roosevelt again sought the Republican presidential nomination. Against him was cited that 1904 pledge. His supporters explained that he had meant another consecutive term; that if, for example (and they then used this illustration) a man at breakfast says: "I refuse to have another cup of coffee," his refusal applies only to that matutinal repast and not to any of those that follow. In 1912, Mr. Roosevelt did not get the Republican nomination. He organized a third party—the Progressives—and ran well but unsuccessfully. Woodrow Wilson was elected. Not many voters were against the ex-President because if elected he

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE U.S.A.

would have occupied the White House longer than eight years. In 1928, Calvin Coolidge did not put the question to the voters but only to the Tapers and Tadpoles of the Republican party. Succeeding to the Presidency when Warren G. Harding died in 1923, Mr. Coolidge was elected the next year. As his term proceeded, aspirants within the Republican party began to demand that Mr. Coolidge declare himself: Would he run again? Mr. Coolidge, never jocular about his intentions, was silent until August, 1927, when scouting for the 1928 battle was beginning. He then issued a simple announcement: "I do not choose to run for President in 1928." Had he chosen otherwise, his nomination would have been certain; and, as Herbert Hoover's overwhelming victory demonstrated, he could have been elected.

A third term for Franklin Roosevelt will be a real third term, not two terms and a fraction. Against this there is a strong feeling in certain quarters. The fact is clear. The why I cannot now discuss but content myself with suggesting that it is not unconnected with what Walter Bagehot called our "astronomical system of government." When, that is to say, an executive can be dismissed as soon as there is a genuine popular demand for his dismissal and a legislature registers it, there can be less reluctance to let him serve term after term. But the reader is probably asking, Why does this consideration not apply at the time a President is elected for one four-year term; why does it not apply when he is elected for a second four-year term, and why does it apply only when a third term is contemplated? That question I cannot answer. But if Mr. Roosevelt should run again, his Republican opponent will ignore the fact that there is no clear answer to the question. The bulk of critical comment concerning Mr. Roosevelt's reticence comes from the Republican candidates and press. Manifestly if in these quarters it was honestly thought that a candidacy for a third term would help the Republican nominee

by giving him the votes of those who believe that the third term tradition should be preserved as one of the bulwarks of the Republic, there would be no criticism but silent prayers that Mr. Roosevelt would decide to run again. But the Republicans are complaining bitterly that Mr. Roosevelt will say neither "yes" nor "no" and the wails indicate their present calculation that he, as a party nominee, would have a personal following more numerous than the party voters who, because of their third term fears, would prefer a Republican candidate.

In respect of a third term candidacy, to repeat, there is uncertainty which may not be resolved until June. Which of the two nominees will be successful will be uncertain until November. What other enlightened country ever had a more unnecessarily tedious electoral time table? England can decide to get rid of a Government, dissolve Parliament, hold a general election and have a new Government within a month. We take ten months—not for behind-the-scenes manoeuvres which go on all the time, but for the legal requirements. Primaries to elect delegates to the nominating conventions come in March; the election in November, and the inauguration in January. Walter Bagehot said that our system might give us a President who was a pugilist when we wanted one who was a Quaker, or vice versa. In July we shall limit our choice to two persons. By November we may want neither of them. If the country approves the November choice, it may by the following January regret that it cannot choose again.

These leisurely arrangements grew up in the days when the communication of persons and of intelligence was much slower than it is now. They give the Tapers and Tadpoles more time for manipulation and bargains and are good for trade. More money is spent in publicity and on travel for the candidates and their supporters. The parties pay the

broadcasting companies for more time on the radio, and the American Institute of Public Opinion will be able to take more polls. Through carefully selected samples for the country as a whole and in many of the states, it will attempt both for the vote on the Presidency and for the vote on state officials, to forecast precisely what the results of the election will be. There will be some debate on the question of whether, if the polls show that one presidential candidate seems materially more popular than the other, voters who do not care greatly will rush for the band-wagon in order to be on the winning side. The American Institute of Public Opinion maintains that in its past polls, taken at regular intervals before an election, there has been no evidence at all of a band-wagon vote. But there will be doubters who will think that in forecasting the results of the election, the pollers will influence those results. I say "pollers" because that is more accurate. To boast of "measuring public opinion" is somewhat pretentious. "Opinion" is a good deal more complex than intention to vote a particular way, and measurement must mean more than the tabulation and reporting of the "yesses" and "noes" that are given to specific questions. That is not scientific measurement, but elementary arithmetic.

It seems to show—so far as it shows anything—that, if the election were held now, such a percentage of the electorate would vote for President Roosevelt as to make a third term candidacy successful. Later "polls" may give a different result, but meanwhile, the preliminaries of the 1940 presidential battle are taking place in a more apathetic atmosphere than we ordinarily have. For this apathy I have suggested two causes: one, the war which, even though it is not the kind of war which the United States—and, I imagine, England and France—feared, engrosses thinking and thereby drains nervous energy. If the war becomes a more "frightful" one, American interest in party preliminaries to the presidential

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

race will become even less keen than it now is. At the same time, events in Europe may make Mr. Roosevelt answer the question which thus far he refuses to answer.

By and large, save for a brief initial period of nervousness, the country has strongly supported his words and deeds on behalf of the maintenance of neutrality. During seven years he has had considerable experience of foreign affairs. He has had opportunities to acquire knowledge that is far vaster than that possessed by any one of the other contenders for the Presidency. It may well be that, on the basis of the European situation in June, he may offer himself again as a candidate and that the country will welcome the decision although with resignation rather than delight and on the theory that it is better to bear with a President whom we know rather than to turn to one whom we do not know. But the domestic ills we now bear are serious and so far as I can see they are likely to get worse before they get better.

UTOPIA AND REALITY

By LEONARD WOOLF

WE are living through a period in which the use of power, force, or violence is playing a predominant part in human society. The phenomenon is not confined to the relations between states; it can be observed within states in the relation between government and individuals and between individual and individual. Societies and historical periods have differed widely in their organization of power and in the way in which force or violence has been applied to human relations. Until comparatively recent times it was commonly held that the communal control of power and the elimination of force or violence from human and social relations were important elements in civilization. It was even believed that these views were not merely utopian aspirations, but had in many cases been translated into historical facts. In the 19th century the potential power of a physically strong man to impose his will upon a physically weak man had in most places been rendered inoperative by social organization. By similar methods the potential power of the man with a club, an axe, or an automatic pistol had also been rendered inoperative. The power of kings over their subjects, of aristocrats over commoners, of men over women, of governments over citizens, of employers over employed had often, it seemed, been eliminated or modified. Most people believed that it was possible not only to control or modify the use of power, but also that of violence, and to do so effectively for an intelligent purpose. It seemed to be undeniable that the use of torture and flogging as methods of "doing justice" had been abolished in some places, that in others it was no longer possible for a man to be hanged for stealing a sheep

or a few pence, and that in others the utopian idea of abolishing the death penalty had been adopted without apparently increasing the number of murderers or of their victims.

In the nineteenth century the control of the use of power and the efforts to eliminate force and violence from the relations between states, governments, and individuals were closely associated with the practice and theory of liberalism, democracy, and humanitarianism. The war of 1914-1918 for four years reversed this process of controlling, sublimating, and eliminating the use of power or violence. War between states is not only the logical result of "power politics," it is power politics reduced to their simplest terms. It also entails the adoption of force and violence as primary elements in determining a vast number of human and social relations which at other times are regulated by discussion, compromise, "law," or other non-violent methods. Few people will deny that this four year period of power and violence had a considerable effect upon European society and the minds of Europeans. The simplest and most direct effects of historical events are often soon forgotten or underestimated by historians and politicians. It is a simple fact that an enormous majority of those Europeans who were not killed in what they then called the Great War did not like it; in fact, they disliked it so intensely that enormous numbers of ordinary persons said: "Never again," by which they meant that in their humble opinion everything should be done which was possible to eliminate war from European society. Their aspiration may or may not have been utopian—we shall consider this question later—but their convictions, the state of their minds were a political reality which was having profound effects all over Europe and which not even the most realist statesman, general, or historian could afford to neglect.

One effect of this conviction was the founding of the League of Nations. The disillusionment of ordinary men and

women in 1918, their feeling that war was in the twentieth century not a tolerable way of life, or even of death, their dim doubts as to whether it had proved to be an effective method of "settling anything"—these things were not the only cause of the birth of the League of Nations, but they had a good deal to do with it. The statesmen—other than Wilson—who established the League did not believe in it; they thought themselves to be realists and the League utopia. The statesmen who "worked" the League for fifteen years or so did not believe in it; they thought themselves to be realists and the League either utopia or a convenient or inconvenient instrument—it depended upon circumstances—of national policy. The main impetus which had brought the League into being and prevented it from being completely scrapped by realists or reality was another reality, the voice of common people who had said and might perhaps still say: "Never again."

The League failed. As it failed, ordinary people could no longer be heard saying: "Never again"; you heard them saying clearly, often bitterly, always helplessly, in the streets of cities, in fields, and villages, "It is coming again." The two realities were not unconnected. The failure of the League may have been due to its having been utopian, but it was not an isolated historical incident, the casual failure of an academic dream brought up with a jolt against the hard facts of life. It was only part of a general historical process or movement which can be clearly discerned in the period between November, 1918, and September, 1939. It gradually became clear that the post-war Europe was not going to return to the nineteenth century attitude towards power, force, and violence. In many countries governments allowed private armies to fight one another in the streets of great cities. Dictatorships took the place of democracies. Pogroms became a recognized method of administration; change of government or even of the government's programme or policy

were effected or prevented by "massacres," "purges," executions, or political assassinations.

Fascism in Italy—national socialism in Germany—Stalinism in the U.S.S.R.—Pilsudski or a government of generals or colonels or majors in Poland—little dictators in the little countries—Manchuria, Abyssinia, the destruction of the republican government of Spain, the destruction of the democratic republic of Czechoslovakia, the invasion and partition of Poland—thus we have reached the second great war. These facts can only be stated and interpreted in terms of power, force, and violence. They are the negation of another series of terms which had previously seemed to have some meaning to human beings: peace, law, order, common interests, compromise, liberty and democracy. Human beings are never content just to accept the facts, their miseries, savagery, and stupidities. They have an itch to explain and interpret them, to find some fig leaf of a theory or philosophy to cover the nakedness of their own folly or cruelty. Politicians and professors of politics and history are always ready to supply fig leaves, theories, and philosophies, to comfort the dead, the dying, the disappointed, and the crucified with the assurance that nothing could possibly have happened except in the way in which it did happen and is happening and that everything is for the best in the worst of all possible worlds.

So today you will find any number of people offering us fig leaves to cover fascism, communism, and war, theories which prove the inevitable failure of democracy and the League of Nations, philosophies which discover the seeds of a new world in the most ancient forms of violence and slavery. There is a family likeness in all these *ex post facto* consolatory explanations, they rely upon a distinction between illusions, shams, or utopias and realities. Democracy was a "sham"; dictatorship is a "reality." The common interests

of nations and peace are an illusion; conflict of national interests and war are "real." The League of Nations was "utopian"; power politics are "reality." The validity of these theories and of the practical policies, based upon them, which we are exhorted to pursue must depend upon what is meant by this distinction between political or historical utopia and political or historical reality. To understand the distinction is, therefore, not an academic, but a highly practical question, for it is clearly politically imbecile to ignore realities or to pursue policies which are impossible of attainment—only we must know what is a reality and what is "impossible of attainment."

Our search for enlightenment may well start from a book by Professor E. H. Carr which has recently attracted much attention.¹ Mr. Carr is Professor of International Politics and has an intimate knowledge of his subject. His book on Bakunin proved him to be a man of intelligence with an unusual capacity for historical impartiality. His new book is an attempt to lay the foundations of a science of international relations and at the same time to "analyse the underlying and significant, rather than the immediate and personal, causes" in the history of the last twenty years which have brought us once more into war. The whole of Professor Carr's analysis is based upon a distinction between utopia and reality, and if anyone should be capable of making us understand what it is it should be he. There are, as one would expect, very good things in the book, acute analysis of particular situations or processes, illuminating comments on particular events, and trenchant and often salutary criticism of things, theories, and persons with whom Professor Carr is out of sympathy or out of understanding. And yet the book fails in its purpose. It does not give us the beginnings of a science of international

¹ *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939.* (Macmillan. 10s. 6d.). It should be read together with a smaller book which Professor Carr published about the same time: *The Foreign Policy of Britain from 1918 to Sept. 1939.* (Longmans. 6s.).

relations, because its method is unscientific. It attempts to interpret the events of the last twenty years by means of a distinction between what is utopian and what is real in policy. But, although the whole of his argument depends upon the difference between "utopia" and "realism," he never makes clear the distinction between them either to himself or to his reader. The reason is that he had not pushed his analysis either of terms or of events or of causes—particularly psychological causes—far enough.

Let us begin with terms. The term utopia is commonly used in two different ways. We speak of a dream or a policy being utopian in the sense that it contains a purpose or is based upon a hope or ideal which is incapable of fulfilment, and in this sense we oppose it to "realism." But it is also used in the sense of "unreal" as opposed to "reality." The two senses are not the same, but they are continually confused with disastrous results to truth and clear thinking in political controversy and in Professor Carr's book. This can best be shown by examples. Professor Carr's thesis is that the beliefs, objectives, and policies of nineteenth century liberal democrats and of the supporters of the League of Nations in the international field were utopian. He means by that that their beliefs were false and that their objectives and policies were impossible of attainment—not by any means, it will be observed, the same thing. He has a good deal to say about the falseness of their beliefs, but he never clearly demonstrates to us why their objectives and policies were impossible of attainment. He often implies that the failure of the League and of the attempt to reconstruct a peaceful Europe was "inevitable" merely because it was a failure. This attitude can be seen in the emotional colour of his adjectives in such a sentence as "The first and most obvious tragedy of this utopia was its ignominious collapse." Here you have the vulgar and false view that failure is "ignominious" and

proves somehow or other that the attempt itself was discreditable and unattainable. These superficial judgments are characteristic of contemporaries: in 1790, 1830, 1848, 1900, and 1918, if Professor Carr had been a Frenchman, he would have talked about the "triumph" of democracy and the democratic ideals of the "Revolution," but in 1800, 1828, 1851, and 1939 he would have talked about their "ignominious collapse" and utopianism.

As a matter of fact, Professor Carr is himself really well aware of all this. Where he approves of a policy which has failed, as for instance Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy, he sees that the failure does not prove its utopianism or its ignominy, and in his other book he writes: "There is a common inclination in politics to take the deterministic view that any policy which fails was bound to fail and should, therefore, never have been tried. The charge that British Ministers were the dupes of the Axis Powers should not be too lightly made." If the collapse of the policy of appeasement does not prove that it was utopian, the collapse of the League does not prove that it was utopian, and if Mr. Chamberlain's failure was not ignominious, why should Professor Carr see ignominy in the failure of the League?

The answer to this question is that Professor Carr is unconsciously infected with the temporary social psychology of the time, the acceptance of power and force and conflict as the primary (and therefore best) elements in social organization and human relations, and that he feels the necessity to provide the fig leaf of a theory to cover the results of this psychology. He does this by assuming that policies and social objectives inconsistent with *existing* facts or with the psychology of power, violence, and conflict are utopian, and his theory or proof is based upon a confusion between the two senses of "utopian" and upon the common, but completely unscientific, assumption that power, violence, and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

conflict are more "real" elements in society than, e.g., beliefs, law, and co-operation for a common end or common interests.

The League was a political and social organization of states. It was established in answer to a demand, and in this sense it had an objective or ideal—the elimination of war, the resolution of international conflict, and the promotion of the common interests of states or nations. The ideal or objective was not in the League, but in the heads of those who established it or caused it to be established. The League is utopian only if those ideals or objectives are impossible of attainment. The policy of the League, which aimed at organizing the relations of states upon the basis of their common rather than their conflicting interests, is not utopian merely because it aimed at an unattained ideal or objective, as Professor Carr and many other people frequently assume. All policies, even of the most realist statesmen, aim at unattained ideals or objectives. The policy of Hitler aims at the as yet unattained ideal or objective of organizing the relations of states in Europe on the basis of force and conflicting interest, with Germany having an overwhelming superiority of power and therefore able to promote her interests at the expense of other states. In Professor Carr's sense his policy is "realist"; in fact, it is highly probable that his objective will not be attained and is unattainable, and is therefore really utopian. Again, Mr. Chamberlain's policy had as its ideal or objective peace with Hitler by abandoning any common resistance to aggression, any obligation to aid victims of aggression, and by placating Hitler and yielding to his demands. The objective was certainly not attained and was probably unattainable, and the policy was abandoned for its exact opposite. If the criterion of utopianism is attainability, the policies of Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain are no less utopian than the League policy.

Professor Carr's dealing with utopianism and reality in

connection with policy is unsatisfactory because he does not carry his analysis of the psychology of political objective or ideal far enough. But it also breaks down in another important way: it accepts the vulgar delusion about the "reality" of some political concepts and the "unreality" of others, and then illicitly argues that a policy concerned with the former is "utopian" and a policy concerned with the latter "realist." For instance, Professor Carr maintains that the international policy of nineteenth-century liberalism and of the League both broke down because they were based on the promotion of the common interests of states and not on the conflict of state interests. They ignored the problem of power, which is the instrument of conflicting interests. Conflicting interests and power are "real"; harmony of interests is unreal or non-existent and political instruments of co-operation in common international interests are therefore also "unreal." Hence power politics are real and the League and the liberal policy of free trade and international co-operation "utopian."

This kind of attitude towards "interests" and "power" is very common at the present moment, but it is rooted in muddled thinking. The idea that there is some "reality" in a conflicting interest which does not exist in a common interest is an illusion. It springs from the obvious fact that most people are more *conscious* of their own immediate interests than of common interests and that the pursuit of common interests almost always entails the abandonment of some immediate individual interests. But the political reality of interests does not depend upon people's consciousness of them, but on the relative effects of different actions and different forms of social organization. In private life and national politics we have learnt this by bitter experience, and no one believes that the interest of men with knives to commit murder and robbery is more "real" than the interest of men with knives to refrain and be restrained from committing murder and robbery.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

International psychology is still, however, so crude that even a man like Professor Carr can believe that the interest of Germany in cutting the throat of Czechoslovakia is more real than the interest of both Germany and Czechoslovakia in living peacefully together and composing conflicting interests by compromise, merely because Herr Hitler has a very large army, a very large air force, and a very loud and rasping voice.

The question what interests are real, or to put it in another way what is really the interest of an individual, a group, a class, or a nation, cannot be settled in this cavalier way. A study of the history of human society and of international relations, not to speak of one's own life, will make one very careful not to dogmatize about real or unreal interests *in any particular case*. But it also teaches this lesson: that *generally and in the long run* common interests are more real than conflicting interests politically. Nearly every one would agree that this is true with regard to the internal organization of the national state; in the long run and generally every one gains by the pursuit of a common interest even at the expense of individual interests; even the potential murderer is better off in the end if he refrains or is restrained from cutting the rich man's throat; a class which ruthlessly pursues what it considers its own interest at the expense of other classes nine times out of ten digs its own economic grave. But there is reason for thinking that what is true of national is also true of international society. For many centuries now the relations of states have been determined by acceptance of the hypothesis that their conflicting interests are so exclusively real that they must form the basis of national policy. I cannot believe that, if Professor Carr and others who agree with him examine impartially the results, they can maintain that they are encouraging. It would be interesting to learn which of the "Great Powers" had really gained by their ruthless pursuit of conflicting interests in the years 1790, 1815, 1870, 1914, and

1939, and which had lost by pursuing utopian common interests. And *realpolitik*? If reality is to be judged by success, what is the judgment of history upon the work of such realists as Napoleon I, Napoleon III, Bismarck, Wilhelm II, the Russian Tsars, not to speak of British imperialists? The fact is that nothing is more "utopian" than the idea that you can create a stable and permanent society by power and the pursuit of conflicting interests; the ideal is unattainable because it involves an attempt to use two of the most unstable and disintegrating of all social forces, violence in the service of cupidity, as the primary ingredients in that cement which is to hold society together.

The question whether co-operation of states in common interests is possible, whether the power of individual states can be controlled internationally as the power of individuals, groups, and classes have been controlled nationally, and whether these objectives and the preservation of peace can be attained through some such international organization as the League is at the same time much simpler and more complicated than it appears in the books of those who see some peculiar reality in power and conflict and are therefore continually reading the burial service over democracy, the nineteenth century, and internationalism. It has little or nothing to do with "morality," "reality," "liberalism," or "reason." Whether the policy of organizing European states pacifically and of eliminating the *probability* of war is or is not utopian depends solely upon whether that objective is or is not attainable. It has nothing whatsoever to do with some imaginary quality of "reality" attaching to power or violence and to "conflicting interests," but not attaching to law, co-operation, and common interests. The attainability of a political objective almost always depends mainly upon three elements: facts, psychology, and the creation of social machinery or organization appropriate to the object or

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

purpose of the policy and to the psychology. For instance, the attainability of the purpose of Zionists depends first upon such facts as the size of Palestine and the climate of its several districts. It would be utopian to ignore these facts and to put into Palestine more Jews than could exist there or to put a million Jews suddenly into a district of Palestine which is a waterless desert. Another element which has to be considered is the power of the Arabs to shoot Jewish immigrants, and yet another is the conflicting and the common interests of Jews and Arabs. Here it is partly a question of fact and partly of psychology; there is no question of some mystic element of reality attaching to some of the facts and not to others. It is a fact that the Arab has or may have the power to shoot the Jew; it is also a fact that he has or may have the power to co-operate with the Jew. It may be his immediate interest, i.e., he may gain at the moment, by shooting the Jew, but on the other hand it may be his "real" interest, i.e., he might gain more, by refraining from shooting and by co-operating with the Jew. The power to shoot is no more and no less "real" than the power to co-operate, and the conflicting interest which is served by shooting is no more and no less "real" than the common interest which is served by co-operation. Here the most important element is really psychological. The attainability of the Zionist policy will depend upon whether Arabs and Jews pursue their separate interests by conflict or whether they pursue their common interests by co-operation. Lastly, provided that facts and psychology did not make the purpose of Zionism impossible, it would still be necessary to create a form of government appropriate to the peculiar purpose, the peculiar facts, and the peculiar psychology.

This analysis applies no less to the problem of war and peace and international relations than to that of Zionism. Five hundred years of European history have proved that the

"realist" system of power politics, war, and the conflict of interests is grotesquely utopian. Its purpose is to ensure stability of national power, glory, prosperity, and peace; its result has been a kaleidoscope of loud voiced jingoism and national glory alternating with war, defeat, misery, and impoverishment. The reason why power policy and the attempt to establish a stable European society upon it always fails and always must fail is that it ignores both the reality of facts and the reality of psychology. That of course does not mean that the opposite policy, which was embodied in the League idea, is attainable. Whether a pacific international system, based upon co-operation in common interests, is possible in Europe will depend primarily upon facts and upon psychology. But I am inclined to think that the main difficulty, the real cause of the League's failure, is not to be looked for in facts and in "reality," but in psychology.

The international relations of France and Britain between 1895 and 1939 throw light upon the general problem of international relations and upon the effect of psychology. In 1895 France and Britain had a large number of conflicting and a large number of common interests. In the autumn of 1903 when Lansdowne and Delcassé sat down to discuss Anglo-French relations, nothing had happened to alter the objective reality of those interests. The conflict of some and the community of other interests still persisted; both series were "real." This fact blows up the whole of Professor Carr's argument about utopianism and reality in international relations. For in 1903 a revolution in Anglo-French policy and relations took place and it was determined mainly by psychology, not by power, realism, or utopianism. Before 1903 the governments of the two countries conducted their foreign policy on the basis and hypothesis that the most important, the "real," interests of France and Britain were in conflict, and that their common interests were illusory, the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

utopian hallucinations of little Englanders and pacifists. What benefited France harmed Britain, and vice versa twice over. The basis of their international relations was therefore assumed to be conflict of interests, and the main instrument of policy was power. Co-operation, compromise, political machinery for composing differences or pursuing common interests were ruled out; on both sides of the channel statesmen thought of the use (or threat of using) power, economic or military, to promote the interests of their own country at the expense of the other as the proper and inevitable instrument of policy.

In 1903 the relations between the two countries were completely and permanently changed, not owing to any change in their existing interests or in their relative power, but by a decision of their governments, and this decision was caused by a psychological change. Lansdowne and Delcassé did not suddenly see that the conflicting interests had suddenly become "unreal" and the common interests "real"; they came to the conclusion that in general and in the long run the two countries would gain more by pursuing common interests and attempting to compose conflicting interests by compromise than by continuing the pursuit by each of its own interests at the expense of the other. As soon as this psychological change took place, it had a devastating effect upon the importance of power as an element in the relations between the two states. In 1895 the relative power of the two countries had been an element of primary importance in their relations and policy; after 1904 it became negligible. The reason was that once the objective of policy had been changed by the Entente, power became a negligible and inappropriate instrument of that policy. This shows the absurdity of ascribing some peculiar quality of reality to power in international relations. Power is a very real element in human society, just as are law, co-operation, ideas, beliefs, and ideals; its importance at any particular moment depends to a large

extent upon the social or political objective which at that moment individuals are pursuing.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that the change which took place in 1904 in the national policies and international relations of France and Britain could not also take place in the policies and international relations of all the Great Powers, or all the states, of Europe. It is no answer to say that it was only fear of Germany which made France and Britain co-operate instead of fighting one another and that their co-operation was directed *against* another Power. To say that is to admit that psychology and not reality, power, or utopianism is the primary determinant in the international situation. If fear of Germany was sufficient to turn France and Britain away from the pursuit of their "real" conflicting interests into the pursuit of their "utopian" harmony of interests and to eliminate the probability—one might almost say possibility—of war between them for half a century there is no reason, except psychological, why fear of mutual destruction should not effect a similar change in the policies of all European states.

That is the real international problem which confronts Europe and civilization today. It is not a choice between utopia and reality, but between the psychology of conflicting interests and the organization of power politics on the one hand and the psychology of common interests and the organization of international co-operation on the other. The psychology of common interests and of co-operation and peace are there; it is, no doubt, weak, particularly among statesmen, generals, and perhaps professors, but it is there, and has widened and deepened in the last century. Its weakness is largely due to two causes. The first is the universal obstacle to civilization in all spheres of human society, the fact that pursuit of common interests almost always means the abandonment of some conflicting, individual,

immediate interests. The immediate appeal of the individual, conflicting interest is immensely strong, and it requires intelligence and restraint to see or learn that in the long run the individual may gain by abandoning it in the pursuit of common interests. Secondly, the international organization of power is itself a tremendous obstacle in the growth and influence of the psychology of co-operation. It breeds fear, and fear is the greatest fomentor of conflict among human beings and the most potent destroyer of co-operation.

No sensible man will pretend that establishment of international peace is an easy thing. Whether it is possible depends upon whether the international organization of power, as it exists today, can be altered and whether the psychology of common interests and co-operation can be made an active determinant of national policies. These things may not prove possible, but they are not impossible because conflict and conflicting interests are real, and co-operation and common interests are utopian. To believe that is merely to try to rationalize one's own and other people's primitive psychology.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME. I

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

[This is the first of a series of commentaries on Parliament which Dr. Jennings will contribute to THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY.—EDS.]

I
MEMBERS of Parliament set out upon their wartime career with much the same idea as other people, that in wartime everything would be different. It would be different in Parliament because there was no longer real opposition, except in respect of personnel, between the Government and the Opposition. On the 24th August, a week before the German Army invaded Poland, the anti-war party mustered only four votes, as well as the two tellers, against the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill. On the 2nd September, the day after the Germans invaded Poland and the day before Great Britain and France declared war, only seven members voted against conscription. An electoral truce, whereby the two main parties agreed not to put up candidates against each other in bye-elections, was made at an early stage. The divisions in the House of Commons, from August 24th to the end of the session in November, were all on comparatively minor matters. Nevertheless, the Labour party refused to be represented in the War Cabinet which was set up on the outbreak of war, and the Liberal party was not asked, though it was offered ministerial office outside the Cabinet. The number of National Government ministers were increased, and some of these, like Sir John Reith and Sir Andrew Duncan, have been brought in from outside. Facing them are the almost untouched ranks of the Labour and Liberal parties, giving "discriminating" support. The tendency

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

has naturally been for that support to become more and more discriminating.

The agreement between parties rendered easy the passage of the considerable number of emergency measures that the outbreak of war rendered necessary. The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, was passed through all its stages on the 24th September with only one division—supported by 427 members against 4—in the House of Commons. On the 1st September, the famous standing orders and the practice of the House relating to the imposition of charges were suspended, and eighteen Bills were enacted without challenge. On the 2nd September the motion for leave to bring in a Bill imposing conscription was opposed, but was supported on a division by 340 members against 7. On that and the following day six Bills were passed, another six on the 4th and 5th, and seven Bills on the 6th and 7th; in none of these cases was there a division.

Most of the legislation prepared under the auspices of the Committee of Imperial Defence having thus been disposed of in seven days, the two Houses adjourned for a week. At this stage Mr. Chamberlain was giving a weekly review of the war on the motion for the adjournment, which enabled a debate to take place if it were thought necessary. Other ministers, such as the Secretary of State for War, the Minister of Supply, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, sometimes made similar statements, though relating only to their own Departments. It was soon found, however, on the one hand that there was not enough happening to provide material for a weekly survey, and on the other hand that the House of Commons had enough business to occupy three days a week. The practice of sitting on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays was adopted from the 26th September onwards, and was not altered until the pressure of business necessitated the return to the five-day week in February, 1940.

The War Budget provided the first test of the new relations between Government and Opposition. The Opposition view had been stated on the 13th September by Mr. Greenwood, the Deputy Leader:

“I conceive the functions of the House to be twofold, first to hear statements by the Prime Minister and the Government and, if necessary, to debate them, and by that means to keep in touch with the ever changing situation, listening with sympathy and with understanding, trying to bring to bear upon the statements, the legislation and the proposals made by the Government what we honestly conceive to be the views of the British public on whom this Parliament depends. Secondly, it falls on us who are close to the heart of the people, closer than those who are submerged by all the problems which are confronting them—I am not saying anything derogatory of members of the War Cabinet; I am speaking of the nature of the situation—to take the initiative, as responsible public representatives, in raising discussions, to enlighten the Government, to bring home to them the questions that are troubling the minds of the people and to do our best to avoid the Government falling into difficulties.”¹

What emerged from this turgid explanation was that on the one hand the Opposition proposed to act as *candid friend* in criticising Government proposals, and on the other hand it proposed to raise questions itself, especially about matters which seemed to bear hardly on ordinary people. The War Budget was passed without substantial criticism of its main proposals, but there was criticism of details, carried even to the division lobby. The first division challenged by the Opposition since the outbreak of war was in fact on the resolution for the increase in the sugar duty, a resolution

¹ 351 H.C. Deb., 5s., 670.

carried by 113 votes to 79, on the 29th September. The number voting may appear very small, but it must be remembered that this was a Friday sitting. In Committee on the Finance Bill the clause containing the new sugar duty was carried by 201 votes to 137, figures much more representative of the average attendance in the House since the outbreak of war. There were two other divisions on the Committee stage of the Finance Bill.

The second function of the House was at this stage normally exercised by raising questions on the Adjournment Motion. For instance, there was a debate on the Ministry of Information on the 11th October, on war aims on the 12th October, and on war pensions on the 17th October. It was evidently felt, however, that a debate on the adjournment, which did not end in a division, was a very inadequate method of bringing home to the Government the views of those represented by the Opposition parties. It is of course obvious that the Government would not be defeated; but if a debate ends in a division it is necessary for Government supporters to be present in large enough numbers to defeat the Opposition; and this also means that many ministers must be either in or about the House. On the 31st October, Mr. Dingle Foot moved an address for the annulment of certain orders under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. The motion was eventually withdrawn, but only after the Government had agreed to reconsider some of the most dangerous of the Defence Regulations.

On the following day, Mr. Attlee moved a motion demanding increased old age pensions. The time-honoured device of a whitewashing amendment put up by a "dummy" member was adopted, and the amendment was carried by 264 votes to 144. On the 8th November there was another debate, on a motion moved by Mr. A. V. Alexander demanding immediate application of a rationing scheme. The same

procedure was followed, and the whitewashing amendment was carried by 187 votes to 104. There were other valuable debates during the remainder of the session, but they all took place on the adjournment motion. In the main, therefore, the House had completely changed its tactics. In normal times the "Orders of the Day" provide the essential material for debate. In the early months of the war, though there was plenty of legislation, it was not of a controversial character. Frequently, therefore, the main discussion was held on the motion to adjourn, which ceased to be a mere half-an-hour during which private members raised minor grievances, and became in fact discussions on matters of public importance arranged between the whips.

II

The new session opened on the 28th November. The Government's first step was to take all the time of the House so as to relieve Government draftsmen from the necessity of looking through private members' Bills and Motions. The Opposition opposed the resolution, but it was carried by 213 votes to 115. In the debate on the address, the normal procedure was followed, even to the extent of having official Opposition amendments. That of the Labour party regretted "the absence of any proposals for organising to the full our human and material resources in the national interest for the effective prosecution of the war, for the provision and maintenance of an adequate standard of life for all, and for the solution on the basis of social justice of the problems which will arise on the return to peace." It was defeated by 303 votes to 125. The Liberal amendment regretted the absence of "adequate measures to enable the country to add to its financial strength by the development of the export trade"; and deplored "the many unnecessary and unco-ordinated restrictions which are hampering exporters, making

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

it difficult for them to retain their normal trade as well as depriving them of the chance to exploit markets hitherto in the hands of Germany." It was rejected by 226 votes to 31, several Labour members, including the Leader of the Opposition, voting with the Liberal party.

The House continued to sit on three days a week. This involved no reduction in Parliamentary time, except for questions. At this period of the year Fridays are normally devoted to private members' Bills and Wednesdays to their Motions. The effect of the change was therefore only to reduce questions from four hours a week to three hours. There was some demand for an increase in the daily hour; but there is some reason for suggesting that such an increase would increase the number of supplementaries and not the number of questions answered. Some rearrangement was made in the order of questions, so as to give opportunity for questions to those Departments whose questions normally have precedence on Mondays.

After some hesitation on the part of the Government, it was agreed that a secret session should be held on the 13th December. Mr. Speaker afterwards issued the statement that "The Adjournment of the House was moved by the Prime Minister and a Debate took place on the organisation of supplies for the prosecution of the war." The session really appears to have been secret and, apart from an account in a German newspaper which is said to be pure fiction, there has been no suggestion of leakage. Being on the adjournment motion, the debate could not have ended in a division and, indeed, there appears to have been no very great satisfaction with the debate itself. Apart from the greater freedom of discussion which flowed from the fact that Dr. Goebbels was not listening in, it is probable that it did not differ substantially in character from the other debates held on adjournment motions.

Such debates were less frequent in February than in December and January, partly because the Government introduced some controversial legislation, partly because supplementary estimates and estimates provided more convenient pegs, and partly also because formal Opposition motions were sometimes used. The actual progress of the war has been such that little criticism has been addressed to the Defence Departments, and for the most part the debates have been upon branches of administration represented in the Cabinet only by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Food in particular have been under fire. The Minister of Economic Warfare made an excellent impression in a debate on the 17th January, which seems to have left in the minds of members the opinion that while the Defence Departments and the Ministry of Economic Warfare were doing well, much less could be said about the Treasury, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Food and the Board of Trade. The agricultural side of the question was raised by the Liberal party on the 25th January, with special reference to the shortage of feeding stuffs. The Minister of Food made a very ineffective reply—a reply full of promises which have since not been fulfilled—and the House began to wonder whether the Minister's only qualification for this post was not that he had failed in every other. Mr. Lloyd George demonstrated his eternal youth by making a devastating reply, but Mr. Clement Davies also made an extremely good speech. The Minister of Agriculture wound up the debate, but without much satisfaction to anybody else or, probably, himself.

Agricultural policy must be considered in close connection with general economic policy. It is true that general economic policy is represented in the War Cabinet by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and agricultural policy by the Lord Privy Seal; but agricultural policy is in large degree a matter of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

imports (especially of feeding-stuffs), which is essentially a matter of general economic policy. On the 1st February the Labour party moved a motion asking that there should be in the War Cabinet a minister specially charged with the planning of the national resources. The case made was that whereas the Defence Departments were represented by their three Ministers, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and Lord Hankey, the economic Departments were represented only by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that the "Treasury mind" even in a head other than that of Sir John Simon, was not likely to produce the correct line of approach. Other members wanted other things, such as a better organisation of exports. The fact that the proponents wanted different things was, of course, used by Mr. Chamberlain as an excuse for promising nothing. The Prime Minister was, in fact, at his most characteristic in this debate. He was clearly afraid that someone was trying to take away some of his own power, though the ancient tradition that no minister wants power prevented him from saying so. With this attitude must be associated what was evidently a complete misunderstanding. What the critics believed was that under the present system there is no minister responsible for the initiation of great economic policies. If Lord Stamp wants something done, he produces a proposal to the sub-committee of heads of departments, who report to the Committee on Economic Policy, which asks the Chancellor of the Exchequer to bring the matter before the War Cabinet. If the Admiralty wants something done, it goes straight to the War Cabinet. But the Prime Minister apparently had no notion that what was wanted was initiative: he thought that what was being asked for was an arbitrator. Indeed, it seems quite impossible to get members of the National Government to see that co-ordination is not just a matter of settling disputes. Lord Baldwin used exactly the same tactics when the proposal for

a Ministry of Defence was put forward. He, too, thought in terms of arbitration, and the Prime Minister is the prime arbitrator: if anybody suggests co-ordination he necessarily suggests, therefore, that the Prime Minister is not doing his job. Accordingly, when at last the pressure became too great to be resisted, Lord Baldwin appointed a lawyer to act as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence under the Prime Minister's immediate control. So in this debate, Mr. Chamberlain simply denied that there was any need for a minister, raised little difficulties as to who would answer in the House, and finally gave his real reason, that the minister "would challenge the position of the Prime Minister."

These closely related problems again came under discussion through the debates on the Agriculture (Miscellaneous War Provisions) Bill. Why this Bill was introduced has not been made clear, since most of it could have been enacted under emergency powers. The explanation probably is that the Government wanted to show that it was doing something about agriculture. If so, the intention failed. The Bill was not received with enthusiasm in any section of the House. There was gentle derision from the Labour benches and a broadside attack from Mr. Lloyd George, which could not be met by Sir Samuel Hoare's use of the old gag about the Corn Production Act. There was further criticism in, Committee, and on the main amendment, moved by a Conservative, the Government's majority fell to 33—182 votes to 149. Nine divisions were challenged during the Committee stage of that Bill.

In the meantime, there had been a debate on the Government control of food prices. Doubts were expressed about the policy, but on the whole the Government came out of the debate reasonably well. It also came well out of the debate on the terms granted to the railway companies for the sequestration of the railways. Here there was a strong

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

case against the Government, as journals like *The Economist* pointed out. The Labour Opposition could not, however, resist the opportunity to play politics. It is, of course, an essential part of Labour policy that there should be a "permanent national body" for the control of all forms of transport; but the real question for the House to decide was whether the subsidy to railway shareholders was desirable or not. By raising the wider issue, the Labour leaders enabled the Government to get away with a good solid pre-war nationalisation debate, with a good solid Conservative majority at the end of it. There were criticisms of the terms arranged, but the narrower the front of the attack, the more effective it is likely to be.

Good old hit-and-miss pre-war party politics were, however, restored fully when the Government introduced the Old Age and Widows' Pensions Bill. The Opposition did not oppose the Bill as a whole. They accepted Part I, which proposed to reduce the contributory pension age for women from 65 to 60, but their reasoned amendment on second reading was in substance a motion for the rejection of the Bill, and was so held by the Speaker (in fact, it would have been out of order otherwise). The part to which the Labour party objected was that which proposed to abolish outdoor relief to pensioners and to replace it by supplementary pensions granted by the Unemployment Assistance Board, renamed the Assistance Board, after a means test. The debate on the second reading, which required two days, was reminiscent of Parliament at its worst. All the old bogeys and all the false analogies were produced. Labour members asked why there were not means tests for this or that if there was to be a means test for supplementary pensions; Conservatives asked why Labour members assented to a means test for members of Parliament; and one Conservative member produced the old story that the Labour party had initiated the means test in 1910. The

debate was a poor one, but ended in the usual result, a victory for the Government by 249 votes to 134. It may be noted that on the second day of the debate, the 21st February, the Government moved to suspend the eleven o'clock rule so as to get the Money Resolution through. The Opposition divided on the motion, though the Money Resolution was not in fact taken. Nothing illustrates more clearly the return to normal parliamentary procedure. Moreover, the Money Resolution itself was debated, contrary to the usual practice in wartime; and at the end of two days in Committee only eight clauses had been disposed of.

III

There is no doubt that, during the first six months of war, Parliament has performed its critical function extremely well. There has been no suppression of opinion; indeed, when questions of war policy and war aims were under discussion the solitary Communist member was given more opportunity than anyone to put his point of view. If he did not succeed in making himself clear, the explanation probably is that he is not clear to himself; for he was given ample opportunity. There have, however, been no great debates because there is fundamental agreement on war policy. Disagreement arises over minor aspects of policy, such as rationing, agricultural production and economic organisation. The great gladiatorial conquests are no longer possible. Though there is evidently a great and growing perturbation over the inefficiency of the Government, it has hardly appeared in public; and, indeed, if a Whitehall intrigue turned out Mr. Chamberlain as quietly as Mr. Chamberlain turned out Mr. Hore-Belisha, the astonishment in the country would be almost equally as great. The fact that during recent months most speeches in the House of Commons have been against the Government has not percolated into the national

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

consciousness, partly because the Government's steady majority could be obtained, and partly because of the paucity of parliamentary reporting.

The general support which the Opposition has given the Government has in fact released Government supporters from their obligation to support. There is now as much criticism from the Government benches as from the Opposition side. It rarely shows itself in votes, but it does show itself in speeches. Ministers, too, seem to be paying much more attention to criticism. There is, one would suspect, a general feeling of *malaise*. Fewer ministers are in touch with the Prime Minister because he is necessarily concerned with the exotic ministers of the War Cabinet, and none of these, except Sir John Simon and, less frequently, Sir Samuel Hoare, are much concerned with what goes on in the House. The Prime Minister's own future must be obscure to everybody except himself, but nobody knows who his successor is likely to be. Hence the unusual compliment being paid to the House of Commons of close attention to its proceedings. Perhaps, after all, the House will decide.

It cannot be said, however, that the Opposition is in any happier mood. The task of the candid friend is not easy to carry out. The Labour party says in the constituencies that it distrusts the Government. On the other hand, it agrees with the major principles of policy. How is it possible to defend the policy and attack those who adopt it? How is it possible, too, to draw the line between opposition for the sake of opposition (which is permissible and even laudable in peacetime) and opposition for the sake of improvement? Where, for instance, should the line be drawn in the Old Age and Widows' Pensions Bill? The fact is that the position of candid friend is not one which can be held for long. Either one becomes friend and collaborator, or one becomes really candid and an opponent. The Labour party

must make up its mind whether it is going into Opposition—in which case it will obstruct the efficient prosecution of the war—or whether it is going to support the Government. If it does the latter, then it must take the responsibility for government as well. The country does not dislike coalitions in wartime; but it dislikes at all times people who will not take the responsibility for their opinions.

APPENDIX

SESSION 1939-40

(TO 29TH FEBRUARY)

Address in reply to the King's Speech	6 days
Government Legislation	12 days
Finance	2 days
Adjournment Debates	8 days
Opposition Motions	3 days

DIVISIONS

No. of Divisions : 34.

Highest Government Vote : 303 (Labour Amendment to Address).

Lowest Government Vote : 113 (Industrial Assurance Bill, Committee).

Lowest Government Majority : 33 (Agriculture Bill, Committee).

Highest Opposition Vote : 149 (Agriculture Bill, Committee).

Average Vote : Government, 182 ; Opposition, 110.

FALANGIST SPAIN

By BARBARA WARD

ONE of the incidental tragedies of the Spanish Civil War was the extent to which the real nature of the conflict came to be obscured by its absorption into the larger struggle between the European Great Powers. In the last hundred years Spain has had twenty-two *pronunciamientos*, three long and bloody civil wars and seven changes of régime. It follows that her problem is not of to-day or yesterday and that in essence it has little to do with the Fascist-Communist split which grew up in post-war Europe. Spain's problem is the secular problem of adapting her traditional, anti-European, proudly and intransigently anachronistic temper to the exigencies of modern Western civilization which, although she has held it at bay along the Pyrénées since its origins in Post-Reformation Europe, she is no longer able to resist in the overwhelming material strength and driving power of its latter-day industrial development.

The fundamental split in Spain is not between Right and Left in the ordinary sense, but between those who accept modern civilization and those who reject it in favour of something more authentically Spanish. Extremism on the Right represented by Carlist Traditionalism, and on the Left in the shape of the Anarchist movement, upholds Spain, while the Centre parties, Liberal Conservatives or Republican Socialists, support the idea of "letting in the West." It is from the extremists that revolt has always come and it has always been a revolt against "Europeanization." Extremism on European lines, Communism or Fascism, was virtually non-existent until the Civil War. At the 1936 elections the Communist Party only polled a bare 500,000 votes. The

Falangists did not number more than 100,000. Their insignificance was largely due to their extra-Spanish ideologies and connexions and they were rejected by genuinely Spanish extremism, the Communists by the Anarchists, the Falangists by the Traditionalist Requetes.

The Civil War, however, gave the alien ideologies their opportunity. The drawing of the Spanish conflict into the larger struggle between the Axis and the Western Democracies with their temporary ally, Russia, led to a war on a far greater scale than the Spanish Generals, planning for yet another *pronunciamiento*, had anticipated. The Falange, with its Fascist programme, was their link with Germany and Italy and the greater the extent of Axis intervention, the greater became the influence of the Falange. By 1937 its programme was accepted and the Traditionalists were forced with ill grace to accept amalgamation. A similar process was observable on the Left, where the Communists' international affiliations and the outside help they secured enabled them to oust the Anarchists and to absorb the authority of the government into their own hands, a state of affairs which led to bitter fighting between the Anarchists and their supplanters. The result of the Civil War was thus to put into the saddle extremist parties whose extremism was not authentically Spanish, and with Franco's victory a revolutionary movement came to power with the avowed intention of modernising Spain and linking it with the revolutions in Italy and Germany. Spain's isolationism, still represented by the resentful Traditionalists, seemed likely to melt away before the reforming energy of the boisterous Falange.

The Falange, by virtue of the 1937 statute, now became the basis of the new state. On it therefore fell the terrific responsibility of restoring some sort of political, social and economic order to a country in the last stages of material and spiritual ruin. No survey exists of the extent of the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

material damage but the daily press, reports from foreign correspondents and occasionally a revealing broadcast (such as, for example, a peculiarly frank speech given by Señor Suñer, the Falangist leader, on October 31st) offer a fairly convincing picture of the country's straits. In spite of a rigid rationing of all the main foodstuffs, there is a very serious shortage. To give one or two examples: on the annual consumption of rice and vegetables, supplies are short by 300,000 tons; the average consumption of wheat is 180 kilograms per head, but only 100 kilos are available this year; and shortage and rationing bring with them the evil by-products of food hoarding and profiteering in spite of the imposition of ruthless penalties. It is estimated that only a quarter of the milk demand can be covered, as for instance in Madrid where the slaughter of cows during the siege has reduced the normal herd of 17,000 to 5,000 head of cattle.

Devastation is universal. There is hardly a municipality of any size in the former battle zones that has not already embarked on costly reconstruction schemes. Madrid alone has advanced ten million pesetas for immediate use (indeed the problem in Madrid, with 6,000 families homeless, is more acute than anywhere else). Buildings have, however, suffered less severely than the means of transport. Of the 1936 figure of 3,000 locomotives it is estimated that only 1,700 are left, of which perhaps 1,000 cannot be used. Yet Señor Suñer announced that the shortage of road transport was even more severe. The point is of crucial importance, for without a transport system no amount of increased productivity can have an immediately beneficial effect. If the output of farm and mine is to silt up at the end of non-existent roads or devastated railways, neither the internal nor the external markets of Spain will reap any benefit.

Industry in a sense has suffered less than agriculture, for the war-time industrial effort has even increased the potential

of certain industries. For example the output of the Basque mines was increased (with German help) from 240,000 tons of pig iron in 1935 to 304,000 tons in 1938. Increased output in certain branches, however, hardly compensates either for the vast reorganization necessary to restore Spanish industry to the ways of peace or for the many undertakings which have virtually to build up their lost position from the beginning. When the Sagunto blast-furnaces were reopened on November 18th it was considered something of a triumph that just over a thousand men were employed; yet in 1935 the labour force was seven times as great. Food shortage, industrial disorganization and transport difficulties all react unfavourably on Spain's final problem—that of restoring her foreign trade. In 1935 two-thirds of her exports were foodstuffs (a third, fruit); to-day foodstuffs are desperately short and Spain is *importing* wheat and rice and vegetables. Oranges, olives and her luxury trade of early vegetables were concentrated on the east coast, and as the pressure of war increased the Republicans abandoned export crops for staples such as beans and potatoes. It will be years before the old level of production is restored. Finally, apart from war devastation, the year's harvests have been singularly sparse, and in the autumn a fly disease threatened the whole of the olive crop in Estremadura at an estimated loss of over 17 million pesetas.

Examples could be multiplied of the extent of devastation; to-day, a year after victory, the cry of the government is "Give us time," and official communiqués and broadcasts drum home the theme "reconstruction is not the work of a day, a month or a year." It would, however, be unjust to the Falange to suggest that they have not flung themselves into the task with "fascist energy." It must be remembered that the final form of the State—both political and economic—has yet to be determined. The first National Council of the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

peace met at Burgos on September 26th with the specific task of providing the new Spain with its constitution and of establishing the main lines of economic reconstruction. Nevertheless, the Falangist programme was in existence in 1934 and has been officially accepted since 1937. Many of its principles, even before victory, were already in practice in the South and West.

There is no doubt as to the type of economy the Falange will establish—if it can. The principles are those of Italy, that of a nationalist autarkic economy where State control is rigidly enforced and the public responsibility of employers and workers alike expressed through syndical and corporative institutions. Certain of such institutions exist already, for example an embryonic National Delegation of Syndicates whose final form reached law early in February, a National Council for Agricultural Settlement, the National Wheat Service (which controls the sale and distribution of all agricultural produce). On the nationalist front, there is the "Law for the Regulation and Defence of Industry" of December 15th by virtue of which 75 per cent of the capital and all the directors in any new industry must be Spanish. For autarky, there is the Spanish Institute of Foreign Exchange depending directly on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry which exercises complete control over all foreign exchange transactions. Through these new institutions is to be transmitted the modernising energy of the Falange. The Caudillo's New Year broadcast stressed for the thousandth time the right and duty of every Spaniard *to work*, the necessity of raising productivity, of sharing wealth more evenly, of doing away with "agricultural slums" and shameful urban conditions. As a corollary of the speech a ten-year plan was announced on January 11th under which £105 million are to be spent on land reclamation, irrigation, industrial development, the restoration of the transport system, the

building of a vast mercantile marine. Here is activity, modernism, efficiency, technocracy, the West in fact, breaking in a torrent over the tottering remnants of old Spain.

Or so it seems. Even on the economic front the position is ambiguous. Beneath the surface of legislative activity and grandiose planning, reconstruction is extraordinarily localized and haphazard. Schemes are being worked out province by province, irrigation in Andalusia, savings banks and a peasant credit system in the Basque country, loans to small farmers in Murcia. Of a sense of the economic interdependence of the whole community there seems to be little trace. Over and over again, a problem courageously faced has been dropped again without explanation, for instance, the Syndical Laws which were shelved from June, 1939, until February, 1940, or the land reform based on expropriation and settlement advocated by Fernandez Cuerta which disappeared abruptly from the political horizon when Cuerta was—tactfully—appointed to the Embassy in Brazil. (Since that time only land purchase schemes have received any serious discussion.) There is also evidence of a curious undercurrent of unrest and friction in the constant denunciations of "saboteurs and reactionaries" which appear in the Falangist press; the Conservatives are criticized for opposing reform and the Falangist courts take a vindictive pleasure in imposing heavy sentences on business men found infringing state regulations. All is not well and the general uneasiness is giving an uncertainty of touch to the handling of economic problems. The roots of this uneasiness, however, do not lie in economics. The problem facing the Falange is political.

The moral reconstruction of the country goes forward far more slowly and uncertainly than the economic. The devastation of souls has been greater even than the devastation of equipment, and it is inevitable that within a year of a bitter war, there should be, between victors and vanquished,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

few signs of returning social cohesion. Furthest removed from the possibility of re-integration are the armies of tragic exiles, the bulk of them in France, but influential groups scattered through the two hemispheres. The problem of their repatriation appears insoluble. France, it is true, has brought some pressure to bear, and in October certain camps in the Basses-Pyrénées were evacuated, but the fact that no amnesty has been promised to returning Spaniards limits the extent of pressure which France can, in all humanity, apply. A recent appeal made by General Franco did in fact promise fair treatment to any returning refugee, but reports from Spain on the state of prisons and concentration camps discourage any real confidence in the Caudillo's offer.

The Republicans inside Spain have joined the world's growing army of forgotten men. All that is certain is the extent and ferocity of the process of "liquidation." The categories of guilt established in the Law of Political Responsibilities of February 13th, 1939, are so elastic and so subjectively determined that under them literally any suspect can be brought to trial. There is no way of telling the extent of executions and imprisonments and in any case the figure is not static. Such outbreaks as the revolt in the Asturias in July only lead to fresh reprisals and in a vicious spiral of revolt and retribution, camps and prisons remain filled beyond capacity. The scheme of "regeneration through work," whereby each day worked remits two day's imprisonment, together with a recent amnesty covering certain sentences of twelve years and under, should wipe out a majority of the shorter sentences fairly rapidly, but there is no way of estimating the proportion of sentences which exceed twelve years. It is said to be very high.

Nevertheless, there are signs of a certain effort of reabsorption. Socialists and Communists tend to be reintegrated by way of the Falange. Bitter complaints have

FALANGIST SPAIN

appeared in the Traditionalist press over the presence of "Marxists" in the Falangist bureaucracy while ex-combatants and Requetes (they are practically synonymous) go without employment. In all probability the ex-"Marxists" feel at home under the rigidly centralized discipline and reforming energy of the Falange. It is significant that here again a division is apparent, not on lines of Left and Right, but of opposition to and acceptance of the modern European outlook.

Victory has done nothing to heal the breach between the Traditionalist and Falangist wings of the official party. The Falangists came into their own when the fighting ceased and the task of organising victory began. They had the programme, they had whatever there was of a bureaucratic organization; above all, they had the backing of the foreign "technicians." The influence of Germany had increased enormously in the last year of the war and the Falange was deeply impregnated with National Socialist ideals. German engineers were busy in many of the reconstruction schemes; the percentage of Spain's exports groups to Germany rose steadily; "Winterhelp" experts assisted in the organization of the *Auxilio Social*; the Cultural Agreement of January 24th, 1939, brought a flood of lecturers, journalists and propagandists into the country. On April 8th, Spain adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact, thus making it appear that her foreign policy would fall into line with the logic of intervention and that Germany had gained what was virtually a dependency at the mouth of the Mediterranean athwart the main lines of communication of the Western Democracies.

The position was viewed with anxiety outside Spain and with equal anxiety but far fiercer resentment within. The Church opposed the Falange's National Socialist conception of her rights and duties. After the restoration of stipends in October the Falangist press canvassed the re-establishment

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of the Rota (an ecclesiastical tribunal whose decisions were independent of Rome) and of the Government's right to submit candidates to the Holy See for appointment to the Spanish Sees. The Vatican's determined refusal led to a stiffening of the authorities' attitude to the Church, and in November Cardinal Goma's pastoral ("On the War and the Peace") was censored while in proof, a step which caused a sharp protest to appear in the diocesan bulletin of Toledo. The matter is more important than may appear superficially. The Church has always formed the core of the Traditionalist opposition to "Westernization." If the Falange, under the influence of National Socialist ideas were to attack that citadel, the result might well be a renewal, not of the most recent civil struggle perhaps, but of the older Carlist wars, once more on the Modernist-Traditionalist issue.

The uncertainty of the Church's position represents a conflict in the sphere of doctrine and principle. So, too, does the fear of foreign servitude which was at its strongest during the summer of 1939. After Count Ciano's visit in July, General Franco appears to have faced something very like a minor revolt among his Generals. General Yaguë and General Quiapo de Llano were the spearhead of growing opposition not only to the committing of Spain's fortunes to the Axis, but also, on the home front, to the presence of so much foreign "technical" assistance and to the jobbery with which the Civil Service was being manned. All three points constituted a direct attack on the Falange. The Falange had secured the Axis alliance and the foreign help; they had, in fact, brought in the Trojan Horse. They were also responsible for the creation of a privileged bureaucracy from which the Traditionalists and ex-combatants tended to find themselves excluded. General Franco met the Generals—but barely half-way. It is true that he incorporated the Army in the Falange (with the possibility therefore of the

party ranks being swamped by the mass of professional soldiers) and set up a separate Defence Junta, but he counteracted the concessions by dismissing General de Llano from the Military Governorship of Seville and he increased the hold of the Falange on the Government by setting up a Political Junta (which would be virtually his Cabinet) in addition to the existing National Council. In the ministerial reshuffle, Count Jordana, a Conservative, reputedly anti-Falangist statesman, disappeared and the key position was given to Señor Serrano Suñer, a noted advocate of the Axis line.

These changes did not put an end to the discontent. In October combined Army and Requete pressure secured a decree dismissing all non-combatants from party jobs. Señor Suñer countered this by announcing early in November a purge of all suspect Falangists—significantly, to the Right. There are even signs of a certain revival of independent Carlist activity. The funeral of Don Carlos de Bourbon on November 18th was transformed into a major political demonstration and a number of municipalities have introduced pensions for the veterans of the second Carlist war. Even more significant is the renewed interest of the Catholic press in a possible restoration of the Monarchy. There is no question of Alfonso. He is identified with liberal constitutionalism and in any case is reported to have demanded representative government and the inclusion of Socialists in his Cabinet. The Monarchy in question is a Traditionalist Carlist Monarchy which the Right extremists are beginning to look to as the only bulwark against the modernising fury of the unruly Falange.

Nevertheless there would be little significance in this ebullience (did not Franco reaffirm his absolute confidence in the Falange in his New Year broadcast?) were it not for a single fact, a fact which has had more influence on the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

course of Spanish politics than any other in the last year—the signature on August 24th of the Russo-German Pact. Both in the sphere of foreign politics and on the home front Hitler's great betrayal has dealt a blow to the Falangists who were so closely identified with him. The Pact made Spanish neutrality a certainty. It did not, however, lead immediately to any revulsion of feeling. Assisted by the German propaganda machine the Spanish press soon found an explanation consonant with pinning the blame on the old enemy, the pluto-democratic West. The Allies' policy of encirclement brought Hitler to his "unhappy predicament." If they had not sought an agreement with Russia, Hitler would have been spared the Canossa of Ribbentrop's flight to the Kremlin. As a corollary, Spain passionately desired the end of hostilities in the West. Only Britain's obstinate determination to fight Hitler was keeping him from his proper task, that of protecting Europe against Bolshevism. From this conviction sprang the Caudillo's repeated appeals for peace. However, as the evidence of German and Russian collaboration increases and their threat to Scandinavia and the Balkans becomes clearer, Spain's sympathies are showing signs of modification. Her neutrality is now axiomatic and this withdrawal from Axis commitments is linked with a slight but definite weakening of the Falange position at home.

There is a material side to the question. The Falange had based much of their reconstruction programme on German support and on German materials. Now the technicians are being withdrawn, the activities of Hisma have ceased and trade with Germany is impossible save through the costly mediation of Italy. But the psychological significance of Germany's defection is more important. Over against the *complete* isolation of the Traditionalists the Falange had maintained the necessity of opening Spain to modern Fascism and of linking her destinies with the national

renaissance of Germany and Italy. Now the sight of Hitler, the paladin of anti-Bolshevism, celebrating his blood brotherhood with Stalin strengthens a hundredfold the Traditionalist outlook. They have always maintained that Europe is rotten. The Falange wished to confine the contagion to the "carriers of Bolshevism," Russia and the pluto-democratic West. But here is Hitler falling to the plague. The only hope for Spain is to reconstruct her *cordon sanitaire* along the Pyrénées, Hitler has thus enormously reinforced the "away from Europe" movement of thought in Spain.

So strong has it grown that the Falange itself must reckon with it. In his October broadcast, Señor Suñer, arch-exponent of the Axis policy, declared that Spain could not risk the "sacred cause of Christianity" in order to support foreign ideologies and added: "We must be prepared to follow a path away from that trodden by Europe." Here is perhaps the key to contemporary politics in Spain, a key to the uncertainties, the hesitations, the fierce antagonisms. To restore unity, some effort must be made to build up prosperity, yet restoring prosperity means "letting in the West," Western capital, Western technique, Western economic structures which in their turn will breed Western philosophies, social classes and attitudes of mind. Therefore a section of Spain, and by no means the most ignoble, will fight this Westernization even, may be, at the risk of another war. Yet without a modern economy, without prosperity, how can the social fabric be restored? Spain stands, in fact, in the old unhappy dilemma in which she has stood for the last hundred years. She is still apparently incapable of finding a compromise between the fierce and heroic tradition of honourable and uncomfortable living and the ever-increasing pressure of modern ideas coupled with the necessity of building up some sort of functioning economy.

The issue in Spain may well be decided by the outcome

of the European war. If the whole material scientific and technical organization of the West collapses under the strain, Spain will perhaps support the ruin with better grace and better hopes of reconstruction than any other state, for she is inured to misery and has a tradition independent of the material ordering of life. If the West triumphs—for another brief spell of technical and material reorganization unconnected with any spiritual regeneration, Spain may well continue her desperate cycle of civil wars. Only a Europe restoring in victory both its material and its spiritual strength offers any hope to this tragic “invertebrate” Spain.

AFTER FINLAND

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

SO Finland's magnificent resistance to the invaders is ended. I have to write this, sick at heart, when the news of the Russo-Finnish Treaty has just come through. Sick at heart, though glad, of course, that the killing won't go on and on, glad that there won't be half a million refugees pouring into Sweden, glad that British and French soldiers won't be involved in that hazardous campaign. Queer, isn't it, that there are people in this country, even a few people who profess membership of the Labour Party, who are not sick at heart but positively glad that Stalin has won this victory and got away with his plunder. The attack on Finland was so beastly a crime; the association of Stalin with the gangsters in Berlin has, as Nehru pointed out with justified bitterness, betrayed the hopes of millions who have looked to Russia with hope and with a passionate sympathy for her economic aims: and the Finns, in peace and now in war, have so strong a claim on the admiration and gratitude of everyone who values the essentials of democracy.

What is likely to be the outcome of this defeat, in the near future, for the Finns, and for the other Scandinavian States, and for ourselves in the war?

I

First, what can Finland expect? Her losses through the war, and now through the peace, must be very heavy for a poor country with so small a population. She has lost some 40,000 of her best men, and the homelands of a sixth of her people. She has lost Viipuri, and many substantial buildings all over Finland, as well as thousands of wooden homes. And she may continue to lose, during the Western war, her normal markets for her timber and her nickel.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

But the timber is still there, and the nickel. Old Viipuri has gone, but Finland has other ports. And wooden homes, quickly burnt, are quickly built from the building material on the spot; so that much of the reconstruction can be carried through, when money and labour are available, much more quickly than was possible in devastated Northern France.

What of the political future? Can Finland's democratic way of life survive after this, or will "peaceful penetration" by communist influences, and through communist agents avowed and secret, subdue Finland to the Russian level of intellectual freedom?

Any prediction must be mere guesswork: but there is at least this much certitude on which to base a guess.

Firstly, the Finns would be extremely difficult to subdue. They have known an independence of mind, and a standard of education, especially during the past twenty years, incomparably higher than the Russians have yet known. Bobrikov, with his Terror, failed to subdue them, and Stolypin couldn't tame them: they managed for themselves to overcome the bitter animosities bequeathed to them by the struggle and Terror of 1918-19, and now the Finland of Mannerheim has been fused with the Finland of Tanner in the crucible of war. It won't be easy to break this Finland's spirit.

And this Finland, remember, has kept its army: an army still armed, and with many extraordinary triumphs to look back on. The Russians know by now that this army has more than a nuisance value. It must be recognised, however, that the defensive strength of the new Finland will be much weakened. It is impossible, without maps of the new frontiers, and without first-hand knowledge of the ground, to form even an amateurish estimate of the loss; but it is evident already, from the published text of the Peace Treaty, that the loss will be very severe.

In the south, the whole of the Mannerheim Line has gone. How serious a loss this is cannot be estimated by a layman; and the experts seem at present to disagree about it. The Military Correspondent of *The Times* apparently puts the loss high, for he holds that the Line was extremely well placed, strategically. Mr. Garratt, on the other hand, puts this loss fairly low, pointing out that, when the sea and Lake Ladoga were frozen, the flanks of the Line could be turned, so that its defensive value proved less than had been expected. (Mr. Garratt believes that a stronger defensive line might be built, if funds allowed, between the new frontier and Kotka.) But, in any case, the loss of the Line, and of Viipuri, and of the railway along the western shore of Lake Ladoga to Sortavala, must be a very heavy blow.

In the middle of the frontier, by Kuolajarvi, the loss of territory probably means a greater danger; for here the Russians will be in a much stronger position for cutting Finland in half across the narrowed waist.

In the north, Petsamo itself will be retained by Finland, but armaments will be so restricted that it will be even more vulnerable than before: its defence now will be virtually impossible.

Moreover, Russia is to have what amounts to a corridor to Norway across the Petsamo district, "free from control and free from any transit duties." She is also to have a "right of way" by a connection of the railway from Kandalaksha at the head of the White Sea to Tornio on the Swedish frontier, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. Impossible to judge yet what the full effect of these changes will be; but it is evident that they are dictated largely by strategy and may afford the Russians just such an excuse presently for further aggression as the Japanese railway rights in Chinese territory afforded to Japan.

Lastly, there is the loss of Hangö. There will be a great

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Russian base close to Helsinki, matching the newly-acquired bases on the Estonian side of the Gulf of Finland.

Manifestly, all Finland, and especially the vital industrial area in the south, will be at Stalin's mercy much more certainly and instantly than ever before. If he wants to coerce Finland, if his aim is really (as *Pravda* wrote on December 4) "to transform Finland into a province of the Soviet Union," he will have new means of pressure, direct and indirect.

Thus, although Finland retains her army unbroken, she is in other respects in much the same position as Czechoslovakia was after Munich, when the fortifications had gone and when Hitler was consequently able to take the second bite at his cherry—the seizure of Prague—without serious risk. [He described the technique, you remember, in *Mein Kampf*. After the seizure of Prague, he boasted (April 28, 1939) that "Neither England nor France raised any objection to this arrangement" (the break-up of the country), "which constituted a formal departure from the Munich Agreement, nor was it possible for them to do so: it would have been madness for Paris or London to have protested against an action on the part of Germany and Italy which had been undertaken solely at the request of the countries concerned."]

In the Czecho-Slovak case, Britain and France gave, or promised to give, a guarantee of protection to this country after its defences had been thus fatally weakened. In the Finnish case, Sweden and Norway are now considering a guarantee, by a Treaty of Alliance: but here again, even if the pledge is eventually given in a substantial form, it will be much more difficult henceforth to defend Finland effectively against a Russian invasion. No practicable increase of Swedish or Norwegian armaments will compensate for the loss of strategic positions in Finland: and the loss of these positions will make Finland the more reluctant to take any

risks in supporting Sweden in the event of German attack. So it will not be surprising if the projected treaty collapses or proves to be a very frail addition to Finland's security.

The crucial question, evidently, is: what does Stalin intend to do? Is he likely to treat this peace as only the first bite at the cherry? Will he follow Hitler's example and take the second bite at some convenient time, say a year hence? Or will he be content with holding the positions he has seized at the cost of so much blood and such world-wide loathing of his regime?

