


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
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JOURNAL
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VOL. IX.

OCTOBER, 1939

No. 1

Affection in Orexis

By

P. S. NAIDU,

(*Annamalai University*)

Two eminent psychologists have passed away recently, one at a ripe old age after giving the last finishing touches to his system, and the other at a comparatively early age before giving a well rounded form to his unique psychology. Freud and his psycho-analysis are firmly established institutions in the Western world, while McDougall's Hormic Psychology has yet to fight its way to the front rank. It is true that an outstanding system of psychology cannot be perfected within two decades or so, the period during which McDougall did all his written work ; but when the master-hand has put in patches on the canvas which seem to fit ill with one another, and with the original design, it becomes exceedingly difficult for the disciples to touch up the unfinished parts, and evolve a picture capable of producing unity of impression. Freud's system is luckily free from this unfortunate defect which mars the splendid effects of McDougallian hormism. The founder of psycho-analysis displayed, in the last stages of his scientific career, a tendency to enlarge his list of urges ; but this tendency does not in any sense mar the symmetry of the original system. But, the situation is different in hormic psychology. *The Social Psychology*, *An Outline of Psychology* and *The Energies* represent three distinct stages in the progressive development of the hormic theory, and *The Riddle of Life*, published just before the authors' death, seems to me, to mark a further important stage in the advance. McDougall's mind seems to have been growing

richer and richer, in complexity and inter-relation, right up to the moment of his death, and it is this fact that suggests the pathetic thought to us that had he lived, he would have resolved the many difficulties and clarified the several obscure points in his brilliant system. Of the difficulties present in the fundamentals of the hormic doctrine, I have spoken elsewhere.¹ Here, I shall concern myself with the imperfections of a significant contribution which McDougall has made to psychological theory, namely, the hormic theory of the affective tone of experience.

Professor Flugel's paper² on the subject under discussion is a very valuable contribution to the study of the nature of "Feeling in Hormic Theory." The Professor was, at one time, associated with McDougall very intimately. He has had, in addition, the great advantage of a thorough acquaintance with psycho-analysis. (I hold that hormic psychology stands to gain considerably by affiliation with Freud's system.) Yet the author experiences considerable difficulty in so presenting the hormic theory of affection as to make it embrace all the relevant facts. One wonders whether there is not, in the mind of the professor, a suspicion, lurking somewhere, regarding the validity of the hormic explanation of pleasure. Professor Flugel's final conclusion is that, "It seems on the whole unlikely that the theory of psychological hedonism that once made such vast claims and is now reduced to the doubtful tenure of one tiny fraction of its original territory will hold out permanently even here." This is very encouraging, no doubt, to the supporters of McDougall. But there are discouraging elements in the references, earlier in the paper, to the psychological hedonistic elements in such avowed purposivists as Stout, Ward and Freud and also in James, as well as in the concluding sentence of the essay which runs, "Nevertheless, the fact that it (hedonism) cannot be dislodged is a standing challenge to the hormic psychologist to prove his point in this one matter too (simple sensory feelings), and thus establish his sway over the whole realm of feeling."³ What is the obstacle in the way of a complete and unreserved acceptance of the hormic theory? The difficulty, to some extent at least, is due to the defects inherent in McDougall's system. Barring these defects, we must assert that it is a lack of clear understanding of the peculiar hormic point of view that is responsible for the obstacles encountered even by Professor

1. "On an Extension of McDougall's Hormic Theory" Phil. Quarterly, Vol. xiii, 1937.

2. J. C. Flugel: Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1939, pp. 211-229.

3. J. C. Flugel, Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality, Vol. 7, 1939, p. 229.

Flugel. Hence a determined attempt will be made in this paper to establish the sway of hormic psychology over the whole realm of feeling by such additions to, and elaborations of, the original McDougallian theory as may be found necessary.

In dealing with any psychological problem from the hormic point of view it is necessary to emphasise, at the outset, two important points:

(1) We should never lose sight of the fact that both McDougall and Professor Woodworth stress so frequently, that the substantives used in psychology are really either verbs or adverbs. The substantival usage is a relic of the old faculty psychology.

(2) Though hormic psychology gives great prominence to the innate propensities of the human mind, yet it should be remembered that the immediate activating forces of human behaviour are drawn not from the primitive instincts and emotions, but from the well developed sentiments.

And in dealing with the specific problem of affection, we have to make the following observations:

(1) The affective tone (usually distinguished as pleasure or pain) is a characteristic of behaviour, and is, in consequence, to be treated as an adverb.

(2) There is an affective tone which is the concomitant of behaviour on the higher plane of sentiments, concrete and abstract. There is also another operating on the lower plane where elemental propensities govern behaviour. We should not confuse the one plane with the other.

(3) The affective tone of unpleasantness should not be mistaken for the sensation of pain. When once a clear psychological analysis of pleasantness and unpleasantness has been made, and the meanings of these terms clearly fixed, thereafter there is no excuse for an indiscriminate use of the expressions *pleasantness*, *pleasure*, *feeling* and *affection* to indicate the same quality of experience.

Unfortunately Professor Flugel's paper introduces, at the very opening of the discussion, the very source of confusion that we want to fight against. In a preliminary statement of the hormic position the Professor says, "....conation may be said to be directly attuned to cognition, and not dependent on *affection*."

Where then does *feeling* come in? The hormic theory maintains that *affection*, far from being the cause of conation, is itself dependent on conation. *Pleasant feeling*, it is said, is an accompaniment of

successful conation. . . . all the above writers are agreed that *pleasure* is conditioned by success".⁴

Four different terms, each possessing its own specific shade of meaning, are used here to indicate only one aspect of experience, namely, its affective tone. "Feeling" refers to the totality of the affectively toned experience, from which psychological analysis has isolated the "tone" alone for special investigation. *Pleasant feeling* and *pleasure* are meant to indicate the affective tone of pleasantness, and may, with great advantage, be dropped from our terminology. For the sake of simplicity and clarity of understanding we shall speak of "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness" (remembering that those are adverbs masquerading as substantives) and of "affective tone" as a common term embracing both "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness."

McDougall himself is responsible for the confusion of ideas found in Professor Flugel's paper. In one of his early works he says, ". . . pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action, but at the most of undirected movements; they serve rather to modify instinctive processes. . . ."⁵ Not only is the objectionable word "pleasure" used here, but "pain" is also used as the opposite of "pleasure". In a later work the second defect is set right. The author recognises the difference between pain as a sensation and pain as an unpleasant affective tone.⁶ But the words feeling, and pleasure are used freely. The only means for removing all traces of confusion is to hold fast to the simple terminology mentioned above. It is in this direction that we wish to suggest a slight, but very necessary, improvement on the hormic vocabulary of McDougall.

There is another source of confusion in Professor Flugel's paper for which McDougall is certainly not responsible in any sense. Hormic psychology has laid bare the innate and inherited structure of the human mind. The elemental propensities that constitute the foundation of the structure have been carefully analysed. The mind, however, being dynamic, these elements are in a constant state of synthesis, recombination and decomposition. The fundamental propensities are being steadily built into sentiments, concrete and abstract, of varying degrees of complexity and value. "Man . . . is an assemblage of innumerable elements, bound up in many systems in such a manner that the same element can successively enter a great number

of systems, which are themselves elements in still larger systems; and so on, until we come to the personality regarded as a whole, which should be the greatest system of all, if man's organisation were complete; but it presents a remarkable incoherence, so that the secondary systems are not united in a superior system, and instead of joining and combining they often interfere with one another. This assemblage of systems, which is man, is in relation with the outer world; the impressions which reach him from it, are organised within him, decomposed and recomposed."⁷ Civilised man, in spite of the several centuries of "civilisation" which form his boasted heritage, has not achieved a perfect organisation of his scale of sentiments. His character is yet ill-formed. And so it is that his mental structure which functions now and then on the high level of *cultured* sentiments, often slips down and begins to function on the lower level of primitive propensities. It becomes necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the affective tone of the lower level of experience from that of the higher. Such a distinction was drawn by McDougall in his "Social Psychology". While attempting to distinguish between pleasure and happiness, he raises these two questions, "What is happiness? Is happiness merely pleasure or a sum of pleasures, and if not, what is it?"⁸ and gives the answer that "Pleasure is a qualification of consciousness of momentary duration, or, at most, of a fleeting character, and it arises from some mental process that involves but a mere fragment of one's whole being. . . . Happiness arises from the harmonious operation of all the sentiments of a well-organised and unified personality. . . ."⁹ While this distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness" is clear, and there is no excuse for mistaking the affective tone of the lower "emotional" level of experience with that of the higher "sentiment" level, there is, unfortunately, room for confusion in regard to another aspect of the hormic theory, and for this McDougall is certainly to blame. In the earlier stages of its evolution McDougall's hormic psychology contained a very convincing tri-partite analysis of the instinctive structure of the human mind, with provision for the incorporation of the various psychological aspects of experience. At a later stage the three factors were abridged to two, with consequent loss of clarity and of psychological effectiveness. Professor Flugel approves of this abridgment. He says, ". . . the distinction between affection and conation has proved in many cases more difficult than that between either of these and cognition; hence the increasing use in recent years, at least among British psychologists, of

4. J. C. Flugel, *Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1939, p. 213. (Italics ours).

5. *Social Psychology*, 1936, p. 37.

6. *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 267.

7. Paulhan, *The Laws of Feeling*, London, 1930, p. 140.

8. *Social Psychology*, p. 132.

9. *Social Psychology*, p. 134.

the term "Orexis" to cover both affection and conation as distinguished from cognition."¹⁰ I do not see any merit in merging the colourful emotional aspect of human nature in the conative. On the other hand there is great danger, in this artificial division of experience into the cognitive and the conative parts, of losing sight of the affective tone altogether. In some of my previous papers¹¹ I have argued for the retention of the three-fold analysis of the instinctive structure of mind into the cognitive, affective and conative phases. It is there pointed out that it is in deference to the wishes of his critics, the psycho-pathologists and the middle-of-the-road positionists, that McDougall merged emotion in conation. Such a merger appears to acquire great validity in the light of the incomplete analysis of "sentiments" found in McDougall's works. A very important modification that I suggest of the hormic theory as it emerges from the "Energies of Men" is a return to the position held in "Social Psychology."

Another improvement that is suggested is a clear tri-partite analysis of sentiments, into their cognitive, affective and conative aspects. Two or more instincts enter into an organic unity to generate a sentiment. Just as the emotional components of these elementary instincts merge in the unified "Sentiment," so also the cognitive components unite to produce a single cognitive situation which would serve as the excitant of the emotion, and the conative components result in unified action.

With a hormic theory improved in the manner sketched above we may proceed to discuss the role of affection in orexis. We may start with a provisional definition of the affective tone as given by Professor Patrick. "Pleasure....is the affective tone which accompanies mental and physiological processes when they are normal and healthy, when life is at full tide, when all goes well, and the vital strivings of the individual are being realised.....the elementary things in our soul life are profound impulses or desires, *conations*, as we call them, perhaps the Will-to-live. In his striving after life, full and free, the individual finds the environment sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile. To its friendly contacts nature has added something which we call *pleasure*—a new and wonderful value."¹² The affective tone of pleasantness is the

10. J. C. Flugel, *Feeling and the Hormic Theory, Character and Personality*, Vol. 7, 1939, p. 211.

11. "Some Landmarks in the Evolution of Professor McDougall's Hormic Theory of Emotions," *Phil. Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, 1938.

"A Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments". *This Journal*, Vol. VIII.

12. *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 445.

result of nature's "friendly contact" with the human mind in its fundamental striving after life. It *accompanies the normal and healthy functioning* of all biological and psychological processes.

Starting with this provisional definition, and with an improved hormic theory of the structure of the human mind sketched already, we may proceed to make a critical evaluation of Professor Flugel's estimate of McDougall's "Pleasure-Pain" hypothesis, and through such a critical evaluation arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the rôle of affection in orexis.

The initial approach to the whole problem in Professor Flugel's paper is, in itself, misleading. The question is raised "Do we strive (and therefore act) because we feel? Or do we feel because we strive?" The relationship between conation and feeling is conceived in temporal terms, and the problem is to discover which is the antecedent and which the consequent. *On the hormic theory, the affective tone is neither antecedent to nor consequent on the conative drive, but is concomitant with the smooth and normal functioning of the innate mental structure.* An affective tone is after all the tone of an experience. It is dependent for its very existence upon the concrete experience. How, then, could it have any causal efficacy by itself? The fallacy is due to a misunderstanding of the nature of mental structure. When that structure is understood in terms of the hormic theory, then the question raised at the beginning of this paragraph will cease to have any meaning. It is in the very nature of mental structure to work out its function, and in the course of such functioning the affective tone occurs concomitantly as an integral part of the total experience.

The entire argument and its refutation may be stated in a slightly different way emphasising another aspect of the problem. It is said, by those who have not grasped the full significance of the hormic view of mental structure, that the prior existence of the affective tone of unpleasantness generated by a consciously felt unsatisfied need is an invariable condition for experiencing pleasantness resulting from the progressive satisfaction of the need. The unpleasant pangs of hunger must first be experienced before pleasantness can be generated by the act of enjoying a good meal. Common experience, it is said, justifies this view. We contend that this is a mis-representation of the facts of the case. According to the hormic theory the functioning of the instinctive structure is always affectively toned, either pleasantly or unpleasantly. In the so-called precondition of an unsatisfied need for the experiencing of "pleasure", what has really happened is that the structure has been stimulated, but the functioning is neither normal nor healthy. There is obstruction to smooth working, and is it any wonder that the unpleasant feeling tone

should occur as a concomitant of the hindered experience? As soon as the hindrance is removed, the structure begins to function smoothly and normally, and has therefore a pleasant affective tone. Hence there is no question of an antecedent "pain" for the experience of pleasure. We have either a smooth functioning of innate propensities toned pleasantly, or hindrances to such functioning with an unpleasant affective tone. To say that conation, as such, can exist without any affective tone, and can then give rise to pleasantness or unpleasantness, is not to give a hormic account of experience.

The distinction between "pure" and "impure or mixed" pleasures, which Plato drew long ago in the *Philebus*, and which Professor Joad¹³ upholds is a natural corollary of the mistaken view of the relationship between conation and affection criticised above. An "impure or mixed" pleasure depends on a pre-existing "want" whereas a pure "pleasure" implies no such antecedent "want". "Pure" pleasures are classified into intellectual, aesthetic and sensory. As a consideration of the last type will sweep away the fallacies inherent in the theory under criticism, we shall take it up for discussion first.

Professor Flugel cites "a warm bath," a "pleasing colour" and a "lovely tone"—as examples of pure sensory pleasure. Allen in his book on "Pleasure and Instinct" devotes several chapters to the discussion of the problem that we are now considering. He too draws a distinction between "pleasures and unpleasures which appear to arise directly from bodily conditions, such as the feeling excited by the scent of a rose or by a prick on the skin, by a warm bath or by severe muscular fatigue." and "pleasures" and "unpleasures" connected with such instinctive tendencies as ambition and self-assertion. The two psychologists agree in holding that McDougall's theory is applicable to the second type, but not to the first. "So forced and artificial does the hormic explanation seem in such cases," says the former "that even enthusiastic supporters of the hormic view begin to hedge, and falter when they come to deal with sensory feelings." It must be said that Professor Flugel makes a very laudable attempt to push the hormic theory, as he understands it, as far as possible. ". . . we may suppose that every sensory stimulus. . . . (possessing a marked feeling tone) is a specific excitant of some type of behaviour. Allen too in the chapter entitled "Summary of results"¹⁴, wherein he applies the results of his discussion in the previous chapters to the formulation of a theory of sensory pleasure and unpleasure, says, "Our view is thus that bodily pleasure and unpleasure depend

on an analogue of conation existing in the organism, a *nisus* to maintain, or to carry out to the full extent, the functions proper to the bodily system. They are the results for consciousness of a process of the nature of conation, which has taken place in the nervous system, without the direct co-operation of the conscious self; pleasure being the feeling of the success and smooth working of that process, and unpleasure of its obstructed working." It is evident, therefore, that the only field of experience, the sensory field, which is considered to present some difficulty to the hormic psychologist, may be overcome by a careful analysis of the facts.

Those who assert the immediacy of the affective tone of sensation and of its independence of conation have not grasped the hormic position thoroughly. At any rate, they have not understood the hormic view of the status of cognition. Cognition is an outgrowth of conation in the development of the mind whose structure has been conceived of as being completely instinctual. McDougall¹ has demonstrated, and so have other psychologists of his way of thinking, that intelligence invariably functions in the service of instinct. The development of the cognitive structure of the mind occurs only in the interests of the proper and efficient functioning of the instinctive structure. Sensation and sensory discrimination have no existence apart from conation. While asserting the truth of this position, we should at the same time remind ourselves of two facts connected with the status of sensory experience. The conation which is the basis of a given sensory experience need not be of the elementary type. It may belong to the higher level of sentiment. Then, in the second place, the dependence of a sensory experience on the conative structure of the mind may not be visible on a superficial examination. Often, it will be necessary to apply the psycho-analytic method to reveal such dependence. We should also note that it is wrong to postulate a "want" as the antecedent of a sensory experience and its affective tone.

In the light of the three observations that we have made just now, let us examine the illustrations cited by Professors Flugel and Allen. A warm bath, a sweet tone and a beautiful colour are "pleasant" in themselves. Are they? What would be the affective tone of these sensory experiences, if they were forced upon one suffering from high fever? This fact is recognised by Professor Flugel, and he is prepared to admit that the hormic theory is adequate to the demands made by many of these experiences. But he thinks there are certain simple sensory qualities which baffle the hormic psychologists. Our contention is that they appear to be baffling because cognition is given an independent status which it does not possess. The smell of a rose has been given as an example. To us, in this part of the country, there is another flower whose fragrance has an intensely pleasant affective tone. It is the jasmine.

13. C. E. M. Joad: *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, pp. 64-65.

14. Allen: *Pleasure and Instinct*, p. 62.

The odour emanating from the flower is not pleasant to all people. As a matter of fact Westerners find it rather strong and unpleasant. The extraordinary attractiveness of the smell of jasmine is due to its association with social and religious functions in our life which have a most important and abiding interest for us. The bride and the bridal chamber are unthinkable without jasmine garlands. Love of the most exalted type, human or divine, is inextricably linked with the delightful fragrance of this pure white flower. To my mind the slightest whiff of its smell suggests sometimes consciously but often unconsciously all the gorgeous scenes of marriage or of divine worship on special festive days. Similarly we find that a simple colour or music is associated with deep lying conative tendencies of the human mind. Simple green is not so simple as we seem to imagine. It is restful to the eyes, and has deep physiological effects. To the adult mind it may have a significance stretching far beyond the spectral value which the physicist associates with it. The ancient Hindu aesthetic philosophers studied the effects of these so-called "simple sensations," and reduced their emotional values to some sort of order. Each *raga* or *ragini* has a particular colour scheme associated with it. The reference here is not to synesthesia, but to the excitation of our emotion by a *raga* operating in conjunction with other physical factors which are the natural stimuli for the various sense organs. The *Bhairavi*, (I refer here to the pure and unadulterated Karnatic type, not to the distorted northern type with its Hindustani aberrations), is to me a powerful excitant of the emotion which McDougall calls "Sympathy". So the simple sensory experiences (not excluding such very simple ones as the perception of contours) owe their affective tone to the emotional qualities embedded deep in them. A sensation existing by itself is a psychological myth.

In this connection we may, with profit, remind ourselves of the very valuable work done by the Gestalt psychologists¹⁵ on the nature of the various sensations. When the intensity of a physical stimulus (such as light) is just below the lower threshold of sensation, it has been found that the stimulation of another sense organ (the cochlea, for example) has the effect of producing a visual reaction to the otherwise invisible stimulus. This phenomenon of inter-sensory interaction has been widely investigated, and the results have been used for supporting the Gestaltic position. The concept of the *Gestalt* does receive support from this new field of study, but more than that, we hold that what is behind the Gestalt, namely, the conative drive which generates the Gestalt and holds it together is clearly indicated by the new hypothesis of

structural and functional relationship between sensations. Unity of sensation and the dependence of sensation, even the so called pure and simple sensation, on conation are now becoming established facts.

Our conclusion, then, is that sensory experiences are merely parts of total experiences, wherein conation plays the most significant role.

Before concluding the discussion of this problem and passing on to the next, we wish to point out that several of the obstacles confronting the hormic psychologist will vanish if he would admit the validity of psycho-analysis. Not only the working of the conative structure of the mind at the sub-conscious and the unconscious levels, but also the formation of sentiments and their working at these hidden levels should be recognised. Such an admission will produce a new hormic theory in which the healthy elements of the now conflicting schools could be made to supplement one another and to raise psychology to the level of a respected science.

We shall now consider the significance of the affective tone accompanying aesthetic experience for the theory that is under criticism here. Recent axiological studies in European Philosophy have shed much light on aesthetic problems. The aesthetic "object" has been carefully analysed. The distinction between the "form" and "content of" aesthetic experience has also been drawn. And there have been many noteworthy psychological analyses of aesthetic feeling made recently. Yet in the midst of all this wealth of material, the student of aesthetics finds himself at sea. It is the conviction of the author of this paper that a new orientation to the psychology of aesthetics, a new psychological angle of vision, is urgently needed.

Let us consider, in the first instance, an aesthetic object created by man, a striking picture in water colours or oil, a statue, a piece of poetry, music or a great work of literary art. The "object" is the expression of the entire mental structure of the artist at the time of its production. Unless the artist is producing something to order for the sake of earning a little money, he is creating a new object. What, then, is the relationship between this "object" and the "mind" which creates that object? In the mind of the artist, the elemental propensities have been organised into highly evolved sentiments, unique in structure and exalted in their nature. And an essential characteristic of these sentiments is that they must express themselves. The artist soon discovers that the ordinary channels of expression are inadequate for his unique experience. So he literally creates a new channel, a new "object". Such an "object" strives to appeal to the cultured mind. The aesthetic object is both the product and the excitant of a unique sentiment. If in

15. Hartmann: *Gestalt Psychology*.

the mind of a cultured person, a sentiment identical with or similar to that of which the aesthetic object is both the expression and the excitant, has been formed, then a full-blooded rich aesthetic experience, with its concomitant affective tone, ensues, the intensity of the experience depending upon the degree of similarity existing between the sentiments of the artist and the enjoyer of the "object" produced by the artist. In other words, aesthetic experience is the result of the sympathetic induction of the same emotion in the mind of the on-looker as that which was functioning in the mind of the artist when he created the "object". This theory, based on the hormic sympathetic induction of emotions and sentiments is the only one that seems to fit all the known facts.

McDougall explains how natural objects generate sentiments in us.¹⁶ A great water fall or a terrible volcanic eruption may generate admiration or awe in us. And the region which produces "objects" of our sentiment may easily generate aesthetic objects too.

We have also to consider the question of the aesthetic appreciation of beauty. Does this appreciation stand by itself? Is it *sui generis*? Or, is it merely one aspect of the general aesthetic experience that we have been discussing? In answering these questions, McDougall's distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness" is of great help to us. "Pleasure," we are told is the affective tone concomitant with the working of the lower levels of mental structure, where there is conflict, and happiness the affective tone belonging to the higher organised levels of developed character. Similarly the different aesthetic feelings belong to the lower levels of sentiment formation, while beauty, the appreciation of beauty and the affective tone accompanying such appreciation belong to the highest level of fully organised and unified sentiment.

In aesthetic experience, therefore, there is no question of cognition functioning apart from conation. The aesthetic "object" merely touches off some mental structure and thereafter the mind passes through the whole gamut of experiences familiar to the psychologists.

When we understand the hormic position clearly we find that such statements as "*we are not miserable because we are not listening to music*," become meaningless. For, we have shown clearly that temporal priority in the hormic dynamism of the mind is a myth. There is only concomity, never any priority so far as conation and affection are concerned.

16. *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 333-334.

There is, in Professor Flugel's paper, a very valuable discussion of the nature of the affective tone accompanying the perception of aesthetic form. "Here" says the Professor, "there seems no question of conation in the sense of goal seeking, of the kind that the hormic psychologist is inclined to regard as instinctual." We agree with the professor. There is no goal seeking. But a fundamental confusion has been introduced here between the structure and function of mind. Mental structure is being constantly modified and developed. The modifications are ready to function when the proper stimulus is present. Just because I have mastered type-writing, it does not follow that my fingers should always be seeking to feel the keys and tap them. As I pointed out, when the structure is touched off functioning occurs with the proper affective tone.

A second source of confusion is due to the unjustifiable separation that has been made between cognition and conation. The cognitive function of the mind (the perception of form), according to the hormic theory, is the result of its conative structure.

A third source of confusion is due to McDougall himself. I am merely repeating an observation that I have made already. The pure form of an aesthetic object and the feeling connected with sensory experiences appear to be independent of conation, because hormic psychology has not conceded to psycho-analysis what is due to it. When we recognise the validity of the principles underlying the sub-conscious and the unconscious working of the mind we shall find that the so called "pure" pleasures are grounded in hormic structures.

The intellectual pleasures are not considered here, because Professor Flugel has shown how the hormic principles cover all cases of affective experience relating to this field.

In conclusion, we have no hesitation in asserting that the hormic theory of affective experience is both adequate and sufficient. Difficulties confront only those who have not grasped fully the distinction between structure and function which McDougall stresses in the earlier chapter of his "Outline of Psychology". A felt need, which in itself is unpleasant, has been believed to be the fundamental requisite of behaviour. This position, we contend is untenable and is not the position held by the proper type of hormic psychologist. There need be no "need" at all, either "felt" or "unfelt," as a temporal antecedent of behaviour. The correct hormic position is best expressed in Professor Allen's words. "It is not the case" he says, "that an unpleasant state of want gives the initial impulse and that the agent learns gradually what will satisfy that

want and remove the unpleasure. The picture that presents itself is rather that of an innate capacity, which tends to unfold itself gradually, until the full possibilities inherent in it are realised. This process may be accompanied by pleasure throughout, though this will vary in degree according as progress is more or less equal, and will give way to unpleasure, if progress is at any time held up by some impediment." ¹⁷

Finally, it is not claimed here that the McDougallian form of the hormic theory is perfect in all its details. It does need revision, and extension. But what is claimed is that it is sound at its core.

Some Aspects of Electrical Development in the Madras Presidency*

By

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Electricity and Industry are complementary and to achieve optimum results both must be developed together, a procedure which is not adequately followed in this Province.

Electricity being thus only a phase of industrial development, it is difficult to discuss that part without frequent reference to the whole.

In Madras, hydro-electrical development has probably made more progress in the last decade than in any other part of India. Construction is, however, approaching the demand and, unless special measures are soon taken, the productive capacity may exceed that demand. This is not due to excessive capacity, far from it. It is due to retarded industrial progress as I shall explain later.

There has been a plethora of talk and advice on electrical and industrial development in India, particularly from persons who know little or nothing of the subject, but to-date no comprehensive scheme of planned, co-ordinated, and rational industrial development has been evolved for any Province. So called planning is a fashionable plaything for Governments to-day. It is nothing new, but merely an attempt to introduce into Government the principles of efficient administration and the long range practical judgment, usually followed by technical administrators in successful large scale private enterprises. The first Government to advertise and popularise state planning was Russia but, as well-informed people know, the original efforts were a partial failure due mainly to the somewhat academic nature of the first recommendations, and a lack of proper co-ordination between the various activities.

Even with practical plans available, there is yet another and bigger problem to face, namely that of bringing them to successful fruition.

The consumption of electricity *per capita* is now taken by many countries as an economic index of prosperity, with electrical development as one of the leading industrial activities. Its importance to this

17. *Pleasure and Instinct*, p. 77.

* Inaugural Address of the Economics Association.

Province must, therefore, be emphasized, particularly as there is a marked tendency among a section of the intelligentsia to under-estimate its value to civilisation, a value almost universally recognized.

I read recently in the Technical Press some interesting statistics of the electricity generation and consumption per capita in 18 countries. As it is of such general interest I have had the data extracted. A study of the figures shows that the four leading countries are Norway, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden, and it should be noted that the density of population in each country differs. The per capita consumption ranges from 2760 to 1270 units per annum, and practically all the generation is hydro. The four lowest in the list are Russia, the Argentine, Mexico, and Poland. Japan is also included and stands a little higher in the list than Russia. Large and commercially important countries like India and China are not even mentioned—Why?

An estimate of the total consumption of electricity in India is difficult to obtain, on account of the lack of complete published statistics. As far as can be ascertained, it approximated 2500 millions last year, giving a per capita consumption of 7 units. It is therefore not surprising that India was not included in the list I have just referred to. For this Province the corresponding figure is about 5; yet an agricultural country like the Argentine consumes 156 units. These data are depressing and provide food for careful thought. It may be argued that statistics are misleading, but they are undeniably an indication of relative conditions. Again one may object to using the per capita basis as an argument; yet if the figures are based upon areas, potential wealth, trade etc., the result is still unsatisfactory. Little Belgium with an area of 12,000 square miles, and a population of 8,350,000, generated in 1938, 5,300 millions K.W.H. all by thermal stations, against a total of 203 millions for Madras with a population of 47 millions and an area of 124,363 square miles. Let us even assume that critics might point out that Belgium and Madras are not comparable, then what of our neighbour Mysore. That State has an area of 29,483 square miles, a population of 6½ millions and generated approximately 240 millions in 1937-38 (excluding the energy transmitted to the Kolar Gold Fields, it was about 100 millions). The consumption per capita is thus 37 units. However one reads the statistics or whatever comparisons one makes, the position of this Province is certainly disappointing. The progress of Mysore is not exceptional, it is rather due to an enterprising and progressive state administration. But there seems no practical reason to suppose that our Province, given the proper stimulus, could not only reach the figures of Mysore but exceed them. In fact a consumption of 60 units of electricity per capita for Madras is not an unreasonably high

figure to aim at, but even when attained, we should still occupy a very humble place in the international list already referred to. Yet 60 units, small as it is, represents a total provincial consumption nearly as great as that of the whole of India today and, what is more important, exceeds the probable maximum economic output of the Provincial Water Powers. These are estimated roughly at 400,000 K.W. with a 50 per cent utilisation factor or about 1750 millions annually. With the addition of certain auxiliary thermal plants the utilisation factor of hydro-electricity can be increased. A local example of such a combination is the Papanasam Hydro-Thermal scheme, now under construction.