As soon as one asks these questions one finds oneself in a welter of contradictory answers from those who are either enraged or enchanted by the Russian scene. To estimate a dictator's future course is always rash: and in this case the estimates are commonly exaggerated by wild prejudice in one direction or the other. Nearly the whole of the Tory Party, and many outside it, including many members of the Labour Party, become blinded by partisanship whenever they have to write on any subject concerning communism.

Look, for instance, at the pamphlet recently published by the Labour Party, with the lurid title, *Finland: the Criminal Conspiracy of Stalin and Hitler*. "The dead hand of Czar Nicholas II, the last of the Romanovs, has been laid upon Joseph Stalin and the Comintern. The Red Czar is now the executor of the traditional imperialism of Czarist Russia." Well, some of the Party's officers in Transport House have, I suppose, been maddened by the lies and subterfuges of the Communists in this country; they have known that it was part of the Communist Party's technique to smuggle members into Labour Party organisations (such as the University Labour Federation) who would swear, falsely, that they were not associated with communism at all; they have seen the Labour Party split and confused by these tactics; and now they find a simple satisfaction in saying to the comrades:

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

"Didn't we warn you? Weren't we right in holding that, behind Litvinov's nice words, there was trickery and ruthless opportunism in Moscow, and always the appalling 'Terror'?" Yes. It is easy to understand how some of them may have come to feel like that in Transport House: but it is depressing to find the leaders of the Party authorising the issue, in the Party's name, of a pamphlet so narrow in outlook, so merely vituperative, as this. The case against Stalin is terrific; but it is not the same case as that which could be brought against Czarist Russia.

Or look, on the other hand, at the results of even blinder prejudice in the supporters of the communist regime, such as Mr. Pritt and Mr. Montagu. Mr. Bernard Shaw in his latter years has made various excursions into "realistic," "tough," foreign politics, which have made him appear in the guise of champion of Bombardone and even Battler. Lately, to Mr. Pritt's delight, he has written to the *Daily Mail* (December 2), championing the Emperor Joseph's aggression in Finland on the ground that it was a sensible precaution against aggression by the United States! Finland "should have accepted Russia's offer for a readjustment of territory. She should have been a sensible neighbour. . . . No Power can tolerate a frontier from which a town such as Leningrad could be shelled when she knows that the Power on the other side of that frontier, however small or weak it may be, is being made by a foolish government to act in the interests of other and greater Powers menacing her security. Is America supporting Finland? Well, Finland obviously believes so, or she would not have behaved as she has against a country so much stronger than herself. America has shown a great interest in Finland's case recently."

Mr. Pritt quotes this, in his book, *Must the War Spread?* without irony, under the heading "Sanity and Wisdom of Mr. Shaw." As for Mr. Pritt himself, he can, I think, make

some substantial criticisms of the Finnish White Paper. (The Finnish Blue Book, more recently published, is admirably done, much better than the White Paper.) But his own account of Stalin's motive, his justification of Stalin's attack, is such rotten casuistry that I find myself questioning, as I read, whether this K.C., this M.P. who still receives the Labour Whip,¹ can really swallow the stuff himself.

His thesis is that the British Government have for years been planning a war against the Soviet Union, "for the defence of the capitalist system." (Why a ruinous war should be regarded anywhere as a means of "defending" capitalism is not explained.) Finland, in Mr. Pritt's view, has long been considered by the British as "the jumping-off ground" for that war. (Why the British should have deferred the execution of their plot until access to the Baltic has been closed by a hostile Germany is not explained.) Why, he argues, should the bloody capitalists in London hesitate to push the Finns into war with all Russia? For "even if she (Finland) lost, the death of many of her inhabitants might be very useful to the amoral interests of other combatants. The British Government might well calculate that to involve the U.S.S.R. in such conflict for even a few months would enable British influence to gain ground in Turkey and the Balkans, or would prevent the U.S.S.R. being able to give supplies to Germany." And so Mr. Pritt explains Stalin's invasion of Finland as a legitimate preventive war against British aggression. Besides, the Finns will probably welcome being conquered, after all. If one has read *Must the War Spread?* Mr. Pritt says, "one has no difficulty in realising that a very large part of the population . . . would much prefer to be governed by this new Government"—Kuusinen's!

I have no desire to defend the Chamberlain Government's disastrous record. I don't want to excuse the Tory Party's

¹ Mr. Pritt has since been expelled from the Labour Party.—Ed.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

blind animus against Soviet Russia. I have been led to suppose that Mr. Chamberlain never really cared twopence about the projected alliance with the U.S.S.R. last summer: and, on the basis of the very inadequate information that has been published, I can only conclude that the negotiations with Russia were conducted with inexcusable inefficiency and delay. I recognise, too, that class feeling against the U.S.S.R. has added a dangerous reinforcement to the proper demand for effective aid to the Finns in resisting the invader. But Mr. Pritt's explanations of Mr. Chamberlain's intentions, and Stalin's, seems to me fantastic. It may just do for feeding the prejudice of the most ignorant of the ardent, exasperated adolescents who are (fortunately) crowding into the doorways lately opened by Penguin Specials and by the Left Book Club. But in Mr. Pritt's book, as in so much communist propaganda, intellectual candour has suffered a deforming twist, so that the argument may serve only what the Comintern estimates to be "the interests of the working class."

For my part, I guess that the truth is simpler, and that the governing clique in Moscow is not really as silly in its estimates or as wild in its territorial ambitions as was implied by the writers I have quoted.

The Finns resisted, not because scheming capitalists in London or New York pressed them to do so, or encouraged them to be obstinate, but because they value their liberties, are proud of their achievements, and remember Russian domination with loathing. And Stalin attacked Finland not, chiefly, because he was afraid of the British attack on Leningrad, let alone an American attack (though a dictator isolated in the Kremlin may get pretty wild in his reckoning, especially if he heeds the advice of Pritts and Montagus); not chiefly because of any resolute intention to "do good" to all those stubborn Finns by forcibly submitting them to the blessing of Soviet Union; and not, we may still hope, because of

any already-fixed resolve, such as Peter the Great and Kuropatkin would understand, to extend his dominion to Narvik or to Finland's western shore; nor yet because of a fixed design to grab control of nickel-mines and iron ore; but chiefly because of genuine fear of Nazi power in the Baltic.

Of course, one can never tell where a dictator will stop when once on the march. As Sir Nevile Henderson wrote of Hitler: "Dictators, having achieved absolutism, lose their sense of proportion. Each success leads to ever-expanding aims, while their insatiable desire for their own permanence drives them in the end to put self before their country, and to adventure as the sole means of maintaining their hold."

Stalin may, of course, develop in this way. He is playing the game of power politics in the most ruthless fashion, and his ruthless partner would be still more ruthless as an enemy. He stopped Hitler half-way across Poland, by seizing lands most of which had been recognised by Britain and France in 1920 as predominantly Russian. Probably he has agreed with Hitler on a partition of Scandinavia into two spheres of influence, leaving to Germany the whole or nearly the whole of Sweden and Norway. The two gangsters are playing into each other's hands now, in this revolting old game of menaces and murders: but Stalin was, no doubt, prudent enough to read *Mein Kampf* before going to his Munich; unlike Mr. Chamberlain, he never has trusted Adolf a yard. So the partnership may blow up at any time. When it does blow up, Stalin will at least have a guard on either side of the entrance into the Gulf of Finland.

That, it seems to me, is about the best case that could fairly be put up to explain Stalin's attack on Finland. It doesn't excuse it: and in truth it is a poor enough explanation at the best. Are we not apt still to be misled by arguments about strategy and preventive war which survive from the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

armoury of military theorists of long ago? Isn't it time that a wind of common sense blew through this web of nonsense about Russia's danger and about the temptation to attack her through Leningrad? Because of these webs of nonsense, scores of thousands of Russians and Finns who were alive last summer are now under the earth or under the lakes, or waiting, frozen, for the dreadful thaw.

The conclusion I suggest is that during the Western war Finland will be virtually at the mercy of Stalin, if he should think fit to make a second bite at the cherry. After the war, Finland will be equally helpless, helpless against penetration, unless the Allies win the war, found a real collective peace system, and vindicate their democratic professions.

II

What of the future for Sweden and Norway? All the foundations of Sweden's foreign policy for the past twenty years and more have crumbled with the advance of German power and in face of the Russo-German partnership. Whilst Germany was disarmed and whilst the League afforded the hope (if not the solid assurance) of a real collective defence against aggression, Sweden was one of the leaders of internationalism. The country of Branting and of Unden, like the country of Nansen, has again and again been represented at Geneva by a man who could speak a word otherwise unspoken in support of the principles of commonwealth. During the first months of the application of sanctions against Italy in 1935, Sweden accepted a heavy share of the commercial losses involved in the economic boycott. And to-day it is significant that the International Peace Campaign, which exists to support the collective peace system indicated in the Covenant, has no less than 1,300,000 supporters in Sweden alone. To-day, Sweden is still, I am convinced, whole-heartedly in favour of a real League of

Nations. The great bulk of Swedish public opinion is not, as recent events might suggest, isolationist. The Swedes want not only solidarity with those neighbours who share their democratic faith, but also membership of a League of Nations which is universal and yet not weak. And the Swedes realise clearly that it would be dangerous for them to come into any Federal Union or Confederacy which included Britain and France, but omitted Germany. Holding these ideas, and having always their old fear of Russia and their newer fear of Germany, what can the Swedes do, now that Finland has suffered this defeat?

Sweden will have to face, almost certainly, increased pressure from Germany. Already the Germans are about as ruthless as they could be towards Swedish shipping. They have not only destroyed many Swedish ships, but they have blocked by a minefield the passage of all ships over 2,500 tons from Falsterbo in the south up to Stockholm. But worse things yet are likely to happen. In Dr. Rauschnig's book, *Hitler Speaks*, there are brutally candid warnings of Hitler's ambitions in Sweden, ambitions which would involve sending an immense expeditionary force to the Swedish shore. The Russo-German agreement presumably provided not only for the division of Poland, but also for a division of the Scandinavian States into Russian and German spheres of influence. To-day, having used his threat against Sweden to prevent the passage of Allied troops to Finland, Hitler is in a position to demand his *quid pro quo* from the Russians for services rendered. If he presses the Swedes and Norwegians to cut off all trade, including trade in iron ore, with the Allies, he will be able to count upon Russian partnership in his game of menaces.

If this increased pressure is applied, one result may well be a new political alignment in Sweden. Mr. Hansson has succeeded to a remarkable extent in carrying his parliament

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and his country with him through the unhappy policy which has helped Finland a little, but not enough, and which has prevented Finland from receiving aid on a scale which might have been decisive. But the opposition to Mr. Hansson's policy has always been strong—stronger than the outside world has been allowed to know. If now the disaster in Finland is followed by more severe German pressure against Sweden, the followers of Mr. Rikard Sandler and Col. Bratt will be able to say with increased cogency and even greater bitterness than before: "We warned you, Mr. Hansson, that if Sweden failed to accept the great risk of full intervention on Finland's side, Sweden would herself soon have to face a direct risk even greater."

There are two facts which, I think, make it unlikely that Sweden will willingly make any serious move away from her present policy of sitting on the fence. One fact is that her people must be feeling sick at heart, deeply humiliated, by the disclosure that the Allies really were willing and ready in February to send great forces to the aid of Finland, but that the passage of these forces was blocked by the Swedish Government. If the Allies thought it worth while to make the tremendous effort involved in assembling these forces in French and British ports, they must also have thought it worth while to make very strong representations to the Swedes about the passage of these forces through Swedish territory. (Useless to send them to Petsamo. Impossible to send them into the Baltic.) The Swedes must have taken a very stiff line in refusing this passage. They will be bitterly criticised both in Finland and in Sweden for doing so. And one result will be that the Swedish Government will dig its toes in, fortifying its refusal with arguments for the hybrid policy actually followed. Self-accusation will breed self-justification.

The other fact which must be allowed for is the profound

distrust of the Chamberlain Government. We may be conscious, here in this country, that in this war Britain's power is truly being used, with France's, for a cause wider than that of Britain and France. We may believe that Lord Halifax has been perfectly sincere in his recent support of the doctrine that we must hang together lest we should be hanged separately. We may hold that there was a genuine revolution in British policy after the Ides of March, 1939. But can any of us say that Mr. Chamberlain or Sir John Simon or Sir Samuel Hoare really understands or believes in the collective peace system? Have they said one word since this war began to indicate that they see now that the policy they adopted in the Manchurian case, the Ethiopian and the Spanish case, and especially during the period leading up to Munich, was a mistaken policy? Have they given any clear lead in favour of the rebuilding of that policy of "steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression" which Sir Samuel Hoare affirmed at Geneva on September 11, 1935, and which was the election slogan of our present government in November, 1935?

These are not partisan questions, not simply debating points made by one Englishman to another. They are all questions which the politically educated Swede or Norwegian asks with a sharp awareness of their significance. I was lately in Norway and Sweden. Again and again I was struck by this fact. A government which had a hand in the betrayal of Abyssinia, a government which still defends the Munich policy, is debarred by its own record from selling the idea of collective security to the Swedes—or the Americans either. Mr. Churchill may make the most sensible appeal to neutrals to rally to the old League flag for their own good: he has a better right to say that sort of thing than his colleagues. But he cannot, under present conditions, carry conviction: he cannot assure the anxious Swedes and Norwegians that

his colleagues will be reliable defenders in future of that collective system which they so lately derided and disowned. Our Government has sprinkled its guarantees arbitrarily over Eastern Europe: and lately, tardily, it offered its guarantee to Finland. But the Swedes cannot help noticing that our clients have a way of ending up either in quod, exiled, or dead. Naturally, they will be slow to build their hopes upon the future policy of Powers whose past policy has been so unpredictable and irresolute.

Believe me, this is not simply a partisan's testimony. I am only recording an important fact which I have observed at first hand. I have no doubt that Mr. Garratt, and others who have lately been in Sweden, will confirm this.

The disaster in Finland will force the Swedes to a clearer realisation than ever of the need for collective defence—defence not simply against Germany or Russia, but against aggression, against the war system in general. But so long as Mr. Chamberlain remains head of the British Government, so long as there is no frank avowal that the throwing over of collective security was mistaken, so long as there is no unequivocal declaration of resolve to rebuild the collective peace system as fast and as far as the nations are willing to go, for so long the Scandinavians will continue to sit on their painful fence. They are now spending great sums, enormous efforts, on increasing their defensive strength. They may make some kind of alliance or confederation amongst themselves, if the Germans and Russians do not succeed in preventing this. But neither a new alliance nor new armaments can save what Finland has lost: they can hardly suffice to protect them against any pressure which a reckless Germany may choose to impose: and they can never—as the Scandinavians know well—be an adequate substitute for a real collective defence against anarchy and injustice.

BRITAIN'S TOWN-COUNTRY PATTERN:

THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION

By F. J. OSBORN

THE briefest possible summary of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population would exceed the whole permissible length of this article.¹ It will be of interest, however, to give a first impression of the general tenor of the Report and to discuss a few of the issues of national policy which it raises.

The Commission sat for two years and the body of evidence it collected is of inestimable value to students of urbanism and of the location of industry, to town-planners, and to workers in many branches of government and social service. Undoubtedly the relevant field of enquiry was well covered. The scope of the survey, and the time taken in assimilating the results, gave rise in many quarters to the hope that the Report, when it at last appeared, would take rank among the decisive state documents and mark an epoch in the scientific and political approach to one of the greatest problems of industrial civilisation. If that hope is not quite realised, neither is the fear, entertained in other quarters, that the Commissioners would be so overwhelmed by the complexity of their data as to fail altogether to paint a clear picture or to suggest a policy. Both anticipations

¹ The Report was published on January 31, 1940, by H.M. Stationery Office. (Cmd. 6153. Price 5s.)

Useful summaries appeared in *The Times*, *The Manchester Guardian* and other daily papers of February 1, 1940. The evidence and proceedings have been discussed in previous articles in the *Political Quarterly*: F. J. Osborn, "The Problem of the Great City" (July-September, 1938); W. A. Robson, "Evacuation, Town Planning and the War" (January-March, 1940). The evidence at the twenty-nine public sittings is published in twenty-six parts, and a separate volume of additional evidence is still to be published.

were over-dramatic and perhaps unfair, seeing that the Commissioners, people of conspicuous ability in their own spheres, were not chosen for their prior interest in the tremendous issue referred to them, but as a reasonably representative sample of the economic, administrative and social interests concerned with industrial and urban matters. One or two of them had special knowledge of town and country planning technique and of the background of the controversies on urbanism that have raged in specialised circles for some years, but as a team they started from scratch to investigate a vast subject to which intelligent public opinion has given singularly little attention. In selecting his Commissioners, Mr. Chamberlain, who has often in the past urged the need for decentralisation of the great cities, cannot be accused of a plot to prejudice the case. Enthusiastic planners giving evidence before such a body, sandwiched between the Board of Trade and the Federation of British Industries, may well have seemed to a cynical observer to resemble Max Beerbohm's cartoon of Walt Whitman inciting the American Eagle to soar.

There are innumerable signs in the texture of the Report of a desire, on the part of most of the Commissioners, to find reasons for non-intervention in the balance of forces now deciding the town-country pattern of Britain. There is no point in complaining of this attitude. Governmental interference for its own sake is an ideal only of tyrants and bureaucrats. So far as the analysis of the problem goes, it is no bad thing that the arguments for state action were put at every stage to the severest test by a body of responsible people fully conscious of the potential strength of the resistances to any such action. This "back-peddalling" tendency, as it happens, throws into high relief the Commission's ultimate conclusions as to the principles of future public policy, which are remarkably far-reaching, indeed

revolutionary. At the same time, it makes quite understandable the hesitations and differences of accent that arose when they came to recommendations for immediate practical measures. The most conservative man may change his views on religion or politics if considerations of sufficient weight force themselves on his notice. But before going into a monastery or changing his party, he will usually desire to sleep on it. A fierce critic of the Majority has unjustly called them "The Seven Sleepers." It is a truer characterisation to say that the majority of the Commissioners saw a great light—so great a light that a prolonged rumination upon it seemed imperative.

The clarity of the Report's effect is a little blurred by the fact that, while it consists superficially of three (or four) conflicting documents, there is a substantial overlap of opinions and proposals that cannot be easily disentangled on a first reading. Ten of the thirteen Commissioners, including the Chairman (Sir Montague Barlow), sign the Majority Report. In this the essence of the vast bulk of evidence is comprehensively marshalled. The causes of the present urban grouping of Great Britain are first analysed. The analysis has some defects, and the student of the subject would be well advised to consult in addition the evidence given by the Ministry of Labour, the Board of Trade, and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the critique of past trends in the evidence of town planners.¹ But the Report brings out the elements of chance and caprice in industrial location as well as the more solid permanent and temporary economic causes, and accepts the view of the planners that many (especially of the lighter) industries have considerable elasticity in choice of district, that later settlements of industry in a town may reduce or destroy the economic advantages for industries already settled (a point hitherto entirely over-

¹ Evidence: 3rd and 4th, 7th, 10th and 11th, 20th, 23rd and 25th and 26th days. (H.M. Stationery Office.)

looked by the economists), and that in many cases the social disadvantages or public costs caused by industrial movement are more substantial than the locational advantage gained by the industries concerned. The new factor of vulnerability to air attack, it is shown, is very likely to cause spontaneous movements away from the larger cities, but as a new set of disadvantages may be created by the change of direction, this is an additional factor necessitating control of industrial location on public grounds. The Commission indeed finds no reason to suppose that, in the absence of some restrictive regulation by the Government, the trend of population to London and the Home Counties will be permanently checked "after the rearmament policy has accomplished its purpose." Even though the population of the country as a whole declines, the London area, it is suggested, may continue to expand. This warning may seem to have less force now that the war has reversed the fortunes of the Metropolis and some of the distressed areas. But we cannot foresee the reactions of a peace whose character is unknown. And in the meantime as much damage may be done by chaotic decentralisation as by the insensate coagulation of the past. The Report shows conclusively that the chance-medley of individual factory siting cannot produce a satisfactory economic pattern—still less a satisfactory social pattern. It is something that henceforth what was heterodoxy on this major issue of national policy now becomes orthodoxy, and *vice versa*.

The chapters on the social, economic and strategical disadvantages of concentration in the great cities are the most interesting in the Majority Report. It would be easy to quote instances of complacency about urban evils and of facile optimism as to progress being made by the public services in overcoming these evils. The Minority Report deals successfully with one example of this predisposition,

where the Majority persuade themselves that the state of health of people in the great cities will in due course catch up to that of people in small towns and in the countryside. Perhaps the experiences of the great evacuation have once for all destroyed that extraordinary illusion, which may survive a library examination of the trend of mortality statistics, but cannot stand up against personal acquaintance with men, women and children brought up in the different types of environment. The evidence of the Committee of the three Royal Medical Colleges¹ should have convinced the Majority on this point, as well as on the much debated question of garden-houses versus flats. Strangely enough, on this latter point they give equal weight to the solid body of medical evidence cited and to the *obiter dictum* of one London Borough Councillor, who was naturally very conscious of his constituents' desire to live near their work and to remain his constituents.

On many points of this kind the analysis confuses the statement of the disadvantages of urban concentration with the study of the practicability of avoiding them. It is not always an objective picture of our cities; often it is more like the speech of a defending counsel who finds the truth inconvenient but is too honest or has too much respect for his own reputation to withhold the major facts. Thus the Majority is indefinite at the very points where it is most necessary to be clear. We may admit the extreme difficulty, perhaps even the impossibility in some cases, of putting right in less than a century evils that have taken a century of negligence to create. But the fact that it is disadvantageous (for example) to live far from one's work does not make it advantageous, though it may make it unavoidable, to rear one's family on the fifth floor of a tenement. It is merely one of the numerous ways in which the sins of the fathers

¹ Not yet published.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

are visited on the children. The section on open spaces in cities does not face the issue that in the larger cities, at their present average density, adequate private and public open space can never be provided. This is not a matter of better local planning; it is one of the limitations of simple arithmetic. However difficult it may be, and however long it may take, it is necessary to reduce the average population-density of great cities before even the lowest acceptable standards of housing, open space, and accessibility of home to workplace can be achieved. If this reduction is unattainable, then certain definite disadvantages must remain. The Majority, in their analysis, do not show a full grasp of this situation. But the cumulative evidence for the disadvantages of great cities does convince them. To reverse a mixed metaphor of Shakespeare's, they fight a rearguard action against an incoming tide of fact; and in the end the tide prevails.

One of the most illuminating chapters in the Report is that on the difficulties and defects of present planning legislation and practice. This brings out clearly the essential weakness of the town and country planning machinery—that it must plan without any knowledge of the future trend of local population and without any power to influence that trend. It is rather in the position of a dressmaker having to design a dress without being given the size of the lady. All the designer can do is play for adequacy and design for the largest lady of whom there is legendary record. Hence Oxford's plan for 800,000, and the residential zones for nearly 300 million people in the draft planning schemes for less than half the area of Great Britain. Another great defect brought out in this chapter is the impossibility of reserving from development stretches of rural land, or green belts around cities, owing to the absence of means of compensation for anticipated building values, now recognised to be one of

the crucial deficiencies of the planning mechanism. This leads on to a section describing a number of experiments in and proposals for the coupling of compensation and "betterment," as to the relative merits of which, however, the Commission does not pronounce. The most interesting new proposal is a scheme for compulsory purchase by a "National Development Board," as from a specified date, of the development rights of all the undeveloped land of the country, on a global compensation basis similar to that employed under the Coal Mines Act of 1938, the sum being afterwards apportioned among the claimants. Any intending building developer would negotiate with the landowner for the land at agricultural value, but would also have to negotiate with the Board for the development rights. Under this scheme, which would be administratively correlated with statutory planning, no compensation would have to be paid where land is scheduled in a planning scheme as a rural zone or private open space. There are obvious difficulties in the assessment and allocation of the compensation fund, and in the subsequent attitude of owners to offers for sale, but the proposals have attractions and should receive study.

Satellite towns and trading estates are briefly described and warmly commended. A chapter on the future of the population makes it clear that the officially-expected thirty years of stability of numbers does not in the least imply stability of geographical distribution. A chapter on the Special Areas makes no attempt to add to knowledge on their problems, but helps to build up the case for a national policy tending to the balanced distribution of industry and population in the different areas of Great Britain, and the diversification of industry in all regions. A rather weak section on Types of Cities and the Problem of Congestion is followed by a useful collection of figures about London, with a commentary full of goodwill towards men (but

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

steps to be taken to give effect to them become a matter of technique rather than of political controversy.

When, however, the Commission comes to consider the practical steps, its unanimity breaks down. The Majority propose a National Industrial Board, whose powers in the main should be advisory and informative, with the extremely important exception that it should at once be vested with powers to restrict the settlement of further industries, at first in London and the Home Counties, and later in other areas. Three of the Majority (Professor J. H. Jones, Mr. G. W. Thomson and Sir William E. Whyte) sign a Reservation, rebuking the complacent tendency of the Majority analysis, and describing the whole issue as dangerous and urgent. They insist that the regulation of industrial settlement should be nation-wide and immediate, and that powers should be devised at the earliest moment to give effect to the positive side of the agreed principles. The remaining three Commissioners (Professor Patrick Abercrombie, Mr. H. H. Elvin and Mrs. W. L. Hitchens) present a Minority Report even more critical of the Majority analysis and more strongly stressing the urgency of comprehensive national action. They prefer, and give substantial reasons for, a Ministry to deal primarily with planning matters, but whether the organ is a Ministry or a Board they consider it should be given much fuller powers: to zone the whole country into areas of free industrial entry, areas of restriction, and areas from which further industry is normally barred; to adopt a development policy for the whole country; to absorb the functions of the Special Areas Commissioners; and to finance and assist the building of new towns and trading estates, the development of existing small towns, and the creation of National Parks.

The general impression given by a first reading of the whole volume is thus that the facts are admirably summarised,

that the principles unanimously accepted more correctly reflect the evidence than the rather hesitating analysis, and that the proposals contained in the Reservations and the Minority Report flow more rationally from the adopted principles and the magnitude and urgency of the problem than the proposals of the Majority. There is no real conflict of fundamental policy. It is agreed that the national lay-out has gone all wrong, that it is still going wrong, and that national design and control are necessary. The various reports are not likely to become banners of conflicting factions. The Commission might in time have reached greater unanimity, but it has done useful service in carrying the discussion right up to the point where the exact shape of the necessary national action, on the agreed principles, can be hammered out. It remains for public opinion to be more fully roused on the great issues dealt with, and for the planners and the authorities to work out and apply in detail a practical policy.

especially towards the London County Council and the London Passenger Transport Board), and a recommendation to the Government to do something at once about London—that is, either to plan it themselves, *or* to create a Greater London Municipality, *or* to set up an *ad hoc* executive planning authority. All parties will be grateful for this conciliatory advice. The final chapter of the analysis is a pat on the back for Regionalism. It opens the important question of the decentralisation of Government Departments and the re-grouping of local authorities, but makes no particular contribution to the subject.

Summarising these impressions of the descriptive and analytical sections of the Report, it must be said that they are extremely important as the first full survey of the subject of city-growth and population-grouping in all its aspects. I have had to emphasise what appear to me to be defects in attitude and deduction because, the subject as a whole being new to the larger political world, considered opinions of a Commission that sat for two years will naturally carry great authority, and in the early stages of what is bound to become a world-debate, acceptances and mental “stereotypes” (to use Mr. Walter Lippman’s word) may easily be established that later become embarrassing. But it must be added that the Commissioners, under the tireless drive of Sir Montague Barlow, missed extremely little of the relevant data in their survey, and the Report, while it does not in my opinion achieve a correct balance, succeeds to an amazing extent in synthesising the vast mass of fact and opinion submitted to it.

In the light of the extremely conservative and defensive tone of the Majority analysis, the main conclusions on principles, which are unanimously accepted by the whole Commission, are refreshingly definite and positive. The problem is declared to be urgent, and national action is necessary. Such action requires a Central Authority, national

in scope and character, and extending beyond the powers of any existing Government Department. The objective of national action should be the re-development of congested urban areas (it is implied that such re-development should reduce congestion), the decentralisation or dispersal both of industries and population from such areas, and the encouragement of a balanced development and diversification of industry throughout Great Britain. The Central Authority should formulate a national policy or plan for decentralisation and consider in what areas new towns or trading estates should be fostered, or what existing small towns or regional centres should be further developed. In all these activities provision must be made for the requirements of industry, the social and amenity needs of communities, and strategical considerations. The time factor is stressed. Municipalities should be empowered to build satellite towns and trading estates, and be financially assisted by the Government in doing so. The Central Authority should have some part in correlating statutory town and country planning schemes in the national interest. The national policy should anticipate and check the creation of new depressed areas by its influence over industrial location. Lastly, a systematic continuous survey of industry and natural resources should be instituted. On the issue of compensation and betterment, the Commission asks for further enquiry by a body of experts.

This statement of the principles of national policy is eminently complete and practicable. It may be regarded as the outstanding achievement of the Commission, and as a Charter of National Territorial Planning. In outline it follows the constructive proposals put before the Commission by the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association. It is impossible, in view of the character of the Commission, to over-estimate its significance. If public opinion and the Government accept the principles laid down, the practical

THE POLITICAL USE OF BROADCASTING

By A. LISTENER

A DISCUSSION of the political use of broadcasting raises two sets of problems. One, the problems of the general political use of broadcasting, that is, the relation of broadcasting to the State. Two, the problems of the particular political use of broadcasting, that is, the broadcasting of political matter.

I

In the Preamble to the renewed Charter granted to the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1936 a final clause runs as follows :

"And whereas in view of the widespread interest which is thereby shown to be taken by Our People in the Broadcasting Service, and of the great value of the Service as a means of information, education and entertainment, we deem it desirable that the Service should continue to be developed and exploited to the best advantage and in the national interest." To the legislator of 1926 as well as to those of 1936 it appeared that the national interest in broadcasting demanded a special institution of unique status—a public corporation with a monopoly of the right to broadcast.

It is not at once evident why the national interest in broadcasting was supposed to require such an unusual measure. No other institution of public opinion was felt to require the same treatment. On the contrary, the very reverse condition, that is, the complete withdrawal of any form of State protection or control, was held to be what national interest required. To all such other institutions—association and public meeting, literature and the Press,

THE POLITICAL USE OF BROADCASTING

speech and film, etc.—a canon of freedom, more or less limited in scope, was held to apply. Freedom from State interference, it was said, was the breath of life to a democratic public opinion. And the greater the concessions to interference and control which the positive state demanded in the field of economic action, the more zealously was freedom guarded in the field of opinion.

The chartering of the B.B.C. as a legally protected public monopoly of broadcasting constituted an abrupt departure from this tradition. Moreover, the importance, or rather potential importance, of the Service as a means of influencing public opinion was given as the reason for bringing it under State control and excluding any freedom in its use. That is to say, the ground of the departure was the very ground of the tradition itself. Where formerly the knowledge that any instrument of public opinion was of supreme importance was enough to rouse all men to the defence of their right freely to use it, in the case of broadcasting the demonstration of its supreme importance as an instrument of public opinion provoked the precisely contrary reaction : it roused a majority of legislators in 1926 and again in 1936 to refuse all individual freedom to operate a broadcasting service and led them instead to entrust the exclusive use of the instrument to the direction of a Director-General and a Board of Governors nominated by the Prime Minister and subject to the intermittent but ultimate control of a responsible Minister. What is the explanation of this decision ?

We have really two questions to examine. One, why was broadcasting made a monopoly service ? Two, why was a State control imposed ?

The Sykes Committee of 1923 had answered the second question in the way we have described. "It may be that broadcasting holds social and political possibilities as great as any technical attainment of our generation . . . the

control of such a potential power over public opinion and the life of a nation ought to remain with the State." In statements about public opinion of this general order it is very often overlooked that any institution of public opinion has a double function—it not only is an instrument shaping opinion, it is also a vehicle for its expression. Opinion is not only manufactured, it is also discovered. In 1923, however, the first of those functions appeared to dominate the discussion of broadcasting, and the second dropped out of sight. And it was decided that if broadcasting was to manufacture opinion the State should be the manufacturer. The State's control, however, should not be too close, certainly not as close as that of a Government Department; rather it should be (to borrow a phrase from another field) a remote control. This would allow a qualified independence in the operation of the new service.

To the question whether this remote control by the State should be exercised over a service which was monopolistic or competitive in character, the Sykes Committee gave no extended consideration. On the whole, the Committee preferred a restricted competition—a variety of authorities operating a considerable number of stations. It was left for the Crawford Committee of 1926 to come down firmly on the side of monopoly, plus State control. They asked for a public corporation which would act as a "Trustee for the national interest in broadcasting." Both Committees contributed therefore to the conclusion that the national interest in broadcasting was an interest in the restriction of its use, and that the way to promote this was first to submit it to public control and supervision, and second, to establish a monopoly in the direction and operation of the service.

The main ground of this surprising conclusion—surprising given the traditions of British political thinking—would seem at first to be, quite simply, ignorance of what broadcasting

might grow into, coupled with the fear that it might grow into a monster. In 1923, and still in 1926, both the political and the educational, or cultural, possibilities of broadcasting were unknown, but it was felt by all persons who reflected on the subject that the possibilities were tremendous. This was a new means of communication, linking nation with nation and continent with continent. It was an instrument of trade and commerce as well as of opinion. It was an instrument of mass entertainment and mass instruction. Mass listening, mass response, mass opinion—this mass aspect of broadcasting was the one which lay at the back of the speculation of 1923 and 1926, and still more of 1936. It seemed that this was an institution of public opinion of a distinctively new order; it was an instrument of crowd opinion. No other vehicle of opinion really addressed itself to the nation, ignoring group and individual peculiarity, so that *all heard together and heard the same thing*, as in a physical crowd. Broadcasting could do this, was already doing it in some European countries. It seemed possible that nations might be turned into blind herds, or, as Freud said, hordes, by this new instrument. Was it not therefore vital to keep it out of private hands?

There was a feeling, too, that the ether, which was the medium of the new means of communication, was in a sense public domain and ought not to be exploited freely. Not man but the State should possess the air. Classical economists might call the air a free good, but that was true only of the air a man breathed and not of that he broadcast on. The ether of the wireless wave was subject to scarcity: it had to be economised and directed to its most profitable uses. The State, however, should be the economist and not the entrepreneur, for the entrepreneur did not place a sufficient value upon the education, or enlightenment, which should be one of the main functions of broadcasting.

Out of these confused insights into the potentialities of broadcasting there emerged the demand for monopoly with remote State control. Yet it must be doubted whether on a more reflective view any of these arguments was sufficient to justify a public monopoly. Against monopoly in other fields of human enterprise it had been argued that it reacted ultimately against the consumer's advantage by robbing him of his choice. If this were true of the provision of bananas, or newspapers, or films, or motor-cars, was it not also true of some kinds of broadcasting service, for example, news and entertainment. Why not a free market then? Entrepreneurs could as readily be found to market air as to market any other commodity. Public enlightenment, in the sense of education, might, it is true, be thought a service of a different order. But the British tradition in education was one of fundamental freedom, allowing the fullest diversity. Our national system of education was built upon a history of free and voluntary institutions. Arguments for a measure of State control in fields such as education rest ultimately upon the modern demand for a minimum equality in respect of the service concerned, whether it is an equality of access, enjoyment or behaviour. But while such arguments or demands require State intervention they do not require a monopoly. We may ask for equal schooling, but not for one school. It is still not clear why broadcasting should require special treatment.

By 1936, when the Ullswater Commission had come to report upon the B.B.C. and the proposed renewal of its Charter, there had been ten years of experience of the functioning of the Corporation and of broadcasting in general. Something was now known of the potentialities of broadcasting; there was a history to judge. Speculation as to the future of the service need not now be in the air; it had a past to base itself on. Broadcasting had become a service

of major importance in every civilised country, and with the development of frontier and inter-continental broadcasting it had emerged as an international problem. One authority estimated the total of the world's listeners as 250 million persons, distributed throughout 130 countries.¹ There had, too, been great technical advances, with a consequent development of power competition. There had been developments of overwhelming importance in political broadcasting in the narrower sense.

Furthermore, these ten years had seen the development among European countries of widely different practices in the relation of broadcasting to the State. Thus "out of thirty national broadcasting systems now functioning (in Europe), thirteen are government-owned and operated, nine are government monopolies operated by autonomous public bodies or partly government-controlled corporations, four are physically operated (engineered) by the government and privately serviced for programmes, while only three are privately owned and operated. In two countries (France and Yugoslavia) government and privately run organisations exist side by side."² Perhaps the most interesting of all the organisations was that of Holland. Holland has "no less than five broadcasting associations, run not for profit but for the benefit of their members. Three of them have a religious bias and one a political bias (Socialist). The fifth and largest is "general," that is to say, neutral, non-partisan and secular. Each maintains its own studios and programme staffs, and all five divide the available time on the two existing long-wave transmitters under an equitable system of rotation, paying rental to the company which operates the transmitters. The shares of this operating company are owned jointly by the broadcasting organisations and the government. The arrangement works smoothly, without a case of friction on

¹ Huth: *La Radiodiffusion: Puissance Mondiale*. 1937. P. 71.

² C. Saerchinger: *Radio as a Political Instrument*. *Foreign Affairs*, xvi, pp. 245-246.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

record. . . . Radio advertising is ruled out by common consent ; so is profit. Nobody earns anything but a reasonable salary, and there is not a more prosperous and better-liked broadcasting system in the world."¹

All this experience was available for the Ullswater Commission to review. They found, however, that the experience of British broadcasting was one "of which the country largely approved," and advised no substantial change either in the relation of broadcasting to the State or in the conduct of the service. In 1937 Parliament renewed the Charter and the Postmaster-General issued the new License. The B.B.C. entered its second decade still as a monopoly with remote State control.

II

It may now be suggested that the chief motive, first, for the institution of a public monopoly of broadcasting and later for its retention was not one which was related to the general political use of broadcasting—in the sense hitherto discussed, of the general relation to the State—but one which was related to the narrower political use of broadcasting, the broadcasting of political matter, and in this field attention was primarily centred upon the international implications of such broadcasting. The refusal to admit free broadcasting, had it been really grounded upon a view of broadcasting as an instrument of public education and enlightenment, or even of entertainment, would not for long have commended itself to the traditional view of political freedom in Great Britain. It was the realisation that the air which was to be economised was the air which made up the climate of political opinion, international as well as national, that gave substance to the view that the economy should be a monopoly. We must now turn to see what were the

¹ Ibid.

THE POLITICAL USE OF BROADCASTING

conditions peculiar to political broadcasting which made this necessary. For the purposes of what follows the term political broadcasting will mean broadcasts of political matter, that is, matter which is of a clearly political nature, or that which is designed to procure a political effect.

An initial distinction which at once suggests itself is that between political broadcasts intended for internal consumption and those intended for external consumption. Thus, under the first category would fall broadcasts of home news, and "controversial broadcasting" on home politics, home social services, home economic problems and so forth. Under the second category would fall foreign broadcasts of news and political talks. This distinction, however, would not carry us far for the reason that all political broadcasting, no matter what its intended destination, is capable of being generally consumed. A certain amount of delimiting of destination can be secured by using different foreign languages, and by the use of modern technical devices such as directional antennæ, but such delimitation has only the effect of directing the broadcast upon a particular area and a particular section of the world's population; it cannot exclude interested listeners in any other part of the globe whose receiving apparatus is technically adequate to pick up the transmission. And since the increase in short-wave transmission,¹ which has a proportionately far greater power of penetration than long or medium waves, there has been a corresponding technical development of receiving apparatus with a resultant increase in the amount of international consumption of national broadcasting. A certain amount of course can be done in an area of reception to stop the penetration of a broadcast from an external source—by legal penalties for listening to foreign broadcasts or by jamming the trans-

¹ "In 1930, there were only three short-wave transmitters used in Europe for purposes of broadcasting; to-day there are over 40 powerful ones, and more are being constructed." T. Grandin: *The Political Use of the Radio*. Geneva Studies, 1939, p. 44.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

missions. The Germans use both methods, and indeed in one form of jamming they are able to use them together. "Jamming takes several forms; mechanical Morse code; another voice just behind the first, which renders the broadcast unintelligible; and even artificial static; or a variety of alarming noises, such as sirens, bangings, bells, etc. The last-named system is most frequently resorted to by Germany, the purpose being to enable conscientious National Socialists to denounce their subversive brethren: the noises issuing suddenly from the loud-speaker should in principle discover an unpatriotic listener to his neighbours, and even to the police."¹ Directional transmission and jamming of the reception can impose certain limits upon the penetration of the broadcasts. But the fundamental fact is this—that no country can rely on its home transmissions being heard solely by a home public.

One further fact concerning the external effects of broadcasting must here be taken into account. Not only is the area of the broadcast difficult to determine and the extent of the penetration, therefore, a matter for conjecture, but also the identity of the listener remains unknown. Anybody who has the necessary receiving apparatus may hear the broadcast—Tom, Dick, or Harry, Government official or private citizen, worker or employer, soldier or peasant.

The cardinal importance of these considerations emerges only when we consider the position of political broadcasting when a nation is at war. Under war conditions the geographical and personal destination of transmissions becomes a matter immediately relevant to national success or failure. Political broadcasting is a weapon both of offence and defence. As a weapon of offence political broadcasting has immense potentialities. It may seek to cripple the home opinion of the enemy country by dividing it, setting class against class,

¹ Grandin, *Op. Cit.* p. 25.

subjects against rulers, or by feeding it with false information, or by terrorising it with pictures of horror and ruin, or by bribing it with promises, teaching it false hopes and falser history. It may seek to divert from the enemy all sympathy of neutrals by blackening its character and by threatening extension of the area of war. With this kind of external broadcasting technical devices of one kind or another, constantly improving, can do much to direct the broadcasts to the desired destination.

With broadcasts directed internally, however, no technical device has yet been found which can insulate them from the outside world. That is to say, broadcasting as a defensive weapon is two-edged. Its primary purposes as a defensive weapon are the dissemination of information, the concerting of national, or large-scale group action, and the safeguarding of national morale, negatively by countering enemy propaganda, positively by the provision of entertainment, and forms of positive encouragement. (In this sense war turns all broadcasts into political broadcasts.) Inevitably, however, these broadcasts are heard externally, and function as a source of information to the enemy. They afford an accurate picture of the state of the country in many matters of fundamental importance in war.

This fact, that all internal broadcasting has external effects and the realisation that, while in peace these latter may be neglected, in war they are of great importance, have led to the advancement of the view that in war a compromise should be found between the desiderata of external propaganda and those of internal morale such as to present to the enemy and to the neutral world a united national front. To do this a complete system of Government control of broadcasting would be necessary. We shall see in a moment what is involved in this view.

First, however, the differences between broadcasting and

the Press, in respect of their internal and external effects, are of considerable interest. These differences chiefly turn upon the degree of precision with which it is possible to measure their relative penetration.

As has been said already, the degree of penetration of broadcasting is extraordinarily difficult to measure, and this is true both of the amount of penetration, in terms of the number of persons listening, and of the lines of penetration, in terms of classes of persons listening. Little research on this subject has been done. Where it has been attempted, as in America, the results so far mainly illustrate the ambiguity of the various criteria employed to test the penetration. Numbers of receiving sets in existence gives no guide at all to classes of listeners, or to listening habits. Advertiser's checks on the commercial results of sponsored programmes afford no index of interest in political broadcasting.

The Press is in much better case. Circulation facts, though unsatisfactory in many ways, afford much more information than numbers of receiving sets. Newspaper sales can be analysed as to quantity and area. They can be traced to the houses of the readers. They can be related to class and social divisions. Moreover, where a free Press exists, and the different newspapers represent and cater for distinct sections of the community, comparative figures of circulation can reveal the drift and distribution of opinion. This last criterion is not available for a monopolistic broadcasting service.

The Press then differs from broadcasting in that its destination can be determined and the identity of its consumers known with a far greater degree of precision. And this is true of the external as well as of the internal penetration of the Press, for the external penetration is checked not only by export figures but by the censorship control in the importing country. This latter control broadcasting again escapes.

III

We turn now to consider what bearing this analysis has upon the general question of the relation of broadcasting to the State.

From the inception of the B.B.C. in 1926 it had been the intention to change from remote to direct control by the State in time of war or national emergency. The License of 1937 in this respect only repeats the provision of the first License.

"If and whenever in the opinion of the Postmaster-General an emergency shall have arisen in which it is expedient for the Public Service that H.M. Government shall have control over the transmission of messages by means of the stations, it shall be lawful for the Postmaster-General to direct and cause the stations, or any part thereof to be taken possession of in the name and on behalf of His Majesty and prevent the Corporation from using them, and also to cause the stations . . . to be used for H.M.'s Service or to take such other steps as he may think fit to secure control over the stations . . ."¹

In the light of this provision, and of our earlier analysis of the motives for instituting a public monopoly of broadcasting, it seems clear that an underlying purpose of legislators was to create a broadcasting system which would be immediately adaptable to war conditions. There is nothing surprising in this purpose when it is considered that the whole of our knowledge of national broadcasting belongs to the post-pre-war period 1920-39. With this purpose in mind it seemed to the legislators that the appropriate form of institution was a monopoly with remote State control. Was this a sound choice?

The advantages of a monopoly in the conduct of any service are commonly supposed to be in the reduction of the

¹ Cmd. 5329, 21(1).

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

costs of operating the service, and in the completeness of the control. It is fairly certain that to the question of reduction of costs neither legislators nor public were paying much attention. Some may have had in mind the possible cost which would ensue to the State if it had to take over a service which had been left to develop in the hands of private enterprise. Vested interests would then have to be bought out. But even for those who thought thus, choice they considered was one between public monopoly now, or public monopoly later. The economic aspect of the monopoly was in all minds subordinated to the political: the monopoly was primarily to secure completeness of control by the State—a loose control in peace but tight in war. Such a control would place at the nation's disposal in the event of a national emergency a co-ordinated machinery for mobilising the nation for concerted action and would enable her to present to an aggressor and a neutral world a picture of national unity.

Before advancing any criticism of this view it should be noted that the *Gleichschaltung* of the B.B.C. has not so far happened. It is a matter for conjecture what the precise relations now are between the B.B.C. and the Government. The appropriate first step would seem to be the subordination of the information and talks service to the Ministry of Information. This may in part be already done, or Sir John Reith may now be doing it. At all events the existing control of the B.B.C. by a Director General and a Board of Governors has not been superseded. Furthermore, ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the activities of the B.B.C. is as remote as ever.

As far as its suitability for war is concerned the present structure of broadcasting in this country is in some ways not the best but the worst of the two worlds of State control and independence. The fact that the B.B.C. is a monopoly,

but at the same time is not under the continuous day-to-day authority and direction of a responsible Minister has made the B.B.C., since the outbreak of war, a timid and rather second-rate institution. The worst defect of all monopolies, the tendency to lose elasticity and flexibility, has characterised its operation. Thus after six months of war we are still being given only a single home programme, supplemented recently by a programme for the forces. Without the monopoly, it is doubtful if this lamentable state of affairs would have happened.

This defect was inherent in the B.B.C. from the start. The combination of monopoly with remote State control was always likely to procure the vices of monopoly, that is, uniformity of output, lack of imaginative direction, rigidity, and immunity from public opinion, while not conferring the supposed virtue of State control, that is, security for the public interest, which in war is the maintenance of unity and morale. The argument for remoteness of State control was that thereby the broadcasting service would have a certain freedom of action; but this was not an argument for monopoly. The argument for a monopoly was the fear of war and the necessity of constructing a service which could be switched quickly into the machinery of Government; but this has not happened. That the defects of the present system have taken so long to show is largely due to the novelty of broadcasting itself. That novelty is now exhausted. Those who were children twenty-one years ago and are now soldiers have never known a world without wireless. A public monopoly with remote State control is a wrong solution for the problem of the relation of broadcasting to the State. It is wrong for peace and wrong for war. In peace it is unfavourable to the free movement of opinion, which in a democratic country depends more upon an unrestricted right of self-expression than upon deliberate guidance. In

play a part in them. French, Germans, Czechs and Poles have assumed land warfare to be a practical necessity of existence. That was how they defended their soil or expanded their territory. British expansion has been colonial and her main power in Europe exercised by finance and the Navy. This advantageous position has now been transferred to the United States. During the perpetual conflict about foreign policy during the last nine years, British people have been more or less consciously realising the change. Instinct and tradition would have made us isolationists in spite of our signature to the Covenant of the League, which nominally banished isolationism and neutrality for ever. Gradually we have discovered that we are now inevitably part of Europe, that we share its future either as a small State, with difficulty maintaining its independence against the new totalitarian monsters, or as a dominant country which, with France and other nations, will help to police some form of a reconstructed Europe.

This realisation must, I think, in time alter what we have always assumed to be the "British character." National character may or may not—there is little evidence on either side—depend to some extent on innate racial characteristics. If so, in a people as mixed as the British, and indeed as almost all the other nations of Europe, its innate factors are so entangled as to be beyond scientific investigation. What we usually call national character is a pattern of behaviour evolved to suit the needs of an epoch. This character will change, if circumstances change. If British people have, as they think, the reputation for a belief in fair play, if they have a peculiar sense of humour and a capacity for compromise and toleration, that is because they have for so long been comparatively secure, because they have been able without fear to make concessions to others, because their internal unity has permitted surface differences of party and subordinated class divisions. Because we have felt strong and secure we have been able to give free rein to that moral preoccupation which is a product of Puritanism. When national existence is at stake high principles of ethics may still play their part in the speeches of statesmen and appear in the preambles of diplomatic documents, but practice is

likely to conform to the primitive demands of self-preservation. We claim to lose all the battles except the last; we boast of "muddling through." But muddling through is no sign of genius; it is merely our way of rationalising the fact that being stronger and richer than other people we have been more easily able to afford our mistakes. If we are no longer top dog, but desperately seeking to survive, we shall have to use our brains like other people, or perish. That is the fact that is gradually penetrating the minds of people of all classes and conditions in this country.

One must not dogmatize about public opinion; it is a short-hand phrase used by journalists, politicians and historians to cover up a huge unexplored gap in political theory. Genuine opinions upon public affairs are rare; when they exist, they are more often individual than public. They may be held in common by groups, but seldom, even in time of war, are they so universal as to justify the statement that public opinion is in favour of this or opposed to that. Opinions are private; it is emotions that are public. All one can do is to notice certain waves and tendencies of feeling and outlook. Lack of scientific technique for gauging these tendencies in national psychology is a root defect of democracy. Sidney Webb many years ago hoped to solve the problem of representation and delegation by the "professional representative," that is, by a man whose particular task it was, not to act as a delegate on each issue in a legislative body, not to defend merely the interests of a particular group, but to gauge the long-distance needs and desires of the majority of those whom he represented. The numerous straw votes, unofficial polls and records of opinion set up of recent years in America, and also more recently in this country, are intelligent efforts to give politicians an indication of changes in the public mood and tastes. The technique of taking these votes has recently become far more efficient and complex. But even the Gallop polls and the records of the Institute of Public Opinion are far from scientific. In saying this I am not criticising the methods of the "random sample" or suggesting any improvement in the elaborate methods of canvassing or the selection of various types of towns and villages in which their investigators make their inquiries.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

war it has failed to meet the crisis with resilience and initiative.

A first step towards a right solution is the separation of the question of monopoly from that of State control. It should be said at once that in a democratic country there can be no sound argument in favour of a monopoly of any instrument or organ of public opinion, whether in peace or war. In the matter of State control the case is different. Here the extreme choice is between unrestricted freedom within the laws and full State control. However desirable the first alternative may be, it is not possible in war. Some degree of State control is necessary.

Full State control, however, is inadvisable, for it means that the external effects of broadcasting will be always qualified by the belief that it is official and not public opinion that is speaking. There are many other alternatives to be considered first, some of which have already been touched upon. State control might, for example, extend only to information, leaving entertainment free. The Press is perhaps the analogy to keep in mind. Were State control to change the free Press of this country into what Dr. Goebbels calls a "monoform" Press we should have lost a right arm in our struggle. The essential desideratum for broadcasting as for the Press is the existence of a plurality of authorities. The degree of State control which war requires can then be settled as the situation demands.

SURVEYS

PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

SIX months have passed since war was declared. The civil population of Poland has been bombed and enslaved, the Finns have been through all the horrors of invasion and aerial bombardment, Chinese towns and villages are still daily set in flames from the air. But the civilian population of Britain, France and Germany have as yet known nothing worse than air raid alarms and leaflet raids. In a word, it is still true that none of the big, heavily armed countries care to run the risks of attacking each other; they prefer to fight on the soil of weak and comparatively defenceless countries. In trying to estimate the psychology of Britain—we have unfortunately no adequate material with which to gauge German opinion—the unmaterialised threat from the air is of profound importance, since the whole outlook of the British nation in the last four years has been deeply affected, one might almost say built upon, the conflicting emotions connected with aerial bombardment. One after another of our leading statesmen have warned us that war would mean "the destruction of civilisation"; by reiterating Mr. Baldwin's famous statement that the bomber would always get through, they have persuaded most people that war to-day would mean the physical destruction of our society. The lesson was ruthlessly reinforced by the aerial use of gas in Abyssinia and by bombing in Spain and in China. The terrific effect of the sudden seizure of Austria—the decisive moment in British post-war feeling about Germany—was caused by Hitler's use of bombing aeroplanes circulating over Vienna to terrorize the population. I am not suggesting that fear is the only or indeed the most important emotion aroused. Anger and a defensive bellicosity are also natural forms of response. These are on the conscious level and they affect the population of every nation. In England the progress of the aeroplane has had an even more profound effect, unparalleled anywhere except, I think, in Scandinavia.

British psychology in the past has been insular, because Britain is an island which has not been conquered for nearly 900 years. We have thought ourselves superior to Continental politics, believing that we had the power to decide on grounds of morals and self-interest whether or not to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The difficulty is much deeper. The difficulty lies in the limitations of our knowledge of the human mind and in the capacities of the ordinary individual in the huge modern state to form an opinion at all. A certain percentage to-day would vote for Mr. Roosevelt or prefer another Prime Minister to Mr. Chamberlain. That is interesting in itself and important from the politician's point of view. If the records are frequently taken, and from the same group of people, some real indication may be gathered of changes of political feeling and the results of elections may even be prophesied with a comparatively small margin of error. Even so, as the *News Chronicle* discovered on a recent occasion when it took its courage in both hands and prophesied the result of an election on the basis of a poll, the prophecy may go wrong because some unexpected event or new influence may swing public opinion within a few hours of the poll. The basic difficulty is that opinion is not, as political theorists have naturally assumed, to be analysed accurately in terms of groups. The human mind is capable of holding two strong and conflicting tendencies at the same time, and the most careful formulation of the questions to be considered cannot altogether counteract this difficulty. If we consider the British public on the main issue of British isolationism and collective security, on the question of whether we ought or ought not to run any risk of war on behalf of this country or that, there has not been in Britain any genuine "opinion". We talk of the opinion of the Labour Party, of the Liberals, of the workers, of the Conservatives, of industrialists, of the Fifth Column, and so forth. But the most important single fact in the psychology of the public during recent years has been the co-existence of several "opinions" at the same time in almost everyone; we have all been conscious of having within us a tendency to isolationism and pacifism, as well as to bellicosity, righteous indignation and the urge to set the world right. The Fifth Column is not merely a small group of rich and selfish individuals. It is also a certain proportion of the mind of almost all of us. After Munich, M. Blum made a famous remark about feeling both shame and cowardly relief. He spoke for most people in both France and Britain. Mr. Churchill

PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

wandered about the House of Commons, muttering: "Traitors! Traitors!" beneath his breath. Mr. Churchill felt more shame and little relief. Some, mainly Pacifists, felt only relief. But 90 per cent of the population felt both in varying proportions, and fluctuated between the two emotions from day to day and even from hour to hour.

This mental conflict reached its most critical point at Munich, but it is always present when a dangerous and difficult situation confronts a nation, and at such a time "public opinion" depends on leadership. If last September Mr. Chamberlain had declared that Poland had not made the necessary concessions over Danzig and the Corridor and that we must not be involved in a war on her account, he could in all probability have once again kept us out of war with Germany though with more difficulty than he experienced at the time of Munich when he could claim with justice that lack of preparation for war had left us undefended. In the past it has been true that once war has started, such emotional conflicts are promptly settled. The decision taken, all argument in favour of compromise or surrender are forgotten; the political and group differences are laid aside in a concentrated effort to win the war. Because Germany has not in effect begun the war in the air during the last six months, this hardening process is less obvious than it was in the last war. The Fifth Column, though of course far less powerful, remains active both as a political group and as an element in the psychology of almost every individual. A large number of people have sought for the opportunity to put on uniform, partly from a desire to escape the responsibility of further decision or the misery of helplessly watching the tragedy develop. Many factors, including particularly Russia's decision to support the Nazis, have increased individual perplexity and affected the natural tendency to unite in the war. By-elections conducted under terms of a political truce, in which the party which holds the seat is not challenged by the other major parties, suggest that the "stop the war" policy held in different forms by Communists, Fascists and Pacifists has a decreasing hold. The by-election in Silvertown exemplified this to a remarkable degree. The Fascist candidate, after large public meetings, polled only 150 votes,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

while Harry Pollitt, the most forcible and popular of Communist orators in the country, could only poll 1,500 votes, in spite of a well-established Communist organisation in the constituency and a very large support by a number of voluntary helpers. I should not, however, regard these indications as at all conclusive. They show that only a small portion of the working-class electorate is at present in the mood for any revolutionary policy. They do not show that there might not still be a rally on a very large scale to a respected popular leader who came out on the cry of "negotiate now." The polls have been low in these elections—the natural result of a truce in which one or other of the big parties does not stand—and the Fifth Column element is probably still stronger in the middle than the working class. One has the impression too (founded only on incomplete inquiries in different areas), that the influence of Lord Haw-Haw and of German propaganda as a whole is less than it was during November and December. The present line of German propaganda is to show the British Government as a selfish and incompetent plutocracy and to represent Germany as a modern Socialist state. Such propaganda, when allied to repeated declaration of a determination to destroy the British Empire and for ever prevent Britain from playing again a powerful part rather consolidates than undermines middle-class determination; and it does not convert the working class, to whom it is directed, because, coming from the Nazis, it finds no credence. A large part of Lord Haw-Haw's propaganda is listened to with enjoyment; it amuses, and it is common to hear listeners say that "there is a great deal of truth in it." But to hear Socialist arguments stated by a British Socialist against the present ruling class is one thing; to hear these arguments from the enemy is quite another. Moreover, there has now been enough sea and aerial warfare to excite imagination. The loss of battleships and the sinking and machine-gunning of merchant trawlers has a profound effect on a people who know that their security has always depended on the sea.

The most interesting public examination of opinion carried out since the war began is recorded in *War Begins at Home*, by Mass Observation (Chatto & Windus, 9s. 6d.).

PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

Mass Observation surveys have gained in interest because Mr. Harrison and his followers have realised that it is a mistake to attempt to look upon their results as scientific. They present them in qualitative rather than in quantitative terms. One gains from them, not a pseudo-scientific picture of political trends, but a large number of interesting side-lights and suggestive illustrations. Mass Observation's fundamental discovery is that the gap between the politician's assumptions about political opinion and the real interest of the public is immense. Pre-war elections that were represented in the Press as being decisive about the public attitude to war and peace were found by them to be decided mainly on questions of pensions, food prices and such matters of domestic interest. Even the newspapers, according to this analysis, have no very accurate idea of what mainly interests the public. Mass Observation discusses the extraordinary growth of astrology, a sign not only of the need for some substitute for religion speaking with supernatural authority, but also as an example of the natural recrudescence of superstition at a time of grave doubt and anxiety. They examine A.R.P. and other home services, and discover, as one might expect, how large a part class and personal issues play, especially when the civilian services have very little work to do. They examine, or rather illustrate, the psychological effects of the black-out and the significant development of various forms of entertainment in which new dances are among the most interesting. They discuss the effects of the sudden withdrawal of organised sport, which for many people in time of peace is the main relaxation or even the main interest in life. They produce a suggestive though very incomplete picture of the evacuation, of the confusion and the results of conflicting Government policies on questions of rationing, spending and saving and taxation. In the absence of detailed examination of the vast upheaval caused by evacuation and the temporary dislocation of the educational system, this book is invaluable. Somebody still has to write a history of the first six months of the war, but here at least is some of the material for the historian.

The deduction on which Mass Observation lays most stress in their concluding chapter is that the gap between

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

public opinion and political leadership is large and growing. How far it is true that Hitler and the Nazi leaders are now felt in Germany to embody the will and purpose of their country, we cannot tell. That the leaders of democracy do not do so is obvious, partly because the war has been of an unexpected character and partly because of the general impression that they are driven along they know not where. Mass Observation says that those who organise propaganda in this country have little notion of what will be effective. They take as an interesting illustration the reactions of a number of persons to the poster "*Your courage, your cheerfulness, your resolution will give us victory.*" A natural comment on these words (placed under the royal emblem) is that the "your" applies to those who will be killed in the fight while the "us", who will win the victory, applies to a small ruling class. They show that an immense amount of wishful thinking appears in our propaganda. There is no rational justification for the reiterated statement that "time is on our side."

The leaders, as we have pointed out in this book, sail on satisfied, convincing *themselves* that the whole country is united in support of them, whereas even on the very highest poll ever obtained by any method or organisation, only 68 per cent are at all in favour of, for instance, our present Prime Minister. The truth is that the country is potentially united, and that it is largely united in wanting to end the Hitler regime. But it is not yet united in a frame of mind towards the war and towards the future. The unity in those directions is superficial.

The peculiar strength of the totalitarian powers lies in their psychological success. In the modern state, Mass Observation writes:

private ethics and desires have to be transformed, elevated and merged into a general pattern of the whole community. The private interest has to become the public interest. In this country now, the private interest is very deeply rooted; and many of the biggest private interests are terrified that the communal, public ethic should become so strong and collectivised that people

PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

would not naturally return to the private after the war. But in Germany and in Russia, the identification between private and public is extremely close, so close that it threatens our own British way of life. We therefore have to fight the state-collectivised, non-individual machine. And in doing so we have, of course, to try and preserve those features within our own civilisation which "we are fighting for." But at many points it seems technically necessary in this world of speed and science, to collectivise. So we get the strong tensions of opposing interest that emerge all through this book. Those tensions do *not* imply that people consciously erect their own concerns above those of the country at war. They do most definitely imply that there exists no completely coherent and co-ordinated plan to deal with all the problems of a country at war in 1940.

I think this observation, which applies to peace as well as to war, is just and that there is grave danger in this country, ~~whether~~ the war is carried on indecisively for a long period or whether a truce is patched up at some point, of the growth of confusion and doubt under our present rulers. The real truth is that Germany has in her own brutal way solved this efficiency problem of identifying the private and common interest and that this will be solved in some way, probably by the war, in this country too. It may still be solved well, provided some leader (who is not at present on the horizon) comes forward to lead the democratic revival. It will be solved badly if our rulers forget the maxim, attributed by Rauschning to Hitler:

A mass that is apathetic and dull is the greatest threat to unity. Apathy is to the masses a defensive form of rejection. They hide behind apathy, till suddenly they break out in entirely unexpected actions and reactions. The statesman who fails to take immediate measures against a growing apathy of the masses ought to be impeached.

Impeachment is out of date. But the danger of apathy and the need of leadership, whatever happens—victory, defeat, continued stalemate or truce—is startlingly clear.

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

PUBLIC LIBRARIES IN PEACE AND WAR

IN January this year a letter was sent to local authorities from the offices of the National Book Council and over the signatures of Sir Arthur Eddington, Mr. John Masefield, Prof. Gilbert Murray, Mr. J. B. Priestley, Mr. G. M. Trevelyan and the Archbishop of York. It drew attention to the war-time "danger that the constructive activities of peace time may suffer severely," particularly "those activities of mind and spirit which yield no immediate tangible return," and appealed for the maintenance and, if possible, the increase of cultural and educational services and, especially, of the Public Library. "Books are needed now more urgently than ever, partly to give the mental refreshment which is at present the only holiday many people can afford or obtain, but mainly to provide the knowledge, understanding and inspiration which are absolutely essential to the survival of democracy."

The appeal is wise and necessary. The war has removed few of the purposes which libraries can serve and it has added new responsibilities and given emphasis to old ones. Nevertheless, though the public library movement in this country is nearly one hundred years old, and though it has played a considerable if unobtrusive part in the life of a nation and in the lives of millions of individuals, it cannot be said that it has yet been given the recognition and support which should be its due. Probably, if war had not come, the next decade would have seen striking developments. Any pre-war survey would have recorded considerable achievement but it would also have been concerned with limitations, imperfections and inequalities. To appreciate the task and problems of the library service in war time, one must appreciate its peace time scope and organisations. Consequently the present writer proposes to deal chiefly with the normal peace time background referring only in conclusion to the special conditions now imposed upon this service.

Public libraries in England and Wales are maintained by local authorities, urban and county, in accordance with the provision of the Public Libraries Act of 1919, the latest of a series of Acts authorising the provision of libraries at the expense of local ratepayers.¹ The first Act was passed in 1850,

¹ For Scotland the latest Act is that of 1920 and for Northern Ireland that of 1924.

though two or three libraries were established under the Museums Act of 1845. All the Public Libraries Acts have been "adoptive"—that is to say, it has never been compulsory to provide public libraries.

Nevertheless, though progress was slow until the end of last century, to-day there are very few districts without some sort of service; forty-seven million people in Great Britain and Northern Ireland have access either to urban or to county libraries.

Until 1919 expenditure upon libraries was limited to the product of a penny rate. Since then local authorities in England have been free, legally, to spend whatever they thought fit; in Scotland development is still hampered by a 3d. rate limitation. Public libraries as such have never been subject to any form of central government control or inspection and have never received any financial assistance from state funds.

These factors—local option and local autonomy and, until 1919, rate limitation—have largely shaped the library movement or whether each local authority has been free to make whatever of it it desired or thought itself able to make, local conditions vary very considerably—though the differences are not so great as they would have been had not the progress of the best and most progressive been hampered by the rate limitation. This served to formulate ideals which were bound by the shackles of practical possibility and which often persisted after the limit had been removed.

The Librarian, therefore, has always been and still is concerned primarily not with meeting fully the actual and potential needs of library users so much as with deciding how far he may go with strictly limited funds, to what demands he shall give preference and where he must compromise. No two libraries with comparable responsibilities have had similar resources.

Despite this, the mould of library service has been surprisingly standardised. Consequently it is possible, despite great variations in local incomes, to speak of a "typical" system and to find few places which do not conform to pattern so far as the skeleton goes, providing much the same arrangement of buildings and departments, though the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

quality of book stock, staff and equipment varies greatly.

The "typical" library consists of four departments—(a) a lending, or home-reading, department, (b) a reference department and information bureau, (c) a periodicals room or rooms and (d) a children's library with both lending and reference facilities. If the town is small there may be only one library building with these four departments; if it is very small two or more of these may be combined in one room; if it is larger there will be various "branch libraries" to serve those living at some distance from the town centre, and also possibly some special departments such as commercial, technical, local, music or fine arts libraries.

The typical county library system serves all the rural districts, small townships and, often, suburban areas within the county council boundaries excepting such urban places as have themselves adopted the Acts and maintain independent services. It operates from an administration headquarters and central book store from which collections of books are distributed to numerous small country centres, many of them housed in schools, clubs and community centres, managed by volunteers and open for short periods each week. In addition to these, larger branches in premises erected for the purpose, staffed by paid trained assistants, are frequently provided in the more thickly populated districts. As the branch stocks are supplemented by loans to individuals and frequent interchanges, readers in country areas can often obtain the books they require as well as can the average urban reader, though naturally they have not the same facilities for choosing books personally from a large stock.

Both urban and rural libraries are linked up with one another, with a number of specialist collections and with the National Central Library into a nation wide system of inter-library co-operation which is not equalled in extent or efficiency anywhere in the world.

The following statistics, which relate to Great Britain and Northern Ireland and are for 1938-39 will indicate the extent of the service:

There are 510 independent municipal (*i.e.*, urban) library systems, with 665 branches—a total of 1175 central and branch libraries. Ninety-three county councils maintain

county services, provide 340 full or part-time branches and about 16,600 centres, making a total of about 17,033 county service points.