There is a certain glamour about hydro-electricity, and it is popularly supposed to be cheaper than thermal-electric power. This, however, is not so in all cases. Under certain conditions electricity distributed from thermal stations is lower in cost than that transmitted from hydro-plants. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the relative merits of hydro and thermal electricity in more detail; suffice it to say that it is quite probable that the large scale electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical industries, which will one day be established in India, may be located on or near the coal fields, rather than at a water power site. As far as is known at present there are no really cheap and accessible water powers in India, such as are found in some other countries, particularly Norway and Canada. The rivers are not entirely perennial; need costly storage, and the power sites are far removed from load centres.

What then are the factors which go to make up an economic hydro-electric development in India?

The test of productivity will vary according to local conditions. Such a test would not be very rigid in this Province, as no important coal or oil deposits have yet been discovered, and due regard has also to be given to the fact that the surveyed water powers are only likely to meet the power requirements of the Province for another quarter of a century. Hence a long range view has to be taken and hydro-electric schemes which might be judged uneconomic elsewhere, may prove to be a valuable future asset to this Province.

Any scheme has first of all to be technically feasible, and secondly economically sound, having due regard to the previous remarks. The unit investment should not exceed a pre-determined figure, and there must be an assured market for the output.

The bogey of any large development scheme is heavy capitalisation and fixed charges—mainly interest. Once incurred they remain a bur-

den to the undertaking until the capital is gradually amortised or even partly written off. It is therefore of the highest importance that the capital cost be kept down to a minimum and, to achieve this, the construction work must be expedited and efficiently executed. This requires an adequate and experienced staff with effective supervision which, together, are not always easy to obtain on all Government work. The ponderous and somewhat anachronistic administrative machinery which seems to be associated with many Governments tends to restrict progress and, through lack of official understanding, causes needless delays and inconvenience. Under such conditions works cost more than necessary. Such handicaps should not exist under the Board which I shall refer to later.

The limit of unit investment cost depends upon local conditions, particularly interest rates and cost of power from competitive sources. Experience during the past decade in this Province has indicated that for hydro-electric schemes Rs. 1000 per effective K.W. installed down to the high tension distributing stations is roughly the present economic maximum.

The limit is an inclusive figure and to maintain a proper economic check, it is necessary to restrict to certain proportions the percentages of the investment devoted to generation, transmission and distribution. The unit cost of a scheme may be well below that economic limit but, if the percentage of the capital invested in transmission lines or distribution system is too high, the scheme may prove to be unremunerative.

Once the hydro-electric undertaking is in operation other factors have to be carefully watched. One of the most important is the operating ratio, that is the ratio of operating expenses (which should include depreciation) to gross revenue. This ratio ought in normal circumstances, to be kept down to 33% or lower. Another check is the investment ratio, which determines the limiting conditions under which extensions should be made. This ratio is the minimum gross return required on capital invested in new extensions. It is based upon the operating ratio, fixed charges, and permissible profit. It varies generally from 12½% to 20% for different undertakings and according to local conditions. The lower figure may be considered as the extreme limit, and would only be practicable when taxes and interest rates are low. A highly taxed corporation might conceivably have to adopt a higher ratio than 20 per cent, and thus severely handicap development.

Among other limits, which have to be fixed and checked at intervals, are the ratio of gross revenue to investment and the revenue per

K.W. of demand at certain points. The latter is mainly dependant upon the tariff structure and load factors.

It may well be asked whether electrical development has proved of any material advantage to the Provinces. It is not difficult to rate the direct economic benefits, but the indirect ones are not so easily measurable.

The gross receipts from the sales of electricity are expected to reach half a crore in 1940, and progressively increase if no obstacles are placed in the way of a normal growth of the Department. Seven years ago the receipts were under a lakh.

It is significant that the year before Electricity from Pykara was made generally available in the Coimbatore District, viz., 1933, there were 8 Textile mills; to-day there are 35 in the hydro-electric areas all of which are operated by State electricity. Would such progress have been made without an economic electricity supply together with hire-purchase and conversion facilities? Consensus of opinion says no. This has resulted in increased prosperity to the District as evidenced by:

- Higher land values,
- Extensive new building construction,
- Improved roads, water supply, and other amenities,
- Additional employment, not only in the mills, but in ancillary industries and occupations,
- Increased spending power of the people.

Perhaps two of the most important economic benefits are due to the large replacement of foreign yarn and cloth by the local articles, and the substitution of a large amount of imported oil and coal by State electricity. These items alone would run into many lakhs annually.

It is true that the textile industry is in a somewhat depressed condition at present but, as far as Southern India is concerned, it is not necessarily due to saturation caused by the encouragement of cheap electricity and other facilities unless the spending power of the population has been reduced of late. The annual consumption of cloth per capita is about 16 yards which is considered by many people to be rather low, even for a comparatively poor country like India. Furthermore the imports of yarn, particularly from Japan, are considerable. There is thus no real reason to suppose that saturation point has been reached. It has to be admitted that had the industry been suitably controlled and regulated, it would probably have resulted in larger and more economical units, but even now the economic grouping of the

smaller units under one management should tend to improve the situation.

Apart from textiles there has been an increase in miscellaneous small industries in and around towns.

Rural life has not been neglected either.

The area under cotton in the Coimbatore District alone has increased by 61,000 acres in the last 10 years due to the greater demand of the mills.

Pumping by electricity has enabled many small ryots to dispense with at least one pair of oxen. It has reduced his labour costs as he is now able to cultivate the fields while pumping is in progress; the electric motor, unlike the oxen, does not need constant attention. Furthermore, in some cases, he has been able to increase the acreage under cultivation and the number of crops raised in a year.

Perhaps the greatest benefit from a humanitarian point of view is the decreased number of oxen that have to be maintained, and consequently there are fewer stray and half starved animals on the road side. It is well known that there is not sufficient fodder and food-stuff in the rural districts to keep the large number of working oxen in a reasonably fit condition, and there is practically nothing for the numerous cast-off ones. There are now around 1500 electric pumping units installed in the areas commanded by hydro-electric power representing probably the displacement of at least 2,000 oxen.

An electricity supply has been given to over 150 villages in the Province and a gradual change is noticeable after a few years. There is a tendency to increased cleanliness. People do not retire so early at night, but take a greater interest in reading and discussing the questions of the day, while the cinema and radio have supplemented electricity in improving the outlook on life of the average villager.

Electricity is supplanting imported kerosene for illumination and gradually becoming a servant of the people. Perhaps one of the greatest benefits that the electric motor is conferring on village life is to relieve the housewife of much of her erstwhile drudgery. Women are no longer obliged to spend a large part of their time grinding various articles of food, baling water, and attending to other arduous duties. The grinding can be done better by an electric motor installed at a local mill, while the water can be obtained from the electrified village well. The electric motor is thus bringing a more civilised atmosphere into the household and allowing women more time to devote to their home and

children, which must result in a healthier and happier family life. Yet, strange though it may seem, there are local authorities and others in this Presidency to-day who are actually discouraging the installation and use of electric motors and even village lighting.

Cottage industries are rather a delicate subject in India, but in an address of this character it cannot be ignored. It is repeatedly said and preached throughout this Country that a happier life will ensue if manual labour is adopted in preference to the machine. Yet it is generally recognized by well informed people that, if efforts are made to put back the hands of the clock and return to the days of yesterday, it can only lead to a lower standard of living. Most people are living and thinking differently today. The rest of the World, unfortunately, will not allow any nation to live entirely as it pleases. It must go with the times or stagnate and go under. There are numerous examples of the fact that industrialism does not ruin cottage industries. Where industry provides employment, the cottager often abandons his small occupation to accept the more reliable and better paid work which can be obtained in the factory. Some small industries may be killed but others are developed in their place. This is particularly so in France, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. In those countries the cottage industrialists, many having an installation of fractional horse power motors, are found supplementing large industries with small machine fittings and appliances, buttons etc., while gloves, toys, combs, brushes and similar articles are produced in the various villages.

In India cottage industries will generally require assistance. They have to be financed and efficiently organized, from the supply of the raw material at a fixed price, to the provision of appliances, and a steady and profitable market for the finished product. This can only be done by large interests or the State, and would be a function of the Power and Industrial Board which I shall refer to later.

I have now attempted to show how electricity has benefitted the Province economically, and assisted in the development of the Textile industry. It has also been made clear, I hope, that there is not likely to be any substantial progress in electrical development unless industry is developed *pari passu* with it.

The world is full of examples of large scale industrial development. There is nothing new in the idea. In pre-war days the outstanding examples were North and South America. A study of the progress of the more important countries of those continents shows that the pre-requisites of such development are adequate capital, low taxes, initiative,

enterprise, and hard work. The same conditions hold good to-day except that the State has to be substituted for private enterprise to an increasing extent. Rampant nationalism has rendered in many cases orthodox economic theories and policies impracticable, and the fundamental law of supply and demand out of date. It is becoming more difficult for private enterprise to compete with the artificial commercial methods adopted by many Governments today. The State has therefore to interfere more and more in Industry, and support it by financial and other means, if the standard of living of the nation is not to suffer.

Of post-war examples in industrial development Russia is perhaps the most interesting, but the changes to more modern methods that are gradually taking place in Japan, Italy, Germany, England and the U.S.A. are also worthy of careful study. It is not generally known that a most impressive development is in progress in Manchukuo; hydro and thermal-electric power systems, blast furnaces, steel rolling mills and other factories are being constructed. One hydro-electric plant, the Sukia, is designed for 8—115,000 horse power turbines, three of which are being installed now. A single unit in this plant can generate more electricity than the combined Meltur and Pykara Stations. An iron and steel works, reported to be one of the largest in the World, is located at Anshan. It is understood that the basic industries are controlled and mostly operated by Government. Ten years ago Manchukuo was generally considered an agricultural country, the home of the valuable soya bean, although limited exploitation of its mineral resources was also being carried on.

The feverish industrial activity in Manchukuo and Japan to be followed, perhaps, by a similar development in China must result one day in a heavy overproduction of goods and a wholesale dumping in the Eastern markets. This would appear to provide a strong argument in favour of a reasonable selfsufficiency in manufactured products for this Country, combined with suitable control to prevent over-production and fiscal protection against dumping.

However let us return to Southern India. Mysore is, to a certain, extent following the modern trend, but Madras is, rightly or wrongly, leaving industry to private enterprise.

There is at present less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent of the population in this Presidency employed in industries coming under the Factory Act. If therefore World statistics can be accepted as a basis of comparison, the industrial situation in the Province even for an agricultural country is not particularly favourable.

It would seem that private enterprise cannot be regarded now in all cases as a wholly satisfactory agency for developing the industries of this Province.

On the other hand, from an all India point of view, the jute, textile, cement, and sugar industries have made substantial progress under private initiative, but this very progress is another argument in favour of the Board. The progress made has not been regulated or, in some cases, carefully considered. It has been too easy and we are already faced with a possible overproduction in those articles.

A well balanced scheme of nationalisation and regulation, combined with assistance to private enterprise, which is now being attempted in the case of electricity, seems to be the solution. It might be desirable to include a few large State Farms utilizing modern machinery and methods. Based upon the results of, say 5 years' operation, it should then be practicable to organise a few collective farms of small ryots, without unduly prejudicing the rights of private property. The question of including road transport deserves consideration.

Nationalisation does not necessarily connote State management. It is almost universally recognized that the State cannot successfully manage and direct commercial enterprises.

There is a growing opinion among economists that all industrial activities wholly or partially financed by the State including electricity and State farms would be better controlled and directed by a National Industrial Board or Authority. Following modern practice this Board would be non-political in character, and constituted on the lines of a public corporation with adequate financial and administrative powers. Government would, however, in a general way control the policy of the Board, which should be based upon the legitimate economic interests of not only the Presidency, but those of adjoining States and Provinces.

The revenue accruing to Government from properly organised industrial activities, as outlined, ought to be considerable and the indirect benefits due to an accelerated development, which should in all cases pay due regard to existing private interests, would be appreciable.

I know with what horror industrialisation is looked upon by a section of the intelligentsia and I sympathise with their point of view. But increased industrial activity is generally believed to be an economic necessity to the Province and has to be faced. One of the main duties of the proposed Industrial Board would be to prevent over-industriali-

sation. The productive capacity of all industries would be restricted to the average demand of a predetermined economic market and a too strictly parochial or even provincial outlook avoided. Due advantage could be taken to store nonperishable goods over cycles of business depression in order to stabilise production. Only such industries which are economically suited to the Province should be established. The list is not a long one ; so a modest start could be made in the near future without waiting for other parts of India to take the initiative.

It may be of interest to note, in passing, that the Government of Bihar is reported to have under consideration the formation of an Electricity Board. Why should not Madras take the lead in such matters instead of waiting for others to show the way ? An electricity bill, embodying the constitution and powers of a Board for this Province, was drafted in 1935, but Government decided not to proceed with it.

Electricity development has been pursued during the past decade to suit the modest needs of the Province and the anticipated economic benefits have been fully realised. But past progress is not likely to be maintained unless the industrial problem is tackled in a concrete and practical manner.

It has to be recognized that a national industrial policy such as suggested would present a greater problem in our Province than in many other countries. To adjust it to the existing social order would not be easy, and the transition stage must be gradual.

In the final picture Madras might still be essentially an agricultural country with limited industrial activities but so controlled, as to assist the ryot and supplement agriculture wherever feasible.

Studies in Sanskrit Texts on Temple Architecture with Special Reference to the Tantrasamuccaya*

By

N. V. MALLAYYA

PART I.

INTRODUCTION

What is really interesting in the civilisation of a race is its distinctive contribution to the stock of ideas which build up a magnificent fabric of art that raises and instructs mankind. In our study of Indian temple architecture, we shall attempt to unfold the spiritual content which is the most vitalising feature of India's culture. Against the background of world's civilisation, India stands unsurpassed in her spiritual attainments. Spirituality is inherent in her soil ; it is rooted in the soul of her people. It is expressed in every conceivable pursuit of her race, in every creative activity of her people. In our investigations into the architectural literature of India, we propose to consider not merely the material aspect of architecture but also the mental side thereof. In other words, we are inclined to interpret architecture, not only from the point of view of its origin and development, but in the light of idea and reason which it embodies ; for, as the philosophical and architectural literature reveals, the ideal of sacred architecture of India was born of the true Indian conception of 'divinity in a spiritualised body.'

Much has been said and written about Indian architecture by modern exponents and critics of the subject. "The critical and historical study of Indian architecture," as Manomohan Gangoly remarks, "has not been crowned with a measure of success commensurate with the amount of labour bestowed upon it."¹ The genesis of temple architecture is shrouded in doubtful speculations and the theories advanced bearing on its origin and development are various. Among the divers theories started, mention might be made of 'Mound theory' 'Grave theory,' 'Car theory,' 'Umbrella theory' and the like. Then again, there are theories of Greco-Roman influence, Persian influence, Bud-

* Thesis approved for the M.Litt. Degree.

1. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XII, Pt. IV, p. 465.

dhist influence and so on, arising in the course of discussions on the constructional details. The study of Indian architecture, thus presents a tangle of confusion, the reason whereof is not far to seek. Few of the exponents of Indian architecture have cared to explore the vast amount of original architectural literature available in India. A consistent and precise terminology, expressive of the genius of the nation and of the self-contained and distinguishing character of its culture, which the ancient Indian Śilpaśāstras have evolved, has been passed over in silence or neglect. Some feel it an unfortunate position that Śilpaśāstras were ever written in India. Mr. Longhurst thus ventilates his grievance against the existence of Indian architectural texts in the following words: "It is unfortunate for Indian art that the Śilpaśāstras were ever written, as they have been the means of suppressing all originality on the part of the sculptor and have led him to adopt a stereotyped mechanical style of art that is anything but pleasing."² When the dignity of original literature on the subject of architecture and sculpture is thus found impaired by criticism of a hostile character, we feel an imperious instinct to know what the ancient authors have thought and felt about the subject of art, how they valued the literature on the subject which in modern eyes may appear outworn or as portraying a system struggling to express itself. Without minimising the importance of the method of true historical study and criticism, we observe that it will be highly profitable if we do not allow our criticism to override India's architectural idealism, for, idealism has got its own permanent and universal value. We value architectural literature of India because it reflects a phase of the great Indian mind, embodies the process of her mental workings and expresses the inner nature of things. It seeks to emphasise on what is permanent rather than temporary, on what is essential rather than accidental. It is the tendency of modern times to drift towards something which is pleasing or amusing, towards something which is pandering to individual taste. The public of India, especially of ancient and medieval times, however, did not tolerate individualism of a rampant nature and the Śilpaśāstras treat mainly of types rather than of individuals. In the conception of Indian authorities, freedom lies in restraint, and too much of liberty it was thought would end in licence. As Eric Gill observes: "It is not merely that you may get tired of 'too much liberty,' but also that too much liberty is a weight, a positive hindrance. Do we not often say that so-and-so has got 'off the rails'? Do we not thereby imply our instinctive recognition of the fact that there must be rails on which to run? Truly free-

2. Annual Report of the Archaeological Department, Southern Circle, Madras, 1918-1919, p. 27.

dom is only found within bounds and rule is the removal of fetters"³ *The rules of Śilpaśāstras are the rails of freedom on which Art travels to its destination of Truth and Beauty.* In the search for beauty, they do not lead the artist in the line of vague aspiration for what is pleasing or amusing. On the other hand, they guide him and direct him to look behind the outward phenomena to thought and purpose. They enable him to pass beyond the seeming appearances of men and things to their inner nature. In Platonic language, the Śilpaśāstras might be said to teach the artist to 'contemplate the divine ideas.' They contain the investigations of the past human experience in the quest for Divine Beauty and Truth. They leave us the record of art-traditions and tendencies that have been the determining forces of a rich civilisation. They provide us the best key to open the art-treasures of India. Should we not therefore concern ourselves to explain their necessity, just why they are written, what they represent and how they could not have been otherwise? The first law of scientific criticism of a work of art or literature is that we should refrain from judging one culture by another and that we must estimate the perfection of one or the other "in terms of the degree to which it realises its own tendencies and becomes itself." In dealing with Indian art then, we must "first of all make its meaning clear; for this, and not a vague aspiration for the beautiful, was the immediate cause of its production; meaning has created shape, and without understanding meaning, unfamiliar shapes will still appear to us arbitrary, quaint, or exotic." We propose to treat in the first place of the significance of architectural literature, for in the exposition of the ideals of architecture, the basis according to Indian Śilpaśāstras is the human organism and the expression, the spirit which it enshrines. The theory of architecture in terms of the human organism, rooted in the subjective consciousness of the race constitutes the primary subject of our study.

THE BASIS AND EXPRESSION OF INDIAN TEMPLE ARCHITECTURE

In every department of culture, the Indians of old struck the note of spirituality that permeates the rhythmical order of creation. There is a vast force that moves mysteriously behind the veil of appearances and is present in all forms of nature either manifest or latent. This is the 'Spirit' and it is revealed in an ascending degree in forms that are perfect. Of all forms in nature, the human form is the most perfect, for it is the most organic in structure. The 'system of relations' is

3. *Viśvakarma*, Preface, p. 7.

evident there and all parts are harmonised in one living unity. Every member of the body bears its responsibility to this living unity, which rules the entire body. If the leg for instance, does not behave itself properly, what embarrassment it gives to the body and what hideous picture to the spectator! But when it keeps its relationship with the body and blends in the harmony of its organism, it reveals the higher truth, the higher beauty and the higher unity that underlies the diverse parts of the body. In fact, the significance of the human frame lies in its synthetic content which makes it the fitting abode of the spirit, the spirit that moves behind the phenomenal creation. Our ancient seers possessed the power of visualising and realising the radiating inner spirit which constitutes the essential significance of things. The idea of unity that rules the body, of the spirit that dwells in it, is expressed in their works. In such Upaniṣadic expressions like “ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकम्”⁴ where the human form is conceived as the ‘Temple of Brahman’ the idea of body as the abode of spirit is clearly revealed. In *Skandopaniṣad*, the following statement is found which glorifies the human body:

“देहो देवालयः प्रोक्तो जीवो देवः सनातनः ।
त्यजेद्भाननिर्मात्यं सोऽहंभावेन पूजयेत्” ॥⁵

Enjoining the true nature of worship, this text stands for the assimilation of the external with the internal, the synthesis of macrocosm and microcosm, or in other words, the identification of the individual soul with the Universal Soul. It emphasises the glory and dignity of human form, for, it is here treated as the unique home of the eternal spirit-form, the perfection of which is attained in the course of evolution. Hence has the human body become the standard to be attained for the achievement of organic unity.

This heightened significance of the human frame has been inherent in the consciousness of our architects and the style of structure they evolved has ample human references. Our temple architecture thus essentially reflects the spiritual ideal of the race. In the imagination of Hindu devotees, temple is the House of God. God is the Spirit immanent in the universe and temple is His abode. He is Omnipresent, but His Omnipresence is confined within the walls of a shrine in the same way as the Soul is confined within the human body. Again, the Hindu idea of temple as the House of God has its roots in the particular psychology of the worshippers. The large mass of Hindu devotees are necessarily worshippers of images symbolic or anthropomorphic; for,

4. *Chāndogya* (8, 1, 1).

5. *Skandopaniṣad* No. 11.

the Unconditioned and the Absolute, devoid of name and form, is beyond their mental reach. Naturally, their spiritual hunger can be satisfied only in the recognition of an object of adoration and the object thus conceived or perceived is the image. This image represents the immortal spirit. The inevitability of the use and service of image is recognised even by the great philosophers and leaders of religion. Even they who visualised the supreme Godhead felt the impulse to worship irresistible. Image-worship hence is an unavoidable human necessity and a correct appreciation of this form of worship demands a clear understanding of its psychological import.

Enough has been said to show that God and His temple correspond to Soul and the human body. One who probes into the significance of our architectural terms will be struck by this conception of architecture in terms of the human organism. Among the preliminaries connected with architecture, the final ceremonial is known as *Garbhavinyāsa*. The *Garbhādhāna* ritual governs the life of every twice-born while in the stage of conception and this is supposed to govern the structure as well in its incipient state of construction. *Viṣṇusamhitā*, *Mañjarī*, *Gurudeva*, *Tantrasamuccaya*, *Silparatna* and similar treatises on architecture, all refer to this ritual of symbolical significance.⁶ In the wake of several early authors, *Silparatna*⁷ sets forth the view in clear terms in the verse half:

“प्रासादं पुरुषं सत्त्वा पूजयेन्मन्त्रवित्तमः ॥”

The names of the various limbs of the body are found applied in architectural literature to denote the different parts of the structure⁸ such as *Pāduka*, *Pāda*, *Prapada*, *Carana*, *Anghri*, *Jaṅghā*, *Ūru*, *Kaṭi*, *Kukṣhi*, *Pārśva*, *Gala*, *Grīvā*, *Kandhara*, *Kanṭha*, *Sikhara*, *Sīras*,

6. Vide Notes under stanza No. 30 in Part I, Notes.

7. *Silparatna* XVI, stanza 114 (T. S. S. Ed.)

Also vide stanzas 121, 122, 123:

प्रपदं पादुकं विद्यात् शिखां स्तूपीति कथ्यते ।

लोहकीलकपत्रादि सर्वं दन्तनखादिकम् ॥

सुधां शुक्लं त्विष्टकोषमस्थिमज्जा च पीतलम् ।

मेदः श्यामरुचिस्तद्वत् रक्तं रक्तरुचिस्तथा ॥

मसिं मेचकवर्णं स्याच्चर्म नीलं नसंशयः ।

त्वक् कृष्णवर्णमित्याह प्रासादे सप्तधातवः ॥

8. Vide Notes under stanza 23 (Pillars), and stanza 50 (Stūpikā) in Part II, Notes.

Śīrṣa, Mūrdhan, Mastaka, Mukha, Vaktra, Kūṭa, Karṇa, Nāsikā, Śikhā and the like. These terms should not be viewed objectively as they are not intended to denote the mere reproduction of the facts of the human system. They are used and understood in a subjective sense and are employed to strike the note of organic unity in architecture. The harmony that reigns supreme over the build of the human body is here transformed by the alembic of the artist's consciousness into the ultimate expression of his ideal in the art of building. Indian temple is consequently a perfect organic unit complete in itself, as perfectly organic as it is articulated. It is fully vitalised and breathes life at every point. The different parts are so closely united in one organic whole that to tear any one part away would leave an open wound. Even an unsympathetic critic of Indian art will be constrained to admire the glorious achievement of India's genius, which possessed such strong power of articulation of the parts of the structure in a manner that makes it a living organism. The relationship of body and spirit is consistently and persistently proclaimed. Indian culture guards us against the teaching of those who would accept as sufficient one of the two alone, without regard to the other. The spirit demands a body for its expression and the body attains significance when it is infused with the spirit. Indian architecture, which is one phase of the great Indian culture, not merely develops the structural scheme fully but considers the spiritual quality as of equal moment. Indian thought is so pervasive in its influence on fundamentals, that it is hard to say where philosophy ends and art begins. In fact, our culture as its expression shows in the tangible form of architecture or art, or the conceptual form of religion or philosophy has sprung from one and the same perennial spring of thought.

In the whole range of Indian thought, the ruling idea is 'unity' which is best expressed in the harmonious relationship of body and spirit. This is found in the expression of her culture in art and architecture, where the fundamental view-point was to introduce unity in the midst of diversity and diversity in the midst of unity. The members of the structure differ from each other to express the differing functions of each. Each member is thus a unit in itself and the different units in their differing functions give rise to diversity in the midst of unity. This idea of diversity in the midst of unity was born of man's desire to sacrifice monotony. In its absence, the structure would appear one mass. Any plain surface in Indian architecture is broken up into parts, and in its break-up it furnishes a resting place for the eyes. The surface is decorated and enriched with ornamentation which forms a keen source of delight to the searching eyes. The idea of unity in the midst of diversity is, on the other hand, expressed

in the harmonious relationship of the different members of the structure with the structure as a whole, in the modulation of the parts in the Supreme. This fundamental note of unity, not however divorced from diversity, is indicated in the Hindu conception of temple in terms of the perfect abode of spirit, the most organic of forms, the human frame.

Indeed, architecture is certainly the activity of man's clever hand. But, equally certain it is that it is the product of his great thinking mind. His constant environment that it is, he viewed it in the same subjective terms in which he considered himself.⁹ He stamped it with his character and sought to express in it his desires. A deep dive into the inner significance of architectural terminology will not fail to bring home to our minds the essential teaching of Indian architecture, which guides us to great heights, stirs up our higher aspirations and impresses us with the leading idea, the idea of unity which inheres in the consciousness of our race. Rām Rāz¹⁰ observes and in his wake Gauranganath Banerji¹¹ that "the several members of the order are curiously compared to the several parts of the human body." We maintain that this comparison is perfectly natural, if not inevitable, in view of the essential character of Indian culture.

Western writers on architecture too, have not failed to note this human reference to architecture in their writings, ancient and modern. Vitruvius, the ancient Roman writer remarks in his work: "In truth they (symmetry and proportion) are as necessary to the beauty of a building as that of a well formed human figure If nature, therefore, has made human body so that the different members of it are measures of the whole, so the ancients have, with great propriety, determined that in all perfect works, each part should be some aliquot part of the whole; and since they direct that this be observed in all works, it must be most strictly attended to in temples of the Gods, wherein the faults as well as the beauties remain to the end of time."¹² Geoffrey Scott, a modern architectural critic, in his treatise on the *Architecture of Humanism* thinks that architecture like literature was born of man's desire to create and to extend his ego in his creation. Whether he builds or writes, the artist adopts forms and names which echo the human body or its activities. "Architec-

9. Vide Notes under stanza 54 in Part II, Notes under the title *Sthānaka, Āsana and Śayana*.

10. *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, p. 22.

11. *Hellenism in Ancient India*, pp. 35-36.

12. Book III, Chapter I.

tural art," as stated by Scott, "is the transcription of the body's state into forms of building." The phrase "the body's state," as paraphrased by Williams-Ellis, is here used to convey the notion of bodily function.¹³ Stratton, a modern author, in his *Orders of Architecture* attributes organic character to the great Classic Order, thereby suggesting that organic nature is a universal feature of all great architecture. In the course of his remarks Stratton observes: "The very term 'organic' seems to suggest that the qualities of the Order should be related with those which find expression in the forms of animate nature. If principles of composition can be discovered which are alike exemplified in the order and in the shape of animals and plants, it may be claimed that the Order possesses some of the vitality usually associated with the latter. Several such principles may here be mentioned, beginning with that of *Punctuation*. It will be observed that no branch of any tree or plant comes to an end abruptly as if it were cut off at random, but invariably has its ends modulated in some manner as to express the fact that the branch or limb in question has come to a conclusion. Another principle of organic design which is expressed in all the forms of animate nature is that of *Inflection*. Everything which is inspired by the principle of life has each part so disposed that it appears to be naturally joined on to the adjacent parts and has its forms so modified that it expresses this relationship. To give an example of this peculiar sensitiveness to position the features of the human face may be cited: these could not be turned upside down and replaced in that disposition without completely disorganising the formal pattern, because each one of them is conscious that its summit is different from its base. When the body as a whole is considered it is also clear that the head differs from the feet, and a human being could not be turned upside down without assuming an attitude that is inappropriate and a cause of distress both to the person himself and to those who observe him. But a classic column also has a head and a foot, and these differ from each other to express the differing functions of each. Turn the column upside down and it appears to scream at such an indignity. Yet there is no question that it could very well be of plain cylindrical shape and still perform its structural function adequately as in fact many columns designed in what is called the 'modernist' style are seen to do; but these cylindrical columns are dead; they have no knowledge of head or feet because their parts are neither punctuated nor inflected".¹⁴

13. *The Pleasures of Architecture* by C. & A. Williams-Ellis, p. 106.