The municipal libraries provide altogether 24,540,000 books and the county libraries 7,009,000—a total stock of 31,549,000, equivalent to 67 volumes per 100 of population. Last year (1938-39) 242,409,000 volumes were issued to readers—187,293,000 from municipal and 54,116,000 from county libraries—equivalent to 518 issues per 100 of population.

Those registered as borrowers totalled 8,683,000 *i.e.*, 18.5 per cent of the total population. The actual amount of library use is, however, greater than this percentage indicates since on the one hand there are many who use the reference and periodicals departments although they are not registered as borrowers and many unregistered readers who read books taken into their homes by other members of the household. On the other hand a considerable proportion of the total population are either too young to read or are precluded for one of many reasons such as illness, blindness, military service, imprisonment and so on, from using public libraries. Therefore on the whole it might safely be asserted that one out of every two or three people who can use a library in fact does so.

Expenditure on libraries in 1938 amounted to approximately £2,970,000—an average of 1s. 5d. per annum per head of population.

Progress has been rapid and considerable since the Great War. In 1911 only 22 million people had any library service and the average expenditure per head was only 8d. In 1938 the average for municipal libraries was 1s. 7d. and for counties 7d.

All the above figures, however, are but the aggregate of many places above and many below average standards. The picture for any individual library might be very different from that suggested by the averages. For example, *per capita* expenditure in a few towns is still well below one shilling whereas in others it approaches four shillings. Of the money available about 18 per cent is spent on books and 43 per cent on salaries and wages. It does not follow that libraries are

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

overstaffed or assistants overpaid ; on the contrary recognised fair scales of salaries are not operating in a majority of places and only a few libraries employ more than one assistant per 4,000 of population. Neither is expenditure on books anywhere really adequate ; in very few places does it exceed £20 per annum per 1,000 of population or 4s. 8d. per person.

Despite the obvious financial limitations, however, public libraries are rendering very considerable and very economical services to all sections of the public. In theory they exist to provide for all those needs for which books can offer satisfaction and to serve all types and classes of the population. The range of library provision is as extensive as that of knowledge itself. The library starts with the children, providing those books which will stimulate their mental curiosity and imagination, foster their development as thinking individuals and help in their formal education and broaden its implications. Then provision is made for students, young and old, including those engaged in all manner of vocational studies. Even more advanced students, specialists and research workers must often have recourse to public libraries. It is, moreover, a mistake to imagine that professional men and scholars, those associated with centres of research or recognised professional and scientific organisations, are the only people who need specialised information ; on the contrary, any man may at some time or other require books which could not be regarded as "general literature" in ordinary demand. It is one of the most important duties of a public library to give any individual, with definite needs, any material that he cannot more readily obtain elsewhere. Then there are an immense variety of vocational needs which can be met by books ; the library helps the worker, whatever his occupation, to keep abreast of progress in his own field and it can answer many of the problems arising in the technical, commercial and industrial activities of the community. Furthermore, libraries naturally play a big part in the leisure of the people. Some books, especially fiction, are in themselves a pastime ; others help people to enjoy their hobbies and recreations be these carpentering or gardening, genealogy or geology. Libraries also promote interest in the arts—literature, the graphic arts, music, etc. Finally—though it is

PUBLIC LIBRARIES IN PEACE AND WAR

it suggested that the above summary covers the whole range of book use—libraries provide material for that extensive and valuable "general reading" in which men and women engage in order to increase their understanding of life and people, and to make their own lives more interesting. This opportunity for personal development in an atmosphere of freedom would alone justify public library provision. The public library has no axe to grind ; it is not concerned with "why" a man needs a particular book or information ; it remains a surprisingly impartial and catholic institution, ready—saving very exceptionally—to offer hospitality to all aspects of controversy.

If it is to fulfil adequately the many duties it is called upon to attempt—if it is to give each reader the books he requires and if it is to help in educating people in the habit of using books—two things are of paramount importance, these being books and staff.

The book stock must be sufficient, well selected and properly related to actual and potential needs ; there must be sufficient properly trained assistants to select, catalogue, and classify the books to make them easily available to readers, to assist readers in their search for desired material and information and to maintain an efficient, smooth running service. To deal first with the book stock : it is an obvious but most important fact that the better the service the more it must cost per issue. If a library were content to devote its major attention to the mass circulation of the cheapest type of fiction it could secure very large issues at a very low average cost because the less a thing matters the more people are willing to accept it and consequently the greater the output. On the other hand, as soon as the library sets out to meet the genuine, serious needs of purposive readers the more personal and different do these appear and, consequently, the fewer the readers per item of stock. It is the old story of "the higher the fewer." One must not exaggerate the position and so suggest that only a small minority of people want books that are genuinely worthy. This is not the case. Librarians have ever discovered that there is no lack of demand for the most valuable things if these are freely and wisely provided, that there are always more readers for the apparently

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

specialised material, once it is available, than they had anticipated.

The point, however, is that the less purposive a man's reading, the more readily can he accept a substitute; the more purposive the more essential is it that he should have a particular book at a particular time. The inevitable implication is that the smaller the library and the less its book funds, the less can it do for the better type of reader.

There are only two ways of dealing with the situation, (a) a readjustment in the library service unit and (b) the fuller development of co-operation. At present the library service unit is the usual local government unit. Frequently the arbitrary boundary between town and county or between one town and its neighbours results in contiguous communities having absurdly disparate facilities. It has long been argued that a town with less than 30,000 inhabitants should not attempt to maintain an independent service. Many critics would ask for a much larger unit, with sufficient financial means to support expert direction and an efficient staff and to provide a stock of books sufficient to satisfy all but the exceptional requirements of its inhabitants.

Inter-library co-operation is the means by which these can be met. The machinery already exists in the Regional Library systems which cover the whole country and which are linked up with and co-ordinated by the National Central Library. Already considerable and invaluable co-operative work is being done, but the further development of the system must depend on three factors—firstly, a levelling up of standards in libraries of all sizes and a reduction in the number of small units so that libraries do not seek to borrow from other libraries books which they should be able to provide for themselves, secondly, much more systematic specialisation so that the total wealth and variety of provision are increased, and, thirdly, greater financial support for the National Central Library.

The library service also demands suitable and qualified personnel. On the one hand, to run the library as an efficient businesslike machine, method, thoroughness and intelligence are necessary. On the other hand, librarianship is primarily a matter of "public relations." The library worker fails or

succeeds largely according to his ability to establish contact with the many and various people who come to the library for any of a thousand or more reasons. He must be capable of understanding people, have wide sympathies and a very extensive (if necessarily not intensive) knowledge of all manner of things and thoughts. Moreover, he should have faith in the value of his work. Librarianship may thus rightly be ranked as a profession—though not all who engage in it need be of professional rank or type since there is much to be done in the library that is of a routine, non-professional, character.

To-day the importance of professional status and qualifications is recognised. For this state of affairs much of the credit must go to the Library Association. This body, which holds a Royal Charter charging it with the promotion of a better library service by all the means within its power, has rightly devoted itself to the education and examination of library personnel and to the maintenance of a register of qualified and experienced librarians. By lending its influence to the improvement of conditions of service and recruitment it has helped to bring better and more suitable people into the profession. They in turn have helped to improve the character of the service given to the public. Much remains to be done, however.

The library movement therefore promised well when the war came to alter its course. Within recent years many fine and suitable new library buildings had been opened and others were projected. There was a growing tendency to improve the service by concentrating on the better types of library work and gradually decreasing those provisions which were either less worthy or for which there were substitutes. Consideration was being given to the needs of people who demanded special treatment, such as those in hospitals, institutions and prisons. Appreciation of the importance of an information service—as distinct from and complementary to a "book service"—had led to increased attention to the technique of book exploitation and information bureau and reference library method. Undoubtedly before long a national co-operative information service would have been grafted on to the existing co-operative book lending schemes. And with this

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

would have come a widening in the public library horizon bringing with it closer contact with libraries of other types—special, learned society, university—and other agencies for the dissemination of knowledge. We had a not unpromising future. We must hope that our opportunities are only deferred.

The war must inevitably limit the library service in certain directions. We can expect no new buildings; the demands of National Service must lead to a serious reduction in qualified personnel; we must expect to suffer from the reduced spending power of the community. But the war has done nothing to diminish either the value of libraries or the demand for them. They have lost none of the purposes for which they existed before the war. The men, women and children of to-day have no less need for the information, education, recreation and stimulation that they may seek in books and libraries. On the contrary the need has increased. As other forms of recreation have become less easy to enjoy and as black-out and other restrictions have encouraged a stay-at-home habit, people have turned to books as never before. Normal educational facilities, for advanced students as well as for children, have been curtailed and disorganised and the library has had to step into the breach. Thousands of men and women have been transferred suddenly to new occupations and find afresh the need for books that will help them. Above all, war has stimulated thought and speculation. The world of to-day is much more interested in itself, much more eager to understand the whys and wherefores of to-day and the possibilities of to-morrow. War is a great stimulant; in war the imagination is fired and the appeal of art and of ideas is heightened.

Probably the most important effect of the war, however, has been to emphasise the responsibility of the library to provide a broad basis for political and social thought. It is generally believed that the war is being waged to defend democratic ways of living and thinking. Yet any idea of democracy which did not take it for granted that the individual citizen had free access to the means of political self-education would be contradictory. You cannot assume democracy unless you can assume intelligent citizenship. The public

library is the only satisfactory machine so far devised for this purpose, because it is not only comprehensive and representative of all facets of thought, but because it can be adapted by each man to his own needs, interests and abilities. Unless, as has been done in totalitarian countries, it is deliberately perverted, it is the enemy of standardisation, of the "mass mind" and the antidote of propaganda.

Thus the public library can show—apart from any others—three vital reasons why it should be adequately supported in war time: Firstly, it is an institution essential to true democratic civilisation. Secondly, it can, by keeping men's minds clear and normal and their spirits active, help to maintain the morale and faith of the people. Thirdly, it must be a crucial element in the post-war reconstruction period when knowledge and wisdom will be essential if the next peace is not to become but a prelude to the next war. It must not be allowed gradually to lose its influence to-day; rather must it be strengthened to face the tasks of to-morrow.

LIONEL R. MCCOLVIN.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND FROM QUEEN VICTORIA TO
GEORGE VI. By A. BERRIEDALE KEITH. 2 Vols.
(Macmillan. 30s.)

HOW BRITAIN IS GOVERNED. By RAMSAY MUIR. (4th edition
with a new preface.) (Constable.)

PROFESSOR KEITH'S new book will be for many years a useful work of reference for teachers and students of the English Constitution. The plan is simple, clear and very nearly exhaustive. It provides a succinct summary of the history since 1837 and the present position and problems of any part of our machinery of Government. Like all writers on the English Constitution, Professor Keith is helped by the existence of a really excellent literature on the spirit and problems of our system of Government. The works of Bagehot, Maitland and Dicey, to name only the illustrious dead, have provided a tradition of inspiration to all who would write on the English Constitution. It would not perhaps be boastful to say that no other Constitution has been so critically examined and lucidly expounded as has that most difficult of Constitutions, our own. This being so, one cannot help asking what particular contribution any new work is designed to make to the already comprehensive literature. The contribution Professor Keith is designed almost by nature to make, is a planned and detailed survey of every legal principle and institutional minutiae the Constitution contains. He is able also to illuminate any special point by his encyclopaedic knowledge of the fortunes of English institutions overseas. One can be sure that some flash from Tasmania or Newfoundland will lighten some dark corner of our proceedings in Westminster or the Provinces.

In this book the plan followed is to analyse the Constitution into parts—the Crown, the Cabinet, Parliament, Parties, the Executive and the Judiciary, and under each heading to survey swiftly the development of the present position since 1837. To read it is like reading the volume on Constitutional Law in Halsbury's "Laws of England," expanded by references

to the relevant precedents in law, and the debates on politics and institutions which have occurred since the accession of Queen Victoria. One cannot too much admire the skill with which Professor Keith both covers the detail that a constitutional lawyer will look for, e.g., the Royal Titles and Ensigns, or the Status of Aliens, while providing in his exposition for a survey of major changes which the last hundred years have seen. It is impossible to find any problem of the Constitution or any detail which is not somewhere or somehow discussed in this thousand pages. And, in spite of its detail, the book can be read as a continuous narrative.

But this combination of breadth and detail have been secured at some cost. In the first place, Professor Keith, either from a sense of righteous indignation at the policy of those in power since 1931 or from a feeling that the reader must be stimulated to enjoy his passage through so intricate and at times so dusty and detailed a narrative, enlivens his pages by vigorous political polemics. Whatever value these may have in themselves—and their value is, I think, very unequal—they do raise a feeling of uncertainty about the general purpose of the book. Its title promises a study of development. Actually, what we are given is a statement of the present Constitution expounded by a method of historical retrospect. We do not, in fact, see the Constitution in process of change. We do not see how the Constitution of Bagehot has become the Constitution of to-day. Nor perhaps did Professor Keith intend so ambitious a task. But the irruption of polemical commentaries on past and present controversial issues at once arouses and offends our historical sense. There are certain problems about which Professor Keith feels very keenly, and these stimulate him to a lucid and cogent summary of the issues involved. But these particular problems distract from the study of the history of the Constitution. It is as though in the pages of Anson we were to find embedded some cogent summaries of Professor Laski or Ramsay Muir. Many of these are themselves excellent, e.g., on Devolution or the Reform of the House of Lords; some are not quite so convincing, e.g., on the Separation of Powers. But many of them could with advantage have been scrapped to allow room for a more thorough description of vital parts

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of the Constitution, e.g., the organisation and working of the Cabinet.

This question of the Cabinet raises a point of some importance. Professor Keith gives us no bibliography—to do so for so wide a field is almost impossible. As a good lawyer, his references are, whenever possible, to the actual cases, with the precise K.B. or A.C. which the rigour of the game requires. His references in political matters are to the standard biographies and collections of letters or even to the precise column in the *Hansard* of the 'seventies or whatever decade is in question. But he must have received some guidance from secondary authorities, and it is possible that his readers would be grateful for a knowledge of some of these sources of useful if unequal value. It seems strange that a work which should refer quite frequently to Professor Laski's "Parliamentary Government in England"—and one receives a subtle pleasure from the frequent concurrence of our solid author with that mercurial personality—should not have made a greater use of Dr. Jennings's "Cabinet Government" (1936)—which is, after all, the most important work on the mainspring of our system of Government since Bagehot's "English Constitution." From Professor Keith's discussion in the second volume of the *Separation of Powers* it would seem that his disagreement with Dr. Jennings on that important issue may have prevented him drinking as deep as he might from Dr. Jennings's other studies.

To the fourth edition of his critical analysis—critical in temper if not in scholarship—of the British system of Government, Mr. Ramsay Muir provides a preface. This is a high-pitched restatement of the central theme of the original work. That was, it will be remembered, a vigorous plea for proportional representation as a safeguard against the encroachment of the Executive in our political system. Mr. Ramsay Muir now sees in the swollen majority of the National Government since 1931 and the logical development of Party Dictatorship in Germany a confirmation of his worst fears. The representation of a party in the legislature out of all proportion to their strength in the country is a symptom of a serious sickness in the Constitution. On the other hand, in Sweden an electoral system which makes Party Dictatorship impossible,

BOOK REVIEWS

has provided a rational and successful political policy. It cannot be said that this preface adds anything of value to the original work. That was, indeed, a clear and stimulating introduction to the study of our system of Government—it was worthy to be ranked, if far below Bagehot, very close to Sir Sidney Low. It is a pity that Mr. Ramsay Muir has not taken the opportunity of a new edition to weed his text of some errors of detail. In Mr. Muir's Britain the Peers of Scotland are still elected for life, and those of Ireland for the duration of each Parliament, and only three Law-Lords sit in the House of Lords.

K. SMELLIE.

THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM. By E. F. M. DURBIN. (*Routledge*. 7s. 6d.)

MR. DURBIN has given a modest sub-title to his book; he describes it on the title page as "an essay on social policy." It is that, but it is also a great deal more than that. It is a book of real value and importance, one that it pays to read slowly, so that one can agree or disagree meditatively with what the author is saying. It springs, as nearly all political books must at the moment, from our present discontents, the feeling, which so many of us have, that the bottom is dropping out of the social world—perhaps out of the civilization—in which we were born. We have to start again from the beginning, it seems, on a new political pilgrim's progress. If so, the wise man will begin by taking his bearings.

That is what Mr. Durbin bravely attempts in this book. He wants to know where the winds of his political faith and the tornado of events have brought him, and what course they make it desirable and practicable for him to set in the future. His faith is that of a democrat and a socialist, and he is therefore mainly concerned with the future of democracy and socialism in a world in which they are threatened from every side by Nazis, fascists, communists, and all the lesser breeds of authoritarians.

Mr. Durbin is never content to remain upon the surface of his subject; he is always trying to get down to the depths

where the important, and less obvious, causes are working. This is one of the things which makes his book of outstanding merit. But it does not make it easy to read, and Mr. Durbin has the makings of such an illuminating political philosopher that it is worth while pointing out one of his few defects, a defect which adds unnecessarily to the difficulty of reading him and is simply a bad literary habit of which he could easily cure himself. He uses too many words to the square inch, and instead of putting down plainly and succinctly the many important and interesting things that he has to say, he tends to wrap them up in a kind of verbal cotton-wool which distracts and irritates the reader. Take the following examples. Mr. Durbin writes: "But let me hasten at once to say that I have no desire whatever to minimize or reduce the importance of institutional studies," when all he means is: "I do not deny the importance of institutional studies." And when he writes: "Before I leave this question, it may be of interest to offer a tentative explanation of the method by which those who hold the incorrect doctrine have been led to adopt it. I believe that the explanation is not difficult to find. It is yet another example of a most common source of error in the history of human thought," all he means is: "I suggest that the way in which people have been led to adopt this incorrect doctrine is probably one more example of a very common source of error in human thought."

Now that we have had our grumble, we can get back to Mr. Durbin's merits. The theme of his book is the theory and practice of socialism and democracy. It is divided into five parts. The connection between the last four parts is clear. Part II deals with democratic capitalism and is an extraordinarily interesting analysis of its institutional trends. Mr. Durbin shows that democracy has forced capitalism to take a new form, which has some, but not all, nor the most important, characteristics of socialism; it is, in his words, "State controlled, monopolistic, and still predominantly inequalitarian." He does not deny the virtues of this form of capitalism, but he considers that its defects make it essential to pass, if possible, to a further stage demanded by democracy, namely equality. He sees this as a combination of extended state control or socialism with democracy. The remainder

of his book is a consideration of whether, and, if so, how this can be attained. In Part III he examines the communist thesis that the object can only be attained by force and the suppression of democracy. It is one of the most devastating critiques of neo-Marxism that has ever been written. It is devastating, because it is not "just argument," but really attempts to go down to the roots of social psychology and to understand the dynamics of social and political institutions. Part IV then goes on to show that it is only through democracy that it is possible to reach the just or egalitarian society of socialism. Here he is often covering familiar ground, but he brings new light to bear on old problems because he has a point of view of his own with regard to the essence of democracy. Part V is called the strategy of democratic socialism and is really a discussion of how the Labour Party should proceed in detail when it comes to power to transform the existing transitional form of capitalism into the beginnings of a socialist society. What Mr. Durbin has to say here is eminently sensible and should be useful to the Party leaders if they can be induced to read it. But it is not quite in focus with the subtle and scientific analysis in the previous four parts.

Psychology reminds us of Part I, to which we must now return. It deals with individual psychology, the light which the new psychology of Freud and his disciples has thrown upon the way in which the instincts, emotions, or psychological complexes of aggression and co-operation work upon the human mind and affect human action. This discussion does not quite dovetail in to the remainder of the book; yet Mr. Durbin was well advised to include it. The individual psychology of aggression and co-operation clearly have an enormous effect upon the dynamics of social, economic and political institutions. Mr. Durbin is an explorer in this field, and he tentatively feels his way. But he continually refers back in his discussion of capitalism, socialism, democracy and authoritarianism to the facts of individual psychology revealed in Part I. And some of these tentative suggestions are among the most original and valuable things in his book.

LEONARD WOOLF.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

AFTER THE DELUGE. A STUDY OF COMMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. II, 1830 and 1832. By LEONARD WOOLF. (*The Hogarth Press*. 15s.)

THE first volume of this work was published eight years ago. It sought to reveal the origins and character of the communal psychology of democracy. Discerning readers have read and re-read it, and it is now winging its way to widening circles of students across the Atlantic and in this country as a sixpenny *Pelican*. It had the outstanding virtue of freshness—a freshness which lay not only in its illuminating and ironical exposure of the formative attitudes of our contemporary rulers on such great issues as the General Stoppage (no longer called General Strike, save by tactless people), but in its persistent association of present and past through the application of a tenable theory of history to the evolution of democratic institutions. It was surprising that no one had written Mr. Woolf's book before, or so it would seem until one remembers that theories of history rarely escape into the world of historiography from their inaugural lectures wherein the professors imprison them. And, anyhow, historians do not commonly study psychology, or write about behaviour patterns, or attempt to disinter the social forces (if that is the right name) that give them their shape. They have not resolved, for example, the ancient problem of constitutional history, whether it is about institutions, or their use and wont, or about both. A recent academic manual, dealing with the union of England and Ireland after the Irish Rebellion of 1798, put the constitutional steps in the text and dismissed all the real means by which the union was delivered to its agonised victims in a one-sentence footnote of contemptuous dismissal. It is not surprising that people grumble at the unscientific habits of writers who have been rather too apt to claim for their craft the dignity and status of a science. It is the outstanding merit of Mr. Woolf's work that he is thinking about historical processes, and their end-result in the contemporary world in a disciplined way. He has told his readers what he means by history: he defines his technical terms and sticks to his definitions, employing them as an instrument of analysis: he uses recent experience to sharpen his awareness of the nature

of historical change: he employs a working social psychology and examines historical experience in its setting. The result is that despite slips—Robert Carlile for Richard, John for “Orator” Henry Hunt, and the like—*After the Deluge* is a very valuable work. It is history, but not only history. While revealing the underlying and creative unity of present and past, it has a dynamic quality, the quality of, say, a well-placed road-sign. After reading it, you know how things hang together: you have a sense of direction and know the places you are coming to. And that, after all, is not too common nowadays. It explains why Mr. Woolf is not just a scholarly writer upon historical and other themes, but one of the wisest counsellors the radical movement of contemporary capitalism has at its disposal.

The present volume of *After the Deluge* is concerned with the revolutionary movements of England and France in 1832 and 1830. No attempt is made at formal narrative in either case, though much of the story necessarily is present. The specialist will shake an impatient head every now and then over omissions he will regard as sinful. The part played by Hetherington and his *Poor Man's Guardian*, or Carpenter in his *Political Letters*, for example, was surely worth at least a passing mention among the agencies of political education through whose co-operation the common people of England learned to think democratically. Occasionally, too, the connoisseur in the history of radicalism will want a footnote that isn't there. Take, in illustration, the following sentence: “The more closely one studies the history of the years, 1815-1825, the more clearly does one see that it was really a period of latent struggle, a period in which the governing classes proved that they had lost faith in themselves and were incapable of leading the country out of the blind alley of the past, in which a new class emerged capable of taking the lead and solving the problems presented by history, and in which public opinion was being educated to support a mass movement for reform.” In its context, that passage sits easily enough. But it would have meant more if somehow—and Mr. Woolf writes so attractively that he could have done it with consummate ease—the reader could have got a sudden glimpse of the *Black Book*, or *Corruption Unmasked* (and its

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

redecessors, originating often among the effete class that had lost faith in its own validity), and the merchants of Liverpool and Manchester demanding railways in the name of THE 'PUBLIC GOOD' (printed in capitals in their first prospectus) and (say) the meeting at Habergham Eaves of obscure artisans, marching with sticks, banners and music, to protest against the iniquity of Peterloo and show the necessity of parliamentary reform. For these are typical events, typical manifestations of a growing, political articulateness, whose inner character and dynamics Mr. Woolf is studying. It would be absurd to criticise this volume because it does not contain a complete narrative: it is not unreasonable to say that it would have been more satisfying if it had been more avish of fact.

This grumble, all the same, is not very important. The special virtue of *After the Deluge* is its power of giving meaning to contemporary conflicts. All too many of us have been apt latterly to see democracy too much through its enemies' spectacles. That is largely because false historical perspectives are prevalent. Sir Robert Peel was reported, in 1847, to have expressed the gravest anxiety about the condition of Europe. Having studied closely the writings of the socialists, he realised how potent they could be among the victims of industrialism. "The soil of our ancient Europe," he said, "is deeply undermined . . . Who shall dare to foretell the day of explosion? Who shall calculate the boundless ruins of the cataclysm which shall cumber the surface of our Western world?" As a prophecy of events almost immediately to come Peel's words were noteworthy. But even Peel, with all his experience, seemed to underestimate the powers of resistance to the carrying into effect of democratic ideals. A sense of political perspective, and a knowledge of the historical meaning of democratic effort, were never more necessary parts of the democrat's equipment than they are to-day. Mr. Woolf raises questions, stimulates discussion, provokes inquiry. But the special virtue of his book is not academic. It is practical. He shows in this valuable study how in England and France the ideal of political equality was rejected, a century ago, in order to erect a bulwark against the ideal of economic equality. In both countries the

rule of the bourgeoisie began in the events whose meaning he analyses. He leaves one fully aware that the democratic struggle is still on.

H. L. BEALES.

A HISTORY OF POLAND. By GEORGE SLOCOMBE. (*Revised and Enlarged Edition.*) (Nelson. pp. 375. 10s. 6d.)

(1) and (2) POLAND: HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS IN THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING. December, 1936. pp. 36.

(3) POLAND'S NEW CODES OF LAW. May, 1937. pp. 19.

(4) THE NATIONAL INCOME OF POLAND. July, 1937. pp. 15.

(5) POLAND'S FOREIGN TRADE. July, 1939. pp. 27. (*Being Memoranda 1-5 on Poland by the Birmingham Information Service on Slavonic Countries, University of Birmingham. 7s. for the Series of four.*)

MR. SLOCOMBE published in 1916 a book on Poland which he has now revised and brought up-to-date by adding some chapters on her progress since 1918.

It is not the kind of book that the reader would expect from so sparkling a journalist as Mr. Slocombe. Some journalists, Mr. Slocombe among them, have at times felt the need to look deeper into the political world in which they lived, and as a result have given us books, some of them very able books, in which they examined more thoroughly the things and people which in their daily work they had to report, so to speak, on the wing. But this book of Mr. Slocombe's is not that kind of book. Only at the end, in some thirty pages or so, does he deal with things which happened in our time. All the rest is old history, beginning with the beginning of the Poles, and moving slowly through the chequered stages of that nation's progress. Mr. Slocombe has marshalled here a great deal of detail, competently and readably, and the whole, though based on existing works, makes as good an introduction as any to the general history of the Polish people.

Mr. Slocombe writes with a pleasing sympathy which does not shy at the shortcomings of the people he has befriended. It is only when he comes to our own times, which he knows

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

so well and where he is well qualified to discriminate, that his sympathy is apt to lapse into acquiescence. That the resurrected Poland should have started her new life in 1919 with a houseful of problems, was not her fault. Neither was she responsible for the burden of excessive riches in land and people, but rather those ill-advised friends who piled up the gifts at her birth, not always for altruistic reasons. Mr. Slocombe makes a good point, by way of explaining some of the things that were inadequate in their rule, when he says that the long period during which they had to live under foreign oppression had left the Poles with little experience of government. It was a mistaken political generosity that put upon people who knew not how to govern themselves the strain of governing so many others; just as Rumania and Yugoslavia were blessed with new provinces for the good rule of which their political experience and personnel could, at the time, not be adequate.

Mr. Slocombe makes his own the argument of many Polish apologists that the new Poland had a too democratic constitution, too many political parties, and as a consequence too many changes of government. Were not those many parties the natural expression, and a useful political outlet, for the awkward conglomerate of interests and nationalities, of regions and religions, which had been gathered together into the revived Polish state? And if things went poorly in the first period after the world war, were they any better under the subsequent dictatorial régime?—especially if one takes into account that the first had the difficult task of welding that mixed material into some sort of working shape. The issue as to the respective merits of the two régimes might in normal circumstances have remained an open question, but one is surprised to meet with Mr. Slocombe's view after the tragic test of the recent débâcle. The fate which has overcome the Polish state demonstrates almost to perfection the crucial weakness of a dictatorial régime which all too easily becomes a cloak for political and administrative ineptitude, and after the collapse the Poles were the first themselves to denounce and repudiate the hollow claims of those who had ruled them so superciliously for a decade and more. The dictatorship inaugurated by Pilsudski remained

to the last a dictatorship of "colonels," and Mr. Slocombe says, as one might have expected, that they devoted their energies especially to the organisation of defence. The results have been proportionate to the energies.

In the field of foreign policy, says Mr. Slocombe, "Poland's influence steadily increased under Pilsudski" (page 328). It is true that Poland became more prominent in European affairs, but the point is to what end, and with what effects on her own fortunes and on the peace of others? No one could say that her attitude was helpful to the work of the League of Nations, though her own fate depended greatly on the strength of that institution. And while she was backward in working with her smaller neighbours on a democratic basis, she was the first to accept a bargain at the hands of the Nazi régime. In the short summary at the end of the book of the events which led up to the war there is no mention of the part which Poland played in furthering the march of Hitler, and so her own destruction, in the autumn of 1938. One wished that Mr. Slocombe had indulged in a little speculation on why Poland has been repeatedly partitioned. Her geographical situation explains a great deal, but not everything. The difficulties described by Mr. Slocombe were hard, but not insuperable. Mr. Slocombe has rather clouded the issue by slurring over even the obvious lesson of the recent past.

The five monographs on Poland coming from the Birmingham Information Service attached to Birmingham University will prove valuable for reference. One notes with interest that according to Monograph No. 1-2 Danzig's goods traffic, which in 1913 had amounted to 2 million tons, had by 1935 increased to 4.6 million tons. Monograph No. 3 describes Poland's efforts to give herself a unified system of law, and contains a valuable bibliography. All these Monographs come well up to the standard of the better-known Memoranda on Soviet Russia which have issued from the same source.

D. MITRANY.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

A PROGRAMME FOR PROGRESS. By JOHN STRACHEY. (*Gollancz*. 7s. 6d. January, 1940. 348pp.)

MR. STRACHEY'S Programme for Progress is to tackle the problem of unemployment by an expansionist programme—low interest, public works, generous social services and redistributional taxation. Through these means a progressive Government would vindicate itself in the eyes of the world by creating prosperity. But more than that, it would pave the way for a full socialist programme. Expansionism must entail the control of the banking system and, to a large extent, of foreign trade. It requires a widening of the sphere of state-controlled investment. And, by providing some measure of social security, it strengthens the bargaining position of the workers. Precisely because it points in the direction of socialism, an expansionist programme will arouse the bitter antagonism of the governing class. But it attacks capitalism at the point where it is least easy to defend. It creates a certain confusion amongst the reactionary forces, for, from a short-period point of view, the bread of the capitalists is buttered on the progressive side. Successful opposition to expansionism can only create slump conditions, entailing losses to the capitalists as well as to the workers. The policy of low interest drives a wedge between financial and industrial interests, while the promise to abolish slumps rallies a great mass of moderate middle-class opinion to the workers' side. Yet expansionism in itself cannot provide a stable system. We must ever run faster and faster to stay where we are, and the necessary outcome must be some form or other of thorough-going socialism.

The old pseudo-economic arguments that expansionism is impracticable, unsound, and cannot in fact conquer unemployment, have been refuted once and for all by experience. After the rearmament campaign of 1937 the "Treasury view" will never again be able to rear its head, and the anti-expansionist propagandist of the future will be hard put to it to find arguments to prove that loan-expenditure on armaments can conquer unemployment, but loan-expenditure on housing cannot.

All this Mr. Strachey argues with his usual force and clarity.

He is arguing on two fronts, against the liberal who has still some doubts about the practicability of the programme, and against the extreme socialist who maintains that the only hope of progress lies in a direct frontal attack upon the capitalist system. On the second front he admits with great candour his own change of view, and shows how both theoretical reasoning and the lessons of history have led him to adopt his present position. He illustrates his argument at some length by what is probably the most penetrating analysis of the New Deal which has yet appeared, and, in a briefer section, he sets the Nazi economy in its proper perspective in relation to the expansionist programme.

Mr. Strachey has some of the defects, as well as the qualities, of a brilliant popular writer. The easy and persuasive flow of the argument at times conceals somewhat slap-dash thinking. He takes the Multiplier to measure the ratio of secondary employment, in consumption industries, to the primary employment, created by investment, not realising that the writers whom he quotes use it to measure the ratio of total to primary employment. A failure to bring out clearly the distinction between the rate of profit per unit of output and the rate of profit per unit of capital makes his exposition hazy in some passages. And his treatment of the part played by gold has a somewhat mystical air, because he fails to link it up with the rate of interest. But these defects will not distress the type of reader whom he is mainly concerned to reach, and they scarcely impair the force and cogency of his main argument. Indeed, in a work so frankly propagandist, it is rare to find so little trace of confusion and of special pleading.

Mr. Strachey's book is an important phenomenon both in the sphere of politics and in the development of economic thought. Politically it is important because it points the way to a revival, no doubt in some fresh disguise, of a United Front policy. When the war is over, the problem of unemployment will be upon us again on a greater scale than ever before, and if Mr. Strachey's point of view is widely adopted that problem might become the rallying point for all progressive forces, and the solution of it the first step in a general advance.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

In the development of economics the book is an important phenomenon because it marks the convergence between the Marxist and the academic schools of economic analysis. Until now the two schools have existed in water-tight compartments, and the only interchanges between them have been in ill-natured and inconclusive controversy. For this state of affairs both parties were to blame. The academics never dared to meet the Marxist challenge squarely and were content with verbal arguments, a field in which the turgid nature of Marxist terminology made it all too easy for them to score apparent hits; while the Marxists, on their side, did not take the trouble to master the orthodox analysis, and failed to see what powerful weapons the academics themselves were forging for the attack upon *laissez-faire* ideology.

It was Mr. Keynes, himself brought up in the strictest sect of the Pharisees, who unmasked the weakness of the orthodox position, and breached the citadel from within. At first, instead of rushing joyously into the breach, the Marxist writers, including Mr. Strachey himself, were hostile and suspicious. But now Mr. Strachey has realised that Mr. Keynes has robbed the orthodox apologists for the capitalist system of their most important weapons, and makes triumphant use of the magnificent material which the *General Theory* provides for progressive propaganda.

JOAN ROBINSON.

ITALY AND THE GERMAN ALLIANCE

By BARBARA WARD

ITALY'S entry into the war on June 10 was not so gross a breach of historical and political continuity as some critics suggest. It is true that Italy achieved national unity only after a prolonged struggle with the German people in the course of which—both in 1849 and 1915—the Allies came to her aid, but it is also true that once national unity was achieved and Italian statesmen looked abroad for the beginnings of national aggrandizement, France and Britain, and not Germany, became the chief obstacle to Italy's ambitions.

Italy is a poor country. Her soil is not over-fertile and she lacks nearly all the raw materials necessary for building up an industrial system. Expansion under such conditions is bound to be something of a *tour de force*, and even before the last war Italy was painfully conscious of her economic inadequacy and increasingly envious of those states which, besides possessing mineral riches at home, had added to their economic security by annexing empires overseas. Italy's own attempts—the campaign in Abyssinia, which culminated in the disaster of 1896, and the costly war in Tripoli—tended to increase her economic difficulties and, with them, her bitterness against the "Have" Powers.

By her participation in the Great War, Italy hoped not only to round off the work of national unification through the recovery of her *terra irredenta*, Trieste and Trentino, but also to see herself securely set on the path to European Great Powerhood by some amelioration of her problem of supplies and by the acquisition of territory overseas to confirm her "imperial" status. The secret treaties of London and St. Jean le Maurienne which brought her into

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the war specifically guaranteed that should any redistribution of the German and Turkish empires take place, she would receive an equitable share. Thus Italy came to the Peace Conference with high hopes.

They were frustrated. The matter of access to the raw materials of the world was allowed to drop, and although Italy submitted a draft League Covenant according to which all states were to be guaranteed those raw materials "required to sustain healthy conditions of life and industry," the question never got further than inconclusive debate. A much more serious disappointment awaited her in the colonial sphere. While France and Britain shared Germany's African territory between them and secured from Turkey the mandated territory of Syria, Palestine and Iraq, Italy had to content herself with the confirmation of her sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands, which she had already occupied before the war. Apart from this acquisition—if acquisition it can be called—Italy was left empty-handed in the redistribution of colonial spoils.

These grievous disappointments, coupled with the economic maladjustments which followed in the wake of war, drove Italy into a state of social and nationalist exasperation. It swung first to the Right with D'Annunzio's occupation of Fiume, then to the Left with the Labour troubles and stay-in strikes of 1919 and 1920. The Italian Government showed no particular aptitude in dealing with the ferment, and although the gradual passing of the post-war slump eased the position in the factories towards the end of 1921, the nationalist turmoil continued and was intensified, since, unlike the quarrelling and divided Socialists, the nationalists had found a leader.

Mussolini was, perhaps, the first revolutionary leader to realize that revolution in the West would not come from the Left. He began his political career as a Socialist, and since

his own revolutionary programme was contained in a single article—to establish a personal dictatorship—he would, had he believed the Socialist movement capable of sweeping him to power, undoubtedly have remained with it. But his contacts with the Left during and immediately after the war convinced him that the road to power did not lie through its ranks. It is not likely that his conviction was the result of a rational deduction from first principles; it was probably a piece of political intuition, but it went to the roots of the weakness of the Marxist formulation of revolution—the obstinate refusal of Western society to accept a proletarian ethos, a refusal which sprang in part from the growth and consolidation of the middle class, in part from the fact that the sense of solidarity inspired by membership of the same nation far surpassed any loyalty bred by membership of the same class. Mussolini's intuitive analysis of the revolutionary turmoil in Italy in 1920 and 1921 led him to abandon its social elements and to concentrate on the nationalist discontent and ferment. By doing so, he secured the support of the Conservative elements which had been seriously disturbed by the labour unrest during the post-war slump, but the dynamic element in his new Fascist movement was not "defence of the *status quo*," but "the national self-affirmation of Italy."

Nationalism can never be the programme of a revolution. It does not provide an answer to the many political, social and economic problems raised by a revolutionary change in the structure of a society. But Mussolini at that time did not intend any very revolutionary change in the structure of Italian society. He wished to rule, not transform it, and once the nationalist ferment had carried him to power, his chief preoccupation was to consolidate the position he had achieved. He banned the Trade Unions and dissolved Left Wing parties, but as competing political powers rather than

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

as exponents of an unacceptable social system; and he was equally concerned to ban the political parties on the Right and to disband the political and cultural associations of the Catholic Populists. Although a certain amount of regimentation was introduced, the militarization of youth initiated, ebullient speeches made, and mass demonstrations organized, these were the embellishments of a movement which flowed over the surface of Italian life without radically transforming it.

During the first seven years of the Fascist era, there was much talk of the Corporative State, but no corporations. A capitalist economy carried on as before minus the right to strike. There was no revolutionary social transformation. The structure of monarchy and aristocracy, the system of land tenure, remained intact. The position of the Church was even improved by the Lateran Treaties of 1929. Finally, in the sphere of foreign policy, although there was much talk of the "new Italy" and her "new status," a conciliatory policy was on the whole pursued. Italy co-operated in the League and behaved like a good neighbour, even if there were a permanent undercurrent of friction with her "Latin sister," France.

The world economic crisis put an end to the first period of the Italian revolution, that of a potentially revolutionary dictatorship based upon what was virtually a continuation of the *status quo*. Italy, whose dependence on the outside world was extreme and whose economic position had already been jeopardized by an over-valuation of the lira in 1927, felt the economic blizzard which beset Europe possibly more keenly than any other state. With unemployment rising to catastrophic heights and the standard of living of the whole people falling, a mere maintenance of the *status quo* would have threatened the stability of Mussolini's own position. To meet the revolutionary crisis in the economic situation

he had to resort to revolutionary expedients, and it was here that the intellectual poverty of Fascism became a serious danger. The old economic forms of *laissez-faire* capitalism were breaking down and with them the normal forms of bourgeois society upon which Fascism had been built up without any considerable effort to transform them. If they crumbled, Fascism, whose intellectual content was practically nil,¹ had nothing to offer in their place.

At about the same time, Germany was passing through a similar crisis. Here, too, the mass of the people rejected the Marxist formulation of revolution, yet were caught in a revolutionary situation from which the only outlet could be by way of revolution, since all the old forms of liberal democracy and *laissez-faire* capitalism had lost their validity. Into the vacuum created by the need for revolution combined with the rejection of the only fully formulated theory of revolution—Communism—there rushed the negatively revolutionary force of National Socialism which explicitly rejected any reasonably worked-out theory of social change and based its appeal and its programme upon irrationality. Hitler promised everything—however contradictory—to everybody; and the less he carried conviction, the more he was believed. The result of his triumph was the establishment of a system which had no programme beyond the achievement of power in the first place and the extension and consolidation of that power once it had been achieved.

The subordination of programme to power in the sphere of fact corresponded to the subordination of thought to action in the sphere of theory. Having no new order of society to offer, National Socialism preserved the existing forms of Liberal society—the political party, parliament, the profit motive, capitalists and workers—but into these forms there thrust a new and revolutionary force whose whole

¹ Even Mussolini made no attempt to formulate a theory of Fascism until 1932, and then he laid it down as a first principle that theory was subordinate to action.

energy was derived from the irrational urge for power, naked power, subordinate to no other purpose but regarded as an end in itself. The Party, concrete expression of the will to power, swallowed the State, industry, agriculture, the family, the individual citizen. All ceased to have separate validity and existed only in so far as they served to increase the power of the Nazi Leviathan. The community became the mercenary of the State, the whole industrial and agricultural systems were swung from production for use or profit to production for unadulterated power and expansion. *Wehrwirtschaft* proved to be a totally new kind of economy. Foreign policy became the accepted method of browbeating smaller neighbours and dividing and deceiving larger ones, in the interests of an eventual expansion at their expense.

In Italy the same process was observable. An increased militarization of the whole community, the growth of the fighting services, the turn towards *Wehrwirtschaft* and autarky can all be traced back to the period of the world economic crisis. The old grievances, shortage of raw materials and exclusion from the colonial sphere, were revived to foster the spirit of expansionism and extravagant claims to Mediterranean hegemony began to be bandied about. The Abyssinian War was probably planned as early as 1932 and it was a perfect expression of the new policy of imperialism and power. The success of the war confirmed the new line. Italian troops were barely established in Addis Ababa when a new campaign opened in Spain.

The revolutionary process did not modify Italian society either so fast or so profoundly as the corresponding movement of National Socialism managed to transform the German State. In Italy a deeply rooted culture and the strong and unified Catholic Church fought the disruptive and negative tendencies of the new revolution. The general structure of society had not undergone the same stresses and strains as had

Germany's highly industrialized "late capitalist" system. Some sixty per cent of the Italian people still lived on the land and contributed an important element of social stability and continuity. In the House of Savoy the population had a rallying-point for a loyalty which took the form of traditional patriotism rather than fanatical imperialism. Above all, in the easy, good-natured, shrewd and cynical character of the average Italian, the Duce found poor material for the new totalitarian man.

Yet the elements in each revolution which were akin—the cult of violence, the adoption of power as an end in itself, the abandonment of rational criteria, the substitution of imperialism and expansion as the end of society in place of economic plenty or the good life—all these were sufficient to outweigh the stabilizing factors in Italian society and to draw the two revolutions together, with Germany, the more totalitarian and the more powerful state, as the dominant partner. It can be argued that, whatever the turn of European affairs, Italy would have found herself steadily attracted into the German orbit, but the events of 1936 and 1937 undoubtedly hastened the process.

The failure of France and Britain over sanctions confirmed Italy on the new path of aggression and expansion. The application of sanctions was a sufficiently hostile act to suggest to the Italian people that they, a poor "encircled" country, only seeking a legitimate place in the world and a legitimate share of its good things, were being deprived of their due by the jealousy and avarice of the two greatest Colonial Powers. The talk of closing the Suez which accompanied the Abyssinian campaign encouraged a feeling of claustrophobia in Italy which was assiduously exploited by propaganda at home to suggest that France and Britain were determined to keep Italy a "prisoner" in the Mediterranean and to draw the conclusion that Italy's very

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

existence depended upon the achievement of Mediterranean hegemony. When the original act of hostility was followed by a rather abject failure to make sanctions effective, Italy's exasperation was not wiped away, but her confidence and her self-assertiveness increased a hundredfold. She had withstood the siege of fifty-two nations. What more had she to fear? The expansionists were fully confirmed in their policy and within a month of the removal of sanctions Italy was campaigning in Spain.

Already during the Abyssinian campaign Germany and Italy had lent each other valuable support, Germany by abstaining from sanctions, Italy by obstructing the Allies' protest at Germany's violation of the Locarno Treaty. The Spanish campaign brought them closer together. The adventure upon which Mussolini embarked in the first flush of his Abyssinian triumph, threatened after Russian intervention and the first hard encounter at Guadalajara to turn to disaster. It was at this point that Italy drove a bargain by virtue of which she withdrew her support of Austrian independence (thus opening Germany's way to the South East), but received in return German co-operation in the Spanish campaign, a bargain of doubtful value, for by the close of the Civil War it was Germany rather than Italy whose predominance in Spain seemed secure, while in the South-East the German avalanche was sweeping away all other interests and privileges including those of its Axis partner.

The Spanish campaign confirmed the impression created by sanctions, that Britain and France were too decadent, too old, too weary to dispute their imperial position and were ripe to be thrown from power by the rising young Fascist nations. On the other hand, the need for a bargain with Germany was a painful reminder that Italy would be most unlikely to achieve the longed-for Mediterranean hegemony

without substantial help from some other power which, since France and Britain were the Powers to be ousted, could only be Germany. Italy's greed and her dependence were increased at a stroke. She could not renounce her ambitions, but she could not realize them without German assistance. Her helplessness if left to stand alone was accentuated by the strain of two wars. A desperate shortage of raw materials was crippling her armament industry, and not even the privations imposed on the Italian people, the use of synthetic substitutes and the resort to every expedient known to autarky, could disguise the fact that Italy remained dependent upon outside sources of supply for very nearly eighty per cent of all her vital raw materials and that those sources could be cut off completely in time of war by the closing of Suez and Gibraltar, both in Allied hands.

Thus, even had the Duce so wished, once he and his country were committed to a revolutionary policy of power and expansion, he could no longer dispense with the Germans. The Nazi revolution began to exercise a profound influence on Italian society. On a tragic plane there was the introduction of racial laws, on a comic the adoption of the goose-step. Military and commercial missions crossed the Brenner, German tourists arrived in a steady stream. Banking and insurance "experts" appeared in the Italian Ministries. Italy's dependence upon the German market grew; by 1938 a quarter of all her foreign trade was with the Reich. The practice of sending thousands of Italian harvesters to Germany to make good the German labour shortage began. These workers were submitted to strong doses of German propaganda which seeped into Italy by a thousand other channels besides. There grew up in Italy as in every other state laid open to the Nazi infection a class of men who placed the orders of their German masters before common

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

loyalty to their own state. For all the Nazis' outward manifestations of friendship, they made every effort to surround the Duce with their own men so that the final threat of loss of power could be held over him, should he at any time attempt to check his country's disastrous advance towards complete servitude.

It was in the foreign sphere that Italy's dependence became most apparent. By 1938 her partnership in the Axis had reduced her to the position of "brilliant second." She was given virtually no warning of the annexation of Austria nor was her opinion sought on the timing and methods employed during the Sudeten crisis. She was merely brought in at the last moment to help the Nazis to secure their objective without the necessity of going to war. However, so brilliant were Germany's successes, and secured at so little cost, that Italy's opinion of the Western democracies was once again confirmed and *decadenza plutodemocratica* became an article of faith. Germany's growing power and the Nazis' encroachments on spheres of interest hitherto looked on as primarily Italian seemed less important in Rome than the weakness and ineptitude of Italy's two Mediterranean rivals. The Italian leaders argued that if mere pressure could bring about so easy a surrender in Central Europe, there was no reason to suppose that the same process would not have the same results in the Mediterranean. A Mediterranean "Munich" because an obsession. As a policy, it exactly suited the grandeur of Italy's ambitions and the weakness of her economic and military position. Given her shortage of supplies and her extreme economic and geographical vulnerability, the ideal conquest was one for which she would not have to fight at all; the next best, one which could be achieved by a very short and brilliantly successful war. But once again, neither a "Munich" nor a successful short campaign at the expense of the West were conceivable except

in collaboration with the mighty military machine of the Nazi Reich.

Italy had therefore to wait her turn, and all through the winter of 1938-9, while she raised the cry of "Tunis, Corsica, Nice," she was privately urging on Germany the necessity of shifting the focus of "treaty revision" from Central Europe to the Mediterranean. Germany's answer was the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, the taking of Memel and the opening of a campaign against Poland. Italy was allowed some small compensation in Albania, but she was obviously receiving the scantest consideration from her Axis partner. Nevertheless, she clung to the belief that Germany's aims were almost satisfied and that her turn would come. In May, 1939, the Pact of Milan was signed in this hope. Outwardly it was a full offensive and defensive alliance against Britain and France. In fact, it included the secret proviso that Italy's preparations for war would take three years to complete. In the meantime, she hoped to secure all she could in the Munich manner. But she was not yet ready for the "short and brilliantly successful war."

Germany reassured her by saying that the Nazi war machine needed four or even five years. In the meantime, pressure on Poland would continue, Poland would cede Danzig and the Corridor, the West would not fight, and the process of weakening the democracies by every expedient short of war would continue. There was nothing in this programme with which Italy was likely to quarrel. In the event, however, Poland refused to negotiate, and when Germany, exasperated by the Poles' "stubborn obstinacy," drove their tanks across the Polish frontiers, France and Britain declared war.

Since the outbreak of war there have always been two sides to the problem of Italian intervention: Germany's military needs on the one hand, Italy's ambitions and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

weaknesses on the other. Of the two, Germany's needs are probably decisive, since the isolation of non-belligerency has greatly increased Italy's dependence upon Germany. In September, 1939, Germany had a variety of reasons for keeping Italy clear of the conflict. In the first place, the Nazi leaders still believed that a quick Polish defeat, followed by a peace offer from Berlin, would discourage the West from fighting on. It was therefore essential to keep the conflict localized and at the same time to keep Italy in the background as an honest broker against the day of the coming peace offer. When Britain and France refused to negotiate over Poland's carcass and the long months of "siege warfare" began, Germany still preferred Italy as a non-belligerent ally, since, as a belligerent, she would have provided the Allies with various starting-points for an offensive and might quickly have become a military liability. As a non-belligerent she was of the greatest assistance in helping Germany to evade the Allied blockade, and as the months dragged on and it became clear that Germany could resist that kind of economic pressure practically indefinitely, provided the Allies did not tighten their blockade and the Balkans remained at peace, Italy's non-belligerency was a guarantee of both conditions.

Non-belligerency also served Italy's interests. Her war machine had been in a precarious condition at the outbreak of war. Her army was undergoing a process of reorganization and her war stocks had not yet recovered from the drain of the Spanish war. Italian public opinion was against the war. Poland, a Catholic country, had been wiped out and the people at large could see no reason why Italy should engage herself in a conflict designed for German aggrandizement in which not a single Italian interest was at stake. The Vatican, hostile from the beginning to the Axis connexion, used the atrocities committed in Poland as an excuse to exercise all

ITALY AND THE GERMAN ALLIANCE

its political influence in the direction of continued peace. Conservative and anti-German circles, many of them extremely influential, joined their efforts to those of the Pope. It was obviously impossible at that time to bring a united people into a war even had Italy's state of preparedness warranted intervention.

However, the first six months of war brought many changes. In the sphere of internal organization the substitution of Ettore Muti for Starace as Secretary of the Fascist Party was a further step towards the assimilation of Nazi methods and Nazi models. Muti had studied the German system in Berlin, it is said, under the personal guidance of Himmler. He imported into the Fascist Party a new ruthlessness and a new discipline. The Italians' old mixture of cynicism and tolerance which had been their chief bulwark against totalitarianism gave ground before the new assault. With German assistance, a new and more formidable propaganda campaign was prepared. In the economic sphere, the Government went to fantastic lengths to build up war supplies, hawking their currency in return for dollars and spending far beyond the limits of financial security to lay in stocks of petrol, rubber, cotton and scrap. The cost of living rose fifty and sixty per cent, rigid rationing was introduced, and the Italian people began to wonder whether it was not a return to the period of sanctions.

This new economic stringency made the war more unpopular, but it also played into the hands of the propagandists. France and Britain, sitting with their contraband controls at Suez and Gibraltar, were made responsible for Italy's shortages. Here were the two plutocracies with their world-wide dominions again strangling the life out of Italy, prisoner in her own sea, just as they were attempting to obstruct Germany's "peaceful" attempts to secure sufficient *Lebensraum*. Little by little, from being an attack

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

by Germany upon Polish independence the war became a life-and-death struggle of the Axis partners against the selfish imperialism of the decadent West. The complete irrelevance of our contraband control to Italy's new economic difficulties was realized only by the informed few. The mass of the people began to blame France and Britain for their daily shortages and inconveniences. The war took on a popular aspect.

At about this time, in April, the Allies determined to tighten their contraband control. Germany altered her policy accordingly. If the blockade were to become effective, she could no longer afford to wait. First Norway then the Low Countries then Northern France were overrun. Early in June, two months of *Blitzkrieg* had brought the German mechanized columns and infantry to the gates of Paris. There were, naturally, profound repercussions on the Axis. Germany had now reason to revise her views on Italian non-belligerency. The war had moved from the economic to the military sphere. Everything, too, was staked on victory in the shortest possible time. Italy as a leakage in the blockade was useful in a long siege. In a lightning war of movement, her active military support, by threatening France's southern frontiers and diverting part of the Allies' military attention to the Mediterranean, might prove decisive.

Italy's position, too, had altered. Germany's smashing successes helped to persuade her that it would be a very short war and a very great victory. Here at last the possibility of achieving Mediterranean hegemony without the risk of military defeat and economic ruin seemed within Italy's grasp. Her stocks were now capable of meeting three or four months of war; her people were, if not enthusiastic, at least a little roused by the intensive anti-Allied campaign launched just before the invasion of Norway. Conservative circles which had used the military power of the Western

ITALY AND THE GERMAN ALLIANCE

democracies and their chances of victory as a telling argument were silenced. Even the Pope's great influence was powerless to counteract the Nazi virus which had run through the blood of Italy so thoroughly that the semi-official *Relazioni Internazionali* could write: "There is no room in Italy for people with moral preoccupations," and again: "In this conflict we have no scruples."

Thus on June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on France and Britain and the Italian people prepared to seal with their blood the fatal alliance into which their leaders had betrayed them. Whatever the outcome of the struggle, Italy must lose. If Hitler is victorious, the Italians will retain colonial status if they are fortunate; their very independence will be at stake. If Germany is defeated, Italy will share in her degradation and downfall. Few wars have been entered on with a more cynical disregard of the people's real interests. And it is Italy's tragedy that the people and not the leaders will bear the full weight of the disaster which must ensue.

NOTES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON CHARACTER

By KINGSLEY MARTIN

HITLER has expressed a special detestation for British and American journalists. He holds them responsible for the war. In a madly inverted sense he is right. If the world had not been told what Hitler's plans were and what his régime was like, his piecemeal conquests might have succeeded without any but isolated wars. During the early days of the Nazi régime the most strenuous opponents of Hitler were the foreign journalists in Berlin. First under the leadership of Edgar Mowrer and then under William Ebbutt of the *Times* the international journalists insisted on sending truthful dispatches and maintained for several years a considerable degree of independence. Gradually Goebbels got rid of these stubborn tellers of the truth. Excuses were found for expelling them; they were harried and threatened and forbidden official information. Gradually editors who wanted up-to-date news from Berlin substituted "yes-men." Even so, there were always a number of journalists, mainly Americans with world reputations, who were too important to be easily kept out of Germany and who filled the world's newspapers with accounts of the persecution of the Jews, Hitler's military plans and the horrors of the concentration camps. To tell the truth about these matters was necessarily to make war more likely. Only if Hitler had been able to keep the world as ignorant as Germany could he have succeeded without rousing the British and American peoples.

These journalists have lived an extraordinary life during the last ten years. I know no race of men so independent, so tough, so realistic, and so fundamentally humane. Ask

NOTES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON CHARACTER

them what God they served and they would tell you that they were news-hounds and nothing more. They were observers, and if what they saw and reported roused decent people to righteous anger, that was the fault of Fascism and not theirs. They have told their story in cables, articles and books from every country where violence has sought either to impose or remedy injustice. They have demonstrated that peace is not compatible with justice and that in this epoch the price of liberty is often death. They have tried hard not to take sides. They have been news reporters, not politicians, and yet, since facts are the most effective propaganda, they have been the most powerful of anti-Fascist propagandists. Nor in their lives have they always been able to resist the logic of their own reports. Often they have been compelled to drop the rôle of observers and take part in the struggle itself. Some of them were more than reporters in the Spanish Civil War. Others became deeply involved in the war in China and risked their own lives and jobs in helping to save the lives of refugees. Because they could not escape the logic of Hitlerism and knew its methods and purposes at first hand they became, when they advocated no policy, the most fervent protagonists of the policy of resistance to Nazi Germany. Observers first, they could not help being men and moralists.

In a remarkable play called *Thunder Rock* by Robert Ardrey, acted this summer in Kensington, we are shown two such journalists who are no longer able to maintain their pose of neutrality. They agree that they have no message for the world; things have gone too far. Civilisation is crashing. They want to put a message in a bottle and throw it into the sea, so that sometime their words may mean something to posterity. But what is the message? One of them, an airman, wearing the American reporter's conventional garment of tough cynicism, decides that he

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

must throw himself into the struggle somewhere. It does not matter what he does; he cannot remain an observer. He is on his way to China to fight against the Japanese bombers. Has he really no faith or ideals left? asks his friend. Would he fight for the Japanese? He is furious. What! Bomb Chinese civilians instead of dying in battle against the Japanese? . . . He breaks off, realising that he has given himself away. His cynicism is only skin deep; he is under a compulsion to take an active part in helping the victims of violence even though he has little hope of good coming from it. He is contemptuous of his friend, Charleston's, solution. Charleston has found an ivory tower, a lighthouse, where he works alone in the middle of Lake Michigan. He too has lost his "objectivity," as he explains, and has had to get out of journalism. He too is a moral being, he is still trying to resist the impulse to throw himself into a struggle too complex to understand. He seeks a personal solution in a past epoch, only to find that the characters he re-creates in his mind were themselves confronted with problems similar to his. They too believed that civilisation was ended and they failed to make their contribution to its salvation because they too acted as immigrants, paralysed by catastrophe. Fortified by a rational hope that he may be mistaken, even as they were, and that it may still be possible to aid the growth of the good, he too abandons his ivory tower.

I ask myself whether one can imagine such a play being written by anyone but an American or a Briton. This type of moral conflict is almost an Anglo-Saxon speciality. The Englishman and the American are sure in their hearts that it is their duty to put the world to rights. They may withdraw from obligations as the Americans did in 1919 or as British Governments have done consistently since the last war. But it has been with an intense sense of moral

NOTES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON CHARACTER

discomfort and it is this moral preoccupation as much as fear for their own safety that has in the end led them into war with Germany. Confronted with the agonising choice of surrender to the Nazis or devastating war, men and women in France, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Holland and Belgium have all hesitated and been overwhelmed. But the choice was to them, far more than to us, a choice of evils, consciously realised. They weighed the chances of survival. The British and Americans never doubted their survival until the Germans were actually in the Low Countries and Channel ports. Always they argued on the basis of morality. Was war ever right and, if so, was this war justifiable or necessary? They thought not in terms of power, but in terms of ethics.

II

To generalise about the innate character of so-called "races" and nations is the temptation of fools and historians. There are no pure races and we know nothing of the psychological attributes of the national germ cell. We know that governments act differently and that people at various epochs behave according to national patterns. Beyond that, generalisations about national character are usually superficial and misleading. The French, according to my mother's geography book, were "a gay people, fond of light wine and dancing." The Germans were dreamy, wore spectacles and drank beer. The Russians were mystics, living close to the soil and worshipping the Tsar. The Americans were Shylocks and the British called by Providence to rule the world. You had only to cross the seas or change your generation to get all these ideas reversed. The Germans were called to rule the world; so were the French not so long ago. In the eighteenth century the English were regarded as a revolutionary and unstable people, who made a habit of cutting off the heads of their kings. After the French

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Revolution these rôles were precisely reversed. It would not be difficult to compile a list from the writers of every country claiming exactly those qualities we deny them and denying us the qualities we claim. There is always evidence for all such generalisations. I have known Russians more phlegmatic than any Englishman and Englishmen more excitable than any character in Dostoevsky. Germany makes the most interesting study of all. It is safest not to say that the Germans are a "race of carnivorous sheep," well though that phrase summarises the predatory and disciplined behaviour that is so familiar to us. One may learn more but reach no satisfying conclusion by a more materialistic approach; one notes that Germany was never conquered by Rome, that the peasant upheavals that brought in the West of Europe an increase of popular power resulted in Germany in a more oppressive feudalism, that the development of Germany was thrown back by centuries through the destruction of the religious wars and that when Germany was unified the task was done, not through the democratic urge everywhere alive to the early nineteenth century, but through the conquering power of the poorest, most militant and racially the least Germanic part of Germany.

I believe that the characteristics of which the British have so often boasted—the courage (an almost universal human characteristic), the individualism, tolerance, sportsmanship and the rest—are mainly to be attributed to Britain's insular position and to the confidence resulting from freedom from invasion for nearly nine hundred years.

In the nineteenth century, we were so much the dominant empire and so much stronger than anyone else that we learnt to extol lack of foresight as a virtue. From our insular security, it was easy and attractive to support the under-dog; the observer always tends to take the part of the weaker side in a scrap, and Britain had the practical incentive that it was

always to our interest to prevent any great Power from becoming dominant on the continent. Palmerston, John Russell and Gladstone gave us a generous notion of ourselves in foreign affairs. Interest and sportsmanship coincided. Unafraid ourselves, the public enjoyed it when the Government sent stern letters of protest to despots, urged on them the virtues of the British Constitution and more or less openly supported the agitations of oppressed minorities. No one has yet attempted a careful survey of the effects of our intervention on behalf of the Greeks, the Italians, the Poles, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, and the Armenians. We certainly helped the Italians and the Greeks, but it must be admitted that our help was offset by the expectations of help that we roused, but did not always fulfil. No historian has yet worked out the full influence of men like Kossuth, Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Kropotkin, on the minds of British intelligentsia and the working class. John Bull, we were brought up to believe, was a friend of the weak and the oppressed, and since he was often oblivious to the real meaning of British imperialism in India, Egypt and elsewhere, he easily won the reputation of hypocrisy. He accepted as axiomatic that foreign empires were tyrannical and oppressive, and that Britain must have an Empire and must somehow or other not be tyrannical and oppressive. He was willing on occasion to punish his servants if they shot down natives; the one thing he never did was to admit that empires cannot exist without shooting or the threat of shooting.

In the eighteenth century, the British middle class was swept by a Puritan Revolution, which coincided with and was partly derived from the needs of industrialism. During the nineteenth century, the Puritan mentality dominated British Liberal opinion and was surprisingly successful in imposing itself on the quite un-Puritan landed aristocracy, which indeed maintained a full share of power by itself profiting by the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

industrial possibilities of the age and learning to govern in partnership with the middle-class. Peel and Melbourne could succeed one another; Derbys and Greys were still among the rulers of England in 1914. The essential craving of this mentality is to be at ease with its own conscience; it cannot admit what every man of affairs knew to be the case—that government is always a more or less ugly thing, that consent is never more than partial, and that force conquers an Empire and plays a large part in maintaining it. Above all, a Puritan democracy can never go into a war without a moral excuse; a moral excuse by itself will not be sufficient, but nor will a reason of State or call of self-interest. The two must coincide. The foreigner noted with grim amusement the British genius for finding a moral reason to coincide with a political necessity or an economic advantage.

Brought up in a Puritan middle-class home, I cannot ever remember hearing politics discussed except in terms of right and wrong. Trade was good. Tariff Reform was wicked, and there were excellent economic arguments in favour of the first and against the second. Those arguments would scarcely have counted if Free Trade had not also been a peace doctrine making for co-operation among nations, in opposition to the immorality of tariffs which were associated with class and national selfishness and the war mentality. We were fighting in the army of the good, for progress and social reform; the Conservatives, who opposed us, had themselves to accept these criteria. The Utilitarian creed of Bentham, the view, that is, that policy must be decided by the happiness and prosperity of the masses, was not the real creed of the Conservatives, who believed (and could have quoted good arguments from Coleridge and others for their belief) in authority and government by a ruling class with experience and a tradition. But they were shamed out of their real creed; they argued on their opponents' premises and were

forced bit by bit to give way to a democratic philosophy.

In the realm of foreign affairs, the results of this moral preoccupation among the population have been constant and profound. It has been impossible for our rulers, even if clear-sighted themselves, to be honest with the public. The man who is responsible for the policy of a great Empire has to do innumerable things that do not square with the teachings of Christianity. A simple-minded ruler like Queen Victoria saw no ethical problem; to her, Christian duty was always that which suited the interests of the British ruling class. An honest Christian like Bright found it impossible to remain in a Cabinet, while a gigantic and complicated intellect like Gladstone's was constantly driven into the most involved and, as it often seems to us, disingenuous arguments to justify actions which a Disraeli, who was not a Christian in any sense we need worry about, would have done simply on the ground that they were expedient. This does not mean that Gladstone was not a man of principle; on the contrary he risked his career by his book on "Church and State," and again, as a free-lance, he behaved with the greatest courage in exposing the nauseous evils of Neapolitan prisons. But in office the gap between principle and practicability had somehow to be bridged. The public had to believe that justice and right were being done, just as certainly as it had to be satisfied that British interest and prestige were being upheld. Hence, in examining our pre-war history, we have to disentangle at every point what our statesmen were doing to maintain and extend the Empire from the reasons they gave for doing it. Often, no doubt, they convinced themselves of these reasons, but their success or failure depended rather on their capacity to convince the public that what they were doing was morally justified.

England's last aggressive war was fought in South Africa. During the Boer War, the Fabian Society published a

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

enemies on both fronts. But those immensely complicated and important decisions were quite outside the ordinary man's knowledge. He was pleased when Germany was checked in 1906, scarcely alarmed when Hungary seized Bosnia in 1908, and glad when a strong speech by Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House warned off the Kaiser in 1911.

It was indeed only in 1911, during the Agadir crisis, that the country came to realise that war was still a likely possibility. For Lord Grey to have come out with an honest statement about our position would certainly have split the Liberal Party, with internal and external consequences which he would certainly have regarded as disastrous. It seemed better to keep foreign politics as the prerogative of a small inner cabinet. Those who are interested in the technique of government can most easily gain an insight into the way this was managed by reading the fascinating memoirs of Lord Esher. Here one watches astute brains working behind the scenes. New Cabinet Ministers are carefully weighed. Has So-and-so risen to fame because of his success with the common people? If so, he must be watched, but not told too much. Or is he a quiet reliable member of one of the old families who can be trusted not to confuse government with politics, and trained for eventual service in that supreme body, the Committee of Imperial Defence, which Lord Esher devoted his life to building? Lloyd George and John Burns had their uses; they spoke in the moral language which the people understood. They did it all the better no doubt for believing themselves high-minded anti-imperialists. But they were not men to let into the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The more one reads of pre-war history, the more clearly one sees this sharp distinction between the governing men, concerned with empire, and the politicians, concerned with social reform and popular favour. A man like Asquith was the natural Premier since he belonged to both worlds and it

NOTES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON CHARACTER

was his business to adjust their relations. The first group, the governing imperialists, were mainly permanent officials, many of them unknown to the public. Lord Esher was asked to be Viceroy of India, but said "he would rather break stones;" he was offered the post of Secretary of State for War by Balfour and refused, only to be approached by Asquith for the same position when the Liberals came into power. He was perhaps the most influential man in England, but he was scarcely known to the public except as a name in a list of those who attended the King. In the same way, the real heads of the great Service Departments were usually hidden from the public gaze. It is worth while remembering that the personnel of the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office was almost exclusively recruited from a few public schools with the governing tradition. Lord Esher and his friends would have been happy if this division between politics to please the public and government to maintain British interests could have been complete. It was not difficult to maintain continuity when new governments came in, because the ambitious politician was not much interested in questions of defence and imperial policy, and there were always quieter men like Haldane, who were interested rather in the substance of power than in political popularity. But the two spheres could not be kept wholly distinct. The immense energy of a man like Mr. Lloyd George, for instance, had a pervasive influence. One may trace in Lord Esher's diaries, the alarm that was felt when the reforming Chancellor's taxation proposals brought on a conflict with the House of Lords, a situation, as Lord Esher put it, "too perilously" like "that of 1640 for my taste." Lord Esher advised the Crown throughout the struggle over the Lords, the Budget and Ireland: he was the shrewd intimate of Balfour and the King; he was always on the side of the Tories, but anxious above all to avoid the sort of conflict that would bring the King into politics and rouse

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

democracy too much to assert itself. Esher and his friends knew well that in the last resort this subtle game of maintaining two incompatibles, an Empire, which is ultimately governed by force in the interests of a ruling class, and a democracy which may indirectly profit by the Empire but which is founded on ideas of consent and morality, depended on the existence of safeguards which would prevent the electorate from damaging the institution of private property.

To the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Inner Cabinet, the European crisis of 1914 did not come as a surprise. They had hoped that it would not come at all, but they had feared that it might, and were at least partially prepared for it. They were not fully prepared, partly because Service departments usually prepare for the last war rather than for the next one, and partly because eight years of Liberal government, mainly occupied with social reform, had not provided liberally for the fighting services. But their naval and military agreements with Russia and France were fully developed; after Haldane's vain effort to come to an understanding with Germany in 1911, he had been put in charge of the organisation of an expeditionary force and had accomplished his task with great efficiency. The problem lay in the fact that the public, Parliament and indeed the majority of the Cabinet did not know of these preparations or of our obligations to France and Russia. The governing men knew well that if Austria invaded Serbia, Russia must help Serbia, and that France would be obliged to help Russia, and we should have to dispose of our fleet in a manner pre-arranged with France and Russia, and likely to bring us into conflict with Germany. Moreover, a German victory on the continent would be fatal to Britain's position. Almost inevitably, if war began, we should be involved. But this would not be enough for the public who would want a moral as well as a strategic and imperial reason for fighting. It would be necessary, for

NOTES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON CHARACTER

instance, to satisfy Mr. Lloyd George, who was the most popular radical politician and who was opposed to our entry into a war on account of a quarrel in Eastern Europe. The invasion of Belgium solved the government's dilemma.

III

The war of 1914-19 was an immense drain on the manhood and vitality of all classes in Britain and in France. A few far-seeing imperialists knew that they could not permanently maintain their ascendancy on the old self-regarding basis. The French understood this well; they saw the problem simply in terms of a revived German menace, and they sought to build up the League of Nations as a permanent guarantee of the *status quo* in Europe. In the idealistic reaction from the war, that Puritan middle-class which had played so large a part in British politics in the nineteenth century took a very different view of the League. If they had been accustomed to view politics in terms of power, as the French were they might still have believed in the League. They could have looked at it as Norman Angell did, as a means whereby the security of Britain and France could be obtained during an intermediate period required for the building of an international system which would render aggression impossible and great armaments unnecessary. Unfortunately their morality came into headlong collision with what was called French realism. The conflict wrecked the League. Germany was neither effectively suppressed nor intelligently conciliated. To the French, British behaviour was inexcusable. We entered the war; directly it was over we assumed that we could step out again and view Europe from our superior isolation. But I am not again about to tell the story of how Britain and France supported each other and threw away mankind's opportunity. Nor am I going to examine the fundamental contradictions of British capitalism which lie

behind the confusions of our foreign policy. I want only to point out the chasm that existed between the governing men and the vocal groups of British opinion. The governing men were groping blindly in a new world in which their traditional behaviour no longer brought the expected results. They could not for a moment adjust their minds to the ideal of an international society. They were dimly conscious that their word was no longer law in the world and they were terrified of explosions from the underworld such as that which had led to communism in Russia. They lived by expedients, and because they could think out no consistent policy they were unable to rule effectively and only just able to resist the demand for idealistic policies which seemed to them to bear no relation to British interests. Meanwhile no one attempted any honest reply to those idealists who were as much as ever set upon following a moral path and as little as ever in a position realistically to calculate its cost. The idealistic element in the British public was certainly right in holding that British and France through the League could have done anything they liked in Europe up to 1935; they were probably right in thinking that Japan could have been checked without war in 1931. But the moral way of looking at the matter, which was the only way the public, particularly the Left public, had learnt, gave those who governed a continuous excuse for avoiding actions which they did not wish to take. The one sentiment that united the entire country was the desire to avoid war. For the first time in history a ruling class feared war even more than the "intellectuals." Hence it was always possible to plead lack of power and lack of armaments and to throw confusion into the ranks of those who wished to build a world in which aggression should be impossible.

The "Left" throughout this controversy has an excellent case, because it was obvious throughout the Manchurian,

Abyssinian and Spanish wars that the primary reasons for the inaction of the British and French Governments was sympathy with the ruling class of Japan and Italy. But it should in fairness be admitted that there was deep confusion in the minds of many who asked for strong action by Britain and France. The idealistic public still lived unconsciously in the nineteenth-century world in which we believed that in foreign affairs we acted from moral motives, and the Communists, who believed nothing of the sort, deliberately exploited British morality and humanitarianism. And the fact that the League existed and represented the power of fifty-two nations, on paper at least, gave good ground for retaining the notion that righteousness rather than self-interest should dictate policy. Some of us certainly argued that loyalty to the Covenant was Britain's best defence and the only alternative to monstrous rearmament. But I recall as a vivid instance of a state of mind expressed in countless meetings over a period of years, a particular "united front" gathering in the Town Hall of a provincial city to discuss sanctions against Italy. The first speaker vigorously demanded economic sanctions and as vigorously denounced a war as the betrayal of the working classes. The next supported economic sanctions, but pointed out that they might lead to war, and that in that case we should be committed to it. The third said that since war was possible there must be no sanctions. The fourth said of course there must be no war, but that we should block the Suez Canal at once, and the fifth took the entire discussion away into the lofty realms of Christian pacifism. All the speeches dealt with the problem in terms of morality; the difficulty lay in the conflict of two moralities, the moral feeling against war, and the moral desire to prevent the triumphant progress of organised brutality.

It was this deep and general confusion between hatred

of war and desire to put the world to rights that gave Mr. Chamberlain his peculiar hold. Mr. Chamberlain represented Big Business and City interests; he thought in terms of trade. But his loathing of war was shared by everyone in Britain and it was for that reason that he was able to maintain office until the time when, nine months after war had been declared, it became obvious that there was no way out of it and also that there was a grave danger of losing it without the leadership of those who were prepared to carry through the reorganisation necessary to wage it.

Singularly unresponsive to the undercurrents, and unusually aloof from the main current of popular British tradition, Mr. Chamberlain was the very man to put international politics on a business footing. At last and at the wrong epoch we had a Prime Minister who was converted, not by the doctrines of the post-war League of Nations Norman Angell, but by the Norman Angell of 1912 who taught that war could never be anything but disastrous to economic interests. Mr. Chamberlain saw clearly the immense dangers of the old nationalist feeling, of that moral attitude which is part of the Puritan tradition of Britain. The old cries, the rights of small nations, the fight of right against might, international law and the rest, had become to him as unreal as it had to many socialists. The socialist believed that he saw beyond them to the day of popular international government; Mr. Chamberlain believed that he saw through them to the political possibility of successful co-operation between capitalist governments. Thus when Mr. Chamberlain went to Munich his umbrella became a symbol. It was the symbol of business and respectability in contrast to romance and adventure: the symbol of the substitution of the common-sense weapons of peace for the weapons of war. It was the financier's shelter against bombs; it was an appeal for moderation, comfort and decency made in the heart of a

nation led by ruthless, warlike and revolutionary men.

But it is only partly true that Mr. Chamberlain took the traditional morality out of British politics. He had his own moral standards and in a world in which every sane person regarded war as a wicked and loathsome anachronism, to stand as a peacemaker, or even as the man who kept his country out of war, was in itself to make a moral appeal. I know that after Munich Mr. Chamberlain sincerely believed that he had indeed been the instrument of Providence in saving his country from war. Mr. Chamberlain's biographers and friends have all borne testimony to the influence of Mrs. Chamberlain on the Prime Minister; she is, I believe, if not a member, at least a close sympathiser with the Oxford Group Movement. Sir Horace Wilson, now head of the British Civil Service and Mr. Chamberlain's close adviser, is, I hear, also an adherent of Dr. Buchman. It must be remembered that Dr. Buchman publicly thanked God for Hitler, because Hitler had saved Europe from Communism. Now, I don't for a moment suggest that Mr. or Mrs. Chamberlain ever liked Hitler or the Nazi régime; indeed, as a British business man, accustomed to the give and take of commercial intercourse and humanely averse to cruelty and persecution, I am sure that Mr. Chamberlain loathed the Nazis and all their works. But I think he too assumed that Hitler was a bulwark against Soviet Russia, thanked God for the delivery of Europe from Communism, and approached the problem of Nazi Germany in the spirit of a good Buchmanite, who is guided to eschew cut-throat competition and come to terms with his business rival whatever his morals or methods. It is certain that he saw, when he came to office, that Europe was heading for war and that he knew that the one Power that seriously threatened Britain was Germany. It is known that in 1935, when the question of Abyssinia arose, that the experts reported the British Navy would be in a position to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

deal, if necessary, with two of the aggressive Powers, but it would be highly dangerous to engage in war with more. They reported that the only serious danger came from Germany. The natural Foreign Office reply to such a diagnosis was that we needed allies in the east of Europe in order to maintain a balance of power and keep Germany in check. That was to state the matter from a purely British national angle. It was also possible to state this policy idealistically and to urge that through the doctrine of collective security we could build up a system in which all the nations would stand together against aggression and which Germany could enter if she would. But Mr. Chamberlain, the realist, was convinced that whether in its Foreign Office or its idealistic form the doctrine of the firm stand against the aggressor would lead us into war.

As a business man, he assumed that the new Germany would need, as all great industrial enterprises did need, more *lebensraum*, more room to expand, and as he explained on more than one occasion, Germany's natural field for expansion was in eastern and southern Europe. Therefore, it seemed to him that the way to peace was to persuade this new Nazi Germany rationally to expand its economic power without making war on its neighbours; to assure Hitler, who seemed obsessed with the fear of encirclement, that we were not his enemies, but his willing collaborators; that we had no objection, provided he left the West alone, to his domination of eastern Europe. The Left described this as the policy of war against the Soviet Union. The matter is not so simple. Hitler had announced in *Mein Kampf* a determination to colonise the Ukraine, and if he had a free hand in the East, it was obvious that a Russian-German war was probable. That, Mr. Chamberlain would have said, was not his business. If it happened we should at once be immune from the danger of Bolshevism and from the aggression of Hitler. It might

NOTES ON THE ANGLO-SAXON CHARACTER

or might not happen. His concern was to disinterest Britain in eastern Europe, to prevent the absurdity, as he felt it, of Britain once again becoming involved in the age-long struggle between Slav and Teuton, and to heal, if he could, the rivalry between France and Germany and between British and German imperialism. The decisive factor was that British and German capital could both gain by collaboration and would both be destroyed by war. Hence he evolved a simple policy that appealed to his instincts and, he believed, to British interests. He would make direct personal contact with the dictators whose *entourage* he distrusted, he would override the traditions of British policy and discard the usual advisers, and attempt the personal task of winning the friendship and collaboration both of the Italian and German dictators. Mr. Chamberlain assumed, as the stricter Marxists assumed, that Hitler's Germany was subject to the usual appeals of capitalism. Munich would have worked if Hitler too had been a disciple of Norman Angell. One assumes that Mr. Chamberlain has not read *Mein Kampf*.

It is difficult to tell just what is happening to the character of Britain to-day. We remain even in war surprisingly tolerant and decent. If there are bitter feelings beneath the surface because we have been disastrously led and because our soldiers have been killed by inefficiency, stupidity, routine and half-heartedness, these feelings are repressed in face of the common danger. These feelings will find expression, I venture to prophecy, in new and strange ways at a later stage. For the moment many English people are proud of being left alone to fight and relieved as well as anxious at the defeat of their allies. All the islander's pride is aroused. Mr. Baldwin and many others had told us that we could no longer rely on our insular security. But it is one thing to know intellectually that a blow has been struck at the foundations of your faith and another actually to discard that faith. Still instinctively

the British think of Britain as "a fortress built by Nature for herself, against infestation and the hand of war, a precious stone set in a silver sea which serves it in the office of a wall, or as a moat defensive to a house against the envy of less happier lands." To-day we are wondering how good a defence this moat will prove against the envy of less happier lands, and we know in our hearts that whatever happens in this war we are now and for ever irrevocably part of Europe. We shall no longer decide on moral grounds nicely balanced with those of interest whether to help this nation or that; we shall never again preach sermons from a bomb-proof pulpit—that is now an American prerogative. We shall suffer with Europe as part of Europe and have to learn like other frightened people to use our brains. Muddling through was no sign of genius; it just meant that we had more money, more security and a bigger fleet than other people and so could more easily afford our mistakes. A knock-out blow has been dealt to British morality. We shall calculate in future not from the mountain heights of security, but from the common levels of expediency which have dictated the policies of other European nations. We shall perforce become realists. Britain must develop a new "national character."

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

A STUDY has recently been published on the subject of the publicity undertaken by the executive departments of the United States Government.¹ The movement which this enquiry records has been paralleled by a similar development in Britain. Unfortunately, little attention has been given to the matter in this country, though it would well repay investigation.

Governments of all kinds have relied to some extent on rudimentary forms of publicity as a means of enforcing their policies and enhancing their prestige for several centuries. It is clear, also, that the need for not hiding one's light under a bushel has increased with every expansion in the scope of government and every extension in its mass appeal. The deliberate employment of professional exponents of the art of publicity, and the full use of its elaborate technique is, however, comparatively recent. It represents one of those large unnoticed changes which are sometimes described as "a silent revolution," though that *cliché* is singularly inapt to describe the growth of official machinery for giving voice to the activities of the Government.

Mr. McCamy's book gives a useful account of Federal publicity in the United States, both from the factual standpoint and from the interpretative point of view. It shows the extent of the publicity departments, the varied media which they employ, the number of officials engaged on the task, their attitudes towards the work, the hostility shown towards them by Congress, the objectives of Government publicity, its achievements and shortcomings.

All the Federal administrative agencies without exception

¹ James L. McCamy, *Government Publicity: Its Practice in Federal Administration*. University of Chicago Press (agents in Great Britain: Cambridge University Press), 15s. od.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

engage in organised publicity work; and the list includes both the older "regular" departments such as the Treasury or the Department of Agriculture, and the newer ones such as the Works Progress Administration or the National Youth Administration. The more recently established boards and bureaux lead the way in the extent, the vigour and the variety of their publicity. The Social Security Board, for example, has a full-time staff of 17 publicity specialists, the Federal Housing Administration has 15, the Resettlement Administration 10; while the Department of Commerce and the Department of Interior have only 5 each to cover all their multitudinous functions. Several of the Federal organs have regional publicity organs in addition to their headquarters staff in Washington.

The ramifications of Government publicity are very widespread. Newspapers, magazines, books, films, broadcasting, stage plays, painting, songs, posters, exhibitions, speeches, gossip—all are employed in one way or another to serve the ends of Government departments. Every one of the 44 Federal offices investigated by Mr. McCamy issues releases of "spot news" to the Press. Twenty-eight of them issue feature stories. Twenty-one offices prepare or distribute straight news photographs or illustrations of immediate relevance to topical events. Several of them issue cartoons, maps and diagrams. Seventeen offices publish periodicals, ranging in style from the severely technical Bulletin of the Federal Reserve Board to the popular magazine entitled *Indians at Work* issued by the Office of Indian Affairs.

In quality of output the range is very great. Official photographic work is said to be unimaginative and mediocre; whereas in the sphere of films some of the highest achievements (such as the picture entitled "The Plow that Broke the Plains") is the work of Government publicists. Mr. McCamy remarks that the line of demarcation between the

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY

"publicity" picture and the "educational" film is disappearing; while what he calls the category of informative-persuasive films is emerging as a type which combines publicity and teaching. Publicity films attracting the attention of the average man are gaining easy victories over dull educational films inspired by high moral purposes.

A similar study undertaken for this country would be highly interesting. We are scarcely aware even of the fact that most Government departments and many local authorities and independent boards maintain press departments, information officers or public relations men. His Majesty's Stationery Office is the largest publishing house in the country; and its publications are nearly all instruments of publicity in one way or another. Large sums are spent in newspaper advertising by Government departments. The Home Office maintains an Industrial Museum to publicise the work of the Factory Inspectorate; the British Museum sells picture postcards to publicise its exhibits; the Post Office has a film unit; thousands of street crossings are marked by Belisha beacons—and one could mention many other examples of more or less deliberate forms of Governmental publicity.

The effect of all these things is immense. Take, for example, the question of newspaper advertising. How many people realise the enormous influence of advertisements on the attitude of newspapers towards departmental policy? For several months of the war a number of national newspapers ran persistent campaigns attacking the Ministry of Food. The Ministry began to buy advertising space on a large scale, and the attacks mysteriously disappeared. The Ministry of Transport was violently criticised for the heavy toll of road accidents caused by the black-out. The Ministry began to appeal to the public to take greater care in costly advertisements, and no more was heard of its sins. The

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Post Office was for years the *bête noir* of the Press. Every misdelivered letter was reported, every telephone subscriber who obtained a wrong number was welcomed eagerly to the correspondence columns. Then an intelligent Postmaster-General decided to spend £70,000 a year in newspaper advertising. Soon afterwards we began to read of the success which had crowned the efforts of the Post Office to obtain uncorrodable nibs for the use of the public; of the fascinating search at St. Martins-le-Grand for the golden-voiced girl who would on request record the time over the telephone. It is true that genuine reforms of organisation were taking place at the Post Office in consequence of the report of the Bridgeman Committee; but this had comparatively little to do with the improved relations with the Press. The Treasury would scarcely dare to float a loan to-day without incurring considerable expenditure on newspaper advertising so as to secure a good press. The regular paid announcements of the London Passenger Transport Board are an insurance against the risk of adverse criticism when an occasion for it might arise; and gas undertakings have not been slow to learn the gentle art of purchasing immunity from attack when about to raise the price of gas.

In pursuing this line, Government departments and boards are merely following private enterprise in becoming a vested interest of the newspaper world. The important difference is that whereas the business firm is selling a commodity or service, the Government department is selling a public policy.

It is very strange that in an age when political propaganda is all the rage, so little attention should have been focussed on Government publicity in regard to day-to-day administrative activities. The public is almost indifferent as to whether Government departments issue annual reports or not; whether they publish journals or reviews or bulletins.

How else can one explain the remarkable fact that whereas the Ministry of Labour and the Board of Trade publish highly informative periodicals, neither the Ministry of Health nor the Home Office does so; that while both the Ministry of Health and the Chief Medical Officer issue excellent Annual Reports, the Board of Education and the Ministry of Transport do not do so, and the Ministry of Agriculture maintains an obstinate silence concerning the activities of the Agricultural Marketing Boards?

It would be quite misleading to regard the activities of Government publicity as directed merely or mainly towards the suppression of criticism by means of financial inducements offered to the Press through advertisements. As Mr. McCamy points out, a programme of public administration has to be explained to the people who will be affected by it. The speeches of Ministers in Parliament and on the platform, the promulgation of statutes and regulations, are quite inadequate methods of reaching the masses, or even large sections of the community. Hence Government departments must find ways of getting information to the citizens who need to know what a programme means, how they can take advantage of it, what is required of them, why they should support it. Consent to the political principles by the representatives of the people in Parliament must be reinforced by acquiescence or assent to the administrative process by the people themselves on a much more widespread scale.

The particular objectives of Governmental publicity at the administrative level are, of course, extremely diverse. A department may desire the public, or a particular section of it, to make fuller use of a public service, such as the voluntary contributory pensions scheme, or the telegraph or telephone. It may desire to encourage expectant mothers to be confined in hospitals instead of at home. It may wish people to eat less butter or to drink more milk or to consume

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

goods coming from certain countries. It may aim at overcoming dislike of some novel form of regulation. It may want people in time of war to save money and to lend it to the Government, or (in time of slump) to save less and to spend more. It may wish to improve amenities by eliminating litter in the parks. It may seek to enhance public safety by restraining discussion in public of military affairs. It may want to promote physical exercise or to encourage the destruction of rats. All these and innumerable other possible objectives are justifiable in appropriate circumstances; and only people who desire weak and ineffective government can oppose Government publicity in principle.

It is worth recalling that in one of their most notable works published twenty-years ago Mr. and Mrs. Webb declared that the two leading instruments of popular control in a Socialist Commonwealth would be Measurement and Publicity. "We want to get rid of the 'stuffiness' of private interests which now infects our institutions," they wrote, "and to usher in a reign of 'Measurement and Publicity'." Included in "measurement," the Webbs remarked, is a determination of kind and a valuation of quality, as well as a mere quantitative enumeration; while the term "publicity" includes not merely the issue of a blue book, but every method by which knowledge can be brought home to the average citizen, as well as to the persons particularly concerned. "The deliberate intensification of this *searchlight of published knowledge*," they declared, "we regard as the corner-stone of successful democracy."¹

Yet when all is said in its favour there are certain dangers and difficulties inherent in the systematic use by Government of the instruments by which thought and opinion are manipulated; and the author of the American study passes over these lightly and superficially.

He admits frankly that Government publicity emphasises only one aspect of a question. It makes no effort to be impartial or to give a complete analysis of any social situation, but presents a one-sided statement of events and policy. In doing this, he remarks, it conforms to the contemporary practice of representative government. And also, it might be added, of private business.

It may be contended that in the purely political forum we can rely on partisan statements being met by equally prejudiced statements of the matter from opposing angles. That is the main function of political parties. But no effective reply can easily be made to a misleading Government advertisement or poster, or an official report in which the facts are distorted, or to the misdirected jubilee celebrations of the London County Council, for the simple reason that the opportunities for publicising the replies or protests are incomparably inferior to those enjoyed by the administrative body which takes the initiative in the first instance. This disability is not peculiar to the uncovering of facts suppressed, or half-suppressed, or overlooked, by Government. It applies to a far greater extent to ordinary commercial publicity, which is virtually unanswerable.

Mr. McCamy perceives that hostility to Governmental publicity rests on two major premises. One is that that official publicity agents will limit the freedom of the Press and other media to search out public evil and to serve as public watchdogs at the seat of power. The other is that through publicity the bureaucracy may escape responsibility by disguising the true condition of affairs or by usurping the influence over opinion that should properly belong to the legislature or other organs outside the executive arm of Government. I have already said something about the first of these criticisms, in regard to advertisements. Much more could be said about it in connection with what may be called

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

for want of a better term "information pressure." Government departments are often exceedingly shrewd in their judgments of the attitude of outside writers or speakers seeking information; and the amount and character of the information supplied is liable to be in inverse ratio to the amount of criticism which is anticipated.¹ Enquiring outsiders can be skilfully "nursed" by information officers and official Press offices.

The second charge has been so strongly felt in the United States that in 1913 Congress passed an Act forbidding the employment of "publicity experts" unless expressly authorised by Congress. This provision has been evaded by the engagement of publicity experts under such titles as Director of Information, Supervisor of Information Research, and so forth. The proponents of the Congressional provision held the simple view that practices which enable the administration to enhance its own security and prestige, contain the seeds of oppression. If administrative mistakes are not allowed to come to light, executive incompetence and malfeasance will not be rooted out, and the citizens will become a community of slaves subject to the dictates of an official propaganda machine.

This view of the matter is far too naive. To conceive of the many-sided aims of government publicity solely in terms of the suppression of criticism and the data on which criticism might be based, is an over-simplification which is highly misleading. But the fact remains that the line which separates Governmental publicity which is justifiable in terms of administrative needs and efficiency from the type of propaganda control which leads to the totalitarian state and the decline of democracy, is exceedingly difficult to draw. Mr. McCamy does not dispose of the matter by saying that "The innocence of the present publicity offices of any

¹ For an illuminating instance of the attitude of the Home Office, see *The Control of Aliens in the British Commonwealth of Nations*, by C. F. Fraser (1940), pp. 60, 71.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY

intention towards complete censorship of communication in the manner of European totalitarianism is so patent that no defence against charges of dictatorship in the present is needed. Contemporary publicity men and publicity practices in government are merely competing with private propaganda" (p. 246).

All that can be said at this stage is that since Government publicity is at present operating for the most part on the lower levels of administrative activity it does not at present threaten the higher levels of political principle on which democratic government is founded. But that does not mean that great watchfulness is not needed, especially in wartime, to see that legitimate administrative publicity does not gradually develop into full-blown control over the discussion of political and military affairs.

The Webbs, it will be remembered, wisely linked publicity with measurement as the necessary instrument for securing genuine democratic control in industry, local government and other fields of public affairs. Mr. McCamy's study shows that the practice of the American Government is all publicity and no measurement. Moreover, whereas the Webbs had in mind the need for measuring as accurately as possible the social or economic data which was to be presented to the public by the most vivid means possible, Mr. McCamy is thinking of measurement merely in terms of the results obtained from official publicity. "Among all the methods of measurement used by federal publicity offices," he observes, "none is a precise, thorough and unquestionably accurate index of the attitudes in the audience or of the success of publicity in re-orienting these attitudes" (p. 159). And later he writes: "If any one useful first improvement can be suggested from the many connected with publicity program-making and execution, it would be measurement. The present wasteful ignorance of audience and of results could

be lessened considerably by more attention to the available techniques of rough analysis. Publicity men to be effective must above all know the receptivity of their audience to various symbols . . ." (p. 239).

There is a world of difference between these two attitudes. The Webbs are concerned to improve the popular understanding and perception of quantitative factors, in order that people may be induced to base their decisions in public affairs to a greater extent on rational calculations. Mr. McCamy, on the other hand, is concerned merely to measure the effect *on the public* of the manipulation of ideas and action brought about by publicity. Mr. McCamy is simply intent on applying to Government activities the type of measurement which interests commercial publicity men and their employers, though, of course, the criteria of success or failure are necessarily different. It is no doubt desirable to improve the efficiency of official publicity and to be able to test its results quantitatively. But while the Webbs' approach is essentially democratic, the conception of measurement expounded by Mr. McCamy is doubtless accepted and acted upon by Dr. Goebbels.

Another point which Mr. McCamy makes in his eagerness to disarm apprehension is that "Government administrative publicity is not crisis propaganda in the sense of being directed towards a basic change in the composition of the State. It is, rather, a milder continuous representation of the aims and practices of the permanent bureaucracy to the public." If the Federal administrative publicist ever wants to say something "dangerous" to private commercial or financial interests—such as exposing the patent-medicine fraud—he would find closed to his approach practically all the media which he now primarily uses. "The present choice of emphasising the mass media, in other words, is made possible by the sufferance of the owners of these media

for publicity that does not attack private vested interests" (p. 110).

Here we find another potential danger. By building up a technique of publicity which presupposes that the policy to be publicised will never be inimical to private enterprise, the Government official is given access to the Press and other privately-owned media of communication. He is thus in a position to offer little help to a Government which did desire to effect drastic changes offensive to propertied interests. Indeed, he would be in a position to explain to his Minister quite truthfully that all the normal channels of publicity will be closed to him and that it will be impossible to construct substitutes at short notice. In such circumstances, the official publicity expert could act as a powerful drag on the wheels of a reforming Government—a sort of fifth column behind the Socialist Front. This is a matter which requires very careful attention. It points to the desirability of Government departments developing their own media of communication instead of relying exclusively on the favours of those in private ownership. (It may be recalled in this connection that the B.B.C. commenced to issue its own weekly publications as the direct result of a threatened refusal by the Press to publish broadcasting programmes.) It also indicates that the Government should not rest content to take over personnel trained in publicity work by commercial agencies, but should seek to develop its own methods of training and operation. It may be asking too much of an ex-newspaper man to fight the newspaper world on behalf of the Government during an emergency.

Above all, it should be recognised that efficient publicity machinery cannot be built up at a moment's notice. The organisation and principles must be thought out long in advance and gradually evolved if they are to work smoothly and effectively.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

One matter of immense significance of which the American study makes no mention is the fact that the State is itself preparing the minds of the individuals who comprise the nation through the education services, and is therefore able, potentially or actually, to condition in some measure their reactions and receptivity to different types of stimuli. For this reason alone the Government has a unique responsibility. It cannot claim to be "just another advertiser" in an already crowded field. What the child learns at school about the British Empire, let us say, will determine its response to the posters exhibited by such a body as the Empire Marketing Board. The view of the social system which the child absorbs during the years of education will largely determine its reaction in later life to appeals by Government departments to do this, that or the other thing for the sake of national strength in time of war.

It is undoubtedly true that in this country there is little understanding of the connection between such matters, and certainly few links exist between the Board of Education or local education authorities on the one hand and Government publicity organs on the other. But the connection is there all the same; and so, too, is the unique responsibility of the State.

Actually, the most striking fact about the present state of the world is that governments are everywhere dealing with nations that are literate without being educated. In consequence the masses—and for that matter the classes, too—are susceptible to an unparalleled degree to the manipulation of their thoughts and actions through the media of literate forms of communication, as well as through new non-literate forms such as broadcasting. The vulnerability of the literate but uneducated mind is demonstrated by the success attained by Nazi propaganda in Western Europe between 1930 and 1940. Many governments are to-day deliberately using their

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY

so-called educational services for propaganda purposes. No government has so far attempted to immunise the growing generation against the onslaught of propaganda by inculcating an understanding of its purposes and technique. Even the German Government does no more than isolate its people against any knowledge or idea which might work against its own internal propaganda.

The relation between publicity and propaganda, and between publicity and public relations, is not dealt with in Mr. McCamy's book, and the question cannot be discussed here. It is probable that there is no ultimate distinction between publicity, propaganda and public relations: they are different aspects of the same thing. At the same time, the purposes for which they can be used varies greatly. Whereas official propaganda, for example, is exerted by the Government on the people, public relations can and should be used to create lines of communication from the people to the Government. A great many of the departments of State and public service boards in Great Britain are employing public relations officers, and their work is of considerable influence. But here again the subject is wrapt in obscurity, if not in mystery. As I remarked at the outset, there are few questions more in need of investigation.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME. II

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

I

ON the 7th April, German troops invaded Denmark and Norway. Immediately at the end of questions on the 9th, the Chief Whip moved the adjournment in order that the Prime Minister might make a statement. In it he informed the House that the British Government had decided to extend their "full aid" to Norway, and that "powerful units" of the Navy were at sea, but that it would not be in the public interest to give details about any operations in which they were engaged. The leaders of the Opposition parties did not press for details, nor did they debate the questions of policy involved. Private members on the Opposition side were not so reticent. Mr. Mander mentioned that certain events were "extremely puzzling"; Mr. Gallacher was allowed, in spite of interruptions, to accuse the Government of spreading the war and to demand its resignation; Mr. Maxton asked the Government not to be rushed into foolish courses; and Sir Richard Acland drew attention to the fact that the Government had not tried to prevent Japanese aggression against China. These interventions, short as they were, were not to the taste of most members, nor were all of them particularly useful and relevant; but they exhibited the independence of private members and the comforting fact that, even in wartime, they are not prevented from making nuisances of themselves.

On the 10th April, Mr. Chamberlain, in answer to an arranged question, announced the first destroyer attack on Narvik; and on the following day the adjournment was moved to enable Mr. Churchill to make a statement on the naval situation. His account was not as encouraging as

optimistic newspaper reports had led most members to assume, though he did say that "all German ships in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat will be sunk, and by night all ships will be sunk, as opportunity serves"—and some members did not pay enough attention to the qualification at the end. Mr. Alexander, for the Labour Party, was faintly apprehensive, and Sir Archibald Sinclair a little more critical, especially of phrases like "missed the bus." Mr. J. J. Davidson rose for the expressed reason that "there is a growing impatience in the House with any member of Parliament who may ask questions which one or two people think ought not to be asked." A few other members entered protests against the optimistic news that was being given, even by the B.B.C.

From the 11th April to the beginning of May, Parliament gave the Government complete freedom of action. They refrained from embarrassing debates, and they did not even ask for explanations. On the 2nd May, however, Mr. Attlee asked an arranged question so that the Prime Minister might give an account of the situation. It was then announced that the British troops landed at Andalsnes on the 18th and 19th April had been withdrawn, and that the idea of taking Trondheim from the south had been abandoned. In view of operations in progress—the withdrawal of troops from Namsos as announced on the 7th May—he asked the House to defer comment until the following week.

The first full statement was made in a debate on the 7th May. Though by this time criticisms were numerous, the Labour Party had not yet decided to vote against the Government. So far, the party had carried out the policy adopted at the beginning of the war. Though they had on occasions divided on minor aspects of Government legislation, had moved motions on special aspects of the consequences of the war, and had opposed parts of the Old

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Age and Widows' Pensions Bill with all the fervour of peace-time opposition, they had refrained from direct attack upon the conduct of the war. Even at this stage they were not prepared to put down a condemnatory resolution. The result was that the only debate to destroy a majority Government since 1886 (for the defeat in 1895 was on a "snap vote" and was a mere excuse) was on a motion for the adjournment. Supply was the Order of the Day, but the Chief Whip at once moved to report progress, and there was no debate. The Chief Whip then moved the adjournment. The same procedure was followed next day, and the question on which members were divided was, technically, "That this House do now adjourn."

The debate on the 7th was opened by the Prime Minister, who announced that the troops landed on Namsos on the 16th April had been withdrawn. Consequently, the only British troops in Norway were at Narvik, where they had been since the 15th April. The speech was characteristic of Mr. Chamberlain. It explained all the difficulties; it showed how these were insuperable; and it sought to prove that once more the Government had lost through no fault of its own. Having failed to land the whale, or even a fair-sized cod, he produced to the House a minnow—Mr. Churchill was to take on his third job. The speech does not read persuasively, and it is clear from reports in the press and from statements in the House that Mr. Chamberlain was less effective than usual in convincing the House that it was the perverseness of the fates and the devilry of the enemy and not the procrastination of the Government that was to blame. Nor did he receive much support from the 400 members behind him. Sir Henry Croft, Mr. Lewis Jones and Sir Archibald Southby were perhaps the best apologists that the Whips could collect, but they were pop-guns compared with the artillery firing upon the front bench from both sides—

Mr. Attlee, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Colonel Wedgwood, Sir Roger Keyes, Captain Bellenger, Mr. Amery, Major Milner, Lord Winterton and Mr. Greenwood. To restore the balance a speech far more powerful and convincing than any that Mr. Oliver Stanley was capable of making was needed.

After this weak display by the Government, it was not surprising that the Labour Party decided to challenge a division. Not to have done so would have been to deny the principles upon which the party was supporting the Government. The Labour leaders had made plain that, though they had no great confidence in the War Cabinet which Mr. Chamberlain had appointed, they supported the declaration of war and they were prepared to continue support so long as the conduct of the war was efficient. These conditions were no longer being satisfied. They could no longer say that the war was being conducted efficiently. Nor was the failure of the Norway expedition the first evidence of inefficiency. It was true that no division had hitherto been challenged by the Labour Party on the general conduct of the war, but they had gone into the lobby against the Government on sixty-eight occasions since the outbreak of war. Most of these divisions were on matters having at most only an indirect connection with the war; but there had been two on food supply, ten on the Agricultural Bill, two on economic organisation, and one each on the organisation of the War Cabinet, the Railway Agreement, evacuation, dependents' allowances, labour supply, and shipping. In addition, there had been plenty of criticism when no division was challenged—for instance, on Finland and on the Budget of 1940. The fact is, as was suggested in the first article in this series, that it was quite impossible to maintain the position of the "candid friend." The Opposition had not yet reached the position of an Opposition, but it was tending in that direction throughout the session.

The Parliamentary situation was becoming more and more unstable, and the Opposition really had only two courses available. Either it would have to join Mr. Chamberlain's Government, or it would have to oppose in the peace-time sense until a Coalition Government was formed under new management. The Norwegian campaign and the weak defence of the Government against its critics compelled the choice of the second alternative.

Critics of the decision among Mr. Chamberlain's "friends" naturally asserted that the national will to victory was thus weakened. The simple answer is that not only the Opposition parties but also many members on the Government side believed that the quickest way to lose the war was to support the Government. Other critics, including *The Times*, asserted that the adjournment motion was not the proper occasion. Here, too, the answer was simple. Until the Government had given an explanation, the Opposition could not move a vote of no-confidence. The Prime Minister's defence was so poor, and Mr. Stanley's answers to criticisms from all quarters of the House so weak, that an immediate challenge was necessary. It would have been simply redundant to have had the debate all over again on a formal no-confidence motion. There was a motion before the House, and by challenging a division on that motion, as the Prime Minister rightly said, the Opposition was expressing its lack of confidence. If one can vote for Home Rule on "three acres and a cow," one can certainly vote no-confidence on an adjournment motion. Finally, some critics, including the *Manchester Guardian*, stated that to challenge a decision at all was bad tactics. Conservatives, it was thought, would speak against the Government and, above all, would make even more emphatic criticism to the whips in the lobbies. The effect of challenging a vote was to compel the "Yes-men" to vote for the Government. There was much in this

criticism, as the event showed. The Opposition could not defeat the Government. It was, however, based on the fallacy that the purpose of a vote is to defeat the Government. On the contrary, the purpose in this case was to show that the Opposition, and such members of Government parties as had the courage of their convictions, no longer supported the Government. It was the fact of challenging a division and not the result of the division which compelled the Government to resign. The great reduction in the majority showed what Mr. Chamberlain had been loth to believe, that a new Government could not be formed by him; even if no Conservatives had voted against him it would have been necessary for him to make the attempt to form a wider coalition. In other words, it was almost irrelevant what the majority was. The events in Norway shattered the party truce and compelled a change of Government—unless indeed, what is almost incredible, Mr. Chamberlain was courageous enough and foolish enough to carry on with the representatives of ten million electors against him.

It is of course true that Mr. Chamberlain did not immediately recognise the situation. So conscious was he of his own rectitude that he accepted the challenge. "I do not seek to evade criticism, but I say this to my friends in the House—and I have friends in the House. No Government can prosecute a war efficiently unless it has public and Parliamentary support. I accept the challenge. I welcome it indeed. At least we shall see who is with us and who is against us, and I call on my friends to support us in the Lobby to-night." There was never such foolishness since Joseph Chamberlain led the Radicals into opposition because the Government supported Home Rule and not local self-government. True it is that no Government can prosecute a war efficiently unless it has public and Parliamentary support; but such support must be practically unanimous.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

To suggest that one can wage war with the assistance of one's friends when the whole Opposition and most of the prominent members of one's own party outside the Government are in opposition is sheer contradiction.

The rest of the debate was an orderly but precipitate retreat. Sir Samuel Hoare was interesting but irrelevant to the main issue. Mr. Lloyd George was devastating. Mr. Lambert defended the Government by ascribing political motives to its opponents and making an effort to persuade the Opposition parties to be good boys and assist Mr. Chamberlain. Sir Stafford Cripps made it clear that, in this sense, they insisted on being naughty. Mr. Duff Cooper regretted the decision to divide but made his opposition plain. Sir George Courthorpe and Mr. Brooke alone of the subsequent speakers supported the Government until Mr. Churchill rallied the scattered remnants to fire the last shots. The Opposition secured 200 votes, including 43 from the Government side, and among these were nearly all the Privy Councillors out of office and nearly all the Conservatives in uniform. The Government secured 281 votes, of which 53 were cast by Ministers and Whips. Mr. Chamberlain had won, but he had also lost. When he saw the Opposition leaders on the following day, they made it plain that, while they were prepared to join a Government, they were not prepared to serve under him. Mr. Chamberlain then gave way to Mr. Churchill, who formed what was known as a "truly National"—to distinguish it from the falsely National—Government. Mr. Chamberlain became Lord President of the Council; Sir John Simon went to the House of Lords to take the office of Lord Chancellor; and Sir Samuel Hoare went to Spain. So the Munich triumvirate was liquidated. On Whit-Monday, the 13th May, while German troops were reaching the Zuyder Zee and crossing the Albert Canal, the two Houses, summoned by telegram, were passing votes of

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

confidence in the new Government. In the House of Commons only the I.L.P. opposed, and as they could raise no more than a pair of tellers no votes were cast against the "truly National" Government.

Whatever Parliament does is, of course, a triumph for democracy. If the Opposition supports the Government, it shows that national unity can be obtained without Gestapos, concentration camps and rubber truncheons. If it turns out the Government, it shows that bad leaders can be overthrown without revolution. Nevertheless, adding the necessary salt of cynicism, it is true to say that the House of Commons has justified itself. It may be that, if the Germans had invaded Belgium and Holland only forty-eight hours before, the Government could have made a much more effective defence. It is almost certain that, in such a case, there would have been no division. Those whose criticisms of the Government had been based, as most of them had, not on the Norwegian episode alone, but on their general conduct for months if not years, have reason to thank Hitler that he held off just for two more days. The House had time to rebel for the first time since 1885. For the first time since 1918 there is no Opposition, though Mr. Maxton and Mr. Gallacher can be trusted to make plain that, even now, there are a few scattered sections among the population who oppose the whole thing.

II

The debate of the 7th and 8th May has fundamentally altered the Parliamentary situation. It is desirable, however, to complete the record of the Chamberlain period begun in the first of these articles, if only because it covers an interesting experiment. There was, it has been said, an electoral truce and not a party truce. The expression is not exact, because there was an implied understanding of the kind mentioned

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

at the beginning of this article. The Opposition opposed when controversial questions of a peace-time order, like the Old Age and Widows' Pensions Bill, were before the House. It also proposed motions and debated resolutions on internal aspects of the conduct of the war. At the same time, it made no attempt to interfere with the general process of wartime Government, to obstruct Government business, or to embarrass the Government by inconvenient debates. It recognised its public duty to assist and not to hinder. In other words, it had tacitly agreed not to oppose, and the Government on its side had tacitly agreed not to introduce matters of a really contentious nature. There was a truce in the normal party conflict, and not a mere agreement not to contest bye-elections.

The previous article surveyed events up to the 29th February, when the Old Age and Widows' Pensions Bill was before the House. It had been making very slow progress in Committee, and at the end of two days only eight clauses had been considered. One more clause was considered on the 1st March, and on that day three divisions were challenged. Before the House met in the following week, however, there had been conversations "through the usual channels," and agreement had been reached to complete the Committee stage that day. The explanation was that the Government had insisted that, if the Bill was to take effect on the dates fixed, rapid action was essential. The Opposition did not wish to be fractious; still less did they wish to be accused of obstructing increased pensions to necessitous women and aged people. A Labour member thought that "this arrangement through the usual channels is a perfect disgrace and that the Opposition ought not to be stultified by any threats of the Government in any way or shape." However, discipline prevailed. A large number of amendments was not moved, hardly anybody except Ministers spoke from

the Government side, and, though ten divisions were called, the Committee stage was completed by 11-20 p.m. It was part of the arrangement that the Bill should be recommitted in respect of clause 11, but after a short debate it was reported without further amendment, and a few more hours sufficed to get the Bill through report. It was read a third time on the 11th March, a reasoned amendment against the "means test" being moved by the Opposition. There were twenty-seven divisions on this Bill, including three votes against the suspension of the eleven o'clock rule. It must be realised, however, that the Bill had nothing whatever to do with the war. In fact, the relief of the Opposition at being able to exercise its function in the normal peace-time manner was obvious. Few of its members could accustom themselves to the unheroic position of candid friend of the Chamberlain Government.

Much of the rest of the time of the House was occupied with more or less normal business, though strenuous opposition such as that to parts of the Pensions Bill was unnecessary. The Cotton Industry Bill required only two short debates, one of them after 11-30 p.m. The Agricultural Wages Regulation Amendment Bill was read a second time, after debate, without opposition, and only one division was challenged in committee. A debate took place on the order to increase children's allowances under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, and a division was called. The Workmen's Compensation (Supplementary Allowances) Bill was read a second time, after a division, but had not proceeded further before the Government fell. A Labour motion on the Palestine Land Regulations occupied a whole day, but was defeated upon a division. There was a short debate, without a division, on colonial policy. The adjournment was also used to raise the question of entrance examinations to the Civil Service. Half a day was taken up with a debate on the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population. India occupied two days—though here there was closer connection with the war. In fact, of the thirty-three Parliamentary days between the 1st March and the 9th May, fifteen days were taken up almost entirely by normal peace-time matters

It was to be expected that at this time of the year matters relating to the war would be raised primarily on financial business. Seven of the twenty Supply days were taken before Whitsuntide. On the 5th March the Education Estimates were put down in order to have a debate on the educational effects of evacuation, and a division was taken. The second day was purely formal, so as to enable the Labour Party to raise the subject of Palestine. The Air Estimates and Supplementary Estimates were put down on the 7th March so as to secure a debate on supply for the Air Force. This was an important debate because it enabled members to express their disappointment at the rate of progress. It was not entirely effective, however, because neither full criticism nor full defence was possible without giving information to the enemy. The Army Estimates were taken on the 12th March in order to discuss, primarily, the question of dependents' allowances. On the 13th March the Vote of Credit was put down, and the Opposition took the opportunity of criticising the Government's policy in respect of food supply. A division was taken on the motion that Mr. Speaker leave the Chair. On the third Supply day, on the 14th March, the main discussion was concentrated on questions relating to the Army. The Ministry of Supply came under concentrated fire when the report stage of the Vote of Credit was taken on the 15th March, and the adequacy of shipping control was discussed on the Consolidated Fund Bill on the 18th March. The report stage of that Bill was used to debate the effect of the peace settlement

between Finland and the U.S.S.R. This was, so to speak, the preliminary skirmish in the battle which ended with the resignation of Mr. Chamberlain. Though no division was taken, it cannot be said that the Prime Minister obtained a victory. Particularly devastating were the criticisms of members on his own side, notably Mr. Hore-Belisha, Mr. Richard Law and Mr. Harold Macmillan.

The cost of living was debated on the 2nd April on the Civil Estimates, and a division called on the motion for the Speaker to leave the Chair. The fourth Supply day, on the 11th April, was purely formal, because a short debate took place on the events in Norway. On the fifth Supply day, on the 16th April, the Ministry of Labour vote was put down. Here, too, there was much effective criticism of the failure to make full use of the available man-power and to secure the best distribution of what was being used. The Budget was opened on the 23rd April, and the main criticism on the 24th and 25th was that the national effort, as measured by the estimates of expenditure, was still inadequate. The purchase tax was singled out for attack on the 1st May. Finally, the sixth and seventh Supply days were purely formal, because it was at once moved to report progress and the debates on Norway took place on the motion for the adjournment.

It is not possible to discuss these debates in detail. Indeed, the avoidance of detail makes the general impression clearer. The machine worked well so long as the House was discussing peace-time issues. Some very effective "gingering" was done in debates on special aspects of the war as it affected the Home Front. There was a general intensification of criticism, in which both sides took part, leading eventually to the debate on the Norwegian adventure and the fall of the Government. The period of friendly criticism was a transitional phase. It was not possible to

carry out for long the principles laid down by Mr. Greenwood on the 13th September and quoted in the first article. One cannot continue to support the war and criticise the Government. Opposition of this character must lead to demands that the critics take office and do better—demands that cannot be resisted for long. Yet, for those who had no faith in Mr. Chamberlain as a war minister, the delay was not a misfortune. Earlier acquiescence in the formation of a “truly National” Government would have involved serving under Mr. Chamberlain in close association with the other members of the Munich triumvirate. The British Constitution has no well-oiled machinery for turning out a Prime Minister, because it always assumes that it is a Government and therefore a party which has to be defeated. Hitherto, death, disease and intrigue have been the only means for destroying a Prime Minister without an appeal to the electorate to destroy his majority. None of these means can be used by an Opposition. What the Labour Party did was to give Mr. Chamberlain enough rope to hang himself; the danger, as they saw it, was that he might in the process hang the country as well.

III

The new Government was formed on the 11th May, during the Whitsuntide recess. The House was summoned by telegram to meet on the 13th May to debate a motion, proposed by the Prime Minister, welcoming the formation of a Government “representing the united and inflexible resolve of the nation to prosecute the war with Germany to a victorious conclusion.” The Prime Minister spoke for six minutes only, and was followed by Mr. Lees-Smith, representing those members of the Labour Party who were not members of the Government, and by Sir Percy Harris for the Liberal members. Mr. Spens welcomed the new Government as one who had voted for the old Government.

Mr. Maxton opposed the motion because it conflicted with his political beliefs and the principles on which he was elected to the House. He regretted the decision of the Labour Party to join the Government, and believed that the war could be ended by mobilising anti-war opinion throughout the world, including Germany. Mr. Lloyd George expressed a few words of welcome. Mr. Lambert (who had voted for the Chamberlain Government) expressed suspicion of the Labour ministers, and seemed to think that the Liberal Nationals were not getting a fair deal. Mr. Hopkinson, as an independent member, emphasised the responsibilities of private members without political attachments, and Sir Stafford Cripps asked for a reform of parliamentary machinery in the new conditions. Mr. George Balfour followed Mr. Lambert in expressing the hope that Labour ministers would not be subject to outside dictation. A few other members made short speeches, including two unrepentant Chamberlainites. Mr. Maxton then challenged a division, but as there was only one other I.L.P. member present, and he acted as teller with Mr. Maxton, the motion was carried by 381 votes to nil. Among those who voted for Mr. Churchill were 227 of the 281 members who, five days before, had voted for Mr. Chamberlain. The yes-men thus continued to vote “Aye,” especially while junior offices were still unfilled, though it must be admitted that they had every reason to do so, since they were not passing a verdict on the past, and Mr. Chamberlain himself voted for the Government.

As Sir Stafford Cripps said in this debate, “the whole of our procedure and practice in the House of Commons is built up on the basis of having an effective organised opposition.” Mr. Maxton might stand like Horatio with his two colleagues on either hand while Mr. Gallacher shouted slogans against the serried ranks on both sides of the Tiber, but they could hardly be said to be an Opposition. On the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

21st May the Prime Minister announced that in the circumstances the provision for a salary for the Leader of the Opposition was in abeyance. However, it soon appeared that if there was not an Opposition there was nevertheless a "shadow Opposition" prepared to act for purposes of parliamentary procedure. There was some protest from the Conservative benches when Mr. Lees-Smith rose to ask the customary question about business. Later the Speaker announced that any ex-Minister of any party might sit on the front Opposition Bench, though this did not rule out those members of the Labour Party who had been invited to sit there during the Chamberlain era. He refused to say anything about Supply days, but on the 23rd May Mr. Attlee announced that the subjects for debate on those days would be arranged "through the usual channels," and that members of all parties were asked to make their wishes known through the whips. There has not yet been experience enough to show how this system will work; but the eighth Supply day was opened by Mr. Noel Baker for the "shadow Opposition" and the ninth day by the President of the Board of Trade—the latter being followed by a Conservative member, and the debate being wound up by another Conservative and by the Parliamentary Secretary. Evidently, therefore, the first went to the Labour Party and the second to the Conservative Party.

APPENDIX

SESSION 1939-40

(TO 30TH MAY)

Address in reply to the King's Speech		6 days
Government Legislation		24 days
Finance		16 days
Adjournment Debates		16 days
Government Motions		4 days
Opposition Motions		5 days

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

DIVISIONS

(TO 9TH MAY)

No. of Divisions : 61.

Highest Government Vote : 303 (Labour Amendment to Address).

Lowest Government Vote : 113 (Industrial Assurance Bill, Committee).

Lowest Government Majority : 21 (Unemployment Insurance Regulations).

Highest Opposition Vote : 200 (Adjournment : re Norway).

Average Vote : Government, 177 ; Opposition, 110.

THE END OF AN EPOCH

By A. L. ROWSE

"To tell the truth needs no art at all, and that is why I always believe in it." (*Mr. Stanley Baldwin on 'Rhetoric', Cambridge Union, March, 1924.*)

"I have just assumed the duties and responsibilities that attach to the office of Prime Minister. I am entering on them at an age when most people are thinking of retiring from active work, but I have hitherto led a sober and a temperate life. I am informed that I am sound in mind and limb, and I am not afraid of the physical labours which may be entailed upon me." (*Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speech on being elected Leader of the Conservative Party, 31st May, 1937.*)

A PERIOD of nine years, one of the most fateful in the history of our country, came to an end with the overthrow of the Chamberlain Government. It is probable that future historians will be hard put to it to find another period comparable in folly and disgrace, in corruption of the very sources of judgment, in lack of vision and criminal obtuseness in high places, unless they go to the twelve-year rule of Lord North and George III which ended in the loss of America. It is impossible here to do justice to the humiliating period that we have lived through since 1931: it would need the pen (and the space) of a Swift or a Voltaire, the brush of a Hogarth or a Rouault, the pencil of a Low.

What are we to think of a period of which the decisive political manifestations were the two trick elections of 1931 and 1935—the former based on financial panic, the latter on a deliberate fraud; the solid mass of Tory yes-men in the House of Commons who sat there year after year voting for the wrong things, backing the wrong horses on the wrong courses, greeting the loss of strategic position after position to our enemies, Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria,

Czecho-Slovakia, if not with rapture, at any rate with complacency and cheers; yes-men who would listen to no warnings from Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Amery, Lord Cranborne, Mr. Duff-Cooper, let alone Lloyd George and Liberals and Labour men; yes-men whom nothing would unsettle, so tenacious was their misguided instinct of self-preservation, until the military disasters to their country blasted them out of their position after those two days' momentous debate? What are we to think of a period whose typical diplomatic representatives were Sir Francis Lindley at Tokyo, Lord Perth in Rome, Sir Neville Henderson in Berlin,¹ with Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare in charge of the Foreign Office? Of a period whose characteristic publicists were Lord Elton and Mr. Arthur Bryant? Whose great statesmen, responsible for the lives of forty million Englishmen and the safety of a great Empire, were Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain? The head of a family with a great tradition in our history has said: "It has been my ill-fortune to have lived under the two worst Prime Ministers that England has ever had." That is perhaps going a little far, but not very much too far.

It is only possible here to single out one or two of the leading characteristics of this period now at an end, to diagnose its peculiar quality, perhaps rather its pathology.

And first it should be said that this period is really a continuation, and a worsening, of the years since 1922. It is in the past nine years that we have seen the fruition of the mistakes, both of commission and omission, of those earlier years. Yet the situation might have been saved after

¹ We have been favoured with Sir Neville Henderson's own account of his reactions on his appointment (v. his *Failure of a Mission*, p. 13): "In the first place, a sense of my own inadequacy for what was obviously the most difficult and most important post in the whole of the diplomatic service." In that, at least, he was evidently right enough. "Secondly, and deriving from the first, that it could only mean that I had been specially selected by Providence for the definite mission of, as I trusted, helping to preserve the peace of the world." That in itself should be enough to disqualify him from such a post: a completely mistaken conception of an ambassador's function.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

1931: all was not yet lost; but, instead, we have watched, with the fatal fascination of some tragedy being enacted upon the stage of Europe, every opportunity being lost, every wrong turning taken, the whole thing muddled and mishandled. How has it been possible? After the last war, the great democracies took the opportunity to throw over the first-class men who had led them to victory, in favour of comfortable second- and third-raters. The United States threw over Woodrow Wilson for the miserable Harding and the unspeakable Coolidge; France threw over Clémenceau; in Great Britain, the Conservative Party threw out Lloyd George for a Bonar Law and then Baldwin and then Neville Chamberlain. During all these years from 1922 to 1940 the Conservative Party was responsible for keeping out the one man of transcendent political ability this country had, at the height of his experience and European prestige.

But the period since 1931 has had its own peculiarly nauseating quality. Nor is it difficult to define. Apart from the disasters which have overtaken our policy, the failures which all can now see, and which it is not my purpose to go into, there has been a lack of candour, government by fraud and deceit, which has sapped and undermined the old efficacy of Parliamentary and democratic institutions in this country. Mr. Baldwin said in his Rectorial address to the students of Edinburgh University on "Truth and Politics": "Though it has been accepted through the ages that half a loaf is better than no bread, half a truth is not only not better than no truth, it is worse than many lies, and the slave of lies and half-truths is ignorance. Ignorance, static and inert, is bad, but ignorance in motion, as Goethe once observed, is the most terrible force in nature, for it may destroy in its passage the accumulated mental and material capital of generations."¹

¹ Earl Baldwin: *On England*, pp. 96-97.

THE END OF AN EPOCH

Lord Baldwin should know. He is no doubt right: the half-truths that were ladled out to an ignorant electorate by the National Government from its very inception to its end, were in the event more disastrous even than the many lies of Hitler and Goebbels. For they, at any rate, never disguised from their people the desperately serious nature of the struggle upon which they had embarked the nation, and the heroic efforts that were required from the German people in the course of it. Whereas Mr. Baldwin, who knew for two whole years previously the danger into which our relations with Germany had passed, confessed in his swansong as Prime Minister, that he had not told the people, for he "could not imagine anything that would make the loss of the election, from my point of view, more certain." After that, he ceased to be Prime Minister and was succeeded by Mr. Chamberlain. But that did not improve matters.

The fact was that the real reason for our demoralisation as a people went far deeper than the shortcomings of these two men; it was to be found in the very nature of the National Government. That Government had the lie in the soul from the very beginning. It was founded in fraud and it lived by fraud. Its purpose in 1931 and onwards was to collect together all the electoral support it could from all quarters by all means in order to isolate the Labour Movement and keep it out of power for good. The very idea of National Government was thus to undermine and destroy the effective working of parliamentary democracy, in which Government was kept up to the mark by a strong Opposition that could be called upon to replace it if things went wrong. It brought into being a coalition of all classes against the working class. It does not affect the analysis in the least that the majority of people voted for them. If you have all the instruments of power and persuasion in your hands, you can easily bring the majority over to your side. The old

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

nationalist assumptions of liberal democracy were out of date, even if they ever did apply. Conservatives well knew that. Actually the real interests of 75 per cent of the community were represented by the Labour Movement, even though they may not have realised it,¹ and the patriotic interest of the country's security as well, though the Labour Party's spokesmen were incapable of putting it across.

In these circumstances, the technique of "National" Government was to soothe and swaddle opinion, to let no clear ideas of the issues at home and abroad get hold of the minds of the people, to lull them into a sense of false security when the gravest dangers were accumulating for our country abroad. It must be said that the responsible Ministers and their henchmen in the Press were great masters of the technique. They ruled the public mind by suggestion. Anyone who wished to rouse the public to the dangers impending was an "alarmist," or, to quote the elegant word of that great statesman, Sir Samuel Hoare, a "jitter-bug," if not a "war-monger"; those who saw all that we stood to gain by upholding collective security in Europe were denounced by Mr. Chamberlain himself as "blood-thirsty pacifists." The collective security system of the League was to him "mere midsummer madness;" and selling it to our enemies was "realism." (Perhaps "selling" is a misnomer, for they were not even paid for the services they rendered.) All was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Was not Mr. Baldwin Prime Minister, and after him Mr. Chamberlain? Was not Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office and afterwards at the Exchequer?

It was extraordinarily effective. It was impossible to get any sense of the real situation across to the people. They were lulled to sleep, they were doped and duped until they woke up to find themselves engaged in a war for their very

¹ Cf. Rousseau: "What makes the will general is less the number of voters than the common interest uniting them."

existence, and inadequately prepared for it. Bitterly as one may feel about the matter as a political candidate responsible for one's own constituency, it is as nothing when one thinks that all the warnings of Mr. Winston Churchill, with his immense experience and prestige, his oratory and command of the pen to recommend him, went as unheeded as those of any Labour candidate. You have only to read his collection of speeches, *Arms and the Covenant*—or Mr. Attlee's, for that matter¹—and compare them with Mr. Chamberlain's, to gauge the extent of the tragedy, the national folly.

Yet nothing could be done about it until after nine months of war, nine months of defeat and disaster, of blundering and indecision, we had reached the very verge of the abyss. The extraordinary thing was that the more these men failed, the more they held on. There never can have been such a religion of failure, such tenacity and faith in being wrong. The more Chamberlainism failed, the more disasters it had to its credit, the more people clung to it and its visible expression, the late Prime Minister. I remember now an idiot woman in my own constituency—she was an average woman of the Conservative Party, a member of her Women's Institute—who said to me after Munich with that fanatic look in her eyes: "Mr. Rowse, don't you think that Mr. Chamberlain is the most wonderful man who ever lived?" A friend of mine, only the other day, before the overturn of the Chamberlain Government, was in converse with a banker in the train, who told him that this war was very like the last, except that in this one, under Mr. Chamberlain, we had so much better leadership. Poor Lloyd George!

Whatever can explain such a state of mind? How can it be accounted for? Mr. Harold Nicolson has made some brilliant observations on the fascinating, if repulsive, phenomenon of Chamberlainism:

"The true nature of the devotion which he inspires in so

¹ v. C. R. Attlee: *War Comes to Britain*.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

many of his followers is something which ought to be analysed and examined by those who are interested in the condition and future of the Conservative party. It is not the descendants of the old governing classes who display the greatest enthusiasm for their leader; it is rather the descendants of the industrial revolution. Mr. Chamberlain is the idol of the business men; they feel that he understands their perplexities, their ignorance, their sad little optimisms, their harmless ambitions; they have during all these years identified themselves with this representative of the backbone of England, and any decline in his prestige is a decline in their own."¹

Very illuminating, very true. The fact is that Chamberlainism is a phenomenon of decadence, of decline: it is an expression of the declining hold of the rich middle-class, who did great things for England and for themselves in the nineteenth century, upon the life of the country. After the last war, but especially after their experience of the world-depression which coincided with the Labour Government of 1929-1931, they felt themselves to be on the defensive. They were determined to hold on to what they had got, a sentiment which they successfully, though fraudulently, communicated to a vast number of people whose little property was in no danger from a Labour Government. But it has been the property-sense which has dominated the years since 1931, until the fact became too evident that you could not conduct a European war on it. That was at the bottom of all their politics from 1931 onward. In the old days, the Conservative party had principles which it was possible to defend, and to respect if you did not agree with them. Men like Disraeli, or Salisbury, or Balfour had an intellectual position which could be defended as against that of Gladstone, John Morley or Asquith—or even Mill or Marx for that matter. But the National Government could in its very

nature have no principle, except that of holding on to what they or their supporters had got. It was therefore always open to interest pressures, and pursued an unprincipled concessionism—making concessions to whatever interest was strong enough to bring pressure to bear, even to sections of the Labour Movement, to the Trade Unions, to the weaknesses of democratic opinion—as the price of remaining on in office.

The effect was utterly demoralising to all concerned, corrupting to political morale, and ruinous to the country. In the circumstances of the modern mass-electorate, leadership becomes a matter of infinitely greater importance than ever before; it is vital that the morale of the people should not be sapped by telling the people only what the people love to hear. There is something seriously wrong with parliamentary democracy as we have known it in the years since the last war, though what has happened since 1931 is not so much the fault of democracy itself as of the use which has been made of democracy to trick and deceive it, and govern by fraud and humbug. The National Governments could not have continued to hold power if the real nature of their hold upon power and the facts of the situation had been realised by the mass of the people. No doubt it could be argued, better fraud than force; but fraud can be as destructive as force.

Whence, it may be asked, came that peculiar flavour, the moral tone of Chamberlainism, that extraordinary smugness, that self-righteousness, that impermeable and fatuous complacency which all the chosen, inner circle exuded? It was a chief instrument in their technique, by which they muffled all clarity of thinking in the country, and stifled all criticism; it was a defence-mechanism which they all used, much as a grass-snake emits an unpleasant odour with which to defend itself: it was their characteristic smell by which you could recognise them a mile away. I offer this suggestion towards a more complete analysis of Chamberlainism when the time

¹ *The Spectator*, May 17, 1940.

comes. It has not been noticed how closely connected the inner circle of Baldwin-Chamberlainism was with the higher ranks of Nonconformity. Nonconformity in the nineteenth-century had a contribution, of a sort, to make to English society; social progress and humanitarian causes owed something to the Nonconformist conscience and its power of moral indignation. But political Nonconformity in delinquency, without its conscience, has been a sorry spectacle in these past years; there remained only its peculiar brand of self-satisfaction. It was very strong with the men of 1931, the men of Munich. Mr. Baldwin boasts of his descent from a long line of Nonconformist divines; Mr. Chamberlain is a Unitarian; Sir John Simon the son of a minister; Sir Samuel Hoare descended from Quaker stock; Lord Runciman the *beau idéal* of a Wesleyan with their worship of wealth and worldly success; Sir Kingsley Wood, another Wesleyan; there is Mr. Ernest Brown, whose favourite activity, I gather, is local preaching.

Many of these characteristics are to be noted in precise and documentary form in Mr. Chamberlain's speeches: they make such illuminating, if sickening, reading now.¹ Still, the personal characteristics of Mr. Chamberlain have some historic importance; for, strange as it may seem in the case of so obviously second-rate an individual, his was peculiarly a period of personal rule. No one can say that his was not a strong personality: he stamped it upon his administration as no other recent Prime Minister has done. He pursued a *personal* foreign policy to which he sacrificed his Foreign Secretary and Under Secretary, and the corporate, accumulated wisdom of the Foreign Office itself. When he went to Munich, he did not take the Foreign Secretary or any authoritative representative of the Foreign Office, but his

¹ *The Struggle for Peace*: by the Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain, edited by Arthur Bryant. From the difficulty I had in procuring a copy of this work, one might have supposed that it had been withdrawn from circulation.

alter ego, the Chief Industrial Adviser to the Government, Sir Horace Wilson. For this person's knowledge or competence in the realm of foreign affairs there is no more evidence than in the case of Mr. Chamberlain. The result may be seen today.

In reading through these speeches one gets the clearest impression: the vanity and self-satisfaction of the old man arrived late at high office, his ignorance of foreign affairs, his utter lack of vision. We find him again and again defending the "good faith" of the Italian Government in the House of Commons. In October, 1937, he was insisting against Sir Archibald Sinclair that there was no official confirmation of the landing of Italian troops in Spain; the occupation of the Balearics was an "unfounded idea"; the movement of Italian troops into Libya at that time had no "connection with present events."¹ No wonder poor Mr. Gallacher was reduced to interjecting "Nothing means anything": that exactly described the situation. The martyrdom of a friendly Republican Spain was allowed to go on; no notice taken of the bombing of Guernica, in which the Nazis tried out the methods subsequently employed against Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France and which, alas (June, 1940), we daily wait to experience ourselves. British ships that took supplies to the Spanish Republic were stigmatised as seeking only profits, a curiously-motivated attack for an ardent believer in the profit-making system; they were to enter Spanish ports at their own risk. Justice for the Spanish Government was described as "intervening on one side."² The whole idea of collective security, with which our own safety was bound up, is misrepresented as "going to war with everybody."³ The low-down *cliché* of the petit-bourgeois mentality that the collective system meant being "the policeman of the world" is repeated to the herd of cheering Tories.⁴ No wonder he was the idol of the small-minded business-man. No conception that it was our own country's safety which was

¹ pp. 36-40.

² p. 58.

³ p. 59.

⁴ p. 60.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

being betrayed bit by bit into the hands of our enemies even entered his mind or theirs. How different from Mr. Churchill's informed and historic perception that our safety was bound up with that of the other European peoples against the Fascist aggressors!