14. *Orders of Architecture*, page 2.

In the instance of an Indian temple, the two top parts,¹⁵ viz., Śikhara and Stūpikā illustrate the principles of inflection and punctuation. The etymological meaning of the term Śikhara शिखरा अस्त्यस्येति शिखरः is noteworthy. In ordinary literature, the word Śikhā signifies the tuft, the hair on the head tied in upward knot and in architectural literature, it denotes the 'finial'. Its synonym Stūpikā also means the same thing and in Vedic literature, the word 'stūpa' is found employed in the only sense of tuft or top-knot. The final element of a temple, stūpikā or śikhā as it is alternatively called, lends to the structural form a sense of conclusion and thus it satisfies the principle of punctuation. That which has the śikhā is the Śikhara, and this term Śikhara unmistakably refers to the head of an Indian temple. This member of the structure thus corresponds to the head of the human body. The other terms most commonly used to denote the same portions are śiras and śirṣa. A man is known and recognised chiefly by the features of his face. So is the style of an Indian temple determined by the shape of its Śikhara. The distinguishing feature of a Nāgara shrine is its square Śikhara, that of a Vesara shrine its circular Śikhara, and that of Drāviḍa shrine is faceted Śikhara. This element, Śikhara is the fifth member in the six-fold division of an Indian temple and is situated above Gala and beneath Śikhā or Stūpikā. The treatment of Śikhara and Stūpikā with their sure reference to the head and tuft portions of a man's frame confirms the interpretation of architecture in terms of the human organism. The principles of Punctuation and Inflection which are found evidenced in important works on architecture are universal principles and products of the universal mind. As elsewhere, so in India, they are expressed in her classic treatises on the subject. Here, it must be remembered, they are born of the true Indian conception of divinity in a spiritualised body and are worked out with such consistency and continuity as compels our appreciation.

We propose to examine here some of the theories of influence in the field of architecture which some scholars have either attempted or ventured to prove. In this connection the main source of our investigation is the architectural literature of the land. A comparative study of the Indian and Western systems of treatment leads us to the conclusion that what is generally described as "Orders in Indian Architecture" is a misnomer.

15. Vide Notes under Stanza 50, Part II, Notes under the title Śikhara and Stūpikā.

ORDERS IN INDIAN ARCHITECTURE—A MISNOMER.

In his essay on the *Architecture of the Hindus*, Rām Rāz takes a general survey of what he considers as “the several members connected with the “Orders¹⁶ of Architecture.” In the wake of European method of approach towards the subject, he proceeds to treat of the column and entablature as one architectural feature and seeks to find considerable correspondence between the Indian columns and the Graeco-Roman columns. He holds that there is a common basis of classification and this is with respect to dimensions. “Pillars of Indian Architecture may with respect to the dimensions, be divided into seven sorts”.¹⁷ He then mentions the proportions of seven sorts of columns and entablatures associated with those columns. He observes: “Concerning the proportions of columns, the second sort of column in the Hindu architecture may be compared with the Tuscan, the third with the Doric, the fourth with the Ionic, and the fifth with the Corinthian or Composite pillar. This affinity between the columns of India and of Rome and Greece is so striking, that one would be apt to ascribe it to something more than mere chance, etc”.¹⁸ Dr. Ācārya in his thesis on *Indian Architecture* closely follows Rāz and subscribes to his view. Ācārya hits the mark further and goes to the extent of suggesting a relation of indebtedness between Mānasāra, the Indian author and Vitruvius, the Italian writer. His conclusions as briefly stated are as follows: “The striking similarities in the names of mouldings like *Padma* or *Cyma*, *Hāra* or bead, or in the names of orders like *Misra* or Composite, may sometimes be attributed to inexplicable coincidence. But in view of other striking similarities between Vitruvius and Mānasāra, such as the classification of orders into exactly five, and the division of subservient parts, called mouldings, common to all the orders, into eight, and also the proportionate measurement varying equally from six to ten diameters, and tapering in the same way, there would seem to have been something more substantial than mere coincidence. An influence, direct or indirect, of the one upon the other, seems highly probable. I venture to think, further, that there might have been a relation of indebtedness between the two authors”.¹⁹

The position held by Rāz and Ācārya with respect to the comparison of Indian columns with the Graeco-Roman orders does not seem to us tenable. Indian and Graeco-Roman architects have adopted funda-

mentally divergent attitude towards the theme of pillars and entablature. In the conception of their architecture, the Graeco-Roman builders took column and entablature as a single architectural feature. They considered the whole structure as one composite unit, and never thought of parts as units in themselves. In such a circumstance, what strikes any one most is the union of post and beam. The column is divided into three parts, the base, the shaft and the capital; entablature, is likewise divided into three parts, the architrave (or epistyle or lintel), the frieze and the cornice. The whole is known by what is generally called the ‘Order.’ The Graeco-Roman architecture is thus one of column and entablature and the so-called orders of architecture—Doric, Ionic and Corinthian, Tuscan and Composite—are all systematised classifications of the features and forms of the association of capital and beam as found originated and developed by the different branches of Graeco-Roman race, in the various cities, Doria, Iona, Corinth and Tuscany. The Composite Order is a hybrid order, created out of the mixture of the features of Ionic and Corinthian orders. Order of architecture is a misnomer in Indian architectural literature, for, column or strictly speaking capital and entablature are not considered in India as one architectural unit.

The question “what is an Order?” has been answered by Stratton in the statement that the ‘Order creates an organic unity between column and lintel’.²⁰ All Western constructions, it is held, have some affinity with this mode of building as originated and established by the ancient Greeks. Thus Stratton remarks: “In England, France, and Germany, Italy and Spain, in America and Africa and Australia, wherever the white race has erected buildings of any consequence, column and entablature are found of a type which declares its affinity to those which the ancient Greeks developed. Surely this is a remarkable phenomenon, etc”.²¹ It is beyond reasonable doubt that the association of post and beam in an organic union is the distinctive feature of Western architecture. Now, proceeding to the question of the classification of orders, it must be borne in mind, that the basis of differentiation is not the shape of the column. Columns of all orders have always circular shape. This is obvious from a general look at the existing columns of these types in Europe, as well as from the employment of the unit of measure which has reference always to the diameter of the column at the bottom of the shaft. “Several methods have been used for determining the scale of equal parts by which the Orders are

16. *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, p. 37.

17. *Essay*, p. 29.

18. Rām Rāz, *Essay*, p. 38.

19. *Indian Architecture according to Mānasāra* by P. K. Ācārya, p. 153.

20. *Orders of Architecture*, p. 2.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

measured for purposes of delineation, but they are all founded on the diameter of the column at the bottom of the shaft. It has been found convenient to take the lowest semi-diameter of the column as a unit—known as the Module—and to divide it into a given number of equal parts or minutes, the number of parts varying with the character of the Order.”²² Shape, which serves as the basis of differentiation and classification of Indian columns never enters into the Western mode of classification. As has been observed, it is the union of capital and beam that constitutes the differentiating mark of Western orders. Richest and most varied ornament occurs in the capital and the entablature, and all vital elements in the design and composition of a building are displayed there. Thus capital and entablature which together form one single architectural feature, gain supreme importance in the western system of composition and it is by the characteristic features of this architectural unit, that Orders or Styles of Western construction are recognised. But, in Indian architecture, while all parts are related to the whole in organic union, parts are also treated as units in themselves. This conception is clearly revealed in the six-fold division of an Indian temple. The six members, Adhiṣṭhāna, Stambha, Prastara, Gala, Śikhara and Stūpikā are individually considered and in actual practice are required to be ornamented, accented and emphasised. In the instance of column, the second element from bottom upwards, various parts are described which are said to enter into its composition such as the Oma, Ghaṭa, Maṇḍi, Virakāṇḍa and Potikā. Every part of the structure is thus seen considered as a unit in itself and is given a degree of self-consciousness consistent with its importance as a unit. This conception of parts as units in themselves, conscious of their individual existence and importance is a unique feature of our architecture. No exponent of Indian architecture can afford to ignore this peculiar aspect of Hindu composition. The fundamental divergence in the basis of classification is the most serious and powerful objection that can be raised against any theory of the relation of indebtedness between the Indian and Western systems of architecture. Rāz²³ admits that ‘the plan of the Grecian and Roman columns is always round, but the plan of the Hindu columns admits of every shape,’ but curiously enough he fails to realise that it is this recognition of the shape as the fundamental basis of differentiation by Hindu architects and its non-recognition by Western architects that brings about serious divergence between both the systems, apart from other differences in the view-points such as the recognition of structural parts as

22. Stratton on ‘Module,’ p. viii.

23. Rāz, *Essay*, p. 39.

units in themselves in Hindu system and the absence of such a feature in the Western system.

Dr. Ācārya observes that corresponding to the five Graeco-Roman Orders, Doric, etc., columns are classified in India into five Orders, Brahmakānta, etc. Indian columns, it must be remembered, are not found classified as Brahmakānta, etc., on the basis of dimensions. Their classification is on the basis of shapes, and the classes such as Brahmakānta and the like do not correspond to the Western Classic Orders, Doric and the like. The question of dimensions which is relevant in the case of Western classification does not enter into the Indian mode of classification of columns into types such as Brahmakānta and the like. If any correspondence were to be shown between the systems of treatment Western and Eastern, the basis of classification ought to have been common, but a common basis is not found to have been adopted and differences exhibited are wide and typical. In a host of varieties of proportions prescribed, it is but natural to find some correspondence in the matter of proportions prescribed elsewhere. But such casual agreements do not tend to strengthen the argument of influence of one system over the other; for, such proportions are born of certain principles which it is wrong to suppose as the prerogative of one particular race. Mind being universal in essence, its products bear the stamp of universal character in their essentials. The principle of diminution of the breadth of the pillar at the top is such a universal principle of good composition and this is found expressed in both the Western and Eastern systems of constructions. The higher the columns are, the less they diminish in their breadth at the top. While this universal principle is seen working everywhere in the Eastern as well as in the Western modes of construction, the rules and details of measurement are not always necessarily the same. Agreement if there is, is in the matter of broad principles. On the strength of such similarity in the matter of principles, which are universal in their origin and application, we cannot advance a theory of influence of one system over another with any amount of safety or verity. Art everywhere speaks its own language which is international and its forms assume the shape of man’s inner experiences. Just as there are universal and common experiences, so are there universal and similar products of art; and just as there are typical utterances which distinguish one man from another, so are there certain typical elements and devices which express most intimately the peculiarities inherent in the systems of art. The problem of influence in such instances is an artificial one, clearly preconceived. The word ‘influence’ carries with it a biting suggestion of domination or the supremacy of one over the other, and in the realms of art such a

domination is the worst form of aesthetic nihilism, for, it kills all sincerity and freedom of the form of expression, the essential condition of artistic creation. Certain similarities in the employment of certain decorative patterns such as the Padma, which Dr. Ācārya points out do not serve to express any sense of relation of indebtedness. They are universal decorative forms, found in the works of people all the world over. They are not originally Greek only or Indian only, but cosmopolitan and universal and their direct source is to be sought in 'Nature.' The products of nature are copied by man and harmoniously associated with certain architectural elements. The simple and gracious shapes of the flowers of nature are objects of universal appeal and imitation and they cannot be neglected by those who wish to possess a comprehensive repertory of architectural ornament. In view of these factors, any relation of indebtedness, one way or the other between the Indian and European authorities as believed by Rāz and Ācārya, is scarcely conceivable.

THE MOUND AND GRAVE THEORIES EXAMINED

We shall here pass on to consider the Mound and Grave theories started to explain the origin of Indian temple architecture and see how far these theories satisfy the spiritual aspiration of India. Mr. Longhurst observes: "The term Stūpi would appear to be a corruption of the Sanskrit word 'Stūpa', since both words are used to designate the same type of structure. With the Buddhists, the Stūpa was a dome-shaped structure which was a development of the low sepulchral tumulus or mound of earth and stones in which baked bricks were substituted for earth with a view to durability."²⁴ He then starts the theory that Hindu architecture is derived from the older art of the Buddhists.²⁵ Continuing, he remarks: "The Indo-Aryan Hindu temple is a development of the Buddhist temple. The origin of the typical South Indian temple is not quite clear. It would appear, however, that the usual dome-shaped brick and plaster ornament set up over the roof of the shrine chamber of South Indian village temples, known as 'Stūpi' is nothing more or less than a conventionalised model of a medieval Buddhist Stūpa." Here by 'Stūpi' he understands obviously the finial. Counter to this interpretation runs the identification by the same author of 'Stūpi' with the 'tower over the shrine.' Thus, Longhurst states: "They (finials) are known as Kalaśas or Kalaśams in Southern India and are generally made of stucco moulded round a wooden rod firmly embedded in the ridge, or the crown of a Stūpi or

24. Annual Report of Archaeological Department, Southern Circle, Madras, 1915-16, p. 30.

25. Ibid., p. 31.

tower over the shrine..... One may presume that the Hindus borrowed this architectural ornament from the Buddhists".²⁶ In his recent book on the *Story of the Stūpa*, Longhurst seeks to find correspondence between 'Stūpa' the Buddhist mound, and Stūpi (Tower or Finial? of the Hindu temple) and observes: "These striking resemblances between the Buddhist Stūpa and the Dravidian Stūpi cannot be due to mere coincidence".²⁷ He takes a village shrine for example and remarks: "The latter (i.e. flat roof) is surmounted by a brick and plaster structure known in the south as a 'Stūpi' a name which is obviously a corruption of the Sanskrit word 'Stūpa'. If we compare this architectural ornament with the domed roof the Nalanda temple, it is clear how it originated and why it is called a Stūpi at the present day".²⁸ There underlies a lot of confusion in the vague statements of Mr. Longhurst we have quoted above. We do not know what exactly he understands by the term 'Stūpi'. Sometimes he takes it to mean the tower, at other times to mean the pot-finial. In the light of the investigations we have carried into the origin and significance of the term 'Stūpikā'²⁹ on the basis of the original Samskrit authority, we are constrained to remark that Mr. Longhurst has gone wrong in his understanding of the original significance of the term 'Stūpikā'. Vedic literature of the earlier and later period gives for 'Stūpa' the only meaning 'tuft'. Architectural authorities have all of them understood the term 'Stūpikā' with reference to tuft, and this view is consistent with their interpretation of architecture in terms of the human organism. The synonym 'Śikhā' that they employ to denote the same part 'Stūpikā' clearly expresses this view. The statement of Gurudeva "शिखा शब्देन स्तूपिकोच्यते" proves beyond doubt that originally the term 'Stūpikā' signifies the 'tuft'. This point unfortunately has not so far struck the attention of the exponents of Indian architectural literature and as a result wrong theories have been started with regard to the origin of Indian temple architecture based on a wrong understanding of the original significance of technical terms. We observe that 'Stūpikā' (otherwise known as Śikhā), the final element of an Indian temple is a pure Sanskrit term and should not be confused with 'Stūpa' in the sense of Buddhist burial mound. The terms 'Stūpikā' and 'Śikhā' are never found used in the sense of burial mound anywhere in the course of

26. Ann. Arch. Rept., Southern Circle, Madras, 1916-17, p. 34.

27. *The Story of the Stupa*. (Printed at the Ceylon Government Press, Colombo, 1936), p. 28.

28. Ibid.

29. Vide Notes under Stanza 50, in Part II, Notes under the title 'Stūpikā.'

architectural writings. They are used only with reference to the top-most architectural element.

In the wake of Longhurst, Dr. N. Venkataramanayya attempts to trace the origin of South Indian temples to the primitive grave. He states: "South Indian temple is a development of the primitive grave; and how can the theory of Buddhist origin square with it? There is, however, a splendid way out of the difficulty. We are not able to trace the Vimāna surmounting the temple from indigenous sources. It has a striking resemblance to the developed Stūpa, and is also called by the name 'Stūpi'..... Thus the one feature of the Dravidian temple which defied explanation from native sources appears to have been sufficiently accounted for, and the difficult problem concerning its origin seems to have been solved."³⁰ It is not possible for us to agree with the authors of the 'Grave theory'. Nowhere in the course of our study of architectural literature, are we able to detect any evidence in support of the theory of the origin of temple architecture from the grave or mound. The terms employed such as Śikhara, Stūpikā or Śikhā are clear enough in their signification and start from the conception of Prāsāda or temple in terms of Puruṣa or Person. The 'grave theory' has no conceptual background and it should be remembered in this connection that nothing did the Hindus represent or record the significance of which they could not imagine. They were clear, clean and lofty about everything they stated and even in a subject of tangible character the dominant mode of thought was essentially spiritual. And in their expression of architectural idealism, no form was found better suited to represent the spiritual content than the human frame, for, as we have observed already it is the most perfect and organic in structure and hence the best fitted to be the abode of 'spirit'. As regards the forms in architecture we think it is more in accord with the lofty architectural idealism of the Hindus if we seek their source to the various gracious shapes which Nature in her creative moods presents us in her creations. Real artists that they were, the Hindu artists caught the hints that Nature suggests through her objects, and developed on their model architectural forms. The various parts which compose the Stūpikā such as the *Padma*, *Nāla*, *Kuḍmala*, as their very names indicate, were moulded and shaped after the patterns of Nature.³¹ This being the case, the question of one sect borrowing from another does not arise. Longhurst argues that the Hindus had no temples before the Buddhist period and that Hindus adopted as their temple Buddhist Stū-

30. *An essay on the Origin of South Indian Temple*, p. 38.

31. Vide Notes under Stūpikā.

pas, when Buddhism began to decay. It deserves to be stated here, that it is not safe always to advance a theory on the ground of negative data. Temples, it is easy to imagine, would have been built in very ancient times, out of evanescent material like wood which would have fallen prey either to natural decay or to the destructive energies of iconoclasts. From literary sources, we shall attempt on a later occasion to indicate the antiquity of the idea of image and temple worship, prior to Buddhistic period. After all what has Buddhism to do with the genesis of Indian temple Architecture? Did Buddha rise on Indian soil like a sudden flush of light out of darkness or order out of chaos? True, Buddha appeared on the stage of Indian Culture, but his presence should not be described as something cut off from India's spiritual field. His religion is inherent in the soil of India and his rise represents only a stage in the continuous growth of India's synthetic culture. As M. M. Gangoly observes: "It will be irrational in this age to accept the advent of Buddha as a phenomenon which cannot be accounted for as being outside the chain of causation and effect forged in the eternal process of evolution."³² It is reasonable to expect some type of structure, from which Buddhists would have developed the so-called Buddhist architecture. The classification into Hindu Architecture and Buddhist Architecture should not be taken in any exclusive or sectarian sense and as Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy observes: "There is certainly no sound basis for the view that Hindu architecture and art are modelled on those of the Buddhists; the style and technical achievement of Indian art, can never at any stage be described in sectarian terms."³³ In the same strain does Dr. Bhandarkar rightly remark that "it is an absurd solecism to characterise any style as Buddhistic or Jaina or Hindu merely from the accident of its employment under the service of any of these creeds" and that, "the main current of Indian craft tradition is non-sectarian in character".³⁴ Forms in Indian architecture whether under the service of Buddhism or Hinduism, may be generally regarded as having had an indigenous origin, and as such Buddhist, Jaina or Hindu forms as they are called should be considered as cognates rather than as borrowings. This point of view deserves to be remembered whenever we attempt to discuss the theory of origin of Indian temple architecture and the relationship of the forms developed under the service of religions like Hin-

32. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XII, Part IV, p. 467.

33. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th Ed., Coomaraswamy's article on 'Indian Art and Architecture'. Also vide his *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, p. 72.

34. *Rupam* 1920, page 11.

duism and Buddhism. Climatic conditions, the character of the materials in use, racial peculiarities, the psychological union which binds different minds, and above all the architectural idealism of the nation—these and similar circumstances constitute the possible criteria in the tracing of the origin and determination of particular style or form of construction. Longhurst and others who carry the distinction of Hindu and Buddhist art too far and presume that Hindu architecture was derived from the Buddhist Stūpa, are not unfortunately seen basing their theorisings on the above sets of considerations. Their theory fatally ignores the most important of reliable criteria viz., the architectural idealism which a careful study of Indian architectural literature never fails to reveal.

THE THEORY OF THE 'EVOLUTION OF STŪPA.'

We shall make here a passing reference to Longhurst's theory of the evolution of Stūpa itself in view of his consideration of Stūpa as the forerunner of Hindu temple. This theory it will be found is purely a product of imagination which runs counter to India's spiritual aspirations as we see reflected in her religious and philosophical literature.

While tracing the evolution of 'Stūpa' the mound of the dead, Longhurst feels inclined to think that what led people originally to raise a mound was the intention of suppressing the spirit of the dead. He thus observes: "The unchambered tumuli have only a floor of stone slabs about 6 feet below the ground, or no floor at all. On this the remains of the dead together with the usual offerings were deposited and covered with earth. Then, as a rule, two or three big heavy blocks of stone were placed on top of the remains, presumably to prevent the spirits of the dead from returning to earth and causing trouble to the living. It seems that these massively built megalithic graves were the outcome of an intense fear of the evil spirits of the dead, rather than to a feeling of affection for the departed, a fear which still survives, among all primitive tribes in India at the present day."³⁵ This presumption is opposed to the current of Indian thought and religion. The practice of burying the dead, of covering the body with earth and of raising a mound over it, is a time-honoured practice, and is found recorded in ancient literature. We are unable to detect any sentiment of fear or any idea of suppressing the spirit as having actuated those who followed the custom of burying the dead. R̥g Veda presents us a beautiful hymn which is uttered at the time of the burial and it is addressed to Earth in the most endearing of terms. The following two verses will give us an idea of the sentiment

35. *The Story of the Stūpa*, page 12.

expressed in connection with the burying of the body. The body is laid and addressed:

"Approach the bosom of the earth, the mother,
This Earth, the far-extending, most propitious;
Young, soft as wool to bountless givers,
May She preserve thee from the lap of dissolution".
Then the Earth is addressed:
"Wide open, Earth, O *press not heavily on him*;
Be easy of approach to him, a refuge safe;
As with a robe a mother hides
Her son, so shroud this man, O Earth."³⁶

Why was mound erected? We believe that it was with a view to marking out the spot where the dead lie buried. It could not be the intention of any cultured race to raise a mound over the dead in the hope of suppressing the spirits. On the other hand, any structure is built on the spot where the dead lie buried as a mark of distinction and honour to the departed spirit. Otherwise, it is likely that men might trample over the buried place and such an act is supposed to dishonour the departed spirit. Raised ground prevents the possibility of any act of that nature and therefore it is reasonable to assume that mounds were erected with the lofty intention of preventing the living from causing any disrespect to the buried, of extending to the departed spirit a mark of reverence and of perpetuating the memory of the dead. There is no room in the imagination of any civilised race for fear from a passing soul. Surely, we will be giving a distorted view of Hindu culture if we go to a few jungle tribes that still haunt the outskirts of civilisation to derive the source of ideas which build up the magnificent fabric of India's civilisation.

THE 'UMBRELLA THEORY' OF MR. LONGHURST

In the train of the theories of origin and influence comes the theory of the influence of Umbrella on the roof of Indian shrines. Mr. Longhurst thinks that umbrella as a motif had remarkable effect on the architecture of India³⁷ because umbrella is held in India as a symbol of authority and honour. He presumes that Buddhist structures were the first to be so influenced and along with the spread of Buddhism this motif too equally spread. When the Buddhist missionaries spread in South India and entered Kerala, it is presumed that they carried with them their

36. R̥g Veda X, 18, (10 and 11). Translation by Macdonell. Vide "Hymns from the R̥g Veda, p. 88.

37. *The Story of the Stūpa*, p. 11.

umbrella motif as well which became so popular that it had a remarkable effect on the roof of Kerala shrines. Thus Longhurst seeks to explain the peculiar style of wooden temples of Kerala.³⁸ We do agree with Mr. Longhurst in holding that umbrella is regarded in this country as the symbol of regal honour and authority, but it does not appear to us as something that shaped the architecture of India. Roof of any house, is first of all intended as a cover to structure, as a member provided to keep out heat and water. While this structural function of a roof is true, roof need not be regarded as an enlarged umbrella, prompted by a sense of high regard for authority and power. The shape of the roof is the natural expression of the material employed. It is dictated also by the meteorological conditions prevailing in the province. If any sort of influence of one upon the other were possible, umbrella being a thing of temporary use and convenience, it will be more reasonable to assume that there is better chance of umbrella being influenced by the functional motif of the roof which serves as a permanent shade-and shelter-giving member. In this case, umbrella has to be considered as a small replica of roof serving a limited and temporary purpose rather than presume that the roof is an enlarged umbrella or as a structure fashioned after the umbrella. In the question of sequence, the possibility of precedence must certainly be taken in favour of roof as the idea of shelter is essentially and permanently associated with roof, ever since man thought of shelter from rain and sun. Again, roof does not appear to have been influenced in its shape by umbrella, as the roof as reflected in the description of theorists and evidenced in actual practice, admits of different shapes such as square, rectangular, octagonal, elliptical, apsidal and the like whereas umbrellas of similar variety of design are not found either described or manufactured. As for circular roof, it might be said that it is the natural expression of the material brick that is used in dome-shaped structures. "The dome is an obvious type of covering for the primitive circular hut in countries where building materials are only in small units, such as bricks, and where timber is lacking".³⁹ India is enormously rich in building materials and she is especially so in timber. This being the case, the fundamental and dominant shape in structures will certainly be square or rectangular or octagonal when timber is the material commonly employed. Circular form usually appears in buildings where brick is the material chiefly used. Circular design of the roof cannot be held in India as the shape dominating over every other shape such as square or octagonal. When it appears, it has to be originally taken as only a case of the natural ex-

38. *Ibid.*, pages 29, 33.

39. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* under 'Dome'.

pression dependent on the nature of the material employed. Apart from this inherent tendency of the material in use, if we still demand suggestion from some outside phenomenon, we might as well safely look at the sky and imagine dome as having been shaped after the shape of the far-extending canopy above, the canopy that comprehends the expanse of the universe. In any case, the theory of the influence of umbrellas on the roofs of Indian shrines does not seem to us probable. In the vast amount of architectural literature available, there is no reference or indication which tends to support the theory of the influence of Persian or Buddhist or any umbrella on Indian architecture, which Mr. Longhurst seeks to propound without any single reference to the architectural literature of the country, so rich and varied in her treasures of symbolism.

THE CONCEPTION OF PRĀSĀDA AS THE HOUSE OF THE ALMIGHTY.

The term 'Prāsāda' is used to signify both temple and palace, temple when it refers to the abode of God and palace when it stands for the house of the monarch. Thus Amara observes: "वासो प्रासादो देवमुजाम्". This statement echoes the structural correspondence between temple and palace and reflects the character common to both. The splendour and grandeur of each makes it a thing of beauty and of marvel. Upon places of highest eminence rises the Prāsāda (temple or palace) in monumental calm and dignity. The subtleties of its measurements, the relative proportions of its parts and the graciousness of its ornaments are of most delicate description. It is the supreme expression of the noblest efforts and the best skill of artists. It exhibits the care by which great builders obtain fine harmonies and please the minds of men. In the world of men King is looked upon as the central figure and in ancient India was supposed to represent in his person the various divine elements.⁴⁰ By virtue of such a position, he commands dignitaries and attendants and receives from his people willing tributes. With the aid of accumulated wealth and the best skill available in the land, is constructed his palace. Round the hall of the King are constructed accessory structures to meet the demands of royalty. God enthroned in the shrine in 'sacred majesty' is also offered 'Rājōpacāras' or regal service and honour consistent with the conception of God as the Supreme, the Almighty, the Ruler of the Universe. In the system of worship of God as 'Sārvabhauma' or 'Mahāprabhu', rites and ceremonials play a gorgeous part. Gifts of incalculable value fill up God's treasury and the attendants and wor-

40. Vide *Manusmṛiti* (a) Chapter IX (303-311), (b) Chapter VII, 4 and 5.

shippers of the Almighty add to the spectacular aspect of worship. Accessory construction in such a grand and majestic mode of worship is an unavoidable necessity. Thus came to be built around the central sanctum accessory structures such as the Arcanāmaṇṭapa, the Pañca-prākāras and the like. Śilpaśāstras provide rules for the construction of these accessory structures as well after the principal structure has been described. The term 'Prāsāda' refers to the central structure, the sanctum sanctorum, the Holy of Holies. All rules which describe and direct the making of the Prāsāda refer to the central shrine. Architectural interest is chiefly centred on it and it constitutes the chief object of ornamentation. The various rites and ceremonials conducted inside are all in keeping with the presence of the Supreme Being. The abode of the Godhead that is invoked must be accented and emphasised and distinguished from subordinate structures. Hence the central shrine invites the repose and contemplation of the finest works of art and presents situation for the most impressive works of architects. In the midst of structures, it stands firm, as firm as the faith of the faithful and through the hands of artists blooms into beauty. The accessory structures too in their turn enhance the importance of the Holy of Holies and testify to the expression of added dignity which it commands by virtue of its holding the position as the home of the Godhead invoked.

PRĀSĀDA—NOT A CONGREGATIONAL STRUCTURE, BUT THE HOME OF THE SPIRIT

The presence of accessory construction reveals one important feature of Indian temple architecture. It indicates that Prāsāda as conceived in the Śilpaśāstras is the home of the deity and not a hall for mass prayer. It thus distinguishes itself from congregational structures. Since it is not intended to accommodate people, one should not expect to find in it large space inside. Any building, it must be noticed, 'is an act of enclosure whereby a parcel of space is set aside for some purpose'.⁴¹ As Geoffrey Scott would observe, it is the 'art of modelling in space as a sculptor in clay' or a musician in sound. The rules and proportions of the Prāsāda as laid down in the Śilpaśāstras proceed from this conception of building as *enclosed space with a set purpose*. The size of the temple depends upon the size of the image and the division of the space of the main shrine into Garbha, Nāḍī, the internal and external Bhittis is so carefully considered that the set and enclosed space may be taken for 'a language that speaks of the veritable mystery of being, 'Rahasya' as it is called in the instance of the shrine at Chidambaram.'