Our security on that flank was betrayed in Spain. Yet in the New Year of 1938, "I do not want you . . . to think that I am anxious to be relieved of my office."¹ There is all the tenacity of the septuagenarian in that: would that he had been relieved! Instead, it took a series of disasters and a political revolution to remove him, and even then, to the last, he was appealing to his "friends" in the House. Over Czecho-Slovakia and the deepening danger it was the same story: in July, 1938, he had "never enjoyed better health and spirits"; his efforts had "already changed the atmosphere on the Continent for the better."² In September he was accepting Hitler's assurance that his Sudeten demands were his last territorial claims in Europe.³ Lord Runciman, an appropriate choice, was sent to facilitate the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia. We know from the notorious interview with American journalists which appeared in the *Montreal Star*, that the Prime Minister of Great Britain had committed himself to the view that neither Britain nor France nor Russia could fight for the defence of Czecho-Slovakia even if they wanted to, that Czecho-Slovakia "could not survive in its present form" and that "frontier revision might be advisable."⁴ Hitler and Ribbentrop must have found all this distinctly encouraging.

Even more important was the obvious distaste for any common policy with Soviet Russia, in that reflecting the attitude of the whole class he represented; while the exclusion of Soviet Russia from the discussions concerning the fate of Czecho-Slovakia was fatal not only in that particular matter but also to the development of a common

front with the Western Powers. When Hitler presented his ultimatum, with demands that threatened the republic's existence, the British public was told in a broadcast of unparalleled meanness that it was "a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."¹ The Munich Agreement was described by Mr. Chamberlain in Disraeli's words as "Peace with Honour":² no one observed at the time that Salisbury afterwards admitted that at Berlin in 1876 we had backed the wrong horse. The Agreement was also described as bringing "Peace in our time."³ It lasted precisely eleven months. Yet after Munich Mr. Chamberlain insisted: "I have nothing to be ashamed of. Let those who have, hang their heads."⁴ In December he was "not conscious of the approach of old age either in my mental or physical powers."⁵ On his seventieth birthday he was able to congratulate himself on being "still sound in wind and limb."⁶ Six months later this country was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany, inadequately prepared mentally, morally and materially: a war of which the essence of the situation was that though Britain and France together had superior man-power to Germany, and vastly greater resources to draw upon, we were caught in a position of signal inferiority at the time in both. And this after nine years of National Government, to Hitler's seven.

What is the explanation of this extraordinary passage in our history? It is, quite briefly, that the class of rich business-men of whom Mr. Chamberlain was the ideal representative, and before him that other business-man, Mr. Baldwin—the men who made the "National" Government and stood behind it all along—have been so paralysed by the contrary pulls of their class-interest and the interest of the country, that they have ended, for the most part unconsciously, in betraying the country they ruled. Ignominious

¹ *The Struggle for Peace*, p. 275. ² p. 302. ³ p. 303. ⁴ p. 311.
⁵ p. 377. ⁶ p. 413.

¹ p. 65. ² pp. 237, 241. ³ p. 275.
⁴ R. W. Seton-Watson: *From Munich to Danzig*, pp. 38-9.

Germany, he stated that resistance by arms to Germany's attack was, in a way, non-violence.

When the war started there was great enthusiasm in India and great sympathy was felt for Poland. Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Rabindranath Tagore sent telegrams of friendship and support to the President of Poland. There was no anti-British feeling and when Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru said that India would give unconditional support, the whole of India was at one with that opinion. It would not have been difficult in the first week of the war to rally Indian opinion. This sympathy was not encouraged or diverted into useful and practical channels and it gradually evaporated when, within three weeks, Poland was crushed without any apparent material assistance having been given to her by either France or England. India, which was in the beginning of the war not so much a friendly neutral as a powerful ally, was allowed to drift into an attitude of suspense and neutrality, which afterwards gave way to unfriendly neutrality.

In his speech to the Legislative Assembly early in September the Viceroy said that Federation would be held up till after the war. There was in his speech, however, no constructive suggestion to win over Indian public opinion.

The Working Committee of Congress passed a resolution offering its sympathy to Poland, to France and to Great Britain, but at the same time it called upon Britain to declare her war aims with particular reference to her intentions in regard to India. They wanted Great Britain to make her position clear on two points: (1) the demand for the grant of full Dominion Status for India as soon as the war ended, and (2) some immediate step as earnest for the securing of full Dominion Status at the end of the war. In other words Congress wanted responsibility in the Central Government at once.

Great hopes were raised and rumours were widely current in regard to a new coalition ministry in the Central Government consisting of representatives of the three major parties, namely, the Congress, the Muslim League and the Indian States. Responsible British newspapers like the *Times of India* of Bombay and the *Statesman* of Calcutta, both advocated some such move on the part of the British Government.

The Viceroy interviewed various Congress leaders—first Mr. Gandhi, then Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Rajendra Prasad (President of the Congress), then Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel and later Mr. Jinnah, the Muslim League's representative. Following on these meetings every real or supposed minority clamoured to be heard before the Viceroy and the British Government declared their new Indian policy. To meet this demand the Viceroy saw altogether fifty-two "leaders" of India belonging to the Congress, Muslim League, Depressed Classes, Liberal Federation, Hindu Mahasabha, to mention a few. All this meant an unfortunate delay of weeks before anything was settled.

On 17th October the Viceroy made a statement in which he promised to call a conference of all parties at the end of the war for the consideration of Dominion Status. So far as the second demand of the Congress was concerned, the Viceroy offered to have a Consultative Committee for War chosen from panels of different parties in the country.

The Viceroy's statement was considered by the Congress to be unsatisfactory and they called upon the Ministries in the Congress Government Provinces to resign, which they did. The Provinces concerned were Bombay, Madras, United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, North-West Frontier Province, and Assam. The Governors of the various Provinces appointed Advisers from amongst the Indian Civil Servants. The appointment of Civil Servants as Advisers certainly caused less bitterness than the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

appointment of Indian Ministers from minority communities would have done.

The Viceroy once again sent for Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Rajendra Prasad as representing the Congress, and Mr. Jinnah representing the Muslim League, to attend a joint conference at the Vice-regal Lodge. The result was summed up by the Viceroy in the statement issued by him with the correspondence between himself and these three leaders. Following on this, on 2nd November, just a fortnight after his previous statement, the Viceroy, on behalf of the British Government, went a step further and in a letter to the leaders wrote: "The proposition which I invited you and the other gentlemen present to consider as the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League, was that, given the greatest importance of ensuring harmonious working at the Centre, you should enter upon discussions between yourselves with a view to discovering whether you could reach a basis of agreement between yourselves in the provincial field, consequent on which you could let me have proposals which would result in representatives of your two organisations immediately participating in the Central Government as members of my Executive Council."

This was a big step forward and there is little doubt but that if this proposal to enlarge the Viceroy's Executive Council by including representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League, had been made early in September, when the Viceroy addressed the Legislative Assembly, it would have met with a better reception and with more chance of acceptance. Coming when it did it had no chance of acceptance.

The Government of India and the Provincial Governments of Governors and Advisers have shown great tact and patience in handling the situation. The Governors have gone out of their way to create an impression that the

policies laid down by the various Congress Governments are to be continued by the temporary and transitional Governments of Advisers.

The situation in November and December was bad, but it was made worse by the Working Committee's resolution passed at Wardha during the last week of December. The Congress Committee urged the necessity of observing with due solemnity Independence Day on 26th January, 1940. They called upon all Congress Committees and individual Congress men to take the Independence Pledge. The Pledge *inter alia* stated: "The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom, but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses and has ruined India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. We believe, therefore, that India must sever the British connection and attain Purna Swaraj or complete independence." The adoption of this Independence Pledge was a measure of the general deterioration of the political situation in India as no efforts had been made in the months of November and December to improve matters. The policy of drift adopted both by the British Government and the Congress was responsible for the worsening of the Indian situation.

The speech of the Viceroy at the Orient Club, Bombay, on 10th January, was still another great advance. In this speech he said: "His Majesty's Government have made it clear, both through statements issued by myself, and in Parliament, that their objective for India is full Dominion Status—Dominion Status, too, of the Statute of Westminster variety; that, so far as the intermediate period is concerned (and it is their desire to make that intermediate period the shortest practicable) they are ready to consider the reopening of the scheme of the Act of 1935, so soon as practicable after the war, with the aid of Indian opinion; that they are prepared in the meantime, subject to such local adjustments

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and disastrous as their period of rule has been in time of peace, they were still less competent to lead the country in time of war: at the bottom of their failure was the fact that you cannot conduct a totalitarian war and preserve their system of private enterprise. But so entrenched were these men in power, throughout the Conservative Party, which had become their party, in the House of Commons, which had become their club, that it has taken disasters of the greatest magnitude to bring it to an end. Their fall represents a political revolution of the first importance, the significance of which has hardly been realised in the crisis of our fate in the war itself.

But it is surely of great significance for the future that the country to save itself has had to turn for leadership to a combination of aristocrats with the working-class movement. Whatever is the issue of the war, Chamberlainism has fallen, like Lucifer, never to rise again. The men of Munich and of these years that the locusts have eaten have been uprooted, scattered, some kicked upstairs, some out of office altogether, some sent abroad ignominiously to fetch home payment for the services they rendered. The men who have been right all along, Churchill, the Labour leaders and the Conservative rebels, are in control of the war: it is they who occupy the key-positions. And all this rests upon an anomalous position in the House of Commons, where the Conservative caucus and Mr. Chamberlain still have a majority. The House will have in time to be brought into proper relation both with the Government and the country. Wartime Socialism has been brought into being overnight. There is a new spirit abroad in the nation. Yet all now awaits the arbitrament of war. If we win, it will begin a new page in our country's history. But that is another story. What is certain is that an epoch of unparalleled ignominy in our history is ended, even though it has to be atoned for in blood.

INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT

By D. GRAHAM POLE

DURING the past two years the Indian National Congress and its Committees have passed resolution after resolution against the participation by India in any imperialistic war. They at the same time expressed sympathy with Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Republican Spain and other small nations of Europe. Congress also left no doubt as to its dissatisfaction with the Munich settlement, characterising it as a surrender on the part of Great Britain to Hitlerism. They were convinced that Great Britain would not put up a fight on behalf of Poland and that the invasion of that country by the Nazis would merely lead to another Munich settlement. They argued on two diametrically opposed lines—in one breath that Hitlerism should be put an end to by strong nations protecting weaker nations and, in the same breath, that India would take no part in any imperialistic war started by Great Britain.

On the declaration of war the Viceroy, in a broadcast talk, announced India's participation in the war. It is unfortunate that, in the state of Indian feeling, no attempt was made even to make a show of consulting either the Congress organisation or its leaders or even the Prime Ministers and Governments of the Provinces. In spite of this omission, however, Mr. Gandhi went to Simla, saw the Viceroy, and in his personal capacity offered unconditional support to Great Britain, France and Poland. Notwithstanding his strict adherence to non-violence he went as far as to say: "As Mr. Chamberlain has stated, the only force that Herr Hitler can perhaps understand is brute force," clearly implying that England was justified in entering the war. A few days later, referring to Poland's resistance to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

between the leaders of the great communities as may be necessary to ensure harmonious working, and as an immediate earnest of their intention, to expand the Executive Council of the Governor-General by the inclusion of a small number of political leaders; and that they are ready and anxious to give all the help they can to overcome the difficulties that confront us and that confront India to-day."

This was regarded as "a straightforward, frank, sincere and honest statement," and the political situation was greatly improved. It is a calamity that the British Government time and again delay matters till the situation deteriorates almost beyond repair. Three months of suspicion and distrust of British intentions had left a mark on the Indian mind, which had now become more cautious.

When the Viceroy arrived in Delhi in the third week of January he invited Mr. Gandhi to meet him. He had two hours' discussion on the political situation with Mr. Gandhi and again met him on February 5th. It was arranged that Mr. Gandhi would have several meetings with the Viceroy and that, between these meetings, he would see Mr. Jinnah and make a strong effort at communal unity. Mr. Jinnah had already been approached and had agreed to meet him. Just before Mr. Gandhi saw the Viceroy, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan had gone to Delhi and had met the Viceroy. It was common talk that his good offices would be available to bring about a rapprochement between the Hindus and the Musalmans. Fazul Huq, Prime Minister of Bengal, made a very friendly speech in Delhi and it was clear that these two Musalman leaders from the Punjab and Bengal would have had no hesitation in denouncing Mr. Jinnah's leadership and acting independently of him, if the latter continued to take an impossibly obstinate attitude. The news therefore that Mr. Gandhi, after his two hours' talk with the Viceroy, had decided to return to Shergoan (now named Sevagram) near

Wardha without seeing Mr. Jinnah or without waiting for further interviews with the Viceroy, came as a surprise. Next day the official communique was issued, along with Mr. Gandhi's statement. The official communique stated that a prolonged and friendly discussion took place in which the whole position was exhaustively explained to Mr. Gandhi. Mr. Gandhi had made it clear at the outset of the conversations that he had no mandate from the Congress Working Committee and that he was not empowered to commit it in any way and that he could speak on behalf of himself only. The communique further stated that what the Viceroy had offered to Mr. Gandhi was on the lines of what he had stated publicly at the Orient Club. Mr. Gandhi expressed appreciation of the spirit in which the proposals were made, but they did not in his view, at this stage, meet the full demand of the Congress Party. He suggested, and the Viceroy agreed, that in the circumstances it would be preferable to defer, for the present, further discussion with the object of reaching a solution of the difficulties which had arisen.

Mr. Gandhi's attitude is very puzzling. First, he goes as the representative and dictator of the Congress to see the Viceroy, but he escapes responsibility by saying, at the start, that he speaks on behalf of himself only. Whenever a difficult situation arises in the course of the discussion Mr. Gandhi would shake off all responsibility from his own shoulders and say that he could not speak on behalf of the Congress. It almost looks as if Mr. Gandhi is exploiting, perhaps unconsciously, the Viceroy's friendship for him. He knows that the Viceroy means business and that the Viceroy would go as far as possible. He also cannot fail to realise that the Viceroy is subject to certain limitations, having to work under the instructions of the British Cabinet, who could not overnight abdicate their power in India; and yet Mr. Gandhi wants the gift of independence for India from the Viceroy.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

At the same time he makes no constructive suggestions for the satisfactory solution of the four main difficulties in India, viz. defence, British commercial interests, the place of Indian Princes in the new constitution, and the communal problem.

Terrible disappointment was felt that no compromise was arrived at between the Viceroy and Mr. Gandhi and it was clear that the Congress Ministries would not return to office for some time to come at least. Then came Lord Zetland's interview with the *Sunday Times* of 11th February in which Lord Zetland (then Secretary of State for India) said that it was unfortunate that the Congress spokesman made a fetish of the word "independence" since he was convinced that this had created a false impression in Great Britain of the aim which the vast majority of Indians had in view. Lord Zetland's statement seemed to have caused great offence to Mr. Gandhi although it is difficult to see why.

It is perfectly true to point out that talk of independence puts into a very difficult position the British friends of India, official and non-official, who have been pressing on the authorities the claim for India's right to self-government. The Viceroy has, though late, conceded on behalf of the British Government India's claim to Dominion Status. Mr. Gandhi's criticism of Lord Zetland's statement was the first indication to the country that for the moment Mr. Gandhi himself had banged the door against further negotiations and the optimistic atmosphere created during the second half of January gave way once again to doubts and pessimism.

After Mr. Gandhi's interview with the Viceroy, the latter saw Mr. Jinnah and the agreed communique issued on the subject stated that the Viceroy and His Majesty's Government are "fully alive to the necessity of safeguarding the legitimate interests of the minorities."

The one bright spot in the Indian political horizon is Mr. Gandhi's statement, day after day, that he is not going

to launch civil disobedience in the immediate future. He admits that the atmosphere of non-violence is not there for him to start such a movement.

The resolution later passed by Congress did not help matters. In it they stated that: "The Congress withdrew the Ministries from the Provinces where the Congress had a majority in order to dissociate India from the war and to enforce the Congress determination to free India from foreign domination. This preliminary step must naturally be followed by civil disobedience, to which the Congress will unhesitatingly resort as soon as the Congress organisation is considered fit enough for the purpose, *or in case circumstances so shape themselves as to precipitate a crisis.*" (Italics mine.)

This last phrase is significant. It is at once a warning and a threat. The Congress idea was no doubt so to manœuvre things that, without resorting to civil disobedience, it would get some of its leaders in different parts of the country to make anti-war speeches, and thus compel Government to take action against them under the Defence of India Act. Congress would then feel itself in a position to say that it was the Government that took the offensive, and that Government alone should bear the full responsibility for the launching of civil disobedience in the country.

Mr. Jinnah, the Moslem leader, then came out with a new proposal—to divide India into Hindu and Moslem States. He insists that the Moslem League should be recognised as the only body entitled to speak for the Mussalmans of India, in spite of the fact that great numbers of the community are outside its ranks and refuse to recognise its authority, including the Momins, the Arhars, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema (which is strongly supported by orthodox Mussalmans), and the Congress Mussalmans of whom there are many. The President of the Indian National Congress is himself a Mussalman. That way lies trouble and innumerable

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

"Ulsters." In addition to the opposition of the Mussalmans I have mentioned such a scheme would meet with the strongest opposition from the nearly 300 million Hindus in India.

Two recent events, very different in character, have probably tended to make the position of India with regard to Great Britain less tense—first the recent debate in Parliament when a tone of understanding of India's aspirations was more pronounced than ever before in the speeches from all parts of the House and, in the second place, the invasion of Holland and Belgium by the German hordes and the breaking through by them of the French defence line.

The Debate in Parliament on 18th April was one of the most memorable and historic since India came under the rule of the British Crown. It was generally agreed that the Government of India was India's business and that self-government was India's right. There was no dissent from this point of view from any part of the House. Even Lord Winterton, who has not hitherto been credited with liberal leanings, admitted that "We in the Tory Party have in the past been too little inclined to recognise the force and vigour of that moderate public opinion in India which desires self-government." He agreed that the "immediate goal" was Dominion Status. Sir George Schuster realised the full implications of this and flatly declared that he cared very little as to whether the words used by the Indians were independence or Dominion Status, "because if we face realities it must be clear that . . . nothing can keep her bound within the British Commonwealth if the united wish of the Indian people is to withdraw."

India was invited, from all parts of the House, to set up her own constituent assembly and draw up the constitution under which she would wish to live and was assured that, if she did so, legislative authority would be given to that

constitution. Mr. Amery, the new Secretary of State for India, on 23rd May stated in the House of Commons that "the attainment by India of free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth is the goal of our policy. . . . We recognise . . . that it is for Indians themselves to play a vital part in devising the form of constitution best adapted to India's conditions and to India's outlook."

The prospects of civil disobedience seem to have receded into the background. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, on 21st May, said that he did not want to see a Nazi domination of Europe and spoke strongly against those who, in the present situation in Europe, wanted to start civil disobedience. Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, Premier of the Punjab, next day declared that India would shortly be in a position to lend full and whole-hearted support to Britain and her Allies. He added that the prospects of communal unity had never been as bright as to-day.

On 24th May Mr. Gandhi said: "While hourly butchery is going on in the West and peaceful homes are being destroyed, I have no heart to say anything publicly in regard to Mr. Amery's statement. Suffice it to say that I would leave no stone unturned to bring about a peaceful and honourable settlement of the present deadlock." And writing in his paper, *Harijan*, Mr. Gandhi adds: "The greatest gesture from Congress would be that it refrained from creating trouble in India."

Are we approaching the time foreseen by Hastings and Macaulay over a century ago? The Marquess of Hastings, Governor-General of India in 1818, wrote on 17th May, 1818: "A time not very remote will arrive when England will, on sound principles of policy, wish to relinquish the domination which she has gradually and unintentionally assumed over this country, and from which she cannot at present recede. In that hour it would be the proudest boast

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and most delightful reflection that she had used her sovereignty towards enlightening her temporary subjects so as to enable the native communities to walk alone in the paths of justice, and to maintain with probity towards their benefactors that commercial intercourse in which we should then find a solid interest."

Fifteen years later, on 10th July, 1833, Macaulay, speaking in the House of Commons, said: "It may be that the public mind in India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system: that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government: that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history."

Let us hope and pray that, for the sake both of India and England, that we are now on the threshold of that "proudest day in English history."

A NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA

By ALARIC JACOB

THE Ministry of Information's policy of conducting no propaganda in the United States has been well received there. In the first few days of the war, while this policy was yet in doubt, an official in Washington told me: "Hitler is your best propagandist. Just sit back and let him do the work for you."

Five years' residence in the United States, which kept me, in a journalistic capacity, very close to the New Deal administration and which ended a few months after war began, has indeed convinced me that the Ministry has been a thousand times right to lay by the heels the scores of dubious lecturers who, when the war began, were itching to take a trip around the United States under Government auspices. These people could only have done immense harm.

But if this official reticence after war had begun was wise, the same cannot be said for our propaganda policy in the United States during the preceding twenty years of peace. For surely no one can be so naïve as to suppose that we do *not* conduct propaganda in America in peace time. Of course we do! Often subconsciously, but none the less potently, every British citizen who has contacts in America—from Lady Astor, with her parties to ensure that American journalists in Britain "meet the right people" and get the right ideas, to the humblest casual tourist in New York—tries to make a pleasant impression personally and to leave a pleasant after-taste of Britain in American mouths. This is merely a facet of the political instinct with which British people seem to be endowed at birth. The same instinct which tells us to be polite to Frenchmen and bring out all our tact when talking to a citizen of Eire, tells us that it is essential for our survival

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

as a free people to have a friendly, well-disposed United States on the other side of the Atlantic, and that consequently it behoves us all to put our best foot foremost when dealing with Americans.

This being so, it is surely a tragedy that the well-intentioned approaches which our people have put forth towards America in the last twenty years have been based upon such a faulty estimate of modern America as to leave us, engaged in a war against a régime which 85 per cent of Americans abominate and long to see overthrown, yet so ill-grounded in American esteem that millions of Americans sincerely believe that though Hitler deserves to lose, we *do not really deserve to win*: that though a Hitler victory would mean an enslaved Europe, an Allied victory offers no assurance whatever of a *better* world but only of a world perhaps not much worse than the unemployment-ridden world of social and economic injustice we have known since Versailles.

Five years of watching the preliminaries to the second world war being played out in the United States have convinced me that our whole approach to America has been wrong. Even should the United States eventually slip, by successive stages, into support of our war effort, we are still losers thereby, for anyone who has even so much as tea-ed with the English Speaking Union knows that the touchstone of our relations with America has always been the hope that the United States might be induced to help *prevent* war. The formula has always been: "If the British Empire, the United States and France (with or without Russian support) were to get together in a Peace Front, then no other combination of Powers would find it worth while to break the peace, but would have to resort to arbitration instead of force." And our American policy, reduced to its simplest terms, has been to try to convince the United States, sufficiently and *in time*, that Britain and France *are* democracies worth associating with

for themselves and for their value as a first line of American defence.

The Americans were *not* convinced of the truth of these propositions. Without them and without the Russians, who also disinterested themselves in us (though for other reasons), the balance of power as between Democracies and Autocracies was not decisive enough to dissuade Hitler from risking his attack.

This American policy of ours, like all national policies, was one of self-interest, but it also served the welfare of the bulk of other nations in that it genuinely sought to prevent the outbreak of the second world war which is now upon us. Since that endeavour has failed, there can be no harm in reviewing now the reasons why we were unable to interest the United States in taking part in the preventive action that could alone have saved the peace.

First in the list must surely come an ignorance and lack of understanding of the United States among our controlling class that is almost without parallel in our relations with any nation. Indeed, time may show that our mishandling of American relations before this war was grounded in ignorance almost as inexcusable as that which cursed our relations with Ireland. We have had ample opportunity to dispel this ignorance. Our controlling class frequently marries into America: Churchill and Chamberlain are not the only members of it who are half-American.

We have no lack of Far Eastern experts, of experts in the life and culture of Polynesia or Tibet. But where are our American experts? There are so few of them that when it came to staffing even so small an entity as the American section in the Ministry of Information, the authorities were hard put to it to find the men.

Implanted in our official consciousness there seems to be the notion that we don't need American experts because

America is a country so similar to our own that—apart from a little military history—no field for special research exists. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is sheer stupidity to go on considering the United States as an Anglo-Saxon country at all. The nervous vitality of the national temperament, the rigidity and logic of the republican system are perhaps more Latin than north European. Out of a population of some 130 millions, there are 14 million negroes, 6 millions of Italian blood, 5 millions Jews, and many millions of Southern Irish, German, Russian and Polish origin.

True, the laws are Anglo-Saxon and so is the literature at its roots, though scarcely so in its modern development. The educational system owes probably more to the German universities than to the British. In short, the civilisation as a whole cannot be considered as either Latin or Anglo-Saxon. It is entirely distinct. It is North American.

The effort to comprehend this civilisation that is required of us is fully as great as that required of a Greek going to Rome in the age of Augustus. The language is our only bridge, and an increasingly shaky one.

How does a Liberal citizen of that civilisation assess it himself at the present time—a member of the great majority, that is to say, which approved the first eight years of the New Deal and which, come what may in the November election, is never going to permit a complete turning back into the old ways?

The Liberal American surely thinks of his civilisation as a revolutionary one, which was regarded for long after its rise very much as the established powers regard Soviet Russia today. Despite the growth of huge capitalist combines, despite maldistribution of purchasing power and the continued unemployment of some eight million Americans, despite graft and government by political “machines” and racial discrimination in some cities and states, he still regards his

civilisation as the most advanced in the world. He is proud of its free education, its abolition of caste in the European sense, its open road to political or economic power for every citizen, its checks and balances to prevent power falling into the hands of the few, its constitutional insistence upon a government of laws and not of men.

When he looks at other countries, which he does every day through a window wider than that which any other journalism in the world provides, he is disgusted with what he sees in totalitarian lands but he is not attracted by the vista in what he often terms the “Pseudo-Democracies” either. Even before war came, he saw Frenchmen governed by decree; he saw Englishmen governed by a clique of elderly business men, elected years before on a mandate to support the League of Nations, who threw away their own vital interests together with those of Spanish and Czech democracy in an effort to appease the totalitarians, only to rally at the last in support of semi-Fascist Poland (where Jew-baiting and government by colonels appear to him to be national industries).

As for the English specifically, he believes that their social system is an anachronism, with its mumbo-jumbo of a State Church, its absurd House of Lords, and its sale of honours by political parties which would be equivalent, in America, to Henry Ford being made Duke of Dearborn “for political and public services.” The public schools seem to him the negation of democracy. The Monarchy, he suspects, is often put to political use by reaction.

It is easy for us to point to the snobbery of American country club life, to say that Groton is as undemocratic as Eton and “Keeping Up with the Joneses” as ignoble as any foible Cheltenham can show. The American Liberal will reply that these are excrescences which, like weeds, he desires to see rooted out of his national life, whereas class privilege

appears to be as fundamental in ours as the sovereign, lords and commonalty of our constitution.

Again, the liberal American does not react to the same ideological stimuli as the modern Englishman. "Empire" is for him anathema. He has no feeling whatever for "the white man's burden." Although his own dealings with coloured people in the southern states are still dark with the prejudice of centuries, he does not aspire to political control of subject races overseas. He says "Civis Americus sum" with pride, but in so doing, thinks only of his own continent, which is for him as satisfying in flora, fauna and ways of life as is the land of France for the French bourgeois. Since Fascism came to dominate Europe, the civilised world for him has tended to narrow down to the twenty-one republics (and Canada) that lie between the Arctic and Cape Horn.

The pull of the "Old Country" grows ever fainter for the liberal American. Whereas the original Carnegie was always harking back to Scotland and the early Rockefellers and Vanderbilts betook themselves to Europe for all cultural activities, the cultivated American today has to a very great extent turned his back upon Europe. That is not to say that many friendly eyes are not turned backward still. Some aspects of living which the emigrant was loath to leave behind him are still incompletely realised in the New World. But, by and large, we deceive ourselves if we think that the America of Roosevelt has ever felt, or desired, more than a bowing acquaintanceship with the England of Neville Chamberlain. With the new England of Churchill and the Left, however, we may perhaps hope for happier ties!

This hope might find initial realisation in a clarification of what the Empire is to mean to us both. Liberal America is apt to disinterest itself from the preservation of the Empire *in toto*, or as at present constituted, while at the same time realising the insurance value of the British Navy. It is an

obvious American interest that a power, or powers, respectful of the Monroe Doctrine should dominate the Atlantic littoral opposite, but we have yet to convince the liberal American that the possession of India or of large portions of East Africa is a necessary concomitant.

Highly-placed people in Washington, and especially naval men, have told me that the United States, apart from feeling akin to the people of our Dominions, would almost certainly fight to prevent Australia or New Zealand falling under alien domination. Jay Franklin, a journalist very close to the White House, is among those who have assured me of this most categorically. Already, of course, Roosevelt has extended the Monroe Doctrine to cover Canada. So a feeling of responsibility has been shown towards *some* portions of the Empire coupled with complete detachment from others, and particularly from India and the more backward parts of the colonial empire, which it is felt we are holding down by force against the will of their populations, from whom we are withholding education and democratic rights.

A nation which *might* itself have become our greatest Dominion must naturally wonder at times why it is that our Dominions do not declare their independence from a mother country which, thanks to its lamentable geographical situation, seems to become involved in war every twenty years. But although such loyalty often seems incomprehensible, it does not repel. What contributes to isolationist feeling is not the prospect of helping to secure the Dominions but rather the fear of becoming involved in the troubles of the Empire as a whole, with its non-democratic hinterlands and its outposts remote from civilisation and vulnerable to attack.

Of isolationism itself there are two kinds. The first is deserving of all respect. Vigorous democrats like John L. Lewis and Jerome Frank, for example, see isolation as essential for the United States very much as Stalin deems it to be

essential for the Soviet Union. Not for nothing, they feel, did their forebears leave Europe but precisely because they were stifled by the social injustice, the national rivalries and the inevitable wars of the old world. Upon the American continent, they believe, a great new civilisation can be built up. But this civilisation must be jealous of itself, must be self-contained economically in order to be insulated politically. It must have no political ties with the Old World and must stay out of the old world's wars which, whether Kaiserism or Hitlerism be the target, are inevitably imperialist at their source. Behind the barricades of two oceans, a true economic and social democracy can be built up. For this the United States has the necessary resources, physical and human, and as the state of Europe grows worse, more and more of the best Europeans will come and contribute their brains to this upbuilding. The price to be paid must be the loss of foreign trade as now understood. Barter will take its place—sufficient to procure the tin, rubber and few other essentials that must be imported.

The second brand of isolationism seeks to have the cake and eat it. Individuals like Colonel Lindbergh and Senator Vandenberg do not want to give up an ounce of America's foreign power or trade. Rather they mean to increase both by reviving Theodore Roosevelt's brand of pre-war imperialism. Isolationist America, in their view, must see its "Manifest Destiny," which is to dominate the whole hemisphere under the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine. Trade is to be fostered in South America by means of loans and young Americans are to emigrate southward and people the Latin republics with North American stock. It is a programme of Kiplingesque imperialism, with modern trimmings, and it contemplates without alarm the possible triumph of Fascism in Europe and of Japan in the Orient, in the expectation that a United States that was mistress of the hemisphere would be

strong enough to deal on level terms with other imperialisms, and apportion spheres of influence.

All this is so reactionary in its implications that Dorothy Thompson was moved to call Lindbergh a Fascist for advocating it. This policy is advocated mainly by extreme anti-Roosevelt business elements but it has a few supporters in the opposite camp. Ernest Lindley, the biographer of Roosevelt and one of the very best New Deal journalists, probably fancies himself to be an isolationist of the John Lewis school. But upon the outbreak of the war, when I chanced to speculate upon the likelihood that if things went badly the King and the Imperial War Cabinet might shift headquarters to Ottawa and administer the Commonwealth from there, Lindley told me, with some heat, that Washington would never tolerate it.

"We will stop, by force if need be, the setting up of your Empire in our hemisphere" he said. "If you cannot maintain your Empire, you must lose it. We will not throw the United States in to redress the balance of power that you have lost nor will we allow you to involve us in your defeat by setting up your Government under our noses."

That is isolationism of the Lindbergh-Hearst school.

The late Lord Tweedsmuir, speaking as a visitor in the U.S. Senate, observed that the two English-speaking peoples were dissimilar in many important particulars and that it was this very dissimilarity that made them complementary, as each had something to learn from the other. Such aphorisms, however, are too often used to excuse the incoherence of our American policy, as though to say: "What does it matter if our social and educational system *is* reactionary if the Americans find something 'quaint' in these deficiencies? What does it matter if our pavilion at the New York World's Fair contains acres of royal paraphernalia and heraldry and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

little to show that Britain is not still a feudal state? Do not Americans worship all that is old and swallow any nonsense provided it be antique?"

Such delusions are the bane of our approach to America. It cannot be sufficiently emphasised that the United States is now fully grown: she has acquired national treasures and culture of her own: the time is past when she was content to sit in meek tutelage under older civilisations. Even if this were not so, there is no longer an even balance between our civilisation and theirs. The American ideal . . . "all men are created equal, with certain inalienable rights" . . . has always appealed to the widest circles in Britain, the working masses, whereas the British appeal in America has been directed to the smallest circles—the well-to-do.

This has become a positive danger to tolerable relations between us. Hitherto the ruling class in America—cabinet ministers, bank presidents, state governors, newspaper proprietors—has been mostly of British stock. The rich have tended to adopt British social habits, have filled their houses with British art and furniture, have been generally Anglophile.

The working-classes—the Irish Catholics, the poor Polish, Italian and Russian immigrants—have had to leave their own cultures on Ellis Island and to take on the prevalent Anglo-Saxon gloss. Often they have bitterly resented it. Too often, Anglo-mania for them has become identified with the social pretensions and snobberies of the ruling class and, amid the mass unemployment and poverty of the past decade, that has inevitably led to an increase of anti-British feeling. A certain identification between social privilege and things British is, of course, traditional in America, dating from the revolutionary war when a high percentage of the colonial ruling class became the "loyalists" who migrated to Canada to escape Republican rule. But considering the social progress Britain has made in modern times it is lamentable that our excellent trade union

organisation, our social services and housing should be obscured by a tradition that connects the very name of Britain with feudalism and flunkeyism.

What, then, is to be done? I write at a moment when the German invasion of the Low Countries and of France itself has revived the hope that the United States might, sooner or later, enter this war. Certainly, such a thing is conceivable. The eclipse of Chamberlain and the coming to power of Churchill and British Labour have made our cause far more attractive. But time is of the essence. A year ago, when a People's Government in Britain could have meant so much, rural audiences in Virginia and Delaware were still hissing Chamberlain when he appeared on the screen!

The hope we have all shared that the United States might be prevailed on to lend her enormous weight to the task of *preventing* war has been vain: and even if the United States were to intervene in Europe after the war to secure a more stable peace or to aid in reconstruction, there would be no guarantee that once this intervention had achieved its purpose, she would not retire again into isolation.

How are we to prevent her doing so? Surely, only by reform. Only by modernising the British Isles as a prelude to making our Empire what it is *supposed* to be—but is not yet—a commonwealth of free peoples.

A Britain that had no House of Lords, no grinding poverty and no concentrated wealth and hereditary privilege; a Britain that had a classless educational system, that had emancipated India and the Colonies—a Britain that resembled the Sweden or Denmark of recent days, in fact—such a nation could make a new approach to America with the fairest prospect of success. Some may say that even if we became a paragon of democracy the United States would not make common cause with us, any more than she did with invaded Denmark or Norway: others, that America herself is still so

SURVEYS

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RATES.

A GOOD deal of nonsense is always talked about the rates, but this is especially so in times of financial stringency. We are at present faced with serious difficulties in local government finance, and we shall overcome these most readily by abandoning popular fallacies and slogans.

The amount in the pound is commonly regarded as the most important aspect of the rates, if not as the only point of interest. Actually the poundage, as it is called, is one of the least significant features.

The poundage of a local rate depends largely on the ratable value per head in the area. Thus Eastbourne has a high ratable value in relation to the size of its population, so that the ratable value per head is £16 3s. East Ham, by contrast, has a ratable value per head of only £5 16s. This is the main reason why the rates are 9s. in Eastbourne and 19s. 6d. in East Ham.

The following table gives some further illustrations of the relation between ratable value per head and the rate level in a number of county boroughs.

TABLE I

	Amount in the pound of the rates, 1938-39		Ratable value in force in April, 1938	Average amount of ratable value per head of estimated population	
	s.	d.	£	£	s. d.
Barnsley...	18	8	367,739	5	1 0
Birmingham...	15	6	7,199,226	7	0 0
Blackpool...	8	6	1,614,991	13	1 0
Brighton...	10	2	1,881,956	12	17 0
Canterbury...	10	6	231,927	9	2 0
Dudley...	16	0	269,047	4	8 0
Exeter...	9	8	683,172	9	17 0
Gateshead...	16	0	556,395	4	15 0
Grimsby...	15	0	526,224	5	13 0
Halifax...	16	6	603,651	6	4 0
Hastings...	10	0	761,539	11	16 0
Huddersfield...	10	3	946,648	7	11 0
Lincoln...	16	6	441,887	7	0 0

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RATES

TABLE I—continued

	Amount in the pound of the rates, 1938-39		Ratable value in force in April, 1938	Average amount of ratable value per head of estimated population	
	s.	d.	£	£	s. d.
Newcastle-upon-Tyne...	10	8	2,635,148	9	2 0
Norwich...	18	10	758,311	6	3 0
Oldham...	15	8	697,895	5	9 0
Oxford...	9	6	918,495	9	19 0
Plymouth...	10	0	1,758,459	8	7 0
Rotherham...	18	0	419,026	5	11 0
Southend-on-Sea...	11	4	1,522,256	11	2 0
South Shields...	15	0	548,752	5	0 0
Stoke-on-Trent...	18	0	1,209,447	4	9 0
Wallasey...	11	6	869,532	9	3 0
West Ham...	21	2	1,508,868	5	16 0

The political complexion of the council in power will, of course, make some difference. A Labour or Socialist majority will spend rather more and a Conservative or Municipal Reform council will spend rather less. But this factor is negligible compared with the dominating importance of ratable value per head. A Labour council in Brighton would have little difficulty in doing a handsome job of work without raising the rates above 11s. A Conservative council in Poplar could not possibly squeeze the rates down below 17s. 6d.

The areas of high ratable value per head are the places where the better-off people reside or carry on business; the areas of low ratable value per head are the congested districts where the poor reside and work. The former usually have a Conservative council, the latter a Labour majority. Hence, the level of the rates has come to be identified with party programmes and policies. This is justified only in the most restricted sense.

Another important fact about the rates is the average amount raised per head of the local population. This discloses some startling side-lights. Finsbury, for example, though striking a rate of only 12s. 6d., raised £12 10s. for each of its local inhabitants, while Bethnal Green, which levied a rate of 17s. 2d., raised only £3 18s. for each member of its community. This key figure of the amount raised per head from the rates often tears the mask of virtue from faces

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

far from being a perfect democracy that we would do better merely to stress the advantages to be derived from the joint application of two great empires to power politics. But one must not under-estimate the profound inclination among Americans to think well of Britain, in spite of all discouragements—even to look for a lead from her. Their extreme disapprobation of "appeasement" was a measure of the high standards they expect from us. They often refer to our failures as though they were the backslidings of the most enlightened democracy on earth. Full well do they know that we are not that, yet by the very severity of their judgments they impute to us the highest potential of national virtue and honour.

Again, the time seems to be near when America will feel the need for friends. The New Deal has not shown decisive results; indeed, that very shrewd politician, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, has described her husband's whole vast economic experiment as "merely buying time in which to think." Social conditions in many parts of the country are profoundly unhappy, the national economy does not show the robust health it ought to do after eight years of attempted reform and the people are beginning to realise how vast and costly is the undertaking they have assumed to maintain the Monroe Doctrine over thousands of square miles of sea and air against potential aggressors who might come across both oceans simultaneously in overwhelming numbers.

The day may come when we shall be in a position to render America services as vital as those which her reluctant isolationists now fear we are seeking to have them perform in our behalf. Let us be sure to be on hand when that help is needed.

It is true that self-interest must rule national policy and that no nation will perform a vital service for another simply "*pour ses beaux yeux*." But who can doubt that once the

A NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA

working masses of the United States and the British Commonwealth felt themselves co-equal in their democracy, as in their national strength, they would not naturally gravitate together in time of peace and stand side by side in time of common danger?

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

which have no right to wear it. Local authorities alleged to be extravagant are seen to be models of frugality—though possibly reluctant ones; those whose expenditure was thought to be impeccably moderate, are shown to be doing themselves extremely well. The following table is instructive.

TABLE II

Non-County Boroughs and Urban Districts	Amount in the pound of rates, 1938-39		Average amount of rates collected per head of the estimated population	
	s.	d.	£	s. d.
Beaconsfield	10	6	7	2 0
Newquay... ..	10	9	6	11 0
Torquay	11	10	6	19 0
Chorleywood	10	0	6	16 0
Hove	7	10	6	18 0
Tunbridge Wells	10	4	7	13 0
Broadstairs	12	5	6	11 0
Sevenoaks	11	6	7	0 0
Finchley	10	6	7	6 0
Southgate	10	9	7	0 0
Thetford	16	4	3	2 0
Rothwell	15	0	2	17 0
Tipton	17	0	2	16 0
Hadleigh	17	6	2	8 0
Adwick-le-Street	16	4	2	14 0
Conisbrough	20	2	2	19 0
Cudworth	20	0	3	2 0
Featherstone	20	0	3	4 0
Hemsworth	19	6	3	8 0
Swinton	21	4	2	18 0

The war has affected the rating system in several ways. In the first place, evacuation has caused a vast increase in the number of empty properties of all kinds in many of the greatest cities, such as Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds. London has suffered worst of all in this connection. The proportion of empty properties in Westminster has risen from 7 to 18 per cent. In Chelsea, Hampstead, Kensington, Marylebone and other metropolitan boroughs one can see an extraordinary number of vacant flats, houses, shops, garages, restaurants and hotels. Obviously the rates on the premises which remain occupied will rise

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RATES

when their number diminishes, unless there are corresponding savings in expenditure. Although the cost of street lighting and road repairs has decreased, the reduction is not sufficient to compensate for the exodus of ratepayers through evacuation. Table III gives the rates in the pound recently struck by the metropolitan borough councils.

TABLE III
RATES IN METROPOLITAN BOROUGH

	1939-40		1940-41		Increase or decrease
	s.	d.	s.	d.	
Battersea	13	2	13	2	no change
Bermondsey	17	8	17	2	-6d.
Bethnal Green	18	0	19	0	+1/-
Camberwell	13	0	13	10	+10d.
Chelsea	11	8	13	4	+1/8
Deptford	14	4	14	6	+2d.
Finsbury	12	8	13	2	+6d.
Fulham	12	6	13	6	+1/-
Greenwich	14	2	14	0	-2d.
Hackney	13	0	13	8	+8d.
Hammersmith	13	5	14	0	+7d.
Hampstead	12	0	13	0	+1/-
Holborn	11	11	12	8	+9d.
Islington	12	4	12	6	+2d.
Kensington	11	4	7	1*	+1/5
Lambeth	12	3	6	7*	+5d.
Lewisham	12	4	13	2	+8d.
Paddington	13	4	14	0	+10d.
Poplar	18	0	18	6	+6d.
St. Marylebone... ..	11	2	13	2	+2/-
St. Pancras	12	2	13	4	+1/2
Shoreditch... ..	14	0	7	0*	no change
Southwark	13	5	13	11	+6d.
	13	4	14	0	+8d.
	13	9	14	2	+5d.
Stepney	15	5	15	10	+5d.
Stoke Newington	13	10	14	6	+8d.
Wandsworth	11	10	12	4	+6d.
Westminster	10	6	12	0	+1/6
Woolwich	14	1	14	4	+3d.

*The figure given is for the first half-year only.

From the above table it will be seen that the rate has risen in Westminster by 1s. 6d. to 12s., in Chelsea by 1s. 8d.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to 13s. 4d., in Hampstead by 1s. to 14s., in Marylebone by 2s. to 13s. 2d., in St. Pancras by 1s. 2d. to 13s. 4d., in Kensington by 1s. 5d. to 7s. 1d. (for the first half-year only). These are unprecedented increases; but the rates in these metropolitan boroughs are still far lower than those in the East End, where Bethnal Green levies 19s. (an increase of 1s.), Bermondsey 17s. 2d. (a decrease of 6d.), Poplar 18s. 6d. (an increase of 6d.), and West Ham 22s.

Second, local authorities in reception areas are being put to heavy additional expense in providing augmented services for evacuated parents, children, teachers and Civil Servants, not to mention military officers and the employees of private firms who have temporarily transferred their offices. Most of these war-time visitors are billeted on local residents, and their presence in an already occupied house or hotel does not necessarily increase its ratable value. Hence it is by no means easy for the local authority in a reception area to increase its revenue without imposing additional rates on local residents who are already out of pocket on the billeting arrangements.

The basis of liability to rates is the occupation of premises; and this is quite unsuited to the present situation. Today, hundreds of thousands of people are being accommodated in reception areas in premises which they do not "occupy" for rating purposes. Conversely, many deserted houses and flats in London and elsewhere remain legally "occupied" because the tenant or owner cannot afford to store or move his furniture.

There is neither equity nor justice in the way that things are working out at present, either as between individuals or as between areas. Bath, Bristol, Blackpool, Brighton, Carlisle, Gloucester, Exeter, Newcastle-on-Tyne and Nottingham are able to carry on with rates at their pre-war figure—in most cases a low one—while very large increases have had to be made in Great Yarmouth (a rise of 3s. 1d. to 18s. 9d.), Norwich (a rise of 2s. 6d. to 21s. 6d.), Portsmouth (a rise of 1s. to 13s. 6d.), Derby (a rise of 1s. 8d. to 16s. 10d.) and London.

The wrong method of solving the problem is to demand larger grants from the central government. Harassed

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RATES

councillors and officers turn to this as a duck to water without thinking of the larger issues. The Exchequer is already contributing probably £150 millions a year to local expenditure, as compared with perhaps £200 millions raised from the rates, and if local authorities receive a substantially larger share of their revenue from national funds they will be in danger of losing their independence. Were this to happen, our system of local government, which is an asset of incalculable value to our democracy, would disappear.

The most effective remedy for our difficulties would be to pool a substantial part of the rates for the whole country—say the produce of a 5s. rate (about £80 millions)—and to distribute the proceeds among local authorities on the basis of a formula which would take account of their needs. Another device which could be applied at the same time would be to widen the area of charge by levying a regional rate for certain regional services. Lastly, there should be a re-rating of industrial premises.

In 1929, "industrial hereditaments" and railways were freed from 75 per cent of their liability to local taxation. This step was taken at a time when certain of the heavy industries were in special difficulties. Local authorities were compensated for the loss of revenue which they sustained *at that time*, but not for subsequent losses occurring in the future. The need for this immunity from rating no longer exists. It is the householder, the shopkeeper, the occupier of office premises, the proprietor of hotels or boarding-houses, who needs relief far more than the manufacturer, and this could be effected by restoring the pre-1929 position. Incidentally, it would relieve the Exchequer of a substantial sum which it at present pays to local authorities as compensation for losses due to derating.

One hears and reads a great deal about the burden of A.R.P. expenditure, but very little of this falls on the rates. In view of popular misapprehensions on the subject, a short review of the financial aspects of A.R.P. may not be out of place.

First we may consider A.R.P. capital expenditure, which amounted to nearly £67 millions up to March, 1940, of which £58.7 millions fell in the financial year 1939-40 as

compared with only £8.1 millions in 1938-39. Under this heading the Exchequer bears the entire cost of providing gas-masks (£14 millions), Anderson shelters and the strengthening of basements (£20 millions), fire-fighting appliances (£5.5 millions), while the cost of the remaining item of A.R.P. equipment is shared with the local authorities.

Current or recurring expenditure on A.R.P. falls into four categories: salaries and pay of personnel; rent payable in respect of requisitioned buildings; research; and the replacement of material worn out or destroyed. Of these items the first three are paid for entirely by the Exchequer, while the fourth is chiefly borne by the Treasury. The sum involved in 1939-40 was approximately £40 millions, of which £21 millions went to pay A.R.P. workers.

The local authorities receive a grant in respect of their A.R.P. expenditure, whether capital or revenue. The initial grant is calculated at the standard rate, which varies from 60 to 75 per cent. There is a further grant of 10 or 15 per cent payable where the amount of A.R.P. expenditure falling on the rates in any area exceeds the equivalent of a penny rate. Hence the Exchequer grant can amount to as much as 90 per cent. In addition the Exchequer has contributed £7 millions towards the protection of vital services, such as public utilities, and their repair in case of need; a like sum towards the protection of factories under the Civil Defence Act (industry pays the remaining £15 millions of the total cost of £22 millions); and £2 millions for camouflage and the obscuration of glare from furnaces, etc.

The net result of this generous help by the central government towards the cost of A.R.P. is that the burden on the rates is seldom more than a few pence. Only about £3½ millions of the revenue expenditure and £2¼ millions of the loan charges on A.R.P. is estimated to fall on the rates. The average rate burden for the whole country is only just over 3d. In 18 large cities for which figures are available only 3.3 per cent of A.R.P. expenditure falls on the rates and in no case does the rate amount to as much as 5d. in the £. Local authorities certainly have little cause for complaint in this respect.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTERPRETATION. By HAROLD J. LASKI. (*George Allen & Unwin*. 7s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR LASKI has performed a very remarkable feat. He has written a book about the Presidency which Americans accepted as an authoritative classic within a few weeks of its appearance. They have twice before paid that compliment to a foreigner. De Tocqueville and Bryce reached the same distinction, but much less rapidly. Of the three, it is probable that Professor Laski is the best equipped by a long familiarity with the United States, gained first of all as a lecturer at Harvard, and then as a frequent visitor and a friend of many of the most distinguished Americans of his day. Few men born between the Atlantic and the Pacific can know more of the history, temper and institutions of this continent; but few, if any, who came to maturity as citizens of this republic can see it with the friendly detachment of this English observer.

The book has all the solidity and the charm that we expect from its author. He has read everything of any significance in the forbidding mass of the relevant literature—the writings of the political theorists, the closely-knit commentaries of the lawyers, the histories and the memoirs. But he is never burdened by his knowledge, and dares to give us, bold and clear-cut, his own views of the presidential office. They are not academic views. He has the eye that sees history in the vivid colours of the contemporary scene. Jackson lives for him, a vital and slightly eccentric figure, as contemporary as Franklin Roosevelt. Nor is he less familiar with the duller *fainéant* presidents, who are for most of us mere names. His speculations on the nature of this great office rest, therefore, on a mass of living detail, which gives to all his precedents and demonstrations the cogency of experience. For the rest, he is a quick-witted observer who never forgets that the presidency is a living and changing function, that grows while he studies it. He has his forecast of its future, as he has his wishes and his hopes. This is not, the reader will perceive, a work of deadly impartiality.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

It could have been written only by a man who had followed the fate of the New Deal with friendly solicitude.

Such a book was perfect for its original purpose. These chapters were first written as lectures addressed to an American audience in the University of Indiana. The English reader, unless he is a specialist, or has lived in the United States, may wish that Professor Laski had borne his infirmities in mind in this English edition. Its fault is that it assumes a general knowledge of the American constitution and of American history, which the average English reader does not possess. If a second edition is called for, as it ought soon to be, Professor Laski might render it useful to a much wider public, if he would provide it with an introduction designed to give this reader the indispensable framework of knowledge that he too often lacks.

Why is this average, intelligent Englishman so curiously ignorant of American history and American political institutions? Provincial arrogance may supply a partial explanation. But the true reason carries us at once into the central theme of this book. American politics interest us too little because they are too often and for too long together a record of nothing better than day-to-day improvisations and expedients. This constitution was based on the eighteenth-century pessimism which regarded all government as a necessary evil. This reviewer came to know America fairly well during the twelve years of inaction that preceded the election of Mr. Roosevelt. A fixed idea grew in his mind that nothing constructive could be done under the checks and balances of this constitution. As one measured the unwieldy size of this republic, the power of money within it, and the internal divisions of its two governing parties, this diagnosis was confirmed. The mixed record of the New Deal has not wholly dissipated this first impression.

Professor Laski is dealing in chapter after chapter with the paradox of the presidency—the contrast between the dignity and the apparent power of this office and its relative impotence. He does it with scrupulous care, in a series of chapters that deal with the checks that are apt to thwart the strongest president—a conservative Supreme Court, a Senate that clings to its treaty-making power, a Congress that can

BOOK REVIEWS

exalt itself only by belittling the President. If he has a bias, it seemed to this reviewer that he rather understates the negative influence of the Senate over foreign policy. He is, on the whole, somewhat conservative in his approach to the problem of constitutional reform. He suggests direct election by the whole national electorate, and he would abolish the right of Congress to add of its own motion to the Budget. The baffling checks on the executive power are left, however, as the Fathers devised them. For a remedy, Professor Laski wisely relies on organic change with economic pressure as its chief dynamic. The technical changes in modern society must, he thinks, compel Americans to demand what he well calls a "positive" State—a State, that is to say, which plans and constructs, in place of the old negative State that was content with minor and transitory adaptations. When once their will is fixed in this direction, they must create a suitable instrument for the purpose—in plain words, a homogeneous progressive party, that will face an equally solid party of property. With such a disciplined force behind him, a strong president might lead to some purpose throughout his two terms, and even in a third term. Few will question this interpretation. But one is less sure that this development is as likely as it is desirable. It implies the withering of the old territorial traditions. It implies an even more difficult hope—that Southern share-croppers and Mid-Western owner-farmers can join with urban workers, skilled and unskilled, with negroes and with the salariat to make a disciplined party of the "forgotten men." But who among us in these days will complain if a book so wise, so well-informed and so readable is possibly a shade too hopeful?

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE BOARD. By JOHN D. MILLETT. (*Allen & Unwin*. 300pp. 8s. 6d.)

THIS is a study from America; the sub-title of the book is "a case study in administrative autonomy." The title is sufficient to show that we are considering our old friend the Assistance Board from a new angle. For the author shows a certain detachment from all those questions of human interest with which our thoughts and speeches have been so largely occupied, and is interested in studying the machinery of government. And from that point of view the author has no doubt whatever that the Assistance Board is an unsatisfactory device. There is an interesting chapter on the subject of autonomous boards in a democratic society, and it is especially interesting because on this point practice has altogether outrun theory. We have a great number of bodies of the kind, all established "*ad hoc*" (to use an expression which Mr. Balfour described as a convenient barbarism). There are the London Passenger Transport Board, the B.B.C., numbers of Marketing Boards, the Central Electricity Board, the Forestry Board, and the Assistance Board itself and some others. Every one of these, in their time, have been justified on the grounds that Parliament cannot deal with details or with technical matters, and that delegation of administration under statutory rules is preferable, because Parliamentary time will then be spared, more elasticity of administration will be obtained, and certain subjects will be "taken out of politics." But these general arguments are far too general to cover such a multitude of cases. What are the conditions under which an independent board can properly function?

In the first place "financial freedom is at the centre of every other freedom"; and no body set up by Parliament can be "independent" if Parliament provides the money, whatever legislators may choose to say in statutes. And, secondly, if there is "no common acceptance of the purposes pursued," it is impossible to "keep the question out of politics." To take one instance, the London Passenger Board has its own revenues; and there is common agreement that London transport should be as good and cheap as possible. Hence nothing but gross inefficiency or corruption

on the part of members of the Board is likely to bring the Board "into politics." That, or similar trading companies which might be set up, are obviously useful devices. Other cases are not so clear. (Some of us could argue for instance that there is not altogether common assent to the purposes of the various Marketing Boards.) But there is no doubt that the Assistance Board stands quite at the other end of the scale. The money is voted by Parliament; there is the most passionate and widespread controversy as to what purposes should be pursued. It cannot—as long as we are a democracy—be really "independent" or "out of politics."

The author gives in great detail the history of this ambiguous device, and of the difficulties which may be expected in the future. He analyses the contradictory statements which were made at the birth of the infant by its parents, varying from the unguarded statement of Mr. Hore Belisha that "the Board is not a servant of the Ministry of Labour, but enjoys an absolutely independent existence" to the more guarded statement of the Minister that "in applying the policy laid down by the Minister and Parliament the Board would be independent." "The Government," says the author, "did evidently think that the creation of an 'independent' administrative board would be a convenient counter for the pressure to increase unemployment allowances." But nothing can stop the Mother of Parliaments when she is really angry, and angry she was in 1935. So we had the standstill; and the independent board afterwards made exactly those concessions which the Government considered enough to placate their own supporters. Very important from the constitutional point of view was the ruling of the Speaker in February, 1935, that the actions of the Board "can be criticised in the House, because the Government are responsible for the Board, and through them the Board can be criticised."

Since then the Board and the Minister have worked in the most perfect harmony, two minds with but a single thought. But the author, being one of those tiresome persons who possess a tidy mind, considers that it is not wise to postpone consideration of the future strains which may result from illogical arrangements until those strains

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

have actually occurred. "Suppose a change in the party complexion in the House of Commons should result in a Government not altogether willing to defend decisions of the Board. Would, indeed could, a Minister of Labour say to the House: 'I do not agree with the Board, but cannot interfere'?" And if a Minister of Labour came into office who did desire to make changes in unemployment assistance, "he would be confronted with the confusion and uncertainty which surrounded the factor of the Board's responsibility." It seems to the present reviewer that we have at last arrived at a meaning of "taking unemployment out of politics." That meaning is that the independent board is a departmental obstacle to any real change in policy. And such obstacles can be very formidable, when Parliamentary time is precious and a Government is overloaded with business.

A. SUSAN LAWRENCE.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT SERVICES. By POLLY HILL (*with an introduction by D. R. GRENFELL, M.P.*). 226pp. (7s. 6d.)

IT might be imagined that since social insurance, public assistance, factory legislation and similar measures are of vital importance to the mass of the wage earners and their families, the Labour movement and the trade union world would contain a number of experts who had thoroughly mastered these subjects and were able to think constructively about them. This is unfortunately not the case. There is hardly any important work being done in this field by labour's industrial or political leaders, and scarcely anyone who is competent to do it. Hence it has been left for a Conservative like Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P., to tackle such questions as Workmen's Compensation from the point of view of fundamental reform, while Labour members are content to ask merely for minor ameliorations.

Miss Hill's book is, therefore, all the more welcome. It is a study of the Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Assistance schemes, and the relationship between them. It is in the form of a report prepared for the Fabian Society and is frankly written from the Labour point of view. But it is singularly free from preoccupation with outworn orthodox

slogans. It is, however, concerned with the changes which should be introduced into the two unemployment services by a Labour Government in its next term of office. Despite this anticipation, the author assumes an economic background not fundamentally different from the capitalist order as it has hitherto existed.

The report emphasises the undoubted fact that unemployment benefit is in a very large proportion of cases entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the recipient. So far as the Unemployment Assistance Board is concerned, its allowances are distributed in proportion to needs only to a very limited extent; so that here, too, the sums paid are insufficient over a large part of the ground. From this point of view there is, therefore, everything to be said for Miss Hill's contention that the rates of benefit should be raised to a substantially higher level. The question of the effect of this on the willingness to work at present wage levels is, however, an important one, and the author weakens rather than strengthens her argument by sidestepping the problem with such airy remarks as "there are many factors other than benefit rates and wage rates which influence the incentive to work, and the question of whether the benefit rate affects this incentive does not become relevant for the first time when benefit actually approaches wage." The "incentive" objection can be overcome without great difficulty; but it must be met fairly and squarely, and not evaded.

The book contains some penetrating criticism of the Statutory Committee, particularly in regard to its reluctance to propose changes which involve matters of social policy. It is distinctly uncomplimentary towards the London County Council's policy of withholding free meals from the children of the unemployed. It is rightly indignant at the unfair treatment accorded to married women through the Anomalies Regulations. On the positive side, the author is in favour of varying the amount of the weekly contribution in accordance with the wage received, though she would retain the principle of uniform rates of benefit. She accepts the desirability of maintaining the two separate services instead of replacing them by a single unified service. She would relieve the Unemployment Fund of the burden of the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

accumulated debt by transferring it to the Exchequer. She would introduce a system of family allowances to all insured persons (whether employed or not) to be paid out of the disposable surplus which would thus accrue to the Unemployment Fund.

A few errors have been allowed to creep in. For example, on p. 137 the author makes a serious mistake as to the meaning of availability for work. On p. 113 she suggests that an unemployed man has to pay for the cost of educating his children out of the dependants benefit. In general, however, the book is accurate, shrewd, and competent. It is perhaps rather too slender in parts as regards the factual and documentary material, and in places a little sketchy in regard to the argument. But it was well worth publishing and is well worth reading. It is to be hoped that the author will continue her studies in this field of work.

BOOK REVIEWS

MEN AND IDEAS: ESSAYS BY GRAHAM WALLAS. *With an introduction by GILBERT MURRAY. (Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.)*

VOLUMES of essays, which are in fact miscellaneous articles and addresses, are a severe test of the author's worth, particularly if their subject is political or historical. Graham Wallas stands the test so well that it would alone suffice to show that he was a very remarkable man. The selection and editing has been done by his daughter eight years after his death, but she tells us in an editorial note that, though she is responsible for the selection, it had been her father's intention to publish such a volume. She has done her task extremely well. There is not one essay in the volume which is not of permanent interest and value, and, like everything which Wallas wrote, they have the hall-mark of the 24-carat mind and of his highly individual attitude and method of thought. The book is divided into three parts. The first part contains six biographical essays, two on Bentham and the others on William Johnson Fox, Robert Owen, Ruskin, and Lord Sheffield. The second part contains five essays on social and political subjects. Here the most important is certainly a study of the British Civil Service which he wrote in 1928, and there is also a very interesting paper on Darwinism and social motive, which he read to a Conference of Liberal Churches in 1906. Finally, there are seven essays on his special subject, education.

The outstanding quality of Wallas's mind was its originality, and one may even say that his originality was original. It did not consist in his thinking or saying particularly striking things and it was not the kind of originality which produces what is called brilliance. It came from his ability, to which Professor Gilbert Murray draws attention in his preface, always to observe and think freshly. Every one must have noticed that, if you have a picture on the wall of your room, which you may admire immensely and even consider one of the greatest masterpieces, after a certain time it almost ceases to exist to you. You hardly see it because you are always seeing it and always in the same way. Most people, even very profound and original thinkers, after a certain number of years see the objects of their observation

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and the subjects of their thought in just the same way. They have looked so often at the same kind of things that they lose the faculty of seeing them freshly or indeed of *seeing* them at all, and everything falls automatically into the pattern of their own thought. Most people would probably say that Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells, Wallas's most distinguished contemporaries, were far more original and brilliant than he was. In a sense that would be true, and yet in later life for sheer originality and freshness of thought Wallas would beat them every time. If, say in the year 1930, you had presented the three of them with a new social complex or problem, you would have been able to predict with some certainty the kind of way in which Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells would see it, though you might not be able to predict at all the extremely brilliant, original, or valuable things which they would say about it. On the other hand, it would have been quite impossible to predict how Wallas would see it, because he would see it as if he were looking at that kind of thing or problem for the first time. At first sight what he said might sound to you a little flat; yet if you thought it over, you might see that it was an entirely new way of looking at things and threw new light upon the depths of society and politics.

There is hardly an essay in this book which does not reveal this remarkable quality of Wallas's mind, and it is particularly noticeable in studies of Bentham, Darwinism, the Civil Service, and Froebelian education. It is this characteristic which enabled him to exercise a profound influence upon the readers of his books and upon his pupils. Professor Murray says that he regards Wallas "as one of the most original minds of his generation" and of *The Great Society* he says: "That book is one of the very few of which I could say that it made a permanent difference in my outlook on human conduct." These are high claims, but there is no exaggeration in them, and one might add that *The Art of Thought* is not unworthy to stand by the side of *The Great Society*; it makes a permanent difference in one's outlook on human thought and education. Such being Wallas's genius and achievement, it may sound strange to ask why he did not produce an even profounder book and have an even profounder influence upon his generation. Yet, to anyone who has studied his books

BOOK REVIEWS

carefully, the question ought not to seem strange. It is true that they do make a permanent difference in one's outlook on large and important areas of society, that they open new vistas of thought and enquiry. Nevertheless when one gets to the last page of them, one feels a slight sense of disappointment and frustration. The reason is that Wallas, while he had this extraordinary originality and freshness of mental vision, did not have a profoundly creative mind. The difference will be most clearly seen and the consequences apparent, if one compares the mind of Freud with that of Wallas. When you read Freud, you not only feel that he is continually seeing things with a completely fresh and original eye, but that at the same time he is synthesizing and making the most profound discoveries by flashes of creative understanding. With Wallas, you get the freshness and originality of sight and an intense stimulus to thought, but you are left then to think for yourself; the suggestion is analytic, not synthetic; and you are left with the curious feeling that the flash of creative imagination is coming—that it is coming on the next page.

LEONARD WOOLF.

MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION. By KARL MANNHEIM. *Kegan Paul*. (16s. 6d.)

THIS book fulfils the hopes raised by the same author's *Ideology and Utopia*. Important as that book was—it marked perhaps a milestone for social and political theory in this country—this is still more so. A review cannot do justice to the originality, the fullness of its argument; it would need a whole article. Professor Mannheim is a recruit to the intellectual forces of this country, whom we have reason to be grateful for. He has a valuable contribution to make, not only as a scientific student of society, with a spirit of impartiality and fairness beyond praise, but in his own double experience as a German citizen who watched the collapse of liberal democracy in that country, and who is now in a position to compare that situation with ours.

The cardinal importance of Germany to the contemporary world is as a crucible of social experiment, from which we

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

can all learn. Professor Mannheim brings home to us that what has happened there is only one adaptation to the same situation elsewhere—the break-up of liberal democracy, itself the political expression of an individualist, competitive economic system, and our moving willy-nilly into an age of mass society. This new phase of society demands new and far-reaching readjustments, social contrivances, institutions, techniques, and above all, a changed outlook to meet its needs. The totalitarian states have made strenuous efforts to meet the situation, deplorable as these are in many respects and mistaken in direction. Will the democratic states adapt themselves in time to the new challenges? Professor Mannheim speaks of “the illusion of traditional stability” prevalent, while both “social order and the psychology of human beings are changing through and through.” I should make the qualification that human psychology changes less than the social order; but that does not invalidate Mannheim’s thesis, it only means that maladjustments are more acute.

He has a fine and perhaps justified belief that the democracies can produce a better solution than the imposed solution of the dictatorships, a polyphonic harmony rather than a forced unison. But it will need a concerted effort to plan society, including the place and technique of freedom in it. He understands perfectly that the mouthing of the old *laissez-faire* dogmas, so far from being relevant or helpful today, belong to a previous age and only now provoke and aid totalitarian reactions of the worst sort. He sees that modern mass-society has an infinitely greater need of leadership than the old democracy of the few. In that he is profoundly right: that leadership running through society must be organised, though without being uprooted from among the mass. Here Mannheim does not go far enough—he has a too optimistic view of the changes which may be effected in human nature. He is on the side of the angels. On the other hand he addresses a salutary warning to those of us who are apt to be too disillusioned by what he himself describes as men’s “senseless behaviour in politics.” We must not become too sceptical, certainly not cynics or defeatists: he makes a good point when he says that we should be failing in our function of helping to think out beforehand the

necessary adjustments that must come. On the other hand, I doubt if he realises how specialised an activity politics in the fullest sense is, how subtle and difficult a subject for ordinary people to understand. Hence the function of leadership has a redoubled importance.

He sees how the extension of functional rationalisation, in industry, in economic life, has greatly increased men’s irrationality: a dominant feature of our time. He deals with the problem of selecting élites and of keeping them in touch with the masses; he makes the admirable suggestion of organising groups, a series of private, semi-technical publics. He argues that a greater measure of conformity will need to be achieved, and I agree that it need not be at the expense of substantial freedom. The war, and the new government, have brought us overnight face to face with the realities of which Mannheim speaks theoretically; and of all our present leaders, it is the least academic of them, Mr. Bevin, who thinks on the lines of this most academic of sociologists.

In writing, this book marks a great advance on Mannheim’s earlier work. But it is still far too abstract, schematic and repetitive in the dreary German sociological style.

A. L. ROWSE.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEMS. By GORDON EAST. (*Nelson*. 2s. 6d.)

MR. East's book (No. 55 in the Discussion Books series) could hardly have been published at a more appropriate time. As this review is being written, the Italian Duce is still doing the most prolonged and remarkable balancing feat in history; he has not yet toppled himself over into the abyss of war, though for days now he has seemed to have gone too far to save himself. But whether Italy is or is not at war when this review is published, Mr. East's book will retain its peculiar timeliness. He is Lecturer in Historical Geography at the London School of Economics, and he deals with the many Mediterranean problems from the geographical-historical point of view. That means that he treats them very often from an angle which English writers usually neglect or remember very superficially—the strategical.

Standing on the brink of a naval war in the Mediterranean with Italy, it is therefore natural that one reads Mr. East very largely to see what he has to say upon the subject. He has a great deal to say. He gives one the historical and geographical facts which it is absolutely necessary to have in one's mind if one is to understand Italy's position as a military and naval power, her "aspirations," and the strength and weaknesses in her strategical position. This applies equally, of course, to the strategical position of both Britain and France, for in the Mediterranean the strategical weakness of one of these three great Powers is the reverse of a strategical strength in one or both of the others. Mr. East has three chapters in which he deals respectively with the position of each of these three Powers in the Mediterranean; he has a chapter on the Problem of Spain; and he has a final chapter devoted definitely to strategical considerations. All these chapters are full of facts which one wants to have put before one at the present crisis and which are given to one here with great clarity and objectivity. Mr. East's object is not to tell you what his own opinion is on these mighty problems or to convince you that he is right and the other people wrong; he aims at giving you the facts and arguments on both sides which make it possible to understand

the problems and even discuss them intelligently. Occasionally he will commit himself to such a statement as that the closing of the Mediterranean to Great Britain in war would not involve her in serious difficulties. But generally he confines himself to facts, e.g. the number and position of the air-bases of the different Powers and their distance from vital strategical points or the possible lines of strategy in case of war and the strength or weakness of the combatants from a geographical point of view in case a particular disposition of forces were adopted. This is, in fact, the only sensible way in which to deal with this kind of question. What the layman wants to know is the broad lines of the situation, political, geographical, etc., which must affect strategy and the fortunes of war in this historical sea. To go beyond this and attempt to make predictions serves no useful purpose, because, as soon as you attempt to do that, under present circumstances, it is a question of piling hypothesis upon hypothesis. The reason is that there are many factors which must have a determining effect upon Mediterranean strategy, but at the same time we have at present insufficient evidence for forming a judgment as to what the effect will be. For instance, even after ten months of war it is impossible to say with any kind of certainty what the efficacy of air-power will be in an area like the Mediterranean against warships.

It should be added that besides the questions referred to Mr. East has two admirable chapters on the general historical and geographical background of the many Mediterranean problems. There are also two other chapters. One contains quite a good and fair account of the difficult problem which the settlement of the last war and the mandate have created in Palestine. The other deals with the Balkans and Near East, but this is the least satisfactory part of the book, because Mr. East has had to cram much too much into an inadequate space.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

LABOUR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE U.S.A. By KENNETH WHITE. (*The Liverpool University Press.* 12s. 6d.)

THIS admirable survey is the best book known to me on the problems of Labour under the New Deal. It is written not only with a full knowledge of the relevant documents; it is also built upon a real insight into the political and social background in which those documents must be set. Mr. White has realised that the Roosevelt experiment is not a new or sudden invasion of historic Americanism, but the logical outcome of a long experience of government by business men. He has set it in its historic context with imagination and judgment. The result is a book of real value to all who wish to understand recent developments in the United States.

Mr. White's fundamental conclusion is that the main need of American labour is to find the full means of political operation; until it does so there is little prospect of its being able to develop the standards of self-protection that have been characteristic of this country for something like a generation. I am confident that Mr. White is right; but I think the coming of those means is still a long way distant. The truth is that though the New Deal has produced a profound effect on the minds of the American workers, there is tragically little evidence to show that its implications have been understood, much less appreciated, by American business men. Even the elementary principle of collective bargaining has been only partially conceded; and there are whole areas and great industries where its coming is still resisted by violence and even assassination. The recent inquiry by the La Follette Committee into the habits of the Ford plants and the Associated Farmers of California reads like an extract from the history of Nazism rather than a chapter in the life-history of American democracy. Too many judges, especially State judges, are unaware that their function is not to act as legionaries of business men; and there are governors and mayors who still behave in industrial disputes as though they were the hired bravo of big business. Labour, moreover, has been profoundly weakened by the split between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O.; and it must be said that full advantage has been taken of the division by the enemies of

Labour. Predominantly, too, the older parties show no real sign of shaking themselves free from subordination to those enemies; the New Deal is a body of legislation imposed upon them rather than initiated by them. Its life will last so long as the President is there, or someone who shares his faith in the need for a reformed capitalism; a Republican victory would, I am confident, mean the instant arrival of reaction in the economic field.

Mr. White shows admirably how incomplete is the victory the New Deal has won. The truth is that except for the honeymoon period of the first administration, the President has never had behind him whole-hearted Congressional support. It may, indeed, be doubted whether more than a score of Senators and Representatives all told have sympathised with his purposes; and it must be remembered that only in the last year or so has he had a safe majority upon the Supreme Court. He has been, moreover, in the cruel dilemma that each dose of reform was a retardation of recovery, while each spurt of recovery had to be purchased by the sacrifice of reform. I doubt whether American business men have learned anything fundamental from the depression except the important lesson that a reforming President is lost unless he can secure recovery. From that they have drawn the important inference that with sufficient pressure they can always compel a President to a policy of half measures.

That attitude they will retain until Labour opposes to them a united front; and, as Mr. White argues, that ultimately and inescapably means action upon the political field. The problem this raises is whether the need will be understood while the opportunity still remains to take advantage of it. On this head the most important remark ever made about the New Deal is that of Mrs. Roosevelt—"we have done nothing fundamental," she wrote, "but we have bought time to think." That time, I suspect, is more narrow than American Liberals imagine. The anti-democratic forces in America are strong, determined, and aggressive, and they are particularly dangerous because they pose as Americanism. Another term for the New Deal is vital if the real American democracy is to organise before the dangers ahead—dangers

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

criticism of the Marketing Boards, despite 350 pages devoted to their constitution and activities. He advocates no wartime food policy and even his peace policy is of the vaguest: "Optimum retail prices and standardised commodities," whatever that may mean.

Meanwhile the Government muddles along. First the Ministry of Food indulged in profiteering, then food was subsidised. Bacon and butter were rationed, but at prices at which a third of the population could not afford to buy their rations. Farmers were allowed to waste concentrates on spring lamb which were badly needed for pigs and poultry, and they have been allowed to grow what they like on the newly ploughed land irrespective of the real crop needs of the nation. We are still waiting to get, from inside the Government or from outside, a comprehensive food policy consonant with health requirements, adjusted to the increasing strains on our war economy and acceptable to the common people of Britain. Sir John Orr believes he is offering the workers a square deal, but, like the Keynes plan, it is far from square enough.

P. LAMARTINE YATES.

Editorial Note

THE war has necessitated a few alterations in this journal which we should like to explain to our readers. Dr. Robson has entered Government service for the duration of the war, and has therefore had temporarily to resign from the editorship, though he will remain a member of the Editorial Board.

Secondly, the paper situation has made it necessary for us, with other periodicals, to economize in paper. We have, therefore, decided to reduce the size of the issue to 120 pages. On the other hand, by using smaller type for reviews and setting the articles in solid type, we have contrived to give more or less the same amount of matter as in the previous issue, and we hope to be able to continue on this basis in the future.

Thirdly, owing to air-raid damage, the Editorial Offices at 37, Mecklenburgh Square, have become temporarily out of action. Will all readers, contributors, and others note that all manuscripts, books for review, corrected proofs, etc., should, until further notice, be addressed to Leonard Woolf, Monk's House, Rodmell, near Lewes, Sussex?

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

not made less by the implications of the European situation. I observe with interest that Mr. White's conclusions are in the conditional mood. Since he wrote, events have made his doubts even more important and arresting.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

FEEDING THE PEOPLE IN WARTIME. By SIR JOHN ORR and DAVID LUBBOCK. (*Macmillan*. 1s. 6d. net.)

FEEDING THE NATION IN PEACE AND WAR. By GEORGE WALWORTH. (*Allen & Unwin*. 18s. net.)

WHEN our forefathers introduced modern sanitation they had no inkling of the enormous benefits which would ensue; yet the expectation of life is today more than double what it was a century ago. A wise national nutrition policy would probably have equally great and beneficial effects on the people's health. For some years now Sir John Orr has done more than any political party to place the facts of malnutrition before the public, and to press for cheap "protective foods" so that the poorest third of our population might enjoy an adequate diet. His appeals largely went in vain. The Government was not disposed to listen. It could not spare the funds—certainly not £5,000,000 per annum. Yet today when national expenditure is three times as large as in peace time the Government, without hesitation and even without challenge from Chamberlainite back-benchers, devotes £50,000,000 a year to keeping food prices down, and is contemplating spending even more. The marriage of nutrition and agriculture has been solemnized by the God of War.

Sir John Orr quickly seized upon the favourable opportunity for pressing home his arguments. In this excellent booklet he and Mr. Lubbock set forth clearly and concisely Britain's war food problem and make practical proposals for tackling it. They formulate a basic diet of seven commodities—milk, vegetables, potatoes, oatmeal, bread, fats and sugar—adequate to maintaining health. These seven should be subsidised at all costs to keep their prices from rising—the Iron Ration idea sponsored by Keynes, Sir Arthur Salter and others. If the poor spend, say, 4s. 6d. per head per week on food, the iron ration should cost 3s., leaving 1s. 6d. for

other foodstuffs which, decontrolled, would become more or less expensive according as the economic strain of war becomes more or less acute. This, it is argued, would cut food imports from 20 million to 5 or 6 million tons, it would call for a big increase in home production, and would ensure that the poorest third of the population gets its proper share.

Here the queries begin to arise. Is it likely that by these means the poor will get sufficient? They are used to certain foods, and will very largely go on striving to obtain them however much prices rise. Sir John Orr wants them to eat twice as many potatoes and vegetables and more oatmeal, but only such meat as they can afford at decontrolled prices. Will they? And why should they? Would it be wise to ask the workers to revolutionise their diet just at a time when they are being expected to work overtime in the factories? Would it be fair while there are still *escargots* and nectarines on the tables of the rich? Even if all this were reasonable, Sir John appears unduly optimistic about the cost of subsidising the iron ration. There were not many towns in which vegetables could be bought last January at 1½d. per lb., nor will potatoes long stand at 1d. per lb. if farmers are urged to double their output. His estimate of £100 million subsidy per annum would now need to be at least £150 million. A lot of money for such unattractive food! The workers will want to see far more "equality of sacrifice" before they accept oatmeal and onions, spuds and margarine.

Mr. Walworth does not compete in this field. His title is misleading for his long-winded treatise is primarily a history of the Agricultural Marketing Schemes, plus a concluding chapter on the early wartime controls. He has assembled an enormous mass of information, some of which is derived from third-hand sources and much of which seems quite unnecessary to the story. There are too many misprints and misstatements, e.g., Sir Robert Grigg instead of Greig (p. 285), the assertion that chilled beef prices have been rising since 1922, quoting Swiss milk prices at 18 instead of rather over 20 centimes per litre, and so on. The book would be better if it were half its length. Even as it is he gives no interpretation of all the material; he offers hardly a word of

THEN AND NOW

A COMPARISON OF THOUGHTS AND EMOTIONS IN 1915 AND 1940

By BONAMY DOBRÉE

ALITTLE time ago, a dug-out officer at a Cadet Unit made a speech after a dinner held by a Troop to celebrate its passing-out. The backbone of his discourse was a plea to his audience not to allow the old men to bungle the peace as his generation had done, through sloth, or optimism, or idiocy. He dwelt a little on the feelings of bitterness aroused in him and his contemporaries as they saw betrayed, one by one, the principles for which their friends had thought they were dying, till Armistice Day had become too painful a mockery. He went on to say that in winning this war, indeed to win this war, we must come clean; we must know for certain, and begin to live by, the values for which we stand, so as to have something positive with which to oppose the positive side of the Nazi approach. We must affirm as well as deny, since a negative cannot win a war. Above all, in what we affirm there must be no attempt to save material things; and he referred with gratitude to the Prime Minister's statement that it was better that London should be a smoking ruin than that the British spirit should fail. He suggested that England would have to be rebuilt on far less materialistic conceptions, and that at any rate there must be some vision of better things for England herself, something less ignoble than distressed areas and lies, for where there is no vision the people perish.

It was not at all a remarkable speech, but the response it aroused was interesting and symptomatic. The occasion was not really one for a tirade of that nature, yet it was not resented; some found it moving, because they were hungry for that kind of mental food, and many hearers thanked the speaker personally the next day. In 1915 such a speech would have seemed irrelevant, in bad taste perhaps, at best idiosyncratic, since one fought for one's king, or one's

country, or democracy, or for any combination of them, without looking further into the meaning of words. The issue seemed fairly plain. If we won, everything in England would be the same as before, possibly a little better, since the threat of German domination would have been removed. And as nearly everybody believed that pre-war England would return, it followed that one would go on from where one left off, both individually and nationally. Nobody thinks that now. There is no general opinion as to what will happen when we have won, and some feel uneasy as to the future, for the young are not as innocent as they were a quarter of a century ago. They have read about the land fit for heroes to live in, and some see the last war as an attempt to make the world safe for usury, an attempt at which it failed as egregiously as the League of Nations did as an instrument for putting into practice some of its more ostensible ideals.

In both cases, of then and now, I am speaking of the civilian who is becoming an officer, now a larger and more representative class than then, more varied. There are many differences in the general outlook, but there are also many likenesses which it might be as well to dispose of first. Now, as then, there is a willingness to fight (only in a few is this ever an ardour), for all are, essentially, just as much volunteers to-day as they were last time. They like to join because their friends are doing so, which is a very real and important reason, since without this sort of impulse there could be no social solidarity. Some feel, as they felt then, that it is their duty to fight for that society which bred them, fed them, and educated them. It is the quite common feeling of "I belong." No doubt it is an evasion, too easy an acceptance which precludes the necessity for thought, and as so expressed it is possibly a trifle shallow. But behind it there is a feeling of patriotism, which seems to vary very much in different individuals. There is the man who says: "Oh, well, England mustn't be beaten," and who may add, unconscious of historical irony: "It's not in the tradition." That, too, is probably rather shallow, but it merges into the profound and almost mystical feeling for country itself, for ground, for a thing that is, somehow, England. The love

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of soil does still exist, even in people who have nothing to do with the soil, and they would regard it as rape for a German to plough an English field, or for the invader's foot to crush "one spire of English grass." This may really be a longing for something stable, that does not change whatever else may totter, but it expresses itself in this way. Lastly, most young men of every generation share a desire to pit themselves against ultimate things, to face death in its most terrible forms, and to see how they emerge. This is metaphysical, mystical if you like, but that it is common I am very sure.

Common to both periods also is a sense of adventure, but here there is a slight difference. In the old days it was more spontaneous; and though now it emerges as frequently, it comes from a new angle, one might say a little reluctantly. The young man of to-day has a fear of soldiering as of something that will crush his individuality; he has been nurtured on pacifist literature, on *All Quiet on the Western Front*: and, moreover, the feeling of the last decade at least has been a desire for security, for a dull life if necessary, but at any rate a safe one. The spirit of "better not"—which for some years has seemed to be the mark of the Civil Service—has permeated much of the middle class. As soon as he discovers that the soldier's life does not crush the individual, and brings with it a comradeship he has never known, he experiences a happy sense of release: and then, as safety seems ever more distant, he begins to see, in the re-shaping of society that is implicit in this war, a chance of re-shaping his own life. The natural, healthy sense of adventure asserts itself, and he is all the more ready to dare because of the original reluctance.

So much for the likenesses. The differences are many, one sees and feels, yet it is hard at this distance to say exactly what people felt and thought in 1915. One tries to remember other people, to re-live into one's old self, and no doubt one distorts and gets the wrong balance. But certainly at the beginning of the last war one was conscious of a feeling quite absent from the beginning of this one, the idea of *à Berlin*, of the glory of war, of what fun it was to take part in so great an enterprise. A simple excited confidence was

the dominant note. There was a mild species of war-fever, a fear lest the war should be over before one got there. In the main there was no complication; the national or imperial issue seemed good enough when coloured with such pigments as "The war to end war," or "To make the world safe for democracy." I am thinking of the average person. Some others, consciously or otherwise, saw in the upheaval a process which would favour their especial political tendency, either the hastening of social reform, or "putting the workers where they belong"; but I do not think that this really much influenced their attitude at the moment. They kept the further idea in their pockets for production after the war should be won; it was not part and pith of their war emotion. A few, at the beginning at least, some till the very end, believed in the slogans, and this increased their ardour for a time, till mere soldiering made them forget what it was they were fighting for, beyond the fact that they were struggling for their existence and for their like.

To-day the emotions are far more varied, as far as a single limited observer can judge, and far more complex. There is, certainly, no surface glamor, no *à Berlin* sentiment; but one can see what there is far more clearly than one can distinguish what there was through the haze of twenty-five years. The more one considers it, the queerer the picture is. One is told that there was more unity in this country at the beginning of this war than there was at the beginning of the last. I do not believe it. Ostensibly there may have been; it is possible that more people said "Yes" to war this time than they did last, but I am sure that the reasons for saying so were so diverse as almost to amount to contradictions. If some were fighting for their lives, for their country, for the official causes, some were afraid that they might be fighting the right war for the wrong reasons.

It is these last who are probably the best potential fighting material, for though I do not think that any of the young men who join are filled with any relish for the fight, these have in them a fervour that goes a great deal deeper than it did with any last time. It is true that a number of them join by compulsion, but, as I have already said, they are quite willing, because they feel there is a compulsion greater

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

than the legal one. For them the war is based on something wider than rival imperialisms; it is in a sense a religious war which overrides even the national aspect, and they are fighting it for things which go deeper than the old liberal ideas of freedom. They desperately want to win the struggle because they hate the evil thing that Nazidom is. Some of them have seen it in action; they know what it means, and they realise that, short of a complete victory, "it might happen here."

So their reasons are different from those of the men engaged in a mere tribal struggle. Knowing what they do about the last war and peace, they are wary of being caught. There is a good deal of confidence in them, but very little innocence; confidence, that is, in our certainty of victory so long as we keep the issues clear. But there is not the same simple faith in the intentions of our rulers as there was in 1915, and one feels that in many there is a sense that they may be made fools of. Many of them know something of the duplicities and disloyalties which made the present war inevitable. Thus they are aware that their rulers may not be waging this war for the same things as they are fighting for (that feeling, if it existed at all last time at this stage was very rare): too many things have happened to liberty in this country in the last few years to make it possible to disguise the fact that there are a good many people among the mighty by no means averse to totalitarianism as an ideal, and the people I am speaking of know that a certain funk of "the reds" rather ignobly hampers the free play of the anti-Nazi spirit. But these doubts disappeared to a considerable extent with the change of government this year, which brought about a marked rise in morale.

But whether or not the young men think as this group does, all have a sense of inevitability, quite absent last time, when even those who had seen the war coming had felt there was a certain choice in the matter: and this sense seems from the very first to have produced a grimmer determination than was common at the beginning of the last war. This time they know from the start that they are in for a very tough and dirty job, whereas by the summer of 1915 the atmosphere was still fairly easy; and it is this

sentiment which binds together the most diversely thinking or feeling. For the moment this realisation that the job has to be done, that there is not a moment to be lost, this sense of urgency, acts as a cement which was absent in 1915. Then you might quarrel amicably with a man about capitalism or socialism (it is not so outrageous to be a socialist these days, certainly much more common) because it did not very much matter in relation to the war. Now these things matter very much in relation to the war; they are, in a sense, what the war is about. But the issues are so insanely confused, one might so easily quarrel seriously about them, that more unifying emotions, essential among people who have to live close together, and which are, moreover, the easiest to live by, are more evident than the others.

It is much harder this time to get at any idea of "the average," not only because of the wider mingling of classes, but because the average unthinking person has had thought thrust upon him by events. Family political tradition is more easily broken than it was, and even those who say they fight for the old aspect of England, for certain comforts and ways of living, realise that the England we are leaving this year we are leaving for ever. Others, intensely aware that this is a revolution as well as a nationalistic war, are eager for a change, craving for a renewed England which shall have sloughed off much unpleasant skin. Some are cynical about their own future if they survive the war, and see themselves thrown on the refuse-heap as their like were in the last peace: but interests and vested interests have different weight with different people, and it would seem that many are ready to accept a lower standard of material living in return for a clearer standard of spiritual existence, and a sterner maintenance of moral values in all departments of life. They are not afraid of comparative poverty, of a much simpler way of living, and are prepared to abandon those habits of life which make for class distinctions, and have indeed become burdensome. Most accept that a change is necessary, and if a few hanker after the *status quo ante bellum*, a number would be only too relieved to see it gone for good.

Some, indeed, see in this war a vista of liberation, a second chance to wipe the slate clean. If at this period in

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the last war some thought of reforms, what is thought of now is something far more revolutionary, a change in the social structure, even in economic theory. I would say—but this may be taking too rosy a view—that the men joining up now are far more aware of what it is all about than men were then. More people have begun to think politically, since most of them have at one time or another felt politics catching them by the throat. Most of them realise how fatefully politics can be distorted by trade ideals, and wish for finance to be the servant of politics rather than its master. Some are despairing, feeling that they are mere tools (this was not so in 1915); but others, the majority of those who think at all, realise that it will be their responsibility to win the peace as well as to win the war. They have taken warning by what happened last time, and are determined that it shall not happen again. It is this group which is the most eager to defeat Hitlerism, but it will depend a great deal upon what our politicians say and do whether the magnificent spirit which animates them can be maintained. They have seen France betrayed by the "Right," as they saw democracy in Spain, and, without going further back along this lamentable road, they may well realise the weight of the task laid upon their shoulders. If they are disillusioned (the treatment of refugees has not been of happy augury), their value as fighters will be lowered.

This time, then, there is a greater, more fundamental, disparity of opinion, and a far acuter awareness of the issues, which may later on lead to problems of morale. At present the morale of a man joining up is splendid—military morale always is better than civilian morale—and he has no doubts either as to ultimate victory or the justice of the cause. It is quite certain that victory will be his if the cause is not weakened: but should he begin to feel doubts as to the clearness of the cause, as to whether or not the politicians are coming clean, then something disastrous may happen. Last time, the men joining up, not being so aware, were anxious only to win, taking the rest on faith. This time the moral issue is clearer. People want to win for something, for some idea which, though deeply national, cuts through imperialisms and trade returns. The men coming in to-day

would like war aims to be defined, and would like to see them already taking practical shape in this country. The politicians are making a profound mistake, and incurring the suspicion of being double-faced, when they say: "Let us win the war first, and talk of aims afterwards." We were caught that way last time. The men joining to-day are prepared to stake all, and to give all: but if they feel that the vested interests are holding back there is no predicting their reactions. This time there may be many more Siegfried Sassoons.

A great number, it need hardly be said, do not think at all. They have opinions, most of them wavering; but they are too busy to think much, too eager to fit themselves for their job of helping to win the war. Still, large numbers think and discuss, while the others listen, and what is said now is important; for once they are officers they will have still less time to think and discuss, since their responsibilities will absorb their time and energies. No doubt at the end a large proportion will relapse into mental sloth, as the last generation did, thereby selling the pass it had won; a few may still be thinking that the war was fought that things might go on just as before (if such a belief is still in any way plausible); but it seems probable that a very fair number will be prepared to work actively, and to take a large share in the re-shaping of England. They will not be so ready to sit back and let the old, and the old gangs, run the show, and incidentally ruin most of them. And this, I think, is the greatest difference of all: in the last war men joined up for their various reasons, anxious to beat the Germans and to get back to their work and their way of living. Now some of them, few admittedly, but the most mentally vigorous, regard the war as a possible liberation or enfranchisement. While in 1915 men on joining felt they came in to preserve a world, now some of them feel they are coming in to remake it, in a fashion which will be in spirit wholly different from the Nazi fashion; and they will have little tolerance for those who in their hearts cherish the Totalitarian idea.

THE AMERICAN ELECTION

By D. W. BROGAN

THE contemporary world is so full of a number of things that it may seem of little general interest that, of the two candidates for the American presidency who have any chance of being elected, one is breaking the most sacred of American taboos by consenting to serve in the highest office for a longer time than Washington, Jefferson or Jackson, and the other has never been a candidate for any public office except that of the presidency—nor has he ever held any appointive office. Yet the impact of the Nazi revolution on what is politically considered one of the most conservative of great states (indeed, since the death of the Third Republic, the most conservative of great states), could hardly be more neatly illustrated. For although there are many forces behind the “drafting” of Mr. Roosevelt for a third term and behind the nomination of Mr. Wendell Willkie, they would not have sufficed to batter through the barriers of tradition and professionalism had not Hitler’s armies broken through the line of the Meuse.

Had there been no war in Europe, or even had the war, when it occurred, remained in what hasty American critics called its “phoney” stage, the machinery of American politics would have worked normally. It is true that in Mr. Roosevelt’s two terms of office, the machinery had been worked in odd ways, at what conservative critics called excessive speed and for dubious ends, and that there were signs that some parts of the machine would have to be replaced, not merely repaired. But with minor modifications the old political blue-prints were adequate for an understanding of the character and for an estimation of the probable result of the presidential election in 1940.

A succession of electoral defeats, beginning in 1930 and growing severer at each stage, in 1932, 1934, 1936, had reduced the once dominant Republican party to a mere handful in each house of Congress. The Republican

presidential candidate in 1936 made a record by carrying only two states. In the local government units, in the states, in the great cities, the same disastrous history had to be recorded. Democrats were not only dominant in New York and Illinois, but in Pennsylvania and Connecticut! Apart from rural areas in the north-east and a few oases in other parts of the country, the whole of the United States, as seen by a Republican leader in December, 1936, was one vast desert. Nationally, the party was hopelessly in debt; locally it was deprived of almost all its normal resources. It was in danger of death, and American conservatives pinned their hopes not on a revival of “the Grand Old Party” but on a split in the dominant Democratic party. Had Mr. Roosevelt, in 1937, rested content with his triumph, encouraged the idea of a new “era of good-feeling” and devoted himself to “holding the party together,” the conservatives in both parties would have had to bide their time. But his attack on the Supreme Court and the great labour upheavals of the Detroit “sit-down” strikes so angered and alarmed so many elements in both parties, that the plan of taking away the leadership of the Democratic party from “that man in the White House” was at once put into action. A considerable degree of success was attained; many administration projects, the Supreme Court bill, the bill for the re-organisation of the federal administration were defeated; and the presidential control of Congress was at an end—in a Congress in which the President’s party had the most overwhelming majorities in American history.

The congressional election of 1938 ended the first phase of this campaign. It was evident that the Republican party was not just going to disappear. After four successive defeats, each more serious than the last, the Republican party made gains. Formally, these gains were not striking. In the lower house, the Republicans were still only a little over a third and in the upper a little over a fourth of the membership, but not only was that an improvement, but in many states the margin of Democratic victory had been cut very thin; if the shift of voting strength continued, the Republicans could reasonably hope to win the House of Representatives in 1940. More important still, they had

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

recovered control of some very important states—Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts—with a consequent improvement in the morale and zeal of the local politicians, profoundly depressed by years of exclusion from all forms of patronage and power, federal and local. If there was to be a successful revolt from the New Deal, it would be led by the old firm.

This lesson was rubbed in by the nature of the Democratic successes and reverses. Mr. Roosevelt had set out to "purge" the party of some rebellious senators and one conspicuous rebel in the House, Mr. O'Connor. He failed to defeat the rebel senators but he did manage to defeat Mr. O'Connor. But it was evident that if opposition to the administration did not in itself lead to the defeat of a Democratic candidate, it did not necessarily lead to election either. Over a great part of the North and the Middle West, if the electorate turned against the New Deal, they expressed their discontent, not by supporting dissident Democrats but by electing Republicans. Any dreams that may have haunted the minds of conservative Democrats of making their party what the Republican party had been, the political agent of big business and the *status quo*, were dispelled by the elections of 1938.

Nor were these the only dreams that were dispelled; optimistic left-wingers who thought they could afford to press the issue against the old parties were rudely surprised by the defeat of the once invincible Farmer-Labour party in Minnesota, by the ignominious rout of the La Follette Progressive party in Wisconsin, by the very moderately impressive showing of the American Labor party in the east. Professional politicians who had insisted that the voter was not ready to abandon the old parties and that local successes of third parties had been due to personal issues (the political genius of Floyd Olson in Minnesota; the *magni nominis umbra* of the elder La Follette in Wisconsin; the conjunction in New York of support for the New Deal with dislike of the local Democratic party, e.g. Tammany Hall), seemed to have been more right than the optimistic forward-lookers.

The consequences were obvious. The Democratic party could not hope to win if it lost the New Deal support and

the New Deal could not hope to win if it had not the Democratic machines at its disposal. And the common denominator, the buckle that bound, to borrow a phrase from Bagehot, was Mr. Roosevelt. It became increasingly difficult to see how the Democratic party could win unless it ran the great vote-getter and both the New Dealers, the survivors of the Brains Trust, and the heads of the great city machines had an interest in the triumph of the Democratic party in 1940. So there was provided the interesting, comic, or disgusting spectacle (according to the temperament of the observer) of those pet aversions of the professional politicians, Messrs. Corcoran and Cohen, Hopkins and Wallace, combining with those pet aversions of left-minded citizens, Frank Hague, Boss of Jersey City, and Ed Kelly, Boss of Chicago (not to be confused with "Handsome Jack" Kelly, would-be Boss of Philadelphia), to secure the nomination and election of Mr. Roosevelt. A case could be made for the acceptance of Mr. Kelly's support. He was supposed to have seen the light or at least a glimmer of it. Some attributed this improvement of vision to repentance after the massacre of the steel-strikers by his police, a repentance encouraged by the late Cardinal Mundelein. Others pointed out that Mr. Kelly had presented Mr. T. V. Smith to a seat in Congress, and Mr. Smith is a professional philosopher. Some even thought of Dionysius of Syracuse (Sicily) and Plato, though it is unlikely that Mr. Kelly was among them. But for Mr. Hague few excuses could be made. He was the enemy of civil liberties; his machine was the most efficient and disliked in all the eastern states. Men had talked of the Berlin-Rome-Jersey City axis and recalled the bitter hostility of Mr. Hague to Mr. Roosevelt's nomination in 1932. But Mr. Hague had had to make some concessions to the spirit of the age; Mrs. Norton, one of his congressional nominees, had a good labour record—and New Jersey has a respectable number of votes in a national convention and in a presidential election.

It is quite likely that some of the New Dealers would have preferred to run a new candidate, not because they distrusted Mr. Roosevelt, but because they disliked the idea of the New Deal being merely the political shadow of one man. It is even more likely that the bosses of the great city

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

machines would have preferred a new and less dominant candidate, Mr. Farley or another. But as the various trial balloons sent up on behalf of various candidates burst; as Mr. Garner sank from being a menace to being at most a nuisance; as Mr. McNutt remained merely Indiana's favourite son; as Mr. Farley found that his religion and his immense reputation as a practical politician were fatal handicaps; (or rather as the supporters of these candidates found out these sad truths, candidates are always pathologically hopeful); it became evident that if Mr. Roosevelt did not run the Democratic party was sunk. Yet it was not at all certain that Mr. Roosevelt *would* run. He had two favourites of his own for the succession, Mr. Robert Jackson, the Attorney-General, and Mr. W. O. Douglas, the youngest member of the Supreme Court—and almost the only original Brains Trust member who had kept on good terms with the politicians *and* the President *and* the intelligentsia. But the professionals insisted that each of these was "unavailable"; neither, they pointed out, had ever run for office; they would be mere "crown princes" succeeding Mr. Roosevelt by presidential fiat. But, it was reported, the President saw a silver lining in a Republican victory. Four years of the kind of candidate the Republicans were putting up would be wonderfully educational—and Mr. Roosevelt, free from the shackles of office, would be a zealous school teacher. So the moves of the President—his smiles, his frowns, the timbre of his voice, the guests he received at the White House, or on the presidential cruises, or at Hyde Park, were studied with a care recalling a great shift of royal favour as told by Saint-Simon. But no one got beyond guesses.

On the Republican side, the problem seemed simpler. The party was benefiting less from any positive virtues of its own than from resentment against or boredom with the New Deal. Veterans of the Harding regime began to think, if not talk, of a return to "normalcy." Candidates began to pose in the attitude most likely to draw the lightning. Chief of these discounters of a reversion to placidity was Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Mr. Taft is a man of very real ability, as well as the head of a great political dynasty. But no one could say that he has a vivid personality. In Ohio it was a

current joke that many persons had voted for him believing they were voting for his younger brother, Mr. Charles Taft. That kind of story is told of many candidates; it is even told of Mr. Roosevelt, but no one believes that in 1936 anybody confused Mr. F. D. Roosevelt with his wife's uncle, while many persons believe that in 1938, the elder Taft really benefited from confusion with his more vigorous younger brother. Mr. Taft knew his own limitations. He would never be a great, popular, dynamic figure, but he was the kind of candidate the regular politicians like. Outside Ohio, it was realised (with whatever pain) that another Harding was impossible and that Governor Bricker had been too closely associated with that deceased and unlamented statesman to be a good candidate in less tolerant regions. But Senator Taft was the son of a President and Chief Justice; he had real debating ability; he was politically sound; and he knew how to play the regular political game. So the Senator went after the professional delegates in the South, as his father had done in 1912; there was no *vox populi, vox Dei* nonsense about the Taft campaign. If the regular politicians could have had their way, Senator Taft would have been the candidate.

Apparently like, but really quite different from Senator Taft's campaign, was that of Senator Vandenberg. The professional observers of national politics, the newspaper experts attached to the Capitol, had a much higher opinion of Senator Vandenberg than they had of any other visible Republican candidate. They may not have liked him, but they thought he "had what it takes" to be President, but, alas! he had not what it takes to be a strong candidate for the nomination. He was aggressive; he was courageous; he believed that he was a match for the President on the air (a belief facetiously commented on even by faithful Republicans); but to the mass of American voters he was just another senator.

Then there was young Mr. Dewey. In all the polls run by the press, in all the primary elections run by the states, Mr. Dewey's name led all the rest. It was a disturbing thought, for while it would be unkind to take too seriously the jibe that "you had to know Tom Dewey well really to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

dislike him," it was true that few who knew him well thought that he had given any conclusive proof that the presidency could be safely entrusted to a young man whose only experience of public office had been got in sending to jail various batteners on human weakness. It was something to have convicted Lucky Luciano of being a master pimp and Mr. Hines of being a master gambling racketeer, but while it was possible to hold that there were worse educations for the world of Hitler and Mussolini, it was possible to hold that there were better. Mr. Dewey had almost been elected Governor of New York, but he had not had the chance to show his executive abilities that such an office affords. His defeat had left him plenty of time for campaigning (for his District-Attorney's office seemed to run by itself), but it had not given him much to campaign about. Yet this brash young man (that untranslatable American term fitted Mr. Dewey as well as his smart business suits did) was the choice of the Republican voters—as far as they had a choice. Which thing was an omen. The party leaders might groan; they might complain that Mr. Dewey was another John Hamilton (the most unsuccessful party manager of modern times); but there it was, the voters wanted colour, something out of the ordinary, something more than the regular *cursus honorum* of American politics provided. Whether the voters had been spoiled by Mr. Roosevelt or the movies, or both, was, as Mr. Wodehouse puts it, a question bordering on the moot, but they had been spoiled. As Mr. Landon's debacle had shown in 1936, the presidency was now "too good for the average man," as the song put it, and though neither Senator Taft nor Senator Vandenberg were average men, it was hard to discover what they were, if not that. As for the other hopefuls—Messrs. Bridges, Gannett, etc.—their antics only amused the public and, in the case of the opulent Mr. Gannett, rejoiced the hearts of advertising men who found a newspaper proprietor and his money easily parted.

By the spring of 1940, the stage seemed set for Mr. Roosevelt, or his final choice, against whoever the managers of the Republican party could produce to beat Mr. Dewey. Enter Mr. Wendell Willkie. The idea of being President must have crossed Mr. Willkie's mind at an early age, if only

because he is a native of Indiana, and all Hoosiers dream dreams of political eminence. But Mr. Willkie, apart from keeping up a nominal membership in the Democratic party, had left politics, in the formal sense of the term, to his old university rival Mr. McNutt, and had gone in for the informal politics of public utility management. It is, of course, impossible to rise high in the business of supplying electric power to the American people without becoming deeply involved in politics. Either one patronises politicians of approved promise and performance, as was the habit of the late Mr. Insull, in Illinois, or one actively controls the party machine, as was the method of the late Mr. Roraback in Connecticut and the East. Less than ever could a utilities leader keep out of politics when the federal administration was entering the business; and the average American citizen first heard of Mr. Willkie as the defender of private enterprise in the public utility field. But he was thought of merely as an opposite number to Mr. David Lilienthal of the Tennessee Valley Authority, not as a possible rival to Mr. Lilienthal's great chief in Washington. And next to bankers, utility magnates were the most unpopular representatives of big business in the dark years from 1929 to 1936.

How did Mr. Willkie suddenly come out in front, the darkest of all dark horses, heavily handicapped by his profession, his absence of regular political experience, the permanent distrust of the professional politician for the outsider? For one thing, Mr. Willkie is not a regular magnate. His dress, his hair, his manner show that. While Mr. Dewey, despite his semi-rural background, dressed like a rising young executive coming in from Scarsdale on the way to being a risen middle-aged executive coming in from Greenwich, Mr. Willkie dressed like "Mr. Deeds" coming to town from Mandrake Falls, but preserving the rural virtues and homely manners. And any film-renter can tell you that fashions have changed; that the film-goer (who is a woman like a majority of the voters) prefers Mr. Gable to Mr. Montgomery. Mr. Willkie looks like a Capra hero, and that is profitable for a politician. But it takes some originality and courage to look like a Capra hero in Wall Street or at lunch in the Down-Town Association. The bewildered voter, turning

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

away from the ordinary politicians, took to Mr. Dewey, who seemed "different," and when it was obvious that Mr. Dewey was not "different" at all, turned to Mr. Willkie who was.

It is one of the draw-backs of the size of the United States and the comparatively low degree of integration of its political system, that candidates feel bound to start campaigning early. The three main Republican aspirants had launched their campaigns by the end of 1939, that is, when boredom with the "phony" war was at its height and when it seemed highly profitable to emphasise the comparative indifference of the United States to the result of the war which, of course, would end in an Allied victory. For example, Senator Vandenberg and Senator Taft had taken different sides on the question of repeal of the arms embargo, but there was very little to choose between them by Christmas. Mr. Dewey had preserved a masterly silence and then had fearlessly said "yes and again no" again according to the region he was appealing to. But, apart from fears that the victorious Allies would impose a new Treaty of Versailles on a helpless Germany, and deeper fears that Mr. Roosevelt's ambition to cut a figure in history would make him interfere too much in Europe, the main themes were the various crimes of the New Deal against the spirit of true Americanism. Mr. Dewey was especially strong on the necessity of reviving the pioneer spirit that had animated the men and women of the covered wagons when they had moved west and himself when he moved east from rural Michigan to the new frontier of Manhattan Island.

It was this complacent world that was destroyed by Herr Hitler's *Panzer* divisions. The invasion of Denmark and Norway had shown that it takes two parties to maintain neutrality, and the dreadful month of May showed in how dangerous a world the American people was living. It made the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt, who had been the most pessimistic or, as his enemies said, alarmist of American statesmen, a certainty—if he would accept. And it made his election a certainty, too, if the Republicans opposed to him any of the candidates who had talked such optimistic nonsense in the long months of stagnation. Conspicuously different from these was Mr. Willkie. He had been even more positive

in his assertion that the United States was deeply concerned in the fate of Britain and France than had Mr. Roosevelt. When all other candidates had been dodging all live issues, he had taken the bold line that suited his temperament—and his position as the rankest of outsiders. Leading figures in the Republican party, terrified at the prospect of having to rally round Dewey, had noted with interest the masterly campaign of denigration of Mr. Dewey which was waged in the Luce press (*Time* and *Life*) and in *The New Yorker*. But "you can't beat something with nothing," so the anti-Dewey forces outside the regular politicians began to see in Mr. Willkie their only hope. In the East, at any rate, fear of Hitler was beginning almost to cast out hatred of Roosevelt, and men paying quite respectable sums in income tax were heard to say that if any of the leading Republican aspirants were nominated, they would "have to vote for that man."

So much nonsense was written to explain Mr. Willkie's nomination in terms of a purely spontaneous uprising of the people, that its genuinely spontaneous character has been too much discounted, especially on the Left. That a utility magnate, the great enemy of the T.V.A., a Democrat who had only recently left the party, should be nominated as Republican candidate cannot, indeed, be explained in terms of either an unorganised popular demand or a Wall Street ramp. It was all very well for Jules Ferry to talk of Boulanger as a mere music-hall hero, but as Jacques Bainville said, it is not given to everybody to be a music-hall hero. Mr. Willkie's support may come from "the grass-roots of every country club in America," as Mrs. Alice Roosevelt Longworth is reported to have said; but even country-club grass has roots.

In modern times, the Republican party has not taken kindly to great personalities; only two of its presidents have had any claim to intrinsic eminence, and both Theodore Roosevelt and Mr. Hoover were, politically speaking, accidents. The cautious, negative plan of campaign worked out by Senator McNary and Mr. Joe Martin, the Republican leaders in Congress, and suited to the leading candidates and their programmes, was as irrelevant to the political situation

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

after May 10th as the metaphors of missed buses and boats were in Britain.

Of course, the nomination of Mr. Willkie was not solely due to his advanced position on aid to the Allies. It was due to a realisation by the voters and, slowly and reluctantly by the delegates to the Republican Convention, that it was essential to have a candidate who was *positive* about something. Given the nature of the Republican plan of campaign since 1938, it was inevitable that the leading contenders for the nomination would be men who, in a crisis like that of the early summer, would be "pushovers" against a candidate like Mr. Roosevelt in an election fought under the shadow of Nazi victory. That Mr. Willkie was a late starter, a forlorn hope, and an amateur all worked to his advantage when the storm broke. Nobody cared for the regulars any longer, except their fellow regulars—and the ten million marginal voters whom Mr. Roosevelt had polled in 1936 were not interested in regularity.

There is another side to Mr. Willkie's nomination. What ever happens in Europe, the next four years in America are going to see a great, not a less intervention of government in business. The mere technical necessities of the defence programme ensure that. That being so, business naturally prefers to have that intervention carried out by a "friend." Mere general chatter about return to free enterprise; mere metaphors in the manner of Mr. Dewey; mere bookkeeping in the manner of Mr. Taft; mere sectional nationalism in the manner of Mr. Vandenberg's appeal for the bean-growers of Michigan endangered by Mr. Hull's trade policy; none of these promised much to the business class, apart from the obvious fact that the American people would not elect any of the normal candidates.

As long as all that business wanted from the government was favours and a free hand, a neutral politician was all that was needed—a Coolidge was ideal. But in a deeper sense than Mr. Coolidge had meant it, the "business of the United States is business." There are many eggs that cannot now be unscrambled, many federal controls that cannot be relaxed. It is too late to think of going back to 1929; it is, perhaps, not too late to provide that the New Deal shall continue

under new management. So Mr. Willkie's appeal to business is obvious. He has a sense of realities; he will not fight forlorn hopes. Far more than Mr. Vandenberg does he represent the spirit of Alexander Hamilton. If it is still possible to save what is ambiguously called "free enterprise," it can only be done by somebody with more sense of realities than the professional Republican politicians have shown. So many of the supporters of Mr. Willkie must have reasoned.

But not all supporters of Mr. Willkie are provided by Big Business. The attack on the third term tradition will frighten many millions of Americans who may be persuaded that Mr. Roosevelt is a menace to American democracy. Then there are millions of Americans who are distressed at the endless experimentation of the New Deal. The activities of many quondam left-wing supporters of the Administration, obedient consciously or unconsciously to the new orders from Moscow that stunned even the faithful a year ago, will embarrass Mr. Roosevelt and even Mrs. Roosevelt. If Mr. Willkie promises much the same as Mr. Roosevelt in foreign policy, he may win support from elements which think he will prepare for "defence" more efficiently than the Roosevelt administration will or can.

Against this may be set the dodging of the defence issues by the majority of Republicans in both houses of Congress; the fact that the Democrats will, in any case, control the Senate; the poor record of foresight of its professional leaders; and the difficulty of imposing silence on such tactless Big Business politicians as Mr. Pew of Pennsylvania; or of sliding over the fact that Mr. Willkie, as a heroic defender of private ownership of public utilities, is more popular in the best New York suburbs than in Oregon or Colorado. Then there is Mr. Roosevelt, "a poor politician but a great campaigner," as a disgruntled Democratic politician once said to this writer. Even when it is probable that he is acting from non-political motives, as when he took Messrs. Knox and Stimson into his cabinet, his enemies cannot help admitting and admiring his astuteness. Mr. Willkie will have to carry the attack to Mr. Roosevelt, and the President is a master of "rocking with the punch," of choosing the time and place to counter attack. If Mr. Willkie doubts this, let

him consult Mr. A. M. Landon (who ran for President in 1936). That this will be a closer and more interesting election than those of 1932 and 1936 is certain. The irregularity of the proceedings from the politician's point of view, is enough to make prophecy exceptionally dangerous. The vice-presidential candidates are more important and more eminent than usual. But although Senator McNary is one of the most eminent and respected Republican politicians, he and his running-mate had never met until after the Convention. And the Democratic vice-presidential candidate was a Republican almost as recently as the Republican presidential candidate was a Democrat! The rules of the game have been altered and, for good reason, since it has been realised that the stakes are real this time—and immense. The fate of the oldest of written constitutions may be decided in the next four years, and even the local machine politicians, the court-house gangs and the rest, have had to notice the storm on the eastern and western horizons and, inside the country, the evaporation of the hope that the old American way, of "rugged individualism," will ever return. And Mr. Willkie represents not rugged individualism of the type of Henry Ford or even of the mining prospector like Mr. Hoover, but a form of capitalism already embedded in the political structure. The state and business are already wed, which shall be the senior partner? There can be no doubt if Mr. Roosevelt is elected; but if Mr. Willkie is elected? It is too soon to be sure. How many persons, a few years ago, were confident that Herr Hitler was merely a tool of Herr Thyssen. If elected, Mr. Willkie will be a politician willy-nilly—and if the atmosphere of Wall Street is subtly seductive, the atmosphere of the White House has its power too.

DEMOCRACY AT BAY

By LEONARD WOOLF

ON the morning of June 15, 1940, France was a democracy, a democracy at bay. It had a democratic government, responsible to an elected parliament, and, as its allies and the world thought, that government was fighting a war in defence of France and democracy against two totalitarian Powers. The head of the government, M. Reynaud, had only a few days before proclaimed, apparently with the approval of the representatives of the French people, that France would fight to the end and that, if need be, the government would continue the war from the colonies. On June 16 France ceased to be a democracy or to fight for democracy. M. Reynaud resigned and Marshal Pétain, an octogenarian French version of Field-Marshal Hindenburg, formed a government of military men and Right-Wing politicians. An armistice was asked for in such a way that any further resistance was made impossible and France was placed entirely in German power. The obligations of France to her ally were ignored. The terms dictated by Germany and Italy were accepted. The Chamber and Senate were not summoned or consulted and we are now told that the Constitution of France is "revised"—in other words it is made authoritarian. All this has been done by a little group of men into whose hands "power"—the power to obey Germany and coerce France—has slipped by a political transaction conducted in secrecy behind the scenes. Marshal Pétain has destroyed French democracy in war in much the same way as Marshal Hindenburg destroyed German democracy in peace.

Democracy, we have said, was at bay in France on June 15; it is at bay to-day in Britain and the British Empire. The vast majority of the people of these islands and of the Empire are, we believe, determined to defend their independence and their political liberties. But so were the vast majority of Frenchmen on June 15, yet on June 17 they were confronted by a *fait accompli*; no one now knows or

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

will ever know what the will of the French people was on the Monday when Marshal Pétain asked for an armistice, for they had been deprived of the power to resist and of their liberties by an old soldier, a President, and a handful of politicians. These events are a warning to ourselves; we need to consider whether we have adequate defences of democracy, not only against the German armies, but against the kind of internal political transaction which has destroyed it in France.

The internal defence of democracy depends largely upon free speech and a free press, but also to a great extent upon political methods and constitutional law. It is easy to overestimate their importance, but it is fatal to underestimate it. The idea that there is anything new in Nazism or Fascism, as a method of government, is a delusion sedulously encouraged by propaganda. They are the oldest form of tyranny—seizure of power and government by a clique. No democratic institutions or constitution are a 100 per cent guarantee against a *coup d'état* or the seizure of power by a clique, a Hitler, a Mussolini, or a Pétain, but they are capable of making such a seizure difficult or, of it does take place, precarious. That is why it is essential to keep the fundamental institutions of democratic control working during war, even though they may have certain disadvantages. They are an insurance against the consolidation of arbitrary power after a *coup d'état*. Organs of popular government have frequently been able to thwart or smother, in its early days, a *coup d'état*, but once a small group of determined men have consolidated their seizure of power, and abolished the machinery of popular control, it is terribly difficult to unseat them.

The first line of defence against this kind of authoritarian *coup* is parliament—a popularly elected assembly. It is vital that the House of Commons should under no circumstances be placed, like the French Chamber, in cold storage. Whatever happens it must remain in active session, maintaining the ultimate responsibility of the government to itself. Formally the transaction which led to the transference of power from the Reynaud to the Pétain government in France may have been "constitutional," just as was the transaction in Germany between Hindenburg and Hitler. But the

consolidation of arbitrary power in the hands of a few men was in both cases made possible only by the previous destruction or immobilization of all the organs and machinery of democratic or popular control. Democracy and democratic organs of government are no panacea against the political stupidity of the human race; they have their own peculiar defects and disadvantages. War and Nazi propaganda have during the last ten months made the most of those defects and there is among many people at the present time a very bitter feeling against "politicians" who are frequently confused with democracy. These people, often unconsciously influenced by anti-democratic propaganda, do not see that they will not get rid of politicians by getting rid of parliament and democracy. Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, Pétain, Baudouin, Laval, Franco and Stalin are just as much politicians as Stresemann, Reynaud, Blum, Churchill and Attlee. They play the same game, though they play it in a different way. If you have aspirations to form one of the new ruling class or clique, you may perhaps not unnaturally prefer the Nazi rules of the political game and boast of its "efficiency" and achievements in war, conquest, ruin, misery, persecution and injustice; but ordinary persons, whose destiny under these modern despotisms must be that of obedient subjects, a chorus of worshippers, cannon-fodder, or untouchables, will, unless they are imbecile, prefer the evils which they know in democracy and the democratic politician.

The immobilization of parliament is not the only danger of which the Pétain peace warns us. We call Britain and France democracies, but the government of both countries has always been imperfectly democratic, and many of the faults and failures ascribed to democracy in them have really been due to the fact that it did not exist. Pétain succeeded Reynaud and made an armistice which in fact was a peace. By that action he determined the fate of France, of the French Empire, and of the French people for years, possibly for eternity. The transaction which put him in that position and gave him the appalling power to determine the fate of millions was accomplished in secret by perhaps a dozen known and unknown men. The fact that he had formed a government in this way gave him the right and power to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

make peace with Germany on any terms which he personally chose to accept.

It is a disquieting fact that, although we call ourselves a democracy, our constitutional system makes it possible for exactly the same thing to happen "constitutionally" in this country. Democratic control and liberties are always precarious if the government or executive are enabled by the political system irresponsibly to initiate a policy of great national importance, to act upon it without mandate, and so to present parliament and people with a *fait accompli*, with a situation irretrievable when once created. It is, no doubt, essential that a responsible government must be given the power to govern; the danger of getting weak government if the legislature attempts to usurp the function of an executive is insisted upon *ad nauseam* by practical politicians and political theorists. In practice for a hundred years of European history the danger has been the other way round. In all democracies the difficulty has not been to prevent undue interference with the executive, but to prevent the government contriving to evade all responsibility and control. We are one of the oldest and most stable of the "democracies," yet it is astonishing what powers the British government possesses or claims to possess. No one, for instance, seemed to think it remarkable the other day when the government offered the Reynaud government what apparently amounted to federal union between Britain and France, and did so without reference to parliament. It is true that we were at war and that the situation was critical. Yet the proposal could easily have been put before parliament in the space of a few hours, and the offer, if it had been made publicly with parliamentary sanction, would have been far more impressive and might have had a profound effect in France. But the government preferred to act without reference to parliament and people and considered that it had the constitutional powers so to act, although the offer entailed one of the greatest revolutions in our history.

The government was probably correct in thinking that it had the power to unite Britain and France without the consent of parliament. It could have been effected by a treaty between the two countries and such a treaty is made

by virtue of the Royal Prerogative without reference to parliament. The Royal Prerogative is an anachronism which is extremely effective for preventing democratic control. It is particularly dangerous at the present moment, for it is the instrument by which in a crisis a Pétain peace could constitutionally be made here against the will both of parliament and people. By virtue of the Royal Prerogative the Crown enjoys the sole right of declaring peace and war and of making treaties. The king acts, of course under our constitution only on the advice of a minister, but, in the case of a treaty or the making of peace, this would be no safeguard in practice of the control of parliament or the people. In a crisis power might pass from the hands of a Reynaud into that of a Pétain here just as it did in France without any reference to parliament and the British Pétain could, by means of the Royal Prerogative, make peace and a treaty, ignoring the House of Commons. All this would be strictly constitutional.

The danger to democracy in this constitutional practice has long been recognized. In 1924, for instance, the Labour Party made a first attempt to make a breach in the system by deciding that all treaties should be laid on the table of the House for 21 days before ratification. It is significant that the new practice was abolished as soon as a Conservative government came into power, and, though again restored by the Labour Party in 1929, it was again abolished by the National government. There is much to be said for the Labour Party's innovation, but something more is required to meet the dangers of the immediate situation. It is essential to abolish the power of a minister to make peace by means of the Royal Prerogative without reference to parliament. This change would require legislation, for it would be necessary to enact, at the least, that the Executive should have no power to conclude an armistice or make peace without a resolution of the House of Commons authorizing such action.

It will, of course, be said that this is not the moment for constitutional revision. On the contrary, no time could be more appropriate. We are fighting this war for democracy, and we and democracy are at bay. It has often been

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

proclaimed lately that we must lead a European revolution against authoritarian despotism for the restoration of democratic liberty. Democracy is in its present plight because for years democrats have left the initiative entirely in the hands of their enemies. If we are to beat the Nazis and Fascists, we must show that we mean what we say and have the courage of our democratic convictions. We ourselves and all those who stand with us for liberty will gain strength if we show that even in the present crisis we are determined to strengthen our defences against the new despotism, not only on the sea, on British soil, and in the air, but also in our parliament, our laws, and our constitution.

PAYING FOR THE WAR

By Q. FABIVS

THESE is a point beyond which, for the great majority of us, figures cease to have any meaning. We can count up to so many; but thereafter our sense of numbers no longer works. This limit to our counting capacity is different for different things; for it depends in each case on the scale on which we have been used to thinking. In public finance the limit for the man in the street, and perhaps also for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is probably about £1,000,000,000. When that limit is passed, we get into the realm in which, even if we are still as able as ever to calculate, the figures cease to stand in our minds as the symbols of real things.

On this account as well as on others, it is very important that we should, as far as possible, face the problems of "paying for the war" in real terms. Fundamentally, the question that faces us for the immediate future is not monetary: it is that of achieving a right distribution of our productive power and of the consumers' goods which can be supplied after the direct needs of the war and the public services have been met. Money and taxation are of importance as they affect the use of resources and the distribution of the products; but, much more than in ordinary times, we have to beware of topsy-turvy thinking, which puts money calculations on top and expects real things to accommodate themselves easily to the manipulations of the monetary factor.

This consideration is relevant to the general abuse heaped on Sir Kingsley Wood's recent Budget. That it was a bad Budget I fully agree; but I doubt if anyone could have made a good one under the circumstances under which it was drawn up. Where there is no reasoned economic plan there can, in the nature of things, be no reasoned financial plan either; and it is perfectly plain that there is at present, in the mind of the British Government, only the glimmering of an economic plan.

This is not wholly the Government's fault. The blame

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

lies heavily on Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues, who failed to make an economic plan during the earlier months of the war. But when the new Government came to office it was immediately faced by a situation which necessarily made long-term planning very difficult indeed. Arrangements which had been based on the assumption of joint supply for Great Britain and France, and of joint payment, had suddenly to be readjusted to allow for the disappearance of France from both sides of the account. Moreover, the French disaster inevitably shifted the emphasis from the requirements of a long war to the immediate demands of the new defence programme. Aircraft, tanks, every kind of military supply, had to be produced at top speed in order to replace the equipment lost in France and to make rapid provision for a single-handed war of national defence. We could no longer think in terms of what we could afford to buy from America, but only in terms of what we could get; and at home it seemed much more vital to turn out arms as quickly as possible than to buy them on the most economical terms.

Such a time as this was clearly the worst possible for producing a rational Budget. But it was evident that the absurd Budget brought forward earlier in the year by Lord Simon could not be allowed to stand. To have let it stand would have meant giving up all attempt to keep the financial situation under any sort of control. There had to be a new Budget, in face of the immensely rapid rise in the rate of national expenditure. But it was altogether too much to expect that a Budget produced under such conditions would solve any of the real problems of war finance. It had to be produced at a moment when the economic plan, in as far as there was one, was in a state of entire disorder, and there was no possibility of working a Budget out in relation to a revised and improved economic plan conceived in real terms.

Now that we have, by means of a remarkable productive effort and a great increase in certain types of imports from the United States, in the main overcome the immediate dangers consequent on the French collapse, we have to go back to thinking in terms of a possibly prolonged war, and to set about the rational use of our resources on the

assumption of an effort that may have to be sustained over several years. It is in relation to this problem of long-term economic planning for war that a revised financial policy has now to be conceived.

Let us begin with the economic plan itself. In terms of the diversion of man-power and equipment from civilian to war production, and of the bringing into productive use of persons and resources hitherto unemployed, it is plain that the war effort is still nowhere near its maximum. Many of the new war factories are not yet finished; and many establishments at present engaged on non-essential production, or standing half idle, are capable of conversion to war uses. The training of women for work on munitions has hardly begun; it is indeed held up by the slow progress made in training and upgrading semi-skilled workers for the key jobs. On all these accounts, the proportion of national output that is made to Government order is certain to rise sharply over the next few months; and this will involve a further rise in the rate of Government expenditure, unless the methods of purchasing used by the supply departments can be radically altered.

Doubtless, some part of this prospective increase in output to Government order will be in replacement of purchases now being made abroad. But in view of British dependence on imported materials this cannot be a very important factor; and it will be necessary to keep exports high in order to pay for imports that will remain indispensable if higher production is to be achieved. One difficulty here is, of course, that the exports which it is easiest to sell abroad may use up the very materials, machines and types of skilled labour that are urgently needed for war purposes; and it cannot be easy in cases of this sort to strike the right balance. This makes it very important to stimulate to the utmost those exports which do not compete seriously with war demands—even at the cost of leaving the home consumers very short of conventionally necessary supplies. To an increasing extent, the home consumers will have to go without, wherever the things they want can be exchanged for necessary supplies from abroad.

There is, however, no case at all for restricting those

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

consumers' supplies which cannot be used to pay for imports and do not use up materials needed for the war industries, unless the labour and equipment employed in making such goods are really and immediately needed for war work. This is one of the points at which thinking in financial instead of real terms is apt to be most misleading. It is quite false economy to throw out of employment workers who cannot be promptly transferred to more essential work, or plant unusable for war production, wherever this can be avoided. Such disemployment does nothing to ease the *fixchequer's* problems. On the contrary, it makes them harder to solve; and it is furthermore exceedingly bad for the morale of the people who find themselves thrown on the scrap-heap at the very time that Ministers are adjuring them to "Go to it" in the national cause.

It is wrong policy to restrict consumers' purchases of anything which can be supplied to them without hampering the war effort. There will have in any case to be so much going without that every unnecessary restriction ought to be avoided. That is the radical defect of the Purchase Tax, which admits no distinction at all between goods which must be restricted in supply because they, or the materials or labour used in making them, are needed elsewhere, and goods which it is proposed to restrict mainly on the principle that in war-time it is good for people to be made to do without.

Economic planning, under war conditions, means primarily the distribution of the available materials, machinery and man-power between the three sectors—war production, exports, and civilian consumption—in such proportions as are best calculated to promote success in what may be long war, and most consistent, in the third sector, with the claims of social justice. The right distribution, in this sense, is much less likely to be achieved by financial manipulation than by the direct rationing of supplies of materials and labour, and where necessary of machinery also, under the authority of a unified planning organisation. Finance is a blunt instrument, because it cannot distinguish enough between different kinds of goods; and it grows blunter, the range of price-control is widened. For price-control without rationing means a scramble for scarce supplies,

which the customer whose purse gives him the widest range of alternatives is bound to come off best.

Consider first the sector of our national economy which is working to Government order. This is made up of two groups of firms—main contractors, and sub-contractors or material suppliers working for firms engaged on Government jobs. At present, some of these firms are "controlled" by the Ministry of Supply or some other department; but the majority are not, and in practice the presence or absence of "control" does not make very much difference. In both cases firms are subject to Excess Profits Tax at the new rate of 100 per cent; and it is sometimes argued that this removes all incentive to profiteer, and insures that they will work in accordance with the national interest. In fact it does nothing of the sort. Immediately, it makes firms regardless of costs, monetary or real, as long as they are able to secure enough orders to keep their profits up to the pre-war level. It makes them eager to spend as much as possible on renewals, decorations, and other capital improvements which can be charged against E.P.T. And, beyond this, it leaves them thinking in terms not of the profits they can make now, but of the probable effects of what they do now on their profit-earning capacity after the war.

This last is the real nigger in the wood-pile. Firms, fearful of post-war competition, are intensely reluctant to mobilise for war output other firms, not normally in the same line of business, that could be brought in to increase production of essential goods. They are unwilling to make public their patents or secret processes, or to have more workers trained for highly-skilled processes than they can feel sure of being able to use when the war is over. This explains the curious paradox, greatly unlike what happened during the last war, of trade unions of skilled workers pressing dilution on a generally reluctant body of employers. British capitalism has been steadily practising restrictive policies during the past two decades—buying up and destroying "surplus" capacity, preventing the entry of new businesses, imposing quotas and regulations of every sort and kind. It does not easily unlearn under war conditions its restrictive habits; and the present system of "control"

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

plus E.P.T. positively encourages its instinctive bias towards monopoly.

The right way of handling this problem—the only way that can effectively lift the restrictions on total output—is for the State not merely to control, but completely to take over, all the establishments engaged in essential production either for the armed forces, or for export, or for civilian services or consumption at home. If this were done, machine capacity and man-power, as well as materials, could be comprehensively rationed between alternative uses, and the rate of contraction in the less essential industries could be adjusted to the planned expansion of the war and export sectors.

Under such a system, a rational financial plan would become practicable, as it is not now. The State, owning and directing all the essential industries and supplies of materials, could pay out fixed incomes in lieu of dividends or interest to the previous owners, and could put the managers and technicians on fixed salaries as the direct servants of the public. Having done this, it could proceed, with much more hope than at present, to enforce a coherent wage policy, designed to keep wages in the war industries both more uniform and in a more rational relationship to wages in the public services and the consumers' trades. The workers would readily put up with drastic wage-regulation if they were assured that drastic regulation was being simultaneously and effectively applied to incomes of other types. Moreover, it would become possible to break down the barriers between firms, to pool scarce labour and scarce machinery over whole districts, and to place orders so as to ensure continuous and balanced production, and achieve the maximum economies in the use of scarce machines and such exceptionally scarce types of skill as that of the toolmaker. The individual firm is not in most cases a suitable unit for war mobilisation; but nothing short of complete taking over by the State will avail to break down the barriers between the separate capitalist firms which are busily manœuvring to-day, with one eye on the war and the other on prospects of post-war profit.

Given war socialisation as a basis, the budgetary problem

would become relatively simple, and quite secondary. If incomes were rationally distributed, it would matter comparatively little whether prices were high or low; for, given the amount of goods available for distribution to the consumers, the levels of prices and incomes would be determined together, by interdependent decisions of policy. The balance of advantage would rest with a policy of keeping both incomes and prices tolerably stable, in order to avoid the need for continual readjustments and the occurrence of unnecessary hardships in the uncontrolled sectors of the national economy. But the problem would become manageable; and the need for public borrowing could be kept down by the State simply taking what it needed for public use without any payment beyond a bookkeeping entry, and adjusting the prices of the remaining goods to the total of the incomes made available for buying them—or the incomes to the prices, which would come to the same thing.

These measures of socialisation should, of course, be extended to the railways, the banks, the insurance companies, the building societies, and every other agency of importance in the financial field. It is absurd that the State should pay the railways for public traffic, instead of running them as a publicly owned service. It is still more absurd that the State should pay the banks for the privilege of borrowing from them, directly or indirectly, money which only the State's sanction enables them to create, and that insurance companies and other financial agencies should continue to operate for private profit in lending their investible resources to the State. Plainly, the State should take over the banks and, while meeting the cost of running them, should supply itself with such funds as it needs to raise through them without paying any interest beyond this cost. Plainly too the State, while guaranteeing the policy-holders and depositors in insurance companies and building societies, should make direct use of their financial resources without the need of any further payment beyond the costs of administration.

If an economic policy of this nature were adopted, the financial problem would lose most of its complexity. A Capital Levy would become, over a large part of the field, simply a scaling down of the income-payments due to the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

past owners of the expropriated concerns—an instrument of direct taxation which would prevent the piling up of unnecessary debt burdens on account of public borrowing during the war. It is often argued that a war-time Capital Levy would be valueless, because what the State needs for meeting war expenditure is not capital, but spendable income. But, given a policy of direct acquisition of capital assets by the State, a Capital Levy becomes the best instrument for scaling down once and for all the excessive incomes at present paid to the richer classes.

Broadly, then, the policy that is needed for financing the war is one of large-scale socialisation. As long as business—at all events big business—is left in private hands, no method of taxing excess profits will remove either the predominance of the profit motive or the feeling of the workers that the class system remains in being. But as long as this predominance and this feeling exist, it will be impossible to check the scramble for higher wages in the essential industries, or to prevent the development of gross inequalities of income between workers in war industries, workers in less essential trades, and workers called up for service with the armed forces. This scramble will give rise to an acute sense of grievance, especially in an army living in the midst of the home population; and the inevitable outcome will be a general handing out of more money to pacify the aggrieved—gifts which will be automatically cancelled by high prices or by sheer scarcity of goods in view of the expanding demands of the war industries.

I wish I could feel that the Labour Ministers in the present Government were fully alive to these dangers, and to the nature of the remedy. Posed in terms of the expansion of tax revenue under existing conditions, the problem of financing the war without inflation both looks and is insoluble; for it is impracticable either to tax, directly or indirectly, nearly enough to bridge the gap between revenue and expenditure, or to diminish the size of the expenditure as long as the essential industries are left in private ownership. Nor is it possible to meet the deficit by public borrowing out of real savings; for the sum required is much larger than the total which can conceivably be available from this

source. National public expenditure must now be assumed to be reaching a level of roughly £4,000 millions a year, and to be still a long way short of its peak. The deficit to be met mainly by borrowing, if present methods are continued, must be already near a rate of £2,750 millions a year, whereas available savings, *plus* sums realisable from the sale of gold and foreign assets, can hardly be put at more than one quarter of this amount. The rest is presumably to be “borrowed” in the home market—which means, in effect, that the Government is to pay the banks interest for creating it out of nothing.

This is nonsensical finance—the result of a failure to think from the outset in realistic terms. There is no case at all for borrowing these large sums—much less for paying the banks for the privilege of borrowing them. There is, on the other hand, an overwhelming case for taking over the key institutions of business and finance, for appropriating directly and without payment (other than bookkeeping entries designed to keep a check on costs) what is needed for the purposes of the State, and thereafter for issuing to the public only such incomes as will enable them to purchase the available supplies, and for fixing the prices of these supplies so as to allow every household a cheap basic ration of necessary goods. Beyond that minimum, the right policy is to discourage the consumption of such goods as use up scarce labour, materials, or factory equipment, and to encourage as far as possible the use of substitutes which can be produced with the least interference with the national effort in other directions.