41. *The Pleasures of Architecture* by C. & A. Williams-Ellis, p. 68.

The walls which enclose the *sanctum sanctorum* as described in the Śilpaśāstras are thick indeed, as the term 'Ghanabhitti' would indicate. The parcel of space that is left inside is shrouded in 'darkness which becomes dimly visible,' when the religious lights are lit. This interior darkness made visible by the dim burning of lights inside the parcel of space suggests beautifully the idea of mystery that envelops the universe and the spirit that moves behind the veil of mystery. Here the parcel of space symbolises the universe, darkness the mystery that envelops it, gloom the veil of appearances and God the Spirit immanent in the universe. The idea of infinity, of the spirit that works behind the drapery of mystery was the guiding factor which led the ancient authors to set the proportions of the divisions of Garbhagrha in the manner in which we find them prescribed in the Śilpaśāstras. One need not take this as a borrowing from the gloom and darkness that spreads in the interior of a cell-tomb.

DECORATIVE ELEMENT IN INDIAN TEMPLE ARCHITECTURE

Indian builders never contemplated with satisfaction a building which is divorced from ornamentation. Their desire to decorate their creations was so strong that they display a keen sense of ornamentation in every phase of their art and in every part of their building that attracts human eyes. It must not be supposed that carvings in their exuberance destroy the integrity and unity in structural expression. Applied fittingly and in their proper resting parts they make the building most pleasant to behold and invite the eye to pause and to travel and to revel in the beauty of its parts. Ornamentation is an enriching factor in the beautification of a structure in the same way as dress and ornaments are in the beauty of a youthful human figure. Further, the idea that actuated the builders to ornament a structural part was to put accent on it, to emphasise its importance and to make us feel its existence as a unit in itself. The different parts when ornamented thus give the impression of different units which introduce into the building an element of diversity in the midst of unity that pervades the structure conceived as a whole.

Variety is the sign of abundant resource of the human spirit in its creative aspect and this is richly exhibited in India's decorative art. Like the genius of nature, the genius of Indian artist equally rich, profuse and inventive produced sculpture and ornamentation varied in its types of expression. Its creation on the side of architectural ornament comprises representations of both natural and supernatural objects, but with respect to the latter, the achievement is unsurpassed. Representation of forms never seen by human eyes before is the prerogative of

the Indian artist. It is the preferred theme of his decorative art. It takes so large and frequent a part throughout Indian decorative art that it bears testimony to the absorbing interest which the people of India evinced in the mythology of their land. In a country like India, where mythology appeals most to the mass mind, it is difficult for the artist to cut himself off from the depiction of images of mythological fancy. Designs of strange figures, dragons, mythical monsters and many fanciful objects described in the mythology become the theme of the artist in the scheme of decoration of temples. By the miraculous vividness of their forms they rouse strange feelings in their beholders and open the gates of wonder. These objects are not born of jaded tastes or of a mere longing for what was not or of 'life's impoverished glamour.' They are creations of fertile and wonderful minds, products of mythopoeic fancy. 'Vyāla' which appears so frequently and prominently among India's carvings and paintings is a fabulous animal, a creature of mythopoeic imagination. It is ferocious in look and is described as living upon lions, the kings of the animal world. The creative force that led to the production of such fanciful and fierce objects, such strange and striking creatures is inherent in the soil of a tropical country like India. As William Cohn would remark: "Where could this creative force be more fruitful than in the glowing heat of a tropical country, where side by side with the mightiest, eternally snow-clad mountains stretch away extensive plains, where side by side of deserts scorched by the sunshine teeming, impenetrable, primitive forests, where elephants and snakes, tigers and poisonous insects all similarly threaten men". Fergusson condemns profusion of decoration as "over-decorated ugliness", but this remark does not hold good in the case of an Indian shrine, for temple, it must be remembered, is an offering, a gift to the Supreme enshrined in it. Ornament here is not a kind of upholstery, but a 'deliberate incitement to more abundant energies'.

IDEALISM—THE LEGACY OF INDIA

"Ideals may be supplied to art by a small school or society, or by a race and country. Or they may come from a deeper source still, human nature, or the subconscious life which lies at the roots of human nature. If the ideals are narrow and local, the art works only for a clique or coterie. If they are broad and thoroughly human, the art works for a nation or for the whole human race:" thus observes Percy Brown.⁴² India leaves to the human race a rich legacy of idealism. She bequeaths to us art which is the true exponent of human spirit. This art bears the message of spirituality and carries the mind of the beholder from the

visible to the invisible and the spiritual. This art is classical in the sense that it derives its life and strength from the conception of what is permanent and fundamental. At the present time, at the close of a cultural cycle, when traditions are all breaking down, India stands alone of old nations that have passed through the different stages of youth, maturity and decay. She is the only surviving country of the ancient civilised world and her continuous cultural life is due to her adherence to the permanent values of life. Her Śilpasastras are records which set forth themes of art, commonly termed 'religious.' A careful study of these records will amply repay the attention bestowed upon them since they truthfully reflect a distinct and potent art-tradition which is a priceless possession of the Indian people and an object of respect and reverence with the lovers of India. Should we not therefore tap the springs of India's art-treasures which lie hidden in her classic treatises on Śilpa?

42. *A Grammar of Greek Art*, p. 15.

Aphaeresis, Syncope and Apocope

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Aphaeresis, the tendency to remove a letter or a syllable at the beginning of a word, has been the cause of the loss of the initial "y" in such Tamil words as āru (= a river), ānai (= an elephant) and āḍu (= sheep) which were originally yāru, yānai and yāḍu. Due to the same tendency "tāy" (= mother) seems to have been first weakened into "yāy"¹ and then into "ñāy"² and "āy" (cf. "Tāy" in Malayalam and "dāi" in Gond) (also "tāyi" in Yerukala and "tāi" in Baḍaga).

"Tāy", however, was not completely crowded out. Slowly there appeared, it seems, a preference for the old "tāy" which had once been simplified. Here a later process has ended by favouring the very same acoustic type as was eliminated by an earlier change.³ Thus tāy has come back with greater vigour. Whereas at one stage in the history of the Tamil language easing was brought about in this word by the dropping of the dental plosive "t", at another it was by means of the insertion of the same phoneme that ease was secured. The respective reasons are set forth below. "T" is produced by the tip of the tongue making a complete closure against the teeth-ridge.⁴ But the semi-vowel "y" is produced somewhere near the teeth-ridge and is the last in the series of front sounds produced without contact.⁵ And in between these two sounds has to be produced "ā", the first vowel in the back series. In anticipation of the sound "y" that is to follow,⁶ the articulatory organs seem to have produced the front semi-vowel "y" instead of the


front plosive "t". Therefore it is that "tāy" originally changed into "yāy".

But when "yāy" was in vogue for sometime, the vocal organs perhaps found it difficult to execute a rapid succession of identical movements for "y" and hence the palatal nasal "ñ" replaced the initial "y". The merit of "ñ" is that its place of production, the hard palate, is nearer to the place of production of the vowel "ā". This merit itself appears to have disserved it later, for this seems to have been the cause of its ousting. When, as a result of this, "āy" came into being and was in use for sometime, it was probably in danger of being lost, unless some "body" was given to it. As Mr. Vendreyes remarks,⁷ "very short words often lack expression and when phonetic changes tend to abridge words, these are especially prone to disappear." In order that the word might be preserved, lengthened forms such as "āyi", "āyā" and "ā(y)cci" arose in ordinary conversation. When the form "āy" was not serviceable in itself and when more "body" had to be given it, the same phoneme "t", which was originally sought to be eliminated, came to be alternately introduced and ultimately it gained favour by means of suitably supplying the substance the word "āy" lacked. Thus it is that "tāy" has come back with redoubled vigour. In this instance therefore *epenthesis* as well as *aphaeresis* is found.

Syncope, the phonetic tendency to drop an intermediate syllable in a word, is also found in Tamil. In the word "ām" (= Yes; literally, will be or will happen) of to-day the medial syllable "ku" has been completely omitted after a long period of slurring over that sound. "Ku" was very probably corrupted into something like an aspirate "hu" or a sonant "gu" which in turn has been dropped. To the original root "ā" (= to become) the formative "ku" should have been originally added. Then "āku" + "um" (the aorist particle) should have become "ākum" by rule. This has, however, been simplified into "ām" because of the relative frequency of the occurrence in Tamil of the compound phoneme "ku", which happens to be the sign of the dative case. Furthermore, "ku" is found occasionally to have served the purpose of indicating a noun in the genitive case too, as in "avaraku makaṇ" (= son to him). These occurrences were in addition to its appearance in several words as a formative infix. Thus the number of times of the occurrence of "ku" in Tamil being proportionately large, it came to be slurred in articulation and was finally left out.⁸ The same tendency is found in the words "pōm" for "pōkum" (= that which goes to the

1. Puṛaṇānūru verse 159 and Aiṅkuṇūru, verses 1-10, 186, 280, 385.
2. Kuṛuntokai, verse 40.
3. Cf. Leonard Bloomfield: *Language* (Revised Edition, 1935), p. 368.
4. Vide Tolkāppiyam—Orthography, rule 93.
5. Vide Dr. I. J. S. Taraporewala: *Elements of the Science of Language*, p. 234; and Tolkāppiyam—Orthography, rule 99.
6. Hermann Paul: *Principles of the History of Language*, p. 46; and Otto Jespersen: *Language, its nature, etc.* (1934 edn.), p. 280. Also cf. L. R. Palmer's *Introduction to Modern Linguistics*, p. 24.

7. *Language, a Linguistic Introduction to History*, p. 213.
8. Cf. Bloomfield: *Language*, p. 387.



for "cākum" (= that which dies) and "vēm" for "vēkum" (= that which warms). Besides the syncopation of "ku" or "k" there is that of "y" too. Instances are "vākkarici" for "vāykkarici" (= rice for the mouth) and "pāccal" for "pāyccal" (= that which rises or jumps).

Weakenings far in excess of normal phonetic change are also found. They are not ordinary syncopations and cannot possibly be explained now except by stating that they are in some manner related to what Mr. L. Bloomfield, the famous American philologist, would call "the sub-linguistic status of conventional formulae".⁹ "Arumanta-piḷḷai" is an instance in point. That compound word is the result of the weakening of the old "arumaruntanna-piḷḷai" (= a son as dear as a rare medicine). The articulating apparatus having slowly stunted its work of complete and exact enunciation, several slurrings and abbreviations must have taken place before the form "arumanta" was reached. At any rate, this excess weakening should be regarded as very different from sound change proper. It is a weakening similar to the English weakening of "God be with you" into "Good-bye".

Apocope seems to be less common than syncope but much more common than aphaeresis in Tamil. This tendency to reject or to weaken a final sound is evident in the modern pronunciation of the Tamil words "enney" as "eṇṇai" and "venney" as "veṇṇai". Doubtless these words should have had a final "y" in the Primitive Dravidian, for they have emerged from a combination with the word "ney" of old, meaning any gleamy liquid.¹⁰ "Y", however, is scrupulously preserved in the Tamil literature because of the sentimentally alert protection imposed by the writers themselves.¹¹ Whereas in spoken Tamil the tendency to apocope "y" is very often found, in the other main Dravidian languages it started long before and has spread :—

Kannada.	Tulu.	Telugu.	Malayalam.	Tam. (lity.).	Tam. (coll.).
Benne		Venna	Venna	Venney	Veṇṇai
Yenne	Yenne		Enna	Enney	Ennai

9. Language, p. 388.

10. Vide my article on "The Semantic Principle of Expansion"—A. U. Journal (January, 1937), p. 151.

11. Cf. Dr. T. G. Tucker : Natural History of Language, p. 354.

It is noteworthy that the tendency, however, is extending its range in modern Tamil to other sounds such as the trill "r", as is evident from the disappearance of the final "r" in the word "taṇṇir" (= cold water) which is mostly pronounced as "taṇṇi". Sometimes, in order to compensate for the loss of "r", an elongation of the final vowel "i" takes place and thus we have the alternative pronunciation as "taṇṇī".¹²

12. Cf. Dr. John Peile : Philology, p. 36.

Industrial Disputes and Their Settlement

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Ever since the Industrial Revolution disputes between employers and labourers have been almost inevitable features of the modern organisation of industry. This may, in part, be ascribed to the fact that the existing industrial organization has shattered the personal bond between workers and employer. In spite of various attempts, industrial disputes have existed in the past, are still persisting in many countries at the present day, and it is, beyond doubt, desirable that they should be minimised, if not totally abolished, in the future. Different types of machinery have been adopted in different countries to settle industrial disputes. The Canadian Industrial Dispute Act of 1907, the Italian Act of 1926, the Belgium Order of 1926, the Conciliation Act and the Industrial Courts Act of 1919 in Great Britain, the Labour Courts of Germany, the Industrial Disputes Act of India and various pieces of legislation in Australasia have all sought in different ways to settle disputes in industries, as far as possible, amicably. It has been the consistent and persistent endeavour of legislators to secure closer contact between the employees and employers in order to effect peaceful settlement of industrial differences. The various recommendations of the Whitely Committee in England such as the establishment of Workshop Committees, District Councils, Industrial Councils, aim at arriving at solutions acceptable alike to employer and employee.

From a close examination of the legislation on the matter in almost all countries of the world one fact emerges, *viz.*, compulsory arbitration is no longer favoured for an effective solution of the problem. A few of the probable reasons for this attitude may be mentioned. As compared with conciliation, compulsory arbitration has the disadvantage that it does not automatically win the support of both parties to the dispute. The task of the arbitrator is very difficult since he does not possess any recognised body of laws or precedents on which he can base his decisions. These decisions are therefore, necessarily, empirical and arbitrary. Besides, compulsory arbitration takes away from the

worker his right to strike and the opposition from organised labour may make the enforcement of the arbitrator's decisions well nigh impossible. It has also the added disadvantage that Government becomes directly involved in the dispute and has to use sanctions against the employers or against a large body of the employees. While the former may be comparatively easy the latter would be an extremely difficult proposition. Voluntary conciliation, on the other hand, is based on the mutual agreement of the parties. Instead of trying to enforce on the parties a decision from outside steps are taken to bring the parties together and bring about an agreement acceptable to both. Voluntary conciliation eliminates the necessity for enforcement of sanctions and makes for greater stability of the settlement agreed on. It may, however, be contended that State interference in industrial disputes is only logical in that the State which has laid down conditions of work for the protection of the workers and interfered in industry in countless other ways, seeks also to minimise industrial wastage by ruling out strikes; the answer is, that while this position is absolutely justifiable in theory, it has been an unequivocal failure in practice. It has, also, to be remembered that voluntary conciliation has its own limitations: for its proper functioning, sound organisation of workers and employers is a necessary condition. Future legislation in India has to take this aspect of the question into consideration.

Before the Trade Disputes Act of 1929 the only official body for the arbitration and conciliation of trade disputes in India was a solitary Conciliation panel in Bengal. The Employers' and workmen's (Disputes) Act of 1860 was restricted to railway and public works and dealt only with individuals. It did not seek to provide any machinery for the settlement of disputes in other trades or industries. In the same year and in 1861 this Act was extended to various districts in the Bombay Presidency and in 1873 to Sind. This Act was repealed in 1932 and there are no records to show the extent of its effectiveness while it was on the Statute Book. In 1919 and 1920 violent industrial disputes occurred in various parts of the country. In 1921 and '22 the Governments of Bengal and Bombay appointed committees to go into the matter; and in 1924 the Government of India prepared a Bill based on the Bombay recommendations. But it was only in 1929 that the Trade Disputes Act was actually passed. This Act is applicable for a period of five years. In the provinces too legislation on this subject has either been effected or attempted. Being most vitally interested in large scale industry Bombay passed the Trade Disputes Conciliation Act in 1934. In the first instance it applied only to the textile industry in and around

Bombay City. The Act provides for the appointment of a Government Labour Officer and the creation of a Board of Conciliation. The Officer is meant to guard the interests of labour and promote good relations with the employers. He has the powers of a Civil Court and he is the ex-officio head of the Board of Conciliation. Obstruction to the Board's work is punishable with imprisonment up to 6 months though picketing to continue the strike is not penalised. Similar legislation has been attempted in other provinces. In Madras the Minister of Industries circulated a memorandum for eliciting public opinion in regard to legislation of the same kind.

I shall confine myself in this paper to an examination of the main provisions of the Trade Disputes Act of 1929 (Act No. VII of 1929) of the Central Government. This Act empowers the provincial governments or the Central Government to refer any matters connected with a dispute existing or apprehended to a Court of Inquiry or a Board of Conciliation. If a majority in each of the parties so desire it, the Government may appoint a Court of Inquiry or a Conciliation Board which ever is desired. The Court may consist of one or more persons unconnected with the dispute, may hold sittings in public or *in camera* and may issue interim reports and a final report. A Board of Conciliation may consist of 1, 3, or 5 persons including an equal number of representatives of the parties. It is the Board's duty to bring about an amicable settlement as early as possible. If a settlement is arrived at in the course of its work the Board must send to the proper authority a copy of the settlement duly signed by the parties and a report of the activities of the Board. Even if no agreement is reached a clearly worded written report must be sent recounting the steps taken by them to effect a settlement along with their recommendations for bringing the dispute to a settlement. The Courts and Boards under this Act are invested with all the powers of Civil Courts for enforcing the attendance of persons and their examination on oath, for compelling the production of documents and material objects and for issuing commissions for examining witnesses and for such connected things. The Act also provides for the interim reconstitution of a Court or Board if that becomes necessary. All the members of the Court or Board have to sign the written report but they may append minority reports. These reports have to be published by the Government but they may use their discretion in the matter of publishing individual evidences. Information given to the Board or Court, if otherwise not available to the public, may be published only with the consent of the parties concerned. Unauthorised publication of confidential information is penalised. The Act also provides for the representation of the parties by legal practitioners before the Courts or Boards.

The Act makes special provision in regard to public utility services, especially the Railways. It penalises strikes and lockouts without 14 days' previous notice when the strike is in breach of a definite contract between workmen and employer. A strike or lock-out is illegal if it is not concerned with a dispute within the trade or industry or if it is designed to cause prolonged public hardship or to coerce the Government. Financial aid to illegal strikes or lock-outs is also penalised. Punishment is also provided for incitement or instigation of illegal strikes. For prosecution under this Act previous sanction of Government is necessary; cases in connection with this can be tried only by a Presidency or First Class Magistrate. Provision is also made for the protection of persons refusing to take part in illegal strikes or lock-outs. In regard to centrally controlled industries, business and undertakings the Governor-General is given powers to make rules regarding the powers of the Courts and Boards, the allowances to their members and establishments and other connected matters. Similar power is also given to Provincial Governors in respect of other industries, etc., in their respective provinces.

This Act has many defects. Till very recently this Act was very sparingly used by the Central Government as well as by the Provincial Governments. In Madras after the advent of the Congress Ministry, the Minister of Labour appointed a number of Courts of Inquiry to investigate into apprehended disputes. This Act was carefully scrutinised by the Royal Commission on Labour who have made many valuable suggestions for the improvement of the Act.

A year before the Act was due to expire, in May 1933, the Central Government invited the opinions of the Provincial Governments as to whether the Act of 1929 ought to be made permanent and if so what amendments were desirable. Besides, the Central Government wanted to know whether any statutory provision should be made for appointing Conciliation Officers and provincial Industrial Courts, the latter being modelled on the British Industrial Courts. They invited opinion also on the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs while proceedings are pending in a court of enquiry or Board of Conciliation, on making the awards of Boards of Conciliation mandatory on the parties and on penalising picketing at all times or during the pendency of proceedings before a Court of enquiry or a Board of Conciliation. In 1934 the Government of India converted the Act of 1929 into a permanent measure.

It would be good if the following points are taken into consideration in any future legislation on the subject. Every provincial minister must have a certain number of trained conciliators and mediators to assist him. When there is a dispute, actual or apprehended, he must send one

to the spot. The conciliator must persuade the parties to use the voluntary conciliation machinery existing in the industry concerned so that a peaceful solution may be secured. In the absence of such machinery he must use his influence to bring the parties together so that they might hit upon a solution. If he fails he must promptly report to the minister who must have the power to appoint a Court of Inquiry immediately. Such a court will collect all the relevant data and find out exactly the points at dispute. In every case the report must be published and rendered easily available to the public. The publication of the report will not only clarify the points at issue but will also serve to educate the general public on the question and concentrate public opinion on the measures needed. After the report is published either of the parties must have the right to request the minister to appoint a Board of Conciliation. Over and above all these there must be in each province a permanent Industrial Court for review work. As in the Canadian Industrial Act of 1907 it must also be provided that the *status quo* should be maintained during the pendency of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. This does not affect the right to strike or lock-out but merely serves to clarify the issues at stake ; these weapons of industrial warfare are only suspended and may be used after the Court of Inquiry has finished its labours.

Before concluding, I wish to reiterate that voluntary conciliation is infinitely better than compulsory arbitration. For the proper functioning of this machinery the Minister of Labour and Industries must use all his influence for establishing Workshop Committees, Industrial Councils and other forms of voluntary Conciliation Machinery so that both the parties in the industry may be able to understand and appreciate the other man's point of view. Very often experience proves that stubborn and protracted disputes between individuals have yielded before the personal touch, misunderstandings have vanished magically and understanding and amity have resulted. So too in industry the brutal and wasteful weapons of strike and lock-out may be abolished if time and opportunity are given for mutual contact and friendly discussion so that the finer side of human nature may be brought into play. Personal contact and complete understanding must inevitably lead to a policy of mutual co-operation between the different limbs of the same organism of production resulting in the contentment of the worker and the stability of the industry and the greater good of the State and the community which they are meant to serve. The triumphs of peace and persuasion are slow but sure ; they are steadfast as granite though not quick and spectacular like the passing victories of power and force.

NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

NĀRĀYANĀRYA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

BY

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INTRODUCTION

I

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF NĀRĀYAṆĀRYA

Among the treatises on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy now extant, *Nītimālā* holds an honoured place. Its reputed author, Nārāyaṇārya, was a bold and original thinker. Vedānta Deśika holds him in high esteem, and frequently cites him in support of his own views.¹

As in the case of other eminent Indian thinkers, it cannot be definitely ascertained when he flourished and where. Since *Nītimālā* contains numerous references to the *Śrī-Bhāṣya* and alludes also to *Vedārtha-Saṁgraha*,² and since Vedānta Deśika refers in his writings to Nārāyaṇārya and his works, it can be said with certainty that he must have lived in the period subsequent to Rāmānuja and anterior to Vedānta Deśika (i.e., some time between 1075 and 1250 A.D.).

The author of *Nītimālā* is not to be confounded with Śrī Raṅga-nārāyaṇārya, otherwise known as Vaṅgīpurattu Nambi, who has composed some well-known Kārikās. The latter was one of the direct disciples of Bhagavān Rāmānuja and the guru of one Nārāyaṇamuni. Whenever Vedānta Deśika refers to the author of the Kārikās, he

1. “Sūtroktam nūnam anyat ‘Prājñair Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ’” *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā*, stanza 11; “Yat tu Nītimālāyām Nārāyaṇāryair uktam-jñānasya tu parāktvābhāvamātram eva, na tu pratyaktvam”; *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana*, *Jaḍa-dravyapariccheda*, p. 16; “Nārāyaṇāryais tu sambhūti-vināśa-śabdau phaladvārā lakṣanayā vidyā-karma-viśayāv uktau ‘viduṣo vidyāsādhyasya apavargasya samyag-abhivṛddhi-rūpatvāt’ ityādinā”; *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, *Jīvapariniccheda*, pp. 162-3; “ayam evārthaḥ Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ apy uktaḥ ‘Guṇaiḥ iyattārāhityāt, vastunā aparic-chinnatvaṅca avagamyate’ iti”; *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana*, *Īśvarapariccheda*, p. 212; “Yat tu Nārāyaṇāryair uktam ‘saṁsthānam eva jātiḥ; tat pratipiṇḍam bhinnatvepi dvitīyādipiṇḍeṣu saṁsādrśyāt pratisandhīyamānam svāśrayeṣu vastuṣu ekabuddhi-śabdā-nibandhanam bhavati’”; *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana*, *Adṛavyapariccheda*, p. 375. In *Sarvārthasiddhi* while commenting on the verse from the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* commencing with the word “Devaprītyādikam vā” Vedānta Deśika quotes the following verse from Nārāyaṇārya’s *Nītimālā*: “āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire,” *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Benares edition, p. 680. This verse is also quoted in *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, (memorial edition) p. 283: Nārāyaṇāryaistu evam uktam

‘āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire |
Bhāṣyakāropi Bhagavān evam evā’nvamanyata |’”

2. *Nītimālā*, p. 54.

takes special care to give his full name,³ lest he should be mistaken for Nārāyaṇārya, the author of Nītimālā.

In his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*⁴ and in his *Tātparyā-Candrikā*⁵ also, which is an elaborate commentary on Bhagavān Rāmānuja's *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, Vedānta Deśika refers to a gloss on the Bhagavad-Gītā by one Nārāyaṇārya. In the course of his commentary on the Gītā verse "Sarvadharmān parityajya . . .", Vedānta Deśika mentions a number of thinkers who have commented upon the Bhagavad-Gītā and classifies them under two heads⁶:—(i) eminent exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought, such as Bhagavad Yāmunācārya and Bhagavān Rāmānuja; and (ii) rival Vedāntins, such as Piśāca, Rantideva, Gupta, Śaṅkara, Yādavaprakāśa, Nārāyaṇārya and Yajñāsvami. In another context, he describes this Nārāyaṇārya as a follower of Yādavaprakāśa.⁷ Nārāyaṇārya who has commented on the Gītā must be different from Nārāyaṇārya, the author of *Nītimālā*, who is referred to as an ardent Viśiṣṭādvaitin. While explaining the verse in *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa*, wherein the expression "Āptasyāhur niyogam" occurs, Vedānta Deśika states in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*⁸ that in the ranks of the Viśiṣṭādvaita thinkers some maintain that *vidhi* is the Lord's command. That he is evidently thinking here of Nārāyaṇārya is clear from another place in *Sarvārthasiddhi*⁹ and from *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi*¹⁰ where he actually quotes the relevant verse of *Nītimālā* found in p. 54.

3. *Pañcarūtrarakṣā*, p. 30.

4. "Uktañca Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ Bhagavad-Gītā-Bhāṣye-
'Prasiddham api vijñānam vāde Yo nāma nihnute |
Sa sadasyaiḥ niyantavyaḥ vyavasthā nā'nyathā yataḥ ||'"

Nyāyapariśuddhi (Memorial edition), p. 101.

5. "anīyatadharma-parityāgaḥ atra vivakṣitaḥ iti Nārāyaṇārya-vyākhyāyam api na anuṣṭhāna-virodhaḥ." *Gītā-Bhāṣya* with *Tātparyā-candrikā* (Ānanda Press), p. 947.

6. "Piśāca-Rantideva-Gupta-Śaṅkara-Yādavaprakāśa-Bhāskara-Nārāyaṇārya-Yajñāsvami-prabhṛtibhiḥ svam svam matam āsthitaiḥ paraśśataiḥ Bhāṣyakṛdbhiḥ asmat-siddhānta-tīrthakaraśca Bhagavad-Yāmunācārya-Bhāṣyakārādibhiḥ avigīta-parigrhītaḥ ayam atra sārārthaḥ . . ." *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, with *Tātparyā-candrikā*, p. 952.

7. *Saccarītrarakṣā*.

8. "Svapakṣaṇiṣṭhānāmeva keśāmcid Īśvara-niyogarūpa-vidhipakṣam vivicya darśayati." *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Benares edition), p. 684.

9. *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa*, p. 680.

10. "Nārāyaṇāryaistu evam uktam—
'Āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire |
Bhāṣyakāro'pi Bhagavān evam evā'nvamanyata ||'"

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 283.

Besides *Nītimālā*, Nārāyaṇārya has written a treatise on Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. This work is just alluded to in verse 11 of the *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā*. But Kumāra Varada Deśika in his *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā-Paritrāṇa*,¹¹ a commentary on *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā*, tells us that Nārāyaṇārya has attempted in this work to give up needless repetitions and to condense the thousand adhikaraṇas (topics) of Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* into five hundred topics. Nārāyaṇārya's views, however, are not different from those of Jaimini. While the latter elaborately expounded his views even at the risk of repeating himself, so that even the student of mediocre ability could follow them, Nārāyaṇārya had in view the intelligent and talented reader who would naturally be impatient of tiresome repetition.

Nītimālā is written in simple prose interspersed with verse. The ease with which Nārāyaṇārya handles philosophic arguments and the purity of his style are commendable. *Nītimālā* contains a brief, but exceedingly lucid, exposition of the essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. It is divided into ten chapters. The first is devoted to showing that the aspirant for Brahma-vidyā should have previously studied the *Karma-Mīmāṃsā*. In the second chapter, he refutes the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that the Veda has action for its ultimate significance and the Nyāya view that the existence of God can be proved by reason and also shows that the Upaniṣads are not the complements of ritualistic injunctions, but have independent logical validity as statements of what exists as a fact (Brahman). In the third chapter he subjects to critical examination the Advaitic doctrine that the world is only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman. Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda as expounded by Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa comes in for criticism in the fourth and fifth chapters. The next chapter inquires into the nature of Brahman, and is followed by a discussion of the nature of the finite soul in the seventh chapter. The precise significance of *vidhi* is explained in the following chapter. The ninth chapter considers the significance of 'jñāna' which is admitted by all Vedāntins to be the means for attaining mokṣa. An inquiry into the ultimate goal of life (mokṣa) is the subject of the last chapter.