In such a programme, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would find himself reduced to a subordinate role. The key member of the Cabinet in economic matters would be the chairman of the Production Council, which is the nucleus of a general planning organisation. Plans would be made in terms of real things, and financial methods would then be adjusted to fit economic realities, instead of vice versa. The general body of the public would become convinced that the Government was truly endeavouring to promote social justice and equality of sacrifice, and that the vested interests were no longer being allowed, behind a facade of 100 per cent E.P.T.,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to prepare for a resumption of unrestrained profiteering after the war. A rational planning of wages, as well as other incomes, would become acceptable to the public mind; and we could face the prospect of even a long war without fear of financial collapse, or of any other limit to the scale of our war effort than the real limit set by the impossibility of expanding further our resources of production or finding further means of putting them to the best possible use.

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME. III

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

I

THE Houses of Parliament adjourned on the 22nd August for a summer recess of two weeks. Since the beginning of the session on the 28th November, they have passed 45 public Bills, 38 private and hybrid Bills, and 3 Church of England Measures. In spite of the vast powers conferred by the Emergency Powers Acts and other emergency legislation, the number of public Bills is up to the peacetime average, and it must be remembered that ordinarily the number is swollen by small and usually unimportant private members' Bills, though in the current session all private members' time has been taken. In other words, the Government has been compelled to seek powers from Parliament as frequently in the present session as in normal times. This conclusion may appear surprising to those who have been told that "all our liberties have been suspended." Wide though the emergency powers are, however, they are even now subject to considerable limitations. In the first place, parliamentary control of finance has been limited in a minor degree only. There are certain powers of imposing fees and charges for services rendered in the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939; but the closely defined provisions of section 2 of that Act, which have not been affected by the subsequent Emergency Powers Acts, show that, subject to these minor exceptions, the Crown cannot tax by Order in Council. Also, it is still necessary to secure the authority of Parliament for the issue of moneys from the Consolidated Fund and for the appropriation of supplies to the public services. In the second place, the emergency legislation is valid for the duration of the war only, and parliamentary sanction must be sought if anything in emergency action requires the exercise of powers after the war. For instance, though the Treasury could probably borrow without parliamentary authority (though it could not use the funds without such authority), it cannot raise long-term loans without express statutory power.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Similarly, though possession of land can be taken compulsorily under Defence Regulations and can be transferred to farmers and allotment holders, it is not possible without express parliamentary sanction to guarantee that they will be able to collect the harvest.

In the third place, the Crown cannot exercise the emergency powers unless it appears to the King in Council that they are necessary or expedient for the efficient conduct of the war, etc. Consequently, changes in the social services and other developments which are not essentially the product of war conditions must be made by Act of Parliament. Moreover, if they are intended to be permanent they cannot be effected by Order in Council for the reason already given, that powers would have to be exercised after the termination of the war. In the fourth place, the administration of ordinary civil and criminal justice can be changed only within fairly narrow limits, and if wider powers are required, for instance to meet the conditions of invasion, it is necessary to seek parliamentary approval. In the fifth place, the relations between private individuals as such (for instance, in the matter of professional qualifications) cannot always be changed by emergency powers, and legislation is necessary for the purpose. Finally, with certain qualifications, the emergency powers can be exercised only within the United Kingdom, so that if action is required abroad, on the high seas, or in British territory outside the United Kingdom, express power is usually necessary. There were other limitations in the original Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, but most of them have been swept away. Some not already mentioned remain—it is not possible, for instance, for the Crown to acquire the ownership of land (as distinct from the possession of land) for war purposes; but as these have not required additional legislation in the current session it is unnecessary to mention them.

The result of all the limitations has, however, been clear. There has been a constant succession of public Bills before the House of Commons. Naturally, the Bills have been fairly non-controversial, so that long debates have rarely been necessary. Nevertheless, the House has devoted 34 days to legislation other than financial legislation, and 33

days to finance. Since the vote of confidence in the Churchill Government, passed by 381 votes to nil on the 13th May, there have been only seven divisions. On the 16th July, the House supported the Emergency Powers (Defence) (No. 2) Bill by 124 votes to 16 (the motion was for committal to the whole House, but this was because the Deputy-Speaker had not heard the challenge on the second reading motion). On the 30th July the whips were not put on for the motion to go into secret session, and the House approved a secret session by 200 votes to 109. On the following day a motion to rescind certain Defence Regulations was rejected by 98 votes to 60. On the 8th and the 13th August there were four divisions on the purchase tax, the Government being successful by 124 votes to 22, 197 votes to 66, 171 votes to 67, and 159 votes to 57. A division was also challenged on an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation (Supplementary Allowances) Bill, but as no tellers were appointed the division did not take place.

These facts show that British democracy is far from being a temporary dictatorship. The Government has enough power to do what may be necessary for efficient prosecution of the war (except to raise and spend money), but it has to secure the passage of new legislation and exercise its existing powers under a running commentary from the House of Commons. It is true that since the formation of the Churchill Government in May there has been no organised opposition, but there has been constant sniping from the back-benches; and it will be seen from the above summary that as many as 67 votes in a thin House have been cast against it. The influence of parliamentary criticism can never be precisely measured, because it not only results in amendment of Government measures but also affects administration. Nor is the effect on administration to be judged only by changes subsequent to a debate. All administrative acts are done with the knowledge that there may be subsequent criticism, and it is the business of every civil servant to see that his minister does not get criticised. One case where this was obvious occurred early in June, when the Regulations under the Widows' and Old Age Pensions Act were produced. The correspondence between the Minister of Labour and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the chairman of the Assistance Board shows that the Minister tried to meet beforehand the criticisms which he knew would arise if the Regulations were not generous enough. Generally speaking, however, this aspect of parliamentary control is not obvious. Its importance must be stressed because there are many who assume that a Government with a 99 per cent majority is all-powerful. Moreover, the traditional mode of asserting the doctrine of responsible government has stressed the power of the House of Commons to overthrow the Government, and it is perfectly obvious that no party combination could vote down the Churchill Cabinet, or even could have voted down the Chamberlain Cabinet. In fact, no Government with a majority ever loses it in the House of Commons, and parliamentary control of ministers arises not from their fear of defeat but from their anxiety to maintain and increase their popularity. Ministers are political careerists anxious to make and extend their reputation. In normal times there is the even more important check that the Government will soon, as a party, have to fight an election. In present conditions there is no prospect of an election for years, but ministers are still anxious to stand well with the House of Commons. Far from being truculent because they have the whips at their back, they are often obsequious and subservient. A minister who cannot persuade the House that he is right must make concessions to the feeling of the House.

The great change in the present House is that the normal methods for raising debates have had to be modified. Where Government motions are required, for the approval of legislation or of Regulations which require affirmative resolutions, no great change has been necessary. The only question is one of allocation of time. There are, however, other ways of securing debate. Normally, the allocation of time and the choice of subjects of debate are arranged between the Government and the Opposition whips. There being now no Opposition, a new technique has to be developed. As was mentioned in the previous article, the Labour party has set up a "shadow Opposition" with Mr. Lees-Smith as a sort of honorary leader, and it appears that most of the requests for debates have come from the

PARLIAMENT IN WARTIME

Labour members outside the Government. Of the eleven remaining Supply Days, three were purely formal and were occupied by secret sessions on what were technically adjournment motions. Of the other eight, it appears that in five cases the subjects were in effect chosen by Labour members, in two cases by Conservative members, and in one case by Liberal members. The debate on economic policy on the occasion of the Appropriation Bill was also, it appears, suggested by Labour members. On three days (apart from the secret sessions) the essential debate was on adjournment motions, and two of these were apparently chosen by Labour members and one by Conservative members. There was also a motion to rescind Defence Regulations, moved by a Labour member. No doubt in all cases, as Mr. Attlee constantly affirmed when he was questioned, members of all parties were consulted, but in substance it appears that, no doubt because they have an organisation for the purpose, Labour members have exercised more influence upon the course of parliamentary proceedings than any other non-official supporters of the Government. It should be added that Mr. Lees-Smith, as leader of the "Shadow Opposition," has never acted as the leading critic of the Government, and (with one exception) the critics have not been on the Front Opposition Bench. In other words, the "Shadow Opposition" is merely machinery for arranging debates; it is not an organised opposition, which in fact does not exist in the present House.

Nevertheless, there has been plenty of effective criticism, and it may be convenient to mention the more important occasions. On the 12th June there was a good debate on civil defence, though there was so little criticism that it was more effective in reassuring public opinion (which had had much less experience of air raids than it has since had) than in stimulating the Ministry of Home Security. The debate on evacuation on the 13th June was much hampered by the fact that it took place on the Ministry of Health vote. The Minister is responsible for evacuation and for the billeting and health of the evacuees, but many members wanted to debate the education of the evacuees, which was the responsibility of the Board of Education, or evacuation overseas,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

which was the responsibility of the Dominions Office. When a member began talking about evacuation to the United States he was at once informed that that should be raised on the Foreign Office vote. No doubt the inadequacy of shipping ought to have been raised on the vote for the Ministry of Shipping and the shortage of convoys on the Admiralty vote. In short, this was an admirable illustration of the peacetime difficulty—made more acute by the multiplication of Departments—of the Supply Days. These are a relic of the days when the House of Commons discussed expenditure, and their only result is to make effective debate impossible. It is significant that on several occasions in the present session the vote in Supply has not been debated at all, but a whip has at once moved to report progress in order that a debate not trammelled by the rules of order might be held on the motion for the adjournment. All the debates in secret session were on adjournment motions.

The final debates on the first Finance Bill, like all the debates on the second Finance Bill, produced more criticisms of the inadequacy of the Treasury's proposals than of the burden imposed on the taxpayer. The first Bill had been introduced under the Chamberlain régime, and the House thought it such small fry that little time was taken in disposing of it. The second Finance Bill was a more serious matter. Though it could no longer be said that the pace of the war effort was slack, it was felt that the Treasury was making no serious attempt to meet the financial problems involved. In other words, the argument on the first Bill, that the expenditure forecast showed a complete failure to understand the serious nature of the war, became an argument on the second Bill that, though the Government was tackling the problem of armament, the Treasury was not tackling the problem of war economy. There were, however, other criticisms of the Bill. The original purchase tax had been dropped because of the objections of the Labour members of the new Government, but the new one incorporated in the second Finance Bill met with almost equally strong objection from Labour members, because it was asserted that the burden would still fall most heavily on the poorer section of the population. Accordingly, Labour members challenged four divisions on

the purchase tax, though they were unable to persuade the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give way on any major point. A number of very useful amendments were made, however, particularly an amendment, accepted in committee without debate, that books and periodicals should be altogether exempt. It can hardly be said, however, that in making this grudging concession the Chancellor showed any appreciation of the case made against this proposed "tax on knowledge."

There was a good deal of criticism of the administration of war pensions in a debate on the 25th June, but the sting was taken out of them by an announcement that the much criticised Warrant of September was being withdrawn and replaced. This in itself was a recognition of the effect of parliamentary criticism. The debate in the previous session and a host of questions since had shown that the House would demand a more liberal scheme, and the purpose of the announcement was to prevent a repetition of the criticism. On the 26th June there was a short but very effective debate on the adjournment. A Conservative member pointed to the absence of facilities for the troops at the London railway termini. The response was almost immediate, for within a few days the War Office announced that it was requisitioning premises from the railway companies. The subject of the overseas evacuation of children was raised on the 2nd July. It was more a chorus of approval than a debate, for it was not then known that the Admiralty were unable to provide convoys, and the loss of the *Arandora Star* had not drawn attention to the fact that in the new conditions even a fast liner might be torpedoed. There was a short debate on the same subject on the 17th July. It was hardly possible to criticise the limitations which had by then been placed on the scheme, but there was some pointed comment about the number of eminent people (including a Minister) who had been able to send their children abroad while the scheme was practically dropped for working-class children.

The great interest of the month preceding the summer recess was, however, the importance attached to civil liberties. It is necessary to remember that the French Government surrendered on June 22nd, with the result that an attack on

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

this country was to be expected at any moment. Steps were at once taken to deal with possible Fifth Column activities on a scale larger than had been attempted hitherto. Substantial amendments were made to the Defence Regulations, and it was thought that more powers were needed to deal with the possibility of invasion. It says much for the good sense of the members of the House of Commons than in this atmosphere they were not carried off their feet. One point of attack was a committee under Lord Swinton which was, apparently, advising the Government on questions relating to possible traitors. Long series of questions were asked on this subject, but very little information was forthcoming, and in the end the Prime Minister flatly refused to disclose anything further.

A great air battle was taking place off the English coast while the House was debating internment policy on the 10th July. As a debate it did credit to the House of Commons. Its result was the announcement on the 23rd July that an advisory committee had been set up under a High Court judge to consider applications for release and that the care of internees had been transferred from the War Office to the Home Office. On the 31st July, a white paper was issued explaining the categories of persons who might apply for release. They were so defined as not to be of use to the great majority of internees, and the last debate before the summer adjournment was devoted to the subject. Further relaxations were then announced by the Home Secretary.

A second subject on which the House showed an admirable care for civil liberties was that of the Emergency Powers (Defence) (No. 2) Bill. Neither of the earlier Emergency Powers Bills authorised any substantial interference with the administration of civil and criminal justice. The Administration of Justice (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939, conferred on the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary certain powers for altering the sittings of courts, and the effect of the power in the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, as amended by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, to amend legislation was that somewhat wider powers could be taken; they were in fact taken in the Defence (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1940. It is clear, however,

that no court would have read into these Acts any power to transfer civil or criminal justice to special courts. In the House of Commons the Home Secretary stated the contrary, but either he must have misunderstood the advice or he was badly advised. The one leading decision on the Defence of the Realm Acts which was not covered by express language in the first Emergency Powers Act was a case in which the Court of Appeal held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts could not be taken away.

Nevertheless, it is clear that, in the event of invasion, it would be quite impossible to continue ordinary judicial jurisdiction in the areas where military operations were taking place. As the law then stood, it would be necessary for the military authorities to fall back upon the very ill-defined powers of the Crown and its officers under "martial law." Some contingent amendment of the law was necessary, and nobody in the House of Commons denied this assertion. What was denied was that the extraordinarily wide powers proposed to be conferred by the Bill were necessary. As the Bill was drafted, it gave an almost complete discretion to the King in Council to supersede the criminal courts by courts martial. That there was no such intention was explained by the Home Secretary in his second reading speech, when he gave a summary of the Regulations which were eventually issued as the Defence (War Zone Courts) Regulations, 1940. Mr. Lees-Smith set the tone of the criticism when he admitted that special provision was necessary, but denied that the Bill which the Home Secretary had explained was the Bill which had been read a first time. It was even suggested by some members, though the Speaker did not agree, that most of the minister's speech was out of order because it was irrelevant to the Bill. Mr. Hore-Belisha asked that the debate be postponed in order that both the House and the minister might reconsider the matter. However, Sir John Anderson made a second speech, in which he asked for the second reading but promised to put down amendments in committee. This did not satisfy many members on both sides of the House. The Attorney-General explained that in the actual battle area the military authorities would be compelled to fall back on martial law, but the Bill was intended to authorise

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

an expeditious system of criminal justice in the aftermath of an invasion or attempted invasion when there were small parties of men about. He also used a little special pleading for, apart from the quite false history that there has been no invasion of "this country" since 1066, he asserted that the only effect of the Bill was to deal with procedure. That was not so under the Bill as introduced, nor even under the Bill as passed; for the Bill not only authorised the transfer of ordinary criminal law to special courts but also authorised special courts for the punishment of offences against Defence Regulations. Since almost any offence can be created by Defence Regulations, the result clearly is that new offences can be created and tried by any kind of tribunal (except, under the Bill as passed but not under the Bill as introduced, a court martial). What is more, these special tribunals for the punishment of offences under the Defence Regulations need not be in the war zone. However, the "Shadow Opposition" accepted the assurances and did not challenge a division. Some members did, but they were apparently not heard by the Deputy-Speaker; accordingly, they divided on the motion to commit the Bill to the whole House. Sixteen members voted against the motion, namely, one Conservative, two Liberals, ten Labour members, two I.L.P. members, and one Independent. One of the whips was a Liberal and the other a Labour member.

The amendments were duly introduced a week later, on the 23rd July. The Chief Whip had made enquiries and had learned that the passage of the Bill would be completed in three hours. At the end of three-and-a-half hours, however, there were still at least a dozen amendments on the paper, and the Chief Whip had to move progress in order to avoid an all-night sitting. On the following day, after much debate on prohibition and *certiorari*, the Home Secretary was compelled to promise further concessions. The Bill was, however, passed at the end of the debate and the amendment was made in the House of Lords. There is not the least doubt that the Bill as passed was much better than the Bill as introduced. Even so, the Act is far wider than was necessary to authorise the published Regulations. Indeed, its worst defects seem not to have been understood in the

House of Commons because of the method of legislation by reference. In particular, the limitation to the war zones which members seemed to think covers all the Regulations under the Act in fact covers only the transfer of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. The punishment of offences under the Defence Regulations can still be transferred to special courts outside the war zones. Moreover, it is possible to transfer almost any criminal offence from the ordinary law to Defence Regulations, so that the restriction of the transfer of ordinary jurisdiction to the war zones is quite illusory. On the other hand, the provision for judicial review of death sentences is limited to death sentences imposed under the Defence Regulations and such sentences imposed by special courts under the ordinary law need not be reviewed. Finally, the provision that the special courts shall not be courts martial is illusory because, under the earlier Emergency Powers Acts, it is possible to make almost anybody subject to military law. In fact, of course, none of these dangers is to be found in the Regulations so far issued; but that merely shows that the Act is still too wide. It is doubtful if there would have been any criticism at all if the Bill had merely sought to authorise what is in the Regulations.

As further evidence of the care of the House for civil liberties, it should be mentioned that on the 31st July there was a motion to rescind certain Defence Regulations. It was pressed to a division and was supported by 60 members, of whom four were Conservative, one National Labour, five Liberal, forty-four Labour, two I.L.P., one Communist, and three Independent. One of the whips was Labour and the other National Labour. The Government scraped home with a majority of 28.

II

The above survey suggests that the House was concerned more with the incidentals of warfare than with the war itself. It is true that early in June there was a debate on civil defence and that before the House rose, on the 20th August, there was a wide debate on the war situation, during which the Prime Minister made his remarkable speech. For the rest, however, the House did not perform its essential function

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of informing and guiding public opinion on the general problems of the war. Even the general statements on the war situation, which were so common under the Chamberlain regime, were fewer. Statements were made on the 4th June (Prime Minister), 11th June (Mr. Attlee), 18th June (Prime Minister), and 25th June (Prime Minister); but then they stopped until the debate of the 20th August. For two months, therefore, the country was without general guidance on the conduct of the war. It is true that, so far as military operations were concerned, there was a comparative lull during this period; but there were all kinds of urgent problems—the effect of the French surrender and the Italian declaration of war, the new situation in the Balkans, relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, the organisation of home defence, the development of aircraft production, the re-equipment of the B.E.F., and so on.

Mr. Hore-Belisha, after the Prime Minister's speech on the French surrender on the 25th June, drew a moral:

"Has not the statement to which the House has just listened shown the absolute necessity in these times of carrying Parliament with us at every stage? Is it not inconceivable that this great surrender could have been made had the French Parliament been in session and public opinion, as expressed through the press, not been subjected to a rigorous censorship? Will my right hon. Friend assure us, as I am sure he has this matter in mind, that in this country Parliament and a free press will be maintained, so that the Government may not be cut off from the stimulus and inspiration of these patriotic elements in the country?"

The Prime Minister and the House appeared to agree with him. The suggestion, nevertheless, requires a little elaboration. Parliament in itself is not an apt instrument for giving the necessary stimulus to or exercising control over the Government. Its essential function, as Mr. Greenwood correctly indicated at the outbreak of war, is to bring public opinion to bear on the Government and to enable public opinion to be led by the public expression of differing points of view. Members of the House of Commons are not experts in anything; they are mere representatives of ordinary men

and women. The questions which they ask ought to be the questions that ordinary people are asking. The criticisms which they make ought to be the criticisms of ordinary people. The answers to questions and criticisms are made in Parliament, but for the benefit of people outside. The Government must secure the enthusiastic support of the House of Commons because it must have the enthusiastic support of the people. Indeed, total war requires the active collaboration of the people in offices and factories. It is not enough to tell them to "go to it"; they will not go to it unless they understand why it is necessary that they should do so.

All this is elementary because it is implicit in the system of representative government. Yet the House of Commons developed the strange unconstitutional idea that representative government can be carried on by secret session. There were no important debates in public because on five occasions the House went into secret session. There was, in fact, censorship because the one place where information can be most effectively given to the public and criticisms voiced in public was closed to the public. A free Parliament means a public Parliament. No Parliament is competent—indeed, no Parliament can be trusted—to exercise a control over a Government in private. What is more, this present House of Commons is the worst possible instrument for the purpose. It was elected in 1935 during what Lord Baldwin has admitted to be a deliberate suppression of information about the international situation. It supported Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy by immense majorities. It gave the Munich triumvirate a majority a few days before the German irruption into Holland and Belgium. Many of its members are the mere nominees of local party committees because they have been elected under the party truce. The great majority were elected to oppose most of the principles which are now being carried out by the Churchill Government. To trust such a House to represent public opinion when the public does not know what it is saying is the height of folly.

Nevertheless, the suggestion for government by secret session originated not with an unrepentant Chamberlainite but with the leader of the Labour "Shadow Opposition."

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

On the 12th June, when it was proposed to discuss civil defence, some members asked whether it was wise for the debate to take place in public. Mr. Lees-Smith then said:

"For some time I have felt it would be a good thing if the public came to regard a secret session not as something to be alarmed about, but as the normal method of debate and discussion on the war owing to the peculiar circumstances in which debate takes place."

Mr. Lees-Smith misunderstood why a secret session causes alarm. It is not because there is, under this Government, any fear that ultimate success will not be achieved; it is because a secret session gives opportunity for public opinion to be misrepresented, because the public does not trust members to debate in private, and because it is believed that the war can be won only if the strength of the people is made the strength of the Government and *vice versa*.

On that occasion, Mr. Attlee was willing to have the debate in secret, though he believed that the House could debate in public with a proper sense of responsibility. The feeling of the House was, however, against a secret session, and the public debate was in fact extremely useful because it reassured the people about the state of our civil defences, and nothing was said which the enemy could not have found in any newspaper or in the circulars of the Ministry of Home Security. In fact, the debate must have been of assistance towards the conduct of the war, because (apart from its effect in reassuring the civil population) it must have suggested to the enemy that there were no serious defects of which he could make use. To have held the debate in private would have suggested that the defence system was bad. Nevertheless, the House went into secret session on the 20th June in order to discuss home defence. On the 27th June another secret session was held on supply, though this time the Minister of Supply made his speech in public. On the 4th July the Prime Minister gave an account of the attack on the French fleet, and strangers were then ordered to withdraw. On the 9th July there was yet another secret session, and this time the House did not even deign to inform the public what was discussed, though it appears from previous questions that the intention was to debate economic warfare. Thus,

of the eight debates between the 20th June and the 9th July, four were in secret. The public was permitted to learn about war pensions, the evacuation of children, and Indian and Colonial divorce. It was given a little information about supply and the minimum of information about the French fleet; but it learned nothing about any criticisms that there might have been about supply, the consequences of the French surrender, home defence or economic warfare. The questions which everybody was asking were answered, if at all, in secret.

As this process of government by secret session developed, a very critical public opinion developed with it. After the 9th July there was a pause until the 30th July. On this occasion it was proposed to discuss foreign affairs. It appears not to have been pointed out that this time there was no relic of the excuse given for the previous secret sessions. It is possible to argue that home defence, supply and economic warfare cannot be debated without disclosing information to the enemy. The argument is poor, because in fact the purpose of debate is not to disclose information as such, but to interpret information already disclosed and to make and answer widely-expressed criticisms; in other words, to focus in a single debate the loose discussions in press and factory. It was never suggested that in a debate on foreign affairs information useful to the enemy would be provided. The Prime Minister admitted that the purpose was that "members of all parties could say what they really felt about foreign countries without any danger of adding to the number of those countries with which we are at present at war." If a debate on foreign affairs is likely to cause foreign Governments to declare war, and if this is a reason for debating such matters in private, then no debate on the subject could ever be held in public. The fact that we are at war with Germany and Italy already hardly changes the situation. Many members in fact felt that there was no case for a secret session, but Mr. Churchill stimulated the curiosity of others by mentioning that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary had prepared two speeches, one for a public session and one for a private session. This did not mean that he could give more information in the one than in the other, but only that he would

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

phrase his speech differently. The Prime Minister was, however, prepared to have the desirability of a secret session debated, and accordingly moved a motion which was open to debate. Members who wanted a secret session, however, would not listen to those who gave reasons why they should debate publicly, and after half-an-hour a Conservative member brought the discussion to an abrupt end by spying strangers, with the result that the question whether they be excluded had to be put forthwith. The whips were not put on and the ministers did not vote. The motion to exclude strangers was, however, carried by 200 votes to 109. Including the four tellers, the distribution of votes was as follows:

	Cons.	Nat. L.	L. Nat.	Lab.	Lib.	Ind.	I.L.P.	Com.
For Secrecy	123	2	8	67	1	1	1	1
Against ..	47	1	4	39	11	4	3	1

It may be noted that the unemployed Privy Councillors from the Chamberlain Government voted for public debate, while the unemployed Privy Councillors from the Labour Government (except Mr. Wedgwood) voted for secrecy. There appears to be no ready explanation.

The decision was contrary to all the principles of representative government—not to mention democracy. The manner of it, in fact, was almost insulting. Mr. Churchill perhaps found relief from the burden of defence by being facetious. Not a single other speaker explained either the or at any other time why this debate should be held in private, and some members would not allow those who opposed the motion to explain why it should be held in public. The truth may be that the habit of secret sessions has given members a more than usually exaggerated idea of their own importance. It is therefore necessary to explain what one would have expected to be an elementary proposition, that members were not elected as experts capable of advising the Government but as ordinary men and women who happened to carry the right party labels in 1935. What they say carries weight if it is representative of a section of public opinion. It is possible to assume that their opinions are representative if they express them in public. What they say in private is of no interest to anybody but themselves and is as valuable as the opinions of a Band of Hope on the relative merits

Scotch and Irish whisky. There are exceptional occasions, as when conscription was proposed during the war of 1914-18, when special information should be given to members of Parliament. A secret session is then justified because the Government requires authority for a change of policy and it cannot state the reasons publicly. In such conditions it is necessary to rely upon members of Parliament, and in any case it is not the policy but the facts upon which the policy is based which are concealed from the public. What happened in June and July was that ordinary people out of Parliament were denied the opportunity of learning the Government's policy. We have had no public statement on British foreign policy, for instance, since the Churchill Government came into office. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary broadcast an elementary lesson in the geography of the Mediterranean, and the Foreign Secretary was pleased to read us a sermon. The notion that foreign policy should be kept in cold storage because some member might make a foolish speech is the complete negation of democratic control. Government by secret session is government by an incompetent oligarchy; and Mr. Lees-Smith's suggestion that secret sessions should become normal is based on the fallacy that Mr. Lees-Smith is in Parliament on his own merits and not because, of those who voted in Keighley five years ago, 50.5 per cent were prepared to support the Labour policy of those days. He is justified in representing the people of Keighley only so long as they know what he says on their behalf.

APPENDIX

SESSION 1939-40

(28TH NOV.—22ND AUGUST)

Address in reply to the King's Speech	6 days
Government Legislation	34 days
Finance	33 days
Adjournment Debates in public	18½ days
Secret Sessions	6 days
Government Motions	4 days
Opposition and Private Members' Motions	5½ days

WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION?

By TOM HARRISON

LEVELS OF OPINION.

THE phrase "public opinion" has become vague and ambiguous through abuse and misuse. Yet it is a phrase which is of vital importance in any democracy. It is neither pedantic nor academic to attempt an exact analysis of "public opinion."

As a preliminary, it is convenient to distinguish several levels of opinion and behaviour. So long as we continue to talk about public opinion as an all-embracing generality, we shall have difficulty in seeing vital problems and possible solutions. First there are the three main levels of behaviour: SAY—DO—THINK. What a person says he will do is often quite different from what he does actually do. What he thinks he will do, or thinks he will say, may also be very different from what he does do or say. There is not space here to go into these distinctions. They are, however, of fundamental importance to the understanding of social and political processes. Their analysis and description in fact has not yet been attempted. Here, we are concerned mainly with what people say; within this we must distinguish:

What a person says to a stranger.
" " " " acquaintance.
" " " " friend.
" " " " his wife.
" " " " himself.
" " " " in his sleep.

is at the level of wife, self and dream that the most significant, as well as the most difficult, assessment of opinion can be made. This may be termed, provisionally, the level of private opinion. At the top level, the level of stranger (e.g., an interviewer), is public opinion.

If this crude stratification is provisionally accepted, we can proceed to examine the whole situation more carefully.

WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION?

The distinctions suggested between private and public opinion will be fully examined and illustrated in the discussion.

THE PUBLIC.

When Members of Parliament or newspapers talk, as they constantly do, about public opinion, they usually refer to this top level of statement, and they further imply or specify that they refer to the opinion held by the general public. It is always necessary to remember that the general public consists of some forty million adults in the United Kingdom, more than three-quarters of whom left school before they were fifteen. About one in twenty of them have incomes at (or above) the minimum level for an M.P. or a member of the National Union of Journalists; three-quarters have incomes of under £4 a week; a quarter do not vote in any of the elections; more than a quarter do not read any morning newspaper or listen to a wireless news bulletin. A large majority do not know who is Minister for Air or Lord Privy Seal. Less than one in a hundred has written to an M.P. or newspaper during the past five years. The two papers they read more than any others are *Everybody's* and *The News of the World*. Nearly a quarter of the public follow or partially believe in some astrologer or spiritual prophet.

These are the people of whom public opinion is largely composed. Forty million, each one with a private opinion, with private prides and prejudices, personal antagonisms and loyalties. This is the stuff of Britain, tough, solid, stolid stuff—the rhythm essentially slow. When we talk about public opinion, we should mean the top level in this great conglomeration of private opinions. There is not, anywhere, a separate entity called public opinion. Public opinion only comes from the minds and the tongues of the people. But there is an important distinction between the two areas of existence—the area of the minds and the area of the tongues. In the mind is the private thought; on the tongue, the public statement. Logically, a person's "real opinion" is the opinion he holds privately. He will not necessarily voice publicly, as public opinion, certain parts of his *private opinion*, which is a complex of feelings, often conflicting. Which and how much of these he will voice publicly depends partly

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

on his status, mood, character and company, but partly also on external events, and above all on how far it is respectable, "the done thing," to voice such opinions at that time and in that place.

At all ordinary times and places, there is a tendency for most ordinary people to follow what they believe to be the majority, to voice in public mainly those sentiments and opinions which are generally acceptable and respectable. A man's public conversation is confined in the same sort of conventional boundaries as his bowler hat or his behaviour while drinking beer with friends. Always he seeks to do "the right thing." But clothes, songs, opinions can be considerably and even rapidly influenced by fashion, by the social sanction of respectability, "popularity."

There are innumerable examples of the way in which things that were not respectable have become respectable, often so respectable that those who do not comply in turn become *not* respectable. Female fashions and ballroom dances are simple examples.

The sudden emergence of a new era in ballroom dancing, initiated by the Lambeth Walk (which has affected all subsequent dance activities), was a revolution in the public opinion of dancers. But it only took place because there was already existing a profound underlying dissatisfaction with the stilted metaphor and social relationships of foxtrot and modernised waltz. For a long time this dissatisfaction was apparent in the private opinion of dance enthusiasts, though in many cases it was only apparent to the observer and was not consciously formulated in the dancer's mind. An analysis of the situation showed clearly that a contemporary type of sociable, loosening dance would instantly gather up bored private opinion and sweep it into enthusiastic public opinion. But this dissatisfied private opinion had no channels for crystallising or expressing itself, and few persons studying it. Nevertheless, several of the biggest dance-hall proprietors began to be alarmed when they saw dance business dwindling. The most intelligent of these persons saw, in the stage version of the Lambeth Walk, a possible way of re-arousing public interest in his halls. The result, cleverly put across, was a colossal success.

PRIVATE OPINION.

The same process is at work in all parts of public opinion. There are always tensions and changes in private opinion which are likely to emerge quite suddenly into public opinion, and in so doing to take people by surprise. The people taken by surprise are especially likely to be those most interested in the subject, most deeply concerned in it, and therefore least able to appreciate the much duller, more confused and obscure attitude of the private individuals composing their public. It is clear, for instance, that the majority of Conservative M.P.s are still perfectly happy about their hold on public opinion and their position in public prestige. They will probably get the shock of their lives when and if there is another General Election. Similarly, Mr. Chamberlain evidently thought, right up until the last moment of his resignation, that he had public opinion solidly behind him. And so, in the superficial sense of the word, he had. Public opinion was for him; private opinion against.

The only organisation in this country which systematically takes opinion cross-sections, the British Institute of Public Opinion, had shown in its regular Chamberlain polls that his popularity increased after the outbreak of war, from a pre-war average figure of under sixty per cent to nearly seventy per cent. But in the privacy of the darkened cinema, our own monthly surveys of audience response showed that applause for Mr. Chamberlain, when he appeared on news-reels, fell steadily from September onwards. Similarly, the number of unfavourable comments on him in diaries (kept by our nation-wide panel of voluntary informants), steadily increased. Private opinion was gathering against Mr. Chamberlain long before M.P.s were aware of it. Indeed, as we pointed out in a study of the Munich crisis, in private opinion feelings about him were far from approving long ago. To quote from our comment at that time:

Every big paper, including the *Herald*, filled pages with praises of Chamberlain, and not to be outdone, the Premier gave the people a pat on the back, told how the deliberations of the four politicians at Munich had been influenced, apparently in some mystic way, "by

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the peoples of the different countries." During one whole week, no outsider reading an English newspaper could have guessed that an increasing proportion of the population were feeling once more increasingly bewildered, fearful and ashamed. The readers themselves didn't guess it in many cases. That is a very important point. The fact that the papers hang back has a delaying effect on public opinion, because newspapers are so much looked to for social and talk sanction. People's sense of shame about Britain has to be backed up collectively, in order to be positive and recognised, just as much as smoking, football pools, etc. (see M.O.'s *First Year's Work*, 1938, Lindsay Drummond, on these social factors). By representing pro-Chamberlain as the universally-felt sentiment (when in fact even at its top point he never scored more than fifty-four per cent), individuals in their homes were temporarily made to feel that being anti-Chamberlain was old, anti-social, or Socialist.

So, *public* opinion polls showed Chamberlain with a big majority in favour. Even at the beginning of April, 1940, there was no external sign of a crack in his universe. Most M.P.s and newspapers continued to proclaim that the country was uniquely united behind the Prime Minister.¹

So, when there was a terrific explosion against Chamberlain, it all seemed very sudden. But it couldn't have occurred so quickly if there hadn't been a long-standing antagonism. Parliament was for a long time protected against that private opinion antagonism, and hardly realised the extent of its existence, because of the social sanction which delayed dislike for a Premier, the pressure towards "loyalty," respectability. It always tends to be the done thing (for the mass of people) in this country to be loyal to the Government (except on the socially sanctioned occasions for attack, elections); in war this becomes even more marked. Patriotism is at a premium. Party elections are abolished. Violent criticism

¹ It is always as well to be suspicious of this word united. Public opinion is never united about anything—or, rather, it has never been found to be united on anything so far investigated objectively by anybody anywhere. Even the cannibals in the interior of Malekula are not united in regarding cannibalism as an honourable ritual—fortunately for me!

is frowned upon. There is censorship and suppression. Everyone is supposed to be more than ever for king and country. There is thus, in the present organisation of our society, a constant tendency favouring answers supporting the *status quo* of democratic institutions on major issues of Home policy.

An example of the socially done-thing answer (as obtained by direct interviewing) was provided by the British Institute of Public Opinion, and published in *News Chronicle*. The day before conscription was announced they completed a survey on attitudes to conscription, with the following results:

39 per cent in favour.
53 per cent against.
8 per cent doubtful.

The week after, with conscription introduced, they repeated a similar survey, with following result:

58 per cent in favour.
38 per cent against.
4 per cent doubtful.

This tendency to say the done thing has been noted in many societies. For instance, Dr. Nadel, from his recent West African studies, came to the conclusions:

Gross exaggeration in all statements relating to an informant's economic position or social success is the rule in one society, while in another custom demands under-statement whenever an informant is talking about his own family, the number of his wives and children, or similar matter.

PUBLIC OPINION.

This brings us to the heart of the problem. Public opinion is only a part of private opinion and only that part which, so to speak, *dare* show itself at any moment. In predicting trends of public opinion, or even in knowing how the mass of people will react to any big event, it is not enough to know only about *public opinion* of the moment. It is also essential to know about *private opinion* at the moment. From the private opinion of September comes the public opinion of October. Any leaders who bow their heads to pure public opinion at any time, are burying their heads in

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the shifting sands of the desert. They have repeatedly done just this. Baldwin did little else? And in ascertaining public opinion the politicians and the Press have frequently relied on the crudest methods. They have gone among "the people" as M.P.s or as Press reporters and asked people's opinions. The replies they get are particularly influenced by the prestige position of the questioner. The more socially important the questioner, the greater the social sanction on replying in terms which the person questioned believes form a respectable answer. But to a lesser degree the same objection applies to all opinion material collected direct, so long as the person collecting the information is in the position of a stranger. Unfortunately, all members of the upper and professional classes (who run the country) are in this position when they talk to the seventy-four per cent under four pounds a week. That is why they continue so strikingly out of touch with the ordinary common-sense feelings of the ordinary common people. That is why, for instance, editors and peers continue at all times to proclaim that the country is unshakably and uniquely united.

Public opinion can now be redefined in more concrete terms. *Public opinion is what you will say out loud to anyone.* It is an overt, and not necessarily candid, part of your private opinion. It is only when opinions have reached this level that they are freely discussed and gain a mass currency, an upward impact. Many things which agitate many minds never reach this level at all.¹ And generally opinions can

¹ Throughout this discussion I am thinking in terms of the mass of the population, the people I have been living among and studying for nearly four years now, in Worktown (industrial Lancashire), in Metrop (a typical London dormitory), in the East End, and recently also in the border villages of Wales. Readers of *The Political Quarterly* will not always recognise their own behaviour here, though I believe that all of us are to some extent affected by the process which I am trying to reconstruct. But the intellectual and the leader type of person are less affected by respectability, at least in the area of opinion. In Worktown and Metrop there are a mere handful of people who are not accepting the social standards of their group and culture. In Worktown, for instance, with a population of one hundred thousand, the "intelligent weeklies" are read by less than a hundred people; a large part of the population have not been to London; Blackpool is the culture centre and literal Mecca; the vast majority know almost literally nothing about any country other than their own, and very few care a jot for Shakespeare. In the four volumes which we have now completed, and hope presently to publish, on Worktown life, I believe we have shown the overwhelming importance of the done thing, of people's ideas of the past and people's ideas of their personal futures. In Worktown the great asset is respectability, the great Utopia security. The second has proved impossible in the modern world since about 1929, and particularly in the cotton area to which Worktown belongs. Emphasis on the first has therefore, if anything, increased.

only reach this level if they receive social sanction—that is, evidence of external, authoritative, and preferably numerous, support. If private opinion finds itself socially sanctioned, it may very rapidly emerge as public opinion. The result is a "surprising" upsurge, sometimes even revolutionary. But to those who are in touch with the masses at the level of private opinion, of wife and dream, there should be nothing unexpected about it.

Having thus defined public opinion, and distinguished it as *part of private opinion*, it is now necessary to subdivide public opinion into two sorts:

- (1) *Public opinion* which is the overt though often temporary opinion stated to a stranger by the private individual. Strictly speaking, therefore, public opinion when used in a democratic sense means the complex of different points of view stated to strangers by forty million citizens.
- (2) *Published opinion*. This is public opinion as reflected in the Press, B.B.C., news-reels, Parliament. It is the version of public opinion which is given wide currency through these channels.

Sometimes the only thing these two different sorts of public opinion have in common is the first three letters. Even that is misleading. For the first sort is in the pub's public bar, but the second sort is concocted over sherry at the Carlton Club, on a terrace overlooking the river, or at Elvino's in Fleet Street. Not deliberately concocted. But concocted nevertheless. For there is no getting away from this fact: the Press and Parliament version of public opinion is frequently miles away from "real public opinion," let alone private opinion. For first we have the falsification between the person's actual (private) opinion and the version he gives out in public (public opinion), and second we have the falsification between public opinion and the version published (published opinion).

Mass-Observation originated in this very problem, so is automatically engrossed in it. Charles Madge was a reporter, on the *Daily Mirror*, I was working as a navvy in a cotton-mill in Lancashire, when the Simpson crisis blew up. We were both so impressed by the differences between public opinion

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and published opinion on Edward VIII and Mrs. Simpson that we started an organisation to find out what people really were saying (public opinion). We soon found it necessary to extend this into the more ephemeral regions of what people were thinking and murmuring. Ever since, we have been comparing published opinion with public opinion. Results will, we hope, one day make a vast and terrifying volume. For they reveal the extent to which the people are misrepresented, and the Government misled about the people; they reveal the extent to which influential people will go to fake, often unconsciously, support for their own ambitious prejudices or profit interests. *The Times* (Literary Supplement) once devoted a leader to (friendly) criticism of our data on this faking in the Munich crisis; it said:

"Now it is quite true that a newspaper has no right to misrepresent or misreport that strength or weakness of a nation. But it is as easy to give up as it is easy to fall into catchwords; and newspapers, or the more serious among them, may urge that they have another function than that of conducting a census of opinion. This function is to help to form an opinion, guide it, give it articulate expression, endeavour to make it prevail."

That is a fair enough statement of what newspapers try to do. Necessarily, they put forward opinions which are their own, those of the proprietors or editors or some other persons or groups. If they confined themselves to this activity and *were frank about it*, we should have been spared some of the less edifying spectacles of recent years. Unfortunately, every great newspaper has found it necessary at times to pretend that its *own opinion* is public opinion—thus giving substance to its own complaints and campaigns. We have on our files hundreds of cuttings which reflect this process and from which I select at random the following from the *Observer* (23.10.38), the *Evening Standard* (23.1.39), and the *Sunday Express* (18.8.40). (Hereafter italics are mine, and are used to show published opinions, i.e. incorrect generalisations about the state of public opinion on the subject at the time):

"*The British people remain firmly convinced that Mr. Chamberlain is right in standing for the principle of friendly negotiation and respect of Germany's further claims.*" (*Observer*.)

"The suggestion was made this morning that shop stewards in the aircraft factories are preparing an hour-and-a-half strike as a protest against the British Government's failure to intervene.

"Such action would be *resented by the nation at large* as an attempt to use an industrial lever for political purposes." (*Evening Standard*.)

"*We, the common people of Britain*, must see that the Germans collectively pay that price (of virtual obliteration). We must insist in our leaders presenting the bill and enforcing the payment. That is the *burning decision of every one of us* who has seen something of the tragedy of the air raids." (*Sunday Express*.)

All three quotations are pure published opinion, false versions of public opinion at the time. Actual investigations and detailed evidence at the public and private levels on these (and scores of other) occasions, justify us in saying this. The third quotation is a particularly fine example, from an article signed by the editor. It is, to say the least, strange to find Mr. John Gordon referring to himself as "*we, the common people of Britain*." Actually, one of the most striking features of the very detailed investigations made into air-raid reactions all over the country has been the way in which, so far (Aug. 20), little resentment has been aroused against the German pilots or people. It has become a perfect habit for editors to believe they are writing as the representatives of the people. (Indeed, the editor of one paper writes under the name of "*The Man in the Street*," another styles himself "*Man o' the People*." This technique is by no means confined to the mass papers. The responsible Press are fond of it. For instance, the editorial of the *Times* on August 2nd, 1940:

"The disclosure that a staff of canvassers has been nosing out opinion in the homes and public houses of the country *has stirred public resentment much more deeply. The public is not merely annoyed* by the recourse to an

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

expensive, superfluous and much overrated device for ascertaining its mind, but *it is also exasperated* by the manifestation of the Ministry as a self-appointed custodian of its 'moral.'"

This particular point, thus dealt with by the most "responsible" paper, casts a particularly bright light on the whole technique. The daily press, in late July, launched a violently unfavourable campaign against an organisation known as the Wartime Social Survey. This organisation, an exact and interesting scientific machine for testing public opinion (not related to mass-observation), was established by the Ministry of Information. They were finding it impossible to discover real public opinion; they were beginning to find the Press versions inadequate. They began to go direct to the public, with sixty doorstep interviewers. In common with all other organisations which go straight to the public and seek opinions, the Wartime Social Survey (run independently and under unimpeachable academic auspices) found an overwhelming majority interested in the interviews, while a large proportion invited the interviewers into the house to take a seat and have some form of refreshment. Ordinary people welcome the opportunity to state their "public opinions" in this way; they feel, especially since the war, that they have inadequate opportunities for saying anything. This system ran excellently for several months before the Press even heard of it. Thousands of people were uncompromisingly interviewed. Then one day some enterprising reporter got an angle. Within twenty-four hours the Press was shouting against the scheme, and for ten days they ran it, with cartoons in most of the dailies, editorial comment, main front-page headline on several occasions. In almost every item the Press said that public opinion was outraged at the scheme; a few examples:

"*The average housewife considers, for instance, that the amount of soap she has in the house is entirely her own affair. Nor is she willing to discuss with strangers how she feels about the invasion. Her husband is of the same mind.*" (*Daily Telegraph*.)

"The idea of sounding public opinion by doorstep enquiries can hardly have been produced by a British

mind. *Nothing could be at once more unpopular or more futile.*" (*Observer*.)

"There is no need for these door-to-door Paul Prys. Ordinary folk resent their questioning and, when they have collected and tabulated all the answers that are vouchsafed to them, their reports are not likely to be worth the paper they are written on." (*People*.)

"Thousands of amateur inquisitors were let loose on the land, armed with notebook and pencil to swarm from house to house 'to find out what people are thinking.' This is called a Gallup survey and is probably one of the stupidest notions in existence. It suits America admirably, but it *doesn't suit the people of this country.*" (*Bystander*.)

As a test, when the Press was screaming at its loudest, Mass-Observation (which doesn't usually do doorstep work) made two hundred interviews on delicate political subjects (including the campaign itself) in London and Lancashire. There were no refusals, or resentments; plenty of adverse comment on the Press campaign. There has been no effect on subsequent interviewing work. It would seem then that this was a particularly significant example of published opinion. There wasn't any public opinion basis to the thing at all; but the Press couldn't have conducted the campaign unless they had represented the public as behind them. They wanted to conduct the campaign partly because they wanted, largely in their own interests, to get rid of Duff Cooper, whom they regarded as unfriendly to the Press; and partly because, in their own interests, they did not want the Government to have any direct access to genuine public opinion, when much of their strength and power lies in convincing the Government that they reflect public opinion and that all the uproars they make are in the public interest. (Many of them are, of course.) So they dragged out published opinion to confuse the expression of public opinion.¹

¹ Not the least illuminating part of the whole story is the way in which Press reporters besieged the Wartime Social Survey to try and find out where their interviewers were working, while at the same time the Press was full of statements that the public were furious about the survey, complaining to the police and writing to the papers, etc. During the height of the campaign the Wartime Social Survey made several hundred interviews in a London borough. To this day, neither the Press nor anybody else have had a word of complaint, and not a single journalist has been able to locate anyone interviewed! Or even to find the borough.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

But the most significant thing here, as in so many other cases investigated, is the failure of the Press campaign to alienate people against doorstep interviewing. And this raises the further element in public opinion, one which we have already mentioned, but not yet defined, the Social Sanction.

SOCIAL SANCTION.

Social sanction, as the word is used here, works mainly in two ways :

- (1) Some *one* individual high up in the social hierarchy supports or sponsors some movement or habit. The higher the person the more immediately acceptable to the general public. Thus charities and voluntary organisations attempt to have royalty as nominal president. Thus there are defined leaders of fashion, most followed of whom is the Duchess of Windsor. Thus, when the Queen casually picked up a dart eighteen months ago at a Slough Social Centre and threw it at a board, the habit of dart-playing jumped several hundred per cent in the South of England and among the upper and middle classes who had previously indulged relatively little.
- (2) *Many* people lower down support or sponsor. It has to be a large number, preferably a majority. When people feel that other people are doing some novel thing or holding some novel opinion, there is no longer any need to keep the wish to do it (conscious or unconscious) down in private opinion. Thus, the Lambeth Walk was put across on the majority sanction level. Thus, innumerable advertisers exploit this sanction, by simply saying that one or five or ten million people use or read or follow such and such a commodity or person. Such statements are in themselves adequate inducement to new consumers.

If the first sanction operates, the second usually follows automatically. It is more difficult for the second to operate without the first ; and the individuals who are in the position to give a big social sanction are also people who are rich and with the interests and opinions connected with riches ; they are, therefore, unwilling to support or sponsor certain

WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION?

types of mass opinion. This is where the Press cuts in. In its editorials, its news and its advertising, the Press repeatedly uses the sanction of numbers—type (2) above. Those who decide the policy of the papers act, therefore, as anonymous sponsors of the sanction (1) type, through the machinery of presenting their own opinions and wishes as if they were held by a large number of the population, i.e. sanction (2). Sometimes, especially in commercial advertising, their claim to represent large numbers of people is correct ; sometimes their claim is incorrect. We have called such cases published opinion.

Now, when the Press (for instance) puts forward its views as public opinion, it is sometimes successful and sometimes unsuccessful in working-up the public to support these views. Our researches over the past three years have clearly shown that success *very rarely* comes when the Press's version of public opinion is not an accurate reflection of what already exists in public opinion or private opinion. That is to say, when the Press can, either by intuition or by investigation, exploit the underlying trends in private opinion, it can sanction these and bring them rushing up into public opinion. Whereas at the start of its campaign *public opinion* was not in agreement, by the end of the campaign public opinion may be in agreement. This happened, for instance, in the Chamberlain crisis (already discussed). Private opinion had long been anti-Chamberlain. Most of the Press had long thought (or pretended) that the country was behind Chamberlain. But when the Press went round to anti-Chamberlain (largely in reporting the parliamentary debate in early May), and especially emphasised the attack of Sir Roger Keyes—who provided a sanction of the number (1) type (being famous as a brave sailor and not tarnished by the suspicion which the public have about opposition to the Prime Minister from orthodox politicians)—they produced an up-rush from private into public opinion.

But when the Press (or anyone else) merely produces published opinion—that is its own version of public opinion which is based on nothing in the people's minds—then it is very seldom successful in producing any public reaction at all. It is often successful in making some politicians, especially

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

on the level of Aldermen and Peers, believe that the Press version is real public opinion; this influences the actions and decisions of responsible people, sometimes with unfortunate effects. But the Press is not successful in making ordinary people pleased or annoyed about things which do not exist either in their public opinion or in the larger area of their private opinion. Two classic cases of this type are the immense Press campaign against President Roosevelt in America before the last Presidential Election; and the Beaverbrook-Rothermere Empire Free Trade campaign in this country. Both of these failed, and their failure revealed serious limitations on the power of the Press—limitations which the Press seems unready to admit. We have already described the similar failure of the Press campaign against the Wartime Social Survey.

There are many other instances of this failure available. It has become a sort of axiom in the Co-operative Movement that when the Beaverbrook press start one of their periodic campaigns against the Co-ops., sales and membership increase. A Press campaign against rationing last winter was a vested interest campaign, which dragged in all the usual paraphernalia of published opinion. In fact, as surveys by Mass-Observation and the British Institute of Public Opinion showed, a large majority of the population favoured rationing; the Press campaign did nothing to alter this, because most people, both privately and publicly, thought rationing a reasonable procedure.

On the other hand, the recent campaign in favour of interning all aliens did have an effect, because, as detailed studies in the past have shown, a large part of the population are privately anti-alien and anti-Semitic, though their public opinion (e.g. to doorstep interviewers) is dominantly tolerant and anti-anti-Semitic. The Press campaign, led by the Rothermere section, in a few weeks moved public opinion from a large majority in favour of tolerance into a large majority in favour of "intern them all." Here the Press, aided by external events, successfully tapped private opinion, did not merely base the campaign on non-existent feelings.

It is not the place of an observer to assess the effects of these campaigns, which sometimes do not seem to be based

WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION?

on any careful assessment of the real "public interest," and have on several occasions been conspicuously conducted in the interests of a very small section of the community. But it can be noted that every time the Press conducts a campaign which is pure published opinion, it has the effect of making many people puzzled and suspicious. By tampering with opinion, by regarding public opinion as a vague word which can be raked out to support an editorial argument, the Press plays with fire.

The Press would be working in its own long-term interests, as well as in the public interest, if it always took its responsibilities to the public 100 per cent seriously and if it asked itself frequently the question to which a preliminary answer has been attempted here: "What is Public Opinion?" But the deeper question for democracy and far-seeing leadership, and one needing a regular, accurate, objective answer, is "What is Private Opinion?"

THE COLONIES IN THE WAR

By A. CREECH JONES, M.P.

THE loyalty of the colonial peoples to the Crown and Great Britain is one of the impressive facts about the British colonial empire today. It is not suggested that the great majority of these people really know much about the issues of the war or much about Europe and its national rivalries, even if some of the colonies are directly involved in the struggle and others are experiencing direct results from it. The war was seen by the more educated colonial people as at first a European conflict in which the colonies could help Britain with money and goods; now it is seen to be of vaster dimensions, in which even their man-power may be allowed to contribute. In the widest sense, the interests of the colonial peoples are involved in the issues of this tragic breakdown of civilisation.

Up to a month or so ago, the colonial governments and native rulers had given to the British Government seven and a half million pounds in cash and £1,150,000 in loans free of interest. £400,000 had been subscribed to Red Cross work and charities and big sums had been raised to buy aeroplanes and patrol boats, hospital supplies and comforts. The wealthy Malaya States gave £2,000,000 in cash and impoverished Barbados £125,000. The grants were not officially inspired. On the contrary, the Secretary of State was obliged to say in one instance, that is typical of others: "While these magnificent gestures are greatly appreciated the local needs of the Native Administration (Nigeria) must come first." A leading West Indian says: "there is one serious regret that we have here in Jamaica; up to now we cannot persuade the Government to sanction the Council voting money towards a contribution to the war." 20,160 bottles of rum were given instead, and "The Gleaner" raised £25,000 to buy bombers. Poor colonies like Nyasaland gave £32,850 to buy aircraft and also a gift of £20,000. The Banabans, a native community on Ocean Island in the

THE COLONIES IN THE WAR

Pacific, sent £12,500 and could not be persuaded to reduce it to £2,000. A section of the Chagga tribe in Tanganyika levied each of themselves a portion of their harvest in coffee and maize, and the Kilimanjaro native co-operative union raised 20,000 shillings; the natives of Southern Rhodesia collected threepenny and sixpenny bits to help the war effort. Little less than £10 millions have been raised in one way or the other.

This widespread generosity has been accompanied often with somewhat embarrassing expressions of goodwill. The leaders of political opinion in Cyprus sent a deputation to the Governor to tell him that during the war all political agitation was suspended. In the West Indies many labour organisations suggested that they should stop their political and industrial agitation for the war period. Some colonial legislatures thought that all grants from the Colonial Development Fund should be suspended for the duration. This mood has not prevented difficulties cropping up and troubles coming to a head in some territories. The most tragic strike was in the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia where labour standards are deplorable. We await the Report of the Commission as to the circumstances in which 17 Africans lost their lives. There have also been industrial disputes in Singapore.

Nevertheless, the people of most territories have felt obliged to acquiesce in the reactions consequent on war. Executives have, of course, been armed with unusual powers to deal with emergency and military needs. In the early days of the war the Secretary of State expressed his jealous regard for the maintenance of civil liberty. In truth, there have been few lapses in spite of irksome regulations. There has been occasional apprehension as, for instance, the suppression of a trade union demonstration in Trinidad, the use of censorship in West Africa, the suppression of native societies in Kenya, the arbitrary arrests and indefinite detention of Jewish Trade Union leaders in Palestine, and the handling of disputes in Singapore. A few agitators have been detained indefinitely. There were stronger grounds for the detention of Uriah Butler in Trinidad than for the procedure adopted against Wallace Johnson in Sierra Leone. Meantime, the legalising

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of Peaceful Picketing has been refused in British Guiana, Barbados and the Straits. In those colonies where elections for legislatures take place, such arrangements have been postponed for the war and consideration of political and constitutional reform postponed. An interesting move by Mr. MacDonald was an informal comparative study by Lord Hailey, in the British dependencies of West, East and Central Africa, of forms, technical working, and future development of native administration. A similar study is now being made into the principles and methods in Northern Rhodesia.

The slowing down of social and economic progress was a reaction generally expected. Ten years ago the world depression badly affected many colonial areas. Recovery from the social reaction of these years has been slow. A year ago, the Secretary of State hoped that war would interfere with the social programmes of the colonies very little. He directed Governors to maintain the quality of the important welfare services even if officers were seconded for emergency work or found new duties to perform, and he asked that there should be consultation with him before any reduction was made in personnel and expenditure. "It is most important," he wrote, "that ordinary jobs should be carried on as usual. The employment, general well-being, health and morale of our civilian populations have got to be maintained." But as the war has developed the difficulties in most colonies have increased and important modifications of programmes have been inevitable.

It should be noted, in passing, that many hopes of colonial advance were entertained on the eve of the war. For a few years there had been considerable activity in colonial matters. A number of official enquiries had spread much light on the condition of the colonial empire. Parliament and public were agreed that our colonial matters were in a grievous and intolerable condition. The Government had agreed that the facilities of Parliamentary supervision should be improved. The internal organisation of the Colonial Office was slowly adjusted and important administrative changes were inaugurated. More attention was directed to economic, social and labour problems: a social services department for health, housing and education was created and the economic

department strengthened. A variety of colonial subjects excited interest. A Royal Commission had been at work on the West Indies; another had recently reported on the future relations of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; a Committee of the Economic Advisory Council had drawn attention to the appalling conditions of nutrition in the Empire; important reports were being studied on higher education in Africa; the future of the High Commissioner's territories in South Africa was the subject of much speculation; the working of the constitution of Ceylon was under review; the European Highlands policy in Kenya had reached its final stages; the distress of Newfoundland and failure of the Commission Government to improve prospects was a subject of anxiety; the I.L.O. had adopted a series of conventions for native industrial protection, recruitment and regulation of labour contracts, and these were being steadily implemented; the Colonial Marketing Board and Colonial Advisory Committees were getting into stride, and, in most Colonies, Labour Departments were being created and the right of free combination admitted. In addition, so far as Africa was concerned, the Hailey Report had aroused wide interest and brought much new knowledge and suggestion for colonial discussion and action.

In so big and varied a field of constructive possibility, the war has brought uncertainty and delay. Undoubtedly, several important developments have taken place in spite of war. A new Colonial Development and Welfare Act has been passed, preliminary steps have been taken to co-ordinate and increase colonial research and a beginning has been made with the recommendations of the West Indian Commission. An earlier Act, concerned more to create trade and employment in this country than to promote colonial well-being, had made available for economic schemes £1 million per year in grants and loans. Its restrictions had been so tightly drawn that, in spite of the crying needs of the colonies, social services have been denied aid, and after ten years only £5 millions had been paid in grants and £3 millions in loans. Grants-in-aid were often resorted to in the same years and £12 millions had been paid in this way. By the new Act, £5 millions a year becomes available for schemes of economic,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

social and agricultural development in the widest sense. In other words, the new policy abandons the idea that a Colony should have only those services which it can afford to maintain out of its own resources.

The new Act also makes available £500,000 a year for colonial research. It is proposed to put research on a wider and more regular basis and to set up a special advisory committee over which Lord Hailey will preside. It has taken a long time for a great Empire rightly to appreciate the importance of adequate and continuous research into such vital things as health, disease of plants and animals, use of soils, and social development.

The major recommendations of the Royal Commission on the West Indies were also accepted. The non-publication of the Report was a mistake. The Chamberlain Government thought it wise to take an ostrich view of British administration. Evidently, that Government was not robust enough to face the facts about the colonies. The same stupidity happens in broadcasting to-day. The public are entitled to have a more realistic picture of colonial problems and conditions than the complacent talks colonial governors on leave have given them in recent months. The West Indian Commissioners were downright. They asked that £1,000,000 a year for twenty years should be provided for social welfare and development, and that there should be a special organisation set up, independent of the West Indian Colonial Governments, to administer these funds. Grants amounting to £350,000 were made for schemes already submitted. Sir Frank Stockdale was appointed Comptroller, and an Inspector-General of Agriculture, Advisors on Labour, Public Health, Education and Social Welfare have been selected, and the work of implementing many of the recommendations is in hand.

Important as these departures in policy are, there remain the difficulties of war. Material—steel, for example—for economic schemes is more difficult to get and more costly; freight charges and insurance have risen and transport facilities inwards and outwards are more limited. There are new problems of markets for exportable surpluses and the economic life of the colony has now to be planned in the

new and changing circumstances of the world today. Lord Lloyd, like Mr. George Hall, the Under-Secretary, has warned Parliament and the Colonial Governments of these unpleasant facts: "It is vitally important that the interruption of social services should be kept to the minimum, but it is useless to pretend that at present we can carry on as usual with the normal services, meagre as some of them are. Still less is there at present a chance of making much progress with our plans for colonial development . . . it is a matter of material and personnel." It is clear that some services have already suffered, as, for example, anti-soil erosion services in East Africa. Educational progress in Nigeria is held up; public works in Northern Rhodesia and British Honduras are reduced; British Guiana is asked to wait for happier times, and the expansion of social services in Kenya is stopped. Only the bare essential services are now possible in Africa.

The Colonies have also to face great defence expenditure. Few details of military cost are available. The gifts to Britain have depleted their accumulations, capital and reserves. Most colonies are raising defence forces or releasing men for service further afield. It will be recalled that the Cypriot Transport Unit was sent to France, that Southern Rhodesian Air Units are operating in Kenya, that Newfoundland has sent men for patrol work in the Navy and in forestry, that the local regiments in the West Indies have been reformed and the King's African Rifles and African Frontier Forces increased. The Conference of East Africa Governors has been reconstituted and steps have been taken to co-ordinate the defences of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. The Secretary of State recently reminded the colonies that it would be contrary to public interest to reduce the efficiency of the colonial services by releasing men for the armed forces in Britain; men who can be spared should join the local forces; the capacity of the colonies to support and defend themselves as well as produce raw materials of importance to the war effort should not be jeopardised. Most colonies, meantime, have adopted conscription.

In adjusting themselves to the war, colonial administrations ought not to be allowed to fall into a mood of helpless

reaction. That would be inconsistent with all our professions and protestations in this war. Indeed, in some services, particularly labour, progress is actually being made. The colonial governments have also been asked to see that the cost of war falls as lightly on the shoulders of the working people as possible. Public statements have been made about this and a proportion of the expenditure will be found by customs and excise duties and by more equitable direct taxation. The importance of the last method has been stressed in a number of recent official statements. Mr. MacDonald also told the Governor of the Straits Settlements that it would not be appropriate to use an official majority in order to secure any taxation intended to assist the Imperial Government in the prosecution of the war over and above the revenue needs of the colony. The Government has already relieved a number of colonies of certain heavy indebtedness. More than £11 millions owed by various colonial Governments was transferred to the Home Government. Whatever stupidities, or extravagance in policy, or promises to speculators and guarantees to shareholders may be included in this sum, the decision was overdue.

Other effects of the war should now be noted. In spite of many improvements in Colonial Office administration and of the increased professional ability of the staff in recent years, that office has given little bold and imaginative economic direction. Research has been insufficient, little systematic planning has been encouraged, and very limited assistance has been forthcoming either in marketing or finance. It is doubtful if there was much intelligent anticipation of war-time needs. There was little accumulation or storage of stocks; no well-devised and generally known system of distribution or clear understanding between London and the Colonial Governments as to what their contribution should be. In the early days of the war the Colonial Marketing Board was suspended and the Economic Department of the Colonial Office enlarged. A business adviser was appointed. Before the war, international control schemes and quota arrangements existed in tin, copper, rubber, sugar and tea. Most of these could not function properly in the new circumstances. Rapidly the Government intro-

duced a system of controls and bulk purchase designed to secure for the Allies colonial raw materials, to prevent supplies reaching the enemy, to conserve exchange and to effect economies in shipping. In some instances, as cocoa, sisal, oil seed, ground nuts, vegetable oils, and sugar, colonial producers were safeguarded by the Government arranging to buy the whole export production at prices little above those which obtained prior to the outbreak of war. The tin and sugar schemes were maintained and an increased output of tin, rubber and other essential commodities was encouraged. War brought with it, of course, a great demand for the major export products of certain colonies—copper from Rhodesia, tin and rubber from Malaya, oil from Trinidad—and some of the interests associated with these products enjoy just now intense activity and "prosperity."

The cocoa crop in West Africa illustrates the difficulty of economic arrangements in war-time. Much of West African prosperity depends on cocoa. The central European market of 100,000 tons was lost by the war and subsequently the collapse of France and Scandinavia struck other severe blows at this great colonial export trade. Early the Government took steps to avert disaster to the growers by securing the total crop at a fixed price. The shippers received their profits for the buying, but the price to the farmers covered the many interests which stand between producer and exporter. Although the Government assumed big risks, the growers are still very discontented because the goods they import in exchange have risen greatly in price. Undoubtedly, the import trade of West Africa is very profitable and is in an utterly unsatisfactory condition. But the situation resolves itself into this: a fixed unprofitable price is received by the grower: profits are made by shippers and importers, traders, merchants and storekeepers. Loss of markets and shipping space increase the Government loss, while the storage capacity is full to overflowing. Consequently, quantities of cocoa have been destroyed, and next year much of the crop will be destroyed because there will be neither shipping nor markets nor possible storage.

Another interesting economic feature in many colonies stands out. The emphasis of economic policy has been for

colonies to increase export commodities and to receive the part payment which is returned to the colonies in manufactured goods from Britain. Thus external trade has been underlined and insufficient importance attached to the standard of living of the colonial people. Such concentration of production on one or more exports has brought disastrous results in periods of depression. Yet Commissions and Advisers have all reiterated the importance of local industries, land settlement, mixed farming, improved methods of husbandry, production for local consumption and, where possible, a variety in exportable products. The necessity of war is, however, giving a great stimulus to this better policy. The Secretaries of State have urged that the colonies should increase the production of foodstuffs for domestic consumption so that, as far as possible, they may be independent of imported supplies. Colonial Governments have been asked, while trying to maintain suitable trading and thereby support public revenue, to practise a more self-supporting economy so as to reduce shipping demands and secure a new balance in local consumption between imports and home-grown foods, etc. Some colonies already report that they are seriously tackling the finding of substitutes for imported goods and creating suitable local industries. But, in any case, unless rapid adjustments are made, undisposable surpluses will accumulate because of inadequate storage in the absence of shipping and the loss of markets.

A new economic policy for a colony is far from easy. There are interests which thrive on imports and trading and manufactures and which are not enthusiastic about the sacrifice of trade to a better balanced economy. In addition, some colonies rely on their revenues from imports and they cannot easily find alternative revenues or crops, particularly where producers are poor in skill and technical knowledge. Some Colonies which mainly depend on one or two products have already tried to find alternative crops. Sea Island cotton is an experiment in point. It was introduced in the West Indies because of their undue dependence on the single crop of sugar. By research, breeding of suitable strains of cotton, by co-operative ginneries and by organisation of orderly marketing, with an Advisory Council in London,

substantial progress has been made. But in any long view of colonial development, it must be conceded that economic progress is not necessarily the business development of British trading interests. Colonies need better nutrition and more welfare measures and more diverse industries and, generally, fewer exportable crops.