11. "Ata eva prājñā Nārāyaṇāryāḥ:—

parimita-gabhirāṇi paraspara-virodhādi-rahitāni sūtrāṇi praṇīya adhikaraṇānām pañcaśatīm eva Mīmāṃsā-Śāstram ācakṣate. Anyāni punaḥ adhikaraṇāni paunaruktyādi-doṣa-dūṣitāni akathayan . . . Yat tu prājñair Nārāyaṇāryaiḥ saṁgrhya kathānam na tat Jaimini-vacana-dūṣaṇāyate. Jaiminir hi mandāmanda-sakala-śiṣyajāna-saṁvitti-saukāryartham mandaprayojanāni adhikaraṇāni prthak anukathayāñcakāra. Nārāyaṇāryās tu prauḍha-vidvajjana-parigrahābhīsandhinā pradhānārtha-prakāśanena tulya-nyāyatayā sarvam api artha-jātam parimitena grantha-sandarbhena prācikaśan iti dvayor api aikarasya-siddhiḥ iti na virodha-gandhaḥ."

Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā-Paritrāṇa, p. 16.

II

ARGUMENT

1. HOW INQUIRY INTO BRAHMAN PRESUPPOSES
INVESTIGATION INTO KARMA

(Brahma-vicārasya karmavicārānantarya-nirṇayādhikārah.)

The Advaita Doctrine.

The opening chapter of *Nītimālā* discusses the question: Does the study of the Vedānta presuppose as a necessary preliminary an investigation into the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*? The Advaitins answer this question in the negative and contend that, just as the inquiry into the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* (*Karma-jijñāsā*) presupposes only the memorising of the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*, *Brahma-Mīmāṃsā* (the inquiry into Brahman) presupposes only the memorising of the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*, and not the inquiry into sacrificial duties.

Objection may be taken to this view on the following grounds:—

(i) The two inquiries must be undertaken in the order in which the two parts of the Veda—the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*—have been memorised. (ii) Since the Vedānta enjoins meditation on *udgītha* and the like, which are auxiliary to sacrificial ritual (karma), such meditations presuppose acquaintance with sacrifices. (iii) As the injunction ‘The Veda should be studied’ (svādhyāyo’dhyetavyaḥ) insists not merely upon memory by rote, but also upon an understanding of the significance of the texts memorised, even the person who is keen on attaining mokṣa must necessarily have inquired into the import of the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* before taking up Vedānta-śāstra. This injunction (*adhyayana-vidhi*) must be taken to insist upon an understanding of the significance of the Vedas for the following reasons: (a) It is least likely that anybody should strive enthusiastically for unintelligently memorising the Vedas, unaccompanied by an insight into their meaning. (b) The injunction, ‘The Veda should be studied’ meaning thereby, “By study the Veda must be made to acquire a certain excellence or sanctity (*saṃskāra*),”¹² implies that the Veda thus sanctified should subserve some purpose. This purpose could be no other than grasping the meaning (*artha-grahaṇa*) of the Vedic texts. (c) Unless this injunction is taken to prescribe also the inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, there would be no opportunity for the pupil to learn the import of the Veda; for the pupil would, in pursuance of another *vidhi* (*adhītya snāyāt*), leave the *gurukula* immediately after having memorised the Veda.

12. ‘Adhyayanena svādhyāyam saṃskuryāt.’

None of these difficulties, says the Advaitin, is insuperable. The first objection is pointless; for the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa* are intended respectively for two sorts of aspirants—those who aspire for advantages, such as celestial bliss, and those who are desirous of attaining mokṣa. Not setting much store by inferior *puruṣārthas*, the latter class is under no obligation to study the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*.

Against the second objection, it is urged that meditation on *udgītha* and the like only serves to heighten the effects of karma and is, in no sense, an indispensable preliminary to the fruition of karma, and that there is nothing improper in the inquiry into the Upaniṣadic texts preceding the inquiry into karma.

The third difficulty is met by saying that the *adhyayana-vidhi* enjoins only memory by rote; for that alone is the immediate result of *adhyayana*. The insight into the import of the Vedic texts which may come later cannot be treated as the goal of *adhyayana*.

Of the three considerations advanced against the Advaitic position, the first is brushed aside. For there is nothing strange in making unintelligent memorising a *puruṣārtha*. Though it may have little value in itself, it may be treated as a legitimate object of human aspiration in so far as it paves the way for the ultimate goal of life, by successively leading to a knowledge of the significance of the Vedas, and the performance of karmas enjoined therein. In fact, even on the view that *adhyayana* includes the understanding of the significance of the Vedas, it has to be admitted that men value this understanding not for its own sake, but for the results which it eventually yields. The second is no serious difficulty; because its serviceability in leading to a grasp of the meaning (*artha-grahaṇa*) is not the only use of the Veda sanctified by study (*adhyayana*); in itself it is useful for the purpose of *japa*. As for the last, none need be commanded to study the meaning of the Veda; for it is a matter left entirely to the discretion of individuals. Even after returning home, the earnest pupil may go to the *guru* again and seek instruction regarding the meaning of the Veda. The plea that he who has returned home has his time fully taken up by a round of duties, and can possibly have no time to seek the *guru* again needs no serious consideration. In the midst of his multifarious duties, sacred and secular, the eager person can still spare time for this purpose. Further there is nothing in the injunction, *adhītya snāyāt*, to suggest that the student should leave the *gurukula* immediately after *adhyayana*. He may well stay on to inquire into the import of the Veda. All that it emphasises is that he should not think of returning home before finishing the study (*adhyayana*).

The Advaitin continues that even he who maintains that the knowledge of the import (*artha-grahaṇa*) is the goal of study (*adhyayana*) has to make an exception in two cases :—(i) the study of meaningless expressions found in the Veda, such as *hum* and *phaṭ*, and (ii) the study of those portions of the Veda which describe the sacrificial duties that the learner concerned is not expected to discharge. He will also have to admit that the fruit of their study is either some unseen merit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) or mere memory of the text (*akṣaragrahaṇa*). Rather than make this needless discrimination between two sorts of Vedic texts, it would be preferable to maintain that mere verbal memory or some unseen fruit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is the universal result of *adhyayana* (study).

From this it would not follow, says the Advaitin, that none need inquire into the significance of the Veda. All that is contended is, it is not part of the injunction that the Veda should be studied (*adhyayana-vidhi*). As the person memorising the Veda does so with the help of the *aṅgas* (supplementary studies), he is sure to have understood the general drift of Vedic teaching even while engaged in memorising the Veda. Only he cannot be said to have understood it fully. If he is desirous of getting a fuller and clearer knowledge of Vedic teaching there is nothing to prevent him from obtaining this enlightenment from the *guru*. Once it is shown that the injunction, viz., ‘the Veda should be studied’ does not prescribe inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, it would be clear that there is no point in saying that one should have inquired into the meaning of the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* before taking up the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*, as that is the order in which one has studied the Veda. Therefore, the person desirous of obtaining mokṣa may straightway study the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*.

Refutation of the Advaitic Doctrine.

While conceding that the injunction that the Veda should be studied (*adhyayana*) does not insist upon the inquiry into the import of the Vedas memorised, the author is not prepared to accept the Advaitic view that the aspirant for *Brahma-vidyā* may straightway study the Vedānta. On the contrary, he urges that the inquiry into the nature of sacrificial duty (*karma*) should precede the investigation into Brahman.

Three considerations are advanced by Nārāyaṇārya in support of this thesis : (1) The scriptures explicitly assert that the performance of sacrificial duty is the means of acquiring knowledge of Brahman. One scriptural text, for example, says, “They desire to acquire knowledge with the aid of sacrifice (*yajña*), gift (*dāna*), and austerities (*tapas*) of the nature of freedom from desire for the fruit of actions (*anāśakena*).” This is enough to demolish the Advaitic contention that, as the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa* are intended for two sorts of aspirants

(*adhikāri*), the person who is desirous of attaining mokṣa may straightway study the latter without having inquired into the former.

The Advaitin might raise the objection that the text quoted makes sacrifice (*yajña*) the means of the desire for knowledge (*vividiṣā*), and not of knowledge itself (*vedana*). The reply to this is twofold :—(a) In accordance with the well-known dictum that the goal (*sādhya*) of endeavour is either some result (*phala*) or what leads up to it (*phala-sādhana*), the goal of *yajña* should be either the fruit or what leads up to it. But desire for knowledge is neither the result itself nor the means therefor. (b) The sentence, “He desires to go with the aid of horses” (*aśvena gigamiṣati*) obviously makes horses the means for ‘going’, and not for ‘the desire to go’. Likewise, the proposition, “They desire to obtain knowledge by means of *yajña*, *dāna* and *tapas* . . .” means that *yajña* is the means of knowledge (*vedana*), and not of the desire for knowledge (*vedanecchā*).

The Advaitin may object and say that knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna*) is to be obtained from a study of the Vedāntic texts, and not from sacrifices. This objection is met by the remark that by knowledge is not meant ‘knowledge born of Vedāntic texts’ (*vākya-janya-jñāna*), but knowledge which is of the nature of meditation (*upāsanātmaka-jñāna*). If a person performs his religious duties in the spirit of non-attachment to the fruits of his actions, he obtains first mental purification and then knowledge (*vedana*).

While conceding that *upāsana* may stand in need of sacrifice, the Advaitin may still urge that acquaintance with *karma* is unnecessary for inquiry into Brahman. The reply to this is that *Śārīraka-Śāstra* discusses three important problems : (i) the nature of Brahman ; (ii) the *upāsana* necessary for realising Brahman ; and (iii) the goal (*phala*) of Vedānta. Inquiry into *Karma-Kāṇḍa* is essential for the second of these problems. It is but reasonable that the investigation of the *sādhana* (means) should precede the inquiry into the nature of the goal (*phala*). This principle has been followed in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* also. Hence, it must be concluded that *Karma-vicāra* should precede *Brahma-vicāra*.

(2) As the scriptures declare that he who neglects his duties falls into sin, even the person longing for mokṣa is obliged to perform his *karma* in order to avoid sin (*anīṣṭaparihāra*). He too is, therefore, required to study the *Karma-Kāṇḍa*.

(3) The student of the Vedānta must be acquainted with the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, because the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* employs some of the rules (*nyāyas*) followed in *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. For example, in distinguishing

the several *vidyās*, such as *Dahara* and *Bhūma*, from one another, the *Vedānta-Sūtra*¹³ employs *Mīmāṃsā-nyāyas* which serve to distinguish the karmas from one another.

The Advaitin may further argue as follows:—The knowledge that Brahman is a pure unity (*advitīya-vijñāna*) is the means to mokṣa. For acquiring this knowledge of oneness the aspirant must necessarily possess, so the Upaniṣads declare, mental and moral excellences such as control of the mind (*śama*), restraint of the senses (*dama*), renunciation (*uparati*), fortitude (*tītikṣā*) and power of concentration (*samāhita*). It would, therefore, follow that the possession of mental and moral traits, such as *śama* and *dama*, and not sacrifice (*yajña*), is the means to mokṣa. Besides, there is an insuperable difficulty in considering *yajña* as a means to *apavarga* (liberation). *Yajña* implies plurality. How can sacrifice which can flourish only in the soil of diversity be the means for obtaining knowledge of oneness?

To this Nārāyaṇārya replies that it is nowhere stated in the Upaniṣads that knowledge of Brahman who is without distinction leads to mokṣa. Far from asserting that knowledge of *nirviśeṣa* Brahman leads to *mukti*, the Upaniṣads proclaim that he who understands Brahman as being endowed with *viśeṣaṇas*, as having the entire universe consisting of sentient and non-sentient objects as His body, and as possessing illimitable perfections, attains immortality. A *Śvetāśvatara* text, for example, declares: “He who knows the soul and matter to be distinct from their controller, secures the grace of the Lord and thereby attains immortality.”

Nārāyaṇārya goes on to say that the text “They desire to acquire knowledge with the aid of sacrifice (*yajñena*) . . .” by using the term *yajña* in the instrumental case definitely asserts that sacrifice is the cause of the saving knowledge. *Śama*, *dama* and other virtues are to be treated as auxiliary factors (*anugrahaka*). The Advaitin may ask: How can *yajña* and qualities such as *śama* and *dama*, which are wholly contradictory in character, the former standing for what could be accomplished by activity (*vyāpāra-sādhya*) and the latter taking the form of cessation of activity (*uparama-rūpa*), be the conjoint means for the selfsame knowledge (*vedana*). Nārāyaṇārya replies that they serve two aspects of the same and are not contradictory, because the *vyāpāra* refers to the actions enjoined in the Veda, while *uparati* pertains to those actions that have been prohibited and that arise from desire for fruits.

13. Vide *Vedānta-Sūtra*, III, iii. 26 and 42.

2. ON THE VALIDITY OF THE VEDĀNTA.

(*Vedānta-prāmāṇya-nirṇayādhikāra*.)

Taking a pragmatic view of knowledge, the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā asserts that every proposition, whether it be Vedic or not, must point to something to be accomplished (*sādhya* or *kārya*), and not to an existent something (*siddha*). Although the Bhāṭṭa school admits that propositions may either state facts (*siddha*) or reveal some task to be performed (*sādhya*), it yet maintains that, so far as Vedic utterances are concerned, they have action for their final import. Thus, both the schools of Mīmāṃsā are at one in declaring that the Veda has action for its ultimate meaning. On this view, the Vedāntic texts, though apparently statements of fact, are really to be construed as lending support to the injunctions and prohibitions conveyed in other portions of the Veda. Thus, the Upaniṣads are reduced to a position of unimportance, being denied independent logical value (*prāmāṇya*). Surely, the Vedāntin, who regards the Upaniṣads as the final authority for our knowledge of ultimate reality, cannot allow this doctrine to go unchallenged. Nor can he countenance the Nyāya doctrine that God's existence is proved by reason (*anumāna*); for, though the Naiyāyika concedes that the scriptures convey knowledge of matters of fact, his belief that God is established through inference, and not through scripture, as in the Vedānta, deprives the Vedas of all authority (*prāmāṇya*), so far as knowledge of Brahman is concerned. For there is the well-known dictum that the scriptures deal with matters lying beyond the reach of the other pramāṇas.¹⁴ Therefore, the author attempts, in this chapter, to refute these two doctrines which threaten to nullify the Upaniṣads.

The Prābhākara View.

The Prābhākara view is first taken up for examination. In defence of the view that every proposition signifies something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and that the Vedāntic texts also, of necessity, point to *sādhya*, tasks to be performed, it is urged that words would convey intelligible meaning only when their relation to their respective significations have already been grasped. One who is ignorant of the relation of words to their meanings makes no sense out of them. An examination of the way in which the meanings of words are learnt reveals, the Prābhākara points out, that children get to know the significance of words by comparing and contrasting commands like “fetch the cow” (*gām ānaya*), “fetch the horse” (*aśvam ānaya*), and “tie up the cow,” (*gām badhāna*)

14. Aprāpte śāstram arthavat.

and so forth, which elderly persons use in daily intercourse. It is but natural that every word comes to be associated in the child's mind with some action or other. Thus, he concludes that words have the power to signify action, but never the capacity to denote existing things. The Upaniṣadic texts cannot be an exception to this; they too must teach what has to be done and not what exists as a fact, i.e., Brahman. It is possible to argue that an utterance need not always convey commands and that it may also state facts. When, for example, a person's remarks produce in the listener a beaming countenance, the bystander may learn from the facial expression that the remarks only conveyed the news of the birth of a son and not an action. But this contention, the Prābhākara replies, is untenable; for, as there are manifold causes of joy, all that the bystander could learn is that the utterance is the cause of joy; and he could not gather that it is an announcement of the birth of a son.

Refutation of the Prābhākara View.

Nārāyaṇārya declines to subscribe to the Prābhākara view for the following reasons:—(i) For one thing, the example adduced by the opponent does not prove his point. It was suggested that as there is plurality of causes of joy, the messenger's utterance could only convey the news that something that could occasion joy has happened. An effective reply to this suggestion is that, for an identical reason, even the sentence "tie up the cow" (*gām badhāna*) can only mean to the bystander that something has to be done. What that task is he cannot easily guess. For, on hearing the words of the teacher, "tie up the cow", the pupil is found to close his book, to get up from his seat, proceed to the garden and then, tie the cow. Which of these activities was referred to by the master's command, the bystander has no means of understanding.

(ii) Again, before entering upon any action, a person must have a knowledge of the action to be executed. This, in its turn, presupposes acquaintance with the objects connected thereto. The proper sequence is an insight into the meaning of the words uttered by the *guru*, the knowledge that a task has to be performed and then the actual performance, i.e., the overt action. Words, then, must be taken to generate knowledge of objects, and not of what has to be effected.

(iii) Further, it is not true that meanings of words are understood only from the commands given by elderly persons in daily intercourse. The father, mother, teacher or other elderly person points with the finger to different objects in the environment and at the same time utters their respective names. The observant child learns in course of time that these words of themselves denote the several objects in the environment and that the application of such and such names to such and such

objects is based upon the denotative power of words and that the meanings of words do not include a reference to actions. Later, at school, the teacher separates the words of a sentence and points to their meanings.

Nyāya Argument for God's Existence.

Next, Nārāyaṇārya examines the Nyāya doctrine that God's existence is established through inference. The main argument advanced by the Naiyāyika to prove the existence of God may be stated as follows:—Being made up of parts, the earth, the mountain and other things composed of diverse parts and comprising this universe must be effects. And effects are everywhere found to point to efficient causes that are of the nature of agents who know the material (*upādāna*) and the auxiliary (*upakarana*) causes and who also know for whom and for what purpose these effects are intended. Clearly, this agent cannot be the finite souls themselves; for, prior to creation, these souls being devoid of senses, body and also of knowledge (*jñāna*) and power (*śakti*) are scarcely different from non-sentient objects (*acitkalpa*). It is futile to suggest that the countless souls, though devoid of creative power in themselves, yet produce the world by virtue of their past karma; for it makes the gratuitous assumption that the countless souls have performed diverse deeds, which share in common the responsibility for creating the world. The Naiyāyika brushes aside the objection that the argument can at best establish that the creator of the world, like the maker of jars, furniture and so forth, is a person subject to karma, and not an omnipotent Lord. He thinks that if all the characteristics found in the illustrative example (*dṛṣṭānta*), whether they be relevant to the point at issue or not, must necessarily be inferred in the *pakṣa* (subject of the inference), there must be an end to all inference.

Examination of the Nyāya Argument.

Subjecting this argument to a rigorous scrutiny, Nārāyaṇārya shows that, at best, it may establish only that the world needs a cause; but that the author of the universe is a Supreme Personality endowed with auspicious qualities can only be learnt from the scriptures. The Naiyāyika argued that the world with its wonderful shape points to a Supreme Person, even as towers, fortifications and the like point to competent agents; but that argument may as well prove, says Nārāyaṇārya, that, as in the examples cited, many persons are involved in creating the world. Considerations of economy of thought (*lāghava*), he continues, are wholly beside the point; and consistently with the nature of the effect, namely, its wondrous shapes, diversity of authorship must be inferred. He adds that if, on the analogy of jars, cloth and other objects in our environment, the existence of a maker of the world

is inferred, this maker must, like the potter, be subject to *karma*, and need not be omniscient. It is unreasonable on the part of the Naiyāyika to suggest that the analogy should not be pressed beyond a certain point and that when all the features found in the illustrative example are inferred to exist in the *pakṣa*, there would be an end to all inference. For on the strength of the reason (*hetu*), the argument will certainly prove all those features that have not been proved by other *pramāṇas* to be inconsistent with the case in question. As God is beyond the reach of other *pramāṇas*, none of the *pramāṇas* has shown that certain features present in the illustrative example will be inconsistent here. Hence the *hetu* must be taken to prove that the *pakṣa* does resemble the illustrative example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in all respects.

The Naiyāyika may still contend that the very distinction of the world from objects, like jars, must point to a creator who is an omniscient Lord, rather than a person who is subject to *karma*. But this, says Nārāyaṇārya, is untenable; for he who is free from *karma* must be devoid of all contact with body, senses and the like, and cannot, therefore, enter upon creative activity. And it is idle to contend that though devoid of body, senses and other faculties, he may create with the mere aid of his will (*saṁkalpa*); for there can be no *saṁkalpa* in the absence of the body. Should the Naiyāyika contend that the creator of the world is eternally endowed with a body, it may be replied that this would contradict his belief that whatever is made up of parts is an effect and cannot be eternal. At best the Nyāya argument proves the existence of a person more competent than any of the finite souls; but it would scarcely establish that he is at once the efficient and the material cause, and that he creates at one stroke this expansive world with the sole aid of his *saṁkalpa*. That such a God exists can be gathered only from the scriptures.

The Bhāṭṭa View.

Assigning a distinctive position to verbal testimony (*śabda*), the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka holds that while perception and other *pramāṇas* may acquaint us with facts useful or otherwise, the Veda must exclusively serve some useful practical purpose or other, and, must, therefore, point only to action. Since all utterances are meant for the communication of ideas, none would listen to statements, if they did not serve useful ends. Hence only such sentences as are relevant to our purposes can be treated as a source of true knowledge. The securing of pleasure (*sukha-prāpti*) and the avoidance of pain (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*) are the sole ends which man strives after. And these are to be attained only by performing certain actions and desisting from others. The performance of the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, for example, leads to celestial

bliss; and the avoiding of injury (*himsā*) to living beings keeps away the terrors of hell (*naraka*). Those scriptural texts which neither initiate action nor inhibit it can never lead to pleasure or to the removal of suffering. Therefore, the Vedāntic texts are to be taken as prompting or inhibiting activity, if they are to be regarded as a *pramāṇa*.

To a superficial observer certain sentences which merely state facts, without initiating action (*pravṛtti*) or prohibiting it (*nivṛtti*), may appear to produce joy or to terminate pain. For example, the sentence "Here is a treasure-trove" causes happiness; and the proposition, "Here is no serpent", dispels fear. But the careful student will realise that it is the knowledge of the existence of the treasure, rather than its mere existence, that leads to joy. Hence, the sentence, "Here is a treasure-trove", must be construed as conveying the command (*vidhi*), "You ought to understand that there is a treasure-trove."

Refutation of the Bhāṭṭa View.

Nārāyaṇārya disagrees with the Bhāṭṭa view and points out that even judgments which do not prompt action or inhibit it may yet serve useful ends. "Here is a treasure-trove" is useful in itself, in so far as it furnishes knowledge of the presence of hidden treasure. It is mere perversity to construe it as an injunction. Since knowledge is under the control of the *pramāṇas*, and not of the self, knowledge cannot be the subject of a command. Perhaps it may be suggested that all that the *vidhi* means is "Engage in such activities as will lead to this knowledge." But in preference to this roundabout explanation, it is more reasonable to hold that it reveals the existence of the treasure and, thereby, produces joy.

One may admit that this proposition occasions joy, but yet argue that there is no guarantee that it reveals the actual existence of treasure. Like the false promises deliberately used by elderly persons to create joy in children, the sentence in question may be false in fact and yet be the cause of joy. To this the author replies that this proposition, like the promises held out to children, produces pleasure only because it is accepted as true. The moment it is discovered to be false, it ceases to generate joy. But as regards the Upaniṣads, there being no subsequent contradiction (*bādha-jñāna*), no doubts concerning their *prāmāṇya* (truth-value) need be entertained at all. Consequently, Vedāntic texts teaching the existence of Brahman have *prāmāṇya*.

Certain Vedic passages enjoining duties, such as the performance of *viśvajit* sacrifice, do not contain any reference to the desirable results accruing from their performance. In such cases, the opponent is prepared to assume some comparatively trivial result and treat those passages as having logical value. When that is so, what difficulty could

he have in attributing *prāmāṇya* to Vedāntic texts which, at the very moment they are heard, deal directly with the supreme goal of life (*parama-prayojana*), namely, Brahman Himself.

3. REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF THE PHENOMENALITY OF THE WORLD

(*Vivartapakṣa-pratikṣepādhikāra*.)

Vivarta-vāda in Outline.

The Advaitic doctrine that the world is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman is refuted in this chapter. The case for *vivarta-vāda* is stated by Advaitins as follows:—The scriptures teach that Brahman, which is responsible for the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, is *sat* (reality), *cit* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (bliss). It is without distinction of any kind (*nirviśeṣa*), self-luminous (*svayam-prakāśa*) and without a second (*advitīya*). Being clouded by ignorance (*avidyā*) which has no beginning, Brahman becomes the basis of the illusory appearance of this world of plurality. It is in this sense that Brahman is spoken of as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world, and in no other.

Refutation of Vivarta-vāda.

Nārāyaṇārya points out that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world in this sense, by showing that the Advaitic theory that Brahman is pure being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) and is without distinction (*nirviśeṣa*), and without a second (*advitīya*) is unsustainable. He proves also that there is no possibility of Brahman ever being clouded by *avidyā*.

To take the first of these points:—*Sat* cannot be treated as a *jāti* (class characteristic); for, according to the Advaitin, there is only one object wherein it is met with. Nor can *sat* denote 'what can be known' (*prameya*); for Brahman, on the Advaitic view, is not the object of knowledge. Nor yet can it signify distinction from unreality (*asad-vyāvṛtti*); for, if it did, the world which on that view is at once distinct from *sat* and *asad* (*sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*) would possess this character and would, therefore, have to be considered real (*sat*). It cannot also mean mere existence; for that would make Brahman a quality of some entity, since existence is a quality (*dharma*).

The term '*cit*' cannot be said to denote 'that which possesses consciousness (*caitanya*)'; for, on the Advaitic doctrine, Brahman does not possess consciousness, since it is consciousness itself. Nor can it denote 'mere consciousness;' for, if so, knowledge obtained from the

pramāṇas must be termed Brahman. Nor can Brahman be said to be *cit* in the sense of *ajāda* (that which is other than non-sentience), denoting what does not depend upon anything else for its manifestation. For Brahman would then be something that possesses a *prakāśa* which depends exclusively upon itself. But, as a *prakāśa* distinct from Brahman is not admitted by the Advaitin, this interpretation of '*cit*' is opposed to his view.

Again, on the Advaitic position the term *ānanda* cannot be assigned an intelligible meaning. *Ānanda* cannot signify pleasure (*sukha*); for pleasure is well-known to be a quality of the soul; and Brahman is no quality. *Ānanda* cannot denote 'being agreeable' (*anukūlatva*), as it would raise the inevitable question: To whom is it agreeable? Since there is no *jīva* (soul) besides Brahman, it cannot be said to be agreeable to the *jīva*. And since *bhokṛtva* (the character being an enjoyer) is denied to Brahman, *ānanda* cannot be treated as an object of its own enjoyment. Should it be said that it means 'cessation of pain' (*duḥkhanivṛtti*), it may be replied that Brahman would then become a negative principle.

The expression '*advitīya*' cannot mean 'without a second'. It cannot denote the absence of another Brahman like itself; for there would be need of such a description only if there prevailed the view that Brahman is either twofold or manifold. But clearly, such a doctrine was at no time maintained by any one. Again, '*advitīya*' cannot denote that in respect of the world which is only an effect of Brahman, the latter is non-dual; for the doubt that they are different is least likely to arise, since all Vedāntins are agreed that the cause and the effect are non-different (*ananya*).

The Advaitic Position.

According to the Advaitins, upaniṣadic passages like "In the beginning, my dear boy, all this was just Being, one only, and without a second"¹⁵ teach that at the time of pralaya Brahman existed as a unitary principle, devoid of differences of any kind. The text "There is no plurality here"¹⁶ denies reality to multiplicity. The text "Beginning with speech, a modification, a name"¹⁷ asserts that effects are unreal. So also the passage "All this is indeed Brahman"¹⁸ equates the world with Brahman for the purpose of negating distinctions and showing that what was erroneously perceived as the world is not really

15. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, 11, 1.

16. *Brh. Up.*, IV, iv, 16.

17. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, i, 4.

18. *Chānd. Up.*, III, xiv, 1.

the world, but Brahman only. The text "He who knows Brahman crosses sorrow"¹⁹ teaches that by jñāna sorrow is terminated. And what is terminated by jñāna must be *avidyā* (ignorance).

All Pramāṇas Teach that Brahman is a Pure Unity.

All the pramāṇas, the Advaitin continues, teach that Brahman is a pure unity, devoid of differences. To all appearance, perception (*pratyakṣa*) acquaints us with plurality. But in reality, it gives us knowledge only of unity. Even granting that perception testifies to the aspect of manifoldness, its value as a pramāṇa is negligible, since it is infected by *bheda-vāsanās* (impressions of difference). As for scriptural testimony, the *abheda śrutis* must, in the opinion of the Advaitin, be reckoned more authoritative than the *bheda śrutis*. Reasoning also supports the view that Brahman is nirguṇa and that the world is *mīthyā* (phenomenal). The arguments adduced by the Advaitin are the following—(i) All reference to *bheda* must be based on a unitary object; wherever there is an appearance of duality, the basis is unitary, as in the case of the moon appearing double in certain circumstances. (ii) Being perceptible (*dṛśya*) the world is unreal; for whatever is perceived is unreal, as for example the silver wrongly perceived in the shell.

The Scripture Does Not Teach a Nirviśeṣa-vastu.

Nārāyaṇārya vigorously protests against the contention of the Advaitin explained so far and points out that no proposition can establish a *nirviśeṣa-vastu* (distinctionless object); for, in its very nature, any judgment is a combination of words conveying different meanings, and it expresses the relationship of the different meanings conveyed by its parts. Consequently, the scriptural texts cannot teach a *nirviśeṣa-vastu*. Taking the text cited by the Advaitin—"In the beginning, my dear boy, all this was just Being, one only and without a second"—Nārāyaṇārya shows that far from teaching Brahman to be a distinctionless entity, it really draws attention to Brahman possessing infinite perfections. The word '*agre*' (in the beginning) points to a time; '*āsīt*', to an act; '*idam sat*' to the fact of the world existing in the form of *sat*; '*ekam eva*' denotes that Brahman devoid of name and form is the material cause of the world. '*Advītiya*' signifies that there was no other controller (*adīṣṭhāna*) besides Brahman Himself.

Whether it is taken as teaching the true modes of meditation (*upāsana*) or the nature of reality (*tattva*), the text "There is no plurality here" (*ne'ha nānā asti*) necessarily presupposes a listener (*pramātā*).

Its real intention is to deny a world that has not its being in Brahman (*abrahmātmaka*). This idea is echoed in the following verse of the Bhagavad Gītā. "There is nothing moveable or immoveable wherein I am not present as an Inner controller."²⁰

The "ne'ti, ne'ti" text far from denying attributes to Brahman asserts that the attributes referred to in the context do not exhaust Brahman's nature. As Bādarāyaṇa²¹ pertinently remarks, immediately after the *ne'ti* text there follow passages attributing qualities to Brahman.

The text "Vācārambaṇam vikāro . . ." cannot, unless violence is done to it, teach that effects are unreal and that they are merely modifications. Its aim is only to show that the cause and the effect are non-different. The world, being an effect, is non-different from Brahman. From this text it would not follow that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* (without distinction) or that the world is phenomenal (*mīthyā*).

The passage, "All this is, indeed, Brahman" (*sarvam khalu idam Brahman*) does not deny plurality; it only affirms that the world has Brahman for its self, that the world has its source and support in Brahman and that it is dissolved in Brahman. To believe that the world has the same status as that of the silver perceived in the shell is to forget that, unlike silver, the world is not later perceived as false.

The text, "The knower of Brahman crosses sorrow" asserts that knowledge dispels the travails of *saṃsāra*. It is well to remember that this saving knowledge is of the nature of *upāsana* (meditation), and is not mere knowledge of the import of the śruti texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*).

Abheda-śrutis are Not More Authoritative than Bheda-śrutis.

It cannot be said that *abheda-śrutis* have greater authority, in so far as they came later and suppress the *bheda-śrutis*; for there is no warrant for maintaining that subsequent knowledge is more authoritative than the earlier. If such a view were tenable, the preception of the double moon coming after the realisation that there is but a single moon must be valid.

Perception Does Not acquaint us with a Nirviśeṣa-vastu.

The assertion that *pratyakṣa* (perception), being infected by *doṣa* (defect) in the shape of *bheda-vāsanā*, is of little value assumes without proof that *bheda-vāsanās* are a defect. Any attempt to show that they

20. *Bhagavad Gītā*, X, 39. "Na tadasti vinā yat syān mayā bhūtam carā-caram."

21. *Ved. Sūtra*, III. ii. 21.

are a defect lands the Advaitin in the difficulty of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). If *bheda-jñāna* (knowledge of difference) is an illusion, then the impressions (*vāsanās*) generated by them would constitute a defect. But, it is only when the *bheda-vāsanās* are considered a defect, that their cause, viz., the knowledge of multiplicity (*bheda-jñāna*), could be condemned as illusory. To try to obviate the difficulty of *anyonyāśraya* by saying that knowledge of difference is illusory, since the upaniṣadic passages teach a *nirviśeṣa-vastu* is to commit the fallacy of *cakraka* (circular reasoning). If it can be shown that the *pramāṇas* which generate *bheda-jñāna* are defective, because they are beset with *bheda-vāsanās*, it would follow that the upaniṣads teach *nirviśeṣa-vastu*. If it is proved that the upaniṣads teach a *nirviśeṣa-vastu*, then, it would follow that *bheda-jñāna* is erroneous. If it is determined that *bheda-jñāna* is erroneous, *bheda-vāsanās* dependent thereon would be rooted in error and would consequently prove that all *pramāṇas* yielding *bheda-jñāna* would be weak.

Inference (anumāna) Cannot Establish a Distinctionless Object.

The arguments advanced by the Advaitin to prove the reality of a distinctionless Brahman and the phenomenality of the world turn out, on examination, to be fallacious. It is quite easy to devise arguments in support of the opposite contention. E.g. (i) Being unperceived, like the horns of a hare, Brahman is *asat*. (ii) The world is *sat* (real); because, like the ātman, it is not falsified later.

The Advaitic View that Brahman is Nirviśeṣa.

Countless passages such as “*Satyam jñānam anantam*” may appear to speak of Brahman as possessed of infinite perfections, like omniscience. They really teach, says the Advaitin, that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*. He seeks to explain his position as follows:—The text “*Satyam jñānam anantam*” does not speak of a *viśiṣṭa-vastu*, but only refers to a partless whole of reality (*akhaṇḍa-svarūpa*). If it referred to an object possessing qualities, it must denote the qualities and also convey the idea that the object possessing them is unitary. In that case, there could be no unity in the judgment. Again, as the function of each attribute is to mark off its possessor from those not owning it, the three *viśeṣaṇas* (qualifications) mentioned must point to three different objects. Hence the three words of the text cannot be taken to attribute qualities to a single object. A possible objection is that if these words did not refer to *viśeṣaṇas* but only pointed to an identical object, they would be idle repetitions. But this objection is pointless, since the words in question refer to different aspects of Brahman, viz., *asad-vyāvṛtti* (being opposed to unreality), and *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* (being opposed to ignorance).”

“It may be objected that this amounts to admitting that Brahman is *saviśeṣa*. But this is not an insuperable objection, for *asad-vyāvṛtti*, *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* and so forth are not the qualities of Brahman, but Brahman itself. There is nothing strange in identifying Brahman with *vyāvṛtti*; because such a procedure is adopted in the case of *guṇa* (quality), *jāti* (generic feature) and *kriyā* (action). Whiteness, for example, is distinct from its substrate and from other colours. The character of being distinct from others (*svetaravyāvṛtti*) is whiteness itself, and not a quality of whiteness; for the simple reason that a quality is not supposed to possess a quality. Hence it may be concluded, Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*.”

Refutation of the Advaitic View that Brahman is Nirviśeṣa.

Nārāyaṇārya says that the formula “*satyam jñānam anantam*” asserts that Brahman is a unitary principle endowed with *viśeṣaṇas*. Each word therein refers to a *viśiṣṭa-vastu* (an object possessing qualifications); and from the co-ordination of all the words it is learnt that the entities referred to by the words are identical. The opponent asked: Should there not be as many objects (*viśeṣya*) as there are *viśeṣaṇas* (qualifications) in the text? The reply is that so long as the different *viśeṣaṇas* are not contradictory and may well co-exist in a single entity they will not point to a plurality of bases. ‘Being broken-horned,’ ‘long-horned’ and ‘hornless’ are obviously contradictory features and, therefore, cannot be attributed to one and the same cow. But bigness, blueness and fragrance are not contradictory qualities in the same flower and may well co-exist. Even so, *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* may well characterise the same reality, Brahman.

On the analogy of *guṇa*, *jāti* and *kriyā*, the Advaitin maintained that *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* and the like are not the attributes of Brahman, but Brahman itself, and that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*. But his argument is unsound. For in the case of *guṇa*, *jāti* and *kriyā*, *vyāvṛtti* is treated as the very essence of *guṇa*, *jāti* or *kriyā*, since a quality can have no quality. But the case of *dravya* (substance) is different. ‘Being distinct from a cloth (*paṭa-vyāvṛtti*)’ is not the *svarūpa* of the jar, but its quality. Even so, *asad-vyāvṛtti* and the like are the qualities of Brahman. Thus it is clear that Brahman is *saviśeṣa*.

Pratyakṣa Yields Knowledge of Manifolddness.

Since *pratyakṣa* (perception) acquaints us with a world of distinctions, it is unreasonable on the part of the Advaitin to maintain that Brahman is *advītiya*, in the sense of being devoid of *vijātiya-bheda* (distinction from dissimilar objects).

The Advaitic View that Pratyakṣa Cannot Apprehend Difference.

The Advaitin replies that perception can never apprehend difference (*bheda*). For whether *bheda* signifies *anyonyābhāva* (mutual negation) or something else, in any case knowledge of difference presupposes knowledge of *āśraya* (substrate) and *pratiyogin* (the object from which it differs). Being momentary (*kṣanika*), perception cannot apprehend both the substrate and the object from which it differs. If *bheda* denotes *anyonyābhāva*, the perceptual judgment "This is not a cloth" points either to the 'this' or to "not a cloth." If the former, it cannot point to anything else; and if it points to 'not a cloth' it must presuppose the antecedent affirmation "This is a cloth." But it cannot point to both, as perception is momentary. If *bheda* denotes something different from *anyonyābhāva*, even then *anyonyābhāva* must first have been grasped. Take for example the judgment "This is a jar." It implies distinction from cloth and other objects. Thus, even here *anyonyābhāva* is presupposed. Thus all the difficulties of the first alternative confront this also. Hence, *pratyakṣa* cannot generate *bheda-jñāna*.

The Advaitin adds perception apprehends mere existence (*sanmātra*), not limited by space and time. In cognitions such as "The jar exists," and "The cloth exists," the invariable element (*anuvartamāna*), viz., *sat* (existence), like the subject in the erroneous perception "This is silver," is rooted in perception; while the variable elements (*vyāvartamāna*), viz., jar and cloth, like the predicative element 'silver' in the illusion "This is silver," are born of illusion (*bhrānti-mūla*).

Anticipating the objection that when our normal perceptions, unlike the objects of illusory cognition, are not later contradicted, they cannot be condemned as illusory, the Advaitin replies that even in true cognitions there is *bādha* (contradiction, sublation), in so far as there is *vyāvṛtti*, the fruit of *bādha*. When a jar, for example, is perceived, its distinction from cloth (*paṭa-vyāvṛtti*) is implied. The cognition "This is cloth" likewise implies distinction from the jar (*ghaṭa-vyāvṛtti*).

Refutation of the Advaitic View.

Subjecting the Advaitic view to a searching analysis, the author shows that none of the arguments of the opponent is tenable and concludes that *bheda* is vouched for by *pratyakṣa*. The Advaitin urged that since *bheda-jñāna* presupposes knowledge of *dharmin* (substrate) and of the *pratiyogin*, (that from which it differs), it cannot be furnished by perception, which is a momentary process. But the fact is *bheda* is nothing more than *jāti*, (generic property). It does not signify either

anyonyābhāva or something else. It is the *prakāra* (mode) of objects, and is always apprehended along with the *prakārin*. At no time is the *prakārin* perceived in insolation from the *prakāra*. It is impossible to perceive a cow, for instance, without noticing its colour, size, shape and other features. To recognise that a given object is distinct from another, there need be no memory of the *pratiyogin*.²² It is because at the very outset an object is recognised as being distinct from others, the person who desires to secure that object acts in an appropriate manner even in the absence of a knowledge of the *pratiyogin*.

The Advaitin may contend that since *bheda-jñāna*, taking the form "This is distinct from that", clearly presupposes a knowledge of the *dharmin* and of the *pratiyogin*, it is impossible to perceive an object, at the very outset as being distinct from another. The reply is that the apprehension of difference (*bheda-grahana*), like the cognition of non-difference (*abheda-grahana*), is of two kinds. Of two objects which are similar to each other in colour, size, shape and so forth, it may be said, "This is not non-different from that." A second variety of *abheda-grahana* takes the form, "This is the pen which I used yesterday." Similarly, the two varieties of *bheda-grahana* are (i) "The motor car is different from a steam engine", and (ii) "This is a tree". For the first type, knowledge of the *pratiyogin* (that from which it differs) is needed. Knowledge of the steam engine is essential, before a person can distinguish the motor car from the locomotive engine. But for apprehending the second variety of difference *pratiyogi-jñāna* (the knowledge of what it differs from) is not necessary.

When the Advaitin argues that *sat* alone is grasped in perception, as *sat* is the only persistent element therein, he is contradicting his theory that *sat* is not an object of perception. It is admitted on all hands that the eye has the capacity to cognise not bare existence, but the colour, the object possessing that colour and also the other qualities inherent in that object.

There is no value in the suggestion made by the Advaitin that the variable elements in our perceptions are to be condemned as fictitious, even as the predicate element in the illusory cognition, "This is silver," is rejected as false. For 'silver' is rejected as wholly imaginary (*kālpānika*), not because it is a variable factor, but because it is later contradicted (*bādhita*).

Vyāvṛtti is not the result of *bādha*, as the Advaitin imagines. *Bādha* (contradiction) consists in denying that the given object exists at

22. Vide. Note 104 on p. 69 of *Siddhitraya* (Annamalai University Philosophical Series).

the time, and place and in the context specified. Vyāvṛtti, on the other hand, signifies the distinction of one entity from another.

The Advaitic Conception of Ajñāna is Indefensible.

According to the Advaitin, unitary Brahman, becoming clouded by *ajñāna*, imagines a world of multiplicity. What is the precise significance he attaches to the term *ajñāna*?

Statement of the Advaitic Theory.

Ajñāna, says the Advaitin, is not the negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*); for, in that case, it cannot cloud Brahman. Nor can it account for *adhyāsa* (illusion). For an identical reason, *ajñāna* is not *anyathā-jñāna* (wrong knowledge). It is a positive entity (*bhāva-rūpa*), which is distinct from *jñāna-pāgabhāva* (antecedent non-existence of *jñāna*). It is termed *Māyā* or *Tamas*, and cannot be described as either *sat* or *asat* and it is dispelled by true knowledge of reality.

Its existence is established by *śruti* (scriptural testimony), *śrut-yarthāpatti*, (presumption), *anumāna* (inference) and *pratyakṣa* (perception).

Śruti.—A *Taittirīya* text commencing with the words, "Then it was neither Being nor non-Being" ²³ proclaims "Tamas alone existed; and all things were clouded by Tamas." A *Śvetāśvatara* text makes it clear that *ajñāna* is referred to as *Māyā* or *Prakṛti*. "What is called *Māyā* is to be understood as *prakṛti*." ²⁴

Śrut-yarthāpatti.—The famous *Chāndogya* text, "Tat tvam asi" ²⁵ identifies the *jīva* with Brahman. But as the two have sharply contrasted features, they cannot be identical. To reconcile this contradiction, it has to be assumed that one of the two things equated must be unreal. And the unreal entity must be the handiwork of *ajñāna*.

Anumāna.—That *ajñāna* is a positive entity (*bhāva-rūpa*) may be proved by inference also. Take the argument.—Knowledge arising from one or the other of the *pramāṇas* presupposes something else, which is different from the anterior non-existence of that knowledge. This something else clouds the object of that knowledge, and is terminated by the knowledge resulting from the *pramāṇas*. It also dwells in the same place as that knowledge; because knowledge illumines an object not hitherto illumined; just as the first flash of light proceeding from the lamp presupposes a darkness which is a positive entity and which

23. *Tait. Up.*, II, viii. 9.

24. *Śvet. Up.*, IV. 10.

25. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, viii. 7.

the light is now able to dispel and which clouded the object now illumined.

Pratyakṣa.—Perception also establishes the existence of *ajñāna*. Direct cognitions, such as "I am ignorant" and "I do not know myself, nor others besides myself", show that perception reveals the existence of *ajñāna*. The ignorance referred to here is not the negation of knowledge (the antecedent non-existence of knowledge); for, if so, this negation of knowledge would have to be revealed by non-apprehension (*anupalabdhī*). But, as a matter of fact, it is apprehended directly, and is, thus, akin to the perception of pleasure expressed in the judgment "I am experiencing pleasure." Even granting that the negation of knowledge can be the object of perception, the cognition in question does not denote the bare absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*). For at the very moment of this cognition there must be the knowledge of (i) the 'I', the substrate (*āśraya*) of this *abhāva*, (ii) of the *jñānābhāva* itself (*viśaya*) and (iii) knowledge (the *pratiyogin* or counter-correlative). Therefore, this cognition has for its object something positive, and not the negation of knowledge. The advantage in making *ajñāna* a positive something is that it can be perceived without a knowledge of the *pratiyogin*, even as darkness is directly perceived without the mediation of any other knowledge.

It may be asked: How can *Sākṣi-caitanya* (witness, the seer within the *jīva*), whose nature is to illumine the true nature of things, co-exist with *bhāvarūpa ajñāna* which veils reality? But the reply is the *Sākṣi-caitanya* does not illumine the true nature of the real, since reality is self-luminous. On the other hand, *Sākṣi-caitanya* is a percipient of *ajñāna*. The *Sākṣin* and *ajñāna* may well co-exist. There is no danger of the *Sākṣi-caitanya* terminating *ajñāna*. When we make the perception, "This is silver", silver does not cease to exist. When the seer perceives the *ajñāna*, *ajñāna* does not cease to exist. Thus, *bhāva-rūpa-ajñāna* is not without valid proof.

Refutation of the Advaitic Notion of Ajñāna.

Scripture Does Not Establish Ajñāna.

Against this contention, *Nārāyaṇārya* points out that in the scriptural text cited by the Advaitin the term *Tamas* refers to darkness, or to *prakṛti* where *tamogūṇa* is preponderant. It does not refer to *ajñāna*. *Prakṛti* is referred to as *tamas*, because it clouds Brahman, even as darkness veils objects. *Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad* mentions *māyā* as an alternative name to *prakṛti*, because it creates wonderful objects. The term *māyā* denotes that which works wonders. *Māyā* is two-fold: (i) *māyā* that creates *bhrānti-jñāna* and (ii) *māyā* that creates wonders.

Since *prakṛti* creates wonderful things, such as *mahat* (intellect) and *ahamkāra* (egoity), it is called *māyā*.

Arthāpatti Does Not Teach Ajñāna.

It was suggested that unless the existence of *ajñāna* is assumed, no intelligible meaning can be assigned to the text "tat tvam asi", which equates the finite self with the Infinite. Surely, it is possible to justify the text without postulating *ajñāna*. The text in question teaches that Brahman which is the cause of the world and Brahman which has the jīva for His *prakāra* are identical, and not that the jīva is Brahman itself.

Anumāna Does Not Establish Ajñāna.

The argument advanced by the Advaitin only establishes that all knowledge arising from *pramāṇas* has *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* for its antecedent. This knowledge itself, resting as it does upon *anumāna pramāṇa*, must presuppose a *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna*—and that knowledge, another *ajñāna* and so on *ad infinitum*. If, in order to obviate this infinite regress, it is suggested that this knowledge furnished by *anumāna* does not presuppose an *ajñāna*, then, the argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. For there is at least one instance where the *hetu* (reason) is present, while the *sādhya* is absent. There is at least one case where knowledge arising from *pramāṇas* is not preceded by *ajñāna*. Again, the illustrative example of the flash of light is defective in not possessing the *sādhana* or *hetu* (*sādhana-vikala*). For the light of the lamp does not illumine objects hitherto unknown. The illumining power belongs to consciousness only. There may be light, but if there is no consciousness, there will be no lighting up of object. The senses are the causes of the origination of knowledge. The light merely discharges an auxiliary function by dispelling the darkness which prevented the organs from giving rise to knowledge.

Pratyakṣa Does Not Prove Ajñāna.

The claim that *ajñāna* as a positive entity is the object of perception is not justified. For the perceptive judgment "I am ignorant", (meaning "That I am ignorant is realised by me"), yields knowledge of (i) the "I" or the Ego which owns the ignorance (the *āśraya*), (ii) the ignorance itself (*viśaya*) and (iii) knowledge (the *pratiyogin*, the counter correlative). When the cognition conveys knowledge of the *āśraya*, the *viśaya* and the *pratiyogin*, it is wrong to assert that it makes us aware of ignorance.

Again, in accordance with the Advaitic principle that knowledge of the self terminates *ajñāna*, the knowledge of the Ego furnished by this perception must dissipate, and not cognise, *ajñāna*. To say that it is

only clear and distinct knowledge that could remove *ajñāna*, and that the vague knowledge of the Ego furnished by this perception can co-exist with *ajñāna* is as self-contradictory as the assertion that *jñāna* and the negation of *jñāna* can exist side by side.

Further, there is no force in the contention that, like darkness, *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* is apprehended directly, without the thought of anything else. For, unlike *ajñāna*, darkness is regarded as a substance. That is why when darkness is seen its correlate (light) need not be thought of. When, however, darkness is conceived as the opposite of light, the thought of the *pratiyogin* (light) is required. But *ajñāna*, whether understood as the negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) or wrong knowledge (*anyathā-jñāna*) or the opposite of knowledge, necessarily presupposes the thought of its *pratiyogin* (*jñāna*). Thus, none of the *pramāṇas* mentioned by the Advaitin can really prove the existence of *ajñāna*.

Ajñāna Which is said to Cloud Brahman Can Have No Āśraya (basis).

Since the jīva is himself the product of *ajñāna*, he cannot be its basis. Nor can Brahman be its basis; for, on the Advaitic view, it is not the basis of knowledge, but knowledge itself; and what is not the basis of *jñāna* cannot be the basis of *ajñāna*. That is why the jar, which is not the basis of *jñāna*, is never spoken of as the seat of *ajñāna*.

Ajñāna Cannot Cloud Brahman.

To cloud an object is to prevent a knowledge of that entity from arising. But as Brahman is not admitted by the Advaitins to be an object of knowledge, it cannot be clouded. Again, as Brahman is consciousness itself (*prakāśa-svarūpa*), its clouding would amount to its own destruction (*svarūpa-nāśa*).

Is this *ajñāna* known either before or after it has veiled Brahman? Either alternative would lead to an unwelcome result. If Brahman witnesses it before it has cast its spell, there would be no need to posit *ajñāna* or *tirodhāna* (clouding) in order to account for the perception of difference (*bheda*). For if Brahman could perceive *ajñāna* when it is not clouded, Brahman could as well perceive *bheda* which is the result of *ajñāna*. If *ajñāna* clouds Brahman and is known subsequently, *ajñāna* obscures Brahman's nature by its very existence (*sat*). If so, it would follow that it is real; and cannot be dispelled by knowledge. And the world would be real, and not *mithyā* as the Advaitin thinks.

Ajñāna cannot be dispelled.

The belief that *ajñāna* is dispelled by knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is without a foundation. For this knowledge must be either

Brahman itself which is of the essence of consciousness or a knowledge apprehending this supreme consciousness. On the former view, *ajñāna* cannot be said to dwell in Brahman; for, when knowledge of reality which is Brahman itself exists, *ajñāna* stands dispelled; and when *ajñāna* prevails, Brahman cannot exist. The latter view is equally unacceptable, because Brahman is not, on the Advaitic view, the object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge.

The Advaitin may contend that what dispels *ajñāna* is the knowledge that Brahman is without a second (*advitīya*). But this contention is futile; for this knowledge must be either the very essence (*svarūpa*) of Brahman or a quality of Brahman. It cannot be the first, since it would imply that, before that knowledge arose, Brahman must be deemed to have been non-existent. Nor can it be the second; for it would amount to abandoning absolute monism and admitting that Brahman is endowed with distinctions.

Slightly modifying his position the Advaitin may urge that the knowledge which dispels ignorance concerning Brahman is the knowledge that the world is *mithyā* (phenomenal). But this reasoning would fare no better; because such a knowledge may drive out the antithetical thought that the world is real; but it would be powerless to dispel ignorance of Brahman. For this ignorance is not opposed to the thought of the unreality of the cosmos. It is futile to argue that the illusoriness of the world is true knowledge of Brahman, since *prapañca-mithyātva* (the illusoriness of the world) and *Brahma-svarūpa* (the essence of Brahman) are not identical. Thus it is abundantly clear that the Advaitic doctrine of an *avidyā*, which is positive in form (*bhāva-rūpa*), which veils Brahman and dwells therein, and which is terminated by knowledge of Brahman, is illogical.

Brahman Under the Influence of Avidyā is Not the Material Cause.

To the question whether it is Brahman or *avidyā* or both that act as the material cause of the world, the Advaitin is unable to furnish a satisfactory answer. Brahman cannot be the material cause; for, if so, on the well accepted principle that the cause and the effect should share the same features, the world would have to be considered real (*sat*). *Avidyā* cannot be the *upādāna-kāraṇa*, since the scriptures speak of Brahman as the material cause. Nor can Brahman and *avidyā* conjointly act as the material cause of the world; for, in that event, the world should exhibit the contradictory features of sentience and non-sentience (*jaḍatva* and *ajāḍatva*), and of reality and unreality.

The Advaitin may state that Brahman is the *upādāna-kāraṇa* only in the sense that it is the basis of the illusory presentation of the

world, even as shell is the basis of the erroneous perception of silver. To clarify his position, he may elaborate the analogy and say that the erroneous perception, "This is silver," does not have real silver as its object (*viṣaya*), since silver is not present nearabout. It cannot be maintained that this cognition does not point to an object at all; since an objectless cognition is an impossibility. Nor can the cognition refer to itself; for the judgment always treats of an object outside. It does not point to a negative fact (*asat*); for it takes the positive form "This is silver." Nor is it representative cognition (*smṛti*); for it is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). As the cognition takes the form "This is silver," and not "This is a shell," it cannot be said to point to the shell. The only way out of this impasse is to suppose, says the Advaitin, that, on account of certain defects (*doṣa*), a mysterious silver arises for the time being in the shell and explains the cognition of silver. This mysterious silver is not *asat*, because it is perceived; nor is it *sat*, because it is later falsified. Therefore, it is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* (distinct from reality and unreality). In a like manner, on account of *dvidyā* this world which is *sad-asad-anirvacanīya* (incapable of being described either as *sat* or *asat*) arises and accounts for the perception of the manifold world. Since even an illusion must have a basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), this illusion of the world must have Brahman for its basis. It is only in so far as Brahman is the basis of the appearance of the world, that Brahman is described as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world.

In reply to this, Nārāyaṇārya points out that the analogy is unhelpful; because the perception of silver is due to the fact that the brightness-aspect of the shell is noticed, while the shell-aspect present therein is overlooked. But a similar explanation does not apply to the perception of the world of multiplicity; for, consistently with the Advaitic conception of Brahman as *nirviśeṣa* and *nirākāra*, it is impossible to maintain that certain aspects of Brahman are known, while others are not. Hence it is unreasonable to assert that the world of plurality is illegitimately superposed on unitary Brahman.

The Advaitic doctrine that silver of an inexplicable kind (*anirvacanīya rajata*) arises in the shell at the time of the illusion is unconvincing; for the selfsame object cannot possess the contradictory features of being at once distinct from *sat* and of being distinct from *asat*.

To account for the perception of silver (*khyāti*) and its later sublation (*bādhā*), it is unnecessary to posit a mysterious silver which is at once distinct from *sat* and *asat*. A simpler hypothesis would be to

treat the erroneous cognition as a case of mistaking one thing for another (*anyasya anyathābhāvana*).

If an indescribable silver does not arise, and if error consists in mistaking one thing for another, what, the Advaitin might ask, is the object referred to in the illusory cognition "This is silver"? It must be replied, he continues, that it is the shell. But how can, he might again ask, the shell be the object when silver is apprehended?

The author meets this query by saying that what appears need not be the object. In fact, that object is to be considered the *viśaya* which is marked off from others by the knowledge arising from the sense organ which is in contact with that particular object.

Perhaps the Advaitin may ask: How can silver be cognised, when it is not in contact with the senses? The author replies that the same difficulty confronts the opponent also. He must explain how the indescribable silver is cognised, when it is not in contact with the senses. If he tries to meet it by saying that even in the absence of sensory contact, the indescribable silver may be presented on account of defects (*doṣa*), it is open to the author to furnish a similar explanation that the silver is apprehended when only the shell is in contact with the senses owing to a sensory defect.

Nārāyaṇārya further points out that the Advaitin too accepts *anyathā-khyāti* without being aware of it. It is because the perceiver mistakes the indescribable silver for real silver that he proceeds to pick it. If, however, he recognises it as indescribable, such an activity would scarcely follow.

Moreover, the Advaitin must explain how *anirvacanīya* silver is cognised and spoken of as silver. If he says that it is due to the generic feature (*jāti*) of silver-ness (*rajatatva*) present therein, it may be asked whether this *jāti* is describable or indescribable. On the former alternative, it cannot any longer be referred to as *anirvacanīya* silver. On the latter alternative, real silver cannot be perceived, or referred to, as silver. Therefore, an indescribable something cannot be spoken of, or recognised, as silver. The upshot of the whole discussion is that since a distinctionless (*nirviśeṣa*) Brahman cannot be the basis of the illusory presentation of the world of plurality, the view that Brahman appears as the world and is the material cause thereof is untenable.

4. REFUTATION OF BRAHMA-PARINĀMA-VĀDA.

(*Parināma-pratikṣepādhikāra*)

The Teaching of Bhāskara.

Lest the *parināma-vāda* established in the preceding chapter should be confounded with the *Brahma-parināma-vāda* of the *Bhedābheda-vādin*s, the author gives in this and the succeeding chapter a critical exposition of two of the leading schools of *Bhedābheda* philosophy and shows that they are far removed from his own doctrine. The view that is first taken up for examination may be identified as that expounded by *Bhāskara*. Expressed in bare outlines his teachings are as follows: At the time of *pralaya* (cosmic rest) Brahman was a unitary reality devoid of differences, but possessed of omnipotence (*sarva-śakti*); and at *śṛṣṭi* (creation) it transformed itself into finite souls (*bhoktā*, literally 'enjoyer') and non-sentient objects (*bhogyā*, literally 'objects of enjoyment'). The objects of the world are, thus, constituted of Brahman (*Brahma-maya*), mere modifications of Brahman, even as jars, cups and so forth are the transformations of clay. This view, it is claimed, is the logical outcome of scriptural teachings, such as "Brahman is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world" and "All objects of the world are, in reality, Brahman". Taken in the light of these assertions the *upaniṣadic* description of Brahman as being unchanging (*aparīṇāmi*) must be considered to teach that though Brahman is, in its essential nature, changeless, it undergoes modification when it is in association with *upādhi-śakti*. This theory alone, it is further claimed by *Bhāskara*, renders possible a harmonious synthesis of the conflicting *upaniṣadic* texts—the *bheda-śrūtis*, the *abheda-śrūtis* and those speaking of an origin (*utpatti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*) for man (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*).

The *Naiyāyika* objects to this theory on the ground that it only proves that Brahman and the world are wholly disparate; for the cause and the effect are everywhere known to be different, in as much as they serve different purposes (*vyavahāra*), have different forms (*ākāra*) and are denoted by different names (*nāma*). If, however, they are said to be identical there would be no need to posit several factors conducive to the production of the effect. The *Bhedābheda-vādin* easily meets this objection by pointing out that just as the jar is recognised to be no other than clay in a different shape, the world is Brahman in a new shape. Though the two are non-different (*ananya*), causal factors would still be required to account for the different structures (*saṁsthāna*) that the cause assumes in becoming the effect. Differences in state could easily account for differences in respect of name, form and purpose.