This war has already had another important consequence to the Colonies. It is an interesting speculation how far the events of war will destroy colour discrimination in the Empire. The removal of the colour bar so that colonial people not European born may be eligible for service in the fighting services was a belated and half-hearted step made some months ago. The commissions are difficult to obtain, and, in any case, are only for the emergency. In the French West Indies discrimination has long been abolished, and in Africa the British administration will find itself co-operating in Chad with M. Eboué, a black colonial Governor. One can only hope that the experience and British war protestations against Germany for the practice of race discrimination will lead to recognition of the right of coloured people to the fullest participation in the government and control of the areas to which they belong.

Italy's belligerency has changed many colonial areas into zones of military operation. British Somaliland has been evacuated: it was an area where comparatively little of social and economic importance resulted from our control. Palestine has assumed a vast importance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The conflicting interests of Arabs and Jews have not been resolved, but the latter have offered all their resources without bargain in the struggle they know to be their own. In Gibraltar, a big section of the civilian population has been evacuated to Britain. Kenya is defending her northern frontiers. The Royal Air Force has been helped by the South African and Rhodesian Air Forces operating against the Italians in Abyssinia and Somaliland. The Government of the Union of South Africa attach significance to the support they are giving in the defence of the African colonies. Should the area of war be enlarged and Spain and Portugal forced into line with Germany and Italy, South Africa will play a greater part in the two neighbouring

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Portuguese colonies and in developments further north.

Of great importance are recent developments on the far side of the Atlantic. In the West Indies and Bermuda the United States Government now has territory leased as air and naval bases. Whatever effects the use of military bases by an external power may have on a colony, there is no official deceit in the announcement that the proposal is in fact no bartering of British territory and British subjects in return for American assistance. Both Great Britain and the United States have a common interest in defence of the Panama and the Eastern American waters. The West Indian people, with little apprehension but much reluctance, have accepted the suggestion as necessary and inevitable in war.

Finally, the Government should examine whether the war situation affords an unusual opportunity of carrying Colonial policy an important stage forward. Discussion on Colonial collaboration between the French and British Governments last spring opened out a prospect of immense usefulness. The two powers agreed to a regular liaison and exchange of information, to local consultation and co-operation, to arrangements as to production and marketing, and to collaboration on health and other colonial local interests. The adherence of Chad, the Cameroons, and Gabon to Free France, and the promises of British help to these territories for the continuance of the struggle will probably lead to the organising of many of the arrangements contemplated by M. Mandel and Mr. MacDonald before France collapsed. The Belgian Congo is on the friendliest terms with the neighbouring British colonies in Africa and has also placed its great resources at the service of the common cause. The Dutch Empire has also vast reserves of wealth and population, and their West Indian colonies are already occupied to defend their important oil refineries. The combined overseas territories of France, Belgium, Holland and Britain make an impressive picture of colonial administration, readily adaptable for mutual and beneficial co-operation.

The war naturally compels co-operation in respect to certain strategic and economic problems. All the colonies have marketing difficulties; often the same products to dispose of; an equal interest in agriculture and health, and

THE COLONIES IN THE WAR

problems in respect to native administration. The British and French, for instance, are equally concerned about destroying the breeding centres of the migratory locusts in West Africa; tsetse flies, mosquitoes, and locusts do not respect frontiers. If amalgamation of the territories in Africa as a step to a world-wide colonial system seems somewhat remote, there is no room for doubt that no one question in Africa can be studied in isolation. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to urge that steps should now be taken towards rationalising colonial policy and attaining a real co-operation in respect to the broader problems of colonial life.

It seems worth while considering whether an inter-colonial Council could function in London, composed of men representing the four empires, who can bring together and shape to the best advantage the many colonial schemes and projects for social, educational and political development in the territories within these empires. Or an inter-colonial Committee of the three powers concerned with Africa might make a start with the African continent. During the war such a Committee could develop pooling schemes, think out commercial concessions and arrangements, the ways and means of economic inter-dependence; it could barter, exchange, deal with currency and marketing problems, and it could shape long-term policies for mutual assistance where territories are contiguous.

In any case, Britain and the Allied states associated with her in this struggle, ought to impress the world with their vigour, the extent of territory behind them in this fight, the great resources of raw materials and the large-scale co-operation that has been secured. Britain ought to demonstrate its willingness to go on furthering in the Colonial Empire the ideals and the purposes which are actuating the British people. An inter-colonial Council would impress both Britain and the world, give greater confidence and stimulate propaganda work among the subjected peoples in European countries. It would show the world the loyalty of the Colonial peoples, the international spirit in which this nation was prepared to discharge its colonial duties and the possibilities of economic and political co-operation for colonial well-being as well as for a common purpose in the war.

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

By EMMELINE COHEN

THE present war is leading to profound changes in family life, the consequences of which cannot be foretold. For a vast majority of families, the dispersal of the children from the more vulnerable cities and towns has meant a far deeper disturbance in their usual pattern of living than has the calling up of the men. The last war led to a fall in population, both through mortality and the fall in the birth rate. A similar sequence may be expected to this war. Already in the pre-war years there was a growing literature on the subject of the anticipated effects of a declining population on the economic life of the country. The family had become a subject of controversy. Discussion was largely focussed on numbers. The situation to-day is more complex, and far less capable of measurement by arithmetic. What will be the result of the dispersal from the towns on the physical and mental well being of the children? Equally important is the effect of the dispersal on the attitudes of the parents. Will it in any way alter their views on the family, and on the kinds of policy they will find acceptable for the welfare of their children?

The responsibilities which the State assumed with regard to arrangements for the dispersal of the child population are but an added item in the steadily growing impact of the State on the family. The purpose of this article is to enquire how far a consistent policy can be discerned behind the mass of legislation which affects the family to-day.

The most direct impact of the State on the family takes place through those laws which regulate the conditions of marriage, divorce, separation; which define legitimacy, and the mutual obligations of the partners of a marriage, and of parents and children. The radical changes which have taken place in these spheres in recent years surely reflect the decay of one conception of the family, and the emergence of another. What has gone is the rigid family, whose stability rested on the almost unlimited rights of the husband over the person

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

and property of his wife, and of a father over those of his children who were not of age.

By slow stages this rigid pattern suffered modification, and the rights of the wife, mother and children received recognition. The first, and in some ways most important step was the passing of the Custody of Infants Act of 1839, which by giving the Court power to grant a wife living apart from her husband access to her children, and even custody of those under seven years of age, removed one of the reasons which until then forced a woman to remain under the same roof as a cruel or vicious husband. The opponents to the Bill were fully alive to its significance. Sir Ernest Sugden, one of its most implacable enemies, asserted in the House, that a woman's rights should be sacrificed because "to concede her rights against her husband was to concede her right to act independently, and anything which facilitated independent action on her part threatened to break up the family." It was the first step in the break up of the family whose basis was the authority of the husband and father, and the first step in the establishment of the family whose basis was the welfare of all its members. The rigid family was further supported by inflexible marriage laws. Civil marriage was unknown in England until 1836. Until 1857 the Ecclesiastical Courts had jurisdiction over marriage, and although they might grant a judicial separation, they gave no right to remarriage, and to the woman, though she were the innocent party, no right to her property.¹

By slow stages the divorce laws have been reformed. Grounds for divorce are now, with one exception, the same for man or wife—the balance slightly in favour of the woman, in that she can petition for divorce on the grounds that her husband is guilty of homosexuality. The grounds for divorce have been widened as well as equalised, and now include such circumstances as desertion and incurable insanity. These and other provisions of the Act of 1937 go far to ensure that the form of a marriage shall not be maintained against the will of the partners, when their welfare demands divorce. Parliament has secured to married women the right to their own property, and has relieved husbands of responsibility

¹ Reiss, E. *The Rights and Duties of Englishwomen* (1934), page 13.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

for debts contracted by their wives. As a result of the Administration of Justice Act of 1920, power was given to determine certain matrimonial causes on circuit. Thus divorce ceased to be a remedy open only to those wealthy enough to bring their petition to the courts in London.

The changes in the laws affecting children have been equally significant. Mothers have gained the right to the custody and guardianship of their children. But it is not only the rights of parents that are recognized. In the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, it is stated that, in settling a dispute, the court shall regard the welfare of the infant—a term which applies to all minors—as the paramount consideration. A similar regard for the child's welfare is reflected in the Legitimacy Act, 1926, which, in certain circumstances, allows subsequent marriage of the parents to legitimise the offspring.

In recent years, efforts have been made to protect those children whose parents abuse their rights. Parental obligations have become more closely defined. Before the passing of the Children's Act, 1908, only the High Court had power to stop a parent who abused his rights in any way short of a manner held criminal at common law.¹ Indeed, the only duty explicitly demanded of him was that he should not allow his legitimate children to become chargeable to the rates. Since 1908 a number of Acts have been passed dealing with matters relating to children and young persons. There are now defined conditions in which the right of the parents may be superseded in the interests of the child, and in which the child may be removed from the custody of the parents, and placed in other hands. These conditions include personal cruelty, and life in an environment calculated to endanger the child's moral welfare. It is an offence to cause a child unnecessary suffering. This suffering includes neglect to provide adequate food, clothing, or medical aid, or to take steps to secure these necessities through the public assistance services. The fact that the parent does not believe in obtaining medical advice on religious grounds, has been held not to be an adequate excuse for failing to secure medical attention for his child.²

¹ Garnett, W. H. S. *Children and the Law* (1911), page 17.

² Garnett, *op. cit.*, page 18.

These Acts also make it an offence for parents to allow those of their children who are under sixteen years old to take part in certain kinds of dangerous performances. The Education Acts lay down the duty of every parent to see that his children receive efficient elementary instruction in the three "r's," or, if they suffer from physical or mental disability, to see that they receive appropriate instruction. The Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act of 1938 provides redress in certain circumstances for dependents for whom inadequate provision has been made in the will of parent or spouse. Thus step by step the mutual obligations of members of a family have been more closely defined. The Adoption Acts have now made it possible to create an artificial family relationship between a child and one who is not the natural parent. As a result of the Acts of 1926 and 1939 the adopted child has been placed in the same position as the natural child, except as regards succession.

No less important than the changes in the laws directly concerned with the family has been the recognition by Parliament of responsibilities for the protection and welfare of children and of their mothers. Underlying the mass of social legislation can there be discerned any consistent attitude to the family? This legislation may be divided into three groups: protective legislation, provision of services, and the provision of money benefits.

Of the protective legislation, the most important is that which regulates the conditions of employment for children and young persons. There are regulations prohibiting the employment of children under twelve, and restricting the number of hours which a child of school age may work. Inadequate as these regulations undoubtedly are, they show the degree to which Parliament has accepted the responsibility of seeing that the labour of juveniles shall not be exploited in such a way as to injure their health or militate in too obvious a way against their welfare. Some of these regulations have indirectly increased parental responsibility. From the days of the Elizabethan Poor Law a parent has had the duty of maintaining his child. He had also the right to their services. The more adequate the protection of children from the exploitation of their immature powers, the greater

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

has been the burden on the parent of maintaining them.

Quite obviously, the regulations controlling the labour of children grew up to meet specific conditions. They are inspired less by any positive conception of the welfare of young people than by the harmfulness of over-work and excessive physical strain. This statement is as true of recent Acts as of the older ones. For it can hardly be claimed that the restriction of hours for young persons under the age of 16 to 44 hours a week, and for those between 16 and 18 years to 48 hours a week, does more than attempt to limit the evil conditions in which immature persons are expected to toil each day as long as adults.

In view of the history of the social services, it would be unreasonable to search for a consistent attitude to the family in the legislation which instituted them. Particular needs came to be recognized, and the services were created to meet these needs. Thus after school attendance was made compulsory, it was found that ill or starving children could not benefit from the schooling they were compelled to undergo. There grew up in consequence the school medical services, and power was given to local authorities to provide meals for those whose under-nourished condition interfered with their education. In the hands of enlightened local authorities these powers have led to positive results. Implicit in this legislation is the assumption that the education, health and welfare of the child is a joint responsibility of parent and state.

The Maternity and Child Welfare services sprang from the interest taken by voluntary associations, and later by enlightened local authorities, in infant mortality.¹ The pioneers led the way, and the State followed. And so by degrees the kind of provision which local authorities are empowered to make for mothers and infants has expanded, until it includes care during pregnancy, birth and infancy, and the provision of cheap milk. It is not necessary here to enumerate all the various services which are provided. What is significant for our purpose is that it has come to be recognized that the health and welfare of the mother and her infant is the concern of the community. The functions of

¹ McCleary, G. F. *The Early History of the Infant Welfare Movement* (1935), page 122.

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

the State in relation to the family have been expanded.

It remains to consider the attitude to the family as it is reflected in the various schemes under which allowances are payable for dependents, to meet particular emergencies. Many of these schemes share common features. Thus where allowances are made for dependent children, these allowances are tapered. This arrangement is clearly not founded on the needs of the family, but is rather designed to ensure that benefits shall not exceed wage levels. Since wages are not related to the needs of the family, it follows that benefit must not necessarily cover them. The tapered allowance also characterises allowances paid to the families of men serving in the forces. The purpose in this case is less clear. Can it be as a deterrent to the production of families? It is interesting to note that it has been expressly stated that the "family allowance is not intended to cover the full cost of maintenance of a soldier's family; it is a supplement to the soldier's pay in aid of that maintenance."¹

Not all the schemes accept the same definition of "dependent family." The most notable example of this was the exclusion of adopted children from the right of benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Acts. On the other hand the interpretation given to "dependent" under the unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance schemes, and in the schemes for the granting of allowances to dependents of men serving in the forces, is in keeping with the changed attitude to the family, already described earlier in this article. Benefit is not restricted to the wife of the man who draws the allowance; it may also be granted in respect of the woman who is ordinarily supported by the applicant.² Thus actualities take precedence over formalities, and recognition is given by the State to the applicants usual obligations.

Sickness is at present the risk which offers the greatest threat to the security of the family. Since provision is not made in sickness or disablement benefit for the maintenance of dependents, the gap has to be met from savings, or from public assistance. Although this absence of dependents'

¹ Allowances for Families, etc. Cmd. 6138, page 3.

² Report for the Unemployment Assistance Board for 1938. Cmd. 6021, pp. 14-15.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

benefit may be justified from a purely insurance point of view, from the standpoint of the welfare of the family it exemplifies the fragmentary way in which that welfare has been conceived.

From this cursory examination of the relations between the State and the family to-day, certain facts emerge. It is clear that the authoritarian, rigid family pattern has been superseded by one which is more flexible, and in which the welfare, rights and duties of all the members are considered. When the family ceases to promote the welfare of its members, its break up is recognised to be in the best interests of all. Hence the basis of divorce has broadened, and the Children's Acts have defined the conditions in which the rights of the parents may be superseded in the interests of the child. With the growth of social legislation, parental obligations have been more closely defined. At the same time the State has assumed an increasingly wide range of obligations. The death of a woman in child birth, is no longer an unfortunate accident which concerns only her family. A cynic might suspect that it took a declining birth rate to interest the authorities in infant and maternal mortality.

It is clear that at the moment there is no defined policy towards the family. There are a number of policies which affect different aspects of the life and welfare of the family. When the time comes for reconstruction after the war, a number of fresh problems are bound to arise, and old problems may take on different shapes. Therefore unless the questions are viewed as a whole, it is possible that effort may be directed without agreement on fundamental issues. For instance, without some integration of principles, can it be assumed that a policy about population will necessarily correspond with a policy about welfare?

Sir Percy Alden has said recently that "there can be no solution of the many problems connected with social and community welfare unless we begin at the beginning. The child is the foundation of the State, and the first line of defence. We cannot lay too much stress upon the child if the State is to endure."¹ The family is an essential part of the background of the child. We must ensure that those

¹ Aspects of a Changing Social Structure (1936), page 15.

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

needs which are supplied through the family shall be adequate to the child's needs. To-day many of these needs can be accurately gauged. Thus experts have recently been able to describe the nutritional needs of the child, and we know the income necessary per head to secure them. We know the conditions which promote or hinder growth, and the laws governing the employment of young people should be consonant with this knowledge. We know more of the requisites for the mental welfare of the child. Although the way we live must be determined by the way we earn our living, and under present conditions large cities in which many people take up as little space as possible are probably necessary, we cannot doubt that the harmful effects of this pattern of living could be counteracted if we boldly accepted the principle of welfare as essential to the health of the State.

In some respects the war has opened the way to such a policy. The State has accepted increased responsibilities. It has accepted responsibility for making arrangements for the dispersal of the children. The rights of the parents were respected, in that the decision whether the children should go or stay rested with them. Even more important for the future is the fact that for this policy the Government was prepared to contribute to the cost of maintenance. Thus for the first time the nutrition of the child has not depended on the earning capacity of the parent. What will be the effect of this policy on the growth and development of those affected? These things can be measured. The results can be compared with the condition of those who have not been ensured a minimum standard. It is unthinkable that when peace comes we should revert to former standards.

Yet it is absolutely essential that the schemes for the welfare of the child, should not be treated in isolation. There must be an integrated family policy. What should this be? This question at once raises difficulties. Discussion of the family inevitably leads to the expression of violent prejudices. Anyone who has listened to people discussing population must be aware of this. Contemporary Europe shows only too clearly how easily a population policy may develop into an attack on the position of women and a degradation of the functions of the family. Our own history shows that in this

country the emergence of welfare policies occurred *pari passu* with women's emancipation.

If it is accepted that adequate minimum standards for the child shall not depend on the parent's earnings, the question at once arises of how the deficiencies should be met. What provision should be made by cash allowances, and what by services? If the health of the child and mother requires an extension of existing services, should the facilities be free, irrespective of income, or not? And, if not, how should need be judged? Whatever answers are given raise innumerable difficulties. Many of the answers must depend to a large extent on the attitudes of parents. A service must not only be theoretically valuable, it must also be the kind of service which people will be prepared to use. It is this fact which makes it important and interesting to see how far the conditions under which war forces families to live will alter their views or habits.

We may expect the issues involved in the relations of the family and the State to be more rather than less complex when peace comes. We must beware of adopting plausible policies which do not further the welfare of the family, but fit in with whatever may happen to be the dominant post war fads. What is needed is a consistent and co-ordinated policy, which in caring for the parts, does not neglect the whole. So many specialised fields are involved—health, mental welfare, population, education and so forth. Much must depend on the nature of post war problems, on the needs of industry, and so forth. Opposing interests must be reconciled; they will not unless we exercise forethought. Forethought over so wide a field is probably beyond the scope of an individual, and certainly beyond the scope of any one of the departments which are responsible for the social services. What is needed is some form of inquiry or commission, under the chairmanship of a man or woman of wide experience. Such a commission could recommend satisfactory ways of bridging the gaps in existing services, and lay down the principles which should guide policy in all matters touching the family and the child. We need to co-ordinate the many policies which have been followed in our efforts to overcome difficulties and promote welfare.

BRITAIN AND THE FAR EAST

By H. J. TIMPERLEY

IT is astonishing, especially in view of the magnitude of British interests in that part of the world, that such scanty attention should be paid in this country to the study of Far Eastern problems. Few, if any, of our British universities offer more than an elementary course in Far Eastern history, and the negligent attitude of the newspapers is sufficiently indicated by the fact that only one of them has bothered to appoint even a part-time correspondent at Chungking, where Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government has now been established for a year and a half.

In view of the prevailing ignorance regarding Far Eastern imponderables, it is not surprising perhaps that the British Government should have committed the grave blunder of closing the Burma Road for the transit of military and other supplies to China in disregard of its obligation, under the League Assembly resolution of October 6th, 1937, to "refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict." No secret has been made of the fact that the Government was black-mailed by Japanese threats into taking this regrettable step. Since the precise nature of Tokyo's ultimatum has not been revealed it is difficult to argue the point, but the best-informed Far Eastern experts believe that Japan was simply putting up a huge bluff which a show of determination on Britain's part would have exposed at once.

As things now stand, the British Government has shackled itself so firmly to the chariot wheels of Japanese militarism that, according to Foreign Office spokesmen, it cannot even allow ambulances or petrol for Red Cross purposes to be transported over the road unless the Japanese give their permission! And up to this time of writing, Tokyo has not deigned even to reply to the representations that have been made on the point. It is claimed that the closure is merely a temporary one for three months until next October, and that the British Government has "reserved full freedom of

action" at the end of that period. It is not to be supposed for a moment, however, that the Japanese will relax their pressure and, realising this, the Foreign Office decline to give an unequivocal assurance that the road will be opened at the end of the stipulated time. Yet it is obvious that continued Chinese resistance is the best possible insurance against Japanese intransigence. And how long this resistance can be carried on if China is to be deprived of her last remaining inlet from the sea is a matter for melancholy conjecture.

From a legal standpoint the British Government would have good grounds for nullifying this unfortunate arrangement tomorrow if it wished to. It was stipulated as a condition of the agreement that the Japanese should make a genuine effort to reach an equitable settlement with the Chinese, but Tokyo is standing firmly by the terms laid down by Prince Konoye in December, 1938, while the aerial bombardment of Chungking and other Chinese cities has been intensified to a horrifying degree. It is necessary only to mention that the Konoye programme includes Chinese adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the right to station Japanese troops at specified points in China "as an anti-communist measure." Unless the British Government considers that these terms offer the basis of an equitable settlement, it is clearly entitled to consider itself released from its part of the bargain.

Meanwhile we are alienating the feelings of approximately one-third of the world's population. Not only has the closure of the Burma Road aroused a storm of angry protest in China but it has caused profound resentment also in India, where the courageous struggle of the Chinese people during the past three years has been viewed with interest and sympathy. "The Congress President," stated a cable received in London recently from Bombay, "has issued a statement wholly disapproving of the closing of the Burma Road, which was built at enormous sacrifice and already had become the main artery of traffic which brought India, Burma and China nearer to each other. The people of India welcomed the new relationship created and gave their goodwill to the Chinese struggle. The closing of the road means a severe restriction of the growing ties between these countries

and the flaunting of Indian opinion. It is opposed to the foreign policy of the Indian people and the policy of international friendship and Sino-British treaties. It is clearly an encouragement to the aggressor nations and a support of the policy against which Britain professes to be fighting. The British policy in India and China is entirely opposed to the claims of the British Government in relation to Europe."

Messages from America, too, show that this step has cast a sharp reflection upon the validity of our war aims, arousing a feeling of mistrust similar to that produced by Munich and, to go back still farther, by the Anglo-Japanese agreement which assigned to Japan the German holdings in Shantung province seized during the last European war. On the authority of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Political Adviser to the State Department, these concessions "did more, probably, than any one thing in the Treaty to create among American people distrust of the work of the Paris Conference."

The shortsighted character of British policy in the Far East is all the more apparent when viewed against the background of a series of studies recently published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an international organisation which has its headquarters in New York. When hostilities broke out between China and Japan in the summer of 1937, the Institute found itself faced with a new set of problems. And as the conflict intensified, members of the organisation throughout the world were of divided mind as to what role, if any, the Institute should play.

After much careful thought it was decided that the most important task would be to endeavour to utilise the full research resources of the Institute by organising an objective and systematic study of the issues which would confront the Governments and peoples of the Pacific as a result of the conflict. A study of the background of events in the Far East would, it was clear, be equally essential for an accurate anticipation of post-war problems and the consideration of possible post-war adjustments.

An inquiry into various aspects of the Far Eastern conflict was therefore launched by the International Secretariat of the Institute and a number of valuable publications have already been issued. Among these is a study by Dr. Irving

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

S. Friedman of British relations with China during the period 1931-1939. Dr. Friedman traces in detail the reactions of the British Government and of British business groups in China to the successive steps of Japanese expansion, and examines the basic characteristics of the British economic and political stake in China. He comes to the conclusion that, although the outcome of the present European struggle may produce marked changes, "Britain's China policy will continue to be the result of the consideration given to the problems of imperial defence and world politics mixed with a concern for the stakes held by British and financial interests in China."

Since the outbreak of the European war, Japan has become increasingly dependent upon the United States for war materials, while China also relies on American purchasing credits. The extent to which the United States is likely to take advantage of its strengthened position to assert its policy more vigorously than in the past is analysed by Mr. T. A. Bisson in a concise and well-documented review of American policy in the Far East over the same period as that covered by Dr. Friedman's book. He feels that there is no necessity for the United States to follow Britain's lead in the direction of appeasement. "Firm and unequivocal action by the United States at this time," he points out, "would contribute to a Far Eastern settlement that would conserve American interests and do justice to China."

A third study entitled "Australia's Interest and Policies in the Far East," by Mr. Jack Shepherd, helps to explain why the Commonwealth Government should have played so prominent a role in bringing about the Burma Road Agreement. While it is true that "most Australians find it easy to envisage the possibility of a Japanese attack," the fact remains that for a long time Japan was Australia's best customer for wool, and the Australian Government is anxious to smooth the way for a restoration of profitable trade between the two countries. "At the moment," was the author's somewhat gloomy summing up of the outlook in September, 1939, "Australia is faced with a world of shrinking markets, and constant threats of war, and despite the current effort to build up the country's economic and military strength,

her future, without a settlement in the Far East assuring her of export markets and the security she needs, is likely to be dark indeed."

Illuminating glimpses of modern Japan are given in two further studies entitled respectively "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State," by Mr. E. Herbert Norman, and "Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition," by Professor G. C. Allen, of Liverpool University. Mr. Norman sketches Japan's amazingly rapid transition from a feudal into a modern industrial society after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, while Professor Allen discusses the problems raised by this development, with particular reference to the present Sino-Japanese war. Weighing up Japan's chances of economic survival, Professor Allen reaches the tentative conclusion that "Japan's economic position is not so weak as to prevent her from carrying on the present war against China effectively for at least another year, and probably much longer, provided the Western Powers remain passive spectators of events." He goes on to point out that Japan's war effort has seriously distorted her economic structure, however, and that these distortions will become more pronounced the longer the war lasts. Thus Japan will be faced in time with the problem of remedying serious maladjustments in the distribution of her resources, and this it may not be easy to solve even if she succeeds in acquiring the monopolistic position in China for which she is now striving.

All of these books are published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations as part of the "Inquiry Series" and are obtainable in this country from George Allen and Unwin. No student of Far Eastern affairs can afford not to read them. Another volume which throws much valuable light upon the background of the Far Eastern conflict is "Japan's Case Examined," by Professor Westel W. Willoughby, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. To some extent this volume, which traces the development of Japan's objectives in China, is a supplement to Professor Willoughby's longer volume, published in 1935, entitled "The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations." The author examines critically the pleas which Japan has advanced from time to time in

justification of her actions upon the Asiatic continent and finds most of them to be specious. Dealing, for example, with Japan's oft-repeated claim that she has been driven by economic necessity to adopt an expansionist policy, Professor Willoughby writes :

"In the first place it may be said that the misfortunes or needs of one State give to it no ethical or moral right to violate the rights of another State, any more than they justify, in private law, the seizure by one individual of another individual's property.

"In the second place, it can, of course, be shown that this is not Japan's only alternative. As other industrialised countries have done, she can dispose in the open market of her manufactured products, and, in turn, purchase, in free competition with the other peoples, the foodstuffs and raw materials which her subjects may need, and this process will be limited only by the ability of the Japanese to develop an efficient economic and industrial machinery and an adequately trained body of workers.

"In truth, if the processes which have operated in other parts of the world operate also in Japan, as we may expect they will, it will be found that her population will accommodate itself in the matter of numbers to the standards of living that prevail in Japan. That is to say, the standards of economic comfort being given, the population by a process of natural increase or decrease will be determined by the available supply of economic goods. . . ."

List of books mentioned above :

- BRITISH RELATIONS WITH CHINA: 1931-1939. By IRVING S. FRIEDMAN 255 pp. (*George Allen & Unwin Ltd.* 10s.)
 AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST: 1931-1940. By T. A. BISSEY. 162 pp. (*George Allen & Unwin Ltd.* 6s.)
 AUSTRALIA'S INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN THE FAR EAST. By JACK SHEPHERD. 212 pp. (*George Allen & Unwin Ltd.* 10s.)
 JAPAN'S EMERGENCE AS A MODERN STATE. By E. HERBERT NORMAN. 254 pp. (*George Allen & Unwin Ltd.* 10s.)
 JAPANESE INDUSTRY: ITS RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT CONDITION. By G. C. ALLEN. 124 pp. (*George Allen & Unwin Ltd.* 5s.)
 JAPAN'S CASE EXAMINED. By WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY. 237 pp. (*Oxford University Press.* 15s. 6d.)

BOOK REVIEWS

POPULATION POLICIES AND MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE. By D. V. GLASS. (*Macmillan.* 25s. net.)

THIS book contains a copiously documented history of the ideas prevalent about population, the unofficial propaganda based on them and the policies initiated in some nine European countries, mainly during the past sixty years. Though there are in it many statistical tables and brief explanations of the technical and mathematical methods of calculation, the treatment conforms closely to its title, and alike in scope and method it differs from the numerous more special and local studies of population.

Three threads are closely interwoven throughout the chapters, which we may call the Neo-Malthusian, the Philanthropic and the Pro-Natalist. It is surprising that Mr. Glass hardly alludes to the Eugenic movement, though he devotes some space to differential fertility. The journal, *The Malthusian*, had in 1880 the sub-title *A Crusade Against Poverty*. Though the term over-population seems not to have been in common use, the aim of the movement was to replace Malthus's "vice and misery" as the checks on over-population and its resultant poverty by birth-control and family limitation.

To what extent the fall in the birth-rate that began in many European countries in the latter part of the nineteenth century was due to the spread of Neo-Malthusian doctrines, and to what extent to less clearly identified causes, is a question on which Mr. Glass prudently refrains from dogmatising.

The more recent aspect of the Crusade against Poverty has tended to crystallize in the development of family allowances, which at various times and in different countries have taken many forms, such as remission of taxes, subsidised rents, free meals, and direct payments to families. It is perhaps curious that allowance schemes have generally been based on industries and connected with wages, and not, as would appear to be more logical, borne on the general State revenues. If it is granted that the rearing of children is of public as well as of private concern, and that the financial burden should not fall wholly (or indeed, as some persons think, at all) on parents, then this is not a concern of the wage-earning classes or their employers, but of the nation as a whole. But even in the most recent extensions of the schemes by "super-equalisation" systems, the basis was the employers' wage-bill.

In Sweden, other northern countries, and (in its limited adherence to the principle) England, the intention of family allowances and similar aids to parents has been philanthropic rather than based on a population policy. As it has become evident that the poorer, who are also the more prolific, sections of the population, cannot afford to feed

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

themselves and their children on the standard now held to be necessary for healthy growth, on the one side birth-control has been popularised, so that the needs are diminished, and on the other side aid has been increasingly given in a great variety of forms to benefit the children that are allowed to see the light. The motives have not primarily been to check the decrease of population that is now becoming imminent. But in France and in the Dictatorial countries, the movement has been closely bound up with a national drive towards an increased population, the "Pro-Natal" movement. Mussolini is reported to have said in 1927: "Italy must have a population of not less than 60 millions when she arrives at the threshold of the second half of this century." In Germany in 1933 a number of measures were introduced designed to facilitate marriage and increase fertility. In France benefits are specially large for "*familles nombreuses*."

How far propaganda and pecuniary help have affected the number of births naturally cannot be precisely determined, but Mr. Glass includes a careful study of the relevant statistics. Some extravagant claims have been made, which neglect such factors as the attraction of men with families to establishments where allowances are given, increase of marriages and births in years of improving trade and the necessity for a strictly comparable basis. His conclusion appears to be that there has been in most countries little effect that can be directly traced to these causes, while in the case of Germany he writes: "The increase in births attributable to the special measures of National Socialistic Germany is considerably less than the total increase. But there has been, nevertheless, *some* real increase, and the question is—has this been caused by a "psychic rebirth" of the people, or are there more materialistic reasons?"

Such questions relating to the causes that influence births cannot be answered by statistics. But, as is shown abundantly throughout this book, statistics when based on adequate data, can define the problems and put them on a numerical basis, and above all can show the trends of population and their modification as the relevant factors change. But the data are not adequate for the past and are only now becoming adequate for the present and future. The Population (Statistics) Act of England and Wales, 1938, is the kind of measure that will provide some of the necessary information; the use to which it can be put is well shown by Mr. Grebenik in the forthcoming issue of the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*. Meanwhile all students of population questions will turn to Mr. Glass's book when they wish to learn in detail the tendencies of opinion, and the many measures that have been tried to influence population or to lighten the burdens of parents, or to become familiar with the mass of literature on these subjects.

A. L. BOWLEY.

BOOK REVIEWS

FEDERATION AND WORLD ORDER. By DUNCAN and ELIZABETH WILSON. (Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1939. pp. 184. 2s. 9d.)

FEDERAL UNION. A Symposium. Edited by M. CHANNING-PEARCE. Jonathan Cape. 1940. pp. 336. 10s. 6d.)

A FEDERATION FOR WESTERN EUROPE. By W. IVOR JENNINGS. (Cambridge University Press. 1940. pp. 196. 3s. 6d.)

THESE three books were written at a time when the discussion and the formulation of the war aims of the Allies was regarded as a task both practicable and urgent. The tempo of the military operations in that period allowed a more leisurely preoccupation with these problems than has been physically and psychologically possible at a later stage of the war. In the summer of 1940 the sudden impact of events brought sharply into relief the principle of "first things first." The schemes of world order rampant during the winter of 1939 tended to act as an irritating reminder of what was thought to have been an unpardonably easy-going attitude of mind not at all confined to official circles. That impatience is excusable so long as it is not accompanied by the cynical condescension of self-styled realists. However, in a war waged in defence of values transcending the interests of any single State the problem of the world which will emerge after the conclusion of hostilities is not a matter which can be left indefinitely in abeyance. Thus viewed, any consideration of "war aims" in relation to the future of international organisation is not merely an affirmation of our faith in the outcome of the struggle. It is an essential part of reconstruction, and it is not improbable that the Government of this country will be increasingly inclined to consider it as such.

Federation and World Order, by Duncan and Elizabeth Wilson, was written in the summer of 1939. The principal object of the book is to give a description of the working of the Federal institutions in the United States of America, in Canada, and in Australia. This task the authors have performed in a lucid and accurate manner. The concluding chapter of the book is a plea in favour of a Federation embracing the countries of Western Europe, the British Dominions and the United States.

The Symposium edited by Mr. Channing-Pearce is a representative and well-arranged collection of articles the cumulative effect of which is illuminating and suggestive. In the introductory part Mr. Mousley analyses the meaning of Federation, Mr. Duncan Wilson surveys the history of Federation, and Dr. Jennings gives a general account of Federal constitutions. In the second part Federation is examined in its relation to religion (Professor Grensted), to psychology (Dr. William Brown), to culture (Mr. Priestley), to science (Sir John Boyd Orr), to education (Mr. Harlow), to socialism (Dr. Stapledon), to democracy (Mr. Curry), to sociology (Mr. Mackay) and to its general pre-conditions

(Mr. Middleton-Murray). Part III is devoted to *Federation in Practice*, and includes articles by Professor Robbins (Economic Aspects), Professor Keeton (India), Dr. Schwarzenberger (Colonial Problem), Mr. Horsfall Carter (Communications), Major-General Sir Henry Thuillier (Defence), Dr. Maxwell Garnett (League of Nations), and Mr. Patrick Ransome (International Law). In the final part Mr. Jameson, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Jacks discuss Federation in relation to the problems which will face European States after the conclusion of the war.

Dr. Jennings's book is the most important contribution yet made to the literature on the subject in this country and is likely to remain so for some time. Dr. Jennings is indeed well qualified to put before the British public the first complete draft of a Western European Federal constitution. He is one of the most distinguished English constitutional lawyers. He has a specialised knowledge of the constitutions of the other members of the British commonwealth of nations. His numerous and authoritative publications on various aspects of local government and on the working of the British political system show that he is no mere academic writer. His knowledge of general jurisprudence and of international law are a guarantee of his ability to take a wide view of the problem of inter-state Federation. The present book, although slender in bulk, is packed with close argument. It is written in an easy personal style, but it is clearly addressed to the reader who possesses some grounding in political science and constitutional law. When the learned author submits that as the result of the establishment of the Federation as proposed "the Statute of Westminster of 1931 would not be amended even by the omission of a comma" (p. 34) he assumes some preliminary knowledge on the part of the reader.

The principal—and most useful and refreshing—feature of this book is the absence of propagandist tendencies and the distinctly tentative character of the suggestions made by the author. His purpose is to examine the feasibility of the proposed federation as a working system. He does it by means of a draft of a Federal constitution on which the book is in the nature of reasoned comment. There is no trace of pedantry in his submissions—so much so that on occasions the reader wonders whether the author has not gone too far in sweet reasonableness and in contemplation of alternative solutions. Thus while the suggested Federation is one of democratic States of Western Europe—with the possibility of adhesion of Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia—the author thinks that "it is not the inevitable conclusion that totalitarian States must be excluded from the Federation and that "one would make many compromises in order to bring in Italy, Spain and Portugal" (p. 18). His final conclusion is that the Federation must be composed of democracies only. However, his views on the possibilities of Federal control over the maintenance

of democratic institutions and the respect of fundamental rights of the individual show once more what some will regard as an excess of accommodation to supposed practical difficulties. His conclusion is against the insertion in the Constitution of a Bill of Rights designed to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual. It is to be doubted whether his reasons for doing so will command general acceptance. The difficulties and delays of judicial review are not a convincing argument; they apply equally to other aspects of the interpretation of the Federal constitution. The suggested limited power of disallowance to be wielded in this matter by the Council of Ministers is hardly an adequate safeguard of what many will regard as being, ultimately, the fundamental purpose of the Federation.

However, in this as in other matters the author's submissions are intended merely as a starting-point for discussion. The reader is constantly assisted by a full presentation of alternative solutions. This applies in particular to the discussion of the relation of the British Commonwealth of Nations to the proposed Federation and of the solution of the colonial problem. The author analyses in detail the alternatives of the restoration of German colonies to their former owner and of the out-and-out transfer of some or all colonies to the Federation as a whole. He rejects these alternatives in favour of a qualified retention of colonial territories by the States now responsible for their administration subject to compliance with certain principles of trusteeship in the interest of the native population and other States. His proposals for a Colonial Commission charged with extensive powers for the supervision and execution of these principles merit serious consideration. The same applies to his proposed solution of the problem of the Federal Council and to his detailed scheme for the establishment of a People's (or, perhaps, Peoples') House composed of representatives directly elected on the basis of proportional representation in Federated States organised as single constituencies and of a States' House elected in accordance with provisions enacted by each Federated State. In the economic sphere the author proposes a transitional period of Federal supervision and power of disallowance to precede the full assumption of Federal control. In the field of foreign relations Dr. Jennings's draft does not contemplate the entire disappearance of the international personality of the Federal States, including the right of legation and of concluding treaties. Some will think that it is possible and advisable to go much further in the direction of leaving intact the international status of the members of the Federation and that joint defence does not necessarily imply a joint foreign policy in all or even in principal directions. In this respect the principle of a "League" or of a "Confederation of States" are likely to be of much usefulness in every future discussion of the subject. In the matter of the relation of the Federation

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to the League of Nations, Dr. Jennings is clear and emphatic. The reviewer knows of no better exposition within a shorter space of the compatibility—indeed of the necessity—of the co-existence of these two types of international organisation. In Dr. Jennings's view a powerful Federation of Western Europe will mean a stronger League able to devote itself more effectively than hitherto to the fulfilment of its essential purpose. He envisages continued representation of the federated States in the Assembly coupled with an exclusive representation of the Federation on the Council. There is probably no reason why the latter should not be a joint and variable representation composed of several members of the Federation.

Dr. Jennings admits that his book is not concerned with the political and psychological difficulties of a full Federal system between hitherto sovereign States. He assumes that this task has already been effectively performed by others. There are many who challenge that assumption and who believe that a reformed and strengthened League, approaching in many respects a Federal system, is still an object worthy of pursuance as the principal outcome of the second World War. However, even they will admit the usefulness of weighty contributions of the calibre of Dr. Jennings's book.

H. LAUTERPACHT.

THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MANCHESTER. By ARTHUR REDFORD, assisted by INA STAFFORD RUSSELL. Vol. I: Manor and Township (xvi and 392 pp.). Vol. II: Borough and City (viii and 467 pp.). Vol. III: The Last Half Century (viii and 433 pp.). London: Longmans, Green & Co. 21s. each volume.

MANCHESTER is perhaps the most self-conscious of all our local authorities. Sir Ernest and Lady Simon, who played such a large part in the government of the city, have by their writings made us think of provincial local government in Mancunian terms. Now the City Council itself has provided a three-decker "autobiography" in celebration of the centenary of its incorporation. Like most autobiographies on the grand scale, it is apt to be dull. Particularly is this true of the third volume, where the party conflict appears to be stilled and the interplay of personalities is not allowed to show itself through the conflict of anonymous committees. Dr. Redford tells us that no attempt has been made, either by the City Council or by any servant of the corporation, to influence his judgment or to censor his work. Nor is it necessary to explain the dullness of the third volume as an excess of discretion on the part of the editor. Partly, the subject itself is dull, because the slow development of services already established is by no means so interesting as the initial grappling with

BOOK REVIEWS

immense problems. Partly, too, the nature of the material is to blame. The reports of committees and the minutes of the Council are the inevitable source of information, and official drafting is capable of converting the most exciting disputes into prosaic records. This does not explain, however, the almost complete disappearance of the political element in the later stages of the history, for we know very well that there have been as acute political controversies in Manchester as elsewhere. The explanation seems to be that Dr. Redford was more interested in the development of the services as such than in the political and personal controversies which produced the development. Each section dealing with the period since 1870 contains a chapter on administrative machinery, but these are the least effective chapters. However, the subject is so vast that no single author could produce the necessary expertise on all branches of it, and if the author had been a student of politics or administration it is certain that many other parts of the history would have been much less well done, particularly in the first half of the second volume. Dr. Redford has had two great advantages, a knowledge of the social and economic background, and a knowledge of Manchester itself. In addition, he and his collaborator have worked over their vast masses of material with all the care of professional historians. Though the reader is left with no knowledge of the development of the electorate, of the relations between councillors and the people, or of the relations between councillors themselves in the later period, and with little knowledge of the essential administrative problems (so admirably described by Sir Ernest Simon at a particular stage of the history), he has many other things for which he must be grateful to the City of Manchester and the author.

It is impossible in a review to give a full account of these massive volumes. The earlier history, up to the agitation for incorporation, proves once more how impossible it is to generalise about town government before the Municipal Corporations Act. The history of manorial government in Manchester is peculiar; nor is generalisation possible about government under special statutory bodies. On several points Dr. Redford corrects the statements of the Webbs, in so far as they apply to Manchester; and it is obvious that, in spite of the efforts of the Webbs, too little attention has been paid by the historians of the Industrial Revolution to the operations of statutory authorities for special purposes. In fact, Part II of the first volume, which deals with Manchester under the police commissioners, shares with Part I of the second volume, which deals with the thirty years after incorporation, the distinction of being the most interesting portion of the book.

Manchester in the hungry forties has long ago achieved notoriety through the writings of Engels and the reports of the commissioners which preceded the Public Health Act of 1848. A few picturesque

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

details are added, but the only correction which Dr. Redford makes is that Manchester probably was no worse than the other great industrial towns. What he does make clear, however, is the immensity of the task and the great efforts made, with very little initial success, to deal with it. He proves once more by implication (for there is little about the general political background) that the great reforms of the middle of the nineteenth century were effected not by national politicians but by the courage of forgotten local councillors and the ingenuity of local officials who had to face technical difficulties long before a professional technique had been developed. There was, for instance, John Francis, "general surveyor" to the Paving and Soughing Department, who introduced "egg-shaped tubes or pipes of glazed stoneware or baked fire-clay" in place of the older brick sewers, and fire-brick stench traps in place of the old iron traps. Of the same kind was J. F. Bateman, who superintended the first great waterworks scheme. The result was that by the middle of the century Manchester had gone a little way towards justifying Disraeli's remark in 1844 that "Manchester is as great a human exploit as Athens." The great cotton famine interrupted development and provided the first great experiment in "public works" (with the now customary lack of success). After 1870 the city forged ahead with amazing vigour. The relics of the manorial system were abolished, boundaries were extended, though not as they ought to have been (and one would like an equally impartial history written from the Salford angle), the Thirlmere scheme was begun, the Ship Canal started, and a main drainage system laid down. These were great achievements for a single generation which could count on no assistance from Whitehall and more opposition than anything else from Westminster. All this time, too, the city had been operating a highly successful municipal gas undertaking started by the police commissioners as long ago as 1807.

The striking fact is that all this and many other things were done not under general legislation but under local Act powers. In the latest period, however, Whitehall and Westminster have in some respects led the way—precisely in what degree does not appear from the third volume, because Dr. Redford does not appear to be very familiar with the legislative activity of the late nineteenth century and above all of the present century. In respect of housing law, for instance, he is sometimes quite wrong. The general result seems to be that the general legislation—for instance, in respect of road traffic and housing—enabled Manchester to take action which otherwise it could not have taken. The dependence upon Exchequer grants, however, especially in the depression after 1920, imposed a Whitehall brake upon local activity. Manchester has generally been accused of "generous administration," and in some respects it was ahead of Whitehall opinion. The history gives the appearance of slowness in dealing with the urgent problems of the

BOOK REVIEWS

twentieth century, but it is probable that other authorities would give an even more emphatic impression of dawdling.

The fact is that the history of local government during the past hundred years cannot be written until many more local authorities follow the admirable example of the Manchester City Council. Hitherto, there has been too much emphasis on the Whitehall and Westminster end. The completion of the Webbs' work is too vast a task for any individual or even an equally industrious partnership. Until the Manchester example is generally copied the material will not be available, and we must be profoundly grateful that in this as in many other respects Manchester has shown the way.

W. IVOR JENNINGS.

RECENT REVELATIONS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY. By G. P. GOOCH. *Fourth edition. (Longmans. 10s.)*

THE WAR CRISIS IN BERLIN, JULY-AUGUST, 1914. By SIR HORACE RUMBOLD. *(Constable. 18s.)*

LIFE AND LETTERS OF THE RT. HON. SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, K.G., P.C., M.P. Vol. II. By SIR CHARLES PETRIE, Bart. *(Cassell. 16s.)*

GUSTAV STRESEMANN; HIS DIARIES, LETTERS, AND PAPERS. Vol. III. *Edited and translated by ERIC SUTTON. (Macmillan. 25s.)*

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. By A. BERRIEDALE KEITH. *(Nelson. 12s. 6d.)*

TO read these five books, one after the other, with concentration in the middle of the War for Britain is a somewhat difficult but extremely illuminating experience. For they display in detail the grim pageant of diplomacy, international relations, and war, year by year, from 1888 to 1940. None of them are easy books to read—and not all of them are good books—but they fit together like bits of a jig-saw puzzle, and when the final picture is pieced together, one feels that one has really learnt something from it about the trend of international politics and the reasons why Europeans have suffered the curse of a great war twice in a generation. There are two crucial bits in the puzzle: one is the year 1914 and the causes of and responsibility for the first war; the other is the years 1926 to 1929 during which hopes of peaceful collaboration between Germany and France, which the Locarno treaties and the Thoiry conversations of Stresemann and Briand had raised, wilted and died.

Dr. Gooch's volume is invaluable for study of the first problem. It is now in its fourth edition and the new edition is almost a new book. Its predecessor was published in 1930, and Dr. Gooch has revised and enlarged it, omitting a good deal in order to make room for important material published during the last ten years. Though the period covered begins in 1888 and ends with the signing of peace

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

in 1919, the material dealt with is restricted to what has been published since 1914. It provides a kind of super-bibliography for the historian who wishes to unravel the causes of the 1914 war, and therefore of the 1939 war, for the seeds which blossomed in 1939 were sown in 1914. How deep the connection goes is shown by the importance which the question of "war-guilt" assumed in Nazi propaganda. In a sense the whole of this volume and 90 per cent of the volumes which it reviews are concerned with war-guilt, and it is therefore the subject of the short concluding chapter in which Dr. Gooch himself reflects upon the meaning of the documents which he has surveyed. He holds that "the war was the child of the European anarchy, of the outworn system of sovereign states." There can be no doubt that this is true in the broadest sense. But that does not mean that all the governments of the Great Powers were equally responsible for the outbreak of the 1914 war. It may be "a mistake," as Dr. Gooch says, "to attribute exceptional depravity to any of the governments which, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, stumbled and staggered into war," but it is difficult to examine the evidence of the documents and of Dr. Gooch's own pages without forming the opinion that it was the policy and actions of the Austrian and German governments which actually caused the outbreak of war, just as it was their policy and actions which more than once in the previous decade brought Europe very near to the catastrophe. The fact that ultimately a bad international system produces war does not mean that all governments were equally responsible for its outbreak in 1914 nor that the Polish, German and Norwegian governments are all equally responsible for its successor.

Sir Horace Rumbold's book covers the negotiations between the murder of the Archduke and the outbreak of war. He was during that period Counsellor of the British Embassy in Berlin. He does not add any very important material to the immense volume of evidence, but it is an interesting and reliable account of the events of July. It contains some vivid personal impressions, for instance of the attack upon the Embassy by the Berlin mob in the evening when it became known that Great Britain had entered the war. Sir Horace appends to the book a despatch which he sent to the Foreign Office in 1933 when Ambassador in Berlin and in which he gave a clear account of Nazi philosophy and indicated the danger of their policy to the peace of Europe.

The main interest in the volumes which deal with Austen Chamberlain and Stresemann concerns the few years which followed Locarno. Both statesmen were intimately connected with those events. The German was a far more considerable figure than the Englishman and for the study of that crucial period his papers are much more important than the second volume of Chamberlain's life. They are in fact essential to an understanding of why the conversations between Stresemann and

BOOK REVIEWS

Briand at Thoiry, which at the time seemed to contain the seed of great things, bore no fruit. Their sterility, as we can now see, paved the road for Hitler and the march of the Nazi hosts to war. Here again is raised a new question of "war-guilt." The guilt is shared by the French reactionaries who hamstrung Briand and their opposite numbers in Germany who thwarted Stresemann. The failure of appeasement policy during these years was also partly due to the fact that Stresemann, though a considerable figure, was not himself quite big enough—and, perhaps, honest enough—to deal with the situation. And Chamberlain, too, cannot escape responsibility. The effect of his wooden attitude at Geneva and his stubborn determination that Britain should be saddled with "no further commitments," a policy fatal at that moment to the establishment of European peace, are well shown in a note written by Stresemann in October, 1927. And if anyone wishes to learn how blind a statesman like Chamberlain can be and how his prophecies are flatly contradicted by events, let him study the following passage in a letter in which he explained in 1925 to Lord Crewe his reasons for rejecting the Protocol and implicitly the obligations of the Covenant and collective security:

"Yet I am firmly convinced that the true line of progress is to proceed from the particular to the general, and not, as has hitherto been embodied in Covenant and Protocol, to reverse the process and attempt to eliminate the particular by the general. A form of guarantee which is so general that we undertake exactly the same obligations in defence, shall I say of the Polish Corridor (for which no British Government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a grenadier) as we extend to those international arrangements or conditions on which, as our history shows, our national existence depends, is a guarantee so wide and general that it carries no conviction whatever and gives no sense of security to those who are concerned in our action."

Professor Keith's volume carries the story down to 1940. It is full of facts and contains a narrative of the chief events which led to the rise of Hitler and his triumphal progress into war. It is enlivened by Professor Keith's hard-hitting methods of dealing with persons and history. He writes as if his chief pleasure in writing is to deliver a knock-out blow to someone or something. But as his blows are too often directed by prejudice, his book is not remarkable for impartiality.

LEONARD WOOLF.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

MODERN TURKEY. JOHN PARKER, M.P., AND CHARLES SMITH.

(Routledge. 12s. 6d.)

TURKEY AT THE STRAITS. JAMES T. SHOTWELL AND FRANCIS DEÁK.

(Macmillan. 8s. 6d.)

MODERN TURKEY is a sober and accurate analysis of the social progress made under the Kemalist régime, extremely valuable for the facts it provides, though it fails to create a vivid picture either of modern Turkey or of the personality of Kemal.

Its main interest is, of course, the contrast, never explicitly drawn, between the results of Kemalism as a policy of social and economic regeneration, and the results of Stalinism. In essentials the Russian and Turkish economic policies had to deal with the same conditions—a primitive and backward peasantry, backward industry, and a low rate of capital accumulation. Measured in terms of output, Turkey has been more successful in dealing with this situation, in that the standard of living has indubitably risen. Industrialisation has proceeded fast, but without the loss of all standards of labour regulation. The cultivated area has been doubled—an astonishing achievement, since in the U.S.S.R., in spite of the impressive facade of mechanised farming, it has only increased by 25 per cent.

But the two régimes used very different ideologies as their motive power, and in consequence used different methods of capital creation. How far can we draw any conclusion about their respective merits? The Russian Five Years Plan was a policy of industrialisation in isolation, and hence the whole burden of capital creation had to be borne by the present generation, which involved a degree of privation which only a despotic or idealistic social order could have borne. In its beginnings, even up to about 1936, no one who breathed the air of Russia could doubt the power of the communist ideal to transform economic life by inducing a readiness to sacrifice immediate benefits for the sake of constructing a communist industrial system. But because communist ideology is in essentials fatalistic, blind faith in Communism degenerated into blind devotion to Stalin, and the final result has been a failure of the isolationist policy, since Russia's economic progress is now linked up with German industrialism.

For Kemal, by contrast, the liberating ideal was Westernism, and hence foreign loans were the chief means of building up the new Turkey out of the degenerate Ottoman Empire, through a system of State-controlled capitalism, which aimed at the erection of an egalitarian and liberal social order. The result has been a more marked immediate rise in the standard of living, which may facilitate a higher rate of internal capital accumulation in the future. It would have added greatly to the value of this book if the authors had estimated the effects of these contrasted policies on the standards of living.

BOOK REVIEWS

In their chapter on foreign policy, the authors deal far too briefly with the significance of Kemalism in relation to the Near and Middle East. Kemal did not carry through a class revolution, since the landlords who own the bulk of the land on the coastal fringe have never been expropriated. But in a primitive society in which capitalism has not evolved, class revolution has less social significance than revolt against the sovereignty of custom and tradition. The book brings home the paradox that at a time when the West is losing faith in its own values, the Near East has found belief in Western civilisation a potent instrument of social regeneration, and the success of Kemal's ruthlessness in destroying the sovereignty of custom suggests that Westernism in Kemal's sense may satisfy the aspirations of the East better than the false Orientalism of Indian nationalism. British rule in the East can never act as the same regenerating force, because the British ruling class, itself lacking conviction in the values of Western civilisation, can never risk the results of breaking down the tyranny of custom, as Kemal could. Had the authors considered the repercussions of Kemalism on Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the book would have thrown far more light on the part that Turkey might play in the Near East after the war, since at the moment it is the only State in Eastern Europe or the Near East with an independent and stable foreign policy, and British policy has undoubtedly toyed with the idea of using Turkey as a rallying point for a Near Eastern offensive.

Turkey at the Straits is a crudely compiled history of the strategic position, interesting only for the account of the way in which Turkey rid herself of the bondage of the peace treaties, without aggression.

DOREEN WARRINER.

EVACUATION SURVEY. By RICHARD PADLEY and MARGARET COLE.

(Routledge. 10s. 6d.)

WHEN the social history of the war comes to be written information about evacuation which is, at present, buried in the files of local authorities and of the central government will be available, and a final judgment will be possible on what has proved to be one of the most momentous happenings on the Home Front. Pending that time, this survey, carried out by the Fabian Society, gives a most valuable and interesting contemporary account of a movement designed as a purely military measure, but changed by circumstances into a sociological experiment which will leave its mark on innumerable aspects of our social life. It proved that the statement made many years ago that one half of the nation does not know how the other lives, was still true in September, 1939, but fortunately is no longer true. Comfortably circumstanced people, who are apt to object

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Some countries, such as France and Germany, have come to attain at the highest degree of self-sufficiency in food production, through mutual distrust and the fear of war. This has involved a system of tariffs to influence the nature and the volume of production in the directions desired. Thus, the great sugar-beet industry became possible, notwithstanding that the sugar-cane could provide the world with all its sugar requirements at lower cost. Thus France was self-sufficing in wheat and was sometimes an exporter of it, although, as Mr. Yates points out, its yields per unit of land were the lowest, almost, of any Western European country. Germany and France alike felt that the only thing that mattered was to make themselves as independent as they could of imported food supplies, although this could only be secured at the cost of their export trade or of their standard of living.

Other countries, with lesser opportunity for industrial development, of which Denmark was a conspicuous example, had nothing to protect agriculture against. On the contrary, their principal means of securing foreign exchange was the export of agricultural produce, and they developed a rural economy which exploited, on the one hand, the countries which could deliver them cheap cereals, and on the other hand, those which could offer markets for high-priced dairy products. For non-industrial countries it was an admirable system, and the rising prosperity of Denmark during the last two generations bore witness to it. Its weakness was exposed when Britain abandoned free trade in food some ten years ago, and the principal market for the products of Denmark, Holland, and other countries was no longer unrestricted.

Again, there is Britain, unique in Western Europe, in that in it agriculture received no special consideration, and for nearly a hundred years it had been left to find its own level in competition with the British manufacturers of goods for export, paid for in cheap food. Under this standard, employment on the land was necessarily low, but the standard of living was high. Between this philosophy and the French ideal of a hundred per cent self-sufficiency in food, every shade of policy could be found in Western European states, according to the dictates of political necessity or the extent to which other natural resources could be developed in them.

None of these countries has ever felt sufficiently secure to follow Britain in its decision, years ago, to run the risk of dependence upon sources of cheaper food supplies to be found outside itself. Mr. Yates points out that the food requirements of the world could be produced at far less expenditure of human energy than that which is devoted to it at present, but that countries are held back by the fear of war, the danger of unemployment, and by the all pervading worship of the peasant. While nationalism is rampant, the first deterrent to efficiency in food production is inevitable and the same cause is responsible, in a

BOOK REVIEWS

large measure, for recurrent unemployment in industry. But the idea that there is some peculiar virtue in small-scale organisation in food production which is not apparent in any other human activity is as strong in industrial England, with its recurrent failures to bring about the close settlement of the land, as it is in Denmark or Flanders, where there are no alternative occupations for the people.

Mr. Yates has placed students of political economy in Western Europe very much in his debt by this study of comparative agriculture. It is fear and mistrust, he says, not lack of opportunity or of natural resources or of a colonial empire, which prevent the rule of reason and keep men and nations poor. If this was true when Mr. Yates was engaged upon his survey before the outbreak of the present war—and who can doubt it?—what chances are there, now, for the breakdown of barriers and for the establishment of a sane order in human affairs?

The science of nutrition has advanced a long way since the first discovery by Sir Gowland Hopkins of the part played by vitamins in human dietaries, and Mr. Smith's survey of our food supplies is based mainly upon the nutritional requirements of the people. Most of it was made before the outbreak of the present war and it deals with the need for a food policy for the nation aimed at securing the standard of nutrition for everybody upon which scientists are now agreed. In an addendum to his main study, Mr. Smith deals with the minimum requirements of the nation at war. His work deals also with the reorganisation for production and distribution which would be necessary to give effect to a more scientific system of national feeding, and Mr. Smith advocates a great extension of the co-operative principle, both in production and in retail distribution.

C. S. ORWIN.

THE JEWISH WAR FRONT. By VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

IF ever there was a war in which Jews were concerned, body and soul, this is it. Every thinking Jew knows that for him a German victory is the end, and should passionately desire a share in the struggle on the side of Britain. But what will a British victory bring to the Jews? To this no official answer has yet been given.

Mr. Jabotinsky, the leader of the extreme nationalist wing of the Zionists, who has just died in New York, devotes his book to this subject. He pleads, as an immediate course of action, that Jews should be allowed to fight in special Jewish units, and further, that the future of the Jewish nation should be clearly included in the British war aims. The Jewish Legion which he visualises, would have, as its core, the 100,000 Palestinian Jews of military age who have already volunteered their services. Every offer to create such a Legion has been turned

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The first recounts a conversation between a German and a Dutchman: the German boasts of the greatness of the Third Reich, its power, its future. "It is true," replies the Dutchman, "we are a small people without a great future, but when early in the morning we hear a loud knocking at the door, we *know* it is only the milk." The second anecdote illustrates the danger of talking politics in Germany. Three men were sitting on a bench, one of whom was reading a paper. He said "Tch! Tch!" The second man picked up the paper, looked at it and said "Tch! Tch!" The third man rose to his feet and said, "If you fellows are going to commit the dangerous folly of talking politics, I'm off!"

In England the Press is politically free; in Germany the Press is gagged—there is no single opposition newspaper. In England Parliament is free; in Germany the Reichstag meets for the sole purpose of applauding on the rare occasions when Hitler deigns to make a speech to them. In Britain the leader of His Majesty's Opposition is a personage of importance treated with respect only less than that accorded to the Prime Minister. Where are the leaders of the opposition to Hitler in Germany to-day? Mostly dead or exiled; Schuschnigg is being slowly tortured to death.

The treatment of minorities is one of the best tests of liberty. The ruthless persecution of the Jews by Hitler sets up a new world record in intolerance: his treatment of Austrians, Czechs, and other minorities is only less relentless. The classic case of liberty and equality for minorities is Switzerland, where the rights of the Catholic and French minorities are as carefully safeguarded as those of the German-speaking majority. During the last war the German-speaking majority allowed the minority parties, French and Italian, who only had 30 per cent of the voting power between them, an actual majority of four out of seven places in the Cabinet.

DEMOCRACY AND NAZISM

It is not always realised that the treatment by England of its Scottish minority is at least as good as the Swiss case. I well remember whenever we had dealt in the House of Commons with an English Housing Bill, the House then proceeded to spend two or three days discussing a similar but separate Scottish Bill, with the sole object, so far as I could see—and certainly with the result—of giving a larger subsidy from the general taxes to the Scottish houses than to the English ones! And since 1867, when England may be said to have become a democracy, there have been twelve prime ministers, no less than six of whom have been Scotch, and one Welsh.

JUSTICE

If liberty is in men's minds the basis of civilisation, law is the basis of liberty. As Luigi Sturzo said: "The protection of a law common to all, without distinction of race or opinion, is the first, the lowest rung of freedom. If this no longer exists, a country has no right to call itself civilised or Christian."

The best statement I know of the importance of law to civilisation is in a brilliant chapter entitled "The Struggle for Law" in Walter Lippmann's book "The Good Society," from which the following is largely taken.

Lippmann distinguishes two schools of thought: first, the belief in the supremacy of man over man. This is the belief of tyrants and oligarchs: "It is the legalism of the barbarian, for every man, until he has been taught differently, is predisposed to believe that what he wills should have the force of law."

The other school of thought holds that "the idea of arbitrary power exercised at the wilful discretion of any man is alien to the very conception of civilised society. . . . That there is a law which is superior to kings, parliaments, magnates, majorities and mobs. . . . And that the gradual

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

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None of these countries has ever felt sufficiently secure to follow Britain in its decision, years ago, to run the risk of dependence upon sources of cheaper food supplies to be found outside itself. Mr. Yates points out that the food requirements of the world could be produced at far less expenditure of human energy than that which is devoted to it at present, but that countries are held back by the fear of war, the danger of unemployment, and by the all-pervading worship of the peasant. While nationalism is rampant, the first deterrent to efficiency in food production is inevitable and the same cause is responsible, in a

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY


down and the author insists that this is a deliberate policy in order to avoid future Jewish claims. What will these claims be—how is the everlasting Jewish problem to be solved? According to Mr. Jabotinsky, by a Jewish State in Palestine to absorb millions of immigrants and so relieve the pressure in Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe will then agree to be bound by a "Covenant of Equality," eschewing all racial discrimination.

A Jewish Legion has—from the Jewish point of view—much to commend it. It would be the natural focus for the refugees from many lands, for Palestinian Jewry, and for American Jewish volunteers. It would be a Jewish answer to Hitler and would doubtless command immense enthusiasm. A successful Jewish Legion was created in 1917 and fought in Palestine and Gallipoli. And Mr. Jabotinsky is probably right in claiming that the refusal to face the obligations, which a recognised war effort might involve, is holding Britain back from providing this outlet.

But when it comes to war aims, this book is hopelessly "static." It cannot envisage the world of 1949 as different, in essence, from the world of 1939. The miserable "Jewish problem" will, in Mr. Jabotinsky's view, be unchanged by the war. The same economic difficulties which breed anti-Semitism will survive, and the competition for jobs, which makes the ousting of the Jew inevitable, will remain unrelieved. As for the solution which Russia offers, Mr. Jabotinsky admits that he is so blinded by hatred of Communism that he cannot think clearly on this point, and refuses to consider seriously the only haven in which Continental European Jews have found safety to-day.

If Europe's pre-war misery is immutable, and if Communism as a solution for Jews is too evil even to be discussed, then Mr. Jabotinsky's proposals may be the only plausible alternative. But who, if the shaky world we have known is to continue, would guarantee any "Covenant of Equality," who would dare to hope that a new small Jewish State could survive unmolested for as long as a generation? The problem is insoluble if its context remains unaltered. The whole point of this war is to change the context, to resolve the racial and national hostilities within Europe; it is only so that the racial and national problem of the Jews can also be solved.

RITA HINDEN.



Printed in Great Britain by the Waltham Press Ltd., Manchester 4, for The Political Quarterly Publishing Co., Ltd.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

encroachment of true law upon wilfulness and caprice is the progress of liberty in human affairs. . . ."

Lippmann proceeds to illustrate the slow progress of the struggle for law by showing that in England not more than four hundred years ago, the great mass of the agricultural workers had no access to the King's Courts against the arbitrary power of their lords. But by the early 1600's the emancipation had reached a point where Coke could write:

"But now copiholders stand upon a sure ground, now they weigh not their Lord's displeasure, they shake not at every suddaine blaste of wind, they eate, drinke, and sleepe securely; onely drawing a speciall care of the maine chance to perform carefully what duties and services soever their Tenure doth exact, and Custome doth require; then let Lord frowne, the Copy holder cares not, knowing himself safe and not within any danger, for if the Lord's anger grow to expulsion, the Law hath provided severall weapons of remedy; for it is at his election either to sue a Subpena or an Action of Trespass against the Lord."

It is true that the English common law at that period was full of cruelty and injustice, but the essential point is that England had "arrived at the conception of a law governing human affairs which did not originate in the arbitrary fiat of the sovereign."

Locke thought it an evil thing that men should be subject to "the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man," but it is unlikely that he conceived a human will so arbitrary and so evil as that of Hitler.

The most shocking thing in Hitler's Germany is his open and contemptuous defiance of the rule of law. He kills and tortures men who in any way dispute his supreme authority—Protestants, Catholics, socialists, communists, or liberals; he even kills and tortures thousands of men merely because

they are Jews, and because he personally hates them. Not only are his laws unjust, not only does he issue decrees having the force of law without any regard to the usual standards of civilised justice, but the courts have equally little regard to justice in administering the law when the victim is accused of anything contrary to the interests or wishes of the Nazi party. Germany under Hitler has reverted to a state of lawlessness far worse than the worst that existed in England three hundred years ago.

MERCY

If we have to choose a single quality in men that most makes life worth living, it is, of course, love (or mercy, or charity)—the degree of kindness that prevails in the relations of man to man. And it is here that the contrast between Germany and Britain is most startling. One of the reasons why one believes in democracy is that stable democracy seems to make human beings more kindly. There has been plenty of cruelty in Britain in the past. Seven hundred years ago King John tortured Jews to squeeze money out of them. Three hundred years ago witches and heretics were burnt alive. A hundred and fifty years ago Howard's report on prisons at the end of the eighteenth century describes them as undrained, filthy and foul, with little water; bedding consisted of rotten straw, food depended on charity, prisoners were heavily ironed whether felons or awaiting trial. Less than one hundred years ago Matthew Arnold "saw a multitude of children eaten up with disease, half-sized, half-fed, half-clothed, neglected by their parents, without health, without home, without hope."

But during the last one hundred and fifty years there has been an immense growth of humanitarian feeling. Slavery was abolished at a cost of twenty million pounds; the treatment of prisoners, lunatics, paupers and children has