Refutation of Bhāskara's Teaching.

Against the teachings of Bhāskara, Nārāyaṇārya has plenty of shots in his locker. (1) He points out that what transforms itself into the world cannot be Brahman; nor can it be an Īśvara distinct from Brahman. For the scriptures assert unequivocally that Brahman is changeless (*aparīṇāmi*); and there is little warrant for positing a God different from the Absolute. (2) Next he shows that it is quite possible to admit that Brahman is the material cause of the world and that all objects of the world are indeed Brahman without being forced to subscribe to Brahma-parīṇāma-vāda. (Vide Brahma-svarūpādhikāra for a detailed consideration of this point). (3) Then he draws attention to the manifest contradiction involved in asserting that matter (*acit*) is the modification of Brahman which is essentially consciousness (*cid-rūpa*). It is no escape to suggest that all objects really possess *caitanya-śakti*, but that, in the so-called material objects, consciousness (*caitanya*) has been obscured, for when *caitanya* is never met with in matter, it must reasonably be said to be bereft of conscious power.

(4) Against the allegation made by the Bhedābheda-vādin that śruti and smṛti texts speak of men and material things as being subject to origination and destruction, Nārāyaṇārya replies that the scriptures really describe prakṛti as *ajā* and characterise the puruṣa or ātman as *ajā*, as having no destruction (*avināśi*) and as being eternal (*nitya*). He goes on to state that in the light of these texts, those referring to the destruction of men and things must reasonably be supposed to refer, not to their annihilation, but to their attaining oneness (*ekābhāva*) with Brahman at pralaya, that is, becoming inseparable from Brahman, and, therefore, incapable of being treated as different from Him.

He also mentions some of the main difficulties in the way of accepting the view that souls are non-eternal. For one thing, on this view, deeds performed already would have to go without fruition (*kṛtanāśa*); and the jīva would have to experience the fruits of actions not performed by himself (*akṛtābhyāgama*). Besides, if at pralaya the souls are destroyed they would have to be freshly created at *śṛṣṭi* and endowed with an equipment of body, senses and so forth, even though they have performed no karma.

Again the *upāsanas* prescribed for the attainment of mokṣa would become pointless; for the jīva being non-eternal would not continue to exist to experience the blessed state.

Should it be said that mokṣa signifies the destruction of the soul (*ātmanāśa*), and that the *upāsanas* are needed for bringing this about, it may be replied that they are quite unnecessary, since at pralaya the souls are sure to be destroyed. It may

be suggested that the *upāsanas* are intended for those who are impatient and do not wish to wait till pralaya. But it is least likely that men will ever be in a hurry to secure this state. In fact, if mokṣa meant *ātmanāśa*, men would run away at the very mention of it. It is open to the objector to say that men will long for *ātmanāśa*, since it leads to the termination of miseries (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*). True, people long for *duḥkha-nivṛtti*, but not at the cost of their very existence.

Further, while all people strive for pleasure, only those who are at present experiencing sorrows will yearn for escape therefrom. Therefore, mokṣa in the sense of *duḥkha-nivṛtti* cannot be treated as a puruṣārtha (object of human aspiration). Besides, there is no warrant for interpreting mokṣa to be a negative state of painlessness. The scriptures describe it in positive terms, as denoting experience of bliss (*ānanda*).

(5) Nārāyaṇārya then urges that the positing of an *upādhi* whether in the shape of a substance or in the shape of a quality (*sāmānyā*) militates against belief in a unitary reality. It is irrational to seek to get over the difficulty by suggesting that it is at once different and non-different from Brahman; for contradictory qualities cannot be ascribed to the self-same entity.

At this stage, the discussion naturally turns on the question: Are *bheda* and *abheda* contradictory features, such as could not co-exist in an identical object. Mention may now be made of some of the more important among the arguments advanced by the Bhedābheda-vādin in defence of his main thesis, viz., that *bheda* and *abheda* are not contradictory features, and could well co-exist in the self-same reality.

The first argument is an appeal to everyday cognition. We are conscious, it is alleged, of objects as being at once different and non-different. They are non-different in their causal (*kāraṇa*) and universal (*jāti*) aspects; and different when viewed as effects (*kārya*) or as particulars (*vyakti*). E.g. in respect of the causal substances, jars, plates and so forth are non-different; but they are different when they are considered as effects. Again, from the point of view of the universal (*jāti*), namely, cow-ness (*gotva*) all cows, whether they have long horns or short ones, broken horns or no horns at all, are non-different; but they are different the moment the particulars are taken into account.

The second argument seeks to justify the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* on the analogy of the presence of the two aspects of universal (*jāti*) and particular (*vyakti*) in the self-same entity.

The third argument identifies *bheda* and *abheda* respectively with discontinuity (*vyāvṛtti*) and continuity (*anuvṛtti*), and shows that they

may well co-exist in the cow with broken horns, where cow-ness (*gotva*) represents *anuvṛtti*, and 'being broken-horned' (*khaṇḍatva*) represents *vyāvṛtti* (distinction from cows of other description).

The last argument envisages the possibility of the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* by equating them respectively with the narrower universal (*apara-sāmānya*) and the wider universal (*para-sāmānya*), and showing that, in the cow with broken horns, there exists *khaṇḍatva*, the narrower universal which is found only in cows with broken horns, as also *gotva*, the wider universal which exists in all cows.

None of these considerations, however, finds favour with Nārāyaṇārya. He dismisses the first of these as betraying superficial analysis; because from a given point of view (e.g. that of cause and universal or that of effect and particular) there can be only difference or non-difference, but not both.

It may be said that after all *jāti* and *vyakti*, or cause and effect are identical and that, therefore, both difference and non-difference may dwell together. Against this it is pointed out that if the identity of *jāti* and *vyakti* were a fact, there would no longer be two aspects to justify the simultaneous presence of difference and non-difference. But, as a matter of fact, between the universal (*jāti*), which persists in all the particulars (*anuvartamāna*), and the particular (*vyakti*), which is discontinuous (*vyāvartamāna*), there can be no identity.

The opponent may, however, urge that the identity of universal and particular has to be inferred from the apprehension of identity (*tādātmya*) expressed in judgments like 'This is a cow', where 'this' and 'cow' stand respectively for *vyakti* (particular) and *jāti* (universal). But there is little force in this contention, for, if the relation between 'this' and 'cow' were one of bare identity, the two words would convey the same meaning and the judgment would be guilty of repeating the same idea twice over. In reality, the two parts of the judgment refer respectively to the *viśeṣya* (the thing qualified) and the *viśeṣaṇa* (the qualification). Cowness is present in the object pointed to.

The second argument is shown to be valueless; since it makes the gratuitous assumption that there is an entity distinct from, and serving as the basis of, *jāti* and *vyakti*; for, as a matter of fact, *jāti* is present in *vyakti*.

The main defect of the next argument is that it treats *jāti* as though it were *anuvṛtti* (persistence), while it is really *anuvartamāna* (what persists in the several particulars). If, as the Bhedābheda-vādin says,

jāti were persistence and not what persists, since the *jāti* (cowness) is present alike in the horned, the broken-horned and the hornless cows, these particulars would be *anuvartamāna* (what possess *anuvṛtti*, namely 'cowness'). And he would be contradicting his own statement that it is *vyāvartamāna*.

In refutation of the last point Nārāyaṇārya states that there is little warrant for identifying *bheda* with *apara-sāmānya* (narrower generality) and *abheda* with *para-sāmānya* (higher generality). To use terms in this sense is to take liberties with language.

5. REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ŚAKTI-VIKṢEPA

(*Śakti-vikṣepa-pratikṣepādhikāra*)

The Teaching of Yādava.

The philosophical theory which comes in for criticism in this chapter is the teaching of Yādavaprakāśa. According to Yādava, *sat*, or the Absolute is a self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) substance (*dravya*) possessing manifold powers or potencies (*śakti*). Just as clay undergoes modification and exists in the form of pots, cups and so forth, this unitary reality modifies itself and exists in the shape of souls (*bhoktā*), matter (*bhogyā*) and God (*niyantā*). The scriptures say 'trividham Brahma etat' (Brahman is threefold). Souls, matter and God are thus parts (*aṁśa*) of *sat* and therefore, eternal.

The entirety of the souls (*bhoktā*) or all the souls taken together constitute a single self possessing the capacity for enjoyment which is termed *Bhoktṛ-samaṣṭi-puruṣa* (the soul which is of the nature of a collective personality). The souls associated with the respective bodies are its manifestations. They are infinite in number and subtle (*aṇu*). Some of the qualities of Brahman are distinctly found in them while others are not open to view. These souls can be classified under three heads—the souls in bondage (*baddha*), the liberated souls (*siddha*) and the ever-free (*nitya*). The bound souls are of three kinds—*prākṛtika*, *vaikārika* and *dākṣiṇātmaka*. Liberated souls are those persons who have obtained release from bondage to *saṁsāra*. They possess qualities, such as freedom from evil (*apahatapāpmā*). The ever-free are the eternal associates of Brahman.

Objects of enjoyment are no other than the ceaselessly changing *prakṛti*. If they are usually described as *acit*, it is because in them most of the qualities of Brahman remain obscured. *Prakṛti* is of three kinds—time (*kāla*), *paramākāśa* and *avyakta*. Of these, the first is responsible for change in other objects and is infinite. Shorter durations, such as moment (*kṣaṇa*), month and year are the modifications of time.

Paramākāśa is the name given to *Prakṛti* in its initial stage. At *pralaya*, *prakṛti* is known as *tamas* and is said to become one (*ekībhavati*) with *sat*, as it is then scarcely distinguishable from *sat*. Such a state is described as *Śaktyavasthā*. At the time of dissolution, finite souls also are in a state of indistinguishability. It is this fact of souls and matter remaining, before creation, in a state of indistinguishability that is taught in the upaniṣadic text 'sadeva idam agra āsīt, ēkam evā'dvītiyam.' The process whereby, at creation, matter is separated out from Brahman and rendered fit for separate treatment is known as *śakti-vikṣepa*.

Paramākāśa or *akṣara*, which is the first to separate from *sat*, is the abode of *Īśvara* and the liberated souls. Since *śabda* is considered to be its modification, it is also called *vāk*. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in their collectivity go by the name *avyakta*. At *srṣṭi*, *prakṛti* is transformed into *mahat* (intellect) and other elements.

God (*niyantā*, *Īśvara*) possesses perfections, such as omniscience, infinite bliss, supreme lordship and infinite powers. Along with liberated souls, He is asleep at the time of *pralaya*. Gods, souls and matter are at once different and non-different from Brahman—non-different in respect of substance, and different in respect of their divergent states (*avasthā*). This furnishes, it is claimed by Yādava, a satisfactory basis for harmonising the *bheda* and the *abheda śrutis*.

Refutation of Yādava's Teaching.

Against this school of Vedānta philosophy Nārāyaṇārya urges that *sat* is not a substance (*dravya*), but a quality belonging to objects, as is evident from the judgments such as "The pot exists", "The cloth exists." The term *sat* is used in a variety of senses; sometimes it denotes a wise man (*pañḍita*); and sometimes it refers to what is effective. But as applied to Brahman, it denotes unconditional existence (*nirupādhikasattā*). The text, "In the beginning *sat* alone existed", thus states that Brahman alone possesses unconditional existence, while everything else has only a dependent existence.

Next he shows that the doctrine that material objects are parts of Brahman would prove either that Brahman is, like them, non-intelligent (*jaḍa*) or that they share the quality of being self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*). Yādava thinks that the latter alternative is not inherently absurd and that the so-called material objects are really sentient entities, which, on account of certain impediments, do not show off their sentient nature. It demands too much credulity to suppose that a quality never found to exist in an object still belongs to it. If this is possible, any quality may be attributed to any thing.

Nārāyaṇārya proceeds to say that there is little warrant for making a distinction between the Absolute (Brahman) and God (*niyantā*). The scriptures are clear on this point. Having described Brahman as the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the universe they identify the universal cause with *sat* (Being). Lest *sat* should be conceived in materialistic terms, they take care to call it *Ātman*, thereby revealing that it is spirit rather than matter. This would still leave one wondering whether this *Ātman* is any of the finite souls or the God of religion or the Absolute itself. To allay all such doubts the *Śrutis* hasten to call it Nārāyaṇa and identify Him with Brahman. That Nārāyaṇa is referred to as Brahman, not in the restricted sense that He is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman; but that He is wholly and truly Brahman is the unambiguous teaching of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (Hymn addressed to *Puruṣa*), where Nārāyaṇa is variously called Supreme Brahman, *Ātman*, Supreme light (*Parañjyoti*) and Supreme Reality (*Para-tattva*). Coming to the *smṛtis*, it is significant that in one place in the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* the statement that the world consisting of both the organic and the inorganic beings proceeds from *Viṣṇu* is promptly followed by the query "How can the spotlessly pure and qualityless Brahman be the agent in creation?" Clearly, this question presupposes identity between *Viṣṇu* and Brahman.

He points out further that the upaniṣadic statement referring to Brahman becoming threefold far from suggesting that Brahman transforms Himself into God, souls and matter, really states that whoever meditates on Brahman as endowed with the twofold *vibūtis*—*cit* and *acit*—attains to similarity with Brahman (*Brahma-samānākāra*).

The doctrine that souls (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) and God (*niyantā*) are eternally the parts (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, that at *pralaya* *prakṛti* is absorbed (*ekībhavati*) in Brahman, and that, at *prakṛti*, it emerges therefrom even as lustre proceeds from a precious gem is next made the target of attack.

What exactly is meant, Nārāyaṇārya asks, by the statement that at *pralaya* *prakṛti* remains inseparably bound up (*avibhakta*) with Brahman? The opponent must say that, at that stage, the two are either distinct (*vilakṣaṇa*) or non-distinct (*avilakṣaṇa*) or both distinct and non-distinct. But none of these alternatives could be logically defended. For if they are distinct, there is no possibility of saying that they become one (*ekībhavati*) and inseparable (*avibhakta*); if they are non-distinct, Brahman would come to be identified with non-intelligent *prakṛti* and it would be infected by the defects of matter; and if Brahman and *prakṛti* are said to be distinct and non-distinct, it would amount to attributing to them contradictory features. Further,

souls, matter and God can never be said to attain oneness, since they share the character of being ever distinct from one another.

Accepting the identity between Īśvara and Brahman, the opponent may still urge that, at least, puruṣa and prakṛti could be treated as the parts (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, and quote in his favour upaniṣadic texts such as "All this is, indeed, Brahman". But Nārāyaṇārya replies that this would amount to the contradictory features of spirit and matter being attributed to Brahman. In the next chapter he shows that the texts cited by the opponent bear an altogether different interpretation, and that, although prakṛti and puruṣa are altogether different entities, they could still be equated with Brahman and could be treated as the *aṁśa* of Brahman.

In the face of the scriptural teaching that the abode of Īśvara is a kind of immaterial (*aprākṛta*) and changeless (*aparīṇāmi*) entity, the opponent is not justified, says Nārāyaṇārya, in making *Paramākāśa* the first evolute of prakṛti and the dwelling place of Īśvara.

Nor is Yādava on firm ground when he says that Īśvara and the liberated souls (*mukta*) are in a state of sleep at pralaya; since the liberated puruṣas are, according to the scriptures, constantly visualising His essential nature and singing His praises. Moreover, since God is subject to karma, the only cause that could occasion sleep in Him does not exist. Time (*kāla*) cannot be held responsible for the sleep; because it is under God's control, and not God under its sway. Consistently with His nature as a benevolent Person, it cannot be maintained that it is His will that the mukta and He himself should be in a state of suspended animation. It is wholly unsatisfactory to suggest that the Lord sends the mukta to sleep, when it is conceded that they have realized God after having served a long probation on earth, and performed continual meditation (*upāsana*), and when the Lord Himself is said to have been anxiously waiting for the homecoming of the jīvas.

6. THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN

(*Brahma-svarūpa nirṇayādhikāra.*)

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Brahman, the ultimate reality, is the supreme object of enjoyment; He is not limited by space or time or objects. He is free from all evils, and is self-luminous consciousness or light. He is endowed with innumerable qualities, such as knowledge (*jñāna*), power (*śakti*), strength (*bala*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*). All words denoting sentient and non-sentient entities ultimately signify Brahman, since He has them for His body and controls them from within. He is responsible for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world.

BHĀVANĀVIVEKA

BY

MAṆḌANAMIŚRA

WITH

VIṢAMAGRANTHIBHEDIKA

BY

NARAYANA

Edited with Introduction

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योऽपि व्यवहितफलेषु दृश्यते, १ सोऽपि धात्वर्थान्तरात्मकः
प्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा, न प्राचीनधातुगोचरप्रभावनीय इति ।

कर्मणा च करोत्यर्थो व्याप्तोऽतस्तदयोगतः ।

तदभावः प्रत्ययार्थसाधनेऽपि विभक्तयः ॥ १२ ॥

ननु व्यवहितफलेषु साङ्गहायण्या(हण्या)दिषु धात्वर्थं ग्रामप्राप्तिलक्षणं च फल-
मन्तरा सेवादिरन्यो व्यापारो दृश्यते, स एव प्रत्ययार्थो भविष्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह—योऽपि व्यवहि-
तफलेष्वित्यादि । योऽपि तत्र सेवादिरन्यो व्यापारो दृश्यते, स सवे(सेवि)त्यादिधात्वन्तराभिधेयः २
प्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा, न पुनः प्राचीनसाङ्गहायण्या(हण्या)दिधात्वर्थप्रभावनीयः ३ 'साङ्गहा-
यण्या(हण्या) यजेत' इति यजतेः परस्य प्रत्ययस्याभिधेयः स्यात् । अतो धातूक्तव्यापारस्य
कर्तृत्वे स्थित एव प्रत्ययार्थार्थानुयागः ४ ।

इतश्च प्रत्ययाभिधेयस्य करोत्यर्थस्याभाव इत्याह—

कर्मणा च करोत्यर्थो व्याप्तोऽतस्तदभावतः(दयोगतः) ।

तदभावः प्रत्ययार्थसाधने च विभक्तयः ॥ (इति) ॥

सोऽपि धात्वर्थान्तरात्मकप्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा
न धातुगोचरप्रभावनीय इति—क, ख.
सोऽपि हल्यादिधात्वर्थान्तरात्मको न
प्रत्ययार्थः, प्रयत्नान्तरजन्मा न प्राची-
नधातुगोचरप्रभावनीय इति—ग, घ.
अभिधेयप्रयत्नान्तर—छ.

३. 'यः'—अधिकं वर्तते—छ.
४. 'पर्यनुयोगः' इत्यतः परं 'कः प्रत्ययार्थ
इति पर्यनुयोगस्यानवकाश इति ।
एतद्वृषयितुमाह—नैतत्सारम् ; नहि
धात्वर्थेति, इत्यधिकं दृश्यते—च.

करोते: १ सदा २ सकर्मकत्वात्तद्योगविरहेण करोत्यर्थाभावं प्रतीमः ३ ज्वलनविरहेणेव ४ धूमाभावम् । तथाहि—न जातु 'यजेत स्वर्गम्', 'शयीत स्वास्थ्यम्', 'आसीत सुखम्' इति दृष्टचरः ससर्गः ।

यदि मन्वीत सङ्गतिसमर्थविभक्तिभेदाभावादेवम् ।

अयमर्थः—कर्मणा कारकेण करोत्यर्थो व्यासः कृशानुनेव धूमः । अतस्तदयोगतो व्यापकस्य कर्मणः अयोगतोऽसंबन्धात् तदभावः तस्य व्यासस्य करोत्यर्थस्याभावोऽवगम्यते अन्यभावेनेव धूमाभाव इति । प्रत्ययार्थसाधने च विभक्तयः इति व्यापकाभावहेतोरसिद्धिमाशङ्क्य परिहरति । कथमसिद्ध्याशङ्का ? उच्यते । सर्वत्र करोत्यर्थे भाव्यं विद्यत एव, यजेतेत्यादावपि भाव्यवाचिशब्दप्रयोगाभावः केवलम्, न भाव्याभावः । तदभावश्च प्रत्ययार्थसाधने विभक्त्यनुत्पादात् प्रत्ययार्थत्वाच्च करोत्यर्थस्येति । एवमाशङ्क्य परिहरति—प्रत्ययार्थसाधने विभक्तयो—भवन्त्येव । दृश्यन्ते हि प्रत्ययार्थभावनाकरणे तृतीयाविभक्तिरुद्भिदादिनामधेये । अतो भाव्याभावादेव तद्वाचिशब्दाप्रयोगः, न पुनः तत्समर्थशब्दाभावादिति न व्यापकाभावहेतोरसिद्धिरिति श्लोकस्यार्थः । अस्याविष्करणायाह—करोतोत्या(तेरित्या)दिना । अयमर्थः—करोत्यर्थस्य सदा सकर्मकत्वादिति कर्मणा करोत्यर्थस्य व्याप्तिं दर्शयति । तद्योगविरहेणेति—कर्मयोगविरहेणेति—व्यापकाभावहेत्वभिधानम् । करोत्यर्थस्येत्यादि व्याप्याभावसाध्याभिधानम् । ज्वलनेत्यादि दृष्टान्ताभिधानम् । तथाहीत्यादिना कर्मसंबन्धविरहं करोत्यर्थस्य

१. सर्वदा—क.

३. वहि—ग, घ, ङ.

२. सकर्मकतया—क, ख. सकर्तृकत्वात्—क.

४. धूमाभावात्—क.

५. विरहः—ख.

तथाहि—धात्वर्थसाधनावगाहिन्यः १ सुबिभक्तयः, २ प्रत्ययार्थमणि नियोज्ये स्वर्गकामादौ तददर्शनात् ।

तच्च वार्तम् ; एवं सति ४ शेषसंबन्धहेतोः षष्ठ्या अव्याहतसरत्वात् । अपि च प्रत्ययार्थभावनाकरणधात्वर्थनामधेयेभ्यो विश्वजिदादिभ्यः ५ करणविभक्तिमीक्षमाणो ६ नेदमध्यवसातुमर्ह-

शयति । नहि स्वर्गं यजेत (इ)त्यादिसंबन्धो दृष्टः ॥

प्रत्ययार्थेति श्लोकैकदेशव्यावर्त्यामाशङ्कां दर्शयति—यदि मन्वे(न्वी)तेति । कर्मसंबन्धप्रतिपादनसमर्थद्वितीयाविभक्त्यभावात्संबन्धाभावः, नाभावात्कर्मणः इति । तृतीयाविभक्त्यभावे हेतुमाह—तथाहीत्यादिना । धात्वर्थसाधन एव द्वितीयादिभक्तीनां सामर्थ्यम्, न प्रत्ययार्थसाधने, प्रत्ययार्थस्य कर्मणि नियोज्ये स्वर्गकामे तस्यादर्शनात् इति ।

एतन्निराकरोति—तच्चेति । द्वितीयाद्यप्रवृत्तौ षष्ठ्या भवितव्यं 'शेषे षष्ठी' इति, यत्र तृतीयाद्यप्रवृत्तिस्स शेष इति । न च स्वर्गकामादौ षष्ठ्यपि दृश्यते । अतो भाव्याभावः, दभावाच्च करोत्यर्थाभाव इति । अभ्युपगम्येदमुक्तम् । न च धात्वर्थसाधनैकगोचराः कारकभक्तयः, प्रत्ययार्थभावनाकरणनामधेयेषु विश्वजिदादिषु तदभ्युपगमादित्याह—अपि

१. गाहिनः—क ; प्राहिण्यः—ख.

५. 'अपि'—अधिकं वर्तते—ख.

२. तद्विभक्ति—क. तद्विभक्तः—ख.

६. 'मध्यस्थः'—अधिकं वर्तते—क.

तद्विभक्तयः—ङ.

७. मध्यस्थ—ख.

३. प्रत्ययार्थनियोगकर्मणि—ग, घ, ङ.

८. यजेते—ख.

४. शेषत्वे—ग, घ. शेष—नास्ति—ङ.

९. गमादिह—ख.

ति । अस्त्येव कर्मसंबन्धो 'यजेत स्वर्गकामः' इति चेत्-
न ; पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन(त्वात्) साक्षादसंबन्धात् । 'स्वर्गाय
यजेत' इति साक्षात्सङ्गतिरिति चेत्-न ; अकर्मरूपत्वात्, कर्म-
रूपसंबन्धाभावस्य च ^१ भावनाभिधानाभावहेतुत्वात् । अकर्मता

चेत्यादिना । धात्वर्थसाधनविषया एव कारकविभक्तयो न प्रत्ययार्थविषया इत्यनैकान्ति-
कम् ; प्रत्ययाभिधेयभावनाकरणधात्वर्थनामधेयेभ्यो विश्वजिदादिशब्देभ्यस्तृतीयाविभक्ति-
दर्शनादिति । तत्र शङ्कते-अस्त्येवेत्यादिना । अस्त्येव कर्मसंबन्धः ; कर्मविभक्त्यभावेऽपि
'यजेत स्वर्गकामः' इति, काम्यमानस्य स्वर्गस्य कर्मत्वादिति चेत्, तन्निराकरोति—
नेति । ^२ हेतुमाह—पुरुषविशेषणत्वादिति । पुरुषविशेषणत्वात् स्वर्गस्य साक्षात्कर्मत्वेन
संबन्धानुपपत्तेः । नहि विशेषणस्य पदार्थान्तरेण संबन्धो भवति, ^३ राजपुरुषादावदर्श-
नादिति । पुनः शङ्कते—(स्वर्गायिति) । यद्यपि 'स्वर्गं यजते' इति सङ्गतिर्नोपपद्यते, तथापि
'स्वर्गाय यजेत' इति साक्षात्सङ्गतिरुपपद्यत एवेति । निराकरोति—नेति । हेतुमाह—
अकर्मरूपत्वादिति । स्वर्गायिति चतुर्थीनिर्देशात्प्रतीयमानस्य संबन्धस्य कर्मरूपत्वं नास्ति ।
ततः किमित्यत आह—कर्मरूपसंबन्ध(न्याभाव)स्येति । कर्मरूपो यस्यसंबन्धः तस्याभावः
करोत्यर्थभावनाभिधानाभावे हेतुत्वेनोक्तः, अतः संबन्धान्तरं सदपि नोपयुज्यते इति ।
अकर्मरूपत्वं कुत इत्यपेक्षायामाह—अकर्मता चेति । स्वर्गायिति चतुर्थीनिर्देशात् स्वर्गस्य
कर्मता प्रतीयते । कर्मणि हि द्वितीया स्मर्यते न चतुर्थीति ।
स्वर्गस्य भावनया संबन्धमभ्युपगम्य तस्याकर्मरूपत्वादसत्समत्वमुक्तम् । इदा-

१. तद्भावनाभावकतत्वात्—क.

२. हेतुमाह—नास्ति—च.

३. पुरुषाभाव—छ.

च चतुर्थीनिर्देशात् । 'स्वर्गाय यागः' इति च धात्वर्थेनापि
संबन्धात् ।

तुल्यार्थत्वं भावयति भवतीति ^२ प्रसज्यते ।

कः प्रत्ययार्थो धातूक्तव्यापारे खलु कर्तरि ॥ १३ ॥

'भावयति घटं ^३ कुम्भकारः', 'भवति घटम्' ^४ इत्यपि
प्रसज्येत, तुल्यार्थत्वात् । तथाहि—एकस्य(त्र) कर्तुः कुम्भकारस्य
व्यापारं णिजाचष्टे, अन्यत्राख्यातप्रत्यय इति न भिद्यतेऽर्थः ।
प्रयोजकव्यापारो णिजर्थः, कर्तृव्यापार आख्यातार्थः इति नानार्थ-
त्वं योऽ^५ मन्यते, वक्तव्यस्तेनेह कर्तृप्रयोजकभेदः । यदि साधनानां
प्रवर्तयिता निवर्तयिता च कर्ता, स^६ चैकः कुम्भकार एवेति तद्व्या-

नी भावनया सह संबन्धमात्रमपि न सिध्यति, धात्वर्थसंबन्धेनापि 'यजेत
स्वर्गाय' इति निर्देशोपपत्तेः, 'स्वर्गाय यागः' इत्युक्ते तथा प्रतीतेरित्याह—
स्वर्गायित्यादिना ॥

इतश्च कर्तृव्यापारस्मिका भावना नाख्यातप्रत्ययाभिधेया भवितुमर्ह-
तीत्याह—

तुल्यार्थत्वं भावयति भवतीति प्रसज्यते ।

कः प्रत्ययार्थो धातूक्तव्यापारे खलु कर्तरि ॥ (इति) ॥

'भावयति घटं कुम्भकारः' इत्यत्र यादृशसंसर्गावगमः, 'भवति घटः' इत्यत्रापि
तादृशः प्रसज्येत । न तथा अस्ति ; भवतीत्यत्र घटस्य कर्मत्वेन संसर्गानवगमात्,
भावयतीत्यत्र च तथावगमात् । कथन्तर्हि उभयत्र तुल्यार्थत्वप्रसङ्गः ? उच्यते—उभ-

१. संबन्धनात्—क, ग, घ, छ.

४. घट इत्यपि—क. ख.

२. प्रयुज्यते—क, ख.

५. योऽपि—क, ग, घ, छ.

३. 'कुम्भकारः' इत्यादिः 'कर्तुः' इत्यन्तः

६. एवैकः—क.

ग्रन्थो नास्ति क. मातृकायाम् ।

पाराभिधानात्तुल्यार्थत्वम् । घटः कर्ता, प्रयोजकः कुम्भकारः इति चेत्-कथमनीशितुः साधनप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योर्घटस्य कर्तृत्वं तादृशं कुलालमतिक्रम्य । अथागुणतो धातुना अभिधीयमानः व्यापारत्वम्-कस्तर्हि इदानीमाख्यातार्थः ? धातुना अभिहितत्वात्तद्व्यापारस्य । न च व्यापारभेददर्शनम्, येन धातुप्रत्यययोर्विषयविभागः स्यात् ।

यत्रापि कर्तृव्यापारवाचिनौ शब्दौ यतो भवतः—भावयतीत्यत्र कर्तृव्यापारं णिजाचष्टे, भवतीत्यत्राख्यातप्रत्ययः इति, धात्वर्थश्चोभयत्राप्येक एव । अतः प्रसज्यत एव तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अथोच्येत—प्रयोजकव्यापारं णिजाचष्टे, आख्यातप्रत्ययस्तु कर्तृव्यापारम्, अतोऽर्थभेदाद्विभेदोऽप्युपपन्न इति । कस्तर्हि कर्ता, को वा प्रयोजक इति तयोर्विविच्य लक्षणं वाच्यम् । यदि साधनानां नियोक्ता कर्ता, ५ स तर्हि कुलाल एव न घट इति उभयत्रापि तद्व्यापाराभिधानादुर्वारं तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अथागुणतो धातुना अभिधीयमान-व्यापारत्वं कर्तृलक्षणमिति घटः कर्ता, कुलालः प्रयोजकः इति तद्व्यापारवाचिनोश्शब्दयोर्न तुल्यार्थत्वप्रसङ्ग इति । कस्तर्हि इदानीं प्रत्ययार्थः ? कर्तृव्यापारस्य धातुनैवाभिहितत्वात् । न च व्यापारभेदे प्रमाणमस्ति, येन प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः विषयविभागः स्यादिति । तदेतदाह—भावयतीत्यादिना विषयविभागः स्यादित्यन्तेन । अत्राक्षरयोजना नातीव दुर्ज्ञाना ।

१. व्यापार इति, किं तर्हीदानीं प्रत्ययार्थः ?

धात्वभिहितत्वात्तद्व्यापारस्य-क. ख.

२. यतो-क, ख, ग, घ.

६. विषय-नास्ति-छ.

३. 'विषय'-नास्ति-ग, घ.

४. आप्नुमयत्रा-छ.

५. तर्हि स-ख.

करणत्वं च शब्दतोऽन्यतो वा धात्वर्थस्योभयत्राप्यविशिष्टमिति दुर्वारं तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अतो न प्रत्ययो भावनावचन इति सूक्तम्—'प्यन्तस्य भवतेरर्थः केनांशेनाभिधीयते' इति^२ ॥

किञ्च-

कर्तृव्यापार^३ इष्टश्चेत् पच्यादावपि भावना ।

धात्वर्थान्तररूपः स्यात्सोऽप्यधश्रयणादिकः ॥ १४ ॥

ननु करणभेदात्कर्तृव्यापारस्य भेदो भविष्यति । तथाहि—भावयतीत्यत्र णिजाच्यस्य कर्तृव्यापारस्य धात्वर्थः (क)रणम् ; भवतीत्यत्राख्यातवाच्यस्य तु धात्वर्थ-व्यतिरिक्तः । अतः करणभेदाद्व्यापारभेद इत्याशङ्क्याह—करणत्वं चेति । अयमर्थः—शब्दतः शब्दस्वभावात् धातोः प्रत्ययार्थकरणे समर्थत्वात्, अन्यतो वस्तुस्वभावाद् धात्वर्थस्यान्योत्पादस्वभावत्वात् धात्वर्थस्य यत्करणत्वं तदुभयत्राविशिष्टम् ; अतो दुर्वारं तुल्यार्थत्वम् । अतः प्रत्ययो न भावनावचन इति सुष्ठुक्तं भट्टपादैः—'प्यन्तस्य भवतेरर्थः केनांशेनाभिधीयते' इति । अस्यायमर्थः—भवतीत्यस्मिन्पदे केनांशेन प्रकृत्यंशेन प्रत्ययांशेन वा प्यन्तस्य भवतेः भावनाशब्दस्यार्थो भावना अभिधीयत इति । एवमकर्मकेषु भवत्यादिष्वारूपातप्रत्ययस्य भावनावचनत्वं निरस्येदानीं सकर्मकेषु पच्यादिष्वपि तन्निरासायाह—किञ्च-

१. वा-नास्ति-ख.

२. इति-नास्ति-क, ग, घ.

३. दृष्टम्-ग, घ, छ.

४. पच्यादौ यदि-ग, घ, छ.

५. व्यतिरिक्तिम्-छ.

६. धात्वर्थस्यान्योत्पादस्वभावत्वात्-नास्ति-ख.

यदि च कर्तृव्यापारो भावना; स च पच्यादिष्वधिश्रयणादिकः, तं पचिरेवोपादत्ते, अन्यथा सिध्यतिविक्लिच्यतिभ्यामविशेषः स्यात् ।

कर्तृव्यापार इष्टश्च (श्चेत्) पच्यादिष्वपि भावना ।

धात्वर्थान्तररूपस्यात्सोऽप्यधिश्रयणादिकः ॥ (इति) ॥

यदि कर्तृव्यापारो भावनेष्यते, स तु निरूप्यमाणः पच्योदावधिश्रयणादिक एव, नान्यः, स च पच्यादेर्धातोरैवार्थ इति न धात्वर्थान्तरः भावनापदार्थः सिध्यतीत्यभिप्रायः । अत्र व्यवहितसंबन्धादिना वैषम्यादक्षरानुलोम्यं प्रदर्श्यते । यदि भावना कर्तृव्यापार इष्टः, स तु पच्यादावधिश्रयणादिक इति व्यवहितेन संबन्धः । भवतु कर्तृव्यापारोऽधिश्रयणादिकः, किमतः? इति चेत्—तत्राह—धात्वर्थान्तररूपः स्यादिति । धातोरैवार्थान्तररूपः स्यात् विक्लितिलक्षणादर्थत्वात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—पचिरेव विक्लितिमात्रातिरेकेण तत्पर्यन्तं अधिश्रयणादिकं कर्तृव्यापारमप्युपादत्ते । ततश्च तदर्थान्तरिकेण कर्तृव्यापारो भावना प्रत्ययार्थो न सिध्यतीत्यर्थः । अथवा—धात्वर्थान्तररूपः स्यात् २ धात्वन्तराणां अधिश्रयत्यादीनां योऽर्थोऽधिश्रयणादिकः कर्तृव्यापारोऽर्थः, स एव स्यात् । पच्यर्थान्तरिकोऽपि धात्वर्थमात्रान्तरातिरिच्यत इत्यर्थः । एतदेव विवृणोति—यदि चेत्त्यादिना । अयमर्थः—कर्तृव्यापारश्चेद्भावना, स तु पच्यादेरधिश्रयणादिकादन्यो नास्ति, अनुपलब्धेः । स एव तर्हि प्रत्ययार्थो भवती (त्वित्)त्याशङ्क्याह—तं पचिरिति । पचिरेव धातुस्तं कर्तृव्यापारं उपादत्ते, न प्रत्ययः । कुत इति चेत्, तत्राह—अन्यथेति । यदि

१. 'च' नास्ति—ख.

२. धात्वर्थान्तराणां—ख.

३. भावनातिरिक्ता—ख.

अथापि नोपाददीत, तथाप्याधिश्रयत्यादिधात्वन्तरार्थः इति नान्यो धात्वर्थोद्भावनापदार्थः । अथ मतं—करोतीत्यन्विता^१भासप्रत्ययविषयतया अनुवृत्तात्मा^२ व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणगोचरेभ्यो

पचिरधिश्रयणादिकः (कं) कर्तृव्यापारं नोपाददीत विक्लितिमात्रमेवाचक्षीत, तथासति सिध्यतिविक्लिप्रतिभ्यामस्य नार्थभेदः स्यात् । स चास्ति ।

इदानीं अधिश्रयणादेः पचत्यनभिधेयत्वमभ्युपगम्य दूषणमाह—अथापीति । पचत्यनभिधेयत्वेऽप्यधिश्रयणादेरधिश्रयत्यादिधात्वन्तराभिधेयत्वाद्धान्त्वर्थमात्रान्न भेदेन भावनापदार्थस्ति । ध्यतीत्यभिप्रायः । इदानीं प्रकारान्तरेण भावनासमर्थनं शङ्कते—अथ मतमित्यादिना । अयमभिप्रायः—पचति पठतीत्यत्र सर्वत्र करोतीत्यनुवृत्ताकारा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, अतः तद्विषयेणानुवृत्ताकारेण भवितव्यम्, पाकगठादयस्तु धात्वर्थो व्यावृत्ताकारया बुद्ध्या गृह्यन्ते । अतस्ते व्यावृत्तस्वभावाः, प्रतीत्यनुरूपत्वात् विषयस्य । ततश्च व्यावृत्तस्वभावेष्वन्यो धात्वर्थेभ्योऽनुवृत्तात्मा करोत्यर्थोऽन्यो भावना सर्वधातुष्वनुवर्तमानस्याख्यातप्रत्ययस्यार्थ इति ।

अत्रैषा अश्रयोजना । करोतीति योऽन्विताभासोऽनुवृत्ताकारः प्रत्ययः, तस्य विषयतया विषयभावेन अनुवृत्तात्मा अनुवृत्तस्वभावः^३ भावनापदार्थः धात्वर्थेभ्योऽन्यो भवितुमर्हतीति संबन्धः । किंविशिष्टेभ्यो धात्वर्थेभ्यः इत्यपेक्षायामुक्तम्—व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणगो-

१. धात्वन्तरार्थात्मक—क, ख.

४. विक्लितिम्या—च.

२. अन्वितावभासस्य प्रत्ययस्य विषय-
तया—ग, घ, ङ.

५. पचत्यभि—च.

३. व्यावृत्तावग्रहणगोचरेभ्यो—ग, घ ;

६. धात्वर्थव्यावृत्ता—ङ.

व्यावृत्ताकारग्रहणगोचरेभ्यः—ङ.

७. स्वरूपो—ङ.

धात्वर्थेभ्योऽन्यो भावनापदार्थ इति—तदसत् । एवं १ हि सामान्यलक्षणानुपातितया धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव २ स्यात्, न पदार्थान्तरं भावनापदार्थः ।

अथ ३ मतं—सत्यं साध्यतया सामान्यम्, न गोत्वादिवत्तद्रूपतया । त-

चरेभ्य इति । हेतुगर्भं विशेषणम् । व्यावृत्ता अवग्रहा ओकारा येषां ग्रहणानां विज्ञानानां तानि व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणानि, तेषां गोचराः विषयाः व्यावृत्तावग्रहग्रहणगोचराः धात्वर्थाः, तत एव तेभ्योऽन्योऽनुवृत्तात्मा करोत्यर्थः इति । एतन्निराकरोति—तदसदिति । यदि व्यावृत्तेषु धात्वर्थेष्वनुवर्तमानतया अन्यत्वं करोत्यर्थस्य, तदा तत्त्वान्तरत्वं न सिध्यति, किन्तु धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव करोत्यर्थस्यासामान्यलक्षणानुपातितया ४ । एतद्धि ५ सामान्यस्य लक्षणम्, यदेकस्यानेकेषु प्रत्येकं कार्त्स्न्येनानुवृत्तिः । अतस्तल्लक्षणानुपातितया धात्वर्थसामान्यान्नान्यो भावनापदार्थसिध्यति । धात्वर्थसामान्यत्वन्वत्साभिरपोष्यत एवेत्यभिप्रायः ।

तत्र शङ्कते—अथ मतमिति । अयमाशयः—करोत्यर्थस्य सकलधात्वर्थानुयायित्वे सत्यपि न तस्य गोत्वादिवत्तद्रूपतया तत्समवायितया तदनुयायिता, किन्तु तत्साध्यतया । तथाहि—धात्वर्थविशेषसाध्याः भावनाविशेषाः, तेषां करणत्वात् । अतः करोत्यर्थस्य धात्वर्थविशेषानुगमः, धात्वर्थविशेषसाध्यत्वात्, न पुनः स्वयं धात्वर्थसमवायि सामान्यमिति । गोत्वादिवदिति वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । कथं पुनरिदमवगम्यते करोत्यर्थो धात्वर्थसाध्यतया

१. हि—नास्ति—ऊ.

२. सामान्यरूपमेव—क, ख ; सामान्यरूप

एव—ग, घ ; सामान्य एव—ऊ.

३. मतं साध्यतया तत्सामान्यं—ख.

४. पातिततया—ख.

५. सामान्यलक्षणं—ख.

६. सामान्यत्व—ख.

स्याः प्रतिपुरुषं १ शीघ्रं करोति, मन्दं करोतीति स्वसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां योगात् । धात्वर्थवर्ति तु करणरूपं २ सामान्यमन्यदेव । उक्तं ३ हि—

तत्रानुवर्तते, न गोत्वादिवत् तत्समवायितया ? इत्याशङ्क्याह—तस्या इति । तस्याः करोत्यर्थात्मिकाया भावनायाः स्वसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां योगात् । स्वशब्देन भावनोच्यते । स्वसामान्यं विशेषश्च स्वसामान्यविशेषौ । करोतीत्येतद्रूपं सामान्यम्, 'शीघ्रं करोति,' 'मन्दं करोति' इति विशेषः, ताभ्यां योगात् संबन्धात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—करोत्यभिधेयं यद्वस्तु, तस्य साध्यस्वभावानुवृत्तव्यावृत्ताकारयोगात् ४ सामान्यविशेषात्मकं वस्त्वन्तरमेतन्न धात्वर्थे सामान्यात्मना अनुप्रवेशमर्हति—इति । अथवा—स्वसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां—इत्यादेरयमर्थः—सामान्यात्मकौ विशेषौ ५ ताभ्यां योगाच्छीघ्रं करोति मन्दं करोतीति । तथाहि—शैघ्र्यमान्धाभ्यां साध्यस्वभावाभ्यां विशेषणाभ्यां विशेषितौ साध्यस्वभावौ करोत्यर्थस्यावान्तरसामान्यरूपौ गम्येते । अतः ताभ्यां योगादेकार्थसमवायान्न करोत्यर्थो धात्वर्थसामान्यमात्रम्, किन्तु साध्यस्वभावं तत्त्वान्तरम् इति ।

ननु धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव साध्यस्वभावमस्त्वित्याशङ्क्याह—धात्वर्थवर्तीति । धात्वर्थसमवायि यत् सामान्यं तत्सिद्धस्वभावम्, करणरूपत्वादिति । उक्तञ्चैतदभियुक्तै-
द्वित्याह—उक्तं हीति ।

१. पुरुषं—नास्ति—ख.

२. करणसामान्य—क, ग, घ.

५. विशेषात्मकौ सामान्यविशेषौ ताभ्यां—ख.

३. उक्तं च—ग, घ, ऊ.

४. कारायोगात्—ख.

‘अन्यदेव हि १धात्वर्थसामान्यं२ करणात्मकम् ।
अन्यच्च भावना नाम साध्यत्वेन व्यवस्थितम् ॥’ इति३ ॥
तदेतदपेशलम् । तथाहि—

न क्रियाकरणाकारे द्वे ज्ञाने अनुयायिनी ।
यतः प्रतीमः सामान्ये द्वे साध्यसमवायिनी ॥ १५ ॥

एवं परमतमाशङ्क्य तन्निराकरणायाह—तदेतदपेशलम् । तथाहि—

न क्रियाकरणाकारे द्वे ज्ञाने अनुयायिनी ।
यतः प्रतीमः सामान्ये द्वे साध्यसमवायिनी ॥ (इति) ॥

यदि क्रियासामान्याकारं करणसामान्याकारं च ज्ञानद्वयं प्रतीयेत, तदा धात्वर्थसामान्यविशेषातिरेकेणान्यः ४ करोत्यर्थः सामान्यविशेषात्मा सिध्यति । न चेह सामान्यद्वयप्रतीतिरस्ति, येन धात्वर्थसाध्यक्रियाव्यक्तिसमवाय्येकं साध्यं सामान्यम्, अन्यच्च धात्वर्थसमवायि सिद्धरूपं [न?] प्रतीम इति श्लोकस्य तात्पर्यार्थः ।

अत्रैषा अक्षरयोजना । न क्रियाकरणाकारे क्रियाकारं करणाकारं च द्वे ज्ञाने अनुयायिनी अनुवर्तमाने व्यावर्तमानेषु विशेषेषु न स्तः, यतो ज्ञानद्वयादनुवृत्ता-काराद्दे सामान्ये प्रतीमः । साध्यसमवायिनी साध्यं, समवायि च धात्वर्थेन, साध्यम् करोत्यर्थसामान्यं धात्वर्थसमवायि चान्यदिति । एतदेव विवृणोति—न(हि) करणमिति । पञ्चत्यादिषु कारकव्यतिरेकेण तत्साध्यक्रियाव्यतिरेकेण च करणं करण-

१. यागादि—ऊ.

२. सामान्यकरणा—ग, घ.

३. ‘इति’ नास्ति—क, ग, घ, ङ.

४. करोत्यर्थसामान्य—ख.

नहि करणं करणमिति १ क्रियाकारकव्यतिरिक्तेऽर्थे पञ्च्यादिषु प्रत्ययः, यतः क्रियारूपव्यतिरिक्तं करणात्मकं धात्वर्थसामान्यं४ कल्प्येत । शीघ्रमन्दादिषु५ तु धात्वर्थसामान्यस्यैव करोति-वाच्यस्यावान्तरसामान्यभेदः शोणकर्कादिरिवांशवत्वस्य६ ।

मिति अनुवृत्ताकारः८ प्रत्ययो नास्ति, काष्ठादिष्वेव एवंप्रकारः प्रत्ययः । अतः क्रिया-रूपातिरिक्ते करणात्मके धात्वर्थसामान्ये प्रमाणं नास्ति । अतः क्रियारूपमेव धात्वर्थ-सामान्यं न करणरूपम् ।

यदुक्तं ‘शीघ्रं करोति’ ‘मन्दं करोति’ इति सामान्यविशेषान्तरयोग इति, तत्राह—शीघ्रमन्दादिष्विति । ‘शीघ्रं करोति’, ‘मन्दं करोति’ इति तु धात्वर्थ-सामान्यस्यैव करोतिवाच्यस्यावान्तरसामान्यभेदः प्रतीयते शोणकर्कादिरिवांश(त्व)स्य । नहि तत्रांश(त्व)सामान्यानाक्रान्तव्यत्यन्तरसमवायि सामान्यान्तरं शोणत्वादिरूपं उपेयते, प्रतीयते वा । किन्तु अश्वत्वसामान्याधारभूतास्वेव कासुचिद्यत्किषु व्यत्यन्तरपरिहारेण वर्तमानम-वान्तरसामान्यमेव ।९ एवमत्रापि शीघ्रमन्दादिषु करोत्यर्थस्य धात्वर्थसामान्यस्यावान्तर-सामान्यभेद इति । यथा च धात्वर्थातिरिक्तस्तत्करणको व्यापारो नास्ति, तथा पूर्वमेवोक्तमित्याह—उक्तं चेति(च—)न हीत्यादिना ।

१. इति पञ्च्यादिषु क्रिया—क, ख.

२. व्यतिरेकोऽन्वेति पञ्च्यादिषु—क; व्यति-
रिक्तोऽन्वेति—ख.

३. ‘रूप’—नास्ति—क, ख.

४. सामान्यमन्यद्—क, ख.

५. मन्दादिषु—क; मन्दादिषु—ग, घ, ङ.

६. ‘सामान्य’ नास्ति क, ख.

७. अश्वस्य—क, ख.

८. कारप्रत्ययो—ख.

९. मेव तत्रापि—ख.

उक्तं च—

‘न हि धात्वर्थकरणः फलभेदप्रभावनः ।
धात्वर्थं फलभेदं च व्यापारो दृश्यतेऽन्तराः ॥’ (इति) ॥
वाच्यो लक्षणभेदश्च ननु धात्वर्थभावयोः^१ ।
भावः परिस्पन्द इति यजत्यादावसम्भवः ॥ १६ ॥

एवं धात्वर्थसामान्यविशेषपरिहारेण भावनाख्योऽन्यः पदार्थो न, अस्य शब्दार्थत्वं दूरापेतमिति प्रतिपादितमतीतानन्तरग्रन्थेन । इदानीं पुनरपि धात्वर्थभावन-योर्भेदासंभवं तयोर्लक्षणभेदासंभवेन प्रतिपादयितुमाह—

वाच्यो लक्षणभेदश्च ननु धात्वर्थभावयोः । भावः परिस्पन्द इति यजत्यादाव-संभवः ॥ (इति) ॥

धात्वर्थभावयोर्भेदं वदता भेदेन लक्षणं वाच्यम्, संसृग्धस्य हि वस्तुनो लक्षणानुग्रहाद्भेदाधारणमिति । यदि तावत्परिस्पन्दात्मा व्यापारो भावः, अस्पन्दात्मको धात्वर्थः, इति तयोर्लक्षणभेद आश्रीयते, तदा यजत्यादावाख्यातार्थस्य परिस्पन्दरूप-त्वाभावाद्भावनात्वाभावप्रसङ्गः इति श्लोकस्यार्थः ।

अस्यार्थस्य स्पष्टीकरणायाह—अवश्यमिति । लक्षणभेदं शङ्कते—अस्पन्दात्मा धात्वर्थ इति । एतन्निराकरोति—अस्पन्दमानकर्तृकेष्विति । यजते, जानाति, इत्यादिष्वख्यातार्थेषु, भावना(त्वा)भावः प्रसज्येत, तेषां परिस्पन्दरूपत्वाभावात् । तत्रैव

१. अन्तरे—क, ख.

२. तत्र—ग, घ, ङ.

३. भेदयोः—क, ख.

४. वाक्यार्थभावयोर्भेदः वदता भेदलक्षणं वाच्यम्, संसृग्धस्य—ख.

अवश्यं च भावधात्वर्थभेदवादिना तयोः स्पष्टो रूपभेदो^२ दर्शयितव्यः । अस्पन्दात्मा धात्वर्थः, स्पन्दात्मको भाव इति चेत्,
अस्पन्दमानकर्तृकेषु ‘यजते’ ‘जानाति’^३ इत्याख्यातार्थेषु तदभावप्रसङ्गः । गच्छत्यादौ च धात्वर्थस्य भावनात्वप्रसङ्गः ।
चेतनव्यापारस्तु पुरस्तात्प्रत्युक्तः ।

दूषणान्तरमाह—गच्छत्यादौ चेति । गच्छति पठतीत्यादौ धात्वर्थस्य परिस्पन्दरूपत्वात् भावनात्वं प्रसज्येत । ननु तत्रापि धात्वर्थस्य स्पन्दरूपता नास्ति, स तु संयोग-विभागमात्ररूपः, परिस्पन्दस्तु तद्धेतुभूतोऽन्य[त] एव, यत्र ‘चलति’ इति प्रत्ययः । तत्र कथं धात्वर्थस्य गच्छत्यादौ स्पन्दरूपतेति ? अत्रोच्यते—चलतीति प्रत्ययस्य संयोगविभाग-मात्रमालम्बनम् नार्थान्तरम्, प्रमाणाभावादिति वक्ष्यमाणनीत्या अङ्गीकृत्योत्तरमित्यनव-द्यम् । एवं स्पन्दात्मकत्वस्य भावनालक्षणस्यात्मकर्तृकेषु सत्यामपि तस्यामभावात्, गच्छत्यादौ च धात्वर्थेऽभावनात्मन्यपि भावात्, अव्याप्तिः अतिव्याप्तिश्चोक्ता । इदानी-मेतद्दोषपरिहाराय प्रयत्नश्चेतनव्यापारो भावना अस्त्वित्याशङ्क्याह—चेतनव्यापार इति ।

परिस्पन्दमभ्युपेत्य तस्य भावनात्वे दूषणमुक्तम्; इदानीं तदेव निरूपणीयमित्याह—कश्चैष

१. भावना—ग, घ.

२. भेदः प्रदर्श—क, ख.

३. एवं अस्य ग, घ, ङ.

४. मानात्मकर्तृ—क, ख.

५. इत्याख्यातेषु—क, ख.

६. गच्छतीत्यादिषु च—क, ख.

७. भावना अर्थः—ख.

८. तत्रापि च स्पन्दरूपता अस्ति—ख.

९. चलतिरप्रत्ययः—ख.

कश्चैष परिस्पन्दः ? न खल्वयमाश्रयाभिमतान्नेदेन गम्यते ।

कथं न गम्यते ? यदा सत्यप्याश्रये प्रत्यक्षे कदाचिच्चलतीति
प्रत्ययप्रादुर्भावः, २(अतः) तदतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनः ।

इति। क इति क्षेपाभिप्रायेण। ननुप्रसिद्धोऽयं परिस्पन्दः, यत्रायं चलतीति प्रत्ययः । तत्र कथमस्या-
क्षेप इत्याशङ्क्याह—न खल्विति । परिस्पन्दाश्रयत्वाभिमतो यो देवदत्तादिः, तस्मान्नेदेनायं
परिस्पन्दो न गम्यते । देवदत्तादिरेव हि चलतीति प्रतीयते, नार्थान्तरम् । अर्थान्तरत्वे
तदप्रतीतावपि प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गमिति । तत्र चोदयति—कथं न गम्यत इति । आश्रया-
देन परिस्पन्दः कथं न ४ गम्यते, गम्यत एवेत्यर्थः । तत्र हेतुमाह—यदेति । आश्रये
देवदत्तादौ प्रत्यक्षे सत्यपि कदाचिदेव चलतीतिप्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवति न सर्वदा । यथा-
श्रयमात्रालम्बनोऽयं स्यात्, प्रत्यक्षे तस्मिन्सर्वदा प्रादुर्भवेत् । न च प्रादुर्भवति ।
अतस्तदतिरिक्तार्थालम्बन इति । अनेन परिस्पन्दसद्भावेऽनुमानमुक्तम् । अत्रैवं प्रयोगः—
फ(च) चलतीतिप्रत्ययो धर्मित्वेनोपादीयते । देवदत्तादाश्रया(द)तिरिक्तमर्थान्तरमवलम्बते इति
साध्यो धर्मः । तस्मिन्सत्यपि प्रत्यक्षे कदाचिदेवोत्पद्यमानत्वात्—यथा दण्डदेवदत्तयोः प्रत्यक्ष-
योरपि कदाचिदेवोत्पद्यमानो दण्डीति प्रत्ययः तदतिरिक्तविशिष्टालम्बनः, तद्वदिति ।
अर्थापत्तिर्वा अनेनोपन्यस्ता । आश्रयप्रत्यक्षे सत्यपि कदाचिदेव ६ प्रादुर्भवन् चलतीति
प्रत्ययोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते, यथाश्रयव्यतिरिक्तमालम्बनं न स्यादिति ।

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| १. प्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवन्—ग, घ, ङ. | ४. गम्यत इति—ख. |
| २. 'अतः' नास्ति—क, ख, ग, घ, ङ. | ५. म्वनो यत्—ख. |
| ३. रिक्तमर्थमालम्बते—क, ख, ग, ङ. | ६. प्रादुर्भावः—ख. |
| ७. मन्यालम्ब—ख. | |

Reviews

Nyāya-kulīśa or 'The Lightning-shaft of Reason' by Ātreya Rāmānuja.
Edited with Introduction and Notes by R. Ramanujachari, M.A.,
and Pandit K. Srinivasacharya, Siromani (Annamalai University),
1938. Pp. xxxiv+40+212. Price.

This is a standard work on the Viśiṣṭādvaita; and, although fairly well known, it had not so far been published. We owe a debt of deep gratitude to the editors for bringing out so beautiful and reliable an edition of it, and to the authorities of the Annamalai University for giving them the necessary assistance to do so. The author of the work, Ātreya Rāmānuja, was the maternal uncle and spiritual *guru* of the renowned scholar and outstanding exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine, Vedānta Deśika. It also seems that three members of his family viz. his great-grand-father, grand-father and father followed Bhagavān Rāmānuja in the line of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas.

The work is divided into 13 sections of varying length, each dealing with a definite problem of philosophy; and the aim, in each case, is to establish the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita after confuting the views of the schools that differ from it. Of the topics discussed here, three relate to the theory of knowledge and two to the correct mode of interpreting scriptural statements. Of the remaining eight topics, seven are concerned with what may broadly be described as ontology and one, the last, with the conception of ultimate value in Viśiṣṭādvaita. The treatise throughout shows the great mastery of the author over not only the doctrine he is expounding but also the whole realm of Indian thought, excepting only the non-Vedic schools of Jainism and Buddhism. But it is, as its name indicates, highly controversial and the discussions are often technical. It is written in prose interspersed with *kārikās*; but one section, whose purpose is to negate negation (*bhāvāntarābhāvavāda*), is wholly in verse. Though several Mss. have been consulted in preparing the edition, there remain many lacunae in the text. Usually it is single words or phrases that are missing, but there are also places where whole sentences, sometimes as many as half-a-dozen in succession, are lacking. The editors have taken great pains to fill them up wherever possible; and their suggestions, so far as we have been able to judge, indicate discriminating scholarship.

There are two Introductions prefixed to the volume—one in English and the other in Sanskrit. The subject-matter of both is the same; but they are intended for different classes of readers. This plan requires a

word of appreciation, for it shows that the editors have not forgotten, as modern editors are too apt to do, the non-English-knowing Pandits, who form the majority among the readers of books like the one under review. The most important part of the Introduction, from the standpoint of those who are new to the book, is the summary of the arguments in the various sections. It has been very carefully prepared, and is sure to serve as an excellent aid to the study of the work. There are also numerous footnotes. They are, for the most part, explanatory; but they also occasionally refer to textual problems and indicate the sources from which the quotations in the work are drawn.

The book is described on the title-page as the first volume in a 'Philosophical Series' projected by the University. It is a high standard of editorial competence that is set here; and, if the same standard is kept up in the case of the subsequent volumes, there will be every reason to feel gratified with them. We cordially recommend the publication to all scholars that are interested in the study of Indian philosophy. The book is fully indexed.

M. HIRIYANNA.

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